

The London School of Economics and Political Science

‘Women Can Do What Men Can Do’: The causes and consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour in Kitwe, Zambia

Alice Evans

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Abstract

This thesis explores the causes and consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour in Kitwe, Zambia. It examines the relationship between four contemporary trends (1990-2011): worsening economic security, growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour in the form of increasing female labour force participation and occupational desegregation, and the weakening of gender stereotypes. The evidence for these trends comes from census data, earlier ethnographies and my own qualitative research (April 2010 – March 2011). The analysis draws upon a theoretical framework that interprets sex-differentiated practices as resulting from internalised gender stereotypes, cultural expectations and patterns of resource access.

The substantive chapters of the thesis consider alternative hypotheses. Did worsening economic security trigger flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which then weakened gender stereotypes (Chapter 4)? Alternatively, was such flexibility actually contingent upon a prior rejection of gender stereotypes, due to particular formative experiences (Chapter 5) or gender sensitisation (Chapter 6)?

This thesis argues that worsening economic security led many families to sacrifice the social gains accrued by complying with cultural expectations of gender divisions of labour in exchange for the financial benefits of female labour force participation. But occupational desegregation is partly attributed to a prior rejection of gender stereotypes.

Flexibility in gender divisions of labour seems to undermine gender stereotypes and related status inequalities, by enabling exposure to a critical mass of women performing roles that they were previously presumed to be incapable and that are valorised because they were historically performed by men.

Common forms of gender sensitisation in Zambia were rarely said to be independently persuasive; impact generally appears contingent upon exposure to a critical mass of women in socially valued domains. Sensitisation also seems more effective when it enables participants to see that others also endorse gender equality. This can increase confidence in the objective validity of one's own egalitarian beliefs and also shift cultural expectations.

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Any errors are mine alone.

Introduction

'Women can do what men can do' (translated) has become a popular slogan of gender equality in Kitwe, Zambia. This thesis explores the causes and consequences of increasing flexibility in gender divisions of labour (both in terms of rising female labour force participation and occupational desegregation), in the context of related theoretical debates about change and continuity in gender beliefs and practices.

This ethnographic research began just as the price of copper was rebounding, after the global financial crisis that had halted mining activities, induced mass layoffs and stalled development more broadly. By 2010, work contracts were resuming. Yet notwithstanding Zambia's impressive macro-economic resurgence and reclassification as a middle-income country, employment generation has not kept pace. Current despair at widespread economic insecurity contrasts with nostalgic (somewhat distorted) recollection of an earlier time of decent work and 'cradle to grave' social protection.

The fluctuating price of its chief export has not only shaped the Zambian Copperbelt's economic fortunes but also its cultural and political landscape. This includes the sense of self-confidence and modernity enjoyed in the early decades of independence, as well as subsequent political agitation, which catalysed both the shift to multipartyism in 1991 and also the more recent opposition victory in September 2011. Kitwe, the largest city on the Copperbelt, has played host to these developments.

The rich copper deposits on the Zambian Copperbelt have historically been mined, managed and administered by men – as wage labourers, breadwinners, trade union officials, civil servants and politicians. This pattern also holds for related industries and financial gains therein. Accordingly, Zambia fares comparatively poorly in composite indicators of gender parity in education, health, as well as political and labour force participation. It scores 114th (out of 135 countries) on the World Economic Forum's (2012) Gender Gap Index and 163rd (out of 186 countries) on the United Nations Development Programme's (2012) Gender Inequality Index. However, there is growing endorsement of women's incursions into hitherto male-dominated sectors of the economy and politics. The ratio of estimated female-to-male earned income increased from 0.56 in 2006 to 0.64 in 2012. The proportion of female legislators, senior officials and managers is also growing, from 6% in 2006 to 23% in 2012 (World Economic Forum, 2006:143, 2012:360). Why is this happening? And to what extent does this erosion of gender divisions of labour erode gender status beliefs? By 'gender status beliefs' I mean the presumption that men are typically more suited to positions of authority and more deserving of esteem, respect and deference.

The Copperbelt provides an apt location for an analysis of the causes and consequences of changing gender divisions of labour. Earlier ethnographic accounts – from the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, the first anthropological facility established in an African colony – provide detailed descriptions of historic gender roles and relations, as well as pertinent macro-structural factors. The extent to which gender divisions of labour have changed over time can be ascertained from recent Demographic and Health Surveys, censuses and academic literature.

Part of my fieldwork involved examining the impact of exposure to egalitarian discourses. The vast majority of Kitwe's residents have heard of women's rights as a result of widespread gender sensitisation programmes. For instance, gender equality is an examined component of the Zambian secondary school curriculum. Those who have left school are similarly likely to hear egalitarian discourses, such as from radio discussions led by donor-financed Non-Governmental Organisations. At the time of fieldwork, Kitwe was also the national headquarters of the Zambia National Marketeers' Association. Like their elected counterparts in Local Government and trade unions, many market leaders attend workshops to discuss gender issues. This broad exposure enables a comparative exploration of the role of gender sensitisation in promoting egalitarian gender beliefs.

The data presented is analysed by drawing upon the theoretical framework outlined below.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

This chapter begins by presenting a theoretical framework for analysing the gender structure of a society. Following a number of scholars (including Hollander et al, 2011; Martin, 2004; Ridgeway, 2011; Risman and Davis, forthcoming), this structure is conceptualised as comprising three levels. The first level concerns individuals' self-perceptions and their internalised gender stereotypes about men and women in general. The second level relates to cultural expectations in social contexts: how a man or woman anticipates that others in their society will endorse or condemn their behaviour on the basis of their presumed sex category. In addition to these gender beliefs, the third level is the sex-differentiated pattern of resource access, relating to labour markets, laws and public policies. This theoretical framework is subsequently used to conceptualise the causes and consequences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Key questions for investigation concern how the different levels interact and which is analytically primary.

The second half of Chapter 1 explores literature on the impact of flexibility in gender divisions of labour on gender beliefs and practices, relative to other influences such as association and gender sensitisation. A key concept raised in this discussion is 'exposure', i.e. to egalitarian discourses and practices. It also considers the comparative importance of 'interests', e.g. the significance of desires for social respect and financial security. The aim here is to identify outstanding questions to guide the empirical research and analysis thereof.

Chapter 2: Methodology

This chapter describes the research methodology and efforts taken to improve the accuracy of my analysis. It further details four examples of life histories, in which participants identify salient dynamics: worsening economic security, paid work, association, formative experiences, exposure to role models and gender sensitisation. These emergent themes are then interrogated over the subsequent chapters, so as to ascertain their broader significance.

Chapter 3: A Gendered History of the Copperbelt (c.1900-1990)

This chapter examines historical shifts in gender divisions of labour (c.1900-1990). It considers the following sub-questions:

- Historically, what caused certain domains to become male-dominated, and to be perceived as only appropriate for men?
- What have been the consequences of gender divisions of labour?

Drawing on historical ethnographies and participant life histories, I suggest that gender stereotypes of female housewife and male breadwinner emerged in response to imported Christian ideologies, colonial-capitalist concerns and an economic climate that largely enabled men to provide for their families on their own. Responding to the questions raised in Chapter 1, the analysis attempts to identify the interactions between and effects of internalised beliefs, cultural expectations and patterns of resource access. Macro-level changes impacting on the latter are a key recurrent theme over this historical period.

Reflecting back on earlier periods, informants suggested that as a consequence of gender divisions of labour, people had limited first-hand evidence of women's competence in employment and politics. Accordingly, women were often underrated and overlooked. These gender stereotypes appear to have perpetuated gender divisions of labour. Besides exposure, participants also underscored the importance of macro-economic circumstances and men's interests in perpetuating gender divisions of labour and in turn gender status inequalities. The aim of this historical investigation is to contextualise and provide insights into contemporary trends.

Chapter 4: Paid Work in a Context of Economic Insecurity

This chapter begins by setting out four contemporary trends: worsening economic security, increasing female employment, occupational desegregation, and a weakening of gender stereotypes, relating to competence and status. A range of quantitative data, qualitative research and different domains of gender relations are included in order to interrogate claims made. Key research sub-questions include:

- What is the relationship between worsening economic security and increasing flexibility in gender divisions of labour, i.e. women's growing involvement in paid work, and those occupations that were historically male-dominated?
- To what extent has flexibility in gender divisions of labour weakened gender stereotypes, relating to competence and status?

The hypothesis put forward in this chapter is that worsening economic security is a key cause of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This macro-level change shifted interests, leading people to sacrifice the social benefits gained from compliance with cultural expectations in exchange for the economic gains derived from female labour force participation. While most women have turned to stereotypically feminine occupations, growing numbers are pursuing occupations that were previously dominated by men (such as being a miner, electrician or mechanic). Prolonged exposure to women undertaking activities that are both socially valued and previously presumed to be beyond their capabilities appears to provide disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes, concerning both competence and status.

The central hypothesis put forward in this chapter is that worsening economic security increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which in turn weakened gender status beliefs. The subsequent chapters in this thesis explore other possible explanations for the latter two contemporary trends.

Chapter 5: Formative Experiences

Reflecting a theme stressed by participants, as well as academic literature that theorises individuals' development of gender beliefs, this chapter considers the impact of formative experiences (i.e. education and family background). It seeks to answer the following research sub-questions:

- Was worsening economic security sufficient for occupational desegregation or did those who pursue stereotypically masculine jobs already reject gender stereotypes, due to their formative experiences?
- Which formative experiences influence support for flexibility of gender divisions of labour?
- To what extent do the beliefs that individuals develop during their formative years influence their subsequent support for flexibility of gender divisions of labour?

While worsening economic security appears to have been sufficient for increased female labour force participation, those undertaking stereotypically masculine occupations tended to emphasise their prior exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Many emphasised the importance of co-education, where they learnt that girls can perform equally in tests and became accustomed to working together. Other pivotal experiences mentioned were growing up in households financially supported by women and seeing women successfully undertaking non-stereotypical work.

Conversely, participants who resisted women's encroachment into historically male-dominated domains tended to have grown up in homes with a gender division of labour, and had seen insufficient subsequent evidence to disconfirm their gender stereotypes. Early life experiences thus seem to shape the way in which Copperbelt residents interpret contemporary performances of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Although formative experiences do seem to bias subsequent perceptions, there is evidence that attitudes towards flexibility in gender divisions of labour can change within a generational cohort.

Chapter 6: Gender Sensitisation

This chapter considers whether changes in gender divisions of labour were primarily caused by changes in gender beliefs, owing to exposure to egalitarian discourses. This contrasts with the claim made in Chapter 4, that worsening economic security was the primary cause of increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which in turn was sufficient to weaken gender stereotypes. Broadly, it examines:

- Has gender sensitisation weakened gender stereotypes, relating to competence and status, thereby accounting for increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour and greater status equality?
- Are abstract messages of equality commonly interpreted as disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs?

This chapter begins by presenting evidence in support of the hypothesis that gender sensitisation can enable people to rethink their internalised status beliefs, enhance confidence in pre-existing beliefs and also revise their cultural expectations. Participants

seemed most receptive to gender sensitisation when they were able to make sense of it through first-hand evidence of its veracity. In the Copperbelt, experience of flexibility of gender divisions of labour seems particularly significant in this respect. Others, without such exposure, tended to find gender sensitisation unconvincing. This seems to be primarily because common modes of gender sensitisation provide neither safe spaces to critically reflect upon internalised stereotypes nor reason to change cultural expectations about what kinds of behaviour will be applauded by others.

In summary, a chief aim of this thesis is to ascertain the extent to which greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour is primarily a cause or consequence of the erosion of gender status inequalities and related beliefs. As outlined above, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 consider different hypotheses; this is intended to assess their relative influence and should not be read as denying the possibility (or likelihood) that all these factors have exerted some influence.

1. Theoretical Framework

This chapter sets out the theoretical framework that will be used to examine the causes and consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. It considers three main influences upon sex-differentiated practices. First, an individual's internalised gender beliefs (their self-perceptions and gender stereotypes about others). Second, their cultural expectations, about what kinds of behaviour will be endorsed or condemned by others. Third, patterns of resource access: for example resulting from labour markets, laws and public policies. This thesis will discuss the interplay between and relative significance of these three influences, in relation to the causes and consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Central to this thesis is the concept of gender divisions of labour. This can be broadly defined as the tendency of men and women in a particular social context to perform different tasks. Benería (1979:210) suggests that 'the most basic division is between domestic and non-domestic labour', though adds that this analytical distinction obscures more than it informs because the two kinds of activities are so interrelated, especially in non-marketised economies (as also observed by Edholm et al, 1978). This point is elaborated by Benería and Sen (1981a:292-293),

[I]n a subsistence economy, the materials used for domestic production are not bought in the market; they are transformed in such a way that household and nonhousehold production are closely linked – to the extent that it is hard to draw a line between them. Domestic work extends itself into activities such as gathering wood for the domestic fire... Similarly, the agricultural labour process extends itself into household production, as when cereals are dried and agricultural goods are processed for family consumption... In agricultural societies... [t]he separation between productive and reproductive activities is often artificial... By contrast, under the wage-labour system of industrialised, urban societies... unpaid housework becomes more and more isolated and differentiated from nonhousehold production.

Benería (1979:211-212) suggests that while the distinctions between 'domestic' and 'non-domestic' (or 'reproductive' and 'productive') are analytically tenuous (and thus crude characterisations of gender divisions of labour), there are some common characteristics to women's work. Women tend to specialise in activities compatible with their socially constructed childcare responsibilities. Additionally, when women do earn money, it may be regarded as supplementary. Meanwhile men are often stereotyped as breadwinners. Benería (ibid) also notes that gender divisions of labour vary across time, space (between countries and regions), over the life-course and between economic classes.

Gender divisions of labour are also apparent within paid work. The term 'horizontal occupational sex segregation' is used to refer to one sex category¹ being predominantly employed in a particular kind of job, e.g. men's predominance in skilled manual work. By contrast, 'vertical occupational sex segregation' refers to one sex category (e.g. men) outnumbering another (women) at more senior levels.

¹ 'Sex category' refers to the social labelling of people as either 'male' or 'female' upon their appropriate performance of gender; physical sex may not always conform to this binary model (see also West and Zimmerman, 1987).

This thesis refers to three main types of gender divisions of labour: men as 'breadwinners' and women as 'housewives'; women continuing to undertake the lion's share of unpaid care work even when employed; male domination of certain industries and occupations (e.g. mining and mechanics). There are also sex-differentiated practices within occupations, such as in informal trading. These differences will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

This chapter now introduces the theoretical framework used in this thesis and considers different possible causes of gender divisions of labour. It then examines empirical research on the consequences of increasing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. It uses the three elements of the theoretical framework to discuss why flexibility does not always erode gender status inequalities. A final section then considers what other factors, besides flexibility, might facilitate greater gender equality, again drawing on the theoretical framework to examine earlier studies. From this literature review, research questions are derived for the analysis of the empirical material.

The theoretical framework

Internalised gender beliefs

A woman might personally eschew stereotypically masculine activities due to her self-perceptions: how she sees herself and her attributes. Perhaps she does not think that she has the relevant abilities, nor have interest in the activity. She may also internalise gender stereotypes – i.e. assume that women generally (not just herself) lack sufficient competence to succeed in male-dominated domains. Another stereotype she may internalise is what Ridgeway (2011) terms a 'gender status belief' – the presumption that men are more deserving of esteem, influence and deference, and also suited to prestigious positions.

The first point about self-perceptions includes the idea of self-efficacy – the belief that one is able to successfully perform a specific task, such as repairing a car or being economically independent. Bandura (1990:9) argues that self-efficacy is important because '[p]eople's beliefs about their capabilities affect what they choose to do, how much effort they mobilise [and] how long they will persevere in the face of difficulties'. Self-efficacy has been found to be more important than actual academic achievement in determining occupational choices: higher self-efficacy is associated with consideration of a wider range of jobs. Without confidence in their ability to achieve in certain domains, women may avoid them (as found by Bandura et al, 2001, drawing on data from Rome, Italy).

However, other research suggests that women's personalities and self-perceptions are not a primary cause of gender divisions of labour. Instead, these beliefs seem to be a consequence of changes in the broader social environment, specifically women's social roles and status. Twenge (2001) finds that between 1931 and 1993 American women's self-reports of assertiveness tracked (though slightly lagged behind) selected social indicators, namely women's educational attainment and women's median first age at marriage. Women's reported assertiveness rose before World War II, thereafter declined, then rose again after the late 1960s. Meanwhile, men's self-reports of assertiveness exhibit no clear pattern over time. These time-lagged effects suggest that gendered personalities may be largely consequence (rather than cause) of society-wide changes in women's status and resources. Twenge (ibid:141) concludes,

When men's and women's roles become more similar, men's and women's personalities also become more similar. Apparently the increase in women's status and the broadening of their roles has eliminated the sex difference in assertiveness.

Twenge hypothesises that this lagged effect could either be due to the way parents socialise their daughters (in view of changing social expectations) or girls' own anticipations of likely social roles. The wide-ranging influences upon Copperbelt women's self-perceptions are explored throughout this thesis, in relation to both gender divisions of labour and status inequalities.

As mentioned above, individuals may also internalise gender stereotypes. Following Blakemore et al (2009:7), stereotypes can be defined as 'beliefs about members of a particular group simply because they are members of that group'. These are distinct from gendered self-perceptions because they are assumptions about the traits of the typical man and woman. Some social psychologists suggest that children develop their gender stereotypes by observing the sex-differentiated practices of their community, i.e. exposure to gender divisions of labour. Stereotypes may be used to make inferences about others, 'help[ing] us make guesses about how others are likely to behave' (Eagly and Carli, 2007:84-85). While stereotypes may influence our perceptions and evaluations of others, they are not necessarily always salient. As Wood and Eagly (2010:637) argue,

Although social categories such as gender may be automatically activated outside of awareness and without conscious intent, such activation does not always occur. Even when gender stereotypes have been activated, perceivers can control their potential effects on judgments, given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources. However, in the hurly-burly of daily life, people often lack the motivation or resources to exert this control.

This idea of gender stereotypes proffers another explanation of how internalised gender beliefs might affect gender divisions of labour (Cejka and Eagly, 1999; Charles and Grusky, 2007). If women feel that (by virtue of their sex category) they do not possess the qualities that they associate with highly paid and prestigious occupations then they may not apply. Similarly, if a girl believes that by virtue of being female she is not competent in Mathematics then she may give up easily in class and be less likely to pursue related occupations. These gender stereotypes may also be internalised by employers, creating both demand-side and supply-side sources of horizontal and vertical occupational sex segregation. These beliefs about the typical man and woman's attributes and abilities in specific domains can be termed 'descriptive gender stereotypes'.

Internalised stereotypes may also be prescriptive: that is, normative standards of behaviour that apply differently to men and women, regarding what they should and should not do. Some stereotypes may be both descriptive and prescriptive, e.g. gender status beliefs. This idea was developed by Ridgeway (2011:88-89), who explains that,

Embedded in gender stereotypes are *status beliefs* that associate men and their traits with higher status than women and their traits... The status implications of gender stereotypes associate men with greater overall competence, understood as the ability to master events and accomplish goals, while also

granting each sex some specialised skills. Thus, the content of gender stereotypes implies not only difference between the sexes but also inequality [emphasis in original].

Ridgeway (ibid) suggests that because men are often seen as more competent in socially valued domains, they are thus deemed more worthy of status, respect, esteem and influence. Gender stereotypes about differing competencies are thus said to be infused with value judgements, such that stereotypically feminine and masculine traits are not equally appreciated.

Some studies indicate that internalised descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes are commonly disavowed by those exposed to a more heterogeneous range of role models, who provide contradictory evidence of prior assumptions (Eagly et al, 2004:280). However, exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour does not necessarily have this effect, at least not immediately. Research from social psychology suggests that individuals who have already internalised gender stereotypes may interpret subsequent experiences in a way that is compatible with their presuppositions. In order to achieve cognitive constancy, new information about sex-differentiated practices tends to be processed in a way that confirms and is congruent with existing schemas. Otherwise it is ignored, discounted or forgotten. This has been noted by research on gender stereotypes in the United States (Eagly and Carli, 2007; Rudman and Glick, 2008). The idea of 'confirmation bias' would explain why gender stereotypes often lag behind flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Ridgeway (2011:161-162) explains,

Social cognition research has shown that these confirmation biases make people more likely to notice, attend to, and remember events and experiences that confirm what they expect or want to see and to overlook, ignore, or discount things that disconfirm consistent with their expectations... Even when people do clearly recognise an experience as disconfirming their cultural stereotypes, their first reaction is to treat the disconfirming event or person as an 'exception', with few implications for what can be expected in most situations. If, over time, continuing social change causes people to have more and more of these exceptional experiences, pressure to change their stereotypes of what most people are like will build. But because persistent change only slowly seeps through people's confirmation biases, the content of their perceptions of what the typical man or woman is like will lag behind actual changes in others' and their own material experience.

Recall Twenge's (2001) finding that women's self-perceptions lag slightly behind changes in the broader environment. Internalised descriptive stereotypes about the typical man and woman seem to lag even further behind. This, Ridgeway (2011) suggests, is because people are more able to see that their own personal experience contradicts widely-held assumptions; they have greater access to disconfirming information in their own case. For example, a girl may underrate her own aptitude in Mathematics because she assumes girls are weaker at this subject. However, this gendered self-perception may be undermined by her own success in a Mathematics test, leading her to think that she is actually quite good at this subject. However, with less information about others' performance and being cognitively biased against disconfirming information of her gender stereotype, she may continue to presume that other girls generally fare poorly.

A further reason why internalised gender status beliefs in particular will lag behind changes in enacted practices is ‘interests’:

[B]ecause gender status beliefs advantage men over women who are otherwise their equals, men, on average, have less interest in attending to information that under-mines expectations based on gender status... Multiple experiences are required, especially for people who benefit from gender status beliefs because their self-interest makes them more cognitively resistant to disconfirming information (Ridgeway, 1997:222-223).

In summary, one possible way of explaining the persistence of gender divisions of labour and other sex-differentiated practices is with reference to the concept of internalised gender beliefs. Compliance with gender divisions of labour may also stem from concern for social approval, based on the cultural expectation that others in one’s society will endorse behaviour that conforms to descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes. This concept is examined below.

Cultural expectations

By witnessing how others are treated, people may ascertain what kind of behaviour is expected of them and what is necessary to avoid social sanction (ridicule, condemnation or loss of social respect). Individuals learn that they will be monitored and evaluated on the extent to which they conform to normative expectations for their presumed sex category. This motivates the careful management of behaviour and compliance with the norms dominant in a specific society (as argued by Hollander, 2013; Ridgeway, 2011; Risman, 1998:10; West and Zimmerman, 1987). Deviant behaviour that goes against locally accepted practices is likely to be unsupported, e.g. isolated instances of individual men performing care work (Barker, 2011:13).

Here we can distinguish between personal endorsement of gender stereotypes (internalised gender beliefs) and how a man or woman anticipates being judged by others in their society (cultural expectations). Even if not personally supported, cultural expectations may ‘act as the implicit rules of the gender game in public contexts’ (Ridgeway, 2011:162-163). By complying with these norms about gender appropriate behaviour, agents reproduce the social order. Such self-regulation may be either habitual or consciously intended.

This emphasis on cultural expectations is closely connected to ‘doing gender’ theory, which posits that people may conform to the gender divisions of labour prevalent in their society in order to express their gender identity and also publicly demonstrate that they are appropriately masculine or feminine (see Hollander, 2013; West and Zimmerman, 1987). This performance is not necessarily a solo act,

Within the context of marriage, doing gender is also a team performance. If one spouse fails to engage his or her part appropriately, this may reflect negatively on the partner. Conventional gender expectations require husbands to assume the identity of breadwinner and wives to assume the identity of homemaker. Men derive the core of their identities by providing for their families and women by caring for other family members (Tichenor, 2005:194, writing with regards to the United States)

This contrasts with the earlier supposition that gender beliefs are endorsed by agents themselves. As Deutsch (2007:107) explains,

Rather than internalise a set of behaviours and practices or identities that were rewarded and modelled by parents, teachers, and other authority figures, men and women create gender within social relationships throughout their lives... Whereas socialisation theories assume that individuals internalise the gendered norms that were salient when they were growing up, the doing gender model assumes that people respond to changing contemporary norms.

However, while people's behaviour may indeed reflect changing contemporary norms, any such transformation may be impeded by cultural expectations and anticipated social sanctions. Even if one privately questions gender stereotypes, the presumption that they are widely accepted by others may provide an instrumental reason to comply with cultural expectations or else risk social sanction. The penalties incurred by transgressing or even openly questioning prescriptive gender stereotypes (about appropriate behaviour) provides a further explanation for the persistence of those stereotypes and related divisions of labour, besides that of internalised gender beliefs.

Cultural expectations may influence behaviour. For instance, even if a girl does not personally endorse gender stereotypes about differential competence in Mathematics, the expectation that others do not expect her to be good at Mathematics may trigger anxieties, thwarting her own success (as shown by Steele, 2011). Similarly, if women believe that they will be discriminated against in stereotypically masculine occupations then they may be less likely to apply for such occupations. In this way, cultural expectations may become,

Self-fulfilling, shaping men's and women's assertiveness and confidence, their judgments of each other's competence, their actual performance, and their influence in the situation (Ridgeway, 1997:221).

Gender beliefs and social relational contexts help maintain the gender system by modestly, but systematically and repeatedly, biasing men's and women's behaviours and evaluations in ways that reenact and confirm beliefs about men's greater status and competence (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004:521).

In contexts where men's pride, respect and identity lie in being a breadwinner, some husbands resist flexibility in gender divisions of labour. For instance, earlier research in Zambia illustrates the ways in which men have maintained their masculine identities and secured social respect by eschewing stereotypically feminine activities. '[C]onspicuous male involvement in home chores was seen as difficult because of the ridicule that men could face from peers and the community', note Muvandi et al (2000) drawing on focus group discussions on gender in a range of localities (including the Copperbelt). Meanwhile, urban Zambian women are said to gain respect through marriage and motherhood (Rasing, 2001:89; Schlyter, 1999:113-114). Gender stereotypes about the domestic role of the modern housewife are also promoted in social events, such as 'kitchen parties' where the bride-to-be receives gifts of domestic goods (Rasing, 2001:232).

While these performances of gender may be attributed to cultural expectations, they are equally compatible with the notion of internalised gender stereotypes and self-perceptions.

For example, even if a woman's desire for social respect furnishes her with an instrumental desire for motherhood, she may also desire this role intrinsically. Thus even if appropriate performances of gender seem necessary to secure social respect in Zambia, such behaviour could also be due to an individual's support for those practices. Because the two theories often have similar empirical implications, it may be difficult to determine which cause is primary. As England (2005:269) notes,

Unfortunately, we have little evidence allowing us to choose between the internalised socialisation view and the 'doing gender' view. Indeed, much of the evidence offered for the doing gender view seems equally consistent with a notion of internalised (though not entirely unchangeable) values or habits.

These two theories are not mutually exclusive. One task of this thesis is to gauge their relative significance in shaping the causes and consequences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. A further aim is to ascertain key determinants of cultural expectations themselves and why these may shift over time. Explanations considered include worsening economic security, society-wide flexibility in gender divisions of labour, as well as early exposure to role models and abstract messages of equality.

There is likely to be some interplay between internalised beliefs and cultural expectations. Perceiving others as endorsing gender stereotypes may lead people to be more confident in the objective validity in their own internalised beliefs. As Wood and Eagly (2010:637) argue:

Stereotypical beliefs that are supported by social consensus seem valid — after all, others endorse them, and this consensus establishes pressures to comply.

Additionally, if gender divisions of labour largely rest on cultural expectations, they should be weakened if a critical mass of others signal their support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This could occur through speech or behaviour; either way might lead others to revise their cultural expectations and gain confidence that atypical performances of gender will not be sanctioned in a particular social circle. The second half of this chapter draws on earlier studies to consider what kinds of socio-economic processes and social interactional contexts might catalyse a transformation in cultural expectations. These issues are further explored throughout the thesis.

Patterns of resource access

A third way of understanding sex-differentiated practices is in terms of patterns of resource access, as shaped by macro-level factors such as labour markets, demography, legal regulations, government policies and organisational practices. For such theorists,

[T]he continued gender stratification in contemporary American families is better explained by focusing on how the institutional arrangements shape contextual expectations than by relying on how women and men make personal gendered choices (Risman, 1998:153).

There are no fundamental attitudinal differences in men and women, but there are differences in the opportunity structure and in their social position that affect both their choices and the choices of those who can control women's access to power (Epstein, 1988:186).

Such theorists downplay the significance of individual preferences, personalities or attitudes. This thesis will examine patterns of resource access as conceptually distinct from gender beliefs. If policies increase the economic returns to male (rather than female) labour force participation they may thereby influence gender divisions of labour, irrespective of individuals' gender beliefs. Examples of such policies include: paternalistic labour laws that forbid women's employment in certain areas; parental leave policies that hold the employer liable, rather than the state; as well as those that make no parental allowances for fathers. Patterns of resource access may also shape gender divisions of labour in conjunction with gender beliefs. For example, if access to affordable childcare is limited and women are stereotyped as primary carers then they may be more likely to predominate in part-time work.

A further example of how patterns of resource access may shape female labour force participation and thereby gender status inequalities comes from Ross (2008), in relation to oil-producing countries. He argues that a rise in the value of oil production tends to cause a decline in the traded sector (e.g. agriculture and manufacturing) of these countries because the real exchange rate increases and it becomes cheaper to import traded goods. Meanwhile, the new wealth increases the demand for non-traded goods (e.g. construction and services), which cannot be imported. This affects female labour force participation in those oil-producing countries where women are largely excluded from the growing non-traded sector. Such horizontal occupational segregation may be caused by the non-traded sector involving heavy labour (in the case of construction) or (prohibited) contact with men from outside the family (in services). The decline of the traded sector would thus dampen the demand for female labour and the prevailing female wage. This decreases the rewards to female labour force participation. Ross (ibid) further posits that an oil boom would decrease families' perceived interest in female employment, since men's wages are growing with a boom in the non-traded sector. Emphasizing the significance of patterns of resource access, Ross (2008:9,14) argues that 'some measures of female status in the Middle East can be partly explained by the region's oil wealth, but not by its Islamic culture or traditions... Without large numbers of women participating in the economic and political life of a country, traditional patriarchal institutions will go unchallenged'. This explanation of a particular *change* in gender divisions of labour and related status inequalities does not deny the salience of gender beliefs but does downplay their primacy, relative to patterns of resource access.

While Ross (2008) does not use the specific term 'patterns of resource access', he can still be understood as explaining sex-differentiated trends primarily in terms of the macro-economic structure of a society. When examining the causes of growing flexibility of gender divisions of labour, this thesis explores the significance of changing patterns of resource access in terms of worsening economic security: men's loss of permanent employment and rising living costs. This concept of resource access is also used when exploring the *consequences* of growing flexibility, that is how does a woman's independent access to income affect her status?

Bear in mind that there are other conceptualisations of structural constraints in the literature. Some theorists who stress structural causes of gender divisions of labour emphasise demand-side constraints, such as discrimination. They critique supply-side

explanations (i.e. citing women's beliefs and behaviour) as blaming the victim, for suggesting that society-wide sex-differentiated practices result from women's own voluntary choices (see, for instance, Padavic and Reskin, 2002:89). However, there seem to be two limitations of this approach. First, discrimination partly stems from gender beliefs and thus is not conceptually distinct from other dimensions of my theoretical framework. Accordingly, this focus is not helpful for the current project of trying to ascertain the relative significance of gender beliefs. Second, this *a priori* objection to blaming the victim might narrow the field of inquiry. Instead,

We need to explore the various ways women participate in setting up, maintaining, and altering the system of gender relations... Such a view highlights social interaction rather than more unidirectional processes of socialisation, adaptation, and/or oppression. This emphasis suggests that we appreciate women as the active creators of their own destinies within certain constraints, rather than as passive victims or objects (Gerson and Piess (1985:322, 327).

The point here is that we should not shy away from examining why women might comply with cultural expectations. If investigated in tandem with broader, enabling or constraining structures, this should not be conceived of as 'blaming victims'. As Charles (2011:365) argues, 'acknowledging gender-differentiated aspirations does not blame the victim unless preferences are considered in isolation from the social contexts in which they emerge'. Accordingly, this thesis tries to identify interconnections between patterns of resource access, cultural expectations, internalised beliefs and gender divisions of labour.

Examining interconnections

The interplay between the three elements of the theoretical framework likely affects both the causes as well as the consequences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Component questions include those raised by Risman and Davis (forthcoming):

When does an individual choice of gendered options reflect internalised femininity or masculinity, and when do the expectational pressures of others prevail? How does the behaviour chosen by individuals impact the expectations of others, and eventually institutions themselves? When are gendered choices the only ones even imagined? And do institutional changes affect individual imaginations of the possible?... And what happens to interactional dynamics and male-dominated institutions when actors reflexively rebel? Can we explore when people refuse to do gender whether they 'undo' it or simply do gender differently, forging alternative masculinities and femininities that are then internalised as identities? And when does changing social policy effectively change the expectations people hold for others, or for themselves? Future research should follow the causal relationships, as dominoes, to see when, and in what contexts, change begets change, and when it does not.

As highlighted here, attention to any one dimension (of what they term the 'gender structure') does not negate the significance of another. As England (2009:58) notes, 'the field is converging on a theoretical view that sees gender differences and inequalities to be sustained at multiple levels and all across the life cycle, with the relative weight of each factor an empirical question, possibly differing by topic and time period'. Risman (2004:433) similarly comments, '[w]e must pay attention both to how structure shapes individual choice

and social interaction and to how human agency creates, sustains, and modifies current structure' (as also argued by Hollander et al, 2011; Martin, 2004; Ridgeway, 2011).

These calls for attention to interplay build on Giddens's structuration theory. If 'social reproduction occurs in and through the regularised conduct of knowledgeable agents', it then follows that '[s]tructural constraints... always operate via agents' motives and reasons, establishing... conditions and consequences affecting options open to others, and what they want from whatever options they have' (Giddens, 1984:199, 310). Given this duality,

[A]ll explanations [of social practices and phenomena] will involve at least implicit reference both to the purposive, reasoning behaviour of agents and to its intersection with constraining and enabling features of the social and material contexts of that behaviour (Giddens, 1984:179)

The second half of this chapter draws on the theoretical framework outlined above to examine how flexibility in gender divisions of labour has been found to affect status inequalities. It notes mixed findings, offers reasons for persistent status beliefs, and finally explores how status inequalities have been undermined. The overarching aim is to identify pertinent questions to be investigated in later chapters.

The relationship between gender status inequalities and divisions of labour

Arguably, men and women's occupation of different social and economic roles perpetuates gender stereotypes relating to both competence and status. To recall, these are assumptions that the typical man and woman differ in capabilities and that he is more entitled to respect and deference. This causal connection between gender divisions of labour and gender status inequalities has been posited by a number of gender scholars:

Exclusive clubs, special schools, and segregated workplaces not only function to keep women out of interesting and important areas of activity; they also prevent women from seeing that what men can do in these places is nothing women cannot do and might prefer to do. Indeed, the male colleagues of women lawyers, doctors, prime ministers, and technicians have been repeatedly surprised to find women performing credibly (Epstein, 1988:236).

It is this ubiquitous division of people into two unequally valued categories that undergirds the continually reappearing instances of gender inequality (Lorber, 2005:4).

These quotes allude to three key ways in which gender divisions of labour might be associated with inequalities. First, these divisions may constrain women's access to resources and thereby compound material inequalities. Second, divisions may foster descriptive stereotypes – both internalised and cultural – that women are less competent in male-dominated domains. This cognitive association might be disrupted if men and women occupied a broader range of social roles (as argued by Ridgeway and Correll, 2004; Wood and Eagly, 2010:635-657). Third, if the activities in which men are believed to be more competent are more valued than those of women then gender divisions of labour might reinforce gender status beliefs (as argued by Ridgeway, 2011:194).

Gender status beliefs might be undermined in two ways. One possibility is that stereotypically masculine and feminine tasks become equally valued. This might occur

through awareness-raising campaigns about the value of domestic work or, as Ridgeway (2011) argues, if men take on a greater share of this activity. Another way this cognitive association might be eroded is if more women take on stereotypically masculine activities and are thus perceived as equally competent in privileged domains.

Alternatively, one might dispute the posited association between gender divisions of labour and gender status beliefs. If men and women's activities are equally valued then performances of difference need not entail inequalities. For example, Leacock (1978:252) argues that women were 'autonomous' in 'pre-class' societies, 'with their own rights, duties and responsibilities, which were complementary to and in no way secondary to those of men'. In these contexts, women's status depended on their control of access to resources, the conditions of their work and the distribution of the products of their labour.

Similarly, some quantitative research suggests that gender divisions of labour are not incompatible with egalitarian societies. In a survey of ten industrialised countries, Charles (2003) finds that respondents in countries with greater horizontal occupational sex segregation are more likely to disagree with the proposition that 'men have greater rights to jobs during periods of high unemployment'. Additionally, Blackburn and Jarman (2006:299-300) suggest that high levels of horizontal occupational segregation may even enhance women's career progression. Countries with high scores on the Gender Development Index (GDI)² and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)³ often have high levels of horizontal occupational sex segregation and low levels of vertical segregation. The authors attribute this association to reduced chances of discrimination: women have higher chances of reaching senior positions in occupations dominated by women. If men are routinely favoured for promotion (due to gender stereotypes) then horizontal occupational sex segregation may better enable women's career progression. Such women might then act as role models, undermining other people's gender status beliefs.

However, there may be a confounding factor: the Scandinavian countries with high scores for the selected indicators of gender equality also have large public sectors employing women, egalitarian pay policies, strong trade unions and high investment in social welfare. The latter may provide an alternative explanation of the relatively high GDI score. Additionally the GEM may be regarded as an incomplete indicator of gender equality, since it concerns parity at the highest echelons of society. This elite bias constrains the insights that the study provides into the lives of less economically advantaged women and men. Therefore, the patterns that appear hold in Scandinavia do not reveal that gender divisions of labour are always compatible with an egalitarian society. However, this data does highlight the possibility that some women may benefit from occupational segregation.

Another gender division of labour in Zambia is male dominance of paid work in general, not just of specific occupations. Some research indicates that Zambian women's economic dependency on men restricts their room to renegotiate or exit patriarchal relationships (Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:81; YWCA, 1994:37). Rural and urban Zambian women have also been said to comply with gender status inequalities in order to secure the derivative economic benefits that they are normatively entitled to from men (Crehan, 1997:103,134;

² GDI comprises sex-based differences in life expectancy, adult literacy and estimated earned income.

³ GEM refers to female shares in parliamentary seats; positions as legislators, senior officials and managers; professional and technical positions; as well as estimated earned income.

Schlyter, 1999:92). Here gender status inequalities are primarily attributed to patterns of resource access rather than gender status beliefs. Engels (1885:86-90) similarly suggested that women's waged labour would improve their independent financial position in the event of marriage breakdown and thereby enhance their capacity to improve or end unsatisfactory relationships. Kabeer (1997:292) likewise notes the theoretical possibility that economic independence might enable women to live without a male-breadwinner and thus not be married off in haste by natal families who would otherwise regard them as burdensome financial liabilities. However, the empirical evidence is mixed.

Some research finds that women's economic advancement has little impact on gender relations. In Lusaka, Zambia, many women have become 'breadwinners' yet are rarely identified as such by their peers or themselves. Hansen (1997:103) argues that 'the declining economy, which has turned many women into important contributors to household welfare in the face of men's shrinking incomes from wage employment, has aggravated the built in tensions in the conjugal domain without transforming rights and claims in a manner that rewards women for their work efforts in their own rights'. This research from an earlier period contrasts with my own and is discussed at length in Chapter 4. Garikipati (2008) likewise explains that in Andhra Pradesh (India), '[w]omen's increased employment and wage contributions seem to do nothing to challenge the domestic inequalities that confront them; indeed, they may intensify gender inequalities by allowing men to shift family provisioning onto women and to retain greater proportions of their incomes for personal expenses'. Similarly in The Gambia, Costa Rica, the Philippines and Uganda, low-income women's employment has reportedly added to their duties of unpaid care-work without enabling greater reward (Chant, 2007; Kwagala, 1999). Indeed, a range of studies suggest that increased female labour force participation is not matched by men's commensurate share of unpaid care work (Afshar and Dennis, 1992; Benería, 1991; Chant, 1996, 2007; Emmett, 2009; González de la Rocha and Grinspun, 2001; Jackson and Rao, 2009; Moser and Holland, 1997; Razavi, 2009). In Bangladesh too, Kabeer (1997) observed that most female factory workers endeavoured to support rather than threaten established norms and practices of domestic patriarchy, given their dependence on marriage for social respect and physical protection. These findings suggest that gender status inequalities are often not immediately diminished by changing patterns of resource access.

Although enhancing women's economic security may not immediately dissolve gender status beliefs, it may still form part of the gradual process of social change. Some academics maintain that '[m]eeting daily practical needs in ways that transform the conditions in which women make choices is a crucial element of the process by which women are empowered to take on the more deeply entrenched aspects of their subordination' (Kabeer, 1994:301; see also Agarwal, 1994:57, 1997:25). In support of these claims, we find cases in which enhanced income (via either paid work, microfinance or land rights) do enable women to reconfigure conjugal relations (Agarwal, 1994; Benería and Roldán, 1987; Chant, 2002; Kabeer, 1997, 2001, 2008; Kabeer et al, 2011a; Safa, 1996; Wolf, 1992). Some studies in Zambia have similarly pointed to a positive association between women's labour force participation and involvement in household decision-making (Muvandi et al, 2000; WLSA, 1997:122-123). In a range of geographical contexts, improved financial security has also been found to enable women to avoid unwanted partnerships (Bradshaw, 1995; Chant, 1997; Safa, 1999; Oya and Sender, 2009). In rural China, areas with lesser son preference tend to have more income-generating opportunities for women: a smaller, local gender wage gap and higher rates of

female urban migration. This implies that Chinese parents value daughters more when there are greater economic returns to their labour (Murphy et al, 2011).

None of the above studies contradict the claim made in the previous paragraph that increased female labour force participation has rarely resulted in men's greater share of care work. This underscores the significance of the criteria used in evaluating the consequences flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour.

Possible causes of persistent gender status inequalities

Gender beliefs

This section suggests that notwithstanding flexibility in gender divisions of labour, gender status inequalities may persist due to entrenched gender status beliefs. These may be either internalised beliefs or cultural expectations. As noted above, when outlining the theoretical framework, it is difficult to empirically distinguish these two causes. For it may be 'difficult to infer from people's overt behaviour whether they are conforming because they fully accept the legitimacy of an unequal order, or partially accept it, or out of fear, or because they have (or believe they have) no other options' (Agarwal, 1994:59-60).

The salience of gender status beliefs, rather than unequal resource access, is apparent from qualitative research from a metropolitan area in the Eastern United States. Here Tichenor (2005) finds that even when women earn significantly more than their husbands the latter continue to be defined as providers, retaining both decision-making power and the privilege of not having to perform unpaid care work. This American study highlights that a woman's greater access to resources still does not guarantee status equality in all domains. Here '[a]ppropriate "gender display" overrides the logic of resource exchange' (Tichenor, 2005:193). Deutsch (2007:115) as well as Risman and Davis (2013:8) present similar findings, which they interpret as evidence of the primary importance of gender beliefs, rather than resource access.

Irrespective of financial contributions, men and women may conform to cultural expectations in order to be respected by their peers. Drawing on the life histories of middle-class Zambian men, whom he had previously taught as adolescents, Simpson (2005:585) observes that,

Many married men... continued to experience peer pressure to demonstrate that they were not 'under' any woman inside or outside the household, anxious not to be accused by fellow men – and indeed by other family members, both male and female – of acceding to 'petticoat government' in their households. To demonstrate their independence they did not allow their wives to know their whereabouts or to question them about their movements. In contrast, wives constantly reported their movements beyond the household. Some men engaged in extramarital sex. Concerned to appear to be 'real men', they sought multiple partners.

These references to 'peer pressure', accusations, demonstrations and appearances of masculinity are all consistent with the cultural expectations hypothesis. Additional studies similarly suggest that Zambian husbands are mocked if they appear unable to maintain their position as household heads (Crehan, 1997:153; Muvandi et al, 2000; Rude, 1999:12). The

notion that the husband should act as household head appears to be a prescriptive gender stereotype. Likewise, young women in Lusaka (Zambia) are said to be influenced by the cultural expectation that 'submissiveness' is a widely-held prescriptive stereotype; this arguably discourages them from speaking out (Schlyter, 1999:83). Given concern for social respect and approval, a woman's greater access to resources may not necessarily dislodge gender status inequalities.

Besides cultural expectations, the persistence of gender status inequalities may be due to internalised gender beliefs. If people accept the legitimacy of certain claims, needs and rights, they may not even imagine alternatives (Kabeer, 2002:441; Kandiyoti, 1998). For example, even if women increase their financial contributions to the household, they may not ask their husbands to share housework if they have not even considered this possibility, or have but still think of it as abnormal and inappropriate. Women in Zambia's Northwestern Province reportedly accepted gender status inequalities as 'natural' and unalterable (Crehan, 1997:104,133,137). Ethnographic research indicates that they did not question men's authority over women or the legitimacy of wife beating. However, Crehan did observe frequent complaints about men. Also, some men were accused of abusing their authority in certain cases: abusing a woman in public, using unreasonable force or beating her while she was pregnant. Similarly, when labour demands upon a wife exceeded the accepted range, they would be negotiated. These observations suggest that sampled women did not accept status inequalities unreservedly but pushed back, while drawing on a culturally accepted framework that was not itself critiqued.

Enduring status inequalities may also be due to *men's* internalised gender status beliefs, persisting despite increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour. If men consider themselves entitled to deference they may be deeply hostile to attempted disruption. Ridgeway (2011:81) hypothesises,

Their [women's] assertiveness contradicts the hierarchical aspect of gender status beliefs and, thus, violates others' implicit expectations about gender and authority. The gender status incongruity of their assertive behaviour makes it seem illegitimate and rudely dominant. As a result, the women encounter a resistive, backlash reaction to their assertive claims for advancement.

This emphasis on gender status beliefs can be used to explain Silberschmidt's (1999) ethnography of rural Kenya. Here, declining livelihoods weakened men's abilities to fulfil their normative obligations of familial provision. The social consequences of male economic disempowerment included feelings of frustration, marginalisation (from both domestic and national life), as well as the erosion of self-esteem and domestic authority. Without the material basis of gender status inequalities (i.e. the erosion of gender divisions of labour), men's gender status beliefs are often enforced through violence or temporarily evaded through alcohol abuse. Here, in a context of declining access to land and employment, assertive demonstrations of sexual power through short-term extramarital relationships have become increasingly integral to men's identity and standing.

Research from Western Kenya in the late 1980s similarly indicates men's entrenched gender status beliefs, notwithstanding increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Men in this area previously resisted flexibility in gender divisions of labour. But their opposition waned as structural adjustment induced unbearable financial hardship. Women's subsequent

greater resource access does not appear to have undermined men's desire to dominate domestic decision-making. Francis (2002:180) observed,

Her voice carried most weight when her money financed these activities. This greater authority seemed to come both from sheer financial clout, and from the assertiveness that came along with an independent income.

This illustration suggests that by earning money women gained a sense of entitlement to participate in decision-making. But their involvement was contingent upon their own financial input. This implies that women's ideas were not valued, since they were not sought nor listened to when the implementation of the activity was not contingent upon women's economic contributions. Notwithstanding women's increased financial contributions, men's support for domestic gender status inequality persisted. This may have been due to men's internalised gender status beliefs.

Another example where gender status beliefs appear to cause male resistance to flexibility in gender divisions of labour comes from Guinea. Many husbands reacted aggressively to their wives' political participation in 1950s' liberation movement (Schmidt, 2005). The leadership of the RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) had purposefully recruited women in order to capitalise on their ability to mobilise members of their cultural associations. Leaders also recognised women's important role in sustaining striking workers, as well as their families. Sékou Touré also preached for women's emancipation and proclaimed that 'the women are the fire of the RDA' (ibid:125). Despite elite support, women's political involvement generated major domestic tensions, including 'wife beating, marital breakdown, and the taking of more subservient wives were common responses' (ibid:138-139). Schmidt attributes this resistance to: the perceived failure of women to fulfil their normative domestic and sexual duties; men's anxieties about women's independent movement and infidelity; as well as the rapid pace of change in gender roles. Again, women's incursions into a male-dominated domain (i.e. politics) appear to have resulted in tensions. We might attribute this antagonism to persistent prescriptive stereotypes.

In summary, a range of case studies suggest that gender status inequalities persist despite increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour. It seems difficult to ascertain from the material presented whether this is largely due to internalised gender beliefs or cultural expectations. One aim of this thesis is to ascertain when, how and to what extent these different kinds of gender beliefs account for the reproduction of gender status inequalities. The thesis also examines how these beliefs can be weakened – a question also explored towards the end of this chapter.

Formative experiences

Zambian men and women's apparent commitment to gender status beliefs has been partly attributed to their early experiences. For example, drawing on qualitative research with middle-class Zambian men, whom he had previously taught as adolescents, Simpson (2005:576) points to the ways in which gender beliefs are developed through formative experiences:

Very early in their lives these men, as boys, discovered that in the prevailing hegemonic discourse, 'real men' claimed 'superiority' over women and expressed this, in part, by

exhibiting strength – at times in verbal and physical violence and in the repression of emotional expression... Former students regularly based their claim of ‘superiority’ over women on men’s supposed greater physical strength and greater intelligence and upon women’s greater susceptibility to spirit possession. In addition they pointed to ‘African tradition’ which, they claimed, always gave men precedence over women, and to Christianity – especially the Creation story in the Book of Genesis – where, they stressed, it was clear that man was created first and thus should take precedence... Such instruction in masculine force combined with a boy’s education by his peers played a key role in the production of the majority of the cohort’s adult sexual identity and in their assertions of sexual virility.

If certain formative experiences lead to the development of gender status beliefs, in the way described by Simpson (2005), then these stereotypes may be resistant to contradictory information.

In some pre-marital initiation rituals in Southern Zambia, girls are taught that they should ‘be quiet and suffer’, listening to their husbands and abiding by his authority. Geisler (2000:66) argues that this stress on silently bearing ill-treatment ensures that women’s experiences of subordination are separated and individualised, thereby reproducing gender inequalities. While Geisler focuses on the ceremonies themselves, it would appear important to test this socialisation hypothesis by exploring whether taught messages influence preferences and behaviour in later life, especially as constraints and opportunities change.

Interests

Another explanation of persistent status inequalities emphasises countervailing interests. Perhaps men resist change in order to preserve their relative privilege, both within the household and more broadly, in politics and employment. Cha and Thébaud (2009) suggest that ‘[t]he most widely invoked explanation for men’s slow adoption of a gender egalitarian ideology is that traditional gender norms serve men’s interests’.

I define ‘interests’ subjectively here as the satisfaction of desires. This includes economic security as well as power within the home and social respect. For instance, men might oppose women’s participation in decision-making because they want to implement their own ideas. Likewise, men may refuse to participate in care-giving because they want the freedom to concentrate on their own economic, social and leisure activities. This theory can also be used to account for male resistance to female employment: for instance, men may seek to preserve their privileged position in the labour market. Assuming that women are more likely than men to perceive gender equality as beneficial, the interests theory would predict that they are more likely than men to support it.

According to this view, performances of gender are expected to shift when men perceive this as beneficial. Such interests may be shaped by gender beliefs and patterns of resource access. For example, the prescriptive stereotype that men should be breadwinners may lead people to regard flexibility in gender divisions of labour as disadvantageous, given the social costs of non-conformity. Also recall Ridgeway’s (1997:222-223) argument, outlined in the first section of this chapter, that the advantage men perceive themselves as deriving from status inequalities may cause them to be ‘cognitively resistant’ to information that contradicts their gender status beliefs.

The exigencies of the time may lead men and women to perceive flexibility in gender divisions of labour as advantageous, despite earlier resistance. Worsening economic security appears to have increased popular support for female labour force participation in Mexico (Chant, 1994), Kenya (Francis, 2002), Zimbabwe (Kanji, 1995), Zambia (Moser and Holland, 1997) and the Dominican Republic (Safa, 1999) for example. Financial hardship seems to motivate a trade-off: some people may become more inclined to accept flexibility in gender divisions of labour, even though this goes against their gender beliefs. This is also apparent in my research, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Other illustrative examples come from liberation struggles in Africa. In the battles for independence in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, some (but not all) gender divisions of labour were temporarily suspended in order to enhance collective strength against a common foe (Geisler, 2004:50; Kesby, 1996:581). Given exigencies of the time, powerful groups regarded this shift as advantageous. Sex-differentiated practices appear to have changed due to a shift in interests, not gender beliefs – for the latter were manifested after the conflict.

Possible routes towards gender status equality

If gender status inequalities endure because they are seen as legitimate then their erosion requires the ‘emergence of a critical consciousness, the process by which people from a position of unquestioning acceptance of the social order to a critical perspective on it’ (Kabeer, 1999a:441). According to a major report on pathways to gender equality:

[E]mpowerment is... also about shifting the horizons of possibility. As women come to see themselves differently, they can begin to confront and overcome obstacles in their everyday lives. Working with women’s empowerment calls for working with women’s imaginations as well as the material aspects of their lives (Pathways RPC, 2011:10).

The pressing issue is to identify which processes and interventions lead people to question their internalised gender stereotypes.⁴ This section draws on existing studies. It considers the comparative impact of exposure to egalitarian ideas and practices through flexibility in gender divisions of labour, migration, association and gender sensitisation.

Exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour

Some research suggests that macro-economic shifts can trigger men’s exposure to (and in turn empathy for) stereotypically female care-giving practices. Drawing on research in Wisconsin, USA, Chesley (2011) finds that the global financial crisis and consequent redundancies have pushed many men into stay-at-home fatherhood. Their greater involvement in parenting appears to have enhanced their appreciation of women’s daily care work. This has affected relations in the home and in workplaces, where such men have become more supportive of employed mothers. In this way, changing macro-level patterns of resource access may trigger flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which can provide disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes.

⁴ The above quote could be referring to cultural expectations, though that seems unlikely. Cultural expectations do not seem to be based on imaginations but on observations of others’ tendency to praise or condemn men and women’s behaviour. That said, as noted earlier, preconceptions may influence the interpretation of subsequent experiences.

This observation chimes with the conclusion reached by Bolzendahl and Myers (2004:783), derived from longitudinal analysis of American men and women's attitudes (1974-1998):

[I]t is most likely that *both* interests and exposure contribute to the formation and maintenance of feminist attitudes — not one or the other. In addition to making independent contributions, it also seems quite likely that these two processes interact in a cyclical fashion such that exposure causes a redefinition of interest structures and changes in life circumstances, which may in turn lead to further exposure [emphasis in original].

For example, if exposure to care-giving practices leads men to enjoy this activity then they are less likely to regard such flexibility in gender divisions of labour as disadvantageous. Bolzendahl and Myers's (2004) conclusion is further supported by qualitative and quantitative research. In South Africa, Naysmith and Rubincam (2012) point to the inspirational effect of female truck drivers, as well as positive community responses. Their relations with male co-workers also became progressively respectful, notwithstanding initial incredulity and scrutiny. Perhaps their colleagues became more accepting as a result of prolonged exposure to flexibility.

Seguino's (2010) longitudinal analysis of World Value Survey data likewise finds that women's increased share of employment weakens gender stereotypes — when controlling for macro-economic conditions, as well as region and structure of production. As people become accustomed to female labour force participation, gender beliefs appear to shift in turn, such that people are more likely to regard women as having an equal place in the labour market.

On the other hand, recall the earlier cited findings that female labour force participation had little impact on gender status beliefs. These studies raise questions about what kinds of flexibility in gender divisions of labour in which socio-economic contexts can undermine gender beliefs. Additionally, the way that individuals respond to changing patterns of resource access may depend on their place in the class structure. In Wisconsin, for instance, the observed trend of growing support for care-giving amongst unemployed men was less evident in working-class homes (Chesley, 2011). A comparable study in Western USA likewise found a little change in gender divisions of care work amongst unemployed, working-class steelworkers (Legerski and Cornwall, 2010).

Migration

Some studies of female migration suggest that individuals may come to eschew their gender beliefs by encountering alternative possibilities. For example, Dannecker (2005, 2009) records that returned female migrants became critical of gender divisions of labour in their native Bangladesh, having observed alternative practices while working in Malaysia. While overseas they found that Malaysian women working outside the home were respected. They also saw Malaysian women successfully undertaking technical occupations that they had previously thought impossible for their sex. Such exposure led some female migrants to criticise and even challenge inequitable practices upon their return home to Bangladesh. We might explain this behaviour with reference to internalised stereotypes. These dissolved as female migrants were exposed to alternative practices in Malaysia, which they sought to implement in Bangladesh

because they regarded them as in their interests. Although this case study is an example of exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, I have categorised it separately because the migrants were also exposed to greater gender status equality.

Living in Iran for a number of years likewise provided Afghan women and some men with 'a reflexive distance from which to evaluate their own society and to compare it with the different realities that prevailed in other Muslim countries' (Kabeer et al, 2011b:19). This account of migration indicates the importance of prolonged exposure to alternative ways of doing things, as well as the opportunity to personally discover related benefits.

These examples also suggest that change in gender status beliefs can occur through working with existing norms: Iran and Malaysia are both Muslim societies, as are Afghanistan and Bangladesh. This commonality may have been instrumental in enabling migrants to regard the foreign practices as compatible with their own core beliefs.

Association

Participation in forms of associational life where there is some support for egalitarian practices may facilitate an introduction to alternative beliefs and discourses. This might also provide a safe place for women to explore and reflect upon those ideas without fear of social sanction. Furthermore, learning that one's private egalitarian beliefs are shared by others could enhance confidence in their objective validity. Thus when people with atypical gender experiences share their ideas, they may collectively gain confidence in their egalitarian views by learning that they are endorsed by others. This process may also shift cultural expectations, showing that gender atypical performances will not be penalised in this social circle (see also Ridgeway and Correll, 2004:514).

This hypothesis is supported by a range of studies. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, young male, low-income participants professed finding strength in belonging to a peer group that shared their more egalitarian ideas, enabling them to affirm such beliefs without ridicule (Barker, 2000). In apartheid South Africa, community-based women's organisations provided a forum in which women discussed personal struggles, such as the burden of domestic labour, violence within marriage and sexual harassment at work. Realisation of shared, structural (rather than idiosyncratic) grievances and constraints appears to have fostered solidarity between women (Hassim, 2006:52-53).

The impact of association is also apparent from quantitative research. In South India, targeted credit and women's group membership led to greater investment in girls' healthcare, whereas no such change resulted from resources being channelled to non-group member mothers. Holvoet (2005) provides two explanations for this observation. First, she suggests that group membership facilitated women's access to resources without male mediation, thereby reducing their dependency on men. Second, Holvoet (ibid:52) indicates that group membership enabled women to learn that their own, private concerns about gender inequalities were broadly shared. Exposure to others disavowing gender stereotypes provided external validation of their pre-existing egalitarian beliefs and led to a shift in cultural expectations. One such female member is quoted as saying,

I always felt that discrimination against my daughter was wrong, but we just followed what others in the village were doing. By talking to other women and NGO personnel in

the women's group, I became conscious that my own ideas were not bad. I also learned how to express myself. I became more confident and I struggled to get my ideas implemented in the household.

Holvoet (ibid:54) comments,

[O]nly after they became a member of a women's group were they convinced about the legitimacy of their diverging preferences and subsequently able to express their preferences through increased voice in household decision-making. Extra-household bargaining within the community through women's groups further reduced the external sanctions on nonconformist behaviour and made expulsion from the community a less viable threat, which changed the perceived costs and benefits of "deviant" behaviour.

This case study suggests that individuals' exploration and enactment of egalitarian beliefs depends upon the presence of a supportive social environment, where they will not be ostracised or sanctioned for atypical performances of gender. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, it is generally difficult to empirically separate the salience of internalised gender beliefs and cultural expectations. However, as shown in the testimony above, at least one participant in Holvoet's case study explicitly stated that she deferred to men due to cultural expectations, not internalised gender beliefs.

Drawing on Benhabib (1992), as well as empirical research with NGO members in rural Bangladesh, Kabeer (2011:503-504) similarly makes the case for women's participation in associational life:

If it is through the 'given' relationships of family and kinship, the 'communities of birth', that women gain their sense of identity and personhood, then it is through participation in alternative forms of associational life that they can acquire a reflexive vantage point from which to evaluate these relationships. Such 'chosen' communities may embody their own forms of inequality but if they expand women's knowledge, information and interactions with others, they can allow a critical re-assessment of what was hitherto accepted as the natural order of things and open up the possibility of alternative ways of living that were hitherto inconceivable... certain kinds of interactions can strengthen women's capacity to recognise and articulate what they consider to be unjust, to decide what action to take and through their actions, come to formulate their vision of a better society.

This leads to questions about the forms of association may enable critical reflection about given relationships. Will groups of homemakers be just as likely as market traders to collectively disavow gender stereotypes or will their discussions be shaped by divergent experiences and interests? Furthermore, for those persons who have internalised gender status beliefs, can these be undone by dialogue alone?

Gender sensitisation

If gender divisions of labour and status inequalities are caused by unquestioned, internalised gender beliefs then it is plausible that these may be eroded by exposure to egalitarian discourses. Access to such information might lead people to question their assumptions and critique sex-differentiated practices. Learning that one's beliefs are widely-shared, through

participatory gender sensitisation with other supporters of gender equality, may also shift cultural expectations.

This hypothesis is supported by a range of studies. Verma et al (2006:138) find that young men in Mumbai (India) derived great satisfaction from group educational activities (role plays, games and debate). The authors comment, 'It was often their first opportunity to discuss these issues openly, and they particularly liked talking about them with other men'. The men appear to have relished the safe space in which to discuss private concerns. The success of Promundo in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) has similarly been attributed to 'the activities [which] focus on creating a safe space in which young men can question traditional views about manhood and critically reflect on gender, gender injustices and gender rigidities' (Barker et al, 2011b). Similar observations have been noted of ActionAid's 'REFLECT' approach (Cottingham et al, 1998); gender and sexuality lessons in rural Zambian schools (Gordon, 2008); social mobilisation in Bangladesh (Kabeer, 2003; Kabeer et al, 2009:25-27); African churches addressing gender issues and HIV/AIDS (Marshall et al, 2009); the combined impact of atypical role models and critical reflection about gender norms in Uganda (Underwood et al, 2011); and in relation to masculinities in Nicaragua (Welsh, 2011).

However, other studies of participatory gender sensitisation report only partial success. One Indian-based network, called 'Men's Action to Stop Violence against Women', is said to provide men with the opportunity to collectively discuss gender issues. Yet a number of surveyed participants expressed persistent commitment to gender divisions of labour, ideals of violent masculinity, and tended to blame the survivors of sexual violence (Das, 2012:672). Frischmuth's (1998) research in rural Zambia similarly points to varied responses to gender sensitisation. She notes that some sensitised women spearheaded changes, seeking to become more vocal in public meetings. Meanwhile, other sensitised women strongly resisted sharing unpaid domestic work and decision-making, even though many men became increasingly supportive. Both studies raise questions about why exposure to egalitarian discourses might not be sufficient for a disavowal of gender status beliefs. What other factors are relevant? These might include countervailing interests, resource access or insufficient exposure to behavioural manifestations of the abstract ideals promoted.

Conclusion

The literature reviewed, questions raised and concepts outlined in this chapter will be used to analyse empirical data from Kitwe, Zambia. The substantive chapters of this thesis explore the ways in which gender divisions of labour and status inequalities are shaped by internalised gender stereotypes, cultural expectations and access to resources. This theoretical framework is influenced by the work of sociologists and social psychologists (such as Ridgeway, 2011) who attribute gender status inequalities in the United States to persistent gender status beliefs. To test this theory in the Zambian context, this thesis also considers the relative significance of resource access. For example, it explores the extent to which conjugal status inequalities are undermined by a woman's increased access to resources. To analytically isolate the particular impact of resource access, comparisons are made across occupations and historical contexts.

The significance of shifts in interests is also examined. The two main interests studied are desires for financial security (which vary with patterns of resource access) and for social

respect (accrued by compliance with gender stereotypes). In order to ascertain the relative importance of interests and exposure, this thesis considers whether a shift in interests in the form of worsening economic security was alone sufficient for increased female labour force participation and occupational desegregation. Financial hardship could have reduced parents' and husbands' interest in complying with cultural expectations of gender divisions of labour, possibly leading them to prioritise financial security through over social respect (see Chapters 3 and 4). Alternatively, greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour upon worsening economic security may have been contingent upon prior exposure, such as to role models and egalitarian discourses (discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively).

The thesis draws on this theoretical framework to examine the consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. By enhancing their financial security, independent access to resources through paid work may lessen women's economic interest in conforming to gender status inequalities within marriage.

Additionally, the thesis reviews how gender beliefs may change with different kinds of exposure. In this regard, it principally looks at exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour and exposure to egalitarian discourses. In order to determine what (if any) forms of flexibility in gender divisions of labour are particularly transformative, Chapter 4 compares reactions to different kinds of gender atypical activities. Chapter 5 explores whether it matters at what age people become exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, i.e. the significance of formative experiences. It assesses whether beliefs are stable over the life course or can be disrupted by exposure in later life. Chapters also attend to social interactional contexts, contrasting the consequences of homemakers' social isolation with association through paid work in the public sphere, as well as participatory gender sensitisation.

This study of the relative importance of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour primarily focuses upon how men and women are perceived and treated. For example, Chapter 4 charts the impacts of women's paid work on their financial autonomy, self-perceptions, gender stereotypes, social relations with others, susceptibility to gender-based violence, share of unpaid care work and political participation. The latter three topics have been specifically selected as indicators of gender status inequalities. Covering a broad range of dimensions of gender relations should also prevent the possibility of biasing the narrative by selecting a particular indicator of gender equality. A further advantage of this broad range is that many of these themes have been explored by other studies in Zambia, so comparisons can be made.

