Elites and Modernity in Mozambique

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I hereby declare that this thesis stems from original research and I have not knowingly used the work of anyone else unless otherwise indicated.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the connections between ideologies of modernity and social power for three interrelated sets of elites in Mozambique. My research is based on 20 months of ethnographic fieldwork primarily, but not solely, among the now adult children of high-ranking members of Frelimo (Mozambican Liberation Front, the ruling party since independence) and those closely associated with the party in the capital city of Maputo. It examines how elites’ transforming relationship to the project of modernity has allowed them to survive periods of dramatic social change while maintaining power, although in a modified form. The thesis argues that “local” understandings of modernity held by dominant groups in Mozambique have created the wider political field that unifies elites and creates the parameters in which they operate. It allows them both to control the positions that underwrite their social power and to attempt to justify their positions of power. The thesis examines the source of elites’ social dominance and how it has been transformed over the generations. I also investigate how recent social, political and economic changes have created a growing backlash among social groups who were once Frelimo’s strongest supporters. The thesis argues that through the acquisition and monopolisation of “modern” skills, such as high levels of education, elites can survive contested legitimacy because there are few who seem capable of replacing them.

Key words: Mozambique, Frelimo, Elites, Modernity, Maputo
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Map of Mozambique and neighbouring countries. Maputo is located in the southern extreme of the country. Map copyright by National Geographic Society.
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Chapter One

Introduction

… in relatively backward countries, where the process of modernization has yet to come into its own, modernism, where it develops, takes on a fantastic character, because it is forced to nourish itself not on social reality but on fantasies, mirages, dreams (Berman 1982: 235).

1.1 Uncomfortable Modernity

A Mozambican friend, Lina, once expressed to me deep worry over some of the trends she found among the modern Mozambican elite. Lina comes from an elite family. She is of mixed descent, primarily Portuguese and Goan. Her grandfather was born in Portugal and emigrated to Mozambique during the colonial period, where he worked with the Portuguese army. Although he tended towards the right of the political spectrum and returned to Portugal after independence, Samito (Lina’s father and his son) had been a fervent Frelimista (supporter of Frelimo).¹ Samito still frequently speaks about the socialist leader, Samora Machel, the legendary first president of Mozambique. During the socialist period Samito was a high-ranking civil servant. Although he has left government service during the capitalist period, he still maintains connections with the government and many of Lina’s friends also come from families that include current or former high-ranking officials in Frelimo.

Lina is concerned about her family’s sources of wealth in the post-socialist era, which is a far cry from the socialist austerity the elite had previously championed. In the current neo-liberal era, there have been many corruption scandals involving elites and Lina is trying to understand exactly where her family’s prosperity comes from. Lina is not entirely alone in this anxiety. Other thoughtful young elites are also raising uncomfortable questions about their family’s wealth. Another friend once told me that she asked her father, who at the time was in charge of a major public works project, if he was implicated in the corruption that was rumoured to surround the development. He truthfully answered that he had never done anything so bad that he

¹ Frelimo (Mozambican Liberation Front) is the ruling party of Mozambique and has been continually in power since they won independence from the Portuguese in 1975.
could not sleep at night. Despite examples like this, Lina feels that very few young elites ever question their rising prosperity. Many, in her opinion, simply took it as their due, just some of the perks that arise from their status. Lina’s assessment broadly conforms with many non-elite perceptions found in Maputo. The children of elites are often nicknamed the “Do you know who I ams?” Other young elites, although less fond of ostentatious display, still cannot bring themselves to question their families, as Lina remarked about a mutual friend: “You have seen… together with her father, they are like a king with his princess, you know she never questions where everything comes from”.

In Mozambique the allegations of corruption among elites goes beyond the moral complicity of theft and casts doubts on the underlying ideology that was one of the primary internal justifications of their social position. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to know something about the background of the ruling Mozambican elites. The majority of the ruling elites belonged to a category known as *assimilado* (the assimilated) in the colonial era, with a significant minority (like Lina’s family) from Indian, mixed-race, or Portuguese backgrounds. This group is a small minority of the population that is mainly urban-based, with a cosmopolitan outlook and relatively weak ties to “traditional”, or indigenous African power structures. Many of the current elites could broadly be characterised as having a petty-bourgeois background in the colonial period. The social groups who make up this elite became increasing embittered against and alienated from Portuguese colonial rule. It was these groups who came to dominate the Frelimo party, which made common cause with sections of the peasantry and fought a guerrilla against the Portuguese. The eventual outcome was Mozambique’s independence.

