Everyday Resistance in Post-Conflict Statebuilding: The Case of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

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A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, January 2013
Declaration

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Abstract

The thesis explores everyday resistance in post-conflict statebuilding. Despite the turn in peace and conflict studies to study everyday forms of resistance, the concept and the account of its practices remain limited. In addressing these limitations, the thesis develops an alternative account of both resistance and post-conflict statebuilding. Following the framework of James Scott, resistance is understood as the pattern of acts of individuals and collectives in a position of subordination against the everyday experience of domination. What is resisted is not an externally driven liberal intervention, but the coercive and extractive practices fostered by statebuilding.

These dynamics are examined through the case of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, focusing on the provinces of North and South Kivu. Generally studied as a paradigmatic case of state-failure, the DRC provides an insight into post-conflict statebuilding as a plural, improvised and contradictory process. In the thesis, this is linked to historical and sociological practices of statebuilding more generally, and to the specificities of the African political space. Although statebuilding claims to be a strategy to restore state authority, peace, and democracy, the result has so far been a militarised environment, a pluralisation of state authority and a deterioration of living conditions. The thesis examines discursive, violent and survival practices that deny statebuilders the claim to legitimate authority and to the monopoly of violence, while enacting alternative channels of re-appropriation based on solidarity and reciprocity. Post-conflict statebuilding does not require a special framework of resistance. It requires a historicised account of practices, which grasps their heterogeneity and gradients, and which ultimately accounts for resistance as a prosaic presence in the relations of domination that sustain statebuilding.
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Acknowledgments

The process of doing this thesis has been a personal growing experience and passionate journey. Along the way, I have had the privilege to not only explore issues and thoughts that had for long grabbed my heart, but to do so with the support, encouragement, inspiration and challenge of many amazing people. I would like to use this opportunity to express my gratitude and admiration to all of them, even if a few lines cannot represent the depth of their contribution.

My first big warm thanks go to my supervisors, Mr. Mark Hoffman and Dr. George Lawson. They have provided intellectual guidance, a breadth of insight and, in uncountable times, the necessary positive light to develop this project. I am grateful for their support and for all the work and time they have committed to this project. It has been a real privilege to work under their supervision. All what I have learnt from them during this process goes well beyond what is written here.

It should follow a list of people whose names need to remain anonymous or I do not know. They are the heart of this research for having shared their thoughts, experiences and tears in interviews, and in innumerable exchanges in markets, taxis, motorbikes and bars, during fieldwork. I have been inspired by their courage, hospitality and humour and would like to thank them for that and for their sharing.

A big thank you, although she would prefer a big hug, goes to my mum for being there, for her love, care, encouragement and understanding. Thanks to my father, Mavi and Irene, for always reminding me that life is in the small things. Thanks to my best friends María José, José Corrales, Lorenzo, Amaya, María Robles and Ana Sama, for remaining necessary accomplices in this process. Thanks to Shane, for supporting me in taking this avenue, for his generous proofreading, and for
showing me what home is. Without all of you, not only this would not have seen the light, it would have been meaningless.

I would not have embarked in this journey if it were not for the inspiration and encouragement of Dr. Lynne Alice from Deakin University. I wish she could see this finished.

Of my fellow travellers, I want to specially thank Kathryn Fisher for becoming one of my best friends and for teaching me how to be kind with snails. Kathryn, Joe Hoover, Paul Kirby and Meera Sabaratnam have been sources of inspiration, knowledge and friendship. Our conversations, their feedback on numerous drafts, their intellectual integrity and activism have made me and this thesis grow. Thanks to Cristina Barrios and Saïd-Abbas Ahamed for their support, advice, passion for Africa, and friendship. Thanks to Stylianos Moshonas for sharing his wealth of knowledge and neverending bibliographies on Congo, and for his insightful comments on numberless drafts. Thanks to Outi Keranen for her detailed and encouraging feedback on my work all along the way; but most importantly, for sharing a common path and being there. Thanks also to Zeynep, Benedetta, Natalie, Annie, Richard, Elke, Mickey, Myriam and Hadi, what would I have done many times without you? I would do this thesis all over again only to spend more time with all of them and learn more about beautiful revolutionary dreams.

This research would not have been possible without the support of researchers and translators in the DRC, including, Augustine Kilau, Adili Romuald Amani, Fidele Ngeleka, Evariste Mfume, Janvier Lukele and Jacques Abamba. Jacques was assassinated by two unidentified men on the 3rd of June 2012, when he was in a fact-finding mission. His death is testimony of the difficult and dangerous task research is in the DRC, especially for local researchers.
Many people have hosted, transported and helped me during fieldwork, making it more bearable and interesting. Thanks to Blandine Boluka and her family for making me feel at home in Kinshasa. Thanks to Philomène Mukendi for her support and inspirational work. Thanks to Arancha Mareca, who has become an accomplice in dancing Congolese rumba. A special mention also goes to Ana Palao, Alvaro Trincado, Cerise, Maria, Jerome and Leo for their hospitality. Thanks also to the researchers I have found on my way, especially to Helène Morvan and Kasper Hoffmann, for sharing their insights, frustrations and laughter, and providing logistical help.

Thanks to Anna Clover, Sam Fisher, Alan Johnson and Millie Wild for making proofreading an act of political solidarity.

Thanks also to Belén, Lola, Kontxi, Yasmina, Carmen, Javi, Marimar, Jing, Kike, Aina and Milaine, whose friendship has made my life so much more meaningful, rebellious and fun during this time.

Two people in the IR department have been of crucial importance and a reference. Professor Kimberly Hutchings, who, as my adviser throughout these years, has been an inspirational figure, a personal and academic support, and whose work and integrity, have my profound admiration. I am very grateful to Ms. Martina Langer, for her patience, admiring work, and for all the support I have had from her whenever I have knocked on her door.

The IR theory seminar and the Millennium Journal of International Relations have been spaces of important intellectual stimulation. As a Millennium Editor, I am also indebted for the trust the board put on me, and to my co-editors Paul Kirby (again) and Jasmine Gani, whose scholarship and enthusiasm has been an example.
The professors, researchers and administrative personnel that welcomed me to Sciences Po during a period of research deserve a special mention. The intellectual exchanges I had with my tutor, Professor Roland Marchal, along with Professors Béatrice Hibou, Jean François Bayart and Bertrand Badie have made a big imprint in the thesis. I hold very nice memories of this time thanks to CERI researchers Martina Bassan, Marie Bassie, Dorly Castañeda and Samuel Faure.

The MONUC/MONUSCO has had a welcoming approach to my research, and has provided essential secure transport. Several research institutions have facilitated access to invaluable material, including the Pole Institute in Goma, Centre D’Études pour l’Action Sociale (CEPAS) in Kinshasa, the Université Catholique in Bukavu, the DRC National Library and the Museum of Africa in Tervuren, Belgium. The latter was facilitated by Dr. Theodore Trefon, whose work was one of the first insights I had into everyday life in the DRC.

Finally, a special acknowledgement goes to the UK Economic and Social Research Council, for enabling me to undertake this project with a +3 Studentship (ref. number: EH/H17704/1). The International Relations Department at the London School of Economics has also provided invaluable funding for living expenses, fieldwork and conference attendance.

To all of you, thank you.
Acronyms

- **ADF-NALU**: Allied Democratic Forces / National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
- **AFDL**: l’Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Laurent-Désiré Kabila)
- **ANR**: Agence Nationale de Renseignement (Congolese intelligence agency)
- **APR**: Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (ex-Rwandan army)
- **AU**: African Union
- **CAR**: Central African Republic
- **CIAT**: Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (International Committee to Support Transition)
- **CNDP**: Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People)
- **CNS**: Conférence Nationale Souveraine (Conference for National Sovereignty)
- **DDR**: Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration of national armed groups
- **DDRRR**: Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration of foreign armed groups
- **DDR(RR)**: DDR and DDRRR programmes
- **DRC**: Democratic Republic of Congo
- **EU**: European Union
- **FARDC**: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (from 2003)
- **FAZ**: Forces Armées Zaïroises (ex-Zaire Armed Forces)
- **FNL**: Forces Nationales de Libération (Burundian Rebel Group)
- **FDLR**: Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Rwandan Hutu militia formed by the Rwandan Interahamwe in the DRC))
- **FRF**: Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (Mai Mai – Fizi - Minembwe)
- **INGO**: International Non-Governmental Organisation
- **IDPs**: Internally Displaced Persons
- **ISSSS**: International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ex-UNSSSSS) – International support of STAREC.
- **LRA**: Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda – Led by Joseph Kony)
- **MLC**: Mouvement de Libération du Congo, led by Jean-Pierre Bemba (Equateur)
- **MNC**: Multinational Corporation
- **NGO**: Non-Governmental Organisation
- **OAU**: Organisation of the African Unity
- **PARECO**: Patriotes Résistants Congolais (Mai Mai – government funded – Led by General Kakule Sikuli Vasaka Lafontaine)
- **RCD**: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy) - Led initially by Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba and Arthur Zahidi Ngoma – Its subsequent branches were as follows:
  - **RCD-K**: Faction remaining under Wamba dia Wamba, backed by Uganda and based in Kisangani.
  - **RCD-G**: Led by Dr. Emile Ilunga, backed by Rwanda and based in Goma.
  - **RCD-ML**: Led by Antipas Mbusa Nyawisi, backed by Uganda and based in Kisangani.
  - **RCD-N**: Led by Roger Lumbala, backed by Uganda and based in Isiro.
- **RDF**: Rwandan Defence Forces (Rwandan Army)
- **Simba Mai Mai/MRS**: Simba Mai Mai / Mouvement Révolutionnaire Socialiste
- **SOCICO**: Société Civile au Congo (Official Structure/Platform of civil society groups in Congo).
- **STAREC**: Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones sortant des Conflits Armés - Government’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Areas coming out of Armed Conflict [Provinces of North and South Kivu, Maniema, Orientale and Katanga]
- **UN**: United Nations
- **UPDS**: Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social
- **UPN-DDR**: Unité d’Exécution du Programme national de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (DDR National Programme Execution Unit).
Chronology

- **1300** (Aprox.): Rise of Kongo Kingdom around the Congo River mouth and the Luba Kingdom (today’s Katanga towards Lake Tanganyika).
- **1482**: Explorer Diego Cão arrives at the shore of the Congo River and initiates a period of political, cultural and commercial exchange with Portugal.
- **1500 - 1600**: Portuguese political and economic ambitions in Congo, added to a split in Congolese elites between pro-Portuguese/modernists and anti-colonial/traditionalists creates political tensions in the Kingdom.
- **1600 – 1700**: Process of decay and social unrest, ending in the division of the Kongo Kingdom in 1667.
- **1700s**: Anti-colonial sentiment and a political movement to reunite the kingdom generate a series of movements whose most famous example is the one led by prophetess Beatriz Kimpa Vita.
- **1876**: King of Belgium Léopold II convenes a conference of geographers and explorers as a civilising, scientific and humanitarian mission against slavery, which creates the International African Association.
- **1878**: King Léopold and Morton Henry Stanley seal deal to claim Congo a Belgian colony.
- **1885**: Congo is internationally recognised as a Belgian territory at the Berlin Conference. Congo becomes a private territory of King Léopold and is renamed The Congo Free State.
- **1890 – 1910**: Reports of slavery, massacres and maiming raise international concern.
- **1893 - 1894**: Germany’s occupation of Rwanda-Burundi provokes a first Burundian migration into South Kivu between 1899 and 1903.
- **1908**: The Belgian parliament places Congo under the authority of the Belgian government, renaming the territory as The Belgian Congo.
- **1911 - 1918**: First significant migrations of Rwandese population to Congo, settling in North Kivu, in Rutshuru and Masisi, and in South Kivu towards the Itombwe massif.
• **1921**: Simon Kimbangu becomes the leader of a prophetic movement in N’Kamba, (Bas-Congo), which spreads as a symbol of anti-colonial resistance after his arrest.

• **1937**: The Belgian Colonial Administration begins a series of population movements from Ruanda-Urundi to Congo to balance out population numbers in the area.

• **1954**: Rwanda’s independence provokes an influx of Tutsi refugees into Congo.

• **1958**: Founding of the Mouvement National Congolais – a pro-independence party that later will be led by Patrice Lumumba.

• **1959**: Several rebellions across the country, arrest of Lumumba, and statement of King Baudouin favouring Congolese independence.

• **1960** (January): Round table in Brussels, with the participation of a recently freed Lumumba, granting independence to Congo.

• **1960** (June): Lumumba is declared Primer Minister after national elections.

• **1960** (30 June): Congo’s independence from Belgium

• **1960** (July): Belgian troops intervene in Katanga and subsequent secession.

• **1960** (September): Kasa Vubu dissolves parliament.

• **1961**: Lumumba is assassinated after his arrest.

• **1963**: Katanga secession ends under UN auspices.

• **1964**: Pierre Mulele leads a rebellion starting from Kwilu in Bandundu followed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila in Uvira.

• **1965** (24 November): US and Belgium-backed Coup d’État by Mobutu.

• **1971**: Mobutu renames the DRC, Zaire, and starts the Zairianisation process.

• **1985**: Nationalisation Law.

• **1990**: Mobutu declares the end of the one-party state.

• **1991**: Start of the Conference for National Sovereignty (CNS).

• **1992** (August): CNS elects Etienne Tshisekedi (UDPS) as Prime Minister.

• **1992** (December): Coup d’État by Mobutu.

• **1993**: Bunyamulenge uprising.

• **1994** (April): Rwandan genocide.

• **1996**: Start of AFDL War
• **1997** (April): Angola’s intervention
• **1997** (20 May): Laurent-Désiré Kabila takes over Kinshasa.
• **1997** (7 September): Mobutu dies of cancer in Morocco’s capital, Rabat.
• **1998**: RCD/Africa’s World War.
• **1999**: MONUC is authorised to deploy troops (Resolution 1279).
• **1999**: Deployment of troops by South African troops under the OAU.
• **1999** (July): Lusaka Peace Agreement.
• **2000**: MONUC’s mission is placed under a Chapter VII mandate.
• **2001**: Laurent-Désiré Kabila is shot by his bodyguard Rachidi Kasereka.
• **2002**: Sun City Peace Agreement.
• **2003**: Global and Inclusif Accords – 1+4
• **2003** (June): EU intervention in Ituri.
• **2004** (May): General Nkunda and Jules Mutebusi attack Bukavu.
• **2005**: National Constitutional Referendum supports constitutional reform.
• **2006** (July): creation of CNDP.
• **2006** (30 July): Legislative and Presidential Elections – 1st round.
• **2006** (15 – 16 December): International Conference on the Great Lakes Region – Security and Stability Pact
• **2006** (December – Early 2007): CNDP – General Nkunda’s troops and FARDC defectors reject electoral results and set up parallel administrations.
• **2007**: MLC troops confront Kabila supporters in Kinshasa contesting electoral results
• **2007**: Kabila and CNDP agree for Nkunda’s troops to undergo ‘mixage’ and to combat the FDLR together.
• **2008**: Bemba is arrested for crimes against humanity in the CAR.
• **2008** (6 – 23 January): Goma Accords creating the Amani Programme, STAREC, and subsequent UNSSSSS – later turned into ISSSS. Joint military operations by Rwanda and the DRC, and MONUC and the DRC, to disarm/expel all remaining national and foreign armed groups.
• **2009** (23 March): CNDP-Kabila agreement
• **2010** (April): Commitment of CNDP to end parallel administration.

• **2010** (June): MONUC becomes MONUSCO with the main mandate of restoring state authority and protecting civilians.

• **2011** (27 November): Presidential Elections give Kabila a second turn amidst accusations of fraud.

• **2012** (23 March): A series of FARDC defect in North and South Kivu to join a renewed CNDP rebellion- M23 - principally around Masisi and Rutshuru.

• **2012** (20 November): the M23 takes Sake and Goma, including the Goma/MONUSCO Airport.
This thesis explores everyday resistance in ‘post-conflict statebuilding’. It analyses which practices account for it, and whether the framework of everyday forms of resistance can be applied to such context. This research stems from two distinct but interconnected problems. First, the recent attention in peace and conflict studies to everyday forms of resistance, and the methodological turn to ‘everyday practices’ as a framework of analysis have only provided a rudimentary account of resistance. Secondly, this limited theorisation of resistance is partly the result of not having integrated the historical and sociological features of everyday practices into the analysis. Additionally, although the turn to study resistance has been hailed, and rightly so, as necessary for having a more accurate understanding and enabling a deeper critique of statebuilding, the accounts provided so far have been limited on both counts. The thesis provides an alternative account of both resistance and ‘post-conflict statebuilding’. It argues that resistance is the commonplace and prosaic response to the practices of

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1 As explained more extensively below, the phrase ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ is paradoxical. Not only is the context of Eastern DRC one of conflict and not of post-conflict, additionally, different practices contradict the aim of building the state. However, such paradoxical discourse will be retained following what Jacques Derrida calls ‘under erasure’ – that is, consciously using a concept that is ‘inadequate, yet necessary’. Gayatri Spivak “Preface” in Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), xiv. This necessity comes from the fact that this phrase represents a shared understanding amongst the literature the thesis is addressing; from being part of the official discourse and policy documents that are used in the DRC; and from the fact that there are few alternatives. See this chapter, pp. 14 – 16.

domination and power relations, produced and reproduced in the processes of war and statebuilding. Practices of resistance are heterogeneous, and are shaped by the particular political context.

The work of Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty is representative of this turn. They have provided the most extensive accounts of resistance within the peace and conflict literature, shifting the debates away from the concept of the spoiler. In doing so they have provided more nuanced accounts of the dynamics of liberal peace interventions and local societies. However, they are also illustrative of the problems just mentioned. Regarding the account of resistance, there have been issues of form and content. Different terms have been used interchangeably - "resistance", "challenge", "distortion" and "subversion" – denoting lack of conceptual clarity. Resistance has been referred to as a form of ‘critical agency’ and ‘hybridisation’, without establishing the relationship between intentions, actions and outcomes. Resistance is also said to be conscious and unconscious, and something done by both elites and non-elites without sufficient explanation. Additionally, the relationship between everyday resistance and violence has not been sufficiently analysed. Whereas, for example, Roger Mac Ginty includes violent forms of resistance in his account, Richmond’s analysis concentrates on non-violent resistance.

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Regarding the account of ‘post-conflict statebuilding’, one of the most problematic issues is that it is theorised as an international and/or liberal process, thus generating dichotomised analyses across international/local and liberal/non-liberal divides. Although the work of Richmond and Mac Ginty attempts to break with these binaries, these have been reified. Characterising peacebuilding as liberal and international, these analyses have studied the dynamics between ‘international peacebuilding’ and ‘local resistance’ (Mac Ginty) and their consequences theorised as a ‘local-liberal hybrid’ (Richmond). This has considerably limited the critique of statebuilding, missing the nuances of examining this process as featuring historical patterns of domination and mediated by myriad of actors. Since the notion of practice itself makes reference to historical patterns, it needs to be historicised to observe both the contingency and patterns in ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ and the societies that experience it.

Therefore, the undertaking could be seen as a double move. The thesis develops a framework of resistance to account for what it is and what practices constitute it, while developing an account of statebuilding considering its historical and sociological aspects. This is explored through the case of ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ in Eastern DRC and, in particular, North and South Kivu between 2009 and 2011. Portrayed as a paradigmatic case of state failure, the DRC represents a ‘tough test’ on which to premise an account of resistance and statebuilding. Following from its historical image as a place of plunder and tragedy, captured in Joseph Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness, the DRC today is often seen as a place of war, state failure and greed. The DRC’s status as a pathological representation of the relationship between violence, extraction, authority and

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8 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 76.
resistance makes it a ‘crucial case’ for exploring everyday practices of domination and resistance in the process of ‘post-conflict statebuilding’.\textsuperscript{10}

Resistance is not so much a particular resistance against “international” ‘post-conflict statebuilding’, as it is embedded more broadly in patterns of state-society relations. This relationship is not an insulated one of authority and subject. In fact, one of the insights from looking at statebuilding from a historical sociological perspective and from the DRC is to illustrate that this relationship is not a binary, but a plural relation of ‘multiple authorities and centres of political control’.\textsuperscript{11} The particular context is marked by, on the one hand, an increasing militarisation, authoritarianism and impoverishment of the civilian population, and, on the other, by a political discourse of peace, democracy and development. ‘Post-conflict statebuilding’ in the DRC is undertaken and mediated by myriad of international, national, state and non-state actors. The process of reconstituting state authority leads these actors to engage in contradictory practices of militarisation, peacebuilding, shared sovereignty and proxy wars. ‘Post-conflict statebuilding’ is in this sense the representation of the practices of statebuilding more generally. Resistance counters, not the intervention of international actors, but the different forms of extraction and violence undertaken by multiple actors. As a way of introducing these topics, this chapter outlines how resistance and statebuilding have been theorised in the thesis, why the case of the DRC was chosen and what methodology has been followed.

\textsuperscript{10} ‘A crucial case is one in which a theory that passes empirical testing is strongly supported and one that fails is strongly impugned’. cf. Harry Eckstein cited in George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development}, 9.

1. Resistance Patterns in the Everyday

The peacebuilding literature has chosen the framework of everyday forms of resistance, but it has not developed sufficiently what resistance is, and how can this framework apply in a context of conflict and statebuilding.\footnote{Most explicitly in the works of Oliver Richmond. See, in particular, Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; Richmond, “Critical Agency”; Oliver Richmond, “A Pedagogy of Peacebuilding: Infrapolitics, Resistance, and Liberation,” International Political Sociology 6, no. 2 (2012): 115 – 131.} As a way to address these shortcomings, the thesis follows the work of James Scott.\footnote{Mainly: Scott, Weapons of the Weak; Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance; James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).} Scott’s work serves firstly to concretise the account by premising it on patterns and subordinate groups, however uncoordinated and limited their practices might be.\footnote{This does not mean inexistence of loose social movements. A tapestry of civil and political organisations and ongoing social and political struggles take place in a more public sphere. This is seen through the struggle of collectives that have been particularly vocal and also particularly persecuted, for instance, human rights organisations, journalists, feminists, women-rights organisations, students, peace activists, pygmies, etc. However, not only the practices Scott focuses on are more prevalent, they form the basis of these more public struggles. See for example: Gauthier De Villers and Jean Omasombo Tshonda, “When Kinois Take to the Streets,” in Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa, ed. Theodore Trefon (London: Zed Books, 2004), 137 – 154.} Secondly, although a contentious aspect of the framework, it provides an account of the intent and motivations resisters have. Fourthly, it also accounts for the claims posed by authority, which are the target of resistance. It encompasses both material and symbolic claims, individual and collective actions. Finally, it facilitates an examination of a diverse range of acts, including how violent and non-violent practices relate to the framework of everyday resistance.

However, Scott’s definition could improve by referring directly to the patterned character of resistance. Intentions and motivations could be more directly linked, and, since Scott’s framework is developed in a pacified context, more could be said about the relationship between everyday resistance and violence. Following Michel De Certeau, Scott’s account could also include acts that do not oppose or address authority claims directly but are undertaken to fulfil one’s own needs in
detriment of the fulfilment of authority claims. Refining Scott’s account, but retaining its basic wording, the definition of resistance that is used throughout this thesis is as follows:

Resistance is the pattern of acts undertaken by individuals or collectives in a subordinated position to mitigate or deny the claims made by elites and the effects of domination, while advancing their own agenda.\textsuperscript{15}

Therefore, for resistance to be identified as such, at least three elements need to be present: authority claims (e.g. paying taxes, showing respect, complying with the law), denial and mitigation of those (e.g. tax avoidance, mockery, insult, reappropriation) and agenda setting (e.g. self-help, land, reparation of injustice). Without identifying these elements it is difficult to differentiate resistance from any other action of denial. Nonetheless, these elements recover meaning when seen as a pattern of actions within relations of domination.

\textit{Patterns of acts, a practice}

The emphasis on patterns places some limits on what counts as resistance. Everyday resistance is not an automated effect or a random action. Its acts are a patterned practice against domination in a conscious manner.\textsuperscript{16} Ultimately, avoiding taxes, refusing a command or postponing work, for example, are widespread practices of elites and non-elites. For resistance to have analytical value as a political category, it needs to be linked to patterns of insubordination against privilege in economic, social, and political relations. Thus it also requires an account of subordination and class, also implying that elites are not part of the framework.

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Scott, \textit{Weapons of the Weak}, 290.
\textsuperscript{16} As will be elaborated in Chapter Four, this is different from accounting for practices that may have a lesser clear intent.
Subordinate classes

Although the thesis problematises the categories that Scott uses, resistance is theorised as a practice of subordinate classes, or non-elites. The thesis identifies these classes with the working class (both skilled and unskilled), the peasantry, and with what Barrington Moore calls ‘lower classes’ – ‘those with little or no property, income, education, power, authority, or prestige’. Statebuilding lays claims of legitimate authority, extraction, backed by force, on these classes without giving them access to decision-making processes.

Notwithstanding how problematic it is to talk about ‘classes’ in Congo, because social and political relations are fluid and muddled, everyday resistance needs an account of its ‘actors’. The thesis follows Prunier in that, seeing the fluidity of the social and political world in Africa, he argues that linking classes with their networks in the informal economy does not rule out the existence of classes but only its problematisation and nuance. The implication of Prunier’s argument is that in the exercise of accumulation and power, distribution may follow networks of kin and proximity (where ethnic groups and their own rankings come to add an extra layer of social stratification) and may also create fluid boundaries, but it maintains an unequal class system.

In the DRC, subordinate classes represent the majority of the population. According to the African Development Bank, ‘70% Congolese live on less than $1

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19 Ibid., xiii.


22 For a detailed analysis of Congolese class structure see: Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Class
per day, 75% experience food insecurity, 73% are unemployed, 80% operate in the informal sector, 2/3 live in overcrowded accommodation, only 47% have access to clean water, and 9% to electricity’. These circumstances hit women and young especially. 54% of girls are out of school, and ‘only 2.8% of total waged jobs are undertaken by women’. In the context of war, women have been particularly over-represented in refugee groups, and as targets of sexual violence, while being excluded from power-sharing agreements. Lack of employment opportunities for young people means that young boys constitute the bulk of the membership in Mai Mai militias in the East, and in the Kuluna movement in Kinshasa. Although some of these indicators reflect greater historical trends, the experience of conflict and its subsequent statebuilding process has reproduced, not eliminated social hierarchies.

The concept of subordinate/non-elite is therefore complex and contingent. It is intersected by the different kinds of subordination that cut across economic, social, and political relations including class, gender, ethnic group, race, age, sexuality, or physical ability. The complexity of social, economic and political relations means that one could be a street-beggar, yet be in a dominant position with respect to a partner or a child. Scott argued that the everyday framework could apply to other situations of subordination beyond class, such as gender, race, age, sexual orientation and other social hierarchies. While acknowledging these complexities, the thesis does not provide an exhaustive comparison of different kinds of subordinate experiences during statebuilding. Rather it links these to broader dynamics of resistance, violence and extraction in the exercise of building state authority.

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24 Ibid., 14.
25 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Women and Peace and Security (New York: UN Security Council, September 28, 2010), para. 3, 69 - 73, and section III.
26 African Development Bank, Democratic Republic of Congo, 15.
27 Chapter Four will provide a more extensive account of Scott.
Resistance is explored through different discursive, violent and survival practices. These include denigration, slandering, mockery and reworking of mainstream statebuilding discourse; the activities of Mai Mai militias and their use by rural communities to provide security; as well as creative survival practices that range from tax evasion, land reappropriation and the provision of all sorts of social services. The diverse range of resistance practices, and the fact that they may not be straightforwardly seen as practices towards the denial or mitigation of domination require a critical examination of the everyday framework.

One of the main criticisms that Scott has received is that one could never account for the myriad intentions that people would have in, for instance, mocking MONUC/MONUSCO, denigrating the government or even launching an armed attack on the army. These practices are said to be opportunistic, self-serving and ultimately too ambiguous and ambivalent to serve as a category of analysis in political research. Another critique has been that Scott excessively simplifies social reality. This is prominent in the context of statebuilding in the DRC, which is marked by heterogeneity, ambiguity and contradictory processes. However, critics of the Scottian framework have also argued that everyday resistance is an irrelevant category, it is ungraspable or does not exist.28

Against these critiques, this thesis proposes to embrace ambiguity and plurality, while emphasising that resistance is a prevalent historical practice in everyday life. That is, acknowledging the ambiguities of everyday life and the impossibility of accounting for every individual action, resistance should be accounted for as a

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political category. This is added to the fact that, as Hollander and Einwohner argue, resistance is ‘socially constructed’. In the process of identifying what is resistance and what is not, its recognition by those who resist, those who are targeted and those who observe creates a complex interconnection of subjective meaning.

In order to better account for the variety of resistance practices in the DRC, the thesis also proposes a gradation of some elements depending on the visibility of intentionality, the intensity and exposure of the acts used, and how directly authority claims have been addressed. For example, violent acts of Mai Mai militias on the military imply a different level of intensity and exposure than an insult. Similarly, there might be different gradients of visibility of intent. Whereas some of the strategies followed for tax evasion present a thought-out strategy, the subversion of mainstream statebuilding vocabulary to launch alternative agendas and critique statebuilding may not present intent in the same degree.

Different levels of engagement against authority claims will also provide the categorisation of two different practices. On the one hand, and closer to Scott’s account, there are practices that address authority claims more directly (claim-regarding acts) – for example, tax evasion against tax levy, denigration against legitimacy. On the other hand, and closer to Michel De Certeau, there are practices that follow ‘self-logics’ and in doing so mitigate authority claims and the effects of domination (self-regarding acts). According to De Certeau, ‘writing a letter to a friend’ during work, ‘borrowing’ material from work for one’s own purposes or taking a non-marked path are practices of resistance. These are done out of a sense of solidarity with one’s friends and family or prioritising one’s own needs. These practices are ways of subverting the law and order of work, the factory and

30 Ibid.
everyday rules, which simultaneously introduce a ‘sociopolitical ethic’ not based on profit or social hierarchy. Survival strategies in the DRC, which are generally undertaken following relations of proximity and based on an ethic of reciprocity, not only provide ways to mitigate poverty and the deteriorating conditions of an militarised context, they simultaneously enact alternative forms of social organisation and political authority.

In exploring these different elements, as mentioned earlier, the thesis argues that the practices of everyday resistance are determined by the political context. Moreover, there is no universal all-encompassing framework of resistance. Any framework needs to connect its main defining elements of patterns, motivations, acts and actors, and be contextualised. The context of the DRC, and the Kivus in particular, although defined as ‘post-conflict’, ‘peace-consolidation’, ‘peace-building’ or ‘stabilisation’, is one of ongoing war, increasing militarisation and plural authority. In this context, the ways in which rural communities engage in violence either directly or indirectly needs to be seen in a continuum with multiple ways subordinate groups deny and mitigate domination.

2. Histories, Practices and Everydayness in Statebuilding

That statebuilding has become the preferred formula for ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ illustrates an understanding of the state as ‘[t]he foundation-stone of international peace and order’. Thus if the state has failed or has lost its

33 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 27.
legitimacy, it needs to be reconstructed. As Navari argues, the conception of the state, as the embodiment of peace is not extraneous for either International Relations or Political Theory, for whom the state is ‘an arena of moral choice’. It only depends on whether the state is seen as the ethical order (Hobbes/Hegel), in which case intervention might be ruled out; or whether the state is seen as the best ethical order available (Locke), in which case intervention might be required to preserve or infer some changes inside states. Arguably, interventions have taken this Lockean view. For instance, for Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan ‘the state is the most effective mechanism for ensuring security, combating poverty and promoting equality of opportunity, investment in human capital and participation in opportunities afforded by the market’. Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan argue that it is in the performance of these functions that a ‘virtuous circle’ is created which citizenry bolsters and which can actually ‘be delineated through a capacity program with timelines, benchmarks and indicators that serve both as goals towards which the public can be mobilized’. However, turning the state into a peace-broker denotes what Navari also identified as ‘a series of epistemological devices amalgamated with political theory’. She was referring to the theoretical practice of stripping the state of its historical and sociological elements as a historically contingent institution of domination, and turning it into a necessary organising mechanism to maintain national and international order.

37 Ibid., 48.
39 Ibid. p. 2
'Post-conflict statebuilding’ can be seen both as a discourse that informs policy as well as a core element of peacebuilding actions, although not necessarily advancing peace. Call and Cousens define both as follow:

Peacebuilding: Actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics. Post-conflict peacebuilding is the subset of such actions undertaken after the termination of armed hostilities. [...] State-building: Actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding.\(^{41}\)

This understanding underpins the critical peacebuilding literature that this thesis addresses. Mac Ginty, for example, speaks of statebuilding as one of the ‘pillars’ of the liberal peace.\(^{42}\) For Richmond the ‘liberal peace project’ has ‘a statebuilding focus’.\(^{43}\) However, not only these terms do not identify the everyday practices of statebuilding, their conceptualisation assumes some form of concerted effort or strategy which presents several analytical and practical problems.

*Problematic ‘Post-conflict’, ‘International’, ‘Liberal’ and ‘Statebuilding’ terms*

As was advanced in the introduction, the problematic use of the phrase ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ is due to the fact that both ‘post-conflict’ and ‘statebuilding’ do not reflect the complex context of conflict, multiple clashing agendas, plurality and improvisation. As was also mentioned, retaining its usage as a form of Derridean ‘under erasure’ means to accept it as a shared terminology in the literature and policy circles, while highlighting its paradoxical and inadequate nature.\(^{44}\) In fact, the inadequacy of this terminology has already been identified both in policy and scholarly research, but few alternatives are available.

\(^{44}\) Spivak in Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, xiv.
For example, the OECD sees statebuilding as ‘the central objective of international assistance [in] post-conflict contexts’.\(^45\) They also see the category of ‘post-conflict’ as ‘problematic, given the question of war recurrence’,\(^46\) but it seems to have been retained as way to identify the moment in which applying these policies would become legitimate. However, the term has policy and analytical implications. In the case of the DRC, Autesserre has demonstrated that

labelling the Congo a “postconflict” situation instead of a “war” situation made a specific set of policies and procedures (such as the organization of elections) seem natural and appropriate while another set of strategies (such as work on local conflicts) seemed inappropriate and illegitimate.\(^47\)

Autesserre also demonstrates that at a general level, notwithstanding the differences between different organisations and foreign policy agendas, there are collective understandings that create a culture of shared perceptions towards the causes of conflict, the right strategies and the right involvement. ‘Post-conflict statebuilding’ seems to indicate the understanding that certain policy strategies should be followed after a truce. In this sense, the labels of ‘post-conflict’ and ‘international’ both signal consensus in a discourse that authorises international actors to intervene in areas of sovereign political authority in a foreign state after a peace agreement. Although the critical literature has unearthed the power dynamics underpinning those practices, it has not been without issues.

Whether as ‘liberal peace’, ‘international statebuilding’, or ‘global governance’, critics have seen that these practices advanced hegemonic Western security agendas and understandings of political order.\(^48\) For instance, Tim Jacoby argues that ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction reflects Western interests in ‘national security

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 19.


and [the] defence of hegemony’. Richmond sees the liberal peace discourse and international statebuilding actors as hegemonic, albeit challenged. Hegemony identifies the power relations that form the creation of consensus, justifying interventions and how should they be carried out; but it does not capture the nature of statebuilding. As Heathershaw argues, the ‘hegemony of the ‘liberal peace’ is only meaningful [...] in the imaginations of donors, policy-makers and the citizenries of Western states’. Its discourse serves as a claim to authority, as a justification to intervene and as blame externalisation, but it remains contested. The framework of the ‘liberal peace’, or of the hegemony of international actors, overlooks important statebuilding’s failures, and has been called into question for theorising interventions as overpowering, ideologically coherent or indeed as liberal.

Additionally, referring to ‘statebuilding’ or ‘peacebuilding’ suggests that “actual happening statebuilding” or “peacebuilding” is assumed, rather than questioned. Reading ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ as statebuilding more generally links it to historical practices that entail formal and informal forms of governance, accumulation, and broader relations of domination. The thesis disaggregates and scrutinises ‘statebuilding’ in its practices and incidence, rather than just in how and by whom they are operated.

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50 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; Oliver Richmond, Peace in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2008).
Reading statebuilding as a global governance strategy and international intervention paradigm is then not the best entry point to theorise resistance to this process. Missing in these analyses are the important implications the processes of war, accumulation and state authority production as co-constituted by international, local, state and non-state actors alike have for resistance. Moreover, they have been limited to accounts of statebuilding as a process of change, missing also important continuities that directly affect practices of domination and resistance. ‘Post-conflict statebuilding’ is better observed from the patterns of statebuilding at large.

Recent analyses of ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ through the lenses of state formation have afforded a better understanding of this process. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, for example, has conceptualised ‘statebuilding’ and ‘state-formation’ as ideal-types that represent political and social processes that accompany the politics of statebuilding by international, national and subnational actors and which, in turn, are shaped by the temporally and spatially overarching structures of world society.

Drawing on Braudel, Bourdieu, and on political sociology and anthropology more generally, this framework is a step further in linking contemporary processes with


the historicity of societies and world structures, while examining micro-level routine practices and repertoires.\textsuperscript{55} Following Bruce Berman and John Londsdale, Bliesemann de Guevara also argues that ‘statebuilding’ features intentional elements of statebuilding as a ‘conscious effort’, as well as immanent non-intentional elements of state formation.\textsuperscript{56} What these analyses do not emphasise enough is that both statebuilding and state-formation (as ideal-type processes) share patterns in governing practices that produce domination. These practices need to be explored more thoroughly if resistance wants to be understood.

Resistance features intermittently in these analyses as a way to argue that different actors mould the state, that there are hegemonic as well as subordinate agencies that struggle in this process, and that these may not necessarily follow a top-down approach.\textsuperscript{57} Resistance is also mentioned to highlight that statebuilding is contested and mediated, but not as a developed account of it. They do not link structures of domination and subordination, with patterns of accumulation and violence in statebuilding. It is this particular aspect that a historical sociological approach brings about to an analysis of ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ understood as statebuilding more generally.\textsuperscript{58}

\textit{Historical Sociology and Statebuilding}

Similar to the political sociological approaches to statebuilding, historical sociology, and in particular ‘historicist historical sociology’, sees history, structure and world politics as interacting. Its contribution is to see ‘history as a social process in which historical events form part of broader patterns of continuities and change’.\textsuperscript{59} Pace Mills, Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg propose a framework

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 2 – 7.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{58} The analysis will continue to use post-conflict statebuilding without quotes to indicate such discursive uses in the literature and official policy. A more general category of statebuilding –without quotes – will identify processes of authority assertion, accumulation, and violence.
\textsuperscript{59} John M. Hobson, George Lawson, and Justin Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology,” ed.
of analysis ‘at the intersection of three dimensions of the human world’. It includes history, sociology (structure) and international relations. History means accounting for patterns, for the contingency of events and for the particularities of time and space. Sociology accounts for the ‘configuration of social relations and the impact on micro-processes’. International relations accounts for a theory of the international that is part and not external to the other two dimensions.

The thesis draws on Charles Tilly’s account of state-formation, and Achille Mbembe’s theorisation of Africa’s political space to analyse statebuilding. The fact that the DRC has been the site of several multi-state wars, explained through narratives of violence linked to plunder, and that their corollary solution, premised on statebuilding, has itself generated further militarisation linked to continuous extraction, makes Tilly’s account of coercion and accumulation as the basis for state-formation a necessary reference. This does not suggest that war has necessarily contributed to the centralising and organising of the coercive and extractive apparatus of the state in a Tillean sense. In fact it could be the opposite. Tilly facilitates an account of historical patterns of statebuilding, and a reference point on which to articulate relations of domination and resistance.

Following Mbembe, the thesis takes the historicity of the DRC as part of the explanation about the nature of resistance and the context. This counters the main narratives of the DRC, which have seen the DRC’s conflict as a representation of a transhistorical conflict over land and identity, and so as a transhistorical dynamic of plunder and violence and ultimately as failure. The insight the DRC provides


Ibid., 3357.

Ibid., 13.


from this perspective is that post-conflict statebuilding is not so much a ‘hybrid’ of international and local action as it is a process of state reconstruction that reflects the co-constituted nature of any given political institution and order in world politics.

3. The Democratic Republic of Congo: Pathologies and Patterns

Choosing the DRC for an account of resistance and post-conflict statebuilding does not aim to establish how ‘atypical’ a case it is, but to better understand what the ‘everyday’ means and then historicising it. The standard view of the DRC as a case of state failure has provoked accounts in which multiple processes have been explained only by reference to this issue without exploring the more complex aspects of the DRC. According to Mbembe, generally Africa is explained by indicating what it ‘lacks’ and pointing out its failures in comparison to something else, generally some Western model. Adam Hochschild’s metaphor of the DRC as a ‘ghost’ remains prevalent, especially in those who see it as nonexistent. So, as Mbembe notes, when it comes to the DRC, we know more about what it lacks and what it does not properly do than what it has and what it does. This is not to deny the problems and issues that the Congolese experience on a daily basis. The fact that the country has seen both the bloodiest multi-state war in African history, one of the few of its kind on the continent, and one of the

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64 An ‘atypical case’ is ‘enlightening about the conditionalities of a phenomenon, promoting not only understanding but also theory refinement. Often, cases which defy expectations, conflict with the ordinary, illustrate contrasting approaches, or suggest alternatives’. Pertti Alasuutari, Leonard Bickman, and Julia Brannen, eds., The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods (London: SAGE, 2008), 217.


66 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 3.

worst humanitarian catastrophes since World War II, underscores the scale of the problems facing the country.68

Statebuilding and war in Congo, and the everyday conditions of living that are shaped by them, could be seen as raucous but are not pathological. Practices of authority assertion, violence and wealth distribution are patterns in statebuilding processes. The DRC thus illustrates the particularities of its context and how post-conflict statebuilding, as a set of policies and strategies that enshrines collective security mechanisms, becomes enmeshed in and is not extraneous to these practices. As one of the largest and longest UN interventions in the organisation’s history, it also represents a case on which to observe post-conflict statebuilding as a contradictory, improvised and plural endeavour. This means highlighting that UN missions do not operate uniformly or monolithically. Not only do they operate ‘experimental’ strategies at times, they also encounter contradictory side political agendas.69

The material gathered from fieldwork reflects the dynamics of the period between 2009 and 2011 in the Eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. As will be clear in tracing the history of this context, this period represents political dynamics prevalent since the beginnings of the 1996 war. These dynamics have been marked by militarisation, foreign interventionism, extraction and plural authority, and civilian targeting and their mobilisation into war. The actions of the DRC government, MONUC/MONUSCO and Rwanda, as representative of main actors

68 The term ‘multi-state war’ will be used to refer to the 1996 – 1997 and the 1998 – 2002 wars, noting the fact that these wars have confronted coalitions of states in the DRC, but these did not entail an ongoing ‘inter-state’ war throughout the whole period. At times these states were involved in occupying the territory, more than in a military campaign against other states.
operating in these provinces, have contributed to these dynamics. The strengthening of the statebuilding strategies since 2008 has entailed the creation of new sources of violence without resulting in more stabilisation. Some of this violence has come from the CNDP rebellions, the FDLR and Mai Mai militias, but it has also come from three major military operations, undertaken between the DRC, Rwanda and MONUC/ MONUSCO.

The process of post-conflict statebuilding in the DRC has prioritised the consolidation and extension of state authority throughout the territory. However, insufficient means available to the DRC government, the second agendas present in donor countries, political compromises, and the interests of neighbouring countries have meant that the extending of state authority has militarised peace and political authority. It has also consolidated Rwanda’s quasi-hegemonic presence over a significant part of North Kivu. The implication is that there is not ‘one’ ‘international’ statebuilding, but rather multiple intersecting ‘statebuildings’. Some of the consequences of these policies have been that contrary to the claims of peace, development and democracy, the Kivus have experienced a deterioration of living standards and the furthering of authoritarian rule, especially in areas where authority has been held by the military.\(^{70}\) State authority is revealed along an axis of absences and presences, and not as a committed centralising social engineering.

\textit{The Purpose of the Case Study: Theory Development}

The purpose of the case study is not to make any causal inference or to test hypotheses. The question it addresses is not why, but how resistance happens. If, as Jack Levy notes, a case is defined by its research purpose, the selection of the DRC case has followed theoretical aims, providing criteria that are not

\(^{70}\) As it will be noted in Chapter Two, this deterioration contradicts the otherwise improving macro-economic indicators of the DRC, suggesting a link between processes of accumulation and increasing inequalities.
necessarily dependent/independent variables’.\textsuperscript{71} The thesis examines systematically different practices of resistance against practices of domination fostered by the process of post-conflict statebuilding. Thus, following Patrick T. Jackson, the thesis is more an inquiry than a test of nullifiable hypothesis.\textsuperscript{72} This does not mean that resistance does not exist beyond our thinking, but that researching and theorising resistance is not an exercise of objective measurement of independently existing facts.

The evidence provided throughout the thesis is verifiable in so far these are not hidden, or invisible acts. Other researchers may interpret these acts differently. Still, following Jackson, it claims that ‘its validity is internal to its own methodology’, and while its interpretation is open to challenge, it is consistent.\textsuperscript{73} This may not be ‘science’ but it is ‘something to use as guidance for systematic thorough inquiry that has the potential to produce a certain kind of knowledge’.\textsuperscript{74}

The conflict in Eastern DRC and the way statebuilding strategies have been drafted and applied can serve for comparing other case studies. The context of North and South Kivu is complex, but cannot be separated from the politics of the DRC and the Great Lakes region as a whole. They also reflect African politics more generally. However, the generalisations are also limited.\textsuperscript{75} As Scott argues, the study of ‘practices’, meaning the mechanisms, informalities and improvisations that allow for certain schemes to be put ‘in practice’, is the best point of entry for knowledge.\textsuperscript{76} This means that, although it is possible to argue that the nature of political authority in post-conflict statebuilding is plural, what

\textsuperscript{72} Patrick T. Jackson, \textit{The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics} (London: Routledge, 2010), esp. Introduction.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 191.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 6.
this really means in Eastern DRC (e.g. plural centres of power including state and non-state actors in parts of North Kivu, or statebuilding through the deployment of the military) may imply important nuanced differences to what it means in Bosnia (e.g. the influence of the European Union and the US amongst different Bosniak and Croats’ political projects). In other words, highlighting certain practices as resistance may provide a methodological container that will only recover meaning once they are contextualised.

Eastern DRC provides a rich insight on which to premise an account of resistance in post-conflict statebuilding. Such an account shifts our understanding of Eastern DRC from a pathological case of bad governance, corruption and violence to one of patterns, practices, continuities and change. As will be shown, resistance in Eastern DRC is revealed in the mockery done by subordinate classes of both the government and the MONUC/MONUSCO, especially in light of the lack of balance between political promises and the reality lived. It is also seen in the ways popular militias are used or created for security purposes, as well as in the ways civilians mitigate the effects of military rule through negotiation and activate modes of self-organisation to confront poverty. Yet these are not as specific to Eastern DRC as they represent patterns in relations of domination.

4. Research Design and Methodological challenges

The thesis addresses the following question:

*What is everyday resistance in ‘post-conflict statebuilding’?*

From this, subsequent questions arise:
What practices constitute everyday resistance? What is resisted? Is the framework of everyday forms of resistance an appropriate one to analyse resistance in ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ contexts?

As noted above, the overarching argument of the thesis is that resistance counters or mitigates domination, and its practices are shaped by the political context. Resistance in the DRC takes many forms, responding to a context of plural authority, militarisation and extraction that do not match the discourses which justify statebuilding or lived experience. Statebuilding is a claim to and a practice of authority. It claims legitimacy based on its capacity and knowledge to generate democracy, peace and development, but it is exercised incoherently and plurally through practices of violence and dispossession.

The research has gathered evidence focusing on discourses, violence and survival/livelihoods. It has focused on evidence that negates authority and its legitimacy by mockery, slandering and the redefinition of the meanings of the state, democracy, peace and development. It has also analysed resistance by armed groups, and through DIY-survival practices against dispossession and as practices of re-appropriation.

Although the thesis follows Scott and the methodological approach to focus on practices, it is not ethnography. This is because the time spent in the field is considered insufficient, and because a full and critical engagement with the legacy of ethnography from Anthropology falls outside the scope of the thesis. Despite this, there is still an acknowledgement of what Behar calls, the ‘epiphany’ that material, research and analysis have undergone, between the observation, the field and the final text. There is also an exercise of ‘zooming in’ to observe

77 Ibid., 312.
79 Ruth Behar cited in Wanda Vrasti, “Dr Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying About Methodology and Love Writing,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 1 (2010): 84; See also the transition from “history” to the “text” in Michel De Certeau, The
someone criticising the government, or another entering into a negotiation to tame
the authoritarian nature of military rule, followed by a ‘zooming out’, to
extrapolate these to patterns of actions whereby domination is resisted.\(^{80}\)

\[Evidence\ of\ Resistance\]

The main data gathering method has been semi-structured interviews, focusing
on five groups: the population/subordinate class component, representatives of
Mai Mai popular militias, the government, the army, and MONUC/MONUSCO.
Other representatives have also been interviewed as a way to contrast
information. These have included opposition leaders, diplomats, local and
international entrepreneurs, international NGOs, and representatives of UN
agencies. Altogether 158 formal interviews, 3 focus groups, 10 participant
observations, 1 small survey and 75 informal conversations form the corpus of the
evidence.\(^{81}\)

The corpus of the research was established based on the primary representatives
of post-conflict statebuilding and resistance in the DRC. Amongst these, the main
sampling mechanism has been snowballing and random sampling. This was
undertaken under the assumption that the ‘sampling unit is different from the
observational unit’.\(^{82}\) This means that participants are only to a certain extent the
locus of the inference. Whereas government representatives, FARDC, Mai Mai
combatants and MONUC/MONUSCO were easily targeted – albeit the difficulty
in access – targeting representatives of subordinate groups represented a
challenge in several fronts. Firstly, as some participants representing subordinate
groups did not speak French, let alone English, a choice had to be made between

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\(^{81}\) For De Certeau, using ‘zoom lenses’ provides the ‘sociological and anthropological
perspective that privileges the anonymous and the everyday’. De Certeau, Practice of
Everyday Life, v.
\(^{82}\) See Appendix III for a breakdown of fieldwork. 9 OCHA- humanitarian and security
briefings were also attended.
\(^{82}\) Alasuutari, Bickman, and Brannen, The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods, 203,
emphasis in the original.
going through the mediation of interpreters, or focusing on French speakers, thus targeting the more elite end of subordinate groups. The preference has been to have the least mediated communication possible. As noted earlier, the non-elite component of the research has been defined in broad terms. The research has incorporated members of internationally-funded NGOs, university professors and journalists, alongside, market and street sellers, peasant representatives, unemployed youth, community leaders and formal and non-formally organised NGOs.

Summaries of interviews have been partially transcribed, adding all necessary information and relevant verbatim quotes. These have been then interpreted under the framework outlined in Chapter Four. No unwanted conversations have been recorded. In several occasions a translator has been used from Swahili, Bembe and Kinyarwanda to French. All translations from French and Spanish are my own. In addition to this an excel sheet was compiled in order to extract patterns in discourses and other practices.

**Data analysis**

The empirical chapters are based on the examination of activities that are commonplace in daily life, not only in the DRC but everywhere. The challenge is not to present the quantitative incidence of these activities, but to prove that they can be interpreted as resistance. The practices explored are what George and Bennett call ‘building blocks’ in the framework, meaning to ‘study particular types of subtypes of a phenomenon [to] identify common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose’. The interviews and observations are valued both individually, as representative of the resistance account, as well as instances of broader patterns. This means that alongside mapping observations and responses from interviews onto the framework of resistance, the aim has been

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83 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 76.
to gather the same responses across a variety of places and actors to reflect such widespread practice.

Although some points may be illustrated with few quotes, they represent at least two thirds of the interviews undertaken within the same group. Biased interpretations have been mitigated by triangulating responses and keeping in dialogue with the literature. During all periods of fieldwork checks were done formally, in interviews, as well as informally in conversations. Choosing the case of Eastern DRC in a way solves this bias. As will be elaborated in the thesis, policy and scholarly analyses of the DRC have tended to highlight how domination takes place and how this rests on the participation of subordinate groups.

**Time and locations**

The period of fieldwork has taken place over 30 weeks: June – July 2009, June – September 2010 and August – September 2011. Fieldwork was undertaken in Kinshasa, North Kivu (Goma, Masisi, Beni and Butembo) and South Kivu (Bukavu, Bunyakiri (including the localities of Maibano and Bulambika), Uvira, Baraka and Fizi). An additional three months between September and December 2011 were spent as an electoral observer, covering the province of Equateur. Although this time was dedicated to electoral observation tasks, this experience confirmed observations gathered elsewhere. Additional contact was made with members of the Congolese diaspora in London and Paris. The logistics of the research has entailed a limited scope of the fieldwork in terms of the number of interviews and places visited. Even so, aiming at gathering patterns has included observing these activities in eleven different locations in the two Kivus representing a relatively large population.
These locations represent key areas for the post-conflict statebuilding programmes of both MONUC/MONUSCO and the DRC government (ISSSS and STAREC). Due to time, budget and research design constraints, the research could

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84 Cartographer Jillian Luff from MAPgrafix in Jason Stearns, *North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo* (London: Rift Valley Institute - Usalama Project, 2012), 3. The added locations are approximate. No map has been found that locates all fieldwork sites. For a more detailed map of the North and South Kivu provinces and DRC as a whole see Appendix IV.
not cover all of the areas included in these programmes (Maniema, Province Orientale and North Katanga). However, North and South Kivu currently represent some of the most problematic areas with intensive armed activity from different foreign and local armed groups. These provinces are representatives of the dynamics explored in the thesis including: the coercive and extractive practices of statebuilding; the dynamics of the region; the coexistence of different statebuilding projects; and the different practices of resistance.

A note on Gender and Sexual Violence in the DRC

The fact that sexual violence in the DRC is part of the experience of domination of women, and that this type of violence has been perpetrated largely by members of the Congolese armed forces, makes it important to situate the thesis in relation to gender and sexual violence. The thesis has explored women’s role in resistance to statebuilding as discourse generators, organisers, supporters and detractors of popular militias, and providers of everyday living. This has meant a lesser focus on their experience as survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. In several occasions I specifically interviewed women’s organisations that were either directly or indirectly dealing with sexual violence. Here women were not asked to narrate their experience of sexual violence but their experience more generally with authority, war, and survival. This is not to deny the extent to which women have been the target of rapists in the almost twenty years of conflict. However, it situates the research in a particular relationship to gender and sexual violence in the DRC in two ways.

On the one hand, gender and sexual violence are seen as forms of oppression, intersecting with a range of violent and dominating actions. Although all of those forms, whether sexual violence, torture, intimidation, abuse, or killing, deserves its own analysis, the thesis asks broader questions about how these relate to macro-processes of statebuilding and resistance.\textsuperscript{85} As a consequence, not

\textsuperscript{85} Thanks to Paul Kirby for this point.
addressing sexual violence is not due to a lack of attention but a demarcation of the limits of the research. In addition, the thesis takes seriously the findings of new research, which suggests that superficial or singled-out attention to sexual violence, linked to a narrative of the DRC as ‘the rape capital of the world’, has hindered our understanding of sexual violence in war in the DRC itself, and been detrimental to other forms of violence.\(^8\) Autesserre for example has noted that ‘the disproportionate attention to sexual violence’ has neglected non-sexualised forms of torture, and ‘raised the status of sexual abuse to an effective bargaining tool for combatants’.\(^8\) Maria Baaz has also argued that a single sexual-violence focus in the DRC is counterproductive because it reinforces a colonial imaginary of Congo as a place of brutality and lack of civilisation, and monopolises attention on sexual violence.\(^8\) This also undermines the extent of the gravity of other forms of violence, provokes a limited understanding of the relationship between sexual violence and those other forms of violence, de-genders non-sexually related violence, and conflates sex with gender in a way that hides gendered violence against men and boys.\(^9\) Thus acknowledging these complexities and the limits of the research focus, the thesis sees different forms of subordination and domination having a diverse and intersecting relationship with violence.


