Beyond Party Politics: 
Opposition to the European Union 
in France and the UK, 1985-1999

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Abstract

The decade since the Maastricht treaty has seen numerous instances of opposition to the European Union across its member states. Despite this, focused and systematic research on opposition has been scarce, resulting in an incomplete understanding of this phenomenon. This thesis describes, analyses and explains organised opposition, using France and the UK between 1985 and 1999 as case studies. An institutionalist approach is used, relegating traditional socio-historical explanations to a secondary position.

The hypotheses state that political events at the European level will drive the formation and development of opposition within a country, but interactions with the country's political and social structures will produce specific patterns. In particular, the country's institutional structure will have profound effects on this process, especially the relative ease of access and carrying capacities of formal political institutions. These factors are hypothesized to control the development of opposition both within and outside formal institutions. Over time anti-EU groups (be they parties or non-party groups) will increase in volume and profile, as they penetrate the system.

In order to test this model, anti-EU groups are classified on the basis of their form, objectives and ideology. Institutions are shown to play an important role in group structure and strategy, while group formation is clearly driven by events at the European level. Finally, group volume and media profile have grown over time, although electoral success presents a much more ambivalent picture, reflecting the issue's low importance for the general public and highlighting the lack of a link between volume and influence.

The thesis provides a testable model that can be used across Europe to explain national aggregate patterns of anti-EU opposition. The first-order nature of opposition also highlights the increasing importance of the EU in national polities and publics.
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<td>British National Party</td>
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<td>BWMA</td>
<td>British Weights and Measures Association</td>
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<td>CAFE</td>
<td>Conservatives Against a Federal Europe</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIB</td>
<td>Campaign for an Independent Britain</td>
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<td>CPNT</td>
<td>Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDD</td>
<td>Europe of Democracies and Differences</td>
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<td>EDN</td>
<td>Europe des Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National</td>
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<td>FPP</td>
<td>First Past the Post</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
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<td>LCR</td>
<td>Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire</td>
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<td>LESC</td>
<td>Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Mouvement des Citoyens</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mouvement National Républicain</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
<td>Mouvement Pour la France</td>
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<td>Parti Communiste Française</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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<td>RPR</td>
<td>Rassemblement Pour la République</td>
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<td>TEAM</td>
<td>The European Anti-Maastricht Alliance: later, The European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>Union pour la Démocratie Française</td>
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<td>UEN</td>
<td>Union pour l’Europe des Nations</td>
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<td>UKIP</td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
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Finally, I must thank Jo, both for her proofreading and for her constant and loving support. She has made it all worthwhile.
This thesis examines the development of opposition to the European Union in France and the UK between 1985 and the end of 1999. It discusses the reasons for the creation and mobilisation of that opposition, while also considering the extent to which the form of opposition is shaped by the institutional structures within each country, and the profile that such opposition has had. In so doing, this piece of research provides both a typology of the opposition in each country and a means of describing the aggregate pattern of opposition in other national systems.

In this introduction, the focus will be on the why, what and how of the thesis. The case for studying opposition in general, and these case studies in particular, will form a first section. This will be followed by an examination of the parameters that the study will encompass, in particular the definition of what constitutes opposition to the European Union (EU). A discussion of the hypotheses follows, before the methodology used in this study is laid out and explained. A brief overview of the structure of the rest of the thesis concludes this introduction.
WHY LOOK AT THIS SUBJECT?

The first question that any thesis must address is its raison d’être. It is essential that both the author and the reader are clear from the outset why it is that the given subject has been chosen, and what it is that the thesis sets out to do. These two elements are vital because they give direction and meaning to all of the work that follows.

It is an oft noted point that most literature on European integration is conditioned by current events. From the neo-functionalist approach of the 1950s and early 1960s, through the intergovernmentalist critiques that developed afterwards, through to the work on multi-level governance from the 1980s onwards, all have sprung out of the evolution of an economic community into a European Union.¹ So too it is with this thesis. Since the early 1990s, the substantial increases in both the scope and depth of European competencies took the European Union into a new stage of its development.² At the same time, a previously isolated phenomenon became both increasingly common and increasingly important, namely the creation of opposition towards the integration process, both at elite and public levels. The extended ratification process of the Treaty on European Union between 1991 and 1993 is the most widely acclaimed expression of this development. More recently, there have been the failed referenda in Denmark (on membership of the Euro in 2000) and Ireland (on ratification of the Nice treaty in 2001), as well as increasingly prominent politicians who oppose the current process of European integration, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, Jörg Haider and Pia Kjærsgaard. After several decades where integration appeared to be becoming less, rather than more, contentious, the Union has faced falling levels of public support, even in member states that have traditionally been more positive.³

It could be argued that this is nothing new. There have always been figures such as Charles de Gaulle or Margaret Thatcher, who have wanted to shift the direction and goal of European integration to very different ends. Ever since the first enlargement in 1973 to the

³ See Eurobarometer 57 (at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57_en.htm) for summary tables of public opinion. Average support for membership as a “good thing” fell from an historic high of 72% in 1991 to 46% 1996: it is currently 54%.
UK and Denmark there have been populations that have been much less enthusiastic than most about ‘Europe’: indeed, 1972 was the year that Norway first voted against membership.

However, to take this approach would be to miss the fundamental difference between these people and events and the current situation. While there were undoubtedly elements opposed to the integration process before the 1990s, they were isolated within specific countries and to specific issues.\(^4\) By contrast, one of the major features of the current wave of opposition to European integration is its presence in almost every country, both those that are already members and those that are negotiating their membership. It is found at both the elite and the popular level and it has resulted in the formation of hundreds of anti-EU groups and organisations. In short, it is pandemic as a phenomenon in present-day Europe.

This increasing visibility of opposition to the European Union represents the first main reason for studying the subject. It has an intrinsic value as the focus of this thesis. This value derives from the substantial volume that the opposition movement has developed during the 1990s, drawing in increasing numbers of individuals and groups and resulting in new and novel forms of organisation and activity. This thesis focuses on this opposition, trying to understand where it has come from and how it manifests itself. Through addressing these questions, the thesis also starts to explore the question of what impact opposition has had and will have in the future.

This last point leads into the second set of reasons for studying opposition. As opposition has raised its profile over the past decade, so it has potential effects on the process to which it is opposed. In the years since the Single European Act, the European Union has become a much more developed and integral part of political life in Europe, whether one looks at its growing membership, its involvement in almost every public policy field or its public profile. Thus opposition to the EU is an increasingly visible element of an increasingly visible whole, i.e. the EU itself. And this is set to continue being the case, as the Union of the new millennium is confronted with new challenges: the introduction of Euro notes and coins in January 2002, enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, and an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2004 that will be the culmination of a debate on the nature of the Union and its possible constitutionalisation. Each one of these has the potential to bring with it new tensions to the existing system and to make the EU – and by extension opposition – even more of an important issue.

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\(^4\) Not that this should be read as taking events such as the Luxembourg Compromise or the British budget rebate as unimportant in the European Union’s development.
Seen as such, and given the increasing profile and potential importance of anti-EU opposition, this study will provide a useful addition to the study of the EU as a whole. The development of dedicated anti-EU groups and falling public support arguably changes the set of possible paths that are open to the European Union. The Danish ‘No’ vote on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 demonstrates the point, having consequences not only for the Danish government, but also for ratifications in France and the UK, as well as the development of transparency and information strategies at the European level. Put the other way around, in order to have a full understanding of the European Union, it is necessary to have an understanding of the role of opposition. This is true whether the subject is being approached from the academic’s or the practitioner’s viewpoint: the former needs to integrate opposition into models of integration, while the latter needs to understand the causes and objectives of opposition in order to build a strategy that can manage this new phenomenon.

Creating models of opposition formation and development offers two main means of discussing European integration more generally. The first has already been mentioned, namely a consideration of the impact of opposition on the Union’s development. However, this requires an initial analysis of what opposition groups have achieved and are aiming towards, in terms of objectives. As a result, any comment on impact is somewhat speculative and will be limited to some observations made in the conclusions. More directly, the second point of interface between opposition and the European Union is opposition formation: what drives the formation of opposition groups? Whether it is found that groups are formed as a direct result of European events or as a consequence of national debates, the findings will add to the understanding of how the EU interfaces with the general public. Is opposition to the EU simply another example of Europe as a second-order issue, or does it possess characteristics that mark it out as a direct link between citizens and the Union?

The answer to this last question will involve reflection upon the nature of European integration in its present state. With the Convention on the Future of the EU currently debating possible alternative models for the next IGC in 2004, this thesis could offer some useful and timely insights into how the Union is received by individuals, what issues mobilise public opposition and future potential points of friction.

If the reasoning for the thesis has concentrated so far on the specific case of opposition to the EU, then this should not obscure the importance of considering opposition in a more general
Introduction

sense. Robert Dahl described the development of legalised opposition to the government as one of the “great milestones in the development of democratic institutions”, while Karlheinz Neunreither calls it a “new qualitative dimension to the [political] system”. Yet despite such strong words, the study of opposition remains at best patchy at any level of government, let alone the European Union. While there has been a wave of new writing over the past few years, it is still far from comprehensive.

In Hegelian terms, opposition can be seen as the antithesis to government’s thesis, the necessary counterpart needed to produce an advance in the form of a synthesis. Opposition is of necessity a relative phenomenon, since there has to be something to oppose and to react against. Moreover, the form of opposition reflects the form of that which it opposes. Thus in studying it, the object of that opposition is also under study, resulting in a better understanding of that object. This is the case whether considering this research topic as a matter of specific case studies, as opposition in the EU more generally, or as an abstract question of opposition in political systems.

At the same time, it should be recognised that this is a novel form of this phenomenon. The novelty stems from the two level nature of the European Union and the way in which opposition has reacted to that fact. This is the result of the Union being neither a replacement (i.e. a ‘super-state’) nor a reinforcement (i.e. a glorified international organisation) for the member states, but instead a transformation of them. As Laffan notes, the EU has changed the traditional national triptych of territory, identity and function both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the same is necessarily true for opposition to this new system. This makes this study all the more relevant, given the increasing importance of transnational governance structures across the Union.

Three main arguments have been used to justify the importance of this thesis. Firstly, the development of opposition to the EU during the 1990s presents a subject of considerable size and pervasiveness that warrants further study in of itself. Secondly, this opposition movement impacts upon the EU and its development, which requires an understanding of

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6 For example, the Opposing Europe Research Network was created in 2000 by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak at Sussex University’s European Institute. Members of this Network, including this author, have produced pieces on party-based opposition across Europe. A full list is available at: http://www.susx.ac.uk/Units/SEI/areas/OpposingEurope.html

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how opposition interacts with the European integration process, both as an effect and as a cause. Thirdly, the study of opposition as a phenomenon of modern systems of governance remains under-researched, especially in the novel case of the EU. Taken together, these three elements form a strong and coherent case for researching and analysing opposition to the EU.
WHAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THE THESIS?

Opposition, for all of its importance, is not an easily defined subject. Even Dahl did not provide an all-encompassing definition, concentrating instead on a rather specific case:

“Suppose that A determines the conduct of some aspect of the government of a particular political system during some interval... Suppose that during this interval B cannot determine the conduct of the government; and that B is opposed to the conduct of government by A. Then B is what we mean by an “an opposition.” Note that during some different interval, B might determine the conduct of the government, and A might be “in opposition”. Thus it is the role of opposition that we are interested in...”

Dahl’s statement avoids a simple, one-line definition, but does contain three basic elements. Firstly, there is a connotation of power and control: the group in government not only has the desire and means to make policy, but also the position to deny those means to those groups outside of government, should it so choose. Secondly, there is a more normative implication that the different groups have different ideas about what policy should be, and that the other groups are wrong in their beliefs. Finally, there is the implicit acceptance of the framework – neither group attempts to overturn the system so that they can have perpetual control.

However, this basic definition is only a starting point. Apart from the comment that Dahl himself makes straight away, that such a definition is vague and highly abstract, the point made in the previous section must be remembered, namely that the EU presents a novel situation. To this end, it is necessary to consider how the European Union is structured and how it creates a particular dilemma for opposition.

Karlheinz Neunreither, in possibly the only piece to explicitly discuss the question, describes the EU as ‘governance without opposition’.

National systems create opportunities at various levels for different voices to be raised and accommodated. These range from an overarching ‘unity of the system’ (through a constitution), through Dahl’s government and

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8 Dahl, 1966, p.xvi, emphasis in original.
opposition, down to a public sphere of debate. Neunreither not only argues that opposition is contained and integrated at each of these levels, but also that a qualitatively new community develops, transcending the traditional one-way relationship of rulers and ruled.\textsuperscript{11}

By contrast, the EU lacks all of these mechanisms for containing and integrating opposition. Even though there are treaties that lay out various provisions, there is still no formal constitution, nor even a popular sense that what already exists can form a proxy for such a text. Furthermore, the institutional framework of the Union does not take the same form as in a national context. Traditionally, national institutions have been divided on a principle of divided powers (i.e. executive, legislative and judiciary). However, the EU’s institutions have rather followed a principle of divided interests, with the Council representing the member states, the European Parliament the peoples of the Union, the Commission the ‘European’ interest, and the Court of Justice the law. Whatever the reasoning behind the decision, it has resulted in a system that shares competencies, blurs responsibilities and engenders a consensual approach.\textsuperscript{12} Hence, even in the institution that would most obviously represent opposing voices, the Parliament, the dominance of the centre-right European People’s Party and the centre-left Party of European Socialists has tended to drown out that opposition. One might also look towards the lack of clear political alternations within institutions, the continued importance of unanimity voting in the Council and the treaty requirement of impartiality on the part of Commissioners as further examples of this consensual system. As a result, in Neunreither’s opinion, there is a lack of a European public sphere and thus a diversion of EU political issues back into national frameworks.\textsuperscript{13} While national systems can deal with opposition at the point of origin, usually on matters of government policy, the European system is “very fragile: even minor, issue-orientated grievances turn themselves against the system itself.”\textsuperscript{14}

This analysis not only highlights the particularity of the European Union as a governance structure, but also contains the basis for a more exact definition of opposition in the context of this thesis. Essentially this contains two elements: intensity and field of operation.

\textsuperscript{10} Neunreither, 1998. The only other article dealing with the subject that this author is aware of is the now rather dated G. Zellentin, 1971, ‘Form and function of the opposition in the European Communities’, in R. Barker (ed.), Studies in Opposition, Basingstoke, Macmillan, pp.302-322.

\textsuperscript{11} Neunreither, 1998, p.436. This view echoes the work of Karl Deutsch during the 1960s, on the importance of communication in building national (and transnational) communities: see K. Deutsch, 1966, Nationalism and social communication: An inquiry into the foundation of nationality, Cambridge, MIT Press.

\textsuperscript{12} Moravcsik’s critique of this idea – that the structure results from the technical nature of the EU’s work – does not sit easily with the role to which the Union’s pretends: A. Moravcsik, 2002, ‘In defence of the ‘democratic deficit’: Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40-4, pp.603-624.

\textsuperscript{13} Neunreither, 1998, pp.437-8.

\textsuperscript{14} Neunreither, 1998, p.439.
At its broadest, opposition might be extended to include anyone who has any sort of feeling that either integration as a whole, or the European Union as a particular expression of that integration, is anything less than perfect. Of course, this would effectively rob the word of any true meaning, since it would cast the net so wide as to cover almost the entire population of Europe and beyond. Hence it is necessary to bring the term down to a more overt conception of disagreement with the integration project. At the broader level, this means a rejection of any sort of integration between countries, either via the EU or any other organisation. Such an extreme position is not often found beyond far-right wing and fascist bodies of thought, but it should still be considered, inasmuch as it impinges on the narrower debate on the EU.

More common is opposition to the EU specifically, as the chosen means of achieving integration in Europe. This prevalence of opposition to the EU is due to the predominance of that organisation in the post-war period: no other organisation plays the same role, either in terms of scope (especially when one considers the various Central and East European Countries lining up to join) and, more particularly, in terms of depth. The EU is, put simply, in a different class from the European Free Trade Association, the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe or even NATO.

EU-specific opposition can be subdivided into those who oppose the EU as the particular form of integration on grounds of principle, and those who oppose on grounds of practice. The former usually seek one of three routes to resolving their opposition: fundamental systemic change, withdrawal of their country from the EU or, less commonly, the withdrawal of all countries, leading to the EU’s collapse. The relative lack of interest in the third option highlights the preoccupation with ‘regaining control’ of national decision-making in a particular country: what other countries chose to do is their affair.

Those who oppose on grounds of practice tend to be milder in their opposition, given that practice does not of necessity require a systemic change. Having said this, there are those who chose to dress up principled opposition as practical opposition, especially when those principles are not widely held (again, this is often the case with far-right groups).

For many, opposition to the EU is based on opposition to certain parts of the project in particular (e.g. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), etc.), but is deflected into systemic opposition by the EU’s very structure, as already discussed. Even those elements of opposition that do exist tend to become socialised into
the system as they adopt the system’s norms and values. The normative aspect of whether this is a good or a bad thing is not of concern. More important is that it underlines the wider process of consensus building that has taken place as the EU has expanded: at each stage of expansion the Union has developed to include particular groups (at the cost of functional efficiency and global effectiveness) inside the project.

However, it is not the aim of this research to focus so much on those who have been socialised into the Union, but instead to consider those who work actively against the EU and its development. Such a definition has several dimensions. Firstly, it is broad enough to include those who are less than fanatical in their opposition (i.e. the majority), yet tight enough to exclude more overtly opportunistic elements, those for whom scepticism is little more than a sideshow to their primary goals. Secondly, it allows for some degree of differentiation between those who reject the EU as a whole and those who have continued to limit themselves to particular (policy) goals. Finally, it is not level dependent.

This last point is worth developing, since it is the second part of the definition of opposition. If the depth of opposition is highly variable, then so too is its level of operation. There are three key levels to be considered: public opinion, party politics, and an intermediate level that will be termed non-party politics.

At the most diffuse level it is possible to take public opinion towards the EU as an expression of opposition, be it in terms of opinion polls, elections or referenda. Such feeling can be seen at a national or a European level and provides a useful backdrop for more focused opposition. In the chapter on France and the UK’s relationship with the EU the factors that affect such opinion will be discussed in more depth.15

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At the other end of the spectrum, it is possible to concentrate on party political actions, given their key role in the functioning of European democracies and in the political life of the Union and its component members. This has the advantage of a relatively well-structured set of arenas in which actions take place and of a relatively well-defined set of actors within those arenas, as well as being the subject of most of the literature on opposition to the EU.16 Certainly, any clear understanding of the phenomenon of opposition requires a grasp of the impact of both party politics and general public opinion if it is to make sense.

Having said this, it is essential to consider also those non-party groups and individuals on an intermediate level who make up such a substantial proportion of organised opposition. This intermediate level represents a much richer variety of opinions and actions than the other levels, by definition, and yet it is this level that has been largely ignored by academic research.17 This includes those groups, organisations and movements that bring together elements of political parties and the general public in the sphere of civil society. Free from the constraints of seeking electoral success, these groups can adopt whatever structure and positions they feel best represent their interests and priorities, since that is their primary purpose.

If the levels of party politics and public opinion are essential in understanding opposition, then the intermediate level is no less important in that process of understanding. Any

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analysis, therefore, needs to consider all three elements together if it hopes to produce meaningful results. In the following section, a research structure will be proposed that allows for the integration of the three elements into a single framework. The use of an institutionalist approach to the subject places non-party political activity within the context of both public opinion and party activity. In turn this highlights the linkages between the different elements and their relative importance.

Rather than looking at individuals working against the EU, the thesis is concerned instead with organised groups, for several reasons. First and foremost, it is assumed that groups have a greater impact on political life than individuals, an assumption that is explored at the start of the chapter on group formation. Groups are more efficient in their work and can claim to speak for a larger constituency, elements that result in effectiveness gains greater than the sum of their constituent members. Furthermore, groups also have the advantage of being more readily identifiable, since their objectives, structures and activities are relatively explicit. Individuals, on the other hand, do not need to externalise their decision-making processes or objectives in quite the same way, a fact that makes objective third-party observation very difficult. Finally, in the context of anti-EU activity, it is rare for individuals not to be involved in some kind of group activity: hence, the study of groups covers much individual activity. This last point is dealt with at the end of the chapter on group formation, which discusses the relationship between individuals and groups.

As well as not focusing on individual activity against the Union, this thesis also does not deal very closely with the discourse that accompanies opposition. While clearly an important part of understanding the objectives and the critique of integration made by those opposed to the EU, to engage in a (necessarily) lengthy discussion of the numerous critiques that exist would distract from the primary aim of the work, namely the understanding of the forces that shape opposition in the first place. Certainly, discourse does have to be taken into some consideration, particularly when looking at ideological motivations for group mobilisation and formation, but that has to be balanced with the need for a parsimonious project of work. The discourse that a particular group chooses is dependent first and foremost upon the interests of its members, which are in turn what European integration impacts on. Discourse is thus a consequence of integration and opposition, rather than a cause. As a result, it is only where there is a direct need to take account of discursive elements that the issue is dealt with directly. However, this is not to deny that in a broader
approach to the subject, some awareness of discourse within opposition movements is necessary.

To summarise, this section has provided a more precise definition of what opposition to the EU entails. Starting from the observation that the intensity of opposition can vary, this thesis will look at those elements that work actively against the EU and its development. This then allows for the application of the definition to the three levels that exist within national political systems, namely the party political, the non-party political and public opinion. With this, there is now a clear reference point upon which to base the research. More pertinently, in the following section, the hypotheses of the thesis will be discussed in detail, as well as the methodology; both points that require an understanding of what opposition encompasses.
HYPOTHESES

Before discussing the methodological approach of the thesis, it is necessary to lay out and discuss the central hypotheses. The hypotheses form a set of three interlinked statements. The first concerns the cause of opposition mobilisation and formation, the second the form and development of that opposition, and the third its future development. They are as follows:

1. Political events at the European level drive the formation and development of groups opposed to the EU within a country, but these events have unique interactions with individual countries’ political and social structures, producing country-specific effects.

2. This pattern of group formation and development is profoundly affected by the country’s institutional structure.

3. Over time these groups will increase in volume and profile, as their scope for action and their depth of penetration into formal institutional spaces increase.

The first hypothesis argues that it is developments at the European level, rather than at the national, which are at the basis of opposition mobilisation and development within a national system. At first glance this might seem a rather obvious statement, but it runs counter to much work on the relationship between the two levels. Literature on European elections, referenda and even ‘euroscepticism’ itself has tended to converge on ‘second-order’ explanations. Such explanations suggest that while the events are ostensibly about European issues, their outcomes actually reflect domestic concerns. By contrast, in this thesis the reverse is suggested, namely that while opposition operates within, and makes reference to, a national system, it is driven more fundamentally by developments at the European level.

Of course, member states do play a role in those European level developments, but for most practical purposes that does not matter. A theorist such as Moravcsik would argue that

national interests are not obscured by the process of interest aggregation and the complexity of decision-making at the European level. However, policy outcomes still emanate from the European Union itself, and it is this fact that is of primary concern to those opposed to the EU, rather than the relative importance of national and supranational elements within the system.

At the same time, it is also clear that European developments are conditioned by national specificities. People live in countries, each of which has its own set of political and social institutions, with which the EU interacts. The two-level nature of the system that makes it so interesting to study also makes it necessary to consider the relative impact of each level. More concretely, since many of those opposed to the EU would prefer an enhanced role for national institutions, there is a keen awareness of how those latter institutions have been affected by the integration process. Thus the modulation of the European by the national is both objective and subjective.

The second hypothesis concerns the factors shaping opposition formation and development. Here, institutions are accorded a decisive role. In particular, the concept of ‘institutional space’ is introduced, the term that is given to the collection of formal political institutions within which opposition can be represented and develop. Some institutions, such as national parliaments, are ideally suited for opposition representation, while others (such as presidencies) offer much less scope. For this reason, for each of the case studies, it is necessary to provide an overview of the institution space within that country, in order to gauge the likelihood and the location of opposition within that space. This overview also gives an idea of the overall size of the formal institutional space, and so helps in evaluating the probability of opposition developing outside it, in the form of non-party political groupings.

In basic terms, it will be suggested that the relative difficulty in gaining access to British institutions (due to the First Past the Post System) will result in relatively more opposition developing in informal spaces, in the form of non-party groups. At the same time, the requirement for cohesive parties will make it difficult for disaffected politicians either to start a new party or to fully express their opinion within existing parties, resulting in their use of non-party groups to express their disaffection.

By contrast, the relative ease of access to French institutions, compounded by the weakness of French political parties, will produce a situation in which the locus of opposition will be new party formations, since this will be a viable electoral strategy. Informal opposition will be relatively weak and will involve relatively fewer disaffected politicians, who will be able to use the party structures to express their opinions.

Formal opposition in both countries other than in the lower house of parliament will be limited, either because of a lack of formal institutional spaces (as in the UK) or because of a lack of suitability (as in France). It is only in the case of the European Parliament that there exist substantial opportunities for anti-EU elements to gain formal representation.

As has been discussed before, the according of primacy to institutional factors stands in contrast to much of the existing literature on the subject of countries’ relationships with the EU, which tends towards socio-historical explanations. In addition to the advantages of objectivity and comparability that an institutionalist approach brings, it can also be noted that it helps to link the first two hypotheses together. National institutions play a key role in first receiving European developments, so mobilising opposition, before then constraining that opposition. This idea of institutions’ dual action is influenced by the idea of path-dependency, in as much as there is an evolution over time conditioned by previous states. However, it should be made clear that the focus is at least as much on institutions as intervening factors in shaping organisation as it is on the shape of the institutions themselves.

The third and final hypothesis, on the increasing volume and profile of opposition, is also linked to the first two hypotheses by the institutional approach used, since that profile is in part a function of the pattern of opposition that exists. Within the formal institutional space, there will be an optimisation of the institutional possibilities for expressing opposition, while outside there will be an optimisation of organisational forms to maximise impact. At the same time, the evolving European system will provide new occasions and new policy issues that will drive opposition groups within countries. Thus opposition group profile is carried along by both the actions of opposition groups themselves and the supply of new impetuses by the EU.

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It should be noted that this hypothesis only claims an increased volume and profile for opposition groups, not an increased impact or influence. This is due to two factors, one methodological and one temporal. The methodological problem arises from the difficulty of measuring impact: whether public opinion or political discourse is under consideration, it is a relatively subjective matter. The paucity of impartial work in the field makes it very hard indeed to make any kind of quantifiable assessment of opposition’s influence. The temporal issue is linked to the relative novelty of opposition to the EU, at least in its present form. The current wave of opposition dates from the early 1990s, when the Maastricht treaty began a process of major institutional reform. That process is still under way, and is likely to stretch through most of the first decade of the new century, hence the end of the study period is at most halfway through a long-term evolution, the outcome of which is uncertain. Given these problems, consideration of opposition’s impact and influence is limited to a discussion in the conclusions.

Taken as a whole, these three hypotheses clarify the origin, form and path of opposition to the European Union. Furthermore, they are all falsifiable. In the event that national factors are found to prevail over European developments, or that non-institutional factors are essential in explaining patterns of development, or that there is no increase in the volume of opposition, then it will be clear that the hypotheses are lacking in some critical respect. Moreover, in disproving the hypotheses, at least it will also be apparent why they can be disproved, which will follow through to a new and more workable hypothesis.
THEORETICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The final step after the discussions of the reasons for this research, its parameters and the hypotheses is a focus on the means that will be used to conduct it. The methodology used here comprises two discrete parts. Firstly, there is an overarching theoretical framework, namely that of institutionalism. Secondly, there is the use and choice of case studies, drawing on comparative politics approaches. In addition, there is also a limitation in the time period covered in the work, for reasons both of historical developments and of viable data collection.

THE INSTITUTIONALIST FRAMEWORK

In most accounts of individual countries’ relationships with the EU, importance is often accorded to factors such as historical experience or ‘national particularities’. Whether it is Britain’s offshore location, France’s fear of a dominant Germany, or German war guilt, such factors are seen as critical for an understanding of both that country and its European policy. Why then is it not used here?

While such approaches may offer some explanations when considered as part of a much more comprehensive study of a country, too often they are used as a means of sidestepping contentious points. It is this tendency to ascribe too much to such explanations that requires addressing, not least since a substantial critique can be made of them. This critique breaks down into four key points. In the first place, there is no agreement as to which elements from society or history should be considered important, nor of what order of importance they should have, since it is of necessity a subjective process. Secondly, with such a subjective, ‘pick and mix’ approach, it is impossible to make comparisons between different political systems or countries. Thirdly, using socio-historical approaches tends to encourage a view of countries simply as black boxes, rather than the complex systems that there are. Finally,

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23 This was the key argument of Allison and Zelikow, who used the example of the Cuban Missile Crisis to emphasise the need to look at organisational outputs and internal actor bargains in order to properly
from a more methodological viewpoint, such explanations are suspect because they are not falsifiable, since they are chosen precisely because they support the argument and alternatives are deemed unimportant: ‘this is a special country’ does not offer much option for disagreement.

For all these reasons, socio-historical options have been relegated to a secondary position in explaining the creation and development of opposition to the EU within the British and French polities. Instead, attention is focused on the role of institutions. Every country has a set of formal institutions through which political activity is played. Normally these will be national institutions (parliaments, elected heads of state, etc.), but they can also be sub-national (e.g. regional councils) or even supranational (the European Parliament). Taking each of these institutions and analysing the extent to which it allows the expression of dissenting, or opposing, voices, permits the construction of a picture of the ‘institutional space’ in which those voices can operate.

This idea of ‘institutional space’ is central to this thesis and is explored at length in the following chapter. However, here it will suffice to note that it offers the possibility of a much more objective measure of the forces involved in opposition formation and development than does a socio-historical style explanation. Furthermore, since a comparative approach is being used, it allows for the creation of a set of key variables that can be transferred between different political systems in a consistent manner.

In all of this, socio-historical explanations are not to be completely ignored. For a start, it is clear that the institutional structures within a national system are the expression of societal preferences and historical evolutions. Here, those structures are taken as givens, without any in-depth discussion of why they are shaped the way that they are. Even so, this is not socio-historicism by other means: institutions are hypothesised here as powerful agents for shaping actors’ preferences in their own right, regardless of their origin. That they have causal factors of their own is not a key concern of this thesis: institutional change is a medium- to long-term process (even in France), whereas opposition to the EU can count its entire existence over a much shorter time-span. Furthermore, as shall be seen in the conclusions, socio-historicism can offer some useful elements of explanation when used in conjunction with the institutionalist approach used here.

The inspiration for this institutionalist approach comes not only from the perceived shortcomings of existing explanations, but also from other sources. Aspinwall provides the best example of an institutionalist approach to understanding the national-European relationship with his piece on the UK. As will be seen later, this model forms an important part of the model used in this thesis. Dahl places institutional elements at the top of his list of explanatory factors in his overview of opposition in Western democracies, noting that “[…] to ignore the effects of constitutional and electoral institutions leaves one in serious difficulties.”

On the theoretical level, institutionalism has become an increasingly influential paradigm in European studies, albeit in a variety of versions. Indeed Aspinwall and Schneider even go as far as to say that “almost any Europeanist with a minimal level of self-respect flags himself as an ‘institutionalist’ at the moment”! While this rather overstates the case, it does point to a trend that dates back to the mid-1980s, of looking at actors and norms as the basis of understanding the process of integration. It also allows this thesis to draw on, and make comments upon, a body of work that takes a similar approach.

CASE STUDIES – THE NECESSITY OF A COMPARATIVE POLITICS APPROACH
This research will use two case studies, France and the UK, to explore the hypotheses. It might appear strange that a thesis on opposition to the European Union should take two national case studies, instead of either the EU itself or a broad comparison of all member states. However, this choice is predicated on the twin pillars of the nature of the European system and the space available within a thesis.

As was noted in the discussion of the meaning of opposition, the EU presents very particular characteristics. A national system is structured to allow for the expression, containment and absorption of opposing voices, through a series of different mechanisms, such as a constitutional framework and a civil society. By contrast, the EU does not possess such mechanisms – or at the very least, is not perceived to possess them – and hence opposition

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25 Dahl, 1966, p.349. He also comments that the link between cultural premises and opposition are in large part “impressionistic” (p.356).
on any point of the EU and its functioning is readily turned into something more systemic.\textsuperscript{28}  Furthermore, and more pertinently here, opposition still cannot be fully expressed at the European level, since there are only very limited opportunities for dissenting voices within the institutional system, so it has to move back into the existing national systems, where the necessary institutional space does exist.

Seen as such, the very structure of the EU pushes opposition down to a national level, making the use of national case studies essential. To this should also be added the observation that most critiques of European integration involve the diminution of national competencies, and that most alternative plans of European cooperation involve an increased role for nation-states (without wishing to attach any particular connotation to that phrase). The result of this preference for the national over the transnational is usually manifested in the programmes of oppositional groups, which more often than not are more concerned with changing their own country’s relationship with the EU than with changing the EU as a whole.\textsuperscript{29}  As much as the opportunity structure for opposition is much better at the national level than it is at the European, so too the preferences of those in opposition are more attuned to national concerns than they are to European ones.

This then is the reasoning behind the use of national case studies. But why not the use of more cases than the two used here? There are two, interlinked reasons. As was discussed in the use of an institutionalist approach, in rejecting the use of socio-historical explanations for the creation and development of opposition, it is necessary to turn to more objective criteria, namely institutional spaces. It then logically requires that for each case used, there is not only a discussion of the opposition that is present, but also of the institutional structure in that country. However, within a thesis limited to 100,000 words there has to be balance between depth and scope.

Structuring the thesis in this manner clearly makes the choice of the two case study countries rather important, in order to avoid confounding explanations. Furthermore, given the lack of literature in the field, any country would be both interesting and useful to study. Hence the choice of France and the UK needs to be justified both on absolute and relative grounds.

\textsuperscript{27} Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p.2.
\textsuperscript{28} See Neunreither, 1998.
\textsuperscript{29} However, it should be noted that transnational and bilateral cooperation between groups has been present since the early 1990s. At the same time, that cooperation has not resulted in any way in coordinated or unified programmes of action.
Britain’s relationship with the European Union has been the source not only of much political discussion, but also of a large academic literature. As such, it is particularly interesting to evaluate that discussion and literature in light of the institutionalist approach, which explicitly rejects the socio-historical frameworks in which much of the debate has traditionally been based. Furthermore, that debate has translated in a very high level of organised opposition to the EU; there are probably as many anti-EU groups in the UK as there are in all other member states together. This means the UK is a rich environment for study.

While the sheer volume of organised opposition makes the UK as interesting case study, it is not the only reason. In a European context, the country’s position towards integration has been particularly vexed for the entire post-war period. The initial preferences for classical intergovernmental mechanisms eventually led to the UK being excluded from the more federalist projects of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community in the 1950s. Once finally inside, there were soon considerable tensions, resulting in a ‘renegotiation’ of membership with an associated referendum, protracted debate over the British contribution to the budget, a lack of willingness to support Economic and Monetary Union and little enthusiasm for political integration. In short, there has been an almost continuous set of important issues facing the British polity since the 1950s (at least at the elite level), which offers a useful means of examining how the European level impacts on the national level, one of the key hypotheses outlined above.

Moreover, the UK offers a very distinctive institutional environment in which to work. This has several dimensions. Firstly, the dominance of Parliament in the political system has few equivalents (the Danish Folketinget is probably the closest example to be found in the EU), especially given the lack of counterweights to its power and the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. Secondly, the predominant electoral system, First Past the Post, is not only unique in Europe, but also a potentially very important factor in the development of


31 This is based on a survey of anti-EU groups’ websites from mid-1999 onwards. This formed the basis of a website with links to each of these groups, available at: http://www.susherwood.fsnet.co.uk/weblink.htm.
opposition, given its fundamental differences from proportional systems. Thirdly, and related to the previous factor, the British party political system is very consolidated, with effectively only two parties capable of holding a parliamentary majority to support a government. This contrasts with most other European countries, where multi-party systems and government coalitions predominate. The essential point behind this is that the specific configuration of British political institutions offers a unique model, against which other national systems may be compared.

If the choice of the UK is based on the possibilities of making an original contribution to a well-known debate, then the choice of France is based as much on its characteristics relative to the UK as on its own merits. Essentially this comes down to their relative similarities in socio-historical terms, which will be shown to have only limited explanatory power.

It should be clear that it is not being claimed that France and the UK are identical in terms in their histories or their societies, but rather they are relatively similar in comparison to other countries. On the large historical scale, both countries have spanned many centuries, as well as both being former imperial powers. In the more specific context of post-war European integration, they were both key players, if for different reasons, in that process and the much later date of British entry into the European Economic Community should not hide the similarities in the two countries’ European policy. If the French political class has always given the appearance of unreserved enthusiasm for further integration, then it has also always aimed to make sure such integration served French interests. France was the ‘awkward partner’, to use George’s phrase, in the Community before 1974, from the failed European Defence Community negotiations, through the Treaty of Rome to the Empty Chair crisis of 1965-6. In the period under consideration in this thesis, the British government had won its budget rebate and was not much more garrulous than its French counterpart. The former sought opt-outs from the final stage of the single currency and the social protocol, finally joined then left the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and briefly attempted an empty chair policy over the ban on beef exports. The latter delayed and diluted reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, resisted liberalisation of various key economic sectors, and had the European Parliament’s three seats embodied in Community law. In short, while the bones of contention differ, they exist in both cases.

32 Compare this with German attitudes to integration up to the 1990s, based not on power politics but instead on reactive support for French projects. See C.-C. Schweitzer & D. Karsten, 1990, Federal Republic of Germany and EC membership evaluated, London, Pinter, for more details, and J. Teschner, 2000, ‘No
There are other similarities, all of which come together to make France a closer match to the UK than other possibilities. If it is assumed that those member states that are net beneficiaries of EU funds, and especially the Cohesion countries, are likely to have more positive attitudes towards the Union (although clearly the recent case of Ireland makes this a questionable assumption), then the case studies are not too mismatched. France is just about a net contributor, receiving large amounts of agricultural support, while the UK’s contribution is lessened by the rebate, so it does not reach the levels of Germany or the Netherlands.

Even in terms of public support for the EU, there has been a convergence of attitudes in the two countries, although the French public is clearly more positive about membership. While French levels of support were uniformly high during the second half of the 1980s, the British public became increasingly positive, until both countries experienced a downturn from the early 1990s onwards. Even if the absolute levels of support continue to differ (by roughly 10% during the 1990s), then the simultaneous downturn is suggestive of a common cause, a point that is reflected in the hypotheses developed in the previous section.

Finally, at a more mundane level, both countries are of roughly equal size. Small countries are often subject to outside forces in ways that larger countries are not: Luxembourg defines itself by its membership of the EU in a way that neither the UK nor France do. Moreover, in purely institutional terms, the two countries have equal representation and weight within the Union, from the number of votes in the Council to the number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).

Institutionally, there is a clear gap between the two. This point will be discussed at much greater length in the following chapter, but it will suffice to mention here that the British features of parliamentary primacy, First Past the Post and a consolidated party system mentioned above are not found in France. Instead, there is a division between the President and the Assemblée Nationale, a two-round voting system with relatively proportionate outcomes and a fractured multi party system.
In this context, it has been argued that the UK and France possess several similarities. This does not extend to institutional frameworks, since that is the subject of the study, although on several points there are certain similarities between them. But is this really enough to stand up to a socio-historical critique that argues that the particularities of both cases make it possible to simply line them up against each other? Certainly, points can be found that are peculiar to each country, but such points could be found for any other country.

**TIMEFRAME AS CONSEQUENCE AND CAUSE**

The final issue to be discussed in this section concerns the choice of dates for the research, namely 1985 to the end of 1999. Why not earlier or later? The choice effectively reflects both the consequences of the hypotheses and the requirements of viable data.

As already mentioned briefly above and discussed at more length in the next section of this introduction, opposition is hypothesised to be driven by developments at the European level, which in turn interact with national systems. Thus it would make sense to choose a time period that has some meaning at that European level, which 1985-1999 indeed does, marking the development of the European Community into the European Union. 1985 marks the start of negotiations that led to the Single European Act, while 1999 was the year that the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, itself the follow up treaty to the Treaty on European Union of 1992. The three treaty cycles of negotiation, signing and ratification are further complemented by the programmes to create an internal market and EMU.

At the same time, on a national level, the timeframe encompasses a certain parallel situation in the two case studies. In France, François Mitterrand was President for all but the last four years in question, while in the UK the Conservatives held the government through to 1997. Admittedly, this is something of an over-simplification, given two French co-habitations and the change of Conservative leader in 1990, but it does provide a relative sense of continuity to the period. This stands in contrast to the development of opposition, where the timeframe provides a useful ‘before’ and ‘after’ picture. The bulk of group formation and mobilisation took place in the early 1990s in both countries, a fact that will yield a better understanding of the forces at work in their creation.

If the timeframe is justifiable on these grounds, then it is also tied to the availability of data. For the period before 1985 there are even less available than thereafter, both in terms of primary sources and secondary literature, partly because opposition movements were rare.
and partly they had no appreciable impact. Moreover, the data that do exist have only limited use, given the qualitative changes in the European system from the Single European Act onwards and the subsequently changed relationship between the European and the national.

At the other end of the period, it was decided that rather than attempting to provide an accurate account up to the last possible moment, it was better to take a definitive end point. In the context of Stage 3 of EMU, it is clear that there will be developments for many years to come, not least in the UK, where a decision to join still has to be made and put to a referendum. The debate on constitutionalisation is even further from any kind of resolution (after the ‘non-treaties’ of Amsterdam and Nice, the Intergovernmental Conference foreseen for 2004 is not certain to produce a long-term solution). More practically, there is also an issue of those involved not wishing to divulge information at such a stage; in large part this thesis deals with issues that have passed from the public eye.

35 Zellentin, 1971, has already been mentioned re opposition in the Community. Apart from D. Butler & U. Kitzinger, 1976, *The 1975 referendum*, London, Macmillan, which is the best account of the No campaign in the British referendum, there is nothing more than some public opinion pieces and general accounts of the integration process. An exception that will not be considered here is the small literature on the first Norwegian referendum in 1973 (e.g. T. Bjørklund, 1982, *Mot strømmen: Kampen mot EF 1961-1972*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget).
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The final section of this introduction looks at the thesis’ structure, in order to help the reader to see briefly how it relates to the hypotheses laid out above.

Before entering into the specific matter of opposition to the EU in France and the UK, it is first necessary to flesh out the institutional frameworks that exist within the two countries. This is necessary because these frameworks form the basis of the rest of the analysis, since the European developments that drive opposition are shaped by them, as is the opposition itself. Consequently, the first chapter provides a description of the institutional space within each country. This consists of comparing formal institutions (parliaments, heads of state, sub-national bodies, etc.) in order to provide an assessment of locations suitable for opposition within that space. As well as giving a shape to formal opposition, this account will also provide an idea of the relative overall sizes of the spaces, and hence the likelihood of opposition developing outside it.

Having set out the institutional framework, the second chapter provides the historical overview of the two countries’ relationship with the EU from 1985 through to the end of 1999. This will include political developments at both national and EU level, changing public opinion and the creation and development of opposition groups. As such, it provides the practical material with which to test the hypotheses.

This application covers the next two chapters. In the first of these, the factors in group formation are considered. By looking at individual groups in both countries, it is possible to assess the relative importance of different factors in the formation and development of those groups. This assessment will feed into the evaluations of the first two hypotheses on mobilisation and development. Similarly, the following chapter, which looks at group strategies and profile, not only helps with the third hypothesis on impact, but also with the second, since the choice of strategies will reflect the institutional constraints that apply to those groups.

This then leads into the conclusions, where all of the findings of the research will be brought together and compared with the hypotheses. This will allow for those findings to be placed back in the wider literature that exists, in order to see how it fits in. It will also be the point at which a discussion the impact and influence of opposition can be made.
In the Introduction, it was suggested that institutional structures played a key role in the formation and development of opposition towards the European Union in national systems. In order to test this hypothesis, there must be an assessment of what such structures are and how they influence opposition formation and development.

The first step is to define what is meant by “institutions” and “institutional structures”. While institutionalist theory has tended to construct these very broadly – to cover not only bodies such as parliaments and governments, but also rules and practices – the focus in this thesis is more upon the former. The reason for this stems from the idea that while bodies and organisations are indeed constituted by a set of rules and practices, here the main interest is the ease of access for opposition elements to those institutions and the extent to which that opposition can be carried once inside. As a result, rules and practices are seen here more as a function of institutions proper, than as a category of their own.

The central concept in all of this will be the idea of ‘institutional space’. As has just been noted, the points of particular interest are the ease of access to an institution for an anti-EU group or person (hereafter referred to as access), and the subsequent ability of the institution to hold and represent anti-EU viewpoints (hereafter, capacity). This refers both to individual institutions and to the sum of those institutions. While the focus here is on the question of anti-EU access and capacity, this concept can be applied to any issue, as long as it is applied in a methodical manner.

Working from the second of the main hypotheses – namely that group formation and development is deeply affected by institutional structures – a set of sub-hypotheses can be developed about how institutions affect development. Two of these sub-hypotheses apply to how institutions have an effect on any sort of interest representation (i.e. of general
1: Institutional Spaces

application), and one applies to how institutions specifically affect anti-EU representation (i.e. of specific application). In this case, the general sub-hypotheses relate to the ease of access to institutions and their ability to represent a variety of opinions, while the specific sub-hypotheses deal with the relative interests of anti-EU elements towards different institutions.

The first of the general sub-hypotheses says that it is easier to gain access to an institution that uses a Proportional Representation (PR) system of election, than it is to one that uses First-Past-the-Post (FPP). The reasoning behind this is explained in the next section, but is essentially due to the breadth of interests and opinions that each system will typically allow through the electoral gateway to representation inside the institution. Furthermore, both electoral systems will allow easier access for any given interest than a system based on appointments or, in the most extreme case, heredity. In these cases, there is no discretion on the part of the general public on who will be present in those institutions, nor any guarantee that those present will represent any particular opinion.