Upon the assumption of power Frelimo promised a new, socialist/egalitarian and radically modernist social order. In the early days of independence Frelimo enjoyed strong popular support, although some argue the party’s popularity came

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2 By Ideology I am referring to a “master narrative” in which elites support basic beliefs and assumptions, legitimise the existing social structure and show an image of the elite to the world, the way in which they would like to be seen (Getty and Naumov 1999: 18).

3 *Assimilados* were a colonial category for non-whites in the colonial era. To be an *assimilado* one had to demonstrate certain criteria and have one’s application approved by the state. Theoretically *assimilados* had equal rights with Portuguese colonisers, although that was not the case in practise. The status did confer significant advantages as compared to the majority of the population. *Assimilação* is discussed in greater detail in Chapters Two, Three and Four.

4 There is a common pattern in modern revolutions where an embittered urban intelligentsia allies itself with sections of the peasantry to overthrow the social order (see Wolf 1973 for further details).
primarily from it having freed the population from Portuguese rule and that only a small minority of the population actually understood the party’s ideology or political programme (Hall and Young 1997). While this may be the case, the Frelimo leadership’s vision of creating a radically new world was intoxicating to some, especially young urbanites. A middle-class woman in her 40s, who lives in Maputo and comes from a similar social background to many members of Frelimo leaders once told me about how excited she was during the initial days of independence. She is now a strong critic of Frelimo and she feels the party is corrupt and self-serving, but her frequent criticisms are occasionally interrupted by nostalgia when she recalls how she felt when she was a teenager. According to her the atmosphere of the early days seemed electric and she was convinced that anything was possible.

I was about 15 years old when we became independent and I was tremendously excited. Things had been bad under the transitional government, but I was very hopeful for the future. Frelimo had set up neighbourhood parties throughout the city for the independence ceremonies. My mother had attended one of these parties in our neighbourhood. Others of my family, those who had done well under the old regime, stayed home. They were frightened about what would happen to them now and they did not want to be publicly humiliated. As for me, I wanted to go to Machava Stadium, where they were going to have the ceremony. I went with my sister and my aunt and uncle. When we arrived the Stadium was completely packed with people. My aunt and uncle decided to stay in the car and listen to the ceremony on the radio, but my sister and I squeezed our way in. It was amazing. At midnight, when Samora Machel gave his speech declaring independence and they raised our new flag, everyone went crazy with joy. People were completely overcome with emotion, they were crying and cheering, they could not contain themselves. They had a fireworks display and Frelimo soldiers fired their guns into the air to celebrate. My sister and I became worried, the crowd was ecstatic, and we did not want to get accidentally crushed. Some Frelimo guards saw us and helped us out, we were very small and luckily the celebrations were very well-organised. We made our way back to our aunt and uncle’s car and they gave us some tea. It was an incredible night (Field notes 7 July and 8 November 2003).

Throughout my fieldwork I heard many similar descriptions of the early days of independence from middle class urbanites, even from those who are now alienated from, or critical of, Frelimo. For many members of this group at least there was a genuine enthusiasm for Frelimo and the new society they promised to create. Yet despite initial public support for the party’s goals, be it animated as from middle class urbanites I interviewed, or more passive as Hall and Young (1997) suggested was the case for large sections of the peasantry, Frelimo’s plans for transformative modernisation were essentially a “top-down” project. The original egalitarian rhetoric

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5 The Transitional Government was a year-long interim government in Mozambique during the final negotiations for independence. During this period there were many outbreaks of violence in the capital. See Chapter Four for more detail.
of the party aside, the Frelimo leadership together with many of their followers remained a distinctive elite with a particular worldview. This sense of distinction has historical roots that go back to the colonial period. The social groups that were strongly represented in the leadership had seen themselves as the more “developed” sections of Mozambique’s population and their assumption of power was predicated on the promise to transform Mozambique from a colonial backwater ruled by brutal and arbitrary authority to a strong, modern and “rational” state. As the Frelimo leadership tried to create a completely new Mozambique they encountered significant difficulties. Their plans were extremely ambitious. They laid out a social programme which would have been difficult to achieve even under the best circumstances, but which was well nigh impossible under those obtained after independence. Frelimo inherited a state verging on bankruptcy with few qualified personnel to carry out the centre’s directives. The meagre resources that were available were often wasted on grandiose and badly thought out projects. In addition the leadership’s version of modernity alienated sections of the population, which then provided support for or at least acquiesced in foreign funded aggression. By the mid-1980s much of the nation was devastated by a brutal civil war. When Mozambique was mentioned in the world’s media, it was synonymous with poverty, war, shocking brutality and starvation. This was not the version of modernity that the elite had desired to build.

