A Politics of Regulation: Haussmann’s Planning Practice and Badiou's Philosophy

Antoine Michel Paccoud

DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 103,470 words (including 6,232 words of footnotes, essentially the original French versions of material quoted within the text).
ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with empirically determining whether a particular political sequence can be interpreted through Badiou’s philosophy. It focuses on the public works that transformed Paris in the middle of the 19th century, and more specifically on Haussmann’s planning practice. From an epistolary exchange between property owners, Haussmann and the Minister of the Interior during Haussmann’s first years as Prefect of the Seine, the thesis draws out a political event: the playing out in a singular context of an opposition over a political practice predicated on equality. In this case, the opposition is in the field of planning as regulation: the sanctity of property rights against a planner’s efforts to break the complacency of the planning apparatus towards property owners. The thesis argues that Haussmann was a Saint-Simonian state revolutionary that sought to make property owners contribute to the public works in equal relation to the benefits they extracted from them. In the face of sustained opposition, this planning practice was ultimately sacrificed by the imperial regime. Haussmann’s first years as Prefect are shown to have taken place in the temporality of Badiou’s events, while the commonly invoked process of Haussmannisation best describes the situation that followed the demise of Haussmann’s planning practice. Badiou’s notion of the state revolutionary gives us a way to think through the difficulty and evanescence of regulation. It can help us understand those fleeting moments when political will was used to break hierarchies of power and capital. Badiou’s philosophy is shown to be compatible with a social science that is concerned with isolating and singularising particular political sequences, of which early Haussmann is one.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am lucky to have received such generous support in the drafting of this thesis. I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Murray Low, for his invaluable feedback on my work and for his patience and encouragements over the years. I am also indebted to my review supervisors Prof. Andy Pratt and Dr. Asher Ghertner for their time and comments. I am grateful to Prof. Dennis Rodgers and Dr. Gareth Jones for having supported me in my application to the PhD programme and would also like to thank my examiners Prof. Erik Swyngedouw and Prof. Matthew Gandy for their very helpful comments and a stimulating discussion. I owe much to all who took the time to listen to my presentations or to read parts of my thesis: Prof. Andy Thornley, Dr. Nancy Holman, Dr. Alan Mace, Prof. Richard Sennett, Dr. Fran Tonkiss, Prof. Vic Seidler, NYLON members in London and New York, and my colleagues Jayaraj Sundaresan, Adam Kaasa and Dr. Sabina Uffer. And nothing would have been possible without the support of my family, my parents, Arlette Conzemius and Thierry Paccoud, and especially my wife, Ivana Spirovksa Paccoud.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. 7

AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT ......................................................................................... 7

THE SPECIFICITY OF BADIOU’S PHILOSOPHY ......................................................................................... 9

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS .............................................................................................................. 16

CHAPTER 1: HAUSSMANN IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES ........................................................................ 21

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 21

AN OVERVIEW OF SCHOLARLY WORK ON HAUSSMANN .................................................................. 21

BETWEEN UNFLINCHING SUPPORT AND LEGISLATIVE DEFEATS .................................................. 33

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 47

CHAPTER 2: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF AGENCY AND OPPOSITION ........................................ 49

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 49

FROM EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS TO THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS ..................................................... 50

FROM THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS TO AN IDEA OF A SUITABLE FRAMEWORK ................................ 62

BADIOU’S FRAMEWORK: THE SEQUENCE OF THE EVENT .................................................................. 70

SUBJECTIVE FORMALISMS ......................................................................................................................... 72

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 77

CHAPTER 3: BADIOU AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ............................................................................. 80

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 80

BADIOU: AN EVENT WITHIN THE TRANSFORMATION OF PARIS? ......................................................... 81

FROM EVENT TO ARCHIVE ....................................................................................................................... 89

FROM ARCHIVES TO ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................. 100

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 109

CHAPTER 4: FROM ARCHITECT TO PLANNER: PRESENTING THE HAUSSMANN EVENT ..................... 111

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 111

THE WORLD OF THE HAUSSMANN EVENT .............................................................................................. 112

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PLANNING BEFORE HAUSSMANN ........................................................ 116
INTRODUCTION

Much of the Paris we know today – the wide, tree lined and monumental boulevards bordered by lines of uniform facades and the perspectives they create – can be traced to the work of Baron Haussmann and Emperor Napoleon III during the Second Empire (1853-1870). The city’s transformation was profound, ranging from the most monumental (the boulevards, the architecture, and the perspectives) to the most mundane of planning activities (such as street levelling and widening, sewer construction, enforcing building standards). It deeply affected the lives of the almost 2 million inhabitants in the wider urban region, who saw their properties expropriated and destroyed, their leases revoked, their livelihoods endangered and their communities uprooted by massive public works. The Parisian public discovered how the limits between the public and the private could be redrawn by an activist and rigorous municipal administration and the impact this could have on their understandings of the urban environment. Property owners had both much to gain and much to lose from the public works: they meant sharply increasing property values and speculative opportunities but also construction freezes and expropriations. In this rapidly changing environment, the planning apparatus and its regulatory power were also being redefined.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

Haussmann, the Prefect of the Seine who is best known for the programme of public works he conducted in Paris in the second half of the nineteenth century, was fundamentally a planner who sought to regulate private activity over the urban form. The aim of this thesis is to provide the theoretical framework and the evidence to support this claim which runs counter to the vast majority of the literature on the transformation of Paris. But this thesis is also an attempt at introducing into the social sciences the concepts in Alain Badiou’s philosophy. This contemporary thinker has been defending a philosophical project that puts at its centre short-lived sequences in which structural considerations are bracketed out and a particular type of agent resurrects, through its actions, a universal principle that had previously become a dead letter. This thesis will argue that his concepts can be invoked to investigate these intense sequences, of which Haussmann’s transformation of Paris is one. It will then propose a method to find these concepts within empirical material and exploit the material through them to contribute a different, yet complementary, perspective on the public works.

This thesis, like all theses, thus has three components: a theory, a method and empirical material. What makes this thesis particular is that in turning to philosophy for a theoretical framework, a
distance is created between the level of theory and the level of empirical research. It then becomes difficult to join these different components of the thesis together. The decision I have taken here is to reduce this distance by extracting the method of analysis from the philosophical project itself: the method through which the empirical material is analysed has been developed to allow Badiou’s concepts to be invoked in the analysis. A further complication that emerged was that this framework could only be legitimately utilised for a limited set of empirical material: this material had to be located within one of these short lived sequences Badiou calls events. All three components of this thesis can thus be traced back to the initial decision to make Badiou’s philosophy contribute to the advancement of social scientific theorisation. This decision has meant that each part of the thesis is dependent on the other: the material collected must be within an event; what constitutes an event is defined through the theoretical framework; and the method developed to allow the theoretical framework to say something about the material collected from within an event is derived from the wider philosophical project.

It is probably true that this thesis would have been easier to write if the case study had been more immediately relevant to the nature of Badiou’s philosophy. Haussmann’s transformation of Paris does not seem to correspond to Badiou’s insistence that any political event has the affirmation of the maxim of equality at its core. Quite the contrary, it would seem, if the impressive scholarship on his seventeen year tenure as prefect of the Seine is anything to go by. This choice of a case study can be traced back to an initial intuition that the philosophical text I was reading in 2006, Badiou’s *Logics of Worlds*, was in some sense connected to the historical sequence that occurred more than a century and a half ago in Paris. The distance covered since the MA thesis of that same year on the relation between Badiou and Haussmann is vast. From a simple application of his concepts through the analysis of secondary literature, I have since been confronted to the tasks of justifying this relation, both theoretically and empirically, and of reconciling these seemingly opposed characters in a way that productively contributed to an already vast literature. In any case, I can only say that the contradiction between a philosophical project predicated on equality and an urban transformation that has been accused of exacerbating social segregation only made me look for things that previous studies had ignored. One such thing is Badiou’s concept of the state

---

1 This thesis is the product of a sustained an in-depth engagement with this book, Badiou’s sequel to his 1988 *Being and Event* and his 1982 *Theory of the Subject*. It is a long and complex work on which Badiou worked for over 15 years: it presents his most recent reworking of his larger conceptual system. In addition to these three books, Badiou has published a series of commentaries on current events, discussions with other theorists and investigations into the lives and ideas of political and artistic figures. My work on this book (and others by Badiou) was done entirely on the French versions. Where official English translations exist, I will provide these translations in the text and insert the original French versions in a footnote.
revolutionary or the possibility of a political event that takes place from within the state apparatus. This is a new concept in Badiou’s philosophy and one that this thesis will attempt to isolate empirically.

The facet of the public works that has received scant attention, and which is the central object of this thesis, is Haussmann’s planning practice. By this term, I am referring to the decisions taken by Haussmann in his carrying out of the planning interventions afforded to him by the legislative framework of the time. This thesis sets out to identify how Haussmann’s planning practice broke with the way in which his predecessors had made use of planning regulations; what political principles were carried within this planning practice; and how the reactions this planning practice garnered ultimately led to its demise. This parallels the sequence that binds Badiou’s three central concepts. We must first argue that Haussmann’s planning practice can be conceptualised as a political event in Parisian planning. This means answering two related questions: was Haussmann’s planning practice fundamentally different from that of his predecessors? And, does this planning practice carry within it the affirmation of equality? In a second stage, we must uncover the universal political idea that his planning practice constructed in the world of Parisian planning – what Badiou calls the truth of an event. This is equivalent to the following question: what was the political principle that motivated Haussmann’s planning practice? These three questions will form the basis of the empirical chapters. In the conclusion, we will able to answer two more: what consequences did Haussmann’s planning practice have on the world of Parisian planning? And, is a social scientific investigation based on Badiou’s concepts fruitful?

**THE SPECIFICITY OF BADIOU’S PHILOSOPHY**

While the thesis will be a demonstration of the specificity of Badiou’s philosophy, this section will serve to distinguish between the assumptions that will underlay the theoretical framework developed in this thesis on the basis of his philosophy from that of other scholars in the field. This will allow us, from the outset, to provide an overview of the approach that will be taken in this thesis. In its broad strokes, this approach has two major assumptions. The first is that change needs to be investigated in its own right, not as a stage in the progressive development of the world. The second is that agents and the principles that guide their actions are responsible for change, not impersonal processes.
BREAKS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHOLE

Badiou’s philosophy is predicated on the existence of short-lived episodes in which the forces that structure actions can be bracketed out. These events are breaks that come to interrupt the world in which they occur. To present the type of investigation that this basic assumption precludes, it is worth introducing two scholars who have sought to conjoin spatial and social considerations in their theoretical frameworks. Nowhere is this connection more explicit than in the work which has sought to relate Haussmann’s public works in Paris over the 1853 to 1870 period to the Commune uprising of March 1871 that shook the same city a little over a year later. The close succession of these two salient historical events in Paris has led to a long running debate in geography and beyond as to possible ways in which these two sequences may be linked. The importance of this link between spatial and social considerations for our purposes is that a framework that seeks to include too much within its remits runs the risk of viewing the world as the progressive development of a totality.

In this section, we are mainly interested in Harvey’s theoretical framework but it is worth starting out with Lefebvre, the first to interpret the Commune as a “popular reply to Haussmann’s strategy [...] the workers, driven towards peripheral neighbourhoods and municipalities reclaimed the space from which Bonapartism and the ruling class had excluded them” (Lefebvre 2000a: 168). For Lefebvre, Haussmann’s programme led to significant reductions in the visual-spatial realm, both in terms of history of the ‘natural’ urban landscape: “it has been noted time and again that Haussmann shattered the historical space of Paris in order to impose a space that was strategic - and hence planned and demarcated according to the viewpoint of strategy. The critics have perhaps paid insufficient attention, however, to the quality of the space Haussmann thus mortally wounded, a space characterized by the high and rare qualitative complexity afforded by its double network of streets and passageways” (Lefebvre 1991: 312). Haussmann’s transformation of Paris was thus an attempt to impose the rationality of the visual over an urban space, to make it conform to the abstract space sought by the state. But this shattered the complexity of the urban fabric at Paris’ core and destined it to a more limited range of social classes. This was a contributing factor to the Paris Commune: “In 1870 Paris is the weak point of the Bonapartist Empire. At the beginning of 1871 the capital is the weak point of France. Due to industrialization and the growth of the proletariat, on

---

ii Translation mine, here is the original: «Ce fut une réplique populaire à la stratégie de Haussmann. Les ouvriers, chassés vers les quartiers et communes périphériques se réapproprièrent l’espace dont le bonapartisme et la stratégie des dirigeants les avaient exclus.»

iii «Il a été dit et rédit comment Haussmann a brisé l’espace historique de Paris au profit d’un espace stratégique, donc prévu et découpé comme tel; les critiques n’ont peut-être pas assez insisté sur la qualité de l’espace ainsi blessé à mort ; il comportait le double réseau des passages et des rues, haute et rare complexité qualitative» (Lefebvre 2000b: 360)
account of political activity, the opposition to Badinguet. Because of the war, the defeat, the proclamation of the Republic, the siege, the armistice. Certainly. But also because of the social segregation performed by Haussmann, the relocation of workers to peripheral neighborhoods, the gentrification [l' embourgeoisement] and ensuing deterioration in the city center” (Lefebvre 2009: 144-145). There is thus a direct line of causality that is established between the public works and the Commune, one that depends on spatial changes to explain political change, one which affords as much weight to national developments (be they economic or political) than to the social consequences of the spatial changes in the urban fabric.

This line of argument has been adopted and refined by a number of scholars. Harvey is undoubtedly the one who has taken Lefebvre’s argument most seriously, and who has upheld the importance of spatial processes in explaining the 1871 uprising: “The Commune was indeed a different kind of event from 1848, and in part it was so because of the radical reorganization of the living spaces that haussmannization accomplished along with the equally radical transformations in labor processes, in the organization of capital accumulation, and in the deployment of state powers” (Harvey 2006a: 239). We see that changes in the spatial organisation of the city are invoked to provide a complete theorisation of a political event. The question then becomes one of describing the theoretical framework that allows both social and spatial processes to be used to provide such a picture. Here Harvey gives us two different answers. In his Limits to Capital, he tells us that the Marxist concepts (surplus value, capital as process, labour power) constituted through historical experience can be put to use to explain phenomena that are both temporal and geographical, such as “why technological and organizational change and geographical reorganizations within the spatial division of labour are socially necessary to the survival of capitalism” (Harvey 2006b: 450). But he is clear here that this method “cannot, by this means, hope to explain everything there is, nor even procure a full understanding of singular events. These are not the tasks which theory should address” (Harvey 2006b: 450).

This must be contrasted to his later theoretical work which he puts to use in his Paris, Capital of Modernity. Here, the objective is precisely to ‘procure a full understanding of a singular event’, or in the formulation used here, to grasp the ‘totality of interrelations’: “How is the story of this massive transformation of Second Empire Paris to be told? [...] I shall take a middle course and try to understand the historicogeographical transformation of Paris during the Second Empire in terms of a series of intersecting and interlocking themes, none of which can properly be understood without the others. The problem is to present the interrelations without lapsing into tedious repetitions. I must
here put a burden upon the reader, to try to keep the themes in perspective as part of a totality of interrelations that constitutes the driving force of social transformation in a given place and time” (Harvey 2006a: 97-98). This book relies on the framework he laid out in his Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, one that is concerned with integrating spatial processes into the analysis of social and economic transformations: “The insertion of spatial considerations into most forms of social theorizing (dialectical and nondialectical) often turns out to be profoundly disruptive of how the theory can be specified and put to work. [...] it has never been my intention to use such a conceptual apparatus to attack meta-theory per se. My concern is, rather, with trying to rebuild Marxian meta-theory in such a way as to incorporate an understanding of spatio-temporality (and socio-ecological issues) in its frame” (Harvey 1996: 9).

In contrast to the model laid out in his Limits to Capital, in which historically validated Marxist concepts are used to provide an explanation of processes that have both temporal and spatial components, the model used to explain the transformation of Paris is one that is designed to subsume these temporal and spatial components under one theoretical roof. This is how Harvey can claim to identify the total interrelation of elements that explain particular social transformations. What has changed since the Limits to Capital is that the concept of the totality is one that is now seen to be within the reach of his theoretical model. In doing so, he is moving closer to the ontological assumptions of a philosopher such as Deleuze, for whom the world is composed of multiplicities, arranged in myriad layers and dimensions where the totality is an open whole that perpetually creates the new by the constant arrangement and re-arrangement of the multiplicities that compose it. In the same way as Harvey establishes the historicogeographical transformation of Paris during the Second Empire through the ‘totality of interrelations that constitutes the driving force of social transformation’ (Harvey 2006a: 97-98), for Deleuze, “qualitative change, and thus the emergence of the new, occurs in and through the whole, rather than in any term or instant in which it is composed” (Gillespie 2008: 6). It is in this sense that for Deleuze the event is related to becoming – any change that occurs must be part of the becoming of the whole, the general evolution of the whole that is constantly self-differentiating. Seeing events as part of the becoming of the whole forces the view that all events are in some way or another connected to each other. Can this not be said to apply to Harvey’s “general theory of dialectical and historical geographical materialism” (Harvey 1996: 10), with all events caught within that theory contributing to the development and ultimate demise of capitalism?
As discussed in the opening paragraph of this section, Badiou views events as those moments in which structural forces are bracketed out by the actions of subjects. It is thus inconceivable for Badiou that an event is merely the link in the chain of the continuous becoming of the whole. Such a statement is impossible for him because the concept of the whole is meaningless in his philosophy: there are only multiples and the short-lived appearance of eternally recurring principles. Any investigation based on Badiou’s concepts must thus refuse the assumption that a historical sequence of change must be inscribed within a process of development. In contrast, we must posit that sequences defined by change play out eternally recurring oppositions around a set of political principles. The aim of an investigation of this type is to find within an episode of change the universal idea that is being put forth and the effect it had on that world.

EVENTS, PROCESSES, AGENCY

The corollary to the discussion above concerning the impossibility of inscribing events within a process of development is that every event is a singularity. They are moments during which structural considerations can be bracketed out by agents, but this happens in a way that accommodates both the structures that needs to be pushed aside and the practices of the agents bringing about the change. While the concepts that capture the dynamics of an event and the universal principles that can be invoked are fixed, the events that actually occur are all singularities. They are the way in which an opposition around one of these universal principles plays out in a particular place and time. What this means is that findings from one event are not immediately translatable to another: the same concepts may be instantiated, and the unfolding of the event may follow the same sequence, but the events themselves, the way in which structural considerations were trivialised and the actions taken to do so, cannot be invoked across contexts.

This has an important consequence for the study of Haussmann’s public works. Indeed, most of what is known about this historical sequence comes from its comparative use, under the umbrella term of haussmannisation. The public works that took place over a period of seventeen years over the whole of the Parisian metropolitan region are condensed into a single process that is then invoked to understand a sequence of change in other urban contexts. The assumption at the heart of this practice is that a sequence of change can be generalised, that it can be summarised as the unfolding of an abstract process that can take place in any other urban context. This is an assumption that is at the very heart of the study of urban change. An interesting intellectual exercise was undertaken by Lang and Taylor in a commentary piece in *Environment and Planning A* in 2004. They dressed a non-comprehensive inventory of the numerous ways in which new metropolitan forms and new intercity
relations have been named in the field of urban studies in the last decades and found fifty for each. In other words, more than a hundred new terms have sprung up in the last couple of decades to capture recent urban changes. They conclude as follows: “A degree of conceptual disintegration is to be expected, but this invention of concept after concept is hardly conducive to credible understanding of what is going on in and between our cities” (Taylor & Lang 2004: 955).

Each one of these hundred new terms was constructed on the basis of the experience of particular urban contexts and the changes they went through. The process constructed in that way then becomes a tool at the disposal of the researcher when confronted with a different episode of change. The existence of this pool of processes at the researcher’s disposal is undoubtedly convenient. It is only when the sheer number of these new terms is highlighted that the assumption that the same types of changes are occurring everywhere can begin to be questioned. Why do we need over a hundred new terms if all places are structured by the same processes of change?

An answer can be found by coming back to haussmannisation. This is a process that has as many different meanings as there are scholars employing it. If one looks at the issues mentioned above about the potential failings of processes as analytical categories from the perspective of the researcher, it becomes possible to see how a term such as haussmannisation can become useful. Could it not be a way for the researcher to attach a name to the sense of the event under investigation? Deleuze’s concept of sense does seem fitting here: “sense, the expressed of a proposition, is an incorporeal, complex and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition” (Deleuze 1990: 19). A process such as haussmannisation comes to represent something different to each scholar precisely because each uses it to express the sense the public works elicits in them. There is thus not one process of haussmannisation, but as many as there are scholars invoking it. But why would the case of haussmannisation be any different from the hundred concepts collected by Taylor and Lang?

Processes thus seem to be able to fall prey to the comparison of local experiences that are not comparable.

But a second issue with the use of processes in urban studies has been raised by Markusen (2003). She highlights the way in which urban studies is too dependent on the notion of the process to

---

iv «Le sens est la quatrième dimension de la proposition. Les stoïciens l’ont découverte avec l’événement: le sens, c’est l’exprimé de la proposition, cet incorporel à la surface des choses, entité complexe irréductible, événement pur qui insiste ou subsiste dans la proposition» (Deleuze 1969: 30).
explain change. For her, a study solely focused on processes “entails a shift from the study of actors, bureaus and social groups, the structures within which they operate, their actions and outcomes, towards a discourse in which processes themselves become the causal agents” (Markusen 2003: 703). This, she says, “obscures entirely the possibility of and responsibility for a change in a given situation” (Markusen 2003: 703). It is precisely the issue of the responsibility for change that Badiou’s concepts allow us tackle. As we have seen, at its core is the assumption that agents and the principles that guide their actions are responsible for change. Events are moments in which a truth is brought back to life by the actions of a subject. We are thus very far from the notion of process here. As chapter 2 will show, a theoretical framework based on Badiou has two central assumptions that preclude the use of processes: within the temporality of an event, actors exercise Sartrean agency and are locked into irreconcilable oppositions.

A DIFFERENT SET OF ASSUMPTIONS

This discussion has brought out two assumptions that a framework based on Badiou’s project must uphold. The first is that change needs to be investigated in its own right, not as a stage in the progressive development of the world. The second is that agents and the principles that guide their actions are responsible for change, not impersonal processes. Taken together, these two assumptions on the nature of change challenge most of the work that has been done on Haussmann and his public works so far. The investigation on Haussmann’s planning practice in this thesis thus takes a different perspective on the public works that is derived from the specificity of Badiou’s philosophical project. We will see that the effect of the two assumptions above – change needs to be investigated in its own right; agents are responsible for change – will be felt in the way in which this thesis frames agency and opposition.

The notion of agency in Badiou’s project will be explored in detail in the thesis through Badiou’s concept of the subject. We will see that one type of subject, in one particular type of temporality, is able to wield a type of undetermined agency that owes much to Sartre’s writings. This conceptualisation of agency is one that is met with much resistance in the social sciences, where the notions of structure (Marx) and process (Deleuze), among other mechanisms through which agency is limited, frame much of the work. Badiou’s subject is a way in which radical agency can be conceptualised in very particular historical episodes. And though this agency is usually defeated, the changes it brings create such a rupture in the world in which it appears that it can always be felt as a latent possibility in all other worlds.
Badiou’s notion of opposition is intrinsically related to his notion of agency. This is because any agency of the kind described above is bound to attract sustained and ultimately lethal opposition. And Badiou has formalised the type of opposition such undetermined agents will ultimately face. This opposition is thus inherently about a refusal of radical change, a refusal which takes a sequence of forms: refusal to participate, obscuring of the idea and subversion of the practice. This is why change needs to be investigated in its own right and not as part of the overall development of a whole: opposition as conceptualised by Badiou is always concerned with the response to a radical change that exists outside of any historical perspective. And we will see that these oppositions are always concerned with a particular type of radical change, one that attempts to break structures of inequality.

The particular way in which this thesis will use these two concepts together sets it apart theoretically from other investigations into the transformation of Paris. But it also has empirical consequences. In contrast to other studies of the public works, the central empirical focus of this thesis will be the defeats Haussmann suffered in the Council of State, defeats which significantly affected his ability to pursue the public works in the way he had envisaged them. We will see how the conceptualisations of agency and opposition in five authoritative accounts of the public works have limited their interpretations of these events. This thesis will thus arrive at a different explanation for Haussmann’s defeats at the Council of State, one that frames Haussmann as one of Badiou’s subjects – the state revolutionary. This interpretation posits that Haussmann’s planning practice faced sustained opposition from Parisian property owners and that it was ultimately sacrificed for the survival of the imperial regime. We are now in a position to describe the way in which an investigation based on this new set of assumptions will be carried out in practice within this thesis.

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS

The first two chapters introduce the literature the thesis engages with and the theoretical framework that it employs to contribute to that literature. Chapter 1 is concerned with providing the reader with an overview of the literature on the transformation of Paris, situating within that field the accounts that it engages with and identifying within its complexity the aspect that is to be focused on. It will first discuss a series of scholars who have taken a different point of departure in their investigation of the public works. While this thesis is concerned with Haussmann’s planning practice, there are many other ways of understanding and reading these events. The aim of this section will be to acknowledge other types of investigations into the public works and highlight their important insights into the period as a whole. The chapter will then move on to a presentation of the
authors that have engaged analytically with Haussmann’s planning practice. To frame this, it will depart from the identification within the literature of a series of conflictive statements: some portray Haussmann as the epitome of the omnipotent planner, while others describe him as having suffered a number of defeats in the courts that significantly impacted his work. It will then discuss a number of interpretations of these defeats and identify those accounts that this thesis will need to engage with at a deeper theoretical level. We find that five accounts need to be investigated in more theoretical detail and that the thesis’ central concern must be to provide an explanation of Haussmann’s defeats that foregrounds the politics underpinning his planning practice.

Chapter 2 presents the concepts in Badiou’s project that will be used to interpret the empirical material. It first provides a justification for the use of this framework by returning to the five authors identified in chapter 1 and by arguing that their frameworks cannot be invoked to understand Haussmann’s planning practice and its defeat in the courts. It highlights the empirical inconsistencies their accounts contain with regards to Haussmann’s defeats in the courts and investigates their theoretical roots. It shows how the assumptions of these five authors can be classified according to the way in which they conceptualise agency and opposition. To flesh out the type of agency and opposition that a framework suitable to the investigation of a planning practice and the opposition it generated would need, the chapter moves to a discussion of Sartre, as one of the thinkers who has most ardently sought to conceive of radical political agency. Badiou is then introduced as a thinker who has followed some of Sartre’s conclusions to forge an explanation of political change that foregrounds individuals exploiting their Sartrean agency to push through a political principle in the face of opposition. The second half of the chapter presents the theoretical framework this thesis employs. Because of its grounding in Badiou’s concepts, it offers an alternative to the theoretical assumptions underpinning the accounts of the five authors discussed in the first section. Badiou’s fundamental concept of the event sets the scene for a more detailed exploration of his notion of the subject and its key role in political events. The three types of subjects he posits arise within an event and the sequence inherent to their appearance are shown to be the aspect of the framework that allows an investigation based on his concepts to contribute to the literature.

Chapter 3 has the difficult task of moving from the theoretical to the empirical, and thus of justifying the use of Badiou’s concepts for social scientific investigation. Accordingly, the first section will deal with the relationship between Badiou and the social sciences. Badiou’s notion of the compatibility of philosophical with non-philosophical operations is used to cast doubt on the artificial separation he creates between his work and the social sciences. A particular type of social science will be posited
as compatible with his philosophical project, one that identifies and singularises breaks in the world caused by political practices that are an affirmation of equality. The dearth of research that specifically focuses on characterising Haussmann’s planning practice and the fact that Napoleon III had Saint-Simonian leanings makes it possible that Haussmann’s planning practice was influenced by the same utopian socialist and his particular notion of equality. This must be verified empirically. The second half of the chapter discusses the archival material this thesis relies on. It retraces the steps that led me from digitalised newspaper archives to the Parisian Municipal Archives and finally to the National Archives where three boxes were found to contain useful material: a coherent set of letters sent between 1853 and 1859 to the Ministry of the Interior, Haussmann’s immediate superior, by property owners of varying wealth levels in order to bypass Haussmann or to complain about his modus operandi. This entailed that conflict was at the centre of this archival resource, focused on Haussmann’s first years as Prefect of the Seine. The main limitation that emerged from this archival material was that it foreclosed the possibility of statistical analysis. The last section of the chapter details the general method that will be used in the three chapters that follow to uncover Badiou’s concepts within the archival material.

Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter of the thesis. As such, it is the first stage of the method this thesis will rely on to uncover Badiou’s concepts within the archival material. Its task is to show that the historical sequence under investigation exhibits the first characteristic of Badiou’s political events: they are sequences in which a fundamental break occurs within a particular domain. This entails that we must first put forward a hypothesis as to the domain in which this break occurred: a study of the literature shows that this domain is the world of Parisian planning. A presentation of the way Parisian planning operated before Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect of the Seine then serves as the background against which his actions can be understood. The chapter’s next section will be precisely concerned with laying out the ways in which Haussmann’s planning practice differed from that of his predecessors. This is done by drawing from the epistolary exchange between Haussmann, property owners and the Minister of the Interior indications that Haussmann’s planning practice differed in three main types of planning interventions: demolitions, street widening procedures and the creation of new streets through existing fabric. Haussmann ensured that planning regulations were enforced and sought to overturn the hold property owners exercised over planning. The last section makes use of Badiou’s notion of the transcendental of a world, the object within a world against which all other objects are measured, to provide an account of the differences in Haussmann’s planning practice as amounting to a reversal in the structure of appearance, Badiou’s definition of an event. Haussmann’s arrival displaced the architect from this central role in planning
and introduced the planner as the fundamental actor in this world. This serves to frame the fundamental novelty of Haussmann’s actions.

Chapters 5 and 6 represent the second stage of the method developed to uncover Badiou’s concepts within the empirical material collected. This stage is concerned with characterising Haussmann’s planning practice and on the opposition it generated in the world of Parisian planning. Taken together, these two chapters offer the evidence necessary to verify that Haussmann’s planning practice carries within it the affirmation of equality. **Chapter 5** sets the foundation for the constitution of this evidence by providing a means to approach the empirical material and draw from it the principles that motivated Haussmann’s planning practice. Its point of departure is a passage in Badiou that links a subjective type to particular types of affects. It then proposes a generalisation of this relation between subject and affect into an analytical method, one that takes a corpus of text and mines it for specific emotions to reduce the textual material: it is within statements that contain an emotional subtext that the basic principles that emerge out of the political practice and its opposition can be identified. There are thus two layers of coding involved here. A first series of sequential coding runs mines the text for five emotions (anger, contempt, resentment, fear and joy). The statements found to contain emotional subtext are then studied in isolation and coded according to the planning principle they are found to contain. These principles will be grouped into three levels of opposition between Haussmann and property owners over planning. In addition to allowing for the identification of the contested principles at the heart of a planning practice, the five emotions have inherent characteristics that will be used to gauge the way in which each of the three oppositions unfolded over the period.

**Chapter 6** uses the principles uncovered in chapter 5 as raw material to flesh out the subjects and the truth they position themselves around. From Badiou, we know that the subject who brings about the event articulates the four determinations of equality, authority, confidence and will. It is the principles of chapter 5 that allow us to reconstruct these four determinations. And most importantly, we are in a position to respond to the second condition Badiou poses on the occurrence of an event: that a political practice that breaks the structure of appearances be carried by the affirmation of equality. The type of equality found in Haussmann’s actions was the one espoused by the Saint-Simonians: it is predicated on the fact that the collective has precedence over the individual and that all should contribute equally as producers to the improvement of the collective. The other three determinations make a similar use of the principles uncovered in chapter 5. The articulation of the four determinations, and thus the articulation of the principles that support them,
allows us to posit Haussmann as a Saint-Simonian state revolutionary. The subjective types that opposed his planning practice are fleshed out by attaching each one to the opposite end of the principles that forged it. The sequence inherent to the appearance of these subjective types and the information gleaned from the most salient changes in the emotional register coded in chapter 5 provides us with a means to explain the unfolding of the Haussmann event. By contrasting this to literature presented in the first two chapters, we are in a position to establish that the demise of the Haussmann event in the world of Parisian planning led to a situation in which the property owners took control over planning back from the municipal administration.

The conclusion of this thesis returns to the research questions laid out at the start of this introduction. The answers to three of these research questions in the empirical chapters are summarised and the focus moves to the issue of the consequences of the event and of the fruitfulness of an investigation that is based on Badiou’s concepts. These two remaining questions allow for a broadening out of the theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis and for new research avenues to be presented.
CHAPTER 1: HAUSSMANN IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this first chapter is to present the reader with an overview of the literature on the transformation of Paris, to situate within that field the accounts that my research will engage with and to identify within its complexity the aspect I will focus on. The chapter will open with an overview of scholarly work that takes as a point of departure aspects of the public works that differ from this thesis’ focus on Haussmann’s planning practice. This first section will highlight the various methodologies and theoretical approaches through which the public works have been understood: from those most concerned with the relation between Haussmann and the Commune, to those interested in the wider cultural and experiential impacts of the public works, to those scholars who have invoked the transformation of Paris in comparative work.

The chapter will then move on to the scholars that have engaged analytically with Haussmann’s planning practice. To do this, I will first present a contradiction that emerges from the literature on the public works: Haussmann is at the same time viewed as the epitome of the omnipotent planner and described as having suffered a number of legislative defeats that impacted his work. Twelve different accounts Haussmann’s defeats in the Council of State will be presented and discussed. From this, a clear picture emerges of the authors my research needs to engage with – Daumard, Gaillard, Harvey, Benevolo and Sutcliffe – and of the aspect my research needs to focus on: an investigation of the lead up to Haussmann’s legislative defeats which allows for a clearer understanding of the politics underpinning his planning practice to emerge.

AN OVERVIEW OF SCHOLARLY WORK ON HAUSSMANN

This thesis is specifically concerned with Haussmann’s planning practice. This means that it will rely on the subset of all accounts of the public works that have discussed this practice and offered empirical and theoretical insights into its study. It is nonetheless important to situate this thesis within the broader literature on the public works, for a number of reasons. First, and perhaps most trivially, it will make clear that Haussmann’s planning practice is not the most salient concern of scholars of the public works. This reinforces the need to focus specifically on that aspect of the public works. Second, it will introduce a variety of different methodological approaches to the study of a particular historical period. This will highlight the fact that a focus on a planning practice seriously limits the types of materials and approaches that can be investigated. And third, it will
show that a large portion of the scholarly work on the transformation of Paris is more concerned with drawing links with other episodes of urban change that to meticulously studying what occurred in Second Empire Paris. This section will introduce scholars thematically for the convenience of the exposition.

**HAUSSMANN AND THE COMMUNE**

We have already touched upon the relationship between Haussmann’s public works and the Commune uprising in the introduction to this thesis. Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of the public works was discussed and we saw that Lefebvre’s view that the public works were the direct cause of the Commune is echoed by Harvey who writes of the Paris Commune as “one of the greatest revolutionary episodes in capitalist urban history, wrought in part out of a nostalgia for the world that Haussmann had destroyed and the desire to take back the city on the part of those dispossessed by his works” (Harvey 2008: 26). While Harvey has made the transformation his main focus, it is generally the commune that is recognised as the truly significant Parisian event of the latter half of the 19th century, to which Haussmann’s transformation of Paris serves as either a direct cause or a contributing factor: “the Commune thus stands as a coveted prize for any sociological theory that claims to make sense of the relationship between urban protest and the place of the city in capitalist society” (Gould 1995: 9).

In Castells, as in Lefebvre, it is the Commune and not the urban transformation that preceded it that is seen as the phenomenon that is most worth explaining theoretically. For Castells, the Commune is an urban social movement reacting against the twin forces of “the all-powerful state and the real estate speculators” (Castells 1983: 333) that are restructuring the urban form according to their own urban meaning. Castells, armed with the concept of urban social movements, seeks to counter the reliance on class struggle and asserts that urban social movements are “multi-class movements for the very single reason that they do not relate directly to the relationships of production, but to the relationships of consumption, communication and power” (Castells 1983: 320). He sees urban social movements as only able to be “symptoms of resistance to the social domination” rather than “agents of structural social change”, because they are “unable to put forward any historically feasible project of economic production, communication or government” (Castells 1983: 329).

Lefebvre and Castells thus have different theoretical and methodological assumptions than those espoused by Harvey. In the Introduction, Lefebvre’s focus on visual spatial realm was highlighted and this conceptualisation of the public works as leading to a qualitative simplification of Parisian space.
A study that focuses on the visual spatial realm, which has recently been encapsulated by the term urban design, must necessarily focus on different aspects of the public works than one focusing on a planning practice. In this thesis, our investigation of Haussmann’s planning practice will be conducted in isolation of this visual spatial realm. We are interested in the politics underlying this practice, not the effects this practice had on the materiality of Paris’ space. By focusing on a planning practice, we are abstracting from the visual spatial realm, with both the methodological and theoretical implications this entails. Similarly, our investigation will not be able to speak to Castell’s concept of the urban social movement. Gould notes that signs of strife were rare from the 1848 revolution to the Commune in 1871 (Gould 1995: 2). This makes it difficult to engage with a concept that relies on ‘symptoms of resistance to the social domination’. Empirically, Castell’s concept of the urban social movement is also very demanding for a period in which censorship was still very active and for which archival traces of collective mobilisation are rare.

**BENJAMIN**

If one looks for an account of the public works in Benjamin, it seems as though he believed Haussmann was driven mainly by strategic considerations: “the true goal of Haussmann’s projects was to secure the city against civil war. He wanted to make the erection of barricades in Paris impossible for all time” (Benjamin 2006: 43). Susan Buck-Morss also highlights that in Benjamin’s Arcade Project, “later entries emphasize how Haussmann’s public works programs drew political support for the state, controlled labor through state employment, and economically benefited the capitalist class” (Buck-Morss 1989: 313). But the impacts the public works had on the lives of Parisians was for Benjamin much more profound: “as for the phantasmagoria of civilization itself, it found its champion in Haussmann and its manifest expression in his transformations of Paris” (Benjamin 2002: 14-15). Through his work, Haussmann “estranges the Parisians from their city. They no longer feel at home there, and start to become conscious of the inhuman character of the metropolis” (Benjamin 2006: 43). Benjamin locates this alienation in the burgeoning capitalism of the Second Empire and the relation between the old and the new it introduces. This relationship is investigated through material culture and the way in which the city is organized.

Benjamin’s trope for this change culture and space is the arcade: “Where the arcades and their contents remain mythically unchanged, history becomes visible in them; where they have been superseded historically by new commodity phantasmagorias, their mythic form lives on. Such juxtapositions of past and present undercut the contemporary phantasmagoria, bringing to consciousness the rapid half-life of the utopian element in commodities and the relentless repetition
of their form of betrayal: the same promise, the same disappointment” (Buck-Morss 1989: 293). From a methodological perspective, this trope opens many possibilities. This would mean abstracting the transformation of Paris from all in it that was an expression of necessity and focusing solely on what it meant for the way in which “under capitalism, the most recent myths are continuously superseded by new ones” (Buck-Morss 1989: 293). It would entail deconstructing the myths that the public works wrapped themselves around and identifying how these myths were foundational in the sense that they opened a period in which myths would follow each other in rapid succession. This thesis will similarly eschew the necessities the public works responded to and instead focus on the characteristics of the practice that made them a reality. But this will not be in favor of an analysis of material culture and the role of the transformation of Paris in opening the city to capitalism. The thesis will be concerned with the political nature of planning as regulation.

BERMAN

Berman’s project is concerned with the experience of modernity and he looks at particular texts of literature or social theory as entry points to a study of modernity and modernisation. Paris and its transformations under Haussmann are read through Baudelaire: “Even as Baudelaire worked in Paris, the work of its modernization was going alongside him and over his head and under his feet. He saw himself not only as a spectator, but as a participant and a protagonist in this ongoing work; his own work expresses its drama and trauma. Baudelaire shows us something that no other writer sees so well: how the modernization of the city at once inspires and enforces the modernization of its citizens’ souls” (Berman 1982: 147). Baudelaire is interesting to Berman because of his presence at a particularly important place and time. But also because he views his poetry as the new language that modern life requires to fully express the experience of modernity. And for Berman, “what Baudelaire communicates in this language, above all, is what I will call primal modern scenes: experiences that arise from the concrete everyday life of Bonaparte’s and Haussmann’s Paris but carry a mythic resonance and depth that propel them beyond their place and time and transform them into archetypes of modern life” (Berman 1982: 148). What this particular perspective on the public works brings is a situated account of the ways in which the physical transformation of the city acted as a precondition for the emergence of modernity in Paris as well the experiences of an individual who experiences the endless contradictions of modernity. And by this, Berman means both the splendors and the repressed horrors of modern life. The figure of Baudelaire as critical and poetic observer of the public works is a good reminder of the larger historical context in which the public works occurred. However, modernity is not a concept that this thesis will engage with, it will not be an attempt to gauge either the modernity of Haussmann’s planning practice or that of the city that his
public works transformed. It also seems difficult to invoke literary sources to investigate a planning practice.

HALBWACHS

Halbwachs most direct investigation of the public works can be found in his 1928 volume on population movements and the creations of new streets in Paris for the 100 years preceding its publication. His approach to the public works is in opposition to historically based explanations, “we err, here, in attaching primary importance to the precise, concrete, mode of realisation of a general fact, which necessarily had to occur, but whose meaning doesn’t change because it occurred in that way, in that place, at that moment, rather than another way, in a place, in a neighbouring moment” (Halbwachs 1928: 15). Instead, he is interested in the general economic and demographic processes that determine events, not the concrete embodiments of that process in a particular place and time:

“In our research, we have attached ourselves precisely to those aspects of Paris that could be best abstracted from, that could best describe and define in terms appropriate for any other city. We used familiar names which bring back to memory concrete images to refer to the streets whose role we wanted to explain, but this was not a necessity and the results of our analysis would not have been modified had we referred to them by mere letters. It would now be possible to search for and find, in other large cities, streets that play the same role and that were in the same relation with each other or with neighbourhoods with identical social characteristics. This shows that beyond individual experience, called here Paris, but which could as well be Rome, Berlin, San Francisco, etc., and in the particular case itself, what we were looking for were general facts such as the relationship between population movements and construction movements” (Halbwachs 1928: 267).

---

v Translation mine, here is the original: «On a le tort, ici, d’attacher une importance de premier ordre au mode précis, concret, de réalisation d’un fait général, qui devait se produire nécessairement, mais qui ne change pas de signification pour s’être produit sous telle forme, en tel lieu, à tel moment, plutôt que sous une forme, dans un lieu, en un moment voisin.»

vi Translation mine, here is the original: «Or, nous nous sommes précisément attachés, au cours de nos recherches, aux aspects de Paris qui se pouvaient le mieux abstraire, le mieux décrire et définir en des termes qui conviendraient aussi bien pour toute autre ville. Pour désigner les voies dont nous voulions expliquer le rôle, nous avons employé des noms connus, et qui évoquent dans la mémoire des images concrètes ; mais cela n’était pas nécessaire, et, si nous les avions désignées par des lettres, les résultats de notre étude n’eussent pas été modifiés. Il serait dès maintenant possible de rechercher et de trouver dans d’autres grandes villes des voies qui jouent le même rôle, et soient entre elles, ou avec des quartiers présentant les mêmes caractères sociaux, dans le même rapport. C’est donc que, derrière l’expérience particulière, qui s’appelle ici Paris, mais qui pourrait être aussi bien Rome, Berlin, San Francisco, etc., et dans le cas particulier lui-même, nous cherchions des faits généraux tels que la relation entre des mouvements de population et des mouvements de construction.»
This leads to him view the public works from a very particular perspective, devoid of value judgements and actors. For him, expropriation is ultimately an adaptation (Halbwachs 1928: 25) to demographic movements in the city, speculation in real estate a way of relieving social pressures (Halbwachs 1928: 19) and the creation of new streets a way to create neighbourhoods and colonize space (Halbwachs 1928: 83). From his perspective, it is necessary for a particular process to happen because it is part of the order of things, and it thus does not matter exactly how and when it occurs. It is thus meaningless for him to attempt to judge Haussmann’s actions. But on the other hand, there is no attempt to pass judgement on the general processes themselves: they are treated like scientific laws that must only be discovered and on which it would be meaningless to pass judgement.

Although his work on collective memory does not touch upon the public works, there is a sense in which it can open up interesting questions, especially in its relation to space. Indeed, for Halbwachs: “every collective memory unfolds within a spatial framework. Now space is a reality that endures: since our impressions rush by, one after another, and leave nothing behind in the mind, we can understand how we recapture the past only by understanding how it is, in effect, preserved by our physical surroundings. It is to space – the space we occupy, traverse, have continual access to, or can at any time reconstruct in thought and imagination – that we must turn our attention” (Halbwachs 1980: 140). This importance of space for collective memory is all the more vivid in a city, whose space is the foundation on which collective memory can sustain itself: “the districts within a city and the homes within a district have as fixed a location as any tree, rock, hill, or field. Hence the urban group has no impression of change so long as streets and buildings remain the same. Few social formations are at once more stable and better guaranteed permanence. Paris and Rome, for example, have seemingly traversed the centuries without rupturing the continuity of life, despite wars, revolutions, and great crises” (Halbwachs 1980: 132). What sort of impact can a large scale transformation of the city, as Haussmann’s public works were, thus have on collective memory? Halbwachs tells us that groups will resist the destruction or modification of their spaces and there

---

vi «Il n’est point de mémoire collective qui ne se déroule dans un cadre spatial. Or, l’espace est une réalité qui dure : nos impressions se chassent l’une l’autre, rien ne demeure dans notre esprit, et l’on ne comprendrait pas que nous puissions ressaisir le passé s’il ne se conservait pas en effet parle milieu matériel qui nous entoure. C’est sur l’espace, sur notre espace, – celui que nous occupons, où nous repassons souvent, où nous avons toujours accès, et qu’en tout cas notre imagination ou notre pensée est à chaque moment capable de reconstruire – qu’il faut tourner notre attention» (Halbwachs 1968: 146).

vii «Les divers quartiers, à l’intérieur d’une ville, et les maisons, à l’intérieur d’un quartier, ont un emplacement fixe et sont aussi attachés au sol que les arbres et les rochers, une colline ou un plateau. Il en résulte que le groupe urbain n’a pas l’impression de changer tant que l’aspect des rues et des bâtiments demeure identique, et qu’il est peu de formations sociales à la fois plus stables et mieux assurées de durer. Paris et Rome, par exemple, malgré les guerres, les révolutions, les crises, semblent avoir traversé les siècles sans que la continuité de leur vie ait été un seul moment interrompue» (Halbwachs 1968: 134).
will always remain traces of past inhabitants. While this thesis will not touch on this aspect of Halbwachs thoughts, it is important to keep in mind that Haussmann’s planning decisions affected much more than just the physical fabric of the city.

**PAPAYANIS**

The work of Papayanis is an interesting perspective on the public works precisely because it distances itself from the idea that Haussmann marked a significant departure in planning. His project focuses on earlier planning efforts to argue that Haussmann’s public works are only a logical continuation of existing thought rather than a radical novelty. It can thus be attached to the work of the scholars in the volume edited by Karen Bowie, ‘La modernité avant Haussmann’. For Papayanis, the necessity for the involvement of the state in urban affairs had already been recognized in urban thought by the time Haussmann appeared on the Parisian scene. Indeed, concerns about the problems Paris was experiencing had been voiced since the middle of the 18th century. While they remained abstract and vague at the time, many of the concepts that were to influence Haussmann’s work – comprehensive city planning, importance of circulation, relation between the width of the street and the height of adjacent buildings, sanitation, security, etc. – had already made their appearance in discourses about the city (Papayanis 2004: 248). Indeed, for Papayanis (2004) most of the urban theorizing on Paris was concerned with making the city a more efficient entity in its dealing with these matters – and most especially with rationalizing the exchange network to increase its capacity for consumption and production. In describing pre-Haussmannian planning texts, he states that “much of this planning coalesced around several common themes: global/comprehensive planning, circulation, order and security, health, and capitalism” (Papayanis 2004: 248), all of which point to the importance of making Paris a more efficient machine for production, consumption and exchange. What thus emerged for him was a gap between theorizations about the city and the city itself. These theorizations were modern in their understanding of the city – it had to be the support and facilitator for an efficient and orderly environment – but the city itself seemed to be getting more chaotic as time passed. For him, the public works were only the closing of the gap between theory and reality. This thesis will show the considerable distance that exists between theory and reality, which will here be referred to as Haussmann’s planning practice. In this thesis’ conclusion we will able to offer an indication as to how radically different his practice actually was.

**GANDY**

While Papayanis (2004) is most concerned with what occurred before the public works, Gandy’s (1999) work on the Parisian sewer is concerned with drawing out the incompleteness of
Haussmann’s actions in this regard. While Papayanis (2004) highlighted that Paris was already saturated by plans and projects before Haussmann’s arrival as Prefect, Gandy’s focus is on showing that the public works (at least as far as the construction of the sewer system is concerned) cannot in a straightforward manner be seen as an exemplification of the transition to modernity: “the contradictory rationale behind the reconstruction of the Paris sewer system challenges simplistic tautologies, which simply equate modernity with the process of Haussmannization” (Gandy 1999: 36). What this focus on the politics and culture of infrastructure highlights is the complexity inherent in any attempt to think of technical changes: they are inherently tied to conceptions of bodies, attitudes and spaces. This approach allows Gandy to speak about the relation between city and nature – “increasingly a focus of leisure and convenience rather than of material necessity” (Gandy 1999: 32), gender, class and nature – “In Second Empire Paris, the repression of bodily functions in bourgeois society became increasingly manifested in a fear of women and the poor” (Gandy 1999: 34), and centre and periphery: “The separation and reorganization of space set in motion an increasing dichotomy in the olfactory experience of the urban environment between the middle classes and the labouring poor” (Gandy 1999: 35). This conception of urban infrastructure as cultural representation complicates notions of modernity and questions linear accounts of the public works. This thesis’ investigation of a planning practice will not be able to contribute to this body of work.

HAUSSMANNISATION

When discussing the literature surrounding the transformation of Paris, it would difficult not to mention what can be called the field of haussmannisation studies. The concept of haussmannisation is used to explain urban change in cities as different as London (Schubert & Sutcliffe 1996), Brussels (Loo 1994), Dakar (Vernière 1977), Rio de Janeiro (Benchimol 1982) and Cairo (Volait 2003).

“Haussmannisation is used very loosely, to designate virtually every topographical alteration or social change that marked Paris during Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect of the Seine. The word itself has come to signify in shorthand any topographical modernization of any city. The verb appeared in 1892, and the substantive in 1926 [...] like any abstraction haussmannisation is an umbrella concept, with a variety and number of elements that can be crowded under its reach. For many observers haussmannisation came to stand for everything that fit under the still more comprehensive category of urbanization, itself to be found under the most capacious classification of all – modernization” (Ferguson 1994: 118).
The looseness of the concept of haussmannisation explains how a complex urban transformation can be used as a tool to understand other urban transformations around the world. The public works’ complexity emerges from the particular place and time in which it occurred – in Paris between the 1848 June Revolution and the Commune in 1871 – and because of the multiplicity of rationales that were invoked to justify it – i.e. improving sanitation, increasing Napoleon III’s hold on the city, making the city easier to navigate and apprehend, creating impressive urban perspectives and monuments, bringing modernity, increasing land values, etc. If one adds to this that the transformation concerned a very significant proportion of the city and that it was completed in 17 years, this event seems to be quite important in urban history. It is precisely because of the fact that so much occurred in so short a time frame that the transformation of Paris can be encapsulated in a loosely defined process: both the foci of comparison and the comparative strategies used by authors employing haussmannisation as a conceptual tool can be made to depend on particular readings and normative appraisals of the public works.

Within the urban literature, haussmannisation is used interchangeably to refer to a process, to the effects of a process and to the rationales underlying a certain course of action. When viewed as a process, haussmannisation is portrayed either as the use of a comprehensive plan, strict architectural and zoning guidelines and complementarity between streets, residential buildings and monuments (Loo 1994), or as imperious management (Lessoff 2002) or the authoritarian imposition and mode of implementation of the project (Pinheiro 2002). When the focus is on the effects of haussmannisation, the analyses highlight the separation between rich and poor (Holston 1989, Davis 2007), the domination of urban space by the state (O’Neill 2009) or the creation of a model capital city (Wagenaar 2000). Finally, when it is used to illuminate the rationales of those who set out to transform the city (as in, ‘the city of x was Haussmannised’), the main themes are to increase the efficiency of the transport infrastructure (Baxa 2004, Schubert and Sutcliffe 1996), to reduce the chances of successful insurrections and increase political control through monumentality (O’Neill 2009), to reach modernity (Pinheiro 2002, Almandoz 1999) or to maximise the profit available from central city land (Davis 2007).

In order to develop a reading grid through which to understand the relationship between particular comparative uses of haussmannisation and the four traditions of scholarship on the public works, I will rely on Tilly’s four types of comparisons from his 1984 Big Structures, Large Processes and Huge Comparisons. Individualising comparisons “contrast specific instances of a given phenomenon as a means of grasping the peculiarities of each case”, while universalising comparisons “aim to establish
that every instance of a phenomenon follows essentially the same rule” (Tilly 1984: 83). These are further contrasted to variation-finding comparisons that “establish a principle of variation in the character or intensity of a phenomenon by examining systematic differences among instances”. Finally, encompassing comparisons place “different instances at various locations within the same system, on the way to explaining their characteristics as a function of their varying relationships to the system as a whole” (Tilly 1984: 83). These four comparative strategies divide up the various uses of the concept of haussmannisation.

The interesting phenomenon is that these four strategies – at least for the non-exhaustive set of pieces I have analysed – can each be generally ascribed a normative position vis-à-vis the historical event of the transformation of Paris. Individualising comparisons, such as the study of the piercing of Kingsway in London by Sutcliffe and Schubert (1996), tend to have a more positive view of the public works, focusing only on the improvements to infrastructure and aesthetics, rather than on the politics. Similarly, Van Loo’s (1994) study of the haussmannisation of Brussels focuses only on the beneficial effects of the existence of a comprehensive plan and strict architectural and zoning guidelines that allowed for the creation of a coherent cityscape, to the detriment of any other considerations. Because the use of comparison in these two studies is only aimed at achieving a better understanding of their case studies, the public works in Paris serves as an ‘ideal’ case. However, departures from this ideal – a single piercing of the magnitude of a Parisian boulevard occurred in London, the lack of a comprehensive plan led to haphazard development in Brussels – are not understood normatively. Individualising comparisons therefore tend to focus on showing how the urban transformation that is studied differed from what is considered to be the ideal case.

The positive spin on the transformation Paris that is to be found in the individualising comparisons above can be contrasted with the universalising comparisons that consistently stress the negative features of the public works. Engels’ 1872 The Housing Question can be seen as the earliest such attempt to universalise from the Parisian public works: “By "Haussmann" I mean the practice which has now become general of making breaches in the working class quarters of our big towns, and particularly in those which are centrally situated, quite apart from whether this is done from considerations of public health and for beautifying the town, or owing to the demand for big centrally situated business premises, or owing to traffic requirements, such as the laying down of railways, streets, etc. No matter how different the reasons may be, the result is everywhere the same: the scandalous alleys and lanes disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-praise from the
bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but they appear again immediately somewhere else and often in the immediate neighbourhood” (Engels 1942: 71). It is immediately clear that Engels holds Haussmann in no great esteem. This type of investigation, in which general tendencies are abstracted from a particular case and given universal applicability, is frequent within the Haussmannisation literature.

This approach was taken up in English speaking academia by Patrick Geddes in the first decades of the 20th century and by Lewis Mumford in the 1930s and 1940s, both of which strongly condemned the public works, for the strategic and military considerations that guided the piercing of the boulevards, the effect they had on worker housing and the imitations the model of Paris spawned. On this latter point, the following quote from Geddes’ 1915 Cities in Evolution is a good summary of their overall sentiment towards Haussmann: “town planning is not something which can be done from above, on general principles easily laid down, which can be learned in one place and imitated in another – that way Haussmannism lies” (Geddes 1915: 205). There are also a number of more recent universalising comparisons in the Haussmannisation literature. O’Neill’s (2009) study of the rebuilding of Bucharest after the 1977 earthquake focuses on the way monumentality is used to gain political control over urban space, something which he sees as inherent in any urban transformation initiated by an authoritarian leader. Holston’s (1989) study of modernist architecture and more specifically the creation of Brasilia, centres in on how the Parisian public works set the scene for the imposition of rationality on urban space that will always lead to a separation between rich and poor. A third example would be Davis’ (2007) adequation of the transformation of Paris with slum clearances engineered to allow the elites to reap profit from the centrally located premium real estate, a phenomenon he sees occurring wherever profits in inner cities are not maximised. What seems to bring together the authors I have drawn on here seems to be a strong desire to condemn a set of planning practices, be it megalomaniacal architecture, rationalisation of urban space pushed to its extreme and the worst slum clearances in developing megalopolises. The transformation of Paris may serve in this respect as a historical scapegoat, a historical event that had many negative aspects, and from which it is possible to generalise in a way that is useful to condemn current practices.

In comparison to the positive and negative perspectives of individualising and universalising haussmannisation-based comparisons respectively, a more nuanced perspective on the public works serves as the background for the use of haussmannisation within variation-finding comparisons. Pinheiro’s (2002) comparative study of the implementation of authoritarian-rational planning in Rio
de Janeiro and Bahia frames its higher success in Rio de Janeiro as a consequence of its national
capital status and the comparatively higher level of state involvement in its design. Due
consideration is given both to the authoritarian and the efficiency enhancing aspects of the urban
plans (Pinheiro 2002). Baxa’s (2004) study contrasting the nineteenth century transformations of
Paris and Vienna with the stillborn efforts at transport infrastructure rationalisation and
monumentality in fascist Rome, places the blame for the latter’s failure on ambiguities within its
ideology as concerns the relationship between destruction and conservation. Wagenaar’s (2000)
study of difference in the ways in which European capital cities responded to the changes in Paris –
emulation in the cases of Brussels, Budapest and Rome, indifference in London and Amsterdam –
relates comprehensive physical transformations to the built environment of cities to centralist and
authoritarian political systems. These three authors, with their focus on the variation between what
appeared as similar cases, aim to **find criteria that would allow them to theorise the differences
between cases that were all prone to haussmannisation**. The aim here is to discuss how a sequence
of events that unfolded is traced back to the existence or inexistence of particular sociological,
political or cultural forces. For Wagenaar, these forces are centralism and authoritarianism, for Baxa
it is conservationism that is to blame, while for Pinheiro it is interventionism.

A final set of authors who use the process of haussmannisation to understand the dynamics at work
in other cities can be grouped based on their reliance on the figure of Haussmann, the prefect, as an
ideal type against which other administrators, planners or politicians can be compared. Their
comparative strategy can thus be thought as an exemplification of Tilly’s encompassing
comparisons, which place **“different instances at various locations within the same system, on the
way to explaining their characteristics as a function of their varying relationships to the system as a
whole”** (Tilly 1984: 83). The ideal type of Haussmann can be thought of as what Tilly calls the ‘system
as whole’, constituted by all the facets of his planning practice, political rationales, administrative
techniques, etc. Other figures of planners that had a large impact on their cities are then inserted
within this system and their relation to the Haussmann ideal type offer a way to locate and explain
their actions. Almandoz’ (1999) study of the Europeanisation of Caracas in the latter part of the 19th
century relies on the figure of Guzmán Blanco to situate the public works he initiated as outside of
the Haussmannian era, while Lessof’s (2002) work on Alexander Shepherd in Washington D.C.
situates him as an American counterpoint to Haussmann, who held the same tenuous balance
between impetuous planning and imperious and financially reckless management. Both these
authors **use the figure of Haussmann to locate the planners they are interested in within the total
set of Haussmann’s characteristics**. It is through this situation within the total set of characteristics
that are thought to have composed a historical figure that they can evaluate the work of the planner they are interested in.

The way in which Badiou’s concepts offers an alternative to the comparative use of the public works through the notion of Haussmannisation – which the introduction highlighted may lead to the comparison of events that are not strictly comparable – will be discussed in the conclusion.

**BETWEEN UNFLINCHING SUPPORT AND LEGISLATIVE DEFEATS**

We can now move to those scholars that have engaged with Haussmann’s planning practice to a degree or another in their work. In order to frame the discussion of these authors, the focus will be on uncovering what each can bring analytically to help us understand a seeming contradiction in the literature on the public works. We will first present this contradiction and then move on to discuss twelve of its explanations within the literature.

**HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF A CONTRADICTION**

“Haussmann could only have had the career he did under the Second Empire. And very few men indeed could have made what he did of the unique position he held. He was fortunate in that for seventeen years he was able to exercise his considerable talents to the full” (Chapman & Chapman 1957: 251).

This is the way in which Chapman & Chapman assess Haussmann’s career, a man given all the necessary powers to fulfil his vision for Paris. This statement hinges, according to Chapman & Chapman again, on the freedom of action that was imparted to him by his proximity to the Emperor and his unwavering political support:

“The success of Haussmann’s campaigns in the purely municipal field was partly due to his experienced handling of key personalities [...] but it was also due to the support and timely intervention of the Emperor, whose influence was vital when national bodies and personalities were involved [...] In theory, correspondence to and from all the prefects, including the Prefect of the Seine, went to the Minister of the Interior. The Minister was then supposed to place the matter before the Emperor in council. The prefect should have no direct contact with the Emperor. In fact Haussmann saw Louis Napoleon every day. He conducted all business with the Emperor directly, and only sent formal correspondence through the Minister. He was closer to the Emperor than most of the ministers, and in every conflict Louis Napoleon upheld his prefect” (Chapman & Chapman 1957: 142).
Haussmann’s invincibility in the face of opposition is reinforced by Benevolo, who informs us that “precisely because he did have the Emperor’s support, Haussmann was always able to avoid having to justify his actions politically and could present them as technical and administrative measures deriving from objective necessities” (Benevolo 1967: 134).

Juxtaposed to this image of Haussmann as an omnipotent planner is the evidence of a number of legislative defeats he suffered in the Council of State, France’s supreme court of appeal for administrative law courts. Accounts of these legislative defeats can be found in many texts on the public works (Gaillard 2000: 28-30, Harvey 2006a: 131-133, Benevolo 1967: 135-136, Hall 1998: 737-738, Roncayolo, in Agulhon, 1983: 114), and they point to their importance for the course of the public works. Paramount among these legislative defeats was that concerning the evolution of the article in the 1852 decree which allowed the city to acquire strips of land outside of the alignments when it was expropriating. A first decision by the Council of State in 1856 limited this prerogative to cases in which the strips of land were too small to allow the construction of salubrious buildings on them. This was then succeeded by another decision of the Council of State in 1858 that gave the expropriated property owner or his neighbours eight days to acquire the portions of land not needed by the street.

Legal decisions against Haussmann’s municipal administration are thought to have had two major consequences. As Gaillard notes, the most direct consequence of these decisions was that expropriations became a source of enrichment for property owners, given that they were allowed to reap the value added to their properties by the municipal public works without having to contribute in any way (Gaillard 2000: 29). This went hand in hand with Halbwachs’ finding that it is only after 1860 that expropriations began to be seen as a good deal for the expropriated, a fact he attributes both to the constitution of a set of agencies that encouraged property owners to exaggerate their demands for compensations and, more interestingly, to the fact that the expropriation juries distorted the “public’s judgment of the right to property by attributing compensations that were without relation to the real value of the building” (Halbwachs 1928: 34).

