Success versus failure in local public goods provision: Council and chiefly governance in post-war Makeni, Sierra Leone

Anna Workman

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Development of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2013
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

Post-war Sierra Leone faces a deep deficit in the supply of basic public goods which is detrimental to quality of life and remains a risk factor for future conflict. The government, under substantial donor influence, seeks to address this deficit through democratic decentralization. However, evidence of the link between decentralization and improved public goods provision remains weak. I approach the public goods deficit from a different angle; rather than assuming that an imported solution is needed, I consider what can be learned from existing patterns of public goods provision.

At the core of this study is a comparison of ‘success versus failure’ in local public goods provision in the city of Makeni, with the aim of understanding key dynamics that lead to divergent outcomes. While I set out to focus on cases of public goods provision led by two main categories of local government actors—elected councils and chiefs—I found that in all four cases, citizens played a substantial role. I therefore analyze the cases as instances of coproduction of public goods.

I find that coproduction is an important means of maintaining a basic supply of local public goods when state capacity is weak. With this in mind, I draw on the case study evidence to develop a set of propositions about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in contemporary Sierra Leone. These propositions are suggestive of an alternate institutional approach to addressing the public goods deficit—one that is based on the development of workarounds for key obstacles rather than institutional overhaul. However, coproduction is no ‘magic bullet’; it has troubling implications for social equality and the development of state capacity over the longer term and thus judgements about the desirability of coproducive arrangements are likely to involve complex trade-offs.
Acknowledgements

My thanks must go first and foremost to all those who supported the research project while in Sierra Leone: my research assistants, particularly Emmanuel Morlai Conteh, Edward Kanu and Augusta Koroma, who were my closest companions in carrying out this project; the team at ENCISS who provided valuable guidance, their friendship and a much appreciated desk; and Lansana Kamara, who translated and transcribed interviews conducted in Temne. Most of all, I must thank all those in Makeni and Freetown who generously gave up their time to talk to me about local government.

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<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>All People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPP</td>
<td>Africa Power and Politics Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Butchers’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Chief administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civil Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHO</td>
<td>Chiefdom health officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Common pool resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DecSec</td>
<td>Decentralization Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHO</td>
<td>Environmental health officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPRTU</td>
<td>Ghana Private Road Transport Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Historical institutionalism/institutionalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International financial institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRCBP</td>
<td>Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSDP</td>
<td>Justice Sector Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LG Act</td>
<td>Local Government Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local government actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Makeni City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLG</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUYOG</td>
<td>Makeni Union of Youth Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPDC</td>
<td>Provisional National Defence Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCI</td>
<td>Rational choice institutionalism/institutionalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Sociological institutionalism/institutionalist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLPP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLRA</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Roads Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU</td>
<td>Traders’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDC</td>
<td>Ward development committee</td>
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Maps of Sierra Leone

Image P.1 Political map of Sierra Leone (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2005)
Image P.2 Map of districts in Sierra Leone (Wikipedia, 2013)
**Local government timeline**

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<th>Developments in local government</th>
<th>National regimes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freetown City Council established</td>
<td>1808  Declaration of a Crown Colony on the Freetown peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>1896  Declaration of a Protectorate in the interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Hut Tax’ War</td>
<td>1898</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freetown City Council dissolved and replaced by a municipal board</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1937  Introduction of a ‘native administration’ system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectorate Assembly and district councils established</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing anti-chief demonstrations in eastern Mendeland</td>
<td>1946-1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Town Council established</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-chief uprisings in the North</td>
<td>1955-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Townships Ordinance passed, providing a basis for the creation of further urban councils</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makeni Town Council established</td>
<td>1961  Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister Milton Margai (SLPP) in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Developments in local government</td>
<td>National regimes</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local councils temporarily suspended and replaced with committees of management</td>
<td>1962-1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 Albert Margai (SLPP) becomes prime minister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 Siaka Stevens (APC) becomes prime minister but is immediately displaced in a coup; he finally assumes office in 1968 after a counter-coup</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local councils temporarily suspended and replaced with committees of management</td>
<td>1967-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 Sierra Leone declared a republic and Siaka Stevens (APC) becomes president</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>District councils dissolved; urban councils replaced with committees of management</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978 Sierra Leone becomes a one-party state under the APC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1985 Joseph Saidu Momoh (APC) becomes president</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1991 The RUF invade Sierra Leone from Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992 The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) seizes power in a military coup</td>
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<td>Developments in local government</td>
<td>National regimes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (SLPP) becomes president after the restoration of multi-partyism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) seizes power in a military coup and joins forces with the RUF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paramount Chiefs Restoration Programme (later Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme), funded by DFID</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>President Kabbah (SLPP) publicly declares the war over and maintains power in national elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Government Act passed</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
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<td>First local council elections</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second local council elections</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chieftaincy Act passed</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Devolution of powers to councils re-launched</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third local council elections</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ernest Koroma (APC) becomes president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ernest Koroma (APC) wins a second term</td>
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</tbody>
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CHAPTER ONE: The Public Goods Deficit in Sierra Leone

A decade after the end of the civil war (1991-2002), many Sierra Leoneans continue to lack access to basic public goods. The stakes of improving the provision of public goods in Sierra Leone are high; as I shall show, such a step is essential to improving the quality of life of the poorest Sierra Leoneans and to neutralizing a potential driver of future conflict. However, Sierra Leone’s post-war deficit of public goods has deep economic and political roots. The effects of decades of chronic under-investment are pervasive and resilient traditions of corruption have developed within the public sector. The Sierra Leonean state, heavily influenced by donor agencies, is addressing these challenges through a programme of public sector reform, one vital component of which is the decentralization of much public goods provision to a newly established tier of elected local councils. This approach, while consistent with the rather ideological ‘good governance’ agenda, lacks clear evidentiary support.

In this study, I attempt to set aside the tenets of ‘good governance’ and donor assumptions about the effects of decentralization in Sierra Leone. Instead of asking whether decentralization in Sierra Leone will result in better public goods provision, I focus on existing patterns of public goods provision and ask what could be learned from them. More precisely, I compare cases of relative success and failure in local public goods provision led by newly-reformed local councils and chiefs to see what they can tell us about the characteristics of arrangements which are productive of public goods, yet are not predicated on the full realization of ‘good governance’ reforms. While analyzing these cases, it became clear that they were all examples of coproduction of public goods—goods provided through the joint efforts of local government and citizens. Working upwards from these cases, I develop propositions about the conditions under which coproduction of local public goods is more likely to succeed in the current social and political climate in Sierra Leone, which is generally inhospitable to the provision of public goods. I reflect on the significance of these cases to theories of coproduction and explore the potential offered by coproduction as a means to address Sierra Leone’s public goods deficit. I also consider the policy

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1 In adopting this approach, I was influenced by colleagues in the Local Governance strand of the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP), a five-year research programme funded by the UK’s Department for International Development. I discuss the relationship of this study to the APPP in greater detail below.
implications of a more empirically grounded and gradual approach to improving local public goods provision and consider how such an approach could be applied in the context of local government reform in Sierra Leone.

In this introductory chapter, I begin by establishing the significance of the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone and exploring its economic and political roots. I then examine the rise of democratic decentralization as one of the principal donor-backed solutions to improve local public goods provision, consider the evidence in support of the link between decentralization and the supply of public goods, and explore an alternative direction for research and policy aimed at addressing the public goods deficit. Finally, I describe the ‘success versus failure’ research design and methods applied in this study, and provide an overview of the thesis as a whole.

1.1 Origins and significance of the public goods deficit

The classic economic definition of public goods holds that public goods are non-excludable (once produced, nobody can be excluded from their benefits) and non-rivalrous (one person’s enjoyment does not diminish another’s). In practice, few goods meet these criteria when strictly applied. In recent studies of public goods provision in developing countries, more flexible definitions have been used. In her study of local public goods provision in China, Lily Tsai (2007, p. 5) uses the term public goods “to refer to products that have what economists call ‘positive externalities’ for the public – that is, they benefit everyone or almost everyone in society regardless of whether people pay for them or not”. Like Tsai, I use the term public goods inclusively to refer to both those goods that approximate the classic economic definition of public goods and those with positive externalities. My focus is on local public goods, whose non-excludable benefits tend to extend only to the boundary of the locality studied.

There are two important features of public goods that are of interest in this study. First, such goods are vulnerable to the free-rider problem. When individuals cannot be excluded from the benefits of a good, they have a strong incentive not to contribute to its provision, hoping that others will carry the responsibility without them (Ostrom, 2005, p. 24). This results in a collective action problem—although everybody would be better off by contributing to the good, the incentives for any

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2 I thank Tim Kelsall for recommending Tsai’s work on this topic.
3 Although in chapter six I draw an analytical separation between these two sub-types.
individual to do so are weak; for collective action to succeed, some kind of mechanism is usually needed to impose costs on free-riders, making the practice less attractive. Second, and related, public goods are generally not well-suited to private, profit-seeking provision, as it is difficult for private actors to charge all those who benefit from these goods and to exclude those who do not pay from their benefits once they have been provided (Batina & Ihori, 2005, p. 2). Government intervention is therefore often needed to ensure an adequate supply of public goods, although government-led provision continues to face challenges in determining what level of these goods to provide and how to finance them (Batina & Ihori, 2005, p. 1; Ostrom, 2005, p. 24).

The public goods deficit in Sierra Leone is well documented. A recent national survey found that approximately 25 percent of children lacked access to a primary school and 67 percent to a secondary school; 55 percent of Sierra Leoneans lacked access to medical services; and 61 percent to safe water (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2007, p. 26). Sierra Leone lingers at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index, ranked 180 out of 187 participating countries (United Nations Development Programme, 2011, p. 16). Public goods and services are of obvious importance to the quality of life in Sierra Leone—literacy (40.9%) and life expectancy (47.8 years) remain low and maternal mortality (970:100,000) and under-five mortality (192:1,000) high (United Nations Development Programme, 2011, pp. 120-165). These are outcomes that Sierra Leoneans care deeply about.

Furthermore, it is usually through the process of providing goods and services in exchange for taxation that a state forms a social contract with its citizens. Tsai (2011, p. 47) notes that even in those states that do not collect taxes, such as socialist states or resource-rich rentier states, there is a strong link between the provision of public goods and services and citizen acceptance of state authority. A predatory state that continues to tax its citizens while providing few reciprocal benefits is likely to see its popular legitimacy decline, leading to increased challenges to its authority. In Sierra Leone, poor provision of public goods is not merely a product of civil war, but pre-dates it; in fact, the post-colonial state’s failure to form a social contract with its

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4 This challenge is derived from the fact that non-excludability makes it difficult to determine consumer preferences, which are usually revealed through consumers’ willingness to pay.
citizens around public goods provision can be considered an important driver of the decade-long conflict.

The legacy of poor provision of public goods is associated with decades of poor economic performance, corrupt governance and public sector decline, exacerbated by the policy interventions of international financial institutions (IFIs).\(^5\) David Fashole Luke and Stephen Riley (1989, p. 134) argue that economic decline in post-colonial Sierra Leone has its roots in the dominance of a personalized mode of politics which means that “effective economic strategy…has to compete with regime survival as the main dynamic governing political behaviour”. This tension became evident during the long rule of President Siaka Stevens (1967-85) and his All People’s Congress (APC) party, which saw the transformation of Sierra Leone into a republic and later a one-party state. William Reno (1995) argues that rather than strengthening the fragile bureaucratic state he inherited, Stevens dedicated much of his energies to the construction of a “shadow state”—a complex system of informal market networks connecting rulers and businessmen which served as an alternate basis for political authority. One locus of intense shadow state activity was the diamond trade; Stevens dedicated the early years of his rule to gaining control of this trade, relying on reciprocal relationships with a small group of Lebanese exporters who were politically dependent on his favour because they were legally excluded from holding office. While Stevens’ restructuring of the diamond trade was effective at strengthening his hold on political power, it led to the expansion of illicit trading and severely undermined public revenues. To plug the expanding budget deficit, Stevens took advantage of state powers to negotiate grants and loans, once more with Lebanese assistance. However, as the country’s financial position worsened and the availability of credit contracted, Stevens was forced to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

From 1979 onwards, IMF stabilization programmes became a standing feature of the Sierra Leone economy. Rather than narrowing the budget deficit, IMF policies under Stevens paradoxically contributed to further informalization of the economy, the erosion of state revenue and public sector decline (Reno, 1995; Sesay, 1995; 5

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\(^5\) Of course, it is possible to trace this history of poor public goods provision back even further to a colonial state which was largely interested in public goods provision as a means to support extraction of domestic products for export and maintaining order. Limited space prevents me from exploring that earlier history here, but see Christopher Fyfe (1962), Abraham (1976, 1978), William Reno (1995) and Catherine Bolten (2012).
Reno, 1996; Keen, 2005b). Stevens selectively implemented the policy measures prescribed by the IMF, avoiding those that would undermine his power base (Luke & Riley, 1989, p. 137; Sesay, 1995, p. 171). Other measures, notably the privatization of state-run enterprises, were used to expand Stevens’ informal market networks further, with disastrous consequences for public revenues. By December 1984, the IMF ended credit arrangements and Stevens left office with the state in full-blown economic crisis—in real terms, revenue in 1985/86 stood at just 18 percent of 1977/78 levels and the budget deficit had risen from approximately 55 to 98 percent of revenue (Reno, 1995, pp. 137-146). Steven’s hand-picked successor President Joseph Momoh (1985-92) resumed engagement with the IMF in order to address this economic crisis, and was ultimately forced to implement prescribed policies more fully in order to retain access to their support. In 1986/87, Momoh implemented flotation of the Leone; price increases for key agricultural products such as coffee, cocoa and palm kernels; decontrol of the prices of basic consumer goods; and desubsidization of petrol and rice (Longhurst, Kamara, & Mensurah, 1988, p. 26; Sesay, 1995, pp. 172-175). In 1991/92, these measures were followed by drastic staff cuts and salary reductions in the public sector (Keen, 2005b, p. 78).

The austerity measures adopted during Momoh’s regime have been widely criticized for failing to achieve their stated aims, deepening poverty and further undermining state bureaucracy (Hoogvelt, 1987; Longhurst, et al., 1988; Sesay, 1995; Keen, 2005b). Neither devaluation nor higher agricultural prices stimulated exports as anticipated; to the contrary, exports continued to fall throughout the 1980s (Sesay, 1995, p. 177). Richard Longhurst, Samura Kamara and Joseph Mensurah (1988, p. 28) point to the short-term inelasticity of some crops; high input and transport costs; lack of access to credit; and constraints imposed by the land tenure system as possible reasons why higher agricultural prices did not feed through to increased domestic production. Max Sesay (1995, pp. 176-177) argues that this was a case of “theory not being appropriate to the reality”, because the IMF ignored the structural imbalances present in the Sierra Leonean economy when setting policy. Repeated currency devaluations did, however, lead to soaring inflation, while the desubsidization of rice and petrol placed further pressure on families’ budgets. Salary increases did not keep pace with inflation, drawing the middle class into poverty. Sesay (1995, p. 176) concludes that “a family on an average wage in 1980 will have at first slowly, and
then rapidly, slipped into poverty” and Ankie Hoogvelt (1987, p. 81) describes a “new tidal wave of grinding, gruelling poverty” in Sierra Leone.

Neither IFIs nor the government made any real commitment to strengthen state structures alongside implementation of these austerity measures (Reno, 1995, pp. 155-176; Sesay, 1995, p. 183; Keen, 2005b, pp. 77-81). In Reno’s view (1995, pp. 155-176), the priority for IFIs was to establish an arrangement which could deliver timely arrears payments, rather than to strengthen the Sierra Leonean state. He argues that creditors’ continual push for privatization of state functions to foreign firms further undermined the feeble remnants of the state. In 1991, Sierra Leone was offered a Rights Accumulation Programme (RAP) under which creditors would approve further loans and grants if Momoh could demonstrate that he was making some effort to follow IMF recommendations. Reno interprets this as an indication that creditors viewed the Sierra Leonean state as a lost cause, describing the RAP as “a desperate creditor bid to replace the dying bureaucracies of the state with something with which they could continue to negotiate” (p. 183). David Keen (2005b, pp. 78-81) is similarly sceptical about IFIs’ commitment to state-building, commenting on the lack of a public investment programme to accompany structural adjustment.

Steep economic decline in Sierra Leone throughout the 1970s and 1980s therefore resulted in the erosion of state structures and dwindling revenues, which were disastrous for state-led provision of public goods and services. While Stevens tried to maintain a minimum level of basic public goods in order to prevent unrest among those excluded from his patronage network, towards the end of his time in power even this unambitious project began to fail. Following the introduction of Momoh’s austerity measures, social expenditure more or less ground to a halt (Reno, 1995, p. 161). In 1986/87, the Sierra Leone government’s expenditure on servicing its debt exceeded its total budget for health, education and other social services. By 1991 when the war began, social expenditure had dropped to a mere 15 percent of levels prevailing a decade earlier (Keen, 2005b, p. 78). Given a lack of corporate discipline and the failure of the state to pay sufficient salaries (or later on, to pay salaries at all), corruption inside the public sector intensified. In the early 1980s, the ‘vouchergate’ scandal broke in the newspapers—reports of widespread theft of public resources across government through a complex system of payment vouchers, cheques and fraudulent contracts (Dumbuya, 2008, p. 57).
Kingsley Banya (1991) and Staneala Beckley (1993) look at the effects of state decline within the education sector during the 1970s and 1980s, citing problems such as non-payment of teacher salaries, leading to moonlighting; the exodus of more senior and qualified teachers; bribery to obtain junior teaching jobs; an absence of essential supplies, due in part to high levels of corruption; and a shortage of school buildings, leading to a two shift system of schooling. While Beckley (p. 65) argues that the failings of government provision had begun to drive more coproductive arrangements, Banya (p. 134) argues that the government was obstructing a more coproductive approach by continuing to make promises it could not deliver on. In Banya’s view, the degree of centralization remained persistent, with regional offices bypassed and all decisions, large and small, made in Freetown.

Magbaily Fyle (1993) tells a comparable story of decline in the healthcare sector. He finds that healthcare was inadequate in Freetown, but was even weaker in provincial and district headquarters towns, and more or less non-existent beyond that. The specific challenges he identifies include an under-supply of medical facilities and deterioration of existing facilities, with donor funds the only available channel to address this issue; a severe staff shortage, with staff disproportionately concentrated in Freetown; scarcity of drugs and supplies in government hospitals, due in part to corruption; and “informal privatization” of services (Blundo, De Sardan, Bako Arifari, & Tidjani Alou, 2006, pp. 101-103), with Freetown-based government doctors treating predominantly fee-paying private patients in government hospitals to compensate for poor salaries.

Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (2004b, pp. 47-50, 78-81) reiterates Fyle’s (1993) narrative of rural exclusion, arguing that the erosion of public goods and services took place far more rapidly in provincial Sierra Leone than in the capital, Freetown, a trend the TRC (2004b, p. 50) links to the dissolution of district councils in 1972:

Despite their many weaknesses, district councils had at least supplied water, roads, healthcare, agricultural services and rudimentary communal facilities during the 1960s…the dissolution of district councils gradually stifled the

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6 The term ‘provincial Sierra Leone’ refers to the territory which once made up the Sierra Leone Protectorate, established by the British colonial administration in 1896. It is constituted of three provinces: Eastern Province, Southern Province and Northern Province. The fourth region of Sierra Leone is known as Western Area, which contains the capital, Freetown. This territory was once the former Sierra Leone Colony, established in 1808. The Colony was ruled directly, while the Protectorate was subject to indirect rule (see chapter three).
flow of services to people in most of the Provinces. Riverine districts like Bonthe and Kambia, as well as remote ones like Koinadugu, Pujehun and Kailahun, received no electricity or pipe-borne water. Bridges and roads were in a state of disrepair and few schools or health centres survived. The whole of the North had neither running tap water nor electricity by the end of the 1970s. These were facets of regression rather than underdevelopment, as previous governments had apparently left several such facilities intact.

The TRC report describes a subsequent period of “over-centralization of government service delivery” (p. 80) under Stevens and Momoh, with the majority of investment in infrastructure and service provision limited to the capital, Freetown, and the surrounding area. The closure of Sierra Leone’s railway in 1970 and the deterioration of the country’s road network contributed to a sense of provincial isolation. After district councils were disbanded, the principal form of local government for most rural provincial residents was provided by a system of paramount chieftaincy, discussed in detail in chapter three. However, like other public sector workers, paramount chiefs and chieftdom officials were experiencing declining budgets and unpaid salaries, encouraging exploitation of provincial residents to bring in revenue, little of which was dedicated to public goods provision (Keen, 2005b, p. 80).

The withdrawal of public goods and services from large swathes of Sierra Leone’s population during a period of high inflation, when many were struggling to survive, can be considered one driver of Sierra Leone’s civil war during the 1990s.7 The failure of the education system in particular is viewed as contributing to youth vulnerability to militia recruitment, as those excluded from basic education saw few opportunities on the horizon. Paul Richards (1996, pp. 28-29) characterizes the bush camps of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel group which first initiated conflict in Sierra Leone, as an alternative to a failed school system for some. He writes (p. 29):

For many seized youngsters in the diamond districts functional schooling had broken down long before the RUF arrived. The rebellion was a chance to resume their education. Captives report being schooled in RUF camps, using fragments and scraps of revolutionary texts for books, and receiving a good basic training in the art of bush warfare. Many captive children adapt quickly,

7 Other significant (and overlapping) drivers of conflict identified in the literature include: the dominance of a neo-patrimonial form of governance, which weakened the already fragile state and created an excluded class; shame and humiliation experienced by members of this excluded class; the abysmal performance of the economy, exacerbated by IFI intervention; high levels of youth unemployment associated with poor economic performance; abusive local governance by chiefs; and the lure of diamond wealth and wealth acquired through looting (Richards, 1996; Zack-Williams, 1999; Abdullah, 2004b; Keen, 2005a; Richards, 2005b).
and exult in new-found skills, and the chance, perhaps for the first time in their lives, to show what they can do.

Even those who were able to attend university encountered a poor quality of education, political repression and scarce job opportunities on graduation. Ismail Rashid (2004, p. 86) argues that student radicals, through “generational contiguity, cultural interaction and radical politics”, unwittingly influenced the ‘lumpen’ youth who seized arms against Sierra Leone’s rulers as members of the RUF and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Related, Keen (2005b, p. 79) argues that repeated attacks on Njala University College during the civil war were a clear indicator of the anger of youth failed by the university system.

The failure of state-led public goods provision in Sierra Leone has also been associated with feelings of humiliation and shame, which Keen (2005a) argues influenced the extreme violence deployed against civilians during the war. Yusuf Bangura (1997, pp. 27-28) finds that those who lacked patrons to protect them from the fiscal crisis were “badly affected or humiliated by the informalization of the country’s resources and the astonishing contraction of the state”. The TRC (2004a, p. 6) makes a related argument that the selfish behaviour of those controlling the state apparatus contributed to “a collective failure to subscribe to notions of the common good” which led to people being “systematically deprived of their dignity”. Keen (2005a, pp. 57-74) argues that the feelings of shame experienced by rebels before the war influenced the violent strategies they used during the conflict. He writes (p. 59):

Like a dream, war could sometimes hold out the prospect of reversing the humiliations and frustrations of normal life…a fundamental feature of the violence in Sierra Leone was the imposition of extreme humiliation and shame on the victims. In many instances, the violence seems to have been an attempt to turn previous roles on their heads, by imposing the power of the gun on local big men…the widespread sexual violence also involved humiliating the victim. Amputations were also sometimes experienced as extremely shaming.

Drawing on the work of psychiatrist James Gilligan (1999), he suggests that through the humiliation of others, fighters were able to “physically eliminate the threat of shame” (p. 63), maintaining their own self-worth.

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8 Ibrahim Abdullah (2004a, p. 45) defines lumpen youth as “the largely unemployed and unemployable youths, mostly male, who live by their wits or who have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or underground economy”.
9 The AFRC was formed by elements within the Sierra Leone Army which led a military coup against President Kabbah’s government in May 1997; they then joined forces with the RUF.
The stakes of improving public goods provision in Sierra Leone are high—this step is critical to improving the quality of life of Sierra Leoneans and to establishing a basic social contract between the state and its citizens which will provide insulation against future conflict. However, this brief account also indicates that barriers to improving state-led public goods provision have accumulated over a number of decades. Three decades of economic decline, one of which was dominated by civil war, have left the economy extremely fragile. A predatory form of personalized rule has dominated, which has established the public sphere as a space where actors seek to advance narrow private interests, rather than the common good. State bureaucracies have been decimated by decades of neglect and corrupt practice, and there has been chronic underinvestment in infrastructure and human resources. Few would argue that this history provides a challenging starting point from which to increase the flow of public goods in Sierra Leone.

1.2 Decentralization: The solution to the public goods deficit?

It is widely agreed that much of the action required to address the public goods deficit must take place at the local level, in areas where public goods are needed. Since 2004, the Sierra Leone government has been implementing a decentralization programme which it argues will lead to “improvement on a consistently increasing basis in provision and delivery of basic, essential services” (Government of Sierra Leone, 2008, p. 105). The decentralization programme was designed rapidly in 2003-04 with substantial involvement of donor agencies, particularly the World Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). Following the passage of the Local Government (LG) Act (2004) in March and subsequent local elections in May, 19 local councils took office, of which 5 were urban councils. The LG Act (2004) outlined a programme of political and fiscal decentralization, according councils overall responsibility for development in their localities; devolving a range of functions from national ministries related to the provision of basic public goods and services; and empowering councils to tax and spend (within certain parameters).

Sierra Leone’s decentralization programme is a prime example of the ‘democratic decentralization’ approach which has grown prominent in Africa during the 1990s and 2000s. Dele Olowu and James Wunsch (2004, pp. 38, 48-49) have
described this as a “fourth wave” of decentralization\textsuperscript{10}, driven principally by economic and political crises in African states combined with donor pressure to achieve ‘good governance’, but also in some cases by urbanization, globalization and political conflict. This new wave of democratic decentralization has been characterized by the transfer of power and resources to downwardly accountable elected local authorities, as compared to earlier models of deconcentration which involved the transfer of power and resources to local representatives of the central state who remained upwardly accountable (Ribot, 2002, pp. ii-iii).\textsuperscript{11} By the early 1990s, countries such as Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda had all implemented forms of democratic decentralization (Olowu & Wunsch, 2004, p. 39).

Like the Sierra Leone government, the World Bank—the lead donor agency supporting decentralization in Sierra Leone—views decentralization as a means to improve the supply of basic public goods (World Bank, 2009, 2011). The World Bank’s (2003b, pp. 89-90, 186-187) report \textit{Making Services Work for Poor People} argues that bringing decision-makers closer to the people can enable citizens to acquire better information about local public goods provision and seek greater accountability from government, not least through local elections. The World Bank applies exactly this logic in justifying its support for the decentralization process in Sierra Leone; according to a key project document (World Bank, 2003a) “service delivery and development needs of the population can be addressed more effectively by empowered local governments with a strong capacity to manage participatory development planning and implementation with accountability”.

Despite the central role accorded to decentralization as a strategy for improving service delivery in Sierra Leone, evidence of its effectiveness on the ground is weak. While a national survey conducted by the World Bank’s Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) (IRCBP Evaluations Unit, 2008b)
found significant improvements in the health and agriculture sectors within which
local councils had begun to manage decentralized functions, the authors of the survey
report emphasize that the effects of decentralization cannot be separated from the
effects of high levels of donor investment in these sectors and the efforts of many
other actors. A more recent assessment of the decentralization process (Fanthorpe,
Lavali, & Sesay, 2011) found that the education sector had seen the greatest
improvements and cited qualitative examples of local councils engaging in public
goods provision. However, the authors reiterate the conclusion that “it is almost
impossible to isolate [decentralization’s] material impact in a country still undergoing
extensive, donor-supported post-war reconstruction” (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 42).

The evidence remains weak when examining the theorized pathways through
which decentralization is anticipated to act on the provision of public goods: better
government access to information about local preferences and more active
accountability seeking by citizens. Even when there is greater proximity between
government and citizens, information about local preferences in terms of public goods
can only flow between them when appropriate channels exist.12 Richard Fanthorpe,
Andrew Lavali and Mohamed Gibril Sesay (2011, p. 43) find documentary evidence
that needs assessments have been taking place at the small number of councils
studied; I also observed a council needs assessment at my fieldwork site in Makeni.
However, because these needs assessments are an official requirement which must be
met in order for councils to receive development grants, they are not always
implemented in a way that generates an accurate picture of local preferences (see
chapter four) and beyond that may not influence council decision-making. As
Fanthorpe et al (2011, p. 43) observe, “enhancing poor people’s voice in local
government has little intrinsic value unless it leads to concrete action”.

In a recent World Bank volume, Yongmei Zhou and Ye Zhang (2009, p. 124)
conclude that there is little evidence that Sierra Leone’s citizens are actively holding
local councils accountable for public goods provision:

Participation in local elections is widespread. Nevertheless, although much
information about local council operations is public, citizens are not yet
actively monitoring council operations. They also are not very confident in
engaging the authorities and changing the status quo.

12 Furthermore, as David Booth (2012, p. 66) notes, the provision of public goods “is only partly about
services for which there is ‘demand’”.
Fanthorpe et al (2011, p. 43) focus on the role of ward development committees (WDCs)—new citizen bodies chaired by local councillors which were established as part of the decentralization process to serve a transparency and accountability agenda.\textsuperscript{13} Their survey findings indicate that levels of public interaction with WDCs and satisfaction with their performance are generally low, and they also report that participants in focus group discussions seldom mentioned WDCs unless prompted, suggesting that they are fairly inactive.

The broader literature on the link between decentralization and improved public goods and services in Africa is also inconclusive. For example, synthesizing the findings of recent studies on African decentralization, Diana Conyers (2007, p. 21) concludes that “[t]he main impression gained from the limited data on the actual impact on service delivery is that decentralization has done little to improve the quantity, quality or equity of public services in the region”. Jesse Ribot (2002, p. 10) summarizes the evidence on African decentralization and service delivery in similar terms, stating that “evidence that decentralization or deconcentration leads to better service provision is thin”. Etisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio (2009, pp. 152, 153) look at global evidence in support of the link and find that “general conclusions are still tentative”; moreover, the evidence is weaker for developing countries “where institutions are generally weaker than those in mature economies”. Part of the difficulty in reaching firm conclusions is that the causal pathway between decentralization and improved public goods and services is indirect and complex and thus costly and difficult to measure; there are also numerous intervening variables which need to be taken in to account in order to isolate the effects of decentralization on public goods and services (Ribot, 2002, p. 10; Conyers, 2007, pp. 20-21).

Decentralization processes are also contextually embedded and highly variable, making cross-national comparisons difficult (Ahmad & Brosio, 2009, p. 152).

Decentralization’s assured place within donors’ ‘good governance’\textsuperscript{14} portfolios, despite weak evidence in support of the link to improved public goods, is

\textsuperscript{13}This was the status quo at the time of my fieldwork in 2009. The Chiefdom and Traditional Administration Policy (Government of Sierra Leone, 2011) removes the role of chair from local councillors and awards it to chiefs.

\textsuperscript{14}As Grindle (2007, p. S202) points out, there are many different, overlapping definitions of ‘good governance’. She cites the following World Bank (n.d.) definition: “Inclusiveness and accountability established in three key areas: selection, accountability and replacement of authorities (voice and accountability; stability and lack of violence); efficiency of institutions, regulations, resource
perhaps indicative of the tendency of ‘good governance’ strategies to conflate ideological and evidence-based justifications for action. Shortly after the publication of the World Bank’s (1992) milestone publication *Governance and Development*, Mick Moore (1993, p. 6) criticized the aid industry’s conception of ‘good governance’ both for its selective application of evidence and its treatment of distinct policy goals as though they were necessarily mutually supporting:

‘Good government’ has been rushed onto the aid agenda by politicians. Many of the assumptions that underlie it are questionable, and others are plain wrong. We have long known that all the good things identified in the good government agenda – economic growth, electoral democracy, the market economy, respect for human rights, reduced levels of military expenditure and socioeconomic equity – do not typically come in interrelated and mutually self-sustaining packages. Development policy is made in the same real world that obliges the British government, for example, to sacrifice some very highly cherished goals of economic policy in the attempt to achieve others.

More recently, Merilee Grindle (2004) has challenged both the overwhelming length of the ‘good governance’ agenda and the treatment of all of its numerous components as necessary conditions for the reduction of poverty. She advocates that a prioritization exercise be conducted on a case by case basis in order to establish an agenda for ‘good enough governance’, “a condition of minimally acceptable government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development” (p. 526). Grindle thus recommends a more pragmatic and contextually sensitive approach.

The Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP), a five-year research programme funded by DFID, goes further in its rejection of the ‘good governance’ agenda, arguing that the imposition of Western institutional templates it implies has proven to be a flawed approach, and proposing that strategies that ‘go with the grain’ of African social and political realities are likely be more developmental. Tim Kelsall (2008) sets out this view, arguing that the imposition of imported institutions based on a public-private divide which is incongruous with African realities has had the perverse effect of channelling dynamic forces in society into predatory behaviour. He considers how it might be possible to build on “extant notions of moral obligation and interpersonal accountability” in order to harness social and political energies for developmental purposes (pp. 636-637). He suggests that development policy might

management (regulatory framework; government effectiveness); respect for institutions, laws and interactions among players in civil society, business, and politics (control of corruption; rule of law).”
be able to take better account of common aspects of an African ‘grain’ where relevant, such as the extended family; religion; clientelism; ethnic sentiment; and (neo-)traditional institutions. As one (deliberately provocative) example, he floats the idea of service delivery ministries organized along ethnic lines in order to capitalize on ethnic solidarity. Kelsall concludes that ultimately more empirical research is needed to identify whether more successful instances of public goods provision in Africa do indeed fit better with a social and political ‘grain’, and thus whether this a fruitful direction for theory and policy.

Motivated by this alternative approach, this research project represents an attempt to set aside ‘good governance’ assumptions as they relate to local public goods provision in Sierra Leone. Donor support for the decentralization process is based on the belief that decentralization will change social and political logics in Sierra Leone, encouraging government to conform both to legal-rational and democratic norms and encouraging citizens to aid them in that process by holding them accountable for their actions. However, the limited evidence available suggests that such changes have not yet occurred in Sierra Leone, and may not do so in the foreseeable future. I study examples of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in local public goods provision on the basis that such an approach is likely to provide insight into strategies that work with prevailing social and political logics and circumstances, rather than by transforming them.

I focus in particular on how key barriers to success in local public goods provision are managed, rather than eradicated. First, the political system in Sierra Leone offers LGAs little reward for public goods provision. Chiefs, once elected, sit for life, and thus cannot be held accountable for their performance as public goods providers through subsequent elections. Local councils are newly established bodies in a young and fragile democracy. There is evidence to suggest that local councillors in this position are likely to lack the political credibility to make persuasive public goods promises that could help them win elections (Keefer & Khemani, 2005; Keefer, 2007; Keefer & Vlaicu, 2007).15 Philip Keefer (2007) argues that politicians with low credibility are likely to be motivated to seek votes via patrons who are credible with

15 I thank David Booth for recommending this body of work.
their clients. This has a corrosive effect on public goods provision, as patrons generally prefer to provide targeted goods (such as jobs and infrastructure) which lend themselves to being apportioned as rewards to clients (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2007, p. 384). Others argue that politicians in young democracies are deterred from public goods provision because they do not wish to impose the related costs on their constituents, for fear of losing votes (Juul, 2007). Finally, the dominance of ethno-regional voting practices in Sierra Leone (Kandeh, 1992, 2003; Kandeh, 2008) results in single party dominance in large swathes of the country, leaving local councillors more reliant on the upper echelons of the party to secure their seats than on the citizens they represent.

Second, the public sector in Sierra Leone is characterized by intense resource scarcity, particularly at the local level. In 2009 when fieldwork was conducted, aid accounted for 40 percent of Sierra Leone’s total revenue of 1.3 trillion Le (£238 million) and 7.8 percent of GDP (Government of Sierra Leone, 2010). Despite the emphasis on decentralization as the means to address the public goods deficit, only 58.7 billion Le (£11.2 million) was transferred to local councils nationwide in 2009—less than one percent of GDP. Of this, 10.4 billion Le (£2.0 million) was dedicated to administrative costs, leaving only 48 billion Le (£9.2 million) for the provision of local public goods and services nationwide. 2009 budget data does not show any central expenditure targeted to chiefs. In a context of overall scarcity, local government actors (LGAs) are likely to focus their efforts on those areas where resources are more plentiful, neglecting underfunded goods. Officials’ salaries are low and are often paid late, or in some cases not at all. This contributes to corruption, which is already very firmly established in Sierra Leone, placing further pressure on already strained budgets.

Third, trust in local government, particularly local councils, is low. For example, a 2007 national survey of more than 6,000 households in Sierra Leone found that only a third (33%) of respondents trusted local councillors and just under half

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16 According to Keefer, the alternative is to use direct methods for building their credibility with voters, such as vote-buying or canvassing, but these are generally costly.
17 For all currency conversions, I use the exchange rates which prevailed in 2009 when the fieldwork for this study was conducted.
18 The figures discussed here for transfers to local councils exclude salary payments.
19 LGAs are actors officially recognized as constituent parts of local government.
(47%) trusted chiefdom officials (IRCBP Evaluations Unit, 2008b, p. 37). More recently, a 2011 survey of residents of four districts in Sierra Leone (n=608) assessed respondents’ trust in LGAs, understood as their confidence that LGAs would listen to their needs (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, pp. 82-84). Over 40 percent of respondents reported that local councils rarely or never listened to their needs, while just over a quarter (28%) of respondents indicated the same for chiefdom authorities. Levels of trust were generally lower in northern Bombali District, in which Makeni (the site of this study) is based, than in southern Bo District. Approximately 41 percent of respondents in Bombali District reported that the council rarely or never listened, while 37 percent of respondents took the same view of chiefdom authorities. In Bo District, comparable figures were 16 percent for the council and 11 percent for chiefdom authorities. In Eastern Kono District, levels of trust in the council were similar to those in Bombali District (39% reported that the council rarely or never listened), but substantially higher for chiefdom authorities (11% reported that chiefs rarely or never listened). Low levels of trust mean that even when LGAs are motivated to provide public goods, they may struggle to raise the necessary revenue and secure popular cooperation with their initiatives.

Finally, there is a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis local public goods provision. As discussed in more detail in chapter three, local councils and chiefs constitute overlapping layers of government, rather than two hierarchically-ordered tiers. A combination of colonial-era legislation (which remains in force) and post-war legislation leave both local councils and chiefs with responsibility in the areas of development, tax collection, land, and environmental and public health; both sets of actors are also permitted to create bye-laws. Neither the boundaries of their respective roles nor the mechanisms for coordination of their efforts are clearly defined, and the two sets of actors are also in competition for resources. Overlapping legislation provides a resource which councils and chiefs can draw on in staking a claim to desirable areas of activity, or evading responsibility in less desirable areas. This state of affairs can therefore fuel conflict and encourage

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20 Respondents were asked if, in their opinion, certain groups of people or officials can be trusted, or if one should be careful when dealing with them.

21 Respondents were asked whether local councils/chiefdom authorities listen to what people say and what they need.
neglect of onerous responsibilities, both of which are detrimental to local public goods provision.

1.3 Success versus failure: Research design and methods

i) Actors and concepts

I focus on public goods provision led by one local council, Makeni City Council (MCC), and Makeni’s chiefs. Sierra Leone’s 19 elected local councils are a product of the decentralization process, but also build upon an earlier tradition of (partially) elected local councils introduced in the colonial era. The country is divided into 149 chiefdoms, each headed by a paramount chief from one of a select number of ruling houses who is elected for life by an electoral college known as the chiefdom council. While the diffuse chiefdom council (made up of one representative for every 20 taxpayers) continues to be recognized in much legislation as the principal governing body of the chiefdom, in practice executive power resides with the paramount chief in consultation with a smaller body called the chiefdom committee, which includes the paramount chief, the chiefdom speaker (his deputy), section chiefs, court chairmen and women’s and youth representatives. The chief also oversees a small chiefdom administration comprised of salaried functionaries, which in 2009 included the chiefdom speaker, the treasury clerk, local court clerks, local court chairpersons, local court bailiffs, local court members and chiefdom police.

I use the term local government actors (LGAs) to apply to both the council and chiefdom authorities, by which I mean actors officially recognized as constituent parts of local government. I have chosen to focus on LGA-led public goods provision because some form of public authority is needed to overcome free-riding problems and they provide one obvious source of such authority. I refer to chiefs’ constituents as subject-citizens in order to reflect their dual status as citizens of a democratically elected national state and subjects of a chief and to capture the distinct

22 Lineages with founder status recognized by the colonial government as eligible to contest for the chieftaincy.
23 The Chiefdom and Tribal Administration Policy (Government of Sierra Leone, 2011) applies the new name ‘chiefdom electors’ to the chiefdom councillors and applies the name ‘chiefdom council’ to the chiefdom committee. I will retain the earlier names which were still in use at the time of my fieldwork in 2009.
24 Local courts have subsequently been drawn under the authority of the Ministry of Justice.
25 Although non-governmental actors can also serve as a source of public authority, for example, see Christopher Lund (2007).
yet overlapping discourses associated with these roles.\textsuperscript{26} When referring to councillors’ and chiefs’ constituents simultaneously, I use the form (subject-)citizens.

The four cases of public goods provision that I study are all examples of coproduction. Drawing on the definition of coproduction proposed by Anuradha Joshi and Mick Moore (2004)\textsuperscript{27}, I define coproduction as the provision of public goods through a regular long-term relationship between government and citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions. I did not select the cases as examples of coproduction. Rather, during preliminary analysis of the case study data I had collected, I identified coproduction as a resonant and valuable analytical lens for this study. By using coproduction as an analytical lens, I illuminate the extent to which LGAs are dependent on (subject-)citizens to provide public goods and I show that the dynamics of coproductive relationships often prove an important factor in explaining why some instances of local public goods provision succeed, while others fail.

Joshi and Moore’s definition stipulates that coproduction is limited to cases involving “organised groups” of citizens, but I do not apply this restriction. First, this is not a common assumption in the wider coproduction literature (see chapter two). Second, I see the value of the coproduction concept as lying in its capacity to illuminate the role of often ignored citizen contributions to public goods provision, and this restriction unnecessarily limits the scope to do so. I also allow myself some latitude in applying the term coproduction to both official and unofficial instances of chief-led public goods provision which rely heavily on subject-citizen inputs (chapter six). I do so because of the difficulty faced in separating official and unofficial activity in a meaningful way.

Chiefs in Sierra Leone enjoy an unusually high degree of official recognition and incorporation into the state. For example, the role of chiefdom authorities is set out in legislation, and includes core state functions such as tax collection; there is a formal structure in place for their supervision and support via the Ministry of Local

\textsuperscript{26} I thank Tammie O’Neil for suggesting this term, which draws on the work of Mahmood Mamdani (1996).
\textsuperscript{27} Joshi and Moore (2004, p. 31) define coproduction as “the provision of public services … through a regular long-term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions”.
Government (MLG)\textsuperscript{28}, the office of paramount chief is constitutionally protected against abolition; and paramount chiefs are represented in the national parliament. In addition to power delegated from the centre, Sierra Leone’s chiefs derive further authority from local traditions of chieftaincy and related social institutions. Adrian van Rouweroy van Nieuwaal (1999, p. 23) argues that a chief “disposes of two bases of power from which he is able to operate towards the state and towards his people”, while Richard Sklar (2005, p. 18) describes the sovereign state and traditional authority as “two coexistent dimensions of government”. In treating chiefs as LGAs, I recognize that in some instances they act on the basis of power delegated from the centre, while in others they draw on independent sources of local authority. However, even when drawing on independent sources of authority, chiefs’ autonomy is ultimately underwritten by the central state. Moreover, subject-citizens do not usually distinguish clearly between official and unofficial actions by chiefs. To my mind, these circumstances provide sufficient justification for my chosen strategy of treating chiefs as government actors in the context of coproduction regardless of whether they are contributing to public goods provision in an official or an unofficial capacity.

As typical in the bulk of the coproduction literature, the concept of coproduction that I apply is broad. Some argue that this breadth is problematic, since the concept of coproduction can apply to almost any example of public goods provision. I agree that coproduction is not always a distinct modality of public good provision, but rather a form of citizen-government relations which may co-exist with other modalities of provision. I find it useful to conceive of a spectrum of coproduction—while some instances of public goods provision require only limited inputs from citizens others require more substantial inputs. From an analytical perspective, there is perhaps most to be gained from the study of instances of public goods provision where citizen inputs are significant and thus citizen-government relations are important to the quality of provision. That is the approach taken in this study.

\begin{footnotesize}
28 This ministry has been subject to frequent name changes. Under the former SLPP government, it was known as the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development. During the period when I conducted fieldwork, it was called the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local Government and Rural Development. More recently, the internal affairs function has been separated out and it is now known as the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. For simplicity, I will use the Ministry of Local Government throughout this thesis.
\end{footnotesize}
ii) Comparing success and failure

The basic research design I adopt to examine existing patterns of local public goods provision is a comparison of ‘success versus failure’. For each category of LGA—MCC and Makeni’s chiefs—I look at one case of relative success and one of relative failure in local public goods provision (see table 1.3.1). The four cases I compare are drawn from a single urban field site: Makeni, one of three provincial capital cities in Sierra Leone with a population of approximately 80,000 (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2004), introduced in more depth in chapter four. I wanted to focus on an urban site which offered a reasonable pool of ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ in local public goods provision to choose from, and where there were good opportunities for studying both chiefs and councils concurrently. I chose Makeni over other provincial headquarters cities because it had a greater deficit of public goods and therefore ‘successes’ in this context seemed more likely to be instructive in terms of having overcome significant obstacles.

In analyzing the cases, I ask: why do some instances of coproduction by LGAs and (subject-)citizens succeed, while others fail? I pay particular attention to institutional explanations, as discussed in chapter two. This ‘success versus failure’ research design is what John Gerring (2007, pp. 97-99) describes as a “diverse case” approach to case selection; cases are selected to represent as full a range as possible of values of the dependent variable—in this case, performance in public goods provision. I chose this approach in anticipation that comparison of cases at opposite ends of the scale would provide the best opportunity for identifying key variables affecting performance in public goods provision.
Table 1.3.1 Cases of ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ co-production of public goods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative success</th>
<th>Makeni City Council (MCC)</th>
<th>Chiefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clean market, through joint waste management efforts of MCC and traders</td>
<td>Public order, through deciding cases with the cooperation and compliance of subject-citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative failure</td>
<td>Safe meat, through construction and management of the slaughterhouse in cooperation with the butchers</td>
<td>Community infrastructure, through mobilization of unpaid community labour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My categorization of cases as relative successes or failures is based on respondent perceptions (see sub-section iii) on research methods for further details. I chose this approach for two main reasons. First, I did not want to apply an external standard when assessing performance in public goods provision which was not consistent with local perceptions, as this could lead to the odd situation of drawing lessons from ‘successes’ which were considered undesirable by local residents. Second, I was analyzing four different public goods, which made it difficult to develop a common set of indicators to assess performance in public goods provision.

The literature on local public goods provision in Sierra Leone is extremely sparse; given this, the aim of the study is to generate propositions (or hypotheses) about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in the current climate, rather than to test existing hypotheses. A case study approach is well-suited to exploratory research of this kind because it affords an in-depth look at a wide range of possible variables affecting performance in public goods provision, and also provides insight into the mechanisms through which such variables might work (Gerring, 2007, pp. 39-42, 43-48).\(^{29}\) The strategy I pursue involves selection on the dependent variable—an approach which students of political science are commonly cautioned against (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, pp. 129-132, 141-122). However, most of the objections to this approach are based on the assumption that the researcher is operating in a deductive mode, seeking to test hypotheses. Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) acknowledge that selecting observations

\(^{29}\) In any case, no available dataset(s) exist which could have been used to carry out a large-scale cross-case analysis of hypothesized factors explaining local government performance in public goods provision. If I had chosen to develop such a dataset within the confines of the limited resources available to me, it would have remained a relatively superficial effort looking at a small number of variables at a shallow level.
with high and low values of the dependent variable, as I have done, can help in hypothesis generation.

In adopting this approach, I draw on a well-established tradition of ‘success versus failure’ research designs in comparative political science. For example, Robert Putnam’s (1993) landmark study of social capital is based on analysis of the North-South performance gap between regional governments in Italy. More recently, Tsai (2007) has investigated ‘success versus failure’ in local public goods provision in China, asking why villages with the same level of economic development achieve such different outcomes. Judith Tendler’s (1997) highly regarded study of “good government” in Ceará, Brazil focuses on four cases of ‘success’, arguing that the existing literature abounded with examples of ‘failure’ which she could draw on for comparison (p. 19). Finally, Ostrom’s (1990) celebrated study of institutions for managing collective pool resources is also based on a comparison of ‘success’ and ‘failure’. These authors take different methodological approaches—while Putnam and Tsai select the regions studied based on variation on a number of key independent variables due to the deductive nature of their research designs, Tendler (like me) selects her cases on the dependent variable and pursues a more inductive approach.

I designed this research project to contribute to the broader research agenda of the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP). I was a research student member of the Local Governance strand of the programme, which provided access to a number of benefits, including research funding, training in ethnography and advice from senior researchers. However, my research was not fully integrated into the APPP Local Governance strand. I did not participate in collective efforts to carry out coordinated fieldwork and analysis, which were carried out on a different timescale. Nor was the design of my research project subject to any particular APPP specifications; rather it reflects my own efforts to link up with the Local Governance strand’s research agenda. Several key aspects of the research design are therefore influenced by my involvement with the APPP, including my focus on public goods; my interest in comparing success and failure; and my interest in institutional explanations (explored in chapter two). Members of the APPP Local Governance strand also introduced me to relevant literature, perhaps most significantly Ostrom’s

30 Tim Kelsall provided invaluable advice during fieldwork and on my immediate return, and read and commented on drafts of chapters five and six. David Booth and Richard Crook both provided comments on a working paper based on chapter five.
institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, which forms a major component of the analytical framework I apply in this study. However, the IAD framework was not applied by the Local Governance strand to structure their analysis, and my application of Ostrom’s framework, which I set out in chapter two, was arrived at independently. Furthermore, my emphasis on coproduction, which also forms a major component of my analytical framework, was not influenced by my participation in the APPP, but was identified during the analysis phase of the research because of its good fit with the evidence. Where there are overlaps between this study and the work of the APPP Local Governance strand, they are clearly specified.

**Research methods**

The core of this study is a comparison of two sets of ‘success versus failure’ in local public goods provision. Case selection proceeded in two stages: first, during the preliminary research phase, I identified a number of potential cases and selected lead options; subsequently, I conducted a survey of senior representatives of households to confirm whether there was popular support for the characterization of these lead options as ‘successes’ and ‘failures’. Having selected the four cases, I collected data on each through a combination of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and documentary research. I also collected data on the broader historical, political, legislative and policy context. I describe my methods in more detail below.

Preliminary research and identification of cases

During the preliminary phase of the research (February-March 2009), I spent time in Makeni initiating relationships with local government figures. I observed events and spaces linked to each form of governance and talked informally to those I encountered there. I also conducted 30 preliminary interviews of approximately 30-40 minutes in length with representatives of MCC; chiefs; and representatives of civil society organizations. Based on the judgements made by respondents in these preliminary interviews, I identified a number of potential cases of ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ public goods provision led by MCC and Makeni’s chiefs for further study (see table 1.3.2).

**Table 1.3.2 Potential cases of ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ public goods provision**

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31 This framework was discussed during the design stages for collective Local Governance strand work (Kelsall, 2009b).
32 See appendix 1 for a copy of the overall timeline for the research.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MCC</th>
<th>Chiefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relative success | • Clean streets, through waste management efforts<sup>33</sup>  
• Drainage, through construction of culverts  
• Safe meat, through construction and management of the slaughterhouse  
• Roads, through grading and surfacing  
| Public order, through deciding cases<sup>34</sup>  
• Land rights, through a system of land management  
• Community infrastructure, through mobilization of unpaid community labour  |

Note: Underlining is used to indicate the cases finally selected.

For MCC, waste management and construction of culverts were the two most commonly cited successes.<sup>35</sup> I judged clean streets through waste management to be a better case to study for two main reasons. First, interviews and informal conversations suggested that concerns about the construction of culverts were more pervasive than concerns about waste management and therefore it was a more questionable success. Second, there was no culvert construction ongoing at the time of the study and thus no opportunity for participant observation, which I deemed important to gaining good insight into the process of providing the good.

Respondents identified fewer cases of MCC failure. This is partly due to the fact that many of my respondents were representatives of MCC. However, it is also likely that relatively low expectations of local councils as public goods providers made it more difficult for respondents to identify those things MCC was not doing, or was doing badly. A small number of respondents cited problems with the slaughterhouse and roads. Of these two, I judged the slaughterhouse to offer a better case for study. I was seeking examples of public goods provision led by MCC, and responsibility for roads is shared with the Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA). At the time, the council was in the midst of negotiations with the SLRA regarding plans.

<sup>33</sup> The scope of this case was ultimately narrowed to Makeni’s market.
<sup>34</sup> The scope of this case was ultimately narrowed to a single chief’s barri—an open-sided structure where cases are heard and meetings are held.
<sup>35</sup> Although note that there were episodes of failure in the context of both efforts—the corruption scandal described in chapter five focused on the projects funded by MCC’s 2005 Local Government Development Grant, which included a failed initiative to install giant dustbins and a number of culverts considered to be of poor quality.
to improve Makeni’s road network and road construction was largely on hold while this was being worked out, so once again there were no obvious opportunities for participant observation.

It was more difficult to identify cases of public goods provision for chiefs, as they did not generally conceive of themselves first and foremost as providers of public goods and sometime struggled to identify discrete outputs of their efforts. Rather than asking what public goods were provided by chiefs collectively, I asked chiefs about the contributions that they made personally. Deciding cases or resolving disputes was by far the most frequently cited example of a positive chiefly contribution. The paramount chief cited his role in management of land, but few others mentioned this. Some chiefs identified mobilization of labour for community development as a positive contribution, but a senior chief spoke of the difficulties faced in doing so successfully in Makeni and informal conversations supported the view that chiefs did this infrequently and with limited success. I judged public order generated through deciding cases the most suitable example of success as management of land was mentioned less frequently and responsibility for enforcing land rights was shared between chiefs and the council.

Community infrastructure provided through chiefly mobilization of unpaid community labour was the only concrete example of failure that I identified during this preliminary period of research. I had some misgivings about selecting this as a case for study because I was concerned that I would not be able to find a suitable opportunity for participant observation due to the relatively low levels at which it appeared to be occurring; a concern that was later borne out. However, as I was not able to identify a viable alternative, I considered it the best option available.

Survey of senior representatives of households

In July 2009, I conducted a survey of senior representatives of households (both men and women) in Makeni (n=279) in order to determine how far public opinion regarding ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ in public goods provision led by MCC/Makeni’s chiefs concurred with the views of the elite respondents interviewed during the preliminary period of research.36 I wanted to test my initial judgements

36 It would have been ideal to conduct the survey in April 2009, immediately following the preliminary research. However, due to logistical issues in accessing human and financial resources for the survey, it was not possible to do so until July. In the meantime I began to collect data about the two cases I had
about case selection against this broader evidence base and confirm or reject these choices.

**Sample selection**

The final sample was arrived at through a three-stage process, set out in detail in appendix 2. First, dwelling units were randomly selected from MCC’s recently compiled list for the collection of house rates. Subsequently, a household listing was completed for each dwelling unit. Finally, a senior representative of each household was identified and interviewed. Dwelling units were assigned alternately to male and female enumerators, who interviewed respondents of the same sex because it was believed that this would allow the freest exchange of information. Senior representatives of households were either: a) the recognized head of the household (that is, the person other members of the household recognized as its head); b) the spouse of the recognized head of household; or c) the eldest resident in the household of the appropriate sex.

I chose to survey senior representatives of households rather than randomly selected members of households for two main reasons. First, I felt that members of this group were more likely to be established residents of the city and have an informed view on the state of public goods provision. Second, the protocol for identifying the senior representative of household was more straightforward for enumerators and therefore more likely to be followed by them. I recognize that this approach means that the survey data are not representative of the views of Makeni’s residents in general; in particular, the views of youth (a category which refers both to those young in age and those that have not achieved the full social status of an adult, as discussed in chapter six) are under-represented.

chosen for MCC, as I was more confident that they provided the best available comparison. If survey data did not confirm my case selection choices, I was prepared to drop one or more of these cases in response.
Survey instrument and administration

The survey instrument included 29 items covering the following topics: i) respondent characteristics (8 items); ii) public goods provision by Makeni City Council (7 items); iii) public goods provision by Bombali Sebora’s chiefs (9 items); and iv) the extent and source(s) of LGAs’ authority (5 items). A copy of the questionnaire is included in appendix 3.

The survey instrument was administered in one continuous session by nine enumerators, all tertiary students in Makeni (four female, five male). They received three days training in application of the survey instrument and completed one observed classroom interview and one observed field interview before being approved to administer the survey. The survey instrument was structured, with both close- and open-ended items. Krio was used for the majority of interviews (94.6%), with a smaller number of interviews conducted in Temne (4.3%) and English (1.1%). All enumerators participated in a collective session to translate the survey into Krio during the training and written Krio translations were included on the questionnaire. A Temne-speaking supervisor was present during the small number of Temne interviews to ensure that questions were phrased in a consistent manner. All responses were completed in English.

Data processing, data quality and analysis

Initial data entry was conducted by a research assistant under my supervision. I subsequently reviewed the data entry for each questionnaire and cleaned the data. All the data from the survey of senior representatives of households were entered into one dataset with each respondent as an observation. Two main checks were made to verify the quality and accuracy of the data. First, enumerators were asked to subjectively assess the ability of the respondent to understand the language used in the survey and the quality and truthfulness of the responses. There were seven observations for which enumerators reported that the respondent had “serious problems speaking or understanding the language” or that they were “not at all confident” in the accuracy of the responses. These observations were excluded from the analysis. Second, myself and two other supervisors revisited over 95 percent of dwelling units to verify that household listings had been done correctly and that interviews were conducted with the appropriate respondents. Interviewers were asked to return to dwelling units where errors had been made in order to correct them. I
analyzed the survey data using standard techniques for descriptive statistical analysis in SPSS.

**Butcher questionnaire**

Through a separate but complementary process, Makeni’s butchers were asked to assess their satisfaction with the slaughterhouse. These data were collected due to low levels of awareness about the facility among senior representatives of households. The instrument for the butchers was administered by a single male enumerator and Krio was used for all interviews; a copy is included in appendix 4. The same process for data entry and analysis were used as for the main survey dataset.

**Case studies**

As discussed in chapter four, analysis of the survey data indicated that they were generally supportive of my case selection. I dedicated one month to intensive data collection for each case study. I used a combination of participant observation and semi-structured interviews as the main methods of data collection for each case. However, I was unable to identify an appropriate opportunity for observation for the fourth case, mobilizing labour for community infrastructure, due to low levels of activity in this regard, exacerbated by the onset of the rainy season. In total, I completed more than 45 days of participant observation and conducted 56 interviews—27 for council cases and 29 for chiefly cases. I also drew on a range of documentary data, including minutes of MCC and Bombali Sebora chiefdom committee meetings; financial data for MCC; and copies of relevant news stories. My understanding of each case was further developed through numerous informal conversations and additional ad hoc observations.

The data collection for the case studies employed three main languages—English, Krio and Temne—with each requiring a distinct approach. I usually went unaccompanied to interviews conducted in English. If I wanted to explore sensitive issues, I did not record the interviews, but made notes which I typed up soon afterwards for best recall. Otherwise I recorded the interviews and later created either a verbatim or summary transcript from the recording. I began Krio language training in early 2008 and had reached a level of intermediate competency by the time I began my fieldwork. I was therefore able to conduct most Krio interviews myself, but always went accompanied by my research assistant who intervened in case of any difficulties in expression or comprehension by either myself or the person being
interviewed. All Krio interviews were recorded. My research assistant created preliminary verbatim transcripts of these interviews with English translations, which I later reviewed and edited. As I do not speak Temne, I relied on my research assistant to carry out ‘on the spot’ translation during interviews. I later hired a credible professional translator to produce verbatim transcripts of the Temne interviews. During participant observation, the bulk of the conversation took place either in Krio or in Temne. My research assistant was with me at all times and carried out ‘on the spot’ translation when those around us were speaking Temne and provided clarifications when needed when people were speaking Krio. I made notes and later in the day we sat and jointly reviewed them for accuracy. In this thesis, I include footnotes with the original language for all Krio quotes and footnotes indicating that the quote is translated for all Temne quotes.

I coded the interview and observational data in NVivo. I reviewed a range of literature on coding strategies (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Richards, 2005a; Bazeley, 2007; Gibbs, 2007; Saldaña, 2009) and developed an approach which drew together strategies that I found productive. I read through key transcripts and kept a record of aspects that I found interesting, in order to stimulate the creative thinking process (Richards, 2005a). I then coded each transcript, using a combination of “concept-driven” and “data-driven” coding (Gibbs, 2007). I wrote memos on particular interviews and issues of interest (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). I gradually built up a relatively complex set of codes, which I then worked to integrate and simplify so that the coding framework served as a useful resource when writing up my final analysis. Ultimately I analyzed the cases through the lense of the concept of coproduction, drawing on elements of Ostrom’s (2005) IAD framework. This analytical framework is described in detail in chapter two.

Establishing the broader context

In order to situate the cases I studied in broader perspective, I conducted approximately 20 interviews with stakeholders in local government in Sierra Leone. Respondents included representatives of central government and provincial and district government; national non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and donor organizations. All of these interviews took place in English, most were not recorded and summary transcripts were created from notes. I collected a wide range of
documents, both in ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ form, including copies of legislation dealing with chiefdom and council governance, relevant ‘grey’ literature and government and donor datasets. I also monitored three national newspapers between November 2008 and September 2009—Awoko, Standard Times and Concord Times—and clipped news stories about local government, party politics and civil society. I kept a spreadsheet documenting each story and noting aspects relevant to the themes of the research. Finally, I spent a week doing archival research at the National Archives in Kew, attempting to trace the development of the institutional arrangements studied during the post-colonial period, but with limited success.