\(^8\) Ibid., 13 – 14. See also Vinck et al. who show that although sexually-related abuses are still very prevalent, they are less so than other human rights abuses. Out of 2,500 interviewees, out of which 49.7% are women, 23.4% report having witnessed sexual violence, 15.7% report to have been sexually violated, and 11.6% having been violated multiple times, whereas disappearance is reported by 60% of interviewees, 52% report forced labour and enslavement, and 46.2% being beaten up by armed groups. Patrick Vinck et al., “Living with Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes About Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Congo,” Berkeley: Human Rights Centre, August 2008, 33 – 35.
On the other hand, and following from the above, the thesis focuses on the ways both power and resistance operate. Rather than exploring how this takes place through gender roles and sexual violence, the research has noted gender divisions across resistance practices – e.g. Whereas the vast proportion of armed resisters are young men, a significant amount of resistance through survival relies on the work done by women. It has also noted how sexual violence is present when speaking of resistance through armed groups. Additionally, although it is important to note how statebuilding and the assertion of political authority rest on the subjection of women through violence, this is an area that has received extensive research and theorisation.\(^\text{90}\)

The research has premised its study of resistance across different core foundations of statebuilding: discourse, violence and appropriation, as a way to provide an alternative account of both statebuilding and the DRC, while providing a framework for understanding resistance. This is already a vast enterprise, and one that was necessary, given the lack of depth in the accounts of both resistance and statebuilding in peace and conflict studies. The sacrifice has been to neglect a much deeper account of intra-group privilege and hierarchies. This would have entailed a much lengthier time of fieldwork, a narrower limit of places visited, and a distinct focus, which may not have spoken as directly to the debates it was addressing. Still, the discussion broadens the analysis by engaging in an interdisciplinary discussion with how everyday resistance has been conceived and criticised in the social sciences more generally.

5. The Structure of the Thesis

In order to develop these arguments, the thesis is structured in four parts: introduction, theory, empirical analysis and conclusion. In the introduction, Chapter One first examines the contradiction of how post-conflict statebuilding has been consolidated as the standard policy measure in spite of its poor rate of success. It then analyses the accounts of resistance in peace and conflict studies, identifying their limitations and suggesting the use of a Scottian framework as an alternative. Chapter Two examines the case of the DRC. It first discusses three standard explanations of the DRC case. It also introduces the necessary background to the conflict between 1996 and 2003, and to the UN missions in the DRC since 2001. It finally discusses the dynamics of the Kivus between 2009 and 2011, which constitute the context of the empirical chapters.

Part Three elaborates the theoretical framework for the thesis in two chapters: one for statebuilding (Chapter Three) and another one for resistance (Chapter Four). Chapter Three argues that resistance is rooted in the coercive and extractive practices of statebuilding, discussing Tilly’s and Mbembe’s theories, and the multiple challenges they bring to the account. Chapter Four is a development of the framework of resistance. Aside from reworking Scott’s definition of resistance, it addresses important critiques and shortcomings made to the framework, offering several solutions. These include the gradation of some of its elements with elements of De Certeau, and a way to account for the diversity of resistance practices in the DRC, including subversion and violence.

The empirical part of the thesis explores the three areas of resistance practices. Chapter Five examines the discursive realm through statebuilding discourses developed as a claim to authority, and how they are challenged by mockery, denigration, slandering and subversion of meaning. Chapter Six examines violent resistance through the actions of Mai Mai militias and the ways the civilian population relates to them. Chapter Seven explores creative survival and the ways
reciprocity and solidarity allow for mitigating extractive practices and military rule.

The thesis concludes with an opening. Applying the Scottian framework to the study of resistance in post-conflict statebuilding proves to be a rich exercise. It offers an account of the practices of resistance, while adding conceptual precision. The critical appraisal of the framework simultaneously opens avenues to reflect on other frameworks and explore other cases. The thesis does not suggest that a Scottian framework, and the critical development this thesis offers, should be the standard framework of resistance. The thesis argues that precisely because the study of everyday practices implies contextualisation, this affects the framework too. The fact that the study of resistance represents a long-standing multidisciplinary debate, an account of resistance also needs to address the core critiques made to different aspects of it. The thesis sees patterns, intentions, motivations, acts and actors as representative of core defining elements of resistance and the core elements in the critiques. Yet the complexities and muddleness of resistance need to be explained, not ignored or left as too complex to reduce them to an analytical category. A call to study everyday resistance and the need to account for the ‘epiphanies’ in the exercise of analytical abstractions between micro and macro realities is finally a call to embrace the exciting complexity of the world as a knowable sphere.⁹¹

⁹¹ Cf. ‘That the world is complex does not mean it is unknowable’. In Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology,” 3362.
Chapter 1
Statebuilding and Resistance: A Patterned Relationship

1. Post-Cold War Interventionism and the UN: From the Guardian of State Sovereignty to the Bricklayer of the Social Contract

Since 1945, a significant quantitative and qualitative development in the doctrines of intervention and conflict management has made state-society relations the particular sphere of international intervention.\(^1\) Looked at from the evolution of the system of collective security enshrined in the UN, out of the 67 UN peacekeeping operations from 1948 to 2012, only 18 took place between 1948 and 1989. The remaining 49 took place in the post-Cold War period.\(^2\) Although this variance reflects Cold War politics and the use of veto, the fact that almost all of the 49 operations were internal conflicts highlights an important shift in the perception of international security threats and order maintenance.\(^3\) Each operation has been justified under the inter-state framework of the UN Charter.\(^4\) What has changed is that these operations have been increasingly targeted at spheres previously thought of as the exclusive domain of the sovereign political


\(^2\) See Appendix V for a complete list of operations.

\(^3\) According to Charles Call 95% of conflicts were civil wars. Charles Call, “Ending Wars, Building States,” in Building States to Build Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 1.

\(^4\) UN General Assembly, “UN Charter”, Chapters VI, VII and VIII.
authority. These operations have included programmes for economic, security sector and civil administration reform, as well as building civil society capacity.

Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* marks this transition, establishing that the sources of conflict are social and economic and that peacebuilding efforts needed to aim not just at striking a truce, but at a whole set of post-conflict issues including:

[T]he restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.⁵

However, the application of these aims over the last two decades has experienced multiple contradictions. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, which the UN had failed to prevent, and with a worsening crisis in Bosnia, Boutros Ghali issued the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, clarifying that ‘[t]he UN is, for good reasons, reluctant to assume responsibility for maintaining law and order, nor can it impose a new political structure or new state institutions’.⁶ Boutros-Ghali conveyed the idea that the UN could not take over roles that are specifically state duties. In contrast, the UN has taken on the role of trustee and even actual government in cases such as East Timor, Kosovo, Cambodia, and the DRC.⁷

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⁵ UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, para. 55.
effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the US were crucial for a doctrine that identified state failure as a risk to international peace and security. Statebuilding has subsequently become the paradigm post-conflict strategy, to the extent that other international organisations and coalitions of states, with or without the UN authorisation, have undertaken it, in cases like Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia. Thus, as stated, the reconstitution of political authority and the renovation of a social contract have increasingly defined the aims of international interventions.

However, the relationship between statebuilding and peacebuilding remains ‘complicated’. Aside from the setbacks suffered, the interventions have often encountered resistance. The policy solutions given to the dynamics of state power and societal resistance have been premised under the formula of good governance. These formulas are based on the idea of a social contract where states ‘deliver services [,] social and political groups constructively engage with their state’, and meet ‘certain expectations’ the international community has about their

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For instance, a comprehensive DFID report states, on the one hand, that,

state effectiveness exists along a continuum in which conflict and violence – far from an aberration of state formation and development – are an integral reality of these processes.\(^\text{12}\)

On the other hand, the same DFID report notes that:

Durable political settlements should not only represent elites as inclusively as possible, but should require the relations between the state and society – ‘the social contract’ – to be robust and legitimate.\(^\text{13}\)

The tendency in policy-making has been to see challenges and resistance to state authority as an issue of legitimacy rather than understanding these features as integral to the reality of statebuilding. The scholarly research on resistance is still incipient.

This chapter surveys the context in which this scholarly research has emerged, examining the accounts on resistance provided so far and outlining its alternative, which will be developed in the following chapters. The chapter first discusses the critical literature on statebuilding to observe the shifts that have provoked the study of resistance. Secondly, the chapter explores Richmond and MacGinty’s analyses as the most developed attempts to theorise resistance. The work of Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty has been at the forefront of making ‘resistance’ part of the vocabulary of the peacebuilding literature.\(^\text{14}\) However, more than a theorisation of resistance, what they have developed is the concept of hybridity. Lack of conceptual clarity, not having engaged with the critiques that have been

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\(^{13}\) Ibid., 17, emphasis in the original.

made to the frameworks both Richmond and Mac Ginty draw on, and not having integrated a historical explanation into the framework of resistance has provided only a rudimentary account of it. Taking these issues into consideration, a third section discusses the importance of historicising the everyday as a way to explore statebuilding and resistance as a patterned relationship. Finally, the chapter outlines the framework of James Scott’s theory of everyday resistance, and historical sociology, as the basis for an alternative account.

2. *The Critical Appraisal of Post-Conflict Statebuilding*

The literature on post-conflict statebuilding has proliferated and become increasingly nuanced in a relatively short period of time. Paris and Sisk, for instance, identify three generations in this literature in just a period of twenty years, from descriptive studies to the development of critical theoretical frameworks. This third generation mounted a strong critique of the so-called ‘liberal peace’, which generated further debate between those defending liberal peace and those who thought the critiques had not gone far enough. These debates have recently extended to an analysis about whether statebuilding is liberal at all. Notwithstanding the different positions within these debates, there is consensus around two theoretical and methodological elements, which have encouraged a focus on resistance. One is to claim that statebuilding is less coherent and unitary than previously thought; the other is a focus on the actual practices on the ground. The emphasis on the challenges, setbacks and hybridity

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is a response to an extensive literature that had portrayed statebuilding as overpowering and unitary.¹⁸

From different strands, some representatives of the critiques of post-conflict statebuilding are Mark Duffield, David Chandler, Oliver Richmond, Michael Pugh and Roger Mac Ginty.¹⁹ They have argued that post-conflict statebuilding and peacebuilding are Western-driven strategies that fundamentally serve Western interests, whether as a form of control, discipline, extraction, or even as a new form of imperialism.²⁰ Until the recent developments explored below, this literature has been more concerned with making a critique of how post-conflict statebuilding reflected the power dynamics in world politics than examining the ways in which these have been resisted. It could be argued that this focus has come from an understanding that doing critical theory implies, as Halliday put it,

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¹⁹ These are seen as directly engaged in the theorising of post-conflict statebuilding in the way the argument is developed here. There is a side effect in this choice, which is the creation of a false “core” and a subsequent “marginal” “other”, which, by default, prioritises Western, white, male, UK-based voices, leaving important works out, e.g. Susana Campbell, Sandra Halperin, Vivienne Jabri, Gilbert Kadiaghala, Thi Ha Yen Nguyen, Zubairu Wai, etc. For a reflection on the meaning of engaging and excluding material in academic writing see Christine Sylvester, “Anatomy of a Footnote,” *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 4 (January 12, 2007): 547–558.

delegitimising what is presented as universal, natural and unchangeable. Post-conflict statebuilding, being presented as a kind of universal, unchangeable solution, has generated a critique that has highlighted its parochialism and its accountable nature. However, far from ‘subvert[ing] the status quo’, as the ultimate aim of critical theorising might be, these works have reified an image of the West as a hegemonic, unchangeable and unitary actor.

Duffield is an illustrative example. He defines the ‘liberal peace thesis’ as the ‘combin[ation] and confla[tion of] ‘liberal’ (as in contemporary neoliberal economic and political tenets) with ‘peace’ (the present policy predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction)’. In this framework, Western security interests are served by a radicalization of an agenda that merges development with security, and engages liberal reformers with networks of mostly non-state warring parties. Following Foucault, Duffield argues that ‘human security’, ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘state fragility’ are technologies of power where development or peace are not the actual objective of developmental aid and peace strategies, but rather strategies of containment to keep poverty and war far from the developed world. Duffield attempts to expose the ‘developmental rhetoric of scarcity or breakdown […] to address the possibility that protracted instability is symptomatic of new and expanding forms of political economy; a function of economic change rather than a developmental malaise’.

For Duffield, war, insecurity and underdevelopment are generated by the dynamics of appropriation by dispossession in capitalism. These dynamics generate a ‘surplus uninsured population’, who suffer the effects of this

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24 Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*.
25 Ibid.
dispossession and relies on its own devices to cope with, and is ‘potentially
dangerous’.27 Thus the liberal peace is a way to manage this risk, not to change or
address these dynamics.28

In showing that processes of intervention, war and underdevelopment are co-
constituted by and constitutive of larger structures of capitalism and world order,
Duffield insightfully captures the links between politics and economics, security
and ideology operating across international and national divides. Duffield
explores resistance though only superficially. Resistance is conceptualised as sites
of boycotts, insurgencies and forms of non-cooperation to create autonomy.29 However,
there is no explanation of when, for instance, the uninsured population acts as a
vehicle for governmentality and when as a vehicle for creating autonomy from it.
Lack of attention to resistance risks producing an over-rationalised account of
what capitalism is and how Western states operate.

Also using a Foucauldian framework, Chandler argues that post-conflict
statebuilding is a way for Western governments to control the autonomy of non-
Western sovereign states in their relations with citizens and foreign countries.30
Chandler provides several useful arguments about the nature of post-conflict
statebuilding and the shortcomings of the critical literature, but has not escaped
the trap of a Western-orientated focus. Chandler argues that post-conflict
statebuilding is not liberal. Contrary to the critical literature that has seen
interventions framed in the standard ‘good governance’ parlance of democracy,
rule of law, human rights and development, Chandler argues that ‘it is important
to consider their reinterpretation within the international statebuilding
paradigm’.31 One of the main arguments Chandler makes about post-conflict
statebuilding is that it is a new paradigm of policy and practices where there is an

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27 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 11.
28 Ibid., 33.
29 As seen on: Ibid., 75, 137, 154 and 187.
31 Ibid., 26.

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‘inversion of liberalism’.

Unlike Richmond, for whom post-liberalism is an ethical ideal, for Chandler, this is a new paradigm that describes the nature and logic of statebuilding. Whereas for classical liberalism and previous approaches to post-conflict intervention, the ‘autonomy of the subject’ is the foundation upon which modern liberal democratic forms of government are constituted’, for the new paradigm of post-conflict statebuilding ‘autonomy appears to be the problem which requires management’.

In a later edited volume, Chandler further asserts that post-conflict interventions are neither liberal nor ideologically coherent.

Chandler also identifies the contradictory nature of such project whereby

> [t]he view that states and societies, subject to the gaze of international statebuilders cannot be left to develop their own solutions to social, economic and political questions has increasingly gone along with the idea that international intervention cannot solve these problems or questions on their behalf.

With this idea, Chandler also suggests that post-conflict statebuilding discourses serve both as a way to provide their own rationale and place blame on targets. The fact that reconstructing sovereignty is both ‘altruistic’ and ‘self-interested’, for Chandler, explains why, despite its poor record, ‘western governments still feel compelled to carry it out’.

Chandler accounts for failure and incoherence in post-conflict statebuilding, providing a theoretically rich explanation of it. However, within it, post-conflict statebuilding seems overpowering and the result of an identifiable single strategy. Additionally, the fact that statebuilding is theorised as externally driven not only introduces a problematic separation between the local

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33 Ibid.
34 Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*.
38 Ibid., 15 and 1.
and international spheres, but it also makes the dynamics between these two spheres one of the most salient features in statebuilding processes.

Pugh has focused on the political economy of peacebuilding. He has argued that the changes in the economic approach within liberal peacebuilding projects, embodied in the Millennium Development Goals of the 2000s, is a more refined approach than the aggressive Washington consensus-inspired approach of the 1990s. According to Pugh, nonetheless, this new approach still fails to tackle the real needs of war-torn societies. Pugh argues that ‘[a]n inclusive/emancipatory participation of local actors and structural diversity in political economies indicates alternative options to the revisionist ideology that is embedded in a liberal structuring of global political economy’. In a similar way to Duffield, Pugh analyses the forms of resistance to the socio-economic effects of statebuilding projects. He argues that:

Resistance to the power of neoliberalism as a framework for sustainable development and peacebuilding have also apparently been influential. These include in the present case: pressures for “fair trade”, fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), debt reduction, demands for social protection for the poor, and abandonment of aid conditionality.

The risk here is to provide an analysis dichotomised between a powerful capitalist West and a non-capitalist other, and in the process make resistance the sole activity of those politically engaged and organised.

It is towards these analyses and to a more general critique of liberal interventions that the works of Richmond and Mac Ginty have been directed when analysing resistance. They have aimed to provide a more grounded account of how post-conflict statebuilding is resisted. They have argued that the categories of the international and local created in policy-making and peacebuilding studies need to

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40 Ibid., 26, emphasis in the original.
be questioned. The study of ‘practices’ as the locus of research of both post-conflict statebuilding and resistance has been a way to avoid unhelpful binaries and provide greater contextualisation. However, both Richmond and Mac Ginty have ended up re-creating the same narrative of the West as a self-constructed agent at the forefront of interventions. Before exploring the implications of this ‘practice turn’, the next section turns to the work done on resistance.

3. From Spoilers to Everyday Resistance

Throughout the different generations of peacebuilding literature there have been two approaches to resistance, one focused on ‘spoilers’ and the other on ‘resistance and hybridity’. Both Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty have arrived at the concept of resistance through the concept of the spoiler. The ‘spoiler’ debate reflects a generation of more descriptive, less critically engaged research that characterised early peacebuilding research. The spoiler debate had its peak in the late 1990s with the publication of Stedman’s *Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.*

Stedman pioneered the concept of the ‘spoiler’, which he defined as ‘leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it’. Under this view, the setbacks that peace processes had to face were located at the elite and violent level. They were conceived of in value-laden terms in which interventions represented the general interest, whereas spoilers were self-seeking individuals spoiling a ‘virtuous process’. This was the view of Newman and Richmond when they argued that:

spoiling and spoilers cannot be delinked from normative considerations of conflicts or peace processes. In particular, we cannot necessarily assume that all peace processes are equitable or fair to all parties. Thus, the act of

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42 Ibid., 5.
labelling a particular group as a “spoiler” may reflect a political agenda which is an extension of the conflict itself, or the interests of third parties.44

Increasingly, there has been a shift towards seeing international and national actors as involved in an ongoing process of social change, in which neither of these categories is clearly defined. Mac Ginty has advocated the use of the concept of ‘spoiling’, rather than ‘spoiler’, to signify precisely how the changing relations and identities are fundamental for grasping peacebuilding operations.45 The concept of the spoiler still holds some value in policy circles.46 In academic research, there has been a shift towards the study of resistance as broadly denoting the not always accommodating response of societies to post-conflict statebuilding. A plethora of concepts are being used to identify this dynamic. For instance, Richmond and Mac Ginty use resistance as or alongside ‘critical agency’, ‘subversion’, ‘contestation’, ‘distortion’, and ‘hybridisation’.47 Other scholars also have referred to ‘transformation and subversion’48 and ‘social resistance and unruliness’.49 Ultimately, this signals, firstly, a lack of a reference framework for

47 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 186. Other terms used include ‘rejection and co-option’, p. 66; ‘obstructiveness’, p. 74 or ‘liberation’, p. 178. Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 8 – 10. Mac Ginty refers also to ‘forces that confront, resist, ignore, disobey, subvert, exploit, and string-along the liberal peace’. Ibid. 10.
48 Mitchell, Lost in Transformation, 30 – 32.
the study of resistance, and, secondly, that these concepts have tended to add to a critique of post-conflict statebuilding, but not to develop the concepts as such. The work of Richmond and Mac Ginty is particularly illustrative of these issues and they also represent the most developed effort to theorise resistance within this literature.

**The Infrapolitics of Peacebuilding**

Oliver Richmond’s work has focused on hybridity and resistance in peacebuilding contexts in the last few years. His book *Post-Liberal Peace*, which reflects and builds upon earlier work, serves as a framework of reference with which to observe Richmond’s evolution. Richmond’s notion of resistance pivots on different and overlapping concepts including: local, everyday, agency and hybridity. This framework is mainly drawn from Michel De Certeau and post-colonial theory, also deploying the Scottian notion of *infrapolitics* to cover a wide range of actions that are rooted in everyday needs. The overall argument Richmond makes is that post-conflict statebuilding is top-down, coercive and contested by a myriad of actors that end up making it hybrid, far from the liberal state it projects upon the target societies.

This agency can only be grasped by a pluralist ethnographic approach and should highlight the need for contextualised, locally sensitive and welfare-based responses in order to construct positive peace. Ultimately, for Richmond, ‘[r]esistance to the liberal peace in post-colonial terms implies a hybrid form of peace with its own transformative qualities, which are resistant to exclusion’. That is, for Richmond, resistance is a form of critical agency that in striving to

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fulfil local interests and needs hybridises liberal peace. Richmond arguably uses the concept of resistance to articulate a critique and a theoretical framework to understand statebuilding. Although this is a considerable step in theorising resistance, Richmond is not creating an analytical category of resistance from which to ascertain what it is.

**Local, Everyday, Agency and Hybridity**

The *local* for Richmond grasps the different intersecting relations from within society, between the interveners and societies, and the processes of hybridisation amongst them. There are three related concepts: locality, local and local-local.52 ‘Locality’ represents the nature of a physical space that is both local and global, referring not to ‘territoriality’, but to a form of ‘agency’ within that space.53 The ‘local’ refers to how the international community identifies the actors in the societies in which it operates (elites and civil society). The term ‘local-local’ is different and it identifies ‘the existence and diversity of communities and individuals that constitute political society beyond this often liberally projected artifice of elites and civil society’.54 These three concepts identify the *local* as a methodological approach that unites the concepts of hybridity with agency capturing quotidian clashes and symbioses. The *local* also serves as a platform for advocating a peace-building agenda that is locally relevant and a research agenda that is action-driven and ethnographically-based towards an emancipatory goal.55

Alongside *local*, as a kind of critical agency, the ‘everyday’ is deployed as a site of resistance and of emancipatory activity. Richmond makes a call for a ‘fourth generation of peace’ or ‘eirenism’, which implies a better contextualised, more culturally-centred and empathic peace, where people’s needs, rather than the needs of geo-strategic interests, international agendas and international

52 Ibid., 14.
53 Ibid., 13; Richmond, “Critical Agency,” 423.
55 Ibid., 14 – 15.
liberalism, are at the centre.\textsuperscript{56} Everyday is both a space and an action of power and resistance, ‘a terrain in which an everyday life exists that is both commensurate with, in opposition to, and modifying of colonial practices of government’.\textsuperscript{57} As such, the everyday is the site for emancipation, which necessarily takes place through critically acting upon such colonial practices.

Richmond associates this ‘critical agency’ with non-violent forms of resistance. These are activated ‘in unanticipated and sometimes controversial ways’, hybridising statebuilding and resulting in ‘the birth of a post-liberal peace’.\textsuperscript{58} Richmond does not omit the fact that there is violent resistance in post-conflict contexts; but he privileges non-violent forms as ‘constructive practices’ and ultimately emancipatory.\textsuperscript{59} Richmond refers to a wide range of practices from non-compliance and subsistence strategies to Ghandian and Latin American pro-democracy-inspired civil movements.\textsuperscript{60} Richmond characterises the nature of this agency, and hence of resistance as being ‘hidden, fragmented, often disguised and localised’.\textsuperscript{61} The implications of this account, which follows closely Scott’s framework, will be analysed in Chapter Four. What is to be remarked here is that there is insufficient explanation to equate hiddenness and disguise with non-violent resistance, while simultaneously equating it with more organised and public forms of mobilisation. Although this is done via social movements literature and, in particular, the work of Alberto Melucci, how these different arguments and frameworks relate to an account of resistance requires further explanation.\textsuperscript{62}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{57} Richmond, \textit{A Post-Liberal Peace}, 128.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 117 and 18.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 246.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 119 – 122.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 13. These are features that remain as a reference throughout the book.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 130.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Despite the emphasis on hybridity and on the transversal character of the local and peacebuilding processes, the relationship between these two is defined by statebuilding being international and liberal, and the local being a hybridised, culturally grounded agency against statebuilding. That is, there has been a reification of the local/international and liberal/non-liberal binaries. As a practical application of the argument, in an article with Stephanie Kappler, resistance is conceived of as different actions against the international peacebuilding efforts of the European Union in Bosnia. Although there is an acknowledgement of the fact that ‘locals’ have different agendas, some of them connecting with those of the peacebuilding mission and some not, the result is a reification of these categories. The authors suggest that

[p]eacebuilding at the grassroots has become partly synonymous with independence. It has repoliticized and given substance to the local agencies that have emerged. This can be viewed in two ways: either peacebuilding as resistance revitalizes the liberal social contract and gives externally constructed states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina internal substance, or it enables a more proactive encounter between the liberal peace and its ‘others’, in which the hegemonic weight of the liberal peace project is countermanded by local desires for autonomy and local agency for emancipation.\(^{63}\)

These local agencies seem to be activated only towards the international peacebuilding project. Their two possible responses, either as constitutive of the liberal social contract, or as a counter-hegemonic form to a liberal project, underscore the fact that resistance is under-theorised. The article moves between resistance that is done by elites and non-elites, intentionally and non-intentionally, as supportive as well as transformative of the international strategies. For Kappler and Richmond, the contention between EU-local is about how these cultural features, understandings and self-images influence the meaning of peace. This has potential but remains vague. The final conclusion of Kappler and Richmond is a call for more locally-sensitive peacebuilding,

\(^{63}\) Kappler and Richmond, “Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 264.
especially with the needs and culture of societies. The implication of this negotiation/resistance having a sort of endpoint in social relations is debatable and arguably ignores what have historically been processes of statebuilding and resistance.

Richmond’s greatest contribution not only is to have been ahead of the field with a first attempt at theorising resistance in post-conflict contexts, but also to have done so within the framework of everyday resistance. This avenue has facilitated a first account of resistance in post-conflict statebuilding. Richmond has explored diverse everyday practices ranging from imperceptible to organised and vocal forms of resistance that converge in their capacity to corrupt, transform and subvert international interventions. This is a step forward. However, as an account of resistance, it remains vague. Having taken violence out of the ‘everyday’, emancipatory resistance has automatically created, without much explanation, not just two categories, but also a Manichean division between “good” and “bad” resistance. This is added to the reification of binaries and the absence of a historically grounded account. Examining similar issues found in Mac Ginty’s recent work will help elaborating these critiques.

**Hybridising Statebuilding**

Mac Ginty deploys a series of concepts to articulate, similarly to Richmond, that statebuilding is challenged and ultimately hybridised. International peacebuilding is for Mac Ginty a process of hybridisation for the societies it is applied to as much as for international peacebuilding and its agents. Hybridity for Mac Ginty is ‘the composite forms of social thinking and practice that emerge as the result of the interaction of different groups, practices, and worldviews’. Thus hybridisation is a process of intertwinement of individuals, as well as institutions, within and across societies. It is the recognition of the heterogeneity that defines societies and guidance for research to stay away from concepts that portray societies as pure.

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and enclosed.\textsuperscript{65} This applies to how scholars think about interventions, because both interveners and intervened are already hybrids in themselves due to their previous historical trajectory and their complex composition.\textsuperscript{66} However, in peace processes they are both subject to further transformation. Local societies do so because of the power and hegemony of the liberal peace. International interventions transform because of the “resistance”, “distortion”, and “blowbacks” posed by local societies.\textsuperscript{67}

Despite Mac Ginty’s attention to resistance, his analysis is concerned with developing the framework of hybridity and challenging what have been rather neatly constructed categories in the statebuilding literature. Mac Ginty illustrates that giver and recipient work both ways, and that, notwithstanding the constraints to provide a legible and simplified analysis, categories constructed so far in the literature of peace interventions need to be put into question. However, it is precisely at this point where Mac Ginty’s analysis falls prey of its own critique. Although categories such as “liberal peace”, “international community” or “international peacebuilding” are disaggregated, the book maintains a dividing line between the “international” and “the local”. Hybridity as a framework of analysis has four main defining elements: ‘the coercive power of the liberal peace, the incentivising power of the liberal peace, the ability of local actors to resist the liberal peace, and the ability of local actors to provide alternatives to the liberal peace’.\textsuperscript{68} However, the several notions Mac Ginty deploys relating to resistance and the four-point-account of hybridity are not connected to a conceptual framework of resistance.

Resistance runs across different acts, being defined as ‘the ability of local actors, networks, and structures to resist, ignore, subvert, and adapt liberal peace

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 70 – 73.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., Ch. 3.
\textsuperscript{68} Mac Ginty, \textit{International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance}, 92.
interventions’. Mac Ginty highlights that resistance can be conscious or unconscious, that its acts can have unintended consequences, and that they can be both an engagement against and a disengagement from peacebuilding. For instance, speaking of the case of the informalisation of the economy in Iraq, Mac Ginty categorises it as a form of unconscious resistance that has allowed people to provide for themselves and keep away from the ‘lack of reach of the formal economy’. Mac Ginty here breaks with what might be called the De Certeau-Scott problem. That is, the extent to which actions need to be consciously directed against a claim from authority or whether actions by themselves, depending on their outcome, could be seen as resistance. Thus Mac Ginty affirms that ‘resistance’ is simply people getting on with their lives, opting out of the formal structures and norms offered by the liberal peace, and creating their own solutions to local issues. What is problematic is that by this account, resistance is presented as ungraspable, without explaining why. So, for Mac Ginty,

resistance can come in many forms, and [...] we may not always have the correct antennae with which to pick up the extent of resistance. There is a tendency to focus on obvious forms of resistance such as violent insurgency, but more subtle and everyday forms abound in terms of non-compliance or ‘waiting it out’.

The account is not to be disregarded, but it needs further explanation. As seen below, Mac Ginty could link these practices to De Certeau’s ‘perruque’ or Scott’s ‘pose’. However, without further elaboration it is not possible to elucidate why is ‘waiting it out’ resistance and not resignation, for example; or whether these are the kinds of practices both high-level bureaucrats and ordinary citizens might engage in.

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69 Ibid., 78.
70 Ibid., 6; 10 – 11; 72 –73; 84–85.
71 Ibid., 38.
72 Ibid., 212.
73 Ibid., 210.
**Subverting logics and the spirit of De Certeau**

It could be argued that in both Richmond (alongside with post-colonial theory and references to James Scott) and Mac Ginty (despite the absence of a reference framework of resistance), the driving work is done with De Certeau. In fact De Certeau seems to have inspired a literature on hybridity and *transformations* in peacebuilding studies.\(^7^4\) The uses of De Certeau have opened fruitful avenues through which to explore how the logics of post-conflict statebuilding have been subverted, especially from the view that these logics are self-serving practices of the international interveners. However, as mentioned, De Certeau has been deployed to advance an argument about hybridity, as opposed to resistance. As a framework of resistance, De Certeau’s theory has been slightly twisted in its application to the nuances about consciousness and class. This has implications to understand practices of resistance.

For example, there are important differences between De Certeau and James Scott, especially when delimiting what counts as a practice of resistance, how and why. Whereas for De Certeau, there are ‘practices’ above ‘practitioners’ – or rather the practices become a representation of the practitioners; for James Scott the practices become meaningful when explored within a particular relationship. For De Certeau, innumerable daily practices including walking or consuming can be representative of the ways in which people rework their own environment. These daily practices subvert, even if microscopically, the order imposed. For James Scott, foot-dragging or denigrating authorities become representative of how subordinate groups attack or palliate domination. There are therefore important differences regarding intentionality, how these practices are used and by whom and how they might be understood as resistance.

De Certeau analyses two kinds of practices, which he links to a Clausewitzean understanding of strategy and tactic in war. ‘Strategy’ is that of the general. It

\(^7^4\) Mitchell, *Lost in Transformation*. 

represents power (‘a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution’), and its practices relate to the delimitation of a place ‘from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers [,] competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city […] can be managed’.75 A ‘tactic’ is a ‘calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus’.76 This is ‘the art of the weak’, of the soldier, the private, it operates within ‘the enemy’s field of vision’ but it does not have the vision of the enemy as a whole, it plays with it, mostly in the form of ‘trickery’.77 Although there is in both an element of consciousness, tactics remain ambiguous because they are ungraspable, and respond to their own logic.

In De Certeau’s analysis, power and resistance, strategy and tactic, respond to an ‘everyday war’ of targeting and trickery, of delimitation and avoidance, of control of autonomy and of reappropriating the everyday order of life. The figures of the ‘weak’ and the ‘soldier’ against the ‘strong’ and ‘the general’ point to a notion of subversion that is linked to the material relations and social hierarchy between them. Understanding ‘tactics’ as a form of resistance by elites does not follow straightforwardly from this framework.

De Certeau’s notion of consciousness partly originates as a critique to how Foucault and Bourdieu understood power as pervasively present, even in the minuscule aspects of the accent acquired in speech or the bodily control in prison. De Certeau criticises Bourdieu for painting his subjects as having ‘no intention’, living in an ‘assumed world’ and their actions being simply, a habitus, ‘a repetition of the past’.78 For De Certeau, Bourdieu compromised his work, leaving subjects without agency, history or decision-making capacity. He reproaches Foucault for providing little distinction between rationalities, mechanisms, dispositifs and apparatuses, resulting in a set of ‘scattered technologies’ and creating a false

75 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 37.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., 18.
78 Ibid., 56, emphasis in the original. I am simplifying here Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and De Certeau’s critique of it. The essence of the critique is that Bourdieu has stripped the individual of consciousness, decision-making and transformative agency.
problematic ‘dichotomy between “ideologies” and “procedures”’. For De Certeau, discourse does not require practice and not all discourses are based on practice. However, it is possible for discourse and practice to be the same thing. For De Certeau it is important to understand what procedures might respond to other logics, outside or even subverting that of power. De Certeau’s concepts of practice and resistance rely on the meaning of tactics. They are a ‘calculation’, hence conscious, but they are also millenarian and hence ingrained in the subconscious, provoking simultaneously an unconscious use. They are a form of subversion of the logic of power more than an attack.

De Certeau’s notion of resistance is seen in his discussion of ‘la perruque’ (the wig). Workers may sometimes play the role of the employee, as if wearing a wig, but may not be performing the work assigned. De Certeau defines it as follows:

It differs from absenteeism in that the worker is officially on the job. La perruque may be as simple a matter as a secretary’s writing a love letter on ‘company time’ or as complex as a cabinetmaker’s ‘borrowing’ a lathe to make a piece of furniture for his living room.

Here it is possible to see how for De Certeau, the doing, that is the writing of the love letter, which responds to the logic of the secretary’s own life and interests, is a way of subverting the logic of work and the power relation between employer and worker. Yet it is not an oppositional organised collective act against capitalism. It is a quotidian strategy that subverts subordination.

However, this opens an ambiguous ground due to the fact that these practices need to be grasped by their outcomes. If only when the logic of power has been subverted can we assume resistance, a trap is created by the fact that power is generally successful in being imposed. Conversely, following the same argument,

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79 Ibid., 45, emphasis in the original.
80 Ibid., 46; De Certeau, *The Writing of History*, 147 – 148.
82 Ibid., 25, emphasis in the original.
there may not be any situation in which the logic of power is not subverted. In the context of post-conflict statebuilding, the logic of subversion and outcomes applies best when theorising hybridity (an outcome) but resistance becomes elusive. This is not to disregard De Certeau. Quite the contrary, the proposal here is to make a more defined use of this framework and an analysis of its implications. As will be shown through the course of this thesis, De Certeau is an imperative reference to articulate modes of subversion and gradients of intentionality as part of a more concretised framework of resistance. However, on its own, the account of resistance it provides is vague.

The Rudimentariness of Resistance and the Everyday

From the above, there are two issues that need to be addressed in order to deploy resistance in a more consistently articulated way. The first one is the absence of a clear framework that systematically analyses the implications of the different concepts used and their intellectual baggage. Neither Richmond nor Mac Ginty grapple with the problems the frameworks they rely upon grappled with. For instance, one of the main contentions in the debates that have taken place in the study of resistance is whether intent or consciousness needs to be present for resistance to be so. More scrutiny needs to be done of the merging of elites and non-elites together in the same account of everyday resistance. Ignoring the class element both in resistance and in the frameworks of De Certeau and Scott is a slippage. Passing superficially through these issues is a disservice to the theorisation of resistance. So is the use of myriad of concepts interchangeably with resistance without proper account.

The second issue is the theorisation of the nature of post-conflict statebuilding only as a liberal international enterprise. Following Richmond’s argument that

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83 See for instance the summary of the debates on intentionality in Hollander and Einwohner, “Conceptualizing Resistance,” 542 – 544. This is developed in Chapter Four.
resistance is ‘commensurate with the practices of government’, Richmond argues, for instance, that the individualising and fragmenting practices of liberal programmes towards civil society building have fragmented civil society.\(^{84}\) For Richmond, resistance’s hidden and disguised nature implies not rising against or to capture state power but being expressions of affection and solidarity that can develop into social action.\(^{85}\) But the question this raises is why is there then only an account of international liberal statebuilding as a form of authority without regard to statebuilding practices writ large. This does not mean dislodging the international element in post-conflict statebuilding, but demanding an account of the ways in which violence, accumulation and political authority assertion is contested. Otherwise, as Chandler notes, critical analyses of statebuilding could end up being an apology for intervention, suggesting that the interventions could be better if they were not as liberal and were more empathic and locally sensitive.\(^{86}\)

### 4. The Everyday Re-Turn and the Elision of the Historical Explanation\(^ {87}\)

One aspect that is raised by the analyses discussed above is the establishment of ‘practice’ and ‘the everyday’ as the locus of research of both post-conflict statebuilding and the resistance to it.\(^{88}\) The recent everyday turn in peace and

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\(^{85}\) Cf. Alberto Melucci cited in Ibid., 164.

\(^{86}\) Chandler, “The Uncritical Critique of ‘Liberal Peace’.”


\(^{88}\) For a review of literature on the ‘everyday turn’ spanning from the works of Richard Ashley and James Der Derian in 1987 to the most recent work of Iver Neuman and
conflict studies has fostered a focus on resistance, highlighting statebuilding’s weaknesses, ‘blind spots’ and incoherencies.\textsuperscript{89} Using practice-based and ethnographic methodologies, this focus has simultaneously explored in more subtle ways than before the interrelationship between international and national actors, looking more closely at how societies respond. However, the way research has been focused on \textit{everydayness} and practices seems to have elided an important historical explanation.

For instance, Chandler’s Foucauldian approach shows how practices become coordinated through a regime of truth, to create a reality that did not exist before.\textsuperscript{90} Such practices form the post-liberal paradigm. Chandler’s methodology has been to trace the relationship between discourses and practice through policy documents, statements and drafts, and the examination of actual deployment. Similarly, Duffield situates his study within a governmentality framework using Foucault and Agamben. Duffield has used semi-structured interviewing and fieldwork based research focusing on INGOs, international organisations and their personnel. The focus on the practices of international actors attempts to establish how the rationalities of the liberal peace and the genealogy of its practices.\textsuperscript{91}

From those who have theorised resistance, practice has also been a primary area of research. Mac Ginty for instance sees peace as a practice and the peace-making patterns as a way to impose such practice and its values.\textsuperscript{92} For Mac Ginty, hybridity is a methodological approach, which he describes as being interpretive, case-study based, comparative and critical.\textsuperscript{93} Contextualising the account is for

\textsuperscript{89} Newman and Richmond, Challenges to Peacebuilding, 45 – 46; Richmond, \textit{A Post-Liberal Peace}; Mac Ginty, \textit{International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance}, 211.
\textsuperscript{90} Foucault cited in Chandler, \textit{International Statebuilding}, 23 (my paraphrase).
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 6–7.
\textsuperscript{92} Mac Ginty, \textit{International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance}, 1 and 3.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 44 – 45.
Mac Ginty fundamental, not to present societies defined by the otherwise ‘exceptional moments’ of ‘sectarianism, violence, or societal fracture’.94 Richmond openly calls his work ethnographic, further claiming that this research avenue is amenable to an active-research that has an emancipatory aim in mind.95 This ethnography has to be used to research the ‘practices, discourses and rationalities [that] produce governmentality’ as well as the practices of subversion that against each other create hybridity.96 History is acknowledged as part of what constitutes ‘local’ culture and identity, and as an account towards a post-liberal and emancipatory future.

These analyses demonstrate that the relationship between ‘practice’ and ‘ethnography’ and between ‘practices’ and ‘patterns’ needs to be clarified. On the first issue, something else needs to be said about how methodologies match the critical frameworks used in research. Wanda Vrasti has argued that the use of ethnography in International Relations since the end of the 1980s has been selective and instrumental, mainly for data-collection purposes or as ways of critiquing the standard methodological foundations of the discipline while maintaining the credentials for remaining within the parameters of scientific research.97 According to Vrasti, these usages have not taken full account of the political implications of employing such a method, its imperial legacy, and the critical transformation it has gone through within Anthropology. Taking ‘the Comaroffs puzzle’ Vrasti wonders: ‘How do we explain that, just when ethnography was being challenged within cultural anthropology for its structuralist, Orientalist and masculinist foundations, other disciplines, IR included, turned to ethnography as a potential source of political emancipation?’98 Vrasti’s article has raised debate around the relationship between International Relations’ ontology and methodological avenues.99 This is not to deny the value of

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94 Ibid., 3.  
95 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 129.  
96 Ibid., 12.  
97 Vrasti, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations.”  
98 Jean and John Comaroff cited in Ibid., 294.  
99 See the discussion in Millennium: Vrasti, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and
ethnography for International Relations - in fact, Vrasti calls upon international scholars to engage critically with ethnography, not to disregard it. What Vrasti’s critique illustrates is the need for engaging with the intellectual baggage of theoretical and methodological approaches used and incorporated in research.

The second and related issue is the need to emphasise De Certeau’s and Scott’s conception of ‘practices’ in everyday life as having a history and being representatives of patterns. Both De Certeau and Scott focused on practices as a representation of the **practical** ways of dealing with the experience of domination in everyday life as well as a reflection of millenarian practices followed by subordinate classes. It would follow that any framework based on these authors would see practices as historically constituted. Adler and Pouliot identify five characteristics that clearly convey this meaning. Practices are: 1) a ‘performance’, which is the doing or making of something; 2) they are a ‘pattern’, constituting ‘regularity of behaviour’ and ‘the flow of history’; 3) they are ‘socially recognisable’; 4) ‘represent a skill (more than knowledge); and 5) ‘weave together discursive and material worlds’. Under this account, practices and actors represent not just a hybrid outcome, but are part of a process that speaks of patterns of continuity and change. The final section discusses how this approach is used in the analysis.

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A focus on everyday resistance allows for the grasping of ‘practical knowledge’ or ‘metes’.\textsuperscript{101} For resistance, this methodology implies a focus on individual, collective ideological and material insubordination; for statebuilding, it focuses on the practices that facilitate and concretise the operationalisation of formal schemes. However, this methodology imposes a limitation on generalisations. For Scott, ‘although there is something to say about states, revolutions, urbanisation, etc […] in the end we would have knowledge about this revolution, this urbanization, etc’.\textsuperscript{102} Simultaneously, ‘practices’ cannot be disentangled from the relationships, context and processes which they are part of. They become the evidence of the contingency and historical nature of the present. A focus on everyday practices should provide an opportunity ‘to reveal the present as a malleable construct which is embedded in a historical context, thereby serving to unearth the process of temporal continuity and discontinuity with previous social practices’.\textsuperscript{103} The continuities, and not just the transformations need to be accounted for as part and parcel of the intentions, incoherence, purpose and mismanages of statebuilding. Accounting for resistance thus requires historicising the everyday. In this regard, the ‘mêtis’ of post-conflict statebuilding and resistance needs to be ‘historical’, ‘sociological’ and ‘international’.

\textit{A Historical Sociological Explanation}

What the Scottian framework does not straightforwardly provide is an account of the influences of the international as an ‘interactive multiplicity of social orders’.\textsuperscript{104} Although Scott’s framework is in many ways a ‘big picture narrative’,\textsuperscript{105} this is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State}, 313.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State}.
\item \textsuperscript{103} John M. Hobson, “What’s at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International Relations’? Transcending ‘Chronofetishism’ and ‘Tempocentrism’ in International Relations,” in \textit{Historical Sociology of International Relations}, ed. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology,” 3358.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 3360.
\end{itemize}

Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg propose a ‘triangulation’\footnote{Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology,” 3357 – 3358.} formula for a research agenda that has three drivers: structure (‘basic patterning of the human world’), history (‘how societies/social orders have varied across historical time) and the international (‘interactive multiplicity of social orders’).\footnote{Ibid., 3358.} There are two important features of this framework that would become valuable to observe statebuilding, and in the DRC in particular, as well as to understand what historicising the everyday can contribute to the study of resistance. Firstly, it is to understand history ‘as a social process’, shedding light on continuities and discontinuities in social and political interaction.\footnote{Ibid., 3362.} Secondly, to understand micro and macro structures and processes in a dynamic interaction and co-constituted.
The framework proposed by Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg could be summarised as follows.\textsuperscript{112}

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>History</th>
<th>Event, process and contingency as theoretical explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>Impact of relatively fixed configurations of social relations (structures) on micro-processes Patterns of human worldings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td>Central role of “the international” in this dynamic Interactive multiplicity of social orders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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In Chapter Three, this framework is followed to explore statebuilding as a process of building political authority, which implies practices of coercion and accumulation. The implication is to see these practices in the DRC as part of contradictory and plural statebuilding processes in the DRC and not just as evidence of state failure. Chapter Three will turn, firstly, to Tilly’s account of war and state-making and states as protection rackets. As will be discussed, Tilly’s narrative has been criticised for failing to account for processes of statebuilding outside Europe. Here, Tilly’s account establishes these practices as broader patterns of what states are, what processes of statebuilding entail, and how these processes take place.

**The Relevance of the DRC**

Applying this framework to the DRC provides several rich combinations. For instance, as an addition to the insights of the Scottian framework, the key argument developed throughout this thesis is that resistance reflects its political context. Although this is a natural implication from the Scottian framework, the DRC does not just illustrate a variety of practices of resistance, which range from armed attacks to mockery and creative survival, but also the relationship between

\textsuperscript{112} The table includes direct quotes from: Ibid., 3360, 3362 and 3364.
them. A more comprehensive analysis would entail examining resistance as part of the patterns of relations to which it belongs. In this way, Lawson argued that it ‘is not possible to universalise revolutions into single features’ and as such they are ‘better seen as dynamic processes with features contingent on both their world-historical context and their particular social setting’. Similarly, resistance in general, and perhaps not just the more narrowed category of everyday, is better seen as contingent upon the context in which it is embedded. Ultimately, as Scott argued, this is the caveat to generalisations. It is these more nuanced, historically rooted understandings of the context that would allow to analyse violence and extraction as fundamental for the process of statebuilding and resistance, and not simply as an account of the pathological practices of actors in the DRC.

As will be noted in the following chapters, historical, sociological and international elements have been fundamental to generating the current context and to shaping resistance. For example, the everyday resistance in the DRC is partly the result of the break down of a democratic movement in the early 1990s. Different practices of resistance, such as survival or Mai Mai militias, are a contextualised version of broader patterns in state-society relations that have a historical legacy. Similarly, a militarised environment reflects local, international and regional agendas. The two main wars in the DRC that have been fundamental for mobilising civilians into war simultaneously reflect the historical changes that took place as a result of changes in local/global alliances at the end of the Cold War.

These issues put both the standard narrative of the DRC and the critiques of the liberal peace on the same footing. The former have argued that processes of violence and dispossession in the DRC are due to the nature of the DRC as a failed state. The latter have argued that the coercive and neo-liberal nature of statebuilding underlies the ongoing processes of dispossession and violence, co-

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opting peace rather than building it. Against these analyses, this thesis counter-
poses an account that does not necessarily challenge such critiques, but sees these 
processes neither as the pathological nature of the DRC, nor of the 
liberal/international nature of statebuilding, but as relating to what could be seen 
as standard practices in processes of statebuilding. This thesis will not attempt to 
make a transhistorical argument about statebuilding, quite oppositely, it attempts 
to contextualise current practices and processes in light of the continuities and 
changes fostered by the process of statebuilding, while taking the historicity of the 
DRC seriously.

6. Concluding note

This Chapter has posed some of the key questions that will be addressed in the 
course of the following Chapters. It started with a brief account of the shift 
towards statebuilding as the paradigm of intervention in the last decades. The 
Chapter has also examined the critical appraisal and theorising the literature has 
done of statebuilding. These analyses have argued that the process of building 
states seems to only serve the purpose of maintaining the status quo, furthering 
economic reforms that do not necessarily promote welfare or development, and 
ultimately reinforcing Western power and capitalism. However, some of these 
accounts have portrayed statebuilding interventions as coherent, monolithic and 
overpowering.

A focus on practices and the everyday has nuanced these analyses. This new turn 
has unearthed the nature of these missions as improvised, juxtaposed, incoherent, 
as well as challenged, resisted and hybridised. While this has been a step forward, 
the account of resistance remains rudimentary and more as an ad-hoc response. 
The shift from looking at elite violent responses to everyday resistance has 
reflected an attempt to theorise statebuilding in more complex and fluid ways. We 
now know that post-conflict statebuilding intervenes in the relations between
state and society; that it has implications for the distribution of wealth, rights and freedoms; that it has intended and unintended consequences due to its experimental approach, and that it has international, national, liberal and non-liberal elements. However, the most certain thing we know about resistance is that it hybridises statebuilding. If resistance is to be theorised from the actual process of statebuilding, there needs to be an account of statebuilding practices, not so much as a liberal international undertaking but as a process of building state authority, where coercive and extractive practices respond to broader patterns in such exercise.
Chapter 2
North and South Kivu: An Unlikely Space for Resistance?

1. The Failure of the DRC and the Militarisation of Peace

Speaking in 2010 of the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) for the DRC, a MONUC officer argued that escalation of violence in the Kivus for the last few years was a problem of the DRC state being ‘inexistent’.¹ For this MONUC representative, some functions of the state did not work properly. So the task of international actors was to operationalise the state towards making: ‘the police, police, the judiciary, judge… get the software… the public servants, pay them!’² The image of the DRC as a failed state looms large over policymaking but also over academic research. This is added to by activist media campaigns, picturing the DRC as a case of desperation, war, neglect and tragedy: ‘the world’s worst country to live in’,³ ‘a Zaire-shape hole in the middle of Africa’⁴ and ‘the world’s largest failed state’.⁵

The complexities of the multi-state wars that have taken place since 1996, and the ongoing conflict in the Eastern provinces, which defies any single causal explanation, have tended to be accounted for under the paradigm of state failure.

¹ Interview with MONUSCO - ISSSS/STAREC liaison Officer, Goma, July 21, 2010.
² Ibid.
In such circumstances, choosing the DRC as a case to observe everyday resistance in post-conflict statebuilding might seem, if not an impossible task, a rare case from which to generate insights for other cases. The standard cases on which resistance has been studied including Bosnia, Iraq, East Timor or Kosovo, have been instances of a particularly engaged international intervention, or a seemingly organised politically minded resistance. Nonetheless, the DRC has so far seen one of the UN’s largest and longest interventions, including one of the few cases of trusteeship in the post-Cold War period. It has also seen the only EU peacekeeping operations outside Europe. DFID plans to make the DRC its top bilateral recipient by 2015. Additionally, the DRC has been picking up pace regarding macroeconomic variables. It is hailed as one of the ten fastest growing economies in Africa, with a growth rate of 6.1%, predicted to rise to 7% over the next five years.

In the Eastern provinces, where conflict is ongoing, the ISSSS strategy has strengthened international action towards statebuilding. Joint efforts between the UN, the World Bank and INGOs, with the Government’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) have aimed to coordinate military, humanitarian and development action towards building state authority and stability in the region. However, its most visible results are the militarisation of peace, and the continuation of Rwandan interventionist practices, especially in North Kivu, generating ongoing instability. Alongside the already militarised

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6 E.g. Kappler and Richmond, “Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina”; Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance.
7 E.g. Kosovo, East Timor, Cambodia and the DRC. Below there is a comparison of UN engagement in the DRC in absolute and relative terms.
environment caused by the wars of 1996 and 2003, both North and South Kivu have been the target of the UN-backed military operations of the DRC and Rwanda against remaining armed groups. This is added to ongoing proxy wars between the DRC and Rwanda, which both cooperate and antagonise at multiple levels, and a corresponding mushrooming of popular Mai Mai militias. These have risen as a way of providing security to the civilian population in some cases. Some groups have been co-opted by the DRC government and Rwanda to fight a proxy war. Militarisation has also followed from an increased tendency to deploy the military as a representation of state authority. Militarisation is linked to extraction, and, in the 2009–2011 period, this has seen increasing control of mineral resources by the FARDC, even if these are not channelled back to the central state administration.

This chapter provides the necessary background for understanding the context of post-conflict statebuilding in Eastern DRC. It first discusses some of the major accounts of the DRC, as they have been the primary lenses through which statebuilding policy has been viewed. The second section provides a general background of the Congo wars since 1996 to observe distinctive constant features that remain today. Thirdly, the Chapter analyses the UN strategies in the DRC since its deployment. The final section explores the 2009–2011 period, which is the context in which fieldwork has taken place. It will be concluded that the prioritisation of military solutions at crucial times, including those in 1996, 1998, and throughout the 2009–2011 period against more political solutions have been decisive in shaping resistance into its everyday covert self-help, yet militarised, form. Yet the absence of overt formally-organised resistance does not mean the absence of resistance or the lack of political aspirations.

11 Later in the thesis it will be shown how this self in resistance can be both individual and collective, and that community links, reciprocity and solidarity serve as channels of reappropriation for survival.
2. Accounting for Resistance Amongst War and State Failure

The complexity of the Congo wars is that state and non-state actors alike have been engaged in processes of authority assertion, war and accumulation. Since 1996, different states have been at war with each other in the DRC, directly and through proxy armed groups. What has been striking is that despite this complexity, the Congo wars have been overwhelmingly analysed under a single explanatory cause: state failure. It is partly this paradigm of state failure, which in the DRC has been an impediment to the study of resistance.

The few accounts on resistance in the DRC within the period of war provide detailed and historically grounded analyses but have not theorised it. They have rather captured the responses of Congolese people against the imposition of conditions of war and domination from different perspectives: the informal transactions in transnational commerce (Mac Gaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga),\(^{12}\) the Mai Mai militias in Eastern Congo (Vlassenroot);\(^{13}\) DIY informal strategies to provide social services and survival (Trefon);\(^{14}\) and the historical perspective, covering the colonial period to post-conflict statebuilding (Nzongola-Ntalaja and Renton, Seddon and Zeilig).\(^{15}\) These analyses provide a sense of the historical and ongoing political activity of Congolese non-elites, illustrating that people’s responses to deteriorating living conditions can be seen as patterns of actions that attempt to transform or evade the social order. They provide a historical but not a theoretical account.


