

The London School of Economics and Political Science

*Muslims Must Embrace Our Values: A Critical Analysis of the
Debate on Muslim Integration in France, Germany, and the
UK*

Marco Scalvini

A thesis submitted to the Department of Media and Communication of
the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, London, March 2013

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 63534 words.

Statement of use of third party for editorial help

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Al Challis and Conrad Roeber.

*To my mum,
who gave me the courage to follow my hearth and my intuition*

*To my dad,
who taught me to fight against any injustices*

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the help, support and patience of my principal supervisor, Prof. Lilie Chouliaraki. She has been supportive and has given me the freedom to pursue my project without objection but always provided insightful discussions about my work. Her advice and unsurpassed knowledge of discourse theory offered me a unique opportunity to analyse language as social practice and to bridge an intellectual divide between humanities and social sciences.

The support of my second supervisor, Dr. Jennifer Jackson-Preece, has been invaluable on both an academic and a personal level, for which I am extremely indebted. I am also very grateful to Jennifer for her scientific advice and expertise in the field of minorities. Many insightful discussions and suggestions made possible to focus my project on the role of the Other in contemporary Europe.

I also have to thank the members of my PhD committee, Dr. Myria Georgiou and, Maggie Scammell for their helpful advice and suggestions in general.

I would like to acknowledge the financial, academic and technical support of the London School of Economics, and particularly Prof. Charlie Beckett and the *POLIS Journalism and Society* in the award of a Silverstone Scholarship that provided an important financial support for this research project.

I will forever be thankful to my former advisor at NYU, Professor Ruth Ben-Ghiat. Ruth has been helpful in providing advice many times during my graduate school career. She was and remains my best role model for a mentor and teacher.

I would like also to thank to Professors Stefano Albertini, for supporting me during these years. He's the funniest advisor and one of the smartest people I know. I hope that I could be as lively, enthusiastic, and energetic teacher as Stefano and to someday be able to command an audience as well as he can. I'll never forget the many wonderful dinners and fun activities we've done together in New York and Italy.

I thank the staff of the Department of Media and Communication for their support and assistance since my first year at the LSE. I'll miss Jean and thank for her hard work. I like to think of her as the guardian angel of the grad students before she left to start a new position. I also thank Catherine for all the administrative help, and Al for his help these past several months with proofreading and paperwork for the viva. I also thank the wonderful colleagues for always being so helpful and friendly. If I have forgotten anyone, I apologize.

I cannot forget to thank my friends (too many to list here but you know who you are!) for providing support and friendship that I needed. I know I always have my friends to count on when times are rough. These past several years have not been an easy ride, both academically and personally. I truly thank Simone for sticking by my side, even when I was irritable and depressed.

I am also very grateful to Gianpietro, he was my first mentor and the reason why I decided to go to pursue this career. He inspired me to love the smell of libraries, enjoy debating politics, and aspire to postgraduate studies. His enthusiasm and love for teaching was contagious. I would like also to express all my gratitude to Monica and Roberto, two of my best friends, who supported and helped me since my early career. Your constant love, support, and encouragement have gotten me to this point. I would like to thank to Conrad for the support he provided me throughout this last year, without his encouragement and editing assistance, I would not have finished this thesis. Definitely, he is the best and most supportive flatmate and friend that anyone could ask for.

Finally, I especially thank my mom and dad. My hard-working parents have sacrificed their lives for my sister and myself. From the time I was very young, they taught me to value education, love to read, to always try my best, and to reach for my dreams. I would not have made it this far without their unconditional love and care.

This is for all of you.

Abstract

The continuing difficulty of integrating immigrants, especially Muslims, has led many European political leaders to question the merits of multiculturalism and to promote more commitment towards national values and social cohesion. This thesis aims to examine how these national discourses are interconnected and why they have an exclusionary character. Starting from this point, I draw on a theoretical approach based on a model of mediatised convergence in the European public sphere. Secondly, I reconstruct through a critical discourse analysis, the national debates that have emerged across Europe. I then identify commonalities, by looking into the strategies through which these discourses are articulated. Thirdly, I investigate through content analysis, how press coverage has amplified and reinforced this debate.

The cross-national comparison demonstrates a shared concern for how multicultural policies have passively tolerated and encouraged Muslim immigrants to live in self-segregated and isolated communities. This nexus between securitisation and multiculturalism targets first and second generation of Muslims who are assumed, because of their religious and cultural identity, to have authoritarian customs and illiberal values. Conversely, embracing those secular and liberal values that characterise the European *ethos* is exemplified as the best practice to deal with a correct and safe integration. However, this strategy to reduce integration towards a process of assimilation to majority norms and values risks creating further exclusion, rather than enhancing social cohesion and political belonging.

The analysis of national press coverage confirms a shared way of thinking and talking about integration. Despite the political specificity of each national debate, simultaneous coverage across Europe develops reciprocal discursive references on how to achieve community cohesion and manage the migration of Muslims. It can be claimed, therefore, that the more discourses converge across national public spheres, the more they are perceived as stable and consensual. Hence, convergence is a crucial factor to be considered because it allows us to define the boundaries of the European public sphere. However, the study of this transnational debate is crucial not only for scholars of media and communication, but also of European policies and immigration, as this debate involves a larger discussion on how to manage the complexity of relationships between immigrant minorities and the majority in Europe.

Keywords: Muslims, Immigration, Identity, Integration, Political Speech, European Public Sphere, Discourse Analysis, Mediatisation, Convergence.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Context, Background, and the Importance of the Thesis	10
1. A Critical Review of the Literature on Civic Integration	14
2. Controversy and Gaps in the Study of Civic Integration of Muslims	17
3. Aims, Research Questions and Hypotheses	19
4. Synopsis of the Research Method	21
5. Personal Interest in the Topic	25
Overview of the Thesis Structure	28
 Chapter 2: The Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of the European Public Debate	30
Chapter Overview	30
1. Civic Integration and Identity Formation in Europe	32
2. The Construction of Collective Identity	35
3. The Securitisation of Europe	37
4. Islam as the Incompatible Other	40
5. European Public Sphere and Identity Formation	42
6. Transnational Convergence as Recontextualisation of a Discourse	47
The Theoretical Framework in Brief	51
 Chapter 3: Outline of the Methodology, Social and Political Analysis of the Debate	53
Chapter Overview	53
1. Overview of the Method: Critical Discourse Analysis	54
2. The Research Design	59
The Case Studies: differences and commonalities	61
Criteria for Selection of the Nodal Points	63
The Comparative Framework	66
Criteria for the definition of the Analytical Corpus	68
3. The Data Analysis	68
Interpretation of Discursive Practice	70
Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation	71
Explanation of the Socio-Cultural Practice	74
The Research Design in Brief	75

Chapter 4: French National Identity and Integration	77
Chapter Overview	77
1. The Political Context of the Debate	78
2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice.....	82
Interdiscursivity.....	83
Intertextual Chain.....	86
3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation	90
4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice.....	95
Chapter Summary.....	100
 Chapter 5: Who Belongs to the German National Community?.....	 102
Chapter Overview	102
1. The Political Context of the Debate	103
2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice.....	107
Interdiscursivity.....	107
Intertextual Chain.....	112
3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation	117
4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice.....	122
Chapter Summary.....	125
 Chapter 6: The Doctrine of “Muscular” Liberalism	 127
Chapter Overview	127
1. The Political Context of the Debate	128
2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice.....	133
Interdiscursivity.....	133
Intertextual Chain.....	136
3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation	141
4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice.....	146
Chapter Summary.....	150
 Chapter 7: The Transnational Discourse of Civic Integration	 153
Chapter Overview	153
1. The Transnational Convergence in the Press Coverage.....	157
2. The Limits in the Discourse of Civic Integration.....	164
3. The Theoretical and Methodological Contributions of this Comparative Research...	173

4. Limitations of the Study and Future Research Directions	177
Concluding Remarks.....	179
 Appendix 1: Nicolas Sarkozy, "Respecter ceux qui arrivent, respecter ceux qui accueillent" ...	182
Appendix 2: Merkel's speech at the "Junge Union" Conference	183
Appendix 3: Cameron's Speech at Munich Security Conference.....	200
Appendix 4: Press Coverage of Sarkozy's Editorial.....	205
Appendix 5: Press Coverage of Merkel's Speech.....	208
Appendix 6: Press Coverage of Cameron's Speech.....	212
 References	216

Chapter 1: Context, Background, and the Importance of the Thesis

In November 2009, Switzerland voted in Europe's first referendum to add a provision to their Federal Constitution that bans the construction of new minarets. Despite criticism from the government and the churches in Switzerland, the proponents of the referendum argued that the prohibition of minarets would preserve Switzerland's legal and political order because minarets are a symbol of a "religious-political force" that reflects an "attempt" to impose an "undemocratic hegemony" over non-Islamic people (Fraudiger, 2009: 1).

What happened in Switzerland was not merely a temporary cyclic eruption of anti-immigrant sentiment that is randomly present in Europe (Westin, 2003; Merkl & Weinberg, 2003), but rather a symptom of a general cultural and social insecurity of a large part of Swiss voters (Mayer, 2011: 12) towards immigration, and above all, an expression of the problems of co-existence between the Swiss majority and its Muslim minority (Christmann & Danaci, 2012: 154-155).

The outcome of the Swiss referendum represents a larger crisis in the European management of Muslim integration. Muslim immigration and increasing requests for political recognition of diversity have challenged an established sense of borders and loyalties to the cultural traditions and values of the national majority (Koopmans et al, 2005: 142) as Muslims often depend on identities (Aitchison et al 2007: 26), which are not included within the cultural confines of national societies.

In the specific case of Europe, the visibility of Islam has grown greater with the increasing establishment of Muslim immigrant communities in European countries (Göle, 2002). Today, Muslims are indeed the largest immigrant group in most of Western Europe, and this trend does not appear likely to change in the coming years (Leiken, 2012: 104). Consequently, European societies are facing an increasing level of cultural 'differences' due to the growing intensity of migrations from Muslim countries (Meer: 2010). Veils at schools, *burqas* in the streets, mosques in cities and minarets are the manifest visibility of Muslims' diversity (Göle, 2002: 173).

In recent years, the view that Muslim populations in Western European countries are not well integrated into their host societies has led public debate to present multicultural policies as divisive (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2012) and undermining the solidarity inherent in national social models (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). These discussions sprung from the fear of radical Islamism and have fuelled the perception that Muslims are pretending to claim unreasonable cultural and political accommodations, which are alien upon European traditions (Modood 2012)

In response to this multicultural crisis (Lentin 2012; Zapata-Barrero, 2008: 6), political leaders across Europe have simultaneously questioned the actual merits of multicultural policies and have asked Muslim immigrants to make more vigorous efforts to confirm their loyalty to national communities and to avoid future conflict within religious and cultural traditions (Elliott & Turner 2012: 86, Mavelli 2012: 140).

For instance, French former President Nicolas Sarkozy [see appendix A, 2009: line 27] defended the Swiss vote, because it did not discriminate against the freedoms of religious practice or conscience. Sarkozy claimed that the visibility and the open religious profession of Muslims are often considered disturbing or incompatible with the secular and Christian traditions of Europe [44]. According to Sarkozy, it is understandable for European people to worry about immigration and demand that Muslims adopt the political and cultural values of the European countries where they now live.

This view on integration has become part of the political agenda for many leaders across Europe. In October 2010, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, claimed that Germany's attempts to create a multicultural society have completely failed [see Appendix B, Merkel 2010: paragraph 31]. In February 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron echoed Angela Merkel in a speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy by claiming "state multiculturalism" has failed [see appendix C, Cameron 2011: paragraph 8]. He added that the state must oppose, rather than accommodate, the non-violent Muslim groups that are indifferent to

British values such as democracy, the rule of law, and equal rights for race, sex or sexuality [16]. A week after Cameron's speech, Sarkozy, speaking on a French television program, directly quoted Merkel and Cameron, remarking "multiculturalism is a failure" (AFP, 2011).

This debate across Europe is certainly not driven by an attempt to exclude Muslims, but rather by a normative assumption that it is possible to integrate Muslims through the imposition of those universal values, norms and cultural attributes that are shared by Europeans (Carrera and Wiesbrok 2009: 30). This discourse is supported in various policies in which the state is actively promoting the kind of subjectivity that a liberal society requires: tests of values and pledges of allegiance for migrants and citizens, the enrolment of moderate Muslim organisations and community leaders in state-sponsored councils, state training programs for imams, and formal and informal restrictions of freedom of expression to ban extremist views (Kundnani, 2012: 191).

Integration is therefore conceived through the ability of states to promote a set of civic policies in which Muslim immigrants can be integrated only through the assimilation of a normative identity that is more appropriate to the European *ethos*. However, the attempt to conform Muslim immigrants to European values raises questions about the nature of this debate and the practical political limits of civic integration policies. In fact, a continuing emphasis on the need to integrate immigrants could confirm a political vision, in which cultural diversity is seen as a threat rather than a potential opportunity for Europe. In addition, this emergent political consensus does not seem to be aimed at creating policies that fight the conditions of social exclusion, but rather at pushing Muslim immigrants into wanting to be more integrated into European culture (Mavelli, 2012: 139).

The first section of this chapter reviews the present literature on the debate on civic integration. The debate on integration of Muslim immigrants can be seen as a discursive structure that organises the complexity of social relationships between minority and majority. In particular, the discussion assesses how the anxiety for the lack of integration can be politically manipulated with the intent to objectify a collective fear of social disunity and produce a loss of cohesion. Thus, civic

integration can be considered as a normative answer aimed at defining what values and identities belong to that community and perhaps more crucially, those that do not belong.

Section Two focuses on the gaps and controversies in the literature that have investigated the existence of a common discourse on integration that goes beyond national models and philosophies of integration. Specifically, many theoretical and empirical studies have confirmed a convergence toward a universalistic discourse about admission and integration, which have presented multiculturalism as divisive and illiberal. The implication for Muslims is that integration is conceived only through the universal norms of the hosting community, and Muslim identity can only exist, therefore, if it corresponds to the normative identity of the majority. However, these studies fail to distinguish how, at the base of the convergence towards civic integration, there is an interactive process of communication across Europe. This is why, in addition to the political background that explains the institutional processes by which civic integration policies are created and maintained, it is necessary to identify the interactive discursive process through which political actors deliberate, and legitimise “civic integration” following a specific communicative logic of transnational convergence.

In Section Three, the aims, research questions and hypotheses of the present research project are formulated and evaluated. The main assumption is that the debate on Muslim integration is developed through an interactive discursive process between the national and transnational political spheres in which norms are debated and accommodated within a national political context. The analysis of convergence offers an understanding of the connections the European public sphere establishes between countries and how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical impact on how the national public sphere recontextualises transnational discourses on migration and integration, and how these relationships contribute to the construction of a shared normative discourse about integration.

Section Four offers a summary of the research methodology. Here the analytical framework is based on a comparative analysis of three national case studies based on major institutional statements by governmental actors, which are

then considered a point of entry for reconstructing the public debate on Muslim integration. The research methodology combines content analysis - to identify how the press frames this debate — and critical discourse analysis to scrutinise in detail, the national discourses on integration and to compare similar discursive strategies and structures. Hence, this methodology facilitates an interdisciplinary approach to the study of political debate across Europe and a validation of evidence through cross verification from different sources without being constrained to the field of discourse analysis.

Section Five explains my personal interest in this research topic and the attempt to emphasise self-reflexivity, thus revealing my own position in the research process. Finally, Section Six offers an overview of the thesis structure, wherein each chapter is summarised.

1. A Critical Review of the Literature on Civic Integration

The debate on civic integration can be seen as a dispute over how much difference is acceptable and safe within European society. Unlike multicultural integration, civic integration presupposes homogeneity and seeks to maintain social cohesion through a common identity and related values and beliefs (Jackson-Preece 2005: 6). Accordingly, civic integration is assumed as a “one-way process” in which migrants should “integrate into the existing culture and society without any reciprocal accommodation” (Lacroix, 2010: 8). In fact, civic integration policies require newcomers to assimilate to specific cultural and political characteristics in order to fit in with a national identity and become part of the economic and social structure of the receiving society.

Civic integration refers to specific state programs aimed at promoting integration within immigrants through the strengthening and inculcation of a set of civic values, cohesion, homogeneity and culture (Mouritsen, 2009: 24). Instead multicultural integration promotes a large diversity of values, beliefs and identities as legitimate or even desirable within the nation. However, the multicultural approach does not only suggest respect for the role of ethnic communities but also

implies a “two-way process of adaptation” concerning changes in “values, norms and behaviour” for both immigrants and members of the hosting society (Castles et al., 2002: 115).

According to the advocates of civic integration, Muslim immigrants are encouraged by multicultural approaches to close themselves off from mainstream society (Flood et al, 2012: 145). Specifically, multiculturalism is depicted as leading Muslims to develop unwillingness to participate in social and political life, which certainly brings self-exclusion and the development of urban ghettos (AlSayyad & Castells 2002: 142). However, multicultural diversity does not encourage “men to beat their wives, parents to abuse their children, and communities to erupt in racial violence” (Philips, 2009: 45). Multiculturalism criticises homogeneous and monocultural national communities, supports the rights of minorities to maintain their cultural specificity and addresses those inequalities that can be experienced in the process of integration by promoting social equality (Castles, 2000: 5).

The rejection of multiculturalism does not imply that it is impossible to integrate Muslims due to incompatibility with European values. On the contrary, the opponents of multiculturalism tend to emphasise the state’s ability to promote immigrants’ adherence to liberal-democratic values through civic policies. Integration policies are thus used to lead immigrants towards a form of identity more appropriate to the European societies (Geddes 2005: 116). At the same time, the historical process of nation-building in Europe has been profoundly devoted to adopting “a single, homogeneous identity with a shared sense of history, values and traditions” (Smith 2010: 127).

The main stake of civic integration centres therefore, on how historical notions of the nation can be adapted to include new, culturally distinct immigrants, and conversely, how these immigrants must change or adapt to become integrated in the nation (Joppke, 2007, 2010; Mouritsen, 2006; Favell, 2001, 2003). As a consequence, an important challenge to integration is the close relationship between discourse linked to the integration of newcomers, and the long-standing social imaginary of nation building (Anderson 1991), which forms the basis of national identity and provides the background for policymaking.

Several studies reveal how civic integration policies assume that specific categories of immigrants, particularly Muslims, do not conform to liberal and democratic values of Europe (Cesari, 2013). Thus, the paradoxical liberal state prerogative to integrate immigrants through tests, reveals an extreme attempt to realise a politically and culturally homogenous identity (Nachmani 2010: 246), in which Muslim immigrants are identified as the Other to assimilate, according to the values and norms of the dominant majority (Joppke 2010: 139). According to Horner and Weber (2011: 142), the difference between the colonial and the late modern system of integration is that the latter is no longer based on the absolute exercise of power, but on the results of a test supposedly providing an “objective” or “scientific” basis for the decision. Nowadays, the “good ones” are those who successfully pass the test on civic duties, whereas the “bad ones” are those who fail (Horner and Weber 2011: 142).

Civic integration policies are thus not based on an exclusionary political process, but are justified and legitimised through an ambiguous liberal concept of integration (Joppke 2007; Carrera 2009; Kundnani, 2012), which it assumes as being a “non-negotiable and non-questionable” (Mavelli, 2012: 107) universal morality of Europeans. However, this attempt to integrate immigrants through the imposition of supposed universal values raises questions about the normative nature and the practical political limits of these policies, as the process of civic integration involves immigrants having to support these European values even when they find themselves opposed to them (Esposito & Kalin 2011:7).

In summary, the main point of this review is to recognise the importance of studying the debate on civic integration, because it could reveal prevailing discourses on integration including both who belongs, and crucially also, who does not belong, as civic integration policies are bound to the core values of the nation states and requires immigrants to accept the collective identity and cultural values of the host nation.

2. Controversy and Gaps in the Study of Civic Integration of Muslims

Traditionally, the literature on migration and minorities has considered the topic of integration to be bound to the main characteristics of the national community, which can be defined by the territorial, ethnic, or cultural markers of the nation-state (Balibar 1991; Smith 2010; Jackson-Preece 2005, 2006). Indeed, each state considers in a different way which rights should be granted to which groups according to the national “philosophy of integration” (Favel 2001). As a consequence, there are different national factors, which could exclude a common discourse on civic integration of Muslims.

Firstly, national, cultural and historical contexts within Europe remain very different. For example, European countries have significant differences in terms of prejudice or engagement toward Islam “depending on the colonial histories, the geographical location, and the composition of the immigrant community” (Halliday 2002: 125). Secondly, many comparative studies on integration are highly doubtful about a process of convergence within Europe (Bauböck et al., 2006), as the decisive institution in regulating and managing migration remains the nation-state. The nation-state continues to define the rules based on which non-natives are allowed to move to a country and gain access to employment and citizenship status.

For this reason, Favell is critical of the view that the European political system will eventually “challenge the predominance of the nation state in policy making on immigration and integration” (2001: 242). In fact, there is no supranational authority higher than a state itself to decide on immigration or integration policies. The institutions of the EU have no formal competences concerning the very core of state sovereignty (Maatsch, 2011: 150). For example, the European Commission and the Council of Europe can only exercise a limited influence over national legal provisions on citizenship, immigration and integration policies. In addition, these norms are not automatically legally binding. Nevertheless, several authors have underscored how civic integration policies adopt the language of EU institutions in regards to immigration (Mulcahy, 2008; Carrera & Weilsbrock, 2009). In particular, the *European Commission Immigration Law* and

the *EU Framework on Integration* conceive civic integration through a political agenda, whereby immigrants are asked to accept core liberal values and are guaranteed in return, a gradual granting of a set of rights, including social, civic and political rights, comparable to those of EU citizens (Mulcahy, 2008: 118).

Increasingly, the argument is made is that it is possible to observe in Europe, a civic turn in immigrant policies (Joppke 2007; Mulcahy, 2008; Carrera & Weilsbrock, 2009). According to Mulcahy (2008: 118), this civic turn is taking place not through a vertical policy convergence from the EU to the member states, but rather through a horizontal convergence voluntarily and informally led by informal policy networks among member states. However, Mulcahy (2008) and Carrera & Weilsbrock (2009) point to the fact that EU member states have responded in different ways in adopting their policies, and offer several explanations for why countries have adapted, rejected or ignored the EU civic integration norms. In particular, some authors offer evidence that some EU states have introduced policies based on a distorted version of the original EU model of civic integration, which is more analogous to acculturation or even assimilation policies, rather than granting rights to immigrants (Kundnani 2007; Joppke, 2007; De Leew & van Wichelen 2012; Lentin 2012).

Joppke (2007) makes a persuasive case that, in a core group of EU countries - France, the Netherlands and Germany - traditional policies of national integration are losing relevance today through a twofold convergence, which emphasise equality and individual rights, but they also demand the immigrants' political conformity with European norms (Joppke, 2007: 1-2). This trend is apparently shaped by the neoliberal tenet to coerce "individuals, as well as communities they are part of, to release their self-producing and -regulating capacities, as an alternative to redistribution and public welfare that fiscally diminished states can no longer deliver" (Joppke, 2007: 16). However, an implicit limit in Joppke's comparative analysis is to focus only on a small sample of countries - though very influential - which provides a partial representation as to the extent of convergence. For this reason, although there is agreement on the fact that a major pattern seems to exist, especially in a core group of EU states, to adopt a coercive model of civic integration, it could still be early to declare that this 'civic turn' has become

convergent across Europe (Mulcahy, 2008: 117). The resulting trend could not be one of convergence, but of a differential adaptation through horizontal interactions among EU states.

The merit of the pro-convergence literature is to recognise that European countries are developing common responses to immigrant integration through the emergence of civic integration policies based on common norms. However, this literature does not provide an analysis of the debate underlining this convergence towards a coercive model of civic integration, to see which norms and arguments are more influential. What is further missing is a conceptualisation of the discursive interactions among national public spheres, in order to consider whether this ‘civic turn’ follows not just from political national interests, but also from the reciprocal influence that those national debates can have. The question then, with regard to the explanatory role of civic integration discourse and its causal influence in political debate, is how simultaneous national debates on integration might have a mutual impact on legitimising and reinforcing a coercive discourse on Muslims.

3. Aims, Research Questions and Hypotheses

The present research project proposes to examine the public debate concerning the integration of Muslim immigrants that has emerged across Europe in response to the “multicultural crisis” (Lentin, 2012). The goal is to demonstrate how national political debates have a reciprocal impact on legitimising and reinforcing a similar discourse on integration. For this reason, it is crucial to acknowledge the discursive sources of mutual influence and the motives that go with these national debates.

The assumption of a reciprocal influence implies the existence of a shared understanding across European countries. As a consequence, it is central to investigate when and how the discourse of civic integration has been structured and recontextualised along different national public spheres. At the same time, in addition to the political background that explains how this discourse has entered into the national policy agenda, there is a need for critical analysis to be applied to show

how the transnational mediatisation of politics performs a political legitimating function, which aims at creating consensus towards a civic integration of Muslims, when these policies are blatantly discriminatory.

Taking this point of departure and moving forward, there are two central sets of questions to answer:

First, what kind of convergence can be observed in comparing national public debates on Muslim civic integration after the Swiss referendum? How is this convergence on integration constituted at the national level? Furthermore, in order to better understand the role of transnational convergence, the question can be reformulated in this way: How important are the differences between the national debates studied? Can national discourses explain these differences in public debate?

Second, what are the communicative practices and discursive dynamics, which confer the legitimacy to public debate? What arguments are advanced? How are these arguments structured, linked and then recontextualised along different national levels? What themes are discussed under a common discursive regime? Why is a politics of identity reproduced in the discursive regime of integration (definitions of Europe, the relevance of values, and in particular, the construction of and reference to those values)? This last question also involves consideration over how much difference can be acceptable in the name of cohesion.

Research Hypothesis 1 (RH1) assumes that European public debate on Muslim integration has become engaged, not simply in parallel single debates, but it has also entangled a shared discourse to legitimate a policy of civic integration. In particular, it can be argued that a transnational process of mediating political communication supports this convergence towards a common discourse. However, it is assumed that this convergence is redefined at the national level as a national particularism through a specific political interest.

Research Hypothesis 2 (RH2) assumes that the current debate on integration shares a common discourse on a universal idea of a European community of values, which is recontextualised along national identities and also along particular national

political interests. In other words, the politicisation of national identity could be predicated on an attempt to create a shared common sense of European moral community. In this way, what becomes relevant is the strategic use that political debate makes of the concept of 'European values' in order to advance and legitimise civic integration of the Muslim Other.

To summarise, this project aims to look into the cross-national convergence of the debate on integration and seeks to reveal shared strategies of discourse through which Muslim integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of their national contexts. At the same time, I assume that this convergence within European debate on integration refers to a discourse on European common values and traditions, which presents multiculturalism as divisive and illiberal.

4. Synopsis of the Research Method

The purpose of this synopsis is to give an overview of the methodological approach, which is applied in the empirical analysis. My goal is to provide a comparative analysis of national public debates on Muslim immigration to investigate to what extent a normative discourse on civic integration is articulated across Europe and whether or not it reflects the cultural and political particularities of national public spheres.

By using the concept of discourse, I indicate both the semiotic process concerning the representation of a discourse and the social practice referring to the interactive processes in which a discourse is conveyed (Fairclough, 2003: 19). Therefore, discourse is not only what we say and how it is represented but it includes to whom we say it, how and why in the public sphere (Schmidt, 2008: 309). Furthermore, Schmidt suggests that social practice is the communicative process that coordinates norms and values across the public sphere (Schmidt, 2008: 311). In other words, public actors generate and communicate discourses within a given semiotic context in order to deliberate, legitimate and reproduce a discourse through the public sphere. Accordingly, both the semiotic as well as the social process need

to be analysed in order to explain the explanatory role of discourse and its causal influence in political debate.

What is interesting in this transnational debate is to observe how the discourse operates to define political strategic interests and legitimation also, when civic integration policies have been already approved. The discourse thus performs a function of consensus building towards decisions in matters of immigration. As a consequence, in addition to the examination of discursive process in which policies have been approved, there is need of a critical analysis on how a coercive version of the discourse of civic integration is maintained and legitimised, when these policies are blatantly discriminatory towards some immigrants like Muslims.

To analyse this public debate, its discursive articulations, interconnections and its convergence, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), in combination with content analysis are applied. CDA is a valued method to systematically explore discursive practices in broader social and political structures (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough, Jessop, & Sayer 2003; Fairclough 2001). Content analysis is instead used to illustrate in detail, the differences between national and transnational public debates and the relationships between discursive practices and the process of the mediatisation of the debate.

The focus for RH1 is on how this discourse is actually undertaken and covered across Europe. The aim here is to verify the level of interaction between national debates, instead of focusing only on “the diffusion of coherent and persuasive discourse” at national level, the process of transnational convergence points to a “more complex and selective” process through which discourses interact in the public sphere (Crespy 2012: 10). This realisation, in turn, leads to a clearer analysis of how different national discourses draw inter-textually on one another offering similarity in terms of their discursive strategies across Europe.

The focus for RH2 rests on the articulation of the discourse on civic integration and how it is actually linked to the debate on the integration of Muslims. As a consequence, the discourse analysis is aimed at revealing any normative construction, which attaches values to political action and serves to maintain

consensus over policies of integration. Specifically, normative constructions clarify how a discourse recontextualises a set of values and norms embedded in the discourse of civic integration.

The first step of this research design is the definition of the comparative framework. Specifically, I have decided to select three national case studies: UK, France and Germany, which are commonly seen as having divergent models and philosophies of policy integration (Favell 2001, Joppke 2004), as well as different approaches to European integration (Diez Medrano 2003). At the same time, these three countries have faced the same difficulties of integrating Muslim immigrants, which have recently led their political leaders to debate simultaneously: 1) the failure of multiculturalism and 2) how to promote better integration through the strengthening and inculcating of a more general set of civic duties related to a collective European identity.

The second step of the analysis is the reconstruction of the national public debate. Each case study will be based on a national nodal point, which is considered the point of entry for reconstructing the various discourses present in the policy debate on Muslims' integration. Thus a nodal point is a master text, which offers a privileged point of entry into the political debate and allows for the reconstruction of a government's strategy about the development of civic immigration practices and policies. Moreover, the analysis of the nodal point permits a clearer understanding of the discursive practice, how the nodal point links to other discourses, the rules according to which these discourses are tied together and how they are re-inscribed into the political debate (Diez 2005: 628).

The third step of the data analysis combines content analysis with critical discourse analysis - to identify relevant discourses in the public debate and to evaluate to what extent debate is convergent. Hence, this twofold standpoint facilitates an interdisciplinary approach to the study of political debate without being constrained to the field of discourse analysis and allows us to compare the media debate across Europe.

Relevant to the CDA, the nodal points are provided by political statements as a specific genre. My interest is not in those statements delivered by opinion makers or extremist politicians, but rather, in those delivered by national governmental actors – who represent a decision-making elite, who have the political authority both to constrain and enable policy choices.

The time frame for the data collection covers the period after the Swiss referendum on minarets. The ban represents a “moment of crisis” (Fairclough 1992: 230), which pressed European politicians to debate openly how to integrate Islam and Muslim immigrants in order to avoid conflict with the values and traditions of Europeans. Therefore, this crisis of the minarets has made “more visible and apparent” (Marston 2000: 353) any condition of power in this public debate.

Relevant to the content analysis, the analytical corpus comes from the national daily press coverage of the nodal point for seven days in the three countries under analysis. In addition, these political statements have to be highly disseminated through European broadsheets and simultaneously debated by European public opinion. In line with the agenda-setting approach, I am concerned with how the press recontextualises political statements by mediatizing a list of themes, which become part of the public agenda (McCombs 2005). Thus the focus is on the role of the press as a mediator of the nodal points.

The following are the three cases studies and their entry point to the national public debate on the civic integration of Muslims.

In Case Study 1 (Chapter 4), the French public debate is reconstructed around the nodal point of Sarkozy’s editorial published in the *Le Monde* newspaper on 8 December 2009. In this article, Sarkozy defended the Swiss vote and calls upon Muslims to refrain from provocative attitudes, but also urges them not to forget that Europe has Christian values as its foundation. This nodal point highlights how Muslim immigrants’ visibility and their claims for places of worship or wearing the veil in public put to the test the republican character of France.

Case Study 2 (Chapter 5) investigates the public debate generated by Merkel during the Young Christian Democrats Convention. The German Chancellor did not merely state that Germany's attempt to create a multicultural society had "utterly failed." At the same time, Merkel pointed to successful examples of civil integration programs that integrated new immigrants. Merkel also claimed it was a necessity to defend "German Identity" as a major justification by asking for more social cohesion.

In Case Study 3 (Chapter 6), the analysis examines the debate caused by Cameron delivered on the occasion of the Munich Security Council. The British Prime Minister delivered a provocative speech on the failings of state multiculturalism by suggesting that Britain can produce a "muscular" integration by imposing liberal values codified within British identity. Moreover, this nodal point offers the opportunity to analyse how Islam can be constructed to become a security issue in Europe.

In conclusion, my analytical framework focuses on a comparative analysis of three national case studies, based on political statements by governmental actors, which are then considered a point of entry for reconstructing the public debate on Muslim integration. Firstly, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is selected to analyse these statements, their articulations, and interconnections within the public debate. Secondly, the content analysis of the nodal points coverage allows an identification of what perspectives and topics are disseminated, how often and by which actors. The combination of both methods guarantees a more complete analysis of which national factors were central in the convergence and recontextualisation of discourses on Muslim civic integration across Europe.

5. Personal Interest in the Topic

Much of the inspiration for this project has arisen from my own experience as an immigrant and a member of a minority group. Like many students, I became interested during university study in contextualising my life within broader social and theoretical paradigms to make better sense of it. In doing so, my personal

interest is only incidentally about Islam, and is focussed primarily on the relationship between minorities and the majority.

This thesis is thus more an account and an exploration of the limits and problems that relate to the formation of political debate in Europe at large on issues such as the tolerance and respect for cultural differences and how the rejection of these issues occurs. My concern is to understand precisely why the Other is still such an issue today in Europe. Specifically, why is a different identity perceived as a menace and at what point does this fear become the primary source for a concrete, supported political program that aims at limiting or even normalising the diversity of a minority?

I am convinced that European public debate on Muslims is an important example that reveals that not only is the tolerance of diversity always under siege, but also how the fear of the Other continues to dominate the lexicon of the political debate. As Christopher Caldwell wrote to attack multicultural integration: "If you understand how immigration, Islam and native European culture interact in any Western European country, you can predict roughly how they will interact in any other" (2009: 19). Consequently, what is relevant in my work is to explore and understand the complexity of the debate and its process on the integration of Islam, but as Jackson-Preece argues, when homogeneity is fully accepted as the ideal basis of political organisation, the freedom of minority groups becomes all the more precarious (2005: 8).

I began this research project in New York in late 2005, when public opinion was already shaped by world-shaking events that directly involved Muslims after 9/11, the attack on Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq and the bombings in Madrid and London. In that year, I still remember reading a shocking interview with the Italian journalist, Oriana Fallacci, in the *Wall Street Journal*: "Europe is no longer Europe, it is 'Eurabia,' a colony of Islam, where the Islamic invasion does not proceed only in a physical sense, but also in a mental and cultural sense. Servility to the invaders has poisoned democracy, with obvious consequences for the freedom of thought, and for the concept itself of liberty" (Wall Street Journal, Varadarajan, 2005: 7).

That interview was nothing new, as in 2001, during the aftermath of the global anxiety about terrorism, Fallacci attacked Islam from the front page of the most important Italian daily newspaper on the basis of an easy equation and a dangerous one: All Arabs are Muslim, all Muslims are Islamists, all Islamists are terrorists; thus the Arab-Muslim civilization, which is embedded in religious fanaticism, is the major enemy of Western civilization whose superiority does not need to be proven any longer. It was a deliberate case of anti-Islamic upsurge, based on the same processes of stigmatisation and dehumanisation that characterised many ideologies of the twentieth century.

However, what was worse in terms of this re-emergence of intolerance was how the media quickly echoed the many public calls for discrimination against all Muslims in many Western countries. In this context of growing media concern, some opinion-makers have presented Europe as a socially weak society and predicted that Europe was condemned to become an Islamic colony called “Eurabia.” According to Carr (2006: 4), the worst case of the “Islamicisation” prophecy describes the Europe of the future as a place where “Christians and Jews will become the oppressed minorities in a sea of Islam.” Thus, what began as a bizarre conspiracy theory soaked by dangerous political fantasies has become intellectually respectable through the media making visible the discourses elaborated by an elite of intellectuals and well-known newspaper columnists (see Ye’or 2001; Lewis 1995, 2003; Fallacci, 2006; Huntigton 1991, 1996).

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings, Europe faced a threshold in its radicalisation against Islam. A fear of Muslims and resentment toward them increased to an extremely alarming level. What was initially only the aggressive prejudice of a circle of journalists, scholars and religious leaders became the widespread opinion of many Europeans.

Today, almost ten years after Fallacci’s pamphlet, the situation has changed but paradoxically Fallacci was right in writing that Europe was changing. The post-war goal of a European political and social community based on tolerance and multicultural policies is steadily dissolving. Perhaps the presence of Muslims in

Europe will be normalised, but it is not clear yet how this process of integration of Muslim diversity is operating and what effects it will have on the relationship between the majority and minorities at large.

The integration of immigrants is a source of constant controversy as the rise of xenophobic parties across Europe can attest. There is anxiety about national culture being diluted and changing the current way of life; increased perceptions of a burden on national social systems; ideas of value incompatibility between Islam and European society. But these controversies are also fed by frequent political appeals from public authorities to renounce the road to multiculturalism, in favour of a more homogenous collective identity based on common values of a long idolised Christian and Western culture.

Therefore, what is more fascinating in this context is not observing unscrupulous opinion makers and populist politicians, but rather scrutinising national leaders, such as Merkel, Sarkozy and Cameron, who have chosen to talk of integration through generic appeals to security, integration and an idealised European identity.

My interest in this project is not hinged on describing this public debate as merely a process of misrepresentation. In fact, arguing once more that the media reproduce stereotypes does not make an original contribution to research. For this reason, I have focussed on a critical analysis of the integration debate to examine how the civic integration discourse aims at regulating and controlling Muslim newcomers, which are considered hostile to society because of their cultural and religious diversity.

Overview of the Thesis Structure

Chapter 1 has introduced the problems surrounding the assimilation of Islam in Europe and the aims of the research project. Chapter 2 begins with some conceptual clarifications about integration, collective identity and public sphere. It also offers the chapter offers a theoretical approach to explaining transnational

convergence as an interactive process of communication among national governmental players, who are central actors of a process of production and recontextualisation of discourses on civic integration. In [Chapter 3](#), the research design is explained. The analytical framework is based on a comparative analysis of three national case studies based on major institutional statements by governmental actors, which are then considered a point of entry for reconstructing the public debate on Muslim integration. Specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is selected to investigate the nodal points, their articulations and interconnections within the public debate; while Content Analysis is applied to explore the process of mediatisation of the nodal points across the European public sphere. In [Chapter 4](#), the first case study focuses on the French debate and aims at investigating how discourse on Muslim integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of the French model of integration. In [Chapter 5](#), the second case investigates the German public debate; specifically, analysis focuses on how this debate is characterised by 1) a political and cultural rationale that focuses on the “crisis of multiculturalism;” 2) a necessity to redefine German identity in a more cohesive way through an epistemological shift in the definition of a German national identity. In [Chapter 6](#), the third case looks at the British debate, which focuses on the failings of multicultural integration and promotes a new model of integration calling for a policy of "muscular liberalism" in order to guarantee that Muslims respect those values that characterize the national British identity such as democracy, equality before the law and human rights. In [Chapter 7](#), the conclusion provides a comparative analysis of national debates to reflect on the extent to which a discursive process of convergence is emerging towards Muslim integration and how these relationships arguably contribute to the construction of a shared normative discourse about integration across Europe.

Chapter 2: The Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of the European Public Debate

Chapter Overview

In chapter 1, I underline how in the aftermath of the Swiss vote on the Minarets, political leaders across Europe simultaneously debated on how Muslims should make more vigorous efforts to participate in European society, confirming their loyalties to national communities, and working to avoid future conflict within European societies characterised by specific religious, political and cultural traditions. I also introduce some clarifications about civic integration as a one-way policy in which immigrants are expected to embrace a set of civic duties. Furthermore, I explain how immigrant flows and settlements have created an uncertain gap between collective national identity and cultural or religious diversity. In particular, the increasing presence of Muslim immigrants raises concern as their diversity is seen as hostile to the liberal values and cultural traditions shared by Europeans.

The tension between immigrant diversity and uniformity echoes the “diversity dilemma” (Jackson-Preece, 2005: 3), namely, should a State require belonging or rather recognise a freedom to diversity? On the one hand, integration is manifested as being more diverse, and on the other, national states need uniformity. Thus the collision of these two terms, “diversity” and “uniformity” (Jackson-Preece 2005: 5) is at the basis of the debate on integration. The dispute over how much difference is acceptable in the name of integration on the one hand, mirrors the contradiction between an imaginary self-collective (Anderson 1991) and the collective identity of other minorities; on the other hand, it reflects prevailing normative constructions of community including both who does and, crucially also, who does not belong to the national community.

The answer to the diversity dilemma can be coercive when the national community decides to limit diversity, consolidate categories of collective identification, and mobilise political support in defence of social and political cohesion. An example of this process is the politicisation of European identity (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009), which has become an important discursive element of the European public debate in reaction to Muslim presence and Islamic visibility. Specifically, one of the most radical cases of re-identification is the rhetorical appeal of politicians to a European identity based on a supposed Judeo-Christian tradition. Stefano Allievi defines it as “reactive identity” (2012: 379), in other words, an ethnocentric process of self-identification, which works as the reaction to Muslim threatening identities.

In this chapter, I discuss briefly the theoretical framework on which the thesis rests in order to clarify those concepts related to the discourse of civic integration that will be taken up in the empirical investigation. The chapter proceeds through the following steps. First, it starts with some conceptual clarifications of the notion of identity and presents a brief overview of how civic integration is connected to the process of identity formation in Europe. The close association between the principles of integration and identity makes it possible to observe how identity is constructed through political discourse. Second, the chapter offers some relevant clarification about the concepts of collective identity, in addition to European and national identities. Third, it introduces some clarification on how integration can be securitised in order to protect the community from the threat of diversity and justifies a range of policies to control and assimilate national minorities and immigrant groups. Fourth, it is explored why the development of secularism plays a significant role in the problematic interaction between European identity and Muslims. Fifth, the chapter presents a conceptual explanation of the European public sphere and explores how this transnational arena is central in the process of the renegotiation of national identities. Fifth, the last section concludes with a theoretical approach to the analysis of the convergence of the discourse on integration within the European public sphere.

1. Civic Integration and Identity Formation in Europe

Discourse on civic integration determines not only what ‘we’ are, but also who can ‘belong’ to ‘our’ identity. For this reason, in this section, it is functional to offer a brief overview of how civic integration is connected to the process of identity formation in Europe and how the concept of European identity is linked to the emergence of a European public sphere, in which national identities are renegotiated and revised.

The present public debate on the integration of Muslim immigrants has been characterised by recurrent appeals to a common European civilisation, which emphasise Europe's cultural heritage and history through an “organic link” between common past and present values (Mavelli, 2012: 101). Kundani (2012: 160) underlines that it is not only conservative discourse that is keen to stress identity as a cultural basis of European society. Liberal discourse also repurposes the same mechanism of identification, when it emphasises the legacy of Enlightenment: “secularism, individualism and freedom of expression” as key characteristics of European identity (Kundani 2012: 160).

This process of self-identification aims at creating common political values (Muller, 2007c), which can confer legitimacy to social cohesion and political unity in the European project (Mavelli 2012: 101; Risse 2010). In this context, the construction of a European identity exceeds the differences that exist between nations through two distinctive relationships at work, which challenge conventional conceptions of collective identity. First, European identity does not coincide with a national identity, but rather it coexists as a sum of national identities. Second, in contrast to national identities, which are based upon a national imaginary (Anderson 1991), European identity is defined as resting upon shared political and moral values, rather than a national culture, history or language.

This European collective self is often defined through a common belief in liberal and democratic values, which are developed and shared by European nations and within the EU. Therefore, the European identity finds its distinctiveness to a

common concern with morality, civic perspective and political values (Muller 2006: 287). However, European identity is not simply a shared set of values; it is a normative discourse aimed at defining the borders of Europe as a distinct civic and political entity through a complex web of political, moral and legal discourses.

The European collective self does not imply that national identities are replaced by a new identity. Rather, these national differences are interpreted in the light of European universalism that have been realised as basic rights and constitutional norms (Muller, 2007a). In this manner, European citizens are solicited to reflect upon their particular values in the name of shared universal values (Muller 2006: 287).

In more detail, the European collective self can be defined as a “post-conventional” European identity (Lacroix 2002), which operates according to the moral nature of universal laws, which defines the European post-national community. Habermas’ “constitutional patriotism” (1998) presupposes that universal norms codified in the constitution of a post-national Europe (2001) may generate a sense of identification and belonging which goes beyond traditional forms of national loyalty based on ethnic origins, culture or religion (Mavelli, 2012: 98).

This universal validity of post-conventional identity that the political community attributes to the modern European social imaginary (Taylor, 2004; Calhoun, 2003) can create a dangerous moral superiority (Mavelli: 2012: 98) because it implies that immigrants have to support these universal values even when they find themselves opposed to them. This tension between European universalism and the inclusion of immigrants goes beyond Habermas’ theory of constitutional patriotism (1998, 2001). Constitutional patriotism, in its original formulation, was never intended as a particularly “inclusive form of membership” but rather a form of “political attachment” to the community (Muller 2006: 293).

According to Habermas, constitutional patriotism cannot take form in “social practices” or become “the driving force” for “creating an association of free and equal persons until they are situated in the historical context of a nation of citizens in

a way that they link up with those citizens' motives and attitudes" (Habermas, 1996: 499). Therefore, Habermas never supports a universal blanket of rules to integrate the Other, but rather the national subject has to be integrated into "the universal principles of reason and rationality" and to renounce the divisiveness and the exclusion caused by forms of national identity and loyalty (Mavelli 2012:96).

A sense of attachment is thus formed through the general character of society that emerges from a collective learning process that "make collective reflection and contestation possible" (Muller 2006: 287) as a continuous project of the redefinition of the boundaries between a European collective self and the Other, beyond any national, cultural and religious particularistic specificities. However, what happens is that, unlike Habermas' constitutional patriotism, this universal attempt to transcend differences postulates Europe in a dimension of exceptionality and excludes the Muslim Other (Mavelli 2012: 116), unless the Muslim accepts to be assimilated.

In this manner, an analysis of the debate on integration could clarify from a critical perspective, how European identity might be conceived as a desirable and normative form of inclusion, which excludes Muslim newcomers. In this manner, newcomers are solicited to reflect upon their dissonant values in the name of universal values. Its comprehensive rules rest on the superiority of a universal morality, which arguably prevents self-reflection that every encounter with the Other should accompany, whilst at the same time, this universal codification leaves a sense of apprehension about values and identities that this civic Europe should accommodate.

Accordingly, attention should be given to how public debate describes the European self to support the necessity to implement new policies "dealing with admission and integration" of the newcomers (Muller 2007a: 287). In this respect, collective identity is an essential analytical category to understand any discourses and political strategies of inclusion. However, before discussing such an analytical framework, it is necessary to clarify some of the assumptions in the conflict between the European identity and the Muslim Other.

2. The Construction of Collective Identity

The concept of collective identity applied in this theoretical framework draws on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979). This theory was originally developed in psychology as an attempt to unify an individualistic approach and an interactionist approach to social cognition and behaviour (Haslam, 2001; Postmes & Branscombe, 2010). The main assumption is that people divide their social world into *them/us* based on a process of social grouping also known as in-groups (us) and out-groups (them) (Stangor, 2000: 12). Moreover, Tajfel proposes that groups, which people belong to, are an important source of self-esteem.

As a consequence, social identity theory explains how people are driven to enhance their self-image by keeping or developing a positive sense of social identity with their in-group discriminating against the out-group (Stets & Burke 2000: 226). The desire for a positive social identity is explained through the manifestation of three different strategies, namely individual mobility, social competition and social creativity. In each case, these strategies result from an intergroup struggle for power, prestige and status (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) developed through positive strategies aimed to strengthen the legitimacy and stability of in-groups versus out-groups (McAndrew & Milenkovic, 2002). Thus, the process of identity formation of a political community always includes the construction of the Other as an out-group.

Social identity theory can also explain a wide range of political processes based on different collective identifications and it is very useful to explain prejudice, discrimination and those circumstances under which social groups move from social solidarity to overt conflict. Notable examples include the use of the political identity approach as a basis for understanding nationalism (Calhoun, 2001: 15) and the process of European integration (Neumann & Welsh 1991, Neumann 1996).

The construction of collective identity can be directly developed through a political discourse aimed at defining membership, or indirectly through the use of political symbols (Marcussen et al, 1999: 615). Castells explains that those “who

construct a collective identity ... largely determines the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing themselves outside of it" (Castells, 1997: 7). However, when realistic or symbolic threats undermine the process of positive social identification, inter-group anxiety plays a significant role in creating prejudice and fear. Thus, in order to resolve positive social identity, the group at risk activates a mechanism of ethnocentrism (Stets & Burke 2000: 232).

According to Bruter (2005: 12), there are two different perspectives to describe the process of collective identification. The first is based on a cultural perspective and analyses political identity and the sense of belonging that an individual citizen feels towards a political group. The features of the group can be defined by culture, social similarities, values, religion, ethics or even ethnicity. In this way, cultural identification refers to the semiotic system used to legitimise and justify social norms and values and acts as the framework for orientating the members of the community. Specifically, Eder and Giesen argue "Europe is also a symbolic space where projections and memories, the collective experiences and identifications of the people of Europe are represented" (2001: 245). In this way, the process of cultural identification is a process of adaptation around conceptions of Europe and what it means to be European.

The second perspective implies a civic perspective in which political identity defines the process of identification with a political structure through a set of rights, rules and institutions. Thus, a civic-identity emphasises the difference between in-groups and out-groups. However, according to Bruter (2005: 13), civic identity is not aimed at exclusionary processes. The Other is present as a difference, which is not regarded as inferior, but rather as being problematic for political cohesion. Civic identity indeed consists of norms and rules that define the social group and its membership, its goals and social purposes, as well as the collective worldviews shared by the group. Collective identities convey a sense of an imagined community (Anderson 1991), usually based on social discourses about a common fate, a common history or a common culture (Fonderman 2006: 24; Irving Lichbach & Zuckerman 1997: 47).

The concept of collective identity implies a collective identity in which civic integration defines the process of identification with a political structure through a set of rights, rules and institutions. Therefore, the debate on the integration of Muslims is a challenging opportunity to observe whether and to what extent discourses on European identity, integration to European civic values and the emergence of a European public sphere can be entangled.

It is also necessary to understand how and why this discomfort for the Other may be perceived as a danger to the stability and cohesion of a particular dominant group's way of life. The Other offers thus a more flexible conceptualisation of the causes of the perceived incompatibility between European liberal democratic societies and Muslims, because it is based on the features that characterise the dominant group (Taguieff, 2001). When the Other is confronted with the most established values and traditions of a community, it becomes an increasing source of conflict or what Giddens labels as "ontological insecurity" (1984: 63). For this reason, after having clarified the concept of collective identity, it is necessary to clarify how both the discourses of securitisation and secularism play an important role in reinforcing the assumption that Muslim identity is hostile to Europe.

3. The Securitisation of Europe

In sharp contrast to the liberal and tolerant image of Europe that the European Union likes to convey, it is possible to observe a different vision of collective identity implied in the discourse of "Fortress Europe" (Checkel and Katzenstein 2008), namely the process of border security adopted by the EU against illegal immigration. The fortification of Europe does not refer to its foreign relations but depends on the internal problems, which always dominate Europe's relationship with the Other (Christiansen et al 1999: 541).

This constant fear of the Other has thus deep implications for the public debate on Muslim integration, because it represents diversity as an issue threatening the social cohesion of a particular community, and it is "intricately linked up with the question of what it is to be European, and which cultural requirements are

necessary to attain that status” (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 347). For this reason, Kymlicka describes the recent anxiety towards Muslims, which has been manifested in Europe, as a “deeper and persisting ... anxiety about the other” and “a nostalgia for a time when everyone was assumed to share thick bonds of common history and identity” (2007: 124). In this way, the fortification of Europe can be considered as a traditional process of self-defence that any homogenous society develops when it feels threatened by a minority perceived as incompatible with its own values, norms, and beliefs. When a dominant group perceives a challenge to its own position as “occupiers of the centre of national space” and culture (Ghassan Hage 1998: 19), the Other becomes a source of anxiety.

