Everyday (In)Security / (Re)securing the everyday:
Gender, policing and violence against women in Delhi

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A thesis submitted to the Gender Institute of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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- Declaration -

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This thesis was supported by an
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) studentship
This thesis contributes to the literature seeking to reconceptualise human security from a critical feminist perspective. It argues that security is a field of power, implicated in context-specific ways in the (re)production of gendered violences, and that human security must account for how such violences are (re)produced *in and through the everyday*. It explores how socially and historically embedded security institutions, discourses and practices are implicated in ‘the (violent) reproduction of gender’ (Shepherd 2008), taking as a case study Delhi Police’s initiatives to address violence/crime against women, in response to the city’s notoriety as India’s ‘rape capital’.

Drawing on 86 in-depth interviews and 6 months of observational fieldwork with Delhi Police, the thesis shows that Delhi Police have found innovative ways of doing ‘security’ which depart from its association with (masculinist) authority and protection, and which apprehend violences embedded in the everyday. However, the effects are contradictory and ambivalent. Despite challenging some aspects of gender relations, the policing of violence/crime against women also reproduces conditions which enable and sustain the violence. The thesis explores how police discourses construct violence in terms of vulnerability and responsibility, in ways which both normalise and exceptionalise certain violences, and map gendered safety onto normative ideas of sexual integrity such as to reproduce the heteronormativity of marriage as a compulsory institution for women. It investigates the spatial and temporal distancing through which violence/crime against women is constructed, and the consequent reproduction of class differentiation and identification, and normative gender and sexuality. It considers how the unstable gendering of policing, and police work, intersects with and contributes to such constructions of violence/crime against women, and their discursive effects.

The thesis concludes with a qualified and partial recuperation of human security as emancipatory – where emancipation is conceived as transforming oppressive power relations, and power is understood in a Foucauldian sense as pervasive, unstable and productive. It highlights the limits of security, and the relativity of its achievability.
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I use the following symbols when presenting fieldwork material:

*“Italicised in double quotation marks preceded by an asterisk”*: interview or other recorded speech, transcribed, translated from Hindi into English

“Italicised in double quotation marks”: interview or other recorded speech, transcribed, originally in English

non-italicised text followed by an asterisk* or double asterisk**: word or phrase in Hindi, originally uttered in Hindi amid speech uttered in English [*translation supplied in brackets at the end of the quote] [**translation]

… : omitted speech

[italicised text]: explanatory or linking text added by researcher/author to contextualise or make comprehensible the respondent’s speech

[text]: additional information

{text}: interviewer’s/interpreter’s speech

Quotations not formatted in any of the above ways are either not direct citations of speech, or not from fieldwork material but from secondary sources.
# List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addl.DCP</td>
<td>Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASI</td>
<td>Assistant Sub-Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAWC</td>
<td>Crimes Against Women Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>United Nations Convention Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRI</td>
<td>Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Commissioner of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCP</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCW</td>
<td>Delhi Commission for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVAW</td>
<td>United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt.</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>In-Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JtCP</td>
<td>Joint Commissioner of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCRB</td>
<td>National Crime Records Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCICs</td>
<td>Rape Crisis Intervention Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBRD</td>
<td>Police Bureau of Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Sub-Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SpCP</td>
<td>Special Commissioner of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI India</td>
<td>Transparency International India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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</table>
The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives
UNDP (1994: 1)

If our topic is ‘human security’, we should begin by admitting that no woman, from pre-birth to advanced old age, has it.
Martha Nussbaum (2005: 167-8)

Asking different questions, questions that arise by focusing on (women’s) everyday experience, lead to fundamentally different understandings of security.
Annick Wibben (2011: 87)

Human security is the idea that individual human beings, rather than the sovereign state, should be the referent object of security, and that a wide range of interconnected factors beyond external military attacks constitute threats to human life and dignity (UNDP 1994; Commission for Human Security 2003; Alkire 2003). As a normative ideal, human security has infiltrated the highest levels of Western, supranational security policy and praxis, with sometimes contradictory effects (see Marhia and Davies 2013). It has been unevenly mainstreamed into security thinking and policy since the 1990’s, while research and research programmes devoted to it have proliferated\(^1\), prompting claims of a ‘paradigm shift’ (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 19-21).

Human security speaks to the concerns of feminist security scholars in a number of ways, not least by privileging human life, dignity and safety over securing territorial borders, ostensibly challenging the reification of the sovereign state, emphasising interrelationships between

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\(^1\) Such as, inter alia: the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at Oxford, the Civil Society and HS Research Unit at LSE, and the Human Security Applied Research Centre (ARCHS) at Coventry in the UK; the Human Security Report Project, an independent research centre affiliated to Simon Fraser University (SFU), Vancouver, Canada, which manages the Human Security Gateway (a research and information database) and publishes the Human Security Report; and the Ford Institute for Human Security at the University of Pittsburgh in the US.
multiple threats and acknowledging structural violences. As well as attracting interest, however, it has met with critique from both feminist and other critical theorists. Feminists problematise its simultaneously individualising and universalising tendencies (Hudson 2005; Denov 2006) and its treatment of gender (Hudson 2005: 158) and violence against women (Bunch 2004), while other critical commentators posit human security as a ‘new orthodoxy’ (Christie 2010) that has been emptied of any radical or transformative promise it may have held (ibid.; Chandler 2008; Nuruzzaman 2006; Wibben 2008). This is not a reason to abandon engagement with human security, but rather – given its importance in supranational policy – for further efforts to intervene in and rework the project.

The rise of human security occurred in parallel with the increasing articulation of transnational feminist discourses on violence against women and their acquisition of an ambivalently hegemonic status, in particular with the achievement of supranational policy instruments such as the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1993. Such discourses have framed violence against women as a global human rights and, albeit in limited terms, a security issue: hence the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000, and the recognition of rape as a crime against humanity. However, cross-pollination between these two fields of concern – human security and transnational feminist discourses of violence against women – has remained limited.

This research brings these two agendas into productive dialogue. In doing so, it takes forward the feminist call to rethink human security as a critical/interpretive project (Hudson 2005: 164; Truong et al. 2006) – rather than exclusively a normative project oriented towards emancipatory goals – and ‘open up’ the meaning of security (Wibben 2008). I pursue this aim theoretically, through a critical exploration of human security discourse illuminated by existing feminist literatures on gender, security and violence against women, in Chapter One. I also take it up empirically: the analysis and discussion of police efforts to securitise violence against women in Delhi which occupies Chapters Five to Eight is one among many possible contributions to this broader trajectory of critical feminist, human security research. I draw on the empirical analysis to consider, at the end of this thesis, how human security might be rethought from a critical feminist perspective.

The interface between security and violence against women is a particularly fruitful site for analysis in relation to (the task of reconceptualising) human security, since this is where security
features (some of) the violences and lived insecurities which have been shown - by extensive feminist research - to be deeply normalised and embedded in the everyday. Although some scholars of gender and (human) security have called for closer attention to, ‘understand[ing] the gendered context of people’s everyday lives’ (Seckinelgin et al. 2010: 525; see also Colak and Pearce 2009: 17; Wibben 2011: 87; Shepherd 2009), I argue in Chapter One that human security tends to persist in neglecting the everyday, and focuses on the exceptional. I propose that attending to the intersection of ‘security’ with the field of the ‘everyday’ is indispensable to accounting for how insecurities and violences are (re)produced. My research therefore broadly addresses the following questions:

- What are the discursive effects of securitising everyday violence against women? And,
- What are the implications for rethinking human security from a critical feminist perspective?

The qualifier, ‘discursive’ is significant here, and I elaborate further what I mean by this below. This research understands security and practices of securitisation to be infused with (gendered) power relations, produced by and through and constitutive of them, and in looking at the intersection of security with the everyday, and at the discursive effects of securitising violence against women, it explores the implications of this contextually and empirically.

By ‘securitise’, on the one hand I mean simply, to treat as a security issue or concern, and/or to mobilise security infrastructures around/in relation to, a particular ‘threat’, object or phenomenon. On the other hand, I use this concept cautiously and am reluctant to pin down or fix its meaning. The idea of ‘securitising’ something is already inflected by narrow understandings of security which this research seeks to challenge – for instance, that to ‘securitise’ means to treat as an emergency concern, and is a negative response to failures of politics (Buzan et al. 1998). While looking at existing ways in which violence against women has been ‘securitised’, I unavoidably evoke these narrow meanings. However, my aim in this thesis is ultimately to contribute to ‘opening up’ ways of changing the understandings of ‘security’ on which they are based. Although I diverge from Buzan et al.’s realist (re)narrowing of the meaning of ‘security’ in this way, I follow them in approaching ‘security’ as a (particular kind of) speech act, and with Shepherd (2008), understand both ‘security’ and ‘gender’ as performative (Chapter One).

Violence against women has typically been securitised through supranational debates and policy instruments only insofar as it is (treated as) exceptional. Violations occurring on a mass scale, as part of armed conflict, as a strategy of war or political violence, targeted against whole
populations, are posited as security concerns. This reflects the way in which ‘security’ is still dominantly conceived as relating primarily to ruptures in the fabric of normal life rather than the violences embedded within it. As I am interested in investigating (in)security and violence at the everyday level, however, this research explores how violence against women has been securitised through policing discourses/practices\(^2\). The police, represent the more ‘everyday’ face of the state security apparatus, the coercive arm of the state most likely to come into contact with people in the course of their daily lives in situations which are not constructed as ‘exceptional’\(^3\) – although of course, contact with the police will be more ‘exceptional’ for some and more routine for others, as exposure to state practices of securitisation is unevenly distributed according to different subjects’ positionings within a complex nexus of power relations.

Criminalisation, and therefore policing, is a key mechanism through which democratic states have taken up the call to fulfil their obligations to address violence against women (Adelman et al. 2003: 106), although feminist theorists and activists are conscious of the limitations of this approach. A further reason for focusing on the policing of violence against women is the link that has been made between policing and human security. Mary Kaldor (2008: 196) proposes that, ‘human security is what citizens experience in a law governed society’, therefore, it is ‘useful to think about human security in terms of law enforcement’. Kaldor is writing primarily about human security as a principle which (she argues) should inform international military and humanitarian interventions in conflict, complex emergencies and fragile or failing states. Hence she suggests that intervening military powers should ‘act in support of law enforcement… like a police force’ (2007: 192). However, the premise that human security is what we take for granted in fully functioning, liberal democratic states, as ensured in part by and through policing as enforcement of the rule of law, is evident in these claims. She explicitly equates ‘a human security approach’ with what we normally think of as, ‘internal security as the domain of law and policing’ (2011: 446). The proposition that this is necessarily what the police actually do, however, cannot be assumed and needs interrogating. Whether the law can be assumed to

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\(^2\) I use ‘discourse/practice’ or ‘discourses/practices’ at times in this thesis to indicate the imbrication of these two concepts. See Chapter Four for a discussion of ‘discourse’ and how it relates to the material. This does not mean that I treat ‘discourse’ and ‘practice’ as interchangeable.

\(^3\) I am wary of dichotomising armed conflict and ‘ordinary times’ – there are post-conflict situations which mediate between these two poles, situations in which perpetual armed conflict becomes a ‘normal’ way of life, and various forms of routinised armed, organised and/or political violence which are not formally recognised as armed conflict. I recognise these continuities and contradictions, however I still maintain the broad point that much of the dominant discourse on security (in both academia and policy and popular discourse) treats considerations of security as belonging mainly to exceptional situations of armed conflict or the threat of it, whereas I am interested in investigating practices of securitisation around violences and in situations that tend to be constructed as less exceptional.
be a neutral instrument that guarantees human security across the many axes of power and difference that shape people’s experiences of insecurity is also open to question⁴.

In spite of the potential relevance of policing to human security, the relationship has rarely been systematically researched. This research explores the interconnections between policing and human security from a gender perspective, which questions and troubles the very construction of ‘security’ in and through both state policing institutions, and the discourse of human security itself. I review the rich and interesting literature on police cultures, gender and the policing of violence against women in Chapter Two. In doing so, I set out how this thesis takes this research agenda forward in new theoretical directions, while adding to and developing the empirical research base on specialist police services dealing with violence against women.

In seeking a case study for this research, I came across a particular police project in Delhi called Parivartan, meaning ‘Change’. Parivartan’s mission statement deployed a consciously feminist vocabulary: to ‘change the patriarchal mindset’. Its promotional literature cited feminist sources and the project’s managers were seeking to gain recognition and open dialogue with a transnational audience – hence I was introduced to the project by a senior police officer visiting LSE’s Gender Institute, where I was enrolled as a doctoral student. This project appeared particularly interesting given Delhi Police’s notoriety for failing to contain a gendered security crisis which has seen the city dubbed India’s ‘rape capital’ in the 2000s. I was also interested in the way in which Parivartan took the everyday as an object of securitisation, and negotiated transnational (as well as local and national, feminist) discourses of violence against women. I set out the background to Parivartan and contextualise this case study in Chapter Three.

A further reason for choosing to conduct this research in Delhi was the feasibility of the project, given my background knowledge (I have previously studied Indian history and politics at Masters level), my family connections (I am married to a non-resident Indian who has an extensive family network in Delhi and Panjab) and of course, my contact with a key gatekeeper to the research through my affiliation with the Gender Institute. I already had some training in Sanskrit-based, South Asian languages; I was learning Panjabi (my husband’s mother tongue) but decided to switch to Hindi once I had selected the case study. The empirical research on which this thesis is based consisted of six months of fieldwork, during which I conducted 86

⁴ In Chapter Six, for example, I look at how Indian feminist scholarship has critiqued the Indian criminal law on sexual violence for regulating women’s sexuality, and link these arguments with my analysis of police discourses.
qualitative interviews with Delhi Police personnel and a range of related participants at multiple field sites in Delhi, and many hours of observational research, in addition to collecting and reviewing relevant documents and images. I describe and discuss the research process in Chapter Four.

I also explain my analytical strategy, which I call ‘feminist discursive analysis’ (Reynolds 2008: 15), comprehensively in Chapter Four. It is important here, however, to clarify what I mean by ‘discursive effects’. By foregrounding the discursive effects of securitising everyday violence against women through everyday policing, my analysis explores (but is not limited to) the following:

- how is violence constructed through police discourse/practice, and what kind of gendered meanings are thereby produced, mobilised and reinforced?
- how, for instance, is vulnerability to violence conceptualised?
- who is responsible for it and for its prevention?
- who is (de)criminalised, managed, regulated, (dis)empowered, and in what ways, by these constructions and associated practices?
- which kinds of behaviours and performances are normalised and which are rendered problematic or deviant?
- what forms of differentiation and/or identification are engendered and/or reproduced?
- what constructions of ‘security’ are produced and with what implications?
- how is this securing ‘done’ or practised?; and,
- how does the securitisation of violence against women inflect the identity construction of the police as a security institution?

My emphasis on ‘discursive effects’ reflects my understanding of discourse (Chapter Four) and the imbrication of the discursive and the material which informs this thesis. I do not set out to examine ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ in a material reality that is external to the discourses analysed; nor am I measuring quantifiable outcomes, such as violence reduction in statistical terms. While there is no doubt an important place for such research, it would require both longitudinal and mass data collection and command institutional resources not commensurate with a doctoral project. Furthermore, I maintain that it is important to interrogate the discursive effects of the securitisation of violence against women, in order to understand what the performance of
‘security’ does. I embarked on this project with the premise that gender impinges significantly on human security, and a set of questions about how gender-sensitive security could be operationalised through existing, masculinist security institutions. While I still hold this premise, my original questions reproduced the positivist fallacy of positing ‘security’ as simply a ‘good’ to be delivered, the problem to be solved being the means of delivery. Through empirically and contextually investigating the performance of security itself, I became interested in its discursivity, its simultaneous implication in systems of meaning and of power, and the multiple things that the performance of security does and accomplishes, or seeks to accomplish, through, alongside, tangentially to, and sometimes in spite of, the stated aim of making people/women safe. These insights have implications for how we understand the doing of (human) security, and for the very possibilities – and limits – of an ideal of security as emancipation in relation to oppressive power relations.

Equally, it is important to point out the significant limitations of focusing on police discourses of violence against women. While there is much to analyse therein, the discourses which predominate in my research data remain narrow and limited, focusing almost exclusively on conjugal and sexual violence and harassment, but usually without being attentive to the overlaps between them. There is little discussion of caste/gender-based violences, sexual exploitation, prostitution and trafficking, disability/gender-based violences, violences against sexual minority women, forced sterilisations and other forms of institutional violence, ‘communal’/nationalist gender-based violence, female foeticide and infanticide, or poor health outcomes due to structural discrimination, to name a few of the phenomena that have been variously understood as forms of gender-based violence in India by feminist activists and scholars (see Chapters One and Three). There is an audible and gaping silence on the issue of custodial rape, which emerges at certain moments in the data as that-which-cannot-be-spoken-about.

Chapters Five to Eight unfold my feminist discursive analysis of the policing of violence against women in Delhi. I explore the discursive effects of police discourses of violence/crime against women in Delhi, and investigate how these discourses negotiate gender and sexual

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5 Wherever I refer to my data or fieldwork context, I use ‘violence/crime against women’ instead of ‘violence against women’. Most of my interviewees used the category ‘crime against women’ (using the English, ‘crime’, even in Hindi), even when asked questions specifically about violence (hinsa). My own understanding of ‘violence against women’ was strongly influenced by hegemonic, Western feminist discourses on violence and I saw ‘violence’ and ‘crime’ as distinct. One research participant who played a key role in Parivartan shared a similar view, and argued that ‘crime’ is a legal category, but many forms of violence, which are part of social life, are not officially recognised as crime. The vast majority of research participants (particularly in the police) conflated these two categories either explicitly or implicitly. However, ‘crime against women’ was not necessarily constructed as a narrow category referring only to legally recognised crime, but was often used contextually to refer to a broad range of violence and abuse (see Chapter Five) – even though the latter was typically not constructed as ‘real crime’. I use ‘violence/crime against women’ when discussing fieldwork material, therefore, to reflect the fact that these two categories are not
norms as well as local, national and transnational feminist discourses of violence against women, and how they inflect the constructions of ‘security’ which the police embodies. I show how these effects are unpredictable and contradictory: the securitisation of violence against women by the police does not always or straightforwardly secure women or lead to better security provision for women, although there are ways in which it may be beneficial and/or transformative. This analysis is one particular (though by no means exhaustive) way of analysing security institutions as sites for what Shepherd (2008) calls, ‘the violent reproduction of gender’. Furthermore, it enables particular insights about how security institutions are embedded in their social and historical contexts, in particular configurations of power relations, and implicated in the (gendered) reproduction of the everyday.

Chapter Five looks in particular at the policing of domestic, especially conjugal, violence in Delhi, and sets out some of the broad, intersecting discursive frames which cut across police discourses of violence against women, relating to women’s vulnerability, agency and responsibility. Chapter Six examines the policing of sexual violence, including preventative work carried out in conjunction with other agencies. I explore how this work interfaces with gender and sexual norms, and with the legal context. Chapter Seven then considers the spatio-temporal dimensions of police discourses of violence against women in Delhi, and their effects in terms of class differentiation and identification, as well as the negotiation of the ‘modern’ and the transnational. Finally, Chapter Eight connects these analyses of police discourses of violence against women with the gendering of Delhi Police more generally, exploring how gender is constructed through discourses of women’s (un)suitability for certain genres of police work, and the implications of their selective inclusion in the police organisation for changing police masculinities. The Conclusion reflects on the implications of these analyses for theorising gender and (human) security.

Human security conceptualises security fundamentally as a ‘positive public good’ (Hoogensen and Rottem 2004: 157), rather than a negative response to the failures of politics (Buzan et al. 1998). It implicitly rests upon a notion of security as emancipation, encapsulated in the slogan, ‘freedom from fear, freedom from want’ (UNDP 1994). This is critical to how human security distinguishes itself from, and articulates itself against and in relation to, state-based, (neo-)realist constructions of security. The equation of security with emancipation has been articulated most substantively through the scholarship of the Critical Security school which

fully separable in the context of Delhi Police; to indicate that my research participants deployed conceptual categories which did not map perfectly onto those which I brought with me to the field, and equally to indicate the likely impact of my own conceptual categories on the production of the data.
implicitly informs the human security paradigm. Booth (1991: 319) correlates democracy and freedom with security as ‘stable peace’ underpinned by minimum levels of social and political justice, and the fostering of a ‘world community’ (320) founded in a ‘reciprocity of rights’ (322). Accordingly, he locates security in the realm of moral and political philosophy, which cannot be reduced to the technological. However, the elision of (human) security with the setting of emancipatory goals has been critiqued as inadequate to the task of conceptualising how insecurities are (re)produced, and at worst as ethnocentric and ‘hollow’ in its universalism (Shepherd 2008: 69-70).

Insofar as this thesis considers how human security might be rethought from a critical feminist perspective, I aim to navigate a fine path between embracing emancipatory security and eschewing any such ideal – a path which balances attention to both the discursivity and the materiality of security and of violence. The empirical analysis in this thesis underscores that security is indeed, ‘a set of discourses’ (Shepherd 2008, 2008a, 2009). At the everyday level, the contextual performance of security contingently does a number of things other than (sometimes counterproductive to) straightforwardly ‘securing’ people. Are such insights compatible with the notion of security as a public good? This thesis contributes to this body of critique of human security, but attempts to make space for a partial, limited recuperation of security as emancipation, pointing to some ways in which this idea must be reworked. It tests the limits of emancipatory security, and considers whether it is possible to reconfigure our understanding of security as emancipation in the light of its status as a field of institutional power, and its ambivalent implication in the reproduction of some of the very violences it aims to ameliorate (Shepherd 2009: 217).
Gender, everyday violence and (human) security as a field of power:

A theoretical framework

The security debate has changed dramatically since the inception of state security advocated in the 17th century... attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people.

Commission for Human Security (2003: 2)

Most people instinctively understand what security means... protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives.

UNDP (1994: 3)

The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives.

Alkire (2003: 23)

Human security can be understood as the coalescence and repackaging of disparate, marginal strands of critical intervention questioning state-centric approaches to security (MacFarlane and Foong Khong, 2006; Christie, 2010: 171) which came to a head in the 1990s. It thus emerged, in part, from discontent with the (neo-)realist security orthodoxy (Steans 2006) and its tendencies towards militarism and war-making (UNDP 1994). This makes it potentially interesting for feminist critical security scholarship – although the rich insights proffered by these literatures remained largely marginal to human security. Human security is primarily distinguished by its shift in the referent object of security from state to individual: it prioritises the protection of human beings from threats to life and dignity over the securing of national borders against external military threats. In doing so, it expands the range of ‘threats’ within the purview of ‘security’ – although this ‘widening’ is hotly contested (Owen 2004: 375; Hudson 2005: 160; Takhbakhsh and Chenoy 2007: 40) – and foregrounds interconnections between threats, positing differently located states, communities and peoples as increasingly interdependent in a globalising world. Conceived as a largely normative project rooted in the
capabilities approach (Sen 1999; Nussbaum 1999; 2000), human security closely intersects with human development and human rights frameworks (UNDP 1994; Commission for Human Security 2003), reflecting the particular model of personhood these inherit from a liberal humanist tradition of thought. Human security has, to some (contested) extent, upseated traditional (neo-)realist narratives of security; its uneven mainstreaming in supranational policy arenas has prompted claims of a ‘paradigm shift’ (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 19-21).6

I begin this chapter with a critical feminist assessment of the human security paradigm, and propose a performative approach to ‘security’, understood as a field of institutional power. In Section Two, I draw on a range of feminist research to show how ‘security’ is implicated in the reproduction of (gendered and gendering) violences. I explore the relationship between gender and violence, adapting Laura Shepherd’s (2008) understanding of violence as performative of gender. Following a well established feminist literature, Section Three argues that violences are embedded in the everyday, and theoretically integrates the ‘normalisation of violence’ thesis with a framework for investigating ‘the (violent) reproduction of gender’ (Shepherd 2008) through security discourse/practice. The fourth section argues for the irreducible materiality and discursivity of violence, and their mutual imbrication. I conclude by advocating a similarly ‘double’ perspective on ‘security’, which, mirroring my analysis of violence, holds its discursive and its material/experiential aspects in productive tension.

I follow Gasper (2005) in treating ‘human security’ predominantly as a discourse (or cluster of discourses), which generates material effects, spans both the academic and policy arenas, and is not necessarily internally coherent, but contested. The concept remains ambiguous and the boundaries of this discourse are not fixed. However, I anchor my analysis to two primary texts, the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994) and Human Security Now (Commission for Human Security 2003), which have been fundamental to its institutional inception and to the articulation of a vision of human security as a philosophical basis for national and supranational policy frameworks. I also engage with the academic debates that have coalesced around and fed into this primary discourse.

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6 The normative ethics which the human security paradigm embodies is not new, however, but can be traced through cosmopolitanism as a moral and political philosophy, the human rights movement and the liberal humanist tradition in which both of these are rooted. The status of human security is evidenced, for instance, by the fact that humanitarian motivations have become de rigueur in justifications for Western military interventions since the 1990s; even the ‘war on terror’ project, which to many appeared to rehabilitate a militarized model of ‘national security’, was interlaced with human security discourse (Marhia and Davies 2013).
1. Human security: A critical feminist assessment

Human security prima facie speaks to feminist concerns and critiques of the (neo-)realist security orthodoxy in a number of ways. I focus here on two significant considerations: the shift of the referent object to the individual, and the ‘widening’ and integration of the range of threats that fall within the purview of ‘security’. Firstly, the shift of the referent object of security from the state to the individual speaks to feminist criticisms of dominant constructions of security shaped by ‘sovereign state systems that themselves constitute profound and pervasive insecurities’ (Peterson 1992: 49). For some feminist theorists, the inscription of the individual human being as the referent object of security is critically important in guarding against the subordination of the security and well-being of particular individuals to the (imagined) ‘security’ of the collective or community to which they belong. Nussbaum argues that women’s lack of opportunities to realise the capabilities necessary for a ‘fully human life’ stems in part from the instrumentalisation of women’s bodies and reproductive labour as means to the well-being of others, rather than as ends in themselves (2000; 2002). In contrast, human security (like Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities’ approach) posits each and every human being as having intrinsic value, ‘as ends in themselves’, regardless of nationality or sex, or any other marker of identity or difference. This is indispensable for a feminist politics which positively demands that women’s bodily integrity, dignity, and entitlement to a life free from violence are recognised as irreducible values in and of themselves, which governments and international organisations have a duty to secure.

Secondly, human security’s analytical emphasis on interconnections between multiple insecurities and the integrative character of threats (Gasper 2005) resonates with feminist approaches to security, which emphasise the interrelationships between multiple violences (Tickner 1992: 133), both direct and structural, such as ethnic conflict, interpersonal and intimate violence, poverty, environmental degradation and violences which traverse national borders (ibid: 127). Human security thus speaks to feminist theories which posit violence as a continuum (Cockburn 2004; Moser and Mcilwaine 2001). It appears to generate possibilities to transcend the restrictive (gendered) boundary distinctions characterising (neo-)realist conceptions of security, which feminist scholarship has problematised (ibid.: 23): public/private, domestic/foreign, national/international, order/anarchy, war/peace, self/other, us/them. It seems to offer possibilities to foreground continuities between everyday violences located at the less visible end of the continuum, and the over-securitised violent threats (armed conflict, terrorism) at the other end. It suggests the potential to conceptualise insecurities as
systemic, rather than as isolated ‘events’, and therefore to develop frameworks for addressing structural violence.

Human security has attracted a still evolving body of gender scholarship, including critical feminist engagements (see, inter alia, Truong et al. 2006, contributions to *Peace Review* 16(1)/March 2004, Karamé with Bertinussen 2001; Fox 2004; Hoogensen and Rottem 2004; McKay 2004; Chenoy 2005; Hudson 2005; Hoogensen and Stuvøy 2006; Denov 2006; Robinson 2008, 2011). This work encapsulates a range of perspectives, but is decidedly ambivalent in its slippage between celebration and critique. Robinson (2008: 173-6) identifies two distinct trajectories of critique. Some feminist critics, like Bunch (2004), embrace the rights-based, normative approach underlying human security but call for recognition of women’s rights and experiences of insecurity as a separate, gender-based constituency. Others (including Robinson’s own work on a critical feminist ethics of care: 2008, 2011) strive for a rethinking of human security privileging context, relationality and inter-subjectivity over the abstract individual, as categories through which people’s experiences of (in)security can be analysed (Hudson 2005; Hoogensen and Stuvøy 2006). For this group of scholars, including ‘women and girls’ as a special constituency within a rights-based, emancipatory framework falls short. Hudson (2005: 158) observes that ‘gender’, in human security discourse, is typically reduced to ‘women’ or ‘women and girls’ as a group subject to specific vulnerabilities, rather than mobilised as an analytical tool to theorise the (re)production of insecurities. The current research broadly aligns with this second strand of critique. In particular, this thesis takes up and develops Hudson’s (2005: 164) call to reconceptualise human security as, ‘a critical project aimed at interrogating the sources of people’s insecurity, along with the role of the state and other global governance structures in this regard,’ which is echoed in Truong et al.’s (2006) proposal that human security combine its normative dimension with an ‘interpretive approach’ that draws heavily on the analytical resources of gender and feminist perspectives. Human security aligns ‘security’ with emancipatory goals, without sufficiently accounting for the implication of ‘security’ as a field of power in *curtailing* the very possibilities for actualising such emancipation.

This research is also partly inspired by those critical scholars who have argued for foregrounding, and orienting security towards, people’s everyday lives (Seckinelgin et al. 2010: 525; Colak and Pearce 2009: 17; Wibben 2011: 87; Shepherd 2009). Colak and Pearce (2009: 17) argue for a rethinking of, ‘security from below’ which, ‘gets closer to people’s everyday lives in violent contexts’. They see this as integral to the fair and effective delivery of security as a ‘public service’. Human security purports to concern itself with people’s everyday lives in
a way that national security frameworks do not, but its construction of the ‘everyday’ in relation to (in)security remains problematic. Seckinelgin et al. (2010), for instance, question some processes of securitisation stemming from human security’s ‘widening’ rubric – processes which effectively abstract ‘threats’ from their everyday contexts. They examine the securitisation of HIV/AIDS in international policy discourse, and show how it ‘is framed in static terms of state security’ and, ‘national and international security interests’, projecting ordinary people/women (especially in African conflict zones) as a security threat, while reproducing the effacement of the (gendered) ‘structural vulnerabilities’ which shape the course of the pandemic, and how these condition people’s everyday lives. With these perspectives in mind, I turn now to a close, critical interrogation of the construction of ‘security’ in and through human security discourse, paying particular attention to the latter’s production of the ‘everyday’.

Human security discourse constructs ‘security’ in part through the projection of ‘threats’ in relation to the human being, to ‘the patterns of daily life’ (UNDP) or, the ‘vital core of all human lives’ (Alkire 2003) to be secured. This ‘vital core’ proposed by Alkire – a set of rudimentary human capabilities and basic rights which are necessary (but not sufficient) to guarantee human fulfilment (ibid.) – is a central concept taken up by the Commission for Human Security’s 2003 report, *Human Security Now*. However, the focus on anticipating, preventing and addressing threats which disrupt daily life was also a formative thread in the milestone 1994 *Human Development Report*. ‘Security’ is imagined as multi-dimensional (personal security, political security, health security, environmental security, etc.) in both of these documents (UNDP 1994; Commission for Human Security 2003). These dimensions of security serve to categorise the anticipated threats, which are enumerated and described at length; in places reference is made to gender-based discrimination and violence. However, these documents focus heavily on armed conflict (especially *Human Security Now*), large-scale crises and emergencies – that is, on the exceptional. They also acknowledge insecurities produced by structural violence, which they connect (especially the 1994 *Human Development Report*) predominantly with chronic underdevelopment – but its effects only fall within the purview of human security when they reach a point of recognisable severity.

The focus on the exceptional is somewhat in tension with the acknowledgment of structural violence and its multidimensionality. Threats are posited as external to the ‘vital core,’ which is alternatively characterised as, ‘the core activities and functions of human lives’ (Alkire 2003: 4), and overlaps significantly with the construction of ‘daily life’ (ibid.: 27; Commission for Human Security 2003). *Human Security Now* distinguishes human security as concerned with,
'conditions that menace survival, the continuation of daily life and the dignity of human beings'. It thus means, 'preparing for events that could have severe and widespread consequences', and for '[c]ritical and pervasive conditions', which, 'cut into the core activities of peoples lives' (Commission for Human Security 2003: 10-11). These may be sudden or gradual, direct or indirect, but what defines them as human security threats is their 'tragic depth' (Alkire 2003: 4): their level of severity, or their 'chronic' or 'pervasive' characteristics. The threats that human security seeks to safeguard against disrupt the normal, the routine, the everyday: they are imagined as emerging somewhere outside and beyond daily life and its ‘vital core’ of activities and functionings, the integrity of which is constructed as coming-into-being a priori, stable and whole, while the ‘everyday’ is naturalised as already secure.

The externalisation of threats, and the naturalisation of the ‘everyday’ as already secure in human security discourse, de-politicises the field of the ‘everyday,’ rendering invisible the routinised, normalised forms of violence which operate at this level in both public and intimate spaces and effacing the processes by which insecurities become embedded in the everyday. This insidiously reproduces the public/private division in political and social life which feminist theory has worked so hard to dismantle (see Pateman 1989). It also compromises the promise of human security to foreground the interconnections between individualised and organised or collective violences. Hence Truong et al. (2006: xxv) contend that human security ‘needs to reach further down into the domains of the domestic/private/personal/invisible gendered spaces where domestic violence links with militarism/communal conflict/war,’ but it typically ‘falter(s) at the door of these domestic spheres,’ and ‘fail(s) to address the interlocking effects of multiple hierarchies of oppression/discrimination and deprivation’.

This externalisation of threats, and its de-politicising effect, stems in part from human security’s predominantly normative orientation: human security does not set out to explain ‘threats’ (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007) so much as to establish emancipatory goals. However, in the absence of any interpretive framework, such goals cannot translate into modes of being-in-the-world: ‘[w]ithout the study of power and an understanding of the process of political construction,’ comments Hudson (2005: 171, emphasis added), security is not only de-politicised but ‘decontextualised’ (see also Broadhead 2000). Human security discourse thus lacks the resources to critically analyse power relations, which might shed light on how insecurities are (re)produced, beyond positing a series of a priori, existing inequalities along lines of race, gender, income, generation, and so on. As this thesis will show, the analysis of ‘security’ as a field of institutional power throws into question whether, and under what conditions, it can be conceived as ‘emancipatory’ at all.
Human security – and its assumption that emancipation is an achievable goal – rests on a liberal model of personhood which posits the subject as an originary category, a stable foundation onto which to project the ‘vital core of all human lives’, and as a disembodied, rational agent. This subject has been extensively troubled by feminist scholarship (Young 2005; Lloyd 1986; Battersby 1998; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Peterson and Parisi 1998: 6; Quillen 2001; see Marhia 2013). Feminist research on security, militarism and violence has shown that there are interconnections and continuities between the violent ruptures which human security seeks to guard against, and the normalised violences of everyday life which its account of security threats renders, for the most part, invisible (Section Two). These interconnections only become discernible when subjects are understood as embedded in, and produced through, social relations of power. If the individual human being cannot be abstracted in this way, then securing the individual – as referent object of security – is not enough to forge a radical departure in security thinking, and securing emancipation for such an individual is all the more complex. Hence Truong et al (2006: xii) argue that the referent object of security must also include ‘the social relations that mediate human life in ways that ensure its quality and flourishing’ (see also Robinson 2008: 184).

Furthermore, in spite of its conscious shifting of the referent object, human security has failed to articulate a robust enough challenge to state-centric security thinking, claiming not to displace ‘national security’, but to ‘complement’ it (Commission for Human Security 2003: 2, 4), to add an extra layer of security, to cast a wider, deeper safety net in an increasingly globalised and interconnected world (ibid.; UNDP 1994). This claim works on the assumption that securing people is harmonious with securing the state. Human security is temporally positioned as additive to, but not supplanting, hegemonic models of national security in the face of a ‘new’ and ‘changing’ global situation: insecurities can ‘no longer’ be contained within state boundaries, states alone can ‘no longer’ respond effectively to the range of ‘new’ and ‘emerging’ threats (ibid.) – as if, at some earlier, simpler time, a state-centric security approach could have fulfilled all our security needs. The fetishisation of the sovereign state as the provider and arbiter of security, and the sole source of legitimate political authority, is left intact (Shepherd 2008). Feminist researchers have highlighted the complicity of (state) security institutions and practices in the production of (gendered, gendering and gender-based) violences (Section Two). The failure to apprehend the tension between national security frameworks and its own stated aims thus represents a serious limitation of human security. Human security

7 The emphasis on complementarity is particularly pronounced in Human Security Now
cannot simply ‘complement’ national security, a set of discourses which construct ‘our’ security as dependent on the insecurity of ‘others’, without any risk of conflicting aims.\(^8\)

Human security’s widening of the range of threats it securitises does bring hitherto invisibilised forms of violence within the scope of security. However, rather than deliberating over which threats are in or out of its remit, human security needs theoretical resources to account for how ‘threats’ – violences, insecurities – are \((re)produced.\) Furthermore, its limited account of (in)security obscures not only interconnections between different violences, but also the productive capacities of violence itself in relation to gender, identity and subjectivity (Moore 1994: 68-70; Mason 2002), which can feed back into the cycle of its own reproduction (Sections Two and Three). The weakness of human security’s challenge to hegemonic security discourses reflects the positing of ‘security’ unproblematically as a public good – an emancipatory ideal - and its failure to apprehend it as also a ‘political technology’ (Burke 2002) – a field of institutional power implicated in the (re)production of violences and insecurities. These problems are functions not only of human security’s focus on the normative, but also of its positivist, ‘problem-solving’ methodology (Nuruzzaman 2006: 299) – the idea that security problems can be solved in ‘technical’ ways using the right security (development, or other suitable) capabilities. While there is value in seeking practical solutions to material problems, this approach risks obscuring security’s function as a \textit{practice of power.}\n
Security institutions, as sites for the concentrated crystallisation of security discourses and practices, are inextricably embedded in their social and historical contexts, and therefore in specific temporal and spatial configurations of power relations. It is in the context of this situatedness, this entanglement in particular configurations of power, that the (re)production of violences by and through security institutions and discourses/practices has to be understood. Buzan et al. (1998) present a theory of ‘security’ as a speech act, a particular kind of utterance which has distinctive effects: a form of hyper-politicisation which demands a certain response. They claim that securitisation indicates a ‘failure’ of ordinary politics which leaves communities open to threats, such that it should be reserved for emergencies and is to be avoided, not expanded. In spite of the narrow and conservative neo-realist model of security which this argument (re)articulates, it has been critically important in highlighting the

\(^8\) Yuval-Davis’ (2004) analysis of the securitisation of immigration and asylum shows how the securing of national borders against ‘Others’ deemed not useful to the state and the economy is implicated in the production of ‘spaces of exception’ or ‘ex-territorial’ spaces (such as Guantanamo Bay and the detention camps off the coast of Australia) where the logic of human security (protecting the integrity, rights and dignity of each individual human being) is deemed irrelevant and need not apply. This example embodies the tension between ‘national’ and ‘human’ securities.
discursivity and performativity\(^9\) of security as producing particular kinds of political-material effects. Feminist scholars have been at the forefront of highlighting many of these effects, including the multiple intersecting violences produced in name of ‘security’, and their gendered and gendering implications (see Section Two).

The ‘security’ in human security therefore arouses suspicion from critics such as Anthony Burke (2002) who recognise that security utterances have political effects, but who (in contrast to Buzan et al.) are interested in de-mystifying security’s ‘highly legitimate and authoritative role’ (Yuval-Davis 2004). Burke writes:

Rather than seek to resecure security, to make it conform to a new humanist ideal – however laudable – we need to challenge security as a claim to truth, to set its “meaning” aside. Instead, we should focus on security as a pervasive and complex system of political, social, and economic power, which reaches from the most private spaces to the vast flows and conflicts of geopolitics and global economic circulation. It is to see security as an interlocking system of knowledges, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine, direct, and act upon bodies, spaces and flows in certain ways – to see security not as an essential value but as a political technology. (Burke 2002: 2; emphasis in original)

Burke argues against efforts to reclaim security, and instead, for making visible the violences it legitimises. The suspicion of human security arises because such efforts to reclaim security as a positive public good linked with emancipatory ideals inevitably involve participating in a practice of power. The status of ‘security’ as a political technology accounts for the considerable contestation over the definition and content of ‘human security’ as a new security paradigm, and whether it has any value at all\(^10\). Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007: 11) comment that, ‘[t]he concept of human security is anything but neutral from a political or an intellectual point of view’. Defining its key terms ‘serves to delineate reality… and priorities’, and the power and interests of a range of actors are thus at stake (ibid.). For Shepherd (2008), ‘security performs states’\(^11\), and human security belongs to a cluster of emancipatory security discourses which produce particular kinds of (liberal) subjects, and reproduce the state as the sole source of legitimate political authority – implicitly, in effect, institutionalising Western norms which discipline and regulate a range of political subjects and spaces across the globe.

The proposal that human security be reconceived as a critical, interpretive project thus demands an understanding of (in)security that is more critically aware of the kinds of power which

\(^9\) I say more about how performativity theory informs my understanding of gender and violence, as well as security, below

\(^10\) See Hoogensen and Rottem (2004) for analysis of these debates

\(^11\) In a comparable move, which I discuss at length in the next section, she argues that ‘violence performs gender’
alternative models of security are bolstered by, mobilise and reproduce. It demands the re-politicisation of human security, making it more reflexive about its own implication in/as power and reproduction of power. It demands analysis of how oppressive power relations can insidiously reproduce themselves through our very attempts at emancipation. The feminist security literature discussed in the next section has been very effective in making visible the complicity of security discourses/practices in reproducing and legitimising a range of (gendered and gendering) violences and in doing so, it challenges security as a claim to truth. Following Buzan et al. (1998) and (more faithfully) Shepherd (2008; see Section Two, below), this thesis takes a performative approach to ‘security’ as a field of power, and in Burke’s (2002) terminology, a ‘political technology’. I return to the question of whether such an understanding of security is compatible with a partial recuperation of security as emancipatory, in the concluding section of this chapter.

Conceptualising security as a performative, and as a field of power, has a number of implications. It means thinking about the ways in which it is both oppressive and productive. I am borrowing here from Gail Mason’s (2002) insightful feminist adaptation of Foucault’s understanding of power (Section Three). ‘Security’ does not only perform states. It produces particular violences and in doing so, it both perpetrates and reproduces certain kinds of oppression, and it is implicated in the production of particular kinds of subjects, as well as and by extension also – what Laura Shepherd (2008) calls, ‘the violent reproduction of gender’. The next section mines the feminist security literature for insights into the implication of security, as an institutional field of power, in the (re)production of gendered violences. It then explores the relationship between gender and violence, and how these two phenomena impact, shape and mutually implicate one another.

2. Theorising gender, violence and security

Feminist scholarship on security encompasses a diverse range of perspectives, approaches and methodologies. I discuss here: feminist work at the margins of international relations which explicitly challenges the problematic construction of ‘security’ in this disciplinary (and policy) field (Tickner 1992; Peterson 1992; Cohn 1993; Sylvester 1994; Zalewski and Parpart 1998; Hansen 2000; Young 2003); research on the gender dimensions of armed conflict and inter-ethnic/nationalist violence (Cockburn 2004; Elshtain 1987; Giles and Hyndman 2004; Hartsock 1982; Jacobs et al. 2000; Jones 1994; Lorentzen and Turpin 1998; Moser and Clark 2001;
Nikolić-Ristanović 1996, 1998; Korac 1998; Kesić 1999; Seifert 1996; Zarkov 2001); and work on gender, violence and militarism/militarisation (Chapkis 1988; Chenoy 2002; Cohn 1986, 1993; Enloe 1983, 1993, 2000; Price 2001; Jones 2006; Cockburn 2004a; Cockburn and Hubic 2002; Kelly 2000). These literatures overlap, intersect and speak to each other considerably (listing them according to the these three categories, it is difficult to know where to position some works), but while I group them together for the purposes of the present analysis, they do not form a seamless, bounded whole.

These literatures have been extremely significant in drawing attention to the multiple gender-based violences associated with practices of securitisation, and have contributed to the development of important policy instruments and changes, like UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and the recognition of rape in armed conflict as a crime against humanity under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). What follows is not a comprehensive review, but highlights a number of very closely related insights, which inform this thesis. Firstly, this work has demonstrated the unequivocal significance of gender as an analytical lens in theorising security and violence. Secondly, it offers some incisive critiques of ‘security’ as a discursive field and practice of (gendered) power, and thirdly, makes visible the often pernicious effects of security discourses/practices, and their implication in the reproduction of a range of (gendered, gendering and gender-based) violences.

Feminist scholars such as Peterson and True (1998: 19) and Tickner (1992: 9, 16-19) argue that the international relations theory which produces ‘security’ as a field of power/knowledge is structured by a system of gendered hierarchical dualisms or binaries, which derive from a (masculinist) tradition of Western political thought (Blanchard 2003: 1293), such as order/anarchy, domestic/foreign, protector/protected. The values that are privileged, argues Tickner, are ‘related to concepts of masculinity’(1992: 17): thus the idea of security is constructed as the rational use of power to control and domesticate man’s primitive ‘state of nature’ in the domestic realm, and anarchic threats in the ungoverned world of states. Autonomy and separateness are valued over interdependence, attachment and community; zero-sum forms of coercive power are valued over positive-sum, mutual enablement (ibid.: 131-3, Peterson and True 1998: 20).

12 These feminist literatures are critiquing constructions of security broadly stemming from realist and neo-realist theories of international relations (such as Morgenthau 1960; Waltz 1979) which gained significant policy relevancy in the Cold War era (Nuruzzaman 2006: 288), especially in the US.
Feminists challenge the reification of the sovereign state as the proper referent object of security, contending that the abstraction of the state effaces the flesh and blood human bodies that are endangered by security discourses/practices (Elshtain 1987: 91; Hartsock 1982). State-centric security discourse is founded on the assumption that order within the domestic body politic is tantamount to ‘security’ – the ‘domestic’ realm is naturalised as already secure – while (largely military) power secures its borders against the anarchic threats lurking ‘outside’. In contrast, feminist scholarship throws into relief how everyday, gendered insecurities traverse the domestic/foreign, internal/external divides (Peterson 1992; Tickner 1992), and the state’s complicity in such insecurities is effaced by the mystification of state violence as ‘protection’ (Peterson 1992). This reification of the state is wedded to profoundly gendered discourses/practices of militarism which (re)produce forms of hegemonic masculinity13 (Connell 1987, 1995) that valorise and glorify violence, and generate multiple insecurities for both women and men (Enloe 1983 1993, 2000; Price 2001; Jones 2006; Cockburn 2004a; Cockburn and Hubic 2002). In spite of its ostensible departure from such (neo-)realist, state-centric conceptions of security, human security retains some of its key assumptions. In failing to interrogate the violations of the everyday, human security to some extent reproduces this naturalisation of the ‘domestic’ realm as already secure. In externalising threats such that the (re)production of violences is obscured, it similarly reproduces these overlapping external/internal, foreign/domestic, public/private binaries, even as it shifts, reconfigures and renames the boundaries.

Feminist research has highlighted the prevalence of sexual violence in armed conflict as a systematic weapon of war and a means of accomplishing or performing militarised masculinities (Seifert 1996; Price 2001). Sexual violence in war has been normalised by security discourses which dismiss these practices as either incidental, exceptional or inevitable (ibid.; Brownmiller 1977; Hansen 2000). Research on the wars in the former Yugoslavia has been particularly significant in demonstrating the systematic complicity of security forces in the propagation of sexual and gender-based violence (Nikolić-Ristanović 1996, 1998; Korac 1998; Kesić 1999; Zarkov 2001).

13 Connell’s (1987) theory of hegemonic masculinity has been extremely influential in Gender Studies, including in relation to militarism, violence and security. According to Connell’s original argument, hegemonic masculinity is a historically specific and constructed cultural ideal of masculinity, which achieves its hegemony or ascendency through cultural consent, persuasion and institutionalisation rather than violence – although it may also be backed up or enacted by/though force. Hegemonic masculinities are sustained by ‘configurations of practice’ which relate to and valorise such ideals even if they are infrequently embodied. There is therefore a hierarchy of masculinities including those that are hegemonic, complicit, marginalised and subordinated. Hegemonic masculinity is relational and defined against and in relation to both non-hegemonic masculinities, and femininities. Although historically and culturally variable and subject to change, Connell argued that hegemonic patterns of practice generally enable (the continuation of) men’s dominance over women, and contribute to ideologically legitimating it. In Chapter Two, I consider how Hutching’s (2008) adaptation of hegemonic masculinity for theorising the relationship between gender and war is relevant to my analysis of gender and policing.
Peterson (1992) argues that the masculine/feminine, protector/protected dichotomies which permeate practices of securitisation (re)produce the structural violence of unequal gender relations more broadly. Sexual and gender-based violence is not only a weapon of war but tends to increase in interpersonal relations during and after conflict and in militarised contexts (Kelly 2000). Enloe (2000) has shown how militaries often organise sexual access to women’s bodies for their soldiers, to cultivate the right kind of masculinity for soldiering. This association between masculinity and violence is mediated by the eroticisation and masculinisation of violence, and the feminisation of subjugation (Chapkis 1988). Cohn (1986), for example, has shown how the ‘technostrategic’ discourse of the America’s nuclear defence intellectuals in the 1980’s, through a series of highly sexualised abstractions, masculinised and eroticised weapons of mass destruction. Contemporary ‘international’ practices of securitisation such as peacekeeping are not exempt from these critiques – for instance, Cockburn and Hubic (2002) highlight the participation of peacekeeping forces in post-war Bosnia in the sexual exploitation of women.

Such gendered insecurities are not targeted exclusively at women. Zarkov (2001) and Jones (2006) have shown how heterosexist and racialised masculinities associated with practices of securitisation can produce sexual violence against particular groups of men. Gender-based violence in the Balkan conflicts included the systematic massacre of men and boys belonging to certain ethnic groups by security forces (Jones 1994). Cohn’s (1993) ethnography of US defence intellectuals showed that, to perform the highly prized, ‘technostrategic’ masculinity competently, required colluding in the legitimisation of mass forms of violence against whole populations. Young (2003) has shown how the ‘logic of masculinist protection’ underscores both state-perpetrated violence in the name of the ‘war on terror’ in the US – much of which affected predominantly minority ethnic young men – and the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan.

In underscoring the porous boundaries between violences, theorists such as Cockburn (2004) and Moser and Mcilwaine (2001) posit violence as a ‘continuum’. They argue that the continuities between organised, politicised, and/or securitised violences, and those which are everyday, routine, privatised, become visible from a gender perspective. In this view, military invasions, bombing campaigns, rape, domestic violence and trafficking in women, for instance, cannot be understood as discrete and separate forms of violence, as they are linked by the more diffuse violence of structural gender inequalities and the norms of hegemonic masculinities. The continuum theory is an important point of intersection with the feminist literature on violence against women and relates closely to what I call the ‘normalisation of violence’ thesis.
(Section Three). In a similar vein, Jenny Pearce (2007) argues that processes of gender socialisation transmit violent practices and their normalisation, temporally and spatially, from the intimate spaces of the home outwards into the ‘public’ spaces of community, society and the nation-state. These gendered violences then ‘double back’ and reinforce gendered power relations in ‘private’ and in intimate relationships. The naturalisation of male violence is a crucial thread that connects practices of violence across all these spaces. Pearce does not claim that all explanations of violence can be reduced to gender, but that the association between masculinity and violence is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for understanding how a range of violences are (re)produced. Theories of violence as a continuum enable a perspective which not only makes visible the everyday violences which are obscured by human security’s tendency to focus on ruptures, but foregrounds the continuities between the everyday and those ruptures.

The feminist security literature, then, makes a compelling case for the importance of gender as a category of analysis (albeit always inflected by, and intersecting, other vectors of power and difference) in theorising security, violence and its (re)production in many contexts: a lens which makes such violences, and the interconnections between them, visible and intelligible. However, Shepherd (2008: 46-48) offers an interesting critique of these literatures, arguing that their take up of Connell’s (1987) hegemonic masculinities thesis reinscribes the association between masculinity and violence and its normalisation, and elides power with ‘male authority and dominance’, failing to denaturalise these links. She traces this problem back to the literature’s analytical focus on gender difference as coming-into-being a priori, rather than turning the analytical lens onto how gender difference is produced.

Shepherd’s critique is informed by her investment in understanding gender, and additionally security and violence, as performative, drawing on the philosophy of Judith Butler (1990, 1993, 1997). Performativity theory holds that certain kinds of speech acts do something – they bring about what they name (Austin 1975; Butler 1990, 1993; Ahmed 2006, 2007, 2012). Significantly for this thesis, Butler (1990, 1993) argues that practices – including, most famously, doing gender – can also be understood as performative, insofar as they have signifying effects, and (in keeping with Austin’s original theory) insofar as conditions are in place for performative sayings and doings to bring about what they name or signify. Butler (1997: 144) usefully summarises the sense in which gender can be conceived as ‘performative’, as follows:

no gender is “expressed” by actions, gestures, or speech, but… the performance of gender produces retroactively the illusion that there is an inner gender core. That is, the performance of
gender retroactively produces the effect of some true or abiding feminine essence or
disposition… gender is produced as a ritualized repetition of conventions… compelled in part by
the force of a compulsory heterosexuality.

Gender, in this formulation, is something which we repeatedly and compulsively do, rather than
something which we essentially are. This thesis follows Shepherd in taking a performative
approach to gender, violence and security; accordingly, I use the terms, ‘perform’,
‘performance’ and (occasionally) ‘performative’/‘performativity’, throughout, in a sense that
draws heavily on this body of theory. Hence, I find Shepherd’s critique of the feminist security
literatures compelling, as it rests on a radically de-essentialised conceptualisation of gender, and
astutely problematises the way in which these literatures smuggle more ‘common sense’
assumptions into their analyses. I contend that it is important, however, to recuperate from
these literatures the insight that gender is crucial to theorising violence. Here, I carefully work
through this tension by clarifying my understanding of the relationship between gender and
violence.

A performative approach holds that gender does not precede violence in order to explain it.
Rather, (gendered and gendering) violences (re)produce gender. Shepherd also problematises
an approach which, ‘homogenize[s] acts of violence as power’ (2008: 45). This has
ramifications for understanding violence as a continuum, suggesting that, while individualising
accounts of violence are inadequate, a totalising account which collapses all the diverse
manifestations of violence into one another – by reducing them all to expressions of
masculinity, for instance – is also problematic. In place of the implicit assumption that gender
difference comes into being a priori and precedes gendered violences, Shepherd formulates an
account of the relationship between gender and violence which she calls, ‘the violent
reproduction of gender’. In addition to Butler, she draws on a Foucauldian understanding of
power as pervasive and productive,. Shepherd argues that ‘instances of violence’ are sites for
gender performativity, or performances of gender – that is, for the (re)iteration of (regulatory)
norms which bring subjects into being, and both constrain and enable what the subject can do
(Lloyd 2007: 86). In that sense, they are sites for its (violent) reproduction. Gender is not
assumed to be a stable, pre-given category which precedes violence, but something which is
enacted and materialised through (among other things)14 (gender) violence. This performative
formulation radically denaturalises gender, while still allowing for its considerable significance
in theorising many violences. Furthermore, it enables a conceptualisation of violence – and

14 'This, among other things' is significant: gender is produced, reproduced and performed through multiple,
ordinary everyday practices, doings and sayings other than and in addition to gendered and gendering violences. It is
bigger than, and extends beyond, its mutually constitutive relationship with violence and by no means reducible to
this. In this sense, although I argue that gender does not precede violence as such, it certainly exceeds it.
therefore of violent practices of securitisation – as productive. In doing so it provides a useful theoretical framework for investigating and making sense of how security (as a political technology) (re)produces violences and insecurities.

Neither gender nor violences or insecurities come into being a priori, but they may mutually constitute one another in significant and context-specific ways. Violence and gender might be considered to amplify one another in a kind of feedback loop, whereby particular configurations of power relations are patterned by gender in variable and shifting ways, feeding into the production of those violences (which are one among other mechanisms) through which gender is reproduced. This feedback loop accounts, for instance, for the ‘doubling back’ which Pearce (2007) describes, whereby gender relations in intimate spaces are projected outwards into ‘public’ life in ways which produce violences that fold back into and reinforce inequalities within intimate relationships. But it should be conceived as operating not only spatially, but temporally. It is not a closed loop, but might be imagined as a sort of spiral, which allows for the impossibility of power as something fixed, stable or absolute. Hence Butler (1990: 198) argues that, in the gap between gender norms and their (failed) approximations, lurk possibilities for (re)iterating those same norms differently. This way of conceptualising the relationship between gender and (productive) violences as amplifying one another in a spiral feedback loop, is consistent with Mason’s (2002) argument that violence is most likely to occur where power is unstable or in jeopardy, and seeks to secure or consolidate itself. It similarly resonates with Moore’s (1994) argument, which seeks to theorise the psychic dimensions of (gender) violence: that interpersonal violences can be, ‘signs of a struggle for the maintenance of certain fantasies of identity and power’ (70). Violence should be understood, in this view, as not necessarily indicative of a ‘breakdown of the social order’ (ibid.), but as part of its reproduction. Furthermore, ‘in its enactment in social practice it is part of a discourse, albeit a contradictory and fragmented discourse, about gender difference’ (ibid.).

Shepherd’s concept of ‘the violent reproduction of gender’, is particularly useful for investigating the relationship between gender, violence and ‘security’ in this thesis. However I apply it in a qualified way, in conjunction with these insights derived from Gail Mason (2002 – see Section Three), Pearce and Moore, such as to construct my argument that violence and gender amplify one another in a spiral, feedback loop rather than one causally preceding the other, violence being one medium through which gender is performed, reproduced, disciplined and regulated. I also recuperate valuable insights from the literatures which Shepherd critiques – insights to which this thesis is deeply indebted. I use Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinities, for instance, in keeping with Hutchings’ (2008) reformulation of it in the light of
her review of its application in the literatures on gender and war, in which she argues for its potency as a formal, relational concept and an empty signifier, stressing that masculinity has no fixed content. I unpack these arguments in more detail as part of my discussion of policing masculinities in Chapter Two.

I also defend a qualified rendering of the continuum of violence thesis. I agree with Shepherd that gender is not a stable set of power relations or differences underlying this continuum. However I take issue with her conceptualisation of ‘the violent reproduction of gender’ as the enactment or materialisation of gender through ‘instances’ of violence. My contention is that it can be difficult to ascertain where an ‘instance’ of violence begins and ends. For this insight I am indebted greatly to the feminist literatures on security, and on violence against women (Section Three). Conceptualising violence as a continuum draws attention to how the ‘instances’, which stand out as violences performative of gender, blend into a range of other everyday (gender) practices and performances. This is, indeed, how violences are/become normalised and how insecurities – the threat as well as the enactment of violence – become routinised, embedded in the everyday. Such an analytical perspective, which makes visible the many continuities between different violences, is indispensable for the theoretical intervention that this thesis is making. This perspective is not so far removed from the overall tone of Shepherd’s argument; it is consistent with her subsequent comments, which posit violences as reproducing the very cultural conditions which sustain them, and the impossibility of addressing violence against women in isolation. Relatedly, I use Shepherd’s theory in conjunction with recuperating the normalisation of violence thesis - an insight I take from the feminist literature on violence against women, and its emphasis on the violences of the everyday. I make my case for this, and synthesise it with ‘the violent reproduction of gender’, in the next section.

3. The normalisation of violence

This section discusses what I call the feminist literature on violence against women, a body of scholarship which grew out of, and was closely intertwined with, feminist activism and organising in response to violence in a range of countries, including India, in the late 20th century. I have argued that human security lacks the resources to account for the violences of the everyday. The literature discussed in this section demonstrates that many gendered violences are embedded in the everyday, and offers theoretical tools with which to understand the relationship between violence and the everyday. Feminist scholarship on violence against
women, and the activism from which it emerged, has had no small measure of success, both at national and international levels, in naming and politicising violence against women in some specific contexts, including gaining recognition within the human rights movement (Macaulay 2000: 146-147; Youngs 2003; Kelly 2005), and as an international development issue (Macaulay 2000: 148; Pickup et al. 2001; Nussbaum 2005). This literature has been significant and influential, even while it has also been critiqued and problematised.

For this thesis, the most important and compelling argument proffered by this scholarship is that violence is not just about exceptional, painful ruptures in daily life, the ‘act’ or ‘event’; it is part of the fabric of everyday life (Dobash and Dobash 1998: 141). I call this the ‘normalisation of violence’ thesis. It contends that such violence cannot be reduced to the acts of pathological individuals but must be understood as an expression of systemic gender inequalities and injustice and thus reflective of a deeper, structural violence (Hester et al. 1996; Kelly and Radford 1996; Foley 1996; Radford and Stanko 1996; Kelly and Humphreys 2000). Feminist research within this tradition has shown that such violence is typically individualised, pathologised and compartmentalised in common sense, media or legal constructions or through professional interventions. As a result, the interconnections between different forms of violence are effaced, and violence is constructed as treatable at a psycho-social level, without addressing the structural conditions which enable and reproduce it (Kelly and Radford 1996; Radford and Stanko 1996; Foley 1996). This, paradoxically, has the double-edged effect of both naturalising/minimising most violence against women (all the rape cases which are disbelieved, all the harassment which cannot be named as such) and constructing acts of violence which are acknowledged as exceptional. This dual normalising and pathologising effect feeds back into reproducing the unequal, gendered relations of power which enable the violence (Kelly and Humphreys 2000).

Indian feminist scholarship on violence against women has developed in parallel, and also in dialogue, with Western feminist literatures since the 1970’s, and has had a similarly close and symbiotic relationship to feminist activism. In the Introduction to an edited volume published by one of India’s most eminent feminist publishing houses, Kali for Women, Kalpana Kannabiran (2005: 2) characterises violence against women in India as, ‘the violence of normal times’:

It is within the realm of the normal, the routine, that violence against women is deeply embedded, and it is because the greatest part of violence against women is the violence of normal times that it carries with it the guarantee of impunity irrespective of penal, punitive or constitutional safeguards (ibid.: 3).
Kannabiran argues that violence against women arises out of and contributes to reproducing wider, ‘multiple intersecting axes of inequality and discrimination’ (ibid.: 2), and posits violence against women in India as continuous with, expressing and produced by and through, forms of violence that are diffuse and structural. Kannabiran and contributors to the volume construct a broad definition, extending beyond interpersonal violence and encompassing practices such as systematic female foeticide and the forced sterilisation of women with disabilities, as well as class-, caste- and community-based forms of individual and collective gendered and gendering violence. Kannabiran’s framework is equally, therefore, an intersectional analysis that takes account of how the construction of caste, class and community in India contribute to the normalisation of particular manifestations of gendered violence within specific contexts. Feminist agitating around violence in India is usually understood within feminist narratives as having begun with a critique of custodial rape following the infamous ‘Mathura case’ still widely cited in the literature. State authorities and institutions – including but not limited to the law, the courts, the police – are shown to be deeply implicated in the normalisation of violence. For instance, Das (1996) and Baxi (2005) have shown how the discursive formation of court judgments, and medico-legal practices respectively, reiterate rape as normal male practice (Kannabiran 2005: 33).

The way in which the feminist literature on violence against women takes up the concept of the ‘continuum’, is an important feature of the normalisation of violence thesis. The continuum underscores the connections between different acts of gender-based violence through the structural violence – or unequal, gendered relations of power – which produces and legitimises specific acts of violence (Kelly 1988; Kelly and Radford 1998). This troubles and undermines hierarchical typologies of violence which construct some violent acts as more serious: for instance, those that breach the surface of the body in domestic violence cases, ‘stranger rape’ causing physical injury in rape cases; with the effect of minimising most women’s everyday experiences of violence (Kelly and Radford 1996).

The normalisation of violence thesis has a number of implications. It accounts for the systematic de-politicisation of gender-based violence by many intervention strategies – including, according to Prasad’s (1999) research, medico-legal reforms designed to give women access to redress in the face of domestic and sexual abuse in Delhi (Chapter Two). It accounts

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15 The Mathura case in 1972, which was highly publicised and catalysed a wave of feminist agitating across India, involved a tribal girl aged approximately 14-16 whose brother disapproved of her boyfriend and reported her ‘abducted’ to the local police. The police called her and her lover to the police station, where two duty officers illegally detained, raped and sexually assaulted her. The sessions court acquitted the officers on the basis that she did not resist or cry for help and was in any case ‘habituated’ to sexual intercourse and therefore unrapeable. The High Court over turned this verdict but the Supreme Court reinstated it. See (inter alia) Calman (1995: 64-67).
for how the pervasive threat of violence as a possibility routinely structures women’s lives. Nussbaum (2005: 167-168) considers the fear of this threat to be a form of ‘psychological violence’. It is linked with the way in which violence is theorised in this particular feminist literature as a practice of ‘patriarchal’ power and control which oppresses women by acting directly on their bodies, but which also oppresses through psychological damage to the integrity of the self (Tyler 2009; Brison 2002) and through constraining women’s agency by evoking self-policing and self-regulating strategies to manage its ever-present threat (Mason 2002: 121-2). Thus one of the useful themes that this literature foregrounds in important ways is the relationship between violence and power. It posits violence as an expression of power, and therefore enabled by, but also reproducing, relations of power. However this is not without its own attendant series of theoretical problems, to which I now turn.

The radical feminist understanding of patriarchal power, espoused by much of the violence against women literature, is troubled by a performative approach to gender and violence. Hence, Shepher (2008) problematises the positing of ‘patriarchy’ as a set of stable, transhistorical, transcultural power relations whereby men hold power ‘over’ women, and the implicit and concomitant projection of power as fixed, oppressive, and objectively identifiable through an empiricist methodology. She objects to the homogenising of the identity categories, ‘men’ and ‘women’, and accuses this literature of reinscribing the naturalisation of male violence, and effacing forms of gendered and gendering violence which are not committed by men against women, including the violent experiences of many men. She critiques the collapsing of ‘violence’ and ‘power’ into one another. These are incisive and valuable critiques, but do not invalidate the normalisation of violence thesis. This research insists on treating violence as both material and experiential, as well as discursive. The normalisation of violence thesis is compatible with a performative theory of gender, and a somewhat modified, Foucauldian account of power as pervasive and productive. I draw on Mason’s (2002) theory of violence as an instrument of power to address and overcome the apparent incommensurability between accounts of the relationship between violence and power in the feminist literature on violence against women, and Foucault’s (1990 [1981], 1982) conceptualisation of power as productive, pervasive, inescapable, unstable, mobile and relational.

Mason conducts a close analysis of key arguments from the feminist literature, and of Foucault’s perspective on power in his later work, in order to show that there are productive pathways between these two approaches. She shows how, on close inspection, Foucault’s account of power does not preclude the simultaneity of power as both repressive and productive, and argues that he exaggerates the distinction between power and violence (due to
the kind of intervention he was making in contemporary intellectual debates). She synthesises aspects of the two approaches in her theory of violence as an instrument of power, in which power may involve violence but always exceeds it, and the (subjectifying) knowledge that violence produces is integral to, and definitive of, its instrumentality.

