CROSS-NATIONAL POLICY LEARNING AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

The Making of ‘Management for Results’ Policies in Chile and Mexico (1990-2010)

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
London, August 2013
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work.

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Abstract

The study of whether and how learning from abroad matters for policy changes is a fundamental but hugely contested subject at the heart of contemporary policy transfer, policy diffusion, and cognate literatures. Cross-national learning is said to be one of the key mechanisms by which ideas, policies, and administrative reforms travel across jurisdictions. However, it is also said to be fraught with several difficulties, and thus to hardly exert any significant influence on policymaking. This thesis addresses this puzzle through various means. It asks a set of research questions and proposes an analytical framework to explore the relationship between cross-national learning and policy change. It then traces the making of Management for Results policies in Chile and Mexico, comparing policy developments in both countries across two decades (1990-2010).

The thesis challenges conventional scholarly accounts on this subject. It shows that cross-national learning might bring about significant policy changes. However, this does not necessarily occur through the transfer or diffusion of policies or models intact. It happens through policymakers’ use of knowledge from policies abroad in many ways and at various stages of the policymaking process. Moreover, policy changes are neither secured once policy elements are adopted, nor are they completed once their process of adaptation to a receiving environment has started. In fact, policymakers need to devise strategies to ensure the new policies are effective, legitimate, and durable. Full policy convergence does not necessarily happen, but neither does absolute divergence. Across time, through sequences of learning and change, policymakers learn how to overcome cognitive biases and national barriers; how to combine experiential learning and knowledge from policies abroad; and how to better fit policies to their national conditions, while also keeping them in tune with international policy developments.
Acknowledgements

Studies on cross-national policy learning have found that it is hard to know where ideas come from; it is difficult to determine how, why, and what people learn from external sources; and it is very complicated to assess the extent to which beliefs and behaviours change as a result of ‘learning’. In more than one way, these are points which strongly mirror the personal story behind these pages: it is hard to know where the idea for doing a PhD originated; it is even more difficult to determine what I learned from the people I am about to mention; and it is rather complicated to assess how much my beliefs and behaviours have changed because of them. However, it is beyond doubt that all of these persons have taught me much. Or, if I start using the vocabulary which runs through this work, during my six years in London (and in many cases even before this period) they all have been an inspiration, a benchmark, an example, and/or a model from which I have had the privilege to learn. In reaching the final stage of the PhD, the least that I can do is to acknowledge the huge debt I owe them for sharing their time, knowledge, experience, friendship, and love with me.

Before giving any specific names, I would like to express my gratitude towards the Mexican government’s Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT), and the Secretaría de Educación Pública; the Department of Government of the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the LSE Financial Support Office; the Santander Travel Fund; and the Dussauge-Laguna Family Fund. These institutions (formal and informal) provided much appreciated and needed financial resources for completing this doctoral project. I would also like to thank the government officials, international experts, and university professors in Santiago de Chile, Mexico City, and Washington DC for their willingness to speak with me about what they did, saw, and/or have written regarding the subject of this thesis. Because some of the ideas included in these pages were first presented in various international forums, I thank fellow participants who kindly read and/or commented on my papers and talks at the International Research Society for Public Management (Bern); the Ratio Institute (Stockholm); the European Consortium for Political Research (Antwerp); the Universidad Central (Santiago de Chile); and the Political Studies Association (Edinburgh, Belfast, and Cardiff).

During my years at the LSE, Professor Edward C. Page was an extraordinary supervisor. He listened patiently to my various attempts to develop a ‘new take’ on a field he thoroughly knows; offered challenging and useful comments on previous drafts of the thesis; and kindly guided me through the various stages of this research project. Despite his very busy agenda as a leading and highly respected scholar, Ed always found the time to write ‘yet another’ progress report/reference letter, and to offer excellent advice about life in academia. Without his generosity on this and many other aspects of the PhD, this project might not have been completed. Doctor Joachim Wehner was a terrific advisor. His incisive
questions and suggestions about the thesis’ research design were very helpful, and his enthusiasm regarding its contents meant a lot to me, particularly during the very stressful final stages. Since I first came to the LSE, and without having any formal responsibility (or detailed knowledge about what was being written in these pages), Professor Martin Lodge provided insightful and friendly advice on several aspects. He also cordially got me involved in the interesting activities of the Executive Politics and Governance group which he brilliantly leads. From the starting point of the MRes to the finishing line of the PhD, Professor Simon Hix and Doctor Paul Mitchell trusted in my capacity to complete this thesis, and offered very much appreciated support at complicated times.

Beyond the LSE, I have incurred in many other academic-personal debts. The idea of doing a PhD first took some shape in conversations with Professor Patricia W. Ingraham in Syracuse and Washington DC. With her characteristic cheerfulness and willingness to help her students, Pat kindly mentored me through the intricacies of the application process. At the Maxwell School I also met Professor Alasdair Roberts. During the past ten years, Al has offered very valuable advice on my research projects and career goals.

My oldest and in many ways greatest scholarly/intellectual debts are owed to my Public Administration professors at El Colegio de México. In fact, the ideas and topics addressed in this thesis might be seen as part of an ongoing and friendly conversation I have been privileged to hold with them since 1994-1998. Professor María del Carmen Pardo has kindly encouraged my decision to become an academic, and has frankly and wisely counselled me on matters related to the PhD, Public Administration scholarship, and many other things. Professor Luis F. Aguilar Villanueva has generously shared with me his immense knowledge of policy studies and his broad understanding of Mexico’s politico-administrative reality. Professor José Luis Méndez has long shown/advised me how and why public policy and administration studies should be approached from an international/comparative perspective. Professor Mauricio Merino has constantly reminded me that political science research implies a commitment to improving both academic debates and democratic governance.

Thanks to the very nice people I encountered along the way, the field work I conducted for this thesis was much more interesting and fun than I imagined it would be. My good friends Alejandra Acevedo and Sergio Valdés warmly welcomed me (twice) in their home in Nuñoa, and were extraordinary hosts, excellent tourist guides, and most wonderful company. They introduced me to the Chilean culture, history, politics, and food in the best possible way. During our delightful gatherings at the end of each day, they were always keen to hear about my interview experiences and my amateur impressions regarding their country’s government and political life. Professors Eduardo Araya and Cristian Pliscoff kindly opened the doors of the Instituto de Asuntos Públicos of the Universidad de Chile for me, and helped me better understand the dynamics of the Chilean administration. Marcela Guzmán generously accepted to speak with me on several occasions, and patiently, openly, and expertly answered the countless questions I asked her about the Chilean reforms. In the course of interesting conversations and numerous e-mail exchanges, Diego Barría and Álvaro Ramírez amiably offered very useful ideas and recommendations about
potential interviewees, books, places, and general logistics, all of which were instrumental for taking full advantage of my time in Santiago. During a week in Washington DC, my dear friends Gina Lizárraga and Octavio Hinojosa made me feel at home. An intense round of interviews looked like a rather easy going experience thanks to the very fun times I had the chance to spend with them and their lovely daughter Alexa Sofía.

While the writing of a PhD is a rather solitary experience, I was lucky to meet (or meet again with) some great people during this period. My first year at LSE was full of laughter and joy (and food!) thanks to Caterina Arango, Paola Gadsden, Teresa de la Garza, Ileana Rossell, Camilo Domínguez, David Lamb, and Enrique Valdespino (and Ale and Sergio, and Maira, of course). Their friendship was fundamental to cope with stressful times. Thereafter, I spent several hours of friendly, interesting, and fun conversation on topics as varied as this thesis, Mexican politics, life in London, public policy and administration, and nappy changing with May Chu, Julie Gervais, Cecile Hourreau, Christel Koop, Yolanda Meyenberg, Mona Morgan-Collins, Greta Nasi, Jessica Tarlov, Héctor Arámbula, Mario Arriagada, Julio González, Philipp Krause, Jan Meyer-Sahling, José Olivas, Salvador Parrado, Bernardo Rangoni, Yonathan Reshef, Christian Schuster, Arturo Torre, Luke Ulas, Baldwin Wong, and Gisela Calderón (who at key moments also provided me with a life-saving tape-recorder and some essential readings).

Back in Mexico, my friends and family have been a permanent source of support and encouragement. As in previous years, I discussed the contents of this thesis and many other PA topics with Javier González, Rafael Martínez Puón, José Sosa, and César Barceinas (with whom I also talked about more amusing things during his visits to London). With the genial Mateo and María, and my compadres Cynthia Valdés and Guillermo Cejudo I shared this story in all its intellectual and emotional aspects from the very beginning, just as I have shared with them many other stories in the past two decades. As it has been the case since 1982, I was able to freely talk about the ups and downs of the PhD life with Adriana Hernández, Miyuki Kato, Cecilia Posadas, Laura Yesin, and Ricardo Tsumura (with whom I also had great conversations and times during his London trips). The late and much missed Angelita, as well as Raúl, Irma, Coco, Vicky, Licha, Carlos, and Lupita Figueroa Tréllez inquired after this project’s progression with the same open-heartedness they have shown me during the past 37 years. Aidée, Adriana, Geny, Vicente, Bernardo, Pablo Esteban, and the whole Vaca-Baqueiro family caringly followed the whole experience, and welcomed me in their homes every time I travelled to Mexico. My sisters Lulu and Consuelo; my brothers Pepe and Alfredo; my aunts and uncles Rosy, Grisel and Alejandro, Margarita and Enrique, and Ernesto and Blanca; Rosy, Vero, Gaby, Aleca, Omar, and all my other cousins and nephews celebrated with me every little step of the way. With the same alegría that my abue Petrita taught us all, they filled me up with their energy and love and good wishes during our lively family gatherings. From the other side of La Manche, my dear sister Lety always found the time to phone me and ask how things were going, as well as to share with me funny anecdotes about my dear nephews Jean-Baptiste and Gabriel.
Despite the distance, my parents Leticia and José Antonio were by my side the whole time. While they never fully understood why I decided to spend so many years on a single project (particularly one which took me so far away), they knew this was something really important to me. They thus supported me in every possible way, and made every single effort to ensure my stay in London progressed well. They were always happy to hear about my academic, culinary, travel, and family adventures, all of which they enjoyed as their own. I will always be grateful for their love, help, patience, and understanding during these years. Although I know I might never be able to pay them back for this and everything else they have given me, I do hope I will be capable of following their extraordinary example now that I have the opportunity to do so.

In the middle of the PhD road a little *locochón* surprisingly came to join me (us). His arrival made things much more challenging and interesting, and helped me put the thesis and everything else in perspective. During the past three years, I have learned from Sebastián more than I ever thought I could learn from any one person. Watching him grow day after day has been the most enjoyable experience of my life. He probably cannot imagine how much I will miss our commutes to/from the *escuela grande* and the *escuela chiquita*, a routine which he magically transformed into a daily journey of discovery. But I do know that, whether in Covent Garden piazza, the Clapham Common, or anywhere else, there will be many more cupcakes, ice creams, and cookies waiting for us in years to come.

This thesis would not exist if it was not for Maira. For the past fifteen years, she has been my compass and main source of inspiration in every respect. Not even 99,549 words would suffice to express my love and admiration for her. From the PhD application process back in 2006 to the submission of this document in 2013, she has always believed in what I am and what I do. While juggling with her own PhD research project, an extremely chatty and bossy toddler, and a rather grumpy and demanding husband, she still managed to offer interesting ideas, relevant criticisms, and cheerful comments regarding my boring ruminations on policy transfer. Although our days as a *muégano* in London are sadly coming to an end, I am sure that in her company (and now also that of our *pequeño grandulón*) any other place in the world will be just as interesting and exciting as this.

For these and many other reasons, for what I have learned and continue to learn from them, I dedicate this thesis to Maira and Sebastián and Mum and Dad, who are my most valuable and dearest sources of learning.

MIDL

*Holborn-Notting Hill-Fulham-Soho-Clapham*
Politics finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty – men collectively wondering what to do. Finding feasible courses of actions includes, but is more than, locating which way the vectors of political pressure are pushing. Governments not only "power" (or whatever the verb form of that approach might be): they also puzzle. Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing.

Hugh Heclo, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden*

Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone.
– ‘But which is the stone that supports the bridge?’ – Kublai Khan asks.
– ‘The bridge is not supported by this stone or the other’ – Marco answers –, ‘but by the line of the arch that they form’.
Kublai Khan remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: ‘Why do you speak of the stones? The only thing that matters to me is the arch’.
Polo answers: ‘Without stones there is no arch’.

Italo Calvino, *Las ciudades invisibles*
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# List of Acronyms

## CHILE

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BGI(s)</td>
<td>Balance(s) de Gestión Integral General Management Report(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMGP</td>
<td>Comité Interministerial de Modernización de la Gestión Pública Inter-ministerial Committee for the Modernisation of Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCG</td>
<td>División de Control de Gestión (DIPRES) Division for Management Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIPRES</td>
<td>Dirección de Presupuestos Budget Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIDEPLAN</td>
<td>Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación Ministry of Planning and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINSEGPRES</td>
<td>Ministerio Secretaria General de la Presidencia Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMG(s)</td>
<td>Programa(s) de Mejoramiento de la Gestión Programme(s) for Management Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPMGSP</td>
<td>Plan Piloto de Modernización en la Gestión de los Servicios Públicos Pilot Plan for the Modernisation of Public Services Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRYME</td>
<td>Proyecto de Reforma y Modernización del Estado Project for the Reform and Modernisation of the State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECG</td>
<td>Sistema de Evaluación y Control de Gestión System of Evaluation and Management Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM</td>
<td>Sistema de Metas Ministeriales System of Ministerial Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPG</td>
<td>Sistema de Seguimiento de la Programación Gubernamental System for Monitoring Government Programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPGC</td>
<td>Unidad Presidencial de Gestión del Cumplimiento Presidential Unit for Delivery Management</td>
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## MEXICO

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>CONEVAL</td>
<td>Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGME</td>
<td>Dirección General de Monitoreo y Evaluación de Programas Sociales (SEDESOL)</td>
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</table>
General Directorate for Monitoring and Evaluation of Social Programmes

**LFPRH**
*Ley Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria*
Federal Law for the Budget and Fiscal Responsibility

**LGDS**
*Ley General de Desarrollo Social*
General Law for Social Development

**NEP**
*Nueva Estructura Programática*
New Programmatic Structure

**PbR-SED**
*Presupuesto basado en Resultados-Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño*
Budget by Results-Performance Evaluation System

**PEMG**
*Programa Especial de Mejora de la Gestión*
Special Programme for Management Improvement

**PNCCTDA**
*Programa Nacional de Combate a la Corrupción y Fomento a la Transparencia y el Desarrollo Administrativo*
National Programme for Corruption Control and Support for Transparency and Administrative Development

**PROGRESA**
*Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación*
Education, Health, and Nutrition Programme

**PROMAP**
*Programa de Modernización de la Administración Pública*
Programme for the Modernisation of Public Administration

**ROPS**
*Reglas de Operación de Programas Sociales*
Rules for Managing Social Programmes

**SFP**
*Secretaría de la Función Pública*
Ministry of Public Administration

**SECODAM**
*Secretaría de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo*
Ministry of the Controllership and Administrative Development

**SECOGEF**
*Secretaría de la Contraloría General de la Federación*
Ministry of the Federation’s General Controllership

**SED**
*Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño*
Performance Evaluation System

**SEDESOL**
*Secretaría de Desarrollo Social*
Ministry for Social Development

**SHCP**
*Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público*
Ministry of Finance

**SIMEP**
*Sistema de Metas Presidenciales*
System of Presidential Goals

**SPP**
*Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto*
Ministry for Programming and the Budget

**UDA**
*Unidad de DesarrolloAdministrativo (SECODAM)*
Administrative Development Unit

**UED**
*Unidad de Evaluación del Desempeño (SHCP)*
Performance Evaluation Unit

UEGDG  Unidad de Evaluación de la Gestión y el Desempeño Gubernamental (SFP)
Government Management and Performance Evaluation Unit

UPCP  Unidad de Política y Control Presupuestario (SHCP)
Unit for Budget Policy and Control

UPMGP  Unidad de Políticas de Mejora de la Gestión Pública (SFP)
Public Management Improvement Policies Unit

OTHER RELEVANT TERMS

CLAD  Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo
Latin American Centre for the Administration of Development

ECLAC  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

IDB  Inter-American Development Bank

IFPRI  International Food Policy Research Institute

LFM  Logical Framework Methodology

M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation

MFDR  Management for Development Results

MFR  Management for Results

NPM  New Public Management

OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PGC  Public Governance Committee

PRODEV  Program to Implement the External Pillar of the Medium-Term Action Plan for Development Effectiveness (IDB)

PUMA  Public Management Committee (OECD)

SBO  Senior Budget Officials Committee (OECD)

WB  World Bank
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13
Part One

Theoretical, Methodological, and Analytical Considerations
‘[...] a proposition that policy adoption in one jurisdiction is attributable to similar actions elsewhere can only be substantiated if:

1. It can be demonstrated that idiosyncratic domestic factors are not independently responsible for the policy adoption.
2. It can be demonstrated that the adoption is not the result of the effects of similar modernizing forces having the same, but separate, effects on different states.
3. It can be demonstrated that policy makers are aware of the policy adoptions elsewhere.
4. It can be demonstrated that this overseas evidence was utilized within domestic policy debates.

Colin J. Bennett, ‘Understanding Ripple Effects’

The young man said nothing.
He was concentrating so hard on the words he was hearing that the inspector thought he could hear the gears churning in his brain.
Francesco then drew his conclusion.
According to your reasoning, Susanna was very probably kidnapped by someone who knew she was going to take the unmade road that evening.
Someone who lives around here.
In that case we need to get to the bottom of this, find out everybody's name, verify that –'

[Inspector Montalbano] – ‘Stop. If you’re going to start calculating and forming hypotheses, you must also be able to anticipate failure’

Andrea Camilleri, The patience of the spider

[Inspector Maigret] – ‘This is what we call an empty sort of day’
[Mr. Pyke] – ‘So do we’

What could the Scotland Yard be thinking of him?
He had come to study ‘Maigret’s methods and Maigret had no method.’

George Simenon, My Friend Maigret
1

Introduction

The study of how learning from abroad might matter for policy changes, including administrative reforms, is a fundamental but hugely contested subject at the heart of the policy transfer, policy diffusion, and cognate literatures. During the past two decades, a significant number of scholars have argued that national policies are strongly influenced by policy developments in other countries (Waltman, 1980; Bennett, 1991b; Wolman, 1992, 2009; Stone, 1999; Evans and Davies, 1999; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Evans, 2004a, 2009a, 2009b; Heclo, 2010). There are dozens (even hundreds) of articles and books in various fields which document how ideas, policies, programmes, and laws, have spread and travelled across jurisdictions (Berkowitz et al., 2003; Evans, 2004b; Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005; Simmons et al., 2008; Benson and Jordan, 2011; Börzel and Risse, 2012; Graham et al., 2013; Carroll and Common, 2013).

Moreover, several scholars have argued that in many cases these so-called ‘policy interdependencies’ (Rose, 1991b; Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Gilardi, 2013) have not been the result of flagrant copying. Nor have they been related to external pressures, or harmonisation processes associated with supranational/international factors or actors. In fact, policy transfer and diffusion processes have allegedly resulted from national policymakers’ efforts to learn from abroad (Westney, 1987; Rose, 1991a, 1993, 2005; Evans, 2006). Recently, some diffusion scholars have stressed that patterns of cross-national learning might even be characterised as ‘rational’ (Meseguer, 2009; Gilardi et al., 2009; Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009; Gilardi, 2010).

In response to these claims, several studies have shown that learning from other countries’ policies is a rather challenging, when not a frankly unsuccessful endeavour. Policymakers encounter several cognitive, administrative, and political constraints, which limit the amount of learning and borrowing that might actually take place (Wolman, 1992,
Policymakers also confront issues when defining which practices are ‘best’ and why; understanding how foreign ‘models’ really work; determining their relevance for one’s own jurisdiction; and adapting borrowed policies to a new environment (Wolman et al., 1994, 2004; Wolman and Page, 2002; Pollitt, 2003; Mossberger and Wolman, 2003; Vettoreto, 2009; Dussauge-Laguna, 2012c). Then they might face further problems which affect policymaking processes in general: limited resources; lack of time and attention; and political/bureaucratic conflicts (Robertson and Waltman, 1983; Karch, 2007; Dussauge-Laguna, 2013).

Some scholars have further argued cross-national learning is limited even when institutional conditions initially seemed to be propitious. Thus, studies report learning from abroad has been rather problematic in the experience of the European Union’s ‘Open Method of Coordination’ and enlargement processes (Eyre and Lodge, 2000; Chalmers and Lodge, 2003; Jacoby, 2004; Casey and Gold, 2005; Kerber and Eckardt, 2007; Radaelli, 2008; Zito and Schouut, 2009); the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) peer reviews and benchmarking activities (Lodge, 2006; Dominique et al., forthcoming); and the United Kingdom’s devolution process (Keating et al., 2012). In some particular cases, scholars have suggested that the international spread of policies has actually inhibited learning (Deeg, 1995); has produced ‘policy (mis)learning’ (Larsen, 2002); or has resulted in ‘dysfunctional transfers’ (Sharman, 2010).

Lastly, it has been remarked that even if national policymakers learn from abroad, borrowed policies enter a long process of adaptation to its receiving environment, after which little from the original ‘model’ remains. This might be due to policymakers’ deliberate efforts to better ‘fit’, ‘translate’, or ‘localize’ the imported idea (Rose, 1991, 1993, 2005; Acharya, 2004; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; Stone, 2012). Or it might happen as a consequence of complicated processes of institutional ‘innovation’ or political ‘accommodation’ (Westney, 1987; Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann, 2011). In either case, the resulting outcome is one of different national trajectories of policy change, and hardly one of cross-national similarities.

An equally puzzling image is provided by studies on contemporary administrative reforms, for which cross-national learning also plays a central role. Since the early nineties, scholars in this field have flagged the emergence of certain international trends often (but
not only) associated with the ‘New Public Management’ paradigm (Caiden, 1991; Hood, 1991; Wright, 1994; Toonen, 2003b; Roberts, 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Many have underlined how international organisations, ‘epistemic communities’, and consultants have actively contributed to the diffusion of ideas; and thus to ‘isomorphic’ reform trends (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Saint-Martin, 2001; Sahlin-Andersson, 2002; King, 2005; Pal and Ireland, 2009; Dimitrakopolous and Passas, 2012; Pal, 2012).

Studies have similarly discussed whether and how countries have converged around NPM or other reform doctrines (OECD, 1995; Common, 1998a; Kettl, 2000; Christensen and Laegreid, 2010). Many authors have shown that specific types of reform do seem to have spread across several jurisdictions, despite the significant variations in national institutions and points of departure. Thus, ‘privatisation’, ‘agencies’, ‘independent central banks’, ‘freedom of information laws’, ‘regulatory regimes’, ‘performance management’, and even ‘European style international courts’ have reportedly emerged in very different contexts (Peters, 1997; Bennett, 1997; Pollitt et al., 2001; Common, 2001; McCourt and Minogue, 2001; Roberts, 2006; Marcussen, 2007; Thatcher, 2007; Jordana et al., 2011; Alter, 2012).

Yet also in this case scepticism has grown rapidly on various fronts. When transfer/diffusion processes are acknowledged as the source of reform, explanations are often found in mechanisms of policy change other than learning. For instance, a desire to ‘emulate’ reform leaders (Ingraham, 1993); the ‘ritualistic/symbolic’ aims of politicians involved in the process (Nakano, 2004; Goldfinch, 2006); or the pressures exerted by international organisations or other foreign institutions (Ramió and Salvador, 2000, 2005; Bissessar, 2003; Larmour, 2005; Vicher, 2009). In some cases, it has been even suggested that reforms originated in national political dynamics, rather than international examples or trends (Barzelay, 2003; Barzelay et al., 2003; Cejudo, 2003, 2008).

Some administrative reform scholars have suggested reform convergence has mainly been a ‘useful myth’ (Pollitt, 2001). In fact, what has disseminated internationally is reform ‘talk’, and perhaps some ‘accounts of practice’ (Sahlin-Andersson, 2002:54). Other authors have flagged that national patterns/paths, institutional conditions, and ‘administrative traditions’ have heavily conditioned both modernisation attempts and the real impacts of borrowed models and ideas (Roberts, 1997; Premfors, 1998; Lodge, 2003, 2012; Cheung, 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009; Painter and Peters, 2010). Then, several
observers have wondered whether convergence around the administrative reforms advanced by developed countries is appropriate or even possible for developing countries with limited administrative capacities (Schick, 1998; McCourt et al., 2001; Minogue, 2001; Nickson, 2002; Laking and Norman, 2007; Dussauge-Laguna, 2009b; Pritchett et al., 2010; Andrews, 2010, 2012; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012).

The former debates raise a number of important questions, which could be summarised around the following puzzle: if the process of drawing relevant information about foreign experiences in a particular policy field, and converting it to changes of some sort is so complicated, how is it possible that we find so many documented examples of policy ‘transfer’ and ‘diffusion’, particularly in the field of administrative reforms? Moreover, leaving aside other mechanisms like ‘coercion’ or ‘legal harmonisation’, how is it that many of these changes have not actually remained just at the level or ‘talk’, but have gone to include some degree of convergence in policy contents, which would further point towards complex learning processes?

In a way, this situation might simply relate to how scholars talk about similar questions in different terms. For instance, recent diffusion studies which focus on ‘learning’ define this term as a process by which policymakers update or change their beliefs on the basis of information about policy effects in other jurisdictions (Shipan and Volden, 2008; Meseguer, 2009; Gilardi et al., 2009; Gilardi, 2010; Graham et al., 2013). Once policymakers know that a policy (e.g. capital controls; hospital financing reforms; antismoking principles) has worked well elsewhere, they will aim to adopt it. Cross-jurisdictional learning will thus lead to policy changes. Moreover, because diffusion scholars usually understand policies in a dichotomous way (Howlett and Rayner, 2008; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 2012), the adoption of a similar policy across jurisdictions will usually imply convergence.

For policy transfer and lesson-drawing scholars, the story is slightly even if not completely different. Lessons, policies, or more general knowledge might be transposed from A to B, or used by policymakers in other jurisdictions (Rose, 1991, 1993; Page, 2000; Evans, 2004a, 2004b; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000). While scholars do not usually provide a clear definition of learning, they tend to assume it happens in the way of some assessment carried out by policymakers between a particular issue they face in their jurisdiction and the potential solution provided by a policy elsewhere, which is then
transferred. In contrast to their diffusion colleagues, students of transfer/lesson-drawing make two further assumptions. First, policies are not just ‘either/or’ decisions, but bundles of objectives, instruments, and settings (Howlett and Rayner, 2008; Benson and Jordan, 2011). Second, during cross-national transfer/learning process, policymakers aim to ‘fit’ or ‘translate’ the borrowed policy/lesson to the receiving jurisdiction (Rose, 2005; Stone, 2012). Therefore, learning from abroad might trigger policy changes in the way of lessons or policies being transferred. Yet, because of the former two assumptions, these changes will hardly lead to cross-national convergence.

However, by looking at these differences between the policy diffusion and policy transfer approaches one cannot fully understand why contemporary discussions on cross-national policy learning and administrative reforms offer such a puzzling perspective. Conceptual/definitional aspects do contribute to making sense about how scholars offer contrasting assessments on the amount of convergence in any given policy field (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). On the other hand, they do not say much about those other cases in which convergence actually went beyond the level of decisions or ‘labels’ (e.g. Thatcher, 2007; Alter, 2012; Nutley et al., 2012). Nor do they account for why policy changes are attributed to cross-national learning processes despite the challenges which are commonly associated with the latter.

In fact, the problems of the policy diffusion and policy transfer approaches to fully understand the relationships between cross-national learning and policy changes (and potential policy convergence) would seem to lie elsewhere. First, in the limited conceptualisation they offer about what learning really is. As mentioned above, diffusion scholars assert that policymakers learn from the effects/successes of policies in other jurisdictions. However, leaving aside some exceptions (Mossberger, 2000; Weyland, 2006), the literature does not say much about how policymakers learn; what they learn about (other than ‘effects’); or how they use this learning beyond the policy adoption stage. In many ways, this is actually a literature about learning without learners. Among policy transfer scholars the problem is different, but strongly related. Here it is possible to identify specific policymakers, who might learn about many ‘elements of policy’ (Benson and Jordan, 2011). However, in the end learning is a task mainly related with ‘transferring’ and ‘transposing’ policies, lessons, or models, and not much else (but see Bennett, 1991a; Wolman and Page, 2002; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010; Common, 2012).
Second, while both literatures stress that policy changes result from cross-national learning, they do not offer much in the way of explaining how policymakers actually link these two variables. The policy diffusion scholarship has traditionally focused on patterns and processes, rather than in actors or agency (Rose, 1991; Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The only exception to this can be found in works focused on how policy entrepreneurs aim to mobilise support for the adoption of policies existing elsewhere (Mintrom, 1997). Policy transfer/lesson-drawing scholars have long paid attention to what policymakers do. Yet this has been usually in relation to how policymakers learn and draw lessons/models from abroad (Wolman and Page, 2002; Wolman and Mossberger, 2003; Rose, 2005); or about how they ‘fit’, ‘adapt’, ‘edit’, or ‘translate’ borrowed policies (Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; Stone, 2012; Peyroux et al., 2012; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013). However, in the end little is said about how policymakers advance policy changes on the basis of information from other countries’ policies; or about how they might make sure changes are not reversed once enacted.

Third, these are two bodies of literature that study processes of learning-change, which nonetheless generally neglect the temporal implications of such processes. Diffusion scholarship has traditionally cared about time in two senses: when highlighting patterns of diffusion; or when exploring how various diffusion mechanisms work differently at various points in time (Rogers, 2003; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Jordana et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2013). However, given their focus on policy adoption, diffusion scholars ignore other changes in policy which might take place during the implementation phase and thus across time (Shipan and Volden, 2012; but see Acharya, 2007; Karch, 2007; Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann, 2011). Policy transfer/lesson-drawing scholars similarly acknowledge the relevance of time in two ways: by contrasting the degree of policy changes in $t^2$ (moment of transfer) versus $t^1$ (original conditions; e.g. Common, 2001); and by indicating that after the transfer stage, the new policy will enter a long process of adaptation in the ‘importer jurisdiction’ (Page, 2000). Yet the latter assertion implies a rather deterministic view regarding potential policy outcomes. It also impedes thinking about ‘iterations’, ‘loops’, and changing roles across time (Walt et al., 2004; Fawcett and Marsh, 2012; Carroll, 2012).

Thus, contemporary debates within the policy diffusion, policy transfer, and cognate literatures have remarked the relevance that cross-national policy learning might have for
policymaking processes, including those related to administrative reforms. Yet the same literature has flagged that learning from abroad is complicated, rarely leads to significant policy changes, and hardly ever produces cross-national convergence. This puzzling image is partly a result of different conceptual and definitional points of departure among scholars on different camps. But above all, it is related to their shared limitations for providing a broader understanding of cross-national learning; the way policymakers manage to link knowledge from abroad and policy changes; and the temporal implications of these processes.

**The Focus of This Thesis**

This thesis takes as its point of departure the former puzzle and on-going debates. The main research question it addresses is whether and how cross-national policy learning matters for making policy changes. To explore this subject in more detail, the thesis asks four other questions which are strongly linked: What kinds of policy outcomes result from cross-national learning? How do policymakers use knowledge from abroad in making national policies? What strategies do policymakers pursue to advance policy changes? How do cognitive, national, and international factors influence cross-national policy learning processes?

The former questions are directly related to the scholarly concerns summarised above. They are also questions about areas where theoretical and conceptual developments remain limited. Of course, as Page (2000:8) has noted, ‘[i]dentifying which gaps are more important than others is highly subjective’. Thus, the thesis does not claim the former questions are the most pressing for the academic literature. At the same time, it might not be wrong to argue they have received far less attention than others, such as ‘where do ideas come from’; or ‘how do policymakers learn from abroad’ (Rose, 1991, 1993; Mossberger, 2000; Wolman and Page, 2002; James and Lodge, 2003; Weyland, 2004b, 2005, 2006; Meseguer, 2009; Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009; Gilardi, 2010; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010).

In empirical terms, the thesis focuses on the processes by which the governments of Chile and Mexico introduced ‘Management for Results’ (MFR) policies throughout 1990-2010. The research traces the general policy developments associated with the emergence
and institutionalisation of MFR. It focuses specifically on the way government officials in those countries gathered information about MFR practices and ideas in other jurisdictions, and then deliberately used it for (re)designing their own MFR policy.

In contrast to most transfer/diffusion studies, this thesis does not equate the term ‘policy’ with a specific MFR programme, law, or institution. As it is further described below, it assumes a broader conceptualisation. This is with the aim of incorporating into the analysis the various actions and decisions (including goals, programmes, and settings) made by these governments on the subject of MFR across two decades. In the case of Chile, this implies looking mainly (albeit not exclusively) at policy developments related to the performance management and evaluation tools of the Sistema de Evaluación y Control de Gestión (SECG). In the case of Mexico, the analysis covers the performance management and evaluation tools advanced in the past two decades, but requires taking into account the more complex and diverse institutional setting which has evolved in the absence of a centralised MFR system.

The thesis challenges conventional scholarly accounts on the subject. It shows that cross-national learning might bring about significant policy changes. However, this does not necessarily occur through the transfer or diffusion of policies or models intact. It happens through policymakers’ use of knowledge from abroad in many ways and at various stages of the policymaking process. Moreover, policy changes are neither secured once policy elements are adopted, nor are they completed once their process of adaptation to a receiving environment has started. In fact, policymakers need to devise strategies to ensure the new policies are effective, legitimate, and durable. Full policy convergence does not happen, but neither does absolute divergence. Across time, through sequences of learning and change, policymakers learn how to overcome cognitive biases and national barriers; how to combine experiential learning and knowledge from policies abroad; and how to better fit policies to their national conditions, while also keeping them in tune with international policy developments.

The Scholarly Point of Departure

This thesis builds on academic debates on policy transfer and policy diffusion, as well as those in other literatures which have traditionally been flagged as related to them: policy borrowing/copying, lesson-drawing, policy learning, and policy convergence (Waltman,

However, as it will be further discussed in Chapter 2, the thesis will also add theoretical and analytical insights from other literatures. These include ‘knowledge utilisation’, ‘organisational learning’, and the ‘influence’ of international organisations. These are literatures which have often been suggested as relevant for the study of cross-national learning, transfer, and diffusion processes (James and Lodge, 2003; Bennett, 1991a, 1991b; Wolman and Page, 2002; Pollitt, 2003; Common, 2004; Wolman, 2009; Radaelli, 2009; Otoson, 2009; Ettelt et al., 2012; Dussauge-Laguna, 2012b). Furthermore, just as transfer/diffusion does ‘not occur in a vacuum, but as part of the broader policy development process’ (Wolman, 1992:34), this research is ultimately embedded in broader public policy/administration and political science discussions.

While the use of the transfer/diffusion academic literature as a departure point is mostly self-explanatory, there are some significant reasons behind the choice which are worth mentioning. These scholarly fields have been criticised because of a number of important limitations, including some related to its theoretical purchase and conceptual clarity (Stone, 1999, 2012; Mossberger, 2000; Page, 2000; James and Lodge, 2003, Howlett and Rayner, 2008; Evans, 2009b; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013). However, they do offer a set of guiding questions, propositions, empirical findings, and gaps to which this thesis’ preoccupations and findings might be usefully related (Page, 2000:1).

Furthermore, some alternative approaches, which a priori seemed to perhaps be equally or better suited for framing this thesis, were not completely so on closer inspection. For instance, James and Lodge (2003:185-186) suggest that scholars might be better off referring (among other options) to studies on ‘the power of ideas’. Yet in a major overview of the latter field, Béland and Cox (2011:7; Béland, 2009) have recently argued that the ‘burgeoning’ literature on policy borrowing and diffusion actually represents one of several ‘ideational’ strands. Indeed, transfer/diffusion studies focus on understanding and/or explaining how ‘ideas’ (e.g. concepts, lessons, models, or labels) which travel across jurisdictions might contribute to policy changes, in contrast to explanations mainly focused on ‘interests’ or ‘institutional’ accounts (see Carroll and Common, 2013).
In other cases, alternative theoretical approaches did not look that promising once their differences regarding transfer/diffusion studies were taken into account. One example might be found in Thatcher’s (2007) study of how internationalisation processes affect national economic regimes. He takes as a theoretical point of departure a ‘policy approach’ that combines International Relations and Comparative Politics insights. Yet his findings about changes in the utilities sectors of various European countries are similar to those previously produced by cross-national diffusion scholars (pp. 262-265). Another potential alternative was that offered by discussions on ‘isomorphism’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Lodge, 2003; Radaelli, 2000; Knill and Tosun, 2012). However, the main ideas of this approach (e.g. about ‘coercive’, ‘mimetic’, and ‘normative’ sources of change) have long been included in transfer/diffusion discussions, even if not always under the same labels (Westney, 1987; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Page, 2003a; Knill, 2005; Simmons et al., 2008).

Lastly, two other well-known analytical frameworks could have been used here instead of the transfer/diffusion literatures. One is the ‘institutional processualist’ take on ‘public management policy making’. This has been extensively employed by Michael Barzelay and his colleagues (Barzelay, 2003; Barzelay et al., 2003; Cejudo, 2003; Barzelay and Gallego, 2006). The other is the ‘Advocacy Coalitions’ framework developed by Paul Sabatier and his colleagues (Sabatier, 1988, 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Nonetheless, in using the elaborate set of concepts and categories upon which these approaches are built, the thesis could have easily fallen into a situation where the theoretical/analytical ‘means’ became an ‘end’ in itself. The empirical information from the Chilean and Mexican experiences would not have served the objective of better understanding how cross-national policy learning matters for policy changes. It would have contributed to fill the various ‘boxes’ suggested by these frameworks.

**Basic Concepts and Definitions**

The thesis focuses on ‘cross-national policy learning’ and how it might matter for the making of ‘administrative reforms’ (specifically ‘MFR’ ones). But in stating that, one still leaves open the question of what each of those terms actually mean. Some simple definitions would solve this issue for the sake of the basic conceptual considerations that need to be taken into account in comparative analyses like this (Sartori, 1970; Rose, 1991b;
Collier and Gerring, 2008). However, it might be useful to elaborate on how these terms will be employed throughout the thesis and why. This is particularly relevant because of the multiple ways in which they are defined and referred to in the academic literature; the plurality of cognate concepts that exist (with regards to ‘cross-national policy learning’); and the various policy options which could have been chosen for developing the study (in the case of the category of ‘management for results’ within the universe of administrative reforms).

**On ‘cross-national policy learning’**

Cross-national policy learning might be defined as a process by which the beliefs of policymakers (e.g. government officials) are transformed in response to information they obtained about other jurisdictions’ experience in a given policy field, which they then might seek to use for introducing some sort of change in a similar policy field in their own jurisdiction (e.g. regarding a policy’s conceptualisation, institutional design, or programmatic arrangements). This definition has several implications. First, it seeks to be a rather focused one to avoid some of the problems that have affected related concepts, such as policy transfer or lesson-drawing (James and Lodge, 2003; Massey, 2009; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010). Secondly, the definition uses the general term of ‘information’ to allow for the various aspects from which government officials might eventually learn: broad ideas, specific know-how, policy templates, policy solutions, problem definitions, and even general approaches to policy implementation taking place abroad (Wolman and Page, 2002; Béland and Cox, 2011; Mehta, 2011).

Yet an explicit focus on cross-national policy learning, instead of policy transfer, lesson-drawing, or diffusion goes beyond the conceptual criticisms which have been raised against these terms. The research tries to better understand the various ways in which learning from abroad might matter for the making of administrative reforms, and thus might bring about policy changes of some sort. As Bennett and Howlett (1992:275) remark, ‘[p]olicies change in a variety of different ways’. Because learning from abroad might be employed in various manners to produce different kinds of policy changes, it thus makes sense to talk about cross-national learning from the beginning.

Moreover, by focusing on cross-national policy learning, the research aims to leave aside other mechanisms of policy change which are commonly discussed in the literature:
legal harmonisation, competition, copying/emulation, and coercion (Waltman, 1980; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Bennett, 1991b; Page, 2003a; Knill, 2005; Thatcher, 2007; Simmons et al., 2008; Radaelli, 2009; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010). A potential downside of this narrowed focus is, of course, that any findings of the research might only be extended to similar studies, but not to discussions on, say, cross-national learning within the European Union’s Open Method of Coordination. Yet this might be worth doing for the sake of increasing the research’s analytical clarity.

In any case, in assessing how much cross-national learning actually takes place, the empirical chapters will pay attention to these and other rival hypotheses. For example, that there actually was no learning; or that policy convergence resulted from broader socio-economic or political developments (Collier and Messick, 1975; Bennett, 1991b, 1997; Radaelli, 2009). Some authors would not agree with use of only two country studies for determining the relative influence of the various mechanisms and hypotheses mentioned above (King et al., 1994). But a multiple hypotheses testing exercise is actually quite common in ‘small-n’ qualitative studies such as this one (Panke, 2012).

A final reason for choosing the term cross-national policy learning has to do with the way in which these pages understand the ‘policy’ concept. There have been numerous discussions in the public policy literature regarding the best (or least imprecise) way to conceptualise the term ‘policy’ (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Heclo, 1972, 2010; Page, 2006; Howlett and Rayner, 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009). These have shown that policy is hardly ‘a self-evident term’ (Heclo, 1972:84), as definitions vary widely in wording, contents, and assumptions. Some scholars prefer more specific approximations. For instance, Rose (2005:15-16) states that policy ‘is an inadequate word to use in lesson-drawing because it has multiple meanings’. He thus advocates a focus on ‘programmes’. Others favour broader takes on the concept, such as policy as ‘a course of action or inaction pursued under the authority of government’ (Heclo, 2010:4; Heclo, 1972).

In line with the latter conceptualisation, policy will be understood here as the set of decisions and actions (or inactions) made by government officials on a given subject (e.g. MFR, as elaborated below), which might then translate into a set of specific goals, programmes, instruments, and/or settings. If the thesis were to use the concepts of policy transfer, policy diffusion, or even lesson-drawing, it would get closer to the former and more restrictive approach. More importantly, it would be sending the message that its
interest lies on determining how government officials learned about a given institution/programme in jurisdiction A, and then transposed it to jurisdiction B within a very specific period of time. However, as it has been remarked above, the research’s concerns are related to wider questions about learning from abroad and its various uses, as well as about broader policy change processes that might unfold across a longer temporal frame.

**On ‘Management for Results’ Reforms**

As implied in the thesis title, this research focuses on a particular kind of policy: administrative reforms, which in turn comprise the set of decisions and actions related to changing the government’s structures, procedures, or systems to improve its administrative functioning or its social legitimacy (Caiden, 1991; Hood, 1991; Wright, 1994; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Toonen, 2012a, 2012b). More specifically, the research focuses on those administrative reforms associated with the term ‘Management for Results’ (MFR). This is commonly discussed in the academic and international development literatures also as ‘performance management’, ‘results-based/oriented management’, ‘management for development results’, or ‘monitoring and evaluation systems’ (Schick, 1995; Mackay, 2006; de Bruijn, 2007; OECD-World Bank, 2008; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Moynihan, 2008, 2012; UNICEF, 2009; Görgens and Kusek, 2009; Arizti *et al.*, 2010; López-Acevedo *et al.*, 2010, 2012; García and García, 2011).

The topic of MFR has several administrative and political implications which are worth mentioning at least briefly. In broad terms, the idea of MFR implies the development of certain measures to regularly and systematically follow up (‘monitor’) the way in which government activities are being performed; and/or assess (‘evaluate’) the extent to which the objectives of public policies/programmes are being achieved (Görgens and Kusek, 2009:2; Van Dooren *et al.*, 2010:1-15). These measures might refer to a variety of administrative aspects (*e.g.* efficiency, effectiveness, cost, quality), or dimensions (*e.g.* inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes; OECD, 2009).

Despite their different methodological bases and overall rationale, these instruments seek to generate/use performance information for one or more of the following purposes: learning, improving programme design/efficiency, sanctioning, rewarding, (re)allocating budgetary resources, increasing transparency, strengthening accountability, or gaining public trust, among others (de Bruijn, 2007:3-16; Moynihan, 2008:26-38; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Arizti et al., 2010; Van Dooren et al., 2010). Of course, MFR tools might also bring with them negative consequences (de Bruijn, 2007; Moynihan, 2012). Moreover, their practical operation is generally (if not always) surrounded by several political, informational, and administrative hurdles (Schick, 1995, 2003; Hood, 2006; Hood and Bevan, 2006; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Moynihan, 2008; Hilton and Joyce, 2012).

The study of administrative reforms in connection to cross-national learning processes, and particularly those associated with MFR ideas and practices, seems relevant for several reasons. As Peters (1997:71) noted some time ago, ‘[a]dministrative reform has been one of the few growth industries in an era otherwise characterised by a declining concern with the public sector’ (Caiden, 1991; Hood, 1991). The already extensive literature on the subject has certainly pointed at frequent and extensive international exchanges on the subject, in which national governments, international organisations, and ‘global policy networks’ (Pal and Ireland, 2009) have each played significant roles.

In this ‘age of administrative reforms’ (Wright, 1994), MFR has occupied a most prominent place. For example, Ingraham (2005:390), remarks that ‘[f]or much of the twentieth century – and certainly for the last 25 years – performance has been a siren’s song for nations around the world’ (Peters, 1997; Schick, 2003; Moynihan, 2008, 2012). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011:119) similarly suggest that a central feature of the ‘Neo-Weberian state’ that has emerged across many countries is ‘a greater orientation on the achievement of results, rather than merely the correct following of procedure’, which might ‘take the form of a degree of performance management’. Therefore, if there is a policy field (and a specific type of reform) from which it might be possible to gain a broader understanding of whether and how cross-national policy learning happens and matters for policy changes, it is probably this one.

A focus on MFR policies is also relevant because of the significant attention this topic has received in both Chile and Mexico. Since the mid-2000s Chile has stood out as
‘probably the country in the region that marks the frontier in terms of monitoring and evaluation systems’ (May, 2006b:xv). Similarly, Castro et al. (2009ii:v) have remarked that ‘[t]here is intense activity on M&E issues in more than 20 countries in the region, and Mexico is one of the leading countries’. More recently, a major study conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on the state of ‘Managing for Development Results’ in Latin America and the Caribbean ranked Chile and Mexico as first and fourth, respectively, in the region (García and García, 2011:19).

Indeed, as discussed throughout the empirical chapters, the topic has often been (even if with marked ‘ups and downs’) in the government agenda since the mid-1990s and up to this date. In his first ‘Address to the Nation’ (May 27, 2010), the current president of Chile Sebastián Piñera stressed the need for ‘a new form of governing. So that Chileans can benefit from results, and do not just stay hoping for good intentions. A government that does not remain at the level of discourses and words, but of targets and achievements’. In very similar terms, the president of Mexico Enrique Peña Nieto stated during the congressional ceremony for the change of administration that, ‘we need to advance towards a democracy which provides tangible results, and we need it urgently’ (December 1, 2012).

Because of all this, a focus on MFR policies would seem to be both justified and highly relevant. At the same time, however, this might also raise concerns about the issue of selecting cases with attention to the ‘dependent variable’ (Geddes, 2003:89-129). The thesis’ research design is discussed in detail in the following section. But it might suffice to remark here that this is not necessarily an issue for qualitative studies like this, which are mainly focused on theory building and conceptual refinement (Brady and Collier, 2004).

**Research Design**

This thesis is built upon a ‘small-n’ comparative historical analysis of two country reform experiences (Rueschemeyer, 2003; Gerring, 2007; della Porta and Keating, 2008; della Porta, 2008). It follows a ‘structured’ and ‘focused’ logic of comparison (George and Bennett, 2005:69), which is broadly inspired in the ‘most different cases’ approach (Peters, 1998; Brans, 2012). In addition to the comparison, the thesis presents a ‘within-unit’ analysis based on the ‘process-tracing’ methodology. This ‘attempts to identify the intervening causal process –the causal chain and causal mechanism– between an
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable’ (George and Bennett, 2005:206; Brady and Collier, 2004).

Apart from the relevant scholarly references, the thesis makes extensive use of primary sources such as interviews, government documents, and legislation, as well as reports prepared by international organisations. As a whole, this qualitative research design responds to the thesis’ ‘inductive’ rather than deductive logic of inquiry (della Porta and Keating, 2008; Page, 2012a:23). This aims to better understand and build theoretical propositions about whether and how cross-national policy learning matters for administrative reforms/policy changes.

**A Comparative Approach**

The main reason for developing a comparative study instead of a single case study is, quite simply, to provide a richer, more meaningful, and less ‘provincial’ perspective (Marmor et al., 2005:340; Dogan and Pelassy, 1990; Lodge, 2006). As Heidenheimer et al. (1990:22) have put it, ‘[b]y comparing, we learn to see better’ (see Page, 2012a). Thus, the assumption was that more could be learned by discussing the Chilean and Mexican experiences in parallel, instead of just focusing on what had happened in either one of them. Of course, a single country study could have also contributed to the broader ‘comparative conversation’ on cross-national policy learning (Page, 1995:129; Rose, 1991b:447). Yet it might not have been very helpful in terms of looking for policy patterns that occur beyond the country studied (Page, 2012b).

A focus on just two countries, and not say three to six as in other ‘small-n’ comparative public policy studies (e.g. Common, 2001; Thatcher, 2007; Page, 2012a), has methodological and logistical justifications. The focus on only two countries allowed for a more systematic and detailed discussion (Rose, 1991b; Heclo, 2010:14), in line with the research’s general objectives. By adding more countries to the comparison, this kind of fine-grained analysis would have been more difficult to develop.

A ‘Large-N’ comparison might have offered a broader take on the subject, and the opportunity to produce stronger inferences and more generalizable conclusions (King et al., 1994; Gerring, 2007; della Porta, 2008). However, one of the main issues faced by this kind of study, in which most policy diffusion scholarship falls, is limited ability to unveil
complex relationships and multiple causal links in the political/policymaking processes under analysis (George and Bennett, 2005:3-33; Howlett and Rayner, 2008:389; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009:183-186). Because neither finding statistically significant correlations, nor proposing ‘silver bullet’ explanations were essential concerns for this research, a ‘Large-N’ approach was not deemed relevant.

In terms of the ‘logic of comparison’ used here, it could be said that it is ‘structured’ and ‘focused’ (George and Bennett, 2005:67-72). The comparison is ‘structured’ because the analysis of two countries, and the four empirical chapters, takes as a point of departure the same set of research questions already described: What kinds of policy outcomes result from cross-national learning? How do policymakers use knowledge from abroad in making national policies? What strategies do policymakers pursue to advance policy changes? How do cognitive, national and international factors influence cross-national learning processes? Furthermore, the discussion only focuses on those aspects and events which appear to have been directly related to MFR policies in Chile and Mexico, and cross-national policy learning processes linked to them. Events associated with other administrative reform topics, including those in which learning from abroad might have played a significant role in the decisions of government officials, are only discussed when relevant for the thesis’ central topics.

The comparison is ‘historical’ in the sense that it covers policy developments in each country across two decades: 1990-2010. A few references to previous (or subsequent) events have been included in the empirical chapters when they contribute directly to the main discussion. For example, comments about new MFR initiatives in Chile during the Piñera administration’s initial years; or about the original evaluation initiatives in Mexico in the 1970s. While ‘[n]o choice of period is perfect for all analytical purposes’, as Pollitt and Bouckaert (2009:5) have suggested, a focus on MFR policy developments during 1990-2010 has been considered appropriate for at least two reasons (Sabatier, 1993; Capano and Howlett, 2009; Radaelli, 2009:1146): it allows telling the complete story of both countries’ MFR policies, from their beginnings up to almost present date; and it offers the opportunity to trace how cross-national policy learning mattered in different ways across time.

Lastly, the comparison of Chile and Mexico has been broadly inspired by the ‘most different cases’ approach (Dogan and Pelassy, 1990:132-150; Peters, 1998:37-41; Brans, 2012). The adverb broadly is added because these two countries obviously share the same
language and many cultural and administrative features. For instance, an administrative tradition characterised for its ‘extreme formalism’, ‘ritualism’, and ‘hyper-legalism’, which ‘do not constitute substantive indicators, let alone predictors, of responsiveness, effectiveness or democratic accountability’ (Nef, 2003:532; Méndez, 1997; Marcel, 1998c; Nickson, 2002). Also, their political systems are structured on the basis of presidential principles, in which the executive power (and its bureaucratic structure) is separated from the legislative power.

Furthermore, these are two countries which during the past two decades have gone through so-called ‘dual transitions’: from authoritarianism to democracy; and from a relatively closed economy to a liberalised/market one (González, 2008:i:1-14). Little more than two decades ago, both Chile and Mexico were governed by authoritarian regimes: the Pinochet dictatorship, and (in Mario Vargas Llosa’s inaccurate but catchy phrase) the Partido Revolucionario Institucional’s ‘perfect dictatorship’, respectively. These were governments which certainly cared about political and even administrative ‘effectiveness’; but not necessarily about ‘democratic results’.

Despite these commonalities, the Chilean and Mexican experiences also possess sufficient contrasting attributes to fit the ‘most different cases’ comparative approach (Elizondo and Maira, 2000; Teichman, 2001, 2007; Weyland, 2006; González, 2008:14-15; Murillo, 2009:13-14;). First, whereas Chile has been traditionally characterised by low levels of administrative corruption, Mexico’s public sector continues to be perceived as a relatively corrupt country (Transparency International, 2012). Second, the Chilean administration has been regularly perceived to be quite professionalised, even before a formal civil service law was enacted in 2003 (Echebarría and Cortázar, 2007). On the contrary, Mexico’s public personnel practices have been historically portrayed as following the features of a ‘spoils (or quasi-spoils) system’, even after the passing of a merit-based civil service law in 2003 (Grindle, 1977; Arellano, 1999; Dussauge-Laguna, 2011).

Third, the constitutional and legal authorities that Congress possesses (and might potentially use) to influence budgetary policymaking differ quite a lot between the two countries. The Chilean Congress cannot intervene in the preparation or execution of the budget (Blöndal and Curristine, 2003; Boeninger, 2007; Aninat et al., 2008). The Mexican Congress does have the power to amend budgetary proposals submitted by the executive power. In fact, it has increasingly used those authorities since 1997 (Hernández, 1998; Díaz
and Magaloni, 1998; Casar, 2008). Fourth, whereas Chile is a centralised country, Mexico is structured along federal principles (with 32 subnational and over 2,400 municipal governments, all autonomous from the federal government). Last but not least, significant differences exist between the two countries regarding the size of their public administrations; their payroll/budget levels as a percentage of national GDP; and the quality of their public organisations (Echebarría and Cortázar, 2007).

As a whole, the presence of certain similarities in combination with a number of significant politico-administrative differences allows for a sensible comparative analysis in at least two aspects (Dogan and Pelassy, 1990:128; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009:10-11; Heclo, 2010:14-15). Because Chile and Mexico are not completely different, it is possible to avoid the issue of whether it actually makes sense to compare them in the first place. Furthermore, given the variation in these countries independent variables, by comparing them one can focus on finding out (and thus better understanding about) those aspects or patterns of cross-national policy learning and policy changes which are common to them.

**Sources of Information**

This thesis makes extensive use of primary sources of information, including 62 semi-structured interviews, legislation, and several official documents from both the Chilean and Mexican governments. Conducting interviews was considered essential for two reasons. First, in order to better understand MFR policy developments in both countries, it just seemed natural to ask the people who had been involved in the process about the motivations behind the reform initiatives; the politico-administrative circumstances (pressures and favourable conditions) they had faced; the people with whom they had interacted; the information sources (both foreign and national) they had consulted; and the ways in which they had used (or not) what they learned from abroad (or from previous experiences). As Weyland (2004b:26) has put it, ‘[w]ho could provide better information about learning from foreign models than the decision makers who may have drawn the lessons?’ (Wolman and Page, 2002; Page and Jenkins, 2005; Evans, 2009b:251; Page, 2012a).

Second, when this research project began, there were just a few published accounts of MFR reforms. Most of these had been written by policymakers who were (or had been)
involved in these processes. This situation has significantly changed in the past few years, as an increasing number of academic studies has been produced. Yet the literature still shows a tendency towards simply describing the MFR tools’ features; the laws/rules which integrate each of the systems; and the set of key dates which form the history of the reforms in both countries. Moreover, the specialised literature has not explored the question of cross-national policy learning in relation to MFR reforms, nor has any study engaged in a comparison such as the one offered by this thesis.

All interviews were conducted face to face between 2009 and 2011, in Santiago de Chile, Mexico City, and Washington, D.C. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes, with most taking about one hour. With the exception of four interviewees, all were willing to go ‘on the record’, regardless of whether citations in the thesis would be attributed or not. However, in following academic conventions in studies which make extensive use of interviews (e.g. Page and Jenkins, 2005; Hood and Lodge, 2006; Thatcher, 2007; Page, 2012a), as well as to avoid potential negative effects to the careers of those interviewed, citations from interviews are anonymous. The interview protocol was structured on the basis of some general topics (e.g. international reform experiences ‘studied’; participation of international organisations; role of congressional actors or other ministries); and specific questions tailored to take advantage of the interviewee’s current or former official position (Richards, 1996:202).

The sample of interviewees consisted of current and former government officials; international organisation experts; and public policy/administration scholars. In the first case, the focus was on middle-level and senior officials (including some former political appointees) who at some point had/have been directly involved in the making of MFR policies. This could have been in terms of gathering cross-national information, or designing related regulations (generally middle-level officials). Also, in terms of leading the reforms; coordinating the overall implementation of the latter; or negotiating the approval of a new regulatory or programme major change (senior officials).

These interviewees were selected because of one or more of the following reasons: they were mentioned in the relevant literature; they have authored institutional reports or articles/books describing their country’s reform experiences; or by what Richards (1996: 200) calls a ‘snowball effect’, when an interviewee suggested it would be useful to talk to another person as well. Since only a handful of potential interviewees (and certainly not the
most important ones) either declined to participate or could not be located, the sample of interviews could be seen as ‘highly representative’ (Richards, 1996:200).

Regarding international organisation experts, the sample of interviews was more limited, mainly due to practical constraints (e.g. difficulties coordinating agendas, or travelling for a second time to Washington, DC). Also, a few of the interviewees had previously worked as government officials. They kindly answered questions related to both their current international positions, as well as their previous government ones. Yet their interviews have been categorised as ‘former officials’ because discussions mostly related to their previous role. The small sample of international experts interviewed is certainly a limitation. It should be noted, however, that opinions from people in this group nicely complemented and confirmed, rather than contradicted what government officials said.

Lastly, a number of public policy/administration scholars from both countries were also interviewed. This was mainly to gain a broader perspective about the politico-administrative systems of Chile and Mexico. It was also to gather some critical comments about the actual performance of MFR policies. As in the case of international experts, these scholars were selected because of their academic contributions to the study of MFR and/or broader administrative reforms in each country.

A number of measures were taken to secure the veracity of the information gathered during the interviews, and thus its relevance for the thesis. As a means to ‘reduce the noise’ (e.g. increase the confidence; Davies, 2001:78-79), most of the questions and general topics of the interview protocol were asked to at least two interviewees. This was particularly the case for contentious aspects (e.g. inter-ministerial conflicts; the occurrence of international coercion). Another ‘triangulation’ measure used was to compare the interview findings against published accounts and existing academic analyses. Neither of these measures, of course, eliminates all potential sources of bias (e.g. interviewees not remembering accurately, or exaggerating the relevance of an event or someone’s involvement).

In fact, ‘triangulation’ was particularly problematic because most publications on the subject have been produced by the reformers themselves. Or in the case of academic publications, scholars have heavily based their analyses on interviews with the same group of people who was contacted for this research project. However, as Page and Jenkins (2005:xiii) have remarked, interviews such as the ones used for this project ‘cannot be
conducted in a context of low trust’. Thus, the decision was to take as much advantage as possible from this source of information for two main purposes: to fill the gaps about the story of MFR reforms in Chile and Mexico; and to enrich interpretations about how learning from abroad had taken place, and with what policy consequences.

Another primary source used was the set of official publications that each government has produced on the subject. In the case of Chile, these were basically reports prepared by DIPRES. These explain in detail the various aspects of the country’s MFR tools as they have evolved. For the case of Mexico, documents were mainly presidential decrees, laws, and secondary regulations published in the Diario Oficial (Official Journal); and administrative reform programmes (e.g. the Programa de Modernización de la Administración Pública, 1995-2000). These documents were useful to obtain a better understanding of the rationale and programmatic particularities of both countries’ MFR components, as well as to further check on some specific data gathered during the interviews. Furthermore, they provided an excellent means to find how foreign practices have been used for advancing MFR policy changes, at least in a formal aspect (Bennett, 1991b:222).

**Structure of the Thesis**

The thesis is divided into four parts. Part One sets out the theoretical, methodological, and analytical points of departure of the study. It includes this introductory chapter and a second one on ‘Studying Cross-National Policy Learning’. The latter introduces the analytical framework which guides the description and comparative discussion of the Chilean and Mexican experiences. The second chapter discusses the central place of ‘learning’ in policy transfer, policy diffusion, and lesson-drawing debates. Building on these and related literatures, the chapter introduces the variables which might be more important to analyse the relationship between cross-national learning and policy changes, and the policy outcomes which might result from this. In particular, the chapter discusses the central place that the ‘uses of knowledge’ and ‘policy strategies’ have; the potential influence exerted by cognitive, national, and international variables; and the relevance of taking the ‘time’ variable explicitly into account.
Part Two and Three present the bulk of the empirical evidence of the thesis. Each part covers roughly one decade. Taking ten years at a time for each country was convenient to present the various reform events. The division also responds to the fact that MFR policy developments partly followed political cycles. For instance, in both countries there was a presidential transition in 2000, which had a number of significant implications for MFR reforms. Furthermore, while different policy changes took place throughout the two decades, it is certainly possible to see a period in which MFR were first introduced to Chile and Mexico (1990-2000); and a second period in which policymakers managed to institutionalise some kind of MFR schemes, building on previous developments and further ideas from abroad (2000-2010). Lastly, while there are no set rules for dividing up the periods under study, the policy learning/change literature does point at the relevance of using a decade or so as a basis (Sabatier, 1988, 1993).

Part Two is centred on developments between 1990 and 2010. It discusses how and why MFR ideas gained currency in both the Chilean and Mexican governments’ agendas; and how officials formulated a first round of MFR practices mostly by using information from policies abroad. Chapter 3 focuses on the Chilean experience. It argues that the process by which MFR entered the country’s administrative modernisation plans was much more problematic than usually thought. The chapter further shows that Chilean reforms were heavily influenced by the British, Australian, and New Zealand MFR experiences. However, this did not result in a copy of any of these models.

Chapter 4 then turns to the Mexican experience. It argues that the emergence of MFR is certainly associated with the country’s democratisation, albeit not necessarily in the sense it has been commonly suggested. The chapter then shows that the country’s accession to the OECD increased officials’ awareness of MFR ideas. Yet the process by which this led to policy changes does not reflect external imposition. Nor were the contacts with the OECD the only channel through which policymakers gathered knowledge about international MFR developments. This was particularly the case in the social policy field. As a whole, both chapters show how despite the efforts of policymakers, in the 1990s MFR ideas and practices went through an interesting but mostly unsuccessful initial implementation process. This second part also shows that, by the end of the decade, the future of MFR was not very promising in either country.
Part Three covers the period between 2000 and 2010. It elaborates on how and why MFR ideas and practices regained a place in the government agenda of both Chile and Mexico; how and why they achieved a certain degree of institutionalisation; and how and why these national MFR schemes even gained a status as ‘successful’ experiences, worthy of further dissemination across the Latin American region. Chapter 5 presents the Chilean experience and argues that officials from its Budget Office skilfully developed certain strategies to reconceptualise, promote, and secure the legitimacy of the new MFR system introduced in 2000. It also shows that knowledge about foreign practices played a different role in this decade, and was combined with DIPRES officials’ previous experiences in the design and implementation of MFR tools.

Chapter 6 analyses the Mexican experience. It argues that the country’s alleged progress from a social policy sector’s Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system to a government-wide one is inaccurate for two reasons: it ignores how developments in other MFR ‘strands’ conditioned the reform process; and it overestimates the extent to which a unitary ‘system’ actually exists. The chapter demonstrates that knowledge from abroad, and particularly from the Chilean scheme, was ably used by government officials to develop more sophisticated MFR tools. Together, the two chapters in Part Three show how international organisations were not only keen to follow policy developments in both countries, but also played a prominent role in providing them with a ‘stamp of approval’ for their MFR tools and reformist efforts.