This line of thought is clearly explained by the process of securitisation of community (Williams 2003 518), where a process of threat construction is based on a symbiotic relation between a dominant majority and an out-group (Coskun 2012: 39). In this sense, the process of securitisation aims at underlining the existence of the Other as a threat. It is impossible to speak of the security of a community without recognising a source of threat (Wæver 1998: 353). Conversely, in the absence of the Other, we cannot speak about security (Coskun 2012: 39). Therefore, the process of securitisation requires the construction of an enemy-other (Fierke 2007:112) in order to consolidate the stability and security of a society.

Fenton has identified three factors that may transform diversity into conflict. The first of these is when a dominant majority perceives a loss of internal power and reacts to secure its status, the second concerns the erosion of state sovereignty as a result of increasing regional or global movements, and the third involves the collapse of state authority or institutions (Fenton 2004: 189). Accordingly, conflicting differences are seen not as an issue that matters to democratic debate and negotiation in the public sphere, but rather as a question of national security, in which the government can decide to reduce the “democratic process” to protect the state (Kymlicka, 2007: 589; 2010: 106). This development is best explained by the theory of securitisation (Fekete, 2004; Coskun, 2012) developed by the Copenhagen School during the 1990s.

In the securitisation model, security is understood as a discursive process in which actors construct issues as threats to safety. Thus, the contemporary security environment is profoundly related to the politicisation of a question as a threat through a discursive articulation that moves a particular issue beyond the realm of ordinary politics to that of emergency politics, where extraordinary measures are justified (Buzan and Weaver 2003: 491). As a consequence, security politics is not just about underlining pre-existing threats; it is also a discursive “activity that makes certain issues visible as a threat” (Coskun 2010: 81). Within this context, “security refers to a concept that is more about how a society or any group of people” (Coskun 2010: 81) come to describe, or not describe, something as a menace. Securitisation is thus about the process by which fear is constructed through a political discourse.

In this manner, securitisation legitimises the state in its role of protecting the community from external threats (Bigo 2002; Boswell 2007). Under conditions of securitisation, ethnic minorities can be marginalised or severely disciplined through strict regulation of their civil and political rights. Securitisation then, erodes both the political space for minorities and the democratic space (Vertovec & Vessendorf 2011: 44). In other words, securitisation justifies the state enacting a range of policies to regulate and control minorities as well as immigrant groups that otherwise could not be considered legitimate (Buzan et al. 1993: 24). The concept of securitisation is applied then when political actors or policymakers propose exceptional actions against minorities, because public opinion perceives them as a threat to collective belonging even when there is limited evidence of any real menace (Kymlicka 2009: 126).

The Muslim threat can thus be used to legitimate political action, which might not otherwise appear as reasonable. However, it is necessary to distinguish securitising moves, in which an actor discursively presents something as an existential threat from successful securitisation policies; the latter will only exist if and when public opinion accepts the securitising move (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 25). Therefore, any political consensus that favours securitisation has important consequences for the public debate on immigration and its implementation in civic integration policies. At the same time, it has to be reminded that today, securitisation cannot be based on blatant exclusionary policies; such

practice would normally be rejected at an institutional level, because it would run into liberal democratic constitutions (Joppke, 2005: 49) and European anti-discriminatory policies (Schain 2009: 97).

In brief, securitisation is an important theoretical and analytical concept to study integration, as immigrants can contradict the principles that legitimise a national community because it undermines the building of a cohesive political community with a uniform cultural identity (Jackson-Preece, 2006). Thus recognition of diversity, especially of politically organised ethno-cultural groups, can be perceived as a serious menace to national identity as it could destabilise the social and political unity realised after a historic process of political struggles (Kymlicka 1995: 9).

In the next section, it is relevant to analyse how the secular conceptualisation affects European capacity to connect with or exclude the Other and how Muslim diversity has been constructed through the contraposition between Islam with secular Europe. This supposed contraposition has recently enabled political leaders like Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy to play the role of champions for Europe's secular identity against the threat represented by Islam.

4. Islam as the Incompatible Other

Islam is increasingly visible in Europe, as large numbers of people of Muslim faith have settled permanently in Europe and are in fact, or at least aspire to become, 'European citizens'. At the same time, the increasing visibility of their religious identity has sparked a reflection for the future of European values, democracy and secular-driven notions of tolerance (Silvestri, 2010: 46). As a consequence, the problem related to integration of Muslims is often formulated in reference to religion, and Islam has thus become a politically, culturally and symbolically important dimension of difference that often overshadows ethnicity.

This shift from ethnicity to religion has been reinforced by a problematic interaction between the secular and religious spheres in Europe transforming secular

thinkers into the fiercest opponents to Muslim integration. Following 9/11, the Muslim presence in Europe has been increasingly perceived in political debate as aggressive and opposed to European culture and Western traditions. In addition, the media everyday amplify the perception that some Islamic practices “such as forced marriages, female genital mutilations” (Meer 2010: 19) or Sharia Law are spreading across Europe due to the excessive tolerance and relativism introduced by multicultural policies.

The importance of religion in this discussion is that it poses an unavoidable challenge to European secularism, raising the question of whether European societies are truly secular or, indeed, of how secular they are. Rich analytical discussions on secularism have developed recently (Bader 2007; Jakobsen & Pellegrini 2008; Taylor, 2007; Mavelli 2012; Habermas 2010, Butler et al 2011), casting light on the dilemmas faced by contemporary liberal democracies in dealing with religious diversity. Mavelli (2012) offers a compelling argument by suggesting that the present debate on Muslim integration is led on the one hand by Europe’s incapacity to perceive Islam as an opportunity rather than a threat (Mavelli: 143) and that this debate has its roots in a tension at the heart of the secular episteme (Mavelli 2012: 25), and on the other hand by the attempt to integrate the Muslim Other through the imposition of universal narratives, which do not offer any perspective for who does not comply with the image of the European self (Mavelli 2012: 99).

According to Mavelli, the secular mode of knowledge has become the epistemic framework that has marked the progressive withdrawal from the transcendent Other/God by contributing to a parallel, progressive withdrawal from the Other (Mavelli 2012: 36). In other words, the secular subject is not required to embrace ‘alterity’ as a condition of knowledge of the Other, but can rely solely on his own rational faculties (Mavelli 2012: 20). As a consequence, this secular condition is no longer a political limitation of religious influence that empowers critical autonomy, but a ‘constraint’ that limits the European subjects’ possibilities of being, becoming, knowing and connecting with the Other (Mavelli 2012: 8).

Despite the fact that Mavelli offers an epistemic conceptualisation of the secular that exceeds the differences that exist between European nation-states in

terms of secular traditions (2012: 7), from an empirical point of view, national cultural and political interpretations of secularism remain very different because of different national histories. For this reason, secularism cannot be assumed as an unchanging and universal transformative process, as the national dynamics of secularism are not linear and did not move in the same direction. At the same time, by focusing on recent divisive national public debates, such as the French decision to ban the integral veil or the publication of the Mohamed cartoons in Denmark, Mavelli shows how these controversies are an integral part of the same process of the reproduction of secular life (2012: 87). In other words, the European Self needs the Other to preserve its image of a superior civilisation.

Therefore, it could be more reasonable to assume that secular discourse affects the prejudice or engagement toward Islam through two analytical levels: an ontological development at the national level and a more recent epistemological development at the European level. Both levels have very concrete political implications for how the presence of Islam could be debated in the European public sphere and how the secular understanding contributes to strengthening the exclusionary character of the European collective self.

The next section focuses on how the European public sphere is a central category to analyse the transnational present debate on Muslim integration and how the collective self is constantly reconstructed through the interaction between the national public spheres.

5. European Public Sphere and Identity Formation

Today, the increased number of transnational networks of communication associated with globalisation (Fraser 2007: 8) have questioned the national dimension of the public sphere and led to a reconsideration of the concept within a transnational frame (Conway & Singh 2009; Castells 2008). Accordingly, the public sphere has been used to understand the potential of those transnational debates that are now emerging beyond the national territorial state.

Theoretical debate on the characteristics of the public sphere is generally developed by referring to features of national identity such as language, territory and political authority. Habermas (1989: 24–39) implicitly supposes a national public sphere is contained by a national state, or in Fraser’s words a “Westphalian state” (2007). When the public sphere presumes a specific national political context, which bounds a “political community with its own territorial state” (Fraser, 2007: 8), then the public sphere appears to be restricted to a distinctive space (Trenz, 2008: 273) in which political and social issues are debated, but only with reference to specific national features included within linguistic and geographical boundaries.

At the same time, Fraser points out that the contemporary public sphere is increasingly transnational because the constitutive elements of communication are no longer directed towards the national public. Thus, the debates and opinions generated by “dispersed interlocutors” no longer represent the common interest and the general motivation of any national *demos* (Fraser 2007: 19). Habermas himself, responding to numerous criticisms made about *The Structural Transformation*, revised his notion of national sphere and considered a globalised post-national public sphere made up of numerous simultaneous debating publics that are less burdened by the constraints of national identities (1992, 2006).

Scholars have drawn attention to the emergence of a European public sphere, which animates the current transnational public debate within and between European states (Bee & Bozzini 2010, Risse 2010, Diez & Medrano 2003, 2009). The legitimacy of transnational and supranational systems of governance in the European Union (EU) partly depends on the degree to which the boundaries of national public spheres are expanded so as to correspond with the transnational scope of governance. The relevance of this scholarship is to understand whether the public sphere is shifting from the national arena to new institutional venues at a supranational level.

The recent crisis of the EU project generated numerous theoretical discussions about the necessity of creating a stronger European public sphere in order to fix the democratic deficit of the European institutions by linking the EU institutions with their citizens. This could imply an extension of the media arena

itself, leading to a pan-European media system with a pan-European audience. In this context, two crucial empirical questions regarding the potential of a European public sphere have been posed: Do the various nationally consolidated public spheres constitute the EPS? And to what extent can and does this transnational public sphere transgress these national public spheres? In other words, is the European public sphere more than the sum of its national parts? (Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyżanowski 2012: 19)

Other authors have presented a more pessimistic opinion on the emergence of a transnational public sphere (Bee & Bozzini 2010, Risse 2010) by underlining the gap between the idealisations of a European public sphere and the prevailing communicative practices in those cultures that are still based on national characterisations. These authors point out that public debate in Europe is still considered a very nationalistic process because 1) national media tend to stay contained within national or linguistic audiences; 2) news is still tied to national interests in terms of international events; and 3) there is no specific European public sphere because Europe lacks a singular, common identity.

Much of this literature on the transnational public sphere is still embryonic and more efforts have emerged to provide a more comprehensive analysis; at the same time, different studies have shown the existence of a multitude of communication networks covering European themes simultaneously (Trenz & Eder 2004) despite the fact that Europeans do not speak a common language and a common European-wide media does not exist. Here, the concept of ‘network’ occupies a central position because it refers to the interaction between different national media, institutions and social actors. In fact, according to Eder and Kantner, as long as the media communicates “the same issues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance” (2000: 315), there is indeed a common public sphere that may be shared by Europeans.

A European public sphere can thus be formed through the dissemination of media networks as long as the same topics are discussed simultaneously within all different national media (Risse 2010: 4). Although, at the most basic empirical level, this last conceptualisation follows Habermas’ notion of a public sphere as being “a

theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk” (Fraser 1990: 57, 1993), citizens do not need to become fully engaged in a direct discursive exchange within this transnational environment. Therefore this approach refers to a conceptualisation of the transnational public sphere as a realm of shared understanding and common identification, rather than an open arena for public deliberation (Ferree et al. 2002: 290-291).

This conceptualisation of the European public sphere has to be understood as a social construct through which Europeans engage one another and debate issues of common European concern across borders. For this reason, Risse claims that it is possible to observe a process of the Europeanisation of public spheres when the same “themes are debated, at the same time, at similar levels of attention across national public spheres” (Risse 2010: 11). However, Risse finds empirical evidence that controversial debates have more chance of being interpreted through more “similar frames of reference, meaning structures across national public spheres” and media (Risse 2010: 127). This conceptualisation is concerned with a constructionist approach that focuses on the ability of language to frame the terms of debate, thereby creating a discursive context in which social identities and political institutions emerge (Risse, 2009: 147). This line of thought implies that public debate on European issues leads to collective identification processes and creates a community of communication, rather than pre-assuming it as a requisite of the European public sphere.

This constructionist concept of the European public sphere is more helpful in explaining the debate on integration than traditional institutional analysis, which is pitched between neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism (Corner, 2010: 11). These two broad approaches are concerned with the relative agency of states and institutions in the European public sphere, and their concern is with the transfer of policy-making beyond the State to EU level. Neo-functionalist schools of thought have sought to understand whether European integration has been driven by the preferences of national governments (Wiener & Diez 2009: 45); whereas intergovernmentalism focuses on European institutions as being the dominant actors responsible for pushing the European process of integration (Wiener & Diez: 2009: 67).

The public sphere is the communicative arena in which the community is identified as a political entity. The members of the community can, through a public sphere, identify themselves on the basis of what forms their common views. However, the role of citizens as necessary active agents in the debate is not central in this definition of European public sphere; rather their agency is seen as part of a more abstract process of identity formation. The concept of a European public sphere thus implies the formation of a “community of communication” that “presupposes some degree of collective identification” with a European perspective (Risse 2010: 157).

The European public sphere becomes, in this way, both a communicative community that arises through public debate beyond national borders and the communicative arena in which identities develop and gain significance for citizens. The existence of communicative exchanges between countries is, in fact, the necessary condition for the formation of a European identity, in which the European collective-self is constantly reconstructed in interaction with the surrounding out-groups, through the mediation of cultural and political discourses on security and secularism.

An example of this process can be found during the cartoons affair in 2006, when the European press largely agreed on the necessity to defend press independence and freedom of opinion against Muslim protests (Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2010: 266). The simultaneous debate across Europe challenged a differentiation of the public sphere on a purely national basis and revealed a common discourse centred on the contraposition between Europe and Islam, which represented Islam as conflicting with European common values of secularism and freedom of opinion.

The debate on Muslim immigration in the aftermath of the Swiss referendum is certainly a challenging example to observe the transnational construction of a specific discourse on integration through an interactive process of negotiation, influence and national recontextualisation of a normative European identity. As a consequence, the use of the European national public sphere as an analytical

category is strategic to observe the interaction among the national debates, but also a valid approach to study the discursive articulation of new boundaries between the external and the internal, including the definition of a common Other within Europe (Delanty and Rumford 2005).

6. Transnational Convergence as Recontextualisation of a Discourse

In an interesting analysis of the Danish public debate on Muslim immigration, Mouritsen (2006: 73) notes how the institutional debate has been characterised by a politicisation of European common values and culture, predicated on discourses that present cultural homogeneity, in terms of it being a political and functional necessity for Denmark to guarantee the continuity of the nation in a transnational system. Thus, the national particularism that immigrants and ethnic minorities are asked to accept in Denmark are local versions of a normative European debate on immigration, characterised by abstract universalism, state neutrality in matters of religion, and individual and gender equality (Mouritsen, 2010: 52). Therefore, the interactive processes of communication and coordination across national public spheres introduced norms and values into the Danish political debate.

Thus the question is not only whether or not states adopt common norms, but also how and why a process of interactive communication between national public spheres is activated. The theoretical and empirical implications that arise from these questions are particularly salient in seeking to understand the European public sphere's communicative dynamics.

The increasing complexity of political relations in Europe, the transfer of competences up to intergovernmental arenas in which decision-making is shared with other European polities, sets important challenges for national public spheres. In the forms that the transnational public sphere may take, there are two general trajectories that correspond to different forms of convergence: vertical, between the national polity and European-supranational levels, and horizontal between different national polities in Europe (Koopmans & Erbe 2004). The extent of convergence

along these two trajectories indicates the degree of openness or closure of a national public sphere, up to EU level (vertical) or across to other European countries (horizontal). In this way, the analysis of these two forms of convergence provides insight into the degree, form and shape of the emerging European public sphere (Paraskevopoulos, 2001).

Most scholars assume a top-down convergence in their empirical studies, whereby norms are disseminated from above and member states either resist or comply therewith (Checkel 2001, Dell'Olio 2005). In this manner, only the implementation of supranational rules and norms are identified as the source of convergence. This vertical approach can become problematic, as it implies that domestic policy change is solely attributed to international actors, processes and institutions (Busch and Jörgens 2005).

Limited attention has been paid to horizontal convergence, defined as norm diffusion and interaction from one public sphere to another. Paradoxically, horizontal processes of convergence are purely transnational, when compared to the vertical variants, because they build direct communicative links and exchanges between polities across national borders. Moreover, horizontal convergence is likely to be reinforced by the increasing interdependence of national public spheres when they “face [the] same challenge and come up with the same conclusion without coordinating it with each other” (Maatsch, 2011: 150).

To understand, therefore, the recent debate on civic integration of Muslims, it seems to be particularly useful to refer to the horizontal exchanges between national spheres. First of all, the state remains central in regulating and managing many aspects of citizenship and immigrant integration, often justifying policies and actions in terms of national priorities and sensibilities and defining the boundaries of the in-group, and who is *in* and who is *out* (Neumann 1996). The state also remains, in fact, the primary institutional apparatus for legitimising national discourse on identity, through systems of education, law, finance, territorial control and so on.

As a consequence, the role of the national political sphere cannot be ignored in the study of a transnational debate. However, “cross-national policy convergence”

(Knill 2005) could be merely the result of similar solutions adopted by different countries to “parallel problem” pressure such as immigration, securitisation, integration and citizenship (Bennett 1991: 231). For this reason, it is important to compare each national public debate in order to consider to what extent convergence is a real process of communication characterised by the same causal relationship, which enables a “communicative exchange” aimed at sharing the same political discourse (Bulmer & Radaelli 2004:7).

Second, Trenz notes (2008: 274) that the national public sphere remains the central focus in the global arena “for the re-interpretation of issues” concerning transnational processes “within contextualised systems of meaning and particular cultures.” In fact, through the efforts of the media, global debates, such as the “war on terrorism”, are recontextualised into national debates. Recontextualisation is a process that extracts a discourse from its original context in order to introduce it into another context (Fariclough, 2003: 222). Since the political implications of a discourse depend on its context, recontextualisation implies also a national adaption of purpose and of the communicative process (Schmidt 2008: 305).

In this manner, the process of adaption of an international debate produces two simultaneous effects for the national public sphere: 1) the ability of a transnational debate to influence and shape a national discussion and 2) the agency of the national public sphere in recontextualising transnational discourses. For this reason, mutual links and reciprocal communicative exchanges between countries are central in understanding the dynamics of the European public sphere.

This approach on national agency has several advantages. It does not take for granted vertical pressure in various national states. Looking specifically at the national level allows better to capture the specificity of each national case and to see if, when and how a transnational debate has entered into the national political agenda (Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2010). Furthermore, national agency does not assume *a priori*, that Europe has had an effect on national debate on integration. The EU level should be counted alongside many other constraints at work at a national level.

It seems simplistic to assume that the EU or other international actors are the most likely the main source of policy convergence, but perhaps they should be considered among the many determinants of national debate. Therefore, rather than focusing only on a vertical convergence, horizontal convergence points to the mutual influence through which discourses interact through across national contexts, or what we also may call “interdiscursive context” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 45-46). The process of convergence can then be explained “in terms of the reciprocal resonance of public communication” between the various national public spheres (Trenz 2005: 176).

The process of recontextualisation can be instead used to illustrate the specific role of the media in translating a discourse in a national context (Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2010). Therefore, there is no expectation that the media can recontextualise a transnational discourse in national contexts in its entirety, but rather “bits and pieces” (Lynggaard, 2012: 97). Specifically, the filter of the national media is central to the recontextualisation of any discourse on cohesion, belonging and membership of the polity.

Gramsci's definition of hegemony provides further critical insight on how the public sphere legitimates and recontextualises discourses (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 24) through the media. The national media can be considered as a social agent in the public sphere, which reproduces and organises discourses and helps neutralise the different alternatives giving shape to a prevailing hegemony. Thus when the media coverage authorises only a specific set of discourses within the public sphere, opposition tends to be marginalised or domesticated (Block 2013).

As a result, the efforts of the media are not only aimed at developing and recontextualising discourse, but also at shrinking oppositional agency. For this very reason, it is important to analyse how the media actually articulate discourse in the public sphere and which particular interests mark and direct their distinct purposes. The articulation of discourse indeed defines the boundaries of public sphere interaction and the level of deliberation (Dahlberg, 2013: 29).

In conclusion, the European public sphere could be identified as a forum facilitating horizontal communicative exchanges between national debates. However, the national sphere maintains its agency and capacity to recontextualise transnational discourses through the national media. As a consequence, the transnationalisation of the debate implies the existence of a mediatised arena for disseminating a shared understanding across European countries and allows the specificity of each national case to be captured and investigated.

The Theoretical Framework in Brief

In this theoretical chapter, my aim was to clarify concepts that will be taken up in the empirical investigation.

First, I present a brief overview of how civic integration is connected to the process of identity formation in Europe. The close association between the concepts of identity and integration leads to interesting questions about how European identity might be regarded as a desirable and normative kind of collective identity to regulate the Muslim Other.

Second, I offer some relevant clarifications about the concepts of secularism and securitisation. In particular, I explore how these two concepts are entangled in a discursive articulation that tends to reinforce collective representations of a shared community; furthermore I underline how this articulation represents a normative framework in which the Muslim Other has to fit into.

Third, I explain the conceptual relevance of the European public sphere to explore the transnational debate on integration and how debate is central to the process of renegotiating national identities. I have underlined how the Europeanisation of national public debates is leading to a transnational network of communication (Trenz & Eder 2004), which reinforces the process of collective European self-identification in the course of controversial debates about European issues of common concern to Europeans (Risse, 2010: 11).

Fourth, I draw on a theoretical approach based on the model of convergence to apply an analysis of the public debate on civic integration. The level of convergence invites an analysis of the connections that the European public sphere establishes between national countries and how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical impact on how the national media recontextualise transnational discourses on immigration and integration.

In this respect, the next chapter frames the methodology to assess how political debate has emerged across Europe in response to the problems concerning the integration of Muslims. Specifically, the aim is to critically explore in what ways the discourse of integration is positioned between 1) the process to obtain the necessary social cohesion at the level of the nation-state and 2) the acceptance of normative assumptions regarding the civic nature of European identity.

Chapter 3: Outline of the Methodology, Social and Political Analysis of the Debate

Chapter Overview

This chapter aims at defining a methodology to investigate the transnational convergence of the debate on integration and to reveal the shared strategies of discourse through which Muslim integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of their national contexts. The research design is based on a comparative analysis of national debates in order to understand how networks and dialogic relationships develop between different national public spheres and how these relationships contribute to the construction of a shared normative discourse about integration.

In chapter 1, I underline how immigrant flows and settlements have created concern about cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. In particular, the increasing presence of Muslims raises concern, as their diversity is seen as hostile to the values and traditions shared by Europeans. In the aftermath of the Swiss vote on the Minarets, political leaders across Europe simultaneously asked Muslims to confirm their loyalty to national communities and to avoid future conflict within the religious, political and cultural traditions of Europe. For this reason, it is crucial to acknowledge the substantive content of this public debate on integration, to see which norms and arguments were more influential, but also of the discursive interactions within the European public sphere.

In chapter 2, I clarify the theoretical framework by explaining the conceptual relevance of the European public sphere to explore the public debate on integration and how this debate is central in the process of renegotiating national identities. In addition, the concept of recontextualisation analyses the connections that the European public sphere establishes between national contexts and how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical impact on how national public spheres interact reciprocally to legitimate civic integration policies.

In section 1 of this chapter, I offer an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), its strengths and its limits, and I explain why this method in combination with Content Analysis is useful to answer my research. In section 2, the key concepts discussed in the earlier theoretical framework are reintroduced, together with a detailed view of the contributions empirical analysis can make to the development of this research design. In section 3, I discuss the specifics of the research design, and specifically why I have opted for a comparative framework based on national case studies. I also introduce the analytical category of nodal point, which corresponds to the entry level for the reconstruction of public debate. I then present the criteria applied to the selection of case studies, nodal points and analytical corpus. Lastly, I present the full comparative framework, which consists of three national public debates: France, Germany and the UK. In section 4, I explain the analytical process of data analysis, which is based on a three-dimensional model elaborated by Fairclough (1992): discursive practice, textual practice and socio-cultural explanation. Finally, I summarise the research design in a conclusive overview of the chapter.

1. Overview of the Method: Critical Discourse Analysis

The way in which I use discourse as an analytical category focuses on a twofold conceptualisation based on 1) a process of meaning production allowing for certain interpretations of integration while excluding others; 2) a social practice through which integration establishes and maintains political relationships (Fairclough, 1992). Therefore, discourse can be defined as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995: 44). This definition of discourse points to Habermas’ conceptualisation of language as a “medium of domination and social force, as it serves to legitimise the accepted relations of organised power” (Habermas, 1977: 360).

What is interesting to observe in the semiotic content of the discourse is how discourse serves to define actors' strategic interests or normative values and also to present the inevitability and pertinence of a given policy change. For example, the analysis of discourse on civic integration may help to establish a dialectical relationship in order to explain what possible political effects discourse creates in reproducing stereotypes, norms or values. However, discourse is not only shaped by the semiotic elements of text but also by its non-semiotic conditions such as its social practice.

Schmidt suggests that social practice is the communicative process that coordinates norms and values across the public sphere (Schmidt, 2008: 311). In other words, public actors generate and communicate discourses within a given semiotic context in order to deliberate, legitimate and reproduce a discourse through the public sphere. Accordingly, both the semiotic as well as the social process need to be analysed in order to explain the explanatory role of discourse and its causal influence in political debate.

As a consequence of this conceptualisation, I selected Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) because it aims at investigating the relationships between discourse, structure and the influential role that language plays in legitimising power relations. Instead, traditional Discourse Analysis (DA) often ignores the social relations and practices of language by focusing only on text and disregarding how meaning is conditioned by social structures (Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2002: 4).

CDA is a critical interpretative method (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Wodak, 2001; Fairclough 2005; van Dijk, 1993), which rejects positivist conceptions of knowledge based on scientific laws or empirical generalisations (Howarth et al, 2000: 7). According to Wodak, "critical" has to be understood as an attempt to reveal the social forces that underlie a discursive regime (Wodak, 2001: 9) or in other words, the exercise of power and the relations between different social groups (Howarth et al, 2000: 3-4) through the empirical investigation of the use of language.

Specifically, CDA recognises language (Wodak & Meyer 2002: 10) as one of the crucial spheres of human activity. Language is shaped by society, but society is also shaped by language. Language is thus an important element of inquiry for achieving political understanding (Gramsci 1996: 378-9) of how social relations are established and maintained through the discursive work of elite. This method is also a highly normative form of social inquiry and philosophical investigation “aimed at demonstrating what is problematic with a text and discourse based on an emancipative standpoint” (Van Dijk, 1993a: 352). For this reason, Luke suggests the role of the CDA practitioner is to take exact steps as a “Gramscian transformative intellectual in the task[s] of unveiling, countering and consciousness-raising” around dominant discourses (Luke, 2002: 106).

As a ‘social critical theory’, CDA has the goal of showing relations and causes that are hidden and highlight their structural inequalities by promoting further questions of social justice and increasing a general consciousness about the manipulation of the political process of decision-making. This point explains why this method focuses on interdisciplinary research in order to understand how language functions in organising and transmitting knowledge, in establishing social institutions and in implementing power across social contexts (Wodak & Meyer, 2002: 11).

In my analysis I refer to a more specific orientation of CDA, the Dialectical-Relational Approach (DRA), which focuses on the analysis of the extra-discursive domain. The main characteristic of DRA is thus to study discourse as processes of signification, which are dialectically interconnected with elements of social practices related to non-semiotic elements (Fairclough, 2003: 19-20) such as economic systems, social relations and institutions.

According to Fairclough, DRA is defined by a dialectical relationship between discourse (as a broadly semiotic category) and the institution or social structure that frames it (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). This dialectical approach reflects the influence of structuralism on social theory, such as political economy and social conflict illustrated in the Marxist tradition (see Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999, Fairclough 2003, Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2002). As a

consequence, discourses “embed,” “translate” and “condense” (Fairclough 2006: 18) economic and political relations into relatively stable structures of meaning that reflect and reproduce these relations. To put it another way, DRA traces the social, political and economic relations, which inform the constituting discursive practice. The advantage of this approach is that it will provide precise epistemic descriptions of the social life and on-going specific changes, by focusing on languages and on the relations of discursive production.

Considerable criticism has been raised toward the validity and objectives of CDA analysis. The main point of critique is based on methodological considerations: Henderson (2005) highlights how several researchers have criticised CDA as a valid scientific practice for its lack of objectivity. Other scholars have argued that CDA does not apply a critical stand on its own analytical process (Toolan, 1997). Widdowson (1998: 137), for example, criticises CDA analysts of “a kind of ad hoc bricolage which takes from theory whatever concept comes usefully to hand”. Additionally, Widdowson (1998: 150) argues that some CDA studies tend to support the validity of arguments through appeals to “moral conscience” and “social justice”, rather than through reliable empirical evidence. Similar objections to the CDA paradigm have been made by Schegloff (1997), who studied the possibility of partiality in linguistic analysis based on critical and political approaches, while Maussen (2006: 102) criticised CDA because researchers often analyse their texts by seeking illustrations, which confirm the hypotheses developed in their theoretical frameworks.

Several arguments have been made in response to these criticisms. First, with regard to the objectivity, I relate my epistemological position to a Gramscian standpoint. According to Gramsci, scientific objectivity and its universal validity, which are present in positivist social sciences, are inherited by a “semi-religious view of a human subjectivity separated from non-human (natural or divined created) objectivity” (Gramsci 1975: 1437). Scientists in attempting to uncover truths about the social world always apply a degree of interpretation, thus knowledge is always investigated through the subjectivity of the researcher. Therefore, for Gramsci, objectivity always means ‘human subjectivity’ and cannot correspond to the sense of positivist objectivity, because human subjectivity is always entangled to social

relations. This does not mean that Gramsci is against the practice of science or does not believe the knowledge it produces. But from a sociological perspective, a researcher is always a “socialised member of a speech community” and knowledge is always investigated through the subjectivity of the researcher (Chilton 2004: 59). Therefore, what becomes methodologically relevant is not just an idealistic assumption of objectivity, but how to ‘translate’ the researcher’s subjectivity into objectivity.

Self-reflexivity in social sciences requires declaring the stand of the researcher, such as a commitment to emancipation, and also acknowledges how any interpretation of results is obviously constructed from and based on its particular position. As a consequence, “CDA, like other critical social sciences, needs to be reflexive and self-critical about its own institutional position and all that goes with it” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 9). Accordingly, only a fully scrupulous documentation of the analyst’s position in the analytical process can contribute to an advanced process of the analysis (Bauer & Gaskell 2004: 348).

For this reason, it is central as part of my analysis, to elaborate my explicit epistemic standpoint by placing my assumptions, questions and results in a dialectical tension with my data, and elaborate them through reflexivity (Bauer & Gaskell 2004: 348) and self-criticism (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 9). In this manner, the value of CDA lies, therefore, in being able to integrate both the critical and the reflexive points of view that are involved in the social sciences and knowledge production.

Second, concerning the roles of reliability and validity, Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 259) emphasise that CDA applies the same criteria of “careful, rigorous and systematic analysis” as any other hermeneutic and empirical approach within the social sciences. Certainly, researchers can sample text and analyse just those linguistic features to validate selectively their own hypotheses, but this limit concerns any form of empirical investigation, whether qualitative or quantitative; in fact, the adoption of a specific methodology is no guarantee of research quality (Bauer & Gaskell, 2004: 384). Thus the reliability and the validity of any findings depend on the logic and quality of the research design.

In order to preserve the reliability, it is crucial to provide a detailed description of the analytical steps applied - including the selection of sources, the representativeness of the sample, and the rigorous systematisation used for the analysis of that data - can avoid possible distortions via a self-validation of findings. Concerning the validity, this research design combines content analysis with CDA in order to have a second method to gather data and validate findings. Specifically, CDA is useful to understand how discourse on civic integration works toward particular political interests and content analysis will be used to identify relevant 'themes' in the press coverage and to compare similar discursive strategies and structures across Europe. Hence, this triangulation technique facilitates an interdisciplinary approach to the study of political debate without being constrained to the field of discourse analysis.

To sum up, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an interpretative method, which views language as a field of inquiry in critical-social research and focuses on the production of political relationships of power through discursive practices. Moreover, CDA is a critical social theory, which can allow me to analyse how new discourses on integration emerge and how rules, norms and practices are established. As a consequence, the analytical task is not focused only on the semiotic analysis of the negative view of Islam, but also on the analysis of a normative attempt to reproduce a discourse on European identity based on universal values, standards and cultural attributes of the majority. However, in order to cope with the criticism about reliability and validity, the research design combines content analysis with CDA in order to triangulate data analysis.

2. The Research Design

The purpose of this research design is to examine in detail how the transnational debate on Muslim integration recontextualises a discourse about European identity and thereby, persuasively contributes to the legitimisation of a specific consensus on civic integration, in and through the European public sphere. In order to analyse this debate across Europe, two key points have been formulated

to offer a general view of how the research questions elaborated in chapter 1 are developed in the research design.

The *first research question* (H1) focuses on the transnational convergence of the debate, or in other words, how different national debates draw inter-textually on one another offering similarity in terms of their discursive articulation. For this reason, it is assumed that this debate is not only observable through the characteristics of the specific national sphere, but is also likely to be taken up and reconfigured through the filter of the national media. This point implies that the influence the European public sphere exercises on national debates is not based on a vertical communicative exchange, through a top-down dynamic between the EU institutions and state members, but rather through horizontal and reciprocal links across national public spheres.

Specifically, the emphasis is on understanding how controversial political statements are actually undertaken by the media and covered across Europe. The research design needs thus to focus on how a political statement generated in a European country is then recontextualised through press coverage in another country. This analysis of the inter-textuality should thus track the “reciprocal resonance” within the various national public spheres (Trenz 2005: 176). This realisation, in turn, leads to a clearer analysis of how political statements are selectively incorporated into existing national debates. This process of simultaneous coverage is expected to reveal to what extent convergence contributes to a mutual legitimisation of norms concerning civic integration.

The *second research question* (H2) rests on the existence of a shared discourse of integration, which assumes a universal idea of a European community of values. In this way, what becomes relevant is to analyse the strategic use that political debate makes of the concept of ‘collective identity’ in order to advance and legitimise the civic integration of Muslims. For example, Europe can be registered as a collective *we* (for example, ‘European communal’ or ‘the Western civilization’), while the Muslim Other can be seen as non-European, non-secular or as a threat. In this manner, the specific usage of European identity becomes a discursive resource for social and political cohesion.

This normative use of identity should shed light on the contentious and contradictory discourse of integration and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the European self. In more detail, discourse analysis should question the normative nature and the practical political limits of this debate, as the process of civic integration involves that Muslim immigrants have to adopt values and duties even when they find themselves opposed to them.

The research design aims also to investigate other normative strategies through which the discourse of Muslim integration is articulated. There are two critical considerations which can lead to discourse analysis: 1) the debate on the integration of Muslims is a crucial part of the process of governmentality (Miller et al 1991) and 2) the frequent appeals to integration from ruling leaders could hide dominant social and economic rationalities, which provide the real background for framing this debate on identity and power (Horner and Weber, 2011). Therefore, the analysis of the discourse should question any attempts to legitimate specific social relations across the European public sphere.

In order to clarify how the research design respects the quality criteria of public accountability (Bauer & Gaskell 2004: 348), the next section offers an overview of why I have opted for an analysis based on case studies and how I selected each case study. I subsequently introduce the analytical category of the nodal point as an entry level for reconstructing the public debate and the adopted criteria for selecting them. Then I illustrate how I developed the analytical corpus to use in the content analysis. Finally, I sum up the complete comparative framework that consists of the three case studies, consisting of three national public debates and three nodal points.

The Case Studies: differences and commonalities

The research design investigates how the discourse on integration is disseminated through the European public sphere (Trenz, 2005; Eriksen, 2005). As a consequence, the present research design proposes a comparative investigation of

the debate on the integration of Muslims using three national cases: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. This comparison between the various public debates will allow for the disentanglement of similarities in these discourses relative to policies on immigration, multiculturalism and civic integration. These similarities may then be explained in terms of convergence among national public spheres.

As a whole, France, Germany and the United Kingdom are particularly relevant as case studies for this comparison, given their status as the highest immigrant-receiving countries in Europe (Lacroix, 2010: 3). Moreover, the specificity of their national debates on immigration has been shaped by a number of factors, the most important of which include their respective histories with immigration, national political structures (Favell 2001) and shifting perceptions of immigration (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2008: 206).

Briefly, French republicanism considers individuals as the only subject entitled of rights and rejects any form of peculiarity on ethnic or racial lines. The French model of integration is based on the following premises 1) integration of individuals rather than groups and 3) integration implies rights and duties in accord with the republican and secular French traditions (Jennings 2000).

In Germany, the integration of immigrants is linked to the problem of the definition of national identity (Joppke 1999: 95). As a consequence, after the experience of Second World War, politicians have avoided speaking in negative terms of a culturally mixed society, aware of the legacy of racist aberrations under Nazism. After reunification, “concepts of political identity and national culture underwent significant redefinition”, this process is still ongoing and affecting the definition of ‘foreigners’ in Germany (Stehle 2012: 168).

The British model of integration reflects the experience of a multiracial empire and its consequent racial problems (Hansen, 2000). According to Bertossi, British integration policies “came out of the imperial legacy and postcolonial immigration” and have been defined by “an approach based on the importance of minority groups and [...] placed an emphasis on integration, not as a process of acculturation to the nation and civic values,” and on “fighting racial discrimination”

by offering “social and political influence to members of ethno-cultural minorities” (2007: 4).

Despite these countries responding in different ways in adopting their policies of civic integration, the political discourse of Muslim integration remains justified and legitimised through an ambiguous liberal concept of integration (Joppke 2007; Carrera 2008; Kundani, 2012). For example, the state prerogative to integrate immigrants through value tests reveal an extreme attempt to realise a politically and culturally homogenous identity (Nachmani 2010: 246), in which Muslim immigrants are identified as the Other to assimilate according to the values and norms of the dominant majority (Joppke 2010: 139).

In brief, the present research design proposes a comparative investigation of the debate on the integration of Muslims. The first step of the empirical analysis is thus a reconstruction of each national public debate on Muslim integration starting from a nodal point. The next section explains what a nodal point is and the criteria adopted to select them.

Criteria for Selection of the Nodal Points

Each national case study focuses on a nodal point (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), which is considered the point of entry of the public debate. The utility of Laclau and Mouffe's concept is to emphasise the main textual reference that draws different discourses into a coherent frame, from which it is possible to reconstruct the various discourses present in the national political debate. In other words, the nodal point allows for a clearer understanding of the interactive logic of the public debate, how the discourses link to one another, and the rules according to which discourses are tied together and how they are recontextualised into the political debate (Diez, 1999; Fairclough, 1993).

A nodal point is not a closed system, but rather an open system of interconnected discourses that allow for the possibility of reconstructing a public debate. For this reason, a nodal point cannot be a text that has been ignored by public

opinion or irrelevant for political debate. In this research design, the nodal points must be representative of the public debate and the actual way in which the political elite deals with the problematisation of the integration of Muslims.

Nodal points have to be fully representative of respective government positions and are an integral part of a political program about the development of new immigration practices and policies. Thus, they have the shared functions of indicating a government's thinking and desire to influence popular thinking, of promoting similar concepts, and of dealing with a common wish to promote economic growth in the face of a shrinking workforce and increasing challenges from globalisation (Jung 1996). In detail, the applied criteria are:

1. Time Frame: After the Swiss ban on Minarets;
2. Genre: Political statements

At Point 1, the timeframe defines a major limitation for the selection of the debate concerning Islam. The timeframe runs from December 2009 to December 2011, a very short time period when compared to the longevity of the public debate on immigration. Nonetheless, the Swiss referendum represents a moment of political crisis that moved beyond the borders of Switzerland to address the multi-faceted issue of Muslim immigration. According to Fairclough, a moment of crisis occurs when “social practices, which under normal conditions are hidden, became visibly exposed, as communication becomes further problematized” (Fairclough 1992: 230). Thus, during any “crisis”, it is more possible to observe new social and political conditions struggling for hegemony (Fairclough, 2005: 55) that under normal conditions would be difficult to observe (Fairclough, 1992: 230). Thus, the referendum became a unique “moment of crisis,” which urged European politicians to debate openly how to assimilate Muslim immigrants and Islamic culture in order to avoid conflict with the values and traditions of Europeans.

At Point 2, the selected genre is the political statement. Three aspects characterise this genre: 1) it is related to the field of politics; 2) it includes different sub-genres and modalities (written, such as an article or an interview published in a newspaper, or oral such as a speech or a radio interview; and 3) it has to be

considered as an expression of views and not an official institutional act. For example, a political speech given during a conference is not an institutional text because it lacks the prescriptive power of a law; it only has the authoritative power to address political debate and decision-making. Thus these political statements can influence public debate and legitimise policies (Maatsch: 2011: 33-34, 37-38) through the authoritative influence of the author.

What characterises this specific type of genre is the authoritative authorship. The author has to be a top political leader with key institutional roles in national and international affairs. For this reason, only Heads of State or Prime Ministers were considered because they hold the legitimacy of political power and are the major representatives of national sovereignty. Secondly, the author has to be recognised by public opinion across Europe. Briefly, the author has to have the political authority to shape the legislative process and the capacity to interact with transnational debate and political consensus for their political agenda across Europe.

A second aspect to characterise the genre is controversy. I consider those statements that raise strong controversy, both in national public debates and European public debate. According to Risse, a “transnational sphere transcending national perspectives is being created through social practice and contestation” (2010: 152). Indeed, the European public sphere emerges in the process in which the public debates controversial issues. The more people debate, the more they engage each other in political debate and the more they “actually create political communities” in which they can identify themselves (Risse 2010: 152).

Authority and controversy are thus both essential conditions for the emergence of a European public debate. The more authoritative and contentious a political statement becomes, the more media coverage occurs across Europe. In this specific case, statements had to be highly disseminated through European broadsheets, news agencies and TV broadcasts and simultaneously debated by public opinion.

Briefly, a nodal point is a relevant text considered the point of entry for investigating each national debate. Specifically, the analysis of a nodal point allows

the reconstruction of the public debate. For this reason, I define two main criteria to select a nodal point: as specified, one is related to the timeframe, and I considered the aftermath of the Swiss Referendum because it represents a moment of crisis, in which governmental leaders started openly debating the problems concerning the integration of Muslims. The second criterion is the genre. Here, I specified political statements from authorities because they are texts (written or oral) aimed at orienting political controversy and public debate.

The Comparative Framework

The comparative framework consists of the three different national case studies, representing three nodal points and their surrounding public debates, which have been analysed to reconstruct the European debate on Islam integration.

In Case Study 1, (Chapter 4), the articulation of the debate on the integration of Islam in the aftermath of the Swiss ban on minarets is reconstructed by focusing on Sarkozy's editorial published in *Le Monde* and *The Guardian*. In this article, the former French President launched a common public debate aimed at giving political form to the ways in which "national identity" can be defined and supported through the support for liberal and civic integration, rather than the exclusion of Islam. Through this debate and despite national and European criticism, Sarkozy was able to create a powerful political consensus within the European public sphere, which urged for many months, the discussion of the political agenda regarding Islam, giving even greater visibility to Sarkozy's speeches, ideas and thoughts about Islam and specifically, the *Burqa* ban across the rest of Europe.

Nodal Point: 'Respecter ceux qui arrivent, respecter ceux qui accueillent'

[Respecting those who arrive, respecting those who host]

Text, December 9, 2009 published by *Le Monde* and *The Guardian*

Sampling and Coding: Whole text – 1400 words

In Case Study 2, (Chapter 5), the debate generated by Angela Merkel during the Young Christian Democrats Convention is investigated. The German Chancellor

did not merely state that Germany's attempt to create a multicultural society had "utterly failed." At the same time, Merkel pointed to successful examples of civil integration programs that had integrated new immigrants. Merkel also claimed a necessity to defend "German Identity" as a major justification for asking for more social cohesion. Moreover, she addressed the issue of Islam belonging to Christian Germany. It is important to analyse if the debate on Islam has generated a "return" to a discourse on national religious identity or is simply a secular attempt to redefine and transcend German representation of an ideal citizenship.

Nodal Point: 'Multikulti has failed, utterly failed'

Merkel's Speech at the conference of "Junge Union Deutschlands" (CDU),
Potsdam – Transcript, Oct 16, 2010

Sampling and Coding: The whole transcript counts 8000 words but different parts were not directly relevant to the debate on Islam, thus only the section on multiculturalism (2000 words) was sampled, which includes also the part that was highly disseminated by both the broadcast networks and YouTube. The rest of the transcript has been coded through a general summary of arguments and themes. Despite the fact that not all parts of a text were relevant, the coding was strategic to understand the context and the assumptions that were made to support the civic integration of Islam.

In Case Study 3, (Chapter 6), the debate generated by David Cameron at the meeting of the Munich Security Council is examined. The aim here is to analyse how Islam can be constructed to become a security issue in Europe. The British Prime Minister delivered a provocative speech on the failings of state multiculturalism by echoing German Chancellor Merkel. However, Cameron did not reject immigrant integration; he appears to have suggested that Britain can produce a "muscular" integration by imposing liberal values codified within British identity.

Nodal Point: 'Multiculturalism has failed'

Speech given at the Munich Security Conference
Video and Transcript, February 5, 2011
Sampling and Coding: Whole text - 2600 words

Having defined the case studies and the nodal points, it is necessary to introduce the criteria to develop the analytical corpus regarding the content analysis.

Criteria for the definition of the Analytical Corpus

Concerning the content analysis, the analytical corpus focuses on the role of the media in disseminating and recontextualising the nodal points. The corpus for each case study includes one week of daily press coverage following the delivery of the political statement linked to the nodal point. The articles analysed have been collected through the *Nexis* and *Factiva* Databases and includes articles from the leading broadsheets in France, Germany and United Kingdom, which have national circulation. In a few cases, I have included also some articles from newspapers with a high regional circulation such as *Le Parisienne* and tabloids such as *The Daily Mail*. For the database search, I used the category: *Immigration & Citizenship* and I also added the following keywords: Islam or Muslims. In doing so, a total of 162 articles (see Table 3.1) have been collected and stored in a Microsoft Access database. The indexing scheme (see Appendix 4) systematises what has turned out to be a medium corpus of data.

Table 3.1 – Distribution of the articles analysed per country

Nodal Point	France	Germany	UK	Total
Sarkozy	19	10	12	41
Merkel	13	27	19	59
Cameron	11	7	*44	62
<i>Total</i>	44	44	75	162

3. The Data Analysis

According to Fairclough, CDA cannot be reduced to a simple analysis of text, but must focus on the process of production and interpretation (2003: 21). The analytical usefulness of CDA (Fairclough, 1992, 2003; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997)

is thus to offer an examination of the condition of the production of texts and their political implications, as the “relationship between text and social structures is an indirect one, mediated by discourse and social context” (Fairclough, 2003: 21).

The description of the textual features should thus be combined to two more dimensions of analysis: 1) interpretation, which focuses on the “relationship between text and interaction”; and 2) explanation, which focuses on “the relationship between interaction and sociocultural contexts” (Fairclough, 2001: 21). These three levels of analysis form Fairclough’s three-dimensional model (Fairclough, 2001), one of the most common analytical strategies adopted in CDA, because it systematically explores the relationship between text and its social context. This model can be described as follows:

- Description is the level of analysis for the formal features of the text;
- Interpretation concerns the text as a creation of a social process;
- Explanation explores the relationship between the social context, the production of text, and the reading of its potential political effects.

In discourse theory, these three dimensions inevitably overlap (Fairclough 1992: 231). For example, an analysis of the data could begin with some sense of the social and political context that the discourse is embedded in by problematising the boundaries of the text and also defining the implicit or explicit relations that this discourse has to other discourses. This approach implies that the analysis should start by including social and political concepts that lie outside the pure categories of textual analysis. Beginning with the description of the traditional characteristics of a text would not be particularly productive for an analysis aimed at examining the social implication of a text. In this manner, the analysis of text can undertake the following progression:

- Interpretation of discursive practice, which focuses on the social and political conditions of the text, and identifies the intertextuality and interdiscursivity of the discourse;
- Description of textual practice, which examines the textual strategies, by focusing on the process of justification, Othering and legitimisation;

- Explanation of the socio-political context, which illustrates the implications and the political consequences of the discourse on civic integration.

In his last works, Fairclough has reformulated this framework by developing a new analytical model based on Bhaskar's explanatory critique (see Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough 2010), which places more emphasis on the dialectical structure of the discourse. However, the three dimensional model is more explicit in framing the relation between discourse and social context, because it is based on more understandable conceptualisation of the semiotic, discursive and social levels. In the next section, these three stages are further described by providing a set of sub-categories to apply to the empirical investigation.

Interpretation of Discursive Practice

The first step of the empirical analysis is the reconstruction of the discursive context related to the debate on Muslim integration. Starting from a nodal point, the analysis evaluates the conditions and practices involved in the enactment and reproduction of the discourses developed in the debate. Specifically, the analysis pays close attention to interdiscursive and intertextual analysis so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it mutually relates to other texts and discourses held in the public sphere and how these other texts and discourses are actually interconnected to the nodal point.

Interdiscursivity: The objective is to specify how the nodal point is established and articulated with discourses of membership, secularism and securitisation. Furthermore, it is central to observe how the nodal point is translated into concrete policies and institutional arrangements. This step is important, as it can verify to what extent the discursive articulation has been implemented into a concrete political program.

Intertextual Chain: The objective here is to analyse the simultaneous press coverage of the nodal point in France, Germany and the UK. The key question is to

investigate to what extent the deliberative function of the political statements is accurately replicated by the media. The assumption is that the press tends to reinforce convergence by recontextualising only some aspects of the political debate. Based on a preliminary analysis of the corpus, I have identified the most recurrent themes employed by the press. These categories refer to the main line of argumentation employed by the press and reveal to what extent the national press can have a specific role in selecting and disseminating a nodal point. I regrouped these recurrent themes in seven categories and I expect to code more than one category for each article.

First, the citizenship category includes references to membership, civic duties, naturalisation and human rights. Second, the category of Muslim diversity is debated along an inclusive and liberal line. Third, the cultural tradition, which covers references to those values that define the country under analysis as a monocultural society, based on a common past, common traditions and a homogeneous and coherent cultural system. The fourth category relates to the national identity dimension and refers to feelings of belonging to a national community. Fifth, the theme category of Europe includes references to the EU, but also to a European civilisation and the country's position in relation to them. Sixth, the securitisation of ethnic relations includes the risks concerning urban segregation, the highest level of delinquency, but also political violence and religious radicalism. Conversely, social justice refers to social and economic inequalities, which can explain the problems faced by Muslim immigrants in their process of integration.

These categories have the scope to provide a basis for indexing and quantitatively analysing the degree of convergence in the press coverage.

Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation

This level of analysis is aimed at analysing particular textual strategies used in the nodal point. Specifically, textual practice examines the aspects of discourse practice through the understanding of the meanings of texts. In order to assess these textual strategies, I have considered some micro-textual features that can be useful

for evaluating what type of political effects are possibly evoked through coherent textual property. This list does not need to be exhaustive (for a more complete model see Fairclough, 1989: 110-2), but rather it is an outline of possible directions to undertake and investigate further such as:

- keywords
- clusters (a series of words related to each other in meaning)
- oppositions (e.g. negative/positive; near/distant; familiar/alien)
- use of key symbols, slogans, stereotypes;
- patterns of identification and solidarity;
- the specific use of personal pronouns (I, we, you, object: us, them);

Regarding the language source, for the analysis of the French nodal point, I used the English translation of Sarkozy's editorial published by the Guardian. For the German nodal point, I transcribed the Merkel's speech (Appendix 2) from a video on YouTube and translated it from German to English. Therefore, I preferred to use English for the textual analysis, because I had the necessity to use a homogenous linguistic corpus for comparative purposes. This choice can be easily criticised or considered partial as some textual strategies can be missed in the course of any translation, but the aim of the textual analysis is to focus on the relation between text and social structure, rather than simply prioritising the microtextual effects of political rhetoric.

Othering: Civic integration is an active form of regulation and the drawing of boundaries between identities, and thus, discourse on integration presupposes a set of collective identities, social relations and cultural values inculcated in discourses aimed at justifying the necessity of Muslims' integration. Indeed, Othering is about distance and keeping the 'different' a stage apart, and preserving the Self as a constructed difference between identities. Here, I have identified three sub-categories to apply to the analysis by Diez (2005: 628):

What Makes "Us" Superior?

- Representation of the European Self as having superior values to those of the Other.

Where Do “We” End?