Mason’s analysis is particularly useful for a number of reasons. She preserves the link which feminist research has made between power and violence, showing that the two can be intimately connected, without collapsing them into each other. She thus retains the feminist argument that violence can be oppressive, but shows how it can also be understood as productive – the two characteristics are not mutually exclusive. Violence is productive (in the same way that power, according to Foucault, is productive) insofar as it subjectifies – that is, produces particular kinds of subjects, or constructs (differentiated) identities in particular ways. Given that feminist accounts of violence understand oppression to operate at a psychological as well as bodily level, affecting people’s/women’s sense of self and identity and producing self-regulatory behaviours, the productive aspect of violence can be understood as part of how it oppresses, according to Mason, and vice versa.

The normalisation of violence thesis is closely associated with feminist accounts of patriarchal power relations in which violence functions to express, maintain and reproduce power. While I concur that some of these are problematic in their tendency to re-naturalise male violence and ‘pathologise gender’ (Shepherd 2008: 47), the argument that certain forms of violence are normalised need not be wedded to a reifying model of power. The normalisation of violence can be understood as a (political-material) effect of power as productive – and of particular discourses about gender, and practices of securitisation, as I show in this thesis. In addition, it can also be understood as part of ‘the violent reproduction of gender’. If we take Mason’s view that violence is an instrument of power and is productive (as well as oppressive), normalised violences embedded in everyday life can be understood as part of how gender is (violently) reproduced. I would argue, further, that violence is not only normalised, but normalising, and its normalising function is inextricably bound up with its subjectifying effects – it functions to (re)inscribe norms at the same time as it produces particular kinds of subjects who may then police themselves in accordance with these norms. There are violences that are embedded in the fabric of the everyday, and thus normalised, through which gender is performed, indeed which (therefore) violently reproduce gender, and in so doing, normalise certain kinds of gender identities and performances. This normalised–normalising dialectic can be understood as part of the spiral feedback loop through which, I argued in Section Two, gender and violence amplify and reproduce one another.
The normalisation of violence thesis serves to contextually ground my critique of human security in important ways. I have argued that, much like more explicitly masculinist models of (national) security, human security continues to depoliticise and render invisible those violences which are embedded in the everyday and normalised. Feminist research on the normalisation of violence underlies the rationale for privileging the category of the ‘everyday’ in this thesis, and interrogating its intersection with security discourses/practices. This long-standing tradition of researching everyday violences, combined with a Foucauldian understanding of power as pervasive and productive (as well as, sometimes, oppressive) can contribute to theorising how insecurities and violences are produced – and the implication of discourses/practices of security therein – which is crucial to rethinking human security as a critical/interpretive project from a feminist perspective.

The normalisation of violence thesis also informs my choice of empirical research object, namely the effects of police efforts to securitise ‘violence against women’. Explicit attempts to securitise violence against women are in part the outcome and effect of the feminist literatures on security and violence against women discussed here, and related activism, and their success in making these violences visible (UNSCR 1325 is a case in point). The police discourses and interventions in Delhi which I analyse in this thesis are, in part, informed and influenced by these literatures, and the activism which they both derive from, and feed into. These interventions provide interesting sites for investigating the intersection of security with the everyday, and for examining the embeddedness of security institutions in the everyday, and in their social and historical context. Exploring the discursive effects of efforts to securitise such violences, in all their unpredictability, yields insights and theoretical implications for the project of reconstructing human security from a critical feminist perspective.

Having established the normalisation of violence thesis as a fundamental premise of this thesis, and shown how it can be theoretically integrated with a performative framework for analysing ‘the violent reproduction of gender’ in and through security institutions, I return now to the vexed category of ‘violence against women’, and its vociferous critics, and demonstrate how I integrate the materiality and (the different dimensions of the) discursivity of violence, to construct a framework for analysis.
4. The materiality and discursivity of violence

While not treating the category uncritically, I contend it is possible to speak of ‘violence against women’ in a qualified way, which recognises that privileging the category, ‘women’ can obscure the links with and between a host of other gendered and gendering violences. In this section I explain my qualified use of this category, and argue that, like ‘security’ (but also not like it, since its effects, and the kinds of power it mobilises, are often not comparable), ‘violence against women’ functions both as a discourse, and as a material and experiential phenomenon. In doing so, I consider the ways in which postcolonial feminist perspectives have problematised the effects of ‘violence against women’ as a discourse, and show how these inform the current research. I both defend the materiality of violence in the face of such critiques, but also elaborate my understanding of its irreducible discursivity.

Nussbaum (2005: 167-168) argues that violence against women, including structural violence which ‘has the same crippling effects on women’s capabilities as actual bodily violence,’ is a global problem of such magnitude that no woman in the world is secure against it. Her argument seems particularly compelling given the questions at stake for the current research: ‘If our topic is ‘human security’, she argues, ‘we should begin by admitting that no woman, from pre-birth to advanced old age, has it.’ However, some of the arguments which disrupt the potentially universalising and totalising effects of discourses that posit ‘violence against women’ as a ‘global’ phenomenon are equally compelling. I turn to these arguments shortly. The extent to which we can speak of a universal phenomenon called, ‘violence against women’ is always limited and circumscribed by the consideration that ‘women’ are not a homogeneous class of people, but internally differentiated. Thus women’s embodied vulnerabilities (Butler 2004; 2004a) to violences are patterned in variable and unpredictable ways by difference, not produced by a stable set of power relations.

Nussbaum’s argument, of course, invokes the category, ‘women’, as if it were obvious and incontestable who these people called ‘women’ are. Rather than rehearse the multiple ways in which the category ‘women’ may be problematised and deconstructed, whether from the point of view of its obfuscation of differences among ‘women’ or its essentialist or biological foundationalist connotations, I want to suggest a particular way of understanding the term ‘women’ which I borrow from Nicholson (1994: 100-101). Nicholson advocates that we think

16 Other useful and/or qualified defences of the category, ‘women’ which address these critiques include Young (1994) and Gunnarsson (2011).
about the meaning of ‘women’ (she uses, woman) as indicating not a determinate meaning elucidated through a specific characteristic, but a ‘map’ or ‘network’ of ‘intersecting similarities and differences.’ This allows for the fact that, ‘there might be some characteristics – such as possessing a vagina and being over a certain age – that play a dominant role within such a network over a long period of time.’ It also allows for the fact that the meaning of ‘women’ changes across time and contexts, and similarly, that it is fractured and fragmented by difference. Such an understanding is compatible with an anti-foundationalist17 theory of sex and gender. Importantly, ‘within such a map,’ Nicholson adds, ‘the body does not disappear but rather becomes a historically specific variable whose meaning and import are recognised as potentially different in different historical contexts.’

This qualified understanding of the category, ‘women’ does not claim to exhaust the possibilities of its signification, but has important implications for how this research posits the category, ‘violence against women’ as a material and experiential phenomenon. Manifestations of violence against women are not all ‘the same’, in that they are historically, socially and context-specific and embedded. Gender-based violence against women may be mutually constitutive of other violences, both structural and bodily, along a range of axes of difference, including race, nationality, religion, age, sexuality, and (dis)ability, among others. Violence is experienced differently, and accumulates different meanings for, differently located subjects. Quillen’s (2001: 116-117) suggests that accounts of violence against women across national or cultural contexts must carefully contextualise differences and account for specificities, to guard against the risk of reifying them into an ‘imagined radical alterity’. Similarly, this strategy can help to avoid collapsing differences together ‘within a single linear plane’ (Pedwell 2007: 8), whereby ‘violence against women’ is constructed as totalising and undifferentiated.

Like ‘women’, ‘violence’ is not an entirely self-evident, unproblematically referential category. I have argued that it is not transparent and objectively identifiable where an ‘instance’ of violence begins and ends, since violence melds into and out of everyday performances of gender in myriad ways. Similarly, the demarcation of the acts, practices and experiences which belong within the category ‘violence (against women)’ is contested, as ‘violence’ itself is differently

17 ‘Biological foundationalism’ for Nicholson (1994: 82) is the idea that ‘distinctions of nature, at some basic level, manifest themselves in or ground sex identity, a cross-culturally common set of criteria for distinguishing men and women’. Nicholson distinguishes this from biological determinism, not least because it is both compatible and associated with various forms of social constructionism – but also implicated in ‘falsely generalizing matters specific to modern Western culture’. By ‘anti-foundationalist’, therefore, I mean theories premised upon the constructed-ness and discursivity of sex as a biological category, not just gender. It is significant to my argument that ‘the body does not disappear’, furthermore, given that I am discussing embodied vulnerability to violence, and the irreducible corporeality and materiality of violence.
constructed in different locations and by different(ly positioned) subjects (see Åkerström 2011), and such boundary-work is inevitably political.

Whilst wary of the risks of positing ‘violence against women’ as a transcultural, ‘global’ phenomenon, this thesis insists on the materiality of the gendered and gendering violences that many differently located women experience. There are violences that are experienced as (among other things) oppressive – harmful, debilitating, constraining, restricting – by those women who experience them, and those who think or fear that they might experience them (Mason 2002: 121-2). Gender is not, after all, a neutral or egalitarian system of difference. I emphasise the materiality of violence because it is formative. Violence is fundamentally corporeal, acting on and shaping bodies – ‘a touch of the worst order’ (Butler 2004a). It contributes in crucial ways to producing embodied subjectivity and to materialising gender. In this sense violence comes down to the material, the corporeal, but always exceeds it. We cannot apprehend violence without accounting for materiality, for (human?) bodies; violence is irreducibly material and yet, at the same time, it cannot be reduced to its materiality. It is through the productive dimension of violence that its materiality, and its equally irreducible discursivity, are wedded (Mason 2002). It is to this discursivity which I now turn.

In addition to insisting on the materiality of violence and its experiential dimensions, this thesis is also premised on the discursivity of violence, and on investigating that discursivity. There are two key ways in which I understand violence to be discursive; these are distinct, although related, and both are significant to the theoretical framework I am outlining here for analysing police efforts to securitise violence against women in Delhi. Firstly, I understand violence per se to be discursive as well as corporeal, and here I am indebted to Mason’s (2002) arguments. Secondly, I understand ‘violence against women’ to be a discursive category, which not only resists and challenges, but also mobilises, channels and reproduces power, and produces discursive and material effects.

Mason (2002: 124) argues that violence is discursive insofar as it makes statements about the people subjected to, and perpetrating it. Violence not only acts on, but is a form of communication between, bodies. It is not only corporeal, it is a form of, ‘deeply visceral knowledge with both oppressive and productive implications’ (ibid: 133). For Mason, the discursivity of violence captures its productive dimension, which is a function of its

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18 I do not mean to suggest here that men do not experience gendered and gendering violences, but the focus of this thesis is ‘violence against women’.
instrumentality. Violence, she argues, is both the product of particular knowledges, and in turn generates its own knowledges: the statements which violence makes ‘embody a knowledge that is capable of infiltrating the ways in which we experience, and recognize… identity categories’ (ibid.: 133). These statements ‘infiltrate… processes of subjectification,’ through which subjects take on, construct, recognise and understand particular identities (ibid: 124). It is this visceral knowledge that connects the embodied, oppressive effects of violence with its subjectifying and constitutive capacities as an instrument of power\(^{19}\) (ibid.: 133). These constitutive capacities of violence as an instrument of power, and thus the discursivity of violence, are integral to ‘the violent reproduction of gender’, and to the concomitant normalising potentialities of violence. Insofar as violence is both normalised and normalising, and in both these capacities, it has irreducible and closely related material and discursive dimensions and effects. The materiality of violence, while irreducible, however, does not precede its discursivity.

There is a second and distinct sense in which I understand the discursivity of violence, which equally produces a blend of discursive and material effects, but which is less intimately connected with the corporeality of violence as it is experienced. As a discursive category, ‘violence against women’ has served to politicise experiences of violence which, for many women, have often been individualised and isolating. In doing so, it has served to disrupt the normalisation of violence which it names. The formation of this category, and the knowledge which flows into and from it, has been an exercise in resisting and subverting oppressive (gendered and gendering) relations of power. Some postcolonialist feminist perspectives, however, highlight the more problematic effects it produces as it is woven into and out of complex relational webs of power/knowledge by and through differently located subjects.

Ratna Kapur (2005: 95-136) and Inderpal Grewal (2005: 143-157) both problematise the international feminist campaigns on violence against women played out through alliances forged under the auspices of the UN\(^{20}\). They argue that its discourse of ‘violence against women’ – along with claims made about ‘violence against women’ by Western feminist academics (such as Nussbaum, cited above) – has produced normative, discursive and political-material effects which need to be interrogated. Both Grewal and Kapur see ‘violence against

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\(^{19}\) I am not, however, aligning oppressive with bodily and productive with discursive, and neither does Mason. The oppression of violence is corporeal and exceeds the corporeal, it is also to do with these infiltrating knowledges – subjectification – the production and regulation of the self. And its constitutive powers are also to do with the body – insofar as the gendered body materialises through performance (Butler 1990), violences are among the critical performances and (re)iterations through which gender is (re)produced.

\(^{20}\) As does Shepherd (2008), less directly, through her critique of UNSCR 1325 and the production of the ‘international’.
women’ in this context as a universalising and exclusionary discourse which eclipses other feminist concerns and effaces asymmetries of power, differences and specificities, in ways which can compromise actual efforts to address particular forms of violence in specific contexts\textsuperscript{21}. They contend that this discourse is essentialising, producing a stable, universal category of ‘women’. Kapur names this, the hegemony of the ‘victim-subject’, and articulates it as both gender and cultural essentialism, drawing heavily on Narayan’s (1997) critique of the construction of dowry-related violence in India as ‘death by culture’. In a move reminiscent of Mohanty’s (1988) critique of how some Western feminist texts construct the category of the ‘third world woman’ as leading, ‘an essentially truncated life’, Kapur argues that the ‘victim-subject’ in ‘violence against women’ discourse is cast as ahistorical, unemancipated, ‘civilisationally backward’, lacking in self-determination, a victim of her (‘barbaric’, third world) culture. This essentialism, she elaborates, reproduces the problematic, power-laden binaries of East/West, West/rest, and invites protectionist, conservative and imperialist responses – including the recourse to the strengthening of criminal law and its ‘powers of moral surveillance and regulation’ (Kapur 2005: 135). Kapur explores how the ‘violence against women’ discourse has been articulated in India, in relation to the ‘international’ and the dominance of Western feminism therein. She argues that Indian feminism is complicit in (re)producing the ‘victim-subject’ as an ‘authenticity move’, in order to distinguish Indian from Western feminisms in the context of the rise of Hindu nationalism in India.

As a (field of) discourse, ‘violence against women’ can be mobilised to produce a range of effects, many of which may not be intentional, and is far from monolithic. It is an inescapably political category, but it is inherently neither benign nor pernicious, progressive nor regressive. The kind of effects it produces are contingent, and depend in unpredictable ways on the particular contexts into which it insinuates itself and is appropriated, how it is evoked, (re)constructed and adapted, and with which other discourses, meanings and knowledges it intertwines and is co-constituted. This thesis investigates what happens when ‘violence against women’ is securitised at an everyday level, and its take-up within security institutions in a particular postcolonial context. It explores how ‘violence against women’ and security discourses/practices inflect one another in context-specific ways that contribute to ‘the violent reproduction of gender’.

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\textsuperscript{21} Kapur’s critique engages heavily with the US feminist literature on violence against women, such as Catherine MacKinnon’s (1982, 1983, 1987, 1989) work, whereas I have drawn primarily on the British and Indian literature. These are similar but distinct, although the differences are quite subtle. The literature I draw on here, for the most part, claims that violence is normalised through social structures, cultural representations and state practices, whereas MacKinnon may be read – certainly Kapur (2005: 102-103) reads her – as arguing that violence is inextricably built into the very structures of heterosexual relations.
This thesis, then, posits both ‘security’ and ‘violence against women’ – two of the most important categories with which it engages – as discourses, or discursive fields. The empirical analysis in Chapters Five to Eight examines a particular site where these two fields intersect. Furthermore, I have argued in this section that an account of violence as both normalised and normalising, in highly contextual ways, is compatible with an approach to violence which captures both its irreducible materiality and corporeality, and its irreducible discursivity, and the inextricable connections between these two analytical dimensions of violence. In analysing security institutions as sites for ‘the violent reproduction of gender’, I am at once analysing their implication in the processes of normalisation through which violences become (re)embedded in the everyday, and analysing their implication in the (re)production of normalising violences. Empirically, and analytically, it may not always be possible to separate or distinguish the two. In addition, I look at how ‘violence against women’ is mobilised as a discursive category in and through efforts to securitise it, and how such efforts contribute (paradoxically) to ‘the violent reproduction of gender’, the normalisation of certain violences and the reproduction of normalising violences, in ways that are co-constitutive of a host of other effects.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that human security offers insufficient resources to account for – or address – the violences embedded in the everyday, or the complicity of ‘security’ as an institutional field of power in their (re)production. I have drawn on the extensive feminist literatures which do proffer such resources to construct a theoretical framework for analysing the effects of the securitisation of everyday violence against women through policing discourses/practices in Delhi.

Before concluding this opening chapter, however, I want to return to the question of ‘security’, to consider whether a performative approach to ‘security’ as a ‘political technology’ producing pernicious gendered effects and violences, allows any possibility for the reclamation of security as emancipatory, as a ‘positive public good’, in line with the philosophy underlying human security. This thesis does not start from the premise that it is always desirable to ‘securitise’, or posit unlimited expansion of the purview of (human) security as an unproblematic solution. Among other things, this research critically examines the complicated effects of securitising certain kinds of everyday (gendered and gendering) violence. However, I also contend that critical engagement does not mean abandoning any hope of reclamation, and propose a double
vision for apprehending security, which captures how it functions as a ‘political technology’, 
and as a material and experiential condition.

To engage in re-constructing alternative ‘securities’ inevitably means to be implicated in a 
practice of power. But the production of knowledge and theory is always a power-laden pursuit 
(Chapter Four). If feminist theory does not engage in the highly political task of 
(re)constructing the meanings of ‘security’, then it is in no position to disrupt security as an 
authoritative discourse by claiming that it is productive of lived insecurities – since this claim in 
and of itself implies a different understanding of what it means to be in/secure. Perhaps the 
challenge, then, in thinking about how we might re-signify, reinvent, transform ‘security’, lies 
in finding ways to re-appropriate it strategically without falling into the trap of reifying, 
mystifying, fetishising (or as Burke says, desiring to ‘resecure’) ‘security’. Re-signification 
then becomes not a resolution to all problems, but a form of productive, dynamic engagement 
with ‘security’ as discourse.

With this in mind, the theoretical discussion of violence in Section Four, above, has 
imlications for thinking about security. Just as violence is not reducible to its discursivity, so 
security cannot be reduced to its operation as a ‘political technology’. This is not only to say 
that as a discourse, security produces material effects. If violence is understood as material, 
corporeal and potentially oppressive, as well as discursive and productive, this implies the 
possibility of ‘security’ as a material phenomenon, a type of experience, the condition of being 
or feeling secure. Among other things, this might involve experiencing less violence, being 
and/or feeling less at risk from (the threat) of violence and being and/or feeling free(r) from its 
oppressive effects. It is relatively uncontroversial to claim that some people experience more 
vioence than others, and some are or feel more safe or protected from violence, and/or are less 
at risk of violence, and that exposure to violence and experiences of violence vary not only 
between different(ly located) individuals and groups of people, but for each person, across time 
and space. Questions of what makes us more or less secure, what counts as ‘violence’, and 
what it means to be more or less free from violence, are always matters for investigation and 
debate, and cannot be closed to contestation a priori. I am not arguing that security, in its

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22 This proposition defines security – at least in part – in relation to violence: being secure from/against violence or 
free from violence. This is by no means the only way to define security and I am not advocating a narrow definition. 
One of the distinctive features of human security is the focus on ‘freedom from want’ as well as ‘freedom from fear’ 
(UNDP 1994). These aspects are understood as intersecting and integrated and these interconnections have been 
developed in a new and productive direction, for instance, by Robinson’s (2008, 2011) theory of human security as a 
(feminist) critical ethics of care. These broader dimensions of security are important for a perspective which 
considers violence to be structural and diffuse as well as corporeal. I choose to focus on violence here, and how to 
understand security in relation to violence, due to the demonstrated, paradoxical complicity of security (as a political 
technology) in the (re)production of various violences.
materiality, is stable and objectively identifiable. But I want to stick with the proposition that security has an important and irreducible material and experiential dimension. This is not to claim that security exists ‘outside of the power relations through which discourses operate’ (Shepherd 2008: 76). However, abandoning any commitment to security as a material ‘good’ linked with the experience of being free(r) from oppressive violences and their threat, seems to concede the inevitability and intractability of violence and the impossibility of things being otherwise, or of transforming the power relations which (re)produce violences. This implies the possibility of partially recuperating an emancipatory aspect to the material/experiential dimension of security, which I consider further in the Conclusion to this thesis. The next chapter focuses in on policing research, to explore what can be gleaned about policing as a site for ‘the violent reproduction of gender’, and the implication of the latter in the production of (gendered and gendering) constructions of ‘security’.
Securing masculinities:
Research on police cultures, gender, and violence against women

I flick through the booklet given to me by a Delhi Police officer visiting the Gender Institute, where I am a doctoral student. The booklet is the annual report of Delhi Police’s *Parivartan* programme: a campaign for the safety of women in Delhi. The cover image shows two smiling police officers patrolling a Delhi street in khaki uniforms, surrounded by a gaggle of schoolgirls. They are both women. It is precisely this aspect of the image that seeks to capture the observer’s attention. The annual report proudly boasts a host of similar images: there are policewomen laughing with women in the doorsteps to their homes in the narrow streets of Delhi’s resettlement colonies, listening attentively to a woman making a complaint, and putting their arms protectively around an older woman. The images deliberately play on, and challenge, assumptions about who the police are, and what they do. When I conducted my fieldwork the following year in Delhi, only seven per cent of serving police officers in Delhi Police were women23. Indeed, the majority of police worldwide are men, in spite the steady influx of women into policing since the mid-late 20th century.

Policing is indisputably gendered. But the gendering of the police is considerably more complex than ratios of men to women. It is also gendered in its occupational cultures, policing practices and their implications, and these must be considered when analysing the police as a security institution. This chapter reviews the existing ethnographic and sociological literatures on policing and explores what can be gleaned about policing as an institutional site for ‘the (violent) reproduction of gender’. I draw on these literatures, furthermore, to situate state policing within and against ‘security’ as a productive field of power, and theorise the ways in which policing, as a set of institutions and practices, contributes to producing particular, gendered (and gendering) constructions of ‘security’.

The available literature on policing in English focuses overwhelmingly on the English-speaking, ‘developed’ world: the UK, the US, Canada and Australia. I also consider the very limited

23 Interviews with senior officials in Delhi Police, September 2008
literature in English on gender, policing and violence against women in India, as well as relevant studies from other countries where possible. I draw on these literatures not because I see policing as cross-culturally uniform or lacking specificity. The policing space is not isolated from, but rather deeply embedded in, its particular social and historical context, and my analysis of the policing of violence against women in Delhi (Chapters Five to Eight) is testimony to this embeddedness. However, there are some salient cross-cultural patterns and generalisations which, although historically contingent, arguably stem in part from the status of the police as a *sine qua non* of (gendered) modern state-hood. The analysis of changing organisational masculinities in Delhi Police, and the role of violence-against-women work therein, in Chapter Eight especially bears out some of these similarities, and the relevance of looking at studies of policing from elsewhere in the world to this particular research, without losing sight of Delhi Police’s specificity. While the policing literature is vast and dense (Reiner 2010), I focus on the aspects most pertinent to this project.

The first section situates policing as a state security institution in relation to the emergence of the Westphalian state system and its formative history of colonialism/coloniality. I consider Reiner’s (ibid.) theory that modern societies fetishise the police as providers of order and security, and suggest that policing functions on many levels as a regulatory apparatus, exercising what Foucault calls ‘disciplinary power’. Sections Two and Three explore the literatures on police occupational cultures, and gender and policing, which show how policing can serve as a site for the performance, accomplishment and (re)production of (certain prestigious variants of) hegemonic masculinity. I consider the ubiquity and tenacity of certain policing masculinities, in spite of historical and contextual contingency and variation, and connect these with the fetishisation of the police as fending off crime, chaos and insecurity. Section Four then shows how existing literature on the policing of violence against women implicates policing in reproducing the normalisation of gender-based violences. I contend that this is part of how policing (violently) reproduces gender, and inextricably connected with the gendered constructions of security it also (re)produces. I maintain throughout, however, that policing remains a potential site for feminist engagement, and attend to the complexities and contradictions of policing as a gendered and gendering security institution.
1. ‘Police fetishism’, security and regulatory power

Modern societies, argues Reiner (2010: 3), are afflicted by ‘police fetishism’: That is, ‘the ideological assumption that the police are a functional prerequisite of social order so that without a police force, chaos would ensue.’ His critique of ‘police fetishism’ is particularly useful for historicising the police, and reminding us that despite their apparent ubiquity, uniformed police forces as the state sanctioned agents of social control empowered to use coercive force, are the product of a particular configuration of social and historical contexts. Reiner points out that many societies have functioned well without a police force and certainly without the modern variant of policing. This ‘myth’ (ibid.) is further undermined by the plethora of empirical research showing that the police spend relatively little of their time actually fighting crime and have at best a limited, material impact on crime (ibid.: 21). Like Reiner, Ericson’s (2005) study of Canadian policing observes the mythic status of the police function as crime-fighters. Crime control, both theorists contend, depends on a host of intersecting social, political, economic and cultural factors beyond the control of the police. He characterises the police as ‘reproducers of order’, serving a function both repressive and ideological:

The mandate of police patrol officers is to employ a system of rules and authoritative commands to transform troublesome, fragile situations back into a normal or efficient state whereby the ranks in society are preserved. (Ericson 2005: 218; emphasis added)

There are two points I draw from this argument. Firstly, for Ericson, part of the order that the police reproduce, is precisely this myth of ‘crime control, of law and order’ (Ericson 2005: 222). I see this myth as integral to ‘police fetishism’. The tenacity of this ideological myth, and the work that goes into reproducing it, is significant for thinking about the kind of ‘security’ and the gender regimes that the police produce.

Secondly, while its effectiveness is ‘always debatable’, policing aims to secure a particular social order (Reiner 2010: 5), which may privilege some interests over others, and is likely to be patterned by forms of ‘inequality and dominance’ (ibid.: 17). The police seek to reproduce the existing order, the status quo (Ericson 2005: 219). In this sense, policing tends towards conservatism: the police by and large (seek to) conserve and reproduce, rather than deconstruct

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24 On the basis of a review of studies in policing, Reiner (2010: 19), argues that ‘police routinely under-enforce the law’ and that their primary contribution to crime control is symbolic. Foster (2003: 200-201) adds that police spend most of their time on social service tasks and paperwork – see below. See Ericson (1982: 5-6) for a summary of survey, ethnographic and other research documenting the relatively small percentage of police time spent on crime control.
and challenge, extant power relations. There are structural features of modern state police organisations (in addition to their perceived social function), which incline them towards conservatism, such as the rigidity of the hierarchy and the enforcement of conformity in new recruits (Hatty 1989: 78). Furthermore, research has demonstrated that policing is implicated in the reproduction of social inequalities (Foster et al. 2005). Ericson links the order-reproducing orientation of the police with their identification with ideas of middle-class respectability (ibid.: 220), through which certain categories of people are constructed as more policeable. Reiner (2010: 25) comments:

Policing is regularly blighted by inequality, injustice, and discrimination in its operation.
Groups that are low in power and status, such as the poor and unemployed, ethnic minorities, young men (and underclass young women), gays, and lesbians, become ‘police property’ (Lee 1981), disproportionately likely to be treated as suspects at each stage of the criminal justice process.

For Reiner (2010: 6), the institutionalisation of social inequality and hierarchy provide the backdrop for the development of specialist police forces in the modern sense, as a ‘means for the emergence and protection of more centralized and dominant class and state systems’. Policing, then, is a distinctive feature of the modern state system, which feminists have critiqued for its gendered binaries of public and private, protector and protected (Peterson 1992; Pateman 1989; Brown 1992). The development of modern police forces is historically linked to the emergence and consolidation of this system. I suggest, therefore, that ‘police fetishism’ is intimately linked with the fetishisation of the (sovereign) state in national security discourses which Shepherd (2008) critiques, and from which, she argues, alternative, ‘(international) security’ discourses, including human security, fail to seriously depart. Policing is historically implicated in a project which equates ‘security’ with the authority and (zero-sum) power of the state to exercise coercive force in the name of ‘protection’ – a construction which feminist theorists have deeply troubled (Chapter One).

Furthermore, insofar as policing is inextricably wedded to the rise of the modern state system, it has also been shaped by the history of colonialism through which this system was, in part, consolidated. Brogden (1987) argues that the emergence of the New Police in Victorian England, which paved the way for modern British professional policing, cannot be fully

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25 Not only in the sense of being historically coterminous; as manifestations of the state’s definitive monopoly on the use of legitimate force, and more broadly its regulatory power, police forces tend to be considered among the *sine qua non* of modern states.
26 I explain the fetishisation of the state in and through (neo-)realist (national) security discourses, and discuss feminist critiques of it, in Chapter One.
understood without reference to its development in the context of, and contribution to, the imperialist project. Police institutions were shaped in part by the impulse to ‘impose centralised social control’ in the colonies, to delegitimise local customs, norms, legal structures and law enforcement practices and to bolster and legitimise the imperial project of capitalist expansionism, colonisation, incorporation and expropriation (9-10). That which the police aimed to secure, then, included the economic, political and cultural interests and dominance of the colonial powers. The origins of the modern professional police in Western and decolonised countries are therefore deeply implicated in a history of coloniality that extends into the present. The Indian police system is still rigidly based on the structures established in the Indian Police Act of 1861, under colonial rule (Narang 2006: 35). 27 Policing is thus linked to, and at times reproduces, constructions of security as exclusion, control and regulation of unsavoury ‘others’ (people treated as ‘police property’; the colonised, when not compliant) who are deemed threats to or potentially disruptive of the ‘communities’, categories of people and/or ‘order’ to be secured. ‘Security’ is constructed through the dichotomies of us/them, self/other, of borders and boundaries, suspicion and zero-sum forms of power: perhaps unsurprisingly, such constructions of security mirror the discourses of ‘national security’ problematised by feminist security theorists (Chapter One).

Foucault (1984: 241) saw policing as connected with the historical development of what he calls, ‘disciplinary power’ (see also Foucault 1979). 28 Insofar as the police functions as a state institution exercising disciplinary power, it is not only complicit in the reproduction of social inequalities, but contributes to regulating the minutiae of people’s everyday lives – with some categories of people positioned as far more vulnerable and susceptible to regulation, and others variably privileged with the ability to insulate themselves more effectively from it. It is useful to understand the police as exercising disciplinary power in the Foucauldian sense, because this perspective highlights the ways in which policing powers may be productive rather than (as well as) simply repressive. The complicity of policing in the reproduction of social inequalities, for example, is complex and cannot be reduced to securing dominance for one group over others. While policing certainly does deploy coercive force, it also exerts power in a range of more mundane ways which incentivise subjects to self-regulate. In conjunction with various co-existing institutions, formal and informal, policing is one channel through which norms are (re)produced, sedimented and enforced – a key cog in the body of ‘discursive practice’ which

27 I discuss further the implications of this history for studying the police in the Indian postcolonial context in Chapter Three.
28 Foucault (1984: 241) is here discussing ‘policing’ as a form of governmental rationality which exceeds and is not limited to the police function as a formal state security institution, but can be exercised through a range of channels. Nevertheless his observations bring to the fore the salience of the regulatory dimension of policing and the kinds of power it channels and contributes to exerting, which are of considerable significance to the analysis in Chapters Five to Eight.
defines what is normal, acceptable, deviant. While police organisations typically understand themselves as crime-fighters dealing with the exceptional, protecting daily life from harmful ruptures, much of their routine work is more low-level management (including patrol, surveillance, diffusing conflict). Arguably their contribution to securing the social order depends on this routine work more than on dangerous crime-fighting.

This understanding of policing is particularly important for theorising the contribution of policing to the normalisation (or denormalisation) of certain (gendered) violences, as well of other modes of embodying and doing gender. I explore this contribution in the remainder of this chapter, and throughout my analytical chapters, where, for instance, I consider how police discourses/practices surrounding violence against women in Delhi can involve the police in regulating interpersonal (especially marital and sexual) relationships and conduct, at times re-embedding gendered and sexual norms which enable certain violences to persist.

A wave of police reform efforts spread across many liberal democratic states in the latter decades of the 20th century, and continues into the present, in response to public scrutiny and criticism of policing. Community policing has spearheaded this as the dominant good practice model (Adelman et al. 2003). Community policing is an approach which aims to police effectively through cultivating a mutually enabling relationship between individual police officers and members of the communities they serve. The idea is that establishing such relationships will reduce distrust between communities and the police, involve both police and communities in proactive problem-solving, and increase the likelihood of citizens sharing information with the police to improve crime control (Miller 1999: 4-5). Notably, it elevates the social service function of policing, although it is not clear that the valorisation of crime-fighting is reduced in equal proportion (ibid.: 226). It does nevertheless exemplify the presence of counter-hegemonic and competing discourses and constructions of what policing is and means, and therefore competing constructions of security29. I explore the gendered implications of community policing further in the sections which follow. Research suggests, however, that alternative models like community policing have had limited and ambivalent success in shattering the hegemony of the myth of real policing as action filled, mission oriented, crime-fighting, a violent, masculine job (Loftus 2009: 192; Silvestri 2003).

29. These models of policing remain consistent with an understanding of policing as exercising disciplinary power, although the formations of ‘discursive practice’ in which they partake are in flux, and norms may vary as may the specific practices through which disciplinary power is exercised.
The police are not in a condition of stasis, and neither are the societies they police. Ericson’s theorisation of ‘reproduction’, cited above, is useful for the way it allows for the possibility of change. For Ericson, the reproduction ‘is made with reference to the existing order’, but the ‘interactional sequence[s]’ through which order is reproduced contain the ‘seed of change’, such that ‘the outcome may not quite duplicate what was there before the interaction’ (Ericson 2005: 219, citing Giddens 1976). Crucially, furthermore, the fact that order has to be reproduced (rather than just existing, undisturbed) ‘implies that order is not simply transmitted in an unproblematic manner but is worked at through processes of conflict, negotiation, and subjection.’ (ibid.: 219). This provides for the reproduction of existing power relations in and through policing, but simultaneously denaturalises the way things are. No police organisation is an unchanging monolith – if we understand power relations as unstable, fluid and shifting – then insofar as policing reproduces power, there is always the potential for it to be implicated in reproducing it differently. However, given the apparently limited impact of policing on (the production of) crime, we might ask what effect policing is likely to have on violence against women, and on the (re)production of those power relations in which it is embedded. From a human security perspective, securitising violence against women exclusively or primarily through policing could be seen as a short-sighted and narrow strategy that can only ever be limited in its impact. I begin to explore these questions in the remainder of this chapter.

2. Police occupational cultures

‘Police culture’ is broadly understood to refer to a distinctive (Loftus 2009: 3–4) set of ‘informal occupational norms and values’ (Chan 2005: 339), which includes ‘accepted practices, rules, and principles of conduct that are situationally applied’ (Manning 1989: 360, cited in Chan 2005). Research on police occupational cultures developed out of concern about the discretionary power of rank and file police officers\(^\text{30}\). Discretionary decisions are informed by informal norms, values and beliefs as much as (perhaps more than) by legal rules (Reiner 2010: 117; Loftus 2009: 4). Police cultures therefore help to shape frontline officers’ interactions with the people they police. They may reinforce gendered, sexual, racial and class stereotypes and thus contribute to the police role in reproducing social inequalities.

\(^{30}\) Police discretion significantly affects the policing of violence against women (see Section 4, below): in particular, it impacts how policies designed to improve police responses are interpreted and translated into practice via operational policing.
A particular set of tenets has been found to characterise police cultures, many of which can be traced to Skolnick’s (1966) profile of the police officer’s ‘working personality’, which posited danger, authority and efficiency as the key preoccupations shaping police demeanours and behaviours. This literature has been usefully summarised by Reiner (2010) and Loftus (2009). The characteristics discussed include a sense of mission and moral imperative, a hedonistic love of action and excitement and a celebration of violence, all of which are closely associated with a self-image that projects crime-fighting as the police mandate alongside the myth of the indispensability of the police to protect and serve – in other words, what Reiner calls ‘police fetishism’ is definitive of police culture itself. Other tenets are cynicism and a suspicious disposition, isolation and internal solidarity, conservatism, hierarchy and discipline. Reiner and Loftus both link police suspicion to the stereotyping of particular categories of people along lines of race, sexuality, gender and class.

Relatedly and significantly for this research, Smith and Gray (1985) argue that a ‘cult of masculinity’ infuses policing, while Reiner (2010: 128) speaks of ‘old fashioned machismo’ as part of a more general climate of prejudice and discrimination in police organisations. Loftus (2009: 10) similarly emphasises the ‘masculine ethos’ of the police which values physical and emotional ‘toughness’ and is often expressed through ‘predatory heterosexuality’ and misogyny. Gender is fundamental to conceptualising police cultures, the masculinism of which has been considered definitive, as captured by Fielding’s (1994: 47) characterisation of ‘cop canteen culture’ as ‘an almost pure form of ‘hegemonic masculinity’’, drawing on the work of Connell (1987). For Fielding, ‘police forces are sites for competing ways of being a man and expressing masculinity’ (56), which is particularly associated with confronting ‘“real crime” or “real disorder”’ (ibid.). Hence, Foster (2003: 200-201) similarly argues, officers continue to invest in ‘their own ‘self-image of performing a worthwhile, exciting and dangerous task’ (ibid: 201, citing Van Maanen 2003 and Waddington 1999), requiring bravery and machismo, although research indicates that most actual police work is routine, boring, social service oriented and heavy on paperwork. Social service tasks and paperwork are denigrated because they are seen as feminised, despite the critical importance, for instance, of meticulous record keeping to bringing a successful prosecution (ibid.: 202). While actual opportunities for ‘real police work’ may be few and far between, this myth that appears so integral to policing occupational identities is kept alive by an ‘oral tradition’ of ‘war stories’ which ‘glorify[sic] the

31 ‘Real police work’ – usually configured in terms of crime-fighting – is a construct I borrow from the policing literature reviewed here (Waddington 1999: 296; Ericson 1982: 5; Chan 1996: 125; Martin 1999: 115; Manning 1977), that has emerged at numerous policing sites in qualitative research. It also has strong resonances with Fielding’s (1994: 56) contention that performing as a ‘real (police) man’ means dealing with ‘real crime’ and ‘real disorder’. It is sometimes, though not always, used in scare quotes in the literature. I use scare quotes in this thesis to highlight its constructed and even mythical status. I discuss the slipperiness and flexibility of the content of ‘real police work’ further in Chapter Eight, where I apply it to the gendering of police work in Delhi Police.
violence over which [the police] hold the legitimate monopoly’ (Waddington, 1999: 298; on police culture as story-telling, see also Shearing and Ericson, 1991).

The ‘real police work’ that is imagined as the ultimate accomplishment in masculinity is commensurate with ‘police fetishism’ – with the myth of policing as fighting crime and keeping violence, danger and disorder at bay. What is implicit in these arguments is that the gendered and gendering character of policing is indissociable from, and mutually constitutive of, the fetishisation of the police as crime-fighters securing the social order, which in turn is partly a function of the fetishisation of the (sovereign) state and the associated constructions of security as authority, protection and (zero-sum) coercive power. The gender dimensions of policing are thus deeply entangled with the constructions of security which implicitly inform policing and which policing in turn (re)produces.

The literature on police occupational cultures has been widely critiqued. Waddington (1999: 288-290) contends that the relationship between culture and action is not straightforward, a complaint closely wedded to a broader set of criticisms, succinctly encapsulated in Chan’s (2005: 340-341) analysis and widely rehearsed elsewhere (Loftus 2009): that police culture is not deterministic, singular, bounded, universal and unvarying, monolithic and insulated from the external environment such as to preclude the possibility of cultural change. To claim that police cultures are multiple and not monolithic has become de rigueur. The argument is well demonstrated by some of the research on gender and policing, which draws attention to nuances and variations across different police subcultures and historicises particular manifestations of police culture (see Silvestri 2003; Appier 1998).

However, repeated empirical research on police cultures has demonstrated cross-national similarities and enduring continuities over time. Loftus (2009) has demonstrated, for instance, how police cultures in the UK are adapting to and resisting the equality and diversity frameworks being mainstreamed at policy level. She emphasises the tenacity of ‘traditional’ police culture and the intractability of its masculinism (see also Foster et al. 2005). Certain tenets of police culture have been found to be remarkably ubiquitous and resilient, in particular its variable association with masculinity. The intractability of police cultures, and the ubiquity of some of their most enduring features, are typically explained in the literature by reference to the structural features of policing. Reiner (2010) argues that the ‘typical cultural pattern’ he describes is shaped by the police ‘predicament’ of maintaining order and enforcing the law (137), and the ‘similar pressures’ which police encounter (116) in fulfilling their ‘mandated
role’ (118). Loftus (2009) similarly attributes the ‘tenacity and resilience’ of certain ‘stubborn patterns in police culture’ (198) to, ‘the fundamentals of the police role,’ including, ‘the unique position of enforcing the law in a liberal democratic society,’ and the attendant ‘occupational and organizational demands’ (199). Waddington (1999: 302) imputes the tenacious cultural precepts of policing to ‘the defining characteristic of police’, namely, ‘the exercise of coercive authority’.

Reiner’s and Waddington’s explanations in particular read as almost justificatory apologies for police culture. The emphasis on the ‘mandated role’ of the police as a precondition of police culture runs in tension with the arguments made by both theorists that the crime-fighting image of the police is largely illusory. These accounts resort to naturalising police cultures as inevitably following from the structural features and conditions of policing per se, and risk falling back into the trap of reification. In particular, such accounts tend to reify the association between policing and masculinity, which is taken for granted, but generally under-theorised in this literature. This is especially evident in Waddington’s (1999: 298) explanation of ‘[t]he ‘cult of masculinity’ as a ‘celebration of the core aspect of the [police] role’. The masculinism of policing is unsurprising, he maintains:

…for the exercise of coercive authority is not something that just anybody can do. It is traditionally the preserve of ‘real men’ who are willing and able to fight. Confronting physical threat is widely regarded as ‘tough’ work and such work is traditionally associated with masculinity… masculine traits: ‘aggressive’, ‘assertive’, ‘forceful’, ‘willing to take a stand’ and ‘willing to take risks’… seem intuitively compatible with the exercise of coercive authority. (298)

Despite his strategic use of scare quotes, Waddington naturalises the association between masculinity and the qualities valorised in policing contexts. The content and meaning of masculinity is assumed to precede police cultures, which therefore cannot help but align themselves with these attributes in their commitment to exercising coercive authority. This problematic premise is also evident in Fielding’s (1994) analysis. Although Fielding privileges a gender perspective, he treats ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as if it has a fixed content which is knowable a priori.

Hutchings’ (2008) analysis of the association between masculinity and war is instructive in teasing out the effects of such conceptualisations. She shows how accounts which posit masculinity as preceding and explaining war tend to reify and universalise the meaning of masculinity, whereas empirical studies of masculinity construction show that its particular content can vary enormously from context to context. Drawing out the implications of
Connell’s (1987; 1995) influential theory, she argues that ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is an empty signifier, the formal, relational properties of which enable it to valorise whatever content it captures, in relation to subordinated/marginalised masculinities and denigrated/othered femininities (femininity also being an empty signifier). Just as Hutchings argues that masculinity as a formal, relational category enables us to make sense of war and valorise certain war practices, I would add that it serves to valorise both policing per se, in addition to particular constructions of ‘real police work’ and certain policing skills and styles. Such a perspective on the relationship between (hegemonic) masculinities and policing is useful because, as Hutchings argues regarding her discussion of masculinity and war, it renders the association contingent rather than necessary, thereby denaturalising it. It therefore lends theoretical underpinning to the proposition that police cultures are not monolithic, and is more compatible with a performative understanding of gender.

Hegemonic masculinities, in this view, do not precede policing cultures. Rather, policing contributes to producing the association between masculinity and danger, coercive authority, crime-fighting, physical toughness, competition, aggression, bravery, and the rest. It does not do this in a vacuum and without precedent, but draws on, interacts with, reworks, adapts and inflects broader societal gender norms, meanings and associations. Policing is a significant societal site at and through which gender is performed. Gender, in sum, is constituted in and through police cultures at the same time as it is constitutive of them. The next section picks up this argument and draws on the gender and policing literature to explore how policing reproduces gender.

Returning, in the interim, to the intractability of police cultures, I contend that it is not the structural features and conditions of policing which produce these typical peculiarities, but rather the sine qua non myth of policing which constructs the police as crime-busters holding down the rule of law against the threatening tide of chaos – in other words, ‘police fetishism’. This is implied in Loftus’ comment on the partial and contradictory changes brought about by ‘the general shift towards community policing’ (192):

> Officers are encouraged to view members of the public as people with a legitimate right to and involvement in policing services [sic]… However, the endurance of the mission perspective and associated view that the whole point of policing is to lock up criminals undermines these endeavours to reinvent the police role. (ibid.)

This relationship might also be conceived as dialectical – it is not the case that police fetishism precedes police culture as such, but they are mutually constitutive. Furthermore, as
demonstrated by the association between masculinity and the construction of ‘real police work’, discussed above, the fetishisation of the police as crime-fighters also typically mutually constitutes the masculinism of police culture, by filling in the content of the empty signifier that is hegemonic masculinity.

The significance of police fetishism to making sense of policing cultures illuminates the connections between gender, policing, and constructions of security. The rise of modern policing as a security institution was historically coterminous with the institutionalisation and fetishisation of the sovereign state as the sole source of legitimate political authority, and the referent object and arbiter of security (which does indeed, as Waddington emphasises, imply the exercise of coercive authority), which underlies and gives rise to police fetishism. Through police fetishism as the common, enabling factor, police cultures are wedded to the particular, gendered constructions of security associated with the fetishisation of the sovereign state. Research to date suggests that competing and counter-hegemonic policing discourses have not unequivocally shattered the hegemony of the masculinist constructions of security that are produced by, and flow into, policing (see Sections Three and Four).

Given the evident resilience and tenacity of police cultures – to which the failures of police reform have been attributed (Silvestri, 2003: 3) – and in the light of my emphasis, nevertheless, on their contingency, I conclude this section by briefly considering how the possibilities for change in police cultures have been theorised. I draw on the work of Chan (2005), who argues that police cultures have to be contextualised in order to make sense of their resistance to change. Borrowing from Bourdieu (1990), she stresses the importance of the ‘field’ – that is, the context or broader socio-historical environment in which particular police organisations are situated, which may predispose the police more or less to particular trajectories of change in different times and places – and its dialectical relation with the police ‘habitus’, or ‘cultural dispositions’ (ibid.: 341)32. The implication of Chan’s argument is that change cannot always be effectively driven through policy alone, without commensurate changes in the ‘field’. Chan’s analysis usefully highlights the complex ways in which field and habitus interact and inflect one another, accounting for the contingency of police cultures but showing why change is often protracted, partial, ambivalent, and difficult to engineer.

32 ‘Habitus’ can be summed up as a set of learned habits and ways of seeing and doing things, embodied in daily practice and taken for granted competencies and skills. It encapsulates the way in which embodied practice becomes sedimented over time through repetition. It emphasises that individuals’ actions and dispositions are acculturated, but allows for situated (not volitional) agency, which accounts for individual variation and the possibility for change, without minimising the influence of cultural norms.
3. Policing and the (re)production of gender

In this section, I mine the literature on gender and policing (see inter alia, Hunt 1990; Martin 1980; Martin and Jurik 1996; Fielding 1994; Heidensohn 1992; Miller 1999; Corsianos 2009; Brown and Heidensohn 2000; Westmarland 2001; Silvestri 2003; Prokos and Padavic 2002; Messerschmidt 1993; McElhinny 1994; Appier 1998) for evidence as to how policing (re)produces gender. This discussion extends into the next section, which looks closely at how gender is (re)produced in and through policing practices which normalise violence against women. This literature yields illuminating insights about how gendered (and gendering) boundaries between ‘men’ and ‘women’ are marked out within policing and how such boundary-work varies across time and space. This marking out of gender boundaries through constructions of police work, skills and competencies, and through other strategies such as hostility, exclusion, and the sexualisation of women, preserves policing as a site for the accomplishment of certain hegemonic variants of masculinity (Messerschmidt 1993; Fielding 1994: 47; Silvestri 2003: 31; Martin and Jurik 1996: 64; Prokos and Padavic 2002: 443), associated with ‘real police work’. I argue that policing as a means of doing (hegemonic) masculinity is enabled by, and in turn reproduces, ‘police fetishism’ and the concomitant myths discussed above. The constructions of security produced by and through policing are intimately connected with how policing does or performs gender, and with policing as a site for the (violent) reproduction of gender.

Brown and Heidensohn (2000) among others (Heidensohn 1992; Martin 1980; Martin and Jurik 1996; Radford 1989; Corsianos 2009; Appier 1998) have documented the entry of women into policing and their progress within the profession, largely in the English speaking world. Using a discourse analysis approach, Brown and Heidensohn explore how campaigns in favour of women police were constructed, as well as analysing both institutional and informal resistance to women entering policing. They show how discourses surrounding women’s entry into policing were often couched in a discourse of moral reform. These discourses tended to essentialise certain ‘feminine’ skills and qualities which women could contribute to a particular but confined field of police work, involving care and social work aspects of policing, and/or policing other (‘deviant’) women’s sexuality, and protecting and controlling women within the criminal justice system (Brown and Heidensohn 2000: 44-49; see also Appier 1998; Martin and Jurik 1996: 51).
Resistance to women in policing, Brown and Heidensohn (2000: 44) show, has been expressed time and again in terms of women’s unsuitability for the physical demands of the job. This highlights the symbolic significance of the gendered body for policing. The ubiquity of entrance testing focusing on bodily traits and capabilities (whether measured in terms of height and weight requirements, upper body strength, stamina, or other specified health and fitness criteria) is testimony to the importance of constructions of the body for understanding gender and policing (Silvestri 2003: 34). The necessity of the right kind of physique for policing rests on certain assumptions about what police work entails, or what is most valuable about it – which returns us to the myth of policing as catching criminals, and the putative unsuitability of the female body for this demanding and dangerous task. Furthermore, Brown and Heidensohn (2000: 43-44) document the ways in which the figure of the policewoman has been represented as excessively feminine or sexualised as a marker of her incompetence, in order to deprofessionalise her. Where she is portrayed as professionally competent, she is defeminised to the point of ridicule. In short, they argue, femininity and policing competence cannot be simultaneously embodied in the same woman officer. Femininity is thus constructed as the antithesis of police professionalism. These kinds of representations show a strong investment in marking the boundaries between ‘men’ and ‘women’, ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, partly but significantly, through gendered constructions of police work.

The various representations and discourses through which official and unofficial resistance to women in policing has manifested itself, as analysed in Brown and Heidensohn’s research, demonstrate the discursive work that opponents of women, or of gender equality, in policing, put into safeguarding the gendered construction of policing as quintessentially ‘man’s work’, and preserving policing as a site for the performance and accomplishment of masculinity. ‘Police fetishism’ and its attendant myths are reproduced as part and parcel of this work. Hence Martin and Jurik (1996: 64-66) argue that resistance and hostility to women in policing stems from the threat that women’s presence represents to the, ‘idealized image of policing as action-oriented, violent, and uncertain’ which enables policemen to ‘use their work as a resource for doing masculinity’ (see also Hunt 1990).

Perhaps the most notable way in which gendered boundaries are marked out in policing, then, is through constructions of police work and gendered divisions of labour. When women first entered policing in ostensibly ‘feminine’, caring, social service and ‘moral’ functions (Brown and Heidensohn 2000: 46-9; Martin 49-51; Appier 1998; Silvestri 2003: 35), they occupied roles in which they did not compete with men (Brown and Heidensohn 2000: 49). ‘Confined to domesticated roles’, comment Brown and Heidensohn (2000: 57), with a ‘marginalised and
subordinate status’, they incurred little male hostility. The norm in most of the countries included in Brown and Heidensohn’s (ibid.) international study, many of which now have equality legislation in place, is for full integration of women into the police, rather than women occupying separate, specialist roles. Differential deployment of men and women in policing has persisted informally, however, even in contexts of full integration, in variable and subtle forms. Researchers have shown how this can disadvantage women in terms of career progression, since they may be over burdened with under-valued, ‘feminine’ tasks and have fewer opportunities to accrue demonstrable experience of highly prized ‘real police work’ (Fielding 1994: 54; Martin and Jurik 1996: 81-2).

Recent research on British policing has nuanced these discussions. Silvestri’s (2003) study of women senior police officers demonstrates how implicit, de facto gender divisions of labour continue to characterise policing and affect women’s policing careers – helping to explain the low ratio of women to men in police leadership – in spite of explicit organisational commitments to equal opportunities policies. In doing so, Silvestri shows how different (hegemonic) masculinities have more purchase at different ranks. ‘Street cop’ masculinity gives way to more cerebral expressions of ‘smart macho’, ‘managerial masculinity’ higher up the ranks (39), which defines the key qualities leading to success – credibility and commitment – in terms of masculine working practices. Her argument shows how different policing masculinities intersect and reinforce one another, since ample and successful performances of ‘street cop’ masculinity through operational work are also necessary to demonstrate the commitment and credibility understood as definitive of successful ‘managerial masculinity’. There are fewer such opportunities for women, she argues, (92-3) who are still more likely to be assigned to ‘low status’ work including caring posts and work with women and children.

Westmarland’s (2001) ethnographic study of British police forces argues that differential deployment has been eradicated from patrol work (179-181) and is not an insidious way of keeping women in their place (178) as earlier work suggested. However, she observed a gendered division of labour in dealing with sexual offences, with policewomen expected to serve as ‘gendered experts’ in addition to their normal duties (180-181). She contends that this cannot be explained simply in terms of which types of work are denigrated as ‘feminine’, since police have to comply with legal and evidential requirements (for instance, for women to carry out interviews with victims), some of which reflect the demands of feminist advocates of women and children who report sexual violence. Nevertheless, male police were more likely to

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33 Silvestri (2003) criticises this part of her argument for failing to appreciate how power can operate in ways which are not conspiratorial, but routinised.
consciously opt out of feminised and care work (183). Furthermore, she shows, policing has created hypermasculine enclaves, such as the fire arms, mounted and traffic specialist sections: departments with a ‘strongly anti-woman environment’ where good performance is defined in terms of ‘hard physical activity’ and ‘superhuman stamina’ (186). The ‘subcultural masculinities in specialist departments reflect particular hierarchies of gendered competence and status’ (187): this is where masculinity really counts, where ‘men are men’ and women have great difficulty in gaining a foothold (189).

These analyses of the dynamic and versatile gendered hierarchies of police work in modern Britain suggest that differential deployment is manifesting in a range of adaptable forms as policing contexts change. The emergence of protected enclaves of exclusively masculine activity, however, where policing competence is enacted through the physicality and endurance of the masculine body, indicates a persistent investment in preserving policing as a site for the performance and accomplishment of hegemonic masculinities closely associated with police fetishism and its crime-busting myths. This is achieved partly through the production and demarcation of gendered boundaries, and the segregation and exclusion of women.

Research on community policing adds a further, interesting dimension to discussions of the gendered construction of police work. Brown and Heidensohn (2000: 98) suggest that the valorisation of feminised aspects of police work in community policing rhetoric is contradictory, as demonstrated by the marketing of such initiatives through the ‘macho tag’ of ‘zero tolerance’, to render them acceptable. This point is borne out by Miller’s (1999) ethnography of a community policing project in a North American city. In order to produce the more ‘androgynous’ style which befits community policing, Miller shows how stereotypically ‘feminine’ skills and traits have to be repackaged into ‘acceptable ones associated with masculinity, or “real” police work’ (65). She argues, however, that entrenched, gendered connotations are hard to shift and officers’ resistance to the care and service side of policing persists. Tasks are still hierarchically organised and performed implicitly depending on opportunities to accomplish (certain forms of) masculinity, with men choosing ‘tougher’ neighbourhoods, and cultivating a ‘more visible law enforcement stance’ (Silvestri 2003: 37). Westmarland (2001: 186) similarly observed that British policemen negotiating ‘feminised’ situations requiring emotional labour, such as expressions of empathy, resorted to compensatory behaviours and statements in order to maintain their performances of (appropriate) masculinity. Silvestri (2003: 37) comments:
the continued practice of marking out the differences between men and women is clear... [t]he idea that policing has successfully shifted from ‘force’ to ‘service’ orientation, or claims that the crime-fighter has been replaced by a peace-keeper, have been over exaggerated.

The gendered division of labour in policing, and the gendered meanings through which policing work, skills and competencies are (hierarchically) categorised and valued, is not static. But in spite of evident fluidity and variability, available research indicates the ubiquity of forms of boundary-work implicitly (producing and) marking out gender differences which preserve policing as a site for the accomplishment of (various, hegemonic) masculinities. In particular, the link between the myth of policing as heroic, dangerous, action-filled crime-fighting and policing masculinities remains remarkably adaptable and resilient. This observation is both borne out, and complicated in interesting ways, by the current research (see Chapter Eight).

Also relevant to the discussion of the gendered division of labour in policing is what Natarajan (2008: 161) calls the ‘gendered model’, based on an ‘equal but different’ philosophy. Natarajan’s work examines All Women Police Units (AWPUs) in Tamil Nadu, India. Her research is particularly interesting for this thesis and I return to it repeatedly in the discussions which follow. The AWPUs provide a service to women complainants reporting intimate partner and family violence and abuse. The main justification for them is that they can offer a better standard of service, which meets the needs of complainants, with an all women staff. As AWPUs have proliferated across Tamil Nadu since the late 1980’s, almost all women police are deployed in these units, which appear to confine women to a traditionally ‘feminine’, care-oriented area of police work. Natarajan observes that the division of labour is fluid, however. The women police perform a full range of police duties through investigating complaints of violence against women, and are frequently called upon to perform general police duties alongside male colleagues, from clerical work to public order policing. Natarajan defends this model, arguing that the division of labour values women’s ‘unique contribution’ to policing, such as the communication and interpersonal skills they ‘tend’ to exhibit. She contends that the AWPUs have created a different policing ethos in which women can work in an environment free from male domination, harassment and hostility, enabling them to develop their professional skills and confidence on their own terms.

An important theme which Natarajan’s work raises for me is the ambivalence, and the contradictory effects, of transformative policing projects. She explicitly troubles the idea that integration, with the eradication of any gender division of labour, is or should be the ultimate means or aim of gender equality in policing. Her arguments about the benefits for women, within and outside of the police, of an all-women service, are not to be hastily dismissed.
Despite these benefits, however, a ‘gendered model’ of policing which creates a separate sphere for women to police differently, does little to challenge the masculinism of the (mainstream) police as an institution. The women’s police stations are treated as an auxiliary service to ‘real policing’, which remains steadfastly a site for the enactment and accomplishment of hegemonic masculinities, through regimes of physical toughness, and hostility to women, as is evident in Natarajan’s account of policewomen’s experiences of serving alongside men in the mixed police battalions. The gender division of labour which Natarajan advocates does appear to revalue the care and service aspects of policing. However, it simultaneously reproduces the feminisation of these areas of work, and tacitly enables – or at least, fails to disrupt – the reproduction of (hegemonic) masculinities associated with police fetishism.

Despite official acceptance of formal equality, gendered boundary-work is also accomplished through insidious and informal forms of hostility to women in police organisations (Prokos and Padavic 2002: 441). The prevalence of sexual harassment has been well documented (Brown and Heidensohn 2000: 82; 111; 134; Gregory and Lees 1999: 37-53; Corsianos 2009: 107; Natarajan 2008: 128)\(^\text{34}\), described as, ‘widespread and endemic’ (Gregory and Lees 1999: 53), entrenched and normalised by the organisational culture (Brown and Heidensohn 2000: 134; Gregory and Lees 1999: 39). Gregory and Lees (1999: 40) argue that acceptance of ‘persistent low level harassment’ creates conditions which enable more serious sexual attacks. In many contexts the normalisation of such harassment occurs in spite of formal legislation and organisational policies which proclaim official intolerance of such discriminatory practices.

Marking out ‘men’ and ‘women’ through sexualisation signals who belongs and who does not (Prokos and Padavic 2002: 441). The act(s) of marking out gendered boundaries are accomplishments, and productive, of the masculinities which are hegemonised in policing contexts: ‘predatory heterosexuality’ (Loftus 2009: 10) can be understood as one available strategy for performing such masculinities\(^\text{35}\). At the same time, these practices can be understood as part of a continuum (or intersecting continua) of gendered and gendering violences (Brown and Heidensohn 2000: 14), which is not limited to gender-based violence against women but might include discrimination against sexual minorities and performative

\(^{34}\) While Heidensohn and Brown conducted an international study, Gregory and Lees focus exclusively on British policing and Corsianos refers mainly to the US and Canada.

\(^{35}\) Brown and Heidensohn (2000: 67) observe that in 1978 following the Sex Discrimination Act in the UK, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner warned that sooner or later a policewoman ‘would be raped’ as a result of the drive towards gender equality in policing. This comment has interesting implications for understanding the police as a gendered institution. It suggests quite overtly that policing is an environment conducive to male sexual violence against women, but does not consider that policing needs to change – rather that women should be excluded for their own ‘protection’ – perhaps because the kind of masculinity expressed through such predatory heterosexuality (Loftus 2009) is deemed the right kind of masculinity for competent policing.
violences among men, which also (re)produce gender. In other words, these practices and their effects have to be understood as part of how the police serve as a site for the (violent) reproduction of gender.

Research has shown that policewomen exhibit a range of adaptation strategies to the hostility and challenges of gaining acceptance within a masculinist occupational culture. Martin (1980) characterised policewomen’s adaptive styles as ranging between ‘policeWOMEN’, who seek out feminised pursuits within policing, and ‘POLICEwomen’, who seek to approximate the masculine norm. She emphasises the struggle to balance femininity with police professionalism and competence. Martin’s account is problematic in that it risks reproducing the polarisation of policewomen into sexualised/deprofessionalised versus masculinised/unnatural, and the construction of femininity as the antithesis of police competence and professionalism. However, it captures the precarious paradox which Prokos and Padavic (2002) argue that policewomen have to negotiate: being expected to perform both police competence and normative femininity, which are constructed as mutually exclusive. McElhinny (1994) shows how some policewomen, in the bureaucratic police department where she conducted her ethnographic research, resolve this tension by identifying their behaviour (for example, being emotionally distant) as professional, but not masculine, and not in conflict with their identities as women – thereby implicitly challenging the association between particular traits and demeanours (in this case, rationality and objectivity) and masculinity. McElhinny argues that they thereby contribute to redefining ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’.

Some policewomen certainly compete with policemen on their own terms, in order to demonstrate their competence and professionalism and gain acceptance as equals, in ways which serve to affirm policing as a site for the accomplishment of (hegemonic) masculinities closely aligned with police fetishism. Hunt (1984) argues that some policewomen develop a ‘combat personality’, while Brown and Heidensohn (2000: 139-140) use the concept of ‘transformation scenes’ to characterise episodes described in their interview data through which policewomen felt that they had ‘proved themselves’ and gained acceptance to, ‘the fraternity of real police’. Adaptation strategies may have a cost, however. Hunt (1984) argues that they are a form of collusion in ‘the masculine myth of the danger of policing’. McElhinny (2002) similarly comments that the policewomen in her study may be unaware of the ways in which they contribute to ‘the construction of a new ‘rational’ and ‘neutral’ masculine workplace’ through their efforts to demonstrate the appropriate bureaucratic skill set.
Prokos and Padavic’s (2002) undercover ethnography of a US police training academy offers invaluable insights into both gendered boundary work, and how (hegemonic) policing masculinities are reproduced through officer training. They demonstrate the role of training in producing and legitimising the documented, behavioural strategies of policemen to resist the presence of women in their occupational field, such as demeaning language, harassment, harsh and discriminatory treatment, segregation and trying to show them to be unfit for the job. They argue that the academy teaches a ‘hidden curriculum’ which is deeply gendered, and which underscores the ‘scrupulously gender neutral’ official curriculum, to teach the recruits important lessons about how to cultivate the kind of masculinity required for policing, and about who belongs to the policing in-group, and who does not (446).

Prokos and Padavic describe how language, teaching and social practices set up the figure of the ‘cop’ as normatively male. Instruction is delivered to a male audience and women are treated as exceptions or simply ignored. Social bonding takes place over farting contests, explicit conversations about sex, football matches and stories about bar fights which glorify violence and perpetuate the myth of policing as action filled and exciting. Women are physically and symbolically excluded, conversations stop abruptly when they enter the group, as they are ‘not suitable for ladies’. The boundaries are thereby marked between the in-group and outsiders, with maleness and the accomplishment of (violent, heterosexual, white) masculinity being key to insider status. Furthermore, they describe the various teaching and social practices through which gender differences are exaggerated and reified, in particular naturalising the idea of female physical fragility and weakness. In sum:

Women recruits learned that they would be treated differently from male recruits at the academy and that men viewed them as intrinsically less capable and qualified. Men learned that women are fundamentally different and thus are inadequate as police officers. They also learned some of the rudiments of appropriate masculinity by virtue of seeing it contrasted with a caricature of femininity. (451)

Prokos and Padavic argue that this ‘hidden curriculum’ has significant effects. The culture of masculinity propagated in police training, they suggest, limits the numbers of women who enter the police and opportunities for those who do so to progress. This suggests that the police as an institution, and police training in particular – at least in the context of this particular research – is largely successful at (violently) reproducing gender.

Throughout this and the previous section, I have argued that policing is a site for the accomplishment of certain variants of hegemonic masculinity associated with police fetishism and its mythical construction of policing as action filled, dangerous crime-fighting. Gender is
(re)produced in and through policing, and is one of the critical things that police do (Messerschmidt 1993: 176). Observing this, some commentators have asked whether a differently gendered police would do policing (and, I might add, security) differently. There has been considerable speculation about the role of women in transforming the police. Brown and Heidensohn (2000: 12; 124-5) contest Kanter’s (1977) thesis, that gender inequality can be ‘bureaucratised out’ of male dominated organisations as the numbers of women increase; their research confirms the resilience and tenacity of masculinist police occupational cultures, and their ability to adapt to the presence of women among the ranks. However, Brown (1997) earlier argued that it is too early to assess the impact of women on police cultures, proposing that a certain ‘tipping point’ or critical mass must be reached before women start to make a difference. Clearly, the masculinist ethos of police organisations is not straightforwardly anchored to male bodies, and may also be reproduced by policewomen who strategically adapt to it. However, the overwhelming presence of men, who have particular investments in performing hegemonic masculinity and accruing the privileges this confers, is likely to be significant for the reproduction of this masculinism.

As discussed above, Natarajan (2008) argues that the exclusive presence of women produces a different kind of policing ethos in the AWPUs in Tamil Nadu. She claims that the AWPUs have enabled policewomen to construct their own professional culture in accordance with a different set of standards, less paramilitary in style and with less emphasis on physical toughness and endurance. She views the AWPUs as a stepping stone not only to gender equality in policing and beyond, but also to a more community-oriented approach to policing in general. Her argument is compelling in its optimism, and yet it is fraught with troubling contradictions. She reports, for instance, that the policewomen who staff the AWPUs ‘sometimes find it difficult to act more like social workers than police and as a result they tend to be too authoritarian in their dealings with petitioners’ (ibid.: 108). This suggests that these policewomen may sometimes (inappropriately) reproduce the paramilitary style fostered through police training. She also observes that the policewomen are not sufficiently trained in the counselling skills which they require, implicitly suggesting that these skills are both naturalised and undervalued. The women suffer from an enormous triple work burden, juggling the mainstream policing duties they are called to undertake with their full-time commitment to the AWPUs, alongside their considerable domestic responsibilities.