Part Four is integrated by two chapters which seek to put together the main findings and ideas of the thesis. Chapter 7, ‘Comparing Cross-National Policy Learning Processes in Chile and Mexico’, looks back at the empirical chapters in the light of the theoretical/analytical discussion offered in Chapter 2. This is particularly important because Chapters 3 to 6 obviously address the research questions posed above, but they do not follow the same structure in order to privilege a fluent description of the reform stories. Yet Chapter 7 does assume a comparative ‘matrix mode’ (Rose, 1991b). It first summarises the empirical findings, particularly in terms of policy outcomes (e.g. policy changes and degrees of policy convergence). The chapter then seeks to explain them by looking at how policymakers used knowledge from abroad; which strategies they devised to advance policy changes; and how other factors (cognitive, national, and international) influenced the
relationship between cross-national learning and policy changes in Chile and Mexico between 1990 and 2010.

Chapter 8 presents the general conclusions of the thesis. It looks back at the main empirical, conceptual, analytical, and theoretical contributions that this research offers to three sets of literatures: administrative reforms in Chile and Mexico; policy transfer and policy diffusion; and broader political science discussions about policy learning and policy change.
Studying Cross-National Policy Learning

The complex circumstances in which public policy borrowing occurs make the processes that accompany it inherently difficult to characterize and explain.

David Robertson and Jerold L. Waltman, ‘The Politics of Policy Borrowing’

The conceptualization of learning as a kind of intervening variable between the agency (independent variable) and the change (dependent variable), however, may never be successfully operationalized. It may be impossible to observe the learning activity in isolation from the change requiring explanation. We may only know that learning is taking place because policy change is taking place.

Colin J. Bennett and Michael Howlett, ‘The lessons of learning’

Just as governments might learn from one another and facilitate policy diffusion, so too should political scientists working on different subfields learn from one another in order to facilitate the diffusion of useful tool and ideas in their studies.


This second chapter introduces a framework for studying cross-national policy learning processes. It takes as a point of departure concepts and ideas which are at the core of contemporary policy transfer, lesson-drawing, and policy diffusion discussions. In particular, their focus on ‘learning’ as the key factor to be analysed, understood, and explained (Stone, 1999, 2012; Page, 2000; Evans and Davies, 1999; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Meseguer, 2009; Graham et al., 2013). However, the following pages also tap insights from cognate literatures on policy/organisational learning, knowledge utilisation, and the influence of international organisations. Scholars have often stressed the need to better connect transfer/diffusion studies with these other scholarly fields (James and Lodge,
But up to this date there have been only a few limited attempts to do so (e.g. Wolman and Page, 2002; Newmark, 2002; Common 2004; Ottoson, 2009; Ettelt et al., 2012).

While building on previous transfer/diffusion scholarship, the framework here proposed emphasises the need to focus on two variables: the ‘uses of knowledge’ from policies abroad; and the potential ‘strategies’ developed by policymakers. It then sets these elements into a broader context of cognitive, national, and international variables. Lastly, the framework explicitly underlines the relevance of taking the ‘temporal dimension’ into account. This approach to the study of cross-national policy learning contrasts with others, particularly the so-called ‘Dolowitz-Marsh Model’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Dolowitz et al., 2000); and Rose’s steps for lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991, 1993, 2005). With regards to the former, the framework introduced here is less ‘encyclopaedic’ and more focused in terms of the topics it seeks to address. With regards to the latter, it is more elaborate and not really concerned about the degree of rationality which should characterise learning processes. Moreover, in comparison to most diffusion studies (e.g. Shipan and Volden, 2008; Meseguer, 2009; Gilardi, 2010), the framework described here allows for a richer analysis of cross-national learning processes.

The chapter will be divided into six main sections. The first discusses the conceptual meaning(s) of ‘learning’, and the ‘types’ of learning which might take place in policy/organisational settings. The second reviews existing statements about the links between cross-national learning and policy changes across time. The third turns to the variables that might contribute to better understand these outcomes. It particularly focuses on the various ways in which policymakers might use knowledge from abroad, and their actions or strategic efforts to support policy change. The fourth discusses the three sets of

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1 In their 2000 article, Dolowitz and Marsh discussed the following questions: Why do actors engage in policy transfer? Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process? What is transferred? From where are the lessons drawn? What are the different degrees of transfer? What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process? How is the process of policy transfer related to policy “success” or “failure”? While similar questions had been previously flagged by Westney (1987) and Wolman (1992), Dolowitz and Marsh’s take on the subject is probably the most commonly used and referred to. See, for instance, Common (2001); Larmour (2005); Stone (2012); or Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg (2012).

2 In its latest description, Rose (2005:8) spoke of ‘ten steps in lesson-drawing’: learn the key concepts (what a programme is, and what a lesson is and is not); catch the attention of policymakers; scan alternatives and decide where to look for lessons; learn by going abroad; abstract from what you observe a generalized model of how a foreign programme works; turn the model into a lesson fitting your own national context; decide whether the lesson should be adopted; decide whether the lesson can be applied; simplify the means and ends of a lesson to increase its chances of success; evaluate a lesson’s outcome prospectively and, if it is adopted, as it evolves over time.
variables which have been commonly said to influence (e.g. shape) cross-national policy learning processes: cognitive, national, and international variables. The last two sections offer a brief summary of the relevant variables for the analysis of cross-national learning described in previous sections, and the general conclusions of the chapter.

The Study of (Cross-National) Learning

The introductory chapter summarised contemporary debates on ‘cross-national policy learning’ processes. However, before starting the description of the various components of the analytical framework proposed in this chapter, it might be useful to briefly refer to learning’s central place in contemporary policy transfer, lesson-drawing, and policy diffusion debates. Also, it might be worth exploring what ‘learning’ actually means, and how ‘cross-national learning’ might relate to other categories.

With regards to the policy transfer and lesson-drawing literatures, the study of ‘learning’ has actually been a main theme since the beginnings of these fields. Dolowitz and Marsh have stressed that cross-national transfers might take place for several reasons including coercion. Yet their widely cited articles on the subject have underlined the centrality of learning on their titles: ‘who learns what from whom’ (1996), and ‘learning from abroad’ (2000). Similarly, Wolman and Page (2002:478) have remarked that ‘[p]olicy transfer is a subset of policy learning’ (Wolman, 1992, 2009; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010). And Evans (2009b:244) has stated that ‘[t]he study of policy transfer analysis should be restricted to action-oriented intentional learning’. Within the ‘lesson-drawing’ literature pioneered by Rose (1991, 1993, 2005; Asare and Studlar, 2009), the links between transfer and ‘learning’ are equally of essence. Rose (1991:4) notes, for example, that ‘[c]onfronted with a common problem, policymakers in cities, regional governments and nations can learn from how their counterparts elsewhere respond’.

More recently, the study of learning has gained currency within policy diffusion studies. In contrast to its traditional focus on merely analysing ‘the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system’ (Rogers, 2003:5; Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; Collier and Messick, 1975;

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3 Page and Mark-Lawson (2010:49) even suggest that ‘[t]he use of foreign examples to shape domestic policy is thus invariably a matter of policy learning rather than policy transfer’. Common (2012:683) similarly stated that ‘[p]olicy transfer can only occur through policy learning’. 
Jordana et al., 2011), some scholars have started to see learning as a relevant ‘mechanism’ that explains such diffusion processes (Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Simmons et al., 2008; Shipan and Volden, 2008). In other cases, scholars have sought to show how the cross-national spread of policies has been particularly associated with the way in which policymakers learned ‘from policy and from political outcomes’ (Gilardi, 2010:651; Gilardi et al., 2009); or from ‘policy failures and successes’ (Meseguer, 2010:6; Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009). Lastly, Weyland (2004b, 2005, 2006) has aimed to show how and why certain reform ‘models’ have diffused across Latin America on the basis of ‘bounded’ learning patterns.

The study of learning, however, has not been an exclusive concern of transfer/diffusion scholars. On the contrary, the topic has long received significant attention in broader public policy and organisational theory debates. In fact, cross-national policy learning represents only a particular instance of a wider phenomenon (Page et al., 2004; Common, 2004; Wolman and Page, 2002; Wolman, 2009). Thus, by looking at this broader literature one might get a better understanding of two important questions: what does learning actually mean? And how does learning from abroad relate to other processes of learning? Table 2.1 below summarises a number of definitions which are commonly used or debated in the literatures on policy, organisational, and cross-national learning.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of learning</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy learning</td>
<td>Heclo (2010:306)</td>
<td>‘Much political interaction has constituted a process of social learning expressed through policy. In its most general sense, learning can be taken to mean a relatively enduring alteration in behavior that results from experience; usually this alteration is conceptualized as a change in response made in reaction to some perceived stimulus’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sabatier (1988:133)</td>
<td>‘policy-oriented learning refers to relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions which result from experience and which are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hall (1993:278)</td>
<td>‘we can define social learning as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Levy (1994:283)</td>
<td>‘I define experiential learning as a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience. This definition [...] does not require that learning involve policy change, an improved understanding of the world, or an increasingly complex cognitive structure’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meseguer (2009:216)</td>
<td>‘policy makers are rational learners, meaning that they process all information in the same way. Starting with some initial beliefs that reflect the uncertainty about the outcomes of policies, policy makers use the evidence provided by their own and other countries’ experience to update their initial beliefs about outcomes’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational learning</td>
<td>Levitt and March (1988:320)</td>
<td>‘organizations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argyris and Schön (1996:20-21; bold font in original)</td>
<td>‘By single-loop learning we mean instrumental learning that changes strategies of action or assumptions underlying strategies in ways that leave the values of a theory of action unchanged. […] By double-loop learning, we mean learning that results in a change in the values of theory-in-use, as well as in its strategies and assumptions’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Olsen and Peters (1996:4)</td>
<td>‘the ability to detect and correct errors and thereby to improve the functioning of an organization. Organizational learning then implies to identify, remember, and use structures and procedures that improve the problem-solving capacity of an organization and make it better prepared for the future’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author based on works cited.

As many authors have remarked, the question of defining what learning really means, either in a policy or in an organisational setting, remains a rather complicated task (Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Dunlop and Radaelli, forthcoming)\(^4\). Indeed, the definitions

\(^4\) Over two decades ago, Bennett and Howlett (1992:276) noted that ‘many of the fundamental elements of such learning remain conceptually unclear’; and complained about the prevailing ‘definitional ambiguity’. With regards to the ‘organisational learning’ literature, Mahler (2009:17) has similarly remarked
cited in Table 2.1 introduce particular emphases. Yet in spite of that, they all coincide in suggesting that ‘learning’ implies a process by which policymakers (or members of an organisation) update their beliefs and/or behaviours on the basis of new information or experiences.

These broad points provide a good basis to think about what cross-national policy learning might mean. The latter could thus be defined as a process by which the beliefs of policymakers (e.g. government officials) are transformed in response to information they obtain about other jurisdictions’ experience in a given policy field, which they then might seek to use for introducing some sort of change in a similar policy field in their own jurisdiction (e.g. regarding a policy’s conceptualisation, institutional design, or programmatic arrangements).

The second relevant insight to be gathered from this broader literature relates to the various ‘types’ of learning which might take place. In the classic categorisation offered by Levitt and March (1988; Huber, 1991), organisations might learn in two ways. First, they might ‘learn by doing’, and thus obtain knowledge from cumulative experience. Within this category, Hood (1996:48-49) further distinguishes between ‘second chance learning’ and ‘long tenure learning’. The former is related to the adaptation of behaviours in the light of experience after surviving a ‘shocking’ episode. The latter to how organisational members/policymakers are able to ‘feed experience back into activity’ because they remain in office for a long time. They thus have ‘more than “one-shot” at policy or institutional design’. Levitt and March’s (1988:329) second category is that of learning ‘from the experience of others’. This happens through the transfer/diffusion of ‘encoded experience in the form of technologies, codes, procedures, or similar routines’. Therefore, it is in this second class where one could locate cross-national policy learning processes.

Taking into account these categories of ‘learning’ is relevant for analytical and theoretical reasons (May, 1992; Olsen and Peters, 1996; Jacobs and Barnett, 2000; Busenberg, 2001; Karch, 2007a; Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann, 2011; Graham et al., 2013). First, some transfer/diffusion contributions have stressed how instances of ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning from others’ might take place at the same time within a given

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that ‘creating a working definition of organizational learning is challenging because the literature offers such an untidy range of descriptions to work with’. See also Dodgson, 1993:376; and Zito and Schout, 2009:1104.
empirical experience. Therefore, awareness about both types (and subtypes) of learning might be useful for analytical purposes.

Second, because some authors have shown that these two types of learning might somehow interact across time. For instance, Heclo’s (2010) classic study demonstrated that British and Swedish policymakers ‘puzzled’ over social problems and policy solutions. But at times the ideas and insights that triggered these puzzling processes originated in other jurisdictions. Similarly, Westney’s (1987) account of police and post reforms in 19th century Japan showed how ‘imitation’ from abroad was in the longer-term complemented by ‘innovation’ and adaptation of the imported institutions. Thus, thinking about both categories might contribute to developing a deeper theoretical understanding of how they might matter, separately or in combination, for policy changes.

Summing up, the study of cross-national policy learning processes is nowadays a central concern of transfer/diffusion discussions. However, by placing the analysis of this particular type of learning against the background of broader policy/organisational learning debates one can gain some useful insights: a better conceptual understanding of the term and what it really means; analytical power to distinguish it from other types of learning; and a theoretical leverage to generate propositions about how learning from abroad might relate with experiential learning across time.

Cross-National Learning and Policy Change

Having established what ‘learning’ of a ‘cross-national’ type means, one can now turn to discuss the policy outcomes which might result from this kind of processes. This is a central topic of transfer/diffusion discussions, as learning from abroad is associated with the travel of policies/ideas across jurisdictions. However, the links between these two variables might not be as straightforward as generally assumed (Levy, 1994:282; Capano, 2009:8). Therefore, before assessing the extent to which MFR policies in Chile and Mexico originated and/or changed as a result of cross-national learning, it is useful to first look at two aspects: the types of potential relationships between learning and change; and the dimensions which might be employed to measure policy outcomes.
Types of Relationships between Cross-National Learning and Policy Change

In the transfer/diffusion literatures, it is generally assumed that links between learning from abroad and policy changes are relatively straightforward: one can confidently speak about change when a given policy, programme, law, or institution has travelled across jurisdictions. Yet, this might be less straightforward than generally assumed, and one needs to be aware of other potential scenarios.

First, some scholars have noted policy changes might result from other developments taking place in parallel to cross-national learning processes. For example, in discussing how the US ‘copied’ tax and social security policies from the UK, Waltman (1980:6) flagged two important points to be considered: ‘first, that accurate information on another nation’s, or several nations’ policies had been transferred into the system; and second, that this information actually affected the policymaking process’. Similarly, Collier and Messick’s (1975) study on the diffusion of social security policies, and Bennett’s (1997) analysis of the spread of accountability instruments, remarked the need to look at prerequisite conditions or alternative explanations (economic, social, and political developments).

Second, another potential scenario is when policymakers engage in cross-national learning, but no immediate policy changes follow because of a variety of reasons. First, as Rose (1993:ix) has suggested, ‘[l]essons can also be negative; examples of failure identify what not to emulate’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Weyland, 2004b:6). Second, policymakers might gather information about programmes/practices in other jurisdictions, only to later determine that this is not really useful, or that there are better alternatives (Boston, 1996:116-117; Mossberger, 2000:128; Wolman and Page, 2002:480-481). Third, the lack of use might be related to bureaucratic or political conflicts (Levy, 1994:288); to policymakers’ limited resources or capacity (Rose, 1993:14-15); or to the absence of appropriate political conditions (Boston, 1996; Jacobs and Barnett, 2000:194).

5 Page and Mark-Lawson (2010:51) note that ‘in cases where there is prima facie strong evidence that policies have been substantially influenced by those from another jurisdiction, closer inspection shows that the influence of foreign experience is limited and does not appear to have been based on any such direct lessons’.

6 In a previous piece, Rose (1991:7) remarked that ‘[a] programme elsewhere may be evaluated negatively, or the conclusion may be that there is no way in which it could be transferred’. Based on his analysis of social policy changes in 19th century Europe, Heclo (2010:70) also stated that ‘[p]ositive as well as negative lessons were being learned and disseminated’.
Lastly, a few scholars have stressed that time might be a relevant variable to assess how learning from abroad and policy changes are related (Westney, 1987; Stone, 1999; Dussauge-Laguna, 2012a). While most studies focus on events closely associated with the moment/period in which a programme travelled across jurisdictions (Pollitt, 2002:475), ‘transfer is not necessarily based on a single act’ (Page, 2000:5). Indeed, when discussing how international anti-money laundering principles were introduced to China, Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann’s (2011:640) argued that ‘the local accommodation of global norms should be understood as a contentious and open-ended process’. Walt et al. (2004:195) similarly concluded the influence of international organisations in the global spread of health policy ‘best practices’ followed ‘diffuse, iterative, and “looped”’ patterns. Fawcett and Marsh (2012:183) remarked how the transfer of the Gateway programme followed several iterations: from the UK to Australia, then to subnational governments within the latter, and then back to the UK. Along these lines, Carroll (2012) has suggested that the transfer of statutory instruments from the UK (and other sources) to Australia has followed variable patterns across four different stages since the 19th century.

Summing up, the study of cross-national policy learning implies looking at how information about policies in one jurisdiction might influence developments in another jurisdiction’s policy in the same field. Yet in assessing these processes, one needs to carefully determine which policy changes are truly related to learning from abroad and which are not, even if they take place at the same time. Conversely, one should bear in mind that cross-national learning might take place even if policy changes did not in the form of the transfer/adoption of a programme. Moreover, it is important to take into account that relationships between cross-national learning and policy changes do not necessarily end at the moment in which a given policy travelled across jurisdictions. This highlights the need to be aware of the ‘temporal’ dimension of these processes.

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7 Zito and Schout (2009:1116) have recently remarked that the ‘scholarly literature is trying hard to become more precise regarding conditions for learning and questions about whether the time dimension of learning has been underestimated’

8 Page (2000:5) further argues that ‘the time period taken as the period of “transfer” […] is likely to have an impact on many of the other variables’, such as ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘how’, or ‘why’.
**Dimensions of Policy Change**

Cross-national policy learning might lead to policy changes, but there obviously are various ways to ‘measure’ these changes. As discussed in the Introduction, diffusion scholars generally assume a ‘dichotomous view’: policy changes when one jurisdiction adopts an institution, law, or programme which already exists elsewhere (Howlett and Rayner, 2008; Marsh and Sharman, 2009). While widely used and valid for some research purposes, this way of measuring change is probably rather limited. This is particularly the case if one aims to know what happened to the policy under analysis after the adoption stage (Shipan and Volden, 2012).

The policy transfer literature offers a more elaborate way of capturing policy changes. Scholars in this area suggest that changes might occur with regards to several ‘elements of policy’ (Benson and Jordan, 2011:370). Thus, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:12) have proposed ‘eight different categories: policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy programs, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes and negative lessons’ (see Wolman, 1992:41; Stone, 1999; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012).

A third way of measuring policy changes is that related to levels or degrees of ‘policy convergence’ (Bennett, 1991b; Pollitt, 2001, 2002; Knill, 2005; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Holzinger et al., 2008). This implies looking at how a given jurisdiction increasingly resembles another from which it is taking policy information and guidance; or how two jurisdictions converge towards broader international standards. Thus, Bennett (1991b:218) has suggested ‘policy convergence’ might be measured with regards to ‘expressed intents’ (policy goals); ‘statutes, administrative rules, regulations, court decisions’ (policy contents); ‘institutional tools available to administer policy’ (policy instruments); in terms of impacts, consequences, or results (policy outcomes); and in ‘the process by which policy responses are formulated’ (policy styles). Bennett (1991b:219) also remarks convergence is ‘a process of ‘becoming’, rather of ‘being’ more alike’.

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9 Although it is possible to find more elaborate perspectives. For instance, Mossberger (2000:xii) notes that changes associated with diffusion dynamics might simply happen at the level of ‘policy labels’, which are ‘a vague but symbolic idea that has the ability to assume varied forms and fulfill a multiplicity of purposes’. Weyland (2004b:22) suggests that ‘foreign models may not only teach policymakers how to pursue their existing goals better, but may also induce them to redefine these goals and pay attention to important concerns that they used to neglect’. Lastly, Rogers (2003:17) says that some innovations might be ‘reinvented’ in the course of diffusion processes, meaning they could be ‘changed or modified by a user in the process of adoption and implementation’.
Summing up, one may try to ‘measure’ policy changes related to cross-national learning along various dimensions. This might be done simply through a ‘dichotomous’ perspective, as in most diffusion studies (e.g. ‘adoption/no adoption’ of a given programme, principle, or law). It might also be done using a more elaborate understanding of ‘elements of policy’, as it is usually the case with transfer studies. Lastly, on top of the previous dimensions, policy changes might be ‘measured’ in terms of how cross-national learning leads towards some degree of ‘convergence’ across time.

**Uses of Knowledge from Policies Abroad and Policymakers’ Strategies**

Apart from exploring whether (and what kind of) policy changes resulted from cross-national learning, it is necessary to provide some explanation about how these happened. In order to do so, one needs to look at policymakers and the ways in which they link learning from abroad with national changes. More specifically, it is necessary to look at how policymakers actually use knowledge from policies abroad; and what actions or strategies they set in motion to transform this information into policy changes of some sort. While these are central questions for understanding transfer/diffusion processes, they have received only limited attention in the literature. However, for the purposes of this chapter, it is certainly possible to find some helpful propositions in previous academic works, as well as among cognate debates.

**The Uses of Knowledge from Policies Abroad**

The relevance of looking at transfer/diffusion as processes in which knowledge from policies in other jurisdictions is ‘used’ by policymakers has long been recognised. For instance, Bennett and Howlett (1992:276) underlined the need to focus on ‘knowledge acquisition and utilization’. In describing lesson-drawing, Rose (1993:24) similarly stressed that ‘policymakers in country Y want to use knowledge about what happens elsewhere to improve their future’. In the diffusion literature, Mossberger (2000:xi) has focused on ‘how the information [about enterprise zones] is used in the collective, political processes of decision making that characterize public policy’. Among policy transfer scholars, Wolman and Page (2002:480) have stated ‘transfer does require utilization of knowledge drawn from the experience of others, although it does not require actual adoption’. The idea of ‘using’
knowledge from abroad is also central to Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000:5)\(^{10}\) and Evans’ (2009b:243-244) concepts of policy transfer\(^{11}\).

There have been some attempts to ‘ operationalize ’ how policymakers ‘ use knowledge ’ from policies abroad. Bennett (1991a) suggested evidence from abroad could be used in five ways. First, by showing how a certain topic is addressed in other jurisdictions, policymakers might try to put an issue on the political agenda. Second, knowledge from abroad might be used simply as a reaction, to ‘ mollify ’ political pressures. Third, a foreign program might be ‘ emulated ’, and thus used by policymakers as an exemplar for designing of similar programmes. Fourth, evidence from other countries may be used as an input in the search for the ‘ best ’ policy on a given subject. Lastly, knowledge from abroad might be used for legitimating conclusions already reached (see also Pedersen, 2007:67; Dominique et al., forthcoming). More recently, Page and Mark-Lawson (2010) remarked policymakers use learning from abroad in three main ways: as ‘ inspiration ’, when they take ‘ a basic idea, possibly loosely defined, and develop a form or version of it ’; as ‘ demonstration ’, to show that certain policies or decisions are feasible; and as ‘ smart ideas ’, offering guidance or ‘ tricks ’ to solve existing problems.

From a broader perspective, this topic has received substantial attention from the knowledge/research utilisation literature. For instance, Weiss and Bucuvalas (1977:224-225) stated research findings could be used for several purposes. These include raising an issue to the attention of decision-makers; formulating new policies or programmes; evaluating the merits of alternative proposals; improving existing programmes; and mobilising support (Knorr, 1977; Radaelli, 1995; Rich, 1997). They also noted ‘ research is useful not only when it helps to solve problems [...] but research is also useful when it questions existing perspectives and definitions of the problematic ’. Weiss (1979) also spoke about an ‘ enlightenment ’ effect. This refers to situations in which policymakers are not ‘ able to cite the findings of a specific study that influenced their decisions, but they have a sense that social science research has given them a backdrop of ideas and orientations that has had important consequences ’ (p. 429).

\(^{10}\) ‘ [T]he process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system’.

\(^{11}\) ‘ [A] process or set of processes in which knowledge about institutions, policies or delivery systems at one sector or level of governance is used in the development of institutions, policies or delivery systems at another sector or level of governance’.
Summing up, the former propositions provide some ideas about how policymakers might use knowledge from policies abroad. Information about policies in other jurisdictions might serve for advocating new policies, or for changing existing ones. Cross-national learning might be used for instrumental/technical purposes (e.g. formulating policies, improving programmes, or comparing alternatives); or for symbolic/political ones (e.g. arguing, attacking, or legitimating policy options; see also Boswell, 2008; Wolman, 2009). Lastly, these propositions further suggest knowledge from policies abroad might inform policy developments at the adoption and policy formulation stages, but also in other moments of the policymaking cycle(s).

**Policymakers’ Strategies for Advancing Policy Changes**

The literature has similarly flagged that policymakers develop some kinds of actions or ‘strategies’ to further or support policy changes related to knowledge from policies abroad. According to Levy (1994:300), ‘learning has little impact unless those who learn are in a position to implement their preferred policies or to influence others to do so’. Similarly, Page (2003:173) has suggested that ‘drawing lessons from foreign experience and applying them requires commitment, energy, skill, and insight’. Therefore, one needs to look at certain groups of policymakers, and at how they go about linking learning and change.

In terms of specific policymakers, the transfer/diffusion literature has long underlined the relevance of two main groups (Page, 2000). The first is that integrated by government officials. For example, in his study on how learning guided social policy changes in the UK and Sweden, Heclo (2010:301) remarked that civil servants were ‘the most consistently important’ group, ‘among all the separate political factors’. These ‘administrators’ were responsible for ‘gathering, coding, storing, and interpreting policy experience’ (p. 303). They also provided ‘concrete substance to new policy initiatives and in elaborating already established approaches’ (p. 304).

The second group is that of the so-called ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Westney, 1987; Rose, 1993:56-57; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996:345). In his work on the diffusion of school reforms across US state governments, Mintrom (1997:739) defined them as ‘people who seek to initiate dynamic policy change’. He stressed that ‘[t]o have them taken seriously, policy entrepreneurs must develop strategies for presenting their ideas to others’. Mintrom
further noted that these ‘policy entrepreneurs’ invest a significant amount of time ‘networking in and around government’, in order ‘to determine what arguments will persuade others to support their policy ideas’\textsuperscript{12}. Lastly, he remarked policy entrepreneurs try to build ‘coalitions’ (p.740).

The literature has also suggested these groups of policymakers might develop some particular actions for advancing policy changes. Among transfer/lesson-drawing scholars, it is assumed policymakers ‘abstract’ models, ‘transfer’ programmes, ‘draw’ lessons, or ‘adapt’/’translate’ any of these to the politico-administrative environment of an ‘importer’ jurisdiction (Rose, 1991, 1993, 2005; Evans and Davies, 1999; Page, 2000; Stone, 2012)\textsuperscript{13}.

Other studies have referred to the ‘strategic’ character of policymakers’ actions when linking knowledge from policies abroad and changes. In studying how American consultants revamped the Canadian civil service on the basis of management principles from the city of Chicago’s reform experience, Roberts (1996:11) argued this had been possible because of the ‘rhetorical strategy’ employed by the reformers\textsuperscript{14}. Similarly, Gutiérrez (2010:60) has noted that Brazilian bureaucratic experts were capable of advancing water policy changes (originally inspired on the French experience and international standards) on the basis of three strategies. These included gaining appointments in ‘managerial positions related to water policy’; packaging reforms ‘within a government program or policy paradigm so as to upgrade the reform’s priority on the government agenda’; and promoting the ‘formation of a pro-reform coalition’. Lastly, Eyre and Lodge (2000:77) concluded that British and German policymakers ‘strategically’ selected and applied lessons from the European Union’s competition policy

Summing up, previous scholarship has noted that certain groups of ‘administrators’ and/or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ develop some kinds of actions, even strategies, to link learning from abroad and changes in their own jurisdictions. These actions/strategies might

\textsuperscript{12} Wolman and Page (2002:481) similarly state that ‘utilization might occur as part of the political process, with actors referring to the experience of other governments in an effort to persuade others of the desirability (or lack thereof) of a policy’. See Robertson (1991).

\textsuperscript{13} Recent discussions on the ‘circulation of ideas’ and ‘policy mobilities’ have similarly emphasised the role of policymakers as ‘editors’ and/or ‘translators’ of policies and models (Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; Theodore and Peck, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013).

\textsuperscript{14} Roberts (1996:11) suggests the consultants’ strategy included three main ‘arguments’: ‘that civil service reform […] was a “science” that could only be properly discussed by trained technicians. A second argument consisted of an attack on the motives of individuals who challenged the authority of the experts. A third argument consisted of a demonstration that the members of the expert community had reached agreement that certain reforms should be regarded as “best practice”‘.
be related to the formulation of policy contents, or to adapting new policies to their receiving environment. Some might be more in line with efforts to persuade or mobilise support. As a whole, these actions/strategies may be of administrative or political character. They may also be associated with ensuring the effectiveness of policy changes, and/or providing them with favourable (or at least less adverse) conditions.

The Influence of Cognitive, National, and International Factors on Cross-National Policy Learning Processes

The chapter has so far discussed those aspects which might help analyse, measure, and explain how cross-national learning might bring about some sort of policy changes. However, the relationship between these two variables does not obviously happen in a vacuum. On the contrary, it takes place surrounded by a number of other factors which might influence (e.g. shape) policy developments, particularly cognitive, national, and international. On the basis of previous works within the transfer/diffusion literature, and cognate scholarly discussions, how can we expect each one of these variables to affect cross-national policy learning processes?

The Influence of Cognitive Factors

The first set of factors which might influence how cross-national policy learning matter for policy changes is precisely that of what could be called here cognitive factors, or issues associated with how policymakers draw and process information from policies abroad. In principle, the concept of learning has a positive connotation, as it is associated with rationality and improvements. For example, in Rose’s (1991, 1993, 2005) lesson-drawing approach, policymakers obtain lessons after following a series of well-defined steps. These are similar to those commonly associated with the rational approach of decision-making. Within the policy diffusion field, Meseguer (2009:3) has recently argued that ‘governments are rational (Bayesian) learners’. They ‘efficiently update their initial beliefs about expected outcomes with reference to information about policy outcomes in the past and elsewhere’. Then, they ‘choose the policies that are expected to yield the best result’ (see also Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009; Gilardi et al., 2009; Gilardi, 2010).

15 Indeed, James and Lodge (2003:181) have remarked lesson-drawing ‘is very similar to conventional rational accounts of policy-making’.

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However, several scholars have remarked that learning processes are actually fraught with complications. A number of studies have shown learning from abroad usually does not follow the rational model standards (De Jong, 2009; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010). Wolman’s (1992) study on the transfer of urban policies between the US and the UK, and Mossberger’s (2000:159-189) discussion on the diffusion of ‘enterprise zone’ across US states, illustrated how ‘organised anarchy’ and ‘bounded rationality’ processes are more frequent than fully rational ones (see also Mossberger and Wolman, 2003). Weyland (2004b, 2005, 2006) has suggested policymakers tend to follow decision ‘heuristics’ (‘availability’, ‘representativeness’, and ‘anchoring’; see also Levitt and March, 1988; Schneider and Ingram, 1998:62). Instead of ‘rational’ standards, Wolman and Page (2002:484-485) have found that British local governments learn from other jurisdictions through ‘random and unfocused’ processes.

Learning might be hindered by the features of decision-making in democratic environments. Karch (2007a:204) notes that, ‘time constraints and electoral considerations have an especially profound impact’ on policy diffusion process across US state governments (see Rose, 1993:58; Robertson and Waltman, 1993:22; Wolman and Page, 2002:488). Klein has remarked (1997:1270) ‘cross-national curiosity is not a neutral intellectual exercise’, but a process by which knowledge and ideas from other jurisdictions are employed to reinforce ‘policy predilections’, or fight against ‘prejudices’ (Robertson, 1991; Bennett, 1991a; Larsen, 2002). Page and Mark-Lawson (2010:55) assert that cross-national learning processes are surrounded by conflicting demands and pressures from various groups.

Lack of information about a given policy/organisational experience might also affect learning. For example, Westney (1987:25) remarks that, ‘[p]erfect information about

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16 Weyland (2005:283-285) explains ‘[t]he availability heuristic refers to people’s tendency to place excessive importance on information that […] is especially immediate and striking, grabs their attention, and is therefore uniquely ‘available’. Thus, they do not pay balanced attention to all the relevant information. […] [T]he representativeness heuristic shapes their evaluation of experience. This cognitive shortcut induces people to draw excessively clear, confident, and firm inferences from a precarious base of data. Accordingly, they overestimate the extent to which patterns observed in a small sample are representative of the whole population. […] [T]he heuristic of anchoring limits the extent to which they adapt this model to their specific needs. Anchoring induces people to attach undue weight to an initial value, which strongly affects their subsequent judgments’.

17 Karch (2007:198) also adds that ‘[w]hen confronted with a social problem, state officials do not begin from first principles and analyse every possible policy solution. Instead, time-pressed policymakers are most likely to be drawn to politically salient policy innovations that have achieved a degree of visibility or notoriety’.
an organizational model is never available’ (see Mossberger, 2000:130; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010:54). In fact, even when officials go on ‘study tours’ to other jurisdiction, they usually get only partial and not necessarily balanced information about the policy under analysis (Wolman, 1992; Page et al., 2004)\(^\text{18}\). A related issue is that when the sample of available experiences is rather limited (‘of one or fewer’), which might constrain policymakers’ efforts to engage in more comprehensive international searches or analyses (March et al., 1991; Mossberger and Wolman, 2003).

Nor is it generally easy to understand whether and how a policy has been effective or not. Mossberger and Wolman (2003:432-433) note that policymakers usually lack ‘knowledge of domestic debates over programs, program evaluations, or research comparing the strengths and weaknesses of various program designs’ in other jurisdictions. They further add ‘ideas may diffuse before there is any possibility of demonstrated success in the original setting’ (Weyland, 2004b:10; Wolman and Page, 2002:492). Weyland (2004b:5) suggests that policymakers might ‘draw the wrong lessons, both from (seeming) failure and success’. Ettelt et al. (2012:502) have recently remarked cross-national learning comes with ‘the risk of misinterpretation’, as policymakers might have a limited understanding of the context and important details of policies elsewhere (Wolman, 1992; Mossberger and Wolman, 2003).

Learning from the experience of others might be guided by ‘best’ or ‘good’ practices, but the task of identifying these is rather problematic. For instance, Kerber and Eckardt’s (2007:234) discussion of learning in the European Union show it is not always possible to identify ‘best practices’ (see de Vries, 2010). In fact, as the analyses on American ‘revitalised cities’ by Wolman and his colleagues (1994, 2004; Wolman, 2009) have demonstrated, ‘successful’ stories are not always so on closer inspection. Behberger et al. (2008:17) have similarly noted that ‘good practices’ are commonly identified by ‘informed opinion rather than on any scientific evidence’. In studying the diffusion of spatial planning and environmental policies, Stead (2012:108) has also remarked that ‘[a]ccounts of best practices are often condensed and sanitized and lacking in detail for application elsewhere’ (see Vettoreto, 2009).

\(^{18}\) Page and Mark-Lawson (2010:54) remark that ‘the available evidence suggests that the host-guest relationship between the visitor and the host might both inhibit frank questioning of the merits of the programme being visited and/or lead to the host presenting the programme in the best possible light for both domestic and international consumption’. See also Pollitt (2003).
Summing up, despite the positive connotations of cross-national learning processes, these might not necessarily bring about policy changes of a beneficial nature because of several reasons. Among others, these include the ‘bounded rationality’ which characterises learning from abroad; the pressures exerted by democratic politics; the lack of detailed information about foreign practices; issues for understanding how and why a policy has been effective in other jurisdictions; and problems for identifying ‘best/good/practices.

The Influence of National Factors

A second set of potentially influential variables is that related to national factors. Westney (1987:6) remarked, for example, that ‘[s]ince the environment in which the organizational model was anchored in its original setting will inevitably differ from one to which it is transplanted, even the most assiduous emulation will result in alterations of the original patterns to adjust them to their new context’. In similar terms, Rose (1991:21) has suggested that cross-national transfers cannot proceed ‘without history, culture and institutions being taken into account’. Whether referring to administrative traditions, national patterns, legacies of the past, or institutions more broadly, many scholars have noted that the cross-national travel of policies and ideas are conditioned by pre-existing national factors (Mamadouh et al., 2003; Peters, 2005; Thatcher, 2007; Béland, 2009; Painter and Peters, 2010; Lodge, 2003, 2012).

A first national factor that might influence cross-national learning processes is the set of policy legacies or decisions ‘inherited’ from previous governments. For instance, Heclo (2010:17-18) stated that ‘[e]very innovator with a bright idea staggers forward with and against a vast deadweight of accumulated practices and ways of thinking’. Therefore, while partly originated in other countries’ experiences, modern social policies in Britain and Sweden were also a reaction to decisions made in previous times. Similarly, Rose (1993:78; Rose, 1990) has suggested that, ‘[p]olicy makers are inheritors before they are choosers’.

In close association, many scholars have underlined that national ‘institutions’ might significantly condition processes of learning from abroad in various ways. Comparing regulatory reforms in the UK and Germany, Lodge (2003) argued that different institutional frameworks (e.g. the structure of the politico-administrative nexus) influence
which foreign templates are perceived as legitimate and appropriate, and thus worthy of selection (see Busenberg, 2001:176). Researching how much learning and actual transfer has taken place around the European Union’s labour market peer-review process, Casey and Gold (2005:30-32) found a ‘battery of institutional constraints’, such as ‘the lack of the relevant supporting framework’; diverging legal systems; and different political structures (see Lenschow et al., 2005; Christensen et al., 2008). Similarly, Radaelli (2008:250) suggests ‘the heterogeneity of a union of 27 countries is a barrier to the transfer of lessons’. This is because ‘institutional legacies, state traditions, and the dominant legal culture’ set limits to how and which components of policy innovations might travel across jurisdictions (see Olsen and Peters, 2006; Roberts, 1997; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005).

Cultural factors (values and attitudes) might influence cross-national learning exchanges in various ways. Diffusion research has long remarked that policymakers tend to look at ‘the experiences of those countries with which they share an especially close set of cultural ties’ (Knill, 2005:770; see Robertson and Waltman, 1993:32; Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Evans, 2009b:253). Halligan (2007:62) notes, for instance, that the diffusion of administrative reform ideas across ‘Anglo-American’ countries has historically been ‘easy’, because they have showed ‘a high propensity to absorb management and policy ideas from each other’ (Breul, 2006; Laking and Norman, 2007). Conversely, Dominique et al. (forthcoming) have found policymakers might acknowledge that international best practices and benchmarks offer ‘valuable lessons’; but at the same time they might insist their jurisdictions are ‘so exceptional that best practices from other contexts would not apply to their own’ (see Casey and Gold, 2005:32-34).

The particular features of national bureaucracies might matter as well. Hood (1996:49-51) has argued that civil service structures and personnel management schemes may influence the extent to which government organisations learn both from their own experience, and from other organisations/jurisdictions. Brannan et al. (2008; Wolman, 2009) have suggested governments with higher levels of professionalization and expertise might engage more in the generation and use of best practices. Along the same lines, Dodgson (1993:388) has stated the amount of resources an organisation dedicates to learning is important in terms of how much (and how well) learning takes place. Other authors have remarked personnel turnover might significantly affect a government’s learning capacity and institutional memory, particularly if there are no mechanisms in place.
to institutionalise knowledge (Carley, 1992:41; Levy, 1994:289; Olsen and Peters, 1996:14; Hood, 1996:51; Pollitt, 2009). Weyland (2006:63) has argued that ‘institutional divergences inside the state’, such as different policy expertise, esprit de corps, policy priorities, or control over resources might be also affect how diffusion processes evolve.

Lastly, a number of scholars have pointed at other political aspects. Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann (2011), for instance, remarked that ‘constant rivalries’ between various government agencies influenced the process by which China adopted international financial standards and rules. Weyland (2006:67) similarly argued that ‘[t]he balance of power’ that exist among different agencies (e.g. social vs. economy ministries) might determine ‘the political fate of the emulation proposals’. According to Robertson and Waltman (1993:29), the presence of divergent interests between relevant policy actors (e.g. ‘political executives’ vis-à-vis ‘career administrators’) might be equally relevant for policy borrowing exercises. Authors like Olsen and Peters (1996:32; Sabatier, 1988:137) and Cairney (2009) have suggested that ‘situational factors’, like crises, partisan control of the congress/parliament, and ‘windows of opportunity’ might influence the timing and features of learning processes.

Summing up, the literature has flagged a number of national factors which might shape both the processes by which knowledge from policies abroad enters policymaking, and the policy changes which might result from this. Policymakers always ‘inherit’ a set of policy legacies and decisions that might trigger their willingness to look abroad, but simultaneously limit their room for manoeuvre. The country’s institutional framework and cultural values may partly determine which foreign examples policymakers study, as well as which ideas are eventually used or not. Finally, organisational features and other political factors might affect how much learning from abroad actually takes place, and when.

**The Influence of International Organisations**

A third and final set of important variables that might influence cross-national learning processes is that related to international organisations (IOs). A focus on IOs such as the World Bank (WB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) makes sense because they are
traditionally perceived as the most influential among international actors\textsuperscript{19}. This is particularly the case within the literature on the transfer/diffusion of administrative reforms (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Peters, 1997; Bissessar, 2002; Evans, 2004b; Pal, 2012).

The influence of IOs is commonly associated with the idea of coercion, pressures, and/or conditions which these organisations might impose over countries engaged in cross-national learning. Evans (2009b:256;) remarks that ‘[t]he influence of these global economic institutions has been particularly pronounced in developing countries, transition states and states emerging from conflict, which all depend heavily on external aid, loans and investment’ (see Marsh and Sharman, 2009:280). In the field of administrative reforms, Peters (1997:72) has noted that ‘much of the diffusion to the poorer countries of the world is done through donor agencies, so that the adoptions could hardly be seen as autonomous choices by governments’ (see Pollitt, 2003:128).

Indeed, students of administrative reforms in the Latin American and Caribbean region have offered comments in this sense. Bissessar (2002:143) has suggested that ‘the imposition of structural adjustment measures […] was a clear case of a direct coercive transfer where policies were not merely transferred but rather ‘pushed’ by the international lending agencies with little or no input from the debtor country’. Ramió and Salvador (2008:555; Ramió and Salvador, 2005) have remarked that ‘international agencies promoting modernisation have relied on greater financial incentives, supported by political pressure’. Thus, ‘these external actors will have a greater impact on the design of Latin American public administration reform programmes’.

There are other ways in which IOs might exert pressures and thus influence cross-national learning processes. For instance, Finnemore (1993) has shown that UNESCO actively ‘taught’ several developing countries how science policy organisations had become an international ‘norm’ to be followed\textsuperscript{20}. In studying the processes by which countries become OECD members, Carroll and Kellow (2011:147-166) have noted that national governments engage in a ‘voluntary but constrained policy transfer’. Throughout the ‘pre-
accession, accession, and post accession’ stages, countries are ‘expected to share and commit’ to the organisation’s values, and thus adjust their national policies accordingly.

The literature has noted that IOs may also exert a ‘normative influence’. This relates to ‘the creation, support and shaping of norm-building processes for issue-specific international cooperation’ (Biermann et al., 2009:48). Beyond legal frameworks, Pal (2012:xviii) remarks the normative influence may relate to ‘agreements, conventions, and recommendations around systemic reform’. For instance, the OECD’s Best Practices for Budget Transparency (see Pal and Ireland, 2009:648-649). In this broader sense, IOs might then play a double role of ‘standard-setters’ and ‘certifiers’ of these same standards, through peer-review and naming and shaming processes (Lodge, 2005).

In addition, IOs might use their ‘cognitive influence’. According to Biermann et al. (2009:47), this means a capacity to change the knowledge and belief systems of national policymakers through the production of policy studies and other documents. Indeed, Brooks (2004:55) notes that ‘the most direct influence exerted by the World Bank on international pension reform trends [in Latin America] was its establishment of a new language and framework through which pension systems around the world could be evaluated and compared’ (see Lodge, 2005:654). Stone (2004:553) has similarly remarked that IOs contribute to spreading ‘forward thinking’ through their publications and related activities.\footnote{Pal (2012:204) notes, for instance, that ‘any academic publication about almost any aspect of public management will contain at least one citation to OECD research’.

In close relation, IOs might influence cross-national policy learning by constructing, branding, and establishing channels for the dissemination of ‘best’ or ‘good practices’ (Dimitrakopolous and Passas, 2012). In their studies on the diffusion of health policies, Walt and her colleagues (Walt et al., 2004; Ogden et al., 2003) have shown that IOs picked up some local medical practices, repackaged them, and then marketed their use internationally. With regards to NPM reforms, Sahlin-Andersson (2002:60-61) has argued that IOs \textit{(e.g.\ the OECD’s former PUMA committee)} are ‘important editors of reform ideas and experiences’. Their reports introduce a logic to (‘rationalise’) countries’ experiences; attach ‘labels’ that might draw the attention of other jurisdictions; ‘package’ reforms; and promote ‘templates’ and ‘prototypes’ (see Premfors, 1998; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008).
Moreover, Weyland (2004b:13) has argued IOs ‘systematically scan the world for relevant innovations’ with the purpose of disseminating ‘new policy approaches’

IOs might shape cross-national learning through their ‘executive influence’. According to Biermann et al. (2009:48), this implies a ‘direct assistance’ to national governments, including activities (*e.g.* workshops or training programmes) which might enable them to implement international agreements, norms, or standards. Dimitrakopolous and Passas (2012:539) remark the WB regularly develops ‘learning programmes’ and ‘training of trainers’ activities on several reform topics. Brooks (2004:76) has noted that the ‘technical support’ offered by the IADB and WB to Latin American countries worked as an important ‘catalyst’ of health policy reforms. In a more indirect manner, Lodge (2005:662) suggests peer-review processes, such as those conducted by the OECD in the area of regulatory reform, might bring with it a ‘professionalisation effect’ among participant officials (see Pal and Ireland, 2009:650-651).

Lastly, IOs might exert an indirect ‘political influence’ over policy reform processes. For example, Teichman (2007:569) suggests that IOs’ officials ‘play an important role in bolstering the preferences of certain policy actors over others’. While with a number of qualifications, Nelson (2004:49) states that IOs’ contributions ‘sometimes transform internal debates’; might help ‘the emergence of internal consensus’; and might even ‘make a crucial difference in key decisions or actions’. In the case of the Irish regulatory system, Lodge (2005:659) argues the ‘added value’ of the OECD’s peer review process was in facilitating ‘the progress of the long-held advocacy of statutory law revision’, as well as in establishing ‘better regulation’ as a reference for domestic negotiation and argumentation processes.

Summing up, the literature has indicated a number of ways in which IOs might influence how cross-national policy learning processes take place. These range from coercion (*e.g.* loan conditionality) and pressures to introduce policies/practices (*e.g.* through ‘teaching norms’), to rather indirect ‘political influence’. Between these, IOs might shape the cross-national travel of policies and ideas by generating rules/standards (normative influence) or knowledge (cognitive influence) on a given policy subject. IOs might also contribute to policymakers’ learning about policies abroad through the dissemination of ‘best’ practices; or they might support capacity building (executive influence) activities in an area which is relevant for them.
Summary of Variables of Interest for the Analysis of Cross-National Policy Learning Processes

So far, the chapter has discussed a number of variables which are of interest for studying cross-national policy learning. Figure 2.1 below aims to offer a graphic summary of these variables. This does not provide a ‘model’ for predicting these processes. Yet it does contribute to thinking about them as a whole, as the figure allows mapping out their potential interactions. Figure 2.1 puts the relationship between learning from abroad and policy changes at its core. In the middle, it includes an arrow referring to policymakers ‘uses of knowledge’ and ‘strategies’. These are the two variables that this chapter has proposed as most relevant for understanding the links between learning (from other nations’ policies, ‘best practices’, or international discussions/standards in a given policy area) and change (measured in ‘elements of policy’, or degrees of convergence).

**Figure 2.1**
 Variables of Interest for the Analysis of Cross-National Policy Learning Processes

Source: Author.
Figure 2.1 then maps out the other variables of interest. At the left hand side of the core ‘learning-change’ relationship, the figure refers to the influence of cognitive variables, which includes two arrows. The first is ‘types of learning’. This relates to the fact that cross-national learning is but one representation of a wider phenomenon by which policymakers update their beliefs and behaviours. Learning ‘from experience’, via ‘second chances’ or ‘long tenure’, is the other major ‘type of learning’ which has been flagged in these pages. The second arrow, ‘learning limitations’, refers to the potential issues that policymakers might face in drawing insights from foreign experiences: bounded rationality, lack of information, problems for understanding policies in other jurisdictions, and complications associated with ‘best practices’.

Surrounding the core ‘learning-change’ relationship, Figure 2.1 refers to the potential influences exerted by national factors and international organisations. Below the core, there are arrows referring to policy legacies, institutions, culture, organisational features, and other political factors. Above the core, there are arrows for each one of the mechanisms of international influence: coercive, normative, cognitive, executive, and indirect political, as well as influence related to the dissemination of ‘best practices’.

Lastly, at the bottom of Figure 2.1 there is a rectangle and an arrow which refer to the temporal dimension of cross-national policy learning. As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis and throughout this chapter, these processes do not necessarily happen at once. On the contrary, the very idea of ‘a process’ implies the need to think about iterations; and thus about how relationships between learning from abroad and policy changes unfold across time. Taking into account the temporal dimension from the beginning is also relevant for understanding how cognitive, national, and international factors might exert different influences at different points in time.

**Conclusions**

This chapter has introduced a framework for the analysis of cross-national policy learning processes. The previous sections have built on conceptual, analytical, and theoretical propositions offered by the literatures on policy transfer, policy diffusion, and lesson-drawing. Yet they have sought to include insights from cognate scholarly discussions, such as policy/organisational learning, knowledge utilisation, and international organisations.
The chapter first explored the conceptual foundations of cross-national learning. This has been defined here as a process by which the beliefs of policymakers (e.g. government officials) are transformed in response to information obtained about other jurisdictions’ experience in a given policy field, which they then might aim to use for introducing some sort of change in a similar policy in their own jurisdiction. In addition, it has been said that cross-national learning is but one ‘type’ of learning, with ‘learning from experience’ (via ‘second chances’ or ‘long tenure’) being the other major ‘type’.

The chapter then discussed the potential ‘policy outcomes’ of cross-national policy learning processes. It has done so in two ways. First, by briefly touching on how learning from abroad and policy change might relate. Second, by referring to various means in which these changes might be measured, including ‘elements of policy’ (or the policy components introduced in one jurisdiction as a result of cross-national learning); and the degree or level in which these elements are similar (converge) with those existing in another jurisdiction. In both cases, cross-temporal comparisons might be relevant for fully understanding how much change has actually happened as a result of learning from abroad.

The chapter has also explored the variables which might help us understand these policy outcomes. In particular, it has discussed how policymakers might ‘use knowledge’ from policies abroad (e.g. other nations’ policy experiences) in various ways. Then, it has described how ‘administrators’ and ‘policy entrepreneurs’ might develop some actions or ‘strategies’ to advance or support policy changes of some sort. Lastly, the chapter has discussed how cognitive, national, and international factors might influence (e.g. shape) the relationships between cross-national learning and policy changes. It has thus summarised the various theoretical propositions offered in previous transfer/diffusion scholarly works.

Taking as a background this framework, Chapters 3 to 6 will now analyse whether and how Chilean and Mexican policymakers learned from international developments in the field of ‘Management for Results’ (MFR); what policy outcomes resulted from this process of learning; how policymakers used knowledge about MFR; which actions/strategies they developed to advance policy changes on the basis of that knowledge; and how the various cognitive, national, and international factors affected reform processes. Chapter 7 will then come back to the variables flagged in these pages to compare the two national experiences, with the aim of providing some broader propositions about cross-national learning and how it matters for policy changes.
Part Two

The Emergence of ‘Management for Results’ in Chile and Mexico

(1990-2000)
What more logical place to look than the policies of other nations? This is much easier than dreaming up new policies from scratch.

Jerome L. Waltman, *Copying Other Nations’ Policies*

Ideas and slogans can travel, but once they disembark that is only the beginning of the story. They do not find their own way into practice in their new host country, neither can they generally shape policy without themselves being substantially amended in the process.

Edward C. Page, ‘Europeanization and the Persistence of Administrative Systems’

He insisted that the other tried one Gallego kiwi and an oceanic one.

— What does it taste like? These days you can cultivate tobacco in the North Pole; you create artificial environmental conditions and you can grow whatever you like. I started in business as a partner of a society which produced endives, those white Belgian salads. It was a disaster, but now they are quite common. Each thing has its own time and whatever comes before its own time in many cases ends up in ruins. History has neither heart nor mind.

Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, *Asesinato en el Comité Central*
‘A Gradual, but Sustained Process’: The Emergence of ‘Management for Results’ in the Chilean Public Sector (1990-2000)

The key to an effective modernisation process in Chile lies in turning the attention of authorities, executives and public servants towards the results of public management.

Mario Marcel, former Head of DIPRES\textsuperscript{22}

We were about four people and we were like a ‘poor circus’. We performed, we ‘collected entrance tickets’, we did everything...

Former middle-level official, DIPRES.

Chile has been transitioning from No Public Management to New Public Management.

Mario Waissbluth, Professor of Public Management\textsuperscript{23}

It is commonly assumed that the development of Chile’s ‘Management for Results’ (MFR) tools was the product of what Mario Marcel (2006:1; Marcel, 1998c) calls ‘a gradual, but sustained process’. Indeed, as both this and Chapter 5 will try to show, throughout the past two decades the Chilean government was able to incrementally design and consolidate a MFR system, which has even garnered significant international prestige (Mardones, 2002; Mackay, 2007; Zaltsman, 2009; García and García, 2011). Yet the story has not been as straightforward as Marcel’s phrase suggests.

This chapter will discuss the MFR reform initiatives which took place in Chile between 1990 and 2000: the System of Ministerial Goals; some agency-level performance

\textsuperscript{22} The quote comes from Marcel (1993:104).
\textsuperscript{23} The quote comes from Waissbluth (2006:109).
management practices; the Pilot Plan for the Modernisation of Public Management; and the introduction of performance indicators, programme evaluations, General Management Reports, and the so–called Programmes for Management Improvement. More specifically, the chapter will discuss the extent to which these initiatives were associated with cross-national learning and how. In doing so, it will expand on other authors’ general comments about how Chilean policymakers looked at administrative reforms in New Public Management (NPM) country exemplars, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand (Orrego, 1999; Armijo, 2002, 2003; Guzmán, 2005; Marcel, 2006; Olavarría et al., 2011; Figueroa et al., 2011; Tello, 2011).

The chapter will discuss in detail how information from these countries was actually used in the making of MFR reforms. It will show that Chilean officials did not engage in a process of emulation, as suggested by Orellana’s (2004) assertion that Chile ‘copied’ the British NPM model. Nor did they simply ‘transfer’ performance management tools used elsewhere. On the contrary, there seems to be enough evidence to think that Chilean policymakers gathered information from other nations’ experiences. They assessed this before introducing their own MFR proposals. Moreover, knowledge about policies in other jurisdictions was complemented with insights from other sources. These included officials’ own professional training and experience, and technical advice provided by international organisations.

The chapter will also explore the strategies that Chilean policymakers developed during these years to advance MFR policy changes. For instance, trying to conceptualise what MFR ideas and tools were about; convincing other relevant actors about how and why the Chilean public sector could benefit from a focus on ‘results’; showing that MFR reforms were taking place in many other countries, particularly in advanced democracies; and building capacity for MFR activities within the Chilean public sector. All of these strategies were important in times in which the country’s politico-administrative attention was not focused on reforming bureaucratic structures.

Despite the use of information from MFR policies abroad and the strategies developed, reformers faced a number of issues. By the end of the decade, there would be some MFR tools in place, but without a proven track record of success. The need to confront the legacies from Pinochet’s dictatorship; leadership changes inside the administration; and complications related to the design/implementation of performance
management tools were some of the factors which contributed to the rather erratic emergence of MFR in the Chilean government. Thus, in the period covered in this chapter, the country’s politico-administrative conditions complicated the transition from MFR ideas to effective MFR tools and practices.

The following pages will be divided into six sections. The first one briefly introduces the administrative legacy of the Pinochet Dictatorship and how it conditioned the reform agenda of the first democratic government led by president Patricio Aylwin. The second will try to explain how and why MFR slowly emerged in the government agenda. The third section will discuss which international examples were studied by Marcel and his team, and how they were used in developing the first round of performance management tools. The fourth section will summarize the actions and initiatives in the area of MFR which took place during the first half of president Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s administration. Then the fifth section will focus on the administration’s second half, and will explain why MFR lost its relevance. A section of conclusions closes the chapter.

‘An Impoverished and Demoralised Administration’: Confronting the Legacy of the Pinochet Dictatorship

The modern story of administrative reforms in Chile has been directly associated with the country’s political transition to democracy. During the period of 1973-1989, General Augusto Pinochet’s government led a structural transformation of the Chilean state, which included political, economic, and administrative aspects. The dictatorship introduced radical reforms to public ownership and economic regulation that set Chile at the forefront among Latin America’s economies. Yet the reforms also had huge social and administrative impacts: inequality and poverty rose, and the government’s bureaucratic capacity diminished.

According to a report by the Dirección de Presupuestos (DIPRES, or Budget Office; DIPRES, 2005f:7), these changes ‘strongly conditioned the reform options of the first democratic government that entered office in 1990’. President Patricio Aylwin and his governing coalition had to achieve several goals at the same time: to reinstate democratic

24 For a detailed account of the state and administrative reforms during the Pinochet years, see: Orellana, 1994; Boeninger, 1997, 2007; González, 2008i; Garretón and Espinoza, 1992; Garretón, 1993; Garretón and Cáceres, 2003; Waissbluth, 2006; Otano, 2006.
rules surrounded by authoritarian enclaves; to confront social inequalities within the boundaries of an economic system which limited the state’s capacity to intervene; and to administer a bureaucratic system that had been systematically undermined in the course of previous decades.

The Pinochet government sought to reverse former president Salvador Allende’s attempts to introduce a ‘democratic and pluralist’ socialist system in Chile (Orellana, 1994, 2004; Araya and Cerpa, 2009). This was done first of all through a radical restructuring of the state. Pinochet implemented a wide privatisation process, which only spared the copper enterprises (and some others deemed strategic). The number of public entities controlled by the state thus went from 595 in 1973, to 33 in 1989 (Orrego, 1999:10; Bitrán et al., 1999; Waissbluth, 2006). Between 1977 and 1986, more than 150,000 public sector employment positions were eliminated (Garretón and Cáceres, 2003:140). Public sector salaries lost up to 47% of their real value between 1979 and 1990 (DIPRES, 2005f:8). Public sector investment in the education, housing, and health sectors was significantly reduced. The provision of some services (again mainly in the health and education sectors) was either transferred to municipal governments or the private sector (Garretón and Cáceres, 2003:118).

After these reforms, the Chilean central government became the smallest in Latin America. By the end of the dictatorship (1989), public sector expenditure had gone from 45% of the GDP in 1973 to only 21.7% (Garretón and Cáceres, 2003:118). Central government positions represented only 2.8% out of the national workforce total (Marcel and Tohá, 1998:596). During the initial years of the democratic coalition, these conditions remained in place. In fact, the limited size of the state, in terms of public spending levels and personnel numbers, was considered beneficial for public finances (Marcel, 1998b:75, 1997b)

However, the changes to the size and structure of the state brought with them some negative effects. According to Marcel and Tohá (1998:592; Aninat et al., 2008:191), the processes of ‘deregulation, privatisation of public enterprises, externalisation of services

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25 According to Garretón and Cáceres (2003:117), during Allende’s government “[p]ublic services and companies expanded, and a massive operation of nationalizations, buyouts, and interventions in private companies of diverse sizes and quality in all sectors created was called the ‘Social Property Area’”.

26 Marcel and Tohá (1998:596) note that in 1998, that is almost a decade after the transition to democracy, the total of Chile’s public sector employment remained at 7%, compared to 10% in Latin American countries, and 15% among developed countries.
redefined the administration’s responsibilities and tasks’. More importantly, these changes were carried out in the context of ‘a systematic attack on the public service’s prestige, to justify the military regime’s decisions’. Indeed, the public sector was regularly portrayed as ‘intrinsically inefficient’. Another observer similarly stated that ‘the military government sold the idea that it had modernised the state apparatus’ (Lima, 1997:224; Rivera, 2003; Waissbluth, 2006). Yet reforms had merely shrunk the state’s resources and functions. Furthermore, the structural transformations damaged the state’s prestige and administrative capacity. Thus, Marcel (2006:2) asserts that after the ‘reforms and privatisations, the only thing that remained was an impoverished and demoralised administration’.

Despite the legacies of the Pinochet dictatorship, administrative modernisation was not a priority for president Aylwin, and his government did not draft plans on this subject (Marcel and Tohá, 1998; DIPRES, 2005f; Navarrete, 2008; Olavarría et al., 2011). This happened for a number of reasons. President Aylwin was already too busy trying to ensure a smooth political transition. According to a former DIPRES senior official,

With the return to democracy, the members of the ‘Concertación’ faced the challenge of showing that they were capable of governing. Towards the end of the dictatorship, some kind of ‘politics of terror’ had anticipated the arrival of democracy. It was tacitly suggested that it had actually been the democratic regime which had caused the crisis of the early 1970s. The official policy from the Pinochet government was thus to discredit democracy. The incoming governing coalition had thus to demonstrate that a democratic government could be better than a dictatorship, and that the country could move forwards under the new regime (IC4).

This was further complicated because the Pinochet government had introduced a number of legal reforms which constrained the new government’s room for manoeuvre. According to González (2008i:45), ‘unlike any other transition to democracy in Latin America, the Chilean one, spelled out in the country’s constitution, led to the creation of a ‘restricted’ and ‘tutelary’ democracy’. Pinochet left the presidency but did not quit his position as

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27 According to the results obtained by an organisational climate survey conducted by the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in 1996 at DIPRES’ request, ‘while public servants recognise the modernisation of their institutions as a real and unavoidable process, they still face lack of knowledge, uncertainty and fear, associating the former to the traumatic episodes of arbitrariness and job firing of the previous regime’ (Marcel and Tohá, 1998:610-611).

28 Foxley and Sapelli (1999:394) similarly argue that President Aylwin’s government ‘had to produce quick results on three major issues. First, it had to show a change in how government operated by demonstrating a strong sense of political inclusiveness and participation. Second, it had to demonstrate effectiveness in managing the economy: economic stability had to be maintained. Third, the government had to prove to its constituency its commitment to social justice’. 
chief of the armed forces, and thus remained a powerful actor (Garretón, 1993). The government then faced an opposition majority in the Senate because of the presence of ‘appointed senators’, as well as ‘lifetime Pinochet appointees’ in the Supreme Court and the Constitutional tribunal (Boeninger, 2007). Therefore, president Aylwin had to thread carefully in order to avoid political conflicts and ensure the political feasibility of his policies (Silva, 1991; Foxley and Sapelli, 1999; Waissbluth, 2006)\(^{29}\).

Moreover, the new democratic government faced the task of reverting the economic and social inequalities which had been ‘dramatically exacerbated’ during the Pinochet era (Figueroa et al., 2011:71; Foxley and Sapelli, 1999; Garretón and Cáceres, 2003). The governing coalition decided to keep the main economic and financial policy frameworks established during the dictatorship. According to Edgardo Boeninger (1992:8), then head of the Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia (MINSEGPRES, or Ministry for the Presidency’s General Secretariat), it was thought that ‘a Market Economy open and integrated to the world in which the private enterprise is the fundamental productive agent’ was the only viable option for economic development\(^{30}\). However, the new democratic government did introduce a policy called Crecimiento con Equidad (‘Growth with Equity’). This aimed to change social policies and reduce poverty levels\(^{31}\). A fiscal policy reform was also pursued to provide financial support to the former initiatives (Boeninger, 2007:36; Ffrench-Davis, 2003).

Last but not least, senior politicians and policymakers within the governing coalition regarded ‘administrative modernisation’ topics with scepticism. According to Marcel (2006:2):

> At that time people still thought that the idea of reforming the state belonged to another political sector, and not the governing one. In fact, during those years some ministers were not interested in learning about other countries’ experiences on this subject [...]. That was the view which prevailed at the time.

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\(^{29}\) Apart from these institutional restrictions, the Aylwin government also pursued what was labelled a ‘politics of agreement’. Thus, Foxley and Sapelli (1999:398) remark that ‘[e]very important piece of legislation or government program was broadly discussed with the parties of the government coalition and, more importantly, with the parties of the opposition and the relevant social organizations’.

\(^{30}\) Boeninger (2007:36) would further explain that this continuity in economic policy took place ‘because of a political logic as much as because of our own conviction, acquired through the ideological mutations experienced by both political currents [within the government] through the long dictatorial interregnum’. See also Silva (1991:398-399).