By the late 1980s the war had reached a stalemate and the country was in ruins. The ruling elite, desperate to stave off complete collapse and almost entirely dependent on foreign aid, were pressured by international institutions and the country’s major donors to introduce radical changes. Socialism was abandoned, as was the single-party state, a large-scale privatisation programme was introduced and multiparty elections were held (Pitcher 1996, 2002). Since the end of the war Mozambique has enjoyed one of the higher economic growth rates in Africa. The new Frelimo president, Armando Guebuza, once known as a hard-line leftist, has appeared at a photo shoot with George Bush, who hailed him as one of the “New Kind of Leaders in Africa”, a leader who embraces “free markets” and democracy (The Independent 6 July 2005). A recent article that appeared in a British newspaper cited Mozambique as a case to prove that development aid can be effective. Instead of being a “typical African basket-case” (ibid), Mozambique is now seen as a success story.
Yet the triumphalism of these accounts obscures some of the continuities that have accompanied political change in Mozambique. Most important among these is the identity of the ruling class. The present incarnation of Frelimo has replaced the rhetoric of socialist egalitarianism with the more “current” discourse of human rights, multiparty democracy, civil society and foreign investment. Yet the government officials who speak of the need to create an entrepreneurial “culture” in Mozambique are often the same people who spoke of the need to build socialism in earlier years. Since independence the ruling elite has remained remarkably cohesive, despite the changing political situation. Even the more hard-line socialist ministers who have been replaced in the transition to capitalism continue to belong to the party, often as members of the central committee, near the summit of the party hierarchy and Frelimo’s policy making body. In contrast to other African countries, members of the leadership have had relatively few public disagreements or formed splinter parties. Despite the failure of socialism, many members of the ruling elite still see themselves as the “engine” of modernisation in Mozambique, even if modernity will take a very different form. This is central to the self-image of several Mozambican elites and an attempt to legitimise their social power. Elements of this can be seen from grand policy statements to more mundane manifestations such as Frelimo t-shirts and election slogans that consistently promise “progress” in exchange for votes.

By pointing to some of the continuities in Mozambican politics since independence, I do not mean to deny that dramatic changes have taken place. Ideas concerning modernity have been, and continue to be, an underlying thread of both elite political discourse and the way the privileged see themselves. These ideas are not static though and they have transformed considerably since independence.

The vision of modernity originally conceived by the Frelimo leadership was a vast unifying project that would be dependent on mass mobilisation. Following the chaos and destruction of the civil war period, intense internal disputes and ultimately the fall of socialism, these kinds of grand visions of mass modernity appear to be receding from political discourse. Modernity, in the current era, is no longer characterised as a goal that can be achieved through simultaneously mobilising and transforming the population. Instead, many elites increasingly think it is a feature distinctive to themselves. This can be seen both by the new “technocratic” political discourses and by spending time with young elites whose formative period occurred after independence. Young elites are less self-conscious about modernity; for the
most part they always thought that they were. Modernity is something that makes them unique in a country that fundamentally is not. My thesis explores the formation of a Frelimo-based elite and the way they have harnessed changing conceptions of modernity in Mozambique and how they have been linked in various ways to social power.

1.2 Elites

It has long been commented on in elite studies that the term elite is amorphous and that they are difficult to accurately define and delineate (Hansen and Parrish 1983; Marcus 1983a; Shore 2002). As I once heard in a conference, “an elite is a like a giraffe, it is difficult to describe but you know one when you see one”. Part of this problem stems from the fact that in most societies there are multiple “elites”. Thus various groups may dominate the realms of business, cultural activity, religion and politics on a local and national scale. There may be a significant overlap between these groups, with a member of a given elite holding multiple offices in different sectors of society throughout their career but this varies from place to place and in different historical contexts. In addition, although elites can exercise significant power and control resources through their connections to institutional structures, in today’s “mass societies”, unlike those with more feudal forms of government, it can be difficult to demarcate them from the social groups where they have their origins (Marcus 1983a).