The system of segregating women into the AWPUs reproduces a highly gendered division of labour, and with it the reification of ‘women’, ‘men’, and the attendant hierarchies of gendered competencies and skills, which feeds back into reproducing the very gender dichotomies on
which the masculinism of police culture depends. Natarajan’s account of women’s experiences of serving alongside men in the mixed battalions confirms the persistence of an overwhelmingly masculinist, paramilitary ethos which values physical strength and toughness. The masculinist bastion of policing, in other words, remains firmly intact in spite of the different practices being institutionalised in the AWPUs. On the one hand, Natarajan’s analysis of Tamil Nadu’s AWPUs indicates possibilities for a kind of policing which might reproduce gender differently. On the other hand, it also demonstrates the enduring tendency of policing to (violently) reproduce gender in problematic ways. In the next section, I continue the discussion of women’s police stations, and their ambivalent, contradictory and potentially transformative effects, as part of a broader discussion of research on the policing of violence against women.

4. The policing of violence against women

The literature reviewed in this section addresses two main categories of violence: domestic and sexual. Violence against women is not limited to these categories and neither are they mutually exclusive and separable. They reflect categories deployed within legal discourses and law enforcement, by which researchers are, to some extent, constrained in their efforts to carry out meaningful analysis. Some significant research on the policing of violence against women overlaps considerably with the feminist violence against women literature discussed in Chapter One (for instance, Hanmer et al. 1989 and contributors).

Feminists have long protested that police responses to violence against women are insufficient, and that more and better enforcement of the law is needed, despite their caution about wielding the coercive authority of the (masculinist) state (Hanmer et al. 1989a: 6). The literature on the policing of violence against women has shown how the latter has reproduced the normalisation of (gendered and gendering) violence, and – in my reading – how this is inseparable from the ways in which policing serves as a site for the (violent) reproduction of gender. One of the most ubiquitous ways in which policing does this is by minimising this violence and not recognising it as ‘real crime’ belonging within the remit of the mythical category of ‘real police work’ (Stanko 1989: 53; Hanmer 1999: 100-101; Hanmer et al. 1989b: 191). Messerschmidt (1993) elaborates that domestic violence is not considered an effective resource for performing hegemonic, ‘macho cop’ masculinity.
Police researchers in the UK, for instance, have widely documented how domestic violence cases were disparaged as ‘rubbish’ work and arrest was typically avoided (Gregory and Lees 1999: 10; Reiner 2010: 124) before reforms were introduced to rectify such practices. On the basis of a six-month observational study of the policing of domestic violence in two London boroughs in the 1980’s, Edwards (1989: 110) argued that police systematically under-enforced the law. Arrests were few and far between; most reported cases went unrecorded, and of those few cases resulting in crime or incident reports, the vast majority were subsequently ‘no crimed’ (i.e. records were amended to state that no crime took place). These findings were corroborated by a study in North Yorkshire (Hanmer 1989: 100-101) which found that police frequently did not treat domestic violence as a criminal offence, but constructed it as a normal but transient part of marital arguments requiring minimal intervention (see also Hanmer et al 1989b: 195). Gregory and Lees’ (1999: 91-110) research on the policing of sexual assault in London, similarly found ‘no criming’ to be a significantly contributing to the high rate of attrition (i.e. the proportion of cases which fall out of the criminal justice system) and low conviction rates for rape cases. Over 40% of cases in their sample were no crimed, as compared to a three per cent general rate of no criming (94). They argued that rape was being ‘decriminalised’.

Loftus (2009) conducted her study at a time when domestic violence was ‘high on the reform agenda’ for British police departments (128), and mandatory arrest policies were in place. She reports that police made arrests and usually behaved in a dutifully sympathetic way towards victims – but these procedural changes remained out of synch with the police occupational culture and were implemented with the explicit rationale of ‘covering their arse’. Despite being a large part of officers’ daily workload, domestic violence was still regarded as, ‘troublesome and unimportant’, ‘cocks of shit’, and ‘marginal to what many celebrated as meaningful police work’ (128-129). Some officers deliberately avoided responding to ACR requests to attend a domestic violence incident, and did not believe they had a legitimate role to play.

In a study of the ‘medico-legal response’ to violence against women in Delhi, India, based on interviews and observation, Prasad (1999) similarly found that domestic violence was not treated as a crime, but as a normal part of marriage, albeit one which requires counselling and therapeutic intervention aimed at ‘reconciling’ the couple. Concerted feminist activism in India since the 1980’s has been instrumental in helping to usher in a number of legislative reforms (see Chapter Three) designed to protect women from violence, in addition to systems to enable women to formally report abuse and access these rights, including, in some states, women’s police stations or special auxiliary police services which process these complaints, such as the AWPUs in Tamil Nadu, and the Crimes Against Women Cell (CAWC) in Delhi. Prasad (1999)
calls this the ‘special protection’ approach. She argues, however that, not only in spite of, but through these provisions, violence against women is de facto treated as an accepted social norm, tolerable by the state. Deviations from police protocol (failure to record the crime or issue the paperwork authorising medical examinations) were the norm for both domestic violence and rape cases in her research. Police routinely judged cases ‘not serious enough’ and obstructed the timely collection of evidence and bringing of charges against the defendant. She shows how, for instance, Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, ostensibly a progressive and gender-sensitive piece of legislation, is evoked by the police to block women experiencing abuse from accessing the criminal justice system. This law criminalises domestic violence, including dowry-related abuse. However, Prasad observed that police applied the ‘dowry standard’ to screen out violence not directly associated with dowry disputes, contravening the correct application of the law.

Research has also found that the construction in policing of violence against women as trivial and not ‘real crime’ goes hand in hand with a cluster of related discourses which serve to normalise it by minimising, justifying or excusing. These discourses are shot through with, and reproduce, gendered norms and stereotypes of femininity, masculinity, (hetero)sexuality, morality, family and relationships, and have been shaped in part by the gendered public/private division of social life produced by the modern state system and legal frameworks – a longstanding theme in feminist political theory and organising. Hanmer et al. (1989b: 186-188) argue that the public/private divide serves as a major justification for the decriminalisation of violence against women (see also Hatty 1989: 84; Hanmer 1989: 106). In constructing the police as responsible for public order, adds Edwards (1989: 4), this divide relegates ‘private’ or domestic crime to the lowest priority. Prasad (1999) argues that the laws concerning violence against women in India are routinely under-enforced by the police because domestic violence is seen as a private, family matter, and women are discouraged and obstructed from registering a criminal case.

Constructions of public and private also seep into the policing of sexual violence, marking out ‘stranger rape’ – the most unusual form of sexual attack, which is imagined as happening in a public place, or involving the breach of a woman’s private space by an intruder – as a more serious, injurious and credible crime than rape by a known man or a current or former partner. Gregory and Lees (1999) argue that myths about what counts as ‘real rape’ still played a crucial role in the high rates of no criming in their study, with rape by an intimate being the most likely

36 See Chapter Three for a fuller description and discussion of this law
category to be no crimed. The public/private divide intersects with gendered moral discourses in shaping the policing of sexual assault. Temkin’s (1997) study of Sussex police, and Jordan’s (2001, 2004, 2004a) research on police attitudes to women rape complainants in New Zealand, have again confirmed the persistence of rape myths, inflected with gendered notions of (sexual) morality and appropriately gendered behaviour, in police responses to sexual violence. These include the common assumption that many allegations of rape are false, that an attack was provoked, or that an assault by a perpetrator known to the victim which leaves no evidence of physical injury is less serious and even questionable37.

Relatedly, Edwards (1989: 110) argues that police decisions about domestic violence incidents depend not only on legal considerations and the likelihood of a successful prosecution but also on the ‘moral perspective’ of the police, with the consequence that, ‘women are frequently seen to forfeit their right to protection because of moral presumptions about them.’ This is borne out in varying ways by other research. Hanmer et al. (1989b: 194), for instance, found constructions of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ victims to be a recurring theme. Hatty’s (1989) research, on the policing of violence against women in Australia, argues (77-80) that women seen as flouting gender norms, provoking their partners or mentally unstable were viewed as less ‘deserving’ of police assistance; the violence they experienced was deemed more excusable. Police also attributed violence to social stressors such as unemployment or alcohol use, and drew on constructions of male aggression as natural and instinctual to explain, justify and – in my reading – normalise the violence and minimise the perpetrator’s criminal responsibility (82). Loftus’ (2009) research shows that British police still construct ‘deservedness’ in part through gendered principles of respectability. Women who were seen as ‘rough’38, had a ‘history’ of ‘domestics’, or perceived to be contributing to their own victimisation were less likely to receive an adequate response (130-132). Women in prostitution who complained of abuse were invariably viewed with disdain. Loftus reports that they were targeted during police patrols, called derogatory names, and violence against them was viewed as an inevitable occupational hazard. Such punitive police practices thoroughly undermined the rhetoric of ‘helping and assisting’ these women.

Constructions of the ‘deserving’ victim also feature in Prasad’s (1999) research on the policing of violence against women in India; only the most visibly and grievously injured women are seen as deserving of police intervention. She also emphasises other moral discourses, with the

37 Both studies notably also argue that considerable improvements have been made and much good practice is now in place, but still highlight these enduring problems.

38 The intersection of gender and class is significant in such constructions of respectability. Loftus (2009) highlights the ongoing salience of class as an axis of power and discrimination in her ethnography of a British police force.
protection of the family, and family ‘honour’, taking precedence in police and police counsellors’ interpretations of violence and (selective) application of the law. Perceptions of morality strongly inflected with notions of appropriately gendered behaviour were particularly relevant in adult rape cases, in which Prasad indicts government physicians as well as the police. The woman’s ‘moral character’ is assessed by the physician, contravening legal requirements and frequently implying consent, with generally disastrous consequences for the prosecution. Police make similar judgments in disbelieving adult rape complainants and refusing to issue the necessary paperwork or authorise the medical examination relied on in court.

Feminist activism and research has been highly influential in bringing police practices vis-à-vis violence against women to public scrutiny and demanding change, and has subsequently acknowledged the considerable reform efforts that have been made since the 1980’s in policing, in a number of countries (Jordan 2001; Temkin 1997; Gregory and Lees 1999; Stanko 1989; Ferraro 1989; Loftus 2009). Research has documented and explored the effects and implications of significant reforms such as mandatory arrest, rape examination suites and improved training. It broadly shows that the impact of policy change has been partial and contradictory – due, it is widely argued, to the intractable masculinism of police cultures which continues to shape rank and file discretion, and resistance to reform (Stanko 1989: 47-49; Ferraro 1989: 179; Loftus 2009: 130, 136), despite the presence of isolated individuals committed to implementing new working practices and progressive policies. Gregory and Lees (1999: 199-201) argue that until the police ‘put their own house in order’, develop a more equal working environment and – significantly – reconstruct notions of what counts as ‘real police work’, improvements will remain partial and elusive.

Given the significance attributed to enduringly masculinist police cultures in shaping the ways in which violence against women is policed, community policing commands a place in this discussion. Miller (1999) demonstrates the potential of community policing to cultivate and promote a more androgynous, less masculinist policing style that revalues traditionally feminine skills and competencies, albeit in ambivalent ways. As Adelman et al. (2003: 119) point out, the rise of community policing as the dominant best practice model for police reform has closely coincided with the coming to prominence internationally of violence against women as a human rights issue to be addressed by the state through the mechanisms of policing and criminalisation. However, Hanmer et al. (1989b: 186, 198) are wary of the transformative potential of the community policing model, which ‘rests on an understanding of community as a unified structure’ and may therefore mean that police incorporate the interests of dominant
Adelman et al. (2003) draw on their research on the policing of violence against Arab minority women in Israel to argue that community policing is not an automatic solution to the under-policing of violence against minority women, but may reinforce it, depending on how ‘community’ is constructed. They argue that the policing of violence against minority women in multicultural societies is frequently shaped by problematic culturalist understandings of violence as a legitimate cultural practice, or an intrinsic characteristic of the ‘otherness’ of minority cultures.

Overall, existing research has shown that many police practices vis-à-vis violence against women contribute to ‘the (violent) reproduction of gender’, both within and beyond the institutional and organisational boundaries of the police. They amount to a form of institutional and systemic violence, insofar as they contribute to reproducing the normalisation of violence and the conditions which enable it. This closely aligns with arguments that feminists have long made about the masculinist state. Many of the policing practices researched are in part the result of police reform in response to feminist activism and criticism. But despite changes in police practice and special measures to address violence against women, the problem of how it is policed has not been unequivocally ‘solved’. The police initiatives in Delhi which are the subject of the chapters which follow, have to be understood as, in part, the product of both feminist and general public scrutiny of the police, as well as feminist agitating, and interaction and negotiation between feminist agendas and the state. Before concluding, I consider alternative approaches to policing violence against women through specialist women’s police stations, as explored in research from Brazil and India.

Santos (2005) describes the establishment of ‘the world’s first women’s police station’ in São Paulo, Brazil, in the 1980’s – an outcome of feminist wrangling with the Brazilian state, later replicated throughout Brazil and Latin America. Women’s police stations were set up in Brazil exclusively to process complaints of violence against women, and employ an all-women staff. Santos argues that they have helped to usher in a new form of ‘gendered citizenship’ – but it is emphatically a contradictory gendered citizenship. To some extent, women’s police stations have begun to denormalise violence against women in Brazil, enabling thousands of working-class women, in particular, to name it as a crime (178). In many other ways they contribute to renormalising it, however. Policewomen are not all feminists; some do not view violence against women as ‘real crime’; their perspectives are shaped partly by the dominant, masculinist police culture. The women’s police stations, argues Santos, have tended to operationalise the hegemonic feminist discourse on violence against women in Brazil, which privileges conjugal violence as representative of violence against women, eclipsing other forms of gendered
violence including racialised violence against minority women, and violence against sexual minorities and women in prostitution. Complainants use the service in contradictory ways, often seeking to evoke the coercive authority of the state without pursuing criminalisation. Their interactions with policewomen, ‘both challenge and reinforce hierarchical values in Brazilian society and the dominant masculinist police culture’ (185; emphasis added).

In Natarajan’s (2008) study of Tamil Nadu’s AWPUs, she evaluates their effectiveness at dealing with crimes/violence against women by analysing case records and interview data. I read her account as illustrative of the ambivalent and contradictory effects of women’s police stations, although her argument is somewhat different. The AWPUs, she explains, provide a mediation and counselling service to complainants and their families, although they also have the authority to register criminal cases. Natarajan argues that the AWPUs are successful dispute resolution systems. She defends mediation and counselling as an effective and culturally sensitive way of approaching situations of domestic violence (110-111) in what she calls ‘traditional’ societies like India, and envisions AWPUs as a ‘back door’ path to gender equality in Indian society and policing. The AWPUs evidently provide a service to many ordinary, primarily working class women experiencing violence and abuse in the home, which is not readily available through the mainstream (male) police (who have a reputation for, at worst, custodial rape – Prasad 1999). Natarajan’s interviewees felt that the coercive authority of the police was significant in compelling their abusers to change their behaviour, but felt more comfortable approaching women police. The AWPUs give these women a certain amount of leverage to challenge the violence they experience in their intimate relationships.

However, both the service provided, and Natarajan’s celebratory account of it, in significant ways reproduce the normalisation of the violence, in comparable ways to the implementation of the special protection system in Delhi, so stringently critiqued by Prasad (1999). The dispute resolution approach, by constructing domestic violence as ‘disputes’, which are part of normal intra-familial conflict (a perspective Natarajan endorses39 (110)), normalises the violence. With its emphasis on counselling and reconciliation, this system appears to divert women from seeking criminalisation. Only a tiny minority of cases sampled (1.5%) resulted in a criminal

39 Natarajan’s account considers domestic conflict an inevitable part of the human condition, and defends mediation against arguments that it is unsuitable in cases of domestic violence due to the unequal, gendered power relations at stake. It could be argued that her perspective allows for the fluidity and instability of gendered power relations within families and relationships, which (as Shepherd (2008) points out) are effaced and fixed by the orthodox radical feminist account which pathologises such relationships. I would argue, however, that we need an account located somewhere between these perspectives, which recognises this fluidity and instability of power relations while also making visible the ways in which they can operate in broadly hierarchical – if unpredictable – ways, to systematically disadvantage some and enable violence to be insidiously reproduced.
case, and according to Natarajan’s categorisation of violence, it has to put a woman’s life in danger before it is considered ‘serious’, which minimises the more ubiquitous, everyday, routine experiences of violence. As Santos (2005: 182) observes in the case of women’s police stations in Brazil, conjugal violence appears to be the form of violence against women privileged by this approach – with a particular emphasis on dowry disputes – while other gendered violences are eclipsed. The AWPUs’ intervention could be characterised as a service to help deal with the minutiae of family problems, to ‘train’ people to perform their family roles more appropriately and manage their intimate relationships more normatively: an example, in other words, of the police exercising disciplinary power. In this way, marital violence is reproduced as a social norm (Prasad 1999): a relationship problem to be managed – and the state has an interest and duty to intervene to preserve the integrity of such relationships – but not a ‘real crime’.

Natarajan claims that the AWPU model, and the methods of addressing violence against women it espouses, are suitable for India’s ‘traditional society’, not least because it does not represent a radical challenge to culturally sanctioned gender identities: paradoxically, according to this argument, their success is based on their partial conservatism of the status quo.

Both of these examples – women’s police stations in Brazil and AWPUs in Tamil Nadu – indicate the contradictory and problematic potential effects of addressing violence against women through masculinist state security institutions. These women’s police services set out with aims that are at least partly transformative, but remain constrained by the masculinist institutions and gendered social and historical contexts in which they are embedded. However, they complicate the picture of police institutions as inevitable sites for the (violent) reproduction of gender. While even women’s police services may both violently and conservatively reproduce gender, they can also offer limited opportunities for feminist engagement, and they hold the potential for gender to be reproduced both the same and differently, in nuanced and ambivalent ways.

Conclusion

In Chapter One, I argued that ‘security’, as a field of power, is implicated in de-securing certain (categories of) people, and in reproducing (gendered and gendering) violences, partly and significantly by virtue of the way in which it is gendered and (re)produces gender. This chapter has explored the implication of policing, as a practice of securitisation and a set of state security institutions, in the (violent) reproduction of gender. The policing of violence against women
has typically normalised such violence, a problem which has not been unequivocally resolved by reform efforts or alternative policing models such as community policing or specialist women’s police stations. This normalisation reflects the construction of such violences as not, ‘real police work’, the boundaries of which are crucial to constituting and sustaining the image of the police as crime-fighters, and the concomitant myth of their absolute indispensability to social order. The doing of ‘real police work’ serves as a resource for the performance and accomplishment of (certain prestigious variants of) hegemonic masculinity. I argued that the (violent) reproduction of gender in and through policing can be linked to hegemonic, masculinist constructions of security associated with the fetishisation of the sovereign state as referent object and arbiter of security, which feminists have extensively problematised.

The gendering of policing, and the ambivalent and contradictory effects of reform efforts and alternative policing projects, have to be understood in the context of the gendered (and gendering) state. Radical feminist theorists of violence against women such as Hanmer et al. (1989) and contributors, remain cynical about the possibilities for engaging the police in transformative strategies and projects (Radford 1989: 45; Hatty 1989: 88; Ferraro 1989: 182). Claims about the inescapably ‘hetero-patriarchal’ or masculinist character of policing have to be situated against broader arguments which posit the state as the institutionalisation of men’s interests because patriarchy is ‘embedded in [its] procedure, in the state’s way of functioning’ (Connell 1990: 516-7), and the paradox of seeking ‘protection’ from ‘the very power whose violation one fears’ (Brown 1992: 9). Policing and state security institutions might be considered to epitomise state masculinism (ibid.). However, there is also a strong – although not unproblematic – tradition of feminists engaging with the state as the site and focus of struggles to transform gender relations (ibid.: 7-8). The police reform efforts and specialist policing projects discussed in this chapter are partly the outcome of such struggles.

Connell (1990) and Messerschmidt (1993) argue that engagement with the state is necessary because of its masculinism, which is part of the problem that needs to be addressed. Furthermore, a range of feminist political theorists have cautioned against reducing the state to an agent of patriarchy (Rai 1996, 1999). They contend that the state is not a coherent monolith, but a fractured, fragmented, contradictory and multiplicitous site of contestation, ‘a network of power relations existing in cooperation but also in tension’ (Rai 1996: 5; see also Brown 1992: 12). Hence in spite of its tenacious masculinism, the state is ‘deconstructible’ (Brown 1992: 31), and may yield spaces for feminist leverage (Rai 1996). Connell (1990) argues that its masculinism is not inherent but historically contingent, ‘a matter of concrete social practices’ (535), even while such practices are rooted in a long and complex gendered history of state-
making (Peterson 1992). It is this contingency and deconstructibility which offers the possibility of things being otherwise. The contradictory and ambivalent effects of attempts to transform the way in which policing does gender, and violence against women is policed, bear out these more nuanced analyses (see Santos 2005). The rich and interesting literature reviewed here is testimony to the resilience and adaptability of state masculinism in its myriad forms, and the (potentially endangering) masculinism of the gendered ‘securities’ it produces. But it also shows that policing is a site of change, and of potential feminist engagement with the state.

The current research builds on the tradition of contextualised, empirical analysis established by this literature, and seeks to extend the discussion of specialist police services for dealing with violence against women, and their unpredictable effects. Such services have been on the rise in recent decades but the literature on them in English, particularly focusing on projects outside of the English-speaking ‘Western’ world, remains limited. This area of policing is constantly evolving. The chapters which follow look in particular at a recent specialist policing project by Delhi Police which has deployed an explicitly feminist vocabulary, and actively negotiated transnational as well as local and national (hegemonic) feminist discourses on violence against women. Existing literature prompts reflection on the questions I explore in this research, but does not address them directly. Firstly, I look at how these policing initiatives implicitly and explicitly construct and engage with gender, and gender (and sexual) norms, and with what (discursive) effects. Secondly, I look at how they inflect the constructions of ‘security’ which police institutions embody. Thirdly, I draw connections between both of the above.

I deploy the resulting analysis to bring everyday policing of everyday violence into more explicit dialogue with discussions about human security. Connections have been made between policing and human security, albeit implicit or indirect. Mary Kaldor (2007: 192; 2008: 196; 2011: 446) for instance, equates human security with the enforcement of the rule of law and advocates an interventionism which uses the military, ‘more like policing’ (2007: 192; 2011: 446). The premise underlying such arguments is that human security is the default condition, the ‘internal security’ which citizens of liberal, democratic states take for granted, as underpinned in part by the police as law-enforcers. However, the police role in relation to human security tends to be explored in relation to post-conflict situations, fragile states or complex emergencies, while everyday, routine (gendered) violences – and the implication of security infrastructures in alleviating or reproducing them – fall under the radar. This research therefore seeks not only to add to the empirical literature on specialist policing approaches to violence against women and their myriad effects, but to explore these from a perspective which considers the wider implications for theorising gender and (human) security.
Gendered (in)security in context:
Violence against women in India, Delhi Police and the ‘rape capital’

“Incidence of sexual assaults and rape has increased over the last few years in Delhi at a higher rate than rest of the states in India... In addition to this, there were three widely publicized instances of rape cases in moving vehicles on the roads of Delhi... during 2004-2005. The whole city was under the grip of fear. The national media dubbed Delhi as the "rape capital of India". Even international media based in Delhi endorsed the fear of people of "Delhi being an unsafe city for women". The Delhi Police was under tremendous pressure to contain the increasing graph of sexual assault and rape cases in the capital city of India...”

Delhi Police (n.d.), Parivartan Campaign webpage

This research project took me to Delhi, because one of Delhi Police’s recent initiatives on violence/crime against women caught my attention through the efforts of key senior officials to promote the project, and gain support and insight from an international community of ’experts’. This initiative was Parivartan, meaning ‘Change’, launched in August 2005. This chapter tells a story behind Parivartan and its inception. A story, not the story, because there are always multiple stories. The story I choose to tell is one which situates Parivartan against certain disparate but intertwined and coalescing histories, which help to explain the rationale for selecting Delhi Police’s initiatives for women as case study for an analysis of how gender is (violently) reproduced in and through the policing of violence against women. This story situates Parivartan and indeed, the wider case study, spatially, socially and historically, albeit in a limited and specific way. It situates my analysis of Delhi Police’s initiatives for women against what is known about the prevalence and manifestations of violence against women in India, how it has been analysed and conceptualised by Indian feminist scholarship, and framed as a focal issue by Indian feminist activism, and its claims on the postcolonial Indian state. It recounts relevant legal provisions and reforms relating to violence against women in India, focusing on those that are frequently referenced by police in my data. It sets out some key
aspects of the colonial and postcolonial history and background of policing in India and its reception by the Indian public, before looking more closely at the structural composition of Delhi Police, its reputation and relations with its public, the history of the induction and deployment of women therein and the rise of its various initiatives for dealing with violence/crime against women.

1. Violence against women in India

Violence against women has been a visible focus of feminist activism and scholarship alike in India since the 1970’s. As in many other countries around the world, research has found the prevalence of domestic violence to be high. The National Family Health Survey 2005-06 (IIPS 2007) found that 40% of married women aged fifteen to forty-nine reported experiencing some form of physical, sexual or emotional violence at the hands of their husbands. A multi-site survey conducted by the International Centre for Research on Women (ICRW 2000) estimated the prevalence of domestic violence to be even higher, with fifty per cent of women surveyed reporting some form of physical or psychological violence: 40.3% reported physical abuse and 43.5% reported psychological abuse. In the urban slum site surveyed in Delhi, 53% of women had experienced some form of marital violence; 48% had experienced psychological abuse while 45% had experienced physical abuse. The urban non-slum site surveyed in Delhi showed less prevalence, but the overall figure for violence against women in marriage remained high at 26%. The NFHS found that only 25% of women affected ever seek help. When they do so, they turn predominantly to other family members, not to institutions: only two per cent of those surveyed went to the police and only one per cent contacted a social service organisation. ICRW’s research echoed these findings, with only two per cent of women respondents reporting that they had sought help from any kind of external agency.

Kannabiran (2005: 2) argues that there is a public discourse of moral disapproval about violence against women in India, but that its application is highly selective. Along with contributors to her edited volume (ibid.), she shows how violence against women is embedded in the normal, the everyday, the routine – and that this is reflected in the impunity perpetrators regularly enjoy irrespective of the legal safeguards in place (ibid.: 3). ‘Exceptional’ violence, contends

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40 This survey does not appear to have inquired into the prevalence of sexual violence against women in intimate relationships or in the home.
Kannabiran – or what in human security terms might be framed as ‘disruptions in the patterns of daily life’ – only becomes comprehensible against the backdrop of this, ‘violence of normal times’, which remains a ‘critical instrument in the subjugation of women and their confinement to private spaces’ (2005: 34) – what Mason (2002, see Chapter One) might call, ‘an instrument of power’.

Indian feminist analyses of violence against women highlight intersectionality, structural violence and the complicity of the state (ibid.; see also Gangoli 2007). Vindhya (2005: 210-11) points out that much of this scholarship has ‘focused on the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system in providing justice and safety to the affected women’. Gangoli (2007: 123) argues that this is because the various arms of the Indian state – from the legislature to the criminal justice system - have persistently shown themselves to be ‘anti women’. Not only has this been a key theme for feminist scholarship on violence against women in India; the activism of India’s vibrant feminist movement has targeted the state and made legal reform a key strategy – albeit one that is contested and problematised by some activists and scholars such as Agnes (1992), Menon (2004) and (more ambivalently) Sunder Rajan (2003). Gangoli (2007: 7) highlights that the feminist movement for reform of rape law, which emerged in response to the infamous Mathura case41 in 1970’s and early 1980’s, had a strong focus on structural violence rather than on sexual assault as an interpersonal phenomenon, emphasising its class/caste dimensions and focusing in particular on custodial rape (ibid.: 21) – and more broadly on the complicity of the repressive state in post-Emergency India, as represented by the police and the courts, in systematically perpetuating violence against women and ensuring its impunity. Sexual violence by the police against poor and marginalised women was a key issue for early self-identified feminist groups.

2. Feminist activism and legal reform on violence against women

These feminist groups’ agitating gathered pace from the late 1970’s onwards, in particular on the two issues of rape, and dowry-related violence, and would eventually contribute to the development of legal provisions to protect women from violence. This is not to say that the actual reforms passed into law met all of the demands made by feminists and women’s rights advocates – numerous analyses show that they fell short in a various ways (Gangoli 2007; Calman 1995; Agnes 1992). I briefly highlight here the amendments to the law on rape and sexual assault, and to the law prohibiting dowry, which introduced a new section criminalising

41 This was a highly publicised custodial rape case which catalysed a wave of feminist agitating across India. See Chapter One, footnote 12 for more details.
cruelty to women in marriage. I also highlight more recent changes introduced with the passing of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA 2005). These are not exhaustive of the legal provisions under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) or Indian law more broadly that relate to protecting women from gender-based violence, but represent those most frequently referenced in police discourses of violence/crime against women.

Sections 375 and 376 of the IPC, dealing with rape, had remained unchanged since 1860 (Agnes 1992) until the early 1980s. In response to the agitations following the Mathura case, the government introduced a Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill into the Lok Sabha, which was passed in December 1983 (Calman 1995: 119-120). The amendments centred predominantly on custodial rape, shifting the burden of proof to the accused in such cases exclusively, such that women still faced the difficult task of proving that they did not consent ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ in non-custodial rape cases (ibid.). Minimum sentences were laid down (seven years, or ten for custodial rape, gang rape, rape of a pregnant woman or a girl under twelve). However Agnes’ (ibid.) research showed that judgments in the decade following the amendments routinely failed to apply the minimum sentencing guidelines. Perceived shortcomings of the amended law included its failure to introduce any new measures to ensure that police properly record all rape cases reported, or forbid the examination of the victim’s sexual history. The definition of rape under Section 375 centres on penis penetration and excludes sexual assault involving other orifices, body parts or objects. This, along with the lack of recognition of rape within marriage for women and girls over fifteen, has been contested by feminist lawyers and activists who have called for detailed changes to the law since the passing of the 1983 amendments (Menon 2004: 110-111).

Feminist agitation over dowry-related violence, dowry murder and other forms of domestic violence against women also came to a head at the very end of the 1970’s with the emergence of self-identified feminist groups, who highlighted ‘the careless or hostile attitude of police to complaints of dowry death’ (Calman 1995: 133). In response, a joint committee of parliament was appointed in January 1981 to review the Prohibition of Dowry Act, 1961; amendments to the law were passed in 1983 and 1984. Section 498A was added to the IPC, making ‘cruelty’ to a woman by her husband or any of his relatives a non-bailable offence punishable by up to three

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42. The 84th Law Commission was also established to make recommendations.
43. The Lok Sabha, or House of the People, is the elected, lower house of the Indian Parliament.
44. The definition of custodial rape remained narrow: limited to state officials in positions of authority and excluding those holding informal, economic power over women.
45. This is despite the legal age of marriage being eighteen. Furthermore, rapes of a girl aged twelve to fifteen by her husband were to be treated more leniently in terms of sentencing than extra-marital rapes.
years’ imprisonment plus a fine. ‘Cruelty’ is broadly defined to include ‘mental’ as well as ‘physical’ cruelty. The law specifies that ‘cruelty’ can include (though is not limited to) persistent demands for dowry and/or harassment intended to coerce a woman or her relatives to meet such unlawful demands (Calman 1995: 132-3). In 1986 another new section – 304B – was created under the IPC, introducing the offence of ‘dowry death’\(^{46}\). However, Prasad’s (1999) research on the medico-legal response to violence against women in Delhi in the 1990’s showed that police were routinely applying ‘the dowry standard’ – that is, insisting on recording only cruelty which could be proven to be dowry-related as a criminal offence under section 498A, which is a misapplication of this law intended to protect against a broad spectrum (or continuum) of conjugal violence.

Although feminist activism in India has rightly sought to hold the state to account for its complicity in the perpetuation of gender-based violence against women, the irony is that this has all taken place within the context of constitutional conditions which, prima facie, do not look hostile to women. Article 14 of the Indian constitution guarantees equality under the law for men and women, Article 15 provides for equal access to public spaces, Article 16 promises equal opportunities in matters of public employment and Article 39 provides for equal pay for equal work (Gangoli 2007: 2). Furthermore, Article 15 states that, ‘Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making any special provision for women and children’, leading Nussbaum (2002a: 98) to observe that ‘India’s constitution is in some ways very attuned to issues of sex equality’, and moreover that it expresses a commitment to ‘securing substantive equality for previously subordinated groups’, including through differential treatment that is sensitive to the history of subordination and unequal power relations.

In 2005, a new and landmark piece of legislation was passed, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA 2005), following a decade of advocacy and consensus-building by women’s groups in India (Lawyers Collective 2007: iii). The drafting of the PWDVA 2005 drew on the constitutional provisions cited above, as well as international instruments to protect the human rights of women, such as CEDAW\(^{47}\) and DEVAW\(^{48}\) (Lawyers

\(^{46}\) This made it possible to prosecute a husband and/or in-laws if a woman died of burns, any other injury or suspicious circumstances within seven years of marriage and had been subjected to cruelty or harassment related to dowry demands (Lawyers Collective 2011: 4). New provisions made it mandatory for police to order a post-mortem in such cases (Calman 1995: 133). The new legislation did little, however, to ensure that the dying declarations of dowry victims were accorded proper legal status as evidence, in the face of the courts’ common practice of dismissing them (ibid: 134), and failed to set a limit on the number of ‘gifts’ that can be given as a way of circumventing the unlawful practice of dowry.

\(^{47}\) Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979

\(^{48}\) Declaration for the Elimination of Violence Against Women adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1993
Among other things, the PWDVA 2005 sought to address some of the key limitations of 498A, which include the following: dependence on police as gatekeepers to the criminal justice system, research and experience having shown that they can block women’s access to criminal law provisions; only married women harassed by husbands and in-laws can appeal to section 498A; despite an ostensibly broad definition, in practice it was hard to get sexual or economic violence recognised under the rubric of ‘cruelty’ – and police often apply the standard of physical violence causing medically diagnosed injury as evidence of cruelty (Lawyers Collective 2011: 5); there is a high burden of proof for criminal law (‘beyond all reasonable doubt’) which can make it hard for charges to stick (Lawyers Collective 2007: 4) in domestic violence cases.

The PWDVA 2005 attempts to fulfil women’s constitutionally guaranteed rights more substantively by providing immediate civil relief backed up by criminal law provisions, i.e. the breach of a civil order by a perpetrator is a punishable criminal offence. It includes a broad, detailed definition of domestic violence with examples – sexual, economic and emotional abuse are covered; protects women in all manner of domestic relationships (not just marriage), and creates a right to residence of women to shared households, which protects against dispossession. Civil reliefs include protection or ‘stop violence’ orders, residence orders, monetary relief, compensation orders, and temporary custody (of children) orders. These are designed to meet a range of needs more holistically than the criminal law can do. Cases are supposed to be disposed of within 60 days but this has been extremely difficult to achieve in practice (Lawyers Collective 2011: 7). The PWDVA 2005 makes it incumbent on the state to establish an infrastructure to support the implementation of the law, the key features of which are Protection Officers who facilitate women’s access to the legal system, and registered service providers. The police are duty-bound to provide women with information about the law, and also have a function in ensuring the enforcement of orders. The Lawyers Collective Women’s Rights Initiative (2007: 6, 1), an organisation heavily involved in campaigning for the new law, argue that the PWDVA 2005 sought to ‘restore a woman to a position of equality within the marriage’, by providing a violence-free space from which to negotiate, challenging male control of private space.

Reforms to the criminal law in India have been critiqued by feminists as ineffective and as failing to sufficiently challenge patriarchal constructions of gender and sexuality. For instance, rape laws and their interpretation and implementations have been characterised as regulating
women’s sexuality rather than protecting them from violence\textsuperscript{49} (Das 1996; Gangoli 2007). It is significant that one of the reasons civil remedies have been advocated and now achieved through the PWDVA 2005 was that the police often barred women’s access to the instruments of criminal law (Lawyers Collective 2011: 5). And yet, Delhi Police operates a range of initiatives for women, which I analyse in this thesis, and clearly wants to be seen as benevolent, not hostile, towards women’s rights.

3. Policing and the police system in India

The Indian Police is organised according to a two-tier, hierarchical system whereby all managerial posts in the state and union territory police forces are filled by serving officers recruited and trained into the Indian Police Service (IPS), which is one of India’s three nationwide, highly exclusive and elite civil service organisations. The IPS recruits university graduates through national open competition. The constabulary and inspectorate (lower and upper subordinates) who constitute the rank and file of the police are recruited directly by the state and union territory police forces and trained at their police training schools. To put it crudely, the IPS officers hold the decision-making posts and the rank and file operate in service of their authority and follow their orders. Promotions, especially at the lowers ranks, are few and far between and it is difficult and exceptional, though in principle not impossible, for a police officer recruited at the level of Sub-Inspector (SI) or Constable to be promoted above the rank of Inspector into a lower managerial post.

Law enforcement in India is still governed by the Indian Police Act of 1861, which established the police in order to serve the interests of the British colonial regime following the 1857 uprising. Police organisations were accountable only to the repressive authorities and by no means to ordinary people, whom they were supposed to keep in check. Measures were thus taken to distance them from the communities from which the rank and file were drawn and whom they policed. Despite numerous police commissions, their recommendations have rarely been taken up and commentators broadly agree that there has been woefully insufficient organisational or structural change in the police since Indian independence to render it a suitable

\textsuperscript{49} I explore these arguments in more detail in Chapter Six, where I link them with my analysis of police discourses of violence/crime against women.
police service for the world’s largest, postcolonial, democratic polity (Dhillon 2005: 23; Mehra 1985: vii; HRW 2009: 5; Joshi n.d.: 2; CWHI 2007: 1).

Commenting on data from the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Joshi (n.d.: 10) reports that complaints from the public about police deviance and lack of accountability usually fall into four broad categories. These are brutality and abuse of authority — indeed, in my interviews, some police openly talked about slapping or beating someone up, sometimes publicly, to teach them a lesson; corruption — there is evidence of police routinely taking bribes to supplement their incomes (TI India 2005: 9), although the official police line is that this is down to ‘a few bad apples’; partiality; and failure to register complaints. The latter is a general problem connected with the fact that police performance tends to measured in the eyes of the public and media in terms of crime statistics, and they can come under direct pressure from political leaders to show a reduction in crime by registering fewer First Information Reports (FIRs) (HRW 2009: 9). Evasion of formally registering women’s complaints of violent crime by the police is both a gender issue, therefore, and also needs to be understood as part of this broader pattern.

In India there is a general public perception of the police and the criminal justice system as a whole as ineffective and unaccountable (HRW 2009: 5; Joshi n.d.), a history of politicisation and misuse of the police and police brutality, particularly during the Emergency (1975-77), and as noted above, a history of custodial rape. Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) research (2009) on policing in India explores a number of issues, including both the failure to register crimes, and corruption. The research demonstrates how the most socially and economically marginalised groups are most vulnerable to the failure to register complaints, as this systematic under-recording of crime works in conjunction with, it is argued, a corrupt police culture in which ability to pay a bribe, social status or political connections determine outcomes. HRW contends

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50 This report by Transparency International India found that corruption is endemic to India’s public services, but the Police were ranked as the most corrupt, with 80% of respondents who had interacted with the police reporting that they had to pay a bribe.

51 Some women participating in this research reported that their husbands bribed the police not to register their complaints, hence corrupt police practices can work in tandem with the economic power of men over women to reproduce unequal, gendered power relations.

52 A First Information Report (FIR) is the first, official documentation that a crime has been reported. Police are supposed to lodge the FIR immediately upon receiving a complaint, and give a copy to the complainant.

53 The failure to register women’s complaints of violence, particularly by her husband or in-laws, is identifiable as a gender issue not only from informal police discourse/practice (Chapter Five), but in the official discourses of the courts and Crime Against Women Cell (CAWC) policy and procedures, which stipulate that FIRs are to be registered only with caution and as a last resort, and that the aim primarily is to mediate, ‘reconcile’ and divert complainants from use of criminal justice processes, in the interests of preserving the family (Chapter Five; see also Prasad 1999; and Delhi Police Standing Order no. 281: Special Unit for Women and Children, issued August 2008)

54 HRW also investigated abuses such as illegal detention, custodial torture and extra-judicial killings, as well as the poor working conditions and low moral of India’s rank and file police officers.
that the discourse of ‘a few bad apples’ thinly masks a culture of lawlessness and abuse, which is fuelled by poor working conditions and the low morale of the rank and file. As a result there is, ‘an unprecedented level of public distrust and fear of the police’ (ibid: 8). Considering Delhi Police specifically, of 23,409 complaints received in 2003, 22% (5908 complaints) were against the police themselves; a further 1448 such complaints were made to the NHRC in that year, and a further 207 were received in the police complaints post-box (Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2006: 84).

4. Delhi Police and its gender credentials

Delhi is one of India’s seven union territories and therefore has its own police force. Because it is the national capital city, and therefore considered to have special security requirements, Delhi Police reports to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, not the state government, unlike other state or city police forces in India (Govt. of the NCT of Delhi 2006: 84). Delhi Police currently claims a strength of 76,000 and is organised into three ranges, eleven policing districts and 180 police stations.55

The earliest record of women police in modern India, identified by Bhardwaj (1999), is the batch recruited under British rule in Kanpur in 1939 to remove women protestors. Women police were first deployed regularly in the police immediately following independence in a number of states, with Delhi and Panjab taking a lead (ibid: 47-50). Twenty-one women Constables and Head Constables were deployed in Delhi in 1948, mainly to provide security to the Prime Minister facing a deluge of supplications from refugee women in distress (ibid.: 65). Despite an absence of explicit policy on women police in the early days, they were evidently recruited, and deemed necessary, to fulfil tasks thought to be women-specific such as frisking women, apprehending, searching and interrogating women suspects and escorting women detainees, handling women participating in demonstrations, dealing with juvenile delinquency and implementing social legislation targeting women and children (ibid: 60-61).

Bhardwaj observes that women have also been deployed on general duties within the district police in Delhi, but there has consistently been a high demand for women police for such

55 A map of the rank structure of Delhi Police is included as an Appendix.
specific functions related to women and children. She charts how police roles for women have been forged through official constructions of women as particularly suited to ‘social work’. Hence, in the 1960’s, women police in Delhi started to receive special training ‘to deal with the problems of women and children and work for the prevention of juvenile delinquency and immoral trafficking in women and girls’ (ibid.: 63). Between 1970 and 1980, women police Assistant Sub-Inspectors (ASIs) and SIs were routinely trained at Delhi School of Social Work, following the recommendations of the Delhi Police Commission of 1968 and the 1974 Committee on Police Training. The National Police Commission of 1980 recommended that women police be trained to, ‘perform their special role in relation to women and children’ (Govt. of India 1980 cited in Bhardwaj 1999: 81). It also emphasised their role in understanding the causes of crime and developing a ‘humane’ approach to implementing social legislation and preventative measures. The first of India’s All Women Police Stations was inaugurated in Kerala in 1973, and sporadically emulated by a small number of other states (Bhardwaj 1999: 63) – such as in Tamil Nadu, where the All Women Police Units (AWPUs) have become institutionalised as documented by Natarajan (2008). Bhardwaj argues that these patterns of deployment for women police in India follow a discernible trend of the social service aspect of policing receiving greater emphasis in democratic societies (1999: 39).

In the late 1960’s, Delhi Police Commission’s Recommendations (Govt. of India 1968 cited in Bhardwaj 1999: 68) proposed a phased recruitment policy for women officers. Larger batches were sanctioned based on demand – for instance, with the start up of the Crimes Against Women Cell (CAWC) following the introduction of new legislation on dowry violence in 1983. From 1986 onwards Delhi Police started to recruit batches exceeding two hundred at a time (Bhardwaj 1999: 68-9). By 1994, the strength of India’s women police had increased more than six-fold, but still accounted for only 1.5% of the total police force (ibid.: 53). Vacancies in Delhi Police at lower and upper subordinate levels are sanctioned by the Home Ministry of the Union Government, by sex. That is, vacancies are announced for men and for women respectively, and recruitment and training is then conducted accordingly. Men’s vacancies are routinely sanctioned in greater numbers than women’s vacancies. For instance, during my fieldwork in September 2008, a round of recruitment was open for 3300 men and 1067 women at Constable level. At that time, seven per cent of serving officers in Delhi Police were women, and the organisation was officially aiming for a female strength of ten per cent.

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56 Recruitment is to Constable and SI ranks for lower and upper subordinate level positions, respectively.
57 Interview with a senior police official involved in recruitment, September 2008.
58 Interviews with senior police officials, September 2008
The history of women’s induction and deployment in Delhi Police, and the broader history of women in policing in India against which it must be situated, therefore reveals ingrained assumptions of policing as a generically male occupation. This is neither surprising nor specific to India, but reflects the very invention of the modern police as a highly gendered state security institution. Evidently women are nevertheless deemed necessary to fulfil specialised niche roles. The particular tasks and fields women have been deemed suitable for reflect patterns of differential deployment in policing that have been documented elsewhere in the world (see Chapter Two) and suggest assumptions about the innate skills and capacities women are thought to have by virtue of their sex/gender. In particular, the earlier perceived necessity of women to enhance the ‘social work’ and preventative dimension of modern policing is a clear precursor to the roles and tasks women predominantly occupy in today’s Delhi Police, and for which they are constructed as suitable. These include deployment for programmes such as *Parivartan* with its emphasis on prevention, the causes of crime, and women’s putative ability to demonstrate sensitivity and humanity towards the communities served. In Chapter Eight I consider further how this pattern of gendered differential deployment persists into the present, and its implications for the policing of violence/crime against women and the (violent) reproduction of gender in and through the latter.

A key factor which has created increasing demand for women in Delhi Police has been the rise, since the 1980’s, of its various initiatives for women. The Crimes Against Women Cell (CAWC) was the oldest and most institutionalised service for women run by Delhi Police when I conducted my field research in 2008, and hosted and oversaw a number of more recent initiatives. It was established in the 1983, in response to the media coverage and feminist campaigning around dowry violence which resulted in legal reform and the introduction of Section 498A to the IPC (Section Two). The CAWC does not function in quite the same way as the AWPs analysed in Natarajan’s (2008) work on Tamil Nadu: instead policemen and women work together in this auxiliary unit. It nevertheless created a surge in demand for women police, and today both its headquarters (HQ) and its eleven district-level cells remain, to varying degrees, disproportionately staffed by women, given the overall representation of women in Delhi Police (reportedly seven per cent in 2008). The remit of the CAWC was initially to provide a policing infrastructure through which to implement the new anti-dowry legislation, however this has long since expanded into a wider approach to tackling domestic violence and abuse without formally criminalising it, when possible, through practices and

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59 In 2010 the CAWC was merged with Delhi Police’s Juvenile Unit and renamed SPUWAC, the Special Police Unit for Women and Children. In this thesis I continue to use its older acronym, the CAWC, since SPUWAC as such had not come into existence when my interviews were carried out. The district level CAWCs continue to operate under SPUWAC’s supervision in Delhi.
structures which siphon it off from mainstream, operational policing. The CAWC started its life based at Police HQ in downtown Delhi, but now has branches in all policing districts and a separate HQ based at Nanakpura in South Delhi, which was inaugurated as a police station with authority to register criminal cases in March 2008.

A number of related services and initiatives for women are variously housed at and/or coordinated (and promoted) by the CAWC. One of its earliest innovations was the self-defence training programme introduced by a woman Joint Commissioner of Police (JtCP). The programme was later disbanded, but was reformed in 2002. Staffed by sixteen women police Constables and Head Constables at the time of my fieldwork, in addition to calling in the help of external experts, the programme provides free, intensive training to girls and young women, responding to requests from schools, colleges and Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) in Delhi, and holds a number of annual, intensive, self-defence training summer camps. A senior CAWC official in 2008 reported that over 60,000 girls had been trained by the team so far. There is also a dedicated Women’s Helpline with a mobile response unit, which has been in operation since the early 2000s. The helpline works in conjunction with regular, police emergency response services, to ensure that women complainants are able to report their complaints to a female officer if required. It also performs a monitoring and oversight function, ensuring that responses at the scene of a callout are adequate, and that appropriate follow-up action is taken by the relevant local police. At the time of my research the helpline was served by only one mobile response vehicle staffed by four policewomen, to serve the whole of Delhi – although requests for more vehicles had reportedly been made to Police HQ. This meant that only about a third of the 25-30 callouts received in any 24-hour period could be attended, and callouts had to be prioritised based on the seriousness of the incident. The helpline pursued its monitoring function even for unattended calls, however, and reportedly passed any cases not satisfactorily ‘resolved’ to senior officials in the CAWC. Finally, at the time of my field research in 2008, the CAWC HQ was coordinating a programme of internal ‘gender sensitisation’ and ‘women-specific laws’ training, implemented by suitably qualified local non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The CAWC holds central responsibility for the monitoring of, and guidance on, police implementation of procedures for the investigation of rape cases, although these are carried out under the auspices of local police stations, and of the overall functioning of Delhi’s eleven Rape Crisis Intervention Centres (RCICs). These were established in 2000 through a collaboration

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60 I consider the implications of these methods in depth in Chapter Five
between Delhi Commission for Women\textsuperscript{61} (DCW) and Delhi Police. They are something of a misnomer as there are no ‘centres’ as such, rather a system whereby the police is networked with selected NGOs in each district, who are called upon to provide support to the complainant, and thereby facilitate the collection of evidence, in the event of a rape case. In 2005 the DCW established a specialist team of women lawyers, the Rape Crisis Cell, who further support and monitor the RCICs, in addition to providing free legal services to victims of rape. Standing Order\textsuperscript{62} no. 303, which established these systems, also clarified the procedural duties of the police in responding to complaints of rape, and set up systems to document and monitor the functioning of the RCICs and the investigation of rape cases.

Notably, many of these initiatives involve some sort of collaboration between the police and other organisations, particularly NGOs, who are shouldered with a lot of the ‘care’ or ‘social work’ involved in dealing with violence against women, both because they are seen as the most appropriately qualified actors to take on this role, and because the police claim that they do not have sufficient time and resources. Many of these NGO workers are not paid for the services they provide which assist the police with their work.

The story so far already indicates that the police have been responsive, prima facie, to changes in their wider political and social environment, despite the documented limitations and shortcomings of policing in India. This is in keeping to some extent with trends in policing documented in the wider policing literature, and in particular with arguments that changes in the local policing ‘habitus’ are likely to eventually respond to, or ‘catch up’ with, the ‘field’ (Chan 2005). In Delhi, we see the introduction of a new policing unit, which over time proliferates a range of additional services, following significant waves of feminist agitation and engagement with the state through legal reform in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. To make sense of \textit{Parivartan}’s more recent arrival on this scene, another part of the story of Delhi in the 2000’s must be told.

\textsuperscript{61} Delhi Commission for Women is an autonomous grantee institution set up under the DCW Act (1994), with a remit to investigate any matters relating to safeguards for women under the Indian Constitution, and/or other Indian law.

\textsuperscript{62} Standing orders in Delhi Police are official documents setting out policy and standard operating procedures.
India’s national capital city, Delhi is a vast metropolis with a population estimated to be in excess of fifteen million (Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2006), attracting an influx of economic migrants from across Northern India. Although Delhi has a relatively high per capita income, this income is not evenly distributed (ibid.: vi; Viswanath and Mehrotra 2007: 1544); middle and upper class gated colonies and shopping enclaves with bars and coffee shops are flanked by unorganised slum settlements and densely populated resettlement colonies inhabited by the labouring classes and the urban poor. Less than one fifth of the population lives in planned settlements conforming to minimum standards for basic amenities and services; over five million live in slum clusters with limited access to the latter and high vulnerability to crime (Viswanath and Mehrotra 2007: 1544). Visvanath and Mehrotra (ibid.) critique Delhi’s urban planners for their ‘middle and upper class bias’ in their plans to mould Delhi into a ‘global city’, which has contributed to the increasing privatisation of security in Delhi’s middle-class colonies.

Delhi has in recent years earned itself a reputation as India’s most dangerous city for women. In 2006 (the year that Parivartan celebrated its first anniversary) the National Crime Records Bureau’s (NCRB) published crime statistics indicated that Delhi accounted for a third of the recorded rapes occurring in India’s 35 mega cities (562 out of 1,693). Delhi’s rate of crime against women per lakh population was double the national average (27.6 as per 14.2), including the highest number of molestation cases and dowry deaths of any city in the country (Sengupta 2007: 192). Figures for 2010 are only marginally better, with Delhi still accounting for a quarter of recorded rapes in major cities and almost 15% of dowry deaths (NCRB 2007, 2011). The public perceptions survey conducted for the Delhi Human Development Report 2006 found this notoriety to be reflected in the perceptions of Delhi’s residents, cutting across class distinctions. Eighty-one per cent of respondents rated the city as unsafe; over 90% and 45% respectively thought public transport and workplaces were not safe for women; and only 24% thought Delhi Police was doing good or very good work (Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2006: 7).

Public safety is highlighted as the first of the four priority areas for human development identified by surveyed residents in the Delhi Human Development Report 2006, and women’s
safety in particular is accorded attention and concern: ‘Delhi’s women in particular feel extremely unsafe almost everywhere – at home, in the workplace, on the roads, and in public buses.’ (ibid.: 75). The report argues that, in addition to infrastructural issues (as identified in ‘safety audits’

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conducted by the Delhi-based, feminist organisation, Jagori) such as badly maintained public spaces and poor lighting, key factors in creating insecurity for women in particular are ‘[i]nsufficient presence, responsiveness and aggressive attitudes of police and civic authorities’; ‘[t]raditional notions of privacy and refusal of neighbours or police to intervene in situations of domestic violence’; and, ‘[a] ‘macho’ culture and lack of respect for women and women’s rights, leading to cases of violence being ignored or trivialized by the general public as well as those in positions of authority’ (ibid.: 10). Hence, not only is women’s insecurity framed as an issue at the forefront of holding back Delhi’s ‘progress’ in terms of human development, but Delhi Police in particular is singled out and held to account for this in the report. The then Police Commissioner of Delhi did not do the police any favours in terms of redressing negative perceptions when, in 2002, he proclaimed that sexual harassment and crimes against women would decrease if women ‘dressed properly’ (Sengupta 2007: 193).

Feminist activists and academics (specifically Jagori and the Centre for Women’s Development Studies (CWDS)) were consulted by the Government of Delhi in order to generate recommendations for the Delhi Human Development Report 2006, based partly on the findings of Jagori’s safety audits. Improving public safety, including reducing crime against women, children and the elderly, is one of the nine ‘Delhi Development Goals’ set out in the report. In addition to infrastructural improvements and increased and improved service provision for women experiencing violence, these include a set of six recommendations directly targeting the police. These call for more gender sensitisation training, more trained women police deployed in police stations, more and better collaboration between the police and women’s organisations, including review meetings with senior officials and the possibility of setting up helpdesks in police stations, more emergency response vehicles and personnel, and a thorough review of the CAWC (Govt. of the NCT of Delhi 2006: 107).

In addition to the issue of women’s safety, or lack thereof, being highlighted in the Delhi Human Development Report 2006, there was media coverage in the period preceding the report of high-profile rape cases in Delhi. One incident in 2005 became known as the ‘Dhaula Kuan rape case’, in which a female student was gang-raped in a moving vehicle and police failed to

66 This is a research methodology which Jagori borrowed from the Metropolitan Action Committee on Public Violence Against Women and Children (METRAC) in Toronto, Canada, developed in the 1980’s. It involves a group of women, who know and regularly use the audited area, walking through the area just before and after dark and systematically assessing a range of safety risks and factors, including both physical, infrastructural aspects of the space, and less tangible, perceptual aspects. See Visvanath and Mehrotra (2007: 1544-1545) and Jagori (n.d.: 04)
intervene (also discussed by Puri 2006). Another case in 2003 involved an attack on a Swiss diplomat visiting Delhi. Delhi was dubbed the ‘rape capital’ by the city’s English language media, and Delhi Police was plagued by some resoundingly bad press. Senior figures at Police HQ and the Home Ministry decided that something needed to be done, and be seen to be done, to counteract this negative image of Delhi Police as negligent vis-à-vis violence against women. Dr. Sagar Preet Hooda, an IPS officer serving in Delhi Police’s North West district at the rank of Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police (Addl. DCP) at that time, was charged with the task of devising a multi-pronged strategy for addressing and preventing gender-based violence against women and girls in certain crime ‘hot spots’ in the city. Dr. Hooda had a doctorate in Sociology and a long-standing interest in human rights and gender issues in policing. These qualifications combined with his serendipitous deployment in Delhi’s largest and most challenging policing district, which had recorded the highest overall figures for crimes against women in 2004, and the highest number of cases of rape, kidnapping/abduction of women and girls, dowry death and cruelty at home specifically, of all the policing districts (Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2006: 34). The district is densely populated, with a high concentration of slum settlements and resettlement colonies.

Dr. Hooda took the lead on conducting preliminary background desk research on crime statistics in Delhi, both internally and as compared with other ‘global cities’ such as London and New York (already, thus, positioning Delhi as a ‘global city’), as well as on existing law enforcement responses to sexual and gender-based violence. He organised a brainstorming session with a range of stakeholders and ‘gender experts’ on the causes of violence against women in the city. The result was the birth of Parivartan - Delhi Police’s campaign ‘for the safety of women and children in Delhi’ – which was officially launched in August 2005. Parivartan is the only initiative of Delhi Police addressing gender-based violence against women and girls, which is not coordinated or overseen by the CAWC. Parivartan put women police on daily beat (street level patrolling) duties for the first time in the history of Delhi Police, in order to build good relations with, and create an atmosphere of safety for, women in the target communities, and intervene directly in situations of domestic violence or sexual harassment. These women beat Constables also took on the role of community educators in order to raise awareness of violence/crime against women and gendered safety issues as part of a broader prevention strategy. This strategy included a wide programme of events drawing in the expertise of non-

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67 See The Hindu, Saturday May 14th 2005. This reputation has stuck: see Mohan (2011) and Narayan (2012).

68 These are residential areas where slum dwellers have been relocated as a result of slum clearance programmes - although more formal settlements than slums, they remain densely populated and still suffer from insufficient space and amenities.
police professionals, such as free, educative street theatre and film screenings in the community, and safety workshops, self-defence training and lectures in schools. The first annual review of the programme in 2006 celebrated it as a resounding success, which had, ostensibly, brought local crime figures down, and a five-year plan for the programme, from 2006 to 2011, was endorsed. I carried out my fieldwork with Delhi Police from February to October 2008, in the middle of the five-year plan period; the next chapter describes and explains how this research was conducted.

Conclusion

There are some particular features of this story which render Delhi Police, in 2008, an interesting and fruitful case study through which to explore the discursive effects of securitising violence against women. The gendered ‘security crisis’, to frame it in such terms, which prompted Delhi Police to launch Parivartan and indeed which, at lower levels of intensity, had already led over time to the provision of a range of services dealing with violence/crime against women by Delhi Police, has brought into view gender-based violences which are deeply embedded in the everyday, and normalised – making them objects of securitisation. Parivartan as a project made a number of claims about ‘gender’ as a thematic issue for intervention (indeed, I soon discovered that these kinds of claims were being made at other Delhi Police sites in less conspicuous ways). The taking up of ‘gender’ as a significant frame for addressing a projected security problem is interesting, given my arguments about the relevance of gender as an analytical resource for thinking about security (Chapter One). Finally, Parivartan evidently tapped into a set of transnationally circulating discourses which have in recent times begun to bring ‘security’ and ‘violence against women’ together, and offered an opportunity to explore how these are negotiated in, and inflect, a highly specific, local context.

The story I have told here sets up the analysis which constitutes the remaining substantive chapters of this thesis. I analyse Delhi Police’s initiatives for women and their (discursive) effects, focusing disproportionately on Parivartan, but drawing on data collected from a range of sites and differently situated respondents within and beyond Delhi Police. I explore how security is performed, by and through these initiatives: how it is both reworked in innovative ways, and reproduced in masculinist ways. I look at how policing and police work are gendered, and the significance of both women police officers and ‘doing gender’ in Delhi Police
as an organisation, highlighting the intersection of these with the (violent) reproduction of
gender through police discourses of violence/crime against women.
Chapter Four

Conducting a feminist discursive analysis
of the policing of violence against women in Delhi

It is May 2008, on the far North-Western outskirts of Delhi. I am waiting in a dusty beat-box by the side of a busy road with my interpreter, and a woman Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) of police. There is no fan inside the cramped beat-box but it shelters us from the 40-degree sun. A woman Constable from a local police station joins us to give an interview about her experiences of working for Parivartan. We sit on a wooden bench and begin the interview while the ASI goes to buy tea from a local chaiwallah⁶⁹. My digital voice-recorder picks up the roar of the traffic in the background. Later that year, in September, I am conducting interviews with senior police officials in Police Headquarters (HQ) in downtown Delhi. I have called the official I want to speak to today on his mobile phone, and submitted a request in writing to his secretary. The appointment has been postponed at short notice twice. I sign in at the security desk, take the lift to the eighth floor and wait for 45 minutes outside the official’s office. It is a welcome relief to walk into the air-conditioning when he invites me in, and I take a seat in front of his enormous, plush desk. He asks me about my project and takes a cursory look at my consent form, while ringing the bell on his desk to summon the peon for tea service.

These two snapshots of fieldwork show that collecting the data for this research involved entering into relationships with a range of differently positioned research participants, relationships inflected in unstable ways by power. I negotiated differences of language, nationality, race, and sex/gender, for instance, against the backdrop of an established field of institutional authority, and made decisions about how to represent myself, my project, and my research participants in different contexts. This chapter discusses the process of data collection, and how the research has been shaped by some salient methodological issues.

⁶⁹ Tea-seller
1. A feminist discursive analysis\textsuperscript{70}

This section explains how I conceptualise this project as, ‘a feminist discursive analysis’. I highlight some formative preoccupations stemming from feminist theory, before outlining my understanding of ‘discourse’. Feminist research, argues Kronsell (2005: 283), calls for explanation of the ‘normal’, the taken for granted (see also Enloe 2004). This means positing the ‘normal’, the routine, the everyday, as not ‘natural’ but as historically and socially contingent, I would add: such that we could think it otherwise. The troubling of the ‘normal’ is something I take up in this research on human security and the policing of everyday violence.

Feminist epistemologies and methodologies have proliferated extremely productive debates since the 1970’s which have had transformative effects both within and beyond feminist knowledge production (Hekman 1997; Evans 1997: 50). These epistemologies and methodological perspectives are multiple, internally contested and not reducible to a single paradigm (Alcoff and Potter 1993: 3; Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 146; Fonow and Cook 2005: 2213), but distinctive features which have inspired this research include the following. Firstly, feminist interventions have problematised positivist approaches to knowledge production, contending that all knowledge is situated and perspectival (see contributions to Alcoff and Potter 1993: 1; Haraway 1988). These insights enable, among other things, the apprehension of the deep intersection of knowledge and power (Alcoff and Potter 1993: 13; Evans 1997: 50). In feminist security studies (Chapter One), this manifests through the conceptualisation of ‘security’ as a field of institutional power which is productive of a range of violences, rather than as a straightforward public good which can be achieved through technical means.\textsuperscript{71}

Secondly, feminist epistemological and methodological frameworks therefore generate critical perspectives on power. Power relations form a crucial object of study for feminist research, which informs both my theoretical framework established in Chapter One, and my empirical analysis in Chapters Five to Eight. Feminist interventions in knowledge production also understand power as integral to the research process. Accompanying the critique of positivism is the contention that research is not a neutral, transparent window onto the ‘real’ world.

\textsuperscript{70} I borrow this term from Reynolds (2008: 15)

\textsuperscript{71} The field of security studies and international relations more broadly, however, still remains highly resistant to feminist critiques of its positivism (Tickner 2005).
Feminists trouble the subject/object dichotomy which radically separates the knower from the known, and argue for the need to ‘take subjectivity into account’ (Code 1993), to ground knowledge production in the specificity of material, lived experience (Hartsock 1983; Harding 1993; Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 3) or in a ‘politics of location’ (Rich 1986); to pay attention to the positionality of the researcher and how it shapes the knowledge produced. Hence, thirdly, the feminist emphasis on the importance of reflexivity in research praxis (Fonow and Cook 1991; 2005: 2218-2219; Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 148, 158), and an ethics which aims to be accountable (to the research participants, to those about whom knowledge is produced, and for the effects of the representations produced by research) and non-exploitative (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 158). I say more, below, about how I negotiated reflexivity, accountability and ethics in trying to operationalise a feminist praxis.

The preoccupation of feminist frameworks with the critique of power inflects the concept of ‘discourse’ and the ‘discursive’ which I mobilise in this thesis, and is a significant reason for pursuing a feminist discursive analysis, exploring the discursive effects of securitising violence against women. Discourse Analysis (DA), as a group of social science methodologies, has generated plethora of permutations and I do not attempt to do justice to these here (see Wetherell et al. 2001; 2001a for an overview of approaches). My framing of this project as a ‘feminist discursive analysis’ rests on a broadly Foucauldian conceptualisation of discourse.

For Foucault, ‘discourse’ is what joins together power and knowledge in an inextricable nexus (1990 [1981]: 100). It is the ordering of meaning through which regimes of power/knowledge take effect— including what can/cannot be said, what is enabled and foreclosed. Discourse is not reducible to language but overlaps deeply with the material. Here I find Hekman’s (2009) and Hook’s (2001) readings of Foucault particularly useful. They both foreground the epistemological strength of what I call this ‘double vision’, which holds in view both the discursive and the material, and the intimacy between them, but without collapsing the material into the discursive. For Hekman (2009: 452), the attention to social and political realities which attends this conceptualisation of discourse is what makes Foucault a theorist who offers useful resources for feminist research.

A Foucauldian conceptualisation of discourse implies a particular understanding of power as productive, pervasive, mobile, and relational; as everywhere, but possessed by no-one (Foucault 1990 [1981]: 92-97). Discourse is inseparable from power (Hekman 2009: 448), both producing power and serving as its conduit, its instrument and its effect (Foucault 1990 [1981]: 101). Yet discourse exists in a contradictory relation to power – as both its vehicle, but also its potential stumbling block, harbouring seeds of new discursive formations (ibid.). It is ‘a series
of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable’ (ibid.), but multiplicitous, ‘operating in a field of [mobile] force relations’, such that, ‘there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy’\(^{72}\) (ibid.: 101-2). Although there are both dominant and counter discourses, there is no clear binary opposition between them. Paradoxically, the discontinuity (Foucault 1990 [1981]: 100; Hook 2001: 535) of discourse, which is at once the source of its efficacy as instrument and conduit of power, also imbues it with potentialities for resistance and rendering power fragile (Foucault 1990 [1981]: 101). DA can, therefore, enable the study of (contextualised) agency and contingency, and should not in this thesis be understood to present an overly totalising account of power. In its discontinuity, discourse may give rise to unpredictable divergences and strands of resistance which nevertheless partake of aspects of dominant discourses, or can be understood as immanent (rather than transcendental) to them.