This had a direct, secondary, consequence on the public works. By making expropriations more expensive, it seems to have pushed Haussmann into using the services of building companies in

---

ix Translation mine, here is the original: «Les jurys n’ont pas faussé le jugement public au regard du droit de propriété, par l’attribution d’indemnités sans rapport avec la valeur réelle de l’immeuble.»
order to share with them the heightened costs of expropriations. As Hall informs us “from the end of the 1850s the regularization operations were being increasingly handed over to entrepreneurs, who became responsible for the entire process of implementation, including expropriations, and who supplied the town with finished streets” (Hall 1997: 74).

How can these two facets of the public works be reconciled? On the one hand is the statement that Haussmann had full backing from the Emperor and could pursue, unhindered, the program he had set out for the city, and on the other, a series of legislative defeats which forced him to change the way in which he rolled out the public works. There are different attempts to put these two contradicting tendencies together. We will now discuss a number of scholars (presented chronologically) that have developed accounts of the reasons for Haussmann’s defeats in the courts.

**GIEDION**

Giedion (1943) argues that Haussmann was the first planner to see the large city as a technical problem to be solved; as he says it, Haussmann “wished to make Paris the first of the great cities to be brought into conformity with the industrial age” (Giedion 1943: 469). To achieve this goal, we are told that “Haussmann allowed no group to block his schemes: he cut directly into the body of the city in his transformation of Paris” (Giedion 1943: 501). While there is no explicit discussion of the Council of State decisions, Giedion points out that “there would have been no objections if he had confined himself to enlarging streets already in existence. But to cut new ones was to disturb the settled scheme of things and to show a lack of respect for the rights of property” (Giedion 1943: 496). This seems to point to a resistance from property owners to the public works, at least as far as the cutting of new streets through urban fabric is concerned. Giedion also notes the opposition Haussmann faced in his search for financing in the Parliament, where we are told both the left and right opposed him as well as the landowners (Giedion 1943: 491). In general, this opposition is conceptualised as taking place between Haussmann and the bourgeoisie, as the following quote makes clear: “The bourgeoisie, however, could not forgive Haussmann for disturbing their peace” (Giedion 1943: 494).

**PINKNEY**

Pinkney’s account of Haussmann’s defeats is seen from the perspective of Napoleon III rather than from Haussmann’s: “The Council of State in December, 1858, persuaded the Emperor to limit the city’s authority to condemn property and thereby cut the profits from resale of land that Haussmann had counted on when he planned the Second Network” (Pinkney 1958: 185). These defeats are seen by Pinkney as contributing to the exponential increase in the money needed to carry out the public
works in the 1860s. This was made worse by the fact that "real-estate values inflated rapidly in the 1860's. Juries were unpredictably generous in awarding indemnities for condemned property, and changes in the regulations governing expropriations cut anticipated profits from the resale of property and augmented indemnity payments" (Pinkney 1957: 47). Pinkney seems to propose two elements to explain the legal cases against Haussmann in the Council of State. These can both be found in the following quote detailing the difficulties Haussmann was to face in trying to bring the Emperor’s plan for the city to life: “It had to be developed into practical working plans and then transformed into the reality of stone and mortar over the almost insuperable obstacles of expense, vested property interests, the inertia of municipal authorities, and political hostility” (Pinkney 1955: 130). The first element, ‘vested property interests’ can be seen in to focus on the courts’ siding with property owners and limiting the legislation Haussmann had at his disposal to execute the public works. The second, ‘political opposition’ is manifested in Pinkney’s thesis that the opposition against Haussmann should be interpreted as attempts to attack the Emperor himself: “The Prefect made an ideal whipping boy. He had no significant political following. The liberal deputies from Paris (and presumably the public, too, since they regularly elected opposition deputies in the sixties) disliked him as an authoritarian, and the provincial deputies, who generally supported the Empire, objected to his extravagant spending in Paris. Even among the imperial ministers he could not count on certain support. His position depended solely on the favour of the Emperor, and when an attack was made on Haussmann there was no mistaking the real target” (Pinkney 1958: 189). For Pinkney, Haussmann’s defeats in the courts can thus be attributed to two simultaneous factors: the interests of property owners in retaining profits emerging from the public works and the role Haussmann played as Napoleon III’s political scapegoat.

**CHAPMAN & CHAPMAN**

For Chapman & Chapman, these defeats can be traced back to Napoleon III’s inability to see the drastic financial consequences they would have on the public works (Chapman & Chapman 1957: 147). They inform us that the Council of State’s decisions were motivated by the threat to private property the expropriation law under question posed: “when the Council of State questioned this procedure they did not accuse the administration of irregularities; they simply stated that the increased value of unused land should go to the original owners and not to the City of Paris” (Chapman & Chapman 1957: 146). Apart from the increased financial burden they entailed, Chapman & Chapman did not see Haussmann’s defeat at the Council of State as threatening to the public works program. As far they are concerned, Haussmann had more to fear from within the administration than from property owners fearing expropriation, who “did not attack the principle of
public spending only as long as their fortunes grew” (Chapman & Chapman 1957: 154). This can be seen to emerge from the fact that their angle on the public works is to show the independence Haussmann managed to win from his superiors through the Emperor’s support – this particular episode (in which the Emperor failed to grasp the issue at stake) is conceptualised as the exception that confirms the rule. Haussmann’s defeats in the Council of State are thus understood by Chapman and Chapman as a bout of bad luck that was a momentary drawback. This helps us understand how they reconcile his defeats with the statement from the quote above that he “was fortunate in that for seventeen years he was able to exercise his considerable talents to the full” (Chapman & Chapman 1957: 251). For Chapman and Chapman what mattered was Haussmann’s proximity to the Emperor: nothing outside of this relation could seriously affect his power.

DAUMARD

Daumard’s study is in the lineage of the statistical work undertaken by Halbwachs on Parisian streets and expropriations during the 19th century. Her investigation focuses on property owners, their properties and the variations in property prices over the period. Because she believes that the public works are only the consequences of century long changes, her aim is to uncover the long run trends that lie under, and direct, the transformation of Paris: “At a time when the capital city renovates itself, and Parisian society is in transformation, it is interesting to analyse how a traditional investment product evolves, how a traditional type of capitalist reacts in an expansionary period and faced with the renewal of economic and social structures. The study of Parisian buildings and of their owners can be used to analyse the permanence of ancient structures in a modern world” (Daumard 1965: 5)

For Daumard, the interesting dilemma at the heart of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners is not that which opposes the general interest to the right of property – an opposition she dates back to 1819 – but the private interests at play behind these statements of principle. What she is interested in is how this battle translated into the compensations property owners received after expropriation and in gauging whether these were in fact exaggerated with respect to the value added the average Parisian property owner would have received during the public works, a period in which all property values were increasing. This would allow her to find out

Translation mine, here is the original: «A une époque où la capitale se rénove, où la société Parisienne subit une mutation, il est intéressant d’analyser comment évolue un type traditionnel de placement, comment réagit un milieu classique de capitalistes en période d’expansion et devant le renouvellement des structures économiques et sociales. L’étude des immeubles parisiens et de leurs propriétaires est un élément pour analyser la permanence des structures anciennes dans un monde moderne.»
whether expropriations were indeed the cause of Parisian fortunes and how they impacted the overall evolution of the social composition of Parisian property owners. Expropriations are of a particular interest for her precisely because they are at the nexus of the two forces which she conceptualizes as determining the evolution of the building stock: “speculators’ greed and state intervention, either independently or jointly, allowed the renewal of the building stock”\textsuperscript{xi} (Daumard 1965: 274). The opposition between property owners and Haussmann over expropriation compensations is inscribed within the context of ownership and this in a long term horizon (1800-1880) in which a shrinking number of Parisians could afford to step onto the housing ladder. The perspective she offers is thus to understand, to a certain extent, the motivations pushing property owners to demand largely inflated compensations once expropriated: in a context of increasing property values and of heightened speculation, property owners felt they would lose not only their existing capital but also the returns on that capital they could have expected to receive. The following thus needs to be taken quite seriously in any analysis of the relation between Haussmann and property owners:

“Haussmann and the admirers of the Second Empire’s achievements may have denounced the greed of Parisian property owners and stigmatized their lack of a sense of public responsibility, and as well-deserved as these criticisms may be, it remains true that value-added was very unequally spread out among old Parisian houses and that no special charge or tax on those privileged buildings came to restore the balance”\textsuperscript{xii} (Daumard 1965: 220).

**BENEVOLO**

For Benevolo, at the heart of these legislative defeats was a tension that emerged out of Haussmann’s defence of “the rights of an abstract administrative entity (‘the city’) against the concrete rights of the citizens” (Benevolo 1967: 136), with the right of property ownership being foremost among the latter. This tension was for Benevolo one of the basic problems of modern planning. This tension was highest in Europe after the 1848 revolution: at the same time as modern planning was constituting itself as a practice there occurred the capture of town planning by conservative leaders (Napoleon III, Disraeli and Bismarck most notably), centered on the “importance that a coherent policy of public works could have [for] the political stability of their

\textsuperscript{xi} Translation mine, here is the original: «L’avidité des spéculateurs et l’intervention de l’Etat, soit indépendantes, soit conjuguées, permirent le renouvellement du patrimoine immobilier.»

\textsuperscript{xii} Translation mine, here is the original: «Haussmann et les admirateurs des réalisations du Second Empire ont pu dénoncer l’avidité des propriétaires parisiens et stigmatiser leur manque d’esprit civique, si justes que puissent être ces critiques, il reste que la plus-value était répartie très inégalement entre les anciennes maisons de Paris et qu’aucune charge ni imposition spéciale sur les immeubles favorisées ne vint rétablir l’équilibre.»
respective countries” (Benevolo 1967: 110). Thus for Benevolo, in undertaking the public works in a way that disrupted the rights of property owners, Haussmann went against the principles of the second Empire and was met with fierce resistance in the Council of State. This interesting issue here is that Benevolo notes that “Haussmann’s personal views were strictly conservative” (Benevolo 1967: 134). We thus have an opposition over planning between individuals with political leanings that should be aligned.

Benevolo’s larger interpretation of the public works is based on an incomplete separation between the technical and the political aspects of planning existing at that time. He thus explained the tensions that arose through the public works as coming out of the politics that emerged from Haussmann’s planning practice, an insight he is alone among scholars of the public works in making. This is an idea that we will be discussing at length throughout the thesis. Haussmann’s legislative defeats, for Benevolo, are thus directly linked to his attempts to interpret planning laws in manner at odds with the Second Empire’s conservatism. What we can see with Benevolo (and will see later with Sutcliffe) is that this translates into a focus on the opposition Haussmann faced as a way of situating Haussmann in the history of planning. For Benevolo, Haussmann came into legislative difficulties because he sought to go against the separation between the technical and political aspects of planning that had been created after 1848. This allowed planning to become a merely technical preoccupation which sidelined any deep political issues: “Town planning [...] cut adrift from political discussion, tended to become increasingly a purely technical matter at the service of the established powers. This did not mean that it became politically neutral; on the contrary, it fell within the sphere of influence of the new conservative ideology which was evolving during those years, of Bonapartism in France, of the reforming Tory groups in England and of Bismarckian imperialism in Germany” (Benevolo 1967: xiii). Haussmann, in seeking to interpret expropriation laws to the advantage of the city “refused to accept the political logic of the regime which he personally supported so whole-heartedly” (Benevolo 1967: 136). In doing so, he brought politics back into planning and suffered the consequences in the Council of State. Benevolo’s emphasis on Haussmann’s politics will be crucial to this thesis.

SAALMAN

Saalman’s account differs from most scholars of the public works by pinning Haussmann’s legal defeats on the opposition between city and country: “It was in the national legislature with its heavily provincial representation that the opposition came and gradually gained the support of disaffected urban elements as Napoleon III overextended his national goals and international
ambitions. It was not, in the last analysis, a struggle between an eternally thick-headed bourgeoisie and the enlightened but isolated Prefect of the Seine, but the old and familiar battle between city and country” (Saalman 1971: 113). Saalman here displaces the focus from the opposition between Haussmann and property owners (presumably those Saalman is referring as the ‘thick-headed bourgeoisie’) to a much larger opposition at the national level. The defeat in the Council of State, it seems, must be understood as the moment at which the camp opposing the public works won out against its supporters. The actors in this larger confrontation are listed by Saalman: “Conservatives in banking, industry, and agriculture were hostile to the deficit-financing policies of the regime as such [...] disgruntled legitimists and ex-Orleanists were happy to fish in troubled waters. The Socialists saw no hope until the Empire was overthrown [...] The new class of daring financiers, large-scale building contractors, big department store owners, hotel operators, and the rest of the nouveau riche commercial breed had every reason to support and promote all aspects of the Second Empire program [...] Big business and the employed workers as well supported Napoleon III and Haussmann even if the lower middle class in the city and provinces did not” (Saalman 1971: 113). For Saalman, the decisions against Haussmann were a focalizing point for the larger opposition between town and country, each side backed by well-defined actors within Second Empire France.

GAILLARD

For Gaillard, these two decisions against Haussmann in the Council of State flowed out of the time-honoured principle that the local authority should not be allowed to appropriate for itself the added value the new streets created (Gaillard 2000: 28). She asserts that courts supported property owners because the magistrates were themselves property owners: “they spontaneously judged that public interest must be restricted and that it should respect, as much as can be, the rights of property ownership” (Gaillard 2000: 28). These court decisions thus signalled the defeat of the type of planning the Empire, and thus Haussmann, represented: what she calls discretionary planning.

For Gaillard, however, the interest is the fundamental political move that underlines the public works, with “haussmannisation less of a practice of urbanism than a politics looking for a balancing point favourable to the Empire” (Gaillard 2000: 433). She calls it a balancing act because “everything occurs as if the Empire’s rapid urban renewal of the capital city had caused the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xiii} Translation mine, here is the original: \text{\textit{Ces magistrats sont aussi des propriétaires : ils jugent spontanément que l’utilité publique doit être restreinte et qu’elle doit respecter, autant que faire se peut, les droits de la propriété privée.}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xiv} Translation mine, here is the original: \text{\textit{On est donc amené à voir dans l’Haussmannisation moins un urbanisme qu’une politique à la recherche d’un point d’équilibre favorable à l’Empire.}}}\]
development of a new urban being, as if the Empire itself liberated forces in movement that turn their back on its principles” (Gaillard 2000: 428). We can thus see how Gaillard stays within the Durkheimian legacy: while she sees political principles motivating the public works (the most important of which seems to be to create a hierarchy of urban spaces, which pushes back the poor to the periphery), their practical application encounters forces (such as rapid immigration, political practices, historical path dependencies) which intermingle with the desired course of action. The end goal of her study was to understand the legislative elections of 1869, and through these, to explain the role of the 18 years of imperial urban in producing ideas so different from those that existed in 1848 (Gaillard 1975: 4-5)

For her, then, the public works were a constant balancing act by the Empire to maintain a sufficient support base. While Gaillard’s interpretation of the reasons motivating the Council of State’s 1858 decision against Haussmann is not exactly political (as we have seen above, she assumes the courts supported property owners because the magistrates were themselves property owners), her discussion of the consequences of these decisions surely is. The first is the embrace of the public works by property owners who now received by law the value-added to their buildings from the public works. Gaillard notes the sudden increase in petitions demanding street creation and improvements but also, as has already been noted, that the cost of the public works in their later stage increased exponentially (Gaillard 2000: 29). The second consequence she notes concerns expropriations, and the fact that they had become very advantageous for property owners from the 1860s. This she states brought back a distributive urbanism (“urbanisme répartiteur”), or an urbanism in which the sequencing of the works and who will be served first becomes a central political concern (Gaillard 2000: 29). These two consequences created a dilemma for the Empire after Haussmann’s legislative defeats: “Putting an end to the public works angers property owners and builders on whom the Empire has chosen to lean on, just as the public works are responsible for a financial impasse that foreshadow the end of haussmannisation” (Gaillard 2000: 430). Gaillard’s conceptualisation of the relationship between Haussmann and property owners is thus fundamentally a question of political support, and it is a crucial insight that needs to be carried forward.

---

xv Translation mine, here is the original: «Tout se passe comme si le renouvellement rapide de la capitale entrepris par l’Empire suscitait un développement nouveau de l’être urbain, comme si l’Empire délivrait lui-même, des forces de mouvement qui se retournent contre ses principes.»

xvi Translation mine, here is the original: «L’arrêt des travaux mécontente la propriété et le bâtiment sur lesquels l’Empire a choisi de s’appuyer, et cependant les travaux sont responsables d’une impasse financière qui présage la fin de l’Haussmannisation.»
SUTCLIFFE

Sutcliffe’s main aim is to position the public works in the history of what he calls comprehensive urban planning, which he believes Haussmann fell short of because of his lack of regulation of private development: “Second Empire Paris, perhaps, came closest to planning without actually getting there. The authorities spent a hundred million pounds on public works in less than twenty years and introduced stricter and more refined building regulations. However, Haussmann’s brand of intervention was too dependent on massive investment of public funds to achieve that essential quality of planning, the power to perpetuate itself. [...] There were too many gaps in the powers available for the strategy followed to amount to planning, and indeed one searches Haussmann’s memoirs in vain for any idea of comprehensive urban planning, even though he wrote them as late as the early 1890s” (Sutcliffe 1981: 204). The reason for its failure to achieve comprehensive planning is the “absence of a balanced distribution of specific interventions between the positive (public provision of facilities) and the negative (regulation of private land use) modes” (Sutcliffe 1981: 204).

The court decisions were thus important because they showed the “authorities’ basic unwillingness to disturb private interests” (Sutcliffe 1981: 134) and thus showed that Haussmann had no ‘negative mode’ of planning, no power to control private interests. Sutcliffe notes that the same phenomena occurred with respect to building regulations, stating that “building in Second Empire Paris was not substantially more restricted than under Louis XVI” (Sutcliffe 1981: 134). This lack of a negative mode of planning proved that Haussmann had not achieved comprehensive planning. In contrast to Benevolo, Sutcliffe does not distinguish between what Haussmann achieved and the planning practice that he pursued to arrive at those goals. This can explain why his interpretation of the 1858 Council of State defeats is framed as a general movement of opposition rather than one that is specifically attacking Haussmann’s actions: “In the following decade, however, a sullen opposition began to make itself felt at all levels of French society to the emperor’s constant political and legal léger-de-main. The courts began to favour a more restrictive interpretation of the compulsory-purchase powers while compensation, which was fixed by panels of property-owners, rapidly inflated” (Sutcliffe 1981: 133). Sutcliffe’s situation of Haussmann in the history of planning is an issue that will be frequently returned to in this thesis.

CHOAY

Choay (1983, 1996) has attempted to rehabilitate Haussmann, describing his planning as one of regularisation, based around the interconnection of comprehensive and layered systems that fulfilled the twin objectives of circulation and hygiene, which she defines as “the will to optimise the
city’s functioning by the integration of the ends and of the means put at his disposal by science and technology” (Choay 1996: 274). Choay’s work has been very closely linked to the autobiography Haussmann wrote towards the end of his life, his Mémoires that she edited and closely studied. This experience gave her the opportunity to take this text, concerned mostly with the major projects he undertook and the practical steps he took to carry them through, and to attempt to extract from it an understanding of how Haussmann himself understood his contribution to the theory of urbanism. What she reads between the lines is the broad schema that framed his practice: a preoccupation with circulation and sanitary improvements, a conception of the city as an integrated whole, and thus the need to implement his solutions in the same way everywhere. What she finds however is that: “Haussmann’s thinking is not carried out in the abstract, but is concerned with specific case, that of Paris which is to be adapted to the requirements of the new era, or as it is frequently expressed in the Mémoires, to regularise. We can call ‘urbanism of regularisation’ that practice which, against theoretical urbanism, does not contend to scientific universalism, is not based on a social critique and does not propose a spatial model” (Choay in Agulhon, 1983: 166). What is interesting in her account is that she specifically refers to Haussmann’s work as a practice; a mode of being that is concerned with action, not with theorisation. The notion of practice is one that will frame this investigation on Haussmann and the public works.

RONCAYOLO

Roncayolo is another scholar whose lineage can be traced back the Durkheim and Halbwachs. This can be seen is his use of ‘social forces’ as key explanatory devices in his account of Haussmann’s public works. His conception of the 1858 defeats is interesting in that it takes a view that goes against that of other authors. For him, there is nothing particularly interesting about the 1858 defeats as they are only a confirmation of the power of the social force of property: “The imperial regime itself arbitrates and compromises between Saint-Simonian ambitions and the social force, the ‘principle’ that is property, in its classical definition. The law, in theory and practice, leans in that direction, exceptions notwithstanding, and the 1852 decree is one such exception; the institutions,
like the Council of State, also\textsuperscript{\textlxvi} (Roncayolo, in Agulhon, 1983: 114). What is more interesting for him is the 1852 decree which we will discuss in more detail in chapter 4. This decree is important because it marks a lonely exception to the overall triumph of the social force of property; it was the only moment at which property was really threatened by state intervention. Haussmann’s defeats in the Council of State can thus be seen as a return to normality. Haussmann’s only resort was to attempt to salvage the power this decree lent him for as long as he could. In Roncayolo’s account it is thus Haussmann that was in a defensive position, not property owners who knew that the power of history was on their side. He summarises this period thus: “This battle of interests, settled most often in the property owners’ favour, is not only a page of social history. It marks the topographical design of a large section of the Haussmannian projects\textsuperscript{\textlxvii} (Roncayolo, in Agulhon, 1983: 114). This means that though Roncayolo does not provide a detailed account of Haussmann’s 1858 defeats: they are seen as a return to a normality governed by the social force of property. This invocation of a social force evacuates the need for a precise mechanism through which the 1858 decisions were taken. Roncayolo’s insights will be used in chapter 4 but we will only discuss his approach again at the end of chapter 6.

**HARVEY**

For Harvey, these decisions were part of an organised counter-attack from property owners faced with Haussmann’s attempt to impose the capitalist form of private property on them: “It was, in short, the capitalist form of private property in land that Haussmann encouraged, and in so doing he collided head-on with more traditional and deeply entrenched attitudes and practices” (Harvey 2006a: 127). Harvey adds that this counter-attack, and the financial rewards it brought property owners, brought political advantage to the Empire at the expense of Haussmann’s municipal administration: “A material foundation was laid for a political rapprochement between Parisian property owners and Empire. Unbeholden at the beginning, the Empire increasingly looked to them as a base of support in a capital where opposition sentiment dominated as early as 1857” (Harvey 2006a: 127).

\textsuperscript{\textlxvi} Translation mine, here is the original: «Le régime impérial lui même arbitre ou compose entre les ambitions Saint-Simoniennes et la force sociale, le ‘principe’ que constitue la propriété, dans sa définition classique. La loi, dans la lettre et la pratique, incline en ce sens, sauf exception, et le décret de 1852 en est une; les institutions, comme le Conseil d’État, aussi.

\textsuperscript{\textlxvii} Translation mine, here is the original: «Cette lutte d’intérêts, tranchée le plus souvent en faveur du propriétaire, n’est pas seulement une page d’histoire sociale. Elle marque le dessin topographique d’une grande partie des opérations haussmannienne.»
We thus get two things from Harvey. But before we present them, his thought needs to be discussed briefly. For Harvey, the spatial configuration of cities in modern capitalist societies is linked to the issue of capital accumulation and any significant change in the spatial ordering of a city is typically set into motion by a crisis in capital accumulation. It is in the 19th century that “the formation of physical and social infrastructures adequate to support the reproduction of both capital and labor power while serving as efficient frameworks for the organization of production, consumption and exchange surged to the forefront of political and managerial concerns” (Harvey 1989: 30). For Harvey then, the public works were a productive investment in the built environment, in opposition to the vast program of public works in 1848, the workshops, that indebted the regime and whose closure led to revolution that same year (Harvey 1989: 81). They were productive precisely because they allowed for capital over-accumulation to be resolved through the creation of a new spatial configuration. But this necessitated a profound change in land-based capital: it needed to be involved in the circulation of capital. In order for capital to be released and to circulate freely the attitudes and values of property owners had to be changed. There needed to occur a profound change from the situation under the July Monarchy in which the powerful class of property owners “undertook few improvements except those dictated by personal gain, whim, or the search for status. The capital they engaged was mainly seen as securing revenue or, in the case of shopkeepers, a use value, rather than the productive circulation of capital via the construction of the built environment” (Harvey 2006a: 130).

We can now see how his conception of the public works gives us an explanation as to the occurrence of the Council of State decisions. The opposition to Haussmann from property owners is understood as a reaction to the demands of capital circulation: “If Paris was to be transformed, then capital had to be mobilized, not only into buying and selling but also into demolition, reconstruction, and long-term management of the urban space according to collectivist principles that were quite alien to the privatism of traditional property owners” (Harvey 2006a: 132). Property owners were thus pushed out of their comfort zone by Haussmann’s insistence on the capitalist form of private property. The second insight we get from Harvey is that property owners were not only those that needed to be coerced into promoting the free circulation of land-based capital, they were also a powerful social class that was courted by the Empire for its political support. In order to survive, the Empire had to free the circulation of capital and this meant changing the way in which property owners treated their property. But this had to be done in a way that did not alienate property owners from the Empire. Haussmann was thus caught in the middle of this contradiction. His 1858 legal defeats are the nexus between these two contradictory forces pulling on property owners. As Harvey sees it: “if
the property owners consolidated their alliance with the Empire, therefore, they did so partly at Haussmann’s expense” (Harvey 2006a: 133). Haussmann used all the means at his disposal to break property owner resistance, a move which in turn triggered a counter attack from property owners through the Council of State.

The next chapter will discuss in more detail how his framework leads him to view Haussmann’s public works in following way: “The towering figure of Haussmann dominates the state apparatus of Paris throughout the Second Empire. To say that he merely rode out the storm of social forces unleashed through the rapid accumulation of capital is by no means to diminish his stature, because he rode out the storm with consummate artistry and orchestrated its turbulent power with remarkable skill and vision for some sixteen years. It was, however, a storm he neither created nor tamed, but a deep turbulence in the evolution of French economy, politics and culture, that in the end threw him as mercilessly to the dogs as he threw medieval Paris to the démolisseurs (demolishers)” (Harvey 2006a: 152).

JORDAN

Jordan’s contribution to the public works literature can be found in his preoccupation with understanding the paradox at the centre of Haussmann’s work: “He was not a great man so much as a representative figure – the professional, bourgeois bureaucrat, an early and impressive example of the expert, the technocrat, the urban planner – yet his life’s work, the transformation of Paris, is a great and enduring accomplishment. Beautiful, bejewelled, endlessly fascinating, it is not the kind of work we associate with bureaucrats and bureaucracies” (Jordan 1995: xix). His book is then an attempt to use the events of the public works to flesh out Haussmann’s character. For Jordan, the defeats Haussmann suffered in the Council of State seem to be an entry point into the Prefect’s nature at a time when he was facing a challenge that was going to have drastic financial consequences for the his public works programme. This particular focus of his investigation means that he is less interested in the causes of the defeats than in the way in which these difficulties led Haussmann to devise new ways of financing his public works programme. He borrows his interpretation of the defeats from Benevolo, a planning historian we will discuss at length below. This interpretation highlights the opposition of property owners to his use of the expropriation laws: “the Council of State and the Cour de Cassation, which he could not control, continued to side with the concrete rights of the landowners against the abstract rights of “the city”, an administrative entity” (Jordan 1995: 240). This un referenced sentence bears an uncanny resemblance to Benevolo’s formulation detailed above, which frames Haussmann as defending “the rights of an abstract
administrative entity (‘the city’) against the concrete rights of the citizens” (Benevolo 1967: 136).

Further evidence that Jordan is predominantly interested in this episode of the public works as a way into Haussmann’s paradoxical character can be found in the absence of development of this conceptualisation of the opposition in terms of ‘rights’. What he takes out from this is that property owners had become a “formidable competitor for control of urban space” (Jordan 1995: 241) that Haussmann had to fight creatively to complete the public works.

CONCLUSION

This survey of the literature on the public works thus brings us to the following conclusion. If this investigation is to focus on Haussmann’s planning practice, then it must be able to account for Haussmann’s legal defeats in the Council of State. And this means that the relationship between Haussmann, property owners and the imperial regime must be properly understood and theorised. This chapter has also made clear that this calls for a more detailed discussion of a number of existing interpretations and theorisations of these relationships. Although from different traditions, Daumard, Gaillard, Harvey, Benevolo and Sutcliffe all have compelling insights into the opposition between these actors. But these accounts also raise insights and questions that warrant further investigation. Daumard and Gaillard highlight the importance of both economic and political tensions inherent in the opposition between Haussmann and property owners, while the accounts of Harvey and Sutcliffe both point to a grey zone in the understanding of the origins and impacts of Haussmann’s legislative defeats: if the ‘after’ is very well research and theorised, there is no parallel investigation into the way in which Haussmann dealt with property owners before those defeats. In reference to Sutcliffe, was he exercising the negative mode of planning? And with respect to Harvey, was he already just ‘riding the storm’? Finally, the contradiction in Benevolo’s interpretation – a conservative Haussmann opposing a conservative Napoleon III – points to a need to better understand what was at stake for Haussmann in the public works.

Taken together, these accounts indicate that the issue of Haussmann’s defeats in the courts, the reasons for his opposition with property owners, and the relation between Haussmann and the imperial regime can be integrated through an investigation into Haussmann’s planning practice. The notion of planning practice allows us to separate Haussmann’s method from the imperial regime’s programme for the city. It gives us a way of thinking about the opposition between Haussmann and property owners as produced by his concrete actions rather than his role within larger processes. And the notion of planning practice allows us to precisely identify what was defeated in the Council of State. A hypothesis we can put forward here is that the courts defeated a planning practice that
was opposed to by both property owners and the imperial regime. The aim of the next chapter will be to explore the theoretical implications of the findings uncovered here and to propose a theoretical framework that can be used to investigate a planning practice and the opposition it produced.
CHAPTER 2: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF AGENCY AND OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to arrive at a theoretical framework that offers a solution, when used to understand the public works, to the empirical issues that will be identified in the accounts of Daumard, Gaillard, Harvey, Benevolo and Sutcliffe. The empirical inconsistencies within their frameworks centre on the events that led to and on the consequences of Haussmann’s 1858 legislative defeats in the Council of State. In order to present a framework that offers a solution to these empirical problems, it is necessary to first show the theoretical roots of the empirical problems highlighted in the accounts of the five authors discussed in the last chapter. Accordingly, the first section of this chapter will extract from the empirical issues in their accounts the theoretical assumptions that lie underneath and are responsible for them. These assumptions are the theoretical moves that need to be challenged if a solution to the empirical issues presented in the last chapter are to be resolved.

The next section will use the theoretical assumptions uncovered in the works of Daumard, Gaillard, Harvey, Benevolo and Sutcliffe to find a suitable framework for our investigation into the public works. It will be shown that the assumptions of these five authors can be classified according to the way in which they conceptualise agency and opposition. From these assumptions, a picture of the framework needed will start to form: it will need to allow for agency and for a conceptualisation of opposition. The discussion will thus move on to the discussion of Sartre, as one of the thinkers who has most ardently sought to theorise a notion of radical individual agency. Badiou will then be introduced as a thinker who has attempted to conceptualise the way in which this type of agency can create ruptures that are ultimately defeated by a powerful opposition.

The next section will serve to introduce the framework that will be used to offer up an alternative to the theoretical assumptions underpinning the accounts of the five authors discussed in the first section. This will be done by showing the progression in Badiou’s thought from thinking about being to thinking about appearing, and how his notion of the event relates to these two domains. His notion of the structure of appearances will first give us a static view of the world appearing. The discussion will then move on to the analysis of the way in which change can occur in the realm of appearing. This dynamic analysis will set the scene for a more detailed exploration of his notion of
the subject and its key role in the transformation of the structure of appearances within the context of a political event.

The final section will thus present the way in which Badiou conceives of subjects. This will be introduced by discussing the way in which Badiou understands the relation between his own politics and his philosophy of the political. The importance of this relation lies in Badiou’s ambivalent treatment of the role of the state, an ambivalence that turns out to be productive because it made him posit the compatibility of very different political subjectivities with a single philosophical model. That is, both the mass rebel (which acts in defiance of the state) and the state revolutionary (which acts from within it) can be conceptualised as the faithful subjects of a political event. The determinations of such a faithful subject (equality, authority, confidence and will) and the way in which they are articulated will produce a different answer for the different situations that the faithful subject is seeking to overturn. This section ends by presenting the other subjects of a political event, the reactive and obscure subjects, who act in opposition to the faithful subject in a particular sequence.

In the conclusion, the ways in which a framework based on Badiou can be used to answer and complement the accounts of the five authors discussed in the first section will be presented.

FROM EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS TO THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

This first section will return to the five scholars of the public works singled out in the last section of the previous chapter as being those which had most clearly engaged with the opposition between Haussmann, property owners and the imperial regime and who had sought to explain Haussmann’s 1858 defeat in the Council of State. While the last chapter presented their accounts and highlighted the difference in their approaches, this chapter will pick up on empirical inconsistencies in each of these accounts and attempt to understand their origins. To do this, each author will be discussed once more. First, the empirical inconsistency in the account will be drawn out. In a second stage, the empirical problem will be translated into a theoretical problem. Finally, the aim will be to identify the theoretical assumptions at the root of this theoretical problem. This means explaining the empirical inconsistency in their accounts of the 1858 Council of State decision by the basic assumptions of their theoretical frameworks. It is in relation to these theoretical assumptions that any alternative framework invoked to understand the public works must be positioned.
The last chapter presented Daumard’s approach to the transformation of Paris. Her work on the relation between Haussmann and property owners was shown to have been focused on the perspective of property owners, and more precisely on situating their actions within the changes occurring over the wider period (1809-1880). The public works are but one historical moment inscribed within the long run trends of a shrinking number of Parisians able to afford to buy property. In this context, those 17 years of heightened construction activity, speculation and property prices deeply conditioned property owner responses. Daumard’s focus is on the private interests at play behind the lofty principles invoked by Haussmann (public interest, sanitation, employment possibilities, private enterprise development) and property owners (the rights of property) over the proper compensation to be paid to those who had been expropriated (Daumard 1965: 210). But it is the latter she focuses on, giving us very little to understand the actions of the municipal administration. Indeed, Haussmann’s actions are taken as occurring outside of the frame of her analysis, as another of the social forces impacting on the decisions of property owners. The focus is thus not on the interplay between the actions of the municipal administration and the decisions of property owners but on the way in which the former, as one force among many others, shaped the decisions of the latter.

This leaves us with a missing portion of the analysis: how did the opposition between private economic interests and the municipal administration unfold? In Daumard’s account, interest is only on the consequences of Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State and especially on the way in which it contributed to the rising compensations given to those who had been expropriated. If our main task is to understand why Haussmann’s planning practice was defeated in the Council of State when he seemed to enjoy full support from the emperor and how that defeat impacted on his practice, then the missing portion in Daumard’s account becomes significant. In order to uncover the theoretical assumptions at the foundation of her selective treatment of the actors involved in the public works, a first step is to move from this empirical issue in her work to its theoretical manifestation.

Theoretically, what is most surprising about her work is the difference in status between the municipal administration on the one hand and the property owners on the other. While neither are attributed agency – Haussmann depends on the legal dispositions for his actions and the property owners respond to the signals of the property market – the way in which they are constrained is given markedly different attention. Could this be because Daumard’s aim is to understand using
quantitative information how a particular social group reacted to wider social forces within a definite time frame? It would surely be much more difficult to transpose such a method of analysis to the decisions of the municipal administration concerning the public works, given the variety of influences acting on it. The success of her approach is thus in part dependent on her circumscribed area of investigation, and on her decision to treat Haussmann’s actions as an external force acting on the property owners. In this way, she evacuates from the requirements of her analysis all that concerns the interplay between Haussmann and property owners and all possibility of treating the relationship between them as dynamic, as one in which the actions of the one impact on the other and progressively transform that relationship. As a corollary to this, her analysis doesn’t offer an indication of what the main nexus of opposition between Haussmann and property owners might have consisted in, nor the reasons that may have been at play underneath it.

The dissymmetry between a municipal administration construed as a social force and the property owners placed at the centre of an analysis is problematic theoretically. It makes it impossible for her account to treat the relation between Haussmann and property owners as one that is mutually impacting and constraining. Instead, the planning apparatus evolves in a separate sphere, bound by constraints that exist independently from the property owners. And this latter group itself reacts to the actions of the municipal administration as only one of the multiple constraints it faces. At the heart of her theoretical framework is thus a clear separation between the actions that are to be explained and those that are to be taken for granted – the issue for our purposes is that Haussmann, whose actions we set out to understand, is relegated by Daumard to the category of social force, and as such is behind the artificial boundary of what she set out to explain. But what are the theoretical assumptions that can explain this boundary-setting?

The major assumption at play in her work seems to be that actors respond to wider social forces and do not choose their course of action. This we have seen exemplified in her account of how property owners were led to progressively demand more in compensation for their expropriation. The second assumption follows from this and seems to state that the social forces constraining a particular set of actors are themselves the responses of other actors to another set of constraints operating at a different level: here, the municipal administration whose actions act as a social force constraining property owner actions is itself shown to be constrained by different considerations (such as the legal system). Directly related is the fact that Daumard seems to think that this sequence of structural conditions has to have a cut-off point, i.e. that some actions need to be taken as granted in order to understand their constraining impact on the next set of actors. In our
case, the set of constraints on Haussmann’s actions are not investigated in any depth and the focus is clearly on establishing them as one of the currents pushing property owners to act. What this means is that **there can be no theorisation of the relation between different sets of actors as an opposition if they fall within different levels of the structure**. The assumption underlying Daumard’s theoretical framework is that all actors are merely responding to the social forces that are acting on them. But because each set of actors is, presumably, located at different places in the structure they each are faced with different social forces. What could be construed as an opposition between different sets of actors is in her framework conceptualised as these actors being pushed in different (and sometimes opposing) directions by the idiosyncratic social forces directing their actions. Haussmann is pushed on a certain course of action by the legislation at his disposal; property owners are pushed to act in certain ways because of Haussmann’s actions. But these two movements are independent from each other – the fact that they are going in opposite directions is only of passing interest.

**GAILLARD**

The last chapter presented Gaillard’s account of the public works as one in which the major determinant was Napoleon III’s desire to safeguard his regime. We learnt that the importance of Haussmann’s 1858 defeat in the Council of State came from its effect on the relation between property owners and the Second Empire: property owners found themselves in a situation in which they did not need to contribute to the public works but still received by law the value-added to their buildings from the public works. The court decision also made expropriations more advantageous to property owners. All of this meant, however, that the public works became more and more costly as time passed, leading Gaillard to present their continuation in the 1860s as a dilemma for the regime: putting an end to them would anger the supportive property owners and the construction industry but pushing them forward would irremediably lead to financial disaster (Gaillard 2000: 430). We can thus see that Gaillard thinks the public works cannot be divorced from the evolution of Napoleon III’s regime. What is perplexing is that given the importance of the imperial regime in her account of the public works, there is no clear explanation of the way in which it engineered the rapprochement between property owners and the public works. That is, no link is made between the regime and the legislative defeats suffered by Haussmann in the Council of State. For Gaillard, the courts acted for reasons independent of political manoeuvring: they supported property owners because the magistrates were themselves property owners (Gaillard 2000: 29). There seems to be a blind spot in her analysis: if the public works were such an important tool for the emperor to gain support from key social groups, and if Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State was precisely the spark that led
to their rapprochement with the regime, can it not be suspected that Napoleon III had some kind of role in this process? It would be a very fortuitous coincidence if this were not the case. In order to understand why Gaillard did not investigate this relationship, we need to abstract from this empirical blind spot and understand its theoretical roots.

Theoretically, the issue at hand here is her conceptualisation of the state and the modalities of its relation with society. Her account seems to isolate the state from society and to disallow an investigation into the relation between the state and social groups past that of the categories of support and opposition. The following passage is a clear exemplification of this tendency:

“The Empire’s active urbanism does not only come up against the forces of inertia named provincial resistance, limits on fiscal efforts and retreat in the face of indebtedness. It itself secretes the opposition that puts a brake to its momentum, in the shape of inequalities, rivalries and coveting that would not have existed in a time of stability. In other words, in Paris, the regime did not only meet the opposition of a reborn democracy and of the emerging working movement, it was in part abandoned by precisely those who, having already benefited from the works had nothing left to expect, and by those had arrived at the banquet last and were desperate to be served”xxi (Gaillard 2000: 123-124).

Seen from the perspective of the state, the study of the public works can be reduced to the establishment of a balance sheet, attributing plusses and minuses to social groups and forces according to whether they act in support of or in opposition to the regime. What this obscures are the relations between the state and the institutions loosely connected to it, be it the municipal administration or the courts. Most important for our purposes is the relationship between the imperial regime and Haussmann’s planning practice. Indeed, as seen in the last chapter, Benevolo’s account introduced the notion that Haussmann was going against the imperial regime in pushing through his interpretation of the planning regulations (Benevolo 1967: 136). We thus see that Gaillard’s notion of ‘imperial urbanism’ does not allow for the separation of the imperial backing of the public works from the actions taken by the municipal administration to carry them out in

xxi Translation mine, here is the original: «L’urbanisme actif de l’Empire ne bute pas seulement en effet sur les forces d’inertie qui se nomment résistance de la province, limites de l’effort fiscal, recul devant l’endettement. Il secrète lui-même l’opposition qui freine son élan sous les espèces d’inégalités, de rivalités, de convoitises qui n’eussent point existé en période de stabilité. En d’autres termes, le régime n’a pas seulement rencontré a Paris l’opposition de la démocratie renaissante et du mouvement ouvrier naissant, il a été lâché en partie par ceux-là même qui ayant bénéficié des travaux n’avaient plus rien à attendre et ceux qui, venus les derniers au banquet, désespéraient d’être servis.»
practice. The planning apparatus is contained within the state, but the courts are not: this inconsistency emerges out of a priority given to the theorisation of the relation between the state and those social groups who were most obviously supporting or opposing the state, to the detriment of the relation between the state and those actors and institutions loosely connected to it – and whose relations with the state are more ambiguous and difficult to ascertain. Another casualty of this prioritisation is a way to theorise the relationship between social groups and those institutions. To understand where this priority in her theoretical framework comes from we need to look at the main assumptions holding it together.

As in Daumard, the primary assumption of Gaillard’s framework is that there is no agency, that individual actions are merely a response to wider social forces. But the difference with Daumard is that the social force that constrains their action is the city, ‘la Ville’, the collective personality of Parisians as a whole. By collective personality, she is referring to the relation between two traits: progress through industry and democratic exaltation (Gaillard 2000: 426). Parisians, as a people, are defined as holding these two traits no matter what actions the imperial regime is attempting to subdue them with, that is, to accept progress and Empire. In a framework in which no single actor or social group has agency, but in which the sum of all these individual parts have a collective personality defined as an aspiration for progress and democracy, how can the role of the state be conceptualised? For Gaillard, the state is at the same time exterior to the city but essential to the development of its personality. That is because the state, through the public works, has a direct impact on the city: it attempts to bring Parisians into the fold. This separating out of the state from the city explains the prioritisation inherent in her framework of the relation between the state and Parisian social groups: she is in fact gauging the relationship between the state and the city itself, that is, how the city reacted to the Empire’s attempts to co-opt it. Her disregard for the relation between the state and those institutions connected to it is thus explained by the fact that this relation is internal to the state, and does not affect – in her view – the city and its personality which is her main point of interest. And because she is not interested in the internal workings of the state, she does not seek to ascertain the relationship between social groups within the city and the institutions of the state: such as the relationship between Haussmann and property owners which is at centre of my preoccupations.

HARVEY

In the last chapter, we saw that Harvey’s account of the public works conceptualised the relation between Haussmann and property owners as subsumed under the imperatives of the circulation of
capital. In order for the public works to unfold, Haussmann needed to liberate the capital that property owners had over-accumulated through their unwillingness to view property as a form of capital that needed to be mobilised and liberated. Property owners thus opposed Haussmann’s planning practice because he sought to force onto them the capitalist form of private property. The 1858 defeat in the Council of State was a counter-attack by property owners to regain control over the use of their property. But for Harvey, it also marked a political turning point as it cemented the alliance of property owners with the imperial regime at the expense of Haussmann. In contrast to Gaillard then, Harvey introduces a separation between the regime and the planning apparatus. But while he tells us what the impact of the legal decision was on the relationship between property owners and the regime, he does not really discuss how it impacted on Haussmann’s dealings with the property owners, and consequently on the public works as a whole. The fact that property owners won their counter-attack against Haussmann must mean that they reverted back to the practices that had fuelled capital over-accumulation. This contradicts the fact that the public works went on for a dozen more years after 1858 and in an atmosphere of increased speculation (after the 1858 ruling made expropriations more advantageous to property owners) and of contracting out to private developers, all of this within a much larger area after the 1860 annexation of the surrounding boroughs to the city of Paris. Harvey’s account thus leaves us with an unanswered question: since the successful opposition of property owners to Haussmann’s planning practice did not halt the course of the public works then how exactly did it impact his practice and the public works? In other words, how did the 1858 Council of State decision impact the circulation of capital in Paris?

Lurking behind this question emerging from Harvey’s account of the public works is the issue of agency in the face of the logic of the circulation of capital. Harvey construes Haussmann as a pathetic figure who rode out the storm unleashed by the rapid capital accumulation of the public works he worked to liberate. All of his actions tended towards freeing capital from the binds of myopic property owners and to hopelessly attempting to tame its circulation. Haussmann was merely the puppet of a “deep turbulence in the evolution of French economy, politics and culture, that in the end threw him as mercilessly to the dogs as he threw medieval Paris to the démolisseurs (demolishers)” (Harvey 2006a: 152). But this account runs into problems when it seeks to explain the relation between Haussmann and property owners: instead of reverting back to their myopic ways after defeating Haussmann, property owners instead participated in an even greater degree to the circulation of capital. Can it be that Haussmann before 1858 was not seeking to liberate capital circulation but to take control over it? And that his defeat allowed property owners to participate to the full in the rapid capital accumulation of Paris in the 1860s?
What this problem highlights is the need for a discussion of the notion of agency. What does it mean to say, as Harvey does, that Haussmann “rode out the storm with consummate artistry and orchestrated its turbulent power with remarkable skill and vision for some sixteen years” (Harvey 2006a: 152)? For Harvey, agency is diffused out to all individuals and the possibility of overturning the impersonal force of capital circulation is latent in all domains of society: “This converges directly on the single most important question: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions to transform the structure of capitalist social ordering to produce an alternative kind of society called "socialist" or "Communist"? Marx's conclusion was quite simple and, I think, indubitably correct: the only way to transcend capitalism was through a class struggle waged against capitalist class and their associated interests across all moments of the social process. So the question for Marx is not who is going to be an historical agent because all of us are. But how can one kind of collective agent crystallize out as an overwhelming political force that can accomplish this revolutionary task” (Harvey 1996: 107).

But even though this agency is everywhere, it is rendered impotent by the power of capital and of the class that acts in its interests. Capital is the social relation that determines the course of history through its circulation and its cycles of accumulation and devaluation. For Harvey, political action, opposition and ultimately revolution can only occur through the overcoming, once and for all time, of the structures of power and class, such as through the synthesis of all local anti-capitalists movements in a common commitment to communism. What this kind of framework makes difficult is the theorisation of opposition that exists outside of this all-encompassing relation between this ‘collective agent’ and capital. It precludes the thought of an opposition to capital that is conceptualised not as the final planetary victory over capital and the class that serves it but as a localised skirmish that reveals the shaky foundations of its power. This is precisely the type of opposition we are interested in here. Haussmann was operating from within the state apparatus but we have seen that both property owners and the imperial regime held a degree of responsibility for his defeats in the courts. To understand such an opposition, one would have to reframe the notion of agency and its relation to the state. We would have to posit that Haussmann was able to act, from within the state apparatus, in a way that was free from the structures of power and class that drive the development of history, that is, in a way that was oblivious to the tyranny of socioeconomic necessity. One would have to posit that Haussmann acted against the development of capitalism. This would entail a very different notion of agency from that of Harvey’s framework, one that is more undetermined, more Sartrean. One in which it would be possible to oppose the circulation of
capital outside of a collective agent, in a local battle aimed not at final resolution but at revealing that it is possible to act in opposition to the circulation of capital. Such a notion of agency would make it possible to conceive of Haussmann as aiming for control over the circulation of capital rather than for its liberation in the service of capital. And this would in turn mean that the opposition such an individual faced would be directly related to the course of action it freely embarked upon.

BENEVOLO

Throughout this chapter and the last, it has been argued that Benevolo’s main contribution to the scholarship on the public works was the separation he introduces between the Second Empire and Haussmann’s planning apparatus. Haussmann’s 1858 defeat was a sign for Benevolo that he had strayed too far in his planning practice from what the imperial regime endorsed, which effectively meant that he had “refused to accept the political logic of the regime which he personally supported so whole-heartedly” (Benevolo 1967: 136). The significance of this episode, for Benevolo, emerges from the fact that planning after 1848 had been captured by conservative politicians who had sought to strip from its practice any notion of politics. This meant that planning had to be understood as a purely technical exercise that could be used to further the political goals of these conservative regimes. Haussmann, in his dedication to the successful execution of the mission he had been entrusted, went beyond purely technical planning by pushing for an interpretation of the expropriation regulations that was strongly opposed by property owners. In so doing, he entered into a political conflict that opposed the public works to the rights of the individual, a tension that Benevolo believes lies at the heart of modern urban planning.

The originality and pertinence of this interpretation of the 1858 Council of State decision have already been highlighted. But we can now focus on the unanswered question this account leaves us with: if it is politics that pushed Haussmann to disrupt the rights of property owners, then what kind of politics was it exactly? Benevolo tells us that Haussmann was “a man who never confused the technical and the administrative with politics” (Benevolo 1967: 134), that his “personal views were strictly conservative” (Benevolo 1967: 134) and that it was “natural that Haussmann should give unqualified support to the future Napoleon III and should remain faithful to him until the fall of the Empire” (Benevolo 1967: 134). Should the isolated instance in which Haussmann decided to go against the ‘political logic’ of the regime be attributed to a simple error on his part, as a step too far taken in the midst of the action? Or is it an indication of the seedlings of a political stance that somehow found their way into Haussmann’s planning practice?
The crux of the issue here is with Benevolo’s conception of planning as an activity that has two components, what he calls the technical and the political. Historically, there have been configurations in which these two dimensions have been fused, and some in which they have been separated. The line separating out these two periods was the 1848 revolution. Before that date, planning been undertaken by specialists and officials but had kept close links to the activism of the utopians (Owen, Saint Simon, Fourier, Cabet and Godin) and thus, their “achievements, even the most technical, had their roots firmly planted in matters of ideology, which in turn corresponded largely with the beginnings of modern socialism” (Benevolo 1967: xii). After that, however, politics and planning split, leaving planning as a technical activity ready to be captured by the regimes in place, what he calls the ‘new conservative ideology’. It is in this new context that “Haussmann set the pattern for the town-planner as a specialist worker who declines all responsibility for initial choice, and therefore in practice for the town planner who is at the service of the new ruling class” (Benevolo 1967: 135).

Such a clear split between those vast periods of time, across very different national contexts, naturally invites caution. Evacuating all notions of politics from Haussmann’s planning practice and stripping away from it ‘all responsibility for initial choice’ may only be one perspective from which to judge his actions. As Benevolo himself states, “the modern and positive aspects of his work are to be found precisely in the independence he allows himself, as a pure administrator, vis-à-vis other State department” (Benevolo 1967: 135). The problem here may be that the way in which Benevolo thinks of politics in planning only really concerns the level of initial choice and does not intervene in the day-to-day actions of the planning apparatus. His framework does not then allow for a positive theorisation of the politics underlying Haussmann’s practice, but only negative determinations: against his conservative political views, against the conservatism of Napoleon III and against the individualism of property owners. What is needed here is a positive theorisation of his motivation to carry out the public works, and thus of the politics underlying his planning practice. It is only with a theorisation of his actions that seriously takes into account the tension between Haussmann as the epitome of the technical administrator and Haussmann as the planner who refused to accept the political logic of the regime that it will be possible to understand his actions leading up to the 1858 defeat.

In contrast to the three scholars discussed above, a basic assumption of Benevolo’s framework is that actors do have a degree of agency. Napoleon III’s agency is paramount: he was responsible for the public works themselves and for their overall layout. In Haussmann’s case, this agency is the
relative independence from his superiors he fought hard to establish for his planning practice. None of the forces directing the actions of individuals in the other three frameworks are present here. Instead, we have a very clear statement of the importance of politics for the public works: planning is a political decision in itself, not a technical practice that is inherently political. There is a historical assumption at the foundation of his framework: planning can either be political (and in this sense politics is equated with the ideology of the left) or it can be stripped of its politics and become a purely technical matter (and fall prey to capture by the ideology of the right). Depending on the historical period, then, planning can come to represent very different things. But the definition of politics is fixed and it is equated for Benevolo with ‘social and economic planning’. Politics can thus only emerge when there is a relationship between the planning of cities and social and economic planning, such as the situation in Europe until the 1848 revolution, a situation that now needs to be returned to: “for progressive tendencies of modern planning can be practically realised only if they make contact once more with those political forces which tend toward a similar general transformation of society” (Benevolo 1967: xiii). In modern times, the assumption is that the actions of planners are driven by technical considerations, with none of the ‘progressive tendencies of planning’. Such was the case of Haussmann. Based on this assumption, if opposition to a particular planning practice is to occur, then it must the opposition between technical considerations and private interests, not between two political stances. This is why his framework does not allow for the conceptualisation of the political stance that may underlie Haussmann’s planning practice.

SUTCLIFFE

The discussion now moves on to the last of the five scholars this chapter will engage with. We saw that Sutcliffe’s approach to the public works was situated within an investigation of the discovery of urban planning during the long 19th century, and more precisely of what he calls comprehensive urban planning. The transformation of Paris is of interest to him because it presented some of the characteristics of comprehensive urban planning, most evident in what he terms the positive mode of planning (or the provision of public services), but failed to understand the importance of the regulation of private land use, what he calls the negative mode of planning (Sutcliffe 1981: 204). In the last chapter, we saw that Sutcliffe uses Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State as evidence that planning under the Second Empire showed a “basic unwillingness to disturb private interests” (Sutcliffe 1981: 134), a statement he further pushes by referring to the lax building regulations of the period. This leads him to conclude that planning in Second Empire Paris “came closest to planning without actually getting there” (Sutcliffe 1981: 204). The discussion around this statement in the last
chapter centred on whether Sutcliffe was right to assume that planning under the Second Empire could be construed as a unified whole. Even though Haussmann lost in the Council of State, this defeat only happened after he had been prefect for five years and had thus been allowed to make use of the legislation imparted to him. As Sutcliffe himself states, the expropriation laws had been strengthened by the Emperor in 1852 and “during the 1850s the courts smiled on these new powers, and Haussmann used them to carry out a number of schemes” (Sutcliffe 1981: 133). It is only the 1860s that these powers began to be curtailed, when “a sullen opposition began to make itself felt at all levels of French society to the emperor’s constant political and legal leger-de-main” (Sutcliffe 1981: 133). Until this opposition manifested itself through the action of the courts and the increasing demands for expropriation compensations, Haussmann was free to make use of significant powers over private land use, the definition for Sutcliffe of the ‘missing’ negative mode of planning in his practice. It thus seems as though the significance of the 1858 Council of State decision is not that it shows how far planning was from its comprehensive ideal but that there were two distinct periods in Haussmann’s planning practice. What needs to be understood here is how these two periods differed and how and why the transition between them occurred.

Theoretically, the little attention that is given to the transformations that occurred within planning during the Second Empire can be traced back to Sutcliffe’s judgement of that style of planning by its results, rather than in its unfolding. Additionally, Sutcliffe tends not to separate Haussmann’s actions in his carrying out of the public works from the Second Empire’s planning culture. There is thus none of the separation we saw in Benevolo between Haussmann’s planning practice and the goals of the imperial regime. Here, the public works are judged as the expression of a single idea, executed by a single actor. It is only in this way that this episode can be easily fit into the development of comprehensive urban planning. Indeed, this is the main goal Sutcliffe has set out for himself: to trace through the myriad planning experiments in Germany, Britain, the United States and France over the long 19th century the progressive development of the idea of comprehensive urban planning. This necessarily means extracting from each of these the main idea that it expressed, without needing to dive too deeply into the process each of the planning practices went through. This is feasible because each episode of planning is a particular rung on the ladder leading to comprehensive urban planning, and each rung has its own internal logic that can be identified and judged by its results.

As in Benevolo, planning is here based on the acknowledgement of agency. This can be seen in his conceptualisation of a type of planning (here, Second Empire planning) as the expression of an idea that can be put into practice rather than as an imperative imposed by external forces. The rising
opposition to the imperial regime that then impacted on the expropriation legislation Haussmann was using is seen as a response that the Second Empire had called upon itself by its authoritarian ways, rather than as independent social force motivated by opposing ideals constraining its planning endeavours. As a consequence of this conceptualisation of the agency of planning institutions, it follows that there is no major transformation of the style of planning without a fundamental change that comes from within. This is what allows Sutcliffe to assume that planning during the Second Empire was the expression of a single idea, and that this single idea must then be judged by its results. There is no need to investigate the process of planning if the idea driving it doesn’t change throughout the period. This view of planning thus affords no weight to the problems inherent to the implementation of this idea, in much the same way as Benevolo’s conception of politics in planning as acting at the level of initial choice obscures the everyday politics inherent to the practice of planning. This can explain the vagueness of Sutcliffe’s explanation of the courts’ restrictions on the powers of expropriation: opposition comes from ‘all levels of French society’ and is directed at the emperor. This is very far from the identification of property owners as the spearhead of opposition in Harvey and from the realisation in Benevolo that the opposition was focussed on Haussmann’s planning practice rather than on the imperial regime.

FROM THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS TO AN IDEA OF A SUITABLE FRAMEWORK

THEORISING AGENCY AND OPPOSITION

The most general distinction that can be made between the major assumptions underlying the accounts of these five authors is based on the question of agency. As we have just seen, Daumard and Gaillard rely on the fundamental assumption that actors do not have agency; that individuals respond to the pressures of wider social forces. Daumard sees each social group as dependent on the actions of another, in an endless sequence of structuring conditions that leave no space for autonomous action. Gaillard sees all actors within the city as individually responding to the pressures created by their collective actions, which in turn triggers actions from the state. All of the state’s actions towards the city are determined by it, and then absorbed and responded to in a way that the state never planned. Benevolo and Sutcliffe, on the other hand, assume that individuals can make their own choices, and especially when it comes to the planning apparatus at work in a given process of urban change. For both of these authors, agency intervenes most crucially at the level of the decision to carry out a particular planning project: here, the authorities can make decisions independently of all economic and political forces. Once this initial decision is made, the two authors
then diverge on how this agency is carried through in the implementation phase. While this agency remains complete for Sutcliffe (for whom any real transformation of the idea behind the planning intervention can only come from within it), for Benevolo it becomes more muddled as a split is introduced between the authorities sponsoring the intervention and the planner who sets out to do the actual work. As a technician, however, even the planner has autonomy from society in his practice. Finally, Harvey’s framework is predicated on the possibility of agency everywhere and for all. But this agency is impeded by the power of capital and the class that serves it and agency will only be effective when it is channelled into a final global opposition to capital.

In addition to this broad opposition on agency, their accounts can also be divided with respect to the possibility of conceptualising opposition. For the first set of authors (Daumard and Sutcliffe), there can be no conceptualisation of opposition. For Daumard, this is because actors are pushed in a particular direction by the particular social force acting on them, which is different from the social force acting on the other social group: there is no opposition, only parallel (and as often, perpendicular) development. In Sutcliffe’s case, planning can only be fundamentally altered from within, by the decision of the authorities; this by definition entails that there can be no serious opposition to the planning apparatus. In contrast, the assumptions of the other three authors tend to allow a conceptualisation of opposition, albeit of an opposition of a particular kind. Gaillard, for example, allows for a conceptualisation of opposition only if it concerns the opposition between the state and the city through the myriad social groups composing it. Oppositions internal to the state or that concern an institution of the state and a particular social group are not given any theoretical weight. This is because her understanding of the state as a black box does not allow for a distinction to be made between the state and the planning apparatus. This same conditional possibility of opposition can be found in Harvey, whose assumptions only allow for the final opposition to capital and the class that serves it that occurs when local anti-capitalism movements will be synthesised into a global movement and directed by an avant-garde socialist political organisation (Harvey 1996: 434). Finally, for Benevolo, since planning is a political decision in itself, not a technical practice that is inherently political, and since modern planners are merely technicians, it follows that the only opposition a planning practice can elicit is one that pits technical considerations against private interests. What this does is evacuate the political from the practice of planning.

If we are to set up this project as an investigation into the role played by property owners and the imperial regime in the defeats suffered by Haussmann at the Council of State, then we are forced to recognise that none of these frameworks, taken in isolation, are based on assumptions that would
make it possible. Though they cover important aspects of the public works, they are maladapted to
the particular focus of my investigation by their treatment either of agency or of opposition. Though
Daumard’s framework cannot be used, both because it affords no agency to actors and denies the
possibility of opposition, the crucial message that emerges from her work is that of the constraints
that social groups put on each others’ actions through their own course of action. In the same way,
Gaillard’s decision to sideline agency and the limitations she puts on the concept of opposition
should not obscure her insight into the links between the public works and the imperial regime. The
theoretical framework at the heart of Harvey’s convincing and richly documented account of the
public works can also not be used for our purposes: the type of agency it contains does not allow us
to understand the opposition Haussmann faced – as an agent of the state supposedly acting to
liberate capital circulation – from both property owners and the imperial regime. This showed us
that the framework we need to use must be based on a more undetermined notion of agency, and
one that can be invoked from within the state apparatus. This would allow opposition to be framed
as a response to the actions taken by an individual that impede the circulation of capital rather than
promote it. Benevolo and Sutcliffe have a lot to offer that is specifically about the public works as an
episode of planning, the former through his separation of authority and practice in planning, and the
latter through his situation of Haussmann in the history of planning. These conclusions derive from
their conceptualisation of planning as an activity that presupposes agency but their frameworks
become less useful when it comes to understanding the ways in which planning garners and deals
with opposition: while Sutcliffe assumes planning cannot be transformed from the outside, Benevolo
evacuates all notions of the political from the opposition to modern planning practices.

Thus, taken in isolation, none of these frameworks take both agency and opposition seriously. What
is needed is a framework that can bring together the strength of Daumard’s bracketing out of social
facts to focus on one particular point the endless sequence of structuring conditions of society,
Gaillard’s pointed focus on a particular relationship (between the city and the state), the need for a
reframing of agency we saw emerging from the limitations to Harvey’s sophisticated account,
Benevolo’s insights on the specificities of planning as a practice and Sutcliffe’s historical situation of
Haussmann’s style of planning. This entails that we are looking for a framework that offers a bridge
between agency and structural considerations and in which opposition between a planning practice,
the state and social groups can be conceptualised. Because their main assumptions are antagonistic,
it is clear that a patchwork of their frameworks is not a viable option. This means we need to look
somewhere else for a solution.
The discussion above on the limits to the theoretical frameworks of the five accounts of Haussmann’s defeats in the Council of State pointed towards the need for a framework that allows for opposition to be theorised as the response to a practice predicated on autonomy from structural considerations. This is what has been found to be necessary from the discussion of Harvey’s, Benevolo’s and Sutcliffe’s account of the public works above. We can immediately think of a figure that has sought to oppose precisely this enterprise: Althusser stands tall here as the Marxist philosopher who has most strongly sought to push any subjectivising tendencies out of Marxism and who has attempted to ground it as a science of history. His philosophical adversary here is unquestionably Sartre: “Thus in Sartre, historicist humanism takes the form of an exaltation of human freedom, in which by freely committing himself to their fight, he can commune with the freedom of all the oppressed, who have always been struggling for a little human light since the long and forgotten night of the slave revolts” (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 142).