- Representation of Muslim identity as opposing universal values. Hence, the self is not simply represented as a superior, but through universal principles, as a consequence the Other should accept the principles of the self.

Are They a Menace for Our Security?

- Representation of Muslim identity as an existential threat (‘securitisation’). Muslim values are turned into a security threat.

In this way, the process of Othering involves the construction of the Other through those textual features that emphasise social identities and collective values. This textual strategy of construction and definition of identities are thus central to the development of legitimisation strategies.

Legitimation: the aim is to identify and research different strategies of legitimisation through references to how a particular social structuring of discourse can become universal and part of the legitimising system that sustains the implementation of policies to integrate Muslims. In detail, the dimension of universalising the particular is relevant to four legitimisation strategies:

- Legitimisation of universal values through culture (identity, history, religion)
- Legitimisation of universal values through procedure (participation, democracy, efficiency)
- Legitimisation of universal values through “standardisation” (political belonging, social standards, economic standards)
- Legitimisation of universal values through membership (insiders vs. outsiders)

Therefore, an analysis of legitimisation strategies aims at revealing any textual construction, which attaches value to political action and serves to legitimate policies of integration. In particular, it is the use of features related to a European

identity in order to advance and legitimise civic integration and its relations with the Other. The goal is to find those attempts to universalise some of the values embedded in a broader social, cultural and political European framework, in which the relations between different social identities are defined as elements of the reproduction of civic integration.

Explanation of the Socio-Cultural Practice

Central to this level of analysis are the social and political implications of the discursive structure. Specifically, the discourse on civic integration includes three critical considerations: a) the limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the European self; 2) civic integration as a process of Othering and 3) the elite's attempt to hide social and economic disparities as an explanation for the lack of integration (Joppke 2007). As a consequence, I have defined three key sub-categories to analyse:

- Normative: As discursive strategy, integration can be normative and encloses prejudices and limits affirmation from going beyond what is prescribed as “correct” identity. Thus, how does civic integration engender a normative discourse providing universal norms to belong to a common community (European, Western, National)?
- Moral right: Integration can assume a moral right on behalf of the local resident majority to determine the limits and obligations of other identities. Thus, how does civic integration presuppose an effective power determining the acceptable and unequal relation between self and other?
- Exclusion: What alternative causes could explain the lack of integration? Does the debate on civic integration ignore social inequalities?

The last part clarifies not just how discourse on civic integration recontextualises a deeper core of values and norms, but it is also an opportunity to provide a clear analysis of the limits of the “articulation of universal” within this

discourse (Chouliaraki, 2003: 279). Therefore, my goal is to consider the political implications of this discourse by pointing to why civic integration can contribute to further marginalisation of Muslim immigrants, rather than representing a process of effective inclusion, which can lead to social equality and membership.

The Research Design in Brief

In this chapter, I propose a comparative investigation of the public debates on the integration of Muslims based on three national cases. The research design aims to systematically explore the discursive articulation of civic integration by focusing on the social and political structures embedded in the European public sphere.

The first goal of the present analytical framework is a reconstruction of each national public debate starting from a nodal point. A nodal point corresponds to a specific political statement, which is considered a point of entry for reconstructing the broader public debate on integration of Muslim immigrants. The second objective is to investigate the press coverage across Europe. Indeed, the aim of this step is not merely an attempt to describe how the European public sphere works, but rather to draw on evidence that tentatively shows a degree of political convergence toward a universalistic discourse regarding the obligations that Muslims have to accept.

The third goal aims also to examine in detail, how the ruling elite speaks about Europe and its identity and thereby, persuasively contributing to the creation of a consensus on civic integration among European public opinion at large. Given its political role, the ruling elite has a privileged access to the media and its authority legitimates the reproduction of any discourse in the public sphere.

What is central in this methodology is the combination of critical discourse analysis with content analysis in order to underline how transnational debate can affect the national public spheres through mutual observation between international political actors and national spheres. In addition, the comparison of these debates

also allows an illustrating in detail of: 1) any differences between national and transnational public debate and 2) how the assumption of a European identity and its underlining values might be recontextualised into national debates along different national political interests.

In conclusion, in section 1 of this chapter, I explain the methodological choices and evaluate the specific questions concerning the issues of validity and reliability and how to overcome the limitations of CDA. In section 2, I re-introduce the research questions and the theoretical framework. In section 3, I discuss the specifics of the research design and how I develop the comparative framework based on national case studies. In section 4, I describe the analytical process based on a three-dimensional model elaborated by Fairclough (1992): discursive practice, textual practice and socio-cultural explanation and how I combine content analysis with CDA.

In the following chapter, the present research design is applied to the first case: the French public debate on Islamic integration. In particular, Chapter 4 aims at reconstructing the French debate by focusing on Sarkozy's article published in the *Le Monde* newspaper, in which the former French President defended the Swiss vote and argues for the necessity of a debate on national identity in order to protect the 'Republican' values of France.

Chapter 4: French National Identity and Integration

Chapter Overview

This chapter offers an account of the public debate on integration that was originated by former French President Nicholas Sarkozy after the Swiss constitutional referendum, which voted to ban the construction of new minarets in November 2009. The debate is reconstructed by taking as a nodal point Sarkozy's editorial published in the *Le Monde* newspaper on 8 December 2009. In this article, Sarkozy defends the Swiss vote and calls upon Muslims to refrain from provocative attitudes, and urges them not to forget that Europe has Christian values at its foundation.

Sarkozy's intervention came not only in response to concerns about the Swiss referendum, but as a consequence of the broader debate over integration. Since the beginning of his presidential mandate, Sarkozy promoted a public debate to discuss the features of immigration and national identity. The Republican approach to integration rejects any public recognition of ethnic, religious and cultural identities as antithetical to the French national identity. However, the recurrent riots in the suburbs and the requests to wear the veil at school reveal the incapacity of French policy to integrate the second generation of Muslim immigrants through the Republican model.

This debate on national identity has been quite innovative for French public debate, because for decades, the commitment to a universal Republican conception of citizenship excluded discussion of any form of identity-based instance. Therefore, Sarkozy's editorial reflects this tension between Republican citizenship and pluralism and aims at discussing whether immigration is indeed slumping France's social and cultural identity.

The analysis is structured in four sections: i) the first section is an overview of the contemporary political debate around the integration of ethnic and cultural diversity within French society; ii) the second section focuses on the reconstruction

of the discourses related to the French debate on Muslim integration and evaluates the discursive practice involved in the enactment of the debate; iii) the third section is concerned with the textual strategy found in the nodal point; iv) the last section offers an explanation of socio-cultural practice and specifically aims at investigating the normative ambivalence in the French politics of identity and its limits to consider Muslim diversity and any hidden political or economic rationalities underlining the discourse of civic integration.

1. The Political Context of the Debate

This section places Sarkozy's editorial within the context of the French debate on integration in order to sum up the main problems of immigration and capture the critical points of the French integration model. According to Sala Pala and Simon "the central pillar of French integration policy has traditionally been nationality legislation" (2007: 3). As a consequence, naturalisation is encouraged and citizenship is granted with relatively few requirements. In obtaining the French nationality, immigrants grant the same rights and obligations of any French citizens. Viewed in this way, citizenship and nationality are inseparably intertwined. Despite the fact that the Nationality Law, adopted in the early 1980s, stresses the need for immigrants to become an integral part of French society as citizens, this goal has remained being more of a part of the Republican rhetoric, rather than being implemented in effective political strategies to overcome socio-economic and cultural inequalities of Muslim population.

The social and urban exclusion of Muslims is particularly apparent in suburban areas, the so-called *banlieu* (Wacquant 2008: 19). In these areas, Muslim communities suffer a higher rate of unemployment than non-Muslims with the same level of education. Moreover, Muslims are generally forced into "less-skilled employment categories, which are usually unstable and poorly paid" (Leiken, 2012: 72). For many Muslims, the appropriate response to social marginalisation is to create their own communities based on a "common identity" shaped by Islam (Maayan, 2007: 5).

The creation of this “ethno-familial culture” (Cesari 2004: 25) makes the reality of these closed realities acceptable and even desirable, as these suburbs are subsequently perceived as Muslim *enclaves*. This self-segregation reinforces the Muslim population's identification with traditional practices and makes Islam a cultural mobilising force: “Forming a community becomes one way to define a collective identity that is a basis for action and public self-assertion” (Kastoryano 2006: paragraph 15).

A general frustration over the lack of concrete opportunities became evident in 2005 when violent confrontations (Emerson 2009: 6) between youths and the police took place in several suburbs surrounding France's major cities after the accidental death of two youths of Malian and Tunisian descent in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. Certainly, these riots did not have any religious character, but the disappointment of the Muslim second generation highlighted the inequality of treatment, and the feeling that their community was marginalised by the state (Kokoref 2009: 147).

The breakdown of public order in suburban areas offered the chance for some political leaders to take advantage of voters' concern over security and immigration. At the 2002 Presidential Elections, Jean Marie Le Pen – the leader of the radical right wing party *Fronte Nationale* - scored a surprise electoral result with a xenophobic and anti-Muslim agenda, coming in 2nd place behind President Chirac. The result was shocking not only for France but also for Europe, and it was the turning point for reconsidering immigration and integration policies.

As a first step, the new right-wing government elected in 2003 approved strict anti-immigration policies sponsored by Sarkozy as Interior Minister. Furthermore, Sarkozy gained notable visibility (Leiken 2012: 271) when during the 2005 riots, he referred to the rioters as *racaille* [scum]. This term in French is more pejorative than the translation to “scum” in English- it characterises an entire group of people as subhuman, inherently evil and criminal, and in effect, useless. Sarkozy used the riots as an excuse to launch his own political response to social distress from suburban areas for a militarisation of the *banlieu* to prevent urban crime and terrorism. The potential exploitation of public order offered Sarkozy an opportunity

to launch his presidential electoral campaign in 2007 focusing on both the issues of urban security and the negative perceptions of the integration problems of Muslims to gain an electoral consensus. After the election, his presidential mandate was characterised by a more moderate view aimed at encouraging a national debate about what it means to be French and the erosion of national identity and culture.

A second problem concerning the integration of Muslim people is related to the accommodation of religious needs. The initial controversy concerning the accommodation of Muslims' needs was engendered by the construction of the Mosque in Lyon. The idea of building a grand mosque in Lyon was first broached in 1980 by the President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing during the electoral campaign and prompted a heated debate (Bowen, 2007: 68), because Islam was seen as a foreign religion and inclined to fanaticism. In addition, the government's intention to use public funding was strongly rejected by opponents because it violated the principles of separation between religion and the state. In this debate, Le Pen's National Front gained a large consensus by fiercely opposing the project (Tlemçani, 1997: 33) and the accommodation of any Muslim religious needs.

The Mosque of Lyon was only officially inaugurated in 1994. During the speech at the inauguration, the Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, praised efforts to build a moderate Islam compatible with the French Republican tradition (Hargreaves 1995, 206–208). This recognition of Islam was certainly important as it represents an attempt to override the inflexibility of Republicanism. At the same time, the precondition of creating a moderate Islam, compatible with French values, it has been seen as a state's attempt to control the influence of religious intermediaries to enhance social control among immigrants and French citizens of Muslim heritage (Prugl & Thiel, 2011: 44).

Another controversy related to the accommodation of religious needs was the question of the Islamic scarf (*hijab*). French political elites and public opinion have always favoured forbidding Muslim women from wearing a veil in public¹, because

¹ Public debate surrounding this issue exploded in October 1989, when three female students in a secondary school in Creil, a Paris suburb, were suspended for refusing to remove their scarves in class. Despite the fact that the Conseil d'État (Council of State) ruled in November 1989 that the scarf

the veil represents how Islam oppresses women and it is also a symbol of belonging to the Muslim community. Women who wear the veil display their religious and community affiliation by challenging the national unity goal assumed by French Republicanism. As a consequence, the veil and later the *burqua*², are examples of difficulties the French have had in integrating Islamic culture through a strict application of French universalism.

French public debate on integration reveals three different major controversies, which have framed the public opinion's concerns towards Muslim integration: 1) the recurrent urban riots; 2) the radicalisation of Muslim identity in segregated urban enclaves and 3) the accommodation of Muslim religious needs. These controversies have helped fuel anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant resentment in national public opinion due to a general concern for the lack of integration of the Muslim population.

In regards to the adoption of civic policies, Sarkozy, since when he was Minister of Interior, was certainly one of the most active politicians advocating for Muslim integration. After several years of struggling to formalise relations between the government and Muslims, in 2003 Sarkozy supported the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith [*Conseil Français du Culte Musulman*] as an official

was compatible with the secular tradition of the public schools (Klaussen, 2005: 174), President Chirac supported a law banning the use of any visible signs of religious affiliation in order to preserve French secularism in public schools. The law, sometimes referred to as "the veil law", was approved by the French Parliament in March 2004 and forbade the wearing of any religious symbol, including the Islamic veil, the Jewish *kippah* and 'large' Christian crosses (Scott, 2010: 1; Joppke, 2009: 45). Although the law affects only Muslims, its legislative consequences have mainly targeted female students practicing the Islamic faith.

² The last act of the *veil war* was in June 2009, when Sarkozy as President was addressing both houses of Parliament [*Congrès*] in a special session at Versailles. On that occasion he condemned the *burqa*, an extreme "a sign of subjugation and debasement" that was "not welcome." One day after a speech to both houses, a Parliamentary commission, led by Communist M.P., André Gerin, was created to investigate "the practice of wearing the *burqa* and the *niqab* by certain Muslim women...on the national territory", with the aim to "better understand the problem and to find ways to fight against this affront to individual liberties" (*Assemblée Nationale* 2009a). After six months of deliberation and testimony from 180 experts (*Assemblée Nationale* 2009b), what became known as the "Burqa Commission" stated that the "wearing of the full veil is a challenge to our republic. This [practice of wearing a full veil] is unacceptable" (BBC News, 2010) and recommended a "general and absolute prohibition of the integral veil in public space" (*Assemblée Nationale* 2010a: 187). As a consequence, the National Assembly in July 2010 passed a law that prohibited "*la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public*" [the dissimulation of the face in public space] (*Assemblée Nationale* 2010b: 9, 11).

forum to dialogue with the French state. The council is a national elected body representing the Muslim community similar to the Jewish Council (CRIF). The creation of the council was criticised as, in the virtue of secular and republican values of France, there is not a necessity to officially recognise a religious group. Conversely, some Muslim organisations not represented in the council denounced Sarkozy's attempt to encourage a state-led, liberal version of Islam.

In the same year, Sarkozy introduced the Welcome and Integration Contract [*Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration*, CAI] as a first attempt to implement the Directive 2003/109/EC into the French legal system. The CAI institutionalised and formalised a contractual relation between the state and immigrants, in order to grant admission and security of residence. In Sarkozy's CAI, the permanent settlement of immigrants is reserved for those who have chosen to respect French values, and one of the main purposes of this conditionality is to reinforce the Republican integration "*intégration républicaine*" of immigrants (Carrera & Weisbrock 2009: 14). Originally, the CAI had a semi-facultative nature but it had become mandatory in 2006 with the approval of the new Immigration Law [*Loi relative à l'immigration et à l'intégration*], also called Sarkozy Law II.

Sarkozy's Immigration and Integration Law evaluates three main elements of an immigrant's integration: 1) integration in accordance with the secularism of the state; 2) the subject to integrate is an individual rather than a collective, and 3) integration presupposes rights and duties (Bertossi 2007: 26). Therefore, the French state does not accept any ethnic or race difference with immigrants and public support is granted only for individual merit and advancement (Schain, 2009). The main purpose of these conditions is to reinforce the Republican integration [*intégration républicaine*] of immigrants and to maintain citizenship as a key aspect of the process of integration into the French Nation (Sala Pala and Simon 2007: 3).

2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice

This section looks at the immediate communicative processes of Sarkozy's editorial, in other words, the conditions of social reproduction found in the text. It

offers two levels of analysis, namely, interdiscursivity and the intertextual chain. Across these two levels, the analysis pays close attention to interdiscursive and intertextual analysis, so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it mutually relates to other discourses held in the public sphere and how other discourses actually framed Sarkozy's article.

Interdiscursivity

This analytical level aims at investigating how Sarkozy's speech is established in a specific discursive context and how it can be articulated with other discourses. It is very important to underline that Sarkozy's editorial came not only in answer to the concern about the Swiss referendum and French opposition to the construction of Mosques, but also in the midst of a broader debate over French national identity that was launched by his government in October 2009 (Marquand, 2009). This debate was aimed at discussing two central questions: "what it means to be French today" and "what immigration contributes to French national identity" (Cosgrove, 2010). In his contribution to *Le Monde*, Sarkozy offers a definition of what it means to be French by focusing on two intertwined discourses: 1) the discourse of Republicanism which assumes the principle of undifferentiated citizenship and 2) the discourse of secularism based on the separation between religion and the State.

The French model of integration is built over the Republican discourse born out of the French revolution. Republicanism is based on the idea that the French nation is imbued with Enlightenment values (Scott, 2004: 32) and unique in regards to the rights of individual citizens, which are laid down in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. This view sees the state as being constituted by the will and consent of free citizens, who can exercise their rights. But no one can invoke the status of belonging to a minority, immigrants included, because the Republic is one and indivisible.

The French Republicanism assumes thus that the population living within the national boundaries can be defined only by legal-political criteria (Feldlum 1999:

75). The existence of any racial, ethnic, or linguistic minority is not recognised because all citizens are formally part of the nation. This is also the reason why France does not recognize Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Bullard 2008: 59), which protects the rights of minorities to practice their own culture and religion and use their own language. In terms of policy integration, allowing the formation of minorities or granting specific minority rights would be seen as the failure of Republican integration. The centrality of discourse of Republicanism in French society explains why pluralism remains difficult to achieve and creates strong limitation on the expression of any cultural diversity.

The core aspects of the French Republicanism are the universalistic aspirations of the Enlightenment (Feldlum 1999: 73), the revolutionary mythology that created a unique historical identity (Ichijo, 2011: 41) and the preservation of the national unity (Sudlow, 2012: 169). These Republican values are not confined to small academic circles but they are always at the very centre of any public debate from the Parliament to the pages of daily newspapers. Therefore, these Republican values of the French state are shared by the whole civil society. At the same time, Republicanism reflects the liberal and conservative standpoints.

These two Republican standpoints share a universalistic conception of the state, which is based on the expression of a universal culture, but for the ‘conservatives’ if French citizens hold other cultural values alongside the universal ones, it is a private affair and not that of the French state. The ‘liberals’ share this universalistic conception, but they have a more society-oriented viewpoint, thus they may encourage different cultures and subcultures coexisting in the state. The only difference involves the amount of cultural diversity that both sides are willing to acknowledge and appreciate. At the same time, both liberals and conservatives reject multiculturalism at integration policy level, as the existence of structured ethnic communities -what is known as *communautarisme* in the French political debate- is considered as a major threat to the universalistic aspirations of the Republic (Sala Pala and Simon 2007: 4).

The second discourse that Sarkozy points to is secularism. The principle of *Laïcité*, which permits state neutrality, strictly calls for 1) a rigid separation between state and religion (similar to Jefferson's wall) and 2) an absence of any religious expression in the public sphere. This last point implies a containment of religion into the individual private sphere (Casanova, 1994: 35). At the same time, Sarkozy rejects a traditional concept of secularisation in which religion is considered as a matter for the private sphere only and claims instead that religion should play a positive role in the public sphere.

Sarkozy explains his interpretation of *Laïcité* in his own book published in October 2004, titled *La République, les religions, l'espérance*. Within it, he describes his desire to return to an "open and serene" secularism, in which each person can practice his faith and contribute in strengthening democratic institutions. But this requires, in his words, a return to a more "positive secularism" rather than a tolerant one (Sarkozy, 2005). Therefore, Sarkozy can be defined as a reformer of the strict tradition of French secularism because he recognises a public role for religions and a positive influence on society.

Sarkozy's idea of "positive secularism" is based on the argument that religions are the *keepers of ethos* that are necessary to maintain liberal values. In his Swiss referendum intervention, Sarkozy underlines how secularism "is not the rejection of religion, but [a] respect for all faiths" [line 40] and recalls that when he was Interior Minister, he created the French Council of the Muslim Faith [line 41] putting Islam on the same level as the other "major religions" [line 42]. This line of thinking was also exposed during Pope Benedict XVI's visit to France, when Sarkozy said that it was "legitimate for democracy and respectful of secularism to have a dialogue with religions" (Donaido, 2008).

The discourse on "positive secularism" re-contextualises those arguments elaborated by Habermas (2010) in a definition of post-secularism as an attempt to reconceive the significance of both religion and the secular in the context of contemporary politics. According to Sarkozy, the "old conception of state secularism must evolve because the State cannot remain indifferent to the public role of religion" (2005: 185). His discourse for a different secularism has an important

consequence in terms of reintroducing the classic debate on ‘faith and reason’ and in readdressing relations between religion and the state without, however, challenging the secularised nature of French political institutions.

In brief, the principles of equality and political citizenship in Republicanism define culture as a private matter and thus Muslims cannot claim any special cultural rights. At that same time, a recognition of Islam with any accompanying benefits and rights is restricted by the secular tradition of the French constitution, which establishes a rigid separation between religion and state. Both secular and Republican discourses have a clear, difficult relationship with the cultural diversity of Muslims because of 1) the persistent influence of secularism on the reclusion of the faith in a private sphere and 2) the central role of the state over civil society and its unifying mission. As a consequence, the unity of the state is more important than the manifestation of any particular minority’s expression of identity, culture or religion.

Intertextual Chain

The objective of the present section is to analyse how the nodal point is disseminated and contested across Europe through a content analysis of the press coverage. Sarkozy delivered his reaction to the recent Swiss referendum through an editorial first published on 8 December 2009 by *Le Monde*, a traditionally leftist newspaper. The same article was translated into English and published the day after by *The Guardian* with the title “France and the Swiss minaret vote” (Appendix 1) in the *Comment is Free* section.

I have collected 40 articles, related to Sarkozy’s editorial, from leading newspapers in France, Germany and the United Kingdom by searching *Nexis* and *Factiva* databases in the period from Monday 8th to Sunday 15th December 2009. The distribution (table 4.1) of articles shows that the French sample is overrepresented (19 articles) with a ratio of 4.75. However, the non-local distribution appears homogenous with a differential margin in the ratio of 0.37.

Table 4.1

Sarkozy	France	Germany	UK
Articles	19	10	11
Sources	4	8	7
Ratio	4.75	1.25	1.57

By following the model proposed in chapter 3, I have considered seven thematic categories: first, the membership, which includes references to the Constitution, civic duties and citizenship. Second, the issue of religious diversity is debated as a difference to tolerate rather than a pluralist encounter. Third, the cultural tradition dimension, which covers references to ‘our traditions’ and ‘our values’ that define the French as a monocultural society, based on a common past, common traditions and an apparently homogeneous and coherent value system. The fourth category relates to the national identity dimension and refers to a political discourse of belonging to the national political community. Fifth, the thematic dimension of Europe includes references to the EU, but also to a European moral community and France’s position in relation to it. Sixth, the securitisation of ethnic relations includes the risks concerning urban segregation, the highest level of delinquency, but also political violence and religious radicalism. While social justice refers to social and economic inequalities, which can explain the problems faced by Muslim immigrants in their process of integration.

Table 4.2 – Thematic Categories

Thematic Category	France	Germany	UK	Avg.
1. Membership	10	6	5	7.0
2. Religious diversity	14	7	9	10.0
3. Cultural tradition	15	8	8	10.3
4. National identity	17	7	6	10.0
5. European perspective	14	8	7	9.6
6. Securitization	15	7	8	10.0
7. Social Justice	4	3	4	3.6

These categories refer to the main line of argumentation employed by the press and reveal how the press tend to mediatise a nodal point and to what extent a transnational convergence can be recognised. I coded more than one thematic

category (TC) for each article. The distribution (table 4.2) is consistently high in the three countries for the TC n. 2, 3, 5, 6; while low for TC6 and dissimilar for TC n. 4. In more detail, the European press in disseminating Sarkozy's arguments agree on four main points.

a) Sarkozy declares understanding for Switzerland's controversial vote to ban the construction of Muslim minarets. The press also accentuated that according to Sarkozy, the referendum banning minarets was a reaction to the complex problem of immigration. In particular, the Swiss were concerned of the effects that immigration had over their national identity. This argument covers thematic category n 4, 5, 6.

b) Sarkozy calls on Muslim practitioners to avoid ostentation and provocation for fear of upsetting the Christian majority. In particular, it is emphasised that Sarkozy asked to practice religion in "humble discretion". This argument covers the thematic category n 2, 3.

c) Sarkozy's concern regarding the question of national identity as the solution to promote civic integration in France as well as Europe. In particular, it is reported that Sarkozy claims national identity is the antidote to separatism and that Muslims have to support the development of a moderate Islam in France. This argument covers thematic dimension n 4, 5 and 6.

d) Sarkozy mentions the necessity to combat discrimination and ensure that Muslims can feel to being full citizens. However, an important condition is noticed that Sarkozy imposes regarding the process of integration: anything that could change France's Christian roots and Republican values would be firmly rejected. This argument covers thematic category n 2 and 3.

Commentators generally criticised Sarkozy for his dangerously simplistic views on the issue of minarets and Muslim integration and also denounced Sarkozy's call to debate national identity as risking degeneration into a populist dispute on immigration to gain support within the far right electorate (Appendix 4 – FR #8, DE #3 #4, UK #7). Sarkozy is also accused of promoting anti-immigrant

sentiment simply to divert the public from the country's economic problems in a time of deep social crisis (FR #2, DE #1, UK #4 #7).

Despite this widespread criticism, it has to be noted that French reporters agree with Sarkozy's calls for strengthening national identity. However, there are few modest differences as to what extent Muslim cultural and religious diversity should be accepted (FR #14 #16). Some opinions tend to be more willing in considering a certain degree of flexibility in the Republican interpretation of integration (FR #2, #7), in order to accommodate some needs of Muslims, whenever they are compatible with French secular values.

It has to be noted that this point of view does not automatically reflect a traditional division between the Left and the Right, which see conservatives as being more closed towards the accommodation of cultural and religious diversity. In French public debate, this polarization does not seem to have been respected as I could find divergent opinions on both sides (FR #4, #5, #7). However, despite different points of views, French commentators do not defy the republican conception of integration (FR #11, #7, #6), which remains shared not only by conservatives and socialists, but also surprisingly by a large number of Muslims leaders (FR #4).

German and British press tends to criticise a model of integration based on an intransigent interpretation of secularism (DE #10, #; UK #2 #7 #11) and also underline the risk that Sarkozy's speech could support a strong nationalism against immigrants (DE #4, #5; UK #7, #11). Although commentators focus on the problem concerning religious and cultural diversity, they recognise that Sarkozy is right in pointing out that in Europe, there is an emergence of suffering towards immigration, especially Muslims (DE #5, #6, #7; UK #10, #2), which could degenerate into blatant xenophobia if European countries fail to integrate Muslims.

The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of convergence in the mediatisation of Sarkozy's editorial. The press, in all three countries under analysis reported the main arguments adopted by Sarkozy in reaction to the Swiss ban of minarets. Despite the wide criticism that Sarkozy

received, the press agreed with him that the referendum was the symptom of a deep distress towards the complex problem of immigration.

In the aftermath of the Swiss referendum, Sarkozy was the only European leader to not condemn the vote and to raise concern of the effects that immigration could have over the attachment that European nations have towards their religious and cultural traditions. The visibility obtained through the transnational press coverage represented for Sarkozy, a great political opportunity to use the European public sphere to communicate his political agenda on immigration and national identity. For months, journalists had been called to discuss Sarkozy's speeches, ideas and thoughts about integration of Muslims. This ability of leading the European public debate was clearly manifested along the debate on the *Burqua* Law.

3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation

This section examines the textual aspects of discourse practice. Textual features can be a useful empirical terrain to explore and interpret throughout the dialectical tension that occurs between the actual text and its social context. The analytical model proposed in this section offers a general overview about the textual features, and a second stage that focuses on the political effects of that textual practice, through an assessment of the Othering and legitimation strategies on which the text is based and can thus be interpreted.

At the general level, this textual analysis is conducted on an English translation of Sarkozy's editorial, which appeared in *Le Monde* and translated into English by *The Guardian* on 9 December 2009 (Appendix 1). As a consequence, some micro-textual features are lost in the present analysis, due to translation. However, this analysis is not aimed at investigating linguistic features, but rather to understand the arguments and the logic behind the French discourse on integration as presented by Sarkozy in his editorial.

The text shows elements of style and enunciation that mark the rhetorical articulation of a political speech. It is possible, thus, to identify the genre of the

political speech despite the fact that the contribution was a written editorial. For example, Sarkozy favours short words and phrases over long phrases, and each sentence averages 10/12 words, both in the original French version and the English translation. In the text, there are no connectors between sentences, and the use of subordination is rare. This strategy is unusual in a written text since subordinate relationships between sentences are necessary to establish more complex relationship between arguments. Thus, Sarkozy's editorial prefers the immediacy of coordinated connections and avoids any subordination between sentences.

A vivid and descriptive language, typical of the political speech, characterizes the wording of the text. Words like "convictions", "beliefs", "astonishing", and "unhappiness" from the two opening paragraphs are a small sample of the tone that the author wants to evoke. In doing so, Sarkozy prefers creating a cause-and-effect relationship through emotional and personal meaning; for this reason words are chosen for their emotional emphasis in order to point to readers' feelings rather than to structured arguments, which are more typical in a written text.

In order to explore the role of identities, I focus on the construction of the Other through those textual strategies that emphasise social identities and collective values. The construction and definition of identities and it is indispensable to support the development of any legitimization strategy of the discourse of civic integration. It is in that sense, for example, that Sarkozy advocates that people's fear of losing their identity cannot be ignored or undervalued [31-32]. In his view, the Swiss people felt their identity was being threatened by immigration [32-33].

It is also possible to observe how the textual practice affects the manner in which the Other is articulated as someone who is separated. Sarkozy writes: "I also want to tell them [Muslims] that in our country" [49]. In another sentence, he wishes "the creation of the kind of French Islam that ... shares our social and civic contract" [54]. Here, the author establishes a concrete separation between "us" and the Muslim-Other through the identification and recognition of both symbolic identities.

In different passages, Sarkozy evokes also stereotypes and prejudices toward Muslims. He writes that “we do not respect people by forcing them” – which is already an interesting construction based on the classical dichotomy of *Us vs. Them* analysed above – “to practice their religion in cellars or warehouses”. Also, surprisingly, he argues that respect for Muslims and all newcomers means “endorsing the equality of men and women, *Laïcité*, and the separation of the temporal from the spiritual,” which strongly limits at homogenization of cultures and belonging rather than simply choosing to respect newcomers.

The collective identity of the in-group is based on the expression of a “we” identification referring to all the French people. These constitute the public space in which the enunciation operates. It is the sense of “we” at the beginning of the speech or the reference to “the Republic”, which is in and of itself performative, in that it is the manner used whereby the speech establishes actors and confers identity and political status, as opposed to simply addressing those who do not belong to France. Sarkozy does not speak directly to Muslims: “I want also to tell them that in our country” [49]; rather, he is talking to the French people, saying that Muslims have to assume their own identity, but he also refers to “our country,” implying the country belongs to the French people.

A confirmation of this claim is Line 35, which reads: “National identity is the antidote to tribalism and sectarianism”. Here “national identity” evokes the value of nationalism as a secular characterisation of both self-determination and respect of the individual and personality. At the same time, “tribalism” and “sectarianism” evoke the negative values of backwardness and are attributed to Muslim communities. Tactically, these negative characteristics are opposed to a “national identity” to give more prestige to the supposed European secular values of tolerance and rationality recalled by Sarkozy.

In claiming European values are “welcoming” and “tolerant” [29-30] Sarkozy absolves any responsibility of Europeans in contemporary history. Sarkozy proposes a one-sided European heritage, which drawn from the values of the Enlightenment and is characterised by universal values of reason and tolerance as opposed to Islam as an Other with different values. Colonialism and the more recent

instances of ethnic cleansing including the holocaust cannot be defined as a manifestation of the welcoming and tolerant character of Europeans (Judt 2008). Moreover, Europe and Islam are described as two separate essences that can be resolved only through the belonging of Muslims to Enlightenment, democracy, secularism and Republicanism, in other words, those features characterising French national identity. In this way, Sarkozy projects the vision of the Republican French universalism toward the whole Europe. In Sarkozy's words, Europe is an enlarged in-group projection of French national identity through the vision of a 'French' Europe. Sarkozy's understanding of Europe is thus based on an attempt to establish French influence in the domains of European politics and culture.

In order to explore the process of legitimisation, this analysis focuses on those strategies adopted in Sarkozy's editorial to sustain the implementation of policies to integrate Muslims. The goal is to identify and research those textual features, which give meaning to the discourse of civic integration.

First of all, Sarkozy legitimises his political standpoint by reference to the feelings of "the people" [8] and argues that politicians' incapacity to connect with the people will "feed populism" [10]. At the same time, Sarkozy's appeal to people's feelings is *per se* a populist strategy, in fact populism defines a view supporting "the rights and powers of the common people in their struggle with the privileged elite" (Norton et al, 2010: 612).

Sarkozy appeals also to his people's emotion in order to legitimate his perspective. For example, "violence" and "visceral contempt" are associated to the behaviour of those members of elite, who refuse to listen to what "comes from the people" [8]. He also states that when the elite becomes "deaf to the people – indifferent to their problems, feelings, and aspirations – we feed populism" [8-10]. Here, "feeling" and "aspirations", according to Sarkozy, describe the correct spirit of people as opposed to the lack of empathy evident in the opinion of the elite.

Sarkozy chooses words that give emotional emphasis to arguments, in doing so, this text creates a cause-and-effect relationship through emotional and personal meaning. This strategy is also developed in Line 12, where Sarkozy asks "How can

we be surprised by the success of extremists when we ignore the unhappiness of voters?”, thus reducing the problem of the referendum to a basic question that lies within the dichotomy of “happiness/unhappiness” within people, implying that being discontent is a matter of unhappiness rather than a social problem. Again, in Line 22, Sarkozy writes: “Instead of vilifying the Swiss, we would do better to ask ourselves what their vote revealed”. The use of “vilifying” typifies the point of view that Sarkozy’s approach to those elites who criticised the Swiss vote.

A further strategy adopted by Sarkozy is to focus Muslim’s responsibilities towards France. For example, Sarkozy argues that religion must be practiced “discretely” and must avoid undue “provocations” [55-56]. Here “discretely” means in a private way, without creating any conflict with other groups, a point that exemplifies Sarkozy’s view on the role of religion in the public sphere. As a consequence, Sarkozy implies that the rights of religious minorities do not and must not override or change the secular identity that the French majority accepts culturally. I underscore above, Sarkozy criticises the privatisation of religion and supports a more “positive” role of religions in the public sphere; however, he seems to conclude that Muslims are responsible to practice their faith without challenging the sensibilities of French people.

In a key paragraph, Sarkozy calls also on Muslims to avoid “anything that could be regarded as [a] challenge to” [51] the creation of a moderate Islam in France. A rejection of French cultural and political roots will “scupper” or damage [52] the integration of Islam into French society [52]. Thus, according to Sarkozy, Muslims are not only responsible of political belonging, but also the creation of a French version of Islam. This implies that in its current form, Islam cannot be part of France, and for this reason, Islam must modify itself, so it can belong to and join the presumed French identity. Muslims have also the obligation to recognise and accept the French “social and civic contract” [54]. It is not enough simply to recognise the political and cultural roots of France. For this reason, Muslims must respect the rules of French society without asking for any special accommodation.

To summarize the main points of this textual analysis, Sarkozy’s editorial shows elements of style and enunciation that are typical of a political speech despite

the fact that the contribution was written for publication in a newspaper. In this editorial, Sarkozy calls on Muslims to accept the designated political and cultural identity of France. In overviewing the characteristics of French national identity, Sarkozy defines Islam as a historical Other by distinguishing Europe and Islam as two separate essences that can be resolved only through the belonging of Islam to France. However, Sarkozy does not preclude anyone from being integrated into or being part of the defined French society if they simply are willing to accept the mutual sharing of already defined French values.

4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice

This section explores the social and political implications of the French discourse of civic integration and focuses on two critical considerations: 1) normative ambivalence in the French politics of identity and its unwillingness to consider Muslim diversity as part of the French self and 2) any hidden social and economic rationality underlining the discourse of civic integration.

The very language of Sarkozy's model of integration is based on normative assumptions regarding the political and cultural nature of French national identity. Sarkozy recalls that the most important aspect of national identity is based on the principle of *Laïcité*, or in his words, "the separation of the spiritual and the secular," which, according to Republicanism, is the only cultural-behavioural filter against fanaticism [46]. Thus the secular-liberal state, according to Sarkozy, should incorporate religious and cultural characteristics into the very foundation of its social contract; at the same time, Muslims must publicly recognise French identity while the civic contract has to deliberately exclude any other identity that might challenge French values, which are basically "Republican" and "deeply marked by a Christian civilization" [49-50].

Sarkozy conceptualises republican and Christian religious values as a universal discourse and assumes the homogeneity of these values as a given national characteristic. Is France in fact secular? Sarkozy seems to think that it is only partially so and that the country is instead the product of a compromise between

“Christian civilization” and republican political values. The importance of “Christianity” in Sarkozy’s view raises the question whether France is indeed truly secular or what precisely the French term *Laïcité* implies.

This discourse addresses, in a political context, the ways in which national identity can be used to support, rather than deny, the integration of Muslims, via the adoption of liberal and civic values that are inherent in it. However, Sarkozy’s appeal to unity and cohesion is based on a discursive strategy aimed at devaluing Muslim immigrants as Other, not for their different ethnicity, but for those of their intrinsic cultural differences that might clash with French liberal values. Accordingly, Sarkozy promotes a specific integration that is aimed at underlining the Muslim immigrants’ responsibilities toward France and its political community.

While the French idea of secularism confers equal dignity on all religions [40], Sarkozy downplays, in some instances, those religious and cultural distinctions peculiar to Islam, disregarding that these distinctions are central to the essence of that faith. Sarkozy declares that Islam does not need to undermine “its core beliefs” in order to be considered as French [51-54]. At the same time, he also declares that all Muslim immigrants should integrate themselves into French society and respect its cultural traditions and values, which he expressly defines as having “Christian” roots and “Republican values” [49-50]. This is a very particular conceptualisation of national identity, since non-Christian minorities such as Jews, and recently Muslims coming from the nation’s colonies, have always populated the French nation.

The assumption that Muslim groups have some distinctive religious customs ignores the natural process of cultural adaptation and mixing to which minorities are exposed, and thus reinforces the perception that Muslims are the Other. The effect of this view, in turn, reproduces a hierarchy of acceptable and unacceptable cultures and religions. By determining who can and who cannot be included, civic integration presupposes an unequal relation between France and Islam, which can then be explained as the need of Muslim immigrants to adopt ‘advanced’ French democratic and secular values.

Sarkozy declares that he will “do everything to ensure that French Muslims enjoy the same rights as all other citizens. I will fight all forms of discrimination” [47-48] but anything that could challenge Republican values will damage the creation of a “French Islam” [51-52]. Sarkozy’s discourse aims at recognizing a public role to Islam [40-42], though it is defined as a foreign religion [49-50] and religion of immigrants [36]. In other words, Sarkozy’s model of integration is not sympathetic towards the acceptance of the Islamic faith, but only towards the creation of a specific national version of Islam.

This concept of “French Islam” is problematic because it implicitly assumes that the present Islam is alien to French society and traditions. Muslims can be integrated only if they agree to create a French Islam, thereby renouncing any of their political and cultural characteristics that can be deemed to contrast with or oppose French identity. Consequently, this discourse infringes the liberal principle of religious freedom and contradicts the secular notion of state neutrality, selectively accepting Islam only when it belongs to France.

A main argument in Sarkozy’s speech is that Muslims should embrace the French national identity for their own best interests. In his words, “national identity” is the only antidote against “sectarism” and “tribalism” [35], and once again, he discusses the creation of a “French Islam” that “shares our social and civic contract” [53-54]. Thus, Sarkozy’s discourse is aimed at promoting the recognition of Islam as a full member of French society through common rules and mutual duties that will still protect the French national identity.

Sarkozy’s discourse aims at integrating Muslim immigrants and their religious diversity; in his words there is no attempt to neglect Muslims and their role in French society as advocated by the radical right. The emphasis on common values as the core of the requirement integration has an inclusive character. For this reason, Sarkozy calls on Muslims to respect the French social and civil contract. However, there is a caveat, namely that Muslims must submit to those values and norms embedded in the French social and civic contract. As a consequence, there is a small space for foreign cultures and identities, which promote values in conflict with the principle of Republicanism and secularism.

Integration can be only achieved through the complete ‘inclusion’ within the French political system and the French political community. This universal condition to inclusion excludes any form of multicultural society. Indeed, diversity, which is not French, may just be tolerated but certainly it cannot be recognized by the State. For this reason, it can be argued that Sarkozy’s discourse – despite the term is not mentioned – it has a clear assimilationist nature (Brubaker 2001: 535).

This approach of universal inclusion can work with the first generation of immigrants, as they tend to adapt, transform or deny their own identity during the process of integration. There is only a substantial level of exclusion for those newcomers that do not want to change their inner values. However, this approach can be a problematic limit in absorbing any religious, political, or cultural features related to the identity of the second generation of Muslim immigrants. A large part of this group is inclined to emphasise its cultural diversity through public self-assertion; young Muslim women who ask to be allowed to wear the veil at school or in public are an example of this process. Therefore, the application of an inflexible interpretation of Republicanism and secularism is likely to become more and more a source of conflict with the second generation’s need to redefine its identity with traditional practices.

A second major implication in this discourse is to imply cohesion but at the same time, this hides economic and social problems experienced by Muslims. Sarkozy refers to the problem of self-segregation among Muslims in France, through what he calls “sectarism” and “tribalism” [35], but he does not address the economic causes of this social exclusion. Both the suburban segregation and religious radicalisation of Muslims in France have been linked at least in part to social exclusion and economic disparity (OSI 2010, Amghar 2007). For many Muslims, the appropriate response to such social exclusion, which is a mix between economic inequalities and ethnic discrimination, is to “form their own associations based on their common identity in Islam” (Maayan 2007: 5).

The French model of civic integration is therefore grounded, on the one hand, on the acceptance of a political discourse promoting uniform civic values to

produce a normative homogenisation of cultures; on the other hand, this discourse lacks of any consideration about economic and social inequalities. Therefore, it is not surprising that French Muslim immigrants face greater segregation and social exclusion than other minorities (Jackson & Doerschler 2012). It could be debated whether those are consequences of the civic contract, but certainly the French model of integration does not provide real content to the professed universal values of the Republic or concern about the social aspirations of the Muslim population of France.

To sum up, the increased concern within the French public debate about Muslim immigration has reinforced a traditional French discourse on the nation-state that asserts two discursive strategies: firstly, the persuasiveness of Republicanism and secularism in shaping the national identity of France; secondly, the rejection of any public recognition of ethnic and cultural identities as antithetical to the national identity. As a consequence, the integration of Muslims implies 1) the personal commitment to French Republican principles; 2) the effective respect of secular values and 3) a stronger involvement of the immigrant in French society. This last point implies not only an integration process based on the knowledge of French values but also on grounds of a high adaption to French national community. In this manner, French civic policy aims at absorbing immigrants as completely as possible into society – politically, socially and culturally.

Chapter Summary

Taking as a nodal point Sarkozy's editorial published in the *Le Monde* newspaper on 8 December 2009, the analysis developed in this chapter offers a reconstruction of the French public debate on integration in the aftermath of the Swiss national referendum.

Sarkozy understands that the vote prohibiting the minaret was a response to a more multifaceted problem than religious freedom. In his view, Europeans' anxiety over losing their national identities cannot be ignored [31-32]. However, Sarkozy's editorial came not only in answer to the concern about the Swiss referendum but in the midst of a broader debate over French national identity that was launched by his government in October 2009 (Marquand, 2009). This debate was aimed at discussing two central questions: "what it means to be French today" and "what immigration contributes to French national identity" (Cosgrove, 2010).

The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of convergence in the mediatisation of Sarkozy's editorial across Europe. The press not only debated Sarkozy's arguments but also conveyed a general agreement in considering the Swiss vote not as an isolated episode of intolerance but as a symptom of a deep concern towards the complex problem of immigration. The visibility gained through the transnational coverage represented for Sarkozy, a political opportunity to use the European public sphere to communicate his agenda on the integration of Muslims. This ability of Sarkozy in leading the European public debate became clearly evident along the debate on the *Burqua* Law.

There are three key observations that come out of the Critical Discourse Analysis of Sarkozy's discourse. First, integration is based on universal and already accepted normative assumptions on the political and cultural nature of French identity. Thus, Sarkozy argues that people need cultural homogeneity, while isolationism and self-segregation should be rejected because they are threatening the national identity of French society. At the same time, the most important aspect of this discourse on integration lies in its potential for discrimination by limiting the

affirmation of any other form of diversity that could possibly undermine social cohesion and also by producing inflexible hierarchies for identifying acceptable and unacceptable cultures and religions. Sarkozy demonstrates this limitation currently through the request to Muslim immigrants to adopt only advanced French democratic and secular customs.

Second, the French discourse of civic integration implies a one-way process that is based on the acceptance of the French identity. Although Republicanism does confer equal dignity on all religions, the French model of integration is particularly unresponsive when it comes to culture and religion. Especially, it tends to downplay, and in some instances to ignore, religious and political distinctions that are peculiar to Muslims, no matter how important it is to their faith and practice. The paradoxical consequence of this approach is that it promotes exclusion rather than inclusion, an integration that is aimed at reinforcing group boundaries rather than promoting full social cohesion.

Third, Sarkozy calls for a fight against discrimination towards Muslims, but he does not mention the economic problems of immigrants nor include them in his discourse on integration. These are issues that may lie at the root of some of the current social distress of many urban areas in France, which is a reality of social and economic divisions along ethnicity. For this reason, the attempt to consider integration only through the achievement of the citizenship certainly confirms Republican values, but it has not resolved the social problems of Muslim immigrants. These economic divisions and a perceived lack of social opportunities for a large part of the Muslim population, especially among those of second generation, are the causes of self-segregation in communities shaped by a traditionalist Islam.

The next chapter reconstructs the public debate on integration through an investigation of Merkel's speech during the Young Christian Democrats convention in 2009. In this speech, the German Chancellor states that Germany's effort to create a multicultural society has "utterly failed," and claims the necessity of defending the German identity as a major justification for asking for more social cohesion.

Chapter 5: Who Belongs to the German National Community?

Chapter Overview

This chapter offers an account of the controversy raised during the speech delivered by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 16 October 2010, when she addressed a meeting of the youth organisation of her conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party at Potsdam. In her speech, Merkel stated that efforts to build a multicultural society in Germany had "utterly failed" [24] and stated: "The concept that we are now living side by side and are happy about it does not work"[25]. Notably, Merkel's speech not only supported the failure of *Multikulti* but expanded the view that Muslim immigrants are expected to integrate into German culture, *Leitkultur* and adopt its values.

Merkel's speech should be considered one of the more important on immigration given by a Head of Government in Germany in recent years. In the post-war period, any high-level discussion of the role of immigrants has always been likely to address only the margins of the political debate in order to avoid any controversy. In being careful of the legacy of racial discrimination that resulted in the Holocaust, politicians avoided speaking in negative terms of a culturally mixed society (Kolb 2008: 5). Hence an open criticism of immigration and multiculturalism has long been unthinkable in German public debate.

After reunification and especially since the end of the nineties, there has been a upward debate within German society on the proper level of immigration, especially regarding Muslims, the effects of immigration, and the degree to which Islam can actually be integrated successfully into Germany (Pautz 2005). Simultaneously, political debate has also focused on defining the key characteristics of German national identity. As a consequence, the concept of *Leitkultur*, the leading German culture, has entered the political debate through conservatives who want to define German national identity in a very restrictive way (Pautz 2005: 4).

The chapter is divided into four analytical parts. The first part deals with a contextualisation of Merkel's speech and the place of that speech in the general debate on integration that took place before the speech and has continued following it. The second part focuses on the reconstruction of the discourses relating to the German debate on Muslim integration. Starting from Merkel's speech as the nodal point, the analysis evaluates the discourse articulation of the debate and its coverage across Europe. The third part is an analysis of the textual features and political effects. The last part discusses socio-cultural practice and explores some of the assumptions, which are the bases of Merkel's stance against multiculturalism and their limits in defining only a correct way for integrating Muslims.

1. The Political Context of the Debate

This section places Merkel's speech within the context of the contemporary German debate on integration, and aims to identify which political controversies have fuelled public opinion anxiety about a more ethnically diverse society and the perception of the Muslim community as a 'problematic' minority, which cannot or do not want to participate in German society.

In Western Germany after World War II, "the concepts of nation, belonging and citizenship" were still "determined by the idea of an ethnically homogenous community" as a basis for state organisation "defined by descent, [and] a common culture and history" (Miera 2007: 3). This restrictive approach to national identity, despite its racist aberrations under Nazism, was prolonged by the outcome of the division of Germany (Joppke 1996: 468) and the consequent German diaspora. West Germany was conceived as the homeland of all Germans and for this reason prioritised only the immigration of co-ethnics (Kolb 2008: 5).

Citizenship was recognised through the "principle of descent", namely *ius sanguinis* (Green 2004: 28) and the naturalisation of immigrants was complex and discretionary, which meant that acquiring German nationality was considered an exception (Miera 2007: 3). Instead, opening "the national community to foreigners would have posed the risk" of redefining national identity and of weakening the

German responsibility to its “dispersed and repressed co-ethnics in the East” (Joppke 1999: 63). According to Article 116 of the Basic Law (the West German Constitution), automatic citizenship was assigned to ethnic German refugees who fled from the Communist East. Thus only migrants with German ethnicity [*Aussiedler*] could be fully admitted into the national community (Miera 2007: 3).

The public debate on immigration was thus characterised by the rejection to consider Germany as a country of immigrants. Immigrants were called ‘foreigners’ [*Ausländer*] or ‘guest workers’ [*Gastarbeiter*], mirroring “the general view that they did not belong to German society, and would leave the country” (Miera 2007: 4). The massive recruitment of “guest-workers in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s did not challenge this concept as foreigner workers were regarded as residing temporarily in Germany” (Bös 2004) and “immigration policies focused almost absolutely on control and return of migrants” (Kurthen 1995: 922-923). As a consequence of this view, Germany did not grant permanent residence to migrant workers, thus establishing both a guest-worker regime and the priority of German state interests over the right to the integration of migrants (Joppke 1999: 98). In fact, conceiving the Federal Republic before the reunification as a country of immigration and integrating multiple minorities in the national body would have contradicted the “Basic Law's conception of a provisional state geared toward the recovery of national unity” (Hailbronner 1983: 2113).

It was only after reunification that the public openly considered Germany to be a country of immigrants. A new vision about ethnic and cultural diversity was thus established based on the incontrovertible evidence that the long-term settlement of immigrants and their families was an avoidable reality (Miera 2007: 5). The first step towards the adoption of an integration policy was taken in 1991 with the reform of the Aliens Act, which has provided an important simplification of the complex process of naturalisation (Kurthen 1995: 930). However, the law did not grant any status to non-German immigrants; foreign people continued to being considered just as ‘aliens’. In addition, the requirements for naturalisation demanded fifteen years of residence and the renouncement of their former nationality (Kurthen 1995: 933). As

a consequence, most immigrants and their children born in Germany continued to remain as foreigners.

The situation changed under the government led by the Greens and the Social Democrats – (SPD), which took pro-active steps to reform immigration and integration policies. First, the government reformed Nationality Law by recognising the principle of *ius solis* (Farrell 2003:8). In more detail, the new regulation, which came into force on 1 January 2000, allowed children of foreigner immigrants to obtain citizenship if one parent has been legally resident in Germany for eight years (Miera 2007: 5). Second, the 2004 Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) made provisions on the entry of foreigners, their residence and asylum procedures (Carrera 2006: 3). The introduction of this immigration policy marked an important turning point compared to the previous legal situation; in fact immigration was finally recognised through formal access to the job market and legal equal treatment.

The policy introduced also some measures to promote the civic integration of immigrants mainly focused on language acquisition. Primarily, newly arriving migrants, apart from citizens of EU-member states and refugees, were obliged to take attend the *Integrationskurse*, a 600 hour program of German language instruction and 30 hours of civic instruction (Carrera 2006: 4). According to Joopke (2007) the new *Integrationskurse*, extended to immigrants the same program that was established for facilitating the integration of German-ethnic migrants (Aussiedler), which originally was not open to non-ethnic immigrant groups such as the guest workers. Secondly, the Immigration Act expressed concern for security and strengthened counter-terrorism measures to control asylum seekers and migrants. A key aspect was the possibility for immigration officials to deport "hate preachers" and terror suspects without trial (Gräßler 2006).