Arguing against approaches which he believes reduce discourse to language and text, Hook (2001: 543) proposes that DA as a method must move ‘both in and out of the text’ (citing Said 1983), and ‘drive the analysis of the discursive through the extra-discursive’ (emphasis in original) – or rather, in my view, ‘extra-textual’, since the intimacy between the material and the discursive troubles the notion of a purely extra-discursive realm. He recommends the methodological practice of connecting and corroborating textual analysis with extra-textual factors and looking at material practices – a strategy I strive for in this research\(^{73}\).

Clearly, analysis of speech and text is a crucial aspect of DA as applied in this thesis, and I analyse not only interview transcripts but also speeches, lectures, workshops, official documents and publications, and informal speech. I draw on Potter and Wetherell’s (1987; 1995) concept of ‘interpretative repertoires’ – namely, the ‘resources’ that respondents evoke to discursively construct the objects of which they speak. This is not inconsistent with a Foucauldian understanding of discourse as inextricable from material relations of power, although I am less preoccupied with linguistic form and more interested in material practices than Potter and Wetherell, hence my analysis is not exclusively of text and speech. I understand these ‘resources’ which participants draw on as part of – and enabled by – wider discourse(s). These repertoires produce knowledges about their objects; these resources are shaped by unspoken

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\(^{72}\) Note that ‘strategy’ here does not imply an overarching intentionality or master subject which ‘presides over its rationality’ (Foucault 1990 [1981]: 95).

\(^{73}\) Although I take on board these aspects of Hook’s argument, I do not fully accept his critique of traditions of DA which privilege textual analysis: that these focus disproportionately on discursive effects, failing to sufficiently grasp the relation of discourse to power, or unpack its material dimensions, and insidiously recuperate the author and research participant as sovereign subjects. Hence, I do not see my use of his work as inconsistent with my adaptation of aspects of Potter and Wetherell’s (1987; 1995) approach to DA.
rules which govern what is thinkable, sayable and knowable (Reynolds 2008: 18; Hall 1997: 45) by the ‘conditions of possibility’ (Hook 2001: 540) which shape, constrain and enable discourse. They produce particular kinds of subjects, acquire and embody authority and blend with and into institutional and regulatory practices (Reynolds 2008: 18-19; Hall 1997: 45-46), as I seek to demonstrate throughout my analysis. They are embedded in and shaped by power.

Significantly, discourse is not reducible to text and speech, but also includes the signifying effects of material practices. Hence, it consists in the meaning-making around, flowing into and flowing out of, institutional (material) practices, such as police procedures. Insofar as I analyse police practices, and analyse them discursively, I analyse the way they are framed (for the most part) and the meaning-making in which they are embedded and which they reproduce, rather than taking the practices directly as objects of analysis. I analyse different levels of discourse, and hence what I do with the analysis, and the way I do it, varies over the course of the thesis and between chapters. In some places, I analyse general patterns (across speech, text and to a limited extent, practices and procedures), identifying the broad repertoires that are invoked, how they are invoked, and their implications. At other times, I engage in closer, deeper analysis, examining particular claims (or occasionally, things that are done – insofar as that distinction is tenable), and how they are made by specific subjects in specific contexts / to specific audiences / to produce particular effects. I show how these particular claims/accounts/performances draw on the broader repertoires, and reproduce and/or diverge from or destabilise them. I zoom in and out of the data as part of my methodological strategy, which attempts to capture, to some extent, the overlap between the discursive and the material, and the different levels on and through which discourse operates.

It is important to identify the limits of my analysis insofar as it engages with regulatory power. I focus closely on the police as an institution and analyse discourses circulating within the police, while acknowledging their intersection with discourses (also) circulating beyond this institution. The claims I can make in terms of how these discursive formations regulate social practices outside the police are limited. I explore the (discursive) effects and implications of police discourse/practice, in particular in terms of the normalisation of violence and the gendered implications for ‘security’. I also make modest claims about how the intersection of police discourses with co-existing discursive formations (such as legal discourses on sexual violence) may contribute to the wider regulation of social practices. But my data does not necessarily enable me to measure the success of such discursive formations at effectively

74 I borrow the concept of ‘signifying practices’ from Butler (1990: 177, 185, 188; 1993: 11)
regulating differently positioned subjects in different contexts beyond the police and policing (such as young women’s sexuality – see Chapter Six). Such claims would require different research.

Foucault’s work has been both critiqued by, but also productively engaged with and taken up by feminists (see Fraser 1989; Hartsock 1990; Sawicki 1991; Deveaux 1994; McNay 1992; Mason 2002; contributions to Diamond and Quinby 1988 and to Hekman 1996). The intersection of power and knowledge which he posits is particularly pertinent to the kind of feminist research I am undertaking: this underscores my conceptualisation of both ‘violence’ and ‘security’ as irreducibly and simultaneously material and discursive (Chapter One). Drawing on a Foucauldian understanding of discourse and power need not imply a nihilistic relativism. While interested in critically interrogating norms, this research does not come from a perspective which eschews all norms, but understands feminism to rely partly on normative judgment. Hence, argues Hekman (2009), it is our values which produce alternative discursive formations. Neither does it mean that all interpretation is arbitrary (ibid: 442), although it cannot be traced to a creative, authorial subject. If anything, a Foucauldian conceptualisation of discourse lends weight to the feminist insight that all knowledge is produced through situated and contextual interpretative processes. Finally, although Foucault has been read in such a way by some interlocutors, this theoretical commitment does not close all possibilities for apprehending people’s agency or how this interacts with processes of social change. Accordingly, nor does it straightforwardly efface any possibility for emancipatory politics. As the analysis in Chapters Five to Eight will show, a Foucauldian inspired, feminist discursive analysis can make it possible to appreciate how agency (whether individual or institutional) can play out in ways which simultaneously reconfigure and reproduce (aspects of) extant power relations. Such an analysis can help to account for the intractability of certain features of modern police organisations and their adaptability to contemporary reforms, as these track wider processes of social change. In doing so, the perspective adopted in this thesis positions us better to imagine non-utopian possibilities for emancipation, while keeping in view how these possibilities are shaped and constrained by significant limitations, which in turn demand that we rethink what (security as) emancipation means – a question I return to in the Conclusion to the thesis.
2. Researching the policing of violence against women in Delhi

The feminist discursive analysis of the policing of violence against women in Delhi presented in the following chapters is based on six months of intensive fieldwork in Delhi between February and October 2008, divided into one longer data collection period (March-July) and a six-week follow up visit (August-October). During this fieldwork I interviewed 86 people, 53 of whom were Delhi Police personnel. I also conducted many hours of observational research and collected relevant documentary materials. My primary method of data collection was the qualitative, semi-structured interview. This type of interview is particularly suited to gaining, ‘a detailed picture of the respondent’s beliefs about, or perceptions or accounts of, a particular topic’ (Smith 1995: 9), and hence for exploring police (and others’) constructions of violence/crime against women, and accounts of their relevant policing practices. Semi-structured interviews allow flexibility to follow up emergent and interesting themes, and a qualitative rather than quantitative orientation can capture such themes in all their richness, complexity and ambiguity (ibid.: 9-11).

Ethnographic field methods are considered de rigueur within the strand of police research which focuses on informal police cultures that, comments Loftus (2009: 201) ‘operate beneath the presentational canopy’ of formal organisational policy. The immersion and integration of the researcher into ‘normal’ police routines is considered essential to access the ‘backstage’ performances of rank and file officers. I draw heavily on this body of research in Chapter Two. However, my project is not an a traditional ethnography of ‘police culture’, but a focused study of how the police in a particular setting negotiate a specific issue, and with what discursive effects.

Loftus’ ethnography (ibid.) with a British police force was based on two types of data: informal police talk, and ‘descriptions of officers doing police work’. Participant observation as a method may have the advantage of enabling the researcher to observe what people do, as distinct from what they say they do, to an interviewer. Loftus opines that, ‘the way officers dealt with real situations could convey much about the norms and craft rules of routine policing’ (208). Potter and Wetherell (1995: 84) similarly observe that there may be advantages to observing and collecting ‘participants’ everyday, unsolicited talk’ about a topic, due in part to the contrived nature of the interview situation and the difficulty in making straightforward extrapolations from interview talk to other contexts. The relative lack of ‘naturalistic’ data that can be gleaned from long-term, participant observation may therefore be a limitation of the
current research. However, Loftus also observes that despite her success at integrating with the police and building rapport, there is no way of knowing how much her presence ‘contaminated’ their ‘backstage performances’ (205). I would suggest that there is no such thing as ‘uncontaminated’ data. Furthermore, Potter and Wetherell also observe that interviews retain the distinct advantage of providing, ‘an occasion where a relatively standard range of topics can be explored with each of the participants’ (84), overcoming the vast technical and practical challenges in collecting a large body of naturalistic material.

Conducting interviews

I gained access to the field primarily through a senior police official involved in Delhi Police’s Parivartan75 programme, whom I met when he visited my university in 2007, in addition to obtaining formal permission from Police HQ. I also volunteered for a local women’s organisation which provided further points of access to relevant field sites and participants76. I interviewed a range of people engaged in Delhi Police initiatives for women at different levels, in addition to those involved in both routine operational policing and management and decision-making.

Within the police, I interviewed:

- Both policemen and women ranging from Constable to Inspector level77 posted at the three selected police stations in Parivartan target areas, including:
  - Parivartan women beat Constables,
  - Rank and file police working in routine operational policing;
- Other police staff at different levels who were or had been involved in implementing Parivartan;
- Senior police officials at Police HQ who had taken decisions regarding Parivartan, and/or who were involved in policy-making, recruitment and training of police, or the Crimes Against Women Cell (CAWC); and,

75 Parivartan, meaning ‘Change’, is Delhi Police’s ‘campaign for the safety of women in Delhi’, launched in 2005: see Chapter Three.
76 More detailed information about the process of accessing the field can be found in the Methodological Appendix.
77 A summary of the rank structure of Delhi Police is included as an Appendix.
A range of staff working for the CAWC at different levels and with different specialisms, primarily at CAWC HQ but including staff in Parivartan target area district branches.

I also interviewed:

- Professionals who worked with the police in implementing Parivartan;
- Professionals providing services to women experiencing violence who worked directly or indirectly with the police; and
- Women who had experienced violence.

I obtained informed consent from interviewees in writing where possible and verbally in all cases. Interviewees are anonymised where I refer to their speech in the thesis, with two exceptions, who were too identifiable to anonymise and who gave me permission to quote them. My interviews were qualitative and semi-structured, and lasted between 45 minutes and three hours, with the majority in the 1½-3 hour range. I used a very flexible interview schedule to make sure that all the key topics were covered, while allowing space for unexpected themes to emerge. The key topics varied depending on the category of respondent. Police were generally asked a range of questions about (their experiences of) policing and their daily work, the police organisation and its gender composition. They were engaged in detailed discussions about violence/crime against women and the role of the police in addressing it. Those involved in Parivartan or other particular initiatives were asked further questions about the initiative in question. Individuals outside the police who were involved in Parivartan were asked about their organisation and their work, and engaged in discussions about violence/crime against women in Delhi and their involvement in Parivartan. Professionals working with women who have experienced violence were asked about their experiences of supporting women who have experienced violence, including assisting women in reporting violence to the police. Women who had experienced violence were asked to tell their stories in as much detail as they wanted.

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78 A table of research participants (interviewees) by sex, rank and position is provided in the Methodological Appendix, with further descriptions of how I contacted them, decisions about using the data, and full interview schedules.

79 See the Methodological Appendix for further details. While I concur that the concept of informed consent rests on the fiction, much critiqued by feminist theory, of the autonomous, rational subject, and can at best be approximated given the range of potential unknowns that may arise in the process of conducting an interview (Scharff 2009: 70; citing Duncombe and Jessop 2002: 111; Halse and Honey 2005: 2149), I still consider its approximation a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a non-exploitative research praxis.

80 I describe and discuss the anonymisation of the data further in the Methodological Appendix.
to. Then they were asked follow-up questions, in particular relating to decisions about/experiences of reporting violence to the police\textsuperscript{81}.

A significant minority of my interviewees spoke fluent English and were happy to be interviewed in English. Most of them did not. Although I speak basic, conversational Hindi, my language skills were not sophisticated enough to pick up sufficient detail and nuance, which could have seriously impoverished the data. I therefore hired two research assistants/interpreters, both young women university graduates, who worked with me for a number of months in succession, providing simultaneous interpretation for interviews conducted in Hindi. I briefed them thoroughly about the project and their responsibilities. I researched local salaries and paid them each a salary equivalent to a graduate job in a Delhi-based call centre, from my research studentship. I tried to establish conditions in which I could always conduct interviews in private, but in practice this was not always possible and interviews sometimes became a wider, group discussion or were interjected by other police personnel. I could not exercise full control over such situations; attempting to do so created stress for myself and often for my respondents, but did not necessarily enable me to collect richer, more useful data. However, lack of privacy may in some instances have affected the kind of performances I was able to access during interviews in unpredictable ways.

**Additional research methods**

In addition to interviews through which I formally gathered recorded data, I also noted details of observations and numerous conversations. Many of these conversations were very informal – while waiting to conduct interviews, drinking tea, or having lunch, with police officers whom I met regularly, such as the staff at the Parivartan Cell of the Outer District. I also held informal discussions with Social Work students interning with the programme. I was given permission to observe some Parivartan meetings for beat Constables convened by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP)\textsuperscript{82}. I observed a range of interactions in police stations and other police sites, including HQ and district branches of the CAWC, in the time spent waiting between interviews. I was invited to observe and in some cases voice-record Parivartan activities, including its signature street pantomime performances and workshops, lectures and self-defence training in schools in the target communities. My fieldnotes on and recordings of these activities have played a crucial role in my analysis.

\textsuperscript{81} See the Appendices for the full interview schedules used.

\textsuperscript{82} DCP level officers, as in this case, are often the head of a policing district.
Some potential respondents declined to be formally interviewed or voice-recorded, or to sign a consent form, ostensibly for reasons connected with a perceived lack of institutional authority to give an interview, but nevertheless engaged in lengthy in-depth discussions guided by my interview schedule, and stated that they were happy for me to use such information as data. I did not pressurise people to give recorded interviews, and allowed such respondents to opt for a discussion not named, an ‘interview’. The act of naming the interaction an ‘interview’ and taking a signature on the consent form was seen by some participants as potentially threatening, while the actual act of sharing information, reflections, thoughts, and opinions and consenting for me to use this in my research was generally seen as less problematic.

The collection of informal, observational data complicates the issue of informed consent. For the researcher in the field, Ramazanoğlu and Holland (2002: 158) point out, ‘the entire experience is data’ – but they stress that this does not divest researchers of our responsibilities to our research participants. Pereira (2010: 87) conceptualises this as an issue of the slippery boundaries between being ‘on’ and ‘off’ duty as a researcher, which raises questions about who needs to give consent for their speech or interactions to be used as ‘data’, and when. Like Pereira, I addressed this issue for the most part by using more informal data to help me ‘develop a sense of context’, but do not generally cite and analyse people’s speech if consent was not explicitly obtained. I do comment on information gleaned through informal interactions, particularly as this was an important source of insight, for instance, into the difficulties of institutionalising a project like Parivartan, and into how practices sometimes diverged from formal rules and procedures. I have taken particular care to anonymise the sources of such data: I do not refer to names or any other identifying features. However, I do draw on data collected via un(voice)recorded conversations which participants preferred not to name as an ‘interview’, in cases where the participant verbally consented to the information being used in the thesis.

I collected a small number of documentary materials to supplement data gathered through interviews, observations and informal interactions. These included Parivartan promotional literature in English, Parivartan programme schedules and meeting notes, safety leaflets, posters promoting the services offered by the CAWC, reports on Parivartan produced by organisations and professionals invited to audit and review the programme, and copies of relevant Delhi Police Standing Orders detailing policies and standard operating procedures in relation to relevant categories of crime, such as rape. I tried to obtain relevant statistical data from Police HQ in order to get an accurate picture of the percentage and deployment of women in Delhi Police, but did not gain access to all the information requested.
**Implications of my sample construction**

The focus of this research on particular sites may have affected the kind of data collected. I focused disproportionately on sites where the policing of violence/crime against women takes place, some of which are separated from routine operational policing. I interviewed a disproportionate percentage of staff involved in this specialist work (which includes, for instance, women Inspectors/SIs posted in police stations and therefore on the frontline of routine operational policing, but deputed to investigate rape cases specifically). I also included rank and file police officers involved in routine operational policing in the research sites in my study, and senior police officials involved in various aspects of policy-making, implementation and management, because violence/crime against women is also policed through routine operational policing, even if cases are referred to the CAWC or other specialist services such as the Rape Crisis Intervention Centres (RCICs). Furthermore, policy decisions (including, for instance, the allocation of resources, decisions about recruitment and deployment, and the issuing of standard operating procedures) are made by Police HQ (in consultation with the Home Ministry) rather than any specialist unit. Nevertheless, as a consequence of my focus on certain sites and strands of police work I interviewed a disproportionate number of women police: just over half of my police interviewees are women, but women only accounted for seven per cent of the total strength of Delhi Police at the time. In spite of the transfer policy, which means that all police officers in Delhi Police are generalists and experience a range of policing work, I also interviewed a disproportionate number of officers who have spent much of their policing careers working in the areas of ‘social work’ and violence/crime against women. I wonder, for instance, if this is one factor which might account for why my data was not as inflammatory as the viciously unadulterated woman-blaming attitudes to sexual violence espoused by officers in Delhi Police and the police forces of Delhi’s satellite towns, in a recent undercover exposé by Tehelka magazine (Bhalla and Vishnu 2012). Quite possibly, unusually ‘sensitised’ police officers are over-represented in my sample. But I do not believe this is the full story. I pick up this question below, where I discuss my own positionality in relation to my research participants and the insights that reflecting on it has generated.

**Interpretation, transcription and translation**

My assistants began to transcribe and translate the interviews conducted in Hindi while I worked on those conducted in English during the fieldwork. This was an extremely time-consuming process and it became clear that I would need to use a professional transcription and translation service for the majority of the data. All transcribers and translators were fluent in both Hindi and English. The service-provider signed an appropriate contractual document
agreeing to protect the data, and agreed on a transcription system similar to that used by my assistants and myself. This involved transcribing the entire interview, including the interviewer’s and interpreter’s speech, and any interruptions or interjections, where audible on the recording. All Hindi speech was recorded in blue text, transliterated into roman script, and translated into English in bracketed black text below. I asked transcribers to devise a system to record pauses, tones of voice, aspirations and so on, but found when reviewing the transcripts that this had been done with less consistency than I would have liked and it is likely that nuances were lost in this way. The professionally transcribed and translated transcripts did contain some errors and may have contained more that I did not pick up. Where an excerpt of speech seemed incongruous, or indeed where it was particularly interesting and I considered using it in the analysis, I would review the original audio file and look closely at the translation, if applicable. I corrected some minor errors in this way but suspect that, due to my limited Hindi, I was more successful at observing errors in the transcription of interviews conducted in English than in the transcription and translation of interviews conducted in Hindi.

I highlight these practices, and the possibilities for ‘errors’ of transcription and translation here, not because I believe there is necessarily a single ‘correct’ translation of a piece of speech or text (Temple 2005), but in order to foreground language difference as a critical factor that has shaped the knowledge produced by and through this research, possibly in ways that cannot be made fully transparent. The data that I use in this research has been subject to multiple processes of translation (Pereira 2010: 111): much of it, from Hindi to English via simultaneous interpretation, from situated speech to transcribed and transliterated words on a page, and then again into English text; it has then been selected, filtered and interpreted for inclusion in the final ‘authoritative’ text. Language difference and translation has methodological, epistemological and political implications; reducing it to a technical problem may be to the detriment of the research, and of a reflexive, ethical research praxis (Temple 2005; Pereira et al. 2009). Language difference in research is not fully separable from the vexed political and ethical issue of representation (Spivak 1992, Temple 2005). I discuss broader issues of representation raised by this research in the next section; suffice to say here that the act of translation is one of interpretation rather than the transparent transmission of meaning (Temple 2005). Interpreters and translators thus make an active, and situated, contribution to the production of knowledge (Temple 1997, 2005; Temple and Edwards 2002). The interpreter/translator’s positionality impacts research relationships and the research process in complex and context-specific ways, including offering up some ‘voices’, accounts, meanings and interpretations while filtering out others (Ficklin and Jones 2009).
Here are two examples of where these issues became particularly visible to me, during the course of conducting and/or reflecting on the research. In the first example, my first interpreter and I interviewed a male beat Constable, who was keen to demonstrate the various ways in which he believed women to be responsible for violence perpetrated against them. I was acutely aware of his views both from the simultaneous interpretation and my own understanding of his Hindi speech. I was also aware at several points during the interview that he was referring to both my interpreter and myself and talking about how we were dressed. My interpreter asked me afterwards if she could avoid transcribing that particular interview. She said that she had not translated everything verbatim and hinted that he had said things which she felt deeply uncomfortable repeating. We discussed our own responses to the content of the interview. When the interview was professionally translated, it was evident that the interviewee had given hypothetical examples of how women provoke violence in which he, my interpreter and/or myself figured as imaginary characters and in which he sexualised one or both of us. My interpreter had filtered out the language which she was embarrassed to repeat. The in-situ interpretation was thus sanitised in a way that may have affected the construction of my follow-up questions and the overall direction of the interview. The interpreter’s presence, in addition to the language barrier, served to distance and cushion me from certain language which I might have construed as offensive or threatening, therefore enabling the interview to continue when I might otherwise have terminated it. This was at my interpreter’s expense, in the sense that her position as a young woman, directly implicated in the woman-blaming discourse of a man in authority, made her vulnerable. I regretted that I had inadvertently put her in such a difficult situation.

The second example involves my second interpreter who identified more self-consciously as feminist and increasingly took an active role in co-constructing the interview questions. During one interview in particular she reacted in a combative way to some comments made by a woman police Inspector about street-level sexual harassment. In contrast, I had not adopted a strategy of arguing with respondents, preferring to probe for clarification and elaboration, as I was cautious about damaging rapport. On this occasion my interpreter directly challenged the interviewee. The interviewee responded by eagerly and animatedly defending and elaborating upon her position. The exchange was productive in terms of generating useful data. On other occasions the interpreter engaged in discussions with interviewees about her own experiences of witnessing domestic violence within her family, eliciting certain responses and ways of relating to the subject matter from interviewees. In these examples, the interpreter’s status as an active and constitutive, situated participant in the dynamic interaction of the interview becomes particularly discernible and the fiction of the interpreter as a passive mediator is exposed.
If it was not always obvious at the time of the interview, the professional transcription and translation of the interviews, including all the interpreter’s speech, shed light on some of the ways in which the interpreters’ presence had contributed to shaping the interactions, and sometimes indicated various ways in which my questions were re-framed and respondents’ talk was filtered by interpreters in the course of an interview. However, professional translation did not provide a straightforward ‘solution’ or enable me to cancel out the ‘interpreter effect’: indeed it introduced its own set of problems. I spent time building up working relationships with my interpreters, discussing the perspective of the research project and the content of the interviews. I had no such opportunity to build relationships with the professional translators, or explore the impact of their positionalities on the translations produced.

Temple and Edwards (2002; Temple 2005) recommend locating interpreters/translators as co-researchers and openly exploring how their positionality has shaped the data. In practice it was not possible to apply this approach as fully and productively as they suggest in my research project. Under ideal circumstances I would have worked with the same interpreters during the many months after fieldwork that I spent pouring over transcriptions and translations and analysing the data, discussing any discrepancies between in-situ interpretations and written translations, as well as my readings of the data more generally. However my research was carried out under conditions that made this extraordinarily impractical. The nature of the work for my two assistants/interpreters was as a transitory stop-gap before moving on to further study and other projects. They were not able to dedicate the necessary time and commitment, despite their interest in the project. Communication became more complicated after I returned to the UK from Delhi, and I did not have the resources to continue paying them for their expertise in the long term. I have checked written translations against detailed notes made on the basis of simultaneous interpretation, and in some instances against excerpts from the audio files. But I have to acknowledge that this is a poor substitute for an approach which more comprehensively and critically explores how the research is shaped by the positionality not only of researcher and researched, but also the interpreter/translators.

I have adopted certain strategies in my presentation of the data which attempt to take account of the multiple processes of interpretation it has undergone. Venuti (1998) argues for strategies to ‘foreignise’ translations, to reveal their status as translated speech/text rather than trying to create, ‘the illusory effect of transparency’ (12). I do not claim to have achieved the kind of non-domesticating translation which Venuti advocates. However, where speech was recorded in English, I have left intact the Indian English with its characteristic idioms, occasionally interspersed with Hindi words and phrases, and sometimes grammatical or syntactical ‘errors’
(depending on how proficient in English the respondent was, this being highly variable), rather than routinely ‘correcting’ it to ‘standard’ or ‘natural’ English. The translations were produced by native Hindi speakers and again, I have refrained from ‘naturalising’ the English therein, as much as possible. Where an excerpt or quote is mostly translated speech, this is indicated in the text by the use of an *asterisk before the citation. These practices do not transcend the complexities of language difference and translation or ‘overcome’ the problem: it is debatable whether these issues can be satisfactorily ‘resolved’ and there is no single, correct way to negotiate them (Temple 2005). The aim is rather to make the status of some quotes as translated, and of the data in general as traversing language difference, visible, and remind the reader of the non-transparency and situatedness of the perspective I offer, in this thesis, on the speech of my many research participants, and its possible meanings.

3. Positionality, power and representation

Reflexivity has become a mainstay of feminist conceptions of ethical research praxis, and is a corollary of the epistemological perspective that all knowledge is situated. Finlay (2002: 533) defines reflexivity as, ‘a continuing, dynamic, and subjective self-awareness’, which stems in part from the understanding of the researcher and her experience as ‘intertwined’ with the world. Ramazanoğlu and Holland (2002: 158) characterise reflexivity, firstly, as ‘making explicit the play of power relations in your research process’; secondly, as ‘reflecting critically on the consequences of your presence in the research process’. Here, I discuss some ways in which my positionality may have affected the knowledge produced, weaving this together with a broader consideration of power and representation in the research process. I explore questions to which there is no readily available resolution, as well as how this process of reflection has generated productive insights for the research. I start by discussing issues arising in fieldwork and move on to considering the presentation of data.

The way in which I conducted the research and the relationships I entered into with respondents were significantly shaped by the fact that I was entering an established field of institutional power (the police), and interviewing people in authority. This might be considered ‘studying up’ (Harding and Norberg 2005: 2011) – studying the ‘powerful’ – but although it involved researching institutions of hegemonic masculinity in order to question the ‘normal’ (Kronsell 2005), I do not consider my research to be ‘studying up’, due to my position as an outsider – not only to Delhi Police, but to Delhi, and to India. I was not automatically the ‘power-holder’ in
the research relationship, but despite working with people in authority, neither were my participants. This points to the complexity, instability and fluidity of power relations in the research process (Grenz 2005). Power shapes research encounters but is ‘not possessed by anybody’ (ibid.: 2092). I interviewed people in authority, but also people subject to authority, and many respondents occupied both of these positions simultaneously and relationally.

More senior interviewees were harder to gain access to, a function of their superior power to evade and resist my efforts to draw them into my project. They usually spoke fluent English and were university educated. They were almost invariably men – although some were probably not much older than me. Their working conditions ensconced them in formality and ritual. In many cases their mode of relating to me was one of condescension. This group of respondents performed authority in the way they related to me as a young woman, a ‘student’, in an unfamiliar culture, educating and enlightening me about things I did not understand. Although it caused me discomfort, I found myself colluding in these relationships and performing naivety: implicitly, as a way of representing myself as non-threatening, facilitating access and rapport, and gaining more detailed data. This at once affirmed their (highly masculinised) authority to pronounce on certain subjects, but conversely empowered me to conduct the research. Being a young woman researcher in a masculine institution is not automatically disadvantageous (Loftus 2009).

As someone from outside the police system, and outside India, I could walk in and out of that field of power without being caught up in its rules, norms and regulatory structures in the same ways as my respondents. I had a kind of semi-privileged access and was exempt from the terms on which most of my participants normally enter the institution, even though I had to defer to institutional hierarchies in certain ways (for instance, to secure permission to conduct the research). The fact that I had authorisation from the highest echelons of the organisation, and gained access through a senior official, is likely to have affected people’s decisions about taking part, their ways of relating to me, and representing themselves. Lower and upper subordinate officers by definition had less formal or institutional power to protect themselves from me. The local institutional hierarchy could easily thwart my efforts to maintain an ethical research praxis if I was not vigilant: for instance, if an enthusiastically helpful senior officer presented me with a string of subordinates who had been ‘recruited’ (possibly coerced) to give interviews. I had to be extremely careful and strategic about obtaining consent, and occasionally made creative excuses where I felt that I could not distinguish between ‘real’ and coerced consent. Obtaining official permission was only the beginning, not the end, of negotiating access, which was an ongoing task (Loftus 2009).
The research was also shaped in significant ways by the privileged outsider position from which I approached it: as a white, middle-class, educated British woman. I was able to negotiate access partly because I am a scholar at a prestigious, internationally acclaimed educational institution. I was able to afford to employ assistants/interpreters partly because of economic inequalities on a global scale, and the relative positioning of India and the UK within these power networks. Research relationships were also shaped by this wider web of structural power relations encompassing histories of (post)coloniality, nation and race, imbued with power-laden binaries such as modernity/tradition and developed/developing. These sometimes surfaced in my interview data, not least because they intersect with, and supply discursive resources which are drawn on to negotiate, the issue of violence against women.

I did not declare my feminist orientation, as such\(^{83}\). However, assumptions and expectations were formed about me on the grounds of my combined status as a ‘lady scholar’ studying ‘women’s issues’, and as a Westerner in Delhi, which may have shaped respondents’ performances in interviews, in ways that I cannot fully predict. On the one hand, I believe that being a (feminist) gender scholar helped to open access to key policing projects, because of how they were framed as performing modernity towards an imagined international audience: I was interpellated as part of such an audience. On the other hand, a Delhi-based sociologist advised me that senior police officers always know the ‘politically correct things to say to people like you and me’. My contention is that these conditions do not straightforwardly invalidate my data. My own positionality combined with the ways in which, I came to learn, certain orientations towards gender issues were treated as markers of progress, development and modernity. In general, the police were keen to be seen as taking violence/crime against women seriously – in spite of variation in definitions of violence, constructions of its causes, and understandings of the police role vis-à-vis violence. Are the woman-blaming discourses highlighted in the recent *Tehelka* article more ‘authentic’, ‘backstage performances’\(^?\)? Possibly – but I remain suspicious of the notion that there exists such an ‘authentic’, underlying reality waiting for research to penetrate and access it. It is also possible that the disparities between my research and this journalistic exposé reflect variation and contradiction in the way in which Delhi Police officially and unofficially negotiates the issue of violence/crime against women. Woman-blaming and other ‘non-politically-correct’ discourses were not absent from my research data. However, they were not typical of it in the way in which they are presented as pervasive and uncontested in the *Tehelka* piece. They were more subtly interwoven, and

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83 One interviewee whom I spoke to regularly during fieldwork asked me, sincerely, in an interview, if I knew what feminism was – and was clearly hoping to educate me about it.
sometimes coexisting in tension, with a multiplicity of more complex, ambivalent and contradictory repertoires.

I would not reduce my interactions with police officers, to people ‘knowing how to say the politically correct things’. There were many instances when respondents said things which I would not consider ‘politically correct’, and in some cases indicated to me that they anticipated that I would not approve, but persisted in defending their positions. Perhaps more to the point, what is considered ‘politically correct’, and/or the impression which the police, as individuals and as an organisation, sought to project in and through their interactions with me, is telling in itself in terms of considering how Delhi Police negotiate the issue of violence against women, and with what discursive effects. The interviews were sites of such negotiation, which also extends (and may take different forms) beyond the interview – this does not render the interviews ‘too staged, unreliable or misleading’ (Pereira 2010: 90) to count as useful data. I draw here on feminist methodological perspectives, as well as on Potter and Wetherell’s (1995) theory of discourse analysis, both of which conceptualise the interview as a dynamic social interaction in which knowledge is co-constructed, rather than a neutral, transparent ‘window’ onto the world of the respondent. Presser (2005: 2087) contends that, ‘[t]he researcher’s goal is not to emancipate the authentic story of the narrator—none exists—but rather to expose as much as she can of the relations that influence the construction of the story that is told’ (this she calls, ‘strong reflexivity’).

For Presser (2086), furthermore, ‘relations of power between researcher and participant become part of interview data’. Thus, methodological issues are not cleanly separable from the analytical perspectives we, as researchers, adopt towards our data, and the knowledge produced. Reflecting on the way in which respondents seemed to interpellate me as a particular kind of audience, how they seemed to want to be seen by me, and the way in which the issue of violence/crime against women was negotiated through our relative and specific positionings in interviews, has enabled insights about the meanings which circulate around violence/crime against women in Delhi Police, how these relate to and intersect discourses which exceed the organisation and its local and national setting, and their effects. These insights seep into and inform the analysis in subsequent chapters, particular Chapters Seven and Eight.

As I have already hinted at in discussing power and research relationships, choosing to conduct cross-cultural research means that my positionality vis-à-vis the research and its participants confronts me with the problem, much debated in feminist research ethics, of ‘representing
others’ (Alcoff 1995). Although I do not seek to ‘speak for’ any particular group of research subjects, representations matter and have political consequences. The fact that I seem to have been interpellated as part of a particular kind of (imagined) audience by some key gatekeepers of the research, due to being a Western feminist scholar, partly shaped, I believe, their investment in the representations I produce. I became acutely aware of this investment, for instance, when I noticed a post from a Delhi Police official about Parivartan on an India-wide mailing list and forum for gender practitioners. At the bottom, amongst a list of awards and appreciations including ISO accreditation and prestigious, international policing prizes, was written: ‘selected for its PhD programme by Gender Institute, LSE’. I was granted access implicitly, I believe, on the understanding that I share with the programme managers certain aims and am supportive of their work on violence/crime against women. However, my research is committed to highlighting the ambivalent and contradictory effects of this work, not to posit these as ‘failings’ of Delhi Police, but to look at how they are produced contextually, in part through the negotiation of transnational discourses of violence against women which have accrued a certain hegemonic status. At the same time, I am cautious about undermining, through heavy-handed critique, projects aiming to change gender relations, however imperfectly. I do not want, for example, to reinforce the feelings of overburdened women Inspectors, who sacrifice their personal lives to investigating rape cases, that it is a thankless task rewarded only with criticism and hostility.

Reflecting on this has prompted me to think about to whom I am accountable for the representations I produce, and acknowledge that questions of accountability produce irresolvable tensions. I am accountable to my gatekeepers and research participants, hence I have sought to protect them through practices such as ensuring informed consent as far as possible, and anonymising data sources. This accountability also means considering the implications of my representations for them. However, in writing about violence and how it is policed, is the research not also accountable to women in Delhi, and indeed everywhere (since I treat Delhi Police as a case study in relation to a broader theme) who experience violence? This is a much less tangible form of accountability, especially as it is not possible to objectively identify the ‘interests’ of women who experience violence (which are in any case not unified and homogeneous), and it has not been part of my project to systematically research them. What I aim to do is investigate how norms and practices of violence are (re)produced by and through gendered relations of power, on the basis that the ongoing deconstruction of power is necessary, though by no means sufficient, for the transformation of gender relations and their violent manifestations and effects.
Being accountable for the knowledge I produce means acknowledging the particular responsibility that my position in relation to the researched, as a white, Western, non-Indian scholar writing about India, places upon me for my representations. Ratna Kapur (2005) problematises what she calls, the ‘hegemony of the victim-subject’ which pervades transnational discourses of violence against women, as well as significantly infusing some Indian feminist perspectives. She draws, in particular, on Narayan’s (1997, 2000) insightful critique of cultural essentialism, and her concerns are also reminiscent of Mohanty’s (1988) astute critique of certain Western feminist discourses which reify the ‘third world woman’ as leading, ‘an essentially truncated life’ (65), devoid of agency, irrevocably oppressed by culturally sanctioned patriarchy. While I take issue with Kapur in defending the taking up of gendered violence as a material reality affecting many women’s lives (Chapter One), I concede her argument about certain hegemonic representations of violence against women and the power relations in which they are entangled, at a global level. These transnational discourses are ambivalent, rather than unequivocally harmful, in my view – but I aim, in this thesis, to avoid reproducing ‘the hegemony of the victim-subject’ and the kinds of cultural essentialism and imperialism it potentially colludes in or enables. I seek to do this by carefully situating Delhi Police discourses as produced relationally, in part through the ways in which they negotiate precisely some of these transnational, hegemonic discourses of violence against women. I show the disconcerting ambivalence of the effects of the way in which they do so. I offer an analysis which does not lend itself to reifying discourses of ‘death by culture’ (Narayan 1997). While I argue that police discourses are historically and socially embedded, I do not claim that they represent some authentic Indian culture, or that women’s lives in Delhi are shaped by perennial victimhood. I am also careful to look at how the reproduction of gender through the policing of violence against women is partly a function of the status of the police as a masculinist security institution, based on a colonial model which is inseparable from the fetishisation of the sovereign/Westphalian state as the globally hegemonic form of legitimate political authority. I consider how this, alongside the negotiation of transnational discourses which associate good gender credentials with progress, development and modernity, inflect the (postcolonial) project of Indian statehood.
Vulnerability, agency and responsibility:
The ambivalent securitisation of everyday violence

It is a well researched premise that gender-based violence... [is] the product of learnt behavior in societies structured around dynamics of power and domination. As such, it can be changed, particularly through proper education of children, youth and adults at the community level.

Delhi Police (n.d), Parivartan Campaign webpage

It is July 2008, at an English medium school on the North Western outskirts of Delhi. At least one hundred adolescent and pre-adolescent school girls file quickly into the large, drafty school auditorium under the nose of the Head Teacher, their uniform white blouses tucked into their navy A-line skirts, their hair oiled and braided, carrying satchels stuffed with tattered exercise books. It is not yet 9am but the outside temperature is already close to 40 degrees Celsius and the large ceiling fans whirr overhead. Today, a visiting psychologist is delivering a workshop on safety, courtesy of Delhi Police’s Parivartan Cell.

The psychologist introduces himself and asks the girls when and where they should think about safety. He mentions two high profile cases in which Delhi schoolgirls were murdered. “Do you think this can happen to you?” He asks. A murmur passes through the auditorium. The girls think yes, it can. He reminds the girls that safety issues arise without warning. “But can you still handle it?” He asks. The girls are silent, anticipating. “Yes, you can”, he says, emphatically. The girls eagerly await the secrets he will impart which will save them from such a fate. The psychologist tells numerous stories of real life examples of girls who were attacked, or who closely evaded attack, in Delhi. After each anecdote he asks the girls: “What could she have done to prevent it?” The girls are reticent at first, and the whirl of the ceiling fans fills the silences. As the workshop progresses they begin to catch on and start volunteering answers.
“Who made her unsafe?” Asks the psychologist, about a girl who was attacked while talking on her mobile phone on the side of the road. “She herself”, call out a handful of students. The psychologist begins to round up. “Who makes Delhi unsafe?” He asks. “We do”, chime the girls. At the end of the workshop, the psychologist gives out two helpline numbers to call in an emergency. He tells the girls to share the strategies for avoiding danger which he has taught them as widely as possible with their friends and sisters. “Because these important lessons can save your life.” One student stands up to thank him. “Nowadays we cannot even step outside our houses”, she remarks. “We are not safe anywhere.”

The scene just described is part of Delhi Police’s preventative strategy to address violence against women in the city. It raises some of the questions with which this chapter will engage: How are safety and security constructed in the psychologist’ interactions with the schoolgirls? How does this interaction fit within the wider context of Delhi Police’s initiatives for women, and what kinds of ‘security’ do these produce? How is vulnerability to violence understood, and who is positioned as responsible for violence and its prevention? What effects do these constructions produce, for instance, in terms of gendered agency? Section One focuses on the construction of (gendered) ‘security’ by and through Delhi Police initiatives for women; Section Two explores the policing of domestic violence and considers debates about the value of criminalisation; Section Three investigates how violence/crime against women is framed in terms of vulnerability, agency and responsibility, and unpacks some ostensible tensions between these framings. The chapter also does three further things. Firstly, over the course of the first two sections it describes the policing initiatives to which I refer, in particular Parivartan and the Crimes Against Women Cell (CAWC). Secondly, the first and third sections serve to identify some key themes which cut across the different aspects of the data that I unpack in the chapters which follow. The chapter therefore has a sense, in places, of pointing the reader forward towards the analyses in later chapters. Finally, I reflect on how the discourses/practices discussed here play into the (violent) reproduction of gender.

1. Constructions of security: Entering the terrain of the everyday

Some of the practices through which violence/crime against women is addressed by Delhi Police’s various initiatives for women, which I introduced in Chapter Three – and by Parivartan, its high profile ‘campaign for the safety of women in Delhi’ – imply constructions of ‘security’ which are interesting for thinking about gender and human security, and which
deviate from the masculinist, authority and protection model discussed in Chapters One and Two.

‘Operation Change’ and securitising everyday violence

*Parivartan* (‘Change’) was launched in 2005 following a negative publicity hit to Delhi Police in the wake of some high profile rape cases. According to Dr Hooda, the nodal officer responsible for the campaign, *Parivartan* was based on the idea that sexual violence should not (as it has typically been) be treated by law enforcement as non-preventable. Prevention, for him, is closely tied with the broader project of ‘changing the patriarchal mindset of society’: a refrain he emphasises keenly in interviews, and which is integrated into the *Parivartan* Mission Statement promoted in the campaign literature and on the Delhi Police website (Delhi Police n.d.).

There are two broad arms to *Parivartan*’s strategy. The first is the targeted deployment of women police Constables on the beat, in a manner which closely mirrors community policing models, and the second is a set of educational and awareness-raising activities targeting the community at large, but young people and adolescent girls in particular. Initially, 20 beats (the smallest unit of policing) spread across a number of police stations in the target areas were selected for intervention, and 40 women police Constables received specialist ‘gender sensitisation’ training and implemented a programme of ‘door-step policing’. Later, the programme was extended to a total of 40 beats in the North West and Outer Districts. The *Parivartan* beat Constables went on beat patrol six days a week (excluding Sunday) in pairs in their respective beats in the slums and resettlement colonies. Initially they went door-to-door, introducing themselves to women in the community, informing them about the police services and discussing safety. They handed out mobile phone numbers for women to contact them directly for assistance and invited women to speak to them about their experiences of domestic violence and marital disputes. They made a point of seeking out such cases and tried to ‘resolve’ them in situ, where possible, through informal counselling interventions similar to those deployed by the CAWC (see Section Two). They offered women the opportunity – and threatened perpetrators with the prospect – of registering a formal complaint at the police station, which could lead to criminal proceedings. The women beat Constables also held a daily ‘surgery’ at a beat-box on a busy road where women could make complaints, and patrolled outside schools at arrival and departure times to discourage sexual harassment or ‘eve-teasing’ of girl students by men and boys.

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84 The North-West policing district was bifurcated to create the Outer District in 2007.
During the initial period of intensive beat patrolling, the Parivartan Constables set up ‘Women’s Safety Committees’ (WSCs). These consist of a group of up to 20 local women who meet monthly with the beat Constables to raise any issues of concern and/or address cases of violence/crime against women. By calling local women to attend meetings, they make themselves known as intermediaries to whom women can bring complaints of violence. They intervene as requested and call in the assistance of the beat Constables in any cases they cannot directly manage. They collect feedback from local women and draw the beat Constables’ attention to issues of concern; this seemed to be the channel through which arrangements for beat patrolling of schools had been established. The WSC members were self-selected and vetted by the beat Constables, who checked that they did not have any criminal associations and favoured women who were confident and well-known in the community. However, the formation and membership of WSCs appeared to be quite informal.

The second broad arm of Parivartan – educational and awareness-raising activities – adopted several manifestations, including its signature street theatre performances on rape, domestic violence and dowry. These short, participatory pantomimes staged by Jagran, a Delhi-based not-for-profit mime and performance group, were developed in consultation with Dr Hooda and performed in numerous public spaces in the Parivartan target areas, often attracting large crowds and provoking discussion of the issues highlighted. Women beat Constables participated in the performances to get themselves seen and known, and some reported in interviews that complaints of violence and abuse were brought to them spontaneously by women who had seen the shows. By the end of 2008 Jagran had put on well over 500 official performances for Parivartan. Other activities included safety workshops in schools for adolescent schoolgirls led by the staff of Swanchetan, an eminent not-for-profit group of psychologists with experience of working with the police to provide trauma counselling to victims of violent crime; ‘sexual responsibility’ workshops for adolescent schoolgirls led by a youth educator and UNFPA consultant with expertise in reproductive health; self-defence training courses in schools – also for adolescent schoolgirls – provided by trained women beat Constables; a mobile vehicle showing short, educational films on key themes, and finally, ‘gender sensitisation’ training for police personnel staffing the selected localities.

Parivartan draws on a number of existing models and traditions of policing and dispute resolution, such as community policing, whereby police build relationships of mutual trust and

85 United Nations Population Fund
cooperation with the communities which they serve. This accords with the evident concern of the police organisation in Delhi to improve its public image, which emerges as a persistent theme my interviews, and which I examine in Chapter Eight. It also replicates the law enforcement practice that has developed elsewhere on the Indian subcontinent of addressing violence/crimes against women through specialist policing cells staffed predominantly or exclusively by women police, who use informal counselling and mediation to try to address grievances outside of the criminal justice system. This is the policing model adopted by Delhi’s CAWC. The WSCs draw on the traditional Indian dispute resolution system of local ‘panchayats’, which similarly inspires the ‘mahila panchayats’ (women’s panchayats) established and overseen by Delhi Commission for Women (DCW) – the difference being the formal connection with the local police via the Parivartan Cell.

Parivartan is also distinct, however, in that it was the first programme to deploy Delhi Police women on beat patrols, with the aim that they reach out to women who may be experiencing violence, rather than waiting for the women to come to the police station or specialist women’s cell. It was and is believed that many women perceive the police station as a hostile environment. Indeed, the research cited at the beginning of Chapter Three (IIPS 2007) found that only two per cent of women experiencing violence reported it to the police. While some cast this as a misperception, some police personnel acknowledge that the police have often failed to provide an adequate service to women complainants. This is posited as both a gender-specific issue and part of a wider problem of police-public relations. It was also thought that many women did not know about their rights under the law, and/or were not able to access the police due to being prevented from moving about freely and unsupervised outside of the home.

The Constables, Parivartan In-Charge (IC) and former IC, and WSC members interviewed reported initial resistance in the communities and suspicion of the police. People asked, ‘what are you going to do?’, and protested, ‘you won’t be any more effective, we don’t want to talk to you, you can’t help us.’ Women called on to join the WSCs were fearful of taking on the role

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86 Other documented examples include the women’s police stations in Tamil Nadu (Natarajan 2008); and Mumbai’s Special Cell for Women and Children, established in part through dialogue and collaboration between the police and the Tata Institute for Social Sciences (Dave and Solanki 2001).
87 These were established under the supervision of a lead NGO, Action India, which has trained up to 20 women members of each local panchayat in legal issues, particularly related to crimes against women, and dispute resolution techniques. The idea is that these local women then intervene directly to resolve cases related to violence against women, women’s rights and related issues, or escalate them by advocating for women seeking police assistance or by connecting them with lawyers and/or DCW’s services (DCW n.d.). See also ICRW (2002) on a range of related community-level responses to domestic violence in India.
88 I discuss the implications for the gendering of police work in Chapter Eight
89 The Parivartan In-Charge (IC) was a woman upper-subordinate (i.e. of ASI to Inspector rank) deputed to supervise the beat Constables.
of ‘informers’, and there was hostility and taunting from local men. The interviews also yielded mixed reports about the response of male beat Constables. However, with persistence the women beat Constables reported that they were able to build good and sustainable relationships with local women who began contacting them and asking them to intervene in disputes and cases of violence and abuse, as well as asking for assistance with a range of other problems.

There were practical problems with the implementation of Parivartan and difficulties in institutionalising the programme and maintaining its momentum, which I consider further in Chapter Eight.

The women beat Constables interviewed reported that they dealt with numerous complaints of domestic violence and abuse during beat patrolling and that most cases came to their attention through these interactions with women in the community, and/or in their own homes. They appear to have assisted women who would not have brought their complaints to the police station, in cases which would probably otherwise not have come to the attention of the police. Parivartan is, therefore, structured in a way which acknowledges the pervasiveness of everyday violence/crime against women and girls that is part of their intimate, family, community and personal lives. There is a caveat here in that Parivartan, like routine operational policing, does in some significant ways treat sexual (as opposed to domestic) violence as a rupture in the fabric of everyday life, but it treats the threat of sexual violence and its management as a routine, everyday experience which significantly structures the lives of Delhi’s women and girls. Because violence (domestic violence especially) is routine, everyday, treated as ‘the norm’, it is not brought to the attention of the police (as a rupture, something exceptional, a ‘crime’ to be reported) – but it comes to the police attention when they enter the field of women’s everyday lives and go looking for it, partly through consciously building more trusting, reciprocal, non-authoritarian relationships with local women. Parivartan beat Constables, in other words, address violence by entering the terrain of the everyday and trying to intervene in and reconfigure it, at a practical level.

*Civil and civilised: Combining friendly policing with coercive authority*

Security as an institutional practice produced not only by Parivartan, but through the work of the CAWC, seems to move away from the masculinist ‘authority and protection’ mode of

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90 I consider these responses further in Chapter Eight.
91 My interviews with Parivartan beat Constables indicate that, in practice, they assisted local women and their families with a range of problems not limited to gender-based violence against women. They reported helping people to claim their pensions and apply for ration cards, as well as mediating disputes about local amenities.
92 I explore the implications of this in Chapter Six.
security associated with the legitimate use of force, in ways that replicate the policing and dispute resolution models in which both of these initiatives partake. This is signified for instance by practices such as attending house calls in civil dress, explicitly to communicate a more ‘friendly’ persona and facilitate better communication, as well as to alleviate the stigma associated with a visit from the police. Staff from the CAWC explained a similar rationale for regularly working in civil dress, arguing that this helps complainants to feel more at ease, anticipating that they may be intimidated by the uniform, which signifies coercive state authority. This reflects more broadly the emphasis in the CAWC on creating a supporting and enabling atmosphere which diverges from the authoritarianism of regular police stations:

“Generally police station has negative image, scolding, this and that. Here everybody talks very decently with the complainant.” (Counsellor, CAWC)

In other ways Parivartan’s and the CAWC’s approaches revert to and reproduce security as authority and protection. For instance, both women beat Constables and CAWC staff reported calling on their authority as police in order to warn violent men about the potential consequences of their actions – threatening punishment and legal sanction – which they felt lent weight to their ‘soft’ interventions, namely counselling and ‘making them understand’, as they could ‘scare’ perpetrators into changing their behaviour:

*“When he comes here to the police station, even though it’s partly counselling he gets to know the power... He gets to know the consequences also... Now the issue has come before police... We do our work in terms of counselling but he gets scared that it’s the police station, so he resorts to apologising and surrendering... In many cases he himself confesses.” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

This finding is consistent with Natarajan’s (2008) analysis of the All Women Police Units (AWPUs) in Tamil Nadu.

This combination of approaches already institutionalised by the CAWC and the Indian women’s policing model it reflects, represents a more holistic way of understanding security as part of the police remit, and recognises the intersections between women’s individual (in)security and other forms of crime and social problems, reflecting feminist theorisations of violence as a continuum (Chapter One). Addressing violence/crime against women is constructed by CAWC staff as part of the police role of preventing crime, making the city safe, and enabling society to function:
“The police being the custodian [of]… the society it is our prime duty to find out what is the reason for distress and unrest... The children coming out from the broken family will turn up to be criminal or the short-tempered peoples... They will definitely harm the society... it is a social crime... Crime is crime, be it a social crime, be it otherwise a crime, theft or whatever it is... If you beat your wife it comes up as a social crime... If you beat a person outside receiving sustained injuries are the same. So pain is same why it should not be taken care of? ” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

*"I will give you an example: the husband is a drug addict; after taking drugs he beats up his wife; wife comes and lodges a complaint, then the counselling starts... Afterwards his addiction is controlled; at the same time prevention of crime is happens - when he is under drug addiction he would have been a thief... The same is applicable in the case of alcohol also - after alcohol consumption he becomes violent... when counselling is started here he is made to understand... In this way there is prevention of crime also. So we help the woman who comes to us in all possible ways... It helps a lot in prevention of crime indirectly. ” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

**Security as empowerment, resistance and self-determination**

*Parivarton*’s various activities such as the workshops and lectures on safety and sexual responsibility, self-defence training for schoolgirls and street theatre, also participate in this construction of ‘security’ which is not reduced to authority, protection and coercive force. The educative, preventative approach is broadly based on the premise of the everydayness of violence and its threat, and the way in which gendered violences can shape the lives of adolescent girls in particular ways. These implicitly posit security as at least partly a matter of: sexual and bodily integrity, knowledge, awareness, and reconfiguring certain gender norms - for instance, equipping girls with confidence to ‘speak out’, to name and challenge violence, to resist, without being paralysed by fear and shame. These interventions call upon a similar philosophy to the CAWC’s Delhi wide self-defence training programme.

One of *Parivarton*’s interventions was a safety workshop delivered in government schools in the target areas by *Swanchetan*. Information about *Parivarton* is shared with schoolgirls, including helpline numbers to call in an emergency, to report abuse, and for psychological support. The content of the workshop has a strong focus on empowerment, which the psychologists and workshop leaders whom I interviewed stressed as part of their philosophy. The workshop leader gives practical suggestions about what the girls can do to prevent assaults and protect themselves, most of which are about resisting being coerced and/or manipulated.
For instance: Don’t be scared. If someone tells you not to tell anyone, not to shout, then do tell someone, do shout. Don’t be shy. Don’t be polite. If someone asks you for help, tell them to ask someone senior to help them. If someone drags you through the streets and no-one intervenes, shout ‘he’s not my father’ or, ‘he’s not my brother/uncle’. Raise your voice and protest if someone teases you. If someone gets too close, blow your nose in his face. Remember that attackers do not usually look ferocious, they look like ordinary people, and they may do things to win your sympathy and/or gratitude, such as helping you, or telling you they’ve lost their pet puppy.

The workshop attempts to challenge gender norms which make girls into compliant victims – feminine submissiveness and shyness, in particular, as well as other norms such as unconditional respect and politeness to elders, including people who are not known to you. It seeks to actively empower girls to resist, and to believe that they do have both the power and the right to resist. It highlights that attackers are not monstrous and are therefore not always easily identifiable, and equips the girls with legal knowledge about certain rights, which can enable them to resist attack by someone posing as a person in authority. The workshop thus implicitly aligns security with empowerment, resistance and self-determination rather than straightforwardly with coercive authority and protection.

Similarly, the youth educator and UNFPA consultant who delivered the lectures on sexual responsibility in government schools understood her role as about empowering girls with both knowledge and the confidence to resist violence. In important ways her lectures challenged the stigma associated with sexual violence, which can lead to passivity and silence due to the shame of sexual violation. She incited girls to speak out, to name the violence, to risk being disbelieved. The emphasis on speaking out is also powerfully communicated through the medium of Hadsa, meaning ‘Mishap’, Jagran’s pantomime on rape. In the closing scene, the rape victim publicly points the finger at her attacker such that justice can be done, and he is dragged to his fate by Delhi Police Constables.

The techniques taught by the CAWC’s self-defence training programme, which were replicated on a smaller scale by Parivartan, were ostensibly more physical and technical than the above. The training is mixed martial arts based, and educates girls and young women about how to use ordinary items on their persons as weapons against an unexpected assailant. The women police self-defence trainers interviewed felt that the purpose of the training was mainly to empower young women to resist ‘eve-teasing’, a widely used euphemism for sexual harassment and
assault in public places. One trainer argued that the techniques could be adapted to protect oneself from domestic violence. In particular, both trainers interviewed, a senior police official at the CAWC and one other woman Inspector at the CAWC who commented on the training, all emphasised the importance of acquiring ‘confidence’ and the right frame of mind, over and above the effectiveness of any particular physical techniques. They insisted that the training has less to do with physical skills and more to do with alleviating fear, aiming to empower primarily at a 'mental' or psycho-social level:

*“This is our main motive, to remove the fear from the minds of girls.”* (Woman Head Constable/Self-defence trainer, CAWC)

These non-conventional constructions of security, in some notable ways, reflect the equation of security with emancipation which is a key characteristic of a human security approach. Interventions which aim to empower, to instil resistance and self-determination, have potentially emancipatory implications at an individual level at least, while efforts to reconfigure everyday gender relations and denormalise violence seem to strive for emancipation at a more structural level. However, these modes of performing security are also ambivalent and contradictory in their effects – effects which complicate this emancipatory potential, but reflect the ways in which performances of security are inescapably enmeshed in a field of (gendered) institutional power. I begin the analytical work of unpacking these in the remainder of this chapter. In the next section, I discuss the normalisation of domestic violence.

### 2. Re-securing the everyday: The normalisation of domestic violence

The police institutional understanding of violence/crime against women broadly constructs conjugal violence as paradigmatic of the latter – hence the CAWC, as the principal police initiative to address violence/crime against women, has an official mandate to intervene in domestic violence and abuse, dowry demands and marital disputes. Given the primacy of the CAWC, conjugal violence is thus privileged in the framing of Delhi Police’s various initiatives, and through the ways in which these are constructed in the discourses of the police staff implementing them. For instance, most frontline police as well as some specialists assumed when I asked them about violence/crime against women that I meant conjugal violence, and spoke about this almost exclusively. Often my interpreters and I had to ask further questions to solicit discussion of sexual violence and harassment, and/or other manifestations of gender-
based violence. The following are some examples of responses to the questions, ‘what forms of violence do women experience?’ or, ‘do women experience particular kinds of violence because they are women?’

“Routine beatings, regular beating, that is a common... Every second woman... is subjected to this routine beatings, kind of domestic violence.” (Woman Inspector, former Parivartan IC)

“Mental and physical torture is given by their husband and in-laws... domestic violence. Torture to the women by any male in the house.” (Woman Inspector and SHO, CAWC)

*“Mostly it is beating her up, like someone’s husband comes drunk in night... and then there is a dispute between them.” (Male beat Constable, Parivartan target area)

*“Most of it is related to dowry only... and beating, mostly.” (Male beat Constable, Parivartan target area)

This is consistent with Santos’ (2005) analysis of women’s police stations in Brazil, which treated conjugal violence as paradigmatic, at the expense of other manifestations of gender-based violence against women. Paradoxically, conjugal violence is also normalised and the harm it effects is minimised by and through the specialist police interventions designed to address it. It is perhaps even because it is understood as paradigmatic – as typical, common, normal, everyday, routine, inevitable – that it is normalised and constructed as ‘not real crime’.

The Crimes Against Women Cell: ‘Reconciliation is our prime motive’

The oldest and most institutionalised initiative ‘for women’ in Delhi Police, the CAWC was established in the 1983, following feminist lobbying and legal reform on dowry-related violence. A specialist, auxiliary service which operates in parallel with, but separately from, routine operational policing, the CAWC currently has a HQ run by a Joint Commissioner of Police (JtCP), and a branch in each of Delhi’s eleven policing districts headed by an Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP). Until 2008, the CAWC did not have the authority to register and investigate criminal cases, although it could pass a case to the relevant local police station and recommend that a case be registered. This is somewhat ironic, given its name and the context of its inception – the feminists who fought hard for the introduction of Section 498A to the Indian Penal Code (IPC) (see Chapter Three) certainly wanted dowry-related violence to be

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93 Delhi Police interventions, however, while casting domestic violence as not ‘real crime’, do not straightforwardly position violence/crime against women as not ‘real police work’. Its status as ‘real police work’ is highly ambivalent and contested: I consider this further in Chapter Eight.
treated as a criminal offence by the police. The HQ in Nanakpura in South Delhi was inaugurated as a police station with authority to register and investigate criminal cases on 31\textsuperscript{st} March 2008; this was considered to be an ‘experiment’\textsuperscript{94}. At the time of my fieldwork the district branches still lacked this authority.

The primary mandate of the CAWC is to reconcile woman complainants with their marital families, and the percentage of cases ‘compromised’ or ‘reconciled’ is its foremost measure of success, although the HQ at Nanakpura does now assist women in registering criminal cases as well as in making use of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA 2005; see Chapter Three):

\begin{quote} “Basic mandate that let everybody live happy. We must bridge the gap between the two parties... minimum houses should... be broken. Reconciliation is our prime motive.” \\
(Woman Inspector, CAWC)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote} “The purpose [of our work here] is to prevent family break-ups” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)
\end{quote}

CAWC staff report that they are sensitive to the needs and wishes of women complainants even with this priority in mind. In the interests of not breaking up the family, the CAWC aims to address dowry and other domestic violence and resolve marital disputes through counselling. Complainants initially present their case to an Enquiry Officer who will call both parties for counselling and try to seek the most amicable resolution before considering criminal charges. Some couples are referred for further counselling with professional (non-police) Counsellors – two in-house professional Counsellors with formal training in social work had recently been employed at the CAWC HQ in Nanakpura with funding from DCW at the time of my research. The CAWC also connects complainants and their families with services provided (often unpaid) by local and specialist NGOs, including professional and psycho-therapeutic counselling, legal assistance and mediation. The CAWC is staffed by both men and women police but deploys a high ratio of female staff\textsuperscript{95}. As detailed above, Parivartan beat Constables appear to emulate CAWC practices and the tradition of policing in which these partake, by using informal counselling skills to intervene in cases of domestic violence and avoiding criminalisation as far as possible.

\textsuperscript{94} Interview with senior CAWC official

\textsuperscript{95} At the time of my research it was reported that 60% of staff at the Nanakpura HQ were women, whereas Police HQ sources reported that only seven per cent of total Delhi Police staff were women.
Thus, the handling of domestic violence is siphoned off from routine operational policing, and CAWC staff interviewed justified this by claiming that it enabled them to provide a better and more appropriate service. They consistently argued that violence/crime against women cannot be adequately addressed through routine operational policing as it is distinct from other forms of crime, and that police stations are overburdened with their general workload and cannot devote the necessary time, patience, attention and compassion needed to successfully resolve such cases. Women were understood to have particular characteristics, expectations and needs and dealing with cases of violence/crime against women was understood to require not only understanding and sensitivity to these needs, but additionally a particular ‘caring’ skill set explicitly associated with ‘social work’. A few interviewees believed another rationale for the CAWC existing as a separate, auxiliary service was to free up the local police to focus on ‘real’ crime, while keeping cases out of the courts, where they clutter up the system and do not bring women rapid or effective relief. The following are some examples of explanations for the separation of the CAWC from mainstream policing:

*“See the general police’s work, our local police they have all kinds of crime reported... But in women’s cell we have cases only related to women, so we are able to concentrate fully on it. Local police doesn’t have so much time that we take that case and just keep on solving that one case.... They have to keep everything on par... It can be dealt with by local police but any lady is not satisfied for sometime only... Police have just heard like this and they haven’t taken much notice of it. Here it is that... we listen to her for one hour, even two hours... So they feel that there is time specially for ladies here... Due to this reason this Women Cell has been created differently, so that that satisfaction can be given to them.” (Woman ASI, CAWC)

*“The atmosphere and the working of a normal police station, it’s already overloaded that it is very difficult to deal with such cases there, because it’s a counselling for the whole family... There should also be proper space available, to listen to them which is not possible in a police station, there are already so many cases in the police station.” (Woman SI, CAWC)

“In thana* we are getting all type of crime... The mind setup and the working culture... It could not permit us to think positively and emotionally about the ups and downs of the family... Because we are not here to deal with women’s cases only; we are here to deal with each and every crime... But in Women’s Cell the staff posted over there is only dealing with these type of complaints, so... Their mindset is automatically setup accordingly... We could [not] concentrate on these type of matters in the police station, so that’s why we have setup [laughs] separate cell for these type.” (Woman Inspector, Former CAWC staff) [*police station]
The consensus is that routine operational policing is ill-equipped and unsuitable for dealing with violence/crime against women, particularly in terms of supplying the necessary emotional labour for managing what are construed as, “the ups and downs of the family”. These arguments are quite compelling: dealing with violence/crime against women requires a specialist skill set (listening, understanding, counselling) and specially allocated resources (time, space) which can be best provided in a specialist setting that is not impacted by the multiple, conflicting demands of routine operational policing, and which strives to remain uncontaminated by the authoritarian atmosphere which is the norm in such settings.

Furthermore, some CAWC staff appear to work with a holistic understanding of conjugal violence. They held broad and inclusive definitions, covering a spectrum from physical violence, beatings and burning to ‘mental torture’, emotional abuse, withholding financial support, and withholding contact with natal family or with children.

“‘So how, I mean, how exactly would you define domestic violence?’

*‘Beating, keeping them hungry, denying them the proper food, denying them proper medication... threatened abortions... avoiding pregnancy to harass the girl to deprive her [of] motherhood, for dowry demand... Not only physical it is emotional also, to deprive the girl... to see her parents... To deprive the girl to lead her personal life in a normal manner.’* (Woman Counsellor, CAWC)

*‘There is harassment physically, mentally and sexually. For example, a husband, 50 years of age... he comes home any time and asks his wife to have sex with him... even if in front of children... The woman is pressurised and disturbed as there is cruelty... Different kinds, like not providing food, not providing necessities, not paying children’s fees, and doesn’t even come home for four-five days.’* (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

In this sense the understanding of conjugal violence that is operational within Delhi Police appears to reflect some aspects of feminist knowledges about violence/crime against women, which understand a range of abusive and controlling behaviours not limited to physical violence causing injury as part of a continuum (Chapter One), and for which feminist activists in India have tried to gain legal recognition under Section 498A and the PWDVA 2005 (Chapter Three).
‘Running with the social structure’: Violence/crime against women as not ‘real crime’

However, the siphoning off from mainstream policing into an auxiliary service with such limited powers to evoke the criminal law constructs violence/crime against women as ‘not real crime’, and this inflects the thoughtful justifications of this specialist service, in which violence is euphemistically reduced to *“family matters” and, “the ups and downs of the family”*. The heavy emphasis, both official and informal, on reconciliation - the importance of preserving the home above all else, as the place where a woman has the right to feel safe – and correspondingly, the structural set up which diverts cases away from criminalisation and prosecution, equally contribute to normalising and minimising violence. It is constructed as an extension or an integral part of inevitable, routine intra-familial conflict. The widely applied standard for criminalisation, according to many interviewees – namely evidence of physical violence having caused fresh physical injuries, which are readable on the body – belies the broad definitions which characterise informal discourse on conjugal violence.

The CAWC, as I have already indicated, belongs to a loose grouping of police initiatives in different states in India, which adopt the ‘counselling’ approach to conjugal violence – a euphemism for ‘advice’, argues Dave (2005: 179). In contrast to Natarajan’s assessment of this approach as applied by the AWPU’s in Tamil Nadu (2008; see Chapter Two), Dave argues that this policing approach with its emphasis on reconciliation does not view conjugal violence as ‘real crime’ or violence at all, but sees the family as sacrosanct and tries to take a neutral standpoint: ‘saving the family as an institution is foregrounded, not violence against individual women and children’ (ibid.: 180), which, she adds, betrays a lack of understanding of the power dynamics behind women’s need for assistance. If we are to take Dave’s argument seriously, in human security terms, the preservation of the family takes precedence over women’s security, bodily integrity and dignity as individuals. A certain configuration of social relations is secured, as called for by some feminist critics of human security (Truong et al. 200: xii; Robinson 2008: 184; Chapter One) – but in all likelihood, not those relations which are most conducive to emancipation from violence or its threat.