Therefore, the absence of a theorisation of resistance from the post-conflict statebuilding context of the DRC does not stem from the lack of resistance, but rather from the accounts that have been given of the DRC itself. Three of these accounts stand out; on the one hand, the resource wars thesis, which focuses on the motivations for war, and on the other hand, what could be called localist and regionalist accounts, which focus on the actors involved. The spectre of the failed state underpinning all of them and the absence of a broad political movement have made these analyses examine the actions of subordinate groups both as victims and co-producers of a context of domination, plunder and violence. Thus resistance has not been seen as relevant within these dynamics.

**The Resource Wars Thesis**

The resource wars thesis is widely supported by academic, policy and activist research.\(^\text{16}\) The UN has been at the forefront of the analyses. A series of high-level

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reports have consistently emphasised the link between resource exploitation and the continuation of wars.\textsuperscript{17} These resources include minerals, agriculture, forestry, wildlife, financial resources and Congolese labour. Just to give an idea of the extent of this exploitation, in the period between 1998 and 2002, US$ 5 billion worth of state assets from the mining sector (especially diamonds, cobalt, copper and germanium) were transferred to private companies under Zimbabwean control with no compensation for the DRC treasury.\textsuperscript{18} Rwanda’s military expenses were financed at around 80\% by the Congolese enterprise (calculated in $320 million).\textsuperscript{19} Although Uganda does not produce gold, gold exports became its second largest income source.\textsuperscript{20} Instead of the sanctions and embargoes against Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi that the final report of the UN Panel on Illegal Exploitation suggested imposing, the World Bank and the IMF granted Rwanda and Uganda debt reduction benefits due to their good economic performances.\textsuperscript{21} In recent years, mining has become Rwanda’s ‘largest foreign exchange earner’, with up to 30\% coming from illegal mining in Congo.\textsuperscript{22}

The resource wars thesis has informed UN policy towards statebuilding, reflecting not only the vision of the DRC as failed but also the influence of neoliberal understandings of how states and their economies should work. Neoliberal approaches to statebuilding have called for contradictory approaches. They
have pursued a policy of rebuilding the state, while de-regulating its industries, de-linking forms of economic control from the central apparatus of the state, and fostering self-market regulation. For example, mining management has been carried out through several attempts to formalise private control.\(^\text{23}\) The reliance on private actors means that, despite the shaming and finger-pointing contained in these reports, some sensitive material was removed from the final report and few judicial procedures have been started.\(^\text{24}\) Moreover, some of the companies, governments and individuals that these reports accused of fuelling the conflict have continued to work, if not directly in government positions, then as forms of subcontracted authority in parts of the territory.\(^\text{25}\) While the resource wars thesis unearths a fundamental dynamic of the Congo wars, explaining the continuation of conflict, it portrays practices of accumulation as a criminal and not as a political undertaking.

Something that the resource wars thesis does not point out is that, as Johnson and Kayser note, informal exchanges and trafficking are part of a longer trend of bypassing state regulations, poverty and building local influence.\(^\text{26}\) Similarly Kabamba notes that merchant elites who are part of larger networks succeed at


\(^{24}\) Dominic Johnson and Christiane Kayser, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Shadow Economies in the ‘Heart of Darkness’,” in Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 2005), 146. Note that Jean Pierre Bemba, for instance, has been indicted by the ICJ for crimes in the CAR, and his arrest is seen more as a political move to support Kabila than to his criminal activity reported in the panels on illegal exploitation.

\(^{25}\) E.g. Minister Katumba Mwanke and Banro. UN Panel of Experts, Panel on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, Annex II, p. 2 and Annex III, p. 7. Subcontracted authority is developed in the next Chapter.

providing the community with much needed resources outside of state channels.\textsuperscript{27} These practices may have fuelled the continuation of war and may have not fostered an industry. However, they have made the DRC and other neighbouring countries’ economies grow.\textsuperscript{28} Additionally, as the localists and regionalists have argued, this vision has missed the important identity, political and security concerns that go hand in hand with economic motivations.

\textit{Localists}

The localists argue that the sources of ongoing conflict are rooted in historical grievances or in particular local features. There is a broad spectrum between those who see violence in Congo as a pre-colonial issue, and those who see historical and localised dynamics disrupting national and regional ones.\textsuperscript{29} Séverine Autesserre is a primary representative arguing that violence in the Kivus is the consequence of population movements and land disputes ongoing since the 1930s.\textsuperscript{30} The problem with the post-conflict statebuilding strategies is that they have aimed only at the national or regional levels, ignoring the local dimensions. Autesserre sees this failure as stemming from three dominant narratives that have limited the view of conflict and its solutions: ‘a primary cause of violence, the illegal exploitation of natural resources; a main consequence, sexual abuse against women and girls; and a central solution, reconstructing state authority’.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30} Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo.
\textsuperscript{31} Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales,” 205.
Autesserre identifies mainstream policy drivers, but most vividly, she captures the historical and symbolic importance of identity and land as sources of political authority.

Although providing an important warning bell for considering the historicity of Congo, Autesserre falls in a ‘tempocentric’ account by tracing an unchanging continuous line between the 1930s and today.\textsuperscript{32} History, in other words, seems to have left no footprint. Additionally, Autesserre and other localists do not explain convincingly why the inter-state war that started in 1996 did not happen earlier. Conversely, an ongoing violent conflict over land is taken as a permanent feature of Congolese politics. Localists end up portraying the image of a violent inside that disrupts a more pacified outside, remaining within a framework in which the right kind of interveners with the right kind of sensitivity could apply policies that would build the right kind of state. The ‘local’ element in the localist account seems to operate as an autonomous domain, as if its dynamics were not, at least partly, the result of broader global processes.

As will be noted throughout the next Chapters, one of the powerful insights from the current context in the DRC, and one that precisely complicates a theorisation of resistance, is that the global and the local are enmeshed. At the local level, it is possible to find actors as disparate as the MONUC/MONUSCO, the military, a corporation or an externally-backed armed group playing state-like roles in the absence of an administrative state-based authority. Additionally, the trans-historical account occludes the real input of historical factors on the sources of violence. Armed militias may be linked to particular ethnic groups, but this does not turn the conflict over land into an ethnic conflict. One of the features that characterises the DRC is that its context is a very fluid and changing one. Identities, alliances and agendas shift rapidly and constantly. The fact that land in

\textsuperscript{32} ‘Tempocentrism’ happens when a ‘naturalised present is extrapolated backwards in time to present all historical systems as ‘isomorphic’ or ‘homologous’’ in Hobson, “What’s at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International Relations’?,” 7.
the DRC is simultaneously a source of customary authority, the target of different state agendas, a tool to foster elite support and the illustration of international political economic trends, makes the Congolese village at any one time a ‘shorthand’ for a complex historical space.

**Regionalists**

It is this spatial connection that regionalists capture. Most regionalists do not disregard the local features as intervening in the continuation of conflict. What they argue is that the dynamics in the DRC are linked to the dynamics of the Great Lakes region. In this view, it is not just state actors like Rwanda and Uganda who have affected the development of events, but also their interconnections with their corresponding diasporas in each country, their common and conflicting commercial interests, their links to non-state actors, including armed groups, as well as their common security threats.

A vivid example of the differences between regionalists and localists has been exposed by the criticism Jason Stearns made of an article published by Séverine Autesserre in The New York Times. The journal piece is a summary of the arguments Autesserre has made over the last six years:33

The international community has failed to help Congo achieve peace and security because it fundamentally misunderstands the causes of the violence [–] distinctively local conflicts over land, grassroots power, status and resources, like cattle, charcoal, timber, drugs and fees levied at checkpoints. Most of the violence in Congo is not coordinated on a large scale. It is the product of conflicts among fragmented local militias, each trying to advance its own agenda at the village or district level. Those then percolate and expand.34

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Jason Stearns responds with the following:

While [Autesserre] is right to emphasize the local dynamics of conflict, her argument is flawed. She falls victim of her own critique: she, too, ends up being overly reductive, failing to account for the different kinds of armed actors, each with its unique underlying dynamic, in the Eastern Congo. In fact, reading her op-ed, one might think that the reason for the uptick in violence in the Kivus this year is due to land conflicts and struggles for power at the village level. But the main protagonists since the beginning of the transition in 2003 have not been fragmented local militia with parochial concerns, but rather armed groups that are tightly linked to regional political and business elites, such as the CNDP, PARECO, and, most recently, the M23.35

In developing his response, Stearns gives a brief background of the CNDP, which, as he notes, was formed ‘by senior members of the RCD military, in coordination with officials in Kigali and Goma’ to ‘safeguard’ their interests.36 Even when local grievances around land may be at the root of certain armed groups, Stearns argues, they ’have since become integrated into regional business and political networks’.37 Stearns represents here the regionalist position, which constitutes the bulk of the literature. Regionalists provide a moderate argument that includes the context of the region and the trans-border dynamics that have affected the Congo wars. They account for the internal dynamics without making them a solely Congolese transhistorical affair. There are important differences amongst regionalists, depending on whether the emphasis is put on the role of external countries, even if from the region, or the internal factors of the DRC as a failed state.38 For instance, Nzongola Ntalaja speaks of factors of instability in the region

of which state weakness is paramount. Turner affirms that both the 1996 and 1998 wars were the work of Rwanda with the involvement of different regional and continental actors. The underlying factors of war are to be found in a combination of state failure, cultural and socioeconomic issues and the political economy of the DRC. The insight from the regionalist account is the need to problematise the different divides across the local–global but also within society across elites and non-elites. The regionalist account suffers however from not linking the dynamics of the region with what are patterns of state behaviour more generally.

**Localities, Histories and the International**

These accounts highlight important features of the DRC context, but they are a reminder of the need to reconnect international historical and sociological dynamics. This entails seeing local and global, present and history as co-constituted. An exploration of resistance should take this complexity into account, considering the different levels in which actors operate. The analyses explored above also underline the fact that lack of more organised movements means the absence of resistance, and that this is partly the result of a complex system of ethnic alliances, war and extraction. On the contrary, as will be shown in the next chapters, these are factors impacting on resistance but they do not exhaust it.

**3. Landmarks of War and Statebuilding**

Practices of resistance and the dynamics of statebuilding in the DRC are marked by four events, which surround the recent armed conflicts. These include: the ousting of Mobutu, which suffocated an important democratic movement, the Rwandan genocide, the AFDL war of 1996-1997 and the RCD rebellion, which

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turned into Africa’s World War (1998 – 2003). The 2009–2011 period mirrors some dynamics generated earlier and it is therefore important to provide a brief background. These four events have created a militarised extractive context of plural authorities, which explains why resistance generally takes both a covert and militarised form.

The first event is the ‘elbowing’ of Mobutu. The choice of a military solution was underpinned by a series of factors relating to the end of the Cold War, a deep crisis in Zaire and the Rwandan genocide. The Rwandan-initiated military campaign in 1996 gathered regional and international support, but suffocated a democratic movement. The efforts of thousands of civil society organisations, dissident parliamentarians and political parties long opposed to Mobutu, culminated in the 1992 Conference for National Sovereignty (CNS). This was a conference of over 2,000 delegates representing opposition parties and a plethora of civil society organisations, which managed to appoint a new government. However, Mobutu’s coup three months later and the 1996 international campaign against him meant the ushering in of a new authoritarian regime and the loss of the more vocal and formally-organised resistance.

The second event was the spilling-over of the Rwandan genocide to the DRC. The Rwandan genocide needs to be understood in two stages: One in which the Hutu Interahamwe killed up to 800,000 Tutsis, Twa and moderate Hutus in Rwanda and its Congolese aftermath; and a second in which the Tutsi-led AFDL with the APR killed 300,000 Hutu refugees, militias and civilians, during the 1996–1997

44 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 171.
45 Etienne Tshisekedi of the UDPS was elected by the CNS in 1992, but three months later reverted by a coup by Mobutu. Ibid., 195.
military campaign in the DRC.\textsuperscript{46} As such, its effects were regional, not only being an igniting factor for the explosion of the Congo Wars, but also for how politics and war in the Great Lakes Region became determined by a pro/anti Kagame-Tutsi cleavage.\textsuperscript{47} The genocide has ever since marked Rwanda’s need for security in Eastern DRC, added to economic agendas. An additional effect has to do with the fact that Rwanda’s intervention in the DRC carries its own statebuilding project. For Rwanda, the fulfilment of these security and economic agendas largely depend on intervening in the DRC. Yet the two wars that Rwanda has led in the DRC have both bolstered and endangered Rwanda’s interests.

The third and fourth events are the two complex multi-state wars of 1996 (AFDL/APR war) and 1998 (RCD – Africa’s World War). They have represented Fanon’s view of the Congo as Africa’s revolver trigger in that, as Kankwenda puts it, they have mobilised Africa militarily.\textsuperscript{48} The full-blown militarisation these two conflicts provoked was due not just to the instances of inter-state war, but also to the fact that they extensively targeted civilians and engaged them into the war effort. The AFDL campaign was aimed at: 1) dismantling the refugee camps where Interahamwe genocidaires from Rwanda to prevent them reorganising; and 2) ousting Mobutu who had become a source of insecurity in the region.\textsuperscript{49} Not only they had US support but also, crucial to its success were the interventions of Angola and France, the mobilisation of Mai Mai militias and factions of the Congolese military.

\textsuperscript{48} Kankwenda, L’Économie Politique de La Prédation Au Congo Kinshasa, 362.
\textsuperscript{49} Lanotte notes how by the mid 1990s, rebel groups from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and, to lesser extent, the CAR and Zimbabwe had refuge in or directly fought in the DRC. E.g. UNITA against Angola; the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and the West Bank Nile Front (WBNF) against Museveni; and Sudan was raiding John Garang’s rebel posts from northern Zaire. Olivier Lanotte, Guerres Sans Frontières En République Démocratique Du Congo: De Joseph-Désiré Mobutu À Joseph Kabila (Bruxelles: Coédition GRIP-Editions complexe, 2003), 36.
Africa’s World War was first a US-backed Rwandan-Ugandan-Burundian effort to oust Laurent-Désiré Kabila, allied to an internal movement called the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). It then encountered the response of Angolan, Namibian, Chad, Zimbabwe, and the Mai Mai militias. These militias sided with Laurent-Désiré Kabila because they had a historical and ideological connection with him as a revolutionary figure. They also responded out of nationalist sentiment to what was seen as an invasion. The maps below give an orientation of the complex system of alliances in the region.

Map 2. Regional Interventions by year

50 Kabila was as a historical nationalist leader, who had fought at the time of the independence, formed part of Lumumba’s cabinet and then joined Pierre Mulele in one of the most serious uprisings against Mobutu. Élikia M’Bokolo, Le Continent Convoité: l’Afrique au XXe Siècle (Paris: Études Vivantes, 1980), 157.

This map does not include the broader international alliances. Aside from the already mentioned US support to the Rwandan-led coalition, Chad and the CAR supported Kabila with the help of France, and Namibia and Sudan with Libyan aid.\textsuperscript{52} In the East, as Map 2 shows, it was the Mai Mai militias, mostly of General Dunia and General Padiri that were able to contain the actions of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Despite this, Mai Mai representation was subsequently undermined in the peace negotiations. This has created resentment amongst those who fought for Kabila and after different failed DDR attempts, many have rejoined the Mai Mai militias.\textsuperscript{53}

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\textbf{Map 3. Approximate deployment 1998 - 2002\textsuperscript{54}}
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\textsuperscript{53} This is developed in Chapter 6.

These wars are the prototype of the resource wars thesis. They had an extractive character, which included the partition of the DRC between the different coalitions, during the 1998-2003 period (Map 2). Especially in the Kivus, the dynamics of foreign occupation and the different conflict management solutions have created what Ndaywel calls a ‘giant octopus’. A pluralisation of authority through power-sharing agreements and the deployment of different forms of representation of state authority have fostered overlapping military and commercial networks with state-like functions on the ground.

**War and the Heterogeneity of Rule and Resistance**

The significance of these four events goes beyond a dynamic of war and statebuilding. They include genocide, the toppling of Mobutu’s historical dictatorship and two processes of multi-state war, with one of the highest civilian death tolls since World War II. Although the high impact on civilians is a trend in contemporary wars, in the DRC it has been remarkable. Whereas there had been 145,000 battle-deaths between 1998 and 2001, by 2003 between 2.4 and 3.9 million total war-related deaths had been reported. A common pattern has been the

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56 See the point of military and commercial networks articulated more extensively in Raeymaekers, “The Power of Protection.”

conquest of territory, typically through raids and the typical response from civilians has been flight. However, this targeting has also been a main factor for engaging people in war, making civilians rely on their own devices for protection. Additionally, the AFDL war and Africa’s World War, which were brought under the rubric of national liberation, first against Mobutu and then against Laurent-Désiré Kabila, have also been factors in funnelling political aspirations through the participation in war.

War and statebuilding have therefore been determinants for the militarisation of the environment and hence of forms of resistance. The plurality of new authorities, elites and alliances that have been forged across ideological and ethnic lines has fragmented both rule and resistance. This period should be also seen as part of an ongoing unfinished process. The ‘post-conflict’ context has been marked by the use of violence towards the pursuit of state security and economic agendas, even if through proxy armed groups. Resistance is then not an anti-state or an anti-war movement, but rather a negation or, at least, mitigation, of the everyday context of domination. The question that follows is to what extent the UN post-conflict statebuilding strategies have contributed to this context.

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4. The UN and the Contradictions of Post-Conflict

The UN’s post-conflict statebuilding strategies in the DRC reflect more the evolution in the frameworks towards conflict resolution than the actual evolution of the conflict. Having been reluctant to intervene for a number of years, the UN turned the DRC into one of the first laboratories for post-conflict statebuilding. After the more significant deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in 2001, the two missions deployed – MONUC (until 2010) and MONUSCO (from 2010) – have been the epicentres of international peacebuilding in the DRC. Although the UN declared the DRC a threat to international peace and security in order to justify its intervention, a late and controversial arms embargo, and lack of response to a war of aggression against a member state were evidence that the image of Zaire/DRC as a failed state became the guidance for action.\(^{59}\) The UN actions have been contradictory. Its main priorities of civilian protection and the reconstruction of state authority have been compromised by improvised and experimental approaches. MONUC’s referent role does not mean that international action has been homogenous. Conversely, the contradictory nature of UN actions in the DRC responds to the ways in which member states have instrumentalised and ‘marginalised’ MONUC in the pursuit of side agendas.\(^{60}\)

The priorities of civilian protection and reconstitution of state authority are seen in both MONUC and MONUSCO landmark resolutions.\(^{61}\) The weight and

\(^{59}\) Calls for action were based on the nature of Zaire as failed and not on the nature of the conflict. E.g Ugandan Ambassador Permanent Representative to the UN Matia M. Semakula Kiwanuka, “Letter Addressed to the President of the Security Council. Document Number: S/1996/1038” (UN Security Council, December 12, 1996); Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen at the time stated that ‘To say that [Congo-Kinshasa] has a government today would be a gross exaggeration’ cited in Young, “Contextualizing Congo Conflicts,” 24.

\(^{60}\) Trefon speaks of mutual instrumentalisations national and international actors, see Congo Masquerade: The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure (London and New York: Zed Books, 2011); Stearns argues that the UN has been “politically marginalised” since 2006, see From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo, 63.

responsibilities of MONUC/MONUSCO have consistently grown, turning into the longest and one of the largest missions in UN history. Its tasks include civil administration reform, democracy promotion, civil society capacity-building, demobilisation (DDR(RR)) and security sector reform (SSR). MONUC has helped maintain the integrity of the DRC and was a major actor behind the first democratic elections since independence in 1960. MONUC/MONUSCO have been in many instances the sole guardians of peace and security in many parts of the Kivus. However, the impact remains limited. The graphs below illustrate how the DRC ranks high on the list of DPKO deployments by personnel, military deployment and budget. Yet when taking other aspects into account and, in comparison to other missions. They reflect the patchy, contradictory and multidimensional character of post-conflict statebuilding.

(2010).
Figure 1. DPKO Uniformed and Total Personnel

Figure 2. Budget DPKO by mission

Figure 3. Peacekeeper/Population Ratio

Figure 4. Reconstruction Budget 2004


2 Ibid.


4 Ibid., 130.
Similarly, the devastating humanitarian effects of the two full-fledged multi-state wars did not make the DRC rank high in the amount garnered by OCHA appeals in the 1998–2003 period or in humanitarian assistance.

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Table 1. Comparative of Private contributions to OCHA appeals

The disparities between needs, goals and actual funding reflect the political nature of aid. What is relevant is that the agenda of social and political transformation stemming from the definition of the DRC state as non-existent, where statebuilders start ‘from scratch’, runs up against agendas of donors. A complex political environment and long-term objectives also largely exceed the resources at hand. This has been noted in the shortcomings towards civilian protection and state authority reconstruction. Despite the large deployment of peacekeepers and despite being authorised to use force, MONUC/MONUSCO only started military operations in conjunction with the FARDC in 2005, and have only once launched an operation autonomously, in September 2010. Although the DRC government

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6 These disparities reflect intersecting political agendas of interveners and challenges of coordination between different UN agencies, donors and aid agencies. These are widely researched issues. In relation to the DRC see: Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below*; Trefon, *Congo Masquerade*. Some of these have been addressed by MONUC/MONUSCO due to its status as an integrated mission, meaning ‘to have a clear chain of command and central decision-making authority from which all UN country-activities can be coordinated’. Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, eds., *Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo* (Berlin: Lit, 2008), 8.

7 Interview with MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7), Kinshasa, July 9, 2009.

has the primary responsibility for providing security to its citizens, there have been particular situations where MONUC/MONUSCO have been seen as directly responsible for the failure to provide civilian protection. In 2004, for instance, General Nkunda attacked Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, hosting one of the largest MONUC deployments in Eastern DRC, subjecting its population to systematic crimes against humanity for a week. In 2008, the Kiwanja massacre entailed the killing of 67 people 3 km away from the MONUC military camp. In 2010, just over 32 km from the MONUSCO base, and for several weeks, a coalition of Mai Mai Cheka and FDLR combatants committed 387 rapes, mostly of women but also of men, girls and boys, in addition to other forms of torture and abuse.

The fact that peacekeepers obey their own countries’ rules of engagement makes them subject to the risk each country wants to expose their soldiers to. Even so, failure to respond in these situations is linked to the UN’s strategy of not engagement against armed groups except when in support of the DRC government.

The aim of reconstructing state authority has seen the UN mission and donors entering the same logic of informal politics and governance agreements that they were trying to tackle. Ever since its first deployment, MONUC has prioritised strategies conducive to the formation of government and to restructure the

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12 Interview with MONUSCO Political Affairs Officer (no. 63), Goma, July 21, 2010; Interview with FARDC General (no. 146), Bukavu, September 7, 2010; Interview with Amani Leo Operations Officer, Goma, September 13, 2010; Informal Conversation with Pakistani Battalion Blue Helmet, Bukavu, August 13, 2010.
security sector. This has relied on power-sharing agreements between the warring parties, which not only has given an incentive to take up arms, but has also created a contradiction with the aims of fostering peace and promoting democracy. As declared by the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Heile Menkeros: ‘MONUC [is] buying peace’. This is not just a matter of asserting trade-offs in a difficult political process, but of articulating the contradictory relationship statebuilding has with peace. As shown below, the UN has been instrumental in providing legitimacy and, to some extent, logistics to articulate patchy formulas of informal and shared authority with neighbouring states and through the military. The result has been the creation of new sources of violence. From different positions, Verhogen, Vlassenroot and Rayemakers illustrate how post-conflict statebuilding has relied on forms of privatised governance, which have been constitutive of structural violence dynamics, ultimately producing and reproducing sources of insecurity. For Trefon this is due to post-conflict statebuilding in the DRC being a strategy of ‘mismanagement, hypocrisy, powerlessness and sabotage’. Reform and aid strategies, both intentionally and unintentionally, either fail, or reproduce the problems they were trying to solve. This is facilitated by a culture of secrecy and impunity and a climate of mutual instrumentalisation and competition between national and international actors.

16 Trefon, Congo Masquerade, ix.
17 Ibid., 9.
18 Ibid., 14 – 18.
The development of post-conflict statebuilding as seen in the actions of MONUC/MONUSCO is contradictory. These are seen in the disconnection between aims and funding, in the intersecting agendas of member states and the challenges of the context. Different levels of commitments at different times, reflecting the broader status of interventions in the political agenda has been felt in how the UN has responded to the ongoing crises in the DRC. This has been further challenged by the fact that the process and certain policies towards the building of state authority have themselves entered into contradiction with other priorities such as civilian protection and peacebuilding. The fact that the main sources of legitimate authority for the intervention rely on these priorities, yet they are also its main shortcomings, points to those deeper incoherencies in the nature of the process.

5. Deepening Statebuilding, Militarising Peace: North and South Kivu, 2009 – 2011

The context of militarisation, extraction, and plural authority that was shaped through the four events seen above, and to which the international strategies of post-conflict statebuilding have contributed in a contradictory manner, not only maps onto the 2009–2011 period, but has also deepened. In particular, the DRC and Rwanda have engaged in a relationship of mutual instrumentalisation and mutual confrontation through proxy wars, which has carried the mark of both countries’ statebuilding projects. The international response to this context has been to encourage political compromises between the two countries, and to

support a military strategy against the FDLR and Mai Mai groups. These groups have been seen as the source of the sour relations between the DRC and Rwanda.

**Background**

Since 2004, Nkunda has been operating a parallel administration in Masisi, Rutshuru and Nyirangongo (three territories of the North Kivu province), entailing a parallel decision-making structure, parallel police, a parallel army and different regimes of labour and taxation. The DRC government has responded to this in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, encouraged by MONUC and the diplomatic community, there have been a series of programmes to integrate Nkunda’s troops in the FARDC. On the other, the DRC government has supported militia groups, especially PARECO, as a military strategy against Nkunda.\(^{20}\) Out of these negotiations, two agreements have constituted the reference of action. Firstly, the Goma Accords of January 2008 constituted a comprehensive strategy of reintegration of all armed groups including CNDP, PARECO and several Mai Mai militias. They established the Amani programme in which STAREC came to light, and a series of military operations in which the DRC and Rwanda and the DRC with MONUC/MONUSCO targeted the FDLR and Mai Mai militias. Despite the initial hype about the value of these agreements, by August 2008 the CNDP had withdrawn from the Goma Accords and was threatening to take over Goma. The March 23 agreement of 2009 (henceforth March 23 agreement) came to the rescue of the Goma Accords as a bilateral agreement between the CNDP and the DRC government. However, this section will explore what was previously advanced: that these undertakings have resulted in the consolidation of CNDP’s positions; in Rwanda’s continuous intervention in the region, becoming an ongoing source of instability; in an increasing militarised and extractive environment; in a pluralisation of state authority; and a mushrooming of Mai Mai militias.

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Confrontation, Instrumentalisation

The support of Rwanda to the CNDP is linked to its own security and economic interests. Ever since the AFDL war in 1996, Rwanda has claimed that a weak DRC is a threat to its security, providing refuge to dissident FDLR-Interahamwe.\textsuperscript{21} The FDLR is a reformation of the old Rwandan Hutu-dominated Interahamwe militias that crossed the border into Congo at the time of the Rwandan genocide. Although they state their ultimate aim to be the ousting of Kagame and the re-establishment of a Hutu government in Rwanda, their presence and evolution in the DRC relates to a series of complex factors. Added to their fears of being tried in Rwanda for crimes of genocide, during their almost twenty years in the DRC where they have managed to establish rule in many areas, they have also formed families and created a series of military and commercial networks with the DRC government, the FARDC and some Mai Mai militias.\textsuperscript{22} The DRC government has used the FDLR to fight against Rwanda and Rwandan-backed groups many times, including the 1998–2003 war, and contingently throughout the transition. The FDLR and the FARDC have been in conditions of symbiosis to exploit mines in several locations in North and South Kivu.\textsuperscript{23} Hence, the FDLR has been a major source of the souring of DRC-Rwanda relations. The uprising of Nkunda, mobilised under a discourse for the protection of the Tutsi minority in North Kivu, is partly based on the continued presence of the FDLR in the area. However, observers note that the problem of the FDLR may be overstated, facilitating only a justification for ongoing interventionism.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{22} Interview with Group Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu, August 25, 2010; Steve Hege, Understanding the FDLR in the DR Congo: Key Facts on the Disarmament and Repatriation of Rwandan Rebels (Charlottesville: Peace Appeal Foundation, February 24, 2009).


The use/abuse relationship between the DRC and Rwanda is not new. The wave of migrations and refugee flows from Rwanda to the DRC in the 1950s and 1960s meant that a significant part of the population especially in Masisi and Rutshuru (North Kivu) were of a Rwandan descent. A change in the nationality law in 1985 that went from granting Congolese nationality to the descendents of those in the territory before 1908 now included those who were in the territory before January 1st 1950. This, added to the process of Zairianisation in the 1970s, which meant a change in land ownership not only created resentment between ‘autochthones’ and ‘allochthonous’ but this came also because many Kivutian political elites and businessmen were linked to Rwanda and not to the DRC. Although the wars in 1996 and 1998 and major peace agreements gave Rwanda a stake in the DRC government, its backed elites have felt wary of possible shifts in power. Ultimately, the DRC government has turned its back to Rwanda several times before.

General Nkunda, who had already fought under the APR and RCD in 1996 and 1998, became the perfect solution for Rwanda to maintain a political, military and economic influence in the Kivus. Rwanda’s support afforded him the capacity to rise as a defender of the Tutsi community. As a charismatic, university-educated evangelical pastor and military leader with a national discourse for the defence of minorities, he gathered as much popular as elite support, especially from within his Tutsi community of Rutshuru and Masisi. This support and Nkunda’s own

26 Ibid., 540.
27 Ibid.; Prunier, *Africa’s World War*, 49 – 50. Stearns notes that elites were linked to Rwanda in business relating to goods imports and exports, banking, minerals, coffee, cattle herders, exploitation of large agricultural holdings as well as transport and transit these goods towards Kigali. See: Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 260.
28 RCD’s elite became split between those under Rwandan and Kabila’s influence. This was also the case of General Masunzu, which provoked a split amongst elites in Minembwe (South Kivu) with the subsequent formation of the Banyamulengue militia FRF as will be seen in Chapter 6.
30 Joseph-Roger Mazanza Kindulu and Jean Cornelis Nlandu Tsasa, *Les Cadres Congolais de*
personality reflect that he is no pawn operating within anyone else’s agenda. Additionally, elements of the DRC government have also supported Nkunda. For instance, Vice-president Ruberwa and Governor Serufuli supplied with arms.\(^\text{31}\) The support that Nkunda gathered from the population of Masisi and Rutshuru, linked to the network of elite alliances that go as far Kigali has made Nkunda both a threat and a necessary ally for the DRC government.

**Peace through Military Means: Umoja Wetu, Kimya II and Amani Leo**

The 2008 Goma Conference was a response to the spiral of military confrontation over the previous four years. It formalised a rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda, encouraging a series of formal military operations backed by MONUC, and giving the operations special powers, funding and immunities. The fact that a military operation was prioritised illustrates a strengthening of statebuilding, but that continues to be done through sharing means of coercion and extraction, and informalised governance formulas based on scattering the army across the territory of North and South Kivu.

Between January 2009 and April 2012 three military operations were launched: Umoja Wetu, Kimya II and Amani Leo.\(^\text{32}\)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Operation</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Area of Operation</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umoja Wetu (Our unity)</td>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>35 days</td>
<td>Meridional North Kivu</td>
<td>FARDC - RDF</td>
<td>500 FDLR dislodged then relocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimya II (Silence)</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>South Kivu</td>
<td>FARDC/ MONUSCO</td>
<td>Mai Mai and FDLR attacked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amani Leo (Peace Today)</td>
<td>January 2010</td>
<td>15 months</td>
<td>STAREC areas</td>
<td>FARDC/ MONUSCO</td>
<td>FDLR substantially touched, leadership in judicial process. Several groups relocated and still operating as allies with Mai Mai militias.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. 2009 – 2011 Goma Accords Operations

These operations provoked an outcry. Although they managed to dismantle certain FDLR chains of command and camps, as well as dislodging them from the mine sites they had occupied, they did so by taking a big toll on civilians. The FDLR retaliated against the population in areas where the FDLR had set up a parallel administration. The FARDC and the RDF for their part engaged in severe human rights abuses in the course of their military action. Several NGOs, local and international, called for their suspension, and some for the demilitarisation of villages. The popular rejection of these operations led the government to introduce operation Amani Leo. In the eyes of a commander deployed in South Kivu, the problem with the previous operations was that the population were not involved or consulted.

Nevertheless, with or without popular support, these operations represented one of the backbones of the restoration of state authority. Amani Leo FARDC Operations officer defined the strategy as follows:

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36 Interview with FARDC Colonel in Baraka (no. 129), August 31, 2010.
It is not about exterminating all FDLR like saying – there is no one FDLR member that breathes – no, that is not possible; what we mean is that in one or two months we can eradicate the FDLR phenomenon, as a military organisation here in our country, with all its capacity to operate, to set up barriers on the roads and get taxes, to continue exploiting the minerals like they want, to have the political control of certain localities. Once eradicated, we can restore state authority all across the country.\textsuperscript{37}

MONUSCO’s founding mandate supports this vision with its goals including: the termination of military groups, support for the government to better protect population, and the support for the restoration of state authority in areas held by armed groups.\textsuperscript{38} The question is whether state authority has indeed been restored. On the one hand, military operations have had the effect of giving the FARDC increasing control over mining.\textsuperscript{39} On the other, this is a sign of CNDP and Rwandan interventionism. As the map below shows, the largest control of mines is in the hands of FARDC. However, as many of the FARDC deployments in control of the mines are in fact ex-CNDP troops, these have continued to serve the CNDP structure, and alongside that, have continued to grant Rwanda access to mineral exploitation.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with Amani Leo Operations Officer, Goma.
\textsuperscript{38} UN Security Council, \textit{Resolution 1925 (2010)}, 3.
\textsuperscript{39} Global Witness, \textit{The Hill Belongs to Them} (London: Global Witness, 2010).
The reinforcement of CNDP positions through reintegration efforts is a trend that comes from before. For example, with the 2007 reintegration attempt, called *mixage*:  

42 ‘Mixage’ is a process of demobilisation and reintegration in the army without
Nkunda’s commanders continued to respond to their own chain of command, meeting regularly in Nkunda’s headquarters and launching operations independently [...]. Most importantly, they were put back on the army payroll. With 3,500 declared soldiers at the beginning of *mixage*, Nkunda benefited from over $70,000 each month in salaries.\(^{43}\)

The result, Stearns argues, is that the CNDP consolidated their positions, especially along the border with Rwanda.\(^{44}\) Similarly, the fact that the March 23 agreement established that CNDP troops would integrate the FARDC but would not be deployed outside the Kivus has essentially provoked only a change of uniforms.\(^{45}\) For Rwanda this means the fulfilment of important security and economic agendas. For the DRC it has been a compromise, encouraged by the diplomatic community, to reinforce state presence in the area. The military operations have also left a presence of military authority not only in the mines, but also in the villages around them. The fact that part of this military is linked to Rwanda signifies a political compromise and an exercise of shared sovereignty. This is further illustrated by the use of non-military means.

**The non-military means**

Under the Programme Amani Leo, there were the statebuilding programmes *proper*: STAREC from the government and ISSSS, from the ‘international community’.\(^{46}\) The pacific resettlement of refugees has also been of crucial importance due to the massive fleeing of refugees and the territorial nature of the war, linked to the occupation of mining, cattle and farming-rich areas.\(^{47}\) Premised on the doctrine of state weakness, the ISSSS articulated its mandate through the connection between security, state authority and development. In its foundational redeployment. Troops are allowed to remain in their area but ‘mixing’ up with FARDC.

\(^{43}\) Stearns, “Laurent Nkunda and the CNDP,” 253. Emphasis in the original citing an interview with General Siatilo Ngizo, in Goma, February 2007. It is noteworthy that Jason Stearns was coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Arms Embargo at the time.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 254.

\(^{45}\) Interview with MONUSCO - ISSSS/STAREC liaison Officer, Goma; Interview with MONUSCO Political Affairs Representative (no. 149), Bukavu, September 8, 2010.

\(^{46}\) UNSSSS turned to ISSSS - including main donors and the participation of INGOs.

\(^{47}\) Pole Institute - Dossier, *RDC, Nord Kivu: Les Guerres Derrière La Guerre* (Goma: Pole Institute, September 26, 2008), 8.
statement, it noted ‘the fragile nature of peace-building in eastern DRC’ and its purpose ‘to consolidate current peace gains and create the conditions for longer-term recovery and development’. Its priorities were set as enhancing security, promoting the restoration of state authority and creating conditions for refugee return and economic recovery in the key conflict-affected areas it was concerned with. Similarly, STAREC’s foundational document affirms that ‘the global objective of this plan is to stabilise the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo by improving the security environment and by restoring state authority in the areas controlled by armed groups’. While agreeing to a policy in which the military means are at its heart, most countries financing STAREC have contributed to portfolios outside military operations.

A significant initiative has been the Permanent Local Committees for Reconciliation. These committees were planned to ensure the peaceful return and accommodation of refugees in North and South Kivu. The need for a negotiated approach is due to the fact that the land holdings and even the houses of these refugees may have been redistributed by the customary chief, occupied by the military or the police, sold or taken by an authority. Particularly in North Kivu, negotiations at the grassroots level have turned into a geopolitical exercise. This is due to the fact that identification and nomination of refugees is made through the UNHCR/DRC/Rwanda Tripartite, but is enacted locally. This means that on the part of the DRC, this nomination is done largely by the CNDP. As such, many so-called autochthonous residents of Masisi, but also from Walikale and Rutshuru, have argued that it is a tactic to settle Rwandan population in Congo.

49 Ibid., 2 – 3.
51 Interview with Starec - Amani Leo representative, Goma, July 20, 2010.
52 Interview with Louis Batenda General Director of Ucoopanoki Cooperative, Goma, July 23, 2010; Interview with Professor from the Université Catholique de Bukavu, Bukavu, July 18, 2009; Interview with UN Habitat representative, Goma, September 10, 2011.
53 Interview with President of Civil Society - Masisi Centre, Masisi, September 12, 2011.
Interestingly, residents are not the only ones to have this perception. According to a UNHCR officer, Rwanda is using this strategy to such effect:

The people that want to come into Walikale and Lubero are not Congolese; it is Kigali that dictates that. There is not a lot of population there, so those who live there feel really threatened. There is a lot of space. The strategy is that they allow for those new settlers to come in and compensate them with development projects. We need to do that very slowly. People in Walikale are the people from the hills, with provincial characters, we need to convince them. We need to reduce the dependence of people on the customary chief. We need to give a land title to each of them and create the conditions so that investors can come to bring development. But for that we need to form the customary chief and give him an alternative also. It is a political but also a humanitarian project. It is the only way, otherwise we risk that there is war again. We can put pressure on Rwanda in regards to the FDLR but their policy of establishing themselves in Congo is not possible, they receive 50% of their budget from overseas, but if the West stops their aid, they can always go to China. Rwanda has a de facto occupation of Rutshuru and Masisi, and it is now trying to take Walikale and Lubero because there are a lot of minerals there, we can only try that this is done in a calm and peaceful way.\(^{54}\)

The political implications of this policy have meant that its operationalisation has been slow. Nevertheless, it is an important policy that has come to formalise similar structures already in place.\(^{55}\) The above passage summarises many underlying assumptions about the DRC held by international staff. The vision of the DRC as a ‘Zaire-shape hole in the middle of Africa’ still influences international-backed policies. The belief that investors are the engines of development subordinates social and political questions to the conditions in which investors need to operate. Rwanda’s position allows it to take autonomous decisions by bypassing development aid conditionality. Similar views are found in a US embassy cable. Reporting on a brief given by Head of UNHCR – DRC, which analysed issues in the signing of the Tripartite with Rwanda, Ambassador Garvelink stated:

Recognizing that the CNDP had much invested in the return to bolster its constituency in the Kivus, a senior UNHCR official said the agency was worried about the potential for violence stemming from an acceleration of

\(^{54}\) Interview with UNHCR Officer, Goma, August 4, 2010.
\(^{55}\) Interview with UN Habitat representative, Goma.
the process by either the CNDP or the Government of Rwanda. The official said that it would be very easy for indigenous groups opposed to the return to "stage a small massacre" to terrorize Congolese Tutsis into staying in camps. When asked what UNHCR could do to prevent such attacks, the official said that the process hinges on the CLPCs, who will be key to ensure local buy-in of the process, and critically, to determine which areas are safe for return. But it remains to be seen how the guarantors of the return process could prevent manipulation of the CLPCs, many of whom will operate in CNDP strongholds. A UNHCR official candidly said that that the Congolese delegation had signed the Tripartite "for the gallery" and that much of the refugee return process was "out of the government's control" - overseen by the CNDP parallel administration, which the official suggested would become even more entrenched following the recent GDRC cabinet reshuffle which excluded the CNDP. 56

Both analyses represent the widespread acknowledgement of Rwanda’s presence in Eastern DRC. They also show that there are different statebuilding projects taking place simultaneously, each having a difficult relationship with the promotion of peace and stability in the region. 57 However, more than a political compromise, in so far as this geopolitical social engineering is activated under the premise that the alternative is war, it is coercive. Operating at the level of ethnic social composition may have an impact on land access and local political representation, and so it also has an extractive effect. The fact that these local identities with their subsequent political reorganisations act as conveyor belts for state political, commercial and security agendas at different levels finally illustrates that local, national and international dynamics are enmeshed.

**Concluding Thoughts on the 2009–2011 Period**

The different strategies pursued through the 2009-2011 period have not furthered peace in the Kivus. On the contrary, they have reinforced the presence of armed

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groups, and have guaranteed strategic positions for Rwanda. This has fuelled tensions, violence and instability. Though these strategies may have resulted in the assertion of state authority in some areas for the purpose of stabilisation, they have relied on the presence of the military. The increasing militarisation of the area has externalised violence and humanitarian costs on the local residents. As Autesserre notes, Eastern DRC has seen a deterioration of the living conditions with more displacement than in 2006, ongoing human rights abuses and with the DRC falling in its development index ranking to be ‘the least developed country on earth’. Autesserre’s reflection highlights a contradiction of post-conflict statebuilding with its claim to be a necessary stepping-stone towards development. Even so, the context of 2009-2011 represents a deepening of statebuilding strategies. Not only both the DRC and Rwanda have been instrumentalising and confronting each other aggravating a context of violence and deteriorating life conditions. The formal strategies developed through STAREC and ISSSS have sustained informal governance arrangements and a military strategy towards peace that has generated further violence.

6. Militarisation, Plural Authority and Extraction: The Context of Resistance

This chapter provided a background against which to observe the context that shapes resistance in the DRC. It has been argued that militarisation, multiple authorities and extraction are prominent. The different dynamics in place illustrate that defining post-conflict statebuilding as international does not identify the factors that may be at the root of generating sources of domination and hence of resistance. Throughout the whole period, but significantly during 2009 and 2011, multiple actors, including the UN, have fostered governance arrangements that have not always led to the creation of state authority, or provided civilian protection. The underlying reasons for this require grasping the different historical, international and sociological factors.

Two full-fledged wars, genocide and regime change, first suffocated a democratic movement and funnelled popular political aspirations through military means. The latent layer of everyday resistance became prevalent but significantly militarised. An important implication of these multiple periods of conflict is that alongside multiple wars, there are multiple statebuildings. These have been mutually reinforcing but also mutually undermining. In the DRC, war does not necessarily make the state nor is the state the only actor at war; war has been seen as a useful and effective tool to pursue certain state agendas. Rather than centralising state power and military power, wars have acted primarily against the population. They have left at times a scattered presence of military authority and have forced state and non-state actors to form contingent alliances. Although this period is part of an ongoing and unfinished process, the dynamics of fostering informal governance arrangements have generated a co-habited context of citizens and military exposing the relation between war, statebuilding and resistance most clearly.

As will be seen in the next chapters, resistance is an everyday response, a negation and a subversion of a lived context of domination. As has been highlighted, this context of domination is not just a side effect of war and statebuilding but also reflects the ways in which people have been primary targets of war and instruments of both war and state authority assertion. The 2009-2011 period is characterised by a deepening of statebuilding strategies, a militarisation of peace as well as by an upsurge of popular militia action. Although there have been studies reflecting on this period and the reasons behind this upsurge of militias, very few accounts have seen civilian response as resistance and when so, it has not been theorised. Conversely, this is a particularly relevant period for analysing trends of what the relationship has been between war, statebuilding and resistance since 1996. Using the DRC case study, the task in the next chapters will be to show the relationship between different practices of resistance.
Chapter 3

Asserting Authority: Violence, Extraction and Legitimacy in a Plural Space

To govern men as to produce and collect goods is inseparable from the specific modes of the distribution and modulation of violence.¹

1. Ruling over People

Examining the literature on post-conflict statebuilding and the trajectory of its practice in the DRC highlights the need for embedding the study of this process in its historical and sociological context. What the critical literature has rightly identified is that post-conflict statebuilding policies resemble the hegemonic position of mainstream policy-making. The fact that this literature has accentuated the ways in which there is no ideological or operationalising coherence in these policies has been a step forward to provide nuanced analyses of the nature of statebuilding. Even so, the focus on hybridity has provided a critique of the relationship between “international” statebuilding and “local” societies. To better account for resistance the analysis needs to be focused on ruling and resistance practices. However, as Eric Wolf states, social science cannot be restricted to the study of ‘self-contained’ societies.² They need to be studied as social relations interconnected with global political and economic processes. Resistance therefore reflects not just issues of bad-governance, but the experience of war, poverty, and political processes as illegitimate or intolerable. These processes go beyond a relationship between state and citizens. They reflect historical continuity and

² Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 385.
change, and a myriad of political compromises, agreements, struggles and improvisation.

Still, it could be argued that whatever other challenges post-conflict statebuilding faces, whether administrative reform, economic reactivation or the stabilisation of ongoing conflicts, it poses statebuilders with the basic question of how to assert rule. Ultimately, as Weber argues, states are ‘associations of rule’. Post-conflict statebuilding in the DRC is a good illustration that an important element in this process is the production of authority. For Weber, state rule implies the transformation of domination into authority, which meant that norm-making and economic management backed by force rested on rationalised rule and population’s consent. It also implies that states have to monopolise the claim to the legitimate use of force. However, following Laski, there remains an element of domination in the exercise of state rule because ‘[t]he state, indeed, has rarely hesitated to claim paramount authority, even if, on the occasions of conflict, it has not been overwhelmingly successful’. Consent is limited and contingent and does not entirely set the basis for the practice of state authority.

Post-conflict statebuilding has resolved the problem of legitimacy and rule through the production of a discourse of protection and social change. For statebuilders, the problem is not whether violence and extraction are a practice of statecraft, but whether these can be exercised in a legitimate manner. The power-sharing formulas amongst warring parties, later sanctioned through national elections, have attempted to provide this legitimacy. In the DRC, the two national

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4 Ibid., 90 – 91 and 313. Weber distinguished between power as coercion and power as authority. Speirs notes that a closer translation of Weber would identify these as ‘power’ and ‘domination’, where domination (herrschaft) means legitimate power, and so they can be seen respectively as ‘domination’ and ‘authority’. See: Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, eds., *Weber, Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21 and 370.  
elections have generated accusations of fraud. Elections have represented a rush to legitimise the power-sharing agreements. Autesserre, for example, speaks of a rush of international actors to have state representatives as interlocutors.⁶ For Kabila, elections were a way to consolidate his power, gathering elite support at the national and international level, rather than popular support. Additionally, having a national government has not meant that state authority has been extended throughout the national territory. Asserting rule, especially in the Kivus, has not been so much a centralising rational exercise in the Weberian sense, as much as a form of ‘improvised discharge’.⁷ This form of asserting state authority reflects what Mbembe calls private indirect government. It refers to the practice of establishing private forms of ruling by troops, economic actors and others, generally using illegal taxation or forced labour, fostering a culture of immunity and authoritarianism.⁸ The reconstruction of state authority has not represented an authority resting on popular consent, but on the political compromises of different parties in matters of power-sharing. The discourse of post-conflict statebuilding informs these strategies and underpins the need for these compromises, also affording a platform for legitimising international actors.

As was argued in the last chapter, the quasi-hegemonic presence of Rwanda has been a political compromise facilitated by international actors and by the DRC government, even if the DRC government has simultaneously confronted it militarily. The consolidation of state authority has entailed contradictory and improvised arrangements where, for instance, mines in Eastern DRC have been increasingly placed under FARDC control. While this control largely represents the strengthening of the CNDP and Rwandan influence, it also illustrates shared sovereignty, plural authority and informal practices as practices of statecraft.

⁷ A Weberian form of indirect rule emphasising improvisation and simulacra more than strategic planning. Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 81 – 82.
⁸ Mbembe, On the Postcolony. Ch. 2.
These forms of authority and governance do not make the DRC pathological, they illustrate how statebuilding processes take place more generally.

This chapter has several aims. A first aim is to illustrate that resistance is rooted in the coercive and extractive practices of statebuilding. Secondly, it explores plural and informal ruling as patterns of statebuilding practice. Thirdly, it shows how these practices characterise the nature of post-conflict statebuilding as a plural and improvised form of ruling and authority assertion. Finally, it highlights several challenges of theorising resistance in this context that will be necessary to address in the next chapters. In order to do so, the last section of the chapter discusses Achille Mbembe’s theory of the nature of political authority and of the political space in Africa. Addressing Mbembe’s challenge that ambiguity, plurality and the co-production of power are characteristic of the African political context, and that speaking of resistance is irrelevant, will provide an opportunity to reflect on the categories established by the Scottian framework of resistance in the following chapters. These ambiguities and complexities will give particular shape to practices of resistance. They need to be embraced as part of the analysis but not foreclose it.

The chapter develops these arguments over four sections. First, it looks at patterns in the practices and processes of statebuilding through Charles Tilly’s ‘bellicist’ account. As this has been criticised as an account that negates more than explains statebuilding in Africa, a second section discusses some relevant critiques. The problem with Tilly’s account is that it is focused on the process of power concentration that ultimately reflects the unfolding of the European modern nation state. The argument here is that statebuilding is a process of asserting, consolidating and exercising rule through the management of violence and wealth. Tilly’s account of coercion and accumulation as sources of authority

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provides a good standpoint to study general patterns. A third section discusses the application of Tilly’s framework with some examples from the DRC. This section will establish that if the practices of coercion and extraction are considered under the light of different exercises of distribution and concentration of violence and wealth; and if ‘the international’ is thought of as a timely ally - not just a violent competitor - or as already embedded in the process, the framework can elucidate the heterogeneity of statebuilding. A final section explores the challenge plural forms of coercion and extraction pose to the Scottian framework through the theory of Achille Mbembe. Mbembe brings a necessary warning against simplifying the analyses as a state-society binary or as one of domination and resistance. A fuller response to this challenge will be elaborated in the next chapters.

2. Practices and Patterns of Statebuilding

In order to examine the patterns of statebuilding more generally, this section examines the links between statebuilding, violence and extraction, following what Teschke calls the ‘core hypothesis constitut[ing] the dominant paradigm of state formation theory in contemporary scholarship’. This is not to fall back in ‘tempocentrism’ and argue that, for instance, the ruling efforts of Kabila bear no differences to the centralising exercises of the Kongo Empire. Nor is it to reify myths about Europe, sovereignty, or any ‘intellectual legitimations for mainstream IR’. Less so is the aim to portray Europe as the model to say something about what Africa lacks. On the contrary, the aim is to see the present as a construct of historical continuity and change, and to reflect on common

shared practices of statebuilding that can provide a better theoretical grounding for understanding what is resisted.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{The War-making and State-making Thesis: An Overview}

The DRC has been the contemporary theatre of multi-state war in Africa. Its narrative of violence and plunder, and the corollary solution, premised on statebuilding, enmeshed itself in a process of militarisation and extraction, makes the bellicist account of war, coercion, accumulation and state-making a necessary reference. These practices need to be accounted for and compared with discursive peacebuilding formulas of statebuilding as a process towards peace, democracy and development. As Tilly states:

At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government.\textsuperscript{14}

Tilly’s landmark study on state formation opens with the story of Hammurabi’s conquest of the nearby Mesopotamian city-states around late XVIII B.C., asserting that it was representative of patterns of state formation in history.\textsuperscript{15} Tilly acknowledged that important to the process of subjecting the population of these states to Hammurabi’s own Babylonian rule was the deployment of a discourse that justified his rule as divine and just. Hammurabi claimed a right and an obligation to make laws, under the divine dictate of god Marduk, further vilifying all resistance as going against divine will.\textsuperscript{16} For Tilly, although this conquest contained an important cultural, religious and rule-making exercise, it was coercive power that allowed Hammurabi to create his state. The underlying

\textsuperscript{13} Hobson, “What’s at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International Relations’?,” 7.
\textsuperscript{14} Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 169.
\textsuperscript{15} Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 1.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
theory is that statebuilding is one of power concentration determined in large part by mutually influencing external and internal pressures. Different combinations of these dynamics provided different type of states, but the pathway was similar.\textsuperscript{17} Elites’ rivalry and conquest provoked wars; this provoked the need for military conscription and taxation, centralising state power, and turning it into an instrument of coercion against the population and the subjugation of rivals. The absolutism that this new institution developed was only transformed several centuries later through wars and revolutions, not through a social contract.\textsuperscript{18} States-society bargaining, added to the development of commercial, military and diplomatic alliances, gave way to the modern European state system.\textsuperscript{19}

Tilly identifies patterns of statebuilding, acknowledging that other historical cases would be far less neat than that of Hammurabi. So are most of Tilly’s case studies. Normally there are multiple state makers, multiple claims on authority and multiple challengers. Taming competitors is not about annihilating them as much as a process of fostering alliances. Tilly attempts to capture a process, not just single actors. This is well exemplified by Tilly’s thesis of state-making as organised crime.\textsuperscript{20} States by this measure were protection rackets. State-makers rise as protectors of allies and competitors when the threats are real but also when they are invented. In order to foster rule, channels of accumulation and gain allies, the government could invent a threat turning itself into a protector before elites, making wealth transfers and punishing population if necessary.\textsuperscript{21} Organised crime was not a challenge to the state but its actual source of operation to gather elite support, maintain extraction and yield coercive power. In this equation, the distinction between ‘‘legitimate” and “illegitimate” force makes no difference to the fact.\textsuperscript{22} This fact for Tilly is that state authority requires the management and, if

\textsuperscript{17} Tilly differentiates states according to their organisational structure including: City-states, Tribute-taking empire and nation states. Ibid., 21 – 25.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 110 – 119.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 15 – 22.
\textsuperscript{20} Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.”
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 171.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 171, emphasis in the original.
possible, the monopoly of violence. Tilly’s narrative therefore speaks to broader patterns of statebuilding. Some elements of it, including centralisation of rule, monopoly of the use of violence and the underlying assumed progression towards the European state deserve however more scrutiny, before this account is applied to contemporary DRC. But before doing so, it is important to observe how Tilly conceptualised the relationship between statebuilding and resistance.