\(^{31}\) Poverty levels reached about 45.1\% of the population in 1987. At the end of the Pinochet dictatorship, the level was still high at 38.8\% of the population (Olavarría, 2010:21).
Along these same lines, Waissbluth (2005:13) notes that a number of parliamentarians and politicians used phrases such as, ‘the modernisation of the state is a topic of the right’; or, ‘I will not dedicate myself to the state reform because that is where all politicians go to die’. Another observer remarks that a ‘mediocre polemic’ regarding the size of the state had dominated the debates of previous years (Orrego, 1999:9). This in turn blocked broader discussions about ‘the complex and concrete questions on ‘how’ a contemporary state can change its culture, improve its productivity, increase its internal and external coordination, and thus better serve citizens’. For some members of the governing coalition, the mere concept of ‘reform’ raised concerns about causing a ‘confrontation with bureaucrats and the institutions inherited from the dictatorship’ (Garretón and Cáceres, 2003:120; Waissbluth, 2005; Navarrete, 2008).

The Aylwin government did, of course, introduce some important reforms (Marcel and Tohá, 1998; Armijo, 2002; Garretón and Cáceres, 2003; Ramírez, 2004; Navarrete, 2008; Araya and Cerpa, 2009). To increase central government coordination, the former Secretaría General de la Presidencia became the new MINSEGPRES (Drago, 2002; see below). A set of new agencies for policy issues neglected during the dictatorship, such as the rights of women and young people, the environment, and indigenous affairs, were established. There were efforts to improve public sector working conditions, particularly remunerations (Marcel and Tohá, 1998; Waissbluth, 2006)\(^{32}\). Between 1990 and 1996, public sector salaries increased 59% in average (central government 49.5%; the judiciary 92.5%; municipal education sector 78.7%). Lastly, some reforms strengthened the administrative capacities, legal authorities, and accountability mechanisms across municipal governments (Rivera, 2003; Waissbluth, 2006).

The former reforms addressed some important issues, but also left many others unattended. From the point of view of those involved in modernisation tasks, a key limitation had been the lack of concern about public services provision, administrative capacities, and management more broadly (Marcel and Tohá, 1998). According to a former official, some people just ‘felt that there was a need to change how the public sector worked’ (IC5). In order to do so, some policymakers sought a different take on

administrative modernisation, based on ‘management for results’ principles. This is discussed in the following section.

‘Winning the Hearts and Minds of Authorities and Political Executives33: The (Slow) Emergence of MFR Ideas

Despite the low profile of administrative modernisation topics, during the second half of Aylwin’s administration a concern about ‘performance’ and ‘management by results’ slowly emerged within two central government institutions (MINSEGPRES and DIPRES), as well as in a number of decentralised public agencies. Particularly important were the efforts led by Mario Marcel, then Deputy Director for Efficiency and Public Service at DIPRES. He led the efforts to show how and why a focus on ‘results’ (and the implementation of associated managerial tools) mattered for the Chilean public sector.

The first area in which a ‘results’ orientation appeared was at MINSEGPRES. This ministry had been created to ‘provide to the government with coherence and efficiency in its actions’ (Drago, 2002:76; Muñoz, 2005). Apart from its role in providing advice to the president, the ministry was in charge of ensuring inter-ministerial coordination across the central government. In order to do so, it created a Sistema de Metas Ministeriales (SMM, or Ministerial Goals System) in 1990. According to Drago (2002:77), the system:

focused on making explicit the main annual goals for each ministry, agency and public service, in order to evaluate their links with respect to the programmatic priorities of the government, as well as to strategically orient the work of ministries in accordance to those priorities, so that the Executive could be in a position to follow up and evaluate the degree of progress and accomplishment of these priorities, and could detect on time requirements and potential legal, budgetary, management, or coordination challenges.

The idea behind the SMM was relatively simple: central ministries established specific ministerial goals, in line with the government’s programmatic priorities, which were then reported to MINSEGPRES. The information produced was used directly by the president and in cabinet meetings. As such, the SMM represented the first big effort in the Chilean government to introduce some kind of goal-setting and monitoring mechanism, with the aim of increasing ‘rationality in decision-making processes’ (Armijo, 2003:57; IC14).

33 The phrase comes from Marcel (2006), referring to the state of things around 1996-1997, but in support of arguments similar to those he expressed in previous years (Marcel, 1993).
However, the implementation of the SMM was not without issues (Drago, 2002; Armijo, 2003). Ministries did not easily develop their goals, and sometimes reported activities instead of actual results. Most of the times goals were not based on quantitative indicators, nor were they linked to the budget. Thus, it was difficult to follow up or evaluate them properly. Moreover, ministries complained about the ‘bureaucratisation’ generated by the system, whose information demands only added to their daily tasks. The SMM remained in place until 2000, when it was reformed (Zaltsman, 2006; IC12; IC13). Yet towards the end of the Aylwin presidency, without Minister Boeninger’s support, it lost its political and administrative relevance (IC18).

The need to improve public sector ‘performance’ became also important for some ‘servicios públicos’ (e.g. government agencies; Navarrete, 2008; Olavarría, 2010; Olavarría et al., 2011)34. In this case, modernisation processes were led by individual agency leaders, who wanted to show that they were capable of doing ‘interesting things’ (IC7)35. These were senior officials who ‘thought that democracy implied the need to provide better public services, that citizens needed to feel democracy was capable of improving their welfare, and who tried to gain, in addition to electoral legitimacy, a legitimacy by performance’.

Most of these senior executives had previous experience in private sector management positions. Many had also pursued postgraduate studies abroad (Figueroa et al., 2011:72; Tello, 2011:258-259). They tried to improve the efficiency and quality of the services their agencies provided by introducing strategic planning and management concepts (e.g. ‘mission’, ‘clients’); by updating information technology systems; and by redesigning internal procedures and formats (Olavarría, 2010). Through these reforms, they reportedly improved service coverage and standards, waiting times, and citizens’ satisfaction (Armijo, 2002:288). More broadly, a former DIPRES senior official remarks they also contributed to ‘legitimising the modernisation agenda’, and a broader ‘concern about results’ (IC30).

34 Agencies often mentioned in the literature are: Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII, or Internal Revenue Service); Instituto de Normalización Previsional (INP, or National Institute for Pensions); Servicio del Registro Civil e Identidad (SRCeI, or General Register Office); and Fondo Nacional de la Salud (FONASA, or National Health Fund).

35 Waissbluth (2006:90) remarks these policy entrepreneurs were told they could ‘do whatever you want, but without making much noise’. Navarrete (2008:81) similarly states these changes happened ‘in a ‘furtive’ manner and without a major support from the central government’.
The third and perhaps most important front in which the interest in ‘performance’ and ‘results’ emerged during Aylwin’s administration was the Ministry of Finance’s Budget Office. DIPRES officials became interested on this subject because of a lack of information about budgetary efficiency and the broader impacts of public spending. According to two former DIPRES officials:

The Ministry of Finance observed with particular preoccupation the challenges faced in the implementation of public programmes and the lack of tangible results reported by government institutions and policy sectors which were receiving significant amounts of money. The experiences of the health sector and general initiatives for improving public administration salaries were particularly frustrating (Marcel and Tohá, 1998:601).

Along very similar lines, a former middle-level official says that:

We needed to have more information about the way resources were being spent. We also needed to introduce the topic of evaluation, because we required background information about the performance of public institutions. This had to be included in the analysis when we negotiated with public sector unions. Thus, we had to produce information about public spending and about which consequences this was having on the provision levels of public services (IC17).

When Marcel and other DIPRES officials met with agencies to discuss budget allocations, no relevant/objective information on agency performance levels or programme results was available to inform decision-making processes (IC17). Furthermore, a middle official remarks that ‘inside the executive we needed to evaluate implementation results because resources were scarce. So we used to ask ourselves, “Is it worth maintaining the programmes? Could they be modified or eliminated?”’ (IC9). From DIPRES’s perspective, it was necessary to have better information. In particular, about how well agencies were working; how they were spending public funds; and what consequences were being achieved in terms of the provision of public goods (IC9; IC30). This information could then be used for making budgetary decisions, as well as for reporting to Congress and society the way in which public resources were being used.

While for DIPRES officials the modernisation of the state was related to producing (and using) information about public sector performance, not all politico-administrative actors thought the same. In fact, Rivera (2003:122) remarks that there were at least two opposing views:
The first one located at the Ministry of Interior, put the emphasis on administrative reform; the second one, more influenced by the new schools of management modernisation, was located at the Ministry of the Presidency’s General Secretariat and the Ministry of Finance. The President, himself an specialist in administrative law, opted for the first one and convened a special commission of administrative law experts which would elaborate a set of projects presented to Congress in 1992.

Indeed, president Aylwin flagged various administrative issues, albeit from a rather legalistic perspective: administrative deregulation, decentralisation, reforming the General Controllership Law, improving the public personnel statute, or creating administrative tribunals (Aylwin, 1994; Rivera, 2003).

In response to this, during the following years Marcel used his position at DIPRES to advocate a focus on ‘results’ and the use of ‘performance management’ tools. According to a former senior official, he did so both ‘behind the scenes’, in numerous discussions with government ministers, legislators, and fellow public servants, as well as in many other forums (e.g. weekly lunches with parliamentarians; IC20). For instance, in January 1993 he participated in a seminar sponsored by the governing coalition to discuss future political manifestos. In his participation, Marcel remarked that:

a great number of controls are transformed into bureaucratic procedures and not appropriate controls as such; therefore, it is necessary to eliminate those which are not needed by implementing an appropriate management control scheme and the evaluation of results through relevant indicators (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, 1993:58-59; bold in original).

Furthermore, throughout the following years Marcel published several documents which detailed the rationale for introducing MFR practices in the Chilean public sector (Marcel 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999, 2002a, 2006; Marcel and Tohá, 1998). In those publications, he argued that the Chilean modernisation process had left aside important problems of the administrative apparatus. As a result, the Chilean state was ‘old fashioned’ and ill-prepared to ‘face the big challenges of development and modernity’ (Marcel, 1993:89).

Marcel (1993:90) criticised existing reform proposals for being rather ‘vague’. He said some were actually concealing ‘second intentions in favour of privatisation or the achievement of corporatist aspirations’. Marcel argued that modernising the Chilean state ‘did not require big legal reforms, but a transformation of the organisational culture’ (Marcel, 1998a:90). More specifically, he referred to ‘the development of a management
system focused on results’, which could better address Chile’s contemporary political conditions:

The Chilean organisational culture is characterised by its focus on regulations, methods and procedures to do things, rather than results. That tradition, which could have made sense within a state focused in administrative and normative functions, is not consistent with the diversity of executive and oversight functions performed by public organisations. Similarly, the proliferation of controls and restrictions, characteristic of a public sector which was in the middle of great political conflicts and economic adjustments, is not suited for the climate of agreements and stability which currently characterises the country (Marcel, 1998a:104)36.

In a later document, Marcel added that, ‘economic conditions in the following years will demand an increase in efficiency in the use of public resources’. This would happen because ‘the Government will be under pressure to solve a similar or higher volume of social and productive demands with resources that grow more slowly than in previous years’ (Marcel, 1994:16). A ‘results-oriented’ culture was thus necessary for administrative, political, and economic reasons.

**Box 3.1**

**Mario Marcel’s ‘Results-based Public Management Model’**

`A consistent model of public management based on results require the following components:

a) A clear definition of the mission and objectives of the public organisations, including the identification of the client or final payee of the action of these organisations.

b) An identification of the products and results associated with those objectives, susceptible to being periodically measured and evaluated, as far as possible through feedback from clients’.

c) The allocation of individual responsibilities in the process of generating the management product or result, measurable and suitable to being evaluated.

d) Flexibility and autonomy in administrative, financial and personnel administration matters in proportion to the organisational and individual responsibility for achieving objectives and goals.

e) A systematic and periodic process of evaluation of results, of public and external character, and

f) A system of incentives linked to the accomplishment and surpassing of goals associated with the results of management.’

Source: Based on Marcel (1993:105; italics in original).

36 Scholars have shared this view. For instance, Ramírez (2004:35-36) notes that ‘the challenge of consolidating the democracy […] found significant practical obstacles, such as a weak and rigid state apparatus, whose symptoms were: a bureaucratic work style, lack of administrative professionalisation, limited concerns about quality of attention paid to the users, a focus on procedures (and strict focus in complying with administrative norms) instead of results’. Similarly, Aninat _et al._ (2008:191) state that ‘[d]uring the twentieth century [the Chilean bureaucracy] developed a reputation for low levels of corruption by Latin American standards, but also was marked by strong centralisation, an emphasis more on procedures than on outputs, and no participation of civil society or market mechanisms in the provision of public services, making it rigid and not very efficient’.
More specifically, Marcel proposed a number of ideas which could guide this modernisation process. As summarised in Box 3.1 above, he talked about defining organisational ‘mission’, ‘objectives’, and ‘goals’; clarifying ‘individual’ responsibilities and contributions to public services provision; and, above all, ‘measuring’ and ‘evaluating’ public management ‘results’\(^{37}\). In other writings, he advocated the use of ‘management control systems’ based on ‘indicators’, and a clearer association between performance information and budgetary policy-making. According to him, these tools would allow ‘evaluating the various dimensions of management in these services, but also improving their internal administration and favour a more contractual and transactional relationship between central authorities and state organisations’ (Marcel, 1994:28). From a budgetary perspective, they would contribute to ‘a better allocation of public resources’; and the progressive alignment of budgetary controls with evaluations of institutional goals and objectives (Marcel, 1994:28; Marcel, 1998b).

Marcel carefully stressed he was not for ‘administering the public sector with criteria and methods from the private sector, but for ensuring a management model for the public sector’ (Marcel, 1993:107). He noted that ‘abandoning’ existing administrative procedures and norms was not an option; yet it was possible to adapt them to a results-oriented management approach:

- results and goals can be added to the budget process, in exchange for more financial autonomy;
- flexible pay options should complement basic remuneration schemes to account for each individual’s experience, qualifications and performance; administrative oversight can be oriented towards ex post control systems or audits, etc. (Marcel, 1993:107).

Marcel highlighted that changing the Chilean public sector culture was ‘a long and gradual process which requires years, if not decades to get accomplished’ (Marcel, 1993:107). Yet he also noted it would be ‘possible to produce substantial changes under current norms, without major legal reforms’ (Marcel, 1993:108). Whereas the former point stressed the need to adopt a long-term perspective, the latter hinted at the potential room for manoeuvre.

\(^{37}\) Of course, Marcel was not the only actor that talked about these topics. At the time, other observers flagged that the Chilean public sector was characterised by an ‘absence of mission and objectives internalised in the organisations’; the ‘allocation of resources based on history rather than associated with results to be produced’; and the ‘lack of effective systems for evaluating management and personnel’ (Vignolo et al., 1993:53).
In the longer term, Marcel’s model/ideas and tactical insights would become central features of the Chilean modernisation process. Yet in the early 1990s, at the time in which he set forth his conceptualisation, the feasibility of MFR reforms was uncertain. In fact, much work remained to be done in terms of fleshing out and advocating these proposals. While Marcel’s early writings already show that he was well aware of contemporary international discussions and public sector reforms\(^3\), at this point (1993-1994) Chilean officials decided to engage in more explicit efforts to learn from policy developments abroad.

**A Copy of the British Modernisation Process?**

**Initial MFR Changes**

Since 1993, Marcel and his team started to pay more detailed attention to what the so-called ‘NPM’ countries, such as New Zealand, Australia, and particularly the UK, were doing on MFR reforms. These facts have long been mentioned in the academic and official literatures (Orrego, 1999; Armijo, 2003; Guzmán, 2005; Marcel, 2006; Araya and Cerpa, 2008; Arenas and Berner, 2010; Olavarría et al., 2011; Figueroa et al., 2011). Nonetheless, accounts either exaggerate or misunderstand what was learned from these foreign experiences, or how knowledge about international MFR was used by Chilean policymakers. For instance, Patricio Orellana (2004) suggests that a ‘pro-British tradition and the critical juncture in which the strong man of the process was an anglophile, meant that the British modernisation process was completely copied in Chile\(^3\). While there is some evidence to support these claims, the story was actually more complicated.

In June of 1993, Marcel led a delegation of Chilean officials, who went on a study tour to the UK (DIPRES, 1993a). During their visit, officials met with representatives from the Civil Service College, the Civil Service Commission, the Efficiency Unit, the National Audit Office, the Office of Public Service and Science, the Office of Public Management,

\(^3\) To be precise, Marcel does not cite NPM academic publications in these early works (e.g. no ‘Hood, 1991’, or ‘Pollitt, 1993’). However, the language he uses and the passing references to ‘other countries’ clearly show he followed international debates very closely. His continued use of ‘public management’ as a key term, and the idea that ‘performance’ could be evaluated in terms of ‘effectiveness, efficiency and economy’ further prove this (Marcel, 1994:19). Instead of journal articles or books (most of which were actually produced later in the decade), he consulted official documents and government reports.

\(^3\) A number of interviewees mentioned that Marcel’s stay at Cambridge University, when completing his PhD in Economics in the 1980s, had generated his interest in using the British reforms as a model (IC5; IC9). Yet, it should be noted that the British reforms were among the most famous in the early nineties.
the Department of Environment, H.M. Treasury, and Harrow Council. The study tour was sponsored by the British Council and the Overseas Development Administration, per *DIPRES*’ request. The delegation attended presentations on ‘Value-For-Money Audits’; ‘Financial Management Initiative’; ‘Next Steps’; ‘Efficiency Scrutinies’; ‘Market Testing’; and ‘Citizen’s Charter’. According to the report prepared by *DIPRES*, officials learned about the guiding principles of the British reforms. Among other things, they noted that ‘value for money’ was a widely used concept; that ‘transparency’ and ‘openness’ were considered guiding principles for conducting ‘public business’; that agencies submitted public reports to Parliament; and that management was being ‘objectified’ through the quantification of institutional objectives and results.

The study tour report also remarks a number of features from the British experience (*DIPRES*, 1993a:2-6; bold font in original): ‘the Treasury is absolutely involved in the measurement of performance of Public Services’; ‘Efficiency Scrutinies’ reports did not ‘only diagnose efficiency’, but also included ‘project proposals’ to improve services; and ‘[a]ll Public Services have a framework paper in which their Mission, objectives, services, standards, operation mechanisms and channels of communication with clients are all specified’. It then concludes that, ‘the [British] experience under analysis and the reflection developed afterwards by the members of the mission offers a good basis for the development of these [Chilean modernisation] ideas’. Indeed, as noted below, the initial MFR practices of the Chilean government would certainly reflect the British experience.

The influence of the British ‘model’ has been acknowledged by officials involved in the first stages of the Chilean reforms. For instance, Armijo (2003:58) remarks that ‘a source of methodological inspiration was obtained from the experiences developed in the United Kingdom, such as the efficiency scrutinies and the Performance Indicators’. A former *DIPRES* official similarly said that, ‘first we went through a process of strategic planning, incorporating New Public Management concepts, and in those times what was happening in the UK was the most important reference’ (IC17). Another stated that in the mid-1990s, ‘when we began to think about measuring public programmes, the first thing we thought about were indicators, which were used in countries like the UK, thought to be fashionable at the time’ (IC4).
Indeed, Chilean policymakers travelled to the UK because they wanted to learn about that country’s specific experience in implementing performance management tools. According to one participant,

The British case was probably the most appropriate in terms of what we wanted to know about feasibility and implementation. It did not represent something cumbersome, nor did it require many legal modifications. Otherwise, we would have needed to think about a broader time horizon. We wanted to know about practices which could be easily and quickly applied to Chile. There were other cases like France or Spain, which were different examples, but did not seem to be easy to use. For example, Spain had a system in which institutions were supposed to report information via an on-line system, something that would exist in Chile only a decade afterwards. In that sense, the British case seemed to be potentially easy to reproduce (IC26).

Perhaps the strongest evidence about the British influence on the Chilean MFR reforms of the early nineties was the use of similar performance management tools. The same official adds that,

After the study tour, we basically brought back with us two things. The idea that agencies had to work on their strategic planning, that they had to design a navigation chart. Based on that, then we said, ‘OK, let’s measure this’. And we asked ourselves, ‘how are we going to do that?’ Well, based on indicators: a formula, a process of information gathering, monitoring, etc. These were very basic things, but they did not exist in Chile (IC26).

Another interviewee adds that, ‘the trip allowed us knowing the methodological/conceptual part of this topic. From that trip onwards, we started to write, and the methodology of our pilot plan comes precisely from what was observed in that trip’ (IC21). The use of performance indicators linked to public institutions’ mission and goals would certainly become a key component of the Chilean reforms.

Using knowledge from the study tour (but also previous research, as detailed below), in 1993 DIPRES launched a Plan Piloto de Modernización en la Gestión de los Servicios Públicos (PPMGSP, or Pilot Plan for the Modernisation of Public Services; DIPRES, 1993b, 1993c; Armijo, 2003). The PPMGSP’s objective was to ‘promote a new vision about public management and change the focus from procedures (policies, instruments, and regulations), towards the results of those procedures’ (DIPRES, 1993c:1). It also suggested there was a ‘democratic imperative’ which called for ‘more transparency in public decisions’, and the ‘appropriate use of authority and public resources allocation’ (DIPRES, 1993b:1).
The PPMGSP argued that public organisations should ‘familiarise themselves with modern management techniques and incorporate in their administration the process of strategic planning, allocation of individual responsibilities and systems of management evaluation’ (DIPRES, 1993c:1; underlined in original). The programme was built upon six areas described in Box 3.2. These aimed to guide agencies’ actions to determine ‘measures to improve their organisation and operation’; define ‘management indicators and productivity measures’; and introduce an ‘information system which could optimise the budget allocation mechanism’ on the basis of ‘goals and the evaluation of results’ (DIPRES, 1993b:3).

### Box 3.2

**Pilot Plan for the Modernisation of Public Services**

1. **Strategic Planning**
   - Definition of the institutional goals and mission
   - Analysis of the organisation (structure, inputs/outputs/clients, information systems)

2. **Internal Scrutiny**
   - Identification of modernisation projects (priority areas)
   - Classification of the agency’s functions/tasks (core vs. subject to outsourcing)

3. **Development of Modernisation Projects**
   - Definition of a specific work-plan
   - Identification of improvement projects

4. **Design of a Management Control System**
   - Development of evaluation indicators (both global agency performance and specific projects/activities)
   - Indicators for measuring effectiveness (quality, coverage, opportunity), efficiency, and financial performance (savings)

5. **Implementation of the Management Control System**
   - Design of information gathering and monitoring systems

6. **Establishment of Performance Agreements**
   - Design of agreements for the allocation of institutional incentives

Source: Author based on DIPRES (1993c).
The *PPMGSP* initially applied only to five public services (agencies)\(^4\). These institutions were chosen to increase the chances of success, as well as because of ‘the methodological relevance of each service in terms of its users, the policy sector to which it belongs and the potential benefit its management improvement would represent’ (DIPRES, 1993c:7). However, the participation of these agencies was voluntarily. This would remain the rule until 1998, when a new MFR tool was introduced (IC9; see below).

Participating agencies received external support to develop their modernisation and improvement plans. Consultants helped agency officials in the process of drafting strategic plans, and for designing relevant performance indicators. These consultancies were financed by *DIPRES*. This was both to support agency efforts, but also because of *DIPRES*’ limited human resources. Indeed, apart from Marcel, there were only four other public servants working on the coordination of the *Pilot Plan*.

While the previous description shows that Chilean officials did use knowledge and specific tools from the British experience, it would be misleading to assume they simply ‘copied’ the UK model. The use of strategic planning, performance indicators, and monitoring; the central role of the Finance Ministry; and a focus on ‘results’, all became features of the Chilean scheme. Yet the same study tour report states that, before travelling to the UK, *DIPRES* officials had already drafted some modernisation plans. The information gathered during the UK visit was thus used to ‘comparatively evaluate the criteria and methods of the Plan Piloto de Escrutinios de Eficiencia’ (or Pilot Plan of Efficiency Strutinies; DIPRES, 1993a:5). Furthermore, the report noted that this initial project represented ‘a more ambitious and integral effort than the efficiency scrutinies used in Great Britain’ (DIPRES, 1993a:5).

Moreover, the study tour took place in June of 1993, but before that date *DIPRES* officials had already been looking for information about foreign MFR practices. According to one official,

\(^4\) These were: *Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero* (Agriculture and Cattle Service); *Servicio Nacional de Capacitación y Empleo* (National Service for Training and Employment); *Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas* (the National Board for Scholar Support and Scholarships); *Dirección General de Deportes y Recreación* (General Direction for Sports and Leisure); and *Dirección General de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos* (General Direction for Libraries, Archives, and Museums). In a second round, five services associated with the Ministry of Finance were added: *Tesorería General de la Nación* (National Treasury); *Servicio de Impuestos Internos* (Internal Revenue Services); *Casa de Moneda* (the Mint); *Servicio Nacional de Aduanas* (National Customs Service); and *Dirección de Aprovisionamiento del Estado* (State Provisions Directorship). See Armijo (2003:59).
We were working on this in DIPRES since the second half of 1992, looking at information that was available about the British experience, some papers on France and Spain. The US reform experience was complicated, because there were different conditions at state and federal levels. Then, in terms of the role played by a Ministry of Finance, we could not find any relevant experience in the US. We started to think about how to advance these reforms. We thought about measuring the productivity of the public sector, but that was too complicated because you cannot measure costs. The trip thus allowed us to see the practical side of a specific experience. We had already studied papers and public information from other countries. This trip was mainly to learn about practical issues which could emerge on this subject (IC26).  

Indeed, from the beginning of the reform process, Chilean officials were keen to study other foreign examples. Marcel (2006:2) remarks that they ‘studied what was happening in Great Britain, the reforms in New Zealand, and the less known experience of Australia’. In a later document, Marcel (1998a) discussed those three national experiences and the US one, showing good and detailed knowledge of all cases41. Moreover, he noted that these countries aimed to link ‘the evaluation of performance and the economic processes in which public institutions participate, particularly in the budget process’ (Marcel, 1998a:56). Therefore, even if the British experience served him (and his team) as a departure point, it was not the only source of knowledge for developing the Chilean MFR tools.  

Other interviewees pointed at how, from the very beginning, the Chilean MFR tools did not just originate in the transfer of British ones. According to a former senior official,

Our tools did not follow a model from abroad, they were all ‘home made’. Obviously they did pick up concepts developed abroad. But it would be inaccurate to say that we followed the Australian or the New Zealand model, or that this tool is the same to the one used by the British at the time (IC5)42.

Another DIPRES official elaborates on the same point:

41 On the British reforms, he said that ‘performance indicators have played a key role’, among other things, ‘as information or object of study in evaluations of the institutional management’ (p. 54). Regarding New Zealand, he remarked that the development of performance indicators had been part of ‘one of the most radical experiences of state reform’, in which there was a clear distinction between ‘results’ and ‘products’ (p. 54). On Australia, he pointed out that reforms had been closely linked to the financial sector, and had been part of a broader process involving strategic planning, organisational restructuring, and the use of performance-based incentives. He further noted that ‘performance indicators and goals have become part of one of the most complete systems for presenting budgetary information’, and that ‘evaluation systems […] have had a rapid development’ (p. 55).

42 Armijo (2003:64) similarly notes that, ‘even though the initial sources of methodological inspiration came from the United Kingdom’s experiences, in general terms the methodological design and the implementation were done with the national budgetary resources and with national experts’.
We did not apply the methodologies other countries had as they were. We adapted them. For example, in the case of indicators, we were clear that this was an instrument which contributed to the decision-making process. But this could not happen in automatic, by linking directly remunerations and budgetary decisions. That had already been done and failed. Therefore, we followed a rather indirect path to produce more objective information through these instruments, so that they could contribute to decision-making. We did not introduce performance contracts, which existed in those countries, because our idiosyncrasy was not prepared for that (IC8).

The former quotes further evidence that Marcel and his team did make an effort to analyse and assess the practical experience of other countries. According to a former senior official, ‘we did not buy the New Public Management at face value. We took the kind of instruments and ideas that were emerging. Then we reviewed our problems, and discussed the extent to which different tools could help us’ (IC30).

Summing up, the PPMSGP had certainly been associated with the British managerial experience. Yet a simple process of transfer/copying from London to Santiago, as suggested by Orellana, did not actually take place. Furthermore, the PPMGSP represented only the very first step in the process by which Chilean officials introduced MFR ideas and practices. As stated by the PPMSGP’s introductory document, ‘[t]he capacity to implement any innovation will depend on the capacity to attract the attention around the new idea, establish the legitimacy of the proposed innovation and being capable of going beyond the pilot phase towards its wider application’ (DIPRES, 1993b:5). In the following years, many factors would intervene before Chilean policymakers managed to build a more or less coherent set of MFR tools.

‘A President That Would Let Us Do Things’:
Advancing MFR in the Frei Administration

In contrast to Aylwin’s government, president Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s term (1994-2000) is generally portrayed as a key turning point in the history of Chile’s administrative modernisation (Mardones, 2002; Garretón and Cáceres, 2003; Ramírez, 2004; Waissbluth, 2006; Olavarría et al., 2011; Figueroa et al., 2011; Tello, 2011). One interviewee even remarked that ‘there could have not been administrative modernisation in Chile if it was not because of president Frei’ (IC7). Indeed, it was during Frei’s administration that a Comité Interministerial de Modernización de la Gestión Pública (CIMG, or Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Modernization of Public Management) was created. It was also during his presidency that a first Plan Estratégico de Modernización de la Gestión Pública
(PEMGP, or Strategic Plan for the Modernisation of Public Management) would be enacted in 1997.

Yet in terms of MFR, the Frei years were not completely positive. During the first half of the administration, Marcel and his team were capable of advancing MFR on various fronts. The Plan Piloto (PPMSGP) set the basis for the use of performance indicators in a much bigger number of government agencies. Three new performance management tools (programme evaluations, performance reports, and performance improvement programmes) were introduced. The MFR capacity of DIPRES and other government agencies was strengthened. And the jargon of MFR spread government-wide. On the other hand, much of this progress would be lost during the second half of the Frei administration (as described in the following section).

President Frei became interested in administrative modernisation for a variety of reasons. He entered office when the topic had already gained an important place in the governing coalition’s agenda. As the previous section showed, individual agencies and DIPRES had advanced some reform initiatives. Moreover, MFR had been discussed in meetings and documents sponsored by the ‘Concertación’ (Boeninger, 1992; Flisfisch et al., 1993). Then president Aylwin had remarked in his final presidential address (May 21, 1993) that, ‘it is clear the administrative apparatus of the state requires a modernisation, to set it in tune with the needs and urgencies of the contemporary world and make it more agile, capable, and efficient’. Thus, as a member of the same political coalition, president Frei could not simply ignore these precedents.

There were also political and personal reasons behind president Frei’s interest on this subject. The ‘modernisation’ agenda was relevant for him because ‘he needed to find something to differentiate himself from President Aylwin’ (IC7). The latter had successfully carried out the transition to democracy. Therefore, Frei required something politically valuable and symbolic for his government. The label of a ‘moderniser’ thus seemed to be a rather useful one (Tello, 2011:249). Lastly, many authors have remarked that president Frei personally cared about this subject (Armijo, 2003; Ramírez, 2004; Olavarría et al., 2011; Figueroa et al., 2011). An interviewee suggested, for example, that Frei believed these topics were important because ‘he is an engineer, he had been an

43 These words have been cited by various Chilean scholars. See Navarrete (2008:92); Olavarría (2010:20).
entrepreneur, and he had been a top executive of various businesses. For him management topics were very close to his heart’ (IC7). Another similarly said that, ‘as an engineer, he understood that it was necessary to implement government programmes correctly’ (IC9).

President Frei supported administrative modernisation in at least three ways. The first one was by including the topic in his political manifesto, which stated that, ‘modernising public management and adapting the organisation of the state to the challenges of the new times will be a priority of the next Concertación government’ (Ramírez, 2004:37). Then he established an inter-ministerial committee on the subject of modernisation (the CIMGP), with representatives from MINSGPRES, DIPRES, and the Ministry of the Interior. This committee sought to ‘promote and coordinate the administrative modernisation efforts of ministries and agencies, as well as to design and propose general policies on the subject and the instruments needed for implementing, monitoring and evaluating the programme’ (Armijo, 2003:49). The CIMGP was in charge of designing government-wide reform initiatives. It also provided a forum for government officials to discuss administrative modernisation topics, such as MFR. These were later disseminated across government (Armijo, 2002; Ramírez, 2004)\(^\text{44}\).

The president also contributed to keeping the topic on the politico-administrative radar. The following quotes illustrate this point. In the first case, the citation comes from the presidential decree by which the CIMGP was created in December 1994. At that time, president Frei stated that:

\[
\text{The country’s development requires the gradual perfecting of our administration, making it more efficient both in its organization and its management. [...] It is indispensable for the achievement of this objective [...] to move gradually toward a management style oriented by results and centred on the service to the citizenry, and [...] that the mission, goals, and results of the public organisms be known by the citizens, so that they may evaluate their management in terms of relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency}\text{.}^\text{45}
\]

\(^{44}\) According to Armijo (2002:282-283), ‘The coordination, established as a working mechanism of the [Inter-Ministerial] Committee, was guided by permanent activities with participant institutions and those responsible for the various management topics, including workshops and seminars, meetings for the diffusion of relevant experiences of public services, international seminars, designation of people in charge of ministries’ modernisation commitments, creation of networks and task forces [...] [and] a policy of open doors to support and/or reply to questions from institutions’.

\(^{45}\) As cited by Garretón and Cáceres (2003:127).
In July of 1995, President Frei similarly expressed that:

The process of modernising public services requires developing an organisational culture with a focus on results. To achieve that it is necessary to have well-founded evaluations […] Therefore, updating and improving the current systems of evaluation of the state is something deeply important for the government, Congress and the citizens. During the following years it will be necessary to improve and strengthen the public sector’s evaluation capacity, as an essential element for decision-making. […] We have committed ourselves to finding the evaluation methods which […] will allow us evaluating with simplicity and objectivity the effectiveness and efficiency of at least the main government programmes (Frei, 1995).46

The quotes are particularly interesting because they echo concepts and ideas first used by DIPRES officials in previous years. They also show that a ‘focus on results’ had achieved a central place in the country’s modernisation agenda. The second quote further hinted at the new MFR tools which DIPRES would introduce in 1996-1997.

According to a former MINSEGPRES official, Frei was ‘a president that would let us do things. He was convinced that administrative modernisation was good and thus let ministers develop their own projects’ (IC5). This also created some room for manoeuvre for the groups of middle and senior level officials who, as Marcel, were part of the CIMGP. They found the opportunity to advance their ideas about administrative modernisation. In fact, it was these public servants, and not their ministers, who understood the subject and thus led the process of reform. According to the same official, modernisation plans and projects were carried out:

leaving aside ministers’ intuition or goodwill. Sometimes ministers or deputy-ministers did not really know the subject which they were dealing with. It was their advisors who had a vision and suggested, when the time came, certain decision paths. For instance, when we were developing the modernisation plan in 1996, the minister did not know anything about this, but Mario Marcel did know. Thus, ministers usually accepted these ideas because they realised these were important topics (IC5).

Another former DIPRES senior official similarly states:

Mario [Marcel] would tell the minister what he wanted to do, which areas he wanted to strengthen, and the minister would agree. Ministers never assumed a protagonist role, but they understood these were things that needed to be done and thus they would say, ‘OK, go ahead and do this’ (IC2).

46 Very similar words would be used by President Frei (1997:37) in his presentation during the second international seminar on administrative reforms described below.
An academic observer similarly notes that, ‘the modernisation process was strongly advanced by a group of “técnicos” [technocrats] within government’ (IC7; Figueroa et al., 2011:84)\(^{47}\).

However, the design and implementation of actual modernisation or MFR initiatives did not progress easily during 1994-1995 for various reasons. Whereas president Frei had shown some interest on the subject, this did not necessarily translate into institutional support or resources (Ramírez, 2004:88; Waissbluth, 2006:42). Furthermore, Armijo (2002:238) points out how during ‘the phase that goes from the promulgation of the decree which created the Inter-ministerial Committee until the definition of an explicit Program for Modernisation in 1997, there was an intermediate phase in which the role of this committee was barely visible and not very effective’\(^{48}\).

In fact, the first Executive Secretary of the *CIMGP*, Rodrigo Egaña, was too busy dealing with other political responsibilities within his ministry (*MINSEGPRES*). He thus stepped down of his role, and Marcel took over the committee’s Secretariat in 1995 (IC23). *DIPRES* then assumed the formal leadership of the reform process, on top of the informal leadership it already had because of Marcel’s expertise and knowledge on these topics\(^{49}\). But in real terms that did not mean much, as he was still only a Subdirector at *DIPRES*.

Furthermore, Marcel’s appointment as Executive Secretary of the *CIMGP* did not solve the main issue at the time: the lack of experience and capacity in modernisation topics, MFR in particular. Whereas in previous years Marcel and his team had studied other international experiences and had even travelled to the UK, they still faced several limitations. First of all, none of the public servants in Marcel’s team had formal academic background on topics such as performance measurement or management control systems. Nor did they have previous practical experience on this subject, other than that obtained in implementing the *PPMGSP* during previous years. In fact, as indicated by the citation at the

\(^{47}\) Waissbluth (2005:13) suggests that during the Aylwin-Frei governments, there were about 10 individuals who played a key role as policy entrepreneurs. He asserts that ‘[w]ithout doubt, if these 10 key people had not existed, without these ‘public managers’ self-defined as such before the term was formalised, the take-off of the [administrative] reform would have been much slower and with less results of what it had’.

\(^{48}\) Araya and Barría (2008:87) similarly state that, ‘[b]etween 1994 and 1996, [the Inter-ministerial Committee] lacked sufficient public visibility to lead a broader modernisation effort, leaving the responsibility of public management modernisation in the hands of the Budget Office’.

\(^{49}\) In discussing the main actors in these years (1994-2000), Figueroa et al. (2011:84) suggest that ‘[w]ithout doubts, a fundamental actor in this team was the then Budget Director, Mario Marcel, whom various actors qualify as “the true promoter of the progress in the subject of modernisation”’. It should be mentioned that Marcel was temporary director only for a few months in 1996.
beginning of this chapter, they were more ‘like a poor circus’, in which a few people had to
deal with ‘everything’ (IC21).

These conditions were not much better in other government ministries and agencies. The concepts of ‘results’, ‘public management’, or ‘performance’ were almost completely unheard off at the time. According to Armijo (2002:286), ‘many of the executives who were in charge of leading [the administrative modernisation process], did not have previous public management experience’. The MFR ‘capacity’ of the Chilean government thus needed to be built before more substantial reforms could take place.

Within the context of the CIMGP, Marcel and his team developed a number of actions to further support the introduction of MFR ideas and practices. They aimed to increase agencies’ awareness about this subject, and also tried to diminish their reluctance to use concepts which apparently applied to the private but not the public sector (Muñoz, 2005). The use of foreign examples had a central role as a source of learning and capacity building, as well as a means to persuade other actors. According to a former DIPRES official:

We basically read and learned about the international experiences. We took a document which had been prepared on the basis of the trip to the UK. The first thing we did was to develop a methodological guide on performance indicators. We downloaded documents and contacted people, but we did not travel abroad again. We wrote the guide on indicators for the public sector, with most of the examples coming from the British experience. Then we started to train people. This guide was distributed among public agencies. Then we also gave talks in the ministries and agencies about these concepts (IC21).

The Guía para la Construcción de Indicadores de Desempeño en los Servicios Públicos (Guide for the Design of Performance Indicators in the Public Services; DIPRES, 1995; Bonnefoy, 2003:16; Armijo 2011) offered agencies an introduction to various MFR topics. It explained why indicators were important for measuring the ‘performance of public services. On the basis of international examples, the Guide also described the kind of indicators agencies could design. Box 3.3 below shows some examples included in the ‘Guide’.
### Box 3.3
International Performance Indicators Examples Used by DIPRES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of increment in the costs of a project compared to the original budget (Transit New Zealand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social benefits recovered (Benefits Agency, United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Import duties collected versus those budgeted (Customs Service – Import-Export Control, Australia)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Programme operation expenditure/programme total expenses (Social Security Department, Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Costs associated with collecting import duties versus income collected (Customs Service – Import-Export Control, Australia)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Benefits recovered through fraud detection and prevention, amount and percentage (Benefits Agency, United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of roads in critical condition. Target 7-8% in a period of 5 years (Highways Agency, United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of time spent by inmates on out of cell activities. Target 25% (Scottish Prison Service, United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Service</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Waiting time in answering client calls (Tele-Service Centre, Social Security Department, Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• First benefit payment dispatched in less than 10 days. Target 75% (Employment Services, United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Average time in Airport Passenger Control (Customs Service, Passenger Processing, Australia)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author based on DIPRES (1995).

A second activity led by DIPRES was the development of two international seminars on administrative modernisation (IC5; IC14; IC17; IC30; Armijo, 2002, 2003; Figueroa et al., 2011). These took place in Santiago in March 1995, and May 1996, under the formal sponsorship of the CIMGP. Hundreds of public servants from the Chilean central government reportedly took part in these activities (DIPRES, 1996, 1997). In the first seminar, the managerial reform experiences of the UK, New Zealand, Australia, and Sweden were discussed by experts from those countries. There were also representatives from the OECD (who discussed reform trends in the OECD region), and the WB (who spoke about their participation in reforms in developing countries). During the second seminar, the focus was on quality of customer service. There were presentations about reforms in specific agencies of New Zealand, the UK, Sweden, Catalonia, and Singapore,
and discussions about trends in quality of service across OECD countries. In both seminars, Chilean public servants and experts debated the applicability of international reforms to their country. They also analysed the reform initiatives which were taking place in Chile.

According to some interviewees, information obtained through these seminars was useful in various respects. A former senior official states that, ‘the seminars were very important in terms of knowledge and information, and also of international contacts’ (IC20). Another suggests that, ‘people who came to those seminars learned a lot from them’ (IC21). These are, of course, claims difficult to assess. Yet they allow seeing how officials perceived the seminars and their contribution to the broader reform process. DIPRES produced two books and videos, and organised workshops and information ‘fairs’ to further spread the ideas discussed in the seminars. Moreover, the international experiences presented during the seminars became a useful source of empirical knowledge for DIPRES officials when they introduced programme evaluations and performance incentives in 1996-1998 (IC21).

These international seminars were not, however, only about ‘capacity building’. They were planned with the objective of persuading other actors, by showing them international MFR trends. According to a former DIPRES senior official:

We brought foreign experts so that they could tell us what was happening abroad in terms of public management. That helped us because, what was a preoccupation of a rather small group of people, an elite which was aware of reforms taking place in the rest of the world, could become something relevant for the broader public sector and for politicians. We also always took care of inviting parliamentarians to these seminars (IC30).

Along the same lines, a former MINSEGPRES official states that international experts helped them ‘raise awareness’ among participants, because the description of ‘how reforms had taken place in their countries served as a demonstration effect’ (IC5; Figueroa et al., 2011:79). Another former DIPRES official remarks that, ‘the seminars contributed to promote the concepts of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of public expenditure’ (IC21). These seminars thus had both technical and political purposes. Indeed, in the introduction to the book containing the papers from the seminar, Marcel (1996:7) remarked that:

We wanted to have first-hand knowledge of the experience of the countries which have made more progress in the field of reform and modernisation of the state to show that change is possible, that
there are ideas, methodologies and techniques in constant evolution, which are available to those who want to take advantage of them.\(^{50}\)

The idea of developing international seminars was thus aimed at enriching the intellectual debates, and contributing to building the Chilean government’s capacity on these subjects. But officials involved in the modernisation process (particularly those at DIPRES) also used the seminars, and specifically the foreign experiences presented then, to advocate administrative reforms.

In close association to these activities, between 1994 and 1996 DIPRES officials worked on the design and introduction of three new performance management tools. First, they promoted the development of agency performance indicators, which built on work previously done through the PPMGSP. Marcel and Tohá (1998:602-603) remarked that the Pilot Plan ‘had remained easily exposed to the ups and downs of policy sector authorities, institutional pressures and urgencies’, as well as ‘too isolated and slow in order to produce a significant impact in the whole of the administration’. Therefore, DIPRES officials sought to develop a more ‘transversal’ (e.g. government-wide) effort (Marcel, 1998a:67). In 1994 DIPRES asked ministries and agencies to prepare ‘performance indicators’.

The ‘Guide’ mentioned in previous pages was used as a basis to help agencies design indicators of efficiency, effectiveness, economy, and quality of service (Marcel, 1998a; Armijo, 2003). This exercise was initially carried out on a voluntary basis. This aimed to broaden the use of indicators without paying much attention to their technical quality. Thus, ‘with a few exceptions, all proposals submitted by agencies were accepted’ (Marcel 1998a:67)\(^{51}\). As a result, whereas the PPMGSP had only covered 5 (and later 10) agencies, a total of 26 agencies decided to join the use of performance indicators in the first round. Table 3.1 shows how the number of agencies and performance indicators increased until 1998, when numbers decreased slightly. For reasons to be discussed in the following section, performance indicators were discontinued in 1999 (Guzmán, 2002:7).

\(^{50}\) In the introduction to the second seminar’s volume, Marcel (1997a:10) similarly stated that, ‘[t]he realisation of this Meeting and the publication of its main contents […] are embedded in an effort to disseminate the modernisation ideas and experiences in the public sector in order to facilitate the integration of a network of agents committed to the changes inside the state apparatus for the benefit of the citizenry’.

\(^{51}\) According to Marcel (1998a:59), ‘[g]iven that in many cases the first obstacle is to win over the scepticism of the public servants regarding the feasibility of the things, it might be convenient to set in motion an initial experience of identification of indicators and management goals without all the previous steps, in order to perfection the system as it involves the internal and external adherence to the organisation’.
Table 3.1

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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of public agencies</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of indicators produced</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Armijo (2003:89), with modifications.

A particularly interesting feature of this effort was that, from the very beginning, DIPRES officials tried to introduce a stronger association between the new performance indicators and the budget. As discussed above, this was a practice that Marcel and his team had observed in leading NPM countries (Marcel, 1998a; Armijo, 2003:61). Therefore, agencies’ performance indicators were attached to their annual budget proposals to the Congress. From DIPRES’s perspective, the objective was to take advantage of budgetary policymaking as a cyclical event. Performance indicators could be thus employed to put pressure on agencies to make more efficient use of their resources. Similarly, DIPRES officials considered that by including performance indicators in the budget they would ‘enrich the budgetary discussion, traditionally centred in an incremental analysis, steering it towards more fundamental aspects of government management’ (Marcel, 1998b:67). However, as it will be discussed below, none of these objectives were achieved until the mid-2000s.

Programme evaluations were the second performance management tool introduced in these years. In 1996 the topic was included as a part of the protocolo presupuestario (‘budgetary agreement’) signed between the Executive and Congress for fiscal year 1997. According to various interviewees, the logic behind this agreement was the need to ‘change the rules of the game in terms of how budgetary policy discussions were taking place in Chile at the time’ (IC26; IC30). Despite the very limited authority Congress possess in terms of budgetary policymaking (Boeningger, 2007; Aninat et al., 2008; Zaltsman, 2009), parliamentarians from the opposition had found ways to put pressure on the Executive. Moreover, they had been able to cut 600 million dollars from the 1996 budget. In response to these pressures, a former senior DIPRES official explains that:
The following year people were afraid of ending up in a similar situation if things did not change. Marcel had temporarily taken over as Head of DIPRES two weeks before the presentation of the budget. Therefore, he had to devise a strategy to work with Congress. Given that there had been some previous work on indicators, and that the topic of evaluation seemed to be significant from practices DIPRES officials had observed in other countries, Marcel went to the Congress with the offer of reaching a political deal. The idea was to improve substantially the quality of information and the transparency regarding government activities. He was able to reach a deal with the Unión Demócrata Independiente [UDI, or Democratic Independent Union party], and the governing coalition. On the basis of this agreement, evaluations and general management reports were included in the budget (IC30).

Thus, DIPRES took advantage of the political situation to introduce evaluations, while at the same time addressed a real congressional concern regarding access to information about public sector effectiveness 52.

Given the lack of experience on the subject of evaluations, Chilean officials looked at international practices. According to a former senior official, ‘we did look abroad, but at the time not many countries were conducting evaluations. Australia was doing lots of evaluations, but under a completely different design, because in their case it was the departments or ministries which were in charge of managing evaluations’ (IC30). Information gathered during the previous trip to the UK was not very helpful, because the focus there was on performance indicators rather than evaluations as in Australia (see Schick, 1990; Mackay, 2012).

In the face of these limitations, another former DIPRES official says that, ‘we found the experience that the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank had in the use of “logical frameworks”. We thus contacted the IDB, and they came to train our team which was in charge of this topic’ (IC21; Marcel, 1998c). The Logical Framework Methodology (LFM) helps to map out the causal assumptions and conditions required for a given programme to achieve its objectives (Aldunate and Córdoba, 2011). An official notes the LFM provided them with ‘a tool which was easy to use, because it was didactic and very helpful for putting things in order’ (IC9). Between 1997 and 1999, the LFM was used in 80 evaluations (Marcel, 2002a:237).

The Balances de Gestión Integral (BGIs, or General Management Reports) were the third performance management tool introduced in this period. The BGIs tried to offer a systematic account of how well public agencies/ministries had fulfilled their institutional

52 Rivera (2003:136) states that ‘[t]he lack of satisfaction shown by parliamentarians from the Finance committees in the Chambers of Deputies and Senators, regarding the lack of information about social programmes [...] led to the proposal of conducting an annual programme of evaluations’.
commitments (Marcel, 1998a; Armijo, 2003). The BGIs included information about ministerial goals and performance indicators, as well as more general information about each institution. According to a DIPRES official,

The idea was that institutions could get used to the topic of accountability, instead of remaining hidden behind the state apparatus. We wanted them to tell citizens things like, “We exist for this, we have this many public servants, we manage these resources, and during last year we did this” (IC26).

At the time BGIs were introduced, president Frei (1997:36) expressed the latter would ‘enormously contribute’ to congressional works, and would ‘improve management information and transparency’. In terms of its links with international experiences, a former DIPRES senior official says that the BGIs ‘more or less took some ideas that we gathered from other countries’ (IC30). However, other interviewees also stated that the idea was that BGIs became something similar to the annual balance reports which are commonly produced by private sector organisations (IC14; IC26).

Thus, throughout 1994-1996 DIPRES officials had once again used foreign examples and international practices. This was for two main purposes: first, to support the design and introduction of MFR tools; and second, to persuade other actors about the need to modernise the Chilean public sector with the use of MFR practices. With the support of international organisations, DIPRES and other officials received training on the LFM. Because reforms were mainly led by DIPRES, significant attention was always paid to how the new tools could strengthen the budgetary cycle.

Nonetheless, DIPRES officials also cared about how MFR could make a direct contribution to changing the country’s political dynamics. According to a DIPRES official:

We noticed that we could produce a budget with added-value. The world was changing, the relevant actors were changing, and thus we could not just continue presenting an itemised budget based on the traditional budget classification system. We noticed that a stronger discussion about the results which citizens expected from a given fiscal policy was growing. We also noticed that congressional debates about budgetary policymaking were changing, with more interest paid on whether the goals promised by the governing group were being accomplished or not (IC8).

Indeed, soon after programme evaluations and BGIs were introduced, Marcel (1998a:80) stated along the same lines that:
a better integration of performance measurement and evaluation as part of the budgetary system provides an opportunity to adjust legislative discussions to Chile’s institutional conditions. In fact, the international experience shows that in those countries where the Executive has more control over decisions which commit fiscal resources, the political-institutional system might achieve more stability if Congress concentrates its efforts in better auditing the merits and results of public policies. In this way, strengthening these Congressional functions might not just address the frustrations of congressmen regarding budgetary discussion (and thus a source of stronger pressures over the quality of management in public institutions), but also be a contribution to the political system’s development.

Given the predominance of the Executive in terms of budgetary policymaking, Marcel and his team saw in MFR reforms a means to increase the involvement of the Legislative, and thus rebalance the division of powers.

However, 1996 was still too early to determine whether the new performance management tools had successfully increased the effectiveness of the Chilean public sector; whether they had changed its budgetary policymaking procedures; or whether they had contributed to developing the country’s political system. After the process of cross-national learning and internal deliberation started around 1992, the formal introduction of performance indicators, evaluations, and reports represented a considerable achievement. Moreover, Orrego remarks that (1999:21), ‘[t]owards the end of 1996 one could observe a new common language among public servants; […] the institutionalisation of management instruments; the consolidation of successful pilot experiences, and the establishment of a performance culture’. On the other hand, at the end of that same year, Marcel left his position in DIPRES. This and other factors discussed in the following section showed that the MFR agenda had not secured a place in Chile’s politico-administrative system just yet.

‘Things That in the End Were Not Completed’: The Decline of MFR in Frei’s Administrative Reform Agenda

The second half of Frei’s presidency had contrasting effects on the administrative modernisation agenda, and particularly on its MFR dimension. In 1997 president Frei enacted the Plan Estratégico de Modernización de la Gestión Pública (PEMGP, or Strategic Plan for the Modernisation of Public Management). This represented the climax of discussions and reform initiatives dating back to 1992-1993 (CIMGP, 2000). Furthermore, in 1998 DIPRES created the Programas de Mejoramiento de la Gestión (PMGs, or Programmes for Management Improvement). These introduced a government-wide mechanism to link institutional goals and annual remuneration increases. On the other
hand, between 1997 and 2000 the MFR agenda actually lost some ground. Furthermore, whereas the PMGs would later become a central feature of the Chilean MFR infrastructure, in the short term they negatively affected other tools. Thus, despite all the progress achieved during 1992-1996, as the Frei presidency came to its conclusion the future of MFR looked rather feeble.

To some extent, 1997 was a very good year for administrative modernisation in Chile. President Frei enacted the PEMGP, which focused on six reform areas: strategic management; information technology and communications; transparency and integrity in public management; service quality and citizen participation; human resources; state institutions; and communications (MINSEGPRES, 2000; Ramírez, 2004). According to Armijo (2003:50), the PEMGP ‘provided stronger coherence to the various actions which had been developed up to that date, opened up new themes and added other elements related to managerial reforms’. Moreover, by including ‘strategic management’ as one of its lead subjects, the PEMGP seemed to guarantee the continuation of MFR topics.

The year 1997 was important for MFR also because a new line of performance-based remunerations, the so-called PMGs, was then introduced. During the previous years, ‘[t]he increasing attention in results and performance soon permeated to the topic of remunerations’ (Marcel and Tohá, 1998:603-604). This had led some agencies to develop instruments to link ‘remunerations, responsibilities and performance’. Some initiatives related to the use of ‘performance bonuses’ were implemented in various sectors: teachers, custom agents, municipal (health policy) public servants, and personnel of the Ministry of Public Works and Health Services (Marcel, 1997b; Marcel and Tohá, 1998).

The changes introduced by the PMGs sought to be even more significant because of its government-wide coverage. Per agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Asociación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales (ANEF, or National Association of Fiscal Employees; Mardones, 2002:7-9; IC1), the PMGs established that public servants could receive a salary increase for the following year if their institution achieved its annual goals (Guzmán, 2011). The creation of the PMGs responded to the unions’ permanent demands for higher salaries, but also to DIPRES’ interest in finding a way to put an end to the annual increases which had automatically taken place since the return to democracy. A DIPRES official further states that, ‘it was evident that if we really wanted to progress in the
question of building some kind of results-based budget, we needed to find a way to link remunerations with results. Otherwise the scheme would not work’ (IC26).

The PMGs also originated in some form of cross-national learning, but in this case in combination with knowledge about reforms previously implemented by DIPRES and other Chilean agencies. Based on his analysis of international trends, Marcel (1994:37) had already suggested that the Chilean government could eventually develop ‘a scheme of ‘bonus by results’. This could be based on information about goals, institutional management, and performance agreements negotiated between ministries/agencies and central authorities. A former DIPRES official remarks that, ‘the example of New Zealand was an important input that helped us validate the idea of having a certain performance contract, even though we did not use something exactly as in New Zealand, Australia, or any other country’ (IC21). These international insights were complemented by lessons drawn from existing performance-based remuneration systems in Chile. According to the same official, ‘Marcel sent us to research the best practices available in the Chilean government, particularly the management agreements which at the time seemed to have given good results’ (IC21). The PMGs also built on the work previously done by Marcel and his team on the Pilot Plan and the performance indicators.

In fact, the decision was to terminate the performance indicators as such, making them part of the PMGs. Instead of focusing on broad institutional goals, the latter aimed to measure topics which seemed to be of interest to public servants, such as training, hygiene, or workplace safety (IC26). According to a former DIPRES official:

The idea was that institutions could listen to public servants unions in the making of the modernisation plan, following a certain methodology, and that then they could commit with certain goals. The first goals were not very high, nor were they backed with audit systems. In some sense, it was assumed that in the first years the majority of institutions would achieve performance levels high enough to obtain their remuneration increases. We created the conditions so that ANEF took part in the agreement, which in the end was very good for both parties. It was not like the PMGs would ask from them things which could not be achieved (IC21).

In practice, however, the introduction of the PMGs brought with it some negative effects. To begin with, the initiative cut short the learning process associated with developing performance indicators linked to institutional goals. This happened at a time in which the concept of indicators had not been consolidated yet (IC26; Marcel, 1998a:80).
Moreover, *DIPRES’* limited institutional capacities for managing these topics further aggravated these issues (Guzmán, 2011). A former *DIPRES* senior official notes that:

> Institutions did not actually find a clear counterpart in *DIPRES* to talk about their *PMGs*. Ministries designed their *PMGs* on the basis of some indicators, but *DIPRES* did not review these. Therefore, the *PMGs* became just another administrative procedure, in which indicators mainly referred to routine activities. These were rather poor indicators, with goals set at very low levels. One could say there was an involution, with indicators losing the prestige they had already earned. That was very negative for the reform process (IC14).

A high number of public servants received performance bonuses, but *DIPRES* did not have the capacity to determine whether institutions had actually obtained ‘real and substantive improvements’ (Marcel, 2002a:237; Costa, 2007:7; Guzmán, 2011). In other cases, the *PMGs* actually penalised institutions which were sincerely trying to strengthen the links between institutional performance and salary increases. According to a *DIPRES* official,

> Because the level of management capacities varied a lot among institutions, some of them used indicators which measured very simple things and with very low targets. Thus, their employees would get the monetary incentives. However, there were other institutions which developed very good indicators, with very demanding targets. Thus, they sometimes did not achieve these targets and their members did not receive the salary increases. Therefore, there was no real relationship between getting the incentives and management improvements. It was not a fair system (IC9).

*DIPRES* also faced difficulties with the implementation of programme evaluations. Although in theory they were associated to budgetary cycles, in practice the evaluations were not used for decision-making purposes. According to a former *DIPRES* official, ‘the number of people who was working on performance management was limited. While institutions had started to know us, inside *DIPRES* the budgetary specialists for each sector did not like us much’ (IC21; Filgueiras, 2000). Another former senior official similarly states that both groups ‘talked past each other’ (IC30). These internal issues were important because it was these so-called ‘sectorialistas’ (policy sector budget specialists) who decided agency/ministry budget allocations. Therefore, it was them who had to use the results of programme evaluations. Because they were not doing so, programme evaluations were not fulfilling their original rationale.

Apart from these technical issues, the MFR agenda was significantly affected when Mario Marcel left *DIPRES* in 1997. While he had been interim Director during the last quarter of 1996, president Frei decided to appoint someone else in that position. Marcel
then took up a position at the IDB in Washington and remained there during 1997-2000. Some of his advisors, who had participated on the various MFR initiatives of previous years, also left DIPRES in the following months. The new Director did not have the same interest on MFR topics, and decided to focus on personnel management and industrial relations topics (IC21; Rivera, 2003:132). Therefore, the MFR capacity of DIPRES was severely affected, and the subject lost impetus within the agency.

These problems were further aggravated by issues related to the broader administrative modernisation process. Although the PEMGP had included MFR as one of its main lines of reform (under the ‘strategic management’ heading), the programme also included many other topics. Some of these actually followed a completely different logic. According to Marcel and Tohá (1998:698), there was a:

vast agenda of law projects guided by legalistic criteria [...] which not only introduce new sources of rigidity in the public administration, but also [...] generate a clear disorientation regarding the sense of the reforms. This explains the little clarity that still exists regarding modernisation’s objective, and the best instruments to achieve it.

A former senior official adds that, ‘the Inter-Ministerial Committee promoted programmes, measures, many of them rather experimental, with lots of discontinuities, things that in the end were not completed’ (IC14). The subject of MFR thus seems to have lost ground in the middle of many other reform initiatives, particularly after Marcel’s departure.

Moreover, the inter-ministerial committee never consolidated a strong institutional basis. According to Claudio Orrego (1999:15), who was the Committee’s last Executive Secretary during 1997-2000, the CIMGP was ‘far away from the president’; it was led by someone who was ‘a head of division, not a minister’; and it possessed limited ‘financial and human, as well as legal’ resources (Marshall and Waissbluth, 2007:4; Olavarría et al., 2011:127). All of this in spite of the participation of representatives from the most important government ministries.

Thus, during the second half of the Frei administration, MFR reforms lost relevance and, above all, a sense of direction. The former happened because of a modernisation agenda which had been overloaded, with several topics but rather limited resources. The latter related to Marcel’s departure from DIPRES, as well as to problems faced in the use of programme evaluations and the implementation of the new PMGs.
Conclusions

In summarising the foundations of the Chilean MFR system, a middle-level official remarked that the initiative had come:

Directly from the vision of DIPRES about what could happen in the following 10 or 20 years. We were looking at what developed OECD countries were doing, and we then thought about how we could advance in that line. We also looked to what the IMF was requiring to those same countries in terms of budget information and statistics. Thus, our references were always the most developed countries. We were looking at the trends and instruments, how Chile was doing in comparison. Then we discussed how we could gradually use those methodologies in our own benefit (IC8).

Indeed, as it will be described in Chapter 5, in hindsight that is more or less what happened. Chilean officials did make an effort to learn about other countries’ MFR reforms. They initially looked to the UK, but also to Australia, New Zealand, and to broader international evaluation practices. Furthermore, Marcel and his colleagues did use this information to design most of the MFR tools which were introduced in 1990-2000: performance indicators (and later the so-called ‘programmes for management improvement’), programme evaluations, and general management reports. All of these were mainly focused in increasing efficiency in public spending. But they were also aimed at rebalancing Executive-Legislative relationships.

On the basis of this information from abroad, reformers developed some strategies to advance policy changes. Among other things, Marcel and his team focused on raising other actors’ awareness and understanding about MFR, and the potential benefits these practices could bring to the Chilean public sector. They sought to build the capacities of DIPRES and other agencies on the subject. They aimed to show other political actors that MFR reforms were taking place in many other countries as well. Through these strategies, and despite the involvement of MINSEGPRES and other agencies in the modernisation agenda, DIPRES assumed the leadership of the reforms during most of 1990-2000.

Yet the official’s comments cited above are not completely representative of what really happened. The ‘gradualism’ which has come to characterise the Chilean MFR reforms was not completely deliberate. Marcel and his colleagues at DIPRES (and the CIMGP, which oversaw the reforms during Frei’s presidency) certainly pursued a ‘gradual’ take. They did so through the implementation of a Plan Piloto, and by accepting poorly defined performance indicators in the early years. However, this ‘gradualism’ was mostly a
result of several constraints. Among other things, these included the lack of knowledge and practical experience about MFR, as well as the rather limited administrative capacities and various resistances within (and beyond) DIPRES.

Throughout the period covered in this chapter, reformers confronted a rather challenging environment. Political and administrative issues inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship; an Aylwin administration which did not care much about administrative modernisation, or gave priority to legalistic over managerial approaches to governing; a Frei presidency that did support MFR, but mainly from a rhetorical rather than a practical perspective; and an administrative reform agenda which grew in number of topics and political presence, but lacked the corresponding institutional support. Moreover, the departure of Marcel (and soon after of his advisors) affected the consolidation of the new MFR initiatives.

Thus, between 1990 and 2000, Chilean policymakers introduced a number of MFR initiatives, many of which had been associated with ideas and examples from policies abroad. Yet despite the various ways in which Marcel and his colleagues used this information, and despite the strategies they set in motion to create favourable conditions for these policy changes, by the end of the decade Chile still lacked a well-functioning MFR infrastructure.
‘Things Could Not Remain the Same in a Democracy’: The Emergence of ‘Management for Results’ in the Mexican Public Sector (1994-2000)

Congress did not influence the administrative reform plans. Zero. Congressmen did not care, nor were they involved on this. They cared about political issues.

Former Senior Official, Ministry of Public Administration

There is an influence because as intelligent human beings we try to learn from other experiences and formulate our own conclusions of what could be beneficial to our country; but that does not mean that the OECD tells its members what to do.