Various changes have characterised immigrant policy after the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led by Merkel won the elections in 2005 and 2007. The conservative stance was deeply influenced by a traditional concept of the nation, based on traditional "cultural, ethnic and religious" features (Stehle, 2012: 168). Although, some of these amendments to the existing legislation were intended to

integrate the EU policy guidelines on immigrants and refugees, which have been promoted in the name of ‘integration’ (Cheng 2008: 60).

The 2007 reform of the Immigration Act policy introduced an ‘integration from abroad’ clause. With this clause, migrants were required to prove to have a certain minimal level of knowledge of German as a condition for their admission (CMR 2010: 36). Exceptions were granted for non-EU immigrants from Japan, Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland and the United States of America, who could prove to have the required basic linguistic knowledge after entering Germany. This deferential treatment creates a clear discrimination between immigrants and especially targets Turks, who are the largest community of immigrants. In 2007, the government also reformed the Nationality Act and required a nation-wide citizenship test for all applicants starting from 1 September 2008. This requirement reversed the law of 1999, which did not request any linguistic or value test for naturalisation. According to Cheng (2008: 60), the implication of this amendment is to replace the old blood restriction with ‘values.’

Despite many and quick changes after the reunification on matters of citizenship and immigration, a principle, which has remained stable, is that the main instruments for integration in German society are civic and language requirements. Immigrants are required to learn the German language and to prove their knowledge of the national culture and respect of the Constitution (German Federal Foreign Office, 2013). However, there are two steps in this process of integration 1) before entry, through a basic language course and test to take abroad; 2) and after admission through both an advanced language course and an orientation course, which conclude in two final tests and together they constitute the integration test.

In conclusion, the political debate on German identity and integration of immigrants has been characterised by three different historical periods: First, dealing with the German diaspora after 1945; Second, defining a new German national self-conception after reunification; Third, the civic integration of non-German immigrants in contemporary German society. Overall, the German approach to integration still considers naturalisation not as an instrument to promote integration like in France, but as a final point of a successful process of integration. At the same

time, the process of integration requires several tests and a considerable amount of cultural adaptation.

2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice

The first step of the empirical analysis is the reconstruction of the discourses related to the debate on Muslim integration. Starting from Merkel's speech addressed on 16th October 2009 as the nodal point, the analysis evaluates the conditions and practices involved in the enactment and reproduction of the speech. This section offers two levels of analysis, namely interdiscursivity, and the intertextual chain. Across these two levels, the analysis pays close attention to interdiscursive and intertextual analysis, so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it mutually relates to other discourses held in the public sphere and how other discourses actually framed Merkel's speech.

Interdiscursivity

This analytical level is aimed at investigating how Merkel's speech is established in a specific discursive context and how it can be articulated with other discourses. Broadly speaking, the speech is entangled with two discourses, a firm critique of multiculturalism and a detailed definition of the features that characterise German identity. These two discourses revolve around the question of whether German national identity is challenged by the multicultural character of the present society (Ichijo, 2011: 77), which is perceived by the public opinion as a more ethnically diverse society (Stehle, 2012: 168).

Merkel claims that there are large numbers of immigrant descendants often viewed today as a major problem in certain urban areas: "In *Frankfurt am Main*, two-thirds of the children under five years old have migrant backgrounds" [30] and "twice as many of them have never graduated from any school" [31] or "never finished any vocational education". Thus, according to Merkel, multiculturalism has led to the development of ethnic ghettos, which has brought a lack of willingness to participate in wider social or political life. Civic integration policy is instead recalled

to overcome the ineffectiveness of multicultural policies through a social project aimed at assimilating within immigrants, the liberal values that identify German, European and Western societies.

The discourse on the failure of multiculturalism can be seen as an essential response to avoid a conflict between a separatist Muslim community and the liberal values at the core of contemporary Germany, such as freedom of speech, secularism, gender equality and anti-totalitarianism. This discourse recalls Habermas' concept of constitutional patriotism (1990, 1998) by advocating universal, liberal-democratic values as the core of the German Constitution [27, 32]. As a consequence, integration is predominantly referred to the "basic norms and values as formulated in the constitution, equal rights for men and women, human rights, secularism, a certain knowledge of the history of our country which would then lead to the rejection of anti-Semitism" (Lofink 2005: 84). At the same time, these aspects are strategically opposed "towards Muslim migrants who are accused of lacking these attributes" (Miera 2007: 10).

Second, the denunciation of multiculturalism failure is strictly connected to the vision of national identity and conceptualisation of German leading culture. Following German re-unification, concepts of "political identity and national culture" experienced significant redefinition (Stehle 2012: 168) along with the necessity to "re-establish a 'normal' German national consciousness cleared of the memory of the Holocaust" (Pautz 2005: 41). This normal consciousness began in the early 1980's and continued after the reunification (Williams, Bishopa & Wighta 1996: 215-216) with the emergence of the *Leitkultur* discourse as the substitute for the disqualified discourse on nationhood.

The *Leitkultur* discourse was first introduced in 1998 by the German-Arab sociologist, Bassam Tibi as a cosmopolitan discourse based on the ideals of the European Enlightenment - of the precedence of reason over religious revelation and dogma, and based on human rights including freedom of religion that resulted in a society founded on pluralism and reciprocal tolerance (2001: xvi). Thus, according to Pautz (2005), the discourse of *Leitkultur* is instrumental to full German "normalisation" through the undertaking of a two-fold discourse, the goal of which

is to put the Holocaust into full historical perspective and thus consign it to a closed chapter of German history. The *Leitkultur* discourse can be also related to the discourse on “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1996). Namely, constitutional patriotism presupposes that universal principles recontextualised in the “constitution of a community” might develop identification and belonging which go beyond “conventional forms of loyalty based on ethnic origins, national culture or religious tradition” (Mavelli, 2012: 98).

At the same time, the discourse that underlines Merkel’s assumptions on *Leitkultur* is not based on the emergence of a post-ethnic German society, but defines German and European identity as “strongly influenced by the Christian-Jewish heritage” [29.]. As noted by Habermas (2010), the “arrogant appropriation of Judaism” is an incredible “disregard of the fate the Jews suffered in Germany” and also a “relapse into an ethnic understanding” of German culture, which is a dangerous challenge to the liberal constitution as it is based on a distinction between “us” and the foreigners. This attempt is very evident when *Leitkultur* is defined by religion through citing the Judeo-Christian tradition rather than simply German culture. As a consequence, it can be argued that the discourse on a Judeo-Christian *Leitkultur* defines a monocultural German society as opposed to a newcomer culture. In doing so, this particular discourse on *Leitkultur* draws distinct boundary lines between nationals and Islam with the national body, and excludes Muslims from public life if they do not agree to assimilate the values of the majority.

The *Leitkultur* discourse entered the political debate officially in the fall of 2000, when the former chairman of the CDU party, Friedrich Merz, called on non-nationals living in Germany to fully adopt the country's "mature, liberal *Leitkultur*" (quoted in Mittelman 2010: 62). Merz's appeal to the homogenisation of immigrants to German society raised concern, even within his own party, but after a few years the concept became an acceptable one in the present political debate. The question of *Leitkultur* has also involved a part of the Left; Thilo Sarrazin, an economist and member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) denounced in a book (2010) the failure of Germany's post-war immigration policies. In particular, he described immigrants, especially Arabs and Turks, as reluctant to *Leitkultur* and argued that: “No other religion in Europe makes so many demands. No immigrant group other

than Muslims is so strongly connected to claims on the welfare state and crime” (Sarazin 2010b). As a consequence of his assumptions, Sarazin advocates restrictive immigration policies in Germany and across Europe to limit Muslims’ presence, as Muslim immigrants cost the society more than they can generate in added economic value (Sarazin, 2010b). Despite the amount of large criticism, he obtained a great consensus in a large part of the German population including Social Democrats (The Independent, 2011).

This dispute over Sarazin’s thesis inspired the former German President, Christian Wulff (Christian Democratic Union - CDU), to dampen the debate by stating that Islam was part of Germany. Specifically, on October 4, 2010, during his speech on the anniversary of German unification, Wulff affirmed in front of the Parliament, that in addition to Christianity and Judaism, “Islam also belongs in Germany” (Reuters, 2010b). His speech received major applause in the *Bundestag*, and “yet just a few days later, many on the conservative side of German politics and society” appeared to be very unsettled by it (Spiegel Online, 2010a, 2011).

Shortly after Wulff’s speech, different conservative leaders firmly reacted against the thesis that Islam can be considered part of the German nation. For example, the General Secretary of the CDU, Herman Gröhe, or the Christian Democratic Union Bavarian Governor, Horst Seehofer, both stressed the importance of preserving the German *Leitkultur* (Spiegel Online 2010b, 2010c). Also, Merkel did not escape the opportunity to refer to the *Leitkultur*. In November 2009, one month after the Potsdam speech, at the CDU Annual Conference in Karlsruhe, she recalled the "Christian view of mankind" but also the Germans’ “Judeo-Christian tradition” [*christlich-jüdischen Leitkultur*], specifically declaring that Germany needs more public discussion "about the values that guide us and about our Judeo-Christian tradition" (Merkel, 2010: 27).

Certainly, references to Christian roots are standard in the Christian Democratic Party, but these references are not used anymore to define a common tradition that defined a Christian democratic political tradition, rather they have been used as a divisive concept, explicitly based on the assumption that Islamic culture cannot be integrated into European culture. On November 16, 2010, the CDU passed

at the 23rd Annual Party Conference a resolution titled “Future Responsibility” [*Parteitage der CDU Deutschlands Verantwortung Zukunft*] in which it stressed that German culture is based on the "Christian-Jewish tradition, ancient and Enlightenment philosophy and the nation's historical experience" (CDU, 2010: 2).

The resolution also states that "Our country benefits from immigrants who live and work here. But Germany does not benefit from a minority that refuses to integrate, does not want to learn our language, and denies participation and advancement to their children. ... We expect that those who come here will respect and recognise our cultural identity" (CDU 2010: 2). This resolution explicitly marginalises Islam, as it underlines the fact that Islam is not part of German roots and is viewed as an immigrant religion belonging to those who do not want to integrate into German culture.

Such a strong emphasis on the Judeo-Christian tradition of German identity can be also found in a resolution approved in November 2011 at the 24th Annual Party Conference of the CDU. Titled “A Strong Europe – A Bright Future for Germany”, the resolution says “Europe is a community of values. This holds true despite all the diversity and differences that exist between its various Member States”, yet European identity is “unified by our common roots of Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christianity and Judaism, along with the liberal spirit of the Enlightenment” (CDU 2011:4). Indeed, this document reconfirms the concept elaborated a year earlier, but in using a rescaled perspective, it universalises the concept of a leading cultural identity in the national discourse, which does exclude Islam, but unifies the other different traditions of philosophical thought.

The *Leitkultur* discourse is certainly relevant in framing the debate on immigration, but it is not established as a concrete political goal to change the legislation on immigration. It is rather a mode to organise ways of thinking and talking about the integration of immigrants into Germany. There are also two important limitations in the political framework of Germany that constrain any repressive development of the discourse of *Leitkultur*.

Firstly, the German constitutional framework has understandably created a greater institutional sensibility towards ethnic or religious discriminations. As a consequence, the constitutional court would reject any policies targeting minorities. Secondly, the federal legislative framework makes it difficult to implement common policies within different *Landers* as the constitution does not allow for a centralised policy to override the autonomy of single German states. A large amount of political power is decentralised and respects the different sensibilities concerning integration policies.

As a consequence, despite a very tough public debate, the *Leitkultur* discourse is more focused in defining a shared consensus toward a very abstract self-definition of national identity rather than excluding Muslim immigrants through specific laws and policies. At the same time, this political discourse risks reinforcing a problematic perception of integration, as Muslims are automatically seen as opposed to those specific values identified in the German nation. Thus, those tests to evaluate the level of integration can be seen as an attempt to realise German *Leitkultur* ideals.

To sum up, three discourses emerge from Merkel's speech: First, the discourse on the failure of multiculturalism reveals a political assumption that there is only one correct method to integrate Islam and rejects any recognition of other integration perspectives. Second, the leading aspects of German identity are defined through its own historical national specificity, which universalises the particular values, rules and norms of a European civilisation influenced by Christian-Jewish heritage.

Intertextual Chain

The objective here is to analyse how the nodal point is disseminated and recontextualised across the European press. The outcome reveals the role that national press can have in selecting and disseminating topics through the European public sphere. There are some preliminary considerations to make about the analysis of this speech.

Merkel's speech in Potsdam has become very well known in Germany, and also across Europe for the controversy it provoked. Despite a large number of comments and editorials published, the full transcript of the speech is not available, and it has never been translated into other languages (see the full transcript and translation I provided here in the appendix 2). As a consequence, Merkel's speech is a highly mediatised political communication, which gained enormous coverage across Europe and beyond, but it is plausible to assume that few people had a real chance to listen to that speech.

Many of the ensuing articles in the European press were mostly based on that one small passage from Merkel's speech, which was taken out of context because of the sensationalism of some of her claims and thus perhaps undervaluing or ignoring the nuances and complexities of Merkel's stated arguments. Press coverage is thus partial and done in snippets. All the articles refer to just the excerpt where Merkel firmly attacked multiculturalism for being an utter failure.

Another controversial excerpt refers to the Christian roots of Germany. Precisely, the AFP reports this in relation to Merkel's statement: "We feel attached to the Christian concept of mankind, which is what defines us. Anyone who doesn't accept that is in the wrong place here" (AFP, 2010). However, this quotation does not appear in the original speech given in Potsdam on 16 October 2010 [Appendix 2]. According to the *Deutsche Welle*, the statement was actually delivered the day before at another regional conference³ of the CDU in Berlin (Schrader, 2010). The quotation remains original, although certainly, the misattribution is unprofessional. The replication that this error had across European press proves once again, the extent that the national public spheres are more and more interconnected.

On the Internet, I found the full video of the speech that is clearly in German and almost 40 minutes long on YouTube⁴ under the *Junge Union* (Youth Christian Democrats) channel. I also found several shorter clips available online, which are

³ "Wir fühlen uns dem christlichen Menschenbild verbunden. Das ist das, was uns ausmacht." Wer das nicht akzeptiere, "der ist bei uns fehl am Platz". (Schrade/DW, 2010).

⁴ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaEg8aM4fcc>

different lengths, generally between 50 and 80 seconds and in some cases are dubbed or subtitled. However, I was able to access all of the videos, which always included the same passage on multiculturalism from minute 45 of the integral video: "At the start of the [19]60s we invited the guest-workers to Germany. We kidded ourselves for a while that they wouldn't stay, that one day they'd go home. That isn't what happened. And of course the tendency was to say: let's be 'multikulti' and live next to each other and enjoy being together, [but] this concept has failed, failed utterly." As a consequence, the dissemination of these videos through the Internet and social media remains based only on a small passage of the broader speech.

In regards to the press coverage, I collected 58 articles from leading national newspapers in France, Germany and the UK through the Nexis and Factiva databases for seven days between 17 and 24 October. The corpus distribution (table 5.1) shows a wide amount of coverage across the three countries. Clearly, the German sample is overrepresented (27 articles and 11 newspapers) but interestingly the ratio is slightly higher than the French one (+0.3). While the British sample has a medium size but a lower ratio, it reveals that many newspapers published just one article on Merkel's speech. Conversely, in France, each newspaper published more than two articles.

Table 5.1

Merkel	France	Germany	UK
Articles	13	27	18
Sources	6	11	12
Ratio	2.17	2.45	1.50

In the second step of the analysis, I have indexed the thematic dimensions (TD), which have been prioritised (table 5.1). These dimensions refer to the main line of argumentation employed by the press to define the relevant themes adopted by the press in the coverage of the nodal point and provide a basis for indexing and quantitatively analysing the level of convergence in the European public sphere.

According to the model proposed in chapter 3, I have considered seven thematic dimensions: first, the membership, which includes references to citizenship, civic duties and respect of the Constitution. Second, the issue of religious diversity debated as a difference to tolerate rather than as a pluralist encounter. Third, the cultural tradition dimension, which covers references to ‘our traditions’ and ‘our values’ that define Germany as a monocultural society, based on a common past, common traditions and an apparently homogeneous and coherent value system. The fourth category relates to the national identity dimension and refers to feelings of belonging to the German nation. Fifth, the thematic dimension of Europe includes references to the EU, but also to a European moral community and German’s position in relation to it. Sixth, the securitisation of ethnic relations includes the risks concerning urban segregation, the highest level of delinquency but also religious radicalism. Yet, social justice refers to social and economic inequalities, which can explain the problems faced by Muslim immigrants in their process of integration.

Table 5.2

Thematic Category	France	Germany	UK	Avg.
1. Membership	11	26	12	16.3
2. Religious diversity	9	13	9	10.3
3. Cultural tradition	11	26	16	17.6
4. National identity	8	25	9	14.0
5. European perspective	10	14	13	12.3
6. Securitization	11	24	17	17.3
7. Social Justice	3	11	7	7.0

These categories refer to the main line of argumentation employed by the press and reveal to what extent the national press can have a specific role in selecting and disseminating a nodal point. I coded more than one thematic dimension for each article. It is possible to see through the distribution in Table 5.1 how all the thematic categories are consistent in the three countries, while national identity (TC 4) is more relevant just in the German debate. Overall, it can be argued that the European press agrees with Merkel that immigration is problematic as it is creating a self-segregated community (TC6) especially among Muslims, and

therefore newcomers have to integrate themselves (TC 1) and respect the norms of the countries where they live. Here is the outbreak of the most common claims:

- Ethnic ghettos are a social problem (TC 6);
- Countries have the right to set requirements for immigration (TC 1, 3, 5, 6);
- Immigrants should master national language (TC 1, 5, 6);
- Subsidising immigrants' program for integration is not sufficient (TC 1, 7);
- Muslims have to abandon practices, such as forced marriages (TC 1, 2, 6);
- Government needs to encourage the training of Muslim clerics (TC 2, 6)
- Immigrants cannot exploit and weigh down the welfare system (TC 6, 7);

The claim on multiculturalism was certainly the most divisive in the press coverage. Although commentators converge on the fact that 'ghettos' are a serious social problem (TC 6) in many urban areas of Europe, a large part of the press does not see multicultural policies as being responsible for this urban segregation. Liberal and moderate newspapers openly contest the claim on multiculturalism, but for different reasons. In fact, the former are more willing to accentuate that Germany is already a multicultural society, and the latter raises doubt as to whether Germany has ever adopted multicultural policies. Instead, conservative newspapers and tabloids tend to agree with Merkel on the failure of multiculturalism.

I found further differences at the level of contestation between internal and foreign debate. In the German press, liberal newspapers tend to question Merkel's argument because they generally reject the very concept of German *Leitkultur* [Appendix 5: DE #11, #14, #18]. A very different position comes from business press, which conceivably is more concerned with the fact that German industry and the economy need workers from abroad [Appendix 5: DE#13, #14, #15]. In particular, it is underlined that immigration has been extremely regulated in Germany; as a consequence any attempt to represent immigration as uncontrolled does not correspond to the reality. In France and the UK, press agreement seems to focus on the fact that Merkel's tone was intentionally exasperated for electoral reasons in order to distract the public opinion from the real economic problems of Germany and the Eurozone [Appendix 5: FR #5, #6, #13, UK#12, #13, #15].

The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of convergence in the mediatisation of Merkel's speech and a convergence in framing some of the underlining themes. This convergence represented for Merkel an unexpected communicative success, as its speech did not address a European public. However, the statement on multiculturalism generated controversy across Europe and in some cases also beyond. Although there is common agreement on the fact that 'ethnic ghettos' are a serious social problem in many urban areas of Europe, large parts of the press do not see multicultural policies as being responsible for this urban segregation. At the same time, it can be argued that the press agrees with Merkel that newcomers have to integrate themselves and respect the norms of the countries where they live.

3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation

This section examines the textual aspects of discourse practice through a clearer understanding of the meanings of text. The analytical model proposed in the present section puts forward a general overview about the textual features, and a second stage that focuses on the political effects of that textual practice through an assessment of the Othering and legitimation strategies on which the text is based and can thus be interpreted.

First of all, the textual analysis was conducted on an English translation of the Merkel speech. As underscored already, this analysis is not aimed at investigating linguistic features of the German language, but rather to understand the arguments and the logic behind the German discourse on integration as presented by Merkel in her speech. In doing so, I offer a transcript of the speech fully translated in English [Appendix 2]. This text is the corpus of the analysis for the present chapter. As a consequence, some micro-textual features are lost in the present analysis, due to the translation. In addition, the complexity of the German language, such as its preference for composed words, cannot be translated into English. For this reason, the analysis of this speech pays more attention to the features of the text that are

most relevant in any macro-analysis, rather than an absolute microanalysis of the text.

The style of this political statement is a traditional public speech addressed to a Party Convention. This type of communication fulfils a ritual function of any party; it tends to be mainly celebrative in its overall communicative purpose. As a consequence, the speech shows highly conventionalised features, which characterise a speech delivered at party conventions. For example, the speech begins with a traditional greeting “Dear friends of the Young Union [*Junge Union*]” [1] and a closure of “heartfelt thanks” [34]. Successively, the first paragraph is based on personal anecdotes, which is a classical rhetorical strategy aimed at obtaining the attention of the audience. In succession, the speech is arranged in coherent thematic sections of different lengths, but the flow from paragraph to paragraph is made through a strong argumentative logic.

The speech can thus be divided into nine thematic segments: 1) greetings and introduction [1]; 2) a contextualisation of the role of the CDU in German history from the Cold War to the present [2-3], which has a celebrative function; 3) a contextualisation of present and future problems for Germany [5- 7]; 4) an analysis of the role of Germany in Europe [8-10]; 5) the explanation of what the central mission is for an industrial country [11-15] and 6) how the welfare state has to be reconsidered [16-24]. In the middle of the speech, there is a break of some seconds, which is also a rhetorical device to regain the attention of the audience, before Merkel introduces a second opening 7) in which [25-28] she celebrates again the Party, by recalling the historical leaders, their role after reunification and the leading principles of equalities shared by all Christian Democrats. In section 8, she recalls the German President’s statement about the role of Islam in Germany and moves to the problem of immigrant integration and multicultural policies [29-33].

When looking at the length of these thematic sections, the clusters concerning the Welfare state [16-24] and immigration [29-33] are certainly the largest, with 8 paragraphs for the welfare section and 5 paragraphs for the section on immigration. These two sections are not only consecutive, but also linked through a short digression [25-28] in which Merkel declares both the political agenda of her

government as a necessity to assure Germany a future and a role in the World [25] in accordance with the Christian values of the CDU [26, 28]. In the conclusion [34], Merkel ends her speech by challenging the audience regarding the importance of taking action according to their Christian Democratic values, which lead the CDU party.

Concerning the Othering, the aim herein is to examine the construction of the Other through those textual features that emphasise social identities and collective values. First of all, it is interesting to note how Merkel does not speak directly to Muslims or immigrants. For example, in the sentence: “Because the ones who we want to integrate, those are the ones who need examples to follow” [31], the “We” is opposed to the “ones”. The “We” is clearly the German people, which have the role to integrate the “ones”. However, the “ones” is not clearly identified through any ethnic or religious group, it represents an abstract Other. In this way, Merkel is more prudent than Sarkozy in addressing the Muslims. She prefers talking of the “ones” who Germany has to integrate [31.] However in the speech, there are many elements that clarify that this Other is made up of Muslim immigrants, especially when she claims that immigrants have to assume secular values and traditions [30].

Merkel refers quite often to a Christian identity to define the in-group. However, this speech was delivered to a convention of a party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which from its very name, declares its own Christian roots. These references can be considered as coherent with the political space in which the speech was given. As a consequence, when Merkel mentions a “Christian image of human beings” [26] or the “Christian Democratic understanding of people” [28], her attempt is not actually aimed at excluding those who are not Christian. Instead, she seems to be referring to the CDU political tradition, which does try to apply Christian values to public policy decisions.

Merkel, in fact, recognises that “Islam is a part of Germany” [29]. Indeed, she agrees with German President Wulff, who had said that Islam belonged in Germany. At the same time, she believes “that our culture is strongly influenced by the Christian-Jewish heritage” [29]. In this way, she reinforces the dynamic of Self and Other by defining the Self as being deeply tied to Judeo-Christian legacy and

the Other through highly stereotypical assumptions on Muslims. For example, Merkel recognises that “we” have received various different contributions from the “Arabic territory” [29] like “algebra and astronomy” [29]. However she does not make any specific distinction within Islam [29] between Mediterranean, Arab or Turkish, as for her, these distinctions in culture or religion or both are not relevant, because all are opposed to the concept of German *Leitkultur*. In other words, Merkel is more interested in offering an essentialist definition of Muslims as a non-European Other.

This last consideration is especially important because it reveals how Merkel tries to establish a discursive strategy based on the “positive self- and negative Other-presentation” (Woodak, 2007: 333). As a consequence, when Merkel speaks of a “Christian culture” in the country, she seeks also to create differentiation by conferring identity and political status on Christian Germans and opposes it for those who do not have Christian values. However, she clearly abuses some religious concepts, in fact, it is not always very clear what Merkel defines as “Christendom” [29] or the “Christian image of human beings” [26]. Nor is it evident to what extent, she believes that Christian values are compatible with Jewish ones.

As Habermas (2010: paragraph 17) correctly denounced, the discourse on “Judeo-Christian” is a political attempt to recontextualise the old, formerly defamed, anti-Semitic discourses in order to stigmatise a new minority, namely, the Muslims. Indeed, any appeal to Judeo-Christian traditions is manipulative and instrumental, because it wants to exploit the Jewish question against Islam, and to make Muslims incompatible with German *Leitkultur* and central for a society based on the construction of “in- and out-groups” (Woodak & de Cillia 2007: 333).

At the same time, the *Leitkulturdebatte* can also be explained as the attempt to re-establish a German identity within a wider European context (Pautz 2005), thus allowing Germany to reconstruct an acceptable German national consciousness. For example, Merkel claims the goal of Germany is to promote the image of an open and tolerant country present in Europe. She also adds the importance of Europe for Germany: “our coexistence in Europe... Europe is our present and our future” [8]. Furthermore, she asks “Is Germany still European?” and answers “of course” [9].

She also admits how “the unifying of Europe has helped us [Germany]” [32]. In this way, Merkel seeks to establish a national identity and consciousness within the ongoing European debate over the roots of European civilisation.

At the level of legitimisation, the analysis focuses on the strategies of legitimisation through references to authority or power. Precisely, the aim is to identify how the text provides a particular social structuring of discourse to become universal and thus a part of the legitimising system that sustains the discourse of civic integration.

Merkel legitimises integration through the need of more social cohesion and responsibility among Muslims. Specifically, she claims that it would be nice to “live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other” [31]. But she argues that Germany is broadly secular, believes in gender and social equality, and does allow dissent and ideological irreverence. Islam, on the other hand, is widely interpreted as prescribing a precise society based on religious precepts, preaches gender inequality, and endorses hierarchy, absolutism, and asceticism [32]. Moreover, Muslim culture is lead by an assertive culture, characterized by an intense religious and social control, which is bent on changing its own.

Integration, according to Merkel, requires that Muslims accept that democratic and secular institutions come before any religious statements. The consequence, according to Merkel, is that German society cannot let its values be undermined: "it's important in regard to Islam that the values represented by Islam correspond with our Constitution" [32]. Specifically, she argues the problem of integration of Muslims is not based on the practice of religion, but rather on the respect by Muslims of the liberal values expressed in the German constitution. For example, she says it is “girls must go on school trips, participate in physical education; as for forced marriages we want nothing to do with that; it’s incompatible with our legislation” [32.]. For these reasons, Merkel sees in education the proper way to integrate Muslims into German society.

A second aspect of the legalization strategy is based on the need of more vigilance and control against to prevent insecurity. Talking of the urban segregation

of immigrants, Merkel says that immigrant youth break the law 6, 8, or 9 times before going to court [33] or that police officers “can't enter” these segregated areas where immigrants live [33]. More precisely, according to Merkel, the lack of integration regarding immigration involves the risk of immigrants becoming socially isolated because there are large chances to live with the German ‘Other’ in a ‘parallel society’, where German cultural norms might become faraway [30].

A last aspect of the legitimisation of integration is based on an economic rationale, which assumes the need of integration in order to preserve German economic development [5]. In her speech, Merkel recalls the history of contemporary German immigration and specifically Turkish immigration, when she states “we are a country that, that at the beginning of the 1960's brought guest workers to Germany—and now they live with us” [30]. Specifically, after WWII, Germany accepted immigrants to fill the lack of labour, due to the nation's war dead. Initially, immigrants were from Europe, yet afterwards, Germany had to open its borders also to Turks and others to satisfy the demand for workers.

To sum up, through the process of Othering, Merkel tries to establish a collective identity through the use of “We” to identify all those people who recognise the Christian roots of Germany. In Merkel's speech, one can identify a process of Othering through a definition of the boundary between insiders and outsiders. As a consequence, integration is legitimated by the necessity to protect Germany's cultural, political and economic features. At the same time, this legitimisation is often premised upon a fear of Islam due to the incompatibility of some Muslim practices with the German legal system. Therefore, vigilance and regulation are essential, since Muslims tend to live in segregated area and are inclined to fanaticism. Finally, Merkel's legitimisation of integration also has an economic instrumental function, which is to guarantee Germany's social security.

4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice

The goal of analysing the social practice is to underline the social and political implications of the discursive structure under analysis. Specifically, the

analysis will focus on three critical considerations: 1) the normative ambivalence in the German politics of identity and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the European self; 2) the debate on the integration of Muslims as a central part of the process of regulation of immigration and 3) any hidden political or economic rationality underlining the discourse of civic integration.

Merkel makes it clear that immigrants will likely stay and more will continue to arrive in Germany, as “immigration is an irreversible process especially because Germany needs immigration for supporting its economy and its manufacturing industry” [32] and the “amount of people with a migration background among the younger population is increasing, not decreasing” [30]. Although the effect of a lack of integration is creating social problems in many urban areas, Merkel does not follow an anti-immigration discourse. According to her, in fact the right solution would not be to block immigration, as she clearly recognises the “economic” importance of immigration, which is central for Germany in a globalised world [5]. Yet, Merkel demands more effort from Muslim immigrants to integrate themselves in German society and have them accept the values that characterise German cultural identity [*Leitkultur*]. Therefore, Merkel suggests that there is a specific moral right for a host society to ask for and expect more integration from newcomers.

Merkel advocates for a model of integration in which immigrants are an integral part of the society, hence “integration is a central theme” [30] for the realisation of a cohesive society. But she is very firm in evaluating multicultural policies as a failure because these policies allow foreigner cultures to remain separate and justify the non-acceptance of shared values. Instead, her approach to integration focuses on a pedagogic process, which addresses the newcomer towards positive models. However, this approach does not suggest a reciprocal learning between the majority and immigrants, but rather an ambiguous attitude centred on a universal and superior morality of the German society. In her words, those “we want to integrate” are those who need “examples to follow” [30]. This last statement uncovers the one-way conceptualisation of Merkel’s model of integration, in which the newcomer does not have any subjectivity.

The subsequent debate thus presupposes the ability of the state to define which values are acceptable and compatible with German national identity and which are not. As a consequence, the universality of liberal principles becomes more of a myth for those immigrants who have a dissonant identity that cannot be conciliated within German national culture [*Leitkultur*]. This point confirms the withdrawal from any engagement with the newcomer. The immigrant is perceived as ‘alien’ element that could challenge the original and preferred sense of German nation, if the state does not contribute to his moral education. Thus, when *Leitkultur* is recontextualised into the discourse on civic integration, it becomes a strict prescription of how the immigrant has to change for not being considered a foreigner, but at the same time restrains any possible affirmation of a non-German identity.

Merkel does not simply concern herself with the cultural and religious values of immigrants, but also focuses heavily on the socioeconomic integration of immigrants through their active participation in the labour market. In Merkel’s discourse, there is a clear obligation for immigrants to contribute to German welfare. To be more precise, Merkel’s speech takes into account, immigrants’ individual responsibility towards the political community: “Each individual is important for us, each individual, that is our goal, will get a chance in our country” [27] or “you will be supported when you are in a situation of need but we also have a demand for you that each of you, who can, contributes to society” [22]. Individual responsibility is thus central in the process of integration, and the immigrant must be held individually accountable of his own integration, while the collective community cannot be responsible of immigrants’ actual needs.

Civic integration, as defined by Merkel, thus constrains the process of integration into an economic rationality, which focuses on maintaining a stable political environment in order to guarantee the desired economic progress that Germany wants. As a consequence, multiculturalism is considered a failure because, in granting specific rights to collective groups, it weakens individual responsibility. In fact, multicultural policies, according to Merkel, do not enforce the acceptance of good citizenship by immigrants and also do not encourage them to have full consideration of their responsibilities towards the welfare of the nation.

To summarise, in this analysis of the socio-cultural practice of discourse, it was possible to find out how the German discourse on civic integration is entangled with two discursive strategies aimed at politicising the national identity and providing economic rationality to the need for a civic identity. As a result, only the assimilation of civic values is considered central to effective integration and the support for welfare policies that fully guarantee real social integration can be easily rejected because it does not bring a specific contribution to economically advance the nation.

Chapter Summary

Taking as a nodal point the speech that Chancellor Merkel offered at a meeting of the youth organisation of her conservative party in Potsdam in October 2010, the analysis developed in this chapter offers a reconstruction of the public debate across Europe after Merkel's speech.

The analysis of the national press proves there was a significant degree of convergence in the mediatisation of Merkel's speech. In particular, the claim that any attempt to build a multicultural society in Germany has failed received the largest amount of coverage. Despite the fact that the press accepts the premises of Merkel's argument, namely that 'ethnic ghettos' are a serious social problem for public order in many cities of Europe, large parts of the moderate and liberal newspapers do not see multicultural policies as the main cause of this segregation, rather they question the poor level of social integration that German policies have promoted. At the same time, press across Europe agree with Merkel on the fact that immigrants have to integrate themselves and respect norms of the countries where they live.

There are three key observations that come out of the Critical Discourse Analysis. First, central to Merkel's speech there is an explicit attempt to universalise the acceptable values, rules and norms of the German majority through the cultural and religious identity that characterise the national community. At the same time,

this so-called *Leitkultur* can become an inflexible cultural-national discourse that determines which forms of diversity are compatible or appropriate within Germany.

Second, Merkel's speech undertakes a moral duty on behalf of the dominant cultural majority to determine the limits and obligations of the Muslim, who needs to abandon those practices and values that are incompatible with German legislation such as forced marriage. Certainly, this last point can be easily agreed, but the politicisation of the German national culture reduces those immigrants who want to express a different cultural identity like Muslims to a political problem.

Third, it is a real contradiction that a public discourse aimed at asking for more unity and cohesion to immigrants, especially Muslims, is then supported by such a restrictive assumption of the national culture. Merkel invokes integration as a liberal democratic principle but then, the national cultural domain, which remains based on an ethnic-religious identity, prescribes what inner values are acceptable in the immigrant.

In the next chapter, the third and last case study analyses the debate generated by the British Prime Minister on the occasion of the 2010 Munich Security Council, when David Cameron delivered a provocative speech on the failings of state multiculturalism. The aim here is to examine not only how Cameron echoes Merkel's speech, but also how he suggests that Britain has to integrate Muslim people through a "muscular" integration based on imposing liberal values codified in the British national identity.

Chapter 6: The Doctrine of “Muscular” Liberalism

Chapter Overview

A few months after Merkel’s controversial statement that multicultural society in Germany had “utterly failed” [Appendix 2], David Cameron gave a speech on 5 February 2011 [Appendix 3] at the *International Security Policy Conference* held in Munich. In this speech, Cameron argues that multicultural policies are responsible for creating “separateness” rather than an encouragement of immigrant participation in society [8]. Moreover, Cameron is concerned that the marginalisation of Muslims creates a fertile terrain for extremism, as radical Islamists can find new supporters within disaffected Muslim youth. For this reason, Cameron claims that multicultural policies should be replaced with a new policy aimed at promoting British values within the Muslim population in the UK.

Specifically, he states that a “tolerant society” is passive and neutral to values and for this reason, it cannot integrate immigrants and therefore leaves them alone [16], while a “muscular” liberal society should encourage “active participation in society” in order to achieve integration through “true cohesion” [17]. Consequently, Cameron calls for a policy of “muscular liberalism” [16] to guarantee that Muslims respect national British “core values” such as democracy, equality before the law and human rights. In this manner, Cameron’s discourse on civic integration argues for explicit emphasis to be placed on the need for Muslims to adopt liberal values.

This speech is treated here as a nodal point of the British public debate on the integration of Muslims because it magnifies the recent shift in the British approach to integration. The traditional British model of integration was considered pluralist because it was established on the importance of minority groups and stressed importance “on integration, not as a process of acculturation to the nation and civic values, but as a programme of equal access to the rights of British society, which itself recognised multiculturalism as a social and political goal” (Bertossi 2007: 4).

At the same time, due to the emergence of different controversies related to Muslim immigration, such as segregation and extremism, the British model has turned away from a pluralist model in favour of a more civic approach (Bertossi 2007: 4), which stresses the relevance of common national civic values as a requirement for integration.

This chapter has four parts. The first part aims at offering a historical and political contextualisation of the debate. The second part focuses on the reconstruction of the discourses related to the British debate on Muslim integration. Starting from Cameron's speech, the analysis evaluates the discursive practices involved in the enactment of the speech through interdiscursivity and intertextuality. The third part is concerned with the textual strategies found in the nodal point. The last part offers an explanation of socio-cultural practices and specifically moves to examine the political limits in the discursive articulation underlining Cameron's speech.

1. The Political Context of the Debate

In the present section, I review the evolution and arguments of the public debate on immigration in order to contextualise the shift from a pluralist to a civic model of integration.

In legal terms, the traditional British model of integration implied that everyone born in British territories was recognised as having "British subjecthood" within the allegiance of the Crown (Hansen, 1999: 69). Thus, the *jus solis* granted British nationality to anyone born in the United Kingdom or one of the Crown colonies. The historical reason of why the British model can be identified as pluralist is based on the fact that as an empire, Britain did not experience the same pressures that led "other countries to a rigorous definition of their nationality", in order to restrict the movement of individuals, especially traders or colonisers (The Round Table, 1973: 139).

Secondly, as a monarchy, nationality and migration laws were based on “allegiance to the Crown”, rather than an attachment to “descent from a particular stock” or “a particular territory” (The Round Table, 1973: 139). For these reasons, the British model has been always considered as antithetical to the French Republican model (Favel, 2001: 4), which is based on a strong political definition of individual citizenship as a source of national unity.

Throughout the 1960s, the criteria of nationality and citizenship were still codified in the British Nationality Act of 1948 and “post-war migrants who arrived in the United Kingdom as ‘British subjects’ have been recognised as ethnic and racial minorities requiring state support and differential treatment to overcome barriers in their exercise of citizenship” (Meer and Modood 2009: 479). Furthermore the government wanted to integrate minorities “into the labour market and other key arenas of British society” (Meer and Modood 2009: 479) through several Race-Relations Acts by promoting equality of opportunity (Lester, 1998).

The British approach to integration was based on a political compromise between the Conservative and Labour parties’ on immigration legislation (Hansen 2000: 144), as an approach to a normalisation of race relations through the implementation of antidiscrimination policies. In the words of the Labour home secretary Roy Jenkins, Britain set out to create “cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”. Specifically, he defined integration “not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Jenkins: 1967: 267).

From the end of the 1960s, the speeches of Enoch Powell, a conservative MP, had become very popular in large part due to conservative public opinion, which also included traditional Labour supporters within the working-class (Hansen 2000: 172). In two of his most famous speeches “There is a Sense of Hopeless” (1968a) and the “Rivers of Blood” (1968b), Powell attacked the British Nationality Law, which allowed any citizen of the Commonwealth to flee to the United Kingdom.

Specifically, Powell addressed his criticism towards the government's decision to accept Indian and Pakistani refugees from Kenya and Uganda and predicted violent racial conflicts in the near future as a consequence of this continuing influx of immigrants. Moreover, Powell, in the "Rivers of Blood" (1968b) addressed a radical critique of the Race Relations Act 1968, which he found immoral and offensive as granting the possibility to "immigrant communities" to "organise" and "consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign against their fellow-citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with the legal weapons" (1968b).

As a result of increasing public concern for immigration, the Immigration Act 1971, increased controls on immigration and restricted the right of British subjects from the Commonwealth to migrate to the UK (Herbert, 2008: 16). Specifically, only British subjects with sufficiently strong links to the United Kingdom had the right of residence. Afterwards, Thatcher's government politicised the discourse on national identity and the public opinion's concern for immigration. Thus, the reform of the Nationality Law in 1981 gave up the imperial tradition of loyalty to the Crown and partially abandoned the *jus soli* (Hansen 2000: 208).

The first major event that raised concern in public opinion about Muslims was the controversy created by the publication of *The Satanic Verses* in 1988 (Parekh 2002: 295). After the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel, the Muslim community felt that "as citizens they [were no less] entitled to equality of treatment and respect for their customs and religion than either the Christian majority denominations or other religious minorities" (Meer and Modood 2007: 5). Thus the Rushdie affair revealed the lack of political achievability and public understanding faced by Muslim communities in the UK.

As a result, Muslims asked for real accommodation of their religious and cultural specificity by the State (Meer 2010: 75). Conversely, the fact that Muslims did not want to assimilate British values if integration required surrendering their religious heritage, raised concern in public opinion, which became more and more sceptical about the effectiveness of the existing model of integration. In this way, the Rushdie's Affair became a turning point for Islamic presence in Britain because it

underlined the lack of understanding and, specially, the lack of sympathy towards Muslims' political visibility.

A second event that highlighted the crisis of integration policies was certainly the ethnically-motivated riots in 2001 (Bagguley and Hussain 2006:547, 2008: 1). Although the causes of the riots were based on the deep-rooted segregation of South Asian-Muslim communities, which authorities had failed to address for generations (Oldham IRP 2001), the media "denounced the refusal of members of ethnic minorities to adhere to British identity" and public opinion perceived the problem of integration as "a lack of loyalty and civic responsibility" of Muslims (Bertossi 2007: 29).

In response to public concern, the New Labour government, under Tony Blair, began to focus on policies based on community cohesion (Somerville 2007: 55), which were aimed at talking about the need to value difference, while emphasising a "common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities" (LGA 2002: 6). This new concern over integration brought the government to review the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 and adopt standardised tests to demonstrate knowledge of language and life in the UK. Applicants have to prove "a sufficient knowledge" of English or Welsh or Scottish and pass the "life in the United Kingdom" test (Life in the UK 2004: 11). In addition, the 2002 Act introduced a citizenship oath and pledge to be given in a public citizenship ceremony.

The public's perception of Muslims' settlement completely deteriorated after the terrorist attacks of 7th July 2005. Although the British model of integration has been always considered more advanced compared to the mono-cultural models of France or Germany, it was second-generation immigrants in a multicultural Britain who perpetrated the bombings in London. As a consequence, much of the public concern was oriented towards a reconsideration of multiculturalism, which was held responsible for Islamic separateness and related to a growing radicalised Muslim youth.

In a speech following the 7/7 attacks, Blair argued that the origins of extremism were not "superficial but deep" and could be found "in the extremist minority that now, in every European city, preach hatred of the West and our way of life" (2005). Under his guidance, the Blair government drafted an anti-terror strategy titled "Prevent Strategy", which sought to counter extremism by controlling and regulating Muslim organisations (Coolsaet, 2011: 225). At the same time, the Labour government "devoted greater attention to what has often been phrased as a 'hearts and minds' approach to Muslim communities", by enrolling "Muslim individuals and community organizations in their efforts to prevent radicalisation and promote voices of mainstream Islam amongst the Muslim youth" (McGhee, 2008: 71).

Labour under Gordon Brown's leadership, who succeeded Blair as Prime Minister, tried to establish specific conservative credentials with an attack on immigration and multiculturalism (Alleyne 2011: 101). The aim was to gain an electoral consensus on the assumption that people would demand action on immigration above all other issues and divert attention away from the economic crisis. In a famous speech delivered during the celebration of 300 years of Union between England and Scotland in 2007, Brown defined "British identity" through the shared values and common interests that characterise Britain institutions. He argued that multiculturalism failed to emphasise what ties the country together; thus, according to him, multiculturalism became "an excuse for justifying separateness" and a "tolerance of – and all too often a defence of – even greater exclusivity" (Brown, 2007).

In brief, five different issues have framed the British political debate on immigration: Firstly, the main reason why the British model of integration adopted a pluralist approach is because most of the immigrants were coming from former colonies and as such, were British subjects. Secondly, the fear of uncontrolled immigration from the Commonwealth countries brought Britain to reconsider a complete revision to the Nationality Law. Thirdly, the Muslims' request for accommodating religious and cultural diversity especially after the Rushdie Affair increased the scepticism of public opinion toward multicultural integration. Fourthly, the ethnic conflicts during the 2001 riots, shifted immigration policy from

a pluralist model to a civic approach to civic integration. Finally, in the post-9/11 context, the concern for terrorism reinforced the view of Muslims' lack of loyalty and civic responsibility.

2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice

This section looks at the immediate communicative processes of Cameron's speech, in other words, the conditions of social reproduction found in the text. It offers two levels of analysis, namely, interdiscursivity and the intertextual chain. Across these two levels, the analysis pays close attention to interdiscursive and intertextual analysis, so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it mutually relates to other discourses held in the public sphere and how other discourses actually framed Cameron's intervention.

Interdiscursivity

The objective is to specify how a nodal point is established in a specific discursive context and how it can be articulated with other discourses. Moreover, it is relevant to analyse how this discursive framework is also translated into concrete policies and institutional arrangements aimed at securitising ethnic relations.

Cameron agrees with Merkel that multicultural policies are a failure, because it encourages different ethnic groups (especially Muslims) to close themselves off from mainstream society. The discourse that Muslims are a self-segregated minority can be located in the thesis of 'parallel lives' (Philips 2006: 27) that was developed in the public inquiry on the 2001 riots (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008; Oldham IRP 2001), which accused Muslim communities with self-segregation and "adopting isolationist practices under a pretence of multiculturalism" (Meer and Moodod 2009: 481). According to Cameron, multicultural policies cause urban segregation, which causes some disaffected youth to reject the interpretation of a moderate Islam and to adopt a more radical interpretation. In this way, it is possible to identify a set of three discourses to which Cameron draws to in his speech.

First, Cameron attacks multiculturalism for destabilising and accentuating both exclusion and radicalism within immigrant groups. Multiculturalism is seen as leading to the development of an unwillingness to participate in wider social or political life, a lack of identification with British 'norms' and 'values' and, in some frequent cases, the emergence of extremist religious groups who are intent on menacing citizens and political establishments. This approach links multiculturalism to the discourse of securitisation of ethnic relations and especially to the anti-terrorism agenda. Cameron explicitly criticised the previous government for focusing too narrowly on terrorism and violent extremism and failing to be sufficiently "muscular" in standing up for British liberal values [16]. For this reason, Cameron suggested a new government approach to extremism through a revision of the Prevent Strategy elaborated by the Labour government.

Second, by rejecting multiculturalism Cameron promotes a discourse on civic integration, which emphasises community cohesion and a participative conception of citizenship, which requires a sense of belonging and common vision for all communities living in the UK. This community cohesion is based on moral virtue and a civic identity based on national values. Specifically, Cameron calls for a policy of "muscular liberalism" [16] to guarantee that Muslims respect national British values such as democracy, equality before the law and human rights [4, 5]. In this manner, Cameron's discourse on civic integration argued for explicit emphasis to be placed on the need for Muslims to adopt liberal values. However, this specific discourse on civic integration recalls more the tenets embedded in Republican discourse, rather than those from a liberal discourse, in which individuals have equal opportunities and diversity is supposed to be seen as having positive value.

Third, the call for muscular liberalism has been adopted in the new Prevent strategy presented on 7 June 2011. According to the Home Office website (2011), the plan is largely based on 1) responding to the ideological challenge of Islamism and those who promote it; 2) preventing people from being drawn into terrorism; and 3) monitoring extremism and radicalisation within institutions and organisations. Therefore, the new security policy does reflect the Prime Minister's

February 2011 speech in Munich in which he created a link between non-violent Islamic extremism and terrorism⁵.

Paradoxically, this “muscular” approach to integration challenges traditional liberalism, as it has the potential to undermine those values that Cameron defines as liberal and would likely defend. It is understandable that public funding would not be used for radical groups, but it raises concern of the attempt to delegate to universities and Internet providers, the power to take action actively against groups or individuals who “do not support our core values” (Home Office 2011: 12).

As a consequence, this prevention strategy commits the Government to broadening its counter-terrorist efforts to include a new public enemy, the “nonviolent extremist”, who is a Muslim, “who may reject violence, but who [does] accept various parts of the extremist worldview” [4]. However, despite the rhetoric, Cameron’s measures were part of the general political debate on Islamic extremism, already established under Labour in 2007 via a concrete political agenda to change the legislation on counter-terrorism.

Fourth, by focusing on civic integration and social cohesion, Cameron recalls his social conservative discourse on the Big Society⁶. In detail, the Big Society’s discourse offers a political foundation for the social transformation of British society, based on a transfer of the moral centre of society from the government to the civic sphere through an application of four priorities: 1) more power to communities; 2) volunteerism and participation to community; (3) transferring power from central to local government; and 4) support of charities and social

⁵ The Prevent strategy explicitly claims that dealing “with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values” (Home Office 2011: 12). In a specific section on “Higher and Further education” (Home Office 2011: 74), the government asks universities to monitor those “people who may be drawn into extremism and terrorism” (2011: 78) and to protect students “from the consequences of their becoming involved in terrorism, and take reasonable steps to minimise this risk” (2011: 79). There is also a section on the Internet that proposes to limit “access to harmful content online in... schools, public libraries and other public buildings” (2011: 80) and “remove unlawful and harmful content from the [I]nternet” (2011: 80). The new Prevent Strategy has also extended its reach to include the NHS. Doctors, nurses, and other medical staff will be asked to identify those patients at risk of being drawn into radicalisation. However, it is not clear how doctors, teachers or Internet providers would be able to detect and evaluate what is “unlawful” or “harmful” (Home Office 2011: 77), and clearly a matter of political evaluation and potentially an extremely divisive designation.

⁶ This discourse was introduced by Cameron during the Conservative Party Conference on 8 October 2009 and became a key concept of the Conservative Manifesto in 2010

enterprises (Bochel 2011: 15). Thus the Big Society discourse is based on the necessity to make civil society self-responsible for its own welfare and security (Heppell and Seawright 2012: 25). This discourse implies that all aspects of cultural and political integration of Muslims can be reduced to inducing self-responsibility for their community, rather than waiting for the support of State multicultural policies.

To sum up, Cameron's speech in Munich could be articulated around three different discourses: 1) multicultural policies have failed to promote integration, as British society has become too tolerant, less secure and more vulnerable to Islamic extremism; 2) securitisation as a strategy to tackle the home-grown causes of extremism, through 3) a muscular liberalism involved in guaranteeing that Muslims respect national British core values such as democracy, equality and respect of the law; 4) muscular liberalism is thus entangled to the conservatory idea of Big Society, which focuses on individual self-responsibility for his own community.

Intertextual Chain

The objective here is to analyse how the nodal point is disseminated and recontextualised across the European press. The outcome reveals the role that national press can have in selecting and disseminating topics through the European public sphere. On 5 February 2011, Cameron gave his speech [Appendix 3] at the *International Security Policy Conference* held in Munich. According to Cameron, many young British Muslims are drawn to Islamist extremism because they feel separated and marginalised.

The press underscored how Cameron's speech echoed the controversial comments made by Merkel a few months earlier in Potsdam, when she defined multiculturalism as a failure, saying Germany had not dedicated adequate attention to the civic integration of immigrants. Similarly to the process of dissemination of Merkel's speech, Cameron's statement also gained enormous popularity through broadcasters, the new media, and the press, becoming a significant example of a highly mediated event in the realm of modern political communication.

Table 6.1 – Coverage of Cameron’s speech across Europe

Cameron	France	Germany	UK
Articles	11	7	42
Sources	7	4	7
Ratio	1.57	1.75	6

For this analysis I have collected 57 articles from leading national newspapers in France, Germany and the UK through the Nexis and Factiva databases for seven days between 5 and 12 February 2011. The distribution (Table 6.1) of articles shows that the UK sample is clearly overrepresented with 42 articles, but still this number is very high considering the fact that I excluded nearly 200 articles published by tabloids; this result reveals indeed a very high interest for the British press for the issue of integration. The distribution (Table 6.1) of non-local coverage is homogenous. The French press confirms its previous trend for Merkel’s nodal point (13 articles and a ratio of 2.17, while now is slightly lower with 11 articles and a ratio of 1.57). The German cluster counts 7 articles, which is significantly lower if compared to the coverage of the two previous nodal points (Chap. 4 and 5), but the ratio is higher than the French one (1.75).