In these ways, existing studies have been used to guide my analysis of contemporary trends in Kitwe. They are drawn upon in order to answer the overarching research question regarding the causes and consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

2. Methodology

My qualitative fieldwork was undertaken between April 2010 and March 2011. It was largely based in Kitwe, a Copperbelt district with a population of 506,045 according to the last census (CSO, 2012b:2). Data collection comprised life histories, thematic individual interviews, group discussions, student essays and observation. Figure 2.1 provides a broad overview of this sample by grouping participants into occupational categories; a full listing of participants is included in Annex 1.

Primary Occupation	All participants (interviews, focus groups, student essays)			Of which, detailed life histories		
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
Administrative support worker	2	5	7			
Counsellor	6	2	8			
Domestic worker	4		4			
Health care worker	8	2	10	2		2
Housewife	13		13	2		2
Pastor		1	1			
Politician	9	12	21	4	1	5
Professional/ managerial	16	15	31	3		3
Service worker	4	4	8	1	1	2
Skilled manual worker (not stereotypically masculine, e.g. hairdresser)	4	1	5			
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	14	21	35	11	2	13
Student	52	45	97	5	1	6
Teacher	16	15	31	3	1	4
Trader	67	30	97	14	5	19
Unemployed	18	8	26	2		2
Total	233	161	394	47	11	58

Figure 2.1: Participants, grouped by occupational category and research method

Out of the larger total, 119 narrated their life histories; an additional 58 were particularly detailed. Four of these histories are included in the second half of this chapter. A further 48 participated in group discussions on more than one occasion. This is my core sample. The remainder were either interviewed individually about a thematic topic, submitted an essay or once contributed to a group discussion.

As shown above, traders comprised a large proportion of my informants. This is due to two factors. First, interviewing members of this group provided some insight into typical circumstances since small-scale trading is a common livelihood in Kitwe. Second, earlier studies on female labour force participation in urban areas of Zambia (e.g. Hansen, 1997; Schlyter, 1999) have likewise focused on traders, so this shared focus enables comparative analysis. My own participants who traded in the market appeared to have similarly low levels of income as those described in these earlier ethnographies from the 1980s and 1990s. Without sufficient access to capital, many in my sample sold on someone else's behalf, for which they were paid very low wages. While other interviewees did invest in their own micro-enterprises, they stressed that profits had worsened over the past decade due to market saturation.

Students also constituted a sizeable share of the total number shown above. Their contributions largely comprised group discussions and essays, rather than life histories.

Once I had communicated my research interests, the vast majority of participants were befriended over a period of several days, so that we built up a relationship of trust and understanding prior to the interviews. Friendships with market traders, for example, were often fostered by me helping out with their stalls and inviting customers to buy their goods. As friendships developed, participants would often introduce me to others I was interested in meeting, thereby expanding my sample.

Throughout my research I have tried to listen rather than direct the conversation or impose my own framework. Accordingly, I invited people to tell me about their lives, reflect on their experiences and identify salient influences. On other occasions, such as when interviewing a woman mechanic or politician, I might ask when she started to want to do such work and how she had progressed over time. Sometimes I intervened with questions. For example, if participants mentioned that they attended a particular type of school (such as single-sex or co-educational), I might ask their opinion of it.

Group discussions focused on specific themes, such as female political participation. These clusters of people were all pre-established, not artificially constructed for research purposes. Observing their interactions provided insight into the naturally-occurring effects of association: how participants express their views in social contexts, collectively construct history, share ideas and affirm or question each other's accounts. Indeed, being already familiar with each other (as kin, neighbours, co-workers or political colleagues), contributors were often sufficiently comfortable to dispute each other's perspectives. Some urged others to caveat or contextualise their claims, to accommodate diverse experiences. Another effect of interlocutors being at ease with each other was that my role was generally limited to initiating the discussion and then remaining silent, intervening only occasionally to seek clarification. This enhanced their collective control over the agenda – though clearly the content may still have been influenced by my presence, as well as power dynamics within the group. Furthermore, since discussants were knowledgeable about each other's lives, they could ask each other questions about issues of which I was not aware and had not considered.

Observation of gender sensitisation and mainstreaming programmes formed another important part of my research. This included NGO meetings with community leaders, NGO and government outreach activities in low-income urban areas, Southern African Development Community (SADC) efforts to lobby for electoral quotas for women parliamentarians, and lessons on gender in three schools (a co-educational government school, a government boys' school and an elite, co-educational private school). I spent a total of three months in these schools, with one or two particular classes in each. Since teachers were often absent, I was encouraged to set students essays. These papers (on future aspirations, school sex composition, role models and gender differences) provided tremendous insight. By spending a long time with these organisations and schools, I hoped to become familiar to them and thereby observe typical behaviour.⁵ Although it remains

⁵ In other qualitative research on gender sensitisation in schools, one male teacher confessed to behaving differently because of the researcher's presence. Notwithstanding embarrassment, he said the word 'sex', because he felt that 'he could not let her [the researcher] down since she had

possible that events may have been biased by my presence, when I asked students in the class at the boys' school whether this had changed anything, they reported no difference in teaching style, class content or staff absenteeism, only an unusual absence of corporal punishment.⁶

A particularly illuminating part of my research process was living in homes across a socio-economic range. For four months I lived in one of the poorest areas of Kitwe, a high-density township, built for African non-mine employees during the 1940s and 1950s. According to a local authority survey of low cost housing in 1951-1952, there were just over a thousand two-roomed houses here at that time, a further 56 had a third room (Mutale, 2004:191). Most of these houses now show signs of significant disrepair; they do not appear to have been renovated since colonial times. Each house has an outdoor tap and area for bathing with a bucket – with mealie-meal sacks carefully pinned around a timber frame, which provides privacy when it is not windy. The functionality of the outdoor taps varies: some families have been cut off due to non-payment of bills; meanwhile, those that do pay only receive a couple of hours of water each day. Even then, the public supply sometimes gets polluted by the nearby mines, so it is essential to listen out for radio announcements in order to avoid skin or eye irritation when bathing. The (outdoor) pit latrine was not supposed to be used at night time, given the possibility of armed gangs. But the only act of violence I ever encountered involved two young women in the middle of the day, fighting over a mutual boyfriend. With little privacy between homes, neighbours quickly came to observe the commotion, as the young women tore each other's hair and second-hand clothes.

Occasional disputes notwithstanding, there was a very communal atmosphere. Unlike high-income areas, there were no high wall fences to provide privacy. Early each morning, passers-by would call out from the unpaved road, on their way to work or church, greeting us women and girls as we routinely swept the fallen leaves and debris from the numerous avocado, guava and mango trees, so that the surrounding ground should appear presentable. We would also exchange pleasantries while queuing for soft white buns at one of the numerous small roadside stalls, set up by those with capital in order to boost incomes. But many neighbours skipped breakfast, due to the rising cost of bread. Dinner was the most significant meal of the day, when the whole family sat down together on the floor, sharing bowls of *ubwali* (maize porridge), dried sardines and vegetables. We usually waited to eat until my host father had returned from one of the many nearby taverns – there were two within 50 metres of the house. Then, after dinner, we would place an old sponge mattress and blankets on the sitting room floor, upon which three of us slept. The remaining children slept in a small cabin, with a corrugated iron roof, that became exceedingly hot in the rainy season. The children were usually at school during the day but this pattern was sometimes interrupted because their parents struggled to source funds for their school shoes and fees.

Living with participants was a crucial part of the research process, enabling me to observe attitudes and behaviour that might not be spoken of during interviews: love, family interactions, neighbourly relations, as well as sources of anxiety and barriers to personal freedoms. Sharing participants' personal spaces, observing their relationships with friends,

come all the way to observe a sex education/HIV and AIDS lesson' (Morrell et al, 2009:98). In order to minimise the potential for such bias, my research was conducted over an extended period of time, with the hope that teachers would not make a special effort to please a 'visitor'.

⁶ Although corporal punishment is pervasive, it is illegal. It was suggested that their teachers did not want to commit an offence in front of me. This said, I did witness beatings in another school.

neighbours and family members also helped me understand the nuanced realities behind the rhetoric.

[This image has been removed for copyright reasons].

Figure 2.2: The low-income settlement, Kitwe

Note: one square = 100m x 100m; buildings are represented by dots.

Source: Zambia Survey Department, 1:5,000 Topo-Cadastral Series Map, Sheet NO.2886, cited in Mutale (2004:189).

I also stayed with BanaMulenga (38, a bank manager) and her family in a high-income area built for Europeans in the 1950s. It is far less densely populated than the low-income area discussed above – as can be seen by comparing Figures 2.2 and 2.3. She supported the extended family single-handedly; her husband had lost a significant amount of money during the global financial crisis and was yet to get back on track. He was absent until late most evenings, away at a bar. The two young daughters both went to private schools. These, like many of the local social amenities, were originally established by the mine companies. Unpaid care was provided by a maid and two young female relatives, pursuing their own studies.

[This image has been removed for copyright reasons].

Figure 2.3: The high-income settlement, Kitwe

Scale: one square = 100m x 100m

Source: Mutale (2004:190).

For several weeks I also stayed at a boarding house with six young women, two of whom were training as mechanics. Others pursued more stereotypically feminine occupations: teaching and social work. We stayed together in a single room, with bunk beds, in the servants' quarters at the back of a house originally built for European mine managers. Most of the houses on this road close to town similarly housed students, to boost incomes, so visitors were frequent. Besides cooking, eating, dancing and joking together, we also reflected on their different career paths and gender beliefs.

In my first few months in Kitwe I had lived further down this same road, which was so riddled with potholes that it was faster to walk than drive. Here I shared a bed with two teenage school girls and their extended family: a mine supplier, his wife, her sister and their two infants. Gender divisions of labour and status inequalities were omnipresent. If men visited they would always eat separately, at the table, while women and children ate in the kitchen; women were largely silent in Bible study sessions; and when the father returned home from work the house would become a little quieter.

During my time in Lusaka, I stayed at the National Assembly Motel, which houses parliamentarians. Over breakfast they shared their experiences and opinions of gender sensitisation, female political participation and national governance more generally, which enabled me to contextualise gender specific issues. They also invited me to parliamentary sessions, relevant workshops and also social events.

Besides these medium-stay locations, I often stayed overnight with participants whom I knew well – they wished me to meet their families. Interviews with informants' family

members and friends helped to triangulate life history narratives. Sometimes these discussions were facilitated by participants themselves (e.g. a young woman might interview her mother). This enabled me to benefit from the daughter's insights and minimise my own influence. Conversations with third parties also enhanced my understanding of people's backgrounds and family influences. Another motivation for this kind of data triangulation was my increasing recognition that changes in gender roles and relations have 'supply' and 'demand' aspects: a woman politician and supportive voters; a woman mechanic and employer; a wife keen to participate in decision-making and a receptive husband. Accordingly, it was important to listen to all parties, for the reasons behind a woman's self-confidence and other people's confidence in her may be different. Neglecting either narrative would limit our understanding of how change occurs.

The nature and quality of my research was significantly enhanced by attaining fluency in Bemba, the language most commonly spoken in the Copperbelt. Yet other features of my identity, such as my youth and non-marital status, may still have led participants to shield some information. For instance, the Bemba *icisungu* ceremony and related trainings, in which I participated, are only for the bride-to-be and married women. This secrecy is partly intended to prevent unmarried women from deploying that knowledge to 'steal' their husbands. Ann Tweedie (a female researcher associated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in the 1960s) was given only partial information about the Bemba girls' initiation ceremony. Schumaker (2001:127) suggests that this may have been because she was perceived as too immature to understand these matters.

It was important for me to present myself in an appropriate manner so that I might gain access to a broad range of information. None of the married women I interviewed seemed to see me as a threat – perhaps partly because I often mentioned my partner, about whose well-being they would often inquire. Although unmarried cohabitation is condemned in Kitwe and I only ever heard of one such instance, participants appeared to accept my own relationship as equivalent to marriage. In addition to not drinking alcohol, not going out at night, not wearing tight or revealing clothing⁷ and attending church on a regular basis, I was particularly careful when associating with men. For example, in the market, I first interviewed women in each section and then men, to develop rapport and understanding with women, so they would not be suspicious of me talking to men. Also, once I had participated in the ceremony, at the invitation of a *banacimbusa* (traditional counsellor), others appeared to accept that my entry had been sanctioned. To my knowledge, no one objected. Married women would often delight in testing me about what I had learnt.

Besides this specific knowledge, cultural knowledge of social decorum was equally valuable (as also noted by Robertson, 1983:64, in relation to her ethnographic research in Ghana). I learnt how to properly convey respect, such as by sitting on a lower level than elders; stooping when giving or receiving something; and physically slapping someone's arm to convey shared amusement. Summarising participants' comments by using Bemba idioms

⁷ The first time I walked into the central market, a middle-aged man tried to make a 'citizen's arrest' on me. He shouted in objection to the length of my dress, which had come to reveal my knees, as an inadvertent consequence of my efforts to manoeuvre over narrow, makeshift market pathways in rainy season. Being new to the place and knowing little Bemba, I was terrified. Also, over the past decade, there have been a number of occasions in which 'indecently' dressed women have been publicly stripped by gangs of unemployed male youths in Kitwe's central market and bus terminals (The Post, 2012a,b). While I personally never felt vulnerable to such attacks, they do reflect the ways in which female independence and appearances were closely monitored and often negatively judged.

also seemed to communicate an understanding of their perspectives. In these ways, I sought to become an accepted ‘insider’.

To record fieldwork data, I kept a diary and digitally recorded interviews or took hand-written notes when in noisy contexts (such as markets, where I would make Bemba transcriptions). All data was then coded using NVivo software so that I could identify trends and exceptions. Bemba and English written summaries of my findings were then frequently discussed with participants, in person, by phone and via the internet.⁸ I see this feedback as important for accuracy as well as for accountability to research participants.

When analysing data, recorded life histories were understood as a construction of the past. Writing on masculinities in Ghana, Miescher (2005:152) comments, ‘Oral history is less a factual representation of the past than in its rendering a reflection of the past’s meaning for the present and thus a reflection of the speaker’s subjectivity’. This possibility is discussed throughout this thesis, particularly in discussing the extent to which gender status inequalities have eroded over time (Chapter 4). In order to broaden my understanding of past events, I interviewed a range of respondents, repeatedly, both individually and with groups. As mentioned earlier, members of the latter would sometimes ‘correct’ each other and debate varying interpretations and experiences.

Despite attempts to improve accuracy, it remains likely that certain details were omitted from participants’ narratives. The perceived importance of different influences may change over time and memories often fade. Even if participants accurately recalled all pertinent experiences, some relevant macro-level trends might be obscured. Besides trying to work out what actually happened in the past, it may be fruitful to use life histories as an insight into the present. As Sangster (1994:6) comments,

Rather than seeing the creation of oral sources as biased or problematic, this creative process can become a central focus for our research: we need to explore the construction of women’s historical memory. Asking why and how women explain, rationalise and make sense of their past offers insight into the social and material framework within which they operated, the perceived choices and cultural patterns they faced, and the complex relationship between individual consciousness and culture.

Participants’ accounts were also triangulated with important historical ethnographies (e.g. Richards, 1940; Epstein, 1981; Powdermaker, 1962 and others from the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, as well as Ferguson, 1999). The explanations provided in these texts sometimes contrasts with participants’ accounts of the past. In this thesis I have noted disagreements and caveats in the presentation of disparate accounts.

One point to bear in mind in reading historical ethnographies is that women’s accounts of pre-colonial practices may have been overshadowed by privileged groups’ capacity to articulate gender stereotypes (Wright, 1983), as well as the paucity of African women in urban survey teams in Northern Rhodesia. Given their reproductive workloads and proscriptive stereotypes about female labour force participation, there were no women in urban survey teams till the late 1950s (Schumaker, 2001:211). That said, even if women were underrepresented in survey teams, it cannot be assumed that Copperbelt women would have

⁸ For example, one young participant downloaded a summary of my findings, which she printed for her mother and other market traders to read.

eschewed the portrayals presented by men (see also Kesby, 1999:28-29, who makes a similar comment in relation to Southern Rhodesia).

Examples of life histories

Below I document four life histories. These speak to themes commonly identified in other life histories and group discussions: changing patterns of resource access, female labour force participation, association, maternal employment, exposure to role models and gender sensitisation. These influences are further explored and interrogated over the subsequent chapters, so as to ascertain their significance more broadly. This section also seeks to provide background context about the participants whose stories are drawn upon in the main text and explain how their claims were corroborated. Note that some inconsequential details (such as names, ages and dates) have been removed to preserve participants' anonymity.

BanaMayuka

BanaMayuka⁹ and I were both a little nervous when we first met, about to give short speeches to an assembled crowd in the market. She was to present her manifesto – what she would do if elected as a section leader of ZANAMA (Zambian National Marketeers' Association). I had also been invited say something in Bemba on the loudspeaker, to amuse people. The President of ZANAMA, Elvis Nkandu was always been very supportive of my research, inviting me to association meetings in the Copperbelt and introducing me to a range of people. He had appointed BanaMayuka as an interim committee member in 2009 and now she was standing for election.

Sitting together on a wooden bench, with a good view of proceedings, she explained what was going on. This initial encounter became characteristic of our subsequent relationship: observing and discussing market events, dynamics and personalities. With eighteen years' experience of trading in the market, as well as a quiet smile that conveyed warmth, empathy and care, she was extremely well-liked. When walking through the vast market together, manoeuvring around little bridges, she always encouraged me to greet every single trader we passed, regardless of whether I was to interview them or not. I had not done this originally since I had not assumed that others would want to greet me; it felt rather presumptuous to greet strangers. Moreover, it was rather time-consuming to take the time to speak to everyone. But I followed her advice – to appear open and friendly – and thus became widely known. Her longevity in the market enabled her to tell me about various individuals and broader social shifts. As such, I spent a great deal of time sitting at her stall, behind mounds of dried sardines, listening to the traders collectively reflecting on social change. Many called me her child – just as she did.

Her father had died in a mine accident in 1973, when she was little over a year old. Her mother never remarried; instead she sold *kapenta* (dried sardines) at the township market, to support her twelve children – six of whom have since passed away. Together they lived in a house given to them by the mine company upon her father's death. BanaMayuka described her mother as being like herself: caring, hard-working, humble and always listening to others before speaking herself. BanaMayuka left her single-sex state school when she became

⁹ *Bana* means 'mother of'; BanaMayuka means mother of Mayuka. It is a term of respect. I have used this prefix when participants introduced themselves to me in this way.

pregnant – as was protocol at the time. Immediately after disclosing this information, she proudly reeled off the educational attainments of each of her children, as if to show that she had succeeded vicariously.

BanaMayuka married upon pregnancy in 1988, to a Namwanga man, hailing from Northern Province, just like her own Bemba parents. Although her education had ended abruptly, he continued in education and got a job at the mine. This secured them a house in Nkana East, an area originally built for European mine managers during the colonial period. But this benefit was lost when his contract was terminated. BaShiMayuka¹⁰ remained unemployed for six years. Sufferings entered the house, in terms of resource shortages. When men lose work they develop *'icifukushi'* – becoming frustrated and fraught with discontent – BanaMayuka once told me, in general terms, though not about her husband per se. Perhaps out of spousal love and loyalty, she always described her husband as a 'good man'.

When staying at their house, I separately interviewed her daughter, Chimwemwe (an articulate young woman with her mother's smile). We had known each other for some while, having chatted when she visited her mother's market stall. Chimwemwe recalled that upon unemployment her father started drinking more with his new circle of friends. Chimwemwe also narrated that her mother never used to rest: 'working Sunday to Sunday', until 8pm each day, selling dried sardines and importing clothes from overseas, when she had sufficient capital. She now has high blood pressure. BaShiMayuka husband has since resumed work, as a mine machine operator.

Notwithstanding the negative effects identified by Chimwemwe, BanaMayuka often reiterated how increased female labour force participation had transformed stereotypes of women – from passive dependents to resilient, hard-working fighters. She often proudly told me about other female breadwinners (especially widows), who single-handedly provided for their children. She stressed that working women of today were much happier than those housewives of previous generations, when they used to be 'oppressed' (*'ukutitikishiwa'*). Although she denied that she had ever been oppressed in her own marriage, she did suggest she had gained more knowledge, skills and confidence through travelling to new places, meeting different people and learning from them. She also chorused a slogan popular amongst market women: *'ifitenge kuntanishi, amatoloshi kunuma'* (skirts to the front, trousers to the back; meaning, women should lead).

BanaMayuka first learnt about her rights when a national Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) visited Kitwe's central market and invited traders to learn more about gender at their local office. Their words encouraged her greatly, to redouble her efforts, to work hard, with the confidence that she could do any work that men do. Visibly animated, BanaMayuka narrated that their support led her to get a passport to travel overseas for business and to buy a plot of land, in 2006. She had previously doubted herself, wondering whether she was right to work so hard – 'to punish/exploit herself' (translated). Now, echoing a common refrain, she knows that if her husband dies she will not suffer. She also described her husband as being pleased that she had visited the NGO, since she would now be able to look after the family if he died. Though we did not discuss it explicitly, I understood the repeated references to her husband's possible death in the context of life expectancy being 49 years in

¹⁰ BaShi means father of.

2011, up from 42 in 2000 (UNDP, 2013).

BanaMayuka maintained that learning about rights had made no difference to her relationship with her husband – apparently it was already amicable, with trust and understanding. Though she detailed multiple ways in which trading had changed her perceptions of others as well as herself, BanaMayuka strenuously denied that her tenure as breadwinner had changed her marriage. Both comments should be understood in the context of social opposition to women explicitly challenging conjugal power relations. So perhaps there is reason to think that either influence was more transformative than she let on.

On the other hand, her account was supported by separate conversations with her husband, BaShiMayuka, and their daughter, Chimwemwe. While staying at their house for a few days, her husband and I took walks round their township, passing the bars and visiting his unemployed friends who now volunteered at the local Victim Support Unit. Both father and daughter pointed to his long-standing support for gender equality, which predated her labour force participation and exposure to gender sensitisation. Chimwemwe narrated that she consulted her father when she heard about gender equality at school and was encouraged by his answer, given her trust in his opinion. He also fostered her self-confidence by reading library books together and writing poems for her to present to his friends. Another indication of his long-established commitment to equality is that, when asked for something by the children, he has always consulted his wife. On occasion he also tells his four sons to wash the plates and clean up the kitchen.

BaShiMayuka himself attributed his belief in gender equality to his childhood, especially the teachings of his white female secondary school teacher. Also, by undertaking domestic jobs in the absence of sisters, he came to regard this behaviour as acceptable. His egalitarian beliefs and behaviour appear to have preceded his wife's labour force participation and exposure to egalitarian discourses. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis will consider the extent to which a disavowal of gender stereotypes was a cause or consequence of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour in my sample more generally.

BanaMayuka's interactions with market women led her to insist on the need for more female leaders, whom she portrayed as more caring, empathetic and knowledgeable of women's problems. However, for a long time, she was reluctant to stand as a leader in the market association: she doubted her own capability to lead and was concerned about having to deal with difficult people. But she was encouraged to stand by women who she had brought to the market, as well as those whom she had aided with interest-free loans, so that they could start trading or manage funeral costs. (This account was independently corroborated by others). Elvis Nkandu, the president of the nationwide market association, also wrote her a letter, urging her to stand. She narrated the matter to her sister who further encouraged her to believe she had a gift for leadership. As an interim committee member, she then became accustomed to interacting with male leaders, gained the confidence to speak openly and grew more confident in her disavowal of gender status inequalities.

Being a member and leader in ZANAMA introduced a degree of bias: BanaMayuka was

protective of the association, as well as the ruling party with which it was allied.¹¹ Also, she knew that I had interviewed and was on good terms with many of ZANAMA's senior leaders, including its national president. Hence perhaps she was concerned about whether she could trust me to keep her comments confidential. In our early conversations she did not speak of gender discrimination within ZANAMA. Another female market association leader however divulged that their proposal to prioritise and manage the upgrading of market toilets had been refused by their male counterparts. BanaMayuka denied this version of events. Sometime later I brought up this same matter, asking what was happening with the infrastructure development. On this occasion, BanaMayuka explained that the men had argued the upgrading should be delayed. She first presented the men's account of the problem: insufficient money. Then she suggested that the real problem was that the men in question underrated female leaders, presuming them to be incapable. Apparently one man objected at the meeting and the others followed. After failing to convince them that the toilets should be prioritised, BanaMayuka relented because she did not want to cause discord within the group. Subsequent to this conversation she gave further examples of male resistance to women's initiatives. She also suggested another reason for this behaviour: men did not want the women to perform well and be recognised by others. This may have been due to concern to preserve their positions as leaders.

To broaden my understanding of alleged discrimination, I spent several days with her male counterparts on the committee: we toured the Copperbelt together, visiting different market associations and meetings. Unlike BanaMayuka, they tended to stress supply-side explanations of women's paucity in leadership: women are less intelligent, do not put themselves forward and fail to support each other (referencing the alleged 'pull her down' syndrome).

Key insights from BanaMayuka's life history include the synergistic relationship of gender sensitisation and paid work in the public sphere, which enabled association with a range of women. As a combined result of these influences, BanaMayuka exhibits great pride in women's demonstrations of equal capabilities and fortitude. This said, she has not really challenged the prescriptive stereotype that women should be responsible for unpaid care work. This reflects broader, asymmetrical flexibility in gender divisions of labour – a very partial kind of change. The dangers of this trajectory are also evident in the stress and high blood pressure that has resulted from, what she terms, her 'self-exploitation' (translated).

In the course of this thesis I will draw on additional data to explore the extent to which this portrayal is shared by other women, and what accounts for any discrepancies. For example, by comparing the accounts of market and home-based traders, we might ascertain the impact of certain kinds of association (Chapter 4). We can also interrogate alleged synergies with gender sensitisation by exploring what happens when stay-at-home mothers hear abstract messages of equality but lack first-hand evidence of women's competence through interactions in the public sphere (Chapter 6).

Matthew

¹¹ Following the change in government, ZANAMA and a number of other market associations were deregistered for their active support of political parties, contrary to the Societies Act. This ruling was upheld by the Lusaka High Court (Times of Zambia, 2012). Kitwe City Council subsequently took up responsibility for maintenance of the market.

Female leaders of a rival market association (ZATMA, the Zambia Traders' and Marketeers' Association) were much more publicly vocal than BanaMayuka. They would not be quashed or quietened. Moreover, male colleagues purposefully elicited their contributions in committee meetings. Having spent several weeks together, narrating their own life histories and discussing gender relations in market politics, these female market leaders introduced me to one of their colleagues, Matthew, a politically active, middle-aged vegetable seller.

Though extremely thin, swamped by clothes several sizes too large, Matthew appeared enlivened by discussions. He reflected on the causes of change, both in society and his own life, while I filled small, clear plastic bags with carrots for sale. His lengthy monologues required few prompts. Only occasionally did I intervene, asking him to consider an alternative interpretation. Sometimes we paused to attend market association or political meetings, to which I was always invited.

Matthew had grown up locally, in a home characterised by gender divisions of labour and status inequalities. Reflecting back, he portrayed previous generations as being 'inferior about those things; they didn't understand'. Matthew took this setup as 'normal' and followed similar practices when he married in 1984: 'I was thinking that a woman is supposed to be lower than the man'. This remark aside, Matthew generally downplayed his own gender beliefs and emphasised women's behaviour when accounting for gender status inequalities in previous years. He portrayed his wife as previously being reliant upon him to provide for the family. In those days, he explained, men bore the burden of work and responsibility for household provision. Meanwhile, women were 'relaxed', 'expectant', and 'lax'. The problem was *their* 'mind-set'. Also note Matthew's suggestion that men are in some ways disadvantaged by the gender division of labour.

When first asked about his previous employment, Matthew said he was a 'miner'. This occupational description implies physically demanding labour, in a valorised industry. He was actually a store keeper at a local mine, though only clarified this subsequently. His initial presentation reflects the broader pride and status in mining. Indeed, some men trading in the market continued to wear their blue overalls, as if to shroud themselves with evidence of historical masculinity. Having lost his job at the mine in 1988, Matthew entered the informal economy and began trading in the market. They shifted to a smaller house, sold assets and stopped eating breakfast. He reiterated the magnitude of the economic change, repeating over and over again how terrible it was, 'descending' down into a poverty they had never experienced before. At first his wife remained at home, as before. When he returned with little money, due to a precarious income-stream, she tended to blame and castigate him for his failure to provide, suggesting he was not even trying. (We might speculate that without her own income, she had little other means of pushing for more resources, other than to pressure her husband). Such accusations, combined with a dramatic change in living standards, caused arguments and violence: 'I even used to beat my wife'.

In 1991, as life became intolerably difficult and they struggled to pay school fees, his wife proposed that she should start selling dried sardines and beans at home. After about two years of her trading, household decision-making became more bilateral. Being equally responsible for household financial provision, she ceased to blame her husband: 'she would never complain, she would never point the finger at someone's fault, because when the fault comes, automatically that fault will be in the hands of both of us'. Now, Matthew suggested,

they are working together, with shared responsibility for income-generation and household management. Thus rather than relying on him, she initiates ideas. Her mind 'broadened', apparently. Furthermore, through personal involvement, his wife has come to understand the unreliability of income streams through trading, rather than doubting him as before.

Just as Matthew attributed conjugal change to a shift in his wife's attitude and behaviour (rather than his own), he gave a similar account of gender divisions in society more generally. Women, in previous decades, had occupied themselves with 'small issues', relating to their roles as housewives, relying on men to solve more important issues, through political engagement. According to his testimony, women rarely put themselves forward (*tabaleipelesha*) – and there was no mention of the social context that framed these choices.

However, Matthew's tendency to emphasise supply-side causes of gender divisions of labour waned over the course of his narrative. While he never explicitly claimed that women had been purposefully excluded from high status roles, he did suggest that women may have been overlooked, since 'we men' did not know that they could provide for the family and nation. He maintained that he has only recently seen women coming to 'stand up, to fight... and solve particular problems as equals'. (Standing up is in contrast to sitting [*ukwikala*], which is also used to describe homemakers and unemployed people – who are just waiting to be provided for). Seeing women earn money, to protect their families from starvation and send their children to school, changed Matthew's perceptions of their importance. He suggested that women are the ones suffering from hard-work nowadays, hence they deserve recognition.

Matthew did not appear to appreciate unpaid care work ('small issues'). Instead, it was by seeing women successfully undertaking socially valued roles that his gender status beliefs have changed. Furthermore, as we have seen, he focused on supply-side causes: women were underestimated since they had provided people with little reason to think otherwise. Later on, when we had developed more rapport and engaged in further reflection, Matthew suggested he had taken advantage of his position as breadwinner, making household decisions unilaterally. Also, when asked why he subsequently agreed with radio messages on gender equality, he replied that this was because his historic behaviour was 'inhuman... I had to change, for the betterment; it was changing me to be a better man'. This implies a shift in his own behaviour.

Besides changes in individual characteristics, Matthew also justified gender equitable participation in grassroots political campaigning by reference to macro-level shifts. For him, Government failure to abate worsening economic security necessitated collective effort, drawing on all available skills. He reiterated that nowadays, rather than automatically ascribe roles on the basis of sex category, we need to look at individuals' capabilities: their leadership qualities. By failing to capitalise on these strengths we might fail to advance. This metaphorical reference of being tied together in unity (*ukwikatana*) was frequently echoed by other members of grassroots branches of the political opposition in Kitwe.

Matthew also explained gender divisions of labour with reference to cultural expectations. He suggested that his freedom is limited by observations and pressure from his extended family: 'I've got others who are observing our marriage and our living'. He explained that they might start to gossip or cause problems if they see him cooking while she listens to the

radio.

To shift the discussion to the impact of gender sensitisation, I asked a broad, opening question about when they first started talking about gender on the radio. Matthew, being naturally talkative, proceeded to reflect on this at length. He suggested that when he first heard about gender, fifteen years ago, he accepted some messages, such as equitable participation in household decision-making. However, like others, he rejected many prescriptions out of hand: they seemed laughable. (By aligning his own response with cultural expectations of the time, Matthew may have been trying to defend his earlier position, suggesting that everyone did it. Alternatively, he may have sought to elevate his position as a narrator, broadly knowledgeable about society, as well as his own life).

Matthew suggested that he became more receptive to gender sensitisation once he had seen women demonstrate their equal competence in work and politics (i.e. undertaking socially valued roles in contemporary Copperbelt society). He explained, 'when you just listen to the radio minus knowing what is on the ground, it won't carry weight... seeing is believing'. He did not entirely dismiss the significance of sensitisation, however. Radio broadcasts signalled wider social acceptance of his egalitarian beliefs: 'ah, these things which I was thinking about, others also think about, then it's normal'. Previously he would beat his wife when she claimed to be too fatigued to wash the clothes. The radio taught him that it is normal for a man to wash children's clothes. Matthew suggested that the Bible had played a similar role in endorsing his experiences. His particular Roman Catholic Church distributes pamphlets on gender equality, denying gender status inequalities and preaching collective input.

Two questions arise from this account. First, has Matthew's outlook changed as much as he implies? Perhaps he is not as egalitarian as he professes. Matthew suggested that ZANAMA (the rival market association) was recruiting female members in order to secure donor funding, while the male leaders maintain control. Perhaps he had like ambitions and sought to portray his market association in a positive light to a European outsider, with possible links to donors. This hypothesis seems unlikely on two counts: first, he never asked me about donors; second, a number of women do occupy senior positions within the market organisation, all of whom maintained that they were respected by male peers, regarding each other as equals.

Although Matthew indicated that his gender beliefs have changed and that he can now help out with unpaid care work, he does not appear to have become more appreciative of unpaid care work – referring to it as 'small issues'. Moreover, when asked why he is at the market while his wife sells from home (where business is even slower), he said that it enabled her to look after their young child – possibly implying that this was her primary responsibility. (The limits to egalitarian change more generally are discussed in Chapter 4).

Second, is it really the case that the main catalyst of change was others' behaviour, rather than his gender beliefs? The accuracy of Matthew's account of the past is questionable. Perhaps his wife had always initiated ideas but he used not to listen. Maybe the catalyst of change was not her contributions, but rather his perception of their importance. This interpretation is indeed possible, but it is also unknowable. What we do have data on,

however, is Matthew' description of his own perceptions of her contributions, and these are worth understanding.

Matthew suggested that he came to respect women as equals when he recognised their 'vital importance'. This did not result from reflection on the value of their unpaid care work – which he appears to continue to regard as non-productive and unimportant. Rather, it appears that his gender status beliefs only changed when women proved their capacity to perform tasks he regarded as socially valuable. He frequently reeled off examples of women succeeding in atypical domains – pointing to the significance of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This valorisation of male work was broadly chorused by his female counterparts in the market, who similarly portrayed men as previously taking responsibility for 'hard work' (*incito yakosa*) – implying that unpaid care and other feminine occupations are not.

Helen

Helen was 'quiet' and 'reserved' in the City Council chamber: she never initiated a motion – the town clerk as well as other interviewed clerks and councillors told me. Interested in this female leader, I called and arranged to visit her low-income district. Her daughter, Sibeso, prepared and brought the tea for us in a dainty, blue rimmed china teapot, which I never saw again during all my subsequent months of living with them. On our first meeting I was treated as a visitor but our relationship changed over time, as did my understanding of Helen, who was not at all like the person described by the well-educated men in town.

I once returned home in the rainy season to find Helen (sometimes called BanaSibeso, meaning mother of Sibeso) digging a trench, to manage the water flow, with her husband, BaShiSibeso (the father of Sibeso). Their marriage was very much a team effort. When friends came around, they would all sit together, often drinking cartons of *chibuku* (an alcoholic drink made from sorghum and maize, only sold in low-income areas). Both husband and wife were vocal and opinionated; they would talk for hours about the economic suffering endured in our township, growing inequalities and capitalist exploitation of Zambia's natural resources. If male visitors expressed an opinion that she disagreed with, Helen would engage them in debate, rather than hold her tongue. While her husband might disagree with her position, he never objected to her participation. On one occasion, when his interruption caused her to lose her train of thought, she became embarrassed, frustrated and exited the group discussion. But he would always treat her respectfully, calling out 'my friend, BanaSibeso' (translated). For her part, she would never go to bed before BaShiSibeso came home, she insisted on waiting up for him – though often drifting asleep on the sofa. The only cause of friction was when she returned late in the evening and drunk; while waiting for her BaShiSibeso would ask me, 'Where is your sister?'

Though her parents were Lenje and hailed from Central Province, Helen prided herself in knowing all the Bemba proverbs. She had grown up in Kitwe, with 12 siblings. Her father, formerly a driver for UBZ (the United Bus Company of Zambia), would hand over all his salary to his wife, a 'hard-working businesswoman', who traded at the central market, which was unusual back then. Helen told me that most women depended on their husbands, who worked in industries, adjacent to our township. Besides greater economic opportunities, costs were lesser: school fees, school books, medicine and health services were all free – she maintained. When discussing change over time with her friends in the Residents'

Development Committee, they similarly denied there was any poverty in the 1970s: people would have three meals a day, commencing with bread and butter, as well as tea with milk and sugar. (Such nostalgia is commonplace, though not entirely accurate).

Helen partly attributed her self-confidence to her formative years. She became accustomed to interacting with the opposite sex in primary school, where she saw that she could outperform them. This experience led her to reject some gender stereotypes. At the time there were a number of social clubs in Copperbelt towns, financed by the mines. Here she interacted with a range of people, undertook new activities and became sceptical of gender stereotypes. Furthermore, her parents encouraged her to be 'strong', 'tough' and fearless. These experiences will be further discussed in Chapter 5.

Her husband proposed while she was still at school; they courted for five years. He was 'very cool, welcoming me, gentle, not drinking, not smoking'. Also, unlike school boys who she thought would just waste her time, he was working as a carpenter for a large company. They married in 1986.

Consumer goods became scarce in the late 1980s. Life became even more difficult in the following decade, with the mass closure of industries. But the new government's promise to bring new investors gave hope to residents of our low-income settlement. Still waiting, many of our neighbours had become depressed. Nowadays, '[w]hen you wake up in the morning you don't know where the money is coming from', Helen laughed, when chatting with political colleagues. This said, there was a temporary surge in consumption in the mid-2000s, as high copper prices boosted local employment.

Throughout her marriage, Helen 'moved up and down': she traded within Kitwe and beyond. By interacting with different people, she learnt about profitable enterprises. In the years immediately preceding the global financial crisis she travelled to Botswana and Tanzania to import blankets, clothes and DVDs. At that time, BaShiSibeso worked for the mines. There he heard about a new political party, the Patriotic Front (PF), and sought his wife's counsel. But she had no interest in politics, believing it to be a waste of time and preferring to concentrate on her business. Instead he involved BaShiNsenga, a friend of theirs, who stood on a PF ticket in 2001. The meetings were held at BaShiSibeso and BanaSibeso's house. Being uninterested, Helen would exit and leave them to it, but this was perceived as impolite, so she subsequently stayed to listen. By gathering with others, she started learning and thinking about politics. (Her husband gave the same account, on one of the many evenings we talked together).

They started campaigning, mobilising people and making structures. Helen told me that she was originally appointed to a position in the women's wing of the party but withdrew to contest a seat at a lower level, in order to have the confidence and power that comes from election by the people. Moreover, she wanted to be in the main body: 'I want to fight with men... interacting with men, I think it's normal, I'm very comfortable'. She expressed resentment of the historical tendency of women being used to sing and dance for male politicians. This said, she did not aspire to political office at this time, considering this to be a role for men.

In 2006, Helen was widely encouraged to stand as a politician – by voters, party colleagues

and her husband. She initially refused, preferring to focus on business, but others were persistent. Her popularity may have been partly due to her reputation for financial assistance. In those days, she would be frequently called upon to help out with funerals. Helen denied that she had any more money than others; she was just more generous, having grown up with parents that always welcomed long-term guests without demanding rent. Being Catholic she also believes that generosity will ensure blessings.

With a popular desire for change, Helen was elected as a community representative. Reflecting back she suggested that voters favoured whoever stood on the PF ticket, regardless of sex category. On other occasions, she pointed to bias: '[p]eople wanted change, they wanted a female [politician]'. This said, some others called her a 'prostitute'. This is a historically common label, implying that a woman can only succeed through sexual favours. This language still persists in some online discussions about female leaders. It is partly a reflection of misogynist attitudes and also a discursive strategy of attempted intimidation – much like when she was attacked at home, by thieves allied with the ruling MMD party. Attitudes towards female politicians will be discussed in more depth in Chapters 3 and 4.

Keen to understand why others at the City Council suggested that she was quiet in the chamber, I asked Helen how she solved community problems. She explained that it was more effective to go directly to the Town Clerk, who would refer her to the relevant department. Not all problems were effectively solved through initiating or debating motions in the chamber. Helen always presented herself to me as fearless (this seemed like a self-presentational strategy that she used in politics more generally). However, she did explain that in her early years of being a politician she was still learning about how the system worked and so had not been very vocal in the chamber. A further constraint was that 'in chamber have to use *icisungu* [English], this makes it difficult'. While Helen is fluent in English (her third language), it may be nerve-wracking to speak in this high-pressure, formal environment, where political opponents are ever ready to laugh at a mistake made by a woman from a poor township. Because she was not seen to contribute, one Member of Parliament regarded her as useless and was very rude to her on occasion, using derogatory language. Meanwhile, other female politicians independently narrated cordial and respectful relations with him. So, it seemed that the clerks and councillors had provided an accurate characterisation of Helen's behaviour. However, this was not evidence of her ineffectiveness, moreover it was liable to change as she learnt the ropes (she was re-elected in 2011), and certainly not representative of her dealings back in the constituency. It is equally important to note that a number of men were even quieter than Helen in the chamber.

Besides being a politician, Helen is also a mother, of six children. She described her first-born, Sibeso, as social and sharp (unlike the second eldest Mwenya). But Sibeso disappointed her parents by going to cohabit with her boyfriend. Being socially unacceptable, this brings great shame upon them – BaShiSibeso described it as a 'wound'. Neither parent has visited their place, for this would signal their approval. Mwenya lived at her boyfriend's mother's place – in an unsuccessful attempt to embed herself in his life. Both returned home some months into my stay, after mounting evidence of their partners' infidelity.

On our first meeting, when discussing women's political participation, Helen volunteered, 'I've got one boy here, he sweeps, cooks, washes plates'. 'Every day?', I asked. 'Every day',

she replied. However, I never saw her son clean anything, besides his own clothes. What accounts for this discrepancy between her report and my observation? Moreover, why did she even raise this issue? Perhaps Helen supports the idea of men sharing domestic work, though has not concentrated her efforts on enforcing this at home, given a multitude of competing concerns. Also, early in our relationship, Helen may have been trying to present herself as more successful in challenging gender stereotypes.

There were several other occasions in which Helen's testimony appeared at odds with her behaviour. Although Helen had expressed condemnation of gender-based violence, having attended related trainings, she was never very responsive to the women who came round bleeding and battered. They would talk but I never saw her encourage them to report the issue to the police, nor did she give them money to procure the requisite doctor's report. This may reflect limited interest, a reluctance to interfere, or a belief that this particular course of action would not actually benefit the women concerned.

Another apparent example of inconsistency was her insistence that women were not fighting for equal rights at home but in political decision-making. She made this point in a conversation with her husband and their mutual friend, BaShiNsenga. In other conversations she referred to her husband as 'household head'. This was surprising, given the seemingly egalitarian nature of their marriage. On the other hand, she may have perceived the espousal of conjugal status inequalities as a way of publicly respecting her husband, in line with prescriptive gender stereotypes – a small price to pay for the freedoms gained through mutual understanding. Moreover, given that there is greater social acceptance of equality in the public rather than private sphere, Helen may have thought it strategically effective to pay lip-service to gender stereotypes.

Another area of ambiguity concerned the changing position of women more generally. Helen explained that, in the past, when women married then 'everything is finished' (translated). The implications of this were two-fold. On the one hand, even if educated, women were rarely permitted to participate in politics or employment, for the latter would signal her husband's inability to provide. Nowadays, however, 'they say that a woman can do what a man can do, it's true. This time you can see a woman can drive a very big vehicle, a woman can be an electrician, a mechanic. We have joined politics... I think women can perform much better than men'. But the negative corollary of this flexibility of gender divisions of labour is that many women now share (or sometimes even single-handedly assume) men's burdens of responsibility for household provision.

Helen explicitly underscored the importance of several influences: her formative years, association (with men and women, through politics and employment), as well as the gradual process of political apprenticeship. While these have had a cumulative impact, the effect of each individual experience appears limited. For example, despite outperforming boys at school, Helen maintained that she did not previously consider politics to be open to women. This suggests that the disavowal of one gender stereotype (e.g. the assumption of men's greater competence in education) does not entail the disavowal of gender status beliefs. While these gender beliefs may be related, they are built and eroded by distinct experiences.

Another message was only implicit in her account: the way in which her husband and other men act as gatekeepers to gender equality. Although Helen did not attribute her confidence

to her husband's encouragement, it is nonetheless evident from her account and my observation that he has been with her every step of the way (encouraging her to enter politics and facilitating inclusive community discussions at home), just like her father before him.

Gender sensitisation was another possible influence, though repeatedly repudiated by Helen. She resented the money that NGOs earned through gender sensitisation, talking about women in politics, while she (an actual woman in politics, struggling to fulfil community expectations) received no such benefits – though she was given a bicycle for campaigning a few years ago. This sense of grievance may have coloured her judgement about the effectiveness of gender sensitisation. Furthermore, her habitual references to slogans used by the women's movement (such as '50:50 in decision-making') suggested that these did have a positive impact, providing a sense of collective struggle and broader social acceptance of her incursions into a male-dominated domain. This said, she was not greatly moved by exposure to other gender matters, in which she was not personally invested (such as gender-based violence and unpaid care work). The impact of gender sensitisation will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

Rose

Rose – a 'blaster' (explosives engineer), former 830 tonne dump truck driver, mine union leader at branch level, women's rights activist, as well as pastor and divorced mother of six children – was introduced to me by her colleagues in the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia. Having been invited to stay, I travelled to her low-income, informal compound.

Born in 1969, Rose grew up with three siblings, chiefly supported by their father, a miner (fitter). Though she initially described her mother as a 'housewife', Rose later revealed that she loaned money to others and thus had her own income. This echoed a broader theme in my narratives, whereby women's home-based enterprises were often neither mentioned nor valorised. Nonetheless, Rose held her mother in high esteem: she characterised her as strong, good person, who would encourage her husband if he returned home disenchanted, and always urge others to be doing something, not just to be sitting. Her parents would make the budget together. Having been a cadet at school, aspiring to be a soldier, Rose was both accustomed to and interested in performing men's manual work. Her aptitude in several stereotypically masculine domains (Mathematics and sports) enhanced her sense of self-efficacy in others: it 'makes me think I can challenge a man in that way'.

Rose's schooling was interrupted in Grade 9, when she became pregnant (though she subsequently returned, in adulthood – due to her restless ambition). Her father died the following year, in 1990. His family tried to take their house.¹² Life became difficult. Rose starting selling maize in Congo, with money from her brother, but this was stolen. She assumed work at a grocery shop though was not happy there so got a job as a hospital cleaner. Struggling on an extremely low wage, she applied for short-term work at the mine, to clear the bush to make way for new development. Secretarial work was another possibility, but when Rose announced this ambition, her boyfriend of the time became enraged and tore up her certificates. He wanted her to be a housewife. They separated.

¹² This practice is called 'property grabbing', where a husband's natal kin claim 'his' assets after his death, evicting his wife and children.

In 1998 she became a pastor and also a member of the Zambian National Women's Lobby: 'no more men can challenge me. Already I had that spirit but when they brought that gender¹³ I started to believe in myself'. Having learnt about rights and equitable sharing of domestic work, she came home and told her then husband. He sat in silence, listening. His behavioural changes were limited: cooking occasionally, such as if she was out or unwell – this is a common response to sensitisation, compatible with what men are taught by the *bashibukombe* in pre-marital counselling. Rose's narrative did not dwell on her marriage, though in one discussion with me and her church mate about gender-based violence she revealed that her husband once beat her on the road, when he discovered her drunk, having left a child home alone. She subsequently divorced her husband when she discovered he had married someone else, without her knowing. Being single had major benefits, she maintained, allowing her the freedom and time for her paid work, church and union activities. Notwithstanding the associated stresses of such labour, this optimistic portrayal was chorused more widely, in discussions with other divorced/widowed women. This theme is further explored in Chapter 4.

In 2004, the same year as her divorce and her mother's death, Rose applied for another six month contract at the mine – to work as a dump truck driver, taking copper and waste. Out of 120, 37 were picked, including eight women: 'Historically people were afraid, saying "It's men's work". But we women started to work and now we work better than men... It was a challenge because people said this belongs to the men. But this challenge made us go out in the compound to encourage women, "Don't just sit, you can do what a man can do" (partly translated). I saw such evangelism in her participatory Pentecostal church service; Rose urged others to be financially active and believe in themselves. Since working as a truck driver, she applied to become a blaster – 'a gateway to promotion'. Prolonged experience of financial hardship led her to expand her horizons: 'as a woman you have to think twice about your future. If you just think about what women can do you can't do anything... They [other women] think their husbands will bring them money. I have to look after my [six] children.'

Besides economic motivations, Rose was also galvanised by a desire to 'wake up my fellow women'. Since she trained as a blaster three other women swiftly followed in her footsteps: 'they wanted to do it but were [previously] doubting themselves'. Others are employed as electricians, boiler makers, mechanics, fitters, blasters and welders at the mine. Rose also said that when she returns home, wearing her overalls, passers-by express their pride in her atypical labour and inquire about employment possibilities. I saw evidence of this respect when living in their community.

Rose explained that as she gained self-confidence and understanding about labour politics, she entered into and ascended up the ranks of Mineworkers' Union of Zambia. At the most recent election, where she stood against three men, people were saying 'Let's try a woman'. Support continues, from most colleagues (apparently), and Rose denied that she was troubled by the others. During a separate focus group discussion, more senior male trade unionists expressed appreciation of and respect for Rose's leadership at branch level.

Notwithstanding her success in a number of atypical domains, there were limits to Rose's support for gender equality. When asked about the distribution of domestic work, Rose told

¹³ 'Gender' is a commonly used short-hand to refer to gender equality or gender sensitisation – in this case the latter reading seems more plausible.

me that all her sons know how to cook. But when staying over, I observed that these jobs were always undertaken by girls. Daughters, not sons, hauled up water from the well – few in their low-income township have taps. Also, despite being local chapter person of a national women’s rights organisation, Rose blamed women for some occurrences of domestic violence, such as if a husband beats his wife to abate the noise she makes when he returns home exhausted with nothing to show for his toils. This said, when discussing the issue with her female church mate, BanaMwansa (who endures an abusive marriage), Rose rejected her counsel that a wife should always receive her husband lovingly, never denying intercourse, even if he has returned home late in the night, or has beaten her. The desperate screams of a woman being beaten next door disrupted this conversation. The cries continued for some time, uninterrupted by neighbours. Rose subsequently explained that she does not advise BanaMwansa to leave her husband, but will take her to programmes on women’s rights so that she can learn and reflect. I got the impression that Rose had challenged some gender stereotypes more than others.

Rose beamed with pride and joy in narrating her life history, visibly animated. She claimed that her status as a result of entering male-dominated domains. This was also apparent in my observation of the church service and visitors to the house; she appeared to be respected, congratulated and held in high esteem by other community members, who see her as a ‘strong woman’. This adjective, with connotations of masculinity, is generally only used to refer to women undertaking men’s roles. Interviewed male and female members of the congregation (who were either unemployed or in precarious employment) portrayed her as inspirational and courageous. Chapter 4 will further explore the extent to which public attitudes towards female leaders and miners have shifted.

Another question concerns the key causes of Rose’s incursion into male-dominated domains. The answer seems to lie in a combination of factors: her mother’s character, her own aptitude in Mathematics, subsequent financial hardship, gender sensitisation and also a gradual process of gaining confidence through experience. While Rose mainly stressed the impact of worsening economic security, other women have also experienced financial hardship yet not entered atypical occupations. Chapter 5 will explore this question more broadly, asking whether worsening economic security (a shift in interests) was a sufficient condition for occupational desegregation.

3. The Historical Causes and Consequences of Gender Divisions of Labour (c. 1900-1990)

Introduction

This chapter explores the historical causes and consequences of gender divisions of labour. The stereotype of male breadwinner and female housewife appear to have emerged as a product of imported Christian ideologies, colonial-capitalist concerns and an economic climate that largely enabled men to provide for their families on their own. Reliant upon husbands for status and financial support, many urban women had little conjugal bargaining power. Gender divisions of labour also meant that people lacked first-hand evidence of women's equal competence in employment and politics, who they thus often underrated and overlooked. Such perceptions seem to have reproduced women's exclusion from prestigious positions – a pattern sustained by macro-economic circumstances in the early decades of independence. Compliance with the gender status beliefs promoted in pre-marital initiation thus became necessary to marital and economic security, as well as respectability, which was not previously the case. While there were exceptions to these trends, the historical record illustrates the interplay between patterns of resource access, cultural expectations and individuals' own gender stereotypes.

This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 3.1 suggests that although gender divisions of labour prevailed in the pre-colonial period, some aspects of women's work were socially valued and the sexes were economically interdependent. In Section 3.2 attention turns to the gendered effects of colonialism. In the early colonial period (1920s-1930s), male preponderance in rural-urban migration gave women scarcity value and bargaining power in Copperbelt towns, even though men monopolised employment. Section 3.3 details how these emerging freedoms had been thwarted by the late colonial period (1950s), due to colonial-Christian gender beliefs, legislative changes and women's limited opportunities for economic independence. Section 3.4 then argues that gender divisions of labour were perpetuated in the early decades of independence (1960s-1980s), as men's access to employment was largely assured. The rich copper deposits on the Zambian Copperbelt thus continued to be mined, managed and administered by men – as wage labourers, breadwinners, trade unionists, civil servants and politicians. Housewives' resulting social isolation and economic dependence appears to have curbed their opportunities to collectively reflect on their circumstances, develop confidence in their capabilities, and militate for change. Section 3.5 examines the significance of traditional pre-marital initiation.

3.1 The pre/early colonial period (1920s-1930s)

Matrilocal protection, matrilineal importance and gendered economic interdependence in rural areas (1920s-1930s)

Most residents in the Copperbelt came from matrilineal, Bantu ethnic groups, especially those of Northern and Central Zambia (Mitchell, 1956). The earliest accounts of this area are found in Audrey Richards' ethnographies of the Bemba ethnic group. Other migrant-sending

communities (e.g. the Kaonde, Lozi, Ngoni and Tonga) seem to have been similar in some but not all respects. These differences will be noted.

Due to matriliney, matrilocality and the economic importance of women's productive and reproductive capacities, pre- and early colonial Bemba women enjoyed a relatively high status, in comparison to subsequent generations on the Copperbelt.

In pre-colonial times, Bemba men's political strength depended heavily on the fertility of their sisters and matrilineal kin. With limited means of storing wealth (due to practices of shifting cultivation), their power consisted in the right to demand labour services, rather than the accumulation of goods. Thus, relative to patrilineal ethnic groups, Bemba women enjoyed high status, with parents welcoming the birth of girls, as potentially able to bring male labour to their village and thereby reproduce the lineage (Richards, 1940, 1995:27).

With matrilocality, men moved to their wife's village at marriage. Instead of paying significant bride-wealth, a son-in-law would perform bride-service, working quietly and submissively under the authority of his wife's kin (Richards, 1940; for similar practices elsewhere see also Lovett, 1997:174 on the Lakeside Tonga in Northern Nyasaland, a nearby labour reserve; and Wright, 1983:74-75 on the Tonga in Northern Rhodesia's Southern Province). Control over wives was gradually awarded to husbands, who acquired status as their families grew. However, it was not difficult for dissatisfied Bemba women to initiate separation, since there were no high bride-wealth payments to be returned (Chanock, 1998:146; Richards, 1940, 1995; see also Crehan, 1997:106 for parallel findings about the Kaonde in North-Western Northern Rhodesia).¹⁴

A husband might acquire permission to relocate with his wife to his natal village. But wives enjoyed the option of returning with their children to their own matrikin where they might have children with other men, thereby expanding the labour force. So although a wife was supposed to obey her husband as household head, matriliney limited his rights, authority and control. A wife was not tied or beholden to one particular man (i.e. her husband) since familial authority was dispersed between matrikin and spouses. Further protection was provided by Bemba customary law (Epstein, 1981:109; Milimo, 1988:8; Richards, 1940:86).¹⁵ However, even though no single male monopolised power over a woman, her brother and lineage would still claim extensive rights over her children (Richards, 1940:33; see also *ibid*:90-93 on ostensibly hierarchical aspects of gender relations).¹⁶

Not only was a woman entitled to her own share of communal land but Bemba men and women (as spouses and kin) were also economically interdependent. A Bemba husband was supposed to clear the bush to make his wife a garden, construct a house or granary and also provide clothes. In turn a wife's economic obligations were to garden, hoe, harvest, cook, fetch water and firewood, make pots and mud the hut her husband built (Richards, 1940:22,85; see also Crehan, 1997:105,148-149 for parallel findings about the Kaonde in

¹⁴ Note that polygamy was rare among the Bemba, unlike the Southern Bantu ethnic groups, such as the Tonga (Richards, 1961:181).

¹⁵ See also Gluckman (1987:180) on the ease of accessing divorce among the bilateral Lozi in Zambia's Western Province. By contrast divorce was historically impossible for Tonga women in Southern Province (Colson, 1961:229).

¹⁶ Another indication of patriarchy is that the literal Bemba translation for 'women' is mothers of mothers (*banamayo*, where *bana* means mother of and *mayo* means mother), while 'men' are either labelled fathers of fathers (*bashitata*) or fathers of people (*bashibantu*). The latter term implies that men have authority over people in general, not just members of their sex.

North-Western Northern Rhodesia; and Gluckman 1989:179 on the Lozi in Western Province). Although there were distinct gender divisions of labour, it seems that women's work was considered to be of equal importance as that of men. Responsibility for food production gave women status since it facilitated reciprocity between kin (Moore and Vaughan, 1994; Powdermaker, 1962:158,193; Richards, 1995:25; see also Colson, 1961:104 for parallel findings about the Tonga in Southern Province).

Importantly, the protection and cooperation normatively afforded by matrilineal and conjugal ties was not predetermined but depended on on-going activation, such as through the exchange of services (Moore and Vaughan, 1994). However, this social structure does seem to have at least enhanced women's scope for social respect and status. Audrey Richards (1940:91-94) notes that in this context of economic interdependence and kin support,

The Bemba woman is never considered... as the possession of her husband... in the sense that an Englishman does, or did, consider his wife as belonging to him, or as the South African Bantu speaks of his wife as though she were his property... Thus in lieu of a fixed pattern of dominance and subjection between husbands and wives, such as the formal teaching of the Bemba girls would suggest, there seems to be every kind of contradiction between the norm and the actual behaviour, and between the relative status of married persons of different rank, different ages and different stages in the marriage relationship.

Richards elaborates that the position of women was not static (see also Moore and Vaughan, 1994:225-229; Saidi, 2010:164). Bemba women obtained authority with age, childbirth and particularly as grandmothers. '[Older women] acquire great weight in family councils and often carry out important negotiations on behalf of their sons or other male relatives. When past child-bearing the woman ranks as a man, can drink with men and talk her mind freely before them, and has a number of ritual duties and privileges' (Richards, 1940:22-23).¹⁷

By virtue of descent, some senior women also occupied important positions: hereditary guardians of ancestral shrines, heads of villages, chieftainesses and princesses (Richards, 1940:22-23, 1995:48-49; see also Colson, 1961:116 on historical instances of Tonga women founding villages in Zambia's Southern Province).

Richards' narratives reveal that a woman's status was not determined by traditional marital teachings but instead dynamic over the life course and shaped by a woman's perceived value (to her kin and husband) in a context of matrilineal and conjugal economic interdependence.

Pivotal demographic, social, religious and economic changes were precipitated by colonialism, male wage labour and Christian influence. Northern Rhodesia was officially claimed as a British colony in 1923, having been previously acquired by the British South Africa Company in the 1890s for mineral prospecting. By 1930, four large mines had been established on the Copperbelt (Parpart, 1983). Ethnographic accounts suggest that these

¹⁷ Older persons' equal powers and responsibilities over people in general are also reflected linguistically; female and male grandparents are called '*banakulubantu*' and '*bashikulubantu*', meaning 'big mother'/'father of people', in general. This contrasts with sex-specific responsibilities of younger generations, as previously mentioned. The significance of other markers besides gender is also indicated by third person descriptors being gender neutral in Bemba, as in Bantu languages more generally.

new dynamics fundamentally refigured the valuation of gender divisions of labour, as well as associated status beliefs.

3.2 Colonialism and demographic change (1920s-1930s)

To ensure the supply of wage labour for copper exports and to finance territorial administration a head tax was imposed on adult males. To further increase labour supply to the mines and to protect European settler farmers, the colonial government restricted alternative rural livelihoods. African farmers were limited in the crops they could grow and were paid a lower price for their maize in comparison to Europeans (Weeks et al, 2007:15-16). This fostered male rural-urban migration, uneven sex ratios and rural dependence on male wage labour. This section will detail how these structural demographic and economic changes significantly transformed age- and gender-based status inequalities in the Copperbelt during the 1920s and 1930s.

Some urban women in the Copperbelt became successful entrepreneurs and accumulated significant capital. Others accrued incomes through employment in hospitals, small-scale trading, beer-brewing or vegetable gardening (Chauncey, 1981:58,153; Parpart, 1986:150-152). With economic independence from men, urban women gained greater control over their lives (Chauncey, 1981:143). One claimed, 'Many educated women I know... say we will leave a man, we have our own salary now, we can bring up our own children, we will do better without' (quoted in Parpart, 1986:152). However such potential was constrained by women's limited access to resources. One of the largest sectors – domestic service in European settler homes – was closed to women since colonisers considered them to be promiscuous (Hansen, 1989). Accordingly, most women were economically dependent on men's wages (Epstein, 1981:57; Parpart, 1986:152, 1988:118; Wilson, 1941:40-41).

Crucially, however, urban women were not tied to a particular man, at least not in the 1930s. In this decade, when the ratio of men to women was 2:1 (owing to male dominance of urban migration), women found new partners with ease and were not permanently dependent on any one man in particular. Men were generally keen to provide a higher standard of living for their wives or else risk losing them. Being in high demand, women in the mine compounds could use marriage as a means of upward mobility. Thus although women were economically dependent on men in general, they were not permanently tied to any particular man. Many would divorce rather than endure abuse (Chanock, 1998:208-209; Chauncey, 1981:152; Parpart, 1983:88-89, 1988:118-119; Wilson, 1941:65).

By entering into temporary alliances with urban men, women found greater autonomy. Some fled villages in order to avoid unsatisfactory marriages, harsh toil and rural elders' control of their reproductive and productive labour (Parpart, 1986, 1994; Geisler, 1992:441). Other women arrived in the Copperbelt as obedient wives but changed with urban influence, as they learned of alternative possibilities. The urban situation thus enabled the realisation of what one colonial observer based in the Northern Province in the 1930s termed 'the growing desire of native women for a more independent status' (Ault, 1983:183). This early-to-mid colonial period thus enabled 'the weakening of patriarchy... women were demanding their rights within marriages and asserting their right to break off unsatisfactory marriages either informally or through the courts' (Parpart, 1988:117-119).

Drawing on the theoretical framework, we might conceptualise Copperbelt women's informal relationships with men as a form of resource access. Demographic circumstances in the early colonial period enabled women to bargain for better treatment because their consequent scarcity value allowed them to access resources through men without being dependent upon a particular man.

However, it is important to note the limited kind of social change that evolved in 1930s. There is little evidence that women gained greater respect from men during this period. As detailed in the next section, there was a subsequent patriarchal backlash. Women's growing autonomy appears to have been perceived as deviating from (rather than disconfirming evidence of) men's gender status beliefs. Note also that urban sex ratios evened up over time.

3.3 The mid-to-late-colonial period (1940s-1960s)

Resistance to women's growing autonomy and the rising importance of marriage in the Copperbelt (1940s-1950s)

The autonomous initiatives of the early colonial period were thwarted by a subsequent backlash. The urban migration of independent women and the urbanisation of marriage were increasingly resisted because they undermined rural elders' control of young men and marital transactions. The availability of women in urban areas meant that men could marry women in town without serving their wife's matrikin in rural areas. Accordingly, provincial reports in the 1930s identified the 'new independence and self-assertiveness of the young women' as a major concern of rural African male elders (cited in Chanock, 1998:211). Anxieties stemmed from women's defiance of village restrictions, their migration to urban areas and proclivities to leave unsatisfactory marriages (Ault, 1983:184-185; Chanock, 1982; Chauncey, 1981:155-157; Epstein, 1981:65-66,283-284).

The colonial government was also worried. In a context of the Great Depression, where two thirds of the Copperbelt workforce became redundant between 1929 and 1931, the government was concerned about urban control. It came to oppose female urban migration and sought to limit the growth of Copperbelt families due to fear that this would create costly social responsibilities and undermine social stability (Ault, 1983:194; Chauncey, 1981:157-158; Parpart, 1988:121). In 1939, the colonial state gave Native Authorities power to demand that unattached women acquire special permission to travel to urban areas (Chauncey, 1981:158).

Colonial opposition to the migration of independent women may have also stemmed from a concern to placate anxious African leaders and thereby protect the imperial project. Schmidt (1992:121) similarly portrays colonial support for patriarchy in Southern Rhodesia as an effort to 'mollify male discontent by helping the men to regain control over their women'.

Christian concerns also featured in this growing backlash against women's increasing autonomy. Their priorities shifted from protecting women to preventing social breakdown. Missionaries sought to impose insoluble, monogamous marriage by denying divorce to Church-members (Chanock, 1998:151-152,159,193; Parpart, 1988). Churches also promoted female subservience and modesty (Parpart, 1988:133; see also Mizinga, 2000 on Southern

Zambia). Influenced by this religious ideology, the emerging Christian, African elite feared that 'bad girls' would prohibit their respectable status in colonial towns. In order to distance themselves from sexual immorality and gain respectability by virtue of their own marital status, this elite supported the rural repatriation 'not only of out and out harlots but also of divorced and unattached women in general' (Chingola court report cited in Parpart, 2001:279). For different reasons then, concerned African men, colonial officers and Christians sought to limit urban women's independence. The ramifications of their actions were long-lasting.