A mixed methods approach

I collected and analyzed multiple sources of data to build a more complete picture of local public goods provision. When selecting cases, I used preliminary interviews to develop an initial set of options and then conducted a survey of senior representatives of household to reach final choices. When collecting data for each case, I focused first on carrying out a period of participant observation and document review. Through this process, I developed a good base of knowledge from which to formulate interview questions and conduct interviews. This helped to minimize the risk that respondents would give easy answers, or answers that they thought would appeal to me. I interviewed a wide range of relevant actors involved in the provision of each good to ensure a balanced view. In developing the case study narratives presented here, I have drawn on a range of respondent accounts, rather than relying on one respondent too heavily. Inevitably, there is some unevenness in the quantity and quality of evidence supporting the case study narratives. Where the evidence on a particular point is limited, I have clearly indicated that this is the case.

Research ethics

The research was carried out in accordance with the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Research Ethics Policy (2006) and the Economic and Social Research Council Research Ethics Framework (2006). An LSE ethics review questionnaire was completed and reviewed by my supervisor, who determined that a full LSE Research Ethics Committee review would not be required. The main potential risk posed by the research was damage to relationships between i) LGAs and donors; ii) LGAs and central government; and iii) (subject-)citizens and LGAs. When conducting the research, I minimized this risk by taking care not to
discuss any participant’s views with others. In reporting the research honestly and accurately, reputational risks cannot be eradicated altogether, but I have aimed to be sensitive to the importance of relationships and reputation to research participants in my reporting.

I obtained informed consent orally from all those who participated in either semi-structured or survey interviews. I explained how the information collected would be used and I made it clear that participation was voluntary. With the exception of those in prominent leadership roles (the mayor, the paramount chief and Pa Rok), participants were told that they would not be identified by name in the final report, but may be identified by title or organization. All recordings and transcripts of interviews were stored securely on my laptop, in a password-protected folder and without the use of participants’ names. During the course of my fieldwork, my digital recorder was stolen with a number of recordings on it, as I was only able to transfer these periodically when I had computer access. On the advice of LSE’s Research Ethics Committee, I visited all those whose recordings were stored on the recorder at the time of the theft to explain what had happened and the possible implications, and to offer my apologies.

1.4 Overview of the thesis

The thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter two, I set out the analytical framework that structures the case studies of ‘success versus failure’ and review the literatures which inform this framework. In chapter three, I provide an account of local government in Sierra Leone, focusing on the dynamics of post-war reform, the historical development of local government, and contemporary academic debate about chiefs and local councils. In chapter four, I introduce Makeni, the field site for this study, and provide a more detailed account of the specific forms of chiefdom and council government found there. I also present the findings of the survey of senior representatives of households, which provide insight into respondents’ views on the performance of MCC and Makeni’s chiefs as public goods providers. In chapter five, I compare two cases of coproduction led by MCC—the more successful case of a clean market jointly produced with the traders and the less successful case of a safe supply of meat jointly produced with the butchers. I follow this with a comparison of two cases of coproduction led by Makeni’s chiefs in chapter six—the more successful case of public order generated through a senior chief’s barri with the cooperation and
compliance of their subject-citizens and the less successful case of community infrastructure produced through the mobilization of unpaid labour. In chapter seven, I consider the case studies collectively in light of theories of coproduction, set out four propositions about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in post-war Sierra Leone, and anticipate and address some of the main criticisms of the analytical approach taken. In chapter eight, I conclude by exploring the potential of coproduction as a means of addressing Sierra Leone’s public goods deficit, reflect on the policy implications of a more grounded and gradual approach to institutional reform to improve local public goods provision, and consider how such an approach might apply in the context of local government reform in Sierra Leone.
CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical Underpinnings

At the core of this study is a comparison of four cases of relative success and failure in local public goods provision. I analyze these cases through the lens of the concept of coproduction, taking an institutional approach which draws on elements of Ostrom’s (2005) institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework. I accept her definition of institutions as rules, or more specifically as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interaction, including those within families, neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations and governments of all scales” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 3). In this chapter I describe the analytical framework that I apply in this study and review the key literature which informs this framework. First, I consider two of the main bodies of literature looking at local public goods provision in Africa which motivated me to pursue an institutional approach: literature based on experimental games conducted in African settings and social anthropological accounts of ‘everyday governance’ in Africa. Next, I describe the broad context of ‘new’ institutionalist literature from which the IAD framework emerges, set out my application of the framework and address two main theoretical points of contention: the characterization of human agency and institutional change. Finally, I review the literature on coproduction, including literature critical of coproduction’s deployment as a strategy for improving the supply of public goods.

2.1 Institutions and local public goods provision in Africa

Both the experimental and anthropological literatures looking at local public goods provision in Africa is complex and worthy of extensive discussion; here I am able to provide only a highly partial summary of each and indicate how they relate to the analytical framework that I apply in this study. While these literatures are based on very different assumptions about the nature of the social world and causality, they both share an interest in the micro-level study of institutions and the way in which these shape public goods outcomes.

i) Experimental games

Experimental games have been used principally by economists, but increasingly by other social scientists also, to compare theoretical assumptions about human behaviour to actual behaviour; the games are structured interactions intended
to replicate relevant theoretical scenarios. More specifically, researchers have used
games to better understand the role played by preferences and norms in shaping
behaviour. Colin Camerer and Ernest Fehr (2004) provide a useful overview of the
games played and the key findings yielded. The main headline is that a substantial
portion of players in such experiments do not conform to the model of the rational
egoist, pursuing only material net benefits; they appear to have other-regarding
preferences, including preferences for reciprocity and equality.\footnote{The evidence for this is that players reward reciprocal and fair behaviour (or punish the lack thereof), even at a material net loss to themselves.}

The majority of experimental games conducted in the 1980s and 1990s relied
on the participation of student populations in Western countries. More recently,
studies have been conducted with a wider range of subjects, including those in
African countries (Henrich, et al., 2004; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, &
Weinstein, 2007; Hofmeyr, Burns, & Visser, 2007; Barr, Lindelow, & Serneels, 2009;
(2004) have conducted what is perhaps the most widely known cross-cultural study,
based on a set of experimental games played by members of fifteen small-scale
societies, including four based in Africa. Two main games were played—the
ultimatum game\footnote{In this game, the first player (the proposer) receives a sum of money (the pie) and can choose to allocate any portion of it to a second player (the responder). The responder, with full knowledge of the size of the pie and the size of the offer, can accept or reject the proposal. If the responder accepts, she receives the amount proposed and the proposer receives the remainder. If she rejects the proposal, neither party receives anything. If players were behaving like ‘egoists’, all positive offers would be accepted, and proposers would offer very small amounts.}, which measures the extent to which participants are willing to
punish other players for unfair behaviour at a cost to themselves, and the public goods
game\footnote{In this game, players receive a sum of money and can choose to contribute any share of it (from zero to 100 percent) to a group fund. After all players have had a chance to contribute, the collective pot is increased by 50 percent (or in some cases doubled), and distributed equally among all players. ‘Egoists’ would choose to free-ride, contributing zero to the fund.}, which measures the extent to which participants are willing to contribute to a
public good at a cost to themselves.

The researchers interpret results from the fifteen societies studied alongside
existing experimental evidence (based principally on Western student populations).
The results are consistent with existing evidence to the extent that no society studied
lent support to the textbook economic assumption of rational egoism. However, the
degree of variation in patterns of play across the fifteen groups exceeded that found in
the entire literature to date, suggesting that preferences are influenced by participants’
environments rather than universal in nature. Institutions appear to be a principal channel through which environmental influence exerts itself. The authors argue that variation in levels of market integration and the payoffs to cooperative behaviour between societies, which are associated with distinct institutional structures, explains about half of the variation in mean ultimatum game offers. The authors also highlight some specific micro-level examples where patterns of play in the public goods game are consistent with the behaviour implied by local institutions. For example, they note that the Orma in Kenya explicitly recognized the parallels between the public goods game and the Kenyan institution of *harambee*, which involves a locally driven process of contributions to support the provision of local public goods such as a road, school or other community building (pp. 39, 49). The contributions made by Orma participants were noticeably more generous than those of other groups, and wealthier participants tended to contribute more than poorer ones, as they would in the context of *harambee*. The authors also propose that the Hadza group in Tanzania implicitly made a connection between food-sharing practices and the ultimatum game (p. 40). In general, Hadza participants made low offers and experienced high rejection rates. The authors suggest that there are parallels with the pattern of evasion and punishment typical of food-sharing practices within this group.

Experimental work of this kind has been criticized for heroic assumptions about the extent to which behaviour in an experimental setting maps onto behaviour in ‘real life’. Based on research in rural Sierra Leone, Maarten Voors, Ty Turley, Andreas Kontoleon, Erwin Bulte and John List (2012) investigate whether public goods games are predictive of behaviour in the context of a development intervention to provide public goods in the community and find no statistically significant relationship between the two. They suggest that respondents’ behaviour may be affected by the pool of subjects involved; the context in which decision-making takes place; the extent and nature of scrutiny by others; the presence or absence of ethical

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40 For example, in the ultimatum game, mean offers varied from 25 to 57 percent of the pot, while the range typical in experiments with student subjects is 42 to 48 percent. In the public goods game, the mean contribution for student subjects is approximately 40 to 60 percent and typical distributions of contributions have a U-shape, with a mode at full defection (contribution of zero) and a secondary mode at full cooperation (contribution of 100 percent). Mean contributions for the 5 societies which participated in public goods games ranged from 34 to 65 percent and none had a mode at full defection. 41 These measures are based on rankings of each society according to how frequently its members engage in market exchange and the potential benefits of cooperative productive activities (rather than those conducted alone or on a family basis).
considerations; and the stakes of the game (p. 308). Henrich et al (2004, pp. 42-44) comment on a range of ways in which the framing of the experiments they conducted could have influenced the results, including experimenter bias where the experimenter had a pre-existing relationship with the participants; the use of money, which may provide a specific cue or signal about the nature of the situation; and the strategy used to instruct participants on how to play the games. Cecile Jackson (2011) suggests that more fundamental framing effects are at play in the work of Henrich et al (2004) than those the authors discuss. For example, she argues that the very act of naming an activity as a game has a significant framing effect, as there are specific cultural views about the behaviour appropriate to the playing of games; related, she argues that experimental games involve largely informal interactions which may be divorced from the formal arenas which (in some cases) they attempt to replicate.

The cross-cultural application of experimental games is also vulnerable to accusations of ‘culturalism’. Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2004, p. 63) describes culturalism as an essentialization of culture, which “reduces all societies (along with their various groups and sub-cultures) to ‘one’ system of cultural values, or even to a ‘national character’ or ‘basic personality’”. The tendency of analyses of data from experimental games to point to single group-level cultural dynamics, such as food-sharing practices establishing generalized cultural standards of fairness, can be interpreted as falling into a trap of cultural simplification and essentialization. These critics would emphasize the multiplicity of cultural logics influencing human behaviour, as well as the high degree of internal differentiation within any society.

**ii) The anthropology of ‘everyday governance’**

Anthropological studies of patterns of ‘everyday governance’ at the local level in Africa provide a valuable counterpoint to the more abstract findings of experimental games. I base this discussion on three recent and prominent edited volumes: Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur’s (2009) volume focused on the governance of public goods provision; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan’s (2006) volume looking at “everyday corruption” in front-line services; and Christian Lund’s (2007) volume which focuses on “twilight institutions”—those which are not formally part of the state, yet exercise public authority regardless.

42 The authors use the term “collective service delivery” which they leave open to cover the provision of “public, collective and communal goods and services” (p. 2) by a range of actors.
These volumes share an interest in producing scholarship which is both empirically grounded and free of artificial boundaries derived from ill-fitting theory. Blundo and Le Meur (p. 2) observe that all contributors “describe and analyze in very concrete terms the institutional and political processes stemming from the provision of a number of public, collective and communal goods or services”; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (p. 8) state the authors’ primary objective as “to describe the habits, procedures and justifications involved in corruption and, furthermore, to understand how public services work ‘in reality’ and how their users participate in or adapt to this mode of operation”; and Lund (p. 2) argues that the authors “investigate how public authority actually works in the face of obvious state failure and impending collapse”, approaching the study of public authority from below. This approach can be read as a response both to research by proponents of ‘good governance’, which is perceived to be an effort to legitimate an inappropriate ideal, and to prominent accounts of the African state by authors such as Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) and Jean-François Bayart (1993), which are perceived to suffer from weak empirical grounding and exhibit culturalist bias (Lund, 2007, p. 2; Blundo & Le Meur, 2009, p. 2).

Many of the heterogeneous cases discussed in these volumes provide insights into factors affecting performance in local public goods provision in Africa. Kristine Juul (2007) and Marc-Éric Gruénais, Raphaël Okalla and Eric Gauvrit (2009) focus on the perverse incentives created by decentralization of public goods provision. Juul finds that in the rural municipality of Barkedji in Senegal, the transfer of responsibility for tax collection from an appointed administration to an elected administration has weakened tax enforcement, as local councillors avoid unpopular enforcement measures for fear of electoral consequences. This leaves the council with little to no revenue to fund public goods provision and thus renders councillors reliant on wealthy patrons to fund urgent development projects, reinforcing a system of clientelism. Gruénais et al find that decentralization in Cameroon has improved the incentives for facilities based in the capital to provide healthcare services at the expense of those based in more peripheral areas. While centrally located facilities can take advantage of greater autonomy to recruit better staff, access funding more rapidly and increase their independence, peripheral facilities receive less central government support, but are not able to attract qualified staff and continue to face difficulties in
accessing resources which can only be obtained in provincial centres after paying bribes.

Others focus on the interaction between what political scientists usually term formal and informal institutions. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (2006, p. 5) define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels”. Nassirou Bako Arifari’s (2007) study of customs authorities in Benin, Niger and Senegal provides one example of a close study of informal political institutions which operate alongside more formal ones. Bako Arifari finds that the central government sets targets for customs authorities without providing the necessary resources to meet them. In response, directors of customs offices “develop strategies ‘to attract clients’ which are characterized by a certain flexibility towards the clientele” (p. 217). For example, customs officers develop reciprocal relationships with traders who provide petrol and vehicles to support the operations of the customs service in exchange for favourable treatment—which could be described as corrupt coproduction. Using Helmke and Levitsky’s language, the coproducive arrangements are “substitutive” as regards revenue-raising, as they achieve the same outcome that the formal institution is intended to in terms of enabling the customs service to meet its designated revenue targets. However, these arrangements are “competing” as regards the public safety role of the customs service, as the flexibility offered to clients undermines customs’ officials’ ability to protect the public interest.

This body of work offers a contextually embedded narrative of public goods provision based on rich accounts of the processes through which public goods are provided in practice. The ethnographic methods employed by anthropologists are well-suited to the study of incentives for local public goods provision, which are often context dependent and cannot simply be read from formal institutional structures; and informal institutions, particularly those that lie concealed behind officially sanctioned ones. Many of the studies included in these collections yield surprising findings about local public goods provision, and often run counter to orthodox development thinking about the strategies most likely to improve the quantity and quality of public goods available. However, these collections do not offer a more general explanatory

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43 Olivier de Sardan (2008) argues that it is more appropriate to refer to professional and social norms and rules, which may have an official or more practical character.
theory about the conditions under which local public goods provision is more likely to
succeed (indeed, many of the authors would be likely to reject such a project).

While some working in an anthropological tradition question the validity of an
approach based on experimental games, as discussed above, from the perspective of
those conducting such experiments there is potentially much to gain from an
engagement with social anthropology. Experimental games aim to generate general
propositions; anthropological work can explore how these propositions might apply in
particular contexts, as well as expose the limits of their applicability. When
surprising patterns of play emerge in experimental games, such as those observed by
Henrich et al (2004), anthropological work may be able to explain these with
reference to participants’ perception of the games and related social beliefs and
practices. Similarly, when there is a disparity between the findings of a set of
experimental games and observed practice, such as that discussed by Voors et al
(2012), anthropological work may be able to indicate why such a gap exists.

Furthermore, despite significant differences between these bodies of literature,
they also point in a similar direction: the micro-level study of institutional
arrangements through which public goods are provided. In pursuing this direction, I
follow the social anthropological literature in studying how public goods are provided
in practice, through direct observation. At the same time, I am interested in
developing more generalizable propositions about the conditions under which
coproduction in Sierra Leone is more likely to succeed. Rather than an experimental
approach, which would require me to test specific hypotheses, I follow a more
inductive approach, but one that is structured by the use of a common analytical
framework which I elaborate on in the next section.

2.2 An institutional approach

i) Three institutionalisms

The study of institutions has enjoyed a resurgence over the course of the last
three decades. From the perspective of political scientists, this large and multi-
disciplinary ‘new’ institutionalist literature is generally understood to break down into
three main schools of thought: rational choice institutionalism (RCI)\(^{44}\), historical
institutionalism (HI) and sociological institutionalism (SI). It is difficult to draw clear

\(^{44}\) Related work in economics is usually known as the new institutional economics.
boundaries between these schools of thought, given the diverse range of literature which each contains and recent efforts to bridge the gaps between them (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999, pp. 369-370). There is insufficient space here to describe each of these schools in detail and this has been done ably by others elsewhere (Koelble, 1995; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998; Campbell, 2004). Instead I offer a brief sketch of each and explain my reasons for drawing on the IAD framework, which falls within the rationalist tradition, but also challenges key aspects of rationalist thinking.

Rational choice institutionalists (RCIs) have generally shown interest in institutions from a theoretical perspective as a means of explaining the discrepancy between rational choice predictions and observed behaviour in situations where collective action problems are expected to occur, but do not. Institutions, RCIs have argued, can facilitate cooperation and enable collective action problems to be overcome. They tend to conceive of institutions as either exogenous constraints on action or equilibrium ways of doing things (Shepsle, 2006). The work of economic historian Douglass North (1990) is a prominent example of the former approach; he defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally…the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. North argues that institutions reduce uncertainty in the face of complex problems and limited human problem-solving capacity. Kenneth Shepsle (2006) argues that the view of institutions as equilibrium ways of doing things is distinct in that it treats the rules of the game as endogenous, that is, they can be changed by the ‘players’. Under this interpretation, rules are considered a reflection of popular will rather than exogenous constraints. When influential players seek to change the rules of the game, the equilibrium way of doing things can be considered unstable and the institution fragile.

Historical institutionalists (HIs) have shown interest in institutions from a more empirical perspective as a means of explaining specific real world political outcomes (Thelen, 1999, p. 373; Steinmo, 2008, pp. 156-158). According to Sven Steinmo (2008, pp. 156-158), HIs’ interest in institutions emerged inductively as


46 In game theory, a Nash equilibrium exists when each player is making the best decision s/he can, taking into account the decisions of others.

47 North is considered a major contributor to the new institutional economics.
comparative political studies persistently identified institutional structures as a significant influence over political strategies and outcomes. HIs’ definition of institutions tends to be somewhat looser than that of RCIs; according to Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996, p. 938), HIs define institutions as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy”. One important way in which HI work differs from much RCI work is in its emphasis on the importance of historical context and temporal sequencing in determining the structure and effects of institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 941; Immergut, 1998, pp. 16-25; Thelen, 1999, p. 371; Steinmo, 2008, pp. 164-167). HIs are also more likely than RCIs to characterize institutions as the product of political struggles which reflect the will of dominant political forces (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 940; Immergut, 1998, p. 16). Finally, HIs have tended to place greater emphasis on the role of ideas alongside institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 941; Steinmo, 2008, pp. 167-174).

Sociological institutionalism (SI) emerged from the field of organizational studies in the late 1970s and challenges the view that organizational structures merely represent efficient designs to achieve organizational goals. Instead, sociological institutionalists (SIs) tend to characterize organizations as socially embedded, and organizational structures as reflective of the broader institutional environment (Powell, 2007). SI is associated with a more cultural understanding of institutions which focuses on the way in which institutions serve as a medium through which individuals interpret the social world and provide templates for action (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 948). In emphasizing the interpretive role played by institutions, SIs draw on concepts such as “symbolic systems, cultural scripts and mental models” (Powell, 2007, p. 1). SIs perceive institutional structures to offer far more limited scope for individual choice than most RCI and HI colleagues, arguing that human behaviour is guided by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than a ‘logic of consequences’. In what is widely recognized as a key SI text, Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1991, p. 10) write:

...individuals do not choose freely among institutions, customs, social norms, or legal procedures. Once cannot decide to get a divorce in a new manner, or play chess by different rules, or opt out of paying taxes. Organization theorists prefer

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models not of choice but of taken-for-granted expectations…absorbed through socialization, education, on-the-job learning or acquiescence to convention.

The emphasis here is on the imaginative limitations that institutions impose on individuals and the dominance of habitual, rather than calculated, forms of behaviour.

My choice to draw on Ostrom’s IAD framework does not reflect a straightforward privileging of an RCI perspective over other forms of institutionalism. The diversity of work on institutions reflects their complex, multi-faceted character, and different theoretical approaches capture distinct facets of their operations and effects. Moreover, while Ostrom’s work falls within a rationalist tradition, she also challenges important aspects of rationalist thinking: she rejects a simplistic model of human agency based on the assumption of a universal rational egoist and accords a significant role to social norms; draws on insights from cognitive research about the importance of ‘mental models’ as an influence on behaviour; and employs a multi-tiered approach to analysis which can be used to explain how political struggles at different levels shape institutions. Nevertheless, there are a number of key aspects of RCI thinking which are reflected in her work that I find valuable for the purposes of my investigation. These include: a theoretical focus on institutions as a means to resolve collection action problems, such as that posed by the provision of public goods; a clear definition of institutions as rules which is appropriate for micro-level study of public goods provision; and a focus on the role of human agency and strategic behaviour. Beyond these broader benefits, the IAD framework is designed for pragmatic, policy-oriented work and flexible use, which suits my purposes well.

**ii) The analytical framework**

The concept of coproduction provides an entry-point for analysis of the four cases I discuss, but it does not offer an analytical framework for dissecting them. For this, I draw on the IAD framework. As discussed, Ostrom (2005) defines institutions as rules; despite the wide diversity of human institutions, she argues that they are underpinned by a common set of “universal building blocks”. The IAD framework is an attempt to identify and describe these universal components so that they can be used to make sense of institutions. Ostrom emphasizes the strategic character of human behaviour in institutional contexts, summarizing the essence of the IAD framework: “[i]ndividuals interacting within rule-structured situations face choices regarding the actions and strategies they take, leading to consequences for themselves.
and others” (p. 3). Ostrom captures this strategic interaction using the concept of an action situation.

According to Ostrom, an action situation occurs whenever “two or more individuals are faced with a set of potential actions that jointly produce outcomes” (p. 32). The main purpose of defining an action situation is to draw boundaries around a discrete set of actors, actions and outcomes for the purpose of analysis. The analytical focus is on a particular snapshot of an institution at a given moment, rather than the historical development of an institution over time. However, this approach does not imply examining a particular phenomenon in an isolated way; relevant historical, social and economic context is drawn into the analysis, represented principally by exogenous variables influencing the action situation. Ostrom defines seven sets of variables that make up an action situation, which are based on the basic components of a game in game theory: 1) the set of participants; 2) positions to be filled by participants; 3) potential outcomes; 4) allowable actions and action-outcome linkages; 5) the control participants have over action-outcome linkages; 6) the information available to participants about actions, outcomes and their linkages; and 7) the costs and benefits of actions and outcomes. To these, she adds a further three sets of exogenous variables which influence action situations: 1) the rules which participants use to order their relationships; 2) the attributes of the biophysical and material world being acted upon; and 3) the attributes of the broader community in which action is grounded.

I do not employ the formal IAD terminology in chapters five and six as I find it too cumbersome for the purposes of presenting a case study narrative intended to be legible to a wider audience. However, underpinning the case studies is an implicit conception of each case as an action situation in which there are two positions to be occupied: LGA and coproducing (subject-)citizen.49 The specific participants are Makeni City Council (MCC); Makeni’s chiefs; and the groups of (subject-)citizens that they engage with in the course of public goods provision, including traders, butchers, those involved in cases heard by chiefs and young men. MCC is treated as a corporate actor, while the other participants are treated as individual members of a group with common interests.

49 Arguably I describe more than two positions in the course of each case study narrative. However, the main dynamic of interest is that between LGAs and coproducing (subject-)citizens.
I assume that participants make decisions about how to behave based on an assessment of the costs and benefits of potential actions and outcomes. Ostrom recommends breaking the costs and benefits of potential actions and outcomes down into 1) the physical outcome of a chain of action; 2) associated external material rewards/sanctions; and 3) the valuation placed on a combination of 1) and 2) by the participants. For the cases I discuss, the physical outcome is ultimately the public good in question, produced to variable quality. Further material rewards/sanctions can attach to the potential outcome itself, or to actions leading to the potential outcome. The valuation of the physical outcome and related material rewards/sanctions is dependent on participants’ preferences. Ostrom is open-minded on the nature of participants’ preference structures—as discussed in greater detail in the next section, she argues that beyond preferences for material gain, human beings demonstrate other-regarding preferences and preferences shaped by social norms.

In fleshing out the kind of human agency exercised in action situations, Ostrom argues that it is important for analysts to specify how participants acquire and use information and how they select a particular action from a possible pool of potential actions. Field-based researchers do not have access to the specific cognitive data generated through experiments; I therefore take one strategy recommended by Ostrom, and adopt an assumption of bounded rationality (Simon, 1972; Ostrom, 2005). To clarify, while I consider all participants to be capable of strategic behaviour, I assume that there are limits to their rationality. They are likely to have access to incomplete information about the situation they are in, including the full range of actions they might take, possible outcomes and the linkages between actions and outcomes. They are unlikely to make a comprehensive calculation about how best to maximize benefits to themselves at each decision point. Instead, they are likely to rely on context-specific heuristics to simplify the decision making process, which include strategies such as satisficing (seeking an acceptable rather than an optimal outcome).

Of the three categories of exogenous variables which Ostrom identifies, she places the greatest emphasis on rules. Ostrom defines rules as “shared understandings by participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited or permitted” (p. 18). This definition is unusual in its claim that rules are always understood by participants to be enforced, so in order for a prescription to qualify as a rule, Ostrom (p. 151) requires that arrangements for
monitoring and imposing sanctions are in place. In Ostrom’s view, it is this key feature which distinguishes rules from norms. While norms are also prescriptive, failure to observe a norm is costly because of the internal value that participants attach to norm violation, rather than as a result of externally imposed sanctions. Although Ostrom emphasizes that rules are “shared understandings…about enforced prescriptions [my emphasis]”, she indicates (p. 139) that this does not imply that rules are necessarily consciously recognized by participants as such. Further, while Ostrom emphasizes that rules are enforced prescriptions, she argues that this does not imply that rule conformance is based solely on fear of punishment (p. 167). She suggests that it is common for rules to have a significant degree of normative support which leads to voluntary compliance, noting that it would be very costly to maintain many rules if compliance was fully dependent on punishment. However, Ostrom also argues that in the absence of punishment, normative support for rules commonly dwindles as those following them see violators go unpunished.

Ostrom outlines seven categories of rules which link to different components in the action situation, set out in table 2.1.1. Her motives in classifying rules in this fashion include providing a consistent language which can be used by institutional scholars to prevent “babbling equilibrium” problems, providing a full sense of the structure of the action situation and helping analysts cope with the complexity of the wide array of rules found in the social world (p. 175). I have used Ostrom’s rule classification system to map out the key rules organizing the action situation in each of the four cases I discuss, which helps to clarify the underlying structure of rules in each case, and I include copies of these rule classifications at the end of each chapter for reference.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of rule</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position rules</td>
<td>Specify the positions in an action situation and restrictions on the number of participants who may hold the position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary rules (entry and exit rules)</td>
<td>Specify eligibility for positions; the process for determining which eligible participants enter and exit positions; and the process through which participants enter and exit positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice rules</td>
<td>Specify what participants occupying positions must, must not or may do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregation rules</td>
<td>Specify who decides the action or activities to be undertaken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information rules</td>
<td>Specify the lines of communication between participants and the form which communication will take</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payoff rules</td>
<td>Specify the costs and benefits attached to actions and outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope rules</td>
<td>Specify which outcomes must, must not or may be affected in the action situation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other two sets of exogenous variables that Ostrom identifies are attributes of the biophysical and material world and attributes of the community. In the former category, it is important that all four goods studied are public goods, broadly interpreted to include those with positive externalities. Aside from this, I do not discuss attributes of the biophysical or material world in any detail during my analysis. Ostrom provides no clear definition of attributes of the community, but cites a number of relevant variables, including size and composition, the values of behaviour accepted, the degree to which common understandings about particular action situations are shared, the degree to which preferences are shared and levels of inequality (pp. 26-27). I focus on attributes of the social and political environment which present a barrier to the provision of public goods, including a political system which offers little reward for public goods provision; resource scarcity; low levels of trust in local government; and a lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities (as discussed in more detail in chapter one).

While defining an action situation sets the boundaries of a unit of study for micro-analysis, Ostrom also emphasizes that action situations do not tend to exist in isolation; rather multiple action situations are “nested” within one another. Ostrom argues that the rules applied at one level of analysis are nested within rules set at another level of analysis which establish how the first set of rules can be altered. She defines three levels of rules:
• Operational rules—those which directly affect everyday decision-making for participants;
• Collective choice rules—those which determine the rules to be used in changing operational rules; and
• Constitutional rules—those which determine the rules to be used in changing collective choice rules.

The case studies I present focus on operational rules, while touching on collective choice rules to a lesser extent. I do not carry out structured analysis of how any action situation(s) at a higher level act on those set out in chapters five and six. However, I do describe a large portion of the relevant constitutional rules in chapter three, which provides an introduction to local government in Sierra Leone.

To summarize, I treat each of the four cases studies as instances of coproduction of local public goods. I draw on elements of Ostrom’s IAD framework to animate these instances of coproduction, treating each as an action situation in which LGAs and coproducing (subject-)citizens face strategic decisions about the actions they take in the context of the rules governing coproduction; attributes of the social and political environment; and the character of the goods they are coproducing. I use concepts from Ostrom’s framework to underpin and structure the analysis, but I do not employ formal language. My purpose in employing the IAD framework is to gain insight into the specific cases studied and through these cases into the empirical phenomenon of coproduction of local public goods in Sierra Leone.

iii) Modelling agency

The IAD framework is clearly in keeping with the tendency of RCI work to emphasize the role of human agency, with the analysis centring on the strategic calculus made by individuals in order to maximize the attainment of their preferences within the context of an institutional structure. Such an approach conflicts with the views of SIs who believe that a ‘logic of appropriateness’ dominates human decision-making. Beyond arguments about the primacy of a habitual logic of action, some SIs have focused on the cognitive limits which restrict human capacity to make strategic calculations and lead to reliance on decision-making shortcuts, and others have challenged the very notion of human rationality. For example, the well-known ‘garbage can’ model of organizational decision-making suggests that problems and solutions may not be connected by a clear causal link, but instead meet at random
Many HIs do not object in principle to the conception of actors as strategic calculators; they have been willing to make use of both ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ models of agency in their arguments as needs require (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 939; Steinmo, 2008, p. 163). However, HIs have criticized RCIs’ characterization of actors’ preferences. HIs have argued against the assumption of a universal rational egoist whose preferences are fixed and exogenous to institutions. In contrast, HIs argue that preferences are formed within an institutional context which helps give them shape (Koelble, 1995, p. 232; Thelen, 1999, p. 375).

Ostrom (2005, pp. 99-133) considers the significant challenge of how to model human agency for the purposes of institutional analysis in some depth, bridging the gap between these different perspectives on agency to some extent in the process. As discussed above, the IAD framework does not require the assumption of a universal rational egoist. In fact, Ostrom’s assessment of the evidence indicates that the model of the rational egoist is only effective at predicting human behaviour in competitive market settings. She points to the abundance of experimental evidence (such as that described in section 2.1) that participants in games posing social dilemmas do not behave like rational egoists; they value actions and outcomes for reasons other than the material net benefits they generate. She explains this deviation from the rational egoist model using the language of norms. While Ostrom suggests that humans have an innate capacity to learn norms, she indicates that they are socially transmitted. She proposes that norms lead to the formation of intrinsic preferences about how participants behave and how they wish others to behave. This leads them to assign positive or negative values to actions and outcomes based on the emotional responses they evoke.

By underlining the relationship between norms and preferences, Ostrom acknowledges that preferences are context dependent. This implies a feedback loop between institutions and preferences, as institutions will inevitably have an effect on norms. However, when analyzing a particular action situation (particularly in a predictive mode), Ostrom finds it important to treat participants’ preferences as fixed and exogenous to the action situation for the sake of analytical clarity. Thus Ostrom recognizes that preferences are context dependent, but the IAD framework is not designed to model preference formation. Ostrom’s conception of norms also provides one means of closing the gap between the ‘logic of consequences’ privileged by most RCIs and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ privileged by some SIs. Ostrom suggests that
norms about appropriate behaviour influence preferences and therefore feed into a strategic calculation about how to behave. However, this is unlikely to be satisfactory to analysts who see behaviour as having a more taken-for-granted quality.

Ostrom’s focus on strategic behaviour does not imply that human beings are perfect calculating machines. Like some SI colleagues, she is persuaded by cognitive research which indicates that individuals often rely on heuristics to make decisions rather than performing a complex calculation to maximize net benefits received. She also emphasizes the role played by mental models which draw on culture in shaping participants’ perception of an action situation, including their expectations of how others are likely to behave. However, unlike some SI colleagues, she sees these mental models as relatively malleable, arguing that they are likely to be revised through information search and experimentation with different strategies if the outcomes they deliver are unsatisfactory to participants.

In sum, Ostrom advocates for a complex model of human agency, which allows for varied preferences influenced by norms and a diversity of decision-making processes. This approach addresses some of the main criticisms levied by HIs and SIs, but it leaves some key tensions unresolved, including the question of how institutions shape preferences and the appropriate treatment of habitual behaviour. It also remains challenging to specify a complex model of agency when carrying out analysis with the IAD framework, leaving analysts dependent on general assumptions such as bounded rationality in some instances.

iv) Institutional change

This study is not centrally concerned with questions of institutional change. My focus is on a spatial comparison of the performance of four sets of institutional arrangements in 2009, rather that the origins of those arrangements and the process through which they developed over time. However, my purpose in comparing examples of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in local public goods provision is to see what they might teach us about strategies for addressing the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone. Some grounding in theories of institutional change is therefore helpful in order to think through the policy implications of the findings. In particular, I am interested in what institutional theory suggests about the possibilities of deliberate interventions to reform institutions.
RCI scholarship has been criticized for failing to provide a persuasive theory of institutional change; a difficulty that many RCI scholars acknowledge (Bates, 1998; Greif & Laitin, 2004; Greif, 2006; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011) and one that is shared by other forms of institutionalism. In conceiving of institutions as equilibria, RCI theorists face theoretical difficulties in explaining how and why one equilibrium breaks down and another establishes itself (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 953; Thelen, 1999, p. 381; Steinmo, 2001; Greif, 2006, p. 159). Sven Steinmo (2001), drawing on the work of Shepsle (1986), summarizes the problem as one of uncertainty acting as a barrier to change; he writes, “People are afraid of changing the rules because it is difficult to know what will happen after the rules are changed”. Avner Greif (2006, p. 159) argues that conceiving of institutions as an equilibrium phenomenon appears to negate the possibility of endogenous change. To elaborate, in the context of an equilibrium, each player’s behaviour is a best response, given their expectations about how others will behave. As such, it would appear that the stimulus for change must come from exogenous sources as otherwise nobody has any incentive to deviate from the institutionalized behaviour.

For Ostrom (2005, pp. 243-251), institutional change is change in a complex nested hierarchy of rules. As discussed, she identifies three levels of rules—operational, collective choice and constitutional; the scope for change in the rules at one level is constrained by the rules set at a higher level. She suggests that institutional change proceeds through a strategic process whereby a “minimum coalition” of participants in an action situation must find that the benefits of change outweigh the costs; uncertainty and cognitive limitations mean that they may well be wrong and the rule change will result in unintended outcomes. Ostrom and Basurto (2011) set out a broad range of mechanisms through which institutional change can occur, both deliberate and unconscious. Among the deliberate mechanisms identified are imitation of perceived successes; external interventions (such as aid

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50 Hall (2009) suggests that a general problem faced by all three institutionalisms is that theories focused on institutional persistence tend to emphasize the robustness of institutions rather than their malleability. In general, HIs are able to provide strong and nuanced accounts of change for particular institutions, but have failed to develop more generalized theories (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 954-955; Steinmo, 2008, pp. 167-174), although recent work by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2009) represents a notable exception. SI approaches enable theorists to explain why particular institutional forms might be chosen for reasons such as their interpretive resonance and legitimacy, but is less effective at describing the role of competition and conflict in institutional change (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 953-954).
interventions); responses to changes in the biophysical environment; competition; and conflict over the meaning of rules. Unconscious mechanisms identified include cognitive dissonance; technological change; and non-enforcement of rules, all of which can erode rule systems. Their list therefore allows for both endogenous and exogenous processes of change, but they do not specify how the proposed mechanisms work.

While Ostrom and Basurto (2011) identify a wide range of mechanisms of change, their extensive research into institutions for managing common pool resources has persuaded them that some mechanisms are more likely to result in successful institutional outcomes than others. When it comes to deliberate processes of change, they favour a locally driven process of “trial and error”, or “tinkering”. This is a common theme of Ostrom’s work (1990, pp. 182-216; 2005, pp. 217-254) and is based principally on the argument that institutions are complex systems of rules which interact with changing social and physical environments. Given this, it is simply not possible for public officials and other reformers to conduct analysis that will yield the “perfect set of rules” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 254). While external expertise can still play an important role in undertaking more finite analytical projects, its importance is likely to be secondary to the expertise accumulated by those who have long been engaged in refining and following a particular system of rules, and thus a gradual, adaptive approach which builds on their knowledge base is likely to achieve greater success. While Ostrom and Basurto (2011, p. 337) freely acknowledge that such a process will not necessarily lead to effective institutions, they see the external imposition of “a uniform set of formal rules” as a dangerous move which will not yield the level of variety needed for adaptive learning to take place.

Greif (2006, pp. 158-186) provides a fuller theory of institutional change which explicitly addresses the question of how endogenous institutional change can occur in the context of an institutional equilibrium. When an equilibrium exists, an institution can be described as self-enforcing: “each individual, taking the structure as given, finds it best to follow the institutionalized behavior that, in turn, reproduces the institution” (p. 16). Greif argues that endogenous change occurs when self-enforcing institutions lead to outcomes which modify key exogenous variables that affect the motivation of actors. When this causal link between institutional outcomes and key

51 Greif’s work has been used by the APPP Local Governance strand elsewhere (Booth, 2010).
exogenous variables increases the range of situations in which the institution is self-enforcing, institutional reinforcement occurs. Conversely, when this link reduces the range of situations in which the institution is self-enforcing, institutional erosion occurs.

Greif (pp. 169-170) identifies a range of different patterns of institutional change, depending on whether the changes to key exogenous variables and their significance are recognized. He argues that when these changes are not widely recognized, it is more likely that institutional change will occur as a result of experimentation and risk-taking. When these changes are recognized after they have already progressed substantially, they can result in sudden institutional change. Finally when these changes are recognized as they occur, decision-makers are likely to lead deliberate processes of institutional reform to reinforce failing institutions.

Greif (2006, pp. 187-199) argues that deliberate processes of reform to tackle the weaknesses of failing institutions more commonly follow a gradual process which requires “marginally altering their elements or adding new ones to render them self-enforcing” (p. 195). Greif suggests that this gradual approach is not only more common than a radical overhaul, but more likely to be successful because institutional elements with historical standing perform better than newer alternatives.

He defines institutions more broadly than Ostrom as “rules, beliefs, norms and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behaviour” (p. 30).52 At the root of the “fundamental asymmetry” between old and new institutional elements is the fact that such elements are attributes of individuals as well as institutions; they “reside in individuals’ memories, constitute their cognitive models, are embodied in their preferences…; they are what individuals bring with them when they face new situations” (p. 188). As such, they are the default that individuals draw on when attempting to establish the “micro-foundations of behaviour”, for example “a cognitive framework, information, normative guidance, and a way to anticipate what others may do to coordinate their behaviour with their responses” (p. 190). Although newer, alternative institutional elements can also inform and guide behaviour in this way, introducing them is likely to be both costly and difficult. In particular, it requires altering individuals’ internalized beliefs, including their beliefs about how others are likely to behave. Achieving this is no mean feat—Greif suggests that

52 Although Ostrom’s IAD framework also specifies a role for beliefs, norms and organizations.
“bargaining, coordination, search, and learning costs” would be involved; change would take time; and its outcomes would be uncertain (p. 190).

The debate on institutional change is both complex and relatively immature (Thelen, 1999; Hall, 2009; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011). The contributions discussed indicate that scholars working in an RCI tradition recognize both exogenous and endogenous sources of change, and are making progress in theorizing the latter. From the point of view of deliberate interventions to reform institutions, Ostrom and Greif both lend their support to a gradual approach to reform which recognizes the value of local experience and longstanding institutions. In light of their contributions, the wholesale import of institutions implied by ‘good governance’ looks highly problematic.

2.3 Coproduction and its critics

I adopted the concept of coproduction as an analytical lens for this study because it provides valuable insight into the four cases of LGA-led public goods provision that I investigated, all of which relied on substantial (subject-)citizen inputs. In particular, I find Joshi and Moore’s (2004) account of coproduction helpful in making sense of these cases. As discussed in chapter one, I draw on their work to define coproduction as the provision of public goods through a regular long-term relationship between government and citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions. Aside from the cases discussed in this study, many other arrangements for local public goods provision that I observed in Makeni were examples of coproduction. Olivier de Sardan (2011, p. 29) proposes that “co-delivery of a good or service by actors belonging to a number of different modes” is the norm in West Africa (although only those examples which involve cooperation between government and citizens constitute coproduction, according to my definition). Coproduction therefore appears to be a widespread phenomenon, worthy of attention.

The concept of coproduction was developed in the context of debate about urban service provision in the United States (US) during the late 1970s and early 1980s. At the time, local governments were under intense pressure due to a combination of federal budget cuts, declining local tax revenues linked to citizen resistance to taxation, poor economic performance and dwindling urban populations

53 The modes Olivier de Sardan discusses are: chiefly, associational, municipal, project-based, bureaucratic, sponsorship-based and religious and merchant.
Following President Reagan’s victory in 1981, ideas about downsizing the state and reducing government spending on public services came to the fore (Palmer & Sawhill, 1982). Given this backdrop, coproduction was viewed by many theorists as a strategy that could help urban governments make savings on service delivery. For example, Richard Rich (1981, p. 62) describes savings from coproduction as a “substantial boon to the city budget”; Charles Levine and Glenn Fisher (1984, p. 186) talk about coproduction as a “powerful tool for resolving fiscal stress”; and Roger Ahlbrandt and Howard Sumka (1983, p. 219) argue that “[a]s city budgets become tighter…residents will find themselves having to participate more and more to sustain adequate levels of service”. This framing of coproduction positions citizens as a resource to be taken advantage of by city governments in order to deliver savings.

However, in this literature, coproduction is viewed as far more than a straightforward cost-cutting measure. Researchers also emphasize other substantial benefits associated with coproduction, including higher quality service delivery and a revitalized culture of citizenship. One of the main insights of the coproduction literature is the importance of citizen contributions in the context of people-centred services, such as education and health, where transformation of human beings is the main aim. These services rely on interdependent contributions—neither governments nor coproducing citizens can produce them alone (Parks, et al., 1981). Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom (1977) argue that appropriate engagement with and support of citizen coproducers in the context of such services is essential to achieving a high quality of provision. They write (p. 93):

Without the intelligent and motivated efforts of service users, the service may deteriorate into an indifferent product with insignificant value…When professional people presume to know what is good for people rather than providing people with opportunities to express their own preferences, we should not be surprised to find that increasing professionalization of public services is accompanied by a serious erosion in the quality of those services. Gordon Whitaker (1980, p. 246) finds that Americans “have been misled into an over-reliance on service agents and bureaucratic organization of human services”. When government actors recognize their reliance on citizen coproducers, he argues, they are able to act in accordance with the limitations and the opportunities this relationship entails, achieving a better quality service.
As regards the effects on citizenship, Elaine Sharp (1980, p. 114) argues that coproduction offers a valuable alternative to a conflictual citizen-government relationship vis-à-vis public services, in which citizens simply “demand, consume and judge”. She argues that this conflictual model sets public officials on the defensive and ultimately leaves those citizens who make the effort to engage with government disillusioned. In contrast, she finds (pp. 109-110, 114-115) that the model of joint responsibility represented by coproduction enables public officials to engage with and invest in citizens more freely and creates opportunities for citizens to learn about public service provision and develop new competencies. Levine and Fisher (1984) make a similar argument, proposing that coproduction is one of the few cost-cutting strategies that could also address the crisis of public confidence in local government indicated by citizen resistance to taxation. They argue that unlike popular cost-cutting measures such as privatization of public services or interventions to improve operating productivity, coproduction recognizes citizens as integral to public service provision and brings citizens and public officials into daily interaction with one another. In their view (p. 181), this provides a platform for citizens to “build both competence and a broader perspective, a vision of the community and of what it can and should become”. These authors suggest that coproduction offers a more expansive role for citizens—rather than critical consumers of public services, they become active producers, with opportunities to learn, develop and shape their political communities.

The US debate on coproduction died down by the mid-1980s, as coproduction lost out to marketization as a means of delivering public services at lower cost; privatization and contracting out strategies were adopted by governments around the world, managerialist approaches became dominant, and academic and policy interest in coproduction dwindled (Alford, 1998, 2009). However, coproduction has experienced something of a revival in European and North American policy literature in the late 1990s and 2000s (Alford, 1998; Bovaird, 2007; Alford, 2009; Pestoff & Brandsen, 2009; Verschuere, Brandsen, & Pestoff, 2012). John Alford (2009, pp. 4-9) argues that this can be explained by the emergence of ‘Third Way’ public service
reformers in the US and the UK, who were interested in bringing ‘community’ back in alongside market-based solutions.\textsuperscript{54}

The focus of this thesis is on coproduction in the context of debates about international development. Overall, coproduction has received relatively little attention in this field; indeed, one of Joshi and Moore’s (2004) key arguments is that coproductive arrangements have gone unrecognized because of low levels of awareness of the concept. The 1980s were dominated by the direct introduction of market-oriented strategies for public goods provision in developing countries, usually under the auspices of IFIs and donor agencies (Larbi, 2006, p. 25). However, by the 1990s evidence had accumulated that market-based solutions were insufficient for development, and there was renewed interest in the role of state-society engagement in achieving developmental outcomes. Peter Evans (1996b; 1996a) and Ostrom (1996) examine coproduction in the context of a broader exploration of state-society synergy—a virtuous circle in which citizen engagement strengthens government institutions, which in turn provides an enabling environment for citizen engagement (Evans, 1996b, p. 1034). They take a generally optimistic view, emphasizing coproduction’s potential to improve public goods outcomes and the quality of governance, while acknowledging that this potential may go unrealized.

Ostrom (1996) argues that the potential for state-society synergy is only present when citizen and government inputs into coproduction of a good are interdependent, rather than substitutable.\textsuperscript{55} When inputs into coproduction of a good can be made by either citizens or government, they are substitutable. For example, citizens can take their waste to central collection points for pick-up, or government officials can collect it from their residences. According to Ostrom, the key question in the case of substitutable inputs is whether the wage rate paid to government officials is higher than the opportunity cost to citizens; if this condition holds then there are efficiency gains to be made by maximizing citizen inputs, as long as citizens are motivated to perform. When some combination of inputs from citizens and

\textsuperscript{54} In the UK, coproduction is currently being discussed in the context of the Coalition’s ‘Big Society’ agenda which aims “to give citizens, communities and local government the power and information they need to come together, solve the problems they face and build the Britain they want” (Cabinet Office, 2012). However, it has tended to be left-wing think tanks which have promoted the idea of coproduction as a means of achieving greater citizen participation in government (New Economics Foundation, 2008; Muir, 2010), even as many on the left have criticized the ‘Big Society’ agenda overall as merely a cover for deep cuts in social spending.

\textsuperscript{55} Ostrom was one of the co-authors of Parks et al (1981); this argument builds on that earlier work.
government is required for production of a good, they are interdependent. For example, government officials cannot educate students or improve patients’ health without their active cooperation. In the case of interdependent inputs into coproduction, the potential for synergy lies in the possibility that government and citizens will influence each other’s behaviour in a positive direction, encouraging greater mutual effectiveness. Ostrom argues that deliberate government efforts to engage citizens in a participatory fashion can help to elicit such synergy. She compares two cases—a highly successful water and sanitation initiative in peri-urban Brazil and poorly performing primary schools in Nigeria. In the Brazilian case, the municipal government encourages extremely high levels of citizen participation in design and maintenance of a condominial sewerage system, while in the Nigerian case, central government’s top-down control of education and wild fluctuations in education policy disempower teachers and parents, discouraging their contributions.

Evans argues that synergetic coproduction is usually dependent on two features: complementarity and embeddedness. Complementarity exists when there is a clear division of labour between public and private institutions based on their particular attributes, and embeddedness describes the ties, often informal in nature, that connect citizens and public officials across the public-private divide (1996a, p. 1120). Complementarity is clearly present in the case of coproduction based on interdependent inputs by local government and citizens. However, Evans argues that the full potential of this complementarity can only be realized in cases where embeddedness is also present. Evans sees embeddedness at work in the successful case of coproduction described by Ostrom (1996), as well as in Wai Fung Lam’s (1996) study of coproduction in the irrigation sector and Tendler’s (1997) study of a coproducitive health campaign in Brazil.

Both Ostrom and Evans draw links between coproduction and social capital, suggesting that state-society synergy established in the context of coproduction can contribute to state-society synergy more broadly. Evans argues that the production of social capital is not limited to the societal sphere; the ties across the public-private divide that constitute embeddedness also draw upon and contribute to a stock of social capital. Ostrom notes (p. 1083) that social capital developed through coproduction

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56 Robert Putnam (1993, p. 167) defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”.
can ‘spill over’ to other areas of action, enhancing citizens’ capability to seek an active role in improving the quality of other goods. More recently, Tsai (2011) has argued that social capital generated through coproduction can ‘spill over’ in a direction favoured by local officials, by encouraging greater citizen willingness to follow state policies. However, not all forms of social capital are developmental. In earlier work, Evans (1995) argues that embeddedness is only developmental when a state has achieved a threshold level of corporate coherence which renders it autonomous. In predatory states, Evans argues, embeddedness is likely to result in capture of the state by private interests.

Despite these important contributions to the debate in the 1990s, coproduction did not become a widely used concept in the literature looking at state-society engagement vis-à-vis public goods provision; over time, this discussion became largely dominated by the narrower issue of formal partnerships between non-state actors (most commonly NGOs) and governments to deliver goods (Robinson & White, 1998; White & Robinson, 1998; Batley, 2006; Batley & McLoughlin, 2010). In the 2000s, Joshi and Moore and colleagues (Joshi & Ayee, 2002; Masud, 2002; Joshi & Moore, 2004) revived the concept of coproduction because they felt it captured a modality of public goods provision which was distinct from the range of approaches recognized by the aid establishment.

Joshi and Moore (2004) take a far less optimistic view than Ostrom (1996) and Evans (1996a)—for them, coproduction is more a survival strategy to maintain a basic supply of public goods in states where authority and public finances are weak than a desirable approach which can improve the quality of public goods provision. They identify two sets of drivers of coproduction, both “variants of the imperfection or incompleteness of states” (p. 41). The first set of drivers discussed are “governance drivers”, declining levels of state-led public goods provision which result in an adaptive response by citizens to retain access to much-needed public goods. When the quantity and quality of goods and services declines, “organized groups of citizens with something at stake move in to help shore them up” (p. 41). The second set of drivers discussed are “logistical drivers”, environmental factors such as complexity or

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57 They argue (p. 34) that the standard classification of approaches to public goods provision includes: a) collective action independent of state agencies, b) direct provision through private associations, c) direct market provision on a for-profit basis, d) direct provision through state agencies and e) indirect state provision through sub-contracting to other agencies.
variation in the physical environment or difficulties in accessing poor households in rural areas which lead citizens to organize at the local level and link up with government actors to ensure access to services. I find this a more fuzzy category, as it is clear that the degree of logistical challenge that the state can manage without citizen support depends to a high degree on state capacity (a theoretical overlap that Joshi and Moore acknowledge). Joshi and Moore include coproduction driven by citizen control of key resources needed for provision of the good (whether information, personnel or public authority) within this category; it therefore seems to subsume the concept of interdependent coproduction identified by other theorists.

To an extent, Joshi and Moore’s account resonates with 1980s work on coproduction as a response to fiscal crisis in urban settings in the US. However, rather than planned policy interventions to reduce public spending, the examples of coproduction they describe tend to be ad hoc adaptations to scarcity as governments and coproducing citizens struggle to maintain an adequate supply of public goods. In keeping with their more modest approach, Joshi and Moore do not claim that coproduction implies state-society synergy, nor that it generates developmental social capital with broader applicability. In contrast to Ostrom and Evans, Joshi and Moore view the embeddedness which underpins coproduction with some anxiety. Although they consider the Weberian model of statehood critically, they ultimately accept its value as an ideal template. For them, embeddedness implies the blurring of public and private power, resources and authority in a murky fashion that undermines clear lines of accountability.

Like Evans (1996a) and Ostrom (1996), Diana Mitlin (2008) and John Ackerman (2004) are less concerned about the preservation of a Weberian model of statehood; instead, they see positive value in the penetration of the state by organized groups of citizens. Mitlin describes the efforts of grassroots slum-dwellers associations to improve the quality of housing and services available in informal settlements through “self-organized co-production”: taking on responsibility for securing land for new housing; constructing housing; and providing some components of sanitation services, sometimes without state consent. She argues that the daily, practical engagement in public goods provision implied by coproduction provides a better platform for influencing the state than oppositional accountability-seeking practices, leading to gradually expanding grassroots influence over policy. In her view, engagement on a more practical level can avoid a defensive reaction by the
state; build positive linkages between public officials and grassroots organization; improve the skills and capacities of members of grassroots organizations; encourage greater participation by disadvantaged members of grassroots organizations; and enable the design of systems of public goods provision to be grounded in local experience. Ackerman focuses on “co-governance for accountability”—the joint involvement of citizens and public officials in oversight activities and other core government functions. His examples include state-society collaboration to generate city budgets in Brazil; organize federal elections in Mexico; govern schools in Chicago; and audit public expenditure in India. He considers the direct involvement of citizens in the core functions of the state as far more effective than recognized vertical and horizontal mechanisms of accountability and argues for the formal institutionalization of co-governance strategies by governments. These accounts do not provide a particularly persuasive rebuttal of Joshi and Moore’s concerns, however, because they both rely on an implicit assumption that coproducing citizens act in the public interest. There is a gap in both accounts regarding how citizens with governmental responsibilities can be held accountable by citizens more broadly.

Alongside these studies, a body of literature has emerged which is intensely critical of public goods provision reliant on citizens’ unpaid or low paid labour (Miraftab, 2004; Zerah, 2009; Samson, 2010; Boesten, Mdee, & Cleaver, 2011). For these authors, such practices are associated with the hegemony of neoliberal ideas about statehood and result in exploitation and deepening inequality. Their arguments resonate with David Harvey’s (2005) characterization of the neoliberal project as one intended to restore the power of elites. He writes (Chapter 1, ‘Why the Neoliberal Turn?’), paras 9-10:

Redistributive effects and increasing social inequality have in fact been such a persistent feature of neoliberalization as to be regarded as structural to the whole project…the evidence strongly suggests that the neoliberal turn is in some way and to some degree associated with the restoration of reconstruction of the power of economic elites.

Following this logic, the package of decentralization, privatization and participation strategies promoted by the aid establishment and adopted by governments for local

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58 Mitlin’s account is therefore close to Sharp’s (1980) account of coproduction as a means of achieving enhanced citizenship.
59 I thank Kate Meagher for pointing me to this body of work.
60 A Kindle copy of the book was used and thus I provide a paragraph number rather than a page number.
public goods provision are considered by these authors to be aimed at keeping costs low rather than improving the quality of public goods provision or democracy, while the elite bias built into these policies means that their effects on inequality are overlooked or met with relative indifference by those implementing them.

One key argument made by some of these authors is that the discourse of participation and empowerment is deployed strategically to justify deep cuts in public spending on public goods provision. Faranak Miraftab (2004) argues that the linked concepts of community participation, social capital and empowerment have on the one hand been depoliticized by the development industry by treating them in isolation from community power structures, and on the other hand have been used as a rationale for a very political reorganization of public goods provision. In her view (p. 239), the outcome is one of “symbolic inclusion…and…material exclusion”. Marie-Hélène Zérah (2009, p. 856) makes a similar argument that the discourse of participation has been “co-opted” by neoliberalism, short-circuiting more radical forms of opposition. She finds that the neoliberal logic of participation shifts additional responsibility to the individual, requiring each one to “live his/her life in an ‘entrepreneurial form’”; this conception of participation furthers the aims of those seeking the withdrawal of the state from direct provision of public goods.

Miraftab (2004) describes how the dynamics of symbolic inclusion/material exclusion manifested in the context of new waste collection schemes in black townships and informal settlements in Cape Town based on privatization and community-based participation strategies. Some schemes utilized a ‘contracting-out’ approach, which involved private providers recruiting unemployed community members as labourers. One scheme targeted unemployed women in particular, while another involved the recruitment of community entrepreneurs to oversee labourers; entrepreneurs were given a fixed budget for all operating costs and retained any unspent portion for themselves. Another scheme was based on a ‘volunteer’ approach—groups of women were encouraged by local councillors to sweep the streets and collect trash on an unpaid basis. Public officials argued that these schemes empowered black communities by providing capacity building opportunities for entrepreneurs and employment opportunities for labourers. In addition, those schemes specifically targeting women, whether on short-term contracts or as volunteers, were described as achieving gender empowerment, as women were
considered to be developing marketable skills that could aid them in finding future employment.

Miraftab (p. 251) argues that, on the contrary, the schemes reinscribed and expanded the scope of racial, class and gender inequality in Cape Town. The schemes were purportedly designed to extend waste collection services to poor, black neighbourhoods, but in Miraftab’s view did so only on the condition that residents of these areas made investments of their own unpaid or low paid labour, while residents of wealthier, predominantly white neighbourhoods received curbside collection of waste as a “citizen’s entitlement” (p. 252). She finds the empowerment of black entrepreneurs to be a narrow form of economic empowerment ultimately dependent on the exploitation of labourers, which does nothing to challenge the collective disadvantage faced by residents of black townships. In addition, she finds the terms of employment for labourers highly unfavourable. Paid labourers received wages substantially lower than the standard municipal rate. The scheme targeting women paid a particularly low rate of wages and recruited workers on the basis of one-year non-renewable contracts. However, on completion of these contracts they were not able to find further employment and refused to leave their positions, leading to a clash with volunteer women expecting to replace them. She argues that far from empowering women, these schemes were based on patriarchal gender ideologies about the low cost and easy availability of women’s labour, and their suitability to cleaning work, which extends their housekeeping role from the domestic to the municipal level.

Melanie Samson’s (2010) analysis of the waste management sector in Johannesburg extends this discussion. Samson argues that it is the specific associations forged between spaces and subjects in the context of racialized gender ideologies that enables the recruitment of unpaid female volunteers for street cleaning. She compares the situation of male street cleaners in formerly white business districts in the employ of an initiative funded by local businesses to that of female street cleaners in townships working on short-term contracts or as volunteers. While street cleaning in Johannesburg has developed an identity as a feminized area of work over recent decades, male street cleaners were preferred in business districts to give the illusion of additional security. In contrast, the association between women and unpaid or low paid street cleaning work was reinforced in townships through recruitment strategies for poverty alleviation and volunteer programmes. Samson
argues that female volunteers were persuaded to take on these roles by gender
discourse which framed their street cleaning work as protective of their children and
political discourse which framed it as a means of demonstrating revolutionary
commitment to the African National Congress (ANC) party, as well as more
instrumental motivations to secure future employment.

Zérah (2009, pp. 872-873) also discusses the potential for exploitation of
labour in the context of participatory development schemes in Mumbai, but places
greater emphasis on the way in which such schemes result in a power shift towards
the middle and upper classes. For example, Zérah describes a coproductive
programme for waste management based on partnership between street or building-
level associations and the municipality which has resulted in improved cleanliness
and has enabled members of these associations to acquire greater influence in local
decision-making. However, the leadership of these associations is largely drawn from
an elite strata of society and their political vision consists of a “modern, clean and
efficient city cleared of hawkers, shanties, encroachment of public space and overall
‘chaos’” (p. 867); Zérah therefore concludes that this form of coproduction
contributes to a trend of ‘peripherization’ of the poor. Boesten et al (2011, pp. 53-54)
discuss a related issue of elite domination in the ranks of community-based workers
(CBWs) commonly serving on a voluntary or low paid basis in the context of
participatory programmes, resulting in some instances in elite monopolization of
project resources intended for the community writ large.

This literature plays an important role in highlighting the equality implications
of coproduction of public goods. There are three particularly significant dimensions
brought out by these authors. First, the uneven application of coproduction as an
approach to public goods provision can imply a tiered system of citizenship, where
certain categories of citizens receive public goods as a citizenship entitlement, while
others are expected to make inputs of their own labour or other resources. Second,
and related, coproduction’s reliance on unpaid or low paid labour can lead to
exploitation of vulnerable populations; in many instances, it is those occupying less
favourable positions within a social hierarchy whom will be expected to make inputs
of labour. Their performance of this labour may ultimately reinforce their lower
social status. Third, coproduction can facilitate elite capture of the benefits of a
particular good, or can provide an in-road for elite political influence which may
undermine the interests of the poor.
These authors situate coproduction as continuous with other forms of privatization and driven by a common neoliberal logic. This approach is valuable in highlighting that the failures of state capacity resulting in governance-driven coproduction in developing countries are linked to governance policies promoted by the aid industry as well as other factors such as poor economic performance and mismanagement of public resources. It is also helpful in raising awareness of continuities between coproduction and related modalities of public goods provision, particularly as they unfold within specific contexts. However, by characterizing coproduction as a form of privatization, these authors obscure some of its distinctive features. Coproduction is about joint provision of public goods by public officials and citizens. This is distinct from a market-based strategy like contracting out to a private provider which relies on low paid or voluntary inputs of labour. The latter does not provide for direct interaction between public officials and citizens which are credited by advocates of coproduction as the basis for state-society synergy. In addition, contracting out represents a deliberate policy decision to formally delegate responsibility for provision or production of a particular good to a private agent, leading directly to a leaner state. In contrast, coproduction often leaves formal responsibility with the state while informal dependencies on citizens develop organically and as a result of citizen-led as well as state-led action; these dependencies may not be recognized officially and are likely to be easier to reverse should the revenue position of the state improve.