In keeping with Dave’s critique, it is evident that CAWC staff do not see their role as one which involves strictly implementing or adhering to the criminal law:

*“Role of police is different here. We don’t move ahead seeing a legal thing in mind. We work a little on the sidelines what law says... We are running at the sidelines of law. The law says that as soon as you get some information in which there is cognisable offence... You register the case, investigate it and send it to court. We are giving...”*
counselling in this. So you can say that it is a little away from the law. And you can consider that the way our social structure is, we are trying to run with it, our police is trying to run with the social structure, moving a little away from the law.” (Male Inspector, CAWC)

“The main job of police is to maintain law and order... It’s a different scene in the CAW Cell... here we don’t work like police officers do... We are mainly counsellors.” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

“Because we are dealing with the matrimonial disputes, so they are not the criminal, the boys are not the criminal... So our role is very wide mediator, a facilitator.” (Woman Inspector and SHO, CAWC)

This ‘running with the social structure’, to borrow the language of the first Inspector cited here, is double edged: on the one hand, it can involve allocating time and patient listening skills to a woman in distress; on the other, it may mean helping her to resolve her situation by and through negotiating with the perpetrator(s) of abuse and reinstating her in the violent home, having reached ‘agreements’ that both parties will modify their behaviour – sometimes in ways which reproduce normative understandings of gender which have contributed to producing, enabling and normalising the violence. Hence, the normalisation of violence is also reflected in interview data which constructs violence as part of the normal process of a young wife’s ‘adjustment’ to life in the marital home, when she joins her husband and often his extended family after marriage.

*“In CAW Cell we deal about family matters... We try to clear all the misunderstandings, and if there is problem when a girl comes to a new family and she finds it difficult to adjust there, and we try to make her understand and also work out things in such a way that she can adjust better.” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

These discourses which blur together violence and ordinary marital discord tend to hold all parties equally responsible, or to put particular responsibility on the woman for managing her behaviour gender normatively and/or in accordance with husband’s or affines’ expectations:

*“We have seen... that many a times it is a girl’s mistake, not the boy’s fault. If you don’t cook the food for him... then naturally he will get agitated and might be give a slap or two to you... If he is able to eat food peacefully then there would be no problem, everything will run fine, would be normal. If he is earning and she is not cooking food even sitting at home, then there are more chances of a fight.” (Woman ASI, Parivartan Cell)
“All these problems have come up because our child is very much pampered... The moment she is married, she is no more a daughter, now she is a daughter-in-law... She has to work the way her mother was working.” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

In the course of these explanations for violence, some interviewees mobilise ‘Indian culture’ as an imperative to which parties to a ‘conflict’ should look to govern their behaviour, and manage their relationships96.

To sum up: although conjugal violence is constructed as paradigmatic of violence/crime against women, it is simultaneously constructed as ‘not real crime’, but understood as a normal or inevitable part of the fabric of everyday life, albeit one that needs careful management – unlike sexual violence, which is constructed as qualitatively different from domestic violence (see Chapter Six). The CAWC, then, provides a kind of ‘support’ service which diverts complainants away from prosecution and involves the state in managing and disciplining the conduct of marital and extended family relationships in order, primarily, to preserve the integrity of the (joint) family. This is considered to be for the benefit of society as a whole, because it keeps the institution of the family intact and prevents the social problems imagined to be caused by children who are the product of broken homes. The Parivartan beat Constables’ interventions which informally emulate the counselling approach have a similar effect. Notwithstanding unequal gendered power relations, it is noteworthy that this includes, to some extent, policing men’s behaviour – for instance, demanding that husbands fulfill their proper duties as fathers and family breadwinners by working, providing income, not spending it irresponsibly on alcohol, and so on.

‘What women want’? Understanding the dispute resolution approach in its complexity

The normalisation of domestic violence, and concomitant disciplining of marital and family relationships, has the effect of (violently) reproducing gender. That said, the practice of addressing violence/crime against women outside of the formal criminal justice system has to be understood in its complexity. Almost all respondents insisted that most women complainants reporting domestic abuse from their husbands and in-laws do not want to pursue a formal criminal case which could result in the perpetrators being prosecuted, because in most cases they are economically dependent on the husband and/or extended family and fear that filing a criminal case might enrage the perpetrators and exacerbate the abuse. They reported instead

96 I explore contested discourses of Indian culture in more depth in Chapter Seven
that most complainants want the police to ‘make them [the perpetrator(s)] understand’ so that they can live peacefully and free from violence and abuse in their marital homes:

*“Wife thinks that why to send him to jail, if he becomes more violent on going to jail. She says that just threaten him and leave.”* (Male beat Constable, Parivartan target area)

*“The lady herself says no to it [registering a criminal case]. The woman herself says that make him understand... Where will my kids go then [if the husband is arrested].”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

*“Women do not want to disturb their homes... All they want is to warn them... If the case gets registered, now there is no chance for reconciliation, so... we mostly try to make compromise... What women mostly want is that their home does not get destroyed.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

*“Once a girl is married then she feels that her in laws’ house is her house, and if I report against them then where will I go?... After marriage her own parents don’t support her... and there is no one that she can turn to, so she finds it better to adjust with her husband... So we facilitate her to take such decisions.”* (Woman SI, CAWC)

This is consistent with Natarajan’s (2008) findings on women’s use of the AWPUs in Tamil Nadu, and is similar to Santos’ (2005) conclusions on women’s ‘contradictory’ use of women’s police stations in Brazil (Chapter Two).

However, Prasad’s (1999) research on women’s experiences of reporting violent crime in Delhi in the 1990’s deeply troubles the assumption that ‘reconciliation’ and ‘compromise’ are uniformly ‘what women want’. She argues the CAWC reproduces marital violence as a social norm, and that police systematically block women from accessing the criminal justice system (482). She interviewed 40 women who tried to file a First Information Report (FIR) under section 498A, 73% of whom had to make repeated trips to the police station to secure the FIR and medical examination. The women in Prasad’s study were routinely forced to attend a police counselling session with the perpetrator to explore avenues for reconciliation before the police would register charges – by which time weeks had elapsed, and most women dropped their charges anyway. Similarly, the fourteen women who had experienced violence among my

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97 Based on 60 interviews with women complainants and observation at the CAWC
98 The First Information Report (FIR) is the first documentary evidence that a crime has been reported. The complainant is supposed to receive a copy from the police; no charges can be filed without this document. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) criminalises cruelty to women in marriage, including dowry-related violence, as a non-bailable offence (see Chapter Three). The medical examination can only be carried out by a designated, government medico-legal expert with authorisation from the police, and is required as legal evidence to bring a prosecution against the perpetrator.
research participants, and some of the activists who advocated for them, painted an ambivalent picture. Many women do want to return safely to the marital home, or make a separate home with their husband and children. Dave (2005: 186) points out that, ‘most women are unwilling to walk out of the family due to social hostility to women without male support’, while Kannabiran (2005: 9) highlights that marriage may be viewed as the only security for women against assault by strangers. These arguments point to women’s preferences being structurally constrained in certain ways, and their desire for reconciliation with the abuser has to be understood in this context. In contrast to the refrain that women uniformly want to save their homes, some of my interviewees who wanted to see their perpetrators punished were pressured at all stages towards reconciliation, blamed for the violence and/or felt they had no choice but to sign ‘compromise’ agreements that they did not feel were in their best interests. In cases where satisfactory outcomes were achieved it was with considerable pressure from activists from women’s rights or social service organisations.

Some CAWC personnel also explained that the legal process is extremely time consuming, arduous and unrewarding with cases taking many years to reach a satisfactory conclusion and therefore does not bring women any kind of effective relief. They saw their role as partly about trying to steer women away from this system, not always or exclusively because their complaints did not count as ‘real crime’, but also because they felt it did not effectively meet the needs of women complainants and might even make them more vulnerable or put them further at risk. At the CAWC HQ in Nanakpura at the time of this research, respondents reported that they were starting to inform complainants about, and assist them in using, the PWDVA 2005, which offers civil remedies providing (in theory) rapid relief for women facing a range of different kinds of domestic violence (see Chapter Three).

The evident tendency to deflect women away from the criminal justice system does not mean that no valuable services are provided to women experiencing violence and abuse. In some instances (up to a quarter of complaints made at Nanakpura according to some respondents), criminal proceedings are instigated. In others, women are assisted in recovering their property and/or applying for custody of their children while divorce proceedings are initiated, often by mobilising relatively new provisions under the PWDVA 2005.

Debates about the value versus the drawbacks of criminalising violence/crime against women, and the ambivalent effects of addressing it through a specialist, auxiliary service, have resonances with the equality versus difference debates in feminist theory. The treatment of
violence/crime against women within Delhi Police recognises and privileges gender difference in ways which equality approaches, more popular in contemporary Western policing, may not. In this way it reflects proposed feminist approaches to human security which treat ‘women (and girls)’ as a gender-based constituency, subject to specific vulnerabilities and therefore in need of special protective measures (Chapter One). This has some distinct advantages. However, while recognition of difference is necessary to provide services to meet gender-specific needs and address gender-specific violations, in this particular context, gender itself is often reified in the process. This approach contributes to the (violent) reproduction of gender, and thus of the very conditions that enable the violence, more than challenging and deconstructing oppressive gender norms. I turn now to some broad, cross-cutting themes which inflect police discourses of violence/crime against women in Delhi, and which are critical in shaping their ambivalent and contradictory effects.

3. Constructions of vulnerability, agency and responsibility in police discourses of violence/crime against women

Constructions of vulnerability, agency and responsibility ostensibly work in tension with one another in police discourses of violence/crime against women, which at times project women as helpless victims, and at others, conversely, blame them for the violence, or for not doing enough to avert it. I show in this section how these constructions can be understood in significant ways as operating in tandem. Women and girls are broadly held responsible, in a range of ways, either for causing or inciting violence or – more usually – for preventing, averting, avoiding, managing and mitigating it.

(Contested) Discourses of bodily and emotional vulnerability and moral weakness

Women’s and girl’s vulnerability is a theme which is pervasive at both explicit and implicit levels in the interviews, but also contested. Women and girls are frequently constructed as a ‘vulnerable’ population alongside children and the elderly, in need of special services and protection. Some police explained that special provisions are needed for women, or that violence/crime against women happens because of the essential vulnerability of women’s bodies: women are both physically ‘weaker’ than men, and compromised by the sexual composition of their bodies:
“Because of the vulnerability of women in terms of their, you know, being physically weaker and also in terms of their sexuality.” (Senior police official, when asked why violence against women happens)

“From her birth [the woman is] treated on a different footing... The woman is always protected by the family in a protected environment... because of her, you can say, physical complexities... Delhi Police has been taking care of all segments of society, all the more weaker section like the women, the elderly, the children, even the handicap people, there are special efforts being made for that.” (Male senior police official)

“I will say the biological weak build up of the, by nature the lady is weak, not very strong, the basic reason is this, physically weak.” (Counsellor, CAWC, when asked why violence against women happens)

The notion of vulnerability as physical weakness is particularly pervasive because even when it is not explicitly articulated in relation to violence, it is implicit in the widespread idea that the gender division of labour in policing partly reflects women’s physical composition and unsuitability for physically tough work (see Chapter Eight). However, vulnerability is constructed also in other, more complex ways. Here Arijit, Director of Jagran, talks about a scene from the rape pantomime, Hadsa, and Minister for Women Renuka Chowdhury’s response to it:

“This neighbour comes in and the parents go out and without provocation he goes in and says now she is vulnerable and the Minister took note of that. And she was very categoric and publicly she said that this is so true and lots of times violence happens because of vulnerability... Violence also happens because you’re vulnerable.”

This account of vulnerability does not so unequivocally reduce it to biological or bodily structures, but admits the possibility of vulnerability as socially and/or circumstantially produced. In this sense, it aligns more closely with the counter discourses discussed below, which understand vulnerability as socially produced and as a harmful fiction. Ideas about women’s vulnerability as a function of their physical weakness and sexual composition are more prevalent in the interviews, however.

Discourses of elopement, which I discuss in Chapter Six, implicitly project yet another account of vulnerability. In this account, girls of a certain age, namely during adolescence, are depicted as morally weak and susceptible to emotional manipulation: to being ‘lured’ into illicit

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99 Although arguably, there remains an implication in Hadsa that the girl is inherently unable to defend herself when not supervised by her parents. In Chapters Six and Seven I explore how its narrative reproduces certain (gendered) norms about privacy, family, and the use of space.
relationships, vulnerable ‘to temptation’, to ‘false promises’, due to their tendency to go off the rails at this age, and their inability to distinguish right from wrong without close supervision and guidance. This is framed as much more of a problem, and as accounting for more rape cases, than the risk of straightforwardly being physically overpowered.

These various discourses of vulnerability intersect closely with a number of other key themes through which violence/crime against women is framed, with significant discursive effects, which I explore in the chapters which follow. The construction of women as a vulnerable population bolsters the temporal narrative (see Chapter Eight) which posits Delhi Police as moving from being a repressive, authoritarian, neo-colonial force to being a compassionate, protective, paternalistic organisation suited to modern India and its global capital city. The discourse of women as vulnerable by virtue of their bodies also interlinks with constructions of space and transgression, explored in Chapter Six. Women’s bodies – young, unmarried women’s bodies in particular – are constructed as potentially serving as invitations to violation when they are ‘out of place’ or inhabit, move through, or transgress into the wrong kinds of (mainly public) spaces, or use these spaces carelessly or inappropriately. Similarly, constructions of women’s bodily vulnerability interlink closely with the glorification of the family (home) as the ultimate source of safety and protection for women and girls (Chapter Six) – which in turn contributes to the normalisation of violence through practices privileging the integrity of the family.

The discourse of women’s inherent vulnerability as traceable to their bodies was contested in some interesting ways by some women police, however. Some contended that women are emotionally stronger than men and have greater endurance for pain, which enables them to give birth and withstand all sorts of routine suffering. Some argued that women’s weakness is a cultural fiction which women internalise, and/or which manifests itself as a paralysing fear that prevents women and girls from making full use of their capacities to resist violence. For instance, the following Inspector argued that women are seen as weak and tend to internalise this view, but that her work with them at the CAWC is about helping them find and mobilise the inner strength they did not know they had, a strength which she feels has helped her to succeed as a police officer:

*“It’s a male dominated society... Here the girl is always considered weak... Because women are considered weak, men feel that they can be easily overpowered. Like if the girl is working in an office, and the employer is sexually exploiting her... With my

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100 In Chapters Six and Seven I show how constructions of space and transgression intersect with considerations of sexual morality and class.
experience in the CAW Cell I felt that girls just feel that they are weak, but they are not actually weak from inside, and when we counsel them... we bring out their inner abilities and after that they become so bold... After this they had many more horizons open to them... They are gentle but not weak - the other term for ‘power’ is also ‘woman’ - she gives birth to all. Even death is conquered by her. If women want, Madam, they have so many powers in them. But they are not able to understand their ability, and if I hadn’t realised my abilities I wouldn’t have been here, I would have been sitting in some house.”

In a similar vein, a Head Constable working for the CAWC’s self-defence training programme discusses an incident in which she simulated an attack on a trainee who used self-defence techniques in response:

*“Our program on kidnapping, if the girl is a little mentally prepared, then they can’t take her to the vehicle. Once she is picked up mostly the girls get frightened and are subdued. But that girl did not fear and defended herself, she hit out with her legs to one person and she dragged me a long distance... So it’s just that girls get afraid just by someone even whistling at them so then they are not able to defend themselves. In that fight we sustained a lot of injuries also as she defended herself from being taken to the vehicle... I can’t believe... that two people can carry a girl into a vehicle and rape her, as long as the girl is conscious. These types of actions happen only when girls get too frightened. It is that fear which we try to remove from the mind of girls. Once that is finished, much crime cannot happen.”

This Head Constable goes on to discuss at length her own experiences of fighting back against ‘eve-teasers’ on buses, and admonishes other women and girls for staying silent and not actively resisting, which she believes would quickly put an end to such harassment. She believes men routinely sexually harass women and girls because they know they can get away with it, and triumphantly recounts the many times she has successful scared away an ‘eve-teaser’ since joining the police. In contrast to the discourse of women as inherently vulnerable to violence, this Head Constable argues that this vulnerability is a fiction created by fear. Implicitly, women internalise a sense of themselves as vulnerable and this helps to create conditions under which violence can be perpetrated. Hence for her and her colleagues, the self-defence training is about instilling confidence and alleviating fear, rather than just physical/martial arts techniques.

The inherent vulnerability of women and girls is challenged in similar ways by the Swanchetan safety workshop and some of the other sexual violence prevention and education strategies operating under Parivartan, which focus heavily on empowerment and using the resources at
hand (your senses, your intuition, your knowledge, your voice) to take control of one’s own safety in seemingly positive ways. I discuss the content of these in more depth, as well as what is ambivalent about them, below, where I consider the theme of responsibility in relation to constructions of vulnerability.

**Double-edged: Gendered responsibility for violence and its prevention and management**

Thus, on the one hand, violence is naturalised as the result of women’s innate and unavoidable physical and sexual vulnerability. Although contested by counter discourses, this naturalisation of violence effaces the way in which vulnerability is *socially* produced by and through unequal relations of power. It both individualises the violence, reifies and (violently) reproduces gender/sexual difference. On the other hand, there is also a powerful set of repertoires which hold women and girls (at least partially) *responsible* for the violence perpetrated against them, or certainly for preventing, avoiding or managing it. Again, the notion of responsibility is pervasive in the data at explicit and often, implicit levels. It is conceptualised in a range of ways. Explicit and unapologetic woman-blaming discourses are not absent from the interview data but are quite exceptional. One male Constable working in a *Parivartan* target area expounded the multiple ways in which women bring violence on themselves, ranging from provocative clothing and behaviours, to the failure to normatively fulfil the requirements of a good wife and daughter-in-law. But his perspective – or at least, his candid way of delivering it – was not the norm among my research participants.

More pervasive were subtle implications of responsibility. When discussing the normalisation of domestic violence in Section Two, for instance, I emphasised how the woman is often held responsible for ‘adjusting’ to her new family environment and for fostering domestic harmony. She is expected to behave in certain ways in order to avert the possibility of violence, including normatively managing her marital and family relationships. I show in Chapter Six how women and girls are held responsible for managing their sexual integrity, which is conflated with (sexual) safety, in order to avert sexual violence. This includes the avoidance of consensual sex outside of properly sanctioned marriage, as well as the general management of their sexual conduct, use of space, and association with the opposite sex, as normatively as possible. The normative management of both marital relationships and sexual integrity are reinforced by the discursive construction of the kind of knowledge and ‘awareness’ which women and girls need to cultivate, according to police discourses, in order to prevent or avoid violence, as discussed in Chapter Seven.
Significantly, furthermore, even those discourses which are explicitly empowering, affirming, and unequivocally delegitimise violence, also implicitly participate in the allocation of responsibility to women and girls for preventing violence and managing its risk. Some such discourses intersect closely with the counter discourses to the construction of women and girls as inherently vulnerable. For instance, the self-defence trainers argued for the value of young women having the confidence to move around freely and defend themselves or ‘raise their voices’ against violence and harassment. However, they also insisted that with the right training and in particular the right mindset, women and girls themselves can and should prevent violence. The Head Constable cited above says she refuses to believe that a girl can be forcibly abducted and raped, as long as she is conscious. She does not claim that women and girls consent, but rather that they are paralysed by fear. She expresses considerable frustration that women and girls do not generally react more assertively to sexual harassment and assault in public places, which she thinks would put a stop to it. The concept of ‘confidence’ here functions ambivalently to reinforce the burden of responsibility on women and girls for confronting and managing the violence and harassment perpetrated against them.

Similarly, the advice given out in Swanchetan’s safety workshop also encumbers adolescent girls and young women with responsibility for anticipating, and protecting themselves from, attack. The workshop implicitly challenges the idea that it is female bodies and their lack of strength and/or sexual composition which makes women and girls vulnerable, by suggesting that vulnerability is a transient state which we put ourselves into. Girls make themselves vulnerable by blocking their senses, by talking on mobile phones in public, by not being vigilant, by not setting boundaries, saying no or telling someone when a boy starts to make unwanted advances, by being shy and polite, by not speaking out, and so on. In other words, girls do not have to be vulnerable – and it is not their bodies being ‘out of place’ that makes them vulnerable.

Challenging the inevitability of vulnerability is indeed very useful. It can contribute to denaturalising violence (insofar as vulnerability is mobilised to naturalise it), and recognises the agency of girls. In fact, the workshop seeks to actively cultivate and develop that agency: to empower girls not to be, or think of themselves as, vulnerable. But with this recognition and cultivation of agency comes a double-edged burden of responsibility. Not only does this responsibility deflect attention away from changing and de-normalising the behaviour of men and boys who feel entitled to act in sexually coercive ways towards women and girls across a range of spaces (public transport, the workplace, the home). There is a risk that it can also insidiously reinvigorate woman-blaming discourses. Such an effect is not intended by the
workshop leaders – but, in the claim made in the workshop that 99% of attacks can be prevented by taking certain steps to keep ourselves safe; in the constant refrains throughout, “what could she have done to prevent it?”, “what did she do wrong?”, lies the implication that, if violence can be anticipated and is so eminently preventable (on the part of the victim), you have yourself to blame if you are attacked. We make ourselves vulnerable, the workshop leader tells his captive audience. “Who makes Delhi unsafe?” He asks. “We do”, the girls chorus. This erases the ways in which Delhi is made unsafe by the atmosphere which implicitly condones ‘eve-teasing’ and by gender norms which make women and girls uncomfortable vociferously resisting it; by the men and boys who think it is normal to harass women and girls.

Like Swanchetan’s psychologists, the UNFPA consultant who delivered ‘sexual responsibility’ lectures saw her role as about empowering girls. In important ways, as highlighted in Section One, her lectures challenged the stigma associated with sexual violence. But, these lectures also placed a similar burden of responsibility on girls for resisting violence, and for avoiding situations in which they could fall prey to both sexual predators and the temptation to transgress – hence she counsels girls against getting a boyfriend, studying alone with a boy, or going to parties. I analyse one of the lectures in more depth in Chapter Six and show how it blurs the boundaries between sexual coercion and transgressive consensual sex. In order to stay safe, girls are made responsible for anticipating and evading situations in which either could potentially take place, and/or demonstrably and vocally fighting back and performing their displeasure lest someone ‘think they are enjoying it’.

This lecture explicitly challenges the idea that to experience violence is shameful, in order to encourage girls to speak out and resist, as does Swanchetan’s safety workshop, albeit more implicitly. However, these educative interventions discursively produce a new – or perhaps, reworked – category of shame: feeling ashamed because you have failed to protect yourself, when you have been taught that violence is preventable and the power to prevent it lies in your hands. Shame because you did not spot the danger signs, you were taken in, you did not quite succeed in resisting enough – therefore you must have allowed this to happen; people will think you invited it. The way in which empowerment is envisioned and attempted through these interventions emphasises the responsibility of women and girls, but may not do enough to assure them that violence and abuse are never their fault.
**Ambivalent agency: Normatively negotiating resistance and compliance**

These various discourses of vulnerability and responsibility prima facie seem to co-exist in tension. Vulnerability is constructed in ways which efface agency, while the allocation of responsibility to women and girls clearly *requires* their agency, and to some degree negates their putative vulnerability. However, the picture is more complicated than this. Agency holds a problematic and ambivalent status in the data, demonstrated in particular in Chapter Six, where I analyse accounts of sexual violence which overlap with accounts of elopement, and constructions of victimhood. Where the girl’s sexual agency is acknowledged therein, she is sexually precocious and the instigator of the crime. These girls are on the “wrong path”, the road to “nowhere”. Such accounts align closely with claims by police interviewees that women and girls routinely lie about rape, when really they consented to sex – exercising sexual agency in a deviant and transgressive way – and conversely, with one respondent’s criticism of married women who withhold socially legitimate sex from their approved husbands. The only *legitimate* sexual agency for women, in this data, is fulfilling one’s wifely duty in order to keep domestic harmony.

These discourses, though not forming a seamless whole, have the cumulative effect of broadly knitting together in the following ways. Women and girls are *responsible for managing* the (inherent) *vulnerability* and thus liability that is their gendered/sexed bodies. Agency that is mobilised in ways which *deviate* from these imperatives of preventing violence in recognisable, *legitimate* ways (for example, *not* by running away from home at night, even though home may be where the violence is101), and performing normative gender and sexuality, is what is suspect and deviant.

This managing of *vulnerability* – both to being overpowered, and to transgression – is key for averting sexual violence and harassment, whereas vulnerability is less in the picture when it comes to managing marital violence. Insofar as vulnerability is associated with marital violence, this association is more subtle, and comes to the fore especially in discussions about economically disadvantaged women living in slums and their ‘lack of awareness’ (see Chapter Seven). As I have shown in this chapter, there are discourses which emphasise resistance over compliance. Usually resistance is advocated in relation to sexual violence (often implicitly assumed to be from an outsider, despite the widely cited knowledge that most rapists are known...

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101 I am referring to a particular interview excerpt here, analysed in Chapter Six, in which a Parivartan woman Constable tells of an incident in which a teenage girl was picked up by police on the street at night. The Constable insisted that she was lying about the family violence she reported, *because she had run away from home at night*, which indicated her mendacity.
to their victims), while compliance is often advocated in relation to marital violence. Those discourses which advocate resistance (notably in conjunction with self-defence training and educative interventions which seek to empower girls), I have shown, also reinforce the emphasis on responsibility – in this case, for resisting properly and effectively. There are, however, very few counter discourses which explicitly advocate active resistance to marital violence, where responsibility is not so much for effective resistance as for compliance and adjustment to the situation, as discussed in Section Two. Counter discourses challenging the imperative to comply with an abusive husband or in-laws are perhaps implicit in the cultural critiques discussed in Chapter Seven. This difference between how resistance to sexual versus marital violence is framed reflects the normalisation of marital violence as part of the everyday, in contrast to the construction of sexual violence as rupture (see Chapter Six).

Targeting ‘patriarchal minds’?

The responsibility of men and boys, and women, for not perpetrating violence is almost never addressed in and through the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi, until it comes to criminal responsibility which, as shown in Section Two, is rarely evoked. Societal responsibility for creating an environment which de-normalises violence is addressed through counter discourses critiquing cultures of gender discrimination (Chapter Seven), but these are not the dominant repertoire in the data. Significantly, it is also addressed through the language of Parivartan’s Mission Statement: ‘changing the patriarchal mindset of society’. Dr Hooda’s (the nodal officer responsible for Parivartan) language is interesting, in that it does confront societal responsibility for wider, long-term social change and does not individualise gender-based violence against women and girls. He emphasises that prevention involves both mobilising ‘multiple stakeholders’, including other state and community agencies, to generate a ‘mass-based’ campaign – and, crucially, reaching out to potential perpetrators:

“Police response was inadequate not because police were not serious but because other stakeholders were not fully involved in their efforts. Police comes face to face with a sexual offender for the first time only after he has committed the offence, therefore police were not actually able to reach out to large number of people who were potential offenders.”

For Dr Hooda, the ‘patriarchal mindset’ which Parivartan sets out to change is socially and psychically instilled through the family and a range of other institutions including community norms, schooling and media, and is the most important factor which ‘causes’ gender-based violence against women and girls:

“On further scrutiny and discussion with the feminists... One of the most important causes of violence against women was the patriarchal mindset of society... There are other factors...
also but this is the most important. It was very important – to succeed in any intervention, strategy, or any campaign against violence against women, it was still very important to deconstruct patriarchy and demolish the patriarchal mindset of society. Patriarchy is the background. It is the setting. It is a context and it is the given thing which generates or which reduces equality, gender inequality or violence against women."

However, this perspective is exceptional in the data, even among other police and professionals involved in implementing and overseeing Parivartan. Despite the educative activities through which Parivartan seeks to effect social change, as I continue to demonstrate over the course of the ensuing chapters, Parivartan, in practice, hardly targets ‘patriarchal minds’ at all. It predominantly targets women and girls in ways that reproduce their responsibility for preventing violence and managing its risk. This is not to assume that all ‘patriarchal’ minds are male minds, but to argue that targeting ‘patriarchal minds’ also requires targeting the minds of boys and men.

Conclusion

Police initiatives to address violence/crime against women in Delhi, especially Parivartan, show some interesting and innovative ways of doing security which move beyond the masculinist authority and protection model, albeit without transcending it completely. They bring securitisation into the terrain of the everyday, instead of focusing on ‘ruptures’ in daily life. At the same time, they suggest different meanings for ‘securitise’, as security becomes a matter of living in safety, peace and harmony in your own home, having the confidence and being empowered with the skills to name, speak out against and resist violence, and protecting one’s bodily integrity and self-determination. These are both partly the outcome of securitising violence/crime against women and, at the same time, the grounds or basis which enable its securitisation. Nevertheless, I argue in this chapter and throughout this thesis that these non-conventional ways of doing security have ambivalent and contradictory effects in this context. They challenge gender norms, inequalities and constraints in some ways, but also and significantly (violently) reproduce normative gender and sexuality in others, and reward their successful performance. I also emphasise, however, that this process of (violently) reproducing gender is always partial and incomplete. I show how it is contested from within by counter discourses, which may at times draw on or overlap with more dominant discourses, or play upon the tensions within and between them. The next chapter begins to address how these gendered
configurations of vulnerability, agency and responsibility play out through the (preventative) policing of sexual violence.
In a dusty square, a small and rare stretch of open space in a densely populated resettlement colony in the North Western outskirts of Delhi, a large crowd has gathered curiously around a colourful makeshift stage framed with giant banners advertising Delhi Police’s *Parivartan* campaign for the safety of women in Delhi. The actors in mime artists’ hyperbolic make-up glistening in the oppressive heat of Delhi’s late afternoon summer sun, have secured a captive audience in the groups of young children weaving their way nimbly to the front of the crowd. The performance, *Hadsa*, is a ten-minute educative pantomime about rape and sexual assault. The audience knows that the suspicious neighbour who befriends the father of the teenage girl is a Bad Man, but why can’t the father or mother see this patent truth? They shout out their disapproval and dread as the girls’ parents are obliviously lured away from the house so that the Bad Man can make his move on the helpless daughter, fear etched across her pantomime face. The sexual attack takes place off-stage. When the parents return, they mime their horror as their daughter emerges with her clothes torn and blood stains on her legs and face. In a dramatic gesture accompanied by a drum roll, she slowly raises her arm and publicly points the finger at her attacker. ‘What should we do with him?’ the show’s narrator asks the excitable crowd. ‘Arrest him!’ ‘Throw him in jail!’ ‘Beat him up!’ they heckle. Two women police officers in khaki Delhi Police uniforms stride purposefully onto the stage. These are not actors, their faces are clean of clown like make-up. They are beat Constables from Delhi Police’s *Parivartan* Cell. They demonstratively handcuff the Bad Man and drag him offstage as he mimes a faux struggle, amid an uproarious frenzy of triumphant whoops, cheers and laughter from the crowd.

This chapter explores how violence/crime against women is framed in terms of sexuality in police discourses in Delhi. The argument rests on understandings of ‘sexuality’ as socially and discursively produced and inflected with power, thus having political implications. Following theorists such as Foucault (1990 [1981]), Rich (1980) and Puri (2006), I understand sexuality as a central organising concept of the social world: a ‘dense transfer point of power’, a regulatory force (Foucault 1990 [1981]) which is not reducible to the intimate or private. Adrienne Rich
(1980) makes a powerful argument for conceptualising what she understands as ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ as a political institution – that is, an established norm and corresponding set of practices which are embedded in social life and taken for granted, pervasive and manifested through myriad effects across different spheres of existence. For Rich, compulsory heterosexuality and its erasure of other options for sexual expression (for women in particular) deeply intersects with gender inequality. The idea of heterosexuality as a compulsory institution is particularly useful for understanding how discourses of sexuality in the policing of violence/crime against women reproduce sexual/gender difference and gender inequalities. Sexual discourses serve as ‘tools of power dispersal’, which are ‘productive of truths, structures and histories at institutional sites’, argues Jyoti Puri (2006: 146), analysing such discourses in the Delhi context. In this chapter I take the police as one such institutional site, and examine how sexual discourses are woven into and co-construct police discourses of violence/crime against women, and the effects in terms of the (re)production of sexual/gender difference and inequality.

The first section explores how (gendered) sexual safety is constructed both through the mobilisation of notions of ‘honour’ and modesty, and in relation to the everyday. Section Two examines the policing of elopements and non-socially sanctioned pre-marital sexual relationships, and its discursive effects. The third section closely analyses some of Parivartan’s educative rape prevention work. Section Four situates these analyses against the literature on gender and sexuality in India, and feminist arguments about how the laws on sexual violence serve to regulate women’s sexuality. I consider how police discourses participate in a field of contestation over sexual norms, and in Section Five, show how rape is normalised therein. The final two sections then explore the spatial dimensions of the sexual discourses which inflect the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi, including the glorification of the family and the mapping of gendered safety and risk onto the divisions between public and private, and the intersection of both with the gendered regulation of sexuality. Although I draw on data from a range of interviewees in this chapter, I focus disproportionately on Parivartan and its preventative strategy against rape – as exemplified by the rape pantomime, Hadsa, with which I opened this chapter. It is in these interventions that the discursive framing of safety as sexual integrity, and the various permutations and implications of this framing, are most salient.
1. Safety as sexual integrity and sexual violence as rupture

In the police discourses I observed, women’s safety and security is constructed in important ways as coinciding with gendered understandings of sexual integrity. In such discourses, sexual violence and harassment are understood as a breach or violation of sexual integrity, with implications of sexually immoral or improper conduct which may be (implicitly or explicitly) attributed to both parties. Consider the following excerpt from an interview. The Constable is explaining the formal rules which make it mandatory for women police to supervise women detainees.

*“If something may happen between a man and the woman then it would give a bad name to the police, that it happened in police custody, our image has been like this for years. It’s to keep a woman’s modesty safe, [that] is why we are supposed to guard them.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

This Constable makes one of the very few, albeit indirect, references to custodial rape in my data. It is significant that the issue of protecting women in custody from custodial rape is framed in terms of ‘modesty’, and furthermore, that according to this Constable, women’s modesty is being guarded primarily against its violation through consensual sexual encounters. This same Constable comments later in the interview that a policeman cannot rape an adult woman without her consent; that usually when this happens the policeman has been seduced and both have momentarily lost control of themselves. The rules, in this interview therefore, are framed not as protecting women’s bodily integrity when they are in a particularly vulnerable position vis-à-vis men in authority, but as protecting women from their own propensity to commit indiscretions and conduct themselves immodestly – which in turn reflects badly on the police.

In the following quote, another woman Constable is complaining about the pervasiveness of sexual harassment and violence against women in public spaces, and the unfairness of the burden of safeguarding their ‘honour’ that women have to bear:

*“A woman has to save her honour. Men are not at all afraid of this thing that you are raped or something else. A woman, however she tries to retreat they will try to get on top of her. In the morning I was coming in the bus, one person sat with me. I kept going to one side, he kept on getting close to me. Then I said to him, should I go outside the window? Then he started staring at me. I said to him that, stay away from me or I will beat you up here and now. Then he stood up there and got down from the
The concept of ‘honour’ or izzat is closely tied to notions of sexual integrity – a breach of sexual integrity damages and erodes one’s honour, and it is the imperative to safeguard one’s honour that makes sexual integrity precious. It also has wider implications to do with family, caste and class status, which I discuss further below. This Constable’s complaint about the constant work she has to put into safeguarding her ‘honour’ on her daily commute to work, makes clear how gendered this form of social capital, and the notions of sexual integrity on which it partly depends, are. Men do not have to be constantly vigilant against sexual threats to their honour, she implies, but for women, protecting this precious and vulnerable resource is a routine but constant and relentless effort. Despite the palpable sense of unfairness that resonates through this quote, it reinforces the notion that protecting her honour through managing the threat of sexual violence is a woman’s responsibility first and foremost, even though she does not position the men who pose the threat as provoked, or as behaving reasonably.

The alignment of safety with sexual integrity is also reflected in the externalisation of rape as the principal security threat to women under the Parivartan campaign; the construction of sexual violence as ‘rupture’, as a more serious and criminalisable offence than domestic violence; and in particular, the policing of ‘elopement’. I discuss the first two of these in this section. Parivartan’s positing of sexual violence as the prime security threat to women and girls in Delhi is evident from the story of its inception recounted in interviews and in the Parivartan promotional literature in English\(^{102}\). This story highlights the increase in the incidence of sexual crime in Delhi preceding the launch of Parivartan, and the media attention paid to a number of high profile rape cases (see Chapter Three). The text of the Parivartan promotional literature speaks broadly about violence against women, and mentions battering and domestic violence, but slips back into projecting rape and sexual assault as the real threat. The section on the causes of violence against women is entitled, ‘Interrogating the Causes of Rapes and Gender-based Assaults’, and the ‘Mission Statement’ reads, ‘To change the patriarchal mindset of society toward women, to substantially reduce violence against women particularly rape in the city, [and] create an atmosphere of safety wherein women would feel safe and secure’ (emphasis added).

Parivartan’s target localities were selected partly on the basis of reported rape figures, and its educational and awareness-raising activities primarily emphasise rape prevention. When asked
why Parivartan was started, some women Constables working on the programme identified the incidence of rape as its prime rationale:

* “Parivartan cell was basically started for rape cases only... these are cluster areas and the crime rate is high here like rape cases, kidnapping, abduction.” (Woman Constable, Parivartan Cell)

* “There are more cases of rape with young girls... Because of this our DCP had started this Parivartan program.” (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

Thus, although in practice the Parivartan women beat Constables spend more time intervening directly in domestic violence, and do not have the authority to investigate rape cases, Parivartan is primarily framed as a campaign against sexual violence, cast within this frame as the threat which makes the city (feel) unsafe for women, particularly its public spaces. However, the assaults which make up the rape figures in the target areas lack the exceptional characteristics of the stranger attacks and gang-rapes in more affluent areas of Delhi which made the notorious headlines. Indeed, the Parivartan literature draws on existing feminist knowledge, in addition to analysing police statistics, and finds that over 90% of rapes are committed by perpetrators known to the victim. This implies an overlap between sexual and domestic violence and furthermore, it troubles the projection of rape as an external security threat which makes the public spaces of the city unsafe for women and girls. It troubles the very boundary between public and private.

The projection of rape as the prime security threat to women and girls is enmeshed in a broader discourse which, in contrast to the normalisation of domestic violence discussed in Chapter Five, constructs sexual violence as a ‘rupture’ in the fabric of everyday life, from the perspective of human (in)security. Rape is treated as a more serious crime than domestic violence: it is classed as a heinous, non-bailable offence under the Indian Penal Code. This is reflected in the language of the Parivartan promotional literature in English: ‘Rape and sexual violence is the most dehumanizing and traumatic experience for women.’ Rape is investigated in police stations as part of mainstream operational policing, unlike domestic violence, complaints of which, as detailed in Chapter Five, are routinely diverted away from the criminal justice process, or ‘resolved’ in situ through ‘counselling’ by Parivartan’s women beat Constables. The seriousness of rape as a crime is reflected in comments such as the following:

103 All investigations are handled by the inspectorate, which is trained for this purpose.
104 I return to the discussion of public and private space, gender and violence later in this chapter.
105 As documented in existing literature from other contexts, for example see Barnish (2004: 11). Puri (1999: 75-102) found that experiences of sexual aggression were pervasive among the young, urban, middle-class Indian women who participated in her research, and included assaults and abuse perpetrated by a range of family members in domestic settings.
*“The most serious... is like if a rape is committed against a women, this is very bad thing... not approved in our society, in our religious books this has been condemned, Lord Rama had killed Bali for this reason because he kept wife of Sughriva with him... Lord Rama killed Bali that it is a crime to forcefully keep anybody’s sister or daughter.”*  
(Male Constable, Parivartan target area)

It is similarly reflected in the reported prioritisation of cases received by the Women’s Helpline. A woman ASI Helpline Operator told me that, as the helpline does not have the capacity to respond to all calls, they will not necessarily respond to a *“routine fight between husband and wife”*, but will always respond to a reported rape. A male senior official told me that domestic violence is a “social problem”, whereas the police “can act immediately” in cases of sexual violence.

I stress that to say that rape is constructed as more serious ‘crime’ than domestic violence is not to argue that it is always effectively handled by the police; indeed, the existence of standing orders detailing mandatory procedures for good practice in the investigation of rape¹⁰⁶ is testimony to, and aims to rectify and compensate for previous inadequate police practice vis-à-vis complaints of sexual violence (see Prasad 1999)¹⁰⁷. My data does not permit me to make broad observations about how effectively rape complaints and investigations are handled by Delhi Police. However, it did highlight widespread beliefs among women Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors (SIs) responsible for investigating rape cases that women and girls routinely lie about rape, that most cases involving adults happen with consent, and (in some cases) that informal enquiries are therefore made to verify the complaint before formally recording the mandatory First Information Report (FIR). Similarly, the projection of rape as a ‘real crime’ in contrast to domestic violence does not mean that rape is not in any way normalised: I discuss the literature on the normalisation of rape under Indian law later in this chapter. Nevertheless, sexual violence is constructed as qualitatively different from domestic violence, and I argue in this chapter that the horror of sexual violence, and its status as ‘real crime’ and the prime security threat to women and girls, reflects and is inescapably bound up with the alignment of safety with sexual integrity.

¹⁰⁶ See Delhi Police (2000) Standing Order no. 303, which details the functioning of the Rape Crisis Intervention Centres (RCICs) and processes for rape investigation. It stipulates (among other things) that two upper subordinate level investigating officers (IOs) should be appointed for rape investigations in each police station and ‘sensitised’; that the IOs should not call the victim to the police station but should visit her residence in plain clothes to file the FIR; that the victim’s ‘character and antecedents’ should not be probed; that the support services of designated voluntary organisations and in some cases Delhi Commission for Women (DCW) should be called on; in addition to procedures for the timely collection of medical and other forensic evidence.

¹⁰⁷ Prasad’s (1999: 487-490, 495) research in the 1990s found that police routinely denied that a crime was committed, blamed the victim, made errors in documenting evidence and obstructed the timely collection of medico-legal evidence, which is the most important component of the prosecution and usually indispensable to securing a conviction.
2. Policing elopement and the regulation of young people’s/women’s sexuality

The alignment of gendered safety with sexual integrity is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by an analysis of police discourses on ‘elopement’, which were pervasive in my interviews. ‘Elopement’ is the term used in Delhi Police to describe illicit, pre-marital (hetero)sexual relationships in which a girl runs away from her parents’ home with her boyfriend, possibly with the intention of marrying him against her parents’ wishes. If the girl is below the age of consent (sixteen\textsuperscript{108}), charges of statutory rape can be brought. According to interview accounts, either the girl’s parents bring the case and seek her recovery, or a case is filed retrospectively when the relationship ends and the boyfriend does not honour his alleged promises of marriage. It is in discourses on, and the policing of, elopement that the overlap between safety and sexual integrity becomes most eminently visible, as it similarly becomes clear that sexual integrity for young women means, in this context, confining one’s sexuality and sexual expression to marriage, with an appropriately selected and socially approved partner.

Police raised the theme of elopement in interviews, when I asked if they thought women and girls experienced particular kinds of violence or crime, as well as in discussions of why Parivartan was necessary, and what sort of cases the beat Constables encountered in carrying out their work. In some interviews, accounts of elopement dominated the discussion of rape, and no clear distinction was made between the two. This partly reflects the lack of a clear legal distinction, because there are rightly legal provisions to protect against statutory rape. It also reflects the understanding of rape implied in the citation from the male Constable, above: \textit{“that it is a crime to forcefully keep anybody’s sister or daughter.”} If rape is not an assault upon a woman’s bodily integrity so much as an insult to the male and/or senior family members who consider themselves responsible for her, then consent, and the sexual agency of the women or girls concerned, become less relevant to determining the character of the crime, and the harm that it effects. The way in which sexual agency features in discourses of elopement is nevertheless telling, and connects the alignment of safety with sexual integrity with the themes of vulnerability and responsibility explored in Chapter Five. In some accounts of elopement, the young women and girls involved are constructed as vulnerable and helpless, innocent, ‘not knowing any better’, lured by false promises on the part of the boyfriend. In such accounts their

\textsuperscript{108} Sections 375-376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) on rape state that a man who has sex with a woman or girl aged under 16 commits rape, regardless of consent. However, there are inconsistencies between different legal provisions, with the Juvenile Justice Act fixing the age of consent at 18, and the very recent Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Bill (2012) proposing the same. Police participating in this research were not always clear about whether the age of consent was 16 or 18.
sexual agency is all but completely effaced and they are reified as victims, more or less by virtue of their sex. This is reinforced by the fact that, under the law, a minor boy like an adult man can be punished for statutory rape of a minor girl, irrespective of her consent. Ironically, however, when a girl’s sexual agency is acknowledged, it is constructed as deviant, disruptive and dangerous, and must be contained.

These two discourses are not mutually exclusive or opposing, but mutually imbricated, and both enmeshed with notions of responsibility. A significant way in which they are imbricated is through the idea of vulnerability to temptation or transgression, a tendency to “go out of track”, commonly attributed to teenage girls in my interviews:

*“The girls get attracted in a certain [age]… Suppose there are boys living around and they keep looking at her and if they do it ten times the girl may also fall for it once and above all the age group is such, girls can take wrong step and run away from home.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

*“If from 14 to 20 years she is able to control herself, then she will face no difficulty. Girls tend to go out of track in this age, the rapes are in this age only, and in this only they do wrong things. If they control themselves from 14 to 18, then these rape case will be very less.”* (Male Constable, Parivartan target area)

Some girls, comments one woman SI who has investigated rape cases, *“are such”* that they go around freely enjoying sex. This putative susceptibility to transgression is also indicated by the use of the word ‘wrong’ (galat) to characterise teenage girls’ behaviour and decisions.

*“The child might get on the wrong path and get involved with wrong company… they might get wrongly attached to boys, this is really a very wrong, wrong step.”* (Woman Constable, Parivartan Cell)

*“In lower class mostly... Girls between 13 to 15 of age they run away from their home and go into wrong way.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

However, these ‘wrong’ attachments, steps and choices are produced partly by the girls’ vulnerability, which in turn is produced by their lack of (moral) understanding:

*“The girls belonging to the age group of 14 to 16, they don’t have the thinking power of what is right or wrong... she might go to a boy and there is something between them, physical relation is made but it is wrong.”* (Woman SI, former investigating officer for rape cases, Parivartan target area)

This makes them particularly vulnerable to compromising their sexual integrity in ways which
have devastating consequences. The male Constable cited above also commented:

*“These days it is like this once the boy and girl meet, two or three times they will eat together... do some wrong things, I saw that a girl and a guy were lying naked, like in compromising condition... For a little greed they destroy their lives. And after falling in that they are of nowhere. They don’t have anywhere to go.”*

After “falling in” to the trap of doing “some wrong things” with boys, these girls have destroyed their lives and “are of nowhere”, they have “nowhere to go”. The evocation of space here is particularly interesting. The implication is that such girls have ruined their marriage prospects as well as alienating themselves from their natal families. Having compromised their sexual integrity, there is no space as such that they can legitimately inhabit, they do not belong. A woman without a family is ‘of nowhere’¹⁰⁹ and can have no legitimate existence. Although framed in part through a discourse of lack of awareness and therefore vulnerability, these accounts underscore the burden of responsibility for managing the risk of violence – and for/through safeguarding their own sexual integrity – which police discourses place upon women and girls. They are held responsible for these “wrong” attachments, for failing to “control themselves”, for being “careful” in making their choices “at the right instant... after reconsideration and proper thinking” (to quote one male senior police official involved in *Parivartan*).

Both direct police interventions in (potential) cases of elopement (whether formally registered as rape cases or not), and some key aspects of *Parivartan*’s sexual violence prevention work, have the effect of policing young people’s – especially young women’s – sexuality, sexual morals and behaviour, in effect disciplining them to conduct themselves (gender) normatively and in accordance with prevailing sexual mores. This regulatory function is comparable to the disciplining of marital/family relationships through the CAWC’s interventions in domestic violence (Chapter Five), and exemplifies the exercise of ‘disciplinary power’ (Chapter Two) through the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi. Women Inspectors/SIs investigating rape complaints, and *Parivartan* beat Constables, described instances of informally advising against and intervening in pre-marital relationships, and disciplining those involved:

* “I asked her does she understand the meaning of love and I explained to her that this was wrong for her, for the boy and for everybody.” (Woman SI, former investigating officer of rape cases, *Parivartan* target area, on advising a girl whose parents had brought statutory rape charges against her boyfriend)

¹⁰⁹ I return to the themes of both family and space at the end of this chapter.
*“A member of the Women’s Safety Committee she came that my daughter is going to run away, she is having an affair. I and [another police Constable] went and met that girl and explained her a lot of things. Then we came to know from her that all the belongings were packed, she was about to run away anytime. But listening to us she stopped, kept her belongings and now her mother has married her... She was 17 years, she would have run away, then again [a] rape case...”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

In some instances, this involved policing young people’s use of public space, and of their personal time, to guard against elopements:

*“There was a park, so many couples used to come, we used to make them understand. This is not good. Your parents send you to study, you be limited to that work only. Means just trying to protect against a mishap happening... It might happen that some girl might run away with some boy, so we used to ask them how have you come, why have you come. Some were like this, they used to tell at home that we are going to school and used to sit there... We used to make them understand that this is their age of studying.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

In the quote above, the Constable reports that a girl’s mother invoked her involvement. In other instances, police disciplining, and attribution of responsibility, extended to parents of teenage girls:

*“[Parivartan beat Constables] used to tell me that [they] used to solve a lot of problems... We told that your daughter is sitting there. We talked to her parents that this is wrong, she should be in school at this time and she is sitting there with a boy... Your daughter was found there and why did you not check if your daughter has gone to school or somewhere else?”* (Woman SI, former investigating officer of rape cases, Parivartan target area)

In Parivartan meetings which I observed, beat Constables reported that they helped to settle some cases by arranging for the boy and girl to get married, and thus legitimise the relationship. In other interviews, some police reported that a rape case could sometimes be ‘settled’ by proposing that the perpetrator marry the victim (having, presumably, made her otherwise unmarriageable) – it was unclear in these interviews whether the rape cases referenced were statutory, in which an under-age girl consented to a relationship, or not. Insofar as police discourses posit any societal responsibility for addressing violence/crime against women, this is largely expressed through the regulation of girls’/young women’s sexuality and agency. While my research does not measure the ‘success’ of this regulatory function (in terms of young people’s sexual behaviours or adherence to norms), the latter serves to (violently) reproduce sexual and gender norms in ways which at times enable the very violences these interventions
seek to ameliorate. It deeply troubles the emancipatory aspirations of the security performed by Parivartan and related initiatives.

3. Vulnerability and temptation: Policing young people’s sexuality through sexual violence prevention work

The educative and preventative work carried out under the Parivartan programme is particularly interesting for its contribution to the alignment of women’s and girls’ safety with sexual integrity. It is at once more subtle and ambivalent than some police discourses, but at the same time reproduces sexual and gendered norms in insidious ways. This work is for the most part designed and implemented by professionals outside the police, who specialise in fields such as social communication, youth work and psychological counselling. The professionals whom I interviewed or spoke to informally conveyed a strong sense of commitment to the educative and preventative side of Parivartan, and in important ways their work can be shown to challenge the reproduction of some gender norms which enable gender-based violence. Here, however, while keeping this ambivalence visible, I explore the contribution of this work to the policing and disciplining of young people’s/women’s sexuality, sexual morality and conduct.

I start by analysing a discussion of a new pantomime script proposed by Arijit, Managing Director of Jagran, the street theatre and social communications organisation which performs pantomimes to raise awareness about violence/crime against women in Parivartan target communities. This script was in progress when I interviewed him in 2008. I focus on this discussion in depth, even though this script had not been performed during my fieldwork, because it illuminates the theme of elopement and its construction as sexual violence/violation so effectively. I then comment on the lecture on sexual responsibility delivered to adolescent schoolgirls by a UNFPA consultant, and revisit the safety workshop conducted by specialists in psychological counselling and violence prevention, Swanchetan, both of which were organised regularly by the Parivartan Cell.

When I interviewed Arijit of Jagran, the topic of elopement came up, as it did in numerous other interviews. Arijit said he was thinking of putting together a new play on elopement to show in the communities Parivartan is targeting. The play scenario is one in which a young man dating a schoolgirl, without their parents’ approval, is rushed into marrying her by a wiley
man who bets 5000INR that he cannot marry her – and promises him a job if he does marry her and brings her to another city or colony. The title is ‘Innocence’, and Arijit emphasises that the boy is just as innocent as the girl. The couple are ‘saved’ from their dangerous naivety just in time by a do-gooding chaiwallah\textsuperscript{10} who overhears the bet being made and intervenes to mobilise the girl’s haplessly oblivious parents, scolding them for not keeping a closer watch on their daughter, for almost letting her become one of the horror stories that proliferate in the city’s newspapers. The wiley man is revealed to be a scheming sex-trafficker.

Arijit also discussed several other scenarios. For instance, he could make the boyfriend less innocent and more predatory. He did not want to, however, because then he would be accused of slamming boyfriends - the message he portrays cannot be “anti-men”, otherwise it will not get through. So the wiley man is wholly, and unequivocally, the bad guy. All the danger and menace of the elopement is displaced onto this character and, critically, \textit{the threat of sexual violation and exploitation that he represents}. He also considered offering another scenario – asking the audience what happens to the girl, two years down the line – does she survive or not? And revealing, in a dramatic closing scene, her half-alive body slumped by the side of road, with torn clothes and blood, i.e. (what Arijit projected as) signs of sexual violation. He thought this would be very effective too – but he was not so keen on this route. He thought this would be “too drastic” – he was worried about causing fights, inflaming people. He would rather “bleach” it a little bit so that it is “balanced”. He considered showing how the girl is ostracised. Just showing a couple get together without their parents’ consent is “not a story” for him, and neither is showing the girl simply return home. Arijit did not clarify what he meant by a story, but from his account I understand that a story must have both entertainment value and a moral message.

I asked Arijit if he would like to challenge the norms which justify ostracising of the ‘recovered’ girl to punish her for her illicit intimate relationship. He replied that the point, for him, is to show that when you are young there are all sorts of (implicitly, dangerous) “temptations”. Temptations which naivety can lead you to cave in to. The couple are “naïve” to put “value” into their decision, it won’t be “balanced”. Implicitly, the temptation is to commit a transgression – to conduct one’s sexual life outside of the norms which are supposed to contain and structure it (although, the pattern of transgressive behaviour itself constructs/appropriates/acccords with a competing but related, i.e. equally heteronormative, set of norms.) The narrative goes thus: ‘When you are young you are vulnerable and naïve. You

\textsuperscript{10}A tea-seller - someone in a position to accidentally eavesdrop on conversations.
are vulnerable to temptation, the temptation to transgress, and you need to be shown that the transgression carries with it consequences – violation, the loss of sexual integrity. It is not the road to freedom.’ This is a message for young people. But Arijit emphasised that it is also a message for parents to educate their children about these risks. It accords with Hadsa, the rape pantomime, which I discuss in Section Six, below: young girls are vulnerable to predatory men. But also, implicitly but crucially, to their own curiosity and desire. Parents are called on to keep a closer watch, to keep these vulnerable young girls on the straight and narrow.

I pressed further about the trafficking connection. Its narrative function is to dramatise the danger of elopement without demonising the boyfriend. Arijit did not believe trafficking to be a pervasive issue in the Parivartan target communities. Implicitly, he is willing to set it up as a narrative device, a tropic encapsulation of the loss of sexual integrity that attends illicit pre-/extra-marital sex – in order to get a strong enough message across to both parents and children. Especially girls. The effect is to re-inscribe the norm of marriage sanctioned by the family as the only legitimate form of sexual relationship, especially for women and girls – despite Arijit’s own admitted personal ambivalence about these norms.

A strong focus of Parivartan’s preventative work is educating young women and girls to protect themselves against sexual attacks and violation, hence the safety workshops and the self-defence training organised in local schools. As in Arijit’s proposed narrative on elopement, however, a key dimension of this work is enabling girls to withstand ‘temptation’ – which invariably means transgressing sexual boundaries by getting inappropriately involved with a boy. This is well illustrated by the sexual responsibility lecture delivered to teenage schoolgirls by a UNFPA consultant. As highlighted in Chapter Five, the lecture shares many valuable features with the safety workshop delivered by Swanchetan, including an emphasis on empowerment, resistance to violence, and challenging gender norms which produce compliance. However, the mapping of safety onto sexual integrity is also discernible. I analyse some excerpts from one such lecture, which I was permitted to voice record, with this in mind.

“Nature has made the body of women such that she will get married, and she will become a mother, who gives birth... Why are the hips of women wide? Because in future

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111 I do not have data to confirm or contest the empirical accuracy of his claims about this, including that girls are trafficked into Delhi’s red light district from Nepal and Bihar, except insofar as trafficking was not considered to be a key issue for intervention in any of my other interviews with Parivartan police staff, with the exception of isolated cases.

112 Arijit described a disagreement with his own family over a relationship of which they did not approve.
The consultant tells the girls that they have a right to information about their bodies, and part of the purpose of her lecture is to provide such information. Given that Abraham (2004) argues that the withholding of information is one key way in which young Indian women’s sexuality is controlled by their families in order to be channelled into marriage, this dissemination of information – indeed, the very idea of a right to such information and a forum through which to access it – seems potentially empowering. It is particularly interesting, however, which information she provides: marriage and motherhood as women’s natural, biological destiny.

*“Those who were on one foot, those who... just care about their rights and do not pay any heed to their responsibilities, then would that person be able to go far in life? They won’t be able to, why won’t they go far in their life? Because they just talk about their rights and forget about their responsibilities.”

*“There is a trend these days of girlfriend and boyfriend. Is it there or not?... Many children... feel the pressure and think that I have some shortcomings and because of that I do not have a girlfriend or a boyfriend. So under the pressure, they do such thing, which causes problems for whom?” [Children reply: “Their own”; the consultant concurs]

The key message seems to be that heterosexual marriage is the only option for the expression of sexual rights. The consultant illustrates the problems attendant upon having a boyfriend through the metaphor of running on one leg: getting a boyfriend is trying to access your sexual rights without adhering to your sexual responsibilities. Elsewhere in the lecture, some sexual rights are specified, such as the right to information about one’s body, the right not to be forced to do anything, not to be touched against one’s will – both important rights which delegitimise sexual control and violence – and the right to give birth to a child. It is much less explicit what the sexual responsibilities continually referenced in the lecture are, but they are implicitly tied to certain kinds of normative sexual or gendered behaviour. They involve not transgressing norms about who and what kinds of (sexual) relationships are off limits. The consultant constructs this as an issue of not succumbing to pressure and, in addition to emphasising the importance of not succumbing to the pressure to get a boyfriend, gives a number of further examples:

*“He comes to her home, does homework together and then after that he misbehaves with the girl and molests her, a friend who used to study with her in the same school but he misbehaves today since there was no-one at home... What somebody is thinking and
what his mentality is you cannot know about it. In most of the rape cases, the study that has been done, the rapist is always a known person.”

*“There was a party, friends had pressurised [her] to come to a party. She did not want to go there but then went there and there also she was misbehaved with.”

The first quote here posits not only having a boyfriend, but associating too freely with boys – studying with a male friend unsupervised – as dangerous and risky. The longstanding feminist knowledge about rape being perpetrated by known men is mobilised here, not in order to disrupt the sanctity of the family, but in order to control the sexuality and freedom of association of adolescent girls: the known person is not a family member, but a friendly boy whom the girl has invited home to study with. Similarly, giving in to the pressure to socialise outside of the family in contexts where there will be unrelated boys is posited as dangerous, and threatens sexual violence and violation.

In another example, the consultant presses the girls not to give in to pressure and allow themselves to be molested by men on crowded public transport, lest someone think they are enjoying it. They are encouraged to resist and to speak out. In this way, pressures to go to a party where there will be boys, or to get a boyfriend, are associated with the pressure you face when a man tries to touch you against your wishes in a cramped and crowded space: all of these situations involve a potential loss of sexual integrity. According to the speaker, it is the girls’ responsibility to protect their sexual integrity, by resisting both temptation and violation in all of these different circumstances, just as it is their right to speak out, name the violence and accuse the attacker: sexual responsibilities are the flipside of sexual rights. The message is that sexually responsible behaviour can protect women from sexual violation. The blurring of the boundaries here between consensual (giving in to ‘temptation’ with a boyfriend) and non-consensual (being molested on a bus) sexual encounters illustrates that it is the loss of sexual integrity that is common to both scenarios, which both sexual rights and sexual responsibilities seek to safeguard.

The consultant is interested in empowering girls and does not propagate a straightforward woman-blaming discourse. In some important ways her lecturing challenges particular gender norms such as passivity and submissiveness as feminine virtues, and silence due to the shame of sexual violation. However, her lectures on sexual responsibility both deviate from but also, in

113 Delhi’s public buses are notorious for the high incidence of sexual harassment and assault against women and girls.
crucial ways, replicate and support aspects of police discourses/practices which construct safety as sexual integrity and violence/crime against women as (resulting from) sexually immoral or improper conduct. In this lecture, the ‘sexually responsible’ adolescent girl who is empowered and aware of her rights also knows where the proper boundaries of sexual (social and familial) decorum are, and has the tools at her disposal to resist the many temptations and pressures to transgress them. In this way she can realise her sexual rights, to self-knowledge, self-determination and motherhood, while – indeed, through - progressing towards her destiny as a (good, chaste) wife and mother. The realisation of her sexual rights becomes harmonised with this destiny, while transgression of sexual mores, and weakness in the face of pressure to do so, is the path towards violation and the loss of sexual rights and integrity. The consultant’s discourse thus appears to reflect Kannabiran’s (2005: 28) argument, that the articulation of women’s rights in India is only possible within the normative frameworks of heterosexual marriage and kinship.

4. The socio-cultural and legal regulation of sexuality and the construction of ideal (rape) victimhood

It is useful, at this point, to contextualise the construction of safety as sexual integrity in the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi against more diffuse forms of socio-cultural regulation of sexuality, as documented in some of the literature on sexuality in India. I connect these with the regulation of women’s sexuality through sexual violence law, as observed in the Indian feminist literature. I then consider how both of these forms of sexual regulation feed into the perpetuation of rape myths and in particular, the construction of ideal victimhood in police discourses of violence/crime against women.

The regulation of sexuality in India has been shown to stem from its deep implication in intersecting systems of power, hierarchy and status. Chakravarty (1993) has argued that under early Brahmanical patriarchy women’s bodies were understood as literal gateways or entry points into the caste, and invested with meaning as repositories of (caste) purity (and the attendant power and privilege). Hence sexual relations between a high caste woman and a man of the ‘wrong’ caste posed a detrimental affront to high caste patriarchal authority. Chowdhury (1997) takes up this point in his essay, ‘Enforcing Cultural Codes’, on the violent consequences of elopements which flout caste norms, norms about clan exogamy or more subtle and complex boundaries demarcating class and family status in Northern India. Sexual pairings which
transgress such boundaries damage caste, village, clan or family ‘honour’ or *izzat* (see also Kakar 1996: 57; Das 1993 [1976]), and are feared to result in a loss of status if not duly punished. In particular, argues Chowdhury, the control of (especially high caste) women’s sexuality through channelling into an appropriate marriage, plays a role in protecting caste lines, class status and the patrilineal transfer of property. The near universal imperative to control women’s sexuality within marriage (Banerjee 2002) and its playing out through family and community sanctions, as well as the internalisation of norms and self-policing, is a recurring theme in the literature (see also Abraham 2004; Thapan 2009), as is the casting of adolescent girls’ sexuality as particularly dangerous (Chowdhury 1997; Banerjee 2002; Abraham 2004) – hence the practice of early marriage in some communities/families. Adolescence is a risky time due to the onset of sexual maturity prior to the proper channelling and confinement of girls’ sexuality within marriage, which carries therefore a risk of violation and the loss of honour.

Leena Abraham’s (2004) research documented in her essay, ‘Redrawing the *Lakshman Rekha*’, explored sexual discourses among low income young people in an urban metropolis, and is particularly useful for setting the regulation of sexuality through the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi against a wider cultural context. She highlights the changing sexual attitudes and increasing sexual liberalism which has accompanied globalisation and the rise of consumerism in modern India, and therefore speaks to concerns (articulated elsewhere in the literature, for instance Srivastava 2004) about a tendency to reify ‘Indian sexuality’ and to over invest religious and cultural ideals with the power to regulate sexual practices in everyday life.

Abraham directly addresses the intersection between gender and sexuality (2004: 209). She argues that, while there is evidence of an increase in premarital sex, and of increased tolerance of premarital sex, in urban and particularly metropolitan India, sexual liberalism in India’s metropolises is ‘male-oriented’, and serves to reproduce constructions of gender difference and the resilient structures of gender inequality, by preserving ‘traditional notions of male and female sexuality’ (241). Both young men and women participating in Abraham’s study understood male sexuality as naturally aggressive, and boys’ and men’s entitlement to premarital sex via a variety of practices (including sexual aggression towards women and girls and use of sex workers and pornography) was normalised. Girls reported feeling intimidated and affronted by experiences of male sexual aggression but rarely resisted due to feelings of shame, self-blame, and fear of reprisals or attracting further unwanted attention. Boys may engage in pre-marital relationships with girls which may or may not involve some sexual contact, however they are more likely than girls to consider these ‘time-pass’ rather than ‘true-love’ liaisons, and hence typically do not consider their casual girlfriends to be marriage material.
The young women’s accounts indicated that their sexuality is carefully controlled from adolescence or earlier, from within both the family and the community at large. This is achieved through the withholding of information from girls about sex and their bodies, instilling a sense of fear (of pregnancy, and of men in general) and of shame about their own sexuality and bodies (230), in addition to restrictions on freedom of movement and association with the opposite sex. Sex and marriage become synonymous for many girls, and self-policing to channel one’s sexuality exclusively into marriage is a matter of both preserving family honour and avoiding allegations, abuse and violence within a prospective marriage due to having compromised one’s chastity – a bride’s virginity being highly prized by both boys and girls. Male sexuality is not controlled in this way: boys’ freedom of movement and of association is largely unrestricted, although they learn to expect that a prospective wife must have adhered to these norms of chastity, modesty and sexual confinement in order to be marriageable. Abraham emphasises the centrality of marriage, even in the metropolis (230-231), to sexual and social life for young women. The lower middle-class girl students interviewed for her study viewed marriage as inevitable, as the only viable source of social security, and as the only legitimate expression of their own sexuality – despite witnessing the realities of ‘drunkenness, wife battering and lack of romance’ (230) in marriages within their own families and immediate communities.114

Puri (1999) similarly problematises claims of a ‘sexual revolution’ and sexual ‘liberation’ in India as not critically examining and taking into account the way in which new and evolving discourses on sex largely continue to reinforce heteronormativity. Exploring how middle-class women in metropolitan India talk about sex and sexuality and negotiate the heterosexual norm, Puri argues that in their accounts of (almost exclusively marital) sexuality, women position themselves as active and desiring sexual agents. This challenges the notion critiqued by Srivastava (2004: 21), that women internalise the idea of themselves as de-sexualised bodies and vessels for reproduction. Sex for these women is about pleasure, satisfaction and building a good and ‘equal’ relationship with one’s husband. Puri argues in particular, however, that the narratives ‘reiterate notions of sexual respectability, especially as shaped by social anxieties of women transgressing the boundaries of what is considered sexually appropriate’ (1999: 104).