The German result is unexpected as Cameron’s speech was given in Munich. My impression is that the press covered the conference in Munich and many important speakers gave a speech. As a consequence, it is reasonable to argue that Cameron’s speech had to share the German media agenda with other speakers. By looking at the conference program reports, on the same day the following speakers had been called to give a talk: Ban Ki-moon, Merkel, Hilary Clinton, van Rompui and McCain⁷. Moreover, I can exclude an anti-British prejudice, as in the same period I have found several articles covering Cameron’s statement on the Egypt crisis and Mubarak’s resignation (February 11, 2011).

For each article I coded more than one thematic category (TC). The distribution of the themes appears consistent for the TC 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (avg. > 12) in the three countries. Overall, the European press agrees that Cameron accused

⁷ The full program of the 47th Munich Conference, February 4-6, 2011 is available on the following page: <http://www.securityconference.de/en/activities/munich-security-conference/msc-2011/program/> (accessed on 1st September 2013).

multiculturalism as a failure, saying it was partly responsible for promoting Islamist extremism.

Table 6.2 – Thematic Dimensions

Thematic Dimension	France	Germany	UK	Avg.
1. Membership	6	4	26	12.0
2. Religious identity	7	4	27	12.6
3. Cultural tradition	8	7	31	14.0
4. National identity	6	5	35	17.0
5. European perspective	5	5	28	12.6
6. Securitization	9	6	31	15.3
7. Social Justice	3	2	18	7.6

In more detail, the analysis has considered seven thematic categories as reported in Table 6.2. First, membership (TC 1) includes references to citizenship, integration and respect of law. Second, the issue of religious diversity (TC 2) is debated as a difference to tolerate, rather than a pluralist encounter. Third, the cultural tradition (TC 3), which covers references to ‘our traditions’ and ‘our values’ that define the UK as a mono-cultural society, based on a common past, common traditions and an apparently homogeneous and coherent value system. The fourth category relates to the national identity (TC 4) and refers to the political discourse of belonging to the UK. Fifth, the European perspective (TC 5) includes references to Europe as a Western moral community and the British position in relation to it. Sixth, the securitisation of ethnic relations (TC 6) includes the risks concerning urban segregation, the highest level of delinquency, but also political violence and religious radicalism. Conversely, social justice (TC 7) refers to social and economic inequalities, which can explain the problems faced by Muslim immigrants in their process of integration.

These categories refer to the main line of argumentation employed by the press and reveal to what extent the national press can have a specific role in selecting and disseminating a nodal point. Here is a breakdown of the most common claims:

- Young British Muslims were drawn to violent ideology because they found no strong collective identity in Britain (TC 4, 6)
- The failure of multiculturalism is a threat to security (TC 6)
- State multiculturalism encourages different cultures to live separate lives (TC 1, 6)
- Young Muslims are rootless. (TC 2)
- Second generation Muslims search for something to belong to and believe. (TC 4)
- Lack of integration can lead young Muslims to Islamism. (TC 2, 6)
- Integration has to be based on more active, muscular liberalism and less passive tolerance. (TC 1, 4, 3)
- A passively tolerant society stands neutral between different values. (TC 3)
- Europeans need to believe in liberal values and actively promotes them. (TC 5)
- References to earlier speech given by Merkel and Sarkozy or the *Burqua* Law. (TC 5)

Regarding the *Burqua* law (TC 5), the French parliament approved the ban on 11 February 2011, six days after Cameron gave his speech. The same day of the French parliament's vote, Sarkozy gave an interview on the French TV in which he joined Merkel and Cameron's attack on multiculturalism and made a very controversial statement: "If you come to France, you accept to melt into a single community, which is the national community, and if you do not want to accept that, you cannot be welcome in France" (Appendix 6 FR #1, #2; DE #4, #5, #6; UK #43).

Regarding contestation, Cameron's remarks enraged many critiques from British commentators. First, Muslim groups attributed to Cameron, the will to place an unfair responsibility on minority communities about integration, while he failed – in their view - to stress how the majority could help Muslims feel more welcome in Britain (UK #6, #7). This last point is quite central to criticism of the social policies developed by the Tory cabinet. Bunting, for instance, remarked how Cameron's "nostalgia for a strong national collective identity, and a sense of shared values" is highly improbable in a country in which "all kinds of collective identities have been weakened or abandoned" and "institutions that expressed and inculcated a sense of

nationhood are in decline, whether [they be] political parties, trade unions or Christian churches” (UK #24). In addition, many columnists underscored how such an attack against multiculturalism was a mere attempt to distract public opinion from the government’s unpopularity for making massive budget cuts (UK #18, #26).

Those British columnists, who support Cameron's arguments, are split in two groups. The liberals agree that in several cases, multiculturalism has meant more segregation (UK #10; #15); yet they disagree on the complete renunciation of multicultural policies because they are seen as a process by which people respect and communicate with each other. As a consequence, they argue that integration should promote a feeling of belonging in society as long as more economic security is offered as an incentive to encourage social cohesion (UK #14; #16). The conservative front generally agrees on blaming British society as a passive and tolerant community, which encourages immigrants to live apart (UK #20; #19). Some editorialists also recognise that Labour policies are accountable for this failure, because they have failed to provide a vision of society to which immigrants can feel they want to belong (UK #8; #10).

By mapping German and French newspapers, it is possible to observe that contrary to what happened in regard to Merkel’s speech, on this occasion the coverage was not limited to the sensationalism of the statements on multiculturalism, but offered a more complete evaluation of the speech. Overall, it is possible to argue that in this case there was a more reflective approach to the question of integration. At the same time, it has to be recalled that Cameron gave his speech during an international event and the transcript was in English and available on the PM’s website, and this facilitated a more elaborate understanding of its complexities and political implications than what occurred following Merkel’s speech.

By comparing the social media to the press coverage, very often the speech is took out of context and focus takes place only on the most controversial statements on multiculturalism undervaluing and ignoring the nuances and complexities of other claims. There are several video extracts available online of different lengths, generally lasting between two and three minutes, all of which

include Cameron's attack on multiculturalism: "Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values" [8]. It is possible to argue that new media, on the contrary to the press, tend on one hand to increase levels of intertextuality through an exponential dissemination of the same extracts; on the other hand, they reduce the level of interdiscursivity by focusing only on a specific discourse on multiculturalism.

To sum up, Cameron's speech was largely mediated across Europe confirming once again an interest of the press in covering political statements on integration. However, the process of convergence in France and Germany focused more on how Cameron echoed Merkel in stating multiculturalism as a failure, reproducing, in this way, a polarisation between liberal and conservative commentators. Instead, the British press paid more attention to domestic prevention of Islamic extremism and the revision of the Prevent Strategy plan. Despite widespread criticism about the willingness to refuse multicultural policies and the attempt to securitise Muslim relationships, Cameron's speech did gain a large consensus across the European press on the need to promote political belonging and encourage social cohesion among second generation Muslim immigrants.

3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation

This section examines the textual aspects of the speech. The analytical model proposed in the present section proposes a general overview about the textual features, and a second stage that focuses on the political effects of that textual practice, through an assessment of the Othering and legitimation strategies on which the text is based and can thus be interpreted.

The textual analysis is conducted on the transcript delivered by the Prime Minister's press office [Appendix 3]. The style of this political statement is that of a public speech addressed to an international forum during a plenary session. It is

characterised by a charismatic speaker who generally detains political authority and a competent audience composed of experts and diplomats. However, some style features of the speech seem to be more coherent in terms of domestic political communication. For example, the speech tends to be mainly celebrative in its overall communicative purpose and is characterised by a rhetorical articulation that fulfils a typical ritual function of similar political speeches offered to partisan conventions, rather than one delivered to an international conference. Also, the vocabulary includes plain language and basic words, avoiding any technical jargon that is often seen in speeches intended for an international audience. Moreover, in the text, there are important keywords that have very strong political connotations for a British audience, for example, “British values”, “collective identity”, “national identity” and “local identity.”

In addition, in the opening part of the speech, Cameron positions himself by his use of the singular pronoun “I”: “Today I want to focus my remarks on terrorism...” [1]. In this way, he states and delivers his own identity through use of “I” but then in Line 3 he moves to the use of “We”, which stands for the British nation: “We are dealing with our budget deficit” [1] or “We will still have the fourth largest military defence budget in the world” [1]. In this way, Cameron is not just addressing those in his immediate audience, but also addressing all Britons by establishing a common identity between him and them. It is this sense of the plural “we” at the beginning of his speech, which in and of itself is a performativity in the manner often used when a speaker addresses distant actors and confers identity and political status on them.

At the level of Othering, the speaker defines himself and expresses contrasting identities. An interesting feature defining the definition of the in-group identity can be observed when Cameron changes the register of subjectivity, so that the “we” may stand also for the international community: “We must ban preachers of hate from coming to our countries” [12]. The use of “we” also establishes a common identity with its international listeners and recognises in them a specific political authority, which Cameron calls upon to act: “We must ban” [12].

From the beginning of his speech, Cameron makes it quite clear that “liberal values” [4] of freedom and tolerance are main features defining the British society. Specifically, he refers to those values as “Western” [5] and indeed embedded in “Western democracy” [4]. In addition, liberal values are expressed and persuasively conveyed by Cameron so as to contrast British society with Islamic extremism. He defines Islamists as a people who refuse liberal values and universal human rights [4, 5]. In particular, Cameron also defines a set of normative points to discuss whether Muslims and their organization can be considered part of the political realm when they are fully accepting “universal human rights – including rights for women and people of other faiths”, in the “equality of all before the law”, in “democracy and the right of people to elect their own government” and experience “integration” [12].

Cameron does not articulate the Other as traditional Islam, but rather as an Islamic extremism. According to Cameron, Islamist extremism is based on “a distortion of Islam” [12] and represents a serious threat for European countries [3] because it rejects liberal values and promotes separation. Moreover, Cameron distinguishes the difference between Islam and Islamism by saying that “Islamist extremism and Islam are not the same thing” [4]. Islam is defined as a peaceful religion [4] and “Western values and Islam can be entirely compatible” [5]. An example comes from “the streets of Tunis and Cairo”, when people demanded “the universal right to free elections and democracy” [5]. Only the Islamist is regarded as having a fundamentally different and opposing British identity. Therefore, Cameron is not concerned with those Muslims who integrate into the political community and accept the same liberal values but with Islamists who indoctrinate young Muslims who feel apart and unaligned.

Cameron does not focus on negative social or cultural differences, deviances or threats attributed to these extremists, but rather on ideology. The word “ideology” is repeated 11 times to denote Islamic extremism, while Cameron never defines his own idea of cohesion and integration as being ideological, even when he claims that Britain must adopt a policy of “muscular liberalism” to enforce the core values of the nation within the immigrant community [16]. Therefore, this attempt to define “ideological extremism” as a threat helps to recontextualise the construction of a

discursive construction of the in- and out-groups (Woodak, 2007: 333). To be more precise, Cameron deploys a positive and non-ideological perception of the in-group, which projects a negative and ideological position toward the out-group. This strategy is central to the process of Othering, which identifies Islamist extremists as the Other inside the British community.

The main risk for the British community is represented by those “groups and organisations” as directed by charismatic leaders who “promote separatism by encouraging Muslims to define themselves solely in terms of their religion” [10]. This “ideology of extremism” and “separatism” indeed “can engender a sense of community, a substitute for what the wider society has failed to supply” [10]. As a consequence, Cameron seems more concerned not with terrorists, but rather those “*non-violent extremists*” who preach Islamist ideology without practicing violence, or in his words, those terrorists who “were initially influenced by what some have called ‘non-violent extremists’ and then took those radical beliefs to the next level by embracing violence” [11].

At the level of legitimisation, the analysis focuses on the strategies of legitimisation through references to authority or power. Precisely, the aim is to identify how the text provides a particular social structuring of discourse to become universal and thus a part of the legitimising system that sustains the discourse of civic integration.

The key problem, according to the British Prime Minister, comes from those segregated communities that reject traditional Islam to support radical Islamism. Cameron blames multiculturalism for encouraging “different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream” [8]. The menace of “segregated communities” [8] is used to legitimatise a discursive strategy that aims at universalising cultural and political values as both uniform and necessary for integration into British society: “We have even tolerated segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values” [8].

This last point also reveals how much political belonging is central to Cameron’s development of civic integration. In Cameron’s words, “we must build

stronger societies and stronger identities at home” [16], but “we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism” [16]. A passive “tolerant society” does not integrate citizens, but rather leaves them alone [16], while a “muscular” liberal society should encourage “meaningful and active participation in society” in order to achieve integration through “true cohesion” [17]. Consequently, the dimension of universalization of a particular form of liberalism, defined as “muscular”, is the main strategy Cameron uses to legitimatise his discourse on civic integration.

Cameron discourse develops also an international perspective to legitimate the necessity to take action against Islamic extremism: “We will not defeat terrorism simply by the action we take outside our borders” [3]. Here “we” and “our borders” refer to the Western European community as it is confirmed in the following: “Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own countries” [3.] This strategy also confirms his interest to prove that other international leaders are legitimate partners in the debate on security and integration. Specifically, he shows an interest in partner speeches by remarking: “as Angela [Merkel] has said the security aspects of our response...” [3.] In this way, despite the fact that Cameron delivers a statement that concentrates more on domestic policy rather than foreign policy, he projects Britain into a transnational political debate by focusing on a common strategy for integration and security to adopt across Europe.

To summarise the approach to textual strategy, Cameron expresses a concern about extremism in the UK based on the “ideology” of Islamism [4], which he believes both disaffects and radicalises Islamic youth. His viewpoint is that multicultural policies are responsible for creating separateness rather than encouraging participation [8], and for this reason, he argues that multicultural policies should be replaced with a “muscular liberalism” [16] that promotes effective integration. As a consequence, Cameron’s demand for community cohesion and appeals to a national identity reveal an attempt to assume an unquestioned and inevitable reality of those Muslims who refuse political belonging and disrupt social cohesion. This textual strategy raises several questions about the political nature and the practical limits of this discourse on integration.

4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice

The goal of the present section is to underline the social and political implications of the discursive structure under analysis. Specifically, the analysis focuses on three critical considerations: 1) the normative ambivalence in the British politics of identity and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the British self; 2) the debate on integration of Muslims as a main part of the process of immigrant regulation and 3) any hidden social and economic rationality underlining the discourse of civic integration.

First, Cameron defends the British tradition of liberalism and then determines the limits and obligations of Muslims through a definition of nonviolent Islamic extremism. The nonviolent extremist is someone who does not belong or accept these liberal values and takes on radical beliefs, but without engaging in actual violent or terrorist acts. This concern has deep implications for the definition of integration as it shows the risk of arbitrariness embedded in this asymmetrical hierarchical relationship of power, in which Cameron's government wants to decide who is a threat to democracy or not.

Cameron's discourse is contradictory with its basic liberal assumption when targeting non-violent extremism. Liberal democracies have a historical tradition of discussing "how to prevent illiberal and undemocratic forces from abusing the rights and powers that liberal democracy extends to all" (Kymlicka 2010: 116). British liberals have never banned either the Communist or Republican parties, although these groups do want to abolish British institutions, such as the Parliament or the Monarchy. As Kymlicka puts it, democratic liberalism "gives free speech [also] to those who would refuse free speech to others" (2010: 159).

A constant vigilance against any political form of extremism cannot be based on the suppression of basic liberal principles for some. Democratic liberalism is based on the assumption that governments cannot interfere in the lives of individuals outside of guaranteeing that all citizens are protected from the control of others. Instead, Cameron's discourse on security and extremist prevention is based on the

assumption that the political authority should be the arbiter over who is democratic and who is not.

This contradiction between respect for freedom of speech of a violent minority and an enactment of majority safety, points to the “diversity dilemma” mentioned by Jackson-Preece (2005), namely, that the principles that legitimate a political community may conflict with the freedom of minorities to refuse both belonging and uniformity. Precisely, the collision of values, such as “freedom” and “belonging”, creates the presence of the Other as a potential source of insecurity and conflict (Jackson-Preece 2005: 3-5).

Second, the security-based approach embedded in the discourse of “muscular liberalism” aims to impose a British identity as a solution to violent extremism. However, in practical terms, this discourse justifies only the implementation of measures to regulate Muslim extremism through a highly ideological view of political belonging based on identity.

According to Cameron, the problem of identity reflects the deep dilemma that is inherent in the discourse of multiculturalism and its failure to achieve social cohesion. Consequently, Cameron claims “It’s that identity, that feeling of belonging in our countries, that I believe is the key to achieving true cohesion” [17]. Yet rather than seeking to deal with the cultural challenge offered by Muslim identities, Cameron attacks multiculturalism for destabilising and accentuating both exclusion and radicalism within immigrant groups. “True cohesion” [17] does not imply any form of cultural mediation; it is only a political act that implies to Muslims that they belong to and have a British identity.

Cameron claims legitimacy of the state in terms of its authority and obligation to protect its citizens from any threat (Edelman 1977: 4-5; Jackson-Preece 2005, 2006) that can disrupt political stability. Yet, muscular liberalism is a form of withdrawal from any engagement with some Muslim communities where Islamism is seen as central to a certain vision of the political sphere. Moreover, proposing a form of cultural homogenisation of a particular minority ignores the fact that cultural/religious differences cannot be resolved by only the obligation of a national

identity. It is quite doubtful that such a proposal can be effective to reduce tension and prevent violence, as relations between the state and radical Muslim extremists are not viewed as related to the deliberative function of the public sphere, but as a question related to state security (Kymlicka 2011: 44).

Cameron's discourse strategy appears to be justifying a policy that is aimed at preventing nonviolent actions through the negation of liberal values like freedom of speech for a specific target group. Thus, when the government only claims the right to limit democratic debate and negotiation to protect itself, political mobilisation may be banned as a form of extremism, and even if Muslim "demands can be voiced, they will be rejected by the larger society and the state" in the name of the discourse for prevention of extremism (Kymlicka 2007: 589). Overall, organisations and groups that advance claims against the state can only be considered disloyal. Consequently, the process of securitisation and especially its re-contextualisation in the discourse of extremism prevention have deep implications for the public sphere, because Islam, or at least its more radical parts, is represented as threatening the identity of a hegemonic community and undermining its political and cultural model (Buzan et al. 1998).

This discourse works through the exclusion of those cultural and political differences that are considered unacceptable by the political authority through the use of the specific normative framework. Any organisation that does not reject extremism will be marginalised on the basis of its political ideology. However, such a discourse implies a lot of ambiguities, for example, what is the legal difference between "radical extremists" and "nonviolent" ones [11]? Is someone who supports the implementation of Sharia law automatically a "nonviolent extremist" because that person rejects liberal values?

As a consequence, securitisation and integration are based on the same process of uniformisation of political belonging and an explicit emphasis on the need for Muslims to adopt liberal values, wherein relations between the state and Muslims would be a matter of state security and not a matter of normal democratic debate and negotiation (Kymlicka, 2007). Integration is thus reduced to just the ability to internalise dominant liberal values.

Third, according to Cameron's discourse, poverty and social injustice cannot be considered to be the basis for integration failure, as "many of those found guilty of terrorist offences in the UK and elsewhere have been graduates and often, middle class" [6]. Yet, the recent study *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections* (Simcox, Stuart, & Ahmed 2010) contradicts Cameron's argument, as reported by the Home Office's *Prevention Strategy* (2011: 25), data shows that "just under one third of the total for whom information on education was available had attended university or a higher education institute." Indeed, Cameron commits the mistake of misrepresenting the social and class reality of those people who decide to follow Islamic radicalism.

This discourse intentionally refuses to take into account the fact that Muslims live disproportionately in the most deprived urban areas in poor housing where they receive only a basic education and are discriminated against in employment [7]. According to Cameron, poverty is only a contributory factor to terrorism, instead "one important reason" why "so young Muslims" are inclined to support terrorism is "a question of identity" [7]. Thus, Cameron undertakes identity as a causal explanation of radicalism and rejects any other counter-argument to explain social exclusion such as urban segregation, low social mobility or institutional discrimination, which can well be the root cause of the manifestations of extremism.

Referring to this point, Cameron aims at creating of self-responsible and active individuals. Cameron specifies precisely how this active participation can be promoted. He suggests: "making sure that immigrants speak the language of their new home and ensuring that people are educated in the elements of a common culture and curriculum" [17]. He also proposes "introducing National Citizen Service", a programme for kids "from different backgrounds to live and work together" [17]. Here it is possible to recognise an overlap between the discourses of 'Big Society' and civic integration, which is also confirmed by the belief that a "common purpose can be formed as people come together and work together in their neighbourhoods" [17] through an active engagement of immigrants. In Cameron's own words, civic involvement "will also help build stronger pride in local identity" [17].

Cameron appears to contradict himself when advocates at the same time for integration through participation in society, “by shifting the balance of power away from the state and towards the people” [17] and linguistic, educational and even civil service policies. What seems clearer is that the government is not retained or deemed responsible for offering effective programs to produce economic security and social solidarity, but it is responsible towards the cultural and political integration of Muslims. This approach may enhance social cohesion, but cultural differences have to be legitimated, otherwise these programs can reproduce dangerous assumptions aimed at creating conformity and cultural homogenisation.

To summarise, Cameron attacks state multiculturalism for tolerating non-liberal values. These liberal values, which identify British national identity, are a necessary means for maintaining a stable political environment that guarantees the desired integration of Muslims. Instead, the Muslim extremist is someone who does not belong or accept these liberal values and takes on radical beliefs, and also without engaging in actual violent or terrorist acts.

This security-based approach embedded in the discourse of ‘muscular liberalism’ aims thus to impose liberal values as a solution to integration; at the same time the risk of arbitrariness embedded in this asymmetrical hierarchical relationship of power is self-evident, in which the government wants to decide which values are a threat to democracy or not. As a result, only the uncritical assimilation of liberalism is considered to be central to integration, while welfare and multicultural policies are considered not effective in reaching political belonging.

Chapter Summary

Taking as the entry point Cameron’s speech on the prevention of Islamic extremism given at the *International Security Policy Conference* in Munich in February of 2011, the analysis developed in this chapter offers a reconstruction of the public debate on Muslim integration and evaluates the political conditions and the social practices involved in the enactment of the discourses around this debate.

The British debate on Muslim integration recontextualises a discourse on security that is aimed at the implementation of measures to regulate Islamic extremism through both homogenisation and political integration, but without precise policies for contrasting social exclusion. Accordingly, Muslim immigrants, especially those who are second generation, are exclusively responsible for their own integration, while their membership is dependent upon their ability to internalise dominant liberal values and nothing more.

There are three key observations that come out of the Critical Discourse Analysis of the British public debate. First, the aim of this muscular liberal discourse is to combat radicalism and separatism. According to Cameron, prevention should be addressed toward those extremists who preach Islamist ideology even without practicing violence. However, the re-contextualisation of this discourse as a policy of extremist prevention can have important outcomes in the political sphere, because when a minority is depicted as a dangerous enemy, then diversity could be understood to be a force that only subverts the security of social cohesion.

Second, Cameron's approach to civic integration is presented as a solution to the problem of identity decline in UK society, which he blames on a passive and tolerant society. According to Cameron, identity stands for a feeling of belonging that he believes is “the key to achieving true cohesion” [17]. However, this “true cohesion” does not imply any form of cultural mediation; it is only a political act that implies for Muslims that they belong to and have a British identity. As such, it is paradoxical that a discourse aimed at asking for more integration through unity and cohesion of immigrants, especially Muslims, is supported by a rigid definition of national identity.

Third, Cameron underestimates poverty and social injustice as causes of separatism and extremism. Instead Cameron's discourse assumes a model of society, also outlined in Cameron's manifesto for the Big Society, wherein the Muslim immigrants must be held individually accountable and morally responsible to the British community. As a consequence, integration is more concerned with the

obligations that are expected of immigrants, rather than their rights and eventual movement toward full social equality.

In regards to the transnational press coverage, the analysis shows a significant degree of convergence in the mediatisation of Cameron's speech. However, the process of mediatisation has emphasised in France and Germany how Cameron echoed Merkel in stating multiculturalism as a failure. Instead, the national press paid more attention to the political implications of Cameron's domestic prevention of Islamic extremism. Despite widespread criticism across Europe about the willingness to refuse multicultural policies and the attempt to securitise Muslim relationships, Cameron's speech did also gain a large consensus on the need to promote political belonging and encourage social cohesion.

In the next chapter, I provide a comparative analysis of these national debates to verify to what extent a discursive process of convergence is emerging towards Islamic integration and how these relationships contribute to the construction of a shared normative discourse about integration across Europe.

Chapter 7: The Transnational Discourse of Civic Integration

Chapter Overview

This analysis of the European public debate on Muslim integration examines specific debates on the subject in France, Germany and the UK. Each of these debates is based on a political statement, which offers a privileged point of entry for reconstructing the national public debate. I apply Critical Discourse Analysis to investigate how the nodal points link to discourses, the rules according to which these discourses are tied together, and how they are re-inscribed into a broader political debate. Moreover, I apply Content Analysis to facilitate the comparison of national debates and evaluate the role of press in reinforcing a specific discursive articulation of civic integration. Here, in brief, I outline the three cases studies and the main characteristics that define each of them.

Chapter 4 reconstructs the French public debate by taking as the nodal point, Sarkozy's editorial published in the *Le Monde* newspaper on 8 December 2009. In this article, Sarkozy defends the Swiss vote and calls upon Muslims to refrain from provocative attitudes, but also urges them not to forget that Europe has Christian values as its foundation. Sarkozy's intervention came not only in response to concerns about the Swiss referendum, but also as a result of the broader debate over French national identity, which was aimed at creating political consensus within French society on the issues of national identity and the integration of Islam.

In the discourse analysis, I underline how the language of Sarkozy's speech emphasises universal and already established normative assumptions contained in the discourse of Republicanism and secularism. The increased concern within French public debate about Muslim immigration has reinforced a traditional French discourse on the nation-state that asserts two discursive strategies: firstly, the persuasiveness of Republicanism and secularism in shaping the national identity of France; secondly, the rejection of any public recognition of ethnic and cultural

identities as antithetical to the national identity. As a consequence, integration of the Muslim should respect 1) a personal commitment to French Republican principles, 2) an effective respect of secular values and 3) an active involvement in French society. These three points imply on one hand, the responsibility of Muslims to accept and adopt those secular customs and universal values defining the national identity. On the other hand, they preclude the possibility of accommodating any ethnic and cultural needs. Therefore, multiculturalism at the level of integration policy is always rejected, as the existence of structured ethnic communities would be a major threat to the universalistic aspirations of the Republic.

The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of convergence in the mediatisation of Sarkozy's editorial. Despite widespread criticism, the press across Europe agreed with him that the vote was the symptom of a deep distress towards the problem of immigration, which could degenerate into open xenophobia if European countries fail to integrate Muslims. The visibility obtained through the transnational press coverage represented for Sarkozy a great political opportunity to use the European public sphere to communicate his political agenda on immigration and national identity.

In chapter 5, the German public debate is analysed by taking as the nodal point, the speech delivered by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel on 16 October 2010. This speech generated significant controversy in Germany and across Europe, as evidenced by the high number of comments and editorials published as a result. In her speech, Merkel claims that multicultural policies of integration have been a complete failure and demands more effort from Muslim immigrants to accept the values that characterise German cultural identity, namely *Leitkultur*.

The discourse analysis underlines how Merkel's speech is characterised by a necessity to redefine national identity in a more cohesive way through the attempt to universalise the acceptable values, rules and norms of the German majority through the cultural and religious identity that characterises the national community. At the same time, this attempt to define the German *Leitkultur* can become an inflexible cultural-national discourse that determines which forms of diversity are compatible or appropriate within Germany. It can be in fact argued that the discourse of

Leitkultur defines a monocultural German society as opposed to other newcomer cultures. It is a real contradiction that a public discourse aimed at asking for more unity and cohesion to immigrants, especially Muslims, is supported then by such a restrictive assumption of the national culture. Merkel invokes integration as a liberal democratic principle but then, the national cultural domain, which remains based on an ethnic-religious identity, prescribes what inner values are acceptable in the immigrant.

The outcome of the content analysis shows an important degree of convergence in the mediatisation of Merkel's speech and a convergence in framing some of the underlining themes. This convergence represented for Merkel an unexpected communicative success, as its speech did not address a European public. Despite general agreement on the fact that isolationism and self-segregation are a serious social problem in many cities of Europe, large parts of the press disagree on blaming multiculturalism as a cause of these ethnic-ghettos. At the same time, the European press considers Merkel's assumption -that newcomers have to respect norms of the countries where they live- to be correct.

Chapter 6 takes as the nodal point Cameron's speech on the prevention of Islamic extremism, given at the *International Security Policy Conference* in Munich in February of 2011. By echoing Merkel's speech, Cameron argues that multicultural state policies have passively tolerated and encouraged British Muslims to live apart, thus pushing many young Muslims to embrace Islamism. Instead, the state should promote a feeling of belonging in a common society, through a national identity, and not be an accomplice of those non-violent Muslim groups that stay ambiguous on those liberal values that characterise British national identity.

The discourse analysis conveys the discursive articulation of Cameron's speech as an attempt to universalise a strict form of normativity that explicitly rejects any form of tolerance towards non-liberal values in order to avoid undue cultural conflict, religious fanaticism and thus maintaining a stable political environment that also guarantees the desired integration of Muslims. As a result, only the assimilation of liberal values is considered to be central to integration policies, while welfare and multicultural policies are not considered as central in the

politics of integration. Therefore, Cameron's discourse magnifies the recent shift in British public debate on integration. In fact, the British model of integration has turned away from a pluralist approach, which had stressed the role of integration, not as a process of assimilation, but as a policy of access to social rights, in favour of a more civic model of integration, which places the importance on shared values as a key element of integration.

The analysis of the press shows Cameron's speech was largely covered across Europe confirming once again a converging interest of the press for controversies on the integration of Muslims. However, press in France and Germany focused more on how Cameron echoed Merkel in stating multiculturalism as a failure. Instead, the British press paid more attention to the domestic prevention of Islamic extremism and the revision of the Prevent Strategy plan. Despite widespread criticism about the willingness to refuse multicultural policies and the attempt to securitise Muslim relationships, Cameron's speech did gain a large consensus across the European press on the need to promote political belonging and encourage social cohesion among Muslim immigrants, especially those of second generation descent.

Starting from this point of departure, the goal of this chapter is to compare the three case studies. The assumption is that this public debate across Europe has become engaged, not simply in parallel single debates, but also embroiled in a common discourse on civic integration. As a consequence, I use the European public sphere as an analytical category to investigate the degree of convergence of the national public spheres towards a common discourse.

This chapter is developed in five sections. In the first section, I offer a comparative analysis of national debates to verify the extent to which a discursive process of convergence is emerging and to understand how mutual intertextual chains develop between merely different national public spheres. In the second section, I compare the socio-political implications of this European debate and I question this emerging discourse, which centres its strategy of integration through the request to Muslims to adopt abstract values, regardless of their social and cultural needs. In the third section, I provide a final assessment of the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of this project as well as the significance

and value of the study. In the fourth part, I review some limitations of the study and possible avenues for future research. Finally, I close with final remarks on the full project.

1. The Transnational Convergence in the Press Coverage

The three case studies reveal how Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron's political statements have obtained large visibility across Europe through the coverage of the national press. However, it is not clear to what extent this simultaneous coverage impacts upon national debates, and eventually legitimates a common discourse on integration. Therefore my goal is to investigate how a process of transnational mediatisation can have a political legitimating function, which creates consensus towards a civic integration of Muslims.

In stating my Research Hypothesis (RH 1), I emphasise that this debate across Europe is supported by a common discursive space in which diverse national actors have enacted and reproduced a common discourse on integration. Consequently, in Chapter 2, I explain the conceptual relevance of the European public sphere as a forum that facilitates and encourages the dissemination of discourses (Trenz 2005: 176; Diez, 2005: 628), which is thought to lead subsequently to political consensus.

The public sphere is commonly defined as a communicative space in which common problems are debated through a rational-critical confrontation (Habermas 1989). This deliberative conception of the public sphere assumes an inclusive public debate motivated by the goal of obtaining democratic consensus through mutual understanding and agreement (Dahlberg, 2013: 24). Public debate is thus seen as central to the official decision-making processes, through rational-critical debate and opinion formation. However this approach to deliberative public sphere is highly normative and aims at defining universal norms, which should be applied for evaluating any distortions within the public sphere.

My standpoint is instead influenced by discourse theory and argues that it is crucial to question the deliberative concept of public sphere with respect to the process of discourse formation and interaction with the media. In other words, the convergent status of a discourse can obscure other discourses that do not conform to what it means to be legitimate. Following this assumption, it can be argued that convergence defines the limits of the communicative interaction in public sphere. The articulation of a convergent discourse is therefore political, because it defines what is included and excluded in the debate. Consequently, the European public sphere can be investigated as a transnational arena, in which the simultaneous mediatization of political statements establishes a specific hegemonic articulation, which excludes conflicting discourses from the public debate, reducing in this way the deliberative practice.

Through a cross-national comparison of the national media coverage, I have been able to explore 1) how convergence is enacted among the national spheres via intertextuality and 2) which thematic categories are consistent across nations via interdiscursivity. I have collected 166 articles, related to Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron's statements, from leading newspapers in France, Germany and the United Kingdom by searching *Nexis* and *Factiva* databases in the following 7 days after each political statement was delivered.

The coverage of the three nodal points (Table 7.1) proves a reciprocal interest across Europe for political statements concerning Muslim immigration. For each case study, it is possible to identify a homogenous distribution of the articles. Local coverage tends to be higher than foreign coverage in all three cases, but that seems quite reasonable, as national press tends to cover more a statement given by national leaders. The comparison of the ratio shows that non-local coverage tends to be consistent in all three cases within a margin of 0.3-0.6.

The comparison of the ratio is very useful in order to cope with the differences among national markets; for example in Germany many newspapers are regionally based and not very relevant for international news. Moreover, the *Nexis* database does not include two main national newspapers, and for this reason I had to also search the *Factiva* database. In the case of France, overall, there are fewer

newspapers than Germany but are mainly national. Finally, both databases list a larger number of British newspapers, first of all because this database targets an English audience and secondly, many of these newspapers are tabloids. These two reasons can explain why, during the coverage of Cameron's speech, the British press published notably more articles (a ratio of 6 compared to 1.5 of France and 1.7 of Germany).

Table 7.1 – Distribution of the articles analysed per country

Nodal Point	France	<i>r</i>	Germany	<i>r</i>	UK	<i>r</i>	Total
Sarkozy	19	4.7	10	1.2	12	1.5	41
Merkel	13	2.1	27	2.4	19	1.5	59
Cameron	11	1.5	7	1.7	*44	6.0	62
<i>Total</i>	44		44		75		162

The quantitative measure of the cross-national coverage confirms an increasing interconnection among the European public sphere, which enables mutual references and links between national public spheres. Certainly this generalisation has to be limited to these three specific cases, which are based on controversial political statements given by recognised political leaders. At the same time, when these two conditions are respected it is likely to expect a replication of the same process of convergence across the national press.

Findings indicate that coverage also entails a similar way of framing these political statements despite the national differences and problems concerning immigration (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2 – Thematic Dimensions

Thematic Category	France	Germany	UK	Avg.
1. Membership	27	36	43	35.33
2. Religious diversity	30	24	45	33.00
3. Cultural tradition	34	41	55	43.33
4. National identity	31	37	50	39.33
5. European perspective	29	27	48	34.67
6. Securitization	35	37	56	42.67
7. Social Justice	10	16	29	18.33

The most relevant category for this transnational analysis is the European perspective (TC 5). This category does not imply the lack of a national perspective; on the contrary, it reveals a dialectical tension between the national and the European level, in which the national debate reflects its position on integration in relation to Europe as a Western moral community. In particular, content analysis reveals that the most remarkable characteristics of this European perspective are: a) interest for immigration policies of other European countries; b) interest in public debate generated in other European countries; c) recognising leadership to non-national European political leaders.

Coverage analysis also shows that the press has a similar way to frame the problems concerning Muslim integration as a lack of common values (TC 3) and the difficulties for Muslims to adopt a national identity (TD 4). In more detail, the outbreak of these two categories presents the more recurrent themes used in press coverage:

1. Muslims have to recognise and belong to a European/Western civic identity;
2. Integration policies should prioritise those Muslims who agree to assimilate the national values of the majority;
3. Muslim immigrants present intrinsic cultural differences that may clash with liberal and secular values shared by Europeans.
4. Muslims should become more secular, reflective and anti-authoritarian.
5. Civic integration policies aim at asking for more unity and cohesion of immigrants.
6. National identity is an effective tool to support social cohesion.

The close association among the thematic categories concerning European perspective (TC 5), national identity (TC 4) and cultural values (TC 3), confirms how the process of identification in a European collective-self (Risse: 2010: 11; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:8) has become a discursive resource in the press coverage of the debate over Muslim immigration. In particular, the critical discourse analysis of the three nodal points confirms how politicians have reinforced the specific construction of a collective identity separated by the Muslim Other

through the *Us vs. Them* contraposition. The definition of a shared identity and belonging to a European community is primarily shaped by a discourse that promotes a system of communal loyalties based on the acceptance of and observance of a common sense of history and traditions within Europe.

This finding is confirmed also by the content analysis, which shows how simultaneous press coverage constantly recontextualises a discourse that all Europeans belong to a single political community (TC 5) which is respectful of the European national identities (TC 4) and asks a high commitment (TC 1) of Muslims to accept the values and culture that Europeans share (TC 3). At the same time, the empirical analysis conveys that there is a limited discussion of what are those shared cultural features among Europeans; they are generally taken for granted as abstract principles concerning liberalism and secularism and there is no reflection on the fact that those ‘common values’ are subjected to divergent interpretations, even within a homogenous national groups.

The unifying character in these debates is the appeal to national discourses, which rigidly define the political identity of the national community, such as French Republicanism, British Liberalism or German *Leitkultur*. These discourses are an integral part of the national rhetoric and are reproduced in any institutional processes. However, the particularity of these national discourses in the literature has been used to explain divergent models of integration (Favel 2003). What is possible to observe is perhaps the opposite process, namely politicians recur to those discourses to legitimate integration through the acceptance and adoption of shared values within Europe.

In the reconstruction of national public debates, I underline how both liberals and conservatives place the same importance on shared values as a key element of integration. For instance, in France, Sarkozy’s view of Republicanism does not differ from the one of socialists and consequently they are both afraid of any integration policies, which can grant any special rights to minorities, the unity of the nation is considered irreducible. In the UK, the national identity plays an important factor for both Tories and Labourites; in fact Cameron adopts Labour’s views on civic integration and echoes Blair’s rejection of multiculturalism. In Germany, the

Green-Red government with the support of the Christian Democrats approved value tests and a more 'selective' immigration law in order to preserve the specificity of the German culture. This convergence seems even more explicit in regards with securitisation.

Multiculturalism has been framed as a danger to the security and cohesion of the community in the three cases under investigation. The 'crisis of multiculturalism' comes at a time of increased sensitivity towards security as a result of the terrorist events of 9/11 and those of Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 (Mishra 2008), and therefore, international terrorism has led to an increasing securitisation of migration policies (Meinhof and Triandafyllidou 2006: 11, see also Cesari 2006; Jackson-Preece 2006). In this context, multicultural models of integration have been questioned under the pressure of the media, which have increasingly linked Islam with violence, separatism and anti-Western values (Halliday 2002; Flood et al 2010).

In the content analysis, I have included a thematic category of security (TC 6). Therefore I coded any article, which adopts or reports concern for the lack of integration as a serious threat to the social cohesion and prosperity of European countries. In Germany and France, the debate on the integration of Muslims has been related to the issue of public order and urban segregation. Newspapers widely report (even in absence of a transcript and a translation from German) Merkel attacked multiculturalism as the cause for the self-segregation of Muslim immigrants and the higher level of crime related to those segregated areas (Appendix 2: paragraph 8).

In the same way, newspapers report Sarkozy's concern for a frightened European population, which sees immigration as a problem of conflicting values and are more and more anxious about the "tribalism and sectarianism" of Muslims (Appendix 1: lines 33-35). And again, newspapers widely disseminate Cameron's view that the root of extremism has to be found in multicultural policies, which have caused urban segregation and have pushed disaffected youth to reject the interpretation of a moderate Islam and to adopt a more radical interpretation (Appendix 3: paragraph 8).

By mapping the coverage of these three statements, it is possible to confirm a stable degree of convergence towards the assumption that multicultural policies do not encourage adopting those values that belong to the European community (TC 6); conversely embracing common values is exemplified as the best practice to deal with a correct and safe integration (TC 3). This nexus between securitisation and multiculturalism targets newcomers who are assumed, because of their religious and cultural identity, to have authoritarian and illiberal values. Once again, this discursive articulation points to the European process of self-identification, thus preserving those values that characterise the collective-self is a matter of security for the political cohesion of European nations.

Two more observations have to be added on the general dynamic of the European public sphere. Firstly, the focus on the ability of European press to frame simultaneously political statements makes it very important to conceptualise convergence as related to the process of mediatisation of the European political debate. Press coverage creates a discursive space for arranging and contextualising discourses coming from other European countries into the national public debate through a consensual and relatively coherent discursive articulation. This process of articulation can be explicitly identified as transnational convergence through the media.

Second, comparing the coverage of political statements allows us to identify the extent of convergence and define the boundary of the debate. Transnational convergence via the media tends on the one hand, to increase the level of intertextuality through an exponential dissemination of statements while on the other hand, it reduces the level of interdiscursivity by focusing only on those arguments based on those universal assumptions that refer to national identity discourses. However, the empirical analysis reveals how civic integration has been contested in several editorials. That proves that the debate remains open to those arguments like social justice (TC 6) which are not included in the discursive articulation of civic integration. Therefore, intertextuality and interdiscursivity make the discourse of civic integration universal in that it seems to represent the whole public debate.

In conclusion, this cross-national comparison of public debates through content and discourse analysis emphasises the connections that the European public sphere establishes between national countries and how simultaneous debates impact on how national public spheres recontextualise transnational discourse on migration and integration. It can be claimed, therefore, that convergence, through mutual references, organises a shared way of thinking and talking about integration. The more the discourse on civic integration converges across national public spheres, the more it is perceived as stable and consensual in the public debate because the mutual discursive reference limits the force and effect of any oppositional discourse. Therefore, convergence through the media contributes to producing and sustaining a discursive articulation of civic integration.

2. The Limits in the Discourse of Civic Integration

The empirical analysis reveals how the political statements from Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron are predicated upon a commitment to a common concern with civic perspective and political values. Therefore, despite the fact that nodal points are based on the cultural and political specificity of the national political context, these national discourses share a common assumption on Europe as a moral community, which defines what values belong to that community and, perhaps more crucially, those that do not belong. As a consequence, this discursive articulation centres its strategy of integration through the request to newcomers to assimilate and in some cases, dissolve into European values. In this section, I consider the political implications of this discourse by pointing to why this model of integration can contribute to further marginalisation of Muslim immigrants, rather than representing a process of effective inclusion, which can lead to social equality and membership.

In Chapter 1, in the literature review, I emphasise that the main stake of civic integration focuses on how political conformity with European norms can become a limitation in the inclusion of new, culturally distinct immigrants and conversely, how immigrants must change or adapt to be admitted and live in the EU (Joppke, 2003; Mouritsen, 2006; Favell, 2005). Consequently, I raise the question whether this ‘civic turn’ follows just from the national interest or from a process of collective

European self-identification (Risse 2010; Kundani 2012), in which national political debates have a reciprocal impact on legitimising and reinforcing a similar discourse on immigration. For this reason, it has been crucial to compare and acknowledge the discursive sources of mutual influence and the motives that go with these national debates.

In developing the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, I observe how European collective self-identification has become a discursive resource for social and political cohesion (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:8) in several controversies in regards to immigration. In particular, I highlight how these controversies are exploited through the *Us vs. Them* contraposition (Delanty and Rumford 2005; Risse and Sikkink 1999) to reinforce the construction of the Other. The most controversial aspect of the process of Othering lies in its potential for discrimination by defining political criteria to define acceptable and unacceptable diversity in the immigrant, while the European *ethos* is considered a quasi-natural and transcendent identity that characterises the European history.

In conducting the critical discourse analysis, I confirm that each nodal point refers to specific values associated with a collective identity, and the analysis of the press coverage clarifies how these values have been recontextualised and promoted through three national public spheres. Furthermore, through the analysis of the textual practice, I observe how Muslims are represented as a single monolithic block, rather than as a collection of very diverse groups unified only in a single religious belief that they practice and often interpret in quite different ways. Conversely, I observe how Europe is always claimed as a collective *We* across national borders.

For instance, Sarkozy defines “Europeans [as being] welcoming and tolerant: it is in their nature and culture” (Appendix 1: lines 29-30); Merkel defines Germany as part of an European “culture”, “strongly influenced by the Christian-Jewish heritage” (Appendix 2: paragraph 29) and Cameron calls for a common mission of European countries “to wake up to what is happening in our own countries” (Appendix 3: paragraph 3) and to defend “Western values” (Appendix 3: paragraph 4). These discourses are thus constructed on the base of the ‘us-them’ dichotomy but

the implication of this dualism places ‘us’ in a higher position, of a more advanced civilisation, which implies that Muslim values are wrong or certainly less correct than ours.

This discursive articulation of the European *ethos* starts from the supposition that European political, social, and cultural features are always right and appropriate, and for these reasons, cultural and identity uniformity are desirable through the assimilation of liberal and civic values. This assumes that the Muslim-Other constitutes a problem for which *We* have to find a solution (Honer and Weber, 2010: 142; Wodak 2008:295). This rationality is used to defend the adaptation of Muslim immigrants to the European *ethos* through policies predicated upon a commitment to a common European concern with civic duty and political values.

Any attempts to provide a legal definition of what these values are and how they could be declined is a serious limit to the project of the Europe Union, which is based on the incorporation of a plurality of cultures in order to override the divisiveness and the exclusion caused by nationalism in the tragic history of Europe. Therefore, this post-national concept of Europe centred on a model of universal inclusion beyond the national, cultural and religious particularistic specificities (Mavelli 2012: 116). Paradoxically, this attempt to transcend differences through a common *ethos* and universal moral laws postulates Europe in a dimension of exceptionality, which transforms Muslim unyielding diversity as a source of political, social and cultural insecurity.

Hence the question is whether it is possible to integrate Muslims through the imposition of universal values, norms and cultural attributes shaped by the European *ethos*. I have identified three fallacies in the logic of this model of inclusion. First, the European *ethos* supposes that the majority shares all the features of the European self and consequently all values are adopted within the European population. Instead, there are always remarkable differences among citizens, especially when we consider established minorities are accommodated in the nation. This supposed homogeneity is extremely dangerous when applied to immigration because it reproduces a new category of Other, which needs to be scrutinised in order to check if it belongs to the European *ethos*.

Furthermore, liberal and civic values are defined in an abstract way. Anytime those values are referred to in public debate they are hardly ever explained or questioned. They are just supposed to have a self-evident and given meaning, which is particular and universal at the same time (Georgiou, 2005: 486); particular by being defined in a specific political national context, and universal by being assumed as an uncontested meaning shared across different social groups and countries in Europe (Mauritsen, 2008: 32). The call towards newcomers to adopt liberal and civic values thus reveals both the universal character of the European *ethos* and the particular political interest.

The evident point here is that the meaning and implication of these universal values – including gender equality, secularism, democracy, freedom of speech and tolerance – are presumed as being uncontested. Nonetheless, these values are certainly questioned at the national level between different ideological groups, for example, liberals and conservatives have different views on civil rights such as abortion or gay marriage. Also, at the European level there is not a shared consensus among countries on many of these supposed universal values. For example, secularism in France has a rigid connotation of separation between the state and the church; while in the UK, the Church of England is officially a state church. But even the most elementary of human rights such as the protection of linguistic minorities or religious freedom are not unequivocally interpreted in all European countries.

The universalization of liberal and civic values tends to idealise our culture and prevents us from understanding what we really are and what could be shared with the Other. This reluctance to understand the Other creates just different categories of immigrants: the “good” migrants are the same as *us* and deserve to be integrated, while the “bad” migrants are so different from *us* that they cannot be integrated (Horner and Weber 2011: 142). This strategy to reduce the complexity of the relationships with immigrants towards a process of integration of values risks creating further exclusion, as the universal character of the European *ethos* could bring more closure towards all minorities and newcomers who are perceived as not European.

Second, the most questionable aspect of the discourse of civic integration is not based on an absolute exercise of discrimination that would be incompatible with the legal constitutional framework of the nation and of the EU, but a form of control of the state, which requires immigrants to prove to have assimilated liberal values. This new form of ‘governmentality’ (Miller et al 1991) is based on the conviction that it is possible to assess whether immigrants are good citizens through standardised courses and tests. This liberal paradox implies hence that the state can guide individuals toward the acceptance and adoption of liberal values. However, such an approach appears highly controversial, as a liberal ethic is more articulated than linguistic competency and it would be illiberal to question the inner beliefs of the immigrants, unless it is assumed that freedom of speech and religion are secondary to the goal of integration.

At the same time, this approach to integration does not address the problem of immigrant descendants. In the last ten years, European countries have experienced limitations in integrating some religious, political, or cultural features developed by second generation Muslims, who are often national citizens. A large part of this group is inclined to emphasise its cultural diversity through public self-assertion; examples of this process are young Muslim women who ask to be allowed to wear the veil at school or the political extremism of some young Muslims. Therefore, the tendency to reduce this debate on integration to an ‘unquestionable’ adoption of core values is likely to remain a source of conflict with those Muslim nationals, who need to redefine their own identity with traditional practices.

Several empirical studies prove that despite some conflicts, Muslim immigrants of first and second generation descent have been embracing national identities and liberal values. The *2007 Gallup World Poll* (Nyri, 2007) in a specific survey on *Muslims in Europe* suggests that Muslim residents identify strongly with the country in which they live. Data reveals that in France, Germany and the UK, Muslims have the same degree of loyalty to the country in which they live as the national population. Thus the survey suggests that while religion remains an important part of Muslim identity, it does not imply any weaker sense of political belonging.

This result is also confirmed by a study on eleven cities in seven European countries conducted by the *Open Society Institute*. The *Muslims in Europe* report (OSI, 2010) indicates that Muslims and non-Muslims recognise “similar values as important to the country” in which they live; moreover, “these values correspond to those that are identified as core European values, such as respect for the law, freedom of expression and equality of opportunity” (OSI 2010: 69). The specific report on *Muslims in London* also reveals that Muslims have a higher rate of trust in political institutions compared with non-Muslim respondents. Approximately 49 per cent of Muslims had trust in the national Parliament, compared with just over 35 per cent of non-Muslims (OSI, 2012: 22).

Therefore, findings prove that Muslims in Europe have a “political sense of belonging” and “attachment to the city and country where they live” (OSI, 2010: 23). At the same time, Muslim “religious identity” does not reveal any noteworthy effect on respondents’ acceptance of liberal values (OSI 2010: 76). Further evidence that Muslims’ level of religiosity does not influence their level of political trust comes from the European Social Survey, the German Social Survey (ALLBUS), the Home Office Citizenship Survey (HOCS) and Statistics Netherlands. Data analysis suggests a positive orientation to political institutions among Muslims, in contrast to non-Muslims (Jackson and Doerschler 2012a, 2012b). These findings openly contrast with the discourse, reproduced in Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron’s political statements, that Muslim immigrants share illiberal values. Therefore, the discourse of civic integration seems rooted in assumptions and stereotypes, which should be reconsidered carefully in the light of the cultural adaption that Muslims immigrants are doing to integrate themselves in their host societies.

What is necessary is a dialogue between the majority and the newcomers about diversity, which should not posit our values as antithetic to Muslims or any minority culture. Those efforts to promote national values among immigrants can be effective if based on a process of participation and education, and not an imposition of a supposed superior culture. For this reason, it is possible to be critical towards those illiberal and authoritarian values of a minority, but only after having questioned the goals of civic integration through a serious self-criticism of any

underlining assumptions regarding the rhetoric of common values (Mouritsen 2008: 34).

There is a third and last critical consideration that emerges from this critical analysis: the discourse of civic integration tends to underestimate social and economic disparities faced by Muslims in their process of integration. Specifically, there is not attempt to offer any economic and social explanation of the process of urban segregation. According to Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron, Muslims of first and second generation have been encouraged by multicultural policies to segregate themselves and to live separate lives apart from mainstream society.