This literature is ultimately performing a critique of what it perceives as the global dominance of a neoliberal ideology about the role of the state aligned with a system of capitalism and complicit with structures of patriarchy and racism. Given this broader agenda, this literature has a tendency to generate heavy expectations of processes of public goods provision to deliver radical social transformation. The unspoken implication of this literature seems to be that only a strong, well-resourced state committed to egalitarian social transformation can provide public goods appropriately; this leaves an unresolved question about the best course of action in the absence of such a state. Given the lack of adequate public goods available in many developing countries, the value Joshi and Moore accord to arrangements—even if not ideal—that can deliver at least some modicum of goods in the context of scarcity does not look out of place. As such arrangements often work through existing institutions, it seems unsurprising that they often sustain hierarchies rather than transform them.
The goods generated through such arrangements may not benefit all citizens equally in all instances, while still improving life for the poorest citizens some of the time. Given this tension, coproductive arrangements require scrutiny; they raise questions about which trade-offs are acceptable in the short- to medium-term to maintain a supply of public goods and about what the long-term implications of making such trade-offs will be. However, it seems premature to disregard them outright.

Concluding comments

In this chapter, I have set out the institutionally-oriented analytical framework that I will be applying in chapters five and six and reviewed key literatures that inform this framework. In doing so, I have established some of the themes to be revisited later in the study. In chapter seven, I compare the cases of coproduction presented in preceding chapters and discuss their collective relevance. I consider how these cases fit with existing theories of coproduction and what they suggest about the implications of coproduction for the quantity and quality of public goods, the quality of governance more broadly and equality. I reflect on the model of agency implied by my case study narratives, taking into account SI and HI critiques of an RCI model of agency. And in the final chapter, I reflect on the value of coproduction as a means of addressing the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone.
CHAPTER THREE: Local Government in Sierra Leone

Local councils and chiefs are the principal local government actors (LGAs) in post-war Sierra Leone. They make up two layers of government which are conceptually distinct but in practice overlap, and their fate is in many ways interlinked. In this chapter, I situate these LGAs in political and historical context, paying attention to the connections between them. I begin by describing the processes of post-war reform of local government underway in Sierra Leone and some of the different interests at stake in them. I then look at selected historical episodes in the development of local government over the course of the last century which deepen our understanding of the post-war scenario. Finally, I provide an overview of the current academic debate about local government in Sierra Leone, which I revisit in the concluding chapter of this study.

3.1 Post-war reform

In the post-war flurry to understand the causes of the civil war, failures of chiefly governance and the withdrawal of the central state from the provision of public goods were identified as significant drivers of conflict (Richards, 1996; Fanthorpe, 2001; Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004b), energizing donors to collectively throw their support behind a democratic decentralization programme. While the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) government formally embraced decentralization, there is little research which explores its motives in doing so. Given the extent of Sierra Leone’s dependence on donor funding, there were certainly incentives “to ‘say the right things’ to external donors” (Jackson, 2006, p. 102). Daniel Esser (2012, p. 405) goes further, arguing that “[n]ot only were major political reforms…conceived by international agencies, but responsibilities ensuring that these reforms were put into practice were also divided among them”. Following consultations in 2003, the Local Government (LG) Act (2004) was drafted and passed swiftly, ahead of local government elections in May. DFID was one of the main supporters of democratic decentralization, yet in 2000-02 had also funded a programme to restore paramount chiefs to their chiefdoms (Fanthorpe, Jay, & Kamara, 2002). This engagement with ‘anti-democratic’ actors was unpopular with other members of the donor community (Fanthorpe, 2005, p. 34), and led one commentator to suggest that DFID was “helping to re-create the
conditions for war” (Hanlon, 2005). Following the launch of the decentralization process, power struggles began to play out in the local government sphere between donors and central government; ministries and local councils; and local councils and chiefs.

In 2009, tensions between donors and central government were evident in the context of the state architecture responsible for oversight of local councils. The LG Act (2004) established the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Local Government and Decentralization (a committee of ministers and selected council chairpersons) to provide strategic leadership for the decentralization process, but among donors it was said that its performance had been lacklustre.61 Aside from these bodies, the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) were formally responsible for oversight of council operations and finances respectively. However, in practice, donor-funded project units weakly integrated within these departments were providing the most direct guidance and oversight of local councils. In MLG, there was a significant rift between the World Bank-funded Decentralization Secretariat (DecSec) (which occupied its own buildings) and the rest of the ministry. DecSec had essentially staked out the territory around local councils—indeed, a World Bank representative that I spoke to justified its insulation from MLG on the grounds that this had allowed decentralization to advance more rapidly. Deprived of control over a significant chunk of its portfolio, MLG maintained a tight grip over chieftaincy and was not particularly disposed to work cooperatively with the donor-funded decentralization architecture.

The SLPP government accepted a relatively high degree of donor intrusion into the local government sphere during the early implementation of decentralization, but the APC government has since shown signs of re-asserting control over local councils. When local councils were first established, MLG’s district offices closed their doors and MLG supervision was left to the provincial administration.62 However, in mid-2010 MLG announced its intention to bring back district officers in a re-centralizing move enabled by powers set out in colonial era legislation (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 14). In its public response, the opposition SLPP (2010)

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61 Other governing bodies established by the Act include the Local Government Service Commission (responsible for oversight of human resources) and the Local Government Finance Committee (responsible for the formula for grant allocations).
62 This consists of the resident minister, the provincial secretary and supporting staff.
argued that this was a strategy to exert greater political control over opposition councils:

The SLPP holds the position that the APC is disturbed by the fact that they do not have absolute control of all districts despite the fact they are in charge of central government. The APC is particularly disturbed by the fact that as a ruling party, they can only influence 10 out of 19 councils.

Rather than being driven by partisan politics, Fanthorpe et al (2011, pp. 18, 21) suggest that this move was influenced by conservative forces within the civil service, emphasizing that councils from both sides of the political divide opposed the move.

Ministries have flexed their muscles by resisting the devolution of powers to local councils. Key areas of responsibility accorded to local councils by the LG Act (2004) include education up to mid-secondary level, primary health care, feeder roads, management of the rural water supply, land registration and coordination of mining licences. A supporting statutory instrument set out 80 specific functions for devolution, but by mid-2009 only 37 had been transferred and, under donor pressure, MLG re-launched the devolution process (Decentralization Secretariat, 2009).

Among the ministries and agencies most resistant to devolution were the Sierra Leone Roads Authority, the Ministry of Lands, the Ministry of Mines and the Ministry of Education63; donors grumbled that ministerial resistance was largely attributable to reluctance to allow any disruption of established corrupt practices in these lucrative areas. The devolution that has occurred appears to have taken a fairly superficial form—local councils approve district-level budgets for ministries, but do not exert real influence over their policies, and lack of payroll devolution in key sectors (for example, education) means that relationships with Freetown remain more important to officials than those with local councils (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 47).

The SLPP government was careful never to cede control over chieftaincy to donors, and this strategy has been maintained by the APC. The majority of legislation governing chiefly practice was first developed under colonial rule during the 1930s, and survived largely unchanged into the post-colonial period. To date, the government has passed only one significant piece of post-war legislation addressing chieftaincy: the Chieftaincy Act (2009), which focuses on the election of paramount chiefs and maps closely onto existing practice. Under the Chieftaincy Act (2009), paramount chiefs will continue to be elected for life from ruling houses (lineages

63 In keeping with the approach used for MLG, the latter three are simplified names.
recognized by the colonial government as having an eligible claim) by an electoral college of chiefdom councillors under the supervision of MLG. Efforts by reformist NGOs to lobby for the introduction of universal adult suffrage and to bring elections under the supervision of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) were unsuccessful (Bayoh, 2009; Civil Society Platform on the Chieftaincy Bill 2008, 2009; Kamara, 2009). Under sustained pressure from donors, the government later produced the Chiefdom and Tribal Administration Policy (2011), but this also largely preserves the status quo. Notably it emphasizes the need to retain chiefdoms as “the basic unit of administration”, which provides a strong signal that councils are not expected to assume full administrative responsibility. However, the policy does make one important concession to reformist pressures by setting out a commitment to hold a national debate on whether to introduce universal suffrage in chieftaincy elections and promising legislation before the end of 2014. If this proceeds, it will be a substantial reform which will inevitably influence the way in which chiefs construct their bases of support.

The introduction of the LG Act (2004) and the Chieftaincy Act (2009) without the repeal of colonial era legislation has resulted in some overlap in the roles and responsibilities accorded to councils and chiefs: both have responsibilities as regards development, tax collection, land, and environmental and public health, and both have the right to develop bye-laws. However, the key point of contention between chiefs and elected councils is not their overlapping mandates, but access to resources. Both rely on a combination of central support, mining revenue (where relevant) and locally-raised revenue. Councils receive central grants based on a common formula which are ‘tied’ to specific categories of expenditure and remain highly dependent on donor backing. According to the recently developed chiefdom policy (2011), the government will provide annual grants to the chiefdoms and cover the salaries of paramount chiefs and chiefdom police. However, early post-war consultations with chiefs suggested that government grants had not been paid in years (Fanthorpe, et al., 2002, p. 20), and those I spoke to in 2009 said that central transfers to chiefdoms were small and irregular. The LG Act (2004) entitles councils to a precept paid from the local tax collected by chiefdoms. In addition, councils are permitted to raise

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64 Although the Act does accord NEC a role alongside MLG in chieftaincy elections.
65 A head tax of 5,000 Le (£0.95) levied on every adult over the age of 21.
revenue from licences, fees and charges, and property rates; however, in rural areas, much of this revenue is shared with chiefs (Fanthorpe, Sesay, Turay, & Koroma, 2009, p. 46; Kargbo, 2009, p. 42; Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 57). Moreover, local revenue collection is challenging in general, given a weak revenue base, popular resistance to taxation, poor information systems and limited resources for revenue collection. I monitored three newspapers closely in 2009 and found no stories of violent confrontation between chiefs and councils over resources, but this underlying tension was raised in numerous discussions by those involved in local government over the course of my fieldwork.

Donor commitment to decentralization makes it difficult for central government to formally resolve the ambiguities in revenue-sharing in chiefs’ favour. However, MLG has intervened in chiefs’ favour as regards the precept on local tax. Following the passage of the LG Act (2004), it was agreed that councils would receive 40 percent of the local tax revenue collected by the chiefdoms. Yet in 2009, MLG permitted chiefs to retain the full amount of 2008 local tax revenue collected, on the grounds that they needed to pay a backlog of salaries. Subsequently the precept was reduced to between 5 and 15 percent of local tax revenue, depending on chiefdom size (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, p. 57). A senior representative of MLG that I spoke to justified a reduced precept on the grounds that local councils should not have a right to transfers from both above (from central government) and below (from chiefs). He also argued that local councils had delivered relatively little of note to the chiefdoms in the first four year of operations and thus had undermined people’s willingness to pay local taxes. MLG’s willingness to go against the LG Act (2004) provides further evidence of central government’s strong support for chieftaincy.

This brief account of post-war reform of local government is necessarily incomplete because it is based principally on my 2009 observations of an evolving political process. However, it provides some insight into the multiplicity of interests at stake, the fault lines which underpin the upbeat donor narrative as regards decentralization and the inter-connections between local council and chiefdom governance. The history of local government that I set out in the next section significantly enriches our understanding of the dynamics of post-war reform of local government in Sierra Leone by clarifying why chieftaincy enjoys such a high degree of central support and by exposing the historical baggage which the ‘new’ system of elected councils established under the decentralization process carries with it.
3.2 Historical background

I provide a brief overview of four overlapping episodes which offer insight into the historical development of local government in Sierra Leone: colonial efforts to refashion chieftaincy for the purposes of indirect rule 1896-1940, experimentation with local councils 1946-72, constitutional reform 1947-1951 and the subsequent role of paramount chiefs in party politics during the 1960s-70s. Collectively, these narratives demonstrate how chiefly government became a deeply embedded component of the Sierra Leonean state and political system over the course of the last century, while local councils failed to gain traction and were frequently suspended even in their comparably short lifetime.

i) Indirect rule and the refashioning of chieftaincy

Britain’s colonization of Sierra Leone followed a dualist track. The Freetown peninsula was ruled directly as a Crown Colony from 1808, while the interior was subject to indirect rule following the declaration of a Protectorate in 1896 (Fyfe, 1962, pp. 1-104; Kilson, 1966, pp. 1-2; Cartwright, 1970, p. 15). From the perspective of the British, indirect rule required refashioning of local political institutions in order that they could serve as a medium to govern on their behalf. Treaty-making during the 1800s had already begun this process, applying the common label of ‘paramount chief’ to local leaders of quite different standing and limiting chiefs’ diplomatic, judicial and economic powers (Little, 1967; Abraham, 1976; Wylie, 1977, pp. 129-143; Abraham, 1978, pp. 171-214). The Protectorate Ordinance (1896) deepened these strictures, and the subsequent introduction of a house tax triggered violent resistance to the colonization of the Protectorate in 1898, known as the Hut Tax War. Within the year, the conflict had been brutally put down and many of the ‘insurgents’ had been executed. The failure of the Hut Tax War resulted in a grim acceptance of the reality of colonization and the radical changes brought about by the Protectorate Ordinance (1896) and related legislation began to take effect (Wylie, 1977, pp. 167-207; Abraham, 1978, pp. 145-169).

With the implementation of colonial laws in earnest, chiefs lost sovereignty in their own territories and instead became agents of the colonial administration. Their diplomatic powers ceased; they were required to collect taxes for a higher authority; and their legal powers were emasculated (for further discussion on the loss of legal powers, see chapter six). Colonial reform of chieftaincy also had the effect of
undermining pre-colonial checks and balances on chiefs’ power. Prior to the
declaration of the Protectorate, paramount chiefs usually ruled in consultation with
sub-chiefs and other advisers, who provided a significant portion of their resources
through the collection of tribute. Under colonialism, new legislation backed by
colonial force transformed the dynamics of this process such that tribute was driven in
a more top-down way and by the 1920s was frequently demanded in cash rather than
in kind; paramount chiefs were thus liberated from dependence on their advisers, who
had previously served as a significant check on their power (Dorjahn, 1960, p. 132;
Finnegan, 1965, p. 50; Kilson, 1966, p. 20; Wylie, 1977, p. 202). The threat or use of
violence as a means to control chiefs’ behaviour was more or less eradicated. Chiefs
could no longer be overthrown in war nor could sub-chiefs and sodalities\textsuperscript{66} assassinate
an unpopular ruler (Dorjahn, 1960, pp. 136-139; Cartwright, 1970, pp. 28-30). The
British used powers to remove and replace chiefs liberally during the preliminary
consolidation of colonial rule (up until around 1910) and thus many of those in power
lacked popular legitimacy (Wylie, 1977, p. 198; Abraham, 1978, pp. 280-300); they
were perceived by their subjects as “tax gatherers masquerading as chiefs” (Fyfe,
1962, p. 606).

These developments encouraged a situation in which paramount chiefs began
to take advantage of their prerogatives to secure highly advantageous positions within
One of the key means through which they did so was through the use of their powers
to call for unpaid community labour. Recognition of the right to command
community labour in 1905 was both a sop to chiefs and an attempt to regulate this
practice to some extent in order to uphold the abolition of slavery.\textsuperscript{67} Given colonial
pressure to gradually relinquish slaves over the next three decades, chiefs began to
rely heavily on unpaid community labour to operate their farms, undermining their
subjects’ capacity to engage in commercial agriculture on their own behalf (Abraham,
introduced restrictions on chiefs’ powers in this regard, limiting the scope of
permitted tasks for which chiefs could call on unpaid community labour, and the

\textsuperscript{66} Sodalities are sacred associations for men or women which are organized around rituals of initiation
and the transmission of secret information (Richards, Bah, & Vincent, 2004, p. 8). They are often
referred to as secret societies.

\textsuperscript{67} Although it was only slave trading which was abolished when the Protectorate was declared;
domestic slavery was not abolished until 1926.
maximum contribution of labour which could be asked of any individual. Nevertheless, chiefs continued to take advantage of unpaid labour for commercial gain, calling upon their subjects to build permanent cement-block houses, work commercial farms and transport commercial goods (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, pp. 162-168; Cartwright, 1970, p. 31).

In the late 1930s, the colonial administration made more serious efforts to standardize the institution of chieftaincy through the introduction of a ‘native administration’ (‘NA’) system similar to those already established in other British colonies in Africa, notably Nigeria. Legislation passed in 1937 confirmed chiefs’ recognized role in maintaining public order, but also established new responsibilities in the areas of public health, sanitation and social welfare; granted chiefs the authority to raise revenue through taxes; and established separate treasuries for each chiefdom to manage their resources. The reforms introduced by these ordinances were implemented gradually, as chiefs were given a choice about whether to opt into the ‘NA’ system. A decade later, just over half of the chiefdoms had chosen to do so (Kilson, 1966, p. 28; Barrows, 1976, p. 101). Martin Kilson argues (1966, pp. 25-33) that some chiefs resisted the transition because it replaced their multiple revenue streams with a regular salary. In order to address this, the colonial administration permitted a large proportion of chiefdom revenue to be allocated towards salaries, leaving little for the supply of basic public goods.

In its implementation, the ‘NA’ system failed miserably to check abuses by chiefs; instead, it offered additional grounds for chiefs to advance their own position, often at the expense of their subjects (Kilson, 1966, pp. 53-59; Cartwright, 1970, pp. 30-33). In 1946-51 there was a high frequency and intensity of demonstrations against chiefs in eastern Mendeland (Barrows, 1976, pp. 100-120; Tangri, 1976), and in 1955-56, more widespread anti-chief protests broke out in the North. Chiefs’ houses were burned down, their property was destroyed and some were physically attacked. Both Kilson (1966, pp. 60-64) and John Cartwright (1970, pp. 75-86) interpret the northern protests as evidence of popular resistance to intolerable chiefly abuses. In Kilson’s words (1966, p. 60), the riots were evidence of “a form of rural ‘radicalism,’” which in some cases constituted a virtual peasant revolt against
traditional rulers and authority”. Walter Barrows\(^{68}\) (1976, pp. 100-120) and Roger Tangri (1976) take a different view, arguing that these outbreaks of violence were the product of an alliance between youth angered by chiefly abuses and ‘big men’\(^{69}\) from rival chiefly factions. From their perspective, the protests were not a revolt against chieftaincy per se, but an attempt by youth to secure more attentive patrons and by ‘big men’ to secure control of the chieftaincy for themselves.

Kilson and Cartwright are close in many ways to the interpretation of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces set up by the government to investigate the matter (the Cox Commission). The Cox Commission (1956, pp. 226-230) concludes that the violence was the consequence of “grave maladministration” by chiefs, enabled by weak oversight by a government which demonstrated “almost complete ignorance” of chiefly abuses and the tensions they had created at the local level. According to the Cox Commission, the immediate trigger for violent protests was steep tax rises between 1954-55, but the Commission situates rising taxes in the context of a broader set of chiefly abuses, including the use of forced labour; the collection of illegal licences, levies and tribute; and miscarriages of justice by chiefs’ courts.\(^{70}\) Chiefs’ failure to provide the public goods for which they were made responsible under the ‘NA’ system is not addressed at any length, although the Cox Commission (p. 175) observes that “less than one third of [tribal authorities’] revenue goes in expenditure within their own scope and visible to the taxpayers; of that small proportion some goes to reserves or other unspectacular projects”, suggesting that the enlargement of chiefs’ role in this regard had not really taken off.

The Sierra Leone government (1956, pp. 6-7), which consisted of a combination of colonial administrators and African ministers, had few populist sympathies and officially rejected the Cox Commission’s interpretation. Instead, the government argued that protests against chiefs could be explained by northerners’ greater exposure to other regions of the country in the context of modernization, which had changed their attitude towards chiefs “from one of consent or tolerance to one of bitter resentment”. The government did commit to implementing some of the

\(^{68}\) Note that Barrows’ discussion is limited to eastern Mendeland.

\(^{69}\) The term ‘big men’ refers to those that are wealthy and/or powerful patrons.

\(^{70}\) Although based on popular testimony, the Cox Commission’s perception of these practices is of course heavily biased by colonial administrative norms and much of the nuance of what people were aggrieved about and why is lost in the account.
Cox Commission’s recommendations, including the abolition of demands for forced labour; the prohibition of fees, charges and fines (other than local tax and court fines); and prosecution of those exacting tribute. A number of other important recommendations were side-stepped or rejected, including those to establish reformed chiefdom authorities in place of existing chiefdom councils (tribal authorities) and to end chiefs’ involvement in party politics (Sierra Leone Government, 1956, pp. 8-18). Following further government investigations, nine paramount chiefs were either deposed or forced to resign and two suspended, but within four years, five of the eleven had been reinstated. While steps were taken to follow through on some of the commitments made, for example, the enactment of legislation to abolish forced labour, central government oversight of chiefs remained permissive and thus chiefly abuses continued over subsequent decades. Thus while in one sense this outbreak of anti-chief violence represented a significant challenge to chiefly authority, the government’s response also underlined strong central support for retaining the status quo.

ii) Experimentation with local councils

In the late 1940s, the colonial administration began to experiment with local councils as an additional form of local government in the Protectorate. Kilson (1966, pp. 203-216) and Tangri (1978b) suggest that this was a nationally-driven development, arguing that (given the known weaknesses of chiefdom government) district councils were viewed as a means of putting post-war development plans into action. However, Reno (1995, pp. 59-60) argues that the colonial administration’s commitment to a system of local councils was reflective of a change of heart in Westminster; concerned about popular resentment of traditional authority in African colonies, the Colonial Office directed national administrations to develop more inclusive political institutions which could foster the development of a moderate political class interested in maintaining an amicable relationship with the British in the post-colonial era, and perhaps encourage the emergence of a civil society which demanded more efficient government. Reno suggests that local officials resisted this Westminster-driven agenda to some extent because of their enduring reliance on paramount chiefs to retain control of local polities. This helps to explain why local councils in Sierra Leone took such a conservative form, remaining very much under the sway of the colonial administration and chiefs.
District councils were originally established under the Protectorate Ordinance (1946) as consultative bodies for development planning, but reformed by the District Councils Ordinance (1950) to play a greater role in the implementation of development plans. From 1950, the membership of each district council consisted of the paramount chiefs within the district, plus additional members elected by chiefdom councils (tribal authorities), which were subject to the paramount chief’s influence. District commissioners served as council presidents until the mid-1950s, when a 1954 amendment to the Ordinance was passed allowing council members to choose their own president, enabling paramount chiefs to secure most of these positions. While a further amendment in 1956 provided for the direct election of non-chief members, paramount chiefs continued to hold between a quarter and a third of the seats in each council as well as most of the presidencies (Hicks, 1961, p. 197; Kilson, 1966, pp. 203-207; Cartwright, 1970, pp. 77, 86, 119; Tangri, 1978b, p. 19).

Urban councils in the Protectorate were established during the 1950s and 1960s under separate legislation—first in Bo during the mid-1950s, then subsequently in Makeni, Kenema and Koidu after enabling legislation was passed in 1959. Paramount chiefs also presided over these urban councils and two-thirds of their members were nominated either by the government or by chiefdom councils, while the remaining third was elected. Freetown City Council dates back far earlier to 1893, but suffered from a troubled relationship with the colonial administration which saw its dissolution and replacement by a municipal board with a government-appointed majority in 1926; this board ruled the city for the next two decades (Kilson, 1966, p. 221; Wyse, 1987).

Colonial reports indicate that district councils initially “got off to a flying start” (Hicks, 1961, p. 198)—they established health centres, dispensaries, sanitary services and took steps to protect forests and develop seedling nurseries. Given these early positive results, and the Colonial Office’s policy of support for more representative local government, it is unsurprising that a senior British official looking into the potential for expanding councils’ responsibilities, H.W. Davidson, recommended that a “bold policy of Decentralisation” be adopted, giving councils substantial control over the provision of public goods and services (Davidson, 1953, p. 9). Davidson notes that most officials ‘on the ground’ preferred a more conservative approach based on gradual development of district councils’ role, but rejects this on the grounds that it would inhibit political progress. In line with this
recommendation, an enlargement of council powers was enacted in legislation in 1954 (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, p. 209; Tangri, 1978b, p. 20). Yet within two years, the Cox Commission (1956, p. 214) was arguing that district councils were an aggravating factor in stirring up local resentments; it recommended that district councils be reconstituted as advisory bodies and that service delivery functions be returned to chiefdom authorities and central government.

The Cox Commission’s recommendations were ignored, but local councils continued to fare poorly in the post-independence period. From the 1960s, councils came under increasing levels of political attack from the centre over the misuse of funds. Between 1962-65 and 1967-71, they were temporarily suspended and replaced with committees of management made up largely of centrally-appointed district officers and paramount chiefs. From 1968, a series of calls was made for their dissolution. In 1969, a private member’s motion was passed in parliament calling for a review of their continued existence. Although the resulting Local Government Review Committee recommended that councils be overhauled rather than abolished, the Sierra Leone government chose instead to suspend them indefinitely from early 1972 (Tangri, 1978b, pp. 25-26). Subsequently, district councils were dissolved and their infrastructure and staff absorbed by the provincial administration. Urban councils continued to operate as government-controlled committees of management (Kanu, 2009, p. 53).

A number of inter-linked explanations have been proposed in the literature for the failure of district councils, including an insecure and inadequate resource base, poor management, domination by paramount chiefs, and a lack of resonance with ordinary Sierra Leoneans. Initially local councils were funded by central grants, which were supported in part by the war-time reserves of produce marketing boards. They also had the power to raise resources through a voluntary precept on chiefdom administrations; from 1954 this precept was made compulsory, with the size of the precept to be negotiated between each council and the relevant chiefdoms (Hicks, 1961, p. 198; Tangri, 1978b, pp. 18-19). The Cox Commission argued that the precepting system contributed to anti-chief uprisings because the burden of paying the precept (which ranged between 40-55 percent of local tax revenue in 1955) drove up average tax rates. After more than a decade of paying a fixed sum of tax (1937-50), the tax burden on Protectorate Sierra Leoneans increased by between 120 and 230
percent from 1950 to 1955 (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, pp. 126, 208-210, 255). While the precepting system survived into the 1960s, with the precept now fixed by government, it became an increasingly unreliable source of income. From the mid-1960s onwards, paramount chiefs were frequently unwilling or unable to pay precepts and central intervention to enforce precept obligations was inconsistent. Regular central grants for economic development came to an end in 1955, leaving only intermittent capital grants which could be withheld for political reasons. This precarious situation meant that a rising share of local councils’ resources was dedicated to administrative expenditure, and functions gradually leaked back to central government due to council incapacity (Cartwright, 1970, p. 172; Tangri, 1978b, pp. 21-22). One explanation for council failure, then, is that councils were transitioned too rapidly from almost total dependency on central grants to dependency on a new and volatile system of local taxation which could not adequately support them to fulfil their responsibilities.

This brief explanation of problems with council financing also indicates underlying management problems. Shortly after their creation as local development agencies to implement government projects, councils were transitioned abruptly to the status of local political authorities. The colonial administration withdrew from their supervision around the same time, transferring oversight to a new SLPP Minister for Local Government, who was understandably preoccupied with developments on the national stage as Sierra Leone approached independence. It was also not in the interests of the newly-established SLPP cabinet to interfere with the operations of councils because (as discussed in section 3.2, iii) an alliance with paramount chiefs was critical to their political success. Central oversight of councils was therefore weak, enabling widespread misuse of funds with few repercussions. Staffing for councils presented a further challenge from a management perspective. Prior to a significant expansion of councils’ powers, H.W. Davidson (1953, pp. 10-11) recognized a skills shortage as regards service delivery, and recommended that central government assign posts focused on local service delivery to councils in order to avoid duplication. However, looking back on the relatively short life of local councils, Tangri (1978b, p. 23) finds that councils filled their own vacancies on the basis of close ties to council members, facilitating collusion in a range of corrupt practices. In his view, the inadequacy of staff was a “chronic weakness” equal in severity to lack of central oversight.
Kilson (1966, pp. 205-216) perceives both the financial fragility and mismanagement of councils to be linked to the corrosive effects of chiefly domination of councils. He argues that chiefs deliberately overloaded district councils with functions that they did not wish to perform through their own administrations, while holding on to the larger share of local revenue. At the same time, he perceives them to be responsible for much of the embezzlement of district council funds that took place during the 1950s and 1960s. He describes paramount chiefs taking advantage of council powers to access advances for private vehicles and extensive misuse of a building materials loan scheme to allocate loans to chiefs’ clients. In his view, parasitic behaviour of this kind was enabled first by continued commitment of the colonial administration to indirect rule through chiefs (despite policy in Westminster) and later by the political reliance of the SLPP on chiefs.

However, the Cox Commission’s analysis (1956, pp. 204-218) suggests that district councils were themselves parasitic on the people, as remote bodies accumulating tax revenue to provide goods on a highly uneven basis and with little regard for popular demand. The Commission reports (pp. 211-212):

> We have learnt of areas where development and services are non-existent…We have learnt everywhere that there is dissatisfaction with the works and services which…are concentrated in urban areas…Witness after witness has asserted…that they do not wish to pay for water supplies in towns where nature has provided them with perennial streams; that they do not wish to pay for electricity in towns where they can use oil lanterns…Witness after witness has said that there are schools only in urban areas and even where they are provided elsewhere they are not provided for everyone. Even roads, it is said, are not provided everywhere.

The Commission’s report suggests that district councils should not have been created as political bodies at all because districts are not meaningful political units underpinned by a “common local feeling” (p. 214). For this reason, the Commission argues that public goods provision should remain at chiefdom level, where such “common feeling” does exist and where accountability relationships can develop. While Kilson (pp. 202, 214) disregards this argument as a justification for the “nearly pathological obsession” of the colonial administration with indirect rule, Tangri (1978b, p. 20) concurs that chiefdoms were the “primary point of identification” for most Sierra Leoneans, while the district councils remained remote bodies which commanded little loyalty.
iii) Constitutional reform

To accompany the development of more inclusive local political institutions, Westminster also pushed for national constitutional reform offering increased opportunities for self-government (Wyse, 1990, pp. 144-145). In the mid-1940s, Europeans continued to dominate Sierra Leone’s two governing bodies—the Executive and Legislative Councils—with African representation limited to a minority of seats on the Legislative Council, of which the largest share was allocated to the Colony. In 1947, Governor Stevenson’s submission of a set of proposals for the reform of the Legislative Council launched a fierce constitutional struggle that would last until 1951. The historical literature suggests that there were four main sets of interests at stake in this struggle: those of the Colony elite, predominantly Krios71; those of an educated Protectorate elite; those of paramount chiefs; and those of the colonial administration (Kilson, 1966, pp. 154-170; Cartwright, 1970, pp. 43-63; Jones, 1981, pp. 175-186; Wyse, 1990, pp. 133-163).

The most significant feature of Stevenson’s proposals was the introduction of an African majority in the Legislative Council. However, the terms he suggested were favourable to the Protectorate, and to paramount chiefs in particular: they gave the Protectorate ten seats in the Legislative Council, leaving only four for the Colony72; they required that the Protectorate members be elected by the Protectorate Assembly73 from among its members, which gave chiefs a great deal of influence over the selection of candidates74; and they delayed the introduction of a literacy

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71 Krios are the descendants of freed slaves who settled on the Freetown Peninsula under the auspices of British philanthropists and the British government (Fyfe, 1962, pp. 1-104; Kilson, 1966, pp. 1-2; Cartwright, 1970, p. 15). Early settlers who sailed from London, Nova Scotia and Jamaica 1787-1800 were joined by those freed from slaving ships after the abolition of the slave trade by Britain in 1807. Over time, these distinct groups took on a common identity.

72 The remaining seats were to be held by Europeans—some accounts put this at ten seats (Kilson, 1966, pp. 161-162; Wyse, 1990, pp. 144-145), while others put this number at nine (Cartwright, 1970, p. 44; Jones, 1981, p. 177).

73 The Protectorate Assembly was an additional consultative body for the Protectorate that was established alongside the new district councils in 1946. The body had a total of forty-two members: ten official members; six nominated unofficial members, of whom four were required to be Africans; and two members from each of the thirteen district councils (reduced to twelve district councils after 1950). In common with the district councils, the Protectorate Assembly was dominated by paramount chiefs, who made up more than three quarters of the membership throughout the body’s lifespan.

74 Stevenson’s proposals required that nine representatives be elected from the pool of members put forward by district councils and one be elected from the pool of nominated members. The nine candidates put forward by district councils therefore move through a three-stage process: 1) if paramount chiefs, they are automatically ex-officio members of district councils, otherwise they are elected by chiefdom councils who are under paramount chiefs’ influence; 2) district councils
requirement (which approximately 80 percent of chiefs could not meet (Kilson, 1966, p. 164)) for three years.

The Colony’s largely Krio elite had campaigned for constitutional reform to establish an African majority in the Legislative Council since the 1920s, yet when the moment finally came they found themselves facing a colonial administration supportive of giving majority rule to the Protectorate. While the colonial administration had been signalling this direction throughout the 1940s, nevertheless the Colony elite experienced this more explicit statement of colonial policy as a bitter betrayal. They raised a number of significant objections to the Stevenson proposals, including: the substantial role accorded to chiefs, the related waiver of a literacy requirement and the incoherence of a single Legislative Council to represent both Colony and Protectorate overlaid on a dualistic system which accorded distinct legal statuses and rights to Colony and Protectorate persons (Cartwright, 1970, p. 47; Wyse, 1990, pp. 150-152).

Protectorate leaders understandably took a more welcoming stance to the proposals. However, there was a divide between paramount chiefs and members of an educated Protectorate elite. The latter, represented by the Sierra Leone Organization Society (SOS), were also concerned about the domination of political opportunities by paramount chiefs and argued in favour of a literacy requirement. This cleavage within the Protectorate leadership provided the basis for a potential alliance between educated professionals in the Colony and the Protectorate. While some authors suggest that Colony intransigence prevented such an alliance from being realized (Kilson, 1966, pp. 166-168; Cartwright, 1970, p. 51), I concur with Akintola Wyse (1990, p. 154) that the attractions of an alliance with chiefs would have outweighed those of an alliance with the Colony even if the latter had adopted a more flexible approach. Not only was there a high degree of social overlap between the chiefly class and educated professionals in the Protectorate, as many of the latter group belonged to chiefly lineages, but the logic of majority rule suggested that an alliance with Colony politicians would be of little enduring value.

Once more following Westminster’s lead with reluctance, the colonial administration pursued a conservative vision of reform which preserved chiefly

(dominated by paramount chiefs) elect candidates to the Protectorate Assembly; and 3) the Protectorate Assembly (dominated by paramount chiefs) elects candidates to the Legislative Council.
power. There is agreement in the literature that the administration intervened in the constitutional conflict to reconcile the chiefs and the educated Protectorate elite, as they envisaged a role for both in the future government of Sierra Leone. While Kilson (1966, pp. 158-161, 166) and Cartwright (1970, p. 51) also describe efforts to placate Colony representatives, Wyse (1990, pp. 138-139, 146) points to long-standing anti-Krio bias among colonial officials and suggests that they may have encouraged Protectorate politicians to inflame tensions with Colony politicians, presumably in order to push them to unreasonable behaviour and facilitate the development of a Protectorate-based alliance.

The Stevenson proposals were considered at a tense select committee meeting in mid-1948 which brought together the attorney general, the chief commissioner, the African members of the Legislative Council and additional extraordinary members to allow equal representation of Colony and Protectorate. At the outset of the meeting, the three extraordinary members from the Colony walked out in protest at the chief commissioner’s participation, which they claimed would prevent the paramount chiefs from speaking freely. In their absence, an agreement was reached on the make-up of the Legislative Council—the committee advised the government to expand the number of Legislative Council seats for both the Colony and the Protectorate (from four and ten to seven and fourteen respectively) and to refrain from making a universal recommendation on the sensitive issue of literacy. Crucially, the committee also recommended that the unofficial members of the Legislative Council be permitted to elect four of their number to the Executive Council, expanding the scope of the constitutional reform significantly. These proposals were subsequently endorsed unanimously by the full Legislative Council and approved by the governor and the secretary of state for the colonies.

Far from concluding the matter, the finalization of these proposals initiated a period of protest by the SOS and Colony representatives. The SOS submitted a memorandum demanding a more democratic form of election to the Legislative Council. Colony representatives launched a vitriolic public campaign in the national press that played on Krio fears of Protectorate rule; unsuccessfully petitioned the secretary of state for the colonies; and used their majority in the Legislative Council to delay the proposed constitutional reforms. The governor’s attempts to set up a second committee to consider the constitution failed because Colony and Protectorate representatives could not agree on its composition. In April 1950, the governor issued
an ultimatum to the Legislative Council that the 1948 proposals would be passed unless they could come together and agree on a revised set of measures. By this point, the rift between Colony and Protectorate had deepened to such an extent that a rapprochement was unachievable. Moreover, it was not in the interests of Protectorate representatives (particularly chiefs) to make further compromises, as the default outcome served them well. Reconciliation was achieved, however, between paramount chiefs and members of an educated Protectorate elite. When the governor recommended that the 1948 proposals be implemented in May 1950, two additional concessions to the Protectorate educated elite were made—the inclusion of a literacy requirement and changes to the make-up of district councils to create additional opportunities for the participation of non-chiefs. In July 1950, the Freetown branch of the SOS passed a resolution calling for the constitution’s implementation, signalling an end to the Protectorate educated elite’s opposition to the proposed constitutional reform (Cartwright, 1970, p. 52).

The alliance between paramount chiefs and an educated Protectorate elite developed through this constitutional crisis grew stronger as the Legislative Council elections got underway (Cartwright, 1970, pp. 55-63; Wyse, 1990, pp. 160-163). In August 1950, a number of Colony political groups formed a political party called the National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL). Prior to the November 1951 Legislative Council elections, Protectorate politicians followed suit, dissolving the SOS and forming a national political party which incorporated some Krio politicians, the SLPP. The SLPP first courted chiefs because of their high degree of control over the electoral process for Protectorate seats, but continued to do so after the election because chiefs secured eight seats on the Legislative Council while SLPP members secured only six (four Protectorate seats and two Colony seats). In November 1951, the Legislative Council was convened and at an extraordinary session the governor sought to identify the leader of the majority party. Following the SLPP’s refusal to form a coalition with the NCSL (which had secured three Colony seats), the governor called for a division on the Legislative Council and all of the paramount chiefs declared their support for the SLPP. The SLPP’s leader, Milton Margai, was subsequently given the position of leader of government business and was able to

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75 According to Wyse (1990, p. 159), the SLPP did not contest the elections on a party basis, so these numbers reflect those candidates who had declared their membership of the SLPP; Cartwright (1970, p. 58) finds that only three avowed SLPP members won Protectorate seats.
select the unofficial African members of the Executive Council. From 1953, these
Executive Council members assumed ministerial positions, which gradually increased
in scope until full independence was declared in 1961. An alliance between a national
political party and paramount chiefs was therefore a foundational element of the post-
colonial state in Sierra Leone, which was to persist through subsequent decades.

iv) Paramount chiefs and party politics

By the 1960s, paramount chiefs were well-established as critical players in
party political struggles. Victor Minikin (1973) was among the first to describe the
role that chiefs, as well as their rivals for chiefly power, played as political brokers in
national elections. He argues that Sierra Leone’s ruling politicians “feared the
implications of mass participation in politics” (p. 129)—the threat to their
conservative agenda and ultimately their political ascendance—and sought only to
secure a sufficient number of votes to maintain their hold on power. Rather than
investing in building a party structure to mobilize voters, the SLPP preferred to rely
on paramount chiefs to bring in the vote. The opposition APC in turn formed
alliances with rival ruling house factions eager to secure the chieftaincy for
themselves. According to Minikin, this approach enabled national politicians to
divert popular energies into local-level struggles and pursue a conservative national
strategy free from interference. By serving as political brokers, chiefs and their rivals
were able to further their own interests within the chiefdom, as well as securing
political protection for the institution of chieftaincy. The result was a “two way
process” in which “national politicians exploited local conflicts to further their own
elite interests; while simultaneously local brokers used national issues, and the
conflict between the political parties, in the struggle for advantage” (p. 30). Barrows
(1976, pp. 217-232) describes a similar pattern of “double politics” based on self-
interested reciprocal exchange between ruling house faction and party, but disagrees
with Minikin that national politicians deliberately excluded the masses. In his view,
the factional pattern of support for political parties was fairly effective at generating
integration between national elites and the masses, as each national politician was a
member of a local elite, and each faction contained both local elites and masses. He
concludes that “[t]hrough the intermediacy of local elites, the masses and the political
center are connected”.

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Despite this difference, Minikin (1973) and Barrows (1976) largely agree on the adverse consequences of ‘double politics’ in Sierra Leone and are joined in their gloomy assessment by Tangri (1978a). First, ‘double politics’ makes the pursuit of coherent national policies difficult because political parties are required to court numerous and disparate local actors. Minikin (p. 135) blames ‘double politics’ for “the parochialism and the preoccupation of national politicians with local disputes”; Barrows (p. 233) describes political parties as “the prisoners of small-scale squabbles”; and Tangri (p. 171) argues that attempts to contain “a patchwork of interests” have prevented parties from assuming “a distinctive ideological posture”.

Second, ‘double politics’ creates instability and violence at the local level. According to Barrows (p. 225), it is the utilitarian character of party-faction relationships that makes them unstable because either side is liable to switch their loyalties if the alliance ceases to be advantageous. Party elites are therefore likely to use repressive tactics to maintain factional support and factions are likely to use violence to gain party attention.

The APC’s rise to power in the 1960s initially seemed to mark a shift in central-local relations. Excluded from the close relationships with paramount chiefs enjoyed by the SLPP, the APC adopted alternative strategies to increase its chances of success in the 1967 elections, building a robust network of party organizers; playing on northern anxieties about their region’s neglect by the SLPP; and employing anti-chief rhetoric (Barrows, 1976, pp. 128, 235). This led some to believe that the APC would abolish chieftaincy, or at least take steps to curtail the powers of chiefs. However, on taking office, the APC continued to collaborate closely with chiefs to maintain political control. The early years of APC rule were particularly turbulent at the local level, as many of the rival factions that had supported the APC during the elections used violent tactics to remove and replace incumbent chiefs with tacit government approval (Minikin, 1973, p. 135; Barrows, 1976; Tangri, 1976, pp. 319-320; 1978a, p. 168). Tangri (1976, pp. 319-320) and Minikin (1973, p. 135) argue that locally driven violence subsided after the APC’s second election victory in 1973 when senior APC politicians made public statements indicating that they would no longer tolerate violence in local political struggles. Yet during the same period, the APC government began to directly deploy violent tactics to ensure local control. For example, in diamondiferous Kono District, the APC government used state agencies to forcibly install paramount chiefs with no local standing. However, not all such
attempts were successful; some were thwarted by strong local resistance and thus the APC government could not fully dispense with ‘double politics’ in favour of brute force (Reno, 1995, pp. 79-103). Perhaps counter-intuitively, ‘double politics’ also survived the transition to a one-party state in 1978, as factionalism within the APC was sufficiently high to support a pattern of rival chieftdom factions linking up with rival factions within the party (Barrows, 1976, p. 255; Tangri, 1978a, p. 167).

The general pattern of central-local linkage in post-colonial Sierra Leone built directly upon the template of indirect rule established during the colonial period. However, this pattern was destabilized by the introduction of competitive party politics, as there was a mismatch between a system of chiefs elected for life, while power at the national level transferred hands between parties (prior to one-party rule). On the one hand, chiefs’ involvement in party politics increased their value to the centre and thus incentivized central government to protect chiefs’ autonomy and access to resources in general terms. On the other hand, chiefs became more vulnerable to politically motivated violence—they were forced to make risky choices about how far to show their support for the government of the day during elections, and exposed to challenges from rival factions backed by the opposition party. Chiefs’ involvement in party politics also led to a decline in their legitimacy, as their subjects disapproved of their orientation towards rewards from the centre rather than local needs (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, p. 147; Minikin, 1973, p. 132; Tangri, 1978a, p. 169). In sum, this account is both a testament to the remarkable durability of centre-chief linkages, and also to the distortion that chiefs’ role has undergone in order to sustain this pattern of linkage, with attendant implications for their local relationships and standing.

3.3 Contemporary debates

During the post-war period, academic debate on local governance in Sierra Leone has clustered around three main questions: 1) how far can failings of chiefly governance be considered a cause of the civil conflict?; 2) should chiefly governance be abolished or reformed in the post-war period?; and 3) what potential do elected local councils have to bring about a transformation of political culture at the grassroots?
i) Chiefs

Richards (2005b) has been one of the most forceful voices identifying chiefly governance as a significant driver of conflict in rural areas. In Richards’ view, there are strong historical continuities between the practice of domestic slavery prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the exercise of customary power by chiefs in the late twentieth century. He attributes this in large part to indirect rule, which he believes “froze in place” (p. 582) chiefly privilege. Richards emphasizes three sets of customary practices which chiefs use to retain control over women and young men, particularly those of lower status: exercising the chiefly right to call for unpaid community labour; maintaining a system of polygynous customary marriage based on costly bride payments, often converted to long-standing labour obligations; and using judicial power, including disproportionate fines, to enforce their decisions. Richards (p. 585) summarizes the combined force of these practices:

Regular fining of young cultivators keeps them in poverty and dependency. Chiefs and landowners thereby accumulate surplus labour and send their own children to town for education. The children of the poor remain in the village, providing ‘community labour’ for roads and other basic amenities mainly benefiting traders and the chiefly classes. The more docile among the descendants of the former slaves continue to work the land for subsistence returns. Others, less willing to queue in line for increasingly uncertain patrimonial scraps, default on their fines, are hounded into vagrancy and end up as protagonists of war.

Influenced by the work of Emile Durkheim, Richards draws the conclusion that the civil war was a form of “slave revolt” (p. 580) of the descendants of former slaves against the chiefly class that exploited their labour and denied them opportunity.

Fanthorpe (2001) also describes the exclusionary tendencies of chieftdom governance as a factor motivating young men and those of low status to join militias, but for somewhat different reasons. Fanthorpe argues that rural Sierra Leone has long been characterized by the “extreme localization of criteria of identity and belonging” (p. 372). The introduction of a system of ‘native administration’ in the 1930s locked in this pattern by linking access to rights and property to inclusion on a village tax register. The consequence of this approach has been to establish an enduring reliance on chiefs “to authorize and guarantee the ‘native’ identities that confer rights to land, legal protection, and political representation”, thus limiting the number and location of points at which such rights can be secured (p. 383). With demographic and economic change, chiefs in many rural settlements were neither able to guarantee
rights nor offer a viable livelihood to all those with a legitimate claim. As a result, young people and those of low inherited status were increasingly prevented from accessing rights and property, whether they remained in their home village or sought opportunity elsewhere. Fanthorpe (p. 385) concludes:

Sierra Leone may therefore represent a case in which alarming numbers of people have become neither ‘citizen’ nor ‘subject’…we should not be surprised to find that many underprivileged young Sierra Leoneans have been as ready to embrace the ‘secular sectarianism’ of the RUF and the camaraderie of the combat group as the undisciplined lifestyle of the footloose ‘lumpen’. The only moral communities available to these agents may be those of their own desperate making.

Fanthorpe is therefore making a structural argument about the limitations of a system of governance based on localized identity, with chiefs responsible for guaranteeing associated rights, rather than suggesting that chiefly abuses are responsible for driving young people out of villages and into the arms of militia groups. He also views the exclusionary character of chiefdom governance as a contributory factor in the civil war, rather than a central cause.

In later work, Fanthorpe (2005) persuasively criticizes Richards’ (2005b) account of the war as a slave revolt against a chiefly class on methodological and interpretive grounds. He finds that Richards’ case relies heavily on testimony from ex-combatants during the post-war period, which is distorted because it is, at least in part, a strategic response to the political context. According to Fanthorpe, intensive popular engagement conducted by a raft of donor-funded NGOs led to “the use of grievance as a rhetorical device” by ex-combatants eager to influence NGO decision-making to their advantage (p. 40). He suggests that the emphasis on the abuses of chiefs and elders in ex-combatant discourse should be considered one of a number of rural social tensions, rather than the dominant one. Revisiting the chiefly practices Richards finds most problematic, Fanthorpe argues that chiefs commonly use their power to call for community labour to generate public, rather than private, goods:

While chiefs’ calls for ‘community labour’ may be resented by some, many of these activities—e.g. clearing overgrown bush paths that may harbour poisonous snakes, maintaining footbridges, and refurbishing school buildings—clearly benefit the community as a whole and not just local elites. These activities are hardly comparable with the agricultural corvées of the early colonial era. (p. 36)
Furthermore, Fanthorpe finds that there is little anthropological evidence to suggest that chiefs and elders monopolize young women or use the institution of customary marriage to shore up their power in the way that Richards suggests.

In Fanthorpe’s view, the attitude of the majority of rural Sierra Leoneans towards chiefly authority is one of ambivalence rather than outright rejection. While they complain of chiefly abuses, they also value chiefs because it is they rather than the central state that “‘know a person’s right’, i.e. the customary rights and properties that establish de facto local citizenship” (p. 44). Fanthorpe confirms that the pattern of ‘double politics’ described by Barrows, Minikin and Tangri persists; national politicians continue to intervene in chiefdom politics in order to advance their interests and control of the chieftaincy remains a significant prize because of the access to resources and influence that it affords. For all of these reasons, chiefdom politics remain highly energized.

The Richards-Fanthorpe debate can be broadly characterized as one of abolition versus reform (Jackson, 2006; Sawyer, 2008). The obvious implication of Richards’ (2005b) argument is that the post-war restoration of chieftaincy is likely to facilitate renewed chiefly abuses and drive another generation of young men to war. Richards (p. 588) concludes that reforming rural rights is “as urgent an issue as tracking the gun-runners or diamond- and timber-smugglers”. Although he stops short of calling for outright abolition of chiefs, he does argue for the abolition of the “unsupervised and undocumented judicial practices” in which they are involved “through exemplary appeals to higher courts” (p. 587)—a significant step towards undermining chiefs’ authority. The logical policy route following from Richards’ research seems to be one of significant disempowerment and ultimately abolition of chiefs. Fanthorpe (2005) seems to advocate a more gradual process of reform. His emphasis on the vitality of chiefdom politics and the perceived importance of chiefs as guarantors of citizenship rights suggest that abolition of chieftaincy is neither achievable nor politically desirable, despite the problematic character of chiefdom governance. He suggests that a pathway of “re-bureaucratization” (p. 44) at chiefdom level along lines that would render chiefs more downwardly accountable would be a preferable approach.
Subsequent empirical research provides mixed evidence. Lending support to the reformist view, Edward Sawyer (2008) presents survey evidence from four localities\(^76\) which runs counter to Richards’ (2005b) claims that chiefly justice is predominantly a mechanism for control of youth labour. He finds that chiefs are considered to perform well relative to other actors in terms of resolving conflict, with section chiefs and village headmen ranked in third and fourth place respectively out of a range of nine possible providers, below religious organizations (first place) and NGOs (second place), but above local courts (sixth place). In rural areas, chiefs had even higher levels of support, with headmen and section chiefs ranked in second and third place after religious organizations. A complementary survey conducted by Fanthorpe et al (2011, pp. 71-105) finds that traditional authorities achieve higher satisfaction scores than local councils and central government for their performance in managing projects and services; 47 percent of respondents reported that traditional authorities always or often respond to local needs in an efficient manner, compared to 40 percent for local councils and 38 percent for central government. In Bombali and Kono, respondents identified traditional authorities most frequently as the political authority they would approach first to ask for development and services, while in Bo and Western Area Rural, local councils were the more common choice. In support of an abolitionist perspective, the findings of an ambitious national study of chieftaincy by Daron Acemoglu, Tristan Reed and James Robinson (2012) are consistent with Richards’ characterization of chiefs as anti-developmental. The authors reconstruct the basic history of all 149 of Sierra Leone’s chiefdoms in order to investigate how the concentration of chiefly power impacts on development. They find that those chiefdoms which have been controlled by fewer ruling houses have significantly worse development outcomes, notably lower rates of literacy, school attainment, and non-agricultural employment.\(^77\) At the same time, they find that attitudes to chiefs are more positive and social capital\(^78\) is higher in those chiefdoms which have been controlled by a smaller number of ruling houses. They interpret this as evidence that chiefs have captured civil society to serve their own purposes, which

\(^{76}\) Sawyer reports findings from a survey (n=300) conducted in Tonkolili District in the North, Kenema District in the East, Western Area Urban (which contains Freetown) and Western Area Rural.

\(^{77}\) They consider non-agricultural employment to be a proxy for economic development in lieu of micro-data on incomes.

\(^{78}\) Measured by attendance of community meetings, participation in groups and the undertaking of collective actions.
they suggest incentivizes greater popular investment in chieftaincy and leads to more positive attitudes towards chiefs. This theory casts doubt on the use of attitudinal survey data to assess chiefs’ developmental potential, but also sits uneasily with Richards’ reliance on accounts of grievances against chiefs. However, aside from the puzzling concurrence of poor development outcomes and positive attitudes to chiefs, the authors do not provide further evidence in support of this link. In addition, the model the authors specify is quite limited and leaves important questions unanswered. For example, they only look at the relationship between the concentration of chiefly power and a narrow set of developmental outcomes (literacy, education and non-agricultural employment); the attitudinal data they draw on focus on attitudes to age and authority, not to chiefs specifically; and they do not discuss how government installation of chiefs (Abraham, 1976; Reno, 1995) (which could potentially introduce a dynamic of reverse causality between economic development and number of ruling houses) affects their results.

Richards has worked with colleagues (Mokuwa, Voors, Bulte, & Richards, 2011) to investigate his earlier claims about chiefly abuses in greater depth; this has resulted in more narrowly circumscribed but better substantiated claims. Using court records and survey data79, the authors explore whether there is evidence that elderly polygynists encourage sexual relationships between young men and their wives in order to demand their labour in recompense, or, if this fails, to sue them for ‘woman damage’ (adultery). They find that ‘woman damage’ claims occur at an extremely high frequency both in local courts and in adjudication outside of the local court system; the frequency of claims is positively associated with the amount of upland farm land cultivated and the level of demand for labour; and the accusers tend to be older than those accused and are more likely to have larger upland farms and multiple wives. However, these findings apply only to the Gola Forest region and to upland rice farming specifically. Furthermore, the findings are evidence of capture of the local legal system broadly speaking by an elderly elite, rather than of chiefs’ abuse of judicial powers. While chiefs may well play a key role in shoring up the power of

79 The authors surveyed local court records in nine chiefdoms bordering the Gola Forest over the period 2000-10 and analyzed these alongside an existing sample of World Bank court data from 2006-07. They also conducted a household survey investigating adjudication outside of the local court system (by family members, elders, village chiefs, etc.) in seven chiefdoms during the first half of 2010.
this elderly elite, their precise role in relation to these practices requires further elaboration.

**ii) Local councils**

Comparatively speaking, Sierra Leone’s reformed local councils have received relatively little academic attention. This is partly a consequence of their short lifespan, but perhaps also of a perception among Western researchers that as institutions built on a recognized template they are better understood. Yet analysis of Sierra Leone’s decentralization process by Fanthorpe (2005), Paul Jackson (2005, 2006) and Esser (2012) suggests that imported assumptions about local councils obscure important aspects of the social reality in Sierra Leone and underlines the importance of a contextualized understanding of these actors. In assessing whether councils have the potential to deliver political transformation at the grassroots, two particular themes emerge in these authors’ work: the failure of both donors and central government to take account of the “lessons of history” (Fanthorpe, 2005, p. 46); and the complex relationship between donor and central government agendas vis-à-vis decentralization.

While donors believe that decentralization will serve to “[reincorporate] the rural poor into the Sierra Leonean body politic” and “capture and catalyze modernizing ideas about citizenship and sociality already emerging at the grassroots” (Fanthorpe, 2005, pp. 34-35), Fanthorpe argues that the decentralization process is a far more conservative reform than they imagine. He finds the resemblance between ‘new’ elected councils and those abolished in the early 1970s striking: they are financially dependent on a precarious combination of central (donor-backed) grants and local revenues shared with chiefs, and operationally dependent on the capacity of chiefdom government to fulfil many of their roles. This leads Fanthorpe to conclude that post-reform local councils remain vulnerable to a similar fate to their predecessors and that re-bureaucratization should have focused first at the chiefdom level to provide a foundation which local councils could build upon.

Jackson concurs with Fanthorpe in recognizing conservative forces at work in the decentralization process, and sees much of this conservatism as emanating from an administrative cadre. He writes (2005, p. 56):

> It is somewhat alarming to have conversations with government officials who see this pre-war period as some kind of perfect system that needs to be rebuilt...It is closely linked to the denial of the war itself within Freetown…in
that there is a belief that during the war the bureaucracy somehow heroically kept the country going in the face of barbarism.

He sees this administrative conservatism as manifesting through the recycling of personnel from the former centrally controlled system of local government. In Jackson’s (2006) view, administrators stand alongside local politicians and chiefs as one of three key groups which will determine the form that decentralization takes and its likely outcomes. He is concerned about the competence of recycled staff, as well as the increased likelihood of both conflict and collusion with chiefs based on pre-existing relationships.

All three authors agree that donors and the SLPP government approached decentralization with different agendas, and that the government’s support for the decentralization process was probably motivated by a desire to maintain access to external resources and/or to extend its political control. However, while Fanthorpe sees the partisan character of local councils as providing a potential entrée for elite capture of these bodies, Esser (2012, p. 415) argues that partisanship is a “blessing rather than a curse” because it enables local representation and serves as a conduit for change. At dispute is a decision by the SLPP government that local elections should be held on a partisan basis, rejecting the recommendation of a national consultation conducted by MLG (with DFID and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funding) to the contrary. Fanthorpe sees this as an instance of the SLPP government seeking to expand its base of support in the face of “overwhelming popular demand” (p. 46) for non-partisan elections. Describing the local elections that followed, Fanthorpe cites examples of well-worn partisan tactics: canvassing by chiefs on behalf of ruling party candidates, on threat of deposition for disobedience; and the development of a local form of ‘double politics’ whereby opposition councillors ally with rival chiefdom factions to gain leverage against government-allied paramount chiefs. He suggests that it is in the context of these bitter political struggles that the value of customary regimes to the rural poor becomes visible; while such regimes enable chiefly exploitation, they also provide some protection for the rights of the rural poor, which are completely disregarded in the milieu of zero-sum partisan politics “in which loyalty and trust are available to the highest bidder” (p. 45). While Jackson (2005, p. 52; 2006, p. 103) makes a less explicit judgement on the government’s motivation for rejecting the recommendation for non-partisan elections, his comments reflect sympathy with Fanthorpe’s position.
Esser (2012, pp. 406-407) tells a very different story. He perceives the consultation recommendation in favour of non-partisan elections to be a reflection of a donor agenda, rather than popular disillusionment with partisan politics. He further argues that the SLPP government was in favour of non-partisan elections as a means of preventing the opposition APC from getting more of a foothold. In his view, it was a conflict with the 1991 constitution, which provides for elections to be held on a partisan basis, that prevented the joint interests of donors and the SLPP from being realized. Focusing on the implications of decentralization in Freetown, Esser is intensely critical of aid agencies’ behaviour. He describes the way in which donors took advantage of their unusual degree of influence in Sierra Leone to push decentralization through while making little effort to engage national ministries, let alone sub-national stakeholders. Following the APC’s electoral success in Freetown, Esser finds that donors colluded with the SLPP government to undermine the APC-run Freetown City Council (FCC) in direct contradiction of their professed commitment to democratic principles. As a concrete example of donor-government collusion, Esser cites a power struggle between the SLPP government and FCC over waste collection in Freetown (2012, pp. 412-413). Rather than supporting FCC to take on responsibility for this area in accordance with the LG Act (2004), donors continued to channel funds through central government. In doing so, he suggests that they were motivated by their desire to pursue their development plans under politically stable conditions. In his view, an approach consistent with democratic decentralization “would have required sincere engagement with different parties, while also accepting the risk of changes in national counterparts and plans” (p. 410).

Despite his critical account of the role played by aid agencies in inhibiting decentralization in Freetown, Esser remains in some ways the most optimistic about decentralization’s potential to deliver political transformation at the grassroots. He sees the APC’s record in controlling FCC as a potential driver of the APC’s 2007 election victory and concludes that “[r]ather than reigniting conflict, partisanship has proved to be a source of change driven by Sierra Leonean preferences instead of international blueprints” (p. 415). However, given the dramatic episodes of partisan violence which occurred in Freetown in March 2009 (Anonymous, 2009), triggered by an incident involving Freetown’s APC mayor, this seems to be rather a selective reading of the evidence. Nevertheless, Esser makes a valuable contribution in
highlighting the distinct dynamics of decentralization in Freetown where the city council must struggle against central government rather than chiefly encroachment.

Fanthorpe is perhaps the most pessimistic about decentralization’s transformative potential. For him, it represents a revival of an earlier, failed model of local government, and he concludes that “[i]t is hard to imagine an arrangement less likely to promote a transformation in political culture” (p. 45); instead, he suggests, there is a substantial risk that “decentralization will simply create new platforms for the old politics”, leaving the rural poor “locked, as before, into a desperate scramble for elite patronage” (p. 47). Jackson (2006) steers something of a middle course, arguing that the success of decentralization will depend on the outcomes of power struggles between chiefs, local councillors and administrators. He believes that local councils have a chance of “breaking down the damaging socio-political relationships that supported a rural gerontocracy”, but also sees co-optation of local councils by that gerontocracy as a real possibility.