114 Reflecting the essay’s title, Abraham therefore argues that the traditional Hindu ideology of pativrata and the lakshman rekha are reproduced by dominant modern metropolitan Indian sexual discourses among young people (2004: 213). Pativrata ‘embodies the confinement of female sexuality through the complete devotion of a woman to her husband regardless of how he treats her’, as symbolised by Sita, the heroine of the great Hindu epic, the Ramayana. In the Ramayana, Lakshman, brother of Sita’s husband Ram, draws a line around Sita with an arrow ‘in a pivotal scene’, to protect her from the dangers of the forest. The line (rekha) ‘symbolises the limits of Sita’s confinement and also the idealised confinement of the chaste Indian woman who must cast herself in the Sita mould’ (ibid.).
These anxieties include fears of women violating the rules of chastity outside of marriage, or jeopardising their status as virgins through pre-marital sex. Some of the women’s narratives contest these norms of sexual respectability, in particular by challenging expectations of pre-marital chastity. Despite this, the confinement of female sexuality to socially approved, heterosexual marriage remains a powerful and normative imperative in young women’s lives.

Meenakshi Thapan (2009), in her ethnographic study of embodiment among both educationally advantaged and disadvantaged young women in urban India, also emphasises the channelling and control of young women’s sexuality within marriage, and their internalisation of the glorification of marriage as their destiny – in spite of various contradictory resistances and competing career aspirations in the educationally advantaged group. Marriage – often early marriage – was constructed as the only option for the educationally disadvantaged group growing up in the slums with minimal schooling, who learn that sexual autonomy is not an option. Thapan argues that ‘women in all social classes’ were ‘groomed for marriage and motherhood’ (27), and some come to idealise it, while others anticipate it as a harsh experience involving forced sex and domestic violence.

Police discourses which map safety onto sexual integrity can thus be understood in the context of wider socio-cultural constructions of sexuality and its intersection with, and mutual construction of, gender inequality in particular, in addition to its implication in caste and class status. Sexual norms are not uncontested, however, as is evident both from existing literature on sexuality in India, and from the evidence in my data that elopements and pre-marital relationships do take place and hence attract police attention. Police discourses can also therefore be understood as participating in a field of contestation over sexual norms. Some aspects of the policing of violence/crime against women challenge certain gender norms, but in significant ways highlighted in this chapter, it reproduces the status quo by regulating and disciplining young people’s – especially young women’s – sexuality. This exemplifies how the performance of security can reproduce extant power relations at the very same time as seeking, in closely related ways, to challenge them – compromising the emancipatory potential of these security practices.

Considering the forms of social and cultural capital and privilege accruing to groups, families, and men which are understood as being damaged by the loss of a woman’s sexual integrity, according existing research, it is perhaps not surprising that the safety of women and girls is framed through the lens of sexual integrity by police initiatives. This framing also reflects the laws on sexual violence and their implementation, as highlighted by Indian feminist scholars. Kirti Singh (2004) argues that rape is constructed in law as a breach of women’s chastity rather
A woman has to (be seen to) have chastity, therefore, in order to be rapeable. Das (1996) and Baxi (2005) show how the law in its application produces dichotomised constructions of chaste victims, and ‘loose’ women who are ‘habituated’ to sex. The latter are constructed as inviting violation, their bodies read against their word, rape reduced to consensual sex (Das 1996), through practices such as the notorious ‘two-finger test’ (Baxi 2005) and its interpretation by medico-legal experts and judges.

Rape myths which recurred in my data can broadly be understood within this framework of safety as sexual integrity. In particular, such myths contribute to the construction of an archetypal ideal victim, reflecting the legal construction of victimhood according to feminist analyses, and its contribution to the regulation of women’s sexuality. One such myth is that ‘real rape’ is minor rape:

*“The true cases those are maximum of minor”* (Woman SI, former investigating officer for rape cases, Parivartan target area, when asked about the ratio of minor to major cases she investigated)

*“Rapes which are committed on girls below nine years of age, I agree, are genuine but if the girl is 13-14 years old, I don’t think they are genuine... In most cases there is consent, I would say in 70% cases there is consent of [the] girl.”* (Woman SI, former investigating officer for rape cases, Parivartan target area)

Discussions of rape in interviews almost always focused predominantly on minor rape, and/or described the typical victim as a girl or child, positing minor rape as paradigmatic of ‘real rape’.

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115 I am not suggesting that there are no distinctions to be made between these three theorists, particularly as Menon also problematises rights-based discourses around rape and constructions of bodily integrity. Both Menon and Gangoli also trouble certain feminist understandings of sexual violence for the ways in which they have contributed to reinforcing normative constructions of female sexuality.

116 The ‘finger test’ is, ‘a practice where the examining doctor notes the presence or absence of the hymen and the size and so-called laxity of the vagina of the rape survivor… to assess whether girls and women are “virgins” or “habituated to sexual intercourse”.’ (HRW 2010: 2-3). This test is routinely carried out by medico-legal experts authorised to complete the formal medical examination of women and girls who report being raped. In a damning critique, HRW (2010) have argued that this test has ‘no forensic value’ and is a breach of the human rights and dignity of women and girls who have been raped.

117 I borrow the concept of ‘rape myths’ from Kelly (2001: 5). Kelly reviews the literature on the high rates of attrition and low conviction rates for rape in the UK, and draws on Estrich’s (1987) study of the legal construction of rape in the US. Such myths are various and context-specific, but Kelly identifies a number of tenacious and powerful myths in the British context, including that ‘real rape’ is committed by a stranger, outside, in the dark, often involving a weapon, and is likely to cause injury; that women and girls who have been raped can be expected to react in certain formulaic ways; that women and girls ‘ask for it’ and/or make up false rape allegations (2001: 4). All of these are negated by the research evidence. She argues that such myths affect the criminal justice process by influencing police, judges’ and jurors’ perceptions, and shows that the rarer rapes conforming to this template are more likely to be reported to the police. Here I only discuss myths which I identified in my interviews with Delhi Police, but there is some evidence of overlap with the package of myths which Kelly found to be prevalent in Britain. HRW (2010) argue that medico-legal practices such as the two-finger test perpetuate ‘damaging stereotypes’ around sexual violence in India.
A lawyer at the Rape Crisis Cell at Delhi Commission for Women (DCW) reported that older women are rarely believed when they report a rape to the police; the Rape Crisis Cell provide assistance to such women in the event that the police refuse to register the complaint (see also Prasad 1999). The Delhi Police Standing Order which governs the functioning of the Rape Crisis Intervention Centres (RCICs) (see Delhi Police 2000) refers to ‘minor victims’ as its target beneficiaries, in the first line of the text. The ‘ideal victim’ is thus constructed as a child, whose chastity is assured to be in tact.

A related myth that recurs in the interviews is that women and girls lie about rape, and correspondingly, that what actually occurs in most rape cases is consensual sex. Indeed, in the quote above, the SI comments that she does not believe girls above nine years of age, and certainly not above 13 or 14, are ‘genuine’ victims. All but the most transparently innocent are looked upon with suspicion as potentially sexually precocious, and responsible for compromising their own sexual integrity. A woman beat Constable deployed under Parivartan explained to me that “many rapes... are made up” after a boy and a girl “are attracted to each other” and “run away”. The discourse of women and girls lying about rape positions them as exercising sexual agency in a deviant and transgressive way. The same Constable, for instance, having earlier in the interview indicated indirectly that precautions are taken against custodial rape, when asked directly about the issue, insists that such rapes only occur with women’s consent, and that women use sex to manipulate policemen:

*“If a policeman is sexually involved, that’s only possible with the other person’s consent... Mostly it happens with the lady’s consent, whichever way they lure them, sweet-talk them into something, or do them a favour and asking for the same in return.”*

In the following excerpt, a woman Constable working for the Parivartan Cell explains to me how she knows when girls are lying:

*“Yeah they do lie... The activities of the child tell us that they are lying. Activities like going out of home, running away, speaking badly, will say that I am going to school and then you don’t find her in school but find her somewhere else.”*

Thus, children who are seen as transgressing boundaries - literally, including going out of home, running away - are not trustworthy: their victim credentials, as it were, are suspect. The transgression of boundaries itself is implicitly posited as an invitation to, or wilful succumbing to, violation – it puts the girl’s sexual integrity into question. This Constable explained that Parivartan was started for such children: it has a moral purpose, keeping wayward and deviant children on the straight and narrow.
A further quote, from a Woman SI who investigated rape cases, provides an interesting example of how transgression impairs a girl’s victim credentials:

*“I have a case... She does not live with her own parents or with her in-laws, she has put allegations on her in-laws that they beat her up and her baby... I recently came to know that she was roaming around with some boys in [a Parivartan target area] and was arrested thinking that she was a bad girl and was handed over to her parents... What would you say about this girl?... She just wants to stay out of home, roaming about, not doing any work, just enjoying, you can’t decide whether she is genuine or not. I am unable to understand, why she runs away from home again and again... I had a rape victim... she was mentally disturbed... That girl has a genuine case as she herself does not know what was happening with her and was very poor... Where a girl wants help from us, we can do that but if she wants... help just for enjoyment, police is helpless there.”

The SI contrasts a “genuine”, deserving, and suitably helpless rape victim with a girl who ‘roams around’ just for “enjoyment”. This young woman who ‘roams around’ has not complained of rape but of domestic abuse. What is illuminating about this quote however is that it showcases the SI’s understanding of how a ‘genuine’ victim is identifiable, and similarly, what interferes with a woman or girl’s victim credentials, whether she claims to be affected by sexual or other violence. The SI does not seem to consider that, given the allegations of domestic abuse, this young woman may be fleeing violence at home. The “roaming around”, and the implication that through this transgressive and inappropriate use of (public) space, she is compromising her own sexual integrity (“roaming around with some boys… just enjoying”) makes it impossible for the police to help this young woman. Where safety is identified with sexual integrity, and women and girls are broadly held responsible for managing the risk of its violation, only those who successfully and demonstrably perform the safeguarding of their sexual integrity are deemed truthful, genuine victims, worthy of police assistance.

The framing of safety as sexual integrity therefore has consequences for the way in which sexual violence is policed, not only in terms of regulating sexuality. It seems likely, from these accounts of lies, consent, and the rarity of the genuine, helpless victim, that it affects decisions about rape cases are handled by the police. Indeed, some police interviewed reported that ‘enquiries’ are made informally before the FIR is filed to screen out presumed false allegations, and Prasad (1999) has previously shown how police block women’s access to the criminal justice system based on similar assessments of genuine/deserving victim-status. Thus, the elision of safety with normative ideals of sexual integrity for women and girls in police discourses not only contributes to the (violent) reproduction of gender therein, but may also feed
into reinforcing the structural difficulties highlighted by Indian feminists (Chapter Three), facing those women and girls who register complaints of sexual violence and seek redress through the justice system. In doing so it contributes to reproducing the conditions which sustain such violences by perpetuating their impunity.

5. The normalisation of rape as entitlement or aggressive male sexuality

While I have argued that sexual violence is constructed as a ‘rupture’ in the fabric of the everyday, and treated as a more serious criminal offence than domestic violence by the police, this does not mean that it is not normalised at all. The normalisation of rape operates in a different way from the normalisation of domestic violence discussed in Chapter Five - although in some key ways both normalisations work in tandem with each other. For instance, rape in marriage is completely normalised under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which defines rape as excluding non-consensual sex between a man and his wife, as long as the wife is aged over fifteen. Similarly, a woman Inspector at the CAWC, in discussing her views on women’s responsibility for domestic violence, described some cases in which a husband had brought a complaint that,

“The girl does not allow them to touch [her] from the day one. She wants all the facilities... She would like to roam with you... Now I would like to study, give my papers, give my fees, everything. But I will not allow [you] to touch me, because prior to my marriage I had an affair with someone, and I am unable to forget... The marriage is not consummated.”

The material benefits that accrue to women through marriage to a breadwinning husband (even though some of these women earn their own incomes) are posited, in this account, as benefits to which one earns one’s entitlement at least in part through sexually servicing one’s husband. The Inspector indicts young women withholding sex from their husbands as a form of gendered “harassment”. This reverses the very principle of the recognition of marital rape: a man is entitled to sex from his wife, and it is her duty to provide it; failure to fulfil that duty counts as harassment. Note how women’s sexual agency, when expressed through withholding socially legitimate sex within the proper boundaries of an approved marriage, is cast as transgressive and

118 More lenient sentencing is recommended in the case of rapes of a woman/girl aged 12 or over if the perpetrator is married to her.
violating the norms of acceptable sexual and marital conduct, in a comparable way to the construction of inappropriate expressions of sexual agency through pre-marital sex as deviant.

Singh (2004) argues that rape in Indian legal discourse is cast as a crime of passion and thus naturalised, while Das’ (1996) analysis of court judgments argues that rape is normalised as a product of male sexuality constructed as inherently aggressive and easily provoked. The normalisation of male sexual aggression under the law formalises the everyday normalisation of male sexual aggression which Abraham (2004), documents in her study of sexual discourses among young men and women in metropolitan India. This notion is also reflected at key moments in my interviews with Delhi Police, and reproduced by speakers who orient themselves in significantly different ways towards violence/crime against women. For instance, a male beat Constable deployed in a Parivartan target area argued emphatically and repeatedly throughout his interview that ‘woman is responsible for the violence inflicted against her’, and the assertion that male sexuality is uncontrollably subject to provocation was among his justifications:

*“Someone is wearing cut sleeves, someone is wearing net dress, all sorts of dresses in which the body was visible of the ladies... Everything inside, breasts, etc. will all be seen. Then automatically the man will be instigated. A man is instigated fast... In our college life we have seen that, she is wearing cut sleeves, threading, so automatically any gents... will get an attraction.”*

In addition to blaming women for provoking violence by dressing in revealing clothes, this Constable contended that men could be easily “instigated” by sexual content in films (referring to mainstream Bollywood cinema, not explicitly pornographic material). He described a hypothetical scenario in which a group of men would ‘eve-tease’ (harass) the next young woman they saw on leaving the cinema, and one of them might “automatically” pursue and rape the next young woman who smiled at him or whom he saw wearing a sleeveless top. A senior official involved with overseeing the implementation of Parivartan, in contrast to this Constable, openly challenged woman-blaming discourses. Nevertheless he also reproduced a discourse of aggressive male sexuality as accounting for the pervasiveness of violence/crime against women – albeit in a more sophisticated language, linking this phenomenon with patriarchy and male chauvinism, and therefore not so unequivocally naturalising it:

“One of my senior officers used to say that the society, especially [in] the Northern part of the country, [it] is expression of unfulfilled libido... that is how in the crude form can be told that in the typical patriarchal society or typical male chauvinism, a person feels a sense of achievement and of course a sense of release also. I mean sense of his pent
These discourses of aggressive male sexuality are frequently mobilised (in my data, and in the judicial statements analysed by Das (1996), for instance) to shift the responsibility back on to women for ‘saving their honour’ (see also Gangoli 2007: 62-63). In this sense, the normalisation of rape works in tandem with its construction as ‘rupture’. It is the sexual integrity of the woman, and by extension the ‘honour’ of her (male) relatives/family, which is ruptured – but by a threat which she is cast as responsible for anticipating and not provoking, a risk which she should know how to manage. In addition, the normalisation of rape as an outcome of (naturally) aggressive male sexuality intersects with the responsibility attributed to women and girls for managing the liability of the putative vulnerability of their bodies (Chapter Five) – for instance, by restricting their freedom of movement, by dressing appropriately, or (in accounts more self-consciously oriented towards empowerment) by being more assertive and learning how to properly fight off an attacker. This knowing how to protect one’s honour connects the framing of violence/crime against women in terms of sexual integrity and morality closely with the discourses of education and awareness through which it is also framed, and which I explore in the next chapter. In the ways demonstrated here, police discourses insidiously reproduce gender norms which feed into normalising violence, reinforcing unequal gendered relations of power even as they ostensibly invite women and girls to challenge and resist these. This complicates the nascent emancipatory potential of these policing initiatives.

6. The glorification of the family and the safeguarding of sexual integrity

These final two sections explore how gendered sexual safety is spatially constructed. This section unpacks the significance of the notion of ‘family’ in the data, while the next section examines the overlapping constructions of gendered safety in terms of (the use of, and boundaries in between) private and public space. The analysis herein underscores the core argument in this chapter about the conflation of safety with sexual integrity and the concomitant regulation of young people’s/women’s sexuality.

The family is figured in my interview data as the prime source of safety for women and girls. The glorification of the marital home, as the place where a woman is entitled to feel safe, makes
sense in a context in which the confinement of women’s sexuality within marriage is a powerful cultural imperative, as discussed above\(^{119}\). It is reflected, firstly, in the heavy official emphasis on ‘reconciliation’ and ‘compromise’, on keeping the home intact as the first priority in police handling of domestic violence under both the CAWC and Parivartan (see Chapter Five).

Secondly, it is reflected in the metaphors and similes of family relationships which are evoked by some interviewees to indicate the ideal way in which the police ought to treat women, both as complainants and as colleagues:

“So like every policeman is a human being, he at home, he behaves with the female family members in a very dignified manner. The same is expected from him to deal with the women approaching police for any assistance.” (Male senior police official, CAWC)

“We sensitised them to how to behave, how to be polite matlab*, you forget ki** you are a police officer as a human being you can as your brother, you are talking to your sister and you are talking to your mother, we do not use abusive language.” (Woman Inspector/Station House Officer (SHO), CAWC) [*meaning; **that]

“When you have a wife, you provide for her. You understand her problems. But there is a woman who comes and works with you, you don’t understand her problems. You don’t provide for her essential things. So that like that awareness has to come.” (Woman senior police official)

These excerpts form part of a wider narrative, which I explore in Chapter Eight, about how the police can improve/is improving, its services to women and treatment of women employees, as it modernises. Family relationships are idealised as models for ideal police behaviour and treatment of women, therein. The archetypal police officer in this story is a man, and indeed – although I interviewed a large proportion of women police for this study – over 90% of Delhi Police personnel are men. The assumption behind this narrative is that family relationships are ideal and can serve as models for ideal behaviour. Policemen, we can assume, behave “with female family members in a very dignified manner”, never “use abusive language” and provide for their wives’ needs while ‘understanding her problems’. Family relationships are held up as a model not only for ideal police behaviour, but for harmoniously achieving gender equality and gender ‘sensitivity’ within the police, including in its dealing with the public. This glorified

\(^{119}\) Feminist activists lobbying for legal reform have made use of the normative idea that women are entitled to safety within the marital home to call for better legal protections against domestic abuse. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA 2005), thus introduced residency orders to protect women against dispossession. For the Lawyer’s Collective (2007, 2011), who were very active in lobbying for the Act, the protection of a woman’s right to safety in her marital home recognises the potentially violent consequences of throwing a woman out of her marital home. It therefore privileges redressing power imbalances to create a safe negotiating position from within the marriage, over the assumption that the safest and best option is always for a woman to exit the marriage and leave her home.
ideal of family life effaces abuse and violence that occurs within the family, and the way in
which it relates to unequal and gendered relations of power (and its abuse) within families.
There is a certain irony here, in that police personnel working for the CAWC are confronted by
the reality of less than ideal family and marital relationships on a daily basis – yet it is the ideal
which appears as the more ‘true’ representation of the family in interviews, than the all too
frequent deviations from it.

The glorification of the family is further reflected in other ways in which the police report
handling complaints of violence in interviews. One Constable working for the Parivartan Cell
recounted a story of being called for night duties because a teenage girl had been brought to the
police station after she was found ‘roaming the streets’ late at night. The girl reported that
she had run away to escape abuse from her father and stepmother. The Constable claimed that
the girl was obviously lying about the abuse in order to cover up her own mistake: namely,
leaving the safe boundaries of the home to wander the streets at night. The Constable and her
colleagues suspected elopement, and tried to extract information about who had lured the girl
away from home, by intimidating and ‘beating’ her, but no such information was forthcoming.
The Constable reported that the girl’s father and stepmother were summoned to the police
station. The Constable advised the girl that if her parents had scolded her or meted out some
corporal punishment, it was due to her own errors and she should behave herself properly. The
girl was advised of the multiple dangers that can befall young women who roam the streets at
night, in contrast to the safety of the family home. She was made to ‘admit her mistake’ and
was sent home with her father and stepmother:

*“I counselled her that she should listen to her parents and that she is 17-18 years old
and if she does anything wrong, they will be the ones who will counsel her and that
nobody else is going to support her, parents will only support her.”*

The Constable’s narrative exemplifies the construction of home and family as the site of safety
and protection for women and girls, and the ‘outside’ as the dangerous and uncertain space from
which violence emanates – and into which, crucially, it is their own responsibility not to
transgress. The girl’s allegations of violence perpetrated by family members are summarily
dismissed by the police, in this account. The violence is justified as part of the normal, parental
disciplining of a wayward, teenage child. The girl’s story is constructed as implicitly un-
believe-able: the idea that the threat to one’s security and bodily integrity could spring from
within the family is too discordant with the Constable’s understanding of the outside as the

120 It is mandatory for women police to accompany women in police custody.
space of danger, and the home as the true source of safety and support. Furthermore, as argued above, it is the girl’s exercising of agency in order to try to escape the violence, and her consequent transgression of the very boundaries of the home, that impairs her ‘genuine victim’ credentials for this Constable. This means that leaving home in order to exit a violent situation becomes a symptom of dishonesty, and a rationale for disbelieving your story and reinstating you in the (violent) home. This particularly rich extract raises the theme of the boundaries between private and public space, their investment with meanings related to gendered notions of safety, in/security and danger, and the deep intersection between this and the glorification of home and family –which I return to in the next section.

The glorification of the family and its construction as the space which best safeguards and protects women and girls is also reflected in aspects of Parivartan’s rape prevention work. These include the emphasis on, and glorification of, girls’ biologised destinies as wives and mothers (i.e. their future roles in the family) in the sexual responsibility lecture; and Swanchetan’s safety workshops’ exclusive focus on sexual attacks perpetrated by strangers in public spaces, indicating the difficulty of addressing violence within families. The rape narrative in Jagran’s pantomime, Hadsa, with which I opened this chapter, also illustrates this theme. Jagran’s Managing Director, Arijit, explained that Dr Hooda was integral to the writing of the script of Hadsa. Dr Hooda had asked Arijit to adapt an existing play on sexual assault, to show that most perpetrators are known to their victims. Arijit reported, however, that both of them felt that it would be highly inappropriate to depict sexual violence by a family member. Instead, the predatory neighbour serves as a sort of proxy. The effect of this decision is that Hadsa’s rape narrative fails to clearly and directly challenge the sanctity of the family, and the related notion of the home as the safest place for women and girls. In this narrative, the safety of the home is breached by the carelessness of the girls’ parents, which opens it up to infiltration by a dangerous outsider. The pantomime carries a message designed to educate and discipline parents to keep a close watch on their (girl) children (Arijit is explicit about the targeting of parents in his interview) – a message which also reinforces the idea that threats to the safety of women and girls come from outside (the home). The rape pantomime is also an example of how the feminist knowledge that the vast majority of rapes are committed by assailants known to the victim, is rarely mobilised to challenge the sanctity of the family or open discussion of abuse and violence within families.

Arijit justified the decision to make the sexual predator a neighbour, and not a relative, in the following way:
“We, I believe, through this play actually address the lowest common denominator in society... And in appealing to all, we also have to be very careful that we do the play within the prevalent norms of society. We can’t come up and say something which is so inflammatory, which will actually go against being persuasive theatre.”

Significantly, in terms of thinking about what *Parivartan* is trying to achieve, this quote talks explicitly about working with and within prevalent norms *in order (partly) to change* them. This sense of working both with/within and against prevailing norms captures the ambivalence of the project as a whole – which both reinforces and reproduces problematic gender (and sexual) norms at the same time as it tries to challenge, dislodge and rework some of them, in sometimes contradictory ways. It brings this ambivalence to the surface and shows how it is explicitly negotiated in some aspects of the work invested in the project.

7. Private and public space and the construction of gendered safety

I turn finally to a brief discussion of space and the association between (gendered) safety and privacy, including the deep intersection between this theme and the glorification of the family. Safety, for women and girls, is explicitly associated with privacy and private space in the interview data. This association is reflected in the construction of the slums as more prone to violence/crime against women due to a lack of privacy and enclosed spaces, which I explore further in Chapter Seven. It is also reflected, by implication, in the disproportionate focus on the dangers of public spaces, and the dangers for women/girls who ‘roam around’ – that is, use public spaces without a clear and obvious legitimate purpose (such as getting to and from school or running a specific errand) (Viswanath and Mehrotra 2007: 1545). Consider, for instance, the Constable cited above, who reported scolding a teenage girl complaining of violence in the home for exposing herself to danger by ‘roaming around’ the streets; consider also the SI cited in Section Four, who reports that the police are powerless to save girls who wilfully ‘roam around’ outside the home. This disproportionate focus on public danger also characterises *Parivartan*’s safety advice and preventative policing, as exemplified by the emphasis on safe use of public space in *Swanchetan*’s safety workshops, and the UNFPA consultants’ lectures on sexual responsibility. The latter in particular illustrates that not only is the use of *anonymous* public spaces like streets and parks considered risky, so is free or excessive association with unrelated men and boys in more regulated public environments such as schools and colleges. Relatedly, as demonstrated in my analysis of these lectures, above (Section Three), the threat from public spaces is not just of coercion or strangers attacks, but also of temptation and
transgression. To the woman or girl who wants to preserve her sexual integrity, public spaces are awash with risk.

This construction of public space, and its risky or inappropriate usage by women and girls, underscores the mapping of safety onto sexual integrity. If safety is sexual integrity is the confinement of sexuality to marriage/the marital home, the threat must come from outside of the privacy of home and marriage, from from associating with unrelated men and boys on the street, on public transport, at school and at work. As emphasised in the last section, this glosses over the high risk of sexual violence from male members of the (natal or conjugal) family. The focus on the dangers of public spaces positions women’s bodies as even more vulnerable, particularly to sexual violation, when ‘out of place’ – outside of the safe boundaries of the home, particularly without supervision and/or a legitimate purpose.

As shown in this chapter, both Parivartan’s community beat policing, and its rape prevention and educative work, operate partly by disciplining (or seeking to discipline) young people, especially young women and girls, and their parents, in order to limit opportunities for transgression and violation. However, it is significant to note that the programme also, conversely, actively intervenes in certain ways to address the vulnerability of women and girls in public spaces, by trying to make public spaces safer for them. Parivartan beat Constables reported widely, for instance, that they had been called upon by Women’s Safety Committees (WSCs) to provide a police presence to combat sexual harassment of adolescent girls in the vicinity of local schools. Women Constables reported patrolling outside schools at arrival and departure times, sometimes in civil dress, in order to catch the culprits. They reported that the incidence of harassment in the patrolled areas had decreased, as the likelihood of being caught and possibly charged was quite high due to the consistent police presence. One male senior police official involved in overseeing the implementation of Parivartan argued that combating sexual harassment was important as it contributes to an overall atmosphere of public safety. These efforts to regulate sexual harassment in the vicinity of schools can be read as another of Parivartan’s attempts to enter, address and reconfigure aspects of everyday life which structurally expose women and girls to gendered violences. This extends beyond individual empowerment, but exerts disciplinary power to regulate sexually aggressive male behaviour and, even if at a somewhat superficial level, denormalise it. This strategy remains charged with ambivalence, however, as it is notable that going to and from school figures in the data as a legitimate use of public space for girls, unlike ‘roaming around’ without a specific purpose or meeting friends or a boyfriend in the park. It is the entitlement to use public space appropriately which is deemed worthy of this protection.
The three police self-defence trainers whom I interviewed emphasised that the training is about giving women and girls the confidence to be assertive and vigilant, to protest loudly about violence and harassment, and to fight back. One trainer, whom I cited in Chapter Five, expressed some considerable frustration, and felt that the prevalence of sexual harassment on public transport and the streets could be dramatically reduced if women and girls universally and consistently expressed their unwillingness to tolerate such behaviour. Both the self-defence training and educative interventions discussed in this chapter aim to empower girls to use these threatening public spaces as safely as possible, and do not straightforwardly advise against using them at all. Women’s and girls’ use of public space is regarded as inevitable and there are no calls for total seclusion of women and girls in the data. However, and significantly, most of these interventions seek to make public spaces safe for women and girls predominantly through modifying women’s and girl’s interactions with the spaces and ability to negotiate them – targeting women’s and girls’ attitudes and behaviours, rather than those of (potential) perpetrators. Women and girls remain consistently burdened with the responsibility for managing the liability of their bodies while using public spaces in more ‘risky’ ways, for knowing how to avoid or prevent an attack, or effectively resist violence – part of their broader responsibility for safeguarding their sexual integrity.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated how gendered safety is constructed as overlapping with sexual integrity in the policing of sexual violence in Delhi, in a cultural context in which the latter is defined in terms of confining women’s and girls’ sexuality to an approved (heterosexual) marriage. Expressions of sexual agency which challenge gendered sexual norms can interfere with a woman’s or girl’s victim credentials if she reports violence to the police. This reflects the way in which ideal victims are constructed under Indian law and its judicial application: both police and judicial constructions of victimhood conflate rape with a breach of sexual integrity. I have also shown how the normalisation of rape in some police and legal discourses works in tandem with its framing as rupturing individual and family/(caste/class) honour, through the apportioning of responsibility to women and girls for avoiding, preventing, managing and mitigating the risk of violation, by not provoking, and/or not exposing oneself to, aggressive male sexual advances.
The overlapping of safety with sexual integrity in police discourses is likely to have material effects in terms of the recording and effective policing of sexual violence, as well as on prospects for conviction. It also means that the (preventative) policing of sexual violence has the discursive effect of policing young people’s/women’s sexual morality and conduct, in a way that is comparable to the (gender normative) disciplining of couples’ marital conduct through police interventions in domestic violence (Chapter Five). This regulation of young people’s/women’s sexuality reinforces the (hetero)normativity of socially sanctioned marriage (and motherhood) as the only legitimate expression of sexuality, reproducing (marital) heterosexuality as what Rich (1980) calls a ‘compulsory institution’, for women. In these ways, the construction of gendered safety as sexual integrity (violently) reproduces gender. This in turn reproduces the (gendered and gendering) conditions which enable both sexual and domestic violence, and the overlaps between them. This violent reproduction of gender counteracts and compromises the emancipatory potential which some of these performances of security offer in inciting women to challenge and resist violence.

The mapping of safety onto sexual integrity and the construction of the latter in terms of the confinement of women’s sexuality to marriage is reflected in the glorification, in police discourses/practices, of the family (home) as the site of belonging, safety and protection. By extension, safety is associated with privacy and private space, and women and girls are held responsible for actively managing the risk to their sexual integrity which negotiation of public spaces entails. In the next chapter, I further explore the spatial dimension of police discourses of violence/crime against women, and its intersection with a temporal dimension, both of which have significant effects in terms of the (re)production of class differentiation and identification, and normative gender and sexuality.

121 The India-wide conviction rate for rape cases brought to trial was 26.5% in 2010, having steadily dropped from 44.28% in 1973 (Swami 2012). Das (1996) links declining conviction rates (even following rape law reform) with the normalisation of rape and constructions of victimhood in judicial reasoning, which posits rape as a breach of the system of alliance (via marriage). Legally, no corroboration of a victim’s testimony is technically required to secure a conviction. However, Prasad (1999) documents the effects of police disbelieving the victim’s testimony and/or blaming victims, and failing to properly collect and record evidence. She argues that such obstructive practice works in tandem with medico-legal practices such as physician’s ‘character assessments’ of victims, to pose extreme challenges for prosecutors in securing convictions in rape cases. See also Baxi (2005) on the normalisation of rape in judicial and medico-legal discourses and the medical construction of ‘consent’ as readable from the body.
The slums are rife with the sound of violence:
Class, education, and the negotiation of the ‘modern’ in police discourses
of violence/crime against women

*“Crime starts from the home only. I have seen some girls who tell me... that my father does this with me, and we have got some cases, there is a boy of 19 years, he raped his own younger sister... They are less educated... The atmosphere in which they live... they are going on wrong path and commit crime, behave bad with girls, run away with someone, do snatching, they get this education from their homes only and mother/father, they have nothing to do with them and don’t explain to their children... The parents here don’t show them the right path.”*

(Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

This Parivartan Constable is explaining why the campaign targeted particular areas with a high concentration of slums and resettlement colonies, and why there is, she thinks, so much violence/crime against women in such places. This chapter picks up the theme of space with which I closed Chapter Six, and explores the spatio-temporal dimensions of police discourses of violence/crime against women in Delhi. First, I examine how the slums and resettlement colonies are framed as primary sites of violence, and how this framing intersects with the conflation of violence/crime against women with sexually immoral behaviour, discussed in Chapter Six. Second, I consider how violence/crime against women is framed in terms of (a lack of) awareness, knowledge and education. A lack of knowledge of how to conduct oneself normatively is projected onto the inhabitants of the slums and resettlement colonies, who are thereby constructed as in need of more intensive preventative policing, lending a significant class dimension to the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi. Finally, in addition to a spatial distancing, the projection of violence/crime against women onto particular kinds of people and spaces equally effects a temporal distancing, which intersects with the spatial, and which I explore in the third section. I analyse how addressing violence/crime against women serves among a broader set of ‘gender credentials’ within the police as (part of) a performance of ‘being modern’, and as a marker of progress.
1. The slums as sites of violence and moral degeneracy

The Parivartan programme targets the slums and resettlement colonies and constructs them as the predominant sites of violence/crime against women, as is widely reflected in my interview data. Given the status of this programme as a high-profile, recent and self-professedly innovative attempt to bring the notoriously high levels of violence/crime against women in the city under control, this brings a significant class dimension into the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi. Lower-class and slum communities are positioned as more violent and treacherous for women and girls:

*“You will find very high crime rate in these areas.”* (Woman Constable, Parivartan Cell)

*“In these small congested areas, this is seen more in these area... There are big number of cases in these areas.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

“Slums are mainly man-dominated... The men in the slums...[are] liquor addicts... They usually beat [their wives] and not a single woman can protest against these beatings.” (Woman Inspector, former Parivartan IC)

Senior police officials interviewed rejected the idea of extending Parivartan to other areas as unnecessary, casting it as a specialised intervention for the slums and resettlement colonies. Whilst they refer to poverty and economic insecurity, the slums are envisaged as sites of violence largely due to their putative lack of the conditions for adequately safeguarding the sexual integrity of women and girls. In this section, I discuss five recurring repertoires which contribute to producing, and are called upon to explain, this construction of the slums as sites of violence: the pathologisation of families living in slums and resettlement colonies; lack of privacy; the (mis)use of space; a general atmosphere of moral degeneracy; and finally, economic migration. Because these repertoires all intersect, several themes tend to arise simultaneously in one quote and some quotes are partially repeated as I highlight different themes manifesting in them.

The pathologisation of slum-dwelling families

The first repertoire that I focus on, reflected in the quote with which I opened the chapter, is the pathologisation of families living in slums and resettlement colonies, which contrasts with the glorification of the family and home as the site of safety and protection for women and girls...
There is a recurring narrative among police working in Parivartan target areas, which explains violence/crime against women in the slums and resettlement colonies as stemming from the malfunctioning of the family: these are families in which both parents work outside of the home and ‘don’t show the right path’ to their children, who are not properly cared for or protected. The family fails in its idealised function of keeping women and girls safe. Here, a Parivartan woman beat Constable explains what causes sexual violence in ‘these areas’:

*“Like there are people who are very careless about their children and they leave their children with their neighbours when they are going out and those neighbours only rape the children.”*

This Constable has just explained, in a rather contradictory discussion in which she also extols the benefits of women working outside the home (she is, after all, a working mother), that ultimately the mother is the best caregiver for the children in the family. The mother’s absence due to economic necessity, or her insufficient attentiveness or too permissive attitude in particular, is deemed a problem that allows violence, violation and transgression to occur.

In the following example, another Parivartan woman beat Constable similarly argues that the mother should remain with the children and keep a closer watch over her daughters in particular, to avert rape:

*“What happened was that husband and wife would both go to their village and leave their children behind... and ask the neighbours to take care of [them]... There is less chances of rape if the daughter is with the mother... If the mother keeps a control over her daughter, after we explain to her... to save her from others and keep a watch that she does not get involved in some wrong activity.”*

The mother figures significantly in these discourses which problematise families inhabiting slums and resettlement colonies. Next, this Constable goes on to say:

*“In most of the rape cases we have observed that it is done by someone close... This is seen more in these areas.”*

The feminist knowledge that sexual violence is mostly committed by perpetrators known to the victim is mobilised here to project violence onto slum-dwelling families in particular, in which parents (especially mothers) do not adequately protect their children. For the Constable cited above, the figure of the rapist is most likely to be a neighbour who has access to the children because neglectful parents/mothers have left their children inadequately supervised. The following excerpts are two further examples of how this knowledge is mobilised in such a way.
in the data. The respondents are a woman Inspector and a woman Sub-Inspector (SI), both former investigating officers for rape cases in Parivartan target areas:

*“Their parents also, like their father is a drunkard, and there are victims who were raped by their father... uncle or some other relative, or else if the girl has gone out to play then the rickshaw driver in the market rapes her. Their mothers would have gone out for work, they leave their kids at home unattended or leave them in the care of their neighbours and the neighbours rape the girls.”

*“There are many children and they have one small place to live and everything happens there. We had even talked to one... a case in which the... rapist is her brother. The boy says Aunty, what is wrong in this, mummy-papa also do the same thing... The boy was around eleven or twelve.”

These interviewees explicitly acknowledge the possibility that the known perpetrator may be a family member – however, they do not challenge the glorification of the family, which they reproduce elsewhere in their interviews. These examples are framed as illustrations of ‘things that happen in these areas’: in subtle ways they contribute to an overall picture of the slums and resettlement colonies as spaces of moral degeneracy and depravity – a theme I explore further below. It is because the fathers and other male relatives are ‘drunkards’ that they rape their daughters or nieces (and thus, fail in fulfilling their parental duties to protect, cross inappropriate boundaries); it is because girl children are left unattended by working mothers or allowed too much freedom to play in public places that they are attacked by rickshaw drivers or neighbours. It is because children are prematurely exposed to sex that a brother rapes his sister. In all cases, the moral degeneracy stems from and/or contributes to, the failure of the family to fulfil its ideal functions: male breadwinners get drunk and behave irresponsibly; mothers go out to work, upsetting the gender division of labour and leaving children insufficiently cared for, unguided and vulnerable to both violation and transgression; parents fail to protect their children from exposure to corrupting sexual knowledge. Boundaries are not successfully established and maintained and the slum family, in these narratives, is incapable of serving its function of safeguarding the sexual integrity of women and girls and thus protecting them from violation.

**Gendered safety, spatial congestion and lack of privacy in the slums**

This putative failure of families inhabiting slums and resettlement colonies to successfully embody an idealised construction of the family as safe and protective is very succinctly captured in this comment from another woman beat Constable working for Parivartan:

*“In these areas... little girls are in rape cases, so even their own family members torture them, they should be loving towards them.”*
Like the second SI cited above, this Constable attributes the malfunctioning of the family, and the sexual violence that results, to the lack of privacy in the slums and resettlement colonies:

*“There are slum areas, there people have one-one room, parents and children all live in the same room, it’s a bad thing for children, they see everything... Girls get deceived by boys and elope with them, or husbands get drunk and beat up their wives.”*

Lack of privacy is the second repertoire through which many respondents made sense of the excessive (and gendered) violence attributed to the slums and resettlement colonies. These areas figure as sites of spatial congestion in which there is both a failure of metaphorical boundaries (resulting in transgressions from appropriate or normative behaviour) – because, for instance, children witness sexual activity between their parents – and a literal failure of physical boundaries which are thought to keep women and girls safe: people see things they should not, and everyone is accessible to one another:

*“This area is very congested... Cases of sexual harassment and rape... are more in slums. Because houses are so congested that kids of 10-12 years of age they see such type of activity and they become habituated to it, or run away from home... They don’t know what is right [or] wrong, nobody is there to guide them and parents are also illiterate.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

“Once we come to the slum area, the privacy is very low, the living standard is very low... Both parents are working and nobody can take care of the kids... and they... play on the roads, whatever they want to do... So, by the way, they fall into the bad net or sometimes indecent things happens to them.” (Woman Inspector, former Parivartan IC)

“The target areas were chosen as the J.J. clusters*... They were the most vulnerable as far as crime on women is concerned because... the privacy is less in that area... They are subjected to scrutiny of many passers-by.” (Male senior police official involved in overseeing Parivartan) [*resettlement colonies]

The spatial divisions and boundaries, both literal and figurative, disrupted by this lack of privacy, are understood to help ensure the safety of women and girls – not least by safeguarding and controlling their sexual integrity. In addition to these rationalisations, it is evident from my data that the limited privacy in slums and resettlement colonies makes the communities more accessible and amenable to police surveillance. It makes them more police-able than the middle-classes, which compounds the class dimension and the claims that these spaces host more, or more excessive, violence/crime against women, since violence is rendered more visible.
Gendered safety and inappropriate use of space in the slums

The third repertoire repeatedly mobilised to explain the violence deemed characteristic of the slums and resettlement colonies is inappropriate use of space. There is considerable overlap between this and the construction of gendered safety in terms of negotiation of public and private space, discussed in Chapter Six. There is equally a deep intersection with the two repertoires already discussed. The slums and resettlement colonies are constructed as spaces in which children are not properly cared for or guided by their parents and therefore do not know better than to ‘roam around’, using public space in risky ways which expose them to danger, and temptations to transgress. This is exemplified by the Inspector cited in the subsection above, who claims that children whose parents leave them unattended play in the street, do “whatever they want to do”, and are ready prey for the local rickshaw-wallahs- and neighbours-come-therapists/child-molesters. The following quote provides a further example:

*“Parents go to work and children just keep wandering here and there and... they do such wrong things... So we used to tell the people... just take care of this, make children understand. Like if children are given some temptation, then make them understand don’t fall for it. Tell them that report such things to mother.” (Woman ASI, Parivartan IC)

These children’s (mis)use of public space puts them at risk of both violation and transgression in these accounts, reflecting the construction of safety as confining oneself as much as possible to the private space of the home (Chapter Six).

The intersection between the misuse of space, and the lack of privacy attributed to the slums, is captured in the following quote, from a woman Constable working for Parivartan:

*“The children of slum area, their homes are close to each other... In the case of educated families they don’t like going here or there without any reason, whereas in slums their houses are so close by that they keep peeking into each other’s house and nobody is attached to each other. You will find very high crime rate in these areas.”

Here, the idea of a lack of privacy is framed through a classed opposition. People inhabiting slums and resettlement colonies are subtly but unfavourably compared with “educated families”, who, “don’t like going here and there without a reason”. The implication is that people living in such spaces do ‘go here and there’ without a legitimate purpose, which quickly flows into a description of them “peeking into each other’s houses” – an inappropriate use of space – all of which signals that “nobody is attached to each other”, hence social sanctions which ordinarily curb violent crime cannot prevail.
The slums as spaces of moral degeneracy

The penultimate theme which I explore in this section is the construction of the slums as hosting a general atmosphere of moral degeneracy and depravity: spaces in which television, westernisation, and sexualised media have a particularly corrupting influence, where people “watch blue films” (pornography), gamble, ‘roam around’ aimlessly, brew and drink alcohol to excess, and women’s bodies become sources of entertainment. This picture of slum living aligns closely with a distinct although related discourse of the slums as in need of development, as the “most patriarchal” and “backward” spaces of the city. The following excerpt is from an interview with a senior police official involved in the inception and oversight of Parivartan. He is explaining to me why certain areas where targeted, and why, he thinks, they feature higher reported rates of violence/crime against women. I quote him at length here, because his comments illustrate so effectively the construction of the slums as morally degenerate and violent, as well as the intersection between this theme and the other repertoires already discussed.

“Anonymity breeds all these things, where these people coming from villages living in Delhi slums, they are anonymous. Under the cover of anonymity they behave like animals... People from the villages are moving into the big cities to make money... Like in the big crowds, you see the way the crowd behaves, I think this molestation and this thing, this crime against women is also... You see all the vices of the slum exist over there. People hire a television and DVD player. They watch blue films there, that is the source of entertainment there. When they have this kind of site, what are they going to do? When they find women in the evening they have been getting there, going here, going there and everybody is not having any identity... This type of situation does not exist elsewhere. That's why the commission of these offences and all these rapes have been committed by only those people who are known to them - 98% rapes have been committed by people who know them... members of their extended family, they come there from villages, old acquaintances...”

In this narrative, moral degeneracy is caused by “anonymity” and hence a lack of attachment to others that stems from migration into the city, and therefore uprooted-ness and lack of identity, from which follows a lack of stigma associated with crime. The anonymity of the slums in this construction produces sub-human (“like animals”) and opportunistic behaviours. People are motivated solely by making money and the desire for entertainment. Sanctions on freedom of movement and association do not apply (“going here, going there”) and everyone is, in any case, “without identity”. The breakdown of ties and attachment to others frees people to abuse others (to sexually abuse women and girls, for instance), including members of their own
families. Ironically, at this point in the narrative the claim of total anonymity ceases to hold as women and girls are raped not by anonymous strangers, but by distant relatives and old acquaintances who, freed from the social sanctions of village life, feel liberated by the apparent anonymity of the slum. Here we have, again, an example of the mobilisation of feminist knowledge about rape to demonstrate the moral degeneracy of the slums as spaces in which the protections normally (or, ideally) provided by family relationships are eroded and corrupted; the private (the safe space) is too readily exposed to, and polluted by, the unsavoury goings on in public spaces, and no-one is safe or untainted.

The above is a particularly rich and illuminating quote; however, the overall picture of the slums and resettlement colonies as sites of moral degeneracy, which leads to violence/crime against women, traverses the interviews in more subtle forms. The following quotes illustrate the association between violence and the putative moral corruption of the slums in less direct ways:

*“There are a lot of slum areas over there and the most problem is they get drunk and beat up their wives... From the beginning they have got this habit, like their parents did not try to stop them and they drink everyday in the evening.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

*“They are low category people, they do not understand that how many facilities you give them... So many facilities they have from the government, they don’t know how to use it... Electricity is going to waste, sound pollution is there. If the child is studying they do not care, would not slow it down, they just want to create noise, want to enjoy, whether you spend lakhs of rupees for them, they are not going to understand things.”* (Male beat Constable, Parivartan target area)

The putative prevalence of violence/crime against women in the slums and resettlement colonies is widely associated with the proliferation of *“bad habits” or “vices of the slums”* – in particular, home brewing, (illegally) selling and consuming alcohol, and gambling, which make people *“lose their minds”* and create a general atmosphere of criminality, moral ineptitude and inadequate parenting. Both of these respondents and others, frame the immoral or improper behaviour with which they characterise the slums as products of poor knowledge or under-education – a theme I explore in depth in the next section. The woman Constable claims that bad habits are formed through a lack of parental guidance, whereas the male Constable argues that people “*do not understand*” how to behave properly, and how to avail themselves of the facilities provided. For this Constable, this failure of understanding is less a product of under-education or poor parental guidance than an inherent feature of the “*low category people*” who inhabit such spaces, who are wasteful, noisy, hedonistic, and do not value
education. In his view, therefore, it is unsurprising that these people commit violent and sexual offences, and that women and girls in this environment transgress boundaries, seek out and invite violation.

**Economic migrants as eroding social sanctions and producing violence**

As noted above, the putative moral degeneracy of the slums is associated especially with the economic migrant population. The role of economic migration in producing violence in Delhi’s slums is the final repertoire discussed in this section. That Delhi is ‘a migrant city’ is a refrain which peppers the interviews and was widely understood as one ‘cause’ of violence/crime against women in the city, by police and also some professionals working for women’s rights or other service organisations to support women experiencing violence. Economic migrants are variously constructed as bringing the patriarchal, ‘backward’ values of under-developed rural life to Delhi, or conversely, as indulging in violent crime precisely because traditional sanctions break down when people are uprooted from their villages and exposed to a modern, cosmopolitan, urban culture which they lack the sophistication to assimilate and manage. This is exemplified in the following two quotes. In both cases, the respondents are explaining why violence/crime against women happens, and why it is a particular problem in *Parivartan*’s target populations:

“Delhi has noticed a large... influx of migrant population and the target group... generally comprises of this population... This migrant population... has no face in the local area... They would not hesitate to do any crime because there is no stigma attached to them. There is no one who knows them.” (Senior police official involved in overseeing *Parivartan*)

“The fact that many people are from outside Delhi who are working here, many of them are working as daily wage labourers, there are lot of vendors, lot of increase in the slum clusters that you see in Delhi, lots and lots of migrant population. So the families are here, sometimes children are here, sometimes children not there, but they have not actually forgotten their own traditional family roots which could be in the village, but they find it very difficult to adjust in the new environment, which is very very urban, very, very so called educated, and elite-class. They want to adapt themselves to the, I would say, to the demands that the metropolitan life, but at the same time, there is a lot

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122 Delhi has a large economic migrant population, and the boundaries between the city and the surrounding rural areas are blurred, with people commuting into the city, and others living transient lives in the city or on its periphery and returning periodically to their natal villages, where they maintain immediate and extended family ties. A high proportion of such migrants live in unplanned slum settlements.
of conflict, because the values that they have as migrants of particular places outside Delhi and the expectations and demands of a city like Delhi, there is lot of clash.”

(Academic/Trainer of Parivartan staff)

The linking of migration with violence and crime, through the idea of the erosion of social sanctions, was a discourse peculiar to some of the most senior police officials interviewed (IPS officers educated to degree level or above), and some non-police professionals who contributed to Parivartan. The academic cited above claims that there has been a rise in violence/crime against women in Delhi in recent decades, and she associates this with economic migration and the mismatch which she posits between migrants’ expectations and aspirations, as raised by metropolitan consumer lifestyles, and the material reality of their lives. Following the excerpt cited, she asserts that violence/crime against women is not limited to these social groups or to slum populations. However, in her narrative, the inhabitants of the slums, especially economic migrants, occupy a central place, alongside the breakdown of family life. She associates these things with each other: the high expectations and pressures of modern life mean parents do not have time for their children (as wage labourers, both parents may work outside the home); they are unable to “socialise” and “sensitise” the child to provide the “strong foundation of the child's personality”. Family and broader community relationships are not as secure as they once were. She makes these comments in very general terms, and refers frequently to “modern life” as producing this predicament, but keeps zooming back in to focus on how this plays out among economic migrants, wage labourers and slum populations in Delhi in particular.

Here, again, it is evident that the five distinct repertoires highlighted in this section articulate together to construct violence as emanating from slums and resettlement colonies. In this example, the erosion of family ties and the malfunctioning of the family – the failure of certain families to fulfil their idealised role – intersects with economic migration and implicitly, the moral degeneracy of slum living: that is, children raised without a strong foundation to their personality, established by good parenting, will go on to commit crime, indulge in violence and abuse and/or (possibly) transgress boundaries and invite violation.

I finish this section with one further quote illustrating the way in which economic migrants figure in narratives of violence in the data:

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I finish this section with one further quote illustrating the way in which economic migrants figure in narratives of violence in the data:

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123 Indian Police Service, i.e. managerial level police staff. See Chapter Three.
"In a state like Delhi there are too many outsiders and they don’t know the law of Delhi... Delhi’s particular people understand all these things, but the outsiders who are coming in they are making this really a mess." (Woman Head Constable/Self-defence trainer, CAWC)

This quote explicitly illustrates how these narratives of economic migration as contributing to violence/crime against women displace the source of the violence outside of Delhi, or (thinking back to the excerpts cited above) onto the boundaries where cosmopolitan, modern, urban culture meets ‘backward’, rural ways of life that have been uprooted and disrupted. This speaks again to the theme of space, linking this chapter with Chapter Six. The construction of the slums and resettlement colonies as the prime sites of violence/crime against women, partly through associating economic migration with the production of violence, displaces the violence onto these purportedly unruly spaces. Thus, it contains it, by deflecting attention away from violence/crime against women among the middle- and upper-classes, who are not subject to the same kind of policing. A spatial distancing is taking place in and through these discursive moves, which simultaneously and mutually constitutes a temporal distancing, an implicit (or sometimes explicit) claim to progressing beyond, advancing away from the state of affairs in these peripheral spaces which have not sufficiently succeeded in moving with the times. I further explore the complexities of this temporal dimension of narratives of violence in the final section of this chapter.

The quote above also highlights how the migrant population is strongly associated with a purported lack of education, literacy and awareness ("they don’t know the law of Delhi"), which is constructed as contributing to the violence. I explore these pervasive discourses in the next section.

2. Violence as produced by lack of awareness, knowledge and/or education

A lack of ‘awareness’, under-education and/or illiteracy are frequently cited as causes of both domestic and sexual violence by interviewees, especially those working in Parivartan target areas. This explanatory theme manifests in a number of ways, with the victim, perpetrator and

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124 This is not my word, but one that was used readily in interviews, and is common in Indian English as a synonym for ‘under-developed’. The pejorative implications are not quite as strong as in British English.
community at large variously cast as lacking sufficient awareness to prevent violence or know how to conduct themselves such as to avoid it. In particular, a lack of knowledge and poor literacy are attributed to the inhabitants of slums and resettlement colonies, and thought to contribute to the violence associated with these spaces. Such a discourse has to be understood in the context of how education can function as an idiom of hierarchy in India (Jeffrey et. al. 2008). Jeffrey et al.’s (ibid.) ethnography of educated un/underemployed youth in rural Uttar Pradesh identified a common discourse of ‘educational value’ (62), which is similarly reflected in my data, albeit with distinct implications. Jeffrey et al. found that ‘notions of education and illiteracy’ serve as, ‘a grand narrative for organising other forms of cultural capital’ (202), and are instrumental in producing a ‘new hierarchical principle of difference based on school qualifications and educated demeanor’ (203). Jeffrey et al. consider the ambivalence of education as a recent, hierarchical organising principle: while not ‘straightforwardly hegemonic’ (20), they argue, these narratives effect a heavily gendered form of symbolic violence that reproduces male privilege, and intersects with and reinforces other existing hierarchical principles, including caste and religion. Here I draw attention to the ambivalence of the framing of violence/crime against women through discourses about education, as well as the (re)production of class differentiation and identification therein.

I discuss a number of repertoires pertaining to this broad theme, including: women’s education and economic independence as reducing violence; education as contributing to transcending a culture of gender inequality and oppression; and the importance of appropriate knowledge about sexual boundaries. I argue however, that the dominant and cross-cutting repertoire maps the awareness necessary to avert violence onto embodied knowledge of how to normatively perform gender and sexuality, for women and girls in particular.

* ‘If they are provided education then 50% problem will be solved. If they are educated then they will be aware of their rights, facilities provided by the government and they will also become an earning hand in the family.’ (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

* “By education I mean, 90% of the crime, if women are educated they will be dependent on themselves, she will do job, will go out... Women working is very important. If she is working, she will give good education to her children and have good

**Education, women’s economic independence and violence**

The first repertoire I consider is the idea that education can enable women to be or become economically independent, as exemplified by the following:
understanding between husband and wife... They teach them good habits. This is the main thing... If we are well educated only then we will tell others good things.”
(Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

For both women Constables cited here, economic independence is a way for women to avoid and resist being downtrodden and having to accept violence and abuse in the home. It is notable however that the economic independence earned through education is not promoted as enabling a woman to exit a violent domestic situation. Rather, and for the second Constable in particular, it is about improving women’s contribution to family life and in doing so, minimising the risk of violence: enabling them to teach their children well and thus fulfil their roles as mothers more effectively; enabling them to understand their husbands better, thus both fulfilling their roles as wives more effectively and averting domestic violence. The significance of education in these and similar narratives functions to both challenge and reinforce gender norms: troubling the exclusivity of the male breadwinner role and women’s economic dependency, while reinforcing idealised notions of (modern, educated and nurturing) wives and mothers. Hence, this effect reflects and exemplifies the way in which the police discourses/practices analysed here simultaneously challenge gender norms in some ways while reproducing them in ways that are closely related and which can partially undermine the emancipatory potential of some of the security interventions of which they partake.

These narratives implicate parenting, in particular mothering, in the moral education and development of children, which is seen to safeguard against violence if properly executed. In doing so they feed into the pathologisation of families living in slums and resettlement colonies discussed above, who – being poorly educated – are thus constructed as unable to provide appropriate education and guidance for their children. There is also a certain contradiction, in that many of the women in the Parivartan target areas are reported by research respondents to work outside the home, albeit in menial (not ‘educated’) jobs, due to economic necessity. As demonstrated in the previous section, this is frequently cast as both cause and symptom of the malfunctioning of slum families that leads to violence.

*Education and transcending cultures of gender inequality and oppression*

The second salient repertoire holds that education enables a certain transcendence of gender inequality and oppression, thus mitigating against violence/crime against women. This is

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125 See also Donner (2008: 123-154) on this theme, and its intersection with class.
expressed in two related ways. Firstly, there are recurring claims highlighting the significance of women’s awareness of their legal rights. A lack thereof is framed as enabling violence to go unchecked:

*“Most of the women who face such problems are lacking in education. There are not aware enough, they don’t know what’s happening with them is right or wrong.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

However, this sits alongside a progress narrative in which women who have been *“changed”* by education, *“understand there is law to protect [them]”,* so are newly emboldened to, *“go against [their] husbands”.* Violence is becoming more visible, in such accounts, as women gain awareness, *“speak out”* and *“fight for their rights”*. The second expression of this repertoire is framed more explicitly as a cultural critique, and posits a lack of education as contributing to a culture of son preference and gender discrimination in families. Some women police criticise such practices for reproducing violence/crime against women:

*“In Indian culture... there is a need for gender sensitisation... Men think that women are like the shoes that they wear... There is a general assumption that a man has got to do this while a woman has got to do that, and if they don’t do this [i.e. what a woman is supposed to do] then this [violence] happens, and that the woman will get raped, and also that daughters are not supposed to go for work, only sons have to work.”* (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

*“They should educate the parents not to teach such things to their daughters, to women in the family and they should be taught not to suppress them like this... They need to change their value system.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

*“My family was educated, their thinking was different. There was no difference between girls and boys.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

The order in which I have sequenced these three quotes is entirely constructed, as they are extracted from three interviews with different individuals taken at different times and places. Nevertheless, they work well together to illustrate this discourse critiquing gender discrimination in families, and emphasising the role of education in combating it. The first quote connects violence/crime against women with a gender division of labour, the production of gender norms and ideas about gender difference which the Inspector posits as cultural: *“if they don’t do this [i.e. what a woman is supposed to do] then this [violence] happens... and the woman will get raped”.* This is by and large the same *“value system”* – which treats boys and
girls differently, favouring sons, and reproduces gendered norms of acceptable behaviour – that the Constable cited in the second quote is criticising, arguing that parents must be educated such that they learn not to “suppress” their daughters. The Constable cited in the third excerpt similarly refers to such a value system or cultural context in her interview, and distinguishes her own family, in which she felt that boys and girls were treated equally, by their superior education.

The following two quotes illustrate in more depth how some interviewees posit education and awareness as necessary to rectify a cultural context in which male children are favoured and girls and boys are differently socialised, which facilitates violence/crime against women:

“Lack of education, lack of awareness and totally man-dominated society... They think... my mother has also gone through... all these things [i.e. violence] and I am here also for this only, because they never... protest against these beatings. They think ki* this is the culture... and this is the right of a man [to] beat his wife... We have to change their mind set up... Because women, female and male child are equal and girls are also entitled to get the education, and education is the best thing to make a society healthy. If a girl is educated she knows much better, what is good and what is bad for her.” (Woman Inspector, former Parivartan IC) [*that]

*“In our society girls are suppressed, men do whatever they like... We don’t tell our kids at home... the male members of our house, we don’t tell them to see the girls of other families with a good eye, don’t go about eve-teasing. So there is a difference of education... We don’t give education from our own houses. If we give education at home front itself then this situation won’t come... Education from home is most important. Removing the difference between males and females, your kids, boys and girls should be given same education. When the... boy [gets a wife] he will act accordingly, the way we tell him.” (Woman Head Constable/Self-defence Trainer, CAWC)

The Inspector cited here is referring specifically to the slums of Delhi. In addition to advocating equal treatment of boys and girls, her take on this theme crosses over into related discourses on how education can avert violence, discussed above. Education, for her, ‘makes a society healthy’, hence it is not only for a woman’s or girl’s immediate benefit that she should be educated, but rather to enable her to make a wider social contribution. And yet it is also important that women and girls ‘know what is good and bad’ for them, which echoes the tone of those discourses emphasising knowledge of legal rights. The second quote is interesting for its emphasis on how men and boys are educated and learn what is/is not acceptable behaviour. For this Head Constable, due to gender discrimination and differentiation starting within the home,
boys are allowed unlimited freedom and not taught not to sexually harass women and girls. This excerpt makes visible a current which runs right through this discourse of education as combating gender discrimination in the home – namely, the implication of parents (though less unequivocally mothers, in these narratives) in the production or prevention of violence/crime against women.

One of the interesting, and significant, features of this repertoire is that it directly challenges and critiques gender norms – specifically, problematising son preference and the expected, or cultivated, behavioural differences between boys and girls. It thus functions as a highly salient thread of ambivalence running across the dominant discursive frames. Education is framed as holding emancipatory potential for women and girls (empowering them with knowledge of legal rights, resources and options for resistance, and so on), and the calls for the re-education of boys and men (in/through socialisation in families) aspire to reconfigure the everyday environment which is conducive to gendered violence. On the one hand, it echoes Parivartan’s aim as enshrined in its mission statement, to ‘change the patriarchal mindset’ of society through community level education, indicating how potentially emancipatory discourses linking education – or, the generation of new/different knowledge - with violence prevention permeate from the official level to (some of) the grassroots personnel implementing these programmes. On the other hand, the emancipatory avenues these discourses appear to open are clouded by more conservative permutations of the association between education and violence prevention. Hence, many of the gender norms which it challenges, I have argued, are ambivalently reproduced by aspects of Parivartan’s safety advice and preventative anti-violence work. Furthermore, these cultural critiques work in tension with the translation of the ‘awareness’ posited as necessary to prevent violence, which slum-dwellers are constructed as lacking, into knowledge of how to comport oneself in accordance with certain gender and sexual norms, particularly those governing marital and family relationships. I show below how this is pervasive in the data.

**Knowledge of appropriate sexual boundaries**

Although the putative interrelationship between violence/crime against women and awareness/education is primarily framed in terms of a lack of awareness, there are moments at which this interrelationship is framed in terms of the right or appropriate kind of knowledge. In these cases, too much of the wrong knowledge, for instance early sexual exposure, is constructed as corrupting and harmful. I have demonstrated this in the previous section when illustrating how interviewees associate lack of privacy with an increased incidence of violence/crime against women. Privacy is associated with safety in a number of ways, one of
which is by enabling the control and management of sexual exposure and knowledge – hence the claims that children in the slums *“see everything”* and become sexually precocious, leading to violence and violations. Conversely, at other moments in the data, children’s lack of knowledge and education about sex is problematised. For example:

*“According to Indian custom children of 10-15 age group they don’t know much about sex, and in slums it is completely nil. Because if a child is going to school, then he gets some knowledge about it… but in slum they are innocent. They don’t know what is right, what is wrong, nobody is there to guide them, and parents are also illiterate… So un-education is the most important reason for this [violence/crime against women].”* (Woman beat Constable, *Parivartan* Cell)

While prima facie there is a tension here, I would suggest that these seemingly contradictory discourses work together to some extent. Not knowing about sex, according to the Constable cited above, means not knowing right from wrong, due to innocence and lack of guidance. Implicitly, this may mean not knowing right from wrong with respect to sexual behaviour. Being exposed to it – through lack of privacy – may therefore mean increased chances of indulging in it without the requisite knowledge to do so within the ‘proper’ boundaries and according to appropriate norms.

*Embodied knowledge: The normative performance of gender and sexuality*

The knowledge required to avert violence is not straightforwardly a matter of formal education, although this is clearly valued in these discourses. On many levels, implicitly and explicitly, the under-education to which violence/crime against women is attributed, broadly translates into a lack of awareness of how to comport oneself properly, gender normatively, in accordance with sexual mores and the norms of family relationships. For example, here a woman Inspector at the CAWC explains why domestic violence occurs:

“Maybe lack of knowledge, maybe lack of confidence, lack of understanding results into the small grievances which are being taken care of by counselling only… So we have to make them understand what is your basically duty, that you have not [been] discharging your duty, every time you are demanding something… There are certain duties which are attached to a women by virtue, attached to women or, like in our Indian context if we say male is meant to earn the money. Woman is to look after the house but since now the ladies are also independent and working, still what we need to do, you need to walk together. We have to understand what my husband should do, what I should do.”
The failure to perform your gendered “duty” within a marriage, stemming from a ‘lack of knowledge/understanding’, is what precipitates violence, according to this Inspector. A similar argument is made in the following quote:

*“There [slums/resettlement colonies], mostly people are illiterate, that is why these kind of problems come up... They [the women] don't know how to live easily, that by doing this, if I don’t give food to my children then also there might be problems at home, they cannot think a little ahead also... If they were to understand [these things] then they would never allow this domestic problem [i.e. violence, marital disputes] to increase more... It increases because she does not understand sometimes.”* (Woman ASI, Parivartan IC)

In this excerpt, knowledge of how to fulfil the roles of wife and mother according to a husband’s and in-laws’ normative expectations, and the corresponding ability to do so successfully, is again implicated in the interrelationship posited between education, awareness and violence or its prevention. Here, in addition, the lack of awareness which purportedly begets violence is projected onto the inhabitants of the slums and resettlement colonies, reinforcing the significant class dimension of these discourses. Illiteracy and the corresponding failure to understand and perform one’s marital duties are the problems of a homogenised, them, over “there”, in contrast to a tacitly implied, I/we who bears (and seeks to impart) this superior knowledge. Behaving properly in accordance with gender, sexual and familial norms, thus demonstrating one’s (formal and informal/moral) educational credentials, implicitly serves as a marker of class difference and identification in these narratives: a sign that you do not belong in the unruly and violent space of the slum. This classed distancing effect is also produced, for instance, through the following explanations of sexual violence, and ways in which they evoke (lack of) proper understanding:

*“Whatever they [adolescent girls living in slums] see on TV and get inspired from that and they see their parents living in slums, they are unable to understand what is right or wrong.”* (Woman SI, former investigating officer for rape cases, Parivartan target area)

*“Why rape takes place, how can I say that... All I can say is that girls don’t have understanding about this matter... They don’t have the understanding of these things. If she is a minor girl, anybody can give them false promises and they get carried away. What more can I say, rape happens because of this reason only as the minor girls don’t have the knowledge.”* (Woman Constable, Parivartan Cell)

In these accounts, it is (slum-dwelling) adolescent girls’ lack of understanding of sexual mores and boundaries, and thus failure to perform them, which leads to transgression and violation. Hence, the knowledge required to avert violence/crime against women includes awareness of how to set one’s children – girls in particular – on the “right path” through appropriate moral
guidance, as emphasised in the quote with which I opened the chapter. In sum, this particular repertoire burdens women and girls with the responsibility to know how to behave in accordance with gender and sexual norms, in order to prevent and avoid violence. It thereby (violently) reproduces gender, working in tension with, and insidiously counteracting, the emancipatory potential of some of the salient discourses linking education and violence prevention, discussed above.