In the analysis of the French nodal point, I underline that Sarkozy calls for a fight against discrimination toward Muslims [line: 48], but without mentioning the economic and social problems immigrants have for including them in that same process of civil integration. By hiding structural inequalities, Sarkozy ignores the reality of those disparities that lie at the root of some of the current social distress experienced by French Muslims in suburban areas (Mayan, 2007). In this way, the French discourse on civic integration aims at taking into account Muslim immigrants' responsibilities toward France and its political community rather than their real social needs.

By analysing the German nodal point, I note that Merkel refers to the lack of integration of some Muslim immigrants [paragraph 32-33] but she never takes into account, the effectiveness of welfare programs to avoid marginalisation of immigrants or urban segregation. Merkel explicitly states that immigrants must integrate into the national society without counting on welfare policies [#31-32]. Thus Muslim immigrants are held individually accountable to guarantee the desired economic progress Germany wants. Accordingly, the German discourse of civic integration promotes the individual responsibility of immigrants towards the economic and social progress in Germany without any further costs to the social welfare.

In the study of the British nodal point, Cameron promotes a muscular liberal model of integration [#11] to prevent radicalism and terrorism among Muslims.

Cultural and political integration of Muslims is thus reduced to the development of a security agenda based on the control of Islamism and the certitude that Muslim groups effectively assimilate liberal values. Conversely, the British discourse on civic integration excludes any social integration based on the intervention of the state based on the elimination of social and economic inequality [#7].

These three statements repurpose the “parallel lives” thesis (Philips 2006: 27), which accuses Muslim communities of carrying out practices of self-segregation and social isolationisms under the banner of multiculturalism. However, there is no evidence that uniform societies offer “better social conditions than countries with a long tradition of diversity” (Vieyetz 2008: 87). It can be claimed in fact that countries that have better stability and social cohesion are those like Canada or Sweden, because they based their policies on promoting and protecting cultural diversity through multicultural policies. On the contrary, those countries like France that have managed diversity through an exclusion from public space, have shown a very high level lack of cohesion. A model of integration concerned with obtaining conformity can only create further marginalization, as it does not leave any room to accommodate specific cultural aspects (Kymlicka 2010: 99).

Furthermore, several empirical works show Muslims in Europe are more likely than the local population to be poorer and live in segregated neighbourhoods with high levels of crime (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007). In addition, Muslims experience significantly greater rates of unemployment and poverty than the general population; while “those who are employed are often in marginal and low-paid jobs” or at a higher chance of unemployment (OSI, 2010: 24). Therefore, in France, Germany and the UK, Muslim immigrants remain part of an alienated underclass, which struggles to be integrated into the economic system.

Perhaps the fact that these countries are still characterised by “deep social and economic divisions along ethnic lines” (Jurado 2008: 70) could question whether social isolationism and self-segregation can be also explained by social and economic inequalities. As a result, politicians should consider in a more realistic way, the economic and social discrimination that immigrants face during the process of integration. In particular, governments should promote policies aimed at

removing all the fundamental barriers to “the participation of immigrants in all aspects of economic, social, cultural and political life, including unequal opportunities and discrimination” (Jurado 2008: 81).

To summarize, the evidence from the empirical analysis suggests the discourse of civic integration is based on a strong conviction that it is possible to avoid cultural conflict and maintain social cohesion through the strengthening of a collective identity, which requires the adherence to liberal values and respect of civic duties. However, such an approach appears highly idealistic, as it seems unrealistic that a course or a test could be really effective in promoting integration. Moreover, this civic approach tends to overstate the degree to which liberal values are universal in Europe as values are by definition subject to divergent political interpretations.

Second, several social surveys are explaining that Muslim immigrants have the same degree of loyalty to liberal values as the national population, while Muslim religious identity does not have any substantial influence on the acceptance of liberal values. Therefore, the limit of civic integration is not only to deploy a shared set of cultural features to define the borders of the European identity, but to apply discriminatory criteria to justify the assimilation of liberal and civic values. Here the risk is to introduce, in the management of the relation with immigrants, a dangerous ethnocentric view (Balibar 2004: 75), which can see Muslim diversity as a deficiency that has to be corrected or expelled.

Third, the discourse on civic integration tends to disregard social justice and promote a rationality based on the individual responsibility of the Muslim newcomers to integrate themselves without any particular welfare support from the state. However, Muslim immigrants of first and second generation descent have significantly greater rates of unemployment and poverty than the general population. Paradoxically, public debate remains stuck in the belief that diversity brings social isolationism and segregation rather than the socioeconomic realities.

Finally, my personal concern touches upon the illiberal character that this discourse on civic integration brings to the debate about immigration. Although it

can be considered justified the goal to insist on the relevance of a core set of values and principles, this debate hides a deeper problem concerning the limits of the State power to norm the sphere of individual values and to sanction any deviation from a normative identity. Can the state impose on an individual, a requirement to adopt a collective identity? Can an individual be a citizen without having to conform to the majority's idea of what are 'good' values? And finally can any policy enforce integration into the majority? Those questions seem very important not only for what is regarded as Muslim immigration, but in the general debate of the respect of minority and individual freedoms.

3. The Theoretical and Methodological Contributions of this Comparative Research

The main goal of this thesis is to analyse the European debate about civic integration during the so called multiculturalism crisis. Civic integration was conceived in EU immigration law as a balanced strategy "whereby immigrants were asked to abide by core liberal values and were ensured, in return, the gradual granting of a set of rights, including social, civic and political rights, comparable to those of EU citizens" (Mulcahy, 2008: 118). At the same time, the literature has offered a large amount of evidence that a core group of European countries have approved policies centred on a distorted version of civic integration akin to acculturation or even assimilation (Joppke, 2007; Muller 2007; Kundan, 2012). As a consequence, it has been crucial to investigate these national debates in order to understand how and why they are converging at the same time towards a common discourse on civic integration.

The second goal of this thesis is to provide a considered response to a recent debate between scholars in Media studies and European studies, which observes the Europeanisation of the public sphere (Eriksen 2005; Trenz, 2005, Triandafyllidou et al 2010) as part of a general process of transnational communication (Fraser, 2007; Conway & Singh, 2009). Investigating this emerging transnational public sphere and the interaction within national public spheres is essential for investigating the boundaries of any debate across Europe. The more a discourse converges across

national public spheres, the more it is perceived as stable and consensual because the mutual discursive reference among public spheres limits the force and effect of any oppositional discourse. As a consequence, a process of convergence is not without consequences as it can contribute to a distortion of the debate.

The findings from this study offer two major contributions to the literature quoted above. First, my thesis provides evidence that the national public sphere remains central to the legitimisation of many aspects of immigrant integration in terms of national priorities and sensibilities. This is despite the fact that the increased number of transnational networks of communication associated with globalisation (Fraser 2007) and the process of European integration (Eriksen 2005) have questioned the national dimension of the public sphere and led to a reconsideration of the concept beyond the national territorial state (Risse 2010). Consequently, transnational convergence does not limit the agency of the national public sphere; at the same time, convergence through the media can reduce the deliberative function of the public sphere by reinforcing previous political decisions and controlling the level of contestation.

This apparent contradiction is verified through the observation of the simultaneous coverage of Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron's political statements on immigration and multiculturalism. The mediatisation of these political statements across Europe has enabled horizontal links and exchanges across national public spheres. Thus this process of simultaneous mediatisation has created a national discursive space for debating integration through a European perspective. Conversely, this reciprocal interest to transnational political discourses seems to narrow the capacity of the public sphere to question some arguments, also when they are based on wrong assumptions.

Hence, the articulation of a transnational discourse in the European public sphere is crucial as such articulation involves the process to establish a normative discourse, which aims at organising the complexity of social relationships between immigrant minorities and the majority. Consequently, it is central to investigate mediatised convergence and its associated discourses in relation mainly to the role of the European public sphere and then to deliberative practice. A hegemonic system

of discourse limits the process of the deliberative debate, and thus defines the limits of the communicative interaction in the public sphere.

The second contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate how this simultaneous debate on Muslim immigration reinforces the construction of new boundaries between the in-group and the out-group through the definition of the new Other (Delanty and Rumford 2005). Specifically, civic integration reinforces a discourse on the Other, based on the *Self vs. Them* construction, which assumes that the Muslim constitutes a problem that *We* have to find a solution for (Honer and Weber, 2010: 142; Wodak 2008:295) through a “one way process” of integration in which Muslims are “expected to integrate into the existing society without any reciprocal accommodation” (Lacroix, 2010: 8). The analysis thus presents evidence that discourse on integration tends to legitimise a collective identity among Europeans that reflects common traditions and culture.

The public debate across Europe thus seems to be moving towards a similar process of collective self-identification, which implies the universal acceptance of normative assumptions regarding the political and cultural nature of European identity (Risse, 2010). Furthermore, it can be claimed that the same discourse assumes that integration can be granted just through the ability of the immigrant to internalise the liberal values that characterise the European *ethos*. Thus, and similar to traditional discourses on nationalism, the European identity becomes a discursive resource for social and political cohesion (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:8) based on the relationship between the identification with a distinct political national entity and with a European moral community.

In regards of methodology, the empirical analysis evaluates the conditions and practices involved in the enactment and reproduction of the discourse of civic integration of Muslims in the national public spheres. Therefore, the analytical task is not focused only on the semiotic analysis of the negative view on the presence of Muslims and Islam, but also on the analysis of a normative attempt to integrate them into a discourse on European identity based on universal values, standards and cultural attributes of the majority.

By looking at interdiscursivity and intertextuality, the analysis also reveals how national nodal points are mutually related to similar national discourses and how press coverage is central in creating a European perspective to legitimate a civic approach to integration. For this reason, the strategic use of a comparative framework, based on a Critical Discourse Analysis in combination with a Content Analysis illustrates in detail a) the degree of transnational convergence between national discourses on civic integration and b) the intersections between discourses on national identity and Europe as a collective representation of a shared community represent the cultural space that the Muslim Other must fit into.

The comparative framework is central to underline how transnational debate can affect the national public spheres through mutual observation between international political actors and national spheres. Specifically, the analysis of the transnational convergence allows an investigation of the boundaries of this emerging interaction within national public spheres, as such debates involve what is included and excluded in this debate. This approach has thus given many explanations of why the discourse of civic integration centres its strategy of integration through the request to newcomers to assimilate abstract values for legal entry and residence in the EU.

In order to cope with the widespread criticism about the reliability and validity of any hermeneutic methodology in the social sciences, the thesis has provided a rigorous systematisation of how data have been collected and analysed. Concerning the validity, this research design combined Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with Content Analysis (CA) in order to have a second method to gather data and validate findings. Specifically, CDA has been useful to understand how discourse on civic integration works toward particular political interests, while CA has been helpful to identify relevant ‘themes’ in the press coverage and to compare similar discursive strategies across Europe. Hence, this triangulation technique has facilitated an interdisciplinary approach to the study of political debate and a validation of data through cross verification from different sources.

To summarise, my thesis contributes towards bringing theoretical contribution and empirical evidence to the study of transnational processes of

communication. It explains transnational convergence by investigating: 1) the ability of some governmental leaders to shape and lead the European public debate on integration of Muslims and 2) how the simultaneous coverage of press can reinforce a transnational discourse in the national public sphere. Transnational convergence thereby invites us to analyse connections that a transnational discursive space, such as the European public sphere, can establish between national countries and how and why national public spheres recontextualise at the same time, a common discourse on civic integration.

4. Limitations of the Study and Future Research Directions

A number of caveats need to be noted regarding the present study. First, in my empirical analysis I reconstruct convergence through the reciprocal influence between national public debates. The research design posits that domestic political factors are the real explanations for convergence and does not consider supranational actors, such as the EU, among the many determinants of national debate. However, in the literature review (Chapter 2), I report that several authors have underscored how the discourse of civic integration is part of the language adopted by the EU institution in regards of immigration (Carrera & Weilsbrock, 2009, Mulcahy, 2008). For this reason, further analysis might usefully evaluate what influence on the public debate over integration comes from European and national institutions. In more detail, it could be interesting to study when and how ‘civic’ amendments in national legislations have been justified in light of the EC Directives on immigration.

Second, the horizontal approach also excludes a bottom-up process of communication. In the case of the Swiss ban on minarets, Muslims have appealed to European institutions to stop the implementation of that vote (Christmann and Dannaci 2012). The same process happened after the French ban on the full veil, when Muslim groups appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (Rosen 2004: 147). Thus, it might be worth addressing a further question in future research to explore how transnational convergence can be realised through Muslim political practices to pursue their rights and freedoms (Anagnostou and Psychogiopoulou

2009) with the support of European institutions. As a consequence, a further study could assess those bottom-up processes of communication in which Muslims engage political activity against any attempt to exclude their diversity or claim their political subjectivity to obtain the recognition of their diversity.

Third, the analysis of the debate does not consider the role of public opinion and to what extent the public perceives multiculturalism. The debate on civic integration overlaps with the increasing influence of xenophobic parties and more than a decade of Islamophobic campaigns. Notably, it is possible to hypothesise that political actors are highly sensitive to public concerns about immigration, and for this reason, governments could keen to implement civic integration policies in order to 'neutralise' voters' fear towards ethnic and cultural diversity. Future research could investigate the public's concern through a multi-dimensional methodological approach, which would give additional analytical leverage to the present thesis. For example, I could consider a) an analysis of national public opinion surveys, b) in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens and c) an analysis of the debate through the social media.

Fourth, the debate on integration can also be further analysed through examining alternative causes such as the ideological orientation of governments. Conservative political leaders gave all the three nodal points taken in analysis. Therefore, further research could be done through in-depth interviews to public decision makers in order to explore to what extent the role of political membership is relevant in developing a particular viewpoint and what differences exist with the opposition.

Finally, I plan to extend my PhD work beyond this specific debate on Muslims to a more specific debate on the admission and integration of immigrants. Rather than looking just at Muslim integration, I would like to analyse those attempts to present multicultural integration as both divisive and undermining of political and social cohesion. Accordingly, it could be interesting to work on a larger empirical set of data that is aimed at understanding what forms of diversity are still perceived as a destabilising issue for community cohesion in Europe, rather than as a general contribution to pluralism.

Concluding Remarks

This thesis focuses on how the European public sphere has recently hosted a focused debate on the integration of Muslims, one that reflects a mainly European concern toward imparting national culture and values to newcomers. My goal has been to assess the mediatization across Europe of this political debate by investigating shared strategies of discourse through which civic integration is articulated and legitimated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of each national context. Hence the study of this discourse in the European public sphere is crucial not only for scholars of media and communication, as this discourse involves a large debate on how to manage the complexity of social relationships between immigrant minorities and majority in Europe.

When looking at the justification used by Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy, it appears clear that their main goal is to obtain a better management of migration. However, the evidence from this study also suggests a strong conviction that integration can be realised through the promotion of those liberal values necessary to avoid cultural conflict and maintain social cohesion. Such a discourse appears problematic because civic integration is often reinforced with a normative paradigm that tends to overstate the degree to which liberal values are universal in Europe and seeks to secure the identity of the national majority, regardless of the social and cultural needs of newcomers. As a consequence, civic integration policies could be applied as a mechanism for diversity control, through political criteria aimed at choosing what categories of immigrants can be admitted and can reside in the state.

There are a number of important considerations that need to be made here regarding the mediatization of the political debate on Muslims and in general of immigrants. The analysis of the French, German and British debates demonstrate how the presence of Muslims have been framed as a security concern by blaming multicultural policies as both a leading cause of Muslim self-segregation as well as an obstacle to the lack of integration. The present debate thus reinforces stereotypes on Muslims and ignores the process of cultural adaptation and mixing that Muslims

are already experiencing in Europe. Sociological surveys show that Muslims have started becoming an integral part of European societies and embracing national identities and liberal values at the same degree as locals. Therefore, the assumption that integration is primarily or solely about cultural and values assimilation depends on a total misunderstanding of any advancements that Muslim immigrants are doing to be an integral part of Europe.

Certainly, immigrants have a duty to learn the national language and to know, respect and observe the Constitution and legislation of the host country. However, it appears highly controversial to attempt to define what those liberal or ‘national’ values are and how these policies may exclude or target those who do not believe in such values. As Withe noted, how we define the European *demos* is an ideological matter (2008: 115), and is bound up in a broader question of how the Other comes to be represented.

In the reality of an increasingly multicultural and diverse Europe – where immigration plays a much larger role than in the near past – such an insistence on universal rights, identity and culture risks being socially and culturally divisive rather than unifying, as it can potentially reinforce perceptions of minorities as an eternal Other (Kymlicka, 2010:99). As a consequence, the attempt to create a civic identity based on the reproduction of “non-negotiable and non-questionable” European values raises uncertainties about the real transformative potential of the European project, specifically considering the realisation of a cosmopolitan Europe capable of embracing diversity (Mavelli, 2012: 107).

It is difficult to predict whether civic integration policies will produce the desired result of a more cohesive society, or whether they will only marginalise immigrants, especially Muslims. However, it appears plausible to argue that cohesion occurs when integration takes a two-way process of adaptation, in which values, norms and cultures are more a terrain of reciprocal confrontation and dialogue rather than an inflexible form of identity developed by a reaction to an increasing presence of Muslims. But this is possible only if integration recognises that the specificity of Europe is based on tolerance and respect for diversity and not on a universal culture to impose to minorities. Therefore, Europeans should

approach Muslims with respect and a willingness to listen and learn. Central to this is the construction of an inclusive European public sphere, in which Muslims can make proposals and raise objections, and to bargain and have representation beyond and independently of their belonging to any culture, religion or nation.

Appendix 1: Nicolas Sarkozy, "Respecter ceux qui arrivent, respecter ceux qui accueillent"

France and Swiss minaret vote

Wednesday 9 December 2010

The present editorial is an edited and translated extract from an article that appeared in *Le Monde*, 9th December 2009.

“Material removed for copyright reasons”

English Source:

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/dec/09/france-swiss-minaret-vote-muslims> (Accessed on 15th December 2009)

Original French Source:

http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2009/12/08/m-sarkozy-respecter-ceux-qui-arrivent-respecter-ceux-qui-accueillent_1277422_3232.html (Accessed on 15th December 2009)

Appendix 2: Merkel's speech at the "Junge Union" Conference⁸

Potsdam, 16 October, 2010

Dear Philipp Missfelder, dear friends of the Junge Union.

Lieber Philipp Mißfelder, liebe Freunde der jungen Union,

[1] This year I am here. Last year there wasn't a website which was blocked by the Konrad-Adenauer-House, either. I reread everything that was being circulated, and I think it's good that today, here in Potsdam, in Babelsberg, we can talk about what the responsibilities of our times are, how we can engage in policy-making for the people. And I believe it's worth looking back again at the last 20 years. Back then the German parliamentary session could not have been held in Babelsberg—or perhaps it could have. And a few days ago, when we were very near here, in Berlin with Helmut Kohl for 14 days, we thought about the unity party convention of the Christian Democratic Union, about this incredible time in which suddenly something had started to move that the vast majority in Germany had already given up hope in. Namely, that the Cold War had ended, that the Wall had fallen, that Germans were united again and that the Christian Democratic Union could, as well as the CSU, say: It was worth it to stick to our ideals, it was worth it to stand for German unity. Even though it was a goal that didn't look realistic for many years, it was right to stick to this goal, because, dear friends, values must be protected even if they aren't attainable at the time.

[1] Dieses Jahr bin ich hier. Es wurde letztes Jahr auch keine Internetseite vom Konrad Adenauer Haus aus gesperrt. Ich habe es nochmal nachgelesen, was da alles so im Umlauf war, und ich glaube, dass es gut ist, dass wir heute hier in Potsdam in Babelsberg miteinander darüber sprechen können, was die Aufgaben unserer Tage sind. Wie wir Politik für die Menschen machen können und es lohnt sich glaube ich nochmal 20 Jahre zurück zu blicken. Da wäre ein Deutschlandtag nicht in Babelsberg abhaltbar gewesen oder doch gerade schon. Und wir haben vor wenigen Tagen, 14 Tagen mit Helmut Kohl, ganz nah hier in Berlin noch mal an den Vereinigungsparteitag der Christlich Demokratischen Union gedacht. An diese unglaubliche Zeit, in der plötzlich etwas in Bewegung kam, was die allermeisten in Deutschland ja schon gar nicht mehr geglaubt hatten. Nämlich: dass der kalte Krieg zu Ende war, dass die Mauer gefallen ist, dass die Deutschen wieder vereint waren und dass die Christlich Demokratische Union sagen konnte, genauso wie die CSU, es hat gelohnt, an Idealen festzuhalten, es hat sich gelohnt für die Deutsche Einheit einzustehen. Auch wenn es ein Ziel war, was viele viele Jahre als nicht realistisch aussah, so war es richtig an diesem Ziel festzuhalten, weil man Werte verteidigen muss, auch wenn sie noch nicht erreichbar sind liebe Freunde.

[2] And for those of you who were still relatively young at the time, or even

[2] Und für Sie, die Sie damals noch relativ jung oder ganz klein waren, ist das ja

⁸ The present Transcript and Translation have been obtained through the video available on Youtube <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaEg8aM4fcc> (accessed on 1st November 2010) for reproduction please contact Marco Scalvini scalvimi@gmail.com.

younger, these are probably just stories about history. But history, that's the foundation on which we build and from which we take the responsibilities of our time. That is why German unity is a success story and that is why we can be proud that we had German unity with Helmut Kohl as Chancellor. And that's why it was good that back then a Christian-Liberal Coalition was ruling. There's no doubt that if Lafontaine had said that back then, who knows, dear friends, if I'd be standing here today?

[3] And now, since last year, we have again the possibility to engage in policy-making in a Christian-Liberal Coalition. Philip Mißfelder has indicated what he expects. I think these expectations of our party's youth organisations are absolutely legitimate. We are living in a time when many things have to be decided. Two years ago a fundamental financial and economic crisis began. A crisis that taught us a lesson, a lesson that is also of great importance for us as Christian Democrats: namely, this crisis has taught us that freedom is essential, which we also saw in 1989/90. Freedom is the prerequisite for democracy, but freedom is not arbitrary. Freedom as we understand it is not a freedom of something but a freedom to something. A freedom to take responsibility.

[4] What we accomplished with the end of the Cold War, defeating the dictatorship, socialism, communism, could turn out to be just as reprehensible if we have freedoms that know no more responsibilities. And in the financial markets that kind of freedom has been prevailing. That is why the financial markets must be regulated. The financial markets and also the stakeholders there, the products there—for such things we also have a responsibility. Market excesses should never happen. That is the lesson of the international financial crisis.

inzwischen Erzählung aus der Geschichte. Aber Geschichte, das ist ja das Fundament, auf dem wir aufbauen und aus dem heraus wir die Aufgaben unserer Zeit beziehen. Und deshalb ist die Deutsche Einheit eine Erfolgsgeschichte und deshalb können wir stolz darauf sein, dass wir mit Helmut Kohl den Kanzler der Deutschen Einheit hatten. Und deshalb war es gut, dass damals eine Christlich-Liberale Koalition regiert hat. Nicht auszudenken, wenn Lafontaine damals das sagen hätte, wer weiß, ob ich dann hier stehen könnte, liebe Freunde.

[3] Und wir haben jetzt, seit dem vergangenen Jahr, wieder die Chance, in einer Christlich-Liberalen Koalition Politik zu machen. Und Philip Mißfelder hat darauf hingewiesen, was er sich erwartet. Ich finde, diese Erwartung der Jugendorganisation unserer Partei ist absolut legitim. Wir leben in einer Zeit, in der sich vieles entscheiden muss. Vor zwei Jahren hat eine elementare Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise begonnen. Eine Krise, die uns etwas gezeigt hat. Gezeigt hat, was auch für uns als Christdemokraten ganz wichtig ist: diese Krise hat nämlich gezeigt, Freiheit ist wichtig, das haben wir nämlich 1989/90 gesehen. Freiheit ist die Voraussetzung für Demokratie, aber Freiheit ist nicht beliebig. Die Freiheit, wie wir sie verstehen, ist eine Freiheit nicht von etwas, sondern das ist eine Freiheit zu etwas. Eine Freiheit, Verantwortung zu übernehmen.

[4] Das, was wir geschafft haben mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges, die Diktatur, den Sozialismus, den Kommunismus zu besiegen, das hat sich dann genauso als verwerflich gezeigt, wenn wir Freiheiten haben, die keinerlei Verantwortung mehr kennen. Und in den Finanzmärkten hat ein solcher Freiheitsbegriff geherrscht. Deshalb heisst es auch: auch Finanzmärkte müssen reguliert werden. Auch Finanzmärkte und die Akteure dort, die Produkte dort, auch dafür gibt es eine Verantwortung. Exzesse der Märkte dürfen nicht passieren. Das ist

All this is a confirmation of what has made Germany so strong over the last 60 years, namely the social market economy of a responsible, free, economic order.

[5] The global economic crisis that resulted from the financial crisis has been profound. That's the situation that we, in the year 2010, have before us. You who are sitting here today will, in the next 20 years want to build our country in whichever sector you choose. And so the questions arise: What are our tasks? What do they mean? First, what I say to you is this: We have to think about what the situation will be in the world after this crisis. As I have always said: We in Germany want to come out of this crisis stronger than we were when we entered it. Secondly: during such a crisis the deck of cards will be reshuffled. That's exactly what we are experiencing now. We have strong Asian markets. China, for instance, has become a lively, challenging competitor. And we can't simply say: We don't like that. We have to stand up to the competition if we want to preserve our prosperity.

[6] The second challenge that lies before us concerns the change in our society's age demographic. Happily people are getting older and we have more medical options, but there are fewer young people in our country. In 1990 the average age was 35, today it is 42 and in 2030 it will be 58. This is the reality. Regarding this, nothing more will change. Now is the question: What political power has the opportunity and the courage and can make the decisions that will lead us to the right answer to this challenge? I think we all agree: We don't want to have lived only in the past in prosperity, security and freedom; we want this just as much for future generations. That is the task we have

die Lehre aus der internationalen Finanzkrise.

Das alles ist eine Bestätigung dessen, was Deutschland seit 60 Jahren stark macht nämlich der sozialen Marktwirtschaft, einer verantworteten, freiheitlichen Wirtschaftsordnung.

[5] Die Weltwirtschaftskrise, die sich aus der Finanzkrise ergeben hat, diese Krise hat tiefe Spuren hinterlassen. Das ist die Situation, die wir im Jahre 2010 heute vor uns haben. Die, die Sie hier sitzen, werden in den nächsten 20 Jahren unser Land gestalten wollen, an welcher Stelle auch immer. Und deshalb ist die Frage: Was sind unsere Aufgaben? Was bedeutet das?

Da sage ich als erstes: Wir müssen uns überlegen, was nach dieser Krise die Situation auf dieser Welt ist. Ich hab immer gesagt: Wir in Deutschland wollen stärker aus dieser Krise herauskommen als wir hinein gegangen sind. Jetzt wird als zweites gesagt: Während einer solchen Krise werden die Karten neu gemischt. Genau das erleben wir jetzt. Wir haben starke asiatische Märkte. China ist ein lebendiger, anstrengender Wettbewerber geworden. Und da können wir nicht sagen: Das passt uns nicht, sondern diesem Wettbewerb müssen wir uns stellen, wenn wir unseren Wohlstand erhalten wollen.

[6] Zweite Herausforderung, vor der wir und Sie alle stehen, das ist die Veränderung des Altersaufbaus unserer Gesellschaft. Die Menschen werden erfreulicher Weise älter, die medizinischen Möglichkeiten werden mehr, aber es gibt weniger junge Menschen bei uns im Land. Wir hatten 1990 noch ein Durchschnittsalter von etwa 35 Jahren, wir haben heute ein Durchschnittsalter von 42 Jahren und wir werden 2030 ein Durchschnittsalter von 58 Jahren haben. Das sind die Realitäten. An diesen wird sich nichts mehr ändern. Jetzt ist die Frage: welche politische Kraft hat die Chance und den Mut und die Entscheidungen, dass wir auf diese Herausforderung eine richtige

to accomplish. That is why our Christian-Liberal Coalition has as its mission setting the right course for Germany for the next 10 to 20 years. As part of this we'll need to anticipate some very unpleasant findings.

Antwort finden? Ich glaube, wir sind uns einig: Wir wollen nicht nur, dass wir in der Vergangenheit im Wohlstand gelebt haben und in Sicherheit und Frieden, wir wollen, das für die künftigen Generationen genau so. Das ist unsere Aufgabe, die wir erfüllen. Deshalb hat unsere christlich-liberale Koalition die Aufgabe, die Weichen für Deutschland für die nächsten 10 und 20 Jahre richtig zu stellen. Da muss man mit sehr unangenehmen Befunden rechnen.

[7] Since the last big coalition—not the one from 2005-2009 but from the late 60's—federal politics has been accustomed to spending more than it has brought in. This has led to a huge mountain of debt, which we all have to deal with now. And if we do not want your generation and your children to have no opportunity whatsoever to shape their future, we must drastically change course. That's why it was right that the CDU/CSU was the driving force in incorporating the debt ceiling into the Constitution and in saying: We must stop living on credit. We cannot continuously draw cheques on the future. We have to make do with what we have.

[7] Seit der letzten großen Koalition, also nicht der von 2005-2009 – sondern Ende der 60er Jahre - hat sich die Bundespolitik angewöhnt, immer mehr auszugeben als man eingenommen hat. Das hat zu einem riesigen Schuldenberg geführt, mit dem wir jetzt alle umgehen müssen. Und wenn wir nicht wollen, dass Ihre Generation und Ihre Kinder überhaupt keine Chance zur Gestaltung mehr haben, da müssen wir massiv umsteuern. Und deshalb war es richtig, dass die Union die treibende Kraft war, ins Grundgesetz eine Schuldenbremse aufzunehmen und zu sagen: Wir müssen Schluss machen mit dem Auf-Pump-Leben. Wir können nicht dauernd Schecks auf die Zukunft ziehen, sondern wir müssen endlich mit dem auskommen, was wir einnehmen.

[8] When the left so often debates what justice is in our time, then I say: The biggest injustice is simply living day to day and not caring about the future. We are partners in justice when we reduce our debts and finally start making realistic financial policies. That has a different meaning with our coexistence in Europe. Europe is our present and our future, which has in the context of Europe once again a totally different meaning. We have experienced it before, what happens in such a crisis, when countries haven't got solid finances and nobody believes anymore that someday they'll pay back their debts. That was the case with Greece, and later also the rescue of the whole euro. And look—you can speculate as much as you like whether we acted too soon or too late. I

[8] Wenn so oft von der linken Seite darüber diskutiert wird, was denn Gerechtigkeit in unserer Zeit ist, dann sage ich: das Ungerechteste ist, einfach in den Tag hinein zu leben und sich nicht um die Zukunft zu kümmern. Wir sind Gerechtigkeitspartner, wenn wir Schulden abbauen und endlich realistische Finanzpolitik machen. Das ganze hat in unserem Zusammenleben in Europa, Europa ist unsere Gegenwart und unsere Zukunft, das hat im Kontext mit Europa noch einmal eine ganz andere Bedeutung. Wir haben es früher erlebt, was passiert in einer solchen Krise, wenn einige Länder überhaupt keine soliden Finanzen mehr haben und niemand mehr daran glaubt, dass sie ihre Schulden eines Tages zurück zahlen. Das war der Fall Griechenland;

had a very strong opinion and I'm not going to depart from it now or in the future. When we have a strong euro, then isn't time to say: 'Now we need a little solidarity.' No, the prerequisite for solidarity in Europe is that each and every country does its homework. That's what we were expecting from Greece.

später noch die Rettung des gesamten Euro. Und schauen Sie, da kann man jetzt lange darüber philosophieren, ob wir zu früh oder zu spät gehandelt haben. Ich hatte eine ganz feste Meinung. Und von der werde ich auch in Zukunft nicht abrücken., wenn wir einen starken Euro haben.. Dann kann nicht gesagt werden: jetzt brauchen wir mal ein bisschen Solidarität, sondern es ist die Voraussetzung für Solidarität in Europa, dass jeder, jedes Land seine Hausaufgaben macht. Genau das haben wir von Griechenland erwartet.

[9] And in connection to this the much talked about topic has been: Is Germany still European? Do we still feel responsible for the heritage of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl? I say: Of course! If we had gone through this economic crisis without the euro, we would have had a very, very difficult time. We would have had to constantly rely on currencies. But I also say, to defend the legacy of Helmut Kohl and Konrad Adenauer, the precondition is that we are committed to a reasonably stable culture in Europe. That is the basis for a common currency and it must not be doubted. But precisely because of that it is necessary that we set a good example. Because if we don't do our homework others will not accept the demands that we make.

[9] Und es ist ja in dem Zusammenhang viel darüber gesprochen worden : ist Deutschland noch europäisch? Fühlen wir uns dem Erbe von Konrad Adenauer und Helmut Kohl noch verpflichtet? Ich sage: natürlich! Wenn wir ohne Euro durch diese Wirtschaftskrise gegangen wären, hätten wir eine ganz, ganz schwierige Zeit gehabt. Dann hätten wir unentwegt Währungen stützen müssen. Aber ich sage auch, um das Erbe von Helmut Kohl und Konrad Adenauer zu verteidigen, ist die Voraussetzung, dass wir uns alle einer vernünftigen Stabilitätskultur in Europa verpflichtet fühlen. Das ist die Grundlage für eine gemeinsame Währung und daran darf auch nicht gezweifelt werden. Aber genau dafür ist es eben auch notwendig, dass wir mit gutem Beispiel voran gehen. Denn, wenn wir unsere Hausaufgaben nicht machen, werden andere von uns nicht akzeptieren, dass wir an Sie Forderungen stellen.

[10] Solid financial policies are a prerequisite for justice in our country. We must ask ourselves: What do we want to be in 10 years? In 20 years? I think we are doing the right thing if we say, Germany should be an industrial country! An industrial country! This also means that we establish a sensible energy policy. An energy policy that is not dominated by desires and ideologies but an energy policy that is oriented toward the future, that says: Yes, we want to reach the age of renewable

[10] Die solide Finanzpolitik ist eine Voraussetzung für Gerechtigkeit in unserem Land. Da müssen wir uns fragen: was wollen wir denn sein in 10 Jahren, in 20 Jahren? Da glaub ich, tun wir gut daran zu sagen: Deutschland soll ein Industrieland sein! Ein Industrieland! Dazu gehört auch, dass wir eine vernünftige Energiepolitik machen. Eine Energiepolitik, die nicht von Wünschen und Ideologien beherrscht ist, sondern eine Energiepolitik, die auf die Zukunft ausgerichtet ist; die sagt: ja, wir

energy, but that at the same time says: We want to keep our jobs, we want affordable electricity and we want to guarantee the security of the energy supplies in our country. These are the three points on which we're focusing our energy plan. Therefore a full commitment to renewable energies is needed.

[11] But I can't charge blindly forward and make this happen tomorrow. I need bridges that lead me into this age of renewable energies and that, at the same time, allow people to continue living in prosperity. This is exactly what we are doing. That's why we say that, to a certain extent, we'll need to extend the lifespan of the nuclear power plants. And we'll still need to use coal as an energy source for a certain period of time. These bridges will take us more quickly, not more slowly, to the age of renewable energies. In addition, I say that whoever wants to establish renewable energy sources in Germany must also be willing to build new infrastructure. We will need hundreds of kilometres of new power lines. High-voltage power lines.

[12] And, dear friends, if one is in favour of wind energy or solar energy but wherever a powerline is to be installed suddenly joins the citizens' initiative, that just doesn't make sense! That is why it will be very important to talk with the people at this point about how we will implement change. We can be happy that we were all born in a country where there are already electrical lines and the railroad tracks have already been laid. Otherwise it would be quite difficult to know whether we would still manage to enforce electrification and railway building.

wollen das Zeitalter der erneuerbaren Energien erreichen, die aber gleichzeitig sagt: wir wollen unsere Arbeitsplätze halten, wir wollen Strom bezahlbar lassen und wir wollen die Versorgungssicherheit in unserem Lande garantieren. Das sind die drei Punkte, an denen wir unser Energiekonzept ausrichten. Deshalb ein uneingeschränktes Bekenntnis zu den erneuerbaren Energien.

[11] Aber ich kann nicht mit dem Kopf durch die Wand gehen und das von heute auf morgen schaffen, sondern ich brauche Brücken, die mich in dieses Zeitalter der erneuerbaren Energien so führen, dass gleichzeitig die Menschen in Wohlstand weiter leben. Genau das machen wir. Deshalb sagen wir: Wir brauchen eine bestimmte Verlängerung der Laufzeiten der Kernkraftwerke. Da sagen wir auch: wir brauchen die Kohle noch als Energieträger für bestimmte Zeit. Und diese Brücken werden uns schneller und nicht langsamer zu einem Zeitalter der erneuerbaren Energien führen. Dann sag ich aber auch hinzu: wer erneuerbare Energien in Deutschland aber durchsetzen will, der muss auch bereit sein, neue Infrastruktur zu bauen. Wir werden hunderte von Kilometern von neuen Leitungen brauchen. Hochspannungsleitungen.

[12] Und, liebe Freunde, wenn das so aussieht, dass man zwar für die Windenergie, die Sonnenenergie ist, aber überall, wo 'ne Leitung verlegt werden soll, ist man Mitglied der Bürgerinitiative, dann geht das nicht zusammen! Deshalb wird es ganz wichtig sein, an dieser Stelle mit den Menschen darüber zu sprechen, wie wir Veränderungen durchsetzen. Wir können ja froh sein, dass wir alle in einem Land geboren wurden, wo es schon elektrische Leitungen gab und Bahnschienen schon fertig waren. Ansonsten hätten wir es ja ganz schwer, ob wir es noch schaffen würden, die Elektrifizierung und die Eisenbahnifizierung durchzusetzen, steht im

[13] But we are also making a contribution in our generation to modernisation and change, whether through road construction and railway projects, as indeed they are represented here, or whether through new high-voltage power lines or broadband connections. All of this is our task, otherwise we will lose touch with the future. And now I say quite clearly: I believe that the road project, which is also a European project, from Paris to Bratislava, through Hungary and on to Turkey, is a really important one for Europe. And I think we all have grounds for advocating for Stuttgart 21. But—and people are smiling in the second row because I said “but”—I’m saying merely that the railway is still not finished. And herein lies the task: you, we, are sitting here with this enthusiasm for these projects, and with this enthusiasm we have to go to the people and convince them.

[14] Politics functions today and this is something beautiful. It can no longer be the case in Germany, after the successful unification that one can decree by order of the mufti that something will now be done a certain way. Rather the people expect from us—and rightly so—that we talk with them about our projects. And you can see from the ‘western runway’ construction project, for example, that we learned something. When you ask Roland Koch or anyone else in Hesse what was done to implement the new runway project at the airport, there were endless discussions. And that’s why it’s our task now to make it clear that there are many who are also for Stuttgart 21 and who aren’t afraid to bring into discussions those who have doubts today and try and convince them. That is the task we have today in the modern world.

Raum.

[13] Aber dass wir in unserer Generation zur Modernisierung und Veränderung auch einen Beitrag leisten, sei es durch Straßenbauprojekte, sei es durch Bahnprojekte, wie sie hier ja auch vertreten sind, oder sei es durch neue Hochspannungsleitungen oder Breitbandverkabelung. All das ist unsere Aufgabe, sonst werden wir den Anschluss an die Zukunft verlieren. Und jetzt sage ich ganz deutlich: Ich glaube, dass das Verkehrsprojekt, das ja auch ein europäisches ist, von Paris nach Bratislava über Ungarn fort in die Türkei, ein richtig wichtiges für Europa ist.

Und ich glaube, dass wir auch alle Gründe haben, uns für Stuttgart 21 einzusetzen.

Aber, es lächelt in der 2. Reihe, weil ich 'aber' sage, ich sage ja lediglich, damit ist der Bahnhof ja noch nicht fertig gebaut. Deshalb kommt die Aufgabe. Mit der Begeisterung, mit der Sie, wir hier sitzen und euch für dieses Projekt einsetzt, mit dieser Begeisterung muss man auch zu den Menschen gehen und sie überzeugen.

[14] Politik funktioniert heute, und das ist ja etwas schönes, das lässt sich ja in der Bundesrepublik nach der geglückten Einheit nicht mehr so, dass man sagen kann per order de mufti, das wird jetzt so gemacht, sondern, die Menschen erwarten von uns, mit Recht, dass wir mit ihnen über unsere Projekte sprechen. Und daran können Sie sehen – aus der Startbahn West z.B. hat man etwas gelernt – wenn Sie Roland Koch, alle anderen in Hessen dort fragen, was gemacht wurde, um das Projekt der neuen Startbahn am Flughafen durchzusetzen, dann waren da unendlich viele Gespräche. Und deshalb ist es unsere Aufgabe jetzt, deutlich zu machen: es gibt viele, die auch für Stuttgart 21 sind, und die scheuen sich nicht davor, mit denen, die heut Zweifel haben, auch ins Gespräch zu kommen und Überzeugungsarbeit zu leisten. Das ist die Aufgabe, die wir heute in einer modernen Welt haben.

[15] The central task, if we want to be an industrial country, is surely to talk about how it looks in the job market. When I became the Federal Chancellor five years ago the situation in the winter of 2005 was such that a large German magazine opened with the correspondingly large letters: "5 Million Unemployed! Mrs. Merkel, They Are Now Yours!" Well, I still found them to be Schröder's fault but now they were mine. And, dear friends, today, five years later, we are at 3 million! That is our success. Our success. It is not only our success. Medium and large companies, trade unions, employers all worked together. But without reasonable framework requirements it could not have been accomplished.

[16] Let me add, also in light of our changing age demographics, that every year there are now 200,000 more people retiring than there are young people entering the job market. It is now time to fight for each and everyone so that they can receive employment. Three million unemployed is too many and jobs for all must remain the goal of our politics. Even if this isn't feasible tomorrow and perhaps not the day after tomorrow, it must be done! We know that we have 2 million long-term unemployed. That is too much! In the federal budget we spend €40 billion on long-term unemployment, the local governments spend another €10 billion. Imagine if we could manage to find a job for half of the 2.2 million people.

[17] Therefore, and I state this quite clearly, we will not rest until we have tried to give everyone an opportunity through training and reintegration. We cannot give in to the faint cry asking us to allow increased immigration again until we have made every effort to qualify our own people and give them a chance. Among these 2.2 million we

[15] Die zentrale Aufgabe, wenn wir Industrieland sein wollen, ist sicherlich, dass wir darüber sprechen: wie sieht es denn auf dem Arbeitsmarkt aus? Als ich vor 5 Jahren Bundeskanzlerin wurde, da war im Winter 2005/2006 die Situation so, dass eine große deutsche Illustrierte aufmachte mit den entsprechend großen Lettern: 5 Millionen Arbeitslose! Frau Merkel, das sind jetzt Ihre! Tja. Fand zwar immer noch, dass das noch Schröders Schuld war; nun waren's meine. Und, liebe Freunde, heute, fünf Jahre später sind wir bei 3 Millionen! Und das ist unser Erfolg, unser Erfolg. Es ist nicht nur unserer Erfolg. Daran haben Unternehmen, Mittelständler und Große, daran haben Gewerkschaften, Arbeitnehmer mitgewirkt. Aber ohne vernünftige Rahmenbedingungen wäre das auch nicht.

[16] Jetzt sag ich, auch angesichts der Veränderung unseres Altersaufbaus, jedes Jahr gehen jetzt 200 000 Menschen mehr in Rente als junge Menschen auf den Arbeitsmarkt kommen, jetzt heißt es, für und um jeden zu kämpfen, dass er auch einen Arbeitsplatz bekommt. 3 Millionen Arbeitslose sind zu viel und Arbeit für alle muss das Ziel unserer Politik bleiben, auch wenn es nicht morgen und vielleicht noch nicht übermorgen realisierbar ist, es muss geschafft werden! Und da wissen wir, dass wir 2 Millionen Langzeitarbeitslose haben. Das ist zu viel ! Im Bundeshaushalt geben wir 40 Milliarden Euro für Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit aus, die Kommunen nochmals 10 Milliarden. Stellen Sie sich mal vor, wir würden es schaffen, für die Hälfte der 2,2 Mill. Menschen wieder eine Arbeit zu finden.

[17] Deshalb sag ich ganz klar: wir werden nicht ruhen, bevor wir nicht hier versuchen, über Qualifizierung und Wiedereingliederung jedem eine Chance zu geben. Und der leichte Ruf, wir sollen noch mal ganz viel Zuwanderung haben, dieser leichte Ruf, dem dürfen wir nicht nachgeben, bevor wir nicht alles daran gesetzt haben, um

have 700,000 single mothers because of the lack of childcare. Indeed, Ursula von der Leyen did the right thing as Federal Minister for Family Affairs when she put the emphasis on childcare.

unsere eigenen Menschen im Lande zu qualifizieren und ihnen eine Chance zu geben. Und bei diesen 2,2 Mill. haben wir etwa 700 000 alleinerziehende Mütter. Da mangelt es an Kinderbetreuung. Deshalb hat Ursula von der Leyen es richtig gemacht, dass sie als Familienministerin einen Schwerpunkt auf Kinderbetreuung gesetzt hat.

[18] And 1.3 million of those 2.2 million are people over the age of 50. Let me tell you one more thing: If we don't start thinking differently as a whole society, from the company policies to the trade unions, and say that people over 50 must have a chance in our job market, that they don't belong to the 'scrap heap', so to speak, and are no longer employable, if we can't treat older and more experienced people differently, judge them differently, then we will as a society fail. This is not a humane society!

[18] Und 1.3 Millionen von den 2.2 Mill. sind Menschen, die über 50 sind. Jetzt sage ich Ihnen ein Weiteres: wenn wir nicht ein gesamtgesellschaftliches Umdenken von der Politik über die Unternehmen bis hin zu den Gewerkschaften bekommen, die sagen, Menschen über 50 müssen eine Chance auf unserem Arbeitsmarkt haben, die gehören nicht sozusagen als 'Altes Eisen' benannt und nicht mehr als nicht vermittelbar. Wenn wir das nicht schaffen, dass wir mit denen, die älter sind, mit denen, die Erfahrung haben, anders umgehen, sie anders einzuschätzen, dann werden wir als Gesellschaft scheitern. Das ist doch keine menschliche Gesellschaft!

[19] Therefore, our task is as follows: of course people at an advanced age (when someone such as myself who is 56 talks about an advanced age at 50, it's funny, but that's the way it is)—in any case, if these people are not given the chance and the hope of also having a job when they pass 60 then the debate about raising the retirement age to 67 becomes, of course, quite difficult. When we see how the life expectancy is increasing then it's clear that there are, indeed, no reasonable alternatives to the decision we have taken to extend the working life.

[19] Deshalb heißt die Aufgabe: natürlich Menschen auch im höheren Alter (wenn man, wie ich 56 ist und dann von höherem Alter bei 50 spricht, ist auch komisch. Aber, na ja, ist halt so) jedenfalls, wenn man dann Menschen nicht die Chance und die Hoffnung gibt, auch arbeiten zu können, wenn man über 60 ist, dann wird die Diskussion über die Rente mit 67 natürlich schwierig. Aber wenn wir sehen, wie die Lebenserwartung steigt, dann gibt es doch keine vernünftige Alternative zu dem Beschluss, den wir gefasst haben, dass wir zu einer verlängerten Lebensarbeitszeit kommen.

[20] I ask you sincerely in your discussions with the young members of the Green Party and the SPD to keep putting pressure on these pain points. What is being done time and again in the SPD under Mr. Gabriel's leadership, counter to what Franz

[20] Ich bitte Sie ganz herzlich, auch in Ihren Gesprächen mit den Jungen aus der Grünen Partei und auch der SPD, legen Sie den Finger immer wieder in die Wunden. Was dort in der SPD immer wieder gemacht wird, unter Führung von Herrn Gabriel,

Müntefering was doing, has nothing, absolutely nothing to do with future- or reality-politics. But the precondition is also that we make it a norm for one to still be employable at 50 after losing one's job.

gegen das, was Franz Müntefering gemacht hat, das hat mit Zukunfts- und Realitätspolitik nichts, aber auch gar nichts zu tun. Aber die Voraussetzung ist eben auch, dass wir es zu einer Normalität machen, dass man auch noch mit 50 vermittelbar ist, wenn man seinen Arbeitsplatz verloren hat.

[21] And, dear friends, now that we have recalculated the Hartz IV reforms, I believe herein lies another social debate of great importance: when children today are writing down as their career aspiration 'Hartz IV' something has gone wrong in our society. Hartz IV, long-term unemployment, that is an expression for rapid minimum subsistence income, that is an expression of our understanding of society: we say that those in need, who need the solidarity of the community, will also get it.

[21] Und, liebe Freunde, jetzt haben wir die Hartz IV-Sätze neu berechnet. Ich glaube, es ist auch hier eine gesellschaftliche Diskussion ganz, ganz wichtig: wenn es heute Kinder gibt, die als Berufswunsch aufschreiben Hartz IV, dann läuft was falsch in unserer Gesellschaft. Hartz IV, Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit, das ist Ausdruck für rapides Existenzminimum, das ist Ausdruck unseres Gesellschaftsverständnisses: dass wir sagen, wer in Not ist, wer die Solidarität der Gemeinschaft braucht, der bekommt sie.

[22] But the task remains—this is the true sense of encouraging and challenging people—that long-term unemployment is not a life destiny, rather one must do everything possible to get out of it. And therefore it was right, regarding the Hartz IV reforms and the minimum subsistence income, to say, We're taking the alcohol and cigarettes away because it must be worth it to them to earn some money themselves and be a part of society's working life. In other words, when we do this we say to people: We will support you in an emergency situation, but we also have a task for you, everyone of you who can contribute something to society must do this as well. This discussion has to be held with the utmost determination.

[22] Aber es bleibt die Aufgabe, das ist der tiefere Sinn von fördern und fordern, dass Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit kein Lebensschicksal ist, sondern dass man alles tun muss, um daraus wieder raus zu kommen. Und deshalb war es richtig zu sagen bei den Hartz IV-Sätzen, beim Existenzminimum, da nehmen wir Alkohol und Zigaretten raus, denn es muss sich lohnen, auch mal selber wieder etwas zu verdienen, damit man in der Gesellschaft teilhaben kann am Arbeitsleben. Das heißt, wenn wir das tun, den Menschen sagen: Ihr werdet unterstützt, wenn ihr in einer Notsituation seid, aber wir haben den Anspruch an euch, dass jeder, der etwas beitragen kann zu dieser Gesellschaft, seinen Beitrag auch leisten muss. Diese Diskussion muss mit aller Entschiedenheit geführt werden.

[23] Besides the retirement pensions we need to also be concerned with the future of our healthcare system. This, I tell you, is the most difficult subject in all developed industrial societies. Take a look at other

[23] Und wir müssen uns neben der Rente auch mit der Zukunft unseres Gesundheitssystems befassen. Da sage ich Ihnen: das ist das schwierigste Thema in allen entwickelten Industriegesellschaften.

countries, how they're battling over the topic of healthcare policy.

[24] I want to say one more thing about our health care reform because most people like hearing the details on this topic. What we are doing is of great importance, a decisive turning point, and it is the following: For 60 years we have linked the costs for health care to labour costs. We are now in a situation where we are saying, and this must be told to the people: if we don't want a two-tiered health system then health care expenses will have to increase. People are getting older, the medical possibilities are getting better, but under no circumstances does health care get cheaper. Efficiencies can be improved and all but on the whole it will get more expensive. When it does get more expensive and when the international competition for work gets stronger, if I don't want a two-tiered health system I can no longer couple the rising cost of health care to labour costs. That is what we have decided. The deeper meaning of this decoupling—and since nobody should be overextending themselves we're, of course, going to put a ceiling on the amount and say: whoever can't pay it themselves will be supported, but no longer through the solidarity of the contribution system and ever-growing costs but rather through the solidarity of the taxpayers. Among them, the 10% highest earning pay 50% of the income tax. That is more justice, not less justice. And that's one thing we have to aggressively make clear in debates with the Social Democrats and the Greens. I'm saying it now, loud and clear, because I'm aware of the complexities around the health care discussions even in our ranks. All of it is important: doctors' fees and hospital equipment, etc. Particularly important, however, is that we tell the people that we care about an equitable, sustainable health care system.

Schauen Sie sich nur auch andere Länder an, wie dort um die Gesundheitspolitik gefochten wird.