Concluding comments

The post-war reform of local government currently underway looks quite different when understood in historical perspective, rather than through a donor lense. Based on pre-conceptions about the marginality of traditional authority, donors tend to over-estimate the fragility of chieftaincy. For example, Fanthorpe (2005, pp. 35, 36) finds that international staff tend to view decentralization as a means to “capture and catalyse modernizing ideas about citizenship and sociality” and are “predicting the final demise of chiefdom administration”. A consideration of the history of chieftaincy in Sierra Leone instead points to an unusually resilient local government institution which has maintained a prominent status over the course of the last century (although it came under violent attack during the civil war). Much of chieftaincy’s success can be explained by the close linkages chiefs have forged with the centre, during colonial indirect rule, at the birth of the post-colonial state and through the pattern of ‘double politics’ sustained during the post-colonial period up until the present. According to Fanthorpe (2001), even the popular resonance of chieftaincy is rooted in chiefs’ role as guarantors of local rights and citizenship, which is a consequence of the incorporation of chieftaincy by the state during colonial rule. With this historical background in mind, the central government’s approach to chieftaincy in the post-war period seems best interpreted as an effort to protect the
status quo, which serves their political interests. Both ‘reformist’ and ‘abolitionist’
academics recognize that chiefly power is deeply embedded in the Sierra Leonean
state, and in society; while the former see the degree of embeddedness as a barrier to
drastic curtailment of chiefs’ powers, the latter see the harm caused by chiefs as
necessitating drastic action.

Donor agencies supporting local councils in Sierra Leone believe them to be a
democratic innovation, but the historical evidence indicates that the contemporary
local council system has far more in common with the failed local council system of
the 1940s-70s than they might like. Councils are heavily dependent on continued
external support for their survival, creating a risk that politicians and administrators
will view councils more as a temporary extractive opportunity than an enduring
component of the political landscape, and rendering them vulnerable to collapse when
funding is reduced or withdrawn. As in the past, councils are likely to struggle to
capture the political affections of their constituents, particularly given the large size of
their jurisdictions, the relative isolation of many Sierra Leonean localities; and their
limited resources. In this struggle, as in their efforts to secure resources and carve out
a clear role for themselves, they must compete with chiefdom authorities. Councils’
success in this regard depends heavily on the level of central backing they receive, but
given their unproven utility to the centre as compared to chiefs, they remain in a
highly precarious position. At the same time, there is tentative evidence that new
connections have been forged in the context of decentralization which link the fate of
chiefs to that of councils. For example, the government’s concession as regards the
potential applicability of universal suffrage to paramount chief elections suggests that
it is becoming difficult for chieftaincy to evade the logic of democracy which
underpins the council system. Should this change proceed, it could provide an entrée
for reformists to push for further reconfiguration of chieftaincy along more
democratic lines.
CHAPTER FOUR: Public Goods Provision in Post-war Makeni

Against the general background of the local government landscape set out in chapter three, I now introduce the city of Makeni, my fieldwork site. I provide an overview of Makeni’s history from the colonial era to the present, focusing in particular on the economic and political events which have contributed to the city’s relative underdevelopment. I introduce the LGAs studied—Makeni City Council (MCC) and the chiefs of Bombali Sebora—and provide a flavour of the dynamics which characterize each form of government. I then set out the findings from the survey of senior representatives of households that I conducted in Makeni, which provide insight into local perceptions of public goods provision in the city. As the purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for the case studies of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ which follow, I conclude by considering what the data tell us about the potential of these LGAs as providers of local public goods.

4.1 An introduction to Makeni

Makeni is the main economic and political hub in northern Sierra Leone, located approximately 110 miles from the capital city Freetown by a paved road and home to a population of 81,715 at the 2004 census (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2004). It was upgraded from a town to a city following the introduction of decentralization, along with three others—Bo in the South (pop. 148,705) and Kenema (pop. 126,966) and Koidu-New Sembehun (pop. 79,981) in the East (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2004). Makeni, Bo and Kenema serve as the headquarters for each of Sierra Leone’s three provinces, while Koidu-New Sembehun is the main urban centre in the Kono diamond mining district, close to the Liberian border. Makeni is the smallest of the three provincial headquarters with the least favourable supply of key public goods, a position which is the legacy of the colonial administration’s approach to regional development. It is also the heartland of support for the ruling APC party, which regained power in late 2007 (a year before my fieldwork began), and the current president’s home town.

The city of Makeni is a relatively recent creation, the result of railway and road construction in the 1910s-30s. According to Milton Harvey (1967, p. 28), the
first settlement of Makeni was established at the turn of the twentieth century by Keni, the rebellious son of one of the elders of nearby Rogbani, who set up a three-hut village near the current city centre. Following the construction of a northern railway branch connecting Makeni to Freetown in 1916, the settlement transformed rapidly in size and significance. From the perspective of the colonial administration, the main purpose of the northern railway was to extract palm kernels, which yielded palm oil used in Britain during the Industrial Revolution to make candles and lubricant for machinery (Bolten, 2008, p. 34). Between 1916-23, Makeni saw a wide variety of new facilities grow up alongside this extractive trade, including Syrian- and European-run commercial enterprises, a prison, a dispensary, a post office with savings facilities, a mission school and a military barracks. In 1921, Makeni was declared the district headquarters of the newly created Bombali District and by 1927 its population had reached approximately 1,000 people (Harvey, 1967, pp. 27-31).

During the 1930s, Makeni’s position grew steadily stronger. The railway line heading north from Makeni to Kamabai was closed, leaving Makeni as the terminal point on the northern branch of the railway. Subsequently, roads were built connecting Kamabai, Kamakwie and Kabala (significant settlements which lay further north) to Makeni, consolidating the town’s position as a regional economic hub. In 1931, Makeni was declared the provincial headquarters town in place of Makump and by 1933 its population had reached 2,325 people (Harvey, 1967, p. 30). From 1950 onwards, services in Makeni expanded and improved and its population continued to grow. By the mid-1960s, Makeni was home to more than 12,000 people, as well as five elementary schools, two secondary schools and a teacher training college; a hospital; city, district and provincial administrative buildings; two major businesses; a bank; a cinema; 25 Lebanese shops; more than 60 African shops and bars; and three open air markets. (Simpson, 1968, pp. 21-33).

While Makeni’s growth and development was rapid, the pace of development in the North lagged behind both the South and East from the beginning of the twentieth century. Catherine Bolten (2008, pp. 43-47) argues that higher levels of colonial investment in the South and East reflect the colonial administration’s relative valuation of the export products derived from these regions. The railway to the South and East was completed between 1895-1908, enabling these regions to gain an early

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80 The name Makeni can be translated ‘to Pa Keni’s village’ (Harvey, 1967).
advantage in cash crop farming. While the main focus in the North was on the extraction of palm kernels, a range of additional cash crops were farmed in the South and East, including tree crops and swamp rice which required investment in mechanized agriculture. The export economy was later transformed by the discovery of alluvial diamonds in the East in the early 1930s; palm products dropped from 71 to 36 percent of national exports between 1928 and 1936, while diamonds rose from 0 to 56 percent of exports between 1931 and 1936 (Reno, 1995, p. 48). Both the colonial administration and the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, a subsidiary of De Beers which had been granted a monopoly on exploration and mining, made investments in infrastructure in Kenema and the East in order to maximise profits from the diamond trade (Reno, 1995, p. 47; Bolten, 2008, p. 46). In addition, educational opportunities were far better in the predominantly Christian South, in part due to higher levels of missionary activity. In 1938, the number of children attending school in the South was four times higher than in the North, and remained more than three times higher a decade later (Cartwright, 1970, p. 26).

The disparity between the South and East and the North persisted during the post-colonial period. Comparing Kenema and Makeni in the 1960s, Dick Simpson (1968, pp. 28-33) finds that Kenema has a larger population, more industries and commercial firms, higher levels of employment and wealth, and larger and higher quality hospitals and schools. In 1978, a dam on the Dodo River was completed that provided power to Bo and Kenema, but no similar dam was developed at the Bumbuna River, which sat in close proximity to Makeni (Bolten, 2008, p. 48). While Harvey’s (1967, p. 37) account of Makeni from the late 1960s describes an electrified town, according to Bolten (2008, p. 76) mains electricity in Makeni was supplied by diesel-fuelled generators at a local power plant and broke down some time in the 1980s or early 1990s, as did the supply of piped water. In 1994, an attempt by the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) military junta to restore electricity and piped water was scuppered by the reluctance of Makeni’s residents to pay for these services (Bolten, 2008, pp. 92-95). National survey data from 2007 indicate that approximately a quarter of households (26%) surveyed in Kenema and a fifth (19%) of those surveyed in Bo enjoyed mains electricity, while none in Makeni did so (Government of Sierra Leone, 2007, p. 148). In addition, well over half (58%) of the households surveyed in Kenema and close to a fifth (19%) of those surveyed in Bo had access to either piped water or a public tap/standpipe, while fewer than one
percent of households surveyed in Makeni did so (Government of Sierra Leone, 2007, p. 144).

The relative underdevelopment of northern Sierra Leone was a critical factor in the successful mobilization of support by the APC party between its formation in 1960 and its first election victory in 1967. The party was formed by disgruntled northerners, both Temnes and Limbas 81, who felt that they were under-represented within the United Front government established in 1960 by Prime Minister Milton Margai in an attempt to co-opt his opposition (Cartwright, 1970, pp. 115-122, 125-137; Kandeh, 1992, pp. 91-92). The APC mobilized support by exploiting a number of significant grievances in the North and in Western Area, including resentment of southern prosperity (Tangri, 1978a, p. 172). By 1962, an ethno-regional voting pattern had emerged—while the SLPP dominated in the South and East (where Mendes 82 make up the largest ethnic group), the APC won a majority of seats in Northern Province (twelve seats compared to the SLPP’s five) and challenged the SLPP’s dominance in Western Area (four seats compared to the SLPP’s five). This regional divide had deepened by the 1967 elections in which the APC ultimately prevailed 83, taking close to three quarters of the recorded votes in Northern Province and Western Area, but only 16 percent of the vote in Mendeland (Cartwright, 1970, pp. 157, 249).

Despite the APC’s reliance on a core of northern support, Makeni’s relative underdevelopment persisted through decades of APC rule (1967-93). Arthur Abraham and Habib Sesay (1993) argue that the North did receive disproportionate access to public goods and services under APC rule, citing road construction to Makeni and other northern destinations and the distribution of agricultural projects. However, Bolten (2008, p. 49; 2012, p. 37) argues forcefully that Makeni was passed over for major development projects during Stevens’ era because of his anger against a group of northern politicians who broke away to form the United Democratic Party in 1970 and held meetings in Makeni. British government records underline the

81 The Temne ethnic group is the largest in Sierra Leone, making up approximately 35 percent of the population, while the Limba ethnic group is the third largest, making up 8 percent of the population (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). These two groups are generally considered to constitute the bulk of the ethnic base of APC support (Kandeh, 1992, p. 92).
82 The Mende ethnic group is the second largest in Sierra Leone, making up approximately 31 percent of the population. Mende-Temne rivalry currently forms the principal politicized ethnic cleavage in Sierra Leone (Kandeh, 1992, p. 90).
83 The APC won the election in March 1967, but a series of coups and counter-coups took place before an APC government was formed in April 1968.
significance of this challenge to President Stevens’ rule (The National Archives: Public Record Office DO 223/1), yet it seems unlikely that Makeni’s association with this political challenge was the principal cause of decades of neglect. The account of Sierra Leone’s economic decline that I set out in chapter one indicates that patrimonial resources were under intense pressure and that providing public goods, rather than those targeted to specific supporters, was low on Stevens’ list of priorities. Reno (1995, pp. 79-129) argues that Stevens initially invested his energies and resources in bringing the diamond trade in the East under his control. It seems likely that rewarding Makeni’s residents collectively for their political loyalty with a substantial boost in public goods was simply not a priority for Stevens, particularly given the lack of strong political competition in the city. Jimmy Kandeh (1992, pp. 94-95) lends some support to this view, arguing that despite the status of the North as an APC base of support, contracting patronage opportunities resulted in “widespread popular discontent with the performance of the APC regime that cuts across ethnic and regional lines”, expressed through demonstrations in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Makeni was largely unaffected by the early stages of Sierra Leone’s civil war (1991-2002). However, from early 1994, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces (the rebel group which instigated Sierra Leone’s civil war) began to make incursions into Bombali District (in which Makeni is based) and establish bases there. In May 1997, members of the Sierra Leone Army led a coup against President Kabbah’s elected government, formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and announced that they had established an alliance with the RUF. In February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces driven out of Freetown by troops from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) engaged in a wave of violent looting in Makeni known as ‘Operation Pay Yourself’. In March 1998, ECOWAS troops established a base in Makeni and RUF/AFRC forces spread throughout the district. After ongoing fighting between ECOWAS forces and the RUF/AFRC during the latter half of 1998, the RUF/AFRC seized control of Makeni on December 24, 1998, and the town remained a key base of operations until 2001. After the violent collapse of early disarmament attempts in Makeni in early 2000, government helicopter gunships attacked RUF/AFRC positions in and around Makeni between May and July 2000, leading to numerous civilian deaths, property damage and mass exodus. Makeni was returned to the control of peacekeeping forces in April 2001 and disarmament began

Bolten (2008, p. 42) argues that despite the suffering of Makeni’s residents, they were stigmatized by Kabbah’s SLPP government as rebel collaborators, while the residents of occupied towns in the East like Kailahun and Kono were treated as victims. According to Bolten, this enabled Kabbah to restrict the flow of post-war aid to Makeni, while investing in the regions where he had political support. However, when I arrived in Makeni in October 2008, almost seven years had passed since the end of the war and the political pendulum had swung in Makeni’s favour with the return of the APC to power. President Koroma, who took office in late 2007 and held on to power in the 2012 elections, is not only the first president identifying as a Temne (both Stevens and Momoh identified as Limbas), but was born and raised in Makeni, where his mother still lives. Far from being stigmatized by the central government, Makeni was now a focus of party pride. The president was in the habit of making frequent weekend visits to Makeni between 2008-09 and the 2009 APC conference led to a significant cleaning and redecorating of the town and the temporary supply of electricity to some of the city’s streets in order that it could show Sierra Leone its best face.

Despite this significant change in Makeni’s political fortunes, there were surprisingly few major projects underway to improve its supply of public goods during the course of my fieldwork in 2009. The city’s central square remained scarred by a failed project to construct a clocktower (see image 4.1) and there was little obvious movement to establish mains electricity and piped water and bring the city up to the standard of Bo and Kenema, the other provincial capitals. However, since leaving Makeni I have heard through correspondence with my research assistant that significant improvements in the city’s infrastructure took place prior to the 2012 elections, including the completion of the clocktower. While Makeni may finally be receiving some political reward for its loyalty to the APC, the legacy of underdevelopment it has inherited will only be overcome with sustained support.

4.2 Local government actors in Makeni

Like other provincial localities, Makeni is governed both by a local council, MCC, and chiefdom authorities headed by a paramount chief, in this case Paramount Chief (PC) Kasangna II of Bombali Sebora chiefdom. The city council and chiefdom
authorities are not the only form of local government present in the city—the district
council, district offices of ministries and the provincial administration are also found
there; the latter consists of the resident minister, North (the regional representative of
the Ministry of Local Government) and the staff that supports him, headed by the
provincial secretary. However, it is MCC and Bombali Sebora chiefdom authorities
that are the focus of this study.

i) Makeni City Council

Makeni Town Council was established in 1962 under the authority of the
Townships Act (1959)—seven years after Bo’s council, but one year before
Kenema’s council. While initially the council was partially elected, from 1972 it
operated as a centrally appointed committee of management (Kanu, 2009, p. 53). It is
difficult to trace the early history of the council with a high degree of precision, as its
records were destroyed when the council building was burned down during the RUF
invasion of Makeni; the provincial archives held at the provincial secretary’s office
were also destroyed (Reed & Robinson, 2012, p. 2). Council workers claim that the
rebels started the fire at the council building, but most of Makeni’s residents believe
that the council workers themselves burned down the building for fear that their
corrupt practices would be discovered and retribution visited upon them.

The secondary literature touching upon the early history of Makeni Town
Council is extremely sparse. Based on fieldwork conducted in the mid-1960s,
Simpson (1968, pp. 69-72) describes a council made up of thirteen councillors—six
elected, two appointed by central government, two appointed by the chiefdom
committee, the paramount chief, the area engineer and the medical officer. While he
finds the town council more effective than its district-level counterpart, he notes that
the council faced a significant problem in encouraging the town’s residents to pay
building rates, which had driven them into deficit. Alhassan Kanu (2009, p. 53)
argues that town councils’ performance deteriorated after they were converted to
committees of management in the early 1970s. In his view, they were simply the
local machinery of predatory governance driven from the centre and provided little of
benefit to the town’s residents. Drawing on newspaper archives, Bolten (2008, pp.
80-84) provides some insight into Makeni Town Council under military rule in the
1990s. On coming to power, the NPRC fired all councillors and replaced them with
new appointees. Initial successes in road repair and the construction of new public
buildings were short-lived; by the mid-1990s the council was bankrupt, a corruption scandal exploded and the chairman and six other councillors were suspended. Bolten suggests that this cycle of corruption has established itself as a familiar routine of council behaviour which makes it very difficult for residents to trust any council enough to invest in paying taxes.

The first post-reform Makeni Town Council established in 2004 had a total of twelve political representatives—one chairman, a former NGO worker called Musa Mansaray, and eleven councillors, four of whom were women. All of the councillors represented the APC party. The post-reform council inherited the administrative and operational staff of the pre-war committee of management. Decades of patronage had swelled the ranks of these inherited staff to almost 100; this is consistent with accounts by Kanu (2009, p. 53) and Tangri (1978b, p. 23) which report that council recruitment was used systematically to reward clients. While several of those in more senior administrative positions remained in office, approximately 50 percent of the administrative and operational staff were laid off at the end of September 2004. This led to immediate protests about the lack of redundancy payments (Bolten, 2008, p. 101) which according to staff at the Decentralization Secretariat, remained unpaid in late 2009 due to a protracted dispute about whether payment was a central government or council responsibility.

The first eighteen months of the council’s operations were highly turbulent, characterized by struggles with local interest-based associations. Bolten (2008, pp. 99-107) describes a bitter dispute over dues collection in the lorry park which resulted in two different drivers’ unions collecting dues simultaneously—one at the behest of the council, and the second operating on its own authority. In chapter five I describe a similar dispute over dues collection in the market which caused significant animosity with the Traders’ Union and primed them to take action against the council’s chairman over a corruption scandal which blew up in late 2005. By February 2006, the chairman, the deputy chairman and the chief administrator of MCC had been forced to resign. This was claimed as a victory of citizen accountability-seeking by advocates of decentralization (Zhou, 2009, p. 25), when it would be more accurate to characterize this episode as the product of local political struggles, as discussed in the next chapter. The chairman was replaced by another

84 Minutes, council meeting, October 21, 2004.
councillor for the remainder of the term, Andrew B. Kanu. Makeni Town Council was subsequently renamed Makeni City Council (MCC) after the town was upgraded to a city, and Andrew B. Kanu became Makeni’s first mayor.

Following the 2008 elections, the number of political representatives increased to sixteen, seven incumbents and nine new representatives. Seven of the sixteen councillors were women, including the deputy mayor; this is likely to reflect the APC party’s desire to make a nod to the gender equality agenda of development donors. Of the five former councillors who were not re-elected, two had resigned during the corruption scandal and two gave up their seats to compete for the separately elected position of mayor. They lost out to a newcomer, Moses Sesay, a young man who had worked as a teacher for more than a decade in both Sierra Leone and Gambia and subsequently as a corporate sales executive for a mobile phone company. He only became active in politics in 2007, shortly before his election. The APC’s choice of Sesay for mayor therefore seems to indicate a desire for new blood in local politics following their national victory. By 2009, the number of professionalized administrative staff at MCC had expanded following a recruitment exercise to fill a standard set of positions for each council. The chief administrator (CA) was a member of the old guard—he had first joined Makeni Town Council as an administrative assistant in 1993, but was promoted to acting deputy CA in the post-reform world and then managed to win the CA post after the forced resignation of his predecessor in the corruption scandal. Some of the other key posts, including that of finance officer and deputy CA, were filled by newer recruits.

Survey data collected by the World Bank project supporting the decentralization process indicate that in 2008 MCC’s councillors ranged in age from 32 years to 58 years old, with a mean age of 45 years. Twelve of the sixteen (75%) were born in Bombali Sebora chiefdom, a further three (19%) in other chiefdoms in Bombali District and one (6%) in nearby Tonkolili District. Ten (63%) identified as Temne, four (25%) as Limba and one each as Fula and Mende (6%). Nine (56%) were Christian and five (31%) Muslim, with the religious identification of the

85 These positions were: chief administrator, deputy chief administrator, finance officer, accountant, procurement officer and statistician (Kanu, 2009).

86 The 2008 Decentralization Stakeholders Survey was carried out by the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP). I obtained a copy of the dataset and carried out basic descriptive analysis of this data using SPSS. I include the mayor in the category ‘councillors’ for the purposes of this analysis.
remaining two unknown; this does not reflect the religious make-up of the city, where Islam is the majority religion. In general, councillors appeared to be wealthy. Eleven councillors (69%) had a generator, ten (63%) had a television, eight (50%) had a motorized vehicle and three (19%) had a computer—all unusual possessions. Eight councillors (50%) had lived outside the country, predominantly in West Africa, and twelve (75%) had family members living outside of the country, predominantly in North America and Europe.

Once more, all councillors represented the APC party—this was unsurprising, as more than 90 percent of votes cast in Makeni’s 2008 local elections were for the APC (National Electoral Commission, 2008). The APC’s decision about which candidates would receive the party symbol was therefore critical in determining electoral outcomes. On average, councillors reported facing approximately six rivals in their bid to win the party symbol. Councillors reported receiving assistance from local party officials (62%), Freetown party officials (23%) and their communities (15%) in their bid for the party symbol. Over 80 percent of councillors said they paid a financial contribution to the party for the symbol—this ranged from 200,000 Le to 250,000 Le (£38 to £48). In addition, councillors reported spending between 200,000 Le and 20,000,000 Le (£38 and £3,800) of their own funds on their election campaigns; the median amount spent was 3,500,000 Le (£670). Over 50 percent of councillors said that their own funds were the most important source of support for their campaign, while others cited supporters within their ward (19%), supporters outside their ward (13%) or the party (13%) as their most important source of support. Twelve councillors reported receiving 1,000,000 Le (£190) from the APC towards their campaign costs, while the remaining four councillors said they did not receive anything. Only four councillors reported receiving funds from the chiefdom authorities—for three of them, this amounted to 50,000 Le (£9.50), while one received 200,000 Le (£38). Five councillors reported receiving funds from private businesses ranging from 100,000 Le to 1,000,000 Le (£19 to £190).

The survey demonstrated strong kinship links between Makeni’s councillors and chiefs. Fifteen of sixteen councillors (94%) were members of a ruling house, twelve (75%) counted a town chief or section chief among their relatives and eleven (69%) were related to a paramount chief, of whom six (38%) were related to PC Kasangna. The survey data suggested that relationships between PC Kasangna and the council were generally positive. All but one of the councillors reported that the
paramount chief strongly supported decentralization and all councillors agreed that there was no current dispute with the paramount chief. On average, councillors reported meeting the paramount chief approximately five times during the previous month. Seven councillors (44%) said they would consider running for the position of paramount chief in the future, while twelve councillors (75%) expressed an interest in running for an MP position. It therefore appears that there is a significant overlap between councillors and the chiefly elite in Makeni; a phenomenon that has been well documented for national politicians in Sierra Leone (Kilson, 1966, pp. 71-75; Barrows, 1976, pp. 204-205).

Life for the council in 2009, when I was conducting fieldwork in Makeni, was far calmer than during the first phase of reform. Mayor Moses Sesay seemed to have avoided making significant enemies, leaving him at lower risk of exposure through a corruption scandal. However, there were rumours during the 2009 APC conference held in Makeni that the president was dissatisfied with his performance and would not give him the symbol for a second term in 2012.87 My experience with the council suggested that the mayor makes most of the decisions on its behalf behind closed doors. Monthly council meetings are constructed as a dialogue between the mayor and individual councillors speaking one at a time, rather than a group discussion. Although the mayor sometimes seeks councillors’ approval for decisions during these meetings, I never witnessed a vote take place on any issue discussed. Councillors also run fifteen committees focused on different functions and services.88 However, the committee system is quite disorganized—some committees fail to meet and they often have little to report when called upon by the mayor during meetings. Councillors complain about the lack of budget and administrative support available to them to operate these committees. The role of a councillor appears to be a relatively powerless one—it is only those who have the mayor’s ear who can exert influence over council policy.

The council implements a number of ‘transparency, accountability and participation’ measures specified in the LG Act (2004), including opening its meetings to the public, posting meeting minutes and developments plans on the notice

87 According to my research assistant, Moses Sesay did indeed lose his position in the 2012 elections.
88 The committees set up in 2008 were: agriculture, budget and finance, development, education, establishment, health and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, local technical planning, procurement, social welfare, surveys and town planning, taxation, women’s empowerment, works and technical maintenance and youth and sport.
board and holding needs assessments. However, few people attend council meetings, perhaps due to their length, uncertain start times and/or the relative lack of decision-making taking place there. Minutes and plans are usually posted after some delay and often only a few pages are visible due to limited space on the glass-covered notice board. I observed one needs assessment shortly after arriving in Makeni; it was extremely well attended, but few people had the opportunity to speak, and the meeting quickly descended into a dispute about the lack of transport allowances available. These few observations indicate that ‘transparency, accountability and participation’ measures may be dulled in their implementation.

The clear continuities between past and present councils touched upon here lend further support to the view that Sierra Leone’s decentralization process is conservative in character (Fanthorpe, 2005; Jackson, 2006). To Makeni’s residents, the ‘new’ local council represents the latest manifestation of city government, rather than a radical break with the past. The key administrator is recycled from a widely discredited period of city government. The councillors representing Makeni’s residents exhibit characteristics common to Sierra Leonean politicians: they are drawn from elite backgrounds and enjoy close links to chiefs. While they are elected rather than appointed (as under the former committee of management), the dominance of ethno-regional politics means that councillors remain reliant on central goodwill for their positions. Struggles over local resources and cycles of corruption which have already re-established themselves in the post-war period are also familiar to Makeni’s residents.

This account is also suggestive of an underlying tension between a donor-led model of decentralization and local political culture. The basic architecture set out in the LG Act (2004) is in place and prescribed practices to promote transparency and accountability—for example, holding meetings open to the public—are followed. Yet it is partisan politics that really energizes the local council system and this continues to imply a set of clientelist relations. The effectiveness of electoral accountability is undermined both by councillors’ lack of influence and by the APC’s role in hand-picking candidates. While some measures to promote transparency and accountability are in place, they do not appear to be encouraging societal accountability-seeking of the kind envisaged by donors; the key example of change cited by donors (the 2005 corruption scandal) is underpinned by a local political narrative which is suppressed when it is framed in this light. In sum, I found little evidence of electoral or societal
accountability developing in a manner which would yield better public goods provision in accordance with popular theories of decentralization.

**ii) Bombali Sebora chiefdom**

Makeni lies entirely within Bombali Sebora chiefdom, a Temne chiefdom, making up one of its five sections. Bombali Sebora was first established as a ‘native administration’ in 1939. While Makeni was a site of protest during the outbreak of anti-chief violence in the North in 1955-56, the extent of the outbreak was relatively limited (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, pp. 34-36). Government hearings were held in early 1957 to investigate the paramount chief’s conduct. Complaints against him included showing a lack of respect to his people; employing forced labour on his farms; and allowing the ‘native’ court to impose excessive fines, often prior to cases being heard. Although the paramount chief’s conduct was found to be “subversive of the interests of good government”, he narrowly avoided deposition and was instead temporarily suspended (Edwards, Willan, & Storr, 1957, pp. 23-29, 73-24).

The current paramount chief is PC Kasangna II, who has been in power since 1993. The chiefdom he rules is structured according to two distinct logics. The standard administrative hierarchy derived from colonial-era legislation (described briefly in chapter one) is in place. However, the chiefdom is also structured according to a Temne hierarchy of pre-colonial origin, made up of kāpar, or ceremonial chiefs. These ceremonial chiefs are chosen by the paramount chief and undergo an extended period of ritual seclusion with him known as kantha before his installation. There are a number of titled positions in the kāpar hierarchy, each with its own set of responsibilities, including ritual responsibilities connected to the death and installation of a new chief (see Simpson (1968, p. 57), Vernon Dorjahn (1960, p. 113) and Kenneth Wylie (1977, pp. 31-53) for further detail).

The Temne institution of chieftaincy has a mystical dimension which is not shared in the more secular Mende tradition (Biyi, 1913; Ture, 1939; Dorjahn, 1960; Ijagbemi, 1973). E. Adeleye Ijagbemi (1973, pp. 25-26) describes a pattern of mystical linkage connecting each Temne paramount chief to his predecessor in a line

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89 Esu Biyi (1913, pp. 198-199) and Vernon Dorjahn (1960, p. 112) note that there are important differences between ‘Muslim’ and ‘society’ chiefdoms. In the former, sub-chiefs bear the title alimamy rather than kāpar. Bombali Sebora is a ‘society’ chiefdom.
stretching back to the first king Bai Farma Tami, a Fula man who once ruled over all Temne people, but returned to Fuuta Jalon (across the border in Guinea) at his death. Each man selected to be paramount chief is required to undergo a process of transformative preparation before his installation. An account of the installation process in Makari chiefdom documents three stages: an annointing ceremony; the performance of rites by the former chief’s kápor and the selection of new kápor; and a period of seclusion (often lasting many months) known as kantha along with those he has chosen, during which the chief learns about his chiefdom and his responsibilities as chief (Ture, 1939). During these stages, the prospective chief takes on a series of names symbolising his transformation; it is only once he leaves kantha and is crowned that he takes on his chiefly title. In Bombali Sebora, those I spoke to mentioned a progression from ɔwe-a ley (the one that is meant/intended) following the chief’s election, to ɔsip (the leopard) once he enters kantha, to kombolo (a flying squirrel) in the later stages of kantha.91

In 2009, PC Kasangna had not yet completed the ritual installation process, creating an awkward situation where an interim chief (Pa Rok) and a paramount chief rule concurrently.94 Until the elected paramount chief enters into kantha, he must share the power of the chieftaincy with the kápor or ceremonial chiefs of the former paramount chief, in particular Pa Rok, who rules as interim chief between the death of one paramount chief and the installation of the next. When a chief goes into kantha, he takes those he has selected to serve as his kápor with him. The first among them is Kápor Mosém (guardian of traditions/customs), who is always the prospective chief’s sister’s son—according to several of the chiefs I spoke to, this ensures that women (who cannot become paramount chiefs in the North) have their own share in the chieftaincy. On the death of the chief, Pa Mosém becomes Pa Rok, an interim

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90 There has been a Fula presence in Sierra Leone since the 17th century, with the majority of Fula originating from Fuuta Jalon in Guinea. A permanent Fula settlement in Freetown was established in the early 1800s. Other areas of settlement included Bombali District, Tonkolili District, Kailahun District and Pujehun District (Jalloh, 1999, pp. 1-10).
91 These discussions were somewhat incidental and therefore this may not be a comprehensive list of the names a chiefly candidate takes on during his transformation.
92 The rest of this account is based on fieldwork in 2009 and uses the present tense to describe events at that time.
93 This is the common usage English spelling, so I do not italicize.
94 According to his Facebook page, PC Kasangna did enter kantha in 2011, and has now been crowned in accordance with Temne custom.
ruler who plays a significant role in the burial rites of the former chief and the installation of the new chief.⁹⁵

As he has not yet entered *kantha*, Kasangna is a paramount chief in the eyes of the government, but he is not a full chief according to Temne custom; a number of chieftdom elders emphasized to me that he is still *ɔwe-a leŋ* (the one that is meant/intended). Pa Rok retains certain powers, including the right to operate the main chieftdom barri (where cases are heard) and oversight of the *kápor* and the chieftdom’s sodalities (secret societies) (see chapter six). He also plays a critical role during the installation of a new paramount chief. Pa Rok’s presence ensures the continuity of the “mystic chain” (Ture, 1939, p. 95) of chiefs—he is the human link which connects one paramount chief to another. However, the delay in PC Kasangna going to *kantha* creates risks for the renewal of the chieftaincy in its Temne form. The former chief’s *kápor* are dying out and cannot be replaced and Pa Rok himself could die before PC Kasangna enters *kantha*, undermining a sense of continuity.

Many different explanations are given for Kasangna’s failure to enter *kantha*. His critics say that he is afraid because he violated chiefdom laws during the election and that if he goes to *kantha* he will die there, presumably as a consequence of supernatural forces. In contrast, the account given by Kasangna and his allies suggests that the attorney general, the son of the former paramount chief, is blocking his ability to enter *kantha* because it will undermine his influence over the chieftdom, exercised through Pa Rok and the other *kápor*. A further possibility is that Kasangna is reluctant to commit to a period of several months in *kantha*, which could result in him having to relinquish his position as one of the paramount chief representatives in parliament.

There are further tensions in Bombali Sebora over the practice of rotation of the chieftaincy between clans or ruling houses observed in most Temne chiefdoms (Dorjahn, 1960, pp. 126-127).⁹⁶ In Bombali Sebora, there are four ruling houses which all belong to the Kamara clan: Petbana Marank, Petbana Masimbo, Maboleh

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⁹⁵ If *Pa Məsom* dies before the paramount chief, the chief selects a *Kápor Bana* who will take on the role of Pa Rok in his stead.

⁹⁶ The practice of rotation is not unique to Temne chieftaincies. In some cases, rotational agreements were created when colonial amalgamations took place. For example, see Fanthorpe et al (2009, pp. 32-33).
and Mabureh. Historically, they have taken turns in holding the chieftaincy\(^\text{97}\) and in any given election local custom dictates that only the descendants of the relevant ruling house should compete in earnest. PC Kasangna from Maboleh ruling house was reportedly elected ‘out of turn’ in the rotational cycle, breaking with this custom. There were clear dividing lines between the ruling houses over the events which transpired during the election. Those I spoke to from Petbana Masimbo (which was passed over) and Mabureh (which would follow Maboleh if rotation were observed) argued that there was a clear custom of rotation, but this was overcome through the intervention of the NPRC military regime in favour of Michael Kamara (who later became PC Kasangna II). Michael Kamara’s wealth was also seen as key to his success, as it enabled him to spend generously in order to mobilize chieftain councilors and to pay the 1,000,000 Le (£190) fee required to ‘buy’ the ballot boxes. His main rival from Petbana Masimbo reports that he could not afford this sum and was forced to drop out of the running; his subsequent petitions to NPRC and SLPP governments were fruitless. This is perhaps unsurprising, as Kasangna is perceived locally as a staunch supporter of the SLPP; while he denies this, he acknowledges that his failure to campaign actively for the APC in 2007 disappointed President Koroma, particularly as Koroma’s father was instrumental during Kasangna’s own election to the chieftaincy.

Those from Maboleh (house of the current chief) and Petbana Marank (house of the previous chief) argued that the rotational system was no longer in effect at the time of the last election, as it had been undermined by the claim of chiefly descendants from obsolete chiefdom Konta Bai Siari\(^\text{98}\) that they had the right to compete in elections in Bombali Sebora (although to my knowledge this claim had not yet been fully recognized by chiefdom elders). Representatives of both Maboleh and Petbana Marank said that there was little protest from other ruling houses during the last election, highlighting a post-election letter to the district commissioner signed by all ceremonial chiefs which confirmed their support for Michael Kamara. Looking

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\(^{97}\) Although local accounts describe a lapse of 48 years when the chiefdom crown was stolen; Simpson (1968, pp. 47-48) puts this as occurring in the second half of the nineteenth century.

\(^{98}\) According to PC Kasangna, Konta Bai Siari was absorbed into Bombali Sebora and Paki Masabong chiefdoms during the colonial period. He believes that there was no formal amalgamation agreement and therefore descendants of Konta Bai Siari’s chiefs have not been considered eligible to stand for election in either of these chiefdoms. The Sierra Leone Protectorate Handbook (1960) documents an amalgamation of Bombali Sebora and Bombali Siari in 1949 with the name Bombali Sebora persisting as the name of the new amalgamated territory.
forward, it is not clear whether rotation will continue to be practised—representatives of three out of four ruling houses said that they believed that the next election would be open to candidates from all ruling houses.99

This description of Bombali Sebora chiefdom is broadly consistent with the literature on central-local relations describing the prevalence of ‘double politics’ (Minikin, 1973; Barrows, 1976; Tangri, 1976, 1978a). Opponents’ accounts of the election suggest that the NPRC government played a significant role in assuring PC Kasangna’s election, and he appears to have subsequently formed a reciprocal relationship with the ruling SLPP government. This has placed him in an awkward position with the current APC government (and his own subjects) which is likely to require some renegotiation. While central intervention in chiefdom affairs is evident, struggles for control and influence are played out in the context of local institutions. PC Kasangna’s rivals accuse him not of bad government, but of violating long-standing customs. While PC Kasangna appears to have been successful in riding rough-shod over chiefdom rules regarding rotation of the chieftaincy, he has not been so lucky when it comes to practices around initiation and crowning of a chief. This account emphasizes the resilience of a characteristically Temne form of chieftaincy—the hierarchy of kàpør and the practice of kantha discussed are a prominent feature of accounts of Temne chieftaincy in the nineteenth century (Ijagbemi, 1973; Wylie, 1977, pp. 31-53). Wylie (1977, p. 212) argues that the preservation of Temne institutions played a protective role during the decades of colonial government, allowing Temne people “some dignity and some identity”. While the present manifestations of these institutions are, of course, much changed, they continue to materially shape the power and authority of the chief. PC Kasangna’s delay in going to kantha means that he must share power with a rival and his patron, and cannot oversee the chiefdom’s main barri or the sodalities—both activities that carry a significant degree of local legitimacy. Thus while central support may have enabled PC Kasangna to obtain and hold the position of paramount chief, he cannot easily brush away the consequences of not adhering to local rules.

99 The 2009 Chieftaincy Act states that in amalgamated chiefdoms, elections will be conducted on a rotational crowning basis. It is not clear what this will mean yet given the particular history of amalgamation in Bombali Sebora.
4.3 Survey findings: Local perceptions of public goods provision

In chapter one, I set out the methods used to conduct a survey of senior representatives of households. Here, I set out the findings. First, I establish the main characteristics of the respondent group. I then set out respondents’ views of LGAs’ performance as public goods providers, considering how far they support my case selection. Finally, I present some data on respondents’ views on the nature and extent of LGAs’ power.

i) Respondent characteristics

The final dataset analyzed (n=272)\(^{100}\) was made up of 47 percent male and 53 percent female senior representatives of households. They varied in age from 18 to 88, with a mean age of 37.4 years (SD=14.0). Current life expectancy in Sierra Leone stands at 47.8 years (United Nations Development Programme, 2011). The women interviewed were on average younger than the men, with a mean age of approximately 35 years, as opposed to 40 years for men.

Approximately one third of those surveyed (34%) identified Bombali Sebora as their chiefdom of birth, and can thus be considered ‘indigenes’ of the chiefdom. Of the ‘strangers’ born outside of the chiefdom, 18 percent identified a chiefdom of birth in Bombali District and a further 21 percent identified a chiefdom of birth outside of the district but within Northern Province. Only two percent reported being born in a chiefdom in either Southern Province or Eastern Province. Approximately 20 percent reported that they could not identify their chiefdom of birth\(^{101}\), but could name a district, of whom 75 percent identified a district in Northern Province, 16 percent a district in Eastern Province and 9 percent a district in Southern Province. The majority (69%) of respondents identified as Temnes, while smaller numbers identified as Limba (9%), Fula (9%), Loko (4%), Mandingo (4%) and Mende (1%). Islam was the dominant religion (79% of respondents), but a substantial proportion (21%) of respondents were Christian.

\(^{100}\) As discussed in chapter one, seven respondents were excluded due to concerns about the quality of their responses.

\(^{101}\) This result is surprising given Richard Fantorpe’s (2001) arguments about the “extreme localization of criteria of identity and belonging” (p. 372) in rural Sierra Leone (chapter three). It is possible that the linkage to a chiefdom of birth becomes less critical for those that have permanently relocated to a city. It is also possible that respondents found this question invasive, as it identifies them in a very explicit way.
Thirty-six percent of respondents reported having no formal education within the school system, a further fifteen percent had ended their education at primary level and thirty-one percent at secondary level. Three percent had attended university, ten percent had attended training to be a teacher or nurse, and four percent had attended technical or vocational training. Women had lower levels of education than men. This gap was widest at the extremes; female respondents made up 70 percent of those with no formal education and only 32 percent of those who had completed further or tertiary education.

Respondents were asked whether somebody in their household owned a variety of technological items, including items for managing communications and transport. In terms of communications, a high proportion (80%) of respondents reported household ownership of a mobile phone and a radio, but only 18 percent reported household ownership of a television. This is unsurprising given not only the higher cost of this item, but the lack of a central supply of electricity and low levels of generator ownership, which stood at 20 percent. In terms of transport, 18 percent of respondents reported household ownership of a bicycle and 9 percent household ownership of a motorized vehicle. Just over a quarter (27%) of respondents reported household ownership of at least one high value item (a generator, television or motorized vehicle).

Fifteen percent of respondents lived in a household where a member occupied a position within chiefdom government, including that of paramount or section chief (4%), kàpɔr (ceremonial chief) (3%), sub-chief (5%), chiefdom councillor (10%) or a local court position (1%). No respondent lived in a household where a member occupied a recognized position within local council government, while one percent had a household member who was a ward development committee (WDC) member. All respondents who counted a WDC member among the members of their household also had a household member who served within chiefdom government.

**ii) Public goods provision led by MCC**

The questionnaire first probed respondents’ views of the positive contributions made by MCC in an open-ended way in order to situate the cases of interest in the
The five positive contributions most frequently identified by respondents were cleaning the city (73%); constructing/maintaining the drainage system (58%); constructing/maintaining roads (33%); constructing/maintaining the new council building (16%); and providing market facilities (16%). When asked to identify the single best thing the council had done, cleaning the city was the clear leader (41%), while maintaining the drainage system lagged behind in second place (20%). Only seven percent of respondents identified constructing/maintaining the slaughterhouse as a positive contribution and only one percent considered it the best thing the council had done.

In response to a similar open-ended probe about areas in which the council had failed to perform, the five areas of failure most frequently identified were providing a water supply (45%), constructing/maintaining roads (43%), providing electricity (36%), cleaning the city (28%) and constructing/maintaining the drainage system (22%) (table 4.3.1). When asked to identify the most important thing MCC had failed to do, providing a water supply (18%) and electricity (15%) topped the list, with only eight percent of respondents identifying the cleaning effort. Very few respondents identified the construction and management of the slaughterhouse as an area of poor performance (2%) and even fewer (1%) considered it MCC’s most important failure.

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102 When coding responses, I created a response category if a minimum of six respondents (2.2%) considered the area either a success or a failure. All other responses were coded as ‘other’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Success* (n=247)</th>
<th>Failure** (n=259)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean the city</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct/maintain the drainage system</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct/maintain roads</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct/maintain new council building</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide market facilities</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collect revenue</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct/manage slaughterhouse</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct/maintain other buildings</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide water supply</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide educational facilities/services</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry out public health activities</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide medical facilities/services</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Behave transparently/accountably</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintain public order</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide electricity</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate employment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control commodity prices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construct clocktower</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide personal advice and support</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Renovate stadium</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage the council administration effectively</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide support for agriculture</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents were asked: “From 2004 when it was established until now, what good things has the new Makeni City Council done for the city”? “Frɔ 2004 we den briŋ dis nu Makeni Siti Kawnsil until naw, wetin na di gud tiŋ den we yu fil se Makeni Siti Kawnsil don du fɔ di siti?”

**Respondents were asked: “From 2004 when it was established until now, what has Makeni City Council failed to do the city”? “Frɔ 2004 we den briŋ dis nu Makeni Siti Kawnsil until naw, wetin na di tiŋ den we yu fil se Makeni Siti Kawnsil nɔ du fɔ di siti?”
Respondents were also asked to assess their satisfaction with the cleaning effort on a four-point scale (1=very unsatisfied, 2=unsatisfied, 3=satisfied, 4=very satisfied). More than three-quarters of respondents reported that they were either satisfied (64%) or very satisfied (12%). The median satisfaction score was 3, or ‘satisfied’, and the mean satisfaction score was 2.81 (SD=0.73). Women (M=2.85, SD=0.75) were more satisfied than men (M=2.77, SD=0.71); those aged 35 and below were more satisfied (M=2.94, SD=0.66) than those aged 36 and above (M=2.67, SD=0.76); and those living in households which owned at least one high value item (M=2.92, SD=0.77) were more satisfied than those living in households which did not (M=2.77, SD=0.72). The only statistically significant difference was in mean scores by age (t(242)=3.07, p<0.01).103

Levels of respondent knowledge of the slaughterhouse were low—22 percent of respondents reported that they had no knowledge of the slaughterhouse and a further 43 percent had heard about it, but never visited. Due to their greater familiarity with its operations, butchers rather than survey respondents were asked to assess their satisfaction with the slaughterhouse. Over 95 percent of the butchers reported being either very unsatisfied (14%) or unsatisfied (82%) with the slaughterhouse facilities provided by MCC. Butchers’ median satisfaction score was 2, or ‘unsatisfied’, and their mean satisfaction score was 1.91 (SD=0.43).

The survey data provide strong support for the choice of a clean market (as one outcome of MCC’s cleaning effort) as a case of relatively successful public goods provision. While responses to the open-ended probe indicated that MCC’s efforts to clean the city were not universally well-regarded, approximately three-quarters of respondents identified the cleaning effort as a success, while approximately one-quarter of respondents cited it as a failure. Over 40 percent of respondents identified it as the single best thing the council had done, while fewer than 10 percent of respondents pointed to it as MCC’s most important failure. Reported satisfaction levels with the cleaning effort were generally high, despite some variation by age and economic status.

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103 The assumption that the data are normally distributed was not met. However, the Student’s t-test is known to be fairly robust to violations of its assumptions. I also carried out a Mann-Whitney U test, which confirmed that the only statistically significant difference in satisfaction scores was by age.
The survey data provide weaker support for the choice of safe meat produced through construction and management of the slaughterhouse as a relative failure. This area of activity did not draw significant attention from respondents either as a success or failure. This can be explained in part by the fact that levels of knowledge about the facility were low. The butchers’ more informed assessment of the slaughterhouse is consistent with my characterization of this case as a relative failure.

iii) Public goods provision led by chiefs

For chiefs, the five positive contributions most frequently cited by respondents were deciding cases (60%), providing personal advice and support (for example, food, loans, monetary gifts) (26%), maintaining public order (for example, upholding laws, keeping the peace, preventing violence and witchcraft) (17%), managing land (9%) and advocating for infrastructural improvements (8%) (table 4.3.2). Deciding cases was identified as the best thing that chiefs do by 45 percent of respondents, a lead of more than 30 percentage points over providing personal advice and support (11%), the next most popular choice. Mobilizing community labour was identified as a positive contribution by seven percent of respondents and five percent of respondents considered it the single best thing that chiefs do.

The five failures most frequently cited by respondents were deciding cases (26%), providing personal advice and support (25%), advocating for infrastructural improvements (15%), providing water (12%) and generating employment (11%) (table 4.3.2). The most important failures reported were deciding cases (14%) and providing personal advice and support (11%), echoing the greatest successes. Mobilizing community labour was identified as a failure by 10 percent of respondents and 5 percent considered it chiefs’ most important failure.

104 There was a higher level of non-response to questions about chiefs than MCC, particularly chiefs’ contributions. For example, 56 percent of respondents answered the question about chiefs’ positive contributions and 75 percent answered the question about their failures, while 91 percent and 95 percent answered the same questions for MCC respectively. This may reflect a number of factors, including lower levels of knowledge about chiefs’ activities, lower levels of positive regard for chiefs and a reluctance to pass judgement on chiefs (although response levels were higher for chiefly failures than successes).

105 I consider deciding cases to be a form of maintaining public order, but I made the decision to separate it out from other related activities due to the high volume of respondents that identified this sub-category specifically.

106 When coding responses, I created a response category if a minimum of six respondents (2.2%) considered the area either a success or a failure. All other responses were coded as ‘other’.

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Notably, respondents (albeit in quite small numbers) appeared to expect chiefs to get involved in a wide range of activities which are currently beyond their official mandate, including providing water (12%), educational facilities and services (9%), roads (9%) and electricity (4%). This may reflect confusion about chiefs’ role in a shifting local government landscape, but could also be interpreted as suggesting a continued appetite for chiefly involvement in local public goods provision despite the introduction of elected local councils.
### Table 4.3.2 Respondents' perceptions of chiefs' successes and failures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive contribution by chiefs</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents identifying as:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Success* (n=151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decide cases</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide personal advice and support</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain public order</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage land</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate for infrastructural improvements</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilize community labour</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean the city</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect revenue</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide information</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate with MCC</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry out public health activities</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide market facilities</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control commodity prices</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide water supply</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate employment</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide educational facilities/services</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct/maintain roads</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behave transparently/accountably</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate for reduced taxes</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide electricity</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate for food</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct clocktower</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents were asked: “What good things do the paramount chief and his sub-chiefs do for the city of Makeni?”/“Wetin na di gud ti di paramount chief di la chif di apa di wok de du fa di siti?”

** Respondents were asked: “What are chiefs failing to do for the city of Makeni?”/“Wetin na tiy den we yu fil se di chif den no du fa di siti?”
When asked to assess their satisfaction with chiefs’ performance in deciding cases, more than 60 percent reported that they were either very satisfied (17%) or satisfied (47%), resulting in a median satisfaction score of 3, or ‘satisfied’, and a mean satisfaction score of 2.69 ($SD=0.90$). In contrast, when asked to assess their satisfaction with chiefs’ performance in mobilizing community labour, more than 60 percent of respondents were either unsatisfied (25%) or very unsatisfied (36%), resulting in a median satisfaction score of 2, or ‘unsatisfied’ and a mean satisfaction score of 2.12 ($SD=1.01$). A paired samples t-test indicated that the difference in mean satisfaction scores for deciding cases and mobilizing community labour was statistically significant ($t(241)=6.97, p<0.01$).

Mean satisfaction scores for each activity were compared by gender, age, whether a member of the household owned a high value item, whether respondents were indigenes of the chiefdom and whether a member of their household was involved in chiefdom government. The results are reported in table 4.3.3. Most of the differences in mean satisfaction scores across the sub-groups compared were small—approximately 0.1 or less. The outliers were the greater satisfaction with chiefs’ performance in mobilizing labour reported by respondents from households which owned one high value item (a margin of 0.24) and respondents who were ‘indigenes’ of the chiefdom (0.21), and the lower satisfaction with chiefs’ performance in deciding cases reported by those involved in chiefdom government (0.22). Using independent samples t-tests, no statistically significant differences were found between means for any of the pairs of sub-groups compared.

107 As above, the assumption of normality was not met. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test also indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between satisfaction scores.

108 As above, the assumption of normality was not met. Mann-Whitney U tests also indicated that there were no statistically significant differences between satisfaction scores for any of the pairs of sub-groups compared.
Table 4.3.3 Mean satisfaction scores for chiefs’ performance in deciding cases and mobilizing community labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th></th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciding cases</td>
<td>2.71 (0.93)</td>
<td>2.66 (0.87)</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing labour</td>
<td>2.06 (1.06)</td>
<td>2.17 (0.94)</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciding cases</td>
<td>2.71 (0.94)</td>
<td>2.69 (0.86)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing labour</td>
<td>2.09 (1.00)</td>
<td>2.15 (1.02)</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High value item</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciding cases</td>
<td>2.76 (0.86)</td>
<td>2.66 (0.92)</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing labour</td>
<td>2.29 (0.94)</td>
<td>2.05 (1.02)</td>
<td>-1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigene</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciding cases</td>
<td>2.78 (0.90)</td>
<td>2.68 (0.87)</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing labour</td>
<td>2.02 (0.95)</td>
<td>2.23 (1.01)</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved in chiefdom government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciding cases</td>
<td>2.50 (0.88)</td>
<td>2.72 (0.90)</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing labour</td>
<td>2.20 (0.98)</td>
<td>2.10 (1.01)</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses

The survey data provide strong support for the choice of public order generated through deciding cases as a success. Deciding cases was the most frequently cited positive contribution made by chiefs (60%), it was identified as the best thing that chiefs do by a clear margin (over 30 percentage points) and the satisfaction scores for this activity were high across a number of different sub-groups. Despite this strong overall performance, a substantial proportion of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with chiefs’ performance in deciding cases—approximately a quarter saw it as an area of poor performance and 14 percent saw it as chiefs’ most important failure.

The survey data provide somewhat weaker support for the choice of community infrastructure produced through chiefly mobilization of community labour as a failure. Small and relatively equal numbers of respondents considered chiefs’ efforts to mobilize community labour a positive contribution (7%) and a failure
(10%). This pattern was repeated in respondents’ choice of mobilization of community labour as chiefs’ best contribution (5%) or most important failure (5%). However, the relatively low satisfaction score generated for this area of activity, which persisted across sub-groups, lends greater support to the characterization of this good as a failure.

iv) Comparative power of MCC and the chiefs

Respondents were also asked to share their views on the power of councils and chiefs, defined as a coercive or disciplining power—“pawa fo kontrol di pipul den/power to control the people” (table 4.3.4). Questions on this topic were intended to provide some insight into popular perceptions of the nature of LGAs’ power and where the balance of power between the council and chiefs lay. Responses to an open-ended question about the sources of power for each category of government actors were strikingly similar. Just over half of the respondents (56%) identified the central government as a source of power for MCC, and close to half (47%) did so for chiefs. This suggests that both sets of government actors are perceived to operate with central backing, and perhaps under central control. At the same time, approximately 40 percent of respondents identified the will of the people, expressed through election or selection, as a source of power for both sets of government actors. This implies that despite the hereditary element of chiefly elections, many respondents perceived the electoral outcome to be a reflection of popular will. Only five percent of respondents specifically identified chiefdom councillors, the individuals who actually vote in chiefly elections, as a source of chiefs’ power. The president was also a frequently cited source of power for both MCC (17%) and chiefs (13%)
Table 4.3.4 Respondents’ perceptions of MCC’s and chiefs’ sources of power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of power*</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents identifying source</th>
<th>MCC</th>
<th>Chiefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The central government</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A higher local authority</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The people, through election or selection</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The people, through their cooperation</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their good actions</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The law</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their ability to inflict punishment</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The APC party</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The president</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mayor</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police and/or the military</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiefs and elders</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiefdom councillors</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-chiefs (including ceremonial chiefs)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition and ceremony</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status as a natural leader</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents were asked: “What gives the Makeni City Council/the paramount chief and his sub-chiefs authority over the people?”/“Wetin yu fil se naim gi di Makeni City Council/di paramount chif en di ɔda chif ɗen we de ep am di pawa fo kɔntrol di pipul ɗen?”

Some respondents reported that MCC and chiefs derive power from one another. This was particularly true for MCC—17 percent of respondents identified chiefs and elders as a source of MCC’s power, while only 7 percent considered MCC to be a source of chiefs’ power. Chiefs were also perceived as having some unique sources of power—14 percent of respondents identified tradition and ceremony as a source of chiefly power, and 3 percent reported that chiefs acquired their power because they were the natural leaders of the people. Relatively few (less than 3%)

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109 Unfortunately, responses were not detailed enough to unpack this category.
considered either the police and/or the military or the youth a source of LGAs’ power, suggesting that neither MCC nor chiefs routinely use these actors to enforce their will.

More than two-thirds of respondents reported that both MCC and chiefs had either strong (42% for MCC and 43% for chiefs) or very strong (29% for MCC and 27% for chiefs) power to control the people. However, a clear majority (63%) agreed that chiefs had more power than MCC, with only a third (33%) reporting that MCC had more power than chiefs and four percent reporting that they had the same level of power. Chi-square tests were carried out to see whether respondents’ assessments of the relative power of MCC and chiefs were affected by their age, sex, household ownership of a high value item, ‘indigene’ status or household involvement in chiefdom government. Only age had a significant effect—60 percent of those aged 35 or under reported that chiefs were more powerful, compared to 72 percent of those aged 36 and above ($\chi^2 (1, n=244)=4.07, p<0.05$).

**Concluding comments**

The brief history of Makeni that I set out here indicates that the poor supply of public goods available in the city is, at least in part, the product of a troubled history with government. Neglected in the colonial period because its export goods were less lucrative and required less investment in supportive technologies, Makeni’s relative underdevelopment remained unaddressed by the SLPP government in the early post-colonial period. The rise of the APC was facilitated by exploiting northern grievances about the poor supply of public goods in the region, yet Makeni’s underdevelopment persisted through decades of APC rule. This history is likely to have resulted in particularly low levels of trust vis-à-vis public goods provision in both central government and those LGAs that have historically served as its agents; the survey data indicate that respondents see a close linkage between central and local authority for both the council and chiefs. While I do not have access to data about levels of trust in Makeni specifically, data presented in chapter one suggest that the levels of trust in LGAs are far lower in Bombali District than in more developed Bo District; chiefs do better than councils by a small margin (Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, pp. 82-84). Low levels of trust make it difficult to raise the revenue necessary to support local public goods provision, and to secure the necessary cooperation from citizens which

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110 The four percent of respondents who reported that MCC and chiefs had the same level of power were excluded from this analysis.
the provision of many local public goods (including those I describe in subsequent chapters) relies upon.

The data set out here provide some insight into why chiefs in Makeni might enjoy greater legitimacy and trust as public goods providers than the city council, despite their long association with a range of exploitative practices. Chiefly government is underpinned by governmental structures of pre-colonial, as well as colonial, origin; as Wylie (1977) suggests, the former are likely to be particularly valued because they invoke a sense of local ownership and pride. Moreover, governmental structures of pre-colonial origin are imbricated with sodalities: powerful social and political institutions in their own right which are usually understood to enjoy significant legitimacy (Richards, et al., 2004). Yet a potentially modest advantage in terms of legitimacy and trust does not mean chiefs have the will or the capacity to provide a full range of local public goods; survey data suggest that popular expectations of chiefs as public goods providers focus in particular on the provision of public order, personalized advice and support, and, to a lesser degree, management of land.

This leaves plenty of scope for the reformed city council to carve out a role as a local public goods provider and survey data suggest that Makeni’s residents are willing to recognize successes when they occur. However, this account supports the view put forward in chapter three that it is important to recognize that the council is not starting afresh, but building on a discredited history of predation and poor performance. While continuity with the pre-reform town council may have escaped the notice of donors, it has not escaped the notice of Makeni’s residents. The re-establishment of familiar routines of behaviour is particularly troubling in this context as they are likely to further deepen mistrust in the council, increasing the barriers it faces in addressing the public goods deficit.
Images

Image 4.1 Makeni’s failed clocktower, October 2009 (author’s photograph)

Image 4.2 Makeni City Council’s new building, October 2009 (author’s photograph)
CHAPTER FIVE: Makeni City Council and Interest-based Associations: Forging Fragile Bargains for Public Goods Provision

In post-war Makeni, interest-based associations—those representing the shared interests of members with a common trade—are widespread.111 Organized and often in control of substantial financial and political resources, these associations are often well-suited to take on coproducive responsibilities. In this chapter, I compare two cases of public goods coproduced by MCC and members of interest-based associations. The first one, a clean market produced through collaborative waste collection and disposal by MCC and members of the Traders’ Union, is relatively successful; the second, a safe supply of meat produced through partnership between MCC and members of the Butchers’ Association to enable inspection of meat at a council-run slaughterhouse, less so.

I use the concept of coproduction to frame the following analysis, drawing on Ostrom’s (2005) IAD framework to flesh out the dynamics of the coproducive relationships (as discussed in chapter two). I describe the process through which each good is coproduced, identifying the key rules underpinning coproduction. I then identify the main differences which provide an explanation for the performance gap between the two cases (section 5.1). Following this, I set out the main incentives and deterrents which influence the willingness of MCC and members of interest-based associations to follow the rules of coproduction (sections 5.2 and 5.3). The range of incentives and deterrents influencing actors’ behaviour is large, and I do not attempt to describe them all. Instead, I focus my attention on the small number which seem to exert the greatest influence. These incentives and deterrents are shaped by important features of the social and political context (which constitute exogenous variables within the IAD framework).112 Again, these are numerous, and selectivity is required. I pay particular attention to some of the key barriers to local public goods provision (set out in chapter one), namely a political system which provides little motivation for

112 These exogenous variables are considered fixed for the purposes of analysis of the action situation, in this case each set of coproducive arrangements.
local councils to provide public goods; a public sector characterized by intense resource scarcity; and poor citizen trust in local councils.

5.1 Two cases of council-led coproduction

i) MCC and the traders: coproducing a clean market\textsuperscript{113}

Cleaning the city is not a devolved function recently assigned to MCC\textsuperscript{114}; it was formally declared a council responsibility by the Townships Act (1959), which provided the legal basis for expanding the presence of urban councils in Sierra Leone. Makeni’s council workers and residents describe significant fluctuations in cleaning efforts over the years, dependent on political will, access to resources, and public cooperation. Here I focus on MCC’s efforts to clean one strategic site in the city, the main market, through cooperation with the traders, who are represented by the Makeni branch of the Sierra Leone Traders’ Union, known locally as the Traders’ Union (the TU).

At MCC, responsibility for cleaning the city lies with a small health department led by two health workers who have been with MCC for over a decade: an environmental health officer (EHO) on assignment from the Ministry of Health and a senior health aide.\textsuperscript{115} Although the EHO is the senior staff member, he plays only a limited role in waste management activities. The health aide is the direct supervisor in this area; it is his job to hand out assignments to waste collection workers each morning and to monitor their activities. MCC owns a modest fleet of vehicles, but a number of them are usually out of service at any time. In May 2009, MCC was operating with six motorized tricycles and one large rear-loading rubbish truck, which had recently returned from being repaired, while a further five motorized tricycles and a small tractor were out of service.\textsuperscript{116} By August 2009, only three tricycles were working, but maintenance was underway. The vehicles are managed by one truck

\textsuperscript{113} The following description is based primarily on observational and interview data collected during a month-long intensive period of fieldwork focused exclusively on waste collection in May 2009, as well as follow-up observational and interview data collected between June and September 2009. I use the present tense to describe the status quo at that time.