3. Gender credentials as markers of progress: Ambivalently negotiating the ‘modern-foreign’

So far this chapter has picked up and developed the broad theme of how violence/crime against women is constructed in terms of space and spatiality. This final section explores how violence/crime against women is constructed in terms of temporality, and how this temporal dimension intersects with the spatial.

Addressing violence against women as a marker of progress

The promotion of women’s rights and freedoms in general, and working to eradicate violence/crime against women in particular, broadly figures in the data as a marker of progress and being modern. Conversely, violence/crime against women itself and its persistence functions as a sign of backwardness, being under-developed, of not having (yet) reached modernity. This is expressed in a number of ways. For instance, there is a more general discourse of policing as enabling and furthering the development of the nation. Initiatives to address violence/crime against women are positioned contributing to this wider project.

“[Policing is] one of the noblest services because we get to interact with the victims, with the sufferers, with the people who are in need to justice, so we are the first agency to give them relief... It provides tremendous scope to work for the community, for the society. It is also an essential component of any development process, that if law and order is well implemented... then the society progresses a lot... can be run without any fear, there will be flow of international tourism, and individuals feel safe and they practice their professions so that leads to the development of any country. So we,

126 I borrow this term from Pereira (2010: v; 231-232)
policemen, contribute a lot to the development of any society.” (Male senior police official involved in overseeing Parivartan)

This official’s comments were in response to a question about why he joined the police. This kind of response was not uncommon. For instance, a male Station House Officer (SHO) in a Parivartan target area similarly told me that he “wanted to do something for the development of [his] nation”. The official cited above, however, also sets this response against a progress narrative about the sensitisation of the police to gender issues, in which Parivartan’s deployment of women on the beat, features as “just a start”. He claims that more forms of violence against women are being officially recognised as crime, and addressed by law enforcement. Implicitly, then, tackling violence/crime against women becomes part and parcel of how the police ‘develop the nation’ and ‘society progresses’. This is expressed more directly by other respondents such as this Parivartan woman beat Constable:

*“Parivartan is also a society improvement program. A very good program for ladies. So very good schemes of such types these days are coming out from the police by which we are able to improve the society.”

Similarly, a woman Inspector working for the CAWC explained that intervening in domestic violence and marital disputes is part of the police role because reconciling couples and preventing broken homes minimises the impact on the children, and “when the children are affected, the nation is gone.”

The association between addressing violence/crime against women and (societal and national) development and progress is also expressed through the idea that resistance to, and speaking out about, violence is a sign of the times, and of the country becoming more modern and developed, such that violence is no longer being tolerated or considered tolerable:

“Now with... the overall modernisation of the society and improvement in the economic status... value system is changing... Now, women are coming open, they are opening up that if somebody misbehaves with them they have the courage to complain.” (Male senior police official)

“Our society is developing more, more and more of our girls are going out, they are reacting, I think they are being vocal if not vociferous... I mean... the issue

127 There are resonances between this official’s account of policing and its contribution to the security and development of society, and Kaldor’s account of law enforcement as a crucial element in the provision of human security which we tend to take for granted as ‘internal’ security in liberal democratic societies (Introduction; Chapter Two; Kaldor 2007, 2008, 2011). There is evidence, however, that policing in India does not always or reliably deliver on these idealised functions, in practice (Chapter Three; HRW 2009).
[violence/crime against women] was there earlier also but now it’s time that we better... handle it... We can’t delay it now anymore.” (Male senior police official)

At other moments, the persistence of violence is expressly linked to being under-developed:

*“The mentality of Indians has not developed so much.” (Head Constable/Self-defence trainer, CAWC)

This comment is part of this Head Constable’s explanation for violence/crime against women in Delhi, and precedes a narrative about how unprovoked eve-teasing (sexual harassment) is a behaviour common to migrant populations who need educating.

The way in which police efforts to address violence/crime against women come to signify progress and development can be understood as part of a wider discourse of women’s rights as markers of progress which circulates transnationally (albeit manifesting in myriad, contradictory ways and with a wide range of effects) and can be traced through recent (gender and) development discourses back to colonial discourses (see Abu-Lughod 2002; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Randol 2005; Shepherd 2006; Stabile and Kumar 2005; Volpp 2001). The ways in which violence/crime against women, and responses to it, are invoked in my data has to be contextualised against this discursive economy, which extends beyond the boundaries of Delhi and indeed of India, but also connects into these spaces. In particular, violence against women features significantly in such discourses since the landmark conference in Beijing (1995) and the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) (1993). Violence against women has been increasingly framed by and through international feminist lobbying and official UN rhetoric as a human rights issue which it is the responsibility of states to intervene in (Macaulay 2000: 146-147; Youngs 2003; Kelly 2005). The primary means of intervention foregrounded has been policing, criminalisation and prosecution (Adelman et al. 2003: 106). Hence, what states are doing about violence against women has acquired an internationally recognised status as a marker of a progressive, modern orientation towards rights.

The ‘doing something to stop violence/crime against women equals progress’ equation is reflected in a spatial distancing which equates to a kind of temporal distancing in my data. Violence/crime against women is projected onto spaces marked as ‘under-developed’, where people lack ‘awareness’, and which are on the periphery of metropolitan Delhi life; spaces in which ‘traditional’, rural values clash with modern lifestyles into which they cannot properly assimilate. Violence/crime against women is constructed as happening over there in those places, amongst people who do not know any better and are thus ‘behind’ (an implicit) ‘us’ in
terms of progress. There are moments when this intersection between spatial and temporal distancing is made explicit in the data:

*“This [violence/crime against women] happens a lot in lower localities. {You are saying labour class?} Labour class and those who are financially weaker, less developed.”* (Woman SI, former Parivartan IC)

“*Given the status of the women in the Indian society especially these people... who are lower economically and socially... Now these people, because of their social background and also because they are economically backward... they do not raise their voice against the exploitation and torture... India has advanced a lot, but still the value that has to be joint family system still is maintained in the lower strata of the society, economically lower... Within the slums there are areas where you don’t feel that you are in a city.”* (Male senior police official)

“In the slum area you are not going to find any gender sensitisation... They just prevent a female child to go to school... because the lack of amenities is there, how could they think for a better future? If they are still struggling for their survival they never ever face ki* what is the modernisation... Women never ever protest against all these situations. They never ever stop their husbands.” (Woman Inspector, former Parivartan IC) [*that]

The association between addressing violence/crime against women and progress is also reflected in the way in which the former, combined with visibly performing gender sensitivity/sensitisation, is understood and packaged as a necessary, contributing aspect of the ongoing modernisation of Delhi Police as an organisation and a security institution. ‘Doing gender’ well makes the police more ‘modern and people friendly’\(^\text{128}\): I explore this theme in depth, in Chapter Eight.

**Performing ‘doing gender’ to an international audience**

Crucially, the status of anti-violence/crime against women work as a marker of progress is reflected in the way in which Parivartan is being performed for an audience that extends beyond the people who use police services, and beyond Delhi as a city: an audience that extends into the ‘international’ arena. This is evidenced by the official literature about the programme, both on and offline, produced in English, the seeking out and winning of

\(^{128}\) Here I am directly quoting the former Commissioner of Delhi Police’s statement posted on the Delhi Police website until 2012. See Chapter Eight.
international awards and certifications, and the overall importance accorded to ‘disseminating’ and ‘communicating’ the programme through both India-wide and international networks of development practitioners, gender experts, and policing and security experts. Among numerous examples, Delhi Police sought and achieved ISO certification for Parivartan in 2007, and the programme was documented as a case study of good practice in gender mainstreaming for a UNDP resource book by Delhi-based organisation, Women Power Connect (see UNDP India 2008). The nodal officer responsible for Parivartan made visits to the US to receive an international policing award and to the UK to connect with both policing and gender experts, distributing the Parivartan literature as he went.

Following the launch of Parivartan in 2005, the programme officially participated in the UN-led, annual international campaign, ‘Sixteen Days of Activism Against Gender Violence’ – predominantly by working with local schools and organising training and educational activities and competitions for young people. The team who evaluated Parivartan for the UN resource book claimed that this was the first time a police department had participated in the campaign (UNDP India 2008: 99). Embracing the Sixteen Days of Activism was significant as an example of how Parivartan connects with, draws on and insinuates itself into the transnationally circulating discourses on violence against women highlighted above. The Sixteen Days of Activism span the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (25th November), and International Human Rights Day (10th December) to symbolically emphasise that violence against women is a human rights violation (UN Women 2011). It exemplifies the way in which violence against women has been successfully framed as a human rights issue, thus putting the onus on states as key actors in addressing it.

Recognition from an international audience – especially countries and institutions perceived as ‘modern’ and influential – is highly valued and considered to lend the Parivartan programme credibility. This in turn feeds back into the performance of ‘doing gender’ or ‘doing something about violence/crime against women’, successfully.129 Hence, the list of ‘awards and appreciations’ and the photographs of award ceremonies and overseas visits featured in the Parivartan (on- and offline) literature, as evidence of the programme’s innovation and success. Senior police officials who had key roles in designing, implementing and overseeing Parivartan

129 By ‘successfully’, here, I mean that official recognition in the form of awards and certifications, and (formally and informally) being seen to perform ‘doing-something-about-violence/crime-against-women’, are implicitly treated as markers of success by Delhi Police. I’m not using ‘successfully’, at this moment, in the way in which Ahmed (2006, 2007, 2012) uses it to argue that institutional anti-racism work fails in its performative function and is thus not successful in realising or producing anti-racism substantively or materially. I am thus not using it to mean that these recognitions and accreditations are unproblematically indications of success in materially reducing or eliminating violence/crime against women.
indicated the significance of being seen to do something about violence/crime against women, and receiving international recognition, in interviews:

“See the need for ISO, it is a very important recognition, it is recognised internationally that this organisation is ISO-certified.”

“The program was very innovative and very good. It is for the entire Delhi to see, then entire country, and even internationally also it was acclaimed... It was already on the international map by way of that ICLP award... [The nodal officer] had already gone to US to seek that award and after he came back... it was very heartening for us that we got ISO certification.”

It is worth recalling again the context of Parivartan’s inception, namely the attention drawn to the disproportionately high rates of violent crime against women in Delhi by press coverage critical of police responses. It was important to the police as an organisation to be seen to act on violence against women, and by a wide audience:

“We certainly felt that we did not deserve as much adverse publicity as was being done by the press... So we thought that we have to have some mechanism to counter it and show it to the world also... We were being forced to the wall... It was undue adverse publicity.” (Male senior police official involved in overseeing Parivartan)

The importance of ‘doing gender’ well, and the courting of a wider audience has to be understood in a context in which Delhi Police feel under scrutiny both nationally and internationally, due to their status as policing India’s national capital city:

“Delhi Police... are centre of the eyes of everybody, media... even the Neta-ji* and the, because this is the capital of India, whatever has been taken that can attract the international attention as well. So, Delhi Police is more sensitive over any incident and their calibre is always on the edge.” (Woman Inspector, former Parivartan IC)

[*leader, i.e. President/Prime Minister130]

In Chapter Eight I discuss further the significance of addressing violence/crime against women and successfully ‘doing gender sensitivity/sensitisation’ to the Delhi Police’s ongoing image management.

There are eminently good reasons for seeking out local, national and international recognition and for communicating widely about Parivartan, which were also discussed in interviews:

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130 ‘Neta-ji’ is used as shorthand for political leaders, but it’s not clear which national political leader the interviewee is referring to here.
sharing and disseminating good practice and learning from other practitioners and theorists, learning from impartial, external audits and evaluations, enabling others to replicate the programme, and involving as many stakeholders as possible to create a ‘mass-based campaign’, which was a driving idea behind Parivartan. ISO certification in particular helps to ensure and monitor the standardisation of procedures and to institutionalise the programme, making it independent of the political will and commitment of any particular individual. All of these rationalisations for the promotion of Parivartan in ways which engage it with transnational discourses on violence against women, and with international audiences, make sense, but I would argue that it is also doing another kind of work. The reasons cited are not necessarily in conflict with my argument, that one of the things that these activities are doing is performing ‘doing gender’ to an international audience, as part of a broader performance of ‘being modern and developed’.

My use of ‘performance’ here is indebted to performativity theory (see Chapter One) and in this case, particularly to Ahmed’s (2006, 2007, 2012) rendering of it in her analyses of organisational equality and diversity work in the UK. Ahmed’s work is useful for conceptualising Delhi Police’s anti-violence/crime against women work as performative, in two ways. Firstly, Ahmed conceives of the work she analyses as ‘performance’, in the sense of how, ‘universities perform an image of themselves’, and also, ways in which they ‘perform in the sense of, ‘doing well’” (2007: 594). Secondly, she investigates the ways in which this work is non-performative, or fails to bring about what it names (substantive equality and diversity, or anti-racism). Ahmed (2006) argues that diversity work is ‘strategic’; its ‘appeal is about looking and feeling good’ – hence it is its proximity to, ‘the ideal images organisations already have of themselves’ that allows ‘diversity’ as such to ‘accrue value’. Thus diversity work is often about ‘image management’ – ‘generating the ‘right image’ and correcting the ‘wrong one’ (2007: 605) – where it is the image and not the organisation that is understood as wrong, and thus perceptions that need changing. I am similarly arguing that violence/crime-against-women-work in Delhi Police is readable at least partly as an exercise in transforming or ‘correcting’ a negative public image which police staff feel positively aggrieved about (see above, and Chapter Eight), rather than as straightforwardly or exclusively about transforming material gender relations.

Just as, ‘diversity and equality become ‘things’ that can be measured, along with other performance outcomes’ (to show that the university is, ‘doing well’, Ahmed 2007: 596), similarly, the Parivartan webpages showcase evidence of how the policing of violence/crime against women can be statistically measured as a performance outcome, as evidence of ‘doing
well’. Like words, signifying practices (Butler 1990, 1993) do not achieve their effects in and of themselves, but only insofar as there are conditions in place that allow them to ‘act’, to serve as ‘happy’ performatives (Austin 1975; Ahmed 2006). This anti-violence/crime against women work comes to signify ‘doing well’ in this context, because of conditions which are independent of and extend beyond Delhi Police – namely, its investment with the potential to signify ‘being modern’. Furthermore, just as the equality and diversity documents analysed by Ahmed do not bring about what they name, so the securitisation of violence/crime against women by Delhi Police, I have shown throughout this analysis, does not unproblematically bring about what it claims as its effect: securing women, or reducing/eradicating violence/crime against women (partly because the conditions for its realisation are not in place). But, like the equality documentation, it does do various (other) things. One of the things it actively seeks to do is to produce Delhi Police as ‘gender-friendly’ and therefore ‘modern’.

The way in which Parivartan performs Delhi Police’s gender credentials to an audience which extends into the international arena captures the intersection between the spatial and the temporal dimensions of the construction of violence/crime against women in my data. Foreignness – at least, a rather particular kind of foreign-ness which circulates through transnational discourses such as those highlighted above which configure violence against women as a human rights violation – is broadly associated with modernity, development and progress in my data, albeit ambivalently so. This association between foreign-ness and modern-ness is succinctly captured by Pereira (2010: v; 231-232) in her research on the epistemic status of Gender Studies, in the concept of the ‘modern-foreign’. Pereira describes the modern-foreign as a ‘truth-point’, a point in space/time which is seen as authoritative and can thus be discursively invoked in local interactions to lend credibility to claims or, in this case, to police initiatives and programmes. Often this association between the temporal and the spatial is quite implicit in my data; however, there are moments when it is rendered more explicit, such as the following:

“Europe or any other developed nations I don’t think such institution [as Parivartan] is needed because the awareness level is already very high.” (Male senior police official involved in overseeing Parivartan)

131 The comparison with Ahmed’s analyses of equality and diversity work in British universities should not be over-extended; the (non-)performativity of this and of Delhi Police’s violence/crime-against-women-work have similarities but do not map perfectly onto one another. Ahmed looks closely at the production, circulation and take-up of documents as instruments in themselves, whereas I am only looking at documents which seek to reflect and promote (rather than embody) institutional practices, and the practices themselves are (arguably) invested with significance, first and foremost. Therefore it could be argued that more is being done to change not only perceptions but the organisation and its practices, in Delhi Police. In addition, although I have shown that violence/crime-against-women work is not automatically successful as a performative in Delhi Police, assessing the success of it as a performance of ‘being modern’, in terms, for instance, of its reception by different audiences and interlocutors, is another matter and something I do not have suitable data to explore.
In this quote, a senior police official argues that Parivartan is not needed in “developed nations” which have a high “awareness level” (education and ‘awareness’ being markers of progress – see above), and Europe is given as an example of the ‘developed’ world. This comparison is mobilised to legitimate Parivartan, which is implicated as compensating for a lack of development, and as an initiative which is progressing Delhi Police and indeed India forward, towards and into development, propelling the police, the city, the country, into ‘being modern’.

**Reverse progress narratives**

There is, however, a contradiction in this alignment of ‘doing gender’ well, and addressing violence/crime against women, with progress and ‘being modern’. This becomes more comprehensible if we consider the ambivalence with which the ‘modern-foreign’ is apprehended. Insofar as doing-something-about-violence/crime-against-women serves as a marker of progress, the latter is implicitly associated with the successful performance of middle-class-ness, in part through (performing) being educated and ‘aware’. As argued above, this includes embodied knowledge of (gender) normative conduct and sexual mores, especially in marital/family relationships. Successfully performing normative gender and sexuality are broadly constructed in my data as preventing or mitigating violence/crime against women. Conversely, the failure to successfully do so is implicated in causing and/or exacerbating violence/crime against women. However, these gender norms and sexual mores are considered to be, to some extent, in tension with some significant influences emanating from the ‘modern-foreign’. There are resonances between the model of modern Indian womanhood implied by these discourses, and that more explicitly promoted by Hindu nationalist discourses. These promote attachment to ‘traditional’ gender norms glorifying women’s role in the family, especially as mothers, and ideas of sexual purity, alongside the ‘empowerment’ of young women through militarisation. Such values are configured as integral to projecting a strong, modern and distinctly Indian national identity – thus simultaneously posing as a reclamation of ‘tradition’, but also (re)orienting the ‘modern’ away from the ‘foreign’ and towards particular expressions of Indianness (see, inter alia, Basu 1993; Basu et al. 1993; Corbridge and Harris 2000; Hansen 1996, 1998, 1999; Sarkar 1993, 1999; Sarkar and Butalia 1995).

The tension between gender norms, sexual mores and the glorification of the family as Indian values, and the ‘modern-foreign’, is at the heart of the ambivalence manifested in the negotiation of (what is perceived as) modernity, globalisation and development. This ambivalence is expressed in two overlapping ways in the data: what I call ‘reverse progress
narratives’, and the defence or valorisation of aspects of ‘Indian culture’, especially when these are seen as threatened or undermined by the influence of ‘westernisation’ or ‘globalisation’.

There is a small group of narratives which I call, ‘reverse progress narratives’ because they propose that violence/crime against women is produced by the movement of people away from the locus of the ‘traditional’ – the village or rural community, and the corresponding loss of the ‘traditional’ values and community sanctions which safeguard against violence and abuse. These narratives are closely intertwined with the association between economic migration into urban slum settlements and violence/crime against women, proffered for the most part by very senior police officials and non-police professionals. For instance, in the first section of this chapter, I cited a senior police official who argued that the “social scrutiny” of the migrant’s “traditional place” is broken down when he comes to Delhi, lives in the slum and feels “freer to commit crime”. Such narratives come close to romanticising a ‘traditional’ past and seem to complicate the association between violence/crime against women and a lack of progress or development. An academic who provided training support to Parivartan, also cited in Section One, constructs a reverse progress narrative which focuses on the breakdown of ‘traditional’ family structures (reflecting the glorification of the family), and is equally bound up with her analysis of economic migration as contributing to violence/crime against women:

“If I recall when I was growing up, things were not so bad, but... in view of the globalisation, the family system... is under threat... The breakdown of the traditional joint family system and increase in the number of nuclear families... increase in the number of divorce cases... single parent families... increase in drug addiction... juvenile delinquency, alcoholism, increase in the crime rates, all these are... related to the family-related factors. So things have really changed a lot in the contemporary era and it is a lot to do with globalisation and its impact on the family structures... There is a breakdown of the community bonding that used to be there till 20-30 years back and because of so many urban pressures, because of the globalisation pressure, there is overall consequence, which one of these is violence against women.”

In these narratives, it is neither straightforwardly ‘traditional’ rural life which is the problem, or produces violence/crime against women, nor ‘modern’ metropolitan life: rather it is the clash between the two – a clash that is both spatial and temporal. This is well captured in the following quotes, the first from a senior police official and the second from a beat Constable, both male:

“You see the people coming from remote villages; they are exposed to the city life. And
there is a wide gap. A boy studying in a good public school, he finds a girl in skirt studying in that very classroom that has a different feeling in that boy, whereas a man coming from a village... he comes here, he suddenly finds women and exposed to this kind of dirty literature and nobody is there to keep a social control on that, social control is at its lowest ebb... Whereas in structured colonies one can’t behave like this. That’s why the incidence of rape is highest in [slums and resettlement colonies].”

“The culture has changed completely... the sense of clothing, etc. With this a man’s feelings change, and sometimes [get] out of control and [he] commits such crimes.”

The way this clash is presented feeds back into the construction of slums and resettlement colonies as sites of moral degeneracy, by positioning economic migrants and the urban poor as not sophisticated enough to manage the cultural influences of modern life. Although the inability to negotiate the ‘modern’ is projected onto these particular groups who are held largely responsible for violence/crime against women, these narratives reveal an ambivalence about the ‘modern’ and the ‘modern-foreign’ in particular. Although tackling violence/crime against women is about performing ‘being modern’, and in turn, ‘being modern’ (as encapsulated in being well-educated and so on) helps to counteract violence/crime against women, there is also a strong sense that the ‘modern-foreign’ must be carefully managed, and balanced against nurturing attachments to (what is perceived as) the ‘traditional’.

**Defences of ‘Indian culture’**

The Constable cited above explicitly refers to processes of ‘cultural change’, and in doing so captures the overlap between these reverse progress narratives and a related set of narratives espoused by a wider range of interviewees, who more staunchly defended ‘Indian culture’, whether in its own right, or against the perceived threat of external cultural influences, particularly relating to (the performance of) gender and sexuality. The aspects of Indian culture defended may be specific or rather amorphous, but are often associated in such accounts with preventing or mitigating violence/crime against women. Therein lies a crucial dimension of the ambivalence I wish to highlight. Namely, these accounts make clear that the aspects of Indian culture defended or celebrated are understood as being contra the ‘modern-foreign’ (processes of modernisation, globalisation and westernisation), because they are positioned as threatened by it. However, their successful performance indicates that one is, ‘aware’ and educated (and by extension, middle-class). They are thereby implicitly, and ambivalently, also aligned with the ‘modern’, and with progress. For example, the following is a quote from the woman ASI working for Parivartan, already cited in Chapter Five and again in the final subsection of Section Two, above, where she argues that domestic violence often results from women’s failures to do their domestic or wifely duties properly. This led to a discussion of gender
differences:

*“No, differences [between men and women], seeing the Indian culture there are many, otherwise there are none, if you believe then there are many, if you don’t then there are none... [I believe] we should remain according to our culture.”

This ASI here suggests that it is important to perform gender in certain (normative) ways, not because it is natural or biologically destined, but as a cultural imperative – adherence to which, she has already indicated, helps to avert violence. Similar overtures inflect the CAWC Inspector’s claim cited in the same subsection, that “in the Indian context”, men and women have gender-specific “duties” with which they must comply in order to live harmoniously. Another Parivartan woman beat Constable links the norm of reconciliation (in the policing of domestic violence – see Chapter Five) directly with “Indian culture”, insofar as solving domestic violence cases is understood to involve getting people to comply with ‘cultural’ gender norms:

*“There were some cases in which two houses avoided being broken... many such cases. One girl... in our area... was newly married. Her husband was a lawyer. There was something regarding dowry, they had reached to the point of divorce... We made him understand once you are married to someone in Indian culture – we made a compromise between them.”

These invocations of ‘Indian culture’, which is seen as embodied by certain gender and sexual norms, do not in themselves appear to have a distinct spatio-temporal dimension, but it is useful to read them alongside further defences of Indian culture which more explicitly construct violence/crime against women as produced by the threat of perceived, external cultural influences, to do with gender and sexuality, encroaching on the terrain of ‘Indian culture’. For instance, a male beat Constable in a Parivartan target area explained the incidence of sexual violence as follows:

*“If we talk of rape, it is because of women’s clothes, their mentality... If you go into rural [areas], no-one has the guts to rape someone... Like here, they say Western culture is here... Valentine’s day comes, they give flowers, these days it is like this – once a boy and girl meet, two or three times they will eat together, [then] do something wrong.”

Elsewhere in the interview, this same Constable claims that:

*“The crime is very less here in India. In European countries crime against women is very high. Sex is free there... Here there is not much crime, here the crime is slapping his wife or kicking, for an hour they will not talk to each other but by evening they will be
While this Constable’s explicitly woman-blaming discourse is exceptional in my data, the ideas he proffers about ‘Indian culture’ – in which rape is disapproved of, in contrast to the ‘free sex’ of European cultures – are espoused by interviewees with different attitudes to violence/crime against women. Arijit, Managing Director of Jagran, associates violence with modern forms of popular culture and entertainment which normalise sexualisation and present young people with the temptation to transgress:

“You see so many beauty pageants... Mothers are telling the daughters to go for beauty pageants. They’re allowing them to wear bikini and even get photographed... So, we are in a process of transitioning... All sorts of intervention by film, by Internet. I mean, there are so many things, kids are getting pictures, images, everything which our parents... never had access to.”

In contrast, in his work, he claims, he is interested in drawing on the “good side” of “Indian culture” – its sexual morality: that “in this country... we don’t pinch bottoms to compliment people”; that mothers are respected and held up as goddesses. Arijit sees these good aspects of Indian culture as in tension with violence/crime against women. He sees the violence as a violation of these norms – hence he wants to tap into such norms to get his anti-violence and safety messages across.

To a varying extent, depending on what the content of ‘Indian culture’ is understood to be, these defences of it run in tension with the cultural critiques discussed in Section Two – namely, claims that son preference, gender socialisation and ignorance and repression about sex contribute to violence/crime against women. The defences of ‘Indian culture’ analysed here are closely enmeshed with the somewhat more dominant repertoires also presented in Section Two, which associate being educated and having ‘awareness’ not with transcending gender socialisation, but with knowing how to properly comport oneself in accordance with prevalent gender and sexual norms. In this way, they contribute to (violently) reproducing gender, and destabilise the potentially emancipatory dimensions of the security/ies performed by Parivartan.

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132 The social communication and theatre group who perform Parivartan’s signature street pantomimes
Managing/disciplining encounters with the ‘modern-foreign’: Aligning progress with normative gender and sexuality

While education and ‘awareness’, including women’s, are for the most part highly valued in the data and consistently framed as markers of modernity and progress, there are moments when they are rendered ambivalent. For instance, women’s and girl’s education is associated with their increasing use of public space – something cast as risky and needing careful management to prevent violence (see Chapter Six). This Inspector argues that violence/crime against women has increased precisely because of women’s education, increased economic independence and involvement in public life:

“It [violence/crime against women] is only because of... the development of the country when we started working. Prior to that in India especially, the working percentage of women was very less... There was less exposure of the women in the society in terms of working... Gradually with the liberalisation and education, they have... started working in each sector of the society. They are much more exposed in the practical life. So... they are facing the problems also.” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

The construction of violence/crime against women as a sign of under-development, of being not-yet-modern, is only very rarely challenged in the data. The dominant repertoires hold that doing something to address violence/crime against women is an indicator of progress, and ‘being modern’. However, in the reverse progress narratives and defences of ‘Indian culture’ analysed here, this association is complicated by the idea that significant aspects of modernity also contribute to producing violence/crime against women. They do so largely through the corruption of ‘Indian culture’. Modernity is understood to entail processes of globalisation, westernisation, and cultural change through the negotiation of the ‘modern-foreign’, which threatens Indian culture’s putative family values and gendered sexual morality. For the most part, modernity and globalisation are not cast as ‘bad’ or unequivocally dangerous, per se. It is a question of how these forces are negotiated, and by whom. The implication is that they must be negotiated in a way which keeps intact the ‘Indian’ values which privilege the family and certain notions of sexual morality. Slum dwellers and economic migrants in particular are deemed incapable of this sophisticated balancing, and portrayed as succumbing to base animal instincts, abandoning morality and committing sexual crimes – hence violence/crime against women is readily displaced onto the slums and resettlement colonies by my research respondents. In this way, the complex reverse progress narratives, though more nuanced, align with the more staunch and explicit defences of Indian culture against outside corrupting influences133. The Inspector’s (just cited) association of women’s involvement in public life

133 This is by no means to say that there is uniform agreement about what ‘authentic’ Indian culture is or exactly which practices and norms are to be defended, as there is a variety of views.
with an increase in violence/crime against women, and the related managing and disciplining of women’s use of public space thought to help minimise violence/crime against women (Chapter Six), can be considered part of the careful and ambivalent negotiation of the forces of modernity.

The overall effect is that, while addressing violence/crime against women is part of performing progress, and thus cultivating a modern and developed Indian nation, progress in these discourses also requires strength in the face of ‘modern-foreign’ influences, and continued commitment to certain distinctly Indian cultural values and norms. The latter are understood to safeguard against violence/crime against women if properly applied and practised. This reinforces the argument articulated above, which equally rests on the analysis thus far in the thesis, that in and through the policing of violence/crime against women, progress is aligned with the normative performance of gender and sexuality – for both sexes, but predominantly for women and girls. Thus, despite paradoxically challenging gender norms in crucial ways, progress and reverse progress narratives, as well as the status of doing-something-about-violence/crime-against-women as performing being modern, articulate together in complex ways to feed back into the (violent) reproduction of gender.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that constructions of violence/crime against women which underlie its policing in Delhi have significant and intersecting spatial and temporal dimensions. These work to reproduce both class differentiation and identification, and normative gender and sexuality. A highly classed discourse projects violence/crime against women onto the slums and resettlement colonies, constructed as dangerous and morally degenerate spaces that fail to sustain the conditions necessary for safeguarding the sexual integrity, and thus safety, of women and girls. Such constructions rationalise the disproportionate police targeting of these communities, which takes advantage of their structural vulnerability to surveillance and intervention. Lack of education is associated with the putative moral vacancy of slum lifestyles, while the ‘awareness’ needed to avert violence broadly translates into knowledge of how to comport oneself in accordance with gender and sexual norms and mores.
Like education, addressing and reducing violence/crime against women – indeed, demonstrating good organisational ‘gender credentials’ – functions as a marker of progress for the police, as they situate themselves in relation to hegemonic, transnational discourses. Simultaneously, however, the forces of modernity are understood to usher in external cultural influences which threaten ‘Indian culture’’s family values and sexual morality, and thus contribute to (re)producing violence/crime against women. Hence, modernisation is ambivalently apprehended, and figured as demanding careful management and (self-)discipline in order to be safely negotiated. This requires the middle-class, educated sophistication in which economic migrants and inhabitants of the slums are found lacking. Ultimately, progress, and ‘being modern’ are aligned with performing not only middle-class identities, but also normative gender and sexuality – both through this ambivalent negotiation of the ‘modern-foreign’, and through the cumulative construction of successful performances of gender and sexual normativity as the best/only way of preventing and mitigating violence/crime against women.
‘A modern and people-friendly force’:
The transformation of organisational masculinity in Delhi Police

*“When I heard that... Madam’s number was up to become CP [Commissioner of Police], I felt that Madam will become CP and she will do a lot for us... for ladies... I didn’t know that she would take retirement. When I came to know that she took retirement I felt like committing suicide... I felt so sad... She was worthy of that post...

It is said that in our society a man does not want that a woman comes above him.”

(Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

*“Today our Madam would have been CP if these gents were not there, [if] they had not suppressed her... and we are very sad about it.”

(Woman police control room operator)

These two policewomen are talking with great emotion about long serving IPS officer Kiran Bedi, who was bypassed for the post of Commissioner of Police in favour of a junior, male colleague, the year before I undertook this research in Delhi. Bedi is touted by the English language press as India’s first woman IPS officer. Famous for towing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s car from downtown Delhi, her social reforms of Delhi’s Tihar jail and her stint as police advisor to the UN, highly decorated and holder of multiple awards, Bedi is something of a national icon in India. Many of the 28 policewomen who participated in this research told me enthusiastically that she was their inspiration for joining the police (spreading the ‘craze of uniform’), as well as for the kind of police officers they wanted to be: bold, fearless, dedicated to ‘social work’ for the betterment of the nation and providing better services to women.

134 Indian Police Service, the all-India, elite civil service agency that supplies management level staff to India’s state and union territory police forces. See Chapter Three.
Bedi publicly voiced her dismay at being superseded for the post, protesting that she was overlooked because she did not have the networking clout or ‘booze friends’ to ensure her path to the top (Ray 2007). She reportedly argued that the appointment of a woman to the Police Commissioner post would have benefitted India’s national image and enabled her to further the upliftment of women (Wikipedia 2012). Bedi unexpectedly took voluntary retirement soon thereafter, resigning her post as Director General of the Police Bureau of Research and Development (PBRD), claiming she wanted to devote more time to social work. At a global symposium on ‘Women Changing India’ in 2012, she again accused bureaucrats and politicians of conspiring to make sure Delhi did not get a woman Police Commissioner (The Economic Times 2012).

The Bedi controversy was not just about gender. Both the President of India and the Chairperson of the ruling coalition at the time were women and despite the persistent under-representation of women in politics and senior positions, India has a tradition of revering female leaders. Bedi ruffled many feathers in the police throughout her career, not least by challenging corruption, and the poor responsiveness of police to complaints received. There were news reports of key movers in the Home Ministry fighting to block her candidature because she was ‘too radical’ and ‘outspoken’ (Times of India 2007). Nevertheless, some of the policewomen participating in this research saw it as a symbolic blow for women in India, not just in policing. Bedi’s supercession for the Commissioner post and the responses of the women police cited can be understood as part of a wider, more nuanced but also more mundane pattern of exclusion and selective inclusion of women in Delhi Police, and the corresponding gendered meanings attached to women’s and men’s bodies, capacities, skills and social positionings through which these practices are formally and informally legitimated and rationalised, as well as at times contested and troubled.

This final analytical chapter takes a wider view of gender in the police organisation. It contextualises my analysis of the policing of everyday violence/crime against women in Delhi against how constructions of police work in Delhi Police are gendered. It considers how this both impacts on, and is manifested in and through, the ways in which violence/crime against women is constructed, securitised, and becomes ‘(real) police work’. I focus on three significant themes: the construction of women as less suitable than men for certain essential and definitive kinds of police work; the construction of women as more suitable and highly necessary for certain policing tasks and fields, especially the policing of violence/crime against women, falling under the category of ‘social work’ which is seen as part of the police’s modern remit; and finally, the construction of gender in policing, especially ‘gender sensitisation’, as a
core area of organisational development and transformation work. I explore how this latter theme – along with and including the increasing deployment of women in those roles in which they are deemed necessary, and the provision of better services for women – contribute to the ongoing reworking of organisational, police masculinity in Delhi Police into a more ‘modern’ form.

1. (Delhi) Police fetishism and women’s (un)suitability for ‘real police work’

One of Parivartan’s innovations was the deployment of policewomen on beat patrols for the first time in Delhi. Women have not been excluded from field policing altogether – they are deployed for arrangement duties and VIP security, although often where the work involves dealing directly with women. Beat patrolling is considered to be the frontline of operational policing and part of ‘real police work’ – a construct I extrapolate from the gender and policing literature reviewed in Chapter Two (Waddington 1999: 296; Ericson 1982: 5; Fielding 1994: 56; Chan 1996: 125; Martin 1999: 115; Manning 1977). Drawing on this research, I made a connection between ‘real police work’ as a resource for doing masculinity, and what Reiner (2010: 3) calls ‘police fetishism’. The latter refers to the myth that the (gendered) construct, ‘real police work’ – the content of which varies, but tends to consist in highly valued tasks such as patrolling, maintaining law and order and arresting criminals – is at the heart of policing and being a police officer, and is what keeps society safe from crime and disorder.

Although not widely used as such in my interviews, I find this construct, ‘real police work’, useful in terms of capturing and reflecting on gendered patterns of meaning which are present in my data. Although my questions centred on violence/crime against women, I also discussed policing work and the police organisation with research participants. I do not have suitable data to compare what the police in my sample say they do – or what they construct as important and essential to policing – against what they actually do, in order to objectively test the ‘police fetishism’ hypothesis in the case of Delhi Police. There are also other aspects of policing in India, which I was not able to systematically collect data on, or observe: for instance, the high levels of corruption and bribery, and relatedly, the routine implication of police officers in petty

135 I follow Reiner (2010) in using the term ‘myth’, because a substantial body of research across a range of contexts shows that crime is determined by a multitude of factors external to and beyond the control of the police; that the police spend more time on routine tasks than engaged in high-speed pursuits and adrenaline-fuelled encounters, and that the impact of the police on crime patterns tends to be minimal (see Chapter Two). The myth is nevertheless characteristic of common public perceptions of the role and function of the police, as well as the self-perceptions of police officers and organisations.

136 See Appendices for the full interview schedules.
criminality, which have been documented elsewhere (HRW 2009; TI India 2005). I focus heavily in this chapter on a certain idealised image – or a cluster of images – that the police hold of themselves, which both circulate informally and are propagated at an official level. Whilst it is wise to apply the term ‘mythic’ to these constructions only tentatively given the limitations of my data, it also seems reasonable to infer from existing research on policing (Chapter Two), and on the Indian police specifically – including their documented tendency to systematically under-record crime (Chapter Three; HRW 2009) – that how the police actually do policing is unlikely to correspond unfailingly to these idealised self-representations. Rather than setting out to prove these representations totally mythical or otherwise, I am interested in the level of investment in them which cuts across different locations and positionings within Delhi Police. Regardless of their objective ‘truth’, it is the investment itself which, in part, produces what might be considered their fetishising effect and ‘mythic’ status. I explore how this investment is gendered: how it is connected with the reproduction of idealised policing masculinities, and the implications for both women in the police, and for the policing of violence/crime against women.

The idealised images that proliferated in my interviews with Delhi Police correspond to Reiner’s account of police fetishism and its common myths, while the concomitant gendering of ‘real police work’ also shows some significant parallels with existing research on gender and policing. The construction of the police as primarily crime-fighters pervaded discussions of the police role, training and the qualities that make a good police officer. The police organisation was described as fulfilling a “highly critical” social function – maintaining law and order, detecting and preventing crime. The police, *“save us from terrorists or criminals”*, such that people can live without fear, and ensures *“the protection of society... the safety of the life and belonging of the public”*, *“the security of the nation, of the city”*. The police are described as having a powerful deterrent effect, scaring the *“corrupt people or bad elements”* who would otherwise, *“weigh heavily on the common or honest man”*. In this discourse, it is *“only because of the police”* that, *“crime gets suppressed”*. Were it not for the police, *“crime would increase manifold”, “bad characters”* and *“drunkards”* would freely *“roam the streets”*, and *“a human being would not know another human”*. I am citing here from a range of men and women police officers of different ranks and serving in different postings.

Reflecting some of the existing literature on gender and policing, this (mythic?) status of the police as crime-fighters in which most of my interviewees were deeply invested – and notions of ‘real police work’ associated with it – critically underlie the gendering of police work. Thus, cutting across my data was the pervasive belief that women are not suitable – or are less suitable
than men – both for routine operational policing work, and/or for core policing tasks typically understood as definitive and characteristic of ‘real police work’, such as patrolling, maintaining law and order, and ‘catching criminals’. These tasks are constructed as requiring qualities and competencies understood as masculine, which – despite narratives of women being ‘toughened up’ by a uniform and unforgiving training regime – often explicitly translates into a need for male bodies. Below, I focus on three salient justifications for the dominance of men in policing which mutually reinforce each other, as well as playing into the framing of violence/crime against women in and through Delhi Police initiatives. These are: the 24-hour working culture of Delhi Police; women’s putative lack of physical strength or capabilities to tackle dangerous male criminals; and the idea that certain policing tasks compromise the safety of women police officers who, like women in general, are positioned as vulnerable by virtue of their femaleness.

‘Police work is 24-hours bound’

The twenty-four hour working culture of Delhi Police is frequently cited in interviews as characteristic of police work, in both discussions of why policing work is unsuitable for a lot of women, and ruminations on the difficulties of the job and the kind of characteristics and qualities required to survive in it.

*“The duties are very hard... For example... as you reach home you get a call and you have to go there because we are 24-hours bound... They can call you at any time of the day... I have been called at the night... at 3:30 and I had to go.” (Woman Constable, Parivartan Cell)

Men and women police, particularly at the lower ranks, emphasise being constantly on-call, getting called for duties at all hours of the night, having no time off for holidays and minimum rest. The qualities thought to be demanded by the 24-hour culture overlap considerably with those prized for making an officer good at ‘real police work’. These are qualities associated with mental and physical toughness: terms that recur in the data are ‘toughness’, ‘stamina’, ‘strength’, ‘fitness’ ‘discipline’, ‘(mental) alertness’, ‘courage’.

*“To become a police personnel a person needs a stamina... Any person cannot do the police job because there is a lot of struggle... For more than 24 hours we do job continuously, a common man cannot do like this... We have to develop stamina... Just imagine a criminal who is running after committing some crime, if we are not physically fit we would not be able to catch him... The strength in body is also very necessary. If we are... not well built up, we can neither run nor catch him, so the crime will increase.” (Male beat Constable, Parivartan target area)
This quote shows the interconnections between a number of the themes I highlight in this section – the distinctiveness of the police officer as compared to ‘the common man’ (which I explore further below); how this distinctiveness consists in the bodily and mental qualities and capabilities which meet the demands of the 24-hour culture – including physical strength associated with male bodies (which I discuss in the next subsection); and how these in turn reflect the (mythic) construction of ‘real police work’ as tantamount to catching criminals and suppressing crime, commensurate with police fetishism. Here are two further examples:

*“It is 24 hours job, at any time in emergency we are always ready... with the help of physical training... We are not supposed to show that we are tired or fatigued. We have to be active all the time... to feel that we are absolutely fit and energised, to show to public and impress them... Means the public or the criminals should not feel that police is tired and they cannot do anything... We have to jump over walls, get on the roof and then arrest them... 24 hours you have to show that I am not tired.” (Male beat Constable, Parivartan target area)

*“You have to catch the criminals... They are thieves... They do snatching and run away... They even kill people. If the training of the police is not so hard, so they would not be able to face the dacoits*, nor can they snatch the pistols from their hand, nor can they catch by running after them... A police person should remain fit physically... and any type of problem is there, they should be able to find a solution to it.” (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell) [*armed robbers operating in gangs]

Police work is therefore associated with a certain and unique type of body and mind, partly cultivated and produced through a rigorous and specialised training regime. This body-mind is tireless in the face of adversity, constantly on the frontline of the battle against dangerous criminals, never rests, and must ceaselessly perform its accomplishments to an audience of both the general public and (potential) criminals in order to maintain its edge over crime and disorder. I emphasise perform here because of how this police work, and the masculinity it embodies, is audience-oriented and appearances are crucial: the aim is to ‘show’ and ‘impress’.

While this description of police work as constant crime-fighting may be questionable, the long working hours are not a fiction. Shift work, being on call round the clock, working for months on end without leave, routine night duties and sleeping in police station barracks are par for the course for the rank and file (see HRW 2009). These are understood in the data as masculine working practices which clash with women’s domestic responsibilities: women have to take care of the children, cook, clean, wash, and care for their in-laws in joint families. This means that, in the words of one senior police official, “a man makes himself more available for his profession than women”. Senior officials involved in the recruitment of lower and upper
subordinates used precisely these arguments to explain the disproportionate ratio of men to women in Delhi Police, which is reproduced through the official practice of recruiting at these lower ranks by sex:

“We need more male officers, the Constable I mean... Female officers... have to look after their children, so these type of impediments are there. So considering all those things, to run a police station, to run an organisation, it is decided that exactly... how many female Constables we want.”

Such rationalisations were reproduced widely by police of different ranks. They were also routinely mobilised to explain some aspects of the gender division of labour in Delhi Police, such as the fact that women do not routinely do night duties. Both men and women police across the spectrum expressed such views. These gendered domestic responsibilities are identified as ‘cultural’ more frequently than posited as biologically destined, but this did not make them any less static, compulsory or unavoidable for many interviewees.

Crystallising this perspective that the long-hours culture of policing work does not comfortably mix with women’s (presumed) ubiquitous and non-negotiable burden of domestic labour, there is a stereotype, predominantly held by male personnel but also articulated by some women interviewed, of policewomen as reluctant to do field duties and unwilling to do the ‘real’ hard work of policing: they would rather sit in the police station or office, do lightweight administrative or support work, and go home early to get the dinner ready for their families. This sentiment is succinctly captured in the following excerpt from a senior police official, which is rather derogatory towards policewomen, whom he portrays as work-shy shirkers of ‘real’ responsibility. His views are not atypical.

“We had to work a great deal on our women Constables also because they had never worked in the field... They also feel that after five o'clock they should run away to their home and to cook food... Instead of five they will like to run away at four o'clock; to extract work from them also is, it was not very easy task... On some pretext the women police will take okay, today my son is not well, I will come four hours late, two hours late, all kind of things and the male police also adjusting with them, because they were not doing any substantive work.”

137 Although in some cases these descriptions of ‘what women (have to) do’ directly contradicted policewomen’s own descriptions of their working practices, strategies for managing childcare and commitment to their jobs – which I explore further below.
He later elaborates on this: “they were not involved in the policing as such” – literally asserting that women, on the whole, do not do ‘real police work’. Similar sentiments are expressed by some male Constables:

*“The more of hard work has to be done by a male. Generally the police work is done by gents, ladies police… they come to police station and sit down or lie down… If the ladies come, ladies will hear them… But the major crime is very less on women. That is why there is very less requirement of ladies police. They just come and rest and five o’clock go to their homes… We have to do everything.”*

A woman Inspector who formerly worked as Parivartan In-Charge, reported that male resistance to Parivartan was informed by precisely this sort of thinking about policewomen: the Station House Officers (SHOs) thought, “now they have got another chance of running to their homes”.

Some key figures involved in the establishment of Parivartan reproduced a modified version of this discourse when discussing the challenges involved in setting up the programme, claiming that women have resisted real policing work as a matter of preference: “it is not that women can’t do it, but… probably they would not like to do it.” They prefer desk assignments, are not prepared to commit themselves to long hours, tiring duties and difficult responsibilities. And field policing – conducting raids and so on – is where ‘real police work’ is at, in these accounts. A woman Head Constable/Self-defence trainer, who is something of a champion of women police, also questioned whether a policewoman can ever *“give 100% devotion”* to the job when, unlike a man, *“there is some part of her mind thinking that my children are going to get back from school, whether they will be able to open the lock, whether they will be able to eat food.”* However, she identified this as an impediment to substantive equality, rather than a straightforward question of preferences:

*“See although we sing the song of equality between men and women, but you see that if lady police… when she goes home she will have to work a lot… And the males they are not devoted to the house.”*

Some women police did express preferences for desk assignments and regular daytime working hours. For instance, an Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) working for Parivartan felt it was better for women to be based in the police station despite reporting that she was very successful in her former role as a beat Constable and took a great deal of satisfaction from this work. She was dismayed when she was deputed to investigate rape cases, due to the long, unsociable hours. She combined her police job with domestic duties, including caring for her two children. As I
demonstrate below, however, other policewomen are determined to prove that they work as hard or harder than the men.

Women police are constructed, therefore, as less committed to the police as an organisation because of the unavoidable conflict between the demands of work and the pull of domestic responsibilities. This is implicitly cast as a source of potential weakness to the police organisation, and is frequently used to explain why the number of men far exceeds the number of women. It is projected as potentially weakening the police for two salient reasons. Firstly, the police as an organisation is understood to require a kind of absolute commitment, discipline and self-sacrifice – especially from the rank and file who by and large are not supposed to make consequential decisions but must be conditioned to faithfully follow orders. This is reflected in particular in discussions about police training and the kind of officers it aims to produce. For instance, a woman Constable describes how particular training practices which work through disciplining the body, such as ‘parade’, in combination with practices like wearing the uniform, teach “discipline” to new police recruits by and through creating a simultaneous sense of unity and “feeling of oneness” which effaces individual differences between them.Implicitly, this sense of oneness marks the police as different and distinct from the ‘common man’. Existing police research has noted that internal solidarity combined with distancing from social life outside of the police is often a marked feature of police organisations (Reiner 2010: 122).

Thus, the second reason that women’s competing commitments to domestic life are seen as potentially weakening the police organisation, is the importance of maintaining this highly prized boundary between the inside and outside of the police. This boundary is produced in discussions of how police training completely transforms police recruits, making them fundamentally and recognisably distinct from ordinary citizens. The characteristics which distinguish the police from the ‘common man’ overlap with those posited as necessary for the ‘real police work’ of catching criminals, and for the demanding 24-hour culture: stamina, strength, and ability to confront crime and difficult situations head on with an aptitude for handling any kind of problem. Women, or certainly an excess of women, in the police implicitly threaten this boundary. The demands of ordinary, mundane, domestic, civilian life – demands concerning emotional attachments in particular, such as care of children and other relatives – are imagined to enter the police organisation with women police, and threaten to disrupt its internal integrity. If a woman’s commitment is split then she is fracturing this

138 In practice this is highly contestable, given that a Constable on the front desk of a police station can, unofficially, decide if someone’s complaint is worthy of being recorded or not, and given that Constables serving the Parivartan beats are actively mediating violent domestic disputes
oneness, and hence destabilising the boundary between inside and outside. The presence of (too many) women in the police also appears to threaten this boundary in other ways related to their putative unsuitability for ‘real police work’, which I discuss further below. This boundary is maintained in part through the discourse of the police officer’s uniqueness and difference from the general population as exemplified by his strength. Insofar as women are constructed as ‘weaker’ – lacking the brute strength to manage male criminals – their presence may threaten to dilute the uniqueness constructed as distinguishing the police. The discursive positioning of women on the outside of the boundary that demarcates ‘real police work’ can be understood as one means through which the distinctiveness of that work is (re)produced.

This discernible boundary between inside and outside is to a large degree fictional – or at least, more porous than imagined in interviewees’ accounts. This research attests to the embeddedness of the police in their socio-cultural and historical context, as does existing police research (for instance, Chan 2005). The justifications for the persistent predominance of men in the police, and accompanying notions of which kind of bodies are most suitable for which kinds of work rest partly on, and derive from, broader, prevalent (though by no means uncontested) common-sense understandings of sexual difference and expectations of gender normative behaviour (for instance, the non-negotiability of women’s domestic duties).139

‘You have to have people who are physically strong’

The second cluster of reasons invoked to explain women’s lack of suitability for the core aspects of policing – also implicitly mobilising constructions of ‘real police work’ – focus on the bodily capacities required to handle male criminals. Women’s bodies are described as necessarily lacking the brute strength required. When asked why the police has historically been and continues to be dominated by men, the ubiquitous response was that most criminals are men, that there are – or were until recently – few women criminals, and little reported violence/crime against women. The leap from these statements to the claim that women were therefore not needed in the police was typically made in a matter of fact way such that the conclusion, ‘therefore women were not needed’, was posited as logically following from the gender composition of criminals and victims, and as transparently self-evident. In addition to again mobilising the notion that police work is fundamentally about catching dangerous criminals, the implicit inferences betray the widely held assumption that women’s role in the

139 This embeddedness is remarked by some interviewees, in particular when problematising police responses to violence against women and/or the dominance of men in the police.
police is and/or should be highly gender-specific and confined to women-oriented/women-suitable tasks, as I explore in greater depth in the next section.

Many interviewees, both men and women police at different levels, elaborated further on how men – and male bodies with particular characteristics – are necessary for certain core policing tasks such as overpowering dangerous criminals, controlling angry mobs, and patrolling at night, or for handling certain threatening situations, such as being surrounded by assailants while on patrol. In particular these elaborations foregrounded the putative superior physical strength of male bodies, which enables them to do and handle things which women cannot:

“Women… physically she is very soft and long hours of duties and also meeting all kinds of criminals is the job of the policeman… The job conditions are such… Wherever physical strength is required… women police are not, may not be that successful… Like there is a crowd of 5000 people, you have to have people who are physically strong.”
(Male senior police official)

“Well it’s the nature of the job… it’s an instrument of the government, which uses force… It requires physical strength.” (Male senior police official)

*“Men are also physically more powerful. There is some work which ladies are not able to do, but men are able to do it a lot better… Sometimes there are riots… If a single lady is posted for patrolling duty at night, she won’t be able to do it that effectively. Just imagine if four people surround her, but a man would tackle this better.” (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

Women’s bodies in these accounts are constructed as less powerful and efficacious in the exertion of coercive force. These constructions align with discourses, sometimes associated with justifications of the predominance of men in the police but often elsewhere in the data, of women as being more ‘soft’ and ‘gentle’. These equally play into the putative suitability of women for certain gender-specific fields of policing work, explored in the next section. They also intersect with the construction of women and their bodies as inherently vulnerable to violence, a significant discourse through which violence/crime against women is framed (Chapter Five). This is in turn implicit in a third reason for women’s unsuitability for ‘real police work’ as discussed shortly: the idea that certain policing tasks compromise women’s safety.

Neither my interview data, nor gendered constructions of police work within Delhi Police, form a homogenous, internally coherent, discursive totality. Aside from counter discourses explicitly
contesting and shifting constructions of sexual difference implied in and by these pervasive discursive frameworks, there are also notable internal inconsistencies in interviewees’ discussions of how police work is gendered and gendering. The discourse of women as unsuitable for core aspects of police work due to certain presumed embodied features of sexual difference sits alongside, and in some tension with, a less pervasive but still salient discourse of the police as gender-neutral, which aligns to some degree with the emphasis on ‘gender sensitisation’ as a core area of police development that is helping to progress and modernise the organisation (discussed in Section Three). Claims to gender neutrality surface in recurring remarks by interviewees across the sexes and the ranks, that no distinction is made between men and women in the training or the work, and that women are not less capable. At work, men and women alike are police officers, first and foremost. The following is an excerpt from a senior police official involved in police training:

“Women police job requirement is almost the same as the man’s… Suppose she comes across a criminal on the road... She has to take him, and we train her to kick them hard. A women’s job requirement is same so she is trained in the same manner, so we don’t differentiate... if a lady Constable... has to deal with a male criminal, oh she is going to as harsh as we are... as professional as we are.”

There is an evident tension between this official’s comments about police training and policewomen’s learned professionalism, and his defence, elsewhere in his interview, of the necessity of the predominance of men in the police as the physically stronger sex who can handle criminals and ensure the safety of women. A similar tension also manifests in an interview with another senior police official, who rationalises the persistently high ratio of men to women in the police in a manner common to most of my interviewees (more men are needed because most criminals are men, men are more physically powerful and do not have to perform domestic work). However, when discussing recruitment practices – including the fact that rank and file posts in Delhi Police are expressly sanctioned by the Home Ministry by sex – this same official flatly denies that there is a policy of maintaining a (vast) majority of men in Delhi Police, despite the fact that clearly, recruiting by sex and opening more posts for men than for women will continue to have this effect in the lower ranks\textsuperscript{140}.

This tension between justifications for maintaining a majority of men in the police, and prima facie claims to gender neutrality, can be understood as the product of the mythic status of this imagined need for men and male bodies to get the real work of policing done. In practice, while

\textsuperscript{140} The IPS recruits through India-wide open competition and not by sex – nevertheless it remains dominated by men.
there is differential deployment (as detailed further below), there is still ample evidence of women competently doing the same work as men in the police. This may be put down to exceptionalism, as in the following woman Inspector’s case:

*“About ladies it was generally spoken that ladies don’t work, ladies always want to run home, so like I used to oppose. So they used to say, no we are not saying for you, you are an exceptional case.”*

What this indicates, however, is that the discursive work which sustains police fetishism, and the concomitant myth of ‘real police work’ as catching dangerous criminals, also sustains and reproduces the image of the police as hyper-masculine by and of necessity, and vice versa. Hence this justification for male dominance persists despite conflicting evidence and inconsistent claims about police work and gendered skills and competencies. This instantiates the argument made in Chapter Two, that the gendered (and gendering) character of policing may be understood as indissociable from, and mutually constitutive of, the fetishisation of the police as crime-fighters, which I linked with the fetishisation of the sovereign state and associated constructions of security as authority, protection and (zero-sum) coercive power.

Note, for instance, that the gendering of policing is done somewhat differently in and through policing initiatives and practices which mobilise non-conventional constructions of security, like Parivartan, as discussed in Chapter Five.

‘It’s a very rough job’

The third and final justification for maintaining a majority of men in the police is the idea that certain policing tasks compromise women’s safety. This is articulated in a number of ways. The nodal officer responsible for Parivartan commented that the women Constables deployed on the beat were apprehensive about their own safety while patrolling, and concerns were also raised in media reports. Some Parivartan beat Constables explained that they would not go on the beat without their beat partner as they felt at risk. Other police officers commented that ‘ladies’ were given office jobs to keep them safe.

This discourse intersects with the two justifications for women’s unsuitability for (some) police work already explored – the emphasis on the 24-hour culture as requiring masculine working practices and the notion that male bodies with superior brute strength are necessary to tackle

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141 Bhardwaj’s (1999: 75-6) research indicates that safety has long been a concern surrounding women’s deployment in Delhi Police. She cites the 1980 National Police Commission’s recommendations that women’s police training should be the same as men, but with less emphasis on toughness and more on self-confidence and safety techniques, including unarmed combat and mixed martial arts (Govt. of India 1980).
dangerous situations and male criminals. For instance, it is argued that women cannot patrol beats at night or perform night duties because it is *not safe for them* and they are therefore less suitable for the 24-hour working culture – although, in practice, women police *do* (and *are* called upon to) perform gender-specific night duties such as accompanying female detainees and investigating rape complaints. Policing is cast as compromising women’s safety both through the discursive frame of police fetishism itself, which imagines ‘real police work’ as entailing an ongoing demonstration of toughness; and simultaneously through the discursive frame of women’s putative innate bodily ‘weakness’, which renders them less able to handle the dangers and more at risk of harm. Thus, the idea that certain policing tasks compromise women’s safety also reinforces the construction of women’s bodies as inherently vulnerable to violence (Chapter Five), particularly if they are *out of place* (see also Chapter Six). The demands of ‘real police work’ potentially put women’s bodies out of place, such as on the streets at night.

It is noteworthy that events may be read in line with, and as such reproduce, gendered understandings of safety and vulnerability to violence, as in the case of one woman beat Constable’s interpretation of the murder of a male Sub-Inspector (SI) from her police station. I know very few details of the incident other than that it was understandably traumatic and frightening for the police station staff who discovered that their colleague had been murdered while on duty. One possible reading of the incident is that the supposed superior brute strength of a male body may not necessarily offer sufficient protection if an armed assailant is intent on murdering you – that is, it could be read as rendering embodied gender/sexual difference *less* significant than other factors in determining safety and vulnerability to assault while on the job. On the contrary, however, this Constable reasons that the murder of a male police officer makes women doubly vulnerable: *“they don’t even let gents go, what will they do with ladies?”*. 

In the context of the data as a whole, I suggest a reading of this gendered concern for women’s safety which follows a slightly different logic to claims about physical strength, or a lack thereof. Here, a male senior police official talks about the risks of the job for women:

> “It’s a very rough job... If women are there all by themselves, they’re... you know, vulnerable to various kinds of assaults.”

Notice that he posits women as vulnerable to *“various kinds of assaults”*. The *“various kinds of”* is loaded with implication – he is not just talking about straightforward *physical* assaults. Elsewhere in the same interview, this official talks about how women’s bodies are inherently vulnerable to *sexual* violence:
“…because of the vulnerability of women in terms of their, you know, being physically weaker and also in terms of their sexuality.”

It seems plausible and indeed likely that the dangers which it is most feared that women may be exposed to in (the ‘wrong’ kind of) policing work are sexual rather than exclusively physical, and that this concern carries such weight due to the way in which women’s safety is understood to overlap and intersect with sexual integrity and ‘honour’ (Chapter Six). In Chapter Six I argued that rape lends itself more than domestic violence towards externalisation as a security threat because of the gendered intersection between women’s safety and sexual integrity – rape is a threat to sexual integrity and ‘honour’, while domestic violence may be understood as part of (albeit bad management of) the normal order of things. Hence, concern for the safety of policewomen, mobilised to justify the persistent dominance of men in Delhi Police, can be understood as part of this wider set of meanings about gendered safety and security.

The overall effect of these discourses which posit men/male bodies as necessary and suitable, and/or women/female bodies as less/unsuitable for highly valued, core policing tasks, is to reproduce and re-entrench the gendering – the masculinisation – of police work, in ways which participate in what Shepherd (2008) calls, ‘the violent reproduction of gender’. They re-normalise constructions of gender which are complicit in the ‘masculine authority and protection’ model of security.

Whilst I have emphasised that in justifications for the persistence of a majority of men in the police, ‘real police work’ is implicitly constructed in ways which are commensurate with the myth of the police as crime-fighters, it is important to clarify that the content of ‘real police work’ is unstable, flexible, and at times contested. This instability and malleability becomes particularly significant in Section Three, where I discuss the tension in my interview data between the valuing of bodily characteristics and skills understood as necessary for catching dangerous criminals, and the equally salient valuing of a broad set of interpersonal and caring skills (politeness, listening, patience, and so on) which construct police work as a form of social service and emphasise the importance of good relations with the public. I set this tension against a set of progress narratives which posit Delhi Police as becoming more people-friendly and paternalistic as it improves its services for ‘vulnerable’ populations (including through deploying more women and doing more to address violence/crime against women). This overall project expands the content of ‘real police work’ and seems to complicate the fetishisation of the police as primarily crime-fighters – but I will argue that it does so in ambivalent ways. Here, however, I consider how some policewomen ambivalently contest their putative unsuitability for core policing tasks.
Counter discourses: ‘Women are 101% better’

As discussed in Chapter Seven, some women police are highly critical of gendered practices and norms which they attribute to Indian ‘culture’/‘society’. Some respondents (for instance, the woman Inspector cited in Chapter Five) associate their own work in the police with an active rejection of the inferiority complex they see as socially cultivated in girls, and even a means of transcending it. This transcendence of the inferiority complex produced by gender discrimination also manifests implicitly in some policewomen’s accounts of their admiration for IPS Officer Kiran Bedi, and their aspirations to emulate her:

*“When we used to see Kiran Bedi Madam then we used to feel that we should also join police. In being a lady she undertook such a bold step... There was so much boldness in her that we felt like, if ladies get into police - a lot of - in society - didn’t want to let girls go for it - how will she go for police? What work will she do? But it is fun to work, in this uniform - we get a different satisfaction.” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

“She is my idol... she is the first Indian IPS officer... The work attitude, the boldness, the fearless, the prompt action-taking-lady, before her nobody ever... ever met with that type of lady.” (Woman Inspector, former Parivartan IC)

One Parivartan beat Constable felt that the experience of joining the police and undergoing police training had expunged the vulnerability which makes most women susceptible to violence. She argued that no-one can get away with ‘eve-teasing’ a Delhi policewoman, whether she is in uniform or civil dress; policewomen exude the toughness inculcated by their police training and experience:

*“Other working women... If somebody eve-teases her, she will ignore it, it will ruin my prestige... We [Delhi policewomen] react immediately... We feel that we can handle it on our own. Delhi Police gives us training on self-defence, we use some of that... The way we look at them... the fellow understands that we cannot eve-tease her.”

A woman Inspector working for the Crimes Against Women Cell (CAWC) similarly argues that being in the police makes her and her fellow policewomen *“bold” and “confident”: “I can keep myself safe, I can keep others safe.” According to these policewomen, weakness and vulnerability may be socially and culturally produced characteristics of women and girls but they are by no means their intractable or inevitable destiny. Working as policewomen is itself figured as a mode of transcending this imposed inferiority complex.
Some policewomen argued explicitly that women are stronger than men in specifically feminine ways, and/or are better at policing work. In these accounts, women *“are more loyal”* and *“faithful”* to their duties and less likely to get involved in corruption, *“speak politely as compared to gents”*, are *“more educated”* than men, *“more sensitive”* and *“sympathetic”* in dealing with problems, *“more trustworthy”*, *“more caring”* and *“emotionally stronger”* than men. Some of these policewomen openly and even angrily and sarcastically challenged the discourse of women as physically weaker than men, and as helpless and vulnerable:

*“Yes the helpless weak Prime Minister… our first woman President, first female IPS Kiran Bedi Madam, where is the helplessness?… If a country is being ruled by woman how is she weak and vulnerable?”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

Others argued for women’s efficiency and competency across all spheres of life and work, sometimes drawing on women’s domestic roles as evidence of their capabilities:

*“Go to police stations, go anywhere, our ladies are doing a very good job… At every place they do a good job, at home a mother takes good care of her child.”* (Woman ASI, Women’s Helpline)

*“Women are 101% better, a woman is a mother, she is a daughter, she has given birth to man, she is able to understand all type of problems because she is a family person… What a woman can understand, a man never can.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

While many policewomen interviewed felt that there was an inevitable clash between professional and domestic responsibilities for women in the police, the marshalling of this argument to justify the unsuitability of women for routine operational policing was problematised by policewomen’s accounts of their own hard work and dedication to their duties. Like their male counterparts, they described being called for night duties and working through major festivals. In particular, the four women Inspectors I interviewed who had been deputed to investigate rape cases reported working extremely long, gruelling and unsociable hours, handling heavy and demanding workloads, and prioritising the work over their family commitments:

*“Once a case comes in between our job and family, definitely we will choose the case... My family will be taken care of my husband... but nobody can take care of victim as well, specifically if she is the lady.”* (Woman Inspector, investigating officer (IO) for rape)

Some policewomen felt that they had to work harder than male colleagues and show disproportionate commitment in order to prove themselves worthy:
“I will also have to perform better, like I was determined that I have to do equally well and things like that.” (Woman senior police official)

“I worked very hard. I have far more medals, more knowledge [than] them... To get this recognition, I worked hard... Harder than our male counterpart. Because... everybody’s mindset is that the lady cannot do this... So we have to prove. Somehow, we have to prove ourselves... For that, we have to pay some extra hard work... To establish ourselves amongst our male colleagues.” (Woman Inspector, former Parivartan IC)

Thus, dominant gendered and gendering discursive constructions of police work in Delhi Police are unstable and open to constant contestation. Such counter discourses were particularly salient in interviews with policewomen, many of whom nevertheless also rehearsed the more dominant repertoires. They challenge the reproduction of gender in and through policing and constructions of police work, but can also ambivalently contribute to it: for instance, on the one hand defending women’s strength and aptitude for police work; on the other, connecting this with women’s putative nurturing qualities and gentleness – claims which closely align with more dominant refrains about sexual difference.