A second general sub-hypothesis can be made about the capacity of an institution to represent opinion. Here, there is a distinction between institutions that have only one person filling them and those that have many people. In the first category there are presidencies and heads of state. Clearly, in such institutions there is very little scope for the representation of a variety of interests, since there is only the one person, so an \textit{a priori} assumption of a low capacity can be made. At the same time, a multi-member institution such as a parliament or council, by its very nature as an assembly of not necessarily convergent opinions, will allow for a much wider interest representation. In general, it might be expected that this capacity to represent opinion will rise in a linear fashion, as more members become involved in an institution.

Over and above these two general sub-hypotheses, a more specific sub-hypothesis has to be added regarding the representation of anti-EU interests. There are institutions at a variety of levels, from the sub-national, via the national, to the supranational. The sub-hypothesis states that anti-EU interests are more likely to be represented in supranational and national institutions than they are in sub-national ones. The reasoning is threefold. Firstly, supranational institutions, and here this essentially means the European Parliament, are likely to have anti-EU interests represented inside them because they deal primarily with EU matters. Secondly, anti-EU groups might see their primary goal as being control of national

\footnote{Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, give a good account of the variety of interpretations of ‘institutions’.}
institutions, given the privileged place these have in controlling EU policy-making and, *in extremis*, in having the power to withdraw from the Union. Sub-national institutions will have much less exposure to the European Union and its workings, since regional and local work will dominate the agenda, and so offer little opportunity to anti-EU groups to affect policy outcomes.³⁷ Thirdly, those attempting to pursue anti-EU positions will be more inclined to seek representation in institutions in which they will be able to have an impact, both on policy outcomes (via their votes on legislation) and on public opinion (via the profile of the institution). On both counts, sub-national institutions are less well placed than are those at higher levels.

Beyond individual institutions, the overall institutional space must be looked at. This is for two reasons. Firstly, it permits the evaluation of the relative access and representation capacities of matched institutions in the two countries: when the actual formation and development of opposition is applied in each case, it will be possible to see how much that reflects the opportunity structures available in each case. Secondly, it allows for the estimation of the relative overall size of the institutional space available to opposition. This is important, because it leads into a further assessment of the development of opposition outside of formal institutions.

In all of what has been said so far, there has been an implicit assumption that the focus rests on institutions such as parliaments, assemblies, councils or presidencies. However, it is also necessary to consider civil society, and the space that exists for political expression outside those formal political institutions. If the overall capacity for opposition in these formal institutions is restricted, then it might be expected that opposition would develop in civil society, in forms that are not bound by institutional rules and norms in the same way as they would be otherwise. This distinction can be termed as a distinction between *formal* and *informal opposition*, where the formality is a function of the space in which that opposition is expressed. Formal opposition is thus that which takes place inside formal institutions, informal opposition that which takes place outside.

³⁷ It should be noted that Hughes *et al* have argued that in Central and Eastern Europe, the lack of involvement of sub-national elites creates a potential space for opposition to the EU to develop (J. Hughes, G. Sasse & C. Gordon, 2002, ‘Saying ‘maybe’ to the ‘return to Europe’’, in *European Union Politics*, Vol.3-3, pp.327-355). However, in both France and the UK the extent of public debate on European issues renders this relatively unlikely.
This division is also a useful indicator of the divide between those opposed to the way a system is developing and those opposed to the system \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{38} In the case of the EU, this is particularly important to note, since unlike most national political systems, the EU lacks a popular demos, as well as the spaces in which to express and diffuse opposition, so making it more likely that what opposition does occur will be of a systemic nature. If there is no possibility of expressing an opinion against one element of the system (such as a particular policy), because the system does not allow for that, then there is little alternative but to question the entire system, since that is the only level at which opinions can be expressed: there is no intermediate point for representing views. Obviously, the supranational nature of the EU also adds the complication of two levels on which opposition can be expressed, with the understandable result that most opposition occurs at the national level, in traditional spaces, both inside and out of the formal institutional structures.

In order to fill out this idea of institutional space, it is necessary to look at the individual formal and informal institutional spaces available in each country. Once done, some comments can then be made about how those spaces interact with each other, what their relative overall size is, and what impact this ought to have on opposition formation and development.

\textsuperscript{38} In his study of opposition spaces within the European Union, Neunreither, 1998, describes this as a systemic/non-systemic distinction.
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND ELECTORAL GATEWAYS

Looking at formal opposition elements, it is necessary to turn first to those bodies expressly designed to accommodate the variety of opinion within a polity, namely the elected assemblies. Those elected to represent a constituency in a parliament will reflect the opinions of that constituency, either by themselves, or by working in a party that is similarly minded. The extent to which members of the parliament reflect public opinion at large and the extent to which parties can coalesce and develop is dependent to a large degree on the means by which the former are elected.

As with most levels of government in the UK, the House of Commons uses a simple FPP, multi-constituency system. In France, Assemblée elections have usually been run under a two-round system, with FPP in the second round between the two candidates with the largest number of votes from the first round, unless one of them receives an absolute majority in that first round. The exception was during the 1986 election, when a d’Hondt PR system in each département was introduced on the initiative of the Socialist Party, before being withdrawn again before the 1988 election.

The relative merits of FPP and PR in their various forms are not important here. However, the difference does open up the potential for important effects on national political systems. Aspinwall structures attitudes towards European integration on a cleavage between a pro-integration core and an anti-integration fringe, which builds its opposition on a wide variety of reasons, drawing from both the left and right of the political spectrum. Such a modelling of attitudes reflects work by Hix and Lord, as well as Taggart, which have stressed the transnational dimension of party positions on European integration, to the detriment of voting on national lines: positions on left-right and pro-anti integration spectra are dominant within the European Parliament over parties from one country holding the same position. With this structure of attitudes, Aspinwall then suggests that the electoral system acts as the key intervening variable between social preferences and policy outcomes.

Under the First-Past-the-Post system, small parties are penalised and there is a strong incentive for prospective candidates to seek membership of one of the main parties if they wish to have a reasonable chance of success. Once in the party, Whip systems work to keep the members of the parliamentary party in line with each other. However, at this point a

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40 Hix & Lord, 1997; Taggart, 1998.
tension arises, namely that the party leadership has to accommodate, at least some extent, those members with anti-integration opinions. Hence, “power sharing occurs within the ruling party, and on questions of European policy the centre of balance falls between the pro-integration centre of the spectrum and the anti-integration end of the spectrum”.\textsuperscript{41} While logically this centre of balance could be hard up against either of these two endpoints, in practice neither a hard pro or anti position would be stable. This is because in a situation where there is a spread of positions, there is still a need to give the minority position (be it pro or anti) at least some concession in order to avoid on-going tension. As a result, policy positions are likely to be intermediate between the two extreme points.

Aspinwall characterises this tension as “fundamentally anti-centrist”, since it creates a tension towards a polarizing of policy between the two parties.\textsuperscript{42} This echoes Finer’s argument that the centrifugal forces within an essentially two-party system create not only a divergence from the overall attitude of Parliament but also, and more importantly, an even larger divergence from the overall attitude of the electorate as a whole.\textsuperscript{43} This occurs because party preferences will tend to be concentrated around poles either side of the median of overall Parliamentary preferences, which in turn are not necessarily representative of electoral preferences, due to the distorting effects of FPP. It stands in sharp contrast to the Proportional Representation electoral model, where while it is easier for those on the fringes to gain election, it is harder from them to enter into a governing (centrist) coalition. Thus anti-integrationists on both left and right tend to be excluded and marginalised from policy making.\textsuperscript{44}

This could have several consequences. Firstly, in the FPP system, the size of the governing coalition/party’s majority is of key importance, since the smaller it becomes, the more power individual members gain. In the particular case of the UK, the relative dominance of the Labour and Conservative Parties reduces the ability of party managers to avoid this effect by choosing different coalition partners, an option that the more fragmented French system permits.

The second impact is the link between representation in elected offices and extra-parliamentary groups. It might well be that if EU-opposition elements cannot gain representation in elected assemblies then they will take other routes to achieve their goals of

\begin{itemize}
  \item Aspinwall, 2000, p.431.
  \item Aspinwall, 2000, p.431.
\end{itemize}
influence and power. Thus a country with FPP might be expected to have more extra-parliamentary groups than a country using PR. At the same time, given that moderate opposition is more likely to have an effective position of influence in an FPP system, then there is a potential dynamic for building links between those moderates and the extra-parliamentary groups. Thus the choice of electoral system could have important consequences on the development and strategy of extra-parliamentary groups.

However, while both the Assemblée and the Commons use FPP systems, the contexts in which they find themselves differ. The latter is the key locus of institutional power in the British system, whereas the former is not. While one might expect similar effects vis-à-vis the electoral systems, despite the French two-round system owing something to ideas of proportionality, there is in fact a difference.

Essentially, this is a consequence of the relative weakness of French political parties, itself the result of the reduced role that parliament plays under the constitution of the Fifth Republic. Knapp and Wright note that the historical lack of parliamentary majorities under the previous Republics led to the creation of a system of ‘rationalised parliamentarianism’ which would compensate for that. Stevens suggests that the presence of cross-cutting cleavages in French society has produced many small parties that cannot consolidate themselves, particularly given that almost all of them are caucus parties, designed solely for the purpose of winning elections, rather than maintaining power. The two-round system also creates further dynamics towards fragmentation, with the first round creating conditions which lead to competition between ‘allied’ parties, as well as for individual candidates to escape party control. This last point is linked to the practice of cumul des mandats, which combines with the tradition of localism in French politics to allow the development of a strong regional base that is relatively disconnected from the changing national scene.

This modulating effect is important to keep in mind, since when considering the location of the development of opposition, the electoral system is a key factor in the structure of political parties. In a ‘pure’ FPP system (such as the British), there are very few parties, which rely on internal cohesion in order to maintain their position as viable parties of government (coalitions being rare). At the other end of the scale, a PR system will enable

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44 Aspinwall, 2000, p.432.
many more parties to gain representation, and so any friction between coalition partners will be inter-party, rather than intra-party. Considered thus, the French system, while using a apparently FPP system, displays more PR-like characteristics, due to the two round system and the aforementioned weakness of the parties.
OTHER NATIONAL FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL SPACES

Having discussed the national assemblies, other national institutions also have to be considered. Essentially, these are the second chamber of parliament and the head of state. While these do not play the same role as the lower chamber, in terms of decision-making and interest representation, they are still essential parts of the national decision-making process, and so deserve to be considered as possible locations for opposition.

While both the House of Lords and the Sénat are involved in the formulation and promulgation of legislation, they are both relatively circumscribed institutions. While the latter has a constitutional right to influence legislation through the navette system of amendments (Article 45 of the French constitution), in practice it is the Assemblée that has the final say in the process.\footnote{See http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr for the text of the French Constitution in both English and French.} Similarly, while the House of Commons is nominally free to legislate on any matter and to run its own affairs, in practice, this freedom is limited by the Parliament Acts, which allow the House of Commons to overturn any decision made by the Lords, except on the prolongation of the life of Parliament.\footnote{See http://www.parliament.uk for further details of the Lords’ powers.}

While the House of Lords is composed of a mixture of unelected hereditary and life peers, the Sénat is elected one-third every three years by an electoral college of regional representatives.\footnote{The Sénat has the most comprehensive and understandable guide to the complex electoral procedure on its website at http://www.senat.fr} This produces a rather paradoxical effect: while it is easier for anti-EU elements to gain entry to the Sénat, there is a higher institutional capacity for opposition representation in the House of Lords. This should be explained in some more detail. Leaving aside the hereditary element of the Lords, the remaining members are appointed on the basis of government-sanctioned ennoblements, either from retiring MPs or other public figures. In the case of ex-MPs, they will be unlikely to be anti-EU, due to the Common’s FPP system, as discussed above, which means that such figures will be relatively rare. In the case of public figures, while these are generally elevated on the basis of their political inclinations, the government of the day is unlikely to want to include people who are likely to cause difficulties on major lines of policy, of which the EU is one. As a result, the chances of someone opposed to the EU entering the Lords is relatively small, even in comparison to the Sénat’s convoluted electoral system, which at least allows regional-based politicians to gain access to that institution. At the same time, while political groupings play an important role in the day-to-day functioning of both chambers, the substantial number of
crossbench members in the Lords has no equivalent in the Sénat. As a result, within the Lords there are more opportunities for a member to avoid any party whip and present their opinions, including opposition to the EU.

Turning to the heads of state, there is a rather stark contrast between the two countries. In the British system, the monarch has no more than a figurehead role. However, in France the President, who has a direct mandate, and who retains various executive powers to that office, has a much more important position. Article 34 of the constitution lists the areas in which the Assemblée may legislate, leaving the so-called domaine réservée for the President. The right of the President to appoint the Prime Minister (Article 8) and to dissolve parliament (Article 12) further highlight the President’s predominant role.

Once again, the differing means of access to the positions has an impact on the likelihood of anti-EU elements gaining access. In the case of the British monarch, there is essentially no chance of such an event occurring, further compounded by the constitutional presumption that the monarch does not involve themselves in matters of politics. For the French Presidency, the use of the same type of two-round system as found in Assemblée elections does offer some chance of anti-EU figures at least gaining a platform from which to make their views known. However, the one-person nature of the post means that the European issue has to compete with many others, a state of affairs that does not work in its favour. Consequently, it does not present a much more favourable outlook than the monarchy.

One final note before moving on to institutions on other levels concerns the French political system. While there was an assumption that the relationship between the President and the government would be made workable by both being of the same political affiliation, the co-habitations that took place in 1986-88, 1993-95 and since 1997 demonstrated that this need not necessarily be the case. Moreover, these periods have shown that for many French politicians, it is control of the Elysée that is the top prize in the system. As a result, the

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52 Even in quantitative terms, the 6 non-attached members (out of 321) of the current Sénat (2001-04) is insignificant in comparison to the 180 (out of 700) listed Lords’ crossbenchers (at 10 Jan 2002). Details from the respective websites: http://www.senat.fr and http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldhome.htm

53 Elgie & Griggs, 2000, discuss the Presidency in more depth.

54 During the 1995 presidential elections, the issue of ‘European construction’ was not among the top five most important perceived themes of the various candidates in the first round. BVA, ‘Le suivi de l’état d’opinion du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle’, poll published 25 April 1995.

Assemblée is not just a space for political debate, but also a space for manoeuvring towards the Presidency, a situation that could have impacts on the expression of opposition towards the EU. If an Assemblée politician becomes principally defined by his or her anti-EU stance, then that might have a negative impact on their chances of election to the Presidency. As a result, this might provide a check on would-be Presidents in their positions, although as shall be seen, this may be more of a theoretical problem than a practical one.
In both France and the UK there are various sub-national levels of government, from the regional down to the local. However, as previously discussed, moving down this scale, away from the national level – and, more pertinently, the European level – it has been hypothesised that there is increasing marginalisation of the European issue, as well as less interest on the part of anti-EU elements seeking representation. As a result, while focusing primarily on regional level institutions, it is also necessary to note lower levels.

At the regional level, France clearly has the more developed system, despite moves in both countries towards increased decentralisation. The 1982 reforms in France, like the 1997 reforms in the UK, marked important changes in the structuring of power within each country. In the former case, this meant a strengthening of the regional councils (conseils régionaux), through the introduction of direct elections on a mixed FPP/PR two-round system, and with the extension of their powers to cover parts of education, along with regional economic and transport planning. While this new electoral system makes it somewhat easier than before for interest groups (in this case, anti-EU elements) to gain access, the limited nature of the councils’ work, and the relatively low profile of the institution, does not lend itself to a large carrying capacity for opposition.

Having said this, the French system is still well developed in comparison to the British one. Effectively, there is an absence of regional government for most of the period of this study, until 1997 and the creation of regional assemblies in Wales and Scotland. Elected on mixed FPP/PR systems (full PR in the case of London), these assemblies have somewhat limited powers in a variety fields, all being nominally subject to overriding legislation from the House of Commons: even the Scottish Parliament, which has limited tax powers, suffers in this respect from the Commons’ supremacy in the British system. Even if in practice Westminster does not get involved in decisions made by these bodies, this should not hide the limits under which they work. A second point that should noted concerns the relative

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57 The London Assembly can also be added to this short list, given its substantial size.
lack of connection between these British regional institutions and the national political scene, in comparison with France. While French politicians are much more used to, and adept at, moving between different levels of government, the creation of these regional bodies in the UK has resulted in a hiving off of those elements with which they deal into a separate political territory. Consequently, while the British regional assemblies are probably easier to access and carry opposition than their French counterparts, they are less connected to matters European.

Below the regional level, there is an intermediate level of départements and county councils. Traditional foundations of local government in both countries, if for very different reasons (the French representing a top-down structure of the state, the British a bottom-up tradition), both have direct elections to their councils (conseils généraux in France) and both have limited powers in education and planning measures. Using the same electoral systems as their national counterparts, it might be expected that both have the same level of access as the Assemblée and the Commons, but with a lower capacity, due to their smaller size and the restricted nature of their work. Similarly, while the numerous communes in France and district and parish councils in the UK offer relatively easy access to interest representations, they do not really represent many opportunities for either substantial public profiles or influencing of public policy.

In contrast to the plethora of sub-national institutions that do not offer substantial prospects for anti-EU representation, there is a converse situation at the supranational level. Here there is really only one institution that offers possibilities, namely the European Parliament. Both countries send 87 representatives to the European Parliament, the French on a national-list PR system and the British on an FPP system prior to 1999, and on regional-list PR thereafter. The use of PR has meant that access for British opposition elements to the European Parliament has increased to the same sort of levels as the French have long had, for the reasons outlined in the discussion of electoral gateways earlier.

However, a warning must be sounded here, concerning the way in which this ‘European’ institution is treated. As has been clearly established, European elections are treated as second-order by both electors and those elected; the elections are a reflection of events on the national level rather than of those on the European level.\textsuperscript{58} This results in lower turnout, increased protest voting and more potential for new political groupings to breakthrough to

positions of political representation. This last effect has occurred in both countries, with the Front National (FN) making its electoral breakthrough in the European elections of 1984, and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) making its in 1999, after the change in the British voting system. Consequently, representation in the European Parliament is as much conditional upon national concerns as it is upon attitudes towards European integration. This said, it is not to deny that anti-EU groups will be more likely to seek representation in an institution that deals explicitly in their field of activity and whose control would be a signal victory.
As has been discussed above, formal institutions represent a structured means for opposition to be expressed, discussed and integrated. Thus far, attention has been focused upon those institutions, because they offer the clearest means of identifying and isolating elements of opposition. However, these institutions and that opposition sit within a wider framework, namely that of civil society. This social and political artefact of formal democracy allows individuals of any background to engage freely in political activity, either singly or as part of a group. Free from the constraints of seeking electoral success, these groups can adopt whatever structures and positions they feel best represent their interests and priorities, since that is their primary purpose.

These informal groups can be broken down into three main categories, classified by their approach towards representation. There are those that have tried and failed to gain entry to formal institutions, those that have successfully gained entry but which then leave formal institutions, and finally those that have not tried at all to gain entry. Each of these requires more detail.

When discussing the impact of electoral systems on opposition representation in assemblies, it has been noted that certain elements will be barred from election; most frequently under FPP, but also under PR. Since it is precisely these elements that are most motivated on the issue of European integration – given that they have run for election – they can be considered to form a first set of informal groups outside of parliament to project their opinions. However, it must be noted that it is unlikely that such people will give up their attempt to join formal institutions after one failure. Indeed, it may well be that their informal opposition is more of a ‘holding position’ until such time as they are able to enter an institution and work from there. Alternatively, there may be a recognition that formal representation is unlikely to occur (especially if the hurdles to access are high), but is still desirable. In such a case, the search for formal representation becomes an addition and a supplement to informal opposition, with a view to reaching a point where both exist alongside each other.

The second source of informal groups occurs when those who did pass the electoral hurdle into formal institutions step back outside. By letting those who have strong views on the matter of European integration express them through the alternative outlet of non-party groups, party managers can potentially reduce the tension within the party on policy
positions. Similarly, non-party groups offer those extremists the opportunity to give full vent to their feelings, without jeopardising their position within the party structure. Certainly, since the ultimate aim of any non-party group is to change public policy outcomes there is still a conflict between the governing party and those members of that party involved in non-party group activity. However, that conflict is externalised in a way that it would not be otherwise.

Since non-party groups are not just composed of marginal members of political parties, but also of non-party political figures, the ‘party political-ness’ of the groups is obscured and reduced. This is also apparent in the creation of cross-party groups, which further limits the association between a group and a party. However, a distinction should be made between non-party groups and intra-party groupings on specific issues. This latter set - typified by such British groups as Conservatives Against a Federal Europe (CAFE) and Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign (LESC), or Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s CERES grouping within the Parti Socialiste before it split away - are a means of organising party factions within the party structure, although some have developed links out beyond the Parliamentary party. While such groups play an interesting role in the development of parties’ policy outcomes, they are still essentially held hostage by the tensions of party cohesion and vote-maximisation.

There is a third source of informal opposition to consider. This is the set of individuals who do not try to gain access to formal institutions in order to project their message: instead they are solely focused upon working around such institutions. This is not to say that they have no interest in formal institutions, but that they attempt to influence them from the outside, rather than inside: possibly because their concerns are very specific and so unlikely to appeal to a large constituency. The integration process is not an even one, inasmuch as its costs tend to be concentrated and its benefits diffuse. Consequently, sectoral interest groups may well become mobilised against particular aspects of the EU’s programme. This includes particular fields of economic activity (such as EMU or agriculture), policies with a horizontal impact (such as social or environmental legislation), or parts of European identity building (such as citizenship rights). However, given the aforementioned unevenness, it is not possible to make an \textit{a priori} judgement as to which groups will be affected by, then mobilised against, the integration process. This source represents the element of informal opposition that is least predictable in its composition and development.

Taken together, these three sources of informal opposition form an essential addition to our understanding of opposition within formal institutions, since the two interact with each
other. Although they fall outside of those institutions, they are still affected by the levels of institutional access and carrying capacity. This is clearest for the first source, but it is also true for the other two, both of which see benefits in organising outside of formal institutional spaces, beyond the control of those higher up the system.
Having now covered the range of formal and informal institutions, it is possible to describe and analyse the overall size and configuration of institutional space within each country. Table 1 summarises, at least in terms of formal institutions, the levels of access and carrying capacity for each institution in France and the UK as described in the preceding sections: Figures 1 and 2 represent the same information graphically.

Taken as a whole, there is a wider choice of spaces in France than there is in the UK, particularly in terms of access to institutions. In the case of the two national chambers and the head of state, this difference is due to the very different electoral systems in operation and the general weakness of French political parties in the Assemblée. As a result, while there is a similar carrying capacity in national institutions, there is a greater likelihood of its potential being realised in France, given this relative ease of access.

Furthermore, the French space has been much more interconnected than the British one, a point underlined by the possibility of holding multiple elected positions, the cumul des mandats. The 1985 law which permitted this was reformed in 2000, but even in its new reduced form it represents a much greater interlinking of spaces than occurs in Britain. In the latter’s case, while dual mandates became possible for those MPs holding seats in the Scottish and Welsh assemblies, this was the exception, and one which has become less rather than more common. This aside, for the period under consideration, France’s institutional spaces can be considered as having relatively high levels of interaction and shared representatives. Indeed, Stevens notes that it not only possible, but not uncommon, for politicians to build a successful political career without sitting in the Assemblée.

Putting all of these elements together, there is a more accessible and interconnected set of formal institutions in France than there is in the UK. While overall carrying capacity does not seem to be that different between the two, the lower requirements for access in France seem to suggest that the carrying capacity there will be more fully exploited. As a result, anti-EU opposition groups might be expected to locate themselves inside French formal institutions more readily than in British ones, with the corollary that informal opposition will be more common in the UK. Indeed, beyond these general remarks it is possible to make

59 The Sénat’s website contains a full set of documentation on this question at: http://www.senat.fr/evenement/cumul.html
60 Stevens, 1996, p.211.
some more detailed hypotheses, along the lines of those already outlined in the introductory chapter.

Table 1: Overview of Formal Institutional Spaces in France and the UK, 1985-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Access</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Level</td>
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<td><em>House of Commons</em></td>
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<td>(not 1986-88)</td>
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<td>HIGH</td>
<td>FPP</td>
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<td>AN</td>
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<td><em>Sénat</em></td>
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<td>(1986-1988)</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<td></td>
<td>AN</td>
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<td>MID</td>
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<td>SP</td>
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<td><em>Conseils Régionaux</em></td>
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<td>AR</td>
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<td>PR</td>
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<td>AE</td>
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<td><em>European Parliament</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>(pre-1999)</td>
<td>FPP</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(post-1999)</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<td></td>
<td>AE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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Key: Appoint. = Appointed; AE = European Assembly; AN = National Assembly; AR = Regional Assembly; Hered. = Hereditary position; FPP = First Post the Post; PR = Proportional Representation; SP = Single Person position.

61 The levels in this table are relative, rather than absolute.
In the UK, the centrality of the Commons, and the use of the first past the post system will be the central factors. Parties will tend to try and externalise opposition elements into new and existing non-party groups. This is due to the small number of parties and their desire to
Institutional Spaces

maintain party cohesion in order to be large enough to form a government majority. This will be particularly pronounced at times when the government has a small majority in parliament, since the leverage that each individual Member of Parliament (MP) has grows. Consequently, the expected pattern would be a predominance of non-party groups over party or intra-party groups, with the former centred on disaffected members of political parties. Intra-party groups would develop, but not to the extent of seriously changing party policy.

In France, the relative weakness of the Assemblée, the fragmentation of the party system and the weakness of the parties’ structures means that new party formations will emerge, differing only in respect to the European issue from their previous affiliations, without any electoral penalisation. The link with small majorities that is expected in the UK would also not be an issue, since both government and opposition parties could be susceptible to the processes mentioned. Moreover, the closeness of the new parties to the previous parties on other issues apart from the European one will enable working relationships between them to develop, potentially to the extent of joining together in a government coalition. Here then, the pattern would be more one of new parties forming out of existing parties, based around key individuals, and so would be unlikely to be any more stable than those existing parties. Non-party groups would be formed not by disaffected politicians, but rather by non-party political elements, drawn to opposing the EU for a variety of reasons.

In both countries, the development of opposition in formal institutions other than the parliament will be limited. In the British case, this is due to the lack of alternative spaces, whereas in the French case, it is due to the other spaces not being conducive to anti-EU activity becoming the dominant variable. The Presidency is a single post, and candidates’ positions on the EU are likely to count for less than positions on issues more relevant to the electorate (such as the economy, social services, health, etc.). By contrast, sub-national institutions (and so, indirectly, the Sénat) are likely to be more focused on local issues, again relegating opposition to the EU to a more minor role. The only partial exception to this might be found in the European Parliament. The use of proportional representation in France for the whole period would suggest that oppositional elements might have found representation relatively early on, in comparison to both French domestic institutions and to British opposition groups, which would have been barred by the first past the post system in use until the 1999 elections.

A theoretical framework has now been built for assessing the impact of institutions on opposition creation and development. Ease of access and carrying capacity have been
identified as the two key concepts determining that impact and they have both been quantified. This has permitted a more systematic picture of the institutional landscape in which opposition operates.
2: France and the UK in Europe, 1985-1999

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of France and the UK’s relationship and interaction with the European Union during the period under study. This will include political developments at both the national and the EU level, changing public opinion and the creation and development of opposition groups. As such, it provides the practical material with which to test the hypotheses laid out in the introduction, relating to opposition formation and development.

Rather than taking a simple chronological approach to the period between 1985 and 1999, this chapter is organised by themes, since this allows for an isolation of the various elements that it is necessary to consider. These elements will be recombined at the end of the chapter with some brief comments on emergent patterns, and also in later chapters when looking at factors in opposition formation, strategy and profile.

The chapter is broken down into five sections. Firstly, there is an overview of the development of the European Union itself over the study period. A second section then focuses upon the reception of those developments in each country and the way in which the EU has been dealt with inside the national system. A brief overview of the media landscape is followed by a consideration of public opinion in France and the UK towards the Union, both in terms of popular support and popular interest in the subject. The final part of the chapter deals with the specific development of organised opposition to the EU in both countries.
THE EVOLVING EUROPEAN SYSTEM

The main hypotheses suggest that developments at the European level are important drivers of opposition mobilisation, formation and development. This section will therefore consider how the EU has developed over the timeframe of the study, in terms of institutional structures and policy developments.

One of the main rationales for taking the period 1985-99 was that it marked a relatively well-defined period in the development of the European Community (EC) into the European Union. 1985 marked the start of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) for the Single European Act, after the various impasses of the 1970s and early 1980s had been largely resolved at the Fontainebleau summit in 1984. 1999 marked the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, itself the follow up treaty to the Treaty on European Union of 1992 that had caused so many problems across the member states. Thus the period gives three treaty cycles (negotiation, signing, ratification) to study and compare. Additionally, the Single European Act and Maastricht provided for medium term projects, the single market programme and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) respectively. Figure 3 provides a quick overview of these dates.

Figure 3: Key Dates in the Development of the EC/EU 1985-1999

- Single European Act
- Treaty on European Union
- Treaty of Amsterdam
- Single Market Programme
- Stage 1
- Stage 2
- Stage 3
A point to note here is that while all these events are plotted as discrete periods of time, in practical terms there was a lack of clarity of when each event began and ended. The most extreme example of this is the single market programme, the roots of which predated even the Commission White Paper of 1985, and which had an official target date for completion of end of 1992, but that is still being followed up to the present day. Similarly, each of the treaties saw greater or lesser periods of debate before official negotiations began, as well as discussion after its entry into force about its impact, especially when looking at the medium term projects. Indeed, Amsterdam was legally pre-programmed by Maastricht, largely as an exercise in tidying up the latter’s provisions. Nevertheless, despite these caveats, they can still be used as a frame of reference.

Given the constraints of space, it is not possible to enter into any great depth of detail in the matter of the Union’s development, and indeed there are more than enough excellent books on the subject. Instead, the main focus will be upon describing the basic timetable of events between 1985 and 1999, and particularly institution- and policy-building, since these are the main concerns of the hypotheses. A clear understanding of these events, in conjunction with national responses to them, is essential in the evaluation of the posited process of group formation.

Considered in these broad terms, the study period saw the rapid expansion of the Community/Union in both scope and depth. The Single European Act not only formalised the single market project, but also introduced new competences for cohesion, the environment and research, as well as the beginnings of an integrated foreign policy. It also extended the powers of the European Parliament and reintroduced qualified majority voting as an alternative to the de facto unanimity that had persisted since the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966. The ‘1992’ project, as the single market programme was popularly known, marked an active attempt on the part of the EC to raise its public profile: clearly, if the single market was to create the full set of benefits promised, then both businesses and consumers needed to be informed. The Commission used both experts (e.g. the Cecchini report of 1988) and politicians to help raise public awareness.

At the same time, the momentum of the Single European Act enabled the Community to reform its budgetary procedure and start more extensive modifications to the Common

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Agricultural Policy (CAP), resulting in 1988 in the Inter-institutional Accord between the Commission, European Parliament and Council, as well as the first set of medium-term Financial Perspectives for budgetary planning. Finally, Commission President Jacques Delors exploited the increasing popularity of the EC and its work, as well as a reference in the Single European Act’s preamble, to persuade the European Council to agree to a committee on economic and monetary union, comprised of the heads of the national central banks under the chairmanship of Delors himself. The committee produced its report on EMU in April 1989, and the Strasbourg European Council was able to agree upon an IGC to prepare treaty revisions in December of the same year.

At the same time, the situation in the wider Europe was changing rapidly. 1989 saw the ever increasing effects of Soviet perestroika and glasnost, as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe used their new-found freedom of manoeuvre to liberalise their systems, leading to a summer of increasing migrations across the ever more porous Iron Curtain and deepening crises of legitimacy for the regimes of those states. On 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall was opened, rapidly leading to plans for the unification of the two German states in October 1990.

However, the moves towards German unification also had internal repercussions for the Community. Germany’s partners in the Community were uncertain as to its future direction. Indeed, the Germans themselves recognised that unification could result in looser ties with the Community. This was especially true for Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had a very close relationship with French President Mitterrand, and who wished to demonstrate that Germany was committed to further integration. Thus, at the Dublin European Council, in June 1990, a second IGC was agreed upon, to consider questions of ‘political union’. This not only covered institutional reforms, but also increased cooperation in foreign and security policies, as well as internal affairs.

From the official opening of the IGCs in December 1990 to their conclusion at the European Council meeting in Maastricht one year later, there was a relatively positive air about the proceedings. Many involved in the negotiations saw the opportunity to make a qualitative leap in the level of integration. The Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht, created a new structure, the European Union. The EU comprised three pillars. The first was the European Economic Community, now renamed the European Community (EC), further

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65 The most detailed account of these IGCs is contained in K. Dyson & K. Featherstone, 1999, The road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
developed with a new co-decision procedure for the European Parliament; a consultative Committee of the Regions; a new selection procedure for the Commission; new competences, including provisions on citizenship of the Union; and a full programme for EMU. Alongside this strong supranational pillar were created two weaker, intergovernmental pillars. The second pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy, formalised European Political Cooperation and created potentially strong instruments for common action. The third, co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs, reorganised the intergovernmental co-operation that had taken place before, but to no great effect. On the top of the pillars was placed a set of common provisions, giving the European Council a guiding role and improved coherence between the various elements.

The ambitious nature of the Maastricht project soon became apparent. Even with the introduction of the subsidiarity principle, which limited the EC’s actions to those which member states could not perform better themselves, the increased profile of the Community in the wake of the ‘1992’ programme for the Single Market meant that public interest had been awoken, along with many fears. This was true not only in traditionally sceptical countries, such as the UK or Denmark, but also in more positive members, France and Germany being prime examples. The seemingly sudden appearance of the Community in all walks of life caused people to question how it had happened and, more importantly, what basis it had in terms of legitimacy. The ‘democratic deficit’ had already been a popular topic before Maastricht, and the treaty signed there opened as many questions as it resolved.

All of this was demonstrated vividly when the Danes narrowly voted against ratification in June 1992, followed by the tiny majority in favour in France in September. At the Edinburgh European Council in December, special arrangements and ‘clarifications’ were made for the Danes, allowing them to vote narrowly in favour in May 1993. Finally in November 1993, Maastricht came into force, almost two years after its signature, and after a particularly tricky passage through the British parliament and a reference to the German Constitutional Court.

Despite the large and unanticipated difficulties of ratification, the underlying political commitment from the key Franco-German pairing and from others remained. This commitment was to be tested once again after Maastricht, when the Exchange Rate

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Mechanism (ERM) came under increasing pressure from currency speculators. The entry of the British pound, after much procrastination, in 1990 came at a time when the ERM was becoming increasingly rigid, as the tight Bundesbank policy clashed with other countries’ economic needs, and speculators sensed a chance to break the central banks’ resolve to protect parities.\(^\text{69}\) First in 1992 and then again in 1993, the ERM was blown apart, if not actually destroyed, and many observers thought that EMU would have to be scrapped, as public hostility towards the reforms required to meet the convergence criteria grew. However, a strong political resolve rode out this storm and put EMU firmly back on track by 1996.

Another consequence of the end of the Cold War was the questioning in some other European countries of their neutrality and non-alignment policy. The economic and political benefits of membership of the EU were weighed against these policies and were convincing for most, a fact highlighted by the negotiations between the EC and the European Free Trade Association on the European Economic Area in the early 1990s. Here, the Association’s members soon realised that the relationship was highly asymmetrical and that they would be obliged to take up most of the Community’s acquis without having a say in its formulation.\(^\text{70}\) Consequently, applications for membership where lodged by Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway, and in 1995 the first three of these states joined the EU, Norway having again rejected membership in a referendum. Whilst largely painless as an enlargement, the new members brought their own particularities to the EU and were to leave their mark on the next treaty revision, which Maastricht had provided for.

The follow-up IGC to Maastricht was always going to face difficulties. Its timing had been based on the false assumption that by 1996 Maastricht would have been in force for almost five years and so would have provided much information on that treaty’s short-comings. The ratification process instead effectively took two years out of that period. Similarly, the IGC was intended more as a fine-tuning exercise than a major overhaul. This caused problems, as the momentum of the 1980s was lost to increasing systemic problems and generalised scepticism. The crisis of 1992-93 produced calls for a major re-think of EMU, but political exigencies of cross-linked deals done at Maastricht meant that it was never really likely that such an important project would be renegotiated. The Germans had been sold on EMU by

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the close modelling of the European Central Bank on the Bundesbank and the Southern members by the provision of much increased structural aid.

The result of this was that the IGC was seen by most as ‘Maastricht II’, rather than ‘Amsterdam I’. The impending enlargement to the East (where countries had been placing applications for membership since the early 1990s) theoretically put extra pressure on those involved to make more radical proposals for institutional reform, a key theme of the IGC, but this was countered by the political inertia of the member states. In June 1995, a Reflection Group was set up under the Spanish Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp to consider the key points of discussion and its subsequent report was the basis of the decision at the Madrid European Council in December of that year to open the IGC in March 1996.71

The IGC was officially finished at Amsterdam in June 1997. Despite the late arrival of a new British Labour government to the negotiating table, and the resultant incorporation of the Social Charter into the treaty, it was clear that it was not only they who had reservations and the Treaty of Amsterdam produced no big advances.72 Amsterdam’s main achievements lay in the refinement of Maastricht. The co-decision procedure was simplified, to give the European Parliament full veto powers, and extended to more policy fields. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was restructured and developed more fully than time had allowed in Maastricht, and Justice and Home Affairs was partially incorporated into the EC. A new chapter on employment was added, to address the growing concerns about rising unemployment in the Union. A procedure for closer co-operation between member states was created, partly to allow the semi-incorporation of the Schengen Convention on free movement and partly to improve flexibility in light of the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. As part of a simplification process all treaty articles were renumbered sequentially and obsolete provisions deleted. But the most striking feature of Amsterdam was its omissions: despite the recognised need to reform the institutional structures in the face of enlargement, no agreement could be found, other than to limit the number of seats in the European Parliament to 700. An attached protocol declared that a full institutional restructuring would have to take place when the number of member states reached 20, with a possibility of resolving the Council vote weighting/number of commissioners question before then. No IGC was provided for in Amsterdam apart from this protocol.

71 McDonagh provides a good account of this process (B. McDonagh, 1998, Original sin in a brave new world: The paradox of Europe: an account of the negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Dublin, Institute of European Affairs).

If Amsterdam was a damp squib, then the Commission was intent on maintaining the momentum towards enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, and one month after the European Council, it announced its “Agenda 2000” programme. This combined the Commission’s opinions on the various applications to join the EU with a set of proposals for reform of Union policies (especially CAP and structural funds) and budgetary requirements (in anticipation of the end of the Delors II package in 1999). On the basis of criteria laid down at Copenhagen (1993), the Commission was in favour of opening negotiations with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia - as well as the previously agreed Cyprus - a proposition which the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 confirmed. For those countries not invited, there would be continued links and a new European Conference, the first of which took place in March 1998.

The reform element of Agenda 2000 was a long a drawn out process, and what was agreed at Berlin in March 1999 only came after much haggling and some rather noticeable watering-down. At the same time, it was becoming apparent that there was a risk of leaving behind the other applicant countries semi-permanently. As a result, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, agreed to open negotiations with Romania, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta, to begin in early 2000. It also agreed that while Turkey was to be recognised as an applicant, it would remain a special case.

While this was happening, there were several important developments within the Union. In May 1998, a special meeting of the Council decided that 11 countries had met the Maastricht convergence criteria for joining the Euro. Despite the fact that, strictly speaking, almost none of the member states had met the criteria, only Greece failed to improve its economic position sufficiently to make the grade. The UK, Denmark and Sweden maintained their reserve on joining. Seven months later, on 1 January 1999, the Euro was born, with the setting of “fixed and irrevocable” conversion rates of the 11 currencies.

The success of the Euro’s launch was quickly overshadowed as the Commission found itself under attack by the European Parliament over fraud allegations. In March 1999, it resigned en masse after a damming report by an independent committee on matters of fraud, nepotism

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74 This somewhat woolly interpretation was necessitated by the fact that to have excluded France, of example, would have undermined much of the raison d’être of EMU. See L. Tsoukalis, 2000, ‘Economic and Monetary Union: Political conviction and economic uncertainty’, in, H. Wallace & W. Wallace (eds.), Policy-making in the European Union, 4th ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.149-178.
and mismanagement. The search for a replacement to Jacques Santer eventually led to Romano Prodi, the former Italian prime minister, but he could only be properly installed as President at the end of 1999, after the summer European elections, where the right finally broke the left’s control of the European Parliament. Meanwhile, the protracted wrangling over the Agenda 2000 proposals came to a conclusion in March 1999 at Berlin. It had taken almost two years to reach an agreement on the proposed reforms, as countries fought to maintain the funds they received from the budget while simultaneously trying to minimise their contributions. Of particular note in the bargaining that resulted was the retention of the British rebate (albeit with concessions to other net contributors) and last-minute concessions to the French on the matter of agricultural payments.

By the end of 1999, the EU’s institutions had finally resolved their issues, only to find themselves at the edge of another IGC. In December, at the European Council in Helsinki, the member states agreed to review institutional structures in the light of enlargement, as well as the further development of a defence capacity for the Union. This second element dated back to an Anglo-French summit at St. Malo one year before, and was to lead to plans for the creation of a 60,000 strong rapid reaction force to be put in place by 2003.

The net result of this development has been the creation of at least some European competence in almost every area of public policy. Moreover, the profile of the EC/EU rose to a new level, first because of the single market programme and then because of the developments contained within Maastricht. Unfortunately, data are not available to measure this directly for the entire period, but it is clear that, at least in intention, the Union has become increasingly aware of the need to involve the general public.

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77 Compare the extent of the proposals for marketing the Single Market (which were the first of their kind at the European level) against the much more sophisticated programmes on enlargement and the single currency.
EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE UK AND FRANCE

A necessary complement to developments at the European level is the reception of those developments within the national systems of the UK and France. The reasons for this are all interlinked. First and foremost, it is only through looking at this reception that it is possible to understand the development of European integration as an issue within a national context. The first hypothesis of this thesis states that national systems receive and adapt European developments, producing a country-specific form of opposition. Hence, it is only through an outlining of those national systems, and then a comparison with the initial European events, that it is possible to see where an interface has occurred and which issues have generated friction. Such friction points are important because they provide potential proximate sources of opposition mobilisation, one of the key topics in the following chapter on group formation. Finally, an analysis of the national reception of European developments also helps to build an understanding of national discourses on the EU: discourses that further explain the relationship between the European and the national levels.

In practical terms, this requires a consideration of several elements. At the broadest level, there is a need to cover the general sweep of national interactions with the European Union during the study period. More precisely, attention will be focused upon events that might give rise to discussion and debate within national systems on matters European. This includes both European events, such as treaty ratifications and policy developments, and national events, such as national elections, where Europe can potentially play an important role.

As was discussed in the previous chapter on institutional spaces, the size of a government’s majority in parliament potentially has a major impact on the pattern of opposition formation and development. While this is particularly the case with First Past the Post systems, the extent to which the French two-round system is also affected by this mechanical effect should also be considered. While this is discussed briefly during the following text, and in more detail in later chapters, it will help the reader to refer to Figures 4 and 5, showing the size of government majorities in the House of Commons and Assemblée Nationale respectively, in order to gain an impression of the actual figures involved.
In 1985, both France and the UK had realigned themselves with the rest of the Community. Mitterrand’s excursion into socialism in the early 1980s had been even less successful than Thatcher’s neo-liberalism and, with the British budget rebate secured at Fontainebleau the year before, both saw the development of a fully integrated European economy as an attractive proposition, if for differing reasons. While the UK saw the liberalisation across the EC as way to expand into new markets, in France the benefit was more focused on the

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push it would give to economic modernisation and to moving further towards a more integrated Europe. Coupled to an adventurous Commission under Jacques Delors (Mitterrand’s old finance minister), the scene was set for an agreement on revitalising the EC.

Despite subsequent claims of being misled, Thatcher and her government were happy with the treaty signed in 1986, having been among the more vocal supporters of the single market. Similarly, Mitterrand used the Single European Act as part of his move towards becoming a committed European, alongside his growing friendship with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Quick ratification followed (aided in France by the co-habiting Prime Minister Jacques Chirac) and the legislative programme of the 1985 White Paper was rolled into place. But at this very point the problems that were to bedevil the British debate on Europe were beginning.

The general elections of 1986 and 1987 in France and the UK respectively, both revolved around national issues. The switch to Proportional Representation (PR) in France had been an attempt to cushion the losses of the left after the failed reintroduction of socialist principles had weakened the French economy; the right had regrouped after the 1981 elections and the Front National (FN) had begun to gather support on the far right. In the UK, Thatcher was confident that the on-going neo-liberal project of the Conservatives was in tune with popular wishes, not least because Labour was still in a state of disarray after the 1983 election.

The 1988 presidential and general elections in France underlined this pattern. The co-habitation between Mitterrand and Chirac since 1986 had opened up the possibility of competing claims on the handling of the economy. This was of importance, since the October 1987 stock market crash allowed Mitterrand to distance himself from the government’s tainted hands and feel secure in his candidature. Division on the right helped Mitterrand to return to power, and just about managed to mobilise voters into returning a small left majority to the Assemblée.