\textsuperscript{114} As discussed in chapter four, before Makeni was declared a city in 2006, MCC was called Makeni Town Council. For simplicity’s sake, I use the name MCC to refer to all incarnations of the council in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{115} The Ministry of Health is a simplified name. The EHO is paid through the Ministry of Health. The job title ‘senior health aide’ is taken from the MCC budget for 2009-11. Health staff tend to use job titles flexibly, usually referring to themselves as public health officers or health inspectors.

\textsuperscript{116} This represents a big improvement on the situation in 2004 when the ‘new’ council took office. At this time, only the small tractor was available.
driver, a team of five tricycle riders and five tricycle assistants who ride with them, known as their ‘mates’. Their efforts are supplemented by a team of eight labourers, four of whom are assigned to the market and other central areas of town.

The LG Act (2004) established a chief administrator (CA) at each local council to act as its administrative head and to implement decisions made by MCC’s political representatives: the mayor and the fifteen councillors. The CA works with the finance team to make funds available for fuel, vehicle maintenance and salaries. Waste collection workers engage in a daily struggle to secure fuel and on occasion maintenance and salary payments are delayed for several weeks, even months. However, a minimum flow of resources is always maintained by MCC so that waste collection can continue. The mayor appears to be more active than the CA in supervising the activities of the health department, despite the fact that his role is intended to focus more on agenda-setting than implementation. On one occasion, he personally disciplined workers in response to complaints that they had been asking for payments for household waste collection, which carried weight because he had already fired one tricycle rider and his mate for transporting private goods in their tricycle. According to one of the waste collectors, the mayor also tries to counteract the negative effects of weak cash-flow by providing fuel money from his own pocket when needed, instructing the workers, “Make the city shine like a mirror.”

The councillors sit on committees overseeing each service delivery area. The committees have a mandate to monitor performance and finances and report back to the council with recommendations. In general the committees are weak: they meet infrequently, lack access to appropriate information, fail to keep records of their meetings and rarely make substantive recommendations. The chairlady for the health and sanitation committee was suffering from a long-term illness during the period of study and therefore that committee was particularly inactive. This appeared to cause little to no disruption to waste collection activities by MCC, which suggests that the committee’s inputs are not critical to the waste collection effort. There have also been several attempts to establish citizen-led waste collection committees, but these have proved unsustainable. In 2006, the health and sanitation committee established a waste collection committee made up of six representatives of each of the city’s three wards to carry out monitoring, but this was no longer active. In May 2009, MCC and UNDP held a meeting to establish a solid waste management committee made up of representatives of interest-based associations, local radio stations and the WDCs
created by the LG Act (2004). To the best of my knowledge, this committee had not met again by September 2009.

The market, which sells food and household goods, lies concealed behind Makeni’s main square. Heading north, a long, narrow street which peels off to the right leads into the most densely populated area of the market. Two dark, congested buildings where traders sell their goods at fixed tables lie on either side of the narrow street, while others sell directly on the street itself, from baskets, wooden stools, or their laps, hoping to capture shoppers before they enter the market buildings. From there, the market sprawl continues to the north and east, thinning in density.

The frequency with which waste is collected in the market fluctuates, depending on the availability of vehicles and fuel. In May 2009, MCC sent vehicles to the market every morning to collect waste, but by August 2009, this had dropped to three mornings per week. The large rubbish truck struggles to make its way down the narrow street which runs through the market, forcing the street traders (who are acting against MCC instructions by trading there) to snatch up their goods and edge backwards to the sides of the street. A small number of tricycles support the truck’s efforts by collecting waste from the outskirts of the market, before heading off to cover other areas of the city. This waste is then transported to a number of sites outside the city limits\textsuperscript{117} and burned.

MCC’s waste collection activities are heavily reliant on traders’ efforts to gather waste for collection. On my first day observing waste collection in the market, I watched traders on the outskirts of the market setting up for the day. A middle-aged woman dressed in a white tank-top and a blue wrapper and a man in a football t-shirt swept the breadth of the street leading up to the market with palm-leaf brooms, eventually depositing neat piles of waste next to a tricycle parked on the road before returning to their stalls. This is a typical scene; for most traders in this part of the market, preparing waste for collection in the areas where they work is part of their daily routine.

Inside the market buildings, gathering waste is more labour-intensive. The buildings are dark, the aisles between the tables are narrow, and the spaces under the tables fill up with bags and baskets of goods for sale. Waste, much of it organic,

\textsuperscript{117} I refer to sites that fall beyond the colonial-era administrative boundary of the city. Most of them are in peri-urban areas.
accumulates quickly during the day as sales are made. According to MCC waste collection workers, two of the riders’ mates come to the market at five o’clock in the morning a few times a week to sweep out the market space. It was difficult to confirm the frequency at which this was happening, but it was not sufficient to keep the market buildings free of waste. The traders sweep the market buildings themselves, as well as making voluntary contributions to young men to act as additional market sweepers.

MCC periodically organizes general cleaning days when all residents of the city are expected to join with MCC, the army and the police to tackle standing waste. Many people say this practice was first introduced during the military regime of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) (1992-96), while others argue that it dates back beyond that. While MCC claims that these cleanings occur every month, in practice they take place closer to once every two to three months, and often serve as preparation for an important event in the city, such as a presidential visit or party political event. On general cleaning days, traders’ contribution to cleaning the market is particularly apparent. When I visited the market early in the morning on a cleaning day, I found that it was closed for trade, with the usual intense buzz of buying and selling replaced with vigorous cleaning. Near the entrance, a young man was standing inside one of the deep gutters that lined the streets for drainage purposes, digging out a pile of slime-covered, rotting rubbish and mud. Similarly green piles of waste had been deposited along the edge of the gutter behind him. The rubbish truck was parked in the middle of the street and a steady flow of women and children hurried towards it, emptying baskets, buckets and other containers. Three to four hours passed before the cleaning effort wound down and traders could return to business.

Aside from the significant labour inputs traders make to support the waste collection effort, they pay dues and licence fees to the council. In May 2009, those trading at tables paid daily dues of 200 Le (£0.04) per table, while owners of permanent stalls paid annual licence fees which usually fell between 50,000 and 100,000 Le (£9.50 and £19.00). This revenue is not tied to waste collection; it goes into a discretionary account. However, MCC staff said that these funds were sometimes used to cover fuel and workers’ salaries and therefore paying dues can be considered a further trader input into the cleaning effort. In August 2009, the CA told me that MCC was currently negotiating with the TU to increase market dues to 400
Le (£0.08) per table. In November 2009, traders began to pay an increased rate of 300 Le (£0.06) per table following the completion of negotiations.\textsuperscript{118}

It seems inevitable that some traders are free-riding\textsuperscript{119} by failing to contribute labour or money towards the cleaning of the market, but this was not a complaint made by respondents, either MCC representatives or traders, suggesting that levels of free-riding are generally low. However, MCC workers do complain about destructive behaviours demonstrated by a small number of traders, including bringing household waste into the market and dumping it there for collection and obstructing the council’s rubbish truck in its efforts to travel down the narrow street through the market.

Nobody I asked could give a recent example of the former offence, but an incident occurred in August 2009 when a group of traders fought with the truck driver after he crushed one woman’s goods on the market street, even throwing stones at the vehicle, according to some reports. This was dealt with swiftly through the imposition of fines on the violating traders.\textsuperscript{120} Dues are collected daily by a team of privately-contracted dues collectors. Disputes between the dues collectors and traders in the market are relatively common, but resolved quickly, often through the intervention of a market chief.\textsuperscript{121} MCC’s 2009-11 budget estimates compliance with market dues payments at 95 percent.\textsuperscript{122} Despite instances of conflict, for the most part traders seem to be contributing their labour and paying their dues.

This description suggests a small number of essential rules underpinning the coproduction of a clean market by MCC and the traders. On MCC’s side, MCC must provide vehicles to collect waste on a regular basis. On the traders’ side, traders must gather waste for collection, pay market dues or annual licence fees and ensure that they do not obstruct MCC’s collection efforts. The monitoring and enforcement arrangements for these rules are discussed in greater detail below. A fuller categorization of rules and norms governing the coproduction of a clean market are set out in table 5.A.1, attached as an annex to this chapter.

\textsuperscript{118} I am grateful to my research assistant Edward Kanu for providing this information after my departure from Makeni.
\textsuperscript{119} See chapter one for further discussion of free-riding.
\textsuperscript{120} My attempts to pinpoint exactly who had imposed the fine were unsuccessful.
\textsuperscript{121} I describe the role of market chiefs in section 5.3.
\textsuperscript{122} I include budget estimates in my analysis, but I suggest that they be treated with some caution. I do not have sufficient information about the budgeting process used by MCC to be confident that the estimates included in the budget are realistic.
ii) MCC and the butchers: coproducing safe meat

The new slaughterhouse in Makeni was constructed in 2004, replacing an older, open-sided structure at the same site. It was funded by a Local Government Development Grant in accordance with the Rapid Results Approach, which required that councils use the grant money for projects that could be completed within 100 days, in order to build immediate trust in their capacity to deliver public goods (Kanu, 2009). The new building was spacious, consisting of a slaughtering hall, a holding area for cattle, an inspection area with two tiled counters, a cool room, an office, two toilets and a bathroom. By 2009, the slaughterhouse had fallen into a state of disrepair, with cracks and crevices in the concrete floor of the slaughtering hall in which blood congealed; loose or missing hooks for securing cattle; damage to the metal roof from the vultures that gathered there each morning; and a broken door. On its opening, the slaughterhouse was equipped with a generator and two freezers, but the generator broke within a year and was never repaired, and the freezers were eventually relocated to MCC’s staff canteen. Running water was originally supplied by Sierra Leone’s water parastatal, but this ceased after pipe damage occurred during roadwork. Construction of a well began with the support of an international NGO, but was never completed. By June 2009, the only water source available to the slaughterhouse was a small stream that ran behind the building.

Like waste collection, management of cattle slaughtering was declared a council responsibility by the Townships Act (1959), and is the responsibility of the health department. The EHO, the senior staff member, takes care of day-to-day supervision. He comes to the slaughterhouse almost every morning at six o’clock to inspect the meat after slaughter. He is joined by a supernumerary policeman attached to MCC, who collects the slaughtering fee from the butchers, and sometimes by the chiefdom health officer (CHO) for a neighbouring chiefdom, who also fills in as the principal inspector from time to time when the EHO is absent. Two elderly labourers clean the facility every day, one of whom lives in a room at the slaughterhouse, doubling up as a night caretaker.

123 The following description is based primarily on observational and interview data collected during a month-long intensive period of fieldwork focused exclusively on cattle slaughtering in June 2009, as well as follow-up observational and interview data collected between July and September 2009. I use the present tense to describe the status quo at that time.

124 These grants are intended to support development projects designed by local councils in consultation with their constituents.
The CA and the finance team control the flow of resources to the slaughterhouse, which has slowed to a trickle. One of the labourers at the facility showed me a series of handwritten copies of letters that he had submitted to MCC asking them to carry out repairs and provide cleaning supplies, which he said were ignored. The only resource consistently provided by MCC is kerosene for homemade lamps which are used to light the slaughtering and inspection, a job they do poorly. The EHO claimed that two gallons of kerosene are provided each month, but one of the labourers stated that he usually receives only one gallon, which is inadequate. Only very minimal cleaning supplies are available; the two labourers clean blood and guts off the slaughtering floor with water, cleaning rags, small brooms and their bare hands. The CA appears to provide little oversight of staff performance. Although the health and sanitation committee is generally inactive, at a May 2009 council meeting one of its members who had taken the initiative to visit the facility said he suspected that there was a gap between the number of cows slaughtered and the slaughtering fees submitted to MCC, and described the maintenance problems at the slaughterhouse, but no further action was taken. Notably, the mayor himself never personally intervened.

There are eleven registered butchers in Makeni, who operate thirteen meat stalls at different locations in the city.\textsuperscript{125} They, or more commonly their assistants, bring their cattle to the slaughterhouse every morning, often travelling quite long distances on foot in the darkness, at some risk from thieves.\textsuperscript{126} During the period of observation, an average of six cows were brought for slaughter each day. At the slaughterhouse, a small group of men and/or boys slaughter each animal by the weak light of MCC’s homemade kerosene lamps and the electric torches they bring along with them, and one of them carries the meat upstairs to the inspection room. The inspector (either the EHO or the CHO) looks over the meat, palpating it and making incisions to identify cysts, abscesses and parasitic infections, amongst other problems, also working in very dim light. He sometimes cuts out infected pieces or holds back an entire organ before returning the remainder to the butcher or assistant, who usually submits to the inspector’s decision without complaint. For each cow slaughtered, the

\textsuperscript{125} The number of registered butchers cited here is based on an interview with the chairman of the BA and the number of stalls on my own observation. In its 2009-11 budget, MCC works on the assumption of only ten licence-paying butchers.

\textsuperscript{126} Following the war, there is no central cattle enclosure in Makeni where butchers can graze cattle. As a result, cattle are transported from different peripheral locations by their owners/owners’ assistants.
butcher or assistant pays 4,000 Le (£0.76) to the supernumerary policeman. Each group then packs their meat up into a wheelbarrow and transports it to the relevant stall, beginning sales immediately.

At a council meeting shortly after the completion of the slaughterhouse in December 2004, councillors agreed on 10,000 Le (£1.90) as a reasonable fee for each cow slaughtered and a 10,000 Le (£1.90) monthly fee for each meat stall.\(^\text{127}\) Following negotiations with the butchers in early 2005, this was reduced to 4,000 Le (£0.76) per cow and an annual licence fee of 50,000 Le (£9.50) for their meat stalls. According to the EHO, the CA had subsequently tried to negotiate an increase with the chairman of the Butchers’ Association (the BA), but he was angrily rebuffed because the butchers felt that they were paying for facilities such as electricity and water which were no longer being provided.

Non-attendance at the slaughterhouse can be considered a form of free-riding because those butchers who do not attend the slaughterhouse can benefit from information about outbreaks of cattle disease without contributing towards the costs of surveillance.\(^\text{128}\) It was difficult to assess precisely how many butchers were regularly sending cows to be slaughtered in the slaughterhouse, as slaughtering took place in darkness; butchers commonly sent assistants to slaughter on their behalf; and the frequency at which butchers slaughter a cow varies. Observation suggested that a substantial proportion of the small group of eleven butchers was sending cows to the slaughterhouse regularly and paying the required fees, so this is not a case where non-attendance had reached desperate levels. However, representatives of the council and the Ministry of Health complained about butchers slaughtering outside of the slaughterhouse, identifying two unofficial slaughtering sites—one in the centre of town and one on the outskirts of town. As slaughtering takes place in darkness in the early hours of morning, and because slaughtering outside the slaughterhouse is sensitive, I was unable to observe this practice directly. MCC estimates butchers’ compliance with payment of the slaughtering fee at only 60 percent in their 2009-11

\(^{127}\) Minutes, council meeting, December 20, 2004.
\(^{128}\) Secondarily, they may benefit from any positive effect that the presence of the slaughterhouse has on customer demand for beef. This effect is likely to be slim because it requires that: a) customers assume that butchers use the slaughterhouse, b) customers believe that beef coming out of the slaughterhouse is safer than beef resulting from unsupervised slaughtering, c) customers are concerned enough about meat safety to change their buying habits to purchase more beef and d) customers consider different forms of meat to be substitutable. The survey data discussed in chapter four do not support a) or b).
budget, which is consistent with council representatives’ complaints about non-attendance at the facility (although it is also possible that this estimate reflects the retention of a portion of the slaughtering fee by MCC staff at the slaughterhouse). Butchers’ reports confirmed that slaughtering outside the slaughterhouse did occur with some regularity—approximately one-third of butchers and assistants interviewed said they had slaughtered a cow outside the slaughterhouse since its construction.

In terms of the essential rules which underpin coproduction, it seems that MCC must provide a slaughterhouse facility and the critical operating resources it requires, such as health personnel, electricity, water and a freezer. Butchers must slaughter their cattle in the slaughterhouse, submit to the inspection carried out by the EHO and pay a slaughtering fee. As above, the monitoring and enforcement arrangements for these rules are discussed in greater detail below. The full categorization of rules and norms governing the coproduction of a clean market are set out in table 5.A.2, attached as an annex to this chapter.

**iii) Drawing comparisons**

These accounts of the coproduction of a clean market and a safe supply of meat are consistent with the characterization of the former as a relative success, and the latter as a relative failure. They provide insight into the institutional reasons for this variation in performance, by indicating that the essential rules underpinning coproduction are generally followed by both MCC and the traders in the case of cleaning the market, but are largely disregarded by MCC and only weakly followed by the butchers in the case of the slaughterhouse. Thus the coproductive arrangements for cleaning the market are an example of a relatively functional institution that is producing a regularity of a behaviour, while the coproductive arrangements for providing safe meat are an example of a weak or failing institution that does not exert sufficient influence over participants’ behaviour.

In both cases, the consistency and quality of MCC’s inputs are affected by constrained resource flows. Waste collection suffers from an uneven flow of resources, which means that the level of service fluctuates. The slaughterhouse is being steadily starved of resources, which means that the level of service continually declines. I argue that these different resource allocations are the result of an explicit

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129 I consider this a rule because the butchers do appear to impose sanctions, albeit somewhat weak ones, for a failure to do this. See discussion in 5.3 i) for further detail.
decision by MCC to invest in waste collection and follow the rules which enable cooperation, and an implicit decision to neglect the slaughterhouse.

Both the mayor and the CA informed me that MCC had decided to concentrate on waste collection as their highest priority. Given MCC’s modest resource base, the council is not in a position to tackle larger-scale problems like electricity and piped water, except through partnership with central government. In their eyes, the choice comes down to waste collection and construction of culverts, which are both achievable on a relatively small budget. While the latter had been the previous mayor’s top priority, the current mayor told me that MCC had ceased activity in this area because the Sierra Leone Roads Authority had plans to work on a section of Makeni’s road network. While the decision to prioritize waste collection is not a formal one, documented in MCC’s annual development plan, it is explicit. The mayor’s personal involvement in monitoring this activity and the presence of ongoing resources to fund it indicate that it is backed by real commitment.

The best evidence of the implicit decision to neglect the slaughterhouse is provided by MCC’s persistent failure to act on warnings about the problems occurring there. As early as May 2006, the former chairman of the council\textsuperscript{130} complained at a council meeting about “the inefficient and ineffective supervision of the slaughterhouse which is hazardous in that community”\textsuperscript{131}, yet no further action was taken. A series of letters by an MCC worker to the CA about the need for repairs to the facility were ignored. Information reported at council meetings was not acted upon. Finally, the mayor, who once told me that when he delegates “nothing much happens”, had not intervened personally to improve matters as he had with waste collection.

It is evident that the presence of inputs by members of coproducing interest-based associations is essential to the provision of a clean market and a safe supply of meat. When looking at the monetary inputs, it is clear that the traders are more willing to cooperate than the butchers: the former agreed to an increase in dues, while the latter are resisting a fee hike. When it comes to comparing levels of participation in the cleaning effort and attendance at the slaughterhouse, it is more difficult to draw clear conclusions, due to incomplete information and the variable size of the two

\textsuperscript{130} The position of ‘chairman’ was given the new title of ‘mayor’ after Makeni became a city at the end of 2006.
\textsuperscript{131} Minutes, council meeting, May 5, 2006.
groups; while the number of traders runs into the hundreds, the butchers number only eleven. What is clear is that representatives of MCC perceive free-riding to be a problem in the case of the butchers, but not in the case of the traders; this is reflected both in their comments and in the budget estimates for market dues and slaughtering fees respectively. In addition, the small size of the group of coproducing butchers means that there is a noticeable impact on the safety of the meat supply if even one does not attend—just under 10 percent of the meat available for sale that day will have escaped inspection. In contrast, the cleaning effort in the market is unlikely to be affected by a small number of traders free-riding by refusing to clean; those that do participate are likely to absorb their share of the work. While it would be ideal to have a more precise estimate of how levels of cooperation compare for each group, the data strongly suggest that butchers are less willing to cooperate with MCC than the traders, with more serious consequences.

In the following sections, I dig deeper by looking at the main incentives and deterrents which influence the choices made by MCC and members of interest-based associations. I focus in particular on incentives which vary across the two cases, addressing two questions:

- Why is MCC willing to invest in a clean market and follow the essential rules which enable relatively successful coproduction, while failing to do the same in the case of the slaughterhouse? (section 5.2)
- Why are the TU and its members more willing to cooperate with MCC and follow the essential rules which enable relatively successful coproduction than the BA and its members? (section 5.3)

### 5.2 Incentives and deterrents for MCC

#### i) External funding

Resource scarcity is one of the defining characteristics of the broader political environment in which MCC operates. The council survives predominantly on a range of modest grants from central government, which are backed by donor funding and ‘tied’ to specific categories of expenditure. According to MCC’s 2008 financial

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132 Assuming that each butcher slaughters approximately the same amount of cattle and that the inspection improves meat safety.
statement\textsuperscript{133}, these grants amounted to approximately 647 million Le (£122,900) in 2008, making up 65 percent of MCC’s total recorded income of approximately 996 million Le (£189,200), while own source revenue accounted for only 34 percent. In this context of overall deprivation, one of the most powerful incentives influencing MCC decision-making is access to external funding\textsuperscript{134}. Senior MCC staff are understandably reticent to identify money as a motivation for their actions, but there is substantial circumstantial evidence to suggest that MCC prioritizes waste collection and neglects the slaughterhouse because of the relative financial gain to be had from each.

\textsuperscript{133} I obtained an unofficial electronic copy of this document from MCC.
\textsuperscript{134} I use this term to refer to funds from central government or from donor agencies.
### Table 5.2.1 MCC’s recorded income in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount (millions of Le)</th>
<th>Amount (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-governmental grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General fund (salary and administration)</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>33,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>25,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid waste management</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government Development Grant</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>17,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special health initiatives</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>122,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own source revenue</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>63,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>189,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MCC receives regular injections of resources to support waste collection in the form of a quarterly ‘tied’ grant for solid waste management and ongoing donations of vehicles and equipment. The waste management grant was recorded as approximately 45 million Le (£8,500) for 2008 and was estimated at 105 million Le (£20,000) for 2009. According to MCC staff, vehicles have been donated by the Bishop of Makeni (a tractor, 2004), the Libyan government (a rubbish truck, 2005), central government (six tricycles, 2006) and UNDP in partnership with One World Link (five tricycles, 2009). In August 2009, MCC was expecting a skip truck, 30 skips and a bulldozer, also paid for by UNDP and One World Link. More temptingly, waste collection has the potential to attract large-scale donor investment in the form of cash grants, rather than equipment procured by the donor agency themselves. Since 2004, MCC had been waiting for a sizeable grant from the World Bank to develop a permanent landfill site. “I want to believe the money came and

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135 This table is based on an unofficial copy of MCC’s 2008 financial statement.
136 I obtained this figure from MCC’s 2009-11 budget.
137 Interview with UNDP representative in Makeni, May 28, 2009.
went to wrong hands,” the former mayor told me, suggesting that the Ministry of Health had diverted the funds to the SLPP for electioneering. However, in 2009, the mayor was alerted that over £250,000 in World Bank funds was available for landfill sites in four cities and would be allocated on a first-come, first-served basis. If MCC secured a quarter of this collective fund, the amount received would be equivalent to approximately 30 percent of its annual reported income in 2008. Furthermore, MCC might obtain latitude to manage the money itself, creating greater opportunity for diversion of a portion of the funds.

Since its completion, the slaughterhouse has offered very weak opportunities for financial reward. It is very likely that some portion of the original slaughterhouse budget of approximately 97 million Le (£18,400)\(^{138}\) was returned to MCC staff and political representatives in the form of a kickback from the construction contractor, as this practice is considered routine. It is also quite likely that the anticipation of kickback money influenced MCC’s decision to use the Local Government Development Grant to build a slaughterhouse, as there was no popular pressure, either from the butchers or any other group, to undertake this initiative. The accountant at another local council in the region told me that kickbacks for construction projects are usually negotiated by the finance officers because they are “a technical matter”. He estimated that an average kickback would be a cash payment equivalent to approximately 10 percent of the total contract, which would then be divided between senior staff, with the largest share going to the chairman or mayor of the council. The total reported income from the slaughterhouse in 2008 was approximately 4.3 million Le (£820)\(^{139}\); this amount is unlikely to have even covered the costs of frontline workers and the supply of kerosene, which I estimate at approximately 5.6 million Le (£1,060).\(^{140}\) From the time the slaughterhouse was completed, there has been next to no external interest in the facility, and neither money nor equipment has been

\(^{138}\) This figure was obtained from a dataset of Local Government Development Grants for 2004-07 compiled by the World Bank’s Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP).

\(^{139}\) It should be noted that this figure seems low. During the period of observation, we saw a mean of six cows being slaughtered per day. Based on 355 working days per year, the slaughterhouse should generate 8.5 million Le (£1,620).

\(^{140}\) My estimate is based on salary data from MCC’s 2009-11 budget, and includes 100 percent of the annual salary and benefits for two cleaners (3.9 million Le/£740), 25 percent of the annual salary and benefits for one supernumerary policeman (480,000 Le/£92), 25 percent of the annual salary and benefits for one senior health aide (800,000 Le/£151) and 24 gallons of kerosene at an estimated price of 16,500 Le per gallon (400,000 Le/£75).
forthcoming. MCC has not made any attempt to fundraise for the slaughterhouse, perhaps recognizing its relative lack of saleability to donors.

When MCC receives external funding to support waste management, it comes under pressure to demonstrate a minimum level of results in order to keep the money flowing. This leads MCC to become more dependent on the traders, as the coproducive relationship between MCC and the traders provides a low-cost means to demonstrate results in one of the city’s most visible locations—the market. At the same time, MCC has adequate resources to make sustained contributions to the cleaning effort. Without regular injections of external resources, MCC lacks the capacity and the motivation to invest in the upkeep of the slaughterhouse and allows the facility to deteriorate.

**ii) Political capital**

MCC’s decision to prioritize waste collection in the market can also be explained by its desire to acquire political capital with the traders, who make up one of the most powerful economic blocs in the city. According to MCC records, market dues from those trading at tables totalled approximately 139 million Le (£26,400) in 2008, 14 percent of MCC’s total recorded income and 42 percent of MCC’s own source revenue. Not only do market dues provide a substantial proportion of MCC’s annual income, they are also received on a daily basis and are therefore critical to tiding MCC over when central government grants are delayed. Aside from the valuable income they provide for the city, the traders have a proven capacity to disrupt MCC. This was demonstrated during a period of mounting tension between the TU and MCC which began shortly after the 2004 local elections and culminated in the forced resignation of the first MCC chairman in February 2006. At the heart of this conflict was control of market dues collection. I now briefly describe the main events of this conflict in order to illustrate the character of the relationship between MCC and the TU.

Following the May 2004 local elections, MCC privatized dues collection in the market, awarding the contract to the Dollar Guys, an association of money changers, rather than to the TU.141 The TU’s executive was angered by this decision, believing the TU to be the rightful collector of market dues, and the Dollar Guys

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141 See Anuradha Joshi and Joseph Ayee (2002, 2009) for a related discussion of the use of interest-based associations as tax collectors in Ghana. I discuss this case further in chapter seven.
merely one of the sub-groups falling under its umbrella. The TU allowed dues collection in the market to go ahead, but when a corruption scandal broke against the MCC chairman in late 2005, its executive was more than ready to organize against him.

The scandal centred around the use of MCC’s 2005 Local Government Development Grants. Initial concerns about the quality of the projects\footnote{MCC had undertaken to complete three projects: the construction of culverts (40 million Le/£7,600), the development of a rice farm (65 million Le/£12,400) and the installation of large dustbins at strategic collection points in the city (60 million Le/£11,400). This information was obtained from a dataset of Local Government Development Grants for 2004-07 compiled by the IRCBP.} undertaken with these funds led to an investigation by a civil society grouping which included NGOs, local media and interest-based associations, revealing a significant discrepancy between reported and actual expenditure. In November 2005, *Awoko* newspaper reported that Makeni’s traders were reluctant to pay their dues because of their suspicions about MCC’s involvement in fraud (Anonymous, 2005). In January 2006, the APC party gave the MCC chairman 48 hours to resign from his position and revoked his membership of the party, seemingly anxious about the effects of the scandal on the anti-corruption platform it was promoting in the run-up to the 2007 elections (Anonymous, 2006a). The chairman did not resign, but instead turned towards the ruling SLPP for support. On February 13, 2006 the city’s frustrated residents, including the traders, engaged in a full-day strike. The same day, the SLPP resident minister for the northern region issued an ultimatum calling on the chairman to resign within 24 hours (Anonymous, 2006c). On February 15, 2006, the chairman finally submitted a letter of resignation and stood down (Anonymous, 2006b).

I do not argue that the traders were the main architects of the movement to remove the chairman from power. Bolten (2008) suggests that an older generation of politicians, including the paramount chief, may have been working behind the scenes to orchestrate more visible civil society action, acting in a well-recognized political tradition of concealment (Shaw, 2000; Ferme, 2001). A teacher active in local politics made a similar case to me, arguing that the chairman had angered the paramount chief, the provincial secretary and others by ending a system where market dues were informally shared between a circle of the city’s political ‘big men’, rather than retained for the council alone. “His enemies waited for him to make a mistake and then took it to civil society,” he said. Whether or not the TU was one of the main
strategists behind the effort to remove the chairman, the participation of the traders was critical to achieving his final resignation. In particular, the success of the strike hinged largely on their ability to shut down economic activity in the city and withdraw one of MCC’s most critical sources of income.

The TU’s struggles with MCC did not end with the introduction of a new chairman, but rather entered a new cycle. The TU was finally awarded the contract for dues collection in the market, but quickly fell behind in its payments, and came under suspicion of corruption itself. The chairman of the TU denied these accusations, arguing that the debt reflected diminished revenue resulting from public holidays, cleaning days and seasonal dips in trade. By May 2007, the TU had submitted a letter attempting to revoke their contract for dues collection with MCC\(^{143}\), but their request was not accepted, and by December 2007 the TU’s debt had reached almost 13 million Le (£2,400).\(^{144}\) The July 2008 elections saw the introduction of a new mayor, the third post-reform change in the political leadership of MCC. The contract for dues collection in the market once again returned to the Dollar Guys. While initially MCC seemed set to pursue an aggressive strategy against the TU to recover its debt, proposing the possibility of court action\(^{145}\), later on the matter was quietly dropped. The CA told me, “We need an improved personal relationship. For a traditional Temne man, once you take him to court, he is an enemy for life.” This was in many ways a shrewd move, which went some way to mend fences, but left MCC with leverage over the TU.

In the context of the détente underway between MCC and the TU, MCC’s decision to prioritize cleaning of the market can be viewed as a way to build political capital with the traders and encourage improving relations. The traders constitute a significant source of MCC revenue and a substantial body of political support (or opposition). By performing well in waste collection, MCC can acquire political capital to spend in securing the important financial and political resources controlled by the traders. MCC has arguably already used political capital acquired through collecting waste in the market to negotiate an increase in market dues. MCC has an established channel of support with the TU via its executive, which facilitates the process of spending political capital. However, the desire to acquire political capital

\(^{143}\) Minutes, council meeting, May 23, 2007.
\(^{144}\) Minutes, council meeting, December 13, 2007.
\(^{145}\) Minutes, council meeting, February 11, 2009.
with the traders is a relatively fragile incentive for MCC action. The recent history of MCC’s relationship with the TU suggests that it is prone to episodes of conflict, during which MCC adopts more aggressive or coercive methods to secure access to market revenue.

Relations between MCC and the BA have a far more detached character. When I spoke to the chairman of the BA in June 2009, he told me that he had not met with the mayor at any point during his first year in office to discuss the slaughterhouse. The butchers make only a small contribution to MCC revenue: their slaughtering fees brought in less than one percent of total recorded income in 2008, and at maximum their meat stall fees could have brought in 650,000 Le (£124).146 While 60 percent of the butchers interviewed reported that they were born in Bombali Sebora chiefdom, 80 percent of them identified as Fula, rather than Temne (the ethnic majority). The local reputation of this minority ethnic group is that they are careful to avoid political controversy. One Fula butcher described this cautious approach as the best way to protect one’s property, saying, “You have a vehicle, children, a wife, a business…If you have conflict, you might lose one of those things.”

Historian Alusine Jalloh (1999) argues that throughout the post-independence period, Fulas favoured a pragmatic approach to involvement in politics which consisted of prioritizing their business interests and adapting to changing configurations of power, rather than seeking to shape them. Jalloh finds that despite this business-oriented approach, Fulas suffered as a result of the transition from SLPP to APC rule in 1967-68.147 During 16 years of SLPP rule (1951-67), Fula merchants developed a close relationship with the SLPP leadership, making substantial financial contributions to the SLPP between 1961-67 and supporting the party in the 1967 elections. Their refusal to provide similar support for Siaka Stevens’ 1967 APC campaign led to the harassment of Fulas during the elections and their subsequent alienation from the APC government. Fula attempts to negotiate a better relationship with Stevens’ APC government were set back after Stevens illegally deported Freetown’s Fula chief Alhaji Bah in 1971 to face imprisonment in Guinea at the will of his ally President Touré. In 1975, after extensive Fula lobbying, he was eventually

146 This is an estimate based on licence payments of 50,000 Le for 13 butchers’ stalls. There is no disaggregated data for payments from meat stalls in the 2008 financial statement.
147 The SLPP lost the election in March 1967, but a series of coups and counter-coups took place before the APC finally took office in April 1968.
released and restored to his earlier position. Despite his poor treatment at the hands of the APC, in 1978 Alhaji Bah led a sustained Fula mobilization to secure protection for Fula business interests in exchange for financial contributions to the APC. This troubled political history provides further justification for a contemporary strategy of caution.

Further investigation into the political history of Fulas in Makeni is needed for a fuller understanding of the political dynamics of the relationship between the predominantly Fula butchers and MCC. However, it seems reasonable to draw a preliminary conclusion that the Fula butchers’ cautious profile prevents MCC from fearing disruptive action organized by the butchers. Given this, the BA’s related passivity, and the limited revenue that the butchers bring in for MCC, it is not surprising that MCC sees little incentive to acquire political capital with the butchers through exerting itself at the slaughterhouse.

5.3 Incentives and deterrents for traders and butchers

One explanation for the difference between traders’ and butchers’ level of cooperation with MCC could be the variable benefits which accrue to the executive members of the TU and the chairman of the BA respectively. The mayor told me that MCC had offered to send a percentage of the market dues collected to the TU’s account if they agreed to an increase in the daily rate, some of which would be likely to end up in executive members’ pockets. As far as I am aware, no such offer had been made to the chairman of the BA. Personal profit could be sufficient to motivate the TU executive to renegotiate the rate of market dues on an ongoing basis and make efforts to minimize free-riding, while the lack of personal profit could motivate the chairman of the BA to resist renegotiation of the slaughtering fee and ignore free-riding. However, neither the TU executive nor the BA chairman has sufficient control over the members of their associations to secure their compliance to unpopular measures. The TU’s executive is vulnerable to protest because a group of younger traders is lobbying to take over leadership of the organization, while the BA’s chairman is one of a small group of businessmen who relate on fairly equal terms

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148 Secondary sources on this topic are very limited.
149 There are parallels here with Joseph Ayee and Richard Crook’s (2003) study of public toilets in Ghana. In contrast with the policy wisdom that local associations are suitable advocates for improved services, they find that local associations are frequently not well positioned to challenge local politicians and may suffer retaliation when they do so. See chapter seven for further discussion of this case.
rather than an authority figure to be obeyed at all costs. The TU executive’s confidence in negotiating an increase in market dues is therefore likely to reflect an awareness that traders will be sufficiently receptive to this change, whereas the BA chairman’s refusal to renegotiate the slaughtering fee is likely to reflect an awareness of the mood among the butchers. It is therefore important to look at the incentives/deterrents which motivate the broader membership of interest-based associations.

\[i)\textbf{ Confidence in government reciprocity}\]

One of the main challenges to cooperation between MCC and members of interest-based associations is the poor legacy of local government in Makeni, which is characterized by repeated cycles of corruption and betrayal. Bolten (2008, p. 84) argues that the people of Makeni operate according to a “conflicted narrative of governance”, caught between “hope and cynicism”. The very existence of coproducive arrangements for public goods provision can be viewed as an expression of hope by members of interest-based associations. However, cynicism prevents members of interest-based associations from contributing freely to public goods provision without direct evidence of government reciprocity.

Writing from a psychological perspective, Linda Molm, David Schaefer and Jessica Collett (2007, p. 199) define positive reciprocity as “the giving of benefits to another in return for benefits received”. They argue that acts of positive reciprocity convey two distinct dimensions of value to the recipient. First, the instrumental value, which is the value to the recipient of the material benefits received from the reciprocator. Second, the symbolic value, which is the value conveyed by the act of reciprocity itself through the information it provides about the partner and the relationship. As discussed in chapter two, there is experimental evidence to suggest that many people have a preference for reciprocity which is based on its symbolic value, rather than its instrumental one; in numerous games, experimental subjects have demonstrated willingness to reward generous behaviour and punish selfish behaviour, even though delivering the reward or punishment comes at a net cost to themselves (Camerer & Fehr, 2004, p. 56). Molm et al argue that on a symbolic level, acts of positive reciprocity can build trust in the reciprocator. According to this theory, positive reciprocal behaviour by MCC would ameliorate the baseline level of
low trust between MCC and its citizens over time, while negative reciprocal behaviour would communicate disregard and erode trust further.

In general, traders are more willing to contribute to the cleaning of the market than butchers are to the operations of the slaughterhouse because they are relatively confident that MCC will reciprocate their efforts. There is no formal contract which lays out the inputs that MCC and the traders will make to the cleaning effort. The coproductive relationship works through daily reciprocal exchange—the traders gather waste and MCC collects it. If MCC fails in its obligations to collect waste, the traders can reduce or cease their efforts to gather it, acting individually or collectively. Traders do not consistently impose sanctions against MCC for poor performance, but they have done so in some instances. Bolten (2008, p. 83) describes just such an episode of negative reciprocity in mid-1996, when residents heaped up rubbish at the market and on main roads to protest against the lack of waste collection.

This daily model of exchange can be described as a form of in-built monitoring which enables cooperation in spite of generally low levels of trust. The traders have accurate information about whether MCC is collecting waste and a range of responses at their disposal. As a result, they need not fear being duped by MCC. Over time, it seems likely that if the pattern of positive reciprocity this in-built monitoring enabled were to persist, the symbolic value conveyed would begin to increase traders’ trust in MCC. However, I did not find any clear evidence that trust was growing. For example, the TU chairman remained acutely aware of the threat of earlier court action:

Well, the council, we are waiting and listening, we are listening to them. We are listening to what they say, what they do. Because, before, the other man told me that they have written that they will take us to court, take the union to court for what we owe…if they take us to court, then they are doing us wrong, they are forgetting all the good we have been doing for them…150

In addition, conversations with traders in the market yielded mixed results: some were appreciative of the council’s efforts in cleaning, while others were resentful of past wrongs.


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The butchers agreed to pay a slaughtering fee of 4,000 Le (£0.76) per cow and an annual licence fee of 50,000 Le (£9.50) per meat stall on the understanding that MCC would provide a fully-staffed slaughterhouse facility with running water, electricity and a freezer. While this agreement requires an element of daily exchange, with MCC providing fuel and staff and butchers attending and paying fees on a daily basis, it also requires MCC to make longer-term investments to maintain the buildings and equipment. It was difficult for the butchers to monitor whether MCC was investing sufficiently in maintenance at first, but MCC’s persistent failure to fix the damaged water pipes or the broken generator sent a clear message that they would not fulfil their agreed commitments.

The butchers perceived this as a significant breakdown in reciprocity. In the words of the chairman of the BA:

…they built the slaughterhouse, brought water, made all the facilities, gave them to us, they even bought us a freezer, but that was all for one month, two months…After that, nothing. They gave us electric light there, in the mornings when we go to slaughter, but right now nothing…That is finished. But any cow that we kill over there, we pay 4,000 Le (£0.76) per cow, we are paying for the council, the city. 151

The EHO reported that during the last meeting with the butchers: “they were really angry because they said they are paying and they are not enjoying the facilities they are paying for.” While I was observing at the slaughterhouse, butchers approached me to complain about the “shameful” facility; a common point made by butchers was that the place had been built to a good standard, but had deteriorated. The emotional tone of many of these reactions suggests that the butchers were responding to the disregard conveyed by MCC’s actions (the symbolic value of reciprocity), as well as the loss of material benefits (the instrumental value of reciprocity), but it is difficult to tease these two dimensions apart.

The most dramatic possibility open to the butchers in terms of demonstrating negative reciprocity would be an outright refusal of cooperation, either by refusing to pay the slaughtering fee or refusing to attend the facility. However, this would involve a direct confrontation with MCC; an outcome the reticent butchers would prefer to avoid (as discussed in section 5.2). I consider the BA’s refusal to

151 “…dem bild di slawta, briy wata, du ɔl di fasiliti dem, gi wi dem, briy ivin friza dem ɔt da ɔl na wan mɔnt, tu mɔnt…Natin egen. Dem bìn gi wi layt de, na mɔnin we wi de go fɔ go slawta, ɔt rayt nɔw natin…Da dɔn dɔn. ɔt eni kaw we wi de kil yanda, wi de pe wan kaw fɔ tawzın liyons, na wi de pe fɔ di kansul, di sitt.”
countenance an increase in the slaughtering fee and perhaps also the reluctance of some butchers to consistently slaughter at the slaughterhouse as more moderate forms of punishment for MCC’s rule-breaking behaviour. It is for this reason that I describe the prescriptions governing MCC’s behaviour at the slaughterhouse as rules, rather than norms.

**ii) Self-enforcement of cooperative behaviour**

MCC is in a weak position to carry out monitoring and enforcement of the rules governing trader and butcher inputs into coproduction because it lacks both the necessary human resources, and a clear basis for action. Official MCC rules applying to management of the market and the slaughterhouse are derived principally from older legislation, and are not well-known by all MCC representatives; MCC has not yet passed its own bye-laws.\(^{152}\) While MCC representatives describe making intermittent interventions against more extreme rule violations, such as an attack on a rubbish truck or persistent unsupervised slaughtering by a particular butcher, they do not act on more routine rule-breaking such as low daily effort in cleaning the market or periodic absences by butchers in general.

In the market, there are multiple layers of self-regulation operating independently of MCC which help to encourage cooperative behaviour as regards the cleaning effort. First, there are three market chiefs whose principal role is to resolve disputes between traders in the market. The position of market chief is integrated within the chiefly hierarchy; the market chiefs are approved by the paramount chief and act under his authority. However, market chiefs are also executive members of the TU. Aside from resolving disputes, market chiefs, two of whom trade in the market themselves\(^ {153}\), act as monitors and trouble-shooters. One of the market chiefs described his role: “to monitor the activities of the people, to listen and observe their movement”\(^ {154}\). Their very presence therefore helps maintain orderly behaviour. Market chiefs do not perceive themselves to have any specific responsibility for cleaning of the market, which is considered to fall within MCC’s purview. Nevertheless, on general cleaning day, the market chiefs can be seen walking up and

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\(^{152}\) The LG Act (2004) empowers MCC to create its own bye-laws, but this process has lagged. Suggested bye-laws were not submitted to the CA until February 2009 following which they must be sent to Freetown for review by the attorney general’s office. (Notes from council meeting, February 11, 2009)

\(^{153}\) The third is now elderly and acts more as an adviser.

\(^{154}\) Translated from Temne.
down the narrow street through the market, overseeing traders’ efforts, listening to their complaints and offering encouragement. Market chiefs are also likely to be among the first to know about problems like free-riding, conflict between traders and waste collectors, and the accumulation of standing waste, and are drawn into efforts to resolve such issues.

Traders also regulate each other through normative pressure. Traders usually sell in the same spaces every day, which makes their behaviour highly visible to each other. In many cases, traders are operating alongside peers selling the same kind of goods. They are not only each other’s neighbours, but each other’s creditors, lending money or goods when needed. They also belong to sub-groups of the TU, for example, the Fish Sellers’ Association, or the Cigarette Sellers’ Association, each with its own chairperson. If traders do not follow rules such as sweeping their areas each day, or contributing for additional sweepers, they are likely to be sanctioned by social disapproval which could damage their reputation and interrupt their access to intra-group benefits. Conversations with traders suggest that expressions of social disapproval are usually quite mild, with persuasion emerging as the most common first response to a neighbour who does not join in the cleaning effort. However, for those highly dependent on their peers, social disapproval can have a powerful influence.

Alongside advocating for traders’ interests to MCC, the TU executive also plays a regulatory role in the market. According to the market chiefs, members of the TU executive do not have the authority to impose fines on traders, but they can prevent a troublesome trader from accessing a table from which to sell his/her goods in the market. The chairman of the TU described his own efforts to encourage traders to clean: “I tell the traders that if anybody does not go to his/her table, I will seize the table…everybody goes to clean his/her table.”155

The regulatory authority exercised by the TU executive is likely to be supportive of MCC’s aims only when the two bodies are aligned.

Butchers, like other traders, are highly dependent on each other for periodic loans. Their business is capital intensive because of the high cost of purchasing a single cow. It is common for butchers to purchase a cow on a repayment basis from another butcher or a cattle trader, or to pair up and take turns slaughtering a cow and

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155 “...a tel treda dem enibɔdĩ we nɔ go na in tebul, a de siz in tebul...enibɔdĩ de go klin na in tebul.”
sharing out the meat to prevent having to freeze too much overnight. Butchers are therefore well positioned to apply normative pressure on one another to attend the slaughterhouse, but appear not to do so.

The BA chairman does advocate to local government on behalf of the butchers, but he is far less active than the TU executive in this regard. The BA’s main function seems to be coordinating mutual support efforts to keep each butcher operating at a profit. According to the BA chairman, meetings of the butchers focus mainly on current threats to profitability and the BA collects contributions to support any butcher who sustains a shock to his business. The chairman of the BA has passed responsibility for most of the daily running of his butcher business on to his sons, and appears to serve more as a senior adviser for a group of businessmen than a regulator. Individual butchers’ choices not to attend the slaughterhouse seem to go relatively unchallenged by him.

This disparity in self-enforcement of the rules underpinning coproduction between the traders and the butchers points to a further reason for higher levels of cooperation with MCC found in the former group. There is tentative evidence that this disparity is linked to differences in the perceived legitimacy of the coproductive arrangements between groups. Traders’ desire for a clean market is relatively uncomplicated—informal conversations with traders often yielded comments such as, “When the place is clean, you feel comfortable,” and, “If the place is dirty, it smells, you cannot get good air.” As a consequence, they are likely to accept the aims of coproduction as valid. The pattern of positive reciprocity that has been maintained recently lends further support to the legitimacy of the coproductive arrangements. In contrast, the construction of the slaughterhouse was a top-down initiative and thus reveals nothing about butchers’ interest in having such a facility. While no butcher argued that the slaughterhouse was unnecessary, it seems likely that butchers are ambivalent about the facility—on the one hand, it offers advantages such as council-provided cleaning, a place to interact with other butchers, and the acquisition of information about cattle disease, but it is also inconvenient and costly to transport and slaughter cattle there. The council’s failure to adhere to the terms of the agreement reached with the butchers has conveyed disregard and resulted in the withdrawal of key resources such as electricity and running water which would make slaughtering easier. The general mood among the butchers is therefore one of dissatisfaction, which undermines the legitimacy of the coproductive arrangements.
Concluding comments

MCC has forged a bargain, albeit a somewhat fragile one, with the traders regarding the cleaning of the market. Its decision to do so appears to be driven principally by material and political motives. Through demonstrating visible results in the market in terms of waste collection, MCC is able to maintain its access to central and donor funds to support this area of activity. Working cooperatively with the traders and following the rules of coproduction is perhaps the most straightforward way for MCC to enjoy steady access to a favourable flow of market dues and to reduce the likelihood of disruptive political action by the traders. The cleaning effort therefore forms one component of a broader politicized exchange between MCC and the traders. In contrast, MCC has reneged on a more finite deal with the butchers regarding the upkeep of the slaughterhouse, seeing little financial or political gain to be had from maintaining the arrangement.

The traders have a clear interest in the cleanliness of the market, are able to be relatively confident of ongoing reciprocity by MCC because the daily structure of the pattern of exchange protects them against being duped and are subject to self-enforcement by multiple layers of regulatory authority within the market. These factors combined encourage them to pay dues and assist in cleaning the market. The value butchers accord to the slaughterhouse is less certain, particularly when critical resources such as electricity and water are taken away, and given their poor treatment they have little reason to believe that MCC will uphold future commitments. As a consequence, the BA and its members are unwilling to countenance an increase in the slaughtering fee and a lack of self-enforcement in their ranks allows non-attendance at the slaughterhouse to go unchecked.
## Table 5.A.1 Key rules and norms underpinning coproduction of a clean market by MCC and the TU and its members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of rule/norm</th>
<th>Content of rules (R) and norms (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong></td>
<td>There are two positions: 1) an LGA; and 2) a citizen coproducer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boundary (entry and exit rules)</strong></td>
<td>LGA: MCC must take on the role of LGA with responsibility for cleaning the market (or else face punishment by central government/donors) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizen coproducer: All those trading in the market must take on the role of citizen coproducer of market cleanliness (or else face punishment by MCC) (R); traders’ families, friends and associates may also play the role of citizen coproducer (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Choice</strong></td>
<td>Waste collection: MCC must provide vehicles to collect waste on a regular basis (or else face punishment by traders/central government/donors) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion of council resources: MCC workers must not divert waste collection vehicles for personal use (or else face punishment by the MCC executive) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waste gathering: Citizen coproducers must gather waste for collection (or else face punishment by their peers/market chiefs/the TU/MCC) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payment: Citizen coproducers must pay market dues or annual licence fees (or else face punishment by MCC/court action) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obstruction: Citizen coproducers must not obstruct waste collection vehicles (or else face punishment by market chiefs/MCC) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>MCC and citizen coproducers should share information about waste collection via the TU (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregation</strong></td>
<td>MCC should decide on the frequency and scope of collection (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The TU and its members must agree to gather waste (or else coproduction of a clean market cannot occur) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Payoff</strong></td>
<td>Waste collection: If MCC neglects to perform waste collection, traders may refuse to gather waste in the future (or else if MCC persists in its neglect they may impose further punishment) (R), or central government/donors may withdraw funding (or else if MCC persists in its neglect they may impose further punishment) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion of council resources: If MCC workers divert waste collection vehicles for personal use, they may lose their jobs or be subject to other serious penalty (or else if they resist they may be subject to further punishment) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waste gathering: If citizen coproducers refuse to gather waste, they may be subject to fines by the market chief, refusal of a table by the TU or denial of support by peers (or else if they resist they may be subject to further punishment) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obstruction: If citizen coproducers obstruct waste collection, they may be subject to fines by the market chief or be taken to the local court (or else if they resist they may be subject to further punishment) (R)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
may be subject to further punishment) (R)

Payment: If citizen coproducers refuse to pay market dues or annual licence fees, dues collectors may seize their premises/goods (or else if they resist they may be subject to further punishment) (R)

Scope

A minimum level of market cleanliness must be maintained (or else MCC may lose access to donor funding) (R)
Table 5.A.2 Key rules and norms underpinning the coproduction of safe meat by MCC and the BA and its members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of rule/norm</th>
<th>Content of rules (R) and norms (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boundary</strong></td>
<td>There are two positions: 1) an LGA; and 2) a citizen coproducer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong></td>
<td>LGA: MCC must take on the role of LGA with responsibility for operating the slaughterhouse (or else face punishment by central government) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizen coproducer: All butchers must take on the role of coproducer of safe meat (or else face punishment by MCC) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Choice</strong></td>
<td>Facility and basic resources: MCC must provide and staff a slaughterhouse facility (or else face punishment by central government) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional resources: MCC must maintain the facility to a reasonable standard, provide electricity and water and provide a freezer (or else face punishment by the butchers) (R)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slaughtering: Butchers must slaughter their cattle in the slaughterhouse (or else face punishment by MCC) (R)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspection: Butchers must submit to the inspection carried out by the EHO (or else face punishment by MCC) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fee: Butchers must pay a slaughtering fee (or else face punishment by MCC) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>MCC and citizen coproducers should share information via the BA (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregation</strong></td>
<td>MCC should set the basic operating procedures at the slaughterhouse (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCC and the butchers must reach an agreement about their respective inputs into the coproduction of safe meat (or else coproduction cannot occur) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Payoff</strong></td>
<td>Facility and basic resources: If MCC fails to provide or staff a slaughterhouse facility, central government may take disciplinary action (or else if MCC resists central government may impose further punishment) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional resources: If MCC fails to provide additional resources agreed with the butchers, the butchers may refuse to pay an increased slaughtering fee (or else if MCC resists they may utilize further tactics of resistance) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slaughtering: If butchers slaughter their cattle outside the slaughterhouse, MCC may make warning visits and ultimately have them charged to court (or else if they resist they may be subject to further punishment) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspection/fee: If butchers refuse to submit to an inspection or pay their slaughtering fee, MCC may have them charged to court (or else if they resist they may be subject to further punishment) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Those rules marked with a star (*) are weakly enforced
CHAPTER SIX: Chiefs and their Subject-Citizens: Renewing and Redefining Chiefly Authority through Public Goods Provision

In 2009, Makeni’s chiefs lacked both a clear government mandate to address the public goods deficit and donor support. Nevertheless, they remained politically powerful and actively engaged in local public goods provision, most prominently the production of public order, as the discussion in chapter four indicates. In this chapter, I compare two cases of coproduction by chiefs and subject-citizens in Makeni: the relatively successful coproduction of public order by the barri of a senior chief, Pa Rok, and the relatively unsuccessful coproduction of community infrastructure through chief-led mobilization of unpaid community labour.

I apply the same analytical approach set out in chapter five, describing the coproduc
tive processes through which each good is provided, drawing comparisons between them (section 6.1) and elaborating on the main incentives and deterrents which influence the actions of chiefs and subject-citizens in each set of coproduc
tive arrangements (sections 6.2 and 6.3). I focus once more on the role played by features of the social and political environment which present barriers to local public goods provision (chapter one): a political system which provides little motivation for chiefs to provide public goods, in this case due to their lifetime hold on power; an impoverished public sector, which pays salaries to only a narrow sub-set of those involved in chiefdom government and even then at low levels and on an unpredictable basis; and a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities, given the presence of a plurality of actors engaged in providing similar goods and overlapping regimes of rules outlined in legislation and in policy.

6.1 Two cases of chief-led coproduction

i) Maintaining public order

The deeply bifurcated development of the Sierra Leonean state during colonial rule has resulted in a judicial system which incorporates two divergent legal traditions: customary law and ‘English’ common law. Residents of Makeni can

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156 The following description is based on observational and interview data collected between January and September 2009, including a month-long intensive period of observation of the barri in August 2009. I use the present tense to describe the status quo at that time.
choose whether to take their cases to the magistrate’s court, which operates according to the ‘English’ common law tradition, or to one of the local courts, which operate primarily according to customary law, while incorporating certain elements of ‘English’ common law. Both of these courts enjoy official recognition. Some residents eschew officially recognized courts altogether in favour of a chief. Chiefs at all levels in Makeni hear cases. Senior chiefs have their own barris\textsuperscript{157}—open-sided structures where cases are heard and community meetings are held.\textsuperscript{158} When chiefs’ barris act like courts, they are violating the Local Courts Act (1963), which prohibits any “exercise or attempt to exercise judicial powers” within a local court jurisdiction, unless authorized by alternate legislation.\textsuperscript{159} Despite their illegality, chiefs’ barris are tolerated, and sometimes even protected, by the central government.

Chiefs’ barris have a complicated relationship with local courts. They compete directly for cases, which they decide using a similar body of customary law. However, at the time the research was conducted in 2009, both chiefs’ barris and local courts fell under the authority of paramount chiefs.\textsuperscript{160} Local courts were part of the chiefdom administration, supervised by MLG; the resources they earned were paid into the chiefdom account; and the local court chairperson was usually selected on the recommendation of the paramount chief, and approved by representatives of MLG. Therefore in many cases the local court chairperson was a client of the chief and some chiefs used their influence over the local court chairperson to shape the outcome of cases.

\textsuperscript{157} ‘Barri’ is the most common English spelling found in the academic literature; colonial-era documents also tend to use the spelling ‘barri’ or ‘barrie’. Contemporary newspapers commonly use the spelling ‘barray’.

\textsuperscript{158} The three local courts in Bombali Sebora chiefdom are also housed in barris, although these are official government buildings rather than barris constructed by chiefs’ supporters on their own initiative.

\textsuperscript{159} Section 40 of the 1963 Local Courts Act states: “(I) Any person who shall—(a) within the area of the jurisdiction of any constituted Local Court exercise or attempt to exercise judicial powers, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of any Act; or (b) sit as a member of such Court without due authority, shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding twenty-five pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both such fine and such imprisonment”. According to Fanthorpe et al (2009, p. 37), some chiefs make an argument that their judicial decisions are protected by section 72 (1) of the 1991 Constitution, which states: “The institution of Chieftaincy as established by customary law and usage and its non-abolition by legislation is hereby guaranteed and preserved”. If chiefs’ judicial role is part of customary law, they argue, then it cannot be abolished.

\textsuperscript{160} In July 2011, an amendment to the Local Courts Act was passed which transferred oversight of local courts to the Office of the Chief Justice, diminishing paramount chiefs’ influence (Koroma, 2011).
As discussed in chapter four, PC Kasangna has not yet been installed fully in accordance with Temne custom and therefore shares some of his chiefly powers with Pa Rok Sebora Sesay\(^{161}\), including the right to operate the main chiefdom barri. There is a clear difference in the physical appearance of the barris overseen by Pa Rok and the paramount chief. Pa Rok’s barri is a permanent structure, painted bright red with a heavy thatched roof, while the paramount chief’s barri is a temporary structure which consists of a flat palm-leaf roof supported by sticks (\(\text{agbaya}\)) (see images 6.1 and 6.2). One of the barri officiators explained this:

According to the ceremonies here, it is due to the tradition that they didn’t build one like that over there. Because Pa Rok has been to \(\text{kantha}\)^{162}, the paramount chief has not been there yet, so they are not supposed to make that barri there like how they made Pa Rok’s one…The time when he goes to \(\text{kantha}\), they are going to build a barri like this one. So at that time, it will be destroyed. There should only be one barri there for the paramount chief, but because he hasn’t been to \(\text{kantha}\) yet, he doesn’t know the ceremonies, that’s it.\(^{163}\)

I chose to study Pa Rok’s barri because its status as the main chiefdom barri made it a hub of daily activity attended by a wide range of subject-citizens, while the PC’s more subdued barri dealt mainly with cases affecting members of his ruling house.

Pa Rok’s barri (hereafter ‘the barri’) is located inside the former paramount chief’s compound, just a few minutes from the city’s main market. In the shaded interior of the barri, those presiding over cases sit on wooden chairs gathered around a wooden table on one side of the barri. The complainant(s) and the accused(s) sit on a wooden bench immediately opposite on the left and right sides respectively.\(^{164}\) Behind them are three further rows of seating, both plastic chairs and benches, which accommodate about 30 people. When the barri is full, the low walls around the edge are used as additional seating. Four men preside over cases at the barri on a daily basis: the chairman, a ceremonial chief with the title \(\text{Pa Kápor Bana}\); the vice-

\(^{161}\) The interim ruler who is the foremost of the former chief’s ceremonial chiefs, or \(\text{kápor}\).

\(^{162}\) A period of ritual seclusion which is a prerequisite for full installation as a Temne chief.

\(^{163}\) “\(\text{Akôdín to di srîmoniy ya, di tradishôn naim mek dem no mek am lek yanda. Bikôs Pa Rok i bin dôn go na \text{kantha}, di paramawnt chif i no go de yet, so dem no sôpos fo mek da bare de lek aw dem mek Pa Rok in yon…Di tem we i de go na \text{kantha}, dem de bild di bare lek aw dem bild am. So da tem dande, i dôn brok. Önlî na wan bare fo de nômô na di paramawnt chif, bot bikôs of i no go na \text{kantha} yet, i no no wetin na di srîmoniy, na da.}”

\(^{164}\) From the perspective of those presiding over the case.
chairman, a retired soldier who is also Pa Rok’s cousin; the secretary, a literate local construction contractor who belongs to the former paramount chief’s ruling house, Petbana Marank; and an additional member who belongs to Petbana Masimbo ruling house. Other ceremonial chiefs regularly attend the barri to join them in presiding over cases. They are supported by a messenger who informs people when they have been summoned to the barri and follows up on errant individuals who fail to attend. Pa Rok remains involved in the proceedings through regular visits and phone-calls, acting as the barri’s supervisor.

The barri officiators preside over a wide variety of cases, including those dealing with debt, family matters related to divorce or separation, abusive language, land, witchcraft and sodalities (secret societies). In keeping with their chiefly obligations, they do not generally turn cases away, even those that involve disputes over very small amounts of money or goods. Unsurprisingly, there is some tension between chiefs and local courts over the scope of their respective jurisdictions, which overlap extensively. Pa Rok, the barri officiators and senior members of ruling houses argued that ceremonial chiefs have exclusive jurisdiction over sodality and witchcraft cases, but a local court chairperson in the chiefdom insisted that these cases could also be addressed in the local courts. He also argued that land cases should always be dealt with by the local courts because chiefs do not keep written records of cases. In his view, the barri officiators take an opportunistic approach, accepting any case that comes their way. However, Pa Rok and the vice-chairman argued that they always refer criminal cases, including rape and theft, to the police. No matters of rape or theft were brought before the barri while I was observing proceedings, but the barri officiators did take on a number of cases which are classified as criminal in the standard work of reference on customary law in Sierra Leone (Fenton, 1951).