This confusion exists in Mozambique where there are also multiple elites. The term could conceivably be applied to local regulos (chiefs), regional party cadres, high-ranking members of the major opposition party, religious leaders of influence, foreigners connected with powerful international aid agencies and the top members of the Indian merchant class whose wealth grows from international economic connections. This thesis concentrates on an interlinked group of people who currently appear to be the socially dominant, if not uncontested, group in Mozambique. This group coalesces around the Frelimo party, including many current or former high-ranking members, their families and close associates. The dominant place of high-ranking Frelimo members is widely recognised in Mozambique and Frelimo is often used as a generic term for elite in Maputo, Mozambique’s capital.
My thesis focuses primarily on the now adult children of this dominant group and traces the genesis of this group from the colonial period to the present day. Through the thesis I divide these elites into three interrelated generational groups. The first I call the colonial elite; they are the forbears of the current elites. The second I call the revolutionary elite, who are, frequently, the descendents of members of the colonial elite. Many members of this group are still in power in today’s capitalist democracy and may no longer hold views normally deemed as “revolutionary” but most owe their prominent status to the successful conclusion of the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism and the fact that they (or a close kinsmen or associate) were a member of Frelimo during the struggle and/or the socialist period. The final group I have labelled the independence elite and they are, in many cases, the children of the revolutionary elite. They were usually born toward the close of or after the liberation struggle and have no personal experience with colonialism and, in most cases, only childhood memories of socialism. The independence elite normally began to secure their positions during the capitalist era.

Numerous members of the revolutionary and independence elite have their origins in southern Mozambique, particularly the capital and the Gaza province at the beginning of the 20th Century. The southern colonial elite was primarily a petty bourgeoisie and they were among the most privileged sector of the non-white population. This group was racially mixed and consisted of Mulattos, some Indians, particularly Goans, and the most important for the purposes of this thesis, assimilados from the major southern ethnic groups, primarily the Shangaan, Ronga and Chope. The colonial elite differed in several respects from other elite groups in Mozambique due, in part, to the way in which southern Mozambique was incorporated into the colonial and wider regional economies. Since the beginning of the 20th Century the colonial elite had been gradually squeezed out of mercantile professions due to discrimination and competition from white colonialists and the Indian merchant class. The prevalence of migrant labour, the patterns of landholding and the nearness

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6 The predominance of southern ethnic groups in the colonial elite and later the revolutionary elite have led critics to level charges of ethnic favouritism and domination in Mozambique. While there may be elements of truth to this accusation, it is more complicated than it first appears. Many members of the revolutionary elite from the south married women from prominent northern families during the liberation struggle. As the south is patrilineal and the north is matrilineal their children do not have an “official” ethnicity, nor do they usually speak an African language. Thus many ethnically mixed members of the independence elite simply describe themselves as Mozambican.

7 The Indian members of the colonial elite were often Goan and had a different social background than the Indian merchant class. Goans had a far stronger social base in the colonial bureaucracy.
of the capital with its associated economic and educational opportunities also aided in the formation of the colonial elite as an urban based petty bourgeoisie. Many of the African members of the colonial elite came from chiefly lineages that often contributed to their educational opportunities. This background and the particular historical events that took place in the south contributed to the formation of a very specific social group. This group tended to be based in urban professions and the lower levels of the civil service and drew their positions and prestige more as members of the “modern” economy than as being part of “traditional” power structures.

There was often a direct relationship between members of a state-based colonial elite and the revolutionary elite that would eventually seize control of the state. Examples abound: Raúl Honwana was a colonial civil servant and father of Luis Bernardo Honwana (Minister of Culture under Frelimo), João Honwana (Commander of the Air Force under Frelimo), Fernando Honwana (aid to the first President, Samora Machel) and Gita Honwana (appointed by Frelimo to be one of Mozambique’s first female judges). Joaquim Chissano’s (former Foreign Minister and later President of Mozambique) father was translator for the colonial civil service. Marcelino Dos Santos’ (former vice-President of Frelimo) father worked for the national railways under the colonial state. Despite this strong relationship, there were numerous exceptions. Samora Machel’s father was a prosperous peasant and most of his family were involved in migrant labour to South Africa. His father’s land was confiscated by the state though and during the colonial period Samora Machel worked in the capital as a nurse. Magid Osman, the former Minister of Finance, came from an Indian merchant family also based in the capital. In general though, the colonial elite of the south was strongly tied to the bureaucracy of the colonial state.

The revolutionary elite grew from a section of the colonial elite, normally those who were the most disaffected and alienated from the colonial state, especially Protestant assimilados.8 Once again there were exceptions though. For instance, Jacinto Veloso (Minister of the Interior and head of the secret police under Frelimo) came from a well-established and wealthy white colonial family. The revolutionary elite were also joined by small numbers of radical Portuguese who wanted to help

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8 The connections between Protestantism and the revolutionary elite will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Three.
build socialism.\(^9\) Many, but not all, came from Segundo (lit. second, but in this case second-generation) backgrounds. Segundos were white Portuguese who were born in Mozambique and had families that had been in the country for generations. They faced discriminated by the ruling faction of the colonial state, who were more recent arrivals. In addition, during the liberation struggle many northerners joined the ranks of the revolutionary elite. The northerners were often mission-educated and came from similar social backgrounds as the southerners, although some rose through the ranks during the struggle.\(^10\) The revolutionary elite was separated from other descendents of the colonial elite who came from extremely similar social backgrounds by their (or a close relative’s or associate’s) participation in the liberation struggle. This process of social formation resulted in a small, tightly interlinked ruling group, where many members had known each other personally, often since they were children, and were bound even more closely together by shared goals and experiences.