Sartre spent his later years attempting to bring his brand of existentialism (where issues of choice and responsibility are paramount) closer to Marxism. His “shift from his early ‘private’ existentialism, the anguished solitude affirmed in that book as much as in his novel La Nausée (1938), toward a militant collective conception of praxis” (Hallward 2003: 42) led him to the concept of the ‘group in fusion’. For Sartre, the group in fusion is an answer to the question of how a collective form of politics can exist in a way that avoids institutionalisation. Indeed, as soon as political action moves from the individual to the collective, there is a risk that political action will become constrained through its collective production, that is, by institutions, habits, rituals, etc. The group in fusion played the role of a vehicle for collective political agency that avoided such pitfalls: it was the dissolution of the passivity of normal human existence through the coming together of individuals in a fused unity, in which all can participate in the construction of the collective subject. By default, however, “the authentic collective praxis active in the group in fusion was essentially ephemeral, discontinuous [...] collective activity is reserved purely for the moment of revolt as such. Everything else follows inevitably from our essential passivity, our animal ‘inhumanity’. True Sartrean ‘humanity’ emerges only in the ephemeral, occasional dissolution of passive anonymity” (Hallward 2003: 43).

This is because any attempts at maintaining a coherence for the group in fusion in the long term will

xxi «L’humanisme historiciste prend ainsi chez Sartre la forme d’une ‘exaltation de la liberté humaine où, de s’engager librement dans leur combat, il communie avec la liberté de tous les opprimés, qui, depuis la longue nuit oubliée des révoltes d’esclaves, luttent à jamais pour un peu de lumière humaine.’» (Althusser and Balibar 1973: 183)

xxii What Sartre calls seriality — the collective form of social inertia (Badiou 1980: 8).
lead to the institutionalisation and thus to the end of political praxis. Sartre could not overcome this contradiction, and finally backed the concept of the institutionalised communist party as the only vehicle for the advent of communism.

The ephemeral nature of collective political action that breaks from the passivity of normal human existence and the possibility it represents of thinking of the actions of subjects outside of structural considerations was thus a way to theorise radical political agency. Of all the thinkers that followed Sartre, Alain Badiou is unquestionably the one who has most developed this conception of political subjectivity as a flash that breaks with the normality of human existence. Where Sartre saw the party as necessary to allow the ephemeral quality of politics to be channelled into bringing forth the end of the history of class struggle, Badiou, in refusing the solution of the party (a mode of politics that is forever linked to Stalinism) has radicalised Sartre’s intuition by defending the thesis that politics must be subtracted from the history of the class struggle: “It is a matter of going beyond the idea that politics represents objective groups that can be designated as classes. That idea has had its power and importance. But in our opinion, we cannot today begin from or set out from this idea. We can begin from political processes, from political oppositions, from conflicts and contradictions, obviously. But it is no longer possible to code these phenomena in terms of representation of classes. In other words, there may exist emancipatory politics or reactionary politics, but these cannot be rendered immediately transitive to a scientific, objective study of how class functions in society” (Badiou 1998a: 114).

For Badiou, politics is about short lived but intense political oppositions that attempt to carve out something new from the Sartrean normality: “what I call political is something that can be discerned only in a few, fairly brief, sequences, often quickly overturned, crushed, or diluted by the return of business as usual” (in Hallward 2003: 45). These brief political sequences are fundamentally about an opposition between two groups: “Badiou’s philosophy, early and late, refutes the possibility of any ‘third way’. The two implies, very literally, le tiers exclu: the excluded middle. Political struggle takes place between ‘opposites’, pure and simple” (Hallward 2003: 46). But they are also defined by the breaking up of normality into two opposing camps: “The two of a truth will divide its situation between those who are for or those who are against, but this division is always a result: before the two, the situation was governed by the false unity of consensus, by the apparent identification of elements with their situational place” (Hallward 2003: 47). These oppositions are thus between individuals that have decided to take a stance to align with one or the other camp. Badiou’s concern is in understanding how the opposition between these two camps can be formalised philosophically.
in the context of this flash (what Badiou calls the event) where humans shake the passivity that has maintained them within the objectivity of existence. Central to that undertaking is to think about what it means to become a subject within one of these intense political episodes (of which revolutions are the quintessential manifestation). We can see that Badiou’s thought has maintained the possibility of radical agency that was at the heart of Sartre’s project, while complementing it with a way in which to conceptualise opposition to this agency in the context of very particular periods of political action.

Badiou’s project eschews detailed descriptions of the workings of capitalism. As Hewlett rightly notes, “in spite of Badiou’s elaborate mathematical discussions, his thought does not share what Marx and Engels described as a scientific approach to socialism, which dissects the mechanisms of capitalist society and in light of this dissection explains the transformational potential these mechanisms offer” (Hewlett 2007: 67). His understanding of Marxism is a militant one: “any living knowledge is made up of problems, which have been or must be constructed or reconstructed, not of repetitive descriptions. Marxism is no exception to this. It is neither a branch of economics (theory of the relations of production), nor a branch of sociology (objective description of ‘social reality’), nor a philosophy (a dialectical conceptualization of contradictions). It is, let us reiterate, the organized knowledge of the political means required to undo existing society and finally realize an egalitarian, rational figure of collective organization for which the name is ‘communism’” (Badiou 2012: 9). It is thus on the terrain of politics that Badiou finds his unique perspective on Marxism, a new way of understanding politics that can only be useful if extirpated, both theoretically and historically, from the figure of the class struggle. This allows his project to speak about political oppositions, both retrospectively and prospectively, devoid of any totalising schema.

His interest is not in workings of the capitalist system but in the instances where concrete decisions taken by actors create a split within the world, a decision that splits it irremediably into two opposing camps. And these splits occur because the decision taken introduces an idea strong enough to pit those it affects into stances that can never be dialectically overcome. In this Badiou shows his indebtedness to Plato because he posits that these powerful ideas are in fact universals that can overcome the differences objective existence assigns to human animals. Badiou gives the

xxiv «Toute connaissance vivante est faite de problèmes, qui ont été ou doivent être construits ou reconstruits, et non de descriptions répétitives. Le marxisme n’y fait aucune exception. Il n’est ni une branche de l’économie (théorie des rapports de production), ni une branche de la sociologie (description objective de la «réalité sociale»), ni une philosophie (pensée dialectique des contradictions). Il est, redisons-le, la connaissance organisée des moyens politiques requis pour défaire la société existante et déployer une figure enfin égalitaire et rationnelle de l’organisation collective, dont le nom est «communisme»» (Badiou 2011: 19).
following example of this overcoming of differences: “there is also this passage from the 1793 Constitution, which I like to quote, according to which ‘any foreigner who adopts a child, or feeds an elderly person, and finally any foreigner who will be deemed by the legislative body to have deserved well of humanity, is admitted to the exercise of the Rights of the French citizen’. Rather than being identitarian, the norm has become generic: whoever proves by their actions that they are concerned with the human race must be treated in egalitarian fashion as one of us”{xxx} (Badiou 2012: 78). The notion of equality is thus at the heart of Badiou’s philosophical project: all political ideas further the cause of equality. It is a materialism that has as its basic building blocks bodies and languages, but a materialism that can be struck at its heart, in very special circumstances, by the recurrence of a universal idea which opens up a brief space for political action and decision. What Badiou calls the materialist dialectic is the historical to and fro between moments of normality in which human animals are structured as bodies and languages and those unique moments when an idea allows these same human animals to transcend this normality and to refashion it in the name of this idea (what Badiou calls a truth). Terray summarises Badiou’s indebtedness to Sartre by noting that both of their projects follow a similar three part structure: for Sartre, it is seriality, the group in fusion and the organisation - for Badiou, it is the world of bodies and languages, the event, and the construction of a truth (Terray 2011: 130-131).

For Hewlett, Badiou’s project amounts to a fundamental split from historical materialism: “it seems in fact that Badiou is in search of a complete alternative to the historical and dialectical method of Marx, of a theory which breaks with the idea of any logic of history, but where engagement with the circumstances of the time is nevertheless crucial to any process of profound change and any understanding of this process” (Hewlett 2007: 64). However, if Badiou’s project is understood, as he does, through the materialist dialectic then it is logical for him to focus on particular and short lived episodes of human history, while relegating the rest of historical time to those interested in understanding the structure of bodies and languages. As such, Badiou’s project can thus be seen as more likely to be a complement than an alternative to historical materialism. All that Badiou seems to be saying is that there are moments when the laws of historical materialism can be interrupted by the consequences of a powerful political idea and by the decisions taken by individuals in its name. It

{xxx} «Il y a aussi ce passage de la Constitution de 1793, que j’aime citer, selon lequel «tout étranger qui adopte un enfant, ou nourrit un vieillard, tout étranger enfin qui sera jugé par le corps législatif avoir bien mérité de l’humanité, est admis à l’exercice des Droits du citoyen français». La norme, au lieu d’être identitaire, est devenue générique: quiconque prouve, par ses actions, qu’il se soucie du genre humain, doit être traité, égalitairement, comme un des nôtres» (Badiou 2011: 116).
is this notion of a universal idea that allows the temporary appearance of agency, but also of the opposition that this agency always attracts.

AGENCY AND OPPOSITION: BADIOU AS AN ANSWER

There thus seems to be value in his project for the purposes of the investigation we want to undertake of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners. It seems to offer a way of dealing with both the issue of agency and that of opposition in a way that allows for a bridge to be made between the more structural accounts of Daumard, Gaillard and Harvey and those of Benevolo and Sutcliffe which afforded total autonomy to the planner. In particular, it is interesting in its ability to complement the longer-term and broader analysis developed by Harvey. Badiou gives us a way to understand moments of sharp, discontinuous changes that can be thought of as short-lived episodes in which capitalism is bracketed out. His approach can thus be used to centre in on a particular short-lived episode that may have escaped Harvey’s general interpretative scheme and extract from it the essence of the opposition to the development of capital it represents. There is a sense in which this other, discontinuous and anomalous, temporality is something that Harvey has grappled with. This can be seen, for example, in his attempts to minimise the uniqueness of the Commune in capitalist development:

“The Commune was a singular, unique, and dramatic event, perhaps the most extraordinary of its kind in capitalist urban history. It took war, the desperation of the Prussian siege, and the humiliation of defeat to light the spark. But the raw materials for the Commune were put together by the slow rhythms of the capitalist transformation of the city’s historical geography [...] The Commune was produced out of a search to transform the power and social relations within a particular class configuration constituted within a particular space of a capitalist world that was itself in the full flood of dramatic transition” (Harvey 2006a: 302). Could his study of Paris from 1848, centred on uncovering the structural determinants of the Commune, be motivated by the necessity of offering a way of explaining its emergence scientifically in order to lessen the need to take its uniqueness and anomalous nature into account? In any case, there is no doubt that it is worth exploring whether looking at Haussmann’s opposition from property owners and the imperial regime through this other temporality can complement what we have learnt about it from the other perspectives discussed in detail above. The final section of this chapter will present the framework that could be used to investigate Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State.
As mentioned above, at the heart of Badiou’s philosophical project is the constitution of a materialism (of bodies and languages) that can be interrupted and profoundly impacted by universal ideas (Badiou 2006: 12). It is by acting under the impulse of these ideas that bodies (or objects) can become subjects and work to impact the course of history. Ontology is thus at the heart of his project and his second major work, Being and Event first published in 1988, was a demonstration of how set theory could be used to understand ruptures within being, what he calls events, as dependent upon the actions of individuals in a certain situation. Through a mathematical procedure called forcing he shows that every set contains within it an element that is indiscernible and that cannot be named, whose identity can in effect be decided by a subject (Badiou 1988: 376-377). In doing so, and following through on all of its consequences, the subject alters the existing ontology and brings in the idea that the material world did not previously contain. By equating ontology with set theory, Badiou finds a way to conceptualise the flash appearance of an idea in the materiality of being.

In his more recent work, Logics of Worlds first published in 2006, Badiou has supplemented his treatment of being with one of appearing or being-there, this time employing the mathematics of logics to conceptualise its structure (Badiou 2006: 110). What he is interested in is to understand the structure of appearances that holds our world together (with world here to be understood as a local situation). Appearances, for Badiou, are things in themselves that exist in a given local situation, organised within it by an immanent and a-subjective transcendental. In other words, in a world, objects appear to a greater or lesser degree depending on how closely they are related to that which is at its centre, the transcendental. This transcendental is immanent because it is an object that exists within the world it is structuring, and against which the intensity of appearance of other objects can be measured (Johnston 2008: 347). In contrast to Kant, then, this transcendental is not shared by all mental agents, who all perceive appearances through the same, singular transcendental. For Badiou, every time a human being enters a new world, the world appears to it as structured by an element contained within that world. This entails that the transcendental is also a-subjective because it does not depend on the agent actively structuring reality (as it is the case in Kant), but instead structures the appearance of all objects (including bodies and languages) in the same way (Johnston 2008: 347). As a further consequence, there are as many transcendentals as there are worlds, and no one transcendental is more necessary than the other. When appearing in the world, being thus appears (exists) under the guise of objects.
We are now in a position to present the ways in which this additional realm of the appearing (or being-there) affects the concept of the event presented above for the realm of being. The important concept here is that of the site (Badiou 2006: 383-401). It is the fleeting moment in which the ontological (and thus mathematical) law is violated, in which the void between being and being-there is revealed, and it only exists to disappear. But the existence of a site is not a sufficient condition for an event to occur. Because it only exists to disappear, an event must be measured by the consequences of that site for the structure of appearances. It is only if the site, through the actions of the individuals which have understood the significance of the idea arising from it and have decided to push it to its final consequences, has an exceptional influence on the structure of appearances that it can be considered as an event. And for Badiou’s logics, there is no greater consequence than to make something which did not formerly exist appear maximally. An event is exactly that unsettling, or more precisely, that reversal of the structure of appearances by which the inexistent in a world becomes maximally existent (Badiou 2006: 398). This new configuration of appearances, now organised around the vanished site such that what is closest to it appears most strongly, is the new present in which subjects form to put into practice the universal idea the site represented. Through its application, the structure of appearances is durably transformed. This is thus the essence of Badiou’s conception of the process through which a structure of appearances can change. It is based on the pure chance of the occurrence of a site, on its impact on the structure of appearances, and on the work of individuals to identify the significance of the idea the site released and to use it to follow through on the reversal of the structure of appearances opened up by the event.

What is of interest to us in the context of our investigation into the public works is the interface between the event, the idea it unleashes (what Badiou calls its truth) and the role of subjects in using that truth to durably transform the world. It will be the task of the next chapter to discuss at length the relationship between Badiou’s philosophy and the use it could be put to at a theoretical level to investigate the opposition between Haussmann and property owners. There are many issues emerging from the compatibility between a philosophical project and the use it can be put to theoretically and these will need to be ironed out. The aim of this last section is to present in much greater detail the way in which Badiou conceives of subjects. Indeed, for the moment, I have used the words individual, actor and subject interchangeably. The difference between these hinges on the particular conception Badiou has of subjects, which has great relevance for the wider discussion on agency that has been central to this chapter. It is worth mentioning here that I am only interested in a particular aspect of Badiou’s work. For him, there are four major domains of human activity in
which events can occur: politics, arts, science and love. While the overall schema of the event is the
same for each of these four domains, they each have their own truth, or universal idea, and they
each have a particular type of subject that acts within the context of the event to apply that truth. I
am here assuming that if the opposition between Haussmann and property owners is suited for an
investigation with a framework based on Badiou’s philosophy, then it is most likely that this
opposition will be of a political nature. The discussion that follows thus derives from this assumption
and will only deal with the subjects that appear within political events. It will arrive at political
subjects by a presentation of the relationship between Badiou’s philosophy and his politics.

SUBJECTIVE FORMALISMS

“In 1982, I published a book entitled Theory of the Subject. This goes to show that in the long-run, the
theme of the subject unifies my intellectual undertaking, against those who define (post)modernity
by the deconstruction of this concept. The category of ‘subject’ has been criticized from the right,
through its Heideggerian incorporation into metaphysical nihilism. But also from the left, through its
reduction to a mere ideological operator. Althusser argues both that History is a ‘process without a
subject’ and that the distinctive feature of ideology—opposed to science as the imaginary is opposed
to the symbolic—is to ‘interpellate individuals into subjects’. Only pious phenomenologists or
conservative Sartreans would have come to the defence of the subject if Lacan had not entirely
refounded its concept, while taking on board the radical critique of the subject of classical humanism.
That is why traversing Lacan’s anti-philosophy remains an obligatory exercise today for those who
wish to wrest themselves away from the reactive convergences of religion and scientism”\textsuperscript{xxvi} (Badiou

Badiou’s politics have always been closely linked to his philosophical project, and he has always
pushed for a separation between politics and the state, with the state assuming an inherently anti-
democratic role. Accordingly, he views political events as being represented by uprisings again the
state, in which the people – or presentation – are able to fix the superpower of the state, or the

\textsuperscript{xxvi} «J’ai publié en 1982 un livre titre Théorie du Sujet (Paris, Seuil). C’est dire que le motif du sujet unifie au long
cours mon entreprise de pensée, contre ceux qui définissent la (post-)modernité par la déconstruction de ce
concept. La catégorie de «sujet» a été critiquée à droite, par son incorporation heideggérienne au nihilisme
méthphysique. Mais tout aussi bien à gauche, par sa réduction à un simple operateur idéologique. Althusser
soutient à la fois que l’Histoire est un «process sans sujet » et que le propre de l’idéologie, opposée à la science,
come l’est l’imaginaire au symbolique, est d’ «interpeller les individus en sujets». Il n’y aurait donc eu que les
phénoménologues pieux ou les sartriens conservateurs pour défendre le sujet, si Lacan n’en avait entièrement
refondu le concept, tout en assumant la critique radicale du sujet de l’humanisme classique. C’est pourquoi la
traversée de l’antiphilosophie de Lacan reste aujourd’hui encore un exercice obligé pour qui s’arrache aux
convergences réactives de la religion et du scientisme» (Badiou 2006 : 548).
representation. This means that the power of the State becomes knowable and it becomes possible
to effect some change over it. The following quote from Logic of Worlds is a good indication of
Badiou’s politics:

“For the sake of all of the world’s revolutionaries, the Cultural Revolution effectively explored the
limits of Leninism. It taught us that the politics of emancipation can no longer work under the
paradigm of revolution, nor remain prisoner to the party-form. Symmetrically, it cannot be inscribed
in the parliamentary and electoral apparatus. Everything begins—and here lay the sombre genius of
the Cultural Revolution—when, by saturating the previous hypotheses in the real, the high-school
and student Red Guards, and then the workers of Shanghai, between 1966 and 1968, prescribed for
the decades to come the affirmative realization of this beginning. But their fury was still so enmeshed
in what they were rising up against that they only explored this beginning from the standpoint of
pure negation” (Badiou 2009: 518).

Among many other things, what this highlights is a particular stance towards the state: while his
philosophical project is entirely focused on what are usually referred to as revolutions, violent
uprisings directed at a state that is safeguarding a highly unequal social order, his politics are much
less clear. If revolution is out of the picture, and the parliamentary and electoral system does not
permit a politics of emancipation, then it is unclear what role the state is to play in the kind of
alternative he is referring to. The Red Guards acted with sanction from the state, and as such are of
a different order than the revolutions his philosophical project is based on. Badiou is aware of this
tension between his philosophy and his politics and dedicates a long note to it in the appendix of
Logics of Worlds (Badiou 2006: 544-547). The following passage presents his conception of the
relationship between philosophy and what is outside of it; in this particular case, the reality of
political action:

“For me, this outside operates as a system of conditions-in-truth for philosophy. Now, no result of any
condition of philosophy is ever reproduced as such in the axiomatic field of that philosophy. In this

xxvii «La Révolution culturelle a en effet expérimenté, pour tous les révolutionnaires du monde, les limites du
léninisme. Elle nous a appris que la politique d’émancipation ne peut plus être sous le paradigme de la
révolution, ni non plus captive de la forme-parti. Symétriquement, elle ne peut s’inscrire dans le dispositif
parlamentaire et électoral. Tout commence, et c’est le sombre génie de la Révolution culturelle, quand, en
saturant dans le réel les hypothèses antérieures, les Gardes rouges lycéens et étudiants, puis les ouvriers de
Shanghai, ont, entre 1966 et 1968, prescrit pour les décennies à venir la réalisation affirmative de ce
commencement, dont ils n’ont exploré, tant leur fureur était encore prise dans ce contre quoi ils se levaient,
que la face de négation pure» (Badiou 2006: 543-544).
sense, philosophy’s appropriation and metamorphosis of its conditions cannot be distinguished from the philosophical act itself, which is why one can never object anything to philosophy that is purely and simply exterior to it. What must be considered instead is the degree of compatibility between a philosophical operation and a non-philosophical operation which, having been seized conceptually, has entered into the field of the philosophical operation (Badiou 2009: 519).

What this excerpt reveals is the distance that separates what is outside of philosophy and serves as the basis or condition for philosophy to emerge and what becomes of that outside once it is conceptualised within a philosophy. What Badiou wants to show is that his politics and his philosophy cannot be thought of in terms of an identity or a contradiction – what is important is to gauge the compatibility of an understanding of politics, and thus of particular political sequences, with the philosophical framework he has developed about politics. Philosophical and non-philosophical operations each feed on the other to advance our understanding of the political. This is a point that will be explored in much more detail in the next chapter. This tension between politics and philosophy has been uncomfortable for Badiou (with his view of the state progressively warming up), but it has also been productive. It has meant that he has had to deal with the different types of subjects a political event can bring out – from those that are purely antagonistic to the state to those that act within the state itself.

Indeed, Badiou’s conceptualisation of the relationship between philosophy and politics allows him to introduce a distinction between different types of faithful subjects (those subjects who act in support of the truth of the event under question) that can emerge in political events. This is because different political sequences can bear a form of compatibility with his philosophical concepts: they are different concrete instantiations of a same set of philosophical concepts. Logics of Worlds present two different types of faithful subjects: the mass rebel (which he sees in Spartacus, Müntzer or Tupac Amaru) and the state revolutionary (as, for example, Robespierre, Lenin and Mao). These two very different kinds of faithful subjects can both emerge out of a single concept, the political event. The simple fact that one of his faithful subjects acts from within the state itself shows that Badiou no longer believes that the state is completely antithetical to politics. It is in this sense that

« On sait que, pour moi, ce dehors opère comme système de conditions-en-vérité de la philosophie. Or, aucun résultat d’une condition quelconque de la philosophie n’est jamais reproduit tel quel dans le champ axiomatique de cette philosophie. En ce sens, l’appropriation et la métamorphose de ses conditions par la philosophie ne se distingue pas de l’acte philosophique lui-même, et c’est bien pourquoi on ne peut jamais rien objecter à la philosophie qui lui soit purement extérieur. Ce qu’il faut plutôt considérer, c’est le degré de compatibilité entre une opération philosophique et une opération non philosophique qui, conceptuellement ressaisie, est entrée dans le champ de cette opération philosophique » (Badiou 2006: 544).
his view of the state can be said to be warming up. This further guarantees that the truths that will emerge out of political events will be applicable to both of types of faithful subjects, truths that he posits:

“articulate four determinations: will (against socioeconomic necessity), equality (against the established hierarchies of power or wealth), confidence (against anti-popular suspicion or the fear of the masses), authority or terror (against the ‘natural’ free play of competition). This is the generic kernel of a political truth of this type”xxix (Badiou 2009: 27).

The different faithful subjects that bring forth political events in different times and places all carry a particular articulation of these four determinations that fit the circumstances in which that subject evolves. The notion of determination should be understood here as the condition of being determined, as a synonym of resoluteness. This fits in with Badiou’s foundational concern with action and decision: faithful subjects take certain decisions in their actions, that is, to act against socioeconomic necessity, against the established hierarchies of power and wealth, etc. The truth should be understood as the articulation of these four determinations at the heart of the faithful subject’s actions that allows for the over-turning of a particular structure of appearances. By articulation, we should understand the way in which these different decisions to act are brought together within one course of action. This one course of action that brings together these four determinations will be adapted to the structure of appearances that exist in the world before the event. The faithful subject is thus that entity which adapts its actions to be able to transform the way the world is structured.

In an event of any kind the actions of the faithful subject open up a new present; through his actions it is showing how the world can be changed. In doing so, the faithful subject stirs opposition. Indeed, as we have seen in a previous section, Badiou puts political opposition at the very centre of his project. Any event splits the situation into those who are for and those who are against. The faithful subject pertains to the first category, while the two other subjective types he discusses (the reactive and obscure subjects) are part of the second. It is to the first of these other types of subjects active in an event that we now turn.

xxix «Toutes ces vérités articulent quatre déterminations, la volonté (contre la nécessité économique-sociale), l’égalité (contres les hiérarchies établies, de pouvoir ou de richesse), la confiance (contre la suspicion anti-populaire ou la peur des masses), l’autorité ou la terreur (contre le libre jeu « naturel » des concurrences). Tel est le noyau générique d’une vérité politique de ce type» (Badiou 2006: 36).
A first response is denial, one refuses to join in on the course of action taken by the faithful subject. As Badiou insists, however, the reactive subject’s denial is a form of engagement with the new: “In order to resist the call of the new, it is still necessary to create arguments of resistance appropriate to the novelty itself. From this point of view, every reactive disposition is the contemporary of the present to which it reacts. Of course, it categorically refuses to incorporate itself to this present. It sees the body—like a conservative slave sees the army of Spartacus—and refuses to be one of its elements. But it is caught up in a subjective formalism that is not, and cannot be, the pure permanence of the old” (Badiou 2009: 54). This means that those who deny the new present of the event must instead strive for another present, what Badiou calls an extinguished present, one that receives some of the benefits of the new present without having to risk anything: “As violent as it may be, reaction conserves the form of the faithful subject as its articulated unconscious. It does not propose to abolish the present, only to show that the faithful break (which it calls ‘violence’ or ‘terrorism’) is useless for engendering a moderate, that is to say extinguished present (a present that reaction calls ‘modern’)” (Badiou 2009: 61).

But reaction is not the only response to a new present. Once reaction has been established as a response to the new present, it is possible for this response to be taken a step further, that is, to actively attempt to throw a cloak over the new present so as to hide it away and suppress it. “The production is neither that of the present nor of its deletion, but instead that of the descent of this present into the night of non-exposition. Is this to say that all we have here is a return to the past? Once again, we need to offer a twofold answer. In part, the answer is obviously yes. What the patricians and bishops want is no doubt the pure and simple conservation of the previous order. In this sense, the past is illuminated for them by the night of the present. But, on the other hand, this night must be produced under the entirely new conditions which are displayed in the world by the rebel body and its emblem. The obscurity into which the newly produced present must be enclosed is engineered by an obscurantism of a new type” (Badiou 2009: 59). To cast the new present into the

---


xxx « Si violente soit-elle, la réaction conserve la forme du sujet fidèle comme son inconscient articulé. Elle ne se propose pas d’abolir le présent, seulement de montrer que la rupture fidèle (qu’elle nomme «violence» ou «terrorisme») est inutile pour l’engendrement d’un présent modéré, c’est-à-dire éteint (qu’elle nomme «moderne») » (Badiou 2006 : 69).

xxx « La production n’est ni celle du présent, ni celle de sa nature, mais bien celle de la descente de ce présent dans la nuit de l’inexposition. Est-ce dire qu’il n’y a là que retour au passé ? Encore une fois, nous devons proposer une réponse duplice. Pour part, évidemment oui. Ce que veulent les patriciens et évêques est sans
shadows the obscure subject “systematically resorts to the invocation of a full and pure transcendent Body, an ahistorical or anti-evental body (City, God, Race...)[...] the essential Body has the power to reduce to silence that which affirms the event, thus forbidding the real body from existing” (Badiou 2009: 59).

For Badiou, there is thus a particular sequence of events that relies on the subjective types: the faithful subject comes first, pushing forward on a certain course of action that triggers the reactive subjects to oppose and seek to deny the merit of that truth, and this denial is then a fertile terrain for obscure subjects to invoke a ‘pure transcendent Body’ that casts into shadows the actions of the faithful subject (Badiou 2009: 62-63). This sequence is fundamentally about the unfolding of an opposition between actors coalescing into particular subjective roles depending on the stance they take towards the particular universal idea that is being invoked in that circumstance. Belonging to either one of the three subjective types described above is a matter of conscious decision, of militant conviction that an idea must be nurtured, resisted or destroyed. These subjective formalisms are thus crucial to allowing the existence of agency: it is through the actions of the faithful subject and the opposition these actions trigger from the other subjects that dynamism and change is possible within the structure of appearances. It is thus not the event which is the crucial concept of Badiou’s project, since it is merely the outcome of a chance occurrence. What is really fundamental is the role he assigns to the actions of particular individuals that occur as a consequence of the event, and which are what really allow for an overturning of the existing structure of appearances.

CONCLUSION

We thus seem to have in Badiou an interpretative framework that can integrate empirical facts about the world in a way that conserves both Sartrean agency and a focus on opposition, within a temporality that brackets out the laws of historical materialism and the forces at the heart of the

a aucun doute la pure et simple conservation de l’ordre antérieur. En ce sens, le passé s’illumine pour eux de la nuit du présent. Mais, d’un autre côté, cette nuit doit être produite dans les conditions toutes nouvelles qu’exposent dans le monde le corps rebelle et son emblème. L’obscurité où il faut encler le présent nouvellement produit est machinée par un obscurantisme de type nouveau» (Badiou 2006: 67).

«Dans l’effroi où le mettent Spartacus et ses troupes, le patricien – et l’évêque vendéen, et le comploteur islamiste, et le fasciste des années trente – ont systématiquement recours à l’invocation d’un Corps transcendant, plein et pur, un corps antihistorique, ou anti-événementiel (Cite, Dieu, Race...), d’où procède que la trace sera niée (là, le labeur du sujet réactif est utile au sujet obscur), et, par voie de conséquence, le corps réel, le corps divisé, également supprimé. Invoqué par les prêtres (les imams, les chefs...), le Corps essentiel a le pouvoir de réduire au silence ce qui affirme l’événement, et donc d’interdire au corps réel d’exister» (Badiou 2006: 68).
accounts of the Durkheimian sociologists. Using this framework for social scientific analysis means focusing on a particular opposition within a context of significant change and determining, through an analysis of the actions of the faithful subject and the reactions these cause, what characterised the idea that lay underneath this opposition and how the faithful subject sought to use it to overturn the structure of appearances. To understand the actions of the faithful subject means deciding whether that subject is a mass rebel or a state revolutionary, a decision that hinges on that subject’s relation to the state. The next step is to use the four determinations of equality, authority, confidence and will to develop a picture of their articulation and to ascertain what mode of politics they are attached to. The constitution of an effective opposition, through the emergence of obscure subjects on the foundations laid down by the reactive ones, and the details of its interactions with the faithful subjects will allow for an understanding of the way in which the truth affected the structure of appearances. This means determining how the local situation was changed by the actions of the faithful subject as it sought to impose a truth against those that opposed it.

We can thus integrate into a single framework the insights of the five authors discussed at length in the first section. Daumard’s insistence that an analysis must focus on a single point within the endless sequence of structuring conditions of society – that of the influence of Haussmann on property owners – can thus maintained by using Badiou’s framework. His focus on a single nexus of opposition that coalesces around a particular idea and the opposing stances it creates is a way of staying true to her bracketing out of all other social facts to analyse one set of events in detail. The figure of the state revolutionary could be used to break the black box of Gaillard’s state and allow for an understanding of opposition to the City that can occur from within an institution of the state, in a way that is not reducible to the imperial regime. This can also accommodate her insight on the link between the public works and the imperial regime, but can also allow Haussmann’s planning practice to be separated out from the imperial regime. At a more general level, Badiou’s approach allows us to bracket out the sociological forces that ground their analyses and to focus on the exercise of Sartrean agency.

We have already shown that Badiou’s temporality of the event occurs in a flash that suspends the primacy of the laws of historical materialism for a short period of time. Thus Badiou should not be seen as an alternative to Harvey, but as a complement: their analyses are concerned with different temporalities, with theoretical (and philosophical) assumptions that are adequate only for the analysis of that particular temporality. Harvey cannot say anything about the temporality of the event (witness his difficulty in dealing with the Commune, which he never studies in isolation but
only as the endpoint of complex transformations), but Badiou says nothing of that which lies outside of the event either (there is just the permanent existence of an unequal and unjust structure of appearances – what Sartre called ‘inhumanity’). It will be the task of chapter 4 to show that the opposition between Haussmann and property owners unfolded within Badiou’s temporality rather than Harvey’s.

Again, the faithful subject will give us concrete concepts within which to think about a positive determination of Haussmann’s politics – the missing portion of Benevolo’s account. This will allow us to build on his separation between state authority and planning practice to develop an account of Haussmann the planner which construes his actions as inherently political, and which thus reinserts politics within the act of planning itself. Finally, once we are able to identify how the opposition Haussmann received from society can be understood via the reactive and obscure subjectivities, then it will be possible to see how fundamentally Haussmann’s planning practice was transformed through this sustained opposition. This will allow us to judge the situation of Haussmann’s planning practice within the history of planning based on an assessment of the internal transformation it had to go through in its application to the Parisian situation. It may well be that Haussmann was indeed a comprehensive planner but that this was taken away from him by the alliance of property owners with the courts and the imperial regime.
CHAPTER 3: BADIOU AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has the difficult task of moving from the theoretical to the empirical, and thus of explaining how Badiou’s concepts can be used for social scientific investigation. Accordingly, the first section will deal with the relationship between Badiou and the social sciences and find within Badiou’s philosophy clues as to what it means to use his concepts in the social sciences. Badiou’s notion of the compatibility of philosophical with non-philosophical operations will be used to cast doubt on the categorical separation he creates between his work and the social sciences. It will be argued here that a particular type of social science is compatible with this philosophy. This social science is empirically concerned with isolating and singularising from within particular political sequences in particular worlds the construction of truths. This means that these political sequences must provoke a break in the structure of appearances of a given world and be carried by a political practice that is an affirmation of equality.

The identification of the transformation of Paris in the 19th century as one of these particular political sequences is immediately problematic. Isn’t this historical episode antithetical to the idea of equality itself? The questions raised in the last two chapters in relation to the accounts of Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State showed that this may not be the case. What these chapters highlighted was that there was a dearth of research that specifically focused on characterising Haussmann’s planning practice. The fact that Napoleon III had Saint-Simonian leanings makes it possible that this planning practice that we are yet to discover will be influenced by the same utopian socialist.

An archival resource that would allow for Haussmann’s practice to be studied still needs to be found. The way in which I arrived at the material that will be used in this study will be presented by retracing the steps that led me from digitalised newspaper archives to the Parisian Municipal Archives and finally to the National Archives. It is in the National Archives that I found three boxes that were both manageable and coherent. Most importantly, these boxes contained letters that showed that Haussmann was under pressure by both property owners and the Minister of the Interior.
The chapter will then focus on these boxes, starting with a general presentation of their situation in the archives and of their content. Their most important characteristic is that they sit within the archives of the Ministry of the Interior, to which Haussmann, as a prefect, was subordinated. This meant that the letters sent to the Ministry of the Interior were sent there in order to either bypass Haussmann or to complain about his *modus operandi*. It contains these original letters from (mostly) property owners but also Haussmann’s responses to the Minister of the Interior’s queries about them: be they additional information about the case or a justification of his actions. This entailed that conflict was at the centre of this archival resource.

The three boxes will be shown to contain letters from a representative set of individuals from the section of Parisian society we were aiming to find, with property owners of varying wealth levels making up the majority of these individuals. The main limitation that emerged from this archival material was that it foreclosed the possibility of statistical analysis. The last section of the chapter will detail the general method that will be used in the three chapters that follow to uncover Badiou’s concepts within the archival material.

**BADIOU: AN EVENT WITHIN THE TRANSFORMATION OF PARIS?**

**BADIOU: PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE**

In the last chapter, the relationship between Badiou’s philosophical project and his politics was discussed to bring out the different ways in which faithful subjects of political events could relate to the state. This discussion will now be focused on what this relationship means for Badiou’s understanding of the role of the social sciences, and thus for the legitimacy of using his philosophical framework for social scientific analysis. This is a crucial question because Badiou has always dismissed the social sciences as unable to break out from the structure in which they are embedded. In a sense, this means that the social sciences will forever be excluded from the realm of the event, which is the remit of political, scientific, artistic and amorous action. Hallward gives us Badiou’s view on the social sciences:

> “Badiou writes, “The ‘social sciences’, in my view, are not sciences at all, and have no place in the distribution of truth procedures”. While left-leaning social scientists like Balibar and Bourdieu may certainly analyze important themes (the sans-papiers, feminism, the labor movement, poverty, and so on), they are “politically very weak, for the simple reason that they do not break with parliamentarism, ‘with democratic consensus’”. They can contribute only to an “oppositional” stance,
that is, a position of protest from within the state-sanctioned structures and rules (parties, elections, trade unions, constitutional amendments, etc.). But “unfortunately, the category of ‘opposition’ is precisely a central category of parliamentarism, of ‘democracy’. No genuine break can be made from within this category. The social sciences thus remain dependent upon the state, and are consequently without truth” (Hallward 2003: 395).

Again, we see the importance of the category of the state for Badiou: the problem with the social sciences is that they exist ‘within the state-sanctioned structure and rules’. But is this not also the case for the natural sciences? At least in modern times, scientific research is usually undertaken within the structures and rules of the state and very often funded by it. There must thus be something else which makes Badiou so antithetical to the social sciences. One way of looking at this could be to highlight that the natural sciences really do break the structure of appearances when a scientific discovery occurs: what was once irreducible to scientific law now submits to it. Coming back to the social sciences, it is difficult to think of such a clear mechanism through which the social sciences lead to the transformation of appearances. There do not seem to be any social scientific events, or as Badiou puts it, ‘no genuine break can be made from within this category’. But even if we admit that no easy mechanism of evental breaks can be conceptualised in the case of the social sciences, it is not necessary to cut them off completely from the occurrence of events. By working through the details and annexes of Badiou’s work, it is possible to uncover a way in which a connection can be established between his philosophy and the social sciences. To present this, it is worth going back to the quote presented in the last chapter detailing his conception of the relationship between philosophy and what is outside of it:

“For me, this outside operates as a system of conditions-in-truth for philosophy. Now, no result of any condition of philosophy is ever reproduced as such in the axiomatic field of that philosophy. In this sense, philosophy’s appropriation and metamorphosis of its conditions cannot be distinguished from the philosophical act itself, which is why one can never object anything to philosophy that is purely and simply exterior to it. What must be considered instead is the degree of compatibility between a philosophical operation and a non-philosophical operation which, having been seized conceptually, has entered into the field of the philosophical operation” (Badiou 2009: 519).

“On sait que, pour moi, ce dehors opère comme système de conditions-en-vérité de la philosophie. Or, aucun résultat d’une condition quelconque de la philosophie n’est jamais reproduit tel quel dans le champ axiomatique de cette philosophie. En ce sens, l’appropriation et la métamorphose de ses conditions par la philosophie ne se distingue pas de l’acte philosophique lui-même, et c’est bien pourquoi on ne peut jamais rien objecter à la philosophie qui lui soit purement extérieur. Ce qu’il faut plutôt considérer, c’est le degré de
Badiou seems to be saying two things here. First, that philosophy can ‘seize conceptually’ non-philosophical operations. And secondly, that some of these non-philosophical operations, once seized, can become compatible with a philosophical operation. In essence, this means that some non-philosophical operations can be incorporated into a philosophical operation if they are conceptually appropriated and metamorphosed by philosophy. But what sorts of non-philosophical operations are likely to be compatible with his philosophy? That, for him, the ‘outside operates as a system of conditions-in-truth for philosophy’ is telling. Indeed, what Badiou means by conditions for philosophy are the four human activities (politics, art, science and love) that are amenable to events. It thus seems as though non-philosophical operations from these four domains of human activity are those that are compatible when seized conceptually. Badiou explains the process through which non-philosophical operations in these domains become incorporated into philosophy thus: “that which has been thought and invoked as a condition by a philosophy is reconceived in such a way that it becomes another thought, even though it may be the only other (philosophical) thought compatible with the initial conditioning thought” (Badiou 2009: 519).

We now learn that when philosophy seizes non-philosophical operations from the four domains of activity that are compatible with it, what it is doing is rethinking these in a way that guarantees the compatibility of this new thought with philosophy. The question that then come to mind concerns the types of non-philosophical operations that can be rethought in a way that makes them compatible with his philosophy. For one, we know that these non-philosophical operations must be concerned with one of the four conditions of philosophy: politics, art, science and love. But can we go a step further? Badiou himself gives us an example that can help us with this:

“it is not in the least contradictory but, on the contrary, perfectly compatible that the Terror can constitute for Sylvain Lazarus a singular politics, relying on the body that bears it […] and that, philosophically speaking, as Hegel immediately thought, it is a projection of the egalitarian maxim. This is even, for the philosopher, a perfect example of the materialist dialectic between existence and being, or between the immanent protocol of the becoming of a truth in a world, and—once that truth has come to be—its trans-worldly eternity. Furthermore, it is entirely natural that in the labour of this
compatibility, anthropology, which is strictly linked to the process of a politics and thus to the present of a truth, concerns itself with the first aspect, isolating and singularizing it, while philosophy turns to the second, whose concept it renews\(\text{xxxvi}\) (Badiou 2009: 519-520).

We can leave the reference to Lazarus, a close associate of Badiou’s, on the side for the moment. What is most interesting here is that Badiou introduces a mediator between the condition (in this case politics) and the philosophy. This mediator is what he calls ‘anthropology’, the role of which is to isolate and singularise the ‘immanent protocol of the becoming of a truth in a world’. It may be worth discussing what Badiou means by truth in a little more detail here. Truth is Badiou’s name for a universal. But not any universal: Badiou is adamant that “universality is not the ‘for all x’ of a judgement deemed universal. For me, universality, that is, the possible predicate of a truth, is always a construction, a procedure, which is arranged within a particular situation or world. Universality is always built with materials that are particular\(\text{xxxvii}\)” (Badiou and Milner 2012: 104). For him, what is interesting is the fact that “as a universal, a particular truth is not entirely reducible to the particular world in which it was created\(\text{xxxviii}\)” (Badiou and Milner 2012: 104). In effect, how can something built in a particular world be transmitted and understood in many others? For Badiou, this means that “the universality of a truth is that which is in exception of the anthropological hold of a particularity, or of the hold of a historical and cultural world, of the hold of the context in which it is built\(\text{xxxix}\)” (Badiou and Milner 2012: 105). An event is that which is in exception of a particular anthropological context and it is thus an event which is able to bring forth a truth that is in exception of the system of identities and differences existing in a particular world.

\(\text{xxxvi}\) “Il n’est aucunement contradictoire, par exemple, mais au contraire parfaitement compatible, que la Terreur puisse être pour Sylvain Lazarus une politique singulière, dépendante du corps qui la porte (comme il le dit, à partir de 1793 l’État est faible, il n’est qu’une administration suspendue à des lieux, comme la Convention, les clubs, l’armée...), et qu’elle soit philosophiquement, comme l’a immédiatement pensé Hegel, une projection de la maxime égalitaire. C’est même, pour le philosophe, un parfait exemple de la dialectique matérialiste entre l’existence et l’être, ou entre le protocole immanent du devenir d’une vérité dans un monde, et, une fois qu’elle est advenue, son éternité trans-mondaine. Et il est tout à fait naturel que, dans le travail de cette compatibilité, l’anthropologie, étroitement liée au processus d’une politique, donc au présent d’une vérité, s’occupe du premier aspect, l’isole, le singularise, et la philosophie du second, dont elle renouvelle le concept» (Badiou 2006: 545).

\(\text{xxxvii}\) Translation mine, here is the original: «L’universalité n’est pas le «pour tout x» d’un jugement supposé universel. Pour moi, l’universalité, c’est-à-dire le prédicat possible d’une vérité, est toujours une construction, une procédure, qui se dispose dans une situation ou un monde particuliers. L’universalité est toujours construite avec des matériaux particuliers».

\(\text{xxxviii}\) Translation mine, here is the original: «En tant qu’universelle, une vérité particulière n’est pas intégralement réductible à la particularité du monde où elle est créée»

\(\text{xxxix}\) Translation mine, here is the original: «L’universalité d’une vérité, c’est ce qui fait exception à l’emprise anthropologique d’une particularité, ou à l’emprise d’un monde historique et culturel, à l’emprise du contexte dans lequel elle est construite»
We are now in a position to come back to Badiou’s use of the word anthropology. We can see from the quotes above that when Badiou talks of anthropology as a mediator between condition and philosophy, he is referring to the ability to isolate and singularise a truth as it appears within a particular anthropological context. And this ability is predicated on anthropology’s close link to the ‘process of a politics’ (in this one of the four conditions). It is only when anthropology has isolated a truth as it is built in a particular world that philosophy can seize it conceptually. We can now turn Lazarus’ work for an example of the anthropology Badiou is referring to here. In his *Anthropologie du Nom*, Lazarus presents his central concept of a historical mode of politics: a historical sequence in which a singular political thought is deployed. Lazarus distinguishes two types of historical modes of politics, those that are in inwardness (marked by a multiplicity of homogenous spaces) and those that are in outwardness (where the state is the only space of a heterogeneous multiplicity). The former are the revolutionary (1792-1794), the classist (1848-1871), the Bolshevik (1902-1917) and the dialectic (1928-1958) modes, pinned to the respective figures of Saint-Just, Marx and Engels, Lenin and Mao (Lazarus 1996: 90-91). In contrast, the latter are represented by parliamentary democracy in France since 1968 and Stalinism (Lazarus 1996: 92-95). It can immediately be seen that Lazarus and Badiou share the same political referents: both are seeking to discover a politics that goes both against parliamentary democracy and against the party-state, and both use the same political sequences to draw lessons for future political practice.

Lazarus’ notion of the historical mode of politics is precisely the type of anthropological operation Badiou is referring to: it isolates and singularises truths as they emerge in particular worlds. But it also does more: it allows Lazarus to classify these modes of politics and to split them into two opposing camps. This split is introduced with reference to space and its distribution with respect to the state. Lazarus’ departure in his work from the specific task Badiou assigns to anthropology opens up a possibility that social science can be compatible with Badiou’s philosophy. At the centre of this compatible social science must be the effort to isolate and singularise truths as they are built in particular worlds. To allow space for a social scientific investigation (in the field of politics for example) that is compatible with Badiou’s philosophy we must confront a difficulty head on: the rarity of politics. This is because anthropology is the identification of truths as they are built in the process of a politics. For Lazarus, “*politics, far from having as its object structural invariants or of being a particular instance of societies, is strictly without object, and is said to be, for this reason, in subjectivity or in inwardness. In this sense, politics is not constant; it is sequential and rare. This conception founds politics in thought as a singular thought, and not on classes, history, economics,*
the State” (Lazarus 1996: 35). Does this mean that a social science compatible with Badiou’s philosophy, in the field of politics for example, is destined to the repeated study of highly salient political sequences, such as the historical modes of politics identified by both Lazarus and Badiou (the revolutionary, the classist, the Bolshevik and the dialectical modes)?

UNPACKING COMPATIBILITY: THE EVENT FOR SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION

It is worth taking a step back here. We have so far shown that Badiou’s philosophy is concerned with political sequences as mediated by anthropology. It is anthropology which isolates and singularises the processes of a politics in particular worlds and philosophy which is then concerned with the trans-worldly existence of the truths that have been identified. We can thus posit here that anthropology is concerned with the empirical life of politics and philosophy with its theoretical existence. Or as Badiou summarises in his commentary on Lazarus’ thought in Metapolitics: “putting philosophy under condition of politics ‘taking-place’ (or politics as an infinite unfinished procedure) will pass through the anthropology of the name, inasmuch as one will entrust the latter to identify – by way of modes, names and places of the name – singularity at work. One will then seize this singularity in toto as truth (and as the manifestation of a singular eventality) within the space of philosophy, wherein singularity thereby affects and compels major conceptual readjustments” (Badiou 2005b: 54).

Philosophy and anthropology are thus in a position of mutual dependence. Anthropology is concerned with the identification of the construction of truths in a particular world, what Badiou in the quote above calls ‘singularity at work’, and it must thus know what to look for. And philosophy relies on the identification of such truth constructions to build its subjective formalisms (the transversal figures of the mass rebel or state revolutionary, for example, which can appear in a number of different truth constructions, and thus in a number of different worlds) – what Badiou here calls ‘major conceptual readjustments’. In a way then, at least half of the task of circumscribing what counts as a truth construction rests with anthropology. What anthropology

Translation mine, here is the original: «La politique, loin d’avoir pour objet des invariants structuraux ou d’être une instance particulière des sociétés, est sans objet au sens strict et dite, pour cette raison, en subjectivité ou en intériorité. Dans cette acception, la politique n’est pas constante; elle est séquentielle et rare. Cette conception fonde la politique dans la pensée comme pensée singulière et non sur les classes, l’histoire, l’économie, l’Etat»

«Mettre la philosophie sous condition de la politique ‘ayant-lieu’ (ou comme procédure infinie inachevée) passera par l’anthropologie du nom en ceci qu’on lui fera pleine confiance pour identifier, par modes, noms, lieux du nom, la singularité à l’œuvre. Et qu’alors on saisira cette singularité «en bloc» comme vérité (et comme relevant d’une evenementialité singulière) dans l’espace de la philosophie, que dès lors elle affecte, et contraint à des remaniements conceptuels majeurs» (Badiou 1998b: 64-65).
must guarantee is that the political sequence it identifies as truth construction be compatible with what the philosophy posits a truth is. To know the limits of anthropology, we must thus know what limits Badiou puts on the occurrence of truths. Once this limit is understood, it will be possible to posit that a social science that is concerned with what Badiou names anthropology is compatible with his philosophy. This social science is the identification of truths in particular worlds. Conceived in this limited way, social science has the capacity to break out of the structure in which it is embedded. This allows us to question Badiou’s overall dismissal of the social sciences. As an empirical investigation into truth constructions, the type of social science I am proposing here can serve as an instigator for new political sequences. By offering a critical re-reading of political sequences, a space can be opened for their renewed political use.

We have described in the last chapter how the truth of an event is that which is brought into the world by the faithful subject in its actions and how it is conceived as the articulation of the four determinations of equality, authority/terror, confidence and will. These are the concepts that pose limits to what Badiou considers as a political event. Of these four, it is clear that equality is the determination that most strongly conditions his political events, it is the defining characteristic of a political event: “It is thus that a political sequence signals its existence point by point through an enthusiasm for a new maxim of equality; art by the pleasure of a new perceptual intensity; love by the happiness of a new existential intensity; science by the joy of new enlightenment” (Badiou 2009: 76). Badiou acknowledges his indebtedness to Rancière for his adequation of politics and the affirmation of equality: “Rancière’s conception of equality inspired me, and still does, because of its axiomatic power: equality is never the goal, but the principle. It is not obtained, but declared. And we can call ‘politics’ the consequences, in the historical world, of this declaration” (Badiou 2009: 560). This last quote on his debt to Rancière gives us an indication of the conception of equality that Badiou puts at the centre of the truths his political events. What seems important in his conception of equality is that it be assumed in all political action, but without it being the explicit goal of the political sequence. Setting up equality as the goal of a political sequence would be to acknowledge that equality did not yet exist, that it was distant state that one hopes will one day be attained.

xlii «C’est ainsi qu’une séquence politique se signale point par point par un enthousiasme pour une nouvelle maxime de l’égalité, l’art par le plaisir d’une nouvelle intensité perceptive, l’amour par le bonheur d’une nouvelle intensité existentielle, la science par la joie de nouvelles lumières» (Badiou 2006: 85).

xliii «Mieux encore, ce livre vraiment étonnant qu’est le Maître Ignorant, Cinq Leçons sur l’Emancipation Intellectuelle (Paris, Fayard, 1987), ou Rancière met à l’épreuve des étranges conceptions pédagogiques de Jacotot sa conception de l’égalité. Conception qui m’a inspiré, qui m’inspire toujours, par sa puissance axiomatique : l’égalité n’est jamais le but, elle est le principe. Elle ne s’obtient pas, elle se déclare. Et on peut appeler «politique» les conséquences, dans le monde historique, de cette déclaration» (Badiou 2006: 585).
Against this, Rancière states that equality is “a point of departure, a supposition to maintain in every circumstance. Never would truth speak up for it. Never would equality exist except in its verification and at the price of being verified always and everywhere”\(^{xliv}\) (Rancière 1991: 138).

This notion of equality is not one that is fixed once and for all, but one that is tied to political action, one that is verified everyday and everywhere through political action. What this means is that we can’t assume from the outset that this equality is or is not present within a particular political sequence. Finding this notion of equality within a political sequence means dissecting the political practice it represents for its underlying assumptions rather than judging it by results or consequences. So what limits on the types of political sequences that can be isolated and singularised by social science does this notion of equality impose? The definition of an event stays the same, as a break in the structure of appearances in a given world, but to it is added the condition that this break be produced by a political practice which assumes equality, which axiomatically affirms it in its actions. While this condition of an affirmation of equality imposes limits on what is considered a political event, this limit is not as strict as Badiou seems to portray it. This is especially true if the world in which this break in the structure of appearances is to occur is scaled down from the dizzying heights occupied by Badiou’s archetypal political events, which affect whole nations and regions (as in the French or Russian revolutions). From this discussion, we can posit that any break, at any scale, which is produced by a political practice that assumes equality, rather than strives for it, can thus be seized by Badiou’s concepts. The corollary to this is that an empirical social scientific investigation can be invoked to isolate and singularise this more encompassing type of truth construction. What it must do is to look within particular political sequences for the construction of a truth. And once it has been identified, it is then legitimate to invoke Badiou’s trans-worldly concepts (subject, trace, etc.) to shed light on the empirical trajectory of that truth.

The next section will confront the findings of this section with the case of Haussmann’s transformation of Paris in the 19th century. Now that we have seen that social science can empirically look for processes of truth construction, we must offer elements of justification as to our investigation of a historical episode that seems antithetical to both politics and equality. Is it legitimate to invoke Badiou to think through the issues highlighted in the treatment of Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State by the scholarship on the transformation of Paris?

\(^{xliv}\) «L’égalité n’était pas un but à atteindre, mais un point de départ, une supposition à maintenir en toute circonstance. Jamais la vérité ne parlerait pour elle. Jamais l’égalité n’existerait que dans sa vérification et au prix de se vérifier toujours et partout» (Rancière 1987: 118).
FROM EVENT TO ARCHIVE

WHAT IT MEANS EMPIRICALLY TO FRAME HAUSSMANN AS AN EVENT

The last section has shown that any use of Badiou’s concepts in a social scientific investigation must be predicated on the identification of a political practice that used its affirmation of equality to break the structure of appearances of a given world. This section will attempt to reconcile this demand with last chapter’s discussion on the potential of Badiou’s concepts to illuminate Haussmann’s transformation of Paris. The immediate question is here: why Haussmann?

Interestingly, Badiou himself has asked this precise question in the context of this book on Saint Paul: “Why Saint Paul? Why solicit this "apostle" who is all the more suspect for having, it seems, proclaimed himself such and whose name is frequently tied to Christianity's least open, most institutional aspects: the Church, moral discipline, social conservatism, suspiciousness toward Jews? How are we to inscribe this name into the development of our project: to refound a theory of the Subject that subordinates its existence to the aleatory dimension of the event as well as to the pure contingency of multiple-being without sacrificing the theme of freedom?”

In this book, he also attempted to bring his philosophy into conversation with historical events, and the life of an individual. It is true that this project is attempting to go a step further. As mentioned above, Badiou uses social and political observation to articulate his philosophical work. Here, the aim is bring his philosophical concepts into contact with empirical material in order to investigate whether a particular truth can be isolated and singularised from it. But the controversial nature of the individual at the centre of these two enterprises is similar.

Indeed, at first sight, it seems as though the public works are very far removed from the types of political sequences Badiou has in mind for political events. Most of the haussmannisation literature discussed in chapter 1 argues that the transformation of Paris was exactly the opposite of Badiou’s political events: it was the forceful imposition of order over a city (Lessoff 2002, Pinheiro 2002), monumentality for political subjugation (O'Neill 2009), engineered social segregation (Holston 1989, Davis 2007), etc. Even those scholars of haussmannisation who view the public works in a more

---

\[4\] «Pourquoi saint Paul? Pourquoi requérir cet «apôtre» d’autant plus suspect qu’il s’est, de toute évidence, autoproclamé tel, et que son nom est couramment associé aux dimensions les plus institutionnelles, et les moins ouvertes du christianisme : l’Eglise, la discipline morale, le conservatisme social, la suspicion contre les Juifs ? Comment inscrire ce nom dans le devenir de notre tentative: re-fonder une théorie du Sujet qui en subordonne l’existence à la dimension aléatoire de l’événement comme à la contingence pure de l’être-multiple, sans sacrifier le motif de la vérité ?» (Badiou 1997: 5)
positive light do so for purposes far removed from those that animate Badiou’s work: complementarities between streets, residential buildings and monuments (Loo 1994), improvements of the transport infrastructure (Baxa 2004, Schubert and Sutcliffe 1996), achievement of modernity (Almandoz 1999).

When we move to those approaches that focused explicitly on the public works discussed in detail in the first two chapters, we are forced to admit that the picture does not look very different. Both Lefebvre and Harvey see the public works as having pushed workers to the periphery and that which triggered the Commune uprising (Lefebvre 2000, Harvey 2006a). More specifically, we saw that Harvey’s view of Haussmann’s actions was an indictment of his powerlessness in the face of the speculative forces he unleashed on Paris (Harvey 2006a). Halbwachs, Daumard and Gaillard all minimise the impact Haussmann had on the city: they note the successes and excesses of the period but do not ascribe causal power to Haussmann’s actions, which were only a blip on the radar in comparison to the larger social forces they invoke (Halbwachs 1909, Daumard 1965 and Gaillard 2000). While other authors may have a more positive outlook on the period and on Haussmann’s actions, this outlook is determined by characteristics of the public works that seem distant from Badiou’s insistence on a political practice that affirms equality: the extent of the public infrastructure provision (Chapman & Chapman 1957, Pinkney 1958), the new technical nature of planning (Giedion 1943), attention to circulation and hygiene (Choay 1983, 1996).

It seems difficult to expect to find the construction of a truth in the public works on the basis of the existing literature. But chapters 1 and 2 did highlight an aspect of the transformation of Paris that had not received enough attention. It was found that uncertainties remained as concerns the events that occurred around Haussmann’s 1858 defeat in the Council of State. Most of these uncertainties can be traced back to two overarching questions. The first can be gleaned from the accounts of Daumard and Gaillard and it concerns the mechanism through which the defeat in the Council of State occurred. For Daumard (1965), the important relationship here is that between Haussmann and property owners, but there is no indication of how that opposition unfolded and whether it had any influence on the 1858 decision. For Gaillard (2000), the important relationship is that between the imperial regime and property owners, but again, there is no explanation of how this alliance was cemented at Haussmann’s expense.

The second question is aimed more directly at Haussmann and it emerges from the accounts of Harvey, Benevolo and Sutcliffe: what were the characteristics of Haussmann’s planning practice? In
Harvey (2006a), this comes out of his statements about the relationship between Haussmann and property owners. Indeed, his account is based on the assumption that Haussmann and property owners were opposed because Haussmann sought to make them adopt the capitalist property relations that were needed to allow for the mobilisation of capital within Paris. For Harvey (2006a), the 1858 decision is construed as a successful resistance to this principle by property owners. This account was put into question by the fact that capitalist property relations became more deeply entrenched, that more capital was mobilised and that speculation became more widespread after 1858 than it was before. The issue at stake here is Haussmann’s stance towards property owners, and more importantly, towards capitalist property relations: was his planning practice aimed at releasing or at regulating capital?

This issue is similar in Benevolo’s account. It concerns the relationship between the political ideology of the imperial regime and the politics at the heart of Haussmann’s planning practice: in his practice, Haussmann contravened the principles of the imperial regime by interpreting expropriation laws in a way that went against the interests of property owners, and suffered defeat in the Council of State as a consequence (Benevolo 1967). This interpretation contradicts the picture Benevolo gives us of Haussmann as sharing the political ideology of the regime and leads to the question of what politics drove Haussmann’s planning practice. In the case of Sutcliffe’s account, the issue of situating Haussmann’s practice comes in his treatment of it as essentially unchanged throughout the period (Sutcliffe 1981). This is problematic because the facts clearly show that the 1858 decision took away powers that Haussmann had used extensively beforehand, thus segmenting his tenure as prefect in two distinct periods. In order to understand how these two periods differed, it is necessary to understand what characterised Haussmann’s planning practice and how it was impacted by the Council of State’s decision.

Based purely on the accounts of these five authors, it can be seen that an important aspect of the transformation of Paris has not been adequately studied. Chapter 2 argued that the root of this gap in the scholarship on Haussmann originated in the theoretical assumptions underlying the main approaches to the public works. These assumptions did not allow for the theorisation of opposition and agency that was needed to conceptualise Haussmann’s actions outside of structural considerations and the opposition that these actions elicited. This understudied aspect of the public works is an important one because it touches on the relationships of the imperial regime and Haussmann with property owners (and thus implicitly on the power of property owners over planning) and on the essence of Haussmann’s planning practice. The fact that what is missing in the
accounts of the scholars of the public works is an account of Haussmann’s planning practice is an encouraging sign. Indeed, from the discussion on Badiou and the social sciences above, we know that must look for a political practice that affirms the principle of equality. From the literature, and especially the accounts of Benevolo (1967), Gaillard (2000) and Harvey (2006a), we know that Haussmann’s planning practice was inherently political (caught in a triangular relationship with both the imperial regime and property owners). This is a possible anchor point for the identification of a truth construction: a political practice waiting to be fleshed out empirically. But what hopes do we have of uncovering a principle of equality within this political practice? One possibility is that this planning practice was influenced by the same Saint-Simonian leanings that authors such as Sagnes (2008) and Anceau (2008) attribute to Napoleon III. It was the Emperor himself who gave the impetus for the public works and Haussmann’s planning practice may have reflected the same political tendencies. It is only through empirical research that we will be able to ascertain whether Badiou’s concepts presented in chapter 2 can be employed to shed light on Haussmann’s planning practice. The next section will present the way in which I located the empirical material that will be used in this thesis.

THE ARCHIVE

There are not many options available to a researcher seeking to revisit a series of events that occurred in the middle of the 19th century. This is especially the case when the material that is to be collected has to allow for an investigation into the political practice of an agent and the responses it triggered. This section will detail the method that was used to identify the archival material that this investigation will rely on. The assumptions and strategies that were taken into the archive will be reviewed first, followed by the way in which I searched for suitable material within the archive.

It is impossible to know in any detail what is in a particular box in an archive without going there and opening it up. Some indices have been digitalised, but even these only offer a short description (and usually only a title and time period) that rarely goes beyond the government department and section from which the papers originated. The best way to prepare for what would ultimately have to be a search within the archive was to identify what kind of material would be suitable and thus which archives to consult. What is of interest in this investigation is a political practice and the responses it generated, identified through the existing scholarship as being crucial to the events surrounding the 1858 defeat. These actors involved are Haussmann, property owners (described as

 Pinkney (1955: 125) also wonders whether Napoleon III was inspired by the Saint-Simonians in his plan for the public works and Roncayolo explicitly pits the social force of property against the Saint-Simonian ambitions of Napoleon III’s regime (Roncayolo, in Agulhon, 1983: 114).
central to the events in the accounts of Daumard and Harvey) and the imperial regime (whose influence was seen as decisive for Gaillard and Benevolo). The method chosen was to establish a set of guidelines that could be used to select the archives to visit and to maintain focus on the task at hand once in the archives.