Women's previous gains of movement and access to divorce were reversed when British officials accorded male chiefs judicial authority, enabling them to define 'tradition' and 'customary law' (Chanock, 1998; Geisler, 1992:450-451). In 1944, rural elders' control was restored when the mines only granted Africans married accommodation upon production of a marriage certificate from the woman's home area. Even when Urban African Courts (established in 1938 and no longer requiring the consent of rural Native Authorities after 1953) came to authorise such proceedings, they always insisted on registered marriages (requiring the consent of kinsmen), bride-wealth payments and heavy fines of adulterers. Divorce was only granted reluctantly, after prolonged consultations (Chanock, 1998:207-208,212-214; Epstein, 1981:110; Mitchell, 1957:4; Richards, 1940:110-111).

To control wayward women, divorce was made less desirable, such as by preventing women from taking their children with them upon separation. African elders also supported higher bride-wealth prices (to be returned to the husband upon divorce) in order to make marital dissolution unaffordable (Chanock, 1998:176,215-216; Geisler, 1992). Such moves were supported by the colonial government and Copperbelt men, willing to pay more to prevent women from being 'proud and cheeky' (Chanock, 1998:175-178). Bride-wealth remittances, rather than bride-service, were also encouraged by urban wage labour. It was difficult for men to arrange the prolonged periods of absence from urban employment that were necessary to undertake bride-service for their rural in-laws (Chanock, 1998:180; Richards, 1940:57,78; Seur, 1992:382; Wilson, 1941:49-50).

There is disagreement over the extent to which urban courts 'invented' tradition. Epstein (1981:109,279,283-284,305-306) maintains that the procedures and principles mandated by African urban courts merely followed, or at least universalised, existing customs and practices. However, Chanock (1998:35,45) contends that some elements were manufactured. Epstein defends his case about the continuity of broadly shared values by showing that judges and litigants invoked the same body of norms. However, in my opinion, this does not show that litigants held the same beliefs as judges, for they may have just been strategically invoking those norms that they thought the courts would recognise – as appears to be the case for married female plaintiffs (Parpart 1988:127). Vaughan (1994:12) raises another objection, that 'it would not seem to me to be possible to reconstruct with any certainty a "before" against which to measure the distortions of the "after"'. So, the extent to which customary law changed over time may be effectively unknowable.

But certain elements do seem to have changed, such as the shift from bride-service to bride-wealth, which appears to have been significant.¹⁸ The increasing amount of bride-wealth payments seems associated with fathers' increasing powers over children and husbands over wives. While higher payments may not have changed the meaning of contracting a marriage (Moore and Vaughan, 1994:160-164), they do seem to have constrained women's exit options as their families were reluctant to return their bride-wealth (Chanock, 1998:175-181; Richards, 1940:78-80; Mizinga, 2000).

Even though bride-wealth repayments made divorce more difficult, few women were deterred from marriage because its legal importance also increased over time. Unmarried women were deemed to have no proper place in town and some were forcibly repatriated to their villages, though often unsuccessfully (Chanock, 1998:193; Epstein, 1981:281-282,313; Parpart, 1988:121). Fear of repatriation led many women to remain in unhappy marriages, rather than request a divorce (Epstein, 1981:117).

Women also had a financial motivation for marriage registration. They did not have access to municipal housing or rations from mining companies in their own right but only upon production of a marriage certificate (Mitchell, 1957:4). Most women were thus economically dependent on men, given the limitations of their own livelihood options (Geisler, 1992:458; Hansen, 1997:28,40; Parpart, 1988:123). With the increased legal and financial importance of marriage and marriage certificates in towns, more people registered (Epstein, 1953:8, cited in Parpart, 1988:121).

Women fighting back in the mid-colonial period (1940s-1950s)

Despite socio-economic change, some women fought back in an effort to regain the freedom they enjoyed in the 1920s and 1930s. Drawing on the urban court records of the 1950s, Parpart (1986, 1988) argues that women were not passive pawns in patriarchal struggles but instead sought to secure 'autonomy' in various ways. Some women maintained economic independence through beer-brewing and prostitution. Others protected themselves against the event of conjugal breakdown by secretly keeping savings in friends' and relatives' houses, or investing in social networks to secure reciprocity.

While the vast majority of women lived with a man in the 1950s, many eschewed binding marriage registration in favour of informal liaisons, where exit remained possible (Parpart, 1988:123-124). Although chiefs repatriated unmarried urban women to rural areas, they would often escape, pre-emptively, or return clandestinely. Subversion became so common that urban courts were resigned to abandon the policy of repatriation in 1953 (Chauncey, 1981:158-160; Hansen, 1997:33-34; Parpart, 1988:123). Women who did marry sometimes refused bride-wealth payments in order to enable an easier passage out of marriage and better assurance of child custody (Parpart, 1988:124-125). Married women's resistance is also evident in court records. The nature and frequency of female complaints and litigation illustrates they selectively invoked recognised custom to their advantage (ibid:123-127). But

¹⁸ Barnes (1961) and Colson (1961:126) claim that many Tonga in Southern Province (matrilineal and patrilocal) and Ngoni to the East (patrilineal) practised bride-wealth instead. If not all Copperbelt residents hailed from areas that previously practised bride-service then this shift to bride-wealth was not universal. However, Wright (1983) contests this claim about the magnitude of bride-wealth amongst the Tonga in earlier decades, pointing to men's construction of history. Mizinga (2000) and Wright (1983) do maintain that the economic value of Tonga bride-wealth increased under colonialism – echoing Copperbelt trends.

while some sought to preserve their cherished autonomy, many women had other desires, such as for social respect – which required compliance with Christian-colonial prescriptive stereotypes.

Christian-colonial prescriptive stereotypes in the mid colonial period (1940s-1950s)

The British colonial regime expected women to be dependent housewives (Glazer, 1997:144). For example, one girls' boarding school was established on the Copperbelt with the explicit moral mission of creating 'town-bred girls who can become good wives and mothers in an urban environment' (quoted in Parpart, 2001:278). From the 1930s to 1960s, mining companies sought to stretch miners' low wages by training their wives in domestic skills: sewing, hygiene, laundry, handicrafts, cooking, and sometimes reading and writing (Parpart, 1983:79,142). Gender divisions of labour (i.e. breadwinner and housewife) were thus prescribed, as part of a moral and colonial-capitalist mission.

European prescriptive stereotypes of male breadwinner and female homemaker not only transformed gender roles of economic interdependence but also their symbolic importance. Food preparation was denigrated from honour to duty, thereby eroding the status women previously accrued from performing this gender role (Rasing, 2001:93). While colonial ideas of female domesticity were not novel, their social meaning appears to have changed. Notwithstanding their historically multiple social roles, women became stereotyped as 'just housewives' – a position that became devalued in the market-based economy.

Colonial-capitalist ideologies about 'good housewives' were communicated by mining companies, churches, government social welfare and the media. These gender divisions of labour were adopted by the emerging elite, who sought to mark their social position and impress others. The rest of society aspired to keep up (Epstein, 1981:71,75; Kallmann, 1999; Parpart, 2001:280-283). Based on ethnographic research in the Copperbelt, Mitchell (1956:15) explains that 'the prestige system in the urban area thus uses "civilisation" or "the European way-of-life" as a standard or scale of prestige' (see also Ferguson, 1999:168-169,175). Newspapers, government social welfare and churches also promoted the notion that women should be housewives.

With men keen to acquire respect and Christian missions' prescriptive stereotypes being increasingly accepted, women were progressively assigned to an exclusively homemaking role. For most women in the Copperbelt in the 1950s, their days largely revolved round their husband and his working hours, in symbolic recognition of his 'new status as breadwinner and master of the household' (Epstein, 1981:70; see also Chauncey, 1981:150; Powdermaker, 1962:188-190).¹⁹

Conjugal relations were also in flux. Many women in the Copperbelt sought to secure respectability by accepting their husbands' orders and only associating with reputable women (Parpart, 2001). More subversive behaviour may have been discouraged by their limited exit options, stemming from the stigma of divorce. In the 1940s and 1950s, marital stability became increasingly critical to respectability, for the urban poor and emerging elite

¹⁹ Although men dominated paid employment in domestic work throughout the colonial period, there is little evidence to suggest that such employment affected practices in their own homes (Hansen, 1989).

alike (Epstein, 1981:257). Surveys suggest that marriages also stabilised during this mid-colonial period, as a result of these processes (Parpart, 1988:122).

However, there was variation by class. In the mid-colonial period, women with wealthy husbands were less likely to divorce, since they derived significant financial benefits from marriage, in comparison with poorer women. Even if they did seek divorce, their families were often unsupportive because they were reluctant to return their high bride-wealth. Accordingly, elite wives often resorted to 'magic' to improve their marriages (Parpart, 1988:132). New values of respectability also deterred middle class men from 'excessive' divorces (Powdermaker, 1962:152,169). Accepted freedoms permitted within marriage also varied by class. The urban poor, unlike the emerging urban elite, deemed it acceptable for women to frequent beer halls, though not to drink to excess, chase men or neglect their duties as housewives (Parpart, 2001:281).

Intimate relationships may have also varied with women's fall-back position. For example, relationships with physically beautiful women were particularly precarious, since they had many other potential suitors (Epstein, 1981:255). Women's independent wealth may have also enhanced their autonomy. However, such opportunities were limited by women's widespread economic dependence on husbands, as will be elaborated in the next section.

Women's economic dependence on husbands in the mid-late colonial period (1950s and 1960s)

In addition to widely-held gender stereotypes, women's economic dependence on men also shaped Copperbelt gender roles and relations in the mid-to-late colonial period. While colonial authorities and mining companies encouraged married women to care for, stabilise and reproduce labour, women's income-generating opportunities were purposely held in check by government restrictions and fines on their economic activities (such as beer-brewing and prostitution). Such obstacles were imposed in order to entrench women's economic dependence upon, and commitment to, male employees, thereby preserving social stability and cohesion (Chauncey, 1981:136,149; Epstein, 1981:57,116,309-310; Glazer, 1997:144; Milimo, 1998:10; Parpart, 1988b:122; Powdermaker, 1962:151,192; Wilson, 1941). Like European authorities, many Africans were equally opposed to women being wage earners. Men with working wives might be mocked and shamed. Sending one's wife to the market was seen as a failure to live up to prescriptive gender stereotypes: being a breadwinner had become key to men's urban respectability (Epstein, 1981:58; Harries-Jones, 1975:156).

As a result of these colonial, capitalist and patriarchal desires, 'the economic aspect of the woman's role had been diminished under urban conditions' (Epstein, 1981:68,116). Very few women worked outside the home (Chauncey, 1981:150; Hansen, 1989:121,130-134; Powdermaker, 1962:188-190). A 1954 study of Lusaka's main African market found that one fifth of traders were women. Further, these were not full-time, regular traders. Most traded seasonally and were either married to a market trader or were a female head of household (Nyirenda, 1957:37-42, cited in Hansen, 1997:41)

Such characterisations are also evident in collective memories of this period. While none of my participants actually lived during this time, so could not provide a first-hand account,

they still provided valuable insights into popular representations of earlier generations. Markus, a 45 year old garage owner and mine engineer explained contemporary gender divisions of labour with reference to past stereotypes:

The way I see things myself, it's more of a historical issue, engraved in people's veins, because men were coming out to work in town. It became a law that a man should be moving up and down, even after they moved their wives here, they still just suffered in the kitchen, saying 'He's going to the mine'. And remember, when we go through the mining regulation, it's now that the government has changed the rules, there never used to be a woman underground. Me, I'm a mine engineer... We had a woman surveyor working underground, she had to be exempted by law, so you can see there are some deterrent factors which make women the way they are now.

As Markus describes, women's economic opportunities were intentionally hampered by the Government. Additionally, because houses in mining towns were linked to employment (which was male-dominated), an adult woman could only access accommodation through a man. Without a husband she remained with her kin, perhaps sleeping in the kitchen or makeshift shelter (Epstein, 1981:116,313).

Throughout the colonial period, women's economic dependence was perpetuated by gender bias in education, which may have in turn reflected labour market expectations. As John (22, funding his secondary education through piece-work and church sponsorship) explained in an essay I commissioned:

In those days back[,] men are the only people whom the government of this country were regarding as the strong compared to women. And men were regarding themselves that they think wiser than women. Women were not allowed to study further because they were thinking that women will get married but men are the one who studied hard and got advanced in the education so that in retain [return] they can marry and look after the family properly... A long time ago, their was a rule were [where] they said that only men would go and work while the women are supposed to remain at home to look after the family.

This description, echoed universally in my Copperbelt sample, is supported by quantitative data and ethnographic accounts (Mulenga, 1988:25; see also Mizinga, 2000:68 on Southern Province). Girls' education was often, though not universally, seen as unprofitable. In general, parents were much more concerned about their sons' rather than their daughters' education (Epstein, 1981:155; Powdermaker, 1962:199-201). Missionary sponsorship seems to have been similarly asymmetric. For example, Gloria (66) married at 15, when her father died and no one would support her. The Catholics had sponsored her brothers' education but not her own. She explained,

They didn't count us women historically. We were suffering [translated, see Annex 2 for original Bemba].ⁱ

Ensuing gender divisions of labour meant that women became dependent on their husbands for respect, as well as material resources. By comparison, Copperbelt male miners have always had great pride in their status as '*bashimine*' (fathers of the mine), providing the country's lifeblood through their arduous toil (see also Ferguson, 1999; Larmer, 2007). Epstein (1981:75) observes,

Women were not able to seek achievement and the esteem of their fellows in the same ways that had become possible for men. A woman's status in town, and more particularly a wife's, rarely rested on what she had achieved through her own efforts but was in most cases refracted through her husband. To impress her own importance on another she might thus proclaim, "BaMuka Chief Clerk?" (Don't you know that I am Mrs Chief Clerk?).

With a weak fall-back position, women in the 1950s commonly remarked that they would put up with a lot to preserve their marriages. Epstein (1981:67,109-110,120,313-314) notes that,

In circumstances where employment was necessary to survival, and few jobs were available to woman, the husband immediately found his position enhanced... [Upon finding a job and accommodation] he was master of the house... he could lay claim to a power and an authority over the affairs of the household that were not part of his customary role... a wife was obliged to defer to her husband in all things.

Powdermaker (1962:203) similarly observed that 'men were even more their masters than in the past'. Some husbands controlled their wives by telling them what to do and forbidding certain actions, then constantly reminding them of their economic dependence and derivative status (Epstein, 1981:339). Although some men allowed their wives to manage household funds (if they did not trust themselves to spend wisely), they would still publicly present themselves as masters of their households, with obedient and deferential wives (Chauncey, 1981:150; Epstein, 1981:76-77). The salience of gender stereotypes is indicated by female students' essays, which Powdermaker (1962:187-188) collected from a single-sex government boarding school. In describing their fantasies, 73% of these middle-class girls wished to be men, envying their privileges, power, strength and bravery.

The majority of my participants similarly described their parents and older generations as observing gender status inequalities at home. This included symbolic displays of hierarchy (through food allocation, unpaid care work and kneeling when serving food); women having limited exit options; as well as being underrated and consequently having limited participation in household decision-making. BanaMwimba (a 41 year old market trader, selling dried sardines at Kitwe's central market) explained,

Historically women were oppressed. If you cook a chicken there were specific parts reserved for the father [meaning husband]. There was nowhere for women to be going to... Women of previous generations didn't talk at home. Those who spoke were men... Their husbands didn't permit them to sell because they were providing for them. If one marries one has to listen to one's husband. So she can't sell. Some men were proud, others just wanted to make their wives suffer. She can't speak, she can't make a decision. Men didn't have confidence in their wives [translated].ⁱⁱ

However, Ferguson (1999:180-181) has disputed this portrayal of domestic patriarchy under colonialism. He suggests that Copperbelt women in fact expected a 'considerable measure of social and sexual independence'. But Ferguson does not refer to specific evidence corroborating this claim, only mentioning Epstein's (1981:112) observation that some women fought back when assaulted by their husbands and would 'give as good as they got'. Clearly, such retaliation does not itself prove that Copperbelt women were not oppressed by their husbands during the late colonial period. Furthermore, Ferguson himself recognises that to

achieve independence women had to be 'willing to brave divorce and domestic violence'. Given the price of this independence, it is not clear to what extent Ferguson contradicts my analysis. If the only alternative to conjugal patriarchy was violence and/or divorce (which was heavily stigmatised), BanaMwimba's suggestion that Copperbelt women were 'oppressed' (*ukutitikishiwa*) during the mid-late colonial period seems plausible. Also, since Ferguson largely draws on discussions with male mineworkers (ibid:36), his narrative might be biased by their particular perspectives.

While marriages appear to have become more patriarchal during the 1940s and 1950s, other aspects of gender relations seemed to reflect alternative values. In urban areas it became increasingly common to postpone marriage until after puberty and to choose one's own partner (Epstein, 1981:255-256,270; Powdermaker, 1962:156,167; Wilson, 1941:70). Some young women took the initiative to engage in sexual relationships rather than passively submit to an admirer's advances. Such a woman would live with her lover, cook, clean and enjoy romance. With like-minded women, they would go to beer halls and European dances, enjoying a degree of independence unlike wives bound by restraint. Boyfriends would support them with gifts of money and clothes (Epstein, 1981:312; Powdermaker, 1962:163-164). Adultery was largely blamed on these women, not the men who had sought these attractive partners for pleasure and status (Epstein, 1981:100,336,351).

Equally important is the dissolution of historic forms of status inequalities. Gerontocratic patriarchy was challenged by urban men in town, who formed inter-ethnic solidarities through work, as well as trade union and independence struggles (Gluckman, 1960; Larmer, 2007; Mitchell, 1956).

Women's social relationships and political participation in the mid-to-late colonial period (1950s-1960s)

As housewives, many women were socially isolated. In the absence of emotional support and security from husbands, wives often turned to their own siblings and parents. However, Epstein (1981) contends that kin-based support may have dwindled over time.²⁰ If true, this shift would probably have worsened women's economic security.

While men's work, union and leisure activities facilitated the formation of relationships outside the neighbourhood, Copperbelt housewives were often socially isolated. 'Most women on the township had no communal or social role, and their work was restricted to the household... which was a drastic change for them' (Powdermaker, 1962:188-189). Since most husbands refused to allow their wives to accompany them to beer halls, many reluctantly remained home alone (Epstein, 1981:107).

Some women neighbours developed close relations. But these relations were often transient and unstable, due to a (pre-1950s) colonial policy that discouraged Africans from permanently residing in urban areas (Epstein, 1981: Chapter 6). Furthermore, even though

20 Although Ferguson (1999:184-185) has highlighted the continuing salience of matriliney in some respects, he does not suggest that this protected women's economic security. In the eyes of their matrikin, women's role and value seemed to decline. For example, pre-colonial Bemba matrikin often welcomed the birth of girls as bringing labour into the village. But in the urban Copperbelt families were primarily supported by male waged labour. Additionally, matrikin previously supported women's exit from marriage, as they could increase the lineage through remarriage. However, such tolerance seems to have been undermined by Christian prescriptive stereotypes.

urban social networks were economically important to women in many ways, they paled in comparison to both women's earlier kin-based support in pre-colonial villages and to men's access to industrial jobs (Epstein, 1981:166-179; Glazer, 1997:147; Hansen 1984:228; Parpart, 1986). Being house-bound, with multiple children and a heavy burden of domestic work, not allowed to accompany their husbands to beer halls, nor economically interdependent with other households like their rural counterparts, many women became emotionally reliant on their husbands for company in the mid-to-late colonial period (see also Epstein, 1981:118-120,260-261).

Economic dependence tended to reinforce women's identification with their husbands and prevent collective action amongst women (Parpart, 1986:156). Inter-female aggression (between lovers, co-wives, and matrikin versus nuclear family) over the scarce resource of male support became pervasive. As Glazer (1992:166) comments, '[m]en became a resource worth competing for, particularly in the urban class-based society' (see also Powdermaker, 1962:157,164,167,207-214). Patterns of resource access thus impeded women from developing solidarity with each other.

However, many women were still politically active in support of their husbands' livelihoods. For example, miners' wives supported men's struggle for higher wages during the 1940s and 1950s (Parpart, 1986). There was, however, one exceptional case of women spearheading their own action, when two thousand women demonstrated against the municipal beer monopoly in Lusaka in 1954. They wanted to be allowed to brew beer so that they could provide for their families (Hansen, 1997:40).

In the 1950s and 1960s, women's participation in nationalist struggles was curbed by competing domestic and reproductive demands on their time (Epstein, 1981:70). Few husbands allowed their wives to abandon these duties. Nor would many men grant their wives permission to work with other men, lest they risk being labelled a 'fool' by their friends (Harries-Jones, 1975:31-32). The United National Independence Party (UNIP) exacerbated such concerns by warning men that political participation and independent travel on the part of their wife would trigger rumours of her infidelity (Geisler, 2004:43). While UNIP did create a respectable space for women's political participation, in the form of the Women's Brigade, this was only to support men's endeavours: by providing food, housing, financial support for the movement and its leaders (Harries-Jones 1975:100; Schuster, 1993:17-18, cited in Geisler, 2004:24).

Notwithstanding these constraints, the independence struggle did legitimate some new opportunities for women. Geisler (2004:45,62-63) notes that '[w]omen members of nationalist movements... valued the small spaces they gained. Dissatisfaction and disappointment only set in after independence (1964), when their achievements were not honoured in the ways anticipated and dreams of personal liberation did not come true'.

3.4 Women's continuing economic dependence on men in the early decades of independence (1960s-1980s)

Although the ruling UNIP's Women's Brigade nominally included women, men 'directed its organisation, policies and activities and appointed its officials' (Schuster, 1993:17, cited in Geisler, 2004:24; see also Ng'andu, 1988:129). Women's role was to support men's political

endeavours (Geisler, 2004:24). Leaders of the Women’s League (the Brigade renamed) stressed that their political participation was to serve both husband and nation, in compliance with Christian models of the good wife, and not to challenge patriarchy at national or local levels (Crehan, 1997:141; Geisler, 1987:43, 2004:92-93). Even at Zambia’s first Women’s Rights Conference in 1970, repeated efforts were made to reassure men that patriarchy was not threatened (Geisler, 2004:91). The President’s wife, Betty Kaunda, assured Zambian men that,

We do not intend to neglect our duties in the home... We talk about woman power but we do not mean it as a threat to man power! I see a new role for women, a new task for woman power: we must be the custodians of happiness and security in the home, the watchdogs of morality in our society (quoted in Geisler, 2004:91).

Dissenting voices were also constrained by the authoritarian climate under UNIP, which pushed NGOs to welfare issues rather than gender politics (ZARD, 1994:18-19).

Labour market statistics indicate marked gender divisions of labour during the early decades of independence, with men predominating in paid employment. The 1969 Census puts Kitwe’s working African population at 36,017 men and 3,283 women (CSO, 1973:8). Subsequent, nationwide labour market surveys suggest that women’s share of formal employment remained low, only rising marginally from 6.3% in 1975 to 7.7% in 1980 (CSO, 1986:30-31). There appears to have been little change in aggregate levels of employment or occupational sex segregation over the 1970s, as shown by Figure 3.1. Here, lighter colours indicate earlier decades.




Figure 3.1 Sex-disaggregated employment by industry, Zambia, 1975, 1979 and 1980

Source: CSO, 1986:30-31

Although there are reasons to be sceptical of this labour market data, as discussed in the next chapter, the trend indicated by the available statistics was corroborated by all my participants, as well as previous studies in Zambia. The latter further detail how urban and rural women's income generation was constrained by Government policies (Long, 1968; Moore and Vaughan, 1994:215; Munachonga, 1989:147; Seur, 1992:330). For example, work for urban women continued to be legally restricted, through bans on underground employment, night-work in industry and employers' provision of housing/ housing allowances to married women. Women's remuneration was also limited by repeated absenteeism (due to children's sickness or pregnancy) and refusal of men's sexual advances, which jeopardised their chances of advancement (Caro, 1985:125, cited in Mulenga, 1988; Glazer Schuster, 1979:69,74-75). Female employment was also curbed by employers' preferences, such as for male domestic workers in the early post-colonial period (Hansen, 1989:232).

A global fall in copper prices in the mid-1970s triggered macro-economic decline in the Zambian Copperbelt – resulting in job losses, wage cuts, inflation, consumer shortages and riots in the subsequent decade (Ferguson 1999; Larmer 2007). However, this decline does not appear to have been sufficiently significant to trigger ruptures in gender divisions of labour or gender beliefs – my participants maintained that this only happened later with economic restructuring in the 1990s. In the 1970s and early 1980s at least, relative economic security and public welfare provisions meant that few families, husbands and women themselves felt compelled to push for women's employment (on the historic public provision of social services and infrastructure see Fraser and Lungu, 2007:4; Larmer, 2007:122). As Helen (whom I lived with in a low-income compound) said of her adolescence in the 1970s,

A long time ago... [my mother] was selling at the Green Market, there were very few women selling. The majority of women didn't know about selling. What they were doing is to depend on their husbands. Because their husbands had jobs, they were working in industries, industries were all over... There was free education and medical care... Everything was free, even the books at school... Historically women were oppressed. Even if she was educated, men would not want that person to go and work, they just want her to be a housewife. She cannot participate in anything: in political parties, you cannot go at the market and sell, because her husband will be feeling shy, "Why is she selling? It looks like I'm not keeping her very well"... A long time ago women were very oppressed because men didn't want a woman to do things... to work or have her own money [translated].^{iii,21}

Helen (politician).

We did not know we would suffer in the future, that's why we married young. In the past things were cheap [translated].^{iv}

BanaNyawa (41, married, runs a teashop in the market with her daughter).

²¹ By comparison, Helen added, 'Now this time a woman is a human being, she can do what men can do. Women have money, just like men may have money' [translated].

The society, they were saying a girl's place is in the kitchen, so my mother was a full time housewife; sometimes selling tomatoes at home but not going to the market. Women had no chance of doing what they think they can do, especially maybe going far away to do their business, they were not allowed.²²
BanaMutale (39, domestic worker, never married).

These narratives indicate multiple influences. Some women grew up assuming men would provide for them. Others sought their own incomes but were constrained by prevalent gender stereotypes, whereby men's status and pride was contingent on household provision. Further, men's economic opportunities largely enabled them to fulfil their normative role of breadwinner. This echoes findings on rural Western Kenya in the 1970s and 1980s, where men gained authority through their status and breadwinners. For women also, trading carried a stigma of poverty and women who could avoid it prided themselves on not having to "sit in the market" (Francis, 2002:175).

Another reason for men's reluctance to support their wives' employment was their knowledge of sexual harassment in the workplace (Glazer Schuster, 1979:114). Many husbands were also concerned about women's independence through labour force participation, in terms of physical mobility, finances and consequent threats to power balances at home. Given these countervailing concerns, husbands often refused to allow their wives' employment (see also Munachonga, 1989:150). Some husbands further tried to dominate their wives through closely spacing births and strictly controlling their own income (ibid:151).

A letter to the editor of the *Zambian Daily Mail* (23/09/1984) provides an example of social resistance: 'We employ women at the expense of men. Is it not a fact that men are by nature bread winners? I'm sure we need not be reminded of the women's rightful place because it is a well known fact that her place is in the kitchen so to say'. The writer, Mr Sakala, further called for an end to female employment and for men to be placed 'in all positions held by women' (quoted in Geisler, 1987:61). While this letter does not provide evidence of the extent of social resistance to women's employment, it nonetheless indicates some of the social sanctions women faced from some quarters when they failed to conform to prescriptive stereotypes.

Based on his ethnographic study of Kitwe in the late 1980s, Ferguson (1999:194) observed that,

With little access to employment, and formidable obstacles in the "informal sector", a woman's ability to live in town at all might depend on her ability to form a relation with a husband or lover. Housing on the Copperbelt is normally allocated to men, often by virtue of their status as employees... And even if a woman did manage to find housing on her own, she would have a very difficult time earning enough money to support herself.

Similarly, many of my participants initially described their mothers and wives as previously being 'housewives'. However, this characterisation may have been biased by stereotypes of the time. Participants often subsequently mentioned their home-based enterprises, e.g.

²² Similarly BanaMutale observes, 'But this time everyone can go and do the same thing'. The reasons for these changes will be explored in Chapter 4.

selling tomatoes. Even if productive, women's home-based work rarely appears to have been recognised or appreciated. Furthermore, such income-generating activities generally paled in monetary significance to men's waged labour.

The following pages will document the consequences of these gender divisions of labour in the early decades of independence. While Rasing (2001) contends that Copperbelt housewives derived status and autonomy from their control of the domestic sphere, no such prestige was evident in my interviews. As exemplified in Matthew's life history, participants tended to describe women as being historically preoccupied with 'small issues', relating to their roles as housewives, relying on men (who alone were 'strong') to solve more important issues, through political engagement. Mike (42, onion wholesaler) maintained that,

It's not possible for a housewife to know many things because her intelligence hasn't been awakened in many things. She's not found with many people, she doesn't have a head that knows how to stay with many people ... Even travelling long distances, she doesn't have much knowledge, she doesn't know how people travel, how they stay with people in the market, so she doesn't have knowledge [translated].^v

Because unpaid care work was devalued, many former housewives explained that they previously thought themselves less intelligent than men and so would follow their suggestions in community politics and at family funerals, e.g. regarding burial arrangements and asset redistribution. Gender divisions of labour thus appear to have perpetuated gender status beliefs.

Economic dependency ensured that many women both feared losing their husbands and also staying with them, often enduring violence (Glazer Schuster, 1979:126-130). The earlier ethnographies cited often attributed gender status inequalities to women's weak fall-back position. However, my own participants (whose experience of social change enabled them to identify binding constraints in previous decades) differed. They stressed that besides being unable to bargain for equality, housewives also tended to regard physical abuse as 'normal'. Their social isolation inhibited their exposure to alternative ways of living and opportunities for collective reflection. Some explained this point with reference to a Bemba proverb: 'a child who doesn't travel praises their mother's cooking' (translated). This is exemplified in the following conversation with Gloria (66, a divorced caterpillar trader). She narrated that her jealous husband would question her movements and did not want her to look clean, so as to prevent other men from being attracted to her. Sometimes he went off for a month at a time, leaving little money for her to survive upon.

Gloria: My husband used to beat me. If he came from wandering and you ask him what he was up to then he would beat you... [I didn't tell anyone] It's a secret of the house, you can't say anything... I used to pray about the suffering so that he might change... I didn't have any friends, I just stayed at home...

Alice: What did you think about your husband's behaviour?

Gloria: We were oppressed, you perceive it to be normal, but it's not good [translated].^{vi}

BanaJessy (39, married female market trader): We used to think you pass through sufferings alone.

Alice: Why?

BanaJessy: Back then we had not yet started to be found with many different people at the market [translated].^{vii}

A letter from a 'worried wife' in Lusaka to the Zambia Daily Mail expressed similar effects of social isolation. Having complained that her husband did not reciprocate her efforts to please him, she asked, 'Am I the only housewife undergoing this treatment or are we many?' (Geisler, 1987:64). Additionally, one newspaper article on kitchen-parties (where women gather to give kitchen goods to a prospective bride) quotes a woman as saying, 'My husband never takes me out. I am expected to stay at home year after year while he enjoys himself. What do you expect me to do?'. As Geisler (ibid) notes, these written statements are likely to reflect the concerns of elite housewives. While such women may have accrued some social status and enjoyed the leisure of not having to work, being a housewife also seems to have led to social isolation and unhappiness. Moreover, isolation may have impeded women from identifying structural obstacles: not knowing that they were 'many' may have led women to think it was a personal problem, rather than an outcome of the gender structure, which appears to have cut across class lines.

While some women did engage in trade, the cultural stereotype that only men could be economically self-sufficient meant that female traders were often suspected of resorting to alternative means of support. This was evident in some participants' life histories as well as earlier ethnographies. For instance, interviewed female traders repeatedly stressed that 'we are not prostitutes' (Schuster, 1982:116-117,120). This pre-emptive defence indicates their cultural expectations – their presumptions and related anxieties about how others perceived them.

Some educated urban women occupied prestigious positions and became financially independent (see also Glazer Schuster 1979:22,115 on Lusaka). My participants suggested that such dual-earner households tended to observe more egalitarian relationships, providing inspirational role models for their children. However, their lone encroachments into male-dominated domains do not appear to have undermined gender stereotypes in society more broadly. A number of my male and female participants recalled that they used to regard such women as 'prostitutes'. Given the paucity of women in employment, people often lacked evidence of their aptitude and so assumed that they were only there as a result of sexual favours, not merit. Also, many female employees did face sexual harassment, so their work lives may have involved some (unwelcomed) sexual activity (Glazer Schuster, 1979:70).

Besides limited exposure to women demonstrating their equal competence, this gender stereotype may have persisted due to countervailing interests. First, feeling threatened by their husbands' female colleagues, housewives may have sought to undermine working women's respectability through accusations of inappropriate conduct. Second, seeing a woman performing the same job as themselves countered gender status beliefs and bruised men's egos (Glazer Schuster, 1979:74). Men may have consoled themselves by denying that their female colleagues had advanced by virtue of merit. Thus, male co-workers and housewives may have purposively used this terminology ('prostitutes') to shame women whose actions countered their interests. Also, there may have been an interaction between interests and exposure (as discussed in Chapter 1).²³ For example, men may have been blind

²³ Ridgeway (1997:222-223) argues that people's 'self-interest makes them more cognitively resistant to disconfirming information' of their stereotypes.

to disconfirming evidence of their gender stereotypes if their self-esteem was rooted in the belief that they were superior to female colleagues.

Limited first-hand evidence of women's aptitude in male-dominated domains led people to doubt and resist their attempted incursions into politics. Being unaccustomed to female leaders, many regarded it as inappropriate. Strong outspoken women were often beaten, chastised or at least reprimanded by their embarrassed kin – cognisant of cultural expectations. By witnessing others being treated according to stereotypical beliefs, people learnt what kind of behaviour was necessary to avoid social sanction.

Many husbands felt that they were supposed to be the household head and so were uncomfortable with their wives entering politics. Furthermore, with little first-hand evidence of women's efficacy in politics it was often assumed that they only ascended through sexual favours and were hence labelled 'prostitutes' – by men and women alike (see also Geisler 2004:191). Geisler (1995:567-568) noted, '[t]hose who transgress such prescriptions are disrespected, derided, ridiculed, slandered and demoralised by colleagues, and receive little electoral support from their parties'. Many female politicians reportedly experienced marital problems and instability (Ferguson et al 1995:9,13-14). The few women that did successfully become parliamentarians in the early 1990s were mostly divorced or single (61%) (ibid:9).²⁴

Notwithstanding these demand-side constraints, male participants primarily stressed supply-side causes of women's paucity in politics. They insisted that women in the 1970s and 1980s tended to follow men's endeavours rather than initiating their own political activities: they rarely put themselves forward (*tabaleipelesha*). Women's 'passivity' was attributed to them being largely unaccustomed to speaking out for themselves, so lacking the requisite sense of self-efficacy. Mike (42, a grassroots political activist and onion wholesaler) commented:

Women used to say "Only a man can do it, only a man can do it, only a man can do it"
[translated].^{viii}

For demand and supply-side reasons, the paucity of women in prestigious positions appears to have been self-perpetuating. There was little disconfirming evidence of internalised gender stereotypes or cultural expectations. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, women accounted for only 3-8% of elected MPs (ZARD and SADC, 2005:25). As shown by Figures 3.3 and 3.4, there were no female Cabinet members between 1978 and 1988. In the latter two graphs, lighter colours indicate earlier periods.

²⁴ Other authors also point to this discrimination and hostility (from families, voters and parliamentary colleagues alike) as an obstacle to women's political participation (Ferguson et al,1995; Geisler, 2004; Kimberly and Ferguson, 1995:12; Schylter, 1999:118; 2009:30). However, they do not explain it by reference to limited evidence of women's efficacy. Perhaps, it is only with exposure to experiential evidence of (many) women in leadership that my participants were able to explain converse historical trends. Earlier studies did not detect the importance of limited exposure, since they lacked the contemporary counter-factual of women in leadership. In this way, the present can inform our understanding of history, just as history informs our understanding of the present.




Figure 3.2: Percentage female of elected members of parliament since 1964
 Source: Singogo et al, 2009:26




Figure 3.3: Party leadership, numbers
 Source: CSO, 1991:62




Figure 3.4: Party leadership, proportion female, 1972, 1978, 1982 and 1988

Source: CSO, 1991:62

Women's paucity in socially valued domains seems to have reproduced gender status inequalities. Gender divisions of labour also appear to have fostered misogyny. Many women were resented by men, as Ferguson (1999:194,196-198) recounts his observations of Kitwe in the late 1980s:

With both earning power and the control of housing so overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of men, women's economic strategies were necessarily largely focused on ways of gaining access to male-controlled resources... Workers thus have increasingly perceived themselves to be struggling to survive economically, all the while surrounded by a sea of grasping, ever-needy, mostly female dependants... A political economy of misogyny thus begins to become visible: with shrinking real wages, besieged from all sides with demands, workers felt panicky and taken advantage of by what could sometimes seem like greedy women who did not understand or care about their problems. And no one, in their view, was more to blame, or had worse motives, than their own wives and/or girlfriends.

Such hatred seems to have been exacerbated by the physical consequences of gender divisions of labour, which created male-only discursive enclaves in which women were portrayed as problematic sexual objects. Men's misogyny was 'extreme and unremitting' (Ferguson, 1999:188).

These stereotypes of women were not only articulated and reproduced by men. Economic dependency upon husbands also turned housewives against unmarried women – repeating the colonial trend. In the early decades of independence, married women's anger was primarily directed at their husbands' female drinking partners, rather than their husbands (Glazer, 1997:152). National discourse (newspapers, popular songs, the Women's League and politicians) similarly tended to blame independent unmarried women for moral and economic decay. With their make-up, mini-skirts and wigs, these 'prostitutes' supposedly tempted men away from their wives and familial provision, resulting in unstable marriages, child-neglect, abortion and teenage pregnancies (Geisler, 2004:92-95; Glazer Schuster, 1979; Longwe and Clarke, 1990). Unaccompanied women's movements were restricted from the

early 1970s and periodically thereafter by bans and police harassment. To promote morality, re-establish traditional values and ensure submission to husbands as well as older women, calls were made for a revival of pre-marital counselling (Geisler, 2004:95-97; Glazer Schuster, 1979:148–153; Hansen, 1997:112-113; Longwe, 1985).

3.5 Traditional rituals and teachings

It has been argued that gender status inequalities partly resulted from gender divisions of labour. An alternative hypothesis emphasises the influence of ‘tradition’. One way in which these beliefs have been passed down, across generations, is through premarital initiation.²⁵ Many of my own participants attributed women’s endurance (*ukushipikisha*) within abusive, hierarchical marriages and their described proclivity to passively follow others’ directives without considering, articulating or following their own desires during the early decades of Independence to these teachings.

Icisungu instructions seem unchanged, as maintained by elderly women and evident in the similarities between my own experience of *icisungu* and that depicted by Richards (1995).²⁶ As noted elsewhere (Geisler, 2000:66-67; Schlyter, 1999:106; Rasing, 2001:146,153), Zambian initiation ceremonies tend to promote gender status inequalities within marriage. *Banacimbusa* (traditional counsellor) BanaNkonde (55) prescribed as follows:

You must make yourself pliable. The man is the head of the house, one must follow what he says, so that you live within marriage, because if you leave you will find exactly the same thing [i.e. men are all the same; the grass is not greener on the other side]. Don’t leave, you must stay... A woman has the right to speak but not to use strong words; she must be calm when explaining... If he refuses you must follow. If the man scolds, the woman must return to the ground [both figuratively and literally, by kneeling]... Through this way of speaking you will live harmoniously [translated].^{ix}

25 This was most famously documented by Audrey Richards (1995), drawing on research in 1931-1933. More recently, Rasing (2001) found that initiation was widespread, at least among her participants (Catholic women with formal jobs in Mufulira, a Copperbelt town). Participants to my own research similarly seemed to take it as given. Only one woman declared that she would not take her daughter to a traditional counsellor. Other research differs however. Rural participants to Moore and Vaughan’s Zambian study (1994:171) maintained that *icisungu* is uncommon and were reluctant to detail their own initiation. But their efforts to downplay its prevalence may be symptomatic of their unwillingness to discuss the topic. In Mozambique, Signe Arnfred (2011:174) similarly broached difficulties when trying to interview young initiates: ‘it was a very awkward scene... not a word passed their lips’. Such obstacles may account for why Audrey Richards (1995:63) did not interview the *banacisungu* participants of the ceremony.

26 I was invited to participate as a *nacisungu* (initiate and would-be Bemba bride) by a *banacimbusa* (traditional counsellor) presiding over the initiation of two betrothed, heavily pregnant sisters living nearby in our low-income compound. The *banacimbusa* (my host’s closest female friend) was keen for me to learn. So I joined in the training and rituals, as a would-be Bemba bride. I am unaware of other outsiders being invited to participate in this ceremony.

Our initiation consisted of a month’s private training and then an overnight event to show the sisters’ readiness for marriage to their female in-laws and gathered married women (of all ages). The training detailed conjugal obligations, just as Richards previously documented (1995:140). There were also similarities in symbolic behaviour in the overnight event: we *banacisungu* were veiled by a large cloth as we crawled into the room of assembled married women. We later used our mouths to grab domestic emblems (e.g. a cooking stick); and underwent a series of physically excruciating, arduous challenges, embodying the prescription of fighting for one’s marriage (see also Richards, 1995:64,73,79,107,193).

However, in contrast to Richards’ descriptions (in which dances were not a major component and mostly comic), sexual dancing was a central part of the overnight event (see also Kapungwe, 2003:45-48). This may indicate the increased perceived importance of securing one’s husband’s attention through his sexual satisfaction. Different individual women took turns to demonstrate their prowess, so that we *banacisungu* might learn the secrets of marriage and gain status by joining a new community of married women. However, this variation in activities does not detract from my central point that the taught message appears to have remained constant over the twentieth century.

Participants suggested that these teachings encouraged women to passively follow others' directives, without considering their own desires. This was first pointed to me by Sophia (the director of a NGO providing legal and psycho-social support to survivors of gender-based violence). I also observed it myself. When narrating their courtship and marriage, some women explained changes by reference to their husbands' and families' preferences and decisions, rather than their own. When I voiced my observation that they seemed to be following what their husbands wanted, they often referred to their *banacimbusa's* instructions.

Traditional teachings were also said to have quietened women's voices within marriage. Suzie (55, a market trader selling dried sardines) attributed the shyness of earlier generations of women to *icisungu*:

If you go into marriage they gave you rules of the marriage, 'You should be scared of your husband, you obey/listen to what he says [translated].^x

The normative weight of *banacimbusa's* instructions may have been augmented by urban housewives' social isolation, which limited their awareness of alternative, possibly more enjoyable ways of living.²⁷ The dearth of opportunities for collective reflection for those that did not congregate in the public sphere may also account for historically limited social support for abused women.

Even if urban housewives did reject gender status beliefs, their ability to renegotiate conjugal relations may have been constrained by their limited exit options. Indeed, even though the instructions appear similar across history, women's compliance seems to have varied across time with individuals' differing levels of resources. Recall that in an earlier context of economic interdependence and matrilineal support, Richards (1940:94) noted, 'there seems to be every kind of contradiction between the norm [i.e. patriarchal teachings] and the actual behaviour'. Despite being taught to submit, women's autonomy was historically enabled by the prevailing patterns of resource access. It was only with women's increased economic dependency on their husbands that the latter were able to achieve their interest in gender status inequalities.²⁸

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated that gender relations can change rapidly with shifting patterns of resource access. Demographic circumstances in the early colonial period enabled women to bargain for better treatment because their consequent scarcity value allowed them to access resources through men without being dependent upon a particular man. Subsequently, however, women's access to resources (in the form of multiple potential partners who might support them) waned: urban sex ratios evened up over time, monogamy became a

²⁷ The consequences of women coming together through labour-force participation is explored in Chapter 4.

²⁸ For example, my fellow *nacisungu*, Cecilia (23), asked my opinion of the instruction that we should never refuse to have sex with our husbands. I paused in reflection. She volunteered that she did not think it was right, but added that it would be necessary to prevent his infidelity, since there were many women, especially those without work, eager to take her place (see also Muvandi et al, 2000 for similar findings in urban and rural Ndola, in the Copperbelt). This competition for men is partly due to women's continued difficulties in obtaining decent work. Similarly in Tanzania, young women's desperation to secure a husband in a context of economic crisis led to a rise in female genital cutting, contrary to their mothers' wishes and historically successful state policies (Nypan, 1991).

prescriptive cultural stereotype and women's direct access to income (through employment) remained limited.

Christian-colonial stereotypes prescribing gender divisions of labour became entrenched due to a combination of macro-level factors. They were first buttressed by colonial labour market policies and legislative changes. Zambian aspirations for middle-class status also incentivised many to emulate European settlers. These class markers were increasingly copied because they were perceived and promoted as fashionable displays of modernity. Desire for social respect and upward mobility thus motivated compliance with gender divisions of labour. Further, given patterns of resource access, the typical man could achieve social status as sole breadwinner without sacrificing economic security. Hence many denied their wives' employment.

Confined to the home, urban housewives (both working-class and elite) were often socially isolated, not exposed to alternative ways of living. Being economically dependent on their husbands limited their capacity to renegotiate conjugal relations. Together with the devalorisation of their unpaid care work, women's consequent inexperience in the public sphere gave others little reason to value their advice. With limited first-hand evidence of women demonstrating equal competence in prestigious socio-economic domains, people tended to stereotype men as leaders. These factors, in conjunction with cultural expectations, made it more advantageous for women to comply with the patriarchal messages promoted during initiation rituals. These rituals alone do not account for the behavioural change that occurred over the past century, since they have not been significantly modified.

4. Paid Work in a Context of Economic Insecurity

This chapter makes the case that four trends are occurring in the contemporary period (c. 1990-2011): female labour force participation is increasing; more women are entering male-dominated occupations; economic security is worsening; and gender stereotypes (relating to competence and status) are weakening.

Section 4.1 suggests that worsening economic security (a change in patterns of resource access) was a key trigger of increased female labour force participation and women's incursions into stereotypically masculine occupations. This dynamic can be conceptualised as a shift in interests: worsening economic security increased the economic cost of compliance with cultural expectations concerning the male breadwinner and female housewife model. Subsequent chapters will consider whether worsening economic security was sufficient for increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour or whether it was only jointly sufficient. It may have operated in tandem with some people's prior rejection of gender stereotypes, resulting from their formative experiences or their exposure to gender sensitisation (explored in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively). Exploring these different hypotheses enables us to understand the interplay between interests, exposure, internalised beliefs, cultural expectations and shifting patterns of resource access.

Section 4.2 explores if and how increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour has affected gender stereotypes and status beliefs – the assumption that men are not only more suited to but also more deserving of roles of authority, as well as associated esteem, respect and deference.

The section begins by examining participants' accounts of the consequences of increasing flexibility in gender divisions of labour in terms of women's self-perceptions as well as their social relationships with others, at home, in neighbourhoods and workplaces. Collective reflection and exposure to women demonstrating their equal ability to assume roles historically dominated by men seems to provide disconfirming evidence of individuals' gender stereotypes and associated status beliefs, in some respects. Because working women are increasingly regarded as innovative and knowledgeable, many see it as advantageous to heed their advice. Furthermore, by gathering together, sharing their experiences and views of gender atypical experiences, people working in the public sphere appear to be collectively dismantling gender stereotypes. Cumulatively, this evidence points to the interplay between interests and exposure, underscoring the primacy of the latter in eroding gender status inequalities.

I then interrogate the claim that gender status inequalities have weakened. Earlier studies (undertaken in the 1990s) provide conflicting evidence on how Zambian family relations have been affected by increased female labour force participation. Although divergent findings could simply reflect the different time periods in which research was undertaken, it still raises questions about my participants' narratives of weakening gender status inequalities. In response, I examine the reliability of their testimonies and highlight the limits to posited growing egalitarianism, as evident in the prevalence of intimate partner violence and men's limited share of unpaid care work. This section also offers explanations for the persistence of these intra-household status inequalities, highlighting interactions between interests and exposure.

While Section 4.2 largely focuses gender status inequalities in the domestic domain (as affected by growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour), Section 4.3 focuses on public roles of authority, as well as associated esteem, respect and deference. It examines how increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour (i.e. women’s growing share of remunerated work and male-dominated occupations) has affected the demand for and also supply of female leaders.

4.1 Growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour and worsening economic security

Increasing female labour force participation

Census data points to a recent increase in female labour force participation. From 1980 to 2000, the proportion of urban Copperbelt women who are employed increased from 13% to 21% (as illustrated Figure 4.1). Meanwhile, the proportion of the male adult population that is employed has decreased over time (ibid).




Figure 4.1 Proportion of adult population (over 12 years) employed, urban Copperbelt, 1980, 1990 and 2000

Source: CSO, 1994b:55-57; CSO, 2004a:66

Figure 4.1 does not show the proportion of urban Copperbelt men and women in employment in 2010, since this data has not yet been published. Descriptive tables for the 2010 Census only include statistics for the Copperbelt as a whole, not urban areas thereof (which comprise 81 percent of the total Copperbelt population, CSO, 2012a:2). These statistics are represented in Figure 4.2, which shows rising female employment in the Copperbelt.




Figure 4.2: Proportion of adult population (over 12 years) in employment, Copperbelt, 1990, 2000 and 2010

Source: CSO, 2004a:66, 2012a:216

The definition used by all these censuses is that '[t]he employed population includes all persons who work for remuneration in the form of wages, salaries, commissions or pay in kind; operate their own businesses without employing others, and; work in a family business or farm without pay or profit (CSO, 1994b:161, 2003:76, 2012b:35). This shared categorisation excludes the following: 'unemployed and seeking work', 'not seeking work but available for work', 'full-time housewife/homemaker', 'full-time student', 'not available for work for other reasons' (CSO, 1994b:161). The distinction between 'unpaid family workers' and 'housewives or homemakers' is that the former category are presumed to be involved in an income-generating family enterprise but not getting paid themselves.

However, Benería (1981) and Rakodi (1988:497,501) critique this conceptualisation of economic activity as considering only those goods and services exchanged in the market. Data derived from this definition will arguably underestimate the size of the labour force in areas where non-market production is prevalent, as well as the number of workers engaged in such activities. It will thus under-report women's work in less economically developed countries, such as Zambia.

Small-scale urban agriculture is one example of a non-remunerated productive activity to which low-income urban Zambian women have heavily contributed. Drawing on surveys from the late 1970s in the Copperbelt and Lusaka, Rakodi (1988:511) suggests that it 'makes a significant contribution to domestic consumption for between a quarter and a half of low-income area residents, for at least a few months from about February to May each year, [but] is unimportant as an income-generating activity'. By omitting such labour in their definitions of economic activity, Zambian censuses are likely to have underestimated women's productive activities. Moreover, as Benería (1981:17) argues more broadly, such categorisations 'reinforce ideological biases related to the undervaluation of women's work'.

This argument provides reason not to interpret Figures 4.1 and 4.2 as providing full representations of Copperbelt women's productive activities. But while census data does not

show all the work undertaken by women (or men), it does indicate that urban Copperbelt women are increasingly undertaking work that is typically recognised and valued by Zambians (i.e. market-orientated activities). It remains an open question, however, whether women's status is enhanced by undertaking such work.

But Benería (1981) then raises two further concerns: census data may not even track market-orientated activities. By categorising workers according to their 'main occupation', censuses are likely to overlook homemakers who undertake some market-orientated activities in addition to their domestic responsibilities. Additionally, if it is 'considered prestigious to keep women from participating in non-household production [then] when asked whether women do so both men and women tend to reply negatively even if this is not the case' (ibid:14). This seemed to be the case in my own research: some participants initially described their mothers as 'just housewives', though subsequently revealed that they had traded from home. One example of this comes from BanaMutale (39, domestic worker): 'my mother was a full time housewife, sometimes selling tomatoes at home but not going to the market'. I did not ask how her work was described to census enumerators; they may have been told that she was economically inactive.

What matters for current purposes – in ascertaining the extent to which female labour force participation has changed over time – is not whether women's remunerated work is recognised but whether the degree to which it is recognised has changed over time. If there has been any change in the perceptions of enumerators and/ or survey respondents then rising female labour force participation would be 'in part a statistical artefact', as suggested by Elson (1999:614). On the one hand, as will be elaborated upon in this chapter, there does seem to be greater appreciation of women's remunerated activity, since it has become increasingly vital to household survival. Yet certain types of work continue to be privileged. The word '*incito*' (literally translated as 'work') is generally used to refer to waged employment, not self-employment.

While it is possible that women's labour force participation in earlier decades was under-reported, my participants did universally maintain that female labour force participation had increased significantly. A number of female market traders said that they personally were previously housewives (like their mothers) and denied earlier involvement in income-generating activities. Furthermore, this chapter will argue that any change in the recognition of women's paid work is partly due to a critical mass of women now being in employment, in contrast to earlier times. If this is the case then increased recognition of female employment would not be a case of exaggerated reporting but rather a reflection of the observed phenomena.

In summary, when interpreting census data on female labour force participation it is important to recognise that it excludes non-marketised productive activities (such as small-scale urban agriculture) and may under-report some under-valued remunerated activities (such as non-waged employment). It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which census data is accurate. However, the general trend depicted in the graphs above was corroborated by all participants, who maintained that female labour force participation had significantly increased.

Occupational desegregation

Alongside increased female labour force participation, there appears to have been another contemporary trend, namely increasing occupational desegregation across the socio-economic spectrum in the Copperbelt. By occupational desegregation, I mean that women are increasingly entering occupations historically dominated by men.

Skilled manual work was historically the preserve of working class men, while the professions were monopolised by middle class men. For both economic groups, gender divisions of labour appear to be waning. Zambian censuses do not include a category for 'skilled manual work' but Zambia's Demographic and Health Surveys do, providing statistically representative data for the Copperbelt though not urban areas in particular. In the Copperbelt, the proportion of employed women working in skilled manual occupations more than doubled between 2001 and 2007, from 3.5% to 7.9% (CSO et al, 2003a:38; CSO et al, 2009:44). This data purports to include the informal economy. Typical jobs include carpenters, construction workers and electricians. The percentage of Copperbelt women employed in professional and technical occupations also increased between 2001 and 2007, from 7.7% to 12.4% (see graph below). Meanwhile, the proportion of employed men in these occupations grew by a lesser extent (CSO et al, 2003a:38; CSO et al, 2009:44).

Census data similarly indicates that an increasing proportion of urban Copperbelt women in all occupations, save clerical work and sales (see Figure 4.3; where a lighter shade is used for earlier decades). The proportion of women in production and related work doubled between 1980 and 2000, though still remains low.




Figure 4.3: Proportion of women in occupations, urban Copperbelt, 1980, 1990 and 2000

Source: CSO, 1994b:64-65; 2003:73.

Figure 4.3 only goes up to the year 2000, since census statistics for urban areas of the Copperbelt have not yet been published. We only have access to sex-disaggregated 2010 Census data for urban areas of Zambia. Also, this data cannot be used to compare trends in manual work since definitions of these categories have changed over time. But we can still chart urban trends in non-manual occupations, where women's share seems to be growing (see Figure 4.4). While urban data is not necessarily representative of urban areas of the Copperbelt, the two graphs do display similarities: women's share of professional, technical, administrative and managerial jobs rose between 1990 and 2000, while the proportion of women undertaking clerical work dipped during this period.




Figure 4.4: Proportion of women in non-manual occupations, urban Zambia, 1990, 2000 and 2010

Source: CSO, 2003:85, 2012a:228

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 indicate occupational desegregation, though not to the same degree as emphasised by my participants. There are several potential reasons for this discrepancy. First, some of this data is not stated: in 2010, 7% of women who declared that they were employed did not also state their occupation (CSO, 2012a:228). Thus it is possible that contemporary flexibility in gender divisions of labour slightly varies from the picture presented in the graphs above.

Second, my interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011 – a decade after the most recent sex-disaggregated Census data for the Copperbelt. The increase in flexibility in gender divisions of labour reported by participants may have largely occurred in the intervening period. My qualitative research provides reason to expect that more recent data will point to greater occupational desegregation.

Third, Census data does not disaggregate by sex within occupational categories: it does not tell us the extent of horizontal or vertical desegregation within professional and technical work, for example. Nor does it inform us about the degree to which the jobs now performed by women are stereotyped as masculine. In summary, statistics point to a partial change in occupational sex segregation, but it is possible (though not proven) that this data might understate the extent of flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour.

Sex-disaggregated data on industries can help shed more light on labour market trends. Census data for urban areas in general is depicted in Figure 4.5. This graph shows that with increasing female labour force participation, most women find employment in industries that already have a large proportion of women. These industries include trade, restaurants and hotels; finance; as well as community and personal services (which includes health, education, government administration and domestic service). While a smaller proportion turns to stereotypically masculine industries, the female share of mining and electricity supply is shown as increasing over time. Since the vast majority of Zambian mines are in the Copperbelt (Matenga, 2010), this urban statistic likely reflects Copperbelt trends. There is also a sizeable female share of the new category, ‘Information and Communication’.




Figure 4.5: Proportion of women in various industries, urban Zambia, 2000 and 2010

Source: CSO, 2003:88, 2012a:225

Besides charting the proportion of women employed in each industry, we can also observe the changing distribution of female employment across industries, where 100% represents the total number of women in employment in any one year. Figure 4.6 is statistically representative of urban areas in Zambia, not the Copperbelt in particular. Though Kitwe is much larger than most other urban areas in Zambia, this difference may not be relevant. The most recent available Copperbelt census data (displayed in Figure 4.7) indicates similarities at the turn of the century: urban/Copperbelt women were predominantly employed in three key sectors, namely trade, community services and agriculture. Given similarity at one point in time, the diachronic trend depicted in Figure 4.6 may be indicative of Copperbelt dynamics.




Figure 4.6: Percentage distribution of employed women (over 12 years) by industry, urban Zambia

Source: CSO, 1993:81, 1994a:70, 1999:98, 2004b:95, 2005:72




Figure 4.7 Distribution of the usually working population by industry and sex, urban Copperbelt, 2000²⁹

Source: CSO, 2004a:77

Figure 4.6 suggests that the proportion of employed women employed in community and social services decreased over the past two decades, as they largely turned to trade and agriculture. Note also the recent declining percentage of women employed in manufacturing. This could be interpreted as demonstrating that there has been little flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This said, the data is ambiguous, given the high proportion of ‘not stated’ responses for 1991 and 2010.

Further, this data reveals neither horizontal nor vertical occupational segregation within industries. It does not tell us what particular jobs women have been doing. Historically there may have been a higher share of women in manufacturing but my participants suggested that this was largely in support roles. Similarly, the data does not account for the size and profitability of women’s enterprises in ‘trade’, nor their positions within community and social services (which includes domestic service, education, health and government administration).

This section ends by recapping key statistics, while bearing in mind the above-noted caveats. From 1980 to 2000, the proportion of urban Copperbelt women who are employed increased from 13% to 21%. By 2010, 30% of Copperbelt women were employed. As female labour force participation has risen, most women have joined sectors that already have a large proportion of women (e.g. trade, finance, and community services). Alongside such continuity, occupations have become less vertically segregated by sex. For example, the percentage of Copperbelt women employed in professional and technical occupations increased between 2001 and 2007, from 7.7% to 12.4% – a greater increase than that of men. Further, between 1990 and 2010, in urban areas of Zambia, the proportion of managers who were female increased from 12% to 29%. Horizontal occupational sex segregation also appears to be declining. In the Copperbelt, the proportion of employed women working in

²⁹ By ‘usually working’, the Census refers to those that were working in the 12 months prior to the census night.

skilled manual occupations more than doubled between 2001 and 2007, from 3.5% to 7.9%. The proportion of Copperbelt women in production and related work also doubled between 1980 and 2000. Data for urban areas similarly points to a rising female share of stereotypically masculine industries, such as mining and electricity. Since the vast majority of mines are in the Copperbelt, this urban statistic likely reflects Copperbelt trends. In summary, horizontal and vertical sex segregation appears to be declining, with growing female labour force participation.

Worsening economic security

A third contemporary trend is that perceived economic security has worsened in the Copperbelt over the past thirty years. By the early 1990s, both real *per capita* consumption and GDP had plummeted, to one third of what they had been fifteen years earlier in Zambia (McCulloch et al, 2001; World Bank, 1994b:4; illustrated in Figure 4.8). This was partly due to the fall in copper prices (see Figure 4.9). Although the Government maintained consumption levels by increasing borrowing, it did not improve productivity (McCulloch et al, 2011). Zambia thus became heavily indebted.

Government turned to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and introduced a four year Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1983. This involved trade liberalisation, interest rate liberalisation, the removal of price controls, reduced government expenditure (on food and fertiliser subsidies) and public sector contraction (Kalinda and Floro, 1992:11; Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004:21-22). During the 1980s, living costs increased rapidly while formal employment and real earnings fell (Kalinda and Floro, 1992:29; World Bank, 1994a:15-18). In light of popular resistance, the Government temporarily abandoned the World Bank's liberalisation reforms. However, a subsequent donor aid-freeze pushed heavily-indebted Zambia to return to the IFIs and resume restructuring (Kalinda and Floro, 1992:13-15; Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004:22).




Figure 4.8: GDP per capita, levels and annual growth rates

Source: World Bank (2007:45, Figure 2.9).




Figure 4.9 World copper prices, \$/mt, real 2005\$, 1960-2012
 Source: World Bank (2013)

The 1990s were characterised by widespread retrenchments, as infant industries were crippled by trade liberalisation (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004:8). Employment in manufacturing and mining greatly reduced during this decade (Bigsten and Mkenda, 2001; CSO, 2003:86; as depicted in Figure 4.10, where lighter shades indicate earlier periods). Between 1978 and 2003, employment in mining (a central industry in the Copperbelt) fell from 66,000 to 20,000 (Matenga, 2010:2). The declining numbers of those employed in ‘community’ reflects public sector cuts. Many retrenched workers turned to agriculture – as documented by Ferguson (1999), drawing on ethnographic research undertaken in Kitwe in the late 1980s.




Figure 4.10: Distribution of usually working population (12 years and over) by industry, Copperbelt Province, 1980, 1990 and 2000
 Source: CSO, 1994b:67, 2004a:75

Formal jobs not only reduced in number but also in remuneration over the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Formal sector wages decreased significantly, especially in mining and manufacturing (Moser and Holland, 1997:36; World Bank, 1994a:15,143). By 2006, only 45% of miners were found to be on permanent, pensionable contracts; the remainder had been shifted on to

three month contracts on a lower wage, without former fringe benefits or job security (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:21). Thus even though the copper price rebounded after 2003, employment therein remains insecure.

Many men turned to the informal economy to replace formal employment or to supplement declining wages within it. Between 1998 and 2010, the proportion of economically active Copperbelt men who were employed in the informal economy increased from 47% to 54% (CSO, 2005:76; 2011c:120). Accordingly, the informal economy grew by 6% per annum in the late 1980s (World Bank, 1994b:8). In the early decades of independence, infant mortality had halved (from 147 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1969 to 79 in 1977). Families' subsequent financial hardship is reflected in major reversals in child health. Infant mortality increased to 107 in 1987-91. Child stunting and wasting were also higher in 1990 than they had been in 1970 (McCulloch et al, 2001:3).

Decline continued during the 1990s (see Figure 4.8). During this decade in Zambia, the compound annual growth of employment and GDP registered at 3.8% and 0.8% respectively (Sparreboom and Albee, 2011:34). In the next decade (2000-2009) the compound annual growth rate of employment and GDP registered at 2.0% and 5.4% (ibid). The growth in GDP partly reflects a boom in world copper prices between 2003 and 2007 (see Figure 4.9).

Employment creation was halted and reversed by the global financial crisis. In July 2008 copper prices plummeted from a record high of US\$8,985 to US\$2,811 per metric tonne in December 2008 (Musokotwane, 2009:3). The Mine Safety Department in Kitwe recorded that 7,324 (out of 32,636) persons directly employed by mining companies had lost employment between June 2008 and May 2009 (Matenga, 2010:4). Further job losses were endured by 11,915 (out of 30,515) persons employed by contracted companies (ibid:4). By 2010, unemployment in the Copperbelt registered at 28.3% (CSO, 2011c:102-103). National youth unemployment (20-24) had risen to 59% (CSO, 2011c:111).³⁰

Further social consequences can be seen in Figure 4.11. This graph illustrates another component of worsening economic security: plummeting life expectancy, which partly stems from the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Although the Government's introduction of free Anti-Retroviral Drugs has extended lives (accounting for the sharp increase in life expectancy from 2005), families cannot rely on breadwinners to survive middle age and are thus financially at risk. The illness and death of a productive adult is frequently identified as a major negative shock to the welfare of urban households (World Bank, 2007:131). Many of my participants explicitly and openly referred to this risk, as discussed in the next section.

While Figure 4.11 also indicates improvements in education and gross national income (GNI) per capita, this has not directly translated into greater economic security. Many low-income parents complained that they had laboured to educate their children yet still they had not found employment.

30 I include nationwide data on youth unemployment in urban areas here, since there is no recent age-disaggregated data on unemployment specifically in the Copperbelt. While Kitwe's size makes it different from the vast majority of urban areas in Zambia, there is still reason to think that nationwide data on youth unemployment can give an indicative picture for Kitwe because they share similar trends of overall unemployment (CSO, 2011c:111).




Figure 4.11: Trends in Zambia’s Human Development Index Component Indices, 1980-2010

Source: UNDP (2012).

The common contemporary perception of worsening economic security is encapsulated in the following conversation between community representatives of a low-income settlement, built adjacent to Kitwe’s industrial area where male residents were previously employed.

David (Chairperson of the Residential Development Committee): In Chiluba’s term [Zambian President from 1991 to 2002] we experienced the selling of companies, now people in this community are just roaming down the streets.

Helen (local politician): We trusted investors but they don’t pay taxes so they make the country poorer.