**States and Resistance**

By any means, this violent and extractive enterprise encountered resistance. Tilly argues that resistance took several forms as ‘popular collective action’ and as ‘new claims on the state’. In this process, subject population and their traditional elites could engage in agreements to launch a rebellion, or elites could be co-opted in the statebuilding exercise through the protection racket mentioned above. The heterogeneity of population was a difficulty for establishing state rule across Europe, and this became the target of increasing homogenisation in terms of language, religion, and administration. The more these type of mechanisms disturbed subordinate population, the more resistance it gathered. According to Tilly, the nature of this resistance was often covert and localised, ‘employing the “weapons of the weak”’. Subordinate groups were likely to turn these into outright revolt when state’s actions were particularly damaging to their collective identities, when they had strong ties between them or with national or international elites, and, when they had identified states’ vulnerabilities. Tilly notes that states have impacted on the form resistance has taken but also that resistance has determined the form of the state.

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23 Ibid., 171.  
25 See also: Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 60.  
27 Ibid., 100.  
28 Cf. James Scott cited in ibid., 101, emphasis in the original.  
29 Ibid., 117 – 122.
The Tillean account of coercion and accumulation offers the possibility to understand coercion and extraction as connected to statebuilding and not only to a narrative of state failure. The problem is that it has been precisely a Weberian-Tillean account of the state that has been leveraged to argue that the DRC does not exist or that it does not function in the right way.\textsuperscript{30} The relationship between war and statebuilding in the DRC has generally been seen as ‘unproductive’ in that war has not generated a state in the Tillean sense.\textsuperscript{31} The literature on statebuilding, with the discourse of state failure, and the Africanist literature, with the discourse of ‘neo-patrimonialism’, have made coercion and accumulation pathological practices of statecraft.\textsuperscript{32}

For Migdal and Schlichte a Weberian ‘image’ of the state as ‘coherent, fairly unified actors, set apart from, or above, other social organizations’ has permeated both academic research and policy-making.\textsuperscript{33} However, this does not account for the fact that the use of informal extra-official channels does not mean that these are not geared towards ruling and asserting authority. Migdal and Schlichte agree with the view that violence is central to state power, which they see as common to state theory, including Weber, Elias, Tilly and others.\textsuperscript{34} Their view is that this power, which affects practices of norm-making, tax and labour extraction,


\textsuperscript{33} Migdal and Schlichte, “Rethinking the State,” 4. Migdal, later with Schlichte, defines the state as a ‘field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by 1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual practices involving those staffing its multiple parts and those they engage in their roles as state officials.’ Ibid., 15. Joel S Migdal, \textit{State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Consti tute One Another} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 15 – 16.

\textsuperscript{34} Migdal and Schlichte, “Rethinking the State,” 16.
bureaucratic administration and the use of force, will vary across states.\textsuperscript{35} A focus on actual practice beyond legal/illegal, formal/informal or public/private divides is what can illuminate the ways in which states operate.\textsuperscript{36} While the bellicist account is not without issues, as the next section shows, it brings an opportunity to focus on the process of post-conflict statebuilding as sharing historical features with broader practices of rule making and hence accounting for resistance also as a patterned response.

3. Challenges to the Bellicist Account

The challenges to the \textit{bellicist} account have been extensive. Of particular interest are those that have taken issue with the narrative for its eurocentrism, for the emphasis that has been placed on the centralisation of coercion, and the ethical critiques leveraged against its methodology. Nevertheless, in comparison to other accounts of the practices of statebuilding, the \textit{bellicist} account highlights some particularities of the DRC as a context of war and statebuilding while being illustrative of broader patterns of statebuilding.

\textit{Issues with the Narrative}

Some important critiques of the \textit{bellicist} narrative relate to the ‘elision of empire’ and of the non-military, even personal aspects of statebuilding.\textsuperscript{37} Bhambra, for instance, argues that the Weberian-inspired narrative has a civilisational bias, a narrowed view of processes outside violence and war and has artificially created a “success” story on which to measure others.\textsuperscript{38} The standard statebuilding story resonates with Weber’s account of the rationalisation of authority. The processes

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 16 and 31.
of coercion and accumulation were increasingly undertaken, not as forms of personalised rule, but formalised and legalised into central bureaucratised institutions.\textsuperscript{39} However, if a European type of state, so crucial for making the DRC the embodiment of failure, is the model to follow, it is important to recognise that even in the relatively parochial narrative of European state formation its sources of authority, as Tilly points out, are not consent and democracy, but war, coercion and accumulation. When colonisation is added to this narrative, which as Bhambra argues, is constitutive and not a consequence of modernity, it shows that European states were not entirely self-made, but benefited from extraction and war in the colonies.\textsuperscript{40} Thus industrialisation, and consecutive reform of absolutism, was a process dependent and determined by war, violence and extraction.

John Hobson’s challenge to the ‘Eurocentric’ versions of the rise of Europe and capitalism does not necessarily undermine the argument that war, coercion and accumulation played a role in the emergence of states. His research shows how tools and ideas fundamental for the rise of ‘the west’ were the result of copy, appropriation and exchange of inventions and technologies developed in Far East Asia and North Africa.\textsuperscript{41} Teschke advances a different narrative altogether. He argues that not just war, but also royal marriages and the process of class formation in Europe gave light (somewhere close to the early XIX century and not the Westphalian peace) to the state system that has been depicted as the paradigm of international relations.\textsuperscript{42} Marriages were an important mechanism of appropriation and balance of power across Europe. Teschke also challenges that concentration of means of coercion, as in the statebuilding thesis of what he calls the \textit{Weber-Hintze paradigm}, was the requisite for the development of European states. Conversely, Teschke argues that,

\textsuperscript{40} Bhambra, “Historical Sociology, International Relations and Connected Histories.”  
\textsuperscript{42} Teschke, \textit{The Myth of 1648}, 11; 220 – 225.
due to peasant possession of the means of subsistence, feudal mobility enforced access to peasant produce by political and military means. Since every lord reproduced himself not only politically but also individually on the basis of his lordship, control over the means of violence was not monopolised by the state, but oligopolistically dispersed among a landed nobility.43

In a more contemporary argument and with the example of Central America, Holden sees that the climax of state power, well into the twentieth century, was not so much the concentration of coercive power in the hands of the state, but its dispersal amongst the population.44 Common to these accounts is what Das saw as the fundamental flaw in Weber’s argument: ‘The state’s monopoly over what Weber called “legitimate” violence does not end violence—it redistributes it’.45 The flaw is in having concentrated exclusively on the mechanisms of centralisation rather than on coercive and military practices as important to the process.

**The Ethical Challenge to Methodology**

There is a deeper question of the feasibility and ethics of offering,

an intelligible reading of the forms of social and political imagination in contemporary Africa solely through conceptual structures and fictional representations used precisely to deny African societies any historical depth and to define them as radically other, as all that the West is not.46

Not least, the European state, most prominently embedded in an idealised service-provider form in policy documents, makes the African state a bad state. Dunn noted that ‘[s]ince citizenship, territorial integrity, and monopoly on the tools of coercion are all considered prerequisites for statehood, this raises serious doubts

43 Ibid., 46.
about whether African states are in fact states at all’. Dunn shows how common misunderstandings in both International Relations and Africanist state theory, which take the state as a given, impose a European model as shorthand for what states are. As a result “African” states are applied all sorts of “madlibs” – adjectives to be inserted in a blank space next to the word “state” – all of them accentuating its lack of something, its failure or lack of accomplishment. Dunn’s survey of these “labels” include:


The pervasiveness of these labels speaks not just of how accurate the framework of coercion and accumulation is, but also of how this is applied to African politics. Therefore, a focus on historical practices embedded in the present could bring about a richer view of contemporary statebuilding.

**Competing or Complementary Accounts?**

Other critiques of the bellicist account have argued that war, in particular, has not played the same role in other parts of the world. Particularly, some have argued that state formation outside Europe was not marked as frequently by war. Patterns of state formation in central Africa have been varied. The Great Lakes region, together with the Ethiopian highlands, seems to have had ‘the longest

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48 Ibid., 46.

traditions of relatively centralized state structures’. These have been the result of migration flows and the influence of the centralising exercises of political rule in the Kongo, Luba-Lunda and the Kunda kingdoms. Wa Muiu and Martin argue that the Kongo kingdom had developed a highly centralised structured around a single currency, a centralised army and the King. However, this power was articulated on a mutual authority assurance between the king and local elites. As Ndaywel è Nziem notes, government was over people and, as long as aristocrats acknowledge the King’s authority and paid him tribute, the King had sovereignty over them.

Protection and tribute formed a network of political authority where elites shared power, and their allegiance to the king was linked to religious, identity, security and economic agendas. Statebuilding was not just about concentrating power from competitors, but also about sharing sovereignties. Resistance on the part of the population took the form of flight from authorities. Distance to the centralised administration of power meant laxer power, and so this encouraged authorities and elites to extend rule through alliances rather than war.

Looking at actual practices of governance, James Scott provides a different account, arguing that what drives state-makers is ‘high modernism’, that is, the ‘faith’ in administration, science and technocracy to organise people and nature in a productive way. Citing Proudhon, for Scott,

To be ruled is to be kept an eye on, inspected, spied on, regulated, indoctrinated, sermonized, listed and checked off, estimated, appraised, censured, ordered about. . . . To be ruled is at every operation, transaction,
movement, to be noted, registered, counted, priced, admonished, prevented, reformed, redressed, corrected.\textsuperscript{57}

Statebuilding in this version is an exercise of control that aims at making the population and the environment legible, hence simplified and homogenous. These practices are still underlined by a logic of asserting rule, extracting consent, taxes and labour, and hence of coercion. Additionally, in the DRC these \textit{homogenising} practices have not been the hallmark of the statebuilding exercise. The largest census undertaken was only done in 2011 for voting purposes.\textsuperscript{58} Even the biometric census done recently for the military and the new phone-payment system, financed largely by the EU as part of a security sector reform scheme, do not change the fact that governance practices do not rely on turning Congolese into consuming and working taxpayers.\textsuperscript{59} Tax extraction is not the main means of state appropriation. The military is still used for the purpose of asserting authority, but state authority continues to be only partial.

Taking these different critiques and alternative accounts into consideration facilitates a critical application of the framework. They highlight the shortcomings in regards to its own narrative of European statebuilding, and they demonstrate that Tilly’s account cannot be applied as a progressive account towards a particular standard state. In fact, analysing this account, statebuilding could be seen as an ‘ongoing and open-ended process’ rather than as a pathway to a

\textsuperscript{57} Pierre-Joseph Proudhon cited in ibid., 183.
particular institutional arrangement.\textsuperscript{60} The critiques also highlight the need to contextualise in order to understand the particularities of each process and historical moments. However, Tilly’s account also illustrates that statebuilding as a process that is mediated, heterogeneous and plural reflects historical patterns. It also identifies coercive and extractive practices as core to statebuilding and hence to resistance.

4. The Bellicist Account as Practices and Processes in the DRC

In the last chapter, it was seen that in the DRC war has tended to be directed against the civilian population. Authority tends to be shared, either as a way of extending state authority, as a way of fostering alliances or as a compromise in light of external and internal pressures. The exercise of coercion and extraction has been undertaken by a myriad of state and non-state actors. It was also mentioned that this reflected not just the DRC’s statebuilding process but also that of neighbouring countries. The standard narratives of the DRC seen in the resource wars thesis and elements of the localist and regionalist accounts illustrate the limitations of narratives premised on state failure and not taking account of patterns of statebuilding more generally. As seen, while the DRC’s administration remains sclerotic, and its population are amongst the poorest in the world, the DRC is one of the fastest growing countries in Africa. As such, practices and processes of coercion and accumulation need a further contextualisation of how they take place. Having outlined above a schema of what the practices of statebuilding are, this section contextualises how plurality and decentralisation in the exercise of authority, coercion and extraction takes place and links these to the ways the discourse of statebuilding provides a legitimating mechanism to those practices and their actors.

\textsuperscript{60} Jung, “State Formation and State-building: Is There a Lesson to Learn from Sociology?,” 40.
**Sharing Authority**

The forms of private indirect government that Mbembe speaks of have been a prominent way of asserting authority in the Kivus. As discussed in the previous chapter, the government has shared means of coercion and tax extraction with armed groups, neighbouring countries, state and non-state actors. Both the government and the UN officials acknowledge that the presence of MONUC/MONUSCO where the government is not present acts as a form of state authority.\(^{61}\) This is not just a feature of contemporary African states. As Krasner argues, ‘rulers have frequently departed from the principle that external actors should be excluded from authority’.\(^{62}\) This has taken place through invitation, intervention or negotiation.\(^{63}\) In the DRC, the presence of Rwanda, for instance, has taken place through a mixture of the three. The strategies attached to the STAREC and ISSSSS programmes coexist with other multiple statebuilding projects including that of the DRC, Rwanda, and others, leaving a plural and heterogeneous picture. At any given time, authority could be represented by state or non-state representatives; national or international, political, economic or military actors. As Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot state, ‘the post-election security predicament in the DR Congo […] combines elements of non-state governance such as military control over resources and cross-border regulation with a reinvigoration of patrimonial state practice’.\(^{64}\) It is not uncommon to see multinational corporations, international NGOs, UN mission representatives, FARDC and poorly equipped government officials undertaking what could be seen as state functions. They patrol, provide civil order, tax the

\(^{61}\) This was a common view amongst the 17 UN officers interviewed. A UN officer stated in an interview what is otherwise a visible fact in Eastern Congo: ‘in some places we are the only visible authority’. Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 14), Goma, July 14, 2009. This was shared by a Provincial Government representative. Interview with North Kivu Provincial Assembly representative, Goma, July 23, 2010.


\(^{63}\) Ibid.

population, build infrastructure, provide arbitration, amongst others. Hence, as will be illustrated in the empirical chapters, they become targets of resistance.

This was the case of Anvil mining operations in the village of Kilwa (Katanga). 65 Most villagers worked for the company, who operated as a de-facto government. When in 2004 villagers revolted against the mine, they created a poorly armed group to start looting the mine. Their reason was that the mine was not providing the village with jobs. They had expelled most local workers except the security guards. Anvil mining in this case retaliated by flying the army into the village and massacring up to 100 people. Although this case caused outrage not only for the number of deaths, but also for how the MNC-army linkage operated as a despotic government, the actual strategy of allowing companies to operate as de-facto governments is still in place.

In Twangiza (South Kivu), for example, the MNC Banro is the de-facto government. 66 The old town was on the site of a gold deposit that Banro wanted to mine. As such, negotiations with the customary chief and the mediation of an NGO, whose Banro’s representative was not allowed to name, resulted in the moving of residents to a new re-built town a few kilometres away from the old one. 67 As Jana Hönke argues, this is nothing new in the DRC, whose trinity of colonial authority was exercised by the state, the corporation and the church. 68 However, in the context of war, mining companies take on special security roles. 69 These roles include putting in place an indirect form of government by providing services to the population such as patrolling operations, recruitment of private security and cooperating with government intelligence agencies to assure civil

66 Interview with Banro Representative, Bukavu, August 10, 2010.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
peace.\textsuperscript{70} This is actually promoted by international agencies, especially IFIs and MONUC/ MONUSCO, which seek to reconstruct state sovereignty, being able ‘to legitimate deals with foreign firms and creditors.’\textsuperscript{71} This strategy also ‘leaves in place an interlocutor who acknowledges debts and provides a point of contact between foreign state officials and strongmen’.\textsuperscript{72} What Mbembe calls private indirect government is a common view in the literature, which have been seen within a logic of Weberian discharge,\textsuperscript{73} as ‘governance assemblages’,\textsuperscript{74} ‘privatisation and socialisation of violence’.\textsuperscript{75} Still, the result is the plural constitution of political authority.

The existence of plural authority also brings us back to the more sociological elements of statebuilding. The myriad of practices that make post-conflict statebuilding ‘messy’,\textsuperscript{76} ‘experimental’,\textsuperscript{77} resting on multiple ‘trade offs’\textsuperscript{78} as much as on the militarised and extractive strategies illustrates its historical sociological nature. The high modernist version of post-conflict statebuilding policy documents goes alongside multiple agendas and informalised practices in which both national and international actors participate.

\textsuperscript{70} Speaking in general of the link between businesses and the government a representative of a security company said that they supported and, at times, took over policing tasks. Interview with Security Contractor, Beni, August 2, 2010.
\textsuperscript{71} Dunn, “MadLib #32,” 53.
\textsuperscript{72} William Reno cited in ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Jana Hönke, “Transnational Pockets of Territoriality and Indirect Discharge,” Politique Africaine no. 120 (2010).
\textsuperscript{75} Mbembe and Hibou see in this form of discharge of the means of coercion to private companies a form of ‘privatisation of violence’ that ultimately weakens sovereignty. Béatrice Hibou, “The ‘Privatization’ of the State: North Africa in Comparative Perspective,” in The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 71–95.
\textsuperscript{77} Paris, At War’s End, 195; Chandler, International Statebuilding, 104; Zeebroek, La Mission Des Nations Unies Au Congo.
\textsuperscript{78} Barrios and Ahamed, “Democracy Promotion Vs State-Building.”
Sharing coercive and extractive authority

The sharing of the use of violence still represents ‘a resource and a mode of political action’.79 This has been examined as a form of ‘privatisation’,80 working through private groups and contractors, and as a form of ‘socialisation’81 in the sense that community groups form their own armed groups, remain armed or ally themselves with other armed groups. Added to these forms of violence management, there is the formalised use of violence as a peace-enforcing practice (UN, military means and military deployment) together with the government-sponsored violence of foreign troops (e.g. by the DRC and Rwanda). The DRC is thus illustrative of the need to account for the international historical and sociological factors influencing violence production.

In the DRC, the relation between coercion and extraction and statebuilding has been seen as unproductive. This has had an effect regarding how state-society relations have been seen. For instance, the public/private, formal/informal, state/non-state divide in the use of violence has been seen as a mark of state failure, where social struggles have ceased to engage in political contestation. As an example, Crawford Young argues that the DRC conflict is part of a trend in which armed groups exhausted anti-colonial and socialist ideologies, turning into gangs and jumping on the bandwagon of the resource revenues, fostered also by an increasing state weakness.82 Rulers, no longer able to count on the support they received during the Cold War, have been forced to engage in criminal strategies of illegal trafficking, support of armed groups and to depend on non-state economic alliances.83 ‘These rulers’, Reno argues, ‘reject the pursuit of a broader project of creating a state that serves a collective good or even of creating institutions that

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81 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 45 and Chapter 2.
82 Young, “Contextualizing Congo Conflicts,” 28.
are capable of developing independent perspectives and acting on behalf of interests distinct from their rulers’ personal exercise of power’. Under this perspective, the use of violence, both by the state and by those who contest it, has only been explored as an unproductive failed practice. The underlying assumption is that this violence has not served a social revolution or a developmental project as in Europe, giving rise to the view of the DRC as a ‘cancer’.

The argument about unproductive violence is closely related to the argument about unproductive rent extraction. Bayart argues that the ‘politics of the belly’, that is, ‘the social struggles that make up the quest for hegemony and the production of the State bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which all actors – rich and poor – participate in the role of networks’. Taking account of the historical trajectory of African politics, Bayart’s argument concentrates on the failure of elites to transform people into labour and capital into investment. Rent extraction is presented only as a tool of gathering elite support and foster kin-links. In other words, there is economic production but the surplus is ‘dilapidated’. Challenging these theses, Mbembe notes that they:

seem to argue that it is only in Africa that the economy is inserted in social relations. And that... [the economy] is not (as we imagine it must be) a domain separated, autonomous, of the social organisation. The relations of reciprocity, redistribution and circulation are, therefore, treated as “extra-economic”.

The consequence is the need to account for pluralism in the political sphere, not as a way to assert, as Bayart does, that social struggles merge everyone into a corrupted struggle for the state, but to account for how relations of domination and resistance take place within those struggles. Not only are there ‘many economic regimes’ but also ‘[t]he processes of accumulation are, consequently,

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84 Ibid., 1.
85 Dunn, Imagining the Congo. Ch. 5.
88 Ibid., 15, emphasis in the original.
multi-formed'. Rent and productivity, far from being incompatible, are a source of authority. In the DRC, military and economic actors provide a presence of authority, sourcing domination and provoking resistance. This is not a parallel state order, but one on which statebuilding in the DRC rests. Certainly, when the state is not particularly present, state agents and those on which consent is claimed can and do subvert roles. This means that subordinate classes might use the opportunity to enter into exchanges to get a mutual benefit from this relation, as much as those representing authorities might use the opportunity to garner their support.

**High Modernism as Legitimacy**

The authority of statebuilding stems from a discourse that defines it as the necessary process to foster peace, promote democracy and enable economic development after conflict. Embedded in this discourse are not only a claim to decision-making, but also one that asserts the knowledge and capacity for undertaking the task of statebuilding. This discourse portrays the state as an institution of protection and social change. On the one hand, war, oppression and poverty are the effect of state failure; on the other, the state is the embodiment of liberty, peace and development. These two premises have provided a sort of auto-generated legitimacy to statebuilders, making the state and their interventions public goods in themselves. Scott’s vision of statebuilding as ‘high modernism’ fits here in that it is primarily a ‘faith’ and a ‘belief’. In Scott’s words, high modernism is:

> the belief in the capacity of technicians and engineers to design and implement comprehensive new forms of living and production that would be superior – that is, more “progressive”, productive, healthy, and humane to anything thus far devised.\(^9\)

\(^8\) Ibid., 16.
\(^9\) Ibid., 17.
Nevertheless statebuilding provides neither protection nor social change in the form that is stated. In Chapter Five, it will be observed how this failure gives way to a blame exchange between the DRC government and the MONUC/MONUSCO. What is important to remark on here is that the discourse plays two important functions in terms of legitimacy: 1) it turns statebuilding into authority without the need for popular consent and 2) it maintains legitimacy in the face of failure.\textsuperscript{92} The assertion to undertake statebuilding for the maintenance of international peace and security, and for the protection of the population does not need negotiation or consent by the population. In last two years in the Kivus an increased militarisation of the region, a subsequent increase in violence against the civilian population and the fostering of networks of patronage against economic development means that the effects of military/corporate rule is externalised on to population while leaving few mechanisms of accountability.

Statebuilders whether national or international are under no illusion that a Keynesian-type state will be built in the DRC in the near future, nor that their own practices are totally representative of what it says in policy documents. A MONUC Political Affairs representative put it succinctly:

Our main focus is to build the minimum necessary for institutionalisation – the state will take 50 – 100 years to function. Civil society needs to play an advocacy role and also be a partner for reconstruction. We also need to rebuild the morale.\textsuperscript{93}

This is representative of a discourse that is deployed as an authority claim, but that externalises any failures or blames on the actual target. What examining the DRC case brings out is that the DRC is an instance of a pattern rather than an exception. Defining the problem as the lack of the state, allows the solution to be defined in both technical and ethical ways. The technocraticism infused in


\textsuperscript{93} Interview with MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7).
statebuilding is also based on an ethic of ‘doing something’. As Chandler argues, ‘[t]his simplistic focus sets up an interventionist discourse where western governments are seen to have the solution to problems of non-western states and where any western government action, regardless of its outcome, can generally be portrayed as better than acquiescence and passivity’. The underlying construction of local inadequacy reifies simultaneously an image of international responsibility, knowledge and capacity.

**Continuities and Change**

These practices are part of a logic of state authority assertion as much as a practice of domination. Tilly’s account captures patterns in statebuilding that allow us to observe the more historical and sociological aspects of post-conflict statebuilding. These aspects identify post-conflict statebuilding as a combination of the micro-politics of the DRC, the politics of the region and the politics of post-conflict statebuilding. This interaction reflects factors of historical continuity and change. How these are present through governing arrangements, proxy wars and UN-supported military operations, leads us to contextualise how these practices take place. One of the distinctive features is that centralisation of authority, of coercion and extraction, is not as central as is the management of state authority throughout the territory. However, this opens new sources of violence and not always guarantees the extension of state authority. In this regard, the discourse of protection and social change provides a stronger mechanism for legitimacy, even in the face of failure, than popular consent. However, if the bellicist account can identify statebuilding practices, it may pose a problem to explore resistance. As already seen in the localist and, to a certain extent, regionalist and resource wars accounts of the DRC, the idea that subordinate classes participate in the processes of extraction and war highlights a series of complexities necessary to address.

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What particularities of the political context impinge on how resistance takes place requires not a standardised theory but an analysis of those particular factors.

5. A ‘Chaotically Pluralistic’ Political Space

Achille Mbembe is representative of a heterogeneous Africanist school that has theorised African politics and social processes taking its historicity as part of their theoretical and methodological framework. This historical approach also accounts for the transversal relations that have forged Africa as co-constituted by and co-constituting of broader world politics. The challenge that Mbembe brings is that analysing practices of coercion and accumulation are hardly illustrative of practices of resistance. Mbembe stands out for having developed a framework in which pluralism is the mark of the political space and of modes of governance. Conversely, he has also developed a negative outlook of African politics. By denying resistance and declaring the postcolony an ‘economy of death’, Mbembe falls prey to his own critique of making sense of Africa only as a crisis. For Mbembe, plurality and heterogeneity do not determine resistance, but subjection.

In theorising the nature of political power in Africa, Mbembe develops several useful arguments about statebuilding. Firstly, Mbembe argues that violence, accumulation and symbolic representations are inseparable. Secondly, these take place across several divides that are ultimately irrelevant: dominants/dominated, formal/informal, local/global, public/private and historical/present. Finally, this can only be grasped through the notion of ‘entanglement’, meaning mutual

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transformations and syncretism, not only of actors and processes, but also of time and space. This notion includes practices, structures and systems of representation. Entanglement is for Mbembe also a methodological approach to challenge binaries that, according to him, do not account for the plurality and complexity of this entangled space called the ‘post colony’. For Mbembe:

The notion “post colony” identifies specifically a given historical trajectory—that of societies recently emerging from the experience of colonization and the violence which the colonial relationship involves. To be sure, the post colony is chaotically pluralistic; it has nonetheless an internal coherence. It is a specific system of signs, a particular way of fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes. It is not, however, just an economy of signs in which power is mirrored and imagined self-reflectively. The post colony is characterized by a distinctive style of political improvisation, by a tendency to excess and lack of proportion, as well as by distinctive ways identities are multiplied, transformed, and put into circulation. But the post colony is also made up of a series of corporate institutions and a political machinery that, once in place, constitute a distinctive regime of violence. In this sense, the post colony is a particularly revealing, and rather dramatic, stage on which are played out the wider problems of subjection and its corollary, [in]discipline [ - and of the emancipation of the subject].

At its core, what characterises “the political” in post-colonial Africa is its own historicity, its pluralism, its institutional structure and its practices, simultaneously constituted by violence, symbolism, and a modus operandi of excess, improvisation and subjection. In many ways Mbembe captures what has been a hallmark of historical sociology – the account of how past and present, global and local processes are co-constituted. The war in the DRC, its institutional structure and the future of the region need to be understood in relation to these historical-present, global-local, cultural-political factors.

\[96\] Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, 102 – 103, emphasis added. Please also note that on p. 103 of the cited English version, the translation ends the quote with the word ‘discipline’. However, the French version is as follows: ‘Voilà pourquoi la postcolonie pose, de façon fort aiguë, le problème de l’assujettissement, et de son corollaire, l’indiscipline ou, pour ainsi dire, de l’émancipation du sujet’. It is an important nuance. It is more likely that, after having identified the characteristics, features and structures of domination in the postcolony, Mbembe ends up the paragraph reflecting how the subjection, indiscipline and emancipation play out in such political space. Achille Mbembe, *De la Postcolone: Essai sur l’Imagination Politique dans l’Afrique Contemporaine*, 2nd. ed. (Paris: Karthala, 2000), 140.
It is not surprising for Mbembe that the post-colonial state is ‘itself a form of domination’ due to the use of ‘universal techniques (a state and its apparatus)’.\(^97\) What has shaped post-colonial states’ ‘institutional machinery’ is the confrontation and symbiosis of the new educated elites (évolués) and the old colonial administration.\(^98\) Elites’ struggles were aggravated by foreign interventions and the new ways in which African economies were inserted in the global economy. During the Cold War great powers forcefully removed democratically elected leaders across Africa (e.g. Lumumba, Krumah, Sankara, amongst others). Additionally, the introduction of cash crops, of economic adjustments dictated by the Bretton Woods institutions and corporate pressures, served both international demand as well as local agendas.\(^99\) These fostered externally-backed factionalism, social inequality and even wars.\(^100\)

The conclusion to draw from Mbembe’s analysis has implications for the analysis of statebuilding strategies: the change of actors and the introduction of political and economic schemes does not necessarily change the nature of domination. The DRC’s political infrastructure is still conditioned by those broader historical and international political economy processes. The DRC is also still based on a dual customary and administrative system, conditioning present sources of war, land conflicts and the deployment of authority. Customary chiefs today play a role as agents of state power, in statebuilding strategies, or as necessary accomplices, either voluntarily or by force, for the extractive activities of MNCs, armed groups and foreign governments.

**Ambiguities and the Challenge to Resistance**

However, these complex relations and blurred divides lead Mbembe to cast doubt on resistance and argue that political relations are *convivial*. This means for Mbembe that the political landscape is more defined by an agency of subjection,

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\(^97\) Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, 60.  
\(^98\) Ibid., 40.  
\(^99\) Ibid.  
\(^100\) Ibid., 41.
of accommodation and ‘entanglement’ than conflict between a category of resisters and dominants. Mbembe provides us here with a fundamental challenge that is important to address. But let us return for a moment to the present context of the DRC.

Since 1996, the DRC conflict has been characterised more by the targeting of the civilian population than by a conflict between armed groups. Civilian population have been systematically subjected to different forms of domination, through war, forceful displacement, killings, torture, sexual violence, forced labour, and forced marriages. This has at times been carried out by foreign and national armies, as well as by popular militias who were operating as part of a broader government strategy. Throughout the different wars, the DRC has gone through the toppling of a long-term dictator, two moments of genocide, and several international interventions (by the AU, EU and UN). Although the most common strategy followed by population against war has been flight, civilians have actively participated in it in different roles, either by contesting or facilitating these forms of violence.

When Mbembe calls the African post-colonial political space an ‘economy of death’ and a ‘regime of impunity’, it partly resonates with the cacophony of events in present DRC. What Mbembe wants to capture is a condition, on the one hand, which is that of the nature of the political space in Africa as one that has become co-habited by those who kill and get killed; and, on the other hand, a sort of “agency” of subjugation. Killing and being killed have become not the domain of any particular class or state agent or the domain of power anymore. Rather, there is an entanglement meaning actual, even intimate, hybridisation between domination and subjugation. For Mbembe this is a reflection of the system of domination that took place during the colonial experience whereby

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102 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 11 – 18; 200 – 205.
‘[j]ust as the ruminant [...] feels an attraction to the salt in man’s urine, one could say that the colonized individual feels attracted to the colonizer’s excrements, and vice versa’. The conclusion from this is not only that ‘resistance’ is an irrelevant category, more so, looking at forms of domination implies a profound analysis of cultural, historical, economic and political relations that have made African societies ‘chaotically pluralistic’.

The result however is an exaggerated theory of domination, or as Judith Butler puts it, a sort of ‘extravagant power’. While Mbembe rejects almost all social theoretical concepts for doing violence to the nature of African politics, society and culture, his notion of domination as an inescapable desired ‘masculine Thanatos’ projects a vision of Africa that reproduces the assumptions Mbembe wants to challenge. Mbembe is ignoring here not only the capacity for insubordination within structures of domination, but also the important relations of solidarity and mutual support that come to add, chaotically so, to the relations of death and abuse. What Mbembe points out is that beyond international intervention and processes of international political economy, the source of domination is not just the state, or neoliberalism, or liberal peace, but the intimate encounter of those who kill and coerce and those who in their desires contribute to their own coercion and killing.

Yet, resistance in colonial and post-colonial times has tended to subvert the terms of such co-habitation. For example, Mamdani points out that whereas the colonial state apparatus relied on ethnic and religious authorities, ‘one finds it difficult to recall a single major peasant uprising over the colonial period that has not been either ethnic or religious in inspiration’. But this fragmented resistance.

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103 Ibid., 237.  
107 Ibid.
Nzongola also argues that resistance in colonial times emerged in the ‘new structures that colonialism had itself created: colonial army, workers, camps and compulsory agricultural labour’. These analyses indicate the need to account for practices of resistance in the daily experience of relations of domination. Mbembe shows that relations of domination and resistance are not necessarily a story of good and bad, not even about the advance of an ethical agenda. This warning against simplifying an analysis of resistance points to embracing the ambiguous realms in which relations of domination take place.

6. Ambiguity and Pluralism in Statebuilding and Resistance

This chapter has consolidated three key ideas that run through the thesis. Firstly, that statebuilding is a process of asserting, consolidating and exercising rule through coercive and extractive practices. This takes the form of improvised discharge and statebuilding becomes mediated by multiple actors creating plural authority. Post-conflict statebuilding discourse provides a way to legitimise this process as a claim to authority. Secondly, it has highlighted that resistance is rooted in the coercive and extractive practices through which statebuilding is carried out. Finally, and most importantly, the relationship between statebuilding and resistance speaks of a historically contingent process rather than a dynamic of liberal/international statebuilding and local resistance. Developing a Tillean account, with its critiques, especially from an Africanist perspective, has provided the theoretical standpoint from which to observe how the nature of the political context determines practices of resistance. To this extent, practices of violence and extraction refer to patterns in statebuilding. However, it has been highlighted that not only concentration of coercive means and accumulation account for statebuilding. Its management, distribution and sharing can provide further coercive and extractive power, and a way to represent state authority in the absence of it.

The context of power relations in which multiple statebuilding projects coalesce impinges on resistance. Plural forms of domination give rise to a series of resistance strategies that make resistance heterogeneous. This is not an ad-hoc response to the particular context, but the prosaic forms of resistance against the coercive and extractive practices of statebuilding. The ISSSS programme under which government and non-governmental organisations operate does not reproduce a different structure of authority nor a different type of resistance. Zücher sees this as ‘the local’ being imposed on ‘the international’. But as seen, it is more that these two spheres do not provide adequate analytical categories for studying resistance or statebuilding. There is no “international” statebuilding as an outcome.

By all means this resonates with a Scottian framework. The use of Scott in peace and conflict studies has been done to theorise the ways in which local practices have subverted internationally-led policies. The trade-off has been the loss of significant historical and sociological depth. Not only in regards to the statebuilding process, but in regards to the political spaces where these processes have taken place. As such, if Scott’s framework is to be fully applied for its conceptual framework of resistance it would have to respond to the nature of statebuilding not as an international policy, but as a process entangled in the historicity of Africa, muddled by ambiguities, improvisations, continuities and changes. The Scottian framework would have to live up to the challenge of a ‘chaotically pluralistic’ political space and even become an insight into it.

Chapter 4
A Framework of Everyday Resistance for Post-Conflict Statebuilding Contexts

1. What is Everyday Resistance?

The informalities, ambiguities and contradictions statebuilding runs into reflect the political nature of the process. Chapter One examined a new generation of literature on post-conflict statebuilding, which pointed out statebuilding’s lack of coherence, and the poor record of success. This literature started exploring resistance, which deepened a critique of statebuilding and a theory of hybridisation. Yet it has left resistance only rudimentarily theorised. Richmond’s work with elements from De Certeau, Scott and post-colonial theory does not sufficiently elaborate his argument that resistance is ‘critical agency’ and its nature ‘fragmented, hidden, disguised and localised’.1 The tendency of this critical literature to portray resistance as a response to the international and liberal nature of statebuilding has missed important insights of examining resistance as a response to statebuilding more generally.

Part of the advantage of making the everyday the site for theorisation and research is precisely the possibility of contextualising the research, and taking into account the more complex texture and depth of the processes societies go through. The focus on everyday resistance has identified a variety of practices ranging from violent responses to protests, boycotts, non-compliance and unintended actions, but with subversive outcomes. How these different categories relate to each other and to a concept of resistance has remained limited to making a stronger argument about how these practices hybridise statebuilding. Resistance has thus

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been theorised in relation to an outcome more than in relation to its practices. The result has been that more has been said about statebuilding than about resistance per se. Bringing in the framework of James Scott provides a definition of resistance that examines ongoing practices of domination and resistance from a more general angle of class and state-society relations. Scott’s framework is not without problems. His focus on intentions, how individual acts prove to be political and social, and the over-simplification of relations of domination are ongoing critiques. In the previous chapter, the critique advanced by Achille Mbembe of the failure to grasp the chaotically pluralistic nature of the political space in Africa, and speaking directly to the limited applicability of frameworks such as Scott’s, rejected any binary categories of domination and resistance.

It was also seen that the DRC case offers the possibility of examining both certain generalities and particularities, making it particularly suitable to exploring the framework of everyday resistance in a post-conflict context. The DRC illustrates how the post-conflict practice of consolidating and extending state authority reflects practices of state accumulation and violence. Pointing out how these practices are resisted should not be seen as stemming from a conception of the world as structured around a binary of domination and resistance. It is argued that any resistance framework has to embrace the ambiguity of the context and the acts. The DRC also introduces the possibility of exploring the relationship between different categories of practices including the ‘weapons of the weak’ (e.g. mockery, slander/denigration and reworked statebuilding vocabulary), guerrilla warfare and survival tactics that largely subvert elite appropriation. However, different practices do not account for what resistance is, nor are they decisive to distinguishing resistance, rebellion and revolution.² Seen as isolated “acts”,

² E.g. Eric Selbin argues that what distinguishes resistance from rebellion and revolution is its less threatening character to power, and its actions being linked to long-term processes and to societies’ memories of social struggle. Rebellion, by contrast, is ‘a type of insurgency or uprising which rarely seeks to change the entire system’ but manages to threaten it generally with violence. Revolution finally is a ‘dramatic upheaval involving a group of united people overthrowing their government’. Eric Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story (London: Zed, 2009), 11, 12 and 13.
slander, denigration, mockery and violence can be dominating strategies too. For these acts to be seen as resistance, they need to be explored as patterns of behaviour in situations of subordination.

In response to these issues, this chapter explores how and why Scott’s account of resistance can provide an answer to the question of what resistance is and serve as guidance to identify what practices constitute resistance in post-conflict statebuilding. It will be argued that a framework of resistance needs to connect patterns, intentions, motivations, acts and actors in a relation of domination. The Scottian framework does so to a certain extent, but it is not explicit enough. While unintended resistance becomes an exercise of abstraction, intentionality is hard to grasp. A ‘translation’ is required between what is observed and how it is described. The chapter first explores Scott’s framework. Secondly, there is a discussion of the critiques leveraged against the Scottian framework, and of the challenges that a post-conflict statebuilding context poses to it. This is done through three subsections: a) the relation between intentions and motivations; b) the ambiguity of the actors and the question of binaries; and c) how different types of “acts” can be part of the framework, with a special attention to violence. As a guidance to forthcoming empirical chapters and in response to a debate that places the complexity of resistance in terms of its existence or not, violence or not, its oppositional nature or not, the last section provides a reworked account of resistance discussing how some of its elements can be gradated to better grasp the complexities of resistance.

2. The Art of Theorising Resistance

James Scott’s theory of resistance has developed over thirty years and four major publications: *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, *Weapons of the Weak*, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* and *The Art of Not Being Governed.* The main line of argument

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3 James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*
in these works is that resistance is rooted in the daily individual and collective covert acts of opposition and self-help against domination; it does not need recourse to political or labour organisations, but rather to actions like foot-dragging, mockery and fake compliance. Several other propositions follow from these: that subordinates have their own political agendas; that, on those bases, they make political choices about their lives and about the daily experience of different forms of power; that relations of domination have material and ideological bases; and that consent is limited. Scott’s work is mainly driven by a response to a body of Gramscian literature that saw domination as resting on consent, and those who defined resistance as an area of formally organised and revolutionary activity. According to Scott, this literature assumed that subordinate classes acquiesced, that they were relatively disadvantaged in regard to the transmission and absorption of hegemonic ideas, and that they were not directly coerced. So resistance was elitist and partial. Scott argues that to see resistance only as a collective enterprise with a revolutionary end is to subject millions of actions to the *unwritten records of history*. Rather, Scott argues that modest, covert actions, concerned with immediate gains and self-help, constitute a permanent layer of resistance in which struggle against domination takes place and in which class consciousness and even revolutions may take root. Scott’s

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conclusion in *Weapons of the Weak* summarises these arguments, and it is worth quoting at length:

Resistance in Sedaka[7] begins as, I suspect, all historical resistance by subordinate classes begins: close to the ground, rooted firmly in the homely but meaningful realities of daily experience. The *enemies* are not impersonal historical forces but real people. That is, they are seen as actors responsible for their own actions and not as bearers of abstractions. The *values* resisters are defending are equally near and familiar. Their point of departure is the practices and norms that have proven effective in the past and appear to offer some promise of reducing or reversing the losses they suffer. The *goals* of resistance are as modest as its values. The poor strive to gain work, land, and income; they are not aiming at large historical abstractions such as socialism, let alone Marxist-Leninism. The means typically employed to achieve these ends –barring the rare crisis that might precipitate larger dreams- are both prudent and realistic […] When flight is available – to the frontier, to the cities – it is seized. When outright confrontations with landlords or the state seems futile, it is avoided. In the enormous zone between these two polar strategies lie all the forms of daily resistance, both symbolic and material, that we have examined.8

Scott does not mean that there is no acquiescence amongst the peasantry, or that peasants are all innate revolutionaries, but that there is no evidence to suggest that even when the dominant ideology is to a certain extent internalised, this limits the possibilities for social conflict.9 Scott identifies working relations, land ownership and moral behaviour as the realm in which to observe the daily experience of domination and resistance. This highlights the material basis of resistance, while noting that resistance as well as power operate on world-views, symbols and idealisations. Agendas of work, land and even social justice are advanced through an idealisation of the past or of a future of salvation. These tend to simultaneously project an idea of a good leader or king, the arrival of god or a liberator.10 All of these are ways of de-legitimising present arrangements or

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7 The name given to the small village in Malaysia where *Weapons of the Weak*’s fieldwork takes place.
8 Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 348 – 349, emphases in the original.
9 Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 77.
10 Especially developed in *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* and in the *Art of Not Being*
changes implemented and articulating political alternatives. Although Scott’s work on resistance focuses primarily on the peasantry in South East Asia, it has expanded to generalise to other situations of subordination, going from the relatively narrowed class relations to state-society relations.\footnote{From the exclusive, narrow focus on Malay and Burmese Peasantry in The Moral Economy of the Peasant and Weapons of the Weak, to an overall argument about subordination in Domination and the Arts of Resistance. State/society relations are explored most notably in the Art of Not Being Governed and in Seeing like a State.}

In constructing these arguments, Scott provided a categorisation of two types of resistance: the formally organised and the everyday forms of resistance. At its core, this typology represents Scott’s response to the literature on hegemony and false consciousness. In establishing such a distinction, Scott simultaneously outlined the nature of everyday resistance: prosaic, covert, unstructured, individual or collective, informal and focused on modest demands and immediate gains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Everyday</th>
<th>Formally Organised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continuous/Ongoing/Prosaic</td>
<td>When Possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert</td>
<td>Overt/Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncoordinated/Fragmented</td>
<td>Organised/Structured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual/Collective</td>
<td>Collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate gains/Sustainable</td>
<td>Long term gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Formal/structured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3. From Scott Weapons of the Weak*\footnote{Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 33.}

Although Scott later proved that the peasantry has greater ideological commitments and that they make use of all kinds of available figures (whether gods or kings) to think of emancipation and long-term change, his point was that everyday resistance differed from formally-organised resistance in that self-

\footnote{From the exclusive, narrow focus on Malay and Burmese Peasantry in The Moral Economy of the Peasant and Weapons of the Weak, to an overall argument about subordination in Domination and the Arts of Resistance. State/society relations are explored most notably in the Art of Not Being Governed and in Seeing like a State.}
centred and immediate gains did not dislodge the political element in these acts. As Scott argued: ‘[t]o insist on such distinctions as a means of comparing forms of resistance and their consequences is one thing, but to use them as the basic criteria to determine what constitutes resistance is to miss the wellsprings of peasant politics’. 13 Scott was opening the ground for exploring politics and relations of domination, not in the open field of structural and formal politics, but in the everyday relations of the workplace, village life and the home.

Nevertheless, in this transition away from a narrow account of resistance, Scott’s version has been seen as stretched. 14 Orter for instance wonders: ‘When a poor man steals from a rich man, is this resistance or simply a survival strategy?’ 15 Hibou defines the ‘infrapolitical approach’ to the study of relations of domination as the one that sees ‘resistance everywhere’. 16 Underlying these critiques is a question of the relation between the particular practices of resistance, the possibility to grasp intentionality and the interpretation of power relations. The debates the concept of everyday resistance continues to generate demonstrate that this framework is not straightforward. Still, one of the advantages of using a Scottian approach is that it provides a clear definition and a framework within which to categorise practices.

**Defining Resistance**

For Scott, resistance is

any act(s) by members(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large

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13 Ibid., 294.
15 Ortner, “Resistance,” 175.
farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis those superordinate classes.\textsuperscript{17}

On this account, resistance is not so much defined by the particular ‘act’ used (which could be ‘any’) but more by its \textit{intention}, that is, by the conscious use of that act to \textit{mitigate}, \textit{deny} or \textit{advance an agenda}. The advantages of this account, which Scott already notes, are the identification of both material and symbolic underpinnings of class relations and of relations of domination, which are present in both claims of authority and resisters’ agendas.\textsuperscript{18} Resistance can be both individual and collective, and does not need to be organised or politically minded.\textsuperscript{19} The emphasis on intent is to point out that resisters may not be successful in their attempts. However, Scott also acknowledges the ‘enormous difficulties’ in proving intent.\textsuperscript{20} Intentionally mitigating a claim does not mean the existence of a developed class-consciousness; nor does it mean that these acts entail a struggle against capitalism or for socialism in the abstract. As such intention is gathered from the actual practice, of for example avoiding tax, or avoiding increases in land rent.\textsuperscript{21} For Scott, these acts are political and their significance goes beyond not having paid the tax or having avoided rent increases. As these practices do not exist in a vacuum, but are part of a relation of domination, they represent the ways in which everyday mechanisms of domination and resistance operate.

Although \textit{Weapons of the Weak} was written as an account of class relations, Scott later extended this definition to a general theory of resistance, arguing that ‘similar structures of domination, other things being equal, tend to provoke responses and forms of resistance that also bear a family resemblance to one another’.\textsuperscript{22} The context of gender, racial and state-subject relations would foster similar responses. For Scott then a superordinate position, and more generally,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Scott, \textit{Weapons of the Weak}, 290.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 290 – 291.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Scott, \textit{Weapons of the Weak}, 290.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 296.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Scott, \textit{Domination and the Arts of Resistance}, 21.
\end{itemize}
domination entailed a material and symbolic extractive capacity (land, rent, labour and taxes, as well as prestige, honour, deference) as well as a productive capacity delimiting the realm of what is possible (to do, to aim or to achieve) and not possible (delimit ‘the realm of idle dreams [and] wishful thinking’). For Scott these were not “given” categories or represented a permanent state of being, but were firstly rooted in the historical experience of the actors. As discussed below, critics see in this account unambiguous categories in a binary of domination and resistance that do not grasp the complexity of everyday life. Nonetheless, Scott’s framework is developed with close relationships in mind, allowing for a significant degree of ambiguity.

The political significance of these individual acts of self-help is not due to their capacity to change the structures of domination that they aspire to mitigate or deny, but their widespread prevalence, and their amenability to the largest working class in the world: the peasantry. These forms are prosaic, and thus for Scott ‘[t]o understand these commonplace forms of resistance is to understand much of what the peasantry has historically done to defend its interests against both conservative and progressive orders’. So everyday forms of resistance have a historical and present value for their prevalence, but they also have a future value. Later Scott said that everyday forms of resistance are a pre-history of revolution. They are significant in themselves as the permanent layer of resistance that illustrates the relative success of domination and limited consent.

The problem is that, while opening the ground for an account of commonplace forms of resistance, it simultaneously becomes harder to account for what is not resistance, or as Ortner noted earlier, distinguishing between pilfering as an act of resistance and as an egotistic act. In this regard Scott noted:

24 Scott asserts to ‘subscribe wholeheartedly to the judgment reached by E. P. Thompson’ that class struggle precedes class and class-consciousness. Ibid., 296.
26 Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, xvi.
27 Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 203.
To ignore the self-interested element in peasant resistance is to ignore the determinate context not only of peasant politics, but of most lower-class politics... When a peasant hides part of his crop to avoid paying taxes, he is both filling his stomach and depriving the state of grain... When such acts are rare and isolated, they are of little interest; but when they become a consistent pattern (even though uncoordinated, let alone organized) we are dealing with resistance.\(^{28}\)

Scott argues that the aims to be achieved are not selfless but by definition self-centred. Avoiding a tax, stealing part of the crop, denigrating or slandering authority does not advance a collective agenda of “the working class” or of “liberation”; yet they are individual representations of class struggle. Scott’s definition, nevertheless, by equating ‘agenda advancing’ with ‘mitigation’ and ‘denial’ does not sufficiently recognise that pursuing an agenda is not just another aim but a permanent motivation. From Scott’s definition, ‘agenda advancing’ is resistance because it does so at the expense of elite claims. Hence, agenda advancing necessarily mitigates and denies elite claims. This agenda has embedded the values and modest goals that Scott describes which tend to do with land, work and pre-existing arrangements. Therefore, agenda advancing, which provides an account of motivations, needs to be accounted for alongside intentions. Ultimately, what is important is that beyond intentionality, these acts are not accidental, at the discretion of one opportunistic individual; they become the individual opportunistic representation of the patterns in which everyday resistance takes place.

### 3. Critical Analysis of the Everyday Framework

In Chapter One it was noted that a limitation in both Richmond and Mac Ginty is that neither of them sufficiently address the issues and critiques that the everyday framework of resistance has received. Not only are the critiques that Scott has received important to articulate resistance in the context of statebuilding, they need to be addressed to assess the suitability of the framework in Eastern DRC.

\(^{28}\) Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 295 – 296, emphasis added.
There have been four main critiqués: (1) The category of resistance is too broad, unable to differentiate resistance from coping strategies or whining without particular political significance.\(^{29}\) (2) Intentions are ungraspable.\(^{30}\) (3) Scott pays insufficient attention to peasant agendas, providing univocal readings of certain acts as resistance.\(^{31}\) (4) Scott conceives reality only through a binary of domination and resistance, over-simplifying the dynamics and structures of power and state-society relations.\(^{32}\)

These critiques overlap with the challenges that emerge from applying this framework to a context of actual conflict, statebuilding and Eastern DRC. This context poses three other challenges: how to conceive of violence and the use of different oppositional or non-oppositional practices; how to articulate resistance in a context of plural authorities, where authority is ambiguously represented and where statebuilding is not a process of social transformation; and, finally, how to grasp resistance in a context characterised by many Africanist literature by ambiguity and conviviality. In response to these challenges, this thesis proposes that any account of resistance needs to connect those who resist (the actors), their intentions and motivations, with patterns of social and political interaction around extraction, violence and privilege. This raises many questions about the interpretation of each and one of these elements is given within an account of resistance. Rather than examining the critiqués one by one (a discussion that has


\(^{30}\) Ortner, “Resistance.”


been held over many years), this section analyses how the framework applies and how these challenges can be addressed.

3.a. Connecting Intentions and Motivations

The relation between intentions and motivations needs to be established. Intent may be defined as the aim of denying or mitigating an authority claim or the effects of domination. Motivations are the reasons, justifications, and agendas behind those aims. Both have been raised as key elements that determine what is and what is not resistance. Abbink, Bruijn and Walraven for instance argue that ‘resistance must be defined not so much as a set of concrete acts but by the intent of those acts, with the object of defending preexisting sociopolitical situations’.33 They note how the historiography of African resistance changed from studying nationalist elites in the 1960s to studying unorganised individual resistance, including silences and dreams in the 1970s.34 The inclusion of unintended and unconscious acts had broadened the definition of resistance ‘too much’.35 In the early debates in Anthropology, in the 1980s, for instance, Brian Fegan already argued that intent was a necessary element of resistance.36

Although Scott also defines resistance in terms of intent, he is less categorical. Scott draws attention to the fact that despite these acts failing in their intent more often than not, they are politically significant. These aims may or may not be expressed that way by their practitioners, the practices themselves are a way to gather intent.37 The intent of tax avoidance may be no more than not paying tax, but it denies the state its taxes. The intent of an insult might be denigration or delegitimation, but it denies authority deference and legitimacy. Additionally, cultural and historical elements may be more important than intention. For

33 Abbink, Bruijn, and Walraven, A Propósito de Resistir, 22, emphasis in the original.
34 With reference respectively to Donald Crummey and Achille Mbembe in Ibid., 17.
35 Ibid.
37 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 296.
instance, Homi Bhabha argues that ‘[r]esistance is not necessarily an oppositional act of political intention’. 38 Scott is close to Bhabha in that intentionality should not be seen as reflecting an already formulated ideology against power, but a collective memory and a culture of insubordination to authority. 39 The meaning of ‘practice’ itself reflects that historical legacy.

However, this also raises a tension that is most distinct in De Certeau’s analysis. As mentioned in Chapter One, De Certeau was critical of Bourdieu’s portrayal of agents without agency, bearers of automated practices almost irrespective of the agent’s will. De Certeau argues that ‘tactics’ and the practice of insubordination have a historical and millenarian element, and embraces, with Freud, the realm of the subconscious. Conversely, he also argues that one could not think of these practices as escaping the subject’s consciousness. Walking following one’s logic or writing a letter to a friend in ‘company time’ are conscious activities in the sense that they are done in full knowledge by its agent. 40 De Certeau draws attention to the possibility of seeing resistance as a self-regarding practice, where authority claims may not be directly confronted, but ignored, reappropriated or subverted.

The difficulty of gathering intent, and linking with the debates about motivation, was the core of the critiques of Scott made within Anthropology studies in the 1980s. Sherry Ortner, a primary representative of these critiques, argues that resistance studies are limited because they lack ethnographic ‘stance’ – a commitment to grasp the ‘thickness’ and the ‘depth’ of the complex relations. 41 According to Ortner,

Resistance studies are thin because they are ethnographically thin: thin on the internal politics of dominated groups, thin on the cultural richness of

38 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 110.
40 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 50 – 60.
those groups, thin on the subjectivity – the intentions, desires, fears, projects – of the actors engaged in these dramas.\textsuperscript{42}

The critique is that resistance studies simplify reality excessively by not considering the web of relations where subjects are embedded. Following from this, Ortner argues that scholars disregard how practices and meanings evolve for both resisters and scholars, and thus how ambiguous and subjective these acts are.\textsuperscript{43} Ortner ends up with a final objection, which resonates with recent arguments advanced by Mbembe and Hibou, to the category of resistance more generally.\textsuperscript{44} Because resistance, and especially its intentions, is ambiguous, Ortner proposes to account for the multiple ways in which practices can be ‘creative and transformative’ yet be the result of contradictory and mixed intentions.\textsuperscript{45} By this account, intentions may not be central and may provide a richer account of other aspects in everyday human relations, but doing away without intention undermines an account of the agency against the experience of domination.