[24] Ich will Ihnen auch zu unserer Gesundheitsreform nur eins sagen, weil die meisten lieben die Details auf diesem Gebiet. Wir machen jetzt folgendes und das ist wirklich wichtig und das ist eine entscheidende Weichenstellung. Wir haben 60 Jahre lang die Kosten für die Gesundheit immer an die Arbeitskosten gekoppelt. Wir sind jetzt in einer Situation, wo wir sagen, das muss man den Menschen sagen: wenn wir keine 2-Klassen-Medizin wollen, dann werden die Ausgaben für Gesundheit steigen. Die Menschen werden älter, die medizinischen Möglichkeiten werden besser, das wird unter keinen Umständen billiger. Da kann man Effizienzverbesserung machen und alles: insgesamt wird es teurer. Und, wenn es teurer wird, und wenn der internationale Wettbewerb um Arbeit stärker wird, dann darf ich in Zukunft, wenn ich eine 2-Klassen-Medizin nicht will, die Gesundheitskosten, die anwachsen, nicht mehr an die Arbeitskosten koppeln. Dazu haben wir uns entschlossen. Der tiefere Sinn dieser Entkoppelung, und, da ja niemand überfordert werden darf, machen wir natürlich eine Überforderungsgrenze und sagen: wer das selber nicht bezahlen kann, der wird unterstützt, aber nicht mehr durch die Solidarität des Beitragssystems, bei den anwachsenden Kosten, sondern durch die Solidarität der Steuerzahler. Bei denen nämlich die 10% der Bestverdienenden 50% der Einkommenssteuer zahlen. Das ist mehr Gerechtigkeit und nicht weniger Gerechtigkeit. Und, das müssen wir ganz offensiv in der Auseinandersetzung mit den Sozialdemokraten und den Grünen immer wieder deutlich machen. Ich sag das jetzt hier so klar, weil ich auch um die Vertraktheiten um die Gesundheitsdiskussion in unseren Reihen weiß. Es ist alles wichtig: Ärztehonore und Krankenhausausrüstungen, u.s.w.. Besonders wichtig ist aber, dass wir den

Leuten sagen: wir kümmern uns um ein
gerechtes, zukunftsfähiges
Gesundheitswesen.

[25] Dear friends, these all are the decisions we have to make, which are currently on the table and that will set the course for Germany. That's why since autumn I've been talking about decisions. Maybe there is no final answer yet as to how, in the next 10 to 20 years, we want to live with one another. That's why it is also our job to affirm, again and again, how we see ourselves, our country and our role in the world.

[25] Liebe Freunde, das alles sind die Entscheidungen, die wir zu fällen haben, die im Augenblick in der Beratung sind, und die die Weichen für Deutschland stellen. Deshalb habe ich auch vom Herbst der Entscheidungen gesprochen. Und das alles gibt vielleicht noch keine abschließende Antwort, wie wir denn in den nächsten 10 und 20 Jahren miteinander leben wollen. Deshalb gehört auch dazu, dass wir uns immer wieder vergewissern, wie wir auf uns, auf unser Land, auf unsere Rolle in der Welt schauen.

[26] And again I recall the year 1989. Actually, something extraordinary happened in the former GDR—people who couldn't speak their opinions publicly for 40 years were suddenly on the streets, saying: We are the people! – and shortly thereafter, after 40 years separation they held our flag in their hands saying: We are one people! And since then we have been one nation! And all of us sitting here today, we are a part of this one nation and we must also say how we imagine coexisting in this nation for the next several decades. First I'll say that we are members of the CDU, the CSU or we stand near them. Before we talk about others we should first talk about us and what has always distinguished us. That's why we call ourselves Christian Democrats or Christian Socialists. This is the Christian view of man.

[26] Und ich erinnere noch einmal an 1989. Da ist ja eigentlich in der ehemaligen DDR etwas Unglaubliches passiert: Menschen, die 40 Jahre lang öffentlich nicht frei Ihre Meinung sagen konnten, sind plötzlich auf die Straße gegangen und haben gesagt: Wir sind das Volk! Und nach 40 Jahren Trennung haben sie ganz kurz darauf gesagt und dabei unsere Fahne in der Hand gehalten: Wir sind ein Volk! Und seitdem sind wir ein Volk! Und alle, die wir hier sitzen, sind Teil dieses einen Volkes und müssen auch sagen, wie wir uns unser Zusammenleben in diesem Volk für die nächsten Jahre und Jahrzehnte vorstellen. Und da sage ich als erstes: wir sind Mitglieder der CDU, der CSU oder stehen ihr nah. Bevor wir mal über andere sprechen, sollten wir erst mal über uns sprechen und das, was uns immer ausgezeichnet hat. Deshalb nennen wir uns Christdemokraten oder christlich-sozial. Das ist das christliche Bild vom Menschen.

[27] And if we are truly honest, then we should perhaps talk once again about what this means. Because many people in our country no longer know this as they did 50 or 60 years ago. And since many people don't express it at all anymore because many around us don't believe anymore, or hardly

[27] Und, wenn wir mal ganz ehrlich sind, dann sollten wir vielleicht einmal mehr darüber sprechen, was das bedeutet. Weil viele Menschen in unserem Lande das nicht mehr so gut wissen, wie sie es vielleicht vor 50 und 60 Jahren wussten. Und weil viele Menschen es auch gar nicht mehr

believe, they go to church only at Christmas. This means that only those who are self-aware can talk confidently to others about their identity. That is our priority. And, not surprisingly, it is written in our Constitution: Human dignity is inviolable. Every single person is important to us, every single person in our country, this is our mission, gets his chance.

aussprechen, weil viele um uns herum gar nicht glauben, wenig glauben, nur Weihnachten in die Kirche gehen. Das heißt: Nur wer sich seiner selbst bewusst ist, kann selbstbewusst mit anderen über ihre Identität reden. Das ist unsere vorrangige Aufgabe. Und nicht von ungefähr heißt es in unserem Grundgesetz: Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Jeder einzelne Mensch ist für uns wichtig, jeder einzelne Mensch, das ist unsere Aufgabe, bekommt in unserem Land seine Chance.

[28] We talk in our policy program about equal opportunity and from this experience we give every person an opportunity to develop in our society. What so affected us as we all sat in front of our televisions following the rescue of the 33 coalminers in Chile, was that there was a country that did not give up on a single person. After 17 days they were still saying: No, we will continue looking. They found them and they saved them, and for every single man they did everything humanly possible so that he could return into daylight. That is what it means to protect the dignity of a person in an exemplary way. And so it is that each person in our society is entrusted to us. That is our Christian Democratic understanding of man.

[28] Wir reden in unserem Grundsatzprogramm von Chancengleichheit und aus dieser Erfahrung heraus geben wir jedem Menschen die Möglichkeit, sich in unserer Gesellschaft zu entfalten. Was hat uns das so berührt, wie wir alle am Fernseher gesessen haben und die Rettung der Kohlearbeiter dort in Chile verfolgt haben, der 33 Bergleute. Dort hat ein Land keinen einzigen Menschen aufgegeben. Dort hat man nach 17 Tagen noch gesagt: Nein, wir suchen weiter. Man hat sie gefunden und man hat sie gerettet und hat für jeden einzelnen Menschen alles Menschenmögliche getan, damit er wieder ans Tageslicht kam. Das ist, die Würde des Menschen exemplarisch zu schützen. Und so ist uns auch jeder einzelne Mensch in dieser Gesellschaft anvertraut. Das ist unser christdemokratisches Verständnis vom Menschen.

[29] Our president Christian Wulff recently said the right thing when he said that our culture is strongly influence by the Christian-Jewish heritage. That Christianity belongs to us and that Judaism belongs to us. From this a large part of our tradition developed. And I would remind you that we received algebra and astronomy in the 10th century from the people of the Arab region—this was so much about blessings we received from other places. But he also said that Islam is also a part of Germany. It

[29] Jetzt hat unser Bundespräsident Christian Wulff doch das Richtige gesagt, er hat gesagt, unsere Kultur ist ganz stark vom christlich jüdischen Erbe geprägt. Das Christentum gehört zu uns, das Judentum gehört zu uns. Daraus ist der große Teil unserer Tradition erwachsen. Will nur dran erinnern Algebra und Astronomie haben wir im 10. Jahrhundert von Menschen auch aus dem arabischen Raum bekommen, also nur soviel auch zu den Segnungen, die wir von woanders bekommen haben. Aber er hat

is part of Germany, and this is evident not only in the footballer Özil.

gesagt, der Islam ist auch Teil Deutschlands. Und der ist Teil Deutschlands. Das sieht man nicht nur am Fußballspieler Özil.

[30] Dear friends, the question now is how we handle this issue. Integration is a central theme among the younger people of our country because the number of people with immigrant backgrounds among the younger population is increasing, not decreasing. In Frankfurt am Main, two out of three kids under the age of five have immigrant backgrounds. And we are a country that at the beginning of the 60's brought guest workers to Germany—and now they live with us. We have been lying to ourselves for quite some time now. We said to ourselves that they're not going to stay, that at some point they would go away. But that is not the reality.

[30] Liebe Freunde, jetzt geht es darum, wie wir mit dieser Frage umgehen. Und da ist das Thema Integration ein zentrales Thema, weil unter den jüngeren Menschen unseres Landes die Anzahl der Menschen mit jungen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund zunehmen wird und nicht abnehmen wird. In Frankfurt am Main ist bei Kindern unter 5 Jahren von drei Kindern haben zwei einen Migrationshintergrund und wir sind ein Land das im übrigen am Anfang der 60er Jahre die Gastarbeiter nach Deutschland geholt hat. Und jetzt leben sie bei uns, wir haben uns eine Weile lang in die Tasche gelogen. Wir haben uns gesagt die werden schon nicht bleiben, irgendwann werden sie weg sein. Das ist nicht die Realität.

[31] And naturally the initial approach here was to say: Now we'll create a multicultural society and live side by side, content with each other. This approach has failed, absolutely failed and that's why I decided, when I became the Federal Chancellor, to bring the theme of integration into the Chancellor's office, because it's one of the most important themes of our society. There are successful examples and I think we have to start right now talking about what has been successful elsewhere. Because precisely those whom we want to integrate, they need role models. And then there are many things that have not yet succeeded. We were the ones after all who said: Yes, these people will stay with us. They have contributed to our prosperity, so they must have their share. It is not acceptable that twice as many of them have never had any schooling. It is unacceptable that nowadays we have twice as many that have not finished any vocational training. That makes us the social problems of the future, that's why integration is so important and that's why, above all, those who wish to be a part of our society must not only comply with

[31] Und natürlich war der Ansatz hier zu sagen: Jetzt machen wir hier mal Multikulti und leben so nebeneinander her und freuen uns über einander. Dieser Ansatz ist gescheitert, absolut gescheitert. Und deshalb habe ich mich entschlossen, als ich Bundeskanzlerin wurde, das Thema Integration ins Kanzleramt zu holen, weil es eines der großen Themen unserer Gesellschaft ist. Und da gibt es gelungene Beispiele und ich glaube wir müssen in der jetzigen Zeit darauf aufpassen, dass wir auch mal über das, was geschafft ist reden. Weil gerade die, die wir integrieren wollen, die brauchen Vorbilder. Und dann gibt es vieles, was auch noch nicht gelungen ist. Und wir waren doch die dann gesagt haben: Jawoll, diese Menschen werden bei uns bleiben. Sie haben zu unserem Wohlstand beigetragen, sie müssen ihr Teil haben. Es nicht geht an, dass doppelt so viele von ihnen keinen Schulabschluss haben, es geht nicht an, dass wir heute doppelt so viele keinen Berufsabschluss haben. Das macht uns die sozialen Probleme der Zukunft und deshalb ist Integration so wichtig und deshalb heißt es vor allen Dingen, das diejenigen, die

our laws, must not only commit to the constitution, but they must above all, learn our language. Learn our language and know our language—that must be of utmost importance. And that will require a lot of effort from us yet.

[32] It's true that language tests were first held in states governed by the CDU/CSU. It is important that students who go to school at least understand their teacher, otherwise they can't be expected to follow the curriculum. It is important and right that we direct our efforts towards obtaining vocational qualifications. And it is absolutely right and important to say that girls must go on school trips, participate in physical education; as for forced marriages we want nothing to do with that; it's incompatible with our legislation. But, on the other hand, there has to be openness on our side, too. We have always been a country open to the world. The unifying of Europe has helped us. We are known throughout the world as a country that was the world champion in exports and is still one of the leading export nations. Of course we don't need the kind of immigration that burdens our social system, it's not about that, but we will need an immigration of specialists because, unfortunately, there aren't many young Germans or immigrant children choosing subjects like natural science engineering. We definitely don't want to be seen as a country that shuns someone who doesn't immediately speak German or grew up with German as their mother tongue, and make them feel unwelcome here. That would harm our country to a major extent, companies would go elsewhere because they wouldn't be able to find any more jobs with us. It's safe to say that the challenge of the immigration issue is one of the main tasks for the near future but it's also safe to say that we are a country that gives people a chance—this

teilhaben wollen an unserer Gesellschaft nicht nur unsere Gesetze einhalten müssen, nicht nur sich zum Grundgesetz bekennen müssen, sondern sie müssen vor allen Dingen auch unsere Sprache lernen. Unsere Sprache lernen, unsere Sprache können und darauf muss absoluter Wert gelegt werden. Und das wird uns viele Anstrengungen noch kosten.

[32] Es ist richtig, dass in den unionsregierten Ländern zuerst die Sprachtests gemacht wurden. Es ist wichtig, dass die Schüler die in die Schule kommen wenigstens ihren Lehrer verstehen, weil ansonsten ja auch nicht zu erwarten ist, dass sie dem Schulstoff folgen können. Es ist richtig und wichtig, dass wir auf Berufsabschlüsse aus sind. Und es ist absolut richtig und wichtig zu sagen, Mädchen müssen mit auf die Schulreisen kommen, am Sportunterricht teilnehmen und von Zwangsehen halten wir gar nichts, das ist mit unseren Gesetzen nicht zu vereinbaren. Aber es gehört auf der anderen Seite natürlich auch ein Stück Offenheit von uns dazu. Wir waren immer ein weltoffenes Land. Die Europäische Einigung hat uns geholfen. Wir sind in der Welt als ein Land bekannt, dass Exportweltmeister war und noch zu einer der führenden Exportnationen gehört. Und wir brauchen keine Zuwanderung natürlich, die unsere Sozialsysteme belastet, darum geht es überhaupt nicht. Aber wir werden auch Zuwanderung von Spezialisten brauchen, denn leider entscheiden sich zu wenig junge Deutsche oder Migrantenkinder dafür naturwissenschaftliche Ingenieursberufe und anderes zu erreichen. Das heißt wir dürfen auch kein Land sein, das nach außen den Eindruck vermeidet jeder der nicht sofort Deutsch spricht und mit Deutsch sozusagen als Muttersprache aufgewachsen ist, der ist uns hier nicht willkommen. Das wird unserem Land sehr stark schaden. Dann werden Unternehmen woanders hingehen, weil sie bei uns keine Arbeitsplätze mehr finden. Das heißt, die Forderung nach

must always be the Germany's trademark.

Integration ist eine unserer Hauptaufgaben für die nächste Zeit. Aber zu sagen, wir sind ein Land, dass den Menschen in unserem Lande eine Chance gibt, das muss auch immer das Markenzeichen Deutschlands sein.

[33] What has always been the strength of the CDU/CSU is its politics of measure and middle. From this arises the legitimacy to also challenge that which we are, on the other hand, supporting. And this challenge has certainly been too timid in many areas in the past. But I'll tell you: this challenge is very concrete. A country that challenges cannot allow a youngster to break the law six, eight or nine times before proceeding to court. A country that challenges has to make sure that the police have access to every part of our country. Places where the police don't dare to enter simply cannot exist. When I say this I'm referring not only to people with an immigrant background. When in Berlin, on the eve of May 1st in Kreuzberg, the police declare that the CDU aren't allowed to set up a stand to advertise their principles, this is as wrong as when police officers can't enter certain towns.

[33] Was immer die Stärke der Union war, das ist eine Politik von Maß und Mitte. Daraus erwächst uns die Legitimation auch zu fordern, wenn wir auf der anderen Seite fördern. Und dieses Fordern ist mich Sicherheit in der Vergangenheit an verschiedenen Stellen zu kurz gekommen. Aber ich sage Ihnen auch: dieses Fordern ist sehr konkret. Ein Land, das fordert, darf nicht 6 und 8 und 9 bis auf die Tat eines Jugendlichen ein Prozess erfolgt. Ein Land, das fordert muss sicherstellen, dass an jedem Ort in unserem Land die Polizei Zugang hat und dass es nicht Gebiete gibt, in die sich kein Polizist mehr reintraut. Ich sage das, ich sage das im Übrigen nicht nur in Bezug auf Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund, sondern wenn in Berlin am Vorabend des 1sten Mai in Kreuzberg die Polizei erklärt, die CDU könnte keinen Stand mehr aufbauen an dem sie für ihre Prinzipien wirbt, dann ist das genauso falsch, wie es falsch ist, wenn Polizisten nicht mehr in andere Ortschaften hinein kommen.

[34] If we in this spirit as I have just presented to you, with an idea of our society of tomorrow, go with the right decisions in these matters in the next few months, then I say to you: we have all it takes to convince the people. And so, in conclusion, my request: When I open the newspaper I sometimes get rather nervous. We are not in a laboratory for theoretical physics; we are five months away from crucial state elections. Helmut Kohl has always told us one thing: "The expression 'election campaign' consists of 'election' and 'fight.'" And what I expect, it's not that we'll have a theoretical discussion about this and that, no matter how, when or what the outcome of the election is. Rather, I expect each and

[34] Wenn wir in diesem Geist, wie ich Ihnen dargestellt habe mit einer Vorstellung von unserer Gesellschaft von morgen, mit den richtigen Weichenstellungen in der Sache in die nächsten Monate gehen, dann sage ich Ihnen: haben wir alle Chancen, die Menschen zu überzeugen. Und deshalb meine Bitte zum Abschluss: Wenn ich die Zeitung aufschlage, dann wird man manchmal ganz nervös. Wir sind hier nicht im theoretischen Physiklabor, sondern wir sind fünf Monate vor entscheidenden Landtagswahlen. Helmut Kohl hat uns immer eins gesagt: das Wort Wahlkampf besteht aus Wahl und aus Kampf. Und was ich erwarte, das ist nicht, dass wir jetzt theoretische Betrachtungen über dies und

every member of the CDU/CSU to fight for their beliefs and to convince people. That we go out and we say, We can do it because we have the right ideas for Germany. We want to make it happen because it's our future that's at stake. When we go out with this statement, when we are taking care of not only ourselves but also the people, then we have all the opportunities. Despair is really not a good counsellor, nor is fear. Rather, let's go straight to the point, straight to the people we must convince. We have a lot to do and, it's true, we have been fighting too much. But now the task until March and until next year is to fight, work, and advertise—everyone altogether. Heartfelt thanks!

jenes anstellen, wie wann was bei welchem Ausgang passiert, sondern ich erwarte von jedem einzelnen in der Union, dass er für seine Überzeugungen kämpft, dass er die Menschen überzeugt. Dass wir rausgehen, dass wir sagen wir können das schaffen, weil wir die richtigen Konzepte für Deutschland haben. Wir wollen das schaffen, weil wir - weil es um unsere Zukunft geht. Wenn wir mit diesem Ansatz nach draußen gehen, wenn wir uns nicht um uns selbst kümmern, sondern auf die anderen zugehen, dann haben wir alle Chancen. Und Verzagtheit ist wirklich kein guter Ratgeber, Angst schon gar nicht, sondern ran an die Sache, ran an die Menschen, die wir überzeugen müssen. Da haben wir viel zu tun, da haben wir uns zuviel gestritten, aber jetzt heißt die Aufgabe bis zum März und zum nächsten Jahr kämpfen, arbeiten, werben und alle miteinander. Herzlichen Dank!

Appendix 3: Cameron's Speech at Munich Security Conference

Munich, Saturday 5 February 2011

[1] Today I want to focus my remarks on terrorism, but first let me address one point. Some have suggested that by holding a strategic defence and security review, Britain is somehow retreating from an activist role in the world. That is the opposite of the truth. Yes, we are dealing with our budget deficit, but we are also making sure our defences are strong. Britain will continue to meet the NATO 2% target for defence spending. We will still have the fourth largest military defence budget in the world. At the same time, we are putting that money to better use, focusing on conflict prevention and building a much more flexible army. That is not retreat; it is hard headed.

[2] Every decision we take has three aims in mind. First, to continue to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan . Second, to reinforce our actual military capability. As Chancellor Merkel's government is showing right here in Germany, what matters is not bureaucracy, which frankly Europe needs a lot less of, but the political will to build military capability that we need as nations and allies, that we can deliver in the field. Third, we want to make sure that Britain is protected from the new and various threats that we face. That is why we are investing in a national cyber security programme that I know William Hague talked about yesterday, and we are sharpening our readiness to act on counter-proliferation.

[3] But the biggest threat that we face comes from terrorist attacks, some of which are, sadly, carried out by our own citizens. It is important to stress that terrorism is not linked exclusively to any one religion or ethnic group. My country, the United Kingdom , still faces threats from dissident republicans in Northern Ireland . Anarchist attacks have occurred recently in Greece and in Italy , and of course, yourselves in Germany were long scarred by terrorism from the Red Army Faction. Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that this threat comes in Europe overwhelmingly from young men who follow a completely perverse, warped interpretation of Islam, and who are prepared to blow themselves up and kill their fellow citizens. Last week at Davos I rang the alarm bell for the urgent need for Europe to recover its economic dynamism, and today, though the subject is complex, my message on security is equally stark. We will not defeat terrorism simply by the action we take outside our borders. Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own countries. Of course, that means strengthening, as Angela has said, the security aspects of our response, on tracing plots, on stopping them, on counter-surveillance and intelligence gathering.

[4] But this is just part of the answer. We have got to get to the root of the problem, and we need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of where these terrorist attacks lie. That is the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism. We should be equally clear what we mean by this term, and we must distinguish it from Islam. Islam is a religion observed peacefully and devoutly by over a billion people. Islamist extremism is a political ideology supported by a minority. At the furthest end are those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an entire Islamist

realm, governed by an interpretation of Sharia. Move along the spectrum, and you find people who may reject violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist worldview, including real hostility towards Western democracy and liberal values. It is vital that we make this distinction between religion on the one hand, and political ideology on the other. Time and again, people equate the two. They think whether someone is an extremist is dependent on how much they observe their religion. So, they talk about moderate Muslims as if all devout Muslims must be extremist. This is profoundly wrong. Someone can be a devout Muslim and not be an extremist. We need to be clear: Islamist extremism and Islam are not the same thing.

[5] This highlights, I think, a significant problem when discussing the terrorist threat that we face. There is so much muddled thinking about this whole issue. On the one hand, those on the hard right ignore this distinction between Islam and Islamist extremism, and just say that Islam and the West are irreconcilable – that there is a clash of civilizations. So, it follows: we should cut ourselves off from this religion, whether that is through forced repatriation, favoured by some fascists, or the banning of new mosques, as is suggested in some parts of Europe. These people fuel Islamophobia, and I completely reject their argument. If they want an example of how Western values and Islam can be entirely compatible, they should look at what's happened in the past few weeks on the streets of Tunis and Cairo: hundreds of thousands of people demanding the universal right to free elections and democracy.

[6] The point is this: the ideology of extremism is the problem; Islam emphatically is not. Picking a fight with the latter will do nothing to help us to confront the former. On the other hand, there are those on the soft left who also ignore this distinction. They lump all Muslims together, compiling a list of grievances, and argue that if only governments addressed these grievances, the terrorism would stop. So, they point to the poverty that so many Muslims live in and say, 'Get rid of this injustice and the terrorism will end.' But this ignores the fact that many of those found guilty of terrorist offences in the UK and elsewhere have been graduates and often middle class. They point to grievances about Western foreign policy and say, 'Stop riding roughshod over Muslim countries and the terrorism will end.' But there are many people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who are angry about Western foreign policy, but who don't resort to acts of terrorism. They also point to the profusion of unelected leaders across the Middle East and say, 'Stop propping these people up and you will stop creating the conditions for extremism to flourish.' But this raises the question: if it's the lack of democracy that is the problem, why are there so many extremists in free and open societies?

[7] Now, I'm not saying that these issues of poverty and grievance about foreign policy are not important. Yes, of course we must tackle them. Of course we must tackle poverty. Yes, we must resolve the sources of tension, not least in Palestine, and yes, we should be on the side of openness and political reform in the Middle East. On Egypt, our position should be clear. We want to see the transition to a more broadly-based government, with the proper building blocks of a free and democratic society. I simply don't accept that there is somehow a dead end choice between a security state on the one hand, and an Islamist one on the other. But let us not fool ourselves. These are just contributory factors. Even if we sorted out all of

the problems that I have mentioned, there would still be this terrorism. I believe the root lies in the existence of this extremist ideology. I would argue an important reason so many young Muslims are drawn to it comes down to a question of identity.

[8] What I am about to say is drawn from the British experience, but I believe there are general lessons for us all. In the UK, some young men find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practiced at home by their parents, whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries. But these young men also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values.

[9] So, when a white person holds objectionable views, racist views for instance, we rightly condemn them. But when equally unacceptable views or practices come from someone who isn't white, we've been too cautious frankly – frankly, even fearful – to stand up to them. The failure, for instance, of some to confront the horrors of forced marriage, the practice where some young girls are bullied and sometimes taken abroad to marry someone when they don't want to, is a case in point. This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology. Now for sure, they don't turn into terrorists overnight, but what we see – and what we see in so many European countries – is a process of radicalisation.

[10] Internet chatrooms are virtual meeting places where attitudes are shared, strengthened and validated. In some mosques, preachers of hate can sow misinformation about the plight of Muslims elsewhere. In our communities, groups and organisations led by young, dynamic leaders promote separatism by encouraging Muslims to define themselves solely in terms of their religion. All these interactions can engender a sense of community, a substitute for what the wider society has failed to supply. Now, you might say, as long as they're not hurting anyone, what is the problem with all this?

[11] Well, I'll tell you why. As evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were initially influenced by what some have called 'non-violent extremists', and they then took those radical beliefs to the next level by embracing violence. And I say this is an indictment of our approach to these issues in the past. And if we are to defeat this threat, I believe it is time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past. So first, instead of ignoring this extremist ideology, we – as governments and as societies – have got to confront it, in all its forms. And second, instead of encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone.

[12] Let me briefly take each in turn. First, confronting and undermining this ideology. Whether they are violent in their means or not, we must make it

impossible for the extremists to succeed. Now, for governments, there are some obvious ways we can do this. We must ban preachers of hate from coming to our countries. We must also proscribe organisations that incite terrorism against people at home and abroad. Governments must also be shrewder in dealing with those that, while not violent, are in some cases part of the problem. We need to think much harder about who it's in the public interest to work with. Some organisations that seek to present themselves as a gateway to the Muslim community are showered with public money despite doing little to combat extremism. As others have observed, this is like turning to a right-wing fascist party to fight a violent white supremacist movement. So we should properly judge these organisations: do they believe in universal human rights – including for women and people of other faiths? Do they believe in equality of all before the law? Do they believe in democracy and the right of people to elect their own government? Do they encourage integration or separation? These are the sorts of questions we need to ask. Fail these tests and the presumption should be not to engage with organisations – so, no public money, no sharing of platforms with ministers at home.

[13] At the same time, we must stop these groups from reaching people in publicly-funded institutions like universities or even, in the British case, prisons. Now, some say, this is not compatible with free speech and intellectual inquiry. Well, I say, would you take the same view if these were right-wing extremists recruiting on our campuses? Would you advocate inaction if Christian fundamentalists who believed that Muslims are the enemy were leading prayer groups in our prisons? And to those who say these non-violent extremists are actually helping to keep young, vulnerable men away from violence, I say nonsense.

[14] Would you allow the far right groups a share of public funds if they promise to help you lure young white men away from fascist terrorism? Of course not. But, at root, challenging this ideology means exposing its ideas for what they are, and that is completely unjustifiable. We need to argue that terrorism is wrong in all circumstances. We need to argue that prophecies of a global war of religion pitting Muslims against the rest of the world are nonsense.

[15] Now, governments cannot do this alone. The extremism we face is a distortion of Islam, so these arguments, in part, must be made by those within Islam. So let us give voice to those followers of Islam in our own countries – the vast, often unheard majority – who despise the extremists and their worldview. Let us engage groups that share our aspirations.

[16] Now, second, we must build stronger societies and stronger identities at home. Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism. A passively tolerant society says to its citizens, as long as you obey the law we will just leave you alone. It stands neutral between different values. But I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in certain values and actively promotes them. Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality. It says to its citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these things. Now, each of us in our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty.

[17] There are practical things that we can do as well. That includes making sure that immigrants speak the language of their new home and ensuring that people are educated in the elements of a common culture and curriculum. Back home, we're introducing National Citizen Service: a two-month programme for sixteen-year-olds from different backgrounds to live and work together. I also believe we should encourage meaningful and active participation in society, by shifting the balance of power away from the state and towards the people. That way, common purpose can be formed as people come together and work together in their neighbourhoods. It will also help build stronger pride in local identity, so people feel free to say, 'Yes, I am a Muslim, I am a Hindu, I am Christian, but I am also a Londoner or a Berliner too'. It's that identity, that feeling of belonging in our countries, that I believe is the key to achieving true cohesion.

[18] So, let me end with this. This terrorism is completely indiscriminate and has been thrust upon us. It cannot be ignored or contained; we have to confront it with confidence – confront the ideology that drives it by defeating the ideas that warp so many young minds at their root, and confront the issues of identity that sustain it by standing for a much broader and generous vision of citizenship in our countries. Now, none of this will be easy. We will need stamina, patience and endurance, and it won't happen at all if we act alone. This ideology crosses not just our continent but all continents, and we are all in this together. At stake are not just lives, it is our way of life. That is why this is a challenge we cannot avoid; it is one we must rise to and overcome. Thank you.

Source: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/> (accessed on 15th February 2011)

Released under an [Open Government License v2.0](#)

Appendix 4: Press Coverage of Sarkozy's Editorial

Database: Nexis (FR, DE, UK)

Database: Factiva (DE)

Category: Immigration, Citizenship & Displacement

Keywords: Sarkozy and (Muslims (or) Islam)

Period: Tuesday, December 09, 2009 – Monday, December 14, 2009

Time Of Request: Thursday, August 08, 2013 20:19:40

French Newspapers	
1.	Les mots du débat; Dossier. L'islam et la laïcité au centre du débat. Repères La Croix, Lundi 14 Décembre 2009, EV...NEMENT, 317 mots
2.	' Une assimilation réussie, c'est la clé du métissage ^a ; Dossier. L'islam et la laïcité au centre du débat; Pour Henri Guaino, le débat sur l'identité nationale ne peut se résumer à l'immigration ou à la question religieuse, mais ne pas les évoquer serait ' absurde ^a La Croix, Lundi 14 Décembre 2009, EV...NEMENT, 1232 mots, ROYER Solenn de; ROUDEN Cécile
3.	La mosquée de Castres profanée la nuit dernière Le Parisien, Dimanche 13 Décembre 2009, A LA UNE; RELIGION, 465 mots, R.B.
4.	M. Portier : " La laïcité d'intégration joue aussi pour les musulmans " Le Monde, 13 décembre 2009 dimanche, POLITIQUE; Pg. 8, 1344 mots, Propos recueillis par Stéphanie Le Bars
5.	Analyse; Pourquoi la France n'a pas de leçon à donner à la Suisse Le Monde, 12 décembre 2009 samedi, EDITORIAL - ANALYSES; Pg. 2, 913 mots
6.	L'ISLAM est-il soluble dans la République laïque ? Même si ce n'était pas, à l'origine, l'objet du débat sur l'identité... Le Parisien, Jeudi 10 Décembre 2009, FAIT, 329 mots, Henri Vernet et Béatrice Houchard
7.	Le débat sur l'identité tourne au débat sur l'islam Le Monde, 10 décembre 2009 jeudi, UNE; Pg. 1, 788 mots, Stéphanie Le Bars
8.	M. Sarkozy veut éviter que le FN confisque le débat sur l'identité nationale Le Monde, 10 décembre 2009 jeudi, POLITIQUE; Pg. 13, 654 mots, Abel Mestre, Caroline Monnot et Patrick Roger
9.	Identité et unité nationales Le Figaro ...conomie, Mercredi 9 Décembre 2009, OPINIONS; Pg. 17, 407 mots, Du Limbert, Paul-Henri
10.	Le nouveau message de Sarkozy : l'islam de France Le Figaro ...conomie, Mercredi 9 Décembre 2009, FRANCE; Politique; Pg. 3, 660 mots, Jaigu, Charles
11.	Identité et unité nationales Le Figaro, Mercredi 9 Décembre 2009, OPINIONS; Pg. 17, 407 mots, Du Limbert, Paul-Henri
12.	Identité nationale: Sarkozy invite chacun : pratiquer son culte avec 'humble discrétion' Les Echos, Mercredi 9 Décembre 2009, ARTICLE; Pg. 2, 444 mots, CECILE CORNUDET
13.	' Une assimilation réussie, c'est la clé du métissage ^a ; Dossier. L'islam et la laïcité au centre du débat; Pour Henri Guaino, le débat sur l'identité nationale ne peut se résumer à l'immigration ou à la question religieuse, mais ne pas les évoquer serait ' absurde ^a La Croix, Lundi 14 Décembre 2009, EV...NEMENT, 1232 mots, ROYER Solenn de; ROUDEN Cécile

14.	<u>Les mots du débat; Dossier. L'islam et la laïcité au centre du débat. Repères</u> La Croix, Lundi 14 Décembre 2009, EV...NEMENT, 317 mots
15.	<u>" Mariages gris " et matins bruns</u> Le Monde, 9 décembre 2009 mercredi, D...BATS; Pg. 20, 1173 mots
16.	<u>L'équité sociale, priorité de l'électorat ouvrier</u> Le Monde, 9 décembre 2009 mercredi, POLITIQUE; Pg. 12, 845 mots, Jean-Michel Normand
17.	<u>Assemblée: débat sans passion sur la nation</u> Le Figaro ...conomie, Mercredi 9 Décembre 2009, FRANCE; Politique; Pg. 4, 524 mots, Huet, Sophie
18.	<u>Assemblée: débat sans passion sur la nation; La droite se félicite de l'initiative d'...ric Besson, la gauche dénonce des arriÈre-pensées électorales.</u> Le Figaro, Mercredi 9 Décembre 2009, FRANCE; Politique; Pg. 4, 524 mots, Huet, Sophie
19.	<u>Les ratés de la politique d'immigration choisie</u> Les Echos, Mardi 8 Décembre 2009, ARTICLE; Pg. 2, 499 mots, MAXIME AMIOT

German Newspapers

1.	<u>quergeschrieben; Das Minarettverbot: Ein Bruch</u> Die Presse, Montag 14. Dezember 2009, 452 Wörter, von Andreas Khol
2.	<u>Vier Fragen an Josef Joffe; Was macht die Welt? Zum Krieg bereit sein, Minarette tolerieren und Boni fließen sehen</u> Der Tagesspiegel, Montag 14. Dezember 2009, TITEL; S. 1, 458 Wörter
3.	<u>PRESSESTIMMEN;</u> Frankfurter Rundschau, Donnerstag 10. Dezember 2009, LESERBRIEFE; S. 32, 340 Wörter
4.	<u>Sarkozys nationale Nabelschau</u> Die Presse, Donnerstag 10. Dezember 2009, 727 Wörter, Von unserem Korrespondenten RUDOLF BALMER
5.	<u>Selbstzweifel einer Grande Nation; Wie die Franzosen über ihre "nationale Identität" diskutieren</u> Frankfurter Rundschau, Mittwoch 09. Dezember 2009, POLITIK; S. 8, 654 Wörter, Stefan Bröndle
6.	<u>Sarkozy bricht eine Lanze für die Schweizer; Muslime sollen nicht provozieren - Initiative gegen Minarett-Verbot</u> Stuttgarter Nachrichten, Mittwoch 9. Dezember 2009, ZEITGESCHEHEN; S. 4, 254 Wörter
7.	<u>Sarkozy verteidigt die Schweizer</u> Spiegel Online, 8. Dezember 2009 Dienstag 9:08 AM GMT, NACH MINARETT-VERBOT, 639 Wörter
8.	<u>Multikulti àà Sarkozy</u> Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 December 2009, 246 words
9.	<u>Die Watte des Präsidenten,</u> Die Zeit, Gero v. Randow 10 December 2009 370 words
10.	<u>Frankreich streitet über seine nationale Identität - Das republikanische Experiment,</u> Die Welt, Sascha Lehnartz, 333 10 December 2009, 333 words

British Newspapers

1.	<u>Equality and public safety invoked in call for ban on 'extremist' burka</u> The Times (London),
----	--

	December 14, 2009 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 34, 137 words, Charles Bremner
2.	<u>Brawl engulfs Sarkozy's grand debate; Matthew Campbell watches a national exploration of 'identity' descend into farce in Troyes</u> The Sunday Times (London), December 13, 2009, NEWS; Pg. 31, 942 words, Matthew Campbell
3.	<u>MEN WHO PUT WIFE IN BURKA 'NOT WELCOME IN FRANCE'</u> DAILY MAIL (London), December 11, 2009 Friday, 563 words, FROM IAN SPARKS
4.	<u>Twitchy Sarko losing some gloss; Analysis</u> The Times (London), December 10, 2009 Thursday, NEWS; Pg. 43, 263 words, Charles Bremner
5.	<u>Sarkozy defends; Swiss ban on minarets</u> The Daily Telegraph (London), December 9, 2009 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 23, 281 words, Henry Samuel
6.	<u>Sarkozy: Muslims should be discreet</u> The Express, December 9, 2009 Wednesday, NEWS; 4, 155 words
7.	<u>International: Sarkozy defends Swiss over ban on minarets: French president calls for 'discreet' form of worship: Statements meant to stir xenophobia - opposition</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, December 9, 2009 Wednesday, GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 18, 629 words, Ian Traynor, Europe Editor
8.	<u>Muslims told 'be discreet'</u> The Sun (England), December 9, 2009 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 2, 88 words
9.	<u>'Humble' Muslims</u> The Sun (England), December 9, 2009 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 2, 41 words
10.	<u>Sarkozy warns Muslims 'practise faith discreetly'</u> The Times (London), December 9, 2009 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 44, 176 words, Charles Bremner
11.	<u>Sarkozy defends Switzerland minaret ban</u> Guardian Unlimited, December 8, 2009 Tuesday, 645 words, Ian Traynorguardian.co.uk

Appendix 5: Press Coverage of Merkel's Speech

Database: Nexis (FR, DE, UK)

Database: Factiva (DE)

Category: Immigration, Citizenship & Displacement

Keywords: Merkel and (Muslims (or) Islam)

Period: Monday, October 25, 2010 – Monday, December 18, 2010

Time Of Request: Thursday, August 08, 2013 20:19:40

French Newspapers	
1.	<u>L'ANALYSE; Merkel peine à rénover la droite allemande</u> Le Figaro, Vendredi 22 Octobre 2010, OPINIONS; Pg. 15, 508 mots, Saint-Paul, Patrick
2.	<u>Les privilèges de l'...glise en Bavière remis en question</u> Le Figaro ...Economie, Jeudi 21 Octobre 2010, INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 8, 561 mots, Saint-Paul, Patrick
3.	<u>Immigration : le président allemand joue la conciliation</u> Les Echos, Mercredi 20 Octobre 2010, BREVE; Pg. 20, 63 mots, LES ECHOS
4.	<u>Pourquoi Angela Merkel critique les immigrés</u> Aujourd'hui en France, Mardi 19 Octobre 2010, EDITION ABONN...S - POLITIQUE; ALLEMAGNE, 486 mots, CATHERINE TARDREW
5.	<u>Le modèle multiculturel allemand a-t-il Echoué ?; La question du jour;</u> Patrick Moreau, chercheur sur l'Allemagne au CNRS à Berlin La Croix, Mardi 19 Octobre 2010, LA QUESTION DU JOUR, 362 mots, MAILLARD SÉbastien
6.	<u>L'Allemagne brise à son tour le tabou du débat sur l'islam</u> Le Monde, 19 octobre 2010 mardi, EUROPE; Pg. 8, 1235 mots, Marion Van Renterghem
7.	<u>" 20 % de l'Electorat européen craint que la diversification culturelle fragilise les nations "</u> Le Monde, 19 octobre 2010 mardi, POLITIQUE; Pg. 8, 630 mots, Propos recueillis par Cécile Prieur
8.	<u>Le grand Écart de Merkel</u> Aujourd'hui en France, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, EDITION ABONN...S - POLITIQUE; Allemagne, 203 mots
9.	<u>En bref</u> La Tribune, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE; Pg. 11, 393 mots
10.	<u>Merkel revendique les valeurs chrétiennes de l'Allemagne</u> Le Figaro ...conomie, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, UNE-FIG; Pg. 1, 93 mots, OberlÉ, Thierry
11.	<u>Merkel enterre le modèle d'intégration allemand</u> Le Figaro ...conomie, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, EUROPE; Pg. 9, 641 mots, Brunet, Marion
12.	<u>Merkel revendique les valeurs chrétiennes de l'Allemagne</u> Le Figaro, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, UNE-FIG; Pg. 1, 93 mots, OberlÉ, Thierry
13.	<u>Merkel enterre le modèle d'intégration allemand; Intervenant dans le dÉbat sur l'immigration, la chanceliÈre a dénoncé samedi l'Échec du modèle multiculturel^a de son pays.</u> Le Figaro, Lundi 18 Octobre 2010, EUROPE; Pg. 9, 641 mots, Brunet, Marion

	German Newspapers
1.	<u>Skandinavien: Missglückte Integration</u> Handelsblatt, Freitag 22. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 16, 272 Wörter, Steuer, Helmut
2.	<u>USA: Parallele zu hispanischen Einwanderern</u> Handelsblatt, Freitag 22. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 16, 313 Wörter, Ziener, Markus
3.	<u>Frankreich: Applaus von den Rechtsradikalen</u> Handelsblatt, Freitag 22. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 17, 290 Wörter, Alich, Holger
4.	<u>Verzögerung am Bosphorus; Deutschland erschwert türkischen Unternehmen den Handel - Nun beginnt sich die Türkei von ihrem wichtigsten Handelspartner abzuwenden</u> Die Welt, Freitag 22. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT; S. 10, 946 Wörter, Freia Peters
5.	<u>Was unsere Gesellschaft zusammenhält; Seid endlich universal: „Multikulturalismus“ und „deutsche Leitkultur“ sind gleichermaßen Irrwege</u> Die Welt, Freitag 22. Oktober 2010, FEUILLETON; S. 23, 1392 Wörter, Richard Herzinger
6.	<u>Schmutz statt Präsident Wulff; INTEGRATION Die frühere Bundestagspräsidentin kritisiert im taz-Interview die Debatte als „rückwärtsgewandt“: „Wir sind eine multikulturelle Gesellschaft“</u> taz, die tageszeitung, Donnerstag 21. Oktober 2010, SEITE 1; S. 01, 260 Wörter
7.	<u>Westerwelle in Indien: Wie die Multikulti-Debatte den Minister begleitet</u> Handelsblatt, Mittwoch 20. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 14, 503 Wörter, Hauschild, Helmut
8.	<u>Bohrende Fragen zur Integration; ISLAM-DEBATTE Eine Zahnarztpraxis in Berlin-Neukölln. Mitarbeiter und Patienten - fast alle sind Einwanderer. Was denken sie über den Integrationsstreit, den Sarrazin und Wulff entfachten? Der Arzt, die Prophylaxe-Assistentin, der Praktikant und die einzige nichtmigrantische Kollegin antworten</u> taz, die tageszeitung, Mittwoch 20. Oktober 2010, TAZZWEI; S. 13, 1224 Wörter, DIANA AUST
9.	<u>Zuwanderung spaltet die Koalition; Streit um Punktesystem wird schriller - Innenminister de Maizière: Jeder plaudert ohne Sachkenntnis daher</u> Die Welt, Mittwoch 20. Oktober 2010, POLITIK; S. 2, 965 Wörter, Freia Peters
10.	<u>Willkommene Arbeitskraft; Bundesler will Ausländern Punkte geben, Schavan Berufsabschlüsse schneller anerkennen</u> Frankfurter Rundschau, Dienstag 19. Oktober 2010, POLITIK; S. 6, 530 Wörter, Olivia Schoeller
11.	<u>Pünktchen für mehr Akzeptanz; KOMMENTAR VON LUKAS WALLRAFF</u> taz, die tageszeitung, Dienstag 19. Oktober 2010, SEITE 1; S. 01, 398 Wörter, LUKAS WALLRAFF
12.	<u>„Merkel sucht ein Feindbild“; Grüne Köstner weist Multikulti-Aussage zurück</u> Frankfurter Rundschau, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, POLITIK; S. 1, 296 Wörter, Olivia Schoeller
13.	<u>„Kulturelle Abschottung ist falsch“</u> Handelsblatt, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 12, 882 Wörter, Afh, ppe, Sven
14.	<u>Merkel provoziert Unmut der Liberalen</u> Handelsblatt, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, TITELSEITE; S. 1, 246 Wörter, saf
15.	<u>Zuwanderung: Merkel und Seehofer halten „Multikulti“ für gescheitert</u> Handelsblatt, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK; S. 12, 663 Wörter
16.	<u>Zurück auf die Schulbank; Aus Langzeitarbeitslosen lassen sich nur schwer Fachkräfte machen / Arbeitsmarktexperten fordern mehr Zuwanderung</u> Der Tagesspiegel, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, WIRTSCHAFT; S. 15, 734 Wörter, Janel Mielke

17.	Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gestorben; PARTEIEN Ruf nach qualifizierten Einwanderern wird lauter taz, die tageszeitung, Montag 18. Oktober 2010, SEITE 1; S. 01, 206 Wörter
18.	Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert, 559 words, 18 October 2010, Die Welt
19.	Wer zu uns kommt, Torsten Krauel, 295 words, 18 October 2010, Die Welt
20.	Die "türkisch-deutsche Achse", Boris Kalnoky, 1,084 words, 19 October 2010, Die Welt
21.	„Eine Million Verweigerer“ Integrationsunwillige bis Multikulti –as hinter den Kampfbegriffen der Parteien steckt, Von Roland Preuß, 525 words, 19 October 2010, Süddeutsche Zeitung
22.	Zuwanderung spaltet die Koalition, Freia Peters, 802 words, 20 October 2010, Die Welt
23.	Der Bundespräsident als Integrator; Wulff versucht in Ankara, die irre ausländerpolitische Diskussion ins Flussbett der Vernunft zu leiten, Von Heribert Prantl, 437 words, 20 October 2010, Süddeutsche Zeitung
24.	Worte der Woche, 201 words, 21 October 2010, DIE ZEIT
25.	MEINUNG ZEITGEIST; Einwanderung? Aber ja, Josef Joffe, 476 words, 21 October 2010, DIE ZEIT
26.	ZUWANDERUNG; Magnet für Talente von draußen, Vera Sprothen, 1,061 words, 21 October 2010, DIE ZEIT
27.	Was unsere Gesellschaft zusammenhält, Richard Herzinger, 1,109 words, 22 October 2010, Die Welt

British Newspapers

1.	Multiculturalism needs defenders; International Studies Independent Extra, October 21, 2010 Thursday, COMMENT; Pg. 4, 979 words, Adrian Hamilton
2.	Europe is sinking rapidly; LEADER COLUMN The Express, October 20, 2010 Wednesday, LEADER COLUMN; 1, 116 words
3.	Europe is sinking rapidly The Express, October 20, 2010 Wednesday, EDITORIAL; OPINION, LEADING ARTICLES; Pg. 12, 270 words
4.	Help Turks assimilate, Gul urges Germany The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, October 20, 2010 Wednesday, GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 22, 264 words, Kate Connolly, Berlin
5.	Multicultural mistakes; THE DAILY TELEGRAPH Established 1855 The Daily Telegraph (London), October 19, 2010 Tuesday, EDITORIAL; OPINIONS, LEADING ARTICLES; Pg. 21, 307 words
6.	DON'T START A RACE WAR Daily Star, October 19, 2010 Tuesday, NEWS; 15, 304 words, by EMMA WALL
7.	'Multikulti' has failed in Germany says Merkel The Daily Telegraph (London), October 18, 2010 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 20, 289 words, Allan Hall

8.	<u>MULTICULTURALISM IN GERMANY HAS 'FAILED UTTERLY' SAYS MERKEL</u> DAILY MAIL (London), October 18, 2010 Monday, 582 words, FROM ALLAN HALL IN BERLIN
9.	<u>Immigrants must learn German, says Merkel</u> Daily Post (North Wales), October 18, 2010 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 14, 147 words
10.	<u>Warning for immigrants</u> Evening Times (Glasgow), October 18, 2010 Monday, FOR; Pg. 10, 63 words, NO BYLINE
11.	<u>Multi-cultural society has failed says Merkel</u> The Express, October 18, 2010 Monday, NEWS; 02, 497 words, By Allan Hall and Sarah Westcott
12.	<u>Comment: Merkel's own goal: Germany's leader is wrong about multiculturalism, though a football match may have rattled her</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, October 18, 2010 Monday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 29, 741 words, Philip Oltermann
13.	<u>Multiculturalism is a failure, says Merkel: German chancellor's remarks reflect heated debate and suggest shift in attitude towards immigration</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, October 18, 2010 Monday, GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 16, 740 words, Kate Connolly, Berlin
14.	<u>Merkel admits: Multicultural society has failed in Germany</u> The Herald (Glasgow), October 18, 2010 Monday, HS - NEWS; Pg. 16, 410 words, sabine siebold potsdam
15.	<u>Weak Merkel stokes xenophobia as she fights for political survival</u> The Independent (London), October 18, 2010 Monday, WORLD; Pg. 20, 904 words, Tony Paterson in Berlin
16.	<u>Integration has two sides; Leading Articles Germany</u> Independent Extra, October 18, 2010 Monday, COMMENT; Pg. 2, 420 words
17.	<u>Germany's new culture struggle</u> Metro (UK), October 18, 2010 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 16, 181 words, Aidan Radnedge
18.	<u>SPLITTING HERRS; Merkel: Immigration has polarised Germany</u> The Sun (England), October 18, 2010 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 26, 213 words, NICK PARKER

Appendix 6: Press Coverage of Cameron's Speech

Database: Nexis (FR, DE, UK)

Database: Factiva (DE)

Category: Immigration, Citizenship & Displacement

Keywords: Cameron and (Muslims (or) Islam)

Period: Saturday, February 5, 2011 – Saturday, February 12, 2011

Time Of Request: Thursday, August 08, 2013 20:19:40

French Newspapers	
1.	<u>L'ANALYSE; Multiculturalisme:Sarkozy tranche</u> Le Figaro ...conomie, Samedi 12 Février 2011, OPINIONS; Pg. 17, 670 mots, Waintraub, Judith
2.	<u>' L'Échec du multiculturalisme 'a</u> Aujourd'hui en France, Vendredi 11 Février 2011, EDITION ABONN...S - FAIT DU JOUR; DIVERSIT..., 191 mots, V. Md.
3.	<u>Grande-Bretagne : l'" École libre ", c'est possible</u> Le Monde, 11 Février 2011 vendredi, CONTRE-ENQUETE; Pg. 15, 508 mots, Virginie Malingre (Londres, correspondante)
4.	<u>Multiculturalisme: Marine Le Pen embarrasse David Cameron</u> Les Echos, Vendredi 11 Février 2011, ARTICLE; Pg. 20, 356 mots, NICOLAS MADELAINE
5.	<u>David Cameron dénonce le multiculturalisme et lance le débat en Grande-Bretagne</u> Le Monde, 8 Février 2011 mardi, INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 8, 881 mots, Virginie Malingre
6.	<u>L'Allemagne prend conscience que 20 % de sa population est issue de l'immigration</u> Le Monde, 8 février 2011 mardi, POLITIQUE; Pg. 8, 650 mots, FrÉdÉric LemaÔtre
7.	<u>Le Royaume-Uni ouvre ses portes aux riches immigrants</u> Les Echos, Mardi 8 Février 2011, ARTICLE; Pg. 8, 609 mots, NICOLAS MADELAINE
8.	<u>Cameron cible l'islamisme</u> Aujourd'hui en France, Lundi 7 FÉvrier 2011, EDITION ABONN...S - POLITIQUE; GRANDE-BRETAGNE, 142 mots
9.	<u>David Cameron reconnaît l'Échec du multiculturalisme</u> Le Figaro ...conomie, Lundi 7 Février 2011, INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 8, 597 mots, Vanlerberghe, Cyrille
10.	<u>David Cameron dénonce le multiculturalisme</u> Les Echos, Lundi 7 Février 2011, BREVE; Pg. 16, 69 mots, CATHERINE CHATIGNOUX
11.	<u>Royaume-Uni : pour Cameron, la politique d'intégration a Echoué</u> Le Parisienne, Samedi 5 FÉvrier 2011, A LA UNE; INTEGRATION, 627 mots

German Newspapers	
1.	<u>Multikulti-Streit in England</u> Berliner Zeitung, Montag 7. Februar 2011, POLITIK; S. 4, 503 Wörter
2.	<u>Ende der falschen Toleranz; Multikulturalismus ist für den britischen Premier Cameron gescheitert</u> Die Welt, Montag 7. Februar 2011 , FORUM; Kommentar; S. 3, 331 Wörter, Thomas Kielinger