The recent digitalisation of many of the leading newspapers of the time by the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (the Gallica digital library), meant that I had a resource available on which these guidelines could be tested\textsuperscript{xlvii}. By studying these digitalised 19\textsuperscript{th} century newspaper issues, it became very clear that they would not be useful for the type of investigation I was pursuing. In the 1850s, there was still quite an active censorship of the media and the articles featured in these newspapers were usually limited to the neutral description of facts and events. Nowhere could traces of the voice of the journalist be found. Additionally, the transformations Paris was going through were very rarely the subject of newspaper articles. While this can seem surprising today when we think of the scale and intensity of the transformations the city went through in a short period of time, some elements of explanation can be found. First, because the public works were seen as an initiative emanating from the Emperor himself, it may be that any negative press about them was censored at source. Second, in the period I am investigating (the lead up to the 1858 Council of State decision), the public works remained quite localised to the Grande Croisée (Hall 1997: 66), the cross-shaped opening that Napoleon III had given Haussmann instructions to pierce through central Paris. This concerned the following axes: North-South (Boulevard de Strasbourg – Boulevard de Sébastopol – first section of the Boulevard St. Michel) and East-West (Rue de Rivoli) axes. Finally, most newspapers were focused on national and international issues, such as the Crimean War (1853-1856), industrialisation and the creation of the railways.

These reasons made the use of the digitalised newspaper archive impossible. But the investigation of that resource provided some useful indications of the kind of archive that could contain evidence of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners. The main warning that emerged out of this was that censorship had to be bypassed if any written material containing traces of a political practice and the responses it garnered were to be found. The sensitivity of the issue because of its direct link to the Emperor meant that this could be a serious problem for all material published at the time (in the media but also in books, pamphlets, published memoires, novels). It quickly became clear that the best way to avoid the issue of censorship was to search within the archives of the government departments that were directly involved with the public works. Indeed, what better

\textsuperscript{xlvii} I looked at Le Journal des Débats and La Presse, two leading newspapers of the time (see Appendix 1)
place to find uncensored written material than in the place where it was kept secret? This thus
came one of the guidelines I took to the archives. But it also helped me decide which archives to
visit: by following the different governmental bodies active during the public works, I was able to
decide from the outset that I would need to visit two different archives, namely, the Parisian
Municipal Archives and the National Archives. This is because both municipal level bodies (such as
the different services under Haussmann’s control) and national level bodies (such as the Ministry of
the Interior to which Haussmann was subordinated, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of
Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works) were involved in some way or the other in the public
works. My intuition was that these different bodies were in contact, in some way or the other, with
the Parisian public and that some trace of that contact could exist in their archives. For example, I
knew that Haussmann, by law, had to carry out public consultations as part of the process through
which public work projects were adopted. This was the kind of material I was hoping to find. It
seemed like the text that would be produced in the contact between the public and the bodies
carrying out the public works would contain traces of both Haussmann’s planning practice and the
responses of property owners to it.

VISITING THE PARISIAN ARCHIVES

I started my fieldwork at the Parisian Municipal Archives for a number of reasons. They are smaller
than the National Archives and I assumed it would be easier to get familiarised with the way in which
an archive works there. I also wanted to follow up on the intuition that public consultations would
be a good place to look for the thoughts of members of the Parisian public. Even in this relatively
small archive the quantity of boxes available for perusal was astounding. Indices at the archive did
not give me much more detail into the content of particular boxes than the ones posted online and
the process of looking through promising boxes became one of trial and error. There is a language
and a principle of organisation to the archive and I realised I needed to translate what I was looking
for into the language of the archive. I was expecting to visit the archive, but soon realised I needed
to settle there, to learn its language, to understand its logic if was ever to find something I could use.
In this process of acclimatisation, how I looked for things changed. I was as much looking for
material that fit with the ideas I had before arriving as I was learning the form that material could
take in the archive.

Through this process, I learnt how and where to look for the kind of material I was searching for. This
was a bitter lesson, as I soon realised that this material was not what the archives were as a whole
about. Most of the boxes contained documents produced in the daily routine of administrative
bodies, and as such did not contain any trace of the outside world. And when there was contact
between the administrative bodies and the public, such as in the case of the public consultations,
these were highly codified and were more concerned with obtaining a swift assent from the public
that in creating an active discussion around the urban intervention in question. It was certainly naive
to assume that the phrase ‘public consultation’ in 19th century France would mean the same thing as
it does today. It is worth describing in some detail the content of the boxes I studied in the Parisian
municipal archives as they were an important step in the process that led me to the actual archival
material used in this study.

The archival resource I found there was part of the archives of the city halls of the Paris
Arrondissements (the City of Paris’ subdivisions – 8 before 1860, 20 after the 1860 boundary
extension). I focused specifically on the documents that were collected within each arrondissement
that dealt with the process of road piercing and construction. These are organised by street and
usually contain all the documents relating to the administrative procedures that were required to
create a new boulevard. The process was as follows: the mayor of an arrondissement would receive
a note from Haussmann asking him to make public the particular route of the boulevard that was
planned for his area. He was asked to organise a public consultation through which any questions,
grievances or complaints that arose were to be recorded and sent back to Haussmann. Once this had
been done and sent back to him, Haussmann would then send back a map on which the exact area
of each building that needed to be expropriated was indicated and asked the mayor to contact the
individual owners of these buildings and have them fill out a roster – giving their name, profession
and house number. Once this had been collected, it was sent back to Haussmann who would then
work out the amount of compensation that would be offered to the owners for their building or the
part of it that needed to be destroyed. The expropriation process would then start: either the offer
was accepted or it had to be enforced through an official decree (which Haussmann had the
mandate to put forth). Everything would be done under the scrutiny of a notary and it was usually
the case that when a decree was needed, it was after a negotiation process between the owner, an
agent of the state and a notary. When the expropriations were secured, the required demolitions
took place. There then followed a series of technical studies – levelling, slope standardisations,
sewage construction – which all required assent from the owners whose buildings now faced the
street.

The full list of boxes consulted in the Parisian Municipal Archives can be found in Appendix 1
Within this process, there are many moments at which objections and grievances could have been voiced. The most obvious is the public consultation that was organised when the plan for a new boulevard was first unveiled. These public meetings were organised within the city hall of the arrondissement in which the new boulevard was to be created and usually lasted for three to five days. Posters inviting residents to attend were sent through already prepared by Haussmann and it was the Mayor’s responsibility to display them within the neighbourhood. A notary was mandated to oversee the whole process and to collect both spoken and written questions, comments and grievances. He would also give the Mayor a daily report of the number of people who attended the meeting and whether any comments were made. The Mayor would then send all of this alongside his own conclusions on the consultation to Haussmann. In the archive boxes I have looked at, I found that these reports were there for around a fifth of the road openings (of which each box usually contains 50 to 75). These are thus a good source of information about the general opinion of residents (owners, residents and shopkeepers) on the transformations that were to occur in their neighbourhood. Other expressions of public opinion that I found were punctual responses to particular announcements – the amount of land to be expropriated, the particular route of a new road, the amount to be paid for sidewalk or sewage construction, etc. These used a different channel of communication: they were either petitions signed by a number of individuals (maximum 15 to 20) or letters from individuals and sent either directly to Haussmann or to the local Mayor. Accordingly, this was mostly used by the upper classes to voice their concerns directly to the highest authority. A final source of grievances comes from collective letters written by shopkeepers, merchants and light industrialists. The particularity of these letters is that they brought together all trades – from butchers to jewellers – and were solely focused on the speed with which the works were undertaken. In the Paris archives, there are 33 boxes which contain the information I have just detailed.

I quickly became submerged with information: 32 boxes, each containing between 50 to 75 road opening cases, stretched out over the 12 old and the 20 new Arrondissements, and for the 1853 to 1870 period. It felt like it would be a life’s work to go through all the boxes, let alone photograph, transcribe and analyse them. Over and above this purely logistical issue, I did not sense that the text contained in these boxes (at least the 12 I carefully read through) would in any way allow me to access the protagonists I was interested in. As could be expected since this was a municipal archive, the imperial regime was absent from the boxes. More problematic however, was the notable absence of non-administrative and non-procedural text from Haussmann. The few letters that were written by Haussmann in these boxes seemed devoid of any personal involvement, as if he were only
selecting codified answers according to a set of predefined criteria. I encountered a series of letters from wealthy owners who sought to enter into negotiations with Haussmann about the amount of land to be expropriated or who attempted to engage in land swapping in order to secure prime land on the new boulevard. I also found numerous petitions in which groups of owners or shopkeepers asked for the upgrading of the streets or sidewalks in front of their buildings or shops or the piercing of a particular street that would either increase the value of their property or bring in more customers. In most of these cases, the archives contain both the original petition and the paper trace of how it was dealt with by Haussmann’s administration. It seems as though responses to these demands depended entirely on whether they corresponded to the particular plan Haussmann had worked out for an area. The success of a demand was not correlated to the wealth of a particular area or the social make-up of the group making it (petitioners would generally write their profession when signing). Expectations were thus handled in a very rational and objective way: Haussmann would only accept deals that corresponded to what he had already worked out.

What I realised while becoming disenchanted with this collection of boxes was that the material it contained did not allow for an image of Haussmann’s planning practice in its political manifestation to emerge. What seemed to be missing was any sense of two-way communication in the non-administrative documents within these boxes. The comments received from Parisians during the public consultations, for example, were recorded and sent to Haussmann, but there was no trace of a response by Haussmann. Since these consultations were simply ways of registering assent from the public, there was no effort and in fact, no need, to respond to comments and to engage the public. The same can be said for the complaints and petitions that were sent to Haussmann’s administration in the course of a road piercing: as mentioned above, Haussmann gave codified answers, without making any effort to open a communicative channel. This may well be a response to the fact that these manifestations by the public were for the most part unthreatening. Complaints about obstructions to their trade by shopkeepers would resolve naturally, and Haussmann understood that shopkeepers’ worries would be dispelled as soon as they realised that their business would profit from the enlarged street. Even the most vociferous complaints by wealthy property owners fell on deaf ears: it was not by complaining to the municipal administration that Haussmann’s street piercing machine could be stopped. The absence of two-way communication can thus be seen as stemming from the fact that because there was no threat to his planning practice, Haussmann did not feel compelled to respond.
I started to see a parallel between my experience in the Municipal Archive and Badiou’s *Saint Paul*, a book that by necessity had to rely on the only material written by Paul himself: “*letters, written by a leader to the groups he has started or backed. They cover a very brief period (from 50 to 58). They are militant documents sent to small groups of the converted. In no way are they narratives, in the manner of the Gospels, or theoretical treatises, of the kind later written by the Church Fathers, or lyrical prophecies, such as the Apocalypse attributed to John. They are interventions*” (Badiou 2003: 31). I then realised that, similarly to Paul’s militant universalism, the politics of Haussmann’s planning practice would emerge in the middle of action, in the midst of a to and fro, when actions were seriously questioned and had to be justified. What I needed to find was Haussmann under pressure.

**IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES**

While looking for alternatives archival sources, I was fortuitously helped by an archivist’s suggestion to look into a particular collection at the National Archives. I had been so consumed by the abundance of material at the Parisian Archives that the National Archives seemed like a place I was expecting to visit in a distant future. But this suggestion immediately caught my attention because it seemed to offer a very different perspective on Haussmann and his relation with the Parisian public. The name of the collection was ‘Public Spirit’, an eloquent wording for the paper traces of the tracking and reporting of anti-Bonapartist sentiments by the Ministry of the Interior under the Second Empire. The online description of the contents of the different boxes this collection contained (reports on public disturbances, data from the political police, reports on public opinion by various administrators, minutes of Arrondissement Council meetings) seemed to offer the threats to Haussmann’s planning practice I thought would give me access to the material I was after. I thus decided to make a pause in my work in the Municipal Archive and investigate the boxes that looked most promising in this collection in the National Archives.

A very promising series of boxes was found in the National Archives (coded as F² II Seine 1-37) containing documents related to urban road works from 1792 to 1861. Three of these (33, 34 and 37)...

---

*Les textes de Paul sont des lettres, écrites par un dirigeant aux groups qu’il a fondés ou soutenus. Elles couvrent une très brève période (de 50 à 58). Ce sont des documents militants envoyés à de petits noyaux de convertis. Ce ne sont d’aucune façon, ni des récits, comme le sont les Evangelies, ni des traités théoriques, comme en écrivent plus tard les Pères de l’Eglise, ni des prophéties lyriques, comme l’Apocalypse attribuée à Jean. Ce sont des interventions* (Badiou 1997: 33).

1 The full list of these boxes can be found in Appendix 1
2 Though the last document I found was for 1859, not 1861. These boxes have, to the best of my knowledge, never been studied. My hypothesis concerning this rather surprising neglect is that I was looking for something other scholars may not have been, that is, traces of the relation between Haussmann and property owners. As
35) are specifically concerned with the period I am interested in: 1853 (Haussmann’s assumption of the role of Prefect of the Seine) to 1859 (just after his defeat in the Council of State). I have searched extensively for the continuation of this archive past 1859 but it seems to have been lost, as was the case with a large amount of documents, when the City Hall was burnt down by the retreating Communards in the final days of the *Semaine Sanglante* in May 1871 (Milza 2009). These three boxes contain around 115 administrative cases centred on letters sent to the Minister of the Interior (Haussmann’s immediate superior) by Parisian property owners over the 1853 to 1859 period. At the time, I took the decision not to open the boxes containing documents for the period preceding Haussmann’s arrival in Paris. I now realise that it would have been very valuable to have access to this information so as to be able to ground an analysis of the break introduced by Haussmann in a comparison with the situation that preceded his arrival, read through the same archival resource. In all honesty, I don’t think I would have been able to analyse many more cases than I already have. But there is no doubt that I should have invested some time during my stay at the National Archives to go over some of these documents so as to have a basis against which to compare the boxes I did open. For this purpose, I now have to rely on the literature. This is a clear limitation of my thesis.

The three boxes I did decide to exploit in depth contain letters sent by Parisians to the Minister of the Interior to complain about the actions taken by Haussmann, or to submit a proposal or request. Around half the cases also include a letter from Haussmann to the Interior Minister in which he explains the reasons for which he decided on the course of action that is being complained about or to give his recommendation on whether the proposition or request should be followed through. In some of the cases, there is also a letter from the Interior Minister to Haussmann, in which the former either outlines the decision he has taken or questions the arguments Haussmann has put forward. My interest in these letters and the responses they elicited was piqued by both the fact that the three main protagonists I was interested in were represented (Haussmann, property owners and the imperial regime, through the Interior Minister) and by the fact that they were steeped in confrontational language. Haussmann seemed under pressure here – both by the property owners who complained of his *modus operandi* and of the principles that motivated it, and by the Interior Minister. This seemed like fertile terrain for uncovering a political practice. Actions were questioned, letters were written in the midst of action and courses of action had to be defended.

discussed in chapters 1 & 2, this relationship has not been the focus of many works on the period. Historians may also have seen these letters (if they found them) as mere details in the wider scheme of the urban transformations underway.
Practically, I felt that these three boxes contained an amount of information that was manageable given the time and resources available. But more importantly, they held a coherent set of cases that stretched out over the period I needed (1853-1859) in order to understand the events that led up to Haussmann’s 1858 defeat and its immediate aftermath. The letters are relatively well distributed over the 1854 to 1859 period\[^{\text{III}}\], but there are only 4 cases for 1853. A clear limitation is the collection’s abrupt end in 1859. Any conclusions as to the effects of the 1858 defeat on this particular set of relationships will thus have to be tentative. I nonetheless felt that I had found the material I needed: a coherent and temporally bounded set of letters that centred on Haussmann’s conflictive relationships with both the property owners he dismissed so easily in the documents from the Municipal Archives and his immediate superior, the Minister of the Interior, who also represented the interests of the imperial regime. The next section will present the material in these three boxes in more detail and explain how they will be analysed.

**FROM ARCHIVES TO ANALYSIS**

**THREE BOXES OF 19\textsuperscript{th} CENTURY LETTERS**

The three boxes that will be used in this investigation are from the archives of the Departmental Affairs section of the Interior Ministry, whose responsibilities during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century included territorial administrative divisions, the merging and limits of communes, issues of competencies and administrative precedence, departmental and local roads, the civil registry and departmental buildings. These three boxes contain cases related to the urban road network in the Department of the Seine from 1853 to 1859. From 1790 to 1964, the city of Paris was at the centre of a large department (one of France’s 86 at the time), called the Département de la Seine and designed to include Paris and all of the suburbs contained within a radius of 3 leagues, approximately 12km (Magné de la Londe 1902: 38). It was split up in 1968 into the four departments that today form part of the Petite Couronne: Paris, Seine- Saint-Denis, Hauts-de-Seine and Val-de-Marne. It thus contained most of what could be at that time considered as the Paris metropolitan region (approximately 2 million inhabitants in 1860).

Haussmann was appointed Prefect of the Department of the Seine in June 1853 and as such was the administrative head of the department. As prefect and sole executive authority over the department of the Seine, Haussmann’s attributions were vast. He cumulated the functions of Prefect of the Department and of Mayor of Paris and was thus in charge of appointing the agents of municipal

\[^{\text{III}}\] 1854 (18), 1855 (11), 1856 (28), 1857 (26), 1858 (21), 1859 (7)
services, deciding on alignments and building permits for all of Paris’ roads, establishing expropriations to be carried out, and in general presided over all aspects of the municipal administration. In spite of these vast attributions and of his special relationship with the Emperor, as prefect, Haussmann was still a civil servant of the Imperial regime and thus subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. This archive sits in the Departmental Affairs section of the Interior Ministry at the National Archives because it deals with cases that originated with letters or petitions sent to Haussmann’s superiors, not to Haussmann’s municipal administration. This means that there was an initial choice made by most of those who sent the letters: they targeted Haussmann’s superior in the hierarchy either because they wanted to bypass Haussmann, complain about his decisions or thought that the real decision making was done in the Ministry of the Interior.

What is interesting about this archival resource is that once the Ministry of the Interior received a letter or petition concerning Haussmann’s work, he had to forward it to Haussmann either to ask him about his view on the petition or to ask for his justification of the decision that was complained about. Most cases were resolved quite quickly and the paper trace that remains is usually the original letter and Haussmann’s reply to the Ministry of the Interior’s request for more information. Some more complex cases can contain multiple letters to the Ministry of the Interior over the period of a couple of years, Haussmann’s replies to the Minister’s request for information or for a justification and the Minister’s responses to these. Taken together, these cases offer written traces of the usually conflictive relations between the three protagonists I am interested in.

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHY AND THREE BOXES OF LETTERS

Now that the archival material that will inform the empirical analysis of the next three chapters has been presented, we can return to Badiou’s concepts and detail the way in which they will be sought within the archival material. We are here entering completely new ground. Badiou’s use of evidence to support the analyses of events that illustrate his philosophical texts is never laid out methodically. Excerpts from texts are used both as illustration of concepts and as pedagogical tools to draw out concepts for the reader. It is overwhelmingly clear, however, that his approach is predicated on the qualitative analysis of text. This may seem surprising given his emphasis on mathematical exposition and formalisation. While mathematics is what grounds his concepts philosophically (set theory for being, logics for being there), these concepts are then fleshed out and brought to life in each of the four fields of human activity (politics, arts, science and love). There is thus a symbiotic relationship between the mathematics that grounds the concept philosophically and the material (philosophical, literary, plastic, musical, political) that brings these concepts into contact with lived reality. This is
the aspect of his enterprise that this thesis has attached itself to, not the mathematical formalisations that ground the concepts.

It thus appears from Badiou's work that any attempt at making use of his concepts to interrogate text must be based on the qualitative analysis of that text. The issue here is that Badiou does not lay out any method that could assist us in this task. Passages containing an illustration of a concept or given to the reader so that he may find the concept within it are already selected by Badiou for that particular task. There is no indication of the method Badiou employed to locate and select these pieces of text, no indication as to what would direct such a search. The task we are confronted with in this thesis is to develop a method to locate Badiou's concepts within a body of text. We are thus aiming to provide a general method that could be utilised to uncover events and their unfolding within a coherent corpus of text. The three empirical chapters that follow will be an application of this method to the three boxes of letters identified above. In its broad strokes, it can be separated out into three different tasks. The first, which is the focus of chapter 4, will be to establish that a genuine break occurred in the world under consideration. Without such a break and the overturning of the structure of appearances, it is not possible to find a truth and thus to use Badiou's concepts. Chapter 5 will move on to the second task of providing a way into the political principles that were brought to the surface by the break in the world. These principles will then be used in Chapter 6 to argue that the political practice that produced such a break was predicated on the affirmation of equality. This will allow for the truth to be posited and for Badiou’s concept of the subject to be put to use to shed light on the public works.

This method thus internalises the two conditions set by Badiou to his political events, a break in the structure of appearances and a political practice that affirms the principle of equality, in its approach to the empirical material. It acknowledges that there needs to a sequential fulfilling of these two conditions: the break in the world must be established before the political practice that produced it can be scrutinised. But it is also based on the assumption that it is much more difficult to establish the characteristics of a political practice based on a limited set of empirical material than to ascertain whether the empirical material carries within it any indication that a break has occurred. This why chapter 4 will be concerned with isolating the break in the structure of appearances and chapter 5 and 6 will allow for the detailed investigation of the political practice that produced it. The next section will present some data checks conducted on the archival material.
DATA CHECKS AND LIMITATIONS

I transcribed all the letters from the 115 cases I had photographed in the archives. This was a painstaking process. The major difficulty was in deciphering 19th century handwriting. Indeed, all letters within the boxes I looked at in both archives were handwritten, and print was only used in specific cases, such as reports, placards and posters. The quality of the handwriting was very variable and there was much more emphasis on calligraphy as there is today: the most difficult to read were thus from those who had very graphically oriented handwriting (very slanted, long loops, overlapping lines due to extended letters). These difficulties were more pronounced where the ink had slightly faded or where the quality of the photograph was lower (I was taking the pictures without a tripod). The French used in the letters is not very different from the one used today, but I had to get accustomed to the manner of expression in these letters which is much more formal and eloquent than the French of today. There were many expressions that have fallen out of use, and in some cases, technical vocabulary related to architecture and the building industry was used. Thus, the transcription process was one of getting used to a particular mode of expression from a particular time.

In parallel to the transcription of the letters, I classified letters according to the type of letter the case originated from: a complaint, a proposition or a request. Complaints, by far the largest group with a total of 90 cases, were usually directed at an administrative decision taken either by Haussmann or by the local mayors outside of the city of Paris boundaries. The complaint letters were sent to the Minister of the Interior or the Emperor to ask for the revocation of the administrative decision that had been taken against them. The 14 requests were demands made to the Minister of the Interior or the Emperor that either bypassed the municipal authority or were ignored by it. Demands originated from needs that the public felt the municipal authority should have responded to, such as the poor state of a particular neighbourhood, or expectations that the municipal authority had instilled in them and that had not yet been met, such as promises of payments or expropriations. The 11 propositions were sent to the Minister of the Interior and the Emperor in order to submit ideas and projects that were thought to be of appeal to them, be they ideas for new streets to pierce, how best to use empty land or how to better transform the whole city. This broad classification of letters will be returned to in the empirical chapters.

A first test on the empirical material I conducted was to investigate whether the property owners in this archive were a homogenous group, and if so, what social category they represented. It would be a clear limitation if I found that the empirical material would only shed light on the relation between
Haussmann and the wealthiest property owners in Paris. This would limit the range of possible interactions as well as the generalisation of my findings to the Parisian propertied class as a whole.

Two initial, broad checks, gave me an element of hope that this would not be the case: out of the 115 letters from the public, 9 were written by tenants, 13 by individuals representing companies or developers and 93 by property owners. If the archive contained letters from tenants and collectives, there was an indication that it may also feature property owners of different wealth levels. A second test was to look at the distribution of letters in terms of their geographical spread. The signs were once again encouraging, with 88 of them sent from within the city of Paris in its pre-1860 limits, 23 from the ring of suburbs that were annexed to the city in 1860 and 4 from outside of these. This distribution is roughly representative of the distribution of population in 1856 (1.17 million within the pre-1860 city, 0.36 million outside the walls).

The information on the letters themselves allowed for a more sophisticated differentiation of the property owners. It is possible to establish with reasonable accuracy whether or not the author of the letter owned more than one property. Indeed, every letter had to have a return address. If the author lived in the property he owned then there is only one address mentioned, but if he lived in another property he owned, the letter will feature both addresses. There were three cases in which more than two properties were owned, and this was possible to establish because the owner was either living outside of Paris (and thus referring to his two properties in Paris in addition to his return address in the other city), or the additional buildings were within the same plot as the one in question. The division between those owning only one property and those owning more than one could also be verified by the way in which they referred to their property. Those who lived in the property they owned referred to it as ‘ma maison’ (my house), while those who owned more than one property referred to the property in question as ‘ma propriétée’ (my property). Out of the 93 property owners who sent letters to the Minister of the Interior, 43 owned a single property, 47 owned two properties and 3 owned three properties. While there are limitations to this method, it is a strong indication that the letters came from a varied cross-section of Parisian property owners.

A final check came in the form of the location in the city of the properties owned. Location is crucial because Paris already had a very marked social division between its wealthier West and poorer East and between its centre and the more peripheral areas. Based on poverty maps by Parisian

_____________________

iii It is possible, for example, that someone owning more than one property wrote to the Ministry of the Interior only with respect to the property they were currently living in, and are thus wrongly categorised as owning only one property. Or it could be that other properties owned are not mentioned.
Arrondissement collected from the Parisian Municipal Archives by Gaillard for 1850, 1856 and 1869, the 20 Parisian Arrondissements were divided into four tiers (Gaillard 2000: 488iv). The 1869 map is necessary because the two earlier maps do not give us any information on the 8 Arrondissements that were added to the city in 1860. Given that Gaillard does not provide the actual data behind the maps, and that these three maps are from different time periods, the classification of areas into tiers needs to be taken as a rough estimate. It is quite clear though that the Arrondissements 1, 2, 8, 9 and 16, located on the western portion of the Right Bank were the areas where poverty was lowest (1 indigent per 30 to 40 inhabitants). They make up the first tier. It is also relatively easy to identify those areas with the highest poverty: the 5th (on the eastern portion of the Left Bank, where part of the quartier Latin now sits), the 13th and 14th (directly to the south and east of the 5th) and the 20th (far eastern portion of the Right Bank). In these areas that make up the fourth tier, there was an indigent for every 10 inhabitants. To differentiate between tier 2 and tier 3 becomes more difficult because the maps do not allow smaller differences to be read. However, we can see that the more central Arrondissements 3, 4 and 10 on the Right Bank and 6th on the Left Bank (tier 2) are better off in both 1850 and 1856 than the more distant 11, 12, 18 and 19 on the Right Bank and 15th on the Left Bank (tier 3). As for the 7th, Gaillard indicates that the large number of charitable institutions there acted as a magnet for indigents (Gaillard 2000: 162). I have thus decided to include it in the second tier.

Once these tiers had been established, I went through all of the letters in each case to identify the addresses of all the properties owned. I then used Google Earth to find out in which Arrondissement these properties were located. Each property was then assigned the corresponding tier. The difficulty here was that most of the streets names have changed since the 1850s. In most case, defunct street names could be matched to existing streets using an online correspondence facility on the Paris City Hall Website. When the location of the defunct street could not be established that way, I had to rely on the Dictionnaire Administratif et Historique des Rues de Paris et de ses Monuments. Published in 1844 by Félix and Louis Lazare, it is the most exhaustive catalogue of Parisian streets before Haussmann’s interventions. Available in digital form through the Bibliothèque Nationale’s online digital archive Gallica, this text was crucial in helping me situate the properties mentioned in the letters. I combined the location tiers with the information on the number of properties owned to obtain an estimate of the wealth of property owners. Points were assigned to the authors of the letters according to the tier in which their properties lay, and the same points

iv While using the level of the Arrondissement for this data check may conceal some significant intra-
arrondissement variations in poverty levels, we are restricted to this unit of analysis by the availability of data.
were awarded for any other properties they owned in Paris. Tenants were also awarded points according to the tier in which the apartment sat, although these were lower than for tier 4 owners. Four tiers of individuals can thus be derived from the total number of points they scored (using natural breaks in the series). There were 29 tier 1 individuals who scored four or less. These were all tenants and owners of a single tier 3 or tier 4 property. A large number of property owners (41) were found to have a score higher than six but lower than ten. These were individuals who either owned a single property in tiers 1 or 2 or who owned two properties in tiers 3 or 4. A third category of 20 individuals have scores of twelve or fourteen, achieved through two tier 2 properties or a tier 1 and a tier 2 property. A final group of 12 individuals have scores that range from sixteen to twenty-four, obtained through the ownership of two tier 1 properties or of three properties. This more detailed analysis reaffirms the heterogeneity of individuals who sent letters to the Minister of the Interior in terms of wealth. Although it is clear that they belonged to the wealthiest portion of society, they are diverse enough for us to be able to assert that the letters contain a representative cross-section of these wealthy individuals.

We can thus posit that limitations to the data do not originate in the data itself, but in the use that can be made of it analytically. The data has been shown to be representative of a certain section of Parisian society over a limited period of time. The fact that the data only offers evidence of the relation between Haussmann and a particular set of individuals is not an impediment to the investigation that this thesis has set out on. Indeed, we have seen from the first two chapters that the relation that is understudied is precisely that which opposed Haussmann to property owners. While it would of course have been very valuable to have access to a much larger set of individuals, and one that is more representative of the Parisian population as a whole, the focus of the investigation into their content would have been quite different. The material in this archive is appropriate for the investigation that we are undertaking here. The temporal limitation of the dataset is more problematic because it limits the type of analysis that can be conducted on the data. It forecloses the possibility of statistical analysis given the limited temporal data points available: 5 or 6 depending on whether the year 1859’s seven cases are included. Any trends that may arise from this limited number of temporal data points will have to be treated very cautiously. We are now in a position to move to the analysis of the archival material that will be conducted in the next three chapters.

---

The point scale for property status is then as follows: 8 points for tier 1 properties, 6 points for tier 2 properties, 4 for tier 3 properties, 2 for tier 4 properties, 1 for tier 1 tenants, 0.75 for tier 2 tenants, 0.5 for tier 3 tenants and 0.25 for tier 4 tenants.
ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES OF THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS

Given the impossibility of an analysis based on the statistical analysis of trends in the content of the letters over the limited number of data points available, we must turn to a qualitative analysis method. In doing so, we align ourselves with Badiou’s practice of dissecting textual evidence in his philosophical texts. A difference, however, is that we must find a rigorous method to treat the text and allow for Badiou’s concepts to emerge. An advantage when attaching an investigation to an internally coherent project such as Badiou’s is that one knows the general route one has to follow in the analysis. As mentioned above, we know that we must first identify a world and the break that occurred within it, before moving on to the political practice that produced that break and what characterises it. It is more difficult, however, to fit this general frame into the format of a thesis. This is because we must first make sure that the period we are looking at genuinely represents a break in a world. This is a precondition to then moving on to the main piece of analysis, the identification of a political practice and the idea it carried into that world. We must thus separate out this section on the analytical strategy employed in two: there is one strategy for chapter 4, and another for chapters 5 and 6. What unifies them is the use of a single tool, QSR’s NVIVO, a computer assisted qualitative analysis software. Given the large amount of text that is to be investigated (around 122,000 words) and its high segmentation into 115 cases, this software was very useful in allowing for flexibility in the categorisation of cases and statements. We will now present both analytical strategies in turn.

What does it mean to look for a reversal of the structure of appearances in practice? This is the task that chapter 4 will confront. Its strategy will be to start with the concept of the world, the part of existence that one has the intuition was fundamentally altered. This means that the first question that needs to be answered when approaching the empirical material is the following: in what domain are we expecting a fundamental change to occur? This allows for the investigation to be circumscribed to that portion of reality in which a break is hypothesised. This hypothesis will be formulated both on the basis of the existing literature and the empirical material, in our case on the confrontation of the conditions of Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State in the literature with the letters from property owners to the Minister of the Interior concerning Haussmann’s practice. Chapter 4 will establish that this world is that of Parisian planning. Once the world has been identified, the focus must move to the break that occurred within that world. Another hypothesis is necessary here. The literature should once again give us an indication of how the break occurred in the world: it is only with an intuition of the change that a world has undergone that we can look at the empirical material fruitfully, it is only against the backdrop of an initial situation that one can
determine whether a change has occurred. This means laying out the situation that existed in the particular world on which the investigation is focussed and contrasting this with that revealed in the empirical material. In chapter 4, this second hypothesis will be that Haussmann’s arrival in Paris as Prefect of the Seine fundamentally altered the way in which planning was conducted. The empirical material used in that chapter will be limited to letters of complaint and three main planning interventions and property owners’ responses to them will be invoked to support this hypothesis. It will be shown that the world changed transcendental (that object which stands at the centre of the world and distributes intensities of appearance): before Haussmann, this was the figure of the architect, with Haussmann, that of the planner as regulator. What caused this transcendental shift was Haussmann’s planning practice.

How do we find the idea that drove a planning practice’s affirmation of equality? Chapters 5 and 6 will need to take inspiration from Badiou to forge an analytical method that allows for the uncovering of the fundamental characteristics of a political practice. We know that the point of arrival should be three subjective types positioned vis-à-vis a truth. In practice, Badiou gives us no method to arrive at these concepts from textual material. Chapter 5 will pick up a passage in Badiou that links faithful subjects to particular types of affects. It then proposes a generalisation of this relation between subject and affect into a research method, one that takes a corpus of text and mines it for specific emotions to reduce the textual material: it is within statements that contain an emotional subtext that the basic principles that emerge out of the political practice and its opposition can be identified. There are thus two layers of coding involved here. A first series of sequential coding runs mines the text for five emotions (anger, contempt, resentment, fear and joy). The statements found to contain emotional subtext are then studied in isolation and coded according to the planning principle they are found to contain. These principles will be grouped into three levels of opposition between Haussmann and property owners over planning. In addition to allowing for the identification of the contested principles at the heart of a planning practice, the five emotions have inherent characteristics that will be used to gauge the way in which each of the three oppositions unfolded over the period.

The principles uncovered in chapter 5 are the raw material that chapter 6 will utilise to flesh out the subjects and the truth they position themselves around. From Badiou, we know that the faithful subject articulates the four determinations of equality, authority, confidence and will. The principles of chapter 5 will allow us to reconstruct these four determinations. And most importantly, we will be in a position to respond to the second condition Badiou poses on the occurrence of an event: that a
political practice that breaks the structure of appearances be carried by the affirmation of equality. This equality will shown to be Haussmann’s interpretation of the Saint-Simonian conception of equality: that of the contribution of all Parisians to the public works in accordance to what they receive from them. The other three determinations will make a similar use of the principles uncovered in chapter 5. The articulation of the four determinations, and thus the articulation of the principles that support them, will allow us to posit Haussmann as a Saint-Simonian state revolutionary. The subjective types that opposed his planning practice will be fleshed out by attaching each one to the opposite end of the principles that forged it. The sequence inherent in the appearance of these subjective types and the information gleaned from the most salient changes in the emotional register coded in chapter 5 will allow for the unfolding of the Haussmann event to be inscribed within the literature on the public works. This event is found to have preceded the situation that Harvey is concerned with in his *Paris, Capital of Modernity*.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has thus acted as a bridge between the theoretical preoccupations of the first two chapters and the empirical analyses that will follow in the next three chapters. Its aim was to provide a mechanism through which to move from concepts originating in philosophy to a social scientific investigation. Its early sections sought to reconcile Badiou with the social sciences by exploring his notion of the compatibility between philosophical and non-philosophical operations. It was argued that a particular type of social science was compatible with his philosophy, one that was concerned with empirically isolating and singularising political truth constructions in particular worlds. It is with respect to the political sequences in which a truth construction was identified that Badiou’s concepts can be used theoretically. At a practical level, it was determined that these types of political sequences had to fulfil two conditions: they led to a break in the structure of appearances of a given world, and carried within them a political practice that affirmed the principle of equality. Haussmann’s public works were found to offer little justification for an application of Badiou’s concepts: most of the literature presented a picture of his actions that were not reconcilable with Badiou’s demands. The fact that chapters 1 and 2 had identified a gap in the literature as concerns Haussmann’s planning practice was taken as a sign that the empirical material could yet offer a different image of his planning practice. Napoleon III’s Saint-Simonian leanings made it possible that Haussmann’s planning practice could have internalised the ideas of this utopian socialist.

The chapter then moved on to the confrontation between theoretical conditions and the limitations inherent to archival research. The main issue here was to find archival material that would give us
access to Haussmann’s planning practice and the responses of property owners and the imperial regime to it. In this process, the detailed scrutiny of digitalised newspaper archives of the time oriented the search towards the archives of the government bodies involved in the public works. A visit in the Parisian Municipal Archives led to interesting material: comments made by Parisians during public consultations, petitions, and letters of complaint. The unthreatening nature of these comments, petitions and letters meant that Haussmann, if he answered, did so in an efficient and codified way. This led to the realisation that his planning practice would only emerge when prompted by a conflictive situation. This conflictive situation was reflected in three boxes found in the National Archives: a coherent set of letters written by property owners to the Minister of the Interior, Haussmann’s direct superior, to bypass or complain about Haussmann’s planning practice. The three main protagonists were represented, the period was the one I was looking for and the circumstances were conflictive. These three boxes were found to contain 115 administrative cases of varying complexity. The individuals represented within the letters in these cases were found to originate from a diverse set of tenants, property owners and representatives of collectives. While they were a minority of the Parisian population at that time, they are the public that this investigation needs to rely on. The limited number of temporal data points available however foreclosed the possibility of relying on statistical tests.

The last section of the chapter detailed the way in which these letters would be used to put into practice an analysis that uses Badiou’s concepts. Badiou does not give us a method to move from empirical evidence to his concepts. The general method that will be used to uncover events and their unfolding within a coherent corpus of text thus had to be devised by balancing the demands of Badiou’s concepts and those of rigorous social science. This general method was presented as the identification of a break in a world through the confrontation of a hypothesis made on the basis of the literature with the empirical material. A double coding exercise follows that seeks, in a first instance, to isolate the statements that contain emotional subtext, and in a second, to mine these statements in isolation for opposing political principles. A final step is to confront these principles with the concepts of subject and truth. This allows for Badiou’s condition of the affirmation of equality in a political practice to be verified and the unfolding of the event to be derived. It is to these three empirical chapters that we now turn.
CHAPTER 4: FROM ARCHITECT TO PLANNER: PRESENTING THE HAUSSMANN EVENT

INTRODUCTION

In chapters 1 and 2, the point of departure of this thesis’ investigation was presented: Haussmann’s defeats at the Council of State from 1856 onwards. If we are to follow the method of inquiry laid out in chapter 2, that is, one which makes use of the concepts in Badiou’s philosophical project, and exploit the archival resource detailed in the last chapter, then we must first establish that the sequence under consideration exhibits the characteristics of Badiou’s events. Last chapter’s discussion established that two conditions had to be met to treat a historical episode as an event: it had to create a break in the world and this break had to be produced by a political practice that carried within in an affirmation of equality. This chapter will be concerned with the first of these two conditions. This means that it will delimit the world in which the break is hypothesised to have occurred and then identify the break itself.

A first section will discuss Badiou’s notions of the world and the transcendental and delimit the world in which the property owners’ letters to the Minister of the Interior over the 1853 to 1859 period were inscribed. From within the infinite number of worlds of the Paris of the public works, it will be shown that the epistolary exchange between Haussmann, property owners and the Minister of the Interior were limited to the world of planning. A presentation of the world of Parisian planning as it stood before Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect of the Seine will serve as the background against which his actions can be understood.

The next section will be precisely concerned with laying out the ways in which Haussmann’s planning practice differed from that of his predecessors. This will be done by drawing from the letters indications that Haussmann’s planning practice differed in three main types of planning interventions: demolitions, street widening procedures and the creation of new streets through existing fabric. The last section will use Badiou’s notion of the transcendental of a world to provide an account of the differences in Haussmann’s practice as amounting to a reversal in the structure of appearance, the definition of an event. This will be shown to mean that there were two transcendents at play in the event: the one that preceded the event and the one that the event produced. As objects of the world, these two transcendents, the architect and the planner, will be used to frame the fundamental novelty Haussmann’s actions introduced.
THE WORLD OF THE HAUSSMANN EVENT

A MORE DETAILED PRESENTATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF WORLD AND TRANSCENDENTAL

This first section will serve to delineate the field in which the investigation of the empirical material will take place. The first two chapters established that the role of property owners in Haussmann’s defeats in the Council of State had not been extensively researched and presented philosophical concepts that could allow for another perspective on that relationship to emerge. The last chapter presented the difficulties encountered in the search for archival material that could shed light on the relationship between Haussmann and property owners and help explain his defeats in the courts. The question that needs to be answered now is that of the situation of this particular investigation within the complexity of the public works that transformed Paris from 1853 to 1870 (and beyond). This question is fundamental to any investigation that seeks to make use of Badiou’s concepts.

This is because his events are only events of particular fields or domains of human activity. At a first level, he defines four fields of human activity in which events can take place: politics, art, science and love. But events in any of these four fields also have clear spatial, temporal and conceptual boundaries. Each event in any of those fields occurs in a singular world. As discussed in chapter 2, a world is Badiou’s term for a local situation. That local situation is defined by a logic which ties all objects within it together. That is what Badiou calls the transcendental of a world: it is an object against which the appearance of all other objects in that world is measured. Or in Badiou’s terms, the transcendental of a world “designates the constitutive capacity of every world to assign to what abides there, in that world, variable intensities of identity vis-à-vis what also abides there. In short, ‘transcendental’ designates that a world, in which pure multiplicities appear in the guise of objects, is a network of identities and differences that concern the elements of what appears.” (Badiou 2009: 596).

How strongly an object appears in a world depends on how strongly it is identified with that world’s transcendental. In a world in which an event happens to occur, the changes that event brings about can be most immediately seen with respect to the transcendental: what was formerly inexistent in

\[\text{The concept of «transcendental» est sans doute le concept opératoire le plus important de tout la Grande Logique, ou théorie de l’apparaitre. Il désigne la capacité constitutive de tout monde d’attribuer à ce qui se tient là, dans ce monde, des intensités variables d’identité à tout ce qui s’y tient également. En somme, «transcendental» désigne ceci: un monde, où apparaissent à titre d’objets des multiplicités pures, est un réseau d’identités et de différences concernant les éléments de ce qui y apparaît» (Badiou 2006: 618).} \]
that world (that is, without any connexion whatsoever to its transcendental) becomes the new transcendental. As Badiou puts it, “if what was worth nothing comes, in the guise of an evental consequence, to be worth everything, then an established given of appearing is destroyed. What seemed to support the cohesion of the world is abruptly turned to nothing. Thus, if transcendental indexing is indeed the (logical) base of the world, it is with good reason that we can say, along with the Internationale: ‘The earth shall rise on new foundations’ [Le monde va changer de base]”\textsuperscript{lvii} (Badiou 2009: 379-380). An event is thus defined as the maximal appearance of what was formerly inexistente in a world: this is what Badiou calls the reversal of the structure of appearances. A corollary of this seems to be that an event occurs within one particular world, in which a transcendental replaces another. There does not seem to be any well defined temporal delimitation of a world since it can accommodate transcendental shifts. The world stays fixed, but the ways in which objects appear within it change. To identify a world thus means circumscribing a particular place and a particular domain in it, but without assigning it any temporal envelope.

The identification of the world in which the event takes place and of its transcendental are thus crucial to an investigation of the changes that event brought and the way in which it unfolded. At a more fundamental level, we cannot talk of an event without having identified a world. In order to make use of Badiou’s concepts, our task is to show that an event occurred in a world. This means defining the world and looking within it for a reversal of the structure of appearances. As mentioned above, this means circumscribing the place and domain that will be studied and identifying within it the initial transcendental and that which is inexistent within it.

**THE WORLD OF PARISIAN PLANNING**

We will start here by identifying the world within which the Council of State’s 1858 decision and the archival material that will form the basis of these empirical chapters are inscribed. As highlighted in the last chapter, Haussmann was Prefect of the Department of the Seine, one of France’s 86 departments at the time. It included Paris and all of the suburbs contained within a radius of 3 leagues, approximately 12km (Magné de la Londe 1902: 38), for an estimated total population of 2 million in 1860. In addition to his role as Prefect of the Department, Haussmann was also Mayor of the city of Paris. This means that we have two different possible spaces to consider: the city and the

\textsuperscript{lvii} «Nous avons là une maxime transcendantale: si ce qui ne valait rien en vient, sous les espèces d’une conséquence événementielle, à tout valoir, alors une donnée établie de l’apparaître est détruite. Ce qui semblait soutenir la cohésion du monde est frappé de nullité, en sorte que, si l’indexation transcendantale des étant est bien la base (logique) du monde, c’est à bon droit qu’il faut alors dire: «le monde va changer de base»» (Badiou 2006: 400).
department. The literature on the public works discussed in chapters 1 and 2 is concerned with the city of Paris itself. This is understandable given that the most monumental public works were limited to the space within the city’s walls. The archive we are dealing with here forces us to open the space of our investigation to the level of the department: property owners from outside of the walls of the city also sent letters of complaint to the Minister of the Interior. While these letters at times indict the behaviour of the mayors of their local areas, these mayors were under Haussmann’s direct supervision and an understanding of the conditions that led to his defeat in the Council of State cannot eschew, from the outset, any of his actions. For simplicity, we will refer to the Department under Haussmann’s jurisdiction, and the spatial limit of the world under consideration, as Paris.

We are now left with the issue of the domain that will be investigated within the complexity of Paris in the first years of Haussmann’s tenure: what aspect of this place at that particular time will be explored for evental possibilities? It is clear that this domain must be that which allows us to investigate Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State. We can thus reframe this question as the following: what did the Council of State defeat in Haussmann’s practice? To answer this, we can turn back to Benevolo, the planning historian introduced in the first chapter. His discussion of the 1858 Council of State decision is framed around the emperor’s inability to see the impact it would have on the city: “In this the emperor made a serious error. The 1858 decree had enormous visible consequences and changed forever the shape of Paris and other European cities. It established a rigid boundary between public and private space, the building front, which replaced the reciprocal relationships characteristic of the earlier tradition. This situation created an economic imbalance between public administration and privately owned land. Property values inflated, which in turn created a public deficit and led to the disfigurement of the urban environment. Overbuilding and high density raised property values while public services lagged behind, unable to keep up with the pace of private initiative” (Benevolo 1993: 175-176).

For Benevolo, the 1858 decision defeated the balanced relationship that he believed had existed between public and private space, and thus between public services and private initiatives. What this accounts tells us is that Haussmann’s practice was defeated in its attempts to establish a particular relationship between public services and private initiatives. This gives us the domain of the world we are concerned with: urban planning. Indeed, planning is precisely that field which regulates both public and private initiatives within the urban environment. We now have the space and the domain of the world within which the 1858 Council of State defeat occurred. This world can be named as ‘Planning in Paris’. The task we are now faced with is to investigate this particular world
for any transcendental shift that may have occurred. Such a shift would indicate that an event had taken place and would fulfil the first condition we have set for the use of Badiou’s concepts.

A VIEW FROM THE LITERATURE

The next step is thus to look for this transcendental shift within the world of Parisian planning. From the literature on the public works, a general idea emerges that this shift may have accompanied Haussmann’s assumption of the position of prefect in Paris. We must reiterate here that what is meant by planning in this study is the regulation of both public and private initiatives in the urban environment. From this perspective, what we find in the literature is a sense in which Haussmann had an influence over and beyond his role as prefect. Why else would Sutcliffe single out Haussmann’s expertise as one of the three driving forces of the public works? “In Paris the strategy was the product of three major contributions – Louis Napoleon’s aspirations to modernize the city, the expertise of Georges Haussmann, the Prefect of the Seine whom he appointed to direct the works in 1853, and the experience accumulated by the municipal and departmental authorities from the more hesitant modernization efforts of the 1840s” (Sutcliffe 1981: 132). What exactly is the content of this expertise? Sutcliffe does not give us more details on what he saw as Haussmann’s precise role in the changes that Paris underwent.

Gaillard’s account provides us with an indication that Haussmann’s urbanism had two characteristics that set it apart from that which came before it. On the one hand, she notes that “the political mechanisms that would allow for an urbanism of the large scale are thus already in place during the Second Republic. It is the laws of the Second Republic that made possible the methods that, under the Empire, despoiled property owners in the public authorities’ profit” (Gaillard 2000: 24). Haussmann’s urbanism thus seems to have been predicated on the different use of existing legislation, rather than on new legislation. This is echoed by Harvey, who notes Haussmann “came armed with strong powers of expropriation ‘for reasons of public interest’ and of condemnation for ‘insalubrity’ bequeathed to him out of the social legislation of the Second Republic. He was prepared to use both in ways their initiators had hardly envisaged” (Harvey 2006a: 133). A first dimension in which Haussmann’s tenure as prefect seems to have caused a rift in the world of Parisian planning concerns the use of legislation he had as his disposal upon his arrival in Paris. Both Gaillard and Harvey note a discrepancy between the spirit of the legislation and the way in which Haussmann applied it in practice.

Translation mine, here is the original: «Les mécanismes politiques qui permettront un urbanisme de la grandeur sont donc en place des la IIe République. Les lois même de la IIe République faisaient la voie aux méthodes qui, sous l’Empire, dépossèdent les propriétaires au profit des pouvoirs publics »
They also highlight that his use of the legislation was at the expense of property owners. This is precisely the second characteristic of Haussmann’s urbanism in Gaillard’s account. She states that this urbanism was predicated on “increasing the government’s power of intervention in the city” (Gaillard 2000: 39). Harvey again emphasises Gaillard’s findings by noting that Haussmann “fought throughout, in the end not so successfully, to counter the privatism and parachialism of individual and local interests through legislation and rhetoric focused on the public interest for a rational and orderly evolution of space relations in the city” (Harvey 2006a: 106). It thus seems as though Haussmann’s use of the legislation at his disposal had a strategic aim: to push the balance of forces in planning towards public intervention and as a corollary, to weaken the hold property owners exercised over planning. Given that Haussmann’s use of the legislation seems to have been aimed at strengthening the planning apparatus in relation to property owners, we can suggest here that Haussmann’s arrival on the scene may have been the transcendental shift we are looking for in the world of planning. It will be task of the rest of the chapter to verify this claim using the evidence within the epistolary exchange between property owners, Haussmann and the Minister of the Interior during the first years of Haussmann’s tenure as prefect. This will be done by first presenting the way in which planning was undertaken in Paris before Haussmann, both in its theory and practice. Indeed, the literature above has indicated that we must focus our investigation as much on the way in which planning is conducted on the ground than on the legislation that may exist at any given time. Having both the theory and practice of planning before Haussmann will allow us to show the ways in which Haussmann’s planning practice differed from that of his predecessors.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PLANNING BEFORE HAUSSMANN

ALIGNMENTS AND THE 1807 LAW

The first attempts to impose a measure of regularity on the urban fabric were the 1607 edict that forbade timber frame constructions and limited overhangs from fears of fires, the 1667 ordinance that limited to sixteen meters the height of facades on the street and the royal declaration of 1783 which marked the shift from architectural regulations to regulations that correspond much more closely to principles of urbanism. The 1783 legislation was crucial in that it established that all roads in Paris would be submitted to the rule of the ‘Grande Voirie’ (Magné de la Londe 1902: 96). The ‘Grande Voirie’ is all roads that are seen as crucial to public interests, in opposition to the ‘Petite

\[^{ix}\text{Translation mine, here is the original: «Disons si l’on veut qu’avec des éléments empruntés à l’urbanisme passé, Haussmann a créé un urbanisme nouveau. Tout en augmentant le pouvoir d’intervention du gouvernement dans la ville, il a favorisé les relations interurbaines et dégagé des artères encombrées.»} \]
Voirie or roads that have a purely local character. This meant that the Parisian road network came to be considered as a matter of national interest and all alignments and modifications thereof had to receive the Council of State’s approval. The 1783 declaration also established the relationship between the width of the street and the maximum height facades on that street could have and regulated attic heights. Throughout the pre-revolutionary period, street network legislation also established the notion of ‘alignement’, a principle that was later codified in the 16 September 1807 law.

The word ‘alignement’ has a particular meaning in this context: it refers to the layout of the street as it features in a general street plan of the area. A street that is outside its alignment is one that does not conform to the way in which it is laid out in the plan of the area. The 1807 law “empowered all towns to draw up plans showing the desired ‘alignements’ of all their streets and other public places, including those not yet in existence. After approval of the plans by the prefect of the department and the central government, the mayors were empowered to require all new building to conform to the ‘alignements’. Lands ceded to the highway in execution of the ‘alignements’ were to be compensated at their assessed value only, with no indemnity paid for disturbance. General powers of compulsory purchase were also clarified” (Sutcliffe 1981: 128). Passed under Napoleon’s First Empire, the 1807 law thus gave the planning authority strong tools to improve the urban fabric. It was meant to foster the incremental widening of streets by refusing to allow buildings to be erected or repaired if they overstepped the decreed alignment. And it placed the powers of expropriation in the hands of the executive, not the judiciary: the administration had the mandate to decide on the works to be undertaken in the name of public utility, to pronounce the expropriations required and to decide on the compensations to be distributed.

In practice, however, the 1807 law never received full application. There seem to have been two main ways in which this occurred. First, the 1807 law came under attack in the legislature and the courts. Sutcliffe’s account focuses on the attacks this law suffered on its clauses concerning the creation of new streets, informing us that “the power to plan new streets in unbuilt areas never took root in France. After some early decisions in favour of the principle, the courts began to rule (much as they did in the United States) that restrictions could not be rightfully enforced on landowners in respect of streets which were not yet in existence. This principle was confirmed beyond all further dispute by a decision of the court of appeal in 1837” (Sutcliffe 1981: 129). This meant that planning new streets became much a more onerous task for the planning authority as the land needed be acquired through compulsory purchase and compensation had to include disturbance indemnities.
Sutcliffe notes that this weakening of the 1807 law encouraged urban authorities to leave the creation of new streets to landowners, adding that “municipal authorities, for their part, did their best to persuade owners to observe basic standards of width, paving and drainage in their new streets by refusing, or threatening to refuse, adoption of defective thoroughfares” (Sutcliffe 1981: 129). The courts thus defeated a central component of the 1807 law and pushed a crucial element of planning into the hands of land and property owners.

Attacks by the courts on the 1807 law find further validation in a letter Haussmann sent to the Minister of the Interior in 1858. It concerns the advice the Minister had received from the Civil Buildings’ Council (‘Conseil des Bâtiments Civils’), henceforth CBC. The CBC was an institution that offered architectural guidance in the context of public building commissions and public works projects. They had recommended that the Minister give a property owner an authorisation to build that Haussmann had refused. In his letter, Haussmann indicts the CBC for contributing to the weakening of the 1807 law: “it is not the first time that the Civil Building’s Council’s opinion goes against measures decided by the administration to improve the road network based on a sound evaluation of the city’s needs. Its influence has contributed in no small measure to the creation of the narrow and petty case law which still holds sway in the Council of State today as concerns housing under legal order to be pulled back and that allows most of these houses to defy the 1807 law with impunity”¹ (Case 205, 1858). Haussmann’s denunciation of the influence of the CBC on the case law on alignments shows us that the 1807 law’s main clause, the alignments, had also undergone successful attacks in the courts. Through the influence of the CBC, one should see the power of property owners over planning. In the same letter, Haussmann exposed the CBC’s historical links with private property, denouncing “the architects (most of them kept very busy by private construction projects) that make up the Civil Buildings Council and who bring to it mind frames forewarned against the actions of the municipal authority”² (Case 205, 1858). In both cases in which the 1807 law was defeated in the courts, we see that this benefited property owners and their agents: they took over control on the building of new streets and circumvented the obligation to conform to alignments.

But the courts and the legislature were not the only institutions that sought to limit the power of the 1807 law. A second way in which the 1807 law was not invoked to its full potential concerns its

---

¹ All my translations of the quoted archival material can be found in Appendix 2. These are referenced according to the case number appearing on the folder in which the letters were found. The date refers to the year in which the letter was sent.
application in practice. Over and beyond the defeats it suffered in the courts and legislature, Roncayolo’s account offers an indication that it was never applied very rigorously during the July Monarchy (1830-1848): “the figures of the property owner and of the tax payer (often the same person) inspire the utmost respect. Thus, one refrains from scrupulously implementing the measures of the 1807 law on alignments and city extensions, notably with respect to the drawing up of a general plan. One limits oneself, under the fastidious gaze of the architects of the Civil Building’s Council, to ensuring the smooth join at the limits of existing and new urban tissue”\(^{\text{lxix}}\) (Roncayolo, in Agulhon 1983: 97). This shows us once again that planning was beholden to property owners and the CBC in the years immediately preceding Haussmann’s tenure as prefect.

FROM ALIGNMENTS TO EXPROPRIATIONS

After the 1807 law, the focus of legislators turned to the legal bases for expropriations of public interest. As mentioned above, the 1807 law had given the executive strong powers of expropriation. These were handed back to the courts as quickly as 1810, where they resided until 1833. In that year, the power to decide on expropriations was given back to the administration but the right to pronounce expropriations stayed with the courts. This system was very cumbersome in practice, with very long administrative procedures and could be threatened by the refusal of a single property owner, problems faced by Prefect Rambuteau while piercing Paris’ first boulevard in 1838 (the street near the Pompidou centre which still bears his name). Attempts to make expropriations procedures more expeditious as the problems facing Paris grew led to the compulsory purchase powers of the 1807 law to be modified by the 1841 law. The May 3\(^{\text{rd}}\) 1841 law on expropriations of public interest allowed for a more expeditious expropriation procedure (Herson 1843: 6). But as Sutcliffe notes, “this was a classic railway-building instrument which, when used in towns, revealed the normal defects” (Sutcliffe 1981: 133). An indication of what these normal defects might be can be found in Roncayolo’s description of the law, which highlights that “the 1841 law was created to serve the needs of railway construction. It does not take away any of the property owner’s rights”\(^{\text{lxii}}\) (Roncayolo, in Agulhon 1983: 106). Expropriations were thus not a threat to property owners and the jurisprudence as a whole continued to lie in their favour until the 1850s.

\(^{\text{lxix}}\) Translation mine, here is the original: «Le propriétaire et le contribuable (souvent la même personne) inspirent le plus grand respect. Aussi évite-t-on d’appliquer scrupuleusement les mesures prévues par la loi de 1807 sur les alignements et l’extension des villes et notamment l’établissement d’un plan général. On se contente, sous le regard pointilleux du Conseil des Bâtiments Civils, formé d’architectes, de veiller au bon raccord des voies, à la limite du tissu ancien et du tissu nouveau.»

\(^{\text{lxii}}\) Translation mine, here is the original: «La loi de 1841 est fabriquée pour les chemins de fer. Le propriétaire n’y perd aucun droit.»
It is only in 1850, with the assumption of Louis Bonaparte as President of the Second Republic that grounds were found to create an efficient compulsory acquisition instrument. This was the 1849 cholera epidemic which led to the 1850 law to be passed. While the bulk of the law set out describe the composition and mission of new commissions that were to be established to investigate insanitary conditions in Parisian communes, its thirteenth article also stated that the commune may acquire all concerned properties through the 1841 law’s procedure if their insanitary condition is the result of external and permanent causes. As Benevolo notes, “the whole importance of the law lies in this article” (Benevolo 1967: 104). Insanitary conditions could thus serve as a pretext to put the 1841 law’s compulsory purchase procedure to use. Expropriation legislation was further strengthened by the 1852 decree, passed by Napoleon III only a year before Haussmann started his tenure as Prefect of the Seine. This was the last piece of planning legislation passed before Haussmann’s arrival on the scene. In addition to reinforcing the 1807 law by mandating that requests for the proper alignment and levelling precede any constructions and that the builder conform to all prescriptions in the name of public safety and salubrity mandated by the municipal authority, the 1852 decree allowed for an expropriation procedure suited to the creation of new streets through existing urban fabric.

Its most important article is the following: “In all expropriation projects aimed at widening, straightening or creating Parisian streets, the Administration will have the possibility of including the totality of affected buildings in its plans, in those cases where it considers that remaining sections are not of a size or shape that would allow for salubrious constructions to be erected on them” (Faure 2004: 443). In other words, when a new street is to pierce through urban fabric, the sections of buildings through which the new street is to pass will be expropriated, but also all those sections of buildings that have been partially cut through and which are not deemed to be large enough to accommodate salubrious buildings. The 1852 decree thus reinforced the tools at planners’ disposal by allowing for the expropriation not only of the required buildings themselves but also of strips of land that bordered the future path of the boulevard. This allowed for the capture by the city of real estate that would immensely increase in value after the boulevard was pierced and that could then be sold off at a high margin. The huge expenditures needed to expropriate, demolish, clear, level, pave, etc, could then be recouped by selling the land bordering the new boulevards. This clause of

---

[50] Translation mine, here is the original: «Dans tout projet d’expropriation pour l’élargissement, le redressement ou la formation des rues de Paris, l’Administration aura la faculté de comprendre la totalité des immeubles atteints, lorsqu’elle jugera que les parties restantes ne sont pas d’une étendue ou d’une forme qui permette d’y élever des constructions salubres.»
the 1852 decree shifted the balance back to the public power from a situation that was highly profitable for property owners since the 1807 law.

**PLANNING BEFORE HAUSSMANN’S ARRIVAL IN PARIS**

The planning legislation Haussmann inherited from the Second Republic was thus much stronger than what it had been throughout the half century that preceded his arrival in Paris. But it was still not as strong as that enshrined in the 1807 law as it was meant to be used. Because expropriations had been separated out from the general concept of alignment, they were now subject to the stringent requirements of the 1841 law rather than treated as fixed lines on a general plan that property owners needed to yield to. The administration could get the areas to be expropriated authorised by executive decree but the administrative procedures needed to expropriate remained as stringent as they had been until then and an expropriation could only be pronounced when: the public works were authorised by imperial decree, the prefect has designated the areas on which the works would take place, and the private properties that were to be expropriated had been identified. Maps showing the parcels to be expropriated and their owners then had to be drawn up and shown for up to eight days at the city hall, during which time any complaint or observation was to be noted. The prefect, taking all of this into consideration, then determined which properties were to be expropriated, and by when. The 1852 decree thus impacted property owners’ position vis-à-vis expropriations only to the degree that it allowed for expropriations to once again be decreed by the executive. The lengthy administrative procedures that had been accumulated through the trials and errors of the expropriation legislation since 1807 still remained.

In addition, for all the changes introduced to the expropriation legislation by both the 1850 and 1852 laws, they did not strengthen the 1807 law as concerns the issue of alignments, understood here as the need to draw up general plans and limit repairs and new constructions that did not conform with that general plan. All the 1852 law did in this respect was to reaffirm that Parisian streets formed part of the ‘Grande Voirie’ and mandate that the builder of a new construction on the street ask for the proper level in addition to the proper alignment it was to be built on. The only other important article referred to the need for existing and new buildings to be connected to the sewer system. All other articles were of a secondary nature, mandating that facades should be kept clean and painted, scraped or whitewashed every ten years; all residents bordering the street had to take charge of its first paving; and all floors in new buildings had to have a minimum of 2.6 meters in height. The 1852 decree did not offer much to strengthen the 1807 law and to counter its weakening by the courts and the lack of interest of planners in applying it to its full potential. With respect to alignments,
then, we can state here that there is no evidence (in the legislation or in the practice of planning) to indicate that property owners’ hold over the alignment legislation had been broken by the 1852 decree.