The implications of Ortner’s argument is that to claim that a category of resistance is irrelevant because one cannot grasp all desires, hopes, cultural constraints and aims in an individual, let alone in a collective, is to reduce resistance to a psychological category and devoid it of its historical, political and social meaning. Additionally, the existence of myriad of agendas, and of a self-centred element within it, do not necessarily point to ‘conviviality’ or to a lack of conflict in relations of domination. Similarly, the absence of principled motivations does not rule out resistance. It becomes necessary to link intent with the motivations, that is, the reasons, agendas and justifications behind those acts. Often practices have both self-centred and selfless motivations.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 190.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 175.
\textsuperscript{44} Mbembe, \textit{On the Postcolony}. Ch. 3; Mbembe in Weaver Shipley, “Africa in Theory,” 666; Hibou, \textit{Anatomie Politique de La Domination}.
\textsuperscript{45} Ortner, “Resistance,” 190 – 191.
Motivations: Self-centred and self-less resistance

Self-centred acts may not necessarily entail self-gain, but the prioritisation of one’s own agenda in detriment of the fulfilment of authority claims. In De Certeau’s account, where intent is not present, prioritising one-self suggests ‘an alternative socio-political ethic’ that antagonises the logic of profit, whether represented in the factory or in patterns of consumption. As already seen in the examples De Certeau provides (pilfering – ‘a lathe to make furniture at home’ or ‘writing to a friend while at work) was at a loss, for the impact that being caught would have. This makes more meaningful the fact that this ‘risk’ is taken, not out of a logic of self-profit, but out of solidarity with ones’ friends and families. Behind this account, and similarly to Scott, is the fact that resistance is not just the realm of public, collective and seemingly selfless agendas but also the realm of quotidian self-help acts.

The problem is that whereas the former seems to be straightforwardly amenable to infer a political argument, the individual covert, self-centred ones are not. Yet by looking at the interaction between self-centred and selfless motivations as examined in resistance studies, the lines are blurred even in revolutionary organisation. Wolf for instance, in his studies of peasant revolutions in the 20th century, argued that peasants ultimately acted for themselves and that they carried a deep sense of injustice. Barrington Moore also argued that battles over land and the uses of land symbolises battles over power, morals and ideas about how society is best organised. Similarly Scott thought that peasants tend to be more radical at the level of ideas than at the level of action. Self-serving acts may not go as far as envisioning a new society, but they do not preclude them. They could rather be seen underlined by an idea of what is legitimate and an

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46 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 25.
47 Ibid.
48 Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1971); Wolf, Europe and the People Without History.
49 Moore, Injustice.
50 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 331.
interpretation of one’s own position of subordination. The presence of an aspiration to change the effects of domination is a marker of resistance.

3. b. Binaries, Ambiguities and Pluralism

If intentions and motivations become more meaningful when seen as patterns of behaviour, the critique as to whether the social and political world can be read in terms of a binary of resistance and domination still remains. This links to the challenge the complex, plural, and contradictory context of post-conflict statebuilding DRC brings to the framework. Three issues have been raised against Scott’s account in this regard. Firstly, that in order to understand the nature of political power and the post-colonial state, it is necessary to understand the heterogeneity of social and political relationships and how power operates not just from above but also horizontally and from below.51 Secondly, the extent to which any strategy of resistance could position anyone out of the reach of power is questioned, arguing that power relations are ambivalent.52 Thirdly, Scott’s framework might not be applicable to a context where the state cannot be conceived in the ‘high-modernist’ terms of Scott’s own account.

Representing these critiques, Hibou argues that the exercise of domination is part of the common ‘desire of normality’ in which the pursuit of a ‘constellation of interests’ may involve the co-recreation of domination by dominants and dominated alike.53 This echoes Mbembe’s arguments about domination operating through people’s self-subjectification. It is remarkable that from different perspectives, all of these critiques translate heterogeneity, ambivalence and ambiguities into a framework of relative acquiescence. ‘Conviviality’ in the case of Mbembe, ‘symbiosis’ in the case of Bayart, and ‘accommodation’ in Hibou, accentuate the consensual rather than the conflictual elements of the political

53 Hibou, *Anatomie Politique de La Domination*, 16.
space. Even so, if complexity means the denial of resistance, there might be a problem with the methods and frameworks employed. However, to deny the relevance of resistance or claim its ungraspability is a disservice to the heterogeneity that needs to be captured.

Analysing resistance as a political category entails an exercise of simplification and hence a trivialisation of society. Scott captures the fluidity of social interaction to a certain extent. The context of *Weapons of Weak* is a small village, “Sedaka”, which is in many ways a cohabited context. Village politics entailed much tacit consent (something that is not far away from Hibou’s ‘accommodation’) not only of ‘poor’ to ‘rich’ but of ‘rich’ to ‘poor’. For instance, receiving and giving charity was, for Scott, an exercise of power and resistance. Charity benefited the poor, yet it reproduced their subordinate condition, glorifying the generosity of the rich. While disliking being patronised, if rich villagers did not give charity, they were systematically the targets of a moral attack by the poor who called them stingy and arrogant. Charity here represents a shared world of moral values, which not only does not impede class conflict, but facilitates it through the stretching of its interpretation, subverting the nature of the obligation such values entail and advancing subordinates’ agenda on the basis of these values. Negotiating the conditions of subordination to one’s advantage, including avoiding repression, or upholding dignity was for Scott a signal of everyday resistance. The idea of the ‘third realm’, or the ‘pose’, which will provide in Chapter Five the basis for observing the post-conflict statebuilding discourse as platforms on which power and resistance operate, is also for Scott the more interesting ambiguous space between consent and opposition.

However, if the state is not always present, or it is in a plural and ambiguous form, the challenge is not only how to conceptualise resistance and how it takes

54 Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*; Bayart, *The State in Africa*. Ch. 6 and 8; Hibou, *Anatomie Politique de La Domination*.
55 Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 197 – 204.
56 Ibid., 204 – 208.
place, but what is resisted. Authority may be represented and mediated by a plurality of actors, but it enacts patterns of extraction and privilege.

Current statebuilding process in the DRC is not characterised for aiming towards turning citizens into producing and consuming taxpayers. Yet, the ways in which the population is ignored, expelled off their lands, contained and repressed if perceived to be rebellious, or used in order to provide social services, represent continuities and change in forms of exercising domination. This is seen in the militarization of rural communities; in the indirect discharge enacted by both the government and the international actors through the STAREC programme; and the relative authority exercised by MNCs in some mining sites, or in the areas where state revenue and expenditure is focused.57 Thus patterns of extraction and violence in building state authority may be seen in myriad of actors, yet they lay symbolic and material claims on subordinate classes.

In later works, Scott also advanced that both forms of governance by state authorities and forms of resistance could also be seen as a form of ‘reticence’.58 As such not just engagement but also disengagement, negotiation as well as imposition are fundamental to grasping the full picture of statebuilding and resistance in the DRC. In Weapons of the Weak, Scott argued that ‘only those survival strategies that deny or mitigate claims from appropriating classes can be called resistance’.59 In Seeing like a State, high modernism and its failure were also characterised by ‘state-initiated social engineering’ which was ‘transformative’, ‘muscle-bound’, ‘coercive’ and ‘authoritarian’.60 The Art of Not Being Governed, although opening with a paragraph where ‘would-be conquering administrators were determined to subdue a recalcitrant landscape and its fugitive, resistant inhabitants’, not only advances a framework of mutual reticence but also one of

57 E.g. At the peak of Africa’s World War, 80% of state revenue was put towards the war effort. ICG, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, Africa Report (Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 2000), 41.
58 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 32.
59 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 301.
60 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 4–5.
mutual dependency.\textsuperscript{61} This later work captures better the current DRC context of continuity. For Scott, flight, oral history, nomad agriculture and remote settlement were all strategies to ‘keep the state at arm’s length’.\textsuperscript{62}

Security self-provision and strategies of survival could be seen as bridges towards this end of state evasion. They allow subordinate classes to mitigate state domination, by avoiding or bypassing it. The experience of the state as a predator, as partly absent and as another armed group, generates a reliance on personal solidarity networks and relations of reciprocity. The family, the clan, the ethnic group, the neighbourhood and INGOs allow for covering certain needs, without turning to the state. Yet, survival, and supporting or engaging in armed struggle is determined by an unequal, violent and extractive context as much as by reciprocity and solidarity. Exchanges, especially amongst unequal parties, can involve deceit, scamming, abuse and coercion. But this may in turn generate increasing social conflict. If relations are muddled by an exchange in conditions of ‘conviviality’, ‘horizontality’ and ‘co-habited space’, they may be open to interpretation, but does not rule out resistance.\textsuperscript{63}

\textbf{3.c. Heterogeneity and Ambivalence of the practices: Violence, Hiddenness and Subversion in Acts of Resistance}

The fact that resistance should be understood as a practice – a pattern of acts – makes ‘acts’ central to the account of resistance. Yet ‘acts’ on their own do not define resistance per se. They must be made part of a framework that accounts for them as patterns in which subordinate groups deny or mitigate domination. Two important points follow from this. Firstly, acts are ambivalent. In fact, an act of violence or of appropriation can be an act of domination. What makes this act an act of resistance is the fact that it is embodied and represents the challenge of a position of subordination. Secondly, it follows that different types of acts, whether

\textsuperscript{61} Scott, \textit{The Art of Not Being Governed}, 1.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., x.
\textsuperscript{63} Mbembe, \textit{On the Postcolony}; Ferguson, “Seeing Like an Oil Company.”
confrontational, violent, subversive, covert or evasive, can account for how resistance takes place.

**Ambivalence of the ‘Acts’**

One of the ways in which Scott’s account provides both guidance and flexibility to analyse resistance, is the idea that ‘any act’ can be resistance if fulfilling a certain criteria. However, this requires putting both power and resistance in relative terms. With the example of discourses, Scott clarifies that:

Power relations are not, alas, so straightforward that we can call what is said in power-laden contexts false and what is said offstage true. Nor can we simplistically describe the former as a realm of necessity and the latter as a realm of freedom. What is certainly the case, however, is that the hidden transcript is produced for a different audience and under different constraints of power than the public transcript.64

More than the boundaries between these two transcripts, the real conflict takes place in the space in between. Scott premised his central argument on the existence of a ‘third realm’, a ‘pose’, where the ‘politics of disguise’ and ‘double meaning’ are a hint to understand that ambiguity is the key to understand the politics of resistance.65 Reflecting this ambiguity speaks to the different gradients in the elements of resistance. Previous applications of this framework to the study of statebuilding have analysed the dynamics of domination and resistance while representing the levels of ambiguity and complexity of the context. Heathershaw, for instance, deploys a Scottian framework to observe how multiple public transcripts represent multiple selves that create and recreate statebuilding and peace, despite its failures.66 These transcripts provide knowledge and shape practices, whose contradiction with the rhetoric is a feature rather than a problem or a deviation of peacebuilding as such.67 This is what Heathershaw captures with

64 Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 5.
65 Ibid., 18 – 19.
66 Heathershaw, “Seeing Like the International Community”; See also: Heathershaw, *Post-conflict Tajikistan*.
the idea of statebuilding as a ‘simulation’. The high-modernist rhetoric of protection and social change is a pose on which both agendas of state authority and resistance are premised.

**Violence/Non-violence**

When Scott categorises everyday resistance as covert, latent and unorganised, he does so by identifying the means that are generally available to the ordinary peasant. As Scott argues:

Most forms of this struggle stop well short of outright collective defiance. Here I have in mind the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on. These Brechtian – or Schweikian– forms of class struggle have certain features in common. They require little or no coordination or planning; they make use of implicit understandings and informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority.

Whatever ‘acts’ are deployed for resistance is determined by the possibilities available to political action. Everyday resistance is ultimately carried out in the safety of anonymity and at the lowest risk of repression, to assure the sustainability and permanency of a struggle. Selbin, who has examined the relationship between resistance, rebellion and revolution, argues that the covert - ‘I obey but I do not comply’ –type of acts ‘often form the basis of resistance’. For Selbin, whereas revolution is rare, resistance is commonplace, integrating acts that defy authority, mostly in covert ways. However, as in the debates around intent, lack of confrontation has generated doubt as to whether these acts can be seen as opposing domination and indeed as resistance. On the contrary, emphasis on the hidden, latent and covert nature of everyday resistance has created a tension between the everyday framework and more confrontational, even violent

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68 Ibid., 346.
69 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, xvi.
70 Rowe and Schelling cited in Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance, 11.
practices. Scott does not fully elaborate on violence and this is particularly relevant in the context of statebuilding.

Everyday resistance needs to be read in a continuum of different practices of resistance. The different acts used need also to be analysed as reflecting the larger political context in which they are embedded. It is therefore problematic to equate everydayness with non-violence. While Scott was writing from a pacific context of South-East Asia, he did not mean to outline a framework of pacific resistance. Scott noted that ‘low-grade, hit-and-run, guerrilla action’ was not unusual in everyday resistance. He also made clear that peasants were ready to oppose land-owners and employers, violently if necessary, to stop changes in property law, salary losses, social arrangements and living standards. In later work, Scott explored the ways in which peasants engaged in armed rebellions, violent actions, banditry and crime as a form of resistance. Similarly, analysing violence as amenable to the practice of resistance does not necessarily equate or reduce ‘violence’ to dynamics of power and resistance.

In peace and conflict studies literature the relationship between violence and resistance has been analysed differently. Violence in Mac Ginty is linked to the coercive and violent political context of post-conflict interventions. Violent resistance comes alongside other practices that range from ‘outright resistance’ and ‘forms of non-compliance’. The relationship between them is the capacity they have to hybridise statebuilding and not the link they have to an account of resistance. In exploring the transformative capacity of peace processes, conflict

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72 Ibid., 98, 254 – 259.
and violence, Mitchell has examined the relationship between violence and resistance in peace processes. Following De Certeau, Mitchell argues that the ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ described by De Certeau can be engaged by citizens and governing bodies alike, not to mention groups such as paramilitary organizations that do not fit neatly into either category. […] As such, both the ‘powerful’ and the ‘weak’ are the subjects and objects of resistance […] Resistance, then, is a mutual dynamic in which all parties feel capable of (at least to some degree) controlling, shaping or intervening in the acts, powers or logics that shape their lives.  

Beyond the element of conflictuality that can take the form of violence, what, if anything, distinguishes resistance from agency, from power politics, and ‘resistance from governing bodies’ from ‘resistance from citizens’ is left unexplained.

Richmond, by contrast, has provided the most extensive account of everyday resistance but has equated it with non-violent practices. Richmond’s account of resistance as hidden and disguised leads to the identification of what he calls emancipatory forms of critical agency, which concern non-violent, civil forms of resistance. As Scott, Richmond does not argue that everyday resistance is literally invisible. Richmond sees resistance as covert discourses and non-confrontational activities against the standardised locally unaware promises of the international community. Case studies include local NGOs, which refuse to be compliant with the dictates of the statebuilding vision of civil society, and are marginalised as a result in their lobbying efforts towards reform and welfare demands. These often non-violent forms of resistance, as they are developed in Richmond’s work, resemble more the politics of organised movements than the infrapolitics of the weak Scott developed. For Scott, hidden acts and the politics of disguise, or the ‘pose’, have

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76 Mitchell, *Lost in Transformation*, 31
77 See resistance as “invisible” in Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*, 89, 94.
78 Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace* See Ch. 3.
79 Ibid., Ch. 3.
80 Ibid., 117.
to do with the politics of repression and the relation resistors have to power, not to an ethic of non-violent resistance.

Nothing captures better the meaning of hiddenness and infrapolitical than the Ethiopian proverb with which Scott opens his *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*. It reads as follows:

*When the great lord passes the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts.*

That before authority those in a subordinate position may act as showing respect to such authority should not be mistaken for acquiescence or consent. Rather, the scripted roles in which authority and subordination are enacted in front of each other should be contrasted with the ways in which actors behave when they are among their equals. These acts are visible, even public, but not confrontational. It could be also argued that taking violence out of resistance provides a Manichean analysis. Richmond’s ethical and political agenda ends up creating a good and bad statebuilding project and a good and bad form of resistance. However, this does a disservice to the analysis. Not only can resistance not be sanitised, violence too has to be analysed as a central aspect of the constitution of state authority.

**Opposition/Subversion**

The above raises the question of the extent to which resistance is necessarily an act of opposition in the form of denigration or direct attack, or whether it can also be grasped in its subversive capacity. Subversion may be understood as a form of *aikido*, meaning ‘self-defence [or self-help] using the strength of the dominant group’.

Seen from the differences between Scottian ‘acts’ and De Certeau’s ‘tactics’, different practices may have different referents. For De Certeau, resistance tactics are ‘innumerable practices by means of which users

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81 Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, v.
reappropriate the space organized by techniques of sociocultural production’. Resistance is not so much an attack against and a confrontation of power as a transformative force that produces its own outcomes. For Scott, ‘acts’ are intended to mitigate or deny domination.

This means that whether the primary referent of an act is ‘opposing’ a claim, or whether the primary referent is one self (individual or collective), they can be both seen as ways of denying or mitigating those claims and the effects of domination. In the Art of Not Being Governed, the condition of relative statelessness of the population in the high plateaux of South East Asia was due to their long historical patterns of escaping state power. Here, population have managed to preserve a way of life relatively protected from state interference using tactics including escapism, agricultural nomadism, oral history and, when necessary, armed resistance. It follows that resistance does not always need to be an attack, let alone in a violent form, but rather an ‘act’ upon one’s position of subordination. In this respect, for example, solidarity and self-organisation may actually provide the means for such mitigation without entering into direct opposition. Analysing different acts may entail that the everyday resistance is not necessarily always covert, especially in militarised contexts.

4. Gradients of Intentionality, Intensity, Exposure and Engagement

Three important consequences follow in order to develop a framework of everyday resistance in post-conflict statebuilding. First, Scott’s framework provides good foundation for that purpose, although with some reworking. A second consequence is the need for a framework that connects patterns, intentions, motivations, acts and actors. This does not mean to pre-empt a

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83 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, xiv.
84 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed.
85 Ibid.
particular account but a need for justification. Precisely because, as Hollander and Einwohner point out, resistance is ‘socially constructed’ between claimers, resisters and observers, it requires the exposure of the underlying assumptions in any account of resistance. A third and final consequence is that resistance cannot be conceptualised in terms of all or nothing. As will be explored in this section, some elements of resistance such as intentionality, the intensity and exposure of its acts, and how directly authority claims are targeted can be gradated in order to provide a rich account that captures the complexity and ambiguities of resistance.

Bearing these issues in mind, the account of resistance this thesis proposes is as follows:

*Resistance is the pattern of acts undertaken by individuals or collectives in a subordinated position to mitigate or deny elite claims and the effects of domination, while advancing their own agenda.*

This definition establishes resistance as a practice (a pattern of acts). It follows Scott in identifying both individuals and collectives in a position of subordination as the bearers of this practice, thus presenting it as part of a relation of domination. This means that, similar to Scott, those acts are directed towards elite claims and the experience of domination. It adds an explicit link between intent (denial or mitigation) and motivations (agenda advancing). It is an analytical category and does not represent any kind of permanent position that individuals are in, nor does it claim to capture all daily interactions that take place in a complex environment like statebuilding in Eastern DRC. However, it represents resistance as a political category. Beyond the individual act, these acts concern patterns and trends in relations of domination.

The definition also sets some limits to what counts as resistance. Resistance is not an effect, it is a patterned practice. Unintended acts sit at the edges of its scope.

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This is different from accounting for the fact that self-regarding actions may have a lesser clear intent. What it means is that, for instance, forgetting to pay one’s taxes could hardly be seen as resistance. Similarly, random acts that do not target authority claims or the effects of domination do not qualify as resistance. However, as mentioned above, the discussion is rather unhelpful if couched in terms of the actual existence or absence of resistance. This definition is not intended to provide an all or nothing measure of resistance. Rather it identifies the core elements of an account, some of which can be gradated.

Hollander and Einwohner propose not to become trapped in futile definitions and to account for resistance directly through a typology. They provide a category following what they consider the pith of cross-disciplinary debates on resistance: intention and recognition. In their typology, they combine resisters’ intentions and the recognition of resistance by resisters, targets and observers. Hollander and Einwohner categorise seven activities according to whether the resister intended there to be resistance, and how this is recognised by the targets and the observer. Their typology is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of resistance</th>
<th>Is act intended as resistance by actor?</th>
<th>Is act recognized as resistance by target?</th>
<th>Is act recognized as resistance by observer?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overt resistance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert resistance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwitting resistance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target-defined resistance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Externally-defined resistance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missed resistance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted resistance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not resistance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Hollander and Einwohner’s types of Resistance.87

One of the greatest achievements of this typology is to represent ‘the fact that the concept of resistance is socially constructed [...] and that resisters, targets, and

87 Ibid., 544.
observers all participate in this construction’. Nevertheless, the typology reflects more the relationship between the practices and the literature than the nature of resistance.

Hollander and Einwohner see resistance as concerning primarily action and opposition and fundamentally as a relational concept. As they argue, ‘the interactional nature of resistance also highlights the central role of power, which is itself an interactional relationship, not a characteristic of individuals or groups’. It is precisely this interactional nature that categories should attempt to grasp. Despite the basic conceptual framework provided based on ‘action and opposition’, Hollander and Einwohner’s typology does not reflect this. Nor does it show what makes each actor or the observer recognise the act as resistance. There is still a need to provide an account for the ‘acts’ themselves. However, Hollander and Einwohner’s proposal of categorising acts according to different aspects of resistance and levels of intent can set the basis for a typology that encapsulates both the conceptual framework and these different aspects.

Taking stock of the core arguments advanced in this chapter, and as an introduction to how different practices of resistance will be discussed in the following chapters, the table below categorises the different elements of resistance and its gradients. Whereas all the elements (patterns, intentions, motivations, acts and actors) need to be present, these can be categorised and display different gradients (clarity of intentionality, intensity of acts, and how directly claims have been opposed).

Categories in the table respond to the now familiar arguments: Elite claims and resistance can be symbolic and material; resistance practices may attempt to deny the claims entirely or mitigate them partially; it can be individual and collective, and use different acts. Gradients reflect Scott’s account, complemented by De

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88 Ibid., 548, emphasis in the original.
89 Ibid., emphasis in the original.
Certeau’s. They can affect intentionality, appearing to the observer in a visible or less visible form. Acts can have different gradients of intensity, as they confront authority ‘face to face’, in an overt manner, or even violently. The different ways in which Scott and De Certeau understood resistance as a practice of engaging against authority claims or as a practice that follows self-logics illustrates two different kinds of practices. 1) Practices through acts that engage against authority claims more directly (claim regarding) and that take the form of a more oppositional form of resistance and even of attack. 2) Actions taken in a self-centred, self-help manner or in the form of ‘aikido’, actually using the claim to one’s advantage, and taking generally form of subversion.

The table below illustrates how these different categories and gradients relate in regards to the practices discussed in the empirical chapters. Although, as stated, outcomes are not relevant to an account of resistance because acts may have no impact or may result in the opposite of what was intended, the table offers a category of possible outcomes, which also reflects the relationship between claims and resistance practices as discussed in the next chapters. They do not exhaust other practices that may be more prevalent in other post-conflict contexts.
Table 4. Overview of the Everyday Framework of Resistance Applied to Current Practices in the DRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act</th>
<th>Nature of claim and Object of claim</th>
<th>Nature of Practice</th>
<th>Possible outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Is the intent visible?</td>
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<td>Has there been 'face to face' confrontation?</td>
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<td>How directly has the claim been opposed?</td>
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<td>How intense is the practice?</td>
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<td>Possible outcome</td>
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<td>Insult/ slander/ denigration</td>
<td>Symbolic – Legitimacy/ deference</td>
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<td>Directly – Claim-regarding</td>
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<td>Discursive attack</td>
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<td>Mockery</td>
<td>Symbolic – Legitimacy/ deference</td>
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<td>Discursive attack</td>
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<td>Meaning subversion</td>
<td>Symbolic – Agenda setting</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Individual</td>
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<td>Indirectly/’Aikido’ Self-regarding</td>
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<td>Discursive subversion</td>
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<td>Mai Mai attacks</td>
<td>Material and Symbolic–Authority, Monopoly of Violence</td>
<td>Denial</td>
<td>Collective</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>More repression</td>
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<td>Directly – Claim-regarding</td>
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<td>Physical attack</td>
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<td>Use of Mai Mai for security</td>
<td>Material and Symbolic–Authority, Monopoly of Violence</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Collective</td>
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<td>Less visible</td>
<td>Intended/ Random/ More repression</td>
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<td>No-‘users/ Yes - militias</td>
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<td>Violent subversion</td>
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<td>Tax Evasion</td>
<td>Material – Tax levy</td>
<td>Denial</td>
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<td>Directly – Claim-regarding</td>
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<td>Material attack/ collective</td>
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<td>Land defence/ reappropriation</td>
<td>Material – Extraction</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Individual</td>
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<td>Material Subversion</td>
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<td>Military rule negotiation</td>
<td>Material and Symbolic–Authority</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Individual</td>
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<td>Indirectly/’Aikido’ Self-regarding</td>
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<td>Political subversion</td>
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<td>Survival and self-manage</td>
<td>Material – Social and political organisation, extraction</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Individual</td>
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<td>Less visible</td>
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<td>Indirectly/’Aikido’ Self-regarding</td>
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<td>Political subversion</td>
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These examples and as they are interpreted above are not meant to be read in absolute terms, implying for example, that in all situations an ‘insult’ may be more overt than slandering or self-management. Ultimately, as there are not unambiguous acts of resistance, and there are plural intersecting relations of domination, which are changing and contingent, any framework of resistance needs to embrace heterogeneity, ambiguity, but also patternedness in relations of domination.

5. The Way Ahead

We have come full circle in that, as stated in Chapter One, one of the most problematic aspects of the accounts of resistance in the post-conflict statebuilding literature was that they had provided a series of arguments about its practices, its nature and how it affected statebuilding, without having fully elaborated what resistance is. Methodologically, it has been stated that while focusing on practices is a rich ground for theorising, generalisations have to be limited. The practice of statebuilding and resistance is, as seen in Chapter Three, necessarily affected by the political space in which they are part of. This means that although certain features of resistance may apply generally to post-conflict statebuilding and certain practices would be similar, they would recover meaning once they are contextualised.

From the above, there are three important ideas to retain for the empirical chapters. Firstly, that an everyday framework of resistance is not necessarily one of non-violent invisible action, but rather an account of the quotidian practices of subordinate individuals and collectives that deny or mitigate domination. This quotidian element means that these practices aim to be repression-proof and easily applicable without the need for a special political organisation. Despite their self-help character, they represent a political category. They can have
different gradients of intensity, exposure, of engagement against claims and of intentionality.

Secondly, Hollander and Einwohner’s point that resistance is ultimately socially constructed needs to be born in mind. Having a conceptual framework becomes imperative for any account of resistance. As one of the main arguments put forward, the account of resistance needs to link the different main defining elements of resistance: patterns, intentions, motivations, acts and actors. Only through the discussion of how the observer sees these elements interrelating, necessary, prevalent or gradated can one account for resistance and be able to respond to the different challenges that theorising and researching everyday life generate. Finally, resistance requires an account of the historical and sociological features of statebuilding as a contingent process.

The next three chapters provide a practical application of this framework. While it notes how uncoordinated and self-help actions are prevalent, it also takes account of the muddled context, and different interpretations. Thus while bearing in mind that there are no unambiguous accounts of resistance, this is necessary in order to understand social relations in any political process like statebuilding.
Chapter 5
Discursive Attacks and Redefining Ideals

We don’t believe in the authorities anymore. When you say… ‘there, that’s the new administrator, everyone may clap but with a certain mockery…’ Him also, what is he going to do?¹

We could wonder about the role of that whispered language within the political system of unanimity. It is, to my mind, a way of softening the overwhelming and restrictive official language in order to make it more bearable; it is an antidote. Irony and humour are the weapons of the powerless in the face of arbitrary ruling… We can also see in it a runaway reaction… But I think that it is more just to consider derision as a consciousness-raising exercise, and as a consequence, a way of social contestation.²

[I]t is in fact more plausible to contend that so far as the realm of ideology is concerned, no social order seems inevitable... the imaginative capacity of subordinate groups to reverse and/or negate dominant ideologies is so widespread –if not universal– that it might be considered part and parcel of their standard cultural and religious equipment.³

1. Statebuilders and State-Recipients, a pose

Authority is generally claimed with an underlying morality. Statebuilding, in particular, is deployed as the best solution to the problems of war, authoritarianism and poverty.⁴ In Eastern DRC this authority claim has materialised as a discourse of protection and social change. Against this discursive construction, mockery, denigration and slandering operate as a primarily intentional mechanism to deny the legitimacy and authority of

¹ Interview with Peasant Union Member (no. 151), Bukavu, September 2010.
³ Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 331.
statebuilding. Resistance is not necessarily against the ideals of democracy, development and peace, but to the fact that neither protection nor social change is being delivered. It also shows that by using the same language of post-conflict statebuilding, referring to the state, democracy, peace and development, the discourse is used as a denial of legitimacy and as a platform for advancing alternative agendas. Post-conflict statebuilding discourse is not only resisted, but also subverted.

The three quotes above capture three ways in which discursive resistance takes place in the DRC. First, the union representative articulates what Scott calls the ‘pose’, (the roles that the powerless and the powerful adopt towards each other). A politician’s parade without the clapping would be an act of denying an authority its share of pomp, and with that, her/his delegitimisation. What Scott and this union representative convey is that resistance does not often operate as a direct defiance in front of authority. Generally, one may clap at the parade, but express reticence and discontent somewhere else. Secondly, resistance is to be found in how Congolese non-elites judge authorities from their lived experience, even if this is only shown in the ‘whispered language’ far from the hype of a politician’s parade. Thirdly, discursive resistance unearths that critique is a form of resistance to the unanimity statebuilding claims, subverting its own discourse and revealing dissent.

Ideals constitute a platform on which both power and resistance operate. The claim to construct the good state, bring democracy, development and peace, become long-term claims on which statebuilders legitimise their interventions and demand consent. They are also discursive formulas to justify ‘failure’. As John Heathershaw argues, the ‘survival’ of peacebuilding is due to the resilience of its discourse. Seen from its goals of transforming society through the construction of a positive peace, democracy and state-society relations, it actually ‘fails’, and
becomes a ‘simulacra’ of its own discourse. This captures the situation in the DRC where despite the ongoing war, the increasing authoritarianism and the deterioration of living conditions, post-conflict statebuilding survives on its discourse as a long-term claim to rearrange society under a particular worldview. Simultaneously, these ideals become a way to hold statebuilders to account, to voice discontent and elaborate a vision of how things should be.

In Scottian terms, these ideals correspond to the battleground on which elite and non-elites’ public and hidden transcripts are enacted. Although as Heathershaw argues, post-conflict statebuilding contexts generate multiple transcripts, these two serve as a standpoint to observe how authority claims are laid out and how they are denied or mitigated. The different discourses found for instance in government and UN officials as forms of blame exchanges end up articulating what Barrington Moore calls the moral authority of suffering. Post-conflict statebuilding’s discourse is projected with a sense of inevitability and unanimity demanding consent, despite ongoing armed conflict and deteriorating living conditions. These conditions however give way to criticisms and political alternatives.

Although the hidden transcript cannot be simplistically seen as an arena of freedom, it provides a safer audience among relative equals. The public transcript

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6 Applying a similar argument to aid agencies operating in countries in conflict, and the DRC in particular, Zoe Marriage argues that these agencies operate justifying their actions under a moral authority, which simultaneously allows them to externalise blame on recipients for the short-comings of their own activities. Zoe Marriage, Not Breaking the Rules Not Playing the Game: International Assistance to Countries at War (London: Hurst & Co., 2006).
7 Heathershaw, “Seeing Like the International Community”; See also: Heathershaw, Post-conflict Tajikistan.
9 The example of the quietness in the classroom in comparison to the burst of talking when the teacher leaves illustrates the point. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 25.
has several functions including: concealment (hiding the nasty aspects of power and elites’ disagreement), unanimity (giving a sense of agreement between elites and non-elites and denying dissent), euphemism and stigma (beautifying power and uglifying dissent) and public parade (dramatising the grandeur of power). These functions are visible in that post-conflict statebuilding’s claim to authority is done by projecting an image of unanimity and grandeur. It also operates as concealment and stigma, as a way of externalising blame for failure, and as a way to stigmatise dissent. They create a *pose*, which illustrates that authority claims generate mutual constraints of behaviour on both authorities and subordinate classes, and also that consent is not ‘the whole story’. In the DRC although these discourses are part of the public domain, they are constructed in the safety of anonymity.

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, it analyses post-conflict statebuilding’s public transcript and its construction of a moral authority, and secondly, non-elites’ hidden transcript. This latter part will be done in two sections, one that analyses mockery, denigration and slandering as ways of negating legitimacy and demanding accountability. The second section analyses the redefinition of standard post-conflict statebuilding vocabulary, such as the ‘state’, ‘democracy’, ‘peace’ and ‘development’ where the creation of alternative political agendas is particularly visible. Taking these factors together offers non-elites what De Certeau sees as the ‘opportunity’ of transforming “belief” into “mistrust”, into “suspicion”, and indeed” denunciation […] to manipulate politically what serves as circular and objectless credibility for political life itself.

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10 Ibid., 45 – 66.
2. Elite Claims and the Moral Authority of Suffering

The dynamics of claiming authority while justifying and externalising failure turn statebuilding’s public transcript into what Moore called the moral authority of suffering. For Moore, authority implied obedience to the social arrangements by which ‘some human beings extract an economic surplus from other human beings and turn them into culture’. Suffering for Moore meant that ‘pain and suffering [become] to a degree morally desirable [...] unavoidable or even inevitable’. Although Moore theorised this moral authority as the basis for obedience to some of the most tyrannical systems, in Congo, this moral authority enables elites to demand obedience and justify the ongoing crisis on the basis that they can provide, even if not right now, the goods of statebuilding.

The discordance between discourse and practice makes statebuilding not only a justification of power, but also a morality of power. However, Scott shows that no moral order is inevitable. Peasants, Scott argues, even try to change the fate of the weather through prayers, rituals and planting strategies. Yet statebuilding is deployed with a sense of inevitability and necessity, serving two main functions, as a discourse of legitimacy and a justification for failure. Firstly, it has the capacity to create a shared vocabulary and meaning on which to justify authority. Subsequent claims attached to the position of authority, i.e. extracting taxes, negotiating international agreements, allowing foreign investments or articulating military operations are premised on an aspiration towards a good state, democracy, development and peace. Secondly, the public transcript functions as a projection of statebuilding as necessary and inevitable in order to demand consent. Its failures are externalised in a dramatisation of power doing all it can

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13 Moore, Injustice, 17.
14 Ibid., 80.
against an extremely averse context. This section examines these two functions of authority claims and the justification or externalisation of failure found in two main actors: the MONUC/MONUSCO and the government.

a. MONUC/MONUSCO

MONUC was set up with the legalistic wording of the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, but this was in the spirit of addressing the ‘well-being and security of the population’ as well as the ‘adverse impact of the conflict on the human rights situation’. Similarly, Resolution 1925, that changed MONUC to MONUSCO, established as its priorities civilian protection, peace stabilisation and consolidation, and restoration of state authority. More than ever before, Resolution 1925 put the responsibility of peace and order on the Congolese government, while defining the UN mission as an external supportive actor, primarily concerned with civilian protection and political oversight.

The success in civilian protection nevertheless remains limited. The same peace agreements that have brought about a relative truce have in many ways legitimised armed actors and armed struggle as a vehicle for political power. Many of these agreements are at the basis of an almost blanket impunity operating in the DRC. Statebuilding provides, in this case, the capacity to deploy authority claims while externalising responsibility. For instance, in discussing the challenges of civilian protection with a Civil Affairs MONUC officer in relation to the Kiwanja massacre in 2008, the officer narrated the protests against MONUC that took place in Sake, Goma and Bukavu after the CNDP attacks in 2008. In this occasion, the population protested by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails

18 Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 14), Goma, July 14, 2009.
at the UN compound in Goma for failing to protect them.\textsuperscript{19} The CNDP attacks included the killing of approximately 150 people in the town of Kiwanja, ‘half a mile’ from the MONUC’s base, hosting 138 peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{20} MONUC’s response generated a series of inquiries and calls for greater coordination of the peacekeepers and the FARDC.\textsuperscript{21} For MONUC Civil Affairs easing the intensity and persistence of these protests and criticisms rests ultimately in population’s understanding what the UN mandate is and its limits. In regards to the same protests, an officer in Kinshasa stated:

This is what we try to do now because there was lots of criticism towards MONUC from civil society on protection issues. Hopefully that is why we also have the logistic part as one of our pillars. We try to take them [civil society organisations] with us as much as we can on the ground, so that they see the situation on the ground and they can also inform the population and see how we can better protect people. We do that with the government, so that they take responsibility and they don’t just sit and criticise.\textsuperscript{22}

The fact that protection depends on Congolese actors understanding ‘the situation on the ground’, and providing solutions, reveals the dynamics of a discourse of legitimacy in the face of failure. But contrary to the overall aim stated in the quote, criticism has not gone away. MONUC and MONUSCO have a substantial Public


\textsuperscript{20} Human Rights Watch, Killings in Kiwanja (New York: HRW, 2008), 1.


\textsuperscript{22} Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 1), Kinshasa, July 7, 2009.
In 2009, in Kinshasa, aside from the staff working to produce the MONUC Magazine and the emission of MONUC Réalités, two staff were focused on the monitoring of national and international press, key blogs and political commentators, ‘to record and if necessary respond when MONUC is cited’. MONUSCO now produces Echos of MONUSCO magazine and broadcasts MONUSCO Réalités. The first issue published under MONUSCO, giving information about its new mandate is entitled: ‘A new mandate for MONUSCO: priorities: civilian protection, elections and development’. The whole issue shows how the claim to protect civilians and work towards democracy and development provides the legitimate bases for UN action in the DRC and, as shown below, blames the DRC government for these goals not being achieved.

Similarly, in a video from MONUC Réalités, the topic is ‘to what extent has MONUC’s presence economically benefited the Congolese population? Two Congolese economists argue that MONUC’s impact has been positive. The argument is made by pointing out the surplus of capital that enters the Congolese economy through the employment of both international and Congolese nationals as well as through the building of infrastructure, using UN money, not Congolese

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24 Interview with MONUC Public Information Officer, Kinshasa.
25 It should be noted that the UN radio in the DRC, Radio Okapi, is one of most reliable and arguably most-listened sources of information in the DRC. It is able to reach very remote areas 24/7; twice a day it produces news in the five official languages of the DRC, and there are daily breakages for news on each province. However, it not only works as a partnership between the UN and the ONG The Hirondelle Foundation, and has several independent sources of funding; it was also conceived from the start as a permanent project of independent information, regardless of the UN presence. See Radio Okapi, “A Propos,” Radio Okapi, 2012, http://radiookapi.net/a-propos/ Accessed 08/08/2012; Radio Okapi, “Grille Des Programmes,” Radio Okapi, February 21, 2011, http://radiookapi.net/programmes/ Accessed 08/08/2012.
money. One of the economists gives a first-hand example: a UN staff member rents their apartment for $3,000 per month, which has allowed the owner of the apartment to reinvest this money into a pork farm in the rural outskirts of Kinshasa, which employs 15 people. The video does not show that where the UN has their main headquarters, the cost of living has rocketed, pressing popular classes out of the central urban centres where offices and personnel tend to live.\(^{28}\) It emphasises the overall positive impact of the mission, hinging on the discourse of statebuilding and externalising blame onto the government.

MONUC’s blame externalisation is exemplified in most of the UN Secretary General reports to the UN Security Council. The December 2009 report, for instance, opens with a paragraph where UNSG states the common goals and strategies of MONUC and the Congolese government, while putting the blame on the government and FARDC for the continuation of instability:

Despite the enhanced and innovative measures taken by MONUC to protect civilians, the operations also took a heavy toll on civilians, who were displaced and subjected to reprisal attacks by retreating armed groups. Furthermore, the actions of undisciplined and recently integrated FARDC elements seeking to settle old ethnic scores resulted in serious violations of international humanitarian law, including killings of civilians.\(^ {29}\)

Lack of resources and sufficient training is often raised as part of the problems


MONUC/MONUSCO faces in doing its tasks properly. However, in these over ten years, the UN missions in the DRC have increasingly placed the responsibility of war and statebuilding on the government, while portraying themselves as a neutral third party, mediating between political and military authorities and the civilian population. This was made explicit in an interview where a UN official emphasised the role the UN plays in creating a particular kind of civil society, which intimates the government to provide social goods and services without generating dissent or antagonism.

What we do is to make sure that civil society lives up to their goals and statutes. Their role is to check the government... In Sun City they were given seats. These have been the main constraints for civil society to stay away from politics and stay loyal to their own statutes and to safeguard the interest of the population: demanding improvements in social services, demanding accountability from politicians; fighting for rights; development, advocacy... some political advocacy is OK, but not exclusively! We got to the stage where civil society was doing 90% of political activity: questioning processes, questioning things and advocating for appointment – actual advocacy and position, that was all they were doing! They were not doing such things as demanding services or rights, but actually questioning processes, that is, typical things that should be done by political opposition.

Here it is possible to see the articulation of an ideal that establishes a division of labour in society and in the undertaking of statebuilding tasks. It furthers the idea of a representative government having a civil society that is focused not on the structural problems of society, but on lobbying politicians on particular issues. It is also possible to see a reverberation of the hidden transcript of the UN and the underlying image of the DRC as dysfunctional. This dysfunctionality is seen in statements like ‘elections are still tribal here’, ‘the government does not even

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30 Interview with Political Affairs Representative (no. 46), Kinshasa, July 7, 2010; Interview with MONUSCO Civil Affairs Officer (no. 142), Uvira, September 5, 2010.
31 Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 14), Goma.
32 Interview with Political Affairs Representative (no. 45), Kinshasa, July 6, 2010, 45.
have figures of its own population’, 33 there is no sense of progress’, 34 ‘here, there are no political parties or real civil society’. 35

In several informal conversations with UN officials, UN agency members and other international representatives, there is a commonly held view that civil society is a collection of individuals that attempt to access international money by acquiring the vocabulary that funding bodies and international organisations want. 36 In a similar way that popular classes negate the existence of the state, creating an image of what the state should be, elites’ negation of civil society is a way to delegitimise ‘civil society’. This works as a hidden transcript redressing international actors and demonising those who in the public transcript were the heroes of their policies. Furthermore, underlying this criticism there is an assumption about the Congolese being corrupt, not really interested in undertaking such noble aims such as ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ but instead using the vocabulary to access international funding.

A MONUC officer, for instance, affirmed:

We are dealing with people who are helpless... The mass of the people in this country are illiterate... there are no real political parties here, we are trying to build this country from scratch, there is no real civil society... it is in a state of infancy. 37

Portraying the Congolese as helpless only gives a pretext to the strategies of the intervention. Other common “tags” used by MONUC/MONUSCO or diplomatic officials in interviews and informal conversations were ‘corrupt’, ‘lazy’,

33 Interview with MONUSCO Civil Affairs Officer (no. 158), Goma, September 9, 2011.
34 Interview with Political Affairs Representative (no. 45), Kinshasa; Interview with Political Affairs Representative (no. 46), Kinshasa; Interview with MONUSCO Electoral Division Officer, Kinshasa, July 6, 2010.
35 Interview with MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7), Kinshasa, July 9, 2009. This sentiment was recorded amongst the 17 UN officers interviewed and other international bodies.
36 Informal Conversation with UNOPS representative, Goma, July 14, 2009; Interview with GTZ representative, Goma, July 13, 2009; Interview with EU PAG representative, Kinshasa, September 15, 2010.
37 Interview with MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7), Kinshasa, July 9, 2009.
‘opportunist’, ‘selfish’ or ‘backward’. This seemed to be saying that ultimately it was the fault of the Congolese, both the elites and non-elites, that they are in this situation. A former MONUC officer stated that ‘the Congolese elite, that is, the political, economic and military elite have destroyed the state’. While these analyses about the role of Congolese elites in fostering an economic and political crisis are not necessarily wrong, they highlight the way international staff complaints seek an exoneration of their responsibility for the state of affairs and an acknowledgement that they are doing their best against all odds. Through these views there is an affirmation of the rightness of the strategies, and of the difficulty of the task. In the process, statebuilding is idealised and societies, in this case the DRC, are pathologised.

b. Government

The vocabulary of the state as an engine and receptacle of peace, democracy and development is deployed in a similar manner by the government. Statebuilding provides a model, both to mirror government’s public image and justify action. Electoral campaigns have illustrated statebuilding vocabulary very clearly. The programme of each political party has revolved around their capacity to restore state authority and bring peace, democracy and development. For instance, Joseph Kabila based his 2006 campaign on the ‘five pledges’ (cinq chantiers) referring to development. This was pushed forward in the 2011 elections with the ‘Revolution of modernity’. The programme is based on the promise of development, to make the DRC an emergent country by 2030 and a world power to join BRICS countries by 2060.

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38 Interview with Ex-MONUC officer (no. 2), July 7, 2009.
41 Ibid., 2.
Kabila’s media platforms also revolve around the cohesiveness of state authority. Kabila TV, which is linked to the presidential website, and his own private media platform, DigitalCongo, which includes a TV channel and a news website, both display a focus on developmental projects, and on the official and solemn acts of Kabila as President.\(^{42}\) State unity, development and peace have been Kabila’s discourse drivers. Not only do these resonate with people’s political aspirations, they have been presented as arguments to ask the UN to leave. In December 2009, in a conference broadcasted by the Congolese National Radio and Television (RTNC), Kabila emphasised ‘the good relationship between the UN and the Congolese government’ but stated that there should be ‘a plan of progressive UN retreat and disengagement’ based ‘on the net improvement of the security situation in the Eastern part of the country’.\(^{43}\) From this vantage point we can see that the image the government projects reflects the broad foundations of statebuilding discourse. These include the cohesiveness of state authority in being able to maintain its territory, to secure its population, to be the democratically elected representatives, and to have an economic development and modernisation plan. For the DRC government too, peace, democracy, and development operate as a shared vocabulary on which to premise legitimate state authority.

The responsibility for not achieving those goals is a matter of exchanging blame. For instance, when putting the complaints heard from MONUC/MONUSCO officials and those of the population to a few government representatives, the response was usually to blame the “international community”. One of these government representatives stated:

> The DRC needs social democracy but it is not possible because of lack of investment and lack of financial means. The DRC is asphyxiated because


\(^{43}\) RTNC, Conference de Press Presidentielle (Kinshasa, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6-JXV8ByRH0&feature=youtube_gdata_player Accessed 08/08/2012.
the policy from the big powers is ‘you pay us first before we give you the money’... also everyone is having a piece of the cake here. The US and France take the petrol, the US and Belgium take the Cobalt, Germany operates in the Katanga mining, the gold is taken by Canada and the UK and a bit by the US, diamonds are taken by Israel, Holland and South Africa. I have no problem with investment in resources, but in the context of a neo-colonial model, there is no hope for the Congolese.\textsuperscript{44}

The narrative is not simply one of absolving themselves of responsibility, but of pointing out the constraints they suffer to fulfil their promises. Similarly, for a member of the North Kivu National Assembly, the DRC was a place for everyone to get rich through programmes of development and peacebuilding. He complained that the vehicles of MONUC always seemed to be parked and that they were not travelling to the interior of the country. He added:

\begin{quote}
We don’t understand MONUC’s politics. After 2005, they are there, we see them patrol with the helicopters during the night, if the enemy is in the skies, we don’t know... they come for example to support elections, or giving some bureaucratic support to the government, but regarding security, in comparison with the arsenal they have, the weapons... if we had such capacity all the problems will be finished by now.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

The vision this representative shows is that of the Congolese being victimised while not having the necessary capacity to face the problem. Statebuilding’s discourse is enacted as a public transcript that serves as a tool to legitimise inaction and externalise blame. Authority is deployed on moral grounds, where the legitimacy for intervention and action of elites is premised on the benefit and protection of the population. However, at the same time, this creates an exit strategy through which to externalise blame for the promises of statebuilding not being realised. A common vocabulary is created around idealised versions of the state, democracy, development and peace, that serves as a platform for authority claims. In the view of Congolese officials this is not an appropriation of

\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Government Representative (no.31), Kinshasa, July 22, 2009.
\textsuperscript{45} Interview with North Kivu Provincial Assembly representative, Goma, July 23, 2010.
“international” vocabulary but their own aspirations. Thus ‘democracy’, ‘decentralisation’, and many strategies for reform are the initiative of the Congolese government, and not of the ‘international community’.46

As long as they remain more of a discourse than a real undertaking, they are better seen as claims which have embedded symbolic and material demands on Congolese subordinate classes. There is a demand of recognition and legitimation, as well as of bearing their suffering, of consent, of waiting and getting by despite all odds. Thus the morality on which statebuilding is justified makes discourses a fruitful arena on which to observe resistance. The creation of ideals, the justification of power on moral grounds and the normative commitments deployed with the statebuilding mission are part of the tools that authority uses. Conversely, these are turned into weapons of delegitimisation and a into a platform from which to advance alternative agendas.

3. The Denial of Legitimacy

If post-conflict statebuilding operates as a claim to legitimacy and consent, and resistance is defined by the denial of these claims, what follows is that delegitimisation and disobedience should be seen as a primary area of resistance. For Scott, it is here where the hidden transcript develops. Mocking, denigrating and slandering authority, both in the claims of MONUC/MONUSCO and the government, are widely used tools. Although these discourses take place in the open, it is done through the safety of privacy or anonymity of the crowd. They are not necessarily hidden as much as they are non-confrontational.

As Toulabor argues, humour and derision are often used as methods for confronting the established social order and as such, should been seen within a

sphere of social contestation. Mockery, denigration and slander constitute a form of resistance in that they configure a pattern of action which denies the legitimacy of power, turning its claims to authority into an exercise of domination. That is, if power is justified by its capacity to create the good state that can deliver peace, democracy and development, resistance denies this claim by pointing to the hypocrisy of power, to other possible agendas and to the lack of commitment to statebuilding’s own discourse. Mockery, denigration and slandering are hidden transcripts. They run beneath official proclamations, challenging or at least contrasting, with the image of unanimity that authorities wish to project in regards to their actions.

a. Mockery

Of MONUC/MONUSCO

Mockery reflects a critique in which politicians, but also MONUC/MONUSCO, are pictured as lazy and corrupt. This practice constitutes a pattern. Any visitor to the DRC can identify how the MONUC is mocked, almost to the extent of arguing that it is thanks to the Congolese people that MONUC officers have a job. For instance, a common mockery of MONUC is in the form of ‘its name says everything, they are just here to observe how we are killed’. This is an old criticism from when MONUC was only authorised as an observation mission. This has not only been a form of covert resistance, but a demand on MONUC to take stronger action against armed groups and foreign intervention.

47 Interview with Representative from Association des Femmes Violés, Kinshasa, July 8, 2009; Interview with Representative from Association de Femmes pour la Pacification et le Developpement (AFEPAD), Goma, July 26, 2010; Interview with Cojeski Representative (Collectif des Organisations des Jeunes Solidaires de Congo-Kinshasa), Goma, July 26, 2010; Interview with Bukavu Resident, Witness of 2004 Nkunda Attacks, Bukavu, September 4, 2010.

48 MONUC was placed under Chapter VII by Resolution 1291 in 2000 but not in its original authorisation in 1999. MONUC/MONUSCO have not tended to use force overall. See Chapter Two this thesis.

Another mockery common in the Kivus, during the peak of violence from renegade soldier Nkunda, was the popular saying against MONUC: ‘no Nkunda, no job’.\textsuperscript{50} This inferred that MONUC needed seemingly artificial justifications for being in the country. It was not that the threat of Nkunda was not real, it was that people saw the emergence of the likes of Nkunda as a consequence of MONUC not doing its job properly, thus perpetuating the need for the mission to be there. A common criticism claiming ‘they do nothing’, ‘they just run up and down their cars’ or inquiring ‘what do they do?’ raised the same issues.\textsuperscript{51} The criticism is done from lived experience, illustrating how popular classes see themselves as bearing the suffering of the shortcomings of the decisions and strategies of power. From this criticism it is possible to observe an articulation of ‘what should be happening’, or ‘what MONUC should be doing’. Thus showing that in this case, denial of legitimacy goes along a projection of an agenda.

In Kinshasa, the same day that MONUC changed to MONUSCO, with a change of mandate, the mission was renamed ‘MONUSKOL’ (as in the beer Skol, portraying a vision of UN workers as more interested in alcohol and night-life than in peace).\textsuperscript{52} In Bunyakiri and Bukavu, MONUC or MONUSCO were said to be abbreviations for ‘Milice Onusienne au Congo’ (UN Militia in Congo).\textsuperscript{53} This not

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Group Jeremie Representative, Kinshasa, July 9, 2009; Interview with Group Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu, August 25, 2010; Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 14), Goma; Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 1); Interview with Ex-MONUC Officer (no. 2), Kinshasa, September 17, 2010; Valeria Izzi argues that this sort of slandering illustrates mistrust and the obstacles for the work of peacebuilders, in “‘No Nkunda No Job:’ Rumours, Local Narratives and Peacebuilding in the Kivus, Democratic Republic of Congo,” \textit{Human Security Perspectives} no. 1 (2011): 165 – 181.
\textsuperscript{51} Although this was raised in many interviews, the sentiment reflected here is something observed as prevalent in all fieldwork locations in ordinary interactions outside interviews.
\textsuperscript{52} Interview with MONUSCO Electoral Division Officer, Kinshasa, July 6, 2010. This was corroborated in daily outgoings in Kinshasa, and echoed in several interviews and informal conversations elsewhere E.g. Informal Conversation with International Alert Research Assistant, Goma, July 7, 2010.
\textsuperscript{53} E.g. Interview with Group Jeremie Representative, Kinshasa; Interview with Representative of Women’s Group Femmes Père Saint-Simon, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010;
only refers to the multiplicity of armed groups that people confront regularly, but also to a common criticism levelled at the UN that they are not there to make peace.

Of ‘Politicians’ and the Government

The president and the government are not exempt from mockery. Joseph Kabila is called ‘Kinyago’ (marionette) or ‘Kanambe’ implying he has “Rwandese origins”. Portraying Kabila as manipulated to serve external agendas or denying his Congolese nationality is a direct challenge to his legitimacy. A flipside of nicknames is the technique of refusing to say Kabila’s name. Although this could follow voting patterns and oppositional lines, it is striking that this is observable in Kinshasa, the two Kivus and Equateur. Across these provinces it is not uncommon to hear people referring to Kabila as ‘that one’, ‘him’ or ‘the one you know’. This silence seems to be both a protest but also a defence, which simultaneously deny and mitigate authority.

In addition to nicknames and silences, jokes are a common way to mock the government. For instance, very soon after the government committed to its ‘five pledges’, people renamed them the ‘five songs’. This effectively portrays the government as not being serious in their realisation. In Goma, a common joke asks ‘what has changed?’ and people respond, ‘well, BunaZa [Zaire’s beer] is now BunaCo [Congo’s beer] and the market CadeZa now it is called CadeCo’. The joke

Focus Group Young People Bunyakiri, Bunyakiri, August 21, 2010; Interview with Bukavu Resident, Witness of 2004 Nkunda Attacks, Bukavu; Informal Conversation with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010.

54 Those who assert that Kabila is Rwandese say that his real name is Hipolite Kanambe and not Joseph Kabila Kabange.


56 This was observed in during fieldwork in Kinshasa, North and South Kivu, and in Equateur as an electoral observer from September – December 2011.

contends elites’ assertion that they are creating a ‘new’ state, by implying that nothing has changed. Similarly, the popular saying, ‘Mobutism without Mobutu’, implies that politics today are indistinguishable from the former Mobutu era. As justice is one of the domains in which there have been fewer improvements, it is also a site of mockery and critique. An evaluation study of UNDP activities in 2006 asserts that ‘the justice system is [...] distrusted and reputed to be corrupt’. In the study, ‘most respondents stated that they would rather put their trust in institutions such as churches and human rights organizations or proximity community leaders’. During the 2006 election campaign Kabila promised to reform the justice sector through the slogan ‘the doors of prison are big’. For Kabila this statement conveyed his government’s commitment to ‘zero tolerance’ against corruption and to prosecuting crimes no matter who was responsible. As corruption is seen as one of the biggest obstacles towards conflict resolution and access to justice, people added a simple sentence to the slogan to change its


60 Direct mockery was recorded in 10 interviews with subordinate groups/civil society representatives. That there is a sentiment of distrust to the justice system in Congolese society was directly raised in all 75 interviews with civil society/ordinary people and 4 government officials speaking of a popular sentiment.