David: Before [there was] not contract work, Zambians, now contract. Now the people who are working are suffering more than those not working, compared to those selling, they come home, there’s no money, so they go to *ka* [*‘ka’* is a belittling term] shylocks, 100% interest.

Helen: ZESCO cut power off, [the parastatal supplying electricity] disconnect you ‘cause you can’t pay.

David: We’re squeezed, I’m telling you!

Helen: When you wake up in the morning you don’t know where the money is coming from! [laughs].

This conversation speaks to the statistics outlined above: widespread unemployment, privatisation, tax avoidance by foreign companies, the casualisation of employment, increased indebtedness, disconnection from utilities and a general sense of economic insecurity. This sharply contrasts with nostalgic accounts of the past, which emphasised men’s access to employment and better social security. This perception of worsening economic security was pervasive amongst participants and by no means unique to my acquaintances in the low-income settlement in which I stayed.

Thus far three contemporary trends have been suggested: from the late 1980s to present there has been worsening economic security, increased female labour force participation and some occupational desegregation. The next section will argue that these are not just correlated but also causally connected.

The relationship between worsening economic security and increased female labour force participation

This section explores the relationship between perceptions of worsening economic security and increased female labour force participation. This section sets out evidence indicating that the former is a key cause of the latter and then considers how best to understand this causal relationship, in terms of the concepts articulated in Chapter 1.

All participants describing personal accounts of female labour market entry maintained that husbands conceded to their wives' requests to join the labour market as life became financially intolerable. BanaMwimba's account below is fairly representative of recorded life histories, from men and women alike:

Alice: Who wanted you to start your trade?

BanaMwimba: It's me myself. My husband was refusing, he was jealous.

Alice: So how did you come here?

BanaMwimba: He came to see we started to suffer [in 1994], that's when he said, 'Go ahead and sell' [giving her capital to this end]. We've accessed water ourselves, illegally! [she chuckles] [translated].^{xi}

Despite worsening economic security BaShiMwimba (her husband, a truck driver) was initially obstinate. He only relented after five months of living without electricity, having cut meat and fish from their diet, eating just mushrooms and *kapenta* [small dried sardines, one of the cheapest foodstuffs]. BanaMwimba started selling *kapenta* at Kitwe's central market only sometime after her husband became unemployed. Matthew's life history (detailed in Chapter 2) provides a similar narrative: his wife suggested that she should start selling some time after he lost formal employment at the mines and his inadequate profits from self-employment in the market repeatedly triggered disputes.

Besides men's loss of formal employment, many women (from across the socio-economic and generational spectrum) openly referred to the possibility of their husbands' deaths. Labour market entry was often explained in recognition of this risk, which increased over the 1990s with plummeting life expectancy (as illustrated in Figure 4.11).

BanaMwila (working as part of a collective house-building scheme, while her chronically unwell husband remains at home): This time, it's difficult, it's tough... This time it's not good to sit at home. This time be clever! A woman should not just sit at home. A woman should also be working. The husband is working, his wife is also working, just in case work finishes, or the husband dies. But if you're just sitting, what will you do?

BanaChemba (a co-worker and widow, also in her mid 50s): Nothing.

BanaMwila: Nothing [translated].^{xii}

A woman should not just sit; she should go help her beloved so that things will be easy if he dies [translated].^{xiii}

BanaMwamba (40, married, sells onions in the central market),

'Just sitting' is a common way of describing homemakers and the unemployed; it means to be idle and unproductive. It is indicative of the low status of unpaid care work and shall be returned to later in this chapter.

Thus, worsening economic security (in the form of men's job loss or anticipation of their death) was identified by middle-aged women and men as a rationale for their own or their wives' labour market entry. Interviewed young women also referred to these risks. Having observed the perils of financial dependence and been encouraged by their parents, they almost universally expressed aspirations to be in employment. When asked whether they would prefer a job, a husband or a baby, the overwhelming majority chose the first option; I only ever heard one exception to this rule. Often, when describing hopes for the future, young women talked about the kinds of jobs they would like – some did not even mention marriage unless prompted. These desires are illustrated by the following comments, drawn from different interviews.

I wanted to be independent, not to be lazy, to give up but to deal with things by myself, with my own strength... I came to see that things are difficult... There's no dad and no mum, so I came to see that if I just sit then I'll ruin myself, so I should work hard and look to my future... I don't look at the man, I have a boyfriend, even if he hasn't given me anything, me I don't even care, all I care is I work extra hard... whether he's there or he's not there... I have to do what I want to do... Even if I marry, I don't want to rush into marriage but to work hard like a man, not just to sit.

Annette (24, trainee soldier, supporting her grandmother and chronically ill brother).

I also want to be independent... What if the husband dies? Like the way my father died, if my mum wasn't strong, what would she even start from? – concerning sending us to school. As in you learn to be independent so that if anything happens to your husband you still go on, you're still strong... My mother is working so hard to sponsor me to school, that inspires me to work hard that I should do great things for her, not that I should be depending on a husband.

Jurita (17, fatherless girl, whose mother works as a chef in England to support her education at an elite private school).

Experience is a good teacher. So when you experience that kind of life whereby your dad who was a breadwinner dies, you try and think, 'Ok, if my mum had the way of providing for us, we couldn't suffer like this, so maybe I will try and make a difference. I will also do something for my family, as well as my husband, so at the end of the day we're going to balance up. Even when he's not there, I'll be able to provide for the family'. I think experience is a good teacher.

Chimwemwe (21, currently working as a decorator so she can fund her continued study of Law. Her mother, BanaMayuka, provided for the family through market trading while her husband was unemployed for seven years – see life history).

Comments such as these indicate that people's experiences of the pitfalls of dependence on a single male wage have been pivotal in transforming aspirations. This said, the reliability of these self-presentations may be questioned. It is possible that their behaviour does not reflect their professed aspirations for independence. However, these three individuals did seem especially committed to economic advancement. When interviewed, Annette's grandmother took great pride in telling me that Annette has long been the breadwinner for their family, notwithstanding her youth. (Though it remains possible that she has been

financially supported by boyfriends). Jurita's determination to progress in education and secure gainful employment is reflected in her consistently high grades and concentration in class – something I observed while at her school. Chimwemwe's gender atypical career choice (lawyer) and type of piece-work is also telling.

Notwithstanding these efforts to triangulate their accounts, they (and other young women who gave similar narratives) may have overstated their aversion to economic dependency in order to be seen to comply with contemporary social condemnation of this. But even if just a mere façade, such self-presentation would also be evidence of a change in cultural expectations. It indicates that women increasingly wish to present themselves as striving for economic independence. This contrasts with previous decades.

From the above narratives, one might infer that flexibility in gender divisions of labour was previously impeded by a supply-side constraint: women themselves did not desire employment because of their self-perceptions and internalised gender stereotypes. However, further discussions indicate the additional importance of a shift in cultural expectations.

As discussed in Chapter 3, many men previously secured respect by demonstrating their ability to provide for their families single-handedly and so refused their wives' labour force participation. By adhering to these cultural expectations they led others to presume that such practices were normal and deviance would be sanctioned. Worsening economic security has increased the economic costs of compliance with these cultural expectations. Due to perceived economic necessity, people have increasingly sacrificed the social benefits accrued by adherence to earlier prescriptive stereotypes. This shift in interests appears to be a major factor accounting for men's increased proclivity to cede to their wives' suggestions that they should seek employment. The ensuing rise in female labour force participation resulted in widespread contradictions between gender stereotypes and practice.

Gender stereotypes appear to have weakened: women now accrue more status through paid work in the public sphere than being a housewife. Their economic activity is increasingly welcomed. Repeated exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour and widespread recognition of economic insecurity seems to have led to a shift in widely-held prescriptive gender stereotypes, now endorsing mutual support between spouses. This ideal was stressed by the vast majority of men and women, from across the socio-economic and generational spectrum. To provide evidential support for this shift, I include testimonies from those describing how people are judged in the Copperbelt and also others making such judgements:

A long time ago women weren't selling, the reason being that their husbands were refusing them, not wanting to be made shy in front of his friends, as if, 'I don't keep you well'. That's how they were a long time ago but now this time things have reversed. This time husbands long to have a woman who is selling... People are jealous of us traders because we help our families. They say, 'They're strong, they live well, they eat, and the reason is because their wives are strong in selling' [translated].^{xiv}
BanaDavid (45, married, sells tomatoes in the central market).

I like women who work, so that she's working and I'm working, we're both helping each other, we're solving problems [translated].^{xv}
Stephen (26, unmarried mechanic, working at an informal road-side garage).

This time, men say ‘You know I have to marry someone who is doing something’ [partly translated].^{xvi}

Helen (politician in a low-income settlement, see life history).

Women have many problems. The economy of today is very difficult. A woman should work hard to help her spouse [translated].^{xvii}

Mary (55, sells *kapenta*, her husband is intermittently employed as a driving instructor, formerly retrenched).

A woman should help her beloved at home... I’m strong, I do business, I manage everything that I want. I safeguard love at home, I have money, ‘Come, we share’. We pay for the children’s school fees, it’s better we sit down on the ground, we understand each other, we work out how to solve problems... This time a woman should be working hard, not just sitting. If you just sit at home then what will you eat? [translated].^{xviii}

BanaMwamba (40, sells onions wholesale, thus often travels across Southern Africa, while her husband manages the home front).

BanaDavid asserts that prescriptive stereotypes have changed: husbands are now proud of wives that trade at the market. While this account might be biased by BanaDavid’s possible desire to present herself as socially respected, it was consistent with accounts from men, included above. Indeed, it was very rare for young men (be they school or university students, working or unemployed) to express a desire for a partner who was ‘just a housewife’ (disparagingly put). A broad range of participants made the normative claim that women should be in paid employment, given economic insecurity. See also the disparaging reference to ‘just sitting’ in the last quote – consistent with a broader trend.

In line with theories that emphasise the power of widely-held gender beliefs in interactional contexts, this shift in evaluative criteria appears to be tremendously significant, given the importance of securing social respect in Zambia. Since female labour force participation no longer contravenes widely-held gender stereotypes, there are no associated social costs of shame or disapprobation (even for husbands). Instead, as the quotes above suggest, women workers are increasingly appreciated. This may have factored in Annette’s, Jurita’s and Chimwemwe’s decisions to pursue employment, even though they did not mention it explicitly.

Importantly, I have proposed different explanations about different temporal stages of socio-economic change: worsening economic security (a change in patterns of resource access) appears to have shifted interests, triggering increased flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour, despite countervailing cultural expectations. But the latter obstacle appears to have weakened over time, with repeated exposure to information that contradicts gender stereotypes.

The relationship between worsening economic security and occupational desegregation

Having set out evidence suggesting that worsening economic security has triggered increased female labour force participation, this section now examines whether it has also caused occupational desegregation.

On the one hand, it is possible that parents with finite resources, struggling with precarious employment, now have less spare resources to fund their daughters' education so prioritise that of their sons. If worsening economic security has jeopardised girls' education, it might then impede occupational desegregation, though not female labour force participation in general. Education is not a barrier to all occupations (exceptions include small-scale trading), but employment has become more competitive and employers increasingly demand qualifications (CSO, 2003:90). Educational achievements are also closely correlated with employment status and earnings in Zambia (CSO, 2005:102; CSO et al 2009:41; Nielsen, 2000).

However, notwithstanding their declining access to resources, interviewed parents expressed desires for their daughters to become educated and work, not just to marry – as was previously the cultural expectation (as discussed in Chapter 3). Quantitative data provides further evidence of this shift. In the Copperbelt, gender parity in reported school attendance in the Copperbelt is roughly equal until age 16-18, where it falls to 63% of girls compared with 73% of boys (CSO, 2005:36). In response to the statement 'A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl', 39% of sampled Zambians expressed disagreement while a further 36% strongly disagreed (World Values Survey, 2013). The proportion of respondents who strongly disagreed was slightly higher persons aged over 50 (40%). There are no obvious differences between subjective social class or occupations (ibid). This data sharply contrasts with historical ethnographies and participants' recollections of earlier decades: recall Gloria's claim that girls were 'not counted' (see Chapter 3). Given that older persons now appear particularly supportive of girls' education yet were not so in earlier decades, there appears to have been a rapid change in gender beliefs, within a generational cohort. This is consistent with my own interviews.

Stated concerns for female education seem partly motivated by parents' concern for their daughters' well-being as well as their own hopes for reciprocated support in old age. Worsening economic security and the loss of pensionable formal employment underscores the importance of intergenerational support. Participants often maintained that it is women who help elderly parents. Helen (with broad knowledge of the low-income compound of which she is the twice-elected representative – see life history) summarised an increasingly common contemporary view:

These days female support the parents more than the male; they have the heart for the family. I think the female are doing much better than the male.

Worsening economic security seems to have catalysed a positive feedback loop between parental encouragement of girls' education and employment, female employment and then daughters' support of their parents. Parents also seem increasingly inclined to support their daughters' aspirations for stereotypically masculine occupations due to the greater

availability and higher wages of such work, as well as a background context of economic insecurity. These benefits were also commonly referred to by young women pursuing stereotypically masculine occupations. Even if out of formal employment, mechanics may still be able to find piece-work. Meanwhile, tailoring (an occupation historically popular with women) seems to have become less attractive, since it is difficult to compete with the influx of extremely cheap, imported second-hand clothes. When visiting a government-subsidised vocational training institute I noted that far more women were studying 'Power-electrical' than 'Tailoring'.

Rose (a 42 year old divorced explosives engineer, whose life history is detailed in Chapter 2) explained,

As a woman you have to think twice about your future. If you just think about what women can do you can't do anything... I don't depend on men... Many people want work. Now work, when it's available, you enter anything that is seen, even men's work [spoken in both Bemba and English, the Bemba is translated and the English is quoted verbatim, so this extract is partly translated].^{xix}

Recall that because Rose (a single mother) was desperate to provide for her family, she found work clearing the bush for mine expansion. With an eye on promotion she has successfully trained as a dump truck driver and explosives engineer. Note her expressed disdain for gender stereotypes about the kind of work women should do. We might explain this by reference to a shift in interests. Given financial hardship, she (and many other women) seemed less inclined to prioritise accruing the social benefits gained from compliance with cultural expectations (about what women are capable of or what they should do).

Furthermore, because other people are cognisant of common difficulties they seem less inclined to penalise gender atypical behaviour if it appears to further incomes. Even if an occupation was historically regarded as an inappropriate performance of gender, it is increasingly permitted because that woman is perceived as trying to support her family. 'I think, in the economy as it stands, no job is for women and no job is for men... Everyone can do it', commented Mwelwa (30, married, middle class supplier of contract labour to the mines and church deacon, whom I was living with at the time).³¹

However, even though worsening economic security has triggered a shift in interests, not all prescriptive stereotypes have relaxed. Some forms of work are deemed inappropriate for women because they require behaviour that is not respectable. Sex workers themselves are still vilified; sympathy is limited. Also, when sitting on a bus waiting for it to fill with passengers before travelling, it is common to be approached by men selling sweets, biscuits, drinks, phone credit, or cheap watches. While women also trade these same items, they sit at kiosks and wait for customers to come to them. Only 'prostitutes' call out to strangers; respectable women should not. Concerns about female sexuality evidently persist. Only once did I see a young woman walking up and down at a bus station selling talk time to

³¹ However, expressed support does not necessary reflect a change in practices. For instance, even though Mwelwa voiced support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour it is notable that he has still not recruited any women to work on a contract basis as manual labourers in the mines. When poor female relatives visited our house they were given some 'mealie meal' (the staple flour), but when men begged Mwelwa was more likely to find them work.

waiting travellers. She was not chastised or reprimanded in any way, nor was she as vocal or as assertive as typical male vendors. Instead she stood quietly amongst us, clearly advertising. She was exceptional, however. Worsening economic security does not appear to have catalysed a shift in all gender divisions of labour, nor acceptance thereof.

Thus far this chapter has suggested that occupational desegregation was triggered by a change in interests (i.e. financial hardship led some families to prioritise the financial gains accrued by women undertaking stereotypically masculine occupations, even though this deviated from cultural expectations). Once started, this trend has enhanced exposure to women in non-stereotypical roles. For instance, growing numbers of young women are enrolling in vocational training institutions, where girls often compete favourably with their male counterparts. Here, teachers as well as students (both male and female) at vocational training centres painted a picture of mutual support and enthusiasm, especially when a confident woman has demonstrated competence equal to that of male peers. They corroborated the account provided below from one male auto-mechanics teacher at a Local Government subsidised centre in a low-income settlement:

The teasing goes on for a week, they joke, then they forget, usually when they learn they see a girl in the forefront, they see they are eager to learn. A male would fail to run the engine; a female would run the engine... Those [young women] that come to do power electrical or automotive there's just that element of confidence, they seem like they can stand up to anyone or anything or any challenge they come across. Especially when you're doing practicals, one on one, after they've gotten some stamina and a lot of competition, you disturb an engine, you ask her to rectify. She just has to do it. And a male fool is waiting outside. So she just has to push herself to run the engine. And when they go out, depending on the opportunities, they will make it. Even if you have one girl in class there's still competition. She really wants to make the boys run for their money.

Exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour appears to foster acceptance thereof. This may indicate a change in internalised gender stereotypes about women's competence. Alternatively it may signify a shift in cultural expectations. In light of expressed approval from teachers and classmates, people revise their presumptions about how others will respond to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Since these two analytical concepts (internalised beliefs and cultural expectations) can both account for the observed phenomena, we cannot ascertain their relative significance in this particular instance. Also, the explanatory power of these concepts is not mutually exclusive. With sufficient disconfirming evidence of their internalised gender stereotypes, some people now regard women as equally competent. They seem less prone to ridicule or question women's incursions into gender atypical occupations – i.e. less inclined to enforce prescriptive stereotypes. This in turn affects others' cultural expectations, about how they will be treated. Either way, growing exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour seems to generate a positive feedback loop initially triggered by a shift in interests.

Changing attitudes at workplaces are highlighted in the following conversation, in the office of the Treasurer of the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia. Following a lengthy, general discussion of the state of union politics (in order to develop rapport), I asked what they thought of women doing men's work.

Daniel (Union Chairperson of Mine A): A long time ago they used to say to a woman found with men doing men's work, 'You don't understand, prostitute'. But this time they accept, she's not a prostitute. There's no problem. We've all agreed, both women and men.

Kupela (Union Chairperson of Mine B): The work culture is sound, you give them respect, they respect you... Generally today there's a change. They're very confident.

Daniel: Things done by a man can also be done by a woman.

Kupela: In the past companies only took in a few women, to see if they can work... Companies came to find that 'Yes, women can do men's work'... Performance was there, discipline was there... At the workplace there will always be that friction but women will always stand their positions and they will forge ahead [partly translated].

As discussed in Chapter 3, the reference to 'prostitute' refers to historical gender stereotypes. Given the paucity of women in employment, particularly in skilled manual work, people often lacked evidence of their aptitude and so assumed that they were only there as a result of sexual favours, not merit. Nowadays, however, the term 'prostitute' is far less commonly used to refer to women in gender atypical domains.³² Gender stereotypes seem to have weakened: fewer people assume that women are necessarily less competent in skilled manual work. With the appropriate certificates attesting to their qualifications, many accept their equal place.

However, greater egalitarianism should not be automatically inferred from the above conversation. The branch chairpersons may have sought to exaggerate the extent of mutual respect, equality and harmony amongst the workers they represent. They may have wanted to give a positive portrayal of their mines, not only to me as an outsider but also to each other and the national leader present. Maybe they desired to illustrate their compliance with the prescriptions to which they had been exposed in gender sensitisation workshops (discussed in Chapter 6). Furthermore, given their elevated positions, they may also have been unaware of the extent of male resentment and sexual harassment on the shop floor.

While these interpretations might be valid, it would still be a notable indication of social change if these union leaders regarded references to gender equality rhetoric as a way of presenting themselves positively to colleagues. Also, because I recognised these possibilities for bias, I triangulated their account by interviewing male and female miners, employed in different capacities. These focus group and life histories indicated that although attitudes have broadly shifted, resistance remains in some quarters. Several male miners denied that women could or should work underground. Further, some women miners reported difficulties with colleagues.

We might expect to find particular opposition to occupational desegregation from unemployed men, seeking to protect their privileged access to the labour market (as discussed in Chapter 1). Indeed, some unemployed young men do try to discourage women from undertaking stereotypically masculine jobs, in the hope of finding employment themselves. This chimes with interest-based explanations of attitudes towards flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Daisy (mechanic): In the past people were saying, 'You should stop doing men's work, you should stop because it's men's work'.

³² Though critical comments in response to online news items about female politicians often refer to them as *'ihule'* (prostitute).

Alice: Who said this?

Daisy: Men, young men, they want me to be sweeping [doing unpaid domestic work at home instead]. It's just jealousy... Because they wanted me to stop... Maybe when I go out of work, maybe they think they can replace there, maybe that's what they think. Bush mechanics – he knows how to repair but he didn't go to school.

Alice: Does it affect you?

Daisy: No no no [partly translated].^{xx}

Anne (machinist at the mine): We are competing with men, in our culture it is new to them to work with women. To our superiors they have confidence in us but to our colleagues they feel challenged, or want to intimidate.

Sophie (lab analyst): Work mates think *abanakashi* [women] are favoured

Alice: Do many have a problem? [translated].

Sophie: *Banono fye* [just a few], most are friendly and very helpful.

Exchanges such as these suggest that some (but not all) men, both in and out of work, perceive women as threatening their prospects of employment, progression and promotion. Although employed women like Daisy denied that they are discouraged in this way, it is possible that they might have downplayed or might not have been consciously aware of the extent to which they are affected by such comments. Moreover, others might be. However, Sophie does not portray all men as difficult.

In summary, it has been proposed that worsening economic security (a change in patterns of resource access) has been a major trigger of flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour, by shifting interests and then, through increased exposure to flexibility, weakening internalised gender stereotypes and cultural expectations. Alternative hypotheses are explored in Chapters 5 and 6.

4.2 The consequences of greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour on women's self-perceptions and social relations

I now turn to examine the consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. To enable comparison with previous studies in Zambia and more generally, this section focuses on relations with household members, neighbours and co-workers. The further topic of political participation is left for Section 4.3.

This section has been structured in a way that reflects the cumulative effects of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. It begins by examining the consequences of an individual woman assuming the stereotypically masculine activity of income-generation. As has been the case historically, a woman's paid work seems to increase women's financial autonomy. While personally significant, increased access to resources does not seem sufficient to weaken other people's gender stereotypes, by which a woman is commonly evaluated.

Having examined the impacts of an individual woman's increased access to resources, this section then explores how society-wide flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour has affected gender beliefs. Exposure to and association with a critical mass of women demonstrating equal ability to perform work that was previously presumed to be beyond their capabilities and has high status because it is associated with men seem to erode some (but not all) gender stereotypes and associated status beliefs. Additionally, by gathering

together and sharing their experiences, those who now recognise women's equal competence gain more confidence in their views. These social circles then collectively develop, articulate and enforce more egalitarian beliefs.

This section ends by interrogating the proposition that gender status beliefs have weakened: it examines contradictory findings from earlier decades; the questionable reliability of my participants' narratives; as well as data on gender-based violence and unpaid care work.

Greater financial autonomy

The first effect of a woman's labour force participation, as emphasised by many women and their observant children, is her enhanced financial autonomy. However, an independent income does not seem sufficient to shift her cultural expectations or others' gender status beliefs – the assumption that men are more suited to and deserving of roles of authority, as well as associated esteem, respect and deference.

A woman's labour force participation appears to increase her financial autonomy, in two ways. First, it allows divorced and widowed women to maintain their own households rather than remarry. This finding is consistent with the wider literature. Research undertaken in the Dominican Republic suggests that employment has enabled some women to be less tolerant of and thus evade unsatisfactory relationships (Safa, 1999). Likewise, in Honduras, women's access to productive work enables the formation and survival of female-headed households. This is partly because employed women are more likely to perceive themselves as being able survive independently (Bradshaw, 1995). Quantitative research in Mozambique similarly finds that women are more likely to be divorced or separated if they live in an area with a high or growing demand for female labour (Oya and Sender, 2009; see also Chant, 1997 for similar findings in Mexico).

Many interviewed female heads of households stressed the relative freedom of this living arrangement. Despite the emotional tolls induced by sole responsibility for household financial provision (later discussed), they claimed to have more time for socialising, employment and politics. Indeed, without husbands to care for or be controlled by, divorced and single women constituted the majority (61%) of female parliamentarians in the early 1990s (Ferguson et al, 1995:9).

Another effect of female household headship that is not contingent upon a broader shift in gender beliefs is that it reduces the risk of violence from an intimate partner, according to the 2007 Zambia Demographic and Health Survey. Of those who have ever experienced physical or sexual violence, 19.2% of divorced or separated women (in contrast to 11.8% of married women) reported no recent physical or sexual violence from their current or most recent partners. Similarly, of those who have ever experienced emotional violence, 17.2% of divorced or separated women (in contrast to only 3.6% of married women) reported no recent emotional violence from their current or most recent partner (CSO et al, 2009:290). This data seems to support the above argument to some extent: financial autonomy enables women to maintain their own homes, where they enjoy greater freedoms in some respects.

However cautious interpretation is still required. First, these are Zambian-wide trends, so may not reflect differences on the Copperbelt. Second, even if ex-married women are less

likely to report such abuse, they still appear to be at a very high risk. Indeed, the vast majority of divorced and separated women report recent emotional, physical or sexual violence; heading one's own household only seems to offer marginal protection for women. Munalula (1998:258) similarly found that separated women are vulnerable to aggression from ex-partners. This is one example of how the effects of an individual woman's increased access to resources may be tempered by other people's gender beliefs.

Second, within male-headed households, financial autonomy often enables married women to provide for themselves and their children without being dependent on a husband's good graces. By contrast, housewives are often said to be bullied by their husbands who use their financial dependence to maintain power and control, such as by withholding funds. Descriptions of contemporary housewives are similar to those of previous generations, as illustrated by the following conversations:

If you don't work, if you don't do anything, it's not easy to stand on your own. Because even if you say something, maybe he[']ll shout at you, he'll slap you and chase you. Who are you? You don't work, you don't do business, you're just a housewife, so it's not easy. Beatrice (18, school student – she would often regale and reflect upon such stories from our low-income compound).

BanaNelson (40, breadwinner since her husband lost his job): A long time ago it was men who worked, so they controlled women.

Alice: Now women sell there's a difference?

BanaNelson: Yes, men don't control very much. Those who don't sell are oppressed by their husbands, in everything, it's when they beg. Those who sell have freedom at home.

Alice: Explain how you understand the term 'oppressed'.

BanaNelson: That's the culture in Africa. We don't have the right to do what we want, to make decisions. I want to go to a kitchen party, he doesn't agree.

Alice: When did you feel oppressed?

BanaNelson: A long time ago, when I hadn't started selling.

Alice: Nowadays?

BanaNelson: There's nothing like that [translated].^{xxi}

Mary (48, married market trader): When a man is working and a woman is not working there's a problem at the house... She'll be following what he says because she doesn't work...

Lucy (46, married market trader):... She knows that it is her husband who keeps/provides for her; she must obey what he says...

BanaHilda (52, widowed market trader): Those women agree to all the rules of men because they don't work. Women who don't sell or work don't have peace or freedom in their homes...

BanaMwimba (41): She can't make decisions in anything or to speak about what she thinks.

Alice: Can women who don't sell give advice for household planning?

BanaHilda: There's nothing like that, it's just the man.

BanaMbewe: Because he's the one that has money [translated].^{xxii}

BanaMayuka (market trader, see life history): Housewives are oppressed very much [translated].^{xxiii}

These conversations highlight the perceived chasm between marriages in which women do and do not undertake paid work (as also observed by Muvandi et al, 2000; WLSA, 1997:122-123 with regards to Zambia). In the above dialogues (echoing additional interviews and my own observations of domestic life in various homes), BanaNelson and Lucy suggest that this difference is partly due to housewives' and employed women's differing levels of income. While economically active women can independently procure small items (such as food and clothing), financially dependent homemakers often need to beg or be deferential in order to secure continued support. Because they monopolise access to income, husbands of homemakers are arguably thus more able to enact their gender status beliefs. Their greater access to resources enables them to enforce their interest in gender status inequality.

However, Beatrice offers a slightly different explanation of this difference (see quote above). In answering her rhetorical question – 'Who are you?' – she hints at an argument she elaborated upon in subsequent interviews: housewives have a lower status. According to Beatrice, it is not that husbands of financially independent women are less able to enforce gender status beliefs but rather that they do not want to, because they are more inclined to perceive their wives as equals. However, this effect does not appear to have been entailed by a woman's labour force participation. Historically, in decades predating increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, participants suggested that women's paid work only enhanced ability to buy small items independently while gender status beliefs persisted. As discussed in Chapter 3, changes in individual's access to resources do not appear to foster a major change in cultural expectations, by which they are evaluated. Without a change in widely-held gender beliefs about what kind of conduct is acceptable then divorced women remain stigmatised and vulnerable to abuse, for instance.

The remainder of this chapter argues that gender relations are not only influenced by an *individual* woman's access to resources but also by *society-wide* gender divisions of labour, which shape gender beliefs. This argument begins by drawing on working women's own accounts, which are subsequently triangulated with the narratives of neighbours, family members and co-workers. Besides corroborating evidence presented, the aim of this structure is to demonstrate the cumulative nature of the observed consequences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Women's self-perceptions

Right across the socio-economic spectrum, working women expressed great pride in their financial achievements. They explained that their self-esteem has grown as they have independently endeavoured, accumulated, invested and financially provided for their families.

Many former housewives explained that they previously thought themselves less intelligent than men and so would follow their suggestions (in community politics and at family funerals, e.g. regarding burial arrangements and asset redistribution). However, with realisation of their own business acumen and capacity to perform the highly important role of financial provider in a time of comparative economic scarcity, many working women insisted that they have ceased to underrate themselves. This focus on self-perceptions (how women regard themselves) thus provides a further layer of explanation of the alleged difference between homemakers and employed women.

These changes appear to have occurred as a result of two key features of flexibility in gender divisions of labour: association and exposure to demonstrations of equal competence. This section on self-perceptions also considers the particular impact of different occupations.

Association

Some former housewives underscored the importance of social interactions in the public sphere through labour force participation. Economic hardship has pushed women traders to associate with a range of people, overcome shyness and stand their ground in conflictual situations. By managing a business, liaising with wholesalers and learning how to maintain customers, women, from across the generational and socio-economic spectrum, have developed new skills and become accustomed to, and thereby confident in, associating with a broad range of people.

By gathering together at the market, journeying across provinces and national borders, female traders often interact with a wide range of people, beyond the comparatively narrow social sphere in which they used to remain. In these new social spaces, women develop friendships, discuss dilemmas and debate different solutions – as was apparent from my own observations and interviews. They learn about alternative ways of doing business, engaging in politics and managing family life. Market women commonly inspire, advise and encourage each other. By sharing with and learning from a vast range of people in this urban environment, women working in the public sphere build up their knowledge about the world and their confidence to comment about it. The expansion of social networks and increased access to information, on the part of working women, can be conceptualised as a change in patterns of resource access.

Similarly in Serene District, Central Province, Seur (1992) found that successful female farmers assisted each other in many ways: exchanging loans, price information and farming advice. By gathering with pioneering commercially-orientated women, others learnt from their example. They noted the practical ways by which they could advance themselves economically, the benefits of an independent income (increased ability to invest in one's enterprise, as well as buy goods for oneself and one's children) and also that as women they need not rely on men to perform traditional male tasks, such as the stumping and clearing of land. In the 1980s, this led to increasing proportion of women cultivating hybrid maize (Seur, 1992:241-242,258-262,296).

Besides sharing practical advice for business development, market women also (rather more subversively) reflect upon prevailing gender inequalities. This seemed to affect their gender beliefs (as distinct from the impact of greater resource access). Former housewives explained that they used to regard gender-based violence as 'normal' (as discussed in Chapter 3). Some maintained that they used to be privately critical of this practice yet presumed that everyone else thought it permissible. By collectively developing a safe space to articulate alternative beliefs, these women learnt that their concerns are shared more widely. Such external validation seems to enhance women's confidence in their own views and lead them to expect a more sympathetic response from others, thereby fostering a shift in cultural expectations.

Additionally, I often observed market women collectively commending women undertaking

masculine occupations. This likely affected women's cultural expectations for themselves and also for their daughters: mothers might become more likely to encourage gender atypical careers if they believe that such pursuits would be respected.

In summary, the consequences of association through paid work appear to be that: (i) women gain practical information about how to increase their incomes; (ii) their self-perceptions change because they feel more knowledgeable; (iii) through familiarity they become more confident in social interactions – less easily cowed; and (iv) by collectively dismantling gender stereotypes they learn that others share their gender egalitarian beliefs. This last effect leads to a revision of cultural expectations. These findings are illustrated below, with a selection of quotes from across the class spectrum.

That woman from Ndola is impressive. She spoke; most new MPs don't speak for two years. She must be doing business; those who do business have learnt not to be intimidated.

Rebecca (47, Government Minister – whom I stayed with for a fortnight in Lusaka, privately commenting about a new MP, who I also stayed with for a fortnight and observed in Parliament. She did indeed become entrepreneurial upon widowhood).

Alice: What gave you the confidence to think you could do it?

Anita (42, politician): I used to sell... *chibuku* [beer]... I used to handle those foolish people, drunkards, then I can handle others.

BanaMayuka (41, a leader in a market association, who supported her family while her husband was unemployed for 7 years; see life history): I've moved up and down, to Botswana and South Africa for business, buying DVDs and radios, and going to Siavonga to buy *kapenta* (dried sardines). I've seen different people. Those who stay in one place don't know how others are staying. You can learn from others, see how others stay. When you are learning from people it can give you confidence... And when you go to other places and they're happy with you it can bring you confidence...

Alice: Are you scared when speaking with men?

BanaMayuka: No, we're not scared.

Alice: How did you develop your confidence?

BanaMayuka: By being found with men all the time [partly translated].

[Previously] we weren't wise, we weren't moving up and down. Only if people come here, selling in town, can they be getting so much intelligence, not just staying at home, you can't have intelligence [translated].

Nancy (41, a divorced rice seller and leader in a market branch of PF [the Patriotic Front], explains why her female neighbours in the village did not develop big businesses).

I have confidence. I've learnt many things. I used to discuss with different people about how they started business and about how they prosper with their businesses. We created many friendships and I learnt about their trades... 'A child who doesn't travel praises their mother's cooking' [Bemba proverb]. If I think about the home I can't possibly know about what my friends are doing. It was difficult before, we [previous generations of Zambian women] weren't free [translated].^{xxiv}

Helen (middle-aged politician in a low-income settlement, who used to import blankets and DVDs from Botswana – see life history for further details).

BanaBecca (36, formerly a housewife then became a hairdresser before selling at the market): I started to learn about different ways of living. Customers were coming with different stories. I picked some things. I started to put them into practice.

Alice: Like what?

BanaBecca: Discussing [things with my husband].

Alice: Did you want to discuss before you had a salon?

BanaBecca: I was extremely keen but I didn't have a place to start from. I just had thoughts. You just keep quiet minus saying anything. I was seeing that people going through problems were overcoming them by discussing them. So I myself wanted to discuss things - it's the way to solve problems. Before I had started associating with many people, like when I was just trading from home, I didn't know how people lived... Before I was living like a slave.

Alice: In what way?

BanaBecca: Like a person without a right to talk about the problems that they're going through... At first I was thinking that things were fine but then [when I had my salon], I started to be awakened... We started to change, slowly slowly [translated].^{xxv}

BanaRuth (35, widowed market trader): I have gained confidence since I started [selling], because if I sell my children are not hungry, they go to school and are dressed. They have a place to sleep. I've really built up my confidence in myself.

Alice: What do you mean by saying that you've built up your confidence?

BanaRuth: I have confidence in doing everything, to discuss with people, to talk with people, because it's people who build us, it's they who show us good ideas. Previously, when I was living with my husband, I had trust in him. It was him who was keeping me... if you remain at home, you're alone, you do housework. But if you come here to the market, you speak with many different people...

Alice: Previously you didn't discuss things with people?

BanaRuth: No, just discussing with a few people [translated].^{xxvi}

These narratives were triangulated by speaking to other family members who attested to a behavioural change, which they partly attributed to association. Their perspectives will be discussed in the next sub-section. Note however that association in later life does not always transform gendered self-perceptions, gender beliefs and behaviour (as discussed in Chapter 5 on formative experiences).

While my participants emphasised the importance of exposure through paid work in the public domain, it seems likely that any form of association with diverse groups could similarly broaden horizons. In rural Serenje district, women from urban areas in general are similarly portrayed as more innovative, due to their exposure to alternative practices. Rural women who had returned from prolonged stays in Copperbelt towns reported that they had gained knowledge and experience of cultivating non-traditional crops (e.g. hybrid maize and runner beans) in nearby farms and gardens. Meanwhile, rural women were said to follow traditional agricultural methods automatically (Seur, 1992:260,302). This hints at the importance of living in an urban context, rather than paid work in the public sphere specifically.

To test the importance of association through paid work in the public sphere (as opposed to urban living more generally), I also interviewed urban housewives and home-based traders. In contrast to the central market traders, these two groups often appeared to have very limited social circles and opportunities to learn about alternative ways of doing or being (as has been the case historically, see Chapter 3). This seems to be partly because many

housewives, both now and historically, have been reluctant to socialise in their compounds, fearing gossip and slander. Jealousy appears to be rife amongst the economically insecure and unemployed in a context of constrained advancement (as also observed in other urban areas of Zambia: Hansen, 1997:107; Parsons, 2010:141). Accordingly, many housewives prefer to confine themselves to a few close friends. Another reason for limited mobility is the volume of unpaid care work for which they are held responsible.

Furthermore, even if housewives do socialise in their compounds, they generally only met similar women, rather than those with gender atypical experiences. As discussed in Chapter 6 on participatory gender sensitisation as well as the next section on exposure, association alone does not seem sufficient for a change in gender beliefs. It seems most transformation when discussants can reflect upon their exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

BanaNancy identified some of the consequences of limited social circles when explaining why she defers to her husband, a miner. That she introduced this topic herself signifies its perceived importance. BanaNancy is 27, she sells vegetables and small packets of mealie meal to neighbours in her low-income settlement, too poor to afford the 25kg or 50kg sacks. However, she does so irregularly – only when there is sufficient surplus from her husband's salary. She sometimes goes to church, gathers with a local group of women and is visited by female neighbours who also trade from home. Being stuck in the compound, she believes that her social circle is relatively small and that her knowledge is accordingly limited.

BanaNancy: My husband is busy with things, he's working. That is knowledge. So we can't possibly be equal in intelligence... There's women [that] have knowledge like [a] man... Where you stay, with BanaSibeso [a politician], the same as like a man! They are meeting different people, they get knowledge... Just staying at home, ahh, the whole day, you're just cooking *ifishimu* [caterpillars – the dish we often cooked together], can you have a knowledge? No...

Alice: Do you be want to be like a man?

BanaNancy: Yah, to know everything [partly translated].^{xxvii}

Many other home-based traders, housewives, former housewives, as well as their husbands and children, similarly explained that they defer to their husbands in decision-making because they lack the opportunities to learn about the world and thereby develop ideas as well as confidence in their chosen convictions. This contrasts with the earlier explanation of homemakers' and traders' differing degrees of voice and autonomy within the household, which emphasised their countervailing interests. Perhaps economic dependency makes homemakers reluctant to contest claims made by the breadwinner. Deference might be used tactically, to ensure on-going support; appearances of it do not necessarily reflect internalised gender status beliefs. This alternative interpretation will be further considered in the next sub-section which draws on different evidence: other people's explanations of why they came to value women's advice.

Exposure to public demonstrations of equal competence

A further way in which women's self-perceptions are affected by flexibility in gender divisions of labour is by exposure to other women acquiring money, skills and knowledge. This commonly occurs in markets and other workplaces outside the home. This enables comparative assessments of men and women. By interacting in the market and sharing

experiences, people not only realise women's equal capacity to provide financially for their families but also the prevalence of the new reality of women's financial significance. Many people have thus come to realise women's equal capacity to earn money, which often has implications for gender status beliefs – implicit in Susan's account below:

Susan (45, divorced, single mother of eight, including one foster child, fruit wholesaler and leader in market branch of the Patriotic Front (PF), then in opposition): I'm better than men, three-quarters of them, I'm better than them... I can beat them... I've compared myself with them. Men fail... to do this work... They just beg, they drink beer.

BanaMwamba: Very many [translated].^{xxviii}

In further conversations Susan narrated that seeing her business thrive and exceed men's had led her to reject stereotypes about women being less competent and less worthy of status. From her bold interjections in political gatherings it was also evident that she does not revere men or defer to their judgement.

Popular recognition of women's new-found roles seems to affect employed women's descriptive stereotypes of women in general. To recall, in the colonial and early post-colonial period inter-female aggression was reinforced by widespread economic and psychological dependence on husbands, as well as spatial segregation through being 'stuck at home' (see Chapter 3). Now, however, working women commonly identify as a group and, moreover, express great pride in that collective identity – as exemplified in the following conversation with BanaChola. She is 43, sells dried sardines in the central market and heads the women's wing of a local branch of the Patriotic Front. Her husband has been unemployed for 6 years. BanaChola told me that she commenced trading while still at school; her younger siblings looked up to her to provide since their stepmother was very cruel and frequently denied them food. BanaChola's father (a miner) instructed her to marry but she was reluctant, wary of doing so without her own money, for she had seen that such women often suffered. At age 17 she started trading millet; subsequently she smuggled goods to accumulate capital. Back then, far fewer people were selling so it was more profitable. Yet, notwithstanding her own economic activity, BanaChola still used to revere men, thinking they were more intelligent.

BanaChola: But in today's generation things have changed. Women have more intelligence than men.

Alice: Why?

BanaChola: Things have reversed here in Zambia.

Alice: In what way have they reversed?

BanaChola: It's women who are keeping men and children, and paying school fees...

Women have pushed themselves forward [translated].^{xxix}

To support her argument that women are outnumbering men in the struggle to provide for their families, BanaChola added that in the bus to the border town of Nakonde (where she buys produce for resale) there will be only four or five men out of 68 passengers. Her account suggests that gender stereotypes are not only influenced by one's own activities but also society-wide gender divisions of labour. Seeing a critical mass of women performing the socially valorised role of household financial provision seems to have changed her perceptions about women's importance. Even though she had always been working herself, it seems that she only adopted a more egalitarian outlook when a critical mass of other

women became breadwinners. This broader shift may have been particularly significant because it also chimes with her personal circumstances: her husband lost employment in 2005. Note also the importance of mobility and paid work in the public sphere in exposing her to other 'strong' women. Had she traded in the small market of her low-income peri-urban settlement (where I noted more entrenched gender stereotypes), it seems unlikely that she would have been exposed to disconfirming evidence.

The critical experience of exposure, discussed above, is not a feature of all paid work. The consequences of female labour force participation on women's self-perceptions appear to vary by occupation, as discussed below.

Occupational desegregation and women's self-perceptions

This section points to occupational variation in how female labour force participation affects women's self-perceptions.

Unlike market traders, domestic workers have few such opportunities to learn from others, share their problems or strategise for career development. Instead they must adhere to their madams' instructions in solitude. Several participants attributed domestic workers' comparative reserve in social fora (such as in Bible study or funerals) to the nature of their work, namely isolated and deferential. Thus it does not seem to be income generation alone which has been pivotal but also the nature of particular forms of work (see also Kabeer, 2001; Kabeer et al, 2011a; Kantor, 2003, on the limitations of home-based work in the United Kingdom, Bangladesh and India).

As one might expect, there also appear to be significant consequences of women undertaking high status occupations. Geisler (1995:553-554) found that young professional Zambian women have ceased to define themselves solely as wives and mothers. Furthermore, they no longer rely on their husband for self-esteem.

In my own research, women from across the class spectrum commonly expressed pride and a sense of equality in doing the same work as men. These workers often remarked that wearing protective clothing (in the mines, factories and garages) brings self-esteem as it symbolises their ability to undertake relatively high status work, which was historically reserved for men. Such pride is reflected in the following conversation with Bwalya (24, metallurgist, whom I lived with for several weeks):

It [a hard hat] gives you status: you're all the same, wearing overalls, and people admire you. 'You [a male co-worker] are wearing one, I'm wearing one'. It sort of puts you on a par with all the people working there. It makes you feel equal with everyone... In these towns, as a woman, when anyone sees you wearing safety boots, they really respect you, because it means you're working... [At work] the respect is the same with everyone... If a woman wears a hard hat it gives everyone the idea she's doing men's work, something extremely challenging... You feel nice yourself. You get a lot of confidence, moving around.

The social meaning of a job does not seem reducible to remuneration. Formal employment in the mines has long been a source of status in the Copperbelt (Ferguson, 1999; Larmer,

2007).³³ Miners have historically been respected for undertaking the arduous work that is essential to the country's economic prosperity. Besides its economic history, mining is further privileged because it performed by men and thus reflects their higher social status (see also Grimshaw and Rubery, 2007:21 on the valorisation of masculine occupations more generally). Blue overalls symbolise working-class masculinity – some retrenched miners even wear them when trading in the market as if to retain their old identities, asserting that they are still men. By wearing the same uniform, women like Bwalya and Rose (whose life history is recounted in Chapter 2) feel that they are 'on a par' with men, denying difference, physically rejecting gender stereotypes in their own case. These clothes also endow women with prestige, by conveying that they are undertaking an occupation that is heavily valorised, interlinked to the social construction of 'the Copperbelt' and equated with masculinity (which is also privileged).

Wearing overalls also enables women to signal that they are economically active. But there appears to be more going on here than just demonstrating gainful employment. As seems to be the case globally, stereotypically feminine professions are often regarded as undemanding extensions of women's natural abilities and are rarely valued to the same extent as men's occupations. Instead these jobs often reflect women's lower status (see also Adams and Nelson, 2009; England et al, 1994; England et al, 2000). Even if female teachers, secretaries or nurses demonstrate their equal ability to earn money, their equal competence in other masculine (valorised) domains is often doubted. To explore the impact of occupational desegregation I asked women employed in different occupations to share their gender beliefs. Those employed in stereotypically masculine domains more commonly eschewed gender stereotypes.

However, this data does not reveal the impact of different occupations, since their views may be a cause rather than a consequence of their occupational choice. A more reliable guide to the impact of desegregation is to learn from others' perceptions of these jobs. Accordingly, subsequent sub-sections (commencing on page 120) explore how occupational desegregation has affected other people's gender descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes. But before turning to others' account, the next sub-section notes the stresses felt by women who have assumed (shared or sole) responsibility for household financial provision.

The stresses of responsibility for household financial provision

While flexibility of gender divisions of labour can enhance women's perceptions of themselves, it also has ill-effects in this context of economic insecurity. Many women find their newfound role of responsibility for household finances extremely stressful. Similarly in Rwanda, female heads of households stressed the difficulties of bearing sole responsibility for household financial provision, as well as balancing work and domestic duties (Burnet, 2012:198). These sources of emotional ill-health were also emphasised by employed women in urban areas of Mexico and the Philippines (Chant, 1996). Some Zambian women claimed that financial responsibility leads to 'BP' – high blood pressure.

Several women used the term '*ukutitikishiwa*' (which usually refers to domestic patriarchal

³³ This occupational identity seems even more important than hierarchical position, in some respects. For example, a senior mine manager may introduce him/herself primarily as a 'miner', rather than as a 'manager'. Similar pride was also evinced in accounts of working in related industries.

oppression) to describe their feelings of struggling alone:

BanaChola (43, market trader): Women are thinking all day, the brain is disturbed, because of all the problems... Women shouldn't have to work, to sell, instead they should be found at home, sweeping and looking after children. Historically they didn't have a problem, they weren't suffering. Those who were working were men...

Alice: Were women oppressed?

BanaChola: Yes, they didn't have rights at home, everything was the man. They didn't agree to anything the woman said.

Alice: They didn't make decisions together?

BanaChola: No, they didn't have powers. Everything: 'Yes, yes, yes'. Because men were managing everything at home. If he chases me, I'm going where? There's nowhere to go to.

Alice: Do you think that earlier generations of women were happier than women of today?

BanaChola: They were happier than those of today.

Alice: Even though they didn't have power, they were happy?

BanaChola: Yes, even though they didn't have power, they were happy.

Alice: I'm confused.

BanaChola: [in English] Happy is better than power... We don't feel happy. Our work is men's [translated].^{xxx} [We are then joined by a mutual friend, BanaMayuka, who dissented, like all the other people I spoke to about this].

BanaChola's life has become particularly difficult; she feels that she has been struggling alone (managing finances single-handedly) since her husband's retrenchment, while he has become thin, withdrawn and depressed. She continued,

But we're suffering. In my opinion, I've come to be oppressed because I've turned into a man. I've started to do men's work... [My husband] he's given up, the problem is that he doesn't have work, he doesn't have money. His thoughts have become overwhelming. He has a disturbed mind. He's given up [translated].^{xxxii}

BanaChola's testimonies highlight how flexibility in gender divisions of labour, as well as associated gains in autonomy and participation in household decision-making, are not always perceived as net gains by women in a context of economic insecurity. Helen (a politician in a low-income settlement, with a very egalitarian conjugal relationship – see life history) provided a nuanced appraisal of dynamics, noting caveats to progress in one respect with recognition of difficulties in another:

Women, *abatitikihiwa* [who are oppressed], they are very few. Women now they have come out. But [when a woman is] alone, planning for everything, it's really tough and difficult... Responsibility is overwhelming... Whatever we are planning it's only you, not a man, so it's not easy. When you're planning for something you have to be both, a male and a female, not one headed... Ah, it's really bad [partly translated].^{xxxii}

One of my Copperbelt hosts, BanaMulenga (a bank employee), died at the age of 39, shortly after a doctor warned her to take more rest, a year after my fieldwork. She had been single-handedly providing for her family after her husband lost employment during the global economic crisis. However, low-income women's experiences of stress may be due to confounding factors such as poverty and national economic policies, as has been suggested of Lusaka (Aidoo and Harpham, 2001:211).

It might be contended that women were better off as housewives in previous generations, when they were not under any such pressure to provide for their families. But this claim was rejected by the vast majority of female participants. Without data on subjective well-being, both now and historically, it seems impossible to ascertain the validity of their accounts. One way of triangulating the positive self-portrayals detailed above is to listen to other people's perspectives about female labour force participation. The next section of this chapter seeks to ascertain whether working women's testimonies about increased social respect are shared more widely.

Women's social relationships

Labour force participation seems to have affected how such women are perceived and treated by others: spouses, natal families, society at large, co-workers and colleagues in political organisations. Women who have become increasingly financially important to their families appear to be widely recognised and appreciated as such. Furthermore, having learnt about different ways of living, women working in the public sphere are more commonly regarded (by themselves and others) as knowledgeable, with valuable ideas. These accounts were given both by employed women and also third-party observers: their families, neighbours and co-workers.

Women's status in marriage

This chapter has claimed that there is a significant difference between the marriages of homemakers and employed women. Two explanations have been offered thus far. One relates to interests: it posits that economic dependency increases both women's interest in deference and men's ability to enforce their interest in gender status inequalities. Another explanation for the difference between homemakers and employed women concerns women's self-perceptions, such as beliefs about their own intelligence. Former homemakers, who had joined the market, universally pointed to a third consequence of labour force participation, namely that they had become more respected. Their husbands previously underrated them but now appreciate their efforts and value their financial contributions – as claimed below:

BanaBecca (36, market trader, sells dried sardines): In short we began to discuss... At the beginning it was difficult, he [my husband] was too proud to recognise women's rights... But now he's different... He saw that my efforts bring progress. At the end he started to change... We help each other provide for the family at home and to provide for ourselves in the future... [The previous situation, of me being a housewife] made him conceited, thinking there's nothing I can do [translated].^{xxxiii}

BanaMwimba (41, market trader, sells dried sardines): Before, if I spoke, he couldn't hear me... I didn't underrate my own thoughts. It's just men who are difficult... [But he came to think,] 'Therefore this young woman has great intelligence. We'll be able to take care of each other'. He used to think there was nothing I could do [translated].^{xxxiv}

Here BanaBecca and BanaMwimba emphasise that their participation in decision-making was not impeded by their own self-perceptions (i.e. BanaMwimba did not underrate herself) but rather by their husband's perceptions of them. In further interviews, both suggested that

their husbands had previously regarded them as less intelligent and so side-lined them when making decisions. BaShiBecca and BaShiMwimba came to perceive and treat their wives differently upon seeing them undertaking socially valued roles. These conjugal changes can be interpreted as evidence of the importance of exposure to women demonstrating their equal competence. It can also be read as an instance of shifting interests: BaShiBecca and BaShiMwimba only listened to their wives when first-hand evidence led them to think that doing so would be advantageous. BaShiBecca, for instance, spoke of the knowledge his wife gains from the market and the crucial role she plays in household survival. Clearly exposure and interests are interconnected; the point is not to deny the salience of either but to identify which is primary. Also note BanaBecca's reference to *insambu sha banamayo* (translated as 'women's rights') – this hints at another influence besides flexibility in gender divisions of labour, namely gender sensitisation – discussed in Chapter 6.

BanaChola's story (further detailed in the life history section) provides another example of conjugal transformation. Upon her husband's retrenchment, BanaChola sought to build a house. Her husband disagreed, wanting to return to the village instead. However, when he saw the bricks built up to window level he realised that his wife was cunning, determined and hard-working. He promptly obtained a loan and gave her money to complete the project. From that day forth, he gave her much greater respect and was keener to hear her thoughts. BanaChola had always been a market trader, never a housewife, but it was only when her husband realised her *relative* financial importance and ingenuity (upon his job loss) that their relationship became more egalitarian. It could be argued that this account cannot be conceptualised as a shift in exposure, since BaShiChola had long been exposed to his wife earning money. However, by seeing that she was half way through building a house (an impressive feat in Kitwe, given capital requirements) did provide new information about her capabilities, or rather it provided glaring, visual evidence of her accomplishments. He had previously perceived her income as supplementary and not crucial to household survival. But then, at a time when he was despairing, losing hope, BanaChola demonstrated her ability to provide a solution, single-handedly.

Other women reported that when their husbands saw them fighting to provide for the family, their husbands became more encouraged and committed to familial provision, so reduced spending money outside the house (e.g. on girlfriends or alcohol). The picture presented by married market traders was universally one of greater respect and appreciation, from their husbands during recent economic hardship.

Market traders also spoke of a society-wide shift in how employed women are perceived. They attributed this change in gender stereotypes to women's demonstration of their equal ability to make valuable financial and intellectual contributions. Traders suggested that because working women are no longer dismissed as less competent, their status has improved, such that they have gained influence.

Gloria (66, chairwoman of local PF branch, caterpillar trader, formerly a housewife, now divorced, living in a single room in an informal settlement): A long time ago they underrated us, saying, 'A woman can't do anything'... When they knew that we women can also work that's when people stopped underestimating us [she proceeds to tell me of a woman who drives a bus from Kitwe to Dar es Salaam] [translated].^{xxxv}

Alice: I want to know why people have started to let women make decisions at funerals.
BanaMwimba (41, market trader, married): Because they've seen that women have intelligence.
Alice: They did not previously think that women had intelligence?
BanaMwimba: Long ago they did not count women.
Alice: When did they start to count them?
BanaMwimba: 2000s.
Alice: These days, do they count all women or just those who have trades?
BanaMwimba: Very much those who have trades, not really those who don't have trades [translated].^{xxxvi}

The most important thing that has yielded fruits is that they have realised that we are equal partners in development and would like to work together with them.
Hilary (44, widowed market trader, selling oranges, and leader in local branch of PF).

These statements that working women have gained status can be interpreted as a change in these women's cultural expectations – how they think they will be perceived and treated by others. The speakers present themselves as thinking that other people are now less inclined to hold gender status beliefs – the stereotype that women are less suited to prestigious positions and less deserving of esteem, respect and deference.

Even if employed women say they are now more respected, it is possible that these cultural expectations about other people's gender status beliefs are incorrect or exaggerated. Indeed, their testimonies do overlook continued gender status inequalities, such as in relation to care work (discussed later). However, even if their expectations are incorrect they may still be significant: the converse belief that others doubt women's competence can become self-fulfilling, thwarting not only self-perceptions (i.e. confidence) but also actual performance (as documented in Ridgeway, 2011; and Steele, 2011, drawing on research from more economically developed countries).

Given that working women's cultural expectations were possibly inaccurate, it is important to triangulate their accounts with other people's perceptions and explanations of social change. This further evidence suggests that women's cultural expectations of greater status are largely valid. Men's accounts generally echoed those of their wives, sisters and co-workers; though in some cases different influences were identified as pivotal. Most husbands of women who became important financial contributors explained that they used to underrate their wife, believing there was nothing of which she was capable. However, since their wife started contributing financially, they increasingly solicited her opinions, in recognition of her efforts and knowledge gained through association in the public sphere. Relationships thus seem to change as women's capabilities and confidence are developed and demonstrated, such that men come to see it as advantageous to listen to their spouses. This data suggests that such exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour is a primary cause of the contemporary erosion of gender status beliefs.

Alternatively one might attribute change in conjugal relations to improvements in working women's fall-back position. Interest-based explanations of gender inequality might posit that men purposively take advantage of wives who are economically dependent upon them because they believe that their wives cannot leave. Thus once a woman is economically independent, her husband may be motivated to treat her better, in order to prevent her

departure. To recall, this is what seems to have occurred in the early colonial period, as women's paucity in urban areas gave them scarcity value.

This interest-based explanation of men's behaviour assumes that husbands of working women believe that the latter will terminate the relationship if they do not become more respectful and embrace more egalitarian practices. But in the contemporary period such exit seems rare: some interviewed women who were financially independent had endured years of unhappy marriages. For example, BanaMulenga (38, a bank employee) was reluctant to divorce, for fear of gossip and concern about her children's well-being. She still resented and did not love her husband, with whom she rarely spent time. However, worries about her children's separation from their father far outweighed her dissatisfaction with the nature of her own conjugal relationship. Statistically representative data from the World Values Survey (2013) suggest that such concerns are widespread. In 2007, 74% of surveyed Zambians agreed with the statement that 'a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily'. BanaMulenga, like other unhappy wives, also expressed concerns about stigma. This deterrent was also noted in earlier qualitative and quantitative research in a low-income area of Lusaka, where Moser and Holland (1997:60) observed that 'For women, the stigma of single parenthood – and its association with prostitution – means that women try to remain married whenever possible'. (Note Moser and Holland's reference to 'prostitution' – a perennial concern).

Income generation does not appear to have significantly improved women's fall-back position. Although they can maintain households independently upon widowhood, the voluntary formation of such households seems relatively rare. While working women's access to resource have improved, cultural expectations about how one will be perceived and treated upon divorce seem to constrain the desirability of exit.

Furthermore, my data does not indicate that husbands perceive their relationships as having become more precarious. Male participants did not voice concerns about women instigating separation, for example. The proposition that men are now extrinsically motivated to behave in a more egalitarian way is not consistent with the data to which I have access. Pathways towards conjugal equality in Kitwe seemed to be more about exposure to women performing socially valued roles in a context of worsening economic security. A term commonly used by men and women alike to describe recent changes was *ukwafwana* (helping each other). This reflects a contemporary sense of mutual support, appreciation and understanding.

In the following narrative, Matthew (47, whose life history is detailed in Chapter 2) explains how his marriage changed as a result of flexibility in gender divisions of labour, in a context of economic insecurity. Matthew used to be formally employed in the mines but was retrenched and so turned to trading vegetables in the market. Business was unreliable and risky. At first his spouse, a housewife, was frustrated; she did not understand why he brought so little money home. Equally exasperated, he beat her. As life became more difficult, they sold household assets and rented a smaller house. At this stage his wife started trading at home; from Matthew's perspective this is how she came to understand and empathise with his business-related difficulties:

We were able to cater for all sorts of major problems so for that reason quarrelling came out because now we are able to understand each other. When I say 'I don't have' she'd

understand my position because now she's on the ground [also involved in business]... At times also she gets also the same problems which I get... so we are able to understand each other.

Matthew's wife also became more engaged in household decision-making as her mind 'broadened' (his term) and she became more active in developing solutions to pressing household problems. In Matthew's opinion she was previously reliant upon him, for ideas and financial support. Other men, accustomed to women as housewives, similarly described their wives and women in general as 'passive' and 'dormant', sometimes even as 'incompetent' and 'ignorant' (translated). While women may neither share these appraisals nor invoke this same explanation to account for their limited participation in decision-making, it is nonetheless vital to take on board men's perceptions of women in order to understand changing gender relations. To this end, Matthew's narrative illustrates how a wife's status may increase if she is perceived as knowledgeable and shares financial struggles, through flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This points to the importance of exposure (rather than interests). First-hand evidence of a woman performing a socially valued role also seemed to change his internalised gender beliefs, relating to competence and status.

I emphasise internalised gender beliefs here, rather than cultural expectations, because Matthew continually referred to his wife's contributions rather than observers' judgements. That said, the latter may have also featured.

Working women's status in natal families

As women enter the labour force, many are supporting their natal families. As people have become increasingly reliant upon and accustomed to such flexibility in gender divisions of responsibility, female breadwinning appears to have exerted a greater effect on gender status beliefs. Historically, in the 1970s and 1980s, even if a daughter was contributing financially, her father might still refuse her participation in decision-making. Participants suggested that people previously tended to underrate all women, regardless of their individual characteristics or contributions. However, in the contemporary period, women who are breadwinners for their natal families maintain that their siblings and parents bestow them with great respect upon recognition of their financial importance. 'She helps the natal family like a man', BanaMuyunda (39, mushroom trader and grassroots political activist) said of her sister, BanaFlo, a mine dump truck driver and single parent. Accordingly, when visiting, she 'gets a lot of respect, they receive her very well', with the slaughter of a chicken or even a goat. 'A person who helps the family is respected, loved and blessed' (translated),^{xxvii} maintained BanaMuyunda.

The gender neutral terminology ('a *person* who helps...') used by BanaMayunda reflects a broader trend: people are increasingly appraised on their performance rather than automatically ascribed a status because of their sex. This is not to suggest that gender status beliefs have disappeared. On the contrary, BanaMayunda's unemployed brother begrudges the lack of respect he receives in comparison. He feels entitled to preferential treatment and is disgruntled that it is not honoured. For the rest of his family, however, financial provision rather than sex category appears to have become the primary determinant of status. Furthermore, because of the importance of financial provision, other prescriptions have been overlooked. BanaFlo (BanaMayunda's sister) has secured approval even though she is a

single mother. Historically this contravention of widely-held prescriptive gender stereotypes would have led to shame and disapprobation, but this concern seems to have been overshadowed.

Working women's status in the public sphere

Women who have ascended to the comparatively high status roles historically undertaken by men have increasingly come to be treated as men's equals, in many respects. This perceptual change is often conveyed by women being labelled as, or likened to, men by others and themselves alike, in virtue of their self-reliance, will power, perseverance, intelligence and financial role at home – stereotypically male attributes in Zambia. Recall the above quote where BanaChola (a market trader and breadwinner) says, 'I've turned into a man'. Notably, this metaphor was only ever used to describe women who performed stereotypically masculine roles, such as working for money, being a breadwinner, a household head or political leader. We might interpret this as people using familiar labels to make sense of the dramatic ruptures to their gender beliefs. On the other hand, it does imply continued commitment to gender stereotypes: if an individual woman demonstrates possession of masculine attributes then she (alone) ascends the social hierarchy to become an honorary man, while all other women remain devalued. Instead of seeing flexibility in gender divisions of labour as disconfirming evidence of their assumptions about the lesser competence of the typical woman, some people (and this was generally men) labelled such exceptions 'men'.

While some people maintain gender stereotypes, many appear to have eschewed earlier assumptions, especially with first-hand exposure of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. For example, while not all women gain the respect of being a breadwinner (unlike BanaMayunda's sister), there is increasingly (though not universally) a sense that any woman can, in theory, undertake such a role. Men from across the socio-economic and generational spectrum maintained that their views have changed as women have shown themselves to be important financial providers. This is echoed in the following conversation:

Scott (42, divorced, onion wholesaler, leader in market branch of PF): I used to think 'It's just a woman'. Women of that time were regarded as people who can't do the things that men do... We were keeping them.

[A man comes along, through the corridor where we sit in the market, among bags of onions. He is middle aged and wears work overalls. He overhears our conversation and interjects]: They didn't do anything but this time they're active, they're more than you a man, 'cause everything they're in forefront and they're sharp than we! This time, me I cannot compete with a woman.

Scott: No.

[unknown man]: I'm very very far.

Scott: Very far.

[unknown man, speaks with passion]: They are sharp, and everything comes, they are the first priority, not we. We are nothing this time, we are only under the people feeding us, that's only what I've observed myself. [unknown man goes on his way]

Scott [on another occasion]: There's nothing that women can fail in doing, it's them who are working very hard these days. There's nothing that can intimidate them and no reason to doubt women, that they might fail, we have confidence these days [partly translated].

It is difficult to ascertain this anonymous man's intentions. While I spent many days chatting with Scott and his contemporaries, this passer-by was unknown to both of us. Why did he want to share his opinion with strangers? Of what was he seeking to persuade us? One possible reason for his intervention may be that the unfolding erosion of gender divisions of labour is a topic of popular interest: many people have observed this form of social change and want to express their opinion about what is happening. It commonly elicits social commentary, just like party politics. Opportunities for reflection were thus often welcomed and even seized without invitation – as in the case above. Thus while it is difficult to determine the validity of his testimony, it might instead be viewed as demonstrating the perceived significance of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Taken literally, as a sweeping claim that there is 'nothing that women can fail in doing', Scott's account sounds hyperbolic. Instead I understood him as speaking in relative terms, rebutting historical gender stereotypes about women's lesser competence. These beliefs were reflected in Scott's interactions with female contemporaries in the market associations and political party, as well as their accounts, which I observed and solicited in order to triangulate his narrative.

Similar sentiments were expressed in an essay that I commissioned. John, a 22 year old mature student, was funding his secondary education through piece-work and church sponsorship, while he lived with several other male orphans in a delapidated single room in a very low-income settlement, with no electricity but communal access to water. He wrote,

Women should be respected because they are also helping people... In homes where women have no husbands they fight in all whys [ways] to look for basic needs of there [their] children and there are some houses where a husband does not work, it is the responsibility of the wife to look for food. So that she feed the family.