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80 Even at the time, it was apparent to those writing on the subject, that integration had rediscovered its dynamism and that those in favour of intergovernmental practice would found themselves in ever more difficult positions. See P. Taylor, 1989, ‘The new dynamics of EC integration in the 1980s’, in J. Lodge (Ed.), The European Community and the challenge of the future, 1st Ed., London, Pinter, pp.3-25.
While Thatcher had seen the Single European Act as an end in itself, France and the other member states wanted to go further. The Delors Committee on EMU was a case in point, as was the growing discussion within the British government about Sterling joining the ERM. By September 1988, Thatcher was making her landmark speech at Bruges, setting out her view of a Community of “willing and active cooperation of independent sovereign states”, rejecting a “European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels”.

To some extent, it was internal party divisions over Europe that made politicians reluctant to engage in discussion of the subject. The 1989 European elections were to mark the first of many for the Conservative party where such divisions were to prove very difficult to manage. Thatcher’s change in policy in the wake of her Bruges speech in 1988 set the party up for a deep split, while Labour completed its European conversion and concentrated on exploiting Tory divisions. In France, the lack of distance on European policies between the socialists, the Gaullists and the centrists left something of a hole in the campaigning, with anti-EU sentiment pushed to the peripheries.

If France was not having problems with the further development of the Community, then it was soon to have more fundamental concerns about a key pillar of the Community’s existence. The collapse of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-90 quickly opened up the prospect of a reunified Germany. The result was the creation of a second IGC on political integration, pushed by the Germans, to reassure France (and the UK, to a lesser extent) of its commitment to the EU as the centre of its European policy. To some extent this also allowed the Germans to push their preferences for a more federal institutional system in balance to French moves towards EMU, a policy that was the logical development of their franc fort policy of the 1980s.

Just as France was pushing on to the next stage of monetary integration, so the British debate on membership of the ERM came to a head, as Thatcher was forced into joining the system by her new Chancellor John Major. By this time, membership had become a totemic issue, rather than one based on reasoned economic argument, a fact that was to come back to haunt

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84 This was the time of the bizarre secret ‘shadowing’ of the Deutschmark by the Chancellor Nigel Lawson, a secret policy that lasted for a year before being exposed and ridiculed by Thatcher. See Stephens, 1996, pp.70-99.
Major just three years later. And it was clear that Thatcher had not made the choice voluntarily, as her distrust of all things European grew. However, coupled with growing problems on domestic tax issues, her position became ever more untenable and in December 1990 she was replaced by Major.88

This left the way clear for the IGC negotiations proper of 1991. The British government was free to pursue a more positive approach towards further integration, while for France it represented an opportunity to go a long way in achieving the geopolitical goal of Germany’s active participation in Western Europe and opening up German monetary policy. If France’s goals were strategic, then British concerns were more parochial; John Major was happy to secure opt-outs from the final stage of EMU and the Social Chapter and the exclusion of the word ‘federal’ from the final text.89 In neither case was there a feeling that ratification would pose any great difficulty.

Of course, in the event ratification was very difficult indeed.90 In France, what had been a relatively smooth process of amending the constitution before ratifying the treaty suddenly became a political football between the President and the two chambers of parliament after the Danish ‘no’ of June 1992, resulting in the rash promise by the President of a referendum. At the same point in time, the British government faced a newly confident group of eurosceptics on its backbenches, resulting in the start of a long and bitter passage through the Commons. Without entering into much more detail, it was apparent in both cases that the debate was focused more on domestic concerns, or at best ‘Europe’ as a general issue, than it was on the specifics of the treaty in question. In both cases, those in power lost much of their credibility and status. Major was already suffering the effects of a very small majority in the Commons (which left him open to radical elements within his party pushing for more eurosceptic positions), while Mitterrand practically guaranteed himself another period of co-habitation after the 1993 general elections.

By the time of the 1992 British and 1993 French general elections, considerations of incumbents’ work came to the fore. In the UK, the surprise victory of the Conservatives was

88 George, 1998, pp.209-230 discusses the last years of Thatcher’s premiership in more detail.
89 See Dyson & Featherstone, 1999, pp.644-690 for more detail on Major’s negotiating position.
achieved by negative campaigning on Labour’s tax plans, despite coming only a few months after the signing of the Treaty on European Union. Mortimore notes that this election was marked by more attention to packaging than content of policy and certainly it was characterised by the rise of negative campaigning in the American style.\textsuperscript{91} In France, the sense of closure on the left’s period of power had been assured by the September 1992 referendum, where Mitterrand had been saved only by Chirac’s belated support. The election was fought largely over economic policy, with the right taking a moderate approach to the economic slow-down. 1993 was notable for the first campaigns by Philippe Séguin, a senior Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR) figure, and Philippe de Villiers, a Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) radical, based in large part on a critique of EU membership. Both had fought on the ‘no’ side for the referendum the previous year and sought to make further political capital, although without any great success.\textsuperscript{92}

Matters were not helped at all by the speculative attacks on the ERM during 1992-93. The effect of German reunification on monetary policy had put increasing strain on the other currencies in the system, particularly those not closely linked to the Deutschmark. In September 1992, the Bank of England fought in vain to keep Sterling within the system’s limits, finally resulting in the currency’s suspension from membership. “Black Wednesday” marked not only a damaging blow to the Conservative’s European policy, but also the end of public confidence in their management of the economy, a factor that would play an important role in the 1997 general election.\textsuperscript{93} Things were made worse by the events of the following summer when the franc experienced similar pressures. However, this time intervention was successful, and backed up first by the Bundesbank and then by a complete recasting of the ERM’s structure, leading many in the UK to claim that they had been unfairly treated.

By the time Maastricht came into force, opinion in both governments and the public across the Union was much more subdued. In France, the effort to get the economy into good enough shape to pass the EMU convergence criteria began. However, this was to cause friction with many workers, leading to strikes; by 1995 it was not entirely clear whether the third and final stage of EMU would happen in 1999, let alone 1997, the first possible date. However, a strong political resolve by Mitterrand and then Chirac rode out this storm and

put EMU firmly back on track with the announcement at Madrid in December 1995 to proceed with Stage 3 in 1999.

Even more than usual, the European elections of 1994 in the two countries were seen by most as little more than testing grounds for national issues. In France, Bernard Tapie’s federalist group matched De Villiers’ breakthrough on an anti-EU platform; but the campaign was basically a dry run of the presidential election due the following year.\textsuperscript{94} Similarly, the Conservative rout reflected popular discontent with the party, rather than their line on the Union, despite the sharp fall in popular support after 1992’s Black Wednesday.\textsuperscript{95}

France’s presidential election of 1995 revolved around the lack of a credible candidate on the left and the struggle on the right to gain support. Goldey and Knapp highlight unemployment and political corruption as the key themes in the campaign, and so despite his success in the European elections, De Villiers made a very weak showing, with even fewer votes than the Trotskyite Arlette Laguiller.\textsuperscript{96}

For the British, free from the constraints of the ERM and enjoying an economic upturn, the problems of their Union neighbours seemed distant. Major was continuing his fight with his party, his vision of being at the “heart of Europe” not being matched by his actions. Minor issues over qualified majority voting weightings after enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden and the choice of a new Commission President were used by Major to give his party the impression that he was playing tough.\textsuperscript{97} While the rest of the Union was pushing on with extra-Treaty cooperation, as with the Schengen Treaty of 1995, the UK continued to fight with itself.

Matters came to a head in 1996, when the beef crisis in the UK took on a EU dimension, as the Commission imposed a ban on beef exports from the UK.\textsuperscript{98} Even the election of Chirac was of no use to Major in his attempts to have the ban lifted; indeed, the French were to prove to be the most difficult state of all. A last ditch attempt in 1996 to block the Union’s work, by means of a refusal to participate in meetings, backfired and seemed to do little...
more than raise Major’s unpopularity with the electorate. The coincidence of the beef ban with the 1996 IGC was also to cause further delays and barriers.

While it has been apparent that European issues have not played a major part in the elections up to 1995, the two general elections of May 1997 proved that this was not always the case. Admittedly, the contexts were very different, but the impact of membership of the EU played an important part in the fate of both elections.

The Conservatives in the UK had struggled through the previous five years on a very small majority, which had served to further the internal party splits on European policy. Matters were made worse still by the rapidly approaching question of membership of the single currency; James Goldsmith’s eurosceptic Referendum Party pushed the main parties into agreeing to hold a referendum on the issue. However, while Goldsmith ensured that the parties had to take account of the Euro debate, this merely reinforced the large-scale use of tactical voting to get the Conservatives out of office after 18 years. As noted before, the Labour party that replaced them were much more positive in their approach to EU matters, although the importance of this should not be overstated, given that this election came in a period of persistent drops in support for membership.

In France, the situation was very different. Chirac had a large majority in the Assemblée, but the pressures of meeting the convergence criteria for entry into the Euro (a political imperative) had resulted in much dithering over policy and a transport strike that had popular support. The need to re-establish his authority, to pursue further austerity measures and to clip the wings of more protests on the right from the FN and De Villiers, coupled with projections of a continued majority led Chirac to dissolve the Assemblée early. However, factional fighting within the RPR and a coherent campaign by the left, working on concerns about unemployment and the Euro, saw the right’s vote collapse and Chirac faced with five years of co-habitation with Jospin’s government. If the EU had been responsible, at least indirectly, for the election being called, then the result did not result in any great change of policy, since not to meet the criteria was not a credible policy option for any administration.

The consequences were clear. The IGC was left to tinker with the Treaties, although the lack of agreement was used as excuse to drag out the negotiations until the European Council at Amsterdam in June 1997. It was only a partial coincidence that this date was

three months after the British general election, as it had been clear that the Conservatives, in power since 1979, were probably going to lose to Labour. The importance in this lay in the increasing hard line that the British had been taking, under domestic pressure, and which other governments hoped would disappear with a new administration. This was in fact the case, and as part of Labour’s new European policy the Social Charter, which had been excluded from full incorporation into Maastricht, was fully communitarised. Nevertheless, it was clear that it was not only the British who had reservations about the EU and Amsterdam was not the great leap forward that some had hoped for, particularly in the field of institutional reform.

If this was the culmination of the French strategy of German containment then it was not to be an unqualified success. The traditional Franco-German axis was weakened in the late 1990s, first by Mitterrand’s replacement with Chirac, and then with Kohl’s replacement by Schröder in 1998, and the lack of coordination made progress difficult. This was apparent in the confusion over the replacement of Santer’s Commission and in the problems of the falling value of the Euro after its introduction. The new Labour government in the UK invested much time and effort building up a relationship with the Germans, while simultaneously working with the French to develop elements of military cooperation that had been dormant since the fall of the European Defence Community in 1954. This latter process, begun at St. Malo in 1998, was partly a means to work to a mutual strength, but also was aimed at distracting attention from the on-going inability of Prime Minister Tony Blair to commit to joining the Euro.

If the 1997 elections had seen the EU developing into a noticeable issue in campaigning, then that position was continued in the 1999 European elections. The switch to PR in the UK allowed the strongly anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP) to gain a national stage, through its campaigning and its first elected seats. Still undergoing the consequences of the collapse of 1997, the Conservative party took a sceptical line, vowing to keep Sterling, a policy that helped it to regain seats lost in 1994.\(^{100}\) In France too, opposition groups (notably the pro-hunting Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions (CPNT) and Pasqua and de Villiers’s Rassemblement Pour la France (RPF)) gained ground and extended the anti-EU vote in France. However, in both countries, turnout continued to fall, suggesting that while

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\(^{100}\) Note that this was also due to a considerable extent to the correcting impact on proportionality of the new voting system.
European elections were being fought more on European issues, fewer people were interested enough to vote.  

It is really only at the end of the study period that European factors have played a significant role in electoral campaigns. Even in the 1997 and 1999 elections, European issues were being considered in specific national contexts (‘how do the convergence criteria affect my job security?’; ‘do we want to lose the pound?’). Putting this back into the question of how elections might affect public opinion, it has to be concluded that any effect would be minimal and confined to the last couple of years in the study period. Even that effect might be seen not as elections affecting opinion, but opinion affecting elections. Certainly this would be true in the British case, where the Euro/Sterling debate had been high profile since at least 1996 and where the Conservative position was based as much on perceived electoral benefit as it was on principle. In France, something similar can also be seen, although the general commitment to a strong role in the EU by all the major parties gave the 1995 debate on the convergence criteria rather an insubstantial quality.

However, as Franklin has recently noted, structural and mechanical effects have to be taken into consideration, which have also led to a fall in turnout: M. Franklin, 2001, ‘How structural factors cause turnout variations at European Parliament elections’, in European Union Politics, Vol.2-3, pp.309-328.
NATIONAL MEDIA AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

In order to have a complete understanding of the formation and development of opposition to the EU, it is necessary to consider the role that the media play in those processes. Earlier, opposition was categorised into elite, popular and intermediate levels, but there was no attempt to address the question of how these levels communicate with each other and within themselves. Not only does the media form a key conduit for these communications, and so require an understanding of how it is used by various actors, but it also has the potential to become an actor itself. As much as the media carries news and information, it shapes them to its own agenda and interests, a process that has a potentially deeply influential impact on elite and popular attitudes.

Starting with this last point, that of influence, it must be considered whether the media does indeed shape opinions and attitudes. As McQuail notes, there is little agreement on the nature or extent of the assumed effects of the media, since there is a paradoxical relationship between the general and the particular: “We can be sure that particular effects are occurring all the time without being able to see or predict the aggregate outcome or to know after the event how much is attributable to the media.”\(^{102}\) Even if a view of the media as all-powerful is rejected, then it can still be suggested that it is important in contributing to the construction of meanings within the public sphere.\(^{103}\) Whether intentional or not, if the media is seen as having an important mediating role, then the media landscape in the two case-studies must be considered.

The size and scope of this piece of research does not allow for the consideration of the entirety of the various media present in France and the UK. Indeed, that research which has been conducted has tended to focus either on specific events (e.g. European elections, or the Commission’s resignation in 1999), or on individual media in individual countries. As a result, this brief overview will concentrate on the dominant media forms for news communication – newspapers and television – in order to give an impression of how they relate to the public discussion on European integration. Where possible, other media will also be mentioned.

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\(^{102}\) D. McQuail, 2000, *Mass communication theory*, 4\(^{th}\) Ed., London, Sage, p.416. At a more practical level, Curtice argues that the British press might have influenced some people to change their votes in the 1997 general election, but that overall the effect was minimal, due to the different directions different newspapers pulled voters (J. Curtice, 1999, ‘Was it The Sun wot won it again? The influences of newspapers in the 1997 election campaign’, CREST Working Paper, No.75, at http://www.crest.ox.ac.uk)

\(^{103}\) See McQuail, 2000, pp.417-422 for a discussion of the evolution of media effect research.
The best known media element vis-à-vis European integration is the British press, which has been the subject of much political as well as academic interest. This has been as much due to the concentration of newspaper ownership into a small number of hands as it has to actual content. The almost complete enthusiasm for integration that had existed since the 1975 referendum began to break down at the end of the 1980s, as the Conservative press followed Prime Minister Thatcher’s change of view after her Bruges speech, most famously captured in *The Sun*’s headline “Up Yours Delors!” (1 November 1990). While the Maastricht Treaty was generally accepted at the time of signing, the crises of 1992, and the ejection of Sterling from the ERM in particular, saw a further wave of objections to the integration process, which was to continue throughout the decade.

As Wilkes and Wring note, while most of the Conservative broadsheets were to follow their right-wing tabloid counterparts down this path of dissatisfaction, there was still support for membership on economic grounds from *The Times*, *Telegraph* and *Economist*. However, the shift did mark a recognition of the gap between public opinion and political parties, as well as the changing nature of membership. This second point was best demonstrated by the clearly differentiated stance that *The Sun* took from 1997 of supporting the Labour party on its general European policy, but not on membership of EMU. George goes so far as to suggest that the Labour party subsequently became beholden to this line, for fear of completely losing the support of a traditionally Conservative press.

In France the situation is much less dramatic, both because newspapers are much less influential and because have remained relatively homogeneous in their support. With the most popular newspapers on both left (*Le Monde*, *Libération*) and right (*Le Figaro*, *Le Parisien*) all expressing clear pro-European positions, it is perhaps not surprising that there is a clear majority who feel moved by the print press towards a more positive attitude towards the EU. Without the development of anti-European stances, such as occurred in the UK, the French press has remained essentially in line with the political elite’s position

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and has somewhat stifled the creation of a public debate: for example, the ratification of Maastricht did not result in the same splits in the media that were seen in the UK.\textsuperscript{109}

If the print press has developed upon divergent paths in the two countries, then television has seen much more stability. In both countries, television (and to a certain extent, radio) has been seen as a generally pro-European medium.\textsuperscript{110} Unfortunately, given the difficulty of studying television’s content and impact, such assertions must remain little more than impressionistic. At the same time, it is worth noting that in the UK the position of the government-owned BBC on European matters has been a source of much debate, usually on the part of opposition groups who feel that it has a pro-European ‘agenda’ out of keeping with its public service role.\textsuperscript{111}

From this quick overview of the media landscapes in the two countries, it can be seen that while the French media has been relatively acquiescent towards European integration as an issue, in the UK it has been both a forum for and a promoter of the various sides of the debate. This difference should be kept in mind when considering how opposition has formed and developed in each national case study, since the media will have a noticeable constraining (or empowering) effect on that opposition in certain circumstances.

\textsuperscript{109} See Stone, 1993, for a discussion of the ratification.
\textsuperscript{111} Global Britain – an anti-EU group set up by Lords Pearson, Harris and Stoddart - has the most comprehensive set of data on this matter at its website (http://www.globalbritain.org).
PUBLIC OPINION

In addition to considering the development of elite and media attitudes towards European integration, so is it also necessary to have an understanding of public opinion. This opinion both shapes and is shaped by elite discourses, and so becomes an integral part of the political system. Consequently, it is necessary to have a clear idea of popular attitudes towards integration and how they have changed over time and between the two countries.

Moreover, measuring public opinion also plays a potentially vital role in explaining relative volumes of anti-EU activity. While this subject is not directly addressed by the main hypotheses, which are concerned primarily with the forces at work in group formation and development, some understanding of the differences in volume between countries is clearly very useful. If it can be shown that there is a factor that provides a plausible explanation for that difference, through popular attitudes towards European integration, then that would extend the predictive power of the hypotheses.

The question “Do you think your country’s membership of the European Union has been a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad or don’t know” has been one of the longest running questions asked by Eurobarometer and is the one that it most frequently used as a headline figure of ‘support’. Figures 6 and 7 below represent the development of the figures for “Membership as a Good Thing” and “a Bad Thing” respectively.

What the two charts show, is that France has been consistently higher in its support for EC/EU membership (and lower in its opposition) than the UK over the fifteen years of the study period. Figure 8 quantifies this difference in chart form. The period from 1985 to 1992 saw a steady convergence of support levels between the two countries, from previously very high levels of difference. To a large extent, that was a result of changes in British support, which had been strongly anti-membership in the early 1980s, rather than any movement on the part of French public opinion. However, this process came to a halt in about 1992, leaving a relatively persistent difference of some 10% in support (and opposition) levels between the two. As can be seen in Figures 6 and 7, this was also a period of falling support levels and rising opposition in both France and the UK, suggesting that both were moving at roughly the same absolute rates.
In these terms then, there is clearly a difference between the countries. That difference fell in the first half of the time frame, but stabilised after 1992. However, it should be noted that while there is a highly significant statistical relationship between the “Membership as a Good Thing” figures for the two countries, there is almost no correlation between the “Bad Thing” figures. That is to say, opposition levels are erratic in their development. At a statistical level, this is due in part to the existence of the “Neither” option in the question. From the data, it is apparent that as levels of “Good Thing” fall, there is not just an increase
in “Bad Thing”, but also in “Neither”. This seems to suggest that it is only in some cases that support turns into opposition; for the rest, judgement is reserved. Opposition is therefore not just simply the withdrawal of support.

However, while patterns can be discerned within this data set, care must be taken. The Eurobarometer series is the only available systematic cross-national public opinion poll: for all the benefits that implies (in terms of comparability and scope), there is a question mark over whether the use of a single question on the ‘goodness’ of membership is a reliable measure of people’s attitudes. Hix discusses this in terms of Easton’s theory of affective and utilitarian support, noting that there is a difference between supporting the system in value terms and believing that the system has political or economic benefits.\textsuperscript{113}

However, when looking at questions directed towards more utilitarian concerns of benefit, it is still possible to see a similar pattern to that for the membership question (see Figure 9). With the “don’t know” responses holding fairly consistently around the 15-20% mark, net percentages for benefit for membership moved in a positive direction in both countries during the period up to about 1990-91, before falling back quite sharply over the next three years, and stabilising over the remainder of the decade. This mirrors the shifts in (affective) support for membership, leading to the conclusion that, at the very least, both are related functions of people’s attitudes towards European integration.

\textsuperscript{112} r = 0.520 and 0.069 respectively.
\textsuperscript{113} See Hix, 1999.
This said, there is then another problem: while the Eurobarometer data might be internally consistent, that does not mean much if they are consistently incorrect. In order to test this, it would be necessary to compare the findings to other public opinion polls. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done, for two interlinked reasons. Firstly, as has been noted, Eurobarometer is the only systematic cross-national poll that is available; hence direct comparisons cannot be made on the same, or even on similar, questions. Infrequently, there are one-off questions asked in several countries, which cover the same topic, but these are insufficient to draw out any meaningful conclusions. Secondly, opinion polls within individual countries tend to reflect national priorities and preoccupations.

![Figure 9: Net Figures for Benefit from Membership](image)

This national particularity was of course part of the reason that Eurobarometer was founded in the early 1970s. However, it does make it difficult to find suitable data for comparison, particularly in France. While the British political debate on ‘Europe’ has been a constant source of friction and, therefore, of polling interest, in France, the relative hegemony of positive attitudes towards the European project meant that systemic questions of membership have been pushed aside in favour of more focused questions (such as voting intentions in European elections, support for the Maastricht treaty, and so on).

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114 Marthaler has conducted in-depth interviews during 2002, but its usefulness can only develop in the long term (S. Marthaler, 2002, “Europe” and the French electorate in 2002: The other side of the Euro”, Paper
The result of all of this is that while there is at least one complete set of competing data on support for membership (and one incomplete one) in the UK, there is no such set for France. Hence, the comparison is necessarily incomplete and lopsided. With that caveat, a good general fit can still be seen between the UK data sets in Figures 10 and 11, at least in the directions of changes in support and opposition. In all of the polls there is rising support for, and falling opposition to, membership until the early 1990s, when there is a reversal. While

the Gallup data has the same four categories as that of Eurobarometer (Good, Bad, Neither, Don’t Know), the British Social Attitudes survey only asks if the respondent supports membership: hence the higher average levels of both support and opposition to membership during the whole period, compared to the other surveys.

In brief, despite its incomplete nature, this comparison appears to give support to the figures produced by Eurobarometer. These figures have demonstrated a certain level of internal and external consistency, to the point that it can be assumed that they provide a fairly accurate impression of public opinion in the two countries on the matter of support for the European Union.

One further issue that must be addressed is the pertinence of the EU as an issue for the public. While the data so far have provided an overview of people’s attitudes towards integration, it is important to contextualise those attitudes within individual’s broader attitudes. For instance, while the early 1990s marked a high point in public support for the Union, that might be less meaningful if very few people thought it was an important subject, just as the falls in support throughout the subsequent period might not be matched by an increased sense of importance.

In practical terms, this requires some gauging of how important the European Union and European integration is to people. As before, the main problem is one of available data. In the UK, MORI have conducted monthly surveys asking what the most important issues of the day are.115 By contrast, no French polling organisation runs such polls. The closest that is available are exit polls from national and European elections, which regularly ask what issues voters based their vote on.116 While these cover somewhat different aspects of individuals’ rankings (elections potentially distorting ‘normal’ preferences), they will at least give an impression of relative movements within a country and of trends over time.

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115 The full data set is available at [http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml](http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml) and is updated monthly. The questions asked were “What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today?” and “What do you see as other important issues facing Britain today?”.

Figure 12 shows the percentage of people citing the EU or ‘Europe’ as an important issue. The monthly data for the UK show a high level of short-term change, with peaks of interest lasting no more than a couple of months: the most consistent phase occurred in the first four years of the study period, when there was minimal interest. At the same time, there is a gradual increase in importance accorded over time, particularly after 1996.

In France, the very high levels of importance accorded to European construction in 1989, 1994 and 1999 is, in large part, a function of these data being collected at European elections. This is borne out by the much lower figures obtained in presidential and Assemblée elections. Indeed, these latter figures are broadly comparable to those found in the UK at the same point in time. Unfortunately, the data are too sparse to make much more comment on overall trends, especially when the figure is so low in the 1995 presidential election.

However, simple percentages only tell half of the story. It is also necessary to look at the relative importance of the issue in comparison with others: this removes the problem of changing absolute values by emphasising relative positions vis-à-vis other issues. In Figure 13, the data has been plotted on the basis of the ranking position of the European issue. While the pattern broadly follows that of Figure 12, it also highlights some additional points.
In France, even though the highest percentage score was for the 1999 European elections, Europe as an issue only came second (to unemployment). In the other cases it has only been a high-ranking issue at the other two European elections. By contrast, the UK has seen a rising relative importance, especially in the last two years of the period. At the same time, it has only been the number one issue once in the UK (in June 1999, the month of the European elections). The mean ranking position over the whole period is 7.5 in the UK and 4.6 in France (7 if European elections are excluded), positions that suggest Europe is only rarely a key component in the general public’s lives.  

The relationship between support and importance is rather complicated. In the UK, importance started to move off its baseline at the end of the 1980s, just as support was growing, but importance continued to rise throughout the 1990s as support fell away. In France, while importance rose in the 1999 election, when French support was at its lowest, this period also saw other issues gain even more importance. Figure 14 shows the relationship between the two sets of data, plotting both percentages for those thinking membership is a “Good Thing” (marked “+ve” on the legend) and a “Bad Thing” (marked “-ve”). While the “Good Thing” relationship supports an inverse correlation between membership and importance, the reverse cannot be said for “Bad Thing”. Thus high levels

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117 Evans has argued that the 2001 general election in the UK represented the start of a move towards Europe becoming a salient issue for voters (G. Evans, 2001, ‘European integration and British politics: Were the Conservatives waving or drowning in the 2001 elections?’, CREST Working Paper, No.92, at http://www.crest.ox.ac.uk). However, even here it is still a process that is much closer to its start than its finish.
of public support result in a lower importance, but high levels of public opposition do not guarantee a high importance.119

To summarise this section, it has been seen that support for, and opposition to, European integration has changed over time, resulting in a peak in support at the start of the 1990s, but falling away in both countries thereafter. As levels of support fell, so too the issue appeared to gain in importance (on the basis of the more comprehensive British data). This said, ‘Europe’ as an issue was at no point the dominant one (pace the French European election exit polls), at best being of comparable importance to issues of economic activity, social welfare, health and security, all of which have had consistently high levels of importance. Thus, while public support has fallen during the 1990s, it is necessary to qualify any potential impact that might have upon organised opposition to the EU by remembering that ‘Europe’ has largely been a peripheral issue for most individuals.120

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118 Data has only been plotted where data is available for the same month, hence only two French points.
119 This calls to mind Lindberg and Scheingold’s permissive consensus, used to describe the willingness of post-war Europe to allow politicians to get on with governing without the need for an active citizenry (L. Lindberg & A. Scheingold, 1970, *Europe's would-be polity: patterns of change in the European Community*, Hemel Hempstead, Prentice Hall).
ANTI-EU GROUPS

The final section of this chapter looks at the development of groups opposed to the European Union. In so doing, it aims to fill in the gaps left by the previous sections, as well as to link the various themes together. Figures 15 and 16 show timelines for the creation of new anti-EU groups during the study period in France and the UK.

The mid-1980s represented a period in the European Community’s history when the discontents of the 1970s had been largely forgotten and there was a broad elite and public consensus on the positive nature of further integration. This was the time of the 1992 project for the single market, a project which appealed to both traditional pro-integrationists (such as the French) and to the previously sceptical (such as the British). That the reasons for their support differed enormously was not the issue, but rather that opposition was not a force in either country. The groups that had fought against membership in the 1975 referendum in the UK had either collapsed or been incorporated into an umbrella group that was to become the Campaign for an Independent Britain (CIB), a group that maintained a minimal presence throughout the 1980s.\(^\text{121}\) In France, anti-Europeanism was anathematic to an elite that constructed integration almost unreservedly as a positive force.\(^\text{122}\)

1989 is the first year in which moves against the integration process began. The year before, there had been the turnaround in Margaret Thatcher’s European policy with the Bruges speech, which gave a convenient peg for the formation of the Bruges Group. At the same time in France, rural elements who felt they were having their lifestyles attacked by European legislation began to mobilise in search of representation. Working from their base in the South-East of the country, they contested seats under the title of Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions, although it was to be several years before this was to bear fruit. Within a year of CPNT’s foundation, British fishermen were starting to organise their protest against the Common Fisheries Policy, using information campaigns and lobbying of MPs.

\(^{121}\) CIB’s current Chair, Lord Stoddart of Swindon, described this period in the group’s history as “keeping the torch alight”. Interview, Lord Stoddart of Swindon, Chair, Campaign for an Independent Britain, 4 December 2001, House of Lords, London. The Conservative European Reform Group had been formed in 1980, but with only a passive agenda of criticising the costs of membership (see Times 30/10/1996, “Tory grandees break cover to defend European policy”). Labour (Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign) and Conservative (Conservatives Against a Federal Europe) groups also maintained a minimal existence during this period.

\(^{122}\) See Benoit, 1997, p.7.
However, these developments were each relatively isolated. It was not until 1991-2 that opposition to the EU came into its own, as the European and national situations changed. At
the European level, the Treaty on European Union rapidly became a symbol of a system that was out of touch not only with popular opinion but also with significant elements of national elites. At the national level, the 1992 general election in the UK left the Conservative party at the mercy of hard-line eurosceptics, while in France the Maastricht ratification referendum in the same year provided an enticing opportunity to break with party lines.123

The British general election came at the time of Maastricht ratification, and as that process became more drawn out, notably after the Danish ‘no’, the more the sceptics felt that their hand was strengthened: the parliamentary fight to ensure the passage of Maastricht was a bitterly fought contest, which deepened the divide between the two sides.124 In the aftermath of the ratification, new groups were set up to channel opposition into the political system (of particular importance were UKIP, set up by Alan Sked in 1992 as a successor to his Anti-Federalist League, and the European Foundation, created by Bill Cash MP the following year). While both of these groups drew in primarily Conservative party members and voters, neither fell into the same category as the Fresh Start Group, which was a purely intra-party set of Conservative MPs opposed to ratification, or Conservative Way Forward, an intra-party grouping dedicated to the promotion of Thatcher’s ideas.125

In France, the combination of Maastricht and the Gulf War pushed Jean-Pierre Chevènement out of the Socialist Party and towards the formation of the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) in 1991. Chevènement worked together with the precursor of Philippe de Villiers’ conservative Mouvement pour la France (MPF), the Combat pour les Valeurs, to introduce a block in parliament to Maastricht’s ratification.126 Further strains took their toll within the right-wing coalition of the RPR and UDF, as Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin campaigned strongly against ratification, through the Rassemblement pour la Non, which drew on Pasqua and Séguin’s think-tank Demain la France.127 Along with the brisk adoption of anti-Europeanism to the Front National’s programme, the collapse of the consensus of the late 1980s in France was as deep as anything that the UK was experiencing, although not nearly as damaging to the government.

124 Baker, Gamble & Ludlam, 1994, easily remains the most detailed text on this episode.
125 On the left, the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism was a relatively low-key body in both its membership and public profile.
127 Milner, 2000, p.42.
One element in understanding the growth of opposition was the development in the early 1990s of transnational infrastructures, which enabled anti-European ideas and strategies to be circulated much more efficiently than before. In 1992, The European Anti-Maastricht Alliance (TEAM) was created at a protest meeting alongside the Edinburgh European Council of December 1992. By 1999, it numbered some 25 member organisations, with another seven observers, from a total of 11 countries inside and outside the EU.\footnote{128} Similarly, a network of left-wing ‘Committees for the Abrogation of the Maastricht Treaty’ was created at a London meeting in 1997, covering 18 countries, although this does not seem to have been as successful as TEAM.\footnote{129}

The 1994 European elections were to mark something of a highpoint in French opposition. De Villiers’ MPF group, fighting under the banner of L’Autre Europe, took over 12% of the vote and sent 13 MEPs to the European Parliament.\footnote{130} One of these, Sir James Goldsmith, was to use his position as a springboard to found the Referendum Party later that year in the UK.\footnote{131} However, successes in France were short-lived, with poor showings in the 1995 presidential election by De Villiers and the eclipsing of Pasqua.\footnote{132} In the eyes of Benoit, the most comprehensive academic analyst of French movements, this marked the end of anti-EU policy positions as a meaningful force.

In contrast to the French system, the UK was undergoing more subtle pressures, driven in large part by the small government majority. Within the Conservative party the strength of the eurosceptical element was growing, helped along by formation of right-leaning groupings such as the European Research Group and the reactivation of Conservatives Against a Federal Europe (CAFE).\footnote{133} At the same time, an incipient youth movement was developing, based on models found in Scandinavia, and the impact of EU regulations was becoming more visible to the general public, as typified by the British Weights and Measures Association (BWMA). This grass-roots group aimed to preserve the use of imperial measures in the UK, against the perceived encroachment of the metric system. This

\footnote{128} British and Scandinavian groups were at the forefront of TEAM’s creation, and it was paralleled by the simultaneously establishment of the Anti-Maastricht Alliance in the UK. TEAM modified its constitution (and name, to The European Alliance of EU-critical Movements) in 1997 and experienced most of its growth thereafter (http://www.teameurope.info/index.html). Also see Annex 1.
\footnote{129} Research to date has only found traces of committees of that name in France, Spain and Italy.
\footnote{130} Milner, 2000, p.55.
\footnote{131} Benoit, 1997, p.61.
\footnote{132} Pasqua’s support for the unsuccessful candidature of Edouard Balladur was to push the former out of the limelight until the right’s collapse in the 1997 general elections. Benoit, 1997, 53.
\footnote{133} There was also movement on the left, with the creation in 1996 of the Labour-based People’s Europe Campaign, which enjoyed a brief period of notoriety before its effective dissolution in the run-up to the 1997 general election.
seemingly esoteric issue was to become something of a cause célèbre in 2000-01, when a market trader was prosecuted for selling a pound of bananas.\textsuperscript{134}

In comparison to Maastricht, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty did not seem to provoke the same reaction, at least in terms of group formation. However, since most anti-Europeans across the Union saw Amsterdam as the completion of what Maastricht had started, this was quite natural. Of more concern was the progress towards the single currency, the Euro. Despite the turbulence of the ERM in 1992-93 and the large strains on member states endeavouring to meet the convergence criteria by 1998, the beginning of Stage 3 of EMU in 1999 was a key target. This was particularly true in the UK, even though it had been clear from the beginning that it would not start Stage 3 with the other member states, due to its opt-out. Nonetheless, the issue was sufficiently politically volatile for Goldsmith to fund the largest ever single-issue protest party, the Referendum Party, in the 1997 British general election.\textsuperscript{135}

While the Referendum Party had no appreciable effect on the election outcome, it did result in both the Conservatives and Labour committing themselves to a referendum on entry into Stage 3.\textsuperscript{136}

The 1997 British general election also highlighted the divisions within the anti-European groups. UKIP had already endeavoured to move back towards other groups before the election, parting company with Sked on the way, and in 1997 it co-founded New Alliance in an effort to create an umbrella organisation to which others could rally, albeit unsuccessfully. The vast majority of the Referendum Party, broken by the death of Goldsmith in 1997, ended up joining with millionaire Paul Sykes (who had bank-rolled anti-Euro Conservative MPs in 1997) to form the Democracy Movement.\textsuperscript{137} At the same time, a few members persisted with seeking election under the banner of the Democratic Party, run by a former Referendum Party manager. Despite this fragmentation, there was still felt to be enough space for the creation of Global Britain, under the direction of anti-EU members of the House of Lords.

By the late 1990s, there was a shift in the focus of opposition, albeit in different directions. In the UK, as a referendum on the Euro became a certainty, so those against the Euro began

\textsuperscript{134} See the BWMA’s website at \url{http://www.footrule.org} for more information on the Steve Thoburn trial. The UKIP was also an important fundraiser and campaigner in this case.

\textsuperscript{135} See Young, 1998, pp. 406-411.

to focus on arranging their campaign. The first of these was to be Trade Unions Against the Single Currency, set up in 1997 to shift opinion in the unions and the Labour Party. In 1998, after an appeal by the former Labour transport minister Lord Marsh, Business for Sterling was created as a forum for businessmen to act to protect the pound. The group was careful to distinguish itself from anti-EU groups, since it proclaimed itself to be against merely the Euro, rather than the EU as a whole, although there is still some contact with UKIP and others. The key political counterpart to Business for Sterling has become the New Europe group of Lord Owen, founded in late 1998. Again, this was an anti-Euro group rather than an anti-European one, although once more the line between the two was somewhat blurred, given the content of some of their output. Together the two groups were to form No in late 1999 as a potential body for fighting a referendum, a role that the cross-party Congress for Democracy was happy to leave open.

In France, the focus did not fall so much on the Euro, which had become a relatively moot point after the 1997 general election had demonstrated the political commitment to the project. Instead, more general concerns over sovereignty issues became more prominent, both in and outside of the party system. Outside, various pro-Republican organisations began to work together under umbrellas such as the Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale (1997) and the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France (1998). These groups, while relatively small, represent a second wave of French non-party activity, along with the Front National splinter group, the Mouvement National Républicain, after the treaty-driven anti-Maastricht and Amsterdam groups.

Inside the French political system, the tensions within the RPR finally resulted in Charles Pasqua leaving to reform the Demain la France think-tank between 1996 and 1998, developing an extensive set of contacts with other groups, notably De Villiers’. De Villiers and Pasqua eventually decided to combine their efforts under the Gaullist banner of the Rassemblement pour la France for the 1999 European elections, thus reuniting the right’s opposition to the EU and gaining 13% of the vote, as well as 13 seats. This was a large

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137 In 2001, Goldsmith’s widow, Lady Annabel, completed the circle, by becoming the Democracy Movement’s Honorary President. See http://www.democracymovement.co.uk
138 Interview, Nicky Sinclaire, Council Member, UK Independence Party, 16 September 1999, UKIP central office, London; interview, Richard Eels, Information Manager, Business for Sterling, 14 September 1999, telephone interview. The former described contact as “passive”. Also see http://www.new-europe.co.uk and http://www.bfors.com/
139 See http://www.new-europe.co.uk/contents.html for examples.
140 For more information on their work, see their websites at http://www.souverainete.org/, http://souverainete.ifrance.com/souverainete/ and http://www.m-n-r.com/ respectively.
141 Milner, 2000, p.55.
142 Some RPR members had formed Debout la République earlier in 1999 to protest at the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, but had otherwise remained inside the party structures.
proportion of the anti-EU vote in these elections, which rose slightly from the 1994 figure to just over 40%.\footnote{Milner, 2000, p.42-3.} It also marked the first national seats for CPNT, with a surprisingly strong showing and six seats.

The British experience of the 1999 elections highlights the impact of the differences in the two systems. The Conservative party took a relatively negative approach towards the EU, although not one of outright opposition, and benefited from both the low turnout and the new PR system to increase greatly their representation in the European Parliament. At the same time, the UKIP made its electoral breakthrough, winning three seats and some 7% of the vote, leading to something of a revival in its fortunes. However, this revival was to be short-lived, as the party soon ejected both its executive council and its leader, Michael Holmes, as it struggled to make the transition to party politics.
This chapter has laid out the key elements necessary for the application of the model of institutional space to the events that actually took place in the two case studies. The locus of interest is in how opposition to the European Union has been created and then subsequently developed. By combining the hypotheses laid out in the introduction and the previous chapter on institutional spaces with the factual events of this chapter it is possible to move towards an analysis and discussion of those hypotheses in the chapters that follow.

Before moving on to that analysis, some comments should be made on the various elements touched upon in this chapter. In particular, it is useful to consider how the different elements fit together and relate to opposition formation and development. Taking the development of the EU itself as a starting point, then it can be seen that this has been a key driving force in the evolution of European policy within the national frameworks, since it necessarily requires a national response. However, it is also clear that those European-level developments have been the (partial) result of those same national-level European policies. Hence the two are locked into a continual process of action and reaction.

At the same time, other factors are at work. While the EU-national cycle is essentially confined to elite groups, there is also the matter of national public opinion to be considered. Given that politicians are reliant upon public support in order to retain office (most obviously at election times), they have to take into account public concerns about the integration process. Admittedly, as has been seen, such concern has come only rarely to the fore in either France or the UK electorates and so it lacks special resonance for either them or politicians. The fall in public support for membership in both countries during the 1990s, and a consequent mismatch with pro-integration elites, made this an increasingly dangerous game to play, both in mobilising public opposition and in opening up political space for opposition politicians.

In all of this, the media has played a key role, in disseminating news, providing a national forum for debate and expressing opinions. In so doing, it has become both a medium and an actor itself, by framing – intentionally or unintentionally – the way in which the debate on European integration has been conducted. As a result, when looking at the processes at work in opposition formation and development, it is necessary to consider whether and to what extent the media has had an impact on those processes.
Finally, the creation of various opposition groups needs to be seen not only as a consequence of all these other factors, but also as a contributory factor. By definition, these groups aim to change national opinions and attitudes, and so it should be expected that as they start to work towards that goal, they will change the debate. This is not to claim at this stage that they are influential, but rather that they become part of the debate, actors whose voice will be expressed, even if not heard or acted upon. Coupled with the internal dynamics of group formation (often driven by personal factors), this makes opposition groups an essential part of the analysis.
In this chapter and the next, the actual events and developments that have taken place in France and the UK with respect to opposition to the European Union will be used to test the hypotheses. Here the primary concern will be with the factors that shape group formation, while the next chapter deals more with the actions that groups take and the volume and profile they have. Taken together, they will permit an evaluation of the hypotheses laid out at the start of this thesis, in particular those concerning the way European events drive group formation and the way in which national institutional spaces shape that formation.

The starting point on this evaluation has to be the following question: why do groups form at all? It is only by having an appreciation of the dynamics of group formation, in the broad sense, that it can be decided what to look at when discussing the parameters of anti-EU group formation. To this end, the first part of the chapter deals with this question, and suggests that as well as proximate factors, it is also necessary to be aware of more basic principles and critiques of integration in order to understand properly how and why groups have formed as they have.

The second important point to be covered at this point is the choice of groups to be studied. Clearly, given the hypotheses proposed in the introduction and the model of institutional spaces laid out in Chapter One, it is essential that a full and complete set of groups is included in the thesis. To this end, some comments are made on the process of identifying and selecting groups, as well as the problems that this can result in.

From this starting point, a basic taxonomy of the groups under study can be constructed, focusing on three dimensions in particular. Firstly, groups will be divided up into those that have EU opposition as their sole or primary focus (hereafter, primary-focus groups) and those that only have it as a secondary part of their work or identity (secondary-focus groups), in order to see whether this is related to other characteristics of the respective groups.
Secondly, differences between groups that have adopted a position of opposition against the entire EU system and those that are only concerned with one aspect of EU and its policies will be looked at. Thirdly, the type of group form will be considered, be it a political party, an intra-party group or a non-party group. Together, these three dimensions will give a clearer picture about the form of organised opposition to the EU in both countries.

This will then lead on a consideration of the groups’ ideologies and critiques of integration. The starting point will be an application of a left-right scale to groups’ positions, in order to help appreciate differences between them. However, given that some groups are not easily positioned on such a scale, the particular critiques of integration that they provide will also be looked at.

After this, the impact of proximate factors will be considered. As stated in the main hypothesis, group formation is seen as the result of European events impacting on national systems. As a result, it is necessary to see to what extent group formation has been triggered by, or is associated with, such European events, from treaties to policy developments. At the same time, it is important to consider two alternative possibilities, namely that national events have been the triggers for group formation, or that internal developments within groups have led to new groups being created.

The final point to be covered in this chapter concerns the relationship of individuals with groups. While the primary focus of this thesis is the role of groups in the opposition process, it must also be recognised that such groups are composed of individuals, who have individual interests, over and above any common interests with the rest of the group. Consequently, groups have to be looked at as vehicles for those individual interests and the ways in which individuals have shaped groups considered. This requires the identification of key figures within groups, and a consideration of how their preferences have shaped that group’s formation.
WHY GROUP AT ALL?

While this thesis looks specifically at how anti-EU groups are created and develop, it is useful to understand the creation and development of groups more generally. Through such a process it is possible to identify those systemic elements that need to be taken into account in this particular area of interest. To this end, the question must be posed of why groups form in the first place. In other words, what benefits does organised collective action offer over individual action?

Two main groups of gains can be identified as resulting from group action, falling under the headings of efficiency and of legitimacy. In terms of efficiency gains, group action allows a more productive division of labour between members. Group action not only allows for simultaneous work on different tasks, which would not be possible for individuals, but also permits the matching of tasks to skills, so optimising available resources. Over and above this, work focused on a specialist area offers more scope for developing a learning curve far beyond that which would be possible for an individual constantly moving from one area to another.

However, an efficient group is not necessarily an effective one, with regard to securing its goals. This is where legitimacy gains come in. By forming a group, individuals can increase the credibility of their message, by showing that they are not alone and that consequently they speak for a section of society. This idea that groups are in some way the ‘voice of the people’ not only increases their legitimacy vis-à-vis other organised groups, but also serves to increase the group’s profile within society and so attract more members, so completing a cycle of legitimisation.

It is in the fusion of efficiency and legitimacy gains that groups can develop effectiveness gains. They are better able to achieve their group goals, because they can optimise their collective resources and because they are able to use their representative function as a lever against other, stronger groups.