We are now in a position to move to Haussmann’s planning practice. The context in which Haussmann took hold of planning in Paris has been shown to have changed more with respect to the legislation on expropriations than to that on alignments. Expropriations could be decreed by executive order, but they were still cumbersome to put in practice. Alignments, on the other hand, remained dependent on the good will of property owners to submit to them, backed as they were by the CBC and unthreatened as they were by unscrupulous planning officials. It is against this background that we must show the transcendental shift that accompanied Haussmann’s planning practice.

A CHANGE IN THE WORLD: HAUSSMANN’S PLANNING PRACTICE

Haussmann’s planning practice, understood here as the use he made of the planning legislation at his disposal to tip planning back into public control, has not been extensively studied. As presented above, the literature on the public works gives us indications that Haussmann did not merely apply the legislation at his disposal: from Harvey’s statement that he was prepared to use the legislation “in ways their initiators had hardly envisaged” (Harvey 2006a: 133), to Gaillard’s mention that the existing legislation “made possible the methods that, under the Empire, despoiled property owners in the public authorities’ profit” (Gaillard 2000: 24). The literature also hints at Haussmann’s role beyond that of an official obeying the Emperor’s orders. In chapter 1, we presented Chapman & Chapman’s assertion that “Haussmann could only have had the career he did under the Second Empire. And very few men indeed could have made what he did of the unique position he held. He was fortunate in that for seventeen years he was able to exercise his considerable talents to the full” (Chapman & Chapman 1957: 251). Benevolo also notes that “the modern and positive aspects of his work are to be found precisely in the independence he allows himself, as a pure administrator, vis-à-vis other State departments. Haussmann’s considerable achievements [...] were only realized after a long and difficult struggle against other sectors of the administration and with his own political superiors” (Benevolo 1967: 135).

Translation mine, here is the original: «Les mécanismes politiques qui permettront un urbanisme de la grandeur sont donc en place dès la IIe République. Les lois même de la IIe République fraient la voie aux méthodes qui, sous l’Empire, dépossèdent les propriétaires au profit des pouvoirs publics.»
In order to investigate whether Haussmann’s planning practice was the transcendental shift that fundamentally transformed the world of Parisian planning, it is thus necessary to turn to the archival material presented in the last chapter. The three boxes that will be investigated in this and the two following chapters were shown to contain 115 administrative cases centred on property owner complaints against measures taken by the municipal administration sent to the Minister of the Interior. As was mentioned in the preceding chapter, these three boxes were filed in the Departmental Affairs section of the Interior Ministry at the National Archives because the cases within it originated with letters or petitions sent to Haussmann’s superiors, not to Haussmann’s municipal administration. Those who wrote those letters thus made a decision to target Haussmann’s superior in the hierarchy, an indication that these property owners believed that Haussmann was acting independently from his superiors. The cases in the three boxes that will be investigated here are related to the urban road network in the Department of the Seine. It was precisely the road network that most of the legislation Haussmann had at his disposal was centrally concerned with: alignments, general street plans, the creation of new streets through urban fabric, expropriation for public utility works on the street network, demolitions for public safety, etc. These boxes thus seem like the ideal place to look for Haussmann’s planning practice related to the Parisian street network.

In the last chapter, it was shown that complaints made up the large majority of the letters property owners sent to the Minister of Interior: 90 complaints as compared to the 14 requests and 11 propositions. Given that the aim of this chapter is to find out whether Haussmann’s planning practice differed from that of his predecessors, we will focus the analysis here only on cases originating from letters of complaints. These are the letters that are most likely to contain details of the way in which Haussmann invoked the legislation at his disposal, and through Haussmann’s defence of his actions to the Minister of the Interior, information as to the strategy Haussmann employed to strengthen the municipal administration’s hold over planning. Moreover, this means that we will only focus on letters of complaint that can be linked to the legislation we have discussed above. We thus need to exclude nine letters of complaint that can be characterised as pertaining to beautification or sanitation. Beautification was made up of cases in which the creation of parks affected the right of property owners to dispose of their property and cases in which ornaments that did not fit with the overall architectural style were ordered to be destroyed. Sanitation dealt with the construction of sewers and modifications to properties that would affect their salubrity. While both sanitation and beautification rationales should not be discounted in the overall project for
Paris, we do not have the necessary evidence to properly investigate them here in their relation to
the legislation. They will be integrated in the analysis developed over the next two chapters.

To understand the relationship between the letters of complaint in these three boxes and the
legislation Haussmann had at his disposal, a first step is to present the focus of the property owners’
letters of complaint. There are three main types of administrative decisions that are the focus of
most of the complaints: refusals of any repairs, minor constructions or property development due to
the building in question not being on the proper street alignment (38 cases), refusals of any repairs,
minor constructions or property developments because a new street was to be opened up over the
property (20) and demolitions of parts or of the whole building (17). The remaining 15 cases range
from fines, to demands for the street to be paved or the property to be connected to the sewer
system.

We can start to see how these three types of cases fit within the legislation we presented above. The
first and most numerous category is directly linked to the 1807 law on alignments: in those 38 cases,
property owners were forbidden to repair or build outside of the alignment contained in the general
street plan of the area under consideration. The second type of case can be directly related to the
possibilities the 1850 and 1852 laws opened up for expropriations for public utility projects on the
street network: they gave the municipal administration the ability to open new streets through
urban fabric. The legislation on demolitions, the third type of case, dates back to the 1607 edict.
While we have not explicitly highlighted the evolution of the legislation on demotions, restrictions
on building add-ons as well as strict guidelines on the methods of construction and building
materials that could be used were contained in most of the laws we described above.

We can already sense that the period has changed. In the overview of the planning legislation above
we concluded that the 1807 law had been under constant attack, both in theory and in practice, for
close to half a century and that 1852 law had not significantly strengthened it. Nonetheless, the fact
that almost half of the letters of complaint that were sent to the Minister of the Interior concerned
alignments is certainly a sign that Haussmann sought to make full use of the 1807 law. The same
could be said of grounds on which property owners are complaining against the creation of new
streets: there is nothing in the 1852 decree that would limit the rights of property owners until their
building was taken from them in return for an indemnity. And from what we have seen of the overall
leniency of the municipal authorities in the early 19th century towards property, the fact that
property owners are complaining about demolitions orders is intriguing.
A surprise here is also the preponderance within an archive directly dealing with the way in which property owners responded to changes in the urban road network of complaints related to alignments and demolitions compared to those related to the creation of new streets. This latter category only accounted for a fifth of complaints. This is striking given the very little weight alignments and demolitions are awarded in accounts of the public works in relation to boulevard piercings, their major symbol. Haussmannisation, or the use of the transformation of Paris for comparative purposes we have described in the first chapter, is only focused on the way in which the piercing of boulevards through existing urban fabric in other cities compare with those done in Paris. From a comparative perspective then, alignments and demolitions were not seen as being an important part of Paris’ modernisation process.

The authors of the four main traditions of scholarship on the public works discussed in the first two chapters also afford very little weight to these procedures. Choay (1983, 1996), who we have introduced in the first chapter as attempting to rehabilitate Haussmann’s work, describes his planning as one of regularisation, based around the interconnection of comprehensive and layered systems that fulfilled the twin objectives of circulation and hygiene (Choay 1996: 274). But in her work, regularisation only seems to apply to what we have called here street creation and sanitation: it is about tweaking the general layout of streets and using technical advances to optimise the city’s functioning. Alignments, and their use for street widening purposes, do feature in Chapman & Chapman’s 1957 account, who we have introduced as the earliest of Haussmann’s biographers in the first chapter. They specifically mention street widening in their discussion of the piercing of the boulevard de Sébastopol (the first North-South major street pierced). They dismiss the effectiveness of street widening procedures and mention that “Haussmann once estimated that by 1870 about twenty-five out of a total of over two hundred miles of road had been widened that way” (Chapman & Chapman 1957: 82). They saw the failures of street widening efforts as an explanation for the choice of expropriation as the main tool used by Haussmann. Harvey mentions that Haussmann “was obsessed with details of alignment” (Harvey 2006a: 100). But Harvey is here talking about alignments from an urban design perspective, continuing on to describe an alignment procedure: “he angled the Sully Bridge across the Seine so that it brought the Parthenon into a direct line with the Bastille column, and in an extraordinary feat of engineering he moved the Victory Column so that it was centered in the newly created Place Châtelet” (Harvey 2006a: 100). We are here very far from the 1807 law.
This brief description of the types of cases property owners wrote to the Minister of Interior about and their relation to both the legislation Haussmann had at his disposal and the literature on the public works points to the need to search within them for further information on Haussmann’s planning practice. We will do this by extracting elements of Haussmann’s planning practice from the epistolary exchanges between the property owners, Haussmann and the Minister of the Interior for each of these three cases in turn. We will then be in a position to establish whether Haussmann’s planning practice was fundamentally different from that of his predecessors.

STREET WIDENING IN PRACTICE

We will start with the cases in which property owners were forbidden to build or repair because their property or land was not on the proper alignment. 29 of the 38 complaints related to street widening followed the same scenario: a property owner asked the municipal authority for the permission to repair a portion of a property that faced the street (a stone fence wall, a facade wall or one of the main supporting columns) or to renovate the walls facing the street. This authorisation was then refused by the municipal authority on the grounds that the property needed to be pulled back by anything from 25 centimetres to over 10 meters in order to correspond to the decreed alignment for that street (usually widening it from anything from 4 to 8 meters to at least 10 meters). The property owner then complained about this to the ministry of the Interior and asked for the administrative decision from the municipal authority to be revoked, either by arguing that the repair works would not lead to a strengthening of the building’s facade on the improper alignment (10 out of the 29 cases), or by arguing that the gain to the public domain from the widening of the street would be insignificant compared to the loss that would have to be incurred from having to rebuild on the proper alignment (6 out of 29 cases), or by arguing both (7 cases).

While complaints in which the uselessness of the street widening procedure is used to argue against the administrative decision is an indication that property owners were attempting to defend private interests, the arguments surrounding the consequences the repairs would have on the solidity of the impinging building reveal much more about the way in which Haussmann used the legislation.

Indeed, arguments around the extent to which repairs would strengthen a property that needs to be pulled back were extremely significant, both for property owners and for the municipal authority. For the former, it put limits to the changes they could make to their property if it was not on the proper alignment, thus curtailing their right to dispose of their property. For the latter, it determined how quickly the properties outside of the alignments could be pulled back to the appropriate level. The stricter the municipal authority was on the kinds of repairs that should be considered as
reinforcing a property, the more quickly the state of the properties would deteriorate and the more quickly the property owners would have to destroy or pull back their properties. On the other hand, if property owners were allowed to reinforce their properties or mask the extent of their state of disrepair, they could perpetuate the existence of a property outside of the proper alignment. The question of whether a certain repair or renovation would strengthen a property that sat outside of the alignment thus took on very important proportions and determined the effectiveness of the gradual approach to urban change street widening represents (in contrast to the comprehensive, quick but expensive approach represented by the boulevards).

We can see how Roncayolo’s description of the leniency of municipal authorities under the July Monarchy on alignments corresponds with the latter scenario: “the figures of the property owner and of the tax payer (often the same person) inspire the utmost respect. Thus, one refrains from scrupulously implementing the measures of the 1807 law on alignments and city extensions, notably with respect to the drawing up of a general plan” (Roncayolo, in Agulhon 1983: 97). Without strictly enforced street plans, street widening could not function and the 1807 law became dead letter. In contrast to this situation, the mere fact that property owners had to convince the Minister of the Interior that their repairs or construction work would not reinforce their impinging facade is an indication that the 1807 law was once again being enforced. It is worth transcribing two letters here in full, as they are the best illustration of the type of case that surrounds the labelling of a construction as solid or not. The first is a letter by a property owner to the Minister of the Interior on the 12th of February 1854 and the second is Haussmann’s response to the Minister’s inquiry about this letter, from the 28th of April of the same year.

“Mr Minister, a prefectural decree from the 26th of January refused to authorise me to renovate parts of the right gable of a house at 4 rue Saint Christophe in Paris of which I am the owner. I take the liberty to appeal to your Excellency about this decision. The refusal I was notified of is based on the bad state of the wall am not allowed to renovate: but a careful examination will easily make noticeable, I have no doubt about this, that this wall is not in the state of disrepair and damage reported by the ‘Bureau de Consultation de la Grande Voirie’ [Public Road Consultation Council], that it is, quite to the contrary, in conditions of solidity that guarantee its life for a long time still and that

Translation mine, here is the original: «Le propriétaire et le contribuable (souvent la même personne) inspirent le plus grand respect. Aussi évite-t-on d’appliquer scrupuleusement les mesures prévues par la loi de 1807 sur les alignements et l’extension des villes et notamment l’établissement d’un plan général. On se contente, sous le regard pointilleux du Conseil des Bâtiments Civils, formé d’architectes, de veiller au bon raccord des voies, à la limite du tissu ancien et du tissu nouveau.»
finally the fears that its exposed construction may have elicited are in reality without any basis. Such is the conscientious and oft repeated opinion of several architects and I do not hesitate, Mr Minister, to vouch on my honour for these facts. Another consideration is worth submitting to your Excellency’s kind attention: owner of a house at 18 rue d'Arcole, I purchased the one at 4 rue Saint Christophe that leans against it only with the view of joining it to the first and to make the one the essential complement, in a way, of the other. This projects has never ceased to be mine, but adverse events have until now prevented its fulfilment: at the moment I am about to go through with it, the obligation to destroy a significant portion of one of these houses would be extremely painful to me, all the while greatly harming me materially, as it would take away from me, without any possible compensation, a part of what constitutes my assets, more than modest, and would mean losing all of the rewards of the sacrifice I have forced unto myself. Allow me, Mr Minister, to trust in your Excellency’s equity, and to ask you, in this occasion, to accept the homage of my highest consideration and respectful devotion. Signed: Baron Martineau

And here is Haussmann’s response to the Minister’s request for his opinion on the case:

“Mr Minister, you have done me the honour of communicating to me on the 11th of March, for my opinion, the complaint that was sent you by Mr Baron Martineau Deschenets against a decree dating from January 26th 1854 by which I refused to authorise him to renovate parts of his gable wall, on the right hand side of his house at n. 4 rue Saint Christophe. Here is, Mr Minister, the cause of this refusal. According to the general plan of alignments for the rue Saint Christophe authorised on the 13th of Ventose year VII (March 3rd 1799), the aforementioned house is liable to be pulled back by about 2.6 meters. The superintendent architect road surveyors having recognised that the portion of the shared wall that exceeds the aligned house to its right is in a bad state, criss-crossed vertically by two large cracks and built with major and filling stones that are degraded and disjoined; that the two bottom layers of the main pillar joining the two houses were destroyed 10 centimetres deep and that the projected works would have had the effect of consolidating that wall; I thought I needed to forbid all manner of repairs. Mr Baron Martineau presents, in support of his complaint that his gable wall is not in the state of degradation and deterioration that the agents of my Administration have pointed out, that it is in conditions of solidity that guarantee its life for a long time still, and that finally the fears that this wall may have elicited are in fact without foundation, and are not shared by several architects he consulted. He ends by looking to put forward motives of a private interest of which I have no need to judge the value. I have had this case examined again and the agents of my Administration have recognised, as they had the first time around that the gable wall of Mr
Martineau’s wall is in a very bad state. I think I need to add here that in 1847 already this wall was filled in and full of cracks, and that this situation has only worsened, to the point that the Police Prefect has ordered its demolition for safety reasons. In consequence, I can only persist in the reasons underlying my refusal, and I have the honour of proposing that you reject Mr Martineau’s complaint⁴ (Case 102, 1854).

It is clear that these letters are a contest between the claims made by Baron Martineau (supported by architects he consulted) and those of Haussmann and his surveyors concerning the strength of the wall that the property owner wants to repair. We learn from Haussmann’s letter that the property in question had been in a state of disrepair for seven years but that it had somehow not been pursued by the municipal administration until Haussmann’s refusal to authorise the envisaged repairs. His letter also reveals that the house neighbouring Baron Martineau’s was on the proper alignment. The repairs that Baron Martineau needed to execute to comply with the Police Prefect’s injunction could only be done on the proper alignment and this was thus a perfect opportunity for Haussmann to bring a refractory building back to the decreed alignment. The fact that Haussmann invoked an alignment plan that precedes the 1807 law shows that he had taken on the task of making sure that alignments were properly enforced, regardless of how long they had been ignored. To do this, Haussmann seems to have relied on the surveillance of private activity by architects specialised in inspecting the state of roads and buildings that fronted them. Haussmann’s use of these surveyors as early as 1854 surely means they had been trained and existed as an institution long before he assumed tenure. The fact that alignments were not enforced is not due to the lack of trained staff, as we can see from the quote below. This property owner complained to the Minister about a refusal to repair an enclosing wall he received from the municipal administration and how this would jeopardise constructions located just behind the wall:

“When I built them [the constructions behind the wall] (30 years ago), this was done under the supervision and the approval of Messrs the road surveyors and of the authority which set the condition of not joining them to or with the enclosing wall. This obligation was scrupulously followed. The alignment in force for the last 30 years, as well as the level of the rue the Picpus, submits my enclosing wall to be pulled back by two meters⁵ (Case 108, 1854).

We have here an illustration of the unwillingness of planning authorities to properly enforce the 1807 law before Haussmann’s tenure as prefect: the enclosing wall was two meters forward of the alignment but the road surveyors and the planning authority still allowed the construction of
buildings adjacent to the wall. The property owner’s complaint comes from the fact that not only did
he need to pull back the enclosing wall but he also had to destroy portions of the buildings behind it
that encroached on the proper alignment. This is clearly an indication that planning regulations had
not been applied rigorously by the municipal administration. In addition, this property owner used
the fact that his property had already been on the improper alignment for 30 years as a reason for
the Minister to allow him to consolidate a refractory wall. This is exactly the inverse of what one
would expect to find in a letter complaint. In the same vein, Baron Martineau gives as much space in
his letter to a refutation of the road surveyors’ statement that the wall is seriously damaged as he
does to the explanation of the project this house was to play a part in. But the project is in no way an
argument that can be seriously invoked to refute the municipal administration’s decision, as
Haussmann is very quick to point out. What this shows though is that Baron Martineau thought it
would be an argument that could convince the Minister of the Interior to once again let him mask
the extent of his property’s disrepair. The fact that this property owner decided to present his case
in such a way to the Minister can mean two things: either Ministers of the Interior before the Second
Empire played a role in the lax application of alignment legislation by supporting property owners
over the municipal administration, or property owners turned to the Minister of the Interior because
their usual arguments fell on deaf ears at the municipal and prefectural levels.

We can see from what has been presented up to now that the major difference between planning
before and after Haussmann as concerns alignments occurred at the municipal level. It seems as
though the municipal administration’s newfound desire to enforce alignment rigorously caught
property owners by surprise and pushed them to appeal to Haussmann’s superior, the Minister of
the Interior. This sense of surprise permeates many of the letters from property owners that
concern alignments. In some cases, this is because Haussmann’s order contradicted advice they had
received (from an architect or builder) that the projects they had planned would be possible: “a
building I purchased last year for the only purpose of a transformation that my architect had assured
me possible” (Case 274, 1858).

In other cases, this surprise seems to be caused by the firmly engrained sense that planning laws did
not carry any importance or weight. Illustration of this can be found in the quote below, taken from
a letter in which a property owner complained to the Minister against a refusal to repair order he
had received from the municipal administration:
"Owner of a house in Paris at 92 boulevard de l’Hôpital (in between the rue du Marché aux Chevaux and the market itself), I asked Mr Prefect of the Seine the authorisation to repair its northern angle and to redo the exterior plastering degraded for a meter by the leaking of a gutter – this building is under an order to be pulled back by about a meter. In his 7 January 1854 decree, Mr Prefect of the Seine has refused, ‘considering that the house’s facade wall is strongly cracked in its portion that exceeds the house on its right; that this portion of it is completely detached from the facade of the house on its left, that several stones are broken in its lower portion, that the planned repair work would result in the wall being strengthened and, consequently, in delaying the widening of the street that fronts the property’. Despite these reasons, of which the terms are a little forced as concerns the consequences of the crack that I myself widened with a view to repair works I was not expecting to see refused, I have the honour of seeking from Your Excellency the same authorisation, asking you to extend it to the repair of two meters of the entablature degraded by the leaking of the same gutter and situated just above the reported plaster degradations” (Case 110, 1854).

This property owner brushed away the municipal administration’s refusal and turned directly to the Minister of the Interior for the same authorisation, and more. He knew his property was outside of the property alignment but cannot believe that Haussmann is actually trying to prevent him from repairing his encroaching property. His request to the Minister for ‘the same authorisation’ is thus an indication that the changes that occurred in the practice of alignment occurred at the municipal level. The move to the level of the Minister is only a response to Haussmann’s decision on repairs works he was ‘not expecting to see refused’. What we see in property owner letters is an element of surprise at alignments being once again enforced and contravening projects they had devised without any consideration for planning constraints. We can thus summarise Haussmann’s planning practice as regards alignments as the decision to enforce all alignments rigorously in order to allow the 1807 law to have its desired effect. No longer would alignments remain dependent on the goodwill of property owners to submit to them.

DEMOLITIONS IN PRACTICE

“Mr Minister, I built a large house with its main facade on the rue the Rivoli and its lateral facades on the rues des Bourdonnais and Bertin Poirée. I have spared nothing to make my house one of the most beautiful on the rue de Rivoli; I have complied in full with all street network regulations. I felt compelled to take advantage of the position of two chimney pilasters placed at equal distance of the axis of my facade on the rue de Rivoli to build a large balcony, linked to a small living room, at the legal height [...]. In this position and two meters from the facade, I thought I could erect a glass
canopy that has long stayed in place when, to my great astonishment I received an order by the Prefecture to remove it. In this state of things, I come to ask you, Mr Minister, to be so kind as to order a visit to the area, to check, in consideration of the space this glass canopy takes up in the Rue de Rivoli, [...] if there are no grounds to grant me the authorisation to keep it, all the more since without causing any harm it is indispensible to the decoration of my house as a whole, one of the most beautiful on the street. Thus, with respect to both art and usefulness, without causing any harm to anything, I demand, Mr Minister, from your generosity, the authorisation to keep it”¹⁸ (Case 140, 1855).

We now move on to Haussmann’s planning practice as concerns demolitions. The quote above is a typical expression of a property owner’s surprise at the intrusion of the municipal authority into the realm of private property. This plaintiff is surprised because he had never expected the municipal administration to scrutinise his private building activity and ask him to demolish an add-on that had been allowed to remain by this same administration. Other property owners expressed the same surprise at seeing the arm of the municipal authority extended to even the most minor details of their properties: a balcony, a small protruding cornice, a chimney stack, a glass veranda and an attic. Of these six infringements of the regulations that elicited reactions of surprise from property owners, only one can be directly related to the 1852 Decree: the attic that is to be demolished had only 2.3 meters in height rather than the 2.6 meter minimum. All the other infringements could have been prosecuted in as early as 1783. There is thus an indication that Haussmann’s use of the regulations differed from that of his predecessors. A sense that something had changed can be felt in the following plea by a property owner to the Minister of the Interior:

“I thus hope Mr Minister that you will accept, given the great harm that would result for me, not to order the demolition of the said chimney stack, and continue as in the past to offer toleration of this construction, whose demolition, as I am honoured to remind you, would be very prejudicial to me and for the city of very little importance”¹⁹ (Case 124, 1854). Another property owner makes as similar request by asking the Minister to get a second appraisal of the situation, following which the Minister “would deign to authorise, as it is customary when, as in this circumstance, it is impossible to submit more fully to the demands of the regulations on the matter, the toleration pure and simple of what exists”²⁰ (Case 65, 1856). Both of these property owners wanted the situation that had existed until then to continue, an indication that Haussmann’s planning practice was disturbing established ways of doing things. These property owners felt that an impermeable boundary existed between private and public domains, with an agreement reached between property owners and the
municipal administration that this limit would remain as such. But Haussmann’s arrival on the scene seems to have broken this compact unexpectedly and against past practices.

Appeals to the Minister of the Interior for toleration (which can be found in five of the six cases under investigation here) are a clear sign that the property owners believed this intrusion into matters of private property was contrary to the aims and principles of the higher authority. Toleration can be seen as an acceptance of the legislation, but not of its application without consideration given to extenuating circumstances. Haussmann, in his application of the legislation, seems to have wanted to take extenuating circumstances as little into consideration as possible. This approach hit a nerve with property owners, who saw it as an attack on their right to dispose of their buildings as they saw fit. This is given vivid illustration in the sentence following the last quoted passage: “If, against all hope, my request were not to be favourably received by Your Excellency, I would be reduced to the necessity, in order to keep this timber frame cornice to lean against it, as it is in my right to do, be it even without a purpose, a small wooden window that would become its dormer, but this would mean pushing a property owner into his last defences and would lead to expenditures with no other effect than of taking away from the street more light and air, and thus to lead to a completely opposite result to the one sought by the Administration”11 (Case 65, 1856).

A perfect example of Haussmann’s refusal to bend the legislation to accommodate property owners is his reply to the Minister concerning a complaint by the official photographers of the Emperor against his order to have their apartment destroyed:

“Messrs the Mayer Brothers think that an exception to the rule can be made in their personal circumstances: they explain that their construction is on a boulevard that is wide and well ventilated and not on one of these narrow streets, that, they say, have motivated the regulation that is being invoked against them; that the destruction of their premises, in the location where it exists, would cause them considerable harm and likewise to their employees; finally, they put forward their title of photographer of his Majesty the Emperor in favour of their request. My opinion on this complaint can differ in no way from those that I have expressed in similar affairs. Presumably, glass structures built outside of the legal height may not present as much of an inconvenience in streets of a large width as compared to narrow ones, but the royal decree of 1784 has precisely determined the height houses could have in proportion to their width and fixes at 17m53 the maximal height allowed in streets 10 meters wide and above. Yet Mr Chayer’s house already exceeding this limit considerably, and Messrs Mayer’s structure further increasing it, the Administration can certainly not authorise the requested
exception, whatever the width of the street and also whatever the reasons of private interest the plaintiffs invoke” (Case 25, 1856).

What is being attacked by Haussmann here is the status of property owners. By giving neglected legislation full application, Haussmann reneged on the implicit arrangement that had existed between property owners and the municipal administration that add-ons that infringed on regulations could nonetheless be tolerated if property owners requested it. This agreement seems to have relied on the respect property owners inspired during the July Monarchy, as noted by Roncayolo in the quote already mentioned above (Roncayolo, in Agulhon 1983: 97). Haussmann’s predecessors seem to have given more importance to the rights of individual property owners than to notions of the public good. It is the change in this status quo which surprised property owners. This explains why property owners did not seek to prove their innocence but just appealed for the toleration of the add-on that infringed on the regulations: property owners were the ones acting outside of the law and they were asking to be exempted of it: “I do not want to attempt to prove my innocence in this respect, tenants like me are I think all very ignorant of the regulations. In any event, I am convinced I have broken the law, but, Mr Minister, allow me to call upon your kindness and the sentiments that set apart Your Excellency in his favour of the arts and artists, to allow me to keep my glass veranda” (Case 169, 1854). Demolitions could only occur if property owners failed to comply with regulations and the municipal administration identified this infringement and prosecuted property owners for it. Before Haussmann, this last step failed to occur, or if it did, it could easily be overturned through requests done through the proper channels. Haussmann’s decision to follow through on existing infringements and retroactively demand demolitions that had not been prosecuted was thus a completely new situation in Parisian planning.

STREET CREATIONS IN PRACTICE

In contrast to alignments and demolitions which relied on similar and longstanding legislation, the creation of new streets relied on the more recent 1841, 1850 and 1852 laws. As mentioned above, the 1852 law gave the executive the power to decree expropriations but the separation of the concept of expropriation from that of alignment after the 1807 law meant that the lengthy administrative procedure of the 1841 law remained. This meant that there were a number of administrative steps that needed to be taken between the moment when the public became aware of expropriation plans for their neighbourhood (during the public enquiry, or earlier if they had the right connections to the City Hall) and the moment at which the expropriation of their particular property would be consumed (requiring a decision by the prefect after all procedures had been
completed as well as dependent on the funds at the disposal of the municipal authority as according
to the 1841 law, compensation had to be paid prior to expropriation). During this time, Haussmann
thought property owners in the zone to be expropriated should be forbidden from making any
changes to their properties, even if they were on the proper alignment. That this should not be the
case was inconceivable for him and he describes the situation that would ensue the following way:

“The administration should, without taking any account of its projects and without making a single
comment, provide all construction permits requested by individuals within the limits of the old
alignments, even as an administrative procedure is under way to adopt new plans. Until the decree
declaring expropriations of public utility, everyone should be completely free to take all possible
actions to block its subsequent execution; the administration alone would have its hands tied. In this
system, the inevitable administrative delays would be a time reserved for private interests, always
very apt and very active, to speculate on the projects submitted to the public enquiries, and commit
all possible frauds against general and municipal interests. It would be the moment, or never, to
invoke the summum jus, summa injuria maxim”\textsuperscript{14} (Case 205, 1857).

This led Haussmann to apply the principle that no building or rebuilding could take place on a
property outside of a new alignment to street creations and he thus forbade any repair, construction
or property development that could be seen as adding value to a property that was to be
expropriated for public utility works, however far in the administrative process these had gotten to.
This was the case from simple projects decided with the Emperor to expropriations just about to be
officially decreed. For Haussmann then, street creations were just another kind of street widening
procedure, which should then obey the same general principles, rather than a different kind of
regulatory tool. Once the plan had been decided, it was illegal to build or rebuild on the wrong
alignment. He explained this conception of street creation to the Minister in his 1857 letter:

“The refusal I notified Mr. Bergeront of the authorisation to erect new buildings on the rue de
Longchamps does not cause him any noticeable harm. Finally, there is a real analogy here between
his situation and that of a property owner subject to a normal alignment procedure who can neither
repair nor improve his building, but who continues to make the most out of it in the state in which it
finds itself and who is cannot take advantage of speculations he is forbidden to undertake to claim
compensation. In any case, the municipal administration, whose right and duty it is to implement all
improvements to the city’s old plans that are called for by the new needs of traffic and circulation,
would be paralysed in its action if, in the presence of project well established in the sovereign’s will,
but not yet decreed, it could be forced to authorise constructions that would come to obstruct them.
The right that belongs to the municipal administration of delivering alignments is only imparted to it by the higher authority to which the approval of projects is submitted. The decreed plans that found the rule of this right are a link only between the higher authority that approves them and the municipal administration which proposed and executes them; third parties cannot make claims on them or obstruct them when it is recognised, at manifold degrees of the administrative hierarchy that they must be implemented. Besides, the alignments the municipal administration prescribed to those building houses under the control of the higher authority cannot be attacked through legal means. The application of these principles has been made by you, Mr Minister, in numerous occasions, notably in the Radiguet case (December 1st 1855 letter). I have the honour of calling the serious attention of your Excellency on this case, the solution of which could have a great influence on the future of street network measures.”15 (Case 234, 1857).

As Haussmann himself gravely informed the Minister, the outcome of the 20 cases of this type were essential to the projects he felt the city needed. His insistence that street creation procedures should be conceived of as alignments was a way to reassert the 1807 law that had been travestied through the courts from 1810 onwards by separating out alignments from expropriations. In effect, Haussmann is attempting to bracket out over 40 years of jurisprudence and return to the 1807 law as it was meant to be used. This is very precisely laid out by a property owner in his 1856 letter to the Minister of the Interior in which he proves that Haussmann’s use of the 1807 law was obsolete:

“The 1807 law had confused two cases, which are nonetheless very different, one that is concerned with widening, of correcting an existing street, and that concerned with the opening of a new street, a new communication axis. In both cases, one proceeded through alignments; and one then confused the alignment and the expropriation jurisprudences. The March 1810 law quickly came to put an end to this confusion; nonetheless, the Administration has still sometimes wanted to invoke the right to subject properties that new streets would traverse to alignment, i.e. the refusal to build or repair, when financial resources did not allow it to proceed through expropriation. But the 1833 and 1841 laws have come to cease what amounted to a veritable despoliation, and settle this issue with principles that are now indisputable. The mistake of Mr Prefect of the Seine is to want to apply today, once more, a case law that can no longer be used: this error is not allowed, this doctrine can no longer be questioned”16 (Case 52, 1856).

The fact that Haussmann persisted in using the 1807 law to forbid property owners to build or repair their property if it was on the path of a street that was to be created explains why street creations
were by far the most contentious aspect of Haussmann’s planning practice, with 8 of the 20 complaints lodged against them containing accusations that the municipal administration was not legally allowed to refuse authorisations to build or repair. While there may have been less complaints targeting street creations than alignment and demolition procedures, these were far more virulent. After 1856, most property owners had come to realise that Haussmann was using his own interpretation of the regulations at his disposal, and that this improper use could be attacked more forcefully in their letters to the Minister. There is thus no doubt that Haussmann sought to define his planning practice over and beyond what the existing planning legislation allowed him to do. This can be seen in the fact that he extends the remit of the 1807 law to include not just plans officially decreed but also any project that had been decided by his administration. He then invoked the principle of construction freezes beyond the cases that even a full application of the 1807 law would allow. The only way to make the public works effective, he thought, was to limit property rights for both alignments and street creations; for him, they were one and the same thing. This reasoning was something property owners deeply opposed, as we can see in the quote taken from Mr Bergeront’s letter to the Minister:

“There is first a profound difference between the alignment of existing public streets and the creation, the opening of new streets. With respect to existing streets, public utility is, in a manner of speaking, declared, and the alignment decision produces immediate effects [...] we must recognise that in all cases, he can no longer build on the plot included in the alignment [...] The opening of new streets accompanies public utility works, for the execution of which the law has consecrated and organised the possibility of expropriating, by imposing on individuals the sacrifice of their right to private property, in exchange for a prior compensation”¹⁷ (Case 234, 1856).

What we can glean from the quote above is that property owners feared expropriations more than they did alignments, surely a reflection of the lax application of the 1807 law by planning authorities before Haussmann’s arrival in Paris, but it also highlights an intrinsic fear of property owners for the loss of their property, called here a ‘sacrifice’. While the need to destroy one’s property to push it back on the proper alignment could be delayed, resisted or in the worst case meant that financial resources needed to be invested in regularising the property, the fact is that one kept the ownership of the property. Expropriations by definition entailed the loss of one’s property (albeit for generous compensation given that expropriation juries were composed of property owners) and one was then justified in attempting to profit as much as possible from this loss. Administrative hurdles to expropriation were thus seen as a healthy safeguard against the excessive power it afforded the
public authorities, all the more when they allowed for opportunities to increase the compensation one would eventually receive.

In the case of alignments, we saw that a power struggle existed between the municipal administration and property owners on the condition of the property that Haussmann wanted pulled back, and how the latter wanted to make sure that the 1807 law was applied in full. That struggle was about establishing that property owners needed to take planning regulations seriously and submit to them in full. We can see that expropriations were at the centre of a higher level dispute over the power public authorities should have in planning, and more precisely, over private interests. We can see this in the juxtaposition of two further quotes taken from Mr Bergeront’s letter to the Minister of the Interior:

“The claims revealed by the decree of refusal that the plaintiff is complaining about are thus profoundly illegal and unjust, and let us add that they are also extremely dangerous, that they open the door to be most perilous arbitrary. The projects that are considered of public utility have multiplied ad infinitum. Through its daily use, expropriation has become easy, should we say unfortunate. However, it already seems to not be sufficient, and is not the May 28 1856 decree a sign of the slippery slope one could be pushed on?”\(^{18}\) (Case 234, 1856).

“Against these tendencies, legal action would be a powerless remedy. Everything depends on the Administration itself, on the spirit that moves it, on the thought it obeys. We have full trust in the judgement and wisdom of the authorities, whose scrupulous observance of the principles and laws has always been the supreme rule, and who will know, we have no doubt, how to prevent the emergence of these dangers we have brought to their attention”\(^{19}\) (Case 234, 1856).

What the quotes above suggests is that this dispute was not so much about financial issues as it was about the existence of a strong and independent planning practice at the municipal level. This property owner is asking the Minister to uphold the laws that govern expropriations because they allowed property in general some independence from the public authority: they were free to repair, improve or build while waiting for their expropriation. Haussmann, on the other hand, acted to restrict that freedom in order to give the planning apparatus an efficient means to improve the city’s street network that could not be derailed by property owners seeking to further their private interests. Mr Bergeront’s complaint about the multiplication of expropriations can thus be seen as a reaction to a phenomenon he felt property no longer had any hold on. It is quite clear that he did
not want everything to depend on the ‘spirit’ that moves the Administration or on the ‘thought’ it obeys. What property owners such as Mr Bergeront wanted to avoid was precisely an autonomous planning practice at the municipal level without much regard for the rights of private property.

CONCLUSION: FROM ARCHITECT TO PLANNER

We are now in a position to conclude this chapter by asserting that Haussmann’s planning practice was a decisive break with the way in which planning was conducted before he assumed his role as prefect. In both street widening and demolition cases, we have seen that he confronted property owner expectations strongly and sought to push for the application of regulations that had not been properly enforced by municipal authorities and not taken into account by property owners. Haussmann’s planning practice in these procedures was predicated on the thorough and rigorous application of the regulations, with the aim of allowing them to have the effect on the urban fabric they were created to have. This is most evident with respect to his efforts to make sure that alignments were respected and acted upon in order to give the 1807 law the strength it had been stripped of through the courts and its lax application by the municipalities of the July Monarchy. Street creations relied on newer legislation but Haussmann’s planning practice can nonetheless be described as autonomous from this legislation. This is because he saw this new legislation as an opportunity to revert back to an interpretation of expropriations that emerged from the 1807 law. He thus forbade property owners from building or repairing as soon as he knew that a new street would come to traverse that plot of land or that building. The change here is not the 1852 law but the way in which Haussmann used it to forge a planning practice that further bolstered the planning apparatus and gave him a way to temper the speculative urges of property owners.

These fundamental changes in the way planning was conducted in Paris can thus be considered as a transcendentental shift, or in other words as the maximal appearance of that which was formerly inexistent. From what has been presented so far, we can see that this object which assumed a central role in the world of Parisian planning is the figure of the planner as the regulator of private activity on the urban fabric. It is this role of regulators that the municipal authorities of the July Monarchy refused to endorse, content as they seem to have been to let property owners infringe and ignore planning regulations. Haussmann’s arrival shattered the passivity of the planning apparatus and put its regulatory function at the very forefront of his planning practice. As we have seen, he fought for infringements to be rectified, no matter how long they had been tolerated, made no room for extenuating circumstances and sought to limit the extent to which property owners could take advantage of the administrative delays inherent to expropriation procedures. Since the
planner as regulator is the transcendental that structured the world of planning when Haussmann assumed his tenure as prefect, what was the transcendental that existed in the period that preceded his arrival?

Roncayolo’s account contains hints as to the way in which the world of planning was structured during the July Monarchy. We have already highlighted his statement that property owners inspired the utmost respect, but we can now turn to the second portion of the excerpt: “One limits oneself, under the fastidious gaze of the architects of the Civil Building’s Council, to ensuring the smooth join at the limits of existing and new urban tissue” (Roncayolo, in Agulhon 1983: 97). We here sense that it was the architects, as natural promoters of private activity and who are famously wary of planning as a regulatory procedure, which were in a sense at the centre of Parisian planning during the July Monarchy. As Haussmann himself informs us, the Civil Building’s Council was the institution through which architects influenced the jurisprudence that made the 1807 law dead letter. Haussmann’s arrival in Paris can thus be understood as a transcendental shift in that it displaced architects from the centre of the world of planning. This is similar to what Roncayolo tells us about the arrival of the engineer in the world of planning: “the engineer, it has been often repeated, takes the architect’s place, and in the boxes in which projects pile up, the Civil Buildings’ Council’s advice is now only of secondary importance” (Roncayolo in Agulhon 1983: 102). But Haussmann was not merely an engineer; he was not only a technician and a skilled administrator. His planning practice as we have described it here was a political act that broke the existing structure of appearances. It is this planning practice as a political act that constituted an event in the world of Parisian planning. The next two chapters will turn to the characterisation of this political practice and to the way in which the event it created unfolded.

---

 lxvi Translation mine, here is the original: «Le propriétaire et le contribuable (souvent la même personne) inspirent le plus grand respect. Aussi évite-t-on d’appliquer scrupuleusement les mesures prévues par la loi de 1807 sur les alignements et l’extension des villes et notamment l’établissement d’un plan général. On se contente, sous le regard pointilleux du Conseil des Bâtiments Civils, formé d’architectes, de veiller au bon raccord des voies, à la limite du tissu ancien et du tissu nouveau.»

 lxvii Translation mine, here is the original: «L’ingénieur, on l’a dit souvent, se substitue à l’architecte et dans les cartons où s’accumulent les projets, l’avis du Conseil des bâtiments civils n’est plus qu’une pièce secondaire.»
CHAPTER 5: FROM LETTERS TO PRINCIPLES, THROUGH EMOTIONS

INTRODUCTION

Now that the last chapter has shown that Haussmann’s planning practice represented a break in the world of Parisian planning, it will be the task of this chapter and the next to characterise this planning practice and allow for Badiou’s concepts to yield an explanation of the unfolding of the event it created. As detailed in chapter 2, this means identifying the faithful subject and the truth it invoked in its efforts to change the existing situation as well the reactive and obscure subjects that respectively resisted and sought to destroy that truth. In that same chapter, it was shown that the truth a faithful subject carries articulates the four determinations of will, equality, confidence and authority. It is against that particular articulation that the actions of the reactive and obscure subjects are to be understood.

Given these theoretical postulates, how are we to move from the empirical material presented in the last two chapters to the faithful subject’s truth and how are we to identify the reactive and obscure subjects? This chapter’s role will be to create a bridge between the empirical material and these theoretical abstractions. This will be done by drawing out from the letters the three axes on which Haussmann and property owners were in opposition and by identifying for each of these axes the competing principles held by the two parties.

To arrive at the axes of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners, I will follow and generalise Badiou’s intuition of affect as an exterior sign of the activity of subjects and use Robert C. Solomon’s work on emotions as judgements to identify and catalogue the letters’ emotional register. Once collected through coding, these emotions will both be used as the material from which the competing principles can be identified and as a way to gauge the evolution of the relative strengths of the principles in each of the three axes of opposition.

The principles upheld within the opposition between Haussmann and property owners will allow us to reconstruct the subjects and the truth they positioned themselves around in the next chapter. The determination ‘equality’ will serve to discuss the second condition that needs to be verified in order to invoke Badiou’s concepts.
SUBJECTS, PRINCIPLES, AFFECTS, EMOTIONS

FROM SUBJECTS TO PRINCIPLES

The last chapter approached the empirical material with a focus on establishing what set Haussmann’s planning practice in his first years as prefect apart from the way in which planning had been conducted until then. Against a discussion of the context in which planning was taking place before Haussmann’s arrival in Paris, the chapter presented how Haussmann’s planning practice differed from that of its predecessors by focusing on three distinct types of planning interventions: alignments, demolitions and street creations. This validated the first of Badiou’s conditions for an event: a break in the structure of appearances of a given world. We now need to verify that Haussmann’s planning practice carried within it an affirmation of equality. Only then would we be able to legitimately invoke Badiou’s concepts of truth and subjects to provide an account of the way in which Haussmann’s planning practice garnered opposition and was ultimately defeated in the Council of State.

The difficulty here is that Badiou’s notion of equality is one that is inherent in the actions of the faithful subject, not a goal that needs to be achieved. As mentioned in chapter 3, equality is the most fundamental of the four determinations that constitutes the truth of a faithful subject. To ascertain whether a political practice carries within it an affirmation of equality, it is thus necessary to identify a faithful subject and scrutinise its actions for the principles they carry. The notion of principle can be understood here as a way to offer an observable counterpoint to Badiou’s notion of determination. We saw in chapter 2 that a determination, for Badiou, is a decision to act in a particular way in the world. The determination ‘equality’, for example, is a decision to act against the established hierarchies of power or wealth (Badiou 2009: 27). But we cannot ascertain this decision without having characterised what drives the actions of the faithful subject. The notion of principle I am introducing here is thus a way to observe what a faithful subject is fighting for in its actions. These principles can then be used to reconstruct the decisions that the subject has taken in its actions, Badiou’s determinations. We must thus first hypothesise a faithful subject and then scrutinise its actions for the principles guiding them. Once these principles have been identified, they can be used to reconstruct the determination and the truth they articulate. Only then will we be in a position to judge whether the principles within the hypothesised faithful subject’s actions can be reconstructed to match Badiou’s determination ‘equality’.
We can use last chapter’s identification of the break introduced by Haussmann’s planning practice in the world of Parisian planning to hypothesise that Haussmann was the faithful subject of the event we are concerned with here. All of the empirical material points to a constant involvement by Haussmann in the conduct of day-to-day planning matters. While it is impossible to gauge how involved he was in all of the cases, he was the head of the planning system and as such set the ground rules for how the cases should be dealt with. All letters written in his name bear his signature, a sign that he supervised all decisions emanating from his administration. Moreover, his personal involvement can be perceived in many of the higher profile cases and it can be assumed that he dictated many of the cases that attacked his planning practice at a deeper level, whether directed to a property owner or to the Interior Ministry. There is a consistency of language throughout his letters over the period that makes it clear that he remained centrally involved in all disputes arising out of his planning practice.

From what has been presented in the last chapter, we are also in a position to state that if we hypothesise that Haussmann is the faithful subject of the event, then it must also be hypothesised that the reactive and obscure subjects are to be found within the ranks of the property owners who sent letters to the Minister of the Interior. It follows from this that if Haussmann, as a faithful subject, is guided by a set of principles in his actions, then the reactive and obscure subjects who are opposing his actions must be assumed to hold principles that are the pole opposite of Haussmann’s. The oppositions between Haussmann and the other types of subjects can thus be thought of as the opposition between the principles that these subjects express in their actions. What we are looking for in the epistolary exchange between Haussmann, property owners and the Minister of the Interior is thus precisely these principles that animate the actions of the three types of subjects. These principles are the raw material that will be used in the next chapter to reconstruct the truth of the faithful subject and to identify the reactive and obscure subjects that oppose it.

**FROM PRINCIPLES TO AFFECTS**

We are now in a position to move to the method through which these pairs of principles can be found within the letters. As mentioned in chapter 3, we are here on entirely new ground, as Badiou does not give us a method through which to put his concepts to use for an empirical investigation. The method that will be detailed in this chapter is thus an attempt I have made to find within his philosophy clues as to how this could be achieved in practice. Because such an endeavour has not been attempted before, there was no reference point to which to attach this method; it is thus completely open to refinement. It also needs to be contrasted to other ways in which Badiou’s
concepts and empirical material could be joined. This will however not be attempted here given the limitations inherent to the format of a thesis. The method that will be detailed here should be seen as the best answer to the issue of joining Badiou’s philosophy with empirical material I have found so far.

The most promising lead as concerns a method to link Badiou’s concepts and empirical material was found in the short paragraph below:

“The global production of the faithful subject of the four types of truths [...] must not lead us to lose sight of the local signs of this present, the immediate and immanent experience that one is participating, be it in an elementary fashion, in the becoming of a truth, in a creative subject-body. In their content, these signs are new intra-worldly relations; in their anthropological form, they are affects. It is thus that a political sequence signals its existence point by point through an enthusiasm for a new maxim of equality; art by the pleasure of a new perceptual intensity; love by the happiness of a new existential intensity; science by the joy of new enlightenment” (Badiou 2009: 76).

The importance of this excerpt lies in Badiou’s inclusion of affect as one characteristic of his concept of the faithful subject. As mentioned in chapter 2, Badiou is careful to maintain that his concept of the subject is purely formal: not an individual but that which adopts a particular stance towards the truth of an event. This has led Badiou to insist that the category of the subject must be thought without that of the individual: when part of a subject, all individuality is lost, only the positioning in relation to the truth matters. What the paragraph above seems to indicate, at least for the case of the faithful subject, is that this positioning is accompanied by affect, so that an individual’s belonging to that subjective formalism could in theory be read through that individual’s affective state. These affects are the mark of subjective participation for all those involved (‘be it in an elementary fashion’) in the becoming of a truth. We recognize here the use of the word anthropology that was discussed in chapter 3: we are thus confident that what Badiou means here is that affects are the empirical manifestation of the faithful subject’s involvement in the construction of a truth.

« D’abord, la production globale du sujet fidèle des quatre types de vérités, ou le nom de leur présent (séquence, configuration, enchantement et théorie), ne doit pas faire perdre de vue les signes locaux de ce présent, l’expérience immédiate et immanente de ce qu’on participe, fût-ce élémentairement, au devenir d’une vérité, à un corps-sujet créateur. Ces signes sont, dans leur contenu, de nouvelles relations intra-mondaines, et dans leur forme anthropologique, des affects. C’est ainsi qu’une séquence politique se signale point par point par un enthousiasme pour une nouvelle maxime de l’égalité, l’art par le plaisir d’une nouvelle intensité perceptive, l’amour par le bonheur d’une nouvelle intensité existentielle, la science par la joie de nouvelles lumières» (Badiou 2006: 85).
Badiou is indebted to Lacan for his concept of affect. He asserts that “for Lacan, affect is the body, to the extent that structure operates within it” (Badiou 2009: 478). Transposed into Badiou’s project, we see that the notion of structure in Lacan becomes that of the subjects assuming particular positions vis-à-vis a truth. We then arrive at Badiou’s insistence, described earlier, that affects are a sign of subjective activity: affects are the body as it is incorporated into the sequence of a truth. A closer look at the affects Badiou attributes to the faithful subject can help us go beyond this formalisation. While it was stated above that each type of event was characterised by the unique affect of its faithful subject (enthusiasm for a maxim of equality for political events), Badiou, in a characteristic move also sets up a parallel sequence of the affects that mark the development of the faithful subject of each type of event. While a faithful subject has been shown in chapter 2 to articulate the four determinations of authority/terror, equality, confidence and will, in the paragraph below Badiou sets out the four affects that mark the sequence through which this subject comes to be constituted (bearing in mind that for Badiou the concept of a point refers to a moment of absolute decision between two alternatives, and two alternatives only):

“The first testifies to the desire for a Great Point, a decisive discontinuity that will institute the new world in a single blow, and complete the subject. We will call it terror. The second testifies to the fear of points, the retreat before the obscurity of the discontinuous, of everything that imposes a choice without guarantee between two hypotheses. To put it otherwise, this affect signals the desire for a continuity, for a monotonous shelter. We will call it anxiety. The third affirms the acceptance of the plurality of points, of the fact that discontinuities are at once inexorable and multiform. We will call it courage. The fourth affirms the desire for the subject to be a constant intrication of points and openings. With respect to the pre-eminence of becoming-subject, it affirms the equivalence of what is continuous and negotiated, on the one hand, and of what is discontinuous and violent, on the other. These are merely subjective modalities, which depend on the construction of the subject in a world and on the capacities of the body to produce effects within it. They are not to be hierarchically ordered. War can have as much value as peace, negotiation as much as struggle, violence as much as gentleness. This affect, whereby the categories of the act are subordinated to the contingency of worlds, we will call justice” (Badiou 2009: 86).


lxx «Quatre affects signalent l’incorporation d’un animal humain au processus subjectif d’une vérité. Le premier témoigne du désir d’un Grand Point, d’une discontinuité décisive, qui installerait d’un coup le nouveau monde,
This passage makes it clear that Badiou’s conception of affects is of a much more complex nature than what was evident from the definition he borrowed from Lacan or from the affects manifested in the actions of the faithful subject. What he presents here is much closer to adopting a particular stance in the world, to taking a decision to act in certain ways, than to passively or unconsciously serving as the vector for an affect: while he uses the words ‘fear’ and ‘acceptance’, its seems as though the verbs ‘desire’ and ‘affirm’ are much more central to his enterprise. Badiou’s notion of affect is thus very different from the way Spinoza uses the term. Indeed, for Spinoza, affect is defined as follows:

“An affect that is called a passion of the mind is a confused idea through which a mind affirms of its body (or of some part of it) a greater or lesser force of existing than it had before—an idea which, when it is given, makes the mind think of one thing rather than another” (in Bennett 2004: 83).

Spinoza informs us that his use of the notion of a confused idea comes from the fact that it is only when the mind has inadequate or confused ideas that it can be acted upon, that it is passive (in Bennett 2004: 83). This is contrasted to the situation in which an individual acts: “a mind’s actions arise from adequate ideas alone” (in Bennett 2004: 54). We can find further development of this now commonplace opposition between passion and action below:

“‘Bondage’ is my name for man’s lack of power [Latin impotentia; often translated as ‘weakness’] to moderate and restrain the affects. It’s a good name, because anyone who is subject to affects is not under his own control and is at the mercy of fortune, i.e. of whatever mood or passion happens to come over him. He is so much in its power that often, though he sees what would be better for him, he is compelled to go after something worse” (in Bennett 2004: 84)
What these quotes highlight is that Spinoza’s notion of affect is much closer to the term emotion as it is used in everyday language. This ambiguity is reflected in the fact that his affectus is commonly translated as emotion (such as in the 1951 translation of the Ethics by Elwes). We are here very far from Badiou’s conception of affect as it emerges from his Logics of Worlds. For Badiou, affects are directly linked to action; they seem to be particular mind-frames that are attached to particular ways of acting in the world. We could say that they are stances or positions adopted towards action, which inscribe actions within a certain way of approaching the world.

FROM AFFECTS TO EMOTIONS

Given the way in which we have understood Badiou’s notion of affect, how are we to find it within a corpus of text? Although he posits the empirical existence of affect, it seems impossible to read a position towards action from text. A way around this could be to think of a way in which the existence of affects could be indirectly recognised within the text. We can return here to the issue of the principles that are held by subjects in their opposition over the truth. We presented these principles as the identifiable counterpart to the subjects; they are manifested through the actions of the subjects. The relationship between these principles and Badiou’s notion of affect can now be hypothesised as the following: when a subject acts, it does so within an affective stance to the world and with a guiding principle. What we now need to include within this is the effect of opposition.

Because a subject’s actions are determined by its position to the truth, and thus to the principle that it is invoking in maintaining that position, we must assume that opposition will not alter its principle. If this were the case, the subject would cease to be. If any change occurs in the subject within an opposition, it must be found in its affective stance. Badiou presents us only with the affects of the faithful subject as it is acting in isolation of the reactive and obscure subjects, stating that in general its affect is one of enthusiasm for a maxim of equality, and that, in sequence, it is constituted through the affects of terror, anxiety, courage and justice. We thus have no indication within Badiou’s work of how an affective stance is disrupted within the context of the opposition between subjects.

The decision I have taken here is to invoke Robert C. Solomon’s philosophical work on emotions to propose a way of understanding how a subject responds to the disruption of its affective stance. Solomon’s work can be invoked here because, like Badiou, he has sought to reaffirm Sartre’s existentialism in the face of the post-modern turn. His central thesis is that emotions must be understood as judgements. For him, the “primary point is that emotions should not be construed as
merely momentary intrusions into an otherwise orderly life but rather as dynamic structures of our experience that must be continually reanimated” (Solomon 2003: 113). Or put more straightforwardly, “an emotion is an evaluative (or a ‘normative’) judgement, a judgement about my situation and about myself and/or about all other people” (Solomon 1993: 126). Emotions are construed as inextricably linked to the way in which we conceive of action and act in the world, and are thus something that we are responsible for. For him, emotional life is inherent to action: not a phenomenon that must be controlled or channelled to act, but one that accompanies and informs action. Solomon conceived of his book The Passions, originally published in 1976, as “an attempt to shift the emotions, from their traditional demeaning role as unintelligent distractions and intrusions into the life of reason, to essential features of reason itself” (Solomon 1993: viii). This is a view that offers an interesting opportunity for us here. What if Solomon’s emotions could be used as manifestations of disruptions in subject’s affective stances? The appearance of emotion within the empirical material would be an indication that a subject’s affective stance is under attack. But this would entail that the principle the subject is invoking to motivate its actions is also under attack. We may be thus able to reconstruct these principles by isolating the instances in which they come under attack, seen through the use of emotion within the epistolary exchange.

Solomon provides the reader both with a ‘logic’ of emotions and with an emotional register. His logic of emotions “ties them together and distinguishes them, illuminating the common transformations of one emotion to another as well as the conceptually necessary connections between certain emotions and certain views of the world” (Solomon 1993: 194). This is done by identifying thirteen axes through which to understand the judgments that may be associated with the use of a particular emotion. The emotional register is then the dissection of an extensive list of emotions according to these axes. In Solomon, we thus get a concept of emotion that is not merely a description of a physical state but also a reflection of a judgment passed on the world through the use of the emotion. This allows for certain characteristics to be assigned to emotions. We will be most interested in four of these characteristics: evaluation, responsibility, status and power. This is because they will give us an indication of what is at stake in using a particular emotion. If the use of emotions, even if in only as a type of performance, betrays something about what is at stake for that individual, then we can make claims about the type of response a subject manifested to an attack on its affective stance, and thus, principles. Solomon’s emotions, precisely because they contain inherent characteristics about the type of judgment that accompanies them, are thus well-suited to an investigation within a corpus of text for the signs that a subject’s affective stance and the principles underlying its actions have come under attack.
We would not be able to as easily establish this connection between attacks on affective stances and emotions if we used other ways of conceptualising emotions. This is clear for the case of Spinoza, for whom action is severed from the realm of emotions. But it can also be seen in the case of affect theory, whose main proponent Sylvan Tomkins conceives of affects as the typical biological responses that accompany an emotion:

“If each innate affect is controlled by inherited programs, which in turn control facial muscle responses, autonomic responses, blood flow, respiratory and vocal responses then these correlated sets of responses will define the number and specific types of primary affects [...] There are, I believe, only nine such responses: interest, enjoyment, surprise, fear, anger, distress, shame, dissmell and disgust. These are discriminable distinct sets of facial, vocal, respiratory, skin and muscle responses” (Tomkins 2008: 647).

For Tomkins, emotions emerge from the interplay between one of these typical biological responses and what “information has entered and been coassembled with the affect in a central assembly” (Tomkins 2008: 647). We are very far from Solomon’s cognitive theory of emotions which “excessively minimizes the role of physiology and feeling, and plays down the essential role of desire” (Solomon 1993: ix). In general, we can state that any attempt to isolate emotions on the basis of the physiological responses they trigger is not compatible with Badiou’s affects. This is because we must remember that Badiou’s subjects are not bodies that feel or experience physiological changes. They are bodies that are structured in their relation to the truth, they are bodies without individuality. But we know that they act with affect and principles. Solomon’s conception of emotions is compatible with Badiou’s vision of subjects, even though it laid the foundation for a cognitive theory of emotions. This emerges from its link between emotions and action, of his view of emotions as ‘essential features of reason itself’. Emotions, as Solomon conceives them, can be thought of as expressible by Badiou’s subjects: they do not rely on physiology, or feeling, or desire but are instead viewed as complements to action, as ways of apprehending the world and evaluating our actions and those of others.

But the connection between Badiou’s affects and Solomon’s emotions is not one that relies on the distinction between these two concepts found in Tomkins, for example, where affect is the biological portion of emotion. There, emotions are the way in which affective responses are expressed by an individual: there are only a limited number of primary affects, but these are expressed as many more
emotions depending on the information that has ‘entered and been coassembled with the affect in a central assembly’. Affects and emotions are thus merely steps in the constitution of an individual’s response to the outside world. In the method we propose here, affects and emotions are both characteristics of an acting subject: affects are the stance taken towards action while emotions are the expressions of the subject’s attempts to remain true to that stance. Emotions are what allow affects to endure, through the appraisal, the evaluation of the situation and the reorientation of action that they allow. This is a conception of the relation between these two notions that differs from that of Deleuze and Guattari in their A Thousand Plateaus. There, they describe this relation thus:

“Affect is the active discharge of emotion, the counterattack, whereas feeling is an always displaced, retarded, resisting emotion. Affects are projectiles just like weapons; feelings are introceptive like tools” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 400)

What we see here is that emotion precedes affect, with emotion seen as that which can then become either an affect (and then viewed as an action) or a feeling (and in this case affect behaviour more indirectly). For Deleuze and Guattari, the important relationship is that between feeling and affect:

“The romantic hero, the voice of the romantic hero, acts as a subject, a subjectified individual with “feelings”; but this subjective vocal element is reflected in an orchestral and instrumental whole that on the contrary mobilizes nonsubjective “affects” and that reaches its height in romanticism” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 341).

But what the two quotes above seem to indicate is that their notion of affect, even it involves a notion of action, is not something which characterises action (such as affect in Badiou as a stance towards action) but which emerges out of action, which is projected through it and affects other bodies. We thus come back to Spinoza. This can be seen in Massumi’s translator’s foreword to A Thousand Plateaus:

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{xxxi}}\]
“‘L’affect’ (Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act. ‘L’affection’ (Spinoza’s affectio) is each such state considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting, body (with body taken in its broadest possible sense to include "mental" or ideal bodies)” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: xvi)

We see from this that their definition of act is a qualification of Spinoza’s in that it replaces the latter’s perfection for their notion of action as that which is increased or decreased by affect. But affects still impact on action from the outside or are made to impact action; they are not a characteristic of action itself. The relation between emotion and affect in Deleuze and Guattari thus inverts that in Tomkins (emotions now precede affect) and uses Spinoza’s notion of affect to conceive of the way in which affects impact action. In contrast to the work of these thinkers, the relation we have proposed between Badiou’s affects and Solomon’s emotions thus appears as holding a very different set of assumptions. The focus is not on affecting other bodies but on developing a way to understand how actions are shaped by both affect and emotions: the former as what inscribes them in a way of positioning oneself to the world and the latter as the manifestations of a subject attempting to maintain that stance in the face of opposition. Their concepts of affect and emotion form a coherent perspective on the way in which subjects introduce and defend principles in a world.

We can thus legitimately use Solomon’s emotions as a way of finding within a corpus of text the moment when a subject’s affective stance is under attack. These are moments in which the principle guiding the course of action will be expressed. Solomon’s work is well suited to this empirical investigation. First, he provides us with a register of emotions that we can use to interrogate the empirical material. And second, he offers us a grid through which to interpret the use of each of the emotions within the register. His work thus allows us to look for well-defined emotions within the letters from Haussmann and property owners to the Minister of the Interior. As a window into the affected defence of a principle by a subject, these emotions will allow us capture those pieces of text within the letters that pertain to those principles. And more importantly for the next chapter’s purposes, the particular judgments Solomon assigns to the emotions found to contain allusions to principles will allow us to better understand how the contests over the status of the planning apparatus between the subjects played out.
FINDING EMOTIONS AND DETERMINING THEIR JUDGMENT

SOLOMON’S CLASSIFICATION OF EMOTIONS

The last section detailed a method through which to identify Badiou’s subjects from a series of letters written in the context of a significant change. It hinges on the search within the letters for the emotions contained in Solomon’s register. These emotions are to play two different roles. First, the statements containing emotions will be looked at in isolation from the rest of the letters and scrutinised for the potential principles they are a marker of. This is because emotions are taken here as a sign that an affective stance is under attack. And because an affective stance is that which defines a subject for Badiou, we know that these affective stances are built around the principles held by subjects. So an attack on an affective stance, seen through emotions, betrays the existence of a principle. A second role for emotions will be to gauge the balance of forces between Haussmann and the reactive and obscure subjects on the principles opposing them. To do this, the types of emotions associated with each principle will be interpreted based on a number of characteristics Solomon assigns to the judgments represented by each emotion. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the first of these roles of emotions, but it will also prepare the ground for the use in the next chapter of the information obtained from Solomon’s interpretation of emotions.