After the successful conclusion of the liberation struggle the revolutionary elite became politically dominant, and following the post-independence exodus of the Portuguese and a series of nationalisations, the state they controlled was dominant in the formal economy as well.\(^11\) The role of the revolutionary elite as a strictly politically based elite began to change after the fall of socialism. In the capitalist era many members of the revolutionary elite used their political power base to secure positions with powerful international aid agencies that provided around 60% of the government’s budget during fieldwork, and to penetrate more deeply into the opening economy. As with many formerly socialist countries, when large-scale privatisations were implemented in Mozambique, current and former state officials were often among the chief beneficiaries as they were some of the few who had the skills, experience, resources and political connections necessary to operate these industries (cf Pitcher 1996, 2002; Verdery 1996).

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\(^9\) Out of a white population of about 250,000, only a small fraction stayed after the first few years of independence.

\(^10\) After the death of Samora Machel and the fall of socialism, some northerners, especially those who rose through the ranks, apparently became increasingly marginalized as socialist ideology faded in importance compared to technocratic ability.

\(^11\) Some major companies from the colonial period decided to continue their operations in Mozambique after liberation and they were not nationalised, although they were subject to government intervention (Pitcher, 1996, 2002).
The expansion of the revolutionary elite into the market economy has been accompanied by a great deal of corruption, which is strictly at odds with the revolutionary elite’s puritan roots. This has included, but is not limited to, extensive asset stripping of former state industries, the use of political connections to facilitate money laundering and drug smuggling and land appropriation. The expressed goal of privatisation and the transition to capitalism was to release economic concerns from the direction and control of the state and allow them to operate in the open competitive system of the market. While Mozambique is held out as an example of a successful structural adjustment programme, this goal has failed in many of its original intentions. The government remains a key player in the economy, retaining part ownership in many large economic concerns; and many new “private” economic players are members of the Frelimo party who retain strong links with the government (Pitcher 1996, 2002). In reality privatisation primarily allowed those with political power to amass economic wealth. The revolutionary elite has managed, often through a blend of both legal and illegal methods, to maintain its position as a “ruling class”, but not entirely through the ownership of the means of production as the traditional Marxist understanding would have it. Instead their social position and ability to access wealth in the capitalist period is based on being dominant politically with the ability to access important networks of power. After my fieldwork concluded the recently elected administration of president Armando Guebuza filled some ministerial positions with regional party members, with weaker connections to the traditional revolutionary elite. It remains to be seen if this will have an overall effect on elite power structures.

The third group this thesis investigates is the independence elite. The life experiences and social strategies of this group differ from their parents in the revolutionary elite in several important respects. They often have no direct experience with colonialism and have always belonged to Mozambique’s dominant group. Few, at least at this stage of their lives, demonstrate much of an interest in taking part in the formal political process. Up to the present date one of the few members of the independence elite to seek political office was the son of Samora Machel who ran for a position on the Maputo city council. Instead, through their educational background and through their political and social connections the independence elite has found positions in various government ministries, and more importantly, as members of powerful international aid agencies or working with growing family run economic
enterprises. Positions outside the government were often seen as “safe” and beyond politics during my fieldwork as there was growing doubt concerning Frelimo’s ability to win the upcoming election in Maputo. Members of the independence elite, unlike their parents, are becoming an international elite with the ability to access high-level positions outside Mozambique (although Mozambique remains a power-base). In this way they are attempting to use political connections to be able to transcend the dependence on politics that is still so essential for their parents in the revolutionary elite.

1.3 The Question of Elites

Now that I have identified the particular set of elites that this thesis will be investigating, the following sections will provide an overview of the dominant trends in elite studies and explain how I draw on the insights of previous theorists and where I seek to expand on existing debates. Broadly speaking, elite studies fall under three main headings, pluralism, the power elite and the anthropology of elites. I shall explore these three themes and then discuss how they relate to conceptualisations of African elites in the following section. I will then discuss the Mozambican case and demonstrate how the role of “modernisers” has been central in legitimising and maintaining social power for the dominant Mozambican elites.