John's female neighbours provide for their families through employment as domestic workers, knitting children's jerseys and reselling charcoal. Although these are hardly prestigious positions, they seem significant for John, who explicitly championed gender equality in class discussions on the topic.

This shift in sentiments was also evident amongst the cosmopolitan, youthful middle class in internet fora. For instance, on the same day that it interviewed the Minister of Labour, Radio Phoenix (one of the largest private radio stations in Zambia) updated its Facebook status to say, 'Respect to all single mothers. Thanks for being strong... May God Almighty keep on blessing you all for your courage'. Nineteen online comments were posted within the hour. Many of the tributes mentioned single mothers' strength and perseverance in a context of economic hardship. While we cannot make inferences beyond this public discourse (i.e. about attitudes and behaviour), two points seem noteworthy. First, single mothers are being praised. Second, single mothers are being lauded for taking on a stereotypically masculine role and related characteristics (e.g. being 'strong').

This appears to fit with a general pattern of women gaining respect for undertaking the valorised jobs of men – in this case, household headship – in difficult circumstances. The prevalence of women heads of households who are successfully educating their children was a commonly cited source of pride for many women. Previously, it was widely assumed (even amongst working women) that female heads of households could not be financially self-

sufficient other than through seeking male support and were thus labelled 'prostitutes'. They were widely perceived as promiscuous, 'stealing' other people's husbands (as also observed by Moser and Holland, 1997:60 in relation to low-income areas of Lusaka). However, this stereotype appears to have weakened somewhat under the weight of a critical mass of women providing disconfirming evidence. This is not to deny the stigma attached to single-parenthood or to say that it is entirely reducible to women's presumed economic dependence on men. Rather, the intention here is to note a small degree of change, which appears due to growing exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

The impact of occupational desegregation on descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes

The impact of female labour force participation on observers' gender stereotypes appears to vary by occupation. Women commonly voiced great pride in seeing other women undertaking work historically dominated by men, taking this as evidence of the equal potential capabilities of their sex. Having long been told that they were different and incapable of certain, privileged tasks, women now visibly rejoice in perceived proof of their equality:

Alice: Tell me what you like to see women doing.

BanaMwimba (41, market trader): Leading, working hard, employed in men's jobs, repairing cars, sweeping in the road, employed at the mine, driving trucks – those things make me very proud [translated].^{xxxviii} [BanaMwimba's face lights up with pride as she proceeds to tell me about two of her friends, who work as electricians].

People's perceptions often vary with their exposure. Those with female neighbours or relatives undertaking jobs historically done by men universally maintained that such women are greatly respected. Many people declared being immensely proud of and impressed by these strong Zambian women, fighting to support their families. While some people have not seen many women undertaking stereotypically masculine occupations or other gender atypical roles like household financial provision and remain sceptical about the possibility of such flexibility in gender divisions of labour, those that have personally witnessed them tend to profess support. Exposure thus appears to provide disconfirming evidence of descriptive stereotypes about women's lesser competence, though other stereotypes may remain.

Many participants appeared impressed by women undertaking stereotypically masculine occupations, as indicated by the quotes overleaf. This sentiment, combined with apparent surprise (rather than concern, anxiety or hostility), suggests that participants previously presumed that women were incapable of such work and hence discouraged flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Their seemingly positive reactions indicated that they now welcome such incursions, having seen women demonstrate their competence. This lends credence to testimonies about earlier periods: when people lacked exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour they tended to ridicule and resist the abstract idea of women entering male-dominated domains.

Comments from observers also enhance the plausibility of earlier cited claims made by women in stereotypically masculine occupations. The latter might have been inclined to overstate the extent to which they are respected by others, in order to present themselves as upstanding members of their communities. Onlookers' narratives indicate that gender

stereotypes are eroded by the sight of women demonstrating their equal competence in activities commonly considered too challenging for women (e.g. driving Caterpillar trucks, auto-mechanics and house-building).

If a woman can drive that big bulldoze in the open pit of Nchanga mine, your fellow womens [sic] are now handling these big big wheels, the Caterpillars, and in the first place, it was amazing to see a girl like you jumping on the big wheels, going into the open pit. The first time it was amazing! You see a woman, clad in overalls and a hard hat, she's underground!

Charles (46, trade unionist, speaking at his office in Kitwe).

We praise them, we help each other.

Solomon (38, married miner, commenting on women who drive dump trucks at Nchanga mine) [translated].^{xxxix}

Samuel (24, studying auto-mechanics, from a family in which boys are forbidden to do domestic work): We came together and saw her [Daisy] lying down under the motorcar and I said, 'I'm very surprised', 'Have you ever seen a girl in a garage?', 'No, this is my first time'. I was impressed, very very impressed... She even started teaching us. She has confidence in working and talking. Customers are surprised, they are so impressed... She is extremely strong. She has inspired me very much when it comes to the way she works... She does everything in the house but she's not married. I used to think that a woman who lived by herself can't possibly live well like in the way Daisy does...

Owen (25, studying auto-mechanics): The reason that made me have confidence in other women is that I've seen Daisy repairing cars at the garage, working hard, providing for her young ones and taking them to school, doing men's work. Living without a man – that's also important... As for Daisy, she can just be married just 'cause she wants to not to, not the fact that she *needs* help. She's able to live on her own Daisy is just like other women, we all have five senses, but other women underrate themselves [partly translated].^{xl}

Samuel and Owen's account seems to signal a shift in internalised gender stereotypes rather than cultural expectations. From Daisy's demonstration of equal competence, they explicitly inferred that other women are similarly competent by virtue of physical similarities. A revision of cultural expectations would presumably require seeing many people supporting women's incursions into stereotypically masculine domains. It seems unlikely that they might have inferred from one employer's support for a female mechanic that all would be similarly welcoming. Their testimony does not indicate a change in cultural expectations.

By saying that 'we help each other' (*tulafwana*), Solomon is not referring to any direct, personal assistance that he derives from fellow female miners. Rather, he interprets their efforts as contributing to broader national development in a time of great difficulty. This echoes a broader discourse: flexibility in gender divisions of labour is regarded as collectively advantageous, as worsening economic security has shifted interests. This background context is further discussed below.

When does flexibility in gender divisions of labour weaken gender status beliefs?

One counter-example to this claim about the transformative effects of women's incursions

into stereotypically masculine occupations is the case of domestic work. This job was previously the preserve of men, due to European concerns about African women's sexuality (Hansen, 1989). But by 2001, only 8% of employed men compared to 27% of employed women were engaged in domestic service in the Copperbelt (CSO et al, 2003:38). However, this historically male-dominated livelihood does not provide women with respect or status. This is partly because the job never was high-ranking to begin with. In their survey of educated young men in Lusaka, Mitchell and Epstein (1959) found that 'domestic servants' were accorded one of the lowest rankings for occupational prestige. Even more lowly ranked was the position of 'garden boy' – a job for adult men (ibid). My impression is that these two jobs are now perceived as equally low ranking. Historically, people gained prestige through living, dancing and dressing like Europeans (Mitchell, 1956). In this context, domestic workers may have accrued status from privileged access to insider information about European lifestyles (concerning fashion, ballroom dancing, interior design and manners) as well as receipt of hand-me-down clothing (as suggested by Hansen, 1989:77,163-165). Dressed in their Sunday best, a domestic servant and clerk would have been indistinguishable in the colonial period (ibid:217). But these benefits no longer obtain.

The case of domestic work implies that women do not gain respect from undertaking men's low status work. But this inference would seem incorrect: a number of participants stressed the importance of seeing women perform other poorly paid or even unpaid, low status stereotypically masculine activities. For example, positive sentiments were expressed at the sight of women clearing drains, with picks and shovels (stereotypically masculine labour) in our low-income compound. My host, a politician, had specifically employed women for this task on account of their perceived reliability and hard-work. Interviewed passers-by were visibly impressed by these 'strong' women, fighting for their families. They still appeared to be greatly admired for their fortitude and were visibly proud of their own strength – smiling, standing tall with their tools and inviting me to photograph them.

Many people previously presumed that jobs such as slashing the grass and digging ditches for drainage were beyond women's capacity. Exposure to them undertaking this work appears to provide disconfirming evidence of their gender stereotypes. By contrast, it seems unlikely that people ever thought women were incapable of paid care work, since women have long been undertaking the very same tasks (e.g. childcare, cooking and cleaning), albeit without remuneration. As stated above, men predominated in this occupation due to white employers' concerns about African women's sexuality. While male domestic servants in the colonial era did learn new skills – such as how to prepare European food – by the time women entered en masse the industry had been 'deskilled' (Hansen, 1989:247,259). Hence by receiving payment for domestic work, women entrants to the occupation did not gain an opportunity to demonstrate skills that were previously in doubt. It seems that women gain status when they demonstrate their capacity to perform a role that was historically dominated by men, which (i) is valorised because of men's higher status; and (ii) embodies stereotypes about gender differences – such that women's demonstrable success in this occupation provides disconfirming evidence of those stereotypes.

This explanation is somewhat complicated by the fact that some women undertake multiple gendered roles, which are perceived in different ways by different people. For example, female domestic workers and market traders do not demonstrate an ability to undertake an occupation that is esteemed. However, those domestic workers and traders who are

important financial contributors to their families do show that they can provide (just like men), and by virtue of performing this socially valued role they are often revered as ‘strong’ by their low-income neighbours.

But to only emphasise individual women’s lone encroachments into male domains without mentioning socio-economic context would seem too narrow. Two further issues featured heavily in participants’ accounts: (a) a critical mass of incursions; and (b) a background context of economic insecurity. These will be discussed in turn.

First, occasional, sporadic sightings do not seem sufficient to weaken assumptions about women’s competence or status. Instead such women are referred to as honorary men, presumed to be ‘prostitutes’ or seen as rudely assertive (by contravening widely-held gender stereotypes). As discussed in Chapter 1, research in social psychology suggests that gender beliefs track but lag behind increasing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This may be because stereotypes influence the interpretation of information, such that contradictory cases are dismissed as exceptional and not perceived as disproving presumptions about the traits of the typical man or woman.

Participants who had come to eschew prior gender beliefs generally emphasised the importance of prolonged exposure to multiple sightings of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This has more commonly occurred in recent years, with a critical mass of women now undertaking gender atypical work. When evasions of gender stereotypes are widespread, they are less commonly overlooked or dismissed as exceptional and more often seen as disconfirming evidence of those stereotypes.

A critical mass of incursions into stereotypically masculine domains is also essential for collective reflection – which many participants identified as significant. This process of sharing and learning from others’ experiences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour (described in the above section on association) can only occur when a number of people have been exposed to this phenomenon. Thirty years ago a woman undertaking a stereotypically masculine job, such as a car mechanic, ‘would have been laughed at’, claimed BaShiMayuka (a miner, whose wife’s life history is detailed in Chapter 2). Accordingly, people at that time may not have anticipated a sympathetic reception to an initiated discussion on this. Before increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, people may have presumed that others were not exposed and so would be less receptive to and supportive of such discourses. However, times have changed as conveyed below. The following is an extract from a lunch break discussion amongst female co-workers at a co-operative house-building scheme. For the past couple of years they have made weekly financial contributions, received training and built two room houses together – with the People’s Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia (allied with Homeless International and Slum Dwellers International).

BanaCarola (54, married, home-based trader): A woman should work, she can build... A woman can dig foundations... But people were laughing, saying, ‘What are you doing over there? You’re just playing’. But this time, now that we’ve built, they praise us, ‘Oh, what you’re doing is very sensible’...

BanaBwembya (53, widow, market trader): Our neighbours give us great respect... Those that have seen how we work praise us saying, ‘You women are working on a big job, it’s brilliant’. They tell their friends, ‘Those women people are strong, they’re working very hard’... Those who know have agreed we’re working very hard. And... they

feel shy about the way they underestimated and laughed at us before... If I passed them they would say, 'She's suffering', but these days it's, 'My goodness, how you've worked!' They understand us [translated].^{xi}

As BanaCarola explains, they were once ridiculed for attempting to encroach into the traditionally male domain of house-building. According to her testimony, their neighbours previously presumed that only men could build houses, so derided the abstract idea of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Without prior exposure to women demonstrating their ability to undertake this stereotypically masculine role, the neighbours thought that such women would be wasting their time and so discouraged them. By publicly expressing these gender stereotypes about presumed female incompetence, the neighbours apparently deterred other women. BanaCarola, co-workers and the NGO project manager informed me that others, with insufficient self-belief and social support, felt foolish for even trying and so gave up, believing the gender atypical task to be impossible. However, once the neighbours had seen that women can indeed build houses they then expressed admiration. Many have even requested to join the scheme.

Seeing a large number of women building their own houses appears to have provided sufficient disconfirming evidence of the gender stereotype that this job can be done by men. By collectively reflecting on the benefits of women undertaking this kind of work, some communities have agreed upon its social importance. Now, instead of mocking or pitying these widows, they applaud them as champions. Prescriptive stereotypes have shifted: no longer do members of this community regard house-building as inappropriate for women. Here we see a close connection between beliefs about what women should do and of what they are presumed to be capable. But the broader point here is that perceptions of an individual woman's employment status or economic activity seem affected by the extent of flexibility in the society as a whole. This critical mass of incursions seems to provide disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs.

A second point about background context concerns the economy. Macro-level circumstances increased the financial costs of compliance with cultural expectations, motivating a trade-off. Even if men and their families secured social respect by adhering to the prescriptive stereotype of male breadwinner and female housewife, many families in the 1990s did not regard this social reward as outweighing associated economic costs. Historically, by contrast, gender divisions of labour were made realisable by macro-economic circumstances and government policies. The economic incentive to flout these cultural expectations was thus significantly lesser for previous generations. While some women did express private critique and resentment, just as some women did seek employment historically, they often faced resistance from their families and employers, who did not regard flexibility in gender divisions of labour as in their interests.

Now, however, because of pervasive difficulties, people increasingly applaud 'strong' women who fight to support their families or physically build their own homes. Those who occupied positions of relative power thus found it less desirable for women to specialise in unpaid reproductive work. In the 1990s, people traded the social benefits of conformity with the male breadwinner model for the economic benefits of multiple income-generating strategies. Furthermore, in the contemporary period, the social cost of undertaking stereotypically masculine economic roles is reduced, as people increasingly champion such incursions – as

discussed in the next section. This reveals the interplay between changing patterns of resource access and gender stereotypes. Compliance (and evaluation in accordance) with gender stereotypes depends in part on the associated costs, which may change with macro-economic circumstances. When those in positions of relative power no longer perceived conformity with gender stereotypes as advantageous, when their interests changed, they ceased to sanction those who evaded them.

Has flexibility in gender divisions of labour really enhanced women's status?

So far it has been suggested that greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour (both in terms of remunerated activities and also occupational desegregation) has weakened internalised gender stereotypes (relating to competence and status) as well as cultural expectations. This section interrogates this claim, exploring the possible reasons for apparent discrepancy with earlier studies in Zambia, which found that flexibility in gender divisions of labour did not undermine gender status beliefs. This section also triangulates participants' narratives by examining evidence indicating continuity in gender status inequalities.

In previous decades, even when women had made substantial economic contributions to the household, these were largely regarded as supplementary. For example, in the absence of a father, low-income male youths in Lusaka tended to present themselves as household head. Meanwhile their mothers, who supported them financially, commonly referred to a lack of filial respect (Schlyter, 1999:83). Similarly, in relation to inter-generational transfers, earlier studies have noted that although daughters tend to support their parents, these remittances were not publicly recognised. Instead men were commonly stereotyped as providers (Kamwengo, 2007:101; Schlyter, 1999:79, 2007:117,129).

Even though some low-income urban women in Lusaka were said to contest widely-held gender stereotypes – regarding themselves as persons of legal majority and claiming joint ownership of matrimonial property – their husbands tended to see themselves as sole owners of matrimonial property and their wives as dependents (Schlyter, 1999:10). Male ownership of self-built housing was often presumed and enforced, notwithstanding female in/direct contributions to construction, maintenance and improvements (Hansen, 1997:137; Munalula, 1998:248). Even if a woman acquired a house through waged employment, their ownership was disputed by their husbands who claimed the fruits of their labours (Larsson and Schlyter, 1993:79).

Previous studies also suggest that flexibility in gender divisions of labour resulted in anxieties – it not only failed to improve women's situation but even made it worse, in some respects. Drawing on research in Mufulira (a Copperbelt town), Rasing (2001:102,106) noted that divergence from male breadwinner and female homemaker ideal sometimes created tensions: a husband might complain about his wife's lack of respect for domestic hierarchy and neglect of domestic responsibilities, such as food preparation.³⁴ For their part, women bemoaned men's infidelity, alcohol abuse, unaccountability, violence and lack of responsibility for the family. Interviewed young men in Lusaka also condemned women's failure to adhere to prescriptive stereotypes about appropriate conduct:

³⁴ Curiously, I never heard this complaint, only rumours of others who suffered from this problem.

“Women are cheeky and do not behave. Wives are disobedient and provoke their husbands because they earn their own money” (quoted in Schlyter, 1998:305-307).³⁵

Schlyter (1999:94-95) further reports that one interviewed group of young men maintained that if a wife did not show respect to her husband then he would be justified in beating her (see also Munalula, 1998:251 on spousal homicides). These findings, from an earlier period, are consistent with Hansen’s (1996:103) argument that,

[T]he declining economy, which has turned many women into important contributors to household welfare in the face of men’s shrinking incomes from wage employment, has aggravated the built-in tensions in the conjugal domain without transforming rights and claims in a manner that rewards women for their work efforts in their own right.

This conclusion raises questions about my claim that greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour has weakened gender status inequalities and related beliefs. However, Hansen’s portrayal is actually consistent with my participants’ narratives of earlier times: they denied that the surge in female labour force participation had changed gender status inequalities instantaneously. Their gendered self-perceptions, stereotypes and cultural expectations only transformed gradually. Recall BanaBecca’s narrative that even when she had a make-shift hairdressing salon in her front yard she was still just a ‘slave... [but] we started to change, slowly slowly’ [translated literally; in Bemba repetition adds emphasis]. Likewise, BanaMwamba (quoted above) started selling onions in 1998 but denied this made much difference to her self-esteem or regard from others in the first couple of years. Similarly, BanaMwimba started selling dried sardines in the early 1990s, but claimed that women only started participating in family discussions at funerals a decade later. My hypothesis is that if Karen Tranberg Hansen and Ann Schlyter now repeated their earlier research then they would find that labour force participation has improved women’s status.

This data from earlier studies and my participants’ life histories suggests that gender status inequalities are only indirectly related to women’s access to resources. For even when low-income women in Lusaka and Kitwe became breadwinners in the 1990s, they were not always respected as such. As discussed in Chapter 2, my sample of market traders appeared just as poor as those described in earlier studies. In Kitwe it seems that with prolonged exposure to multiple contradictions of gender stereotypes, as well as collective reflection upon these shared experiences, people have become less inclined to assume that women are necessarily less competent and less deserving of status than men.

This idea that with prolonged exposure people eventually appreciate women’s economic contributions is also explicit in Seur’s (1992:257-262) research in rural Serenje (Central Province, Zambia). Here, envy and hostility towards successful female entrepreneurs were most prevalent in the early years of their encroachment into the male domain of cash crop farming. Apparently unable to comprehend the success of commercially-orientated female farmers, some jealous others accused them of sorcery – implicitly denying that they had

³⁵ By contrast, I found that although stories still circulate about wives becoming ‘difficult’ upon earning their own money these were generally just fears and rumours, warning women against becoming too proud. It was rare for someone to give an actual example of such dissatisfaction. The few cases of women scolding their spouses were sometimes sympathetically attributed to women’s frustration at their husband’s lack of employment, rather than a desire to boast about their own.

succeeded by virtue of their own merit. Over time, however, the female pioneers were increasingly admired and asked for advice.

Seur's and my own findings seem consistent with research from social psychology, suggesting that gender beliefs lag behind but nonetheless track changes in material practices. Deploying the concept of 'confirmation bias', Ridgeway (2011) argues that people's gender stereotypes may blind them to disconfirming evidence and thereby endure for some time, despite a shift in practices. Drawing on a range of quantitative methodologies (experimental, surveys and meta-analytical) and cross-cultural data (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Germany, India and the United States), Eagly and Diekmann (2012:432) similarly argue that 'vanguard group members who first enter new social roles do not produce much change in their group stereotype but can leave vestiges of positivity that pave the way for further role access for their group. As a critical mass of individuals succeeds in entering non-traditional social roles, they eventually change the stereotype of their group'. For example, when asked to describe the characteristics of men and women in the past (1950s), present, and future (2050), respondents in Brazil, Chile and the United States of America portrayed men as more agentic than women, but maintained that this gap had declined over time and would continue to do so – reflecting women's growing share of stereotypically masculine roles (Eagly and Diekmann, 2000).

Eagly and Diekmann's emphasis on exposure to a critical mass of women in stereotypically masculine domains seems consistent with Seur's and my qualitative findings from Central Province and the Copperbelt respectively. But Seur (1992) also underscores the importance of interests. He notes that many husbands became supportive because they realised the financial advantage of their wives having additional income, which reduced their own burden. Seur's and my Zambian findings suggests that support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour is not just contingent upon exposure to disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes but also depends upon whether flexibility is perceived as desirable, given the institutional context. Seur's and Diekmann and Eagly's (2000) findings are not necessary contradictory here, since the latter focuses on stereotypes (i.e. beliefs) rather than proclivity to support flexibility in gender divisions of labour (i.e. desires).

In Serenje, prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour not only seems to have provided disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes about competence but also status. For example, women are increasingly participating in funeral discussions, concerning burial arrangements and asset redistribution. Historically, only men were regarded as having sufficient esteem and influence to govern these socially important affairs. Mudala Chisenga, a research assistant contributing to Seur's (1992:322) fieldwork, further explained:

In the past, there were certain separations: this type of work was for men, that type of work was only done by women. But nowadays people feel that most jobs can be done by men and women. That's why you find these discussions, this struggle between men and women. But here in Nchimishi women have become equal to men. Because whatever a man can do, even a woman is doing it. Many women are even much better than men, like for instance in farming. This has changed the way men and women think of each other.

Seur's (1992) and Diekmann and Eagly's (2000) findings that beliefs can change with prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour seem to enhance the

plausibility of my participants' suggestion that there was previously little appreciation of women's work but that this has changed over time. An alternative hypothesis is discussed in Chapter 6: gender status beliefs may have recently waned due to exposure to egalitarian discourses. While either explanation may account for the apparent discrepancy between my findings and earlier studies of female labour force participation in urban Zambia, the extent of attitudinal shifts posited by a number of my participants still merits further interrogation. The following sections critically examine the reliability of my qualitative data. It also highlights the persistence of gender status beliefs, which is apparent from prevalent gender-based violence as well as inequitable distribution of unpaid care work.

Did my participants exaggerate the extent of gender equality?

Earlier findings from Hansen (1996) and Schlyter (1999) underscore the need for cautious interpretation of the data I collected. Participants might have exaggerated the extent of gender equality, for the following three reasons: (i) to present themselves as content or at least emphasise the positive aspects of their lives; (ii) to portray themselves as adhering to cultural expectations; (iii) to feign agreement with egalitarian gender beliefs that they might have assumed I held. These possible desires, which would have biased the data, are considered in turn. I further consider the possibility that their stated beliefs were not reflected in practice.

Perhaps female participants exaggerated the extent to which they are respected by others, in order to present an idealised version of their lives. By exaggerating the *pro tanto* benefits of the contemporary erosion of gender divisions of labour they may have sought to make the best of a bad situation (i.e. worsening economic security). It is also possible that former housewives and their daughters previously derived (now forgotten) pleasure and satisfaction from being at home with their children, free from the stressful burden of responsibility for household financial provision. These considerations provide reason for cautious interpretation of the data presented above. On the other hand, almost all participants gave nostalgic narratives of the economic security enjoyed during the Kaunda era (1964-1991) and contrasted this with contemporary hardship. This does not support the claim that participants appeared optimistic about the present or sought to present themselves as content.

Furthermore, this idea of positive self-presentations does not account for the tendency of people in general (husbands, children, siblings, co-workers, neighbours and voters) to talk positively of *other* women. Recall Matthew's life history: like those of other men, it indicates that women's reports of equality are not just positive self-presentations. On the other hand, both women and men may have exaggerated their commitment to gender equality in order to portray themselves as observing a socially sanctioned normative ideal – seeing this as 'the right answer', perhaps. Yet this does not seem entirely plausible since participants were aware of other prescriptions, including patriarchal readings of the Bible, which were freely cited by those who explicitly rejected equality. Furthermore, this critique seems self-defeating: it presupposes that people's cultural expectations have radically changed, in favour of gender equality, and it is exactly this claim that many participants were making.

Another possibility is that some participants feigned egalitarian beliefs in an attempt to impress or please me. They might have assumed that I would appreciate such statements –

perhaps because such discourses were promoted by white, Western donors or because I may unknowingly, inadvertently and unintentionally signalled enthusiasm for particular responses. But this notion of feigned compliance does not seem entirely plausible, for four reasons. First, in narrating their life histories, participants seemed keen to tell me *their* stories about 'Zambia'/'Africa'. A big part of why they appeared to enjoy our discussions was that they were talking about their own lives. Second, in the course of these discussions, participants often expressed views contrary to my own: extolling marriage, child-bearing, heteronormativity and devaluing women's unpaid care work. A number of men did not shy from divulging that they publicly presented household decisions and purchases as their own or joint, even if they were financed or initiated by their wives. Third, when I did mention some aspects of my own life, after participants had been interviewed repeatedly and already narrated their life histories, they were often surprised that I live with my partner without being married. While younger women often expressed support for this practice, older women were generally more conservative. They did not appear to feign enthusiasm or present agreement in the hope of pleasing me. Similarly, many repeatedly urged me to have a child – even those to whom I had divulged my disinterest in mothering. They still sought to persuade me to share their priorities. Fourth, in other discussions, not relating to gender, participants rarely appeared to hold back from dissenting. In summary, the idea that they sought to present agreement does not seem consistent with my observations of our interactions.

Furthermore, the idea that participants sought to exaggerate their observance of egalitarian practices for the sake of complying with cultural expectations or impressing me does not seem compatible with their depictions of earlier status inequalities – i.e. self-incrimination. Men, like Matthew for example, volunteered that they used to beat their wives.

However, even if some people's gender beliefs really have changed, these might not always have been enacted. This discrepancy was sometimes identified by participants themselves. Sometimes I discovered inconsistencies in participants' accounts. For instance, in our interview, Helen (the elected representative of a low-income area, whose life history is detailed in Chapter 2) stressed the importance of gender equality in political representation and chorused a slogan of gender equality, '50:50'. She then proudly volunteered that her 17 year old son shares domestic jobs around the house, such as washing up. But I never once saw him do so in all my months of subsequently living with them. Mulwila was only ever at home to eat meals and sleep. He occasionally helped his father to water the vegetables in the mornings (a stereotypically masculine chore) but was otherwise absent. My impression is that Helen has come to see shared care work as the logical extension of her quest for equal representation in public decision-making (to which she is ardently committed). However, she has not endeavoured to implement this at home because is too busy trading and campaigning for political change, so too exhausted for this domestic struggle. Therefore Helen expressed her support for flexibility in gender divisions of care labour even though she has not been able to achieve it at home.

Similarly, BanaRuth (a widow and former housewife) claimed that she had become more confident and assertive since she had joined the market. But this statement was not always reflected in her behaviour. For example, she once appealed to a nearby male trader to shoo a drunken man who was bothering us. Other women who had long traded were more vocal and agentic, personally dealing with such matters. These apparent discrepancies between

narratives and practices highlight the importance of triangulation through observation. Since I did not observe all participants' lives, their claims need to be interpreted cautiously. They may only reflect a change in beliefs or aspirations (in Helen's case) or partial gains (for BanaRuth). This possibility notwithstanding, we can still note changes in expressed beliefs.

What evidence is there of continuity in gender status beliefs?

This section draws on additional sources and different kinds of data in order to triangulate participants' accounts about an erosion of gender status beliefs. The prevalence of intimate partner violence and inequitable distribution of unpaid care work indicate persistent commitment to gender status beliefs.

Gender-based violence

The evidence presented above lends plausibility to the hypothesis that gender status beliefs are weakened by prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour (in a context where such practices are widespread and financially important, given worsening economic security). If this is the case then we might expect prolonged exposure to be negatively associated with manifestations of those status beliefs, such as gender-based violence. Earlier research on reports of spousal homicide found that 'many cases involved direct challenges to male privilege or authority, or failure by the woman to fulfil her expected gender role... The women appear to have died because they did not do what was expected of good wives or female family members in the Zambian context' (Rude, 1999:19). Ridgeway (1997:122, 2011:81) similarly argues that persons with gender status beliefs lead them to regard women's deviant, assertive behaviour as illegitimate. These two accounts suggest that gender-based violence in Zambia is commonly triggered by women contradicting men's gender status beliefs. If this is the case and if gender status beliefs are weakened by exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour (as has been suggested), then violence and exposure to flexibility should be negatively associated.

Zambia's Demographic Health Survey provides data on married women's reports of violence as well as independent variables. The closest proxy for prolonged exposure is women's work status: whether they are employed or not, then paid in cash, in kind or not at all. This indicator is not ideal since it does not tell us two things my Zambian participants identified as critical, namely the duration of employment and whether it is common for women in the respondent's locality to share that work status. Although participants did emphasise a difference between economically active and inactive women, they did not suggest that there was an immediate change, so this particular indicator might be biased by recent labour market entrants. Kishor and Johnson (2004:44-45) find no statistically significant association between these two variables. On the one hand, this evidence neither confirms nor contradicts my hypothesis that prolonged exposure to flexibility weakens gender status beliefs. However, it does suggest there has not been a backlash against women's encroachment into male domains. Evidence of backlash would suggest that gender beliefs lag behind a change in material circumstances, as found in Kenya (Silberschmidt, 1999; discussed in Chapter 1).

Even if such studies do not clarify the association between prolonged exposure to flexibility and intimate partner violence (IPV), evidence of endemic violence does indicate a distinctly

partial erosion of gender status beliefs. 69% of female Copperbelt respondents to the 2007 Demographic and Health Survey reported prior experience of emotional, physical or sexual violence. This figure greatly exceeds the national average of 54.2% (CSO et al, 2009:287). Furthermore, of women who have ever experienced emotional violence, women in the Copperbelt are most likely to report exposure to violence in the last 12 months (CSO et al, 2009:290). These high reporting rates would appear to reflect a persistent, contemporary problem, not just something endured in earlier decades.

The prevalence of IPV could reflect widespread hostility to women's non-compliance with gender stereotypes, about the kind of labour they should perform and the deferential, feminine ways in which they ought to behave – as suggested by Rude (1999). Men could be attempting to assert their mastery. However, the quantitative data to which I have access does not enable me to test this association. Furthermore, no participant explicitly attributed their or others' experience of violence to women's increasing share of stereotypically masculine economic roles.

Another explanation of IPV points not to women's but to men's behaviour, principally their inability to express their masculine identity through being breadwinners. Perhaps there has been a violent response to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, not primarily because women are undertaking masculine roles but because men are unable to do so. Indeed, household tensions often seemed to result from the stresses induced by men's loss of secure employment, as well as the attendant drop in living standards, economic security status and self-respect. Many men, from across the socio-economic spectrum, suffered during the global economic crisis. Several wealthy suppliers to the mines experienced a sudden reversal of fortunes as their bank loans were called in and companies folded. Some workers who were retrenched during structural adjustment became depressed after years of waiting for promised investors, no longer wasted their time looking for jobs. Friends and family members sometimes attribute their deaths to depression and suicide. As explained by Matthew and BanaMayuka (whose life histories are detailed in Chapter 2):

The situation was very terrible, very terrible. It was like we were somewhere, now you are come into a deep down situation, if you are not very careful you can even develop some sickness, like high blood pressure. It's very difficult. It took me a bit of time to settle down to that level, but nowadays I'm accustomed, I've got no option.

Matthew

When men are not going for work they develop *icifukushi* [frustration].

BanaMayuka

Earlier research in Lusaka likewise found that '[m]any of the unemployed boys felt the stress of not being able to contribute as expected, and thereby not gaining the respect they desired' (Schlyter, 1998:303). Muvandi et al (2000) similarly note that, 'Married men in Zambia ideally see themselves as the breadwinners for the nuclear family. At the same time, support to kin is still an important aspect of local values. It is not only a social obligation but also a means for men to achieve status. Our research reveals that problems for men in terms of living up to socio-economic expectations, especially in the present difficult economic circumstances'.

Some men with *icifukushi* (the Bemba term for angst and pent-up frustration) turn to alcohol, which sometimes results in household conflict and violence (as observed by other studies in Zambia: Hossain and Green, 2011; Moser and Holland, 1997:69; Muvandi et al, 2000). Alcohol consumption might partly explain the discrepancy between Copperbelt men's expressed attitudes towards gender-based violence and women's reports of it. The proportion of Copperbelt men endorsing at least one of the specified justifications for wife beating was below the national average, at 46.3% (CSO et al, 2009:265). Yet, as we recall, the reported prevalence of violence is highest in the Copperbelt. This implies that a number of men who are violent towards their intimate partners also declare this unjust. This apparent discrepancy might be alcohol related. So, the prevalence of IPV does not necessarily reflect persistent gender status beliefs, it may be partly due to intoxication and men's *icifukushi* with their own economic situation.

Such tensions are not universal, however. Many women have prevented conflict by putting extra effort into emotionally supporting their husbands through economic insecurity and turbulence, as they are often advised to do at church. A woman may try to help her unemployed husband adjust to a loss of social status by calling him 'household head', even though their relationship may appear like an egalitarian partnership (as also found by Muvandi et al, 2000; Silberschmidt, 1992:248).

In summary, qualitative research suggests that intimate partner violence is commonly triggered by women's non-compliance with gender status beliefs. The prevalence of IPV indicates that such beliefs persist, notwithstanding flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This said, the data is not conclusive: there may be additional influences (such as alcohol and economic frustration, rather than status beliefs). Furthermore, IPV does not appear to be associated with a woman's economic activity.

In order to further interrogate the foregoing hypothesis (that exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour has contributed towards an erosion of gender stereotypes concerning competence and status), the next section explores another domain in which gender status beliefs seem to persist.

Unpaid Care Work

While appreciation of women's financial contributions and advice seemed increasingly widespread, participants generally maintained that men rarely shared domestic work (*incito sha banakashi* - women's work). Moser and Holland (1997:63) similarly found that men's share of domestic work did not with increased female labour force participation in Chawama, a low-income area of Lusaka. In 1992, their random sample of those undertaking productive work (i.e. for cash or kind, producing for the market or subsistence) found that such men and women averaged 50 hours a week. However, women worked more hours in total due to their far larger share of unpaid reproductive activities (13 to 16 hours a week on average, compared to men's five hours or fewer). Furthermore, women in full-time employment devoted no fewer hours to unpaid domestic labour than those in part-time employment (ibid:64).

This section explores some possible interpretations of asymmetric, unidirectional increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, drawing on the concepts introduced in Chapter 1:

interests, exposure, internalised gender beliefs, cultural expectations and also patterns of resource access. A further, overarching aim here is to ascertain whether seemingly entrenched gender divisions of care work provide evidence that gender status beliefs have not weakened in all respects.

Before discussing the reasons for the distribution of unpaid care work it is first essential to understand how it is perceived by Copperbelt residents. As discussed in Chapter 3, unpaid care was widely portrayed as less prestigious than remunerated activities in the public sphere. Participants suggested that while women's financial contributions to a household were appreciated and enhanced their social status, their domestic work (e.g. washing-up and childcare) tended to be overlooked and taken for granted. Homemakers who only performed this form of labour were commonly referred to as 'doing nothing', 'just sitting' or as focusing on 'small issues'. Additionally, there appeared to be an association between attitudes towards distribution of unpaid care work and gender status beliefs. For example, when a class of 14-15 year olds in a low-income compound discussed gender equality (as part of a Civics lesson), one boy explained that his future wife should sweep in order to show respect to him as household head. This claim was loudly rejected by the girls sitting at the front of the class, who called for '50:50' in marriage. The girls who sought marital equality regarded shared care work as a component of this: they challenged the boy who considered women's care work to be a display of due deference.

In contrast to my own interpretations of the available data on care work (also discussed in Chapter 4), Rasing (2001) portrays domestic work as a source of female power. However, little evidence is presented in support of this claim. One of her informants in Mufulira (a Copperbelt town) apparently insisted on cleaning her husbands' clothes. Rasing (ibid:107) adds that 'if her husband did the housework, he would be interfering in the female domain, and would consequently attack her authority'. It is not clear how Rasing came to this interpretation, no reference is made to sentiments or terminology expressed or implied by participants. Rasing (ibid:233) subsequently claims that 'through it [cooking] a woman achieves power or authority over her husband'. Again, since detail is not elaborated upon, it is unclear why Rasing interprets domestic work as a source of female power, or what kind of power is alleged. Moreover, I saw no evidence of this claim in my own research, quite the reverse in fact. For example, at one government school I observed for three weeks, the staff social involved a football competition between male teachers, after which female teachers served food they had prepared. I did not hear any man expressing appreciation for this service. The division of labour was not questioned in public fora – save by one young female trainee teacher who spoke out during the planning meeting. Thus based on the evidence to which I have access, it does not seem plausible that women commonly gain some kind of power through domestic work – though may still be true.

If we understand unpaid care work (in the Copperbelt) as a display of deference to the male household head, in compliance with gender status beliefs, then continued, society-wide gender division of this labour suggests that women have not gained much status. Even if stereotypes about women's competence have changed they still remain responsible for care work, which is largely unappreciated. This could be interpreted as suggesting that status beliefs are not reducible to assumptions about differential competence. Another possibility is that women have gained status but only in some domains. A husband and wife may regard

each other's ideas as equally valuable and so jointly contribute to household decision-making, yet gender beliefs may become salient in the context of care work.

Here it is important to distinguish between beliefs and performances of gender. Women's internalised gender status beliefs should not be inferred from their behavioural compliance with this cultural expectation. Some women (young and old) privately criticised the unfairness of gender divisions of care work. This suggests that they did not believe that the asymmetry was justified by gender status beliefs. Thus gender divisions of care work do not necessarily provide evidence of internalised gender status beliefs.

Unpaid care work is not only an expression of gender status beliefs, it is also a stereotypically feminine activity. Indeed it is commonly labelled '*incito sha banakashi*' (women's work). Prescriptive gender stereotypes mandate that this labour should be performed by women. Ridgeway (2011) suggests that gender beliefs are more salient in the home than the workplace. Because households are largely based around a heterosexual union of two different sexes, people's gender beliefs are more likely to be activated in this environment. Relatedly, the social institution of the family is widely regarded as a gendered context. Accordingly, when in this environment, people become particularly inclined to sex-categorise on another and to adhere to gender beliefs. Meanwhile, in workplaces gender is said to be less salient. This seems plausible, though difficult to interrogate empirically.

Another reason why unpaid care work continues to be stereotyped as women's work may be that it is largely performed behind closed doors. While the sight of a female electrician often inspires young women to follow suit, the small numbers of men who do help out inside the home remain largely hidden from view. Discouraging cultural expectations thus persist: many continue to think that men's undertaking such work is 'not normal' (meaning neither common nor appropriate). This may explain why women who privately expressed resentment appeared resigned to accept their fate, for they had no evidence to suggest that this tradition was likely to change.

The importance of exposure to such incursions is highlighted by recent rural immigrants to Kitwe, who explained that their husbands had started to help out occasionally since they saw other men doing so in town. In the following dialogue Chilando (41, selling tomatoes in the central city market, having left her village four months ago so that her children focus on education rather than marriage) explains why her husband started helping wash plates after three months of living in town:

Chilando: They are very different, the village and town. It is women who do all the work at the village. Right here in town men cook and help with washing up, but that can't possibly happen in the village! He [my husband] helps me here. They see women going to the market, we're working, we come to the market, we become tired, they come so we can help each other.

Alice: Does he have friends who wash plates?

Chilando: Many.

Alice: Did you used to get tired before [in the village]?

Chilando: We used to get tired but they didn't feel mercy... Because the rules in the village are very tough, they'll be laughing at you. Here he's found his friends helping their wives. Things are very different in the village.

Alice: Does he often wash plates?

Chilando: Only sometimes...

Alice: Not every day?

Chilando: No, because he's working [he makes flower pots] [translated].^{xlii}

Chilando maintains that her husband changed through exposure to other men performing care work. We might interpret this as providing disconfirming evidence of his own, internalised gender stereotypes, in which case we would expect him to continue performing this work if he returned to the village. By contrast, if behaviour is more influenced by cultural expectations then we might expect Chilando's husband to eschew care work upon return to the village in order to express his masculine identity and secure social approval. Perhaps men and women adhere to gender divisions of domestic labour in order to be positively evaluated by others, who are assumed to expect women to perform this work. While I do not know what happens when Chilando's husband returns to the village, other evidence does underscore the salience of cultural expectations. For example, Mr Zimba (a Civic Education and history teacher at a high school) explained,

You know, I think I'm a very good cook but I'm not given the opportunity to cook... If it went out that I enjoy cooking they would think it's something wrong with my wife, she's not looking after me. She can even be forced out by my sisters, by our relatives. They may not do it for as long as I suppose I'm alive, but generally that's the nonsense that can happen. Women's roles are so pronounced and fixated; they're rigid, no matter the education.

Samuel and Owen (the interviewed young mechanics who expressed enthusiasm about a female co-worker, see discussion on page 121) similarly suggested that they could wash clothes or plates but raised concerns about what others would think of them. Such self-reports may be unreliable, however. Perhaps these men did not really want to share domestic work and were just shirking personal responsibility for this gender division of labour. This possibility underscores the importance of recording how people act in different social contexts. For example, some women maintained that they only kneeled when serving food to their husbands in the presence of visitors but not when alone. This discrepancy would seem due to cultural expectations rather than their own internalised gender beliefs. Similarly, Mwale (a 14 year old boy in a low-income compound) would only sweep inside (not outside) the house, so that he would not be seen or laughed at by his friends passing by. Since sweeping inside the house is not perceived as any different from sweeping outside, we cannot explain this behaviour by reference to Mwale's internalised gender beliefs. Instead it seems due to his concerns about other people's appraisals of his behaviour.

Besides gender stereotypes (which may be influenced by limited exposure), we might also explain gender divisions of unpaid care work by reference to structural factors such as marriage markets, which shape interests. Recall that during the 1930s, male rural-urban migration gave Copperbelt women scarcity value, enhancing their ability to bargain for better treatment in intimate relations. The situation has since reversed. Many young men are unemployed and therefore delay marriage because they do not feel financially competent to provide for a household (see Hansen, 2008:221; Muvandi et al, 2000; also Figure 4.12; as well as Hunter, 2010 on South Africa).

[This image has been removed for copyright reasons].

Figure 4.12: Marriage and the macro-economy

Source: The Post, 2010

Most of them they are not married because they're scared, "If I got married what am I going to be giving my wife?"

Mark (middle-aged food supplier to prisons and hospitals, employs manual workers).

There is a low supply of men seeking marriage. However, the demand is high – on the part of women looking for marriage or boyfriends to provide financial support, in a context of their own unemployment and historically socialised dependence on men's earnings.

Intimate relationships can be extremely insecure because there is so much competition from other women, keen to find husbands and/or financial providers (see also Crehan, 1997:151 for parallels with polygynous unions, in which women similarly compete for a man's attention). Thus although some women may have improved their marriages by labour force participation, their marriages remain threatened by *other* women's unemployment. This generates suspicion and divisions between married and unmarried women. This animosity is not novel; it was also observed in Lusaka in earlier decades. Glazer Schuster (1979:83,127) wrote that 'single women... are hated and condemned for their immorality by married women... Unmarried women "cause" men to neglect their wives'.

In the contemporary Copperbelt context women are being advised, in women's church groups especially, to redouble their efforts in unpaid reproductive work, making the home nice for the husband, so as to prevent his departure. Thus, while men increasingly accept working women's financial contributions and participation in household decision-making (because they see this as valuable), many wives are reluctant to push for a sharing of other gender roles for fear this will push men away.^{36,37}

The foregoing reference to interests relating to marriage markets suggests that men's limited share of unpaid care work is not entirely due to internalised gender status beliefs. Even if exposed to alternative practices, men and women might choose to continue with gender divisions of care labour because they have limited interest in pushing for a revision. This aversion is likely compounded by concerns that others will condemn men's performance of *incito sha banakashi*. Evidence about what happens in different social contexts suggests that

36 Similarly in Rwanda, Schindler (2011:16) speculates that unmarried women's particular adherence to traditional gender roles stems from the paucity of prospective partners, given unbalanced sex ratios in the aftermath of the genocide.

37 Men's reluctance to share unpaid reproductive work often seems to thwart women's progression in paid employment. With limited time available for study, social networking and longer working hours, women face difficulties in finding and also advancing in employment. Reproductive labour can also trigger loss of employment, such as following temporary leave to care for sick children. While wealthier women can employ domestic workers to reduce these burdens, maternity leave remains a major issue for employers. This concern was echoed in conversations with trade unionists and human resource personnel. Also, it seems that while employers increasingly recognise women's capabilities and qualifications to work, many remain reluctant to employ women because of asymmetric reproductive burdens, which seem reinforced by lopsided marriage markets - a function of worsening economic security. Such concerns may partly account for the disparity in men and women's earnings, which holds even in similar work (CSO, 2009; CSO et al, 2009:257; Kalinda and Floro, 1992:27; Nielsen, 2000; World Economic Forum, 2009). Current policies for parental leave only reinforce this asymmetry. At present Zambian law permits 5 days paternity leave and 12 weeks maternity leave after two years of continued service. The financial burden is not shared collectively, through social insurance, but borne entirely by the employer. This ensures a structural, financial incentive to discriminate against women (see also ILO, 2010:23; World Bank, 2011:231).

behaviour is shaped by cultural expectations (which vary according to context and prospects of external evaluation) rather than internalised beliefs (which presumably remain stable).

To conclude this section, uneven distribution of unpaid care work and gender-based violence both suggest that status inequalities remain widespread. Yet the available evidence does not appear sufficient to reject the foregoing hypothesis that flexibility in gender divisions of labour has at least enhanced women's status in some domains. Furthermore, the apparent discrepancy with earlier findings in Zambia may be attributed to the passage of time.

Thus far this chapter has explored the consequences of increasing flexibility in gender divisions of labour on household and community relationships, in order to enable comparisons with previous, related studies in Zambia. I now consider a different dimension of gender relations: political participation. This is an important indication of gender status beliefs, which hold that men are more suited to positions of authority and more worthy of influence and esteem.

4.3 The consequences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour on women's political participation

Female political participation appears to have increased significantly over recent decades. The proportion of female MPs doubled during the 1990s, for instance (as shown in Figure 4.13).




Figure 4.13: Proportion of female Members of Parliament, 1964-2013

Source: Longwe, 2011; Singongo et al, 2009:26.

Female political participation also appears to have increased at grassroots levels. This claim is based on comparisons between contemporary data (from my interviews and observations, as well as 2007 World Values Survey data) and historical research. As further elaborated upon in Chapter 3, Zambian women were often mistrusted and marginalised in party politics during the early decades of independence. They were generally allocated the role of singing praises and dancing for male politicians at rallies (Geisler, 2004). In the contemporary period, however, women no longer seem confined to playing a subordinate role. For

example, the Kitwe central market branch of the Patriotic Front (a political party which won the national elections in 2011) was not established by men – who had been fearful of reprisals sponsored by the ruling party. It was founded by four frustrated female market traders, who raised awareness and rallied support by beating drums. Similarly, in the Mufulira (Copperbelt) market association, almost all leaders are women. This is exceptionally high, however: the proportion of female leaders is more commonly between 10 and 30%. Further evidence of rising support for female political participation comes from the 2007 World Values Survey. In reply to the statement that ‘On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do’ **Zambian responses were evenly split between agreement and disagreement.** Women were less likely to express agreement: only 13.6% said they strongly agreed, compared to 21.8% of men. Participants’ life histories and historical ethnographies suggest that if this survey had been undertaken in earlier decades then far fewer respondents would have dissented from the gender stereotype expressed.

Since half of the Zambian respondents to the World Values Survey expressed a preference for male leaders, change should not be overstated. Indeed, women only account for 12.7% of parliamentarians (as illustrated in Figure 4.13). The proportion of women in Local Government is similarly low: only 387 women were adopted by political parties to contest the 2006 Local Government elections (thereby comprising 10.6% of the 4095 total candidates) (Singogo et al, 2009:26). Also, the women who launched PF in the central market reported to a male party organiser and campaigned for a male MP (now Copperbelt Minister).

Though gradual, female participation does seem to be increasing in Kitwe at least. This suggests a transformation of gender status beliefs – that men are more deserving of esteem and influence. The purpose of this section is to set out evidence suggesting that this is at least partly due to flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour in a context of economic insecurity. Subsequent chapters will examine other possible causes. Chapter 5 examines the hypothesis that support for female political participation was not shifted by socio-economic change but instead remained stable over the life course, as shaped by certain formative experiences. Chapter 6 considers an alternative explanation, namely the impact of exposure to egalitarian discourses.

Supply-side changes

When explaining their decisions to become politically active, market women frequently referred to worsening economic security. Many expressed deep frustration that even after struggling to pay for their children’s education they still cannot find employment. In an attempt to galvanise change, many women joined the political opposition (the Patriotic Front, PF), as leaders at grassroots levels. (Subsequent to my fieldwork, PF won power in the national elections of September 2011). BanaMayunda (39, leader in a market branch of PF, selling mushrooms) echoed sentiments expressed more widely:

We stood in politics in order to change the Government, which is not governing well... [My children] they are just farming [she explains that they have not found jobs and she cannot afford to put them through college]... The industries are ruined, there’s nothing... This time we’ve wised up. These days it’s 50:50 [men and women] [translated].^{xliii}

Feeling that no one was fighting for them was another cited motivation for women’s entry

into politics as grassroots campaigners. Many expressed confidence in the PF party leader, Michael Sata, having seen how he had worked in Government. Elected female representatives (councillors and Members of Parliament) expressed similar frustration with current development and spoke about wanting to speak for others. Some women have similarly engaged in union politics, ostensibly motivated by dissatisfaction with low wages and injustice.³⁸

However, even if those women who are politically active stressed the initial influence of economic insecurity (a shift in interests), there appears to be additional factors at play. For example, the vast majority of such women also undertook paid work in the public sphere, through which they had gained self-esteem and learnt about politics. All interviewed female market traders who were politically active had grown up with gender status beliefs, assuming men were more suited to prestigious positions of leadership. Their gendered self-perceptions and stereotypes only shifted when they started selling (as discussed earlier in this chapter).

However, undertaking stereotypically masculine work has not enhanced all women's proclivity to stand as leaders (of market, religious or political organisations). Accordingly, some remain shy when talking with a large group of people. Some doubt their capacity to undertake leadership roles or refrain due to cultural expectations of limited support. For instance, the market women who launched the Patriotic Front (PF) in Chisokone (Kitwe's central market) were initially hesitant to put themselves forward as central leaders (e.g. chairperson), seeing these roles as more appropriate for men. Even when trading, they presumed that men were naturally better leaders, so deferred. However, through experience, trial and error, they now consider themselves to be more capable than current leadership, whom they plan to challenge in the next elections. Their gender status beliefs appear to have developed gradually, with 'political apprenticeship' (a term developed in Cornwall and Goetz, 2005; see also Nazneen and Tasneem, 2010; Tadroz, 2011) and were not entirely shifted by flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour.

Furthermore, although female political activists stressed the influence of worsening economic security, others responded in different ways to this same set of macro-level circumstances. Some women are reluctant to enter trade and student union politics for fear of being suspended or fired – both of which are real possibilities. Additionally, present political leadership and economic dissatisfaction have made some men and women apathetic. Others are interested in national politics but feel constrained by poverty, so prioritise income-generation over political meetings. The decision to respond to economic insecurity through political activism also seemed affected by formative experiences (Chapter 5) and exposure to egalitarian discourses (discussed in Chapter 6), not entailed by structural economic circumstances.

³⁸ Mikell (1995:409) draws a similar link between economic decline and African women's political participation, arguing that women have increasingly put themselves forward, believing that their 'performance can be no worse between that of male politicians... [who oversaw] economic collapses, military coups, civil wars, refugee crises, feminisation of poverty, and structural adjustment programs'. While frustration with previous leaders was evident in my participants' accounts, female activists tended to focus on the economic conditions, rather than lay the blame at masculinity or men. This is characteristic of limited gender antagonism more generally.

Demand-side changes

Even if flexibility in gender divisions of labour in a context of economic insecurity has increased the supply of women candidates, this cannot provide a full account of their rising political participation. Note, for instance, Opuku-Mensah's (2000:189) observation that '[a]lthough the number of women standing for election in Zambia increased from 14 in 1991 to 61 in 1996, their presence in Parliament only increased from 7 to 15'. To explain why female political participation rose in the subsequent period we also need to account for increasing demand.

In order to mitigate economic adversity, many women have developed the very characteristics that people look for in a leader. These include being with others and understanding their concerns; having the confidence to speak for others; strength and endurance through adversity; as well as empathy and compassion. Another quality that Copperbelt residents commonly look for in a leader is financial support for their individual (rather than collective) needs, such as funeral or hospital costs. Women (and men) leaders (particularly market association leaders, councillors and MPs, though not political party organisers or trade union leaders) commonly attributed their popularity to their financial support of others. It is only as a result of flexibility in gender divisions of labour that women have been able to fulfil this role.

Echoing a shift in attitudes more generally, people seem to increasingly (though not universally) focus on the capabilities of a person, rather than their sex. This view was maintained by voters, elected representatives, as well as those on political party selection panels (both at district and national levels) – as follows.

Jacob (45, a leader in the Kitwe branch of PF and on the selection panel for aspiring MPs and councillors): What people want is a person who has been there with them on the ground, who understands their needs their aspirations, who can articulate issues. If it is a man or a woman people will accept.

Alice: Does gender matter?

Jacob: No no no.

Alice: Has that changed?

Jacob: It's so big I can't even explain... It has changed tremendously, we have a good number of women who are councillors, and we have received a lot of willingness from women who want to stand as councillors. I've told them, you go on the ground.

BanaHilda (52, widowed market trader): When choosing a person to be a leader, we should look at how they are; we don't look thinking 'It's a woman'. No, we just look at how they are strong. If it's their gift then they may lead well and men will praise. That's all.

Alice: So these days people don't think 'It's just a woman'?

BanaHilda: No. Long ago women didn't focus their energies on leading, but they've seen that there's no one to speak for them. They should have a person to speak for them [translated].^{xliv}

The men haven't performed well. What people want is change: whether it's a woman or a man, that doesn't matter, they want someone who can deliver, so now they want to try more women.

Anita (politician).

These statements indicate a shift in gender beliefs. However, given the paucity of women in elected political positions, the above denials of gender discrimination seem unreliable. Participants may have purposefully overstated their case. Alternatively, they may be unaware of unconscious bias affecting performance evaluations: men may be seen as more competent or their particular skills may be more valued – in line with gender stereotypes (as also discussed in Ridgeway and Correll, 2004:518). Given this scope for inaccuracy, these comments cannot be counted as evidence of lack of bias.

While many people denied gender discrimination, others stated an explicit preference for more women representatives. This shift in demand seems largely due to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. For example, people have seen how many women have remained resilient in the struggle to provide for their children. Meanwhile, some people feel that men are longer fulfilling their normative roles of providers – either at a personal or national level, since they have presided over worsening economic security. Having been disappointed by men, many people (voters as well as union and party political leaders) noted a shift in sentiments to ‘let’s try a woman’ (see also Mikell, 1995:409, who suggests this as a reason why African women have increasingly put themselves forward as leaders). In some quarters there is a growing expectation that a woman leader would better fulfil the quasi-parental role of leadership.

While women workers and financial providers were often praised by virtue of their masculine attributes (e.g. for being ‘strong’), accolades for female politicians often made reference to their stereotypically feminine and maternal qualities. For example, in the quotes below, BanaJessy refers to women’s ‘hearts of mercy’. Meanwhile, Belinda suggests that people have faith in women because they will not desert voters just as a mother will not desert her children. These sentiments were expressed more broadly: men are sometimes portrayed as irresponsible (spending on alcohol and girlfriends) whereas working mothers are imagined to be self-sacrificing, struggling for their children. Research in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa similarly suggests that motherhood is often used as an effective political identity (Chant with Craske, 2003; Steady, 2011; Tripp et al, 2009). In the Copperbelt, stereotypical representations of motherhood seem to have changed, due to their increasing flexibility in gender divisions of labour in a context of economic insecurity. This said, masculine stereotypes were not entirely absent: promotional flyers for female candidates often also presented them as the ‘iron lady’, i.e. as ‘strong’, firm and unyielding.

Further, by gathering in the market, female traders have come to a shared physical space, where they often realise common interests and develop a positive gender identity (see also earlier section on association). These themes are discussed below.

Alice: What do you think about women leaders?

BanaJessy (39, market trader, former housewife): They are going to the front. They have hearts of mercy, because they’ve seen the problems we women pass through and how we suffer to bring up children.

Alice: Long ago, could you vote for a woman leader?

BanaJessy: We used not to consider supporting a woman leader.

Alice: You didn’t know that other women experienced the same sufferings as you?

BanaJessy: We used to think you passed through sufferings alone.

Alice: Why? You associate with many people in the market.

BanaJessy: That was before we associated with many people in the market [i.e. when we were housewives] [translated].^{xlv}

BanaNkandu (34, married market trader, former housewife): They [women leaders] see the suffering that we pass through.

BanaBecca (36, married market trader, former housewife): It's the very same, she passes through our sufferings...

BanaNkandu: Men have been ruling over us very much. Men use us. So for the elections we want women... In the past we thought that women leaders couldn't explain the truth... We used to respect men so much, so much. Long ago women were supposed to be alone, we didn't associate with other people [translated].^{xlvi}

BanaRuth (35, widowed market trader, former housewife): We should have women leaders because it's a woman who cares/provides for people, so a woman should not suffer... In leadership there should be men and women so that they share intelligence, they should discuss together... We want to have many women leaders. We want to remove ourselves from being in men's hands [i.e. depending on men]... We don't want to hear the intelligence of men alone; we want to listen to the intelligence of women... They [men] wrong us. A woman herself knows what we want because she goes through it... Previously, I was new in the market, I didn't know anything [explains that she previously voted for men]... When you grow you start to see suffering, that's when you may know what kind of leader is needed [translated].^{xlvii}

Alice: Was gender an issue when you were campaigning?

Belinda (60, widow and Copperbelt MP): Yeah, it was an issue. Since the constituency was created no woman has ever stood in that constituency... People said, [corrects herself] men, not women, said, 'Would a woman manage to run the constituency?'. Women themselves said, 'We've voted for men too often'. Women know women are mothers, 'She will not desert us, a woman will never desert her children'... People in general will support a person they know and trust. I've worked in the constituency for over 30 years. They know me, deep down, they know my background. They know I've suffered with them, how I endured the suffering and came through it. I held my head up. I never gave up on my children - that's very important...

Alice: Did you make an issue of being a mother?

Belinda: A mother never neglects her family, no matter what, she looks after everyone and that's what I'm trying to do.

Alice: Would you also advise others [women candidates] to stress this identity?

Belinda: [nods]³⁹

Alice: Why has there been a change in attitudes towards electing women?

Belinda: Society has looked at the women and seen women's achievement in every area of society and that has given the impetus to support women.

These sentiments were shared more widely. Many other women expressed the belief that fellow women would empathise with them and speak on their behalf. Market women in particular often wished there were more female candidates. Some women argued that since women are undertaking men's jobs in paid employment, there are evidently no gender differences and therefore women should also be undertaking men's roles in the political sphere. Flexibility in gender divisions of labour was thus perceived as disconfirming

39 On motherhood being an effective political identity in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa see Chant with Craske (2003), Steady (2011) and Tripp et al (2009). See also Safa (1999:300) on paid work not diminishing 'the centrality of motherhood for women' in the Dominican Republic, but nonetheless enabling them to 'challenge patriarchal values'.

evidence of gender stereotypes. Women frequently showed great happiness in seeing other women at the forefront, as Members of Parliament, notwithstanding the socio-economic gulf between them. By contrast, many women including BanaBecca and BanaNkandu had previously perceived women leaders and employees as ‘prostitutes’ – see Chapter 3.

Men, as voters and political partners, also appear to be warming to women in politics. Again, this shift seems related to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which has provided disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes relating to competence (as discussed in Section 4.2). While women generally used to be overlooked as political activists and leaders (since they were often presumed to lack requisite traits), they are increasingly (though not universally) seen as potentially capable. Scott (42, an onion trader) grew up in rural areas, with a strict division in gender roles and spaces, but maintained that he changed his gender beliefs upon seeing women’s equal fortitude, as they came to the forefront, fighting for political change. In the extract below he stresses the importance of ‘comparing’ – seeing that women can perform stereotypically masculine tasks just as well as men. Previously he perceived women as unqualified: ‘fear[ful] and shy’.

Alice: When talking with Zambians, some tell me that they have a difficulty in trusting women. One person [from another political party] said that a woman could destroy a village [if permitted to lead].

Nancy: [laughs]

Scott: No no, that’s a lie. These days such thoughts will make the country retreat, where...? Backwards. This time we don’t have a ‘man’ and a ‘woman’, there’s equality in our association of PF because we’re all strong... I’ve seen that it is women who are in the front, who are strong in everything they do... We have confidence that women leaders can work harder than us men leaders because of the strength that women have these days... A long time ago women had fear, they didn’t know the reason to stand nor what they should do in life. These days they’ve awakened and know that there’s no work that men alone can do, we may even fail...

Alice: How do you know women are strong?

Scott: How we know is by comparing... seeing women who work really hard... without fear, because we’re with so many problems... Today women themselves think, it’s them who are talking about removing repression in the market... We came to see the strength of women, being strong and active... We are tied to each other [i.e. united]...

Alice: When did women start to become strong?

Scott: Onwards from 2001, I gradually came to see a reduction in fear and shyness. The way of living is so very difficult. They saw for themselves, they understand the life they live in, they taught others... [translated].^{xlviii}

A similar account is offered by Matthew (47), Scott’s contemporary in their market association and political branch of PF (whose life history is provided in Chapter 2):

A long time ago we were saying, ‘They [women] can’t do those things: properly providing for homes, properly providing for families and carefully looking after the country. We didn’t know... A long time ago women weren’t putting themselves forward to join associations and solving problems. They focused on homes as housewives, and small issues... So for that reason mens capitalised on that, in those days. But now these days, upon the women seeing that these problems it’s not only the mens who can solve but also the womens, they stood up and come and fight so they can be opted inside and solve that particular problem as equals. And these days you could find that some womens they are more stronger than mens... Where there is harmony, where there is

unity, women they have to be there... We started to realise that women have intelligence. Therefore we have strength when they [women] have leadership positions [partly translated].^{xlix}

Matthew appears to devalue women's domestic work and does not consider it as a 'big' issue, even though he professes to champion (aspects of) gender equality. This seems to support the foregoing argument that women are increasingly valued by virtue of performing jobs that are valued due their association with men. Hence the importance of this kind of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Gender stereotypes appear to be weakening more broadly. For example, when the idea of an unnamed PF woman candidate was floated in 2001, she was informed that people in local meetings in Kitwe responded negatively, generally saying 'No, we want change and the only people who can bring change are men, because men are more stronger than women'. Accordingly, the woman candidate did not contest a seat to become an MP at that time. However, as stereotypes weakened, she was then elected to senior political positions.

But not all attitudes have changed. While women working with Matthew and Scott (above) maintained they felt respected as equal partners, women leaders in different associations grumbled about male counterparts. When interviewed, these men expressed their doubts about women's capabilities and were consequently reluctant for women to manage projects independently. Evidently, growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour has not shifted all beliefs. The next chapter discusses this case and explores the hypothesis that some people's formative experiences have led them to internalise certain stereotypes, which then remain stable over the life course.

Given others' persistent stereotypes and resistance, some women shun politics in order to avoid expected insults and hostility, not because they regard themselves as less competent. They may assume that this behaviour will be judged inappropriate and so expect to be penalised for non-compliance with prescriptive gender stereotypes. Given these deterrents, men's monopoly of politics does not necessarily reveal women's internalised gender status beliefs – that only men are worthy of influence, deference and esteem. Even if they do participate in market association meetings, they may quieten when confronted with persistent male resistance to her initiatives, opting to preserve the peace and cordial relations with her colleagues (see BanaMayuka's life history in Chapter 2).

There are a number of additional explanations for women's limited presence in parliament and local government that do not entail widespread gender stereotypes about leadership capabilities. For example, political campaigning requires an investment of time, which some women find difficult to accommodate given their caring responsibilities. Even if women do find someone to look after their children, prescriptive gender stereotypes may deter them from undertaking activities integral to political advancement. For example, I observed that female leaders are sometimes negatively judged for socialising in a bar at the end of the day (networking and strategising with political colleagues), when they ought to be at home, looking after their families. Even if others no longer proscribe female leadership, women may still be condemned for engaging in activities instrumental to this end goal.

There are also institutional barriers to entry. The intimidating nature of parliament and local

council chambers was stressed by women MPs and councillors, as well as observant clerks. Many also identified the English language requirement as a major obstacle. Accordingly, some people (both men and women) remain quiet or are easily quietened. But, as explained by experienced female politicians and their colleagues, others learn through political apprenticeship and become savvier over time, eventually proving themselves and thereby gaining upward mobility. Another obstacle is the financial barrier to entry: expectations of hand-outs (e.g. cloth, cash and sugar) from politicians during campaign season may also make it more difficult for women to contest. When seeking re-election, parliamentarians use the financial benefits of incumbency (such as sitting allowances for workshop attendance). Trying to match this is extremely costly. This presents a particular impediment for women, given the cultural expectation of maternal altruism. Expected to endeavour for their children, rather than gamble on their own advancement, women may feel less willing to pursue a political career. These institutional barriers curb women's political participation, thereby preventing popular exposure and the associated transformation in gender stereotypes. These additional obstacles provide a further explanation of persistent obstacles to women's political participation without invoking persistent gender status beliefs. Thus, women's paucity in politics may not reflect widely-held gender status beliefs.