Jorge Chávez-Presa, former Senior Official, Ministry of Finance

As in every process, things mature little by little. You think that the new idea will bloom immediately, but no...

Middle-level official, Ministry of Finance

The origins of MFR in Mexico, most observers would seem to agree, can be found in president Ernesto Zedillo’s administration of 1994-2000 (Pardo, 2003, 2009; Cejudo, 2003, 2008; Aguilar, 2006; Sánchez, 2009b; Huerta, 2010). In those years, the story continues, Congress regained its long lost autonomy and influence. It was thus capable of forcing the Executive to introduce significant reforms to strengthen transparency and accountability, as well as the ‘results-orientation’ of public programmes. However, as this chapter will try to show, while the first assertion is mostly correct (but see below), the second is rather inaccurate. The initial MFR reforms advanced by the Zedillo government were undoubtedly

linked to the country’s process of political democratisation. Yet they were not a response to Congressional proposals or pressures.

This chapter will analyse the various MFR initiatives which were introduced in the administrative modernisation, budgetary policy, and social policy sectors between 1994 and 2000. In particular, the performance management, indicators, and evaluation principles introduced by the Programa de Modernización de la Administración Pública 1995-2000 (PROMAP, or Programme for the Modernisation of Public Administration 1995-2000); the Nueva Estructura Programática (NEP, or new programmatic structure) and Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño (SED, or performance evaluation system), used to reform the budgetary system; and the impact evaluation of the government’s main anti-poverty programme (PROGRESA), and Reglas de Operación de Programas Sociales (ROs, or Rules for Managing Social Programmes) for social programmes.

In exploring the origins and development of these initiatives, the chapter will show how international MFR ideas were used by Mexican policymakers to react against budgetary opacity, administrative inefficiency, and the politicisation of social programmes. Through a variety of channels and sources, MFR reform principles and practices found their way into the government’s agenda. This happened even before the country’s first ‘divided government’ of 1997-2000, as federal ministries drafted their reform initiatives mostly in 1994-1997. Thus, Mexican senior officials found in MFR a helpful means to address the country’s changing political conditions. They did so by their own initiative, and not in response to pressures from Congress or international organisations (Huerta, 2006; Culebro, 2008b; Vicher, 2009).

The chapter will also explore the strategies advanced by policymakers in the three MFR ‘strands’ (administrative, budgetary, and social policy), and their impacts on policy changes introduced in this period. More specifically, it will discuss how policymakers’ sought to explain what performance indicators and evaluation were about; to show how MFR was becoming an international trend; to build the capacity of federal ministries on the subject; and, in the case of PROGRESA, to strengthen the good image of the programme and the impact evaluation attached to it. Senior officials managed to introduce MFR policy changes with the support of some of these strategies; but only those working in the social policy sector secured to some extent the legitimacy and institutionalisation of their proposals.
Indeed, towards the end of president Zedillo’s administration, neither performance management and indicators, nor budgetary reform initiatives had achieved significant results. This would be due to a number of political and administrative problems, including lack of experience on the subject, bureaucratic resistances, inter-ministerial conflicts regarding the use of methodologies, and a loss of relevance of MFR in the government agenda. Thus, as in the case of the Chilean experience, national factors heavily constrained both the origins and the fate of Mexican MFR reforms during the 1990s.

The remainder of the chapter will be divided into five sections. The first will describe the political background in which concerns about results, performance, transparency, and accountability came of age in Mexico. The second will discuss how and why MFR ideas were first introduced by senior officials at the new Secretaría de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo (SECODAM or Ministry for the Controllership and Administrative Development), and why the performance management agenda lost coherence and political relevance. The third section will analyse how MFR ideas became associated with budgetary reform discussions and why they did not achieve its expected results either. The fourth section will discuss how and why policy evaluations emerged as ‘part and parcel’ of PROGRESA, and why this particular MFR strand did gain a higher level of institutionalization. The last section will wrap up the discussion.

‘We Wanted to Stop the Absolute Discrecionalidad’: Transparency, Performance, and Results Come of Age

Despite some previous attempts to introduce ‘evaluations’ in the Mexican public sector, it was during president Zedillo’s administration when ideas associated with MFR started to gain currency. As the process of political democratisation advanced throughout the 1990s, so did national discussions about transparency, accountability, and ‘results’. This would be particularly the case in 1997-2000, when the governing party lost its majority in Congress, and the president faced the first ‘divided government’ of the century. Yet for senior government officials inside the Zedillo administration, things started even earlier, and were not simply a response to congressional pressures. Reform proposals were a reaction against the alleged excesses of the Salinas administration (1994-2000). They were also a means to prepare the federal public sector to the changing political conditions of the country. Thus, it
was senior officials who drafted the reform initiatives, using information about contemporary debates and practices abroad.

The rise of ‘performance management’ in the 1990s was unquestionably associated with the political changes taking place in Mexico. As noted by several authors, the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime originally established in the late-1920s had been severely affected by the various economic crises of the 1980s (Aguilar, 2000a, 2000b; Loaeza, 2008; Cejudo, 2008; Vega, 2008). On top of that, 1994 was a complicated year for several reasons (Méndez, 1994; Rousseau, 2001:411-424). Mexico became a member of the OECD and kicked-off the North American Free Trade Agreement (with the U.S. and Canada). This seemed to signal the country was finally returning to a path of economic development and modernisation. On the other hand, a ‘guerrilla’ group challenged the federal government’s authority. Later in the same year, the official party’s presidential candidate and its secretary-general were assassinated.

Thus, by mid-1994 it was not clear whether the presidential elections would favour the governing party or not (Aguilar, 2000b:169). The substitute candidate (Zedillo) eventually won the presidency without facing fraud allegations as those confronted by Salinas in 1988. Yet he began his government with the burden of coming from the same ‘revolutionary’ party that had governed the country for several decades. Then, on December 1994, less than a month after he had entered office, president Zedillo faced the biggest financial crisis in the country’s history (Rousseau, 2001:425-447; Cadena, 2005). This altered his original government priorities, and triggered strong criticisms against the government. It also increased social and congressional demands for a more transparent and accountable use of public resources.

In 1997, Mexico’s political conditions further changed significantly. The governing party lost its majority in Congress for the first time in history. During the second half of his administration, president Zedillo would thus face a ‘divided government’. This is a fact commonly seen as a turning point in the country’s process of democratisation. For instance, Ugalde (2000:144; Casar, 2008) states that since then, ‘the logic and nature of relations between the executive and the legislative branches of the Mexican government were altered forever, and the relationship between both branches became more balanced’.
The ‘divided government’ is also said to have transformed administrative dynamics, particularly with regards to transparency, accountability, and MFR (Sour, 2007; Rubio, 2012). For example, Cejudo (2008:121-123) remarks that, ‘the legislative branch became, at last, an effective oversight institution with the capacity to control and limit the executive branch’. He further argues that Congress ‘was able to push for changes aimed at reducing the discretionary powers of the president’, thus increasing its ‘oversight capacity’; and that it eliminated ‘the so-called ‘secret budget’’. Therefore, he suggests the various reforms of the Mexican public sector since 1997 were ‘a consequence of the process of political democratization, rather than the result of deliberate reforms inspired by NPM’.

Yet the ‘divided government’ scenario does not really explain why officials from the Zedillo administration became interested about these topics in the first place. In fact, transparency, accountability, and MFR initiatives were a reaction against how government affairs had been usually managed. According to a former senior official:

The way things used to work during the Salinas administration was no longer sustainable. The lack of constraints for using the partida secreta [secret budget] was just ridiculous. We knew that we had to increase transparency, to close down that partida secreta. It was clear for president Zedillo that things could not remain the same in a democracy. Thus, little by little in 1997, 1998, 1999, through the budget decrees, we sought to make some changes to these issues (IM26).

Along very similar lines, another former official expressed that:

We wanted to stop the absolute discrecionalidad [discretionary room for manoeuvre] that existed regarding public spending. Everything was a question of power at that time. Everything was about politics, about being close to the president or other powerful figures. That is how all public servants, from the senior to the lower levels, were able to get more resources, which they then employed for very ambiguous goals. Nothing was objective. No clear figures were used during the process of budget appropriation. Therefore, we knew we had to change things (IM17).

Initiatives regarding a more transparent use of public resources, and better oversight mechanisms, were clearly supported by Congress. From 1997 onwards, the latter would also increase its demands for more accountability.

Yet these comments illustrate that reforms originated within the Zedillo administration in response to ‘business as usual’, and particularly the legacies of the Salinas administration. Despite being part of the same group which had led the economic reforms since the early 1980s, president Zedillo and his collaborators actually wanted to distance
themselves from the previous Salinas administration\textsuperscript{54}. Given the lack of transparency and accountability in the use of public funds, and the absence of systematic assessments regarding whether public and social programmes worked or not (Levy, 2006:102), senior officials deemed necessary to advance reforms in these areas. A former senior official remarked that, ‘the president himself strongly supported the reforms. He truly shared our concerns about the lack of transparency in the use of public resources’ (IM26). Another similarly stated that president Zedillo ‘deeply disliked corruption’, and favoured reforms which could eradicate it (IM17; Schefler, 2004:1-2).

Senior government officials also considered transparency, accountability, and MFR reforms were necessary to prepare the country for what was coming. According to an academic observer, ‘in those years, there was a consensus among the political-administrative elite of the country that they had to develop those reforms which could secure the viability of the country’ (IM2). This was particularly after the economic crisis of 1994-1995. Moreover, president Zedillo and other senior policymakers also knew that political alternation in the presidential elections of 2000 was a very likely outcome.

There are additional reasons for reassessing what was the Congressional influence on accountability, transparency and ‘results-oriented’ reforms. According to a former SHCP senior official, ‘the legislators who arrived in 1997 were very excited because they knew they were the first “opposition congress”; but they were also quite inexperienced, particularly in budgetary matters’ (IM26). Indeed, Congress’ lack of policy expertise had been flagged by academics and legislators alike\textsuperscript{55}. Therefore, even if congressmen participated in discussions about the transparency and accountability rules which were eventually attached to budget decrees, it is unlikely they had the necessary expert knowledge to make a huge impact on the Executive’s proposals.

\textsuperscript{54} Teichman (2001:150) remarks there had been a number of disputes between the Salinas and Zedillo teams regarding the management of the economy, particularly about the timing of the ‘peso’ devaluation of 1994. She adds that ‘[t]he political assassinations, the lack of transparency, especially in the early privatizations, allegations of links between the political leadership, including top technocrats, and the drug cartels […] caused the Zedillo regime to attempt to distance itself from the previous regime’. See Cadena (2005:264-266).

\textsuperscript{55} Díaz and Magaloni (1998:526) concluded their study about the congressional influence on budgetary policymaking suggesting that, ‘a higher professionalisation of Congress through technical corps and a career civil service in the legislative power’ would be required to ensure Congress became ‘a counterweight against federal bureaucracies in topics such as public spending oversight’ (see also Ugalde, 2000:103-104). In legislative debates in the early 1990s, concerns had been similarly expressed about ‘the structural weakness of the Legislature because the committees for Finance and for Programming and Budget did not have independent research [capacity] and depended upon the Ministry of Finance’ (Hernández, 1998:416).
Moreover, most policy changes concerning accountability, transparency and MFR (in relation to budgetary policymaking and other topics) were prepared before 1997. As the following three sections will detail, performance management initiatives were designed between 1994 and 1996. Budgetary reforms were introduced in 1998, but prepared since 1996. And the social policy impact evaluations attached to PROGRESA’s launch in 1997 were planned throughout 1995-1997 (Levy, 2006:118). Other changes that gained visibility during the divided government era had been similarly initiated in previous years. For instance, gradual changes to the amount of resources attributed to the ‘partida secreta’, which would be terminated in 2000, had begun in 1995 right after president Zedillo came to power (Levy, 2004:718).

Summing up, the coming of age of transparency, accountability and ‘results-oriented’ initiatives certainly took place during the Zedillo administration. The emergence of these topics was unquestionably associated with Mexico’s broader process of democratisation. In this scenario, the growing political relevance of Congress contributed to affirm these topics in the political agenda. Yet the timing and specific contents of the various policy initiatives were actually determined by the Executive power. Indeed, senior government officials took into account the changing executive-legislative relationships, but did not act in response to congressional demands. In fact, they were reacting against the way in which government affairs had been previously conducted, particularly during the Salinas administration. They were also aiming to prepare the public administration for a future democratic environment. In devising these initiatives, senior officials took as a point of departure their assessment of Mexico’s political circumstances. However, as the following sections show, they used knowledge about foreign examples and practices in various ways to change public sector rules and practices.

‘To Build Something That Did Not Exist Before’:
Introducing Performance Management in the Mexican Public Sector

The emergence of MFR ideas during the Zedillo administration happened through at least three different ‘strands’. The first and probably best known is that associated with the Programa de Modernización de la Administración Pública 1995-2000 (PROMAP, or Programme of Modernisation of the Public Administration 1995-2000). As other scholars have noted (Pardo, 2003, 2009; Cejudo, 2003; Huerta, 2006; Sánchez, 2009b), the
PROMAP for the first time structured a proposal for using performance indicators and evaluations government-wide. While previous administrations had discussed ‘evaluations’, none had been able to provide a clear conceptualisation of the subject, a detailed explanation of its importance, or a blueprint to guide its implementation.

The PROMAP, however, did manage to address these issues. Furthermore, it also framed the reform of the Mexican public administration within a broader international context. As it will be discussed below, senior officials from the newly created Secretaría de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo (SECODAM, or Ministry of the Controllership and Administrative Development) actively looked at contemporary international modernisation trends. They then used some of these ideas, concepts, and practices in the making of the Mexican programme. Some authors have suggested the insertion of MFR and other administrative reform initiatives resulted from the activism or pressures of international organisations (e.g. the OECD or the World Bank; Huerta, 2006; Vicher, 2009). Yet the process of learning from abroad was developed in a rather autonomous manner by Mexican policymakers.

There had certainly been some government initiatives about ‘evaluation’ and ‘results’ before the Zedillo administration (Mejía, 2005; Cardozo, 2009; Villalobos, 2010). For example, president José López-Portillo (1976-1982) developed an important administrative reform policy. Among other things, this sought to ‘[a]dopt programming as a fundamental government tool, to guarantee the congruence between the objectives and actions of the Federal Public Administration, clarify responsibilities and thus facilitate the timely evaluation of results achieved’ (Carrillo, 2006:245; Pardo, 2000a; 2009).

President López-Portillo also introduced a new Budget, Accounting, and Public Expenditure Law. This tried to set up a programme-based budget, which could ‘state objectives, goals and responsible units for their execution and which allow a permanent evaluation of results’ (Carrillo, 2006:254, bold in original; Chávez-Presa, 2000:267-281; Caso, 2011). To support these changes, a new Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (SPP, or Ministry of Programming and Budget) was created. It focused on the federal budget, aiming to link it with a planning process based on ‘programmes, targets, and, particularly, monitoring and evaluation of results’ (Hernández, 2000:264; Pardo, 2000a).
However, evaluation and programme budgeting initiatives did not progress much. From a political perspective, SPP’s authority and activities were constantly affected by SHCP. From an organisational perspective, SPP’s functions and structure changed constantly, and evaluation activities were never institutionalised. In fact, the SPP minister and future president, Miguel de la Madrid, eliminated an important evaluation unit. From a conceptual point of view, government officials were never able to flesh out what evaluation actually meant. According to Bailey (1984:86), evaluation was something new which ‘lacked bureaucratic “pedigree”’, and could not easily find ‘a role for itself in a basically skeptical bureaucratic environment’. Similarly, Hernández (2000:273-274) argues policymakers ‘did not have a defined idea of what evaluation should be as a daily practice’. On the contrary, SPP’s under-secretary for evaluation was ‘a very imprecise hybrid in terms of its responsibilities’, which ‘became dedicated to produce partial studies with scarce impact in the economic process’.

During de la Madrid’s administration (1982-1988) the subject of evaluation remained on the politico-administrative agenda. In response to a number of social criticisms against corruption levels the previous López-Portillo administration, president de la Madrid created a new Secretaría de la Contraloría General de la Federación (SECOGEF, or Ministry of the Federation’s General Controllership; Pardo, 2000b; Cejudo, 2003). The new SECOGEF was in charge of fighting corruption and establishing a National System of Control and Evaluation. Pardo (2000b:225) remarks that, ‘giving the rank of ministry to the new entity showed that the president had decided to give evaluation a significance it did not have before’.

Yet as it had previously happened, various political, administrative, and conceptual issues impeded the consolidation of evaluation procedures. Despite its original mission (e.g. anticorruption and evaluation activities), SECOGEF was put in charge of privatisation processes and public employment cuts. These were carried out in response to the economic crisis (Rogozinski and Casas, 1993; Pardo, 2000b; Aguilar, 2000b). Furthermore, the

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56 According to Hernández (2000:274), SHCP ‘used its power to put obstacles to SPP’s task through a resource it never lost: the management, physically, of the money’. See also Bailey (1984).
57 This was the Dirección General para el Análisis de la Evaluación (Direction General for the Analysis of Evaluation). President López-Portillo also decided to create a Coordinación de Evaluación (Coordination Unit for Evaluation) attached to the presidential office, dedicated to monitor federal programmes. According to Pardo (2000a:204) this initiative ‘rested force to the Secretary for Programming and Budget, as it created a superior entity associated with the Executive, in reality useful only to validate rather than evaluate presidential decisions’.
‘evaluation machinery’ developed under SECOGEF’s leadership kept a focus on traditional activities, such as financial and budgetary controls (Pardo, 2000b:235; IM6). However, the main issue was that evaluation procedures were reduced to either ‘control’ (e.g. the drafting of additional norms, regulations, and procedures to fight corrupt practices); or ‘self-evaluation’ (e.g. the development of internal meetings and the publication of institutional reports in which laudatory assessments prevailed)\(^{58}\).

These issues were further aggravated during the presidency of Carlos Salinas (1982-1988). The latter continued some reforms initiated by his predecessor (e.g. privatisation and deregulation of public utilities; Rogozinski and Casas, 1993). But he abandoned the limited anti-corruption and evaluation efforts developed so far (Méndez, 1994; Aguilar, 2000a, 2000b; Pardo, 2000b, 2000c, 2009). Moreover, during these years the concept of ‘reform’ became strongly associated with the idea of ‘state reforms’ (Aguilar, 2000a). Thus, there was no room for thinking about ‘administrative reforms’.

It would be during Zedillo’s administration that a more complex and workable understanding of evaluation procedures took place. For reasons discussed above, the president and senior officials wanted to pursue an alternative reform path. This included the development of an ‘administrative modernisation’ agenda, which could address a number of public sector issues previously ignored. Since the presidential campaign, some plans for modernising the public sector were drafted. According to a former senior official, ‘the SECOGEF had been criticised because of its police-type role. Thus, during the campaign there were some voices which suggested enriching its role, giving it a more ‘amiable face’’ (IM17; Culebro, 2008b:117). At the beginning of his presidential term, Zedillo introduced a legal reform to transform the SECOGEF into the new SECODAM. The latter was given an explicit modernisation mandate, on top of the institution’s original focus on corruption control. According to the same former official, ‘the idea was to build something that did not exist before, to start from scratch’ (IM17).

The creation of SECODAM was followed by the drafting of an administrative modernisation programme. This task took place in 1994-1995, led by José Octavio López-Presa as Head of the new Administrative Development Unit. In the decree which enacted

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\(^{58}\) According to Pardo (2000b:258), official evaluation reports ‘do not seem to have had the intention of being serious evaluation exercises to present an objective perspective of where to locate the results that had been planned, programmed and achieved, as well as those that had not been achieved, which could also allow knowing the unpredicted consequences that did not favour its accomplishment’.
the *PROMAP*, president Zedillo talked about the need to build a ‘Public Administration [which] responds with flexibility and timeliness to the changes required by society’. He also stressed the need to ‘developing a new approach and more relevant criteria for public management, and achieving from this perspective those components which might allow the measurement of its productivity and performance (Diario Oficial, 1996a).

The *PROMAP* was structured into six main sections, some of which are only briefly discussed here. Its preface noted that the public sector had ‘an essential role to play in the change that the Mexican Government is proposing for the period 1995-2000’ (Diario Oficial, 1996b). It stressed that in the international level there had been ‘a permanent process of evolution and improvement in the mechanisms to administer and promote the development of various countries’ (Diario Oficial, 1996b). In this sense, the preface remarked that:

In some nations of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which Mexico joined in May 1994, significant transformations have been achieved in terms of market efficiency and production, as well as in satisfying the social expectations of their populations. The results achieved in the last decade by the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and more recently the United States, Portugal, and Spain, show that today, more than ever, government actions have a positive or negative incidence in the environment for the development of industrial and commercial activities, and their peoples’ life conditions.

The preface further noted that, in parallel to these international changes, in Mexico there now existed ‘a more informed society, more participative and critical’. Citizens asked for ‘the permanent improvement of government services, more transparency and honesty in government actions and the use of public resources, and a more complete process of accountability’. The *PROMAP* thus stressed that, ‘a radical change in the way of administering and providing public services is required. It is necessary to refocus how to improve their coverage, quality and effectiveness’ (Diario Oficial, 1996b).

After a review of previous reform initiatives, the *PROMAP’s* third section offered a general diagnosis of the Mexican public sector. This touched on four main topics: the limited infrastructure capacity to deal with increasing citizen demands; centralism; shortcomings in the measurement and evaluation of government performance; and the absence of mechanisms to guarantee public servants’ dignity and professionalisation. With regards to the third topic, evaluation and performance, the document remarked that:
Traditionally, the actions and performance of public administration ministries and agencies has been evaluated on the basis of authorised levels of expenditure, as well as in terms of their association to programmes and budgetary items. However, the measurement of public spending’s contribution to its intended goals has been generally neglected (Diario Oficial, 1996b).

It also suggested that:

The accountability process has not been able to provide information required by the public to form objective judgements, since most of the time this is done by means of submitting documents to government bodies or higher administrative units, or these are of a relatively limited circulation (Diario Oficial, 1996b).

These statements echoed the main preoccupations of senior SECODAM officials. According to a participant in the drafting process, ‘the main thing to deal with was how to measure, how to evaluate, how to ensure that the government was accountable. We had those concerns. We needed to measure the impact of what agencies were doing’ (IM17).

The PROMAP’s fourth section then described four sub-programmes, which addressed each one of the points included in the diagnosis. Regarding the ‘measurement and evaluation of public management’, it stressed that budgetary control should include ‘a thorough evaluation’ of results. This should focus on assessing service quality levels; an appropriate targeting of beneficiaries; and clear links between services provided and public needs/demands. The ‘development of modern schemes of performance measurement and evaluation’ should strengthen accountability mechanisms, increase flexibility, and guarantee an honest and transparent use of public resources.

The PROMAP also stated that ministries would be required to define ‘clear objectives at the institutional and intermediate levels, linked to concrete programmes, actions or services, with significant and quantifiable goals in terms of results’. This was ‘to change the focus towards the expected impact of those programmes on society’ (Diario Oficial, 1996b). The following year (1997), agencies would then need to negotiate with SECODAM (and SHCP) a set of ‘performance indicators’. These would be used to ‘evaluate results’ (quality, costs, relevance); ‘measure effects’ on society or beneficiaries; and ensure the ‘achievement of proposed institutional objectives’ (Diario Oficial, 1996b).

The reference to international modernisation trends in the PROMAP’s preface, and the use of concepts such as ‘performance’, ‘results’, ‘indicators’, and ‘evaluation’, suggest that Mexican officials were drawing information from similar policies abroad. Indeed,
between 1994 and 1996 López-Presa and his team engaged in activities to learn about contemporary public management reforms (Philip, 2003; Huerta, 2006). According to a former official,

We tried to find out what was that countries were doing on this subject. We realised there was a huge international concern about this, and that Mexico was not facing an exceptional situation. Thus we sought to use those experiences in Mexico. We looked at Portugal, which in the mid-1990s developed a very successful administrative modernisation programme. They focused on four topics, as we would later do with the PROMAP. We had many conversations with people from the UK, who were advancing the citizen’s charter. We developed a very good relationship with the person in charge of the reform agenda during the Thatcher administration. She came about 4 or 5 times to Mexico, to speak with many people including the president and secretaries of state. Her involvement was useful when we were drafting our programme, but particularly in helping us communicate the relevance of what we were doing (IM17)59.

López-Presa travelled to Lisbon, London, and Paris, and ‘spoke with many people’. Yet information about other countries’ experiences was mainly gathered through conversations and documents distributed at OECD meetings (IM17; Huerta, 2006). More focused study tours, such as the one developed by Chilean policymakers in the early 1990s, did not take place.

Knowledge about modernisation policies abroad did influence the PROMAP’s structure and contents. As noted by the former official, the Portuguese experience served as a reference to determine the number of topics (four) to be included in the programme. The British experience provided ideas on topics such as service quality and performance management. Then, López-Presa and his team reportedly ‘studied the American case on reinventing government and re-engineering of processes’, in an attempt to use ‘a bit of everything’ (cited in Huerta, 2006:161; Roel, 1998).

However, cross-national learning did not result in a copy of foreign programmes. The PROMAP and other official documents referred to concepts and terms which at the time were being similarly used elsewhere. For instance, SECODAM produced guidelines for defining an organisational mission/vision, and different kinds of performance indicators (SECODAM, 1999). While ‘the Mexican public administration did not offer any significant experience’ on this subject (Pardo, 2003:193-194), these official documents do not make further use of foreign examples, as it had been the case in Chile.

59 Meetings with Kate Jenkins, former senior official in the British government during the Thatcher era, were mostly related to the subject of civil service reform (Philip, 2003).
Nor did Mexican officials engaged in this process as a result of international pressures. According to Huerta (2006:19), the PROMAP ‘epitomise[d] the adoption of discourse, ideology, policy goals, experience and recommendations on reforming public sector from the OECD and its core member countries’. He adds that the Mexican reforms had been ‘largely a product of processes of policy transfer in which the OECD is the prime agent of policy transfer’. There is some evidence that supports this interpretation. A report by SECODAM’s institutional successor states that, ‘[d]uring the administration of president Ernesto Zedillo there was a very strong pressure from the OECD to implement changes in the public management’ (Secretaría de la Función Pública, 2005:30; Zomosa, 2005:141-154).

Yet things were more complicated, as the OECD’s influence was slightly different from what has been suggested. According to a former senior official, ‘the OECD had an enormous influence in the administrative reforms’ (IM17). But this was in a cognitive rather than coercive way. The former official adds that, ‘I can tell you, categorically, there was no pressure from the OECD. We developed this because we thought this was necessary for the country. Someone can tell you “this would be good for the country”, but you can always say no’. In fact, Huerta (2006:104) concedes that it was the ‘Mexican bureaucratic and political elites’ who made ‘the final decision of what, how and when to engage in reform’. He says that:

for Mexican officials learning means to get to know experiences from other nations, exchange information, give and obtain feedback and come to their own conclusions on what is best to be done in Mexico. The OECD does not prescribe policies or programmes but suggests courses of action on the basis of precious studies (peer reviews) and the discussions held at its committees. Learning does not mean to be told what to do in certain circumstances but having enough information to contrast Mexico’s experience with the advanced nations of the world (Huerta, 2006:132).

Therefore, Mexican officials found in the OECD and its country members’ experiences an extraordinary source of reform ideas. In that sense, that organisation certainly performed an ‘influential’ role in PROMAP’s design. Yet it was the Mexican officials’ decision to choose the ideas/approaches which better fitted their assessment about the politico-administrative conditions the country was facing.

Despite these efforts, by the end of the Zedillo administration SECODAM officials had achieved very limited success in introducing MFR practices and ideas. Several
academic experts suggest that the PROMAP did represent a breaking point in the history of administrative modernisation policies in Mexico (Pardo, 2003; Cejudo, 2003; Sánchez, 2009b; IM2; IM3). Indeed, the programme talked about ‘results’ and ‘performance management’ in a more articulated and consistent manner than previous initiatives. It offered a clearer argumentation about why these modernisation tools were relevant for increasing management efficiency. It bridged administrative reforms with accountability and transparency in the use of public resources. Moreover, the rhetorical/conceptual contributions of the PROMAP paved the way for the budgetary reforms which were introduced soon after. In the longer term, the programme would become an important reference for future modernisation initiatives (Secretaría de la Función Pública, 2005, 2008; Rubio, 2012; SHCP, forthcoming).

SECODAM officials also managed to kick off several performance management activities across the federal government. For instance, 1,294 management indicators were produced by government agencies in 1997. The number increased to 2,150 in 1998, and then decreased to 1,856 in 1999 (Pardo, 2003). In addition, SECODAM remarked that there had been significant progress in introducing evaluation practices. According to president Zedillo’s second state of the nation address, the efforts had ‘allowed to associate the achievement of institutional objectives with the satisfaction of the social demands, as well as systematically evaluate the cost, quality and relevance of public services’ (cited by Pardo, 2003:201). To support these activities, SECODAM produced a number of methodological guides, and provided several workshops for federal public servants (SECODAM, 1999). According to Cejudo (2008:116), ‘[d]espite adverse conditions, the UDA [Unit for Administrative Development] was actually able to implement some PROMAP proposals, which led to qualitative changes in the work of the government agencies’.

However, the implementation of PROMAP’s sub-programmes, and specifically the one related to ‘management and evaluation’, faced a number of significant challenges. Despite the use of contemporary discussions on MFR, the lack of practical experience in performance management generated difficulties. A former senior official suggests that:

I cannot say we were very successful in introducing indicators. We did want to introduce them. We tried in various occasions, particularly towards the end of the presidential term. But we did not have much experience, and even the international experience was not directly applicable. I think that is the
project which has to be seen with a longer term perspective, as it was the one which required the most profound transformation of the Mexican public administration. I was not satisfied with what we achieved, even though I do think we planted the seed, we introduced this concern in the public sector (IM17).

These problems were further aggravated when SHCP decided to introduce an alternative system of indicators (Pardo, 2003:205; Culebro, 2008a:61; Sánchez, 2009b). As a result, federal agencies not only had to learn about new MFR ideas. They also were required to deal with two competing methodological approaches and guidelines. According to Pardo (2003:208):

The management indicators, first, it was not clear what they were good for and then, when many agencies had already invested a good effort in defining them, almost at the end of the government, appears the proposal by SHCP to reform the making of the budget, in a sense that all ministries should formulate strategic indicators better linked with the use of resources. […] The result was, then, that indicators as a means to evaluate management could not be formulated in a way in which they could become useful for this. The ministries thought this had just been a waste of time and effort […].

Furthermore, SECODAM and SHCP had a series of inter-organisational conflicts. For instance, a final draft of the PROMAP was ready by mid-2005, but the programme was not published until May, 2006. According to a former SECODAM senior official, ‘the big delay in the programme’s publication came from SHCP. They did not want to become part of it’ (IM17). During the following years, both ministries would continue arguing about the modernisation process (Sánchez, 2009b; Culebro, 2008b). The same former official remarks that, ‘we did have some rivalries regarding which ministry should control the reforms. Unfortunately these things are always about who is going to be in charge. We cared about getting things done, and thus we had to concede in many aspects’ (IM17).

Other issues originated in SECODAM’s leadership changes. The Minister, Norma Samaniego, left her position at the end of 1995, before the publication of the PROMAP. In her place president Zedillo appointed Arsenio Farell, who ‘did not know anything about administrative modernisation’ (IM17), ‘was not interested on these topics’ (IM2), and was seen as an old-school politician (Pardo, 2003:197; Cejudo, 2003)60. López-Presa became undersecretary, but with new responsibilities which were not related to administrative modernisation (Pardo, 2003). His substitute, Santiago Roel, had been an active promoter of

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60 According to Pardo (2003:197), Farell’s appointment ‘undoubtedly influenced in the orientation of Secodam’s work, where more emphasis was put on control tasks than in modernisation aspects’. 
managerialism in subnational governments, and seemed to be well-qualified for taking over the PROMAP’s coordination. Yet Roel mainly cared about quality management, and less about ‘performance management and evaluation’\textsuperscript{61}. Furthermore, because of personal conflicts with Farell, he was dismissed in 1998 (IM17; Pardo, 2003:197)\textsuperscript{62}.

Last but not least, the reform processes were significantly affected by president Zedillo’s limited attention towards this subject. As mentioned above, he had welcomed the idea of administrative modernisation. During the PROMAP’s public presentation, president Zedillo remarked the need ‘to change the orientation of public sector evaluation, in order to measure not only the use of inputs and norm compliance, but also the real achievement of objectives’ (Zedillo, 1996). On the other hand, the so-called ‘error de diciembre’ (mistake of December) of 1994 changed the president’s original plans. According to a former official,

> The crisis altered the government’s administrative modernisation plans. The emphasis was set on cuts. The ‘mistake of December’ forced the president to modify significantly his government plans. It also forced him to negotiate and agree on topics which he did not necessarily thought were appropriate. He then signed an agreement with the PAN [Partido Acción Nacional, or National Action Party]. This included the creation of a supreme audit institution and the investigation of corruption cases associated with the former president’s brother. SECODAM thus turned its focus on anti-corruption, which sidestepped the initial focus on modernisation (IM17).

Thus, by the end of the presidential term, on the basis of ideas and practices learned from abroad, SECODAM officials had made some progress in conceptual and programmatic terms. Yet they had also encountered a number of technical issues, inter-organisational conflicts, leadership changes, and the president’s limited involvement. A very similar story would take place in the second MFR ‘strand’, as described in the following section.

\textsuperscript{61} From Roel’s (1998) perspective, this Unit should have focused on ‘quality of service’. Therefore, it should be staffed with consultants on quality of service, and it should aim to develop indicators and standards for measuring customer satisfaction and quality concerns.

\textsuperscript{62} Roel’s successor was not enthusiast about ‘performance management and evaluation’ either. He chose to focus on process reengineering topics during 1998-2000.
‘The Budget Was a Complete Mess’:
The New Budgetary Structure and Performance Evaluation System

The second area in which MFR ideas and practices emerged during the Zedillo administration was that of budgetary policy management. As in the case of the performance management systems and indicators, it was a group of policymakers within SHCP (the Ministry of Finance) who proposed two closely related reforms. First, the development of budgetary indicators as part of a Nueva Estructura Programática (NEP, or New Programmatic Structure); and second, the creation of a Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño (SED, or Performance Evaluation System). SHCP officials thought Mexico’s public administration lacked effective tools for measuring ‘results’, and for ensuring accountability and transparency in the use of public resources. They also considered the country’s new political conditions demanded such tools. On the basis of ideas about budgetary management trends mainly gathered at OECD meetings, SHCP developed their initiatives for the following years.

There were many conditions which pointed at the need to reform the budgetary system. Given the economic crisis environment, SHCP were worried about improving the management and control of public finances (Cejudo, 2003:319). Indeed, according to a former SHCP senior official, the proposals of the NEP and the SED originated in concerns about ‘the public expenditure as an instrument of macroeconomic stability and healthy public finances’ (IM12). The former official further adds that, ‘we all look for the same thing. If you look at the programme-based budgeting reforms of the US Department of Defence, you can see we are all looking for better or more intelligent control mechanisms, instead of the rather primitive focus on inputs’ (IM12).

The need to improve spending controls, however, was not the only concern. According to the same former official:

We found out that everything [in the budget] was completely procedural, inertial, despite the fact that Mexico was supposed to be using a programme-based budgeting as approved by former president López Portillo. We thus had to start from defining what a programme was. There were no definitions. Just imagine that the most important public programme was called ‘AAA’. There were no mentions as to what originated the programme, what the main objective of the programme was, what the target population was, or how we wanted to produce goods and services. We lacked some kind of thinking about why and how we were spending (IM12).
Basic financial concepts (e.g. expenditure categories, data, measures) that should inform budget analysis and preparation, and parliamentary discussions on public spending were not well developed. Furthermore, another former senior official states that:

The budget was a complete mess. There were very little robust quantitative elements to know what was going on within it. There was no evidence regarding the impact of public programmes, about what was being achieved. No institution was capable of demonstrating any sort of results. There was no accountability. There was very limited transparency and no clear links between expenditure and results. It was urgent to improve the quality of the public expenditure (IM26)\(^63\).

Thus, reforming the budget was about controlling expenditure and increasing efficiency, but also about several other goals: improving measurement mechanisms to assess the effectiveness and results of public programmes; increasing budget transparency to reinforce external accountability to Congress and the public (Chávez-Presa, 2000:144); and developing a clearer ‘terminology’ and budget classification to adapt budgetary policymaking to the changing political dynamics. Regarding the latter point, a former senior official comments that, ‘all of this was also developed to prepare the public administration, so that it could have a language to communicate and negotiate with legislators. This was done thinking about when they would finally decide to discuss budget and programmes seriously’ (IM12; Chávez-Presa. 2000:153).

The Head of the Unidad de Política y Control Presupuestario (UPCP, or Unit for Budget Policy and Control), Jorge Chávez-Presa, initially sought to address two different albeit strongly related issues. First, because the objective was to focus on ‘how to finally make real the so called programme budgeting’, his team decided to talk about developing a ‘New Programmatic Structure’ (IM12)\(^64\). Given the ‘complexities’ of budgetary practices and the ‘obscurity’ of its jargon (Chávez-Presa, 2000:23), reformers started by ‘defining each one of the words used in the Unit by looking at the Spanish dictionary’. They then

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\(^63\) Chávez-Presa (2000:147) mentions that: ‘[i]f a ministry wanted more resources, then it proposed to create a new programme or sub-programme, or added targets to the programmes it already had as authorised. Its justification was to comply with an attribution established in the Law. […] Furthermore, this situation ensured budget resources in the future, thanks to the inertia of the budget process […]. Similarly, at the moment of asking for the creation of the new programme, sub-programme or when increasing the targets, there never was an analysis about the costs and benefits. As a consequence, each year the programmatic structure grew, and there was no way to see if results also augmented’.

\(^64\) It should be noted, however, that the objective was not to develop a ‘planning, programming, and budgeting system’ (PPBS) as it had been originally attempted in the 1970s. Chávez-Presa was well aware that the international and Mexican PPBS experiences had been rather poor. He also knew international discussions had moved away from that topic. However, the legal and budgetary frameworks were built around the concept of ‘programmes’, and thus reformers had to take this term as its basis (Chávez-Presa, 2000:136-137).
‘read the Constitution article by article, the legislation, and the regulations’, in order to ‘define and develop the institutional activities and government functions’ (IM12).

Second, they aimed to build a NEP that could link budgetary policymaking with the planning requirements established in the Mexican constitution. Although a Sistema Nacional de Planeación (SNP, or National Planning System) had been created in the 1980s, no mechanisms had been developed yet to associate plans/programmes with the budget (Chávez-Presa, 2000:145). According to what Chávez-Presa explained a few years later:

the methodology of the NEP allows: a) linking public spending with results; b) linking the actions of the federal public sector with the policy sector programmes; c) facilitating the design and follow up of the multiannual plans and programmes, and d) aligning the Federal Expenditure Budget with the objectives of the NDP [National Development Plan] and with the objectives of the medium term programmes and the functions assigned to the government (Chávez-Presa, 2000:165).

Despite the attention originally paid to national precedents, SHCP officials eventually added concepts clearly drawn from contemporary international debates. Indeed, both the NEP and the SED adopted concepts and ‘labels’ associated with the NPM-type reforms which were taking place in OECD countries. In the case of the NEP’s basic features, for instance, government officials started to use terms such as ‘mission’, ‘indicators’, ‘strategic planning’, ‘clients’, ‘benchmarks’, and ‘flexibility’ (Chávez-Presa, 2000:183). In his account of the reforms, Chávez-Presa (2000:165), explained that, ‘the core of the NEP is linking policy sector programmes with the mission and daily operation of the units in charge’. He also stated that, ‘[t]he NEP uses strategic planning to design a programme which is useful for the society, and therefore mandates to clearly establish the target population, its institutional purpose, the objectives and the indicators’ (p. 176).

The contents of the proposed SED similarly echoed international discussions on performance management and evaluation. The objective was to create a mechanism in which ‘the focus of evaluation changes from one directed towards verifying the accomplishment of volumes, activities and product quantities, to another focused on the results obtained: effect, coverage, efficiency, and quality’ (Chávez-Presa, 2000:220). Evaluating public performance would thus be about measuring ‘continuously and periodically, the achievement of the mission and objectives of an organisation, a programme or a project’. Evaluations should be done ‘taking into account the quality of service and the satisfaction of the beneficiary (Chávez-Presa, 2000:203).
Another innovation was the idea of using ‘indicators’ as the core tool of the SED. Of course, indicators already existed in association to economic discussions (e.g. GDP). Moreover, SECODAM’s performance management initiative had contributed to a government-wide use of the term. Yet the NEP-SED sought to associate indicators with budgetary decision-making for the first time. It also did so in a variety of forms (‘strategic indicators’, ‘project indicators’, ‘management indicators’, ‘service indicators’) which sought to capture all administrative aspects deemed to be relevant for budgetary discussions: efficiency, coverage, effects, quality, equity, and resource alignment (Chávez-Presa, 2000:212). The objective of the reformers was to use performance indicators to reduce paperwork, and eventually grant increased flexibility to budget managers (Chávez-Presa, 2000:164). As a whole, these propositions represented a new take on budgetary policymaking and public spending evaluation.

The international ideas which informed budgetary reform proposals seem to have entered debates through two complementary channels. First, the broader administrative modernisation efforts led by SECODAM clearly had a ‘spill-over effect’ in budgetary reform discussions. SHCP senior officials had known and commented on the PROMAP’s contents before its publication. Moreover, as in the case of other federal ministries, SHCP officials participated in government workshops and talks about performance management, management indicators, and evaluation procedures. This jargon was evidently picked up by SHCP as it fit their reform ideas well (IM17).

Second, and perhaps more importantly, MFR concepts, practices, and examples entered budgetary reform initiatives through the participation of SHCP senior officials at the meetings of the OECD’s PUMA committee. Chávez-Presa even became Vice-Chair of PUMA for two years. He thus attended its meetings, had access to background papers and publications, and gathered relevant information about other countries’ experiences. According to a senior SHCP official, ‘our discussions about budget-by results came from the 1990s, from what we observed at OECD meetings and later at the Senior Budget Officials meetings’ (IM9). Indeed, in his account of the budgetary reform experience, Chávez-Presa (2000:21) thanks his colleagues at PUMA for ‘having given me the opportunity to present in that forum some of the ideas of the book’. He also remarks that when the NEP-SED was being developed, New Zealand, Australia and the UK represented the leading international cases on the subject (Chávez-Presa, 2000:156-160; Roel, 1998).
Yet the fact that SHCP officials were aware of, and even took part in, international discussions on MFR and budgetary practices does not imply they just ‘copied’ these ideas/practices. There is no evidence of study tours such as the one led by Marcel in the case of the Chilean reforms, or trips like those which López-Pesa did to London or Lisbon. Moreover, Chávez-Presa (2000:158-159) actually stressed that:

The Mexican reform coincided with those in other countries in the relevance of taking into account microeconomic aspects in spending and the role of institutions and performance incentives. However, the objectives and means by which these [reforms] were developed are different. In México, the trigger of this incipient budgetary reform was not to achieve fiscal equilibrium. What was a priority in the case of New Zealand and Australia, has been achieved in our country because of fiscal adjustments during the eighties [...]. The Mexican reform coincided with those in the objective of incrementing the productivity of public spending, an objective related with a fundamental demand: to provide higher transparency about the public budget and to establish an accountability system.

He also noted an ‘important difference’ between the New Zealand or British reforms, and the Mexican one. The former initiatives had resulted from a comprehensive public sector change strategy, and had been led from the highest levels of government. Yet the Mexican efforts, Chávez-Presa (2000:159-160) remarked, had originated within the public administration, with the aim of changing ‘the rules of the budgetary process’. The Mexican reform included elements present in other country systems (e.g. ‘indicators’, the need to ‘evaluate performance’). But it also left aside others, such as New Zealand’s accrual-budgeting, or Australia’s extensive benchmarking practices (OECD, 2007).

Nor should the NEP-SED initiatives be seen as the Mexican government’s response to OECD directives or impositions. As mentioned above regarding the PROMAP initiative, the country’s recent accession to the OECD undoubtedly influenced the way in which Mexican policymakers approached the subject (Carroll and Kelow, 2011). According to a former SHCP senior official, ‘the big advantage of the OECD is that you go and with your own peers receive feedback, which is a forum that no consultancy will be able to provide you’ (IM12). But then the same former official also stated that:

To all those who say that the OECD and the Fondo [IMF] influenced [the Mexican reforms], no, that is completely wrong! At that time, it was us, the public servants within the executive, who developed the reform proposals. Moreover, the OECD is a great organisation, it never seeks to impose, they provide principles, guidelines, etc. Then it is your problem to decide how you apply the guidelines. For example, the OECD might suggest that public spending should become more efficient, but then you ask yourself how to do so, how to do this real. With the NEP and the SED we aimed to
operationalise that idea. Furthermore, the IMF is for ‘banana republics’, countries which do not have the capacity to make proposals. And in Mexico we did have that capacity.

Another former senior official similarly remarked that, ‘I was involved in the process of accession to the OECD, and I know this was not like they came and did our “homework”. That never happened’ (IM26).

Despite the efforts to learn from international practices and use them for advancing national reforms, by the end of the Zedillo administration the NEP-SED initiative had fallen short from its original expectations. This was due to the number of significant political and administrative issues SHCP reformers faced throughout the reform process. First, there were strong resistances coming from both internal and external actors. Inside the SHCP, for instance, Chávez-Presa found ‘very difficult to persuade his own collaborators, that was the hardest part because people wanted to do things as usual’ (IM12; IM24). The NEP-SED proposals also encountered serious resistances from the contralorías internas (internal comptrollerships), and above all from the group of Director Generals for Programming and Budgeting in the various federal ministries. According to a former official:

They did not like this because they felt they would lose power and control. Also, because it would require them to do much more work, as they had to get involved and learn about specific public policies. They also had to calculate costs associated with their policies. Either they did not like it, or they did not know how to deal with it, or they did not want to. But the fact is that they represented a very strong opposition. This was despite their permanent complaints about budget spending being all about budgeting and not about programming in any respect (IM12).

Another senior official further noted that, ‘SHCP’s Budget Unit is very powerful, but not as powerful as all the various budget director generals across the federal government’ (IM13).

Then in 1998, a few months after the proposals had been formally launched, Chávez-Presa left his position as head of SHCP’s Budget Office to take up a position at the Ministry of Energy. The NEP-SED reform had been supported since the beginning by the then Undersecretary for Public Spending, Santiago Levy. Yet Levy was already too busy with many other topics and interests, including those associated with the introduction of a new anti-poverty programme (see following section). Moreover, Chávez-Presa’s successor focused on regular budgetary aspects, and did not pay much attention to the NEP-SED reforms. Nor did he seek to keep the former’s group of advisors. Therefore, while the NEP-
SED’s implementation continued until the end of the Zedillo administration in 2000, it lost its politico-administrative priority.

Last but not least, SHCP reformers also faced important difficulties of a more ‘technical’ (administrative) nature. According to a senior SHCP official, the reform had been ‘too ambitious’ and ‘highly theoretical’, and activities such as ‘costing’ programmes in the process of developing results indicators had been too complicated (IM9). Another former senior official suggests that, ‘we overwhelmed the public administration with indicators. There was ‘indicatoritis’. We got lost in finding out which were the indicators we really needed. Some people wanted management indicators, but others wanted results or impact-orientated indicators’ (IM12). Thus, while SHCP kept the upper hand vis-à-vis SECODAM’s indicators proposal, the NEP-SED proposals were not successfully implemented either.

‘It Was Irresponsible Not to Develop an Evaluation’:
Measuring the Results of ‘PROGRESA’ (and Other Social Programmes)

There was a third ‘strand’ through which MFR principles and practices entered the Mexican public sector in the 1990s: the creation of PROGRESA (the government’s main antipoverty programme), and the introduction of the so-called Reglas de Operación de Programas Sociales (ROPS, or Rules for Managing Social Programmes). While embedded in the social policy area, these innovations would later have significant ‘spill-over’ effects government-wide. As in the case of the performance management and budgetary reform initiatives, both PROGRESA’s impact evaluations and the ROPS sought to strengthen transparency and accountability; increase efficiency in the use of public resources; and measure policy ‘results’. Furthermore, in this case the process of learning from international practices also took place without pressures from international actors.

However, developments in this MFR ‘strand’ showed significant differences with regards those described in previous sections. While the initiatives were drafted by senior SHCP officials, their ideas did not originate in OECD debates or NPM countries’ experiences, but in broader international evaluation practices. Moreover, in contrast to the PROMAP and NEP-SED reforms, PROGRESA’s evaluation did produce clearly positive results. This provided a certain aura of ‘legitimacy’ for the regular and systematic use of
evaluation exercises. It also contributed to the survival of PROGRESA (and impact evaluations in general) during president Vicente Fox’s administration (2000-2012; see Chapter 6 below).

The Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA, or Programme of Education, Health, and Nutrition) was created in 1997 to transform the logic of previous antipoverty programmes. According to Teichman (2007:561; Bate, 2004), PROGRESA emerged ‘from the musings of a small number of enthusiastic market reform technocrats’. These were led by Santiago Levy (Undersecretary for the Budget at SHCP), and José Antonio Gómez de León (presidential advisor). They were ‘preoccupied with the inefficiencies of state subsidies because they did not benefit the poorest’, and thus they ‘sought ways to reduce state spending’. An interviewee similarly stated that,

The team surrounding president Zedillo knew that poverty represented the absence of human and social capital. Thus, Mexico was not going anywhere as a country of poor people. But they did not want to repeat the experience of the Salinas administration, which had been neither economically efficient, nor socially effective’ (IM2).

While previous federal programmes had usually focused on distributing food subsidies (e.g. tortilla or milk vouchers), the logic behind PROGRESA was to design a conditional cash transfer programme (Székely, 2004). Target families would receive money as long as they complied with certain conditions. These included, for instance, securing children’s attendance to school; or ensuring that mothers-to-be did not miss their medical appointments. PROGRESA thus sought the double objective of reducing poverty (and particularly extreme poverty) levels, while at the same time enhancing the poor’s health and education capital (Levy and Rodriguez, 2004; Levy, 2006; Niño-Zarazúa, 2010). Designers took as a basis contemporary research developments in ‘antipoverty policy’. These had shown the relevance of taking into account the various ‘interactions, spillover effects, or externalities between food consumption, nutrition, health, and education’ (Levy, 2006:10).

Yet PROGRESA also sought to change the political dynamics which had traditionally surrounded anti-poverty programmes, particularly the Salinas administration’s

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65 There is an extensive literature on PROGRESA and its successor, Oportunidades. The following pages only include a limited discussion of the programme’s features, but see Levy and Rodriguez (2004); Levy (2006); Teichman (2007); Hevia (2008, 2009); and Niño-Zarazúa (2010).

66 Levy (2006:8) notes that, ‘[t]he challenge therefore was not to eliminate [the existing] programs, but to replace them with another instrument that would be more effective and efficient in transferring income to the poor and have greater impacts on their health and nutritional status’. 
Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL, or National Solidarity Programme). PRONASOL had been established to compensate for the effects of the economic crises of the 1980s, but the way it worked had been strongly criticised. For instance, Hevia (2008:66) remarks that PRONASOL:

became symbolic of the Salinas administration and was then stigmatised as an instrument employed for political gains. Without making any remarkable progress against poverty, it was thought it reproduced the same clientelistic and corporatist practices of the worst times of the post-revolutionary period—by means of a secondary, abusive political network set up throughout the whole country (namely, the Solidarity Committees) and a presidential system with no counterbalances.

In response to this, a number of innovations were introduced in PROGRESA’s design. These included the use of more objective statistical methods to identify and select beneficiaries; a decentralised management structure, which acted almost independently from the Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL, or Ministry of Social Development) in coordinating the various public programmes involved (Bate, 2004); the use of cash transfers through bank accounts purposefully set up for beneficiaries; and pre-emptive depoliticisation strategies, such as the temporal suspension of money transfers and programme enrolment during election dates (Bate, 2004; Levy, 2006).

Furthermore, from the beginning policy designers decided that PROGRESA should use systematic ‘impact’ evaluations. From a purely ‘technical’ point of view, the introduction of evaluation as part and parcel of PROGRESA was due to the fact that:

The evaluation of whether the hypotheses of the [programme] design were correct, as well as quantifying the level and direction of the impacts of the actions integrated in education, health and food areas, were deemed to be essential activities. Evaluation would allow having objective elements to propose, if needed, modifications to improve the functionality of the processes and, in general, to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the actions (Levy and Rodríguez, 2004:305).

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67 For example, ‘the geographic selection of poor areas using census-based marginality index, categorical criteria to identify poor households, using socioeconomic survey and census data, and proxy-means tests to select beneficiaries’ (Niño-Zarazúa, 2010:9).

68 In strict sense, PROGRESA’s impact evaluation was not the first one in Mexico. A few years before, for example, the Ministry of Labour, with the support of the WB, had evaluated the impact of its Programa de Becas de Capacitacion para Trabajadores (PROBECAT; or Programme of Scholarships for Training Workers). However, this evaluation did not have any significant consequences on Mexico’s MFR policy. See Baker (2000:134–139).
A WB official similarly remarked that policymakers assumed evaluations would ‘generate information of quality, and evidence to influence policy formulation and decision-making’ (IIO1).

While programmatic considerations were undoubtedly important, Levy and his colleagues were well aware that a ‘new emphasis on evaluation and measurement of program results’ had very important political implications (Levy, 2006:15; Székely, 2004)\(^69\). First of all, the topic of evaluation was included in the cabinet discussions when PROGRESA was being designed. It was thus employed as an additional means to persuade reluctant cabinet members that the programme was worth implementing. Moreover, for Levy and his colleagues it was clear that, ‘in a context of rapid democratization’, they needed to reassure Congress ‘that the new effort would not be manipulated by the executive branch to obtain short-run political advantage’ (Levy, 2006:17; Hernández, 2006:48). The use of ‘credible impact and operational evaluations’, as well as the establishment of ‘clear and strict rules of operation’ (see below) were thus seen as helpful mechanisms to secure the programmes’ funding, as well as to avoid political conflicts.

In addition, evaluations were thought to be relevant for two other reasons. While PROGRESA was informed by the most recent academic research and previous national experiences, it was also full of innovative features. Thus no one could be really sure whether it would actually work. Therefore, a former senior official remarks that, ‘in the face of so many changes, so many resources that were being used for the new programme, it was just irresponsible not to develop an evaluation’ (IM26; see also Bate, 2004). Then, policymakers were concerned about the programme’s future. The same former official states that,

We asked ourselves, “What can we do so that the next president, whoever he is, guarantees its continuation?” We thought about evaluation as a way of securing the legitimacy of the programme, showing with numbers that the programme was really working (IM26)\(^70\).

\(^69\) Because Levy and his colleagues were worried about the ‘credibility of results’, they also put in place other measures: ‘making the databases available to many researchers, so that results could, in principle, be replicated: relying on a mix of national and international academic researchers and domestic and foreign institutions to perform evaluations; and placing no restrictions on researchers with regard to divulging their results’ (Levy, 2006:43)

\(^70\) Along very similar lines, Bate (2004) suggests that ‘[p]erhaps the most important aspect of Levy and Gómez de Léon’s vision was the importance of rigorous evaluation. The two men believed evaluations were a crucial tool, not only for fine-tuning the program's operations, but also for generating credible information and empirical proof of its achievements. [...] Levy and Gómez de León thought that if PROGRESA were to be evaluated by world-class experts, it could improve its chances for survival’.
As discussed at the end of this section and Chapter 6, PROGRESA’s evaluations would certainly accomplish this.

Levy’s interest in developing evaluations emerged at the same time in which the other two MFR ‘strands’ were being developed, but his sources of knowledge on the subject were quite different. As an academic expert and former professor of economics at Boston University, as well as consultant to the WB and the IDB, Levy was aware of evaluation methodologies regularly used to assess public policy results. Therefore, whereas both López-Presa and Chávez-Presa had mainly drawn inspiration from contemporary discussions and experiences within OECD countries, Levy did not look at any specific countries or cases. Nor did he develop any kind of study tour in this regard. In fact, evaluation examples and techniques were simply obtained ‘off the shelf’, by revising the relevant literature on the subject (IM26).

PROGRESA’s evaluation had another international aspect. In order to guarantee the independence, legitimacy, and future visibility of the evaluations to the programme, the Mexican government hired the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI; Teichman, 2007; Niño-Zarazúa, 2010:4). The IFPRI evaluated the impacts of PROGRESA ‘on education, nutrition, health and rural poverty, as well as the program’s overall operation’. This was done on the basis of ‘repeated surveys of individuals from 24,000 households in 506 localities in randomly assigned PROGRESA and non-PROGRESA areas’ (IFPRI, 2002:2). The Mexican government also hired other national evaluators, such as the Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública (National Institute of Public Health, or INSP), and the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (Centre of Research and Postgraduate Studies in Social Anthropology, CIESAS). However, these institutions mainly focused on other programmatic features (Levy and Rodríguez, 2004:306; Cardozo, 2006).

While IFPRI is based in Washington, DC, and the whole evaluation exercise was followed closely by the IDB and the WB (Teichman, 2007), the Mexican government developed these tasks without international intervention or pressures. According to a World Bank official, ‘this was an effort basically directed by the Mexican “technocracy”. The Bank was not formally involved, although it did offer some informal technical advice at some stages’ (IIO1). The official further adds that the main role of the WB was
‘contributing to give PROGRESA’s evaluation results international visibility, which would later become in a higher domestic visibility’. Levy (2006:114) similarly remarks that:

During 1995 and 1996 both the IDB and the World Bank generously provided technical advice on different aspects of the program. Nevertheless, at that time and during the initial years of program operation, it was not deemed convenient to obtain international financing for the program. In 1996–97 such financing would have added yet one more controversial aspect to what was already a fairly significant change in poverty policy, perhaps giving the impression that the program was the result of a mandate of or an adjustment program agreed upon with international financial institutions.

In fact, international funding only reached the programme when PROGRESA became Oportunidades in the early 2000s. At that point, the IDB did provide a loan with certain conditions attached. But even then, that was less a mechanism of international coercion than a product of ‘[a] parallel strategy pursued by the program’s originators’. In the middle of a government transition, they wanted to ensure ‘that important aspects of the program could not be changed without the agreement of the lending institution’ (Teichman, 2007:563).

The evaluation results produced by IFPRI undoubtedly served to accomplish the original objectives of Levy and his colleagues. From a programmatic perspective, IFPRI’s evaluation demonstrated, among other things, the following: ‘PROGRESA’s targeting is relatively accurate’; ‘interventions reduced the number of people with income levels below the poverty level by about 10 percent’; there was ‘a positive enrollment effect for both boys and girls in primary and secondary schools’; ‘PROGRESA students are entering school at earlier ages, experiencing less grade repetition, and better grade progression’; there had been ‘reduced labor-market participation of PROGRESA children for both boys and girls, in both salaried and non-salaried activities’; and ‘improved nutrition and preventative care in PROGRESA areas have made younger children more robust against illness’ (IFPRI, 2002; Wodon et al., 2003; Levy and Rodríguez, 2004; Teichman, 2007).

From a broader political perspective, and despite the fact the then governing party (PRI) lost the presidential elections of 2000, the evaluation results secured the programme’s

\[71\] In an international seminar on M&E, a WB expert expressed that, ‘[t]he World Bank’s chief economist in my area of human development and social services is someone who was earned his fame in the area of evaluation and Oportunidades. He is now distributing methodologies and promoting M&E in many other countries. So we at the Bank should thank Oportunidades and SEDESOL for this’ (Haggerston, 2006:54).
continuity. According to the original plans of PROGRESA coordinators, evaluation results were made available in mid-2000, so that ‘the federal administration entering in December 2000 could have at its disposal more judgement elements about the former’ (Levy and Rodríguez, 2004:337). Indeed, on the basis of the evidence and positive opinions that the IDB and the WB would also offer about PROGRESA, the incoming president Fox and his team decided to keep the programme in place (Levy, 2006; Teichman, 2007). Although they eventually introduced some changes and a different label (Oportunidades), PROGRESA’s basic features were preserved. These included the need to carry out evaluations in a systematic, objective, and impartial way.

Around the same time PROGRESA was being implemented, Levy and his team at SHCP were also working on the introduction of the so-called Reglas de Operación de Programas Sociales (ROPS, or Rules for Managing Social Programmes). PROGRESA was the government’s main anti-poverty programme, but there were other social programmes that distributed resources to the poor. According to Levy (2006:14):

At least among some policymakers there was a sense that these programs had generated corruption; that there were large deviations of benefits for unintended purposes (for example, subsidized maize flour intended for tortilla consumption would be exported or used for animal feed instead); and that the roster of beneficiaries of targeted programs in urban areas had been manipulated for political gain.

In response to this, the budget decree of December 1997 established for the first time that all programmes in the Ramo 26 would be subject to a new set of rules (Diario Oficial, 1997; Fuentes, 2009:8-9). The Ramo 26 (or budget category 26) included social development and antipoverty programmes. According to the budget decree, the ROPS:

should be clear and transparent, and their mechanism for operation and administration should facilitate the regular evaluation of [the programmes’] economic and social benefits in their assignation and application, and ensure the coordination of actions with other ministries and agencies to avoid duplications in the use of resources […] (Diario Oficial, 1997).

As in the case of PROGRESA’s evaluation component, the ROPS aimed to increase transparency and accountability in the use of public resources, which was the main concern

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72 The ROPS are usually built around the following components (Fuentes, 2009:12-13): presentation and background; objectives; general guidelines (such as target population, kind of aid, beneficiaries, and selection criteria); specific guidelines (institutional coordination); reporting schedule; monitoring and evaluation requirements; and complaints procedure.
for SHCP officials. Furthermore, by introducing the practice of evaluation and measurement of results in other social programmes, officials tried to show Congress they were really committed to the efficient and legal use of public subsidies. According to Levy (2006:103), the ROPS ‘substantially reduce the discretion of program operators in the process of beneficiary selection, which had been subject to strong criticism in the past’. Lastly, SHCP officials also sought to provide ‘additional judgement elements for the debate’ regarding how public resources were addressing ‘social and rural development demands’ (Levy, 2004:711).

The ROPS had not been inspired in similar initiatives abroad. They responded to concerns about the inefficient and politicised use of social programme resources. As part of this effort, by the end of the Zedillo administration the ROPS of 135 federal programmes had been published (Levy, 2004). As it will be further discussed in Chapter 6, the introduction of the ROPS as a regular component of the budget decree would certainly have very important implications for development of MFR in Mexico. Jointly with PROGRESA’s evaluation component, the ROPS eventually led Mexican officials to engage in further cross-national learning activities during the 2000s.

**Conclusions**

Performance, results, transparency, and accountability were all terms which gained currency during the Zedillo administration (1994-2000). In many respects, their coming of age was a product of the country’s political democratisation process, including the ‘divided government’ of 1997. The federal Congress’ regained autonomy and increased power would certainly contribute to put these topics in the centre of executive-legislative exchanges. However, the reform initiatives advanced by the Zedillo government did not represent a response to congressional pressures. Senior officials, and the president himself, understood that the country’s political conditions were changing in a radical way. Past policymaking patterns, particularly those associated with the Salinas administration, were no longer appropriate. The use of public resources and social programmes in a democratic environment required different administrative principles and routines. Indeed, president Zedillo and his senior officials addressed these topics since 1994, not 1997.
Moreover, while the country’s political legacies and democratisation process pointed at the need to change how government worked, it was international MFR developments which provided senior officials with ideas on how to design those changes. Of course, not all initiatives (e.g. the NEP and the rules for social programmes inserted in the annual budget decrees) originated in cross-national learning. However, most did to some extent. Thus, administrative modernisation, budgetary reform, and impact evaluation proposals were heavily informed by experiences which had taken place abroad. Policymakers used concepts and techniques associated with contemporary NPM reforms, as well as more general evaluation principles employed internationally. Senior officials took part in OECD meetings and were often in touch with international organisations representatives. Yet they did not face external pressures to follow specific models or tools.

Mexican policymakers also developed some strategies to advance MFR policy changes. José Octavio López-Presa, Jorge Chávez-Presa, and Santiago Levy were relatively effective ‘policy entrepreneurs’. All of them managed to introduce their respective MFR-related initiatives in the government’s agenda. Furthermore, they were able to provide a more or less coherent ‘conceptualisation’ on each of these topics. Yet not all of them were equally capable to secure the future of the tools they so eagerly promoted. Both López-Presa and Chávez-Presa left their original government positions barely a few months after their reform initiatives were enacted. The only different story was that of PROGRESA’s impact evaluation. This was supervised by Santiago Levy and other SHCP officials from start to finish, and achieved a high level of legitimacy and consolidation.