In all of this, there is the logical presupposition that common interests on the part of individual actors lead to group formation and collective action, for the reasons outlined above. In the present case, a common interest in opposing the European Union will bring people together into collective organisations in order to maximise their voice and presence.
However, such a pluralistic view suffers when approached from a rational choice perspective. In rational choice theory, it is individuals, not groups, who act rationally. While individuals might be brought together with others on the basis of common interests or goals, there is both a temptation to free ride (by providing less-than-proportionate resources) and a potential for a conflict of interests (when the group is pursuing multiple goals, which individuals will weight differently). Olson suggests that since such problems will increase with group size, due to increasing enforcement issues, there will be a tendency towards small groups, where individuals are easier to persuade to cooperate and where individual benefits are higher.

Behind Olson’s theory of collective action, it is important to highlight the idea that it is not common interests that bring together the group, but rather individual interests that are best served by common action. Therefore, when considering factors in group formation and development, notice has to be taken not only of external environmental factors (such as the development of the European Union), but also of internal factors (such as members’ and group interests).

The reason behind this dual approach to understanding factors of group formation is more simply expressed as the need to understand the intersection of interests and events. While it is a first step to say that such-and-such a group has formed because of the Maastricht Treaty, that does not explain what it is about that treaty that leads individuals to organise into a group to express their unhappiness. The reasons might be related to individuals’ political economy (as expressed on a traditional left-right scale), or to the impact on their lives (as might be the case for those working in business, the environment or fishing), or to the inadequacies of existing opposition groups (be that on grounds of effectiveness or of clashes of personality). Given such a variety of options, it is necessary to have at least a basic awareness of groups’ ideologies or critiques of integration in order to understand why they have been created at particular points.

This is not to underplay the impact of external events. Indeed, as the main hypothesis states, group formation is driven by European events, modulated through national structures. As a result, when looking at each group, some account must be made of developments in three distinct areas. The first of these is the development of the European Union itself and of its policies, which has been hypothesised as the key motor of group development. However,

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account should also be taken of possible alternatives. Consequently, the second area is that of developments in national polities, which may or may not be related to the aforementioned developments at the European level. Finally, the possibility of groups being created as a result of internal processes of group evolution and/or schism has to be considered.
A point that has not been addressed so far is the question of how groups are selected for inclusion in this study. This has not been an issue thus far, given the relatively general way in which groups have been discussed. However, in this chapter and the next there is a process of quantification of group activity and as a result it is essential that the set of groups contained therein is complete and accurate. In this section, the means of ensuring this and the resultant problems are discussed.

The first step in the process is ensuring that all possible groups that could fall under the scope of the thesis are recorded. This logically begins with a survey of existing directories of groups. While this is relatively well provided for in the UK, where there are the directories of the European Movement and the Bruges Group, as well as the Euro-Sceptic Web Resource, in France no such directories exists. Even in the UK, it has to be recognised that such directories are all incomplete and overlapping. The direct consequence has been a need to build a completely new and complete directory of anti-EU groups out of this existing material. For the purposes of this thesis, that new directory contains two discrete elements. Firstly, an information sheet was produced for each and every group that was considered for inclusion, detailing elements such as group history, size, activities, critique of integration and key individuals. Secondly, a website was built, with links to all available websites (almost all currently existing groups having one).

As this directory was being built, particular care was made to follow up any mention of other groups: for instance, websites often contain links to other groups with similar aims or overlapping memberships. This was enhanced in three ways. Firstly, by the systematic survey of media coverage, using the Lexis-Nexis database, for any references to individual group’s activities. Secondly, by the use of that literature which discussed opposition to the EU in the two countries. Thirdly, by the surveying of the Internet for references to any groups. The value of this approach was clearly shown in the steady growth of groups discovered, over and beyond those including in the pre-existing directories already mentioned. In particular, it was essential in the case of France, where the large majority of

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145 European Movement, 2000 – the content of this has been subsequently added to at the Britain in Europe website (http://www.britainineurope.org/templ.phtml?id=5); Tame, 1997; http://www.euro-sceptic.org/. In France, the closest that comes to such a directory is a listing of ‘souverainiste’ groups (http://www.souverainisme.org/), however this contains very many groups that have no interest at all in the European Union and excludes many groups that do.

146 This website is based on the author’s homepage: http://www.susherwood.fsnet.co.uk/weblinks.htm.

groups outside of the well-known party groups were only detectable through a combination of these surveying processes.

As the directory was been built, a second process was begun, of weeding out those groups that did not fall within the scope of the thesis. The guiding criterion of inclusion was the definition of opposition to the EU provided in the introduction, i.e. those groups working actively against the Union and its development. The essential element within that definition is the idea of active efforts on the part of the group against the EU, or some part of it. If it can be shown that a group has made any such effort, then it has been included in the following chapters.

The issue that immediately presents itself with such a qualifying criterion is whether groups that claim anti-EU positions, but which do nothing to pursue those positions, should be included or not. On the one hand, it could be argued that the saliency of the issue is the relevant dimension, the simple existence of anti-EU tendencies. The positive side to this approach would be an increased certainty that all potentially oppositional elements within a national system are covered. However, it also raises the problem of knowing where to draw the line. It is entirely conceivable that many groups in society would say that they are opposed to the EU, if they were asked, but it was otherwise an issue that had not previously occurred to them, even at the level of setting out their views. This leads on to the alternative viewpoint, namely that only active and salient oppositional elements are of concern. By definition, unrealised potential opposition is inconsequential, because it goes no further than the statement of an opinion. The practical result of this would be that it is only necessary to take account of those groups that substantive action to pursue their aims.

In practice, the problem is more one of theoretical interest than of any great consequence. The vast majority of groups that espouse anti-EU policy positions also conduct active strategies to back up those positions. The few exceptions have not been included in the main text, but rather listed in Annex 1, along with an explanation of their individual situations. The divide between the two groups is clear: those inside have all pursued at least one significant action against the EU, while none of those outside have made any attempt to do so.

Annex 1 also includes two other sets of groups that have not been covered by the research. The first set is another example of the problems of inclusion. In the course of constructing the directory it became apparent that several ‘groups’ were actually single individuals. The advantages of grouping have just been discussed in the previous section, including
legitimacy gains. In a rational world, if a group of individuals try to portray their group as representative of a larger section of society, then it is no surprise that single individuals will try to do the same, especially since a group of one is much easier to manage than a group of several. The development of the internet has also made it much easier for an individual to reach a large audience at low cost and to display the accoutrements of being a group. However, in all the identified cases of single-person groups there is once again a lack of active pursuit of stated aims. This is particularly true for such groups that only exist in the form of an internet site. In the cases of single-person groups, where that person is already in a position of power or responsibility, it may well be that the person is active in their opposition, but never in the name of their ‘group’. Instead, they act in their own name, giving the lie to the existence of the group as a meaningful entity. Consequently, all such groups have been excluded from the research.

The final set of groups in Annex 1 has been excluded for very different reasons. Transnational groups are a very interesting development since the early 1990s, bringing together previously isolated national movements. They represent the more formal end of increasing contact between nationally based groups, with regular meetings and information sharing. In their most institutionalised form, they are associated with the various groups within the European Parliament that represent anti-EU positions. British groups were at the forefront of developing such groups, along with the Danes, as awareness grew of the existence of parallel movements in other countries, be it through referenda campaigns or meeting in the European Parliament. In the latter case, anti-EU groupings have never progressed beyond an ad hoc means of exploiting the European Parliament’s funding and office allocation system. However, in all cases these groups act solely as fora within which national groups meet to exchange information and views. Given the focus in this thesis on national systems, it is argued here that transnational groups are better thought of as a strategy of anti-EU groups, rather than as a form. Since what activity and structures there are rest outside of the national frameworks that are under consideration here, further reference to these groups will be limited to notes in the chapter on group strategies. The list in Annex 1 contains a full list of these groups and their constituent members from France and the UK.

149 This is true of even the predominant transnational group, TEAM, who state on their website: “The TEAM network does not intervene in the domestic politics of individual countries or in the internal affairs of its affiliated organisations. Neither does it seek to impose a common policy on its affiliates as regards EU-issues. It provides information and contacts at the request of its member and observer organisations in particular countries.” (http://www.teameurope.info/about/organisation.htm)
A BASIC TAXONOMY

This section provides a basic taxonomy of the various groups under study, using three different approaches. As a first step, a division is made between those groups that are either solely or primarily focused upon the question of opposing European integration (i.e. primary-focus groups), and those that have only a secondary focus on the subject (i.e. secondary-focus groups). The reasons for this are as much practical as anything else: with almost 60 groups operating in the two countries, particular attention needs to be paid to those that have an anti-EU focus. This is not to imply that groups with only a secondary focus on opposition to the EU are not important, but that the reasons for their creation may well not be linked to proximate events in the integration process, a question that will be dealt with in the following section of this chapter.

The second step taken here is a consideration of the type of opposition that different groups are expressing. Here there are two major cleavages: one lies between those who oppose the entire EU system and those who oppose only one part of it; the other between those who seek withdrawal from EU membership and those who see possible resolutions to their critiques while still remaining within the system. These two cleavages will not only provide more elements of a taxonomy of groups, but will also give some initial evidence of underlying ideologies and critiques of integration.

The final step is one of particular relevance to the hypotheses, since it concerns the type of group that is formed. Here, there is a differentiation between political parties, factions within such parties and finally non-party political groups. As discussed in previous chapters, it is hypothesised that this choice will be related to the institutional spaces available to political actors within a national system. Hence, it is important to clarify the choices that have been made, and then to understand whether these have been the result of the hypothesised pressures, or some other factors.

In terms of ascertaining these various factors, a variety of sources have been used. Firstly, the groups’ own materials and literature have been used, backed up in some cases by comments from group members (either directly, in interviews, or indirectly, from newspapers). Secondly, available academic literature has been used to provide extra support. Thirdly, newspaper reports have been used to see what kinds of actions a group has
been involved in and what kind of image it is trying to present to the press. However, it has to be noted that the availability of information on different groups is very uneven; as a result, where there is some uncertainty, this has been noted in the text.

FOCUS

While presenting the question of focus as an either/or choice, it must be recognised that the reality of the situation is more complex than that. At one end of the scale, there are groups that are purely about opposing the European Union and nothing else. Then there are groups that express positions on other issues, but work from a base-point of such an opposition. These are followed by those who hold other policy positions for reasons unrelated to their opposition, and those positions can be less important, as important as, or more important than opposing the EU. Finally, there are those who hold an anti-EU position solely as a derivative function of other positions. This division can be reduced to a primary-focus/secondary-focus table (Table 2 below) from which to work, placing the first two categories listed as primary-focus.

As just noted, Table 2 provides a brief overview of the groups under inspection in this chapter and the next. Rather than presenting each group individually, there will be a description of the two main sets (i.e. primary-focus groups and secondary-focus groups) in general terms and then of those groups that present particular problems.

Primary-focus groups

In most of the cases listed under this heading in Table 2, there is a clear primacy of the European issue. This operates at different levels, from stated goals of a group, to actions taken. Indeed, the large majority of groups not only have a primary focus on opposition, but a sole focus, with no other policy positions. Of all the groups listed under the ‘sole/primary’ heading in the Table, only the following make any reference to policy positions outside of the topic of European integration:

- In the UK, the UK Independence Party (UKIP);
- In France, L’Autre Europe, the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht and the Mouvement pour la France (MPF).

150 In large part, newspaper articles have been obtained via the Lexis-Nexis system and from individual newspaper archives, both on-line and in hard copy.
151 In this section, and others that follow, Demain la France has been split into early and late periods. This is due to the large structural changes that the group underwent in 1996, when it was relaunched by Charles Pasqua. Likewise, the name Combat pour les Valeurs is also used to describe Combat pour la France,
In all the other cases, there is only reference to the European Union and the group’s position on it.

Table 2: Groups classified by extent of focus on opposition to the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Groups</th>
<th>Sole/Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Federalist League</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti Maastricht Alliance</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti Common Market League</td>
<td>Conservative Way Forward</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain Out of Europe Campaign</td>
<td>Communist Party of Britain</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>British Weights &amp; Measures Association</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bruges Group</td>
<td>Federation of Small Businesses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business for Sterling</td>
<td>Green Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Campaign Against Euro-Federalism</td>
<td>National Democrats</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Campaign for an Independent Britain</td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress for Democracy</td>
<td>The Freedom Association</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative European Reform Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatives Against a Federal Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Foundation</td>
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<td>European Research Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fresh Start Group</td>
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<td>Global Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign</td>
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<td>New Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>People’s Europe Campaign</td>
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<tr>
<td>Referendum Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Save Britain’s Fish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Unions Against the Single Currency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Against the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth For a Free Europe</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Continued on next page)

which although theoretically a successor organisation, was to all practical intents and purposes the same group.
Table 2: Groups classified by extent of focus on opposition to the EU (Cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Groups</th>
<th>Sole/Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France</td>
<td>Action Française</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’ Autre Europe</td>
<td>Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht</td>
<td>Combat pour les Valeurs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debout la République</td>
<td>Demain la France (early)</td>
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<td>Demain la France (late)</td>
<td>Front National</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale</td>
<td>Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouvement pour la France</td>
<td>Lutte Ouvrier</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rassemblement pour le Non</td>
<td>Mouvement des Citoyens</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mouvement national Républicain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parti Communiste Française</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la France</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on groups’ websites and promotional literature

Looking at the four groups that remain (i.e. those with non-EU policies), there is a difference between UKIP on the one hand, and the three French groups on the other. While UKIP holds itself to be a “moderate, mainstream party”, with a full range of policy positions on subjects ranging from the economy, to education and the environment, it is apparent from its manifesto that all of these positions are derived from the party’s opposition to the EU.152

By contrast, the three French groups hold positions on subjects that are not linked in the same way to European integration, although that is still a dominant theme. Philippe de Villiers’s MPF has a party’s slogan of “Souveraineté, Probité, Liberté, Sécurité”, while Benoit has characterised its philosophy under the key words of “identity, the nation, family and values”.153 In relative terms, there has been reweighting away from the European issue in the MPF compared with its predecessor organisation, L’Autre Europe. When L’Autre Europe was formed to fight the 1994 European elections, it was much more strongly focused on opposition to further integration, with De Villiers’s other interest in anti-corruption being

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152 For example, the section on ‘Home Affairs’ talks almost exclusively about how the EU has undermined the British legal system, about the EU’s immigration and asylum policy and about the Charter of Fundamental Rights: even the section on fighting crime ends by mentioning that proposed increases in policing will be paid for by the money saved by withdrawal from the EU (http://www.independence.org.uk/html/home_affairs.html). UKIP’s manifesto is available on-line at http://www.independence.org.uk/html/manifesto.html: the document is dated May 2001, but is broadly similar to party policy since its foundation in 1993. The quote comes from the introduction.

relegated to a minor position. Since the formation of the MPF, and especially after the failed link-up with the RPF, these other issues have come more to the fore.

The Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht presents another example of the interplay of different issues. While the group was explicitly set up to oppose European integration, it has also expressed opposition to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment and to military action by the West in Iraq, both issues of much concern to the French left.

**Secondary-focus groups**

When looking at groups with only a secondary focus on opposition, there is a much more varied pattern, precisely for the reason that a large number of combinations of other issues can take precedence. However, these groups can be placed under four broad headings, based on their primary foci.

The first set consists of far-right parties, who oppose integration on xenophobic or quasi-xenophobic grounds. The members of this set – the Front National and Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) in France, and the British National Party (BNP), National Front and National Democrats in the UK – all base their positions around the defence of national sovereignty and identity, ideas that will be discussed later on.

The second set sits at the other end of the spectrum, and includes those groups that derive their opposition to the EU from their communist or Trotskyite ideological viewpoint. While these are mostly French – the Parti Communiste Française (PCF), the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) and Lutte Ouvrier – there is also the Communist Party of Britain, which holds similar views.

The third is more heterogeneous, comprising as it does groups that do not hold extreme positions on the political spectrum, but who do consider national sovereignty and independence to be key policy positions. Almost all of the these groups could be classified as right-wing – Action Française, Combat pour les Valeurs, the Conservative party, Conservative Way Forward, the first incarnation of Demain la France, the Rassemblement pour la France (RPF) – but the socialist Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) of Jean-Pierre Chevènement must also be included. The relative importance of Europe as an issue varies from group to group; however, in all the cases it cannot be considered as the primary focus

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154 Benoit, 19978, p.59, notes this topic as the last of a series of ‘neo-nationalist’ positions, all the others being linked to the European Union.

155 See [http://membres.lycos.fr/comite](http://membres.lycos.fr/comite).
of the group. Even in the cases of the MDC or the RPF, where an anti-EU position has been a key component of policy, or of the Conservative Party, which seems to have discussed little else for many years, a primacy of European issues cannot be attributed, both because of the extent of other policy positions and because of opposition being derived from broader ideologies.

On this second point, in the cases of Action Française, Combat pour les Valeurs, Conservative Way Forward, the MDC and the RPF, this opposition is essentially a function of wider beliefs about the integrity of the state: consider Chevènement’s opposition to Corsican independence in recent years. Mention has already been made of the breadth of Conservative party policy on non-European issues, which make its opposition secondary, while still important. Finally, Demain la France, as originally set up by Pasqua and Séguin in 1991, was a general think-tank that provided a wide range of policy positions around the official Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR) line: it was only after its second relaunch in 1998 that it increased its focus on European policy.¹⁵⁶

The fourth and final set is a mixed bag of groups that can be characterised as being motivated by particular interests. These range from the environmental and rural concerns of the Green Party and Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions (CPNT) to the libertarian agendas of the Democratic Party and The Freedom Association. The last member of this set, the Federation of Small Businesses, is likewise driven by the concerns of its members and their relationship with the EU.

TYPE OF OPPOSITION

The second dimension in the taxonomy of groups is the type of opposition that the group expounds. As noted above, this can be reduced to two major cleavages: between opposition focused on only one policy area (such as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or the Common Fisheries Policy) and that which is opposed to the entire EU system: of these latter, there are some who simply seek withdrawal of membership and others who feel that solutions can be found inside the Union. Using these two cleavages, a three-way classification can be produced, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3 is broken down into three headings. At the most focused level, there are groups that have very limited objections to the European Union, falling within a single policy area. Such groups are either agnostic or positive towards the rest of the European system: their aims are restricted to specific policy reforms or the ending of a particular policy. Usually this will be a substantial policy area, such as membership of the single currency, but it can be as specific as the repeal of metric measurements.\textsuperscript{157}

However most groups do not restrict themselves to a single issue, but instead raise questions about the system as a whole. At a first step, this involves critiques of various aspects of the Union, including policy areas, decision-making processes, legitimacy and accountability, all in proportion with each group’s particular concerns and philosophies. Normally this is then followed up by a set of proposals for resolving these problems.\textsuperscript{158} The exceptions fall into two categories. Firstly, there are those groups that merely provide a critique without any particular set of solutions, as is the case of various British groups that profess no particular position in their roles as clearing houses for individuals to gain a stage.\textsuperscript{159} Here the Referendum Party is also to be found, since it never went beyond wanting to ask the British public what kind of Europe they wanted.\textsuperscript{160} The second category comprises those groups that do not seek to reform the EU, but simply to withdraw from it, groups listed in a separate column of Table 3. It should be noted that only those groups that have explicitly used the word ‘withdrawal’ have been included in this category, even though there are several groups whose proposed reforms are so substantial that in the unlikely event of ever being agreed to, they would effectively mean the end of the Union in its present form. This is particularly the case for French groups on the far left, which oppose such basic elements as free movement.\textsuperscript{161} However, there is a substantial difference between those groups prepared to discuss withdrawal as an option and those that stop short of that point. This difference is best highlighted by the stance of the Bruges Group and Conservatives Against a Federal

\textsuperscript{157} The latter being the goal of the British Weights and Measurements Association, who attribute the introduction of metric units into the UK to EU directives. See \url{http://www.footrule.org/} and \url{http://www.bwmaonline.com/} for a full justification of the BWMA’s position.

\textsuperscript{158} The most extensive example of such a reform is the Mouvement pour la France’s ‘Projet pour la France’, available at: \url{http://www.mpf-villiers.org/}

\textsuperscript{159} This includes the European Foundation, the European Research Group and Global Britain.

\textsuperscript{160} The proposed question the party wanted to ask was as follows: “Do you want the United Kingdom to be part of a federal Europe? Or do you want the United Kingdom to return to an association of sovereign nations that are part of a common trading market?” The phrasing of the question should indicate where the Referendum Party’s own preferences lay.

Europe (CAFE), both of which state their policy as being renegotiation in the first instance, but withdrawal if their goals are not met.\footnote{See http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/about-bg.htm and European Movement, 2000, p.17 respectively.}

Table 3: Groups classified by type of opposition to the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Groups</th>
<th>Generalised Opposition</th>
<th>Sectoral Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>Anti Maastricht Alliance</td>
<td>British Weights &amp; Measures Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Common Market League</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>Business for Sterling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Federalist League</td>
<td>Conservative European Reform</td>
<td>Congress for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain Out of Europe Campaign</td>
<td>Way Forward</td>
<td>New Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>Democracy Movement</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruges Group*</td>
<td>European Foundation</td>
<td>People’s Europe Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Against Euro-Federalism</td>
<td>European Research Group</td>
<td>Save Britain’s Fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for an Independent Britain</td>
<td>Fresh Start Group</td>
<td>Trade Unions Against the Single Currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Britain</td>
<td>Global Britain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives Against a Federal Europe*</td>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Small Businesses</td>
<td>Referendum Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democrats</td>
<td>Youth Against the European</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Alliance</td>
<td>Youth For a Free Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Freedom Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* - if renegotiation is impossible

(Continued on next page)

As before, rather than analyse each group’s form of opposition, some more general comments will be made. The most notable of these is the difference between the division of groups in each country. While the UK has substantial numbers of groups under the sectoral and withdrawal headings, France has none. To some extent this difference is explained by the criteria employed: as noted above, various French groups propose such extreme reforms to the EU that it would bear only a passing resemblance to the current Union. There are
frequent references to “another Europe” or a “new Europe”, but without recourse to talk of withdrawal from the current EU.\textsuperscript{163}

Table 3: Groups classified by type of opposition to the EU (Cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Groups</th>
<th>Generalised Opposition</th>
<th>Sectoral Opposition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Action Française</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions</td>
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<td>Combat pour les Valeurs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht</td>
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<td>Debout la République</td>
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<td>Demain la France</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Etats Géneaux de la Souveraineté Nationale</td>
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<td>Front National</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L’Autre Europe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire</td>
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<td>Lutte Ouvrier</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Mouvement des Citoyens</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mouvement National Républicain</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mouvement pour la France</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parti Communiste Française</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la France</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rassemblement pour le Non</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on groups’ websites and promotional literature

At the other end of the scale, CPNT does not count as a sectoral opposition group, because its critique has developed well beyond its original opposition to hunting directives.\textsuperscript{164}


\textsuperscript{164} [http://www.cpnt.asso.fr/](http://www.cpnt.asso.fr/) documents this policy position, which covers issues such as transparency and subsidiarity.
However, this should not disguise the fact that there is still a clear divergence between the views expressed by groups in each country. In the UK there seems to be much more willingness to express explicit positions of withdrawal than there is in France, where even styles of language do not fully account for a more circumspect position. Similarly, there is a clear difference in sectoral opposition groups, most notably against the Euro. Even the brief emergence of a couple of French campaigns during 2000-01 in the run-up to the introduction of Euro notes and coins (i.e. outside the study period) did not amount to anything like the organisations that have developed in the UK, for reasons that will be discussed later.  

**TYPE OF GROUP**

The third and final element of the taxonomy of groups concerns the forms that groups have taken. This is not only useful for understanding differences between groups but also key in addressing one of the central hypotheses of the thesis, namely the impact of institutional structures on group formation and development. It is therefore necessary to use a means of classification that allows inferences to be drawn about the link between groups and institutional structures. To this end, groups have been divided on the basis of their ‘party-ness’, i.e. the extent to which they are political parties.

The reason for this choice is clear. In democracies, there are two basic types of organised groups, political parties and non-party political pressure groups. The essential difference between these two types revolves around the pursuit of elected office. By definition, those elected offices will be found in formal political institutional spaces (to use the terminology developed earlier in Chapter One). Thus parties are associated with formal institutions, and ‘non-parties’ with activities around formal institutions, in the informal space of civil society. The difference in group form thus implies a difference in group goals and strategy. Moreover, this difference in form is going to be affected by the possibilities that formal institutions offer, both in terms of access and of carrying capacity: thus national political systems with high levels of access and carrying capacity should have many parties, which will attempt to exploit those options. Conversely, systems with a low chance of access and a small carrying capacity should have fewer party-based groups, since informal opposition will be more likely to be an optimal group strategy.

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165 These French groups were essentially rearguard actions, the most notable being Combats Souverainistes, run by three dissent RPF MEPs during 2001. Their website (http://www.jeboycotteleuro.com) went off-line in January 2002, but is currently being rebuilt as a more general ‘eurocritical’ website. Also active at a
Table 4 shows a three-way division of the groups. In addition to the ‘party’ and ‘non-party’ categories, an ‘intra-party’ category has also been included. This covers those groups that form within political parties, but outside of formal party structures, in which party members can work with like-minded colleagues, usually with the aim of influencing party policy. In the present analysis, the criterion for inclusion in this category is based on statements made by such groups on their political nature. Consequently, groups such as the Bruges Group or the early Demain la France are not included, despite their almost exclusive relationships with the Conservative party and the RPR respectively.

In all cases, classification into the three categories is based on self-assessments made by the groups themselves. The potential confusion that this causes for the intra-party category has already been noted, but it is also true for the other two categories. Amongst the ‘parties’ there are groups such as the Democratic Party, which has only contested one by-election since its formation in 1998, caucus parties such as L’Autre Europe, which had very little organisation, single-issue parties such as UKIP and the Referendum Party, and traditional mass parties, such as the Conservatives or the Parti Communiste Français. In short, there is a huge variety of forms within the ‘party’ heading.

Similarly, the non-party category includes groups as diverse as the 200,000-strong Democracy Movement, with its strongly decentralised structure, umbrella groups such as the Congress for Democracy and the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France, which essentially act as contact points for other groups, and the Federation of Small Businesses, a lobby group that has developed an active anti-EU policy.

Thus it is apparent that the party/non-party division does not capture the full variety of group forms. However, it does highlight the key factor of office seeking, which is related to groups’ perceptions of the opportunities open to them in a national system, a matter that will be dealt with in the following chapter. In both countries, there are substantial numbers of both parties and non-parties with anti-EU positions, the large number of British non-party groups accounting for the main difference in the volume of groups. Even taking into account that some groups are essentially successors to other groups (e.g. L’Autre Europe as the precursor of the MPF, or the Anti-Federalist League reforming as UKIP) – a point

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166 In both cases, the groups claim to have no formal links with these parties: Interview, Robert Oulds, Director, Bruges Group, 29 May 2001, Bruges Group office, London; Le Monde 13/03/1991, ‘En créant l’association “Demain la France” MM. Pasqua et Séguin veulent “dynamiser l’opposition” et “hâter l’alternance”’.

relatively stage was Gardons le Franc, set up by PCF member Michel Redjah, which campaigned for dual circulation of the Franc and the Euro (La Tribune 30/04/2001, ‘Gardons le Franc’).
discussed later on in this chapter – it is still clear that France has proportionately more parties than the UK, due to the relative absence of non-party groups.

Table 4: Groups classified by form of group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Groups</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Intra-Party</th>
<th>Non-Party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Federalist League</td>
<td>Anti Common Market League</td>
<td>Anti Maastricht Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>Conservative European Reform Group</td>
<td>Britain Out of Europe Campaign</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>Conservatives Against a Federal Europe</td>
<td>British Weights and Measures Association</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communist Party of Britain</td>
<td>Conservative Way Forward</td>
<td>Business for Sterling</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Fresh Start Group</td>
<td>Bruges Group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign</td>
<td>Campaign Against Euro-Federalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Democrats</td>
<td>People’s Europe Campaign</td>
<td>Campaign for an Independent Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td></td>
<td>Congress for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Referendum Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>European Foundation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>European Research Group</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Federation of Small Businesses</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Global Britain</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>New Alliance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>New Europe</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Save Britain’s Fish</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Trade Unions Against the Single Currency</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Freedom Association</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Youth Against the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Youth For a Free Europe</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, it must be noted that French intra-party groups have been relatively rare: Rassemblement pour le Non only existed for the duration of the Maastricht referendum campaign before developing into Demain la France, Combat pour les Valeurs lasted for little more than two years within the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) before becoming
L’Autre Europe, and Debout la République was only created in 1999 by members of the RPR. By contrast, British intra-party groups have existed on both left and right since the early 1960s and show no sign of either assimilation by their respective parties or of separating out. This difference implies that the British party system is more capable than the French of sustaining intra-party factions on the European issue.

Table 4: Groups classified by form of group (Cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Groups</th>
<th>Intra-Party</th>
<th>Non-Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions</td>
<td>Combat pour les Valeurs</td>
<td>Action Française</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain la France (late)</td>
<td>Debout la République</td>
<td>Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour le Non</td>
<td>Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Autre Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demain la France (early)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire</td>
<td></td>
<td>Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutte Ouvrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouvement des Citoyens</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouvement National Républicain</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouvement pour la France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Communiste Française</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassemblement pour la France</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on groups’ websites and promotional literature

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167 The Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign began life in 1962 as the Labour Committee on the Five Safeguards on the Common Market, while the Conservatives Against a Federal Europe (CAFE) started in 1971 as Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome (CATOR). See European Movement, 2000, pp.29 and 17 respectively for details of both organisations’ evolution. It should also be noted that CAFE has run down its activities since 2001, when Iain Duncan Smith became leader of the Conservative Party, as a result of its stated position of withdrawal from the EU.
IDEOLOGY AND CRITIQUE OF INTEGRATION

In order to understand the theoretical underpinnings of groups’ opposition to the European Union, it is necessary to apply a yardstick by which to measure their positions at a more abstract level. This section will do just that, working from the starting point of a left-right categorisation.

The idea of a left-right spectrum in political views is not new.\footnote{For example, Downs’ theory of party of party competition, which uses the left-right scale to plot party systems, dates from 1957: A. Downs, 1957, \textit{An economic theory of democracy}, New York, Harper.} Using basic indicators, such as the relative importance of the individual and society, of freedom and security, of private enterprise and state action, it is possible to build up a spectrum, on which groups can be placed. However, such a process presupposes that there is a depth of ideological thinking, i.e. that groups say more than just that they are opposed to the European Union. However, this is not always the case, as can be seen in Table 5. Rather than trying to construct a spectrum of left-right positions for the groups, there is a three-way split of left, right, and neutral/indeterminate.

The criteria for this classification are simple. As a first step, again using groups’ own materials, those groups that express clear left- or right-wing views have been placed into those categories. This set consists almost entirely of political parties, both mature (e.g. the Conservatives and the PCF) and more recent (e.g. the MNR and MPF). To this set are then added those groups that clearly identify themselves with either this first set of groups, or with other parties that occupy clear positions on a left-right scale. Here can be found all of the intra-party groups identified in the previous section, as well as such bodies as Trade Unions Against the Single Currency and the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht, both of which are composed of various left-leaning elements, including both politicians and trade unions.\footnote{Trade Unions Against the Single Currency has various trade union affiliates, at both branch and national level; listed in European Movement, 2000, p.36. The Comité pour l’abrogation du traité du Maastricht is composed of members of the PCF, the MDC and trade unionists. A representative list of signatures can be found with their ‘Appel’ of 16 May 1998, at: \url{http://membres.lycos.fr/comit/appel4.html}. Britain Out of Europe Campaign also falls into this category, given its rejection of the EU as a Communist project: \url{http://www.angelfire.com/id2/boec/}.} Those groups that do not meet these criteria are left in the ‘neutral/indeterminate’ category.

A brief note should be made on the Green Party, since there is a somewhat different rationale for its inclusion under the ‘left’ heading. As noted previously, the Green’s position on the Union is derived from the latter’s impact on environmental issues, rather than the...
Union *per se*. While “Ecology parties have not turned to Socialist doctrines and […] they have been free to develop ideas and programmes unconstrained by any particular ideology”, at the same time, Ware points to a predominance of left-wing policies among such parties, given the need for a high level of state intervention and international coordination.\(^{170}\) This impression is reinforced when looking at the Green Party’s manifesto, which has a strong liberal tendency on matters such as crime, foreign policy and migration.\(^{171}\)

### Table 5: Groups classified by ideological standpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Groups</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Neutral/Indeterminate</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Against Euro-Federalism</td>
<td>Anti-Federalist League</td>
<td>Anti Common Market League</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Britain</td>
<td>Anti Maastricht Alliance</td>
<td>Britain out of Europe Campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>British Weights and Measures</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign</td>
<td>Association</td>
<td>Conservative European Reform Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Europe Campaign</td>
<td>Bruges Group</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions Against the Single Currency</td>
<td>Campaign for an Independent Britain</td>
<td>Conservative Way Forward</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy Movement</td>
<td>Conservatives Against a Federal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Foundation</td>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Federation of Small Businesses</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Britain</td>
<td>Global Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Alliance</td>
<td>New Alliance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Europe</td>
<td>New Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Referendum Party</td>
<td>Referendum Party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Save Britain’s Fish</td>
<td>Save Britain’s Fish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Against the European Union</td>
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<td>Youth Against the European Union</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth For a Free Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>Youth For a Free Europe</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


From Table 5 it can be seen that in both countries a broad spectrum of political ideologies is represented by different groups, with notable left- and right-wing groupings. In France, as in the UK, there are more right-wing opposition groups than left-wing ones, although this is partly due to the number of intra-party groups on the right, the left consisting primarily of parties and non-parties.

However, the main difference is the large number of neutral or indeterminate groups in the UK, as compared to France. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, all but one of the sectoral opposition groups in the UK fall into this category, since they do not develop critiques of integration above and beyond their particular area of concern, so making it very difficult to extrapolate a position on a left-right scale.\(^{172}\) Secondly, the British system is characterised by the large number of groups that make explicit attempts to overcome ideological barriers in order to build opposition to the EU, whereas in France the tendency seems to be to preserve ideological divides. Consequently in the UK, several ‘umbrella’ groups can be seen, acting as fora or clearing houses for anti-EU across the political spectrum.\(^{173}\) In the same way, some groups that might seem to be a priori right-wing groups, because of their predominance of Conservative party members, such as the Bruges

\(^{172}\) Trade Unions Against the Single Currency is the obvious exception, representing an even more highly focused attempt to influence opinions.

\(^{173}\) The Campaign for an Independent Britain and Congress for Democracy being the most notable. Also see the following chapter.
Group or the European Foundation, have attempted to promote their cross-party nature by the prominent inclusion of non-Conservatives in their organisations and by constructing their opposition to the EU in broad terms.\footnote{The Bruges Group’s mission statement reads in part: “Fundamental reform is required of the Common Agricultural Policy, the Common Fisheries Policy, European Court and European Parliament in favour of national sovereignty. There has been no popular agreement to the huge transfer of power from the people to Brussels which has already taken place. Furthermore, economic and monetary union must be declared a non-starter” (http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/about-bg.htm). Similarly vague is the European Foundation’s mission statement, whose substantive objectives read as: “To further European commerce and democracy; To renegotiate the Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties; To argue against the creation of a European army; The widening and enlargement of the Community to include all applicant European nations but only if they do not have to adopt the acquis communautaire in the process; To resist the coming into being of a European federal or unitary state; To campaign against Britain adopting the Euro” (http://www.e-forg.uk/ef/mission.htm).}

So what can be said about groups that do express clear left- or right-wing views? As one might expect, there is a sense on either side that the European Union is a means for promoting the opposite side’s political economy. For the left that means the Union is an agent of free market economics, using the internal market programme to override not only workers’ rights but also the democratic system more generally. For the right, the implication is of a creeping European super-state imposing extra bureaucratic and welfare constraints on national systems. This paradoxical state of affairs is a reflection of a more general uncertainty about the ideological nature of the EU, with its simultaneous development of a deregulated internal market and a more marked social policy since the late 1980s.\footnote{W. Goldstein, 1993, ‘The EC: Capitalist or dirigiste regime?’, in A. Cifrund & G. Rosenthal (eds.), The State of the European Community, Vol. 2, Harlow, Longman, pp.303-320, provides a relatively early discussion of this development in the light of the Maastricht treaty.}

The left’s critique of integration clearly centres on this fear of a threat to its constituency. Indeed, this might explain the somewhat ambiguous stance of the PCF in the mid-1990s, when it was opposed to EMU, but was in favour of European monetary stability.\footnote{F. Greffet, 2001, ‘Le PCF: combattre le déclin par la mutation?’, in P. Bréchon (ed.), Les parties politiques français, Les études de la documentation française, Paris, La Documentation Francaise, pp.105-126, p.122} In the UK, the Labour Euro-Safeguard Campaign’s (LESC) opposition to EMU is founded on resultant cuts to public investment in the welfare state and the potential for increased unemployment in certain regions of the eurozone.\footnote{http://www.lesc.org.uk/mission.htm} But perhaps the most forceful example of the left’s critique of the integration comes from the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht:

“Depuis sept ans, les peuples d'Europe font la douloureuse expérience de l'application du traité de Maastricht. Aucun domaine n'est épargné : services publics privatisés, terres mises en jachère pour empêcher les paysans de produire, marins-pêcheurs à qui l'on interdit de pêcher, jeunes que l'on voue au travail précaire, au chômage, travailleurs licenciés, système de protection sociale
If the left is preoccupied with the effects of the EU on workers and welfare systems, then the right is concerned primarily with the question of sovereignty. On the far right, this manifests itself as opposition to the development of European policies on immigration and security and, in the French case, voting rights for EU nationals in elections. For the mainstream right, issues of national self-determination are prominent. For example, the RPF describes itself as “une formation politique à vocation majoritaire qui a pour objectif de réunir les Français sur les principes qui découlent de la Souveraineté nationale […]”. Similarly, the Thatcherite Conservative Way Forward holds as a principle that “[e]ach nation must be free to determine its [sic] policies to the benefit of its [sic] citizens”, an echo of Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech, where she held as her first guiding principle the idea that “willing and active co-operation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community”. Indeed, the four other principles that Thatcher outlined in her speech – practical Community policies, encouraging enterprise, avoiding protectionism and having a NATO-led defence – represent a checklist to which most right-wing groups in the UK – and, to a more limited extent, in France – could subscribe. The most notable exception to this is the ruralist CPNT, who construct their conservative view of the Union from the starting point of the erosion of regional – rather than national – identities. Despite this, there is still a critique of integration that talks of “[l]e pouvoir confisqué” and

178 [For seven years, the people of Europe have had the painful experience of the application of the Maastricht treaty. No area has been untouched: privatised public services; land put in fallow to prevent the farmers from producing; fishermen stopped from fishing; young people, to whom one gives skilled work, unemployed; workers laid off; a dismantled system of social protection; wage moderation imposed by the European Central Bank on both the active and the retired; pension plans threatened; the educational system called into question] (emphasis in the original). From the ‘Appel’ of 16/17 January 1999, at: http://membres.lycos.fr/comit/appel7.html.

179 Startin noted these three areas as the main focuses of the Front National during the 1990s: N. Startin, 1997, French political parties, Europe and the Maastricht treaty, Unpublished MPhil thesis presented at the Department of French Studies, University of Birmingham, p.103. The British National Party discusses membership primarily as a block to political and economic freedom on its website, but also implies a repatriation of immigration policies as a priority: see http://www.bnp.org.uk/policies.html. The BNP’s opposition to the EU is best seen as a strategic choice, designed to bolster public support, but which also allows the party to achieve other goals.

180 [“a political formation of a majoritarian vocation, which has the goal of uniting the French people under the principles that spring from national sovereignty.”] From the RPF’s Charter, at: http://213.186.36.114/~rpfie/charte1.html.

181 http://www.conwayfor.org/principles.htm; The full text of the Bruges speech is available, with a brief commentary, on-line at: http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/mbruges.htm.

182 Indeed, the Bruges speech as acquired something of a totemic significance amongst UK activists, both left and right, not only for its vigorous defence of national prerogatives, but also as the Damascene conversion of Thatcher against the integration process, a conversion that several would hope could be replicated more widely among the British public. As just one example, consider the first sentence of Bruges Group Co-Chairman, Martin Holmes’ commentary: “It is impossible to overstate the importance of Margaret Thatcher's Bruges Speech […].” (http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/mbruges.htm).
“[u]ne Europe trop lointaine”, requiring reforms that bring power back down towards the people.\textsuperscript{183}

While left and right have been treated so far as logically separate poles of a spectrum, it must be kept in mind that it is not always immediately obvious where to place a particular group. The Mouvem ent des Citoyens of Jean-Pierre Chevènement is a notable case in point. Created by Chevènement from an anti-EU stream of the Parti Socialiste during the Maastricht referendum campaign in 1992, the MDC has developed what Benoit describes as a ‘gothic edifice’ of an ideology: with foundations based on national independence and sovereignty, as well as anti-German and American elements, its programme appears to contain as many Gaullist parts as it does socialist ones.\textsuperscript{184} However, working on the basis of the MDC’s point of origin, and its subsequent entry into the leftist government coalition after the 1997 elections to the Assemblée Nationale, the primary inclination of the party is clearly to the left.

While left and right have developed distinctive critiques of the European integration process, the endpoint is very similar for both sides. As has been discussed earlier in this thesis, one of the key problems of building opposition groups has been the lack of common ground between actors, firstly in agreeing what the problems are and secondly on the solutions to those problems. However, this should not overshadow the fact that, in practical terms, both left and right are able to find common ground in saying that they do not like particular elements of the European Union. The best examples of these common elements are also, almost by definition, the largest: the Maastricht treaty and the Euro. Certainly, the very size of these elements requires at least some response from either side, given the potential impact on Europe’s (and national) political economies. The very existence of critiques on both left and right also shows that these elements have been built out of compromise: for example, the Maastricht treaty may have created the framework for a single currency, with an associated reform of national finances, but it also enhanced social policy, gave citizenship rights to EU nationals and developed foreign and interior policy coordination. As one observer noted at the 1994 European elections in France:

“Apparue avec force lors du referendum sur Maastricht, cette coupure reste vivace et transcende les oppositions politiques traditionnelles: de droite ou de gauche, les anti-Maastricht partagent la même phobie de l'Europe

\textsuperscript{183} [“confiscated power” and “a Europe that is too far away”]; http://perso.wanadoo.fr/cpn/programme.htm.
\textsuperscript{184} Benoit, 1997, p.62.
The overlap of left and right also helps to understand the third category, that of ‘neutral/indeterminate’ in both countries. In the French case, the existence of strong poles of opposition on either side of the ideological spectrum, each based around parties, would seem to make non-partisan opposition less likely. The MDC-PCF-LO-LCR grouping on the left and the MPF-RPF-FN-MNR set of parties on the right provide logical starting points for a broad sweep of partisans, both moderate and more extreme. Since the objects of both sides’ opposition are very similar, as has been discussed, secondary considerations of political ideology, more broadly constructed, come to the fore. This has the effect of pre-empting the development of non-partisan groups beyond the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France and the Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale, neither of which seem to have made a large impression on either political debate or public opinion.

In the British case, the reverse appears to be the case. With the major political parties not wishing to be drawn into explicitly anti-EU positions, and wishing to preserve their coherence in Parliament, the most obvious route for opposition to develop was outside of the party system in a non-party political climate. This has resulted in a large number of groups that cannot be categorised as either left or right. They can be divided into two main types.

Firstly, there are those groups that fall under the ‘neutral’ heading. This is to say that they have never elaborated a position beyond that of opposing the European Union for reasons unspecified. As mentioned above, this includes umbrella groups and those groups that are trying to distance themselves from political parties. Sectoral opposition groups can also be included here, since they do not make extrapolations on the deficiencies of the integration

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185 [First appearing at the time of the referendum on Maastricht, this division [across parties] remains long-lived and transcends traditional political oppositions: whether right or left, the anti-Maastricht campaigners share the same phobia of supranational Europe, condemn the single currency project, and criticize the importance of "bureaucrats in Brussels"][185].: Les Echos 08/06/1994, ‘Élections Européennes – France: les partisans de Maastricht sont sur la défensive’.

186 Note how Benedetto, 2001, considers the ideology of the RPF only to differ from that of the RPR on the matter of European integration – much the same could be said of the relationship of the MPF and MDC to the UDF and Parti Socialiste respectively.

187 The most notable act of the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France was the organisation of the rally in Versailles in January 1999 against the Congrès ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty, while the Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale has overseen the publication of some tracts and several conferences. Details of these organisations’ work can be found on their websites: [http://www.souverainete-france.org/][187] and [http://www.souverainete.org/][187] respectively.

188 This covers the Anti-Maastricht Alliance, Campaign for an Independent Britain, Congress for Democracy, Democracy Movement, Federation of Small Businesses, Global Britain and New Alliance in the first set, and the Bruges Group and the European Foundation in the second. Youth Against the European Union and
process from their specific concerns with their particular policy area. \footnote{This covers the British Weights and Measures Association, Business for Sterling, New Europe, No and Save Britain’s Fish.} A final member of this set would be the Referendum Party, which never articulated a clear critique of the EU during its existence, even if its leader’s views tended towards the right. \footnote{Goldsmith’s personal critique was actually more complex than being simply the same as the standard model of the right, as laid out above. While the party’s manifesto was against a Europe that was “bureaucratic, corporatist and dominated by Germany”; Goldsmith was favour of European defence and diplomatic coordination and a common currency in parallel to national currencies. See Daily Telegraph, 28/06/1996, ‘Goldsmith spells out his vision of Europe’ for more on the manifesto and Financial Times, 28/10/1995, ‘Knight’s tilt at political power’ on Goldsmith’s ideas.} The lack of a political ideology or of an overarching critique of integration has been an asset to these groups, by avoiding the need to have agreement by the groups’ members on such a position, and so allowing the group to focus on their work, be it of providing a space for individual opinions or of achieving specific policy reforms.