Without denying the paucity of women in politics or leadership, nor associated obstacles, support for female political participation is growing. This seems partly because flexibility in gender divisions of labour has undermined gender stereotypes relating to status and competence, in turn shifting women's cultural expectations.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined four contemporary trends (occurring between c. 1990 and 2011): worsening economic security, two forms of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour (increasing female labour force participation and occupational desegregation) as well as a weakening of gender stereotypes, relating to competence and status.

This chapter has put forward the hypothesis that a change in patterns of resource access was the primary cause of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Worsening economic security has meant that men are generally less able to financially provide for their families single-handedly. Many have thus forfeited the social respect historically secured by complying with cultural expectations in exchange for the economic advantages of female labour force participation. Financial hardship also appears to have motivated women to seek occupations historically dominated by men.

In terms of the consequences of increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, this chapter has argued that although an independent income tends to enhance a woman's financial autonomy it is not sufficient to undermine broader dimensions of gender status inequalities, at least not directly. The evidence in support of this claim comes from participants' narratives and earlier studies. Both suggest that in the decades predating mass female labour force participation, women's financial contributions were often unrecognised, at most regarded as merely supplementary, and did not enhance their participation in household decision-making.

It is only more recently, with prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour,

that gender status beliefs seem to have weakened, and this (rather than women's increased access to resources directly) seems to account for the contemporary erosion of gender status inequalities. A critical mass of women are now demonstrating their ability to undertake work that was previously presumed to be beyond their capabilities and has high status because it is associated with men. Such performances are increasingly interpreted as disconfirming evidence of both internalised gender stereotypes and also cultural expectations about how others will respond to women's incursions into male domains. Demonstrations that 'women can do what men can do' appear to undermine the assumption of gender difference upon which gender status beliefs are predicated. This effect did not occur in earlier decades, when, due to its paucity, information that contradicted gender stereotypes was more commonly disregarded as exceptional.

Association through paid work in the public sphere also appears significant. Hearing others reject gender stereotypes seems to enhance people's confidence in the objective validity of this position and provide reason to revise cultural expectations. This does not appear to be a necessary consequence of association, however: women's associations in compounds (comprising homemakers or home-based traders, less exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour) generally promote gender stereotypes.

Although growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour appears to have undermined some gender beliefs, gender status inequalities remain manifest, such as in terms of unpaid care work. To some extent, this can be explained without denying that women have gained respect in other domains (e.g. household and community decision-making). For example, unpaid care work is not only a display of status but also of gender. Because the few cases of men sharing care work remain hidden from view, there is little public exposure to information that contradicts gender stereotypes and cultural expectations about who should perform this work.

To interrogate the hypothesis put forward in this chapter (that a shift in patterns of resource access catalysed increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which then eroded gender stereotypes), the remainder of this thesis explores the extent to which increased flexibility was contingent upon some people's prior rejections of gender stereotypes, due to their formative experiences (Chapter 5) or exposure to egalitarian discourses (Chapter 6).

5. Formative Experiences

The previous chapter discussed the evidence supporting the hypothesis that worsening economic security has been the prime cause of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour in Kitwe, which has in turn weakened gender stereotypes and associated status beliefs. The next two chapters explore the hypothesis that worsening economic security was not a sufficient condition for flexibility in gender divisions of labour but instead contingent upon some people's prior rejection of gender stereotypes. Their gender atypical responses to macro-economic change may have been shaped by earlier experiences. Chapters 5 and 6 thus consider the extent to which growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour may have been a consequence (rather than a cause) of an erosion of gender beliefs.

This chapter examines the significance of growing up in a woman-headed/financially-supported household, flexibility in gender divisions of labour, exposure to role models and co-education. With its focus on formative experiences, this chapter also evaluates the evidence in favour of the hypothesis that gender beliefs remain stable over the life course. This contrasts with the proposition considered in Chapters 3 and 4, that shifting patterns of resource access can rapidly change gender beliefs, i.e. within a generation.

5.1 Women-headed/financially-supported households

Maternal employment was often identified as significant by female participants undertaking gender atypical roles, especially those in historically male-dominated occupations. This is actually consistent with *part* of the argument developed in Chapter 4: exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour (e.g. maternal employment) fosters a rejection of gender stereotypes. But this finding contrasts with Chapter 4 because, in the case of middle-aged participants, whose mothers were employed before the contemporary period, it points to some further factor besides worsening economic security. This section will discuss whether this recent shift in patterns of resource access was not sufficient for increased flexibility of gender divisions of labour but instead contingent upon the example provided by those small minority of mothers already in the labour market.

Quantitative studies of more economically developed countries point to the intergenerational impact of maternal employment. Sons of working mothers in Japan and the United States are more likely to reject traditional gender roles (Fernandez et al, 2004; Willets-Bloom and Nock, 1994). In the United States, such sons generally spend more time on housework when married or cohabiting (Gupta, 2006). Further, both men and women from female-headed households tend to express greater support for women's economic and political participation (Kiecolt and Acock, 1988). These findings suggest that adult's beliefs and behaviour are influenced by their formative experiences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour in the home.

Methodologically, I explored this topic in three ways: by asking participants to identify salient influences; comparing across conversations with participants whose female caregivers⁴⁰ had independent incomes and those that did not; observing domestic practices

⁴⁰ I am being deliberately vague about the identity of 'female' in this instance. In a context of HIV/AIDS many Copperbelt residents grow up with their extended family. One's female caregiver is not necessarily one's biological mother.

in different households. For three months I stayed in a middle-class home where the mother was a housewife but otherwise lived with families where the mother worked.

The vast majority of middle-aged female participants hailed from natal homes largely dependent on men's earnings. They tended to report that they had grown up with similar expectations. Having grown up in a context of society-wide gender divisions of labour, they had little access to information that contradicted gender stereotypes of women as housewives, economically reliant on men's wages. Hence many narrated that they had not imagined alternatives to the domestic model with which they were familiar. However, subsequent to their own labour force participation, many came to question gender stereotypes relating to competence and status (as discussed in Chapter 4). Their gender beliefs were thus not fixed by their formative experiences but changed over the life course.

Middle-aged sons of female homemakers tended to recall concerns about the idea of wives' labour force participation, notwithstanding growing financial hardship. Such men revealed that they were previously concerned about the consequences of female labour force participation, not knowing how it would affect their household relations or social respect. These anxieties were also expressed by unmarried sons of housewives, in addition to those whose wives had not joined the labour market. They worried that gender status inequalities within the household might be undermined by female labour participation. This could be an internalised gender status belief or it might reflect cultural expectations about how others might judge them if they failed to conform to prescriptive gender stereotypes.

The absence of maternal employment may be more significant for men than women, in some respects. Some middle-aged daughters of homemakers stated that they had wanted to start market trading but their husbands had previously forbidden it – as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. This account was corroborated through my discussions with their husbands and other men. Worsening economic security seemed to trigger a quick change in women's aspirations. The binding constraint here was not a supply-side issue of women's self-perceptions or limited ambitions but rather men's concerns – outlined above.

There was, however, some indication that homemakers' own gender stereotypes led them to encourage gender divisions of labour, despite (or perhaps because of) worsening economic security. Some participants suggested that homemakers were more likely than employed women to encourage their daughters to become economically reliant on male family members or boyfriends. Although the vast majority of parents expressed hopes for their daughters' education, some young people (especially those living in very low-income, peri-urban areas) told stories of parents pressuring their daughters to engage in financially-rewarding sexual relationships. A wide range of studies in Zambia note the prevalence of young women seeking male financial support, attributing this to economic insecurity (Abrahamsen, 1997; Bajaj, 2009b; Hossain and McGregor, 2011:580; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Kambou et al, 1998; Mwanangombe, 2012). The impression I formed from my series of interviews was that this practice is more common among families where the female caregiver is not in paid employment. People's responses to the shift in patterns of resource access (in the form of worsening economic security) seemed shaped by their pre-existing gender beliefs, which were in turn influenced by natal household formation.

Participants who grew up in a female financially-supported/headed home commonly

maintained that this experience had made them more supportive of such flexibility in gender divisions of labour (e.g. women's income-generation). Some young men expressed great pride in their mother's economic endeavours. Here we see an interaction between exposure and interests. Maternal employment enabled sons to realise the economic benefits of female labour force participation. Such men commonly regard female employment as in their interests and prioritise this kind of benefit rather than the social gain previously accrued from compliance with Christian-colonial prescriptive stereotypes. Accordingly, they seemed more inclined to support such practices – in mirror opposite to sons of female homemakers. Additionally, maternal financial provision seems to endow daughters with the sense of self-efficacy that they can undertake occupations historically dominated by men. The vast majority of women making incursions into non-stereotypical terrain (whether in politics or employment) stressed that they were inspired by their mothers' financial self-reliance, strength and confidence.⁴¹ Besides gendered self-perceptions, maternal employment also appears to affect descriptive stereotypes about women in general, as illustrated below.

Being brought up by a single parent [who worked as a secretary for Zambia Railways] made me think women can do whatever men can do. If she can raise four children on her own then I can do men's work. They can stand on their own, without men... or with men... I've always grown up wanting to do men's work... I wanted to challenge the men. Brenda (24, a married miner).

Chalwe (24, an unemployed youth): [commenting on his brother's characterisation of gender beliefs in his single-sex school] It's almost everywhere, they say boys are more intelligent than girls. People think like that, most guys, men, think like that. That's why we have more men than women in leadership, standing in front of crowds, talking to people and all that. That's why we're left with this thing of saying 'women can't do this, women can't do that'. That's why women are now fighting for gender equality, it's because they've seen that most people have in their minds that men are better than women. It's not like that. We're actually equal, we're equal.

Alice: When did you start think men and women are equal?

Chalwe: For me, my [divorced] mum has always been hard working, ever since I was young, she's always moving up and down for us... From that alone I see that women can make better leaders, can head homes, they can do a whole lot of things that men can do.

Alice: Why do you think women in general can also do it?

Chalwe: If she can, you can, a young girl can.

Both Brenda and Chalwe consistently rejected gender stereotypes in my conversations with them. They both chiefly attributed this to their mothers' employment.

However, given their youth, Brenda and Chalwe's narratives may have been influenced by the contemporary context of worsening economic security. Accordingly, they are not sufficient to undermine Chapter 4's hypothesis that this shift in patterns of access to resources was sufficient to increase support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour. In order to ascertain the extent which responses to worsening economic security were shaped by pre-existing egalitarian gender beliefs, as developed through particular formative

⁴¹ From my sample of life history interviews with women in gender atypical work, there was only one exception to this trend of maternal employment. Judy (an accountant, elected councillor and orphan) had grown up with her older sister, 'a full-time housewife', who was married to an accountant. Judy attributed her self-confidence and determination to three factors: early exposure to female neighbours employed as nurses, the nuns who encouraged her at the mission school ('they made you feel you can do anything... you can walk on water'), the peer influence of her school mates who all sought employment and also her subsequent participation in various associations.

experiences, we need to draw on interviews with older participants, whose experiences of maternal employment predated the contemporary trend of worsening economic security. In my sample, the vast majority of middle-aged women who had eschewed gender stereotypes from their youth and undertaken gender atypical roles (in politics and employment) were daughters of women who were also employed. Two examples are given below – both from assertive, bold and self-confident women. Also recall Helen's life history, presented in Chapter 2: she too stressed the influence of her mother's employment as a market trader.

My mother was a very strong woman, very courageous, oh my God. She inspired me. She did what the men were doing, men's things, things women weren't expected to do... Here is a woman driving a tractor, she buys a bus, she drives it herself. She was very daring, not scared of anyone, except God. [As a politician and businesswoman] she could face anyone: rich, poor, man, witch, priest. She was frank.
Rebecca (Cabinet Minister).

Sometimes us women we used to fear, [thinking] 'I can't stand in front of men and talk'. [But] when I was young I used to stay with my grandmother, who said, 'What a man can do, a woman can do'... I don't have to depend on a man; I have to depend on myself... I don't feel shy when I'm talking... When I was growing I wasn't growing with my father... I saw that my mother [a teacher] and grandmother [a market trader] were strong. The behaviour of parents is very important.
Grace (40, trader and treasurer, overseeing the construction of the largest church in the Copperbelt).

Although maternal employment often seems associated with the rejection of gender stereotypes, it does not always seem to undermine cultural expectations of discrimination from others. For example, when her fellow female miners expressed dissatisfaction with male union leaders, Brenda cautioned them not to enter trade union politics. Her concern stemmed not from her internalised gender beliefs about women's lesser status or competence but rather her cultural expectation that female leaders are likely to be insulted by others. Because of the penalties Brenda believes that women incur by encroaching upon this male-dominated terrain, she discouraged such pursuits. The binding constraint to support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour may sometimes be cultural expectations, not internalised gender beliefs. Though bear in mind that these concerns do seem to have waned somewhat in recent years, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Women's employment also seems to shape their children's marital relations in later life, with respect to gender status equality. This appears to be the result of three factors. First, participants often said that they expected their own marriages to be like those of their parents. Second, children of women in paid work commonly described their parents' marriages as more egalitarian than those of housewives. However, the extent of this difference may have increased over time. Before the 1990s, when female labour force participation went against widely-held gender stereotypes in Kitwe, it tended to enhance financial autonomy but not respect or appreciation. Yet with growing social acceptance of female employment, in a context of worsening economic security, it appears to have become more strongly associated with greater marital equality. Third, children of working women more commonly expressed aspirations for equality within marriage and referenced their parents as role models.

Meanwhile, participants accustomed to women having a lower status often expressed and enacted gender status beliefs. Even when such husbands reluctantly agreed to their wives' labour force participation, upon worsening economic security, they still expected to be

respected as household heads. They sought the same esteem, influence and also deference from others that their fathers had enjoyed. While working women often try to oblige by communicating with their husbands in a respectful way and waking up very early to undertake domestic work, some sons of housewives still expressed dissatisfaction. For example, my hosts in a low-income compound said of our neighbour that ‘he used to insult her [his wife], “you’re busy selling, you’re not doing duties for me at home”’. Some working wives also portrayed their husbands as jealous, posing multiple questions about their whereabouts if they returned late home from work. However, notwithstanding initial resistance, a number of men did come to reject their earlier beliefs as a result of prolonged exposure to labour force participation (see Chapter 4 and Matthew’s life history in Chapter 2).

If dual-earner households are also more egalitarian then perhaps the critical influence here is not maternal employment but parental support for equality, which is then adopted by their children. While the relationship between parents does seem important, my evidence base does not include cases in which marital equality preceded female employment. Hence this specific claim cannot be tested here. However, the next chapter examines the impact of exposure to egalitarian discourses in the form of gender sensitisation.

In summary, children of housewives, with typically limited first-hand exposure to female competence in socially valued tasks, tended to grow up espousing gender status beliefs. However, formative experiences do not appear to determine beliefs over the life course: many did come to support flexibility in gender divisions of labour upon worsening economic security and further reject gender stereotypes as a result of prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. But this shift was not universal: gender stereotypes often seemed entrenched, especially amongst sons of housewives.

Meanwhile, maternal employment appears to erode commitment to gender stereotypes and associated status beliefs, which seems to affect the pursuit and support of gender atypical activities in one’s formative years. Most participants who had trained for masculine jobs had done so in their youth (obtaining a certificate in auto-mechanics after school, for example). This training in turn appears contingent upon their rejection of relevant gender beliefs, which was often attributed to maternal employment.

Thus while Chapter 4 posited that a shift in patterns of resource access was itself sufficient for both increased female labour force participation and occupational desegregation, the latter often appears to have been contingent upon maternal employment. However, this is not to deny the impact of worsening economic security: due to men’s loss of secure employment, women’s income-generation is increasingly recognised and appreciated (not merely dismissed as supplementary). Also consistent with Chapter 4 is the mechanism identified as conducive to gender status equality, namely exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

5.2 Gender divisions of unremunerated labour in the home

In the Copperbelt, unpaid reproductive work has a low status: it shows respect to the household head and, unlike financial contributions, is rarely recognised as important work. Women’s performance of it demonstrates adherence to gender status beliefs. Because

gender divisions of care work seem so loaded with meaning, sharing such tasks in one's formative years appear to affect gender beliefs more broadly.

Some people undertaking or supporting non-stereotypical gender roles (in the home, employment or politics) referred to their early experiences of sharing reproductive work with their brothers and sisters. Participants who grew up in homes where parents did not treat male and female children significantly differently and where girls were not expected to serve their brothers commonly said that they grew up believing that there was no difference between the sexes. They rejected gender stereotypes. Men who performed domestic work from a young age and saw their fathers doing so also seemed keener to continue doing so when married. This section will discuss the causes and effects of flexibility in gender divisions of reproductive work in formative years.

Boys' performance of reproductive work is usually at the behest of their parents. The most common justification for shared reproductive work is that it enables young men to be self-reliant as bachelors. Boys are also more likely to undertake reproductive work when they are the numerical majority. For example, Chezo (47, a bold trade unionist leader at national level whom I interviewed on multiple occasions) explained that she was the only girl amongst seven siblings, so her parents taught her brothers to cook and wash. Although they demonstrated concern for their daughter in this respect, Chezo did not recall them voicing any egalitarian beliefs. Her father worked for Zambia Railways and her mother was at first a nurse but later a 'full time housewife'. Market trader BanaMwimba's children also share jobs equally since there is only one girl. Her husband, when unemployed, would also sweep. He had become accustomed to this by growing up without sisters. By contrast, when girls outnumber boys their parents generally see less need for flexibility in gender divisions of labour, since the girls share work among themselves, thereby reducing the individual burden.

Occasionally, demand comes from children themselves. Some more assertive girls demand a rota to ensure equity. However, children's desires for renegotiations are not always voiced or accepted. Girls rarely complain or push for change when their household status is insecure, such as if they are adopted members of the extended family or if the breadwinner is their step-parent. Even in their natal families, some young people are silent, knowing that breaking with these prescriptive gender stereotypes is likely to be resisted by their parents. Children are generally the least powerful members of their families and hence have limited capacity to renegotiate arrangements.

Men sharing reproductive work in their formative years commonly identified three effects. First, because such men did not associate this activity with one sex category alone, they seemed less inclined to regard it as an expression of femininity. Second, by undertaking this work some men came to regard it as enjoyable: they took pride in their cooking, their cleanliness and capacity to wash white shirts. Third, parental instructions to share this low status work with their sisters appeared to be interpreted as indicating that girls are not lower in status. Such sons commonly endorsed egalitarian beliefs. For example, Hamadudu (a 29 year old Art teacher) previously shared domestic duties when living with his brothers. Having become accustomed to performing this work it does not seem alien to him. He now often puts his young daughter to bed and washes his wife's nursing uniform, especially when she works night shifts – I observed this while staying with them.

Drawing on life histories with Zambian men whom he previously taught as boys at school, Simpson (2005:574-575,580) further points to the long-term implications of their exposure to paternal performances of ‘women’s work’:

Men recalled that decisions about work tended to rest with their fathers. Any departure from what were generally judged appropriate duties for men and women was signalled by a father’s willingness to perform ‘womanly’ tasks such as cleaning the home, cooking and washing dishes. A father’s willingness to engage in ‘women’s work’ appeared to have had an impact upon those men who saw this and who, in their turn as husbands and fathers, took at least some share in indoor household jobs and childcare. They were also the ones – the minority – who expressed a desire for at least a measure of equality between husband and wife in their marriage.

Simpson’s findings are consistent with my own. Whether undertaken by fathers or boys themselves, male performance of domestic work seems to undermine attachment to gender stereotypes and associated status beliefs.

Women who had shared reproductive work with brothers in their youth likely benefitted from a reduced workload. However, they more commonly emphasised their consequent change in stereotypes and related status beliefs. Chezo (47, who shared slashing grass and cooking with her brothers) explained:

We worked together, we were equal: we didn’t appear different as males and females [translated].¹

Such women recalled that they did not grow up expecting to serve men, but rather work with them as equals. Flexibility in gender divisions of unpaid care work not only seems to affect internalised gender beliefs but also cultural expectations. As discussed in Chapter 4, some working women declared that they had come to regard women’s sole responsibility for care work as unfair. Yet, with limited exposure to men performing this task, they still thought it inevitable. By contrast, women who had grown up sharing such tasks commonly expressed greater optimism in the possibility of widespread social change. Their formative experience of flexibility in gender divisions of labour seems to have provided information about other people’s gender beliefs and the kinds of behaviour they will deem appropriate for men and women. This also applies to other kinds of formative experiences: maternal employment may provide information about others’ reactions to such flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

In conclusion, comparisons between participants point to an association between early exposure to shared care work, a disavowal of gender stereotypes and support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Further, interviewed participants pointed to a causal connection between these three issues. For instance, women undertaking gender atypical occupations referred to the influence of sharing care work with brothers. This suggests that worsening economic security was not a sufficient cause of occupational desegregation. Rather, the female vanguards who initially pursued male-dominated occupations already disavowed gender stereotypes.

However, my data does not necessarily reveal the importance of this experience occurring during one’s formative experience per se, it may just be indicative of any such exposure.

Because it is performed indoors, exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of domestic labour generally occurs in one's own natal home. Such exposure happens to occur during one's formative years. Furthermore, although those not exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of domestic labour were often resistant to such practices, some did change through exposure to egalitarian discourses – as discussed in Chapter 6.

Another significant point of note is that individual cases of shared care work appear unlikely to have affected widely-held gender stereotypes. First, such practices were historically (and indeed remain) uncommon. Given the historical construction of gender divisions of labour detailed in Chapter 4, only a small minority of male and female participants shared reproductive work in their youth. Second, the few households that do share housework do not act as inspirational role models, for they are largely unseen. The privacy of housework constrains popular exposure to this kind of flexibility in gender divisions of labour (as discussed in Chapter 4). That said, those who do share care work in their youth subsequently influence others through their more public practices, such as by undertaking or supporting gender atypical activities.

Also, notwithstanding their formative experiences of shared care work, individuals' egalitarian aspirations were sometimes constrained by macro-level circumstances. The lopsided marriage market created by worsening economic security may curb women's scope to negotiate conjugal assistance (see Chapter 4).

5.3 Role models beyond the home

An additional way in which participants' formative experiences seemed to influence their gender beliefs and support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour was through exposure to women beyond the home successfully undertaking occupations historically dominated by men. Such role models seem to provide disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes relating to competence and status.

These findings are consistent with research from Northeastern USA. Dasgupta and Asgari (2004) found that new students of single-sex and co-educational colleges expressed similar gender stereotypes when they started tertiary education but diverged one year later. The authors' quantitative analysis suggests that this divergence was primarily due to more frequent exposure to female faculty in the women's college. When controlling for exposure to female faculty, the sex composition of the student body (i.e. whether the college was single-sex or co-educational) did not exert a significant effect upon gender stereotypes. What was important was their exposure to female role models.

Asgari et al (2010) further examined interactions with the perceived quality of professorial support on gendered self-perceptions (rather than beliefs about women in general). Having controlled baseline data from the same American colleges, they found a subsequent association between the frequency of contact with female professors (which was also perceived to be of high quality) and a female student's proclivity to associate herself with leadership traits. By contrast, female students who had high quality contact with male professors were more likely to associate themselves with supportive traits. Young women's frequent and high quality contact with female (though not male) professors was also associated with more ambitious career aspirations. This research indicates that exposure to

role models can affect women's self-perceptions and their gender stereotypes. This effect appears to be strengthened with greater personal connections. This quantitative study raises questions about why this association occurs, as well as whether prolonged exposure to role models in middle-age can exert a similar effect, or whether there is something particularly significant about formative experiences.

Before discussing how Zambian people's attitudes and behaviour are affected by their early exposure to role models demonstrating equal abilities, it is first important to understand converse experiences. The paucity of women in various occupational and political roles was sometimes cited (by men and women alike) as evidence of their lesser aptitude. Growing up, seeing only men in leadership and employment, many people doubted women's capabilities in these realms and were thus reluctant to risk giving women opportunities. Women themselves similarly explained that they had not pursued male-dominated occupations because they doubted they could undertake these roles. The absence of role models seemed to affect their gendered self-perceptions, i.e. their sense of self-efficacy. In this way, gender beliefs, gender divisions of labour and a paucity of role models seem mutually reinforcing.

I once attended a Copperbelt provincial market association meeting at the Civic Centre in Mufulira town. The auditorium was decorated with portraits of current Mufulira city councillors. Two market association leaders whom I had repeatedly interviewed pointed out to me that there were only three pictures of women out of 26 councillors. Alan (37) commented, 'Women are few therefore their intelligence is small. The ratio is very bad. It's an example of how the intelligence of men is different from that of women' (translated).^{li}

Even when exposed to women performing stereotypically masculine roles, men like Alan did not seem to interpret this as disconfirming evidence of their stereotypes. For example, in response to Alan's doubts about women leaders, I mentioned the widely-lauded, female-dominated Mufulira market association. Alan was quick to deny that this threatened his gender stereotypes. He pointed to the Mufulira association's occasional recourse to male leadership at a national level. He also dismissed female ministers and Chief Executive Officers as evidence of women's equal competence, since they are under patriarchal guardianship.

We can explain the behaviour of Alan and many others like him with reference to confirmation bias: existing stereotypes affect the way that experiences are interpreted and contradictory information may be disregarded (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4). Growing up in a nearby township, he appeared to have become accustomed to gender status inequalities both at home and in society more widely. His mother was a home-based trader, always deferring to his father. He seems to have interpreted new information in a way that is consistent with the gender stereotypes he developed through his formative experiences. As a result of these descriptive gender stereotypes about competence and status he appears committed to prescriptive stereotypes, believing that women should not be given important responsibilities. Alan's attitudes are reflected in his behaviour: he resists women leaders' independent management of market affairs and doubts their effectiveness (much to the women's infuriation, as detailed in BanaMayuka's life history in Chapter 2).

Similarly, during a lesson on gender equality at a government boys' school, most students responded with incredulity at the teacher's suggestion of a female mechanic. They quickly

rejected it as evidence of equality and insisted that male workers and garage owners would always be on site, sometimes having to assist the female mechanic. In these ways, participants accustomed to men's monopoly over decision-making, leadership and employment often expressed scepticism about women's capabilities and resisted their incursions into these fields (see Chapter 3 for historical parallels).

Having outlined what happens in the absence of early exposure to women undertaking *incito sha baume* (men's work), I now detail what happens when people do have such evidence during their formative years. Cited avenues of early exposure to role models included rural-urban and international migration (to countries where flexibility in gender divisions of labour is more widespread), media access, neighbourhoods as well as employment. Since cases of first-hand exposure have already been discussed (in Chapter 4), it is now worth briefly outlining an example of media exposure.

During a discussion with six women miners, all cited their parents' stress on the inspirational example of Professor Nkandu Luo – a household name in Zambia and former Minister of Health. Anne (an industrial machinist) added, 'Every time Nkandu Luo was on TV my father was saying, "One of you should be like her!". That woman has been a role model to most of us women in Zambia, not really to become a medical doctor [like her, a former lecturer in immunology] but to be financially independent'. Such statements point to the significance of early exposure to a high-profile woman in a male-dominated domain. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, not all women in earlier decades perceived such frontrunners as disconfirming evidence of their gender stereotypes. The female miners' particular interpretations may stem from being with others who praise that person – thereby shifting cultural expectations, by signalling their acceptance of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Their cultural expectations may also have changed by seeing that the President himself trusted a woman with responsibility for the Ministry of Health, a high-profile and prestigious position.

Participants with prolonged exposure to role models in their formative years tended to claim that they grew up eschewing gender stereotypes. This often seemed to have exerted a significant long-term impact, affecting young women's education and employment choices. For example, those inspired by electricians scaling poles can opt to pursue the relevant qualifications, whereas older women with financial responsibilities often feel less able to do so. BanaMwimba (a married market trader) was thrilled to see other women working as electricians, but when asked whether she might follow suit she told me that it was too late. Eschewing gender stereotypes in one's formative years (such as a result of exposure to role models) thus seems to make it more likely that one will undertake the training necessary for stereotypically masculine occupations.

However, not all male-dominated activities require prior training. Exceptions include supporting a family financially, entering politics at grassroots levels and 'unskilled' manual labour (such as cutting grass, breaking stones and digging drainage). Take Charity, for instance: she is a 30 year old widow, living in a low-income settlement. She previously traded at the market but was unable to make sufficient profit to support her child and economically inactive parents. When Charity and her friend Sophie (another former trader) heard that a road building company opened and was recruiting both men and women, they were encouraged to apply. Charity commented, 'I used to think that 'I can't do it', but I saw

that things were difficult, so I came to work' [translated].^{lii} Participants who had undertaken masculine occupations that only required on the job training commonly emphasised a shift in interests, triggered by financial hardship.

This section has presented evidence indicating the importance of early exposure to role models. To this extent, it has provided some reason to qualify the argument put forward in Chapter 4, that a shift in patterns of resource access was sufficient for both increased female labour force participation and occupational desegregation. The latter, especially in terms of stereotypically masculine roles *that require prior qualifications*, often seems to have been fostered by women's early exposure to role models. However, the significance of historic exposure to role models should not be overstated. Given gender divisions of labour in the decades before the contemporary period of worsening economic security, there was then little opportunity for exposure to such role models. Moreover, due to their paucity, they were not always interpreted as disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes.

5.4 Co-education

One experience identified by many participants as integral to their support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour was co-education. Learning with the opposite sex category had led them to revise earlier assumptions of gender difference. Interviewed co-educated students more often questioned gender stereotypes. However, the impact of schooling on beliefs, aspirations and their actualisation is also tempered by domestic upbringing, educational management and labour market possibilities, which vary over time with changing macro-economic context. Accordingly, not all co-educated students come to pursue or support flexibility in gender divisions of labour.⁴²

By contrast, quantitative research in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that single-sex schooling may be more conducive to gender equality. Surveyed single-sex educated girls in Nigeria more commonly disavowed gender stereotypes about Mathematical abilities and in Malawi they expressed higher educational aspirations (Lee and Lockheed, 1990; Mbilizi, 2010). But as the authors note these may reflect characteristics of the schools (more female teachers) and their homes (more middle class).⁴³ Research on two elite boarding schools in Uganda (one co-educational and one single-sex) similarly finds that girls in the latter exhibit higher levels of self-efficacy and performance in Mathematics (Picho and Stephens, 2012). But again, as the authors recognise, the apparent differences between the two schools may stem from other contextual features, besides sex composition of students (such as staff make-up, ideologies and pedagogies).

Ethnographic research in twelve rural, peri-urban and urban junior secondary co-educational schools in Botswana and Ghana reveals multiple manifestations of gender status inequalities: boys commonly assume positions of authority, dominate physical spaces, intimidate girls in class discussions and refrain from routine feminine cleaning in order to avoid ridicule (Dunne, 2007). However, such observations do not provide conclusive evidence in favour of single-sex education, at least not without comparative data or narratives from students. For single-sex educated men and women may also adhere to gender status inequalities when out

⁴²42 School and place names have been changed to preserve participants' anonymity.

⁴³43 Note that studies in more economically developed countries find that the alleged benefits of single-sex education tend to disappear when such background variables are controlled for (Harker, 2000; Robinson and Smithers, 1999; Smithers and Collings, 1982).

of school. Furthermore, even if co-educated pupils do conform to gender stereotypes in this context, it remains possible that their co-educational experiences lead them to privately reject the notion that boys are more competent than girls. The aim of this section is thus to explore the sex composition of schools in relation to the life course as a whole and with respect to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Bajaj (2009a) has narrated how Umutende school (a low-cost, single-sex private institution in Zambia's Copperbelt Province) has sought to promote gender equality. Here male and female students are segregated in different campuses so as to provide a space for young women to 'develop confidence, speak up and take leadership roles' as put by one of the school's founders (ibid:490). Each campus is staffed by teachers of the same sex in order to provide role models and reduce the risk of teacher-student sexual relationships. Morning assemblies at each campus promote social justice, including women's rights and gender equality. Girls lead songs, drum, make announcements and participate in role-plays. Rather than hire cleaners, all students are regularly required to clean the school. Because entire classes perform these tasks together, new male students adjust quickly despite initial resistance to performing 'women's work'. Many also start doing so at home. When surveyed, Umutende students were more likely than those at a nearby government school to label wife-beating, rape and early/forced marriage as human rights violations.

But the causal dynamics are unclear, as Bajaj registers. Was it the institutional commitment to equality, role models, gender sensitisation, shared gender roles or single-sex spaces that proved pivotal? The exact effects are equally hazy. What happens when students graduate from this sanctuary? Neither students' nor graduates' reflections are included. Also, it is misleading to suggest that local government schools have cleaners; my own research suggests this is unheard of in Copperbelt schools, given restrictive budgets. To understand the importance of school sex composition, it is useful to listen to people's own, comparative evaluations. This issue is important since the Zambian government has promoted gender segregation in Mathematics and Science (Mitchell et al, 1999:420; Mumba, 2002).

The following discussion explores how single-sex and co-educational experience influence two dispositions broadly identified as integral to support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour: being accustomed to working with the opposite sex and perceiving men and women as equally competent. This concerns both individual's gender beliefs and also their cultural expectations, by which they anticipate to be evaluated.

School sex composition and working with the opposite sex

Many girls in Kitwe have little opportunity to socialise in their home communities and interact with unrelated boys after school. Their freedom of movement is limited by domestic burdens (as also noted by Nkonkomalimba and Duffy, 2010:32, drawing on research in Zambia). This physical separation from boys appears to be amplified by single-sex education. Interviewed single-sex educated girls tended to express particular shyness about interacting with boys, since they were not accustomed to this.

Likewise, older single-sex educated women often recalled difficulties in adapting to working with men in higher education and employment. They felt embarrassed, timid or easily intimidated. Perceiving guys as 'freaks', Civil Engineering student Chilufya (24) was initially

‘anti-social’. She studied only with women because she felt too shy to admit to men that she did not understand certain issues. Although her trade unionist mother had provided a powerful role model – leading Chilufya to believe that she could become a civil engineer – exposure to other people’s success does not seem lessen the importance of personal experience of learning and working with men. This section will assess the particular effect of co-education in this regard.

Those who moved to co-education from single-sex schools during their formative years explained that they soon became comfortable interacting with unrelated boys. Although the transition often led to temporary difficulties – such as being ‘obsessed with the mirror’ or feeling discomfort when seated next to boys – the vast majority soon saw their male classmates as ‘brothers’. The following narratives from women educated at both types of school echo a general trend, which held across the socio-economic and generational spectrum:

I used to have that phobia of guys. When I used to see a boy I used to think he’d want something from me but when we used to mingle [in co-education] I used to see them as brothers... It seems these boys are here to help me not for other things.

Ruth (19, trainee teacher, visibly relaxed and jovial with male colleagues, first educated at a single-sex school before moving to co-education).

When you’re in a girls’ set-up I think you don’t really get to know the other side... Single-sex school may give girls that confidence but what happens when she goes out into the world? Co-education is the answer; it makes you to be a fighter... I was in debate club with boys, we could win... It helped me move a step further... There are so many at a big school but you compete, leadership starts from when you are young. Sophia (regional director of a women’s rights organisation, educated in co-educational government schools).

Alice: How did you feel working with men [at the mines, where she was a secretary] having just come from an all girls’ school?

Belinda (Copperbelt MP): Because of the previous experience at [Chamboli] [a co-educational school],⁴⁴ it wasn’t bad.

Alice: Do you think that experience at [Chamboli] made a difference in your life?

Belinda: Yes, a lot of difference, it strengthened us; it gave us an insight into the opposite sex and how to deal with them.

Alice: You don’t think you would have got that experience just from living in [the Copperbelt]?

Belinda: No, because when you’re growing up, during that time, you’re told, ‘Girls take this line and boys take that line’, and you knew that when you grew up as a woman you got married and there were only certain jobs you could do...

Alice: How did [Chamboli] make a difference?

Belinda: Because we were given chores to do in a mixed group, we did projects with boys, there was no separation, we worked as a group, not looking at who is a boy, who is a girl... so that helped a lot, and we felt free! – to sit with a boy and chat... to look at each other beyond sex. Co-education is the best because it opens up your mind, whereas if you go into a girls’ school you come out with the perception that a boy is something to fear and a boy can only befriend if he wants to sleep with you... But when you are in co-education you can know very well that you can have a boy as a friend and not have

44 School and place names have been changed to preserve participants’ anonymity.

anything to do with sex, he's just a friend and you learn more from each other, and compete with them. Co-education is the best.

It [co-education] gives girls exposure - to run with guys, it helps them to compete at the level of guys, it helps them to run in life as fast as guys... I think the only way to fight for gender equality is to have girls and guys mixing at school.

Lucia (23, student unionist studying Telecommunications, from a poor family and government school, receiving financial support from government and her church).

These narratives imply that through their experiences of co-education these women came to reject stereotypes of men as being more intelligent, higher in status, and only interested in women for intimate relations. By competing with boys and thereby learning that they could perform equally well, Sophia and Lucia suggested that they came to see themselves as equally competent. Belinda's account is also notable for it suggests that she came to perceive herself and her peers in a less dichotomous way: instead of difference she saw commonality. This was a consequence of being treated in the same way at school, being given the same tasks. However, this is not universal across co-educational schools – as will be discussed at the end of this section. Additionally, Ruth's narrative implies that her cultural expectations changed: she started to anticipate that men would want to work with her, rather than request intimate relations. This shift in expectations may have affected her interactions with men.

These particular interpretations of co-education may have been affected by other influences. For example, Sophia, Lucia and Ruth all had at least one family member who encouraged them to excel in school. This may have strengthened their commitment and sense of entitlement to education, thereby hardening their resolve and determination to stand up to patriarchal bullying. Given that their positive accounts may not be representative of co-educational experiences more broadly but instead reflect their particular home environments, it is important to ascertain the pervasiveness and significance of male intimidation in co-educational schools.

Like Dunne (2007), I observed that boys sometimes tried to undermine girls in co-educational classes. On one occasion at the elite school, a girl stood up to give a presentation and some boys at the back of the class tried to derail her confidence. They laughed and called out, 'Are you nervous?!'. She scowled in their direction and continued, outwardly unperturbed. The boys were reprimanded by their teacher, weary of their attempts to disrupt class for their own amusement. Discussing this incident after class, the girls suggested that dealing with these outbursts made them able to defeat any such attempts to unnerve them.

This strength and optimistic narrative may have been exaggerated or possibly unique to this social group, who appeared emboldened by the support of their like-minded female peers. Also, their parents' financial investment in their schooling may have made them feel entitled to education. That said, such resistance was also demonstrated in a government school in a low-income compound. When one schoolboy suggested that girls should perform domestic work to show respect to the (male) household head he was shouted down by vocal female detractors, sitting at the front of the class. The above account from elite students is also consistent with the aforementioned poorer, older participants who maintained that co-education had prepared them for adult life, where men often attempt to intimidate women.

Even if co-education was identified as beneficial in this respect, perhaps single-sex schooling would have been even more advantageous, especially for those without supportive friends and families. Male intimidation might thwart their self-esteem, participation and performance in school. This concern is important, though was not obviously the most significant obstacle to girls' participation in class. For example, students at one government school I observed were often inaudible due to the noise from unsupervised neighbouring classes. Other prevalent obstacles included teacher absenteeism, large class sizes and limited resources (as further discussed in Das et al, 2007; GCE, 2004; UNDP, 2011:21).

Another, related concern about co-education is sexual violence. This impedes girls' participation and performance in school, possibly resulting in an unwanted pregnancy and drop-out (Morrell, 2000). In a recent survey of eight schools in Lusaka and Chongwe Districts, Zambia, 16.9% of girls expressed feeling at risk of sexual harassment or violence; 23.4% identified male students as those they were most afraid of in this respect, followed by male teachers (18.3%). The remainder either mentioned other adults at the school or did not answer (Topp et al, 2011). Of more recently interviewed females in Lusaka Province, 48% reported that they had personally experienced sexual violence or harassment from a student and 66% reported knowledge of a classmate's experience of the same (WLSA et al, 2012:18).⁴⁵ These reports could be read as strengthening the case for single-sex education, where girls might at least learn in safety, as Morrell (2000) suggests for South Africa.

However, several points should be noted. To begin with, violence is not an inevitable feature of co-educational schools. What seemed most critical in influencing the prevalence of gender-based violence within school was the response from management. This varied considerably among schools. Such diversity indicates the possibility of developing co-educational schools.

Moreover, single-sex education does not necessarily secure safety or prevent bullying from female peers (as shown by research in Durban, South Africa: Bhana and Pillay, 2011). Nor would single-sex education protect girls from corporal punishment or sexual violence from adults, which my participants and some other studies identify as by far the most common source of violence in Zambian and also Malawian schools (CERT, 2008; Topp et al, 2011; though WLSA et al, 2012 find higher reporting of sexual violence from students than teachers). In Zambia, male teachers are just as commonly found in single-sex as in co-educational state schools. Young women also stressed that most violence from peers generally occurs in the context of intimate relations, which are generally outside school.

In summary, the data to which I have access does not support the hypothesis that single-sex education guarantees girls' protection from (adult) male violence nor ensures their class participation and self-confidence. Moreover, without the opportunity to mix with boys in school, girls may feel anxious and apprehensive about mixed sex environments. Additionally, as shown below, co-education may be uniquely valuable, by enabling exposure to disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes.

⁴⁵ Though note that the sex of the perpetrator is unstated, it could be female.

School sex composition and descriptive gender stereotypes

Single-sex education seems associated with endorsement of gender stereotypes, particularly amongst male students in my sample. In essays and conversations on gender differences, the vast majority of single-sex educated men insisted that women are less intelligent. Likewise in Nigeria and Malawi, boys from single-sex schools have been found to hold more sexist views (Lee and Lockheed, 1990; Mbilizi, 2010:235-236).

Before turning to the ways in which school sex composition affects beliefs about women doing ‘men’s work’, let us first consider potential impact on attitudes towards ‘women’s work’. Ethnographic research conducted in urban, peri-urban and rural co-educational schools in Botswana and Ghana found that boys who swept the classrooms were ridiculed by their peers – male and female alike (Dunne, 2007:505). Through being socially sanctioned for contravening prescriptive stereotypes, boys may have developed such cultural expectations and therefore been extrinsically motivated to distance themselves from stereotypically feminine activities. Alternatively, they may have internalised the prescriptive stereotype that only girls should clean.

However, at Umutende school in the Copperbelt, separately educated boys quickly became accustomed to routinely cleaning classrooms (Bajaj, 2009a). I likewise observed that boys routinely swept in single-sex schools. One might think that undertaking stereotypically female labour in the classroom would affect boys’ beliefs about how it should be shared at home. Yet when asked about their present or expected divisions of domestic labour, these boys generally asserted that girls should be caring for them.

This may seem incongruous with Section 5.2, which suggested that sharing domestic labour at home often led boys to become accustomed to this. They often gained pride in this work and ceased to see it as *incito sha banakashi* (women’s work). However, in a large single-sex class an individual boy will only be mandated to sweep occasionally, so it is not as routine as doing the dishes every day. Additionally, unlike more creative aspects of home-based care work such as cooking, there seemed to be little scope for enjoyment in sweeping classrooms. Most importantly, male performance of a menial job in single-sex contexts does not weaken gender status beliefs. To recall, sweeping is a low status activity, to be performed by the person with the lowest status. If boys only perform this work when no girls are around then this does not challenge the presumption that if girls were present then they should perform the work.

School sex composition also seemed to affect gender beliefs about women undertaking stereotypically masculine work. Boys in single-sex education more commonly portrayed girls as potential sexual partners rather than intellectual equals or potential co-workers. They tended to see male-female interactions as exclusively sexual. For example, during my stay with their family, single-sex educated Musenge (24) and his brother Luo (17) suggested that their contemporaries at school saw girls as ‘meat’. Fights sometimes break out between nearby boys’ schools, over presumed rights of sexual access to girls at the adjacent school. ‘Nkana Boys [school] own 75% shares in Betty [the neighbouring girls’ school]’, wrote three male students in their joint essay on single-sex education. They further detailed that girls at Betty Kaunda School are less intelligent and talk nonsense, since they are only interested in their physical appearance.

Having endorsed these stereotypes, these three single-sex educated young men elaborated that they would never ask their wives for advice. They might listen but would presume themselves to know the ideal solution. Two of the three also expressed scepticism about women leaders. Nsenga (18) was somewhat resistant to his peers' stereotypes: he questioned these by reference to his more egalitarian home environment (he labelled his mother, a nurse, 'household head'). For the most part, however, perceiving women as sexual partners, but not intellectual equals, seemed particularly pervasive among men from single-sex schools. Although some single-sex educated male students were aware that girls had scored the highest national marks for their grades, they dismissed them as unusual. They tended to champion sexist stereotypes and disregard contradicting information.

Bear in mind that this data only suggests that school sex composition affects young people's gender beliefs, it does not tell us whether such views endure over the life course. Another limitation of these interviews with students is that they do not reveal how co-education affected gender beliefs in previous decades, before increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Hence the necessity of drawing on conversations with older male participants.

Some of those who had acquired gender stereotypes appeared to retain them in adulthood, disregarding contradictory information. A minority of single-sex educated men recalled being surprised and happy when they discovered in higher education that women are intelligent. However, other men 'did not change, they were still looking at girls to be inferior to them... They were stubborn to change and accept that we are all equal', commented Hamadudu (29, a co-educated champion of gender equality, now Art teacher, discussing his peers from different schools). 'Nkana Boys is a boys' school, the way they see girls it's different from the way boys from [co-educational] Mulenga High School see girls. They have different perceptions', explained Musenge (24, an unemployed male, whose family I stayed with). Some women identified single-sex educated men as particularly hostile towards women who excelled in higher education, employment and politics:

This is why even in institutions some men don't accept when they are given a woman as a senior member of staff, 'cause it's embedded in them that they're superior than women, and these characters are those that have never had that exposure with women in a classroom level, from Form 1 to secondary school. Even at university, if they are there, they will look upon women as an object, which is wrong.
Belinda (co-educated MP, who I stayed with for several weeks).

If true, this indicates confirmation bias: through single-sex education, boys develop gender stereotypes, presume girls to be less intelligent and subsequently interpret information so that it fits with this assumption.

School sex composition was also said to affect the gender beliefs of female students. Single-sex educated Bwalya (24, a female metallurgist, from an egalitarian, female-headed household) described her former classmates as having 'an inferiority complex, in thinking guys are more intelligent than them'. This view was widely shared. Such presumptions sometimes seemed to permit acceptance of gender status inequalities. BanaBecca (36, from a single-sex school, who only recently started participating in household decision-making) recalled, 'Even though I had intelligence, I was thinking that men were better than me, not knowing that I myself was better than others' (translated).^{liii} Without the opportunity to

compare her performance with that of boys and then being socially isolated as a homemaker, BanaBecca had little exposure to disconfirming evidence of widely-held gender stereotypes. She continued to endorse such presumptions until she started trading at the market and saw a broad range of women undertaking the socially valued role of household financial provider. The gender beliefs that she developed through single-sex education were thus undermined through exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour in later life.

When co-educated people were asked about academic abilities, the vast majority maintained that sex category made little difference to performance. While a minority of co-educated boys mentioned earlier discomfort of being beaten by girls (since this unsettled prevailing stereotypes), unease waned over time. We might explain this belated acceptance in co-education and dismissal of isolated examples of female achievement from single-sex educated boys by positing that gender stereotypes only wane with a critical mass of disconfirming evidence, such as prolonged exposure to girls' displays of equal competence.

Co-education does not only appear associated with more egalitarian beliefs, it was also volunteered as a key influence by many male champions of gender equality. Prolonged daily exposure in their formative years to girls' equal competence seemed to provide sufficient disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes:

Women can do what men can do, if it has to do with the use of the intellect... just to think and apply your knowledge... I think they can... I've always thought like that 'cause I've always been exposed to women doing things that men can do, intellectually. I've always been in co-education, so I've always assumed that we're at school to do the same things.

Roy (26, studying civil engineering).

Hamadudu (29, a male Art teacher and a champion of gender equality): Through co-educational school... I saw that girls can do what boys can do. It changed me in a way; I started looking at boys and girls as the same. I used to look at them as people who are unable but after knowing that they can compete with me, we are only different in sex, I started giving them respect. It changed me in the way I was perceiving them.

Hamadudu was financially supported by his sister (a nurse) and he performed unpaid care work as a youth but it was co-education that he stressed most vociferously in our repeated interviews. Many co-educated girls and women similarly emphasised the catalytic effect of exposure to equal competence in education. Namatamma (15, Grade 9, consistently number one in class and aspiring to become a medical doctor) explained:

When we were in Grade 6 we were actually separated, there was a girls' class and a males' class so I used to think 'Wow, maybe the males do better than I did'... When we got to Grade 7... I had to find out that I can even come top of the class then I thought 'OK, then I can even do better than males!'. My attitude just like changed, I was like 'OK, I can do anything!'... I realised that, OK if I can beat them in certain subjects then I can also be a leader then I can do anything that boys can do!

Namatamma is from a very poor family (she shares a very small single room, in a crumbling mud cabin with her mother, a divorced domestic worker, as well as her cousins), but her emphasis upon realising equal capabilities through co-education was echoed across the socio-economic and generational spectrum, as indicated below:

Before I went [to a co-educational school] I thought boys could do better in certain subjects, that hindered me from studying very hard, until I realised that I can also do better... In the mid-term test I was the highest. I just had to brush it out.⁴⁶ So it was interesting for me.

Ruth (19, trainee teacher, from a low-income settlement).

When you've seen that you've beaten them, you like it, there's no difference. The mind is just the same.

Chezo (47, occupational health professional and trade unionist at national level, her daughter, Chilufya, studies Civil Engineering).

From beating boys at school I realised I could also do men's work.

Sophie (26, laboratory analyst at the mine).

As illustrated in the quotes above, a number of participants voluntarily identified co-education as a major influence when narrating their life histories, without my prior mention of this topic. Some (but not all) maintained that through learning together they came to disavow gender stereotypes differences between men and women. However, their particular interpretation of co-educational experiences may have been due to some additional cause, such as gender sensitisation. Even if co-education can reveal the similarities of the sexes by enabling comparative evaluations, it may have only been as a result of exposure to egalitarian discourses that students began to think in these terms. This particular possibility will be further discussed in the next chapter, though for now I note two points. First, older participants such as Sophie and Chezo claimed that they were not taught about gender and equal rights while in school, so denied that gender sensitisation had affected them when growing up. (Though it remains possible that their recollections of co-education had been influenced by subsequent exposure to egalitarian discourses). Second, participants from single-sex schools tended to present markedly different views. Third, pupils who had attended both kinds of schools (like Ruth and Belinda) or were previously sex segregated within co-educational institutions (like Namatamma) reiterated the impact of the transition to co-education.

This emphasis on co-education is not intended to be exhaustive. Clearly, there are many other ways by which young people may come to revise their gender beliefs. This may also occur in the home, growing up with siblings of the opposite sex category. However, it is worth noting that the majority of those who claimed to have rejected stereotypes in their youth strongly emphasised the role of co-education, identifying it as more important than these other contexts. There are a number of reasons why co-education may have been viewed as more important. Girls and boys are often assigned gender-specific domestic roles to perform – exceptions were a definite minority. Accordingly, they tend not to undertake the same task and realise equal capabilities. Moreover, what appears most significant about co-education is not just girls' demonstration of similarity but rather girls' demonstration of similarity in a socially valued domain (i.e. education), thereby challenging gender status beliefs.

⁴⁶ Within the context of this conversation I interpreted this metaphorical phrase to mean something along the lines of, 'I just had to overcome my earlier self-doubt and strive to fulfil my potential'.

The limitations of co-education

Co-education did not seem to be a prerequisite for people's support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Some women who attended single-sex education maintained that they grew up in homes without gender divisions of labour or gender status inequalities. Accordingly, they already eschewed the gender stereotypes that others came to question through co-education. Also, even if most single-sex educated participants grew up endorsing gender stereotypes, this did not determine their attitudes or behaviour in later life, as evident in the case of BanaBecca. The data presented above only indicates the importance of repeated opportunities to compare men and women's displays of competence in the same, socially valued domain, not that this necessarily has to occur in one's formative years.

Meanwhile, co-education only seems to undermine gender stereotypes in synergy with other factors. Experiences of schooling are tempered by domestic upbringing, educational management and labour market possibilities. While many interpreted equal performance at school as disconfirming evidence of all gender stereotypes and denied differences between the sexes, others still doubted that women could undertake gender atypical activities. This may have been because they lacked exposure to egalitarian discourses or flexibility in gender divisions of labour, due to pervasive occupational segregation (CSO et al, 2009:44). For example, although co-educated Joanna (26) felt that she performed just as well as the boys at school and wanted to be an electrician, she doubted this possibility until she had seen a woman electrician working up a pylon and was encouraged by her older, supportive brother. Having saved up funds by trading second-hand clothing (*salaula*) at the central market, she is now enrolled at a vocational training college.

Some co-educated participants with little exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour in other domains (e.g. children of homemakers and/or from rural areas) dismissed girls' academic performance, attributing it to the easy nature of the subjects in which they succeeded. They gave more prestige to stereotypically masculine subjects. We might explain this with reference to their commitment to gender stereotypes, which led them to overlook contradictory information.

Also, some girls struggle to perform as well as boys and do not provide disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes. Informants often attributed this to their heavy burden of domestic chores. Girls' education may also be constrained by sexual harassment and violence, leading to absenteeism – as found by research in Lusaka Province (WLSA et al, 2012). Then teachers with stereotypical beliefs may explicitly tell girls that they are less competent in Mathematics and Science (as found by WLSA et al, 2012). These obstacles may inhibit girls' academic performance, thereby affecting girls' self-perceptions and confirming others' gender stereotypes.

Academic performance also appears to be influenced by expectations of future livelihoods. Some (though certainly not all) middle-aged women narrated that in earlier decades, predating the contemporary rise in female labour force participation, they did not envisage being employed and so were less interested in education. Many market traders, for instance, recalled and regretted formerly being 'too playful'. However, in the context of greater economic insecurity they are now much more supportive of their daughters' education and labour force aspirations. Co-education does not then invariably produce the same

experiences and gender beliefs irrespective of the broader socio-economic context but interacts with students', teachers' and parents' expectations.

School management seemed significant in shaping co-educational experience. For example, I encountered teachers from both co-educational and single-sex schools discouraging girls from pursuing atypical subjects (e.g. Woodwork) (Nkonkomalimba and Duffy, 2010; WLSA et al, 2012 also observed this phenomena in Zambian schools). Much depends on the gender beliefs of the teacher, which may be more or less sexist in either type of schooling. In Kitwe, the allocation of gendered tasks (such as digging pits, sweeping classrooms and student leadership) varied with management's ethos rather than school sex composition. Referring back to Bajaj (2009a), it may be Umutende's staff's disavowal of gender stereotypes rather than sex segregated campuses that explains pupils' more egalitarian beliefs. Recruiting more female Mathematics and Science teachers (in both co-educational and single-sex schools) might challenge gender stereotypes held by faculty and students alike. This has been called for by both pupils and Engineering lecturers in Zambia (Lusambo et al, 2002:12; Nkonkomalimba and Duffy, 2010:36).

Another limitation of co-education concerns economic obstacles. While co-education's influence on gendered self-perceptions and stereotypes was stressed by participants from across the socio-economic spectrum, their behaviour and labour market prospects were often shaped by household finances. Many young people lack access to decent education and employment. Even if enrolled, students' education, self-efficacy and employment prospects are constrained by teacher absenteeism, non-participatory teaching, large class sizes and limited resources in government and low-cost private schools.

Notwithstanding these limitations and mediating factors, co-education in the Copperbelt seems associated with the rejection of gender stereotypes in early life. Through learning together, some participants realised and became accustomed to equal academic performance, which further affected their gender status beliefs. The implication of this section is that early and prolonged exposure to female competence in a socially valued domain (i.e. education) appears to make people more inclined to eschew gender stereotypes and thereby support flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Conclusion

To recall, Chapter 4 presented evidence indicating that worsening economic security increased female labour force participation and occupational desegregation by increasing the economic cost of compliance with widely-held gender stereotypes that prescribed male breadwinners and female housewives. In this chapter, it has been suggested that although worsening economic security was a primary driver of both forms of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour, additional factors seem relevant, particularly in the case of occupational desegregation.

Women who had pursued and trained for masculine occupations emphasised their earlier belief in equal competence. Commonly-cited formative experiences providing disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes included maternal employment, flexibility in gender divisions of domestic work, role models in the public sphere and co-education. With the exception of co-education, these are all examples of exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour –

a mechanism identified as significant in Chapter 4. Co-education is not entirely different however, since it is also a way in which young people gain evidence of women's competence in a socially valued domain, i.e. education.

The more often a young person has these kinds of formative experiences the greater their apparent tendency to interpret them as disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs. Information that contradicts gender stereotypes and cultural expectations is less commonly dismissed as exceptional if it is multiple. For Bwalya (24), having a strong, financially independent mother (who has raised her children single-handedly, since widowhood), as well as sharing reproductive work and household decision-making, has led her to believe that no job or position is reserved for men alone. Given her strengths in Mathematics and Sciences in school, she saw it as logical to pursue Metallurgy, even though this is a male-dominated profession. Her mother encouraged her interest by introducing her to a friend, who was a female engineer.

The importance of early exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour was not only identified by female participants in male-dominated domains but was also notable for its absence in the life histories of participants who had grown up espousing gender stereotypes about women's lesser competence. For the latter group, a change in interests appears to have been a sufficient condition for increased female employment but not occupational desegregation. Worsening economic security pushed women into employment, but their choice of occupation seems influenced by whether they were previously exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which provided disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes. This distinction contrasts with the hypothesis posited in Chapter 4.

Formative experiences appear to be significant for several reasons. First, participants often interpreted subsequent experiences in ways consistent with their existing pre-conceptions. As a result, some people (such as Alan, discussed in this chapter) seemed cognitively resistant to disconfirming evidence of their gender stereotypes. Second, men who had internalised gender status beliefs seemed to feel entitled to preferential, deferential treatment. This belief seemed to lead people to react aggressively to women who did not demonstrate sufficient respect, such as by appearing too assertive. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, prolonged exposure to women performing a socially valued role in a time of financial hardship does seem to weaken gender status beliefs in some cases.

The apparent instability of gender beliefs over the life course raises the question of whether certain formative experiences only appear significant because they are cases of prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour or because they occur at a certain period in the life course. One reason to think that formative experiences do matter is that decisions girls made in their youth often had long-term implications. Girls espousing stereotypes about appropriately feminine activities may shun gender atypical subjects at school as well as related occupations. Although women may subsequently revise their beliefs, they may lack the resources to retrain for a new occupation. The evidence thus suggests that gender beliefs are not necessarily stable over the life course but that formative experiences are nonetheless significant.

6. Exposure to Discourses of Equality

This chapter evaluates evidence in favour of an alternative hypothesis, namely that popular exposure to egalitarian discourses has weakened gender stereotypes, relating to both competence and status, and thereby fostered flexibility in gender divisions of labour. I consider the possibility that worsening economic security was not in itself sufficient to trigger increased female labour force participation or occupational desegregation, without this prior disavowal of stereotypes as a result of gender sensitisation. Furthermore, it is only because of gender sensitisation that flexibility in gender divisions of labour is increasingly interpreted as disconfirming evidence of gender status beliefs. These hypotheses reverse the direction of causation posited in Chapter 4, crudely that macro-economic change catalysed flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which weakened gender stereotypes about competence and status.

Gender sensitisation has become increasingly pervasive

One reason for having some (initial) confidence in these hypotheses is that gender sensitisation has become increasingly pervasive in Zambia. This is evident from five types of data: my conversations with participants, Government and NGO statements, budget allocations, the school curriculum, as well as qualitative and quantitative studies. This evidence is outlined below.

First, many participants had been exposed to gender sensitisation. ‘They’ve really been sensitising’, commented Sophie (26, laboratory analyst at a mine). Bemba interviews were sometimes peppered with the English language term ‘gender’ – presumably learnt through sensitisation. Some explicitly identified sensitisation as a significant influence; others did not but still portrayed it as widespread. For example, boys at a single-sex government school often mentioned in their commissioned essays on whether gender equality is possible in Zambia:

A lot of women are being educated on their rights and duties as citizens, many non-governmental organisations have been fighting and are still advocating for equal rights and opportunities for both men and women.

Nowadays people have learnt the Importance of Gender Equality on sexism. And a number of women have learnt and teach about this issue. Long time in Zambia before the introduction of this policy, men were regarded to be the strongest in terms of doing jobs and quick thinker[s] in marking [making] plans.

Besides schools, participants had also heard about gender equality through media broadcasts and community outreach. If they did not initiate the topic then I would ask whether they had heard of phrases commonly used in sensitisation: ‘gender’, ‘*insambu sha banamayo*’ (women’s rights), ‘50:50’. Only six participants expressed no knowledge of (or seemed confused about these terms).⁴⁷ The remainder of my participants, the vast majority,

⁴⁷ The six participants that appeared unfamiliar with this terminology included Gloria (an elderly leader in a branch of PF, selling caterpillars in an informal settlement); one extremely poor widow (trading from home, without a radio or other access to media broadcasts on gender equality); another elderly widow (a market trader who suggested gender meant women forming groups to rear chickens); and two married market traders

confidently articulated the meaning of 'gender equality' and related terms. This suggests that they had been exposed to gender sensitisation. This said, since my sample is not statistically representative it may not provide an accurate portrayal of popular exposure to gender sensitisation. For example, since I met most participants in public places (such as schools, markets, political and community associations, social gatherings as well as gender trainings), my data may be less representative of more socially isolated people, such as the elderly, disabled and chronically ill.

Sensitisation is sometimes used by Zambian policy-makers seeking to promote behavioural change. For example, the Minister of Gender's statement to the 2013 United Nations Commission on the Status of Women outlined the Government's 'awareness raising programmes to the general public... [comprising] community mobilisation, engagement of men as change agents, involvement and sensitisation of religious and traditional leaders, including local council and other opinion leaders' (UN, 2013:3). This expressed commitment to sensitisation is backed up with financial support. The Joint Gender Support Programme (JGSP) (half funded by Government)⁴⁸ had a budget of \$11 million for 2009-2011. Among other initiatives, this included \$1.6 million to sensitise civil servants on the importance of gender equality and how this might be promoted in their policies and programmes (UNDP, 2008:36). The JGSP also allocates funding to sensitise the general public: \$80,000 per annum for two major annual events: International Women's Day and 16 Days of Gender Activism (UNDP, 2008:36-39).

A number of prominent Non-Governmental Organisations also prioritise gender sensitisation – as indicated by their strategic plans. For example, ActionAid (2013:1) profiles its local partner, the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) as 'promoting gender equity and equality through strategies which include advocacy, sensitisation, capacity-building and community mobilisation'. This is consistent with my own observations of YWCA's activities and is also evident from the NGO's Copperbelt director's (Jurita Mutale's) frequent use of radio and newspapers to advocate for female leaders in the run up to the 2011 national elections. Newspaper headlines surmising her efforts include: 'YWCA urges massive women participation in elections' and 'Participate in political decisions at all levels, YWCA urges women' (The Post, 2011a, 2011b). In the latter Jurita Mutale is reported to have 'urged women to elevate themselves from thinking that their job ended at dancing and singing praises for men, but aim at rubbing shoulders with them within the corridors of power. Mutale also encouraged political parties to level the playing field and create an enabling environment for intelligent and wise women to participate in the country's political affairs'.

During my fieldwork, before the 2011 national elections, I observed similar calls for female political participation by the Women for Change, Women and Law Development in Southern Africa as well as the Zambian National Women's Lobby. The latter recently launched a Copperbelt project entitled 'Women in Governance: Strengthening the Women in the Community for Equal Participation in Governance'. It aims to increase the number of elected female councillors. To this end, it chiefly comprises awareness-raising and

who both denied knowing the meaning of key terms yet still expressed egalitarian beliefs. One 26 year male mechanic did vaguely recall studying the topic in Civics but had since forgotten the content.

⁴⁸ Half the total budget of \$11 million was to be provided by the Zambian Government, other donors being the United Nations, Government of Norway, Ireland, and Netherlands.

community advocacy, through engaging female councillors, men's networks, political parties, as well as traditional and church leaders (ZNWL, 2012).

The prevalence of gender sensitisation is also evident from the strategic plans of other Zambian NGOs. For instance, the Forum for African Women Educationalists identifies community advocacy as a central objective in their strategic plans for 2002-2006 and 2008-2012. They stress the importance of 'building public awareness and consensus on the social and economic advantages of girls' education through advocacy'. This priority is reflected in budget allocation: 28% to community and policy advocacy on girls' education (FAWE, 2008:12).

These forms of gender sensitisation are generally inclusive of both men and women. Interviewed gender facilitators explained that they previously created 'women only, secure spaces' for reflection but now regard men's inclusion as essential for social change. This is consistent with Wendoh and Wallace's (2006:74) earlier finding that men are included in many gender trainings in Zambia (though less so in Rwanda, The Gambia and Uganda).

Almost all sessions I observed commenced by distinguishing between 'sex roles' and 'gender roles'. Participants would then discuss a main topic. One central message of gender sensitisation has been that 'women can do what men can do' (translated). This phrase is used to refer to education, employment, as well as participation in decision-making in the home and politics. Sensitisation also extols the notion that 'men can do what women can do', i.e. unpaid care work. It thus appears that gender sensitisation is both widespread and also aimed at achieving the outcomes that I observed in my own primary research (i.e. the weakening of gender stereotypes). This gives reason to think that it might partly account for my empirical findings.