Therefore, while MFR ideas came of age during the Zedillo administration, by the end of the presidential term not all MFR tools were working as expected. Because there was no previous experience on the subject, ‘performance indicators’ ended up being ‘either too rudimentary, or too favourable, so that agencies could justify how they were doing things (IM2). Evaluation practices remained as rather unhelpful ‘self-praising’ exercises (Pardo, 2003:198). Furthermore, SECODAM and SHCP frequently clashed over methodological, logistical, and other aspects. Thus, as it had happened in Chile, after an initial round of reforms, MFR had had a rather limited impact on Mexico’s public sector.
Part Three

Institutionalisation and Dissemination of the Chilean and Mexican ‘Management for Results’ Models

(2000-2010)
To be successful, a policy transfer must pass several hurdles. It must be capable of adoption through the political system. Once adopted, it must be effective (that is, it must successfully address the problem it is expected to solve in the recipient country), and it must be capable of survival (that is of sustained support to enable it to continue to exist and to operate effectively).

Harold Wolman, ‘Understanding Cross National Policy Transfers’

The adoption of a lesson is not the end of the learning process. Once introduced, a lesson will evolve. It generates feedback that can signal the need to adapt it to deal with problems that were not initially anticipated. If the response generates political satisfaction, then as time goes by what was once a lesson from abroad will become an established commitment of your national government.

Richard Rose, Learning From Comparative Public Policy

And when there are no endorsed or endorsable models there is no other thing that utopia or cynicism, sometimes disguised of historical effectiveness pragmatism disguised of the virtue of prudence.

Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, Asesinato en el Comité Central
‘A Success Story’:
The Making and Dissemination of the Chilean ‘Management for Results’ System
(2000-2010)

DIPRES: Acronym that identifies the Dirección de Presupuestos [Budget Office] […]. Through the expansion of its faculties and the powerful management control instruments it currently possess, as well as its highly qualified technical personnel, Dipres has slowly acquired a political relevance bigger to what could be expected from a simple accounting function. It is said that the director of Dipres is a wise man or know-it-all guy, and, in any case, a powerful actor within government, and also that other Ministries are scared when they need to face their [Dipres] counterpart.

It is of traditional use the expression ‘I will have to go on a pilgrimage to Dipres’.

Alfredo Joignant, Francisco Javier Díaz, and Patricio Navia, Diccionario de la Política Chilena

I have always said that Chile could do more for the Bank than the Bank for Chile.

Senior Official, Inter-American Development Bank

Now with the new government it is being said that our interest lies in ‘results’, and therefore that the key is to make institutions focus on their strategic objectives, their indicators, and then we will measure those. But... we already used to do that!

Middle-level Official, Ministry Secretary General of the Presidency

In a 2003 report on Chile’s budgetary system, the OECD remarked that the country’s MFR scheme could be seen as ‘a success story’ (Blöndal and Curristine, 2004:44). This represented a striking contrast to how things stood at the end of the 1990s (see Chapter 3). During 2000-2010, Chilean government officials were capable of institutionalising a more
or less coherent MFR ‘system’, which could provide DIPRES with valuable performance information for the making of budgetary decisions (Guzmán, 2005, 2011; Zaltsman, 2009; Arenas and Berner, 2010). Moreover, the Chilean system could be considered a ‘success’ because it was the most developed in the Latin American region (Cunill and Ospina, 2003; Zaltsman, 2006; García and García, 2011). However, the OECD’s assessment was a bit of an overstatement. It was offered at a very early stage, at a time in which evidence about the system’s effectiveness was limited, and information regarding its shortcomings was still sparse.

This chapter will analyse the Chilean MFR reforms between 2000 and 2010, particularly the new Sistema de Evaluación y Control de Gestión (SECG, or Evaluation and Management Control System) assessed by the OECD. It will discuss the foundations of the system, how it related to previous initiatives, and the tools it added to the Chilean MFR policy. The chapter will briefly touch on other changes introduced in 2010, such as the creation of the so-called ‘Delivery Unit’, and the unit for social policy evaluations within the new Ministry of Social Development. As in previous chapters, the discussion will explore the extent to which these changes were associated with cross-national learning and how.

The chapter will show that in this period Chilean policymakers continued to use knowledge about MFR practices abroad. Yet they did so in a slightly different way than in the 1990s. International examples from countries like the UK continued providing useful ideas about how to design new MFR tools (e.g. the Comprehensive Spending Evaluations, or the Delivery Unit). Yet for most of the decade, learning about MFR abroad would be mainly related to policymakers’ efforts to redesign existing tools on the basis of international ‘benchmarks’.

The chapter also explores the strategies developed by Chilean officials to support MFR policy changes. Again, these showed both continuities and interesting changes with regards to the previous decade. Under the leadership of Mario Marcel, DIPRES launched an overhaul of the performance management tools introduced in the 1990s. These were reconceptualised under a new SECG, coordinated by a similarly new División de Control de Gestión (DCG, or Division for Management Control). In addition, Marcel and his colleagues developed other strategies to ensure the visibility and longer term survival of the SECG. These included participating in international seminars; publishing several
institutional reports on the SECG’s features; and asking international organisations, such as the OECD, to evaluate the system.

Throughout this second decade of reforms, national factors continued to influence MFR policy changes, but in a different way and not as heavily as other factors. That Marcel could use DIPRES institutional authority and power to further advance MFR government-wide was undoubtedly very important. But of equal or even more relevance were two further factors. International organisations provided Chilean policymakers with a ‘stamp of approval’, both through their positive evaluations on the state of the SECG, and the regional dissemination of the ‘Chilean MFR model’. Furthermore, the continued presence of Marcel and members of his team throughout 2000-2010 ensured that learning from previous reform experiences would be taken into account when developing this new round of MFR reforms.

The following pages will be divided into five sections. The first one will describe how DIPRES officials redesigned the performance management tools implemented in previous years, and how they sought to create a ‘system’ more closely associated with the process of budgetary policymaking. The second section will then show how and why DIPRES officials tried to ‘spread the word’ about the newly created SECG; and how they secured the endorsement of international organisations. The third section will analyse how and why the latter became increasingly interested in the Chilean ‘model’; it will then present the channels used for its international diffusion. The fifth section will briefly explore what happened to the SECG after Marcel’s departure from DIPRES in 2006, including references to president Sebastián Piñera’s initiatives on MFR at the beginning of his administration in 2010. The chapter will close with some concluding points.

‘Something That Was Like Loose Pieces’:
Institutional Changes, Conceptual Refinements, and the new SECG

Despite the efforts made throughout the 1990s, at the beginning of president Ricardo Lagos’ administration the Chilean government did not possess a set of well-working performance management tools. However, in 2000 the situation started to change significantly. Officials within DIPRES set in motion a number of initiatives to establish a new MFR ‘system’: the Sistema de Evaluación y Control de Gestión (SECG, or Evaluation and Management Control System). Between 2000 and 2002, the existing performance management tools were revamped, and new evaluation tools were added. All under a
framework which also sought to strengthen the use of performance information in the making of budgetary policy. The creation of the SECG was supported by two important factors. From a politico-institutional perspective, the process was backed up by Mario Marcel’s ‘triumphal return’ as Head of DIPRES (IC21)\textsuperscript{73}, one of Chile’s most powerful institutions\textsuperscript{74}. From an intellectual perspective, the introduction of the SECG had as a background the lessons previously learned by Marcel. These were further complemented by analyses of recent international MFR experiences with the aim of ‘fine-tuning’ the new system.

The design of the new SECG, and the weight its MFR components slowly gained during the Lagos administration, were partly associated with the economic-political environment of the times. Whereas, the Aylwin and Frei administrations had enjoyed economic prosperity, president Lagos faced an economic recession which had been triggered by the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. Furthermore, because of the rather erratic way in which the Ministry of Finance and the Budget Office had managed the economy during those years, they ‘had lost authority with the Executive and the Legislative’ (Guzmán, 2008:32). These institutions thus needed to reposition themselves to ‘meet pressures from other ministries and sectors’\textsuperscript{75}.

More importantly, Lagos was a well-known and widely respected politician, but also the first president from the Socialist Party (\textit{e.g.} the party of the formerly deposed president Allende). Therefore, his government needed to send clear signals about his commitment to a responsible management of the state’s finances (Guzmán and Marcel, 2008:310). During the following years, Marcel would thus lead a number of significant policy changes. These included the creation of a ‘structural surplus rule’. This established the budget should have an annual 1\% GDP surplus to counter ‘the strong volatility that had

\textsuperscript{73} As mentioned in Chapter 3, Marcel had already been Head of DIPRES for a few months in 1996 in an interim capacity.

\textsuperscript{74} According to Aninat \textit{et al}. (2008:180), ‘perhaps the constitutional provisions that best reflect the strong powers vested in the presidency are those governing the budget process. The formal rules governing the budget process give strong powers to the executive, making Chile one of the countries with the most hierarchical budget institutions in Latin America. The constitutional responsibility for the financial administration of the state belongs to the president via the finance minister, assisted by the budget director’.

\textsuperscript{75} Guzmán and Marcel (2008:309) note that, in the late nineties, ‘fiscal accounts finished a surplus trend which had existed since the middle of the 80s decade in order to incur in a deficit which in 1999 grew up to 2.5\% of the GDP. The absence of measurements which could allow an estimation of how much of that damage was associated with the effects of the Asian crisis and how much to policy decisions paved the way to questions about the management of fiscal policy and doubts about the strength of Chile’s public finances’.
historically characterised public finances in Chile’ (Guzmán and Marcel, 2008:309; Marcel and Tokman, 2002; Blöndal and Curristine, 2004).

*DIPRES* also needed to improve the efficiency of public spending. According to a former senior official, ‘there was an important difference with respect to the nineties decade, simply because the Lagos administration began with a significantly lower amount of public resources to those which had been available before’ (IC28; Marcel, 2006:4). From Marcel’s perspective, MFR initiatives seemed to be an appropriate means to achieve those purposes. As discussed in Chapter 3, he had championed the use of MFR tools. Moreover, he had always been convinced that performance/results information should be used in the making of budgetary decisions.

As Head of *DIPRES*, Marcel enjoyed the authority to lead an internal reorganisation to strengthen the links between performance information and the budget cycle. According to a former *DIPRES* senior official:

> What we did was to review the way we were discussing the budget, the key points and people who participated, and the contents and inputs used in these discussions. We started to change the internal procedures of *DIPRES*. Then we started to change the way in which we worked with the ministries and with Congress. The interesting thing is that, as opposed to what other countries had done, we started from asking ourselves how to take advantage of performance information (IC30).

After consulting the Finance Minister and obtaining his approval, Marcel created a new *División de Control de Gestión* (*DCG*, or Division for Management Control) inside *DIPRES* (IC28). This provided a means to underline the regained relevance of MFR as an important topic. But above all, it represented a functional response to internal issues which had previously affected the functioning of performance management tools. One official remarks, for example, that:

> Before 2000, *DIPRES* did not use the information from indicators or evaluations. Each budgetary sector was ‘a true feud’, with its own practices and routines. It was just very difficult to have access to those groups. It is in that respect that we started to change things. We managed to make budgetary sector experts use the information produced by the other unit of *DIPRES*, which related to the performance and evaluations of central government institutions (IC26).

76 ‘There is a significant institutional strengthening [of MFR aspects] through the creation of a special unit in the Budget Office of the Ministry of Finance’ (Guzmán and Marcel, 2008:319).
The new unit was in charge of designing and implementing a new framework to strengthen the links between performance information and budgetary decisions. As head of the new DCG, Marcel appointed Marcela Guzmán. She had managed the Education Ministry’s performance management system during the late 1990s, and joined DIPRES with a ‘very critical vision’ and the desire to introduce ‘big technical, conceptual, and operational changes’ (IC14).

The new SECG resulted from the combination of a revised version of MFR tools used in the 1990s, and some new evaluation instruments. Marcel and Guzmán decided to separate the performance indicators from the PMGs. As mentioned in Chapter 3, since 1998 the indicators had become part of the PMGs. Yet the merger of these two instruments had not been successful. Thus, performance indicators became once again a self-standing tool, and were attached to DIPRES’s budget proposals as it had originally been the case (Guzmán, 2005:19). The DCG also revamped the formats and procedures of the Balances de Gestión Integral (BGIs, or General Management Reports; Guzmán and Marcel, 2008:319). Thereafter, the BGIs included information about agency performance levels and results, in an effort to increase their usefulness for accountability purposes.

In addition, Marcel and Guzmán introduced significant changes to the PMGs. Despite serious limitations faced during its initial implementation in 1998-2000, these programmes could not be easily terminated because they had been established by law. Therefore, they tried to turn ‘a mechanism of goals self-setting and self-evaluation into a system of benchmarking for the public sector’ (Marcel, 2006:4; italics in original). The DCG thus changed the PMGs’ measurement focus from products to management systems, emphasising those which could be applied government-wide. According to a former DIPRES senior official:

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77 For a detailed perspective of the various tools that integrate the SECG see Guzmán (2005, 2011); Castro et al. (2009i); Arenas and Berner (2010); and Dussauge-Laguna (2012d).
78 Arenas and Berner (2010:24) remark that ‘[t]he BGIs that institutions prepared annually towards the end of the 90s generally did not include information about institutional management and analysis of results, which limited the usefulness and use of these informs’.
79 Guzmán (2005:77) remarked that during those years the PMGs mainly focused on ‘management objectives’, which nonetheless mostly ‘referred to routine activities of the institutions, centred in processes and little demanding goals’. This resulted in ‘commitments that could not be compared in terms of institutional relevance and exigency of its goals, causing that dissimilar effort levels would obtain the same compensation’.
Marcel said, ‘Let’s review the existing modernisation initiatives, those which have been implemented in previous years’. Some of these had been enacted through legal changes, some through presidential decrees. But no one really knew whether they were being actually followed or not. So he said, ‘Let’s structure something in a way that institutions will really join the programme’. And then we started to revise what had been previously done. We could not modify the law, because there was no time for that (IC14).

As a result, the focus of the PMGs turned to administrative capacities, and particularly areas such as human resources (e.g. training and performance evaluation); quality of service (e.g. procedures for public complaints); and financial administration (e.g. tendering processes and financial systems; Guzmán, 2005, 2011; Arenas and Berner, 2010). For each of these topics, DIPRES and individual agencies would negotiate a set of institutional targets. Then, according to the degree in which these annual targets were achieved, public servants would receive (or not) salary increases during the following fiscal year.

Marcel and Guzmán also introduced new MFR tools. The Definiciones Estratégicas (strategic definitions) focused on the institutional mission and objectives of ministries and agencies. This tool sought to reinforce the use of performance indicators. Then, in addition to the programme evaluations introduced in the second half of the 1990s (which were revised but kept in place), two new tools were added: Evaluaciones de Impacto (impact evaluations), and Evaluaciones Comprehensivas del Gasto (comprehensive spending evaluations). According to interviewees, these tools originated in DIPRES officials’ awareness that programme evaluations did not produce enough information about final programme effects, nor about the overall institutional performance of ministries (IC20; IC29). A former senior official remarks, for instance, that ‘along the way, we faced the need to address different questions, and therefore we needed to plan different types of evaluation procedures’ (IC25). Another remarked that:

There are always questions which cannot be fully answered because one would need to evaluate the whole organisation. It is a limitation of programme evaluations. It does not matter which methodology is being used. Therefore, we wanted a line of evaluation which could give us a broader perspective on the organisation, particularly in terms of its strategic coherence (IC20).

The new impact evaluations tried to address ‘the lack of reliable information about final results or impacts on beneficiaries’ (Arenas and Berner, 2010:30). The so-called comprehensive spending evaluations focused in the set of programmes and policies which fall under the responsibility of a given ministry. Then, the objective was that DIPRES
evaluated ‘the strategic coherence between institutional and sector objectives, institutional design (institutional structure and distribution of functions among different work units), production and management processes, use of financial resources and results obtained from the provision of goods and services’ (Arenas and Berner, 2010:32). Table 5.1 below summarises the tools part of the new SECG:

Table 5.1
The Chilean SECG
(2000-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the tool</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Definitions</td>
<td>Provide information about the guiding axes of an organisation’s workload. Derived from strategic planning exercises, or collectively produced analyses. Information includes agency’s mission, strategic objectives, strategic products (goods and/or services), and clients, users, or beneficiaries (Arenas and Berner, 2010:18).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Indicators</td>
<td>Provide quantitative information regarding levels of institutional achievement/results in the delivery of products (goods or services). They involve quantitative or qualitative aspects. They establish a relationship between two or more variables, which in comparison to previous periods, similar products, or goals allows evaluating performance (Guzmán, 2005:19).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmes for Management Improvement</td>
<td>They set the basis for linking levels of annual achievement in institutional goals, and increases in remuneration for public servants within a given agency for the following year. The PMGs are embedded in a set of areas of management improvement, which are common to all public sector institutions (Guzmán, 2005:77-78).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Management Reports</td>
<td>It is a management report mainly structured around: a brief presentation of the institutional performance during the previous year; relevant information about the institution, so that public opinion, analysts, other public services, and Congress can identify it; challenges for the current year (Guzmán, 2005:113).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Evaluations</td>
<td>Identify programmes’ objectives and analyse the consistency between the latter and the same programmes’ design and results. Evaluations initiate with the elaboration of a logical framework, which covers the different levels of objectives, through the identification of final goals (general objectives), specific objectives for each programme component, main activities, and corresponding performance indicators (Guzmán, 2005:45).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Evaluations</td>
<td>Measure a programme’s impact on beneficiaries. This usually implies developing surveys on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. These allow evaluating intermediate and final results, through the use of quasi-experimental methodologies, control groups and baselines (Arenas and Berner, 2010:30).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Spending Evaluations</td>
<td>These are evaluations of institutional coverage, which aim to evaluate the institution’s design, key management processes, results, and use of resources in the provision of strategic products (goods and services). It uses information on government priorities, strategic definitions, data about beneficiaries/users/clients, and costs associated with the provision of institutional products (Guzmán, 2005:49).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author based on Guzmán (2005); and Arenas and Berner (2010).
Apart from all these changes, two important additions were the introduction of the term ‘system’, and a closer association between MFR tools and budgetary policymaking. While Marcel’s writings had already referred to this topic, during the 1990s the emphasis had been set on modernisation, results, and indicators. However, since 2000 DIPRES officials started to talk about the SECG as the basis of a ‘performance-based budgeting system’. According to a former senior official:

In the nineties things were mostly about indicators, evaluations, and improving the budget. But no label was attached to those tools yet. In 2000, we started to talk about a ‘system’, I think because we were reading some literature which was linking everything in a more holistic way. But also because when these things started it was all rather an experiment. When we began this, the topic was already referred to as ‘performance-based budgeting’ around the world, but for us it was more partial. We did not have the security that the system (which actually was not a system yet!) could have a name, because it was all loose pieces. Therefore no one had the descaro (‘cheekiness’), the courage to put such a label to something that was like loose pieces, which kind of evolved, but then would get stalled, and which did not have the character it would later acquire. The differences between the period before 2000 and after 2000 are abysmal in every sense, technically, conceptually, institutionally. What existed before was not enough to be called a ‘system’ (IC20).

From a technical perspective, there certainly were significant differences in the design and number of MFR tools employed. But in terms of policy ‘labelling’, the modifications were equally important. By talking about a ‘performance-based system’, Marcel and Guzmán made an effort to stress the coherence of their reform efforts. Furthermore, as it is discussed below, they also contributed to facilitate its future international dissemination.

The impetus for creating the new MFR ‘system’ came from two main sources. As it has been suggested, most of the changes were a result of the experience accumulated during the previous years. Marcel (but Guzmán and other officials at the new DCG as well) had participated in the design and implementation of the first round of MFR tools. They thus had a good understanding of their potential uses and, above all, their practical limitations. Therefore, in many ways the new SECG was a product of ‘learning by doing’. Indeed, in the following years practical experience would become an important source of information for adjusting the system and its various tools. According to the same former official:

In each cycle, one would see what worked and what did not, because the thing about these systems is that they are repetitive. Therefore, in one cycle one could detect problems which one could change for the other cycle. This can always be done better. In every cycle one learns something, reading on one’s own, talking to the team members, who also identify problems. Then you decide to change, to redact things differently. Furthermore, we used to carry out surveys among actors. In some processes, we would ask things to evaluators, and people coordinating the programmes. Every year we would
analyse this information and we would improve these processes, in order to homogenise concepts. We conducted lots of revisions and self-evaluations, and incorporated changes (IC20).

But if learning from experience acquired a prominent place in the process of (re)designing the SECG, learning from abroad still played a significant role even if not as clearly or directly as in previous years. During this period one cannot find an equivalent to the trip to the UK which Marcel and his advisors made in the 1990s. Nor were there many explicit country mentions among interviewees who were directly involved in the reforms of those years. In fact, one interviewee said that, ‘what I obtained from my visits to the OECD was the impression that what we were doing was in agreement with international developments on the subject’ (IC28).

On the other hand, the documents that DIPRES produced since 2000 to describe the SECG and performance-based budgetary practices in Chile do show that officials continued looking at international trends in these subjects. For instance, in comparing two papers on the SECG prepared by Guzmán in 2002 and 2005, one can notice that the latter explicitly mentions the experiences of leading NPM countries. It also includes several bibliographical references on international reforms; elaborates on conceptual issues related to performance information in budgetary policy-making based on the international literature; and explicitly frames the Chilean experience in wider international debates on the subject. For example, Guzmán (2005:16) remarks that, ‘[t]he process initiated in Chile contains much of the elements and features of other important processes which have been experienced by different countries, particularly regarding the role of budgetary institutions, and the evaluation and control instruments which are used’.

Furthermore, knowledge about international MFR practices was gathered from other sources. In the early 2000s, Professor Allen Schick visited Chile. An expert in international performance management and budgetary reform discussions, Schick participated in seminars and meetings with Marcel, Guzmán, and the members of the DCG (IC28). Then, between October 2002 and September 2003, Guzmán was seconded to the Budget and Management División, at the OECD in Paris. She participated in various research activities, including the drafting of the ‘Performance Information in the Budget Process Questionnaire’, which was later applied to OECD countries (Curristine, 2005).
Thus, during 2000-2006 DIPRES officials used knowledge about international MFR developments in at least two other ways: as inspiration, in the case of the comprehensive spending evaluations; and as a ‘benchmark’ to which Chilean performance tools could be compared, with the aim of fine-tuning them afterwards. In the first case, a former senior official states that, ‘we have heard that the British government was developing comprehensive spending reviews. I remember we tried to even contact them to know the methodology before starting our own’ (IC20). In the end, Chilean officials were not able to get in touch with British officials. However, they still looked online for the formats and questions asked as part of the spending reviews. DCG officials then combined this information with their own ideas, and developed the comprehensive spending evaluations eventually implemented (IC25).

Because of their participation in numerous international forums, Chilean officials were also able to compare their MFR tools with those used elsewhere. On the basis of these comparisons, they made adjustments, even if sometimes of a rather marginal nature. A good example is provided by a former DIPRES senior official:

> From time to time there would be international meetings about, say, how to face methodological issues. But this is very much a matter of very marginal improvements. I mean, it is not like you triggered a revolution. In practice, what you did was to look at other experiences, to validate that whatever you were doing was done properly. In some occasions what happened is that you would go and say, ‘oh, look, there is a PART [Program Assessment Rating Tool]’, because I went to a meeting in which the OMB [US Office of Management and Budget] presented the PART. Then I went back to Chile and told the staff, ‘hey, there is something called PART, please have a look at it, check the questions, and see if there is anything we could add to our programme evaluations’. And then they would tell me, ‘well, we are missing the questions about participation’, and I would say, ‘OK, let’s include those’, and that’s it. As I tell you, this is a matter of small improvements. That is kind of the logic we followed (IC25).

Therefore, since 2000 learning from abroad did not necessarily have the same central place or purposes it previously had. Yet it still seems to have been a relevant source of inspiration and information for DIPRES officials.

Learning (from experience and from abroad) was essential for (re)designing and consolidating the new SECG, but the reform process was not free from political conflicts. On the contrary, during the first half of the Lagos administration Marcel and his team frequently clashed with other institutions, particularly MINSEGPRES. In providing an assessment of the reforms, Waissbluth (2005:12) remarks that in those years ‘the permanent anecdote has been one of conflicts and lack of coordination between both institutions’.
Inter-institutional conflicts came from two main sources. Despite the limitations that MINSEGPRES’s Sistema de Metas Ministeriales had faced (see Chapter 3), the monitoring system remained in place. In fact, it had been re-launched in 2000 as a new Sistema de Seguimiento de la Programación Gubernamental (SSPG, or System for Monitoring Government Programming; Zaltsman, 2006).

However, in introducing the new SECG, DIPRES automatically created a competing mechanism to MINSEGPRES’s system. Agencies would need to agree performance targets and goals with both central ministries. The underlying logic and focus of both instruments were different (e.g. one focused on political strategy, the other on budgetary policymaking). Yet agencies eventually paid more attention to DIPRES’ requirements, which were tied to budget allocations (IC12; IC18). A former MINSEGPRES senior official remarked that the implementation of the SECG tools seemed to have gradually led towards ‘la dictadura de Hacienda’ (‘Finance’s dictatorship’; IC19). Another interviewee similarly spoke of ‘la Dipresiación del Estado’ (‘the process of Dipresiation of the state’, playing with the terms DIPRES and depreciation; IC15).

Further inter-ministerial conflicts originated in the attempts of both institutions to control the wider administrative modernisation agenda. Given the relevance this subject acquired during the Frei administration, president Lagos established a Programa de Reforma y Modernización del Estado (PRYME, or Programme for the Reform and Modernisation of the State). The PRYME included topics such as electronic government, public participation, regionalisation, and transparency (Ramírez, 2004; DIPRES, 2005f; Araya and Barría, 2008; Figueroa et al., 2011). It thus emphasised a focus on ‘state’ rather than ‘managerial’ reforms (IC6; IC19).

President Lagos had considered it would better to leave the leadership of the modernisation agenda to MINSEGPRES. According to a former senior official, ‘president Lagos thought DIPRES was always going to privilege its own corporate interests (that is the financial, budgetary ones). Therefore, he liked the idea of introducing a counterweight’. However, Marcel and his team were keen on consolidating the SECG. They also wanted to lead changes in other areas beyond MFR (e.g. civil service reform). In fact, through the new PMGs, Marcel and Guzmán were de facto promoting a number of modernisation lines (e.g. human resources, strategic planning, financial administration, quality of service). They
thus were reluctant to accept MINSEGPRES’ formal leadership. According to a former MINSEGPRES senior official:

In 2002, there were changes in MINSEGPRES’ senior leadership positions. The new appointees said, ‘we are not going to keep arguing about this issue with DIPRES’. And then the PRYME was dismembered. The topic of decentralisation went to SUBDERE\(^{80}\), the topic of participation to SEGEGOB\(^{81}\), and in MINSEGPRES remained some things such as administrative procedures, electronic government, and transparency. The label PRYME was kept formally. But in fact the responsibility over reform topics was reallocated (IC23).

The same former official adds that, ‘Mario Marcel had much more power in the Lagos government than with Frei, when he already was rather powerful. And in the end he was the winner on these disputes’ (IC23). Thus, although not without problems, DIPRES was able to keep control over the main modernisation topics of the Lagos administration. These included the MFR agenda and the civil service reforms which took place in the mid-2000s (Marcel, 2002a; Valdés, 2002)

The political dimension of MFR also related to the role that Congress should play regarding the reforms. Marcel and his team sought to ensure DIPRES’ control over MFR reforms, as much as they tried to secure broader political support to guarantee the SECG’s long-term sustainability. According to a former senior official:

Our approach with Congress was to go two steps ahead of Congress. We did not want to let Congress take us by surprise. We wanted to ensure it was us who set the agenda to work with Congress. And then we would seek to bring them on board. The first step was when we adopted the OECD code on budgetary transparency. And why was that necessary? Because the huge disequilibrium that existed in Chile between the Executive and Congress was something which could not be sustained for a long time. We also thought that we needed to build certain alliances, to gain trust, to obtain more political support through Congress in order to guarantee the sustainability of the reforms [the SECG] in the longer term (IC30).

Therefore, for Marcel and his team, the institutionalisation of the SECG was not only necessary to establish modern results-based budgetary practices in the Chilean public sector. In addition, it was a means to involve Congressmen in the task of monitoring public sector performance and promoting accountability (IC9).

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\(^{80}\) Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo, or Undersecretariat for Regional and Administrative Development, Ministry of Interior.

\(^{81}\) Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, or Ministry Government’s General Secretariat.
The MFR agenda thus regained prominence during the early 2000s. Previous reform initiatives provided Marcel and his team with very valuable experience, and became the foundation of a more ambitious set of MFR tools, more explicitly linked with budgetary policy-making. Cross-national learning played different but still significant roles. It provided officials with ideas for pursuing a more ‘systemic’ approach; inspired some of the MFR innovations (e.g. comprehensive spending evaluations); informed adjustments in some tools (e.g. programme evaluations); and overall served as a ‘benchmark’ to which Marcel, Guzmán, and the new DCG’s team compared the new MFR scheme. The result would be a more coherent ‘system’, which replaced the ‘loose pieces’ of the 1990s. Marcel’s powerful and skilful leadership allowed DIPRES to maintain government-wide control over MFR and other reform topics. This was further possible because Marcel and Guzmán were able to ‘show’ that the SECG’s was working well. Yet, for so doing, they had to develop other strategies, as described in the following section.

‘To Show the Things We Were Doing in Chile’: The Search for SECG’s International Legitimacy

Beyond institutional and operational improvements, Marcel and Guzmán were aware that the consolidation of the SECG depended upon guaranteeing its legitimacy. In order to contribute to that goal, they actively promoted the new system in numerous international meetings and through several DIPRES publications which described it in detail. Furthermore, they asked international organisations to evaluate the system and/or some of its components. As a result, by mid-2000s the Chilean SECG was well-known at the international level, and it was regularly featured in publications on MFR and related topics (Curristine, 2005; May et al., 2005; Zaltsman, 2006; Mackay, 2007; López-Acevedo et al., 2012).

The first strategy followed by DIPRES officials was to spread the word about the new Chilean system. This was done along two broad lines. First, Marcel and Guzmán (but also other officials) presented the SECG in several international meetings. According to a former DIPRES senior official,

At the beginning, in the 1990s, the point of going abroad was to obtain a broad perspective on these topics. But in the 2000s we started to travel in order to share experiences and listen to what other countries were doing. And we also travelled a lot to show the things we were doing in Chile. The
idea came from Mario Marcel, who had in mind that we needed to go out and talk about our progress. This was part of a communicational strategy, which I think was valid (IC20).

It is certainly possible to trace papers and presentations by Marcel, Guzmán, and other DIPRES officials (or at least their names on the agendas) in seminars and conferences during the period 2000-2006. In various occasions Marcel presented the Chilean experience at the OECD’s Senior Budget Officials meetings in Paris (IC30; Marcel, 2002b). Both Guzmán and Marcel delivered papers in international meetings sponsored by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo (CLAD, or Latin American Centre for the Administration of Development) (Guzmán, 2001, 2005b; Marcel, 2006). Guzmán participated in regional conferences on monitoring and evaluation organised by the WB and the IDB (May et al., 2006; López-Acevedo et al., 2010). Lastly, since 2003 the Chilean MFR system was regularly presented at the ‘Regional Budget Directors Meetings’ in Santiago, co-sponsored by ECLAC and OECD.

DIPRES officials also published many institutional documents to detail the features, objectives, partial achievements, and continuous adaptations of the SECG. According to the same former senior official, these publications aimed to:

Provide the SECG with legitimacy. We thought that if more and more people knew about it, we would secure it more. This was independently of anything you could do to make it better, update it, etc. Because obviously times change and there might be new things that are relevant. But the idea was that we needed to consolidate it. Thus, I understood it in this way: the more it was known, the more we wrote about it, the better. Therefore, every year we wrote a document about the progress we had achieved with the system. If delegations from other countries came to see us, we would hand them these documents. We also had, from early on, many things uploaded in DIPRES’ website, so that people could know about it. It was a question of transparency, of course, but also to legitimise the system (IC20).

Indeed, there are a number of articles by Marcel and Guzmán (or both), telling the story of the SECG82. Furthermore, up to this date DIPRES’ website dedicates a section to ‘Studies and Documents on the Control of Public Management’, where it is still possible to find papers about the SECG (Guzmán, 2002, 2003, 2005a; Arenas and Berner, 2010). From these documents, one can get an image of how the SECG has evolved across time, but also

82 In addition to those already cited, Marcel (2002); Guzmán and Marcel (2008); and Guzmán (2008).
of how DIPRES officials have sought to frame Chilean developments in broader international trends. For instance, Guzmán (2003:8) remarked that:

Clearly, the process that is taking place in Chile is following the direction taken in other countries. Though Budget Offices are responsible for drawing up and executing budgets, in recent years their role in public administration has changed substantially. One example has been the major and complex transformations in OECD countries, where new institutional arrangements have linked the budget with other management procedures, either encouraging or forcing public agencies to measure performance and evaluate results.

In a similar report two years later, Guzmán (2005:14) remarked there were ‘countries like England, New Zealand, Australia and Canada, which have introduced tools for improving budgetary processes and orient them towards results’. Moreover, she suggested the Chilean scheme ‘contains many of the elements and features of other important processes experimented by different countries, in particular those regarding the role of the budgetary institution, and the performance evaluation and control tools which are used’ (p. 17).

Another strategy followed by Marcel and Guzmán was to gain the support of international organisations. For that, they asked the latter to conduct evaluations of the various MFR tools DIPRES had set in place. A former senior official remarks that ‘we involved in as many international evaluation exercises as we could think of’ (IC20). Another former senior official notes that, ‘we asked international organisations specific things, but on the basis of our agenda, and in many cases using them as a sort of intermediary for what we wanted to achieve’ (IC30). Although DIPRES officials wanted to have a ‘sounding board’, in order to know whether they were making progress in the correct way, it seems as though they were mainly interested in legitimising their actions83. According to another former official:

> It was important for us to have an external view. And it was also important that DIPRES was evaluated just as the other agencies had been evaluated. Then we could have the moral authority to tell other agencies, ‘look, here we are all being evaluated’. That would then help us to legitimise our initiatives (IC5).

83 Mackay (2007:60) notes that ‘[t]he Chilean finance ministry’s careful stewardship of that country’s M&E system is exemplified by the review it commissioned the World Bank to conduct into the two principal evaluation components of the system […]. It commissioned this review partly to support the ongoing management and improvement of the M&E system and partly to apply the same standards of performance accountability to itself as it applies to sector ministries and the programs they manage […].’
Similar comments were offered by another former official, in this case regarding the WB’s evaluation of the PMGs (Banco Mundial, 2008):

I would say it was linked to two things. First, we wanted to see if we were doing this well, and given the busy daily routine one does not have time to see whether there is something better in the world in comparison to what one is doing. Then we thought that it was not completely fair that if all programmes were being evaluated, why DIPRES should not be evaluated as well? And we thought that setting the example was something good (IC25).

A first international evaluation took place in 2003. DIPRES ‘requested the OECD to carry out a review of the Chilean budgeting system in a similar fashion as it does for its member countries’ (Blöndal and Curristine, 2004:8). The OECD team analysed a number of topics. These included the budget formulation process; the features of the ‘structural budget surplus rule’; the annual budget cycle; the role of the legislature in budgetary policymaking; and recent public sector management reforms. Moreover, roughly a third of the report was dedicated to discussing the main characteristics, advantages and limitations of the Chilean MFR system established in 2000. The OECD review noted that the ‘Ministry of Finance has a highly developed albeit complex system for obtaining information on the performance of agencies’ (p. 32); that there were ‘concerns about the technical capacities of individual ministries to develop performance indicators’ (p. 42); and that ‘Congress has proven largely uninterested in examining performance information and using it in decision making’ (p. 43).

On the other hand, the review suggested that ‘[t]he Chilean approach to performance budgeting is a sensible one’ (p. 40). More importantly, it closed in a rather favourable note:

The Chilean Ministry of Finance has a highly advanced system for obtaining information on agency and programme performance. Over a ten-year period, this system has been developed and adjusted to take account of lessons learned and changing demands. The Ministry has adapted performance systems to address problems, many of which are common within OECD member countries and do not have easy or obvious solutions. Most importantly, the Ministry has proven willing to take a long-term approach and to persist with performance programmes.

Overall the Chilean performance system compares favourably with OECD member countries, especially in terms of the attention and priority given to performance information in the budget process. This system has combined the integration of performance information in the budget process with the sensible use of this information in decision making.

If there is a weakness in the Chilean system, compared with the best of OECD member country systems, it is that the performance system is so heavily centralised. As a long-term aim, it would be
desirable for agencies’ capacity to be built up so that they are a more equal partner in the decisions on indicators and measures (Blöndal and Curristine, 2004:43-44).

Despite its criticisms, the report concluded that, ‘to date this is a success story’ (p. 44).

A similar evaluation exercise was conducted in 2004. DIPRES officials asked the WB to review the SECG’s ‘Evaluation Programme’ component (Rojas et al., 2005). This included both the ‘Government Programme Evaluations’ in place since 1997; and the ‘Impact Evaluations’ introduced in 2001. The WB consultants assessed the structure and methodologies used by the Evaluation Programme; its daily functioning; the quality of its evaluation exercises; and the impacts they had had on decision-making processes within the Chilean government.

The report suggested that, ‘the use of evaluation on the part of the Congress seemed to have been limited in practice’ (p. 8). Similarly, it noted ‘a weak ownership of the EP [Evaluation Programme] on the side of senior executives in Agencies and Ministries’ (p. 16). Moreover, it stated that the quality of some evaluation reports was not up to international standards (p. 9); that some programmes’ logical frameworks had been designed only during the evaluation processes, but not before these as required; and that the Evaluation Programme ‘has yet to show the specific manner or degree in which it contributes to elevating the effectiveness and efficiency of public spending’ (p. 16).

However, as in the case of the OECD review, the WB’s evaluation was rather enthusiastic about the design and broader impacts of the Chilean evaluation mechanisms. The report noted that Chile had created an ‘evaluation factory’ (p. 19), and that the Evaluation Program was ‘robust and has achieved and continues to achieve impressive results’ (p. 18). Overall, the report concluded that:

DIPRES’ EP is already a notorious achievement. The experience of other countries, [sic.] indicates that systematic practices of evaluation have not been easy to implement and only in some cases have made an important (demonstrable) contribution to improving government. The experience of Chile’s DIPRES […] suggests that it has been possible to establish, in a relatively short time when compared to developed countries with a longer trajectory in evaluation oriented to improving the quality of spending, a complex and effective program which, according to the perceptions of its participants, the number and quality of the evaluations and, above all, its practical uses, produces good results and makes sure they are applied. As an international demonstration of a successful development, which is systematic and sustained, in a sea of lots of failures, interrupted experiences, or successes that are only partially so, the international community, and specially the countries of a similar level of
development, are looking with hope and are hoping to learn from the continuity and deepening of DIPRES’ EP (Rojas et al., 2005:18)\textsuperscript{84}.

A third international review took place in 2007. In that occasion, DIPRES officials requested the WB evaluated the Programas de Mejoramiento de Gestión (PMGs; Banco Mundial, 2008). By that time Marcel and Guzmán were no longer at DIPRES, but some of their former colleagues were in charge of the SECG\textsuperscript{85}. Overall, this review was less enthusiastic than the previous ones. In fact, the WB pointed at several limitations in the PMGs’ design and operation: the complexity of the programme increased ‘transaction costs’, and forced agencies to merely comply with procedures and requirements (p. 10); that PMGs followed an ‘homogeneous logic of implementation for heterogeneous needs and systems’ (p. 11); the various systems included in the PMGs did not interact properly (pp. 11-12); and that the participation of agencies/ministries could be more active (pp. 12-13). The report offered a number of recommendations to improve the PMGs’ design.

But even if this review was more critical and less enthusiastic than the previous two, WB consultants still remarked that the PMG was:

\begin{quote}

a multi-purpose programme that innovatively develops synergies between the policies and tools for human resources, management control and results-informed budgeting and administrative modernisation. Seen in the regional Latin American context, it is Chile’s merit to have found a path that ensures basic management capacity for its administration as a whole and makes real the alignment between written regulations and daily practices in ministries and agencies (Banco Mundial, 2008:5).
\end{quote}

The report also stressed that the way in which control mechanisms, management improvement tools, and budgetary decisions were linked in the PMGs ‘distinguished Chile, with excellence, from the Latin American countries and most OECD countries’ (p. 7).

These highly favourable reviews from international organisations were helpful for DIPRES officials in at least two ways. First, they offered valuable recommendations, most of which were taken into account for adjusting the SECG (IC20). Second, they contributed

84 A similar assessment was later provided by the WB’s consultant Keith Mackay (2007:28-29). He underlined that, ‘[t]his high utilization of M&E information is very impressive, and this alone makes Chile’s M&E system the strongest in Latin America and one of the strongest in the world. Chile has demonstrated that a whole-of-government M&E system can be built and operated at a relatively low cost’.

85 Alberto Arenas was Head of DIPRES, and had been Sub-Director for Efficiency and Public Service. Heidi Berner was the Head of the Management Control Division, and had previously been in charge of Impact Evaluations.
to increasing the system’s legitimacy in various fronts. According to a former official, ‘when you think that something that is working well should be maintained in place, one form of ensuring that is to use international organisations to support you’ (IC25). The OECD and WB evaluations showed that the MFR initiatives introduced by DIPRES since the mid-1990s were in tune with broader international trends. They also showed that the specific tools and methodologies included in the SECG were both appropriate and effectively implemented by DIPRES. Moreover, the reviews signalled DIPRES officials’ openness and disposition to be evaluated by external actors, just as they were using the SECG to evaluate ministries and agencies. Lastly, in combination with developments described in the following section, these reviews helped trigger the international prestige of the Chilean MFR reforms, and their positioning as a ‘model’ worthy of imitation.

‘Everyone Uses Everyone Else’:
The International Dissemination of the Chilean MFR Reforms

The international visibility of the Chilean SECG further increased during the second half of the 2000s. This was mainly (but not only) thanks to the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) support. Indeed, from 2005 onwards the dissemination of the Chilean system became something of a joint enterprise between DIPRES and IDB officials, as the latter were interested in promoting results-based budgeting practices in Latin America. The process followed several channels: from capacity building (training) activities with government officials from other countries, to the active participation of Chilean experts as consultants. The starting point of this collaboration could be traced back to May 16-17 2005. That date was considered important by some interviewees because it was then that the Chilean Ministry of Finance and several international organisations co-sponsored a seminar on the ‘Modernisation of Public Management in Chile’ (IIO3; IC28).

The main objective of the seminar was to discuss the findings produced by various studies on the Chilean government’s performance. These included the OECD budgetary review and the WB review of SECG’s Evaluation Programme discussed above. Also, other assessments which similarly praised Chile’s reformist efforts: a 2003 study of
decentralisation and fiscal federalism policies prepared by IDB staff (Wiesner, 2003); a 2003 ‘Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)’ (International Monetary Fund, 2003); a 2004 ‘Country Financial Accountability Assessment’, jointly prepared by the WB and the IDB (World Bank-IDB, 2004); and a study on the Chilean civil service system prepared by the IDB. The seminar showcased the country’s successful path to reform in various fronts, and underlined its potential to serve as regional ‘model’. As cited at the beginning of this chapter, a senior IDB official even thought that ‘Chile could do more for the Bank than the Bank for Chile’ (IIO3).

Indeed, during 2005 the IDB asked DIPRES to collaborate in a project for building MFR capacity in countries of the region (IC5). The IDB wanted that DIPRES trained officials from financial ministries on MFR tools, particularly those associated with budgetary policy-making (IC14). The IDB financed two rounds of training for officials from these countries, who then met with Guzmán and her team. DIPRES also provided participants with a number of publications on the SECG. These were prepared in advance with financial support from the IDB. A brief note included (with slight variations) at the front page of these publications said:

This book contains a set of technical and procedural documents that the Budget Office (DIPRES) of the Ministry of Finance of Chile has used in the past years to implement its system of evaluations of public programmes and institutions. Prepared by DIPRES, the documents are made available to the Program of Capacity Building for the Formulation and Management of Budget by Results, developed as part of the agreement on Regional Technical Cooperation of the Republic of Chile, through the Budget Office of the Ministry of Finance and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

This program benefits the national governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil [sic.], Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.

86 The study suggested that ‘[n]otwithstanding the unique characteristics of Chile’s decentralization policies, the country in its distinctive way is probably making more stable and effective decentralization progress than many others in Latin America’ (Wiesner, 2003:100).

87 The IMF document stated that ‘Chile has achieved a high level of fiscal transparency in many areas, and has recently made rapid process in closing remaining gaps. The authorities’ responsiveness to new demands—both from within Chile and from international markets—has been a particular facet of strength. / Chile’s main achievements include the government’s success in constructing and disseminating an unusually clear view of its objectives and targets, both at the macro level and for individual budget programs’ (International Monetary Fund, 2003:1).

88 The assessment stated that, ‘Chile scores high on financial management outputs in fiscal discipline, transparency and supporting efficiency in operations because underlying all financial management operations are clear rules, strict adherence to the rules, dedicated and qualified staff and management which rewards ethical and efficient behavior and there is a matching of responsibility with accountability given the decentralization of financial management to the service agencies’ (World Bank-IDB, 2004:ix).

89 As it will be discussed in Chapter 6, there were also some Mexican officials from SEDESOL. A former DIPRES senior official remarked, ‘I do not know how, but they heard about the meetings and asked the IDB to invite them’ (IC5).
Its objective is to develop among participant countries, the institutional capacity to generate and use in the budgetary process information related to the results of government actions, through the knowledge, analysis and diffusion of the Chilean experience in the implementation of its management control system under the concept of budget by results (DIPRES, 2005a:1).

The publications included a 500+ pages long document describing the Evaluation Programme (DIPRES, 2005a); a guide on the BGIs (DIPRES, 2005b); a paper on performance evaluation tools (DIPRES, 2005c); a guide to ‘performance indicators’ (DIPRES, 2005d); one about the stages, key actors, and institutional framework of the Chilean budgetary process (DIPRES, 2005e); an overview of administrative reform measures since the early 1990s (DIPRES, 2005f); a guide on the presentation of financial programmes (DIPRES, 2005g); and two case studies on the use of the management control and evaluation instruments in the telecommunications sector (DIPRES, 2005h), and in the oral health sector (DIPRES, 2005i).

Apart from these training sessions and the distribution of policy documents, DIPRES officials received a number of country delegations on a regular basis (IC20). These were usually led by representatives from the IDB or the WB, who wanted to show government officials how the Chilean experience worked in practice. The frequency of these meetings seems to have been considerable. According to a former DIPRES senior official, ‘every country wanted to learn about the Chilean experience. Sometimes it was boring, and I could not help but thinking about how much time I was spending with them’ (IC20). In some cases DIPRES officials would even meet with representatives from international organisations in consecutive weeks. According to the same former official, ‘we would ask them, “But did not we meet last week?”’, and they would reply, “No, that was with our colleagues from another unit”’ (IC20)⁹⁰.

The IDB also disseminated information about the Chilean MFR through other channels. According to an IDB senior official:

In some cases we were working on a project with a country and we would point at them the Chilean case as something relevant to be analysed, and the country would then go to Santiago. In other cases, the country already knew about the Chilean experience. They would then call us asking to go and see it directly. There were also cases in which the topic was mentioned during the meetings the IDB organises with the incoming government’s ministers, in which we discuss the most important topics for the development of their countries. And, in that context, I remember the case of Chile was presented in various occasions during the meetings (IIO3).

⁹⁰There are at least two units within the World Bank which actively produce documents on Chile: the ‘Latin America and Caribbean’ unit; and the ‘Poverty Reduction and Equity’ unit.
Then, information was further disseminated through the IDB’s ‘Program to Implement the External Pillar of the Medium Term Action Plan for Development Effectiveness’ (also known as PRODEV). This was established in 2005 ‘to enhance the effectiveness of the governments of the region and allow them to achieve better results in their development interventions’\(^\text{91}\). Among other activities, PRODEV supports training, seminars, publications and regional meetings, in which the Chilean experience is usually portrayed as a ‘model’ to be known and studied (IIIO4).

Last but not least, the dissemination of the Chilean MFR practices happened through the participation of former DIPRES officials in consultancy projects for Latin American governments. These consultancies have often been associated with PRODEV’s activities, and have thus been paid for by the IDB. Yet the involvement of Chilean experts in other nations’ modernisation activities actually preceded PRODEV. A former middle-level official referred to these consultancies as follows:

Since I left DIPRES, I have been doing lots of consultancies for the IDB. I did one for Uruguay, I was there one year. Basically our guide for performance indicators was included as part of the budget of Uruguay. Then most of the team members I met while in DIPRES had also worked on these topics for the Uruguayan government. Mario Marcel had previously travelled to advise them. I have also worked in Costa Rica, I have written some documents. All this usually financed by the IDB, but sometimes by the CLAD, the UNDP [United Nations Development Program]. In the particular case of the IDB, they were interested in people that had knowledge about the topic, but mainly from the perspective of the Chilean Ministry of Finance (IC21).

Other interviewees similarly stated that at some point they had been involved in consultancies or training activities in other Latin American countries, for which they had used knowledge and examples learned through their involvement in the Chilean reforms. According to a former senior official:

I will be going soon to advise the Ministry of Finance of [name of country]. But I think [name of other former DIPRES official] is also going at the same time to this country by invitation of another ministry. Therefore, I think we will be kind of competing against each other (IC25).

A relevant question is, of course, that related to why these organisations became interested about the Chilean experience in the first place. While the answer is not straightforward, there are some factors which contribute to explaining this. According to a

senior IDB official, Chile seemed to be relevant because other Latin American countries could learn from its experience in a relatively easy way:

For the Bank, the Chilean is a very useful experience for the countries of the region, because it is easier for them to recognise that experience than those of European countries, or from other continent, and even that of the United States. It is a country towards which they feel more comfortable, they understand their features, and it is a more transferable knowledge, easier to assimilate. Even if Chile is a very particular country, with specific political and institutional features that do not easily appear in the region (IIIO4).

As Chapter 6 will describe, this comment is certainly supported by the way in which the Chilean system became an important reference for Mexican policymakers during the second half of the 2000s.

Another related reason has to do with the agenda that the IDB was pursuing at the time. As mentioned above, the PRODEV had been launched in 2005 with the aim of advancing MFR in the region. In particular, reforms with a focus on performance-based budgeting. Given the SECG’s internal coherence and alleged success with regards to those aspects, the Chilean reforms were clearly useful for showing how MFR systems were feasible in Latin American countries. Indeed, less than a year after quitting the Chilean government, Marcel took up a senior position at the IDB, in the unit in charge of PRODEV.

Furthermore, at the time in which the Chilean MFR system was becoming institutionalised and was gaining international visibility, there were not many regional examples which could be seen as equally ‘successful’. Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, Costa Rica, among others, had all introduced performance-based initiatives since the early nineties (Cunill and Ospina, 2003; Zaltsman, 2006; García and García, 2011). Yet at that point none of those countries had consolidated a MFR government-wide ‘system’, which generated and used performance information on a regular basis.

Lastly, it should be noted that DIPRES’ MFR system was commonly viewed in the light of the political and economic reforms implemented in Chile during previous years. For example, Aninat et al. (2008:160) remark that the country enjoyed ‘a stable and very low level of price inflation, and its fiscal and monetary institutions have earned praise from

92 According to Zaltsman (2006:vii), ‘[m]ost of the [Latin American] systems have had the objective of promoting the use of M&E information and performance improvements by establishing budgetary or other institutional incentive mechanisms, but few have succeeded. The system that has accomplished most in this regard is Chile’s MCS [Management and Control System], which has set up a variety of incentives targeted both at the evaluated programs and agencies and at the budget decision-makers at the Ministry of Finance’
multilateral institutions, credit rating agencies, and international investors’. A similarly positive image could be obtained by looking at Chile’s place in Transparency International’s rankings; The Economist’s quality of life index; or OECD assessments about the country’s ‘governance institutions’ (Waissbluth, 2005; Marcel, 2002a; OECD, 2011). Thus, MFR reforms benefited from the environment in which they were embedded. According to a former official:

We produced documents which increased the visibility of the system. At the time, it was the only thing available, in writing, about how to translate management principles to the public sector, translated and written in easy steps, with a strong pedigree. This was combined with Chile’s trajectory of fiscal growth and transparency, as the country had been growing for many years, had a surplus, a small public sector, etc. Therefore, Chile was successful from any perspective. And then there was not much competition in Latin America, while we had done things properly (IC21).

Indeed, the senior IDB official similarly remarks that when the IDB’s The Politics of Public Policies (Stein et al., 2006) was published, it looked like ‘the report had been designed to showcase Chile’s performance. But that was not our intention; the report was based on abstract theories. Only the Chilean reality closely resembled the theory’ (IIO4).

Thus, while in the first half of the decade the Chilean MFR system that had been redesigned and promoted by DIPRES officials, and had been favourably assessed by the OECD and the WB, by the second half of the same decade it had become a regional ‘model’. To strengthen the SECG’s legitimacy, Marcel and Guzmán carefully sought the support of international organisations. The latter then turned to Chilean officials for developing consultancy projects and advancing an agenda of results-based practices among Latin American countries. As a former DIPRES senior official would remark, in the international dissemination of MFR ideas and practices ‘everyone uses everyone else’ (IC25).

‘A Cultural Change with a View on Results’: The Search for ‘Delivery’ Under a New Governing Coalition

After Marcel and Guzmán left DIPRES in early 2006, the question of whether the Chilean SECG was a truly ‘successful’ became particularly relevant. On the one hand, there seemed

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93 The report discussed how a number of institutional and policy features worked across Latin American countries (e.g. executive-legislative relationships; political party systems; bureaucratic structures; civil society actors; the policy process).
to be enough evidence to support claims about the system’s effectiveness and its contributions to improving policy and budgetary decisions (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012d). Furthermore, between 2006 and 2010, the general structure of the SECG barely changed. Even during the initial years of president Sebastián Piñera’s administration (2010-2014)

94, the SECG remained in place with only minor programmatic modifications, which pointed at its high degree of institutionalisation. On the other hand, observers flagged a number of significant criticisms about way the system worked. Moreover, the Piñera administration did introduce other initiatives, which might eventually affect the relative place of the SECG within the Chilean government’s MFR policy.

A number of scholarly assessments and documentary evidence provide support for the SECG’s positive aspects. For example, Castro et al. (2009i:593) remark the latter ‘is deeply embedded in the [public] institutions’, and has ‘created a common language regarding the control instruments and the evaluation criteria’. Similarly, Pliscoff (2008:17) states that, ‘PMGs have gradually, but effectively become part of the Chilean public management’s jargon and practices’. In a detailed assessment of the links between the SECG and budgetary decisions, Zaltsman (2009:460-461; italics in original) concluded that ‘while compared to the impact of other factors, the effects of performance-related considerations on the agencies’ funding levels may be small, M&E [monitoring and evaluation] assessments do often affect resource allocations’.

Reports produced by DIPRES and the WB provide further examples of how information from performance indicators and evaluation reports was used for redesigning, reallocating, or terminating public programmes (Guzmán, 2005; Rojas et al., 2005; Berner, 2009:170). A recent analysis by Olavarría (2012) suggests that the institutionalisation of evaluation practices has contributed to engaging public servants in the task of following up on their programmes’ functioning, results, and impacts. He notes that evaluations have created ‘spaces for reflection’ about the programmes’ performance, in which all relevant actors are involved. Lastly, several interviewees stressed that the introduction in Chile of MFR tools had certainly contributed to creating a ‘results-oriented’ culture among public servants.

94 The Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, a centre-left coalition, governed continuously from 1990 to 2010. However, in 2010 the Coalición por el Cambio, a coalition of parties from the right, won the elections.
With regards to the SECG’s institutionalisation, the efforts led during 2000-2006 by Marcel and Guzmán seem to have certainly contributed to successfully consolidate the system and its various tools. For instance, during the government of president Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) the only change introduced to the system was the addition of *Evaluaciones de Programas Nuevos* (EPN, or ‘Evaluations for New Programmes’). This tool sought to establish a ‘base line’ for the future evaluation of new public programmes’ impacts (Arenas and Berner, 2010:47). As with some of the changes in previous years, the new tool was partly a response to lessons learned by DIPRES officials about the SECG’s daily functioning. At the same time, while no specific country experience was used as a reference, the EPN reflected Heidi Berner’s (Guzmán’s former collaborator and successor) detailed knowledge about evaluation techniques commonly applied internationally (IC25; IC29).

### Table 5.2
**Performance Indicators in the Chilean Public Sector (2001-2013)**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Number of agencies</em></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Number of indicators</em></td>
<td>275</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>1684</td>
<td>1588</td>
<td>1552</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>1443</td>
<td>1504</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>1197</td>
<td>1221</td>
<td>1035</td>
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Source: Darville (2012) with modifications.

Moreover, as Table 5.2 above shows, the SECG’s consolidation seems to have resisted the changes in governing coalitions in 2010. Taking as a basis information compiled by Paula Darville (2012), head of DIPRES’ DCG since 2010, throughout the Piñera administration the use of performance indicators has roughly remained at previous levels. Indeed, a similar picture might be obtained when looking at the evolution of the various evaluation tools which are part of the SECG. Table 5.3 below shows that the number of evaluations conducted in recent years has mostly remained at pre-2010 levels.
Table 5.3  
Evaluations in the Chilean Public Sector  
(1997-2012)

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<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Public Programmes</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Spending Evaluations</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Evaluations</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of New Programmes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Darville (2012) with modifications. Those numbers in ‘( )’ refer to evaluations in progress.

Notwithstanding the above, the merits and relative ‘success’ of the SECG have been strongly criticised. For instance, Waissbluth (2006:61) remarks the number of MFR tools established by DIPRES is ‘perhaps excessive’, and has resulted in the loss ‘of real capacity of public policy formulation by other government organisations, in an excessive micro-management of budgetary allocations, and in general in an environment of tension and confrontation with the rest of the state apparatus’. In a paper written before she became the current head of DIPRES in 2010, Rosanna Costa (2007:7; Castro et al., 2009i) flagged that the various instruments of the SECG ‘have been structured on the basis of institutional goals barely coordinated, and the attempt to feedback these results with remuneration bonuses has translated into goals that are barely challenging’.

Other important criticisms have been produced regarding the number of evaluations and the amount of resources spent on them each year (Rojas et al., 2005); the lack of Congressional involvement in the analysis and use of performance information (OECD, 2011:120); and the high degree of control, centralisation, and ‘excessive power’ (IC7) that DIPRES exerts over the SECG’s regular operation and information use (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012d:192-193). Moreover, Olavarría and Figueroa (2010:55) recently reported that some public servants consider ‘evaluations are strongly focused in programmes […] but one cannot observe an approach towards a broader take on how different programmes and institutions interact towards [achieving] higher public policy objectives’. In relation to these criticisms, a DIPRES official remarks that:
It might be the case that at some point we faced the problem that our tools became and end in themselves. We were not capable of avoiding the issue of ‘bureaucratisation’, of introducing tools which generate more problems than benefits for other institutions. And that is something which some external experts have seen as a problem, and that the incoming government thought as well. At some point we stopped looking outside DIPRES, and we focused too much on ourselves (IC26).

Partly in response to these limitations, the Piñera administration introduced some changes to the SECG and the government’s MFR policy more broadly. There have been efforts to simplify the structure of the PMG, and make it ‘less invasive’ for the agencies and ministries (IC26). For instance, the use of ISO-9001 procedures as part of the PMGs has been reduced (Guzmán, 2011). Also, as noted in Table 5.3 above, DIPRES apparently suspended the use of Comprehensive Spending Evaluations and those of New Programmes (which had been created a couple of years before).

The Piñera administration also advanced two other significant innovations. The first was the creation of the Unidad Presidencial de Gestión de Cumplimiento (UPGC, or Presidential Unit for Delivery Management) in 2010, which was designed along the lines of Tony Blair’s Delivery Unit. The latter’s founder, Michael Barber, has even advised the Chilean government on this subject, ‘travelling in various occasions [to Santiago], via video conferences, doing some coaching, and suggesting how we could replicate the model’ (IC27). As in the case of the British unit, the UGC was created to follow up on a set of strategic goals, such as economic growth, employment, education, health, security, and poverty.

The original idea was to set up an independent entity. However, a senior official remarks, ‘that would have required a change in structures, in personnel, in the law, and thus exchanges with the congress and a series of processes to institutionalise it’ (IC27). Therefore, it was decided the unit would be located in MINSEGPRES, and specifically in its Unidad de Coordinación Ministerial (UCM, or Ministerial Coordination Unit). This is the unit which had previously managed the System of Ministerial Goals (1990-2000) and the System for Monitoring Government Programming (up to 2010).

According to a senior MINSEGPRES official, the task of the UPGC is not to perform traditional monitoring activities:

This is not just about monitoring. The challenge of this kind of units is not only management control, it is delivery management. It implies that if you see that this goal has deviated from the expected trajectory, you have to do everything possible to ensure the indicator improves and the result gets
closer to what you had planned. It is a new take on how public organisations face their daily management. The idea is to introduce a cultural change with a view on results which have an impact on citizens (IC27).

According to Minister Cristián Larroulet, who advocated the unit’s creation, ‘we are focused in generating an accountability culture towards citizens in the country and in the public service’. However, for some interviewees it remains unclear whether the UGC actually represents a new approach. A former MINSEGPRES senior official remarks that, ‘in 1994-1995 we already had a traffic light such as the one included in Barber’s unit, and which is now been applied in Chile’ (IC23). Along the same lines, a middle-level MINSEGPRES official says the unit ‘is seen as something different, although it is not as different in comparison to the way we were working already. The focus is now on the product, the result for the citizen. They assume we previously cared only about procedures, but that was not the case’ (IC28).

The second addition to Chile’s MFR policy was the creation of the Subsecretaría de Evaluación Social (Undersecretary for Social Evaluation). Established in October 2011 within the new Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (Ministry for Social Development), the new unit is supposed to take up the ‘ex ante evaluations’ of public investment projects, previously coordinated by the former Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación (MIDEPLAN, or Ministry for Planning and Cooperation). Moreover, the new unit’s main task will be to ‘improve the impact of social policies, by taking the task of evaluating and controlling existing social programmes’. Some interviewees suggested that, in preparation for this ministerial change, Chilean officials had been in contact with the Mexican government (IM27; IC22). Indeed, according to a senior Mexican official,

I recently [first half of 2011] travelled to Chile and spoke with Chilean policymakers, and it is amazing what is happening. They are doing something like our evaluaciones específicas del desempeño, although in a shorter version. But if you see the presentation, the front page is exactly the same. Then they also asked us how to evaluate impact. They are taking some things from Mexico, which they might find interesting or useful (IM21).

The former comment cannot fully prove Chilean officials have borrowed certain elements of the Mexican social policy evaluation scheme (see Chapter 6). Yet it does seem to point to at least some deliberate effort to gather information about the Mexican experience⁹⁷.

As a whole, the previous paragraphs offer an image of continuity and some changes in the Chilean MFR policy post-2010. The SECG has remained in place, and available evidence would seem to show that it has now become institutionalised as part of the Chilean politico-administrative system. Furthermore, the Piñera administration has not launched an overhaul of the SECG, and has mainly introduced some programmatic adjustments. On the other hand, the creation of the so-called ‘Delivery Unit’ and a new under-ministry in charge of conducting social policy evaluations do point towards some changes in the country’s MFR policy. It is interesting to note that information about other national experiences seem to have played an important role during the preparation of both changes.

Conclusions

The 2000s were crucial for the Chilean MFR system. During those years, and particularly 2000-2006, DIPRES officials were able to introduce a new SECG. This was above all a heavily revised version of previous MFR reforms, with the addition of some further evaluation tools. As in the 1990s, information from other countries and broader international discussions was used to develop some new MFR initiatives. Yet in contrast to that period, knowledge from policies abroad was mainly used to compare and adjust existing tools. Moreover, in addition to cross-national learning, Chilean policymakers took advantage of their own experiences. They thus informed the processes of policy change with learning from previous reform episodes. Similarly, they also learned from the annual implementation cycles of their MFR programmes.

Furthermore, throughout the decade Marcel and his colleagues (and later his successors) devised a set of strategies to ensuring the appropriate functioning of the SECG, and its longer term survival. They created a new División de Control de Gestión within DIPRES; revised and redesigned existing MFR tools, and added some new ones; and strengthened the links of these tools with budgetary policymaking. Moreover, Marcel and

⁹⁷ It was not possible to interview officials from this Ministry, which had just been created at the time in which a final round of interviews for this thesis took place in Santiago, during November 2011.
Guzmán actively promoted the SECG in many international forums, and published several documents narrating the Chilean experience. They also asked international organisations to evaluate the SECG. These external assessments contributed to secure the SECG beyond the Lagos administration, and turned it into an international ‘model’ worthy of dissemination by the IDB across the Latin American region.