62 Ibid. There are several organisations, now funded by INGOs that do justice settlements as a way to avoid having to go to the courts, e.g. Life and Peace Institute and Alliance pour la Paix et la Concorde.

meaning. The slogan then read: ‘the doors of the prison are big, to take all the big
thieves out’. The expression was a critique of the lack of justice, in particular to
the impunity of those who commit the major crimes.

This slogan was reflected in many forms and shapes in Bukavu, but also in other
cities and territories. A Group Jeremie representative complained that ‘one could
go to prison for stealing a chicken while big thieves are out’. In Bunyakiri, where
a prison had just been built next to an almost-ruined hospital, one of the doctors
complained that the prison would be just for ‘the poor’ while the real thieves
enjoyed ‘the benefit of power’. The tweaking of meaning recalls De Certeau’s
argument that ‘a lucid discourse cunningly turned up fake words and
prohibitions on speaking in order to reveal an ubiquitous injustice’.

This mockery expresses in humour what otherwise is a violent experience. As
seen in previous chapters, the military strategies that have taken place under the
programmes of Umoja Wetu, Kimya II and Amani Leo have succeeded to a
certain extent in demobilising thousands of combatants. But this has come at a
high price for the civilian population. People in local villages not only have to host
and feed soldiers with special privileges under these operations, but also to take
care of the daily needs of demobilised soldiers dumped in the villages without

64 This has been brought up explicitly in 5 interviews: Interview with Group Jeremie
Representative, Kinshasa; Interview with representative from Union Paysanne pour le
Developpement Integral (UPDI), Bukavu, September 8, 2010; Interview with Group
Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu; It resonated as well in many of the student groups
organised to speak of corruption and justice in College Alfajiri, Bukavu. Participant
Observation III, Peace workshop organized by Group Jeremie, College Alfajiri, Bukavu,
July 19, 2009. References to double standards in applying the law, and to experiences of
repression came up also in Interview with UniKin Student Union Representative,
Kinshasa, July 24, 2009; Interview with CODHOD Representative Comité pour la Défense
des Droits de l’Homme et le Développement, July 25, 2009; Interview with Representative
from NGO Observatoire des Droits de l’Homme et Contre la Torture, Kinshasa, July 29,
2009; Interview with Cojeski Representative (Collectif des Organisations des Jeunes
Solidaires de Congo-Kinshasa), Goma.
65 Interview with representative from Union Paysanne pour le Developpement Integral
(UPDI), Bukavu.
66 Interview with Group Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu.
67 Informal Conversation Bunyakiri Hospital Doctor, Bunyakiri, August 21, 2010.
68 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 16.
resources for their reintegration into civil life. Those combatants that join the army or the national police are also likely to keep settling ethnic rivalries while living off the population, not least because of a lack of salary payment.\textsuperscript{69} Further, issues of land, housing and ethnic rivalries brought by the return of refugees and IDPs are left for the villagers to deal with. As such, when people on the ground mock the programme ‘Amani Leo’ (Peace Today) calling it ‘Amani Kesho’ (Peace tomorrow) it reflects an underlying reality of armed conflict, poverty and impunity.

\textbf{b. Denigration, Slandering and ‘Radio Trottoir’}\textsuperscript{70}

A less humorous way to delegitimise and criticise the actions of both the government and MONUC/MONUSCO is through rumours and insult. Whether particular politicians, blue helmets or, in general, MONUC/MONUSCO and the government, rumours portray them as purposely continuing the conflict or trafficking with resources. In Bunyakiri, for example, many residents believed that MONUC was giving food and clothes to the FDLR.\textsuperscript{71} The story was developed in more detailed in a focus group held with young people of the town. One of the participants stated: ‘Not long ago one FARDC shot a FDLR, and when they were going to recuperate the body, he was dressed with the MONUC uniform and had biscuits and even the shoes of MONUC’.\textsuperscript{72} Put this story back to a MONUSCO official, she responded by acknowledging that these rumours are commonplace and that the problem is that ‘there is not good public information [public relations]’.\textsuperscript{73} These rumours are for MONUC/MONUSCO officers evidence of the


\textsuperscript{70} Rumour in French.

\textsuperscript{71} Brought up in the two focus groups done in Bunyakiri. Interviews with four Bunyakiri-based NGOs confirmed these were common rumours: Alliance pour la Paix et la Concorde, Association de Défense de Droits l’Homme Bunyaki, Voix Sans Voix and Femmes Père Saint Simon. Also in Interview with Juma Pili Kabambi, Imam of the Islamic Community, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010.

\textsuperscript{72} Focus Group Young People Bunyakiri.

\textsuperscript{73} Interview with MONUSCO Civil Affairs Officer (no. 145), Bukavu, September 7, 2010.
manipulation of politicians. What these rumours show is not that MONUSCO is not doing enough “propaganda”, it is that people are not willing to look at MONUSCO in a positive light. Rumour resonates with a deeper political agenda. Whether these stories are true or not, whether they originate from a specific politician’s agenda or even FARDC, they are used to discredit MONUSCO. As such they are also a symbol of social conflict.

The government, after all, is not absent from it. As seen above, Kabila is accused of working for Rwanda’s benefit. Rumours run about politicians too. In Baraka, some Fizi deputies are accused of arming Yakutumba both from an ideological perspective but also as a way to access mineral resources. It is striking that in a stretch of about 800 km between Fizi and Beni and of over 3,000 km between these and Kinshasa, in a country with hardly a communication and road network, the same rumours are found word for word: ‘The FDLR is an invention to continue the war’; or ‘MONUC’s soldiers traffic with coltan’; Some of these have become part of the mainstream discourse: ‘MONUC is there to serve Rwandan interests’ or ‘UK, US and Rwanda want the balkanization of Congo’. In Bunyakiri, Fizi and

74 Six out of 17 MONUC/MONUSCO officers directly made reference to this issue.
76 The veracity of the rumour could not be ascertained but several interviewees confirmed that this was an extended belief in Baraka. Interview with Fizi SOCICO representative, Baraka, September 1, 2010; Interview with Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127), Uvira, August 29, 2010.
77 For example similar rumours to those in Bunyakiri were expressed by residents of Masisi who specified that ‘In Nyabiondo et Pinga the Indian contingent has profiteered of mineral resources’ Informal Conversation with Masisi Parish Priest, Masisi, July 25, 2010.
Masisi, for example, a similar rumour circulated: MONUC provided FDLR elements with uniforms, weapons and food to sustain a war in Congo in order to keep Congo weak and easily exploitable. It is remarkable that inquiring about these rumours demonstrates they rarely come from first-hand experiences and that, acquiring details highlights contradictions in the facts. Rumour is used to deny the benign purpose of MONUC’s mission itself, its authority and its rhetoric.

Although rumours are widely known, they remain something to be commented on in the quiet. Denigration through insults also takes place this way. The words of the union representative opening this chapter were followed by a more direct statement: ‘yes, you can do the parade and the show and everyone might give you a big round of applause, but it is to mock you, inside they are saying ‘so, yes, you come again to piss us off’.?79 The catalogue of insults is extensive. It tags politicians and international agents as ‘traffickers’, ‘murderers’, ‘thieves’, ‘lazy’ and ‘liars’, amongst others.80 As Scott noted, insults should be seen as a more direct, less covert tactic of resistance. They do not confront authorities face to face, and they are part of the hidden transcript.

Portraying international and national political actors as incapable, greedy, hypocritical and anti-democratic is a form of discursive resistance that denies the claim of legitimacy and consent. To state that these tactics are a form of delegitimation, and hence of more intentional (claim-regarding) resistance, does not mean that people would articulate the consequences of such discourses in such manner. Nor does it necessarily mean that there is a second agenda that the observer cannot know. What it means is the intent of mocking and slandering authorities is precisely mocking and slandering authorities, the intent, in other words, cannot be inferred beyond the act. It is reasonable to assume from here

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79 Interview with Peasant Union Representative (no. 151).
80 This was gathered most significantly in informal conversations. The words of an airport porter are revealing: ‘Here everyone comes, take what they want, the politicians are liars, the state is a thief and the MONUC does nothing, they are accomplices in all this’ Informal Conversation with Airport Worker - Luggage Porter, Goma, July 15, 2009.
that actors are aware that they are, at least to a certain extent, targeting the deference, credibility, respectability and reputation of authority. These forms of discursive resistance have embedded a political critique of the statebuilding strategies and agenda advancing. In mocking or portraying a negative image of the state of current affairs, these forms of resistance carry out an idea of how reality should be.

4. Ideals and the Articulation of Social Justice as Agenda Advancing

Going back to how claims of authority are justified on the basis of long term idealised promises, this section analyses how these promises become a platform on which to launch a critique of authority, hold it to account and articulate aspirations for social justice. As the discourses seen above, this rearticulating also functions as a denial of legitimacy but it is done as a self-regarding practice. While the critique normally takes the form of a complete negation of the existence of the state, of democracy, peace and development, this negation acts as a way to subvert the agenda. Against top-down, self-serving elite structures and processes, the state, democracy, development and peace are redefined as needing bottom-up decision making, local control and a focus on delivering well-being and public service. Using seemingly conservative discourses, these rearticulating end up being idealisations that reflect political alternatives. Although everyday resistance is not always underpinned by these ideas and may be motivated by more banal and immediate goals, these redefinitions are an important insight into prevalent political aspirations and do underpin many other practices that will be explored in the next chapters.
The Good State

The state is a primary example of the dynamics of denial and subversion. Against the critique and discourses seen above, the state becomes rearticulated as something like a ‘good king’. For a Caritas representative, ‘the state doesn’t exist, it doesn’t protect people, its services are taken over by NGOs and its role must be that of distributing wealth’. A UPDI representative believed that the state should be there to guarantee a good standard of living for the peasants and provide the same protection to agriculture as in Europe. The denominated ‘government of national unity’ brought by the 2002 Sun City agreements, was renamed ‘1+4=0’. As in the most idealised versions of what the state can and should do, seen in Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan or what Chandler calls the ‘silver bullet’, the state is redefined also in non-elite discourses as the engine for development, peace, well-being and public service. The creation of an ideal picture of the state, as something like a “good king” or a “prophet”, is a form of resistance against the lived reality.

In the DRC, idealising the state as a saviour is not new. However, as Englebert notes:

Congolese identity, the imagination of Congo and of the Congolese nation, serve as ideological foundation for the reproduction of the state, denying legitimacy to alternative scenarios and confining political action to factionalism for control of the state itself, or to the non-threatening realm of ‘civil society’.

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81 Interview with Caritas Representative, Justice and Peace Commission, Goma, July 13, 2009. Similar statements were repeated in multiple interviews. For example: ‘There is no state here, no roads, no water, no free education [...] Those are the real problems and in order to address them, they need to start identifying the local initiatives that are already in place [but] we are replaced by everyone’. Interview with Researcher at Pole Institute, Goma, July 22, 2010.

82 Interview with representative from Union Paysanne pour le Developpement Integral (UPDI), Bukavu.

Englebert notes that the co-idealisation of the Congolese nation as both resistance against domination and as its reproduction is a discursive battleground in which elites finally take the upper hand. Yet the significance of the critique, which operates as a way to hold decision-makers into account, and the political aspirations it simultaneously projects are not to be disregarded. An image of a good chief is projected onto the state, resulting in an inversion of terms, where state authority is legitimised in so far it serves the most vulnerable. As Sophia Mappa points out, amongst most ethnic communities across Eastern DRC, authority is seen as an obligation that the chief cannot avoid. Authority is then premised on its value to serve and not for its capacity to command.84 Similarly, the image constructed of what the state should be becomes a mirror of what subordinate groups wish the state would provide for them.

As such, what Congolese subordinate classes seem to be waiting for is an ideal that does not exist in any country in the world. They paint a picture of leaders that are caring and honest, delivering the services the population needs, respecting the law and protecting citizens.85 All non-elite participants made a link between the state and its responsibility for security. In some instances, security was seen as the only thing that citizens could not provide for themselves.86 In other instances it meant a notion of public service.87 The idealised state as a public service and providing social wellbeing is counter-posed to an experience of the state as dominating, coercive and extractive. Agendas of political participation, development and peace are inextricably attached to it.

85 All 75 non-elite participants made a link between the state and its responsibility for security.
86 Interview with FEPSI representative Massica Cafana, Butembo, July 30, 2010.
87 Interview with Political Science Professor, University of Kinshasa, July 7, 2009; Interview with CENCO - Episcopal Conference representative, Kinshasa, July 8, 2009; Interview with Representative from l’Eglise de Cristo, Kinshasa, July 25, 2009; Interview with RAS Representative Renuveau de l’Accion Syndical, Kinshasa, July 7, 2009; Interview with Representative from Centre pour la Gouvernance Participative, Goma, July 14, 2009. Additionally participants in the small survey with street sellers in Goma and residents in Butembo regarding the payment of taxes also shared this view of the state.
Democracy or ‘Démon-cracy’

Against a practice of democracy that is almost exclusively premised on the organisation of presidential and national elections, democracy for non-elites is premised on direct participation in decision-making processes. In a workshop for secondary school students on ‘participatory governance’ organised by the Group Jeremie in Bukavu, it became clear that even if ‘participatory governance’ sounded as if it had just been taken from any policy report from the UN Department of Political Affairs, it had been appropriated to mean that people should participate directly in the decision-making processes of the country. This included a vision in which people had a say in the management of the country’s resources and its distribution. An NGO representative made this point clearly:

The state lives now on the shoulders of people, their agents do not get paid... the problem here in the DRC is that democracy is also badly distributed. We should have started by local elections... but we have started by the presidential elections, legislatives, then provincial, and they have stopped there, and from there they take what they need, they share power amongst themselves, they take whatever land they need, without taking care of their real responsibilities.

This representative is arguing that having started with local elections rather than national would have provided greater accountability, political control, and would have solved the institutional problems linked to problems of development. While there is a critique of how democracy works at the moment, democracy is being

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89 Participant Observation III, “Peace Workshop Organized by Group Jeremie, College Alfajiri, Bukavu.”
90 Interview with Representative of Association pour la Defense de Droits de la Femme (ADDF), Butembo, July 30, 2010. Other similar statements were as follow: ‘the resources, minerals, forestry, water, etc, have to be distributed equally amongst the population’ Interview with Éric Kajemba, director of the Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix, Bukavu, July 16, 2009. ‘The population must participate in how the public economic resources are distributed’ From the summary of a group of students in High School Workshop. Participant Observation III, Peace workshop organized by Group Jeremie, College Alfajiri, Bukavu.
redefined as actual participation from the citizenry. Similarly, Tibère Dunia, from the Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix asserted that ‘peace and development have to come from the grassroots’. Not only is this statement arguing that democracy is constructed from the bottom up, it is also arguing that the elite versions of peace and development are devoid of democratic and participatory content.

These criticisms are prevalent and have been present at different landmarks of the transition after the wars. At the time of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2002) the demand to participate in negotiations of peace meant that peace and democracy had to involve all sectors of society. However, many groups participating in this event argued that, in the end, the process only facilitated a dialogue between the government and the MLC. As such, at the time of the March 23 Agreement in 2009, which put an end to the uprising of CNDP (Nkunda) and other armed groups such as PARECO, people complained that what was being created was an incentive to take up arms, raid the population and then partake in government. The negotiations included that these groups would become political parties and would have the opportunity to partake in power. Notwithstanding the complexity and challenges of ending armed conflict, these discourses are challenging the legitimacy of the actors who partake in government and redefining this version of “peace” as a truce of warlords.

**Development**

Because war and extraction go hand in hand, the idea of development is a site of subversion. Against a vision that authorities illegitimately take and distribute

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91 An organisation that focuses on denouncing and trying to improve working conditions of mine workers and receives international aid for doing research in relation between resource-extraction, conflict and armed groups. Interview with Tibere Dunia Researcher at the Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix, Bukavu, July 16, 2009.
93 Interview with Activity Animator of the League des Organisation de Femmes Paysannes de Congo (LOFEPACO) Clarisse Ngemulo, Butembo, July 31, 2010; Interview with Representative of Women’s Group Femmes Père Saint-Simon, Bunyakiri.
wealth and that they continue a war for further enrichment, the alternative put forward is that development implies participation in decision-making at all levels and that it needs to come from a grassroots level. As such, alongside the idea that wealth stays ‘in the pockets of the politicians’ and that the real wealth of the country goes elsewhere, there is the idea that development aid does not arrive, and that ultimately for development to be properly carried out, and not just from aid agencies, people in the lowest ranks of society have to be involved. This was articulated most forcefully by a representative of a peasant cooperative in Bukavu. Since the mid-1990s The Co-operative felt the logic of development was marginalising and disempowering them, something that they continue to see presently. The peasant o-operative representative stated:

We realised that those organisations hadn’t changed much, they are within a logic of experts, so much a logic of experts that they have forgotten to engage the beneficiaries of their projects. So our members did not see themselves in those projects, they do them for us, without us?... that’s against us! So we wondered, would it not be possible to express and do things by ourselves?

The logic behind the creation of their organisation was a belief in the need to engage more fully in the processes of development for development to be effective. This has been a constant in the way development projects are read. A women’s NGO representative in Butembo also regretted the approach of certain INGOs (that she did not wish to cite) affirming that ‘instead of supporting us, they replaced us... They execute projects, without engaging the population or the local NGOs’. This participation is a way of expressing that development has to contain a democratic element, where there is direct control over the distribution and use of resources.

95 Other interviewees made the same point. E.g. Interview with Researcher at Pole Institute, Goma, interview; Interview with Group Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu; Interview with Representative of Association pour la Defense de Droits de la Femme (ADDF), Butembo; Interview with Representative from Syndicat de Protection des Intérets Paysans, Beni, August 2, 2011. 96 Interview with Peasant Union Member (no. 151), Bukavu 97 Interview with Representative of Association pour la Defense de Droits de la Femme (ADDF), Butembo. They have accessed International Alert funds.
So participation and direct involvement in the decision-making process of resource distribution and development projects is the flip side of a critique about why development does not move forward and why it is not effective on a grassroots level. The implication, which is also linked to the critique of democracy, is that if this reading of development is very similar to the concept of good governance in any standard UN policy document, it is subverted. From the alternative perspective generated in these critiques, there is an aspiration not just to be implicated in all stages of the process and aspects of development, but a belief that this is the right way for development to be both legitimate and effective.

**Peace**

Peace is one of the most ambiguous and multifaceted ideas in the Congo. Whether it is used to critique the shortcomings of post-conflict statebuilding strategies or to argue that they have succeeded, peace is defined in multiple ways – with each meaning signalling a different political agenda. Autesserre, for instance, has demonstrated how international actors, including international organisations, diplomatic missions and INGOs view Congo as innately violent. This assumption has resulted in that peace has been seen as a return to normality, where violence was still present.

However, this is not only an issue for international elites. For Programme Amani, ‘peace is a very long process’, but it is a process that is settled at the top and experienced at the bottom. But they are clear that ‘the war is over’. This vision of non-war/peacebuilding resonates with non-elites’ critique of the post-conflict statebuilding strategies, in which peace is about the signature of a ‘peace agreement’ and ‘power-sharing’. Defining peace therefore sets the priorities and

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99 Ibid., 251.
100 Programme Amani Leo, “Conference de Goma,” 2.
101 Interview with Starec - Amani Leo representative, Goma, July 14, 2009.
strategies to be undertaken. For those who still confront armed groups, violence, poverty, repression and absence of basic services, speaking of peace is simultaneously a critique and the voicing of what could be seen as an articulation of social justice. Peace is redefined as being both a process and a product of political participation, development, personal and collective well-being. What to do about it and how to set priorities is a matter of putting non-elite agendas at the forefront and of having access to decision-making processes.

In this spirit, a Group Jeremie representative stated:

We must start from the proposals that are made at the grassroots. What we want and what the international community wants is diametrically opposed. I am from Kinshasa, here in Kinshasa things don’t go, people suffer. Peace has multiple dimensions: social, environmental, economic... We are oppressed, exterminated, our women are raped, the children abducted by the military... The peace in Congo is a global thing, we need a global approach and not a sectored approach like the MONUC does. It reforms the justice sector here, it does democracy promotion there... Peace here is less important than money. The Congolese context is unique... But you, the internationals, you come here with laboratory theories, preconceived models and try to impose them on the Congo. No, that is not peace.102

The ‘diametrical opposition’ that this interviewee is referring to seems to point fundamentally to how peacebuilding is undertaken. Most likely the ‘international community’, as he states, would agree that peace has all of those dimensions. What he is pointing out is that the strategies enacted are not conducive with addressing all of those dimensions, and that contrary to the discourses of peace, ‘money’ is the underlying real motivation. This is representative of similar responses gathered. As an indication, the representatives of all 21 non-internationally funded NGOs interviewed denied living in a ‘post-conflict’ or non-war context, linking ‘real peace’ to well-being and political participation. Additionally and simultaneously, an alternative agenda is being drafted that redefines peace as social justice with multiple dimensions.

102 Interview with Group Jeremie Representative, Kinshasa.
Shared vocabulary does not mean shared meanings. Moreover, the fact that authority claims are made as idealised promises offers a fertile ground on which to hold authority to account. As Scott notes:

Perhaps the greatest problem with the concept of hegemony is the implicit assumption that the ideological incorporation of subordinate groups will necessarily diminish social conflict. And yet, we know that any ideology which makes a claim to hegemony must, in effect, make promises to subordinate groups by way of explaining why a particular social order is also in their best interests. Once such promises are extended, the way is open to conflict.103

Statebuilding is deployed as a moral necessity to which subordinate classes need to consent, wait and suffer the consequences, for this will benefit people in the long run. Yet, the same promises are taken literally, holding power to account, confronting the ideal that statebuilding paints against the reality on the ground. This is not a new critique. Paul Gilroy, for example, has analysed how black music has provided a way to confront reality and voice aspirations. He argues that,

The politics of fulfilment practised by the descendants of slaves demands that bourgeois civil society lives up to the promises of its own rhetoric and offers a means where by demands for justice, rational organization of the productive processes, etc, can be expressed.104

These are not necessarily found overtly, but rather as a hidden transcript. Or as Gilroy puts it, by ‘opaque means’:

Created under the nose of the overseer, the utopian desires which fuel the politics of transfiguration must be invoked by other deliberately opaque means. This politics exists on a lower frequency where it is played, danced and acted, as well as sung about.105

105 Ibid.
The inversion of statebuilding’s vocabulary, as discussed below, illustrates ways in which statebuilding is delegitimised, critiqued, held to account and counter-reacted with the articulation of how things should be. The ‘subtle’ difference in meaning, as Toulabor notes, ‘consists, grosso modo, in doubling the usual or conventional sense of the words in giving them second semi-hermetic meanings’.¹⁰⁶ The state becomes a ‘good king’ with the capacity for salvation that effectively works for the poor; democracy means direct participation in the decision making processes at all levels; development means wealth distribution and access to its management; and peace encompasses a sense of tranquillity, free from threats of violence and linked to a sense of justice. They are a transformation of power’s own idealisation of its capacities, together with the political aspirations of subordinate classes. The creation of ideals represents not only the negation of the present order, but also the formulation of an alternative one that premises well-being on access to decision making, local control and wealth distribution.

6. Conclusion

In Congo there is no social-political movement that resists statebuilding. Rather, there is a consistent pattern of acts that challenge the actions and inactions of national and international elites. At the discursive level, this entails contrasting lived experience to the promises of a state as rightful authority and service provider, which while not being rejected as an ideal, is rejected in practice. Elite discourses imply a morality that lays a claim to legitimate authority, while exempting them from responsibility for failure. For non-elites discourses are ways of voicing discontent, while remaining pragmatic both about possibilities and repression. They are relevant because they are part of a shared critique. The fact that these discourses are found everywhere and resonate across a broad construct

of ‘Congolese identity’ and ‘Congolese nation’, indicate how everyday resistance operates as a covert strategy, attempting to escape repression while mitigating its effects and advancing one’s own political agenda.

What this chapter has illustrated, beyond how the discursive arena is fertile ground for everyday resistance, is the ambivalence of these discourses as platforms on which both domination and resistance operate. Statebuilding and its promises are claims of authority in spite of failure. These same claims are then used as a subversion strategy to deny the morality of authority and to articulate alternative political aspirations. In Scottian terms, post-conflict statebuilding creates public and hidden transcripts where rhetoric, image and expected behaviour are enacted for different audiences, following a shared vocabulary, including that of state authority, democracy, development and peace. The relationship between different actors to these ideals is enacted as a ‘pose’; that is, there is a level of ambiguity in how public images of authority, deference and obedience are exercised. Discourses are significant because statebuilding strategies are established and justified as a form of inevitable good. The moral authority of the good state and its subsequent delivery of peace, democracy and development facilitate a way to justify a reality of war, poverty and impunity. As such, an obvious starting point from which to look for resistance is the idealism on which promises are made. These powerful promises seem to be enough to request the population to keep waiting, obeying, paying taxes, providing for themselves and facing repression for raising concerns.

The implication in this respect is that post-conflict statebuilding’s discourse is premised on people’s aspirations and not the other way around. To this extent, statebuilding is hardly Western or liberal, but it is better seen as an example of the discursive practice of authority, and more as a populist discourse. Demands to participate in the decision-making processes, to be protected, heard and to enjoy the wealth of their own country are seemingly modest demands. However, these
demands are idealised in such a way that they pose a fundamental challenge to statebuilding practices. In a context of limited capacities for political action, the discursive is a fruitful site of resistance, although, as seen in the following chapters, not the only one.

The following chapters will complement many of the discourses surveyed in this chapter. The hidden transcript runs through Mai Mai militias, justifications for tax evasion and in the undertaking of a myriad of creative survival strategies. Underlying these tactics is a process of delegitimisation, of advancing alternative agendas and raising political aspirations. These discourses and the political alternatives embedded within them are realised not just in mechanisms of critique and the voicing of aspirations, but in the processes of denial and mitigation undertaken for navigating a context of violence and poverty.
Chapter 6

Everyday Violence and Mai Mai Militias

What would you do if the state was a man? I’ll kill him¹

1. From Words to Weapons

The fact that everyday resistance is based on the lack of direct confrontation and on practices undertaken to attract the minimum amount of repression does not necessarily mean that it is without violence. The transition from discourse to violence reflects the argument of this thesis: that resistance is shaped by the political context in which it is embedded, practices respond to such context and do not define resistance per se.

Three aspects need to be analysed in order to understand the role of violence as a tool of resistance: the context of war, the motivations subordinate classes have to support or create armed groups, and how extensive this popular support is. Whereas the first part of this thesis analysed the context of war, this chapter will focus on the other two aspects (motivations and support). These two aspects account for the defining elements of resistance including the intentional denial/mitigation of claims and the agenda advancing on the part of non-elites. They also show different gradients in the practices. It will be shown that attacking the military or other armed groups is a denial of the state’s claim on the distribution of violence and a form of mitigating statebuilding-related violence.

This is a claim-regarding overt practice of resistance. Conversely, using Mai Mai militias to provide security is a self-regarding practice. The violence generated by the context is used and transformed as a self-serving mechanism to counter precisely the effects of violence. In so far as the state is experienced as a form of predation and insecurity, subordinate classes’ motivations have at their core the rejection of state authority and statebuilding agendas. They strive to provide security and protection, while advancing agendas of political participation, representation and land. However, these motivations are not static, neither is the support subordinate classes give to these militias. The support is contingent and changing. Mai Mai militias tend to be formed from specific ethnic groups, or those who are closely related. This does not mean that all members of an ethnic group or of a particular area would support the local militia.

Mai Mai militias pose multiple challenges to an account of resistance. In order to address these challenges and to analyse violence as part of the everyday practices of resistance, the chapter first provides a brief background of the context, history and variety across different militias. The following two sections discuss the motivations and support for these militias. The focus of this chapter is on Mai Mai Yakotumba (Fizi) and Simba Mai Mai/ MRS (Bunyakiri) as cases displaying an anti-government agenda (having less government interference as a result), as cases that have confronted the effects and policies of statebuilding, and whose relation to their constituencies illustrate the dynamics and motivations for popular support. These militias do not represent a continuous popular uprising or a model for ethical resistance. They are an effect of war. They are ultimately representative of the heterogeneity in the practices of resistance.

2. **Important considerations about the context**

Although there was skirmishes, especially throughout the 1990s, Chapter Two already exposed how both the AFDL war and RCD/Africa’s World War were the
defining moment in which subordinate classes’ armed mobilisation took place. The fact that the AFDL war was conducted under the guise of a national liberation movement and led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila succeeded at reviving the Mai Mai historical sentiment of fighting against oppression and colonial conquest. In addition to being a member of Lumumba’s cabinet, Kabila had fought with revolutionary leader Pierre Mulele, who led one of the biggest revolts against Mobutu and was a driving force for the creation of the Simba and Mai Mai popular militias in the 1960s. During the 1996 and 1998 wars, Mai Mai militias generally fought on the side of the government to repel the RCD rebellion and the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian invasions. They however remained autonomous from the army, and since the transition most groups have developed an anti-government stand. The Mai Mai militias consider themselves as inheritors of a tradition of resistance that dates back to the struggle against colonialism and beyond. In a note from a Mai Mai Padiri combatant, this historical tradition of resistance is explained as follows:

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3 Young notes that Mulele’s rebels ‘eliminated a central government presence for some months in the northeast quad-rant of the country and some parts of the Kwilu district in the southwest’. Young, “Contextualizing Congo Conflicts,” 20; Ndaywel è Nziem, Nouvelle histoire du Congo, 496 – 499. Ibid., 496 – 499.
We cannot stop thinking and we cannot stop sending the calls to the mystery that surrounds us everywhere; that is, we cannot stop resisting evil. It is within that approach that the Movement of Mai-Mai resistance was born, which has its distant origins in the domination of man by man [...] Already in 1481, the king Nzingu Panju was opposed to Portuguese occupation in his kingdom; in 1682, the prophet Chimpa Vita resisted against the implantation of foreign power in the kingdom of Kongo, she was burnt alive. In 1942, in the kingdom of the Bahunde, where the Bakumu live, in Masisi, in one of the hunters villages, in Ntoto; Mandayi told Sindikiza that his brother Yusufu Kitawala in the cultural struggle against foreign occupation had a formula that protected men against all attacks from bladed or fire weapons by the enemy. In 1951, Simon Kimbangu died in exile, Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele and recently Desire Kabila, killed 16/01/2001 for having brandished and lifted the spirit of a profound love for the homeland.4

Hence the AFDL rebellion awakened a latent revolt. However, the subsequent militarisation has set peasants on the path to a permanent state of armed conflict.5 This permanent conflict is not because rural classes have since maintained a popular uprising, but because the war has made them primary targets. The RCD rebellion with the Rwanda/Uganda/Burundi invasion in 1998 - 2003, the insecurity provoked by the different CNDP uprisings and the ongoing presence of foreign and national armed groups represent a continuation of an agenda of self-defence and liberation. The strategies undertaken for surviving and confronting war are inseparable from the strategy of joining armed militias as a way of ‘reacting against their marginalisation and exclusion’.6 The choice of means is largely conditioned by the historical moment in which actors are embedded.

Nevertheless, there is great variety amongst Mai Mai militias. While some groups abide by a firm code of conduct and are attached to an agenda of liberation and social justice, others have also turned into predators of population (E.g. Rasta).7

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7 UPDI and LPI, Violence et Insecurité à Nindja/Kaniola: Le Phénomène Rasta, ed. Union
The example of Cheka in Walikale, mentioned in Chapter Two, is a primary example. They carried out the attacks in July-August 2010, which included systematic rape and other crimes in 15 villages in Walikale in alliance with the FDLR. Mai Mai Cheka was born out of a power-struggle for the control of the largest Cassiterite mine in the DRC, which had been given to FARDC/CNDP after the March 23 agreements, in 2009, in detriment of the FARDC/ex-Mai Mai brigade of Colonel Samy that had controlled it since. Other militias, as already seen, have been successfully co-opted into state/elite networks to be used for proxy wars between the DRC and Rwanda. The popular character of some militias is therefore challenged by the fact that militias ally with and pursue elite agendas. Yet this is not static. There is an important element of unreliability and contingency, meaning that Mai Mai groups are likely to betray these elites and form new groups to confront new sources of insecurity.

Despite these complexities, the history and current dynamics in many Mai Mai militias make them representatives of the ways in which rural classes have used or joined these militias as a form of resistance to the effects of domination. The deepening of the statebuilding strategies during the 2009-2011 period has implied the militarisation of the Kivus, of which Mai Mai militias have been the primary targets. The terms set for Mai Mai demobilisation, the ongoing context of war and poverty, and the FARDC being deployed as a representation of state authority, are all sources of distrust and rejection of state authority. Additionally, during this period, the CNDP has consolidated administrative and military positions along the Kivus fuelling Mai Mai nationalist sentiments. The role of the Mai Mai as
militias of self-defence and vehicles of political participation has become even more prevalent. They provide a way to defend and advance agendas of security provision, control of land and local political authority. This last element permeates Mai Mai ideology and represents the long-term aspirations of the Congolese peasantry.

3. Motivations

Most studies of Mai Mai militias have identified marginal conditions of living, poverty and general disenfranchisement as the main reasons for combatants to join them. However, in the DRC this cannot be separated from the context of war. What Misako calls the ‘militianisation’ of life means that self-management and security provision, in the context of relative state absence as well as the pursuit of political agendas and aspirations through armed groups is an ‘effect’ of the context of violence. Violence becomes a form of political participation where power is asserted through violence. In the war context of the DRC, Acker and Vlassenroot argue, violence is the language through which many young marginalised Congolese demonstrate their distrust of state institutions, resist the conditions in which they live in and aim at a more egalitarian order. Joining an armed group could be generally inscribed in the dynamics of contestation of the state since these conditions of living tend to be seen as the consequence of an unjust social order in which the state is directly responsible or complicit.

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These dynamics of state contestation, which as Prunier argues, come both ‘from above and from below’, added to a context of war, signal that uses of violence can be read as furthering elite or personal agendas.\footnote{Prunier, “Violence et Histoire En Afrique,” 4.} The political meaning granted to these motivations is a defining factor in analysing popular classes as politically minded or as politically manipulated.\footnote{This includes academic and policy literature, both international as well as Congolese. See section ‘Social Justice as a Façade?’ below. CCAP representative coordinating the first dialogue between Banyamulenge and Babembe stated: ‘the problem was not the capacity of the communities to live together, but the influence of the war, the flow of weapons into the area as well as the political discourses that some governments and politicians started to play with’. Interview with Representative CCAP, Uvira, August 28, 2010.} Amongst the widespread scholarly research that Mai Mai militias have received, there have been different approaches.\footnote{For example: Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices Dans L’Est Du Congo”; Acker and Vlassenroot, “Les «maî -maî » et Les Fonctions de La Violence”; Alphonse Maindo Monga Ngonga, 

\footnote{Prunier, “Violence et Histoire En Afrique,” 4.}
section reflects, firstly, on the rejection and distrust of the state as markers of intentionality. Two examples from Fizi and Bunyakiri illustrate this point.\textsuperscript{18} The section moves on to discussing how these motivations are linked to community protection and security as important underlying agendas, and land and political representation as important aspirations.

\textbf{3.a. Rejection and Distrust}

\textit{Fizi – Yakotumba}

Mai Mai Yakotumba was created in 2007 but has a significant rebel history.\textsuperscript{19} Its core members fought in the various brigades that were part of the second biggest Mai Mai structure in South Kivu, led by General Daniel Dunia, during the 1998-2003 war. General Dunia’s troops resisted both Kabila’s AFDL and the RCD rebellion. Not only were both of these uprisings seen as an invasion, Dunia’s resistance was the only form of protection against the brutal violence with which these uprisings were undertaken. Yakotumba’s and the previous Dunia’s troops were composed mostly of Babembes, who are the majority ethnic group in the area of Fizi.\textsuperscript{20} The Babembe take pride in claiming that they resisted Mobutu for over 25 years arguing that they ‘vehemently hate all dictatorial political systems that violate fundamental human rights’.\textsuperscript{21} The same articulation has been seen in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} For an earlier analysis of these two areas see Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices Dans L’Est Du Congo.”
  \item \textsuperscript{19} This is the area from where Che Guevara attempted to organise a revolutionary movement with Laurent Kabila. Speaking of the latest development of this group, Judith Verweijen pointed out that ‘some of the “brigades” forming part of the larger Mai Mai movement built by Yakutumba in 2007/2008, operated \textit{de facto} as entirely autonomous groups, and later left the movement. It concerns the: the 5th brigade under Assani Ngungu Ntamushobora, the 6th under Aoci Behekelwa and the 7th under Mulumbathe 5th brigade under Assani Ngungu Ntamushobora, the 6th under Aoci Behekelwa and the 7th under Mulumba’. Judith Verweijen, “Personal Communication - FRF/Yakotumba,” September 10, 2012, emphasis in the original.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Babembe literally means Bembe people.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Author Unknown, “Territoire de Fizi Ou Le Pays de Babembe” (Document provided by Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant, September 3, 2010), 16.
\end{itemize}
the increasing distrust towards the government throughout the transitional period.

When the transition in 2006 brought in the different plans for Mai Mai demobilisation and reintegration, not all of General’s Dunia’s troops were successfully disengaged. Refractory elements, especially William Amuri Yakotumba, rejected the demand to redeploy his troops out of Fizi. Several military and political factors were in place for this decision. Militarily, the Banyamulengue Mai Mai group operating in the high plateaus of South Kivu, the FRF, did not reintegrate into the army and pushed for the constitution of the territory of Minembwe (affecting a part of Fizi’s territory). The Rwandan-supported CNDP had already rejected reintegration, continuing its military activity, which entailed several uprisings. Finally, many Yakotumba members felt disillusioned with the DDR process. Politically, the Mai Mai movement created out of the 1998 – 2003 war was marginalised from the power distribution of the 1+4 formula. They reproached the government for not acknowledging that successful resistance against the rebellion and foreign occupation in the East had been due in large part to their actions. Additionally, the electoral results were contested. These military and political concerns went hand in hand with the Mai Mai criticism about the lack of social and economic development. As such, according to a member of Mai Mai Yakotumba, in 2007, they understood that ‘the DRC kept being open to foreign intervention’ and, although this had turned from a military to a political strategy, they had ‘judged it necessary to create the maquis and oppose the government’.

22 Especially the period immediately preceding the 2009 – 2011 as described in Chapter Two.
23 Banyamulengue literally means people from Mulengue in Swahili. Traditionally, this term has been given in South Kivu to people associated with the wave of migrations from Rwanda and Burundi in the early 20th century, who settled in the high plateaux of the Minembwe massif in between the territories of Kalehe, Mwenga and Fizi, and who tend to be of a Tutsi ethnic background.
24 Interview with Demobilised Combatant from Mai Mai General Dunia, Baraka, September 3, 2010; Informal Conversation with Yakotumba members, Bukavu, August 8, 2010.
25 Interview with Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant, Baraka, September 3, 2010.
Interpreting the Fizi conflict within patterns of statebuilding and resistance is not straightforward. The dynamics of conflict in Fizi have been read as one of ethnic conflict, challenging discourses about social justice as being manipulated by local elites. The so-called autochthonous/allochthonous conflict became even more salient in the context of Mobutu’s Zairianisation and Bisengimana’s policies concerning land, political representation and nationality. Currently in Fizi, there is an important ethnic element in the connection between, on the one hand, Yakotumba’s perceptions of Kabila as a Rwandese or as a facilitator of Rwandan economic expansionist agendas in Eastern DRC; and, on the other, the fact that the Banyamulenge community are of Tutsi origin, having been supported at crucial times by the CNDP and Rwandan officials. This is added to the fact that FARDC deployment in the area was ex-CNDP after the March 23 agreement. This discursive connection illustrates a rejection of state and foreign agendas, and the hailing of traditional modes of political authority and representation. Even if we were to equate ethnic claims with political ones, or problematise the boundaries between the categories of ethnic identity and the political, we would still see that discourses of communal identity are simultaneously discourses of resistance and liberation. This does not mean necessarily an ethical modus operandi. This is the challenge violence brings. Mai Mai Yakotumba have been accused of killing, stealing cattle and hassling Banyamulenge herders. Violent actions need to be seen as conditioned (not justified) by a broader context of war, where there is a

26 As seen in Chapter Two this included the transferring of Belgian and white-owned land to selected Rwandan/Tutsi who were made Congolese nationals after the changes in the nationality law.
28 Interview with FARDC Colonel in Baraka (no. 129). See below the discussion on civil/military relations in Baraka under section 4.c.
vicious circle of armed conflict and arms trafficking, and where the existence of several government projects (DRC and Rwanda included) is also an important element.

**Bunyakiri - Simba-Mai Mai**

A similar dynamic is found in Bunyakiri. It was the headquarters of the ‘biggest’ Mai Mai group in the two Congo Wars under General Padiri. Although in the first instance his troops fought the AFDL uprising because it was largely seen as a foreign affair, this developed into a fragile agreement to later make Padiri Secretary General of the resistance movement, which was attached to the FARDC (FAC at the time). Hoffmann points out that Padiri had significant influence since the Mai Mai had become the de facto government in many rural areas that were under their control. As such, the exclusion of Mai Mai representation from the 1+4 formula had a special impact amongst Padiri’s supporters. Many interpreted this as the exclusion of rural population and of foreign intervention in Congolese affairs. Although Padiri was able to reintegrate, the politics of a government that they see as continuing policies of exploitation with no real development of the economy or peace has been a fundamental factor for new militias to form in Bunyakiri. Similarly, there are those who have reintegrated into the army but whose sons continue as members of the Mai Mai militias in their villages (Eg. Colonel Samy operating in the areas of Numbi, Nyawarowa, Katasoko, Busurunki).

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33 His real name is Joseph David Karendo Bulenda.
34 According to Kasper Hoffmann: ‘In 1999 the Mai-Mai were officially recognised as a part of the Congolese army by decree of the then president Laurent-Désiré Kabila, but their operations on the ground were not coordinated by Kinshasa’ in “Militarised Bodies and Spirits of Resistance,” 77.
35 Ibid., 78.
36 This feeling was transmitted by all 16 Mai Mai combatants interviewed in formal conversations and in 5 informal conversations. According to APC representative and ex-Mai Mai Padiri combatant, in the case of Bunyakiri this has been felt particularly amongst Mai Mai leaders like General Ziralo, General Kirikicho, Major Janvier and Colonel Sadam. Interview with APC Representative, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010; Interview with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant, Kinshasa, July 10, 2009.
37 Interview with APC Representative.
An ex-Mai Mai Padiri combatant expressed the view that, after being disappointed by the government after the transition, his group saw it necessary to renew the group Simba Mai Mai/MRS in 2006.38 Not all members broke with the government immediately. Indeed, between 2008 and 2009 he served as a STAREC demobilisation officer for 18 months.39 However, he regretted that at the time of the interview in August 2010, he had only been paid for 3-months. Likewise, when his demobilisation team (formed of other ex-Mai Mai combatants) had to go on a demobilisation mission, STAREC gave them a vehicle without petrol and they received no stipends or food for their journey.40 This combatant has since stopped believing in the programme, questioning whether the government was really committed to demobilisation, and has rejoined the Simba Mai Mai/MRS.41

The examples of Mai Mai Yakotumba in Fizi and Simba-Mai Mai/MRS in Bunyakiri illustrate that a discursive critique and a denial of state legitimacy can take the form of armed struggle too. These two groups represent trends across Mai Mai groups in the Kivus.42 Statebuilding is read largely as an elite affair, which maintains the exploitation of rural areas while placing them under military rule. As a form of rejection and mitigation against this, militias become a tool of opposition and a source of security and protection provision.

38 Interview with Simba Mai Mai/ MRS Combatant, Bukavu, August 5, 2010.
40 Interview with Simba Mai Mai/ MRS Combatant.
41 The issues raised by this combatant were shared by the other 16 Mai Mai combatants interviewed formally and in the 5 informal conversations. In conversation with a DDR and a STAREC officer, although not directly acknowledging lack of payment, challenges for funding were raised as a challenge for demobilisation. Interview with UPN-DDR Officer, Goma, 21 2010; Interview with Starec - Amani Leo representative, Goma, interview, July 20, 2010.
42 Interview with Demobilised Combatant from Mai Mai General Dunia; Informal Conversation with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant.
3.b. Protection and Security

The militarised context pushes population into a defensive stand. Militias are what Scott calls a ‘state effect’ – a ‘symbiosis’ of state expansion, state violence and its rejection.\(^{43}\) Popular militias are a response to militarised rule, land seizures and a context of increased insecurity. Security is a constant concern not only for Mai Mai militias but also for the population where they belong.\(^{44}\) Although, as explored below, popular support for Mai Mai militias is not generalised across time and space, and although many times militias have become a menace for population, whenever this support is granted it responds largely to a protection concern. Seeking protection through the Mai Mai militias is a denial of state authority and of legitimacy to the post-conflict statebuilding discourse of protection. Seeking protection from the Mai Mai militias is done as the least bad option and could be seen as a self-regarding claim.\(^{45}\) The denial/mitigation of the violence generated by statebuilding is not the intention as much as individual or collective survival. Yet it is undermining of statebuilding’s authority.

A professor from the Catholic University of Bukavu argued that the war has made popular classes use the Mai Mai militias not only to defend themselves from foreign armed groups but also from the state.\(^{46}\) For this professor, this is in the context of the clash between customary and state land policies. In Congo there are two land ownership systems. Customary law makes traditional chiefs guarantors of land access to those that belong to his chiefdom. Administrative law provides access to land through a land title given by the state’s central administration. If property is in question, whoever has a land title is the one who is recognised as owner. The result is that this privileges rich owners who can have access to a land title.\(^{47}\) So popular militias in this case confront the state because ‘it behaves as a

\(^{44}\) Scott too notes that rural rebellions have been many times underpinned by a concern for security: Scott, Seeing Like a State, 37.
\(^{45}\) Morvan, Reinventer Le Quotidien, 95 – 98.
\(^{46}\) Interview with Professor from the Université Catholique de Bukavu.
\(^{47}\) Koen Vlassenroot, “Households Land Use Strategies in a Protracted Crisis Context:
foreign power and not a power that is at the service of the population’.\textsuperscript{48} The implication is that in the context of war, Mai Mai militias are also used to protect population from land expropriation.

\textit{Fizi}

For Fizi residents, the major threat they face is the FARDC, even if Mai Mai Yakotumba has also committed abuses against them.\textsuperscript{49} Interviewees in Baraka criticised Yakotumba, but they felt closer to the Mai Mai.\textsuperscript{50} This is exemplified by the way a member from a NGO articulated her complaint about the negative effects of the war on women. She stated:

\begin{quote}
We continue with all those armed groups... here, there are the regular army, the government and the militias that are in the forest, they continue to make violence. The women, they go from Baraka to Kafolo for example to get provisions, and they [the mentioned armed groups] continue the violence. They all put a problem for us, the FDLR, the FRF, the Mai Mai and the army... The Amani Leo came here to get the FDLR that are located at 250km from here. But instead of going there, they have stayed here. They have started in Makobola towards Fizi centre, there were no FDLR there! Yesterday the FDLR attacked the post of FARDC in Nyange, in the border between Fizi and Kalembe... now, the Amani Leo have come to do what? ... They should go.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

Another NGO worker stated that the solution for the ongoing insecurity in the area was for all militias to demobilise or reintegrate into the army. However, he recognised that for the ordinary people it was the army and not the militias that created the main problem. He stated: ‘if you ask the population, what do you

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[48] Interview with Professor from the Université Catholique de Bukavu.
\item[50] During the fieldwork period in 2010 in particular, 12 NGO representatives were interviewed in Baraka. This interpretation was reflected in four interviews with MONUSCO staff and one UNHRC staff working in Baraka, as well as two officers working from Uvira and Bukavu, but with direct responsibility of the Baraka-Fizi region. Multiple informal conversations with residents, local NGOs, INGOs and MONUSCO operating in Baraka also supported this view. See also: Alden, Thakur, and Arnold, \textit{Militias and the Challenges of Post-conflict Peace}, 116 – 117.
\item[51] Interview with Women’s NGO FEDI representative, Baraka, September 1, 2010.
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want to be done here? They are going to say: that the Amani Leo go. The militarisation of the area is a problem.’\(^{52}\) He then continued to argue that the reason for the militarisation was the resistance found in the area.

There is a lot of resistance, there are a lot of weapons that do not come from the government and that do not submit to the orders of the government. Yes the presence of Amani Leo is a problem for the population, even more than the Mai Mai, but I think the problem of the continuation of the Mai Mai is an ideological and ethnic problem.\(^{53}\)

These words summarise many of the arguments that have been put so far forward in this Chapter. The reliance on popular militias to provide security, added to a sentiment that sees the state either as directly responsible for the situation or not doing anything about it, illustrates the patterns in which resistance takes place. Even if this is seen, as the interviewee does, from the perspective of ideology and ethnic confrontation, the reflection illustrates the popular perception that the FARDC is a menace whereas the Mai Mai militias are the least bad option. Those who are not engaged directly in the militias regret the militarisation of the environment. However, they generally feel more threatened by the FARDC and protected by the Mai Mai, with whom they have a more equal relationship. After all, Mai Mai combatants could be members of their families, including husbands and sons.

**Bunyakiri**

In Bunyakiri, residents have been threatened by both the FDLR and the FARDC. In August 2010 (during fieldwork), the FARDC brigade stationed there had been able to reduce the abuses committed against the population by the previous brigade. However, population were still threatened by the special operations at the time, the Amani Leo troops.\(^{54}\) The cycle of FDLR activity linked to the Amani Leo presence had a direct impact on displacement out of cultivation areas and

\(^{52}\) Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127).

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) See Chapter Two for the specifics of MONUC/MONUSCO support of these operations.
hence on impoverishment. Bunyakiri had turned into a sort of *island of refugees* because the FDLR had the area almost completely surrounded. There were often incursions into the town and many residents had been displaced or could not access cultivated lands.  

Speaking in Maibano, the Secretary General from the Chefferie of Buloho pointed out several local conflicts related to land and to customary leadership. However, for him, the existence of local armed groups was a direct consequence of the persistence of the FDLR in the region. A local human rights organisation stated that the local Mai Mai groups had their own interests, but they were combating the FDLR and they were not there to abuse the civilian population. Similarly, a representative from an NGO of women survivors of rape stated the situation of threat that women faced generated by all armed groups. However, she regretted that: ‘We have to live with the Amani Leo and we never know with which intentions they are coming’. The sentiment she transmitted was that whereas they had an opportunity to react, even if minimal, against the Mai Mai and the FDLR, in front of the army they felt defenceless.

The solution against the FDLR brought by the government and supported by MONUC/MONUSCO was for Bunyakiri residents, as for many in other Eastern regions of the DRC, more a curse than a blessing. Secretary General of the Buloho chiefdom spoke against the FARDC strategies to fight the FDLR: ‘Kimya II has been a disaster, they were there to hunt the residents, their fields and their crops,

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56 Interview with the Secretary General of the Buloho Chiefdom (Bunyakiri), Maibano, August 19, 2010.  
57 Interview with Voix de sans Voix Human Rights NGO Representative, Bunyakiri, August 21, 2010.  
58 Interview with AFIP Representative - Association de Femmes pour les Initiatives de Paix, Bunyakiri, August 29, 2010.  
59 A local human rights NGO representative said that normally complaints about the army could go to the customary security council. However, as the military could participate, the extent to which residents could voice their concerns about the army were limited. Interview with APDHUD Representative - Action pour la Protection des Droits Humaines et le Développement Communautaires, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010.
they pillage, they destroy everything... Then they brought Amani Leo, which has done exactly the same, the population does not have any hope anymore’. This administrator summarised a widespread sentiment amongst residents in Bunyakiri, Bulambika and Maibano. Most political representatives whether administrative or customary expressed their regret against an army that was ‘a disorder’, while pointing out that ‘we cannot speak about it’.

The situation had a direct impact on the perception residents had of MONUC/ MONUSCO. Residents kept wondering what the role of MONUC/MONUSCO was if the FDLR’s positions were known and yet not targeted. Not surprisingly, rumours of UN collaboration with the FDLR, as seen in the previous chapter, spread easily amongst residents. In a focus group with the youth of Bunyakiri, most participants stated that they could not understand why the FDLR was 4 km away from the village without the UN doing anything, a situation that has already been like that for approximately 15 years. ‘Today’ – one of them said – ‘we cannot go to Bukavu as we used to without feeling threatened; our parents long ago stopped cultivating their lands because they have been occupied by the Interahamwe’. As such, they said, ‘this situation has made people furious and as a result, some have taken up the machetes, others the rifles, in order to constitute themselves as militias of popular defence’. The motivation here to create a militia is protection from the FDLR, but it goes hand in hand with the need to cultivate and get on with their life. That is, the desire for normality, to put it in Hibou’s

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60 Interview with the Secretary General of the Buloho Chiefdom (Bunyakiri).
61 The interview took place in the form of public audience attended by 15 people. These words resonated amongst the group. This was the general sentiment gathered across the fieldwork in the area of Bunyakiri, including Maibano and Bulambika. It included 14 interviews with residents, five of which had a similar public setting. This was also reflected in two focus groups, one of 5 people with local youth, and another with 8 women.
62 Informal Conversation with Notables at Maibano, Bunyakiri, August 19, 2010; Interview with Voix de sans Voix Human Rights NGO Representative.
63 Focus Group Young People Bunyakiri.
terms, is not to ‘accommodate’ to the situation of insecurity and army rule, but to act upon it even if by violent means.

Overall, the search for protection and security is a pattern in all Mai Mai groups. What it shows is that the need for protection is not generated by a lack of state authority, but from the ways in which state authority is asserted. Although some Mai Mai groups illustrate the engagement of the civilian population into forms of state violence, the cases seen above, especially through the provision of protection and security to civilian population, illustrates patterns of resistance in statebuilding contexts. This becomes more clearly visible when explored alongside the aspirations embedded in Mai Mai ideology.

3.c. Aspirations and Agenda Advancing

Rejection of, and protection from, government agendas, war and statebuilding do not stand alone. Rather they are embedded in a broader system of ideology, religious beliefs and political aspirations. These include the reaffirmation of forms of local political authority, political participation and land distribution. Although these refer explicitly to the current context, they resonate with broader historical, religious and cultural understandings in Congolese rural areas. The Mai Mai militias and their leaders, as previously noted, contextualise themselves in the specific traditions of resistance against domination that have taken place in the DRC. Thus these agendas are better seen as aspirations, which simultaneously overlap with and reinforce elements of rejection and protection.