Theme One: Pluralism

Elite studies arose from the changing social and political landscape that followed the French Revolution and the introduction of “mass societies” in Europe (Marcus 1983a). The word elite originally meant the elect of god, and its meaning was overshadowed by numerous terms of rank in feudal societies (ibid). The term began to take its modern form through efforts to explain the persistence of deep inequalities of wealth and power that continued in the class stratified societies dominated by the bourgeoisie that started to supplant feudal ones. As western societies became more institutionalised, with power residing in broad categories, such as classes,

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12 Actually Frelimo won a landslide victory, although this was marred by low voter turnout and allegations of fraud.
13 An exhaustive review of literature related to elite studies is beyond the scope of this chapter; instead I will offer a few concrete examples of those I take to be exemplars of their particular trends.
governments, and bureaucracies, the term elites was used to describe the causal force of particular agents behind these impersonal institutions.

What distinguishes elite from such alternative concepts such as class and the state is that it focuses one’s imagery at a much lower level of abstraction than do the later terms. It evokes the image of specific groups of persons rather than impersonal entities such as formal organizations and mass collectivities. Furthermore, the concept of elite carries with it the notion that such groups are the major source of change within relevant levels of social organization – local, regional, societal and international; they are the force behind institutional processes in which others – the masses, nonelites – participate with them (Marcus 1983a: 8-9).

The study of elites therefore gives a human face to what otherwise seems to be the vast and impersonal mechanisms of power that control people’s daily lives. Thus early works dealing with elites served, in some ways, as a rebuke against generalising theories and instead focused on causal agents and a more individual sense of agency.

Fittingly the first studies that brought elites, in their modern sense, to academic prominence were those concerned with preserving a sense of “continuity” with older, more aristocratic forms of social power and were rabidly opposed to the advent of “mass societies” (Hansen and Parrish 1983). Early authors, Pareto and Mosca, were deeply influenced by the more agrarian based power-structures found in their native Italy in the late 19th and in the opening decades of the 20th Centuries. They were at odds with the understandings of emergent capitalism formulated by Marx and Weber, and they defined an elite by reference to its older, more feudal class standing and its associated type of morality. They felt that it was the duty of this elite not to merge with or become hegemonic within the state, but to protect society from it (Hansen and Parrish 1983: 260). Pareto and Mosca argued that a state dominated by the bourgeoisie, or even worse, the masses, would lead to corruption and attempts to redistribute property the masses had no “legitimate” claim to, therefore the older elite was needed to dominate the parliament and executive branch of the government and keep the people at bay (Hansen and Parrish 1983). After the rise of Fascism in Italy, the political ideal of this type of elite became largely irrelevant, but Pareto and Mosca’s influence lived on, albeit in a very different manner, in the conservative leanings of the pluralist view of elites that grew from their insights and gained prominence in the American academy after World War Two.

As with Pareto and Mosca, the pluralist view of elites was used to argue against Marxist theories of capitalism and class-based power. Loosely stated, Marx
believed that there is a “ruling class” at the summit of society, one that controls the means of production and through this dominates the state. This ruling class is bound together by the fact that its members have shared interests, which are opposed to those of the other classes in society (Marx 1976). The pluralists took exception to the idea of a ruling class; they argued that even some of Marx’s own examples show the essential fallacy of this idea, pointing especially to the diverse coalition of supporters which underwrote Louis Bonaparte’s assumption of power in France (Marcus 1983a; R. Cohen 1983). While Marx explained the diverse interests of these coalitions as “class fractions”, pluralists argued that Marx’s ruling class was an abstraction that did not explain the actual behaviour of elites (Kamenka 1983; Marcus 1983a). The pluralists’ case stated that there is no centralised ruling class, but rather a collection of various elites that represent differing interest groups. To understand elites, they said, one must map out the various interests they represent.

Theme Two: The Power Elite

The pluralists generally held sway among non-Marxist analysts, especially in the United States, where their work often dovetailed with the state’s ideological portrayal of itself as a decentralised “open society”. However this was to be powerfully challenged by a re-conceptualisation of the role of elites in society, typified by the work of C. Wright Mills (1956). Mills also focused on the United States after the Second World War, and in arguing against the pluralists, he drew more strongly on ideas associated with the works of Weber and Marx (A. Cohen 1981: 11). His seminal work, “The Power Elite” (1956) argued that American society had been dramatically reconfigured through the New Deal and especially the Second World War. He described a change from a society that had previously had a relatively weak executive centre and where power was often exercised by local governmental representatives, “grand families” and regional corporations, to one in which power was being centralised at the national level. Mills argued that after World War Two the three foundations of power in America were the government, the military and major national and multinational corporations. Besides accompanying the centralisation of power there was an ongoing centralisation of elites. He pointed to the fact that the high-ranking members of the three major bastions of American power tended to rotate
between these organisations, lessening the effect of more localised interest groups and bringing greater overall unity and social control.