The mostly ‘technical’ nature of the reform process was not, however, free from the influence of national factors. Marcel and Guzmán took advantage of DIPRES’ position as one of the most powerful institutions of the Chilean government. There were conflicts between the latter institution and MINSEGPRES, but by 2002 the SECG had become a defining feature of the Chilean politico-administrative system. Then, the arrival of a new governing coalition in 2010 brought with it a revision of the PMGs. The Piñera administration also introduced some policy innovations: a new ‘Delivery Unit’ at MINSEGPRES; and a social policy evaluation unit in the new Ministry for Social Development. While this opened the door for reassessing the role the SECG should play in Chile’s MFR policy, it did not affect the status of MFR as topic of interest. Nor did it end Chilean policymakers’ attempts to inform MFR policy changes with knowledge from policies abroad.
‘From a Sectoral to a Government-Wide M&E System’:
The Making (and Early Dissemination) of Mexico’s
‘Management for Results’ System(s)
(2000-2010)

It was then clear that in order to have successful evaluations of social programmes or of any other government programme, this was more of a public policy task, of transforming institutions and rules of the game, than just a merely technical issue.

Gonzalo Hernández, Executive Secretary of CONEVAL

So for many years there was the bureaucratic custom of defining more than 3,000 indicators in the Budget, in very broad terms and with goals that were usually generated by the budget managers. Basically it was a dialogue about numbers but not about goals, and it was also reviewed in this light by the Congress, with kilos and kilos of paper produced but not used.

Guillermo Bernal, former Head of the Budget Policy Control Unit

I think that what Mexico is doing is richer than what Chile did. I think they looked at the Chilean model and they improved it.

International Expert from ECLAC

A recent WB document reported on ‘Mexico’s progressive movement from a sectoral to a government-wide M&E [Monitoring & Evaluation] system’ (Castro et al., 2009ii:vi). The assessment is based on the various MFR innovations which have taken place within the social policy sector during the past decade. However, this view is perhaps inaccurate in at

99 The quote comes from Bernal (2006:52).
100 There are many publications which detail the various components, institutions, and norms which form part of the Mexican MFR system(s). See González (2008ii); González (2008iii); Rosenzweig and Lozano (2010); Arellano and Purón (2010); Ramos et al. (2011); and Rubio (2012).
least two respects. First, developments in this sector only make sense when looking at how the administrative, budgetary, and social policy MFR ‘strands’ have interacted throughout these years. Second, the idea of a ‘government-wide M&E system’ is problematic because, despite several attempts to increase coordination, these three MFR ‘strands’ have not been fully joined under an overarching and coherent scheme.

This chapter will analyse the MFR policy changes which took place in Mexico during the 2000s, and will explore the extent to which these were related to cross-national learning. It will specifically review the Sistema de Metas Presidenciales (SIMEP, or Presidential Goals System); the creation of a new ‘Monitoring and Evaluation’ (M&E) unit in SEDESOL, and later of a Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL, or National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy); the new Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño (SED, or Performance Evaluation System), later associated with a Presupuesto basado en Resultados (PbR, or Budget by Results); and the Programa Especial de Mejora de la Gestión (PEMG, or Special Programme for Management Improvement).

This chapter will also look at how Mexican officials used knowledge from foreign MFR experiences. As in the previous decade, policymakers continued gathering insights from other international experiences. Yet, for reasons to be discussed below, they particularly focused on the Chilean SECG. This information was used in several ways, including the introduction of evaluation methodologies very similar to those used in Chile; the development of a new performance-budgeting approach; and the redesign of evaluation units at the Secretaría de la Función Pública (SFP, or Ministry of Public Administration, which substituted SECODAM in 2003).

The chapter will further discuss the strategies advanced by Mexican policymakers to support MFR policy changes. SEDESOL-CONEVAL officials were able to persuade politicians and officials at other ministries about the need to establish a variety of M&E practices. Similarly, after the challenges they faced during the Fox administration (2000-2006), SHCP officials managed to persuade the incoming Calderón administration (2006-2012) that a budget-by-results system was necessary. They were also able to implement a number of legal and constitutional reforms to protect the latter. Therefore, by the end of the decade Mexican officials had established significant institutional conditions to support the
effective functioning and the longer term durability of most of the MFR tools introduced in this period.

Lastly, the chapter will show how the process of learning from MFR ideas and practices abroad was partly shaped by national factors, but even more importantly by cognitive and international factors. For instance, political conditions both constrained MFR reforms in the budgetary strand, and opened up opportunities for policymakers in the social policy strand. Yet, throughout the decade, Mexican officials combined learning from MFR practices abroad with what they had learned from previous evaluation and budgetary reform developments. Furthermore, Mexican policymakers received important technical and financial support from international organisations, which endorsed the Mexican reform efforts, and disseminated information about the country’s MFR tools.

The rest of the chapter is subdivided into six sections. The first briefly describes the SIMEP and explains why this was the only MFR initiative which mattered to president Fox. The second details how the social policy MFR initiatives mentioned above evolved throughout the Fox administration. The third focuses on developments in the budgetary area, and elaborates on how and why an important partnership between SHCP and CONEVAL officials took place. The fourth discusses MFR initiatives advanced by the SFP, and its allegedly ‘reactive’ role in the design of government-wide MFR tools. The fifth briefly comments on how Mexican MFR practices have been disseminated by international organisations. The chapter closes with some conclusions.

‘Targets That Matter To Me’: Administrative Reforms in a Democracy

The presidential triumph of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN, or National Action Party) in 2000 represented the first change of governing parties in Mexico in more than seven decades. It thus opened up a ‘window of opportunity’ for the introduction of administrative reforms. Indeed, president Fox’s administration was very active in this policy area (Cejudo, 2008; Dusauge-Laguna, 2008; Pardo, 2009; Sánchez, 2009a; Vicher, 2009). It even sponsored the adoption of the country’s first Freedom of Information Law; the creation of a government-wide merit-based system; and the transformation of the former Secretaría de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo (SECODAM, or Ministry of the Controllership and Administrative Development) into the Secretaría de la Función Pública (SFP, or
Ministry of Public Administration; see SFP, 2005). Many of these reform efforts were informed by contemporary international developments, and involved several international organisations and development agencies. Paradoxically, MFR received only limited attention through the implementation of a *Sistema de Metas Presidenciales* (*SIMEP*, or System of Presidential Goals; Mejía, 2005; Sosa, 2011). Despite its high political status, the *SIMEP* was not truly significant from a government-wide or longer term perspective.

The Fox administration years were very active in terms of administrative reforms, but they were also marked by changing and sometimes contradictory priorities. At the beginning of his term, president Fox established the *Oficina de la Presidencia para la Innovación Gubernamental* (*OPIG*, or Presidential Office of Government Innovation). This unit was led by Ramón Muñoz, a very close advisor of Fox since he was governor of the state of Guanajuato. Muñoz was very interested in ‘management’ topics, albeit from a private sector management perspective (IM15). This was clearly reflected in the *Modelo Estratégico para la Innovación y la Calidad Gubernamental* (Strategic Model for Government Innovation and Quality), which his unit published in January 2001. This aimed to ‘regain citizens’ trust in government, as well as transform it into ‘a world class institution’ (Oficina de la Presidencia para la Innovación Gubernamental, 2001:2; Muñoz, 2004). Some of its ideas and ‘entrepreneurial’ jargon permeated reform efforts throughout the following years (Mejía, 2005; Pardo, 2007, 2009).

Yet the *Modelo Estratégico* was only used for a few months. In April of 2002, in accordance to the national planning system, *SECODAM* published the *Programa Nacional de Combate a la Corrupción y Fomento a la Transparencia y el Desarrollo Administrativo 2001-2006* (*PNCCCTDA*, or National Programme for Corruption Control and Support for Transparency and Administrative Development 2001-2006; Diario Oficial, 2002c). The *PNCCCTDA* proposed five strategic lines, 4 of which were focused on anti-corruption. Other topics such as evaluation and control, human resources, transparency, or regulatory reform were all linked to anti-corruption.

While the *PNCCCTDA* remained formally in place until the end of the Fox administration, yet another modernisation initiative was introduced in November 2002: the *Agenda de Buen Gobierno* (*ABG*, or ‘Good Government Agenda’; Oficina de la Presidencia para la Innovación Gubernamental, 2002; Muñoz, 2004). The *ABG* was based on six lines: honest and transparent government; professional government; government of quality;
digital government; government with regulatory improvement; and government that costs less. Most of the topics and even labels of the ABG were drawn from international discussions (IM7; Pardo, 2007:920; SFP, 2005:40). According to a senior SFP official, ‘both the design of the ABG and the way SECODAM was restructured when it became SFP represented the alignment of the Fox government with the OECD’s governance topics’ (IM4). During the following years, the implementation of the ABG was supported, in financial and technical terms, by international development agencies from the US, Canada, Sweden, the UK, and Spain (IM3; IM7).

However, despite extensive exchanges between Mexican officials and international agents, and the prominent place administrative modernisation had reached in the government agenda, the topic of MFR received only limited attention. There are various factors which contribute to explaining this situation. First, the reform agenda was already quite full, and the implementation of the various administrative changes already too complicated. Indeed, throughout the presidential term, the reform topics often competed against each other in terms of institutional priority and resources availability (Dussauge-Laguna, 2008; Sosa, 2011:112; Villalobos, 2010:107-108). Second, because president Fox’s government was seen as the beginning of a new political era in Mexico (e.g. that of democracy after several decades of authoritarianism), strong emphasis was set on reforms which could signal ‘innovation’ and a break with the past (IM15; IM25). Therefore, anti-corruption measures, as well as transparency and civil service reforms, received both significant political and administrative attention and resources (IIO1).

Yet a third and perhaps more important reason related to president Fox’s understanding of management control. According to the ‘entrepreneurial’ vision of the president and his closest advisors (Pardo, 2007), the task of achieving results was mainly a responsibility of appointed ministers. Thus, monitoring and target setting activities were not seen in the light of comprehensive or systemic schemes, which could cover all government programmes or activities. It was more a question of following up on a selected number of topics of particular interest to the president.

Therefore, the SIMEP was the only tool president Fox used for monitoring the performance of federal institutions. Created by SECODAM officials who were close to the incoming governing group, the SIMEP originally sought to introduce a different approach to evaluation. According to a senior SFP official, evaluation and control activities were
merely about ‘following up every three months whether ministries complied with their budget targets or not’ (IM6). When officials from the president’s innovation unit were shown the proposed scheme, they decided to scale up its use for monitoring the progress of presidential priorities. According to the same official:

The system’s centre of gravity laid in the targets that mattered to the president. He used to say, ‘SHCP has its targets and the institutions have their own targets. But these are the things that matter to me. I do not care about the ministers’ targets, and whatever they decide to include as part of budgetary negotiations. These are the targets that matter to me. I want two or three targets per ministry and per each agency I select, and I will directly negotiate with them’. And this was done in line with the National Development Plan’s priorities (IM6).

The SIMEP was neither inspired nor informed by international MFR developments. The officials who designed it have not previously worked in the federal government. Yet they relied on their private sector experience; insights from the strategic planning literature they used for teaching university courses; and practices they had employed when working in subnational governments (IM6). Then, as implementation of both the ABG and SIMEP progressed throughout the following years, other elements were added to the original monitoring scheme.

The SIMEP eventually included four main components (Mejía, 2005; Diener, 2007; Pardo, 2007): a set of targets (generally three) which had been negotiated by the president and the secretaries of state; a set of targets negotiated between undersecretaries of state, the president’s office, and SECODAM-SFP; some targets associated with the administrative modernisation agenda; and the results of customer/citizens evaluations surveys collected periodically. Results were not made public, but presented in small meetings with the president and some of his close advisors. A ‘traffic light’ system with three levels of achievement (outstanding, satisfactory, and minimum) was used. It was assumed that agencies would comply with the system. According to a senior SFP official, ‘we considered the president’s participation should ensure that the system worked, and thus there were no sanctions’ (IM6).

While both president Fox and the officials in charge of the SIMEP knew about SHCP’s scheme of budget indicators and targets (derived from the NEP-SED reforms of the 1990s), no measures were taken for linking both systems. This seems to have been a deliberate decision, which might be explained by two complementary reasons. According
to a senior official, the president’s view was: ‘why should I enter negotiations about targets which have been already established in the budget, and for things for which there is no extra money available?’ For president Fox and the SIMEP’s coordinators, the system’s purpose was to ‘challenge institutional leaders to do more with the same, to obtain an extra from them’ (IM6).

Furthermore, the SIMEP’s targets were negotiated at the beginning of the year, once the Expenditure Budget had been agreed upon, and had been published in the Diario Oficial (official journal). According to the same official, only when a topic was really important to the president would he instruct SHCP to do budget transfers (IM6). Lastly, the separation of both schemes seems to have been related to the reluctance of president Fox (as well as that of his advisors and some appointees in SECODAM-SFP) to further engage SHCP officials in this project. According to a former senior official,

Fox had a different conception of SHCP. He did not understand the budget and thought that it was simply a matter of adding and subtracting. It was a different situation from the previous four presidents, who had worked at the [former] Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto [Budget Ministry], and thus knew about its importance. On top of this, whatever came from the previous administration by default was a bit suspicious for him (IM26).

Among SHCP senior officials there was not an interest in pursuing the integration of these schemes either. According to an interviewee, ‘what mattered to SHCP senior officials during the Fox government was not to break the budgetary limits” (IM2). Therefore, both initiatives advanced along their own paths.

Assessments about SIMEP’s contributions to monitoring government performance have been mixed, but mostly of a negative nature. A senior SFP official remarks that, ‘the SIMEP did work. In fact, it was the only system which never failed throughout the administration. The president could access it anytime to see the degree of achievement of the targets whenever he wanted to’ (IM6). Along these lines, Mejía (2005:23) notes that the SIMEP was ‘considered by president Fox’s administration as timely, trustworthy, and sufficient’. On the other hand, Pardo (2007:900) argues the system was ‘excessively broad, without an appropriate or sufficient standardisation’. González (2010:158) has similarly criticised the ‘poor quality of many of its indicators, as well as the mechanism established to modify the targets and a weak system of sanctions’. Some interviewees also pointed at other limitations. According to a senior SHCP official, there was significant confusion
regarding the different objectives pursued by budget indicators and the targets associated with the \textit{SIMEP} (IM9). Another senior official stated that:

\begin{quote}
The \textit{SIMEP} just did not work. I was in charge of the targets of a policy sector, and after four months of using it, I noticed that there was a big mistake in a formula, which the coordinators had not noticed. What does that mean? That the system was not really used to making decisions (IM15).
\end{quote}

Indeed, an OECD (2009:100) report remarked that, ‘by 2005, there was no regular or systematic evaluation of performance in the [Mexican] federal administration’\textsuperscript{101}. That situation, however, would change towards the end of the Fox administration, albeit paradoxically without the president’s (or his staff’s) direct involvement.

\begin{quote}
‘First World Evaluations in a Third World Country’\textsuperscript{102}:
Institutionalising Programme Evaluations beyond \textit{PROGRESA}
\end{quote}

Although MFR was not a central topic for the Fox administration, a number of highly significant developments in this area did take place during this term. In many ways, these represented a follow up to the changes introduced during the Zedillo administration as part of the social policy ‘strand’ \textit{(e.g. PROGRESA’s impact evaluation and the ROPS)}. Since 2002, senior officials at \textit{SEDESOL} sought to establish a \textit{Sistema de Monitoreo y Evaluación} (M&E or Monitoring and Evaluation System). While the initiative was not related to the administrative modernisation efforts led by \textit{SECODAM-SFP} and the presidential innovation unit, it would eventually have significant repercussions on the government’s approach to MFR (Castro \textit{et al.}, 2009; Rubio, 2012). Moreover, in the process of designing a ‘M&E system’, \textit{SEDESOL} officials engaged in various cross-national learning activities. These would later influence the way in which \textit{SHCP} and \textit{SFP} officials approached MFR topics, as well as the contents of the policy changes they introduced in following years.

\textit{SEDESOL}’s attempts to build an ‘M&E system’ related to the positive reception that \textit{PROGRESA}’s impact evaluation and the social programmes’ \textit{ROs} had had among congressmen and government officials alike. Given the change in political conditions \textit{(e.g. political alternation and a second ‘divided government’ for the period of 2000-2003)}, both

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item 101 According to a senior \textit{SFP} official, during the Calderón administration ‘the topic of the \textit{SIMEP} and the presidential targets was never discussed. It became a taboo, as if it had never existed’ (IM6).
\item 102 Phrase attributed by Schlefer (2004:8) to Gonzalo Hernández, Director of \textit{CONEVAL}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
set of actors were interested in maintaining the principle that the use of public funds in social programmes should follow clear rules, and should be subject to evaluation exercises\textsuperscript{103}. Thus, for fiscal year 2002, the SHCP and Congress agreed upon introducing two additional innovations (Diario Oficial, 2002a). According to article 63, section b) of the budget decree, for 2002 all ministries and agencies in charge of social programmes (listed in the same decree) would need to:

Present the evaluation of results for each programme to the Chamber’s [of Deputies] Commission of Budget and Public Accounts, no later than October 15 [of 2002], so that the results might be considered in the process of analysis and approval of the Federal Expenditure Budget for the next fiscal exercise. The aforementioned evaluation should be paid with charge to the respective [programmes’] budgets and be developed by academic and research institutions or specialised bodies, either national or international, with recognition and experience in the subject matter of the programmes.

In the case of programmes which will start working during the current fiscal exercise, a partial evaluation might be developed as long as it is feasible to report results, on the assumption that this situation can be justified to the aforementioned Commission.

The budget decree thus introduced the idea that the ‘results’ of all social programmes, and not only PROGRESA, had to be evaluated. Moreover, that those evaluation findings should be made available to inform Congressional decisions on budgetary policy-making matters. The same article established that SHCP and SECODAM (with the National Council of Science and Technology’s support) ‘should publish no later than February 15, the minimum requirements to be fulfilled by the academic and research institutions or specialised organisations’ (Diario Oficial, 2002a). While the deadline was not met, on April 30 of the same year SHCP and SECODAM published the Acuerdo (guidelines), which detailed the principles to be followed government-wide during 2002 (Diario Oficial, 2002b; Conde, 2007)\textsuperscript{104}.

\textsuperscript{103} Castro \textit{et al.} (2009ii:26) remark that ‘[e]valuation in Mexico was an answer to, and a consequence of the political transition to democracy, specifically, to the increasing calls for accountability in government. But it was also a technically planned effort in response to Congress’ political decisions to demand performance evaluations of all government programs’.

\textsuperscript{104} The complete name of the document was: Acuerdo por el que se expiden los requisitos mínimos que las dependencias y entidades de la administración pública federal deberán considerar para seleccionar a las instituciones académicas y de investigación u organismos especializados, de carácter nacional o internacional, interesados en realizar la evaluación de resultados de los programas gubernamentales sujetos a Reglas de Operación en el ejercicio fiscal 2002 (Agreement which establishes the minimum requirements that ministries and agencies of the Federal Public Administration will need to consider for selecting the academic and research institutions or specialized entities, of national or international character, interested in developing the evaluation of results of the government programmes subject to the Operation Rules in the fiscal exercise of 2002).
If the idea that all social programmes should be evaluated before October of 2002 was already challenging, the Acuerdo did not make things much easier (IM16; Medina, 2007). The guidelines were introduced so that, ‘ministries and agencies of the federal Public Administration have homogeneous criteria to select the ideal institutions and organisations to conduct the evaluation of results of government programmes, through the methodologies and procedures that guarantee the trustworthiness of the works’ (Diario Oficial, 2002b). Yet the guidelines required that external evaluation reports should include at least the following components: percentage of accomplishment of the programme’s general and specific objectives; level of satisfaction by the target population; levels of coverage (national, state level, specific populations) of the programme; economic and social impacts of the programmes; a benefit-cost analysis of the resources originally attributed to the programme; a verification of the achievement of the programme’s physical and financial goals; a prospective scenario and opinion about the programme’s continuation, adjustment, or termination; general conclusions and recommendations; and a discussion about the programme’s limitations and the measures needed to solve them.

Given the country’s conditions in terms of evaluation capacity, these requirements were basically impossible to fulfil. The guidelines asked for an enormous amount of information regarding several aspects of each programme’s performance (e.g. general operation, cost-efficiency, impact, customer satisfaction). Then external evaluators and the institutions in charge of the programmes to be evaluated only had about 5 months (May to September) to complete evaluations. Moreover, the ‘evaluation market’ was rather poor: on the supply side, there were not many evaluation experts either in academia or among private consultants; on the demand side, there were neither specialists nor evaluation units within the federal ministries/agencies (Medina, 2007; Castro et al., 2009ii; SHCP, forthcoming). All in all, it certainly looked like this was an attempt to introduce ‘first world evaluations in a third world country’105.

In response to these requirements, between 2002 and 2005 officials at SEDESOL’s newly created Dirección General de Monitoreo y Evaluación de Programas Sociales

105 As Schlefer (2004:7) notes, ‘[p]olitical and technical problems built on each other. For one thing, the October 15 deadline established in the Federal budget, so the Chamber could consider evaluations in making next year’s appropriations, was essentially impossible to meet. The Mexican fiscal year coincided with the calendar year, so programs did not complete – or fail to complete – their objectives until December. The Accord only required this initial evaluation to consider progress through August, but even that requirement was harder than it sounded’
(DGME, or General Directorate for Monitoring and Evaluation of Social Programmes) sought to redefine the ministry’s approach to evaluation (World Bank, 2009b). The DGME was part of the similarly new Subsecretaría de Prospectiva, Planeación y Evaluación (Undersecretariat for Prospective, Planning, and Evaluation). The latter was led by Miguel Székely, an economist and expert in antipoverty studies, with significant experience as an international consultant, who had evaluated PRONASOL’s performance in the early 1990s (Cardozo, 2006:179-181). According to former officials, Székely was strongly convinced that SEDESOL had to strengthen its evaluation capacities for ensuring the appropriate functioning of social policies, as well as increasing accountability (IM16; IM27; Székely, 2004).

To develop SEDESOL’s new M&E approach, the DGME’s Director General Gonzalo Hernández and his team engaged in two complementary activities. First, they analysed in detail those evaluations which had been developed since PROGRESA’s. DGME officials diagnosed a number of issues which negatively affected evaluation exercises.

According to a former official, it was clear for them that the new guidelines were ‘a little like a letter to Santa Claus’. It was simply ‘not realistic’ to expect that every social programme could be evaluated on a yearly basis, and with regards to so many aspects, ‘from its operation to its impacts’ (IM27). The same former official remarks that:

Two things that we saw as a challenge were, first, to have homogenous terms of reference, because everyone used to evaluate whatever they wanted and however they understood things. Therefore, you could not have an analysis of the performance of SEDESOL’s programmes as a whole because there were different methodologies and things behind the evaluations. Then, it was hard to disaggregate what you asked from the evaluation because it is not the same to evaluate the ‘procedure’ than to evaluate the ‘impact’. And it is not the same to use a quantitative approach than a qualitative one. Yet at that point everything was mixed in the same ‘bag’, in the same year (IM27).

A third related issue that DGME officials diagnosed was the lack of consistency regarding how programmes were evaluated in different rounds. The same former official remarks:

Year after year evaluators could completely change the approach or focus of the evaluation exercise. So we asked ourselves what was going on, because there were differences not only across programmes, but also within the same programme across time. There was no consistency. We realised that was because we lacked a document which actually said what the programme was, what was its purpose, what it was supposed to achieve, what was its target population. So you would talk with the programme director and he/she would tell you something about the conceptualisation of the

106 For SEDESOL’s activities in this area beyond that year, see Hernández (2006, 2010); Medina (2007); World Bank (2009b); Franco and Ordóñez (2010); and Cordero (2010).
programme. Then you would speak with the people in charge of implementing the programme, and they would say, ‘well the programme is for this or that’. And sometimes both groups would tell the same thing, but sometimes they did not (IM27).

On the basis of this diagnosis, *DGME* officials sought to increase their own evaluation capacities. They revisited ‘the best texts on evaluation methodologies’, and ‘organised a three weeks-seminar on the best techniques for evaluating impact’ (Hernández, 2010:117). Perhaps more importantly, they started to gather information about international experiences on M&E. In order to do so, Hernández and his team developed a number of different activities. For example, they participated in regional meetings, which were co-sponsored by the WB and the IDB. According to a former senior official, in those meetings ‘we were one of the main actors at that time, because some of the most famous examples were those related to *Oportunidades*’ (IM16). Apart from ‘obtaining lots of feedback’ from international experts regarding the evaluation activities conducted by *SEDESOL*, at these meetings *DGME* officials learned about the ‘positive and negative experiences of Latin American countries on this subject’ (IM16).

*DGME* officials also started to study some specific national cases. According to a former official:

> We did look at various examples, we looked at Chile, we looked at PART [US Program Assessment Rating Tool], we looked at Canada, and those were the three main cases we revised. In fact, we made some trips. We went to Chile, to Canada, and the US. In the US we went to speak with legislators, with people in the Department of Labor. In Canada we went to federal ministries to talk about the coordination of evaluation practices, and to discuss what kind of evaluations they carried out. I really don’t remember how we decided to focus on those three examples, but it was revising documents, talking to people in the field, with people from the WB, IDB, with a consultant that taught a seminar about M&E and why it was important, etc. I recall that we also revised the experiences of New Zealand, the UK, and Colombia’s SINERGIA [Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Resultados de la Gestión Pública]. But it was the first three which served us as the main reference (IM27).

*PROGRESA*’s impact evaluation had been the original reference for *DGME* officials (Hernández, 2010:118). Yet learning about these other international experiences offered them a rich set of ideas about different M&E instruments and methodologies, as well as their practical applications. Another former official remarked, for instance, that ‘we took a lot from Chile, but this was complemented with many other cases, and in reality *SEDESOL*’s system was a combination of all these cases’ (IM16).
During the following years *SEDESOL* redefined its approach to evaluation and used some of these international practices. In particular, there are two changes which deserve to be mentioned. The first relates to the so-called *términos de referencia* (‘terms of reference’). This is a document which establishes the formal requirements that independent evaluators should follow when conducting evaluations. As part of their on-going relationships with the WB (Cardozo, 2006:201-202), *DGME* officials worked with experts from this organisation on ‘how to develop better, more homogenous terms of reference, which could help us evaluate high priority programmes’ (IM27). The objectives were to introduce a certain level of homogeneity for hiring evaluation consultants; to define the activities they should perform; and to establish the products they should hand in at the end of their consultancies.

The second change was the introduction of the ‘Logical Framework Methodology’ (LFM) as the main tool for guiding evaluation practices. According to a former middle-level official:

> We realised we lacked a tool which could help us identify the objectives of a given programme, and the indicators that could help us identify its success or failure. Then we started to revise experiences, we revised the case of Chile, and we thought that we needed something like the logical framework, a table that could tell everyone ‘this is the programme’, and that could help us avoid someone coming and giving you their own version of the programme. Also, we thought this table was something we could give to each evaluator. She could then introduce some additional points, but she would need to evaluate what the programme really was, and not what she thought the programme was (IM27).

With the sponsorship of the IDB, *DGME* officials gathered detailed information about the Chilean MFR system. They attended a seminar in Santiago de Chile, in which *DIPRES* officials explained their MFR tools, including the LFM for programme evaluations (IC4; IM16). Throughout 2004-2005, with the financial and technical support of the WB, the *DGME* launched a pilot project to develop the logical frameworks of five social programmes. In various meetings with programme staff, the *DGME* officials and a WB consultant advised the former to define the logic and objectives of their programme; a set of relevant indicators; and expected impacts (IM16; Medina, 2007:37).

Around the same time, in January of 2004 president Fox enacted a new *Ley General de Desarrollo Social* (*LGDS*, or General Law for Social Development) (Diario Oficial, 2004). Among its various goals, the *LGDS* aimed to ‘establish evaluation and monitoring mechanisms of the programmes and actions of the National Social Development Policy..."
The law created a **Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social** (CONEVAL, or National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy). According to the **LGDS**, CONEVAL would be in charge of ‘revising periodically the achievement of the social objective of the programmes, targets and actions of the Social Development Policy, to correct, modify, add, reorient or terminate them totally or partially’ (article 72).

The **LGDS** established that evaluations could be developed either by CONEVAL or by external academic or consultancy institutions. Furthermore, it determined that ‘the evaluation of results’ should include ‘indicators of results, management and services’, so that the ‘coverage, quality and impact’ of the programmes could be measured (article 73); that indicators should reflect ‘the programmes, targets and actions of the Social Development National Policy’ (articles 74 and 75); and that evaluations should be annual, but could also be multi-annual in some cases (article 78). Last but not least, the **LGDS** established that CONEVAL would be a semi-independent entity, formally attached to **SEDESOL**, but with an innovative institutional design that sought to secure its administrative autonomy and technical capacity. Therefore, the Minister of **SEDESOL**, six academic researchers, and an Executive Secretary (in charge of the agency’s day-to-day management) were all part of CONEVAL’s leadership board (articles 81-85).

The creation of CONEVAL was strongly related to **SEDESOL** officials’ capacity to advocate the professionalisation of social programme evaluations. According to a WB expert,

> Praise for the reforms introduced on the subject of M&E in the social policy field should be given to the Mexican technocracy. They possessed impeccable technical credentials, they knew the topic very well, and they also understood that the democratisation process, with the arrival of president Fox, had opened the door for this type of changes. They were pursuing the reforms mainly because of technical considerations, but of course also taking into account the political conditions and needs (IIO1).

As mentioned above, since he was appointed undersecretary in 2002, Székely had pushed for the institutionalisation of evaluation practices within the ministry, as well as for the regular use of evaluation results in policymaking (IM17; Rubio, 2012). For instance, Székely used to provide Secretary Josefina Vázquez with executive memos ‘detailing the

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107 The other central goal of CONEVAL is that of measuring poverty levels.
strengths and weaknesses of social programmes, as found in evaluations’, so that she could use that information in the course of her budget reviews with programme operators. The Secretary would then tell programme managers, ‘OK, the evaluation says you have got these problems, how are you planning to solve them? Please answer that to me, and then we will see about the resources’ (IM16; IM27). The legislative changes were also undoubtedly associated with PROGRESA’s still recent (and internationally famous) evaluation experience. Moreover, both government officials and congressmen were keen to further limiting the politicisation of social policy resources and decisions.

While CONEVAL’s creation represented a crucial point in the development of Mexico’s MFR policy, it was first of all a continuation of the reform process described in previous pages. In November of 2005 Hernández was appointed CONEVAL’s first Executive Secretary. In developing the organisation’s M&E scheme, Hernández and his team (mainly former DGME officials) took advantage of what they had already learned from MFR practices abroad. For example, they kept the LFM as the centrepiece of CONEVAL’s strategy for evaluating social programmes (IM11). They also maintained communications with Marcel and Guzmán, who would advise them as reforms progressed.

Similarly, on the basis of their experience in SEDESOL and what they had observed in foreign examples, CONEVAL officials realised that ‘one kind of evaluation was not going to be sufficient’ (IM22). They thought different kinds of evaluations were required to assess the various phases or programme components. Indeed, the 2002-2005 experience had shown them that, ‘evaluations were too broad, too expensive, and too general, as they were the same for all the programmes’ (IM16). Drawing on this and their exchanges with Chilean policymakers during 2005-2006, CONEVAL officials abandoned the focus on a ‘one-size-fits-all’ methodology. Instead, they embraced the idea of having ‘a more flexible model with different methodologies, which could answer different questions’ (IC30). The result would be a ‘menu of evaluations’ that remains up to this date (see next section).

In addition, previous cross-national learning exercises allowed CONEVAL officials to combine insights from foreign experiences in the design of new evaluation tools. An example is that of the so-called Evaluación de Consistencia y Resultados (Evaluation of Consistency and Results). This was the product of knowledge gathered from three jurisdictions: the Chilean programme evaluations mentioned above (IM27); recommendations from Canadian public servants, who told them ‘it is very good to have
evaluations, but you also have to present them in a very clear format, otherwise they will not “sell” (IM22); and insights from the US PART, which was ‘focused on the short term, could be replicated for a huge number of programmes, and was based on very specific criteria, with a clearly structured ‘manual’ explaining the procedure’ (IM22).

Continuities between the SEDESOL and CONEVAL phases also existed in terms of relationships with international organisations. Mexican officials had engaged in learning from international M&E practices on their own initiative, and had always made their own decisions regarding what to use in the Mexican scheme (IM21). However, since 2002 the IDB and the WB played a significant role in the making of SEDESOL/CONEVAL’s evaluation approach in various respects. The WB, for instance, supported both technically and financially the development and institutionalisation of SEDESOL’s DGME (Cordero, 2010; Franco and Ordóñez, 2010). It also ‘accompanied the drafting of the Social Development Law, and particularly its evaluation component’; and participated in several internal workshops on the relevance of M&E practices ‘a bit like a facilitator’ (IIO1). Furthermore, both organisations sponsored the study tours developed by DGME (later CONEVAL) officials to Canada, the US, Colombia and, most importantly, Chile. According to a former official:

The IDB and the WB provided great support in helping us identify the challenges of these approaches, why it was important to have evaluations and monitoring systems, and what differences existed between those two concepts. They were also important in getting us closer to the topic in technical terms, in learning about what was being done elsewhere. It was not like the IDB or the WB came to us and said, ‘you have to do some evaluations’. That was already mandatory by law. They helped us finding the best evaluation methodologies; training public servants; and designing specific evaluations. They also got us closer to international experts (IM27).

The support of these international organisations continued to be relevant in following years (Rubio, 2012:179). For example, in 2006 CONEVAL officials implemented an ambitious capacity building exercise which sought two objectives: to persuade senior social programme officials that the LFM was a useful tool; and to provide training for middle/lower-level public officials involved in daily operations (IM22). Some additional seminars were directed to potential evaluators (e.g. consultants), in order to build their evaluation capacities (IM27). With financial resources from the IDB, CONEVAL hired a group of experts from ECLAC, who had already worked with Hernández and his team while at SEDESOL’s DGME. According to an international expert,
We trained more or less 1,000 senior managers of social programmes during a couple of weeks. About two hundred of them would enter the room for a talk of one hour and a half, in which we explained the logical framework methodology, how it was used, and what it was good for. We would then get a coffee and then another 100 people. And that is how we spent the days (IIO5).

The ECLAC experts had extensive experience in using the LFM for evaluation purposes. More importantly, they possessed a detailed knowledge of how the Chilean public sector used it.

Thus, by the final year of the Fox administration some significant progress had been made in terms of developing an M&E system for SEDESOL, which was later expanded for the broader social policy sector. The experience had not been easy for various reasons. Social programme coordinators had faced several challenges for complying with the evaluation guidelines established in 2002. There was not a well-functioning ‘evaluation market’ in the country. Moreover, Hernández and his team had struggled, first at the DGME and later at CONEVAL, to ‘persuade people to develop logical frameworks’ as part of the new evaluation approach they were advocating (IM27).

On the other hand, SEDESOL/CONEVAL officials managed to broaden and reshape the nature of MFR practices in the social policy field. They did so by building on the success of PROGRESA’s impact evaluation; by taking into account the government’s accumulated experience in implementing the evaluation guidelines during 2002-2005; and by using international examples and knowledge of evaluation techniques. Furthermore, the progress achieved in advancing M&E ideas and practices in the social policy sector would have ripple effects on the other two MFR ‘strands’ which had developed in the 1990s.

‘As thick as thieves’:

**SHCP, CONEVAL, and the Ripple Effects of the Chilean MFR System**

In the final years of the Fox administration, SHCP officials started working on how to reform the country’s public finances scheme. This included aspects related to the management of the budgetary system. The first product of this effort was the Ley Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria (LFPRH, or Budget and Financial Responsibility Law) of March 30, 2006 (Diario Oficial, 2006a). Among its various objectives, the LFPRH sought to reintroduce the design of budget indicators associated with a Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño (SED, or Performance Evaluation System) as
the one attempted in the 1990s (OECD, 2009). The reform took place in the middle of a presidential transition, but it eventually gained political support from the incoming administration of president Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). SHCP officials even managed to set the basis for a broader and more ambitious Presupuesto basado en Resultados (PbR, or Results-based Budget). The reform built on SHCP’s previous experience in implementing the NEP-SED (see Chapter 4), and was further supported by the recent experience of CONEVAL officials in developing the social sector’s M&E system.

According to a middle-level official, during these years SHCP and CONEVAL officials became ‘as thick as thieves’ (IM23). They formed a mutually beneficial relationship. SHCP acquired much needed technical expertise (e.g. about evaluation methodologies, specific international examples, and contacts with international experts). CONEVAL protected its own M&E system and influenced the federal government’s broader approach to evaluation of public policies and programmes. Although officials from SFP eventually joined discussions about the new PbR-SED, the partnership formed by SHCP-CONEVAL became the leading force behind the reforms. As a result, the Chilean SECG experience remained as the principal source of inspiration throughout the process.

Since 2005, SHCP officials started preparing some ideas to reform the budgetary system. A major reason for doing this was to regain a central place in the process of defining government-wide objectives. As mentioned above, during the Fox administration SHCP had been relegated from those decisions, and its efforts to produce budget indicators had been ‘bypassed’ through the SIMEP. According to a SHCP official, ‘president Fox had another vision; he developed his own “war rooms”, his indicators and control boards, and supported much more SFP, whereas at SHCP we did not get much attention’ (IM24). Furthermore, SHCP officials realised that some federal ministries were developing systems for monitoring their own programmes, but were not really sharing that information with them (IC30). Under these circumstances, the revival of the NEP-SED introduced back in the 1990s seemed a helpful way to improve expenditure control, and to increase SHCP’s participation in the making of government-wide decisions.

With the presidential transition of 2006 in mind, SHCP officials engaged in two complementary activities for reintroducing MFR ideas into the budgetary policymaking cycle. First, they included in the LFRPH the necessary legal principles to provide a basis for a new SED. The law mainly focused in improving fiscal responsibility and establishing
a set of criteria to guarantee healthy public finances (OCDE, 2009:35-36; SHCP, forthcoming). Yet it also included a formal definition of the SED as ‘the set of methodological elements which allow developing an objective assessment of programmes, along the principles of verifying the degree in which goals and objectives are achieved, on the basis of strategic and management indicators which might allow knowing the social impact of programmes and projects’ (article 2, section LI).

The LFPRH also stated that annual programming and budgeting processes would take into account, among other inputs, the SED’s reports regarding the progress achieved on fulfilling the National Development Plan’s (NDP) objectives and goals (article 24). Then, the law established that the SED would be ‘mandatory for budget executors’ (article 111); indicators included in the SED would become part of the annual Expenditure Budget (article 111); and the SED should be fully implemented by fiscal year 2008. The LFPRH also stated the budget structure would include ‘performance indicators’ to link the NDP and each institution’s annual goals (article 27). The same article mentioned that ‘performance indicators’ could be about ‘coverage, efficiency, economic and social impact, quality and equity’ aspects. Moreover, the law remarked that, ‘the evaluation of performance should be developed through the verification of the degree of accomplishment of objectives and goals, on the basis of strategic and management indicators which allow knowing the results of federal public resources use’ (article 110).

At the same time the congressional approval of the LFPRH was being negotiated, SHCP officials started to look for advice and information from abroad. Carlos Hurtado, then Undersecretary for Expenditure at SHCP, contacted Mario Marcel. They knew each other because of their joint participation in different forums, such as the OECD Senior Budget Officials meetings in Paris, and the Latin American Budget Officials meetings in Santiago (sponsored by ECLAC, OECD, WB, and IDB). According to a former senior official at DIPRES, Hurtado and his team ‘needed to better align indicators. They had too many indicators, and it was not clear how these related to the budget structure. They wanted to rationalise the whole indicators system’ (IC30).

The relevance of looking at the Chilean MFR experience was further reinforced by contacts established between SHCP officials and SEDESOL (later CONEVAL) officials in June 2005. This happened during a seminar on M&E practices in Latin America, co-sponsored by the WB and the IDB in Washington DC. In that meeting, the Head of SHCP’s
Unidad de Política y Control Presupuestal (UPCP, or Unit of Budget Policy and Control), Guillermo Bernal (2006:52), expressed he had been ‘very fortunate to have had the opportunity to speak with Gonzalo Hernández’. Bernal also noted they ‘had never been able to personally speak about these matters in the past’, which gave him ‘an idea of the problems we have in Mexico today’. After this meeting, they started to exchange information, particularly once Hernández became CONEVAL’s Executive Secretary. From the beginning of their exchanges, Hernández suggested Bernal to look at the Chilean SECG (IM10).

During 2006 SHCP officials travelled to Santiago to study the Chilean MFR system. The delegation included Bernal, his advisors, a representative from the IDB (which was funding the trip), and Max Diener. The latter was SHCP’s General Attorney and had participated in the NEP-SED reforms of the 1990s in Chávez-Presa’s team. Diener was a lawyer and thus neither a public management expert, nor strictly involved in budget policy operations. Yet throughout the 2000s he had actively participated in international forums on these topics. Furthermore, he was in charge of ‘translating’ to legal language the various MFR principles underpinning the LFPRH and the supplementary regulations which later accompanied the implementation of the new SED. The SHCP delegation met with DIPRES officials and with Marcel and Guzmán. While they had recently quit their government positions, their newly established consulting firm was hired by the IDB to coordinate the Mexican delegation’s visit (IM18; IC30).

The trip to Santiago was very useful for SHCP officials in various respects. From a purely technical point of view, it provided them with detailed information about the Chilean SECG and its specific tools (e.g. programme evaluations, programmes for management improvement), and the links between performance management information and budgetary policymaking. In addition, the meetings held with Marcel and Guzmán made SHCP officials reconsider the way in which they were approaching the new performance-based system (IC30; IC20). According to a former SHCP official, ‘they discussed with us their vision about the budget system, and from them we tried to learn how to advance the project and how to approach it’ (IM18). This led SHCP officials away from their initial focus on ‘performance indicators’ and a ‘performance evaluation system’. The SED described in the LFPRH basically reproduced the reform initiative of the 1990s. However, after their visit to Chile, Bernal and his team started to approach the SED’s design and implementation from a
different perspective. The SED remained as the central component of the reforms, but not the only one. Evaluations were added to performance indicators, and everything was framed within a broader results-based budgetary system.

The study tour was further helpful because it provided SHCP officials with insights about the broader politico-institutional aspects of the reform. Some of them, like Diener, had followed international budgetary reform developments for more than a decade. They thus had gathered a good amount of information about leading foreign models during the OECD-SBO meetings and other international forums (e.g. about the UK, Australia, Sweden, and New Zealand; IM9; Pérez-Jácome, 2010:39). But SHCP officials had usually thought the cultural and institutional gaps between those countries and Mexico were too significant (IM9).

While the Chilean experience was also different, SHCP officials thought it would be easier to learn from it. On the one hand, the role of Congress in budgetary policymaking was weak in Chile, but very strong in Mexico. Similarly, the size of the Mexican budget was much bigger, and the system more complex than the Chilean one (IM13). However, in the Chilean experience they also found a ‘more realist’ system (IM9), and one ‘which was easier to copy’ (IM13). According to a former SHCP middle-level official:

There were very simple things. For example, that everything was written in Spanish; that SHCP could see itself mirrored in DIPRES; that there were similar professional experiences among those involved in the reform process and their Chilean counterparts. Then, the Chilean case was being used as an example by CONEVAL and other countries. All in all, the Chilean experience represented something that was doable. It was a simple, efficient example, which fit well the logic of a developing country such as Mexico. It also seemed to be culturally closer for those who would be involved in implementing the programme. It thus seemed trustworthy, feasible, and coherent (IM18).

Moreover, the Chilean MFR system was controlled by DIPRES, the equivalent of Bernal’s unit. As it was described in Chapter 4, in the past SHCP officials had struggled to build a performance-oriented budget. This had been partly due to Mexico’s institutional context, which forced them to coordinate efforts and negotiate with SECODAM-SFP. However, the SECG offered the blueprint of a system which could be managed without the latter’s involvement. This was an interesting and appealing attribute of the Chilean experience (IM13).

SHCP officials ‘decided to take Chile as the main reference’ (IM18), but they also looked at other foreign examples: New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, Colombia, and
Minas Gerais (Brazil). They particularly liked ‘the analytical and methodological rigour of the American system’, and the way in which the US government provided public information about federal spending. This would later influence the design of SHCP’s website on budgetary transparency (IM24). In addition, SHCP officials appreciated the ‘Canadian’s sector-wide view’ (IM13), and how the Treasury developed communication channels with other federal agencies to coordinate annual evaluation exercises. These insights did not have an immediate influence on the reforms, but would be helpful at a later point. In fact, during 2010-2012 SHCP officials would engage in a ‘peer-to-peer’ programme with the Canadian government sponsored by the WB, aimed at refining the PbR-SED (Hill and Caso, 2011).

Thus, Bernal and his team had prepared well to face the government transition of December 2006. They then found an incoming governing group quite supportive of their reform plans. While the incoming president Calderón was not an enthusiastic supporter of administrative modernisation topics in general (IM25), he and his team did welcome SHCP’s ideas about reforming the budgetary system. Because his election had taken place under highly polarised political circumstances (including electoral fraud allegations and an electoral triumph by a vote difference of 0.58%), president Calderón was interested in implementing actions which could reduce the popularity of the losing candidate. One of the main issues the latter had successfully flagged during the presidential campaign was that of reducing government salaries and administrative costs. Therefore, president Calderón supported SHCP’s idea of introducing an ‘austerity’ decree (Diario Oficial, 2006b). Among other measures, this suggested to cut down salary levels, and to introduce a Chilean inspired programa de mejoramiento de la gestión (programme for management improvement) to promote administrative efficiency (IM5; Dussauge-Laguna, 2013; see below).

In 2007-2008, when SHCP officials suggested developing further regulations to create a government-wide PbR, and advancing a constitutional reform to extend MFR practices to subnational governments, they also obtained a favourable response from president Calderón. A former senior official notes that president Calderón had been a member of the Chamber of Deputies (2000-2003), and thus he ‘understood well the political relevance of the budget’ (IM26). A senior presidential advisor further says that, ‘the idea of introducing a budget by results perfectly fit with the president’s ideas and the
things he was already promoting for obtaining results’ (IM15). A senior WB expert similarly remarks that, ‘at the beginning of the Calderón administration, the topic had a high political support, because the president wanted to improve his office’s coordination and strategic planning capacities’ (IIIO1).

The design and subsequent refinement of the PbR-SED regulations was also supported by Ernesto Cordero, then Undersecretary for Public Expenditure (2006-2008). A close advisor to Calderón during the presidential campaign, Cordero had been in charge of drafting proposals on economic policy and public finances (IM18). Once in office, he became ‘an active promoter’ of the PbR-SED and similar initiatives (IM19). For instance, he presented to Congress the legislative and constitutional reforms which UPCP officials had prepared, and actively lobbied for getting the changes approved (IM20). Later on, when he became Secretary of SEDESOL in 2008, he also supported the consolidation of the institution’s M&E system (Cordero, 2010; Franco and Ordóñez, 2010).

The fact that MFR gained the attention of the incoming governing group was at least partly due to persuasion efforts led by CONEVAL and SHCP. A senior CONEVAL official recalls that between August and December of 2006, they made significant efforts to explain and ‘sell the product’ of evaluation to the presidential transition team, in which Cordero played a leading role (IM10). Similarly, a senior SHCP official remarks that:

Since the beginning of the Calderón administration, we have repeatedly told our various undersecretaries, first to Ernesto Cordero, and later to Dionisio Pérez-Jácome, that the country needs a system which links the budget with indicators and evaluations. This is necessary both to increase efficiency and to better control public spending (IM9).

Indeed, Pérez-Jácome (2008-2010) also provided continuous support to the UPCP’s activities related to development of the PbR (Pérez-Jácome, 2010; Arizti et al., 2010).

These favourable political conditions provided SHCP officials with room to further refine the SED initiative during 2007-2008. According to the LFPRH, implementation should be completed no later than 2008, and draft regulations should be submitted for congressional comments in March 2007. The LFPRH had given evaluation and performance indicators a legal basis. This was a big difference regarding the NEP-SED of the 1990s, which ‘could never gain normative support’ (IM24). However, from a conceptual/methodological perspective, this still reflected SHCP’s old approach towards
performance-budgeting. As indicated above, after their communications with CONEVAL officials and the trip to Chile in 2006, SHCP officials had realised they required a different approach to this subject.

Thus, throughout 2007-2008 a very complex policy design process developed in at least three intertwined areas. First, SHCP officials engaged in several internal discussions about how to reform the budgetary structure, in order to better assess the quality of public expenditure, and reinforce its performance orientation. According to an SHCP official:

We decided to reform the programmatic structure and the budgetary programmes. I think that was the big decision, because before that we only had a concept of priority activities (subsidy programmes, projects, something called priority activities, and other activities). The 60% of the money was under the latter concept, which who knows what it meant. So if we wanted to evaluate the quality of expenditure, then we first needed to know where this expenditure was heading to. The creation of budget programmes allowed us to define and delineate the destiny of public resources (IM23).

Although the NEP-SED reforms had produced a clearer budgetary structure, they had not eliminated all budget-classification ambiguities (IM13). By introducing the ‘budgetary programme’ concept, SHCP officials found a way to better link public expenditure with the specific objectives of each federal institution, as well as with the general objectives of the NDP (IM14; SHCP, forthcoming). Moreover, because these discussions took place in parallel to the analysis of the Chilean experience, they thought the ‘budgetary programme’ concept would provide them with a useful tool to introduce the LFM as a basis for the new PbR-SED system.

Insights from the Chilean experience represented a second important contribution to the SED design. After his departure from DIPRES in 2006, Marcel was hired by the IDB to advice the Mexican government. Apart from holding various meetings with Mexican officials, Marcel prepared a Plan de Acción (Action Plan)108. In this he set out the conditions required to build a performance-oriented budget in Mexico, and a detailed list of recommendations that the government and SHCP in particular should follow (Alvarado, 2008). Marcel’s involvement in the process was also important because, according to another official, ‘he obviously suggested what he knew, the Chilean system’ (IM19).

108 The name of the project was Plan de Acción: Modelo de Fortalecimiento del Sistema de Presupuesto Basado en Resultados en la Administración Pública Federal de México, or Action Plan: Model for the Strengthening of the Budget for Results System in the Federal Public Administration of Mexico’ (Alvarado, 2008).
Another middle level-official noted, ‘Marcel would not say, “you should use the logical framework matrix”, he would just say, “you have to do this”. But when he explained his examples, he would certainly mention the logical framework matrix’ (IM23). The IDB also funded a second trip of SHCP officials to Santiago in 2007, during which they held a number of meetings with Guzmán (IM14). This allowed them to further focus their attention on building the links between performance information and budgetary decisions.

The third and perhaps most influential factor in the process of designing the PbR-SED was the partnership created between CONEVAL and SHCP\(^\text{109}\). As mentioned above, contacts between Hernández and Bernal dated back to 2005. Once in CONEVAL, Hernández wanted to ensure the regulatory and methodological work he and his team were developing would not be affected by initiatives or actions from other institutions, particularly SHCP. According to a former CONEVAL official,

\[
\text{We started to lobby once we realised that there were many institutions with legal authorities in the field of evaluation, like the SFP, the Ministry of Education which also had its own evaluation unit, and CONEVAL. Then the SHCP was about to publish its law on fiscal responsibility. We were afraid that we were going to come and say to the ministries responsible of social programmes, ‘You have to evaluate this, in this way, under this schedule’. Then SHCP would come and ask, luckily, the same thing. But they could also come and ask for something completely different. And with SFP it could be the same story: maybe they will ask the same thing, maybe they won’t. Thus, Gonzalo Hernández thought, ‘Why don’t we get together with them and build together certain regulations for everyone?’ (IM27).}
\]

Therefore, CONEVAL officials went to see Bernal and his team and explained them, ‘this is my project, this is what I want to do, this is my methodology’ (IM16). More specifically, they detailed how and why they were planning to use the LFM for programme evaluations, a tool they had already employed in SEDESOL. On the basis of their previous experience, CONEVAL officials also tried to stress that, ‘it did not make sense to evaluate just for the sake of evaluating’ (IM27; World Bank, 2009a:3). Hernández and his team thus argued for an approach which used different kinds of evaluation. They also stressed the need to better define which programmes should employ, for instance, an impact evaluation, and which should be evaluated through other techniques.

\(^\text{109}\) Rubio (2012:169) similarly states that, ‘[a] key factor leading to the second phase of the M&E system implementation (2007 to present) has been the strategic partnership between SHCP and CONEVAL. The former had the mandate to implement a performance-based budget, but its experience in M&E was limited, while the latter had substantial M&E technical expertise, but no ‘stick’ to ensure that ministries outside the social sector participated in the system’. 
On SHCP’s side, SEDESOL-CONEVAL’s participation in the design process was welcomed because of time constraints, technical needs, and political reasons. Because of the tight deadlines established in the law, SHCP officials faced a scenario in which they simply ‘had to execute the changes related to the PbR-SED somehow’ (IM16). Furthermore, when they started looking for relevant experiences, Bernal and his team ‘really liked the case of SEDESOL because as an institutional example it was the most coherent and complete’ (IM27). Moreover, SEDESOL’s previous experience showed them that the LFM borrowed from the Chilean SECG could be ‘Mexicanised’ and work well. A former SEDESOL official remarks that Bernal and his team said, ‘OK, you already have a methodology, which has already been proved, and which is actually being properly implemented, why don’t we take this as a basis?’ (IM16).

Along these lines, a SHCP official states that, ‘SHCP’s wise move was that, instead of trying to design something completely new, we decided to build on what CONEVAL had learned and done’ (IM23). Furthermore, CONEVAL’s participation was seen as a ‘life-saving element’ by Bernal and his team (IM13). Given the traditionally difficult relationships between SHCP and SFP on the subject of MFR reforms, SHCP officials thought CONEVAL could play a neutral role, a bit like a guarantor of independent decisions (IM24). This was something that actually fit perfectly with Hernández and his team’s intentions, as they saw themselves as the ‘little’ member between the two ‘big monsters’ represented by SHCP and SFP (IMéxico 10).

This partnership between CONEVAL and SHCP became the leading force during the drafting of supplementary regulations and the PbR-SED’s implementation. According to a former SHCP official, ‘relationships with CONEVAL had been wonderful’, and ‘their expertise has been most helpful’ (IM19). SFP officials joined the SHCP-CONEVAL working group in early 2007, but (as discussed in the following section) their overall influence on the system’s structure and operation was rather limited. A former SHCP official remarks that: 

CONEVAL knew more in technical terms, and thus they led the preparation of guides, concepts, and methodologies. In institutional terms they were smaller, and therefore did not get involved in the tiring process of making the big decisions about the system. SFP did want to lead the project, but they had previously had poor results, and possessed a rather poor technical capacity. In SHCP, people had more expertise. We were more used to doing things (IM18).
Indeed, during the following years SHCP and SFP assigned CONEVAL the leadership role in drafting the terms of reference that federal institutions should employ for hiring external evaluators.

On March 2007, CONEVAL, SHCP and SFP published the *Lineamientos Generales para la Evaluación de los Programas Federales de la Administración Pública Federal* (*Lineamientos*, or General Guidelines for the Evaluation of the Federal Programmes of the Federal Public Administration; Diario Oficial, 2007). These *Lineamientos* sought to ‘regulate the evaluation of federal programmes, the elaboration of the matrixes of indicators and the monitoring systems, as well as the elaboration of the strategic objectives of the ministries and agencies of the Federal Public Administration’ (article 1). In order to do so, the *Lineamientos* provided a definition of ‘strategic objectives’; stated that institutions should align the latter with the NDP’s broader objectives; and that they should be ‘oriented towards promoting effectiveness, efficiency, economy and quality in the Federal Public Administration, and the social impact in the exercise of social spending’ (article 5).

The *Lineamientos* introduced the so-called ‘matrixes of indicators’, which should be prepared on the basis of the LFM (article 3, Section VII). Whereas SEDESOL-CONEVAL had been using the term ‘logical framework’, neither SFP nor SHCP officials thought it appropriate. The former thought it sounded too much like the Chilean system (IM27). For the latter, the reasons were of a legal nature: the LFPRH required ministries/agencies to report ‘indicators’, but it did not mention the concept of ‘logical frameworks’. Therefore, an international expert remarks that, ‘SHCP astutely said, “OK, the regulations say you should report indicators, and thus you will report those to me in this format, which will be labeled matrix of indicators for results”’ (IIO5).

Lastly, the *Lineamientos* stated that evaluation results and those from the programme for management improvement should be ‘systematically articulated with planning and budgetary processes’. This was ‘to guarantee a performance oriented evaluation and provide feedback to the Performance Evaluation System’ (article 16). The same article introduced a variety of evaluation options described in Box 6.1 below. These clearly reflected the lessons Hernández and his team had drawn from their previous
experiences (IM16; Medina, 2007:37), their understanding of the subject, and their capacity to persuade SHCP-SFP to avoid a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.\textsuperscript{110}

### Box 6.1
**Types of Evaluation in the Mexican PbR-SED system**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) <strong>Evaluation of Consistency and Results</strong>: systematically analyses the design and global performance of the federal programmes, in order to improve their management and measure the achievement of results on the basis of a matrix of indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b) <strong>Evaluation of Indicators</strong>: analyses through field work the relevance and reach of the indicators of a federal programme for the achievement of results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) <strong>Evaluation of Procedures</strong>: analyses through field work whether a programme is implementing its operative procedures in an effective and efficient way and whether it contributes to improving management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) <strong>Impact Evaluation</strong>: identifies with rigorous methodologies the change in indicators at the level of results which can be attributed to the implementation of the federal programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) <strong>Specific Evaluation</strong>: those evaluations not included in the Guidelines [<em>Lineamientos</em>] which might be done through desk and/or field work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) <strong>Strategic Evaluations</strong>: evaluations which are applied to a programme or set of programmes around the strategies, policies and institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) <strong>Evaluation of New Programmes</strong>: a diagnosis that justifies the creation of new federal programmes which are to be included in the annual budget project or, if that is the case, which justifies the broadening or substantive modification of existing federal programmes, detailing its budgetary impact and its financing sources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author based on Diario Oficial (2007).

Once the *Lineamientos* were published, SHCP, CONEVAL, and SFP coordinated the development of ‘matrixes of indicators for results’ (OECD, 2009:106-108; Pérez-Jácome, 2010; SHCP, forthcoming). CONEVAL officials expressed concerns regarding the use of the LFM for all public programmes. Yet, a former official notes that, ‘Bernal and his team really liked it and wanted to apply it to every federal programme’ (IM27). While SHCP officials knew that in Chile the LFM was only used for programme evaluations, they decided to push for a wider use of the methodology. An official says this was ‘to reorder

\textsuperscript{110} A WB document states that, ‘significant accomplishments brought about by the General Guidelines in Mexico’s public sector included: having specific steps for the application of logic frameworks to all budget programs; adopting a single, results-based, M&E language in the federal government; providing standardized M&E methodologies; and initiating a government-wide, learning-by-doing M&E process among federal agencies and officials’ (Castro \emph{et al}., 2009ii:8).
and systematise programmes, as well as to allow us entering a process of redesign of those same programmes’ (IM23).

The elaboration of the so-called ‘matrixes of indicators for results’ was further supported by an ambitious capacity building programme. Since 2007, a group of ECLAC and other Chilean experts led several training sessions on how to design performance indicators and logical frameworks (II05; SHCP, forthcoming). These were later complemented with online workshops and diploma courses. The ECLAC experts were also asked to revise and comment on the quality of the ‘matrixes’ prepared by the federal institutions. On that basis, programme coordinators were then asked to make adjustments. As a whole, these various actions for the government-wide introduction of the LFM responded to SHCP’s ‘big bang’ approach, which sought to take advantage of the political momentum (IC30; II01).

The design of the new evaluation scheme was completed with the publication of further regulations in 2008 (Diario Oficial, 2008a; SHCP, forthcoming). SHCP and SFP jointly published the Acuerdo por el que se establecen las disposiciones generales del Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño (Acuerdo SED, or ‘Rule by which the general requirements for the Performance Evaluation System are established’). This Acuerdo SED introduced some conceptual and programmatic additions. For instance, it introduced the first formal definition of the Presupuesto basado en Resultados (PbR, or results-based budget): ‘the process which integrates in a systematic form, in the corresponding decisions, considerations about the results and impact of budgetary programme execution and the use of resources allocated to them’.

Although the term ‘PbR’ was first introduced in the National Development Plan back in 2007, the LFPRH and subsequent regulations had focused on the SED and its indicators. The definition provided by the Acuerdo SED thus formalised, in conceptual and legal terms, the transition to a broader approach. Budgetary decisions ought to be informed by an assessment of the effects of government programmes and spending, a feature of the Chilean and many other international systems. The Acuerdo SED also established that, ‘an annual evaluation programme will be published, which should consider, at least, the budgetary programmes and the types of evaluation which will be introduced’. This clearly reflected that SHCP officials had listened to CONEVAL’s concerns about ‘not evaluating for the sake of evaluation’; and about the need to plan ahead the number and type of...
evaluations to be developed each year, taking into account time and resources constraints, as well as each programme features and needs.

A final component of the reforms was the modification of the federal Constitution’s article 134 (Diario Oficial, 2008b). This established that MFR principles and practices were mandatory for all government levels (e.g. federal, state, and municipal). It also stated that public resources should be administered ‘with efficiency, effectiveness, economy, transparency and honesty to satisfy the objectives for which they are destined’. Furthermore, it indicated that in each government level ‘the results obtained from the use of those resources will be evaluated by the technical areas’ created for that specific purpose. By introducing this change, SHCP officials were addressing a longstanding preoccupation regarding the misuse of public resources by state and local governments (IM12). But in ‘uploading’ the PbR-SED principles to the Mexican constitution, they were also aiming to secure the long-term institutionalisation of the reforms. According to a former SHCP senior official, ‘we promoted the constitutional changes because we know our country, and in order to get things done, we knew that we had to put this in the law and the constitution’ (IM19).

While the constitutional and legal MFR reforms received congressional support, it would be misleading to then assume legislators either strongly influenced or deeply cared about PbR-SED. According to a SHCP official, ‘Congress has participated pushing forth the normative part of the reforms, and has contributed to setting up the requirements and guidelines to build all of this’ (IM23). Other interviewees also reported that some congressmen were increasingly supportive of evaluations, and many of them were happy to get additional information about the performance and results of public programmes. Yet the same official remarks that:

What I have seen is that, after the big legal reform of 2006, it has been CONEVAL, SHCP, and SFP which have been involved in advocating evaluations, advancing requirements for indicators, etc. When we presented the SED proposal [in March of 2007], congressmen did comment on it. But their opinion did not have any substance. Without Congress legal changes would not have taken place. But all of this has been mainly a result of what those three organisations have proposed and organised (IM23).

A former SHCP official similarly said that ‘Congress has followed this closely, but not in terms of saying, “here, you need to add this tool”’ (IM18). Yet another said that:
Congressmen ask for more information the whole time. Then we go and hand them dozens of reports, but they do not read anything. They ask for information as a way to say that Congress is checking on the Executive, pushing it to increase transparency in public spending, to explain how public resources are being managed. But that is just a political discourse. They do not do that because they use that information, study it, and then make decisions or promote reforms or laws to improve things. This is a political discourse with political intentions (IM19)\textsuperscript{111}.

In fact, in order to increase the congressional interest, Bernal and his team had to make additional efforts to persuade deputies about why MFR reforms mattered. With the support of international organisations, SHCP officials asked congressmen to join them in study tours. These were less focused on drawing technical insights about the international practices, than in showing deputies how performance budgeting worked in practice (IM13). According to a former SHCP official:

The OECD invited us to go on a study tour to Paris and London, and we invited some deputies so that they could get more technical knowledge. But mainly to show them why the executive power was advancing these legal reforms, because they did not understand much of what we were hoping to achieve. Something similar was done with a visit to Canada. So more than for us, this has been done for the deputies, to persuade them to approve a set of reforms which had been proposed. They were reluctant to do so because they did not really understand where the executive was heading with all this. We thus explained them that what we wanted was more transparency and spending efficiency. What they saw is what other countries do in this sense, and what kind of legislation has been produced in this sense (IM19).

Another activity focused in persuading political and bureaucratic actors was a widely publicised international conference on PbR-SED reforms. The latter took place in Mexico City in June 2008 (SHCP, 2009; OECD, 2009:112-113; Arizti \textit{et al.}, 2010). Coordinated by Bernal and his team, and co-sponsored by the IDB, OECD, and the WB, the conference hosted experts such as Graham Scott, Nick Manning, Mario Marcel, and Marc Robinson, who discussed the theoretical foundations of results-based reforms. Other international specialists discussed the experiences of Chile, Canada, the UK, the US, Sweden, South Korea, Colombia, Brazil, Australia, France, and the Netherlands. There were other discussions about the use of performance information; the role of Congress in MFR systems; and the implementation of similar reforms at the subnational level. Officials from \textit{SEDESOL}, \textit{SHCP}, and \textit{SFP} presented their recent reform experiences.