Mai Mai militias articulate their agendas around a “nationalist ideology”, aiming for the development of the DRC. It is based on a common reference across the DRC where a “patriotic mentality” means acting for the well-being of all Congolese. Although vague, it reflects the construction of ideas of social justice that were explored in the last Chapter. The articulation of specific political agendas comes with a religious armour that links cultural understandings of
justice with historical traditions of oppression and liberation. In an analysis of the Mai Mai groups of the Uvira-Fizi region, the underlying prophetic and religious element of these groups is noted:

Fizi also has numerous mistico-religious movements, where the leaders present themselves as local “gods”, porters of messages about the liberation and emancipation of the population. At the heart of that society, security-wise in crisis, that messianism of war and self-liberation is alive within the “armed groups” where the core of their prayers devote themselves to prophecies of victory. Those links with the “armed groups” make of those religious movements spaces of popular mobilisation.

This study illustrates that popular aspirations for liberation are expressed through religious and mystical discourses, sifting through Mai Mai ideology and practice. Important to Mai Mai ideology is the discourse of “hatred” against the “foreigners”. As noted in many previous studies of Mai Mai militias, this needs to be understood not as ethnically-based, but rather as a construction of the “unpatriotic element” as a symbol of oppression. The resurgence of militia activity in the Kivus, and elsewhere, maintains these ideas. For instance, a representative of Mai Mai Yakotumba notes:

We were convinced by our brothers in the government that it was a nationalist government, but in reality, we have realised after the transition that it is a government that just wants to capitulate the Congo, they are the thieves that want to leave the country in the mess it is now, only to keep pillaging... it has come in by the window, it is not even a legitimate government.

Against this, a discourse of emancipation is simultaneously created by critiquing the government for pursuing foreign agendas and by locating themselves in a

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65 Amuri Misako points out how prophetic religion, the syncretism of Mai Mai militias is part of its radicalisation. Amuri Misako, “Les Milices Maï Maï Au Maniema,” 127.
68 Milita activity is also seen in other provinces like in Ituri, Maniema, Equateur and Bas Congo. Mbembe argues this is across Africa. See Mbembe, Sortir de La Grande Nuit: Essai Sur l’Afrique Décolonisée, 196 – 221.
69 Interview with Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant.
historical tradition of resistance: ‘We want sustainable peace, not a peace that goes in three seconds... not a peace in servitude, a peace of subjection... that we will never allow... our kids here are resisters by birth’. The government represents for them this ‘fragile peace’ understood as an order of submission. They are hence convinced that ‘sustainable peace’ is only achievable through ‘conquest and not through dialogue’. The exercise of conquest is not only aimed at Baraka or Fizi, but is national in scope. ‘We want a responsible government for the Congo that respects human rights, brings a prosperous society, where we do not speak of war any more, where there is no discrimination, with the aid of god’. As he continued to elaborate, the ‘national’ ideal is formulated not as a project of expelling the foreigners, but as eradicating oppression and implementing development and political participation.

In a similar way, the reconstitution of Mai Mai Simba/MRS was justified as a critique against the government for being ‘foreign’ and as a need to realise population aspirations:

Kabila is not Congolese, they say he is from Hewabora, but we know he is not... he does everything opposite of what people want... the teachers are not paid, the army is not paid, the public servants are not paid... there is social injustice... our politicians are liars, thieves, corrupt politicians that go against the constitution.

The constitution encapsulated to a certain extent popular aspirations and explains the popular support it received: ‘People voted “yes” to the constitution, their aspirations are seen there, they want justice, schools, good public service...’ These aspirations are well captured by what this combatant called ‘the movement’. Mai Mai Simba/MRS aims to: ‘establish a government that is based on the ideals of socialism, which promotes civic and moral education and endogenous political and economic development for the restoration of Congolese dignity’. So although Mai Mai militias have a local attachment and an ethnic component, their ideals go

\[70\] Information in this paragraph comes from: Ibid.
\[71\] This and the following quotes come from: Interview with Simba Mai Mai/ MRS Combatant.
beyond these identities. In fact, the way in which they speak of liberation and a national agenda has been interpreted as a façade to justify criminal activity.

**Social Justice as a Façade?**

Some scholars, policy makers and NGO researchers have argued that these motivations are just a façade. For example, Alden, Thakur and Arnold argue that the continuation of militias in Congo follows an impulse for personal enrichment where Mai Mai’s discourses of social justice are a masquerade without substance.\(^{72}\) Others argue that the real drivers for these militias are historical conflicts over land and customary leadership.\(^{73}\) Some Mai Mai themselves have criticised the mushrooming of militias as an opportunistic, self-serving activity devoid of political significance.\(^{74}\) They criticise this as ‘hillism’,\(^{75}\) articulated as a mockery of those who defend their own ‘hill’ and do not have a broader political programme for the ‘nation’. It is also in this vein that the ‘true’ and ‘false’ Mai Mai, the ‘warrior’ against the ‘adventurer’\(^{76}\) comes in. The difference is articulated between those who ‘truly’ protect the population under a patriotic agenda and those who do not.

These aspirations illuminate the patterns in which resistance unfolds. Although existing land and ethnic-based conflicts could have caused tensions and even violence at earlier times, this was far from the devastating war that has been taking place since 1996. Additionally, as advanced in the first two chapters, one of the distinct characteristics of the DRC conflict is the challenge to the notion of the local as a distinctive sphere from national and international. Rather it is their co-constitution that unearths how different agendas are intertwined in a fluid

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\(^{73}\) Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales”; Autesserre, “Local Violence, National Peace?”.

\(^{74}\) 14 Mai Mai combatants interviewed spoke of this divide but the others thought these were false accusations coming from the government, the MONUC/ MONUSCO and the INGOs.

\(^{75}\) From the French colline (small hill), they speak of ‘collinisme’. Interview with Simba Mai Mai/ MRS Combatant.

\(^{76}\) Opportunistic, motivated for self-gain or self-swaggering.
changing context. At times they are the most reliable security provider, even against the FARDC, yet others are predatory and impose authoritarian rule. They also represent the militarised masculine version of a struggle for social justice. Amidst this, it is not possible to ignore that many combatants blame state agendas for the militarised context and the subsequent political, social and economic underdevelopment. Despite these fluid boundaries, the motivations underpinning Mai Mai militias and their support illustrate that resistance is defined by a context of domination. Even though, examining more carefully to what extent popular militias’ have a popular membership is imperative to analysing them as tools of everyday resistance in a statebuilding context.

4. The Popular Element in the Mai Mai Militias

This thesis has been arguing that everyday resistance is better conceived as an activity of subordinate groups. Not only is this a closer application of the Scottian framework, but it also allows for narrowing the scope of the concept. Additionally, the practices of statebuilding generate violence and extraction, creating conditions of domination, war and poverty. This context and the way subordinate groups confront it make Scott’s framework insightful. Nevertheless, if Mai Mai militias have been used as proxies by different governments, elite factions and MNCs for their own agendas, it is imperative to elucidate the extent to which Mai Mai militias are tools for popular classes’ resistance and the extent to which this popular element is represented in their membership.

Additionally, when popular support is granted, it is neither unconditional nor generalised in any one village. It is more accurate to speak of a tendency to rely on these militias to confront the army, other armed groups and advance security, land and political participation agendas. The fact that some of these militias represent another source of violence and domination against the population makes this popular support contingent. Violence remains a minority response in
comparison with discourses and survival. Yet it is another tool of a broader catalogue by which subordinate classes confront everyday forms of domination. This section gives a brief account of popular support through membership and goods provisioning. It then provides a more extensive discussion through the analysis of government and UN strategies to break the solidarity between civilians and militias.

4.a. Membership

In 2002 the UN estimated the number of Mai Mai combatants active in the two Kivus to be between 20,000 and 30,000.77 In 2009, a report by HRW calculated that there remained around 22 Mai Mai groups with up to 12,000 combatants.78 However, as stated in an unpublished report, a UN DDR action in 2010 was expecting to demobilise 28,375 Mai Mai troops only from South Kivu.79 Although voluntary membership is contested through practices of abduction, their members are largely young men, coming from the rural, unemployed, and unschooled sectors of the population, living with few economic resources.80

Additionally, although Mai Mai militias’ leaders and original instigators are the more educated, military and notables of particular villages, these are hardly representative of the elite.81 They do not represent state-based authority or large

81 An exception is the FRF in Minembwe, which was formed out of a split in the military
landowners. Rather, they should be seen as what Scott calls ‘translators’ or ‘vehicles’, whose more educated position enables them to play as representatives.82 In a study focused on the militias of the Maniema province, Amuri Misako argues that ‘the resurgence of Mai Mai responds to a reinforcement of influential ethnic groups and their elites rather than their replacement or insertion of subordinated ones’.83 However, for Misako this did not affect the fact that Mai Mai militias were a ‘mode of political participation of rural masses’.84 Misako also points out that the upsurge of popular militias corresponds to a reorganisation of the rural political space.85 As seen in the works of Wolf and also Scott, peasants’ political struggles and political aspirations need to be analysed in light of their reliance on their own authorities and their reticence towards outsiders, whether they are foreign or nationals.86 The overwhelming perception gathered in interviews from representatives of subordinate groups, civil society, the government, the army and UN officials is that there is substantial overlap between the civilian population and Mai Mai militias.87 This idea, it must be stressed, is expressed throughout the militias’ non-elite membership. However, it is also the fact that non-military active population provide key support for the continuation of these militias.

4. b. Provisioning: Weapons, Food, Protection and Information

Another area where popular support is visible is in the provision of different goods and services for the militias to operate and survive. Although militias may

leadership. Still many disillusioned unemployed youth in the area may have joined ever since. Interview with FARDC General (no. 146), Bukavu, interview; See also: ADEPAE et al., Au-delà Des “Groups Armés,” 47–48.
82 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 296 and 309.
84 Ibid., 3.
85 Ibid., 13.
87 This was the view gathered from 13 government and local administration officials, 5 military officers, 10 UN officials and 2 UNHCR representatives. The desolidarisation strategies discussed below also support this view.
receive incentives from deputies in Kinshasa, the bulk of their support in terms of weapons, ammunition, protection and information comes from subordinate classes. 88 Many of these militias have also settled around mining areas and are now part of networks of resource plundering and parallel exploitations. 89 However, this is further evidence of the overlap between the civilian population and popular militias. At times resources are exchanged or services are paid fostering relations of mutual support and reciprocity. These networks of support and exchange represent a great challenge not only to the authority of statebuilding but also to the DDR(RR) programmes that are at the heart of it. 90

**Weapons**

Significant funding has been put towards a programme of disarmament by which for every weapon, the government pays $100 in Kinshasa and $50 everywhere else. 91 However, these incentives have been subverted by the availability of weapons and their ongoing use. Many interviewees and informal interlocutors declared how easy it was to buy a Kalashnikov for $30. 92 The same is true of the programmes of demobilisation, finding it very difficult to persuade combatants to

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88 Two MPs spoke of these dynamics as an obstacle for ending the conflict. Interview with Deputy for Goma, Kinshasa, September 23, 2011; Interview with Deputy for Masisi, Goma, August 4, 2010.
92 This was available information in all fieldwork locations. It was confirmed by the two demobilisation officers interviewed, all Mai Mai and ex-Mai Mai combatants and it was raised in detailed in several interviews including Interview with Masisi Territory Administrator, Masisi, September 14, 2011; Interview with MONUSCO JMAC Officer (no. 156), Kinshasa, September 23, 2011.
leave the armed groups, even with substantial economic benefits.\textsuperscript{93} The problem civilians’ resistance to disarmament poses to DDR programmes is that authorities believe their weapons can then be handed over to Mai Mai combatants.\textsuperscript{94} Mai Mai Yakotumba members narrated how they make use of solidarity kin and religious-based networks to access the weapons held by villagers.\textsuperscript{95} Other Mai Mai combatants also recognised their use of family and kin networks to take advantage of the trafficking in conventional weapons and to gather bamboo and gunpowder to fabricate their own guns.\textsuperscript{96}

The Mai Mai do not only rely on these networks to gain access to weapons. They also steal them from the army. One strategy they claim to use is magic formulas that protect them from dying which enable them to attack the army to collect their arms. There are several formulas. A traditional one, giving the Mai Mai their name (Mai or Mayi means water in Swahili and Lingala), is based on the combatants bathing in water blessed by prophet Kimbangu. This bathing protects them from the bullets, which at the moment of impact are turned into water. Another formula is the fabrication of a potion called ‘dawa’, ‘Formula 115’ or ‘grigri’.\textsuperscript{97} Once this potion is swallowed, it provides protection from death. Being under the effects of these formulas, they would attack a battalion, killing its members or making them flee, and then collect their weapons.\textsuperscript{98}


\textsuperscript{94} Interview with DDRRR Officer, Uvira, August 28, 2010; Interview with Assistant Administrator to the Civil Authority Representative, Baraka, September 1, 2010; Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127).

\textsuperscript{95} Informal Conversation with Yakotumba members.

\textsuperscript{96} Informal Conversation with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant; Interview with Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant; Interview with Demobilised Combatant from Mai Mai General Dunia.

\textsuperscript{97} Dawa is a generic name across territories but the others are also used in Bunyakiri and Uvira respectively.

\textsuperscript{98} Interview with Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant; Informal Conversation with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant; Interview with Simba Mai Mai / MRS Combatant.
Another source of weapons and ammunition is illicit trafficking, mainly of minerals. Mai Mai Yakotumba is a case in point. Being in control of part of the coast in Lake Tanganika gives them access to Tanzania and Burundi. They have been known to capture boats.\textsuperscript{99} They also control mines whose profit is used to purchase armaments.\textsuperscript{100} However, the transport and hiding of many of these arms is carried out through networks amongst the civilian population and not necessarily amongst combatants.

\textit{Food, protection and information}

Although weaponry is fundamental for the continuation of the militias and their military successes, they rely on other services such as food, protection and intelligence for survival and strategic planning. Militias tend to be hidden in the forest although some of their members live in the villages. Most of the time they do not have the resources to set up self-sustaining camps. So for instance, an NGO representative who was active in training women in self-defence in the territory of Kabare (South-Kivu) states that ‘their enemy were the FDLR and the FRF... the Mai Mai [General Padiri] just came here to eat and get provisions’.\textsuperscript{101} Although this would be typical of a family connection, the support network seems to be much greater.

Speaking about Fizi and Yakotumba, an NGO researcher noted that the strongest support Mai Mai had were from their own clans and families. ‘It is from here that they take what they need: provisions, munitions, information...’\textsuperscript{102} However, support has to be bigger than the clan by necessity. The interviewee noted that ‘they also have their networks from which they can send a messenger even to the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Interview with Representative CCAP, Uvira; Evariste Mfaume, \textit{Rapport Synthèse de Monitoring} (Baraka: Solidarité de Volontaires pour l’Humanité, September 13, 2010);
ADEPAE et al., \textit{Au-delà Des “Groups Armés.”}
\item UN Group of Experts, \textit{Final Report on the DRC (2011)}, 4 –5 ; Interview with MONUSCO JMAC Officer (no. 150), Bukavu, September 8, 2010.
\item Interview with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant, Kinshasa.
\item Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
heart of the army to gather information’. Different services are sought ranging from the closer environment of the family, to the clan, to the ethnic group to the broader political, military and economic networks and other Mai Mai militias. As will be noted in the next chapter, these networks and exchanges are also part of strategies of everyday survival against poverty.

A FARDC Colonel in charge of Fizi had no doubt about the solidarity and overlap between the Mai Mai and the population. He pointed out firstly that Kimya II had failed because of a lack of population support, and that ‘in fact they [the population] kept passing information to the armed groups’. For this FARDC colonel, it was clear that ‘what makes the whole thing complicated is the population’, adding ‘what enrages me when I see how a soldier is killed is to think, how many houses has he passed by to arrive there? Why has he been hidden? Why hasn’t the population given any information?’

On the whole, Mai Mai’s strongest and most reliable support is the population. Gradients of support are likely to develop from the family to the clan to the ethnic communities and then onto broader networks. This support, even if it cannot be generalised across the whole of the population, represents a challenge to the statebuilding mission. A main obstacle to inter-community dialogue and local peacebuilding strategies is Mai Mai’s conviction that the laying down of arms means subjection to the rule of the army. Evariste Mfume from the NGO Solidarites de Volontaires pour l’Humanité summarised it succinctly: ‘If the communities were to get together and say no to the armed groups, the problem would be finished… but each sees in their armed group their protector’. In Masisi, Bunyakiri, Fizi and Baraka, fieldwork illustrates not hatred against other communities but mainly fear of the army, the FDLR and other armed groups.

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103 Interview with FARDC Colonel in Baraka (no. 129).
104 Ibid.
105 Interview with SVH Director Evariste Mfume, Baraka, September 16, 2011.
106 Interview with Representative CCAP, Uvira; Interview with Banyamulengue Sheep Herder, Baraka; Interview with Women’s NGO FEDI representative; Interview with Fizi SOCICO representative, Baraka; Interview with Father Théofile Gakunzi, Bukavu, August
Peace is highly desired but there is a general distrust that the government and the military can provide it. Significantly, the breaking of ties between the civilian population and their armed groups lies at the heart of many UN and government statebuilding strategies.

4. c. Desolidarising popular classes and Mai Mai militias

The popular support given to Mai Mai militias becomes a visible fact when the government and the MONUC/MONUSCO invest significant resources to ‘desolidarise’ the population from the Mai Mai militias and ‘sensitize’ ‘civil society’ to ‘accept state authority’, ‘lay down the arms’ and ‘live pacifically with the army’. UN Civil Affairs for instance has these ‘sensitization’ exercises as part of its mandate for supporting state authority restoration. ‘Since 2011’ MONUSCO Civil Affairs claims to have ‘reached about 7000 people in 17 different localities in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri District’ in a ‘sensitization campaign on the rights and responsibilities of the administrative authorities and local population’. STAREC has done their own ‘sensitization forums’ throughout those provinces with the support of civil society organisations. STAREC sessions are done by civil society representatives because ‘people do not

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26, 2010.


110 As example: Ahoussi, “Forums de Sensibilisation Des Populations Au STAREC.”
have any trust in the political class’. Their aim is to convince people to stop supporting the armed groups, to stop guarding their weapons, and to ‘pacifically co-habit with the army’.

**An Example from Baraka and Fizi**

One such ‘sensitization’ activity is the workshop organised by MONUC Civil Affairs in Fizi and Baraka (South Kivu) to ease the sour relationship between civil society (population) and the military. The purpose of this workshop is best described in the words of the Civil Affairs officer in his opening speech: ‘there needs to be collaboration and cohesion between society and power in order to render results towards peace and stability’. This officer is voicing not only the perception that people’s solidarity with the armed groups is a real impediment for the statebuilding mission, but the extent to which resistance is successful in denying and subverting state agendas.

The significance of the Fizi territory has already been noted. Aside from the tense relations that have developed between the Tutsi-Banyamulengue population and the Bembe population, the March-23 agreement, by which CNDP elements integrated into the army and were spread throughout the Eastern provinces were also felt in this region. This military deployment fed the theories claiming that Rwanda would be infiltrating the army in their attempt to annex a part of the Kivus. Many of these reintegrated CNDP elements are of Tutsi origin and include many who only speak Kinyarwanda. This situation, in addition to the military

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112 Interview with SOCICO - North Kivu representative, Goma.
113 Participant Observation XIV, UN Civil Affairs Sensitization Workshop between the Military and Civil Society, Fizi and Baraka, September 3, 2010.
114 Civil Affairs Officer, Opening Speech Sensitization Workshop between the Military and Civil Society, Fizi, September 4, 2010.
115 Kinyarwanda is a Rwandese language. Some of these elements reintegrated in the army do not speak the official languages of the provinces (Swahili and French), let alone the local languages. I was able to observe this during my field trips in Baraka, Fizi and Masisi.
strategy of scattering an utterly under-resourced and undisciplined army throughout the territory, has created a low intensity war between the population and the military. As previously noted, this strategy entails those military elements living with and off the civilian population. Although many brigades engage in multiple commercial activities which complement local commercial networks, residents are forced to provide the military with labour, food, housing, sex and information, while the military are a source of violence and predation.\(^{116}\)

As such, this so-called ‘sensitization workshop’ illustrated that the military is perceived as an enemy by the civilian population, and that the military and state authorities needed “civil society” in order to establish state order. The military were complaining that people would side more with the Mai Mai militias than with them, that people would not give them information, that the population was hostile to them and that they did not respect authority.\(^{117}\) NGOs present at the workshop complained about the military’s human rights abuses, the fact that they did not speak their language and that they were treated like criminals, because of the perceived support to their own local militias.\(^{118}\) One of the UN officers moderating the sessions at one point explained what role each was supposed to play: ‘the army, the police and civil society all have a role to play in society under legality’; for example, he said, ‘the teachers must teach and not take up arms’; ‘the soldiers must protect the population and not steal from them’.\(^{119}\)

This workshop demonstrated two interesting factors. One was that the civil society/population component, represented by local NGOs and religious

\(^{116}\) Some of these were raised in the workshop. It came in several interviews and has been reported extensively as dynamics in civil/military relations. E.g. Interview with Women’s NGO FEDI representative; Interview with Representative of Women’s Group Femmes Père Saint-Simon, Bunyakiri; Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished”: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo, 3; Free the Slaves, The Congo Report: Slavery in Conflict Minerals (Washington: Open Square Foundation, June 2011), 13.

\(^{117}\) Participant Observation XIV, UN Civil Affairs Sensitization Workshop between the Military and Civil Society.

\(^{118}\) Rape, arbitrary arrests, extortions, theft and abuse of authority.

\(^{119}\) Participant Observation XIV, UN Civil Affairs Sensitization Workshop between the Military and Civil Society.
organisations had links to the Mai Mai militias. Two days after the workshop, members of this “civil society”, in an attempt to show good will, passed information to the commander of the area to notify them of an incoming attack on one of their battalions. Similarly, despite the imbalance of power, it was demonstrated that people retained a substantial amount of control over what takes place on the ground. Army and state administrators had much to gain from the withdrawal of civilian support to militias and they could obtain concrete compromises from the population: pass information, stop making donations, stop giving food and shelter to the militias. However, there were not similar commitments on the part of the military and the state administrators: stop abuses, rape, robbery, abuse of authority and illegal tax collection. Still, the frustration of the military and administrators was that without the help of the population they could not get rid of the armed groups.  

The experience of the workshop also reveals “civil society” as an ambiguous partner for statebuilding strategies. This ambiguity has been established by research conducted both within policy and academic circles. Mac Ginty, for instance, has also shown the thin line in Northern Ireland between “civil society” and “armed groups”. This is important because whereas civil society is seen as a pillar for liberal peace in order to legitimise a project of statebuilding based on good governance; civil society’s role in this situation is not straightforward. It can act as an antagonist rather than a partner.

‘People are intoxicated’

Examining the efforts to ‘desolidarise’ civilian population from the Mai Mai militias illustrate the non-elite support to these militias and the motivations for  

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120 Interview with FARC Colonel in Baraka (no. 129); Interview with FARC Officer in Baraka (no. 162), Baraka, September 17, 2011.
doing so. Firstly, it is possible to establish a significant overlap at the non-elite level of the population, even if the boundaries of class, resistance and domination are blurred and complicated in the DRC context. Second, these efforts highlight underlying elite assumptions. Precisely because these militias represent the subordinate groups in society, far from making an analysis of people’s political agendas, it is not uncommon to observe how DRC government representatives, UN officials and NGO members think of the Mai Mai as ‘the poor’ or ‘marijuana smokers’ or just remnant ‘embers’. The reasons explaining popular support for Mai Mai militias from these analyses can be summarised in the statement of an NGO officer: ‘people are intoxicated’. People’s support of the militias is seen as the action of helpless, ignorant, ‘lumpenproletariat’-type of people, manipulated by politicians to fulfil their own interests. These assumptions illustrate the elite’s hidden transcripts. Delegitimising and mocking the militias by denying them any political significance and linking them to drug-use and human rights abuses is a discursive attack of the form seen in the previous chapter.

Conversely, that state authority is not straightforwardly accepted resonates strongly with what De Certeau would see as a popular mechanism that subverts discipline. The denial of state authority, whether symbolised in the rejection of the army in Fizi, of the MONUC/MONUSCO-backed military operations in Bunyakiri, in the self-defence mechanisms against the FDLR in Bunyakiri, added to the continuous provisioning for the militias, illustrates political choices with collective dimensions that cannot be seen as anything but forms of resistance.

124 Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127).
125 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, xiv.
5. Conclusion: Militarised Peace, Militarised Authority and Violent Resistance

The militarisation of peace and the dynamics of violence in the DRC are carried out through both official and unofficial channels in relation to how ideals and practices stick or deviate from the kind of ideal state. Although at an official level strategies may attempt to concentrate the use of legitimate violence on the hands of the state, the practice of statebuilding has achieved what Mbembe calls the ‘socialisation’ of violence. For Mbembe, this means that community groups form their own armed groups, remain armed or ally themselves with armed groups as an effect of domination and not as an action of resistance. Although Mai Mai militias represent this form of socialisation and many times have become a source of domination and violence to their own constituencies, they represent a challenge to statebuilding. Mai Mai militias signal self-reliance for community protection and hence a challenge to the discourse of protection on which post-conflict statebuilding is premised. They are a vehicle towards political aspirations. These are articulated through a discourse of survival, security, political participation and land distribution, which are equated to emancipation. Although their ongoing military activity reifies a militarised context that provokes further domination, they represent an everyday form of resistance. Not only they generally operate in typical self-defence and non-confrontational ways, there is also significant overlap between the militias and the non-elite sectors of the population. Either directly or in representation of a larger constituency they deny the actions or mitigate the effects of those that cause insecurity, which is experienced as a form of domination. The cases of Bunyakiri with the presence of the FDLR and the Amani Leo troops, and Fizi with the FARDC are exemplars.

Both MONUC/MONUSCO and the government defeat their idealised vision of the state in the very praxis of statebuilding. The idealised vision of the state,
deployed in the sensitization workshops to desolidarise the population from the militias, involves a civil society that demands services, an army that secures people and a government that provides services to the population. That the government and the army act as predatory armed groups and the fact that MONUC/MONUSCO, knowing this, still supports a strategy of disarming the population while supporting the military strategies of the government and the army challenges the approaches by which they want to restore public service, order, development and peace. A significant response from the population when flight is not possible or unwanted is to join or support the Mai Mai militias.

The fact that these ‘poor marijuana smokers’ present a challenge to the government is not just in their capacity to mobilise illegal resources from mines or weapons from overseas. Rather, the main challenge is that they convey a significant sector of the population’ sentiments against domination and are a tool to protect peoples’ agendas of security, political authority and land. These broader political agendas and not just the difficult economic circumstances they endure should be seen at the root of the challenges many demobilisation programmes face. In conversation with a demobilisation officer, it was stated that without programmes providing reinsertion to a life with enough means of living and a motivating job, it was difficult to persuade combatants to return to civil life.\textsuperscript{127} However, as Marriage and Hoffmann show, it is not just the lack of motivating elements to return to civil life, but the ideological commitments to the armed groups that demobilising strategies do not take into account.\textsuperscript{128}

Mai Mai militias represent a violent way of claiming popular aspirations. Yet these weapons of the weak need not be seen as the summation of other strategies, or a step forward from the others. Rather, they need to be seen alongside others. Armed resistance, whether it is by the direct participation as combatants or by

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{127} Interview with UPN-DDR Officer, Goma.  
\textsuperscript{128} Marriage, “Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier: Demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo”; Hoffmann, “Militarised Bodies and Spirits of Resistance.”}
their support should also be seen as an effect of war and statebuilding. Denying and mitigating their effects while advancing alternative agendas is an example of everyday resistance. The next chapter will illustrate in a similar manner how the context of poverty pushes people to organise their own forms of survival as well as challenging authority’s claim on the distribution of wealth.
In Chapter Three it was argued that the patterns of coercion and extraction within the different statebuilding processes underway determine conditions for the continuation of poverty on the ground. This statement had a caveat: that the exercise and consolidation of state authority did not necessarily imply social transformation or a real commitment of the state to impose itself, but rather the management of state absences and state presences through a plurality of

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authorities. As such, neither post-conflict statebuilding nor state absences can be seen per se as single causes of poverty. These have a long and complex historical legacy. Still, the process of producing state authority is part and parcel of processes of production, distribution and social hierarchy. Kankwenda notes that predation in the DRC, or as he calls it, ‘predatocracy’ is ‘as old as the country’. As such, the strategies of resistance against the impact of war and statebuilding on livelihoods are inscribed in a long historical trajectory. Some would argue that these strategies are characteristic of the material relationship between states and societies or even of the natural struggle against poverty. Although a similar argument should be made of discursive and violent practices so far observed, creative survival figures prominently as an example of how patterns of resistance are recontextualised alongside changes in political and economic circumstances.

Post-conflict statebuilding in this sense represents a contemporary snapshot of a historical process in which political, economic and cultural relations connect the local to the global. Whether resistance is exercised discursively, violently or, as will be explored in this chapter, as a form of survival, it is conditioned by the way authority is asserted along the axis of state absence and presence. Nonetheless, in

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2 An interesting reflection on the role of the state in post-war reconstruction as a vehicle for a capitalist economy can be found in Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Ch. 2.


4 Ibid., 17.

this interstice, solidarity, and not just coercion and extraction, is an important element of the everyday political landscape.

Creativity, as the art of *la débrouille*, is defined here as the use of imagination, solidarity and reciprocity to produce anything that allows or improves survival. Although a rumba-song would have captured the concept better, the image above is also illustrative of the ways in which creativity provides everyday needs. It is a broom made out of needle-like palm leaves held by a tomato can, which serve simultaneously as a holder. Making this broom is the fruit of a myriad of monetary, symbolic and reciprocal exchanges. The final product is testimony to how Congolese creativity facilitates survival and that this is a collective project. This creativity is applied to the delivery of all sorts of services (food security, health, education, conflict resolution, and even national army and police

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7 Music is most representative of creativity in the DRC. Not only is it part of Congolese historical heritage in a special manner, but also it is ever present in daily life as an essential part of its recreation. Music has thus particular significance in *la débrouille*. Arguably music, even mainstream, is a tool of political engagement rather than simple entertainment. See: Paul Tiyambe Zeleza and Dickson Eyoh, *Encyclopedia of Twentieth-century African History* (London: Routledge, 2003) See historical legacy, p. 71 and the roots of Congolese rumba, p. 130. Note the lyrics of rumba-song by Koffi Olomide: ‘Toza na systeme ya lifelo moto ekopela kasi tozo zika te (“We are in hell. The fire is burning, but we don’t burn”’ cited and translated in Ibid., 307. See also: Marcel K. Mangwanda, “Subverting the Dominant Gender Discourse in Congolese Popular Music: Mbilia Bel’s ‘Eswi Yo Wapi’ and Mpongo Love’s ‘Monama Elima’,” *Muziki Journal of Music Research in Africa* 6, no. 1 (2009): 120 – 130.

provisioning). By taking control of these services, subordinate classes are simultaneously articulating modes of political authority and social organisation in a way that deny, mitigate, ‘de-totalise’ and provide alternatives to state authority.9

This is not necessarily an attack, or a direct denial. Rather it is a self-regarding activity, a form of aikido, that subverts forms of extraction by enacting channels of reappropriation. This reappropriation provokes denial of extractive claims and facilitates the mitigation of the effects of domination. Within these practices of survival, there are different practices and grades in the visibility of intent. For instance, while tax evasion or defending land ownership through armed groups could be seen as a more direct claim-regarding form of resistance, non-violent self-help tactics of land seizure, negotiating the terms of military rule and social service and infrastructure provision could all be seen as self-regarding activities that subvert the effects of poverty, appropriation and authoritarianism.10 Revisiting De Certeau’s language, they are tactics that follow self-logics, they redirect wealth, reappropriate it and defend it, subverting the logic of power. This interpretation is nonetheless contested.

This chapter is structured in four sections around the topics just mentioned. It first addresses these critiques as a way of analysing how the framework applies to survival. The following three sections offer examples that illustrate different aspects of statebuilding and resistance practices. Starting with tax evasion and practices against elite land appropriation;11 it follows a section illustrating the mitigation of the authoritarian nature of military rule through negotiation. This deployment has to do with the military approach against armed groups, as part of

10 Self as both individual and collective.
11 In order to simplify the analysis, the term elite-land appropriation will be used to refer to those strategies that are in the orbit of statebuilding including as a consequence of the policy to grant ownership to land holders in detriment of collective holdings via customary law, or as the result of new wealth allocations and development policies. The term non-elite land distribution refers to peasant’s agendas, which imply collective or customary land ownership, land rights, and food security.
the political compromises with the CNDP and Rwanda, and as a form of palliative to state absence. The chapter finishes with a section examining various examples of social service provision.

All these examples illustrate that surviving and mitigating the effects of dispossession is simultaneously a way to provide self-management and rearticulate the social and political space. They reaffirm mechanisms of self-reliance and assert alternative political agendas. In all these areas, although it might not be explicitly stated, women take a central role, being the main service providers. The note on gender division should not be seen, especially after the last chapter, as a portrayal of war-mongering men and caring women. Far from establishing an image of women as ‘peace-makers’ and men as ‘war-mongers’, these divisions need to be seen as part of the imperative of a broader war context, determining labour roles through gender roles. It should also be noted that the examples discussed here, including taxation, land distribution, negotiating military rule and social service provision, are all complex areas from which one could generate volumes of analysis. They have been chosen as illustrations of the dynamics between post-conflict statebuilding and resistance, as they pertain to the sphere of livelihoods and material extraction.

2. Appropriation and Extraction in the Interstice of State Presences and Absences

The reliance for survival on the débrouille has been a feature of Congolese history. The response to the ‘delinquency’ of this relatively absent state, as Kankwenda puts it, has been ‘the emergence of an active and dynamic civil society, organised to take control of everyday survival, education, health, neighbourhood security,

12 Yoka, “Bien-être Et Développement?,” 11; Interview with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant, Kinshasa; Interview with Peasant Union Member (no. 151), Bukavu.
‘People being in charge’ has a dual political value as social services and as political organisation. For Mac Gaffey, for example, ‘through the second economy, the citizenry may not only evade civil obligations but also express resistance to the state and to the class which controls it’. It follows that with the humanitarian crisis of the different wars in Congo, the economy has once again relied on people’s capacity for survival, reflecting the tension between necessity and resistance.

Many have seen survival as an effect of governmentality, signalling accommodation, not resistance, to a successfully imposed neoliberal agenda. Some have also argued that the relative absence of the state facilitates the creation of mechanisms of domination where the state and the effects of a particular political economy transcend private life. Subjection, or at least, negotiation, is henceforth the key for surviving domination, but may not be seen as a form of resistance.

The work of Chabal exemplifies this view. He argues, firstly, that ‘the state may not be able to do what it is mandated to do but it is still vigorous enough to keep a check on what is being done informally’. As a result, the state keeps a degree of control on the ground and maintains informal networks of power linked to state

17 For Foucault, government practice had a certain rational about not only what government means but about the best way to achieve it. ‘Governmental ratio is what will enable a given state to arrive at its maximum being in a considered, reasoned, and calculated way. [To govern is] to arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent […] wealthy [and] strong in the face of everything that may destroy it’. Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978 - 79*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 4; Chabal, *The Politics of Suffering and Smiling*.
agents and bureaucrats. Secondly, Chabal argues that subordinate classes, by providing all sorts of social services, from security to electricity, and hospitals to rubbish management, are actually involved in a form of state extortion. ‘Civil servants’ he argues ‘prey on those who cannot afford to resist them: police harass ordinary people; nurses demand bribes; teachers require payment; the providers of official paperwork (ID cards, passports, market licences, etc.) sell their ‘good offices’.”

Chabal identifies what has been noted in previous chapters, that the capacity of peace strategies to claim success is the capacity of subordinate classes to absorb their negative consequences. Leaving people to ‘fend for themselves’ whether it is rubbish collection, dealing with armed groups or sustaining the national army, can be viewed, within the context of DRC, as a mode of extortion only benefiting those who would otherwise be responsible for dealing with these things. However, the problem with Chabal’s arguments is that he does not afford agency to the political choices subordinate classes make. This is not to say that people opt to be exploited. But to observe this is to ignore the daily strategies of resistance to exploitation and the capacity of subordinate classes to exercise control over their circumstances. Whereas predatory strategies are seen in many state-residual services, self-provision helps to placate poverty, violence and war, and mitigate the extraction of labour, land and taxes.

These strategies also create mutual obligations where ideals concerning what authorities should be doing provide a measure of legitimacy. Chabal himself states that

\[\text{at the heart of the politics of belonging and partaking[,] relations of proximity and reciprocity provide the foundations upon which rulers and ruled, elite and populace, relate to each other within and across communities [and] notions of ethics and morality are based on the honouring of relations of social exchange and on how these relations}\]

\[20\text{Ibid., 151, emphasis in the original.}\]
\[21\text{As Scott argues in relation to inhabitants in the high plateaus of ‘Zomia’, people do not reject ‘development’ but domination. The Art of Not Being Governed, e.g. 113 - 115.}\]
influence the nature and conduct of politics on the continent.\textsuperscript{22}

Therefore ‘bartering’ puts authorities and subordinate classes on a more equal footing. It grants non-elites a space for subverting the relationship by imposing on elites the requirement to negotiate. In all of this, as mentioned before, there is an element of exploitation and abandonment. As a resident of a Butembo neighbourhood put it: ‘if we have to wait for the state, nothing gets done’.\textsuperscript{23} This self-management and self-provision palliates the effects of domination, identifying alternative political agendas of food security, land, and political participation. The examples provided in this chapter are not exhaustive. They illustrate instances of everyday survival where the elements of denial, mitigation and the advancing of subordinates’ own agendas are present.

3. \textit{Confronting Extraction, Subverting Distribution}

State authority assertion and consolidation is done through the levying of taxes, and the transfer and allocation of property rights. Despite in some areas, as seen for instance in the negotiation of refugee settlement or in the ‘sensitization’ exercises to ease civil-military relations, statebuilding has a predatory effect. This effect, and the resistance it generates, is seen in the areas of land property management and tax levy. In the DRC, since land belongs to the state by law, its allocation can be arbitrary, yet remaining within the law. Land links state administrators to multiple state institutions and private elites. Similarly, taxes are not only a tool for state financing but also a survival strategy for public servants.\textsuperscript{24} Contradictorily, the resilience of customary and collective land administration, in addition to the fact that the state cannot efficiently raise taxes, offer an insight into

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{23} Interview with “Nyumba Kumi” Neighbourhood Representative of 10 houses, Butembo, July 2010.
how everyday creative survival denies and mitigates the impact that taxation and elite-land distribution have on peasants’ livelihoods.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Tax}

Non-elites see tax collection as illegitimate. Whether in a formalised or informalised way, there is widespread concern that taxes are paid to \textit{enrich the pockets of the politicians}.\textsuperscript{26} There is nothing unusual about this. The same patterns of discourses and tax evasion could be found worldwide. However, in the DRC, taxes not reaching the state take an important dimension. Those that are collected on the ground generate revenues. This is illustrated by the dynamics in which tax collection and tax evasion take place. The tax revenue in the DRC was 13.5\% of total GDP in 2010 (as opposed to for instance the 37.8\% of the UK).\textsuperscript{27} According to the World Bank, in all countries, generally, 1\% of the registered tax-payers provide 70\% of the tax revenue.\textsuperscript{28} Thus while non-elite tax contributions to the state treasury are marginal or inexistent, they are fundamental for the myriad of state-representatives that are on the ground.

Still, the way taxation works also means that there is widespread tax avoidance.\textsuperscript{29} In a focus group in Butembo (North Kivu), five out of six participants confirmed that they did not pay their taxes, firstly because the tax officer rarely came to their houses, and, secondly, because they felt that they did not owe anything to the

\textsuperscript{26} Cf. Discourses explored in Chapter Five.
\textsuperscript{29} This interpretation resonates with studies including Jeroen Adam and Koen Vlassenroot, “‘La Fiscalité de Poche’: The Politics of Taxation in Eastern Congo” (presented at the Annual Meeting, San Francisco: African Studies Association, 2010); Earlier studies include: Roitman, “The Politics of Informal Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa”; Mac Gaffey, \textit{The Real Economy of Zaire}. 

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state. In informal conversations, many residents stated their refusal to pay their taxes if they were not going to get anything back from them. Interestingly, the idealised version of the state works as a tax avoidance strategy: if the state does not work for them, people will not pay the state its dues.

This was a constant in all places where fieldwork was undertaken. Conflict around tax seemed to be especially prevalent around small commerce where tax officers are more present. In Goma, in a small survey carried out with street sellers, all participants confirmed that they had found ways to avoid taxation. This included hiding merchandise, packing and leaving, and alternating selling days. In the central market at Baraka (South Kivu), sellers complained about the variety and cost of the taxes. They said that the benefit they receive is too low and the taxes too high. As a result, they invented mechanisms for tax evasion. For instance, people selling the same products tend to gather together in the same place. They keep checking whether a tax officer might be coming. If an officer arrives, several sellers of the same product will go away, while one remains. This individual tells the officer that all the products are hers so that the tax paid is substantially lower than if each person had to pay for their product separately. The result is a mutual reticence. Neither the tax officers nor the taxpayers are happy with the tax system, but cohabit as a kind of a stalemate. This does not mean a lack of conflict. On the contrary, there is a constant "toeing and froing", which, in the context of war, entails negotiation, but also armed confrontation.

30 Focus Group Butembo Residents, Butembo, July 31, 2010.
31 Interview with “Chef de Quartier” (Neighbourhood representative) Matumaini Walikomba, Butembo, July 31, 2010.
32 Small survey sampling 10 street sellers in the Boulevard Kanyamuhanga in Goma including: 3 phone credit sellers, 2 tomatoes, chillies and peanut sellers, 1 music seller, 3 bread sellers and 1 photocopy maker.
33 Interviews with Baraka Market Sellers, Baraka, September 2010.
As with the workshops organised to *de-solidarise* population from armed groups, tax payment has its own ‘sensitization’ workshops. For example, a SOCICO representative in Masisi was asked by the government to carry out seminars to ‘demand people to pay their taxes’; but as he says ‘that didn’t pass well through their ears’.

A representative of Itinerant Traders Association in Bunyakiri spoke about the arbitrariness with which taxes were charged. In an exemplary instance of negotiation, he indicated that often ‘when there is a tax that traders see as unfair or that they cannot pay, the association speaks to the inspector or the authorities so that traders are relieved of the payment’.

This cautious negotiation style was reflected in the taxation campaign started by the provincial government of South Kivu. The message on a poster, displayed in one of the poorest neighbourhoods in Bukavu, gently asked: ‘Dear tax-payer, pay your taxes and duties in order to aid your provincial government to finance the 5 pledges and other projects of development’.

As Mkandawire has shown, unpaid taxes are a sign of the weakness of the state and the success of resistance in many African countries. The result is a mutual ‘arm’s length’ distance. The government makes the people responsible for the lack of development, while people are not willing to pay taxes until they see the government work for development.

However, negotiation and coercion go hand in hand. The state seeks alternative ways to finance its own presence and support elite networks, including both threats and the imposition of penalties, including prison.

The state shares taxation levy power with armed groups, the army and the police. This kind of taxation is often negotiated, but if not accepted, it is done at gunpoint. The use, or

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34 Interview with President of Civil Society - Masisi Centre, Masisi.
35 Interview with Bamwicho Bikanaba, Representative of the Committee of Itinerant Traders Association, Bunyakiri, August 21, 2010.
36 Provincial Government of South Kivu, Bukavu’s Kadutu neighbourhood. Poster seen on August 8, 2010.
the threat of violence makes this taxation difficult to evade and further spurs armed contestation. As an example, the chart below shows the taxes extracted by the FARDC and Amani Leo forces.

![Chart showing FARDC extortions in Kabare & Kasha](chart.png)

Table 6. Oxfam Protection Survey

The table above only shows estimates, from multiplying the extraction observed in one day by the thirty days in a month. Although these are not exact figures, extortion by FARDC and Amani Leo troops has been widely reported. However, it would be limited to conclude that the above supports Chabal’s arguments about successful domination. These activities should not be looked at from the perspective of whether the state has been “successful” in extracting taxes and whether resistance has been “successful” in avoiding them. Rather, both of these practices should be seen as ongoing processes. For statebuilding, this process entails negotiation and sharing fiscal authority. For resistance it means a denial of taxation legitimacy to the state.

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**Land**

It could be argued that all of the above regarding taxation applies also to land. However, land has a special symbolic and historical meaning. Changes in its use and property have a direct impact not just on revenue and political authority, but also on the social order and identity attached to it. As such, the conflict over land is not one of livelihoods but of political projects. One project is based on community control, participation in political representation and defence of land access; another concerns increasing land privatisation and concentration; yet other concerns state security and managing military and elite conflicts. These have been underlined by a process of militarisation, as war has acted as a conveyor belt between statebuilding and changes in land tenure. Land seizure and allocation in the DRC have become militarised both through direct occupation by armed groups and by the military response these seizures have prompted. As with the operations of armed groups, wars over land, and subsequent lack of access to land, have caused massive flight.\(^{41}\) Even if the land becomes empty, it still fulfils a series of statebuilding purposes: production of revenue through its sale, allocation or transfer to politicians, entrepreneurs or MNCs and the production of shared authority. Similarly, even if armed groups occupy land, if sufficiently powerful, they are likely to join elite and statebuilding networks.\(^{42}\)

Creativity has subverted elite-land distribution in three ways: as survival against deteriorating livelihoods, as cooperation for production and distribution, and as a form of negotiation with elites.\(^{43}\) These practices do not necessarily demonstrate a victory against elite-land redistribution, but they subvert the logic of


\(^{42}\) This has been the case of CNDP entering the orbit of Rwanda’s statebuilding effort and PARECO for the DRC government to counter it.

\(^{43}\) Other responses include flight and use of militias. This section explores practices of resistance directly linked to creative survival strategies.
appropriation, mitigating its effects and serving non-elite agendas. The effect is also a denial of legitimacy to elite claims, the de-totalisation of coercion, the imposition of negotiation, and the projection of political alternatives. Networks of proximity and kin, cooperative schemes, relying on solidarity and reciprocity, are often used as the ‘workers’ wig’, in De Certeau’s terms. They are the foundation for maintaining and recreating forms of political authority and self-organisation. There is a caveat to this affirmation. As the conflict over land has followed ethnic lines, one may argue that the elite/non-elite distinction is inadequate. This is partly true. However, the elite/non-elite division identifies the political and economic status linked to land tenure, even if social mobility makes these identities fluid.\(^{44}\) As such, without making permanent statements about who belongs where on the basis of class or ethnic identity, this division gains currency because it illustrates the patterns in which those who hold the power to grant land access are resisted by those who do not.

In a study on land tenure, conflict and household land use strategies in the territories of Masisi, Lubero (North Kivu) and Walungu (South Kivu), Vlassenroot identifies several mechanisms of survival within a context of increasing dispossession and food insecurity.\(^{45}\) They go from collective responses such as shared production and cooperative membership to individual methods such as crop theft and militia membership.

\(^{44}\) For instance, while Banyarwanda Hutu peasants had felt discriminated by Hunde chiefs in Masisi through at least the beginnings of its largest migration movement from Rwanda in the 1950s, they now currently hold political and military leadership in Masisi, having joined the CNDP under Banyarwanda Tutsi elite and Rwanda’s government (Banyarwanda meaning literally people of Rwanda, which is a term traditionally used in North Kivu to denominate people of Rwandan origin or with Rwandan ancestors). Jmac reports point to CNDP being majority Hutu but minority Tutsi leadership. Koen Vlassenroot, “Households Land Use Strategies in a Protracted Crisis Context: Land Tenure, Conflict and Food Security in Eastern DRC” (Conflict Research Group University of Ghent, 2006); JMAC Officer, Personal Communication, “Security Update - CNDP,” August 30, 2012; Interview with NRC representative, Goma, July 23, 2010.

\(^{45}\) Vlassenroot, “Households Land Use Strategies in a Protracted Crisis.”
Table 7 summarises the research and findings.

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<th>Constraints to food production</th>
<th>Constraints to food access</th>
<th>Household strategies</th>
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<td>Shifts in land tenure systems:</td>
<td>- Reduction of purchasing power</td>
<td>- Cultivation of small plots in wetlands</td>
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<td>* from a system of relative equality, proximity and mutual dependency based on customary chiefs to a system of alliances based on proximity to Kinshasa’s authorities;</td>
<td>- Limited availability of food</td>
<td>- Shift from monoculture to polyculture</td>
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<td>* collective tenure increasingly privatised and expropriated to large ranches</td>
<td>- Increase in the amount and number of taxes</td>
<td>- Adaptation of crop diversification to (lack of) tenure security</td>
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<td>- Destruction of market infrastructures</td>
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<td>- Pillaging of harvests</td>
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</table>

Many of these strategies are present in the activities of the League of Women Peasants Cooperative (LOFEPACO). It is a federation of peasant organisations for the protection of peasant interest but with a special regard for women’s issues. Most organisations integrated in LOFEPACO are women-only. According to

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46 Adapted and edited table from Ibid., 3. Clarifications on land tenure changes from pp. 6 - 7.
47 Unless noted the information on this organisation provided in the following two paragraphs relies on the following source: Interview with Activity Animator of the League des Organisation de Femmes Paysannes de Congo (LOFEPACO) Clarisse Ngemulo, Butembo.
Clarisse Ngemulo, LOFEPACO’s activity animator, the creation of these organisations and the federation responded to a need to provide women with a space to deal with their specific problems. These problems included a sense of disempowerment, inequality and marginalisation. In particular, in the Hira culture women have inferior cultural status. Around the year 2000 they decided to create a federation to reinforce the strength and effectiveness of other organisations in the empowering of women and peasants. The league facilitated exchanges and training in different domains, including government lobbying. What is striking is that in the middle of one of the worst periods of armed conflict, they felt that the struggle they had started and the campaigning tools the cooperative was granting them became even more meaningful. Not only did women feel like the main targets of war, they also considered that part of the solution to war relied on solving the problems of poverty, inequality, corruption and certain customary traditions that kept women disadvantaged.

As such, the federation constituted an economic solution, a funding mechanism for war-related effects, a campaigning tool, and a vehicle for political and social change. Their activities included the creation of a credit cooperative, assuring food security, creating a seed bank and exchanging products and skills training. The women only spaces promoted discussion on empowerment, self-esteem, leadership, awareness of land tenure rights, customary rules, sexism, and what they called *listening spaces*. These were spaces where women who had been raped

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48 This is the ethnic community many members of LOFEPACO belong to. Women are not allowed to own land. When their husband dies, the land is re-distributed by the customary chief or through the male-members of the family. Interview with Activity Animator of the League des Organisation de Femmes Paysantes de Congo (LOFEPACO) Clarisse Ngemulo, Butembo, July 31, 2010; “Chef de Quartier” (Neighbourhood representative) Matumaini Walikomba, Butembo, July 31, 2010.

49 Their activities were focused in North Kivu and their name was in fact LOFEPANOKI. After 2005 they acquired a national focus, changing their name to LOFEPACO, although at the time of the interview their radio of action was still North Kivu and more so the Beni-Butembo axis. Maintaining a national coverage even if nominally can be a way to have access to certain national and international funding.

50 Information in this paragraph comes from Interview with Activity Animator of the League des Organisation de Femmes Paysannes de Congo (LOFEPACO) Clarisse Ngemulo, Butembo.
could be heard by other women. This has been reinforced by INGOs funding and training and has now developed into a psychological and economic support for survivors of sexual violence.\(^{51}\) They have organized sit-ins to demand the demilitarisation of certain areas like Mangango and Beni. They have also been successful in allowing many widows to access land titles. This has been achieved through campaigning and accompanying claimants to the territorial administrator office.

These activities demonstrate an associative tendency when addressing needs and engaging in political claims. Most importantly, they demonstrate that the constraints imposed by the political context do not make peasants lower their political aspirations, instead they become imperative. Of the six peasant cooperatives encountered during this project, all emphasised that the end of war should bring well-being, development, education, equality and political participation.\(^{52}\) For instance, a representative of the Union of Peasant Cooperatives of North Kivu (UCOOPANOKI), a cooperative of farms and cultivators in North Kivu, said that the main problems they faced were the appropriation of land by politicians, big landowners and MNCs, as well as the incursions by armed groups stealing their crops.\(^{53}\) Their aspirations were stated in terms of land access, security and fair prices to assure life in dignity.\(^{54}\)

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\(^{51}\) In particular the INGO Vredesilanden.

\(^{52}\) Ucoonakopi, Lofepaco, Association of Manioc producers (Bunyakiri), Syndicat de Protection des Intêrets Paysans (Beni), UPDI and Association Nutrition Assisse Communautaire (ANAC). The first three are federations of cooperatives operating across different territories within the province. UPDI and ANAC also operate as broader platforms for peasants to exchange products, cultivation techniques, provide community service, conduct lobbying activities and attract international funding. UPDI has 8 cooperatives associated in five territories in South Kivu (Kabare, Kalehe, Walungu, Mwenga and Uvira), and ANAC works in Mabuku and Beni (North Kivu). This was also the sentiment transmitted in other interviews with peasant unions and producer associations. Interview with Representative from Syndicat de Protection des Intêrets Paysans, Beni, interview; Interview with Representative from Association of Market Sellers and Buyers of South Kivu, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010.

\(^{53}\) As an example, they stated that 725 hectares of land in Kabiso (North Kivu) that belonged to the cooperative were threatened to be expropriated by the provincial government. According to Ucoopanoki representative, the issue had been taken to court, but ‘the approximate 1000 residents were threatened to have to leave in favour of 3 or 4 new proprietors’. Flight normally happens to another area where other family members
Likewise, in Bukavu, the Union Paysanne pour le Développement Integral (UPDI), was born in 1994 out of peasant members feeling disempowered and marginalised from INGOs development projects. Although land seizures and changes in land tenure had been already in place with Mobutu, the war has accentuated it. Peasants feel victims of all parties including politicians, armed groups, and MNCs, yet marginalised of decision-making. Peasants see themselves as an essential part of development, being at the heart of agricultural production. Significantly, the activities of the cooperatives mentioned above included a project of food security and a project of social change. They all claimed a need for empowerment and land conflict resolution.

Subverting Logics

Extraction through taxation and elite land distribution illustrates the mechanisms whereby statebuilding and resistance could be seen simultaneously in direct conflict as in conditions of mutual reticence. The models of private ownership pursued by the DRC government and international agencies, added to the favoured model of extraction whereby artisanal precarious and militarised mining serves large corporations but not necessarily local communities poses a threat to some of the core subsistence mechanisms the peasantry has traditionally relied on. Tax levy, although not a source of state income serves the purpose other political and military purposes that foster state authority presence. In this context, resistance delegitimises authority, reduces its extractive impact and imposes negotiation. More so, resistance produces self-organising mechanisms that resonate with non-elite aspirations for social justice and alternative forms of

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*Ibid.* Access to just prices was also raised in Bunyakiri by Manioc Producers Association. Interview with Representatives of Association Manioc Producers, Bunyakiri, August 21, 2010.

*55* Interview with representative from Union Paysanne pour le Développement Integral (UPDI), Bukavu.

political authority. It is argued that these subversive practices follow self-regarding logics and operate as self-help mechanisms for reappropriation and well-being, they are a form of resistance to the modes of accumulation. This raises the question of the relationship between these forms of resistance and post-conflict statebuilding. As has been argued, statebuilding produces externalities that are felt by the civilian population on the ground. An additional use of survival strategies and cooperative schemes is to tame the effects of the authoritarian nature of the army. This is a direct implication of having a strategy that privileges the needs of armed groups, security and economic interests over those of the civilian population.