In addition, Mills contended that the structure of the American elite was changing. Elite status was not determined so much by family wealth as it was by top positions in the great bureaucratic institutions that ruled the country, which were themselves becoming the chief sources of wealth and power. Paradoxically the move from “grand families” to “great institutions” did not imply social levelling or more open access for people of modest backgrounds, but in Mills view, signified a general hardening of American class structure. Thus formerly dispersed regional elites began to share a similar “elite culture”: they went to the same schools, belonged to the same clubs, inhabited similar social circles, espoused similar ideological views and practised marital endogamy. It was the members of this progressively centralising “elite culture” who were likely to work in at least one, and often multiple, foundations of national power. This gradual universalising of American elite experiences created, in Mills’ words: “social and psychological unity” (1956: 11). In addition these processes were not a historical accident that grew out of the exigencies of the depression and war, but in fact had been carefully planned to ensure the ruling group’s national dominance and growing international influence. Mills felt that the work of the pluralists had completely misread what was actually happening among the ruling elites, and that their continuing denial of an overall ruling class was either ideologically driven or based on a mistaken set of assumptions and focused inappropriately on levels of power that were not the most important ones in society.

The top of the American system is much more unified and much more powerful, the bottom much more fragmented, and in truth, impotent, than is generally supposed by those who are distracted by the middling units of power which neither express such will that exists on the bottom nor determine the decisions on the top (Mills 1956: 29).

Mills’ challenge to the pluralists contributed to increasing academic attention to the possibility of a more unified ruling clique. Analysts began to counter pluralist critiques of ruling elites by pointing out that pluralists’ models could not explain how elites, as individuals, were linked to large-scale corporate bodies, the great institutional bureaucracies that Mills focused on (Marcus 1983a). While Mills’ overall stance was closer to Weber, his style of research also proved attractive to new generations of more Marxist-inspired researchers in the 1960s and 1970s, who wanted
to focus on the structures that underlay social power. The power elite and pluralist trends became opposing camps within elite research, giving rise to a long-running debate about the nature of elites.

Theme Three: The Anthropology of Elites

Eventually the power elite versus pluralist debate stalled. The power elite camp had difficulties explaining the diversity of elites and certain types of intra-elite competition. Their explanations for the roles of elites in society became increasingly conspiratorial. The pluralists, although gaining some advantage from these weaknesses, still could not adequately explain the linkages between grand institutions and elites, nor many forms of unity that do exist among the top-ranking members of society. Both camps became increasingly involved in arcane discussions of what an elite is exactly and tied up in over-detailed attempts to map the role of elites in given societies (Hansen and Parrish 1983; Marcus 1983a; R. Cohen 1983). The debate had also become increasingly normative, with much of the argument focusing on the desired rather than the actual role of elites. Although the insights that arose from this debate have expanded our knowledge on the roles of elites in society, many analysts found that a new approach was necessary, an approach that could make use of insights from both camps (Hansen and Parrish 1983; R. Cohen 1983).

The emergence of a third trend was aided by the growing role of anthropology in elite studies. Although anthropologists had long been interested in the political structures and systems of far-flung places, their attention during the early years of the sub-discipline’s existence tended to focus on small-scale political structures in isolation from their connections to the wider world (Marcus 1983a; Shore 2002). In 1983, George Marcus, inspired in part by the work of Abner Cohen proposed using ethnographic methods to move forward from the pluralist/power elite debate. Marcus argued that the debate had focused overly on the role of elites in institutions. To move forward one should examine them from their own point of view, in order to understand their worldview and their social relationships and structures from the “inside”. Marcus and his supporters felt that ethnographically-based fieldwork would

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14 There are notable exceptions to this tendency, for example Gluckman’s “Analysis of Social Situation in Modern Zululand” (1958).
15 I will discuss the role of Abner Cohen’s work in the following section.
help to determine the specific and variable nature of elites throughout the world instead of arguing increasingly entrenched and mainly normative positions.

The role of elites cannot be inferred from merely positional criteria – who holds what position, who is married to whom, who belongs to what club and so on. Their behaviour must be observed directly over the course of time. This is precisely the proper domain of ethnography, a key reason why we believe that anthropology has a critical mission to fulfil in resolving this debate, and that systematic ethnographic inquiry into the nature of elite families and networks would go a long way towards resolving a stalemated issue (Hansen and Parrish 1983: 261).