\textsuperscript{111} The OECD (2009:114-115) notes that, on the one hand, ‘in comparison with OECD countries, there is a fairly high awareness of the various monitoring systems’ among congressmen in Mexico. Yet on the other hand, ‘[t]his general engagement has not been translated into a system in which performance information would regularly be used to inform budgetary decisions’. Furthermore, the report notes that, ‘while selected congressmen agree on the importance of developing performance information, the role that Congress will play in this initiative was yet to be fully realised’.
The design and implementation of the *PbR-SED* during 2006-2010 were not processes without problems. A senior *SHCP* official, notes that the institutionalisation of these tools ‘has been achieved due to the obligatory nature of the legal framework’, and that neither participating institutions nor public servants have ‘yet taken ownership of the entire system’ (Caso, 2010:74). A former senior official adds that, ‘we faced lots of resistance from other areas inside the ministry’ (IM13). Another official similarly suggests that, ‘there has not always been enough support or trust among participants. Public servants have only slowly convinced themselves, particularly top public servants’ (IM24). Indeed, an international expert further says that initially budget analysts in the *UPCP* ‘neither cared about the *PbR-SED*, nor understood the subject’ (IIO5).

The reforms have encountered other important issues. Throughout the Calderón administration, *SHCP* officials tried but failed to find ways for linking evaluation results and budget allocations (Conde, 2007; IM19; IM24). Then, a senior *SFP* official flags that ‘nowadays we generate lots of information and interesting findings, but we have not got much time to actually follow up on them. In fact, some programmes are over-evaluated, with evaluation reports telling you one year basically the same thing than in the previous exercise’ (IM20). Lastly, as the following section will detail, the introduction of the new *PbR-SED* was surrounded by inter-bureaucratic conflicts between *SHCP* and *SFP* (Pardo, 2009; González, 2010).

However, despite these complications, *SHCP* officials were able to make significant progress in the introduction of a new MFR scheme. Given the short time which has passed since the introduction of the reforms, it is difficult to offer a fair assessment. Yet some tentative comments might be offered. According to a recent government document, the coverage of ‘matrix of indicators for results’ has gone from 41.7% of the federal budget (*e.g.* public programmes to which the budget has been allocated) in 2008, to 59.2% in 2012 (*SHCP*, forthcoming). The same document notes that by 2012 about 40,000 public servants (including federal government and some state/municipal governments) had received some kind of training on MFR topics. More importantly, Table 6.1 below shows the number and variety of evaluations which have been jointly supervised by *SHCP*, *SFP*, and *CONEVAL* since 2007.
Table 6.1
Evaluations of Federal Programmes
(2007-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of evaluations</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012*</th>
<th>Total per type of evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistency and results</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementary (e.g. not originally included in the annual plan of evaluations)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total per year</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Along these lines, a former SEDESOL senior official remarks that:

> Everything on this subject has been institutionalised, which has meant the evaluation culture has been strengthened enormously. It has been generalised. SEDESOL is no longer the only ministry around doing these things. There are now many federal agencies using evaluation, with their own priorities, nuances, but they are already there. You can find excellent practices in many places (IM16).

Within SHCP, a specialised Unidad de Evaluación de Desempeño (UED, or Performance Evaluation Unit) would be eventually established in October of 2012.

The PbR-SED was also built on the basis of a comprehensive and rather complex set of legal, regulatory, and constitutional principles. As some interviewees noted, the reforms of 2006-2008 were not something completely new. Indeed, their origins could be traced back to the 1990s (IM19; IM23; Pérez-Jácome, 2010). Yet Bernal, Diener, and their colleagues were capable of taking advantage of the lessons learned since then. They also profited from SEDESOL-CONEVAL’s reform experience, and took into account relevant recommendations provided by Hernández and his team. Moreover, through their visits to Santiago and their extensive exchanges with Marcel and Guzmán (sponsored by the IDB), Bernal and his team gathered significant insights from the Chilean approach on evaluation and performance-based budgeting. These significant changes in the MFR budgetary
‘strand’ mirrored developments in the social policy one, but also offered a striking contrast with what happened in the administrative modernisation one.

**‘A Rather Passive Actor’**:  
The role of *SFP* in the making of the Mexican MFR system

The previous section showed that *SHCP* led the design and legal institutionalisation of the new *PbR-SED*, but it also hinted at *SFP*’s (*SECODAM*’s successor) rather marginal role in the process. According to a former *CONEVAL* official, ‘*SFP* was a rather passive actor’ (IM27)\(^{112}\). In fact, a more accurate image is that of *SFP* as an institution ‘reacting’ against a number of challenges to its authority over performance management and evaluation in the federal government. First, to *SHCP*’s initiative to create a Chilean inspired *programa de mejoramiento de la gestión* in association to the austerity measures of 2006. Second, to *SHCP*’s broader efforts to control the leadership over the making of the federal government’s MFR policy. Third, to negative opinions regarding its evaluation focus, and a presidential initiative which sought its termination. In the end, despite its longstanding experience on MFR, and a series of internal changes precisely focused in enhancing its MFR capacity, *SFP*’s contributions to the Mexican government’s MFR policy were rather limited.

The first challenge *SFP* officials faced took place right at the beginning of the Calderón administration\(^{113}\). As mentioned above, the incoming government backed *SHCP*’s proposal to introduce austerity measures. The presidential decree on the subject stated that those measures would be ‘oriented towards generating savings in the medium term and will be linked to the Programme for Management Improvement, with the aim of promoting the modernisation of the public management’ (Diario Oficial, 2006b). The idea of introducing a Mexican *PMG* had originated in *SHCP* officials’ visit to Chile in 2006. The Chilean *PMG*’s focus laid on building management capacities, and linking salary adjustments to institutional targets. But it also provided *DIPRES* with performance information which could be used in the process of allocating budgetary resources (Zaltsman, 2009). This seemed interesting for *SHCP* officials, who were precisely looking for a means to associate budgetary control and institutional performance. According to a senior official, ‘the *PMG*

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\(^{112}\) Sosa (2001:117) similarly suggests that *SFP*’s ‘role has been limited to ratifying the instruments and proposals that emerge, either from *SHCP*, or from *CONEVAL*’.  
\(^{113}\) The contents of this and the following page are based on Dussauge-Laguna (2013).
could become a tool for saving’ (IM9). A former official adds that it ‘allowed structuring the austerity decree in a better way’ (IM13).

However, by including the PMG in the austerity decree, SHCP officials were entering SFP’s turf. Several of the decree’s provisions (e.g. those related to public personnel management; the buying and letting of office spaces; information technology management; public tendering) were actually associated with SFP’s legal mandate. Despite this, SFP officials had not been asked to participate in the process of drafting the decree. They only learned about its contents once it was published in the Diario Oficial (Official Journal). SFP officials then contacted SHCP in order to become involved in the drafting of supplementary regulations. Furthermore, SFP officials argued that if a so-called ‘PMG’ was to be developed, they should be in charge of leading policy its design and any further cross-national learning activities (IM).

In March 2007, SFP’s Salvador Vega (then Undersecretary for Public Administration) and his team travelled to Santiago to study the PMG’s structure. They held meetings with DIPRES officials, but also with representatives from other ministries and agencies, and some academic experts (IM1; IM4). This was done with the aim of gathering a broader and more balanced impression of the PMG. A few months later, another SFP representative travelled to Santiago to meet with DIPRES officials and Marcela Guzmán (IC4; IM5). The information gathered during the meetings in those two trips was later complemented with the analysis of the reports that DIPRES had produced about the SECG and the PMG in particular. SFP officials took this as a basis to flesh out the Mexican version of the PMG (IM1).

While in the first half of 2007 SFP and SHCP maintained productive discussions related to the PMG and other MFR topics, their relationships deteriorated towards July of the same year. There were disagreements regarding the PMG’s general objectives and programmatic contents. According to a senior SFP official, this happened once ‘it was clear for SHCP that we had assumed ownership of the programme’ (IM4). The official adds that, ‘the PMG they had imagined to be part of the austerity decree was definitely not the one eventually published. This had a focus on modernisation, improvement, and less on budgetary control’ (IM4).
Indeed, many things changed between December of 2006 and September of 2008, when the *Programa Especial de Mejora de la Gestión* (*PEMG*, or Special Programme for Management Improvement; *SFP*, 2008) was finally published. The name of the programme was different because Vega felt that ‘mejora’ sounded better in Mexican Spanish than the Chilean term ‘mejoramiento’ (IM4). Furthermore, *SFP* officials decided to use the *PMG* not as a tool focused on ‘cost-containment’/austerity, as *SHCP* had originally planned. In fact, they used it as an ‘umbrella’-like term, which could allow them to tag the federal government’s administrative modernisation policy of the Calderón administration. *SFP* officials did take the Chilean *PMG*’s focus on measuring management capacity improvements, and its ‘system-based’ approach to monitoring reform topics (González, 2008). However, they left aside both the programme’s focus on linking salary increases with institutional goals, and its association with budgetary policymaking (*SFP*, 2008; Dussauge-Laguna, 2013).

The design of the *PEMG* was further complicated by the actions *SFP* pursued to confront *SHCP*’s attempts to lead the federal government’s MFR reforms. The *LFPRH* included several articles regarding performance indicators and evaluation, but *SFP* had been neither involved in the drafting process, nor in lobbying for its congressional approval (IM20). After the presidential transition of 2006, *SFP* officials realised they were lagging behind *SHCP* on this subject. According to a *SFP* senior official, ‘when *SHCP* introduced the budgetary emphasis on evaluation, through the budget programmes, there certainly was some kind of institutional jealousy. Undersecretary Vega said, “we really need to be working on that”’ (IM20).

Partly as a result of this, *SFP* officials engaged in an internal restructuring process. This led to the creation, in April 2009, of the *Unidad de Políticas de Mejora de la Gestión Pública* (*UPMGP*, or Unit of Policies for Improving Public Management); and the *Unidad de Evaluación de la Gestión y el Desempeño Gubernamental* (*UEGDG*, or Unit for the Evaluation of Government Management and Performance). The former was put in charge of all things related to the *PMG*, and the latter of developing broader evaluation approaches. The new *UEGDG* was both a reaction to the challenges faced by the *SFP*, and a response to its historical limitations. According to a senior official, ‘the authority of the *SFP* to establish a government control and evaluation system is 30 years old. But if an auditor were to ask you, “please show me how the system works”, there is no document
which describes it’ (IM20; Vega, 2008; IM1; IM6). Senior SFP officials were aiming to
develop a new evaluation approach. They wanted to ‘separate control from evaluation, as it
had usually been the case, because that had led us to a very audit-oriented focus’ (IM20;
Vega, 2010).

The reorganisation process was partly informed by knowledge about international
evaluation practices. Some information had been gathered through the officials’
participation in meetings of the OECD Public Governance Committee. Additional insights
were obtained from WB experts in 2007, when a possible (but not completed) consultancy
project to support the PMG’s design was being discussed (IM5; IM20). In terms of specific
national models, SFP officials only revised the Chilean and Spanish cases. The former
country’s evaluation approach was studied during the trips related to the original PMG’s
borrowing process, and mainly because CONEVAL and SHCP had already used it as a
reference. Yet, according to a senior official, ‘Undersecretary Vega did not like Chile’s
extremely budget-oriented approach’ (IM20; Vega, 2008). Thus, the Chilean SECG was
used only as a vague reference for the making of the PEMG (Dussauge-Laguna, 2013).

The Spanish experience was deemed more interesting, although that did not
necessarily mean it was much more influential. According to a senior official, ‘we always
liked the Spanish model because they separate the controllership functions from the
ministry of public administration. They have even created an independent evaluation
agency’ (IM20). SFP officials approached the Agencia Española de Cooperación
Internacional (AECI, or Spanish Agency for International Cooperation). They also
commissioned a study from a middle-level SFP official who at the time was completing a
training course in Spain. However, SFP officials only had this detailed information about
the Spanish evaluation agency and general evaluation approach once the UEGDG’s design
had been completed.

The UEGDG was supposed to provide a means to face SHCP’s influence in the
design of the government’s MFR system, but in the end its contributions were rather
limited. It allegedly created a forum in which representatives from federal ministries got
together to discuss and develop their indicators and logical frameworks. Furthermore, it
worked with ministries/agencies to adapt CONEVAL’s evaluation methodologies to public
programmes which did not have a social policy focus. The UEGDG also developed follow-
up mechanisms to ensure programme coordinators took into account the recommendations
offered by external evaluators (Cejudo and Maldonado, 2011). On the other hand, a senior official notes that the new internal regulations ended up ‘a bit like Frankenstein’ (IM20). The UEGDG had to share evaluation tasks with other SFP units. Moreover, it was hugely dependent upon the government-wide network of SFP’s ‘internal controllers’, whose main responsibility is to ‘audit and control’.

The third challenge SFP faced throughout the Calderón administration was that related to negative opinions about its institutional performance. Current and former SHCP officials, for instance, expressed their concern about the ‘audit’ bias that SFP introduced in evaluation activities (IM9; IM13; IM19). Similar opinions were expressed by interviewees in CONEVAL: ‘they give it more an audit approach’ (IM21); or ‘when SFP checks the matrixes of indicators, they do it through their controllers, so even if it is not an audit process, it is the internal controller who is checking the performance tools’ (IM22). International experts suggested that SFP’s involvement in developing the programme logical frameworks ‘was not good because they biased the process’ (IIO5; IIO1).

In addition to these negative perceptions, in 2009 president Calderón presented a legal initiative to eliminate the SFP (Fócil, 2009; Dussauge-Laguna, 2009a; Alcalde, 2010). The measure was aimed to reduce public spending and improve government efficiency, which clearly reflected SHCP’s priorities. Indeed, according to a senior SHCP official, ‘all these years SFP has been a burden, completely useless; but the good thing is that we will soon get rid of them’ (IM9). While the initiative did not eventually obtain Congressional support, its mere discussion damaged SFP’s stance and room for influencing MFR policy developments.

Thus, despite its longstanding association with the subject of evaluation, and its protagonist role in previous reform initiatives, between 2006 and 2010 SFP did not exert much influence on MFR. SFP officials gained control over the PMG, but they spent a long time deciding the programme’s institutional features, and did not achieve any substantial results in the short term. Similarly, SFP officials spent more than two years in an internal restructuring process which led to the creation of a new UEGDG with a focus on evaluation different from control. This represented a valuable step in transforming the institution’s ‘audit bias’. Yet it did little to change the negative perceptions about SFP’s involvement in MFR activities which existed among SHCP, CONEVAL, and other actors. Moreover, SFP’s standing was further damaged by the presidential initiative to eliminate it. As a result of all
this, SFP remained in a rather reactive position, mostly following the lead of CONEVAL-SHCP’s partnership.

‘A “Win-Win” Situation’: The Early Dissemination of the Mexican MFR System(s)

Partly echoing the experience of the Chilean SECG discussed in Chapter 5, the emerging ‘Mexican model’(s) also started to gain some international attention. Its features and ‘achievements’ were disseminated through the joint efforts of Mexican officials and international organisations. The former tried to gain an external opinion about their initiatives, but also sought to gain international support and legitimation, which could then serve to consolidate their initiatives. On the basis of their analytical and comparative experience, the latter provided assessments and recommendations. At the same time, they used the Mexican developments to enrich their ‘portfolio’ for future reform projects in the region and beyond. According to a senior CONEVAL official, ‘at the end of the day, well, they are banks. They want to sell what they know best, what might help them in their practices’ (IM22).

International organisations were invited by Mexican officials to conduct studies and evaluate the country’s progress on MFR. According to a former CONEVAL middle-level official:

Gonzalo [Hernández] thought that, since we were asking others to be evaluated, we needed to set the example. Therefore, we ought to be evaluated and find out how others were seeing our work. We could not do an impact evaluation, but we could try to find out what other agencies were thinking about our work, and we could do that through an international organisation which could develop the interviews (IM27).

Because most of the international funding CONEVAL was receiving at the time came from the IDB, Hernández and his team asked the WB to carry out a set of studies in 2007. Apart from various technical notes (World Bank, 2009a), the WB team published a paper in which they offered a highly positive assessment about CONEVAL and the emerging Mexican MFR. For instance, the paper suggested that CONEVAL’s specific role in the development of M&E practices could be seen as ‘an innovative development’ (Castro et al., 2009ii:vi). Moreover, it asserted that ‘the CONEVAL model has become a benchmark for
other developing countries undertaking M&E reforms’ (p. 19). Regarding the broader MFR reforms, the document said that ‘full institutionalization is not yet complete’ (p. vi), but:

after the 2005 reforms, Mexico entered into an advanced stage of performance-based management that is grounded on strong institutional foundations: legislation has provided a modern budget framework, sound M&E tools and arrangements have been developed, and accountability and transparency conditions have been created to make most of the changes operational (Castro et al., 2009ii:vi).

Along the same lines, an IDB official has remarked that ‘without doubt, CONEVAL is a model of how to push forwards the evaluation agenda, which is the agenda of the responsibility in the use of public resources’ (Ibarrarán, 2012).

Something similar happened in the case of SHCP. According to an official, ‘the OECD has helped us publishing a book which tells good things about us’, and added SHCP was trying to have a second report published soon (IM24). Indeed, a recent OECD (2009:14) review on budgeting in Mexico stated that:

The government’s reforms [of 2006-2008] have significantly improved the overall fiscal and budget framework and are in an important step in seeking to address the underlying structural challenges. These reforms are also important in terms of bringing the Mexican budget process and fiscal framework more in line with the new political reality that has evolved since the 1990s.

More specifically, with regards to the results-based budgetary reforms under development at the time, the report noted that ‘[i]n its first year of operation, it has made important progress at the national level and has high-level political support’ (p. 14).

The international dissemination of the Mexican MFR practices has also followed channels supported by the IDB and the WB. Perhaps the most notorious one is the participation of Mexican officials in the Latin American network of M&E specialists, which has been co-sponsored by the IDB-WB since 2005-2006 (May et al., 2006). According to a former CONEVAL official,

I think CONEVAL has started to become a model like the Chilean one, and it is widely used by the IDB. It has many limitations, but in the region it is one of the few examples based on a clear scheme of monitoring and evaluation. Therefore, they often ask us to present it in seminars of M&E practices. I remember we went to Peru, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. So yes, it is becoming an example of M&E schemes in the LA region, but also in others. It is also being taken as a model by the WB (IM27).
On SHCP’s side, officials had presented their reforms experience in IDB-WB sponsored forums in Colombia, Peru, Canada, Dominican Republic, and Washington, DC (IM19; IM24). A SHCP official even remarked that, ‘in Latin America we are already famous’ (IM24).

International organisations also promoted the dissemination of the Mexican MFR practices by funding the study trips of government officials from other countries to Mexico. These included officials from Peru, El Salvador, South Africa, and Zambia, who came ‘to know what we have been doing, generally because of IDB’s or WB’s initiative’ (IM24). Along these same lines, a senior CONEVAL official says they had received visitors from Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Ghana, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, and South Africa (IM21). The official also adds that, ‘as any seller, you want to sell. If they come and we have time, we talk to them. And if we are invited to go somewhere and they pay, we certainly go’ (IM21).

From the perspective of a senior WB official, the interest in disseminating the Mexican MFR experience is simply one of the various activities international organisations routinely perform:

What the Bank partly does in the region is to help find and disseminate best practices. In fact, the Bank has been a catalyser of the evaluation practices in Mexico, because it identified good practices and contributed not only technically, e.g. providing advice, technical support provided by evaluation experts from the WB, but also because it identified an evaluation process which had been well defined, technically solid, planned and implemented appropriately, and which contributed to give it international visibility that later translated into higher internal visibility (IIO1).

The fact that the IDB and the WB have begun to disseminate the Mexican MFR practices has led a senior CONEVAL official to suggest that international organisations merely act as ‘resonance boxes’: ‘they are aware of interesting things which are happening across the world; they are in contact with many countries, and everyone takes whatever they want from them’ (IM21). While partly accurate, the former assertion is also misleading with regards to how relationships between both Mexican officials and international organisations work. The comment from a SHCP official provides what is a more nuanced view of this process:

This is a ‘win-win’ situation. This is a topic [MFR] which is booming, particularly in Latin America. Therefore, when international organisations come and work with us, they help us a lot by saying that
Mexico is doing very well. And the idea is that both parties gain something. That they might be able to say: ‘my project (whether it is the IDB or the WB) of budget by results is working’. Or, ‘this is my policy’ (again no matter whether it is the IDB or the WB which is doing the talking), ‘and look here is Mexico which is working well’. And thus they brag about us with other countries. And for us in Mexico, well of course that is beneficial. And on top of that, I do hope that we are improving the quality of expenditure (IM24).

The extent to which the quality of Mexico’s federal spending has improved remains, of course, an open question. Yet the progress so far achieved by Mexican officials in the design and implementation of MFR practices, in a region where the topic is still very much ‘under construction’, has sufficed to put the Mexican experience in the category of regional experiences which are worth talking about.

**Conclusions**

By the end of the 2000s, Mexican policymakers had been able to develop an elaborate set of MFR tools. At the time of closing this research, policy changes could not be labelled as fully ‘successful’ for various reasons, particularly in the case of those related to the administrative modernisation ‘strand’. However, developments in the social policy and budgetary MFR strands had been hugely significant, in terms of both policy design and degree of institutionalisation (e.g. routine application of evaluations, and formalisation of the reforms in the country’s legal framework). As a whole, the policy outcomes of the 2000s offered a considerable contrast to those obtained in the 1990s.

The making of Mexico’s MFR policy in the period covered in these pages was significantly informed by other countries’ experiences and international debates on MFR. According to a senior SHCP official, after many years of following MFR policy developments, they had understood that ‘no country has got something that works absolutely well’ (IM9). Yet they were still able to obtain useful ideas, examples, and methodologies from other national MFR schemes. Both CONEVAL and SHCP officials studied the Chilean SECG. They used it as a reference for various purposes including the design of evaluation methodologies and training activities. They also gathered some insights from the Canadian and US models. For their part, SFP officials drew some inspiration from the Spanish evaluation agency model.
Furthermore, the chapter has shown how knowledge about international MFR ideas and practices was timely and effectively embedded into broader strategies developed by senior government officials at SEDESOL and SHCP. In the case of the former, this was first done with regards to the institutionalisation of M&E practices; then to avoid conflicts in the formulation and implementation of MFR policy changes. In the case of the latter, policymakers managed to persuade the Calderón administration about the relevance of creating a performance-based budget system. Then officials also guided successfully a number of important legal and constitutional reforms on the subject.

Other factors contributed to the institutionalisation of MFR tools in the social policy and budgetary sectors. First, international organisations played important roles throughout the decade. They provided advice and financial support for study tours and training activities. Perhaps more importantly, they expressed positive comments and published favourable reports about the Mexican experience. Second, Mexican policymakers were able to draw lessons from their cumulative experience on the subject of MFR, both in terms of social programmes evaluations and budgetary reforms. They were thus in a better position to use knowledge from policies abroad. National factors influenced the specific details and timing of the reforms. Yet, in contrast to the 1990s, neither institutional constraints and inertias, nor politico-electoral cycles impeded progress in the making of MFR tools.
Part Four

Drawing Lessons from Cross-National Policy Learning in Chile and Mexico

(1990-2010)
First, in administrative reform as in most other things in life, one size will not fit all. Each nation will extract the components it likes best and fashion them into something that fits. Second, too many commonalities and too much rapid policy diffusion exist for policy designers and leaders not to pay attention to what is happening in other nations. The fit may not be perfect, but the lessons, if they are carefully drawn, can still be applied and the dissonance lessened.

Patricia W. Ingraham, ‘Play it again Sam, It’s Still Not Right: Searching for the Right Notes in Administrative Reform’

In the emulation of selected elements of foreign organizational patterns, as in the creation of new organizations on foreign models, cross-societal emulation simultaneously involves pulls toward and away from the chosen models. The effect is both convergence that does not produce uniformity and divergence and variation that is neither random nor infinite.

D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan

[Commissioner] – ‘You certainly had me fascinated. What you’ve told me is an exercise of the highest intelligence; at moments you seemed like an acrobat on a tightrope, with no net underneath. Because, to be brutally frank, underneath your argument, there’s nothing. You have no proof of anything you’ve said. It could all be interpreted in another way, and any good lawyer could pick apart your deductions without breaking sweat’

[Inspector Montalbano] – ‘I know.’

[Commissioner] – ‘What do you intend to do?’

[Inspector Montalbano] – ‘Tomorrow morning I’m going to tell Lo Bianco that I’ve no objection if he wants to close the case.’

Andrea Camilleri, The Shape of the Water
Comparing Cross-National Policy Learning Processes in Chile and Mexico

The previous four chapters have detailed how the Chilean and Mexican governments developed some kind of policy (e.g. a set of decisions, actions, and programmes) on the subject of Management for Results throughout 1990-2010. Chapters 3 to 6 also showed that the making of these MFR policies was significantly informed by knowledge from other countries’ policies and broader international practices in the same subject. This chapter will now move on to a comparative analysis of these reform experiences. It will take as a basis the central questions posed at the beginning of this thesis, which aim to explore the relationship between learning from abroad and policy changes: What policy outcomes resulted from cross-national learning? How did policymakers use knowledge from abroad in making national policies? What strategies did they pursue to advance policy changes? How did cognitive, national and international factors influence cross-national learning processes?

The chapter will show that learning from abroad mattered significantly for the making of MFR policies in Chile and Mexico. Moreover, MFR policy developments in both countries have converged in various respects. However, the chapter will further show that the processes by which cross-national policy learning led to policy changes did not follow the conventional accounts offered in the policy transfer and policy diffusion literatures. These were not cases in which policymakers studied a given policy abroad, transferred it to their jurisdiction in a more or less modified version, and then engaged in a long process of institutional fitting, adaptation, or translation (Westney, 1987; Rose, 1991, 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Stone, 2012). Nor were these experiences in which policymakers learned about the success of a policy elsewhere, updated their beliefs, and then simply adopted it in toto (Meseguer, 2009; Gilardi et al., 2009; Gilardi, 2010).
In fact, the chapter will illustrate how cross-national policy learning differed significantly from these accounts in at least four respects. First, Chilean and Mexican policymakers gathered information about MFR policies abroad from many sources at various points in time, and then used that knowledge for a variety of purposes throughout the policymaking process. Second, Chilean and Mexican policymakers embedded what they learned in a set of strategies, aimed to build appropriate politico-administrative conditions for the new programmes, and consolidate their longer term durability and legitimacy. Third, cross-national policy learning was not a one-off experience. It was a protracted process during which policymakers continued following international developments, took advantage of ‘experiential learning’, and on that basis introduced policy adjustments or new MFR initiatives. Lastly, the influence of national and international factors on cross-national learning processes was not the same throughout the whole period. On the contrary, the way national factors and international organisations shaped policy developments varied across time.

The following pages are divided into four main sections. The first briefly summarises the empirical findings of Chapters 3 to 6 with regards to policy outcomes. It discusses the policy changes which took place during 1990-2010, and the degree of policy convergence which resulted from them. The second section discusses how policymakers used knowledge from abroad and the third section looks at the strategies they developed to advance policy changes. The fourth section analyses the influence that cognitive, national, and international factors exerted on these processes. The chapter closes with some general conclusions.

**Cross-National Learning and Policy Outcomes**

What policy outcomes resulted from cross-national learning? In order to answer this question, one might think about two aspects. First, about those MFR reforms in the Chilean and Mexican experience which we might confidently say were related to learning from abroad. Second, the extent to which some degree of cross-national policy convergence (between these countries, but also with regards to broader international developments) might be observed. This section addresses these two points by briefly summarising the central empirical findings of Chapters 3 to 6.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Delivery Unit/Targets</td>
<td>- System for Monitoring Government Programming</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Revised PMGs</td>
<td>- Special Programme for Management Improvement</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>- Evaluation of social policy</td>
<td>- New PMGs</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>- Comprehensive spending evaluations</td>
<td>- New General Management Reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>- Impact evaluations</td>
<td>- Programme evaluations</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Strategic definitions</td>
<td>- New programme evaluations</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>- PMGs</td>
<td>- New performance indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>- General Management Reports</td>
<td>- New programme evaluations</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>- PROMAP (performance management and measurement; evaluation principles)</td>
<td>- Presidential Goals System</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>- Special Programme for Management Improvement</td>
<td>- New M&amp;E unit and tools at SEDESOL</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>- Budget Indicators</td>
<td>- CONEVAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>- New PMGs</td>
<td>- System of Ministerial Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>- PMGs</td>
<td>- System of Ministerial Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>- General Management Reports</td>
<td>- System of Ministerial Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>- Performance indicators</td>
<td>- Programme evaluations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>- Pilot Plan (strategic planning and performance indicators)</td>
<td>- Programme evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>- Rules for Managing Social Programmes</td>
<td>- Programme evaluations</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<td>- Programme evaluations</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>- Programme evaluations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author
Table 7.1 above presents the main MFR initiatives introduced during 1990-2010. It is difficult to clearly differentiate in which cases learning from abroad represented (or not) the most important motivation and/or source of knowledge for introducing policy initiatives/changes. However, the empirical discussion does allow pointing at those situations in which it did. On the basis of those instances, it is also possible to argue that cross-national policy learning played a very important role in the making of MFR policies in both countries.

We can talk first about those initiatives for which knowledge from foreign MFR practices and ideas did not seem to matter. In the case of Chile, the only case is that of the System of Ministerial Goals, established at the beginning of president Aylwin’s administration, and its successor the System for Monitoring Government Programming (2000). Neither of these initiatives was developed on the basis of ideas gathered from abroad (Muñoz, 2005).

In the Mexican experience, there were at least two initiatives that involved the use of ‘performance indicators’, ‘measurement’, or ‘evaluations’, which nonetheless did not take into account foreign experiences. These were the Presidential Goals System of the Fox administration, which was designed by SFP officials to follow up targets of presidential interest; and the ROSP of 1997-1998, introduced by SHCP for monitoring social programmes (later complemented with the evaluation guidelines of 2002). These changes responded to perceived needs, either to introduce new evaluation tools (the first initiative), or social demands about the need to curtail politicisation in the use of public programmes and resources (the others).

However, for the rest of the programmes and initiatives which have been part of the Chilean and Mexican MFR policies during 1990-2010 the story is different. For those cases, Chapters 3 to 6 showed it is possible to find a more or less direct relation between national developments and learning from MFR practices and ideas abroad. In the Chilean experience, for instance, the management reforms introduced in some agencies during the 1990s were advocated by policymakers following topics they knew were gaining currency elsewhere. The reforms of the 1990s, including the so-called Plan Piloto, the performance indicators, the programme evaluations, and the PMGs were all heavily influenced by knowledge about the British, Australian, and New Zealand experiences.
The Chilean reforms of the 2000s were similarly associated with international MFR developments. This was the case of impact and comprehensive spending evaluations, introduced as part of the new SECG of 2000 (which was also reformed taking into account international performance-budgeting trends). The more recent creation of monitoring and evaluation areas outside DIPRES, such as the ‘Delivery Unit’ at MINSEG PRES, and the social policy evaluation unit at the Ministry for Social Development, were informed by experiences in the UK and Mexico respectively.

MFR policy developments in Mexico during the 1990s were also associated with broader international trends. For example, the introduction of performance management, measurement, and evaluation practices in SECODAM’s PROMAP; and of budget indicators and performance evaluation in SHCP’s new budgetary structure were both informed by NPM trends which Mexican officials gathered at the OECD meetings. The introduction of impact evaluations in PROGRESA in the 1990s, and the consolidation of evaluation practices in SEDESOL during the 2000s were similarly related to international evaluation practices. In all these cases, senior policymakers were aware of contemporary MFR developments abroad.

Lastly, the Mexican reforms of the 2000s in social policy evaluations and performance budgeting were strongly associated with cross-national policy learning activities led by CONEVAL and SHCP officials. The Mexican PEMG originated in ideas gathered from the Chilean PMG model, even if it later followed a rather different path to performance management and measurement.

Summing up, apart from a few exceptions, most MFR policy initiatives in Chile and Mexico during 1990-2010 were clearly associated with some form of cross-national learning. As it will be further discussed below, some of these initiatives originated in particular foreign cases. Yet the links between learning from abroad and policy changes was not generally one of ‘transfer’/‘adoption’ of policy models across jurisdictions.

**MFR Policy Changes and Policy Convergence**

Another way to explore whether and how cross-national learning mattered for policy changes in Chile and Mexico relates to an assessment of how much policy convergence has taken place between the two countries, and how much with regards to the international
experience. While both countries started from very different points, and while they have maintained important differences in terms of policy styles and implementation pathways, by 2010 they shared a number of significant policy similarities. Taking as a point of departure the empirical information of Chapters 3 to 6, and the criteria discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Bennett, 1991b; Pollitt, 2001, 2002; Nutley et al., 2012), Table 7.2 details the degree of policy convergence between these two countries by year 2010.

Table 7.2
Degree of MFR Policy Convergence between Chile and Mexico

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>CHILE</th>
<th>MEXICO</th>
<th>Degree of convergence</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Policy goals</td>
<td>- Budgetary efficiency, programme effectiveness, budgetary transparency, accountability, quality of expenditure, delivery</td>
<td>- Budgetary efficiency, administrative effectiveness, budgetary and administrative transparency, social accountability, quality of expenditure</td>
<td>Medium/High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy decisions</td>
<td>- Explicit aim to develop MFR tools</td>
<td>- Explicit aim to develop MFR tools</td>
<td>Medium/High</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Explicit interest in linking performance management and budgetary decisions</td>
<td>- Explicit aim to develop social policy sector evaluations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Proposed use of evaluations for the social policy sector</td>
<td>- Proposed interest in linking performance management and budgetary decisions (albeit work remained in progress)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy instruments</td>
<td>- Use of several types of evaluation tools</td>
<td>- Use of several types of evaluation tools</td>
<td>Medium/High</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Use of performance indicators</td>
<td>- Use of performance indicators</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Logical framework methodology</td>
<td>- Logical framework methodology</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Budget by results as an overarching framework</td>
<td>- Budget by results as an overarching framework (in first stages)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy direction</td>
<td>- From performance indicators to increased use of policy evaluations</td>
<td>- From performance indicators to increased use of policy evaluations</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Towards increased combination of M&amp;E mixes</td>
<td>- Towards increased combination of M&amp;E mixes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy styles</td>
<td>- Mainly backed by administrative decisions</td>
<td>- Mainly backed by legal criteria</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Main (and most) MFR tools controlled by DIPRES</td>
<td>- Various agencies (CONEVAL, SHCP, SFP) involved in design and management of MFR tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

In terms of policy goals, it is possible to find very similar wording, statements, and conceptualisations about results, budgetary quality, and effectiveness in both countries. The main difference relates to how these various goals have been interpreted. In Chile, DIPRES exerted an important influence over the reform process, including how guiding goals such as transparency or accountability were associated with budgetary aspects. In the Mexican experience SECODAM-SFP, SEDESOL-CONEVAL, and SHCP all took part in the process.
Thus, in comparison with Chile, goals such as effectiveness, accountability and transparency had slightly different connotations (e.g. administrative or social). Moreover, they were as important as budgetary goals such as efficiency or quality of expenditure.

In terms of policy decisions, government documents and legislation from both countries offer similar statements about the need to measure performance and evaluate programmes. These documents further remarked the relevance of linking performance information with budgetary decisions (compare for instance Guzmán, 2005, and Arenas and Berner, 2010; with SFP, 2008, and SHCP, 2009). More recently, the Chilean government has stated its decision to evaluate social policy programmes, something which has long characterised the Mexican experience.

Both countries also used similar policy instruments and approaches to MFR. Although with their own specific labels and technical specificities, both Chile and Mexico developed some sort of ‘menu of evaluations’ to review different aspects of governmental activity (e.g. programme operations, programme design, policy impacts). Performance indicators and the logical framework methodology were part of both countries’ MFR schemes, even if they were employed in different ways. The overarching concept of ‘budget by results’ was used by the Chilean and (more recently) Mexican budget offices, to stress the inter-connections between the various MFR policy components (Arenas and Berner, 2010; SHCP, 2009, forthcoming).

A relatively high degree of policy convergence could be further noted in the overall policy direction that the Chilean and Mexican MFR policies followed during the past two decades. As Chapters 3 to 6 noted, the specific timing of introduction of the various MFR tools varied between the two countries significantly. On the other hand, in both countries it is possible to observe two important similarities. First, in the 1990s both countries stressed the relevance of measuring results (e.g. efficiency) mainly through the use of performance indicators. Yet in the 2000s they emphasised the relevance of evaluating results (e.g. impacts). Second, MFR policies in both countries have increasingly favoured a combined use of ‘monitoring’ and ‘evaluation’ tools.

Perhaps the only aspect in which policy convergence seemed to be rather low is that of policy styles. The Chilean MFR tools have been established mainly through administrative decisions and regulations. But in the Mexican experience MFR initiatives
have been associated with legal reforms, particularly during the 2000s. Another difference relates to the central government organisations involved in the making of the MFR policies. In Chile, it was DIPRES which dominated the process most of the time. Thus, MFR tools were strongly guided by an interest in ensuring efficient budget allocations (Guzmán, 2005; Zaltsman, 2009; Arenas and Berner, 2010). Only recently (e.g. after the presidential transition of 2010) Chilean officials looked abroad for ideas on how to develop MFR tools not related to the budget. In the Mexican experience, SHCP, SFP, and CONEVAL all took part in the reform processes. Therefore, MFR reforms were not limited to budgetary policymaking. On the contrary, knowledge from policies abroad was employed to design MFR tools for administrative modernisation, budget management, and social policy.

Differences could also be found in how policy changes were implemented. This relates to how policy tools were combined in each country (e.g. various ‘mixes’ of evaluations and indicators); how each one of these MFR tools followed different technical specifications (e.g. information included, reporting formats and periods, percentage of budget covered); how each country emphasised different aspects (e.g. more frequent and sustained use of information from performance indicators in Chile); or how tools emerged and were revised at different points in time in each country (with Mexico almost always being ‘one step behind’).

Thus, apart from significant differences in the policy styles dimension, the Chilean and Mexican MFR policies do seem to have reached a relatively high degree of policy convergence after two decades of reforms. This outcome might be due, of course, to many reasons, including that both countries may have faced similar functional needs. Then, it is obviously related to the fact that Mexican officials studied the Chilean experience, and used knowledge from it in the making of their own MFR policy since 2005. This would already point at the relevance of cross-national learning as a variable which affects policy changes, which might further lead to some degree of convergence.

Yet beyond their mutual exchanges, it also seems as though MFR policies in both countries were heavily influenced by how government officials in Chile and Mexico followed developments abroad. This becomes clearer once the empirical findings summarised above are contrasted with broader international practices. For instance, an OECD questionnaire of 2005 found that, ‘efforts to assess the performance of programmes and ministries are now an accepted normal part of government’ (Curristine, 2005:89;
OECD, 2007). It also remarked that the main goals in using MFR policies were ‘[t]o improve efficiency and effectiveness of government organisations and programmes’; and ‘[t]o provide more concrete information to the government and the legislature on performance’ (p. 96). These are features present in both the Chilean and Mexican experiences.

In terms of policy instruments, the same study pointed that 26 out of 28 countries used performance measures and evaluations (p. 89). As for the general approaches, the questionnaire remarked that the ‘introduction of performance measures into budgeting and management processes is not only a widespread trend, it is also a long-term one’ (p. 90). Although problems remained with regards to performance data quality and the frequency with which it was used, the study noted that countries were trying to better link this performance information with budgetary and other policy decisions (p. 124-125). Once again, these are features which can be clearly recognised in the Chilean and Mexican MFR experiences.

Summing up, this analysis shows that in spite of important differences, similarities between the two countries were in many ways even more significant. Leaving aside alternative paths of development and policy styles, many general features of the Chilean and Mexican MFR policies became increasingly alike across time. These included the kind of policy instruments used; the way monitoring and evaluation tools were combined; and the attempts made to strengthen links between MFR and budgetary/policy management decisions. All of these similarities reflected exchanges between officials from both countries, and broader processes of learning from other international experiences on this subject.

The Uses of Knowledge from MFR Policies Abroad

How did policymakers use knowledge from abroad in making national policies? While the previous section showed that cross-national learning strongly mattered for MFR policy developments, this section will now turn the attention towards how that information actually entered the Chilean and Mexican policymaking processes. Drawing on the empirical material and building on previous works on research utilisation (see Chapter 2),
this section will offer a conceptualisation of the uses of knowledge from policies abroad by policymakers.

As it has been mentioned already, traditional transfer and diffusion accounts stress that learning occurs when a more or less modified version of a policy, decision, idea, or model travels across jurisdictions, either because it is perceived as successful or as potentially relevant for solving a problem back home (Rose, 1991, 1993; Dolowitz, 1997; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Weyland, 2004a, 2004b; Gilardi, 2010). By focusing in the uses of knowledge, it will become clear that cross-national learning does not really happen like that. In fact, with the partial exception of those instances in which foreign examples were used as templates (see below), officials did not transfer a specific foreign practice or idea. On the contrary, they learned from many sources in a variety of ways and at different points during the policymaking process.
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<td>- Need to provide better public services</td>
<td>- Performance management and measurement; Treasury’s involvement</td>
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<td>- Focus on results</td>
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<td>- The roles of Congress in auditing the Executive</td>
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<td>and measurement; Treasury’s involvement</td>
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<td>- Performance indicators</td>
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<td>- Evaluation of programmes and budgets</td>
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<td>General international discussions:</td>
<td>Reforms in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Colombia, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Portugal, and Spain:</td>
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<td>- Relevance of ‘performance’, ‘evaluation’, ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’, and ‘results’</td>
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Source: Author.
Tables 7.3 above and 7.4 (towards the end of the section) provide a summary of how officials from both governments used knowledge from MFR policy developments abroad. Each table covers a decade, in line with the way in which the previous chapters told the story of the reforms. As illustrated by these tables, there were at least seven different ways in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge from MFR policies abroad. These are explained in the following pages.

**Using Knowledge from Policy Developments Abroad as a ‘Compass’**

A first important way in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge from policy developments abroad was one which could be associated with the idea of a compass: a means to learn about the general direction, the range of appropriate changes, or an understanding of modernity officials wanted to get in tune with given contemporary trends. The idea of a compass also contributes to understand how policymakers learn from policy developments abroad on an on-going manner, and not just in relation to specific transfer experiences.

This concept builds on Weiss’ (1979:429) ‘enlightenment’ idea mentioned in Chapter 2. According to her, while policymakers might ‘have a sense that social science research has given them a backdrop of ideas and orientations’, they cannot cite specific studies. Therefore, in this form of knowledge utilisation one cannot talk about how Chilean and Mexican policymakers learned about the British NPM reforms, or the American executive-legislative relations. It is about how they interpreted international policy developments and emerging governance patterns. Then, taking into account their own countries’ changing politico-administrative conditions, policymakers introduced changes similar to those happening elsewhere.

This compass-related learning strongly influenced various public management areas, as well as other aspects of the Chilean and Mexican political systems. Government officials learned about the relevance of reforming government structures and procedures in order to provide better public services; about measuring and MFR as a means to increasing government effectiveness and efficiency; and about how budgetary transparency could help them regain public trust. During 2000-2010 in particular, they also learned about the need to better link performance management measures and budgetary resource allocation.
In following international discussions and trends, Chilean and Mexican officials further learned that increasing and improving the Legislature’s engagement in budgetary discussions was an essential feature of presidential democracies. This could contribute to reducing the monopoly traditionally exerted by the Executive power on budgetary topics. Of course, this is an area in which policy developments were heavily related to the political democratisation dynamics taking place in both countries. However, the international experience provided Chilean and Mexican officials with a clearer understanding about why the longer term stability and durability of their new democratic regimes required more balanced relationships between the Executive and the Legislative.

This use of knowledge from abroad was evident at several points in the Chilean and Mexican reform processes. For example, when Chilean policymakers referred to how DIPRES had been ‘visionary’, and had anticipated the public management/political developments the country could face in ‘10-20 years’ time’. Or when Marcel (1998a) remarked that the international experience clearly showed how important it was for the Chilean Congress to strengthen its auditing role, in order to increase accountability in the use of public resources.

In the Mexican case, this kind of compass-like use of knowledge from policies abroad was present when officials stressed ‘things could not remain the same in a democracy’. The implication being that politico-administrative arrangements in Mexico had to be adjusted to how things worked in other democratic regimes. More recently, it appeared when CONEVAL and SHCP sought to generate more performance information, trying to make it available to Congress and the public, as it is the norm across OECD countries (OECD, 2007; Arizti et al., 2010; SHCP, forthcoming).

The idea that knowledge from policy developments abroad was employed as a compass to guide policy changes should not be confused with a simplistic or cynical desire by government officials to be perceived as modern. This might well have happened among some of them. Yet the broader picture obtained from the interviews, and from the several publications authored by key government officials, is rather different. If anything, it is closer to Westney’s (1987) depiction of how Japanese reformers in the 19th century wanted to modernise their country. Indeed, Chilean and Mexican officials introduced policy initiatives and ideas related to MFR in order to modernise, and thus get their politico-
administrative systems in tune with contemporary democratic governance. But they did not necessarily seek to be perceived as modernisers for the sake of it.

**Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Inspiration’**

A second way in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge from policies abroad is related to inspiration, or how a specific foreign practice, design principle, or label which they have heard about stimulated them to introduce similar policy changes in their own jurisdiction (Rose, 1993:31; Mossberger, 2000; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010:57). This contrasts with the concept of a compass, which flags that policymakers learn from international changes or trends without necessarily identifying the source of learning. Yet it is also different from the idea of a template to be discussed below, as inspiration does not involve a detailed analysis of the specific practice or design principle.

There are a number of examples of how knowledge from abroad inspired policy developments in both countries. In the case of Chilean reforms of the 1990s, government officials referred to the Australian experience when talking about the origins of their programme evaluations tools. Pay for performance arrangements in New Zealand and the UK seem to have inspired officials when they were designing the *PMGs*, which introduced variable remuneration principles for the public sector. In none of these cases, however, foreign experiences were used as a basis to develop a Chilean version. They simple served as a general reference on the subject.

Similarly, the UK Comprehensive Spending Reviews inspired the Chilean Comprehensive Spending Evaluations of the early 2000s. Because of problems faced when trying to contact British officials, a detailed exchange between the two countries did not take place. But Chilean officials still used a similar policy label and the broad idea from the British experience. More recently, officials from the Ministry of Social Development allegedly drew inspiration from Mexico’s social policy evaluation practices and institutions (*SEDESOL* and *CONEVAL*).

In the Mexican experience, the performance management and measurement reforms of the 1990s were clearly inspired in reforms taking place across OECD countries. The British experience with performance indicators and service standards served as an inspiration for *SECODAM* officials, and general OECD trends influenced the introduction
of budget indicators. Yet in none of these cases Mexican officials took specific models as the basis for their programmes. Mexican policymakers similarly drew inspiration from US, Canadian, Colombian, and Chilean evaluation practices in the 2000s, in the course of designing a more ambitious M&E scheme for the social policy sector. The experience of the Spanish government, in which evaluation and control activities are clearly differentiated, served as inspiration for SFP officials when they designed their ministry’s new evaluation approach.

**Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Templates’**

A third way in which Chilean and Mexican government officials used knowledge from policies abroad is in the form of a template, or a more detailed blueprint of reference about how to design (or redesign) a certain programme or practice (Jacoby, 2001, 2004; Weyland, 2004b). The use of templates assumes that government officials had information about the specific features of a given programme or practice, and then decided to use it as a basis for their own version. The idea of templates certainly echoes transfer/diffusion discussions about copying or emulation (Bennett, 1991a; Rose, 1991). However, the new programmes did not necessarily result in an exact copy of the original model.

Perhaps the most significant example of a template being used by both Chilean and Mexican officials is the one related to the Logical Framework Methodology (LFM). This has long been employed by international organisations for analysing/evaluating programmes (Aldunate and Córdoba, 2011). In the case of Chile, the LFM was introduced for conducting evaluation programmes in the mid-1990s because DIPRES officials thought it was ‘easy to use’. Since the mid-2000s, Mexican officials from SEDESOL’s DGME also used the LFM as a template for the design of social policy programme evaluations. Although they had some knowledge about how the IDB and WB used this methodology, DGME officials actually took the Chilean version as a point of departure. During the second half of the 2000s, the LFM was used as a template by SHCP to design the methodology for evaluating budgetary programmes.

There are other cases in which government officials used knowledge from practices abroad as a template. In the Chilean experience, the most famous example was the use of the British efficiency scrutinies and performance management reforms. These were used to
design the *Plan Piloto* of 1993 and the performance indicators, which would become a self-standing initiative in 1995. Standard international evaluation practices and techniques were also used as a template in the design of both impact evaluations (early 2000s) and evaluations of new programmes (late 2000s). After the presidential transition of 2010, the British Delivery Unit example was also used as a template to create a new *Unidad Presidencial de Gestión del Cumplimiento*.

In the Mexican experience there are some additional examples of foreign practices which were used as a template. For instance, this was the case of the Portuguese administrative reform plan, which *SECODAM* officials took as a reference when they prepared the *PROMAP*’s overall structure. Mexican officials also employed knowledge ‘off-the-shelf’ about international evaluation practices in order to design the famous impact evaluation of *PROGRESA* in the late 1990s.

**Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘General Information’**

A fourth way in which knowledge from policies abroad was used is as general information. In some cases officials gathered data, examples, and details about other countries’ MFR experiences either at international forums, or while searching for ideas on how to formulate a specific programme. This general information might have been useful to better understand how MFR worked in other national contexts, to provide policymakers with a clearer idea of the topic as a whole, or simply to broaden the sample of experiences under analysis (Mossberger and Wolman, 2002). However, this general information remained as such because of a number of reasons, including time constraints; that other cases were deemed more helpful; or that information was not as useful/relevant as initially thought.

In the case of Chile, the example that can be provided is that of the French, Spanish, and US administrative reforms of the early 1990s. *DIPRES* officials initially gathered information about these experiences, but eventually thought these cases did not really fit their MFR plans. It was decided the British case was more useful. In the Mexican experience, *SHCP* officials also mentioned that throughout the years they had looked at reforms in South Korea, Denmark, Colombia, New Zealand, and Brazil. Yet they did not directly use information from any of these countries. During the 1990s, this was because they thought cultural differences between Mexico and those countries were substantial. In
the 2000s, the situation was more related to the fact they had already chosen another national experience (e.g. Chile) to be the main source of information for developing the PbR-SED.

**Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Training Examples’**

A fifth way in which government officials used knowledge from abroad was as training examples. In this case information about other countries’ experiences was inserted in various materials, such as booklets, methodological guides, or Power Point presentations. The information was used during internal seminars or training sessions to explain relevant officials (e.g. programme administrators) how a certain concept, programme, or practice actually worked in the public sector of other jurisdiction.

Thus, Chilean officials made extensive use of performance indicators examples from the UK, Australian, and New Zealand in the mid-1990s. The examples were part of the methodological guides distributed across government ministries and agencies, and were also used during training workshops. In the same sense, Mexican officials used examples from the Chilean experience in the development of performance indicators and logical frameworks. This was done in workshops for senior and middle-level officials in charge of coordinating social programmes. More recently, similar examples were used in training sessions for budget programme coordinators, as part of the process of introducing the new PbR-SED.

It should be noted that the use of foreign examples in training materials and workshops evolved across time. Thus, in documents prepared by DIPRES throughout the 2000s the foreign (e.g. British or Australian) examples were substituted with others gathered from specific Chilean ministries. In the case of Mexico, the first talks prepared by ECLAC advisors in 2006-2010 did include several examples from the Chilean experience. Yet more recent guides on the subject, detailing how to prepare performance indicators and logical frameworks, have illustrated this with examples from the Mexican public sector (SHCP-SFP-CONEVAL, 2011).
Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Evidence’

A sixth way in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge about policies abroad is as evidence. In this case, the aim was to demonstrate that a similar initiative existed in other jurisdiction (Bennett, 1991a; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010:58). Evidence was thus used by policymakers to make a case about the need to develop a similar policy, to justify and explain to the broader public the rationale behind certain policy changes, and ultimately to persuade other actors.

Examples of how policymakers used knowledge from abroad as evidence can be found in some of the publications prepared by Marcel during the 1990s, in which reforms in Australia, UK, US, and New Zealand were frequently mentioned to illustrate broader international trends. Evidence was also used to underline the specificities of the Chilean reforms, and to explain how they did not focus on solving an economic crisis but responded to budgetary efficiency/effectiveness concerns. The UK, US, New Zealand, Australian, and Swedish reforms were similarly showcased in widely publicised conferences in Santiago (1995 and 1996). The international evidence presented in those occasions was further distributed among ministries and agencies through the publication of books and other products (e.g. videos; brochures).

The series of publications prepared by DIPRES officials throughout the 2000s also referred to performance-budgeting trends in countries such as the UK, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and more recently Portugal and Finland (Guzmán, 2005; Arenas and Berner, 2010). The publications then explained the specific features of the Chilean SECG-budget by results vis-à-vis these international experiences. More recently, officials presented the experience of the British Delivery Unit in various public forums to justify the creation of similar unit in Chile.

In the Mexican experience, the PROMAP’s official presentation mentioned how performance management had become a central concern in countries like the UK, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Spain, and Portugal (SFP, 2010). Chávez-Presa’s (2000) book on the NEP-SED reforms of the 1990s discussed contemporary reforms in New Zealand and the UK. He did so to frame the Mexican reforms in the broader context of international trends, but also to stress how they had originated in different concerns.
Furthermore, in the second half of the 2000s, Mexican officials frequently used information about international practices as evidence in at least two ways. First, relevant experiences were included in legislative reform proposals, to show how evaluation procedures or performance-based budgeting worked in other countries (Diener, 2009). Second, the experiences of other jurisdictions were showcased in international conferences, like the one sponsored by SHCP in 2008, with performance-budgeting experts from Chile, Canada, UK, US, Sweden, South Korea, Colombia, Brazil, Australia, France, and the Netherlands (Pérez-Jácome, 2010; SHCP, 2009).

**Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Benchmarks’**

A last way in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge from MFR policies abroad was as benchmarks, or specific examples of practices which at a given time deserved to be used for comparison, in order to assess the progress of policy changes already enacted. This allowed officials to contextualise their own policy developments within broader international trends. They also provided them with information about how to make specific policy adjustments.

For instance, DIPRES senior officials remarked that they permanently followed MFR developments across OECD countries, particularly in the early 2000s. This monitoring exercise in most cases did not result in specific changes. But it did provide senior officials with a means to know whether the SECG’s design and implementation processes were being carried out properly. In some instances, however, benchmarking activities did result in some kind of policy adjustments. This was the case of programme evaluations, which at some point were modified to include ideas from, for example, the US Program Assessment Rating Tool.

Mexican officials at SEDESOL’s DGME, and later at CONEVAL, also dedicated significant amounts of time to follow up on M&E developments in other countries. This was initially related to concerns about how to design their own M&E system; and later a government-wide evaluation scheme in partnership with SHCP and SFP. Yet in a later stage CONEVAL officials actively participated in international forums with the idea of continuously adapting their performance tools. As mentioned at the beginning of this
section, Table 7.4 summarises the various uses of knowledge from abroad for the period of 2000-2010.
Table 7.4
Uses of Knowledge from MFR Policies Abroad (2000-2010)

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<td>- Design of comprehensive spending evaluations</td>
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<td>- Design of social policy evaluations</td>
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<td><strong>MEXICO</strong></td>
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<td>General International Discussions:</td>
<td>- Improved links between performance management information and budget allocation</td>
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<td>Benchmark</td>
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Summary on the uses of knowledge from policies abroad

By looking at the uses of knowledge from policies abroad, one can better understand how officials actually associated international MFR experiences with national policymaking processes. With the partial exception of those instances in which foreign examples were used as templates, the picture provided is not one of transfer or diffusion, of policies or models travelling from jurisdictions A or B to Chile or Mexico. On the contrary, the image is one of ideas and insights from several sources being employed by policymakers as they made their own MFR policies.

The discussion further indicates that knowledge from policies abroad was not only used at the agenda-setting or policy formulation stages (Bennett, 1991a; Robertson, 1991). On the one hand, inspiration, templates, and general information were certainly uses of knowledge associated with how Chilean and Mexican officials pushed a topic into the government agenda, or how they formulated policy options. But evidence about international experiences did not only enter the policymaking process at the agenda-setting stage. It was used to keep MFR topics on the government’s radar and to legitimate them.

Furthermore, other uses of knowledge from policies abroad took place at other stages of the policymaking cycle. Training examples, for instance, were used at the start of the implementation process. With the policies already on-going, international benchmarks allowed policymakers to keep the reforms on track, either by indicating them that things were being done properly; or by providing them with examples of how to make adjustments. Last but not least, the idea that knowledge from abroad was used as a compass by Chilean and Mexican officials relates to the fact that international experience flagged to them changes which might need to be pursued (agenda-setting); general ideas about how to develop them (policy formulation); and sometimes insights about how to redirect the policy course (policy adjustments).

Summing up, the uses of knowledge provide us with a means to better understand how cross-national learning informed the making of MFR policies in Mexico and Chile during 1990-2010. They show that learning from abroad is not just about transferring or disseminating policy models across jurisdictions. In fact, cross-national policy learning is mainly about rethinking national policies; imagining new programmes and courses of action; assessing existing practices; planning policy modifications; arguing about topics;
and informing and guiding policy changes. All in the light of developments which might be either taking place in other jurisdictions in the same policy field, or might be perceived by policymakers as representative of contemporary trends and conventions.

**Policymakers’ Strategies for Advancing Policy Changes**

What strategies did Chilean and Mexican policymakers pursue to advance policy changes? As discussed in Chapter 2, some authors have remarked that policy actors might develop certain strategies when using knowledge from abroad for introducing new policies, or for redirecting those already in place. But apart from flagging the key role of policy entrepreneurs and offering some limited conceptualisations (Roberts, 1996; Mintrom, 1997; Gutiérrez, 2010), transfer/diffusion scholarly debates have remained rather silent on this subject.

The analysis of the Chilean and Mexican MFR reform experiences, however, does shed some light on the kind of strategies (e.g. actions planned to achieve a certain goal) that policymakers set in motion. Policymakers did not necessarily develop complicated calculations about potential gains and losses. Yet they did continuously reflect upon which actions and channels would be more conducive to turn knowledge from MFR policies abroad into actual changes in their own jurisdictions.

In specific terms, Chilean and Mexican officials devised two different albeit strongly related sets of policy strategies. First, they used *policy building* strategies. These aimed to establish the basic administrative and political conditions for an appropriate design and functioning of the new MFR tools and practices. As it will be further detailed below, knowledge from policies abroad served as a key point of departure for this type of strategies.

Moreover, Chilean and Mexican officials assumed (or learned from previous reform experiences) that a good policy design and favourable initial conditions would only take them so far. Therefore, they complemented *policy building* with *policy consolidation* strategies. These were aimed at ensuring the continued use, as well as the longer term legitimacy and durability of MFR tools, regardless of political or administrative cycles. Figure 7.1 below illustrates these strategies. The following paragraphs will elaborate on how they worked in practice.
Policy Building Strategies

In terms of *policy building*, both Chilean and Mexican officials engaged in four main strategies. The first one was a *conceptualisation* strategy. This strategy was focused in developing a clear understanding of what MFR (and its various tools) were about. Across time, this strategy took as a point of departure the uses of knowledge described above as compass, inspiration, templates, and general information. In these various fashions, knowledge from policies abroad served officials to delineate the main principles,
components, and technicalities that formed the basis of MFR tools. It also helped them produce clear definitions and illustrations of indicators, performance, and evaluation.

There are various examples of how this conceptualisation strategy worked in practice. One is that of Marcel’s attempts throughout the 1990s to propose a ‘model of public management’ for the Chilean public sector. In the Mexican case, an example is provided by the efforts led by Hernández and his team at SEDESOL to build a so-called ‘M&E system’ for the social policy sector. Another example is represented by the publications prepared by SHCP officials in the second half of the 2000s, focused in explaining the PbR-SED and its components to other ministries, Congress, and the public in general.

This strategy of conceptualisation, however, did not take place once and for all. On the contrary, government officials in both countries were involved in processes of reconceptualisation. This was done in response to both new MFR international developments, as well as lessons policymakers learned from their own practical experience. Perhaps the clearest example of how this reconceptualisation took place was when Marcel and Guzmán introduced a new MFR ‘system’ (the SECG) in the early 2000s. In the case of Mexico, a good example is SHCP’s transition in 2006-2007 from budget indicators to logical frameworks (associated with the so-called ‘matrixes of indicators’), as the new conceptual basis of the PbR-SED.

The second policy building strategy developed by Chilean and Mexican officials was one which could be called professionalisation. This was focused in increasing the pool of available knowledge and skills on MFR topics among officials involved in designing and implementing the reforms. Thus, this strategy was partly based on foreign training examples, but also with the use of templates and evidence. For instance, when IDB experts provided training to DIPRES officials on the subject of programme evaluations in the mid-1990s, they used the LFM template as a reference. Another example of this professionalisation strategy was when SEDESOL’s DGME officials looked at the academic literature, and attended courses about evaluation topics during the first half of the 2000s.

Furthermore, this professionalisation strategy was related to how reformers supported broader capacity building activities. In the 1990s, DIPRES paid for external consultants to advice ministries and agencies in their efforts to develop strategic plans and
performance indicators. Similarly, CONEVAL funded some training courses on evaluation for officials in charge of coordinating social programmes, and others for external consultants to strengthen the evaluation market in the country. A more recent example was the ambitious programme of seminars and online training activities jointly coordinated by SHCP, SFP, and CONEVAL, with the support of ECLAC experts. These courses sought to disseminate knowledge about programme evaluation, performance indicators, and performance-budgeting among government officials. Sessions dedicated to showcase international evidence were added to explain participants why MFR was relevant for their organisations.

The third policy building strategy employed by Chilean and Mexican officials was fine-tuning. This focused on adjusting continuously the components of the MFR tools introduced. This strategy was mainly associated with international benchmarks and a compass-like use of knowledge from abroad. It was also nurtured by practical experience in the implementation of MFR tools. In contrast to the conceptualisation strategy, fine-tuning was not focused on defining the overall components of the policies, but in more specific design details and day-to-day operational aspects.

With regards to international developments, the strategy of fine-tuning was closely related to how officials monitored experiences and cases on a semi-permanent basis. This was particularly (but not solely) focused on those considered best practices. Thus, throughout the 2000s Chilean officials introduced some minor adjustments to the SECG components on the basis of what they saw among OECD countries. Similarly, after looking at the American and Canadian experiences, Mexican SHCP officials sought to refine the way performance information is shared/communicated to the public and other agencies.

The strategy of fine-tuning was also related to experiential learning. As implementation of MFR tools evolved, policymakers introduced some refinements in their design and operation. For instance, DIPRES officials took advantage of the cyclical nature of MFR schemes, and tried to improve the SECG at the end of every annual exercise. Similarly officials from SEDESOL-CONEVAL regularly introduced modifications to their evaluation tools as they tried and tested them.

The fourth policy building strategy that Chilean and Mexican officials followed was one of persuasion. This focused in convincing other actors about the benefits of the
reforms, in order to gain their support for making administrative or legal changes; to facilitate reform implementation; or, once a legal change had been enacted, to keep the topic on the agenda. This strategy required from policymakers arguments about why MFR reforms were necessary and/or beneficial for their countries; and why, despite their origins in advanced countries, MFR tools could suit well the politico-administrative conditions of Chile and Mexico. Therefore, this strategy was mainly related to the use of evidence about specific cases, but also with the broader compass-like knowledge from international trends.

Indeed, much of the initial activities performed by Marcel and his team in the mid-1990s were precisely focused in persuading other actors that MFR was relevant for Chile. Hence his writings on how and why it was possible to develop performance management practices in the public sector. Also on how the Chilean approach to the subject did not have to be a copy of the British or the Australian reforms. The international conferences that DIPRES sponsored in 1995 and 1996, as well as the series of publications and workshops that followed, similarly sought to persuade government officials that a results-orientation was taking hold across the world.

In Mexico, attempts to develop this *persuasion* strategy can be found, for instance, in the publications of Santiago Levy (2004, 2006; Levy and Rodríguez, 2004) and Jorge Chávez-Presa (2000). Apart from detailing the contents of the specific MFR initiatives they had sponsored, their publications explained how and why evaluations/budget indicators were essential to improve efficiency and transparency in public programmes and public expenditure. There are other examples of how Mexican officials sought to persuade key actors about the importance of MFR reforms. First, the various conversations that CONEVAL and SHCP officials had with president Calderón’s advisors during the government transition of 2006. Second, the study tour to Paris (OECD) and Canada that SHCP officials organised for Congressmen, so that they could obtain detailed information on how performance-budgeting worked in practice in other countries.

*Policy Consolidation Strategies*

In addition to the strategies described above, policymakers also set in motion a set of *policy consolidation* strategies. The first one was *institutionalisation*. This was focused in introducing changes to the administrative or legal frameworks of the Chilean and Mexican
governments to provide safer conditions for the evolution of MFR initiatives, and thus to support their longer term duration. In other words, with this strategy officials sought to reduce the chances of policy reversals. The strategy of institutionalisation, however, did not always take place once a programme or initiative had existed for some time. In certain occasions, it happened at the very beginning, partly depending upon the opportunities officials had, and partly on the experience they had gained because of previous reform attempts (see below section on the influence of cognitive factors).