165 The vice-chairman originally held the position of chairman, but was demoted because of objections to a ‘civilian’ supervising a chief. The term ‘cousin’ does not necessarily imply first cousin in the Western sense.

166 I use the term barri officiators to refer to all those who preside at the barri.

167 During fieldwork I observed 35 matters in whole or in part; these broke down as follows: debt (10), family matters related to divorce or separation (5), abusive language (4), land (2), witchcraft (2), threats of violence (2), physical assault (2), disrespect towards chiefs/barri (3), complaints about senior chiefs (2) and sodalities (1). These are my own categories, which draw on the descriptions given by my research assistant and barri officiators. Two matters were not described in sufficient detail to allow categorization.

168 The 1963 Local Courts Act section 13 (1) gives local courts jurisdiction all civil cases where “the claim, debt, duty or matter in dispute does not exceed two hundred pounds in value” and all criminal cases where the maximum punishment “does not exceed a fine of fifty pounds or imprisonment for a period of six months or both such fine and such imprisonment”. The values stated are out of date.
including two cases of physical assault (one minor, one less so); two cases of witchcraft; and one sodality case.

When one person wishes to initiate a case against another, she comes to the barri to explain the case to the barri officiators and pays them a bora which usually varies from between 2,000-15,000 Le (£0.38 to £2.85) and transportation for the messenger which usually costs between 1,000 to 2,000 Le (£0.19 to £0.38). A bora is often described by chiefs as a discretionary token payment which has no set amount. In practice, it is not usually possible to initiate a case without paying a bora and it would be considered disrespectful to attempt to do so. The secretary takes down the basic details of the case and sends the messenger to let the other person know that a case has been brought against her in the barri. When the accused presents herself, she has the option of choosing to have the case sent to another court, either the local court or the magistrate’s court, or accepting the authority of Pa Rok’s barri to preside over the case. If she accepts the authority of the barri, she must then ‘return’ the bora and the transportation fee by paying the barri the same amount as the complainant.

The barri officiators then choose a strategy for dealing with the case. In some cases this requires the navigation of competing norms—on the one hand, there is an expectation that they will treat cases fairly, but on the other hand they are also expected to meet their obligations to relatives and allies. The strategy chosen also reflects the type of case being dealt with. For those cases where the parties agree about the wrong committed, such as debt cases where the debtor acknowledges her debt, the barri officiators merely set out and enforce the terms for settlement. If the ability of the debtor to repay is in question, the barri officiators may ask a third party to serve as the surety for the debt on the debtor’s behalf, taking on the responsibility to pay if she defaults. In cases where the stories told by the complainant and the accused differ, a hearing occurs. Each party must then pay a further sitting fee decided upon by the barri officiators, which varies depending on the number of witnesses, the amount of the bora already paid and the complexity of the case, amongst other factors. The hearing consists of a process of testimony and cross-examination. Beginning with the complainant, each party testifies and is then questioned, first by the opposing party and then by the barri officiators. This process is then repeated for the witnesses. Each party secures her own witnesses and pays

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169 I use the female pronoun throughout this chapter to represent the neutral subject.
1,000 Le (£0.19) to each one that testifies on her behalf. Before testifying, each person swears to tell the truth on the Bible or the Qur’an before making her statement. When one party is suspicious about the veracity of a witness’ testimony, she can ask the witness to swear ‘traditionally’ before testifying instead. In this case, a swearing licence costing 30,000 Le (£5.70) must be purchased from the chieftdom administration and the person requesting that the witness swear traditionally must seek out a local sorcerer capable of preparing the swear (an object understood to be invested with magical power). The witness then stands in front of the swear when promising to tell the truth, with the understanding that if she lies then the supernatural forces contained within it or represented by it will ensure that a specified misfortune will befall her, such as being killed by a snake.\textsuperscript{171}

The barri officiators punish actions which violate customary law through the imposition of fines and fees. In many cases, the parties themselves mutually agree on the amount that is at stake in their dispute. However, some violations of customary law have fixed fees and fines attached, which can be quite severe. An accusation of witchcraft, which is among the most serious offences one can commit in the eyes of the barri, can be particularly costly. Six women and one young girl accused of witchcraft were each required to pay 250,000 Le (£48), a bag of rice worth approximately 110,000 Le (£21), a goat worth approximately 150,000 Le (£29), five gallons of palm oil worth approximately 80,000 Le (£15.20) and bail of 25,000 Le (£4.75) for their release; a total of approximately 620,000 Le (£117) per person. This is an extremely high amount of money given that many economically active adults earn around 5,000 Le (£0.95) per day, or less. Land cases can also be very costly, as the parties have to pay the barri officiators to visit and inspect the land. Two men agreed to pay 200,000 Le (£38) to the barri officiators to visit the disputed land which was the focus of their case. The money from the barri does not go into the chiefdom bank account; it is retained and dispensed by Pa Rok, or by the vice-chairman of the barri acting on his behalf. According to the barri officiators, each person who presides over cases receives a share, as does PC Kasangna. The vice-chairman reported that Pa Rok also uses the funds to meet his obligations to the surviving

\textsuperscript{170} In describing this process as swearing traditionally, I am using the barri officiators’ vocabulary for differentiating between this mode of swearing and biblical/Qur’anic swearing.

\textsuperscript{171} I am ignorant of the precise means through which the swear works. See James Littlejohn (1960) for further background on the Temne practice of swearing.
relatives of the late paramount chief. Acting on Pa Rok’s behalf, the vice-chairman buys a bag of rice and other food supplies for them every two or three weeks and covers medical costs and other costs that arise.

The barri officiators frequently use the threat of imprisonment to encourage parties to comply with their wishes. Within the barri, there is a chair on one side beneath a handwritten cardboard sign which reads “criminal chair”. When somebody refuses to comply, usually by paying a required amount of money, she is sent to sit in that chair until a relative or friend comes with additional funds. If the barri officiators want to exert greater pressure, they threaten to send the person to be locked up at Makump, a nearby village which is home to the only chiefdom cell. The only way they can realize this threat is by transferring the case to a local court with a request that the person be locked up, as the local courts alone have access to the cell. The threat is therefore difficult to realize but nevertheless appears to be effective.

Chiefs’ barris are not integrated into the official justice system, and therefore it is not possible to appeal the outcome of a case in another court. However, a similar strategy of transferring the case to a local court is used to approximate an appeals process. According to the secretary, when a ruling is made, each party has the option to declare that they are dissatisfied. If this occurs, the barri officiators hold on to the expenses from the case rather than delivering them to the favoured party and allow the dissatisfied party 14 days to register the case with a local court. When the local court contacts the barri, one of the barri officiators visits the local court chairperson with the money from the case and explains what took place. The case is then heard again from the beginning, although local court chairpersons are not immune from chiefly influence and may come under some pressure to reach a similar conclusion.

As discussed in chapter one, public goods provision frequently suffers from free-rider problems—when individuals cannot be excluded from the benefits of a good, they have a strong incentive not to contribute to its provision, hoping that others will carry the responsibility without them. It is possible to apply the free-riding concept to this case, with some qualification. In this case, the broader benefit generated by the barri’s operations is public order (see chapter seven for further discussion of this). Arguably, individuals who reject the barri’s authority and refuse to participate in its activities are free-riding on the efforts of chiefs and their peers to produce public order. A parallel in the UK would be evading jury duty, which is clearly considered to be a form of free-riding. However, as the barri is only one site
in Makeni that helps to generate public order, individuals could be contributing to this
good through their participation in the local court, magistrate’s court, or other
channels and thus not free-riding on the efforts of others to produce public order,
broadly speaking. Given that subject-citizens can exercise the choice to have their
cases heard in other courts, it is notable that it is rare for individuals to reject the
barri’s authority—during a month-long period of daily observation, I encountered
only one example of somebody refusing to attend the barri and two accused parties
who expressed a desire to transfer their cases elsewhere.

There is a complex web of rules and norms underpinning coproduction of
public order by subject-citizens and chiefs. To conclude, I pull out the small number
that I consider most essential. On the barri officiators’ side, there is a norm that they
should hear all cases brought to the barri. In terms of their approach to deciding
cases, there are conflicting norms that they should decide cases fairly and that they
should be sympathetic to the interests of their relatives and allies when deciding
cases; this is discussed in more detail in section 6.3. On the side of subject-citizens,
there is a norm that they should bring cases to the barri. Beyond that, subject-citizens
must attend the barri when summoned by the barri officiators, pay a bora and other
relevant fees and answer chiefs’ questions honestly. They must also abide by the
barri officiators’ final decisions and pay any related fines. As discussed, there are
important exceptions to these rules—subject-citizens may choose the venue in which
their case is heard and they may ‘appeal’ their case after a final decision by having it
heard a second time by the local court. A fuller summary of rules and norms is set out
in table 6.A.1, attached as an annex to this chapter.

**ii) Mobilizing unpaid labour to maintain community infrastructure**

In post-war Makeni, chiefs play a relatively marginal role in mobilizing labour
to maintain community infrastructure, which is under competitive pressure from other
actors, particularly the city council. Neither the paramount chief nor Pa Rok seem to
be routinely involved in mobilization of labour—this is a task they generally delegate
to sub-chiefs. All five ward heads I spoke to described playing some role in the
mobilization of labour to maintain infrastructure in their wards, but in most cases this

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172 The following description is based on observational and interview data collected between January
and September 2009. I use the present tense to describe the status quo at that time.
173 For chieftdom purposes, Makeni is divided into seven administrative wards, each overseen by a ward
head. They report to the section chief, who reports to the paramount chief.
was relatively minor. Two reported working with youth groups to periodically clean out gutters, drains and culverts in their areas; one described working with the Islamic Youth Committee to maintain the central mosque, where he also serves as assistant manager; a fourth said he was chairman of a neighbourhood organization called the Turntable Descendants’ Organization which works for community development, including the maintenance of community infrastructure; and a fifth described a more reactive role, organizing food for young people when they asked for his support for maintenance of community infrastructure.

The ward head chairing the Turntable Descendants’ Organization described a recent effort to maintain the area around the local court barri, where plants had grown and potholes had developed during the rains. He spoke of the different strategies he used to mobilize youth to contribute their labour. He encouraged them to take pride in their ward, saying, “This is our ward, let us be in competition with other wards…don’t let them cry us down”. He used member contributions to provide rewards for workers such as cigarettes and food, which was cooked by female volunteers. However, he also threatened withdrawal of the association’s support in times of hardship, such as a death in the family. Despite this mix of strategies, the ward head said that it remained challenging to mobilize youth for community labour. He attributed this to the reluctance of ‘strangers’ (those born outside of the chiefdom) to contribute to the collective effort, a complaint reiterated by Pa Rok when discussing this issue.

Free-riding therefore presents a substantial problem affecting the coproduction of community infrastructure by chiefs and youth. Susan Shepler (2005, p. 79) defines a youth in Sierra Leone as, “someone who is no longer a child, but not yet a ‘big man’ or a ‘big woman’”. She emphasizes that youth is not a straightforward age-based category, but one which describes individuals engaged in “certain relations and activities” (p. 80). According to Shepler, initiation into a sodality is necessary, but not sufficient for the achievement of adulthood. Marriage is generally viewed as a marker of the transition from youth to adulthood, with girls marrying earlier than

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174 I did not have the opportunity to observe sub-chiefs engaged in mobilizing labour, as no chief could identify an upcoming occasion where he would carry out an exercise of this nature. This is partly because my fieldwork on this topic was delayed until the rainy season during which relatively little infrastructural maintenance takes place.

175 The organization takes its name from the neighbourhood in which it is based, which is in proximity to a roundabout, known locally as a turntable.
boys. Those serving as apprentices (including students) are usually considered youth, whatever their age. Youth can also be considered a political category, which describes the “subaltern” (p. 83)—those who lack employment, opportunity and property, and find themselves in an unequal relationship with elders. As Shepler points out, when viewed from this political perspective, youth can be a terminal state. When Makeni’s chiefs speak of mobilizing youth in their communities to assist with community maintenance, they are usually referring to young men. While young women can and do play an active role in carrying out certain kinds of physical labour towards community maintenance and in preparing food for workers, it is young men that chiefs conceive of as the primary targets of mobilization efforts.

The most straightforward way in which free-riding occurs is when some youth free-ride on the efforts of others. However, it is also possible to argue that members of the community who are not considered youth free-ride on the efforts of those who are. Against this interpretation, you could argue that where you find a social division of labour, free-riding does not occur, as older people have done their share of community labour during their youth, and continue to contribute to the public good of the community in other ways fitting to their age. However, this alternate interpretation is undermined by the fact that youth is not a straightforward age-based category, but one which links to social status, and therefore there are opportunities for those of higher status to avoid community obligations even in earlier life, as Richards (2005b) suggests. At a minimum, the fact that community contributions are collected in many instances to support the work suggests that there is an expectation that the wider membership of the community will contribute to the maintenance of community infrastructure, at least financially, and therefore when people are unwilling to make such contributions, they are free-riding on the efforts of youth.

The essential rules and norms underpinning coproduction by chiefs and subject-citizens are therefore relatively straightforward, if not well observed. Chiefs should identify when efforts to maintain public infrastructure are needed and call upon subject-citizens to contribute their labour. They must deploy strategies to motivate their subject-citizens to do so and they must also provide resources such as materials, tools and food to support their participation. Subject-citizens must contribute their labour when called upon. A fuller summary of rules and norms is set out in table 6.A.2, attached as an annex to this chapter.
The post-reform MCC plays a significant role in mobilizing labour, encroaching on chiefs’ role in this regard. Following decentralization in Sierra Leone, MCC is officially responsible for maintaining core components of community infrastructure in Makeni, including roads, culverts and certain community buildings. MCC is therefore the main conduit and/or contact point for both government and external funding for this maintenance work, which gives the council a significant advantage in terms of access to equipment and resources for maintenance. The two most significant donor initiatives providing funds for the rehabilitation of community infrastructure in Makeni, the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), a national social fund established by a 2001 act of parliament, and Go Bifo, a community-driven development project funded by the Japanese Social Development Fund via the World Bank, both engage with councils, rather than chiefs. NaCSA applies a ‘cash for work’ model, and is thus not reliant on mobilization of unpaid youth labour; to the contrary, there is intense youth competition for opportunities. However, MCC sits on the regional committee for NaCSA that makes decisions about which projects are funded and is thus able to exert influence over the decision-making process, consolidating its own reputation as a key actor as regards community infrastructure.

Go Bifo actively encourages a model based on mobilization of unpaid youth labour, making funding contingent on inputs of labour and local materials by affected community members on the grounds that this increases local buy-in. According to one Go Bifo representative, “If you bring in materials and labour from outside, people do not feel part of it. That’s why before the culture of maintenance was lacking in Sierra Leone”. Of course, such inputs also reduce project costs to the donor. Go Bifo work closely with the city council: the council’s CA is required to co-sign the document that allows the release of funds and councillors and WDCs are required to play a key role in mobilizing contributions of materials and unpaid labour. In doing so, they use similar strategies to chiefs: seeking the assistance of youth and encouraging them with incentives such as community recognition and the provision of food. A local representative of Go Bifo reported that five culverts and two primary schools had been rehabilitated through this process—far more tangible results than those associated with the city’s chiefs.

In some cases, youth do not wait for chiefs or MCC to “come with development” to their communities, but take action themselves. Youth groups are in
abundant supply in Makeni—the umbrella organization Makeni Union of Youth Groups (MUYOG) brings together 48 youth groups, and there are others besides which have not joined MUYOG. As Fanthorpe and Roy Maconachie (2010) have argued, many of these groups are oriented towards external funding, and some lie dormant for long periods, reactivating when funding opportunities are available. The eagerness of these groups to demonstrate the characteristics and practices which they believe to be important to donors, such as a clear organizational structure, a constitution, elections, and a 50-50 gender balance, provides some evidence of this. Despite their desire to capture external funds, many youth groups also provide a means for youth with limited resources and opportunities to organize some entertainment and gain some recognition in their communities.

The youth group Eastern Social Club was founded in 2007 to win funding for agricultural projects. They had limited success in this regard, but did undertake the repair of an impassable road which was an important access point to their community. At the outset, the group was able to drum up support from neighbours, who made small contributions of 1,000 to 2,000 Le (£0.19 to £0.38) per week for food and supplies. Some of the community’s women came and cooked for the group and helped to carry stones for the road while they were working. The group approached MCC for material support, and was able to borrow tools, but not the tractor its members believed they needed to restore the culvert. As time went on, community contributions became harder to collect and the group was not able to recruit any other young people to share the work. “Some people are not able to sacrifice to do the job. Only a few. When you ask them to do community work, some people say, ‘I have to go and find what I will eat.’,” said one member of the group. Although they were able to complete the work to a level where the road was passable before the rainy season hit, the road deteriorated again during the rains. The group’s members went to a local chief to ask for his assistance in securing materials to repair the road, but he refused, saying they should make do with locally available sand and stone. They also submitted a grant application to MCC, but did not receive any funding. By the end of the rainy season the road was impassable once more. In this instance at least, youth operating alone faced similar difficulties to chiefs in mobilizing labour.
### iii) Drawing comparisons

In parallel with the cases discussed in chapter five, the accounts set out here are consistent with popular perceptions of relative success and failure in public goods provision, and suggest that this variation in performance is linked to underlying institutional factors. While chiefs, barri officiators and subject-citizens generally follow the rules underpinning coproduction of public order, neither chiefs nor subject-citizens appear committed to doing so in the case of coproduction of community infrastructure. While both are longstanding institutions, the former continues to function relatively effectively, while the latter appears to be in decline.

It is notable that in both instances chiefs and their delegates are in competition with other local actors as providers of public goods. Pa Rok’s barri remains a popular venue despite the presence of two local courts in Makeni which also decide cases using customary law. As discussed in more detail in section 6.3, the barri has numerous characteristics which appeal to users: it decides cases more quickly and usually at lower cost than the local court; it operates using the Temne language; and it is thought to be more sympathetic to the impact of a case on family relations and to the interests of those who belong to a chiefly class. While for the most part these features are likely to be longstanding characteristics of chiefs’ barris, it is also possible that chiefs have been careful to preserve some of these features in order to ensure an edge over local courts. Low costs are perhaps a good example—while chiefs could have increased their fees to levels comparable to local courts, they may have decided to keep them lower in order to remain attractive as a venue for deciding cases. There also appears to be a strategic dimension to management of relations with local courts. Rather than treating local courts as opponents, Pa Rok and the barri officiators take advantage of their association with them to enhance their coercive power and approximate an appeals process. It is only through transferring a case to a local court that a barri officiator can make good on a threat to imprison somebody or enable an ‘appeal’ by having the case heard again in a different venue. While the barri officiators could attempt to obstruct subject-citizens seeking to take their cases to local courts, instead they generally allow subject-citizens to choose which venue their cases are heard in, which helps to maintain cooperative relationships.  

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176 Although I did observe them put up low-level resistance to a local court transfer in one instance of a profitable land case. In addition, blatant and repeated attempts to prevent subject-citizens having their
To determine the significance of these behaviours with greater certainty, further historical analysis is needed to trace the development of chiefly adjudication following the reconstitution of ‘native’ courts (presided over by chiefs) as local courts (with court presidents, or later chairpersons) in the 1960s. However, my observations are consistent with an interpretation that chiefs in Makeni, once excluded from presiding over official local courts, have acted strategically to ensure that they continue to be sought out as unofficial adjudicators. In contrast, there are no signs that chiefs have attempted to remain competitive with other actors vis-à-vis the mobilization of community labour. They have not carved out a unique role for themselves nor found ways to take advantage of access to equipment and resources in the same way that Pa Rok and the barri officiators take advantage of the local courts to enhance their own power. In this case, there appears to be some indication that chiefs may be voluntarily relinquishing their role as mobilizers of community labour.

On the side of subject-citizen coproducers, there is a significant free-riding problem present as regards the mobilization of youth labour, while I observed few instances of subject-citizens rejecting the barri’s authority. This can be explained in part by the character of the goods provided in each case. The adjudication service provided by the barri is a private good with positive externalities in the form of the broader benefits of public order generated. As such, many of those involved in cases at the barri are focused on the private benefits they can secure in the process. The community infrastructure generated through chiefly mobilization of labour is closer to a public good in the classic economic sense—one that is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous. The provision of this good is therefore more vulnerable to free-riding practices. However, this is not the whole story. The classic public goods problem posed by the mobilization of labour for maintenance of community infrastructure could be overcome by chiefs if they were sufficiently committed to doing so and if they were able to sway subject-citizens to cooperate. Related, there are many subject-citizens who participate in cases at the barri who do not stand to profit substantially, for example, guilty parties liable to lose cases and those serving as witnesses. Therefore, it seems that there is a fundamental difference in the way chiefly authority

cases heard in local courts would be likely to arouse the ire of central government representatives in Makeni.
is perceived by subject-citizens vis-à-vis each good which affects their willingness to cooperate.

In the following sections, I consider the main incentives and deterrents which influence the choices made by chiefs and their delegates and subject-citizens. I address two questions:

- Why do chiefs hold tight to their role as coproducers of public order, despite competition from other actors, while seeming to relinquish their role as coproducers of community infrastructure? (section 6.2)
- Why are subject-citizens persuaded to cooperate with chiefs to coproduce public order (even when they do not stand to personally profit from doing so), while they are unwilling to do the same to maintain community infrastructure? (section 6.3)

### 6.2 Incentives and deterrents for chiefs

#### i) Money to eat

The barri is a vital source of income for Pa Rok and the barri officiators. Pa Rok uses his share to fulfil his customary responsibilities to the former paramount chief’s family and to sustain a network of sub-chiefs. The barri officiators make a substantial part of their living from hearing cases at the barri. In the words of one ceremonial chief, “We chiefs rely on Satan to make a living because it is from conflict that we get our money to eat.”177 Or, in the words of one elderly Makeni man, “If there are no cases the chiefs would not survive because they are not working.”178

Each step in the barri’s legal process requires the payment of fees or penalties by the parties involved. The barri officiators’ insistence that all payments to the barri are made on time and in their full amount indicates the centrality of money to the work they do. The barri officiators never begin discussion of the details of a case until the accused party has returned the bora paid by the claimant. In cases where a party fails to return the bora, or to make a debt payment on time, she is usually held in the ‘criminal chair’ until a friend or relative comes to pay the money on her behalf. An elderly woman who asked if she could hold on to her bora until she had explained her case was scolded by the chairman, “You can’t pay money and take it back. Do you think your position better than mine that you are coming to take money from

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177 Translated from Temne.
178 Translated from Temne.
chiefs?” 179 In a witchcraft case where the costs imposed on the accused parties were particularly high, the chiefs showed relatively little leeway in negotiating the first instalment of the penalties downwards, 180 despite the best efforts of the relatives of the accused parties to convince them to do so. The rigour with which chiefs ensure that payments are made could be explained as an effort to disincentivize undesirable behaviour, rather than as an effort to maximize profits. However, I observed the barri officiators resist the transfer of profitable cases to other venues (both to the local court in one instance and to sub-chiefs) which suggests that in some cases at least securing a profit is their main concern. Some of those I spoke to also accused the barri officiators of more dubious profit-maximizing practices, such as taking bribes to find a case in favour of a particular party, or dishonestly reporting the amount of bora paid by the claimant so as to extract a larger bora payment from the accused.

In most instances, mobilizing unpaid labour to maintain community infrastructure actually costs chiefs money, rather than earning a profit. One of the most significant implications of MCC’s official mandate to maintain infrastructure from a chiefly perspective is that it makes it far more difficult for chiefs to access government or donor funding for infrastructure projects, cutting off one potential stream of profits. In an urban context where individuals seek to exchange their labour for wages, and scrutiny of chiefs’ actions is relatively high, chiefs cannot simply demand contributions of labour from youth. Rather, they are expected to provide food or other material incentives and the necessary tools and other materials for workers to encourage their participation. To fund this, chiefs can either turn to collecting community contributions, thus engaging with a new collective action problem, or draw on personal resources. For this reason, mobilizing labour for community infrastructure can be a costly activity.

ii) Authority to administer

Chiefly identity is tightly bound up with the practice of presiding over cases. Much of chiefs’ authority flows from their right to decide cases, and is renewed by their continual exercise of that right. This conception is supported by Christian Lund’s (2007, p. 6) definition of authority as, “an instance of power which seeks at

179 Translated from Temne.
180 The accused parties were required to provide approximately 130,000 Le (£24) and a bag of rice as a first installment. The chiefs eventually accepted 100,000 Le (£19) and half a bag of rice.
least a minimum of voluntary compliance and is thus legitimated in some way”; authority is thus produced through “an active and contested process of assertion, legitimization and exercise”. This process-oriented approach does not take the authority of LGAs for granted, but brings focus on to the way in which authority is continually constructed. Complaining of efforts by MLG representatives to prevent his barri from operating, Pa Rok said, “Who is going to be a chief then you don’t decide cases?...It’s wrong. You can only administer when…you have authority.” I interpret this to mean two things: first, that it is not possible to be a chief without carrying out the identity-defining activity of deciding cases; and second, that it is through the process of deciding cases that the authority to administer one’s chiefdom more broadly is acquired. A local court chairperson described the exercise and acquisition of authority by chiefs’ barris in more naked terms: “When they have barris, they say, ‘Do this, do it like that,’…you feel that it increases authority. That is why when they tell them to stop, they don’t agree to stop. They feel that if they leave those barris, automatically their powers are finished in the chiefdom.” Once more, a connection is made between the practice of presiding over cases and chiefly authority more broadly.

Pa Rok argued vigorously in favour of the barri’s right to decide cases, emphasizing that it has exclusive jurisdiction over sodality and witchcraft cases:

That barri is the suitable place to handle both custom, traditional matters. You cannot take customary matter or ceremony matter to the local court...Society cases. The initiation. Witchcraft case. Chief, any paramount chief, in any chiefdom...those are the people responsible to handle those cases. No other people...That’s why that barri is necessary.

The smooth-running of sodalities and control of witchcraft are both issues of significant popular concern. Framing the barri in this light therefore strengthens its potential to legitimize chiefs’ judicial role and renew chiefly authority more broadly. I consider this move to be—at least in part—a strategic step by Pa Rok to assert an advantage over the local courts in Makeni. This interpretation is supported by the vigorous contestation of his claim by one of Makeni’s local court chairpersons, as well as by historical events; jurisdiction over witchcraft and certain offences relating to sodalities was removed from chiefs by the colonial government and there is a

181 He refers to sodality cases.
record of such cases being dealt with by official, non-customary courts (Fenton, 1951, p. 15; Brooke, 1953, p. 5; Fyle, 1988; Shaw, 1997).

It is thought that membership of sodalities is close to universal in rural Sierra Leone (Richards, et al., 2004, p. ii; Shepler, 2005, p. 100). While membership may be somewhat reduced in urban areas like Makeni, it remains common; there are known sodality sites in the city that are forbidden to non-initiates and loud drumming can be heard when rites are taking place. Sodalities are generally considered to be a highly legitimate form of social organization; the initiations they perform remain an important prerequisite for obtaining adult status and peers undergoing initiation together often develop close bonds. This legitimacy was taken advantage of by armed groups during the civil war—the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) used sodality networks as a basis for recruitment and the RUF’s practice of abduction and initiation resonated to an extent with recognized sodality practices (Jackson, 2004, p. 159; Richards, et al., 2004, pp. 8-10; Shepler, 2005, pp. 100-104).

Given the secrecy which attaches to the inner workings of sodalities, it is difficult to set out the basis of Pa Rok’s claim to have exclusive jurisdiction over sodality cases with precision. As in other Temne chiefdoms, the institution of chieftaincy in Bombali Sebora is imbricated with the principal male sodality, in this case the Poro society; all paramount chiefs and ceremonial chiefs are required to be members (Dorjahn, 1960; Little, 1965b). According to Pa Rok and the chairman of the barri, it was during kantha that he acquired authority over the sodalities; this is why the power to decide sodality cases resides with him, rather than the paramount chief. Dorjahn (1960) gives an account which is suggestive of how this might take place. He describes a Temne chief ‘buying’ the sodalities during the closing ceremonies of his kantha; he pays an amount to each sodality, following which they must give a gift to the chief each time they carry out ceremonies to initiate new members. Following this process, the paramount chief is referred to as the “owner of the societies” and acts as their “patron-protector” (p. 118). While the exact process...

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182 The CDF is an umbrella term for militia groups which supported President Kabbah against the RUF and the AFRC. They were based on ethnic hunting societies, most notably the Mende kamajors (Hoffman, 2007).

183 Despite the requirement for secrecy, research has been conducted on sodalities in Sierra Leone (Dorjahn, 1959, 1960, 1961; Little, 1965a, 1965b). However, as sodalities are not the main focus of this study I did not want to invest a substantial amount of time in this difficult task. I was also concerned that exposing privileged knowledge intended for sodality members alone would impose high costs on research participants.
through which chiefs in Bombali Sebora acquire authority over sodalities may well differ, this account appears to describe a similar phenomenon. During the period of observation, I observed one sodality-related case being heard in the barri which related to a young female initiate who had broken the laws of the main female society, Bondo, by entering a site where only more senior members (sowei) were permitted; the barri officiators asked that my research assistant not translate the details.

Witchcraft cases are among the most serious considered by the barri. The nefarious practices attributed to witches in Temne areas include the consumption of human flesh and blood, shape-shifting into wild animals to carry out violent attacks, and the theft of crops and money; most of these acts are carried out invisibly (Shaw, 1997, pp. 858-861). The chairman of the barri referred to some of these ‘invisible’ practices in explaining why fines imposed for witchcraft were so high:

The wealth of people they have destroyed is what they are paying for…The rice that you heard they were asked to pay, it is people’s rice that they destroyed and when they are asked to pay a bag of rice they grumble…The monies they have destroyed, sometimes one is trying to go overseas, they have the ability to stop the movement, also one may be interested to learn and they can stop it, and when they are asked to pay 200,000 Le (£38) they say it is too much!  

The barri officiators argued that they were better placed than the police and local courts to address witchcraft because the latter have to seek physical evidence, and cannot rely on ‘native’ techniques for identifying witches, which are more effective. In addition, the chairman explained that paramount chiefs acquire authority over the chiefdom’s sorcerers during their installation; in practice, nobody is permitted to seek out a sorcerer without first obtaining permission and purchasing a licence from the chiefdom administration.

The sole witchcraft case that I observed involved an accusation against six women and one young girl; those accused parties that I interviewed were extremely angry at the situation they found themselves in. They contested the strategy chosen by the barri officiators, who wanted them to swear ‘traditionally’ to their innocence, while they favoured a sorcerer capable of identifying witches. They argued that the process of swearing would not exonerate them as an investigation by a sorcerer

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184 Translated from Temne.
185 A second matter of witchcraft which had occurred elsewhere in the chiefdom was brought to the barri’s attention by a sub-chief who was seeking Pa Rok’s approval for the sanctions imposed.
186 The person making the accusation was a young girl. Her family was not willing to be interviewed.
would. Moreover, they complained that they had been required to pay large sums of money before the accusations against them were proven—“they are just extorting money from us”, one of the accused said. However, none argued that their case should have been taken to another court and despite their dissatisfaction the parties were complying with the barri officiators’ orders, with one exception. One woman sought out assistance from a human rights NGO; the husband of another accused party explained this in terms of her inability to pay the fines required, saying:

“…those that God left without money, they found a solution themselves, they went to report to civil society”\(^{187}\). If he is right, the involvement of a human rights NGO did not signify an outright rejection of the chiefs’ authority to judge witchcraft cases, but rather represented an attempt to secure protection against possible enforcement action by the barri, or to establish leverage in negotiating a reduction in the fine.

In sum, the data I collected suggest that there is a sufficient basis of local belief to support Pa Rok’s jurisdictional claims over sodalities and control of witchcraft. When Pa Rok articulates an exclusive role for the barri in hearing these kinds of cases, and subject-citizens bring such cases to be heard by the barri officiators, this represents an instance of re-authorization through a “process of assertion, legitimization and exercise” (Lund, 2007, p. 7). The process of legitimization is particularly effective because sodalities invoke intense popular loyalties and control of witchcraft assuages popular anxieties. By forging a linkage between the barri and these evocative areas, I suggest that Pa Rok encourages a spill-over effect from re-authorization of the barri to re-authorization of chieftaincy more broadly. Support for this can be found in the work of Peter Geschiere (1996), who argues that chiefs’ perceived capability to deal with occult forces is a key marker of the legitimacy of their authority in general.

Chiefs’ performance as mobilizers of unpaid labour to maintain community infrastructure appears to be less central to contemporary chiefly identity and therefore chiefs’ failure to achieve the necessary level of “voluntary compliance” (Lund, 2007, p. 7) to mobilize labour successfully does not profoundly threaten the authority of chieftaincy as an institution in contemporary Makeni. The historical background set out in chapter three is suggestive of why this might be the case. When colonization

\(^{187}\) “…so di wan dem we Gəd mek dem nə bin get, demsef ən…solushən, so dem go na sivul sosayati go mek di ripət”
reconfigured chiefs’ powers at the turn of the twentieth century, the substantial loss of judicial power was one of the most serious consequences (Kilson, 1966, pp. 14-17; Joko-Smart, 1968, p. 34; Wylie, 1977, pp. 190-207; Abraham, 1978, pp. 241-244, 125-130). From serving as the highest point of appeal within their territories, chiefs were reduced to providing the lowest tier of justice in a system controlled by the colonial government.\textsuperscript{188} The jurisdiction of chiefs’ courts was curtailed to exclude all cases involving ‘non-natives’, serious criminal cases (including murder, witchcraft, slavery and cannibalism) and inter-faction or inter-chieffdom disputes. Wylie (1977, p. 191) argues that this was “a direct blow to perhaps the most important powers of the chiefs” and Abraham (1978, pp. 128-129) concludes that “the former powers of a chief were probably reduced by more than half”. At the same time, it is also acknowledged that some of these restrictions on jurisdiction were flouted in practice (Finnegan, 1965, p. 22).

In contrast, chiefs’ powers to command unpaid communal labour are generally considered to have been expanded significantly by colonial legislation (Reno, 1995, pp. 37-40). Colonial official J.S. Fenton (1951, p. 4) writes, “By giving the chief legal rights to labour…Government greatly strengthened the position of chiefs…and rendered the office more secure and attractive”. These expanded powers to command communal labour are properly understood in the context of the concurrent decline of domestic slavery. Slave trading in the interior was abolished with the declaration of the Protectorate and in the late 1920s further measures were taken to abolish domestic slavery (Little, 1967, p. 260; Ferme, 2001, p. 81; Shaw, 2002, p. 38; Richards, 2005b, p. 583). Colonial recognition of a right to unpaid labour can therefore be interpreted both as a means of winning chiefs’ support at a time when their powers to acquire slaves were being curtailed, but also of providing some regulation (or at least the appearance of regulation) of labour practices at a time when abolitionist sentiment in Britain was strong (Abraham, 1978, p. 269; Reno, 1995, pp. 37-40). Maintaining an extensive network of dependents, including slaves, was an important component of chiefly identity, and ‘wealth in people’ remains a significant indicator of social status today (Ferme, 2001, pp. 172-173; Shaw, 2002, p. 164). However, powers to call on

\textsuperscript{188} The Protectorate Ordinance (1896) created a three-tiered court system, consisting of: the Court of the District Commissioner, the Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs and the Courts of the Native Chiefs. In 1903, the second tier was dissolved, and the Circuit Court of the Colony (presided over by a professional magistrate) was introduced as the highest tier.
unpaid communal labour were not bound up with chiefly identity in the same way, but were in large part a colonial innovation; a “powerful administrative instrument” (Richards, 2005b, p. 584) drawn upon by chiefs heavily as restrictions on domestic slavery increased.

Approximately fifty years later, the use of unpaid communal labour was a far more prominent issue in the anti-chief uprisings in the North than abuse of judicial powers (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, pp. 156-159, 162-158). The Forced Labour Ordinance (1932) gave chiefs a right to call upon unpaid communal labour to work their farms; build and maintain their houses, offices and compounds; and transport themselves and their goods. In addition, unpaid labour could be called upon for the construction and maintenance of community infrastructure and for public health activities such as sanitation, care of water supplies, and so on (Fenton, 1951, p. 9). The Cox Commission strongly criticized chiefs’ use of unpaid labour for commercial farming, citing “overwhelming evidence” (p. 166) of widespread impropriety; chiefs came under further criticism for using unpaid labour to build modern private homes, many of which were targeted for destruction by rioters. The Commission emphasized the lack of normative support for chiefs’ right to unpaid labour: “We have found no witness who can be said to support forced labour for chiefs as an ideal concept and very few who came even near to such a view” (p. 167). The Commission was even uneasy about the use of unpaid labour for “minor communal services”, noting that “the difficulty remains of deciding which communal services are ‘minor’ and as soon as the sanctions applicable for non-service become greater than the effect of public opinion the labour seems to be forced” (p. 162). The Commission therefore recommended that legislation enabling chiefs to call for forced labour be repealed without compensation.

The Cox Commission (1956, pp. 186-196) was also critical of the practices of ‘native’ courts, but the criticism was somewhat less searing, and appeared to be motivated in part by its commitment to preserving colonial power. The Commission reported that witnesses had made two main sets of allegations: that there had been “irregularities” in the operation of chiefs’ courts and that extra-judicial fining was widespread. The irregularities cited do seem likely to have been of significant popular concern, particularly fines “exact...to the limit of the convicted man’s capacity to pay” (p. 189); failure by courts to investigate or adjudicate in some cases even after substantial payments had been made; and biased judgements. However, in
its analysis of extra-judicial fining, the Commission appears to conflate two distinct practices: the imposition of illegitimate fines by tax assessment committees and sanitary overseers, and the imposition of fines when a chief hears cases outside of his official court “on what he considers to be his own authority and in his own premises” (Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, p. 188). While the former practice is likely to have stirred popular resentment, the latter appears to be of concern in large part because it challenges the colonial administration’s status as the ultimate source of judicial power. The Commission argued, “[a]ll attempts on the part of anyone to exercise judicial powers without being vested with such powers [italics mine] must be ruthlessly suppressed” (p. 195). This links to the colonial administration’s broader interest—expressed in an assessment of the ‘native’ court system two years prior to the outbreak of anti-chief violence by colonial official N.J. Brooke—in establishing a state of affairs in which all courts can be “properly supervised and brought into a uniform system” in which customary and English law were fused together (Brooke, 1953, p. 18). The Cox Commission and Brooke were caught between wanting to bring all judicial activity under colonial control and recognizing that the administration lacks the capacity to achieve this. The compromise solution they both proposed is that chiefs (including sub-chiefs) should be permitted to continue resolving disputes outside of the court system, as long as they restrict themselves to arbitration and do not deploy any sanctions. Within the court system, the Commission sought to reposition paramount chiefs as appeal judges, thus pursuing reform, rather than abolition, of their judicial powers.189

The Sierra Leone government’s response to the Cox Commission’s report also reflects the greater weight given to the issue of forced labour as a driver of dissent. In a widely circulated public notice following the publication of the report, the government highlighted forced labour as an issue that required immediate action: “All demands for forced or compulsory labour by Chiefs or any other persons must cease forthwith and the necessary legislation will be introduced as soon as possible.” The government followed through on this swiftly with the enactment of the Prohibition of

189 Fanthorpe et al (2009, p. 18) argue that in any case by the time of the uprisings “it had…become administrative policy to take Native Courts out of Paramount Chiefs’ personal control and to appoint Court Presidents to serve for limited terms”. The Cox Commission (1956, p. 191) notes that in some chiefdoms there were centrally appointed court presidents or de facto presidents who regularly deputized for the paramount chief, but suggests that courts headed by paramount chiefs remained the norm, as does N.J. Brooke (1953, p. 21).
Forced Labour Ordinance (1956), although in the legislation a specific exception was made for “minor communal services” prescribed by local authorities or public officers, as long as members of the community “have the right to be consulted in the regard to the need for such services”. The government did not include a response on chiefs’ courts in the public notice (although the illegitimacy of extra-judicial fines was underlined), but did respond in its written statement on the Cox Commission’s report. Here the government agreed that “illegal ‘Courts’ must be suppressed”, but deferred its judgement on the other reforms proposed on the grounds that “detailed examination…must necessarily take considerable time” (Sierra Leone Government, 1956, p. 15). Indeed, seven years elapsed between the publication of this statement and the passage of the Local Courts Act (1963) which reformed ‘native’ courts; the Act established central control over the appointment of local court presidents (chiefs were by now excluded from this role); provided for a right of appeal to courts operating according to ‘English’ law; and made “adjudication without authority” a punishable offence.

Chiefly powers to call upon unpaid communal labour, never as closely linked to chiefly identity as judicial powers, were therefore heavily discredited in the North following the 1955-56 uprisings. Former district officer P.S. Mould (1966) finds that “widespread popular feeling against the traditional authority of chiefs and its more despotic manifestations” (p. 31) following the uprisings meant that the use of communal labour in rural development projects was delayed until the early 1960s in Northern Bombali District, while developing from the mid-1950s in the South and East. When this practice began to gain pace in Bombali District, it did so in the context of prime ministerial support for voluntary effort and an emerging development industry of NGOs and international volunteers. While chiefs continued to play a key role in mobilizing labour during this resurgence, they now had to coordinate with these new actors and also faced the challenge of how to incentivize workers (Mould, 1966). These developments are likely to have contributed to a further erosion of the link between chiefly identity and the mobilization of unpaid labour in the post-colonial period, particularly in urban contexts where wage labour dominates.

Chiefly exercise of judicial powers, while also criticized by the Cox Commission, was not discredited to the same degree. While by the 1960s chiefs had been ousted from presiding over cases in official local courts (Barrows, 1976, p. 108),
these courts continued to operate as part of the chiefdom administration. The transfer of powers to appoint local court presidents (later chairs) to the centre was not always observed in practice. Initially paramount chiefs retained influence over appointments as long as they were allied politically with the centre; during the 1970s the posts were centrally distributed by the APC as marks of patronage; and by the 1980s control over appointments generally returned to chiefs (Fanthorpe, et al., 2009, p. 20). Moreover, acceptance of chiefly involvement in ‘arbitration’ preserved a space for chiefs to continue hearing cases outside of the court system as before. As a result, the strong link between chiefly identity and deciding cases which already existed at the declaration of the Protectorate was able to weather the storm of anti-chief sentiment in the mid-1950s with relative success. Thus the distinct origins of chiefly adjudication and mobilization of unpaid communal labour and the historical trajectory each followed subsequently helps to explain why the former remains more critical to chiefly identity than the latter.

This comparison also suggests that the centrality of chiefly adjudication to chiefly identity may well have been reinforced by the decline of chiefly powers to mobilize unpaid labour. As chiefs came under pressure to refrain from heavy usage of unpaid labour for private gain, they are likely to have clung more tightly to their role in deciding cases as a source of authority. Paul Richards (2005b) sees an even closer linkage between the two areas, arguing that chiefs and elders in the Gola Forest region use their judicial powers specifically to secure the unpaid labour of young men, presumably given the difficulties faced in doing so through more direct channels.

6.3 Incentives and deterrents for subject-citizens

i) Private benefits and practical advantages vis-à-vis local courts

As discussed, the adjudication service offered by chiefs is a private good with positive externalities in the form of the public order it generates. When a complainant/accused has a case in Pa Rok’s barri, her primary concern is usually to “get in rayt”\(^{190}\) (have her rightful claim upheld), and secure the money and reputational benefits due to her. Arguably, these actors could secure similar benefits

\(^{190}\) This is a Krio phrase.
in the local courts, but there are numerous reasons why many subject-citizens prefer to pursue their interests in Pa Rok’s barri.

The service it offers is swifter, and usually cheaper. In the local courts, a complainant pays a standard summons of 15,000 Le (£2.85) and the accused party is given 14 days notice before her court appearance. In the barri, the amount of bora paid is flexible and it is common for the case to begin the same day as it is brought or the following day. The barri does not keep written records, which allows for a faster and less stilted hearing and appeals to some subject-citizens because there is no permanent record of the dispute which could be used against them in the future. Further, the proceedings at the barri take place in the Temne language, while Krio is usually used at the local court.

In addition to these practical advantages, some prefer the barri over local courts because of their beliefs in the favourable quality of chiefly judgement or in chiefs’ appropriateness to hear certain kinds of cases, including sodality and witchcraft cases. One aspect of the barri’s judgements that some favour is their sensitivity to family dynamics than the local courts. The barri’s secretary said:

In that barri, we look at the relationship between people. In traditional courts they don’t want to know whether…this man is your brother or your sister…all they do is follow the law and if you…follow the law all throughout, the family relationship may hamper somewhere.

This view was echoed by one of the claimants in the court, who had encouraged his daughter to bring her case against a young female relative to the barri rather than the local court in order to avoid too many problems developing between them. At the end of the case, his daughter did not keep all the money awarded to her, but returned half of the winnings to the accused who had now admitted she was at fault—an immediate reconciliatory step.

Some members of a chiefly elite favour the barri because they believe they can secure preferential treatment there. On the occasions that I witnessed relatives participating in cases in the barri there was evidence of sympathetic treatment, but the barri officiators did not always pervert the course of justice in their relatives’ favour. For example, a complaint was brought against one of Pa Rok’s sisters regarding an unpaid debt of a rɔba¹⁹² (plastic container used to hold palm oil) to a fellow trader.

¹⁹¹ Here he means conventional courts like the local courts and the magistrate’s court.
¹⁹² This is a Krio term.
She refused to return the *bora* on the grounds that she did not have enough money. She was briefly sent to sit in the ‘criminal chair’, from where she continued to argue with the barri officiators. Eventually, the barri officiators returned the *bora* to the complainant and asked her to forgive Pa Rok’s sister, who it was agreed would return the container. An accused party with less prestigious connections would have been forced to stay in the ‘criminal chair’ until the money for the *bora* was brought to the barri and would have been severely scolded for arguing with the barri officiators. Nevertheless, the wrong she had committed was acknowledged by the barri and the debt was not forgiven. This incident suggests that a norm to decide cases fairly is in tension with a norm to provide preferential treatment to one’s relatives and allies.

As community infrastructure produced through chiefly mobilization of unpaid labour is closer to a classic public good, there are no comparable private benefits available to youth for offering their labour or to community members for making contributions to support this labour. These actors are therefore more vulnerable to the free-rider problem—there is a reduced incentive to contribute labour or money, as all will have a share in the good produced regardless. However, this free-riding problem could be overcome by sufficiently motivated and authoritative chiefs. As a point of comparison, accused parties who know they are liable to lose their cases also face disincentives to comply with the barri, yet do so regardless. In subsequent sections I argue that the key differences are the somewhat oppositional interests of chiefs and youth, as compared to the aligned interests of chiefs and the chiefly elite which constitutes a key user group for the barri; and the stronger sanctions against non-cooperation in the case of the barri which are in turn linked to higher levels of popular acceptance of chiefs’ authority in this arena.

**ii) Vested interests in the ascendency of chieftaincy**

Chiefs’ most important partners in mobilizing unpaid labour to maintain community infrastructure are youth. As briefly discussed earlier in this chapter, Richards (2005b) views the opposition between a chiefly elite and subaltern youth in stark terms. He argues that chiefs seek to exploit youth labour through customary marriage arrangements which involve long-standing labour obligations and onerous fines which impoverished youth are forced to repay in kind. Those in support of this argument tend to view youth associationalism as a strategy for resisting domination by a chiefly elite (Fithen & Richards, 2005). Fanthorpe and Maconachie (2010) argue
for a more nuanced account of youth-chief relations, which takes into account young people’s “complex and multiple interconnections with established authority structures” (254). Many of their observations about post-war youth associationalism and youth-chief relations resonate with my own findings. Like them, I find that the powerful influence of post-war aid in Makeni makes it difficult to determine the longer term social significance of contemporary forms of youth associationalism. Youth groups are often formed within the context of specific development initiatives, and are focused on capturing donor funding. Similarly, I concur with their view that there is weak evidence of youth pursuing associationalism as a means to exit the patronage system. Makeni’s chiefs continue to deploy strategies of incorporation to co-opt influential youth leaders; for example, the former chairman of MUYOG now serves on both the chiefdom youth council and the district youth council. Youths actively seek chiefly support for their personal and collective initiatives, often engaging them as patrons who will advocate on their behalf.

The paramount chief himself is relatively popular among young people, with a reputation for responding supportively when called upon, and many of Makeni’s youth describe their relations with chiefs as “cordial” at first response. However, relations between youth and sub-chiefs are often more fraught. Sub-chiefs sometimes behave like jealous competitors, resenting youth efforts to initiate development activities independently, as well as the political attention they receive. One young man and youth group member described this rivalry, “…when it’s time for election, when the councillors and MPs come, they target us young men. Sometimes the chiefs become jealous…They say we are not more important than them, they are the big ones.” He described a recent contest between his friend and the local sub-chief’s favoured candidate for a position on one of the WDCs set up to liaise with MCC. His friend was successful, but was subsequently warned by the chief and his allies that he would fall victim to a witch gun 193 attack if he went against the chief’s wishes. “As long as we challenge them, we become enemies to them,” he said.

Chief-youth relations in Makeni seem to be very uneven and many of the youth whose efforts are required to maintain community infrastructure appear to feel

193 Rosalind Shaw (2002, p. 208) describes a witch gun as “a weapon constructed out of such materials as a piece of papaya stalk (or other tube-like object), a grain of sand (or other potential missile), and an explosive powder to activate it” which a witch can transform into “a piece of lethal artillery that may be used to shoot victims from considerable distances”.

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quite ambivalent about chieftaincy as an institution. While they do not necessarily seek its downfall, nor do they have a vested interest in enabling the renewal of chiefly authority and shoring up the institution. Young people who are members of ruling houses are likely to be an exception to this rule, but they are the least likely to remain long in the ranks of youth (understood as a political category), and are also least likely to be shouldering the burden of demand for unpaid labour.

My period of observation of the barri suggested that it was used at high frequency by members of a chiefly elite. In total, I observed thirty-five matters\textsuperscript{194} being discussed at the barri; it became evident during proceedings that at least nine of these (approximately 25\%) involved members of ruling houses.\textsuperscript{195} Three of these matters involved complaints brought by chiefs and prominent members of ruling houses about disrespectful behaviour, three were relatively minor cases which happened to be complaints against relatives of chiefs, one was a dispute between two young girls (and their families) who were both members of a chiefly elite and two were more serious matters that involved complaints against the paramount chief and Pa Rok. The very existence of the barri is a marker of the political ascendancy of chieftaincy; the chiefly elite has a vested interest in maintaining this state of affairs because their own status is enhanced by association. The barri also offers a venue where members of a chiefly elite can advance their private interests through bringing cases, and enjoy a more sympathetic hearing when cases are brought against them. These actors are therefore incentivized to provide robust support to the barri, both participating actively in efforts to legitimize its operations and complying with its commands.

Yet the chiefly elite does not seem to monopolize all of the benefits of the barri. To an extent, the barri also appears to be a venue where the behaviour of a chiefly elite is regulated—petty cases were brought against known relatives of chiefs and concerns were raised there about the behaviour of senior chiefs. In addition, there does not appear to be a bar to cases being brought by those of lower status. Lying in close proximity to the main market, the ‘bread and butter’ of the barri lies in enforcing the repayment of often modest debts between traders—10 of the 35 matters

\textsuperscript{194} Some of these matters became cases heard by the barri; others were simply discussed and it was agreed that they would be resolved elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{195} Others may have done so; given the dynamic nature of proceedings and my desire to observe in a non-intrusive way, it was not possible to speak to all of those involved in matters brought before the barri.
I observed were debt cases. Given the emphasis in the literature on chieftaincy as a mode of governance that upholds the power of a male gerontocracy (Richards, 2005b; Jackson, 2006), the particular investment of the chiefly elite in the barri raises concerns about adverse consequences for women and youth. The barri officiators did express bias against women in the context of family matters, generally portraying women as the source of problems within the family. At the same time, women (who are well-represented among traders) were active users of the barri—18 out of the 35 matters raised there were brought by female complainants. Only five cases obviously involved somebody who could be described as a youth, and in three of those cases the young person was the complainant. This could be interpreted as evidence that the barri was not a popular venue for youth to bring cases; at the same time, there was no evidence of an elderly elite using the barri to discipline youth or to gain control of their labour (Richards, 2005b; Mokuwa, et al., 2011). Given the hierarchical nature of Sierra Leonean society, I interpret the chiefly elite’s active use of and compliance with the barri as reinforcing a more general norm of compliance, while at the same time observing that it has an impact on the fairness of decision-making.

iii) Acceptance of chiefly authority and related strength of sanctions

In my discussion of the incentives motivating chiefs, I have highlighted the extent to which the renewal of chiefly authority is a cyclical process of “assertion, legitimization and exercise” (Lund, 2007, p. 6). The legitimization of the barri by subject-citizens through active uptake of its services (when local courts are also available) and general willingness to comply with its instructions empower the barri officiators to impose strong sanctions against the minority who seek to evade its authority. While willingness to comply with the barri is in large part the result of subject-citizens’ voluntary acceptance of chiefly authority, sanctions also play a role in maintaining high levels of compliance.

The barri officiators do allow subject-citizens an exit option in the form of transferring their cases to other courts. Aside from this, they employ multiple enforcement tactics to ensure subject-citizen compliance. The barri messenger is sent out to pursue those who do not respond to requests to appear. The barri officiators publicly chastise those they perceive to be disrespecting their authority in the barri,

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196 Although I cannot say conclusively how many involved somebody from a ruling house.
and in some cases impose spot fines. Those who refuse to pay barri fees and fines or who default on debt repayments are sent to sit in the ‘criminal chair’ until somebody comes to their aid. The barri officiators also make liberal use of threats to send non-compliant individuals to the local court cell at Makump. Local court chairpeople are not necessarily willing to support chiefs to follow through on this threat. One complained, “Well you don’t just bring somebody to the local court and serve him a criminal warrant…What has he done now? Or is it because he didn’t go to your court, the kangaroo court…When I put somebody in prison unlawfully, I am the one that has that problem.” Nevertheless, those I spoke to generally believed that barri officiators had the power to imprison people, which renders the threat effective.

Aside from these sanctions, which work by imposing monetary and reputational costs on those individuals who disobey the barri officiators’ instructions, there is a risk that non-compliance will result in a lasting enmity with the barri officiators, and with Pa Rok in particular. Falling into the bad graces of a powerful chief like Pa Rok, who is known to defend his reputation and authority vigorously, can be quite dangerous. Ceremonial chiefs retain their positions for life, so an enmity with such a person can have a lasting impact on a person’s well-being. Pa Rok is involved in many different aspects of social and economic life in Makeni, and therefore has the potential to hurt his enemies in a wide variety of ways, not least by bringing cases against them.

In the case of mobilization of unpaid labour, a cycle of de-authorization of chiefly authority appears to have been initiated which has an incrementally corrosive effect, redefining the scope of chiefly authority over time. In general, sub-chiefs are not aggressive in asserting their right to mobilize unpaid labour due to weak incentives to do so. The lukewarm response of youth to the calls for labour that they do make further undermines their legitimacy in this domain, weakening chiefly authority. For the most part, disempowered and weakly incentivized sub-chiefs bring relatively few sanctions against those who refuse to contribute money or labour to maintenance of community infrastructure. While Pa Rok could involve himself in pressurizing youth to cooperate more fully with chiefly efforts to mobilize labour, he

197 “Wot yon no jis bring sombôdi na di lokal kot, yu kam sav dis posin kriminal…Wetin i doun naw?!...bi kok i no go na di kangaroo kot we na una kot de…Wen a put sombôdi onóful na prison, na mi got da problem de.”
chooses not to do so. If this cycle continues, chiefs’ role in mobilizing unpaid labour is likely to diminish further, perhaps until the scope of chiefly authority excludes this activity altogether.

Concluding comments

Pa Rok and the barri officiators have strong incentives to remain competitive as providers of public order. The barri generates revenue on a daily basis which is used to fulfil Pa Rok’s customary obligations, sustain a network of ceremonial chiefs and provide a livelihood for those he has chosen to work in the barri. In this way, Pa Rok is able to use his position to provide for a network of supporters who will remain loyal to him. Ensuring that the main chiefdom barri remains in operation also appears to be critical to maintaining the authority of chieftaincy as an institution. By claiming exclusive jurisdiction over sodality and witchcraft cases, Pa Rok is able to tap into subject-citizens’ beliefs about chiefs’ role in sodalities and control of witchcraft to legitimize the barri and renew its authority effectively. Mobilizing unpaid labour to maintain community infrastructure can be a costly, rather than profitable, activity and is less closely bound up with chiefly identity and thus less significant to the authority of chieftaincy as an institution; there are historical reasons for this difference. Given these weak incentives, Makeni’s chiefs are not fighting to hold on to this role as newer actors with an interest in mobilizing youth labour step in.

Incentives for subject-citizens to comply with chiefs’ wishes are multiple and complex, and different combinations of incentives are likely to be relevant to differently positioned actors. Many of those participating in cases at the barri are more motivated by the private goods that accrue to them when they win a case than the broader public order benefits enjoyed by all of Makeni’s residents. They are often attracted by the practical advantages and qualitative differences in judgements offered by the barri as compared to its main competitor, the local courts. A substantial proportion of the barri’s clients are members of a chiefly elite who have a vested interest in the ascendancy of chieftaincy which is buttressed through the barri’s operations; this may encourage some who are liable to lose their cases to comply with the barri regardless. Motivated by the benefits they receive through its operation and emboldened by subject-citizens’ acceptance of the barri’s authority, Pa Rok and the barri officiators enforce the barri’s instructions vigorously, further contributing to high levels of subject-citizen compliance.
Subject-citizens providing money or labour for the maintenance of community infrastructure, particularly youth, are keenly aware of those who benefit from their sacrifices without making matching contributions. While characterization of chief-youth relations as a form of class struggle may not be empirically supported, youth in Makeni appear to be fairly ambivalent towards chiefs and therefore do not have a strong vested interest in the perpetuation of chiefly authority which might motivate them to comply with chiefly requests for unpaid labour in order to shore up the institution of chieftaincy. Weak sanctions against non-cooperation with chiefly mobilization efforts, which are likely to reflect chiefs’ lack of investment in this good, as well as youth attitudes to chiefly calls for labour, leave the free-riding problem unaddressed.
### Table 6.A.1 Key rules and norms underpinning the coproduction of public order by barri officiators and subject-citizens in Pa Rok’s barri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of rule/norm</th>
<th>Content of rules (R) and norms (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong></td>
<td>There are two positions: 1) an LGA; and 2) a subject-citizen coproducer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary (entry and exit rules)</td>
<td>LGA: Chiefs must take on the role of LGA responsible for delivering public order through deciding cases (or else see their authority diminish) (R); chiefs may delegate their authority to hear cases to non-chiefs (barri officiators) (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subject-citizen coproducer: Subject-citizens must take on the role of coproducers of public order (or else face punishment by chiefs/their peers) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Choice</strong></td>
<td>Access: Barri officiators should hear all cases brought to the barri (N)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairness: Barri officiators should decide cases fairly (N)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relatives/allies: Barri officiators should be sympathetic to the interests of relatives and allies when deciding cases (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jurisdiction: Barri officiators must not hear criminal cases (or else face punishment by the police/central government) (R); barri officiators may hear civil cases (N); barri officiators should hear all cases related to sodalities and witchcraft (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiating cases: Subject-citizens should bring cases to the barri officiators (N)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Venue: Barri officiators must permit subject-citizens to choose the venue in which their cases are heard (or else face punishment by central government) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attendance: Subject-citizens must attend the barri when summoned by the barri officiators (or else face punishment by the barri officiators) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payment: Subject-citizens must pay a bora and specified fees to the barri officiators (or else their cases will not be heard) (R); subject-citizens must pay any fines imposed by the barri officiators (or else face punishment by the barri officiators) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of resources: Pa Rok must use revenue from the barri to meet his obligations to the relatives of the former paramount chief (or else face disgrace) (R)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Third parties: Third parties should serve as witnesses and sureties for the parties involved in the case (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Honesty: Subject-citizens must answer chiefs’ questions about the cases honestly (or else face divine/supernatural punishment) (R)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Language: Barri officiators and subject-citizens should communicate in Temne (N); if one party to the case does not speak Temne, a translator must be used (or else the case will not proceed) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of rule/norm</td>
<td>Content of rules (R) and norms (N)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aggregation</td>
<td>Decision: Subject-citizens must accept the final decision of the barri officiators (or else face punishment by the barri officiators) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeal: Barri officiators must permit subject-citizens to ‘appeal’ their cases through a second hearing in a local court (or else face punishment by central government) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payoff</td>
<td>Venue/appeal: If barri officiators refuse to allow subject-citizens to choose the venue in which their cases are heard or prevent them from ‘appealing’ their cases through a second hearing in a local court, representatives of central government may intervene to shut down the operations of the barri (or else if barri officiators resist they may punish them further) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attendance/decision: If subject-citizens refuse to attend the barri when summoned or refuse to accept the final decision of the barri officiators, they may be treated as enemies by Pa Rok and his supporters (or else if subject-citizens resist Pa Rok may escalate his expressions of enmity) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fees/fines: If subject-citizens refuse to pay the fees/fines imposed by the barri officiators, they may be sent to the criminal chair (or else if they resist the barri officiators may punish them further, including through imprisonment if the local court is willing to cooperate) (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of rule/norm</td>
<td>Content of rules (R) and norms (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>There are two positions: 1) an LGA; and 2) a subject-citizen coproducer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Boundary (entry and exit rules) | LGA: Chiefs should take on the role of LGA mobilizing subject-citizens to maintain public infrastructure (N)  
Subject-citizen coproducer: Youths must take on the role of subject-citizen coproducer contributing their labour to maintain public infrastructure (or else face punishment by chiefs) (R)* |
| Choice | Resources: Chiefs must provide resources for subject-citizens to carry out maintenance of public infrastructure (or else subject-citizens will not cooperate) (R)  
Mobilization: Chiefs must deploy strategies to motivate subject-citizens to contribute their labour (or else subject-citizens will not cooperate) (R)  
Labour: Subject-citizens must contribute their labour when called upon (or else face punishment by chiefs/their peers) (R)* |
| Information | Subject-citizens should make chiefs aware when efforts to maintain public infrastructure are needed (N) |
| Aggregation | Chiefs should identify when efforts to maintain public infrastructure are needed and call upon subject-citizens to contribute their labour (N) |
| Payoff | Labour: If subject-citizens refuse to contribute their labour when called upon, they may face the disapproval of their peers, fines or other chiefly punishments (or else if they resist they may be punished further) (R) |
| Scope | None |

Note: Those rules marked with a star (*) are weakly enforced
Images

Image 6.1 Pa Rok’s barri, September 2009 (author’s photograph)

Image 6.2 Paramount Chief Kasangna’s barri, September 2009 (author’s photograph)
CHAPTER SEVEN: Comparing Success and Failure in the Coproduction of Local Public Goods

In this chapter, I draw together some of the diverse strands of discussion introduced in chapters five and six. I consider how these cases fit with existing theories of coproduction, and what they add to them. I then set out four inter-related propositions about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in Sierra Leone in the short- to medium-term. While these propositions are based principally on the micro-level evidence contained in the case studies, I draw connections to a broader set of case study material on local public goods provision in developing countries where relevant. The propositions are generalizations to the level of theory—they have not been tested. As discussed in chapter one, they are most relevant to small and medium-sized urban settings in Sierra Leone, but may have applicability to other settings in Sierra Leone as well as comparable urban settings elsewhere in West Africa. To conclude, I revisit the analytical framework applied and address some of the criticisms likely to be levelled against it.