Secondly, there are those groups that are indeterminate in their position on a left-right spectrum, despite a more extensive elaboration of their position towards the European Union. Essentially, these groups can be described as having a populist agenda. UKIP and its predecessor, the Anti-Federalist League, along with the Democratic Party have developed political programmes that elaborate positions over and above simply opposing the European Union. As mentioned above, in the case of the UKIP/Anti-Federalist League, this programme is essentially dependent upon withdrawal from the EU: the £8.5 million contribution of the UK to the Union (plus another £11.5 million in indirect savings from higher economic growth, lower benefit payments, reduced bureaucracy and increased fishing revenues) will be reinvested into agricultural subsidies, regional spending, higher pensions and more health care for the elderly, lower taxes for the poorly paid, increased funds for the NHS, schools and police, lower petrol duties and higher defence spending. \footnote{See \url{http://www.independence.org.uk/html/manifesto.html} for full details of the breakdown of the ‘independence dividend’ and spending plans.} This mixture of left- and right-wing elements is a hotchpotch of policies that are made possible by withdrawal from the EU, having little ideological coherence. Indeed, the Democratic Party makes no bones about its policies being decided purely on the basis of what ‘the people’ want. \footnote{As the party’s website \url{http://www.democraticparty.org.uk} explains, this works as follows: “Prior to an election, the Democratic Party will publish a detailed manifesto of ‘promises to implement’ specific policies. These policies will have been established from extensive surveillance of public demand and decision, utilising public meetings, opinion polls, media surveys, referendums etc.”} In both cases, the resultant policy falls under a one-word heading of populism, even if that populism is conditioned by rather different impulses.
This section can be summarised in the form of Table 6 below. This Table highlights the main points on the matter of groups’ critiques, the objects of that critique and their form, on the basis of their position on a left-right spectrum. This emphasises that the main cleavage is not necessarily between left and right, but between those groups with clear ideological positions and those without. While left- and right-wing groups have different initial critiques, they share many of the same objects of those critiques and have very similar group form characteristics. By contrast, groups with a neutral or indeterminate position often lack fundamental critiques, have a more diverse set of EU elements that they oppose and almost entirely shun party forms.

### Table 6: Characteristics of groups classified by ideological standpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Neutral/Indeterminate</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critique</td>
<td>EU as threat to workers and to democratic system</td>
<td>Often unclear or unprecised</td>
<td>EU as threat to national sovereignty and independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects of Critique</td>
<td>EMU, Maastricht, Internal Market</td>
<td>EMU, Maastricht, sectoral policies</td>
<td>EMU, Maastricht, immigration &amp; asylum policy, defence policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Form</td>
<td>Mainly party and intra-party</td>
<td>Mainly non-party</td>
<td>Mainly party and intra-party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between group ideology and group form is not that of simple cause and effect. As much as it can be observed that groups with strong ideological positions on the left-right spectrum are mainly parties, and that parties mainly have strong ideological positions, that does not explain which comes first. Clearly, individuals who come together under the banner of an anti-EU party do not then decide also to adopt a clear position ideologically. But similarly, the degree of ideological homogeneity is not the basis for individuals to decide that the best way to express their opposition to the EU is via a particular group form. The resolution of this situation lies in combining the ideological stance of a group with the extent of its focus on opposition to the EU. The left-right spectrum is constructed, as discussed above, on a variety of factors, in none of which does European integration specifically figure. And it is precisely this which makes groups with clear positions on that spectrum more likely to be parties: members’ interests converge on more than simply opposing integration, to the extent that a party will be representative of the vast majority of each member’s interests. This is then reflected in the fact that very few of the groups under the ‘left’ or ‘right’ headings have a primary focus on opposing the
Put more simply, most parties have many policies, which makes placing them on a left-right scale relatively easy, while non-party groups do not have the same breadth of policies, so making them appear to be indeterminate on that same scale.

Those that are primary focus groups are all non-parties or intra-party groups, with the exception of L’Autre Europe and the MPF, both of which also have substantial non-EU policies, as discussed earlier.
PROXIMATE FACTORS

So far in this chapter, the analysis has proceeded on the basis that groups have formed due to ideological or structural factors. However, while these may well explain the underlying process of group formation, they do not explain the specific timing of a group’s formation. Why do different groups develop at different times, even if they share the same ideological background and characteristics?

At the abstract level, it might be expected that groups form when members’ interests are either threatened by developments in public policy (protective action) or given an opportunity to raise the impact of those interests (promotional action). In the former case, members will coalesce in order to protect their interests against what they perceive to be negative developments in public policy, either at a national or a European level. In the latter, developments in public policy might not directly affect group members, but will give them an opportunity to utilise wider public disquiet. This lets them build a constituency upon which they can then receive more attention for their interests, which in turn would make them more likely to be incorporated into future policy developments.

In either case, it would be expected that the process of group formation was associated with particular events at either the national or the European level of governance. This comes back to the first main hypothesis, concerning group formation. In this, it was stated that it is developments at the European level that are the driving force of group formation, developments that are modulated by national structures to produce country-specific results. If this is the case, then it will be possible to identify associations between these groups and European events, with national changes in public policy playing no more than that modulating role.

In order to test this, a grid can be constructed on the basis of different types of proximate factors, both European and national. This grid is presented below as Table 7. For each country, there are five categories under which each group can be placed. ‘European constitutional events’ refers to those events that fundamentally change the structure of the Union. This encompasses not only treaty revisions (in the study time frame, Single European Act, Maastricht and Amsterdam), but also the act of joining the European Community, since there are several groups in the UK that have persisted since the 1960s,
Group Formation

through the act of membership in 1973. ‘European policy events’ covers developments at the European level that do not entail constitutional change, i.e. the formulation, elaboration and implementation of specific policy areas, such as EMU or the Common Fisheries Policy.

The third heading, ‘national European policy events’, shifts the focus to the national level. Here are those groups that have formed as a result of developments in European policy at the national level. This is broadly constructed, to cover not just changes in policy by the government of the day, but also shifts in public debate on European integration more generally. It also includes the specific manner of implementation of European policies by national governments, where a group sees it as the government’s responsibility.

The fourth heading of ‘national policy events’ is a critical category, since it covers all groups whose formation appears to have no apparent link to developments in the European Union or a country’s response to those developments. While this would logically include those groups that pre-date the EU, it would also cover any group that grounds its formation on reasons that are clearly non-European in nature. Since such a category is potentially vast, a final category of ‘group evolution’ has been marked out, since it covers many cases.

While talking about groups being protective or promotional, both these headings are essentially looking at external stimuli to group formation. This still leaves the matter of internal stimuli to group formation. As Olsen highlighted, groups exist because of an overlap of individual interests, not because of a common group interest. Hence it may well be that this overlap is not sufficient to hold individuals together, resulting in a split or re-foundation of a particular group. Therefore, this ‘group evolution’ heading has been included for those cases where it is apparent that such internal processes are at work, rather than any one particular external event.

As before, the classification of groups is based on groups’ own materials, but there is more use made of other sources, notably newspapers from the period and interviews. This is for two reasons. Firstly, groups are often not explicit in saying why they have formed, resorting to vague expressions of their unhappiness with the EU. Secondly, even when they do give reasons, groups may not be providing the whole picture, especially when the circumstances

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are of a delicate nature. Hence, external observers are likely to be more forthcoming about the processes at work.

Table 7: Groups classified by proximate factors in formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Groups</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Constitutional Events</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Common Market League</td>
<td>Conservatives Against a Federal Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Federalist League</td>
<td>European Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Maastricht Alliance</td>
<td>Fresh Start Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Against Euro-Federalism</td>
<td>Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Policy Events</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Weights and Measures Association</td>
<td>New Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business for Sterling</td>
<td>People’ Europe Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative European Reform Group</td>
<td>Save Britain’s Fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National European Policy Events</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain Out of Europe Campaign</td>
<td>Global Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruges Group</td>
<td>New Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business for Sterling</td>
<td>Referendum Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress for Democracy</td>
<td>Trade Unions Against the Single Currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Research Group</td>
<td>Youth Against the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Policy Events</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>Federation of Small Businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Britain</td>
<td>Green Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>National Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Way Forward</td>
<td>National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Evolution</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Federalist League</td>
<td>Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for an Independent Britain</td>
<td>New Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives Against a Federal Europe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Movement</td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Youth For a Free Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued on next page)

196 Given the level of personal tensions that exist between different members of the anti-EU community in both France and the UK, this is as much as internal problem as it is external.
Table 7: Groups classified by proximate factors in formation (Cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **European Constitutional Events** | Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht  
                                     Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France  
                                       Debout la République  
                                       Mouvement des Citoyens  
                                       Rassemblement pour le Non |
| **European Policy Events**    | Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions              |
| **National European Policy Events** | Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale |
| **National Policy Events**    | Action Française  
                                     Combat pour les Valeurs  
                                     Demain la France (early)  
                                     Demain la France (late)  
                                     Front National  
                                     Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire  
                                     Lutte Ouvrier  
                                     Mouvement des Citoyens  
                                     Parti Communiste Française |
| **Group Evolution**           | L’Autre Europe  
                                     Demain la France (late)  
                                     Mouvement National Républicain  
                                     Mouvement pour la France  
                                     Rassemblement pour la France |

Source: Based on groups’ materials, newspapers and interviews

In some cases, groups appear more than once. This happens when it is possible to discern two or more different strands to the group’s formation that fall into different categories.

Looking at Table 7, in both France and the UK there are groups in each of the five categories. Given this, and the often rather specific nature of each group’s formation, each category will be discussed in turn, to draw out common themes as well as particular cases.

**EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL EVENTS**

This category contains a number of groups in both countries. However, that hides the differences in their background. While the UK has three groups that date back to the 1960s, in France there are no equivalent groups: similarly, while there are French groups that are associated with the Amsterdam treaty, the same is not true of the UK.

Taking the oldest groups first, there are the remnants of three groups that predate British membership of the European Community. In the case of the Anti Common Market League, this means 1961 and the first British application under Harold Macmillan. The League was set up directly as a result of this application, in an attempt to bolster Conservative
opposition. Likewise, LESC originally dates back to 1962, when it was set up (as the Labour Committee for the Five Safeguards on the Common Market) for similar reasons. The third group, CAFE, only came into existence in 1971 (as Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome), this time by reason of the government’s third application.

The second set of groups under this heading is that associated with treaty reforms. As mentioned earlier, this covers the Single European Act, Maastricht and Amsterdam. In neither country are there any groups that date from 1986-7. However, the Maastricht treaty was directly linked to several groups. In France, there were the two campaigning groups that developed to fight for the ‘no’ side in the referendum of 1992: Chevènement’s MDC and Pasqua and Séguin’s Rassemblement pour le Non. In the UK, the Fresh Start Group sprang out of two Early Day Motions tabled in the wake of the Danish ‘No’ vote and Sterling’s ejection from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), organising some 50 MPs into a well-coordinated campaign of opposing parliamentary ratification. The Anti Maastricht Alliance (and its European-level counterpart, TEAM) was set up at the ‘counter-summit’ that ran alongside the Edinburgh European Council of December 1992 to promote cooperation between existing groups with a view to opposing the Maastricht treaty and the EU more generally. It joined the Anti-Federalist League, which Alan Sked had developed from his Bruges Group base to field candidates in the 1992 general election, specifically against any MP who would vote for the treaty. Likewise, left-wing elements spent the winter of 1991-92 discussing how to campaign against Maastricht, resulting in the foundation of the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism in May 1992.

By contrast, the European Foundation, while linked to the Maastricht treaty, was based on a rather different rationale. Created after British ratification of the treaty, the Foundation was to carry on the momentum built up by Conservative opponents during that process, by

197 See http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_anteu.phtml?fid=62 for a summary by the pro-European Britain in Europe of the League’s evolution since then.
200 A feature that all European countries have in common.
201 Startin, 1997, pp.93-100. Note that Combat pour les Valeurs formed before the announcement of the referendum.
202 Forster, 2002, pp.86-8, describes the Fresh Start Group as a “party within a party”, given its levels of financing, militancy and organisation.
203 European Movement, 2000, p.2.
204 Sked announced the creation of his party in a letter to The Times on 12 October, 1991.
205 Details of this group are sparse: the only available history comes from a piece in an irregular on-line magazine: ‘Campaign against Euro-Federalism’, Cultural Review, undated, at: http://www.wmids.freeserve.co.uk/caef.htm
disseminating more widely the materials and arguments that had been used.\textsuperscript{206} As with Debout la République in France six years later, the \textit{ex-post} nature of this group does mark it out from the others in this category, but the proximity of the conclusion of the ratification in Parliament with the group’s foundation is not coincidental and shows the different ways that individuals respond and adapt to changing circumstances.

This leads on to the final collection of groups under this heading, namely those associated with the Amsterdam treaty, all found in France. The confusingly named Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht was a left-wing umbrella for socialists and communists created in early 1997 in anticipation of the conclusion of the intergovernmental conference, both to strengthen opposition within France and to build links with other countries.\textsuperscript{207} Likewise, the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France slowly coalesced from late 1997 onwards, taking on its full form as French ratification took place, reaching a peak in January 1999, demonstrating against the Congrès at Versailles.\textsuperscript{208} Debout la République, an anti-Amsterdam group of RPR dissents who wished to contribute to “la reconstruction de l’opposition qui, pour reconquérir le cœur des Français, doit renouer avec les valeurs républicaines et nationales, racines du gaullisme”, symbolically founded themselves on the day of ratification by the \textit{Sénat} two months later.\textsuperscript{209}

One key question that should be addressed at this point is why different treaties have had different impacts, in terms of group formation. At one level, a treaty reform is a basic unit of the Union’s development, so it could be argued that similar mobilisation effects would be similar between each such event. However, this is to disregard the clear difference that marks the three treaties under consideration, namely content. In this respect, there is a fundamental difference between the Single European Act and the two later treaties. The headline objective of the Single European Act was the creation of the internal market through the removal of barriers to free movement. This negative integration, as Scharpf terms it, contrasts with the positive integration of Maastricht and Amsterdam, where new common policies were built up.\textsuperscript{210}


\textsuperscript{207} Le Monde 18/05/1998, ‘Manifestation contre Maastricht et Amsterdam’. The initial founding conference was held in London, with delegates from 18 countries (http://membres.lycos.fr/comit): however, equivalent groups only appear to have developed since in Spain and Italy.

\textsuperscript{208} Figaro 19/08/1998, ‘Opposition – Alliance contre alliance’ and Milner, 2000, p.56

\textsuperscript{209} [the rebuilding of the opposition which, to regain the hearts of the French, must once more take up republican and national values, the roots of Gaullism]: from a group communiqué, cited in Les Echos 16/03/1999, ‘Creation d’un courant anti-Amsterdam au RPR’.

\textsuperscript{210} See, for example, F. Scharpf, 1999, \textit{Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic}, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Also C. Knill & D. Lehmkuhl, 1999, ‘How Europe matters. Different mechanisms of
In broad terms, positive integration is likely to have a much higher profile than negative integration, both because it creates something, rather than simply taking something away, and because the policies it creates are explicitly European, rather than national. This is particularly true of Maastricht, which radically extended the European project, including emotive issues such as citizenship, voting rights and a single currency. Amsterdam, while still following the positive integration line of Maastricht, did not achieve the same level of interest or notoriety because it was more of a refinement than an extension. While the creation of an employment policy did raise some concern on the left, this was not in the same order as that for EMU, partly because of the weak state of the European economy in the second half of the 1990s. Therefore, it is suggested that it was the combination of positive integration and significant policy expansion that made Maastricht responsible for the lion’s share of the groups in this category, leaving Amsterdam a clear second and the Single European Act a distant third.

EUROPEAN POLICY EVENTS

 Given the nature of this category, it is not surprising that the groups that fall within it are exemplified by sectoral opposition. In the UK, there are four anti-EMU groups, all of which developed in 1996-99. The most substantial of these is Business for Sterling, founded by Lord Marsh in June 1998. Organising opposition in the industrial and financial sector, its argument was that “for Britain, with its special trading, investment and financial patterns, the risk of jeopardising our competitive edge through excessive integration remains too high to be acceptable.” It was joined a year later by Lord Owen’s more politically-orientated New Europe, which also centred its critique on the Euro, while maintaining clear support for the European Union more generally. Around these two groups, there was also the beginnings of the Trade Unions Against the Single Currency, which while first launched in 1997, did not really properly organise itself until 2000. Finally, the left-wing People’s Europe Campaign pre-dated all of these, being set up in 1996, but was quickly wound down in the run up to the 1997 general election, so as not to weaken Labour’s attacks on Conservative divisions.

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211 From the letter announcing the launch of BfS: Times 11/06/1998, ‘EMU rebuffed by business leaders’.
212 European Movement, 2000, p.36 gives the 1997 founding date, but it was only with after a reorganisation and relaunch in 2000 that Trade Unions Against the Single Currency was mentioned in any newspaper reports: see Daily Mail 12/09/2000 ‘Broadside by Morris shatters Euro truce’.

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3: Group Formation

Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions, although subsequently the bearer of a much wider critique of integration, originated in the South-West of France in the late 1980s as a response to European directives limiting the hunting seasons for various species of birds. 214 Likewise, Save Britain’s Fish was created in 1990, after several years of uncoordinated actions by MPs and fishermen. 215 The Conservative European Reform Group was set up in 1980 and spent the first ten year’s of its existence protesting (rather than opposing) against the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy and the budget as a whole. 216 In all three cases it does not seem that there was a particular single event that triggered group formation, but rather that a ‘tipping-point’ had been passed, in terms of Union ‘interference’ in the relevant sector.

Finally, there is the British Weights and Measures Association (BWMA), which differs somewhat from the other groups here, in that its focus of opposition is as much the British government as it is the European Union. As its statement of aims has it:

“The latest regulations enforcing metrification are being imposed in order to comply with European Union directives and not on account of any desire by the British people. Our wishes, convenience, traditions and culture are being treated with contempt. Parliament, which let the measures through without debate, must be woken up to its responsibility in this matter.” 217

NATIONAL EUROPEAN POLICY EVENTS

While the previous two categories have been straightforward in the processes at work in group formation, a much more complicated picture emerges in this category, largely due to the interface of the European and the national levels. However, it can be broken down into two main sub-sets: changing government policy and opposition evolution.

The first of these is also the largest and contains distinct elements. Firstly there is changing policy as the result of a new government. Under this heading, come the anti-Euro groups Business for Sterling, New Europe and Trade Unions Against the Single Currency, all of which came into existence after the election of a more pro-Euro Labour government in May 1997. While none of these groups made the link explicit themselves, the general awareness that a decision on membership was made more likely under the new administration was

215 See http://www.savebritishfish.org.uk/hisfish.htm for a full history of the group’s work.
216 It tabled one amendment against the 1986 EC Finance Bill (Guardian 15/11/1985, ‘Du Cann warns of pull-out pressures’), but otherwise limited itself to members making speeches in Parliament.
217 The full “statement of views and aims” can be found at: http://members.aol.com/footrule/. Menno Spiering has written a useful piece on the BWMA’s arguments about the involvement of the EU in metrification (M. Spiering, 2001, ‘The imperial system of weights and measures: Traditional, superior and banned by Europe?’, in Contemporary British History, Vol.15-4, pp.111-128).
clearly a prompt to their formation. Certainly this was the case for Congress for Democracy, an “embryonic national anti-Euro campaigning organisation” set by the Conservative MP Michael Spicer in late 1998 to act as a focus for any future referendum on membership.\textsuperscript{218}

But governments do not need to change for policy to change. This was most famously seen in 1988, when Margaret Thatcher made her Bruges speech. The shift that announced in her dealings with the rest of Europe also catalysed the work of Patrick Robertson in building support for a new group that opposed further integration.\textsuperscript{219} The Bruges Group not only took its name from the town where the speech had been made, but also took Thatcher’s critique as a starting point for its own policies.

Similarly, policy can change because of external events. While the timing of the formation of the Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale in mid-1998 would potentially link it to the Amsterdam treaty, there does not appear to be any direct link between the two events. Instead, the aim seemed to be a general attempt to increase the profile of sovereignty as an issue and to move it to the centre of political debate.\textsuperscript{220}

The second sub-set in this category covers those groups that have developed as a result of the evolution of the public debate on European integration and national policy towards it. It should not be confused with the ‘group evolution’ category that follows below, since the groups here are effectively formed \textit{ex nihilo}, rather than from internal processes or pressures within existing groups. This is most clearly seen with the case of Youth Against the European Union: inspired by equivalent groups in Norway and Denmark, Youth Against the European Union’s founders saw that there was a lack of a youth-based anti-EU group.\textsuperscript{221} In the cases of the European Research Group, Global Britain and Britain Out of Europe Campaign, the founders were already active in opposition movement, but created new groups to meet particular needs. Michael Spicer developed the European Research Group in 1994 to promote coordination of centre-right opposition across Europe, while Lords Stoddart, Pearson and Harris formed Global Britain as an anti-EU research unit in mid-

\begin{footnotesize}
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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{218} European Movement, 2000, p.14. Also see the Congress’ website at: http://www.congressfordemocracy.org.uk.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Robertson is somewhat unreliable as a source on this point: at the time of the Bruges Group’s foundation in February 1989, he claimed to have developed his opposition while working on a speech for MP John Bowis (Financial Times 08/02/1989, ‘Young man in a hurry’); Two and a half years later, he claimed to have been galvanised by an article by Jacques Delors that he had read in 1988 (Daily Telegraph 10/01/1991, ‘The man who founded Bruges’); and shortly after that, he moved his conversion to the cause to his time at school at Dulwich College (Daily Telegraph 12/04/1991, ‘The gadfly of Bruges’).
\item \textsuperscript{220} See http://www.souverainete.org/.
\item \textsuperscript{221} http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3729/index.html has an informal history of the group.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Likewise Bob Lomas, the founder of Britain Out of Europe Campaign, had been active in UKIP, but wanted to pursue other issues, as varied as marches and promoting an anti-EU farming union.

The Referendum Party also belongs in this sub-set, although for slightly different reasons. James Goldsmith had already been active in France as a member (and MEP) of L’Autre Europe, but within six months of the 1994 European elections, he had begun to talk of forming a party to force a referendum in the UK on the results of the 1996 IGC. However, by the time that the party actually became anything more than an idea, in November 1995, the focus was no longer on the Amsterdam treaty, but on Britain’s relationship with the EU more generally. Moreover, it was suggested at different points that the idea of an anti-EU party running in a British general election pre-dated Goldsmith’s announcement of his interest in Europe by several years. Given his untimely demise shortly after the election and the lack of a proximate relationship to any European event, it may well be impossible to have a clear and unambiguous answer to the question of Goldsmith’s motivation.

NATIONAL POLICY EVENTS
As mentioned above, this category is the one that potentially presents the biggest challenge to the hypothesis that it is European events that drive group formation. If groups can be found that oppose European integration, but which are obviously not formed as a result of it, then there would be cause to reconsider the causal processes. However, despite the relatively large number of groups in both countries that do fall under this category, there is an explanation that is consistent with the hypothesis.

In all but one case (the second Demain la France), these groups only have a secondary focus on opposition to the EU. Given this fact, it might be assumed that the development of the EU was not a motivating factor in their original creation, but rather a policy line that...
emerged subsequently, or as a consequence of other policy positions. Certainly, this has to be the case for those groups that predate the integration process that began in the 1950s.²²⁸

However, it should then also be possible to identify the points at which these groups developed their anti-EU position, since that point would be the logical equivalent of the other groups forming in the first place. Table 8 does just this.

Table 8: ‘National Policy Event’ groups classified by proximate factors in the development of their anti-EU position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Constitutional Events</strong></td>
<td>Communist Party of Britain</td>
<td>Action Française</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>Combat pour les Valeurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>Demain la France (early)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Freedom Association</td>
<td>Demain la France (late)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lutte Ouvrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mouvement des Citoyens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parti Communiste Française</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Policy Events</strong></td>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>Front National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federation of Small Businesses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Green Party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Democrats</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National European Policy Events</strong></td>
<td>Conservative Way Forward</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Policy Events</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Group materials, newspapers and interviews

It is clear from Table 8 that there is a strong concentration of groups in the first category, relative to the distribution in Table 7. This is understandable if it is considered that the EU is not a primary concern for these groups, hence policy positions will only develop at major events in the EU’s development: the rest of the time, certainly before such trigger events, there will be less knowledge about the EU and less need to have a position.

²²⁸ In the UK, the Conservative Party and the Communist Party of Britain; in France, Action Française, Lutte Ouvrier, Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire and the Parti Communiste.
Thus, while there are several groups that have opposed the integration process from the very beginning, particularly on both extremes of the political spectrum, there are also old groups that have only relatively recently become mobilised against the EU. The communist and Trotskyite left in France was already opposed to the project of European integration in the 1950s, while the far right was already attempting to join mainstream opposition to British membership in the 1975 referendum. However, radical right-wing groups, such as Action Française and The Freedom Association, only developed anti-EU positions at the time of the Maastricht treaty.

The Maastricht treaty is also linked to the development of several other French groups. De Villiers’ Combat pour les Valeurs, set up in early 1992, rapidly moved from its values-based charter to strong opposition to the treaty’s ratification, even if de Villiers did not seem to have a particularly well-defined anti-EU critique at the time. Likewise, the use of Demain la France as the base for the Rassemblement pour le Non ensured that even before its relaunch, the former had developed a clear opposition to the EU. Finally, and as discussed already, the MDC was created just before the French referendum, as a result of Chevènement’s split with the Parti Socialiste on the issue. The reason for including it here is that Chevènement was also clearly motivated by French policy in the Gulf war, a matter over which he resigned in 1991.

The last two groups in this category present some particular issues, if for different reasons. The relaunched Demain la France was exceptional in having a primary focus on opposing the EU, a position that it inherited and enlarged upon from the original group, hence its policy is considered to derive from the Maastricht treaty. Its inclusion in the ‘national policy events’ category in Table 7 is based on the movement of Charles Pasqua away from the RPR in order to create a distinctive position. It meant utilising the role he had developed in the

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231 One commentator noted at the time: “En réalité, M. de Villiers n’a trop d’idées sur l’Europe, ou s’il en a, elles paraissent être les produits d’un nouveau poujadisme européen.” [In truth, Mr. De Villiers does not have many ideas about Europe, or if he does, they appear to the product of a new European poujadism], *Le Monde* 25/06/1992, ‘Le débat sur le traité de Maastricht: Le nouveau combat de M. de Villiers’.


Group Formation

referendum campaign and then using it as a basis upon which to build other policy positions, which he then did with the Rassemblement pour la France.\textsuperscript{234} The Conservative party has long suffered from internal divisions on the question of European integration.\textsuperscript{235} As has been noted elsewhere in this thesis, this has resulted in the formation of several splinter groups, some aligned and some unaligned to the party. However, it has really only been since their removal from government in 1997 that a more active opposition has developed. While this be could tied to the Amsterdam treaty or the Euro, it is essentially the continuation of a strand of conservatism that dates back through Maastricht to the days of the first two applications to the Community and that is generally suspicious of any ‘entanglement’ with continental Europe.\textsuperscript{236} This makes it hard to identify an exact proximate cause at a European level, which leaves the possibility that it is the fact of not being in government that has allowed the party to give fuller reign to its anti-EU elements. This question will be discussed below.

At the European policy level, there are groups that have all formed since the relevant country has been a member of the Union, but which predate the Single European Act. The BNP, the National Democrats and the Green Party had policies opposed to the EU from their inception, based on their (very different) ideologies.\textsuperscript{237} The Front National did not hold any particularly strong views on European integration initially, but Startin attributes three developments to its rising scepticism during the late 1980s: the tone of François Mitterrand and Jacques Delors’ federalist rhetoric, the Schengen agreements, and finally the plans for EMU.\textsuperscript{238} Finally, the Federation of Small Businesses’ opposition can be ascribed to the development of the costs on its members of internal market regulation and the single currency.\textsuperscript{239}

The final group, Conservative Way Forward, is exceptional in that its policy is derived not directly from European events but rather from Margaret Thatcher’s personal attitude towards the EU. The group was set up by George Gardiner MP (later to fight the 1997 general

\textsuperscript{234} Le Monde 10/06/1998, ‘Charles Pasqua envisage de présenter sa liste aux européennes’ discusses this strategy.
\textsuperscript{238} Startin, 1997, p.103.
\textsuperscript{239} See the FSB’s “10 minute policy brief” on the EU for a fuller exposition of its position: http://www.fsb.org.uk/policy/natpolicyunit/BRIEFS/EUROPE/EUROPE1.ASP.
election for the Referendum Party) in 1991, after Thatcher’s premiership had ended, in order to carry on her policies in the Conservative party.  

Taken together, it can be seen that in all the cases – with the problematic exception of the Conservative party – the development of opposition to the EU can still be attributed to relatively specific and proximate developments at the European level. In groups that have developed such an opposition, many of which are parties, then it has remained a secondary part of the group’s policy (with the qualified exceptions of Combat pour les Valeurs and the later Demain la France, both cases where other factors influenced the focus), rather than becoming its dominant focus. Once again the high degree of overlap between these groups and those with a secondary focus on EU opposition has to be noted: only Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions has origins in Europe-related proximate factors and a secondary focus. Therefore, it might be added that not only is anti-EU group formation driven by European events, but also that such groups are likely to remain focused on European integration. Likewise, groups that are formed by non-European events are unlikely to become groups with an overwhelming focus on European integration.

GROUP EVOLUTION

The fifth and final category in the classification of proximate causes of group formation is that of group evolution. As discussed previously, this category differs from the others, in that it is concerned with internal processes and pressures within groups, rather than with external events. This category can be broken down into three sets: groups formed by divisions, those formed by the joining together of two or more groups, and those that arise as successor groups. Figures 17, 18 and 19 depict the relationships between the majority of the groups mentioned in this category.

The most obvious reason for creating a new group is that of internal dissent, which comes back to Olsen’s theory of collective action. If the overlap of individual interests is too small, then some members will be tempted to take action outside of the group, so as to maximise their position. More prosaically, conflicts between individuals within a group can sometimes make collective action impossible and someone has to leave. However, it appears that such events are relatively rare. The split between Bruno Mégret and Jean Marie Le Pen in 1999 (leading to the creation of the MNR) was a clear example of a personal

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241 This is a more general problem within the anti-EU movement, given the numerous strong personalities involved. See the following section for more on this.
friction, coupled with a divergence on the Front National’s strategy. Likewise, the split of the RPF in 2001 into the MPF and RPF resulted variously from disagreement on party funding and a difference in group goals.

The only other instance of a split is not quite so clear. Alan Sked had been a leading light in the Bruges Group from its inception in 1989. However, his frustration with the government over signing the Maastricht treaty, and his view that there was no alternative to withdrawal, led him to create the Anti-Federalist League in late 1991. This appeared to cause no

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242 Mégret wanted to present a more positive image of the FN, including the possibility of working with other parties, considering Le Pen as too bullying to let the FN ever become respectable (The Economist 03/09/1998, ‘Who’s boss?’).

243 The RPF argue that there was little policy agreement beyond opposition to the EU and that the MPF members were looking to find any way out of the pact (Interview, Eric Cesari, Secretary General, Rassemblement pour la France, Paris, 7 November 2001, Rassemblement pour la France Headquarters, Paris). The MPF deny this, pointing to an unacceptable funding system proposed by the RPF (Interview, Thierry de la Perriere, Secretary General and MEP, Mouvement pour la France, Paris, 9 November 2001, Mouvement pour la France Headquarters, Paris). Relations between the two groups have been frosty since the split.

problems with the Bruges Group, until Sked stood in the 1992 general election: one month later, he was ‘kicked out’ of the Group.\textsuperscript{245} Thus while not technically a split, the difference in strategy and tactics was to result in the formation of a new group.

The alternative to groups splitting is their coming together. Indeed, the two actions are sometimes closely linked: the RPF was created by the fusion of de Villiers’ MPF and Pasqua’s Demain la France in order to present a joint list at the 1999 European elections. Likewise, the Campaign for an Independent Britain (CIB) was an umbrella organisation to restore some unity to the National Referendum Campaign’s members after they had lost the 1975 referendum and had each gone their different ways.\textsuperscript{246}

Other joint ventures have been driven by external events. New Alliance was established after the 1997 general election to try and build a coherent programme between the various anti-EU groups then active (particularly the remnants of the Referendum Party and UKIP).\textsuperscript{247} Unlike the RPF and CIB, the groups involved did not formally merge, instead using the new group as a forum. This was also the pattern used by Business for Sterling and New Europe, which announced the No group in late 1999 as a coordinating mechanism for their work on opposing British membership of the Euro. In both cases, it might be suggested that the reason that the old groups did not formally merge was due to the presence of a dominant group (UKIP and Business for Sterling respectively), which wanted to retain its independence while benefiting from shared action.

The third and final set of groups in this category covers those groups that have formed as successors to existing groups. With only two (linked) exceptions, all of these groups replaced groups that were not defunct, but instead changed some notable aspect of the previous group’s work. The exceptions stem from the collapse of the Referendum Party after the 1997 general election: after a year of negotiations, the remnants of the Party found new funding from Paul Sykes (the millionaire who had bankrolled prospective MPs willing to make commitments never to join the Euro) and founded the Democracy Movement.\textsuperscript{248} At the same time, a former regional agent for the Referendum Party, Geoff Southall, set up the

\textsuperscript{245} Times 16/05/1992, ‘Bruges bruises’. This was due in part to the group’s increasing alignment with the Conservative Party.
\textsuperscript{246} European Movement, 2000, p.12-4, and http://www.bullen.demon.co.uk/cibwhat.htm have details of the CIB’s evolution from its founding in 1976 as the Safeguard Britain Campaign.
\textsuperscript{247} European Movement, 2000, p.32-3, and http://www.users.dircon.co.uk/~iits/newalliance/admin.htm.
\textsuperscript{248} Independent 25/09/1998, ‘Goldsmith fund Sykes’ anti-euros’. European Movement, 2000, p.20-2, notes that before this, Referendum Party members had been urged to join or influence other political parties, so as to affect candidate selection in favour of anti-EU figures.
Democracy Party, adopting the same line on the EU, and adding other policies on a rather *ad hoc* basis.  

The remaining groups offer an array of modifications on their predecessors. Most mundanely, UKIP was essentially a relaunch of the Anti-Federalist League, but with a wider remit to contest all elections, particularly to the European Parliament. The *L’Autre Europe* was a reorientation of *Combat pour les Valeurs* towards the 1994 European elections, focusing more attention on de Villiers’ European policies. More fundamentally, the highly informal nature of *Youth Against the European Union* was a prime concern when some of its members created *Youth For a Free Europe*, which eventually replaced the earlier group in function, if not in its membership.

However, the most extreme example is probably that of *Demain la France*. In 1996 and again in 1998, the group was turned from a think-tank into a ‘*mouvement d’action et de combat*’. At the same time, Charles Pasqua consolidated his position within the group, installing his close ally William Abitbol (later to be an RPF MEP) as president, and excluding Philippe Séguin as the group moved away from the RPR. In short, the group was effectively redesigned as a vehicle for Pasqua, in both organisation and objectives, a development brought to a logical conclusion in the group’s uniting with the MPF to become the RPF in 1999.

A note should be made here of the evolution of the anti-EU groups within the European Parliament (see Figure 19). It was only after the 1994 elections that a truly anti-EU formation first developed: *Europe des Nations* (EDN), brought together *L’Autre Europe* with Dutch and Danish MEPs. The removal of the RPF members from the RPR led to the latter joining the European People’s Party after the 1999 elections, allowing the new RPF to form the core of the Union pour l’Europe des Nations (UEN). The EDN replaced the RPF members with UKIP and CPNT MEPs and renamed itself *Europe of Democracies and Differences* (EDD). While these shifting alliances in the European Parliament did not have an impact on individual parties, it is still interesting to note the emergence of an increasingly

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250 Press Association 13/09/1993, ‘Party to be re-launched’.
251 [The Youth Against the European Union website](http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3729/history.html) cites differences on the extent of Youth For a Free Europe’s opposition to the EU, and its desire for a fresh start as reasons for the lack of complete overlap between the two groups.
252 [a movement of action and combat], *Le Monde* 20/06/1998, ‘Charles Pasqua transforme Demain la France en mouvement autonome par rapport au RPR’.
253 The EDN only just reached the minimum numbers required to form a group, and the loss of an MEP meant the group had to disband, until Goldsmith persuaded an Ulster Unionist to join in 1997, in return for a promise
solid anti-EU faction within the institution and the potential that opens for increased transnational cooperation, a subject discussed in the next chapter.

254 Even the move of the Danish People's Movement from the EDD to the GUE/NGL (Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left) in June 2002 was not the result of a change in policy, but rather due to tensions with the Danish June Movement. For more details on the move, see: EU Observer 20/06/2002, 'Danish NO MEPs part company', at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=6716.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE GROUP

So far the primary concern has been with groups, since they have greater resources, and thus influence, than individuals. At the same time, it must also be recognised that group interests are essentially made up of individual interests. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the relationship of individuals and groups, to see how those individual interests aggregate and shape groups. To this end key individuals can be identified, in order to see how they have shaped particular groups.

The first step in this is the recognition that individuals do not have equal weight within a group. This is due to an unequal distribution of resources, both in the physical and motivational senses of the word. Individuals who provide the funding for a group might well expect influence over group policy. Likewise, someone who is prepared to invest themselves in organising and leading a group would have more influence than someone who contributes only intermittently. From Olsen’s viewpoint, weaker members have an incentive to stick to those who are more powerful, since it allows them to free ride towards achieving at least some of their goals. In the longer run, it may be that some of the weaker members gain enough resources to set up their own group and so achieve all of their goals without the help of the original strong member.

Furthermore, the history of anti-EU in both the UK and France has been marked to a noticeable extent by the work of a relatively limited number of people. In many cases, as will be seen below, it appears that the formation of a group can be ascribed to one or two keys individuals. To take an example, the European Movement’s ‘A-Z of anti-EU and anti-EMU organisations in Britain’ focuses as much on individuals as it does on groups, with an implicit sense that it is an individual’s involvement in a group that makes the group anti-EU, rather than the group making the individual anti-EU.

None of this is to deny the importance of concentrating the focus at the group level. Rather, by understanding the role of individuals within groups, it is possible to enhance further the understanding of group formation and development. While there are occasional actions by individuals, these are exceptional and very rarely have any lasting impact: even the most dedicated individuals are involved in some kind of group.

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257 A good example of this would be Paul Sykes. Mr. Sykes, a retail millionaire, was a member of the Conservative Party, but stood down as their Prospective Parliamentary for Barnsley in 1996 after
In terms of motivation for becoming active opponents of the European Union, individuals fall into one of two main camps: those who see such opposition as a means to an end and those who see it as an end in itself. Both camps are opposed to the integration process in some way, but while the latter are essentially only interested in having an impact on that process, the former use it as part of strategy to some other goal, usually wider political influence. Such a strategy has echoes of Taggart’s view of euroscepticism in parties, which characterises such a policy as a means to break into the set of parties that form part of viable government coalitions.\textsuperscript{258}

Certainly, there is more such opportunistic opposition in France than in the UK. All of the major French figures can be considered to be opportunists to a greater or lesser extent. Certainly, Philippe Séguin’s vehement opposition to the ratification of the Maastricht treaty did not last: with his manoeuvring for the post of Prime Minister after Chirac’s election in 1995, his rhetoric was much toned down, and by 1997 he was in favour of the Amsterdam treaty.\textsuperscript{259} This change of heart made it easier for Charles Pasqua to edge Ségui out of Demain la France and relaunch it as a vehicle for his own purposes, as discussed above. Likewise, Philippe de Villiers has demonstrated an opportunistic streak on several occasions. Firstly, he rapidly turned Combats pour les Valeurs from its initial broad-based ‘chartre pour l’alternance’ into a campaigning vehicle against the Maastricht treaty.\textsuperscript{260} Then he used his increased profile on the issue to fight the 1994 European elections on the L’Autre Europe list, in which he made much of his opposition to the EU, before again broadening his programme with the foundation of Mouvem ent pour la France in time for the 1995


\textsuperscript{259} Benoit, 1997, p.56. Also see N. Startin, 2001, ‘Maastricht, Amsterdam and beyond: The impact of the EU on the French right’, Paper presented at 51\textsuperscript{st} Political Studies Association conference, Manchester, 10-12 April, 2001

\textsuperscript{260} [Charter for a change of government] Le Monde 20/05/1992, ‘Au Palais des congres de Paris une trentaine de parlementaires UDF et RPR ont assisté au lancement du mouvement de M. de Villiers’.
In all of these groups, it is clear that de Villiers has set out the policy positions to his own preference.

This is understandable, given the French model in which political parties are essentially caucuses built to elect their leaders to office. But this does not explain why there are also opportunistic individuals in the UK. Patrick Robertson, co-founder of the Bruges Group, should not be considered an opportunist so much for his use of Thatcher’s speech as a springboard to setting up the Group, as for his subsequent behaviour. After a period in the wilderness, having fallen out with the Bruges Group, he eventually found a post with Goldsmith’s Referendum Party, but did not pursue any further anti-EU actions after the Party folded in 1997. Similarly, James Goldsmith’s motives might be questioned: several observers remarked at the time on his habit of getting very involved in what were to prove passing fancies. Certainly, the strategy and tactics of the Referendum Party were driven very much by his personal beliefs. That said, this should not obscure his involvement with L’Autre Europe in the 1994 European election and his funding for the European Foundation and the Bruges Group.

In the second camp are those individuals who have seemingly made opposition to the EU their one goal. The best example here would be Alan Sked. Sked developed his anti-EU stance during his time as the convenor of European Studies at the London School of Economics in the 1980s and quickly became an important member of the Bruges Group. However, his increasing conviction that withdrawal was the only possible option clashed with the increasing alignment of the Group with the Conservative Party and after the 1992 general election the two parted company. At this point, Sked consolidated his Anti-Federalist League into the UK Independence Party, which he was to lead until 1997, when he resigned. Thereafter, he has continued to participate in various anti-EU activities,
registering the All-Party Alliance Against Brussels as a name of a possible future group, and even working for the Conservative Party during the 2001 general election.\textsuperscript{268}

In the same vein, Lord Stoddart of Swindon has consistently expressed his opposition since voting against membership in 1972.\textsuperscript{269} His work after his elevation to the Lords opposing the Single European Act led to him taking up the chair of the Campaign for an Independent Britain in 1989, a position he still holds to the present day, as well as being the president of LESC. That this was only possible by his retirement from the Labour Front Bench would seem to suggest that his opposition was not designed to further his career.\textsuperscript{270}

At a somewhat more qualified level, politicians such as Bill Cash and Michael Spicer could also be considered as members of this group. Parliamentary opponents of the Maastricht treaty and dominant figures in the European Foundation and the European Research Group respectively, both have been dedicated in their work in opposing the EU. At the same time, their positions has worked in their favour as the Conservative Party has become more overtly opposed to the EU: Spicer was elected chair of the 1922 Committee of Conservative backbenchers in June 2001, while Cash became Shadow Advocate General three months later.\textsuperscript{271} However, given their continued work since these appointments, these can be considered to be a side benefit more than anything else.

This brief overview of some of the more notable individuals in the anti-EU movement is intended to demonstrate that individuals’ paths through time often traverse more than one group and, to some extent, also drive the development of new groups. As has been noted before, there is no one coherent critique of European integration; indeed, there are almost as many different critiques as there are individuals. Therein lies the rub, for it means that any significantly-sized group is likely to contain some variety of critiques and solutions. Under a dominant leadership, this variety is manageable, but without any effective means of coercing group unity (except in the obvious case of parties), there is much scope for individuals to dissent and form new groups that are more in line with their views.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[268] although it will suffice here to say that the main policy shifts have occurred at the same time as changes in the leadership: Michael Holmes’ removal in October 1999 provoked similar upheavals in UKIP (Guardian 15/10/1999, ‘UKIP in turmoil as leadership is ousted’).
\item[269] The Alliance’s website (\url{http://www.aabhq.freeserve.co.uk/}) is no longer working: Sked promoted the Conservatives at various public meetings, but remains completely outside the party structure; Interview Sked.
\item[270] At the same time, health problems were also a factor in his retirement.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
In this chapter, a basic taxonomy of anti-EU groups was developed as an essential step towards testing the hypotheses, using it to expose the processes at work in group formation. In so doing, it has been possible to test the validity of the first two hypotheses, namely that European events drive group formation and that national institutional structures then shape those groups.

The taxonomy of groups revealed several important points. Firstly, groups are diverse in their form, their extent of focus on EU opposition and their critique of European integration. Secondly, that diversity differs between countries, in a manner that is consistent with the hypotheses of the thesis. In France there are relatively more parties than non-parties compared with the UK, which can be attributed to the higher levels of access and carrying capacity in the French system. Moreover, parties tend to have less extreme views than non-parties, and are more likely to make opposition to the EU a secondary focus of their work, which would be expected, given that parties have to take account of other, institutional pressures in their form and strategy.

This is further supported by the analysis of the ideological background and critiques of integration that groups hold. While left- and right-wing groups both hold distinctive critiques, the key cleavage appears to be between groups with a explicit ideological position and those without, given that the objects of ideological groups’ critiques have a large overlap. Once again, non-parties are much more likely to have an indeterminate or neutral position on a left-right scale, precisely because they are more focused on EU opposition and so do not have other policy positions.