In addition, there has been a concerted campaign against gender-based violence, entitled 'A Safer Zambia' (ASAZA). This programme commenced in 2008. Funded by USAID and the European Union, it is implemented in seven districts, including Kitwe. Activities include 'training men as advocates and agents of change; conducting sensitisation for community leaders/traditional leaders; holding community conversations around GBV... national and community radio programs with GBV and gender themes; air and print public service announcements; and use of international events for GBV educational activities' (USAID, 2010:34). One of ASAZA's two objectives is the 'improvement in gender equitable attitudes and behaviours among men and women' (USAID, 2010:7). The training manual then begins by discussing the social construction of 'gender divisions of labour'. It states that 'female gender roles include care of children, household cook, household washing, passenger, subsistence farmer, teacher, typist and male gender roles include: discipline of children, wage employment, cook, household repairing, driver, commercial farmer, head teacher, clerk, soldier' (CARE International Zambia, 2008:9). Their examples of stereotypically masculine work are consistent with my own, described in Chapter 4 (including wage employment as well as specific occupations and activities). Since the ASAZA campaign was on-going in Kitwe around the time I conducted my fieldwork, focusing on stereotyped gender divisions of labour and associated status beliefs, there is reason to think it might have influenced my empirical findings.

Programme evaluations suggest that gender sensitisation has been widespread. For example, by March 2010 (when I started my fieldwork), ASAZA had trained 1479 community leaders, 38 parliamentarians, 1260 youths and 40 communities in seven districts in Zambia. The rationale for targeting community leaders (such as members of Resident Development Associations and Local Government Councillors) is that these are the influential people commonly resolving disputes. Training them on gender is thus envisaged to have a broader effect. A further 15 'Men's Networks' had been formed – including one in Kitwe. These are likewise intended to persuade their peers (USAID, 2010:32). Furthermore, a national, population-based survey conducted for Family Health International found that 45% of urban youths (aged 15-24) had participated in peer education (which often comprises gender sensitisation). This proportion was far higher for urban youths that had attended secondary school (83%). A small, though not insignificant, proportion of Zambian youths (12%) reported that they had been exposed to peer education more than ten times in the past six months (Svenson et al, 2008:30-31).

Besides direct, face-to-face contact, organisations also use media – to which access is widespread. 27% of Copperbelt women read a newspaper, 56% watch television and 74% listen to the radio at least once a week. The rates for men are higher: 37%, 60% and 79% respectively (CSO et al, 2009:39-40). A USAID programme evaluation cites a further study claiming that 73% of surveyed respondents in the ASAZA intervention districts had had recently seen or heard messages relating to GBV (USAID, 2010:3). Since the ASAZA GBV sensitisation is not only widespread but also addresses the gender stereotypes and associated status beliefs, it seems plausible that it might have influenced my empirical findings.

Gender sensitisation is also institutionalised in the school curriculum and has been so for well over a decade. This longevity provides further reason to have some initial confidence in the hypotheses framing this chapter. All secondary students are taught and examined on the social construction of gender divisions of labour as part of 'Civics'. The Civics programme was developed in 1995 and by 1997 932 teachers had received seven days of training (Bratton et al, 1999:809). For Grades 8-9, Civics topics include gender equality, political changes in Zambia, democratic governance, political parties, human rights, conflict, economic policies, the labour market, trade, as well as regional and international organisations. The chapter on gender encourages students to reflect upon the social construction of gender roles and responsibilities, as well as the laws and customs that discriminate against women. Also discussed are the means to promote women's socio-economic participation: education, microcredit and sensitisation. Additionally, it mentions women's rights organisations (see Nalwamba et al, 1997:25-27).

Older students (in Grades 11-12) can opt to further explore these issues in 'Civic Education'. This subject incorporates the judiciary, media, HIV/AIDS, and goes into more detail on gender equality, which is defined as men and women being 'free to develop their personal abilities without limitations set by stereotyped rigid gender roles and prejudices' (page 82 of the textbook).⁴⁹ The chapter on gender explores sources of socialisation (such as the family and media), as well as the time burdens of women farmers, inheritance law and the women's movement. There is a range of case studies to reflect upon, projects to complete and

49 I am unable to provide a full reference for the textbook since I was only able to access a partial photocopy.

questions to answer. A further chapter on ‘social challenges’ discusses gender-based violence.

Earlier qualitative research undertaken in Zambia gives yet further reason to believe that a wide range of people have been exposed to egalitarian discourses:

Villagers, leaders and key informants had learned key gender concepts through government and/or NGO activities; the term ‘gender’ is ubiquitous across Africa now (Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:71).

During my 2002 fieldwork, the topic of gender... was omnipresent in the talk in government offices, among civil servants, and in NGO organisations and the media (Simpson, 2007:185).⁵⁰

In summary, my own research together with further qualitative and quantitative studies, organisations’ strategic plans, budgets, training manuals and the school curriculum suggest that a broad range of people have been exposed to egalitarian discourses. Given its prevalence there is reason to think that gender sensitisation might partly account for two of the contemporary trends detailed in Chapter 4: greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour and support for gender equality. It is hypothesised that these have occurred because sensitisation catalysed a disavowal of gender stereotypes.

Research questions relating to gender sensitisation

As discussed, the main aim of this chapter is to ascertain the extent to which exposure to egalitarian discourses accounts for the weakening of gender beliefs and growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. The strongest hypothesis here is that gender sensitisation has undermined gender beliefs, thereby fostering flexibility in gender divisions of labour. A weaker version of this hypothesis posits that gender sensitisation has contributed to the positive feedback loop, initially triggered by worsening economic security and increased female labour force participation.

This chapter also explores what counts as disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs – whether exposure to egalitarian discourses has similar effects to exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. The remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections, which respectively marshal evidence for and against the hypotheses, examining why gender sensitisation appears to have been transformative in some but not all cases.

Evidence supporting the hypotheses that sensitisation partly or primarily accounts for the erosion of gender beliefs

This section presents evidence in support of the hypotheses by showing that gender sensitisation can enable people to rethink their internalised gender status beliefs, provide a

⁵⁰ Note that ‘gender’, in the Zambian context is often used as a synonym for ‘gender sensitisation’. For example, Matthew (a market trader) once commented, ‘Gender, it encourages us to know the importance of a woman in society’. ‘Gender’ is also used to mean ‘gender equality’: in their essays on whether gender equality is possible in Zambia, two male students wrote that ‘Gender means “roles that can be performed by both sexes”’.

useful conceptual framework, enhance confidence in pre-existing egalitarian beliefs and also foster a revision of cultural expectations.

Gender sensitisation can enable a revision of internalised gender beliefs

Some women described their experiences of gender sensitisation as ‘awakening’ (*ukwiluka*). Such participants appeared to have previously internalised gender status beliefs, without questioning them or conceiving of an alternative. They had previously not considered themselves entitled to greater status and associated practices. Exposure to abstract ideas of gender equality then broadened their horizons: they came to imagine another way of doing things, which they sought to enact despite initial resistance from their husbands. This suggests that sensitisation can be effective, by enabling individuals to rethink their taken-for-granted assumptions.

BanaChileshe (41, market trader) resolutely maintained that her labour force participation was triggered by worsening economic security. However, it was radio messages on women’s rights that gave her confidence that she was entitled to raise her voice in household decision-making. She further explained that her self-esteem had grown as she saw she had the strength to work hard and provide for her children. Meanwhile her husband came to respect and value her opinions more, as he appreciated the fruits of her labour, learnt about women’s rights and, importantly, realised that his wife knew her rights. As a cumulative result of these experiences their relationship slowly changed. She no longer kneels down to serve him food or calls him ‘my father’ – a salutation which many women and children use to show respect.

BanaBecca (36) similarly explained that her marriage has been affected by a range of influences. By trading in the market she supported her family and also learnt about alternative solutions to problems. In these ways she gradually acquired self-confidence as well as respect and appreciation at home. Joint decision-making was further encouraged by gender sensitisation:

BanaBecca: Historically you just follow [your husband’s decisions], good or bad... We didn’t have the right to speak, a man is the head. You must follow what he decides... We weren’t thinking that it was bad. We just perceived everything as fine, because we hadn’t awoken... It [gender sensitisation] came twice on the radio... They were saying that people should change and improve from the past way of living... At first it was difficult for him to follow women’s rights, he had pride... But now he’s different.

Alice: Why has he changed?

BanaBecca: Passing through the lessons and my deeds. Passing through what I’m doing, he sees there’s progress in the things I’ve done... [Whereas, previously, when I was a housewife,] he was proud, thinking there’s nothing I can do] [translated].^{liv}

BanaChileshe and BanaBecca further indicated that exposure to egalitarian discourses had led their husbands to reflect upon the normative implications of their recent shift in gender divisions of labour. Their husbands gave this same account when separately interviewed. However, they also downplayed the significance of gender sensitisation, relative to other influences. They emphasised that association through labour force participation had enhanced their self-esteem and exposed them to inspirational figures and new ideas. Hence sensitisation was not the sole reason that they became less deferential to men and disavowed

gender status beliefs. BanaChileshe and BanaBecca further maintained that if they had not been performing a socially valued role then their husbands (even if sensitised) not have respected them more.

But this is only a speculation (based on their estimation of counter-factuals) and should be considered as such. We cannot ascertain the extent to which sensitisation has contributed to the weakening of gender stereotypes and increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour without comparing different circumstances. Accordingly, this chapter later explores what happens when someone is exposed to gender sensitisation but not flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

For the meanwhile, the data presented above suggests that exposure to abstract ideas of equality can enable individuals to rethink their gender beliefs.

Gender sensitisation can provide a helpful conceptual framework

Some participants explained that although they were convinced of equal capabilities by seeing women mechanics and leaders, gender sensitisation provided a helpful framework by which they subsequently made sense of atypical sightings. For example, three male participants explained that although they had previously dismissed Civics lessons, they later recalled this taught content in order to comprehend their sightings of women repairing cars and cutting grass. Without hearing calls for equality or learning about the conceptual distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour may have been less easily understood, for it might not have cohered with existing cognitive frameworks.

Gender sensitisation can strengthen pre-existing beliefs

By enabling people to learn that their beliefs are shared by socially respected figures and institutions, gender sensitisation was often said to provide external validation and legitimisation of pre-existing concerns and ambitions. For example, a number of female participants maintained that although their interest in gender atypical occupations had preceded their exposure to gender sensitisation, it had enhanced their resolve by communicating broader acceptance.⁵¹ They were encouraged to hear others affirm their view that women are just as capable as men:

It makes you respect yourself more; it really solidified the whole equality thing for me.
Bwalya (24, metallurgist), commenting on a GAD NGO’s visit to her school.

I was even happy, we should work together; gender encouraged me. No more men can challenge me. Already I had that spirit but when they brought gender I became really confident.

Rose (42, an explosives engineer and pastor, see life history).

⁵¹ Some people also viewed gender sensitisation as legitimising their existing concerns about gender-based violence. Claudia (30, unemployed), who was previously in an abusive relationship, has a sense that something is wrong with current arrangements and is keen to learn about ‘gender’, in order to hear authoritative voices opposing what goes on. Housewives, who did not mix with others in the market, often stressed the importance of learning that they were not suffering alone.

It really touches my heart and it keeps me strong.
Annette (24 trainee soldier) further detailed that gender rhetoric reinforces her existing momentum to push herself forward (*ukwisunka* – a common phrase used by pioneering women).

Some men, already persuaded by their own experiences, were likewise encouraged by gender sensitisation. For example, Matthew (47, market trader) enjoys an understanding conjugal relationship, much enhanced by his wife's labour force participation (see life history in Chapter 2). Given his experience, Matthew had already accepted that women can perform 'men's work', so radio discussions on this had little additional impact. However, he was strongly affected by messages that 'men can do what women can do' (translated). These enabled him to think that others accepted men undertaking domestic labour – 'it's normal', he said repeatedly. In Kitwe, 'normal' is often used as a synonym for 'socially acceptable': believing that one is following accepted practices matters, while doing something atypical raises questions. Gender sensitisation thus seem to have the potential to normalise the sharing of reproductive work, showing this is common, and thereby overcoming its physical privacy, which prohibits popular awareness of men helping out in this way (as discussed in Chapter 4).

Official government statements on gender equality were sometimes seen as providing higher-level authorisation of women undertaking atypical gender roles in employment and homes. For example, Rose (42) reported that 'Nchanga mine started employing women when Mr Musenge, the open pit manager, said to management, "[t]here is gender, can we try women?". While reviews of gender mainstreaming might critique the Government for merely paying lip-service to gender equality (see Jennings and Nkonkomalimba, 2011; Longwe, 1997; Rakodi, 2005; ZARD, 1994), it seems that such discourses can still prove influential. Respected texts were also referenced: several participants referred to scriptural support for equality.

This data suggests that one is more likely to pursue gender atypical activities when this is endorsed by others. We might interpret this as indicative of the importance of cultural expectations: others' disavowal of stereotypes shifts listeners' expectations about the kinds of behaviour that are likely to be praised and condemned. This explanation is plausible but it cannot provide a full account of all instances in which people reported increased resolve to deviate from gender stereotypes as a result of sensitisation. Some participants who reportedly found sensitisation encouraging had been exposed to this by persons outside their social circles (via radio or visiting NGOs), i.e. not those who would routinely assess their behaviour. It is not obvious how such sensitisation would have shifted their cultural expectations. Though perhaps public radio broadcasts, an institutionalised school curriculum that includes gender equality as well as government tolerance of NGOs going into schools to promote gender equality do shift cultural expectations, as people come to think that the state will oppose discrimination. I never heard this connection made explicitly, though note Rose's perception of state support.

Alternatively, the internalised gender beliefs theory might explain this phenomenon by saying that one is likely to become more confident in the objective validity of one's beliefs upon learning that they are also upheld by respected others. When the speaker was perceived as believing in the ideas they presented it gave the listeners confidence that they were not alone in their egalitarian beliefs. Whereas in contexts where the vast majority of

other people are perceived as adhering to gender status beliefs, people may not be confident in their own egalitarian beliefs.

Both the idea of internalised gender beliefs and cultural expectations would seem to have different empirical predictions and the former account seems to provide a fuller explanation of the observed phenomena. This question will be later returned in discussion of what happens when someone becomes exposed to the abstract idea of equality yet is not provided with evidence that anyone else (not even the teacher) actually believes in it.

Participatory gender sensitisation can enable debate and reflection

If association and collective reflection are significant, in the ways described in Chapter 4, then we might expect the same of participatory gender sensitisation. Indeed, my evidence suggests that participatory gender sensitisation can be significant in three ways: increasing exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour; facilitating debate and triggering critical reflection upon one's own beliefs; and enabling a change in cultural expectations.

First, participatory gender sensitisation can enable exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, as people learn from those who have broken with cultural expectations. While not everyone has witnessed gender atypical activities, their experiences can be shared by coming together. For example, at a gender workshop for youths in a peri-urban settlement, an extremely misogynist discussion on gender differences was interrupted by 17 year old Joshua's contribution,

My father has been dead for three years. My mother is keeping us nicely... She's been fighting for us. I'm in Grade 10.

This testimony was referred back to by the workshop facilitator and youths as disconfirming evidence of their gender stereotypes.

In urban Kitwe (unlike the peri-urban settlement above), people are increasingly aware of women's economic contributions but still often presume that the typical woman is less competent or less deserving of status than the typical man. Such persons appear attached to gender stereotypes. In this context participatory gender sensitisation can play an important role in enabling people to reflect on the fairness of gender-differentiated rewards. If managed in a way that creates a safe space for attendants to articulate, share and explore their ideas and experiences then gender egalitarian discourses often emerge. Belinda (MP, previously chairperson of a GAD NGO) was trained by the International Labour Organisation to facilitate gender sensitisation workshops (see manual: Bauer et al, 2008). She recounted the sessions,

One man will get up, 'Me, I even wash plates in my house... The other man will say 'But that is a woman's job'. They start arguing amongst themselves... We sit right at the back; we sit amongst them and listen to them... [Some workshop participants may know that women are miners] but it's like it doesn't carry much value, they've seen it but it hasn't been absorbed... They need to talk about it. And when they come out of that workshop they're changed people, they'll tell you, 'Even women can go and they are doing work underground now, and women are electricians, they are tractor drivers, they are bus drivers... A woman can do the same job as a man!...' So we're building them.

Here Belinda implies that exposure to flexibility in gender divisions may not be sufficient for a rejection of widely-held gender stereotypes about differences in competence. As discussed in previous chapters, confirmation bias may blind people to disconfirming evidence of their gender beliefs. But instead of dismissing sightings of women miners as exceptional and retaining the presumption that women are incompetent in this domain, participatory sensitisation can enable people to question the validity of their internalised stereotypes, as well as their taken-for-granted gender status beliefs.

Besides critique, polarised debates also enable the formation of solidarities. For example, a female councillor explained that there was a large Local Government workshop on gender-based violence in 2010. The men blamed violence on women's 'bad behaviour', but such assertions were challenged by the women present. She recalled being emboldened by this demonstration of collective strength, as the female councillors vociferously objected to patriarchal accounts.

We can also explain the importance of participatory gender sensitisation with reference to cultural expectations. As indicated by Belinda, dialogue has the potential to overcome the privacy of domestic work, enabling exposure to what others do. If some people voice their support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour, others may revise their cultural expectations. Participants may become more resolved to enact their beliefs because they have learnt that others in their community are unlikely to sanction them for doing so. Both theories appear able to provide plausible accounts of the phenomena; they may both be valid.

While not all participants had engaged in participatory gender sensitisation, it is possible that such modes of teaching might have contributed towards growing respect and appreciation of women, especially since they have targeted influential persons responsible for dealing with local disputes.

Two claims have been made thus far. First, gender sensitisation is widespread. Second, gender sensitisation seems better able to erode gender stereotypes when: it enables people exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour to reflect on their normative implications; it enhances confidence in the objective validity of gender egalitarian beliefs, through the knowledge that they are shared by others; and it creates a safe, social space to collectively dismantle widely-held stereotypes and establish an alternative consensus. In order to ascertain the validity of the foregoing hypotheses we need to discover whether these are necessary conditions for effective gender sensitisation and if so, whether these conditions are commonly met, i.e. the prevalence of effective sensitisation. Bear in mind that thus far this chapter has only discussed how sensitisation impacts beliefs, not behaviour.

A further, albeit speculative, reason for confidence in the hypotheses is that quantitative data suggests only a moderate degree of occupational desegregation. Yet participants constantly reiterated that there had been a major change. This discrepancy may be due to a shift in how women's work is perceived. It may only be as a result of gender sensitisation that people have increasingly recognised evidence that disconfirms their stereotypes. Additionally, perhaps people are now more cognisant and appreciative of women's work, due to a change in perceptions (owing to sensitisation). Perhaps exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of

labour cannot provide disconfirming evidence of gender status beliefs, since that is arguably a value judgement (not an empirical observation) about the esteem, respect and deference to which a person is entitled, by virtue of their membership of a sex category.

Recent popular exposure to egalitarian discourses may account for the discrepancy between my and earlier findings on female labour force participation in urban Zambia. This contrasts with the explanation put forward in Chapter 4, namely that gender beliefs have lagged behind a shift in material practices because their erosion requires prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

The remainder of this chapter explores what happens when those exposed to gender sensitisation are not also exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour; when they do not think that anyone really believes in the ideas presented to them; and when there is little opportunity to collectively reflect upon widely-held gender stereotypes.

Reasons to doubt the hypotheses

The mode of sensitisation is generally problematic

Notwithstanding occasional cases of 'best practice', gender sensitisation is commonly jeopardised by four pedagogical problems.

First, Civics teachers may contradict class content, either verbally or behaviourally. For example, Victoria (24, a trainee nurse) detailed that her Civics teacher 'believed that some gender roles should have been sex roles, like cooking or whatever, he's like, "No, men shouldn't do that, me, my wife always cooks for me. I'm never seen in the kitchen.'" Despite being trained to teach the Civics syllabus, teachers may maintain gender stereotypes and not present the curriculum as correct.

Some teachers may follow the curriculum in terms of information provision but openly contradict these lessons through their own behaviour. One marked hypocrisy is corporal punishment, which is pervasive in state schools despite its illegality (as also observed by Topp et al, 2011). Teachers at the government boys' school I attended routinely carried metre length cuts of hose pipes. Violence was a constant threat. This may have reinforced the perceived acceptability of physical aggression. One Civics teacher at another government school paused from writing about human rights on the blackboard to beat the noisy, unsupervised class next door. The children protested, 'Madam, corporal punishment, isn't it a violation of children's rights?' She replied, 'You children, you don't listen, so we just have to use a whip for you to listen'. When interviewed about corporal punishment many pupils (aged 14-15) at this school made little mention of rights, even though they had been formally educated on the topic. They did not appear to take their rights seriously. A pupil from another government school and survivor of sexual violence, Julie (15), similarly told me that they are taught about rights, but know they are 'not real'. Christopher, a male teacher, likewise commented, 'in government schools... the teachers will be busy talking about these rights but they will easily beat. They will even tell them, "Go and tell whoever you want to tell", so they [the pupils] will end up wondering do we really have the human rights or is it just something that's on paper?'" By contrast, beatings are rare at elite private schools, where aggrieved, assertive parents are quick to complain.

Besides nominally condemning violence, Civics classes also teach that boys can perform care work (*incito sha banakashi*). Some participants said that their teachers had insisted on boys sweeping classrooms, as is also the case in Umutende school (Bajaj, 2009a). But this experience was not universal. Nine months after observing their Civics classes on gender, I spoke to Mercy (15, from a low-income compound). She maintained that the lessons had made no difference to gender divisions of labour in school: ‘The boys are refusing to sweep, saying it’s girls’ work’. No teacher had intervened to create a rota – again, students could have perceived this as signalling that taught content was ‘not real’.

Government and NGO gender facilitators undertaking community outreach are sometimes equally sceptical of taught content (as also observed by Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:59-61,91-93, drawing on their research in Zambia, Rwanda, The Gambia and Uganda).

Second, all-important opportunities for critical reflection and debate appear infrequent. Many participants detailed that when they ‘learnt’ about gender (either in school or in workshops for community representatives) it was just note-taking without debate. Likewise in South Africa, primary school lessons on gender and sexuality are said to have ‘included a good deal of repetition, rhetorical questioning and intermittent teacher-learning interaction. But for long stretches the children were not directly drawn in, other than to chorus a response’ (Morrell et al, 2009:101). Such forms of gender sensitisation may result from the assumption that exposure to abstract messages of equality is sufficient to change internalised gender beliefs, and thereby foster behavioural change.

Although a range of participatory exercises are included in the Civic Education textbook these are rarely used by teachers more acquainted with rote-learning. Other school lessons I observed were similarly taught in this didactic fashion. Although there are teacher trainings for Civics and Civic Education, interviewed staff from different schools claimed that their head teacher would go in order to profit from ‘out of pocket expenses’. If very few teachers have been trained on participatory teaching methods it then seems unlikely that Civics lessons routinely facilitate critical reflection and debate.

Pedagogical impediments also include limited contact hours and resources, which constrain learning more broadly. The Civics Education teacher at a government school I observed only had one copy of the textbook, and that was a photocopy, to which students lacked access. This was a major problem when the teacher was absent for several months without a substitute. On one day he sent a boy to write up notes on a board but the students were otherwise left to their own devices. With teacher absenteeism endemic in Zambia (Das et al, 2007), it seems unlikely that many teachers have sufficient time for participatory discussions. The prevalence of information provision was evident from my own observations and conversations with former students as well as teachers.

In summary, gender sensitisation in Kitwe generally seems to take the form of rote learning: it tends to expose participants to the abstract ideas of gender equality and flexibility in gender divisions of labour but rarely provides reason to think those beliefs are shared by others. However, this data does not disprove the hypothesis that gender sensitisation has played some role in changing beliefs and practices. These observations should not matter if the binding constraint to a disavowal of gender stereotypes is just that these are taken for

granted due to lack of exposure to such ideas. In order to answer these questions, I asked participants about their experiences of gender sensitisation.

Participants who described their teachers as lacking the time, teaching skills and/or inclination to engage students in critical reflection and debate about gender inequalities tended to recall that they perceived the subject as unimportant. They thought they only needed to repeat the 'correct' information in the exam, not reflect upon its implications for their own lives.

The gender topic wasn't like any other topic, like laws, high court, magistrate and all that. It wasn't taken seriously at all... I guess the teachers didn't think it was vital for us to know about it. There are topics where a teacher says, 'You need to know about this, it's important'. For them they took it we were supposed to have that knowledge for exams only and after the exams forget about it.

Chalwe (24, unemployed man).

We learnt that gender roles both can do, this is in working, thinking capacity, leadership. But sex roles only one sex can do. Most of the people were serious just for the sake of passing exams. But when it came to the practical situation people they insisted that girls can't do some jobs – like working at a bus station... At that time we really believed that gender [equality] wasn't a real thing. We thought a woman can't manage most of the works... Most of the people were serious just for the sake of passing exams.

Owen (25, trainee mechanic).

I didn't concentrate much on gender, I thought we just had to write [the exam], that's all [translated].^{lv}

David (23, fuel station attendant).

Such participants not only stated that they previously regarded the Civics lesson as unconvincing, they also had trouble recalling taught content. Since they had not retained knowledge on the social construction of gender divisions of labour and status inequalities, it does not seem very plausible that the dissemination of this information had impacted on their lives. Though it is possible they had forgotten or not consciously aware of the ways in which they were affected.

Another common form of gender sensitisation is peer education. In Anti-AIDS clubs (a government-mandated, weekly peer education programme in all schools), for example, the focus is on information provision. The peer educators are trained in participatory pedagogies and do attempt to enliven classes by asking questions and using songs. However, in huge classes of 70 students, the inaudible students quickly become bored. Few even attempt to listen; some chat to their friends, nap or dwell on the pain of recent corporal punishment. As Annette (24, a trainee soldier, though previously a peer educator in schools), commented, 'They don't concentrate, they just joke, as if it's play' [translated].^{lvi}

This data suggests that there are several cardinal aspects often missing from gender sensitisation in Zambia. First, it does not always provide evidence that others reject gender stereotypes: teachers may be unenthusiastic about or openly contradict taught content. Second, critical reflection and debate is commonly substituted by didactic information provision. As a result, contemporary modes of sensitisation rarely enable the collective

interrogation of gender stereotypes, nor provide evidence that egalitarian beliefs are broadly shared. Accordingly, it seldom gives reason to change one's cultural expectations or become more confident in one's own egalitarian beliefs.

My evidence seems to count against the strong hypothesis that gender sensitisation explains the contemporary weakening of gender stereotypes and increasing flexibility in gender divisions or labour. Gender sensitisation in schools is also jeopardised by the existing institutional problems thwarting education more generally. These include didactic information provision rather than critical reflection, large class sizes, teacher absenteeism and limited resources (e.g. textbooks). These structural problems help us understand why the vast majority of participants downplayed the influence of gender sensitisation, as shown in the next section.

Disavowals of gender stereotypes seem contingent upon exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour

People's receptivity to gender sensitisation seems shaped by their personal experiences of sex-differentiated practices, by which they judged and made sense of abstract rhetoric. This section presents four types of evidence to support this view. It first makes comparisons across participants and finds that those exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour seemed more accepting of gender sensitisation. Second, it draws on life histories to suggest that first-hand evidence of women's competence in male-dominated domains temporally preceded acceptance of abstract messages. Third, it compares different forms of sensitisation, showcasing the significance of disconfirming evidence (as opposed to discursive rejections) of gender stereotypes. Fourth, it compares responses to different gender terminology and finds most approval for that which chimes with local experiences. This data seems to count against the hypothesis that gender beliefs changed due to gender sensitisation and before growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Comparisons between participants

The first part of this section makes comparisons across participants. Those accustomed to gender divisions of labour seemed resistant to egalitarian discourses. For example, with limited exposure to female leaders, some interviewed women were dismissive of NGO messages on '50:50 in decision-making'. They expressed doubts about women's competence in politics, adding that they had not seen much evidence of this. BanaMayuka similarly recalled, 'other women underrate themselves, saying "No, a woman can't rule", they were refusing. "It's not possible, we can't lead. Yes we can work, but we cannot possibly lead"' [translated].^{lvii} Only by their contemporaries in the market responding to these denials by sharing their own positive experiences of female leaders have these other women traders come to be more accepting of NGO messages that women could undertake prestigious leadership roles. (This latter point underscores the importance of association through paid work in the public sphere).

Similarly, when asked about the slogan 'women can do what men can do', many people who had studied Civics yet lacked exposure to such performances commonly denied its validity. In discussions about mining, for instance, some maintained that women lacked the strength

and endurance to go underground. Others stressed the importance of protecting women – implicitly endorsing the stereotype that women are less capable than men.

During a workshop in a peri-urban area the facilitator tried to persuade young adult participants that there are no set characteristics of men or women. Kelvin (25, farm labourer) commented, ‘in urban areas women are working but not in this community’. The young men insisted that women are weak and easy to convince since they will remain with an unfaithful boyfriend given limited financial alternatives. Their experiences, shaped by patterns of resource access, gave them reason to doubt the abstract claims presented. Writing about Kitwe in the late 1980s, when women were largely economically dependent upon men, Ferguson (1999:186-196) similarly noted misogyny and distrust of women.

Some participants had been exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour but remained attached to their stereotypes and sceptical of women’s abilities. For such persons in trade unions and local government, gender sensitisation was widely said to make little impact. Although there has been a notable shift in social attitudes, it is by no means universal. Some professional women, like Beth (38, trade unionist), complained about their colleagues:

Here the problem is from peers in Lusaka, they said they wanted a man [for her senior position] yet they are trained in gender; they haven’t even tried you to see if you fail. They are aware: everyone has been talking about gender.

Gender sensitisation does not appear to have resolved Beth’s cultural expectations: she anticipates that she will often be underrated and doubted by men. This may adversely affect her self-esteem and performance.

Despite being frequently invited to gender workshops, some male MPs seemed strongly committed to gender status beliefs. I once attended a presentation at the National Assembly on gender-based violence. I sat next to Mayaya (Copperbelt MP, now Minister). He called over a Deputy Minister, inviting her to sit on his lap. She refused. After listening to a presentation detailing constraints impeding the Victim Support Unit and observing a cultural performance (about men and women working together), we watched a drama sketch. A husband and wife are arguing: she wants to go to the market but he is prohibiting her from venturing outside. The husband says, ‘What did the *banacimbusa* [traditional counsellor] tell you? Where are you?’ She duly kneels to demonstrate subservience. Enthusiastic applause erupts from some male MPs in the audience, delighted at this show of deference, as a wife was put in her ‘proper place’.⁵² I discussed this event with several parliamentarians, including the aforementioned Deputy Minister:

Alice: How many gender sensitisation workshops have there been for MPs?

Lillian: I don’t know, many.

Alice: Yet still men applaud at kneeling?

Lillian: [sighs].

Exposure to egalitarian discourse had not appeared to provide disconfirming evidence of their gender status beliefs; nor, for that matter, had exposure to female MPs.

Similarly in low-income communities, gender sensitisation often does not appear to dislodge cultural expectations. Politician Anita Chulu explained that, ‘It’s important to tell women about their rights: when we go in communities I tell women about their roles. I tell them to stand up and speak their voices out. [But] they tell you, “We are coming from different homes”, they think their husbands are different, “they will never let us go into politics but we will always support you”. They think it’s not possible for them; their husbands are already set in their ways.’ Many husbands were described and admitted to being jealous and keen to preserve gender status inequalities. BanaMayuka (41, market trader) likewise insisted that,

Such women know their rights... but their husbands are extremely difficult... They don’t know how to use their rights because they’re scared of their husbands. They don’t have freedom. They listen to the radio and TV but their husbands don’t give them a green light.

Here she was specifically referring to women whose husbands do not permit them to join the market; to recall Chapter 5, this chiefly comprises men not accustomed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. If receptivity to gender rhetoric varies with people’s experiences then sensitisation would not seem sufficient to radically change beliefs. At best it may fortify existing views, through external validation.

Note also that Anita Chulu and BanaMayuka portray certain low-income women as conforming to gender divisions of labour and status inequalities due to concerns about their husbands’ resistance, rather than their own internalised gender stereotypes.

Comparisons over time

As well as making comparisons between participants, we can also use life histories to see whether people find contemporary forms of gender sensitisation persuasive prior to their exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Consistent with the data outlined above, participants routinely insisted that the latter was a necessary condition for a change in gender beliefs:

At first we thought ‘Maybe it’s a joke, what is this now they’re talking about?’ [laughs] For us, we didn’t understand... It’s just that seeing is believing, but now, after seeing what actually they were talking about, it’s now it’s when we came to realise. At first we thought that the guy [the radio presenter] was joking.
Matthew (47, market trader, selling vegetables, see life history).

Those who speak about gender are just talking... [But when] we see a woman repairing electricals, we say ‘That woman is strong’. Seeing is extremely important. You see and then you can understand. Because we don’t really understand radio messages, we just hear it. But if you see that person fixing the electricals, you can really see it happening, then you have confidence [translated].^{lviii}
Nancy (41, market trader and political activist, selling rice).

I see women cutting grass, that gave me confidence to think it’s not hard for them. It’s a man’s job but anyone can do it... I never believed it [gender equality] though I was doing Civics... I started believing it when I saw that things are happening and they are

real, not just talking about it... Right now I'm truly a believer. Civics didn't convince me but it got me thinking then I saw it for myself.
Benjamin (17, an orphan living with his sisters).

As indicated in the above narratives, exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour was commonly seen as proof of its possibility, unlike dubitable radio broadcasts. Henry (30, a miner) likewise explained that he immediately concurred with messages about women's equal capabilities because he had been single-handedly brought up by his mother, a market trader and grassroots politician. He commented,

See what is right; not that you follow it automatically but if it makes sense to you.

Many participants who have undertaken or supported atypical gender activities strongly downplayed the importance of sensitisation programmes. The vast majority emphasised the influence of worsening economic security, their own employment, exposure to role-models, co-education, informal discussions with their peers, as well as conjugal love and understanding. In terms of school influences, for example, co-education was usually said to be more significant to gender beliefs than Civics or Civic Education.

On the other hand, it is important to recognise that people may not necessarily be cognisant of the multiple direct and indirect influences on their beliefs and behaviour. Even if gender sensitisation is often seen as relatively unimportant by participants, its egalitarian rhetoric may still have permeated popular dialogue and could be quietly influencing gender beliefs in ways that participants might not have been consciously aware.

However, this possibility cannot provide a complete account of social change in the Copperbelt since many participants had successfully pursued gender atypical activities before they had been exposed to gender sensitisation. For example, everyone in my focus group of women miners denied having heard of gender equality rhetoric when they started employment. The only call for gender equality they recalled from that time came from the Zambian branch of the Forum of African Women Educationalists (FAWEZA), talking about the importance of girls' education. There were no school lessons or radio messages about women being able to perform 'men's work' (such as mining). Although the women miners granted that contemporary messages of equality are encouraging, they downplayed their influence. Similarly, Judy (42) only heard about 'gender' once she had been elected a politician and then went to workshops. Likewise, many women market traders (such as BanaChola) who had not heard of gender, or had only heard rumours of it encouraging divorce, professed to have non-hierarchical marriages, in terms of respect and decision-making (though generally not sharing domestic work). Since such cases predated exposure to gender sensitisation the latter could not have triggered their shift towards egalitarian beliefs and practices.

While it is possible that they were only able to undertake gender atypical activities because others supported them because they had been sensitised this does not seem true in these specific cases. For example, BaShiChola became more appreciative of his wife as she performed a socially valued role, fighting to provide for the family in a time of great financial hardship – he became unemployed and they were cut off from utilities for non-payment.

Comparisons across different forms of gender sensitisation

We can also compare different forms of gender sensitisation, specifically that which includes and that which excludes exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Here again there appears to be an association. Drawing on her own experiences in rural areas of Central Province, BanaThomas (40, gender facilitator and political party activist) explained that only when women physically saw another woman using a treadle pump (a male-dominated technology) did they cease to presume that this activity was impossible for their sex category. Prior participatory gender sensitisation had not achieved this result.

If you show them practically it can be done it gives them confidence. It gave them the motivation, the self-esteem that what a man can do a woman can do. If you just talk they will exit saying '*balelanda fye*' [they're just talking]. Some listened to the gender workshop, others said it's just talk talk talk... The idea that boys can wash dishes gave them food for thought... But when the facilitators went away everything was forgotten. After the workshops nothing was done.

Then we sat and thought, 'Where did we go wrong?' We tried to implement gender [sensitisation], helping to support group members. We were meeting once a week. We asked 'What have you done?' They gave excuses: 'It was hard', 'the well is far' et cetera, et cetera. We said, 'Why give such excuses when you can access a treadle pump or drip kit?' I showed them how to use this. We did the practicals with the Home Based Care group. The women were scared to use treadle pumps, they thought it was tricky, but actually they found they could do it. I did it first then they saw that if I could do it so could they. She would say, 'I think I can do this BanaThomas'. I recommend that, it's very very good...

Now you've been here, you see it's exactly the system: just telling people to do something, while people have been living like that for years, it's difficult to change their mind-sets unless you really show them it can be done... This time there are some women on ART [Antiretroviral Therapy], they harvest maize, they sell to FRA [the Food Reserve Agency, i.e. they are now 'successful', commercial farmers].

It seems that the women previously doubted themselves, thinking they were unable to undertake this form of *incito sha baume*. First-hand evidence of another woman performing this task made them think it was possible for their sex category. Research in India similarly points to the importance of pump demonstrations for women in increasing their use of this masculine technology (Prabhu, 1999). This is consistent with the argument put forward in Chapter 4, that exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour enhances women's sense of self-efficacy.

Even if gender sensitisation has greatest impact when it provides disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes, this is still only an isolated incident that may be quickly forgotten in the absence of sufficient exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. For example, Chikoti (25, accountancy student) recalled that his teacher took them outside to count the cars driven by men and women. When asked to explain the high number of women driving cars, the boys assumed husbands had bought cars for their wives. So the teacher brought in a successful woman in order to demonstrate the reality of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. She narrated that she had bought her own car:

Alice: Do you think Civics changed people's minds?

Chikoti: It was a reality. Most mothers at home they cook and clean, you don't see them at the office, you see a woman come in, big nice car, you see it, it happens, it does change a lot, what you see is what you get. Our Civics teacher was a very intelligent woman, she would think up solutions... When we counted we came up with ideas that women are getting cars because of their husbands but then she brought in a woman who'd got a car for herself and it worked. I'd call it ingenious.

Alice: Do you think that lesson had any effect?

Chikoti: It left an impression but couldn't change anything for most people, most impressions they only last for a moment, so if you don't see it every day it goes away, if there's no one to back it up, if the head teacher is always a man.

Here Chikoti attributes the impact of this sensitisation to the first-hand evidence of a woman's ability to buy a car for herself. This indicated women's equal abilities in a respected domain. But Chikoti maintains that its effects were short-lived. At that time, Chikoti's father had been the breadwinner while his mother stayed at home. It was only upon his job loss that she setup a restaurant in the market. He was also educated at a single-sex school. As a result he had little evidence of women's equal competence in socially valued domains, such as education, employment and household provision. This form of gender sensitisation was soon forgotten because it was not 'backed up': Chikoti was accustomed to gender divisions of labour at home and had no chance to see girls' equal competence at school. His beliefs only changed upon co-educational higher education.

Comparisons across different gender messages

A fourth set of data indicating that gender sensitisation has little independent impact comes from comparisons of Zambians' responses to different forms of rhetoric. Earlier research in Zambia found that, 'many communities had heard of gender, they had heard about the word but there was much confusion about its meaning. For many it meant "gender balance" and 50/50. It was a numbers game, or a concept that meant women and men were the same. Neither made much sense to many interviewees' (Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:75-76). There was resistance to these egalitarian discourses as a 'northern imposition' (ibid:92). This incomprehension and critique may have been because the abstract messages did not chime with local experiences. Campbell and Cornish (2010:1570) likewise argue that '[o]ne reason for the disappointing outcomes of many [HIV/AIDS sensitisation] programmes is that they are conceived by external experts and imposed on communities in "top-down" ways. As a result, they fail to resonate with the worldviews and perceived needs and interests of their target groupings, or to take adequate account of the complex social relations into which programmes are inserted'.

In the Copperbelt, the phrase that 'women can do what men can do' appears to have become pervasive and popular – overheard in homes, schools and workplaces, as well as in the following conversations:

Alice: Have you heard of 'gender'?

BanaJessy (39, market trader): Yes, [to her friend] how should I explain it?

BanaBecca (36, market trader): Equality. A woman can do men's work and a man can do women's work [translated].^{lix}

NGOCC said, 'Women, come, we should work, don't depend on men alone. We're not different from men. We're just the same... The work done by men can be done by a woman' [translated].^{lx}

BanaMayuka (41, market trader), recounting gender sensitisation in the market.

Our teacher said, 'We must be encouraging women, to be pushing ourselves to do the work done by men so that men see that we women aren't weak. We can also do what they do' [translated].^{lxi}

Chola (23, trainee mechanic).

BanaMulenga (38, bank manager and breadwinner, whom I lived with): [NGOs] They're campaigning for 'equal rights', I'm not sure what this means. Some women have taken it to mean that if a man comes home at 01:00 then so should a woman. I prefer the phrase, 'Women can do what men can do.'⁵³

This phrase seems to have gained support because it encapsulates contemporary experiences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Thus people are commonly able to make sense of it, in contrast to vague mentions of 'gender'. It is also perceived as communicating a positive, uplifting message to women about their equal potential to contribute to national development. Furthermore, this contribution is valued in a time of worsening economic security. It is not perceived as threatening men or patriarchy, yet the consequences of such flexibility are often quite radical, weakening gender status beliefs (as discussed in Chapter 4).

It might be contended that the discursive repetition and behavioural enactment of 'women can do what men can do' signals the effectiveness of this message. However, the apparent popularity of this phrase does not reflect the language frequently used by NGOs. I observed a number of other terms being used in gender sensitisation activities (as did Wendoh and Wallace, 2006). My data suggests that when gender sensitisation is limited to encouraging women's economic activity then it is rarely resisted.⁵⁴

Alice: Did you talk with your husband when you went to NGOCC?

BanaMayuka (41, market trader, see life history): He said, 'You did very well', he liked that I went. He knows that his wife won't have a problem if he's not there or dies [translated].^{lxii}

BaShiMayuka, when separately interviewed, likewise commended his wife's engagement in such activities. Recall that she had single-handedly provided for the family while he was unemployed.

By contrast, earlier discourses were found to be 'accusatory', alienating men who 'felt that women were being set up to usurp male privilege' (Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:73-75,81). This may have been because observed discourses chimed with neither local interests nor exposure. Despite the prevalence of gender sensitisation addressing *incito sha banakashi*,⁵⁵ women's care work remains devalued, even by those (like Matthew) who otherwise champion equality.

53 I was unsuccessful in my attempts to locate the source of the popular phrase (donors, government, local NGOs or the grassroots), but what matters is that this particular phrase took root because it chimed with popular experiences.

54 Part of the reason that men generally do not object to the promotion of this message may be that it is rarely coupled with material support to women in Kitwe.

55 This message is institutionalised in the school curriculum and equally prevalent in the vast majority of gender trainings.

Furthermore, many strongly condemned the notion that married men should do domestic work. To recall data presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, few participants were exposed to such practices or saw it as desirable – given concerns about marital break-up. Recently married Cecilia (23, unemployed, with whom I underwent traditional initiation) explained that although she learnt in Civics that men can do ‘women’s work’ and has asked her husband to help, he refuses. She is unwilling to push him on this in case he ‘strays’ (translated). Similarly, one group of young women (student teachers, social workers and mechanics) explained that they would like their future husbands to help with domestic work but they have resigned to accept their likely non-participation, given widely-held gender stereotypes and worries about marriage break-up.

Since mothers are traditionally blamed for their daughters’ divorce (especially in the event of their non-adherence to ‘tradition’), many mothers are equally opposed to gender messages on flexibility of gender divisions of reproductive work. Nancy (41, a rice trader and political activist) explained that you should wash your husband’s clothes, polish his shoes and prepare his food. She warned that if men start to cook *ubwali* (the staple dish) then,

He’ll seek another woman and his family will agree... They’ll say I didn’t teach my daughter... Here in Zambia marriages finish. If you don’t follow the rules, he’ll seek your friend. Then your friend comes to work just as she was taught... Gender should be understood as working together, not applied to homes, no... There should only be gender equality in government and employment [translated].^{lxiii}

Nancy was exposed to gender sensitisation and maintained that she found it encouraging. Throughout our multiple interviews she always championed equality in the public sphere. However, given structural constraints, she did not think it advisable for any young married woman to seek flexibility in gender divisions of care work. Moreover, she was particularly concerned of being held responsible for the ‘failings’ of any girls in her care. Inter-generational enforcement of gender status inequalities has also been observed by Geisler (2000:68-69), with regards to southern Zambia.

Given these countervailing interests for women and their social support networks, sensitising people to the idea of men sharing unpaid care work rarely seems effective. In the Copperbelt it seems that statements of gender equality are only accepted when they reflect past exposure and current interests. The selective popularisation of particular gender messages suggests that particular statements of gender equality have become popular because of people’s experiences and priorities, rather than the reverse. Evidence has been presented by making comparisons between participants, over time, across different forms of sensitisation and with regard to different messages.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to ascertain whether flexibility in gender divisions of labour might have been a consequence (rather than cause) of an erosion of gender beliefs, owing to exposure to egalitarian discourses. It also considered a weaker hypothesis: gender sensitisation has contributed to a positive feedback loop, initially triggered by worsening economic security and increased female labour force participation.

The weaker hypothesis seems most plausible. While exposure to egalitarian discourses seems significant in many instances, this often appears contingent upon additional exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This was shown by four forms of comparisons: across participants, over their lives, between different abstract messages, as well as different forms of sensitisation. Participants seemed most receptive to gender sensitisation when they were able to make sense of it through first-hand behavioural evidence of its veracity. In Kitwe, experience of flexibility of gender divisions of labour seems particularly significant in this respect. Others, without such exposure, tended to find gender sensitisation unconvincing. Anthony Simpson (2007:185) likewise observed, '[t]he fortunate few retreated to hotels and game lodges for workshops on the topic of gender; many remained unconvinced of the possibility of change. A senior civil servant explained to me that despite these efforts, in his view, things would remain the same, commenting, "Ah, Tony, you have stayed with us long enough. You know what we African men are like!"' (see also Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:75-76).

While common forms of gender sensitisation in Zambia were rarely said to be independently persuasive, this is not to deny that it has exerted any impact at all. Participants who had already rejected gender stereotypes often stated that gender sensitisation had encouraged their pursuit of gender atypical activities. This primarily occurred when they saw or heard other people championing their views, either on the radio or in participatory sessions. By contrast, abstract messages were often disregarded when delivered by those who did not also communicate their personal belief in the ideas presented.

This suggests several things. First, the motivation force of gender sensitisation seems contingent upon whether it shows that other people also believe in various dimensions of gender equality. When school children say that rights are 'not real' because they are so often violated, we can interpret this either by reference to internalised beliefs or cultural expectations. Both perspectives have the same empirical prediction and can provide an account of the phenomena. On the one hand, we might argue that students are more likely to doubt the objective validity of the gender rhetoric if they think it is rejected by respected authorities. On the other hand, seeing other people reject egalitarian beliefs may be important in shaping cultural expectations, about how behaviour will be evaluated by others. The significance of exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour can similarly be explained in both ways: it provides evidence of both women's equal competence (thereby changing internalised beliefs) and also other people's reactions (thereby altering cultural expectations).

For the most part these theories have similar implications and seem difficult to distinguish empirically. However, this chapter has presented evidence indicating reason to favour the internalist account. For example, some participants were reportedly inspired, encouraged

and awakened by radio messages from those outside their social circles, i.e. not the persons who would hold them accountable to their sex category and penalise them for inappropriate performances of gender. For some women (like BanaChileshe and BanaBecca cited) media broadcasts made them feel entitled to higher status, which they then pursued, despite initial resistance from their partners. For those already believing in gender equality this gave them greater confidence in the objective validity of their view, but little reason to think they should expect less discrimination from others. Interactional accounts could argue that when conveyed via state radio participants have reason to think government will oppose discrimination, but I never heard this connection made explicitly.

However, even if some instances of effective gender sensitisation appear to be best explained by reference to internalised beliefs, cultural expectations still seem incredibly important. We can use this concept to highlight the apparent interconnections between exposure and interests. Common forms of gender sensitisation often seem ineffective because they shift neither exposure nor interests. In terms of exposure it rarely provides reason to change cultural expectations about which behaviour is likely to be praised or condemned. As a result, it does not change interests: if one desires social respect then without exposure to enacted flexibility in gender divisions of labour one should have little cause to think this interest will be satisfied by non-compliance with these gender stereotypes.

Conclusion

This thesis has explored the causes and consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour in Kitwe, Zambia. It has sought to investigate the causal relationship between four contemporary trends by drawing on the influences identified by participants through life histories and focus groups. This data has been analysed within a theoretical framework that interprets sex-differentiated practices as resulting from a combination of internalised gender stereotypes, cultural expectations and patterns of resource access. Change and continuity in gender beliefs and practices have been examined using two key concepts, exposure and interests.

The four contemporary Copperbelt trends investigated are as follows. First, there has been worsening economic security over the past twenty years. Quantitative data points to male job losses, declining remuneration and casualisation of employment, low life expectancy, the introduction of user fees for social services and an end to subsidies on consumer goods. This shift in patterns of access to resources was also reiterated by the vast majority of participants and is consistent with earlier qualitative studies. The next two trends are both elements of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour: increasing female labour force participation and occupational desegregation. These trends are apparent from labour market data as well as my own qualitative research. Fourth, gender stereotypes (relating to both competence and status) appear to be weakening – as attested to by many participants and also evident from comparisons between my own observations, contemporary World Values Survey data and earlier ethnographies. It is also manifest in rising female political participation, at local and national level. However, this trend is not universal across persons or domains: persistent status inequalities are evident in the cases of care work and gender-based violence. These four trends are correlated, occurring over the same twenty year time period.

Through life histories and group discussions, participants identified a number of factors to account for the latter three changes (relating to gender beliefs and divisions of labour), in their own lives and society more broadly. These include: financial hardship, gender sensitisation and seeing women performing stereotypically masculine roles (e.g. working for money, being a breadwinner, a household head or political leader of an association). Some emphasised the significance of being exposed to such gender atypical activities in their formative years.

This thesis has considered three different hypotheses to account for the three gender-related contemporary trends. Chapter 4 put forward the explanation maintained by most participants, namely that worsening economic security (a change in patterns of resource access) had triggered increased female labour force participation, which in turn eroded gender beliefs. Compliance with cultural expectations of gender divisions of labour became economically costly from the late 1980s as a result of worsening economic security. Female employment (both generally and in male-dominated occupations) gained support because it was increasingly seen as advantageous. Arguably, worsening economic security was thus a sufficient condition for flexibility in gender divisions of labour, both in terms of women entering paid work and stereotypically masculine occupations.

Many participants maintained that women have gained social respect as well as influence in private and public fora as a consequence of greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour. It

is now less commonly assumed that men are more suited to prestigious leadership positions or more deserving of deference. This attitudinal shift is reflected in rising female political participation. Yet despite the gradual erosion of gender status inequalities, some domains still appear marked by status inequalities. Unpaid care work is a prime example.

There are a number of ways we can account for persistent gender divisions in unpaid care work without positing that women's status also remains low in public and private decision-making. Perhaps gender beliefs are particularly salient in the context of domestic work, as suggested by Ridgeway (2011). Alternatively, the particular privacy of such labour may shield any such flexibility from public view, thereby impeding a change in cultural expectations and preventing positive feedback loops. A further possibility is that lopsided marriage markets make working women anxious to push for a revision to care practices. For these reasons, women's predominant share of care work should not be used as an indicator of their low status generally.

Paid work in the public sphere seems to increase women's access to income and information. However, if this change had directly weakened gender status inequalities then earlier studies on female market traders should have observed similar outcomes. Yet they did not. Research in the 1990s stressed that many poor female traders in Lusaka had become breadwinners but were rarely respected as such (Hansen, 1997; Munalula, 1998; Schlyter, 1999). By contrast, my own participants who traded in the market did emphasise waning gender status inequalities, even though they did not appear to be any wealthier than those described in these earlier ethnographies. Without sufficient access to capital, many sold on someone else's behalf, for which they were paid extremely low wages. While other interviewees did invest in their own micro-enterprises, they stressed that profits had worsened over the past decade due to market saturation. While an independent income may enhance a woman's financial autonomy, it does not itself directly undermine gender status inequalities.

Instead, flexibility in gender divisions of labour seems to have undermined gender status inequalities by providing disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs. These beliefs appear to be weakening with prolonged exposure to a critical mass of women demonstrating their equal competence to undertake activities that they were previously presumed to be incapable and that are valorised because they were historically performed by men. My evidence points to the significance of women undertaking tasks that embody stereotypes about gender differences, such that women's demonstrable success provides disconfirming evidence of those stereotypes. Because gender status beliefs rest on the assumption that there are differences between the sex categories, these status beliefs appear to be eroded when women undermine any kind of presumed difference, not just those relating to socially valued activities. While prestigious positions do lend status to the individual actor, women's encroachments into stereotypically masculine domains appear to have wider reaching consequences, undermining the assumptions of gender difference upon which gender status beliefs are predicated more generally. This apparent importance of an occupation's social construction indicates that gender status inequalities are primarily mediated by gender beliefs and only indirectly affected by resource access.

The context of prolonged economic insecurity means that women's economic contributions have become recognised as fundamental to household survival, not just supplementary – as

appears to have been the case in the early decades of independence. The way that people perceive flexibility in gender divisions of labour appears to have changed as a result of men's declining access to resources. Given prolonged and pervasive difficulties, people increasingly applaud 'strong' women who fight to support their families or physically build their own homes.

Association seems to augment the impact of exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour on gender status beliefs. By hearing tales of women performing socially valued activities, people have become more exposed to disconfirming evidence of gender status beliefs. Those already with egalitarian beliefs learn that such views are shared by others. This provides external validation of one's own beliefs and also enables a shift in cultural expectations. My study indicates the particular significance of association with those exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Without such exposure, association does not seem so transformative: homemakers and home-based traders congregating in compounds generally discussed how to fulfil rather than challenge their cultural expectations of ideal domesticity. Again, this underscores the particular significance of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Besides making this particular point on gender beliefs, Chapter 4 also posits that gender relationships can change rapidly (within a generational cohort), as triggered by changing macro-level patterns of resource access. This hypothesis is supported by the historical analysis presented in Chapter 3. Women's ability to bargain for better treatment in intimate relationships suddenly increased in the early colonial period as demographic circumstances gave them scarcity value in urban areas. This enabled urban women to access resources through men without being dependent upon a particular man. Women's access to resources (in the form of multiple potential partners who might support them) subsequently waned, however: urban sex ratios evened up over time, monogamy became a prescriptive cultural stereotype and their direct access to income (through employment) remained limited. With their wives more economically dependent upon them, husbands were better able to fulfil their perceived interest in gender status inequalities.

Chapter 3 also gives credence to the argument made in Chapter 4 that gender divisions of labour are primarily contingent upon interests and thus endure for as long as they are seen as advantageous. According to this line of reasoning, flexibility in gender divisions of labour rarely occurred in earlier decades because few regarded it as beneficial. Men and women secured respect from compliance with cultural expectations; deviation risked social condemnation. Men's relatively secure access to employment minimised the economic risks of dependence on a single breadwinner.

This argument implies that a binding constraint to increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour is interests, not internalised gender stereotypes about women's competence. Financial hardship may lead people to regard flexibility as more advantageous and therefore trigger increased female labour force participation. However, it does not in itself change presumptions about women's ability to undertake stereotypically masculine occupations. An obstacle to occupational desegregation may remain therefore. Unlike most other women, those who pursued male-dominated activities (such as mining or mechanics) tended to already reject gender stereotypes about competence. These participants often identified the influence of their early exposure to women performing socially valued roles, as well as their

exposure to egalitarian discourses. This raises the possibility that flexibility in gender divisions of labour (both in terms of increased female labour force participation and occupational desegregation) was a consequence (not cause) of changes in gender beliefs. The thesis considered these two alternative hypotheses. Arguably, early exposure to women undertaking social valued roles and/or exposure to gender egalitarian discourses provided disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs and this catalysed growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This may have occurred in conjunction with or independently of a wider shift in gender divisions of labour and worsening economic security – these comprise weaker and stronger versions of the hypotheses.

As discussed in Chapter 5, my data suggest a correlation between early exposure to women demonstrating equal competence in a socially valued domain (e.g. in employment or education), disavowal of gender stereotypes and pursuit of male-dominated domains. Such participants identified these formative experiences as key influences upon their beliefs and behavioural choices. The vast majority of women making incursions into non-stereotypical terrain (whether in politics or employment) stressed that they were inspired by their mothers' financial self-reliance, strength and confidence. Seeing their mothers earning an independent income contradicted the male breadwinner stereotype. Sons and daughters came to think that this was equally possible for all women. Maternal employment also seemed to shape women's self-perceptions: they gained confidence in their capacity to undertake occupations historically dominated by men.

Some of those who grew up with egalitarian beliefs had formerly been exposed to boys undertaking unpaid care work. Where domestic labour was thought of as low status work, male performance of this activity when females are also present undermines gender status beliefs. It signals that girls do not have a lower status. Though important for those with such childhoods, such experiences seem uncommon.

Co-education was also emphasised by many male and female supporters of flexibility in gender divisions of labour. They had come to revise earlier assumptions of gender difference by seeing male and female classmates perform similarly. By contrast, interviewed single-sex educated male students tended to presume that girls and women are less competent. Some were aware that girls had scored the highest national marks for their grades but dismissed them as unusual. They appeared to disregard information that contradicted their stereotypes. However, it is not being claimed that girls necessarily benefit from co-education. Their class participation and performance may be thwarted by male intimidation, harassment and violence. The conclusion to draw from this is not support for a specific education policy but rather the broader point that early exposure to demonstrations of equal competence in a socially valued domain can undermine gender beliefs and foster support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

Those not formerly exposed to women undertaking socially valued activities maintained that they grew up thinking that men were more intelligent and worthy of leadership roles. Further, they did not always appear to recognise contradictory information as disconfirming evidence of their gender status beliefs. Instead they often maintained their stereotypes and labelled women who performed stereotypically masculine roles (e.g. working for money, being a breadwinner, a household head or political leader) as 'honorary men'.

Notwithstanding these apparent differences, there are three reasons that count against the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 5 that growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour was caused by a prior disavowal of gender beliefs. First, before society-wide flexibility, disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs was uncommon. Second, partly due to their paucity, any such vanguards were more generally regarded as deviating from (rather than disconfirming evidence of) gender beliefs. Third, while some in earlier decades became privately critical of gender stereotypes, they may still have eschewed male-dominated domains due to concerns about cultural expectations. These three reasons will be discussed in turn.

First, due to society-wide gender divisions of labour, the formative experiences that commonly provide disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes about competence were historically less common. Subsequent flexibility has increased their prevalence. For instance, with lower rates of female labour force participation in earlier decades, it was uncommon to see women in gender atypical domains.

Second, the impact of such exposure on gender status beliefs appears to have changed over the decades, shaped by wider socio-economic circumstances. Before the late 1980s (when male access to employment was more secure), women's earnings were often regarded as supplementary. Female labour force participation tended to only enhance financial autonomy, rather than respect and appreciation. Historically then, maternal employment less commonly provided disconfirming evidence of children's gender status beliefs.

Similarly, female vanguards in the public sphere (such as in employment and politics) did not always create a positive feedback loop; they were seldom regarded as 'role models'. Without a critical mass of women demonstrating their equal competence in male-dominated domains, lone incursions were often perceived as deviating from (rather than providing disconfirming evidence of) gender stereotypes. Furthermore, women typically had less opportunity to reflect upon these incursions, since many were socially isolated as homemakers. For these two reasons, many onlookers assumed that women could neither be economically self-sufficient nor ascend to the highest echelons by their own merit. Such vanguards were often referred to as 'prostitutes'. While there were always a small minority who eschewed gender stereotypes, in thought and practice, change did not beget major change in earlier decades. Before worsening economic security and a critical mass of employed women, there appears to have been minimal change in gender beliefs. This chimes with Risman et al's (2012:19-20) comment about the importance of social context, rather than individual preferences or circumstances:

Clearly change among individuals cannot happen in isolation from changes in expectations and institutions, nor is it a quick revolutionary strategy. Individuals risk simply being labelled deviant instead of change agents.

Third, certain formative experiences may have been interpreted as disconfirming evidence of internalised gender stereotypes but not cultural expectations. Notwithstanding their idiosyncratic home environments, society-wide gender divisions of labour suggested that others still endorsed gender stereotypes. In previous decades it was more socially acceptable to laugh at (rather than laud) a female mechanic. This may have discouraged such pursuits, even on the part of those who had become privately critical of gender stereotypes. Widely-

held gender stereotypes only weakened much later on, after people had both seen and collectively reflected upon a critical mass of women in gender atypical domains.

In summary, the rejection of gender stereotypes was historically uncommon and rarely created a positive feedback loop. Rising female labour force participation seems more likely to have been due to worsening economic security than a disavowal of gender beliefs. While men were historically stereotyped as breadwinners, this internalised gender belief does not appear to have been the binding constraint to change, for it endured despite rising female employment (as noted by earlier studies in Lusaka: Hansen, 1997; Schlyter, 1999). However, unlike female labour force participation, occupational desegregation *does* appear to have been contingent upon a prior erosion of gender beliefs. The initial female frontrunners of occupational desegregation attested to their prior critique of gender beliefs. Maternal employment or co-education led them to question gender stereotypes about competence. This gave them the self-confidence to pursue stereotypically masculine occupations. Now, due to a shift in socio-economic and interactional contexts, change can beget change: these frontrunners are now more commonly interpreted as role models, thereby catalysing a positive feedback loop. Cultural expectations are changing as those exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour express support when gathered together in public fora.

A third explanation of flexibility in gender divisions of labour emphasises popular exposure to egalitarian discourses. The phrase ‘women can do what men can do’ is widely heard – in schools, markets, media, as well as workshops for civil society organisations and Government. The strong version of the hypothesis is that gender sensitisation has undermined gender beliefs, thereby causing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. A weaker version posits that gender sensitisation has contributed to the positive feedback loop, initially triggered by worsening economic security and increased female labour force participation. Chapter 4 noted the contrast between my and earlier findings on female labour force participation. It suggested that gender beliefs have lagged behind a change in material practices because their erosion requires prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. However, the belated shift in gender beliefs could be due to increasing exposure to egalitarian discourses in the intervening period. The aim of Chapter 6 was thus to ascertain the relative significance of exposure to egalitarian discourses.

Notably, gender sensitisation, exposure to flexibility and association through paid work in the public sphere may be significant for the same reasons. All three may increase people’s confidence in the objective validity of their beliefs in equal competence. All three may shift expectations, through exposure to others endorsing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This can occur discursively, in participatory sensitisation or other associations (e.g. through paid work in the public sphere). Alternatively, their support may be manifest in their behaviour (e.g. the employment of female mechanics). By focusing on rhetoric rather than manifest practices, Chapter 6 sought to ascertain what counts as disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes and cultural expectations.

Conversations with participants as well as my own observations suggest that gender sensitisation, as practised in Kitwe, was seldom interpreted as disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs. Rote learning (a common form of sensitisation) gave listeners little reason to revise cultural expectations: ‘rights are not real’ claimed the frequently beaten school children. Furthermore, abstract rhetoric was rarely regarded as evidence of the objective

validity of claims made. It was commonly disregarded by those not also exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. Nor did rote learning provide a space for people to critically reflect on their gender beliefs. Enacted gender atypical performances were far more commonly interpreted as disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes. This indicates the primary importance of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.

The available evidence thus counts against the strong hypothesis that gender sensitisation independently undermined gender beliefs and in turn gave rise to greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour. However, the weaker hypothesis remains credible. Although few participants identified sensitisation as a primary cause of their rejection of gender stereotypes, many labelled it 'encouraging'. By enhancing confidence in pre-existing gender egalitarian beliefs, sensitisation may well have contributed to a positive feedback loop, initially triggered by worsening economic security and the subsequent increase in female labour force participation.

Prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, driven by worsening economic security, has weakened gender status inequalities in Kitwe because it has provided evidence of both women's equal competence in socially valued domains (thereby undermining internalised gender stereotypes) and other people's increasingly positive reactions (thereby altering cultural expectations). The perceived significance of this contemporary shift is reflected in the Copperbelt mantra of gender equality, '*abanakashi kuti babomba incito sha baume*' (women can do what men can do).