7.1 Theories of coproduction revisited

My choice of coproduction as an analytical lens was based on the affinities I perceived between the four cases studied and Joshi and Moore’s (2004) account of coproduction. None of the cases I describe are deliberate efforts by LGAs to encourage citizen participation in order to improve the quality of public goods provision or governance, such as those described by Ostrom (1996). Two of the cases—a clean market and community infrastructure—are principally a response to weak state capacity; they have “governance drivers”. (Subject-)citizen labour substitutes for the labour of public workers, and financial contributions plug critical resource gaps to enable provision of these goods to take place. The remaining two cases—public order and safe supply of meat—have more complex drivers. In these cases, the inputs made by (subject-)citizens and LGAs are interdependent. The butchers control the cattle slaughtered and screened at the slaughterhouse and have valuable information about signs of cattle disease in the region, while only subject-citizens can provide the information required for the barri officiators to decide cases. The interdependence of inputs in these cases means that it would be very difficult or impossible for LGAs to provide these goods alone (Parks, et al., 1981; Ostrom, 1996).
However, this does not exclude the possibility that weak state capacity plays a role in structuring these coproductive arrangements.

In the context of interdependence, (subject-)citizen inputs can move along the spectrum from just meeting minimum requirements to far exceeding them. In the cases studied, the burden on (subject-)citizens is quite heavy. Butchers must cover all of the transportation costs, slaughter the cattle themselves and pay user fees intended to cover the full operating costs of the facility. The barri is also fully funded through user fees and subject-citizens bear the bulk of the logistical work in pulling together a case. These cases raise difficult questions about where the boundary between state and (subject-)citizen responsibility for provision should properly lie, but there is certainly a good argument to be made that as a consequence of state weakness the inputs required of subject-citizens are unreasonably high. These cases can therefore also be considered to have governance drivers.

The provision of public order through a chief’s barri can be read as a response to weak state capacity in a second sense, in that it is an example of chiefs and their delegates providing a good for which another state institution is officially responsible. Returning to Helmke and Levitsky’s (2006) theory of informal institutions discussed in chapter two, the system of chiefs’ barris is a clear example of an informal institution which is “substituting” for a formal one—the local court system—even in the face of hostile legislation. There are two possible explanations for this: local courts are unable to meet the level of local demand for legal services, or local courts provide a service that compares unfavourably with that offered by chiefs’ barris. These explanations are not mutually exclusive and the evidence suggests that some combination of the two applies. Local courts in Makeni are busy and waiting times relatively long which suggests they are over-subscribed, yet local court chairmen clearly view chiefs as competitors rather than allies managing an overflow service. In the words of one court chairman:

[Pa Rok’s barri] is disturbing us greatly…we want cases, plenty of cases, at the local court because we pay into revenue…when he holds on to a lot of cases you find that he is disturbing the local courts…Because if his barri hadn’t been established, you would find that any case that somebody has,
either he would go to the magistrate or he would come to the local court, you see.\textsuperscript{198}

This attitude suggests competition prevails for at least a subset of cases (perhaps the most profitable ones). At the root of both explanations for the co-existence of chiefs’ barris and local courts is a problem of weak state capacity—the central state has failed to ensure an adequate supply of judicial services, to make certain that those services meet local demand and to enforce laws that prevent rival actors from providing competing services.

The situation regarding mobilization of unpaid labour for community infrastructure is more difficult to interpret. If it is accepted that chiefs and local councils both have an official mandate for this activity (in the form of legislation still in effect), then coproductive arrangements for the mobilization of unpaid labour led by both chiefs and local councils could be interpreted as “complementary” informal institutions. Indeed, the boundary between the formal and the informal could be considered blurred in these instances, as rules governing such arrangements are created in part through “officially sanctioned channels”, but largely communicated and enforced outside such channels.\textsuperscript{199} However, if local councils are treated as the proper authority with responsibility for community infrastructure, as the LG Act (2004) suggests, then chiefs once more appear to be substituting for another state agency. Under this interpretation, the continued involvement of chiefs in mobilizing unpaid labour for community infrastructure suggests either a failure of local councils to rapidly and effectively assume responsibility for this activity and/or of the central state to enforce new rules regarding the respective jurisdictions of LGAs. The difficulties faced in interpreting this case indicates the grey area in which chiefs tend to operate—they are formally recognized as part of local government yet their official mandate remains fuzzy and activities conducted through official channels bleed into more informal (even illegal) activity.

While even the more successful cases of coproduction I describe are motivated by necessity rather than desire, this does not preclude the possibility that these

\textsuperscript{198} “[Pa Rok in barri] de ambog wi gretli…wi go want kesis dem, mek dem plenti, [na di] lokal kot bikas na wi de pe revinu…wen i kin oł anto boku-boku kes dem yu de fen awt se i de ambog di lokal kot dem…Bikas if in bare nɔ de establish, yu fen awt se eni kes we sombɔdi oł, ˌi da i go magistre tɔ i kam na di lokal kot, yu si.”

\textsuperscript{199} Helmke and Levitsky (2006, p. 5) define informal institutions as “social shared rules…that are created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels”.
arrangements offer some advantages over provision carried out by LGAs exclusively. In the case of a clean market, LGA and trader inputs are substitutable: either local government workers could provide the labour required to gather waste or traders could do so. According to Ostrom (1996), coproductive provision is more efficient than government provision as long as the opportunity cost to coproducers is lower than the wage rate of government workers; while I cannot offer any precise calculation, this is likely to apply to market cleaning given that traders often carry out this work during quiet periods of the day when customer traffic is low.

In the case of public order generated by the barri, the inputs made by chiefs and their delegates and subject-citizens are interdependent and thus there is potential for synergy—each side can influence the other in a positive direction, leading to greater mutual effectiveness (Evans, 1996a; Ostrom, 1996). The account I set out in chapter six suggests that there is some synergy between the efforts of chiefs and their delegates and subject-citizens in the barri. Through their active cooperation with chiefs at the barri (for example, bringing cases, paying fees, giving testimony and abiding by judgements), subject-citizens provide necessary inputs of information and legitimize chiefs’ role as arbiters. Thus empowered and informed, chiefs and their delegates are able to perform effectively in terms of issuing and enforcing decisions. Their relative effectiveness sustains subject-citizens’ beliefs in their legitimacy and thus encourages ongoing cooperation. In contrast to the barri, local courts may constrain subject-citizens’ ability to testify by requiring the use of Krio, applying procedural and legal norms that are unfamiliar to some participants and by documenting testimony in writing. As a result, local courts may limit the potential for synergy between subject-citizens and officiators relative to barris.

Evidence of the broader governance benefits of coproduction anticipated by some authors is modest (Evans, 1996a; Ostrom, 1996; Ackerman, 2004; Mitlin, 2008). Ostrom (1996) and Ackerman (2004) see coproduction as offering opportunities for expanding participation in and influence over decision-making, including in core areas of state activity. In the cases I describe, (subject-)citizens take on largely operational rather than design roles and the areas of coproductive activity (with the important exception of the provision of public order) are not core state functions. Evans’ (1996a) and Ostrom’s (1996) arguments about coproduction as a
means to generate fungible developmental social capital\textsuperscript{200} have some limited applicability. The barri does generate social capital which ‘spills over’ to reinforce chiefly authority more broadly. However, as regards the standing of subject-citizens vis-à-vis their chiefs, the reinforcement of chiefly authority through the barri is a conservative rather than a transformative ‘spill over’ effect. While strong chiefly authority could have developmental effects by facilitating other forms of public goods provision, it could also encourage anti-developmental behaviour by chiefs interested in defending their authority from challenges (Acemoglu, et al., 2012). At the market, the relatively close engagement of the TU executive and MCC does provide a platform for cooperation in areas beyond waste management. However, the TU does not derive its influence over MCC so much from the “positive social relations” resulting from “practical engagement with the state” to clean the market (Mitlin, 2008, p. 351), as its control of valued material and political resources. Put another way, successful coproduction of a clean market is more a consequence of the TU’s influence over MCC than a cause of it (see 7.2 for further discussion on this point). This is illustrated by the contrasting situation of the butchers, who exercise relatively little influence over MCC despite an ongoing “practical engagement with the state”.

Joshi and Moore’s (2004) concerns about coproduction leading to blurred accountability do not seem particularly salient to these cases. In the context of an ethnographic study of local government in Tanzania, Kelsall, Siri Lange, Simeon Misaki and Max Mmuya (2005, p. 10) argue that applying Western theories of accountability is comparable to “trying to nail jelly to the wall”. They write:

Reality at local level is a fluid field of interpenetrating institutions and actors, informed by co-mingling cultures of accountability which place rather loose, and not always consistent, restraints on the actions of leaders.

This description fits the field of local public goods provision in Sierra Leone well. Given the prevalence of clientelism, the weakness of electoral routes to accountability, and the relative lack of civil society accountability-seeking, it seems fair to conclude that lines of LGA accountability to (subject-)citizens for public goods provision are already quite blurred. Coproduction cannot therefore be held responsible for a significant deterioration of clarity regarding accountability arrangements. In addition, (subject-)citizens involved in coproduction are not

\textsuperscript{200} Evans (1996a, p. 1033) uses this term to describe “norms of trust and reciprocity and the networks of repeated interaction that sustain them”.

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altogether exempt from societal accountability. For example, traders have an obligation to gather waste that is recognized by their peers; youth have an obligation to provide their labour for the maintenance of community infrastructure; and subject-citizens have an obligation to support their family and friends by serving as witnesses and sureties. Failure to meet these obligations is met by some degree of social disapproval—this may not always be a particularly robust accountability mechanism, but is perhaps comparable in strength to appeals to chiefs to meet their fatherly obligations to subject-citizens or to councillors to meet their obligations to their clients.

In terms of the material effects of coproduction on equality, three main concerns were raised by the literature discussed in chapter two: that coproduction would encourage a tiered system of citizenship in terms of entitlement to goods and services; that vulnerable populations would be exploited; and that elites would capture the benefits of coproduction, or use their involvement in coproduction to leverage greater political influence at the expense of the poor (Miraftab, 2004; Zerah, 2009; Boesten, et al., 2011). The council-led cases of coproduction provide fairly weak support for these claims. While there are risks of exploitation in terms of how waste gathering responsibilities are distributed among sub-groups of traders, there was no obvious tension around this issue and observation suggested that a wide variety of traders pitched in. There was some evidence of elite diversion of waste collection services (see section 7.3), but the extent of this appeared fairly modest. In the case of the slaughterhouse, coproductive arrangements took advantage of butchers’ political vulnerability to some extent, but there was no elite capture of the benefits generated through coproduction.

The chief-led cases of coproduction raise more significant concerns in terms of inequality. Coproduction aside, the organization of chieftdom government already implies a tiered system of citizenship which accords enhanced rights to some subject-citizens (for example, members of ruling houses and chieftdom councillors) and fails to recognize the claims of others altogether (Fanthorpe, 2001). As coproduction led by chiefs works through chiefly institutions, the hierarchical relations which underpin chieftaincy are generally reproduced in the process. Mobilization of unpaid labour to maintain community infrastructure relies heavily on the labour of youth, creating risks of exploitation; nevertheless, youth may gain some benefits from the infrastructure generated. Pa Rok’s barri provides an example of coproduction subject to elite
capture; chiefly elites enjoy preferential treatment when bringing cases to the barri and also benefit from the barri’s reinforcement of a social order within which they hold elevated status. However, lower-status subject-citizens also appear to use the barri to gain access to low-cost, swift resolution of disputes (see 7.2 for further discussion of this point). Neither case of coproduction studied appears to represent an expansion in scope of inequality, for example, through the reinscription of inequalities forged in one sphere of action in a second sphere of action. However, there is an argument to be made that chief-led forms of coproduction have historically influenced the way in which newer bodies such as local courts and local councils engage with (subject-)citizens, expanding the scope of inequality. To summarize, chief-led coproduction reproduces the inequalities which are characteristic of chiefdom government but tends to do so within the confines of recognized spheres of action; those subject-citizens whose unequal status is reproduced during the process of coproduction may nevertheless gain some benefit from the goods provided.

The cases studied therefore offer a rather mixed view of coproduction, providing some evidentiary support for the claims of both advocates and critics of this mode of local public goods provision. In light of these insights, in chapter eight I reflect on the potential value of coproduction as a means of addressing the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone. In the next section I build on the finding that coproduction provides one means of maintaining the flow of basic public goods in weak states where otherwise none might exist. I set out four propositions about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in post-war Sierra Leone, given features of the social and political environment such as weak electoral incentives for LGAs to provide public goods, intense resource scarcity in the public sector, low levels of popular trust in LGAs and overlapping LGA mandates for public goods provision.

**7.2 Conditions for successful coproduction: four propositions**

The more successful cases of coproduction are characterized by an alignment of LGA and coproducing partner incentives which enables meaningful and productive cooperation. This is not at all surprising, and indeed Ostrom’s (2005) IAD framework, which I employ in modified form, has an in-built assumption that two parties in an action situation will only cooperate if each calculates that the benefits of doing so are greater than those of non-cooperation. This does not imply an egalitarian
arrangement—as Ostrom (2005, p. 33) notes, “[i]n some action situations, the standing of the participants is grossly unequal, allowing some to have substantial power over others and the relative benefits they can achieve”. For example, one party could be incentivized to cooperate through coercive measures imposed by the other. Of greater interest are the insights these cases offer into the conditions under which an alignment of incentives might be achieved in urban Sierra Leonean and comparable contexts.

I argue that such an alignment of incentives is more likely to occur, and thus coproduction of local public goods is more likely to succeed:

a. When coproduction of a public good forms one component of a broader political exchange between LGAs and coproducing partners which provides supplementary motivation.

b. When low-cost monitoring of LGAs is integrated into the coproductive arrangements, overcoming the barrier of coproducing partners’ weak trust in government.

c. When coproduction is underpinned by a stable alliance between LGAs and a supportive elite, yet remains relatively inclusive.

d. When coproductive arrangements build on longstanding institutions which resonate with both LGAs and coproducing partners and facilitate collective action.\[201\]

I discuss each in turn to flesh out their meaning and significance.

i) Politicized exchange

As discussed in chapter one, a prominent feature of the political context in Makeni is that LGAs are largely disinterested in providing public goods for electoral reasons—this condition is likely to apply in most localities in Sierra Leone. In the case of democratically elected local councils, reasons for this disinterest include the low credibility of public goods promises, leading to reliance on patronage to win votes; the dominance of ethno-regional politics which means that the party rather than the people chooses local candidates; and reluctance on the part of local politicians to impose the costs associated with public goods provision on their constituents for fear of losing their seat (Juul, 2007; Keefer, 2007; Kandeh, 2008). Elected for life, chiefs

\[201\] This proposition is influenced by the broader work of the APPP Local Governance strand, which I describe in sub-section iv).
are well protected from electoral pressures once they have secured their position. As a result, LGAs are likely to be adequately incentivized to coproduce public goods only when they can secure essential resources—whether financial, political, or otherwise—through the process.

In the case study of a clean market presented in chapter five, the allure of the TU to MCC derives from the financial and political resources it controls. The TU is the gateway not only to the significant local revenue generated by market dues but also to donor revenue dependent on demonstrating a minimum level of results in terms of waste collection. In addition, the TU has the capacity to organize politically disruptive action against the council, or lend its support. The TU’s members value the collection of waste for its own sake, while executive members of the TU also stand to profit personally from deals brokered with MCC regarding market dues. The coproduction of a clean market is therefore not a neutral, technical exchange with parties making the required inputs to secure a commonly desired good; rather, it is a messy political exchange in which various parties seek to secure distinct outcomes that they value. To put it another way, bargains around political support and access to resources provide the motivation necessary for a bargain around public goods provision.

In contrast, the absence of a broader political exchange between MCC and the butchers means that MCC is not sufficiently motivated to pursue coproduction in earnest; instead, the council puts in the bare minimum of effort to keep the slaughterhouse running. This weakens the butchers’ motivation to attend the facility due to the poor quality of services provided. In this case, a bargain based solely on public goods provision fails; if it had been underpinned by linked bargains which provided further incentives for action, it may not have done so.

Joshi and Joseph Ayee (2002) reach a similar conclusion about the importance of politicized exchange in their analysis of a coproducive tax collection arrangement established at a national level between the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) and the Ghanaian government. The basis of this arrangement was a close political relationship between the GPRTU and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government (1981-2001). The GPRTU’s members played a critical role in political mobilization, providing vehicles to transport supporters to rallies and disseminating political propaganda to their passengers. They supported government decisions, even against those of the Trades Union Congress to which it belonged. A
GPRTU strike would also have meant significant economic disruption, giving the PNDC government good reason to keep the union on side. The GPRTU was rewarded for its political loyalty with monopolistic privileges such as sole control of lorry parks and the right to enforce road traffic violations; government support in disputes with rival unions; and favourable access to subsidized motor supplies. The coproduction of tax revenue was an extension of this existing relationship. Eager to increase national revenues, the government introduced a new system of informal sector taxation in the late 1980s which allowed a small number of informal sector unions, including the GPRTU, to collect tax from their members on the state’s behalf and receive a commission on the revenue collected. While not without problems, Joshi and Ayee judge this innovative approach to have resulted in a significant improvement of tax revenues. They see the politicized relationship between the PNDC and the GPRTU as a crucial factor contributing to its relative success, as the agreement around taxation is one element of a broader reciprocal arrangement which encouraged cooperation.

I describe the coproduction of a clean market by MCC and the TU as a fragile bargain because of its vulnerability to political conflict and shifting political alliances. The recent history of the relationship between MCC and the TU demonstrates this—a conflict over the management of dues fed into a strike against MCC’s chairman over corruption allegations, leading to a period of ill-will between MCC and the traders. However, Joshi and Ayee’s (2002) account demonstrates that coproduction based on politicized exchange can be relatively enduring—at the time of their study, the tax collection arrangement between the GPRTU and the PNDC had been in place for almost fifteen years. The PNDC’s extended hold on power played a significant role in enabling this arrangement, as did the dominance of the GPRTU in the passenger transportation sector. However, when the account was published, the arrangement continued under the National Patriotic Party which came to power in 2001 and the authors suggest that it may continue to do so as there are signs that the National Patriotic Party recognizes the political importance of the GPRTU.

There are some forms of politicized exchange that have quite detrimental effects on public goods provision. For example, Ayee and Richard Crook (2003) and Diana Cammack (2012) describe cases where politicians have secured control of service delivery roles for their political supporters, who use them to earn rents for themselves and their political patron. Ayee and Crook focus on the control of public
toilets in Accra and Kumasi, Ghana, arguing that the community groups managing these facilities were commonly the dependents of local politicians, and in some cases were created by them. The revenues generated by these facilities were therefore siphoned off for political purposes, rather than re-invested. Cammack (pp. 10-22) describes a very similar dynamic as regards the control of water kiosks in peri-urban areas in Malawi, although kiosks have tended to be officially managed by sector-specific committees which have been captured by politicians rather than community-based groups. The consequence of this type of approach, Ayee and Crook (2003, p. 29) argue, is that “the actual performance of the service becomes less important than the privately distributed pay-offs it generates”. This has a deleterious effect on the quality of the good provided and leads to violent conflict over the control of delivery points as politicians rise and fall.

In the cases Ayee and Crook and Cammack describe, service delivery has been fully captured by politicians as a source of patronage. The citizen organizations responsible for managing public toilets and the supply of water have no significant independent identity or influence—they are either created by or controlled by politicians. Both citizens and politicians are principally interested in material pay-offs: those managing public toilets and water kiosks are seeking employment and political favour, while politicians are seeking rents. In contrast, the cases of relatively successful coproduction of a clean market and tax revenue involve a balance of power between government and more autonomous citizen organizations. At least one party in each instance has an interest in the outcomes of coproduction—the TU’s members value a clean market for its own sake and the Ghanaian government values higher tax revenues. It is this that motivates the other party to meet its commitments as part of a broader set of reciprocal exchanges.

However, this kind of arrangement is unlikely to achieve the best results as the quality of goods and services is not the first priority of all actors involved. In the case of Makeni’s market, MCC has an interest in achieving a sufficient level of cleanliness to satisfy the traders and its donors, but not in achieving the highest standard of cleanliness possible. Similarly, the members of the GPRTU have an interest in collecting sufficient tax to keep the PNDC government satisfied, but not in exceeding that target. When the source of motivation for coproduction of a good for some

202 Although note that water in this context is a private good.
parties is bound up in broader exchange, performance will only matter to the extent that it impacts on maintaining that exchange and the flow of benefits it provides.

ii) Integrated low-cost monitoring

Trust in LGAs in Sierra Leone, particularly local councils, is low. As discussed in chapter one, recent survey data indicate that local councils are less trusted than chiefs, and levels of trust for both local councils and chiefs are far lower in Bombali District than in the South (IRCBP Evaluations Unit, 2008b, p. 37; Fanthorpe, et al., 2011, pp. 82-84). The gap between trust in councils and chiefs is perhaps unsurprising, as among the key reasons given for the demise of first generation councils is their lack of resonance with ordinary Sierra Leoneans (chapter three). While this might be less significant in urban settings, the (albeit rather limited) secondary evidence presented about MCC’s history suggests that it has been filled with the favourites of the ruling party and used as tool for predatory extraction (chapter four). The gap in trust between North and South is likely to be linked to the history of underdevelopment and higher levels of chiefly exploitation in the North (chapters three and four).

Coproduction of a good by LGAs and (subject-)citizens requires significant inputs from both sides. (Subject-)citizens with a genuine interest in the benefits of the good, who are willing to engage in collective action for its production, are likely to be discouraged by anxieties that LGAs will fail to reciprocate, duping them. Bolten (2008, pp. 91-97) describes how residents’ lack of trust in government undermined NPRC attempts to provide electricity and piped water in Makeni in the 1990s, as residents were simply unwilling to pay their bills. She links their lack of trust to anxieties about corruption and resentment at the provincial capital’s relative underdevelopment as compared to rival capitals Bo and Kenema, resulting in a sense of entitlement to better services at no further cost.

In the case of waste collection in Makeni’s market, the corrosive effects of low trust are mitigated by low-cost monitoring of the local council’s actions which is built into the structure of the coproductive arrangement. Visible inputs by the local council (and the traders) are made on a daily basis and therefore there is a low risk of the traders being duped to any significant degree—they have relatively full information about the local council’s actions which places them in a strong position to impose sanctions swiftly if needed. In this case, sanctions take the form of degrees of
non-compliance. This results in higher levels of confidence in reciprocal action by the local council, making productive coordination possible.

This case resonates with Ostrom’s (1990, pp. 94-100) discussion of monitoring costs in her landmark study of long-standing collective pool resource (CPR) institutions. Contrary to the received wisdom that monitoring and enforcement of rules governing access to CPR presents a significant collective action problem due to the high costs to the enforcer combined with diffuse benefits to the users of the CPR, Ostrom finds that more successful CPR institutions tend to be characterized by relatively low monitoring costs. She gives the example of irrigation rotation systems in which the next irrigator to receive water waits nearby for the current user to finish, making it difficult for any irrigator to exceed his/her allotted amount of water. In this situation, monitoring is a “natural by-product” (p. 96) of users accessing the commons. As such, trust in one’s fellow irrigators’ intentions is not really necessary—the in-built monitoring provides the confidence that fellow irrigators will follow the rules.

Similarly, in the case of waste collection in Makeni’s market, the in-built low-cost monitoring of local council and trader inputs is not present by intentional design, but is merely a fortunate by-product of the most obvious approach to clearing waste in a coproductive mode. This is not common to all instances of coproduction. For example, coproduction of a safe supply of meat requires daily payments by the butchers, but also periodic investments by the council to maintain the slaughterhouse and coproduction of public order in the barri requires subject-citizens to make the necessary payments and provide evidence before the barri officiators deliver a judgement. In these instances, trust could help to facilitate cooperation. Levels of trust in Pa Rok’s barri are sufficient to bring in a steady flow of cases. In contrast, MCC’s violation of the agreement reached with the butchers is likely to have eroded any trust that they previously had in MCC, presenting a significant barrier to renegotiation of their coproductive relationship.

**iii) Inclusive elite alliance**

The case of Pa Rok’s barri suggests that the stability of a coproductive arrangement can be strengthened if a proportion of the coproducing subject-citizens have a vested interest in either the provision of the good or the ascendancy of the form of local government. In this case, chiefly elites view the barri as a fitting venue
in which to advance their private interests and their status is enhanced when the institution of chieftaincy thrives. As a result, this group is particularly motivated to cooperate with chiefs to coproduce public order. A similar dynamic could occur in cases of local council-led provision—those who might have a vested interest in the institution’s prominence include the kinship groups of councillors or administrative staff working at the council; and CBOs and NGOs whose funding is linked to projects carried out in partnership with the council.

The main risk implicit in coproduction which relies on significant elite inputs is that the good produced will be captured by elites and targeted exclusively to their needs (Zerah, 2009; Boesten, et al., 2011). For example, elite pressure could induce the council to focus its efforts on providing waste collection in one area of the city only, restricting access to clean streets and the associated health benefits. Alternatively, a chiefly elite could monopolize chiefly adjudication services, or bias systematically the outcomes of chiefs’ judicial decisions, leaving lower status residents without access to fair, low-cost justice and reducing the volume of public order benefits generated. Elite support therefore only contributes to the success of coproduction when elites operate in an inclusive mode and do not seek to secure all of the benefits produced for themselves.

Elite capture is a high risk in Sierra Leone where there has been a notable history of predatory governance benefiting elites (chapters one and three). Paul Richards and his colleagues (2005b; Mokuwa, et al., 2011) have argued that the capture of judicial power by chiefs and other elites enables them to abuse this power to secure control of young men’s labour. Acemoglu et al (2012) present evidence which suggests that public goods provision is poorer in chiefdoms where power has been continually concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of ruling families. Finally, Melissa Labonte (2011) suggests that post-reform local councils are vulnerable to elite capture in the absence of a number of key measures: steps to reduce aid volatility, monitoring of levels of elite capture in local council-led projects, avoidance of funding in excess of local councils’ absorptive capacity and reform of chieftaincy.

It is clear that Pa Rok’s barri is in the control of chiefly elites. In chapter six I argue that this does not prevent non-elites from gaining access to their services, but does imply some extent of elite bias in the decision-making process, particularly in cases which pit non-elites against elites. Given this, the barri clearly reproduces
social inequality. However, the survey data in chapter four indicate that senior representatives of households are generally satisfied with chiefs’ role in deciding cases; there are no significant differences in levels of satisfaction between men and women, older and younger respondents and those respondents who have relatives directly involved in chiefdom governance and those who do not. This suggests that levels of elite bias are within a range acceptable to many respondents. Jean-Philippe Platteau (2009, p. 46) argues that there is often relatively high acceptance of unequal arrangements in societies where “hierarchical, asymmetric and highly personalized relations” prevail, as long as non-elites gain some benefits from such arrangements. In this case, my judgement is that the benefits of coproduction remain relatively broad, although elites benefit more than non-elites.

Mohammad Masud’s (2002) study of coproducive policing in Karachi provides a further example where elite involvement plays a critical role, yet the benefits of coproduction remain relatively broad. Masud describes the role of the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC)—an organization led by 40 members of the business community with the backing of the governor, and now legislation—in working closely with the police to improve security in Karachi. The members of the CPLC are motivated by particular concerns about high levels of crime which undermine business growth and the rise of kidnapping. Among the CPLC’s functions are the management of online crime databases which can be accessed by the police on a 24-hour basis, including a database of registered and stolen vehicles and a database of all criminal cases; conducting monthly crime analysis to identify patterns of crime; providing specialist support in kidnapping cases; and frontline assistance to citizens in terms of dispute resolution and reporting crimes. The CPLC is largely funded by contributions from the business community and individuals, as well as an annual government grant.

Masud argues that the CPLC’s efforts do not only serve elite interests. While its involvement in kidnapping serves a wealthy elite, its work on car theft has greater benefits for the relatively unprotected middle class and their frontline services in terms of crime reporting and dispute resolution benefit the poor in particular, as many in this group are not willing to engage the police directly due to anxieties about

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203 Respondents are drawn from a group within which older and more established city residents are likely to be more highly represented, but there is no particular bias in respondent selection towards more elite respondents.
possible mistreatment. While the members of the CPLC are largely elite businessmen, many are drawn from minority business communities to whom they have obligations of care. CPLC members are also subject to scrutiny by a “critical countervailing elite” (p. 26) of journalists, lawyers and politicians, who are not permitted to join the organization. Like Pa Rok’s barri, this example deals with the coproduction of public order and security. In this field, it is arguably in the interests of elite participants in coproduction to keep the scope of benefits broad, as low quality public order and security for the poor tends to have knock on effects for their own vulnerability to disorder and crime.

iv) Building on longstanding institutions

This proposition is influenced by the broader work of the Local Governance strand of the APPP. Drawing on APPP fieldwork, including findings from my research (Workman, 2011), Booth (2010, p. 5) proposes that local public goods provision is more likely to succeed when “there are institutions enabling local collective action which…make use of institutional elements inherited from the past which motivate, enable and guide individuals to take particular actions”. He draws on Greif’s (2006) argument (set out in chapter two) that there is a “fundamental asymmetry” between institutional elements inherited from the past and newer alternatives because the former are the default that individuals draw on to make sense of situations, anticipate others’ behaviour and determine the appropriate way to behave themselves. By building on longstanding institutions, LGAs will also benefit from any local efforts made to improve these institutions over time through gradual tinkering (Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011) (chapter two).

Coproduction of a clean market builds on longstanding institutions for the regulation of traders’ behaviour. Market chiefs, the TU and peers enforce a generally accepted set of rules about how traders should behave, discouraging free-riding from the waste collection effort. As MCC has no proper system of its own in place to regulate traders’ behaviour, and lacks the resources to fund a third-party monitoring effort, these regulatory institutions are extremely helpful in maintaining levels of trader cooperation. Taking advantage of existing institutions is likely to be particularly important for local councils, as they have come under pressure to deliver a variety of public goods for which they have no functional arrangements in place. The situation for the coproduction of public order is more complex. The rules
underpinning coproduction in the barri are themselves longstanding institutions. However, Pa Rok and the barri officiators also reinforce linkages with other longstanding institutions, for example, those related to the control of witchcraft and the management of sodalities. They therefore develop a cluster of longstanding institutions which facilitates collective action and to some extent prevents newer actors (such as local courts or the councils) from taking advantage of those institutions themselves. None of these longstanding institutions are fixed or unchanging—they are themselves subject to ongoing gradual (and sometimes more dramatic) processes of change.

The APPP Local Governance strand identify further examples of relatively successful arrangements for local public goods provision which build on longstanding institutions. For example, the *imihigo* system in Rwanda is a system of performance contracts for LGAs which “depends on both rewards and sanctions, some of them drawing on concepts of honour and shame with historical roots going back to the former kingdom of Rwanda”, backed by top-down pressure (Booth, 2010, p. 18). A further example is offered by the emergence of a system of town chiefs in urban areas of Malawi which combines chiefs who were officially appointed during the 1960s to 1980s, rural hereditary chiefs whose localities have now urbanized and self- or communally-appointed chiefs (Cammack, Kanyongolo, & O'Neil, 2009; Booth, 2010, p. 29). These examples emphasize that building on longstanding institutions often involves a process of creative reworking of recognized sets of rules which are given new meaning when applied in a different context or with a different interpretation. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2009, pp. 15-16) identify four dynamics through which institutions can be gradually transformed: displacement (replacement of rules); layering (introduction of new rules on top of old ones); drift (changed impact of rules due to shifts in context); and conversion (changed enactment through strategic redeployment). Complex combinations of these dynamics are likely to be in evidence when newer institutional arrangements selectively draw in elements of longstanding ones.

Nor will all longstanding institutions resonate with those engaged in coproduction or facilitate collective action; chief-led mobilization of unpaid labour provides one example of a longstanding institution whose resonance is in decline. As discussed in chapter two, Greif presents a theory of endogenous institutional change: when the exogenous variables that influence motivation to follow the rules are
changed by the outcomes of that institution, they can contribute to processes of institutional reinforcement or erosion. There is some evidence to suggest that both exogenous and endogenous drivers of change are present in the case of chief-led mobilization of unpaid labour. While I cannot give a full account, the historical material set out in chapters three and six enables me to provide a partial sketch identifying some of the key variables at play. At the beginning of the twentieth century, colonial legislation which enabled chiefs to take advantage of unpaid labour, weak colonial oversight of chiefs’ use of these powers, reasonably robust beliefs in the legitimacy of chiefly authority and the presence of a growing commercial market for crops meant that the payoffs for chiefly exercise of powers to mobilize unpaid labour were high. Initially, this led to reinforcement of the institution, which chiefs deployed in a wider range of situations, for example, to build modern houses. However, increased chiefly exercise of these powers contributed to growing popular resentment and changes in beliefs about the legitimacy of chiefly mobilization of labour, finally expressed through the 1955-56 anti-chief riots. The fall-out from these riots led to a change in legislation which reinforced popular perceptions of chiefly mobilization of labour as illegitimate and reduced chiefly pay-offs for chiefly exercise of these powers. Combined with the rise of the cash economy this has reduced the number of settings in which chiefs can exercise these powers; a trend that has been accelerated by the involvement of other actors in mobilization of labour. Longstanding institutions in decline can therefore gradually cease to function as the default template for action, thus losing their advantage over newer alternatives.

7.3 The analytical approach in critical perspective

i) ‘Success versus failure’: challenges in categorizing cases

One of the principal challenges presented by a ‘success versus failure’ research design is categorizing cases appropriately as relative successes or relative failures in public goods provision. The case study narratives presented in chapters five and six suggest that there are particular tensions around the categorization of safe meat and public order.

In the case of safe meat, the lack of clarity on butchers’ views about the value of having a slaughterhouse facility, even if well-functioning, raises a question about whether this case can be considered a failure of coproduction. In my view, it can, as I do not view a clear desire by coproducing parties to coproduce a good as an essential
pre-condition for coproduction. MCC sought the butchers’ involvement in providing safe meat at the slaughterhouse, and the butchers gave their initial consent. Even if the butchers were lukewarm on the value of the facility, the evidence presented suggests that the potential for successful coproduction existed, had MCC adhered to its original promises and demonstrated greater commitment, in turn encouraging the butchers to cooperate more actively. If this is the case, then the breakdown of cooperation can reasonably be considered a failure of coproduction.

As regards chiefly dispute resolution, there is a question about how to define the public good ultimately produced by this activity. I exercised some discretion in defining the good which results from chiefly dispute resolution as public order, rather than justice. I did so because I considered it a more straightforward outcome of effective dispute resolution. If chiefs are deemed effective at resolving disputes, it seems logical that they are producing a form of public order, understood as a state of affairs in which a set of rules regulating the conduct of members within a community are maintained. This can be considered a public good insofar as it generates stability and peace. However, effective resolution of disputes does not necessarily produce justice, understood as fairness or moral rightness. Chiefs’ involvement in deciding cases has been challenged in the literature precisely on the grounds that the public order they generate is unfair to some, notably young men and women (Richards, 2005b; Mokuwa, et al., 2011). I decided that it would be challenging for the purposes of case selection to assess respondents’ perceptions of whether chiefly dispute resolution was both effective and fair, particularly given the survey’s focus on senior representatives of households, whose views are unlikely to be reflective of a youth perspective. I therefore simply asked survey respondents whether they considered chiefs to be effective at dispute resolution.

I recognize two main weaknesses with the approach taken. First, from a measurement perspective, it would have been more precise to include a specific reference to public order outcomes when assessing satisfaction. As it stands, some respondents are likely to have taken into account how fair they consider chiefs to be when assessing their effectiveness, and thus there is a lack of clarity as to whether respondents are satisfied with public order/justice outcomes. Second, this approach does not recognize the feedback loop between justice and public order. A public order widely considered to be deeply unfair is more likely to generate the ills of instability and conflict than the benefits of stability and peace.
ii) Beyond local explanations

The explanations for performance in local public goods provision that I set out in chapters five and six focus principally on the dynamics between LGAs and their coproducing partners. In doing so, it is not my intention to neglect the important influence of central-local relations over LGA performance, which has been well-documented in the literature (Crook, 2003; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Robinson, 2007). I have established the overall dynamics of patterns of central-local linkage in Sierra Leone (chapter three), draw these into my case study discussions where appropriate (chapters five and six) and revisit these issues in a more deliberate way in chapter eight. However, at the operational level which was my focus in developing these case studies, there was limited evidence of direct central government intervention. This is a finding in and of itself, and one that suggests that both top-down performance pressure and rent-seeking by central government in the context of public goods provision are relatively low. I acknowledge that my comparison of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ by the same LGAs probably diminished the explanatory role played by central-local relations, which would have been drawn into focus more by a design that compared LGA performance across regions known to exhibit different patterns of central-local engagement. For example, a comparison of MCC (controlled by the ruling party) and Bo City Council (controlled by the opposition) would have been more likely to yield interesting results in this regard.

The evidence I did collect on central-local relations in the context of the cases studied suggests a tentative narrative of central support for the two more successful cases of public goods provision. In the case of the barri, Pa Rok argued that it was operating with the express authorization of President Koroma, but against the wishes of the local representatives of MLG—the resident minister and the provincial secretary. He told me that they attempted to shut down the barri, but were forced to back down after the president took his side.

Pa Rok: …They went and reported me to the president twice, but whenever they report me, they used to…I used to [defeat]2044 them, so finally…we are talking as you, but I don’t trust them any longer. So even at times when they call me, I…I wouldn’t go there. Nothing, they have nothing to do with me, because I told them, ‘You have nothing to do with me, you can’t sack me. You can’t do anything to me.’ Because I have the backing of the…president.

2044 Square brackets are used here to indicate poor audibility and thus an uncertain transcription.
Interviewer: …So why do you think the president supported you?

Pa Rok: Because he knew [their reports are fake]. What they are doing is wrong. They can’t…they should not interfere into our tradition. It’s very wrong. That’s what he told them, before me. He told them once, two, three, from there. None of them came my way again, because he told them, ‘See, this is the last. Anytime I get report from you…you people report this man to me, I’ll take action’. So they forget about it.

The resident minister refused to confirm this story when I asked him about it, saying that such matters were handled by the provincial secretary. I was unable to secure a further interview with the provincial secretary to ask him about this specific incident, but in an earlier interview he had described Pa Rok as a “short and very troublesome man”, which is suggestive of some history of conflict or difficulties between them.

Given my lack of access to senior government figures, I can only speculate about possible reasons why the president might have protected the barri against his appointed MLG representatives. This could have been part of a general effort to maintain the political support of chiefly elites who are important for electoral reasons (chapter three). Alternatively, as Makeni is the president’s home town, it might have related to more specific local political dynamics. One possibility in this vein is that the protection offered to the barri was linked to Pa Rok’s close relationship with the attorney general Abdul Serry Kamal, his cousin and the former paramount chief’s son. According to Pa Rok, it was the attorney general who enabled him to secure his position in the face of competition from rivals; as his patron, the attorney general’s local influence is enhanced by Pa Rok’s position, which is far more prominent when his barri is operating.

In the case of the cleaning effort in the market, I found some evidence to suggest that waste management had value to the central government both as a means of preserving the reputation of the party and as a resource which could diverted for private ends. As the president’s home town and a key political base in Northern Province, Makeni can be considered one of the public faces that the president shows the world, and his and the party’s reputation are therefore affected by conditions there. Waste collection can be a useful means for ensuring that Makeni shows Sierra Leone its best face. More often that not, MCC calls a general cleaning day in order to prepare for presidential visits or other significant political events. The APC conference in April 2009 saw one of the most impressive cleaning efforts conducted
that year; in addition, the city was decked with red and white bunting and the city hall where the conference was held was repainted in APC colours.

Waste collection services can also be diverted to serve important members of senior politicians’ personal and political networks. On one occasion I was sitting with the tricycle riders in the council’s canteen when the mayor came in to call two of the riders out for a pick-up at the president’s mother’s house. When we arrived at her compound, we found a large water tank with the top cut off loaded to the brim with waste. Large branches stuck out of the top of the tank, and all around it were numerous smaller piles of waste in bowls and barrows. The two tricycle riders began to gradually tackle the accumulated waste, first emptying the various bowls into the tricycle waste containers, then struggling to tip over the water tank and starting on the huge mound of rotting waste this created. I left her compound after half an hour or so, estimating that it would take them an hour or two to deal with the volume of waste encountered.

While it is relatively clear that a functional waste management service offers some benefits to central government actors, it is difficult to clearly demonstrate that additional central support is provided for this activity as a result. The regular ‘tied’ waste collection grant is provided to all councils based on a common rationale and is under the supervision of donor-funded units, so is not particularly vulnerable to political influence. The allocation of waste collection vehicles is more likely to reflect a political judgement. In 2009, Makeni was reasonably well equipped in that regard and had received a set of tricycles from central government in 2006. Central government may also have played a role in brokering an expected shipment of a skip truck, skips and a bulldozer backed by UNDP and One World Link funds. I was also told that the APC party provides additional funds for the beautification of Makeni to coincide with key events such as the party conference.

This limited and tentative evidence suggests that central support contributed to the success of the barri, and probably also to the waste collection effort in the market. I found no comparable evidence of direct central intervention in the case of the slaughterhouse or of mobilization of unpaid labour for community infrastructure. However, even if central intervention did play a contributing role in the more

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For example, Catherine Bolten (2008, pp. 242-243) notes an occasion when Makeni was passed over for a new tipper for waste collection by the SLPP government in favour of Kono, the country’s main diamond mining district, where they had a higher likelihood of winning electoral support.
successful cases, different patterns of central-local engagement do not adequately account for the performance gap between ‘successes’ and ‘failures’.

iii) Agency

One of the main critiques of rational choice institutionalism (RCI) is the way in which it models agency. RCIs have been accused of focusing too exclusively on material sources of motivation; assuming that preferences are exogenous to institutions, rather than shaped by institutional context; and over-emphasizing the extent to which actors base decisions on a strategic calculus, rather than habit (chapter two). In chapters five and six, I focus on the main categories of incentives which influence LGAs and (subject-)citizens in the context of the coproducive arrangements studied. I emphasize those incentives which vary across cases of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ and therefore offer some explanatory insight into why actors behave differently in each case. I base my understanding of the main incentives at play both on how actors behave and what they say about their motivation and the motivation of others. The underlying model of agency implied is relatively straightforward—individual behaviour in the context of coproduction is influenced by the incentives described, resulting in aggregate effects at the level of coproducive outcomes.206 This implies that actors make a strategic calculation and engage in goal-oriented behaviour. In accordance with the IAD framework, I focus on individuals as decision-makers in the context of a particular role that they play, rather than seeking to understand individual motivation in a more holistic and embedded way. I recognize that this is a significant simplification of human motivation and its influence on behaviour. However, my goal is to identify broader reasons why local public goods provision is more successful in some instances than others. Arguably, a fine-grained approach looking closely at the embedded motivation of individuals is not necessary for this purpose, and could even obscure the commonalities between individuals which lead to aggregate outcomes.

In line with Ostrom’s (2005) approach, the incentives I describe include both material and non-material sources of motivation. On the LGA side, I characterize MCC as being motivated primarily by material gain and political power. This characterization is not intended to encompass the full range of motives which guide

206 With the exception of MCC, which I treat as a collective actor.
public officials at an individual level (for example, see Olivier de Sardan (2012, pp. 12-19)). I consider material incentives to be a powerful influence on chiefs, but I also emphasize that chiefs have an interest in renewing their authority, both as an affirmation of their identity and because of the benefits its exercise brings to them. On the (subject-)citizen side, I describe varied sources of motivation, including a desire for the goods provided; a desire not to be duped; a desire not to face punishment; and an interest in shoring up one’s social status.

Historical institutionalists (HIs) often object to the characterization of preferences as exogenous to institutions. Like Ostrom, I take preferences to be fixed for the purposes of analyzing each case. However, I recognize that there is a feedback loop between institutions and the preferences which motivate individuals to reproduce them. Even preferences for material benefits, which might seem the most obvious example of exogenous preferences, are shaped by institutional context. For example, in their study of corruption, Olivier de Sardan and Blundo (2006, p. 83) argue that when a public official secures a lucrative posting, there is a strong social expectation that s/he will profit from it as far and fast as possible; they write “someone who does not avail him- or herself of an opportunity of this kind that presents itself is considered ‘crazy’, or is suspected of having selfishly ‘devoured’ the fruit of his or her putative illicit activities”. It is perhaps more obvious that chiefs’ interest in renewal of their authority is influenced by their understanding of chiefly identity, which is shaped by their lifetime experience of the institutions of chiefdom government. Similarly, the value (subject-)citizens accord to goods such as public order and cleanliness is socially constituted, in part through the institutions which have historically provided such goods. In my view, recognition of this feedback loop does not invalidate the analytical approach I have taken. It simply highlights another dimension of institutional functioning which is particularly critical to understanding processes of institutional change.

The emphasis I place on strategic calculus seems appropriate for more political institutions based on LGA-(subject-)citizen engagement, which do not have the same taken-for-granted quality as some social institutions. In the two cases of MCC engagement with interest-based associations, relatively autonomous actors with independent sources of power reach mutual accommodations based on fairly explicit bargains negotiated at face-to-face meetings. When these bargains are not upheld, a re-assessment takes place which leads to a shift in behaviour. For example, the
butchers resist paying an increased slaughtering fee and the traders refuse to gather waste as usual. This behaviour is clearly strategic.

In the two cases of chiefly engagement with subject-citizens, strategic behaviour also appears to be prominent. Urban chiefs are under pressure from councils and local courts, and must act strategically to maintain their contemporary relevance. Given this, Pa Rok’s efforts to carve out exclusive jurisdiction for the barri over witchcraft and sodality matters are best interpreted as a strategic step to gain an advantage over the local courts. If he were simply acting in accordance with taken-for-granted beliefs then one would not expect his claims to be contested so vigorously by the local courts. Moreover, chiefs’ jurisdiction over these areas was challenged significantly under colonial rule and thus is unlikely to have a straightforward taken-for-granted quality. Subject-citizens clearly have a strategic choice to make about whether to take cases to the barri or elsewhere (although this may be more or less constrained depending on circumstances), and they exercise that choice. And if chief-led mobilization of labour is in decline as it appears to be, it is difficult to argue that either chiefs or subject-citizens are acting habitually as patterns of behaviour change.

None of this is to deny that habitual behaviour also plays a role in the cases of coproduction studied—individuals are familiar with the general institutional patterns and draw on established routines of behaviour. However, there is sufficient evidence of strategic behaviour to justify an incentive-focused approach.

iv) Historical analysis

The analysis I present in chapters five and six privileges a spatial comparison of ‘success versus failure’—I focus on four cases of coproduction during a single time period on a single setting of the key outcome of interest (performance in local public goods provision). This type of comparison is well-recognized (Gerring, 2007, pp. 164-165, 128) and is suited to my aim of illuminating key differences in the institutional arrangements which underpin ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in local public goods provision. However, there is a risk that such a comparison will result in too narrow an approach, which highlights the structural features of institutions and their effects without understanding why an institution takes a particular form or what the broader conditions are that enable particular features to function effectively.

While limited secondary literature, archival materials and research funds have prevented me from incorporating a systematic temporal comparison of the four cases
studied, I have attempted to avoid the problems associated with a dehistoricized and decontextualized analysis. In chapter three, I have set out a general history of local government in Sierra Leone and in chapter four I have built on this with an account of local government in Makeni specifically. These chapters provide the historical foundation and wider context for subsequent analysis and are explicitly drawn upon during the case study discussions for that purpose. I have also incorporated a limited temporal comparison of the colonial origins and development of chiefs’ role in deciding cases and mobilizing labour because it provides relevant support for my conjecture that the former is more closely linked to chiefly identity. This is a good example of the way in which temporal comparison can enrich insights emerging from a spatial comparison, but it also indicates that insights from spatial comparison, while sometimes limited, are not necessarily invalid.

v) Reflections on the IAD framework

The main aim of this thesis is to deepen our understanding of alternative approaches to addressing the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone, not to deepen our understanding of institutional theory. I have employed the IAD framework as a tool to assist me in this process, rather than considering it an object of investigation. For this reason, I do not discuss the IAD framework further in the concluding chapter, but focus instead on the main concerns of the study.

I do, however, have a brief concluding reflection to share on my experience of applying the IAD framework in the context of qualitative research. While I found the framework extremely helpful to carry out a structured comparison of four cases, its sheer density made it challenging to apply. As describe in chapter two, there are seven basic components of an action situation, three categories of exogenous variables acting on the action situation, one of which is sub-divided into seven further categories, and each action situation is nested within a wider series of action situations at different levels. This is a lot of ground to cover.

The framework is conceived of as a means to address the “babbling equilibrium” problem which afflicts institutional theory—researchers using different language to refer to similar concepts. However, because it is difficult to apply the framework in a comprehensive way without subsuming the research within it, many researchers take a somewhat flexible approach to the framework’s application and some do not specify precisely how they have applied it. I have aimed to avoid this
pitfall by setting out clearly how I have made use of the framework and annexing my analysis of the rules underpinning each case. But it is possible that a more parsimonious framework might be more effective at increasing the coherence of debate about institutional theory.

Concluding comments

In this chapter, I have taken a view on the collective implications of the four cases studied. In particular, I have set out four conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in small- and medium-sized towns in Sierra Leone. These four propositions are by no means intended to be comprehensive—they are based on the selective insights the cases studied afford. In presenting them, I am not encouraging any particular linked policy action. For example, I am not suggesting that the Sierra Leone government or donors should attempt to support coproduction whenever one of these conditions obtains, and I am certainly not suggesting that efforts should be made to manufacture these conditions in order to increase the likely success of coproduction. Instead, my purpose in developing these propositions is twofold: to deepen our understanding of how coproduction works in a Sierra Leonean context; and to contribute to efforts to think creatively about alternatives to a ‘good governance’ approach to institutional reform based on overhaul of social and political institutions. I develop this point further in the next chapter.
CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusions

The broad purpose of this study has been to inform thinking about strategies to address the local public goods deficit in Sierra Leone (and comparable contexts) (chapter one). In preceding chapters (five to seven), I have set out arguments to explain the gap between ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in coproduction in a number of specific cases and I have extrapolated from these cases to develop a set of propositions about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in the current social and political climate in Sierra Leone. In this final chapter, I reflect on the main implications of these findings in three areas. First, I consider what potential coproduction offers as a means of addressing the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone, building on earlier discussions of coproduction (chapters two and seven). Next, I consider the implications of applying a more empirically grounded and gradual approach to institutional reform at the policy level. Finally, I consider how such an approach could be applied to local government reform in Sierra Leone, as well as the study’s implications for the broader academic debate on this topic (chapter three).

8.1 Coproduction and the public goods deficit

In assessing the potential of coproduction as a means of addressing the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone, one is immediately confronted with the analytical difficulties the concept poses because of its breadth and the conflicting interpretations it encompasses. On the one hand, some authors frame coproduction as a response to weak state capacity—it has governance drivers (Joshi & Moore, 2004). In weak states, examples of coproduction can be found even in core areas of state activity and a higher level of citizen inputs is often required than in settings where state capacity is more robust. While some of these arrangements may be desirable only in the short-term while a gap in state capacity exists, others may ironically end up representing an improvement over state-centric alternatives and remain desirable over the longer term.

There are other authors who frame coproduction as a welcome alternative to a more centralist approach (Ostrom, 1996). Under this interpretation, coproduction is understood more as a deliberate policy intervention to encourage citizen participation in the provision of public goods in recognition of the importance of both state and citizen inputs, and the interdependence between them. Pursuing this kind of strategy
is anticipated to result in the production of social capital which spills over to other areas of state-citizen engagement (although I can see no specific barrier to this occurring in the case of governance-driven coproduction), improving the quality of governance more broadly. Therefore coproduction can be interpreted as either a sign of state weakness or strength, and while some coproductive arrangements are considered a necessary compromise, others are considered highly desirable and to be deepened over the longer term.

The cases I present broadly support a narrative of coproduction as an adaptation to state failure. There are clear governance drivers for two of the cases (a clean market and community infrastructure) and more ambiguous governance drivers for the remaining two (public order and safe meat). I find no evidence that coproduction is contributing to a deepening of state-citizen engagement which empowers citizens. I do observe a spillover of social capital from the barri (Evans, 1996a; Ostrom, 1996), but this principally reinforces chiefly authority rather than increasing chiefly responsiveness. In none of the cases described does coproduction provide an avenue for (subject-)citizens to exert significant influence over decision-making processes (Ackerman, 2004; Mitlin, 2008). In general, the coproductive arrangements studied reproduce existing social inequalities, although I see no signs that they expand their scope substantially (Miraftab, 2004; Samson, 2010). All of this points to an important role for coproduction in increasing the quantity of public goods available (as compared to an alternative where state provision fails due to insufficient resources), but not necessarily in improving the quality of such goods or in empowering (subject-)citizens.

This narrative is incomplete, however. Even the relatively straightforward cases of governance-driven coproduction (a clean market and community infrastructure) raise difficult questions about whether such arrangements are desirable over the longer term. The potential efficiency gains these cases offer (as long as opportunity costs are lower for coproducers than public officials) need to be assessed and weighed against other implications of the coproductive arrangements, for example their effects on inequality. Two of the cases (public order and safe meat) are also motivated by the presence of interdependent local government and (subject-)citizen inputs. For these goods, some form of coproduction is not only desirable but necessary over the longer term, even under conditions of state strength. This does not imply a lack of malleability—the coproductive arrangements could take very different
forms in the future. The cases studied therefore also lend support to the argument that state recognition of interdependence and investment in coproduction is important to addressing the public goods deficit over the longer term.

The study of coproduction has creative potential because it is likely to generate a useful pool of ideas about strategies for local public goods provision which fit well with local sensibilities and work under prevailing social and political conditions. The logic behind this argument is that governance-driven cases of coproduction usually represent local solutions to gaps in public goods provision. As the ‘failed’ cases in this study demonstrate, local solutions will not necessarily succeed in generating a reasonable supply of public goods; however, they have an advantage at the outset because they are more likely to ‘go with the grain’ of local social and political logics than those imported by donors or driven from the centre (Kelsall, 2008; Booth, 2012). I do not mean to simplify or romanticize local problem-solving. In practice, the dynamics are complex; for example, Pa Rok’s barri can be considered a local solution to a gap in adjudication services, but it is also the product of highly centralized colonial policy which gave official recognition to chiefs’ courts at the end of the 1800s. Similarly, MCC’s arrangement with the TU can be considered a local solution, but the council itself is the product of a decentralization process based on a donor blueprint and driven from the centre. While there may be few purely local solutions, when local actors exercise significant autonomy in solving collective action problems and determining arrangements for public goods provision, a good contextual fit is more likely.

The propositions I set out about the conditions under which coproduction is more likely to succeed in Sierra Leone (chapter seven) represent one attempt to think creatively about the implications of coproduction. Most of the conditions identified can be interpreted as workarounds (whether deliberate or not) for features of the social and political environment which are generally unsupportive of public goods provision. For example, the presence of a politicized bargain overcomes the problem of a political system which offers weak electoral incentives for public goods provision, the integration of low-cost monitoring overcomes the problem of poor trust in local government and building on longstanding institutions overcomes the problem
of weak operational capacity and can also bolster legitimacy.\textsuperscript{207} The presence of an inclusive elite alliance addresses a more general free-riding problem, but does so in a way that runs counter to the commonplace view that elite involvement is antithetical to the achievement of developmental outcomes. These propositions are therefore suggestive of an alternate institutional approach to solving the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone—one that is based on the development of workarounds for key obstacles rather than the overhaul of key social and political institutions required by ‘good governance’.\textsuperscript{208} I explore the implications of this further in the next section.\textsuperscript{209}

Coproduction has its limits—while it is helping to address the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone, it is highly unlikely to eliminate it altogether. Sierra Leone’s (subject-)citizens do not command the resources or the expertise to plug all existing gaps in provision. Many forms of governance-driven coproduction probably fall into the category of what Olivier de Sardan (2012) calls a “palliative solution”, which I interpret to mean one that does not address the underlying problem of weak state capacity to provide public goods. Critics of neoliberalism go further, arguing that acceptance of coproduction as a strategy for public goods provision normalizes a neoliberal vision of a leaner state, and thus undermines the case for strengthening state capacity to provide public goods over the longer term (Miraftab, 2003; Zerah, 2009). In chapter two, I describe empirical work in this vein which points to examples where coproduction has been adopted explicitly as a component of national development strategies and justified by the language of participation and empowerment, while deepening inequality (Miraftab, 2003; Zerah, 2009; Samson, 2010) (chapter two). The history of structural adjustment in Africa gives good reason to take these concerns seriously. However, this body of work risks exaggerating the extent to which coproduction is a product of neoliberal policy and the extent to which coproduction has been co-opted as part of a neoliberal narrative.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{207} While the first two conditions are suited to resolving these particular obstacles to collective action, building on longstanding institutions could help to resolve a wide range of collective action problems.
\textsuperscript{208} This resonates with the focus of the APPP Local Governance strand on identifying ways of overcoming “key bottlenecks” (Booth, 2012, p. 34).
\textsuperscript{209} In chapter one, I identified four barriers to public goods provision: a political system which provides LGAs with little motivation to provide public goods, poor trust, resource scarcity and a lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities. Coproduction itself can be considered a kind of workaround for resource scarcity. In chapter six, I suggest that lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities has ambivalent effects—in addition to undermining public goods provision, it can result in competition between local actors which encourages better performance.
\end{flushright}
Governance-driven coproduction is a response to weak state capacity. The narrative I set out in chapter one explores how structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s and 1990s exacerbated public sector decline in Sierra Leone. Pressures on public resources remain substantial in the post-war period and donors’ willingness to provide support to the Sierra Leonean state comes with strings attached, which includes limits on the size of the public sector. It is therefore clear that donor policy has contributed to the emergence of governance-driven coproduction in Sierra Leone and that donors continue to impose constraints on the size of the public sector even as they support state-building processes. Nevertheless, it is a stretch to argue that donor policy is the main cause of governance-driven coproduction in Sierra Leone when domestic politics has clearly played a more substantial role (chapter one).

The argument that coproduction is vulnerable to co-optation as part of a neoliberal narrative normalizing a lean state is perhaps more persuasive. However, I do not see a great deal of evidence that this has happened in practice in Sierra Leone where donor discourse is very much focused on citizens playing an accountability-seeking rather than a coproductive role vis-à-vis local public goods. There is also an argument to be made that coproduction, because it requires significant inputs from both government and citizens, lends far less support to an idealized vision of a lean state than other popular modalities of public goods provision, such as self-provisioning through collective action or private provision on an associational or commercial basis. Unlike these modalities, coproduction could equally well be deployed to support a narrative about strengthening state capacity to provide public goods. First, some varieties of coproduction can be considered a temporary fix to a gap in public goods provision, which keeps the state engaged, while providing space to build state capacity over the longer term. Second, as discussed, strengthening coproduction where there is significant interdependence between state and citizen inputs can be considered a capacity building strategy. In practice, coproduction, which remains relatively invisible in Sierra Leone, has not been deployed in service of a capacity building narrative. However, the relative flexibility of the concept suggests that it would be difficult for it to be co-opted fully by a narrative in favour of slimming down the state.

Advocates of ‘good governance’ might see coproduction as limiting state development along democratic lines. In their eyes, the accommodations coproductive arrangements make with existing social and political logics are likely to be viewed as
undermining longer-term efforts to transform those logics. For example, the workarounds that I describe for features of the social and political environment which obstruct local public goods provision could simply be interpreted by advocates of ‘good governance’ as reinforcing a system of clientelist politics, leaving conditions of poor trust in government unaddressed and reinforcing the dominance of traditional elites. These are valid concerns. However, the bodies of institutional theory and empirical evidence discussed in this study (chapters one and two) suggest that democratizing reform based on ‘good governance’ templates stands relatively little chance of success. It is therefore possible to turn the question around, and ask how far such idealistic reforms should be prioritized over coproductive arrangements which are making a contribution to addressing the public goods deficit?

To summarize the arguments made here, I see coproduction as having the potential to address the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone in four main ways. First, coproduction can maintain a supply of public goods when state capacity is weak and state provision has eroded or collapsed. Second, coproductive arrangements that are not desirable in the longer term could provide a temporary fix, enabling the state to build its capacity and resume greater responsibility for provision. Third, some instances of coproduction (including, but not limited to, those based on interdependence) are desirable in the longer term, and if invested in by the state could help to improve the quality of public goods. Fourth, a better understanding of successful coproductive arrangements already in existence is likely to generate new ideas about approaches to local public goods provision more broadly that are congruent with social and political realities.