Looking at the proximate factors in group formation revealed further support for the hypotheses. A large majority of groups can be associated with specific developments at the European level or in national policy towards Europe. Moreover, those groups that have formed because of non-European events can also all (with the exception of the Conservative Party) have the development of their opposition to the EU linked to European events. All of this is consistent with the first hypothesis on group formation. The only partial exception is the matter of group evolution, which is due to internal processes and pressures within groups, rather than European events per se. Such evolution can take various forms, be it group form, objectives or focus, and is contingent upon case-specific factors.
One of these factors is the role of individuals. A limited number of individuals play a disproportionately large role in each country’s anti-EU movement. They do this by moving from group to group with their financial and organisational resources. In many cases, groups form around such individuals and are essentially a function of those individuals’ interests. As a result, it is important to recognise that the motives for these people are just as often based on political calculations of increasing their influence as they are on opposing European integration.
4: Group Strategies, Volume and Profile

Having looked at the factors in group formation, it is now necessary to consider what the groups do once they have been formed. This primarily concerns what strategies groups employ in order to achieve their objectives, but it also includes some calculation of how the volume and profile of opposition to the European Union has changed over time. This second point is obviously related to the third key hypothesis, which states that volume and profile have increased over time, because of increasing scope for action and depth of penetration into formal institutional spaces. Logically, that requires an understanding of what actions groups take in the first place and how that has changed. More importantly, as far as the hypotheses are concerned, exploring group strategies helps to understand the extent to which institutional spaces have been a constraining factor: do those groups working, or aiming to work, inside formal institutional spaces pursue different strategies from those outside? This chapter will address such questions.

The first step in the exploration of group strategies is to establish a single framework of analysis. It is necessary to find some common way of describing the various actions of opposition groups. The reason for this is simple: by extracting the underlying motivation of groups’ actions, they can better be compared and contrasted.

In essence, groups’ action can be reduced to one simple motivation: the desire to secure that group’s objectives. Regardless of group form, ideology or focus, in an ideal world (from the group’s perspective), a group would be able to fulfil all of its policy goals and objectives. However, in practice there are other groups also trying to achieve their objectives, which may go against the group’s own objectives, so it has to try to improve its position of influence relative to those other groups. In short, groups need influence in order to secure their objectives.
The objectives of opposition groups have been discussed in the previous chapter. They range from policy reforms, through major structural reform, to withdrawal from the European Union. What links all of these is their subject matter: public policy. In their different ways, all the groups under consideration are concerned with changing public policy. Where they differ is in the locations and means by which they attempt this.

When talking about locations, there are two distinct elements. Firstly, there is the choice of institutional space where a group can operate. This can either be formal institutions, such as parliaments or assemblies, or informal spaces, which also can be described as civil society. The second element is related to the first and concerns the choice of target audiences, i.e. the set of individuals that a group is trying to influence.

The only group that can change public policy is elected politicians at the national and European levels, so at the end of the day it is they who have to be influenced. However, it is also apparent that anti-EU groups do not devote all of their efforts to influencing elected politicians. Indeed, in some cases they appear to have very little interest in such an effort. This is not to say that there is no attempt to exert indirect pressure on politicians, but it is not the primary effort of such groups. Hence, the potential for different primary target audiences must be borne in mind.

Likewise, the means that anti-EU groups have at their disposal to gain influence are numerous. They can be categorised into four main elements, each of which interacts and overlaps with the others. Firstly, there is the seeking of election to formal institutional spaces, be they at the sub-national, national or supranational level. Secondly and most heterogeneously, there is campaigning, in the sense of specific actions designed either to raise a group’s profile with a particular target audience or to raise awareness of particular issues more widely. This includes activities such as public meetings, lobbying politicians, marches, and single-issue campaigns. Thirdly, there are media-related actions, usually forming part of wider strategies that relate to the first two elements. The fourth heading is somewhat different, in that it concerns information dissemination. This differs from campaigning in that it is a constant process and that it is as much directed to other members of the anti-EU community as it is to other audiences.

In order to analyse the variety of strategies a suitable categorisation must be developed. Three alternatives present themselves: looking at different strategies, different target audiences or different group types. However, in order to address the hypotheses, it would be most productive to look at the impact of group types on strategies. The hypotheses state that
institutional structures will shape group development, including group actions. This will be reinforced if it is shown that each type of group adopts strategies consistent with their position in the national institutional system (e.g. parties only work inside formal institutions and non-party groups only work outside them). It will also allow for observations on how the structure of a group is related to its actions.

This raises the question of what aspect of group morphology is most pertinent. In the previous chapter several means of classifying groups were identified: the extent of their focus on EU opposition, the type of opposition to the EU that they have, the form or ‘party-ness’ of the group and the ideological basis of their opposition. Of these four dimensions, it is most logical to consider the form of the groups as a means of analysing their actions. Group form is the dimension that is most closely related to the matter of institutional spaces: parties are *a priori* much more likely to operate within formal institutional spaces than they are outside them, since that is part of how parties are defined. Likewise, non-party groups will have a tendency to operate outside of such formal spaces, even if their goal is to influence them. The existence of intra-party groups also provides an opportunity to see where the locus of their actions lies, either closely linked to their parties or operating relatively autonomously.

As for the other dimensions, as has been noted previously, group focus is largely driven by group form, parties being much more likely to make opposition only a secondary objective. As far as the type of opposition - be it sectoral, reforming or withdrawal – is concerned, the impact that will have on strategies is likely to be much less than the group form, especially when looking at the case of France, where there is relatively little variation between groups in their opposition objectives. Finally, ideological backgrounds do not provide a very useful dimension, since there will not be any particular difference between groups of the left and of the right, given their similar forms.

While group strategies are divided on the basis of group form, when turning to the question of changing group volumes later on in this chapter, all the groups will be looked at together. This is because the main interest is in the global changes in anti-EU opposition, rather than in changes within particular types of groups. At the same time, it is necessary to look at life-cycle changes (birth, growth, maturity and, in some cases, decline and death) within individual groups that may be hidden within those global figures.

Three methods of measuring group volume will be employed and, as before, there is some overlap and correlation between them. Firstly, the number of members that a group has will
be measured. Secondly, and where relevant, the number of votes cast in any election that a group has stood in will be gauged. Thirdly, some measures of references within the print media of various groups will be taken, which can be used as a proxy for gauging their profile in public debates. Together these three measures cover the two key elements of volume, namely internal size and external leverage. A group does not have to be large, in terms of members, in order to gain either many votes or much press coverage. Likewise, groups with many members do not necessarily exert much of a presence in the media or in elections.
STRATEGIES

In this half of the chapter the focus will be on the three group forms and the types of strategy that they employ in their work. In each case, the four elements of seeking election, campaigning, media actions and information dissemination will be considered. At the end of the section, some overall observations will be made.

PARTY GROUPS

Party groups present the clearest set of strategies of the three types of group form. This is a logical consequence of that form, namely that parties, by definition, fight elections. Since parties seek to gain elected office, the essential thrust of their work is securing public support that will turn into votes at elections. While they also engage in activities other than seeking election, such activities should be seen as functions of building popular support.

All but one of the 22 groups identified as parties in the previous chapter contested elections within their national political system during the study period. The exception, Demain la France, did not for the simple reason that during its latter incarnation there were no elections to contest, having folded into the Rassemblement Pour la France (RPF) before the 1999 European elections. Different parties fought different types of election, as shown in Table 9 below. All parties contested national elections (i.e. to the Assemblée and the Commons), except Demain la France and the RPF, again both for the reason that there were no national elections that they could contest during the period. However, the pattern is more varied with regard to sub-national and European elections.

In Chapter One, on institutional spaces, a sub-hypothesis was elaborated, which stated that anti-EU interests are more likely to be represented in supranational and national institutions than they are in sub-national ones. This was related to the relative pertinence of the European issue in these different institutions: the lower pertinence of the issue in sub-national elections, where more local issues prevail, would make it less likely that a party that sold itself on its European position would be elected. This leads to a logical corollary, namely that anti-EU parties, particularly primary-focus ones, will not contest sub-national elections in the first place. This is for the very reasons that they will be unlikely to get elected and, even if they were, they would have little scope to express their opposition to the EU, since sub-national assemblies spend relatively little time on European matters.
Table 9: Types of Election Fought by Party Groups in France and the UK, 1985-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Groups</th>
<th>Sub-national (Local/Regional)</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Federalist League</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Britain</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democrats</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Groups</th>
<th>Sub-national (Local/Regional)</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demain la France (late)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Autre Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutte Ouvrier</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement des Citoyens</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement National Républicain</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement pour la France</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Communiste Française</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassemblement pour la France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When looking at primary-focus parties, it can be seen that none of them contested sub-national elections during the period, which confirms that the corollary of the sub-hypothesis, and hence the sub-hypothesis itself holds true. This is further bolstered by the fact that while there are several parties that contest sub-national and national elections, particularly in

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272 This group consists of the Anti-Federalist League, the Referendum Party, UK Independence Party, Demain la France (late) and L’Autre Europe. However, it must be noted that from 2000 onwards UKIP did contest local elections.
the UK, there are no secondary-focus parties that contest only national and European elections.\textsuperscript{273}

There is a further distinction between France and the UK. In the former, all parties contested all three levels of elections, opportunity permitting. Even L’Autre Europe turned into the Mouvement Pour la France (MPF) after the 1994 elections and contested sub-national and national elections. In the UK, however, there are some parties that have not contested European elections. In all three cases, they are small extremist parties: the Communist Party of Britain on the left, the National Front and National Democrats on the right. This can be attributed both to the lack of interest in European elections as a forum for these groups’ interests and, more importantly, to a lack of resources.\textsuperscript{274}

Seeking election needs to be seen as a strategy with a double goal. There is the obvious intention of winning enough votes to secure a position in the relevant institution. However, there is also the goal of raising the party’s profile with the public in the longer-term. This is particularly true in the UK, where the height of the electoral hurdle makes election relatively unlikely for a party outside of the big three. Certainly, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) pursued this strategy with respect to by-elections, in an attempt to maintain momentum for the party between general elections and to give dissent from other parties a convenient destination.\textsuperscript{275} L’Autre Europe also falls into this category, representing an opportunistic manoeuvre by Philippe de Villiers to benefit from his position as an important member of the No campaign during the Maastricht ratification to make an electoral breakthrough, and then to use that breakthrough as the basis for his new party, the MPF, with its wider scope of policy positions.

Mention should be made here of UKIP’s electoral strategy, which has not been consistent. Under Alan Sked, the party had a clear policy of not accepting any seats that it might win in the European Parliament, as a mark of its lack of constitutionality.\textsuperscript{276} Money normally paid to MEPs would be returned to the taxpayer. However, this strategy was criticised by elements within the party who were to rise to prominence after Sked’s departure. From 1997

\textsuperscript{273} The Democratic Party has only contested one by-election since its foundation, making definitive statements about its electoral strategy difficult. However, it appears to have a clear focus on national elections in its standing manifesto (http://www.democraticparty.org.uk/). The RPF only contested the 1999 European elections in the study period, but has since taken part in both sub-national and national elections.

\textsuperscript{274} Note that the larger British National Party has contested European elections.

\textsuperscript{275} Interview Sked.

\textsuperscript{276} Sked wrote that if all 87 seats in the Parliament were empty ‘then Europe would know that the British people has repudiated Maastricht and that the road to secession was open’, leaving the government the options of either renegotiating membership or ‘fac[ing] annihilation’ in a general election (Sunday Telegraph 24/04/1994, ‘Sunday Comment: Dear Tory, don't vote Tory on Europe’)

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onwards, party policy changed so as to accept seats in the Parliament, in order to gain a platform, expose fraud and mismanagement and report on the EU’s activities: MEPs would only take minimum expenses and give the rest to help fund anti-EU activities. This shift in policy is related to the differing views within the party leadership, and a good example of the role of individuals within parties that was discussed in the previous chapter.

Apart from seeking election directly, parties also use other methods to support this basic goal. In terms of campaigning, opposition to the EU occurs at two points. The first of these is closely linked to seeking election, as parties express their position during electoral campaigns, in order to gain public support. As such, it is little more than a function of seeking election. The second, however, is separate from the electoral cycle and concerns parties’ campaigns against specific European issues. This can occur both inside and outside of formal institutional spaces.

Those parties that have gained representation inside institutions can then use their position to influence decisions. This essentially consists of voting against positions they dislike and voting for, or even proposing, positions that they do like. Examples here would include opposition to ratification of the Maastricht treaty by the Parti Communiste Française (PCF) and the incipient Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) in France, or of the Amsterdam treaty by the Conservatives in the UK. Such actions are part of the cut and thrust of party politics and are not the primary concern in this thesis.

Of more interest are actions taken outside of formal institutions. The best example of this is the Conservatives’ “Keep the Pound” campaign, which it launched in the run-up to the 1999 European elections and which ran until the 2001 general election. This campaign consisted of a rolling set of public meetings, pamphlets, opinion polls, a website and regular efforts on the part of senior party members to push the issue to media outlets. While this represents the most extreme form of such campaigning, effectively being partitioned off from the rest of party business, it provides a template against which to compare other such activities by parties.

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277 As one UKIP member put it, “we will take the devil’s money and put it to god’s work” (quoted in Birmingham Post 10/12/1998, ‘Sovereignty comes above all’).
278 Daily Telegraph 01/06/1999, ‘Tories step up fight to keep pound’.
279 The website (http://www.keepthepound.org.uk) is not longer functioning, redirecting instead to the Conservative Party homepage (http://www.conservatives.com/). Lord Bell was given responsibility for running the campaign.
While those parties that have representation within formal institutions have the option of voting against policy developments, such as treaty ratifications, those that do not (i.e. the majority) have been forced to express their opposition to these treaties in other ways. Beyond simply releasing press statements with the party’s opposition, this has usually taken the form of involvement in events organised by non-party groups. In France, the PCF and the MDC associated themselves with the appeal of the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht of May 1997, which condemned the impending Amsterdam treaty. Likewise, a demonstration in January 1999, on the occasion of the Amsterdam treaty ratification and organised by the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France, was attended by various members of the MPF and Demain la France. Likewise, in the UK several parties have chosen to join existing umbrella groups, rather than pursuing their own campaigning. This has been the case for small parties, such as the Democratic Party, and even UKIP, both of whom have been involved with the Congress for Democracy from an early date, in order to coordinate plans for any future referendum on membership of the Euro. The Congress for Democracy even appeared to have the seal of approval of the Conservative Party, when then leader William Hague addressed the second congress in July 1999, ironically as part of its Keep the Pound Campaign.

If these actions were the result of optimising resources and avoiding unnecessary and potentially counter-productive duplication, then the actions of the British National Party (BNP) have been more controversial. In 1998 it launched the “Save Our Sterling” campaign, which ostensibly had the same basic aims and elements as the Conservative’s campaign discussed above, albeit on a rather smaller scale. However, most observers saw the campaign as part of the effort by the party to move itself into the realms of public acceptability. The strategy was essentially one of using populist themes to engage with the general public, which would in turn generate acceptance of more contentious policies, such as repatriation of immigrants. The “Save Our Sterling” campaign was part of an on-going effort on the part of the BNP to infiltrate UKIP, dating back to 1997. Then a researcher had been expelled for his BNP links by Alan Sked, which seemed to stop the process.

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280 Le Monde 20/01/1999, ‘Le Congrès a adopté sans passion la révision constitutionnelle’.
282 European Movement, 2000, p.15; Daily Telegraph 09/06/1999, ‘Hague to set out positive defence of the pound’. On a more parochial issue, UKIP has been a key supporter of the “Metric Martyrs”; traders who have been prosecuted for using imperial measurements, since the issue first came to prominence in March 2000. Full details are available at the Martyrs’ website (http://www.metricmartyrs.com/). However, this falls outside of the study period, suffice to say here that the party saw this as an opportunity to demonstrate concrete action towards British withdrawal from the EU and raise its profile.
283 European Movement, 2000, p.3-4.
284 There are more detailed accounts of the BNP and its strategy, upon which this section is based, in both Guardian 13/10/1999, ‘The right revs up’ and Searchlight 07/1997, ‘Nick Griffin…The sting, part 2’, at http://www.searchlightmagazine.com/stories/nickgriffin1.htm.
temporarily. However, after Sked’s departure, the leadership was accused of continuing links with BNP members, as well as removing the anti-racist clause from the party’s constitution. Although neither side has publicly discussed this strategy, and nor there has been any apparent shift in UKIP policy in relevant areas, there is still some concern that the BNP (and the National Front) continues to probe this strategy.\(^{285}\)

In the area of media relations, parties enjoy a pre-eminent position among anti-EU groups. As will be seen in the second half of this chapter, parties take the vast majority of media coverage, especially in France. As the established (and establishment) actors within a national political system, it is not surprising that the media has an interest in the views of parties on various issues, nor that all the anti-EU parties have press officers, trying to push out information to media outlets. Thus media coverage is both a cause and an effect of parties’ public profiles. The need to gain a public profile, and to turn that profile into votes, makes parties keen to exploit the resources that the media has to offer, since the latter has a large potential leverage, especially if it communicates a party’s message in a positive manner. As was discussed in the introductory chapter, the media is not only a passive conveyor of information, but also an actor with its own preferences and interests. As a result, it is just as often that the media contacts a party as it is the other way around.\(^{286}\)

In the final category, information dissemination, parties occupy a particular position. While parties do produce relatively large amounts of information, it is very largely in the context of electoral materials and explanations of policy positions, rather than trying to disseminate material with which to attack the European integration process.\(^{287}\) The reason for this is clear: as a consequence of their chosen form, parties have to be elected in order to effect policy change, so they have to inform voters of their policy positions, to convince voters to vote for them. As a result, materials have the aim of building identification with the party, rather than informing through factual information.\(^{288}\) Even in a primary-focus party such as UKIP, information on its website is almost exclusively directed towards building support for the party, with the small exception of some briefing reports on developments in the EU.\(^{289}\)

\(^{285}\) Spectator 10/02/2001, ‘Sceptics who betray Britain’ (written by Alan Sked); Times 08/06/1999, “I would advise people voting on Thursday to help the Tory revival. It may be the one useful thing to emerge from this useless election.”

\(^{286}\) Interview Cesari.

\(^{287}\) See the MPF’s website, for example (http://www.mpf-villiers.org/).

\(^{288}\) The RPF send out a daily email to supporters and media organisations, outlining the party’s position on the day’s news (Interview Cesari).

\(^{289}\) http://www.independence.org.uk/html/resource.html - this section of UKIP’s website dates from 1999, when the MEPs were able to fund a research officer within the framework of their EDN group in the European Parliament.
Taken overall, there is a clear primacy of seeking election on the part of party groups. While parties pursue activities in the other areas of campaigning, media actions and information dissemination, this is all directed towards supporting the key goal of gaining representation in institutional spaces. This primacy is clearly the result of the group form, since election is considered as the first step to gaining influence. Even where parties have had little chance of election, as in the early days of the Anti-Federalist League and UKIP in the UK, this has not dissuaded them from pursuing their strategy, instead using each election as an opportunity to build on a base that will eventually allow for the securing of seats.

INTRA-PARTY GROUPS
Given that intra-party groups exist within parties (hence their name), it might be expected that their strategies would be parallel in some way to those of their parties. However, this is not the case. Unlike their parent organisations, intra-party groups focus primarily on media activity and information dissemination.

None of the intra-party groups in the study engaged in electioneering. This should not suggest that individuals within these groups did not later seek office, but this they did with other groups. However, during their time in intra-party groups, these individuals confined their electoral activities to their respective parties. The closest to seeking election that any of them got was during the ratification of Maastricht. In France, Combat pour les Valeurs and the Rassemblement pour le Non were key groups on the ‘no’ side. However, this was in the context of the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) and the Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR) respectively not stopping the two groups from pursuing their position, partly through party divisions, partly through a lack of sufficiently strong party structures and partly through a desire to unseat the Socialist Mitterrand through a ‘no’ victory. In the UK, the Fresh Start Group engaged in a concerted programme of voting against the government, only being reined in by the latter calling for a vote of confidence over the inclusion of the Social Protocol. Despite this, the group quickly dissipated itself once the ratification process was complete.

290 See the section on individuals and the group in the previous chapter.
292 Forster, 2002, p.87, records that the group proposed 500 amendments, 100 new clauses, as well as voting 985 times against the government, with a further 1,515 abstentions.
293 The group quickly went from talking about setting itself up on a permanent basis (Times 07/06/1993, ‘Right-wingers pose new threat to battered Major’) to being deeply divided over the question of the Social Protocol vote (Times 07/07/1993, ‘Social Chapter vote splits sceptics’).
While it is understandable that the status of a group that classifies itself as existing within a party would be under threat were it to seek election, intra-party groups do not engage in generalised campaigning. With the aforementioned exception of the French referendum, intra-party groups have only engaged in very limited campaigning activities. Both Conservatives Against a Federal Europe (CAFE) and Conservative Way Forward encouraged their members to select anti-EU candidates in their constituencies for the 1999 European election. Both groups, along with the three other British groups (the Anti Common Market League, the Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign (LESC) and the People’s Europe Campaign), have also been active at their respective annual party conferences, organising debates and meetings. The Conservative European Reform Group operated principally within Parliament, but also occasionally released papers and pamphlets on topical issues. In a similar vein, Debout la République has tried to promote its anti-Amsterdam position within the RPR through colloquia of party members.

While such actions appear to be limited within the broad scope of activities discussed in this chapter, there is a coherent logic behind it. Just as parties are driven by the primary goal of gaining representation inside institutions, so intra-party groups being driven by the primary goal of gaining influence within their respective parties. All parties contain differing opinions on various policy positions, even if there is still enough overlap to ensure a certain level of party coherence. However, the existence of differing opinions creates the potential for different elements within the party to compete for control of the party’s organisational structure. All of the intra-party groups under study have anti-EU policy positions and all are trying to embed that policy into their parties’ structures.

The result is an analogous strategy between parties and intra-party groups. Parties seek representation in institutions, while intra-party groups seek representation within parties. In both cases, there are access mechanisms (e.g. elections) that have to be utilised in order for the group to set about achieving its aims. Seen in this light, intra-party groups are merely adding one more step to the strategy used by parties. They seek to gain control of their party, and then to get that party elected, so that it can effect policy change. Consequently,

294 European Movement, 2000, p.16-20. People’s Europe Campaign used a variation on this approach, trying to get local Labour constituencies to pressure MPs on the single currency.
295 A typical example would be the pamphlet suggesting joining the lower tier of a 2-tier Europe, so as to avoid joining EMU, released during the early phase of the negotiations leading up to Maastricht (Guardian 05/11/1990, ‘Brittan offers new European option’). It is worth noting here that the group ended up as the moderate opposition faction during Maastricht ratification, not following the hard line approach of the Fresh Start Group.
296 See http://deboutlarepublique.ifrance.com/deboutlarepublique/ for minutes of more recent meetings.
the important objective for an intra-party group is to gain influence and position within the party, hence its efforts are directed to that task.

This primary goal not only explains intra-party groups’ activities with reference to campaigning, but also to media actions. While none of these groups has pushed for a high level of coverage by the media (with none of them having full-time press officers), what coverage there has been, has tended to reflect efforts by the group to achieve a more dominant position. Generally speaking, this has meant either articles in newspapers with an anti-EU position, and which are widely read by party members, giving space to group members to express their position, or by more pro-EU newspapers describing the rise of extreme factions within the particular party.297

Taking into account the elements above, one would expect there to be little in the way of information dissemination outside of party members, and indeed this is what is found. In the same way as parties, intra-party groups are less concerned with research and informing a wider public of developments in the EU per se than they are with promoting policy positions that will gain they support in their chosen constituencies (i.e. the party membership). As will be seen in the following section, this contrasts with non-party groups and even with those groups that, while de facto intra-party, hesitate to have any formal links with a party.298

This is evidenced by the relatively sparse nature of these groups’ websites, which contain little more than a statement of aims, the occasional article, a list of group organisers and contact details.299

Overall, the strategies adopted by intra-party groups, with the partial exceptions of Combat pour les Valeurs and the Rassemblement pour le Non, are consistent with the goal of gaining influence in, and control over, their respective parties. Work is focused upon raising the group’s profile within the party, rather than more widely, since to do the latter would be an inefficient use of resources. The exceptions mentioned above were the result of particular circumstances, namely the French referendum on Maastricht, where the aim was precisely to influence the general public. However, both organisations were short-lived, a consequence


298 Such as the European Foundation.

299 This is true for the Anti Common Market League (http://www.bullen.demon.co.uk/cibaeml.htm - part of the Campaign for an Independent Britain site), Conservative Way Forward (http://www.conwayfor.org/), the Labour Euro Safeguard Campaign (http://www.lesc.org.uk/), and Debout la République (http://deboutlarepublique.ifrance.com/deboutlarepublique). CAFE does not even have this, its website
of their restricted goals. Where intra-party groups have persisted, they have followed the strategy outlined above.

NON-PARTY GROUPS
The third and final category of groups, non-party groups, presents a fundamentally different set of strategies to the two previous ones. Whereas both parties and intra-party groups exhibit very similar strategies within their categories, both driven by a clear and overarching objective, non-party groups are much more diverse, in both strategies and objectives.

The reason for this stems from the lack of a single goal. Parties need to gain election to effect policy changes, so their efforts are directed towards election; likewise, intra-party groups need to gain control of their party to effect policy changes, so their efforts are directed towards gaining control. Non-party groups do not have such an objective, for the reason that they operate outside of formal institutional spaces, enabling them to adopt a variety of strategies, designed to achieve influence at different points within the national institutional system.\(^\text{300}\)

Where non-party groups are consistent is in their non-pursuit of elected office. None of the non-party groups under study has contested elections at any level, either during the study period or after it. This is to be expected, given that in the previous definition of non-party groups, there is no intention of pursuing elected office as a strategy. Instead of trying to gain direct control of decision-making institutions within a national system, non-party groups aim to achieve indirect influence. As can be seen in Figure 20 below, there are various ways in which this can be achieved, combining elements of campaigning and media activity.

Figure 20 highlights four main routes for gaining influence within institutional spaces. The first, and most obvious, is the direct lobbying of elected members of those institutions, to shift the balance of opinions within parties (and hence institutions). Secondly, groups can lobby sectoral interests, which may or may not already have active European policies, in order to broaden the range of groups lobbying politicians and institutions on the subject. Thirdly, there is use of the media as a direct conduit of influence within institutions, through the reproduction of non-party group opinions and policy positions. Finally, the media can also be used indirectly, as a means to influence public opinion, which can then influence

\(^{300}\) And on the international level as well: non-party groups are proportionately more likely to be involved in transnational groups such as TEAM.
institutions in a variety of ways, both formally (i.e. elections) and informally (e.g. opinion polls and focus groups). These campaigning strategies, as listed above, are increasingly indirect, in terms of the number of steps and actors between the group and the institution that is to be targeted.\textsuperscript{301} Using these various possibilities in combination, sub-sets of non-party groups can be identified, classified on the basis of their chosen strategies. These sub-sets are listed in Table 10 below, along with the passive strategy of building inter-group contacts, which will be discussed later.

The first two sub-sets to be considered are primarily concerned with the utilisation of more direct forms of gaining influence. \textbf{Think tanks} generate materials and policy positions within their own structures, in contrast to \textbf{clearing house} groups, who instead merely provide a structure through which individuals can project their own ideas. In both cases, such groups aim to influence politicians, either directly or via media coverage of their work.

\textsuperscript{301} This is reflected in the original version of this figure (which did not include sectoral lobbying): there the Bruges Group had labelled the lobbying of politicians as a ‘primary influence mechanism’, and the press-based strategies as ‘secondary’. Bruges Group, undated, ‘Current Communication Strategies’, in-house document, and interview Oulds.
Table 10: Non-Party Groups Classified by Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Sets (constituent groups)</th>
<th>Active Strategies</th>
<th>Passive Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lobbying Politicians</td>
<td>Lobbying Sectoral Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Think-Tanks</strong> (Demain la France (early), European Foundation, Global Britain, The Freedom Association)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clearing Houses</strong> (Bruges Group, Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale, European Research Group)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sectoral</strong> (BWMA, Business for Sterling, Federation of Small Businesses, New Europe, No, Save Britain’s Fish)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyper-Sectoral</strong> (Campaign Against Euro-Federalism, Trade Unions Against the Single Currency)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grassroots</strong> (Action Française, Britain Out of Europe Campaign, CIB, Democracy Movement)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth</strong> (Youth Against the European Union, Youth For a Free Europe)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umbrella</strong> (Alliance pour la Souveraineté Française, Anti-Maastricht Alliance, Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht, Congress for Democracy, New Alliance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Group materials and media coverage
In their most developed forms, both think-tanks and clearing houses produce substantial amounts of material. The European Foundation publishes a regular journal, the *European Journal*, which is still one of the major non-web-based channels of communication in the British anti-EU community, with contributions from both in-house members and invited individuals.\(^{302}\) Similarly, during its heyday, the Bruges Group published Occasional Papers, pamphlets, books, a journal and newsletters.\(^{303}\) Even at the other end of the scale, groups such as the European Research Group and Global Britain have all produced at least one significant piece of work, either as a policy position or as a research project.\(^{304}\)

Where the two sub-sets diverge is in their editorial line. While think-tanks generally claim their work as a collective effort, clearing houses are much more cautious about attribution. The reason for this revolves around the question of group cohesion, a subject already touched upon on several occasions. In two of the three cases, clearing houses do not have a sufficiently strong centre to allow for the imposition of a group line: the Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale limits its communal activities to round-table discussions, summer schools and a newsletter expounding the group’s overall position on the benefits of sovereignty.\(^{305}\) In the case of the Bruges Group, the lack of group cohesion did not result from a weak centre *per se*, but from the internal friction between neo-liberal economists (such as Lord Harris and Kenneth Minogue) and nationalists (such as Patrick Robertson), and from the external friction between the Conservative Party and the Group, which became increasingly aligned after several attacks on government policy in the early 1990s.\(^{306}\) As a result, the only publication that had the support of the whole group was a 1991 Occasional Paper, ironically authored by Alan Sked, who was later to be ejected from the group.\(^{307}\)

Despite this difference in methods, the two sub-sets both have similar aims in their strategies, namely the direct influencing of politicians. This occurs in a variety of manners.

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\(^{302}\) Recent issues are also available on-line at: http://www.e-f.org.uk/pubs/ej/index.html

\(^{303}\) The Group, while still producing the majority of these, was much more intermittent after its clashes with the Conservative Party in the early 1990s (see, for example, Times 16/05/1992, ‘Bruges bruises’). More recently, and particularly after the 1997 general election, the Bruges Group developed and expanded once more, as evidenced by the breadth of activities presented on its website (http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/).

\(^{304}\) This said, the European Research Group’s manifesto, “A Europe of Nations”, did not make any impression on the media, and now appears to exist as little more than a reference on an anti-EU website (http://www.keele.ac.uk/secs/ks40/antieu.html). Global Britain has produced several items on the effects on the British economy of withdrawal and on pro-European bias in the BBC (http://www.globalbritain.org/).

\(^{305}\) See http://www.souverainete.org/ for copies of this newsletter, and details of the other activities. The group does support the publication of books, but only under the authorship of an individual.

\(^{306}\) The Bruges Group’s most prominent attack was on the Major Government’s handling of Kurds refugees during and after the Gulf War (see Times 13/04/1991, ‘Bruges secretary offers to resign’).

In the most straightforward case, groups have direct and personal links with individual politicians built up through common interests and repeated contact. The latter is facilitated by the general proximity of many of these groups to particular political parties (the Conservative Party for the Bruges Group, European Foundation and European Research Group, and the RPR for the early Demain la France): party conferences offer many opportunities for such groups to organise fringe events and meetings. Through such contacts, as well as mailing lists, groups can directly target politicians with their materials, in order to try and influence them.

At the same time, groups use the media to generate further interest in their work and to gain further leverage with politicians. The research that these groups perform is transmitted to the media, via direct contacts and press releases (a feature shared by all these groups, bar the European Research Group), who then report it, thus raising its profile with politicians. This obviously also generates a profile with the wider public, but none of the groups appears to make any particular attempt to utilise this profile, either in seeking mass membership or in directing campaigning towards the public. Of course, generating favourable attitudes at a popular level is also helpful in convincing politicians of the credibility of a group’s position.

If think-tank and clearing house groups have pursued a relatively focused strategy, then sectoral groups have been much more diverse in their activities. To some extent, this is a reflection of the heterogeneity of the groups involved (certainly at the level of objectives), but that should not obscure the similarities between them. Whether dealing with the Common Fisheries Policy or the Euro, sectoral groups have utilised the widest possible range of campaigning strategies.

Direct lobbying of politicians by sectoral groups is both a result of the limited goals that such groups are pursuing (which can be largely achieved without systemic change to the EU, as discussed in the previous chapter) and of the presence of political figures within the groups’ structures. With the exception of the Federation of Small Businesses, which is also the only secondary-focus sectoral group, all sectoral groups have current or former politicians at the head, or close to it, of their organisations. This provides groups with

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308 The director of the Bruges Group, Robert Oulds, describes this as a structural counterpart to direct links with politicians (Interview Oulds).
309 Interview Oulds.
310 Business for Sterling and New Europe (and as a result, No) are headed up by Lords Marsh and Owen respectively; Save Britain’s Fish was co-founded by Austin Mitchell MP, who remains its Parliamentary contact; British Weights and Measures Association was founded and is directed by Vivian Linacre, UKIP
convenient and consistent access to other politicians, as well as the opportunity to have group concerns raised inside formal institutional spaces. Even the Federation of Small Businesses has developed links with UKIP at the individual level.\footnote{Britain in Europe notes the involvement of FSB members in UKIP meetings and links with the Campaign for an Independent Britain (http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.html?fid=84).}

At the same time, sectoral groups also lobby sectoral interests directly. Generally speaking, this involves campaigning in those sectors most closely affected by the EU policy in question. For Business for Sterling and the Federation of Small Businesses this means the commercial sector, via involvement with the groups’ regional sections.\footnote{Business for Sterling currently operates regional committees across the UK, with a national council made up of 300 prominent businessmen (http://www.no-euro.com/whoweare/bfs.asp): the Federation of Small Businesses has 220 branches, organised into 30 regional committees (European Movement, 2000, p.25-6).} Save Britain’s Fish has close links with various fishermen associations, who also provide much of the group’s funding.\footnote{Initial support by the Scottish White Fish Producer’s Association was replaced in 1995 by that of the Fisherman’s Association: The National Federation of Fisherman’s Organisations has also been involved with the group since 1994 (http://www.savebritfish.org.uk/hisfish.htm).} Likewise, the British Weights and Measurements Association (BWMA) has actively worked with traders unwilling to use metric measurements, setting up an ‘Imperial Traders’ Register’ in late 1999, a move which was later to segue into the “Metric Martyrs” legal case.\footnote{European Movement, 2000, p.4-5. The Metric Martyrs were street traders prosecuted for selling produce under imperial measures after the 1st January 2000 deadline for shifting to metric measurements: full details of the case and its background can be found at http://www.metricmartyrs.com/; the BWMA’s involvement is discussed at http://www.bwmaonline.com/.} With a more academic- and politically-inclined target audience, New Europe has been more active in the area of producing research publications and organising speeches, seminars and meetings.\footnote{http://www.new-europe.co.uk/contents.html has full details of these activities. New Europe is also one of the very few groups in the UK to have a youth section, Students for New Europe, launched in October 1999 and based around university groups (see http://www.new-europe.co.uk/student/index.html). No has essentially mixed together New Europe and Business for Sterling’s work.}

If these activities are essentially confined to specific target groups, related to the policy in question, then sectoral groups have also made efforts to reach the general public, both via the media and more directly. This is particularly true of the anti-Euro groups, Business for Sterling and New Europe. They have maintained high media profiles since their formation in 1998-9 (see next section), with dedicated media directors and teams ensuring not only active relationships with the media, but also a platform for their position on the single currency, especially after their creation of No, which is generally treated by the media as the \textit{de facto} umbrella organisation in any forthcoming referendum on membership of the single member. It should be noted that Business for Sterling has maintained a consistent line of not involving politicians in its campaigning (Times 11/06/1998, “Businesses line up against the Euro”), although this has not precluded informal links existing with various figures inside Parliament, nor with UKIP (Interview Eels).
currency.316 While the other groups have a smaller media profile, they do still engage in popular actions, usually structured around specific events: Save Britain’s Fish most famously organised a fleet of fishing vessels to sail up the Thames to London to protest over changes to the Common Fisheries Policy in 1996.317

The reasoning behind the breadth of strategies pursued by sectoral groups is related precisely to the limited nature of their objectives. All of these groups, with the exception of the Federation of Small Businesses, have very limited policy goals, all of which are achievable within the current system of the European Union, i.e. they do not hold positions of generalised opposition. Since this reduces the amount of change required to bring the new policy into effect (because the current system does not have to be built up again from scratch), so it is potentially easier for it to be achieved. The corresponding response to this on the part of the groups is to push at every available point of pressure around formal institutional spaces in order to achieve their goals: Business for Sterling’s information manager described the programme of his group as being to react to government and EU events and to secure a ‘no’ vote in a referendum, broad goals with room for much flexibility of approach.318 This is aided by the simplicity of the message to be communicated: no to membership of the Euro, withdrawal from the Common Fisheries Policy or use of imperial measurements all need much less elaboration than objectives of major reformation of the EU. Put differently, sectoral groups do not pretend to have policy positions on subjects outside of their immediate interests, hence there is a greater potential for disseminating the group’s aims to a very wide audience, while other groups have to adjust their message to different audiences.

This said, there are a couple of groups that exhibit features that merit being referred to as hyper-sectoral. Both the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism and Trade Unions Against the Single Currency have adopted very focused approaches in their campaign strategies that set them apart from other sectoral groups, albeit in differing ways.

As noted in the previous chapter, the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism was founded in 1991 to organise opposition within the Labour party and the trade union movement against

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316 See European Movement, 2000, p.35 and http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antiieu.phtml? fid=98 for the opinions of pro-European groups on this point. No is included here, rather than under umbrella groups, since both Business for Sterling and New Europe have suspended the majority of activities under their own names, so as to give No a clear field.

317 The Herald (Glasgow) 19/04/1996, ‘Fishermen sail in with protest aimed at sinking Euro-policy’. Save Britain’s Fish also encourages the public to join its organisation and to engage in lobbying of MPs and other bodies (http://www.savebritfish.org.uk/whafish.htm). British Weights and Measures Association supports similar action (http://www.bwmaonline.com/Join%20the%20Action.htm).
membership of the EU. As a consequence, its activities have been very focused upon mobilising support for its position within these bodies. It has very close links with the intra-party LESC and co-organised a campaign against Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with the left-wing newspapers Tribune and Morning Star.319 Trade Unions Against the Single Currency has been even more focused in its activities, limiting itself just to trade unions and to the issue of the Euro. While its campaigning was minimal during the study period, even after its relaunch in September 2000, it has limited itself to building up support within individual unions and branches, as well as at events such as the Trades Union Congress.320

In both cases, the groups have eschewed the approaches taken by others, as a consequence of their highly focused nature. Neither has made any attempt to develop a profile in the media generally or with the general public, instead limiting activity to a very precise audience. In this, they most closely resemble intra-party groups, since their aim is to affect the policy of a political party (albeit through the indirect route of trade unions) so as to change public policy. The difference lies in a clearer separation between these groups and their targets than is the case for intra-party groups.

All of the non-party groups discussed so far have exhibited a common interest in lobbying elite-level actors, be they politicians or other decision-makers. However, there are non-party groups that do not structure their work along these lines. The more important of these fall under the grassroots category in Table 10. Despite their very different backgrounds, Action Française, Britain Out of Europe Campaign, Campaign for an Independent Britain (CIB) and the Democracy Movement engage exclusively in activities aimed at the general public. Such action not only includes street demonstrations, rallies and marches, but also public debates and meetings, as well as the distribution of EU-related materials.321

The development of an anti-EU position was an integral part in the renewal of Action Française in the early 1990s, giving it a new focus for its traditional strategy of mass action, most notably at the January 1999 rally in Versailles on the occasion of the ratification by the

318 Interview Eels.
319 The group’s chairmen have all been members of either the Labour party or a trade union (European Movement, 2000, p.12).
CIB has run public meetings throughout the study period, although it has only been since the late 1990s that they have attracted any substantial audiences. It also produces pamphlets and information packs for schools and libraries, organises speakers for meetings, as well as arranging the 1992 ‘counter-summit’ in Edinburgh, which saw the birth of the Anti-Maastricht Alliance and The European Alliance of EU-critical Movements. Britain Out of Europe Campaign has organised demonstrations and a march, as well as lobbying farmers to leave the National Union of Farmers and create an anti-EU union. The Democracy Movement adopted a very decentralised structure after its emergence from the Referendum Party, developing a strategy that combined constant activity at the grassroots level with regular high profile events, such as ‘Democracy Days’ and rallies.

As noted before, these groups have adopted the position that the best way to influence public policy is to create sufficient movement in public opinion to make decision-makers in institutions change their positions. If Action Française and Britain Out of Europe Campaign aim to do this through vocal protests, and CIB through targeting popular sources of information, then the Democracy Movement has taken a more low-profile approach, counting on the sheer volume of its members to have an effect. However, in all four cases there is also an intention and an effect of generating media interest, even if this does still remain relatively small in comparison to other non-party groups.

This contrasts with the two youth groups, Youth Against the European Union and its successor, Youth For a Free Europe. These groups developed out of the perceived need for a youth-oriented anti-EU organisation, such as are found in Scandinavia. In practice, these groups have not instigated much activity on their own, instead joining in with other groups – such as the Democracy Movement – to express their views. This has meant participation in rallies and meetings, as well as working on door-to-door campaigns, both in the UK and Sweden.

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323 Interview Lord Stoddart.
326 Some 200,000 in 1999, essentially inherited from the Referendum Party, as the previous chapter noted.
327 In Sweden the Unga mot EU is attached to Nej til EU (http://www.nejtilleu.se/ungamoteu/index.htm), while in Denmark the JuniBevægelsen has a large youth section (http://www.junibevaegelsen.dk/index.php?page_id=18&data_id=49). In both cases, the youth sections have substantial autonomy of action.
Rather than using the media to convey their message, these groups have adopted word-of-mouth tactics, consistent with their grassroots approach.

While the difference between the grassroots and the youth sub-sets is partly one of size and of the latter’s relative lack of organisation, it is also a reflection of the specialised nature of youth groups. These are aimed at mobilising young people, who are often more sceptical of political activity. As a result, youth groups have been relatively informal, stressing as much the social function of joining the group as the political intent.

The final sub-set of non-party groups presents a very particular situation. Umbrella groups exist in both France and the UK, but their strategies cannot be classified within the active categorisation in Table 10. This not to suggest that these groups have not engaged in any of the activities outlined above, but that it is not their primary purpose. Instead of working to influence public policy makers, the primary strategy of umbrella groups is the promotion of contacts between various groups, with a view to optimising their efforts to influence decision-makers. This stems from the nature of umbrella groups as collections of, or fora for, other groups.

In most of these cases, this is very clearly the situation. The work of the Anti-Maastricht Alliance, the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht, Congress for Democracy and New Alliance has been limited to the organisation of meetings for their various constituent parts, in order to build links, coordinate work and prepare for future activities. The individual reasons for the formation of these groups have been discussed in the previous chapter, and do not require repetition. However, as an illustration of the type of work that umbrella groups have engaged in, the example of Congress for Democracy can be used. Lacking any substantial group organisation, it essentially exists only as a bi-annual meeting for all groups interested in coordinating work on a future referendum on British membership of the Euro. Motions are passed by the plenary session, and any work that is required is

328 Youth Against the European Union helped in the Danish referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998 (http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3729/history.html).

329 This was certainly the case for Youth Against the European Union (http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3729/history.html): while more serious, Youth For a Free Europe still has the feel of a group of friends (see http://www.free-europe.org.uk/).

330 This was also the case, at least initially, for the various European groups, such as The European Alliance of EU-critical Movements (TEAM, which was set up at the same time as the Anti-Maastricht Alliance) and SOS Democracy (an inter-group of MEPs).
fielded out to individuals. The Congress does not even appear to want to turn itself into the lead organisation in the event of a referendum.

In the remaining case there has been some effort to influence public policy directly. The Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France has followed the same path as the other umbrella groups to a great extent, organising meetings for French anti-EU campaigners at regular intervals in order to coordinate their work around some basic objectives concerning the preservation of French sovereignty. At the same time, it has also engaged in occasional activities under its own name, asking the French government to press for a protocol of the respect of national constitutions at the Vienna European Council in December 1998, and co-organising the January 1999 Versailles demonstration. In this respect, it could be that the Alliance is moving in the same direction as CIB, a group that has gradually overcome its initial fractiousness to pursue a coherent strategy. However, at this point in time, its actions still represent the exception, rather than the rule, with member groups still holding the power of decision.

To complete this review of non-party groups’ strategies it is necessary to discuss briefly the importance of information dissemination. While parties and intra-party groups have not treated this as a priority, given their objectives, non-party groups have devoted considerable resources to this work, regardless of their individual strategies. The production of analyses and critiques of European integration, and its subsequent dissemination to as many groups and individuals as possible, is seen as an integral part of these groups’ work. As a result, it should come as no surprise that non-party groups and individuals manage all of the major resources for anti-EU activity, both on-line and off.

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331 Agendas are set by a Steering Committee, compromising politicians and non-party figures from various groups (http://www.congressfordemocracy.org.uk/the%20committee.html).

332 At the Seventh Congress, in March 2002, a resolution was passed that merely proposed that individual groups should work together (http://www.congressfordemocracy.org.uk/seventh.html).

333 As their website notes: “Chaque association adhérente, chaque membre, s'exprime et agit librement en dehors de l'Alliance, dans tous les domaines. Tous s'engagent cependant à respecter, dans leurs prises de position, les principes politiques communs inscrits dans la Charte pour la souveraineté de la France.” [Each participating association and member may express themselves freely outside the Alliance, in all areas. However, each one also undertakes to respect, in the taking of positions, the common political principles contained in the Charter for the Sovereignty of France], http://www.souverainete-france.org/html/pages/qui-sommes-nous.htm.


335 Lord Stoddart notes that the on-going nature of European integration, and hence of campaigning against it, implies a requisite need for full information on events. Interview Lord Stoddart.