3.	<u>Cameron sieht Multikulti-Ansatz als gescheitert an</u> Spiegel Online, 5. Februar 2011 Samstag 3:07 PM GMT+1, BRITISCHER PREMIER, 497 Wörter
4.	<u>Wüende Bauern im statistischen Vollrausch</u> , Sascha Lehnartz, 744 words, 12 February 2011, Die Welt
5.	<u>Der Kopfmensch in der Revolte</u> , Richard Herzinger, 902 words, 12 February 2011 - Die Welt
6.	<u>Leitmotiv zur Leitkultur; Europa kann seine Werte selbstbewusst verteidigen –uch ohne Fremdenfeindlichkeit</u> , Von Stefan Ulrich, 522 words, 12 February 2011 - Süddeutsche Zeitung
7.	<u>Herausforderungen f_r den Westen: M_nchner Sicherheitskonferenz diskutiert „ber fgypten, Nahost und Afghanistan.; Protest ja - aber keine Revolution; Auch nach knapp zwei Wochen Unruhen in fgypten tut sich der Westen schwer</u> Die Welt, Montag 7. Februar 2011 , POLITIK; S. 4, 1278 Wörter, Clemens Wergin

British Newspapers

1.	<u>Town where one in 10 is a Gurkha family</u> The Daily Telegraph (London), February 12, 2011 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 9, 446 words, Laura Roberts
2.	<u>Saturday: Comment: A bill of rights won't free us: People around the world regard voting as fundamental - so why the posturing in parliament?</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 12, 2011 Saturday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 39, 619 words, Francesca Klug
3.	<u>Le Pen offers support for Cameron speech</u> The Daily Telegraph (London), February 10, 2011 Thursday, NEWS; Pg. 17, 218 words, Andy Bloxham
4.	<u>French far right praises Cameron stance on multiculturalism</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 10, 2011 Thursday, GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 15, 237 words, David Batty
5.	<u>You don't set a thief to catch a terrorist; The Prime Minister is spot-on: we should promote democratic values, not cosy up to those who reject them</u> The Times (London), February 10, 2011 Thursday, NEWS; OPINION, COLUMNS; Pg. 25, 1122 words, David Aaronovitch
6.	<u>Cameron's confusion on multiculturalism</u> Guardian Unlimited, February 8, 2011 Tuesday, 821 words, Andrew Brown guardian.co.uk
7.	<u>Comment: This is not a minority problem: Multiculturalism has made progress in Britain - but white reticence is still the stumbling block</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 8, 2011 Tuesday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 32, 698 words, Tariq Modood
8.	<u>Comment: This is not a minority problem: A control order for values</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 8, 2011 Tuesday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 32, 329 words, Vikram Dodd
9.	<u>Comment: This is not a minority problem: Which is the real Cameron?</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 8, 2011 Tuesday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 32, 338 words, Salma Yaqoob
10.	<u>Reading, riting, religion, really?; David Cameron says multiculturalism has failed. So what's he doing promoting faith schools, asks Philip Collins</u> The Times (London), February 8, 2011 Tuesday, T2;FEATURES; Pg. 4,5, 1323 words, Philip Collins

11.	<u>Muscular conservatism could strengthen national identity and counter extremism</u> ; <u>Letters to the Editor</u> The Daily Telegraph (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, LETTERS; Pg. 21, 404 words
12.	<u>Miliband silent in multiculturalism row</u> ; <u>News Bulletin</u> The Daily Telegraph (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 2, 119 words
13.	<u>Did David Cameron really mean what he said about multiculturalism?</u> Guardian Unlimited, February 7, 2011 Monday, 773 words, Salma Yaqoobguardian.co.uk
14.	<u>David Cameron's control order for values</u> Guardian Unlimited, February 7, 2011 Monday, 1215 words, Vikram Doddguardian.co.uk
15.	<u>Letter: Multiculturalism and Britain's national identity</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 7, 2011 Monday, GUARDIAN LEADER PAGES; Pg. 29, 864 words
16.	<u>Cameron's crackdown under way as cash withheld from 'suspect' groups: Funding cut to Muslim bodies after PM speech Steps to combat rise of radicalism in universities</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 7, 2011 Monday, GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 4, 782 words, Patrick Wintour and Jenny Percival
17.	<u>Cameron on multiculturalism: Blaming the victims</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 7, 2011 Monday, GUARDIAN LEADER PAGES; Pg. 28, 655 words
18.	<u>Cameron 'livid' after speech comes under fire Attacks from Muslims leave Cameron under</u> The Independent (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 10, 495 words, Oliver Wright Whitehall Editor
19.	<u>It is state multiculturalism that is racist, and David Cameron who is a liberal</u> telegraph.co.uk, February 7, 2011 Monday 2:15 PM GMT, BLOG, 980 words, By Ed West
20.	<u>David Cameron on Muslims: time to show that we really are all in this together</u> telegraph.co.uk, February 7, 2011 Monday 1:50 PM GMT, BLOG, 614 words, By George Pitcher
21.	<u>Multiculturalism</u> ; <u>Letters to the Editor</u> The Times (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, LETTERS; Pg. 25, 301 words
22.	<u>No Place for the Intolerant</u> ; <u>Multiculturalism has left minorities alienated and adrift. Cameron is right to insist on muscular liberalism to promote values that all Britons must share</u> The Times (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, EDITORIAL; OPINION, LEADING ARTICLES; Pg. 2, 646 words
23.	<u>Cuts hit counter-extremist group</u> The Times (London), February 7, 2011 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 6, 366 words, Roland Watson
24.	<u>COMMENT: MULTICULTURALISM: Mr Cameron has a point - but this is a crude caricature</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 Sunday, OBSERVER NEW COMMENT PAGES; Pg. 32, 735 words, Editorial
25.	<u>COMMENT: The 'big society' is collapsing under its inherent absurdity: The prime minister still thinks his cherished dream has force. It's a pity everyone else is rapidly deserting him</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 Sunday, OBSERVER NEW COMMENT PAGES; Pg. 35, 1208 words, Catherine Bennett
26.	<u>Front: Cameron sparks fury with attack on multiculturalism: PM 'has handed PR coup to far right' Straw says comments 'ill-judged'</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 Sunday, OBSERVER HOME NEWS PAGES; Pg. 1, 821 words, Toby Helm Political Editor Matthew Taylor and Rowenna Davis
27.	<u>Special report: Coalition divided over Cameron onslaught on multiculturalism</u> The Guardian

	(London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 Sunday, OBSERVER HOME NEWS PAGES; Pg. 8, 1378 words, Jamie Doward
28.	<u>Special report: MULTICULTURAL BRITAIN - SIX PROMINENT THINKERS GIVE THEIR VIEW</u> The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, February 6, 2011 Sunday, OBSERVER HOME NEWS PAGES; Pg. 9, 982 words
29.	<u>Diversity does not breed terrorists - politics does</u> The Independent on Sunday, February 6, 2011, COMMENT; Pg. 42, 576 words, Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed
30.	<u>Cameron's confusion over identity; Leading Articles</u> The Independent on Sunday, February 6, 2011, COMMENT; Pg. 42, 739 words
31.	<u>Labour accuses Cameron of lining up with extremists on multiculturalism; PM's attack on some minorities' failure to integrate draws stinging criticism. Matt Chorley and Brian Brady report</u> The Independent on Sunday, February 6, 2011, NEWS; Pg. 4, 1603 words, Matt Chorley and Brian Brady
32.	<u>Speech boosts anti-Islamists</u> The Observer (England), February 6, 2011, OBSERVER HOME NEWS PAGES; Pg. 9, 324 words
33.	<u>Prime Minister stands firm over criticism of multiculturalism</u> The Sunday Telegraph (London), February 6, 2011, NEWS; Pg. 4, 433 words
34.	<u>Miliband ally accuses PM of stoking support for far right</u> The Sunday Times (London), February 6, 2011 Sunday, NEWS; Pg. 2, 427 words, Simon McGee
35.	<u>FINE WORDS, MR CAMERON, BUT WHAT'S NEXT?</u> The Sunday Times (London), February 6, 2011 Sunday, EDITORIAL; OPINION, LEADING ARTICLES; Pg. 20, 584 words
36.	<u>Muslims must embrace core British values, says Cameron</u> The Daily Telegraph (London), February 5, 2011 Saturday, NEWS; FRONT PAGE; Pg. 1, 520 words, James Kirkup
37.	<u>Cameron: my war on multiculturalism; No funding for Muslim groups that fail to back women's rights</u> The Independent (London), February 5, 2011 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 1, 1118 words, Oliver Wright and Jerome Taylor
38.	<u>How monocultural does the Prime Minister want us to be?; Analysis</u> The Independent (London), February 5, 2011 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 4, 501 words, Paul Vallely
39.	<u>The Big Society will never be built on the cheap; Leading Articles</u> The Independent (London), February 5, 2011 Saturday, COMMENT; Pg. 36, 550 words
40.	<u>David Cameron versus the Islamists: the Prime Minister throws down the gauntlet to a deadly enemy</u> telegraph.co.uk, February 5, 2011 Saturday 9:27 PM GMT, BLOG, 599 words, By Nile Gardiner
41.	<u>David Cameron strikes exactly the right note with call for 'muscular liberalism'</u> telegraph.co.uk, February 5, 2011 Saturday 12:49 PM GMT, BLOG, 250 words, By Toby Young
42.	<u>Multiculturalism has failed us: it's time for muscular liberalism, says Cameron</u> The Times (London), February 5, 2011 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 3, 889 words, Roland Watson, Sean O'Neill, Steve Bird
43.	<u>Sarkozy adds to chorus attacking multiculturalism; World Bulletin</u> The Daily Telegraph (London), February 11, 2011 Friday, NEWS; Pg. 22, 105 words
44.	<u>Has Dave realised Enoch was right?; ON SATURDAY</u> The Daily Telegraph (London), February 12, 2011 Saturday, EDITORIAL; OPINION, COLUMNS; Pg. 22, 122 words, Simon Heffer

References

- AFP. 2011. "Multiculturalism has failed, says French president". Feb 10, 2011
- AFP. 2010. "Merkel says German multi-cultural society has failed". Oct 17, 2010
- Anagnostou Dia & Evangelia Psychogiopoulou. 2010. *The European Court of Human Rights and the Rights of Marginalised Individuals and Minorities in National Context*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Allievi, Stefano. 2008. "How the Immigrant Has Become Muslim." *Revue Européenne Des Migrations Internationales* 21 (2) (October): 135–163. doi:10.4000/remi.2497.
- Allievi, Stefano. 2012. "Reactive identities and Islamophobia Muslim minorities and the challenge of religious pluralism in Europe." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 38(4-5): 379-387.
- Alleyne, Mark D. 2011. *Anti-Racism and Multiculturalism: Studies in International Communication*. Transaction Publishers.
- AlSayyad, Nezar, and Manuel Castells. 2002. *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam : Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*. Lexington Books ; Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of California at Berkeley. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0739103393>.
- Amghar, Samir, et al. 2007. *European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society*. Center for European Policy Studies.
- Anderson, Benedict R. 1991. *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso.
- Assemblée Nationale. 2009a, *Proposition de résolution, no. 1725*, 19 June 2009.
- Assemblée Nationale. 2009b., *Mission d'information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national* http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/voile_integral.asp
- Assemblée Nationale. 2010a. *Rapport d'information fait au nom de la mission d'information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national n° 2262 déposé le 26 janvier 2010* <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/rap-info/i2262.pdf>
- Assemblée Nationale. 2010b. "Étude d'impact: interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public," Assemblée Nationale, Paris, May 2010. <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/projets/pl2520-ei.pdf>
- Bader, Veit. 2007. *Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity*. Amsterdam University Press.
- Bagguley, Paul. and Yasmin Hussain. 2006. "Conflict and cohesion: official constructions of 'Community' around the 2001 riots in Britain." *Critical Studies* 28(1): 347–365.
- . 2008. *Riotous Citizens: Ethnic conflict in multicultural Britain*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Balibar, Etienne. 1991. "Racism and Nationalism." In *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, edited by Etienne Balibar and Immanuel M. Wallerstein, 37–67. Verso Books.
- . 2004 *We, The People of Europe?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Bauböck, Rainer, Eva Ersboll, Kees Groenendijk and Harald Waldrauch. 2006. (eds.) *Acquisition and Loss of Nationality. Policies and Trends in 15 European states*. Vol. 1: comparative analyses. Amsterdam University Press.
- Bauer, Martin W., and George Gaskell. 2004. *Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound : a Practical Handbook*. SAGE.
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0656/00703224-t.html>.
- BBC News. 2010. "France MPs' report backs Muslim face veil ban"
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8480161.stm>
- Bee, Cristiano, and Emanuela Bozzini. 2010. *Mapping the European Public Sphere : Institutions, Media and Civil Society*. Ashgate.
- Bertossi, Christophe. 2007. "French and British Models of Integration, Public Philosophies, Policies and State Institutions." COMPAS ESRC Centre on Migration.
<http://www.temaasyl.se/Documents/Offentliga%20dokument%20övriga%20EU/Bertossi%20integration%20policy%20in%20UK%20and%20France.pdf>
- . 2010. "What If National Models of Integration Did Not Exist?" *Perspectives on Europe* 40 (2): 50-56.
- . 2011. "National models of integration in Europe". *American Behavioral Scientist*, 55(12):1561-1580.
- Blair, Tony. 2005. *British Prime Minister Speech*. July 16, 2005
- Bochel Hugh. 2011. 'The Conservatives and the governance of social policy' in Bochel Hugh. (ed.) *The Conservative Party and Social Policy*. Bristol: The Policy Press: 251-68.
- Boswell, Christina. 2007. "Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 45 (3) (September): 589–610. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00722.x.
- Bigo, Didier. 2002. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Uneas." *Alternatives*, Vol. 27 (supplement): 63 - 92.
- Blair, Tony. 2005. *British Prime Minister Speech*. July 16, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4689363.stm>
- Block, Elena. 2013. "A culturalist approach to the concept of the mediatization of politics: The age of media hegemony". *Communication Theory*, 23(3):259-278
- Brown, Gordon. 2007. *We Need a United Kingdom*. Speech, 13 January 2007
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1539367/We-need-a-United-Kingdom.html>
- Brubaker, Roger. 2001. "The Return to Assimilation?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24(4), 531-548.
- Bruter, Michael. 2004. "On What Citizens Mean by Feeling 'European': Perceptions of News, Symbols and Borderless-ness." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30 (1) (January): 21–39. doi:10.1080/1369183032000170150.
- . 2005. *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230501539>.
- Bös, Matthias (2004): "Reconceptualizing Modes of Belonging: Advancements in the Sociology of Ethnicity and Multiculturalism" in: Nikolai Genov (Ed.):

- Advances in Sociological Knowledge over Half a Century*: 221-244.
- Bullard, Alice. 2008. *Human rights in crisis*. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT, Ashgate.
- Bulmer, Simon and Claudio Radaelli. 2005. "The Europeanisation of National Policy". In: Bulmer, S. and C. Lequesne (eds.) *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Busch, Peter, Helge Jorgens & Kerstin Tews. 2005. "The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Instruments". *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 598 no. 1 146-167.
- Butler, Judith, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and Cornel West. 2011. *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*. A Columbia / SSRC Book. Columbia University Press. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0231156464>.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Buzan, Barry & Ole Wæver. 2003. *Regions and powers: The structure of international security* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York.
- Calhoun, Craig J. 2001. "Civil Society/Public Sphere: History of the Concept." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, 1897–1903. Pergamon. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767001157>.
- . 2003. "The Democratic Integration of Europe: Interests, Identity, and the Public Sphere." In *Europe Without Borders : Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age*, edited by Mabel Berezin and Martin Schain, 243–74+. Johns Hopkins University Press. <http://www.nyu.edu/ipk/calhoun/files/calhounDemocraticIntegrationOfEurope.pdf>.
- Carr, Matt. 2006. "You Are Now Entering Eurabia." *Race & Class* 48 (1) (July): 1–22. doi:10.1177/0306396806066636.
- Carrera, Sergio. 2006. *A Comparison of Integration Programmes in the EU: Trends and Weaknesses*. CEPS CHALLENGE Papers No. 1, 1 March 2006.
- . 2009. *In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection between Integration, Immigration and Nationality in the EU*, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Carrera Sergio and Anna Wiesbrock. 2009. "Civic Integration of Third-Country Nationals: Nationalism versus Europeanisation in the Common EU Immigration Policy." CEPS Liberty Security series, October 2009.
- Casanova, José. 1994. *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Castells, Manuel. 2008. "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (1) (March): 78–93. doi:10.1177/0002716207311877.
- Castles, Stephen. 2000. *Ethnicity and Globalization: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen*. London: Sage
- Castles, Stephen, Maja Korac, Ellie Vasta, and Steven Vertovec. 2002. *Integration: Mapping the Field.*: Home Office Online Report 28/03.

- CDU. 2010. *Beschluss des 23. Parteitages der CDU Deutschlands Verantwortung Zukunft*. <http://www.karlsruhe2010.cdu.de/images/stories/docs/d-beschluss.pdf>
- CDU. 2011. *Resolution of the 24th Party Conference of the CDU of Germany. A Strong Europe – A Bright Future for Germany*. <http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/111124-Europa-Kurzfassung.pdf>
- Cesari, Jocelyne. 2004. *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States*. Palgrave Macmillan. <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/hol053/2004044763.html>.
- . 2013. *Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chebel d'Appollonia, Ariane, and Simon Reich. 2008. *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective*. University of Pittsburgh Press. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0822959844>.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1999. "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe". *International Studies Quarterly* 43, 83-114.
- . 2000. "Compliance and Conditionality." Working Paper 00/18. Oslo: ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T., and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2009. *European Identity*. Cambridge University Press. <http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/item2327014/>.
- Cheng, Jennifer. 2008. "Promoting national Values in Citizenship tests in Germany and Australia. A Response to the Current discourse on Muslims?" In *Citizenship Policies in an Age of Diversity*, edited by Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 53-70. CIDOB.
- Chilton, Paul. 2004. *Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie. 2002. "'The Contingency of Universality': Some Thoughts on Discourse and Realism." *Social Semiotics* 12 (1) (April): 83-114. doi:10.1080/10350330220130386.
- . 2003. "Media Discourse in the Public Sphere." In *Discourse Theory in European Politics*, edited by David R. Howarth and Jacob Torfing, 275-297. Palgrave Macmillan. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9781403917195>.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie, and Norman Fairclough. 1999. *Discourse in Late Modernity*. 0 ed. Edinburgh University Press. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0748610820>.
- Christiansen, Thomas, Knud E. Jorgensen, and Antje Wiener. 1999. "The Social Construction of Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6 (4) (January): 528-544. doi:10.1080/135017699343450.
- Christmann, Anna, and Deniz Danaci. 2012. "Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: Direct and Indirect Effects on Religious Minorities in Switzerland." *Politics and Religion* 5 (01): 133-160. doi:10.1017/s1755048311000666.
- CMR. 2010. *Integration and Naturalisation tests: the new way to European Citizenship*. The INTEC Project: Synthesis Report. http://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/621216/synthesis_intec_finalmarch2011.pdf
- Coolsaet, Rik. 2011. *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Conway, Janet, and Jakeet Singh. 2009. "Is the World Social Forum a Transnational Public Sphere?" *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 (5) (September): 61–84. doi:10.1177/0263276409106350.
- Corner, Mark. 2010. *The Binding of Nations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230274952>.
- Cosgrove, Michael. 2010. "What exactly is France's National Identity debate about?". *Le Figaro*, 02 March 2010 <http://plus.lefigaro.fr/note/what-exactly-was-frances-national-identity-debate-about-20100302-148106>
- Coskun, Bezen B. 2012. "Words, Images, Enemies: Macro-Securitization of the Islamic Terror, Popular TV Drama and the War on Terror." *Turkish Journal of Politics* 3 (1): 37+.
- Crespy, Amandine. 2012. "Analysing European Discourse." In K. Lynggaard, I. Manners, K. Kröfgen, *Research Methods in European Union Studies*, Palgrave MacMillan
- Dahlberg, Lincoln. 2013. "Exclusions of the public sphere conception: Examining deliberative and discourse theory accounts". *Javnost-The Public*, 20(1).
- Dell'Olio, Fiorella. 2005. *The Europeanization of citizenship: between the ideology of nationality, immigration and European identity*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Delanty, Gerard. 2002. "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 3 (3) (September): 345–359. doi:10.1080/15705850208438841.
- Delanty, Gerard & Chris Rumford. 2005. *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization*. Routledge, Abingdon and New York.
- Díez Medrano, Juan. 2003. "Ways of Seeing European Integration: Germany, Great Britain and Spain." In *Europe Without Borders : Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age*, edited by Mabel Berezin and Martin Schain, 169–98+. Johns Hopkins University Press. <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip041/2003006212.html>.
- . 2009. "The Public Sphere and the European Union's Political Identity." In *European Identity*, edited by Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein.
- Diez, Thomas. 1999. "Speaking "Europe": The Politics of Integration Discourse", *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(4): 598-613
- . 2001. "Europe as a Discursive Battleground." *Cooperation and Conflict* 36 (1) (March): 5–38. doi:10.1177/00108360121962245.
- . 2005. "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 33 (3) (June): 613–636. doi:10.1177/03058298050330031701.
- Dijk, Teun A. van. 1993a. *Elite Discourse and Racism*. Sage Publications.
- . 1993b. "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis." *Discourse & Society* 4 (2) (April): 249–283. doi:10.1177/0957926593004002006.
- Donaido, Rachel. 2008. "Pope Addresses Secularism in France." <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/13/world/europe/13pope.html>
- Eder, Klaus & Bernhard Giesen (eds). 2001. *European Citizenship: National Legacies and Transnational Projects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elliott, Anthony, and Bryan S. Turner. 2012. *On Society*. Polity Press. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9780745648422>.

- Emerson, Michael E. D. T. 2009. *Ethno-Religious Conflict in Europe : Typologies of Radicalisation Among Europe's Muslim Communities*. Brookings Inst Pr. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/929079822>.
- Erdenir, Burak. 2010. "Islamophobia Qua Racial Discrimination: Muslimophobia." In *Muslims in 21st Century Europe, Structural and Cultural Perspectives*, edited by Anna Triandafyllidou, 27–44. Routledge.
- Eriksen, Erik O. 2005. "An Emerging European Public Sphere." *European Journal of Social Theory* 8 (3) (August): 341–363. doi:10.1177/1368431005054798.
- Esposito, John L., and Ibrahim Kalin, ed. 2011. *Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century*. Oxford University Press, USA. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0199753652>.
- Fairclough, Norman. 1989. *Language and power*. London ; New York, Longman.
- . 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Polity. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9780745612188>.
- . 2001. "Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method in Social Scientific Research." In *Introducing Qualitative Methods*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 121–138+. *Introducing Qualitative Methods*. SAGE.
- . 2003. *Analysing Discourse : Textual Analysis for Social Research*. Routledge. <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0650/2002036936-d.html>.
- . 2005. "Critical Discourse Analysis in Transdisciplinary Research." In *A New Agenda in (critical) Discourse Analysis Theory, Methodology, and Interdisciplinary*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Paul A. Chilton. J. Benjamins.
- . 2006. *Language and Globalization*. Routledge. <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0654/2006011412-d.html>.
- Fairclough, Norman, Bob Jessop, and Andrew Sayer. 2003. "Critical Realism and Semiosis." In *Realism, Discourse, and Deconstruction*, edited by Jonathan Joseph and John M. Roberts, 307 p+. Routledge.
- Fallaci, Oriana. 2006. *The Force of Reason = (La Forza Della Ragione)*. Rizzoli International.
- Favell, Adrian. 2001. *Philosophies of Integration*. Edited by Zig Layton-Henry, Danièle Joly, Danièle Joly, and Zig Layton-Henry. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780333992678>.
- . 2003. "Integration Nations: The Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe." In , 22:13–42. Bingley: Emerald (MCB UP). [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0195-6310\(03\)22001-9](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0195-6310(03)22001-9).
- Fekete, Liz. 2004. "Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State." *Race & Class* 46 (1) (July): 3–29. doi:10.1177/0306396804045512.
- Ferree, Myria M. et Al. 2002. "Four Models of the Public Sphere in Modern Democracies". *Theory and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 3: 289-324.
- Feldblum, Miriam. 1999. *Studying the politics of citizenship reforms and immigration in contemporary France*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Fenton, Steven. 2004. "Beyond Ethnicity: The Global Comparative Analysis of Ethnic Conflict." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 2004; Vol 45(3–4): 179-194 DOI: 10.1177/0020715204049592
- Fierke, M. Karin. 2007. *Critical approaches to international security*. Cambridge,

- Polity Press.
- Flood, Christopher, Stephen Hutchings, Galina Miazhevich, and Henri Nickels. 2012. *Islam, Security and Television News*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137006882>.
- Fraudiger, Patrick., 2008. Argomentario breve sull'iniziativa contro i minareti [brief arguments on the referendum against minarets]. http://www.minarette.ch/i/downloads/argomentario_breve.pdf
- Fraser, Nancy. 1990. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." *Social Text* (25/26): 56–80. doi:10.2307/466240.
- . 1993. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." In *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, edited by Craig J. Calhoun, 109–142. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. The MIT Press.
- . "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere - On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a post-Westphalian World." *Theory Culture & Society* 24: 7–+++. doi:10.1177/0263276407080090.
- Geddes, Andrew. 2005. *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. SAGE.
- German Federal Foreign Office's Website (2013) "German Immigration Act" http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/Zuwanderungsrecht_node.html. (accessed on 1st September 2003)
- Georgiou, Myria. 2005. "Diasporic Media Across Europe: Multicultural Societies and the Universalism–Particularism Continuum." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31 (3) (May): 481–498. doi:10.1080/13691830500058794.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gräßler, Bernd (2005) "First German Immigration Law Takes Effect". Deutsche Welle. 1 January 2005. Accessed on 1st September, 2013 <http://www.dw.de/first-german-immigration-law-takes-effect/a-1442681>
- Göle, Nilüfer. 2002. "Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries." *Public Culture* 14 (1): 173–190. doi:10.1215/08992363-14-1-173.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1975. *Quaderni Del Carcere*. Edited by Valentino Gerratana. Einaudi.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1996. In: Buttigieg, J. (Ed./Trans.), *Prison Notebooks*, vol. II. Columbia University Press, New York.
- Green, Simon. 2004. *The politics of exclusion : institutions and immigration policy in contemporary Germany*. Manchester, UK: Palgrave.
- Habermas, Jürgen et al. 1974. "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)." *New German Critique* (3): 49+. doi:10.2307/487737.
- . 1977: "A review of Gadamer's Truth and Method" In Dallmayr, Fred R./ McCarthy, Thomas A. (Eds). *Understanding and social inquiry*. University of Notre Dame Press. 335-361.
- . 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : an Inquiry into*

- a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- . 1992. Further reflections on the public sphere. In *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, edited by Craig J. Calhoun, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- . 1996. *Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- . 1998. "The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship." *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*. Edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- . 2001. "Why Europe Needs a Constitution." *New Left Review*: 5–26+.
- . 2006. "Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research." *Communication Theory* 16 (4) (November): 411–426. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2006.00280.x.
- . 2010. "Leadership and Leitkultur." *New York Times*, October 28. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/opinion/29Habermas.html>.
- Halliday, Fred. 2002. *Two Hours That Shook the World: September 11, 2001: Causes and Consequences*. This Edition Published 2002. Saki Books. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0863563821>.
- Hansen, Randall. 1999. "The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act." *Twentieth Century British History* 10(1): 67-95.
- . 2000. "Citizenship and Immigration in Postwar Britain." Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hargreaves, Alec G. 2007. *Multi-ethnic France : Immigration, Politics, Culture and Society*. Routledge. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0415397820>.
- Harvey, David. 1990. *The Condition of Postmodernity : an Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Basil Blackwell.
- Haslam, S. Alexander. 2001. *Psychology in organizations: The social identity approach*. London: Sage.
- Heppell Tim & Seawright David. 2012. *Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Herbert, Joanna. 2008. *Negotiating Boundaries in the City: Migration, Ethnicity and Gender in Britain*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Henderson, Robyn. 2005. "A Faircloughian approach to CDA: principled eclecticism or a method searching for a theory?" *Melbourne Studies in Education*, 46 (2), 9-24.
- Horner, Kristine, and Jean-Jacques Weber. 2011. "Not Playing the Game: Shifting Patterns in the Discourse of Integration." *Journal of Language and Politics* 10 (2) (January): 139–159. doi:10.1075/jlp.10.2.01hor.
- Home Office. 2011. *Prevention Strategy* <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/>
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of Oklahoma Press.
- . 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster.
- Ichijo, Atsuko, ed. 2011. *Europe, Nations and Modernity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave

- Macmillan. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230313897>.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1995. *Cultures in Conflict : Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the Age of Discovery*. Oxford University Press.
- . 2003. *The Crisis of Islam : Holy War and Unholy Terror*. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Jackson, Pamela I., and Peter Doerschler. 2012a. "Do Muslims in Germany Really Fail to Integrate? Muslim Integration and Trust in Public Institutions." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 13 (4): 503–523. doi:10.1007/s12134-011-0220-6.
- . 2012b. *Benchmarking Muslim Well-being in Europe*. Policy Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781847428875.001.0001>.
- Jackson Preece, Jennifer. 2005. *Minority Rights: Between Diversity And Community*. Key Concepts. Polity Press. <http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=47trn3vPjZkC>.
- Jackson-Preece, Jennifer. 2006. "Cultural Diversity and Security After 9/11." In *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, edited by William Bain, 139–157+. Routledge Advances in International Relations and Politics. Routledge.
- Jakobsen, Janet R., and Ann Pellegrini. 2008. *Secularisms*. Duke University Press. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9780822341499>.
- Jennings, Jeremy. 2000. "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France" *British Journal of Political Sciences* 30, 575-598.
- Jenkins, Roy. 1967. "Racial equality in Britain" in A. Lester (ed.) *Essays and Speeches by Roy Jenkins*. London: Collins.
- Joppke, Christian. 1996. "Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Britain" *Theory and Society* 25(4) : 449-500.
- . 1999. *Immigration and the Nation-State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2004. "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy." *The British Journal of Sociology* 55 (2) (June): 237–257. doi:10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00017.x.
- . 2007. "Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 30 (1) (January): 1–22. doi:10.1080/01402380601019613.
- . 2009. *Veil : Mirror of Identity*. Polity. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0745643523>.
- . 2010. *Citizenship and Immigration*. Polity. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0745642349>.
- Judt, Tony. 2008. *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century*. Reprint. Penguin Press HC, The.
- Jurado, Elena. 2008. "Conceptualizing Citizenship: tool or reward?" In *Citizenship Policies in an Age of Diversity*, edited by Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 71-86. CIDOB.
- Kastoryano, Riva. 2006. "Territories of Identity". *Riots in France*, SSRN. <http://riotsfrance.ssrn.org/Kastoryano/>
- Kolb, Holger. 2008. "Immigration into a Non-immigration Country: The German Experience", Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Information Series.

<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/seoul/06050.pdf>

- Koopmans, Ruud., & Erbe, J. 2004. Towards a European public sphere? Vertical and horizontal dimensions of Europeanized political communication. *Innovation*, 17(2), 97-118.
- Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, M. Giugni, and F. Passy. 2005. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Social Movements, Protest, and Contention. University of Minnesota Press.
- Koopmans, Ruud, and Paul Statham, ed. 2010. *The Making of a European Public Sphere : Media Discourse and Political Contention*. Cambridge University Press. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9780521138253>.
- Kokoref, Michael. 2009. "Political Dimension of the 2005 Riots" In *From Rioting in the UK and France: A Comparative Analysis*, David Waddington, Fabien Jobard, and Mike King, eds. : 147-156.
- Klusmeyer, B. Douglas. 1993. *Aliens, Immigrants, and Citizens: The Politics of Inclusion in the Federal Republic of Germany*. Daedalus Vol. 122, No. 3, Reconstructing Nations and States (Summer, 1993), pp. 81-114
- Knill, Christopher. 2005. "Introduction: Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory Factors." *Journal of European Public Policy* 12 (5): 764-774.
- Kundnani, Arun. 2007. "Integrationism: The Politics of anti-Muslim Racism." *Race & Class* 48 (4) (April): 24-44. doi:10.1177/0306396807077069.
- . 2012. "Multiculturalism and Its Discontents: Left, Right and Liberal." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 15 (2) (April): 155-166. doi:10.1177/1367549411432027.
- Kurthen Hermann. 1995. *Germany at the Crossroads: National Identity and the Challenges of Immigration*. International Migration Review Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter, 1995), pp. 914-938
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 2007. "Multicultural Odysseys." *Ethnopolitics* 6 (4) (November): 585-597. doi:10.1080/17449050701659789.
- . 2009. *Multicultural Odysseys : Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*. Oxford University Press.
- . 2010. "The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies." *International Social Science Journal* 61 (199) (March): 97-112. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2451.2010.01750.x.
- Laclau, Ernesto & Chantal Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and Social Strategy*. London: Verso.
- Lacroix, Chantal. 2010. *Immigrants, Literature and National Integration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230281219>.
- Lacroix, Justine. 2002. "For a European Constitutional Patriotism" *Political Studies* 50: 944-958.
- De Leeuw, Marc, and Sonja van Wichelen. 2012. "Civilizing Migrants: Integration, Culture and Citizenship." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 15 (2) (April): 195-210. doi:10.1177/1367549411432029.

- Leiken, Robert S. 2012. *Europe's Angry Muslims : the Revolt of the Second Generation*. Oxford University Press.
<http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9780195328974>.
- Lentin, Alana, and Gavan Titley. 2012. "The Crisis of 'Multiculturalism' in Europe: Mediated Minarets, Intolerable Subjects." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 15 (2) (April): 123–138. doi:10.1177/1367549411432384.
- LGA. 2002. *Guidance on Community Cohesion*. Local Government Association.
<http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/Default.aspx?recordId=93>
- Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group. 2004. *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship*. The Stationery Office.
- Lynggaard, Kennett. 2012. "Causality in Europeanization Research: Discursive Institutional Analytical Strategies". In T Exadaktylos & C Radaelli (eds), *Research Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanization*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 85-104.
- Luke, Allan. 2002. "Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis." *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics* 22: 96–110. doi:10.1017/s0267190502000053.
- Maatsch, Aleksandra. 2011. *Ethnic Citizenship Regimes*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Maayan, Sagy. 2007. *Islam and the European Legal Systems: The Headscarf Debate in France and Germany as Case Studies*. Institute for European Studies The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
<http://www.ef.huji.ac.il/publications/maayan.pdf>
- Marcussen, Martin, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans J. Knopf, and Klaus Roscher. 1999. "Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6 (4) (January): 614–633. doi:10.1080/135017699343504.
- Marston, Greg. 2000. "Metaphor, Morality and Myth: a Critical Discourse Analysis of Public Housing Policy in Queensland." *Critical Social Policy* 20 (3) (August): 349–373. doi:10.1177/026101830002000305.
- Maussen, Marcel. 2006. "The Netherlands." In *Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe. Muslims In Western Europe After 9/11: Why the Term Islamophobia Is More a Predicament Than an Explanation*, edited by Jocelyne Cesari, 100–142. Changing Landscape of Citizenship and Security 6th PCRD of European Commission.
http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_Challenge_Project_report.pdf.
- Mavelli, Luca. 2012. *Europe's Encounter with Islam : the Secular and the Postsecular*. Routledge.
- Mayer, Jean-Francois. 2011. "A Country Without Minarets: Analysis of the Background and Meaning of the Swiss Vote of 29 November 2009." *Religion* 41 (1) (March): 11–28. doi:10.1080/0048721x.2011.553140.
- Marquand, Robert. 2009. "France's Sarkozy launches controversial national identity debate." *The Christian Science Monitor*. November 3, 2009
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2009/1103/p06s04-woeu.html>
- McAndrew, Frank T., and Megan A. Milenkovic. 2002. "Of Tabloids and Family Secrets: The Evolutionary Psychology of Gossip". *Journal of Applied Social*

- Psychology* 32:1064–1082.
- McCombs, Maxwell. 2005. "A look at agenda – setting: past, present and future." *Journalism Studies*, 6(4), 543 – 557
- McGhee, Derek. 2008. *The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration & Human Rights*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Meer, Nasar. 2010. *Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230281202>.
- Meer, Nasar. & Modood, Tariq. 2009 "The Multicultural State We Are In: Muslims, 'Multiculture' and the 'Civic Re-balancing' of British Multiculturalism." *Political Studies*, 57(3): 473-497.
- Meinhof Ulrike H. & Anna Triandafyllidou. 2006. "Transcultural Europe: An Introduction to Cultural Policy in a Changing Europe." In *Transcultural Europe. Cultural policy in a changing Europe*, edited by Ulrike Hanna Meinhof and Anna Triandafyllidou. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 3-24.
- Merkel, Angela. 2010. Bericht der Vorsitzenden der CDU Deutschlands
<http://www.karlsruhe2010.cdu.de/images/stories/docs/101115-Rede-Merkel.pdf>
- Miera, Frauke. 1997. *Multiculturalism Debates in Germany*. D2 Report on national and European level cases – Emilie.
http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2008/05/germany_report_multicultural_discourses_final.pdf
- Miller, Peter, et al. 1991. *The Foucault effect : studies in governmentality : with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Mishra, Vijay. 2008. "Multiculturalism." *The Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory* 16 (1) (January): 132–165. doi:10.1093/ywcct/mbn001.
- Modood, Tariq. 2012. "Multiculturalism and the nation" in *openDemocracy*, 20 December 2012
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/tariq-modood/multiculturalism-and-nation>
- . 2005. *Multicultural Politics : Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Modood, Tariq, Ricard Zapate-Barrero, and Anna Triandafyllidou. 2006. *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*. New edition. Routledge.
- Mouritsen, Per. 2006. "The Particular Universalism of a Nordic Civic Nation. Common Values, State Religion and Islam in Danish Political Culture." In *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship*, edited by Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 70–93. Frank Cass Publishers.
- . 2008. "Political Responses to Cultural Conflict: Reflections on the Ambiguities of the Civic Turn." In *Constituting Communities*, edited by Per Mouritsen and Knud E. Jørgensen, 1–30. Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2009. "The Culture of Citizenship: A Reflection on Civic Integration in Europe." In *Citizenship Policies in an Age of Diversity*, edited by Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 23–35. CIDOB.

- Mulcahy, Suzanne. 2008. "Europeanisation of immigrant integration policies: Why do member states continue to go their own way?" In *Citizenship Policies in an Age of Diversity*, edited by Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 117-136. CIDOB.
- . 2011. *Europe's Migrant Policies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Müller, Jan-Werner. 2006. "On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism." *Contemporary Political Theory* 5 (3) (August): 278–296. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300235.
- . 2007a. *Constitutional Patriotism*. Princeton University Press.
- . 2007b. "Three Objections to Constitutional Patriotism." *Constellations* 14 (2) (June): 197–209. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675.2007.00433.x.
- . 2007c. "Is Europe Converging on Constitutional Patriotism? (And If So: Is It Justified?)." *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 10 (3) (September): 377–387. doi:10.1080/13698230701400429.
- Nachmani, Amikam. 2010. *Europe and Its Muslim Minorities : Aspects of Conflict, Attempts at Accord*. Sussex Academic. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/1845194004>.
- Neumann, Iver B. 1996. *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations*. London: Routledge.
- Neumann, Iver B., and Jennifer M. Welsh. 1991. "The Other in European Self-definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society." *Review of International Studies* 17 (04): 327–348. doi:10.1017/s0260210500112045.
- Norton Mary Beth et al. 2006. *A People and a Nation: Since 1865*. Volume 2. Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Nyri, Zsolt. 2007. *Muslims in Europe: Basis for Greater Understanding Already Exists*. Gallup Word Poll. <http://media.gallup.com/WorldPoll/PDF/WPSRMuslimsinEurope1050707.pdf>
- Oldham Independent Review Panel. 2001. *One Oldham, one future - The Ritchie Report*. <http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/Default.aspx?recordId=97>
- OSI. 2010. *Muslims in Europe : a Report on 11 EU Cities*. New York: Open Society Foundations. http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/a-muslims-europe-20110214_0.pdf.
- . 2012. *Muslims in London*. Muslims in EU Cities. New York: Open Society Foundations. <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/muslims-in-london-20120715.pdf>.
- Paraskevopoulos, Christos J. 2001. *Interpreting convergence in the European Union: patterns of collective action, social learning and Europeanization*. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 2002. *Rethinking Multiculturalism Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pautz, Hartwig. 2005. "The politics of identity in Germany: the Leitkultur debate". *Race & Class* 46(4):39-52.
- Phillips, Deborah. 2006. "Parallel Lives? Challenging Discourses of British Muslim

- Self-segregation.” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 24 (1): 25–40. doi:10.1068/d60j.
- Phillips, Anne. 2009. “Religion: ally, threat or just religion?” In: Phillips, Anne and Casanova, José, (eds.) *A debate on the public role of religion and its social and gender implications*. Gender and development programme paper (5). United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 39-58.
- Pieterse, J. N. 2009. *Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange*. Globalization Series. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Plant, Raymond. 2009. *The Neo-Liberal State*. Oxford University Press, USA. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0199281750>.
- Poole, Brian. 2010. “Commitment and Criticality: Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis Evaluated.” *International Journal of Applied Linguistics* 20 (2) (July): 137–155. doi:10.1111/j.1473-4192.2009.00234.x.
- Postmes, Tom & Nila Branscombe. (Eds.) 2010. *Rediscovering social identity: Core sources*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Powell, Enoch. 1968a. *Hopeless*
- Powell, Enoch. 1968b. *Rivers of blood* <http://www.enochpowell.net/fr-80.html>
- Prügl, Elisabeth, and Markus Thiel, ed. 2009. *Diversity in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230104167>.
- Rakić, Vojin. 2012. “The Moral Identity of Europe: From Warfare and Civil Strife to ” <i>In Varietate Concordia</i>.”” *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law* 25 (2) (June): 249–261. doi:10.1007/s11196-011-9218-9.
- Risse, Thomas. 2010. *A Community of Europeans? : Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Cornell University Press. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9780801446634>.
- Rosen, Laurence. 2004. *The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life*. University of Chicago Press.
- Reuters. 2010. “Germany: Imam Training at Universities.” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/world/europe/15briefs-Germany.html?_r=1 accessed 2011
- Reuters. 2010b. “German president welcomes Islam during unity speech.” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/03/us-germany-unity-islam-idUSTRE69218Z20101003>
- Robinson, William I. 2005. “Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation-State to Transnational Hegemony.” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 8 (4) (December): 559–574. doi:10.1080/13698230500205243.
- Ruiz Vieyetz, Edoardo J. 2008. “Citizenship, democracy, and the state of identity: reinterpreting the relationship in new Contexts of diversity.” In *Citizenship Policies in an Age of Diversity*, edited by Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 87-102. CIDOB.
- Sackmann, Rosemarie, Bernhard Peters, and Thomas Faist. 2003. *Identity and Integration : Migrants in Western Europe*. Ashgate.

- <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0754632113>.
- Sala Pala, Valérie & Simon, Patrick. 2007. "Public and Political Debates on Multicultural" in Crises in France, EMILIE – Reports on Multiculturalism Debates
http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2008/05/france_report_multicultural_discoures_final.pdf
- Sarazin, Thilo. 2010a. Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab [Germany Does Away With Itself].
- Sarazin, Thilo. 2010b. "Bei keiner anderen Religion ist der Übergang zu Gewalt und Terrorismus so fließend." *Bild* <http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/spd-politiker-schreibt-in-seinem-neuen-buch-ueber-den-islam-13749562.bild.html>
- Sarkozy, Nikola et al. 2004. *La République, les religions, l'espérance*. Paris, Cerf.
- Schain, Martin A. 2009. "The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union." *European Journal of International Law* 20 (1) (February): 93–109. doi:10.1093/ejil/chp001.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2005. *The politics of European union enlargement: theoretical approaches* (Eds) Routledge advances in European politics. Routledge, Abingdon, UK; New York.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. 2008. "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (1): 303–326. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135342.
- . 2010. "Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change Through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth 'New Institutionalism'." *European Political Science Review* 2 (01): 1–25. doi:10.1017/s175577390999021x.
- Schmidt, Vivien A., and Claudio M. Radaelli. 2004. "Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues." *West European Politics* 27 (2) (March): 183–210. doi:10.1080/0140238042000214874.
- Schegloff, Emanuel A. 1997. "Whose Text? Whose Context?" *Discourse & Society* 8, no. 2: 165–87.
- Scharader, Martin. 2010. "Merkel erklärt "Multikulti" für gescheitert". *Deutsche Welle* <http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,6118143,00.html>
- Scott, Joan W. 2007. *The politics of the veil*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
- Sidanius, Jim. & Felicia Pratto. 2001. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Silvestri, Anna. 2010. "Public Policies towards Muslims and the Institutionalisation of 'moderate' Islam in Europe: some critical reflections", in A. Triandafyllidou, ed., *Muslims in 21st century Europe*, London: Routledge.
- Simcox, Robin, Stuart Hanna and Houriya Ahmed. 2011. *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connection*. Second Edition. The Henry Jackson Society.
- Skey, Michael. 2011. *National Belonging and Everyday Life*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230353893>.
- Smith, Anthony D. 2010. *Nationalism : Theory, Ideology, History*. Polity. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9780745651279>.
- Spiegel Online. 2010a. "Should Muslims Be Treated on an Equal Footing?" *Spiegel*

- Online <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-should-muslims-be-treated-on-an-equal-footing-a-722065.html>
- Spiegel Online. 2010b. "Merkel's Rhetoric in Integration Debate is 'Inexcusable'." <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-merkels-rhetoric-in-integration-debate-is-inexcusable-a-723702.html>
- Spiegel Online. 2010c. "Seehofer und Merkel befeuern Leitkultur-Debatte." <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integration-seehofer-und-merkels-befeuern-leitkultur-debatte-a-723466.html>
- Spiegel Online. 2011. "New German Interior Minister Reopens Integration Debate." *Spiegel Online*, 7 March 2011 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-slap-in-the-face-for-muslims-new-german-interior-minister-reopens-integration-debate-a-749477.html>
- Somerville, Will. 2007. *Immigration Under New Labour*. The Policy Press.
- Stangor, Charles (ed.). 2000. *Stereotypes and Prejudice: Essential Readings*. Philadelphia, Pa.: Psychology Press.
- Stehle, Maria. 2012. "White Ghettos: The 'Crisis of Multiculturalism' in Post-unification Germany." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 15 (2) (April): 167–181. doi:10.1177/1367549411432025.
- Stets, Jan. E., & Peter. J. Burke. 2000. "Identity theory and social identity theory". *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 63(3), 224–237.
- Sudlow, Brian. 2012. *National Identities in France*. Transaction Publishers. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/1412842883>.
- Taguieff, Pierre A. 2001. *The Force of Prejudice: On Racism and Its Doubles*. Contradictions Series. University of Minnesota Press. <http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=AcOG6Y9XG40C>.
- Taylor, Charles. 2004. *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Duke University Press.
- . 2007. *A Secular Age*. MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tajfel, Henri & John Turner, C. 1979. "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The social psychology of intergroup relations?" In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations*, 33–47.
- The Independent. 2011. "From financier to flag-bearer for Germany's far-right." *The Independent* <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/from-financier-to-flagbearer-for-germanys-farright-2228550.html>
- The Round Table. 1973. "Immigration and the Idea of Commonwealth." *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 63 (250) (April): 139–144. doi:10.1080/00358537308453070.
- Trenz, Hans-Jörg. 2005. "The European Public Sphere: Contradictory Findings in a Diverse Research Field." *European Political Science* 4 (4) (December): 407–420. doi:10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210051.
- . 2008. "Measuring the Europeanisation of Public Communication: The Question of Standards." *European Political Science* 7 (3) (August): 273–284. doi:10.1057/eps.2008.19.
- Trenz, Hans-Jörg, and Klaus Eder. 2004. "The Democratizing Dynamics of a European Public Sphere." *European Journal of Social Theory* 7 (1) (February): 5–25. doi:10.1177/1368431004040016.
- Triandafyllidou, Anna. 2010. *Irregular Migration in Europe (Research in Migration*

- and *Ethnic Relations*). Ashgate. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0754678865>.
- Triandafyllidou, Anna, ed. 2012. *Muslims in 21st Century Europe: Structural and Cultural Perspectives*. Reprint. Routledge.
<http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0415534224>.
- Triandafyllidou, Anna, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski, ed. 2009. *The European Public Sphere and the Media*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230271722>.
- Toolan, Michael. 1997. What Is Critical Discourse Analysis and Why Are People Saying Such Terrible Things About It? *Language & Literature* 6(2): 83–103.
- Turner, Rachel. 2008. *Neo-Liberal Ideology: History, Concepts, and Policies*. Edinburgh University Press. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0748632689>.
- Varadarajan, Tunku. 2005. *Prophet of Decline: An Interview with Oriana Fallaci*.
- Van de Steeg, M. 2002. “Rethinking the conditions for a public sphere in the European Union”. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(4), 499–519.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2002. “Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain.” In *Muslims in the West : from Sojourners to Citizens*, edited by Yvonne Y. Haddad, 19–35+. Oxford University Press.
- Vertovec, Steven, and Ceri Peach. 1997. *Islam in Europe : the Politics of Religion and Community*. St. Martin’s Press.
- Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf. 2011. *The Multiculturalism Backlash : European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. Routledge.
<http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0203867548>.
- Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 2008. *Urban Outcasts*. Polity Press.
<http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/074563124>.
- Wæver, Ole. 1998. Security, Insecurity and security in the West-European Non-War Community. In: Adler, E. & Barnett, M. (eds.) *Security Communities*. Cambridge University Press.
- . 2004. “Discursive approaches”. in A Wiener & T Diez (eds), *European Integration Theory*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 197–215.
- Weiss, Gilbert, and Ruth Wodak. 2003. *Critical Discourse Analysis : Theory and Interdisciplinarity*. Palgrave Macmillan.
<http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9780333970232>.
- Westin, Charles. 2003. “Racism and the Political Right. European Perspectives.” In *Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, 97–125+. Cass Series on Political Violence. Frank Cass.
- Wetherell, Margaret. 2001. “Debates in Discourse Research.” In *Discourse Theory and Practice: A reader*, edited by Margaret Wetherell et al. London, UK: Sage Publications: 380–399.
- White, Jonathan. 2010. “Europe and the Common.” *Political Studies* 58 (1) (February): 104–122. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00775.x.
- Widdowson, H. G. 1998. “The Theory and Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis, Review Article.” *Applied Linguistics* 19 (1) (April): 136–151.
doi:10.1093/applin/19.1.136.
- Wiener, A & Diez (eds). 2009. *European Integration Theory*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

- Williams, Howard, Catherine Bishop & Colin Wight. 1996. "German (Re)Unification: Habermas and his critics" *German Politics* 5(2): 214-239.
- Williams, Michael C. 2003. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (4) (December): 511–531. doi:10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x.
- Williams, Michelle H. 2013. *The Multicultural Dilemma : Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation*. Routledge. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9780203082775>.
- Witte, John M. & Christian Green. 2011. *Religion and Human Rights: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wodak, Ruth. 2001. "Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis". In *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edited by Wodak, Ruth. & Michael Meyer. London: Sage: 1-14.
- . 2008. "The contribution of critical linguistics to the analysis of discriminatory prejudices and stereotypes in the language of politics." In *Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere*. Edited by Ruth Wodak and Veronika Koller. Mouton de Gruyter.
- Wodak, Ruth. & Norman Fairclough. 1997. "Critical Discourse Analysis." *Discourse as Social Interaction*. Edited by Teun van Dijk (ed.). London: Sage: 258-284.
- Wodak, Ruth, and Rudolf de Cillia. 2007. "Commemorating the Past: The Discursive Construction of Official Narratives About the 'Rebirth of the Second Austrian Republic'." *Discourse & Communication* 1: 337–363+. doi:10.1177/1750481307079206.
- Wodak, Ruth, and Paul A. Chilton. 2005. "A New Agenda in (critical) Discourse Analysis Theory, Methodology, and Interdisciplinary." In J. Benjamins. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9781588116376>.
- Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karin Liebhart. 2009. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. second edition. Edinburgh University Press. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0748637346>.
- Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer, ed. 2002. *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. First Edition. Introducing Qualitative Methods. Sage Publications Ltd. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0761961542>.
- Wodak, Ruth, and John E. Richardson. 2009. "On the Politics of Remembering (or Not)." *Critical Discourse Studies* 6 (4) (September): 231–235. doi:10.1080/17405900903180954.
- Zapata-Barrero, Ricard. 2009. *Citizenship Policies in the Age of Diversity Europe at the Crossroads*. Edited by Ricard Zapata-Barrero. Fundació CIDOB Grup de Recerca Interdisciplinari sobre Immigració, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/9788482511129>.