In practice, this means that the next section will present the emotions in Solomon’s register found through a detailed coding process of the letters written by Haussmann and property owners to the Minister of the Interior. These emotions are anger, resentment, contempt, fear and joy. Each emotion will be discussed in turn: in each case, examples taken from letters of both Haussmann and property owners will follow a presentation of Solomon’s interpretation of the judgement underlying the emotion, based on four of his characteristics of these judgements (evaluation, responsibility, status and power).

The reason for focusing on only four of Solomon’s thirteen characteristics of emotions as judgment lies in the fact that the emotions that are studied here are embedded in a context of an epistolary exchange with a well-defined and single dimensional purpose: convincing the Minister of the Interior that one’s view on the issue in question is the right one. In such a context, some of his characteristics become trivial. This is the case for ‘emotional direction’, for example, which differentiates outer-, inner-directed and bipolar emotions (Solomon 1993: 196-198): because they emerge from within an opposition, it is clear that the emotions we are concerned with here are by default all outer-directed. Another such characteristic is the judgment of intersubjectivity the emotion betrays, with
trust and defensiveness as the two extremes intersubjectivity can take (Solomon 1993: 215). In the case of the emotions to be discussed here, all negative emotions are defensive, while the positive ones, as personal emotions, are not given any value.

Other characteristics of his emotions do not seem useful to our purposes here. This is the case for the scope and focus an emotional judgement can take. Because we are dealing with letters that are sent to the Minister of the Interior to argue for the validity of their argument, it is generally the case that emotions have a rather narrow scope and a clear focus upon the item or event that is the object of the letter: the planning decision that is being contested or defended or the particular proposal or request that is being submitted or rebuked (Solomon 1993: 199). This is also the case for the notion of the object of the emotional judgment, with a choice between the human, the subhuman and inhuman (Solomon 1993: 200-204). Both for Haussmann and property owners, emotions involved in the defence of one’s own principle or the attack of the other’s principle can only have a human object. The characteristic ‘distance’, which looks at what the emotion means for the desire for physical and psychological proximity, does not seem well suited to an analysis of an opposition over a planning practice. A last dimension of emotions that fits in this category is the type of criteria that is used to form the emotional judgement – these can be of a moral, personal or interpersonal nature (Solomon 1993: 204-206). Because the emotions we are interested in bear a relation to the principles held by subjects, it is clear that the only criteria for judgment that are possible are those of a moral, or ‘objective’, nature.

A final category of characteristics that will not be used are those that go beyond the scope of the purpose that emotions are to play in this analysis. These characteristics are tied to Solomon’s larger project of showing that “every emotion is a subjective strategy for the maximization of personal dignity and self-esteem” (Solomon 1993: 222). This is why his thirteenth characteristic is precisely the type of strategy the emotion allows. The other two characteristics in this category are ‘mythologies’ and ‘desires, intentions and commitments’. As concerns the former, Solomon tells us that “mythologies synthesize our views as emotional judgements into a coherent dramatic framework, organizing the dull facts of the world into the excitement of personal involvement and meaningfulness” (Solomon 1993: 219). The latter is concerned with the demands the emotion used puts on future behaviour – emotion is not only “an interpretation of our world but a projection into its future, filled with desires which sometimes become intentions and commitments” (Solomon 1993: 220). These three characteristics of emotions will not be included in this analysis because they are located on the terrain of Badiou’s affects; they are Solomon’s attempts to inscribe his emotions into
a positioning towards the world: a larger strategy of maximising self-esteem, a mythology, a projection into the future. We have seen that these considerations are antithetical to Badiou’s subjects. They are only inscribed within a structure that positions them and their actions vis-à-vis the truth.

Four of Solomon’s characteristics of emotions as judgment will thus frame the emotions found in letters to the Minister of the Interior: evaluation, responsibility, status and power. They will be defined here, discussed in relation to the emotions found in the letters in the section below (both as aides in identifying and in interpreting them), but the insights gleaned from these characteristics will be put to use in the next chapter’s discussion of the subjects and the unfolding of their opposition.

For Solomon, emotional evaluation is the value judgment that sits at the heart of the emotion in question. It can take the form of an evaluation of incidents, more general aspects of a person or a situation, or of overall evaluations (Solomon 1993: 211). These evaluations will be most useful in guiding the identification of the emotions in the letters, as they offer a subtext that can allow for differences to emerge between related emotions. But “our emotions involve more than evaluations; they also ascribe responsibility, praise for gains, blame for losses” (Solomon 1993: 213). The issue of responsibility is another characteristic that will be useful in separating out emotions from one another on the basis of whether, and to whom, they assign responsibility in the emotional judgement they have made.

Status is a characteristic of emotions that will be central to next chapter’s discussion of the subjects. But it is also of great value in discerning differences between emotions, especially those of negative valence. Put simply, status codes for the implicit relationship that the use of an emotion establishes between the emitter and the object of the emotion: one of equality, inferiority or superiority (Solomon 1993: 206-209). Finally, ‘power’ is a characteristic that betrays the emotion user’s estimation of its own ability to carry out the desired course of action (Solomon 1993: 221). Its importance for our analysis is that this characteristic offers a way to gauge – through the emotion employed – the power that the user estimates is at its disposal within the opposition we are investigating.

A final issue needs to be discussed before we move on to the presentation of the emotions found in the letters. It concerns the goodness of fit between Solomon’s detailed classification of emotions and the statements expressing emotion within the letters to the Minister of the Interior. How can
we be reassured that what has been found within the text and which has been labelled as an emotion actually is liable to be understood through Solomon’s conception of emotions as judgements?

The discussion has remained abstract up to this point. It established that Solomon’s emotions could allow us to identify those moments when an acting subject (defined by an affective stance and a principle) met with opposition from another subject. We hypothesised that such moments would be identifiable by the use of emotion by that subject to appraise the situation in which it found itself. The empirical consequence of this hypothesis is that if principles are found within the emotions, then it is justified to use a theory of emotions that explains how emotions are used by subjects to defend them. This is because it would legitimise the relation between Badiou’s affects and Solomon’s emotions.

The identification of emotions within the text that will be featured in the next section should thus be taken as inscribed within this thesis’ empirical test as to the evental status of Haussmann’s planning practice. Indeed, if principles are found within emotions, this means that the opposition between Haussmann and property owners was an opposition between subjects, not individuals. If that is the case, then it does not matter for our purposes whether the emotions present in the text are real or mere performances. In any case, they represent an action by a subject to defend its affective stance and principle from the other subjects. It is only when the principles have been identified, or not, from the emotions that we will be able to decide whether the relation between Badiou’s affects and Solomon’s emotions is justified, and thus, whether the emotions present in the text can be understood through Solomon’s emotions. We will now move to the five emotions found through the coding process.

ANGER

For Solomon, anger is an emotion that always carries within in it a negative evaluation, a judgement that a personal offence has been committed and that someone is blameworthy (Solomon 1993: 228-229). Solomon sees anger as ‘a great equalizer’, as an emotion in which the antagonist is seen as an equal (Solomon 1993: 227). With respect to the power of an angry judgment, Solomon is less categorical. He defines it as variable, indicating that it can sometimes stand for direct and effective action, but other times not. However, in cases where it is not felt to effective, he posits that anger may in fact be more akin to resentment, an emotion to which we will turn in the next section (Solomon 1993: 229). We can thus assign an element of power to anger here. In general, anger is
thus an emotion that signals a combative subject, one who is in the midst of an ongoing opposition, when principles are pitted against principles without any clear idea of which side will come out victorious.

In line with such characteristics of anger, the emotion was identified in the letters by particularly forceful expressions of discontent, the use of strong negative words or expressions, and the use of sarcasm and exclamation marks. Because of Solomon’s insistence of anger as defined by a sense of personal offence caused by the actions of another, I also included statements that betrayed strong feelings of being the victim of a personal attack. There are 48 statements expressing anger in the letters written by property owners (out of a total of 155 expressions of emotion) and 11 of them in Haussmann’s letters (out of a total of 38). Anger thus seems to have been a very important emotion within this principled opposition. The following three quotes exemplify the kinds of statements I have labelled as ‘angry’. The first two are taken from letters written by property owners and the third from one of Haussmann’s letters:

“I dare hope, Mr Minister, that guided by the thoughts of fairness and justice that direct your actions, you will not refuse to take into consideration the observations I have just had the honour of submitting to you; if contrary to my expectations it were to be otherwise, would it not be telling me: the damage you are suffering could have been avoided if the administration had shown more foresight, it’s possible, I nonetheless oppose that you have this damage repaired, even though it only concerns an 80 centimetre space and I intend to take full advantage of an unfortunate and exceptional circumstance to force you to pull back your house even though it is 22 meters large and is in good condition! Would this be just and fair?” (Case 104, 1854)

“Worn-out, I come once again, Mr Minister, to appeal to Your Excellency to urge you to accelerate the sale of my property which is of no use to me anymore since it is no longer under my control or to have the authorisation to build delivered to me and to establish as valid the compensation I request. I am counting on your compliancy, Mr Minister, to give me an answer and especially to do me justice; as it is completely unacceptable to be a property owner but not to be able to make use of my property” (Case 107, 1854).

“It is illogical to approve an alignment plan and at the same time to declare that property owners are not required to abide by it. Such an extraordinary measure certainly contravenes the spirit and the
RESENTMENT

As mentioned above, resentment can be understood as anger without the accompanying sentiment of holding effective power. Solomon goes as far as to state that resentment is an emotion that betrays utter impotence and intolerable inferiority (Solomon 1993: 292-294). As could be expected from a judgment of impotence and inferiority, especially if it is felt as intolerable, and thus as only a temporary departure from normality, resentment is negative about everything and places blame on the person responsible in a way that is both ill-defined and obscure (Solomon 1993: 292-293). Resentment seems likely to indicate a subject whose principle is losing ground to that of its opponent and who uses the emotion as a way to lash out at the agent they see responsible for their newly acquired impotence and inferiority.

Using the above, resentment was identified by more subtle expressions of discontent than anger, such as overly courteous remarks that can also be read sarcastically, subtle attacks disguised as graciousness, statements with an over-emphasis on defensive arguments that sound like veiled accusations of persecution and feigned incomprehension at the situation that is unfolding. The idea of ill-defined responsibility was addressed by looking within general statements of incomprehension, those questioning the validity or usefulness of a course of action or those exhibiting a general sense of discontent at the way in which the procedures were set up. There were 45 statements expressing resentment in property owner letters (out of 155) and 8 in Haussmann’s letters (out of 38), indicating that it is almost as prevalent as anger in their letters. As above, three quotes exemplifying resentment are shown below, with the first two taken from property owner letters, and the last one from one of Haussmann’s letters.

“The refusal I was signified is based on the bad state of the wall I am not allowed to renovate: but a careful examination will easily make noticeable, I have no doubt about this, the fact that this wall is not in the state of disrepair and damage reported by the ‘Bureau de Consultation de la Grande Voirie’ [Public Road Consultation Council], that it is, quite to the contrary, in conditions of solidity that guarantee its life for a long time still and that finally the fears that its exposed construction may have elicited are in reality without any basis” (Case 102, 1854).
“We could not attribute to as distinguished an official as the Prefect of the Seine the thoughts of a coarse man, but then why this resistance to let us out of this terrible situation he himself has put us in?” (Case 43, 1856)

“Your Excellency will no doubt deem it relevant to obtain the Civil Buildings Council’s opinion on this matter [...]. In order for this joint inspection to leave no doubt behind it, I would ask your Excellency to be so kind as to invite the Civil Buildings Council to serve Mr Ernault a notice to have the coating that covers the area of the ground floor that has been reported as defective removed” (Case 247, 1858).

CONTEMPT

Contempt is an evaluation of severe condemnation for the agent at which it is directed, on the basis of the flagrant irresponsibility of that agent’s actions (Solomon 1993: 234). It is diametrically opposed to resentment in that it designs the other as markedly inferior and exudes considerable power (Solomon 1993: 234-235). Contempt is “a judgment against another person of the most severe nature; it finds him worse than offensive, rather vile or repulsive” (Solomon 1993: 233). Contempt is thus at home in an analysis of emotions emanating from a strong opposition between two parties: it is a clear marker than the subject using it feels its principle is unarguably superior and that reason and history is on its side. This is the emotion that signals the victorious march of a conquering principle.

Contempt was identified by snide remarks, personal attacks, and more direct expressions of discontent than anger or resentment. Any positioning by the speaker as being superior to its interlocutor (or transposed interlocutor through the Minister of Interior) was seen as a potential use of contempt. Solomon also indicates that contempt is usually morally tinged (Solomon 1993: 234), and the use of a vocabulary steeped in moral or even physical disgust also helped in identifying contempt. Contempt featured less often in property owner letters than anger and resentment (25 occurrences out of 155), but made up close to half of all emotions used by Haussmann (18 out of 38 expressions of emotion). As above, two excerpts taken from letters by property owners and one from a letter by Haussmann show the way in which contempt was manifested in the letters.

“And this is enough for Mr Prefect of the Seine to usurp for himself the exorbitant right to strike, as of now, these pieces of land of a servitude forbidding construction, and consequently, of a kind of ban. Is this a serious doctrine, or simply a mistake that inadvertently slipped out, and as such purely
fortuitous? We are not allowed, unfortunately, to believe in a fortuitous mistake and it is consequently for us a duty to bring back to mind the principles that have been neglected”\(^{26}\) (Case 234, 1856).

“You will not allow history to say, My Lord, that under the reign of Napoleon III and under the ministry of Mr Billault, justice was replaced by the most unjust bias in favour of the rich, and in your benevolent solicitude you will deign order an inspection of the premises by someone competent who will easily recognise the revolting injustice the Prefecture of the Seine is voluntarily allowing to be committed to the prejudice of Dame Maurin, owner of house number 18 (there is urgency as construction will soon begin)”\(^{27}\) (Case 48, 1857).

“First, Mr Minister, it is enough to read this decision to know that it is to the contrary completely applicable to the case in question as it forbids all private individuals from erecting anything that protrudes on streets (and roads) without having obtained an authorisation to do so, and no such document has been delivered or even demanded by Mr Lamy, or even by Mr Cartand. [...] This article is so clear and precise that it cannot give way to interpretation, given that it has made provisions for the needs of circulation and for those of salubrity, for the danger that can result from the erection of a balcony at height below that fixed by law, and that it allows no exception. Nothing seems to me to be in a position to prevent a demolition against which one complains only for reasons of private interest”\(^{28}\) (Case 6, 1855).

**FEAR**

For Solomon, “fear is one of the least complicated emotions, so much that it might almost be treated as a negative desire” (Solomon 1993: 253). It is important to think about fear as it would emerge within the letters to the Minister that are under investigation here when discussing Solomon’s characteristics. While the evaluation he associates with fear – “a strongly negative anticipation of an impending event, state of affairs, etc” (Solomon 1993: 253) – and the fact that fear reveals the helplessness of its user fit within the setting we are discussing, this is not the case for the other two characteristics. The status accompanying fear is left open, though Solomon does add that fear is always accompanied by “a tinge of at least temporary inferiority” (Solomon 1993: 252). The responsibility assigned by a judgment of fear is also left open. The way in which fear relates to the other emotions with respect to these two latter characteristics is crucial because it will define the way in which emotions of fear are to be related to the subjects’ defence of their principles. Are we to follow Solomon’s hint and use the temporary inferiority that accompanies fear to relate it to
resentment, and thus interpret fear as another sign of a subject losing ground in the opposition? Or does fear represent an altogether different category, which may mean that it does not grant us any information as to the conflict over principles that unfolds in the event?

As will be shown in the next section, principles were found to be expressed within statements made by property owners with fear. This seems to indicate that fear must be accommodated within an interpretation of the subjects of an event. Another interesting empirical fact is that fear was not found in any of Haussmann’s letters. Whatever fear could tell us about the opposition of subjects is limited to the reactive and obscure subjects. The openness Solomon attributes to fear in terms of the status of the user relative to the receiver means that it cannot be used in the same way as the three emotions discussed above: it cannot inform us of the way in which a principled opposition is unfolding. But the fact that fear signals helplessness and a strongly negative anticipation of the future is useful and could offer us another perspective on the opposition. The use of fear can then be taken at face value as an indication that Haussmann’s actions are having consequences damaging enough to compel property owners to communicate them to the Minister of the Interior. If we understand fear in this way, it can be used to measure the extent to which property owners express that something important to them personally is at stake in their principled opposition to Haussmann. We will see in the next chapter that there is a significant difference in the use of fear by reactive and obscure subjects that this conception of fear can help shed light on.

In the letters, fear was identified through indications of helplessness and speculation as to the impact a certain course of action or decision could have. This could either be fear that something would happen to them or their properties or fear that something they deem absolutely necessary would fail to occur. Fear was also identifiable by pleas from property owners to take certain extenuating circumstances into consideration (old age, demands of a particular trade, bad financial situations) to avoid the dreaded course of action. There were 28 expressions of fear out of the 155 expressions of emotions in property owner letters. The two examples of fear that follow are taken from letters written by property owners.

“It is also a serious mistake on the City’s part to favour the entrepreneur and to prefer him to the resident. The resident builds for himself, builds properly, to keep. The entrepreneur, he builds to sell and for speculative purposes. If the City allows most construction in a given time period to be built by entrepreneurs, there will be more sellers than buyers which will cause a depreciation of property, a
depreciation whose economic consequences could have wide ranging consequences” (Case 3, 1856).

“We had reason to be surprised to see that our names were no longer featured among those to be expropriated on the cadastral map resting in the Neuilly City Hall last October 4th. The wrong the City of Paris has caused us is immense. We have remained without building, renting or making anything during the whole time the notification lasted. Our situation couldn’t be more dismal, all the more so as the City has still not lifted the ban which weighs down upon us. We sent the City of Paris an amicable notification on November 10th that it come to an agreement with us either to acquire our properties or to settle on a compensation, we are still waiting for its answer. It is impossible for us to stay any longer in the miserable situation in which we find ourselves” (Case 30, 1855).

JOY

It is clear that joy is an emotion very different from the ones discussed above, it is “a buoyant breeze that seems to lift us above the concerns of everyday” (Solomon 1993: 275). It is an emotion that is unconcerned with power or status, where responsibility is irrelevant and whose evaluation is simply “everything’s marvellous” (Solomon 1993: 276). It seems very difficult to see joy as connected to the bitter fight over principles that has characterised the statements quoted thus far. As in the case of fear, however, the empirical evidence forces us to acknowledge that joy must be confronted to our identification of the subjects through emotions. More interestingly, most cases of joy were found in property owner letters, rather than in those written by Haussmann. This is surprising given that Badiou posits enthusiasm as the affective stance of the faithful subject of a political event, albeit joy for a maxim of equality. We thus have to consider the prospect of either reactive or obscure subjects expressing joy. This seems difficult to reconcile with the definitions of those subjects Badiou gives, a definition which is based on their strongly antagonistic stance to the faithful subject in which there seems to be little space for joy. It must thus be the case that the property owners expressing joy are in some way or the other connected to Haussmann as the faithful subject. This connection will be explored in the next chapter.

For our purposes here, it is nonetheless important to understand what the use of joy may mean if it is seen as an emotion that both Haussmann and those property owners connected to him use. All property owner uses of joy were found within propositions sent to the Minister of the Interior. These detailed the advantages of the planned intervention they had developed and asked for municipal attention and action. Seen in this context, statements of principles accompanied by joy
would signal that the proposition is seen as responding the desires of the Minister of the Interior and the municipal administration: joy is then a consequence of having thought of an intervention that is personally advantageous and that is also seen as likely to be accepted and supported. Joy can thus be seen as a sign that property owners are adapting to the changes occurring in the city and that they believe to have found a way to profit from them.

Solomon tells us that joy must be understood as a mood in which all seems wonderful. This is as much as we have to go on to identify joy. It may be that the emotion itself is simpler than those discussed above. In any case, identifying joy within the letters was more straightforward. Because the letters are part formal speech, part technical explanation and part antagonistic statements of the type discussed above, expressions of joy were clear exception to the ‘normal’ content of these letters to the Minister. The tone itself was usually sufficient to identify joy. Property owners used joy only nine times and Haussmann only twice. The quote below is taken from a proposition and it displays the characteristic (if not as emphatic) tone that signals joy.

“Finally, these demolitions, constructions, improvement that I have the honour of proposing to Your Excellency, in responding to all demands, to all needs of life, to all classes of society, to all budgets, to all trades, to all local requirements, would embellish Paris, would bring comfort, joy, unity to the worker, rather than the cités ouvrières, and would provide work for years to thousands of arms rendered idle from unemployment; without forgetting Montmartre, les Buttes Chaumont and all the land left to waste, abandoned, in abeyance, etc. When the arms work, the mind doesn’t think. Where the heart is merry, there are no dark thoughts.”

(Case 46, 1857).

FROM EMOTIONS TO PRINCIPLES

Now that the statements with emotional subtext have been collected, it is possible to look at these statements in isolation and to attempt to draw from them the pairs of principles that constitute the different dimensions of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners over his planning practice. From what has been discussed until now, we can expect at least two axes of opposition that correspond to the attacks of reactive and subjects on the faithful subject’s actions. However, the presence of joy within property owner letters – an emotion that does not seem in alignment with the stances of the reactive and obscure subjects – could mean that a third axis of opposition may exist that pits Haussmann against another type of actor. The link between an axis of the opposition and the subject it corresponds to will be made in more detail in the next chapter. This section will focus on presenting the principles that were found within the letters to the Minister.
Out of the 155 expressions of emotion in the letters written by property owners, 26 were found not to contain any political subtext. These 26 emotions were found to concern other issues than the opposition between Haussmann and property owners on the status of planning. Some of these emotions accompanied a personal attack on Haussmann or on other actors in his administration, or demands for simple administrative decisions that the municipal administration has not yet responded to. Others can be found in cases which dealt with third parties (such as building companies), which concerned relations between Parisians (linked to loan payments for example) or which indicted the actions of local mayors from outside the walls of Paris acting on their own initiative. As concerns the 38 emotional statements contained in Haussmann’s letters to the Minister of the Interior, two of these did not accompany the expression of a principle. One of them concerns a dispute between property owners Haussmann had to arbitrate and the other is directed at the an entrepreneur who wanted the city to adopt his idea of establishing urinals that doubled as advertising space at busy intersections. For both property owners and Haussmann then, principles underlay the majority of emotional statements made, thus validating empirically the relationship between Badiou’s affects and Solomon’s emotions proposed above.

The principles were arrived at inductively, by developing categories as I went through the expressions of emotions statements and then refining and consolidating the categories once I had cycled through them once. I then verified the coding of the categories by going through them all a second time. I found that the emotions within the letters by Haussmann and property owners could actually be categorised into four pairs of principles that fit within three main categories: principles concerning the application of planning principles, principles about the role of the planning apparatus and principles concerning the strategic planning of the public works. Principles expressed by Haussmann and property owners in each of these categories will be paired and examples of their presence within emotional statements will be given.

**PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF PLANNING REGULATIONS**

A first dimension in which Haussmann and property owners were in opposition over his planning practice was that concerned with the modalities of application of planning regulations. The issue that was at stake here was the way in which existing planning regulations were interpreted in each particular case in which they were used, with the aim of convincing the Minister of the Interior that their interpretation was the correct one. Property owners invoked circumstances that they believed invalidated the use of the regulations in their particular case, while Haussmann attempted to show
that these excuses were irrelevant in the face of the law. Property owners and Haussmann invoked two principles each in their attempt to sway the Minister of the Interior. These four principles do not form pairs that can be contrasted two by two, but instead represent two different ways in which Haussmann and property owners sought to counter the other’s principle. We will thus look in turn at the two principles found in emotional statements made by property owners and in those made by Haussmann.

The first principle invoked by property owners to dispute the application of planning regulations is clearly laid out in this property owner’s expression of anger: “this wall shows nowhere, in no point, neither loss of balance, neither tilt, neither departure from its alignment, no tears, nor cracks, nor bulge. It is thus wrongly that the designation in poor state has been applied to it, it is not true. It is unfair”32 (Case 108, 1854).

This principle can be called ‘primacy of local knowledge’ and it consisted in positing that the property owner possessed clearer and more pertinent knowledge on the situation of their property than the municipal administration would ever have access to. As such, it offered property owners the possibility of opposing all impositions of decisions and regulations that were based on assessments of the local situation (condition of their property, needs of their local area and effects to their local area of the decision that was imposed) that did not correspond to their own. Below are two more examples of the way this principle was expressed through emotions, the first with contempt and the second with resentment:

Contempt: “one will be surprised at the well-being, the cleanliness and the order that reign in this small republic, and we are convinced that far from causing us problems, from which the criticising spirit is perhaps not sufficiently distant, the experienced individuals responsible for inspecting the property will consider that the buildings can and must be kept in the very reassuring state in which they presently are”33 (Case 273, 1858).

Resentment: “I am disappointed, Mr Minister, that Your Excellency has decided that my request could not be met, and I am that much more saddened by it that I cannot agree with the reasons that you have received for them [from Haussmann] and which motivated your decision. I see the issue on the ground, while Mr Prefect sees it from his office and his maps”34 (Case 3, 1856).
These statements were thus an indictment of the bureaucratic and objective implementation of regulations that were not predicated on local knowledge, but on the uniform application of laws to all local situations that only treated local circumstances as secondary. They were thus directed at everything new that Haussmann’s planning practice represented. Indeed, rather than planning as dependent on personal appeals to the Minister of the Interior (as highlighted in the preceding chapter), Haussmann’s practice relied on the indiscriminate application of planning regulations. His planning practice thus took the property owner out of planning, when it used to be its central figure.

This principle was used 38 times by property owners, out of the 128 statements expressing emotions. A quick survey of the emotional register used to argue this principle reveals that property owners were inclined to feel inferior to the municipal administration: there were 17 uses of resentment, 12 of anger, 6 of contempt and 3 of worry.

The other principle invoked by property owners to contest the application of planning regulations to their particular case finds its best expression in this property owner’s resentful tirade: “When such a heavy burden weighs on individuals, is it fair to aggravate it further through useless demands to pull back properties from the street? The petitioner wouldn’t dare think it and hopes Your Excellency will be good enough to share this opinion”\textsuperscript{35} (Case 17, 1856).

This second principle can be expressed as: \textbf{there is a limit to the burden that planning decisions are to impose on property owners}. These statements were thus a rejection of the indiscriminate application of planning regulations, one that demanded that the personal circumstances of the notified property owner be taken into account in the decision against him. The burdens these statements were directed at range from particular improvements required from all property owners (sewer connections, facade cleaning, safety standards, and building add-on restrictions) to decisions that were seen to be too severe given the material circumstances of the property owner they targeted. The two following excerpts show how this principle was expressed with different emotions:

Fear: “If Mr Porcher were forced to get rid of these buildings put up with his own funds, he would experience considerable harm, but he dares hope that Your Excellency, Mr Minister, will deign to favourably receive the request, or rather the plea, he is sending him”\textsuperscript{36} (Case 281, 1859).
Anger: “I hope, Mr Minister, that after having examined this case you will be good enough not to allow that a decree, which is already very costly for property owners, be applied abruptly without being properly motivated by the terms and spirit of the decree”\(^{37}\) (Case 150, 1855).

Again, these statements show a clear rift between Haussmann’s planning practice and the way in which property owners believed planning decisions should be taken. For property owners, individual circumstances were more important than general regulations, and mitigating circumstances should limit the applicability of planning regulations. Haussmann’s planning practice was attacked because it was seen as putting too heavy of a burden on property owners and thus caused more harm than good by ignoring personal circumstances and individual means.

This principle was expressed 28 times by property owners (out of 128). This time fear is the most prevalent emotion, communicating the impression that property owners felt that they had a lot at stake in attacking this aspect of Haussmann’s planning practice. The other negative emotions show a distribution very similar to the one above, indicating an equally suffered inferiority from property owners: 8 uses of resentment, 5 of anger and 3 of contempt.

Turning to Haussmann, we will look at the principles he invoked to counter those presented above for property owners. In his letters to the Minister of the Interior, the most common principle is the assertion that property owners must under no circumstances be allowed to escape planning regulations. This principle can be clearly read from this angry statement:

“I would add that the petitioner seems to me to greatly exaggerate the harm that a simple rebuilding of an enclosing wall would cause her and that the clearing of a few trees near the wall to be destroyed will be insignificant in a vast garden where there are many others. Considerations, all of a private nature, cannot, moreover, force regulations to bend, especially as concerns alignments”\(^{38}\) (Case 224, 1858).

Haussmann stated this principle 11 times in his letters to the Minister of the Interior (out of a total of 36 expressions of emotions). Contempt was by far the most common emotion (6 occurrences), followed by anger (3) and resentment (2). The picture is quite clear: Haussmann felt that he could look down on property owners who were using spurious excuses to deny the flagrant infractions they had committed. The use of contempt also indicates that he felt that the power to prevent property owners from escaping the course of justice was firmly in his hand. This is the type of contemptuous statement of the principle Haussmann made to the Minister of the Interior:
“Besides, the administration cannot preoccupy itself with the cause that ruins this pillar; it cannot make a distinction that the law has not made. It follows from principle that a building subject to an order to be pulled back, whatever the cause of its ruin, can be rebuilt only on the alignment decreed by law; and if Mr Masson rebuilds a pressure point as essential as a pillar, it would result from this a clear and direct fortification of the façade. As far as the dismissal of tenants and the inactivity of the factory, Mr Masson mentioned them only for the purpose at hand; indeed the state of the building surely made him expect that he would be forced to rebuild it very soon”39 (Case 104, 1854).

Haussmann also had another principle at his disposal, the statement ‘property owners cannot be trusted’. In using this principle, Haussmann posited that property owners were fundamentally dishonest and would always use all the means at their disposal to avoid punishment for planning infractions. In response to this inherent characteristic of property owners, the municipal administration had to constantly monitor and scrutinise property owners so as to ensure that they were not violating planning laws or manipulating the Minister of the Interior to get their way. This is what Haussmann sets out to show to the Minister in the contemptuous statement below:

“He bases his request on the situation of his business that he presents as very worrying and he invokes (although it is irrelevant to the purposes at hand) the services he may have accomplished as a citizen in several situations. You will no doubt recognise, Your Excellency, that the petitioner’s protestations of good faith cannot be admitted in the face of the facts just recalled above. Mr Desanges only paid the tax when made to do so by the Council of the Prefecture’s order, and in the situation he has placed himself in, he cannot, in any way, lay claim to the favour he is soliciting”39 (Case 267, 1859).

This principle was only used seven times by Haussmann (out of 36 expressions of emotion) and its emotional repertoire is more balanced than that of the principle above. Here, anger is used three times and contempt and resentment twice, marking a more equal balance between Haussmann and property owners. It seems as though Haussmann was not as confident in the effectiveness of this principle in convincing the Minister of the Interior.

So we have seen that a first dimension of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners over the status of planning was centred on the application of planning regulations. The principles used by property owners were not putting the activity of planning into question, but only fighting for
their assessment of the situation and their individual circumstances to be taken into account in the everyday application of planning regulations. As such, they can be seen to be in direct opposition with Haussmann’s assertions that planning regulations had to apply to all indiscriminately and that property owners could not be trusted.

A survey of the emotions used by both protagonists in this dimension indicates that Haussmann may have had an advantage over property owners, with resentment used in a majority of property owner expressions of the principles under consideration here and contempt the leading emotion used by Haussmann. A high prevalence of fear in the letters of the property owners indicated that they had a lot at stake materially in this particular dimension of the opposition. In the next chapter, it will be shown that this dimension of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners can be conceptualised as that between the faithful and the reactive subjects. A more detailed analysis of the emotional register used by both parties presented above will allow for a discussion of the evolution of this relationship over the 1853 to 1859 period.

**PRINCIPLES SURROUNDING PLANNING’S ROLE**

The second dimension of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners over his planning practice is one of much deeper significance for planning. It is concerned with the role of planning in society and the powers the planning apparatus should be given over the public in order to fulfil it. Instead of the application of existing planning principles, the issue at stake here is the balance of power between public and private entities within the city. For property owners, the planning apparatus should not have more tools at its disposal to limit private property rights than it already has. For Haussmann, solving the city’s problems is the planning apparatus’ main goal, and it should be given the means to accomplish it effectively. These two competing principles will be presented in turn below.

In the letters by property owners, all emotions in this category express the same basic idea: the municipal administration was forbidding them to take some sort of action on their property (either because of a street widening procedure or because their property was included on the path a street that the municipal administration was going to create) that they thought goes beyond the remit of the control it should have over their actions as property owners. The principle being invoked here can be sensed within these two property owners’ angry statements:
“This decision, Mr Minister, causes my interests great harm; no decree, no urban regulation, gives Mr Prefect the right to stop me from building on this land”41 (Case 234, 1857).

“Are these grounds sufficient to have the company’s request rejected, and to make it impossible for her to make use of her property? The company, based on her rights, cannot accept this”42 (Case 304, 1859)

These statements both express the same principle, namely, that the planning apparatus should not be allowed to limit their right to property beyond what they believe to be acceptable. In all cases, property owners thought that the municipal administration was overstepping the bounds of legitimate government intervention into their private property. This principle was thus in serious opposition to all but a very limited conception of urban planning, with the rights of the individual put at centre stage. These rights could be overstepped by the municipal administration only in a very limited set of circumstances, which as mentioned in the last chapter, concerns the impossibility of carrying extensive repairs to a property that was not on the proper alignment – and which is an obligation that by far preceded Haussmann’s tenure as prefect. In effect, these political statements opposed the very idea behind all that was new in Haussmann’s planning practice: increasing the scope of restrictions related to widening procedures to all repairs and refusing repairs and constructions where a new street was to be pierced through.

There were 47 statements of this principle within the 125 emotional statements in property owner letters. Anger was by far the most prevalent emotion (21 occurrences), followed by resentment (12), contempt (9) and fear (5). We can see that the relationship these property owners had with Haussmann was very different from the one that defined the opposition at the level of the application of the regulations. Here, the emotions indicate a more balanced relationship, with anger high and the use of contempt almost on the same level as that of resentment. There is also a much lower prevalence of fear in the letters of these property owners, an indication that these property owners did not have much at stake materially. This could be interpreted as revealing that their opposition to Haussmann’s planning practice was more ideologically than materially driven. But the most interesting phenomenon is the high use of contempt from property owners in their expression of this principle. Here is an example of the use of contempt by property owners which illustrates the power they believed they held on this dimension of the opposition:
“to tell you Mr Minister to repeal the decision from 9 September 1856, which I have referred to your decision, and doing what he should have done, to give me the authorisation to undertake on the facade of my house at 42 and 44 Rue de la Pépinière, the repairs laid out in my request from July 1856”\textsuperscript{43} (Case 52, 1856).

For Haussmann, the curtailment of property rights was only a means to render the execution of the overall plans for the city less difficult and costly. The principle here can be expressed as: \textbf{property owners must not make the public works of vital importance to the city more difficult.} This can clearly be seen in Haussmann’s angry expression of this principle to the Minister of the Interior in the two excerpts below:

“Suffice it to say that I strongly urge Your Excellency to reject the complaint by Mr de Lucay, whose clear intention is to take advantage of his property’s location to extort money from the city. Adopting this property owner’s system would make the carrying out of the projects of public utility decided for Paris more and more costly, a carrying out which is becoming increasingly necessary, however, since population increase in this city has resulted in insufficient living space and justifies the municipal administration’s efforts to assimilate to the city through clever piercings the open land at its circumference”\textsuperscript{44} (Case 52, 1857).

“These are not vague projects that will be carried out far in the future, but projects of a certain and current nature which do not allow the municipal administration to tolerate building activity which could make the undertaking more difficult and more costly. Besides, is it not doing individuals a favour to forbid them from putting up new buildings that would almost immediately be subjected through a public utility decree to servitudes restricting their use”\textsuperscript{45} (Case 234, 1857).

What we see through the emotional statements in Haussmann’s letters in that the principle he was defending from property owner attacks was concerned with the way in which planning, as an activity of a public institution on the urban environment, should be undertaken. At an overarching level, he asserted that the individual’s freedom could be limited if it made it easier to serve the public interest. As a principle, this was the mirror opposite of the principle made by the property owners discussed above, namely, that individuals should not be further limited in their actions on their properties by Haussmann’s planning practice.
There were ten expressions of this principle within the 36 emotions statements found in Haussmann’s letters. As in the case of the property owners above, the distribution of emotions used by Haussmann is different for this principle than for the ones discussed in the last section. Here, it is anger that was most used (5 occurrences), followed by contempt (3) and resentment (2). We are far from the dominance of contempt seen in the last section. It thus seems as though the vitriolic attacks on Haussmann in this dimension shook his confidence and forced him to adopt a much more defensive stance.

The second dimension of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners thus concerned the extent to which Haussmann’s planning practice should be allowed to curtail private property rights in order to allow the public works to be carried out more efficiently and at a lower cost for the city. Property owners were found to place fundamental importance on the rights of property ownership and strongly contested any attempts by Haussmann to limit their actions beyond what they thought was acceptable. For Haussmann, the priority was clearly the completion of the public works, which he believed to be absolutely necessary to the city, and he was prepared to limit property rights in the name of public utility.

The distribution of emotions within the statements expressing these two principles was found to be markedly different from that discussed in the last section. From a situation in which property owners felt inferior and powerless and in which Haussmann felt superior and powerful, we move to a situation where both sides seem to balance each other out. Property owners used fear much less often, which could indicate that their opposition was a matter of ideology rather than one of material necessity. The next chapter will develop this analysis further and frame this principled opposition as that opposing the faithful subject to the obscure subject. The emotions expressed in this opposition will allow for an understanding of the rise of the obscure subject over the period.

PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE STRATEGIC PLANNING OF THE PUBLIC WORKS

The last dimension of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners over his planning practice was concerned with defining where strategic decisions for the overall direction of the public works were to be made. This opposition revolved around the relative weights of private actors and the municipal administration when it came to deciding which projects should be carried out or not.

Property owners believed that they were best suited to propose which streets should be pierced, more knowledgeable as to the practices which were beneficial or detrimental to the city and a better
judge than the municipal administration as to the correct course of action to follow. Taken together, these ideas can be encapsulated in the principle ‘we know what is best for the city’. Two examples of this principle can be found below, the first expressed with joy and the second with fear:

“I thus believe, Mr Prefect, that I have the duty to ask in the city’s interest, that you be so kind as to examine my first request and the present one, and that you have decreed, out of consideration for the improvements this neighbourhood demands, the expropriation for public utility of the land necessary to open the street I have named rue Odessa”\(^{46}\) (Case 243, 1858).

“I ask Your Excellency to believe that I do ignore the architect and the owner of this house, which if one does not attend to seriously will soon be chosen as the new model (given its high return). Nothing less than the public interest could give me the determination to ask for some of Your Excellency’s time, but it seems that it is in its remit to put forward in the face of this appalling agglomeration of people a new law fixing a maximum number of stories for the whole surface of French land”\(^{47}\) (Case 20, 1856).

There were 15 expressions of this principle out of the 125 expressions of emotion in the letters written by property owners. Close to half of these were made with joy (7), three with anger, and two each with contempt and fear. The overwhelming difference here is the use joy in these statements, which is limited to this principle in the case of property owners. This makes it clear that property owners in this dimension believed that they had found ways in which to take advantage of the public works for their personal gain.

In contrast, what transpires from the emotionally charged sections of some of Haussmann’s letters is a diametrically opposed idea: private actors cannot be left to take planning in their own hands, because they cannot offer effective solutions at the level of the city. As a principle, this can be summarised as ‘only the municipal administration has the oversight and capacity necessary to carry out the public works’. The quote below is an example of this principle, expressed with contempt:

“Mr de Voisins’ brief exposition of his project, insufficient if one wanted to examine it in detail, nevertheless provides a basis for judging that its author is deluding himself on the value of such an idea. I thus do not think. Mr Minister, that there is any need to attend to it as far as I am concerned”\(^{48}\) (Case 24, 1856).
Haussmann stated this principle eight times in his letters to the Minister of the Interior, from a total of 36 expressions of emotion. Contempt is the emotion he most used (four occurrences), followed by two expressions of joy and resentment each. We find here that Haussmann placed himself in a position of powerful superiority over those property owners who sought to make claims to what he considered as the remit of the municipal administration.

In this dimension we can see an opposition that revolves around the legitimate authority to give impetus to the public works. Property owners thought that they should be the ones to design the operations needed to solve the city’s problems while for Haussmann, only the municipal administration had the oversight and capacity to decide which plans would benefit the city as a whole. A brief presentation of the emotions used by both protagonists to express their principles showed a paradoxical situation in which property owners believed to have found a way to profit from the public works while Haussmann treated their efforts with contemptuous superiority. In the next chapter, we will be able to explore this relation in more detail and it will be shown that these property owners are part of what Badiou calls the body of the faithful subject.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has thus allowed for a connection between the empirical material and the concept of the subject which is at the heart of Badiou’s philosophy. Five of Solomon’s emotions were identified within the letters written by Haussmann and property owners to the Minister of the Interior, and these were used to uncover the three dimensions of the opposition at the heart of the event under consideration. Haussmann and property owners were found to formulate conflicting principles as concerns the modality of the application of planning regulations, the role and power of the planning apparatus as well as the balance between public and private actors in determining the course of the public works.

These three dimensions of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners will be investigated in the next chapter in much more detail as the relation between Haussmann, as faithful subject, and the three other types of actors in an event, namely, reactive and obscure subjects, and the body of the faithful subject. The principles invoked by Haussmann will permit for the truth of the faithful subject to be revealed through their relation to the four determinations of equality, authority, confidence and will. This will allow us to find out whether Haussmann’s planning practice contained within it an affirmation of equality. The next chapter will also employ the characteristics
of the emotions used to express these principles and their broad trend over the period to analyse
the sequence of the event, or in other words, the rise of the reactive and obscure subjects and the
transformation of the body. The faithful subject’s truth and the event’s sequence are what will allow
us to offer an explanation of Haussmann’s first years as Prefect of the Seine and of the ultimate
defeat of his planning practice.

This chapter has thus found a method through which to make Badiou’s concepts relate to empirically
measurable phenomena. The identification of opposing principles held by Haussmann and property
owners validates the relation between Badiou’s affects and Solomon’s emotions proposed in the
early part of the chapter. This method has extracted the principles that underlay an opposition
between a new planning practice and its detractors within the world of Parisian planning. But there
is a sense in which this principled opposition touches on a much broader opposition. The principles
uncovered here can be thought of as a reflection of a broader politics of regulation, an argument
that will be laid out in more detail in the conclusion of this thesis.
CHAPTER 6: SUBJECTIVE FORMALISMS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will build on the empirical evidence assembled in the last two chapters to offer an interpretation of the early years of Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect of the Seine based on Badiou’s central concept of the subject. I will then compare that interpretation with those of Harvey and Roncayolo and show how it can complement their accounts of the public works. The central finding that will emerge is that the seventeen years during which Haussmann was at the head of the Parisian municipal administration can be separated into two distinct periods. His early years in that role were defined by his ultimately unsuccessful attempts to break the hold of property owners over planning and to have them contribute to the public works, while the latter period saw private interests and market forces take over the city’s transformation. The first was the Haussmann as regulator event; the second was the speculative frenzy that followed its unravelling.

To arrive at these two separate periods and explain the transition from one to the other, this chapter will start out by using the principles identified in the last chapter from within the expressions of emotion by Haussmann and property owners to identify Badiou’s subjects. In a first instance, the principles Haussmann invoked in his opposition to property owners will be used to reconstruct the four determinations Badiou identifies for all faithful subjects: equality, authority or terror, will and confidence. Haussmann will be identified as carrying within his planning practice an affirmation of Saint-Simonian equality. His articulation of the four determinations will then allow us to posit Haussmann as a Saint-Simonian state revolutionary and to reveal the truth his actions constructed.

The next step will be to use the principles expressed by property owners in their opposition to Haussmann to categorise them into three distinct groups: the reactive subjects who refused to take part in the possibilities opened up by the event, the obscure subjects who sought to destroy the event’s truth and the faithful subject’s body which attempted to profit from the new present. The sequence of the appearance of these subjective types will then be discussed both from a temporal perspective and in relation to the truth of the event. This sequence will allow us to identify the role each of these groups of property owners played in the demise of the Haussmann event, roles that will then be used to complement Harvey and Roncayolo’s interpretations of the public works.
HAUSSMANN AS A STATE REVOLUTIONARY

The principles that were found to be contained within the emotional statements of the preceding chapter can offer us a way to get to the articulation of the four determinations of a political truth that Haussmann invoked in his attempt to break the hold of property owners on Paris’ planning system. Indeed, these principles guided his action, and as such can be understood as the foundation of the truth he produced in the world of Parisian planning. By looking at each of these four determinations in turn, and by linking them to the principles found in his letters in the last chapter, it will become possible to postulate the truth that emerged from his planning practice. Before turning to these four determinations and the truth they articulate, we will attempt to draw out the connection that was intuited in chapter three between Haussmann and Saint-Simon.

HAUSSMANN AND SAINT-SIMON

Choay does not seem to think that there was anything political in Haussmann’s work. She argues that his urbanism of regularisation “does not contend to scientific universalism, is not based on a social critique and does not propose a spatial model” (Choay in Agulhon 1983: 166). She is insistent that Haussmann’s practice was inherently free of any utopian leanings:

“This urbanism of regularisation is too often mistaken by contemporary historians with progressive urbanism, which came later. Indeed, both share the twin fundamental objectives of hygiene and circulation. They present considerable differences, however, given that the utopian dimension which characterised both pre-urbanism and urbanism is absent from [Haussmann’s] Mémoires” (Choay in Agulhon 1983: 173).

From what has been presented of Haussmann so far, the absence of any utopian dimension to his planning practice becomes questionable. He was not a prudent administrator who only bit off what he could chew. On the contrary, he attempted to solve all of Paris’ problems in one single sweep, and strove to do so in less than twenty years. Choay may be adamant about the absence of a utopian design in his work because she comes to it from the perspective of Haussmann’s own writings, which she asserts contains no abstractions, no theory of urbanism. His is a practice, focused on a concrete object. But this does not preclude a utopian vision; it just means that it is to be found

---

bxii Translation mine, here is the original: «Cet urbanisme de régularisation est trop souvent confondu par les historiens actuels avec l’urbanisme progressiste, plus tardif. Certes, tous deux ont en commun les deux objectifs fondamentaux de l’hygiène et de la circulation. Ils présentent cependant des différences considérables tenant au fait que la dimension utopique, caractéristique du pré-urbanisme et de l’urbanisme est absente des Mémoires.»

176
in his practice, living in that which animated his actions, rather than as a conscious project to be found in his Mémoires.

What seems to hinder Choay from assigning any utopian dimensions to Haussmann’s work is the notion of agency: Choay denies any utopian dimensions to Haussmann’s actions because she believes he was only acting in accordance with a general impetus that took over France during the Second Empire, namely, that of rapid industrialisation and financial liberalisation. On the other hand, if Haussmann is seen as having taken stock of the possibilities offered by burgeoning capitalist development, and as having developed a practice that he believed would allow for its channelling into positive improvements for the city, then it is easier to pinpoint exactly where pragmatic considerations gave way to utopian ones.

From what I have presented so far, his practice was based on a number of assumptions: that he would be able to bring the changes he envisioned to the whole of the city, that street improvements would occur without resistance and that private initiatives could be properly directed. Without evidence that this practice could achieve what he intended it to, there is no doubt that the Paris this practice was intended to reshape was still a utopia. In many respects, this utopian Paris can be understood through a Saint-Simonian lens. If it is to become the industrial society Saint-Simon envisioned, then it must be reconfigured in its totality to allow for it to produce things effectively. Most importantly, this Paris needs to be in the hands of the producers and not of the owners who do nothing else but own:

“According to a concept found at the basis of a great number of political constitutions, the most qualified representatives of economic interests would be the property owners. For Saint-Simon, on the contrary, the owner who is merely an owner, and who does not himself exploit his capital, is hardly qualified to fill such an office. He is not even a part of industrial society, for it embraces only producers—and he does not produce. He is a drone, whereas it numbers only bees” (Durkheim 1958: 88).

lxxiv «D’après une conception qu’on trouve à la base d’un très grand nombre de constitutions politiques, les représentants les plus autorisés des intérêts économiques seraient les propriétaires. Pour Saint-Simon, au contraire, le propriétaire qui n’est que propriétaire, qui n’exploite pas lui-même son capital, est aussi peu qualifié que possible pour remplir un tel emploi. Il ne fait même pas partie de la société industrielle, car elle ne comprend que des producteurs, et il ne produit pas. C’est un frelon, et elle ne compte que des abeilles» (Durkheim 1928: 93)
Until industrial society is completely established, i.e., until society is made up only of workers, the role of the government must be to defend producers against those who consume without producing. Haussmann’s planning practice was utopian precisely because he thought he was acting as the directing council of an industrial society, and not as the head of a planning department that chapter 4 showed had bowed down to property owners for at least the two decades prior to him assuming tenure.

The assumptions he made about the possibility of bringing about this programme were in sharp contrast to existing conditions, as the opposition his principles received makes clear. How his practice clashed with the existing conditions in Paris at the time will be returned to in the second half of the chapter. What can be hypothesised here is that it is to Saint-Simon that Haussmann as a faithful subject must be attached. Although Napoleon III’s Saint-Simonian influences are well documented – best exemplified by Anceau’s biography of his subtitled A Saint-Simonian on Horseback (2008) – a connection has not been established between Haussmann’s practice and the thought of the utopian socialist. The discussion above indicates that this missing connection could be traced back to the opposition between thought and practice. While it is natural to link Napoleon III to Saint-Simonian ideas – he who wrote the Extinction of Pauperism in his youth and who created the political space for the vast public works Haussmann took charge of in Paris – it seems much less natural to credit the one who carried out the works with such lofty influences. We can now turn to a truth’s four determinations, with a view of putting the hypothesis of Haussmann’s Saint-Simonian practice to the test.

EQUALITY

Chapter 4 showed that Haussmann’s arrival in Paris created a rupture in the world of Parisian planning. But the discussion from chapter 3 established that this was not a sufficient condition to determine whether this rupture was a political event. This also required that the political practice that created that rupture be predicated on the affirmation of equality. Given the link we postulated above between Haussmann and Saint-Simon, we should expect Haussmann’s affirmation of equality to be based on Saint-Simon’s conception of the term. Harvey gives us an indication of what this conception of equality entailed:

“Equality of well-being was important to the Saint-Simonians, but the working classes were to be raised up by education, proper governance, and resources assembled thanks to the initiative of a
meritorious and technically superior elite of industrials. The health and well-being of the body politic as a whole was more important than the well-being of individuals” (Harvey 2006a: 71-72).

We can better understand what is contained in the quote above by presenting Saint-Simon’s notion of equality in his own words: “‘True equality,’ says Saint-Simon, ‘consists in each drawing benefits from society in exact proportion to his social outlay, that is to his real capacity, to the beneficent use he makes of his abilities. And this equality is the natural foundation of industrial society’” (Durkheim 1958: 96). What this definition shows is that equality is directly related to the notion of contribution: all are equal because all receive as much from society as they give to it. What is important is not the amount that is contributed, but that the contribution be of equal magnitude to the benefits received.

Can this be reconciled with Haussmann’s planning practice? The principle from the last chapter that is most useful for our purposes here is that which stipulated that property owners cannot escape planning regulations, or in other words, property owners should not use their personal power to avoid the decision decreed by the municipal administration. This means denouncing the tricks used by property owners in their letters to the Ministry of the Interior, shedding light on the personal motives underlying a particular demand, highlighting the hypocrisy of their statements and arguing against their interpretation of the legislation. As a prescription, this series of actions by Haussmann indicates that all property owners are equal in front of planning regulations, which entails that existing hierarchies of wealth or power should not allow some of them to escape the regulations. Equality thus seems linked to Haussmann’s insistence on the equal application of planning regulations in the face of attempts by property owners to escape them.

A recurrent motif in Haussmann’s letters to the Minister of the Interior is his insistence that private interests should not hold any weight in the face of the injunctions of planning regulations. This notion of private interest, as opposed to the universality of planning regulations, is crucial to understand what Haussmann was trying to achieve. He was faced with a situation in which property owners were appealing directly to the Minister of the Interior, and thus trying to work outside of the legal framework. Property owners thought they could bypass Haussmann and his application of planning regulations. They must have thought that planning was governed by general guidelines that

lxxv “La véritable égalité, dit Saint-Simon, consiste en ce que chacun retire de la société des bénéfices exactement proportionnés à sa mise sociale, c’est-à-dire à sa capacité positive, à l’emploi utile qu’il fait de ses moyens.” Or cette égalité «est le fondement naturel de la société industrielle»” (Syst. indus., VI, 17) (Durkheim 1928: 103).
could be negotiated and bypassed through their personal pleas to the Minister, such as was the case for this property owner who appeals directly to the Minister after having been refused by Haussmann: "This is why, Mr Minister, I come to you to call for your assistance that could allow me to make use of my right as property owner by authorising me to complete these buildings, the ban on which is causing me great harm"\(^{49}\) (Case 205, 1857).

Haussmann had to constantly attack the logic of these demands to the Interior Minister by showing him that property owners must not be allowed to escape planning regulations by working outside of the legal framework. This meant that appeals to the municipal administration’s decisions were only legitimate if they put into question its legal basis. Any other considerations, such as what he called private interests, must not be given any weight. This is the only way to guarantee that hierarchies of wealth or power did not allow property owners to escape planning regulations. Equality was thus achieved by disregarding all appeals that did not engage with his decision at the level of the legal framework. This is very apparent in his rebuttal of a property owner’s complaint against a widening order, an excerpt from one of last chapter’s quotes: “Considerations, all of a private nature, cannot, moreover, force regulations to bend, especially as concerns alignments”\(^{50}\) (Case 224, 1858). And it also comes out in his insistence that planning regulations must decide the resolution of all appeals to his decisions, another excerpt from a quote featured in the last chapter: “Besides, the administration cannot preoccupy itself with the cause that ruins this pillar; it cannot make a distinction that the law has not made. It follows from principle that a building subject to an order to be pulled back, whatever the cause of its ruin, can be rebuilt only on the alignment decreed by law”\(^{51}\) (Case 104, 1854).

Haussmann’s decision that all property owners should be equal in the face of planning regulations is thus an attack on his part on the way in which property owners attempted to brush away his decisions by appealing directly to the Minister of the Interior. But it can also be linked to the Saint-Simonian notion of equality presented above. The rationale for Haussmann’s planning practice’s affirmation of the equality of all property owners in the face of planning regulations seems to have been predicated on the fact that the collective has precedence over the individual. Planning, as it was conducted by Haussmann, was a way to guarantee that all property owners contributed as producers to the improvement of the collective in relation to what they were gaining from it. As owners, they were receiving benefits from society but they were not contributing in equal measure to that society. What Haussmann, as a Saint-Simonian, was attempting to achieve was to have them contribute in proportion to the benefits they received. We can thus see that the connection between Haussmann and Saint-Simon is validated for the determination ‘equality’. This also
establishes that Haussmann’s planning practice did contain an affirmation of equality, one that is based on Saint-Simon’s conception of it.

**AUTHORITY- TERROR**

The second determination of a political truth, authority, is for Badiou that which acts against the natural play of competition. The free play of competition is problematic in a situation in which there are high inequalities, where those with more wealth or power can bend the existing structure to their advantage. Authority thus seems to be the way to break the inequality of the existing structure, and should be seen as the means through which to obtain the equality of property owners vis-à-vis planning decisions discussed above. This means that authority should be understood here as Haussmann’s constant efforts to establish the municipal administration’s power over planning. Understood in a Saint-Simonian way, this means protecting those who produce from those who consume without producing. Or in other words, making sure that all contribute to society in a way that is commensurate to what they receive from it. Property owners were contravening this principle by refusing to accept the authority of the planning apparatus, which was precisely the institution that was making claims on them to contribute.

The principle from the last chapter that is important here is that which postulates that property owners cannot be trusted to follow the municipal administration’s planning injunctions. As a decision, this can be stated as: the actions of property owners need to be heavily scrutinised and countered. This was essential to make sure that the natural play of competition was not allowed to give property owners power over the way in which planning was conducted, and thus to make sure that they were not trying to escape the contributions that they had to make to society. This meant ensuring property owners were not building sub-standard and dangerous worker housing for a profit, that they were not ransoming the city by improving buildings that would soon be expropriated, and that they were not using personal appeals to the Interior Ministry or external bodies like the Civil Buildings’ Council or the courts to get the decisions affecting them annulled.

To exercise authority, Haussmann needed to stay one step ahead of property owners and find the language needed to keep the Minister of the Interior on the side of the municipal administration. Haussmann had to lay bare the wrongful intentions of property owners. This can be seen in a letter to the Minister in which he contests a particular property owner’s attempts to woo the Minister into excusing her from reparations she was ordered to undertake on a building she owned:
“All the repairs that have been prescribed aim to consolidate the constructions elevated by Mme Bonardi outside of all generally accepted construction practices. The improvements made to the buildings since the condemnation cannot suffice to remedy such an unfavourable circumstance: in vain does Mme Bonardi appeal to the inconvenience the works will cause her and her tenants, this is a question of a very secondary order in the face of which the regulations cannot falter. The administration must to the contrary be tough towards speculators who under the pretext of building worker housing raise for the lowest possible price, in densely populated neighbourhoods, poor constructions whose existence is already limited to the length of a lease and which jeopardize the lives of tenants.”52 (Case 84, 1859).

But Haussmann also needed to keep other influences over planning in check, especially if they were quick to side with property owners. This was the case of the Civil Buildings’ Council (Conseil des Bâtiments Civils), or CBC, which was presented in chapter 4 as an institution that offered architectural guidance in the context of public building commissions and public works projects. Property owners knew that the CBC was an institution that was independent from the municipal administration and that it was immune to the changes Haussmann had brought to the planning landscape. In the opposition against Haussmann’s planning practice, many property owners requested that the CBC investigate the case and offer its advice on the decision taken by the municipal administration. This was a threat to Haussmann as it implied that the Minister of the Interior should base its decision solely on the advice of the CBC and disregard that of the municipal administration, and thus that Haussmann’s decision should be seen as a matter of opinion that could be challenged by asking some other body for its opinion. This is the kind of demand for the CBC’s involvement made by property owners: “These two requests having been turned down in turn by Mr Prefect […] the undersigned property owners comes to ask you, Mr Minister, to be so kind as to order a short visit by Messrs the architects of the Civil Buildings’ Council, persuaded as he is that […] Messrs the architects of the Civil Buildings’ Council, after investigation, will conclude that his request should be authorised”53 (Case 247, 1858).

The fact that the CBC was a well established body made it a threat to Haussmann’s authority over planning. The Minister found it useful as a second opinion on the cases brought to him by property owners and Haussmann found himself increasingly in a position in which he had to defend his actions in the face of the CBC’s agreement with property owner claims. To counter the influence of the CBC over planning, Haussmann had to denounce its historical links with private property and scorned “the architects (most of them kept very busy by private construction projects) that make up
The CBC’s threat to Haussmann came from its direct links to the Council of State, through its disregard for any legislation that curbed the rights of private property. For Haussmann to exercise authority over planning, he needed to constantly scrutinise and counter the actions of property owners, both in their attempts to win over the Minister directly, and through their links with the CBC and ultimately the Council of State. Authority was thus directly linked to his Saint-Simonian conception of equality: the adequation of benefits received and efforts contributed could only be achieved by the constant struggle to ensure that property owners did not escape the municipal administration’s planning injunctions.

CONFIDENCE

The third determination is confidence, which for Badiou is to replace the fear of the masses in the political subject’s actions. This determination will be fleshed out for the case of Haussmann by an examination of the proposals he received from property owners. Proposals to the municipal administration are important here because they reveal another aspect of the relationship between Haussmann and property owners, one that hinges on how Haussmann dealt with development initiatives that were suggested by property owners out of a desire to profit from the climate of transformation the city was engulfed in. Most of these propositions from property owners asked the municipal administration for the permission to cut open a new street on their land.

When considering whether to take these propositions on board, Haussmann used two criteria to evaluate their merits: whether the new street would bring about any improvement to circulation and whether it would be beneficial to building activity. Thus, improvements to the street network were deemed as essential by Haussmann, not only because they improved circulation through the city, but also because streets were seen as ways to open up new land for development. For example, in justifying to the Interior Minister his decision to grant property owners the right to open up a new street on their land in the Quartier de l’Europe, Haussmann invokes the positive contribution of the new street on both these counts:

“This new street will provide some benefits to circulation, by establishing a direct route from the Rue de Berlin to the chemin de ronde [the street in front of the Wall of the Farmers-General, the fortification that served as the city of Paris’ limit until the extension of the city’s limits by Haussmann}
in 1860], in a vast neighbourhood where all communication links are cut through by railway trenches. It will also have the advantage of usefully dividing up large tracts of land, today without use, and to call to them property speculation.\textsuperscript{55} (Case 85, not dated).

The same two considerations are invoked in 1857 to recommend that a building company should be allowed to open a new street on land they own:

“By dividing the vast quadrilateral formed by the Avenues of the Champs Elysees and Montaigne, Rue de Marbeuf and the street that is planned to link the Invalides to the Boulevard de l’Alma, this street they propose to cut would have unquestionable benefits, both as a new means of communication and because of the facades it would guarantee to new buildings, in a neighbourhood where property speculation is not waiting for much else to become very active.”\textsuperscript{56} (Case 239, 1857).

When it comes to considering proposals for new streets by property owners that only responded to one of these two considerations, Haussmann seemed to attach more importance to their role in promoting building development, albeit with an important caveat. This can be seen when responding to another set of property owners who came to him in the context of the case above with a proposal for another street that could be opened at the same time and which they believed would allow for the useful division of empty land. Haussmann dismissed their proposal because the new street would be of no use to circulation and its linkage to the Avenue des Champs Elysees would be very costly. He ends his consideration of the proposal by highlighting that it is only driven by private interest “to which one should only respond if it is accompanied by serious propositions, which is not the case here.”\textsuperscript{57} (Case 239, 1857).

The concept of serious propositions is crucial to unpack. What Haussmann is referring to here is that property owners should bear a large proportion of the costs associated with opening the new street, as it would lead to a large increase in the value of their land, a benefit that should be used as leverage to get them to contribute. This can be seen in another case in which he admits that the new street proposed by a property owner would not bring any new benefits to circulation but recommends its opening because “it would bring undeniable benefits through an improvement of value of the land it would cut through.”\textsuperscript{58} (Case 92, 1857). However, Haussmann follows on from this with this analysis:
“It is clear that the owners of these tracts of land have the utmost interest in seeing this street opened, which would immediately lead to a large increase in the value of their buildings. By destroying his building and allowing the street to run through it, Mr. Wetzel would find himself in the possession of a 66 meter long potential facade on the new street, which as he declares, he would not fail to make use of. In these conditions, the City of Paris cannot consent to the opening of the new street, unless all property owners who own the land needed for the street accept to give away the necessary portions for free, and that they accept, in addition, to bear the costs of first paving, of sidewalks, of lighting and of sewer construction, and to conform to all other conditions the City imposes for the opening of new streets on private property” (Case 92, 1857).

These conditions were designed to turn initiatives that were in the private interest into something beneficial for the city by controlling the profit made by property owners wishing to speculate and by making investments in the public realm a necessary counterpoint to individual gains emerging from the public works. What this discussion shows is a confidence by Haussmann in the initiatives of property owners, but only as long as they are properly directed and controlled by the municipal administration in order for that development to bring the largest benefits possible to the city. As for the other determinations, the political statements uncovered in the last chapter can be used to attain the ‘confidence’ Haussmann decided on. Of interest here is the political statement from Haussmann focused on the inability of property owners to know what is good for the city as a whole. As a decision, Haussmann’s confidence can then be postulated as follows: properly controlled and directed, private initiatives can be made to help solve the city’s problems. It is only in this way that the myriad private initiatives can be properly channelled and used by the municipal administration to further its goal.