The following two examples show how this strategy was used in the Chilean experience. Despite the lack of practical experience, programme evaluations were included as part of the budget decree of 1997 (and later as part of the Budget Law in 2006). This was done to formalise this MFR tool as much as to secure that it would be taken into account as part of annual budgetary cycles. Institutionalisation was also sought with the creation of the División de Control de Gestión within DIPRES in 2000, the unit dedicated to design, coordinate, and implement the new SECG. This was very important because it allowed DIPRES to have a group of policy experts, who could advocate a sustained use of performance information in association to the budgetary decisions.

In the Mexican experience, similar institutionalisation efforts were developed by policymakers in the social policy sector. This was first done through the creation of the DGME within SEDESOL, dedicated to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tasks. Later on, by including evaluation principles and creating CONEVAL in the General Law for Social Development. With regards to the performance-based budgetary reforms of the 2000s, SHCP officials also sought to secure the durability of the new PbR-SED by sponsoring and lobbying the approval of several legal and constitutional reforms in 2006-2008.

The second policy consolidation strategy was one that might be called political deactivation. In contrast to the persuasion strategy described above, this was focused in developing actions to anticipate, eliminate, or at least minimise potential political conflicts surrounding the implementation of MFR tools. This strategy was thus mainly related to negotiating and reaching agreements about the boundaries of various MFR tools, and the roles each actor should play.

In the Chilean experience, the clearest illustration is offered by the various exchanges between DIPRES and MINSEGPRES. During the 1990s, both agencies
collaborated in the making of administrative modernisation tools, and made sure their respective MFR programmes would not overlap. In the early 2000s, after both agencies entered a series of inter-organisational conflicts, a tacit agreement was reached to allow for the continuation of MINSEGPRES’ SMGP despite the introduction of DIPRES’ SECG. In 2010, with the introduction of the Delivery Unit in MINSEGPRES, officials from the latter ministry seemed to be taking measures so that their new scheme did not compete against the MFR tools managed by DIPRES.

An illustration in the Mexican experience of how this political deactivation strategy worked is that represented by the series of meetings CONEVAL’s Hernández held with SHCP officials during 2005-2007. CONEVAL officials knew that the various legal changes that were about to take place on the subject of evaluation would increase the number of actors in the evaluation field. It could also lead to the design of evaluation tools which overlapped with CONEVAL’s. Therefore, Hernández approached SHCP and SFP. He made the case for introducing inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, and shared with them what CONEVAL was doing regarding evaluation methodologies and capacity building. As a result, Hernández built a partnership with SHCP officials; managed to avoid (or at least minimise) conflicts with SFP (and between the latter and SHCP); and ensured the work he and his team had previously conducted would not be wasted.

The third policy consolidation strategy used by Chilean and Mexican policymakers alike was marketing. This was focused on producing and disseminating packaged information about one or more of their MFR tools in national and international forums. The participation of officials in international expert networks is, of course, associated with their governments’ formal links with international organisations (e.g. the OECD SBOs Committee). Yet the empirical chapters provided evidence indicating how this participation related to deliberate efforts by senior officials to publicise their reform experiences.

Marcel’s and Guzmán’s active participation in several conferences throughout the 2000s was precisely related to this. As mentioned in Chapter 5, they assumed that the higher the number of people knew about the SECG’s existence and objectives, the higher the chances of legitimising and consolidating the system. This same reason was behind the publication of several institutional reports, describing the structure and evolution of the SECG. A similar dynamics could be observed in the case of CONEVAL officials, who participated in as many forums as possible to market their evaluation approach.
The fourth policy consolidation strategy used by officials was international legitimation. This relates to the various efforts made by national governments to become ‘certified’, or at least commended for their reform initiatives and efforts by international organisations. International legitimation was thus pursued to show other national actors that MFR reforms were appropriate and necessary. Also to demonstrate policy changes should be strengthened and/or kept as part of the politico-administrative system.

Once again, perhaps the clearest example of this strategy is represented by Marcel’s and Guzmán’s efforts to get the Chilean SECG externally evaluated many times. These evaluations were useful to improve the design and implementation of MFR tools. Yet they were deliberately sought after because of broader political objectives. In being praised by the OECD, WB, and also by the IDB through the active dissemination of the ‘Chilean model’ since 2005, DIPRES officials gained two benefits. In the short term, they increased DIPRES’ credibility and prestige within the central government. In the longer term, they secured the permanence of the system; or at least contributed to it by increasing the political costs of a policy reversal.

There were similar examples in the Mexican case. During the 1990s, it was clear that Levy was looking for the international legitimation of both PROGRESA and the impact evaluation performed to it. That is why he asked IFPRIS (an international institution) to lead the exercise. More recently, both CONEVAL and SHCP officials had their respective MFR tools assessed by the WB and the OECD, respectively. As in the Chilean case, apart from seeking technical advice, officials tried to get a stamp of approval, in order to secure a place for their MFR initiatives in the political and government agendas.

**Summary of policy strategies**

By looking at the strategies policymakers devise we can better understand how learning from abroad actually leads to policy changes. Moreover, a review of these policy strategies offers a strong contrast against the traditional assumptions of the transfer/diffusion and cognate literatures. The image that results from the comparison of the Chilean and Mexican experiences is not one of policymakers who are just busy fitting, adapting, or translating a policy or an idea from abroad (Rose, 1993, 2005; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Mossberger, 2000; Stone, 2012; Prince, 2010; Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann, 2011; Marsh and
Evans, 2012a, 2012b; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013). Nor is it one of policy entrepreneurs merely concerned about policy adoption (Mintrom, 1997).

Of course, Chilean and Mexican officials did invest significant time and effort in making sure the new MFR principles and programmes learned from similar policies abroad were in tune with their own national conditions. Taking as a point of departure the various uses of knowledge previously described, policymakers developed a set of policy building strategies. Their conceptualisation, professionalisation, fine-tuning, and persuasion strategies were all aimed at establishing the politico-administrative conditions that might secure a good policy design, as well as the future effectiveness of the MFR initiatives.

However, Chilean and Mexican officials knew (or learned from experience) that policy changes required from them to ‘power’ and not just ‘puzzle’. Furthermore, they also understood this ‘powering’ needed to go beyond the policy adoption stage. Therefore, policymakers complemented the former strategies with a set of policy consolidation strategies. Institutionalisation, political deactivation, marketing, and international legitimisation were all focused in guaranteeing the longer-term survival and legitimacy of MFR reforms. These various strategies generally took place once the policy changes had been enacted, and were thus mostly focused in securing their future.

**The Influence of Cognitive, National, and International Factors on Cross-National Policy Learning Processes**

Chilean and Mexican policymakers were able to introduce a number of significant MFR policy changes by using knowledge from policies abroad in various ways and by devising several policy strategies. Yet how did cognitive, national and international factors actually influence cross-national learning processes? As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature has produced a number of hypotheses about the ways in which these three sets of variables might shape these processes, either by introducing significant biases, or by constraining the margins for policy changes, or both.

While specific points are flagged in each of the three subsections below, it is worth noting that the comparison of the Chilean and Mexican experiences provide a more nuanced image than the one traditionally offered by the transfer/diffusion literatures. Thus, the influence of cognitive factors is considerable, but less so because of possible decision-
making biases than of how experiential learning might be a key supporting element of cross-national learning. National factors are relevant, but more in terms of defining the general contours and timing of the policies, than as permanent barriers to policy change or cross-national convergence. Lastly, the influence of international organisations is highly significant, yet punctuated by national interests and agendas, and not related to coercion. Moreover, across time the influence of all these factors varied significantly.

**The Influence of Cognitive Factors**

The first set of relevant variables highlighted in Chapter 2 is that of what has been called here cognitive factors. These include rationality limitations which might bias cross-national policy learning, and the occurrence of other types of learning (e.g. learning by doing) which might take place during these processes. The findings from the two country experiences provide some interesting insights on this subject.

In line with previous scholarship, none of the Chilean and Mexican cross-national learning episodes could be considered to have followed patterns of comprehensive rationality. In terms of information gathering, policymakers did not have the time or resources to study all relevant experiences. For instance, Chilean policymakers focused in examples perceived as best practices (e.g. New Zealand, Australia, UK). But they did not study developments in countries like Colombia or Brazil, and only looked at Mexico in the late 2000s. Similarly, during the 1990s, Mexican officials mainly followed OECD experiences. They only turned their attention to Chile and other Latin American countries in the mid-2000s.

Nor did Chilean or Mexican officials have the capacity to gather and analyse all relevant information (e.g. reports, studies, criticisms, interactions with national settings, evaluations) about the specific country experiences they wanted to learn from. As Chapters 3 to 6 described, policymakers conducted just a couple of study tours. These lasted a few days and probably did not allow them to learn about all the specificities of original MFR practices. Only in the case of SFP officials’ visit to Chile in 2007 did officials make an effort to hear critical accounts from actors not directly involved in the management of MFR programmes. Moreover, because both the Chilean and Mexican reforms evolved almost in
parallel to the so-called best practices, officials did not really have the chance to access detailed evaluations about the performance of leading MFR reforms.

However, the biasing effects of the former limitations of cross-national learning exercises were partly minimised by other means. Across time, Chilean and Mexican officials did broaden the number of sources and country examples used. Through their active participation in international forums, they could frequently access reports, documents, and country presentations about other national experiences and contemporary international trends. They also established communications with academic specialists (e.g. Allen Shick), and maintained frequent contacts with other national experts, particularly in the 2000s. In cases where MFR practices had been initially anchored in a foreign model (e.g. the Chilean reforms of the 1990s and the British experience; CONEVAL’s evaluations and the Chilean experience), policymakers later aimed to add insights from other experiences. Lastly, as years passed policymakers became increasingly aware of the main limitations faced by MFR tools both abroad and at home, and reacted accordingly (see below).

The empirical chapters further showed that cross-national learning was not the only type of learning taking place in Chile and Mexico during the two decades under study. On the contrary, policymakers from both countries were able to learn from their own previous MFR experiences. They then sought to bridge this experiential learning with processes of learning from abroad, in what became broader sequences of learning and change. Thus, while differentiating conceptually between these two types of learning is useful for analytical purposes, the Chilean and Mexican experiences also show that they do not necessarily take place in an ‘either/or’ manner. This is particularly the case as time goes by.

These sequences of learning and change seem to have occurred under two broad varieties. The first one, following Hood’s idea (1996) of ‘second-chance learning’ (e.g. the adaptation of behaviours in the light of experience after surviving a ‘shocking’ episode), happened when policymakers faced the opportunity to use knowledge from policies abroad in time\(^2\), and did so taking into account lessons learned from time\(^1\). In the Chilean experience, a clear example of this was Marcel’s participation as leader of the MFR reform process. As detailed in Chapter 3, he was the main advocate and designer of the first round of MFR initiatives in the mid-1990s, but left the Chilean government in 1997.
Marcel had a ‘second chance’ when president Lagos appointed him as Director of DIPRES in 2000. In that capacity, Marcel was in a position of authority to lead MFR reforms. Taking into account the experience gained in the 1990s, he established in DIPRES a unit exclusively dedicated to MFR topics, and appointed someone (Marcela Guzmán) with practical experience on the subject as its leader. Marcel also led an internal restructuring process to make sure that, in contrast to what had happened in the 1990s, performance information would be regularly used in the budgetary policymaking cycle. With the support of Guzmán, Marcel carried out an assessment of the main limitations that the original MFR tools had encountered. This review, in combination with knowledge gathered from abroad about how to better link performance information and budgetary decisions, led to the introduction of a new set of tools embedded in the SECG.

In the mid-2000s, Mexican SHCP officials similarly faced a ‘second chance’. Taking advantage of discussions about a new Financial Responsibility and Budget Law, officials from SHCP’s Budget Unit reintroduced the objective of creating a performance evaluation system linked to the budget. These efforts were led by Guillermo Bernal and Max Diener, Head (since 2001) and General Counsel of the Budget Unit, respectively. Diener in particular had participated in the budgetary reforms of the 1990s. He was well aware of the reasons why the NEP-SED had been unsuccessful. These included the inexistence of strong legal foundations (it had been supported by administrative regulations, not legislation); its incremental approach to reform; and the lack of a clear methodology for building performance indicators.

Once the topic of a performance evaluation system had been included in the new Budget Law, Bernal, Diener, and their colleagues at SHCP aimed to secure the longer term durability of the reform. With the support of Undersecretary Carlos Hurtado, they contacted DIPRES officials (Marcel and Guzmán). They also established a working partnership with CONEVAL. As a result, they were able to refine and improve their initial approach to budget by results (as discussed in Chapter 6). In the logical frameworks for programme evaluations, SHCP officials found a useful methodology. This allowed them to pursue a ‘big bang’, government-wide implementation process. They then persuaded the incoming Calderón administration (2006) about the need to institutionalise the reform through a series of legal and constitutional changes. Thus, in contrast with the NEP-SED of the 1990s, by 2008 the new PbR-SED was fully backed by a legal framework.
Beyond these ‘second chances’ (which by definition are rare), Chilean and Mexican officials do seem to have drawn lessons from their previous experiences in other occasions. Two examples should suffice to illustrate this point. For instance, the introduction of the Chilean performance indicators of 1995 was grounded in what DIPRES officials had learned while implementing the Pilot Plan in 1993-1994. As mentioned above, the PMGs, programme evaluations, and general management reports of 2000 were revised versions of tools implemented in the 1990s. Evaluation tools added throughout the 2000s were also a response to how DIPRES officials learned from the practical limitations of programme evaluations. Changes were then informed by knowledge about international practices.

A similar example can be offered in the Mexican experience. By looking at how social programme evaluations had worked in practice during 2002-2004, officials from SEDESOL’s newly created DGME drew important lessons. On this basis, and supported by the technical advice provided by WB experts, Hernández and his team decided to have different types of evaluations with clear terms of reference to guide the work of external evaluators. When Hernández and his team moved to CONEVAL, this experiential learning was further combined with detailed knowledge about other international M&E experiences to produce CONEVAL’s approach to evaluation. Later on, through their partnership with CONEVAL, SHCP officials also took advantage of this pool of experiential learning in the design of the new PbR-SED.

Summing up, cognitive factors do seem to have influenced cross-national policy learning processes, albeit in a rather complex way. On the one hand, bounded rationality and other learning biases did affect how policymakers learned from international MFR examples. Chilean and Mexican policymakers introduced MFR practices in their national environments on the basis of experiences pointed as best practices. This happened without them necessarily possessing a thorough knowledge of how such practices worked; or about what their real benefits/limitations were. On the other hand, throughout the years policymakers did make an effort to broaden the variety of information sources, and the number of foreign experiences under analysis. Furthermore, they learned from their own experience in implementing MFR policy reforms, and sometimes even took advantage of the ‘second chances’ they had. Thus, ‘learning by doing’ complemented the process of ‘learning from abroad’, and across time produced broader and more complex sequences of learning and change in both countries.
The Influence of National Factors

The second set of variables which might influence cross-national policy learning processes is that of national factors. Discussing these is particularly relevant because, as noted in Chapter 2, several studies have pointed at how they might constrain learning from abroad and the changes that potentially result from it. On the other hand, the first section of this chapter remarked the number of MFR policy changes that have taken place in Chile and Mexico. It also noted that both countries seemed to be converging in some ways with respect to broader international trends. How, then, did national factors influence cross-national policy learning experiences?

At first instance, one could argue that national factors did not matter that much. Chilean and Mexican policymakers did not automatically turn for ideas and lessons about MFR policies to other countries of their cultural/geographic region, as the literature would have predicted. In fact, they looked at countries which were leading international trends, and were thus labelled as ‘best’ or at least important practices. While this was partly due to the lack of relevant regional examples, countries such as Brazil and Colombia have long experimented with MFR practices (Cunill and Ospina, 2012). During the 2000s, Mexican officials did intensively study the Chilean experience, and Chilean officials eventually looked at the Mexican social policy evaluation reforms. However, this seems to have been more a result of the WB and IDB’s efforts to disseminate and better connect regional experiences, than out of policymakers’ acknowledgement that cultural proximity was important for cross-national learning purposes.

Nor did national factors block policy changes derived from cross-national learning in the longer term. On the one hand, MFR principles and ideas did not have an easy arrival to either country. On the contrary, as described in Chapters 3 and 4, the 1990s were very much a trial-and-error period. Policymakers struggled to make the case for introducing reforms which had originated in other jurisdictions with different levels of economic development and legal/administrative systems. Indeed, both countries encountered a number of practical limitations; implementation faced strong resistance from political and bureaucratic actors; and the performance of MFR programmes and tools was not fully successful. In this sense, national institutions (e.g. bureaucratic conditions and conflicts) certainly complicated the reform processes, particularly during their first decade.
On the other hand, learning from abroad did help policymakers to significantly transform some national features. The administrative tradition of Chile and Mexico had long been characterised by opacity; limited political and bureaucratic accountability channels; a focus on procedures rather than performance or results; and (in the case of Mexico) informality and corruption (Méndez, 1997; Marcel, 1998d; Nef, 2003). Yet after two decades of reforms, both countries established several MFR tools; produced data about public sector performance and policy results on a regular basis; and made that information widely available to Congress and the general public. Furthermore, some of the issues they had confronted in terms of measurement, information use, or gaming are also common in advanced democracies (Shick, 1990; Hood, 2006; Hood and Bevan, 2006; OECD, 2007; Mackay, 2012). A recent OECD (2007:68) study on performance-budgeting even stated that ‘[m]ost OECD countries continue to struggle with these reforms’.

But if cultural proximity, administrative traditions, and bureaucratic conditions did not completely constrain cross-national learning activities or policy changes, national factors still mattered. The legacies of the past were important in shaping two things: the original motivations of Chilean and Mexican officials to look at international experiences; and the process of formulating initial MFR tools. In the Chilean experience, the administrative legacies of the Pinochet dictatorship indirectly shaped the way in which DIPRES framed and formulated the first MFR initiatives. In response to what looked like ever-growing spending levels (because of government efforts to reverse poor administrative capacities and social conditions), Marcel and his team looked abroad for ideas on how to monitor and evaluate programme performance. They also thought foreign MFR practices would be an appropriate means to change the traditionally imbalanced Executive-Legislative relationships, and thus would contribute to consolidating the new democratic regime. Performance indicators, evaluations, and general management reports could provide Congressmen with valuable information to better control the use of public resources by the executive power.

In the Mexican experience, the authoritarian legacy of the past would equally influence how and why officials engaged in cross-national policy learning in the first place. The discretional and secretive use of public resources, the politicisation of social programmes, and the lack of accountability mechanisms were all legacies confronted by the Zedillo administration (see Chapter 4). In the light of a broader political democratisation
process, international practices on performance measurement, indicators, and policy evaluations were initially seen as potentially useful tools. From the perspective of SHCP and SECODAM officials, these MFR practices could contribute to improving administrative efficiency, transparency, and accountability. These same reasons were flagged throughout the 2000s, as SHCP and CONEVAL officials stressed how expanding and strengthening MFR tools was essential to fulfil citizen’s expectations about government transparency and accountability (Hernández, 2006, 2010; SHCP, 2009).

National factors also influenced the contours of each country’s MFR policies. As noted above, the design of the Chilean MFR policy components was mostly controlled by DIPRES. Therefore, the search for, and adoption of, MFR tools was strongly conditioned by an interest in finding those which were relevant for budgetary policymaking purposes. Moreover, despite the existence of other MFR tools (e.g. MINSEGPRES’ monitoring systems), it was DIPRES’ tools which received the main attention government-wide. This can be partly explained by DIPRES technical capacity, and by the policy consolidation strategies Marcel and Guzmán developed in the early 2000s. Yet a full explanation needs to take into account the significant informal power and formal authority that DIPRES has traditionally possessed in the Chilean public sector (Blöndal and Curristine, 2004; Ramírez, 2004; Curristine, 2005; Boeninger, 2007; Aninat et al., 2008).

Similarly, in the Mexican experience the contours of the MFR policy were shaped by two complementary factors. First, the participation of officials from SECODAM-SFP, SHCP, and SEDESOL-CONEVAL, each of whom looked at a variety of international examples, departing from different interests and emphases in mind. Second, the involvement of Congress, which repeatedly asked for increased transparency and performance information. Thus, it contributed to keep the topic on the public agenda, and allowed government officials to introduce additional MFR initiatives. During the 2000s, when officials sought to provide MFR initiatives stronger legal support, Congressmen also had the (at least potential) chance to negotiate and modify legislative proposals. As a result of all these institutional particularities, Mexico’s MFR policy evolved in a less homogenous, internally coherent, and swift way than in the Chilean experience.

Other national factors, such as politico-administrative cycles, further influenced how MFR policies developed across time. In Chile, the departure of Marcel from DIPRES in 1997 (and of his group of advisors shortly afterwards) affected the implementation of the
first round of MFR practices. His return as head of the same institution in 2000, on the contrary, provided new impetus to the reform process. More recently, the political changes of 2010 brought some modifications to the Chilean MFR policy. As detailed in Chapter 5, these included adjustments to the PMGs, as well as the creation of new government units dedicated to MFR.

In the Mexican experience, the frequent leadership changes in SECODAM and SHCP during the 1990s had a significant impact over MFR reform initiatives. As new senior officials were appointed to substitute López-Presa and Chávez-Presa, reform priorities changed, initiatives lost momentum, and experiential learning was interrupted. Things were radically different in SEDESOL-CONEVAL during the 2000s. In this case cross-national learning processes resulted in broader and more sustained policy changes. This was at least partly due to the fact that senior officials (Székely and Hernández) remained in their positions for longer periods of time.

Summing up, national factors certainly influenced cross-national policy learning processes in Chile and Mexico. This did not happen, however, in terms of conditioning policymakers’ search for ideas among countries in the region, with similar administrative traditions or levels of development. Nor did it mean the longer term blockage of MFR policy changes. National factors mattered because policymakers sought abroad useful ideas and practices to react against their own countries’ political and administrative legacies. The institutional frameworks in Chile and Mexico determined which actors took part in the reform processes. This in turn shaped what they looked for abroad and how the contours of MFR policies were eventually designed. Politico-administrative cycles also affected the ability of governments to both learn from foreign experiences, and then use that knowledge in the making of their own MFR policies. As a result, national factors influenced the temporal unfolding of Chilean and MFR policies.

**The Influence of International Organisations**

The third and last set of variables flagged in Chapter 2 is that associated with international organisations (IOs) and how they potentially shape cross-national policy learning processes. The literature has pointed at various mechanisms through which this might occur. However, in the field of administrative reforms transfer/diffusion across developing
countries, authors suggest IOs tend to use some kind of coercive pressures to push for the adoption of specific policies or administrative reforms. Yet, how did IOs actually influence the Chilean and Mexican experiences?
## Table 7.5  The Influence(s) of International Organisations on Cross-National Policy Learning

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Source: Author.
Table 7.5 above provides a useful point of departure. The first and rather obvious observation to make is that different IOs (e.g. OECD, WB, IDB, ECLAC) were involved at various times throughout the reform processes. This finding is highly relevant because it raises questions about the appropriateness of attributing IOs’ a very specific role or means of influence (e.g. that of coercive actors). The finding also suggests that an outright denial of IOs’ influence on how national governments learn from policies abroad should always be taken with some reservations.

A second point to be made is that coercive influence (e.g. the capacity of IOs to shape reform processes through financial/political conditions) did not take place. All interviewees denied any kind of reform imposition by IOs. A partial exception to this seemed to happen when Mexico became an OECD member in the 1990s (Zomosa, 2005; Huerta, 2006; Carroll and Kellow, 2011). Yet, even at that time, the use of MFR ideas and practices in the Mexican government’s PROMAP and NEP-SED did not result from direct pressures. On the contrary, Mexican officials decided that international NPM trends (as reported and edited by the OECD) could be somehow relevant to support their own reform objectives.

Furthermore, it should be stressed that IOs involvement in the Chilean and Mexican reforms usually took place ‘by invitation’. In the mid-1990s, the IDB trained DIPRES officials in the use of the logical framework methodology because Marcel and his team wanted to apply it in the new programme evaluations (Marcel, 1998d:71). Similarly, in the late 1990s, it was SHCP’s Levy who asked IFPRI to lead the evaluation of PROGRESA. In the early 2000s, SEDESOL’s Székely approached the WB to support the creation of a new M&E unit, and refine the institution’s evaluation approach. Later in the decade, CONEVAL and SHCP officials asked ECLAC experts to support training activities on programme evaluations. In 2006, SHCP asked IDB for technical support to design its new performance-based budget system.

In the case of their legitimation influence (e.g. certification or praise of reform efforts), IOs seem to have also responded to requests from the Chilean and Mexican governments. This was the case of the OECD review of the Chilean budget system (including its MFR components); and the WB reviews on the SECG’s evaluation components, and the PMGs. It was the same with the OECD review of the Mexican budget system (including recent MFR reforms); and the WB review of CONEVAL and the social
sector M&E system. In all these cases, it was clear for government officials that *legitimation* could be useful. They thus approached IOs, not the other way around.

However, even if the process of review and legitimation of Chilean and Mexican MFR policies did not originate on the side of these IOs, the influence they exerted on policy developments was obviously significant. The publication of reports which praised specific policy components; compared favourably these governments’ approach to MFR with other international experiences; or simply acknowledged their decision to engage in this kind of initiatives, provided government officials with valuable political ammunition. This international *legitimation* allowed policymakers to keep MFR reforms on the agenda, pre-empt criticisms, and delegitimise potential resistances from other actors. IOs participation in international conferences sponsored by the Chilean and Mexican governments was similarly important to ensure the continuity of the reform processes.

The influence of IOs exerted through more subtle and sometimes indirect ways was equally relevant. First, they shaped MFR policies with their *cognitive influence* (*e.g.* socialisation of policy ideas and knowledge). Chilean and Mexican officials revised on a regular basis the comparative studies, reports, and other policy documents produced by IOs (or by academic experts closely associated with them). The concepts, definitions, and methodological approaches of these governments were often informed, when not even guided by this literature (see references in, for example, Guzmán, 2003, 2005; Arenas and Berner, 2010; Berner, 2010; Pérez Jácome, 2010; Caso, 2011). The relevance of this *cognitive influence* was further reinforced by the officials’ continuous participation in forums such as the OECD’s PUMA-PGC and SBO committees. This allowed them to follow up on international trends and the ‘global conversation’ on administrative reforms (Pal, 2012).

IOs’ further shaped national policies as their priorities and conceptualisations filtered in combination with their *executive influence* (*e.g.* technical and capacity building support). Thus, when international experts advised Mexican officials during the creation of an M&E system for the social policy sector and the new performance-based budget, they influenced the reforms in at least three ways. First, building the analytical capacities of the Mexican officials that participated in the project. Second, nudging officials by suggesting which international cases were worth looking at, and then facilitating exchanges with the relevant governments (*e.g.* Chile, Colombia, Canada). Second, pointing at the international
experience to indicate which technicalities could be relevant in the process of introducing MFR tools (e.g. the use of terms of reference for evaluation exercises). While government officials always acted in an autonomous way, they were also keen to listen to what IOs experts could say. This was particularly the case on topics about, or at the stage in which, government officials did not have much expertise on the subject (e.g. DGME officials in the early 2000s).

Lastly, Table 7.5 shows that, as reform processes evolved, IOs sought to reinforce their various mechanisms of influence. For instance, since 2005 the IDB and the WB co-sponsored a regional network of officials related to M&E topics. This allowed them to strengthen their *dissemination influence*. Indeed, it was in the first meeting of this network that SHCP officials met their CONEVAL colleagues, and the latter kicked off exchanges with DIPRES officials. The WB and IDB similarly aimed to increase their *cognitive influence*, by coordinating, sponsoring, or collaborating in several publications on the subject of MFR in Latin America (May et al., 2006; Arizti et al., 2010; Arizti and Castro, 2010; López-Acevedo et al., 2010, 2012). Then, the IDB recently published a comparative assessment of the state of Management for Development Results in the region (García and García, 2010). This might eventually broaden its *cognitive influence* (e.g. by pointing at which MFR elements should be taken into account when establishing a MFR scheme); and its *legitimation influence* (e.g. by praising regional leaders, or pointing at laggards, without the need to wait for countries to request a formal review).

Summing up, IOs have certainly influenced cross-national policy learning processes in Chile and Mexico. But as in the case of the other sets of variables discussed above, this influence has not necessarily been exerted as the transfer/diffusion literature commonly suggest. IOs have not coerced national governments into adopting certain kinds of MFR reforms. In fact, IOs usually participated in the reform process only after policymakers had requested them to do so. Yet IOs did partly shape policy developments in other ways. Their studies and reports have provided national policymakers with technical ideas and concepts. Their consultancies and capacity building exercises have improved the skills of national governments, and sometimes have reoriented the attention of policymakers towards certain countries or topics. Above all, the legitimation they have provided to the Chilean and Mexican MFR schemes has contributed to consolidate them. All of these influences have taken place at various points in time, thus raising questions about the appropriateness of
attributing IOs a particular influence throughout protracted cross-national policy learning experiences.

Conclusions

The previous pages have offered a detailed comparison of the processes by which cross-national learning contributed to the making of MFR policies in Chile and Mexico during 1990-2010. Building on the empirical findings of Chapters 3 to 6, and taking the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 2 as a basis, the pages have sought to answer the central questions of this thesis: What policy outcomes resulted from cross-national learning? How did policymakers use knowledge from abroad in making national policies? What strategies did they pursue to advance policy changes? How did cognitive, national and international factors influence cross-national learning processes?

The chapter first summarised the main empirical findings of the thesis and looked at two policy outcomes of the reform processes. It noted that most changes in the Chilean and Mexican MFR policies can be attributed to information and insights policymakers learned from MFR developments in other jurisdictions, or broader international practices and discussions on the same subject. Then it showed that despite significant differences in policy styles, timing, and implementation patterns, across time the Chilean and Mexican MFR policies became increasingly alike in very important respects. These included similar goals, such as reinforcing accountability or improving budget quality; similar explicit decisions, such as the need to strengthen links between MFR and budgetary policymaking; similar policy instruments, such as performance indicators and impact evaluations; and similar policy directions, such as the path towards a combined use of monitoring and evaluation. This significant degree of convergence further showed that policymakers had been learning from broader MFR international trends, as reported by organisations such as the OECD.

The chapter then analysed how Chilean and Mexican policymakers used knowledge from MFR policies abroad, and suggested there were at least seven alternative uses: compass, inspiration, template, general information, training examples, evidence, and benchmarks. In discussing the meaning of these categories, and how they contributed to MFR policymaking, the section showed that cross-national learning is much more than the
transfer or diffusion of policies across jurisdictions. The section further indicated that knowledge from policies abroad is not only used at the agenda-setting or policy formulation stages. In fact, it might support implementation processes; contribute to keeping a topic on the government’s radar; legitimise changes; or offer policymakers ideas about how to adjust and reorient policies. Thus, for policymakers cross-national learning is also a means to rethink national policies; imagine new programmes and courses of action; assess existing practices; argue about policy topics; and inform and guide policy changes. All in the light of what is happening elsewhere in a similar policy field, with a particular focus on what policymakers think represents contemporary trends or modernity.

This was followed by a section on the strategies policymakers devise to advance policy changes related to cross-national learning. It first discussed a set of policy building strategies: conceptualisation, professionalisation, fine-tuning, and persuasion. These were strategies which took as a point of departure the uses of knowledge discussed before. They aimed to establish the politico-administrative conditions which might secure a good policy design, as well as the future effectiveness of MFR initiatives. The section then discussed a set of policy consolidation strategies: institutionalisation, political deactivation, marketing, and international legitimation. These were all focused in guaranteeing the longer-term survival, use, and legitimacy of MFR reforms, and thus generally took place once policy changes had been enacted.

The focus on policy strategies provided a better understanding of how policymakers connect cross-national learning with actual policy changes. In contrast to most scholarly accounts, the section demonstrated policymakers are not only busy fitting, adapting, or translating policies borrowed from abroad. Nor did they perform a policy entrepreneurial role, and were thus simply concerned about policy adoption. In fact, they know (or learn from experience) that they need to ‘power’ and not just ‘puzzle’ throughout the whole policymaking process.

The last section of the chapter then explored how cognitive, national and international factors influenced the Chilean and Mexican cross-national policy learning processes. The analyses showed these variables certainly shaped how policymakers used knowledge from abroad and advanced strategies for policy change. Yet in many cases the influences of these variables contradict previous scholarly assertions, or at least open up new paths for research.
In the case of cognitive variables, the section supported the idea that bounded rationality rather than comprehensive rationality is what characterises cross-national learning activities. However, it was noted that across time policymakers might broaden their sources of information, expand the number of international examples under analysis, and increase their awareness about problems and limitations. Thus, learning from abroad might never be fully rational. Yet with time policymakers do make an effort to control for potential cognitive biases. Furthermore, policymakers do seem to take advantage of ‘second chances’ and/or use lessons accumulated from previous implementation cycles. In the longer term, learning from abroad is at least sometimes supported by learning from experience, thus producing broader and more complex sequences of learning and change.

The section then showed that national factors certainly influenced cross-national learning processes. Yet not by conditioning how policymakers searched for international experiences, nor by permanently blocking MFR changes. The weight of administrative and political legacies became the main motivation for policymakers to look for MFR ideas and practices abroad. Institutional frameworks determined who and how participated in the reforms, and thus to some extent what they looked for and why MFR policies acquired the contours they did in each country. The temporal development of the Chilean and Mexican policies was similarly affected by national political and administrative cycles.

Lastly, the section illustrated how IOs influenced cross-national policy learning processes in both countries. Against mainstream scholarly assumptions, coercion was not a relevant factor. In fact, policymakers maintained a high degree of autonomy, and more or less controlled how far IOs got involved in MFR reforms processes. It was through their reports and technical advice that IOs influenced in cognitive and executive terms how policymakers thought and acted about MFR policies. Moreover, with their evaluations and reviews, IOs exerted a significant legitimation influence, thus supporting the consolidation of the Chilean and Mexican policies.

Therefore, cognitive, national, and international variables undoubtedly influenced cross-national policy learning processes. Yet after two decades of reforms summarised at the beginning of this chapter, it is clear that with the passage of time Chilean and Mexican policymakers figured out how to use knowledge from abroad; which policy strategies to devise; and how to get through these constraints in order to introduce significant policy changes. The result was not one of complete policy convergence. However, by the end of
the 2000s Chilean and Mexican MFR policies did look alike in several respects. Following their own pathways and timing, both countries had nonetheless arrived at similar points. This was not due to the transfer or adoption of foreign administrative models. It had happened through a process of ‘puzzling’ and ‘powering’ guided by ideas, insights, and examples learned from other jurisdictions, and with the support of relevant lessons learned along the way.
Conclusions

This thesis has told the story of the Management for Results policies developed by the Chilean and Mexican governments during 1990-2010. In comparing these national experiences, the thesis has sought to shed light on a theoretical puzzle which runs across contemporary debates in the policy transfer, policy diffusion, and cognate literatures. Cross-national learning is said to be one of the key mechanisms by which ideas, policies, and administrative reforms travel across jurisdictions. However, cross-national learning is also said to be fraught with several difficulties, and thus to hardly exert any significant influence on policymaking.

The thesis has argued that these contradictions are partly related to how transfer/diffusion scholars think about ‘policy’, ‘learning’, ‘change’, and ‘convergence’ in different ways. But, above all, that they are grounded in the literature’s limited conceptualisation of what learning from abroad really means; the strategies policymakers devise to advance policy changes on the basis of that knowledge; and the various temporal implications of cross-national policy learning processes. The thesis thus remarked that a better understanding of whether and how cross-national policy learning matters for policy change implies addressing the former points.

In response to these issues, the thesis has focused on how policymakers use knowledge from abroad and how they devise policy strategies to support policy changes. It has also departed from a broader definition of policy, and has taken explicitly into account the temporal dimension of cross-national learning processes. In following this approach, the thesis has challenged conventional accounts of policy transfer and diffusion. It has shown that cross-national policy learning is not limited to processes by which a more or less modified version of a policy travels across jurisdictions. In fact, knowledge from policies abroad is used in many different ways and at various points in time throughout the policy
stages. Nor do policymakers involved in these processes are merely worried about adapting, translating, or editing. They develop strategies to both build the administrative and political foundations of policy changes, and consolidate their longer term durability and legitimacy.

The thesis has further shown that cross-national policy learning processes rarely are one-off imitation activities followed by local innovation efforts. On the contrary, they are usually immersed in broader dynamics of sequential learning and change. Ideas and examples drawn from the international experience generate new policy developments, which policymakers certainly need then to adapt to a new politico-administrative environment. This in turn provides policymakers with potential opportunities to learn from experience and diagnose which policy features might require adjustments. But because policymakers constantly participate in international forums, monitor international developments, and communicate with international actors in their policy areas, sometimes insights about these further adaptations also come from abroad. These sequential learning and change dynamics explain why across time developments in certain policy areas, such as MFR, simultaneously show persistent national particularities, and a certain degree of cross-national convergence.

This final chapter will provide a brief summary of the thesis’ main empirical, analytical, conceptual, and theoretical contributions. It will first relate the thesis with discussions about Management for Results in Chile and Mexico. Then, it will set the thesis into the broader context of policy transfer and policy diffusion debates. This will be followed by some comments regarding the generalizability of the thesis’ conceptual and theoretical propositions. Lastly, the chapter will briefly suggest how the thesis speaks to broader political science discussions.

The Thesis and Management for Results in Chile and Mexico

This thesis has contributed to our empirical knowledge about how and why MFR ideas and practices emerged and developed in Chile and Mexico during 1990-2010. It joins a small number of works which have purposefully compared MFR policies in the Latin American region (Cunill and Ospina, 2003, 2012; Zaltsman, 2006; García and García, 2011; López-Acevedo et al., 2012). It also represents the first attempt to approach these specific reforms with a focus on transfer/diffusion topics.
While the general stories told in these pages might be more or less familiar, most of their specific details probably are not. For instance, it is widely known that DIPRES officials went to the UK in the early 1990s; and that Mexican officials from SECODAM and SHCP attended OECD meetings around the same time (e.g. Orellana, 2004; Huerta, 2006). Yet it is less well-known how these officials actually used the knowledge gathered during those visits. Even less, if anything, has been said about the various cross-national learning activities in which Chilean and Mexican policymakers engaged throughout the 2000s.

Chapters 3 to 6 thus fill a gap regarding our empirical knowledge about the processes by which Chilean and Mexican officials have made their governments’ MFR policies. One can certainly get an idea of the contents and rationale of these policies by looking at official documents (e.g. legislation or institutional reports). But that only gives a limited indication of why policymakers thought relevant to introduce MFR ideas and principles. The empirical chapters of this thesis, however, have offered an account of the many people involved in these reform processes. More importantly, they have detailed why Chilean and Mexican officials from different agencies developed an interest in MFR ideas; the sources and countries from which they obtained information; the ways in which they used that knowledge; and the strategies they devised to build and consolidate MFR policy changes related to international developments on the subject.

In addition, the stories and analyses provided in Chapters 3 to 6 contribute to refining our knowledge about how the Chilean and Mexican MFR policies evolved between 1990 and 2010. As indicated in their titles, each chapter has aimed to revisit one important claim about these countries’ reform experiences. Thus, Chapter 3 showed how the introduction of well-functioning MFR tools by the Chilean government was certainly an incremental process, but less because of deliberate decisions made by DIPRES officials than because of several political and administrative challenges faced in the 1990s. Chapter 4 showed how the Mexican democratisation process triggered a first round of transparency, accountability and performance management reforms in the second-half of the 1990s; but it did so through the initiative and pre-emptive actions taken by federal government officials, and not because of congressional or international pressures. Chapter 5 showed how labelling the Chilean MFR experience as a success in the early 2000s was probably related less to a proven track record of achievements, than to DIPRES officials’ ability to market
the SECG. Lastly, Chapter 6 showed that in spite of the influence exerted by CONEVAL since 2005, policy developments in Mexico during the last decade are much more than a simple scaling up of MFR tools from the social policy sector.

The empirical information provided in Chapters 3 to 6 also adds to our knowledge about the relationships between democratisation and administrative reforms (e.g. Cejudo, 2008; Pardo, 2009). The chapters showed that democratisation has been important for MFR because it has provided policymakers in both countries with a motivation to search abroad for reform ideas on how to improve public sector performance (e.g. efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, transparency); a rhetorical background and vocabulary from which they can pick up terms to frame MFR reform efforts; and a justification to pursue additional changes, either by introducing new MFR tools, or by reforming those already in place. The chapters further showed that different national democratisation patterns might have different effects on MFR policies in terms of contents, emphases, and actors involved.

Lastly, the empirical information provided in Chapters 3 to 6 speaks to discussions on how administrative reforms might affect administrative traditions (e.g. Painter and Peters, 2010). The chapters demonstrated that policy changes associated with MFR have contributed to transforming long-standing administrative practices and values in these Latin American countries. While still a work in progress in several respects, the introduction of MFR instruments (e.g. impact evaluations, performance indicators, management reports); the broadening of their coverage; and the increased number and frequency in which these tools are being used have all undermined traditional features of the Chilean and Mexican governments. These include the asymmetrical power relationships between the Executive and the Legislative powers; the lack of public information about public sector performance and policy results; and the discretional, opaque, and unaccountable use of public resources.

Of course, because this thesis has been mainly concerned about the relationships between cross-national learning and policy changes, these important links between democratisation processes, reforms, and administrative traditions can only be flagged here. However, the information and analyses provided in these pages might certainly be of use in future studies on any of these subjects.
The Thesis and the Literature on Policy Transfer and Diffusion

This thesis has made a number of analytical, conceptual, and theoretical contributions to the transfer/diffusion literatures. The first relates to the thesis’ efforts to bridge the preoccupations, concepts, and empirical findings of these and cognate fields. While this has been often flagged as necessary for the future of the field, it has been attempted only rarely (Newmark, 2002; Wolman and Page, 2002; Wolman, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Marsh and Evans, 2012a, 2012b; Graham et al., 2013). Thus, Chapter 2 showed how ‘learning’ and the ‘uses of knowledge’ have become shared concerns of policy transfer/lesson-drawing and diffusion scholars. Also, how insights and concepts from the literatures on policy/organisational learning, knowledge utilisation, policy change, and international organisations can helpfully complement the main transfer/diffusion discussions.

Moreover, the thesis proposed a new framework to study cross-national policy learning. Without ignoring the complexities that characterise such processes, and taking into account previous scholarly works, this framework emphasises the need to look at how policymakers use knowledge from abroad and develop policy strategies to advance changes of some sort. The framework underlines the relevance of three set of factors: cognitive, national, and international. Whereas these have been commonly referred to in the literature, the framework actually elaborated on how each one of them might influence the relationships between learning from abroad and policy changes. Lastly, the framework flagged the need to take the time variable explicitly into account. Thus, it offers an alternative to both the ‘Dolowitz-Mash model’ and Rose’s ‘steps for lesson-drawing’, and as such it might be usefully employed in future studies.

Another contribution of this thesis relates to the new conceptualisations it has offered. Building on the Chilean and Mexican experiences, as well as on previous research on knowledge utilisation (e.g. Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1977; Bennett, 1991a; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010), Chapter 7 has shown that policymakers use knowledge from policies abroad in several ways. These go beyond the simplistic notion of just copying or transferring, and include inspiration, templates, benchmarks, general information, training examples, evidence, and last but not least a compass-like function. Some of these uses are directly related to policy formulation and implementation, and thus to more technical activities. Some others are associated with the agenda-setting or policy legitimisation stages,
and thus to more political activities. Yet in some cases, particularly with what has been called here a ‘compass’, learning about international developments provides policymakers with a general orientation; a sense of what to do or how to think about a certain field or policy issue; or simply ideas to get in tune with trends they perceive to represent modernity.

Furthermore, the thesis has introduced the concepts of policy building and policy consolidation strategies. These are helpful for understanding how policymakers actually link learning from abroad with policy changes. As detailed in Chapter 7, policymakers embed cross-national learning into broader policy building strategies, which are aimed to create the necessary politico-administrative conditions for the effective functioning of new policies. Inspiration, templates, and general information help policymakers (re)conceptualise the contents and contours of (new) policies. By using cross-national evidence, policymakers seek to persuade other actors about the need for new policies. International examples support policymakers’ efforts to professionalise (e.g. train and increase the skills of) those actors involved in policy implementation. Benchmarks, inspiration, and new templates guide policymakers through the process of fine-tuning policies across time.

Chapter 7 further showed that these policy building strategies are sometimes reinforced by policy consolidation strategies. These are aimed to ensure the longer term durability and legitimacy of policy changes introduced at least partly as a result of learning from abroad. Thus, policymakers might develop marketing activities to increase awareness about a new policy, or they may seek to deactivate potential conflicts. Furthermore, policymakers might promote the institutionalisation of policy changes through organisational and/or legal means. Lastly, they may seek international legitimisation, via the endorsement or positive assessments provided by international organisations.

This thesis has contributed to refine our theoretical understanding about the influence that cognitive factors exert on cross-national learning processes. Chapter 7 detailed how policymakers’ capacity to learn from previous reform experiences, as well as from policy implementation cycles, might significantly affect policy changes related to learning from abroad. Despite the several biases which constrain learning and impede full rationality, the thesis showed that policymakers do try to use different information sources; make an effort to broaden the number of countries that serve as a reference; and are aware
and take into account some of the limitations that characterise foreign practices (Mossberger and Wolman, 2003).

Chapter 7 noted that national and international factors exert various kinds of influence at different points in time. National constraints and factors (e.g. legacies, institutions, culture, organisational features, and political cycles) neither necessarily, nor permanently block policy changes. Yet they certainly affect which actors are involved and how/where they look for ideas in the international experience; the specificities of the policy; and its temporal unfolding. The chapter remarked that international organisations are not the coercive and overwhelming forces some scholars have portrayed, particularly when studying administrative reforms in developing countries (Peters, 1997; Bissessar, 2002; Ramió and Salvador, 2005, 2008). These organisations are certainly able to shape national policies in very significant ways and through various means (e.g. cognitive influence, executive advice, dissemination of best practices, legitimization). Yet most of the time they seemed to become involved in MFR reforms ‘by invitation’. Thus, their participation actually responded to each country’s needs, interests, and agendas more than it is usually thought.

In addition, the thesis underlined the relevance of taking time explicitly into account (Sabatier, 1998; Page, 2000; Meyer-Sahling, 2007). This is not only (nor mainly) related to the fact that the analysis of two decades of reforms provides more information than that of just one. By looking at cross-national policy processes with a deeper temporal awareness, one can better understand how policymakers learn from different sources and with different purposes across time; how they reflect upon their previous practical experiences; how policies change at various stages because of policymakers’ (re)assessment of the Zeitgeist and changing international policy developments; and how the influence(s) exerted by national and international factors are not static. While the thesis has not dedicated a specific section to these questions, its findings and analyses might be useful for future research on this subject (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012a).

Other thesis’ findings might be helpful for refining theoretical statements on related topics. For example, the study of how Chilean and Mexican officials legitimised their MFR models with the support of international organisations is relevant for theories on how reform models or best practices are built, packaged, and disseminated (Wolman et al., 1994, 2004; Sahlin-Andersson, 2002; Weyland, 2004a, 2004b; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008).
Similarly, the finding that MFR policies in both countries seemed to become more durable once policymakers coupled policy building and policy consolidation strategies is something which speaks directly to debates on the success of policy transfers (Wolman, 1992; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Fawcett and Marsh, 2012).

**The Thesis and Other Cross-National Policy Learning Experiences**

It is worth asking whether this thesis’ conceptual and theoretical contributions could be extended to other experiences. What would happen if the assumptions of the thesis were to be changed in the analysis of other cross-national learning processes, by using for instance a narrower definition of ‘policy’? To what extent are the statements offered in Chapter 7 valid for understanding the relationship between learning from abroad and MFR policy changes in other jurisdictions? Would the same ideas apply in policy fields other than administrative reforms? The following paragraphs briefly tackle these three questions.

Karen Alter’s (2012) study on the ‘global spread of European Style International Courts’ provides a useful example for addressing the first question. She asserts that there currently are 11 ‘operational copies’ of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), including some in Latin America and Africa. By taking the ECJ as the ‘policy’ to be studied, she applies a more restrictive definition than the one used in this thesis, and closer to the one traditionally used by policy diffusion scholars. The origins of some of these ‘copies’ go back to the 1960s, when regions started to look at the ECJ. While these regional courts have faced several challenges to function properly, they have resulted in successful systems ‘with many rulings and mobilised enforcement constituencies’ (p. 151). Over time, some even have become closer to the ECJ model in significant respects (p.146).

Alter concludes that these ‘regions are drawing lessons from the ECJ’s experience’ (p.150). However, she also argues that ‘Europe’s most important legal export is not so much its formal legal institutions, but rather the embedded approach to making legal institutions effective’ (p. 133). Indeed, she shows how knowledge about the ECJ’s experience has been used in several ways. First, the ECJ take on human rights and war crimes has served to refine regional policy goals (e.g. as a compass). Second, ‘[l]awyers and judges in regional systems regularly look at the ECJ and its doctrines as a guide’ (p.145) (e.g. as a benchmark). Third, ‘legal architects’ have used the ECJ experience to
overcome ‘difficulties arising in the process of regional integration’ (p.151; e.g. as evidence). Fourth, ECJ doctrines have been taken into account for designing the founding charters of other regional courts (e.g. as a template).

Thus, Alter’s findings clearly echo the conceptualisations and propositions offered in these pages. In strict sense, she does not focus on cross-national but on cross-regional learning. Nor does she obviously uses the terms introduced by this thesis. However, the picture she portrays by using a narrower definition of policy is similar to the one offered in these pages: learning from the experience of other jurisdictions is not necessarily about the one-off transfer/adoption of policies intact (e.g. the ECJ). It is about drawing insights, comparisons, guidance, and knowledge which is then used throughout the policymaking process in various ways. Her description of how the ECJ model has spread globally also points at how, across time, the process of learning from abroad might lead towards policy outcomes which are different, yet closely related in significant respects.

The experience of MFR reforms in Colombia offers an opportunity to explore the second question posed above, regarding the applicability of the thesis’ propositions beyond Chile and Mexico. As in the case of the former two countries, Colombia’s Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Gestión y Resultados (SINERGIA, or National System for the Evaluation of Management and Results) is currently thought to be a leading example in the region (García and García, 2011; Cunill and Ospina, 2012). SINERGIA was first introduced in the early nineties, and it has developed along two main phases (Castro, 2009; Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2010). During the first one (1991-2001), SINERGIA mainly focused on monitoring indicators, targets, and objectives, all of which were associated with participant agencies’ plans and logical frameworks (Castro, 2009:6).

At the beginning of the second phase in 2002, SINERGIA’s past performance was revised by the incoming government. The system’s focus changed to reinforce a results-based orientation. Thereafter, SINERGIA complemented monitoring activities with a set of externally conducted evaluations of programme operations, policy design, and impacts. In 2003 the government also started to explore how to link performance information and spending decisions (Castro, 2009:15). After two decades of reform, the Colombian MFR policy resembled the Chilean and Mexican policies in at least three important aspects: the use of a variety of MFR tools; the combination of monitoring and evaluation practices; and the explicit decision to develop some kind of results-based budget.
The similarities in policy outcomes between the Colombian experience and those studied here are strongly related to how policymakers’ have used knowledge from abroad. Since the early 1990s, Colombian officials studied the MFR experiences of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Mexico, New Zealand, the UK, and the US. Yet none of these were transposed or adopted intact. The Mexican and Brazilian mechanisms for evaluating cash-transfer programmes were used as a reference to develop the Colombian impact evaluations (Castro, 2009:19; e.g. as a template). The Chilean and US schemes of rapid evaluations were similarly used to develop the Colombian executive evaluation schemes (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2010:23; e.g. as a template as well).

Also, Colombian officials used the Spanish and Mexican evaluation agencies in public debates as an example of how to institutionalise evaluation practices within highly specialised independent bodies (Castro, 2009:34; e.g. as evidence). The Chilean experience served to compare the functioning of the Colombian Inter-Sector Evaluation Committee (ISEC), and the way it links evaluation results with policy decisions (Castro, 2009:31; as a benchmark). More broadly, the fact that the Colombian policy has come to resemble in many respects the other two (e.g. in policy goals and instruments) would seem to point towards the use of knowledge about international MFR developments as a compass.

In the Colombian MFR experience it is also possible to see how policymakers devised policy building and policy consolidation strategies similar to those found in the Chilean and Mexican processes. The diagnosis about SINERGIA’s performance in 2002 resulted in a broadening of its focus, to include more evaluation activities and links with the budget (e.g. a policy (re)conceptualisation strategy). Colombian officials have tried to strengthen institutional capacities through several training courses on M&E tools for government officials and SINERGIA experts, and have sought advice from Harvard University and University College London evaluation specialists (e.g. a professionalisation strategy; Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2010:24).

Between 2002 and 2009, Colombian officials organised eight international seminars, and several other public forums on MFR topics (e.g. a persuasion strategy). Similarly, SINERGIA published several evaluation reports and distributed those among ‘more than 6 thousand contacts in the private sector, academic, Government and civil society organisations’ (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2010:27; e.g. a marketing strategy). Building on efforts since 2003 to link results and spending, policymakers
negotiated a congressional reform in 2005 which established the principles of a ‘presentational performance budgeting’ (e.g. an institutionalisation strategy). Lastly, Colombian officials remark that SINERGIA is nowadays perceived as a ‘world-class successful model’ by the WB and the IMF; and that its ‘best practices’ are been used in other Latin American countries (e.g. an international legitimation strategy).

Therefore, despite its differences regarding the Chilean and Mexican experiences (e.g. in specific policy contents, institutional actors involved, and temporal unfolding; Cunill and Ospina, 2012), the analysis of the Colombian MFR policy supports this thesis’ central claims. Colombian policymakers have gathered information from MFR policies and models abroad, and have used these insights and specific knowledge in various ways. Moreover, as their Chilean and Mexican counterparts, Colombian policymakers developed strategies to build the administrative and political conditions of an effective MFR policy. They also seem to have set in motion other strategies to institutionalise, market, and legitimise SINERGIA, and thus contribute to its longer term consolidation. Taking advantage of the lessons learned throughout years of reforms, Colombian policymakers have been able to introduce significant MFR policy changes on the basis of cross-national learning. None of this has taken place along the lines of conventional policy transfer/diffusion accounts.

Lastly, the experience of network regulation reforms in Western European countries allows thinking about whether this thesis’ propositions might apply to other policy fields. In studying the effects of internationalisation on economic changes, Thatcher (2007) notes the UK, Italy, France, and Germany have reached similar regulatory policy outcomes in various policy sectors (e.g. telecommunications, electricity, postal services). Despite their different reform paths, cross-country commonalities are partly explained by the fact that national policymakers have continuously followed international policy developments. They then have used this knowledge about polices abroad for advancing policy changes.

Thatcher notes that European policymakers have learned in several ways, for various purposes, and at different points in time. Thus, when reforming securities trading, British officials ‘looked at the US but not comprehensively’ (p. 263), and less for copying than for gathering ‘knowledge of the broad outlines of reforms’ there (e.g. as a benchmark). In other occasions, British officials used the US regulatory schemes as an example to further support their reform claims (e.g. as evidence). French regulators allegedly modelled
the *Commission des Opérations de Bourse* after the US Securities and Exchange Commission, but produced a rather different institution (*e.g.* as inspiration). German, French, and Italian policymakers do seem to have ‘copied’ British reforms in the securities trading sector (*e.g.* as a template). These countries have also transitioned from public monopolies to privatisation, regulatory liberalisation, and the setting of independent regulatory agencies in line with US and British-led reforms (*e.g.* as a compass).

Moreover, Thatcher remarks that learning from other countries’ reforms was closely related to the strategies policymakers developed to advance regulatory policy changes. In the middle of a highly competitive and internationalised environment, information about international regulatory developments served policymakers to build coalitions, explain the risks of not reforming, introduce legal changes, and legitimate choices. Through those same strategies for policy change (*e.g.* conceptualisation, persuasion, political deactivation, institutionalisation, legitimation), by the mid-2000s ‘all four nations had greatly altered deeply rooted institutions that often dated back decades and sometimes centuries’ (p. 4).

In Thatcher’s study, cross-national policy learning plays only a complementary role to internationalisation. Yet his description of how the former mattered for regulatory reforms in Western Europe uncovers similar dynamics to those proposed in this thesis. Policymakers engaged in various forms of learning to inform regulatory changes, which contributed to eventually steer national regulatory schemes towards similar policy outcomes. Furthermore, as in the Chilean and Mexican experiences, European policymakers devised policy strategies. These built the necessary political and administrative conditions for regulatory reforms, and contributed to their legitimacy and consolidation.

Summing up, the conceptualisations and theoretical propositions of this thesis would seem to be applicable beyond the contours of this research. These include circumstances in which one might use a different concept of policy to the one employed here (*e.g.* a more restrictive definition); the analysis of MFR reforms in other countries in the same Latin American region (*e.g.* Colombia); and the review of changes in a different policy field, and within a contrasting group of developed countries (*e.g.* network regulations in Western European countries).
The Thesis and the Broader Political Science Literature

This research has confirmed that an understanding of cross-national policy learning processes is best achieved from a broader public policy perspective (Wolman, 1992; James and Lodge, 2003). By showing that policies and ideas do travel across jurisdictions and produce important changes; that national policymakers do purposefully look for information about specific policy topics in other nations; and that international actors do intervene and potentially influence national policy developments, the thesis has underscored that transfer/diffusion is a particular kind of policy development which deserves to be studied as such (Evans, 2009b, 2009c). Moreover, the research has proved the usefulness of framing the analysis on existing scholarship on the subject (Page, 2000). On the other hand, the thesis allows seeing that it would be rather difficult to discuss ‘learning’, ‘change’, ‘influence’, or ‘uses of knowledge’ without referring to the concepts and theoretical statements provided by the broader political science literature.

The findings from this research similarly point at how a particular transfer/diffusion study might contribute to more general public policy discussions. For instance, the thesis has flagged how policy consolidation is a highly relevant component of these reform processes. Of course, some authors have already noted that policies need to be ‘legitimised’ once they have been devised and approved (e.g. Page, 2012a; Peters, 2012). Yet traditional policy cycle/stages approaches usually suggest policy formulation is followed by implementation, with the latter representing mainly a series of activities focused on ensuring a smooth day-to-day operation (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). The Chilean and Mexican MFR experiences, however, unveiled that policymakers develop a number of strategies in parallel to policy implementation. This was to ensure policies would not be reversed or eliminated. Therefore, just as some scholars have recently turned their attention to questions of policy dismantling (Bauer, et al., 2012), future public policy studies may explore in more detail the relevance and implications of policy consolidation.

In addition, the thesis’ findings are useful to revisit some of the most cited theories on policy learning/change (Bennett and Howlett, 1992). With regards to Heclo’s (2010) classic research, the thesis clearly supports his view of ‘learning’ as the central contributing factor to policy changes. It also reiterates the relevance of policy legacies, and how they might condition policymakers’ decisions (e.g. by triggering reactions against previous policies). Similarly, it underlines the prominent place occupied by ‘administrators’.
However, in the experiences studied here there were no ‘policy middlemen’. In fact, the latter’s role seem to have been performed partly by senior officials (e.g. as people who are capable of sensing changes around), and partly by international organisations (e.g. as external agents with knowledge and capacity to connect developments across jurisdictions). Moreover, ‘puzzling’ certainly occupied a central place in the Chilean and Mexican stories. But the contributions that knowledge from policies abroad and experiential learning made to policy changes were significantly conditioned by policymakers’ capacity to ‘power’ (e.g. develop strategies).

Regarding Hall’s (1993) propositions about social learning, paradigms and change in the economic policy field, this research has found both similarities and inconsistencies. The emergence of evaluation, performance indicators, and a focus on results as central features of administrative modernisation policies do seem to possess some of the properties of what Hall calls a ‘paradigmatic change’. First, MFR reforms have been associated with an ideational shift about the way in which public organisations and programmes should be managed, best illustrated by contemporary debates on the NPM (Hood, 1991; Christensen and Laegreid, 2010). Second, the rise of MFR ideas and practices do seem to have represented a reaction against the ‘anomalies’ accumulated in Chile’s and Mexico’s past (e.g. opacity, low levels of accountability, discretionary and/or inefficient use of public resources). However, in both experiences, the process of learning about MFR did not follow a sequence of first, second, and third order changes. In fact, changes in policy settings, instruments, and goals often took place at the same time, or in reverse order than that suggested by Hall. Furthermore, adjustments to these three levels of change continued happening across time in both nations, associated with how policymakers followed and learned from new international policy developments.

A last important reference is that of Sabatier’s (1988, 1993) advocacy coalitions approach to policy learning and change. The thesis shares with the latter the relevance of looking at policy changes ‘over a decade or more’ for understanding how policies change and how much they do so because of learning. In both Sabatier’s model and this research’s findings, policymakers seek to learn, and actively ‘advocate’ and develop strategies for producing policy changes. Yet this research did not really found well demarcated ‘advocacy coalitions’ for/against a given policy subject. It was possible to find some groups of reformers, who then had to persuade/act against groups of sceptical actors. But it would
be difficult to assert the latter really formed part of a ‘coalition’ with clear ‘beliefs’ and ‘strategies’. More importantly, the most significant changes in policy did not come from external conditions (e.g. economy or political cycles, as suggested by Sabatier). In fact, they happened because of how Chilean and Mexican policymakers learned from policies abroad and used this knowledge, sometimes taking advantage of broader processes of political transformation.

Summing up, the thesis findings are not only relevant for the transfer/diffusion literatures within which they have been framed. The research also speaks directly to the broader Political Science literature. It does so by pointing at some policy topics which might be worth exploring in more detail; and by offering a contrasting image to existing theories about policy learning and change.

**The Thesis and the Puzzle of Cross-National Policy Learning**

In discussing whether and how cross-national policy learning matters for policy changes in Chile and Mexico, this thesis has certainly found evidence which sides with claims about how learning from abroad is fraught with difficulties. Policymakers do face cognitive biases; lack time and resources to study international experiences; and confront important political and administrative challenges. They sometimes fail in their efforts to introduce or sustain policy changes, and sometimes simply manage to make superficial modifications in policy ‘talk’ or ‘labels’.

Yet the thesis has also found that cross-national learning might bring about significant policy changes, in time even leading to some degree of cross-national convergence. This does not necessarily occur through the transfer or diffusion of policies or models intact. It happens through policymakers’ use of knowledge from abroad in many ways and at various stages of the policymaking process. Policy changes are neither secured once policy elements are adopted, nor complete when the process of adaptation to a receiving environment starts. In fact, policymakers need to devise strategies to ensure policies will be effective, legitimate, and durable. Full policy convergence does not happen, but neither does absolute divergence. Across time, through sequences of learning and change, policymakers learn how to overcome cognitive biases and national barriers; how to combine experiential learning and knowledge from policies abroad; and how to better fit
policies to their national conditions, while also keeping them in tune with international policy developments.

Future studies will need to discuss the extent to which this thesis’ empirical findings, conceptual propositions, and theoretical claims have contributed to answering this puzzle. It is certainly difficult to predict how much those studies will converge around the contents of these pages. Yet if scholars make some use of the knowledge included here, then our collective understanding of whether and how cross-national policy learning matters for policymaking will probably have changed for good.
List of Interviews

CHILE

IC1  Academic Expert, Institute of Public Administration, August 18, 2009.
IC2  Academic Expert, Institute of Public Administration, August 18, 2009.
IC3  Academic Expert, Institute of Public Administration, August 20, 2009.
IC4  Former Senior Official, DIPRES, August 21, 2009.
IC5  Former Middle-Level Official, CIMGP, August 24, 2009.
IC12 Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, August 28, 2009.
IC13 Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, August 31, 2009.
IC14 Former Senior Official, DIPRES, September 1, 2009.
IC15 Academic Expert, University of Chile, September 2, 2009.
IC16 Senior Official, Civil Service Unit, September 2, 2009.
IC17 Former Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, September 2, 2009.
IC19 Former Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, September 10, 2009.
IC20 Former Senior Official, DIPRES, November 4, 2011.
IC21 Former Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, November 8, 2011.
IC22 Former Middle-Level Official, MIDEPLAN, November 8, 2011.
IC23 Former Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, November 9, 2011.
IC24 Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, November 10, 2011
IC25 Former Senior Official, DIPRES, November 11, 2011.
IC26 Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, November 14, 2011.
IC27 Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, November 14, 2011.
IC28 Middle-Level Official, MINSEGPRES, November 16, 2011.
IC29 Former Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, November 17, 2011.
IC30 Former Senior Official, Budget Office, November 17, 2011.
## MEXICO

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## INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

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<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>November 8, 2011</td>
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