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Annex 1: Details of participants

Key:

Adolescent: <20

Youth: 21-30

Middle-aged: 31-50

Older person: >50

F: Female

M: Male

DLH: Detailed life histories

C: I cohabited with them

FG: Focus group

TI: thematic interview, e.g. about Civic Education

E: Student essay submitted and discussed

Livelihood Group	Livelihood	Age	Sex	Marital status	Household income level	Type of research method
Administrative support worker	Local government clerk	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Administrative support worker	Local government clerk	Youth	M	Married	Middle	FG
Administrative support worker	Local government clerk	Middle-aged	M	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Administrative support worker	Local court recorder	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Administrative support worker	Administrative role in company	Youth	M	Unmarried	Middle	LH
Administrative support worker	Administrative role in company	Youth	M	Unmarried	Middle	LH
Administrative support worker	Administrative role in company	Youth	M	Non-marital relationship	Middle	RFG
Counsellor	Gender NGO worker	Middle-aged	M	Divorced	Low	FG
Counsellor	Gender NGO worker	Older person	M	Married	Low	FG

Counsellor	GBV counsellor	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Counsellor	GBV counsellor	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Counsellor	GBV counsellor	Middle-aged	F	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Counsellor	Traditional marriage counsellor	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Counsellor	Gender NGO worker	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	LH
Counsellor	Traditional marriage counsellor	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	RFG
Domestic worker	Domestic worker	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Domestic worker	Domestic worker	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Domestic worker	Domestic worker	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Domestic worker	Domestic worker	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Low	LH
Health care worker	Nurse	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Health care worker	Nurse	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG
Health care worker	Nurse	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Health care worker	Health care professional	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	FG
Health care worker	Health care professional	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Health care worker	Health care professional	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Health care worker	Nurse	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG, LH
Health care worker	Nurse	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	LH
Health care worker	Nurse	Youth	F	Married	Middle	RFG, DLH, C
Health care worker	Health care professional, gender equality trainer	Older person	F	Widowed	Middle	DLH, FG
Housewife	Pastor's wife	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Housewife	Housewife	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Housewife	Housewife	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Housewife	Housewife	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Housewife	Housewife	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Housewife	Housewife	Older person	F	Married	Low	FG
Housewife	Housewife	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	FG

Housewife	Housewife	Older person	F	Married	Middle	FG
Housewife	Housewife	Older person	F	Divorced	Middle	FG, LH, C
Housewife	Housewife	Middle-aged	F	Married	Upper	LH
Housewife	Housewife	Youth	F	Married	Low	DLH
Housewife	Housewife	Youth	F	Married	Middle	DLH, C
Housewife	Housewife	Youth	F	Married	Low	TI
Pastor	Pastor	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Politician	MP	Middle-aged	M	Married	Upper	FG
Politician	MP	Middle-aged	M	Married	Upper	FG
Politician	Councillor	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Politician	Head of national market association	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Politician	Member of Parliament (MP)	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Politician	MP	Older person	F	Divorced	Upper	DLH, C
Politician	MP	Middle-aged	M	Married	Upper	DLH
Politician	Councillor	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Middle	DLH, C
Politician	MP	Older person	F	Divorced	Upper	DLH, RFG, C
Politician	Councillor	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH, RFG, C
Politician	MP	Middle-aged	M	Married	Upper	RTI
Politician	MP	Middle-aged	M	Married	Upper	RTI
Politician	MP	Older person	M	Married	Upper	RTI
Politician	MP	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	TI
Politician	MP	Middle-aged	F	Married	Upper	TI
Politician	MP	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Upper	TI
Politician	MP	Middle-aged	F	Married	Upper	TI
Politician	MP	Older person	M	Married	Upper	TI
Politician	MP	Older person	F	Married	Upper	TI
Politician	MP	Older person	M	Married	Upper	TI
Politician	MP	Older person	M	Married	Upper	TI

Professional/ managerial	Manager, gender equality trainer	Middle -aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Professional/ managerial	Manager	Middle -aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Professional/ managerial	Manager	Middle -aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Professional/ managerial	Manager	Middle -aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Professional/ managerial	Senior staff at UN agency	Older person	F	Married	Upper	FG
Professional/ managerial	Senior civil servant	Middle -aged	F	Married	Middle	FG
Professional/ managerial	Local court judge	Older person	M	Married	Middle	FG
Professional/ managerial	Government social worker	Middle -aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Professional/ managerial	Government social worker	Adoles cent	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG
Professional/ managerial	Accountant	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG
Professional/ managerial	Accountant	Middle -aged	F	Married	Middle	DLH
Professional/ managerial	Manager	Middle -aged	F	Divorced	Middle	FG, LH
Professional/ managerial	Lab analyst (at mine)	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG, LH
Professional/ managerial	Bank manager	Middle -aged	F	Married	Upper	FG, LH, C
Professional/ managerial	Manager	Middle -aged	F	Married	Middle	LH
Professional/ managerial	Senior staff at national gender NGO	Middle -aged	M	Unmarried	Middle	LH
Professional/ managerial	Senior civil servant	Older person	F	Divorced	Middle	LH
Professional/ managerial	Manager	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	LH, C
Professional/ managerial	Senior staff at national gender NGO	Middle -aged	F	Divorced	Low	LH, C
Professional/ managerial	Accountant	Youth	M	Unmarried	Middle	RFG
Professional/ managerial	Senior staff at UN agency	Middle -aged	F	Divorced	Upper	DLH, C
Professional/ managerial	Manager	Middle -aged	F	Married	Upper	DLH, RFG
Professional/ managerial	Town clerk	Middle -aged	M	Married	Middle	TI
Professional/ managerial	Head of major development partner	Middle -aged	M	Married	Upper	TI
Professional/ managerial	Senior staff at national gender NGO	Middle -aged	F	Divorced	Middle	TI
Professional/ managerial	Senior civil servant	Middle -aged	M	Unmarried	Middle	TI

Professional/ managerial	Senior civil servant	Middle -aged	M	Married	Upper	TI
Professional/ managerial	Occupational hygenist (mining)	Middle -aged	M	Married	Middle	TI
Professional/ managerial	HR personnel in manufacturing company	Middle -aged	M	Unmarried	Middle	TI
Professional/ managerial	HR personnel in manufacturing company	Middle -aged	M	Married	Middle	TI
Professional/ managerial	HR personnel in manufacturing company	Middle -aged	M	Married	Middle	TI
Service worker	Receptionist	Middle -aged	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Service worker	Police inspector	Middle -aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Service worker	Peer educator	Adoles cent	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Service worker	Peer educator	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	FG
Service worker	Fuel station attendant	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	LH
Service worker	Waitress	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	DLH
Service worker	Waitress	Older person	M	Married	Low	DLH, C, FG
Service worker	Bus driver	Middle -aged	M	Married	Low	TI
Skilled manual worker (not stereotypically masculine, e.g. hairdresser)	Hairdresser	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Skilled manual worker (not stereotypically masculine, e.g. hairdresser)	Hairdresser	Middle -aged	F	Unassigned	Low	FG
Skilled manual worker (not stereotypically masculine, e.g. hairdresser)	Tailor	Middle -aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Skilled manual worker (not stereotypically masculine, e.g. hairdresser)	Hairdresser	Middle -aged	F	Divorced	Low	FG, LH
Skilled manual worker (not stereotypically masculine, e.g. hairdresser)	Nail technician	Middle -aged	M	Unmarried	Middle	LH

Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Road worker	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Miner	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Miner	Older person	M	Married	Low	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Miner	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Miner	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Miner	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic	Youth	M	Married	Low	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Factory worker	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Casual labourer	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	FG

Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Casual labourer	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Casual labourer	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Miner	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG, LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic (at a mine)	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Low	DLH, LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Machinist (at mine)	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Middle	DLH, LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Machinist (at mine)	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Middle	DLH, LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Electrician (at mine)	Youth	F	Married	Middle	DLH, LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Electrician	Youth	M	Unmarried	Middle	FG, LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Soldier	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	DLH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Road worker	Youth	F	Widowed	Low	DLH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Miner	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	LH

Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	DLH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Electrician	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	DLH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Auto-electrical student	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Middle	LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Auto-electrical student	Youth	M	Unmarried	Middle	LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Auto-electrical student	Youth	M	Unmarried	Middle	LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Casual labourer	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	RFG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	RFG, LH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Miner	Youth	M	Married	Low	RFG, DLH
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	RLG, FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	DLH, C, FG

Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Mechanic	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	DLH, C, FG
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically masculine, e.g. miner)	Miner	Middle-aged	M	Divorced	Low	DLH, FG
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Middle	FG, LH, C
Student	Student at co-ed private school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Middle	FG, DLH, C
Student	Student at university	Youth	M	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	FG
Student	Student at college	Adolescent	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Non-marital relationship	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Upper	FG
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG

Student	Student	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	FG
Student	Student at college	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Middle	FG, C
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	FG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	FG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	FG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	FG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	FG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Middle	FG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Middle	FG, E
Student	Student at college	Adolescent	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG, LH
Student	Student at college	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	FG, LH
Student	Student at college	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG, LH
Student	Student at university	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	LH
Student	Student at university	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	LH
Student	Student at university	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	LH
Student	Student at college	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	LH
Student	Student - civil engineering	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	LH
Student	Student	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Middle	LH
Student	Student at university	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	LH, C
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	LH, C
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	LH, FG
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	LH, FG
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	LH, FG
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	LH, FG
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	RFG

Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Middle	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Non-marital relationship	Middle	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Middle	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Middle	RFG, E
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Middle	RFG, E
Student	Student at university	Youth	M	Non-marital relationship	Middle	RFG, DLH
Student	Student at university	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	RFG, LH
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	RFG, LH
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	RFG, LH
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	RFG, LH
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Middle	RFG, LH
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	RFG, DLH
Student	Student at co-ed, elite school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Upper	RFG, DLH
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Middle	RFG, LH
Student	Student at co-ed state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Middle	RFG, DLH, C
Student	Student at single-sex, state school	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	DLH

Student	Student at college	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	LH, C, FG
Student	Student at college	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	LH, C, FG
Student	Student at college	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	LH, C, FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	FG, DLH
Teacher	Teacher - auto-mechanics	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Older person	F	Married	Low	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Youth	M	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Youth	M	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Youth	M	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Separated	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	M	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Married	Upper	FG
Teacher	Auto-electrical teacher	Youth	F	Married	Middle	FG
Teacher	Auto-electrical teacher	Middle-aged	M	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Teacher	Auto-electrical teacher	Middle-aged	M	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Teacher	Teacher	Older person	F	Separated	Low	FG, LH
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Low	LH
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	LH
Teacher	Teacher	Youth	F	Married	Middle	RFG
Teacher	Teacher	Youth	M	Non-marital relationship	Middle	RFG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	RFG
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	RFG

Teacher	Teacher	Youth	M	Married	Middle	RFG, DLH, C
Teacher	Teacher	Middle-aged	F	Separated	Low	DLH
Teacher	Teacher	Youth	F	Divorced	Middle	DLH
Teacher	Teacher	Youth	M	Married	Low	TI
Teacher	Civics teacher	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	TI
Trader	Wealthy business person	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Trader	Supplier to the mines	Youth	M	Non-marital relationship	Middle	FG
Trader	Supplier to the mines	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Trader	Market trader & gender facilitator	Older person	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Adolescent	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Youth	F	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Youth	F	Divorced	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Unassigned	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Married	Low	FG

Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Married	Middle	FG
Trader	Home-based trader	Older person	F	Widowed	Low	FG
Trader	Home-based trader	Older person	F	Widowed	Low	FG
Trader	Home-based trader	Older person	F	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Business person	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Business person	Older person	M	Married	Low	FG
Trader	Business person	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG
Trader	Business person	Middle-aged	M	Married	Upper	FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG, LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG, LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Widowed	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Widowed	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Widowed	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Unassigned	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Widowed	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Widowed	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Divorced	Low	LH
Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Widowed	Low	LH
Trader	Home-based trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Home-based trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH
Trader	Home-based trader	Older person	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	LH

Trader	Business person	Older person	F	Divorced	Upper	LH
Trader	Home-based trader	Older person	F	Married	Middle	LH, C
Trader	Market trader	Youth	F	Married	Low	LH, FG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	LH, FG
Trader	Home-based trader	Adolescent	F	Unmarried	Low	LH, FG
Trader	Home-based trader	Middle-aged	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	LH, FG
Trader	Business person	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	LH, FG
Trader	Market trader	Youth	F	Married	Low	LH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	LH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	LH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	LH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Widowed	Low	LH, RFG
Trader	Business person	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	LH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Widowed	Low	RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	RFG
Trader	Lets out rooms	Older person	F	Widowed	Middle	RFG, C
Trader	Business person	Middle-aged	M	Cohabiting	Middle	RFG, LH
Trader	Market trader	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	RFG, DLH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	RFG, LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Widowed	Low	RFG, LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	RFG, LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	RFG, LH
Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Divorced	Low	RFG, DLH
Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Widowed	Low	RFG, LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Middle	RFG, LH
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH
Trader	Home-based trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH
Trader	Supplier to the mines	Youth	M	Married	Middle	DLH, C
Trader	Business person	Older person	M	Married	Low	DLH, FG

Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	M	Divorced	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Older person	F	Widowed	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH, RFG
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH, RFG, C
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH, RFG, C
Trader	Market trader	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	DLH, RFG, C
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	FG, LH, C
Unemployed	Unemployed	Adolescent	M	Unmarried	Low	FG
Unemployed	Unemployed	Adolescent	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	FG
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	FG
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	FG
Unemployed	Unemployed	Middle-aged	M	Married	Low	FG
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	FG
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	FG, C
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Unmarried	Middle	FG, C
Unemployed	Looking for work	Middle-aged	M	Married	Middle	FG, C
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	FG, LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Middle-aged	F	Married	Low	FG, LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Unmarried	Low	LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Cohabiting	Low	LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Married	Low	LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Middle-aged	F	Divorced	Low	LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Middle-aged	M	Unmarried	Low	LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	M	Unmarried	Middle	LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Older person	F	Widowed	Middle	LH

Unemployed	Out of school youth	Adolescent	F	Non-marital relationship	Low	LH
Unemployed	Looking for work	Youth	M	Unmarried	Middle	LH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	M	Unmarried	Low	LH, C
Unemployed	Unemployed	Youth	F	Divorced	Middle	LH, C
Unemployed	Unemployed	Middle-aged	F	Separated	Low	RFG, DLH
Unemployed	Unemployed	Older person	F	Divorced	Low	DLH, C, FG

Annex 2: Original interview extracts in Bemba

ⁱ Gloria: Fwe banakashi tabaletupenda akale. Namona bamayo twalecula.

ⁱⁱ BanaMwimba: Baletitikishiwa sana, ukucila ba nomba pantu abakale... [she asks another] ni bani abakwata ubuntungwa – aba lelo. Akale banamayo bali abatitikishiwa, nangu waipika nkoko kwali amaparts ya kuli bawishi. Banamayo takuli ukulayako, nomba inonshita tulalya. Na bakamfwilwa balebapoka ifipe kuli balupwa ba balume babo. Munonshiku takwaba, equal rights yaliba bwino... Banamayo ba kale tabalelandapo icalubana panghanda. Abalelanda e bashitata... [banamayo abakale] balume babo tabalebasuminisha ukushitisha. Kali balebasunga. Nga aliupwa afwile ukumfwa mulume mwakwe, so teti ashitishe. Bamo balekwata icilumba, bamo balefwaya fye ukubacusha. Teti alandepo, teti apingule. Tabalebacetekela. Banamayo abengi tabakwete iskuku ukuya ku sukulu.

ⁱⁱⁱ Helen: This time, akale a long time ago, nalapela example from my parents he was selling green market, bamayo, there were very few abaleshitisha, majority banamayo tabaishibe, what they were doing is to depend on their husbands, because amahusbands incito balekwata, they were working in industries, industries were all over, and they were getting maybe a small amount of money as a salary but it had value because ifintu in shops they were much cheaper, tapali ukuliplila amaskulu fees, twalesenda muti wa free, akale balecita examine bwino bwino ... akale everything was free, even the books at school... ubwikashi bwa banamayo I think this time nabuya pamulu, why I say so it's because, akale banamayo baletitikishiwa because even if maybe ena namayo she's educated, tabalefwaya bashibantu that person to go and work, eco balefwaya she's a housewife, she cannot participate in anything, in political parties, you cannot go at the market and sell because her husband baletontokanya ukwebati maybe if she goes there aleumfwisha insoni 'why is she selling? Ninshi I'm not keeping her bwino bwino', so you know, a long time ago banamayo tbaletitikishiwa sana pantu abaume tabalefwaya ukwebati namayo kuti acita ifi and it can work, wamona? So muno mwine mu zambia, kali me I talk about my country, there were very few women who were working, there were very few who was at icisankano. balitikishiwa, tabalefwaya bashibantu bamoneka na ena namayo kuti abomba nalakwata indalama. Now this time na ena namayo is a human being, kuti acita cintu ico bashibantu bengacita, they can have money, no mwaume kuti akwata inda-? indalama.

^{iv} BanaMwila: Tatwaleshiba twalacula kuntanshi eco twaleupwila bwangu. Akale fintu fyali cheap, fyali nakilila umutengo.

^v Alice: Umwanakashi uwashala panghanda fye kuti eshiba fintu fingi?

Mike: Teti eshibe fintu fingi pantu ena mano tayali ayaswika mu cintu bwingi, tasangilwe na abantu abengi, takwetepo no mutwe wakwishiba ifyo engakala na bantu abengi nangu ifyo alesangwa na bona, wamona? nangu ukwenda fine fena ukwenda mu ma distances ayatali, ena takwetepo ubwishibilo bwino bwino, taishibe ifyo benda na bantu, ifyo bekala na bantu mu cisankano, so takwetepo bwishibilo nomba, teti amano elwike bwino

^{vi} Alice: Cupo cenu caliba shani?

Gloria: Balencusha, balintamfya, balikwata ubufubu [when she returned from church he'd ask, 'waciya kwisa?']

Alice: Bushe mwaletontokanya mwaletitikishiwa?

Gloria: Nalekala bwino. [she explains sometimes he went off for a month at a time, leaving small money for her] 1 month bafuma kunganda, bashilako kanono, [nomba at least] fintu fyalenakilile fya mutengo. Nalecula, natendeke akale, eco nakosela.

Alice: Bushe mwalefwaya ukufyuka?

Gloria: Ukufyuka ukuya kwi?... pantu amafunde yalikosa... nangu ku government, mulandu. Wafuma kunganda ulefwaya ukwendauka, government tabalefwaya, baletina amakwebo, takwaleba ukufuma panghanda.. nangu ncule te mulandu, kwikala fye, ukucila ukufuma panghanda. Ukukonka ifunda ya government. Balume --- ukuma. Apo icalengele, nga bafuma mukwendauka, nomba kwisa mukubepeshe mulandu, ninshi kukuma apo pene. Mulandu wa bwalwa.

Alice: Mwaipangile shani?

Gloria: Ukukuma fye, ukukuma tapali ukulandapo. Ulelila fye. Pantu balekwatapo maka.

Alice: Bushe mwabebele nangu umo?

Gloria: Inkama ya munganda, teti ulondolole nangu cimo.

Alice: Balemiuma imiku inga?

Gloria: Limo limo.

Alice: Bushe mwalekwata citemwiko?

Gloria: Bwino bwino fye... amaprayers, nalepepela mulanda pakucula pakuti bacenje... akale abanandi

nshakewate... Impia twalekwata muli Kaunda pantu mutengo walenakilile.

Alice: Mwaletontonkanya inshi pa imikalile ya balume benu?

Gloria: Twaletititkishiwa fye, ulemona kwati fili bwino, fili normal, kanshi tafiweme.

Alice: Ninshi tamulatampa ukushitisha, bushe mwalesakamana pafyo mwingakwanisha?

Gloria: Sana fye.

^{vii} BanaJessy: akale twalemona ulepitapo mu amacushi weka

Alice: Ninshi pantu?

BanaJessy: Ilyo tatulaamba ukusangwa na abantu abengi ku icisankano

^{viii} Mike: Nomba ilyo twapoka ubuntungwa abalwishe baume, nomba banamayo balisafumya insoni no mwenso. ico cine, twapela ukwilula abanesu, nga twaikala fye, iyoo 'kano fye umwaume, kano fye umwaume, kano fye umwaume, calo tapali apo caliya. Abene bakabana banamayo.

^{ix} BanaNkonde: ufwile ukunakilisha, mwaume emutwe wanganda, afwile ukukonka ifyo alanda, pakuti mu cupo mwikala bwino pantu nga wafuma apa wasanga cimo cine. Wibutuka, wikale.

Alice: Umwanakashi kuti alanda nga akwata itontonkanya?

BanaNkonde: Nakwata insambu yakulanda, pakulanda takuli kubomfya bukali ateka mutima pakulondolola.

Alice: Nga akana?

BanaNkonde: Afwile ukulolela mutima waikale. Bushiku bwapapita 4, elo futi kabili mwina mwakwe asuka, amweba, amwelela, fyapa. Nga akana ufwile ukukonka, mwaume nga akalipa, mwanakashi abwele panshi. Umuntu umo abwele kupanshi, umo mukulanda ninshi mwaumfwana.

^x Alice: Munjebe ico balekwata mwenso akale.

Suzie: Pantu amafunde yalekosa. Bena baKaunda, teti mwanakashi eminine pa platform ukulanda, tamwali banakashi mu parliament akale. Nga mwaya ku cupo balempela amafunde ya mucupo, 'uletina balume bobo, uleumfwa ifyo balelanda.

^{xi} Alice: nani afwaile mutampe amakwebo yenu?

BanaMwimba: nebo, ne mwine. Balume balekanya, balekwata ubufuba

Alice: mwashile shani?

BanaMwimba: balesa kumona twaamba ukucula elo basumina ati 'kabiye mukushitisha'

Alice: ilyo balekele incito elyo mwafaile ukutampa makwebo?

BanaMwimba: balekana 4 months...Amenshi twaisula fwe bene, illegal!

^{xii} BanaMwila: Inonshita te cisuma ukwikala panghanda, inonshita kusalapuka! namayo nomba tafwile ukwikala fye panghanda. Namayo na ena afwile ukulabomba, umulume alebomba, umukashi nao alebomba, in case incito yapwa, nangu balume bafwa, nomba ngolekala fye, walacita shani?

BanaChemba: tapali

BanaMwila: tapali

^{xiii} BanaMwamba: Umwanakashi tafwile ukwikala fye: afwile ukwafwa umutemwikwa wakwe pakuti ifintu fyalaanguka nga afwa.

^{xiv} BanaDavid: Akale banamayo tabaleshitisha, mulandu wa balume babo balebakanya wakulangufwisha [wakulangisha] insoni ku abanobe 'nshikusunga bwino'. Efyo baleba akale nomba inonshita fyalipilibuka. Inonshita abalume balakumbwa ukukwata mwanakashi uleeshitisha. 'kanshi uyu mukashi mwandi, alikosa'. Ifwe abashitisha bantu batukumbwa pantu tulafwailisha ulupwa lwesu. Balanda ati, 'balikosa', balekala bwino balya, mulandu wa bakashi babo balikosa ukushitisha'.

^{xv} Stephen: nalitemwa abanakashi ababomba, pakutila alebomba na ine ndebomba, bonse tuleafwilisha, tulesolvinga amaproblems, pantu kulaba nshilebomba ena alebomba, so problem nga yaisa, it's easy for ena ukunjafwe, wamona, nangu problem nga yamusanga tamukwete it's very easy ine kumwafwa. Nshilefwaya ulya umwanakashi uwakwebati tapali ifyo alecita, taishibapo fili fyonse, ndefwaya umuntu uwaile ku skulu

^{xvi} Helen: So now this time bashibantu balelanda ukwebati 'you know i have to marry someone who is doing something', why? it's because they have seen that even a woman can perform

^{xvii} Mary: banamayo balikwata ubwafya bwingi, economy ya nomba yalishupa shupa. Umwanakashi afwile ukwulwisha ukwafwa mwina mwakwe panghanda.

^{xviii} BanaMwamba: mwanakashi afwile ukwafwa umutemwikwa, panghanda, not ukulolela umutemwikwa, efyalenga namayo ukwiposauka, namayo tasanga [?] mwaume awe, aisa mwaume, ninkwata 100, iyoo nshikwete, kapoka nokubomfya mubili wandi. ninkosa ndelala panse, ndecita business, ndekwanisha fyonse ifyo ndefwaya, teti ndande umwaume ndefwaya 100 thousand, so teti ampele 100 thousand. ndesunga.. citemwiko kunghanda

Alice: banamayo abashifwaya ukubomba abene balakwata bwafya

BanaMwamba: ee, pantu ifyo tufwaya banamayo, fingi, so uyo takwete, ndefwaya citenge, kubula, ninkwata impia. 'isa twakana', twasakana impia yalipila abana sukulu. namayo kapata. business ni up and down, ifyo yaba. so afwile ukusuminsha. up and down. so ndefwaya ubwikashi ne ndalama. nomba nga nalolela... it's better twikala panshi, twaumfwana, tampa ukubombfya, nga twasanga

ubwafya panghanda.

^{xix} Rose: Inonshita [banakashi] abengi balakabila incito fya baume, nomba apa kutampila tabakwata. Balaba interested, amasecurity guards, ^{3/4} banakashi.

Alice: Abanakashi abafwaya incito sha baume, bushe bafwaya fye incito ishili shonse?

Rose: Abengi balafwaya incito. Nomba incito nga yaya kwingila yonse iyamoneka, nangu mwaume. Ninshi nalebomba nga cleaner, mukufwaisha incito. There was an extent I wanted to be a mortuary attendant, I was about even to write an application!. Maka maka icalenga imikalile abalume pamayanda tabaposako amano ku bana. Icisholeko fye banakashi ukufwaya incito ili yonse pakuti basunga abana nokutwala abana ku sukulu. Balume bandi baleya ku banyina mukubutuka mukusunga abana.

^{xx} Daisy: Akale abantu balelanda: ukaleke incito iyabomba abaume, ukaleke pantu incito ya baume.

Alice: ni nani uwalandilepo?

Daisy: Baume – abalumendo, bafwaya ndepyanga, ni jealous fye, balekwata ubufuba. [here] ubwafya tapaba, no problem in family, banakashi bapapa fye [didn't discourage]. Ubwafya bukulu, nomba kukosa fye, kali naisa mukubomba [then explains what the problem was] pantu bafwaya ukuleka incito, bengi balanda, they are still talking.

Alice: nani?

Daisy: abengi tabaile kusukulu. some they are just jealous

Alice: jealous of what?

Daisy: of work

Alice: why?

Daisy: maybe when i go out of work maybe they think they can replace there, maybe that's what they think – bush mechanics, he knows how to repair but he didn't go to school

Alice: does it affect you?

Daisy: no no

^{xxi} BanaNelson: Long ago, it was men who worked, so they controlled women

Alice: now women sell, there's a difference?

BanaNelson: ee, tabatukontolola sana, abaume. Abashishitisha balititikishiwa ku balume babo, muli fyonse, elyo balomba. Abashitisha balikwata ubuntungwa munghanda

BanaMwimba: ndalya bread, epo ndefwayako

BanaNelson: ndanwa Castle [examples of freedom]

Alice: londoleeni ifyo mwaumfwa ukutitikishiwa

BanaNelson: ee culture mu africa. tatukwete insambu shakucita ifyo tutemenwe fwe bene, ifya kupingula, ndefwaya ukuya kukitchen party, tabasuminisha.

Alice: ni lisa mwaumfwile ukutitikishiwa?

BanaNelson: kale, ninshi tatulatampa ukushitisha

Alice: munonshiku?

AliceNelson: takuli

^{xxii} Mary: umwaume alabomba, mwanakashi tabomba muli bwafya munghanda, pantu mwanakashi tabomba eco mwabele ubwafya munghanda elyo nomba akulakonka ifyo alelanda umwaume pantu tabomba...

Lucy: umwanakashi ushibomba teti aleya ukuli konse mukutandala. Umulume nga tamusuminisha teti ayeko. Pantu alelelela umulume ukumupela impia ishakutandala. Ulupia lulecepa panghanda, ukwilishamo abana, ecalenga ukupusana panghanda. Umwanakashi talekwata impia ishakushitamo fyakufwala, fyakulisha abana nokumoneka bwino ne mwine. Ecalenga ubupusano. Aleishiba ukuti mulume wakwe ewamusunga, afwile ukumfwila ifyo alanda.

Alice: londoleeni, banamayo, abanenu, abashibomba nangu kushitisha, bushe basumina nokukonka amashiwi yonse ya balume babo?

BanaHilda: ee, balasumina amafunde ya baume yonse, pantu tababomba. Banamayo abashishitisha nangu kubomba tabakwata mutende no buntungwa mu mayanda yabo

Alice: tabakwata ubuntungwa?

:- awe

Alice: tabalanda pa matontonkanya yabo?

BanaMwimba: teti apingule fili fyonse, nangu alanda ifyo atontonkanya.

Alice: banamayo abashishitisha bushe balapanda amano yabo pakupanga amapange munghanda?

BanaHilda: takwaba, umwaume fye [uwalanda]

BanaMakau: kali ewakwata impia.

^{xxiii} BanaMayuka: Banamayo mumayanda balititikishiwa sana

^{xxiv} Helen: Ilyo nakumenye bambi, bansambilishe kwebati nga waya kuBotswana ukwamba ukupanga profit ingi pantu kulya ifintu fyalinaka umutengo, much cheaper. KuBotswana, natampile ukuleta

amaty, amablankets, amadvd, amahome theatre.

Alice: Bushe mukwende calimipele icicetekelo [my bad bamba, it should be: bushe ulwendo lwenu lwalengele mwalikwata icicetekelo]

Helen: Kabili palya nalekumanya abantu abapusana pusana. Nalekwete insubilo ilya kuti naimina pali bacouncillor, abantu balinjishiba.

Alice: Ilyo mwatampile ukushitisha, ilyo mwapangile profit, bushe musango wenu wacanja? [bad bamba, should be: bushe elyo musango wenu wacenjele?]

Helen: Nalikwata confidence, nalisambilila fintu fingi, nalelanshanya na bantu abapusana pusana, pafyo na bena batampile business, nefyo baya pamulu mukupanga profit na amakwebo yabo. Twapangile bacibusa abengi na nasambilile pafyo amakwebo yabo. Nine nalitemwa ukwenda, ndesambilila fintu fingi. 'umwana ashenda atasha nyina ukunaya' [proverb]. Nga ndetontonkanya panganda teti njishibe ifyo banandi bacita. Cali shupa, tatwakakulwike.

^{xxv} Alice: Ninshi mwalekwata saloon, bushe mwaleisha na bacustomers benu pali fyupo fyabo?

BanaBecca: Bambi balelanda. Twaamba ukusambilila inshila sha kwikalalamo, amacustomers, they were coming with different stories. Ndepicking fimo fimo, naamba ukubika mu practice

Alice: cilangililo?

BanaBecca: Ukulanshanya

Alice: Bushe mwafwaile ukulanshanya ninshi tamulakwata saloon?

BanaBecca: Ukukabila, nalekabila nomba nshakwete apa kutampile. Nalekwata amthoughts mu thoughts. You just keep quiet minus saying anything. Nalemona abalepitapo mu amaproblems, balacimfya amafya ukupitila mukulanshanya so neo wine nalisalilepo ukulanshanya. Nge inshila yakupwishishamo amafya. Before that nshale-used ukucita associate na abantu abengi, kwati nalekale pa stand ninshi nshishibe ifyo abantu bekale. So before i do anything mfwile ukucita consult. Bushe, nalekala nga ubusha [slave].

Alice: Shani?

BanaBecca: Nga umuntu takwete insambu shakulanda pa amafya alepitamo... pa first naletontonkanya fili fye bwino, elo (then she had her saloon), naamba ukwiluka... inshila twalekaliliamo pali inshita tufwile ukucenja, pantu ifwe banamayo twalenyantililwe, tatwishibe insambu, twalemona ifibi, kwati fili fye bwino, pantu akale namayo afwile ukwikala panganda ukumona abana, emwaume uwafwile ukubomba. Twaambile ukucenja panono panono.

^{xxvi} BanaRuth: nalikwata icicetekelo apo natampile, pantu nga nashitisha abana tababa mu insala, ku sukulu baleya, nokufwala, balefwala. Apakulala nabakwata. Nalikula sana icicetekelo candi

Alice: Mulondolole ifyo mupilibwile pakulanda ati, 'nalikula sana icicetekelo candi'

BanaRuth: Nalikwata icicetekelo muli fyonse, ukulanshanya na bantu, cakulanda na bantu, pantu abantu eba tukula, ebatulanga amano. Akale, ninshi nalekala na balume bandi nalekwata icicetekelo muli bena. Ebansunga, nomba inonshita... nga mwashala panganda, muli mweka. Mubomba incito sha panganda. Nomba nga mwaisa muno mu icisankano, kulanda na bantu abengi abapusana pusana, pa muli abantu abengi.

Alice: Akale, tamwalelanshanya na bantu?

BanaRuth: Awe, kulanshanya na banono

Alice: Apo balume benu bafwile, mwalilanshanya na bantu abengi, mwalisunga abana benu, mwalikwanisha mweka. Pa icisankano mulanshanya pali inshi?

BanaRuth: Pali makwebo, ifyo wingasanga capital.

Alice: Akale bushe mwalekwata icicetekelo ukulanda na bantu abo tamwishiba? BanaRuth: [she says she wants her daughters to study], nga basambilila they will be ok, baice babili balikwata amano, G2 and G6, mukalamba takwata amano sana, tabelenga sana sana kunghanda]

Alice: icicetekelo

BanaRuth: pantu ndekwanisha fyonse neka, nangu nshikwete capital, icikulufi [as long as] ndi umumi [im healthy].....

Alice: Bushe mulomfwa insoni?

BanaRuth: Awe

Alice: Ninshi tamulatampa ukukwanisha fyonse mweka, bushe mwaile ku citente

BanaRuth: Ee, cimo cine... the more you are growing.. fwe bantu nga tulekala tulepitamo mu fintu fingi filenga ubupusano mu mikalile [way of life] na mu cicetekelo. Kuti nakwata icicetekelo ukulanda ifingi ukulingana nemo napita. Efyo nalandile kunuma, nefyo ningalanda palio lelo fyapusana. Munonshiku kuti nakoselesha muntu uwapitamo mubucushi ubo ine napitamo. Kuti nalanda fingi pantu nalipitamo.

^{xxvii} BanaNancy: Baume kali, teti balinganye amano fifty fifty, like for example, teti tulingane amano na mwina mwandi. Umwine mwandi alepitinkana, aleswangana mu fintu, abombapo, abomba. That is knowledge, so teti tulingane amano. things apo ningishiba nepo eshibe, ena alishiba ifintu. so iwe

walishiba ifintu fingi, so iwe walishiba fingi, ine nshaswangana, walasambilila sana ifintu. waile ku Twatasha, nshafikako. Nausambilila fintu fya ku Twatasha, so Nsengala ukupusana amano, ka?

Alice: Ngacakuti wakwata incito, elyo ukendauka nokukumanya abantu abengi, elyo mukalinganga..?

BanaNancy: Ee, kanshi na ine ndepitinkana, uko nshishibe eko.. waishiba ifishinka, walasanga ati bakweba, waumfwa ka? walaishiba, so ine mukupitinkana, ndebomba, twaamba ukukwata same knowledge.

Alice: So ngacakuti mwakwata incito nokukumanya abantu abengi, elyo mulingana no mwina mwenu?

BanaNancy: Kali, napitinkana, nasanga ati ico ndefwaya ifyo nshishibe, naisamipusha, aishiba, naisa ukusankanya amano.

Alice: So you think if you had a job and were meeting people then your intelligence would be the same as your husband's?

BanaNancy: Hmhm [nods]... ok, a man is a man, you cannot be the same, there's a difference, but some, ok, there's women have knowledge like man. like these nowadays, that's why gender is very important, because you find the ministers are banakashi, it depends how experience you have.

Alice: Are the ministers who are women the same as the ministers who are men?

BanaNancy: For example, where you stay, with BanaSibeso, the same as like a MAN! they meeting different people, they get knowledge. so they have knowledge like a man! 'ooh, i can do this and this'. Just staying at home, ahh, the whole day, you're just cooking ifishimu, can you have a knowledge? No. from you [referring to me]here you go to Kamitondo, you're getting knowledge, you're talking about what?

Alice: Pakukula amayanda kuKawama.

BanaNancy: Waumfwa. You're getting knowledge, 'twalacita shani?', nomba ine, just example, Nsengalapo, nshaishibe, Nsengalile ilya knowledge, i'll be dull. So ngolepitinkana you can be like a man

Alice: Do you be want to be like a man?

BanaNancy: Yah, to know everything. You, you are the same as like a man, moving up and down, to know everything.

^{xxviii} Susan: Abaume nalibacila, three quarters of them, nalibacila, ee

Alice: Kuti mwabacimfya?

Susan: Kuti nabacimfya [i show her the photos]

Alice: namwishiba shani?

Susan: nalecita compare, abaume balafilwa

Alice: balafilwa pakucitenshi?

Susan: ukubomba incito imo

Alice: ukushitisha balafilwa?

Susan: ee, abengi balafilwa, balalomba fye, balenwa bwalwa

BanaMwamba: bengi sana

BaShiMwamba: na ine wine ukulolela

Alice: tabaishiba ifyo kusunga impia?

Susan: tabasunga bwino, 'ndefwaya bwali'. abengi muno muzambia tabomba, babomba contract, babomba fye one month elo babatamfya,

^{xxix} Alice: ninshi mwalekula bushe mwaletontonkanya abaume balikwata amano ukucila banakashi?

BanaChola: ee, nomba inkulo ya inonshita naficinja. Banakashi nabakwatapo amano ukucila abaume

Alice: ninshi pantu?

BanaChola: fintu fyalipilibuka muno muZambia

Alice: fyalipilibuka shani?

BanaChola: banakashi ebasunga abaume nokusunga bana, nokubalipila indalama sha kusukulu... banamayo balibikilishapo'

^{xxx} Alice: bushe muletontonkanya banamayo ba inshita ya kale balekwata ubwafya?

BanaChola: ee

Alice: nshi?

BanaChola: banamayo tafwile ukubomba, ukushitisha, [they should instead] ukusangwa panghanda, pyanga nokusunga bana... ubwafya tabakwete tabalecula, ebabomba baume. Pantu ilyonshita abaume balebomba fyonse, balebakwanisha

Alice: bushe baletitikishiwa?

BanaChola: ee, tabakwete amarights panghanda fyonse mwaume. Tabasuminisha nangu cimo. Tabalebasuminisha nangu cimo. Cakuti kuti balandapo ku balume caumfwika

Alice: tabalepingula bonse pamo?

BanaChola: awe, tabakwete amapowers. Fyonse: yes, yes, yes. Pantu abaume fyonse balekwanisha panghanda lelo namayo takwatapo pocket money. Nga bantamfya, ndeya kwi? Tapali ukondeya.

Alice: bushe muletontokanya banamayo ba inshita ya kale balekwete insansa ukucila ba inshita ya lelo?

BanaChola: balekwete insansa ukucila aba lelo

Alice: nelyo tabalekwete maka, balekwete insansa?

BanaChola: ee, nelyo tabalekwete maka, insansa balekwete

M: nimfulungana

BanaChola: happy is better than power

Alice: nomba, munonshiku, bushe muletontokanya ati banamayo abashishitshia balititikishiwa?

BanaChola: baliba slow minded

[another] tatwatemwa ifwe ukulabomba pantu abalume tabomba

M: nomba bushe muleumfwa insansa pakulanda 'itoloshi kunuma, citenge kuntanshi'

BanaChola: awe, tatumfwa insansa. Incito yesu yabashitata

^{xxxix} BanaChola: nomba tulecula. nalisatitikishiwa pa lwandi pantu nalisasanguka mwaume. Naamba ukubomba milimo ya baume. ...amatontokanya yalisafula sana, baliba disturbed mind.

Balibwelamo inonshita

^{xxxix} Helen: ukutitikishiwa. Banamayo abengi inonshita balititikishiwa - banamayo inonshita they are not free, pantu responsibility, akale tabalebomba, inonshita it's their responsibility. Akale namayo, incito yabo, if i get married ninshi capwa, nomba this time uleisanga ukwebati ifyo tawile ukubomba ifyo wabomba, to earn a living, so namayo ifyo talebomba akale efyo alebomba nomba so aletitikishiwa pantu limbi umulume wakwe tafwile tabomba, fili fyonse akacita pantu akale bashibantu balekwata incito so bashibantu abengi they were helping, nomba bambi balecita retire, bambi balecita prune, so namayo naamba ukutitikishiwa, responsibility ileya,...balitikishiwa mulandu ukwebati where a man can do a woman is doing it, it's very difficult. Whatever we are planning it's only you, not a man, so it's not easy, when you're planning for something you have to be both, a male and a female, not one headed, you are only alone, planning for anything, ah, it's really bad.

^{xxxix} BanaBecca: In short twaambile ukulanshanya

Alice: Ni nani uwatampile ukwakana amatontokanya yabo?... ukucita share amatontokanya yabo?

BanaBecca: Ni nebo, Mapalo ulanda ciBemba deep! Pa first calikosele, ukukonka insambu sha banamayo, pride epo ali. Tabalefwaya ukushikonka. Nomba pali inonshita bali ubupusana.

Alice: Ninshi balicenja?

BanaBecca: Ukupitilamo ifyo ndecita ine bamona ifyo ndecita, muleba progress. At the end bena baamba ukucenja. Tulafwilishanya ukusunga lupwa panghanda, ukwisunga pantanshi.

Alice: Abakanakumona mwalibombesha kuti bacenja?

BanaBecca: Awe, teti bacenje. Cimbi icalenga balikwata icilumba ukwebati, 'tapali ifyo ningacita'.

^{xxxix} Alice: Ninshi mwalekala panghanda apabula amakwebo, bushe mwalekwata icicetekelo pakulanda na bena?

BanaMwimba: Awe, not sana. Kabili nga bafola impia shalekumanina bwino, shalecepa. Nga ndanda, teti amfwike.

Alice: So ni bena abakwanisha impia beka?

BanaMwimba: Hm hm [concur].

Alice: Bushe mwaleisusha amatontokanya yenu?

BanaMwimba: Awe, tatwalesusha amatontokanya yesu. Ebaume abashupa fye.

Alice: Bena balesusha amatontokanya yesu? Apo mwatampile ukukwanisha mwe bene, balimicetekela?

BanaMwimba: Ee, 'kanshi umukashana nakwata amano ayasuma, kuti twasungana'. Pantu balemona tapali ifyo ningacita.

^{xxxix} Gloria: Akale baletususha, ati, 'namayo tapali ifyacita]

Alice: Balileka ukumisusha lilali?

Gloria: Abantu ilyo baishiba ukuti twabomba na ifwe, elyo balekele ukutusha.

^{xxxix} Alice: Ndefwaya ukwishiba ico bantu balitampa ukwingisha banamayo ukupingula mu fililo.

BanaMwimba: Pantu balimona banamayo ukuti balikwata amano.

Alice: Nomba akale tabaletontokanya banamayo balekwata amano?

BanaMwimba: Akale banamayo tabalebapenda.

Alice: Batampile ukubapenda lilali?

BanaMwimba: 2000s

Alice: Munonshiku bushe bapenda banamayo bonse nangu abakwata amakwebo fye?

BanaMwimba: Maka maka abakwata makwebo. Bambi abashikwata makwebo te sana sana.

^{xxxix} BanaMayunda: Alikwata respect sana. Nga aisa bamusekelela bwino, ukumukumbatila, ukunaya bwali, na menshi ayakusamba bwangu bwangu no kwipika inkoko... Umuntu uwafwilisha ulupwa alakwata mucinshi no kutemwikwa na mapalo.

^{xxxviii} Alice: Munjebe ifyo mwateremwa ukumona banamayo balecita.

BanaMwimba: Ukutungulula, ukubombesha, imilimo ishibomba bashibantu, ukulungulisha motoka, ukupyanga mu musebo, milimo ya pa mugodi, driver (trucks), ifyalenga icipale ne cilumba.

^{xxxix} Solomon: Tulabatasha, tulafwana.

^{xl} Samuel: We came together and saw her lying down under the motorcar and I said, 'I'm very surprised', 'Have you ever seen a girl in a garage?', 'No, this is my first time'. I was impressed, very very impressed. The very day we approached her we started asking her some questions, about how she became a mechanic... She even started teaching us. Alikwata icicetekelo mu fyacita and pakulanda. Customers are surprised, they are so impressed. [some] Abaume bamo balanda ati, 'bikweenipo mwaume abombeko bwangu', but the foreman insists, 'awe, alabomba uyu wine'.

Owen: Alikosa sana uku. She has inspired me very much when it comes to the way she works. She's not married, she's a single woman, with sisters. She does everything in the house, but not married. Akale naletontokanya kwati mwanakashi uwekala fye eka teti akwate ubwikashi ubusuma kwati Daisy.

Alice: Ninshi pantu?

Samuel: Kali girls went for early marriages.

Owen: [seeing Daisy] it makes me to increase the faith in women. Daisy is a woman and she is just like other women. it's just 'cos she's determined in what she's doing, not lazy. she's not like those who think, 'I cant do this 'cos I'm a woman'. She just do things on her own.

Alice: Bushe ukumona Daisy akwata fyonse ifyo afwaya apabula mwaume icalenge wacetetekela banakashi bambi? Mulandu uwalenga watampile ukucetekela banakashi ekumona Daisy?

Owen: Ee, mulandu walengele ucetekela banakashi bambi namwene Daisy uubomba ku autorepair alalungisha motoka: ukubombesha, ukusunga baice bakwe nokutwala kusukulu, ukubomba milimo ya baume, living without a man, that's also important.

Alice: So seeing Daisy has changed your views about women?

Owen: Very much, if they become more determined in what they're doing. Some women they think, 'I'm just a woman'. If she only forget that then she can do it. 'Cos there are some women, they are married, but nothing she can do on her own, she will always just wait for the man. But there are some things she can do to help the family, like start up a business, other than just sitting home, waiting for a man to buy food. As for Daisy, she can just be married just 'cos she wants to not to, not the fact that she NEEDS help. She's able to live on her own. Daisy is just like other women, we all have five senses, but other women underrate themselves.

Alice: Now you have more confidence in all women? [both agree]

Owen: E.g. Dora Siliya.

^{xli} BanaJacqueline: ifwe tuli mu system, natukwata icisubilo, twaingilile akale mu people's process. so twalikwata icisubilo akale, 'namayo afwile ukubomba, kuti akula, namayo kuti alima, namayo kuti aimba foundations', twalisa akale. Nomba abantu baleseka, 'ah, ninshi mucita apo pene? mwaangala fye'. Nomba inonshita, twakulako, balatasha, 'oh, ifyo mulecita kanshi, muli amano', nomba tulabomba, abaisa pa monday babomba, baya, abaisa pa tuesday babomba, baya, wednesday, thursday, friday, saturday, sunday. Nomba twali abengi pano, ifyo fine, twaba, ama thousands, amathousands. Fyonse tutashe lesa

Alice: so ulupwa lweni bushe bamicetekela sana munonshiku?

BanaJacqueline: yes, 'my mother is doing something good'

BanaBwembya: abapalamina balatupela mucinshi sana, ati, 'imwe banamayo namuamba ukubomba incito [word missing]', bambi balanda 'awe, mulecula fye', nomba bamo abatumona ifyo tulebomba baletasha ati 'mwe banamayo mulebomba incito ikulu, kabili isuma', baleba abanabo, ati 'banamayo bantu bakosa balebomba incito sana', nomba bambi batina, balemona kwati tuleangala.

Alice: munonshiku bushe kwaba incito sha baume ne incito sha baume?

BanaBwembya: shinonshiku natumona tapali incito sha baume na sha banakashi, pantu incito iyo tulebomba ifwe nincito sha baume, but tulebomba.

Alice: so abanakashi kuti babomba mu mugodi?

BanaBwembya: abanakashi kuti babomba mu mugodi.

Alice: banakashi na baume, bushe balilingana?

BanaBwembya: tatwalingana, twalipusana, lelo, abaume balikosa, balikwata amaka, ifwe tatwakwata sana amaka. Nomba mu matontokanya twalilingana ukubomba incito, ubupusano mu matontokanya tapali. Nomba abanesu Lesa abapele amaka sana, ifwe twakonka panuma. Nomba mu matontokanya tatwapusana.

Alice: abapalamina bushe bamipela umucinshi ukulu ukucila inshita ya kale?

BanaBwembya: abeshibe nabasumina tulebombesha, nensoni, baleumfwa fye insoni pafyo baletususha baletuseka, nomba baleumfwa insoni pantu nabomfwa nokumona. Fwe bene nokubeba

tatwebeba, awe, nomba fya bene baletutula, 'ah, mwabombeeni', not filya balecita ilya, nangu ndepita bashala baleisha ati, 'balecula babaya mukulala nakacola', nomba shinonshiku ni 'mwa-bom-be-eni!'. Nabatumfwa ati namubomba ifitundulu. Abene beka.

^{xliii} Chilando: Kwalipusana sana fye, ku mushi na ku town. Banamayo ebabomba imilimo yonse ku mushi. Mwino mwine mu town, abaume baleipika nokwafwilisha ukuwasha nomba ku mushi teti! Balangafwako ..

Balimona banamayo baya kumarket, tulebomba, tuleisa ku market, tulenaka, balisa ukwafilishanya

Alice: bushe balikwata abanabo abasuka imbale

Chilando: bengi

Alice: bushe mwalenaka akale?

Chilando: twalenaka nomba tabaumfwile uluse

Alice: ninshi tabaumfwile uluse akale?

Chilando: kali ku mushi amafunde yalikosa, balekuseka. Kuno basanga abanabo baleefwilisha abakashi babo. Kumushi fyalipusana.

Alice: bushe basuka imbale libili libili?

Chilando: limo llimo fye, limbi after 2 or 3 weeks

Alice: te cila bushiku?

Chilando: awe, kali balabomba [he makes flower pots]

Alice: banamayo abekala kumushi, bushe batontontokanya balatitikishiwa?

Chilando: balishiba nomba insambu tabakwata

^{xliiii} BanaMayuka: Ukushitisha, wakwata impia, wasambilisha mwana, nomba pampela ya amasambililo yakwe afilwa ukusanga ncito nangu ukufilwa ukuya ku college pa mulandu wa calo ifyo ciletekwa buluku bululuka, kano teka bwino. Fintu fyonse fili expensive, ecalenga mutima ukukalipa fwe bafyashi. Twaiminina mu mapolitics ukucenja buteko, ubushiteka bwino... industry yalionauka, tamwaba... to sensitise amamarket traders, ukubelula amano...

Alice: Balume benu batontontokanyapo shani?

BanaMayuka: Each have rights to follow what they want... But sensitise abantu cila bushiku.

Alice: Nimpapa ukumfwa banamayo bafulile ukucila bashitata.

BanaMayuka: Inonshita we are all jacked up. Inonshita twalisalapuka, these days ni 5050, tulelingana fye... 2008 baSata baponene ukusalwa banamayo cabakalipa sana, elyo baiminine mukwimbamo mu maproblems pantu tabcetekela baSata kuti bapona...

^{xliiv} BanaHilda: pakusala umuntu, ukuba intungulushi tufwile ukumona ifyo aba, tatulolesha ati pantu mwanakashi, awe, tulolesha pafyo akosa. Ngacakuti cabupe cabo kuti atungulula bwino na baume batasha. Capwa.

Alice: so munonshiku abantu tabatontontokenye ni mwanakashi fye?

BanaHilda: awe. Akale banakashi tabaleposelako amano pakutungulula, nomba bamona ukuti tapali abakubalandilako. Bafwile ukukwata muntu uwakubalandilako.

^{xliiv} Alice: Muletontontokanya inshi pali intungulushi shanakashi?

BanaJessy: Shiletwalilile, shileya pantanshi. Balikwatako imituma ya luse, kali balimona amafya tupitamo, fwe banamayo, ifyo tuculamo, pakukusha abana.

Alice: Akale kuti mwavotela intungulushi yanakashi?

BanaJessy: Akale tatwaleposako amano pakusupporta intungulushi yanakashi.

Alice: Akale tamwaleishiba ukuti banakashi bambi balepitapo amacushi yenu?

BanaJessy: Akale twalemona ulepitapo mu amacushi weka.

Alice: Ninshi pantu? Pantu musangwa na abantu abengi ku icisankano.

BanaJessy: Ilyo tatulaamba ukusangwa na abantu abengi ku icisankano.

^{xlivi} BanaNkandu: Pantu balemona ubucushi ubu tulapitamo.

BanaBecca: Cimo cine, ena apitamo. Abaume baliba ne fifulo imyaka inga.

BanaNkandu: Abaume baletuteka sana. Abaume batubombela. So pa ama elections tulefwaya abanakashi.

BanaBecca: Abanakashi pakuti kuti bameeting amademands yesu...

Alice: Akale ilyo mwamwene intungulushi shanakashi, bushe mwaletonkanya amoile fye?

Both: Amouile...

BanaNkandu: Akale twaletontontokanya intungulushi shanakashi teti shilondole fishinka... akale baume balikwata sana amano. Twalebacindika abaume sana fye, sana fye. Akale banakashi bafwile balibeka, tatwalecita associate, takwali ukucita associate.

^{xlvii} BanaRuth: ifwe tufwile tulatemwa ukukwata intungulushi shanakashi pantu namayo ewasunga bantu, so namayo tafwile alecula. Bonse basuma. Mu intungulushi mufwile mwaba banamayo na bashitata pakuti baleakana amano, balelanshanya

Alice: bushe muletontontokanya banamayo balibelela ukuba mu minwe ya intungulushi shaume?

BanaRuth: awe, tulefwaya na ifwe ukukwata intungulushi banamayo abengi. Tulefwaya tufume mu

minwe ya bashitata

Alice: elo bushe muleumfwa muli mu minwe ya bashitata?

BanaRuth: hmm hm [agrees]... pantu intungulushi ishingiri bashitata bafulamo

Alice: ninshi mulefwaya ukufuma mu minwe ya bashitata?

BanaRuth: tatulefwaya ukufuma amano ya bashitata yeka, tulefwaya ukufuma na amano ya banamayo

Alice: mwatampile ukufwaya intungulushi shanakashi lilali?

BanaRuth: last of last year

Alice: finshi fyalengele mwatampile ukubafwaya?

BanaRuth: [abaume] baletufyenga ifwe. Namayo mwine kuti eshiba ifyo tufwaya pantu alepitapo.

Twalelolola amaelections, kwakwata amaelections

Alice: ilyo baiminine, elyo mwatampile ukufwaya intungulushi shanakashi shingi?

BanaRuth: ee. Kunuma nali mupya mu market, so nshaishibe nangu cimo, nshaishibe nefyo abalimo balitontokanya. nomba, inonshita, ninkokola, nimbona na bena intungulula. tulefwaya intungulushi shanakashi nomba abaiminina takwaba. Twalemwene intungulushi shanakashi shali ishinono, twalilolela amaelections nomba banamayo abaimininie bali fye batatu. Nga kwali banamayo abengi abaiminine, nga twalibavota.

Alice: so, lisa, mu bumi bwenu, bushe mwatampile ukufwaya intungulushi shanakashi?

BanaRuth: nga wakula, waamba kumona ubucushi elo wingshiba intungulushi ingafwaikwa

^{xlviii} Nancy: shinonshiku natufumyapo mwenso

Alice: so tamuletontokanya intungulushi shimbi shimisusha nangu shimitwishika?

Nancy: ee, kulingana efyo cile, bambi baletwishiku kuti bateka nomba pali shinonshiku kuti twateka, abatwishika bakesamweneko pantu uno mwaka tulefwaya change

Alice: pakulanda na bena zanama, bamo bamo balikwata bwafya ukucetekela banamayo. umuntu umo alandile ati mwanakashi kuti atoba mushi

Nancy: [laughs]

Scott: awe, awe, bufi. pali shinonshiku kubwesha calo kunuma, amatontokanya yamusangwa baMapalo [Alice], ebalebwesha calo kwisa? kunuma. inonshita tatukwata mwaume no mwanakashi, ukulingana icilonganino cesu ca PF pantu bonse ukukosa, twalimona twalibe fye cinga? cimo. pantu limbi ine mwaume muli fimo fimo nokutontokanya ukwebati apandwik... nomba namona banamayo ebali kuntanshi ebalikosa mu fyonse ifyo balecita, cinshi nalatwishikila?

Alice: munonshiku bushe intungulushi shaume shicetekela intungulushi shanakashi?

Scott: inonshita, ine intungulushi nincetekela, ukubikapo intungulushi ishakalamba isho twakwata. Natukwata icicetekelo ukwebati intungulushi shanakashi kuti shabombesha nokucilapo nefwe bene ifwe intungulushi shaume, pantu amaka ayo bakwata banamayo pali shinonshiku,

[my phone rings - Joe]

Alice: so natukwata icicetekelo cikalamba ukwebati intungulushi shanakashi kale lilya pantu icalengele tukwata icicetekelo pakale muli banamayo mulandu ukwebati banamayo balikwata mwenso, tabaishibe ico baimininipo no ico baba mu bumi. pali shinonshiku baliiluka nokwishiba ati tapali nangu cimo icingabomba bashitata ifwe twingafilwa, pali shinonshiku bonse banamayo, ukulingana. Banamayo kuti babombesha ukucila ifwe baume

[my phone rings]

Alice: namwishiba shani kuti balikosa?

Scott: ifyo twalishiba kuti balikosa, ukulingana, akanshita twabomba mu kabongwe ka fikansa fya calo, ukumona banakashi ababombesha pantu bena mu icilonganino cesu ca branch muno mwine mu cisokone, natukwata banamayo abalebombesha apabula mwenso, pantu tuli ne amafya ayengi BaMapalo [Alice] mufwe, ilo twaambile[word unclear] twisule kano kene kabungwe kwaliba akaswa, twalikwata banamayo abakosa, ebali kuntanshi pakutungulila cino cine tulemona mu chisokone, ebo twakwata. bambi ebalinga, aba kuntanshi ebakulilapo ebaiminine efyo fwe bashitata tulaima nokwima...

Scott: Twabomba na banamayo, nokwikala, lelo banamayo abene batontokanya ebalanda mutitikisha muno m market ufumyepo. ifwe fweka fweka bashitata ulya mutitikisha, elo twaisamona maka ya banamayo, ukukosa nokupambana, baima mu bwingi, nefwe bashitata twaima mu bwingi, nokwikatana. elo banamayo abengi ebali kuntanshi so ni mu 2008, elo bashiletintananghombe ukutila bamonesha ukukosa balanda ukukosa kuli ifwe fwe baume...

A: banamayo batampile ukukosa lilali?

M: ukufuma 2001, naishilemonako panono, ukucefya mwenso ne nsoni. imikalile naishupa, so abena beka balolesha bakwata bwishibilo mu mikalile balekala, balisambilisha kuli bena, ico baishileiminina abengi, mu 2008, nokwebati nefwe bene nomba katwibimba muli cintu, mukupambana, and cacine banamayo balikwatapo maka nokucila bashitata.

^{xlix}Translated sections: Matthew: Akale twalelanda, teti bacite ifi fintu, sunga bwino mayanda, sunga bwino ulupwa, nokulasunga calo bwino bwino, tatwaishibe.

Alice: so akale mwaletwishika banamayo, nokutontokanya 'tapali nangu cimo engacita'

Matthew: icalengele banamayo akale, mulandu banamayo akale tabaleipelesha sana ukwingila mu tubungwe, solvinga maproblems, baposele sana mano pamayanda as housewives, and small issues but concerning the big issues like utubungwe tulya twa fikansa fya calo, solvinga maproblems aya lekana lekana tabaleifumyamo...

Matthew: twaishilemona, twaisaamba nokumona kanshi banakashi nabo balikwata mano, elo twalikwata na maka elo balikwata nobutungulushi, kanshi na bena bantu na tuba babili, twaleamba nokumona fintu fyaamba ukucinja... After twaishilemona, twaisaamba nokumona kanshi banakashi nabo balikwata mano, elo twalikwata na maka elo balikwata nobutungulushi, kanshi na bena bantu na tuba babili, twaleamba nokumona fintu fyaamba ukucinja...

ⁱ Chezo: Twalebomba pamo, twaleba equal, tatwalemoneka difference baume na banakashi.

ⁱⁱ Alan: Banamayo banono so amatontokanya yacepa. The ratio is very bad. Icilangililo ca amatontokanya ya baume yalipusana na banakashi.

ⁱⁱⁱ Charity: Akale naletontokanya 'teti mbombe' nomba namona ifyakucita fyashupa, nasalapo ukubomba.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ BanaBecca: Nelyo nalikwete amano naletontokanya ukuti baume balicilapo pali ine, not knowing ukwebati ine mwine nalibacila bambi.

^{liv} BanaBecca: Akale ukonka fye, nangu nafiweme nangu tafiweme, ukukonka fye.

Alice: Ninshi tamwalepingula akale?

BanaBecca: Tatwalekwata insambu shakulandapo, umwaume is the head. Ifyo apingula mwaume ufwile ukukonka, icalenga cimbi ukupwa, upitapo amainstructions: umwaume nga alanda ufwile ukwikala tondolo.

Alice: Bushe mwalefwaya ukulandapo?

BanaBecca: Tatwaletonkanya ati fibi, fyonse twalefimonu fye bwino, mulandu ukwebati ninshi tatulailuka. Fyaletucusha mumutima mwalesunga fye mu mano yobe, nga mwamwene tafiweme.

Alice: Bushe mwalekwata mwenso?

BanaBecca: Ee, mwenso, pali inonshita balume bali arrogant sana abaume.

Alice: Abalume benu bali arrogant akale? Balecitenshi?

BanaBecca: Nga wakana, ubwafya kuli bena, nomba pali inonshita fyalicenja.

Alice: Bushe mwatambile ZNBC pamo ilyo mwasambilile pansambu shenu?

BanaBecca: Yalisa twice, radio, baumfwile pa icilimba, 'iseni tuumfweko', I said. Ninshi nalekale mu sitting room, nakusha volume, balelanda, abantu bengacenza from past way of living, balundapo. Balikutika nomba. Tabalandile nangu fimo nomba abena balicenja. Tulalanshanya pali fili fyonse. Balefilwa ukucenja pamukumo, kwaliba amaprogrammes ayengi, pa Monday, 10 hours, Wednesday and Sunday. Pa first calikosele, ukukonka insambu sha banamayo, pride epo ali. Tabalefwaya ukushikonka. Nomba pali inonshita bali ubupusana.

Alice: Ninshi balicenja?

BanaBecca: Ukupitilamo mu masambililo na ificitwa fyandi [ama deeds]. Ukupitilamo ifyo ndecita ine bamona ifyo ndecita, muleba progress. At the end bena baamba ukucenja.

Alice: Abakanakumona mwalibombesha kuti bacenja?

BanaBecca: Awe, teti bacenje. Cimbi icalenga balikwata icilumba ukwebati, tapali ifyo ningacita.

^{lv} David: nomba nshaposeleko amano pali fintu fya gender, natontokanye ati tufwile ukulemba fye capwa.

^{lvi} Annette: tabaposako amano, balaseka fye, bali kwati kwangala

^{lvii} BanaMayuka: bambi balisusha, ati 'awe, namayo, teti ateke', balekana, 'teti fibombe, tatutungulule... ukubomba kuti twabomba, nomba ukutungulula, teti tutungulule'. Baletina bashibantu aba mu government, nga tabasuminisha na mayo ukutungulula. Nomba pali inonshita balisuminisha.

^{lviii} Nancy: abo abalelanda pali gender balelandapo fye

Alice: bushe ikalamba ukumona nangu kumfwa pali gender?

Nancy: tulamona fye, twamona umwanakashi alelungisha amalights, umwanakashi, ah, ati, 'umwanakashi uyu alikosa'. ukumona icikalamba sana sana, wamona, waimona, kuti waumfwa. pantu tatuufwa ku icilimbi, tuleumfwa fye. nomba nga wamona ukwebati uyu umuntu alelungisha amalights, wakumona nokumona, ninshi naucetekela, nimmumona, alebomba.

^{lix} Alice: bushe mwaliumfwa pali gender?

BanaJessy: ee, [to BanaBecca] kuti nalondola shani?

BanaBecca: equality. Umwanakashi kuti abomba incito sha baume, no mwaume kuti abomba incito sha banakashi.

^{lx} BanaMayuka: NGOCC balandile ati, 'banamayo iseni tubombe, not ukulekela bashibantu beka ifwe tatupusana na bashibantu, twaliba fye cimo cine, mufwile ukubomba pa lwenu...incito shingabomba bashibantu namayo kuti abomba'.

^{lxi} Chola: ifwe bakafunda abo twakwata, balanda ati, tufwile ukulakoselesha fwe banakashi, kulaishimpa imilimo ilebomba abaume pakuti abaume balemona ati tatwaba weak fwe banakashi, nefwe kuti twacita ifyo balefwaya ukucita, ifyo yaba

^{lxiii} Alice: bushe mwalandile na balume benu ilyo mwaile ku NGOCC?

BanaMayuka: [my husband] balandile ati, 'wacita bwino sana', balitemwa sana, balishiba bakashi babo tabakwete ubwafya nga tabalipo nangu bafwa.

^{lxiii} Alice: Mwacilanda ati, mukabafunda ukunakilila.

Nancy: Ee.

Alice: Ukunakilila shani?

Nancy: ifyo ufwile ukwikala no mulume obe, ena aba pamulu na mulume aba panshi, awe. Pantu umutwe wanghanda, mwaume. Umwanakashi nga aya ukuba mutwe wanghanda, inghanda kuti yaonauka. so tufwile ukumufunda.

Nancy: [answers phone, speaks to her sister in Kasama]

Alice: Mwacilanda mwaume afwile ukuba pamulu, kuti mwampela icilangililo icakulanga ifyo aba pamulu?

Nancy: ngefyo twalelanda mailo pali gender, tatufwile ukusenda gender. Afwile ukubomba, ifunde...

Alice: So amayanda yalaonauka ngacakuti mwaume atampa ukunaya bwali?

Nancy: Ee, kunauka, ukuyafwayako umbi mwanakashi, na family yakwe yalaminisha 'fwaya umbi mwanakashi ulatemwa mwanakashi', mwamona ifyo besa ukulanda, te mwanakashi tabamufunda kuli ine, takwete ifunde iyafuma kuli ine, ena... Mulepingulushanya, mwanakashi kuti alanda ifyakwata mano nombamba umwaume ico alefwaya, uyo mwanakashi afwile ukukonka, kuti wacikonka.

Alice: Mufwile ukukonka ifyo alanda, pantu ngacakuti wakana, kuti abutuka?

Nancy: Kutu aleka, kuleka, kuno kuZambia fyupo filapwa... Nga taukonka amafunde, alafwaya munobe, ee. Elo umunobe akesa mukubomba ukulingana nefyo amufundile... fyupo fyapwa, amadivorce nayafula, nabonaula intambi, pantu we mwanakashi nga waupwa mwaume, ufwile ukucita fyonse panghanda we mwanakashi, pali incito shimo mwaume kuti abomba, nombamba te shonse, mwamona? kupyanga. Nga ine nshilepo kungghanda, ndi ku market, mwaume ali kungghanda ndeisa 'naya', cifwile ifyo nombamba fyongo. 'naciya ku market, iwe tauteka nangu cimo nangu bwali!' Ni gender. So gender taiweme.

Alice: Ninshi taiweme? nga mwaisa kuno mukushitisha na balume tababomba, kuti bashala kungghanda nokunaya?

Nancy: Kutu aipikila mukashi wakwe nga amona nanaka, nombamba te lyonse fye, te cifwile ukuba awe [break]. Gender tafiweme, kuntanshi bakafumyapo. gender mulebombela pamo, not mu mayanda, awe. Mu mayanda tamufwile ukuba gender, awe, gender mu government, mu macito, uko mulebomba eko kufwile ukuba gender.