336 On the internet, mailing lists such as EuroFAQ are non-party, as are websites providing links to materials and other sites, such as the Critical European Group (http://www.keele.ac.uk/socs/ks40/ccehome.html), Facts, Figures and Phantasies (http://www.eufactsfigures.com/), Euro-sceptic.org (http://www.euro-sceptic.org/) and Souverainisme.org (http://www.souverainisme.org/). Off-line, the work of CIB in the UK has already been mentioned.
Unlike parties and intra-party groups, non-party groups are not competitive. Parties compete with other parties to secure election; intra-party groups try to promote their agendas within parties over those of other factions. By contrast, non-party groups can be cooperative, since they are all working towards changing the status quo of European integration: hence their relative willingness to get involved in transnational groupings.\textsuperscript{337} As discussed before, this does not mean that there is much agreement on either the problems or the solutions, but that all groups are motivated by the same desire to change the system in some way. Moreover, success by one group does not necessarily mean failure for the others: the prevalence of primary-focus groups among non-party groups means that it is much more likely that gains secured by one group’s actions will benefit all of the others. The dissemination of information is a result of this non-competitive approach – different groups can use the information in different ways to support their strategies.

This is not only true for information dissemination, but for non-party group strategies in general. The non-competitive nature of the situation in which non-party groups work means that they can adopt very different strategies from one another in a stable manner. Whereas parties and intra-party groups constantly have to optimise their strategies to match their opponents’, non-party groups can engage in strategic specialisation, without concerns that this will result in their marginalisation. Indeed, one of the strengths of the non-party groups’ strategies is precisely that they are diversified, which results in a more complete coverage of all pressure points around formal institutional spaces.

This is not necessarily the intention of non-party strategies. The role of individuals within groups and the impact of divergent individual interests on group cohesion has been previous discussed. At least some of the diversification is thus attributable to the desire of individuals to pursue their own personal projects in whatever way they see fit. At the same time, there is also a structural factor that plays a role. As shown in Figure 20, there are several ways in which non-party groups can exercise influence. This sets them apart from parties (who only have the route of being elected) and intra-party groups (who have to secure control of their party). Non-party groups are thus the only ones not bound by the structure of the institutional system to follow a single course. This is shown in Figure 21 below. Note how both parties and intra-parties only have one course of action with which to secure their goals.

\textsuperscript{337} See Annex 1.
Figure 21 thus represents a summary of groups’ strategies. It shows the interrelationship between parties and intra-party groups, which was not immediately apparent in the taxonomy proposed in the previous chapter, as well as the differences between types of groups. Underlining this there is still the idea of institutional constraints, which variously serve to limit or enable different activities by different groups. Parties and intra-party groups are forced into particular strategies and activities by their initial choice concerning the best way to influence public opinion. On the other hand, non-party groups can exploit more diverse strategies by dint of their choice not to pursue direct representation within formal institutional spaces.
VOLUME AND PROFILE

Having looked at group strategies, the question of volume and profile needs to be discussed. This is directly linked to the third hypothesis that there will be an increasing volume and profile of anti-EU groups over time, due to an increased ability over time to penetrate institutional spaces, a question that will be fully addressed later on. However, the first step in testing this hypothesis is to see whether group volumes and profile have increased at all, regardless of the reasons for this. This will be done through consideration of how many individuals are members of such groups and what level of support they have more widely, both in terms of votes and of media coverage.

GROUP MEMBERSHIP

A first useful indicator of group volume is the changing level of group memberships. Clearly, this has two components, namely changes over time within groups and changes over time in the number of groups. Therefore it is necessary to provide not only global figures, but also figures for each group.

The first point to note is that information on this subject is very hard to obtain, and even harder to confirm. The reasons for this are twofold. The first is political: groups often claim to have more members than is actually the case, so as to strengthen their claims to ‘speak for the people’, a matter that was discussed in the previous chapter. Conversely, groups with low memberships, or falling memberships, will not be eager to report this. The second reason is administrative: paradoxically, this seems to affect larger groups more than it does smaller ones. While small groups can keep relatively accurate records of membership, larger groups often do not keep up-to-date and centralised membership databases, resulting in miscounting of members.338

An associated problem is that of multiple memberships by individuals. This is best illustrated by looking at the membership of one of the main email discussion lists in the UK. EuroFAQ was set up in September 1998 to disseminate anti-EU information: it currently has

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338 The Secretary General of the RPF highlighted this as a particular problem for French parties, which can only receive funding from members or from the state, the latter being calculated on first round votes for the Assemblée and the number of elected posts. Given the RPF’s electoral performance, which will be discussed later on, this means the state does not give the party any funds. However, despite the resulting importance of having accurate membership lists, M. Cesari was still not totally sure how many members his party had, due to “a rather complicated accounting system”. Interview Cesari. However, the suggested figure of 100,000 members in the RPF’s first phase of existence is certainly a substantial overestimate, given that such a figure would have made it the same size as the RPR!
some 190 members. As part of the enlisting procedure, members are asked to list membership of various anti-EU groups. In general, most members who do claim membership of one group will also be members of other groups: for instance, there are several members who belong to the Democracy Movement, UKIP and CIB. As a result, it should be kept in mind that there is likely to be some overlap in memberships, particularly amongst non-party groups.

Consequently, a substantial part of the following section is based on second-hand estimates, either by the author or by other observers. Despite this, the figures do still have a useful indicative value, showing the general trends. The data in Annex 2 covers for groups with a primary focus on opposing the European Union (see Table 2 in the previous chapter), as well as several other notable anti-EU groups, on a year-by-year basis. Figures 22 and 23 put this information into graphic form. In addition to the comments made above concerning the data, some further assumptions must be noted. Firstly, where only more recent data is available for a particular group, then those figures have been extended back to the group’s foundation date. Clearly, this will tend to overstate the size of groups in earlier years, but without any clear means of calculating those figures, this remains the most logical way of treating the data, since it is in the early phase of a group’s existence that most growth takes place. Secondly, while the British figures only concern groups with a primary focus, the French data also include the MDC, MPF and RPF, since a substantial part in their growth results from their anti-EU stance. Their inclusion can also help in understanding shifts between the two sets of groups. Thirdly, where groups either do not have memberships (as in the case of certain umbrella organisations), or lack sufficient structures to make membership meaningful (as for the early phase of Demain la France) then the figure is replaced with a dash.

339 EuroFAQ is hosted by Yahoo! Groups (http://groups.yahoo.com/): the author has been a (passive) member since September 1999. It originates from the EuroFAQ website (http://members.aol.com/eurofaq/).

340 Due to the restricted nature of the list, it is not possible to release specific instances. Moreover, it should be noted that EuroFAQ members have tended to be amongst the more active anti-EU elements, and so their multiple memberships are likely to be less common in other, more passive circles.

341 The inclusion of the three souverainiste parties and the exclusion of the far right and left, not to mention Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions, requires some explanation. Of all the French parties, only the RPF, MPF and MDC made Europe a substantial element of their political platform. As noted in Table 2, only the MPF can be considered as a primary focus group, all the others being secondary focus. However, within those secondary focus groups, the RPF and MDC have shown a much greater interest in European issues than the remainder. Hence only those three have been included, not least so as to not swamp out the other groups: in the classification used by Taggart and Szczerbiak, 30% of the electorate voted for parties with some degree of anti-EU policy in the late 1990s, equivalent to an estimated 12 million voters (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001).
Looking at the figures, in both countries there has been an upward trend over time. Even if the big jumps in numbers in 1997 in the UK and 1999 in France can be attributed to single groups and are subject to a degree of overestimation (the Referendum Party and the uniting of the MPF and Demain la France into the RPF respectively), then that should not hide a wider process, whereby there are an increasing number of groups in both countries, each of which draws in new members. It has to be mentioned that in the case of France, global figures fell quite sharply in 2001, when the RPF split: membership of the resultant MPF and RPF totally roughly 30,000 instead of the 100,000 it had in the aftermath of the 1999
European elections.\textsuperscript{342} By contrast, the Democracy Movement was able to retain the vast majority of the Referendum Party’s support base after the latter collapsed in 1997.

The second observation to be made concerns the relative importance of new groups bringing in new members over existing groups increasing their membership. There is only one demonstrable case of a group substantially increasing its membership over time, the UK Independence Party. Even in this case, it is necessary to be careful with the figures. The party’s internal newsletter talks about a rise in membership from a few hundreds to “some thousands” between its foundation out of the Anti-Federalist League and mid-1995.\textsuperscript{343} During the next couple of years, various newspaper reports placed membership at between 10,000 and 16,000.\textsuperscript{344} However, in his farewell piece, Alan Sked put figures at only 3,000 members, with a ‘hard-core’ of 200-300, i.e. no real increase since 1995.\textsuperscript{345} This practical example of groups inflating their membership is instructive, not least because it appears that a similar process took place after Sked’s departure. His figure was repeated two years later, in the wake of the 1999 European elections, when it was claimed that UKIP’s new leadership had increased membership to 8,000.\textsuperscript{346}

The relative importance of new groups driving increasing global totals, rather than existing groups expanding, highlights the diversification of strategies over time, as discussed in the first half of this chapter. Generally speaking, there has been a move from small, elite groups to larger, popular groups, both in the form of grassroots campaigns such as the Democracy Movement and of fully-fledged political parties such as the RPF and UKIP. However, caution must be exercised over any assumptions concerning future trends. It is still unclear how many more, if any, such large-scale groups each national system could hold. At the same time, it does appear that in overall terms the anti-EU movement has been successful in retaining its membership over time: during the study period, even taking into account overlapping memberships and the various shortcomings of the data, it remains apparent that global totals have tended upwards and that when one group stops, another one will more than replace its membership.

\textsuperscript{342} Interview de la Perriere.
\textsuperscript{344} Times 27/06/1996 ‘Rival party threatens Goldsmith’; Financial Times 03/02/1998 ‘Visions of a ‘monster’ rouse the Independence party’.
\textsuperscript{346} Daily Telegraph 15/06/1999 ‘EU Spanish junket drove retired tycoon into politics’. Even in face-to-face interviews, UKIP Council members refused to give precise figures: a general figure of “more than 10,000” was given to the author (Interview Sinclaire) with the comment that the party did not wish to be more precise for ‘strategic reasons’.
This then is the internal aspect of group volume: its membership. But how does that relate to the external dimension of profile? It is necessary to consider groups’ wider resonance in society, first in terms of electoral power and then in terms of media representation.

ELECTORAL RESULTS
As was discussed in the first half of this chapter, elections are one key strategy that anti-EU groups have pursued in their attempts to improve their position of influence. Thus it is a useful benchmark to look at how well those groups that stand for election do, since this will reflect on their profile in the general public.

As before, Annex 3 lists election performances by groups with a primary anti-EU focus (plus the same French parties looked at in the previous section) in various national elections during the study period, while Figures 24 and 25 give global totals in graphic form. Figures show the percentage of the total vote in each election. Particularly in the early British elections where anti-EU candidates stood, this results in relatively low figures, for the simple reason that not many candidates were fielded: the Anti-Federalist League only had 17 candidates in the 1992 general election, averaging 0.5% in those constituencies. Regional and local election results have been excluded, since none of the groups contested these during the study period. However, the results of by-elections to the British Parliament have also been excluded from the Table: instead they have been included in Annex 4, with Figure 26 below showing their development. As can be seen, these are exclusively the preserve of UKIP. In the Assemblée Nationale, députées are generally replaced by alternates without election.

In contrast to the evolution over time of group memberships, when looking at election results there is a rather mixed picture. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, while British results appear to have followed a consistent trend upwards, this is clearly not supported by the development of UKIP’s by-election performances since 1993. Moreover, looking at UKIP’s results from the 2001 general election, despite the general upward trend there is a slump back to 1.5% of the total vote. Similarly, in France there appears to be a mismatch between European election results in 1994 and 1999 and national elections in between. To

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347 As already mentioned, UKIP has stood in local elections since 2000.
348 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/qui/modifications.asp contains a full list of such changes to the composition of the Assemblée.
349 See House of Commons, 2001, ‘General election results, 7 June 2001’, House of Commons Research Paper, No. 01/54. Even using a figure for the 428 constituencies that UKIP contested, the average is still only 2.1%.
some extent that is due to electoral alliances on the part of the MDC in 1997, but with an estimated 1% of the vote that year, this still does not cover the gap.\textsuperscript{350}

More importantly, in the French case, there does not seem to have been a progressive evolution of anti-EU voting in European elections. Instead, there appears to have been a simple step up between 1989 and 1994. Whether this is purely a temporary phenomenon will only become apparent in 2004.

\textsuperscript{350} Les Echos 27/05/1997, ‘Petits partis: les Verts recoltent les fruits de leur alliance avec les socialistes’.
The case of France does initially seem to be redolent of the situation that has existed in Denmark for the past 15 years, namely the existence of a substantially different constellation of parties in national and European elections. However, this would be to misread the data. Certainly, the MDC has only presented a separate list on one occasion, in the 1994 European elections, but it did not repeat that in 1999, working instead with the Parti Socialiste. But none of the three main anti-EU parties – the MDC, MPF or RPF – has pursued a strategy of only contesting European elections. Likewise, UKIP in the UK has fought both national and European elections. If anything, the differences that can be seen between results can be ascribed to the relatively higher profile of ‘Europe’ as an issue in European elections, with a resultant boost for parties that offer clear alternative visions to mainstream parties. Of course, this is simply another expression of the ‘second-order’ hypothesis these elections, which states that national government parties will do relatively badly and that smaller, more extreme parties will do relatively well.

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351 A. Michalski, 1996, 'Le Danemark et sa politique européenne', Les Études du CERI No.16, CERI, Paris, discusses this. The People’s Movement (Folkesbevægelsen Mod EU) and the June Movement (Junibevægelsen) only participate in European elections, with the former having an electoral pact with the Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkparti), which does not compete in European elections. Reports at the time put this down to political expediency, namely that Chevènement did not want to jeopardise his political standing with the PS and that the MDC was receiving very low scores in opinion polls. Les Echos 09/03/1999, ‘Après bien des tergiversations, le Mouvement des citoyens de Jean-Pierre Chevènement a décidé de faire liste commune avec le PS pour les prochaines élections européennes’.

352 For example, note the differences in issue rating between European and national elections shown in Figure 12.

It is also pertinent to look at the practical consequence of groups’ electoral performances, i.e. how much representation they have gained. Table 11 below lists seats won by anti-EU groups during the study period. In addition to these, there are several more seats that came by other means into the hands of these groups. In France, the MPF has two sénateurs and the RPF one, while the latter also has three deputies in the Assemblée, all of whom crossed the floor from other parties at the time of their formation. Likewise, in the UK, the Referendum Party briefly had one MP for two months before the 1997 general election.

As discussed at length previously, the French electoral systems are more proportionate than those in the UK, and so it not at all surprising that the former has seen more successes on the part of anti-EU groups than the latter. However, it is worth noting that in both countries the site of the greatest success has been the European Parliament, an institution whose legitimacy is questioned to a greater or lesser extent by the various anti-EU groups elected to it.

Table 11: Seats won by anti-EU groups in national and European elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European election, June 1994</td>
<td>13 (L’Autre Europe)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assemblée Nationale, May-June 1997</td>
<td>1 (MPF)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 (MDC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European election, June 1999</td>
<td>13 (RPF)</td>
<td>3 (UKIP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In summary, anti-EU groups have been able to convert their growing internal membership into an increasing electoral profile in both countries. This is a relationship that works both ways. In the UK, UKIP claimed to have doubled its membership after gaining its first seats in 1999, and certainly improved its performance in subsequent by-elections (Figure 26). In France, the mere announcement of the RPF’s formation before the 1999 elections was

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355 It would also be possible to add the 6 MEPs elected in 1999 by CPNT, the party’s first seats outside of regional elections. The 6 now sit with the EDD group in the European Parliament.

356 George Gardiner, founder of the thatcherite Conservative Way Forward, left the Conservative Party in March 1997, after he was deselected by his local association for attacking John Major’s European policy (Observer 09/03/1997, ‘Ditched Gardiner joins Goldsmith’). Given the continued strain between the Conservative’s MEPs and the party proper, the 37 MEPs elected on 36% of the vote in 1999 have not been included, despite the presence of several prominent anti-EU individuals amongst their number (see Guardian 21/06/1999, ‘Tories try to sort out how Euro MPs will be aligned’).

357 Daily Telegraph 15/06/1999 ‘EU Spanish junket drove retired tycoon into politics’.
enough for tens of thousands of individuals to ask for membership, even before the party had established any formal structures.\textsuperscript{358}

At the same time, the size of a group that contests elections does not bear a clear linear relationship to its success. This is best seen in the 1999 elections, where UKIP got over half the national vote of the RPF, despite only having about 5% of the members. Similarly in 1997, the Referendum Party only got three times the mean national vote of UKIP (i.e. looking at constituencies where each party stood), despite UKIP having a mere 1.5% of the Referendum Party’s members and substantially fewer resources. In this, the strong showing of the smaller party is more interesting than to the weak showing of the larger one. One possible explanation in both the above cases is that the RPF and the Referendum Party were only set up shortly before the election, while UKIP had a much more permanent structure in place, which allowed it to maximise the leverage of its resources.\textsuperscript{359} However, it is necessary to take into consideration various other factors, such as other parties’ positions, in order to fully understand the relationship at any given point.

MEDIA COVERAGE
The third and final element of this section looks at media coverage of anti-EU groups. Unlike the previous element, this is of concern to all groups, regardless of form. As was seen in the first half of this chapter, the large majority of groups seek to gain some kind of media profile. The reason for this is clear: national media outlets provide the most cost-effective means of reaching the general population. Larger groups can afford to employ full-time media or communications officers to ensure a steady feed of material to the media, while smaller groups tend to concentrate their efforts on specific campaigns, given their more limited resources. In either case, it would be expected that those efforts would be reflected by media coverage and, if the hypothesis is correct, then that coverage should increase with time.

In order to measure this, coverage in national newspapers over the study period will be measured. Clearly, this provides an incomplete picture of media coverage, but it represents the only practical means of collecting data: television, radio and the internet do not have the same searchable archiving systems as newspapers, the latter further suffering from its novelty. Moreover, as noted previously, newspapers do not play the same role in French

\textsuperscript{358} Interview de la Perriere.
\textsuperscript{359} Certainly this was the view of one defector from the Referendum Party to UKIP. Regional organiser, John Bostock, described Goldsmith’s campaign as ‘useless’ and said that there was a ‘lack of organisation and [much] disillusionment’ (Guardian 01/01/1997, ‘Goldsmith party ‘an empty shell’’)

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society as they do in the UK: the French are as likely to read weekly news magazines as they are newspapers.\textsuperscript{360} At the same time, the aim is not to provide a comprehensive and systematic account of media coverage, but merely an impression of overall trends. The use of primarily broadsheet newspapers here is likewise based on the desire to make trends more visible. More populist newspapers carry substantial less coverage of political events and so of groups, and the Lexis-Nexis database does not have such good coverage, which has potential impacts on making comparisons between the two countries. Despite these caveats, newspapers do give a relatively comparable medium upon which to base this work.

Two elements will be considered in this section. Firstly, references to individual groups will be noted, in order to gauge their individual and collective profiles. Then some key words in anti-EU rhetoric will be studied, as a measure of more general media interest in the subject of opposition to the EU. Data are based on newspaper searches on the Lexis-Nexis database and are presented in the form of references per newspaper per month.\textsuperscript{361} The reason for this is twofold: different newspapers are available for different periods, so results have to be adjusted to take account of this, and monthly units are large enough to give meaningful figures, but small enough to highlight relatively short-term fluctuations.

Naturally, in all of this it must be remembered that media coverage is not a passive matter. Generally speaking, anti-EU groups have to push their stories to media outlets if they are to have a chance of being covered. Alternatively, certain groups may gain a reputation with the media and their opinions on various news items may be sought.\textsuperscript{362} In both cases, the different actors have different agendas, which may or may not complement each other. As discussed previously, media outlets have their own interests, and this might result in over- or under-coverage of anti-EU groups and their activities, relative to other outlets. While this is countered to a certain extent by using a variety of sources – both left- and right-wing, and pro- and anti-European - for each country, it cannot be guaranteed that such effects will be eliminated.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{360} According to Eurobarometer, only 28\% of French interviewees read a newspaper every day, against 50\% of British. Eurobarometer 51, Spring 1999, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb51/eb51_en.htm.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{361} The newspapers used are as follows (including available dates of data): France – Le Monde (From January 1990), Agence France Presse (From May 1993, except October 1995 and August 1998), Les Echos (From January 1993), Figaro (From January 1997); UK – The Guardian (From January 1985), The Times (From July 1985), Daily Telegraph (From September 1988), The Independent (From January 1990).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{362} This is the case for the MPF, who are asked to comment on stories relating to the European Union and to corruption, partly because Philippe de Villiers is seen as being ‘media-friendly’ (Interview de la Perriere). The RPF, by contrast, complains that the media only seeks its opinion on European affairs, because that was its founding characteristic, despite the breadth of policy positions it now holds (Interview Cesari).}
Figures 27 and 28 show the monthly references per newspaper in each country for groups with a primary focus on opposition to the European Union, plus the three French parties looked at in this half of the chapter: Annex 5 provides annualised totals for each group. Other groups have been excluded on the grounds that it would be too complicated to isolate those references that relate to the groups’ EU opposition and that the sheer volume would drown out the other groups: consider that under this methodology, the Conservative Party would score 100 (i.e. three or four references per day per newspaper) on a very regular basis.
The first observation to be made is that, generally speaking, in neither country do anti-EU groups have a particularly high profile: at the end of the study period, British groups were averaging about three mentions per week per newspaper between 23 groups, while in France there were only four months when primary-focus anti-EU groups had more than five mentions per month per newspaper. At the same time, coverage is also very uneven: peaks usually only last one month and even at the end of the period there are months with little or no coverage. Despite the caveats above about the French press, there were more references to anti-EU groups in France between 1992 and 1995 and after 1998.

At the same time, it must be recognised that newspaper coverage of anti-EU groups has generally increased over time. Taking annualised totals for the two countries it can be seen that there is a clear evolution in Figure 29 and Annex 5. Even when looking at falls in coverage year-on-year, the coverage during troughs increases over time, with the exception of UK groups in 1992 and French primary-focus groups in 1995.

While it would be tempting to claim at this point that the media was increasingly covering anti-EU groups, this would be to ignore a more accurate description. Firstly, the unevenness of coverage suggests that it is almost completely event-driven, rather than systematic: rather than occupying a fixed position within the national polity, anti-EU groups only have a profile at certain points. This is mostly seen when looking at the peaks in coverage. In the UK, the 1991 peak is composed of articles covering the Bruges Group’s criticism of the government’s European policy, the bulge in 1996-7 is almost completely made up of
references to the Referendum Party, while the 1999 peak is related to the UKIP’s electoral success at the European elections. Likewise in France, the 1992 peak is linked with Demain la France and Combat pour les Valeurs’ work in the Maastricht referendum, the 1994 and 1999 high spots with the European elections, the 1995 peak with Philippe de Villiers’ presidential candidature, the 1997 with the MDC’s participation in the government coalition, and the 1998 with protests against the EMU convergence criteria. In short, in all cases, coverage is linked to specific events that do not provide for a constant interest by the media. Moreover, the majority of these events are not created by the anti-EU groups, in the sense that they are events which would happen regardless of what they decided to do: the biggest peaks are the result of one or more groups standing for election. Only exceptionally do groups’ own positions come to the forefront (as with the Bruges Group in 1991 and the protests in France in 1998).

A second point to note, and one that was implicit in the previous paragraph, is that coverage is not evenly split between groups. Instead there are a few groups that gain the majority of the coverage, with the rest getting occasional mentions now and again. This is clearest in France, where the three anti-EU parties have substantially more coverage than any of the primary-focus groups. It is even possible to go beyond this and note that it has been the MDC that has had notably more coverage than either the MPF or the RPF, largely due to inclusion in the governing coalition since 1997 and its continued close links with the Parti Socialiste. In the UK, the Referendum Party (between 1996 and 1997), UKIP (especially
after the 1999 elections), the Bruges Group (in the pre-1992 period) and Business for Sterling (after 1998) accounted for the vast majority of references.\(^{363}\)

Moreover, there is a question mark over the relationship between group size and newspaper coverage. In Figure 30, references per year per newspaper are plotted against the membership data from Annex 2, to give a basic indication of the relationship between the two. Despite the crudeness of the membership data, it is apparent that larger groups do tend to receive more coverage than small groups.\(^{364}\) However, the coverage of very large groups is highly variable: while the Referendum Party attracted a very high level of coverage, its successor, the Democracy Movement, has not, and the RPF falls somewhere in between. Furthermore, many middle-sized groups have not received any substantial coverage: none of the groups that pre-date the study period score any higher than 3.25 references per year.\(^{365}\) The only significant outlier to get proportionately more coverage than its size would suppose was the Bruges Group in 1991.

The third and final comment concerns the particular situation in France. While French primary-focus groups have maintained some minimal presence in newspaper coverage after their initial peaks in 1992 and 1994, it is as nothing compared to the three parties. The existence of established parties on both left and right with clear anti-EU policies gives the press an obvious point of contact when debating European issues. As mentioned before, both the RPF and MPF are regularly approached by the media to give comments on such stories.\(^{366}\) This marginalises primary-focus groups, none of which have a comparable organisational structure or membership, so creating a vicious circle where the lack of media presence hinders attempts to increase size, which in turn discourages media attention.

Having now looked at individual groups, the focus now moves to more general indicators of anti-EU discourse. In order to do this, two terms that are closely linked to that discourse have been chosen and the number of references over time plotted in Figures 31 and 32. The terms chosen are “eurosceptic/ism” in British newspapers and “souverainiste/souverainisme” in the French ones. Both terms have sprung out of the public debate on European integration and so can be taken as markers of media interest in the subject. However, while French

\(^{363}\) From a total of 856 references per newspaper over the whole period, the Referendum Party provided 42.84%, UKIP 15.39%, the Bruges Group 18.55% and Business for Sterling 7.51%, making 84.29% of the total. The next most referenced group was New Europe, with 2.07%. See Annex 5.

\(^{364}\) The correlation is significant to 99% at 0.391.

\(^{365}\) I.e. the Anti-Common Market League, Conservatives Against a Federal Europe, Campaign for an Independent Britain (which has no references at all during the study period) and the Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign.

\(^{366}\) Business for Sterling and its umbrella organisation, No, have found themselves in a similar position in the UK since 2000 on the matter of membership of EMU.
groups are happy to take on the title of being “souverainiste”, British groups have, in recent years, tended to reject the “eurosceptic” mantle, often preferring to be thought of as “eurorealists” instead. Despite this, the media has been slow to adapt to this, preferring to use the more widely understood term, even if anti-EU groups do not feel it is entirely accurate. It is also to be noted that “souverainiste” has its modern roots in the Quebecois secessionist movement, and that it only latterly became used in France to denote the anti-EU movement: only the second usage is shown below in Figure 31.

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367 The European Foundation describes itself as “the leading Euroréaliste think tank” (http://www.e-f.org.uk/).
As can be seen once more, British newspapers have a larger number of references per newspaper than the French ones, and they started at an earlier date. In both countries references are highly variable between months, reflecting a lack of a systematic debate, although in the latter years of the period there is the development of an increasing baseline of references, particularly in the UK. Monthly spikes can be identified with particular events, such as the 1997 British general election and the 1999 European elections, a point demonstrated in Figure 33, which shows the relationship between group references and discourse references.

While French primary-focus groups have too small a media profile to make meaningful comments, both British primary-focus groups and French anti-EU parties show an overall positive correlation. This not only shows the periodicity of coverage, but also that trends in group coverage have been mirrored in more general coverage.

In summary, it can be said that there has been a general increase in newspaper coverage of anti-EU groups and of anti-EU discourse more generally. However, this increase has been uncertain and largely dependent on groups’ involvement in bigger events, notably elections: likewise, general coverage has been focused around particular events. It is only rarely that groups have been able to push their own agendas. While larger groups have more coverage

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368 For British primary-focus groups and French anti-EU parties, there is a significance to 99% (0.464 and 0.601 respectively).
than smaller ones, size is not a guarantee of a certain amount of coverage: smaller groups often receive no coverage at all, while very large groups have highly variable levels of coverage. As a result, substantial coverage is the exception, rather than the norm.
SUMMARY

The aim of this chapter has been to describe and analyse the ways in which anti-EU groups have pursued their objectives of influencing public policy within their national systems, and how that has resulted in an increasing volume and profile of protest over time.

With regard to group strategies, the most pertinent criterion for ascertaining what particular choices a group will make is that of group form, more particularly the ‘party-ness’ of the group. Both parties and intra-party groups have chosen highly similar strategies for their work, and this has been the result of the structural limits placed upon them by institutions. In the case of parties, the pursuit of elected office within a formal institutional space forms the overriding concern of the group’s work, since changing public policy is predicated on control of decision-making institutions. Likewise, intra-party groups direct their efforts solely towards gaining control and influence within a party, so they can then use the party to effect changes in public policy through its elected representatives. In both cases, these groups are working through formal channels to achieve results.

In stark contrast, non-party groups have developed a heterogeneous set of strategies, designed to apply pressure, and hence gain influence, at various points around formal institutional spaces. These strategies can be characterised by their level of directness vis-à-vis formal institutions. At the most direct end of the scale, there are groups which lobby politicians and other actors, while more indirectly, other groups aim to use the media to generate interest on the part of politicians and the general public in their positions. Such a diversity of strategies is possible precisely because non-party groups have rejected the option of working inside the formal institutional system, which leaves them free to pursue whatever alternative strategy they feel works most usefully. Moreover, the resultant diversity increases the potential for a greater impact of the groups taken as a whole. This is more clearly seen in the UK, where non-party groups have reached a more mature stage in their development than in France, largely as a consequence of the opportunities presented by the differing institutional structures in each country.

This analysis of group strategies is of importance in supporting the hypotheses concerning the role of institutional structures in the evolution of anti-EU groups. From the analysis it is clear that institutional structures not only shape the pattern of the initial development of groups, but that they also continue to shape those groups’ choices with respect to their strategies.
A second outcome of looking at group strategies is the need to have some gauge of the changing volume and profile of anti-EU groups in both countries. For parties, this means a measurement of electoral support, in addition to considering group membership and media coverage for all types of group. Measuring changing volumes and profile is not only important in itself, since it completes the analysis of anti-EU group behaviour, but also in providing a starting point for a discussion of such groups’ impact, a subject that will be discussed in the conclusions.

There has been a substantial growth of memberships of anti-EU groups in both France and the UK over the study period. Within this, various elements have to be isolated. Firstly, the growth has resulted from the creation of new groups, rather than the enlargement of old ones: in general, groups can expect to grow in size for only a couple of years before plateauing. The reason for this is linked to the continuing proliferation of new groups: over time, the choices available to an individual become much greater, and so it is less likely that they will pick any one group. Compounding this is the effect of high-profile groups drawing in members. The RPF in France and the Referendum Party in the UK increased global membership levels by 80,000 and 180,000 individuals respectively during their brief existences, but this did not translate into gains for other groups, even after the Referendum Party’s collapse (the members effectively being ring-fenced by the Democracy Movement).

While membership has grown, electoral success for anti-EU parties has been much more uneven. It has only been in European elections that anti-EU groups have gained and enlarged their share of the vote over time: national elections have been much more uneven, a point underlined by performances in elections in 2001 and 2002, after the study period. This has resulted in representation in the European Parliament, but only limited seats nationally. There does seem to be some potential for the development of a Danish-style dual electoral constellation between European and national elections, particularly in France, although this currently appears to be unlikely, given the events of the 2002 elections. More incidentally, electoral patterns also support one of the sub-hypotheses of the chapter on institutional spaces, namely that anti-EU groups focus on European and national elections, rather than on sub-national ones.

On the final element of group profile, media coverage, another complicated picture emerges. While there is a general increase in coverage over time in both countries, it remains very uneven. Coverage is driven by events, and so is essentially sporadic, rather than systemic (i.e. the groups are not an integral part of the polity). Moreover, coverage is very uneven
between groups, with one or two groups dominating coverage at any one time. While this is advantageous to the group in question, it tends to starve other groups of media attention. It has to be noted that there is only a weak link between group size and media coverage: while only large groups get very substantial coverage, not all large groups do. If group coverage has been uneven, then the use of anti-EU discourse by the media has grown more consistently. Both French and British newspapers have steadily increased their use of anti-EU terms over the study period. Despite this, the development still remains sporadic, rather than systemic, and show a general correlation to group coverage.

Bringing the two halves of the chapter together, it can be seen that in the pursuit of their chosen strategies, anti-EU groups in both countries have had some success in increasing their volume and presence in their respective national systems. At the same time, that success has been qualified by a failure to secure gains in one arena (such as the European Parliament) and then transform it into gains in other arenas (such as national parliaments). In such a situation, where the success of party-based strategies appears to have reached certain limits, the importance of non-party-based strategies increases. Seen in this way, it once again underlines the point made at the start of this thesis, namely that it is only through the consideration of all types of groups opposed to European integration that it is possible to fully understand the processes at work.
The main aim of this thesis has been to understand how and why opposition to the European Union has developed in France and the UK. To that end, it has built up a basic taxonomy of anti-EU groups, identified ideological and proximate factors in their formation, isolated the different strategies they have used to pursue their different goals, and provided some measure of their changing volume and profile over time. All of this has been done in the framework of a theoretical approach that gives a key place to institutional structures in each country, both as an enabling and a constrictive agent.

In these conclusions, the three main hypotheses laid out in the introduction will be re-examined in the light of the evidence presented in the thesis. By so doing, both the strengths and the weaknesses of the hypotheses will be highlighted, and their relationship with the wider literature in the field will be considered. Such an evaluation completes a circle that started in the introduction: the perceived need to cover an important gap in current research was a driving force behind this piece of work, yet its full value can only be realised by its re-integration into the existing corpus of knowledge. The corpus has three clear elements that have to be dealt with: namely, the study of opposition to the EU, the study of the EU in general and the study of opposition in general. Just as these were the three main sources that justified the necessity of this work, so they are the three main areas that this work impacts upon.

The conclusions fall into two main sections. In the first, the validity of the hypotheses in the face of the empirical evidence will be examined. Each of the three hypotheses is clearly supported by that evidence, with only a small number of outstanding issues that are not fully addressed or resolved. None of these issues serve to discredit the hypotheses, and a clear model for describing the formation and development of anti-EU opposition within a national system is laid out. In the second section, the implications of the thesis’ findings on the three areas mentioned above will be discussed. Despite the somewhat limited utility of the model
outside of the specific area of anti-EU opposition, the research does produce some useful insights into the development of the EU, both past and present, and the study of opposition. However, the thesis adds to the study of opposition to the EU in several ways, each of which address major shortcomings in current research.
VALIDATING THE HYPOTHESES

In the introduction, three main hypotheses were laid out. These were as follows:

1. **Political events at the European level drive the formation and development of groups opposed to the EU within a country, but these events have unique interactions with individual countries’ political and social structures, producing country-specific effects.**

2. **This pattern of group formation and development is profoundly affected by the country’s institutional structure.**

3. **Over time these groups will increase in volume and profile, as their scope for action and their depth of penetration into formal institutional spaces increase.**

In a field that is currently under-researched, showing that these hypotheses are correct would represent a clear advance. They deal with the fundamentals of opposition to the European Union, i.e. the source, pattern and path of organised opposition groups. Moreover, these three elements are all essential in any discussion of the influence of such opposition, at either the national or European levels, a discussion that follows later. However, all of this is dependent upon the validity of the hypotheses being proven.

Rather than simply repeat the summaries at the end of each chapter, it is more productive to look at all the supporting evidence together, followed by a discussion of any outstanding issues. This is not only clearer for the reader, but also allows for a consideration of the inter-linkages between the three hypotheses that are evident from a reading of the evidence.

**SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR THE HYPOTHESES**

The empirical evidence in support of the hypotheses is broad and generally unambiguous. This can be seen in each of the three elements of source, form and path, each of which is a manifestation of the hypotheses laid out respectively above.

In terms of **source**, Chapter Three provided a clear link between events at the European level and the formation of groups at the national level. This was particularly true in the matter of proximate events: in every single case, with one partial exception, it was possible to identify
a European-level event as a specific cause of either a group’s formation or its conversion to an anti-EU position. In the latter case, i.e. conversions, the European event was almost always a major, constitutional-type event, such as a treaty. By contrast, groups formed ex nihilo exhibit a more diverse set of proximate sources, although European constitutional events still play an important part in both countries. This is partly accounted for by the formation of sectoral opposition groups, which oppose specific elements of the EU’s policies, which are unlikely to arise from an event such a treaty. In any case, the special nature of ex nihilo groups is underlined by the fact that groups that convert to an anti-EU position are very unlikely to become primary-focus groups: it is only when individuals are mobilised directly by European events that such groups come into being.

As was suggested in Chapter Three, on group formation, the reasons for mobilisation by these events could be related to individuals’ political economy, or to the impact on their lives, or to the inadequacies of existing opposition groups. In the light of the evidence, it is possible to extend this further. Use can be made of sectoral opposition groups, since they present the most explicit features of linkage. When studying these groups, it is apparent that there is a focus around two specific clusters of sectors. Firstly, there are policies that have a clear economic impact on individuals, such as the Common Fisheries Policy. Secondly, there are policies that have symbolic importance, such as the use of metric measures in the UK. EMU falls somewhere in-between these two, given both its obvious economic impact and its psychological dimension. This division between economic and symbolic matches the variety of explanations put forward for public opinion: as Gabel has shown, utilitarian models offer a robust explanation of the latter. Over and above this, it should also be noted that all of those groups represent examples of the EU presenting a credible and consequential policy: there are no groups opposed to a Union foreign policy, and are unlikely to be until such a policy develops further.

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369 The partial exception is the Conservative Party, and results from the very long-standing unease within the party as to its policy position on European integration.

370 Such groups were only found in the UK, although there is no reason to suppose that this is a country-specific phenomenon. Also note while treaties do lay out guidelines on policy areas, there is usually a long time delay before specific legislation passes through the system, by which time it has evolved from its starting point: as such, this is more in line with the approach taken by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (W. Sandholtz & A. Stone Sweet (eds.), 1998, *European integration and supranational governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press), rather than Moravcsik’s (Moravcsik, 1999), namely that intra-treaty developments are at least as consequential as the particular provisions of a treaty.

371 In a large scale psychological survey of the Euro’s impact across the EU, it was suggested that societies defined by cultural achievement were more positive than those defined by economic success: Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialpsychologische Forschung e.V.,1997, *The Psychology of the European Monetary Union*, Cologne, University of Cologne, at http://www.wiso.uni-koeln.de/wisopsy/forschung/euro/english/english.htm.

One additional explanation that might play a role here is the effect of socio-historical factors. As was suggested in the Introduction, such factors can offer some useful insights when placed within a more structured approach, such as the institutionalist one taken here. In this particular context, the perceived infringement on national traditions might partly explain mobilisation. In France, the right of EU citizens to vote in local and European elections has been one focus of attention, to a degree because of the French conception of a unitary state with an associated united citizenry. Likewise in the UK, the challenge to parliamentary sovereignty carries particular resonance, as does the affective attachment to Sterling (a point that is echoed in the other member state with a strong link to its currency, Germany). Such elements can be taken as additional explanations of the link between events and mobilisation, since they fall outside of the institutionalist approach, although they do not run counter to it.

In addition to the clear link between proximate European events and group formation, there is also a more abstract link between the two, in the form of ideological factors. Where groups exhibit clear ideologies (on both the left and the right), they also have much clearer and cohesive critiques of European integration, which in turn provide a basis for mobilisation. On the right, concerns centre around the question of national sovereignty and identity, while the left is worried about the effect on the welfare state and the erosion of social values. However, despite the clear differences in critique, the actual objects of such groups’ opposition are often the same, i.e. large-scale projects such as EMU or the Maastricht treaty. As far as group formation is concerned, this has meant the larger the project is, the more likely it is that both left- and right-wing groups will be mobilised.

While it is apparent that European events are the driving force behind group formation, it is also clear that there are substantial differences between the UK and France, in terms of the timing of opposition formation. Despite both countries only seeing the development of mass movements in the couple of years leading up to 1999, the UK developed large numbers of groups relatively early, while France did not. These differences could simply be attributed to country-specific political and social features. At the outset of this thesis, a socio-historical approach was rejected, for a variety of reasons, and it is not the intention here to return to it, especially since it is possible to attribute much of the remaining difference to factors relating to institutional structures, as will be discussed below. An institutionalist approach produces a useable, comparable and falsifiable explanation for the majority of inter-country differences.
Conclusions

The model of institutional spaces, laid out in Chapter One, provides a means of measuring the pertinent dimensions of formal institutional spaces within a national system, both internally and externally. Internally, the two key factors are ease of access to an institution and its carrying capacity. In both France and the UK it was evident that those institutions with easy access (usually by means of a Proportional Representation (PR) system) and a large carrying capacity (usually through their multi-member form) were more likely to be the location of anti-EU groups and individuals. Externally, a smaller overall formal institutional space was seen to result in the development of more informal opposition, i.e. outside of these institutions. Additionally, the sub-hypothesis concerning specifically anti-EU opposition was also supported, with anti-EU groups demonstrating hardly any interest in sub-national institutions, and focusing instead on national and supra-national ones.

With regard to the formation of groups, it is possible to attribute differences in timing to differences in institutional structure. As noted in Chapter One, First Past the Post (FPP) systems require party cohesion in order to avoid coalition government, even though this requires individual members making some compromise on certain issues. However, when a governing party only has a small majority, those individuals gain disproportionate power vis-à-vis the party, which needs to preserve its parliamentary integrity. The need to avoid a split and to retain some sense of unity thus often leads to the creation of extra-parliamentary opposition groups at such times, usually in the form of non-party groups. PR systems (and PR-like systems, as in the French case) do not have the same pressures, given the greater number of parties and the consequent possibility of coalition governments. This provides an additional explanation of the concentration of group formation between 1992 and 1997 in the UK, over and above that of European events.

If a country’s institutional space is important in group formation processes, then it is essential to the understanding of the form of those groups. It is directly evident in several ways: a group’s specific form, its focus, its type of opposition and its strategies. More indirectly, there is also an impact on group ideology. In Chapter Three, when building the taxonomy of groups, it was evident that there were distinct categories of groups. Moreover, these categories resulted primarily from the groups’ positions within national institutional structures: that these categories were not arbitrary was evident in the coherent and consistent characteristics that were displayed by groups within them.

The institutional space within a national system provides the basic structure for anti-EU groups. The basic cleavage between formal and informal spaces that was outlined in Chapter One mirrors the divide between parties and non-party groups (intra-party groups
essentially falling in the formal category, by dint of their fundamental relationship with their parent parties). This split between parties and non-parties is not only the most visible means of differentiating between the various elements that make up the anti-EU movements in both countries, it is also the most fundamental. On the basis of group form, it is possible to make assertions on various other characteristics of a particular group.

This link is most obvious in the matter of group strategies: indeed, the complete match between form and strategy can be taken as an additional means of verifying the sources used to categorise form in the first place. Parties, and only parties, engage in the seeking of elected office, directing all their activities to that goal of gaining representation within formal institutions. Likewise, intra-party groups direct their efforts to gaining control of parties in a direct way that non-party groups do not aspire to: the latter aim to change party positions by influencing individuals, not gaining control of the party’s apparatus. In the cases of both parties and intra-party groups, the locus of action is clearly within the national formal institutional space. Non-party groups shun fighting elections, preferring instead to lobby elected officials, the media and the general public by a variety of means in order to promote their policy positions.

Likewise, there is a high level of consistency between group form and group focus. Parties in both countries almost all have a secondary focus on opposition to the EU: the exceptions have mainly been short-lived affairs. Non-party groups are much more likely to be primary-focus groups, for the simple reason that their choice of arena, outside formal institutions, permits the formation of a group that can have aims that are relatively limited. Parties, on the other hand, are usually required to develop broader programmes and consider other issues because they are seeking office and because European integration, as was seen in Chapter Two, does not rank particularly high as an issue in the public arena.

Group form can also be linked to the type of opposition that the group presents. Parties almost wholly express policy positions that place them on the side of intra-system opposition: i.e. they wish to work within the existing system to change it, rather than wanting to withdraw completely. By contrast, non-party groups are much more likely to express either withdrawist positions or more limited sectoral opposition. This difference is once again a reflection of the position of parties within formal institutions. Through their

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373 Of those parties with a primary focus on EU opposition (the Anti-Federalist League, L’Autre Europe, the later Demain la France, Mouvement pour la France, the Referendum Party and UKIP), only the MPF and UKIP have contested more than one election.
implicit acceptance of the existing political system (implicit through the fact of their efforts to participate in it), parties become bound up in it and so tend to seek reform rather than revolution, if only out of a concern for losing their position in that system. This is most patently demonstrated in the exceptional policy of the Anti-Federalist League not to accept any seats in the European Parliament should it have won any: the aim was not to enter the institution, but to bring it down through a crisis of legitimacy. Non-party groups do not seek formal representation, and so they are not constrained in the same way to preserve the system: hence the expression of withdrawist positions. At the same time, non-party groups are free to seek only limited sectoral reforms: parties are under pressure to produce more generalised policy positions in order to garner more votes, especially when European integration is not a particularly important issue to most of the electorate.

More indirectly, it is possible to attribute differences in group ideology to group form, at least in the sense of whether a group has a clear ideology or not. As has been noted above, parties are usually secondary-focus groups with respect to EU opposition and this, combined with the need to fight and win elections (which creates a pressure towards a broader programme of policy positions), creates a situation where a political ideology is more likely both to exist and to be required. Secondary-focus groups have, by definition, other interests that either generate ideological positions by themselves or require an ideology to bind them together. Likewise, a broad programme of policy positions requires an overarching philosophy. The net result is that parties tend to have ideologies, whereas non-party groups do not. The latter often have no ideology beyond the idea that something is wrong with the current state of the European Union.