In spite of this putative unsuitability of women for core tasks, the majority of interviewees, across sexes and ranks, claimed that there was a need for more women in the police. Maintaining enough women Constables in post (subject to the transfer policy) to keep Parivartan operational was a struggle; some women Constables complained that their beat partners had not been replaced after transfers. Women Inspectors were not always available to conduct rape investigations, and those who had been deployed for such purposes were heavily overburdened. Women occupy an ambivalent position in Delhi Police: not fully on the inside but not fully excluded, they are selectively included, and this selective inclusion is seen as being highly necessary to the kind of police service Delhi Police is aspiring to be and/or become.

2. Women as suitable and necessary for specialised fields and tasks

The tension between women’s putative unsuitability for ‘real police work’ and the 24-hour culture, and the calls for more women police, is resolved in part through the ways in which women are constructed as positively suitable and necessary for certain fields and tasks.
understood as increasingly important within a modern police service. Bhardwaj (1999) shows that women have historically been recruited to and deployed for specialist policing functions in Delhi Police, usually involving work with women and children (Chapter Three). She argues that the rise of women in Delhi Police reflects the increasing orientation of modern policing in democratic societies towards its ‘social work’ dimension. Constructions of policewomen’s contribution in my data are largely consistent with this history of differential deployment, and with the assumptions about police work, and about sexual/gender difference, which underlie it.

‘Lots of duties for ladies only’: Social work, emotional labour and violence/crime against women

Dealing with violence/crime against women is a key aspect of policing for which women are considered suitable and necessary, both formally and informally, alongside work involving women or children as either victims/complainants or detainees. This work is understood to belong to the broader category of ‘social work’\(^\text{142}\), which is increasingly seen as part of the police role, complementing and contributing to its law and order, crime control and security functions. Formally, the putative suitability and necessity of women for dealing with violence/crime against women is reflected in the high proportion of women deployed in the CAWC\(^\text{143}\) and the exclusive deployment of women beat Constables under Parivartan. It is stipulated according to official rules and procedures that only women may perform certain tasks such as investigating rape, and escorting women detainees (Delhi Police 2000)\(^\text{144}\) – although in practice these rules were not always observed in every instance at the time of this research, as women staff were not always available.

Informally, this presumed suitability of women for the policing of violence/crime against women is reflected in the arguments cited in Section One, which justify the low representation of women in the police on the basis that most criminals are men and there have until recently been low levels of reported violence/crime against women. It is similarly in evidence in the frequent claims that more women are needed because violence/crime against women is on the rise:

\(^\text{142}\) Other literature on specialist police services dealing with violence/crime against women, such as Dave (2005) on Maharashtra and Mumbai and Natarajan (2008) on Tamil Nadu position these as ‘social work’ functions, and demonstrate how the techniques mobilised in these settings relate to and draw on the broader tradition and field of social work in India.

\(^\text{143}\) When this research was carried out in 2008, it was reported by interviewees that 60% of staff at the CAWC Nanakpura were women; whereas women formed only seven per cent of the total strength of Delhi Police. I requested official statistics from Police HQ on the deployment of women police. I wanted to see where and in which kind of roles they were located, as anecdotally it was clear that a gender division of labour persisted. I was given absolute figures for the numbers of women at different police ranks within the organisation as a whole, but was unable to obtain these figures as percentages of the total strength of the police at the specified ranks, or a break down of where and how they were deployed.

\(^\text{144}\) Interviews with Delhi Police personnel, 2008
“We need more women because we are facing more problems related to women.”

(Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

In interviews, it is argued that women are more suitable for these posts for reasons reflecting both their presumed skill sets or innate characteristics, and the gender-specific needs and expectations of women complainants and/or children. A number of such rationales emerge as salient in the data. Firstly, it is ubiquitously claimed that women and girls are more likely to report crime and victimisation to women police. Women and girls have difficulty reporting to male police, according to this discourse – due partly to gendered norms of modesty and propriety, partly to feeling intimidated by a male figure of authority. Women and girls *‘feel shy’ in the presence of policemen, and are not able to explain things *‘related to her personal body parts’*, such as in cases of sexual violence. Policemen *‘are not able to understand what to ask’*, whereas policewomen *‘are able to understand them better’*, hence women and girls open up and can tell them everything *‘in minute detail’*. Such views were voiced by interviewees of both sexes and across the spectrum of ranks and postings. The history of the police being generally hostile towards women is sometimes referenced as part of this rationale. It is assumed that women find it easier to talk to women, that women are more understanding and better able to handle women’s issues because of their shared identity and positioning as women. This assumption is challenged by research from another context (Jordan 2002), and problematised by the fact that the policewomen participating in this research were not exempt from expressing woman-blaming beliefs about violence/crime against women and/or reproducing discourses which normalised violence.

The assumption that women and girls talk more openly to women is significant in a range of ways, depending on context. Firstly, for instance, the investigation of rape complaints by women Inspectors, with the assistance of women NGO workers or counsellors, is thought to facilitate the efficient collection of testimony and evidence. It is also thought to make women feel more comfortable and is therefore equally aimed at offering (and being seen to offer) a better service to women, as well as achieving a higher rate of ‘compromise’ and reconciliation in domestic violence cases. The deployment of women police is thought to improve women’s access to the police – for instance, via Parivartan – in areas where women were thought to be avoiding the police due to perceptions of hostility, feeling intimidated, stigma, and lack of freedom of movement:

*“Girls are able to tell us all without hesitation. Earlier girls were afraid of coming to police station. Now since we meet them in the area, the girls or women are comfortable telling us all.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)
*“Some women were like they had to remain at home, they were not allowed to go out, like we went door to door, they also got encouragement.” (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

*“Some ladies... are not able to take their problems to the police station... They say that their problems will not be heard, gents will be there, they will not hear the problems... That thing was kept in mind by Mr. Hooda that why not the ladies go to homes and hear to the problems.” (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

Secondly and relatedly, women are considered to be more sensitive and better at dealing with the victim appropriately; they are constructed as more *“caring”* by nature, better at listening, and naturally disposed to be more *“soft”* and *“gentle”* than their male counterparts. They are thought better at *“understanding”* people’s *“sensitivities”* where policemen may be *“biased”*; they *“listen with more humanity”*, and are better at *“public behaviour”*, because, ‘biologically they are different’.

“Women have some natural, inherent, positive things which we give to the society... It helps the department... police is supposed to be brutal, authoritative, and like muscle power... but police nowadays... you have to be sensitive, you have to be polite where you are dealing with problems of victims... For... performing this kind of victim-help role... I think women are the best.” (Woman senior police official)

Women are, therefore, often deemed to have innate gendered characteristics which make them more suitable for working directly with women and children victims and complainants, who, in turn, are seen as vulnerable, delicate, ‘soft’ and in need of gentle handling. These qualities are also thought by some to render women better for a range of related tasks belonging to the field of ‘social work’, such as dealing with older people, and/or which can help the police to improve its public dealing and image – such as handling the public politely. Such beliefs about sexual/gender difference and its relevance for the division of labour in policing are not new. Bhardwaj (1999: 24) cites the National Police Commission report of 1980 (Govt. of India 1980) as proposing that the presence of women police in police stations could help to make the latter more welcoming to people in distress – hence she argues that the increasing representation of women in Delhi Police is instrumental to its carving out of a more service-oriented role for the organisation (Bhardwaj 1999: 25-6). The Commission also suggested that women be deployed on daytime patrols in order to build better relations with the public, although it appears that this recommendation was not taken up before the inauguration of Parivartan in 2005, which has been treated as an innovation.
A third perceived reason for the utility of women in police work dealing with women and/or children, sometimes mobilised to explain the mandatory presence of women police to investigate rape cases and supervise women detainees, is to protect male police from (implicitly, false) accusations of sexual misconduct. What this obscures, which is only very occasionally alluded to in my interviews, is that these rules are also about protecting against custodial rape. That is, women police chaperones serves as a corrective to the fact that the police as an institution has historically not only provided an inadequate service to women but has at times notoriously been the very site and perpetrator of gender-based violence against women \(^{145}\) (Prasad 1999).

The feminised field of ‘social work’ for which women are deemed most suitable is increasingly understood as a key part of the police role, but nevertheless continues to occupy a peripheral position, siphoned off from mainstream policing. The positioning of violence/crime against women within the category of social work largely accounts for its ambivalent status as ‘real police work’. CAWC staff, for instance, link it with law and order, crime prevention, and a broad definition of ‘security’ that involves people living peacefully and harmoniously together (Chapter Five). But much violence/crime against women (especially domestic violence) is not regarded as ‘real crime’ (Chapter Five). The labour invested in addressing it is feminised, and distinguished from the prestigious, masculinised constructions of ‘real police work’ as catching dangerous criminals and demanding physical prowess, highlighted in Section One. The ambivalence of its status as ‘real police work’ is also reflected in how this work is prioritised. Problems with implementing and institutionalising Parivartan, and keeping up the programme’s momentum, indicate the extent to which violence/crime against women work has to compete with routine operational policing tasks and is often compromised as a result. These included women beat Constables being regularly prevented from carrying out their beat duties due to demands for administrative labour within the police station, or arrangement duties; loss of beat partners due to transfer policy \(^{146}\) and the constant need to find and re-train new women staff in order to replace them, with beat duties being neglected in the interim; and many of the Women’s Safety Committees (WSCs) reportedly becoming inactive as a result of lack of regular input/mobilising from the Constables.

\(^{145}\) As in the Mathura case, which was taken up by feminist activists seeking reform of rape laws: see Chapter Three.

\(^{146}\) Delhi Police personnel are recruited and trained as generalists who can work in any area of policing, rank-wise. The transfer policy is designed to protect against police officers developing private interests in a particular area or locality. Police are frequently and seemingly arbitrarily subject to transfer from one post to another, and cannot choose where or in which particular roles they work, although they do occasionally have opportunities to apply for promotions.
The discourse that the work performed by Parivartan policewomen is not ‘real police work’ does not, however, just produce closures for these women. According to one interviewee, women beat Constables defended these roles against hostility and suspicion from male Constables working the same beats precisely by marking out their specific contribution as not ‘real police work’ and as therefore not infringing on the policemen’s occupational territory. This particular woman beat Constable told me how she had dealt with resistance by explaining that her work was different, suitable for ladies only, and that she would not be taking on policemen’s regular tasks but might sometimes call upon their assistance, for instance, if needed to arrest a male perpetrator.

Women and police work: Challenging or reproducing gender?

In practice, when this research was conducted, there was a shortage of women to carry out these tasks for which they are considered most suitable and necessary. There was therefore a deliberate policy of gradually increasing the number of women in Delhi Police through phased recruitment, starting in 2003 following a government decision in 2002 (Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2006: 29). In 2008, women reportedly accounted for seven per cent of the total strength of the police, while official policy aimed to reach and maintain a figure of ten per cent. The selective inclusion of women in the police, and their construction as necessary for certain roles, can be understood both as challenging and reconfiguring gender, and also as reproducing it. The increasing opportunities for women in Delhi Police, like opportunities in other employment sectors, enable women to work outside the home and earn an income. The increasing visibility of women in policing complicates, even if it does not unambiguously undermine, the conception that only men are suitable for maintaining the masculine face of authority appropriate to a state security institution. Furthermore, a large proportion of the women deployed in Delhi Police are contributing to ongoing efforts to (at least be seen to) provide a better service for women in order to address gender inequalities and gender-specific needs in service provision.

The discourses of policewomen who imply that policing enables them to do and be certain things that, as women (from particular backgrounds), they would not otherwise be able to do, or have access to, are particularly significant in terms of how women’s selective inclusion in Delhi Police potentially reconfigures gender. For instance, a woman ASI, and a former beat Constable, both working for Parivartan, described being able to use space with greater freedom of mobility, and having opportunities to familiarise themselves with Delhi as a city, opportunities they felt would be unavailable to them outside of their official roles. They associated this with gaining knowledge and maturity:
“Like earlier we used to never go out of house, used to be afraid, today we know whole of Delhi, seen whole of Delhi... by staying in police. Wherever the duty takes [us], we have to go. We know about all places and know about everything.”

“I was very backward-minded girl, the reason behind joining Delhi Police was also that... I would get to know about the whole of Delhi... I can be posted anywhere. ... Earlier I did not know anything about bus routes. I did not know where any office was, I did not know where Parliament House was... Since I have joined Delhi Police, I was on duty at India Gate and I had not seen India Gate before that. I saw Lal Quila* then. We do our duty and also grow in maturity. ... We get knowledge about different departments.” [*the Red Fort]

I discussed how constructions of space and its legitimate (and gendered) usage figure in relation to police discourses of violence/crime against women in Chapter Six. It is notable that in narratives about Parivartan, women Constables are described as ‘roaming around’ (the Indian English translation of the Hindi verb, gumna) the beat area:

“My lady Constables used to go there in uniform and roam around” (Woman SI, former Parivartan IC)

This term, ‘roaming around’, when applied to women and girls (and occasionally men and boys) often implicitly connotes a transgression. One Constable cited in Chapter Six, for instance, described an incident in which a girl was found *“roaming around” the city late at night, so the beat Constables picked her up and brought her to the police station. Women’s Helpline staff described how they are called to cases in which a woman or girl is found *“roaming around”, or *“by the side of the road”. Women are not supposed to just ‘roam around’ places, if they are out and about they generally (are expected to) have a purpose (Viswanath and Mehrotra 2007). Injunctions on freedom of movement (which differently positioned women experience to varying degrees) are deeply enmeshed with the notion of women’s bodies as inherently violatable when they are ‘out of place’. There are therefore strong hints that working in the police, and especially being deployed on beat patrols, enables women to legitimately transgress some of the prevalent gender norms governing use of space and freedom of movement.

A number of policewomen interviewed felt that working in the police lent them resources with which to challenge gender-based and sexual violence at both individual and structural levels. Head Constables from the self-defence training unit recounted many occasions on which they had made use of their authority as policewomen to challenge ‘eve-teasers’ on public transport. These incidents were presented as part of a broader pattern of delegitimising sexual harassment and assault and letting the perpetrators know that it would not be tolerated, even while
lamenting the unwillingness of many women and girls to engage in equally militant, confrontational tactics. Some policewomen claimed they had joined the police, *“so that we can do something for the women in the society”*, through involvement in providing services to women. Some insinuated that, by working for the police, they could contribute to the development of a more gender equal society through the symbolic effect of visibly endowing women with positions of authority:

“It will be good for the whole society... You see, being in the police gives you lot of empowerment... Wearing uniform itself you feel that you are an authority... and giving that authority to women, giving that kind of confidence to women, how much it can change... It’s a message... that women can do everything.” (Woman senior police official)

These policewomen use their selective and gendered inclusion in Delhi Police to their own ends and as part of their own projects which, in ambivalent ways, challenge certain gender norms and stereotypes, even as others are reinforced.

On the other hand, this selective inclusion of women in Delhi Police also contributes to reproducing gender. It positions women in either support functions considered peripheral to ‘real police work’, or in stereotypically feminised fields which draw heavily on women’s emotional labour and supposed innate propensity for caring. It thus reproduces essentialised understandings of sexual/gender differences, including those putative differences constructed as explaining violence/crime against women – for instance, positing women’s bodies as vulnerable because they are physically weak, soft and gentle. Thus, constructions of women’s gender-specific skills and propensities for social work oriented policing participate in reproducing some of the gender discourses which can also play into normalising, and reproducing the conditions that enable, gender-based violences.

The alignment between women’s putative weakness, and the sorts of qualities attributed to them which are thought to be valuable for social work, remains unstable and implicitly contested, however. I have already shown, for instance, how some policewomen value the feminised skills attributed to women such as being good listeners and dealing with victims of crime sensitively, but do not equate these with weakness but rather with a kind of strength, that extends deeper than physical toughness and encompasses endurance for suffering, the capacity to give birth and nurture:
*“I would like to add something... about ladies. They are gentle but not weak. The other term for 'power' is also 'woman', she gives birth to all. Even death is conquered by her... They have so many powers in them.” (Woman Inspector, CAWC)

“No, women are not less stronger than men, emotionally as well as physically... Have you ever going into mythology of this India?... Whenever trouble came to anybody, only women, the goddesses, the devise* will save the men [laughs]... Ladies are more trusting, trustworthy, more dominated, more caring, more justified... more faithful than men.” (Woman Inspector, former Parivartan IC) [*goddesses]

Women’s putative suitability / unsuitability for certain kinds of police work, including the policing of violence against women, and their selective inclusion in the police, highlight the embeddedness of the police in their social and historical context. The ways in which policing work is gendered and gendering are connected with, and form part of, broader gender conditions which normalise certain violences: the norms and practices which reflect the heteronormative joint family with gendered power inequalities, norms about which spaces women and men can safely inhabit, and constructions of sexual/gender difference, such as the belief that women’s bodies are inherently vulnerable to violation. Some of these ways in which policing is gendered and gendering also, and simultaneously, reflect the masculinism of the police as a fetishised state security institution, installed by and through colonialism. As shown in Section One, they reflect the peculiar police fetishism of modern India’s national security state. Hence, as I have shown, discourses which produce gender difference in policing betray signs of characteristic police fetishism, the associated myths about ‘real police work’ and its symbiotic relationship with the production and validation of a certain kind of masculinity.

I will go on to argue in this chapter, however, that the masculinity which Delhi Police appears to be cultivating is different from this ‘traditional’ fetishised idea of brute strength and catching dangerous criminals. These two (at least) constructions of masculinity co-exist and at times complement and reinforce one another, within Delhi Police. My argument illuminates how the selective inclusion of women, and the securitisation of violence/crime against women, contribute to producing the ‘right’ kind of masculinity at the level of the police organisation, and how it conceptualises and represents itself. In moving towards elaborating this argument further, the next section discusses how the issue of gender and policing, and a process referred

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147 ‘Joint family’ is a term commonly used in India for the patrilineal, extended family unit. Under such living arrangements, a woman typically moves in with her husband, his parents, any unmarried sisters and possibly any brothers and their wives and children, when she gets married.
to as ‘gender sensitisation’ in particular, have become issues for intervention and transformation in Delhi Police, as it reinvents and seeks to modernise itself.

3. Gender and policing as an issue for intervention and transformation

‘Gender sensitisation’ is a term widely used in the police (and beyond) in Delhi to refer to a process of organisational learning and transformation vis-à-vis the issue of ‘gender’. At the time of this research, the CAWC was rolling out a programme of gender sensitisation training district-wise to all police stations, delivered by local NGOs. However, ‘gender sensitisation’ is used – particularly by senior police involved in delivering and improving services for women – to refer to a broader and more amorphous process than can be captured through formal training programmes. It is argued that gender sensitisation and the provision of better services for women are needed and important. In this section, I first discuss how ‘gender sensitisation’ is conceptualised and with what effects. I then consider why ‘gender sensitisation’ and improved services for women are considered important by key figures in Delhi Police. I highlight the temporal narratives through which the ‘gender story’ of Delhi Police gets told in interviews, which can be situated against, and form a crucial part of, a broader narrative of ongoing transformation and progress. This section therefore develops the theme of temporality explored in Chapter Seven, and furthers the argument that Delhi Police’s ‘gender credentials’, including its initiatives for women, serve as markers of progress.

**Gender sensitisation: ‘Women live in a different world’**

Senior police officials offered a range of accounts of gender sensitisation. Some comments allude to the theme of correcting inequality and exploitation. For Dr Hooda, the nodal officer responsible for Parivartan, gender sensitisation is about “understanding patriarchy” and, “its effects on the gender relations or on the development or on the status of women”, and Parivartan is therefore part of this wider project. A woman senior official claims it is about making people aware of where women are “ill-treated or exploited in society”, and inculcating “ideal behaviours” to avoid repeating such ill-treatment. Indeed, ideal behaviours are a ubiquitous theme in these accounts – gender sensitisation is often reduced to, ‘how to behave with/treat women’, on the basis that they are a “distinct category of person”. Some accounts also imply the correcting of police complicity in the reproduction of inequality, by providing better and more equitable services where these have been systematically lacking – such that
there should be, “no discrepancy or discrimination” in dealings with either women complainants or female colleagues: because, a “lot of instances have been coming up where woman has not been attended to properly [by the police]”. While Dr Hooda, in designing Parivartan, perceived inequality as deep-seated and structural (see Chapter Five), this is far from uniformly the case in senior police accounts of gender sensitisation – a point I return to below.

The most ubiquitous understanding of gender sensitisation is as a process through which the police are learning to be ‘sensitive’ to women. This is what the “ideal behaviours” promoted consist in: learning how to provide appropriate services which cater to women’s gender-specific needs. This includes treating women with “empathy” in a “non-judgmental” way for some officials, but it also rests on an appreciation that, “women live in a different world”, and therefore policemen need to understand their different “psyche”. This is not, thus, comparable to gender mainstreaming as considering the gendered impact and implications of all organisational policies, structures and practices. In these accounts which frame gender sensitisation as about ‘learning how to deal with women’ (including that of an official with very senior management responsibility in the CAWC at the time of my research), gender sensitisation can be reduced to a technical problem with a technical – read, apolitical – solution. Training, education and awareness-raising is the answer which will beat a smooth path to good practice in relation to women complainants:

“They are updated with the legal knowledge related to women... through various role-plays, exercises, and you can say discussions, case studies... so that more and more police personnel are sensitised on the issues related to women to make a gender-friendly environment in the police stations.” (Male senior police official, CAWC)

Despite Dr Hooda’s commitment to deeper transformation of unequal gendered social relations both within and (more significantly, for him) beyond the police, many of Parivartan’s ground-level practitioners, and others within the police, understand the programme in the same vein as these dominant accounts of gender sensitisation, as about problem-solving and treating women more kindly. Of course, treating women complainants with kindness and sensitivity – and having standards of treatment monitored and enforced by institutional mechanisms, albeit imperfect ones (such at the Women’s Helpline) – is not a bad thing in a context in which police stations have historically been not only hostile and unwelcoming to women complainants, but at worst sites of further violence. Nevertheless, these accounts risk oversimplifying and obscuring the deeply structural dimensions of gender inequality, and their expression in and through police discourses and practices, including the securitisation of violence/crime against women.
Not only is this account of gender sensitisation depoliticising, a further effect is that it relies on, and reinforces, a ubiquitous discourse of sexual/gender difference which, I have shown, is also mobilised in justifying and reproducing the predominance of men in the police and the differential deployment of women, and is complicit in (re-)normalising gender-based violences. In this discourse, gender sensitisation is necessary because women are different from men, or the “general” public. They are “sensitive” about their “personal space”; more vulnerable, and have gender-specific needs. The recognition of gender-specific needs in service provision is potentially useful, since there is ample evidence that inequalities can be reproduced by treating everyone ‘the same’. The principle of making special provisions in order to promote equality for women, as well as for other oppressed and marginalised groups, is enshrined in the Indian Constitution (Chapter Three) and put into practice through reservations for Scheduled Castes and Tribes and ‘Other Backward Castes’ in employment, education and political institutions, and for women in local government and (following recent legislation) the national parliament.

In Delhi Police, however, it is significant that the dominant construction of gender sensitisation reifies sexual/gender difference in such a way as to reinforce gender stereotypes which contribute to reproducing gender-based violences. This again exemplifies how gender is, albeit unevenly and imperfectly, at times insidiously (and violently) reproduced through the very strategies mobilised to ameliorate gender-based violences. The (violent) reproduction of gender constrains and limits the emancipatory potential of the organisation’s (in some other ways, innovative and useful) anti-violence/crime against women programmes.

‘Today, Delhi Police is a modern and people-friendly force’

Nevertheless there is considerable investment in the project of Delhi Police becoming gender-sensitised and providing better services to women. Parivartan was initiated as a response to bad press coverage of poor police responses to rape complaints; it was deemed imperative by senior officials to be seen to be doing something, and Parivartan served to publicly demonstrate Delhi Police’s gender-sensitive credentials – and to show that the Delhi Police cares for its public. The significance of police-public relations should not be underestimated in this context, given the record of poor accountability and history of fraught relations between the police and the public in India (Chapter Three), the roots of which can be traced back to the inception of the police as an instrument of colonial repression. Police personnel and the police organisation as such are acutely aware of this unfavourable reputation, with some protesting that it has stuck unfairly. The theme of police relations with the public, and the public image of the police, emerges repeatedly in the interview data. Initiatives to address violence/crime against women are constructed as helping to improve this image through building better relations with the public. For instance, one senior police official frames gender sensitisation (although “especially for women”) as contributing to a more “people-friendly” atmosphere in police
stations in general. A consultant, who reviewed Parivartan for a UNDP documentation project on gender mainstreaming, told me:

“They will be fools not to replicate [Parivartan]... They are under pressure from the media, from the public as far as violence against women is concerned... It is in their interests to adopt something like this. It brings in a lot visibility for the police for doing good work. It helps them change their image in the minds of the people... They have to show the sensitive side of police... That women can approach police stations without the fear of being raped.”

Another senior police official formerly involved in overseeing Parivartan described how sexual harassment and an environment which is threatening to women and girls can make a whole area seem unsafe and “give the general impression of lawlessness” and “lack of freedom among... everyone.” In doing so, he positions Parivartan as wider than a programme targeting women and girls, but as demonstrably doing something about public safety, and thus proving the police to be more effective and better serving the public at large. Women and girls, despite being simultaneously singled out in their gender-specificity, are re-included in the ‘general public’ through such concerns.

Insofar as Parivartan, and other initiatives for women, are considered good for Delhi Police’s public image, they can be understood to function as part of an ongoing project on the part of the police organisation, of reinventing and modernising itself, and attempting to shed its negative image as brutish and ineffective. As shown in Chapter Seven, initiatives for women serve as markers of progress for the police. This aim of projecting a renewed and more humane public image is in evidence in the way in which Delhi Police represents itself in official statements. For instance, until June 2012, the Commissioner of Police message to the public on the Delhi Police website (Delhi Police 2008) read, ‘Today, Delhi Police is a modern and a people friendly force. Its commitment is expressed best in its mission statement and slogans – ‘With you, For you, Always’. The priority of Delhi Police is conveyed well in another of its slogan - ‘Citizens First’” (emphasis added). The ‘today’ in this statement serves to temporalise it: a ‘modern and people-friendly force’ is what Delhi Police is in the here and now, what it has worked to become and continues to strive to be. I return below to how the story of Delhi Police and its modern, organisational identity is temporally produced.

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148 This project, which has a lot to do with image management, has to be understood against the history of police reform efforts in India, the stagnation of such efforts and entrenched resistance, especially on the part of state authorities (including the Union Home Ministry) to inaugurating and implementing laws which would guarantee better accountability, independence and civilian oversight of the police, and freedom from political interference. See CHRI (2007).

149 Former Commissioner BK Gupta left the Commissioner post in June 2012 and his message to the public is no longer posted on the site.
This project is also in evidence in my interview data, not only in the concern to defend the police against misrepresentation, but also in the value accorded to people and listening skills and the cultivation of a caring, service-oriented approach, in discussions of which qualities make a good police officer. As briefly indicated in Section One, this was a salient and pervasive theme in the data. As commonly as they pronounced the need for physical fitness, stamina and brute strength, police officers of all ranks declared a good police officer should *“be polite”* and *“honest”,* *“have patience”* and *“listen purely without any bias”* but *“with attention”* to complainants; should *“know how to talk to the public”,* show understanding and offer guidance, *“help”* and *“be with the public in every way”,* and act as their *“friend”*. One woman senior police official put it thus:

“I would like a police officer to be a good human being first... do your duty well... and then helping attitude of course... it’s basically personal integrity.”

While not necessarily a good indication of daily practice (which may or may not bear out these de jure priorities), the importance of such skills and qualities – and in particular the way in which they appear, in the data, to have been emphasised in official training – seems to indicate that building good public relations and a good public image is currently highly valued in Delhi Police, and part of an ongoing (if not strictly official) project of re-making itself as an organisation.

The traits valued in these excerpts are in tension with the more traditionally masculine characteristics such as bodily and mental strength and stamina, which, as detailed in Section One, are considered imperative for the accomplishment of ‘real police work’. What it also illustrates is that the boundaries of ‘real police work’ are unstable, as they are reworked to accommodate the focus on ‘social work’ in policing. Hence I argued above that the status of violence/crime against women as ‘real police work’ is ambivalent, rather than straightforwardly excluded. But although these characteristics prima facie appear stereotypically ‘feminine’ and are often feminised in the data, this reworking and expanding of ‘real police work’ does not necessarily destabilise it as a resource for doing masculinity. It rather enables Delhi Police as an organisation to aspire to, and perform, a different kind of, more mature, modern, advanced, caring, paternalist masculinity. This masculinity does not fully transcend the masculinity consisting in brute strength and toughness associated with police fetishism, which as shown in Section One, is still deeply invested in by the police. These two masculinities are not mutually exclusive but co-exist intimately in the data. The former strives to integrate and incorporate the latter, if somewhat tempering it such that it is expressed as less deviant and brutal, but more protective.
Further evidence of this project of reworking the police and its public image is the emphasis, highlighted in Chapter Five, on providing services to ‘vulnerable’ populations. Gender sensitisation, as improving services to women, fits into this – women being constructed as a ‘vulnerable’ group, alongside children, the elderly, and people with disabilities. The emphasis on service provision for the vulnerable in discussions of police initiatives for women suggests an element of showing the police’s ‘people-friendly’ credentials by positioning women as helpless and in need of assistance. Visible initiatives for women, according to this logic, can be read as demonstrating the benevolent, compassionate, paternalistic side of policing, as it strives to transcend its repressive colonial heritage.

Connotations of the paternal role of the police towards society at large, and demonstrably towards women in particular, are expressed through the use of the metaphor of family in interviews. When talking about training police officers how to behave ‘gender sensitively’, the trope of familial ties is often mobilised: the police evidently need to learn to treat women as they would treat their sisters/mothers/daughters/wives. In Chapter Six I linked this trope with the glorification of the family. It problematically belies the prevalence of violence within the family, but serves, when thus mobilised, to position the police in a recognisably caring, and sometimes condescending, orientation towards women complainants. The following excerpt from a male senior police official’s interview is particularly interesting; here he positions Delhi Police as the father to whom the daughter (‘women’) turns when her marriage is in trouble:

“It is just like say, you know, a married woman has a fight with the husband and she goes and reports it to say her father. Now, what is her father supposed to do? The father would first try to kind of reconcile... rather than immediately start taking... action against the erring party... So, we play that role... Advantage is that of carrot and stick. That well, you better reconcile, otherwise we’ll take police action, so it works very well.”

He extends the simile further, commenting that if the woman has had an extra-marital affair, the father’s conclusion as to whether her husband’s abuse was justified will certainly be affected. Hence, in addition to positioning the police as a paternal authority vis-à-vis women ‘in distress’, this passage simultaneously highlights the ever present imperative to consider the extent to which the woman may be held responsible for the violence perpetrated against her. Women are

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150 Hence in 2009 the CAWC was merged with the juvenile unit in Delhi Police to form the Special Police Unit for Women and Children (SPUWAC).
to be benevolently assisted, but also, where applicable, properly disciplined for their marital and familial conduct – for their own part in inviting violence.

Finally, the sense of Delhi Police refashioning itself as a modern organisation is also produced by a set of interconnected temporal narratives, recounting stories of ongoing transformation both within and beyond the police: about women becoming educated and entering public life, and about the police improving its relations with and services for the public, employing more women, providing better services for women and becoming more ‘gender-friendly’. The story is repeated in different ways throughout the data, by policemen and women of various ranks and postings. The pattern it follows is broadly that: *“earlier”*, *“there were no women in the police”; “police stations were never headed by lady officers”;* women did not want to join or have support from their families to do so. *“People did not consider police as good”*, but *“felt that we won’t be heard”* as, *“police is there to beat up people only”*. Now, in contrast, more and more women are becoming educated and working in the police, and *“the public perception has now changed”, as *“police tries to sort out matters politely and with love”*. These broader changes in policing are often run together with the narrative about the rise of women in the police, as in the following woman SI’s account:

*“Earlier… less educated people used to join police and secondly they [the public] used to think all police does is catch the thieves but now this is not the case. Earlier policemen were not looked upon as good. Today this is not so, police does help, even for children, for ladies it is there, for older people there is a senior citizen cell… Earlier people [thought] that police is bad but now it has changed… Police gets involved with public… Now people have started believing that police will help… The image of police has improved in public eye… Very few females used to come to police but now education… has come… Just now a batch of 1000 girls came, before this a batch of 700 girls came... Strength is increasing.”*

Sometimes women’s presence in policing is explicitly linked with positive change: *“ladies don’t do such things”* as not listening to complainants or *“showing them [the public] might of police”, but they do, in such narratives, report the misbehaviour of male colleagues to senior officers. In some accounts, official work on gender sensitisation is considered to improve the police and its image, and these changes in policing, including the gender composition of the police, are equated with, *“society… developing more and more”*.

These narratives are elicited by discussions about why the police is dominated by men, about women’s suitability for different types of police work – and, especially, discussions of
Parivartan. Parivartan in these narratives is considered both an expression of this wider process of change, and instrumental to producing change – in the working of the police, police-public relations, and public perceptions of the police:

*“Police has already changed a lot from before and is still changing. What Parivartan has done is we also get to know how we should talk, how we should behave with public... now more awareness has come in.”* (Woman beat Constable, Parivartan Cell)

Similarly, the processes of more women becoming involved in policing and being deployed in new ways, and of the police becoming more ‘gender-sensitive’ and improving its services for women, are constructed as intertwined with, and instrumental to, the broader transformation of the police organisation into a more ‘people-friendly’, modern force as it transcends its repressive colonial past. The presence of women police and visibly better services for women are understood to directly enhance the public image and overall performance of the police. This intersecting, gendered group of temporal narratives about change within policing fit together with, and sometimes echo, the story of the rise of ‘social work’ in Delhi Police proffered by Bhardwaj’s (1999) analysis, as a peripheral, niche area of police work. Indeed, the expansion of the category of ‘real police work’ (alluded to above) is directly implicated in the woman SI’s temporal narrative, just cited: “earlier we thought all the police does is catch thieves but now that’s not the case.” The rise of ‘social work’, including specialised initiatives to address violence/crime against women, as a feminised field for which women are particularly suited, is positioned as part of the story of the progress of Delhi Police from its unsavoury history towards a modern, compassionate, caring and altogether more professional future.

**Conclusion**

Having explored police discourses of violence/crime against women in the previous three chapters, this chapter has shown that ‘police fetishism’ is alive in Delhi Police, and reflected in gendered constructions of ‘real police work’ as catching criminals, conducting raids and suppressing riots. Thus constructed, ‘real police work’ in these discourses requires male bodies and masculine characteristics which women, due to their physical and sexual composition and non-negotiable, ‘culturally’ sanctioned domestic responsibilities, cannot adequately provide. Women are not straightforwardly excluded from policing, however, and ‘real police work’ is a more flexible, unstable and contradictory category than can be captured in an account of police fetishism and the marking of women as unsuitable. Hence, violence/crime against women occupies an ambivalent position, not fully included in, or excluded from, the category of ‘real
police work’. Women are selectively included in the police but differentially deployed through strategies both official and informal, and constructed as most suitable for the feminised field of ‘social work’, which encompasses ‘caring’ police roles in addition to the policing of violence/crime against women in particular. Their suitability for this ambivalently peripheral field of police work stems from their putative, inherently gendered traits and ‘soft’ skill set.

Women continue to enter Delhi Police in increasing numbers and are seen to make a distinctive contribution. Their professional presence tests and stretches the boundaries of ‘real police work’. Nevertheless they are accommodated within the police in a way that does not undermine its organisational masculinity. In effect, the securitisation of violence/crime against women, and the attendant selective inclusion of women within the police, contributes to a wider project of cultivating the right kind of masculinity for a police force in the national capital city of a nation-state which imagines itself as modern, independent, democratic, increasingly developed and forward-thinking. These processes and concerns are framed as changing the police as an organisation and, by extension (I extrapolate), the way in which it does security. However, these changes are negotiated in ways which carefully avoid feminising the police. They have the effect of feeding into a transformation in the organisational masculinity which Delhi Police projects as it struggles to gain and maintain legitimacy at different levels: in Delhi, in India, and before an imagined international audience (as discussed in Chapter Seven).

The masculinity of the police is implicitly framed as moving from its past incarnation as aggressive, deviant, repressive, neo-colonial, brutal and corrupt, towards (aspirations of being) modern, benevolent, paternalistic, educated, global, developed and progressive. This ‘modern’ masculinity does not straightforwardly transcend the ‘tough’ masculinity closely aligned with police fetishism. Rather, it incorporates it but dresses it (certainly not always successfully) with a ‘friendly’, paternal, benevolent face, emphasising its protective dimension in contrast to its notorious, historical and contextual association with police brutality and deviance. I do not mean to suggest that this is a coherent or explicit policy or public relations project, but rather the coalescence of a set of effects, and one way in which the value organisationally accorded to being seen as increasingly gender-sensitive and as addressing the safety of women in the city can be understood.

The increasing scope for women’s professional participation in policing, and relatedly, the rise of a range of police services addressing violence/crime against women, contribute to challenging, and enabling the reworking of, gender norms in significant ways. However, the
effects of these two deeply intertwined phenomena, as I have argued throughout this thesis, remain ambivalent and contradictory. Despite the indisputable benefits of women’s increasing involvement in policing, the gendering of police work continues to be complicit in the (violent) reproduction of gender, which in turn complicates the emancipatory potential of the non-conventional and innovative performances of security which emerge from Delhi Police’s securitisation of violence/crime against women.
- Conclusion -

Reclaiming security as emancipation?
On the possibilities and limits of transforming (gendered) power

In December 2012, a woman named Jyoti Singh was gang raped on a city bus in Delhi. She later died from her injuries. This event catalysed a wave of protests within and beyond Delhi, and Delhi Police once again found itself uncomfortably at the centre of a media furore, playing out in the international spotlight. Its ability to keep women safe in the city came under renewed question. Explicit woman-blaming and paternalistic discourses were in evidence, circulating both within and beyond the police, who participated to varying degrees in normalising the idea that women are responsible for (managing or preventing) violence perpetrated against them, such as sexual violence on public transport. However, Delhi Police were also clearly responsive to the need to be seen to be doing something about the problem of violence against women. Notably, furthermore, woman-blaming and paternalistic discourses were vigorously contested, indicating that the discursive construction of violence against women currently forms a site of significant contestation and struggle in (and beyond) India. This thesis has examined the way in which Delhi Police has negotiated this terrain of discursive struggle, which has significant implications for its organisational identity construction, and its contribution to realising India’s aspirations to modern nation-state-hood.

In doing so, it has explored the question set out in the Introduction: what are the discursive effects of securitising violence against women? I chose to pursue this question in relation to everyday gender-based violences, because, I argued, the human security paradigm lacks theoretical resources to account for these, or for the implication of security discourses/practices in their (re)production. This Conclusion distils the theoretical arguments that emerge from my analysis, and considers the remaining research question: what are the implications for rethinking human security from a critical feminist perspective?
The policing of violence against women, alternative securities, and the violent reproduction of gender

I began my empirical analysis with the story of Parivartan: operation ‘Change’, Delhi Police’s ‘campaign for the safety of women in Delhi’, launched in 2005 following a gendered security crisis in the city which brought Delhi Police’s notoriety for its poor handling of rape cases to a head. On close inspection, Delhi Police’s initiatives to address violence/crime against women, Parivartan in particular, showed some interesting possibilities for institutionalising non-conventional practices of security, which might offer resources for re-thinking human security, as an emancipatory project, from a feminist perspective, and forging pathways towards it. Significantly, Parivartan was framed in self-consciously feminist language and projected transformatory goals, its official stated aim being to ‘change the patriarchal mindset’, both within but especially, beyond the police. It introduced new modes of deployment for some women Constables in Delhi Police. The model of security implied and (to some degree) operationalised by Parivartan (and related interventions) foregrounded the everydayness and embeddedness of (some) gender-based violences and involved entering the terrain of the everyday, rather than confronting only its ruptures. Concomitantly, It sought ways to reconfigure the everyday, promoting change in people’s daily practices, interactions and ways of relating to one another. In doing so, at times it aligned security with resistance, empowerment and self-determination. It sought to empower young women to use their bodies and their voices in ways that name, resist and refuse violence in their daily lives, and to empower them with knowledge about their rights and potential capabilities to do so. Security and violence were not unequivocally individualised by these interventions, which (prima facie) recognised that women and girls face a set of everyday, gendered conditions which can be conducive to violence, and tried to impart a range of tools to negotiate these.

It is likely that there is also considerable scope for drawing on a range of other interventions and forms of resistance and organising in order to rethink human security (how, for example, have the protests against the recent Delhi rape defined ‘security’?). What is useful about the analysis presented here, is that it explores the potential (and limits) for alternative securities to emerge from the securitisation of violence against women by and through a conventional, masculinist state security institution, and its negotiation not only of everyday, gendered violences, but of feminist discourses about them, circulating at a range of levels.

However, in addition to opening up resources for rethinking human security, in its emancipatory dimension, from a feminist perspective, the analysis in this thesis points again to the
reproduction of (gendered) power in and through security discourse/practice. Even the potentially emancipatory modes of doing security highlighted here remain entangled with a gendered model of security as coercive authority and protection, and in this particular context, the securitisation of violence against women produces a host of ambivalent and contradictory effects. Domestic violence within marriage in particular – although, or even because, it is broadly treated as paradigmatic of violence/crime against women – is normalised by Delhi Police through interventions which effectively decriminalise it, and involve the state in disciplining couples to conduct their marital relationships more (gender) normatively. Women and girls are largely, and sometimes insidiously, held responsible for violence perpetrated against them, or for preventing, avoiding and/or managing it. This includes managing the putative inherent vulnerability of their bodies, and channelling their agency in line with both normative gender and sexuality, and with fulfilling this responsibility for averting violence. I found notions of responsibility to be pervasive, and to cut across a range of other salient themes.

I showed how gendered safety is conflated with (normative ideas of) sexual integrity, and the policing of sexual violence serves to regulate young people’s, especially women’s and girls’, sexuality in accordance with normative sexual mores, reproducing the glorification of the family and marital heterosexuality as a compulsory institution for women. The conflation of safety with sexual integrity has implications for police constructions of authentic victimhood, which in turn are likely to affect police handling of rape cases – despite the fact that rape, unlike domestic violence, is treated as ‘real crime’ by the police. Existing feminist literature indicates that police constructions of gendered safety as sexual integrity intersect and overlap with Indian legal discourses on sexual violence and their regulatory effects. Sexual violence is both exceptionalised and normalised, reproducing women’s and girls’ responsibility for managing or avoiding sexual risk and danger, and for ‘saving their honour’.

Additionally, the policing of violence/crime against women (re)produces class differentiation and identification by projecting violence onto certain unruly spaces, such as the slums and resettlement colonies, and policing them more intensively. The awareness and education posited as necessary to counteract, prevent and avoid violence, which such spaces and their inhabitants are constructed as lacking, translates into knowledge of (how to successfully perform) normative gender and sexuality, particularly (though not exclusively) when it comes to marital and family relationships. Addressing violence/crime against women serves as a marker of progress for the police. However, partly through the ambivalent negotiation of the ‘modern(-foreign)’ in police discourses, progress is frequently aligned with (the performance of) normative gender and sexuality.
My analysis also considered how police work is gendered, highlighting the exclusion and selective inclusion of women in Delhi Police, and the effects in terms of the (re)production of ideas about sexual difference and expectations of gender normative behaviour. I argued that ‘gender sensitisation’, the rise of women police and of initiatives to address violence/crime against women – in short, the organisation’s ‘gender credentials’ – contribute to cultivating a more ‘modern’ organisational masculinity for Delhi Police, which nevertheless continues to depend on and reinvest in the naturalisation of sexual difference.

This analysis has explored a range of ways in which the policing of violence/crime against women seeks to, and sometimes succeeds in, challenging and reworking gender norms and gendered practices. But equally, it points to the complex ways in which police discourses of violence/crime against women, the disciplinary power they exert and its regulatory effects, (violently) reproduce gender, and with it conditions which contribute to enabling and sustaining gender-based violences. Efforts to reconfigure the everyday in ways that might alleviate or prevent violence, simultaneously and sometimes inadvertently re-secure these gendered, everyday conditions. Violence is at times re-individualised by these very interventions, in particular through this framing of women’s responsibility, vulnerability and gendered and sexual agency. I maintain that this process of reproduction is always imperfect, however, often ambivalent, and co-exists in tension with a range of contradictory forces. This is evident not only from the salient counter-discourses explored throughout the chapters, which typically ebb and flow in their divergence from, and conversely immanence to, the dominant repertoires in the data. It is also evident in the fact that, as I have shown, processes of change are taking place within Delhi Police, the context in which the organisation is embedded, and the dialectic between the two.

**Security as power and discourse**

The (violent) reproduction of gender in and through the securitisation of violence against women, which persists in tension with the potential for alternative securities it also generates, underscores that, rethinking human security from a critical feminist perspective means apprehending security not only as an emancipatory project, but also as, ‘a set of discourses’ (Shepherd 2009). It means accounting for the implication of security discourse/practice in particular configurations of (gendered) power, in addition to projecting emancipatory goals. The complicity of security discourse/practice in shifting, contextual relations of power complicates the utopian equation of security with emancipation.
My analysis in this thesis confirms the need to conceptualise security as a field of power configured in highly context-specific ways. It refutes the familiar fallacy of reducing ‘security’ to a public good, or positing insecurity as a problem to which there is a technical solution: the better or more effective delivery of security through stronger capabilities or provision of services. In one sense, conceiving violence against women as a security problem lends itself to such a reduction. There are many ways in which the state’s protections have often failed, and continue to fail, to extend to women experiencing various kinds of gender-based violence\(^\text{151}\). It could be argued that the (violent) reproduction of gender in and through the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi is partly about technical capabilities. For instance, the state lacks the resources to provide an adequate network of refuges to enable women to exit violent relationships – a model which has been crucial in other national contexts (though usually still under-provisioned).

*Parivartan* made a concerted attempt to extend security provision into spaces and situations which it had not reached: into women’s everyday lives, homes and intimate relationships, into the slums and resettlement colonies. I have shown, however, that its effects have been ambivalent, and did not always unequivocally make women and girls more secure, but at times may have participated in reproducing the very structural foundations of their gendered insecurity. Notwithstanding issues with technical capabilities and the allocation of resources, my analysis shows how these effects are intimately entwined with the way in which key discursive categories such as ‘women’, ‘violence’, ‘safety’ and ‘security’ are (explicitly or implicitly) constructed. In this way, it echoes the findings of feminist research into the securitisation of gender-based violences under conditions of armed conflict (Hansen 2001; Shepherd 2008, 2008a), which shows that its problematic and ambivalent effects are not simply failures of policy implementation, but flow from the discursive construction of significant categories (‘gender violence’, ‘international security’, ‘nation’, ‘rape’) in/by different representations and policy instruments. Security is a ‘political technology’ (Burke 2002), a discursive terrain, inescapably involving the exercise of power.

\(^{151}\) They also fail to extend to all sorts of other people in ways which are gendered and in ways which imply, or stem from, other axes of power and difference.
Security as emancipation as transformation

My analysis brings the discursivity of security to the fore. This problematises human security’s emancipatory re-articulation of security, but it does not render it completely invalid or obsolete. In Chapter One, I argued for a perspective on violence which balances attention to its materiality, corporeality and experiential dimensions with foregrounding this discursivity. This in turn implies an understanding of security as a material and experiential phenomenon in relation to violence, and therefore an emancipatory model of security in line with the vision proffered by human security’s normative agenda – being more free from the oppressive effects of violence. Shepherd (2008: 69), however, critiques the eliding of ‘security’ with (global) emancipation: security as absolute freedom from (oppressive power structures, etc.) in a world in which all threats ‘can be adequately neutralized’ (ibid.). She protests that framing such promises as absolute seems ‘hollow’ given the ‘huge disparities in access to such freedom’ (70), and that differences of social and political context are ignored in the assumption that such freedoms are universally applicable. Furthermore, she critiques the ‘conscious universalism’ of emancipatory formulations of security, and their apparent, ethnocentric failure to acknowledge the roots of their philosophical underpinnings in (Western) liberalism. This critique derives in part from what I call the discursivity of security, and from a perspective which (like this research) is interested in making visible its operation as a field of power.

The empirical analysis in this thesis indeed seems to substantiate the claim that security is not achievable as an absolute. This research offers a way of thinking about how security institutions, practices, and discourses are embedded in their particular social, historical and normative contexts, and thus implicated in the reproduction of the violences they seek to address or safeguard against, precisely because neither security as practice, nor violence, are extra-discursive. There will always therefore be limits to the extent to which security can be emancipatory, and to which emancipatory security can be achievable, since it is itself a gendered and gendering practice of power that is intertwined with, not outside of, the power structures which (re)produce gendered violences, and thus implicated in the (violent) reproduction of gender. However, abandoning any possibility of security as emancipatory seems to concede the inevitability and intractability of (gendered and gendering) violences. Insofar as being or feeling ‘secure’ has to do with being free from (the threat of) violence(s), ranging from the bodily to the structural to the symbolic, security overlaps with some idea of emancipation. The discursivity of security need not mean giving up any sense of it as emancipatory. Rather, it demands its rethinking, through a critical lens which is attentive to its implication in relations of power.
In other words, security as a positive good, and as emancipatory, must be reconciled with its discursivity, its status as an institutional field of power, and with a Foucauldian understanding of power as pervasive, productive, unstable and relational. Conceptualising security as a ‘positive public good’ (Hoogensen and Rottem 2004: 157) and as emancipatory in relation to violence, might mean (among other things) conceptualising it as (the product/outcome of) successful resistance to violence, prevention of violence, denormalisation of violence; as inscribing limits and constraints on the possibilities for violence, and all the ways in which it harms and oppresses and produces particular kinds of subjects (Mason 2002). This might seem to position security as a ‘negative’ – the absence of violence or its threat. It can also be conceived as a ‘positive’ condition in the sense that it is the ability to mitigate or diffuse violence or its threat, and even more so, the capabilities (beings and doings) which are enabled when the constraints and oppressions of violence are lifted. I concur with feminist theorists such as Truong et al (2006) and Robinson (2008), who argue that security as emancipatory is about more than negative freedoms (freedom from violence, keeping threats at bay) but about securing, enabling and facilitating the social relations or ‘relational webs’ that sustain (human) life and ensure its flourishing. Relations, that is, which (among other things) limit or minimise the possibilities for violence. Freedom-from-violence cannot be individualised, because of the way in which violence is – as Judith Butler (2004: 28-29) argues – ‘always, an exploitation of… that primary way in which we are, as bodies, outside ourselves and for one another… a vulnerability to the other that is part of bodily life’. Violence is irreducibly relational, which means that limiting the possibilities for violence requires fostering particular – different – kinds of relations, since we cannot place ourselves outside of the relations which constitute social life and embodied being-in-the-world. Relationality is infused with power. Insofar as violence is an instrument of power (Mason 2002 – see Chapter One), produced by and through (and contributing to the reproduction of) relations of power, security as emancipatory in relation to violence implies the possibility of transforming relations of power.

Transforming relations of power is difficult, challenging and complex, and attempts to do so are forestalled by all kinds of unforeseen and unpredictable pitfalls. Parivartan set out, in part, to transform relations of power. What this research shows is that its attempts to transform have themselves been, at times, (inadvertently?) complicit in the (albeit imperfect) reproduction of power. It shows that this complicity itself is a function of both how ‘security’ operates as a field of institutional power, and how security institutions are deeply embedded in particular social and historical contexts and configurations of power relations.

Given the structural impossibility of getting outside of or transcending power relations, I also concur with Shepherd’s (2008: 69) troubling of promises of security as an achievable absolute.
Security, in its material and experiential dimensions, must be defined in relative terms: more or less at risk, more or less secure. Security is by definition, and structurally, a relative, partial and incomplete material/experiential condition. The possibilities for transforming power relations from within are clearly qualified and circumscribed possibilities, and rest, to some extent, on a qualified and non-volitional conceptualisation of agency: agency that is only possible in the context of power, produced and enabled by and through relations of power, but not predetermined in a totalising way (Butler 1990; 1997). Judith Butler’s work is useful here: she conceives of subjects as brought into being, produced, by and through relations of power: it is the condition of our intelligible existence, of being-in-the-world. But she also conceives of such subjects as contributing to the reproduction and sedimentation of particular configurations of power relations and/or, conversely, failing to do so. It is in these possibilities for deviation, for failing to reiterate the norm (and re-sediment power relations), that agency opens up. This model of agency is immanent to power, but also exceeds the conditions through which it is formed, therefore allowing some kinds of transformation – although it is very difficult to predict in advance what the outcome of transformative efforts will be (which is not to say that we should not engage in them). I observed throughout my analysis of the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi that gender is (violently) reproduced, but imperfectly, partially, ambivalently, inconsistently. As long as there are such possibilities for the reproduction of power to veer off course, there remain possibilities for ‘security’ as (limited, relative and partial) ‘emancipation’ in relation to violence.
- Methodological Appendix -

Part 1: Research participants interviewed, listed by sex and category (total: 86)

N.B.: Some of the categories of research respondent listed overlap with one another. For instance, I interview four women upper subordinates deputed, or formerly deputed, to investigate rape cases, and three self-defence trainers, but these are ‘hidden’ by other categories. I have not always indicated where these categories overlap, so as to avoid identifying respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICE</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police involved in oversight and implementation of Parivartan</td>
<td>13 x beat Constables</td>
<td>3 x senior officials</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 x ASI / In-charge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 x Inspector/SI / former In-charge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other police in Parivartan target areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 x Constables/ Head Constables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 x Inspectors/ SHOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 x Inspectors/SIs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes Against Women Cell (CAWC) Outer District/Former investigating</td>
<td>2 x Inspectors/SI</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>officers for rape in Parivartan target areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAWC HQ</td>
<td>2 x Inspectors</td>
<td>1 x senior official</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 x Inspector/SHO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s helpline staff</td>
<td>1 x ASI</td>
<td>1 x Inspector</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-defence training staff</td>
<td>2 x Constable/Head Constables</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselling staff</td>
<td>1 x Counsellor</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCIC monitoring</td>
<td>1 x Inspector</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police HQ</td>
<td>1 x ASI (Helpline Operator)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s helpline staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 x senior official</td>
<td>3 x senior official</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total police</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other respondents</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Safety Committee Members</td>
<td>7 (1 x group of 5)(^{152})</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals involved in Parivartan training or service provision</td>
<td>1 x trainer 2 x consultants/academics 1 x psychologist</td>
<td>1 x psychologist 1 x communication/development specialist (street theatre)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counsellors working with women who have experienced violence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape Crisis Intervention Centre (RCIC) workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi Commission for Women (DCW) RCIC Lawyer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women who experienced violence</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total other respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{152}\) Five women asked if I could conduct a group interview, rather like an informal focus group, with them as they did not have time to give interviews individually.
Part 2: Further details of data collection and presentation

Accessing the field

Before I visited Delhi, I had learned about a particular policing project making explicit claims about addressing violence against women: Parivartan, Delhi Police’s ‘Campaign for the Safety of Women in Delhi’, through the nodal officer responsible for the project, Dr Hooda, who visited LSE, where I was a first-year doctoral student. For the reasons detailed in Chapter Three, this project was of particular interest at a time when I was searching for a case study. I made contact with Dr Hooda in the first instance to discuss the possibility of researching the programme. The orientation of Parivartan towards an international audience, in addition to Dr Hooda’s appreciation of feminist perspectives on violence, made him amenable to my request. On a preliminary visit to Delhi in September 2007, I sought and obtained formal permission from senior officials at Police Headquarters (HQ) to conduct a qualitative study of the policing of violence against women in Delhi. The officials at Police HQ briefly discussed my plans with me but did not express any concerns, and quickly referred me back to Dr Hooda.

Dr Hooda agreed to facilitate my research in the policing district he was heading at the time\(^\text{153}\), where a number of Parivartan target areas were concentrated. When I began my fieldwork in March 2008, he introduced me to key staff members in the Parivartan Cell, who showed me around the police stations in the locality and assisted me in setting up interviews. I selected three police stations in Parivartan target areas in which to conduct interviews, including the police station which had reportedly registered the highest number of rape cases in Delhi, the year before Parivartan’s inception. The Parivartan staff introduced me to the Station House Officers (SHOs) and administrative staff at the selected police stations, so that I could go directly to the police stations to set up interviews. I discussed the Parivartan programme at length with these staff during our numerous subsequent interactions, who helped me to identify and contact further interviewees at varying levels of seniority, who had been involved in Parivartan but were no longer working in the district.

During my preliminary visit to Delhi, I also arranged to volunteer for a women’s organisation which runs crisis intervention centres across Delhi for women who have experienced violence and abuse. In addition to providing support and advocacy services directly to women, this

\(^{153}\text{At the time of my fieldwork there were ten policing districts in Delhi. There were nine until the North West district, the largest district with the highest crime rate, was split into two districts in the summer of 2007.}\)
organisation provides training on gender and women-specific laws to Delhi Police, and has a long-standing working relationship with them. They offered me another point of access to Delhi Police, as well as the opportunity to observe their work with the police, including gender sensitisation training in local police stations and the Police Training School, where all Delhi Police’s upper and lower subordinate officers receive their initial training.

I was able to quickly fill in the gaps in my background knowledge upon arriving in the field, by working with the aforementioned women’s organisation, speaking to their staff, and talking informally to Parivartan and other police staff in the selected policing district. Such conversations helped build up a picture of the police organisation in Delhi and to identify the numerous initiatives for women (see Chapter Three) that it has developed since the 1980’s, and since 2000 in particular. I also learned about the range of other agencies and NGOs working with the police on issues related to violence against women. I was then able to use existing contacts to negotiate access to additional research sites within and beyond Delhi Police. The central Headquarters of the Crimes Against Women Cell (CAWC) in particular was a fruitful site for this research, as it coordinates most of Delhi Police’s initiatives for women.

I was asked by the organisation to conduct fourteen interviews with women who had experienced violence and analyse them, in order to compile a report documenting the problem of violence against women in Delhi and their intervention strategy and services (Marhia 2008). My supervisor at the organisation suggested that I also use these for my own research. I judged that I was able to satisfy the conditions for conducting these interviews as ethically as possible, and so decided to proceed. Before embarking on the interviews I obtained consent from all participants to use the data for both purposes. I had virtually no control over the construction of the sample for both feasibility and ethical reasons. I met with counsellors at four of the crisis intervention centres and discussed my research with them. The counsellors then asked women with whom they were working if they would be willing to give an interview. I was trusted by these interviewees due to my association with the organisation from which they had sought help and support. The very fact that these women had sought help from an external service provider means that these women constitute an unrepresentative sample of women who experience violence in Delhi; the fact that they were willing to discuss their experiences may also distinguish them as exceptional rather than representative. Those among them who did contact the police almost all did so with advocacy support from the crisis intervention centres and their experiences may not therefore be typical. I cannot predict the numerous other ways in which the process through which they were recruited may have biased the sample. I have not analysed
the interviews in depth in this thesis, but at times draw on aspects of them to support my analysis of the policing of violence/crime against women in Delhi.

**Informed consent**

Obtaining ‘informed consent’ is an important and widely accepted ethical prerequisite for conducting research interviews, which should only be engaged in voluntarily by research participants. I obtained consent from interviewees in writing via a standardised consent form, which my assistant translated into Hindi, where possible, and verbally when respondents were alarmed by or uncomfortable about signing a form. To make sure that consent was as informed as possible, the form included a description of the research and its purpose, of how the data would be anonymised, stored and used, and indicated the respondent’s right to refuse or withdraw at any time. Not all respondents took the time to read the form, however, and my assistants and I also explained this information verbally before embarking on interview, and answered any questions respondents wished to ask.

**Anonymising the data**

In the interests of protecting my research participants but simultaneously offering them recognition for their contribution to the research, I planned initially to offer all participants the option to be named or anonymised. However, I had the impression early in the fieldwork that some respondents did not understand that I did not have an interest in naming them and were agreeing to be named out of politeness. I then decided that a more ethical and practical approach would be to let all respondents know that I would be anonymising all the interviews. I therefore do not name my respondents in the analytical chapters, or use pseudonyms, but simply refer to them by their rank in the police and, where relevant, their role or position. In the interests of anonymity I have not named the police stations at which I conducted much of my fieldwork. I have removed other identifying information: for instance, in cases where details of a respondent’s rank or role would make them highly identifiable, these have been removed or referred to in vague or general terms – hence, most of my respondents from Police HQ are simply referred to as ‘senior police officials’. Some respondents had occupied more than one role that was relevant for my research. Where I quote these respondents, I reference the role most relevant to the excerpt cited or the analysis at hand. Therefore, quotes are not necessarily identifiable as belonging to the same interviewee in my analysis, except where I highlight continuities, which are relevant, between quotes. There are two exceptions to this practice of anonymising, both of whom are key respondents whose position in relation to Parivartan makes them highly identifiable, and who explicitly gave me permission to quote them in the research.
Part 3: Interview Schedules

N.B. The interview schedules listed here are indicative only. In practice, although I carried schedules with me to interviews, I adapted them spontaneously and in situ. The schedule had to be adapted to the many different categories of respondent, and I have not included separate schedules for all categories of respondent here, but broad groupings. Many interviewees were asked much more specific questions about their work or aspects of their work that I was already familiar with.

Interviews with police personnel

*Background and experience in the police, the police organisation and policing work*
- Tell me about yourself. How and when did you join the police?
- Why did you join?
- Do you like working for the police? Why?
- Which postings have you completed in the police? (Follow-up questions about postings – type of work involved, duration, location, etc.)
- Can you tell me about your training? What was training like? How long did it last? What did you learn? Why are those things taught, do you think?
- What qualities, do you think, make a good police officer?
- What do you think is the role and purpose of the police as an organisation? And in society generally?
- How long have you been in your current posting? What is your daily work like? Can you describe a typical day?
- Is there anything difficult or challenging about working for the police?
- Have you been promoted since joining the police? Tell me about that.

*Violence/crime against women*
- Does your work involve dealing directly with crime, now or in any previous posting?
- What sort of crime do you have most experience of dealing with?
- What sorts of crime are most common in the areas where you have worked? Why?
- Which crimes are the most serious? Why? What do you do, in those cases?
- Do you think women experience particular kinds of violence because they are women? Can you give some examples?
  - Have you dealt with any of these kinds of violence? Can you give me an example of a case you have dealt with, or heard about? What happened? Who was involved? What did you/your colleagues/[anyone else] do? Why? What
was the outcome? Did you feel satisfied/happy about the outcome? Why?
What did other people involved feel about it, to our knowledge?

- What are the procedures / what do you do if you receive a complaint of
domestic violence? Rape? Sexual assault/harassment? [any other kind of
violence/crime against women raised in the interview?] What are the first
steps? Then what happens? Why do you do things like that?

- Why do you think these things happen? What causes them?

- Do you think it’s very common? How serious is it? Why?

- What role do the police have in relation to these sorts of
violence/crime/problems? Why? Does anyone else get involved?

- As part of your police training, did you have any special training on violence against
women and how to deal with it?

**Parivartan (for non-Parivartan staff)**

- Have you heard of *Parivartan*?

- What is it? Why was it started? What does it do? What do you think of it?

- Has it affected your work in any way?

**Parivartan (for Parivartan staff)**

- What is *Parivartan*? What does it do? Why was it started? Why was there a need for it?
Why is it being implemented here? Would it be suitable for other places?

- Do you think it has made any difference? In what ways? How do you know this? Do
you think it’s a good programme? Why?

- How long have you worked for *Parivartan*? What is your role? What do you do?

- Have there been any challenges or difficulties in implementing *Parivartan*:

  - For you in your daily work?

  - For the programme overall?

- Did you have special training for work for *Parivartan*? What was that like? What did
you learn? Why do you think those things are taught? Did you agree with everything
you learned?

**The Crimes Against Women Cell (CAWC)**

- What is the purpose of the CAWC? What does it do?

- Why is there a separate unit for this work? Do you think it’s necessary? Is it important?
Why?

- How does the CAWC fit into / contribute to the overall role and purpose of the police?
- [for CAWC staff only] Tell me about your work here. What do you do? How is it different from working in a police station? Did you have any special training for it? What did you learn about? Why do you think those things are taught?

**Other initiatives for women (e.g. helpline, self-defence training)**

- Tell me about your work in this unit. What is the purpose of the unit? How and why was it set up? Why is there a need for it?
- What is your role? What do you do? How does the unit work? Why? (How) is it different from other/general police work?
- Did you have any special training for it? What did you learn? Why?
- How does this unit fit into/contribute to the overall role and purpose of the police? What do you think of it?

**For senior police officials (in relevant specialisms)**

- Tell me about how Delhi Police recruits its staff. What are the procedures? What do you look for in recruits? Are there different/the same processes for men and women? Why are batches of vacancies announced by sex and not by open competition?
- Tell me about how Delhi Police trains its staff. Tell me about the content of the curriculum. Why do you teach those things? Why are they important? Is training the same for men and women? Why? Why are men and women separated for training?
- Can you tell me about how this initiative (e.g. Parivartan, CAWC, Rape Crisis Intervention Centres, or others) was started? Who made the decision? How was the decision made? Why? Why at that particular time? What did people think of it in the police, both higher and lower ranks?
- What formal policies are there governing recruitment/training/procedures for dealing with (various categories of violence/crime against women)? Where can I obtain further information about these? How closely do you think these are adhered to?

**Gender in policing**

- Why do you think it is that most police officers have been/are men?
- Do you think it’s a good thing?
- Do men and women do the same work? In what ways? Why?
- Are more women needed in the police? Why?
- Would it make any difference to have more women in the police? In what ways? Why?
- What do you think of the idea of a 50:50 sex ratio in the police?
Interviews with other relevant agencies/professionals

- Tell me about this organisation. What is its purpose? What do you do here? What is your role/work? How and why did you come to work here?

- [specific questions based on my knowledge of the organisation and its work]

- How and in what capacity did/does your work bring you into contact with the police? What work have you done for/with/in relation to the police? Please tell me about it. [follow-up/specific questions]

- [questions about Parivartan, as above, if applicable]

- [general questions about violence/crime against women, as above]

- Tell me about your experiences of working with the police. What are they like? How do they respond to women who want to report violence/[domestic violence/rape/sexual assault/harassment]? Can you give me some examples? [Why do you think this is?]

- What do you think is the role and purpose of the police? Do they have a particular role in addressing violence against women? What role is that? Why?

- Why do you think that most police are men? Would you like to see more women police? Why? Would it have an effect on the police? In what ways? Why?

Interviews with women who experienced violence

- Please tell me in as much detail as you like how and why you came to seek help from [name of service organisation]?
  
  o [Follow-up questions for clarification and to prompt elaboration on the narrative]

  o What effect did this have on you?

  o Why do you think this happened?

  o Did you try to seek help from anyone else? Who? How? Why/why not?

  o Did you think about contacting the police? Did you ever contact them? Why/why not? Then what happened? What did the police do? What effect did it have? What did you think about their response? What did you want them to do? Do you think the police have a role in addressing violence against women? In what way? Why?

  o Why and how did you decide / manage to seek help from this organisation? What kind of help/support have you received? What effect has it had?

  o What would you like to happen now?
- Appendix -

**Rank structure of Delhi Police**

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<th>Indian Police Service (IPS) Level</th>
<th>Commissioner of Police (CP)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Commissioner of Police (SpCP)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Commissioner of Police (JtCP)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police (Addl.DCP)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP)</td>
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<table>
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<th>Upper Subordinates / Inspectorate</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-Inspector (SI)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI)</td>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constable</td>
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