4. Taming the Military

The strategy of scattering the army throughout the North and South Kivu territory serves political compromises acquired by the military operations coming out of the Goma Accords, those acquired through the March 23 agreement, and the purpose of having some form of state authority presence. Despite much criticism against the poor discipline, lack of control and disorganisation of the FARDC, the actions of MONUC/MONUSCO have supported the government in what seems to be a “better than nothing” approach. MONUC/MONUSCO, the EU and a plethora of foreign government aid agencies have provided operational support, training and funding. But aside from militarising the environment, which in practice is a tool for hierarchisation and the reaffirmation of positions of domination, army deployment is also an extractive tool. On a daily basis, the political, social and economic cost of this military deployment is assumed by local residents, particularly in rural areas. As seen in previous chapters, this deployment has generated resistance, and met with discourses of delegitimisation and armed attacks. However, the dependency the military has on the population

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57 Interview with Starec - Amani Leo representative, Goma; Interview with MONUSCO - ISSSS/STAREC liaison Officer, Goma.
has provoked an ambiguous ground on which survival tactics have been both a way to meet the military’s needs and to mitigate its effects. Notwithstanding the abuses of the military, these tactics have subverted the effects of the military presence so that they serve the self-help logics of the civilian population. Although Chabal, Hibou and Mbembe, for instance, argue that there is not resistance but accommodation, and even a logic of subjection, the dynamics of negotiation highlight that arrangements are contingent, thus allowing for redefining the limits of domination.

In this case, the process of negotiation taps into the logics of reciprocity and creativity that sustain daily life. Militarisation and authoritarianism, imposed by the conditions on which the army is deployed, is *de-totalised* through expectations of mutual obligation and the creation of mutual dependency. On the one hand, FARDC expects the population to respect their authority, provide security intelligence, assume their families’ livelihood needs, supply labour and grant them privileges in certain economic exchanges. On the other hand, residents expect FARDC to provide them with security, policing, labour, a greater guarantee or even ‘official’ stamp on conflict resolution processes, and reciprocity in economic and service exchanges. Judith Verweijen, who has extensively studied civil-military relations, notes that exchanges and civilian expectations of FARDC provisions include ‘conflict resolution, arbitration, policing, economic regulation and other governance practices’. In terms of conflict resolution,

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58 Respect and intelligence became one of the most important demands of the FARDC to civil society in the MONUSCO Sensitization workshop in Fizi and Baraka to ease civil-military relations. Participant Observation XIV, UN Civil Affairs Sensitization Workshop between the Military and Civil Society, Fizi and Baraka, September 3, 2010. How the civilian population provides for the everyday living needs of the military was directly raised in several interviews. This includes cooking, helping with childcare, aid with housework to military wives or directly host them at home. Interview with Representative of Women’s Group Femmes Père Saint-Simon, Bunyakiri; Interview with Women’s NGO FEDI representative; Interview with Representative of Association pour la Defense de Droits de la Femme (ADDF), Butembo; Interview with Representatives of Association Manioc Producers, Bunyakiri; Interview with FARDC Colonel in Baraka (no. 129).

arbitration and policing, they can go from settling chief succession or dowry disputes, to being present at football matches and markets, and prosecuting crimes such as cattle theft and poisoning. FARDC’s authority becomes mitigated and *de-totalised* by the process in which survival, including that of the FARDC troops themselves, is better assured by reciprocity and negotiation than force. In conditions of arbitrariness and inequality, the sphere of negotiation allows space for equalisation and brings a public eye to precisely the arbitrary and violent use of authority.

This dual effect of creative survival applied to civil/military relations can be seen in the response the newly deployed battalion of Amani Leo in April 2010 had in Baraka. Arche d’Alliance Refugee Protection Supervisor, Ildefonse Masumbo Zongolo, relates what has been noted by many Baraka and Fizi residents: These troops were forcing the displacement of people just to steal their goats to eat, beating residents sometimes just to steal their mobile phone, or money. Some of their members were even accused of rape. The worst period was, according to Zongolo, between April and May 2010, which included the attack of Mai Mai Yakotumba in April 2010. Arche d’Alliance organised a series of encounters with these troops and with the Amani Leo Commandant deployed at Baraka. According to Mr. Zongolo, from then on they would be able to go to the commandant, tell him who had done what and the commandant would apply the according penalty. In a primary example of how DIY and personal reciprocal ties

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60 Ibid.
62 Interview with Ildefonse Masumbo Zongolo, Refugee Protection Supervisor of NGO Arche D’Alliance, Baraka.
produce direct control, they would come to verify whether those who had finally been sentenced were serving their sentence. According to Mr. Zongolo:

Now when someone is the victim of misbehaviour by these troops, we visit the Commander and we say: ‘call in such and such because he has done so and so’ – the Commander applies to him maybe 15 days of imprisonment... then we verify whether he is really in the cell... we go there and may say: ‘Commander, we have come to give him something to eat’ – each day, because it is necessary that he gets his punishment.63

In many ways the hierarchy here has been subverted. This does not change what the military still means for many residents: disorder, violence and abuses. But engaging with them through collaboration, networking, solidarity, exchanges and mutual dependency is a way of equalising the relationship, and taming the arbitrariness and authoritarianism of their presence. As Scott noted of Jane Jacobs in her study of public order, she argues that order is not kept by the presence of the police, but by the presence of a multitude of bystanders, watchers, wanderers, shoppers, sellers, and commuters going ahead with their myriad activities.64 A similar argument could be made of the role of creative survival strategies put in place to host and feed troops. Their menace, disorder, disruption and distrust are mitigated by the same activities that are used to sustain family, neighbours and community. The hierarchically commanded militarising presence is subverted by making the military dependent, with a duty of reciprocity, on the landscape of ‘uninstitutionalized, uncodified habits of street-level trust in the production of civic order’.65 Forms of mitigation allow for a possible equalising of civil/military relations. Rather than compliance, they signal social conflict and a rejection of militarisation and predation by state authorities.

63 Ibid.
5. Taking over: DIY Everything and the Case of Social Services

As Tollens argues, it is due to the Congolese art of survival and their creative strategies that, in the midst of one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes since World War II, there has not been a declared famine.\textsuperscript{66} The self-made broom above represents that when something is needed, it is created. However, this does not apply just to everyday needs but goes as far as peace and reconciliation, mitigation of armed groups operations and the army, and, as this section will illustrate, a variety of social services. Reciprocity, solidarity and mutual dependencies established through community networks, ethnic, clan or family links, cooperatives and other groups are channels used for survival strategies. As was pointed out in the previous Chapter, self-reliance takes priority over reliance on the government or state authorities. Its effect, however, is subversion and the undermining of statebuilding strategies to implement the state.

As Vlassenroot and Romkena argue:

People tried to rely on the trust of personal relationships to compensate for the absence of a functioning legal and judicial apparatus. They also tried to evade a venal bureaucracy and an oppressive state by operating in the second economy to find opportunities to better lives. This popular economy of survival, in the end, became an alternative system of economic development that completely escaped state control.\textsuperscript{67}

They also note that ‘these informal structures can pose a serious constraint to state building as part of reconstruction efforts’.\textsuperscript{68} Vlassenroot and Romkena identify three important reasons. Firstly, this provision undermines legitimacy both in the eyes of the population and of donors. This has a domino effect regarding the alternative channels sought by the population for provision, which include the

\textsuperscript{67} Koen Vlassenroot and Hans Romkena, Local Governance & Leadership in Eastern DRC (Goma: Commissioned by Oxfam Novib, 2007), 9.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 8.
reliance on armed groups for security provision. Secondly, it places both the population and the state in competition for external funding. Thirdly, as a consequence, donors have felt more legitimate and secure in providing funds to NGOs rather than to the state, which has contributed to an even weaker state presence.69

More importantly, these mechanisms of survival entail a deeper political statement that resonates with a logic of reappropriation over political affairs. They signal a ‘reinvention of order’70, as Trefon puts it, where there is a process of negation of the imposed order, a subversion of it, and a projection of alternative forms of social organisation and political authority. These points are illustrated with three concrete examples of how electricity and health are generally provided. A final example from the town of Mabuku (North Kivu), where there is no permanent presence of state authority, brings about an opportunity to observe the dynamics of bypassing the state through INGOs.

**Electricity**

As mentioned in Chapter Two, only 6% of the population in the DRC have access to electricity, although the DRC is an electricity exporter.71 However, Congolese people access electricity, not by demanding it from the government or the SNEL, but by self-organising mechanisms. In Butembo, for example, population started to create a system by which approximately every 60 houses would buy a generator together and set up its own electricity system. The system is basic but

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69 Ibid., 8 – 9.
orderly, set up with trunks and pieces of wood. One house hosts the generator and everyone contributes to the petrol. Electricity works from 6 to 10 pm. From Butembo it has now expanded to other provinces.

In the photos below, it is possible to observe how there is now a whole electricity system created where meters of cables and wooden posts supply entire neighbourhoods.

*Image 2. Street view with self-made electricity lines, Butembo, taken July 30, 2010*
In Kinshasa people in poor neighbourhoods steal electricity from the official SNEL network. The problem is that this source does not always work. Hence the mockery and the renaming of the state electricity provider as the ‘National Society of Darkness’. Both strategies work to avoid government-provided services and their consequences, including taxes. As an electrician hosting one generator in a neighbourhood in Goma states: ‘we don’t pay the tax for the electricity anymore because it is not provided, we do it ourselves’. The fact that it is less trouble and more straightforward to rely on proximity channels and one’s own creativity for survival, rather than engaging with the government to provide the services, demonstrates that self-provision is simultaneously a political disengagement from the government.

72 From Société Nationale d’Electricité is called Société Nationale de l’Obscurité.
73 Interview with Electrician in charge of Cooperative Generator, Goma, July 27, 2010.
The work of electricity, as with other activities, such as road maintenance and house construction, is often done through what is called ‘Salongo’. Salongo has had several adaptations. It was first a ‘perversion of a traditional custom of communal labor in service […] by colonial administrators to justify forced labor’. It was then made ‘obligatory civic work’ by Mobutu as one-day a week work towards community service. Under Salongo, FARDC, armed group leaders and government authorities have justified forced labour, including mining, porter-services, cooking and housework. In Butembo, it has been reappropriated as a way to provide community service and improve living conditions. In this case, the beneficiaries of a subverted Salongo are those who initiate these works and they are also those who need it or otherwise they will not have electricity.

**Health**

Health provision is a paradox because, as Zoë Marriage has pointed out, while a substantial amount of aid goes towards health services in Congo, it does not address the causes of why there is not a health service in the first place. As such, this is another area where the population provides for their own needs. Aside from the doctor per population ratio being 0.6 doctor per 1,000 inhabitants, infrastructures are either lacking or in very poor condition. Although funding may come from an INGO or foreign government aid agencies, population will still

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75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 13 – 14.
77 Interview with “Chef de Quartier” (Neighbourhood representative) Matumaini Walikomba, Butembo; Interview with “Nyumba Kumi” Neighbourhood Representative of 10 houses, Butembo; Focus Group Butembo Residents; Interview with Representative of Association pour la Defense de Droits de la Femme (ADDF), Butembo.
be asked to help with the repairs and construction of hospitals and health centres.footnote[80]{Health Ministry representatives confirmed this and added that ‘if someone does not have money, they can bring a goat so that it can be eaten by those working on the construction site’.footnote[81]{The same applies to staff salaries and medicines provided. It relies on the contributions made by patients. There is a system in place that categorises the payment of the patients, A, B and C, according to each patient’s available means.footnote[82]{This has been done through a combination of remnants of government health service, private practice and access to INGO funding. The South-Kivu provincial hospital in Bukavu works this way.footnote[83]{State funds are unreliable and insufficient, and its management is done through a Catholic Church scheme. Each department is managed on a daily basis by the doctors and nurses working at the hospital, and their ongoing payment relies on the contributions made by the patients.footnote[84]{}

*Mabuku*

Much of this self-provision is illustrated by the town of Mabuku, a small town in the territory of Beni, North Kivu, where no official authority has a consistent presence. Police, intelligence officers (ANR) and administrators do not have a permanent post. The Catholic Church, the hospital and a school are the closest forms of institutional authority present, where the population has a direct input,

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footnote[80]{This is the case of the Walikale hospital, funded by Spanish Government aid agency, AECI, through the INGO, Rescate, and co-constructed and co-managed between Rescate, NGO Caritas-Goma, and local residents. Informal Conversation with Rescate and Caritas-Goma representatives, July 23, 2010.}

footnote[81]{Interview with Ministry of Health representatives Fidel Ngoma and Tomas Luzolo, Goma.}

footnote[82]{Ibid.}

footnote[83]{The same staff/patient management either directly or through the mediation of Catholic or Protestant Church schemes were present in Bunyakiri (South Kivu), Butembo and Walikale (North Kivu) and Mbandaka and Gemena (Equateur).}

footnote[84]{Informal Conversation with Emergency Unit Nurse, South Kivu General Hospital, Bukavu, August 11, 2010.}

footnote[85]{Unless noted the information relies on: Participant Observation II, “Mabuku Environments and Village Life” Mabuku, August 2010.}
even in the decision-making process. There is an established payment scheme for teachers, nurses and doctors, who also provide a loose form of authority. For instance, the women of the village built the maternal wing of the small hospital/health centre by collecting materials around the area and making their own bricks. They renamed it ‘Maternite Yetu’ (our maternity – figure below). They established a cooperative so that they can have a partnership with international organisations and thus distribute the money through different activities. Members of the cooperative receive training, a shovel, a hoe and a machete to work on their fields. They bring products to the cooperative from different villages nearby in order to trade them. They also contributed money to have a mill for flour.

Not only is it remarkable the extent to which all these important services are provided, and to which many more could be added, but also the extent to which this provision grants significant control over important social and political processes. This does not mean successful evasion of domination, but it entails

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86 This included Veterinarios Sin Fronteras (VSF) and Doctors Without Borders.
87 For an overview of DIY observations see summaries in Appendix III. Other prominent services include rubbish collection, road reparation, and house building. Interview with Goma’s Town Hall representative, July 27, 2010.
resistance to it. As such, they could be seen, as Mac Gaffey noted of similar
dynamics under Mobutu, as a ‘political option’ against ‘the interests of the state-
based class’.88 This ‘political option’ was seen for Mac Gaffey as one where ‘people
confront a predatory state which fails to provide them with the opportunity to
earn a living wage, with a functioning economic infrastructure or with basic social
services’.89 These non-confrontational forms of resistance mitigate the effects of
domination in which the production of social order and decision-making process
are reappropriated. Retaking the language of the MONUSCO officer cited in
Chapter Two, taking over these services provides the ‘software’ that
operationalises the ‘state’. In this case, such operationalisation is being redirected
to serve people’s needs, provoking, as Vlassenroot and Romkena argued the
undermining of statebuilding in the process.

6. Conclusion: Reinventing authority

The image at the start of this chapter represented those survival mechanisms that
are not only a form of navigating a hostile environment, but an activation of
multiple channels of exchange and production. These create mutual
dependencies, resting on solidarity and reciprocity, and have the capacity to
subvert the effects of domination. As Aili Mari Tripp states, the provision of, and
control over, these services speaks to a broader issue of self-reliance and self-
organisation of the social and political arena:

By pursuing their various survival strategies, people were not just
responding to necessity, they were actively remoulding their own destinies.
They were not only seeking new and innovative ways of obtaining an
income, they were consciously and vigorously resisting the state. In the
course of defying various anachronistic state policies, they were reshaping
the political and economic structures that surrounded them.90

88 Janet Mac Gaffey, Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in
89 Ibid.
90Aili Mari Tripp, “Everyday Forms of Resistance and Transformations of Economic Polic
y”, 161.
Resistance, then, should be seen in the survival strategies as a mitigation of predation. And this predation is, in the eyes of many people, mainly the responsibility of state action. In the process, as Tripp reminds us, alternative forms of political organisation are being created. In this sense a further argument could be advanced: If, as Mbembe states, Africa has been portrayed as the ‘embodiment of nothingness’, we might have to rethink Africa as the embodiment of creativity. Survival/DIY activities ‘signal renewal and creativity’ in ways that show ‘Africa... immeasurably more alive’.\(^9^1\) This goes from everyday needs, including facing the effects of war, to the recreation of new forms of social and political organisation.

The chapter addressed one of the pillars of statebuilding: extraction and wealth distribution. Although extraction in the DRC has been seen as state-destructive rather than state-constructive, there is a certain logic to the way in which it is carried out.\(^9^2\) It produces authority. It is not necessarily invested, nor is there a project of turning subordinates into working and consuming taxpayers, but it allows for sectors of the elite to retain channels of appropriation and distribution. It is self-serving. These forms of authority assertion have been examined from the point of view of the effects they have on the civilian population’s living conditions. The chapter has indicated three areas of resistance through the dynamics of state presence, the layer of ‘post-conflict’ strategies, and the dynamics of state absence and the taking over of social provisions by the subordinate classes. These three areas illustrated patterns of responses and different characteristics of how resistance unfolds.

The intent to impose taxes and elite-land distribution is directly rejected through tax evasion, disobedience and multiple strategies to retain land ownership and


food security, especially through peasant cooperatives. Army deployment provokes a direct impact in the economic and political order. Its success is not only externalised politically and economically onto the population, it ends up depending on the population. Finally, taking over all sorts of social services provides simultaneously opportunities for avoiding state control and for establishing forms of social organisation where people have a more direct participation in decision-making processes. This may not be a ‘political threat’ as Maliyamkono and Bagachwa point out, ‘but they certainly pose an economic challenge to the official establishment’. This challenge has a significant political dimension since the ways in which state authority is resisted have embedded forms of reinventing social organisation and modes of political authority.

This challenge is both theoretical and practical. On the one hand, statebuilding shows itself to be a less peaceful and committed method to building a developed, peaceful, democratic Congo, than it claims. On the other, it shows that as far as the practice of statebuilding is exercised on the ground in ways that contradict subordinate classes’ aspirations, it is stripped of legitimacy, attacked and subverted. Mac Ginty’s ‘tale of two economics’ in Iraq, one official and one of survival, reflects how in the absence of an economy that is able to serve the needs of the population, the people go outside of the official channels, subverting one of the most important foundations of the liberal peace project. In other words, creative survival mechanisms prepare a fertile ground not to accept the state but to reject it.

However, the balance between reciprocities and solidarities, on the one hand, and violence, inequalities and hardships, on the other, demonstrates the ambiguous character of survival. Trefon points out that the *reinvention of order in Congo* ‘has been characterized by tension, conflict, violence and betrayal, as much as by

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innovative forms of solidarity, networks, commercial accommodation and interdependencies’. Daily exchanges are the target of scams, deceits and chicanery. But from here important features of resistance can be extracted that relate back to the themes that have been explored in the course of this thesis.

The analysis of resistance should not project onto the practices used or its actors the vision of an ethical world that characterises their own aspirations. Resistance is contradictory because it is not a permanent state of being for the actors concerned. Nor is it a neat succession of events that connect actors’ ideas with their everyday actions and outcomes. On the contrary, seen from the point of view of the actors, resistance is an ad-hoc limited and conditioned response to a particular context and various changing relationships. More so, the ambiguity of survival as both a site of domination and subversion makes resistance not something that can be analysed by its strategies, nor by its outcomes. From the point of view of the everyday micro level, resistance rests more on intent, as Scott argued. However, this intent is gradated along a political spectrum that ranges from individual protection against a particular claim, the collective refusal of it, to the attack against it and the disengagement from it. More important are the patterns created at the macro level by this variety of actions, making resistance a permanent feature of the process of statebuilding.

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95 Tefon, “Introduction,” 2.
Conclusion

A Heterogeneous and Prosaic Presence

Independence cha, cha, tozui e,
Independence, cha, cha, the day after…

Promises of the day after, promises of the dawn
of a sovereign state where the soil disappears
between militias and rebels, pillages and spoils.
People are moved around like livestock
from parcel to parcel, from governance to guardianship.
The rule of law is essential
to our ethnic groups, plural yet united,
butterfly effect, buffering effect.
Because here we change gold into lead,
the way to revolution is voting;
strength in numbers is the antidote
to change the debt into dowry
with as many rights as duties
more points of connection than differences,
the welfare state: an idea to forget

Independence cha, cha, tozui e,
Independence, cha, cha, the day after…

1. The Day After

Fusing the traditional rumba song of Independence in Congo with rap, ‘the day after’ reflects the flip side of what Roland Paris called ‘At War’s End’. Post-conflict statebuilding is premised on building state authority as a necessary means

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1 Baloji with Royce Mbumba, Le Jour d’Après / Siku Ya Baadaye (Indépendance Cha-Cha), Album Kinshasa Succursale. (Kinshasa: Crammed Discs, 2011). This is a version of the ‘Independence hymn’ in the DRC. In the original, in French and Lingala, the chorus is ‘Indépendence cha, cha, tozui e [we’ve won it], Indépendence cha, cha, tobakidi [we’ve achieved it]’.

2 The song was composed by Joseph Kabasele (Le Grand Kallé), who was a member of the delegation sent to negotiate independence with Belgium in 1960. The song became not only the symbol of a historical victory in the DRC but also ‘the hymn of emancipation of the black continent’ Alain Mabanckou, “«Indépendance Cha-cha»,” Libération, July 8, 2010, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/0101645734-independance-cha-cha Accessed 13/11/2011; Paris, At War’s End.
to achieve and consolidate peace, democracy and development. However, its practice makes these aims more of a claim on which to legitimise authority than a manifestation of what is actually done. The reality of the practices of post-conflict statebuilding demonstrates that the reconstitution of political authority after conflict is a plural, contradictory and improvised exercise. Understanding resistance illustrates not just the challenges post-conflict statebuilding faces, but also the relations of domination that are fostered by it. Lack of attention to resistance has long provided a view of post-conflict statebuilding as overpowering and monolithic in peace and conflict studies. The turn to study everyday forms of resistance has provided a more grounded critique of post-conflict statebuilding, but has left resistance undertheorised.

Using a Scottian framework the thesis explored practices of resistance embedded in everyday life, such as mockery, violence, and reappropriation. These had in common the denial and mitigation of domination, even if they presented qualitative differences and varied intensities. The lyrics of Baloji illustrate the political significance of the critique emanating from ordinary life, however covert and uncoordinated it may be. The song does not represent an organised movement under a structured ideology. Yet, we are told that what happens after the promises of liberation and change is more war, dependency, displacement and plunder. Baloji’s rap reflects that critique is simultaneously the art of exposing lived experience against the unfulfilled promises of authority, while furthering a world-view of redemption and justice: a diverse people causing a ‘butterfly effect’, uniting for the enjoyment of what rightfully belongs to them.

This illustrates how everyday resistance unfolds: elite claims and the effects of domination are refused or mitigated by individuals or collectives in subordinate positions, while advancing their own agenda. These claims and effects are, in the DRC, as they are elsewhere, the reflection of the historicity of the space in which they are embedded. The agenda that is advanced rejects the present, which is
portrayed as unjust and illegitimate against an imaginary future of freedom and justice. Far from advancing a revolutionary agenda, this imaginary remains within the realm of modest demands and often within mainstream discourse (with as many rights as duties). However, it undermines the legitimacy of political alternatives so far given only as promises (the rule of law, voting, the welfare state), by exposing the experience of displacement, debt, poverty and pillaging. This does not mean a rejection of democracy or welfare per se, but the critique interprets them as contradictory to the everyday experience of dispossession and violence. Delegitimising authority and the projection of alternative political agendas go alongside other practices of resistance, which relate to the nature of the political space.

Taking into consideration that statebuilding is characterised by plural authority and by the use of coercive and extractive practices, it was argued that resistance takes place in several forms and relating to how statebuilding is experienced. What defines resistance, regardless of how it is practiced, is that it is a pattern within relations of domination. Its aim, whether achieved or not, is to deny or mitigate this domination, in its multiple representations. Resistance is carried out with an agenda in mind, which reflects not just the self-centred interests of the individual or collectives undertaking it, but also a sense of injustice, of illegitimate authority or moral outrage. Practices of resistance reflect the political context. In the militarised and complex context of the DRC, both state absences and presences impact on the political order. This creates a context of self-help in which non-violent practices can be seen taking place alongside the formation and use of popular militias. Practices that overtly challenge authority, whether discursively or physically, go hand in hand with practices that are self-regarding, but still subversive of domination. In order to discuss the implications of these ideas, this chapter highlights the major contributions of the thesis to the study of its three core elements: resistance, post-conflict statebuilding, and Eastern DRC. To conclude, the final section discusses the avenues opened for future research.
2. A Reworked Account of Resistance and its Practices

The thesis explored everyday resistance in post-conflict statebuilding with several aims in mind: to analyse the practices that constitute it, to assess whether the framework of everyday resistance was applicable to such context, and to address the limitations identified in the peace and conflict literature. The result of this research has been to offer a contribution in those three areas. The critical assessment of Scott’s framework has provided useful guidance to identify practices of resistance and assess the validity of the framework, while developing the framework itself and adding elements of De Certeau to it. The thesis has also established several elements that any framework of resistance should follow, thus contributing more broadly to the interdisciplinary debates on resistance. This section takes these elements in turn.

**No special forms of resistance**

One of the main arguments advanced has been that resistance is heterogenous in its practices, but it is a prosaic, commonplace presence. This therefore also applies to statebuilding, suggesting that there is no special resistance found in statebuilding contexts, nor there is a need for a special framework. Resistance, as a pattern of practices by actors in a position of subordination, and post-conflict statebuilding, as a process of reconstituting political authority, reflect a historically contingent process, which fosters relations of domination, which are plural, contradictory, and improvised. The implication is that an analysis of everyday resistance requires an alternative account of post-conflict statebuilding highlighting its historical and sociological features.

**Developments of the Scottian Framework and Complements of De Certeau**

In applying Scott’s framework critically, the account of resistance has been reworked in three ways. Firstly, it was noted that this framework needed to
emphasise more forcefully that beyond the particular acts employed, it is the patterns these follow and the relation in which they are embedded that gives these individual and collective acts political significance. They are not random. These acts respond to the ways in which domination is denied or mitigated as a constant in relations of domination.

Secondly, it was noted that these acts also carry with them an alternative agenda that generally motivates actors to undertake resistance. It has been important to illustrate that agenda advancing is not an act of resistance alongside denial or mitigation of elite claims, as Scott had argued, but that this is a permanent motivation underlying whatever practices of resistance subordinate groups may take up.

Thirdly, it was argued that the elements of resistance - intensity, visibility of intentionality and engagement with claims - should be gradated. Having different gradients provides a solution to the problem of gathering intent, its visibility, and the diverse range of acts. In regards to this last point, the framework provided a category of claim-regarding acts and another one, inspired in De Certeau, of self-regarding acts. Thus everyday resistance can manifest itself as an attack or direct denial against authority claims in the form of insults, mockery, armed violence, or tax evasion. It can also take the form of subversion, including redefining the ideals embedded in the post-conflict statebuilding discourse, using armed groups to protect oneself, or mitigating the dominating effects of military rule through negotiation and creative survival. The De Certeauian ‘self-regarding’ practices identify acts that deny or mitigate elite claims indirectly. These acts have the self (individual or collective) at the centre of the action. By using or ignoring the claims, have the capacity to subvert these claims. Actions like entering into negotiations with the military or enacting forms of survival facilitate not only the mitigation of authoritarian forms of rule and the effects of poverty, but they also give way to alternative forms of social organisation and political authority.
Fourthly, the framework addressed the relationship between the Scottian framework and violence. Although, as this thesis has argued, violence is part of Scott’s work, it remained underdeveloped. This thesis has provided a more consistent account of the fact that the framework of everyday resistance is defined by the nature of the relationship between authority and subordination, and not by the particular acts used. Everyday forms of resistance establish a framework to understand that the tendency to enact unconfrontational and unorganised self-help practices against everyday forms of domination is connected to the ability these methods have to avoid repression. Thus, everyday resistance is not necessarily violent or non-violent, and it is not necessarily without effect. Different practices need to be seen alongside and in relation to the political context in which they are embedded. This is particularly significant in statebuilding, as processes that have the capacity to generate violence. Moreover, there is a need to account for the relationship between everyday violence and the everyday forms of resistance. Although this had already been advanced by authors theorising hybridity and transformation in peacebuilding contexts, this thesis has elaborated the ways in which violence relates to everyday forms of resistance, independently of its outcomes.³

**Elements of Resistance**

The implication from the above is to have also been able to establish that any framework of resistance needs to connect patterns with intentions, motivations, acts and actors in a relation of domination. This speaks to the interdisciplinary debates on resistance and has the capacity to make a broader contribution. The thesis produced a robust conceptual framework while being flexible, establishing a series of elements and gradients that may adapt to other contexts. In particular, the framework embraced ambiguity, both addressing its own limitations and the

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complex relation between ‘reality’ and ‘interpretation’. The fact that resistance and domination do not speak of permanent states of being but of an ongoing, changing relation, requires theorising relations of domination in reference to their fluid boundaries. Daily life and its political context cannot be accounted for only by reference to a relation of domination and resistance. However, not only resistance represents an important dynamic in the DRC, as in other statebuilding contexts, it is a prosaic presence. A reworked account of resistance has to be seen in tandem with the alternative account of post-conflict statebuilding, and of the DRC.

3. An Alternative Account of Statebuilding

The thesis applied a historical sociological perspective to account for patterns of authority assertion, extraction, and violence distribution in statebuilding processes. The thesis contributed in this respect to the political sociological and anthropological readings of statebuilding as sharing features with state-formation. Statebuilding was conceptualised as a contradictory, plural and improvised process of authority assertion in which multiple actors including state, non-state national and international are implicated. What it added was the possibility to identify resistance practices, not only for being part of the complex processes, and agencies that mould and hybridise statebuilding, but as part of a distinct relationship emerging from practices of appropriation and violence in statebuilding. It was also stated that there is not one but many statebuilding processes taking place. This idea highlighted the intersecting, improvised and second agendas that come into place from myriad of actors, whether local, national, regional or international.

An additional original contribution has been to draw historical sociology, peace and conflict and Africanist literatures into dialogue with each other. While the turn to practices as a methodological mechanism in peace and conflict studies has
been fruitful, this thesis has linked everyday practices to broader historical
patterns and contextualised the account with reference to literature theorising the
nature of an African political context.

Drawing on Tilly’s account that sees coercion and accumulation as fundamental
driving forces in any statebuilding process, the thesis identified militarisation and
extraction as prominent features of statebuilding in present DRC. These do not fit
a narrative of centralisation and institutionalisation, but they reflect patterns in
violence and wealth management as sources of state authority. Even though the
post-conflict statebuilding discourse generates important dynamics regarding the
‘pose’ statebuilders need to adopt to legitimise their actions, state authority
assertion is linked to power-sharing agreements between warring parties, military
strategies and political compromises. These include shared coercive and extractive
capacity with foreign countries, state and non-state actors. The DRC case
illustrates that state authority is seen as paramount to other post-conflict strategies
like democratisation, economic reconstruction and even peace. However, it also
illustrates that state authority may be represented, mediated, shared or
compromised by other institutions, actors, and even other competing state
authorities. These practices show the plural, chaotic and improvised nature of
post-conflict statebuilding.

The historical sociological reading of statebuilding has analysed how macro,
micro, present and historical dynamics interrelate with patterns of continuity and
change. The importance this has for future research on resistance is to place its
study not so much as a response to an internationally-led project, or as an agency
of hybridisation, but as a patterned denial and mitigation of the coercive and
extractive practices of building state authority. The commonplace nature of
resistance in state–society relations has also shown the need to ‘pay attention to
micro-developments that are often governed by contingency but taking care to
place these within broader patterns of historical development’. Contextualising the account of statebuilding is also imperative for understanding resistance as well as the particularities of how statebuilding is conducted.

4. The DRC: Theory Development and its Challenges

The status of Eastern DRC as a ‘tough case’ proved to be an insight for the study of everyday resistance and post-conflict statebuilding. It has expanded the variety of cases the peace and conflict literature on resistance has drawn on. Two implications should be highlighted regarding the extent to which the insights generated from the case study can be generalised. Firstly, for the account of resistance, Eastern DRC has offered the opportunity to explore ambiguities in the actors and practices of resistance. Secondly, Eastern DRC, with one of the highest war-related death tolls in post-Cold War conflicts, one of the few instances of multi-state war of this period, and hosting one of the largest and the longest missions in UN history, has provided an excellent case to explore the complex and contradictory nature of post-conflict statebuilding.

Ambiguities, Complexities and Competing Interpretations

The DRC facilitated a rich standpoint from which to observe the application of the developed framework and the possible challenges to it. Interestingly, the challenge posed by the context of statebuilding and the DRC highlighted a convergence of several literatures with implications for the study of resistance. Certain critical analyses of post-conflict statebuilding, in seeing it as a reflection of the structure of power in world politics, provided a monolithic and overpowering view of post-conflict statebuilding. Within this literature, those who have focused on resistance have advanced a more nuanced view of statebuilding, but their lack of regard for history and class in the analyses have disregarded an important

account of accumulation and coercion in statebuilding.\textsuperscript{5} The political sociological analyses of intervention have seen resistance as part of the agencies and processes that mould statebuilding. What this shows is that from the peace and conflict literature resistance has served a more nuanced and critical analysis of statebuilding, but not of resistance per se.

Similarly, Africanist literatures have provided nuanced understandings and critiques of how structures of power operate in daily life. However, they have in turn portrayed an image of subjection, and an imbalanced account of power. Africanist scholars have objected to Scott’s unambiguous interpretation of certain acts as resistance, offering in return, a certain univocal reading of power relations, of subjection and accommodation. These competing interpretations are not surprising since power and resistance cannot be theorised with regards to independently existing facts. What has been surprising is to find a convergence of literatures seeing ‘agency’, ‘process’, ‘complexity’, and ‘hybridisation’ as limiting, or even skeptical of, the possibility to account for resistance in its own right. These divergences need to be explained.

For example, in regards to discourses and, mockery in particular, Mbembe criticises Scott, Toulabor and, more extensively, Bakhtin. In Mbembe’s articulation of post-colonial political authority, mockery, derision, and popular discourses should not be seen as tools of the governed but as the banal dramatisation of political power.\textsuperscript{6} For Mbembe, the way authorities become symbolised in jokes and derision with reference to the anus, genitals, sexual intercourse, defecations or belching, is evidence of power’s descent to the banal, its usurpation of popular discourses and its own dramatisation.\textsuperscript{7} Henceforth, derision is not the domain of resistance against power but of power’s own reproduction.

\textsuperscript{5} Richmond, \textit{A Post-Liberal Peace}, 13.
\textsuperscript{6} Mbembe, \textit{On the Postcolony}, 104.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 108 – 113.
Mbembe and Scott are not far from agreement. Mbembe’s point is that post-colonial relations are too complex and muddled to see them through a prism of categories that are based on structures that are not necessarily opposed but negotiated.\(^8\) But Mbembe agrees that despite these sophisticated tools of intimate and entangled power relations, oppressive structures and their subversion play a constant game of readjustment where none of them are completely able to subject or subvert the other.\(^9\) It is here where the ambiguity of the *pose* demonstrates how Scott’s framework is able to adapt to the gradients of social conflict and its plurality. According to Scott, the confluence in vocabulary between Karen millennial Buddhist sects opposing Burman rule was evidence that ‘the remedy for a bad king was a better king’.\(^10\) Likewise, the same ideals and vocabulary that serve to legitimise post-conflict statebuilding, serve to challenge such legitimacy.

Mbembe also reminds us that ‘the ways in which societies compose and invent themselves in the present—what we could call the *creativity of practice*—is always ahead of the knowledge we can ever produce about them’.\(^11\) Any practice of resistance has to be understood as embedded in the practice of everyday life, without trying to reduce daily life to a binary relation of domination and resistance. Survival strategies and non-elite reappropriation escape rigid categorisation, but they also display the elements of claims, denial/mitigation and agenda advancing that are present in relations of domination. These strategies facilitate non-elite denial of the state’s extractive and wealth distributive mechanisms; they mitigate statebuilding’s negative consequences, including the externalities of peace strategies; and they represent self-organisational arrangements closer to alternative political agendas of participation, distribution and social service. The particularity of these strategies is that the same way that militias are an effect of statebuilding, understood as the continuation of war and

\(^8\) Mbembe, “Domaines de La Nuit et Autorité Onirique,” 106.
the militarisation of peace, survival strategies are an effect of statebuilding, understood within the context of presence and absence of multiple authorities and their distributive and extractive capacity.

Regarding the use of violence, the thesis pointed out that Scott’s framework is not one of peaceful resistance per se, but a framework to analyse the political significance of these quotidian practices. Because Scott’s studies are not settled in a context of war, they concentrate on relatively peaceful practices. However, Scott acknowledges that even within these contexts, boycotts, hit-and-run and guerrilla tactics are habitual.12 ‘Such low profile techniques’ Scott argues ‘are admirably suited to the social structure of the peasantry – a class scattered across the country side, lacking formal organization and best equipped for extended, guerrilla-style, defensive campaigns of attrition’.13 That is, despite the use of violence, guerrilla-style tactics are not rare and they follow the patterns of other practices regarding loose organisation and avoidance of direct confrontation. Moreover, in the words of Mkandawire, the thesis embraced the challenge that ‘fatally flawed and morally reprehensible though these movements may be, one needs to take their political roots and ideological cognitive components seriously, even as their banditry confounds their political agenda’.14 This ambiguous ground problematised the account of resistance but unearthed important nuances without imposing a Manichean vision on it.

The militarised context and the historical dynamics of self-reliance generated interesting insights into different practices, showing that not just opposition and attack, but also reciprocity and solidarity are important mechanisms against domination. Different practices run alongside each other, also affording the possibility to observe the interplay between violence, self-defence and political aspirations for social justice. Even if the same practices may give rise to different

12 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 241.
13 Ibid., xvi – xvii.
conclusions, the analysis has established a way to challenge uni-vocal readings of discourse, violence, and survival, as agencies of subjection, or as evidence of domination.

**Insight of Statebuilding**

Regarding statebuilding, the DRC illustrated the reconstruction of state authority as mediated by different national, international, state and non-state actors. This mediation has fostered the pursuit of state security agendas through formulas of shared sovereignty, proxy wars through militias and a militarisation of extractive capacity. These formulas have created a contradiction between the aim of reconstituting state authority and the aim of furthering peace. This contradiction responds partly to accommodate the interests of Rwanda and allies in the region, as well as to the perception that the instability of the region is primarily due to the DRC as a failed state.

These dynamics are likely to continue. Nearly two decades into the conflict in Eastern DRC, a rebellion re-started in March 2012. Once again the CNDP, this time with Bosco Ntanganda (instead of General Nkunda), and renamed M23, has led a movement of desertion throughout the army, taking command in several territories in North Kivu (Masisi and Rutshuru) and taking the town of Goma in November 2012.¹⁵ There have been familiar developments and responses. Rwanda and Uganda have denied any involvement, while UN and Human Rights Watch reports argued the opposite.¹⁶ The DRC government has already entered into

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¹⁵ There has been debate as to whether they were the same movement or not. However, all official communiqués are signed as CNDP – M23. M23, “CNDP-M23 Communiqués,” Site Officiel Du M23, 2012, http://www.m23mars.org/category/communiques/ Accessed 4/11/2012. Jason Stearns argues that their leadership, funding and positions, especially in Masisi and Rutshuru, make them the same, with the M23 having less social support than the heydays of the CNDP. Stearns, From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo, 48.

discussions with Angola to secure support in case of a full-on invasion by these governments.\textsuperscript{17} Up to 650,000 people have been displaced, war crimes have already been reported and Kabila has called on the population to attend the ‘obligation to resist the imposition of war [and] for everyone to participate in the defence of the national sovereignty’.\textsuperscript{18} Several armed groups have been formed as a popular response to the CNDP’s uprising. Some are attached to the DRC and neighbouring governments, others are the ongoing popular response to the continued violence. The official responses from the government and the UN aiming to the reintegration of troops have been claimed as a ‘dead-end’ precisely because the old reintegration strategies have weakened the army, have incentivised the taking up of arms and have ultimately furthered militarisation and reproduced violence.\textsuperscript{19}

The DRC case illustrates that there are multiple statebuilding processes, multiple state agendas operating outside and through international organisations. Even when an actor like the UN could be seen operating in a relatively unified manner, as has been the case since 2008 regarding the military strategies and statebuilding in the DRC, the relation between statebuilding and resistance cannot be seen as one of international vs. local actors. Nor can this be solely be accounted for in terms of state-society relations. As was shown, practices of coercion and


accumulation have been fostered, legitimised or created by international actors. Resistance in the DRC reflects these dynamics and thus becomes also complex.

5. Reflections and Openings

The focus on resistance is a way of opening a debate. Embracing its ambiguities and complexities entails entering a multidisciplinary and long-standing intellectual discussion. The study of resistance is just beginning to be established as an integral part of the debates in post-conflict statebuilding and peacebuilding, generally. A first step has been to establish that exploring resistance is an important part of providing a more nuanced, realistic and critical account of statebuilding. The next step therefore is to have a more nuanced and critical account of resistance. This thesis has provided the ground for such an account and argued which core elements it should be concerned with. Different avenues may come to light with the comparison of more case studies, or with a comparison with other frameworks. There is ample scope to compare how more overt and organised practices of resistance relate to the more covert and uncoordinated ones under different frameworks. This has to do not just with the particular conceptual standpoint used to account for it, but also, with the need to gradate and categorise its practices.

The thesis did not account for forms of resistance as a route towards political change in the form that Richmond has proposed. The implication, however, is not that the study of resistance is empty of ethical forms of activism or revolutionary capacity. Indeed, an important insight from the research has been that despite the war environment and the dominating effects of statebuilding, popular aspirations for justice and well-being not only do not go away, they become even more relevant. The argument advanced is that resistance cannot be accounted for in Manichean ways. After all, ‘there are not good subjects of resistance’.\textsuperscript{20} Staying

away from analyses along the ‘unmanly’ divides of “good” and “evil” is to recognize the contradictions embedded in social and political action.\textsuperscript{21} Manichean analyses, as Mbembe argues, have a particular legacy in Africa, as part of ‘a moral economy—whose power of falsification derives from its opaque ties with the cult of suffering and victimization’.\textsuperscript{22} The implication is, Mbembe continues, that the ‘African subject cannot express him- or herself in the world other than as a wounded and traumatized subject’.\textsuperscript{23} The intention of the thesis is to contribute to a breaking up with these divides. This does not mean a rejection of an ethical commitment to research, but it does seek to ‘avoid the philosophical pathology of demanding that the world reflect our conception of it’.\textsuperscript{24}

What these millenarian \textit{anthozoans} of resistance mean for the realisation of the agendas of social justice embedded in its practice is another matter.\textsuperscript{25} In wondering whether the DRC might have a ‘Tahir Square moment’, Stearns argues that the main obstacle to such moment taking place is lack of leadership, whether on the part of the political opposition or on the part of social movements to channel support around them and build ‘social capital’.\textsuperscript{26} Everyday forms of resistance are the ‘social capital’ of revolution, but they cannot be theorised as if they mattered only if they work towards it. Nonetheless, it would be a disservice to the analysis leaving with the idea that everyday forms of resistance do not change anything. They do. They are the microscopic reworking of political and

\textsuperscript{21}‘Our weak, unmanly social concepts of good and evil and their tremendous ascendancy over body and soul have finally weakened all bodies and souls and snapped the self-reliant, independent, unprejudiced men, the pillars of a strong civilization’. Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality}, ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 100.


\textsuperscript{23}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{25}Cf. James Scott: ‘[]ust as millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so do the multiple acts of peasant insubordination and evasion create political and economic barrier reefs of their own’. \textit{Weapons of the Weak}, xvii.

Everyday forms of resistance rework meanings, advance agendas, place limitations on how domination is imposed and create alternative forms of social organisation and political authority. These may not be enough to stop war, change the government and the rules of international political economy, but they may be the basis for more meaningful social and political order.

27 Cf. ‘The actual order of things is precisely what “popular” tactics turn to their own ends, without any illusion that it will change any time soon’. De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 26.
# Appendix I

## List of Interviewees and Research material cited

## 1. Formal Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Details</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political Science Professor University of Kinshasa</td>
<td>Civil society / population</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>7/07/2009</td>
<td>French</td>
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<td>2. CENCO - Episcopal Conference representative Kinshasa</td>
<td>Civil society / population</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>8/07/2009</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Representative Association des Femmes Violées</td>
<td>Civil society / population</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>8/07/2009</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Freddy Monsa Iyaka Suken Director of News Group Le Potenciel</td>
<td>Civil society / population</td>
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<td>23/07/2009</td>
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<td>10. NGO Observatoire des Droits de l’Homme et Contre la Torture</td>
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<tr>
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## 1. Informal Conversations

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<td>3. Emergency Unit Nurse South Kivu General Hospital</td>
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<td>5. Hospital Doctor Bunyakiri</td>
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<td>6. Yakotumba members</td>
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<td>7. Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant</td>
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<td>Goma</td>
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<td>Local and International NGO</td>
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## 2. Focus Groups

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<td>Butembo</td>
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<td>French and Swahili</td>
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<td>5 Young residents</td>
<td>Security and Civil- Military relations</td>
<td>Bunyakiri</td>
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## 3. Participant Observations

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<tr>
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<td>Peace Workshop Organized by Group Jeremie, College Alfajiri</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>19/07/2009</td>
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<td>South Kivu General Hospital</td>
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<td>Participant</td>
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<td>Fizi and Baraka</td>
<td>3 and 4 September 2010</td>
<td>French and Swahili</td>
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## 4. Survey on Tax Levy and Tax Avoidance around Informal Commerce in Goma

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<th>Type of Sampling</th>
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<td>Goma, Boulevard Kanyamuhanga</td>
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<td>Random</td>
<td>French and Swahili</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2 tomatoes, chillies and peanuts sellers</td>
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<td>1 music seller</td>
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<td>3 bread sellers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 Photocopy maker</td>
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</table>
Appendix II

Questionnaires

1. Subordinate groups and civil society representatives

What have been your experiences of/engagement with the ‘international community’?¹

Which international agencies have you interacted with?

What do you think the ‘international community’ is trying to achieve?

What would you characterise as the positive and the negative aspects/impacts of what the ‘international community’ has been doing?

Has there been opposition/resistance to what the ‘international community’ is doing/trying to achieve? Why do you think this is taking place?

How would you characterise the actions of the government?

What do you think are the main obstacles for peace?

What has been the positive and negative impact of the Amani Leo operations in your area?

Has there been opposition/resistance to what the ‘international community’ or the government are doing/trying to achieve? What form does it take?

¹ The notion of ‘international community’ has not served as lenses to explore post-conflict statebuilding or the action of international actors. It was used in the interviews to keep in line with a familiar language used by interviewees. Interviewees were prompted to disaggregate their experience with different aspects of the statebuilding process. The use of ‘international community’ followed again the Derridean ‘under-erasure’ approach in the same way ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ was used. However, in the case of ‘international community’, the thesis provided several alternatives by disaggregating the process of statebuilding, and conceptualising it as plural and contradictory. It also highlighted the clashing agendas, the contradictory policies, the formal and informal governance practices, and how different actors related to statebuilding as a process of accumulation and violence.
2. **UN / International representatives**

How would you characterise the aims/objectives of the ‘international community’ s’ [the UN or the IMF/WB or your agency] presence in the DRC? What is it trying to achieve?

What policies have been mobilised in pursuit of these objectives and why those particular policies?

What would you characterise as the positive and the negative aspects/impacts of what the ‘international community’ has been doing?

Has there been opposition/resistance to what the ‘international community’ is doing/trying to achieve? What form does it take? Who is opposing/resisting it?

Why do you think it is taking place? What do you think these forms of opposition/resistance are trying to achieve?

How would you respond to the view/critiques of the international presence, of the statebuilding project as a form of neo-imperialism/colonialism/civilising mission/tutelage?

3. **Government officials**

What are the priorities regarding the consolidation/extension of state authority?

What policies have been mobilised in pursuit of these objectives and why those particular policies?

What would you characterise as the positive and the negative aspects/impacts of these strategies?

How would you characterise the action of the ‘international community’ regarding the completion of those objectives?

Has there been opposition/resistance to what the government is doing/trying to achieve? What form does it take? Who is opposing/resisting it?

Why do you think it is taking place? What do you think these forms of opposition/resistance are trying to achieve?
4. FARDC/ Amani Leo Officers

How would you characterise the overall objectives/aims of [your troops/Amani Leo troops]?

What are the strategies and resources that have been mobilised for those objectives?

What support do [your troops/battalion] receive from the government / MONUC/ MONUSCO?

What have been the major obstacles for those objectives to be achieved?

Have you found resistance or support amongst residence in the area?

What are the major issues for civil/military relations?
Appendix III
Breakdown of Fieldwork

1. *Formal Interviews*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of Participant / Organisation</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subordinate Groups / Civil Society / Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal organisations with international funding</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal organisations with no international funding</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not formally organised groups</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street / market sellers (not on survey)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant cooperatives</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit cooperatives</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Church organisations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant organisations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim organisation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University professors</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCICO representatives</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Customary Neighbourhood representatives</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Representatives of Subordinate Groups / Civil Society / Population</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mai Mai Representatives</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yakotumba</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simba Mai Mai / MRS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Padiri</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Dunia</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Mai Mai Representatives</strong></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FARDC / Amani Leo</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amani Leo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total FARDC / Amani Leo</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs Ministry</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Ministry</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAREC</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Government Representatives</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial and Local Administration</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Kivu Provincial Assembly</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masisi MP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goma MP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uvira MP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goma Townhall</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Government-appointed) Administrators: Masisi, Fizi and Bunyakiri</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Customary Authority (Maibano)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Provincial and Local Administrators</strong></td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Opposition</th>
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<td>UDPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Opposition</strong></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONUC / MONUSCO</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affairs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Division</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSSS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-MONUC officers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total MONUC/MONUSCO Representatives</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
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</table>
**UN Agencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Habitat</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA – South Kivu</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total UN Agencies</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
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</table>

**MNCs/ Entrepreneurs**

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Security Contractor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local mineral traders - Beni</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local mineral trader - Goma</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td><strong>Total MNCs/Entrepreneurs</strong></td>
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**Foreign Government Agencies and Diplomats**

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<th>Agency</th>
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<td>DFID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgian Development Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Programme for Governance Support (PAG)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Diplomatic Mission</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Diplomatic Mission</td>
<td>1</td>
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**INGOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC Training Initiative – Wilson Centre</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and Peace Institute</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Monitor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Parks</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total INGOs</strong></td>
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**TOTAL FORMAL INTERVIEWS** | **158**
### 2. Focus Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Focus Issue</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Language</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Residents</td>
<td>State-society relations - DIY</td>
<td>Butembo</td>
<td>31/07/2010</td>
<td>French and Swahili translated</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Young residents</td>
<td>Security and Civil-Military relations</td>
<td>Bunyakiri</td>
<td>21/08/2010</td>
<td>French and Swahili translated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Women linked to the NGO Femmes Père Saint-Simon</td>
<td>Security and Civil-Military relations</td>
<td>Bunyakiri</td>
<td>21/08/2010</td>
<td>French and Swahili Translated</td>
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### 3. Participant Observations, Visits and HAG Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace workshop, College Alfajiri, Bukavu, Date</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>19/07/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atelier for Political Elites and Business representatives Kinshasa organised by DRC Training Initiative – Wilson Centre</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>14/07/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTO Masisi – Demobilised Child Soldiers and Integration process</td>
<td>Masisi</td>
<td>24-25/7/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March for Peace and Homily by Archbishop Francois-Xavier Maroy</td>
<td>Bunyakiri</td>
<td>22/08/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS sensitization Civil Society/ Military relations (Baraka and Fizi - centre)</td>
<td>Fizi and Baraka</td>
<td>3 – 4/09/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Public Information Section MONUC - Kinshasa</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>8/07/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Bukavu Hospital</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>11/08/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Bunyakiri Hospital</td>
<td>Bunyakiri</td>
<td>18/08/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAG/OCHA Security and Humanitarian Meetings</td>
<td>Fieldwork period</td>
<td>7 in Kinshasa 2 in Goma</td>
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</table>
## 4. Summary of General Observations of DIY and Everyday Survival Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>- Electricity cable stolen and redirected in Communes Yolo Nord and Matongue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and September 2010</td>
<td>- General Self-rubbish collection; self-water supply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Women exchanging money operating as cooperatives around ‘Patisserie Centrale’ and Boulevard 30 Juin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Grand Marché Kinshasa – cooperatives for the commercialisation of manioc flour, corn flour and palm oil. Credit cooperatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Marché de Yolo – Cooperatives for commercialising smoked fish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goma</td>
<td>- Self-housing construction;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009; June</td>
<td>- Self-rubbish collection;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and August 2010;</td>
<td>- Self-water supply and self-electricity supply in the neighbourhoods of Mabenga and Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2011</td>
<td>- Squatted houses around Cyangungu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>- Self rubbish collection;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009; August</td>
<td>- Self-water supply and electricity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010; September 2011</td>
<td>- Squatted houses around Cyangungu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masisi</td>
<td>- Self-management refugees;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2010 and</td>
<td>- Accommodation of returned combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2011</td>
<td>- Self-housing construction;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni and Butembo</td>
<td>- Self-rubbish collection;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>- Self-water supply and self-provided electricity - Salongo and self-administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Security administration and community policing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabuku</td>
<td>- House building and road maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>- Health centre and maternity management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Food and agriculture cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunyakiri</td>
<td>- Housing construction including hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August, 2010</td>
<td>- Management of refugees;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rubbish collection and water supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Monetary contribution and co-managed by workers and catholic church scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>- Fishing and transport cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June - July 2009</td>
<td>- Military/society relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June and September 2010</td>
<td>- Product cooperative supply – exchanges around manioc flour, palm oil and soap.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
5. *Informal Conversations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of participants</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local researcher</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Journalists</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai Mai Raïa Motumboki</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai Mai Yakotumba</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai Mai Ex-Padiri</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC/MONUSCO</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue helmet</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Agencies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent International Consultants and Researchers</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix IV

DRC Maps

1. Map of the DRC

Map 5. DRC Reference Administrative Map. ¹

¹Map provided courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, with the following disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. OCHA - MONUC, “République Démocratique Du Congo: Reference Map - Carte Administrative,” Reliefweb, July 2011, http://reliefweb.int/map/democratic-republic-congo/r%C3%A9publique-d%C3%A9mocratique-du-congo-reference-map-carte-administrative Accessed 12/06/2012.
2. North and South Kivu in Greater Context

Map 6. South and North Kivu. 

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2. Territorial Division of North Kivu

Map 7. Territorial Division of North Kivu.3

3. **Territorial Division of South Kivu**

Map 8. Territorial Division of South Kivu

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4. Approximate Deployment of Armed Groups in North and South Kivu

Map 9. Armed Groups in North and South Kivu.\(^5\)

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Appendix V

List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948 - 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Mission name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>May 1948</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
<td>January 1949</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNEF I First United Nations Emergency Force</td>
<td>November 1956</td>
<td>June 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
<td>July 1960</td>
<td>June 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>UNYOM United Nations Yemen Observation Mission</td>
<td>July 1963</td>
<td>September 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
<td>March 1964</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>DOMREP Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic</td>
<td>May 1965</td>
<td>October 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>UNIPOM United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission</td>
<td>September 1965</td>
<td>March 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>March 1978</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
<td>April 1989</td>
<td>March 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>present</td>
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</table>

---

*DPKO, “Peacekeeping Fact Sheet.”*
<table>
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
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<th>Description</th>
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<th>End Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
<td>August 1993</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</td>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>February 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>October 1999</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
<td>October 1999</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>May 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>Present</td>
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