This notion of confidence can thus be seen as the positive counterpoint to Haussmann’s Saint-Simonian attempts to ensure property owners contributed to society as much as they benefited from it. While we have seen that the determination authority was predicated on the scrutiny of property owners to make sure they did not escape planning regulations, confidence gives us another method through which Haussmann attempted to make property owners contribute. It was predicated on putting conditions on those who wanted to contribute so that they could achieve a balance between an individual benefit and a contribution to society as a whole. Haussmann’s confidence is thus directly in line with the Saint-Simonian notion of equality presented above.
WILL

We now turn to the last of four determinations of Badiou’s faithful subject. Will replaces socioeconomic necessity as the driver for action; it is that which makes effective the practice that combines a principle of equality, an application based on authority and a confidence in the powers of well managed private interests. We are here quite far from the debate surrounding the rationales underlying the public works Haussmann undertook: whether they were driven by considerations of security, communication, economic stimulus, aesthetics, sanitation, etc. This is a question which has received as many different answers as there are scholars investigating the public works. There was, however, very little indication in the letters that Haussmann was following a precisely laid out plan for Paris. He did not emphasise any particular rationale for the public and seems disinterested in matters of security. This can be seen in his response to a proposition to establish a new marching ground for the military in one of the more volatile areas in North-East Paris: “I do not know whether the government would deem it important to possess a second Champ de Mars; this is an issue that is not under my responsibility” (Case 24, 1856).

But his concern for wider streets and safer building was made clear by the material presented in chapter 4, and it is well-known that the larger plan for Paris that was handed to him by Napoleon III indicated the Grande Croisée described in chapter 3 as a large cross-shaped opening to be pierced through central Paris. We also have this reminder to the Minister in 1855: “as you know Mr Minister, as the city’s resources are allocated in their totality to holistic major works, I can distract none for operations of detail that are not urgently required” (Case 118, 1855). But what exactly were these major works Haussmann was referring to? Were they only the Grande Croisée, the Emperor’s plan?
The following excerpt from another letter to Minister gives us more details on these holistic works:

“Suffice it to say that I strongly urge Your Excellency to reject the complaint by Mr de Lucay, whose clear intention is to take advantage of his property’s location to extort money from the city. Adopting this property owner’s system would make the carrying out of the projects of public utility decided for Paris more and more costly, a carrying out which is becoming increasingly necessary, however, since population increase in this city has resulted in insufficient living space and justifies the municipal

lxxvi In any case, these letters can only give us a part of the story. This is because they were communications between property owners, the municipal administration and the Ministry of the Interior that solely touched upon the street network. A whole aspect of Haussmann’s work dealing with sanitation cannot be evaluated using this particular archive. I have seen boxes containing letters of the same type as the ones forming the basis for this thesis and it seems as though Haussmann was waging another battle against property owners in trying to push through the application of regulations aimed at improving sanitation standards.
administration’s efforts to assimilate to the city through clever piercings the open land at its circumference

In the last chapter, this quote served to illustrate the manifestation, through anger, of Haussmann’s principle that the municipal administration should be allowed to curtail some aspects of private property rights in order to better allow for the plans for the city to be carried out. While this quote does pull out Haussmann’s insistence that individual property owners must not make the public works more difficult, there is another aspect of it that needs to be discussed. This is the fact that Haussmann felt that Paris was facing an urgent problem: the city’s population had outgrown its urban fabric. This was the source of the other difficulties facing Paris, be it circulation, cholera epidemics or unsafe housing. In a way, Haussmann was only identifying a problem that was linked to the wider transformations of 19th century France: industrialisation, urbanisation, migration, etc. (Agulhon and Choay 1983). But his contribution is the elaboration of a planning practice that was meant to offer a solution to this problem. This solution was predicated on the ability to manipulate the street network and thus on the capacity to regulate private activity. It is through the manipulation of the street network, be it through the widening of existing streets or the creation of new ones, that the problems besieging Paris were to be solved: circulation, housing shortages, and of course, sanitation, which we cannot look at more in detail here. The importance of the street network in Haussmann’s overall plan explains why he was so adamant to defend his interpretation and application of the planning regulations at his disposal. Used in the way he envisaged, they would allow him to roll out his improvements more effectively and thus offer a solution to Paris’ problems. But Haussmann’s focus on housing safety and the archives dealing with sanitation not featured in this thesis are also an indication that his project was larger, that it was based on the general regulation of urban space and not just of the street network.

Haussmann could not be a theoretician at the same time as he was developing a practice that was aimed at solving a particular problem at a particular time. He was too caught up in the moment, as a faithful subject, to abstract from his actions. In the first years as Prefect of the Seine, we have seen that Haussmann’s main obstacle in this practice was the opposition from property owners. This is where the principle property owners must not make the public works of vital importance to the city more difficult becomes important. But we now see that these public works were a decision to reclaim the power of regulation over urban space from property owners and their allies. We can now reverse the statement above so that it becomes a decision. This allows for the emergence of the ‘will’ that Haussmann pushed through as a state revolutionary: the solution to Paris’ problem is
regulatory power, and this means curtailing the power of property owners. While the problem
Haussmann faced on assuming his tenure as Prefect of the Seine was caused by wider
socioeconomic forces, the solution he chose was decisively political. It was predicated on a radical
decision to reclaim urban space from property owners and thus flies in the face of what is usually
advocated as socioeconomic necessity: allowing the wealthiest to refashion space while hoping for
the trickle-down to pacify the poor.

We have seen that the determinations of authority and confidence gave us two ways to achieve the
equality at the heart of the planning practice: authority through negative means (controlling that
contributions were of equal magnitude to the benefits), and confidence through positive means
(attaching the contribution to the benefit). Seen through a Saint-Simonian lens, the notion of the will
is thus that which inscribes the determination of equality and its means of achieving into a coherent
frame: the curtailment of property owner influence over the city. For Haussmann the Saint-
Simonian, stripping idle owners of their power was the only way to bring about the largest possible
benefit to the collective. Indeed, we have seen that this is inherent in the Saint-Simonian notion of
equality: “the health and well-being of the body politic as a whole was more important than the well-
being of individuals” (Harvey 2006a: 72).

HAUSSMANN’S TRUTH

We are now in a position to state the truth that Haussmann’s planning practice constructed within
the world of Parisian planning. This truth is the articulation of the four determinations discussed
above that is unique to Haussmann. This means finding out what ‘mode’ of politics this sequence
represents. Haussmann has been shown to be the instigator of a particular kind of practice. He was
not interested in theorising, in giving this practice a universal character. He saw a city that was
besieged by problems and a planning apparatus that was weak, and developed a practice that would
best make use of existing resources. This, Badiou would say, is a discussion at the level of
philosophy’s conditions, it is about a particular politics designed to respond to a particular problem.
In order to be able to uncover the particular political truth this practice constructed – to move to the
universal it contains – it is necessary to first move from a political sequence to the mode of politics
this sequence represents. In chapter 3, we saw that Badiou emphasises the compatibility of Lazarus’
notion of the historical mode of politics with his philosophy. These modes are the different
articulations of the four determinations of the faithful subject in different historical periods. For the
state revolutionary, these modes are revolutionary, Bolshevik and dialectical for the faithful subjects
they emerged from: Robespierre, Lenin and Mao.
It is clear from the four determinations above that Haussmann put into practice in the world of Parisian planning a Saint-Simonian mode of politics. His politics was a response to the situation he discovered in that world on his arrival to Paris: a planning apparatus that was unable to demand from property owners the contribution to society that the large benefits they extracted from it required. All his efforts strove towards inscribing his actions in to a frame of reference that would maximise the well-being of the city as a whole by making sure all contributed in equal measure to what they received from it. His planning practice was predicated on a Saint-Simonian conception of equality and he made use of negative and positive means to achieve it (authority and confidence respectively).

The identification of the historical mode of politics Haussmann represents as that of a Saint-Simonian state revolutionary means that we can now draw out the universal truth (being) from the historical mode of politics exemplified in a local political sequence (existence). This means determining the articulation of the four determinations that makes up the political truth Haussmann constructed while carrying out the public works. The Saint-Simonian leanings of his practice offer an important indication as to what this truth may be. Indeed, at the centre of his system is the need to direct all of society’s efforts towards production. In order to make that possible, all members of the industrial society must be producers, or be made to produce. Turning back to Haussmann’s practice, could it not be that he saw solving the problems of the city as the only goal that Parisians must be dedicating their energies to, a goal to which all should contribute in order to increase the welfare of the population as a whole? This would mean that Haussmann’s truth could be defined symmetrically as: all Parisians must contribute to solving the city’s problems, or be made to contribute. The statement ‘all Parisians must contribute or be made to contribute to solving the city’s problems’ unifies the four determinations presented above. It is based on Haussmann’s ‘will’ (the solution to Paris’ problem is regulatory power), feeds on Haussmann’s ‘confidence’ (properly controlled and directed, private initiatives can be made to help solve the city’s problems), relies on his ‘authority’ (the actions of property owners need to be heavily scrutinised and countered) and demands ‘equality’ (all property owners are equal in front of planning regulations). As such, it can be taken to be truth that Haussmann’s practice tirelessly constructed within the Parisian landscape.

We are now in a position to state that Haussmann’s planning practice can be conceptualised as one of Badiou’s political events: it produced a break in the world of Parisian planning that placed the figure of the planner as regulator at the heart of planning, and he did this through an affirmation of
Saint-Simonian equality. We can also posit that this political event is in the Saint-Simonian mode: all of the determinations of its truth are inscribed within the Saint-Simonian mode of politics in which Haussmann’s planning practice was constructed. Of the two figures of the faithful subject Badiou proposes, it is clear that Haussmann can only be a state revolutionary: he is acting within an institution of the state, not in opposition to the state. The notion of revolution is to be preferred to that of reform here: it is a way to reinforce the nature of a faithful subject as constituting a radical break in the world in which it acted. Haussmann can thus be seen as a state revolutionary in the world of Parisian planning precisely because he did not improve or amend the way in which planning was conducted but made a decision to break with past practices and to establish a planning practice that was effective and autonomous from property owners. We can now return to the property owners and show how they can be conceptualised as the other types of subjects involved in the development of a political event. This means that property owners will be divided according to their relationship to Haussmann’s truth.

THE OTHER SUBJECTS OF A POLITICAL EVENT

Chapter 5 showed that the expressions of emotion from the epistolary exchange under investigation contained three levels of opposition between Haussmann and property owners. The last section has showed that Haussmann’s principles emerging out of these three levels of opposition fit within Badiou’s four determinations of a truth. Haussmann, as a faithful subject, was found to have opened up a new present; through his actions he sought to solve Paris’ problems by making all property owners contribute to the public works, without regard for their wealth or status.

This section will be concerned with developing the last chapter’s analysis of the three levels of opposition between Haussmann and property owners and how they relate to Badiou’s other subjects. We can now position these other subjects in relation to the new present Haussmann opened up by his desire to have all property owners contribute. They are to be defined by their response to this truth. The emotions uncovered in the last chapter will be central to the identification of trends in the oppositions between Haussmann and the other subjects. The relationship between Haussmann and these other subjects will lay the foundations for a discussion of the sequence and eventual demise of the Haussmann event in the next section that will serve to complement the existing theorisations of the public works.
In chapter 2, it was identified that the first response to the actions of the faithful subject is denial: one refuses to join in on the course of action taken by the faithful subject. We saw, however, that this denial is a form of engagement with the new: "In order to resist the call of the new, it is still necessary to create arguments of resistance appropriate to the novelty itself" (Badiou 2009: 54).

Those who deny the new present of the event must instead strive for another present, what Badiou calls an extinguished present, one that receives some of the benefits of the new present without having to risk anything. As such, the reactive subject “does not propose to abolish the present, only to show that the faithful break (which it calls ‘violence’ or ‘terrorism’) is useless for engendering a moderate, that is to say extinguished present (a present that reaction calls ‘modern’)” (Badiou 2009: 61). This subjectivity is not so much against change in itself, but it seeks to direct the change away from the what is considered to be the faithful subject’s dangerous ideal.

It is clear that the opposition between Haussmann and property owners centred on the application of planning regulation presented in the last chapter is of a similar type than the one which has been presented above between faithful and reactive subjects. Property owners opposed Haussmann’s hard-line approach and demanded that their assessment of the situation and extenuating circumstances be taken into account: “I hope, Mr Minister, that after having examined this case you will be good enough not to allow that a decree, which is already very costly for property owners, be applied abruptly without being properly motivated by the terms and spirit of the decree” (Case 150, 1855).

They were willing to contribute to the public works, but only as far as they deemed it acceptable to their circumstances: this meant that they preferred an extinguished present, in which the public works would only allow piecemeal and isolated improvements but in which they would not have to contribute as much. Because street widening procedures depended on the strict application of the regulations for their success, the reactive subjects seemed ready to cope with existing street widths for longer: “when such a heavy burden weighs on individuals, is it fair to aggravate it further through useless demands to pull back properties from the street?” (Case 17, 1856). In addition, by revolting

---

bxxvii «Pour résister à l’appel du nouveau, encore faut-il créer des arguments de résistance ajustés à la nouveauté elle-même» (Badiou 2006: 62).

bxxviii «Elle ne se propose pas d’abolir le présent, seulement de montrer que la rupture fidèle (qu’elle nomme «violence» ou «terrorisme») est inutile pour l’engendrement d’un présent modéré, c’est-à-dire éteint (qu’elle nomme «moderne»)» (Badiou 2006 : 69).
against Haussmann’s extension of construction freezes to street creation procedures on the grounds that their livelihoods were being disturbed, they were also prepared to miss out on the advantages that would accrue to property owners once the new street was completed. Some even refused the logic underlying street creations altogether:

“For a couple of years, we have become accustomed to observing, in the piercing of new streets, a dominant logic, that had been the object of the meditations of the few for a long time, but which has now become a vulgar axiom that one can no longer ignore; this is that we must before all else establish large communication channels that bring closer, through the brevity of travel, localities that were formerly linked only through long and difficult meanders” (Case 306, 1858).

The reactive subjects directly opposed Haussmann’s practice by appropriating the decision on the extent to which they should contribute to solving the city’s problems. This is why Haussmann insisted to such a great extent that all regulations be obeyed in full by property owners, no matter what extenuating circumstances they invoked – if generalised, the arguments of the reactive subjects, who took stock of Haussmann’s bolstering of the planning apparatus but sought to weaken and limit the applicability of planning regulations, could seriously undermine the solution he had in mind for the city. It is in light of the danger from reactive subjects that Haussmann’s insistence on the primordial nature of planning regulations needs to be understood.

HAUSSMANN AND OBSCURE SUBJECTS

But reaction is not the only response to a new present. Once reaction has been established as a response to the new present, it is possible for this response to be taken a step further, that is, to actively attempt to throw a cloak over the new present so as to hide it away and suppress it: “the production is neither that of the present nor of its deletion, but instead that of the descent of this present into the night of non-exposition” (Badiou 2009: 59). To cast the new present into the shadows the obscure subject “systematically resorts to the invocation of a full and pure transcendent Body, an ahistorical or anti-evental body (City, God, Race... ) [...] the essential Body has the power to reduce to silence that which affirms the event, thus forbidding the real body from existing” (Badiou 2009: 59).
The power of the right to private property and its invocation by property owners opposing Haussmann can be understood as the instantiation of such a body. The strength of the right to property is its past: one of the main victories of French Revolution, it is a symbol of the destruction of absolutism. Haussmann’s practice is then construed as a return to the arbitrariness of absolutist rule, a subverted reference to the Revolution to serve private interests: “the declaration of the rights of man of 1791 was the culmination of a battle of many centuries to defend the dignity of the individual against claims that the public good should always have priority over him” (Zeldin 1981: 30).

This served to obscure the rationale invoked by Haussmann to limit property rights, namely, that it is to be understood as the contribution of property owners towards solving the problems of the city. The sanctification of private property by property owners finds a clear expression in this obscure subject’s attack on Haussmann’s extension of construction freezes to street creation cases:

“Upholding private property, its inviolability, and the respect of the laws that protect it are general interests of an order greater than those that for example call for the establishment of new avenues of communication and private property would no longer be really inviolable, the laws which consecrate and establish the conditions under which expropriations can be undertaken would be nothing more than a dead letter, the day where simple administrative projects would suffice to despoil property owners of the rights and advantages of property itself [...] Mr Prefect assumes the power to say: you will not build, because the administration has a project to open new streets that demand the sacrifice of private property! It is impossible to think without dread about the consequences that would inevitably follow from a triumph, even if incomplete, of doctrines such as these, material consequences first, followed by much worse moral consequences” (Case 234, 1856).

The sanctification of private property hides a clear refusal to contribute to the public works. Obscure subjects invoked the sacrosanct rights of property in order to suppress Haussmann’s insistence that all property owners should contribute: this meant that they should not speculate on future works, that they should accept losing out on some of the value of their investments or that they should be willing to delay some of the works they had planned. In response to this, the obscure
subjects vehemently refused that their property rights be in any way restricted, calling illegal any attempts to do so by the municipal administration:

“I dare hope that it will be sufficient to have informed your Excellency of the illegality of Mr the Prefect of the Seine’s decree, and the extent of the irreparable harm that it would cause me, for this decision to be retracted and for the free disposition of my property in legal terms to be given back to me” (Case 233, 1856).

“Mr Prefect of the Seine’s decree of refusal constitutes a blatant violation of the 11 August 1855 decree and of articles 544 and 1719 of the Napoleonic code. On these grounds, the undersigned implores your Excellency to do him justice by repealing Mr Prefect’s decree of refusal and by thus allowing the works requested to be carried out” (Case 276, 1858).

Obscure subjects were much more of a threat to Haussmann’s practice than reactive subjects, as we shall see below, because the principle they invoked was so firmly entrenched in the post-Revolutionary era: any attempt to intrude into the private realm was easily attackable through legal and administrative channels. The excerpt from a property owner’s letter to the Ministry of the Interior in 1857 is a clear example of the way in which Haussmann’s practice was distorted to highlight only his violation of the rights of property, and thus mask what it was really about, making sure all property owners contributed to solving the city’s problems:

“While I wait [for expropriation], I must retain the free disposition of what is mine; a threat of expropriation is not equivalent to an expropriation. Mr Prefect of the Seine is the guardian both of the financial interests of the City of Paris and of its general interests as concerns the improvement of the street network. You will not allow that he abuse of his competencies over the street network to serve, while violating the right to property, what he believes to be the financial interests of the city, and that he sacrifices larger interests to smaller ones” (Case 238, 1857).

For Haussmann, there is no distinction between the financial interests of the city and the improvements to the street network: both are integral to his practice since the limits he puts on the right to property are only a means to make property owners contribute to the overall improvements. By driving a wedge between financial and general interests, this property owner is trying to obscure Haussmann’s call for all to contribute by framing his attacks on the right to
property as serving only financial gains, completely divorced from the overall improvements to the city. Haussmann’s cupidity can then be opposed to the sacrosanct right of property.

**HAUSSMANN AND HIS BODY**

In events, there are only three types of subjects – the faithful, the reactive and the obscure – and we have already attached to these concepts their manifestations in the political sequence opened up by Haussmann’s planning practice. However, one opposition identified in the preceding chapter cannot be assigned to either of the subjects discussed. This is the opposition centred on the relative weight private actors and the municipal administration should hold when deciding on the projects to be carried out as part of the public works. Property owners believed that they should be the ones to design the operations the city needed; for Haussmann, only the municipal administration had the oversight and capacity to decide which plans would benefit the city as a whole.

This opposition is of a different nature than the other two. In a way, it is much closer to Haussmann’s practice, and it can be conceived as a questioning inherent to it: how much control should the municipal administration exercise over the initiatives of property owners? While Haussmann’s answer was indubitably ‘as much as possible’, this question is not one that confronted his practice externally, against which it had to defend itself. The property owners who sought to have their plans accepted by Haussmann’s administration were asking to contribute, not to avoid contributing like the reactive and obscure subjects. Whether their contribution was in the general interest or not was then the question Haussmann faced – as we have seen above in the discussion of Haussmann’s confidence, this depended on property owners being willing to accept to contribute to the extent Haussmann deemed acceptable.

This political opposition was thus internalised in Haussmann’s practice and the property owners who sought to contribute on their own terms to the public works can thus be thought as having belonged to the body of Haussmann’s subjective manifestation. Badiou uses the notion of the body to highlight that subjects are multiplicities, made up of all the elements of a world that contribute to the actions of the subject. I have so far conflated the faithful subject with Haussmann, but this was only for convenience. Haussmann’s practice would not have been possible without the support of his organisation, members of the planning administration, be they the planners and engineers drafting the plans, the inspectors he sent to patrol the streets to report on planning violations, but also those who supported him from outside, such as the building companies who executed some of the works and the lawyers who helped him defend his practice. Most important of all was Napoleon
III who allowed him to stay on as Prefect of the Seine for 17 years (even if, as we shall, not at full capacity).

The property owners submitting their plans to Haussmann and asking for municipal backing can thus be conceptualised as another element making up his body. By actively seeking to contribute to the public works, they internalised the logic behind Haussmann’s street network improvements as this meant their plans would be more likely to be accepted. This went as far as property owners asserting that they would be ready to enact a voluntary construction freeze in their area in order to make their proposition correspond to Haussmann’s practice. These property owners were thus voluntarily and pre-emptively submitting to Haussmann’s main demand, which all other property owners were so busy attacking, as can be seen in their letter to the Minister of the Interior:

“If the City could not immediately carry out this public utility project, it would be in its financial interest that the extension of the street known as Passage St. Dominique be nonetheless decreed, given that the official declaration of its projected route would mean that the owners of undeveloped land the new street would traverse could no longer build anything on it. The undersigned, as property owners in this section of the rue St. Dominique, consequently have the honour of asking Your Excellency to deign call the fatherly instincts of his Majesty the Emperor on this improvement of a public nature. P.S.: If it became necessary to make the commitment of not building on undeveloped land, the petitioners are ready to subscribe to it”\(^{70}\) (Case 120, 1854).

The opposition between Haussmann and these property owners can thus be understood as pertaining to the way in which their contribution to the public works would be carried out: while they want all the plans they submit to receive municipal backing, Haussmann establishes himself as the arbiter of the general interest, selecting to support only those projects which fit his conditions.

**EMOTIONS AND THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN SUBJECTS**

Now that the two other subjects and a section of Haussmann’s body have been identified from within the ranks of the property owners who sent letters to the Minister of the Interior, we are in a position to return to the emotions discussed in the last chapter. These three groups were defined by the defence of a particular principle or set of principles that were read through the emotional statements they made in their letters. But we also saw that each of these three groups of property owners had their own emotional register: they used the five emotions of anger, resentment,
contempt, fear and joy in very different ways. Haussmann too inflected his emotional register to match the type of property owner he was faced with.

In the last chapter, Haussmann’s advantage over the reactive property owners was shown by contrasting the high use of contempt throughout his letters to their numerous expressions of resentment. The situation was very different in the opposition between Haussmann and obscure subjects: anger was the emotion that featured most prominently in the statements of both protagonists’ principles, indicating a rather balanced power dynamic between the faithful and obscure subject. Haussmann’s relationship with his body took on an altogether different form. While property owners’ expressions of joy seemed to indicate that they believed they had found a way to profit from the public works, Haussmann treated their efforts with contemptuous superiority. Reactive subjects expressed fear most often out of all property owners, an indication that they had most at stake materially in their opposition to Haussmann. The much more limited use of fear by the obscure subjects could mean that their opposition was more a matter of ideology than material necessity.

What we can begin to sense by looking at the emotional confrontations at the heart of the three oppositions Haussmann was engaged in is an inherent sense of sequence. It was highlighted in chapter 2 that Badiou’s events have an inbuilt sequence: the faithful subject and its body construct a truth in the world, which first leads to a reactive backlash and then prompts the rise of obscure subjects. This is a sequence that can now be read through the empirical material. Haussmann’s arrival created a break in the world of Parisian planning through the novelty of his planning practice, as presented in chapter 4. This planning practice was shown in chapter 5 to be based on clear planning principles, which we saw above could be articulated to form his truth: all property owners should contribute, or be made to contribute, to solving the city’s problems. We can now go a step further and understand how the arrival of the other subjectivities affected this truth and the Haussmann event as a whole.

The sequence here is both temporal and in relation to the truth itself. Temporally, we see that the emotional statements of reactive subjects were most numerous early in Haussmann’s tenure as prefect, with close to a third of them in 1853 and 1854. The obscure subjects’ statements came later, with a peak representing close to two thirds of them occurring in 1856 and 1857. Finally, emotional statements made by those property owners who were part of Haussmann’s body came last, with over two thirds of them in 1857 and 1858. Apart from the issue of the body, to which we
will turn to in more detail below, this temporal order in the expressions of reactive and obscure subjects fits with Badiou’s sequence of the event.

But this is not the most interesting aspect of this sequence. Much more important is the progression in the position of these groups of property owners in relation to Haussmann’s truth. We have seen above that reactive subjects refused the faithful subject’s new present and preferred an extinguished present in which they contributed less and received more piecemeal improvements. They attacked the equality and authority at the core of Haussmann’s truth by refusing his hard-line approach to the application of planning regulations. But they did this in a way that maintained their inferiority and powerlessness in the face of the municipal administration. They found ways to improve the strength of their complaints (such as through demanding parallel investigations of the case by the CBC) over the period, as reflected in a decrease in the use of resentment, but this did not amount to a significant change in their status in relation to Haussmann. A parallel increase in expressions of fear over the period also shows that these property owners were complaining to safeguard their material interests more than to undermine Haussmann’s truth.

As highlighted above, the situation was different in the case of the obscure subjects. They were specifically attacking the truth by refusing to contribute outright. No improvements to the city were legitimate in their eyes if they did not respect the sanctity of private property. The effect on Haussmann’s truth is immediately perceptible: anger replaced contempt as his most frequently used expression. More significantly, the emotional repertoires used by Haussmann and obscure subject are almost identical if one looks only at the 1856 to 1859 period. The importance of this is that obscure subjects had broken Haussmann’s contempt and created a situation in which the opposition between them became one in which both sides were defending a clear set of political principles. This created a possibility for arbitration which did not previously exist. This effectively marked the end of the Haussmann event. As will be explained in more detail below, the Minister of the Interior chose to side with property owners, and did so by evoking political imperatives from outside the world of planning. The event was broken because something external to the world in which it was occurring came to supersede an all-encompassing opposition over its truth.

So how are we then to understand the part played by Haussmann’s body in this sequence, if their appearance is strongest at a stage in which the event is already unravelling? The answer needs to be that the body is involved in the last part of the sequence, when it detaches itself from the faithful subject and subverts the event for personal gain. For this group of property owners, this meant
profiting from the public works without being tied down by the faithful subject’s criteria, which we saw were encapsulated in his confidence: properly controlled and directed, private initiatives can be made to help solve the city’s problems. The only logic underlying the contribution of these property owners to the public works is the profit motive, pure speculation on the public works. A reflection of this can be seen in the fact that joy was the dominant emotion for these property owners from 1857 onwards. This is thus truly the last stage of the event, when the body acts without a will, without any other motive for action than socioeconomic necessity. In the next section, we will see how this understanding of the sequence of the Haussmann event can complement the accounts of the public works discussed in detail in the two chapters.

SUBJECTS, TRUTH AND THE UNFOLDING OF THE EVENT

We can start the process by which we bring the empirical findings back to the terrain of the existing interpretations of the public works by quoting Harvey in his most vivid description of Haussmann’s role:

“To his credit, Haussmann well understood his limited role. For though he had authoritative powers and frequent delusions of grandeur, he also recognized that he had to liberate more than just the flows of goods and people from their medieval constraints if Paris was to be transformed. The force he had to mobilize—and it was in the end the force that mastered him—was the circulation of capital. But this, too, was a compelling condition present at the very birth of Empire. The surpluses of capital and labour power absolutely had to be absorbed if the Empire was to survive. The absorption of such surpluses via the public works that so transformed the interior space of Paris entailed the free circulation of capital through the construction of a particular spatial configuration of the built environment. Freed from its feudal straitjacket, capital reorganized the interior space of Paris according to principles that were uniquely its own. Haussmann wanted to make Paris a modern capital worthy of France, if not of Western civilization. In the end he simply helped make it a city in which the circulation of capital became the real imperial power” (Harvey 2006a: 108).

It is clear that the empirical material presented so far allows us to question Harvey’s conceptualisation of Haussmann’s role in the public works. The image of Haussmann we get is that of a state revolutionary in the world of planning, actively engaged in controlling and directing the circulation of capital by using opportunities for profit to force property owners to contribute to the public works and by regulating their private activity to ensure they were in the public interest. Harvey’s assertion that Haussmann was powerless in the face of the circulation of capital thus needs
to be investigated in more depth: how could this have happened if his practice was entirely a question of directing and controlling private initiatives?

The answer to this question I want to propose here is that the situation Harvey is describing is that which followed the demise of the Haussmann event. The event we have attempted to describe in this thesis can thus be seen as the prehistory of the haussmannisation Harvey is focused on understanding. This would mean that there were two stages to Haussmann’s tenure as prefect of the Seine: one which occurred in Badiou’s temporality as the event in which a state revolutionary attempted to push the contribution of all property owners to the public works, and the other which unfolded within Harvey’s temporality in which the state, and planning, had once again become subordinated to capital. The temporality of the event we have been focusing on was thus a very special moment in which political will was strong enough to keep market forces at arm’s length. With the event’s demise, market forces and the circulation of capital were able to regain the upper hand and become ‘the real imperial power’ that fashioned Paris to suit its needs.

As such, we can see Harvey’s temporality as directly emerging from the demise of the Haussmann event. In order to link up this thesis’ empirical findings to the wider discussion on the public works, it is thus the unravelling of the event and the transition to the situation Harvey describes so convincingly in his Paris, Capital of Modernity that must now be turned to. What we have seen above is that the attacks from reactive and obscure subjects to his planning practice created a situation in which Haussmann’ truth was seriously questioned. One consequence of this was that private initiatives freed themselves from the binds of the faithful subject; in effect the body detached itself from the event’s truth. But the extended quote from Roncayolo below also shows that property owners were part of a larger movement against Haussmann’s planning practice:

“The imperial regime itself arbitrates and compromises between Saint-Simonian ambitions and the social force, the ‘principle’ that is property, in its classical definition. The law, in theory and practice, leans in that direction, exceptions notwithstanding, and the 1852 decree is one such exception; the institutions, like the Council of State, also. The expropriation juries, usually selected from within the ranks of powerful notables and representatives of the high bourgeoisie, tend to integrate more and more firmly in the compensations the value added the public works are hoped to deliver. Anticipation thus profits, in a first instance, to the owners of land, which removes financial resources from the public authority, increases the cost of the operations, and pushes capitalist enterprises towards more selective means of land use or a more rapid circulation of capital through speculative sales of land or
buildings. In order to complete the second network and the third, in Paris, Haussmann deals with contractors, to whom he entrusts, in return for a fee, not only the works themselves, but also the risks arising from expropriations. At the same time, the geographical field of public interest is constantly brought back to the strict dispositions contained within the law and the 1852 decree is interpreted in the narrowest possible way. The Council of State condemns the City of Paris in this respect, in March 1856, by denouncing the illegality of certain acquisitions. The Council of State’s 27th of December 1858 ruling confirms the right of former owners on the sections of expropriated parcels not on the new alignment. Initial possession of land is thus worth speculative profits, while the law of 1807 and the sharing of value-added it imposed are brought back to memory less and less often. This battle of interests, settled most often in the property owners’ favour, is not only a page of social history. It marks the topographical design of a large section of the Haussmannian projects (Roncayolo, in Agulhon, 1983: 114).

For Roncayolo, this transition seems to have occurred more or less naturally, with property owners described as having benefited from an institutional landscape that inherently favoured them over the municipal administration. Our findings allow us to complement this description by pointing to the actors that were driving the process. From the last section, we have seen that obscure subjects brought the opposition between them and Haussmann over the truth to a point at which only external arbitration could decide which side would prevail. What this allows us to do is to postulate a mechanism through which the transition Roncayolo describes to a situation that fits with Harvey’s

Translation mine, here is the original: «Le régime impérial lui même arbitre ou compose entre les ambitions Saint-Simoniennes et la force sociale, le ‘principe’ que constitue la propriété, dans sa définition classique. La loi, dans la lettre et la pratique, incline en ce sens, sauf exception, et le décret de 1852 en est une; les institutions, comme le Conseil d’Etat, aussi. Les jurys d’expropriation, choisis le plus souvent parmi les grands notables et les représentants de la haute bourgeoisie, sont amenés de plus en plus fermement à intégrer dans les indemnités les plus values espérées des grands travaux. L’anticipation profite ainsi, en premier, au propriétaire du sol, ce qui ôte des moyens de financement à l’autorité publique, accroît le cout des opérations, conduit les sociétés capitalistes vers des formes plus sélectives d’utilisation des terrains ou une rotation plus rapide des capitaux par la vente spéculative du sol ou des immeubles. Pour l’achèvement du deuxième réseau et l’achèvement du troisième, à Paris, Haussmann s’adresse à des compagnies concessionnaires auxquelles il confie, moyennant forfait, non seulement la conduite des travaux, mais les risques de l’expropriation. En même temps, le champ géographique de l’intérêt public est sans cesse ramené aux strictes dispositions prévues par la loi et le décret de 1852 est interprété de la manière la plus étroite. Le Conseil d’Etat condamne sur ce point la Ville de Paris, en mars 1856, en dénonçant l’illégalité de certaines acquisitions. L’arrêt du Conseil d’Etat, pris le 27 décembre 1858, confirme les droits des anciens propriétaires sur les parties des parcelles expropriées, qui restent hors-lignes. La possession initiale du sol vaut ainsi des bénéfices spéculatifs, alors que la loi de 1807 et le partage de la plus-value qu’elle imposait, sont de moins en moins rappelés. Cette lutte d’intérêts, tranchée le plus souvent en faveur du propriétaire, n’est pas seulement une page d’histoire sociale. Elle marque le dessin topographique d’une grande partie des opérations haussmannienne.»
conceptualisation of the public works was achieved. The deciding factor that put an end to this event was the Minister of the Interior’s decision to side with obscure property owners.

These property owners had direct links to the courts and the Council of State, hiring lawyers to defend their interests against the municipal administration. But their biggest victory was in winning over the Ministry of the Interior to their cause. There were many Ministers of the Interior during Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect of the Seine, but there was a notable change in attitude towards Haussmann over the years. While the first Interior Ministers can be considered as part of the reactive subjects – raising occasional objections to Haussmann’s practice as concerns the application of planning regulations – there was a definite move to obscure subjectivity once the Interior Ministers of the late 1850s started to side with property owners (and the Civil Buildings’ Council) against Haussmann. While the defence of property rights is invoked by these obscure Interior Ministers, their concern was much more with matters of national interest, that is, with securing the property owners as supporters of Napoleon III’s regime. Indeed, in the Minister of the Interior’s remit was something called reporting on ‘the public opinion’, an eloquent turn of phrase to describe the active monitoring of anti-Bonapartist sentiments. While Napoleon III came to power on the back of popular support (and could thus afford not to give pre-eminence to the satisfaction of the Parisian property owners), this situation changed with the rise of republican and socialist sentiment in the late 1850s. What the Ministers of the Interiors of that period were sensing was that Haussmann’s hard-line stance against property owners was pushing these away from the regime into republican arms: “A material foundation was laid for a political rapprochement between Parisian property owners and Empire. Unbeholden at the beginning, the Empire increasingly looked to them as a base of support in a capital where opposition sentiment dominated as early as 1857” (Harvey 2006a: 127).

This can be gleaned through the exchange of letters between Haussmann and the Minister of the Interior from the following case. The owner of a large apartment building in the 8th Arrondissement in which 20 worker households lived wrote to the Minister of the Interior in 1856 because she was refused the authorisation she had requested to repair her facade on grounds that her property had to be pulled back 25 centimetres from the street. She argued that such a small gain to the width of the street was useless, as well as the following: “As this house is occupied as of July by twenty small households, getting rid of these apartments at a time when small lodgings are this rare, especially in this neighbourhood, is to go directly against the government’s stated goal of encouraging new constructions of this kind”¹ (Case 63, 1856). Planning to combine this building with the neighbouring private hotel she owns, she requests toleration for two years, at which time she promises to destroy
the building. In the meanwhile she requests the authorisation to execute the repairs necessary to guarantee public safety. This request is then sent to Haussmann by the Minister of the Interior in order to get information on the case and the prefect’s suggested course of action.

For Haussmann, this is a property owner who is driven by private interest only and the house is in such a state of disrepair that it cannot be allowed to persist any longer. He recommends the Minister not to heed the property owner’s request, given that the house “has arrived at the end of its time; now, its reconstruction being mandatory, whatever the extent of the retrenchment, the administration cannot authorise, even temporarily, repairs that to be actually effective, would not only consist in a partial renovation but also in the rebuilding of the main columns, piers, etc. It would establish a precedent all the more regrettable that in almost all neighbourhoods the grounds Mrs de Montgomery put forward could be evoked”\(^72\) (Case 63, 1856). The Ministry of the Interior did not follow Haussmann’s recommendation, but for reasons very far removed from the planning oppositions we have been concerned with in these empirical chapters: “In the strict legal sense, the Prefecture of the Seine is right. However, as the permission is requested only as toleration, for 18 months only, and the house it concerns containing 20 worker lodgings, it seems to me that a refusal would be too rigorous and even impolitic in the current crisis of the rarity and dearness of small lodgings”\(^73\) (Case 63, 1856).

The Minister of the Interior thus decided on Haussmann’s planning practice based on external political considerations. Haussmann had to defend himself against these external attacks on his practice by also appealing to the outside, namely, that in hindering the work of the municipal authority, the Minister was also going against the Emperor’s plans for Paris: “Your administration, Mr Minister, wants the same thing as mine: to safeguard the execution of the plans decided by the Emperor”\(^74\) (Case 205, 1857). But there was little he could do when the Minister started attacking the way in which he carried out street creations:

“As I have already mentioned to you several times, Mr Prefect, such grounds are not acceptable. It is impossible to refuse this individual the authorisation to build on the present alignment on the grounds that there are discussions to establish a new one. In addition, the decree you asked for, and which is currently under examination in the Council of State, does not impose any servitudes forbidding repairs on the property of Mr Coqueret. It only authorises you to acquire it amicably, or through expropriation. As long as you do make use of that authorisation, you cannot oppose the repairs he is planning on undertaking. Following these explanations, I have concluded, Mr Prefect,
with the General Council of Civil Buildings, that Mr Coqueret’s petition must be accepted, and I invite you to deliver him the permission he requests

The Minister’s intervention in planning debates sealed the end of the possibilities opened up by Haussmann. The loss of protection from the Minister of the Interior (and thus from the Emperor) as concerns his planning practice and the court cases in the Council of State from property owners described in length by Roncayolo above brought down Haussmann’s planning practice. Haussmann lost the capacity to make property owners contribute to solving the city’s problems. This meant that his Saint-Simonian programme, based on the control and limitation of owners who did not produce as the only way to make production efficient, was also defeated. The planning apparatus lost whatever power it had gained back from property owners and more had to be offered to property owners in order to enrol them in the public works. This is the breach the property owners that had formerly been part of Haussmann’s body exploited. Private initiatives were allowed to re-arrange the city at will, without regard for the general interest. This echoes Harvey’s ‘freed from its feudal straitjacket, capital reorganized the interior space of Paris according to principles that were uniquely its own’. But what this chapter has shown is that this end result was the consequence of Haussmann’s defeat at the hands of property owners. Haussmann failed not because he could not control the circulation of capital but because the means to do so were taken away from him by property owners in a fiercely contested political battle.

The anonymous letter below was sent to the Ministry of the Interior in 1864 and is a reflection of the change in the dynamic opposing Haussmann and property owners which had occurred in the 1860s: "The left side of the Seine is so forlorn that we do not know if we belong to Paris or the Province. Why this injustice? Do we not pay our contributions as well on this side as on the ride side: if the Emperor and you knew the enemies Mr Haussmann begets against the government, you would change the orientation of his work without delay. Of the eleven députés who were appointed last year in Paris, M. Haussmann is always the cause of at least ten. I invite M. Minister to inquire whether the facts described above are accurate. We deeply apologize if we do not sign" (AN, F1 cIII Seine 31, 1864).

According to its author, Haussmann’s actions were the root cause behind the opposition’s victories in Paris, but the actions he incriminates are not those which have been detailed in this thesis, they are Haussmann’s relative disregard of the Left Bank compared to the Right Bank. The author is not complaining about haussmannisation per se, but because there hasn’t been enough of it. Haussmann’s public works were now very much in demand since property owners were allowed to
fully profit from them. Further confirmation of this can be found in Pinkney’s mention that when Haussmann was finally relieved of the function of Prefect, “legislators found themselves importuned by builders, property owners, and businessmen to revive the works program. (The petitions to the Legislative Body and to the Emperor fill an entire box in the National Archives.)” (Pinkney 1957: 61).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has thus brought the thesis to a full circle. The empirical material, understood through Badiou’s concepts, was confronted to Roncayolo and Harvey’s accounts of the public works. The confrontation of the empirical material with Harvey’s conceptualisation of Haussmann’s role led to the postulate that two periods must be separated out in Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect of the Seine: his early years in that position in which he sought to use his Sartrean agency to break the hold of property owners over planning, and the second period – from 1856 or 1857 onwards – in which the Minister of the Interior sided with property owners and broke his capacity to pursue his truth. It is this second period that is referred to as haussmannisation. The empirical material also allowed us to complement Roncayolo’s account by offering a mechanism through which the actions of the property owners allowed for the transition between these two periods to occur. While his focus was on the way in which the system was inherently in favour of private property, we are now in a position to explain Haussmann’s legal difficulties and the problems it created for his practice by the actions of the subjects, and especially those of the obscure subjects.

Brought back into the web of published interpretations of the public works, the findings gleaned from the archival material can complement some of the scholarship on the public works described in the first chapter. The wider processes which Harvey and Roncayolo theorised as determining the course of events can now be understood to have been unleashed following Haussmann’s defeat at the hands of property owners. The autonomy and administrative ability which Chapman and Chapman highlight was lost in a fiercely fought battle with property owners on the twin fronts of the courts and political support. As for Sutcliffe, his evaluation of Haussmann’s place in history depends on which period of Haussmann’s tenure as prefect they focus on: in the early years, Haussmann was a comprehensive planner who broke the hold of property owners on the planning system; after 1860, he was head of a planning authority once again beholden to property owner interests.

At a more general level, what this chapter has shown is that the concept of the subject has allowed for an interpretive framework to emerge that can integrate the empirical material available and make it complement existing theoretical interpretations of a sequence of events. It allows for the
identification of the individual actors responsible for a larger process of change, and an understanding of the principles underlying their actions. Badiou’s sequence of subjective appearances permits us to use his concepts to understand how a particular sequence unfolded: denial is followed by the process of obscuring which then leads to the body's detaching itself from the truth. The pertinence of the concept of the subject for the understanding of a singular aspect of a well-documented historical episode appears to justify further reflexion on the place Badiou could come to occupy in the social sciences.
CONCLUSION

By exploring the surviving archives and by seeking out archival material that seemed neglected, I caught a glimpse of the transformation of Paris through a very particular lens, namely that of letters from property owners to the Minister of the Interior. What this particular lens on the transformation of Paris seems to depend on is the identification of the period under question (1853-1859) as exhibiting a special temporality. The distance of over 150 years separating us from Haussmann’s first years as prefect allows us to see how different those initial years were from the rest of the 19th century. We see a planning apparatus seeking to establish itself after years of impotence, and property owners struggling to keep the upper hand. This was a temporality of agency and of opposition: gone were the binds on municipal action, a vision of planning based on the control of the circulation of capital could be pushed through. But any real act of agency immediately calls forth a reaction by proponents of the status quo – in this case, property owners. By calling to them the courts and the political support of the Minister of the Interior, they were able to re-establish the prominence of property rights over the public interest. This account shows the distance between the temporality of the everyday functioning of planning and the temporality of these intense sequences when planning itself is under redefinition.

ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS: BREAK, EQUALITY, TRUTH

We are now in a position to return to the research questions laid out in the introduction. The first was concerned with the possibility of conceptualising Haussmann’s planning practice as a political event. This meant answering two related questions: was Haussmann’s planning practice fundamentally different from that of his predecessors? And, did this planning practice carry within it the affirmation of equality? The former was answered in chapter 4. There, we presented the way in which planning had operated before Haussmann’s arrival on the scene. It was found that the 1807 planning law had not been properly enforced by municipal authorities and that property owners and their architects disregarded planning regulations as a whole. Haussmann’s arrival in Paris was shown to have changed this situation dramatically: at the heart of his planning practice was an effort to return to the 1807 law as it was meant to be applied and a decision to use this law to restrict the speculative opportunities the public works afforded property owners. It was concluded that a reversal of the structure of appearances had occurred in the world of Parisian planning. From a situation in which property owners and their architects were at the centre of this world and ordered the appearance in it of all actors, and who thus relegated the agents of the municipal administration to its very fringes, Haussmann’s assumption of the role of Prefect of the Seine marked the arrival of
the municipal agent as a planner with a strong political mandate to regulate private activity on the urban fabric. Chapter 4 concluded that any attempt to answer the second part of the question above, namely whether the planning practice studied here carried within it an affirmation of equality, had to first characterise and understand the political principles that motivated it.

It was the task of chapter 5 to offer a way to extract the principles this planning practice contained from the epistolary exchanges between Haussmann, property owners and the Minister of the Interior during the first years of Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect of the Seine. What was needed was a method that would allow us to uncover these principles while at the same time laying the foundation for an analysis of the material based on Badiou’s concept of the subject. This would allow a connection to be established between the empirical material introduced in chapter 3 and the theoretical framework laid out in chapter 2. Emotions, as understood through Solomon’s philosophical project, were posited as identifiable counterparts to Badiou’s affects. It was hypothesised that emotions indicate that an affective stance is under attack and thus betray the existence of a principle held by a subject. The emotions found within the text allowed us to capture those fleeting moments when subjects appeared to us in their defence of political principles. These principles were found to define three dimensions of the opposition at the heart of the event under consideration: Haussmann and property owners held conflicting principles as concerns the modality of application of planning regulations, the role and power of the planning apparatus as well as the balance between public and private actors in determining the course of the public works. The characteristics of the five emotions used to uncover these principles allowed us to posit the balance of power between Haussmann and property owners in each dimension of the opposition. These dimensions differed significantly, both in terms of the seriousness of their implications for Haussmann’s planning practice and in terms of the power Haussmann had over property owners in them.

It is on the basis of these principles and of the three oppositions they constituted that chapter 6 could offer a response to the question: did Haussmann’s planning practice contain within it an affirmation of equality? To do this, we posited Haussmann as the faithful subject of the event and investigated the four determinations whose articulation constitutes the truth of the event. The first of these determinations is precisely that of equality. To reveal the form these determinations took in the case of Haussmann’s planning practice we rephrased the principles of chapter 5 into decisions, the form in which they are used to act. The type of equality found in Haussmann’s determinations was the one espoused by the Saint-Simonians: it is predicated on the fact that the collective has
precedence over the individual and that all should contribute equally as producers to the improvement of the collective. In conjunction with the other three determinations, Haussmann was identified as a Saint-Simonian state revolutionary, whose truth was the statement: all Parisians must contribute to solving the city’s problems, or be made to contribute. The three levels of opposition between Haussmann and property owners uncovered in chapter 5 were then recast as the opposition between Haussmann and three other types of actors: the reactive and obscure subjects and those individuals constituting Haussmann’s body. The sequence in which these types of actors appeared was uncovered through the analysis of the emotions they used in the defence of their principles. The faithful subject’s truth and the event’s sequence are what allowed us to offer an explanation of Haussmann’s first years as Prefect of the Seine and of the ultimate defeat of his planning practice.

ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS: THE TRACE OF AN EVENT

The three empirical chapters just summarised have allowed us to answer three of the five questions laid out in the introduction. The first concerns the existence of a break in a world and was answered in chapter 4. The second was answered in chapter 6 and pertained to whether Haussmann’s planning practice carried within it an affirmation of equality. The third – what was the political idea that motivated Haussmann’s planning practice? – was also answered in chapter 6 through the investigation of Haussmann’s truth. The two questions that are missing concern the consequences of Haussmann’s planning practice for the world of Parisian planning and the feasibility and fruitfulness of an empirical investigation based on Badiou’s concepts. Answering the first of these two remaining research questions requires us to present an additional concept of Badiou’s: the trace of an event.

For Badiou, the trace of an event is that object which comes to have maximal appearance within the world of the event. Given that the transcendental of this new world was the figure of the planner, it is natural to award Haussmann the name of trace, as the object which best incarnated the figure of the planner in that world. The concept of the trace can most fruitfully be explained through the examples Badiou gives us of it. Here, for example, is the trace of the Spartacus event:

“The initial world, that of the stables of gladiators, organizes the deliberate and gratuitous (we are speaking of games, after all) sacrifice of the lives of slaves in the name of the City. With regard to what the gladiators can think (beyond their ‘profession’), the public power that licences such sacrifices is placed at an incommensurable distance. The revolt of Spartacus and his friends leaves as its trace the fact that this power is measurable and indeed measured: one can dare to confront Roman legions and triumph over them. This lies at the origin of the way in which the different
subjective figures that constitute themselves in Italy between 73 and 71 BC are qualified politically: the faithful subject, borne by the army of Spartacus; the reactive subject, borne by the immense mass of conservative slaves; the obscure subject, placed under the murderous sign of the City and her gods, crucifying thousands of the vanquished so that even the memory of the present which was created over the course of two years by the slaves’ uprising be abolished (Badiou 2009: 70).

The trace of an event is thus the lesson for history that remains after the demise of the event. It is precisely this lesson that those who defeat the event try so hard to erase from memory. The actions of the obscure subject thus take on an even more sinister character: not only do they strive to obscure the rationale invoked by the faithful subject to justify its actions (the contribution of all property owners to the public works for the Haussmann event), but they also destroy the possibility that these actions will have an impact on other situations. By obscuring the Haussmann event, they made its trace imperceptible. Badiou tempers the pessimism inherent in his formalisation of the obscure subject by positing that the eventful temporality—or the world as it exists during an event (what he calls the present)—can be resurrected in a different world:

“The resurrection of this present—as enacted by Rosa Luxemburg, Howard Fast and so many other activists of the communist movement—is itself also political. Of course, it reincorporates what the old obscure subject had occulted. But it can only do this under the condition of a new egalitarian maxim, created for eternity in the bourgeois world of the nineteenth century (Badiou 2009: 70).

That is, the Spartacus event was made vivid once again by its actualisation in another world. This happens through the power that the name Spartacus, as the trace of a past event, forever holds in all worlds in which it subsequently reappears. The trace is what triggers the truth of the Spartacus event, that is, its particular articulation of the four determinations to be adapted in a new context.

boooii «Le monde initial, celui des écuries de gladiateurs, organise au nom de la Cité le sacrifice délibéré et gratuit (ce sont des jeux) de vies d’esclaves. La puissance publique qui garantit de tels sacrifices est au regard de ce que peuvent penser les gladiateurs — au delà de leur «métier» — dans une distance incommensurable. La révolte de Spartacus et de ses amis laisse comme trace que cette puissance est mesurable et mesurée: on peut osser affronter et vaincre les légions romaines. D’où la qualification politique des différentes figures subjectives qui se constituent en Italie entre 73 et 71 av. J.-C.: le sujet fidèle, porté par l’armée de Spartacus, le sujet réactif, porté par l’immense masse des esclaves conservateurs, le sujet obscur, sous le signe meurtrier de la Cité et de ses dieux, crucifiant de milliers de vaincus pour que soit aboli jusqu’au souvenir du présent crée, pendant deux ans, par la levée des esclaves» (Badiou 2006: 79).

boooiii «La résurrection de ce présent, par Rosa Luxembourg, Howard Fast et tant d’autres activistes du mouvement communiste, est elle aussi politique. Certes, elle réincorpore ce que l’antique sujet obscur a occulté. Mais elle ne le peut que sous la condition d’une nouvelle maxime égalitaire, créée pour l’éternité dans le monde bourgeois du XIXe siècle» (Badiou 2006: 79).
The egalitarian maxim of the communists is in direct lineage to Spartacus’ truth: “Like everybody else has a right to do, we slaves want to and can return home” (Badiou 2009: 69). Even though the event is defeated, its trace becomes a symbol that can allow for the truth the faithful subject stood for to re-emerge in a different context.

The concept of the trace thus gives us a way to gauge the consequences of an event. But these consequences have to be understood within the logic of Badiou’s events. What the concept of the trace gives us is a way to link within different events, not necessarily a means to understand how the event affected the situation that followed its demise. If obscure subjects were trying so hard to deny the occurrence of an event, then it is possible that the situation that followed the event presents no noticeable differences from the situation that preceded it. On the other hand, connections between sequences in which the same types of truth are invoked can be made more easily.

So what does this all mean for the Haussmann event we are concerned with here? The empirical material we have studied allowed us to posit that Haussmann’s planning practice was defeated through the courts by property owners and the Minister of the Interior. Their invocation of the sanctity of private property cast his efforts as motivated simply by pecuniary motives and thus diverted the attention away from their outright refusal to contribute to the public works. Once Haussmann’s planning was defeated, the fact that he, as a planner, displaced the architect as the central figure in the world of Parisian planning became void. The archival resource does not allow to see how this world was structured passed 1859. We can only surmise that architects resumed their hold over planning. But the empirical material we have studied here also allows us to hypothesise that another type of actor assumed an important role in planning: these are the lawyers that assisted property owners in their attack on Haussmann’s planning practice. These lawyers allowed property owners to identify that Haussmann’s use of the legislation went beyond the spirit of the planning regulations. They also were the lead actors in the court cases that signalled the end of Haussmann’s autonomous planning practice. The advent of lawyers in planning is compatible with a system in which the guarantee of private property is fundamental: this would strip planning practice of its politics and turn planners into mere technicians inscribed in a web of laws prepared outside of their reach.

\footnote{«Nous, esclaves, voulons et pouvons, comme tout le monde en a le droit, retourner chez nous» (Badiou 2006: 78).}
Further research is needed to assess whether Haussmann’s planning practice had immediate consequences on the world of Parisian planning. We are in a better position, however, to discuss the type of trace Haussmann represents more generally. What we are looking for here is the possibility opened up by Haussmann’s planning practice for other events to occur. We can return to Badiou for an illustration of this, as in his discussion of the consequences of the Commune, which he considers a political event:

“Adding a conclusion to his *History of the Paris Commune of 1871* in 1896, Lissagaray makes two observations. The first is that the cabal of reactionaries and murderers of workers from 1871 is still in place. Aided by parliamentarianism it has even been augmented by ‘some bourgeois pied-pipers who, disguised as democrats, assist its advances’. The second is that the people have now constituted their own force: ‘Thrice [in 1792, 1848 and 1870] the French proletariat has made the Republic for others; it is now ripe for its own’. In other words, the Commune-event, begun on 18 March 1871, definitely did not have as one of its consequences the destruction of the dominant group and its politicians; but it destroyed something more important: the political subordination of the workers and the people. What was destroyed was of the order of subjective incapacity. As Lissagaray exclaims: ‘Ah! The workers of the countryside and the towns are not uncertain of their capacity’. Though crushed and convulsive, the absolutization of the workers’ political existence—the existence of the inexistent—nonetheless destroyed an essential form of subjection, that of proletarian political possibility to bourgeois political manoeuvring. The fact that more than a century later this subjection has been reconstituted—or rather reinvented under the name of ‘democracy’—is another story, another sequence in the troubled history of truths. What we can say is that where an inexistent lay, the destruction of what legitimated this inexistence came to be. At the beginning of the twentieth century, what occupies the place of the dead is no longer proletarian political consciousness but—even though it doesn’t know it yet—the prejudice about the natural character of classes and the millennia-old vocation of property-owners and the wealthy to wield state and social power. It is this destruction that the Paris Commune carries out for the future, even in the apparent putting to death of its own over-existence (Badiou 2009: 379-380).

---

lxxxv «En 1896, rajoutant une conclusion à son *Histoire de la Commune de 1871*, Lissagaray fait deux observations. La première, c’est que la troupe des réactionnaires et des assassins d’ouvriers de 1871 est toujours en place. Parlementarisme aidant, elle s’est même augmentée de «quelques fifres bourgeois qui, sous le masque de démocrate, facilitent ses approches». La deuxième, c’est que le peuple a désormais constitué sa propre force: «Trois fois [en 1792, en 1848 et en 1870], le prolétariat a fait la République pour les autres; il est mûr pour la sienne». Autrement dit, l’événement-Commune, initié le 18 Mars 1871, n’a certes pas eu pour conséquence de détruire le groupe dominant et ses politiciens; mais il a détruit quelque chose de plus important: la subordination politique ouvrière et populaire. Ce qui a été détruit est de l’ordre de l’incapacité subjective: «Ah ! s’exclame Lissagaray, ils ne sont pas incertains de leur capacité les travailleurs des campagnes.»
A crucial concept here is that of over-existence. By this notion we must understand the timelessness of the trace. We have seen that the process through which the inexistent of a world comes to exist maximally guarantees that a site is actually an event. But we can now understand that this transformation of the logic of appearances is so strong that this newly existent entity becomes in a sense eternal: even after its demise, it over-exists the world in which it appeared, it comes to appear in other worlds as that which can be reappropriated by a subject-to-be. Badiou’s trace can thus be understood as what past events leave as legacies for the worlds of the present and the future, it is an injunction to always return to events with a view to reassembling the truth that was destroyed with the materials of the worlds of today. Can we now think of a parallel construction that would allow us to extend the reach of the Haussmann event?

In the same way as the Commune did not destroy ‘the dominant group and its politicians’, Haussmann was unable to rid planning of the influence of property owners. Badiou tells us that what the Commune destroyed was in the ‘order of subjective incapacity’. Could it be that Haussmann’s trace is of the same order? A hypothesis here is that his attempts to establish planning as that which has a political mandate to regulate private activity for the common good showed that regulation could be done. In the same way as in the quote above, the existence of the inexistent – here planning as regulation – destroyed the subjection of planning to the wealthy and powerful. Even though Haussmann was defeated in his planning practice, his actions showed that regulation could be achieved through sheer political will. This conception of regulation as only occurring within the short-lived temporality of events, when structural considerations can be displaced by political will illustrates the fundamental difficulty of achieving autonomous regulation. Regulation only seems possible in certain singular periods in which the political will exists to supersede private interests. This interpretation of regulation is in sharp contrast to that of Benevolo, who concludes his history of the European city with this statement: "et des villes». L’absolutisation de l’existence politique ouvrière – l’existence de l’inexistant –, convulsive et écrasée, n’en a pas moins détruit une forme essentielle de sujétion, celle du possible politique prolétarien à la manoeuvre politicienne bourgeoise. Que cette sujétion soit, un siècle plus tard, reconstituée – ou plutôt, sous le même nom de «démocratie», réinventée – est une autre histoire, une autre séquence de l’histoire tourmentée des vérités. Reste que là où se tenait un inexistant est venue la destruction de ce qui légitimait cette inexistence. Ce qui, au début du XXe siècle, occupe la place du mort n’est plus la conscience politique ouvrière, mais – même s’il ne le sait pas encore – le préjugé quant au caractère naturel des classes et quant à la vocation millénaire des propriétaires et des riches à détenir le pouvoir étatique et social. C’est cette destruction qu’a accompli pour l’avenir la Commune de Paris, jusque dans l’apparente mise à mort de sa propre surexistence» (Badiou 2006: 400).
“The quality of urban space depends upon a fluctuating balance between spontaneity and regularity, and upon a combination of public control and private initiative that can either succeed or fail, stimulate creative change or paralyse it” (Benevolo 1993: 217).

What our study of Haussmann’s planning practice has shown is that such a balance is by definition unachievable, public control and private initiative are two forces drawn by their fundamental principles in opposite directions. Benevolo is forgetting that setting a balance between public control and private initiative is not a decision that can be taken on purely technical criteria. What we have seen is that this decision is fundamentally political and one which is highly conflictive. Regulation cannot be called for in abstraction of political considerations, it must be actively fought for in the face of the opposition of private interests. The case of Haussmann seems to have informed Benevolo’s account in a way that differs from the one presented in this thesis. Here is the lesson Benevolo takes from Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State:

“This outcome exacted an enormous price in terms of economic and spatial balance; from that date property speculation exerted an excessive influence on urban transformations. The remedy, however, was not the permanent public management of the entire urban terrain, a solution incompatible with the European tradition and one which led to disastrous results in socialist Eastern Europe. What was needed instead was the re-establishment of an appropriate degree of competition between public and private interests. It is a problem of degree, like many other of the problems associated with the European tradition. This new combination of public and private interests proposed in the first decades of the twentieth century operates along chronological as opposed to spatial lines; it calls for public intervention at those moments when the urban fabric undergoes change, while giving free rein to private initiative in the intervening periods” (Benevolo 1993: 217-218).

The call for public intervention during periods of change seems to be a direct consequence of his careful study of Haussmann’s public works. But we have seen that there is an important distinction between public intervention and public control: while public intervention took place over the whole period of Haussmann’s tenure in the form of the public works (street and park creations, infrastructure projects, erection of monuments, etc), public control in the sense of the regulation of private activity was lost with Haussmann’s defeats in the Council of State. Badiou’s concepts thus give us a different understanding of regulation. It can’t be decided from a high vantage point as the most suitable course of action to be taken in a particular situation. It must be decided axiomatically and fought for continuously. And it is evanescent. This is because there is a clear difference between
the existence of regulations (in legislation, as manifested by regulatory tools or by an investment in individuals and institutions) and the political will that is needed to carry out regulatory functions. This is because regulation – as manifested by Badiou’s will – exists in opposition to socioeconomic necessity. It is by definition a curtailment of private activity and thus a brake on the circulation of capital. Regulations may exist, but that does not guarantee in any way that they are being used as envisioned. And those who decide to use them to their full power will soon feel reactive and obscure subjects breathing down their necks. Regulation is evanescent because it relies on will and will is easily broken by the power of socioeconomic necessity.

Viewed as an episode in which regulation was successful at bracketing out structural considerations, Haussmann’s planning practice has a much wider reach: the urban fabric is not the only aspect of human existence where political will is needed to break the hold of the wealthy and powerful over regulatory bodies. While we have no guarantee that Haussmann was the original event of this type, his use of Saint-Simonian principles allowed him to forge a planning practice that kept property owners at bay for the first years of his tenure. Because of the breadth of the changes that Paris went through both during the period in which his planning practice was effective and after, it is very difficult to determine whether the effects that did occur in Paris in the latter period of his tenure as prefect could have been avoided if he had maintained control over private initiatives. Seen through the lens of Haussmann as a defeated regulator, the quote from Harvey below offers some elements to answer this question:

“Haussmann’s strategy was two-pronged. If he could not find development companies willing or resourceful enough to undertake the massive projects he had in mind, he used the power of the state to mobilize the financing and undertake the brunt of the work. The city could then recapture the betterment values derived from its own investments, thereby becoming, as critics complained, the biggest speculator of all. Private landowners stood by aghast as benefits they felt legitimately belonged to them poured into the city’s coffers. It was on this basis that they mobilized their successful legal counterattack of 1858. But Haussmann’s second and preferred strategy was, in the end, even more powerful and compelling. It was, he argued, “best to leave to speculation stimulated by competition’ the task of “recognizing the people’s real needs and satisfying them.” To this end he forged an alliance between the city and a coterie of financial and real estate interests (builders, developers, architects, etc.) assembled under the umbrella power of “associated,” or “finance,” capital. It was, therefore, a well-organized form of monopolistic competition that he had in mind. And it had to be this way, because the city subsidized the works through donations of land rather
than money. In this way, as Zola put it, “the new streets were speculated in as one speculates in stocks and shares”. The land itself, as well as the buildings upon it, became a form of fictitious capital. To draw the benefits, however, companies had to be large enough to orchestrate their own externality effects (by, for example, holding onto the prime real estate locations that rapidly improved in value as they developed the land around) and to be able to wait (sometimes several years) for the rise in land value to materialize. The renewal put large concessions in the hands of a few capitalists who had privileged access to the state (including funds from the newly founded Credit Foncier) and behind whom stood a phalanx of financiers (like the Pereires) who had a plethora of other interests, including insurance, construction, and building management companies. It was associated, or finance, capital applied to land development, an innovation born out of the particular structures of Empire and opposed to traditional forms of landownership and use. But the very nature of their operations restricted the financiers to meeting the demand for housing and commercial premises from the affluent classes or large-scale commerce. Largely active in the center and west, they played a crucial role in the formation of the predominantly bourgeois quarters that adorned Haussmann’s new boulevards” (Harvey 2006a: 133).