Putting these elements back together, it is readily apparent that a group’s location within the national institutional space has a clear and direct impact upon its specific form and its strategy. In turn, this produces knock-on effects of varying strength on other, secondary characteristics of the group.

With regards to the path of opposition groups, two basic elements emerge from the research, one concerned with groups’ development to date, the other with future trends. The former element was primarily dealt with in Chapter Four, while the latter springs from the findings associated with the previous hypotheses.

374 The exceptions are the small far-right parties (the BNP, National Democrats and National Front) and the Anti-Federalist League/UKIP.
Conclusions

Over the study period there was a clear growth of anti-EU movements in both countries from an almost non-existent baseline, in terms of members, electoral success and media coverage. Before 1992, there were at most 10,000 people in the UK who belonged to anti-EU groups, and none in France. By 1999, there were between a quarter and a third of a million such people, split roughly 2:1 between the UK and France. Even with the subsequent splitting of the Rassemblement Pour la France (RPF) in 2001, the number of people mobilised into joining anti-EU groups still represents a substantial advance.

In the same way, anti-EU parties in both countries had been able to corner sizeable amounts of votes in European elections, to the extent of gaining access to the European Parliament: the size of the step-change between 1989 and 1994 in France is particularly notable. French parties were also able to gain more limited access to the Assemblée Nationale and, in the case of the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), even able to form part of a governing coalition between 1997 and 2002. If explicitly primary-focus parties have been less successful in the UK, then that should be placed in context by the increasingly sceptical line taken by the Conservative Party after their 1997 electoral defeat: none of the French anti-EU parties had a policy position comparable to the Conservatives’ outright opposition to membership of Stage 3 of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) during the 1997-2002 parliament.

Even if media coverage has exhibited less in the way of entry by anti-EU groups into the national polity, then this must be balanced by the still substantial progress that these groups have made in gaining a media profile. In both countries, groups have not only gained a media profile for themselves, but have also contributed to the growth of anti-EU discourse more generally: in the case of the UK, where anti-EU discourse has had a much longer development, there is a parallel increase in popular interest in the EU as an important issue. Each year has seen the further development of a solid base of media coverage that lies under the peaks and troughs of the majority of the event-driven coverage that occurs. Even the concentration on one or two groups at a time has proved to be a fillip, at least for those groups, who enjoy a brief period, or periods, of substantial media interest.

Obviously, the existence of past trends cannot be unquestioningly extended into the future and it is reasonable to suppose that the study period forms a first part in a much longer life cycle of opposition to the EU. However, the findings from the other parts of the research do point towards further growth in the anti-EU movement. As has been shown above, it is the on-going development of the European Union that is key to group mobilisation and

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375 See Figure 12 in Chapter Two and Figure 32 in Chapter Four.
formation and it is clearly evident that this development still has a substantial distance left to run. In particular, the impending enlargement to 12 new member states in central and eastern Europe has already necessitated reforms to the EU’s structure and policies, a process that the current Convention on the Future of the EU will bring to a head when it presents its recommendations to an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2004.\footnote{See the Commission’s Futurum website for full details of the Convention, as well as numerous submissions: \url{http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm}.}

In the event that the Convention and IGC result in more than a simple scaling-up of current institutions and structures and produce a qualitatively different EU system, then it is very likely that the resultant upsetting of the status quo will generate further mobilisation of individuals against that system.\footnote{The draft text produced by the Presidium of the Convention in November 2002 offers several important evolutions, including a unified structure under a constitutional text and a delimitation of competences. Text available at: \url{http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm}.} The reasoning behind this is grounded in the experience of previous constitutional European events, which have generated opposition mobilisation. In the specific cases of the UK and France, this might revolve around a fall in representation in Union institutions, the complete breaking of parity with Germany in those same institutions (a particular concern of France, as was seen at Nice), or reform of policy areas such as the Common Agricultural Policy (of which France is a major beneficiary) and regional spending (from which the UK does relatively well).\footnote{Recent developments notwithstanding: Guardian 14/10/2002, ‘UK retreats on farm pledge’.}

Even if these changes in themselves do not bring more opposition into being, then the simple fact of enlargement may well. In the latest Eurobarometer, conducted in the spring of 2002, France is the only member state to have a relative majority of its population opposed to enlargement, while the UK has the fourth-largest percentage opposed, just behind Germany and Austria.\footnote{France: 40% in favour, 47% against. UK: 38% for, 35% against. In comparison, figures for the EU15 were 50% for, 30% against: \url{http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57_en.htm}.} In simple terms, neither country has embraced enlargement, even though there has long been a British view that an enlarged Union is a less federal one. Whatever the changes to the Union, individual member states necessarily become less powerful, simply because there are more of them. This has an institutional consequence of relatively less representation. More importantly, it also has more diffuse effects of making it harder to export policy preferences to the European level and, conversely, of making it more likely that policy preferences from outside will be imported into any given country. This has been true of all previous enlargements, but the sheer volume and heterogeneity of the current process are certain to heighten these problems.

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Member State} & \textbf{Per cent in Favour} & \textbf{Per cent against} \\
\hline
France & 40 & 47 \\
UK & 38 & 35 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
The result of this double challenge to the existing Union is thus likely to be further stimulation of anti-EU elements within France and the UK. Given the current level of these elements’ success in European Parliament elections in both countries, the next set in 2004 will provide a useful indicator of how far that stimulation has gone towards more active mobilisation.

OUTSTANDING ISSUES
So far, a very uncritical picture of the findings would appear to have been presented. This is due to the very strong evidence that has been found to support the hypotheses. However, it should not be taken to mean that there are no outstanding issues, as shall be seen presently. However, none of these issues pose any substantial challenge to the hypotheses.

The most glaring issue relates to the question of the volume of opposition in a country, relative to other countries. While it has been shown that volume has increased, and is likely to increase further still, no attempt has been made to explain why the UK has much more opposition than France: certainly, this was not a prime concern of the key hypotheses. We have already noted in these conclusions that membership of anti-EU groups in the UK is double that in France in absolute terms and of the groups studied, the ratio was 2:1 British to French. Media profiles of both groups and anti-EU discourse were similarly higher in the UK throughout the study period. Indeed, it is only in European elections that French anti-EU parties gained higher results than their British equivalents. How can this be best understood?

One point with which to begin would be public opinion, since the public are the ultimate source of all political activity in a democracy. As was noted in Chapter Two, British levels of support have been consistently lower – and levels of opposition consistently higher – than in France. Consequently, it can be supposed that there is a greater reservoir of opposition available in the UK, both to provide individuals to form groups and to support those groups by various means. This might include voting for anti-EU parties in elections, participating in groups’ activities or generating anti-EU discourse. Taking levels of public support would have the methodological advantage of easy comparability and verifiability, as well as a strong potential predictive capacity. However, providing sufficient data to validate this approach would require a systematic analysis of many more than the two countries considered in this study, both inside and outside the European Union: an analysis that is

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380 From the early 1990s onwards this difference are relatively consistent on both measures of support and opposition at about 10%. Prior to that, the UK was much more opposed.
Conclusions

Clearly not possible within this thesis, and which so must be marked out as a point for further research.

Another alternative would be to use socio-historical explanations. For example, while both countries have been characterised as having ‘awkward’ relationships with the European Union, it is also apparent that French politicians have adopted a much more positive approach to the integration process than their British counterparts: if integration has been a policy of last resort for the latter, then for the former it has been a means to the end of securing France’s role in the international system. The resultant hegemony of pro-European rhetoric, made easier by the relative goodness-of-fit with other member states’ preferences, could be argued to have engendered a more positive outlook on the EU in France than in the UK. By contrast, the endless debate in British political (and other) circles about the country’s role in, and relationship to, ‘Europe’ has created a more critical attitude on the public’s part. Clearly, such an explanation lacks the quality of being quantifiable, but it does still suggest that there is something within it that could address the issue of differing national volumes of opposition.

The anomaly of higher percentages for anti-EU parties in French elections – when France comes behind the UK on every other measure of opposition – can be easily fitted into the institutionalist approach. Institutions are hypothesised to have a strong impact on group formation and development, so it is a very small step to extend that impact to people in general, in this case voters. If voters perceive that formal institutions are relatively hard to access (as in the case of FPP to the House of Commons and the pre-1999 European Parliament), then there is an incentive to vote conservatively, i.e. for a party that has a credible chance of winning a seat. The persistence of higher French votes in the 1999 European elections, when both countries operated PR systems, can be ascribed to the very critical line taken by the Conservative Party, which took votes away from the UK Independence Party (UKIP).

The second issue that stands out is the question of whether explicit consideration of institutional space factors is present in anti-EU groups or not. In other words, is there any evidence that institutional space is openly and consciously discussed and debated by individuals when either forming anti-EU groups or developing their strategies? Essentially, there is no such direct evidence, not least for the reason that this theoretical approach

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381 Even if there has been a mixed response in French to the pressures of europeanisation: H. Drake & S. Milner, 1999, ‘Change and resistance to change: The political management of europeanisation in France’, in *Modern & Contemporary France*, Vol.7-2, pp.165-178
Conclusions

currently only exists within this thesis. However, it is apparent that there is an implicit awareness of the limitations and facilitations of the national institutional space in individuals’ and groups’ decision-making processes. Working in a national institutional space shapes the mindsets of actors, both subconsciously and consciously. At the subconscious level, exposure to a national system provides a reference point, inasmuch as actors see what other actors are doing and have done within that environment: this in turn suggests what options are available. More consciously, actors make assessments about where opportunities for action exist and what are the best ways to achieve their objectives: assessments that lead either to them joining an existing group or to them forming a new one. In the cases of the Mouvement Pour la France (MPF) and RPF in France, the judgement was that viable parties could be built around the political personalities of de Villiers and Pasqua respectively: in the UK, Alan Sked saw an opening for an anti-EU party in the early 1990s, even if he also recognised that electoral success might be hard to achieve.  

This thesis has not tried to investigate these personal decision-making processes further, and has instead focused on the aggregate level of group formation and development. As a result, while it has shown how institutional space has moulded the overall division between party and non-party, formal and informal opposition, it has not developed the tools to enable an observer to explain individual cases. At best, it is possible to say that as new actors become mobilised, so they make an assessment of the situation as it stands – in terms of their goals and resources and of existing groups and their successes or failures – and work from there. Hence de Villiers’ success in creating an anti-EU party was part of the incentive to Pasqua to create one of his own, while the grassroots Democracy Movement was a very pointed shift away from party politics after the Referendum Party’s collapse. In the final analysis, this differentiation between the aggregate level and the individual level does not invalidate the findings in any way, but rather suggests that there is clear scope for more research in order to build a model of individual decision-making. At the same time, on the basis of this research it would appear to be very difficult to extract specific and conscious elements in any such decision-making that were not highly coloured by subsequent experience, both positive and negative.

A third point to be considered here deals with the future development of anti-EU opposition. This has been addressed to a certain extent above when discussing future

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382 Interviews De la Perriere, Cesari, Sked.
383 Interview Cesari; The Democracy Movement website lists among the group’s aims, “To work with those who share our beliefs, of all parties and of none, whilst not endorsing political parties or individuals at elections”
changes in volume and profile, but the matter requires some broader comments to be made. Even if European events can be foreseen to generate further opposition in the next few years, it is impossible to make any predictions beyond that timeframe. In part, that is due to the unclear future development of the European Union itself (a point that will be returned to later), but it is also likely that additional factors will start to play a role as opposition grows.

Most importantly, it is very conceivable that at some future time a saturation point will be reached within a country. This implies a level of opposition where it becomes either impossible or very difficult to get any more people to form or join anti-EU groups, vote for anti-EU parties or have any more media profile. It is impossible to say when this point might be or estimate how it might change over time: consider the erratic movement of European integration as an issue shown in Chapter Two. However, it is clear that when that point is reached, it will change the rules of the game for those involved. As they enter a more mature phase of opposition, they will have to develop new strategies that are as much directed towards maintaining their support base (which will thereafter tend most readily downwards) as they are towards changing public policy. This has potential implications on policy positions as well as (particularly) on group fragmentation: the factiousness of the anti-EU movement on both sides of the Channel has never been a selling point and the need for a unified front will become more pressing.\footnote{It is worth noting here that the only anti-EU movement not to have suffered any major split, that of Norway, is also the only one that has successfully managed to keep its country out the EU.}

This is linked to the question of how volume relates to influence, a question that will be looked at in the following section. However, it will suffice to say that, to date, that relationship appears to be rather tenuous, but that does not preclude matters changing. Indeed, in a situation where volume and profile are constantly increasing, then influence would be expected to follow at some point.

However, all of this merely serves to show the model’s lack of ability in predicting the long-term development of opposition. It does not undermine its power to describe and explain the past and present states of opposition. That it has any predictive power at all is a positive feature, given the innate complexity of the European Union and the lack of any clear endpoint at this stage in its development. What the model does offer in the long run is a set of testable hypotheses about how and where opposition will form. This gives it long-term value as a heuristic for understanding the pattern of opposition to the EU.

\footnote{It is worth noting here that the only anti-EU movement not to have suffered any major split, that of Norway, is also the only one that has successfully managed to keep its country out the EU.}
These three issues of relative levels of opposition, explicit awareness of institutional space and long-term development are all elements to be taken into consideration when looking at opposition to the EU. At the same time, this thesis chose not to focus on them directly, instead trying to understand the more fundamental questions of what this opposition looks like, where it comes from and how it has developed. It is only after addressing these questions that it is possible to see the outlines of further work that goes towards dealing with the outstanding issues mentioned here.

None of the issues goes against the research that has been undertaken, but rather shows where its limits lie. For all of these limitations, it must not be forgotten that the institutional space model offers a much more rigorous approach to the question of opposition to the EU than previously existing models, something that will be discussed in the next section. Even if it does not explain every facet, then it still explains the core issues and offers frameworks for further research into those remaining issues. That has been underlined by the strength of evidence given to support the hypotheses: there are few exceptions and those that exist are more the result of the difficulty of isolating individual elements than they are of any fundamental inexplicability.
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WIDER IMPLICATIONS

The overall conclusion, with respect to the hypotheses, is that the evidence from the two case studies of France and the UK supports them. But how does this relate to other work in the field, both specifically and more generally? In this second section, the findings are put back into context, looking firstly at the study of opposition to the EU, then the EU more generally and finally the study of opposition in general. As has been noted, these three fields formed the rationale for the research in the first place and it is to them that the resultant findings are most pertinent.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF OPPOSITION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

As has been made clear from the outset, the study of opposition to the EU is still very much in its early phases, much like its subject. No one model dominates the field and empirical work remains very much a priority. Consequently, there is much potential for making a real contribution to this field. This is of particular importance in addressing a key complaint of Forster that current research has failed to focus sufficiently upon opposition itself, rather than simply as a part of a larger topic.  

The first contribution clearly stems from the mere fact of a comprehensive overview of anti-EU bodies in both countries. Certainly, as far as the author is aware, this is the first such cataloguing piece in the academic literature. This has made subsequent work all the more easy: the approach that currently predominates, focusing solely on political parties, both does an injustice to those non-party groups and makes a complete assessment of opposition within a national system all the more difficult. Indeed, it has only been through this comprehensive approach that it has been possible to construct and verify the institutional space model used in this thesis.

The value of simple cataloguing has been further enhanced by the production of the basic taxonomy and model used in Chapters Three and Four. These provide not only a clear means of differentiating groups on a variety of dimensions, but also lend themselves to application in other case studies. The criteria for classification are laid out and the categories are non-country specific, making them applicable to a large number of potential case studies. This transferability is matched by the transferability of the hypotheses: the

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386 In the UK, the efforts by the European Movement (European Movement, 2000) and the Bruges Group (Tame, 1997) do not extend much beyond a simple listing of groups and members and no effort is given to any kind of analysis. Both also suffer from partisan perspectives.
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exclusion of socio-historical modes of explanation means that the framework used in this thesis can be applied to any member state of the Union, as well as to applicant states and non-members.

This is possible for two main reasons. Firstly, the model is based on features that are found in all democratic societies, namely formal political institutions and civil society. Even in the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe they are to be found, even if they are not fully mature. Secondly, the model is focused at an aggregate level of analysis: it explains the patterns of opposition formation and development very well, rather than the individual cases of each group. As was seen when looking at the outstanding issues surrounding the model, even if there is not a conscious and explicit consideration of a country’s institutional space, then groups still display aggregate patterns that closely mirror the opportunities and constraints of that space.

Moreover, the model and hypotheses are quantifiable and falsifiable. Collection and measurement of the data necessary to prove the hypotheses can be applied in comparable ways in different national systems. Once collected and analysed, that data can also produce results that go against the hypotheses: groups can be driven by national events, rather than European ones, and the distribution of groups can go against the hypothesised opportunities available in the institutional space. The value of these characteristics lies not only in the further strengthening of the transferability of the model, but also in the enhancement of the model’s value. The escape from the methodological limits of the socio-historical approaches makes this institutionalist model all the more valuable.

As an institutionalist model, this research also goes beyond other attempts to apply institutionalist theory to the study of opposition to the EU. Most clearly, it builds upon the basis of Aspinwall’s ideas on the impact of the FPP system on opportunities for opposition in the House of Commons, by extending those ideas to other institutions and by introducing the concept of institutional space. The research also builds in elements of party political behaviour and the role of individuals in the development of opposition, all within the institutionalist framework. As a result, it offers a much more comprehensive appraisal of the impact of institutions on both the formation and development of opposition to the EU.

387 Taggart and Szczerbiak’s, 2001, key piece on opposition is a good example of this problem.
The model also raises issues with other work on opposition to the EU. In the best-known piece on the subject, Taggart describes it as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ on the part of peripheral parties, who use it as a means of developing a distinctive profile in order to gain access to government.389 In this, there is the implicit understanding that oppositional positions are adopted on the basis of developments on the national level (i.e. the state of the party system), rather than through any particular development at the European level. This is obviously at odds with the findings of this thesis, which understands group formation primarily as a function of the evolution of the European Union. At the same time, the existence of opportunistic individuals in both countries has been noted, individuals who oppose the EU for reasons of personal political gain rather than of any heartfelt opinion. How can all of these elements be squared? At the heart of the problem lies Taggart’s focus on political parties: there is no consideration of the substantial amount of activity found in informal spaces, not just in France and the UK, but in all countries.390 The research here has seen that parties, as groups generally pre-dating the integration process, are more likely to shift to positions of opposition. Viewed in that narrow context, it would make sense to see such shifts as a means to improve the party’s standing in a national party system. However, placed together with non-party and intra-party groups, it becomes apparent that it has been European events that have been proximate drivers of opposition mobilisation, formation and (in the case of parties) shifts. This does not preclude opportunists from exploiting the situation, but the persistence and increasing volume of EU opposition suggests that they form only part of the picture.

The persistence of opposition leads into a comment on the one of the key findings of another well-known observer, Benoit.391 In his 1997 book, Benoit portrayed French opposition to the EU as a complete life cycle of growth-maturity-death during the period 1992-5. The failure of anti-EU candidates in the presidential election of 1995 was seen to draw a curtain on a brief period of widespread activity, united by a common ideology of ‘socio-nationalism’. While the relative proximity of left- and right-wing critiques of integration has already been discussed in Chapter Three, the idea of a life cycle has been thoroughly undermined by the continued strength and growth of the anti-EU movement in France. This is understandable inasmuch as the key events that revitalised French opposition – the Amsterdam treaty and the 1999 European elections –post-dated the publication of the book. However, it also betrays a lack of consideration of the trend towards a popularisation of

389 Taggart, 1998.
390 See http://www.susherwood.fsnet.co.uk/weblinks.htm for a comprehensive set of links to groups across Europe.
opposition that was seen in both countries during the 1990s. This popularisation makes it all the more necessary to look beyond the classic preoccupation with party politics and build in an awareness of developments in informal spaces.

A final point to be dealt with here concerns the complaint that institutionalist approaches do not have sufficient explanatory power to deal with the question of the influence of anti-EU groups, or more precisely their lack of influence.\(^{392}\) Certainly, this question has not been at the forefront of this piece of research, and indeed was specifically left until the conclusions for a discussion. The reason for this is clear: without a basic description, analysis and understanding of opposition, it is pointless to ask the question of what influence it has. Consequently, this piece of work forms a necessary basis upon which the matter of influence can be built.

At one level, the rising profile of opposition has not been matched by a concurrent rise in influence. In the two countries, attempts to block the ratification of treaties – especially Maastricht – were nearly successful, but ultimately failed to prevent their full implementation. Nor have anti-EU forces been able to gain decisive control of any national institution and force major changes in European policy. Seen in this light, there has been no direct or substantive influence on the part of opposition movements. However, at the same time, this has not meant that these groups have had no influence or impact at all.

As has been argued, the FPP system in the UK makes governments particularly susceptible to influence when they have small parliamentary majorities. This was certainly borne out by the experience of the Conservative party between 1992 and 1997. As Wallace has documented, there were several occasions where anti-EU elements forced direct concessions on the part of the Major government vis-à-vis European policy, such as the vetoing of Jean-Luc Dehaene for Commission President.\(^{393}\) Designed primarily as a means of placating anti-EU elements within the party, these measures still offer the first example of influence over public policy in both countries. To them can also be added the (unintentional) success of the Referendum Party in getting both the Conservative and Labour parties to agree to a referendum on membership of Stage 3 of EMU.\(^{394}\) The current popular majority against membership and the relative success of opposition groups in preparing for the referendum

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\(^{392}\) Forster, 2002, p.5.

\(^{393}\) Wallace, 1997.

\(^{394}\) Unintentional in the sense that the Referendum Party had aimed to gain a majority in the House of Commons in 1997, hold its referendum on membership of the EU and then disband itself. Major offered the referendum on the Euro in an attempt to minimise the threat to Tory marginal seats in the general election.
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make it much more of a hurdle than securing parliamentary approval, given the size of the current Labour majority.

In both countries, anti-EU parties have gained access to the European Parliament and ensured both an institutionalised voice for their concerns and an important source of information on current and future developments. In this, French parties have been more successful than the British, both by virtue of their numbers and the cumulative experience of their presence: prior to 1999 there were very few actively anti-EU MEPs from the UK. While still not numerous enough to hold significant positions in European Parliament’s structures, the evolution of the UEN and EDN/EDD groups has marked the stabilisation of an anti-EU presence in the Parliament. 395

Moreover, in both countries it is clear that opposition groups have been successful in popularising the previously elite-centred debate over European policy. This has manifested itself in various ways. Firstly, there has been a shift from small, elite-based opposition groups to larger and more popular ones. This is a shift that is both a cause and an effect of the popularisation process: it is hard to believe that there would have been sufficient interest in mass bodies such as the Democracy Movement or the RPF in the early 1990s. Secondly, there has been the growth in anti-EU discourse in the media, which plays an important role in the linking of elite and public domains. Linked to this has been the large investment in modern technologies (especially the Internet) to contact individuals directly, without the interface of the media, an investment that is all the more powerful given the very weak presence of pro-EU groups. Thirdly, British and French groups have been active in the support of similar groups in other countries, the former primarily through non-party umbrella groups such as TEAM and the latter primarily through their presence in the European Parliament. Fourthly, in the UK the semi-permanent discussion about Euro membership since 1997 has further raised the issue’s profile and importance amongst the general public.

The consequence of this popularisation has been an increasing level of interest on the part of citizens and an increasing desire to actively placate those citizens on the part of the elites. Certainly, the difficulties of the Maastricht ratification opened the eyes of many to the disjuncture between the two levels: not for nothing was one article on this subject entitled

‘Uncorking the Bottle’.  

In the post-Maastricht European Union, the growth of public interest, driven in no small part by anti-EU groups with their diverse strategies, has arguably resulted in the current elevation of popular concerns in the form of the Convention on the Future of the EU. This precursor to the IGC in 2004 was explicitly designed to bridge the gap that is perceived to have developed: the first challenge laid out in the Laeken Declaration is “…how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions.” Even with the vast array of policy objectives that opposition groups hold, the full and meaningful involvement of the EU’s citizens in its future development is a positive step, both in ensuring that the full variety of public opinions is heard and in opening up another, more direct route by which anti-EU elements can influence the EU. Neunreither characterised the EU as ‘governance without opposition’, but the Convention model offers a clear means for EU opposition to be re-introduced into the Union’s governance system. Already, those anti-EU members of the Convention have organised themselves into a coherent group, the Democracy Forum, and are making every effort to make their voice heard.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In terms of the study of the European Union more generally, the thesis adds to the knowledge and understanding of an increasingly important issue, albeit one of still uncertain influence. As has just been discussed, the Convention on the Future of the EU represents at least an indirect recognition of the need to reincorporate popular concerns and unrest back into the system. However, the research also had broader implications, all revolving around the central idea of europeanisation.

Europeanisation is concerned with the impact of European developments and events on national structures, and vice versa. In this, the thesis adds to the understanding of how the EU affects individuals and national party systems, as well as the interaction of the European and national levels.

399 Jens-Peter Bonde’s website has full documentation on this (http://www.bonde.com/index.php?selected_topic=35), as does William Abitbol’s site (http://www.convention-france.com/0a_convention.htm).
As has been discussed in the first half of the conclusions, it has clearly been shown that European events are always proximate to individuals’ mobilisation and formation into groups. Thus a direct link is posited between the level of the EU and the level of the citizen. Even if it is apparent that some individuals have ‘used’ the European issue opportunistically, it is still evident that this EU-citizen link does explain a large amount of anti-EU opposition development. As a result, it would appear to run counter to the ideas laid out by several authors on the ‘second-order’ nature of the EU. If the EU has been demonstrated to be secondary to national political issues in events such as European elections, referenda and even – in Taggart’s view – opposition itself, how can that be squared with the first-order nature of opposition proposed in this thesis?

A critique of Taggart has already been made in the previous section and does not require repetition here. Nor it is suggested that other authors have made a mistake. Instead, the proposition here is that opposition to the EU falls into a different category from other second-order events. European elections and referenda are linked by the involvement of an entire national polity, whereas EU opposition, by definition, is limited to those individuals and groups that are specifically interested (for negative reasons) in the EU. This means that it is not only to be expected that opposition to the EU is first-order, but that it is indeed a fundamental characteristic. The lack of opposition sites within the EU itself, as Neunreither suggests, results in a reflux back into national systems. This reflux is strengthened by the focus of most anti-EU groups on the relationship between their country and the EU, rather than any wholesale reform of the Union. The upshot of this is that a situation exists where a first-order European phenomenon is located within national systems. The irony of anti-EU elements marking the first demonstrable expression of a first-order event amongst the EU’s citizens is apparently lost on them, even with the growth of explicitly trans-national anti-EU movements.

This does not necessarily mean that the anti-EU movement is a forerunner of other events becoming first-order. Clearly, it presents very particular characteristics, namely its explicit focus on the EU’s development and its limited membership. In the period since the Maastricht treaty, there has been no evidence to suggest that European elections or referenda have become any less national. However, if the anti-EU movement continues to help politicise the integration project at the popular level, then it is conceivable that in time the EU could become a first-order issue. Of course, this is a long-term development, but one that could be of considerable consequence to the Union’s future development.

401 See footnote 18 for titles.
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With regard to parties, it has been shown how different parties and party systems have responded to the European issue. In both France and the UK, the European issue has produced significant effects. In the former, it has resulted in three splinter parties (the MPF, RPF and MDC), as well as the turning of parties such as the Front National to an anti-EU position and the creation of one new party, Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions. In the UK, it has produced major shifts in the positions of the Conservatives and the Labour party, also manifesting itself in the creation of numerous intra-party groups. While there has not been a major realignment in either country around the European issue, it has certainly coloured party political debate in both cases. The diversification of party positions in the wake of Maastricht was partly tactical, but was also a reflection of the need to develop policies that went beyond a simple permissiveness. Maastricht was not only an eye-opener for publics, but also for political parties. What had previously been a policy position held primarily on the extremes of party spectra was suddenly viable as a centrist position, typified by the Conservatives, but even more by the French splinter parties. It is not coincidentally that the MPF, RPF and MDC only differ from their parent parties on the matter of the EU: anti-EU policy positions were seen as being compatible with moderate left- and right-wing politics.

Finally, some light has been shed upon the interaction between the national and European levels. As has been demonstrated, opposition to the EU is driven by European events, but manifests itself at the national level. The primary object of every anti-EU group that has been covered in this thesis has been to change national policy on the EU, rather than to change the policies of the EU itself. At one level, it can be argued that the focus on the national level could also be seen as a vindication of liberal-intergovernmentalist views of the Union. Anti-EU groups have identified national governments as the key players in the Union’s decision-making process and so have targeted them in the same way as another sectoral interest within a national polity.

However, the counter-argument is that this is simply a rational approach for individuals and groups that question the decisions, if not indeed the legitimacy, of the Union. In its most extreme form, if a group aims to secure withdrawal from the Union then clearly it will be concerned with the national polity, since that is the one that is intended to last. Only when groups seek sectoral objectives is there a reason to act at the European level. This does not

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403 Moravcsik, 1999, is the basic text for this.
in itself provide proof positive that a Moravcsik type model is correct: just as European lobbyists tend to cluster in Brussels, so anti-EU groups cluster at the national level, because in both cases that is the optimal point for securing integration of their interests.\(^{404}\) Once again, there is a certain irony in all of this, given that anti-EU groups are amongst those most strongly convinced of the reality of the centralisation of power at the European level.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF OPPOSITION**

This research has highlighted the need to study opposition, not just within the European Union, but also more generally. As was discussed in the introduction, opposition is an integral part of modern democratic life, in all its forms, both reflecting the structure and process of polities and possessing important characteristics of its own. The work presented here not only confirms the importance of studying opposition, but also adds to our understanding of it.

In some ways, looking at the particular case of the EU presents an easy object of study. The lack of structures at the European level to incorporate and diffuse opposition has resulted in somewhat disproportionate effects. This manifests itself both in a concentration at the national level and in a concentration of generalised opposition, i.e. opposition that questions the system as a whole. This double concentration is clearly in line with Neunreither’s model, which has been discussed previously. More pertinently, it exposes the way in which opposition was developed in a changing European system. Traditionally, the study of opposition has been confined to national systems, since that has been the clear locus of political activity. The combination of a consensus-based system that was created at the European level and the lack of a European public sphere might have led one to believe that the development of ‘European opposition’ was a moot point. Certainly, for the first phase of the integration process that was true. But the burgeoning European system was always going to impact on European publics at some point, a point apparently reached at Maastricht. Since then, there has been a blossoming of substantial opposition, often in novel forms. All of this serves to underline the way in which opposition develops, even in the most unfavourable of conditions.

Opposition is essential to democracy, since it is the necessary counterweight to democratic decision-making: it is the alternative position that offers citizens the possibility of a different

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path. While this thesis has focused on those groups that actively oppose the EU, it must also be recognised that there is a broad spectrum of opinion on what path the Union should take within the mass of those who support it. These elements do not necessarily think the EU is perfect, but they do all recognise the basic legitimacy of its existence, something that is certainly not true of most anti-EU groups (sectoral groups being the obvious exception). The reason these groups have rejected the Union in its current form can be linked to the fundamentally _ad hoc_ nature of the system. Despite all the talk of a federal super-state or an intergovernmental arena, or possibly because of it, there is no clear overarching principle of organisation. One argument that links anti-EU groups with those who would reform the Union is a concern at the lack of clear democratic and accountable structures.

Unfortunately, the current round of proposals being floated in the Convention on the Future of the EU for a constitutional-type document that clarifies competences and decision-making is unlikely to placate the main part of the anti-EU movement, even if it does finally create sites for opposition within the Union.

Opposition is a marker of the health of a political system. In a system that succeeds in taking account of the full breadth of positions within its associated polity, there is relatively little need for opposition, excepting some option for intra-systemic alternation of power. However, when a system fails to provide, it opens itself up, firstly to intra-systemic opposition and then to systemic opposition, which sees the system itself as the root of the problem. Already the lack of opportunities for intra-system opposition to develop in the EU has been discussed, leading to a small, but significant, section of European society that rejects the Union as a legitimate political structure.

However, opposition is also a driver of democracy. The growth of opposition to the EU has certainly contributed to an increased awareness on the part of Europe’s elites for the need to democratis the system, through increased transparency, inclusion and the building of legitimacy. This has been a concern since Maastricht and one that has grown in importance with each new treaty reform until the present day, where a new form of that treaty reform is under way. As has been mentioned already, the results of the 2004 IGC may well not soothe many opponents of the EU, but they will improve the democratic credentials and potential of the Union.

This thesis strengthens the study of opposition in two ways. Firstly, it highlights the need to have a broad conception of what ‘opposition’ covers. Secondly, it offers a model that is applicable to a wide variety of oppositions.
A starting point for the research was a clear gap in the literature on opposition in the EU. The traditional foci on party politics and public opinion meant that an important part of the anti-EU movement was being overlooked. Non-party groups form an essential part of those movements in both France and the UK, and are vital in having a clear understanding of how the EU impacts on national systems. As has been argued, this oversight has contributed to several models of opposition that do not fit the empirical evidence. In a more general context, organised non-party political opposition is an important part of any democratic political system. What has been argued here is that party politics and public opinion are not dichotomous, but rather two ends of a spectrum. In between there lie non-party and intra-party groups, both of which draw together elements of the two end points. More importantly, these groups interact with themselves and with parties and publics, creating the opportunity for influence. An unwillingness to incorporate them into many analyses raises the possibility of the problem just mentioned, of models that do not match the evidence.

The structure used here offers an easily reproducible means of measuring and evaluating opposition in a variety of forms. The model of institutional spaces that was developed in order to address the main hypotheses is itself based on a set of sub-hypotheses, with one exception, that hold true for any type of opposition. The ideas of access and carrying capacity work in any institutional system and are in no way issue specific. The exception lies in the sub-hypothesis concerning the relative interest of anti-EU elements in national and supranational institutions, over sub-national ones. For other types of opposition and interest representation it is easy to use the institutional framework as a base for constructing taxonomies similar to those presenting in the body of the thesis. Indeed, such work would serve to strengthen the theoretical base of the model further, since similar patterns of development within a national system would be expected. Of course, different issues have different impulses and this would mean no a priori synchronicity could be expected between issues. However, the pattern of distribution would logically be the same across issues, given the same set of opportunities for access and presence within formal institutions.
SUMMARY

This thesis aimed to understand the pattern of formation and development of opposition to the European Union. It took the two case studies of France and the UK and used an institutionalist framework to map and describe groups involved in such opposition. This included political parties and non-party organised opposition, the last having been previously overlooked. In so doing, it fully supported the key hypotheses of the research project. As a result, it is possible to say that European, rather than national, events have driven opposition to the EU, that national institutional structures have been vital in the pattern of group formation and development, and that over time the volume and profile of opposition has increased. These findings make an important contribution to the understanding and explanation of opposition to the EU, providing a clear advance on both socio-historical explanations and models that have concentrated on a single level of opposition. They have also contributed to the understanding of the interaction of European and national levels within the Union and offered a model of interest representation that is applicable over a wide variety of issues.
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http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=92 - Britain in Europe, information on Monday Club

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http://www.nejtilleu.se/ungamoteu/index.htm - Swedish Nej Till EU, youth section, homepage

http://www.new-europe.co.uk - New Europe, homepage

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http://www.no-euro.com/whoweare/bfs.asp - Business for Sterling, group organisation

http://www.parliament.uk - British Houses of Parliament, homepage

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldhome.htm - British House of Lords, homepage

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http://www.savebritfish.org.uk/hisfish.htm - Save Britain’s Fish, group history
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http://www.teameurope.info/index.html - The European Alliance of EU-critical Movements, homepage
http://www.tuasc.org.uk/ - Trade Unions Against the Single Currency, homepage
http://www.users.dircon.co.uk/~iits/newalliance/admin.htm - New Alliance, homepage
http://www.w-mids.freeserve.co.uk/caef.htm - Cultural Review, undated article on Campaign Against Euro-Federalism
Annex 1: Groups not covered

NO ACTIVE ANTI-EU POLICY
These groups have multiple members and anti-EU policies, but only as an incidental to their other activities. Unlike secondary-focus groups, which fall within the scope of the thesis and which make some active use of their anti-EU position, these groups go no further than a simple expression of their opposition to the EU. There is no elaboration and the position is nothing more an extrapolation of their core policy positions. As such, they fall outside the definition provided in the introduction (p.20) of opposition groups.

- **Académie du Gaullisme** – As is clear from its name, the Académie promotes Gaullist thinking on the Fifth Republic. It wants a confederal Europe of sovereign nations, but has not pursued any active strategy to this end. See [http://acadgaul.free.fr/Presentation_dossier/Presentation/index.html](http://acadgaul.free.fr/Presentation_dossier/Presentation/index.html).

- **British Housewives’ League** – Set up in 1945, the League aims to give a voice to housewives. Part of this includes informing them of the consequences of EU membership, to which the League is clearly opposed. However, since its participation in the 1975 referendum campaign, the group has not engaged in any active strategy vis-à-vis the EU outside of its membership, which currently stands at roughly 1,000. The League is affiliated to CIB. See [http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=65](http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=65).

- **Christian Heritage Party** – The ‘political wing’ of the Institute of Christian Political Thought, the British section of which was set up in 1995, the CHP makes only peripheral mention of the EU on its official website, and even then it does not form part of its programme. Certainly, the party has not been active in any way on the issue. See [http://www.kuyper.org/icpt/icpt_idx.html](http://www.kuyper.org/icpt/icpt_idx.html).

- **Liberal Party** – Formed in the wake of the merger between the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party in 1988, the rump Liberal Party holds to ‘true liberal’ values. This has included a generally positive policy towards the European Union. However, in November 1998, the party’s Assembly voted in favour of withdrawal from the EU, on the grounds that it was incapable of reform. This vote went against the majority of the leadership, and there has been no evidence that the party has actually done anything to pursue its new policy. See [http://www.kuyper.org/icpt/icpt_idx.html](http://www.kuyper.org/icpt/icpt_idx.html).
Libertarian Alliance – Originally set up in 1969, and taking its current name in 1979, the Alliance is a radical libertarian think-tank, with little central organisation. While it has produced various critiques of the EU from the libertarian perspective (see http://www.libertarian.co.uk/), the Alliance itself has not been active in any meaningful sense on the issue. One of its leading members, Sean Gabb, is responsible for the ‘Candidlist’, which lists MPs’ and prospective MPs’ view on the EU (http://www.candidlist.demon.co.uk/).

Monday Club – Founded in 1961, the Monday Club only came round to an anti-EU position in the 1980s. However, the essential focus of the Club has been its positions on law, order and immigration, the last of which resulted in the severing of links with the Conservative Party in August 2001. No active policy has pursued on the issue of Europe. See http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=92 and http://www.conservativeuk.com/.

National Association of Referendum Party Supporters Groups – The NARPSG emerged from the immediate collapse of the Referendum Party and prefigured the formation of the Democracy Movement. During this brief period, it did not pursue any policy objectives, being solely concerned with the preservation of the movement. As such it was essentially a latent group. See http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=113.

4Sterling.org – Set up by businessmen in Worcestershire in the late 1990s, 4Sterling does not have any presence except its website, which acts as a posting board for its (small number of) members’ view on EMU. See http://4sterling.org/.

ONE-MAN GROUPS
These are groups in name only. Usually this means that they are a single person trying to convey the impression of being representative of a larger group. In all these cases, there is no media coverage at all, and the individuals involved tend to speak in their own name.
• **Campaign for United Kingdom Conservatism** – Set up in 1994, the Campaign is essentially a vehicle created by Rodney Atkinson (ex-UKIP member and brother of comedian Rowan). As such, the ‘group’ is little more than a shell, as evidenced by the activity of Atkinson, who has continued to speak in his own name, rather than that of the Campaign. See [http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=72](http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=72).

• **Cheaper Food League** – As with CUKC, the Cheaper Food League is a vehicle for Conservative MP Teddy Taylor, and lacks any evidence of activity, despite its affiliation to CIB. See [http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=126](http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=126).

• **Cybertrucker/Truth about Europe Campaign** – Both of these websites are run by the same individual (‘Chris’), the former dealing with the introduction of speed-limiters into lorries and the latter offering information on the EU. However, there is no indication that there is any larger group behind these sites. See [http://members.tripod.com/~Cybertrucker/index.htm](http://members.tripod.com/~Cybertrucker/index.htm) and [http://members.tripod.com/~eurotruth/index.htm](http://members.tripod.com/~eurotruth/index.htm).

• **Labour European Forum** – The only presence that this ‘group’ exists is its website, which confirms that it is little more than a vehicle for Labour MP Ken Coates. Despite various pieces on matters European, there is no evidence of substantive activity or of other members. See [http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/elfeuro/](http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/elfeuro/).

• **Populist Party** – The Populist Party counts opposition to the EU as a key policy position in its (very) brief programme on its website. However, there is no evidence to suggest the party, which appears to be a one-man band (Russell White), has contested any elections. See [http://www.iits.dircon.co.uk/populist.htm](http://www.iits.dircon.co.uk/populist.htm).

• **Progressive Liberal Party** – The PLP is pro-withdrawal from the EU, but as with the Populist Party there is no evidence of group organisation or of contesting any elections. The assumption is that the ‘party’ is a single person. See [http://www.raf.cwc.net/](http://www.raf.cwc.net/).
TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS

Whilst these groups have both active anti-EU policies and multiple memberships, they fall outside of the national frameworks that are the focus of this thesis. Their impact is considered primarily as a function of national groups’ strategies.

- **Europe des Nations (EDN)** – The first explicitly anti-EU grouping in the European Parliament, the EDN developed in 1994 after L’Autre Europe’s success allowed it to form the nucleus of a group, along with smaller Danish and Dutch parties. By the time of its demise in 1999, it had also been joined by one Ulster Unionist, the result of a pay off between the UUP and the Referendum Party in 1997, which ensured no campaigning by the latter in Northern Ireland during the general election, in return for the UUP joining the EDN, so as to meet the minimum numbers requirement for group status (Carter et al, 1998, p.476).

- **Europe of Democracies and Differences (EDD)** – The EDD group in the European Parliament was formed in the wake of the 1999 elections, after the departure of the RPF’s MEPs from the EDN to the UEN (see below). Initially consisting of 16 members from 4 countries, the French CPNT and British UKIP were later joined by three dissident RPF MEPs in late 1999, working under the banner of Combats Souverainistes. It should be noted that one of the 3 UKIP MEPs, Michael Holmes, left the group in March 2000 when he was removed from his position as party leader. See [http://www.europarl.eu.int/edd/](http://www.europarl.eu.int/edd/).

- **SOS Democracy** – A European Parliament intergroup since late 1998, SOS Democracy brings together members of the EDD, Swedish and Finnish socialists and Swedish Greens. The group holds regular meetings in order to discuss parliamentary agendas, as well as coordinating activity within the Convention on the Future of the EU. There is a dedicated website ([http://www.eusceptic.org/sos/](http://www.eusceptic.org/sos/)), as well as extensive information on Jens-Peter Bonde’s site ([http://www.bonde.com/](http://www.bonde.com/)).

- **The European Alliance of EU-critical Movements (TEAM)** – Set up at the 1992 Edinburgh ‘counter-summit’, TEAM (originally the Trans-European Anti-Maastricht Alliance) only developed a formal structure in 1997 (Agence France Presse 03/03/1997, ‘40 anti-EU organisations form body to oppose revised Maastricht’). Full British members include CIB, Campaign Against Euro-Federalism, UKIP, Youth for a Free Europe and Bruges Group: LESC, the Green
party and the Democracy Movement have observer status. The Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale is the only full French member. TEAM’s website provides full details (http://www.teameurope.info/index.html).

- **Union pour l’Europe des Nations (UEN)** – Born in 1999 out of the RPF grouping and the remains of the European Democratic Alliance, the UEN initially brought together 21 MEPs from 4 countries, later joined by the Italian Alleanza Nazionale. 6 French MEPs left in 2001, after the split between the RPF and MPF, to become non-attached (Figaro 17/01/2001, ‘Six villieristes quittent le groupe de Pasqua’). See http://www.europarl.eu.int/uen/.

**FURTHER LINKS**
All groups on this list, as well as all groups included in the body of the thesis, are included in a website of anti-EU links across Europe, compiled by the author: http://www.susherwood.fsnet.co.uk/weblinks.htm. It will be noted that various other groups not mentioned here are also present on this site. This was the result of a very broad sweep of possible groups for inclusion. All those sites not mentioned here, but found on the site, fall outside because they are simply informational (without an associated group behind them) or because they were formed after the study period ended.
## Annex 2: Memberships of Anti-EU Groups by year, 1985-1999

### British Groups

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Figures in italics are extrapolated from the following year’s figure.
### Annex 2: Memberships of Anti-EU Groups by year, 1985-1999 (cont’d)

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Figures in italics are extrapolated from the following year’s figure

(Source: Based on interviews, group materials and newspaper reports)
### Annex 3: National Election Results of Anti-EU Groups by year, 1985-1999, Percentage of Total Vote

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(1) – General Election in UK, *Assemblée Nationale* Election in France; (2) – European Election; (3) – French Presidential Election

(continued over)
Annex 3: National Election Results of Anti-EU Groups by year, 1985-1999, Percentage of Total Vote
(cont’d)

**French Groups**

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(1) – General Election in UK, *Assemblée Nationale* Election in France; (2) – European Election; (3) – French Presidential Election

(Source: Based on *Année politique économique et sociale en France*; Butler & Butler, 2000)
ANNEX 4: By-Election Performances by anti-EU Groups in the UK, 1985-1999

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Annex 5: Media References to Anti-EU Groups by Year, 1985-1999

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### Annex 5: Media References to Anti-EU Groups by Year, 1985-1999 (cont’d)

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Figures are references per national newspaper per year

(Source: Lexis-Nexis database)