Judgements about the desirability of different coproductive arrangements are likely to involve trade-offs based on a relatively complex set of considerations, for example, the quantity and quality of the goods they generate, and their implications for the character of state-citizen relations, social equality and the development of state capacity over the longer term. Furthermore, such judgements ultimately rely on a motivating vision of the type of state sought and thus far there appears to be relatively little consensus on this question in post-war Sierra Leone. Donors tend to seek a state that is compliant with ‘good governance’ ideals while also being lean and efficient and high levels of aid dependency provide multiple avenues for them to pursue this vision. While the Sierra Leone government partially embraces this vision in its formal policy proclamations, it continues to conflict with the demands of the
clientelist mode of politics that persists in Sierra; the precise nature of these conflicts is often concealed to avoid disrupting the flow of aid. Public debate on the desired shape of the state therefore takes place in an awkward space between the conflicting agendas of donors and central government. Furthermore, the media does not play a particularly effective role in stimulating the public imagination; media coverage on governance issues is often rather shallow, and is partially captured both by the ‘good governance’ agenda of donors and ethno-regional political agendas. While they do not control all the dimensions of this situation, donors could certainly create more space for national debate by adopting a more pragmatic and less ideological approach to governance reform.

To return to the wider debate in the literature, I neither conceive of coproduction as a straightforward means of improving the quality of public goods and governance, nor as thoroughly co-opted by neoliberal ideology. I see considerable value in coproduction’s potential to maintain basic supply of local public goods when state capacity is weak, its potential to enable improvements in state capacity, and its potential to serve as a source of innovative ideas for improving public goods provision. However, coproduction is clearly no ‘magic bullet’; some coproductive arrangements have troubling implications for social equality and the development of state capacity over the longer term and thus judgements about their desirability are likely to involve complex trade-offs.

8.2 Wider policy implications: a grounded and gradual approach

Beyond the coproduction debate, this study has wider implications for policy to improve public goods provision in African countries. ‘Good governance’ orthodoxy holds that the best approach to improving local public goods provision is via democratic decentralization, but the evidence in support of this link is weak. This study represents an attempt to set aside that assumption and focus on what existing patterns of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in local public goods provision can tell us about alternative routes to improving the supply of local public goods (chapter one). I have provided evidence that relative successes in local public goods provision in Sierra Leone can be achieved through the development of workarounds for key obstacles.

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210 Many stories in the three papers I monitored had the appearance of being paid placements by NGOs or politicians.
rather than the overhaul of social and political institutions (chapters five to seven). I have reviewed key contributions to institutional theory which emphasize the value of a gradual approach to institutional reform (chapter two) and I have also provided empirical examples from my own research and from the wider literature which suggest that arrangements for local public goods provision which build on existing institutions appear to have an advantage (chapters five to seven). Drawing on these insights, I argue that policy to improve the supply of local public goods in African countries should be more empirically grounded and if institutional reform is pursued a gradual approach should be taken.

There are a number of prominent contributions to the development studies literature which draw similar conclusions. William Easterly (2006, pp. 60-111) sets out evidence to show that standardized institutional reforms introduced under IFI structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s and 1990s failed to produce growth. He concludes that it is beyond the abilities of Western economists to design comprehensive institutional reforms which will bring growth to poor countries. Instead, he advocates for “gradual, piecemeal reform and spontaneous efforts…among poor people themselves” (p. 101). Ha-Joon Chang (2002, pp. 129-135) argues that the package of institutional reforms imposed by IFIs is entirely inconsistent with the historical experience of institutional development in rich countries. With this history in mind, he concludes that some of the institutions required by IFIs are unnecessary and costly, institutions do little unless they are harnessed to effective policies and the adoption of a multitude of new institutions in a short timeframe is a wholly unrealistic prospect. Evans (2004, p. 30) labels the promotion of a single package of standardized institutions based on an idealized Anglo-American template “institutional mono-cropping” and argues that such an approach ignores both the critical importance of fit between institutions and context and the underlying distribution of power, while also discouraging innovation.

The findings of three multi-year research programmes looking at issues of governance and public goods provision also point in a similar direction (Centre for the Future State, 2010; Booth, 2012; Putzel & Di John, 2012). The Centre for the Future State (2005-2010) (2010, p. 70) argues that donors’ preoccupation with promoting Anglo-American institutional templates should be over-turned in favour of a more empirically grounded approach which recognizes that “effective public authority is created in a variety of different ways, through bargaining between public and private
actors, and that ‘informality’, instead of being the main problem, could also be part of the solution”. James Putzel and Jonathan Di John (2012, p. 50), summarizing the main findings of the Crisis States Research Programme (2001-2010), reject the “unrealistic and unfeasible ‘big push’ macro-institutional reforms that are advocated by the ‘good governance’ agenda” and suggest that a more effective strategy would include building gradually on sectoral “pockets of growth”. Finally, Booth (2012, p. 95), writing on behalf of the APPP (2007-2012), advocates the abandonment of the “standard institutional formulas” in favour of “[w]orking in a context-sensitive, best-fit way”.

What would a more empirically grounded and gradual approach to improve local public goods provision demand of donors and African reformers (including those inside and outside of government)? A more empirically grounded approach would require a shift in mindset and greater investment in knowledge production (Centre for the Future State, 2010, p. 70; Booth, 2012, p. 95). Conceptually, donors and other reformers would need to free themselves from the constraints posed by the ‘good governance’ agenda and by conventional practice more broadly and adopt a more open-minded approach. They would need to invest in building a context-specific knowledge base about how public goods are provided in practice, the main interests at stake in their provision and the historical development of public goods provision, among other issues. Building such a knowledge base would require the engagement of public officials and the wide array of non-state actors making essential inputs into public goods provision, often through unofficial channels. Within donor organizations, greater continuity in staffing would be needed to enable a deeper organizational grasp of this knowledge base which was genuinely reflected in policy.

It is more difficult to envisage exactly how this improved knowledge base would support gradual institutional reform. Drawing on this evidence base, donors and African reformers could devise top-down solutions based on gradual adjustments to existing institutions, but given the complexity and unpredictability of institutional processes, these would still carry a high chance of failure and unintended consequences. Alternatively, they could lend support to promising developments already underway. However, identifying such developments would remain difficult, as would determining the appropriate form of support. Booth (2012, p. 89) strongly opposes the conventional combination of funds plus imported associational templates deployed by donors, arguing that the most common outcome is the obstruction of
local problem-solving. As an alternative, he conceives of a more limited role for external actors as contributors to “the creation of an enabling environment for local problem-solving”. The Centre for the Future State (2010, p. 76) also envisions a reduced role for donors, arguing that they should shift “from being experts with responsibility for ‘delivering’ on the millennium development goals, to at best being effective facilitators of local political processes”. In the NGO blogosphere, there is now discussion of a ‘participatory institutional appraisal’ approach “where development actors specialize in convening discussions of local players to get over these logjams in ways that reflect and adapt local traditions and values” (Green, 2012).

This proposed solution presents significant implementation challenges because it is highly unlikely to be perceived by local actors as a radical break with the past; instead, externally convened discussions would unfold within the context of an existing set of relations between donors/reformers and local ‘beneficiaries’. Given this, the experience of past participatory programming which has attempted to incorporate a version of local problem-solving discussions—although usually combined with pressure to adopt imported institutional templates—is instructive (Tembo, 2003; Platteau & Abraham, 2004; Platteau, 2009; Casey, Glennerster, & Miguel, 2011). Externally convened discussions are likely to run up against the problem that local actors tend to perceive such occasions either as a necessary step to access donor funds or as an opportunity to earn per diems and other allowances (Platteau, 2009, pp. 28, 51). As a consequence, participants are accustomed to expressing views that they believe donors will find sympathetic, rather than their own preferences. This results in a significant risk that solutions agreed during such discussions will not be implemented (Tembo, 2003, p. 115). As long as funding continues to be attached to such discussions, practices of dissembling are likely to prevail, yet a new approach which involved convening discussions without any linked material benefits is likely to breed resentment. It is also likely that elites rather than the poor and those of low social status will dominate such discussions and thus the solutions reached, like the examples of coproduction discussed in this study, will reproduce (or perhaps even deepen) inequality (Platteau & Abraham, 2004; Platteau, 2009). Facilitating problem-solving discussions which genuinely break with the past would therefore demand an exceptional degree of subtlety, skill and foresight, as well
as the acceptance that the solutions reached to improve local public goods provision may well not be consistent with reformers’ preferences on social justice.

Aside from these implementation challenges, there is widespread agreement that the barriers to donor reform along the lines suggested are high (Duffield, 2001; Unsworth, 2009; 2010; Booth, 2011, 2012). In the UK, there are currently substantial political pressures to spend more money in ‘fragile states’, to provide clear evidence of how this money has been spent and the results achieved and to ensure that aid remains in line with idealized democratic principles. These pressures are not highly compatible with increased spending on knowledge production, reduced spending on democratic institution building and engagement in an experimental process of convening local actors which is unlikely to yield immediate and dramatic successes. Booth (2012, p. 95) suggests that public receptiveness of citizens in donor countries to a more pragmatic narrative about aid may be higher than anticipated; however, it would require a donor government which was genuinely committed to aid effectiveness rather than the appearance of doing good to pursue this option in earnest. Political pressures aside, significant organizational and deeply personal interests would also have to be overcome in order to secure aid agency commitment to a diminished role in some areas and to organizational restructuring intended to substantially increase reliance on country-specific expertise rather than generalist knowledge (Duffield, 2001, pp. 262-265).

In sum, the outlook for the adoption of a more grounded and gradual approach to improving local public goods looks relatively bleak. However, in keeping with the argument that a gradual approach to institutional reform has a greater likelihood of success, I identify some possible entry-points through which this approach might begin to be advanced. First, donors are funding much of the research which suggests that an alternative approach to improving local public goods provision is needed211, which creates opportunities for ongoing dissemination of these kinds of ideas and a gradual shift in perspective. Second, donor organizations are attracted to the idea of innovation, even if this often takes the form of “innovative reworking of failure” (Duffield, 2001, p. 264). As a consequence, it is possible that a more grounded and gradual approach could be experimented with through the recognized modality of a

211 For example, the APPP, the Centre for the Future State and the Crisis States Research Programme are all funded by DFID.
pilot exercise, although in order to demonstrate any positive results it would probably need to run over the longer term. Third, it is possible that NGOs with independent means such as foundations might have an interest in taking these ideas forward on an experimental basis and subsequently promoting them to governments.

8.3 Local government in Sierra Leone

To conclude the study, I return to its central concern: local government and the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone. I consider what my findings contribute to the academic debate about local government set out in chapter three and set out my ideas for how a grounded and gradual approach to institutional reform could be applied in this context.

i) Chiefs

This study lends support to the generally reformist thrust of Fanthorpe’s (2005) work on chiefs, rather than with Paul Richards’ (2005b) more abolitionist narrative. My reading of the historical literature (chapter three) emphasizes the extent to which the institution of chieftaincy is deeply embedded within the structure of the state. I describe the incorporation of paramount chiefs into the colonial state, how this led to an alliance between political parties and chiefs at the birth of the post-colonial state and was then subsequently translated into an utilitarian pattern of central-local linkage between chiefs and national politicians which has persisted to the present day. Through this process of incorporation, chiefs have acquired control over local citizenship regimes and political influence which go some way to explaining their continued relevance locally (Fanthorpe, 2005). At the same time, the discussions in chapters four and six emphasize that chiefs are deeply embedded in society through their linkages to sodalities (in the North) and ruling house elites, personalized relationships with their subject-citizens and ‘thick’ norms and beliefs about the role of chiefs. Given chieftaincy’s enduring significance both within national and local arenas, I find it highly questionable that abolition of chieftaincy was ever a politically feasible option in the post-war period, even given the significant disruption of the civil war.

Findings from my fieldwork draw a picture of chiefly governance that is both popular and flawed, but not entirely abusive. The survey I conducted complements existing survey data (discussed in chapter three) which show high levels of satisfaction with chiefs’ performance as agents of development relative to other
government actors (Sawyer, 2008; Fanthorpe, et al., 2011). Given the multi-polar nature of political authority in the city of Makeni, this is unlikely to be explained by chiefs’ capture of civil society, as Acemoglu et al (2012) contend. My survey data, while limited in scope to Makeni, provide a higher level of specificity about which aspects of chiefs’ performance are perceived positively, and which are not. In particular, chiefs’ role as adjudicators stands out as an area of high recognition and satisfaction. The case study data provide some insight into the reasons for this: chiefs are perceived as authoritative and legitimate decision-makers; the service they provide offers qualitative advantages, or, put another way, fits better with local preferences; and influential elites perceive their own social status to be linked to the strength of chiefdom institutions. While the barri is skewed towards elite interests, its benefits are not fully monopolized by elites. Chiefs flex their muscles even less as regards the mobilization of unpaid labour; their powers in this regard appear to be on the wane as youth are relatively unwilling to cooperate and chiefs find mobilization onerous and unprofitable.

These findings are at odds with Richards’ (2005b) general arguments that chiefs systematically use both their powers to mobilize community labour and their judicial powers to exploit youth labour. However, they are specific to the urban milieu of Makeni and therefore do not contradict the more circumscribed evidence subsequently presented by Richards and his colleagues (Mokuwa, et al., 2011) that local justice institutions in the Gola Forest are used as a mechanism for exploitation of low-status youth. The Gola Forest in Southern and Eastern Sierra Leone is a remote agrarian region bordering Liberia and, according to the authors, “the only part of the country where the rebel RUF could claim any degree of voluntary support” (p. 341). Even within that specific context, the authors find that the strategic use of ‘woman damage’ (adultery) accusations is only applicable in the context of the subsistence-oriented mode of production represented by polygyny and upland rice farming. It is therefore unsurprising that I did not observe this phenomenon in the urban context of Makeni where youth are commonly engaged in the cash economy.

The limited literature available suggests that the decline of chiefly involvement in the mobilization of unpaid labour is also more of an urban phenomenon. Based on semi-structured interviews conducted in six locations, Johanna Boersch-Supan (2012, p. 44), concludes that there is a “clear rural-urban pattern” as regards mobilization of community labour—in villages, chiefs take the
lead, while in towns, youth cooperate directly with local councils. This is broadly consistent with my experience in Makeni: I find that the council-led model is one of the more common patterns of mobilization, while chief-led and youth-led mobilization also occurs (chapter six). While Boersch-Supan considers the decline of chiefs’ powers to mobilize labour in urban areas to be an example of “decentralisation and empowerment of youth…reining in chiefly powers” (p. 45), my account emphasizes the deeper historical roots of this trajectory. The greater prevalence of chiefly mobilization of unpaid labour in rural areas may also explain Fanthorpe et al’s (2011, pp. 21, 30, 47) assertion that chiefs continue to profit from construction contracts on a widespread basis by accepting funds and then calling on communities to provide local materials and labour on a ‘voluntary’ basis. While chiefly excesses appear to be greater in rural areas, lending greater weight to an abolitionist narrative, it is in these areas that chiefs also tend to be most deeply embedded and thus the need for reform is if anything more urgent.

This study points to adjudication as the most prominent chiefly activity, suggesting one obvious entry point for reform. However, when conducting fieldwork in 2009, it was notable that the role of chiefs in deciding cases remained a marginal consideration in donor-supported justice sector reform programming. Assessing DFID’s Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP), Peter Albrecht (2010) and Albrecht and Jackson (2010) take a similar view. Albrecht and Jackson (2010, p. 46) write:

> Given the role of chiefs as providers of 80% of local level justice (according to common in-country estimates), and also the identification of chiefdom justice as being influential in the road to conflict in the first place…it is still striking how little direct attention they appear to have received from the JSDP.

Like Albrecht and Jackson, when I reviewed JSDP’s work in 2009, I found only two contributions to primary justice: work on the development of a new local courts bill and a customary law restatement programme in Moyamba District. When I spoke to JSDP representatives, they took the position that there was no need to interfere with chiefs’ involvement in hearing cases, as long as chiefs limit themselves to arbitration, rather than adjudication. As discussed in chapter six, this is an evasive strategy which has been in use since the colonial period (Brooke, 1953, p. 18; Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, 1956, p. 195); by calling what chiefs do ‘arbitration’, it can be safely ignored.
Albrecht and Jackson (2010, p. 47) argue that chiefs have been neglected by donors in the context of justice sector reform because of their reluctance to develop programming for an institution they do not understand well; Albrecht (2010, p. 5) sees the “rigid dichotomy between state and non-state actors” in development policy as a particular conceptual difficulty in the case of Sierra Leone’s chiefs, as in practice they bridge this divide (a point I discuss in chapter one). Albrecht and Jackson also emphasize the difficulties that donors face in navigating the politicized relationship between chiefs and central government, both in terms of finding the right balance of support between the two levels and in terms of central government sensitivities about direct donor engagement with chiefs. I want to propose a further reason for donors’ neglect of chiefs—a deep unease in engaging with actors they perceive to be fundamentally illiberal and in handling the associated presentational risks. By ignoring chiefs and investing in formal institutions they recognize as legitimate, donors hope that chiefly authority will wither away under competitive pressure. Interestingly, this approach jells with that of national politicians in Sierra Leone, who also ignore much chiefly activity, but for quite different reasons. They hope to preserve chiefly autonomy and foster good relations with chiefs, whom they consider to be valuable political allies; for them, non-intervention is a strategy to allow chiefly authority to thrive undisturbed.

The cases I present suggest that both donors and central government are right about the effects of non-intervention on chiefs to some extent. I find that chiefs in Makeni are operating under significant competitive pressure from other governmental and non-governmental actors. In those arenas where they see little to gain, such as mobilization of unpaid labour, chiefly withdrawal is a credible possibility. However, competitive pressure means that chiefs are likely to hold on even more tenaciously to those roles they see as critical to their livelihoods and the survival of chieftaincy as an institution, such as deciding cases. Furthermore, tenaciousness in a critical area is likely to be intensified by withdrawal from one perceived to be less critical. All the evidence points to the resilience of chiefly adjudication and suggests that it is highly unlikely that chiefs will be persuaded to voluntarily accept a more limited role in this regard. It therefore seems counter-productive for donors to continue to ignore chiefs in the context of justice reform—no serious strategy to improve local courts and increase uptake of their services can be developed without careful consideration of the role played by chiefs’ barris alongside them.
Howe could reform which took account of chiefs’ well-established role as adjudicators proceed? While this study suggests that Richards’ (2005b) characterization of chiefly justice does not fit the reality in Makeni, my analysis is not intended to be a celebration of chiefly adjudication. There is a clear tension between the fact that the barri provides a service that is generally valued, yet sustains an underlying social order that is highly unequal. This tension raises both empirical and philosophical questions which cannot be addressed fully here. For example, does the customary law applied in chiefs’ barris reflect dominant social norms, or does it impose oppressive strictures which fail to keep up with normative change? And how far should those interpreting customary law attempt to ‘lead’ rather than ‘follow’ social norms? Tim Kelsall (2009a, pp. 258-259) points out further difficulties linked to the involvement of external actors in legal reform in Sierra Leone. His main argument is that “law ought not to be an instrument of cultural imperialism”—until there is majority support for a particular norm, he suggests, it should not be enforced as law. To this end, he advocates a “dialogical approach to legal institution building” based on “genuine engagement with the worldview of the Other”. In pursuing such an approach, donors and other reformers in Sierra Leone will face challenges in navigating the normative tensions between international law, ‘English’ common law and customary law, and difficulties in separating the view of the majority from the view of elites.

Bearing in mind the need for a dialogical approach to move reform of chiefly adjudication forward, I briefly sketch out two (mutually compatible) policy options for further consideration. The first option is for central government to provide greater central recognition of and support for chiefs’ role in primary justice, for example, underpinning legislation, guidance and appropriate oversight to limit abuses of power. This option would take advantage of the particular legitimacy that chiefs appear to enjoy as adjudicators and ensure adequate access to officially-sanctioned adjudication services. The Chiefdom and Tribal Administration Policy (2011) seems sympathetic to this option, stating that chiefs’ role in conflict prevention and resolution “shall be given statutory recognition with specific mandates so as to improve the coordination amongst key stakeholders such as the police and the formal court system”. Yet this option would present significant challenges in working out the relationship between chiefs and local courts, keeping in mind that the latter have only recently been drawn under the authority of the Ministry of Justice in order to achieve a separation of
executive and judicial power. It is possible to conceive of an approach where chiefs provided a mediation service which was attached to local courts (or magistrate’s courts) (Rawls, 2011; Crook, 2012), or one where chiefs and local courts were set on a relatively equal footing and integrated into the justice system on similar terms. In both cases, it would be challenging (but perhaps not impossible) to secure the agreement and support of both chiefs and the legal establishment.

The second option would be for central government to reform local courts to behave more like chiefs’ barris. In chapter six, I argue that barris remain competitive with local courts because they offer a number of advantages—they are quicker, cheaper, use the Temne language, apply only customary law and show respect for family dynamics. In chapter seven, I suggest that some of these characteristics enable fuller subject-citizen participation and thus are likely to result in a more synergetic relationship between chiefs and subject-citizens in the coproduction of public order than that found in the local courts. This option takes advantage of the good contextual fit of barris, and would presumably undercut any edge they currently have over local courts. Erica Harper (2011, p. 38) suggests that official courts can improve their competitiveness vis-à-vis customary ones by “reducing and simplifying filing procedures, streamlining case processing to reduce the number of times that disputants need to appear in court, eliminating or reducing case filing costs…employing translators or multilingual court staff, and allowing cases to be heard in local dialects”, as well as “importing modalities, principles or features of customary justice”. Crook et al (2010) find that magistrate’s courts in Ghana are more in sync with popular values than neo-traditional land secretariats because they offer both a balanced perspective (rather than one skewed towards the interests of elites) and lean towards local preferences by employing a conversational style of questioning, allowing the use of local languages and applying customary principles. It is important to underline that enhancing the appeal of local courts in this way would not be sufficient to discourage use of chiefs’ barris unless local courts were accessible and plentiful enough to handle local demand.

**ii) Local councils**

Fanthorpe (2005) argues that decentralization in its current form is highly unlikely to lead to a transformation in political culture because it is essentially a conservative reform which revives a failed model of government. This study finds
plenty of evidence of strong continuities between MCC and earlier city administrations, including: the presence of recycled administrators (Jackson, 2006), central influence over the selection of political representatives, close links between political personnel and chiefs and the adoption of familiar routines of behaviour, such as cycles of corruption (chapter four). I argue that in Makeni the close link between past and present councils leaves MCC with a difficult inheritance of low public trust, which is reinforced by repetition of old behaviours (chapter five). Recent survey data suggest that low public trust in councils is unlikely to be easily overcome by initial improvements in the supply of public goods; in two out of four districts surveyed, Fanthorpe et al (2011, pp. 81-83) find that while local councils are judged to bring more development than any other government actor, they are trusted less. While I concur that local councils have limited potential to transform political culture, this study suggests that they do have some potential to help address the public goods deficit. They would be better able to do so if they were able to overcome the inhibiting legacy of low trust which makes revenue-raising and public cooperation difficult, but this would require them to remain in operation over the long-term and demonstrate a different pattern of behaviour, or at least continued practical relevance. However, there are a number of threats to councils’ longevity, some of which echo the factors that led to the demise of first generation councils (chapter three).

First among these is dependency on external support. First generation councils floundered when colonial grants covering administrative costs were withdrawn; locally-raised revenues were wholly inadequate given competition with chiefs and the lack of a functional social contract to legitimize taxation (not to mention widespread corruption) (Cartwright, 1970; Tangri, 1978b). Like its predecessor, the current council system has been established at the behest of external actors, and is dependent on their support for its continued survival. While donor funding is one of the critical factors which has enabled councils to provide public goods, it also leaves the council system vulnerable to collapse and alleviates the need for central government to make a genuine commitment to its support. As long as the local council system is perceived as a gateway to donor funding, there is no need for central government to make difficult decisions about its value, and to allocate scarce resources accordingly. Given that sustained central support is perhaps the most critical factor in determining the long-term survival of the council system, this is problematic.
A further explanation offered for the failure of first generation councils is capture by paramount chiefs, who exploited council resources to extend their own networks of influence (Kilson, 1966, pp. 202, 207-216). Fanthorpe (2005) and Jackson (2006) express concern that history may repeat itself in this regard. However, Fanthorpe et al (2011) suggests that a pattern of mutual accommodation between chiefs and councils is emerging, rather than one of chiefly capture of councils. In urban settings such as Makeni, the risks of chiefly capture are particularly low given the presence of a strong central government, party political structures and more liberal elements such as NGOs and local radio stations. Yet chiefs continue to represent an important source of political competition which could threaten local councils’ survival. First, councils have to compete with chiefs to win the affections of Sierra Leoneans. Second, they have to compete for the support of central government. The political utility of chiefs to the centre is well-proven, and during the post-war period there has been every sign that central government intends to continue relying on this pattern of central-local linkage to obtain electoral advantage and to maintain public order (chapter three). Currently, chiefs possess a number of distinct advantages over local councillors as political partners: their longevity in office; the useful ambiguity which surrounds their role in legal, administrative and policy terms; their nominal political neutrality, which enables the transfer of loyalties following regime change with relative ease; low levels of donor scrutiny into their activities; and their command of resilient local networks and institutions.

The political utility of local councils to the centre is far less clear, and is complicated by the party political nature of the local council system. Due to the deeply polarized system of party politics, the central government can rely only on those councils controlled by the ruling party, while the remaining councils provide a means for the opposition to build political support. Danielle Resnick (2011) argues that ruling parties in Africa commonly seek to constrain opposition councils to prevent this from happening, taking advantage of incomplete fiscal decentralization (where devolution of responsibilities is not backed by an appropriate allocation of resources) to do so. Fanthorpe et al’s (2011) positive account of Bo City Council’s performance (controlled by the SLPP) suggests that the APC has not been fully successful in this regard; the authors (perhaps somewhat optimistically) conclude that the experience of being in opposition has encouraged SLPP-led councils to “[explore]
the political possibilities of rational-bureaucratic best practice” (p. 16). The APC government’s recent decision to reintroduce centrally-appointed district officers is probably best interpreted as a strategy to counter opposition council success and re-assert central control in the run-up to the 2012 national elections (in which they ultimately prevailed). The implications of this dilemma for the long-term survival of the council system will depend in large part on whether politicians believe that the political future is likely to hold regular alternation of power between the two main parties, or the opportunity for one party to develop a sustained hold on power, as in the recent political past.

Donors pushed decentralization through rapidly in the post-conflict period because it was a recognized ‘good governance’ strategy which seemed to them to neatly address some of the drivers of Sierra Leone’s civil war. The introduction of the local council system therefore does not fit with the grounded and gradual approach to institutional reform outlined in the previous section; it is a clear example of the imposition of an international blueprint (although the ‘progressive’ template intended was reshaped to resemble an earlier, more conservative import in the process). However, this starting point does not preclude donors and other reformers from adopting a more grounded approach to support of local councils moving forward. This study points to two particular aspects of blueprint thinking vis-à-vis local councils which are ideologically motivated and problematic as regards public goods outcomes.

The first is a tendency to depoliticize local councils, treating them as neutral service provision agencies. Esser (2012, p. 416) writes powerfully about this phenomenon in his account of post-war Freetown City Council (chapter three), suggesting that attempts by reformers to deny the council’s political nature merely cripple their ability to engage with it appropriately. In his words:

[the effectiveness of institutional reforms pushed on to national agendas by international agencies is compromised by the latter’s reproduction of a ‘virtual world of inauthentic reality’…which either fails to appreciate or deliberately denies the inherently political character of urban life.

More specifically, a depoliticized vision of the role of local councils leads donors to identify weak technical capacity as one of the main barriers faced in local public goods provision and to invest heavily in a corresponding programme of capacity building. This study emphasizes that local councils are fundamentally political actors,
whose motives are likely to be power-enhancing. Lack of council motivation to solve collective action problems therefore constitutes a more important barrier to improved public goods provision than poor technical capacity. And even when councils are motivated, they may still face challenges in securing the necessary public cooperation due to low levels of trust.

A depoliticized vision of local councils also implies that it would be preferable if these bodies operated on a non-partisan basis, as some donors argued at the time that they were established (Fanthorpe, 2005; Esser, 2012). Not only does this run the risk of inhibiting the expression of local preferences (Esser, 2012), it also has implications for councils’ capacity to prove their utility to the centre. I have argued that partisan politics complicates central government’s assessment of the utility offered by a system of local councils because opposition councils are perceived as a threat. Yet if both political parties come to accept the likelihood of a future of alternating power, they are very likely to prefer a partisan system which allows them to retain greater influence when out of office over a non-partisan system which does not. While a non-partisan system might seem to offer potential for greater local responsiveness (as compared to a system hitched to the will of national politicians), it seems likely that non-partisan councils would either succumb to central capture or be disregarded, making the ultimate failure of the council system more likely.

A second troubling component of donor support for local councils is the preoccupation with citizen engagement as a means to build ‘demand side’ accountability. Booth (2012, pp. 66-71) provides a forceful critique of ‘demand side’ thinking. He argues that while the donor community made a positive step in recognizing that ‘supply side’ approaches (focused on strengthening public sector agencies) were often subject to political capture, no comparable “flash of political realism” has yet been applied to ‘demand side’ approaches (focused on strengthening civil society). He cites a number of limitations of ‘demand side’ approaches, including the weakness of societal accountability without complementary pressures from within the public sector, and the complicity of citizens in patterns of poor governance (even while they are the victims of the resulting policies).

My linked criticism of the ‘demand side’ orthodoxy is that it is too prescriptive about the roles citizens should play. In the context of local public goods provision in Sierra Leone, donors conceive of citizens’ proper role as one of monitoring local council performance and holding local councils to account for the
quality of provision (World Bank, 2009, pp. 58-60). This obscures the widespread presence of coproductive arrangements for local public goods provision, which not only place different and often more substantial demands on citizens, but may in fact make it difficult for them to take up the monitoring and accountability-seeking roles donors envision for them. For example, members of interest-based associations may not wish to destabilize a fragile bargain underpinning a successful coproductive arrangement with their local council in order to engage in potentially fruitless accountability-seeking. Similarly, subject-citizens may prefer not to seek accountability from the paramount chief or Pa Rok for questionable practices in the barri for fear that they will no longer be able to take cases there in the future.

In light of these insights, how could donors and other reformers refocus their efforts to support local councils and thus reduce the public goods deficit? Greater acceptance of the political nature of councils and improved understanding of how councils operate in context are needed as a starting point. A more sector specific approach may be helpful, as prior to channelling funds for a particular good or service through councils, there is a need to consider whether councils are adequately motivated to make good use of them. If not, no amount of technical capacity building is likely to have an impact. Attention needs to be paid to existing arrangements for provision of particular goods; if these are working fairly well, care should be taken not to disrupt them through the introduction of new blueprints for action. Councils should also be given more latitude and possibly support to reach political accommodations with local and central stakeholders that can support public goods provision. To this end, capacity building programmes could incorporate training on more political skills such as negotiation, which play an important role in councils’ work. At the same time, investment in ‘demand side’ programming should be scrutinized carefully, as such programming may cut across existing coproductive dynamics which make a greater contribution to public goods provision.

Concluding comments

This study offers no ‘magic bullet’ for closing the public goods deficit in Sierra Leone. Instead, it makes three main contributions to our understanding of local public goods provision in Sierra Leone which could help to inform modest steps towards that goal. First, it provides much-needed insight into how local councils and chiefs go about providing public goods in practice, illuminating in particular the
important role played by coproduction. Second, it demonstrates the complexities of coproduction in a weak state like Sierra Leone: on the one hand, coproduction helps to prevent the public goods deficit from growing larger, but on the other hand some of its manifestations have difficult implications for equality and long-term state capacity. I suggest that managing these complexities will require public debate and difficult trade-offs. Finally, it suggests a number of possible directions for improving local public goods provision through a grounded and gradual approach. In the first instance, this means avoiding disruption of arrangements based on workarounds to key barriers to local public goods provision which are reasonably effective at generating public goods. However, it could also mean enabling or supporting gradual reform of local government institutions in a direction anticipated to improve local public goods provision. If no ‘magic bullet’ is offered, it may be that none exists; rather a sustained process of gradual change offers the most likely route to closing the public goods deficit and in itself presents a daunting challenge for reformers which will require creative policy making and sustained commitment.
### APPENDIX

#### A.1 Timeline for main period of fieldwork

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 08</td>
<td>Interviews with Freetown-based stakeholders in decentralization process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-Dec 08</td>
<td>Preliminary research trip to Makeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 09</td>
<td>Refinement of research design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-Mar 09</td>
<td>Focused scoping based on research design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 09</td>
<td>Case study 1: Clean market through waste management activities led by MCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 09</td>
<td>Case study 2: Safe meat through construction and management of a slaughterhouse led by MCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 09</td>
<td>Survey of senior representatives of households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 09</td>
<td>Case study 3: Public order through deciding cases at Pa Rok’s barri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 09</td>
<td>Case study 4: Community infrastructure through mobilization of labour led by chiefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 09</td>
<td>Interviews with Freetown-based stakeholders in decentralization process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.2 Sample selection

I designed the sample to be representative of senior representatives of households in Makeni. According to the 2004 census, there are 12,260 households in Makeni. I chose a sample size of 272 senior representatives of households based on the resources available for the survey to be divided equally between male and female representatives. Ultimately, 279 senior representatives of households were interviewed, 132 male and 147 female.

Stage 1: Dwelling unit selection

I could not access a household listing for Makeni nor did I have sufficient resources at my disposal to develop one. Instead I used a list of dwelling units prepared by MCC in 2005 for the collection of house rates as the sampling frame. After cleaning, a total of 7,627 dwelling units remained on the list (158 entries were removed because the address information was incomplete). The sampling frame included a number of inaccurate listings due to the inclusion of vacant lots in anticipation of construction and exclusion of informal housing and newer lots.

National census data from 2004 did not include a count of dwelling units. The dwelling unit count available from MCC (7,758) suggested that there were approximately 1.6 households resident in each dwelling. I estimated that approximately 170 dwelling units would need to be visited to reach the desired sample size (272/1.6=170). In order to allow for inaccuracies in the sampling frame and in the estimate of households per dwelling unit, I made a random selection of 340 dwelling units from the sampling frame. These were allocated in random number order until the required number of interviews was completed. They were allocated either to a male or female interviewer, who conducted interviews only with members of the same sex. In total, 160 dwelling units were allocated to enumerators.

If the dwelling unit listed in the sampling frame was an empty lot or there was no house with the listed house number on the street, enumerators were instructed to go to the next nearest doorway on the left when facing the lot or point on the street where the house should be based on the numbering sequence. If there was no clear numbering sequence on the street, that dwelling unit was excluded. Twenty-three dwelling units were excluded in this manner. Interviews were conducted at 129 of the remaining 137 dwelling units that were located successfully. At the remaining eight dwelling units, residents did not consent to complete the household listing (four
dwelling units), no residents could be reached after three re-visits (two dwelling units) or there was no eligible respondent within the household(s) resident there (two dwelling units).

**Stage 2: Household selection**

In accordance with reputable national surveys recently conducted in Sierra Leone, a household was defined as “all the people who usually eat out of the same pot” (IRCBP Evaluations Unit, 2008a). One respondent from every household resident at each dwelling unit was interviewed to prevent bias against households drawn from multi-household dwelling units. A total of 326 households were identified at the 129 dwelling units where interviews were conducted, approximately 2.5 per dwelling unit. Of these, interviews were conducted with representatives of 279 households (approximately 86%). No interviews were conducted with the remaining 47 households due to non-consent (8 households), failure of enumerators to meet with the appropriate respondent after three re-visits (21 households), and the lack of an eligible respondent within the household (18 households).

**Stage 3: Respondent selection**

All female enumerators interviewed women and male enumerators interviewed men. Female senior representatives of households were selected according to the following criteria:

- If the recognized head of household was a woman, she was interviewed.
- If the recognized head of household was a married man, his spouse was interviewed. If he had several wives all of whom were members of the same household, the eldest wife was interviewed.
- If the recognized head of household was an unmarried man, the eldest woman aged 18 and above was interviewed.

Male senior representatives of households were selected according to the following criteria:

- If the recognized head of household was a man, he was interviewed. In the case of polygamous households where one man was the head of several households who ate from different pots, he was the only representative interviewed.
- If the recognized head of household was a woman, the eldest man aged 18 and above was interviewed.
A.3 Survey questionnaire

Step 1. Interviewer information  COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW

1. Name of interviewer: _______________________________________________________________

2. Interviewer ID: ___|___

Step 2. Property information  COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW

3. Assigned property ID: ___|___|___|___

4. Assigned property address: _________________________________________________________

5. Assigned property located successfully? Yes ___ No ___

6. If NO, were you able to identify another property by going to the nearest doorway on the left to the uninhabited property OR skipped number in the numbering sequence? Yes ___ No ___

    IF YES, PROVIDE ALTERNATE ADDRESS:

    ________________________________________________________________________________

    IF NO, REPORT TO SUPERVISOR

Supervisor information (SUPERVISOR: COMPLETE AFTER REVIEW)

7. Supervisor name: __________________________________________________________________

8. Supervisor ID: ___|___

9. Date of review: ___|___|___|___|___|___|___|___

10. Time review complete: (24 hour clock) ___|___: ___|___

11. Comments: _______________________________________________________________________

    ________________________________________________________________________________

Data entry information (DATA ENTRY PERSON: COMPLETE AFTER ENTRY)

12. Data entry person name: __________________________________________________________________

13. Data entry person ID: ___|___

14. Comments: _______________________________________________________________________

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Step 3. Introduction

READ OUT:

- I am (name) and I am a student at (name of institution). [Krio: Mi na _____ en mi na student na _____.]
  I am collecting information about local government and public services in Makeni. [Krio: A de kam fo gada info meshan bɔt lokal govement en di gud tin de en we de n de du na Makeni.]
- We are conducting short interviews with people in Makeni to learn about their views on this topic. Are you willing to assist me? [Krio: Wi de du smol smol intavu den wit pipul den na Makeni fo lan bɔt wetin den tink bɔt dis topik. Yu go ebul ep mi Ma/Pa?]

Step 4. Household listing COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW

A HOUSEHOLD IS A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO USUALLY EAT FROM THE SAME POT. THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD IS THE PERSON RECOGNIZED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD AS ITS HEAD.

READ OUT:
- How many people are living on this property? [Krio: Amɔs pipul den de na dis os/kɔmpownd/yad?]
- Do they all usually eat from the same pot? [Krio: Den pipul den çi de it na di sem pot?]
  IF NO, THEY BELONG TO SEPARATE HOUSEHOLDS
  - Which groups usually eat from the same pot? [Krio: Udat den de it na di sem pot?]

FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD:
- Who is the head of the household? [Krio: Udat na di ed çi di os?]
  IF RECOGNIZED HEAD LIVES IN SOMEWHERE ELSE (e.g. Freetown) ASK FOR ACTING HEAD
  IF NO RECOGNIZED HEAD, CHOOSE OLDEST PERSON
- How many people are there in the household? [Krio: Amɔs pipul den de it na di sem pot?]

Household listing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of household first name(s)</th>
<th>Head of household last name</th>
<th>Sex (M/F)</th>
<th>Number of people in household</th>
<th>Interviewed respondent from household? (Y/N)</th>
<th>If no, why?</th>
<th>Follow-up needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>1=Short absence</td>
<td>1=Other (explain)</td>
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<td>01</td>
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<td>2=Long absence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3=Refused</td>
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<td>03</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4=No eligible person</td>
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<tr>
<td>04</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5=Other (explain)</td>
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</table>
Step 5. Respondent identification

**FEMALE INTERVIEWERS:** Interview women only:

i) if the household is headed by a woman, interview her

ii) if the household is headed by a married man interview his wife

iii) for polygamous households, if many wives belong to a single household interview the first wife only; if each wife is in a separate household, interview each wife

iv) if the household is headed by an unmarried man, interview the oldest responsible woman over the age of 18 in the household.

**MALE INTERVIEWERS:** Interview men only:

i) if the household is headed by a man, interview him

ii) if the household is headed by a woman, interview the oldest responsible man over the age of 18 in the household

**IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT AVAILABLE:**

i) ask for an appropriate time to come back and find them at home

ii) ask where you can find them and go there to do the interview as long as you will not be intruding.

**DO NOT INTERVIEW ANYBODY ELSE IN THE HOUSEHOLD.**

---

Step 6. Respondent information **COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW**

15. Household number (FROM TABLE ON P.2): | [__] | [__] |

16. Respondent last name: ________________________________

17. Respondent first name: ________________________________

18. Relationship to head of household:

   1=Self (household head)  6=Parent
   2=Spouse  7=In-law
   3=Son/daughter  8=Grandchild
   4=Sister/brother
   5=Nephew/niece  9=Other relative:

   0=Not related

19. If NOT self or spouse, indicate reasons: ________________________________

   ____________________________________________________________
### Step 7. Consent COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW

**READ OUT:**
- I am (name) and I am a student at (name of institution). [KRIO: Mi na ___ en mi na student na ___.]  
- I am collecting information about local government and public services in Makeni. The information will be used to prepare a report which will make recommendations about how to improve public services in the city. [KRIO: A kam gada infɔmɛʃɔn fo no bɔt lokal ɡovmɛnt en di tiŋ dɛn we dɛn de du fo di pipul dɛn na Makeni. Di infɔmɛʃɔn we wi de gada wi go yus am fo mek ripɔt usay wi gi sujɛst aw di lokal ɡovmɛnt go push fo di tiŋ dɛn we dɛn de du.]
- I would like to conduct a short interview with you which will take about 30 minutes. [KRIO: A go lek fo aks yu sɔm simpul kwɛʃɔn dɛn. I jus go tek mi smɔl tɛm.]
- I will ask you questions about yourself, your family, and your views on local government. [KRIO: A go aks yu sɔm kwɛʃɔn bɔt yusef, yu famili en wetin yu tink bɔt lokal ɡovmɛnt.]
- All of your answers will be kept confidential—nobody will know what we talk about. [KRIO: ði wetin we de kam tɔk go lef bitwin mi en yu. Nɔbɔd symbol go no bɔt wetin wi go tɔk.]
- I would really appreciate your assistance in filling out the questionnaire, but participation is voluntary. There is no need to answer any question. If you wish to end the interview at any time, you may do so. [KRIO: A go gladi if yu ebui ep mi fo mek wi tɔk dis tɔk bɔt if yu no go ebui, i fayn, a na go fɔs yu. If yu no want ansa eni wan pan di kwɛʃɔn dɛn i also fayn. If yu want fo tap di intavu, yu kin du so.]
- Are you willing to participate in an interview? [KRIO: Pan ɔl wetin wi dɔn tɔk, yu go ebui tɔk wit mi?]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>IF NO, END THE INTERVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Step 8. Interview information COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW

| 20. Date of interview: (DD/MM/YYYY): |   ||   |   |   |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>21. Time start of interview: (24 hour clock)</th>
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<th>:</th>
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</thead>
</table>

### SECTION 1: RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Sex</th>
<th>1=Male</th>
<th>2=Female</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**DO NOT ASK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. How old are you? [KRIO: Amɔs la yu ol?]</th>
<th></th>
<th>years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. In what district and chiefdom were you born? [KRIO: Naw us distrikt en us chifdɔm we yu bɔn?]</th>
<th>District:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE:** [   ||   ||   ||   ]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chiefdom:</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE:** [   ||   ||   ||   ]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. What is your religion? [KRIO: Wetin na yu relijɔn?]</th>
<th>1=Christian</th>
<th>2=Muslim</th>
<th>3=Other:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**DO NOT READ OUT OPTION**
5. What is your ethnic group?
[**Krio**: Wetin na yu trayb?]

**DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. LISTEN TO THE RESPONSE AND RECORD ONE ITEM ONLY.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1=</th>
<th>Temne</th>
<th>2=</th>
<th>Limba</th>
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<tr>
<td>3=</td>
<td>Loko</td>
<td>4=</td>
<td>Fullah</td>
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<td>5=</td>
<td>Mende</td>
<td>6=</td>
<td>Mandingo</td>
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<tr>
<td>7=</td>
<td>Other:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

6. In school, what was the highest class or form you completed?
[**Krio**: Yu bin de go skul? Usay yu tap?]

**DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS. LISTEN TO THE RESPONSE AND RECORD ONE ITEM ONLY.**

**PROMPT TO ENSURE THAT CLASS/FORM COMPLETED.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>00=</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>21=</th>
<th>JSS 1/form 1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01=</td>
<td>Koranic only</td>
<td>22=</td>
<td>JSS 2/form 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11=</td>
<td>Primary 1</td>
<td>23=</td>
<td>JSS 3/form 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>12=</td>
<td>Primary 2</td>
<td>24=</td>
<td>SSS 1/form 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>13=</td>
<td>Primary 3</td>
<td>25=</td>
<td>SSS2/form 5</td>
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<td>14=</td>
<td>Primary 4</td>
<td>26=</td>
<td>SS3/form 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>15=</td>
<td>Primary 5</td>
<td>31=</td>
<td>Technical/vocational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16=</td>
<td>Primary 6</td>
<td>32=</td>
<td>Teacher training (any year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17=</td>
<td>Primary 7 (old system)</td>
<td>33=</td>
<td>Nursing (any year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34=</td>
<td>University (any year)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Do you or does anyone in your household own any of the following items?
[**Krio**: Yu ɔ ni da pɔsin we de it na yu pɔt ɛni of dɛn tiŋ dɛn ya we a de kam kɔl so?]

**READ OUT EACH ITEM**

| 1=Yes, 2=No |
|--------------|-------------|
| Bicycle      | Electric fan|
| Mobile phone | Umbrella    |
| Generator    | TV          |
| Car/truck/motorcycle | Radio or radio cassette player |

8. Do you or does anyone in your household hold any of the following positions?
[**Krio**: Yu ɔ ni da pɔsin we de it na yu pɔt ɔl ɛni of dɛn pɔsishɔn dɛn ya we a de kam kɔl so?]

**READ OUT EACH ITEM**

| 1=Yes, 2=No |
|--------------|-------------|
| Paramount chief or section chief | Chiefdom councillor/tribal authority (the ones who have the right to vote for Paramount Chief) |
| Kapr (ceremonial) chief | Mayor/local councillor |
| Sub-chief e.g. ward head, town chief, village headman, etc. | Council administrator |
| Chair or clerk in local court | Ward committee member |
## SECTION 2: MAKENI CITY COUNCIL

**READ OUT:**
- Now I want to ask you some questions about Makeni City Council.
  
  [Krio: *Naw a wan le wi kam tok bɔt Makeni City Council.*]

- After the war, a law was passed which established new elected local councils in Sierra Leone.
  
  [Krio: *Afta di wa, dɛn bin briŋ wan lɔ we se wi de vot fɔ nu lokal kwɔnsil na Salone.*]

- The new elected Makeni Town Council was established in 2004 with Musa Mansaray as its leader.
  
  [Krio: *Insay 2004, we bin vot fɔ wan kwɔnsil na Makeni we Musa Mansaray bin di lida.*]

---

9. From 2004 when it was established until now, what **good things** has the new Makeni City Council done for the city?

[Krio: *Frɔ 2004 we dɛn briŋ dis nu Makeni City Council until naw, wetin na di gud tingly den we yu fil se Makeni City Council dɔn du fɔ di siti?*]

**ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE:**

- **SILENT:** WAIT QUIETLY
- **ELABORATION:** IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD?
- **CLARIFICATION:** CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC?

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**DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE:**
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</table>

10. Of all the good things you have mentioned, which is the **best thing** that the council has done for the city?

[Krio: *Pan ɔl di gud tingly den we yu dɔn kɔl, us wan na di bɛte bɛte tingly we di kwɔnsil dɔn du fɔ di siti?*]

Enter the item number between 1 and 5 from the list above

**DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE:**
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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</table>
11. From 2004 when it was established until now, what has Makeni City Council failed to do for the city?

[**Krio:** 2004 we ṣe ṣi ṣe dis n Makeni City Council until now, wetin na di ti ṣe we yu fil se Makeni City Council ṣi ṣe ṣi di siti?]

**ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE:**
- **SILENT:** WAIT QUIETLY
- **ELABORATION:** IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD?
- **CLARIFICATION:** CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC?

| 1: _______________________________________________ | 2: _______________________________________________ |
| ___________________________________________________ | ___________________________________________________ |
| 3: _______________________________________________ | 4: _______________________________________________ |
| ___________________________________________________ | ___________________________________________________ |
| 5: _______________________________________________ | ___________________________________________________ |

DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: |___| |___| |___| |___| |___|

12. Of all the failures you have mentioned, which is the most important thing the council has failed to do for the city?

[**Krio:** Pan o ni ṣi ti ṣe we yu ṣe ṣi ko we yu fil se ṣe ṣi ṣe, us wan na ṣi be ṣe we di kawon ṣi ṣe ṣe ṣi di siti?]

Enter the item number between 1 and 5 from the list above

DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: [___]
13. How satisfied are you with the work Makeni City Council is doing right now to collect trash and clean the city?

[READ OUT:]
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one:

1= You are very unsatisfied, the city is very dirty.

2= You are unsatisfied, the city is dirty.

3= You are satisfied, the city is clean.

4= You are very satisfied, the city is very clean.

Do you want me to repeat the options?

(RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY)

1=Very unsatisfied
2=Unsatisfied
3=Satisfied
4=Very satisfied

14. Does the council come to collect trash from your house?

[READ OUT:]
I am going to give you three options and I want you to pick one:

1= You don’t know anything about the slaughterhouse.

2= You have heard about the slaughterhouse from your neighbours or on the radio.

3= You have visited the slaughterhouse in person.

(RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY)

1=Don’t know anything
2=Heard about
3=Visited

1=Yes
2=No
99=Don’t know
### SECTION 3: CHIEFS

#### READ:
- Now I want to ask you some questions about chiefs in Makeni.
  
  [KRIO: Naw wi de kam tok bɔt chif den na Makeni.]

16. Which chiefdom is this house based in?  
   [KRIO: Insay us chifdom dis os de?]
   
   1=Bombali Shebora  
   2=Makari Gbanti  
   99=Don’t know

17. What good things do the Paramount Chief and his sub-chiefs do for the city of Makeni?  
   [KRIO: Wetin na di gud tin den we di Paramount Chief en di ɔda chif den we de ep am du in wok de du fo di siti?]
   
   ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE:
   - SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY
   - ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD?
   - CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC?
   
   1: _________________________________________________  
   ___________________________________________________
   2: _________________________________________________  
   ___________________________________________________
   3: _________________________________________________  
   ___________________________________________________
   4: _________________________________________________  
   ___________________________________________________
   5: _________________________________________________  
   ___________________________________________________

DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE:
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

18. Of all the good things you have mentioned, which is the best thing that chiefs do for the city?  
   [KRIO: Pan ɔl di gud tin den we yu dɔn kɔl, us wan na di bete bete tin we di chif den de du fo di siti?]
   
   Enter the item number between 1 and 5 from the list above

DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: [___]
19. What are chiefs failing to do for the city of Makeni?

[KRIO: Wetn na di tiŋ dēn we yu fil se di chif dēn ndu fो di siti?]

ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE:
- SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY
- ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD?
- CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC?

| 1: | ____________________________________________________________________________ |
| 2: | ____________________________________________________________________________ |
| 3: | ____________________________________________________________________________ |
| 4: | ____________________________________________________________________________ |
| 5: | ____________________________________________________________________________ |

DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: |___| |___| |___| |___| |___|

20. Of all the failures you have mentioned, which is the most important thing that chiefs are failing to do for the city?

[KRIO: Pan di tiŋ dēn we yu dēn koi we yu fil se dēn ndu, us wan na di be te wan we di chif dēm ndu fो di siti.]

Enter the item number between 1 and 5 from the list above

DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE: |___|
21. How satisfied are you with the contribution chiefs make to maintaining security in Makeni? By security I mean protecting people against violence and theft.

[KRIO: Aw yu fil bot wetin di chif den de du fo mek wi get kolat na Makeni? Kolat a min no fo fet, no fo tif.]

READ OUT:
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one:

[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fo tij den we yu go pik wan we fit wetin yu fil bot wetin di chif den du fo mek wi get kolat:]

1=You are very unsatisfied, chiefs make a very small contribution to maintaining security.

[KRIO: 1=Yu no rili–rili fil fayn, di chif den de sp smol wan fo mek we get kolat.]

2=You are unsatisfied, chiefs make a small contribution to maintaining security.

[KRIO: 2=Yu no fil fayn, di chif den de sp smol fo mek we get kolat.]

3=You are satisfied, chiefs make a large contribution to maintaining security.

[KRIO: 3=Yu fil fayn, di chif den de du boku tīn fo mek we get kolat.]

4=You are very satisfied, chiefs make a very large contribution to maintaining security.

[KRIO: 4=Yu rili–rili fil fayn, di chif den de du boku–boku tīn fo mek wi get kolat.]

Do you want me to repeat the options?

[KRIO: Yu want mek a kɔl dɔn tij dɔn bak?]

RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY

22. How satisfied are you with the dispute resolution carried out by chiefs in Makeni?

[KRIO: Aw yu fil bot di we en mana we chif den de tɔk kes na Makeni?]  

READ OUT:
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one:

[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fo tij den we yu go pik wan we fit wetin yu fil bot aw di chif den de tɔk kes:]

1=You are very unsatisfied, chiefs are very ineffective at resolving disputes.

[KRIO: 1=Yu no rili–rili fil fayn, den no de rili–rili du wel fo tɔk kes.]  

2=You are unsatisfied, chiefs are ineffective at resolving disputes.

[KRIO: 2=Yu no fil fayn, den no de du wel fo tɔk kes.]  

3=You are satisfied, chiefs are effective at resolving disputes.

[KRIO: 3=Yu fil fayn, den de du wel fo tɔk kes.]  

4=You are very satisfied, chiefs are very effective at resolving disputes.

[KRIO: 4=Yu rili–rili fil fayn, den de rili–rili du wel fo tɔk kes.]

Do you want me to repeat the options?

[KRIO: Yu want mek a kɔl dɔn tij dɔn bak?]

RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY
23. How satisfied are you with chiefs’ efforts to organize community labour for development in Makeni? For example, fixing damaged roads, culverts and other things like that.

[KRIO: Aw yu fil bôt di we di chif den de tray fô brinj pipul den togeda fô wok fô development na Makeni? Lek fô mek rod we pwel, kolvut, o ni oda ti.]

READ OUT:
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one:

[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fô ti jen we yu go pik wan we fit wetin yu fil bôt aw di chif den de tray fô brinj pipul den togeda fô wok fô development:]  

1=You are very unsatisfied, chiefs never organize community labour when it is needed.

[KRIO: 1=Yu no rili-rili fil fayn, di chif den no wan de brinj pipul den togeda fô wok fô development we di pipul den nid.]  

2=You are unsatisfied, chiefs rarely organize community labour when it is needed.

[KRIO: 2=Yu no fil fayn, di chif den kin brinj pipul den togeda wan-wan tem fô wok fô development we di pipul den nid.]  

3=You are satisfied, chiefs often organize community labour when it is needed.

[KRIO: 3=Yu fil fayn, di chif den kin brinj pipul den togeda sam tem den fô wok fô development we di pipul den nid.]  

4=You are very satisfied, chiefs always organize community labour when it is needed.

[KRIO: 4=Yu rili-rili fil fayn, di chif den pîl tem kin brinj pipul den togeda fô wok fô development we di pipul den nid.]  

Do you want me to repeat the options?

[KRIO: Yu want mek a kol den ti jen bak?]  

RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY

24. How would you rank the following activities in order of importance:

[KRIO: Aw yu go ebul put den ti jen ya fô bégan pan di wan we yu fil se bête pas di oda ti jen:]  

READ OUT:
-Keeping the city clean [KRIO: Klin di siti]
-Ensuring the safety of meat for consumption [KRIO: Mek shô se di bíf we den sel en we wi de it no get no sik]
-Maintaining security [KRIO: Mek wi get kòlat]
-Organizing community labour for development [KRIO: Brinj pipul den togeda fô wok fô development]

Which activity is most important? [KRIO: Us ti jen bête pa oî?] RANK 4
Which activity is the next most important? [KRIO: Us wan we nia di fós wan we yu κòi?] RANK 3
Which activity is the most important after that? [KRIO: Us wan we nia di wan we yu jus κòi?] RANK 2
Which activity is least important? [KRIO: Us wan de bôtêm.] RANK 1
### SECTION FOUR: AUTHORITY

**25.** How strong is the authority of the Makeni City Council over the people of Makeni?

**[KRIO: Aw trɔŋ yu fil se di Makeni City Council get pawa fo kontrol di pipul den na Makeni?]**

**READ OUT:**
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one:

**[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fo tiŋ den we yu go pik wan we fit di we yu fil boɔ aw trɔŋ di pawa of di Makeni City Council de fo kontrol di pipul den:]**

1 = **Very weak,** people never do what the council asks.

**[KRIO: 1=Rili-rii wik, di pipul den no wan de du wetin di kawnsil de aks den fo du.]**

2 = **Weak,** people rarely do what the council asks.

**[KRIO: 2=Wik, pipul den wan-wan tem kin du wetin di kawnsil de aks den fo du.]**

3 = **Strong,** people often do what the council asks.

**[KRIO: 3=Trɔŋ, pipul den sam tem kin du wetin di kawnsil de aks den fo du.]**

4 = **Very strong,** people always do what the council asks.

**[KRIO: 4=Rili-rii trɔŋ, di tem di pipul den de du wetin di kawnsil de aks den fo du.]**

Do you want me to repeat the options?

**[KRIO: Yu want mek a kɔl den tiŋ den bak?]**

**RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 = Very weak</th>
<th>2 = Weak</th>
<th>3 = Strong</th>
<th>4 = Very strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 = Very weak</td>
<td>2 = Weak</td>
<td>3 = Strong</td>
<td>4 = Very strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**26.** What gives the Makeni City Council authority over the people? (Why do they have authority over the people?)

**[KRIO: Wetin yu fil se naim gi di Makeni City Council di pawa fo kontrol di pipul den?]**

**ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE:**

- **SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY**
- **ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD?**
- **CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC?**

1: 

2: 

3: 

4: 

5: 

**DATA ENTRY PERSON, CODE:**
27. How strong is the authority of the Paramount Chief and his sub-chiefs over the people of Makeni?

[KRIO: Aw tran yu fil se di Paramount Chif en di oda chif den we de ep am get pawa fo kontrol di pipul den na Makeni?]

READ OUT:
I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one:

[KRIO: A de kam gi yu fo tin den we yu go pik wan we fit di we yu fil bot aw tran di pawa of di chif den de fo kontrol di pipul den:]

1=Very weak, people never do what chiefs ask.
[KRIO: 1=Rili-rili wik, di pipul den no wan de du wetin di chif den de aks den fo du.]

2=Weak, people rarely do what chiefs ask.
[KRIO: 2=Wik, pipul den wan-wan tem kin du wetin di chif den de aks den fo du.]

3=Strong, people often do what chiefs ask.
[KRIO: 3=Tran, pipul den sam tem kin du wetin di chif den de aks den fo du.]

4=Very strong, people always do what chiefs ask.
[KRIO: Rili-rili tran, al tem di pipul den de du wetin di chif den de aks den fo du.]

Do you want me to repeat the options?
[KRIO: Yu want mek a kol den tin den bak?]

RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY

28. What gives the Paramount Chief and his sub-chiefs authority over the people? (Why do they have authority over the people?)

[KRIO: Wetin yu fil se naim gi di Paramount Chif en di oda chif den we de ep am di pawa fo kontrol di pipul den?]

ENCOURAGE A FULL RESPONSE BY USING PROBES, FOR EXAMPLE:
-SILENT: WAIT QUIETLY
-ELABORATION: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD?
-CLARIFICATION: CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC?

1: ________________________________________
2: ________________________________________
3: ________________________________________
4: ________________________________________
5: ________________________________________
29. Who has more authority in Makeni—the city council or the Paramount Chief and his sub-chiefs?

[KRIO: Udat get pawa fo kɔntrol di pipul dən pas in kompa na Makeni—na di Makeni City Council o di Paramount Chief o da chif dən we de ep am?]

1=The city council has more authority
2=The Paramount Chief and his sub-chiefs have more authority
3=They both have the same amount of authority

END SURVEY

THANK THE RESPONDENT!
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INTERVIEWER REVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Time end of interview (24 hour clock)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>What language was this survey mainly conducted in?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>How was the respondent’s skill in <strong>speaking and understanding the language</strong> used?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Were any people other than the respondent present during all or part of this interview?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>What is their relationship to the respondent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Are you very confident, somewhat confident or not very confident in the overall quality and truthfulness of this respondent’s responses?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Explain the reasons for your level of confidence in question 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Additional comments:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## A.4 Supplementary butcher questionnaire

### Interview information (COMPLETE BEFORE INTERVIEW)

1. Name of butcher: ____________________________________________________________

2. Butcher ID number: |___||___||___||___|

3. Location of butcher stall: ____________________________________________________

4. Date of interview: (DD/MM/YYYY): |___||___|/|___||___|/|___||___||___||___|

5. Time start of interview: (24 hour clock) |___||___|: |___||___|

### RESPONDENT INFORMATION

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Respondent type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=stall owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=assistant</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 7. Sex |   |   |
|        | 1=male |   |
|        | 2=female |   |
|        |   |   |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. What year were you born?</th>
<th></th>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

If year not known, best estimate of age in years: |___|___|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. In what chiefdom and district were you born?</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chieft:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. What is the highest level of education you have achieved?</td>
<td>1=None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=Primary incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3=Primary complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4=JSS incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5=JSS complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6=SSS incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7=SSS complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8=Technical/vocational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9=Teacher training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10=Nursing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11=University (any year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12=Koranic only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. What ethnic group do you belong to?</td>
<td>1=Fula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=Temne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3=Limba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4=Other:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. What is your religion?</td>
<td>1=Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3=Other:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. How satisfied are you with the slaughterhouse facilities currently provided by the city council?

I am going to give you four options and I want you to pick one:

1=You are very satisfied, the facilities are excellent and don’t need any improvement.
2=You are satisfied, the facilities are good overall, although they could be improved upon.
3=You are not satisfied, the facilities are bad overall and improvements need to be made.
4=You are very unsatisfied, the facilities are terrible and great improvements need to be made.

READ OPTIONS. RECORD ONE RESPONSE ONLY.

1=Very satisfied
2=Satisfied
3=Not satisfied
4=Very unsatisfied

Time end of interview: (24 hour clock) ___:___ ___:___
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

*Books, journal articles, working papers*


---

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**Donor/grey literature**


**Laws**

The Protectorate Ordinance (1896).

The Forced Labour Ordinance (1932).

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The Local Courts Act (1963).


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Images

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