While Haussmann may have portrayed the move from the first to the second of these strategies as a choice after the fact, we are now in a position to understand it as a choice that was forced on his planning practice by property owners and the courts. What this thesis has shown is that this first strategy carried within it a politics of regulation and that it is this political principle that was destroyed. We can thus understand this second strategy as the option Haussmann had to fall back on in order to complete the works planned for Paris. This second strategy relied on another mechanism to control private initiatives: conglomerates of capital much larger than even the wealthiest of property owners in the letters investigated in this thesis. The effects this strategy are well-laid out by Harvey. It seems as though only capital of this size could have had such a large impact on the urban fabric. Van Zanten also recognises a more intangible difference between these two periods:

“In the early 1860s, when the initial projects of 1853 were finished or well underway, something happened—scale changed, focus was lost, coordination lapsed—as new projects were undertaken that were inflections, elaborations, and extensions of the original project....which the amazing success of the first decade of work made seem possible, but that now got out of control and led to the financial crisis of 1867–1869 and thence to Haussmann’s ouster” (Van Zanten, in Harvey 2006a: 97).
Though we cannot go as far as to say that Haussmann’s first strategy had positive results on the city, it is fair to highlight that the second period had a catastrophic impact on the urban and social fabric of the city. More work is needed to establish the way in which Haussmann’s regulatory planning practice impacted on the social and urban fabric of Paris in the first years of his tenure as compared to the impact it had once it was stripped of its regulatory powers. While this is not possible with the archival resource used here (it ends abruptly in 1859), the archival material explored at the Paris Municipal Archives in the process of finding this resource may offer us a way to establish how the impact of these two practices differed. The strength of that material is that it extends across all subdivisions of the city over the full period of Haussmann’s tenure.

ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS: AN EVALUATION OF BADIOU

We now have a single question remaining: does the framework we have developed and put to use in this investigation, based on Badiou’s concepts, allow for a fruitful investigation of empirical material? We have seen that the main issue we encountered was to create a means to connect the theoretical discussions of the first two chapters with the analysis of empirical material. This was made more difficult by the fact that the philosopher we are engaging with disregards the social sciences altogether, and thus does not himself think through the possible linkages his approach could have with them. This has meant that we had to create that link ourselves by exploring the roots of his concepts for possible connections with the world outside of philosophy.

A discussion relegated to the annexes of his *Logics of Worlds* hinted at a possible solution to this problem: it was concerned with the relation between philosophical and non-philosophical operations. It was argued that his concepts could be invoked to investigate political sequences that fulfilled two conditions: they led to a break in the structure of appearances of a given world, and carried within them a political practice that affirmed the principle of equality. Any empirical investigation that was based on Badiou’s concepts could only be justified for historical sequences that fulfilled these two conditions. While it was not hard to imagine the possibility of a break existing within the public works, the demand for a practice predicated on the principle of equality seemed to pose more of a difficulty. A hypothesis such as the influence of Napoleon III’s Saint-Simonian leanings on Haussmann needed to be tested empirically. After an extensive search through the Municipal and National Archives, a coherent set of letters sent to the Minister of the Interior complaining about Haussmann’s planning practice was found.
This archival resource was of immediate interest because it contained traces of a conflict between Haussmann and the two protagonists that had been identified through the literature, in chapter 2, as having played a role in Haussmann’s defeat in the Council of State: property owners and the imperial regime. The letters were sent during Haussmann’s first years as Prefect of the Seine and could thus offer evidence as to the events that led to his defeats in the courts. These three boxes were found to contain 115 administrative cases of varying complexity. The individuals represented within the letters in these cases were found to originate from a diverse set of tenants, property owners and representatives of collectives. While they were a minority of the Parisian population at that time, they are the public that the literature indicated this investigation needed to rely on. With a theoretical framework, and a method to utilities it to analyse empirical material, the letters allowed me to offer theoretical answers to the difficulties faced by the authors discussed at length in chapter 2.

Daumard’s insistence that an analysis must focus on a single point within the endless sequence of structural conditions of society – that of the influence of Haussmann on property owners – was thus maintained by using Badiou’s framework. We focused on a particular world, and within that world on a single nexus of opposition that coalesced around a set of principles and the oppositions these principles generated. This stayed true to her bracketing out of all other social facts to analyse one set of events in detail. In the same way, her message that social groups strongly constrain the actions of others was borne out by the way in which Haussmann’s planning practice was defeated by the combined effort of property owners and the imperial regime. Where this analysis departs from hers is on the fundamentally political nature of the events under consideration. Her focus on the economic interests that motivated both Haussmann and property owners to act in opposing directions seems to be only the manifestation of the political rationales we have discussed here.

Conceptualising Haussmann as a state revolutionary allowed us to break the black box of Gaillard’s state by allowing an understanding of Haussmann as operating from within the state apparatus but not necessarily in accord with its political goals. It is precisely the confrontation between Haussmann and property owners which broke the alignment between Haussmann and the imperial regime. This was made possible by an understanding of opposition that is conceptualised as the relative positioning vis-à-vis political principles. Her insistence on the essential link between the public works and the imperial regime was thus made operable by inscribing the imperial regime itself within this schema of positions. What has been lost of Gaillard’s approach is her framing of the public works as
pitting city against state. Through Badiou, we have had to restrict our scope to the world of planning alone and to a particular section of the Parisian population.

What has our investigation revealed about Harvey’s approach to the public works? First, it has shown that his study is concerned with the latter part of Haussmann’s tenure. By focusing on Haussmann as a state revolutionary, it emerged that his actions early in his tenure were aimed at taking control of the circulation of land-based capital in order to make all property owners contribute to the public works in relation to the benefits they were drawing from it. This makes it impossible to use the term Haussmannisation to refer to the overall process of change that occurred through the public works: this would obscure the conflicts that marked the period and is predicated on the absence of agency during transformations within the social order. Harvey may be quick to point out that the struggle between Haussmann and property owners was merely an inter-elite conflict linked to the process through which land was freed from feudal ownership and inserted within a land-based circulation system.

But Badiou’s notion of the state revolutionary can help us understand that this was not merely an inter-elite struggle, but a genuine attempt by an individual (and the department he administered) within the state apparatus to use state power to break the hold of the wealthy over the organisation of the city. That the overall result, following Haussmann’s defeat is the same as Harvey’s does not mean that we should obscure this conflict under the process of Haussmannisation. On the contrary, it is essential to highlight that the final outcome was the result of a victory of the idea of private property over Haussmann’s particular articulation of the Saint-Simonian notion of equality. And that, as mentioned above, this victory led to the obscuring of Haussmann’s attempts to break the hold of the wealthy over planning. Knowing that this conflict occurred allows us to look for other instances of it, other moments when the idea of private property was pit against a conception of equality compatible with the local historical mode of politics.

This investigation has also revealed that Harvey is not well equipped to deal with the sequences Badiou is concerned with, political sequences which create a rupture in a world through their affirmation of equality. This framework constructed on the basis of Badiou’s concepts should thus not be seen as an alternative to Harvey’s, but as a complement: the analyses that can be conducted using them concern different temporalities, with theoretical assumptions that are adequate only for the analysis of one particular temporality. Harvey cannot say anything about the temporality of the event (witness his difficulty in dealing with the Commune, which he never studies in isolation but
only as the endpoint of complex transformations), but Badiou says nothing of that which lies outside of the event either (there is just the permanent existence of an unequal and unjust structure of appearances – what Sartre called ‘inhumanity’). We can see here a limit to Harvey’s attempts to “rebuild Marxian meta-theory in such a way as to incorporate an understanding of spatio-temporality (and socio-ecological issues) in its frame. This has me writing against those uses of spatiality and of spatial metaphor whose sole purpose seems to be to take unreconcilable difference, incommunicability, particularity, and irreducible individualism and fix them in stone” (Harvey 1996: 9). What we can glean through the use of Badiou’s concepts is that the realm of the event is precisely a moment that is defined by a fundamental difference and incommunicability with a world that is theorised as the development of the whole. Events are particularities and are irreducibly idiosyncratic.

Through the collection of statements expressing emotions in the letters we were able to isolate the principles that were at the heart of the opposition between Haussmann and property owners. This then allowed us to reconstruct Haussmann as a state revolutionary, whose articulation of the four determinations of equality, authority, confidence and will indicated that his actions aimed for the contribution of all property owners to the public works. This gave us the missing portion of Benevolo’s account that helps us understand how a conservative Haussmann and a conservative Napoleon III could be in opposition over a planning practice. Haussmann’s invocation of Saint-Simonian principles, predicated on the equality of all individuals in the face of the needs of the collective, turned property owners against the imperial regime. While Napoleon III’s Saint-Simonian leanings may have remained just that, we saw that Haussmann built a planning practice based on the utopian socialist’s work that had a strong impact on those it targeted. Napoleon III had to sacrifice a planning practice that was predicated on the same set ideas he had once harboured but which now threatened the basis of his rule. Of the two, the evidence emerging from the empirical material indicates that it was Haussmann who was the Saint-Simonian.

Finally, we can see that Sutcliffe’s account evaluates Haussmann’s planning practice only in its second stage, once it had been stripped of its regulatory capability. It is thus not surprising that he deems it not to have amounted to comprehensive planning. What our account shows is how difficult his concept of comprehensive planning is to achieve: a planner who takes advantage of a particular context to impose regulation through sheer political will can very easily lose this capacity. While the material we have analysed cannot tell us about his planning practice as a whole (as detailed in chapter 3, planning interventions for sanitation rationales are not featured in the archival resource
we used), and while the lack of regulation of worker housing he identifies remains an issue, Haussmann’s attempts to reinstate and even embolden the 1807 law is an indication that he did exercise the negative mode of planning. What Sutcliffe’s framework seems to miss, and here he is quite similar to Benevolo, is that the use of the negative mode of planning is not something that can merely be decided in abstraction of the political realities on the ground. What this misses is the fundamental resistance of the wealthy and powerful to any attempt at regulating their actions on the urban fabric.

This shows us that the framework based on Badiou’s concepts that has been put to the test in this thesis allowed for the creation of new knowledge on a historical sequence that has been studied extensively. It has introduced a series of concepts which departs from those of the scholars discussed in this thesis. Two main assumptions found his concepts. The first is that change needs to be investigated in its own right, not as a stage in the progressive development of the whole. The second is that agents and the principles that guide their actions are responsible for change, not impersonal processes. Our investigation in this thesis has been built on taking these two assumptions seriously and on testing the impact they could have on interpretations of a historical event. While the methods used here could be refined and more alternative perspectives could be brought in, there is a sense in which the general orientation of this investigation has allowed for some new avenues of research. In this sense, the confrontation between Badiou’s philosophy and an empirical investigation can be said to have been fruitful.

We can thus take this investigation of Haussmann’s planning practice as another type of social scientific perspective that can fruitfully complement those discussed in chapter 2. We have seen how Badiou’s concepts and the assumptions at the heart of his project can complement Harvey’s work on the public works as the liberation of capital and its circulation through urban space. If we take the historians we have discussed more generally, we can see how this investigation has distanced itself from wider material conditions to focus on a very specific political opposition and how its findings were then put into relation with other (still hypothetical) sequences in which a similar opposition was/is recreated. This also meant that this study takes a very different approach to the comparative use of the public works. At the moment, such comparative use is impossible. The task is now to find other sequences to which Haussmann’s planning practice can be compared. But

\footnote{Shapiro notes: “Neither the sporadic philanthropic paternalism of Napoleon nor the regulatory activities of the Commission on Unhealthy Dwellings substantially improved conditions of working-class housing in Paris during the Second Empire” (Shapiro 1985: 55)}
we have also seen how different this approach is from those that focus on other aspects of the public works, be it infrastructure, material culture, planning traditions, experiences of modernity or their relation to the Commune. These approaches are all concerned with the wider conditions within which the public works are inscribed and thus have a broader, historical understanding of the public works. The type of investigation attempted here is in a way less concerned about the public works as a historical episode and instead seeks to discover the aspects of this episode that can be seized by concepts that have a transhistorical existence. Through this lens, Haussmann’s planning practice is conceptualised as a practical answer to a problem still with us today: how do we reclaim urban space from power and capital? Haussmann’s particular answer was appropriate to the time and place in which he faced this problem. His solution was thus influenced by the historical mode of politics of that particular period: the Saint-Simonian mode. Other answers, in different worlds, will develop other answers in the particular historical mode of politics in which they find themselves.

What Badiou gives us are thus formalisms that allow us to identify, in particular historical sequences, the temporally and spatially specific articulations of a transhistorical figure, be it the mass rebel or the state revolutionary. Could it be that a social science that follows Badiou’s assumptions inherently adheres to encompassing comparisons? As described in chapter 2, these comparisons place “different instances at various locations within the same system, on the way to explaining their characteristics as a function of their varying relationships to the system as a whole” (Tilly 1984: 83). We would have to replace the notion of system, which is antithetical to the foundational role Badiou places on multiplicities and thus his claim that there is no such thing as whole or totality. What could replace this notion here is that of the faithful subject. If there is no subject, then there can be no localisation. If, however, we investigate a political sequence in which an individual or group breaks the existing structure through a practice that affirms equality, then localisation is possible. This would mean that the type of faithful subject can be identified through its relation to the state, the historical mode in which it finds itself and the particular articulation of the four determinations it constructs as truth. Haussmann can thus be localised within the multiplicity of possible state revolutionaries by his particular articulation of the four determinations within the Saint-Simonian mode. The notion of encompassing comparison is helpful in that it directly emphasises the transhistorical perspective at the heart of Badiou’s work. What sort of faithful subject can we expect to see in our current world? What is the current historical mode of politics and how can the determinations be articulated within it? These can be answered empirically by looking, in all possible worlds, at all possible times, for one of the particular political sequences we have discussed in this thesis.
**FINAL THOUGHTS**

As a conclusion, we can posit three ways in which the relation established between Badiou’s concepts and unexplored archival material in this thesis allowed us to complement the existing literature on the public works by cutting Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect into two distinct phases. First, this meant that we could offer a different explanation for the paradox presented in chapter 2: why was Haussmann defeated when he is generally thought to have enjoyed the full support of Napoleon III and to have acted in the interests of capital and power? Our answer lies in Haussmann’s conceptualisation as a state revolutionary whose will substituted regulation and control for the laissez-faire regime of socioeconomic necessity and whose equality abolished the privileged access to the planning system of power and capital. These ideas were back by authority in the application of regulations and confidence in the ability of property owners to contribute in equal relation to the benefits they received. This practice was antithetical to what had passed as planning in the July Monarchy and constituted a genuine break in the world of Parisian planning. It is this planning practice, what we can now conceptualise as Haussmann’s particular articulation of the four determinations in the world of Parisian planning, that went against the ideas that property owners and the regime both held in highest esteem: socioeconomic necessity, the privilege of the power and capital, the flexibility of regulations and the primacy of private interests. Historically, this may have unfolded as the decision by the Minister of the Interior to side with property owners in the interest of the regime. Trans-historically, we can view this as the resistance to and the destruction of the construction of a truth in a world.

Second, it has offered a method to introduce Badiou’s concept of the subject into empirical social science. Of all subjects, the faithful subject has most to offer theoretically. It brings together a number of ideas that may seem incompatible: those of Sartre about the possibility of undetermined agency, those of Althusser on the defence of materialism (Bosteels 2011: 50), those of Plato concerning the adequation between the good life and acting in line with a powerful idea, those of Rancière about the need to assume rather than postulate equality and those of Lacan that made possible a formal theory of the subject that is in opposition to the subject as a register of experience, as a moral category or as an ideological fiction (Badiou 2006: 55-56). So what does this concept of the subject offer to the social sciences, in what way is it new? For one, it allows the researcher to bracket out the wider material conditions existing at a particular place and time and to really focus on what individuals were capable of achieving in those rare moments where power was there to be seized. Badiou’s subjects are not agents of wider social forces or material conditions; they are subjects of the truth they are constructing in a particular world, out of the particular materials
existing in that world (and this includes social forces and material conditions). What this differences means is that subjects can take stock of existing conditions and fashion a practice that best allows them to act, in an affirmation of equality, within them. The agency of a faithful subject is precisely that of not being an agent. The difficulty of achieving and sustaining these rare moments in practice should not be a reason to ignore their empirical existence. Badiou reminds us that short-lived failures may be more instructive than lifeless decades, especially if their existence is suspended in time, ready to be invoked in another such burst of political activity.

And third: our investigation allows Haussmann’s experience to be generalised in a way that is very different from that offered by the concept of haussmannisation. Through the trace of the event, we saw that Haussmann could be understood as the destruction of the subjection of planning to power and capital. While haussmannisation offers the promise of taking the experience of Paris and using it to understand what occurs in another city, we saw that this could present a risk of drawing comparisons across experiences that were not comparable: a process is used to fixate the sense an event expresses, but there is no guarantee this sense will be similar across scholars. What Badiou gives us, on the other hand, may be a more limited ability to generalise from experience and compare different contexts, but it does so in a way that very clearly establishes what we can expect to compare. A political event, in its particularity, is only the playing out in a singular context of an opposition between a practice predicated on equality and those who oppose it. We have drawn out from an epistolary exchange between property owners, Haussmann and the Minister of the Interior during Haussmann’s first years as Prefect of the Seine the playing out of this opposition in the field of planning as regulation. A planner sought to make all property owners contribute to improvements that would benefit the city as a whole, but these property owners resisted this pretension on the basis of the sanctity of property rights. Can this opposition between the regulation of private activity for the good of the collective and the inalienable freedom of individuals to act in abstraction of this collective be found elsewhere? Badiou’s notion of the state revolutionary gives us a way to think through the consequences of taking the notion of regulation seriously. It can thus help us understand those fleeting moments when political will was used to break hierarchies of power and capital.
WORKS CITED


**OTHER WORKS CONSULTED**


APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: ARCHIVAL RESOURCES USED AND CONSULTED

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

F^cIII Seine 31: Prefect’s Reports on Public Spirit and Elections (1789-1877)
F^2 2708 Seine: Departmental Administration, General matters, Road Network – Sewers (1852-1897)
F^I 1158: Departmental Administration, General matters, Road Network (Year X-1869)
F^I 1159*: Departmental Administration, General matters, Road Network (Year X-1869)
F^I 1160*: Departmental Administration, General matters, Road Network (Year X-1869)
F^I 1161*: Departmental Administration, General matters, Road Network (Year X-1869)
F^II Seine 33: Departmental Administration, Departmental Series, January 1855 - April 1856
F^II Seine 34: Departmental Administration, Departmental Series, May 1856 - December 1857
F^II Seine 35: Departmental Administration, Departmental Series, 1858-1861
F^II Seine 36: Departmental Administration, Departmental Series, Inquiry on the Extension of the Boundary of Paris, 1859
F^II Seine 37: Departmental Administration, Departmental Series, Inquiry on the Extension of the Boundary of Paris, 1859
F^8 213: Sanitary Police, 1855-1872

MUNICIPAL ARCHIVES

Archives of the 12 former Arrondissements 1791-1859 (references below are to boxes):

Former 1st Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 106, VI.6.2.V.D6 107, VI.6.2.V.D6 109, VI.6.2.V.D6 110
Former 2nd Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 174
Former 3rd Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 211
Former 4th Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 286
Former 5th Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 336
Former 6th Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 358, VI.6.2.V.D6 361
Former 7th Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 368
Former 8th Arrondissement: none available
Former 9th Arrondissement: none available
Former 10th Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 554, VI.6.2.V.D6 555, VI.6.2.V.D6 556
Former 11th Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 637
Former 12\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.2.V.D6 678, VI.6.2.V.D6 679, VI.6.2.V.D6 680

\textit{Archives of the 20 current Arrondissements 1791-1925 (references below are to boxes)}:
Current 1\textsuperscript{st} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 790
Current 2\textsuperscript{nd} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 984
Current 3\textsuperscript{rd} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 1128
Current 5\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 1384, VI.6.3.V.D6 1385, VI.6.3.V.D6 1386
Current 6\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 1480
Current 7\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 1565
Current 8\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 1706
Current 9\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 1787
Current 10\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 1904
Current 11\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 2014
Current 12\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: none available
Current 13\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: none available
Current 14\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: none available
Current 15\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 2197
Current 16\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: none available
Current 17\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: VI.6.3.V.D6 2353
Current 18\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: none available
Current 19\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: none available
Current 20\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement: none available

\textbf{NEWSPAPER ARCHIVES}

The issues of the following newspapers were consulted. They were accessed through the Bibliothèque Nationale de France’s Gallica digital library:
Journal des Débats: 1852-1858
La Presse: 1853-1861
APPENDIX 2: TRANSLATIONS OF THE ARCHIVAL MATERIAL USED

1 «Ce n’est pas d’aujourd’hui que l’opinion du Conseil des bâtiments civils se montre défavorable aux mesures de voirie inspirées à l’administration par une sure appréciation des besoins de la ville. Son influence n’a pas peu contribué à former la jurisprudence étroite et mesquine qui prévaut encore au Conseil d’État en matière de maisons sujettes à retranchement et qui permet à la plupart de ces maisons de braver impunément la loi de 1807.»

2 «Les architectes (fort occupés pour la plupart de constructions particulières) qui composent le Conseil des Bâtiments Civils et qui y apportent un esprit prévenu contre l’action municipale.»

3 «Monsieur le Ministre, un arrêté préfectoral en date du 26 Janvier dernier m’a refusé l’autorisation de faire exécuter quelques parties de ravalement sur le pignon de droite d’une maison située à Paris rue Saint Christophe n° 4, dont je suis propriétaire. Je prends la liberté d’en appeler de cette décision auprès de Votre Excellence. Le refus qui m’est fait est fondé sur le mauvais état du mur droit dont le ravalement m’est interdit: mais un examen attentif fera reconnaître aisément, je n’en doute pas, que ce mur n’est pas dans l’état de dégradation et d’avarie qu’a signalé le Bureau de Consultation de la Grande Voirie, qu’il se trouve, au contraire, dans des conditions de solidité qu’en assurent la durée pour longtemps encore et qu’enfin les craintes qu’a pu faire concevoir sa construction apparente sont, en réalité sans fondement. Tel est l’avis consciencieux et souvent exprimé de plusieurs architectes et je n’hésite pas, Monsieur le Ministre, à vous attester ces faits sur mon honneur. Une autre considération mérite d’être soumise à l’attention bienveillante de Votre Excellence: propriétaire d’une maison située rue d’Arcole n° 18, je ne suis devenu acquérant de celle du n° 4 de la rue Saint Christophe, qui y est adossée, qu’en vue de la réunir à la première et de faire de l’une le complément, en quelque sorte, indispensable de l’autre. Ce projet n’a pas cessé d’être le mien, mais des événements contraires en ont jusqu’ici empêché la réalisation: au moment où je m’apprête à l’exécuter, l’obligation de détruire une partie considérable d’une de ces maisons me serait extrêmement pénible, en même temps qu’elle porterait un grave préjudice à mes intérêts, puisqu’elle m’enlèverait, sans compensation possible, une portion de ce qui constituent mon avoir, plus que modeste, et me ferait perdre tout le fruit du sacrifice que je me suis imposé. Qu’il me soit permis, Monsieur le Ministre, de me confier dans l’équité de Votre Excellence, et de la prier, à cette occasion, d’agréer l’hommage de mes sentiments de haute considération et de dévouement respectueux. Baron Martineau»

4 «Monsieur le Ministre, vous m’avez fait l’honneur de me communiquer le 11 Mars dernier, afin d’avis, la réclamation qui vous a été adressée par Monsieur le Baron Martineau Deschenets contre un arrêté du 26 Janvier 1854, par lequel je lui ai refusé l’autorisation de faire exécuter sur le pignon droit de sa maison rue Saint Christophe n° 4. Voici, Monsieur le Ministre, le motif de ce refus. Suivant le plan d’alignement de la rue Saint Christophe ordonné le 13 Ventose an VII, la maison ci dessus désignée est passible d’un retranchement d’environ 2m60. Les architectes commissaires voyers ayant reconnu que le mur mitoyen à droite en saillie sur la maison alignée était en mauvais état, sillonné dans sa hauteur par deux larges crevasses et construit en moellons et garnis avariés et désunis; que les deux assises basses de la jambe étaient détruites dans une profondeur de 10 cm et que les travaux projetés auraient pour effet de consolider ce mur; j’ai cru devoir y interdir toutes espèces de réparations. Monsieur le Baron Martineau expose, à l’appui de sa réclamation que ce mur pignon n’est pas dans l’état de dégradation et d’avarie indiquées par les agents de mon administration, qu’ils se trouve dans des conditions de solidité qui en assurent la durée pour longtemps encore, qu’enfin les craintes qu’a pu faire concevoir ce mur sont en réalité sans fondement, et ne sont pas partagées par plusieurs architectes qu’il a consultés. Il termine en cherchant à faire valoir des motifs d’intérêt privé dont je n’ai pas à apprécier le mérite. J’ai de nouveau fait examiner cette affaire et les agents de mon administration ont reconnu, comme la première fois, que ce mur pignon de la maison de Monsieur Martineau est en très mauvais état. Je crois devoir ajouter que déjà en 1847 ce mur était bouché et crevassé, et que depuis, l’état des choses n’a fait qu’empirer, au point que le Préfet de Police en poursuit la démolition pour cause de péril. En conséquence, je ne puis que persister dans les motifs de mon refus, et j’ai l’honneur de vous proposer de rejeter la réclamation du Sieur Martineau.»
«Lorsque je les ai élevées (il y a 30 ans) ils l'ont été sous les yeux et consentement de messieurs les agents voyers et de l'autorité qui a imposé la condition de ne pas les lier au ou avec le mur de clôture. Cette obligation a été scrupuleusement remplie. L'alignement adopté depuis 30 ans, ainsi que le nivellement de la rue de Picpus, soumet ma ligne de clôture à un retraitement de deux mètres.»

«Le 20 novembre dernier j'ai reçu une notification datée du 15 du même mois et m'indiquant le rejet de ma demande seulement en ce qui concerne la construction d'une pile à rez-de-chaussée qui ne peut être autorisée qu'en la mettant à l'alignement. La construction de cette pile étant la base de l'opération que je voulais faire, en me refusant sa construction, c'était m'ôter toute possibilité d'amélioration pour un immeuble dont j'ai fait l'acquisition l'année dernière en vue seulement d'une transformation que mon architecte m'avait déclarée possible. Ce refus me causant un préjudice irréparable, je viens Monsieur le Ministre, vous prier de prendre ma réclamation en considération.»

«Propriétaire d'une maison à Paris boulevard de l'Hôpital n°92 (entre la rue du Marché aux Chevaux et le marché), j'ai demandé à Monsieur le Préfet de la Seine l'autorisation de réparer l'angle nord et à refaire les enduits extérieurs dégradés à la distance d'un mètre de cet angle, par les filtrations d'une gouttière - ce bâtiment est sujet à recullement d'environ un mètre. Par son arrêté du 7 Janvier 1854, Monsieur le Préfet de la Seine a refusé en 'considérant que le mur de face de la maison est fortement crevassé dans la partie à droite en saillie; que cette partie est entièrement détachée du mur de face à gauche; que plusieurs moellons sont détruits dans la partie basse; que la réparation projetée aurait pour résultat de réconforter ledit mur et, par conséquent, de retarder l'élargissement de la voie publique au droit de la propriété. Nonobstant ces motifs, dont les termes sont un peu forcés en ce qui touche aux conséquences de la crevasse élargie par moi en vue d'une réparation que je ne m'attendais pas à voir refuser, j'ai l'honneur de solliciter de Votre Excellence la même autorisation, en la priant de l'étendre jusqu'au rétablissement d'une portion longue d'environ deux mètres, de l'entablement dégradé par les filtrations de la même gouttière et placée directement au dessus des dégradations d'enduits signalées.»

«Monsieur le Ministre, j'ai fait construire une grande maison ayant sa principale façade sur la rue de Rivoli et ses faces latérales sur la rue des Bourdonnais et Bertin Poirée. Je n'ai rien négligé pour faire de ma maison l'une des plus belles de la rue de Rivoli; je me suis en toutes choses conformé aux règlements de la voirie. J'ai cru devoir profiter de la position des deux dosserets de cheminée placés à distance égale de l'axe de ma façade sur la rue de Rivoli, pour y faire une terrasse dépendante d'un petit salon que j'ai pu disposer dans la hauteur légale: les deux dosserets et la face du petit salon forment un arrière corps qui laisse place à l'air qui circule la bien plus que si le comble avait existé là comme dans les autres parties de la maison. Dans cette position et à deux mètres de la face, j'ai cru pouvoir y placer une marquise qui est restée en place longtemps, quand à mon grand étonnement j'ai reçu l'ordre de la préfecture de la supprimer. Dans cet état des choses, je viens vous prier, Monsieur le Ministre, de vouloir bien ordonner une visite sur les lieux, afin de vérifier, si en considération de la place occupée par cette marquise dans la rue de Rivoli, qui jouit d'une très grande étendue, d'une plus grande hauteur que celle de la marquise, il n'y a pas lieu de m'accorder l'autorisation de la conserver, d'autant plus que sans nuire aucunement elle est indispensable à l'ensemble de la décoration de ma maison, l'une des plus belles de la rue, ainsi, sous le rapport de l'art et de l'utilité, sans causer de préjudice à quoi que ce soit, je réclame, Monsieur le Ministre, de votre bienveillance, l'autorisation de la conserver.»

«J'espère donc Monsieur le Ministre que vous voudrez bien, vu le grand tort qui en résulterait pour moi, ne pas exiger la démolition dudit coffre de cheminée, en continuant de m'accorder comme par le passé, la tolérance de cette construction dont la démolition, comme j'ai l'honneur de vous le rappeler serait pour moi très préjudiciable et pour la ville de fort peu d’importance.»

Votre Excellence qui daignera autoriser, comme il advient d'ordinaire, lorsque, comme dans cette circonstance, il est impossible de se plier davantage à l’exigence des règlements sur la matière, la tolérance pure et simple de ce qui existe.»

«Si contre tout espoir ma demande n’était pas favorablement accueillie par Votre Excellence, je serais réduit à la
nécessite, pour conserver cette petite tête de pan de bois d’y adosser, ainsi qu’il est de mon droit, fut elle même sans emploi, une lucarne en charpente dont elle serait alors la jouée; mais ce serait pousser un propriétaire dans ses derniers retranchements et l’entraînerait dans des dépenses qui n’auraient d’autre effet que de retirer à la rue plus de jour et d’air, et d’arriver par conséquent à un résultat complètement opposé à celui que recherche l’administration»

12 «Les Sieurs Mayer frères pensent qu’il peut être fait exception à la règle dans les circonstances qui leur sont particulières: ils exposent que leur construction se trouve sur un boulevard large et bien aéré et non sur une de ces rues étroites, qui, disent-ils, ont motivé le règlement qui leur est appliqué; que la suppression de leur établissement, la où il existe, leur causerait un grand préjudice ainsi qu’à leur personnel; enfin ils font valoir leur titre de photographes de Sa Majesté l’Empereur en faveur de leur demande. Mon avis sur cette réclamation ne peut différer en rien de ceux que j’ai été appelé à exprimer dans des affaires identiques. Sans doute les cages vitrées établies en dehors de la hauteur légale, peuvent ne pas présenter autant d’inconvénients dans des voies publiques d’une grande largeur que dans des rues étroites, mais les lettres patentes de 1784 ont précisément déterminé la hauteur des maisons proportionnellement à la largeur des rues et fixé à 17m53 la plus grande hauteur permise dans les voies publiques de 10m de largeur et au dessus. Or la maison de M Chayer ayant déjà un excédent de hauteur considérable, et la construction des Sieurs Mayer augmentant encore cet excédent, l’Administration ne peut certainement autoriser l’exception sollicitée, quelle que soit la largeur de la voie publique et quelles soient aussi les raisons d’intérêt privé invoquées par les demandeurs.»

13 «Je ne veux pas chercher à prouver mon innocence à cet égard, les locataires comme moi sont, je crois, tous bien ignorants des règlements de voirie. Quoi qu’il en soit, je suis convaincu que j’ai fait une contravention, mais, Monsieur le Ministre, permettez moi de faire un appel à la bonté et aux sentiments qui distinguent Votre Excellence en faveur des beaux arts et des artistes, pour la conservation de ma terrasse couverte»

14 «L’administration devrait, sans tenir aucun compte de ces projets et sans faire la moindre observation, donner toutes les autorisation de construire demandées par les particuliers dans la limite des anciens alignements, alors même qu’une instruction serait ouverte en vue de l’adoption de plans nouveaux. Jusqu’à l’apparition de décret déclaratif de l’utilité publique de ceux-ci, chacun devrait être complètement libre de faire toutes les combinaisons possibles pour en entraver l’exécution ultérieure; l’administration seule aurait les mains liées. Dans ce système, les délais inévitables de l’instruction seraient un temps réservé aux intérêts privés toujours fort habiles et fort actifs, pour spéculer sur les projets soumis aux enquêtes, et o坞drir toutes les fraudes imaginables à l’encontre des intérêts généraux et municipaux. Ce serait le cas, ou jamais, d’invoquer la maxime summum jus, summa injuria.»

15 «Le refus que j’ai fait au Sieur Bergeront de la permission d’élever des constructions neuves sur la rue de Longchamps ne lui cause pas de préjudice appréciable. Enfin, il y a une véritable analogie entre sa position et celle d’un propriétaire frappe d’alignement par mesure ordinaire de voirie qui ne peut ni réparer ni améliorer son immeuble, mais qui continue à en jouir dans l’état où il se trouve et qui n’est admis à se prévaloir des spéculations qu’il ne peut pas y faire, pour réclamer une indemnité. Quoiqu’il en soit, l’Administration Municipale dont c’est le droit et le devoir d’apporter aux anciens plans de la ville toutes les améliorations que réclament les besoins nouveaux de la circulation, serait paralysée dans son action si, en présence d’un projet bien décidé dans la volonté souveraine, mais non encore décrété, elle pouvait être contrainte à autoriser des constructions qui viendraient y faire obstacle. Le droit qui appartient à l’Administration Municipale de délivrer des alignements ne relève que de l’autorité supérieure à laquelle est soumise l’approbation des projets. Les plans arrêtés qui fondent la règle de ce droit ne sont un lien qu’entre l’administration supérieure qui les approuve et l’Administration Municipale qui les a proposés et qui les exécute; les tiers ne sauraient s’en prévaloir ni les entraîner lorsqu’il est reconnu, aux divers degrés de la hiérarchie administrative qu’ils doivent être mis à exécution. D’ailleurs les alignements prescrits aux constructeurs par l’Administration Municipale sous le contrôle de l’autorité supérieure ne peuvent être attaqués par la voie contentieuse. L’application de ces principes a été faite par vous, Monsieur le Ministre, en maintes occasions, notamment dans l’affaire Radiguet (lettre du 1er Décembre 1855). J’ai l’honneur d’appeler la sérieuse attention de Votre Excellence sur cette affaire dont la solution peut avoir une grande influence sur l’avenir des opérations de voirie.»
«La loi de 1807 avait confondu deux cas, qui sont cependant bien distincts, celui où il s’agit d’élargir, de rectifier une rue déjà existante, et celui où il s’agit d’ouvrir une rue nouvelle, une nouvelle voie de communication. Dans les deux cas, on procédait par voie d’alignement; on confondait alors le droit d’alignement et celui d’expropriation. La loi de mars 1810 vint promptement faire cesser cette confusion; nonobstant, l’Administration a encore voulu quelquefois invoquer le droit de frapper d’alignement, c’est à dire d’interdit, les immeubles que des voies nouvelles devaient traverser, lorsque les ressources financières ne lui permettaient pas de procéder par voie d’expropriation. Mais les lois de 1833 et 1841 sont venues mettre un terme à ce qui était une véritable spoliation, et fixer sur ce point des principes désormais incontestables. L’erreur de Monsieur le Préfet est de vouloir encore appliquer aujourd’hui une législation qui ne saurait plus l’être: cette erreur n’est pas permise; cette doctrine ne fait plus question.»

Il y a d’abord une différence profonde entre l’alignement des voies publiques existantes et la création, l’ouverture de voies nouvelles de communication. Lorsqu’il s’agit de voies existantes, l’utilité publique, est pour ainsi parler, déclarée, et l’arrêté d’alignement produit par lui même des effets immédiats […] nous devons reconnaitre que, dans tous les cas, il ne peut plus bâtir sur la parcelle comprise dans l’alignement […] L’ouverture de voies nouvelles rentre dans les travaux d’utilité publique, pour l’exécution desquels la loi a consacré et organisé la faculté d’expropriation, en imposant aux particuliers le sacrifice de leurs droit de propriété, moyennant une indemnité préalable

«Les prétentions que révèlent l’arrêté de refus contre lequel se pourvoit l’exposant, sont donc profondément illégales et injustes, ajoutons qu’elles sont aussi excessivement dangereuses, qu’elles ouvrent la porte au plus périlleux arbitraire. Les entreprises qui sont considérées comme d’utilité publique se sont multipliées à l’infini. L’expropriation est devenue par suite d’une pratique journalière, facile, faut-il dire regrettable. Cependant, elle semble déjà n’être plus suffisante, et l’arrêté du 28 Mai 1856 n’est-il pas un indice de la pente sur laquelle on pourrait être entraîné?»

Contre ces tendances, les recours contentieux ne seraient qu’un remède impuissant. Tout dépend de l’Administration elle-même, de l’esprit qui la dirige, de la pensée à laquelle elle obéit. Nous avons pleine confiance dans les lumières et dans la sagesse de l’autorité, dont la scrupuleuse observation des principes et des lois a été toujours la règle suprême, et qu’il saura, nous n’en doutons pas, prévenir les dangers signalés à son attention.»

Il est illogique d’approuver un plan d’alignement et de déclarer en même temps que les propriétaires ne sont pas tenus de s’y conformer. Une disposition aussi extraordinaire est certainement contraire à l’esprit et la lettre des lois et ordonnances rendues en matière d’alignement

Le refus qui m’est fait est fondé sur le mauvais état du mur droit dont le ravalement m’est interdit; mais un examen attentif fera reconnaître aisément, je n’en doute pas, que ce mur n’est pas dans l’état de dégradation et d’avarie qu’a signalé le bureau de consultation de la Grande Voirie, qu’il se trouve, au contraire, dans des conditions de solidité qui en assurent la durée pour longtemps encore et qu’enfin les craintes qu’a pu faire concevoir sa construction apparente sont, en réalité sans fondement.»
«Nous ne pouvons supposer à un magistrat occupant un poste aussi éminent, que celui de la Préfecture de la Seine, les sentiments d’un homme vulgaire, mais alors pourquoi cette résistance à nous laisser sortir de la position déplorable que lui même nous a faite ?»

«Votre Excellence jugera sans doute à propos de prendre l’avis du Conseil des Bâtiments Civils sur cette affaire; dans ce cas, je lui désigne pour concourir à la visite des lieux, messieurs Charles et Dupeyrat commissaires voyers divisionnaire et d’arrondissement. Afin que cette visite contradictoire ne puisse laisser aucun doute après elle, je prierai Votre Excellence de vouloir bien inviter le Conseil des Bâtiments Civils à mettre préalablement Mr Ernault en demeure de faire enlever totalement les enduits qui recouvrent la partie du rez-de-chaussée signalée comme défectueuse.»

«Et cela suffit à Monsieur le Préfet de la Seine pour qu’il s’aroge le droit exorbitant de frapper, dès actuellement, ces terrains d’une servitude de ne pas bâtir, et par conséquent, d’une sorte d’interdit. Est-ce là une doctrine sérieuse, ou une erreur échappée par mégarde, et purement accidentelle? Il ne nous est pas permis, malheureusement, de croire à une erreur accidentelle et par conséquent c'est pour nous un devoir de rappeler les principes qui ont été méconnus».

«Vous ne permettrez pas Monseigneur que l’histoire puisse dire, sous le règne de l’Empereur Napoléon III et sous le Ministère de Monsieur Billault la justice fut remplacée par la partialité la plus inique au profit des riches, et dans votre sollicitude bienveillante vous daignerez ordonner une inspection des lieux par une personne compétente qui reconnaîtra aisément l’injustice révoltante que la Préfecture de la Seine laisse commettre volontairement au préjudice de la Dame Maurin propriétaire de la maison 18 (il y a urgence car on va bâtir).»

«D’abord, Monsieur le Ministre, il suffit de lire cet arrêté pour juger qu’il est au contraire complètement applicable dans l’espèce car il fait défense à tout particulier de poser des choses saillantes sur les routes (et rues) sans en avoir obtenu la permission, et aucun acte de cette nature n’a été délivré ou même demandé par le sieur Lamy, soit même par le sieur Cartand. D’ailleurs l’ordonnance du 24 décembre 1829 porte article 10 que les permissions d’établir de grands balcons ne seront accordées que pour les rues de dix mètres de largeur et au dessus, et qu’ils ne pourront dans aucun cas être construits à moins de six mètres du sol de la voie publique. Cet article est tellement clair et précis qu’il ne peut donner matière à interprétation, car il a prévu en même temps les besoins de la circulation et de la salubrité, le danger qui peut résulter de l’établissement d’un balcon à une hauteur moindre que celle fixée, et il n’a admis aucune exception. Rien ne me semble donc pouvoir empêcher une démolition contre laquelle on ne réclame que dans un intérêt privé.»

«Nous avons eu lieu d’être étonnés de voir que dessus le plan parcellaire déposé à la Mairie de Neuilly le 4 octobre dernier nos propriétés ne figuraient plus ni nos noms parmi ceux des personnes expropriées. Le tort que la Ville de Paris nous a fait est immense. Nous sommes restés sans construire, ni louer, ni fabriquer pendant tout le temps qu’a duré la signification. Notre position est des plus tristes d’autant plus que la Ville n’a pas encore levé l’opposition qui pèse sur nous. Le 10 novembre nous avons envoyé une signification amiable à la Ville de Paris afin qu’elle eut à s’entendre avec nous soit pour l’acquisition de nos propriétés soit pour l’indemnité qu’elle nous doit, nous sommes encore en attendant sa réponse. Il nous est impossible de rester plus longtemps dans la position malheureuse où nous trouvons.»

«Enfin, ces démolitions, constructions, améliorations dont j’ai l’honneur de proposer àVotre Excellence, en répondant à toutes les demandes, à tous les besoins de la vie, à toutes les classes de la société, à toutes les bourses, à tous les états, à toutes les exigences des emplacements, embelliraient Paris, apporteraient l’aisance, le bonheur, l’union chez l’ouvrier, plutôt que les cités, et donneraient du travail pour des années entières, à des milliers de bras oisifs faute d’occupation pour tous; sans oublier Montmartre, les buttes Chaumont et tous les terrains incultes, abandonnés, en souffrance, etc. Quand les bras travaillent, l’esprit ne pense pas. Où est le cœur est gai, il n’y a point d’idées noires.»
32 «Ce mur ne présente nulle part, à aucun point, ni perte d’aplomb, ni inclinaison, ni déviation de son alignement, point de déchirures, ni lézardes, point de bombardement. C’est donc à tort que la dénomination mauvais état y a été donnée, elle n’est pas vraie. Elle est injuste.»

33 «On sera frappé du bien être, de la propreté et de l’ordre qui règnent dans cette petite république, et nous sommes persuadés que loin de nous susciter des difficultés auxquelles l’esprit de critique n’est peut être pas suffisamment étranger, les personnes expérimentées chargées de l’examen des lieux estimeront que les constructions peuvent et doivent être conservées dans l’état très rassurant ou elles se trouvent aujourd’hui.»

34 «Je regrette, Monsieur le Ministre, que Votre Excellence ait décidé que ma demande ne pouvait être accueillie, et j’en suis d’autant plus peiné que je ne puis me ranger aux raisons qui vous ont été données, et qui ont motivé votre décision. Je vois la question sur son terrain même, Monsieur le Préfet la voit lui de son cabinet et sur plans.»

35 «Lorsque de pareilles charges pèsent sur des particuliers, est-il juste de venir encore les aggraver par des retranchements inutiles? L’exposant ne saurait le penser et il espère que Votre Excellence voudra bien partager cette opinion.»

36 «Si le sieur Porcher était forcé de faire disparaître ces constructions qui ont été élevées de ses deniers personnels, il éprouverait un préjudice considérable, mais il ose espérer que Votre Excellence, Monsieur le Ministre, daignera accueillir favorablement la demande, ou plutôt la prière, qu’il lui adresse.»

37 «J’espère, Monsieur le Ministre, que vous voudrez bien après avoir fait examiner cette affaire, ne pas permettre qu’un décret déjà fort onéreux pour les propriétaires, reçoive une application brusque sans être motivé justement sur les termes et l’esprit du décret.»

38 «J’ajouterais que la pétitionnaire me semble exagérer de beaucoup le préjudice que pourra lui causer la reconstruction d’un simple mur de clôture et que la suppression de quelques arbres qui se trouvent près du mur à démolir, sera insignifiante dans un vaste jardin où il s’en trouve d’autres. Des considérations, toutes d’intérêt privé, ne sauraient, au surplus, faire fléchir les règlements, surtout en matière d’alignement.»

39 «D’ailleurs, l’administration ne peut se préoccuper de la cause qui a détérioré cette pile; elle ne peut faire une distinction que la loi n’a pas faite. Il est de principe qu’une construction soumise à retranchement, quelle que soit la cause de sa ruine ne peut être reconstruite que sur l’alignement arrêté légalement; et si le Sieur Masson reconstruit un point d’appui aussi essentiel qu’une pile, il en résulterait une réconfortation évidente et directe du mur de face. Quant au renvoi des locataires et au chômage de l’usine, le Sieur Masson n’en a parlé que pour les besoins de la cause; car l’état de la maison devait lui faire pressentir qu’il serait obligé de la reconstruire dans un délai rapproché.»

40 «Il fonde sa demande sur la situation de ses affaires qu’il présente comme très embarrassée et il invoque (ce qui est étranger à la cause) les services qu’il aurait rendus comme citoyen en plusieurs circonstances. Vous reconnaitrez sans doute, Monsieur le Ministre, que les protestations de bonne foi du pétitionnaire ne sauraient être admises en présence des faits ci-dessus rappelés. M Desanges n’a acquitté les droits de voirie qu’en exécution de la décision du Conseil de Préfecture et, dans les conditions où il s’est placé, il ne peut, à aucun titre, prétendre à la faveur qu’il sollicite.»

41 «Cet arrêté, Monsieur le Ministre, cause un grave préjudice à mes intérêts; aucun décret, ni règlement de voirie, donne le droit à Monsieur le Préfet de m’empêcher de construire sur ces terrains.»

42 «Ce motif est-il suffisant pour faire rejeter la demande de la compagnie, et la mettre dans l’impossibilité d’user de sa propriété? La compagnie, se fondant sur son droit, ne saurait l’admettre.»
«Vous dire, Monsieur le Ministre, de réformer l’arrêté du 9 septembre 1856, qui vous est déféré, et faisant ce qu’il aurait du faire, m’autoriser à entreprendre sur la façade de ma maison sise Rue de la Pépinière 42 et 44, les travaux indiqués dans ma demande de Juillet 1856.»

«C’est assez dire que j’insiste vivement auprès de Votre Excellence pour lui faire rejeter la réclamation de Monsieur de Lucay dont l’intention évidente est de profiter de la situation de son immeuble pour rançonner la ville. L’adoption du système de ce propriétaire aurait pour résultat de rendre de plus en plus onéreux l’exécution des projets d’utilité publique adoptés pour Paris, exécution qui devient cependant de plus en plus nécessaire, depuis que l’accroissement de la population de cette ville y rend insuffisant l’espace habitable et justifie les efforts de l’administration municipale pour y assimiler par des permis intelligents les terrains encore vagues à la circonférence.»

«Il ne s’agit donc pas de projets vagues et d’une exécution lointaine, mais de projets ayant un caractère de certitude et d’actualité qui ne permet pas à l’administration municipale de tolérer des constructions qui pourraient en rendre l’entreprise plus difficile et plus onéreuse. N’est-ce pas d’ailleurs rendre service aux particuliers eux-mêmes que de leur interdire l’édification de bâtiments neufs qui se trouveraient presque immédiatement frappés de servitudes de grande voirie par l’effet d’un décret d’utilité publique?»

«Je crois donc, Monsieur le Préfet, devoir vous prier dans l’intérêt de la ville, de vouloir bien examiner ma demande primitive ainsi que la présente, et de faire déclarer, en égard aux améliorations que demande ce quartier, l’expropriation pour cause d’utilité publique, des terrains nécessaires pour l’ouverture de la rue que j’ai désignée sous nom de rue Odessa.»

«Je crois donc, Monsieur le Ministre, devoir vous prier de vouloir bien examiner ma demande primitive ainsi que la présente, et de faire déclarer, en égard aux améliorations que demande ce quartier, l’expropriation pour cause d’utilité publique, des terrains nécessaires pour l’ouverture de la rue que j’ai désignée sous nom de rue Odessa.»

«Je prie Votre Excellence de croire que j’ignore l’architecte et le propriétaire de cette maison, qui si l’on ne s’en occupe sérieusement, sera bientôt choisie pour modèle de maison nouvelle (vu son grand produit). Il ne faut pas moins que l’intéret général pour me déterminer à prendre sur le temps de Votre Excellence, mais il me semble qu’il lui appartient de proposer contre cette agglomération détestable une loi nouvelle fixant le nombre des étages dans toute la surface du sol français.»

«Les détails sommaires du projet du Sieur de Voisins, insuffisants s’il s’agissait d’en faire l’examen, permettent cependant de juger que l’auteur se fait illusion sur la valeur d’une telle idée. Je ne pense donc pas, Monsieur le Ministre, qu’il y ait lieu de s’en occuper au point de vue qui me concerne.»

«C’est pourquoi, Monsieur le Ministre, je viens près de vous réclamer votre assistance qui puisse me permettre d’user de mon droit de propriétaire en m’autorisant de terminer ces constructions dont l’interdiction me cause un préjudice considérable.»

«D’ailleurs, l’administration ne peut se préoccuper de la cause qui a détérioré cette pile; elle ne peut faire une distinction que la loi n’a pas faite. Il est de principe qu’une construction soumise à retranchement, quelle que soit la cause de sa ruine ne peut être reconstructe que sur l’alignement arrêté légalement; et si le Sieur Masson reconstruit un point d’appui aussi essentiel qu’une pile, il en résulterait une réconfortation évidente et directe du mur de face. Quant au renvoi des locataires et au chômage de l’usine, le Sieur Masson n’en a parlé que pour les besoins de la cause; car l’état de la maison devait lui faire pressentir qu’il serait obligé de la reconstruire dans un délai rapproché.»

«Tous les travaux prescrits tendent à la consolidation de constructions faites par Mme Bonardi en dehors de toutes les règles de l’art; les améliorations exécutées depuis la condamnation ne peuvent suffire pour remédier à un état des choses défavorable: en vain Mme Bonardi s’appuie-t’elle sur le trouble que les travaux peuvent causer à elle et à ses locataires, c’est une question très secondaire devant laquelle les règlements ne peuvent faillir. L’administration doit au contraire se montrer sévère à l’égard de spécULATEURS qui, sous le prétexte de
faire des logements d'ouvriers, élèvent au plus bas prix possible, dans les quartiers populeux, de mauvaises constructions dont l'existence, limitée d'avance à la durée d'un bail, compromet la vie des locataires.»

53 «Ces deux demandes ayant été successivement refusées par Monsieur le Préfet, sous prétexte que les moellons formant cette pile sont apparentes et désunies, le propriétaire soussigné vient vous prier, Monsieur le Ministre, de vouloir bien ordonner une courte visite, par messieurs les architectes du Conseil des Bâtiments Civils, persuadé qu'il est: que les murs de la dite maison étant droits et bons, et que la pile dont s'agit ne formant pas un point d'appui essentiel de la construction, que de plus, une partie d'enduit à refaire ne constituant pas un travail réconfortatif, messieurs architectes du Conseil des Bâtiments Civils, après examen, concluront à l'autorisation de sa demande.»

54 «Les architectes (fort occupés pour la plupart de constructions particulières) qui composent le Conseil des Bâtiments Civils et qui y apportent un esprit prévenu contre l'action municipale»

55 «Cette nouvelle voie présentera un certain intérêt pour la circulation, en établissant un parcours direct de la rue de Berlin au chemin de ronde, dans un vaste quartier où presque toutes les communications sont interceptées par la tranchée des chemin de fer. Elle aura en outre l'avantage de diviser utilement de grands terrains, aujourd'hui sans emploi et d'y appeler la spéculation du bâtiment.»

56 «Divisant le vaste quadrilatère circonscrit par les avenues des Champs Elysées et Montaigne, la rue Marbeuf et la rue projetée des Invalides au boulevard d'Alma, le percement proposé présenterait des avantages incontestables, soit comme nouveau moyen de communication soit à cause des façades qu'il assurerait aux constructions nouvelles dans un quartier où la spéculation du bâtiment n'attend pas autre chose pour prendre une grande activité.»

57 «La rue que l'on demande ne serait d'aucune utilité pour la circulation publique, puisqu'elle ferait double emploi avec l'avenue Montaigne et la rue Marbeuf située à peu de distance. Son débouché sur les Champs Elysées entrainerait des dépenses considérables, ce qui en rendrait l'exécution fort incertaine. En définitive, c'est aussi une réclamation d'intérêt privé à laquelle on ne saurait donner suite que dans le cas où elle serait accompagnée de propositions sérieuses, ce qui n'est pas le cas.»

58 «Au point de vue de la circulation générale, la voie nouvelle n'aurait aucune importance, réunissant la barrière des fourneaux à l'avenue Montaigne et la rue Marbeuf située à peu de distance. Son débouché sur les Champs Elysées entrainerait des dépenses considérables, ce qui en rendrait l'exécution fort incertaine. En définitive, c'est aussi une réclamation d'intérêt privé à laquelle on ne saurait donner suite que dans le cas où elle serait accompagnée de propositions sérieuses, ce qui n'est pas le cas.»

59 «Il est évident que les propriétaires de ces terrains ont le plus grand intérêt à l'ouverture de cette rue qui augmenterait immédiatement dans une proportion notable la valeur de leurs immeubles. En démolissant son bâtiment et en livrant le passage de la rue le Sieur Wetzel se trouverait avoir sur la nouvelle voie une façade de 66 mètres qu'il ne manquerait pas d'utiliser, ainsi qu'il le déclare. Dans cet état des choses, la Ville de Paris ne saurait consentir à l'ouverture de la nouvelle voie, qu'autant que tous les propriétaires riverains se détermineraient à faire l'abandon gratuit du sol nécessaire à sa formation, et qu'ils consentiraient en outre, à supporter les frais de premier établissement de pavage, de trottoirs, de clairage, de constructions d'égouts, et à se conformer à toutes les autres conditions que la ville est dans l'usage d'imposer pour l'ouverture des rues nouvelles sur les propriétés particulières.»

60 «J'ignore si le gouvernement attacherait de l'importance à posséder un second Champ de Mars; c'est un point qui n'est pas de ma compétence.»

61 «La maison dont on demande la démolition est en effet destinée à disparaître en exécution du plan arrêté: mais les ressources de la ville étant affectées en totalité, comme vous le savez, Monsieur le Ministre, à de grands travaux d’ensemble, je ne puis rien en distraire pour des opérations de détails dont la nécessité n’est pas urgente.»

62 «C'est assez dire que j'insiste vivement auprès de Votre Excellence pour lui faire rejeter la réclamation de Monsieur de Lucay dont l'intention évidente est de profiter de la situation de son immeuble pour rançonner la
ville. L'adoption du système de ce propriétaire aurait pour résultat de rendre de plus en plus onéreux l'exécution des projets d'utilité publique adoptés pour Paris, exécution qui devient cependant de plus en plus nécessaire, depuis que l'accroissement de la population de cette ville y rend insuffisant l'espace habitable et justifie les efforts de l'administration municipale pour y assimiler par des percements intelligents les terrains encore vagues à la circonférence.

63 «J'espère, Monsieur le Ministre, que vous voudrez bien après avoir fait examiner cette affaire, ne pas permettre qu'un décret déjà fort onéreux pour les propriétaires, reçoive une application brusque sans être motivé justement sur les termes et l'esprit du décret.»

64 «Lorsque de pareilles charges pèsent sur des particuliers, est-il juste de venir encore les aggraver par des retranchements inutiles? L'exposant ne saurait le penser et il espère que Votre Excellence voudra bien partager cette opinion.»

65 «Depuis quelques années, nous sommes accoutumés à observer, dans l'ouverture des nouvelles voies publiques, une pensée dominante, qui, des temps reculés avait été l'objet des méditations du petit nombre, mais qui, maintenant, est devenue un axiome vulgaire et que nul ne peut plus méconnaitre; c'est qu'il faut, avant toutes choses établir de grandes voies de communication, rapprochant, par la brièveté des parcours, des localités qui ne communiquaient précédemment que par de longs et difficiles détours.»

66 «Le maintien de la propriété privée, son inviolabilité, et le respect des lois qui la protègent, sont des intérêts généraux d'un ordre supérieur à ceux qui appellent par exemple l'établissement de voies nouvelles de communication, et la propriété privée ne serait plus réellement inviolable, les lois qui la conscarcent et fixent les conditions de l'expropriation ne seraient plus qu'une lettre morte, le jour où il suffirait de simples projets administratifs pour dépouiller les propriétaires des droits et des avantages constitutifs de la PP elle-même [...] Monsieur le Préfet s'arrache le pouvoir de lui dire: tu ne bâtiras pas, parce que l'administration a le projet d'ouvrir des voies nouvelles qui exigeraient le sacrifice de la propriété! Il est impossible de songer sans effroi aux conséquences qui suivraient inévitablement le triomphe, même incomplet, de semblables doctrines, conséquences matérielles d'abord, conséquences morales bien autrement graves ensuite»

67 «J'ose espérer qu'il suffira d'avoir signalé à Votre Excellence l'illégalité de l'arrêté de Monsieur le Préfet et l'importance du tort irréparable qui en résulterait pour moi, pour que cet arrêté soit rapporté et que je reprenne dans les termes légaux la libre disposition de ma propriété.»

68 «Que l'arrêté de refus de Monsieur le Préfet de la Seine constitue une violation flagrante du décret du 11 août 55 et des articles 544 et 1719 du code Napoléon. Par ce motif, le soussigné supplie Votre Excellence de lui rendre justice en reformant l'arrêté de refus de Monsieur le Préfet et en permettant d'office l'exécution des travaux demandés.»

69 «En attendant je dois conserver la libre disposition de ma chose; menace d'expropriation n'équivaut pas à expropriation. Monsieur le Préfet de la Seine est gardien tout à la fois des intérêts financiers de la Ville de Paris et de ses intérêts généraux en ce qui touche l'amélioration de la voie publique. Vous ne permettrez pas qu'il abuse de ses attributions en matière de Grande Voirie pour servir, en violent le droit de propriété ce qu'il croit être l'intérêt pécuniaire de la ville, et qu'il sacrifie les grands intérêts aux petits.»

70 «Si la Ville n’était pas en mesure de mettre immédiatement à exécution ce projet d’utilité générale, il y aurait tout intérêt pour les finances à ce que le prolongement de la rue dite Passage et Dominique fut néanmoins décrété, attendu que, par l’adoption de son tracé, les propriétaires de terrains non bâtis, que la nouvelle rue traverserait, ne pourraient plus y élever de constructions. Les soussignés, en leur qualité de propriétaires riverains dans cette partie de la rue St Dominique, ont l’honneur, en conséquence, de prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien appeler les sens paternels de Sa Majesté l’Empereur sur cette amélioration d’ordre public. P.S.: S’il devenait nécessaire de prendre l’engagement de ne pas construire sur les terrains non bâtis les pétitionnaires sont prêts à le souscrire.»
Cette maison étant occupée au mois de Juillet par 20 petits ménages, supprimer ces locations dans un moment où les petits logements sont si rares surtout dans ce quartier, c'est aller directement contre le but que se propose le gouvernement en encourageant les constructions nouvelles de cette nature.

Elle est donc arrivée à la limite de sa durée; or, sa reconstruction étant obligatoire, quelle que soit la qualité du retraitement, l'administration ne peut autoriser même temporairement une réparation qui d'ailleurs pour être efficace, ne consisterait pas seulement dans un ravalement partiel mais encore dans la reconstruction des piles, trumeaux, etc. Ce serait établir un précédent d'autant plus fâcheux que dans presque tous les quartiers, on pourrait évoquer les motifs mis en avant par Madame de Montgomery.

En droit strict la Préfecture de la seine a raison. Mais la permission n'étant demandée qu'à titre de tolérance, pour 18 mois seulement, et d'un autre côté la maison dont il s'agit contenant 20 logements d'ouvriers, il semble qu'un refus serait trop rigoureux et même impolitique dans la crise actuelle de la rareté et de la cherté des petits logements.

Mais votre administration, Monsieur le Ministre, veut ce que veut la mienne: sauvegarder l'exécution des plans arrêtés par l'empereur.

Ainsi que je vous l'ai déjà plusieurs fois fait observer, Monsieur le Préfet, un semblable motif ne saurait être admis. Il est impossible de refuser à ce particulier l'autorisation de construire sur l'alignement actuel sous prétexte qu'il est question d'en établir un nouveau. Au surplus, le décret que vous avez sollicité et qui est soumis en ce moment à l'examen du Conseil d'Etat, ne frappe pas la propriété du Sieur Coqueret des servitudes de voirie. Il se borne à vous autoriser à l'acquérir à l'amiable, ou par voie d'expropriation. Tant que vous n'avez pas de cette faculté, vous ne pouvez vous opposer aux travaux qui y sont projetés. D'après ces explications, j'ai reconnu, Monsieur le Préfet, avec le Conseil General des Bâtiments Civils que la réclamation du sieur Coqueret devait être accueillie, et je vous invite à lui délivrer la permission qu'il sollicite.

Le côté gauche de la Seine est tellement délaissé que nous ne savons si nous appartenons à Paris ou à la Province. Pourquoi donc une telle injustice? Ne payons nous pas aussi nos contributions de ce côté que du côté droit: si l'Empereur et vous saviez les ennemis que Monsieur Haussmann engendre contre le gouvernement, vous modifierez sans retard son travail. Sur les onze députés qui ont été nommés l'année dernière à Paris, Monsieur Haussmann est toujours l'auteur d'au moins dix. Que Monsieur le Ministre veuille bien s'informer si les faits relatés ci-dessus sont exacts. Milles excuses si nous ne signons.