Marcus’s own fieldwork dealt with “old money” families (Marcus 1983b; Marcus and Hall 1992). Marcus focused on how long-established elites managed to interact with large-scale institutions, protect their wealth and ensure their social reproduction by the use of charitable trusts. In addition, unlike many previous analysts who tended to explain the role of elites in society by using externally derived definitions of power, Marcus used detailed ethnography to demonstrate the ways in which elites themselves understood their power and social positions.

The new direction suggested by Marcus has been expanded by the work of John Gledhill on political processes in Mexico (1994, 1998, 2002). Gledhill’s work is innovative as it examines not only local political concepts and how they interact with wider, transnational, power networks, but also less visible and more informal power structures.

The problem with the kind of debate in which most political scientists were engaged was not simply that it did not look hard enough at what was happening within Mexican society at large, nor at the complexity and variability of particular regional situations: it seldom raised any deep questions about the nature of Mexican elites, and about the way the structures of informal social power behind the formal institutions of political life shape the way in which elites respond to the growing range of problems afflicting the country (Gledhill 1998: 11).

Gledhill’s work explodes the simplicity of the pluralist/power elite debate by demonstrating how various elites (regional, nation, political, social, and economic) are united by a common political culture and often by personal ties as well. Despite this unified culture and these strong ties, fierce competition was in evidence between elite cliques as they tried to protect their own interests, especially in the era of neo-liberalism (1998).

In Mexico the introduction of neo-liberalism eventually began to fracture the established consensus among elites. In a later article, Gledhill (2002) examines the
consolidation of the Mexican political elite, based on the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) that ruled from 1929 until 2000, showing how the introduction of neo-liberalism and growing intra-elite competition led to its eventual demise. Gledhill argues that the political elite was formed through various struggles among the ruling group that arose from the Mexican revolution. While these various elites were not strictly coterminous, the PRI party managed to build coalitions and maintain overall dominance by presenting a united front through the use of state power as both a threat and a source of patronage. The strength of the political class was based on the coherence of the party, with the summit of power being the “revolutionary family” based on a small network of leaders, including ex-presidents, who ran the party and by extension the country (2002: 50). The system began to unravel with the introduction of neo-liberalism and the growth of the narco-shadow state and other sources began to able to rival the state as a source of patronage. As other non-state actors began to rival the state as a source of patronage the sense of coherence at the centre of the political process became harder to maintain, intra-elite competition increasingly became public knowledge, most spectacularly with the assassination of the PRI presidential candidate in the 1990s, blamed on rival PRI members. The final result was PRI’s first ever national electoral loss in 2000. Once again Gledhill goes beyond the simplicity of the earlier debate by showing how elites go through periods of fusion and fracture which are intimately connected both to local political structures and the way in which these structures are affected by wider transnational processes, such as international neo-liberal capitalism.

The exploration of the role of a unified political culture in its ability (and the limits of this ability) to maintain cohesion amongst a ruling group is of vital importance to facilitate a wider understanding of the roles of elites in society and is crucial for this thesis. In her work on two sets of elites in Yemen, republican and monarchist, vom Bruck (2005) observes that contrasting attitudes towards consumption and the display of wealth form a “unified field” for their respective elites. Thus attitudes towards consumption underlie moral critiques of the social systems that the two groups are supposed to embody. For republicans, displays of wealth and consumption of high-status, often imported goods symbolise the modern “consumer democracy” that their rule has ushered in. This stands in opposition to the stultifying puritanism of the monarchists (2005: 261). For the monarchists, avoiding these forms of consumption operates as a repudiation of the corrupt social order of
republican rule (2005: 266-268). I shall also investigate how changing patterns of consumption from socialism to capitalism are intertwined with notions of wider legitimacy, yet an important point remains, one must also examine the relationship of “non-elite” actors to the unified political cultures of elites. In Spencer’s work on the Sinhalese elite of Sri Lanka, he notes that in this case, nationalist discourse is the primary source of a unified political culture (2002: 92). However, Spencer also points out that many “non-elites” have been able to make use of this discourse to further their own ends. In this thesis I shall demonstrate that changing concepts of modernity have been instrumental for the creation of an overall framework that unites Mozambican elites. The thesis shall also explore if, along the lines of Spencer’s argument, the elite discourses that form this framework are inclusionary and offer a space for other social groups to pursue their own agendas, or, following the examples of Gledhill and Mills, they operate as a mechanism to centralise power and how this changes over time.

Anthropology, as the examples above show, has much to offer the study of elites. This is demonstrated by its ability to go beyond the abstract, universalising models offered by other disciplines and offer intimate descriptions from an insider’s perspective of the variable social worlds of elites. An anthropological approach allows us to develop a deeper understanding elites in specific societies, and also an attempt to understand something about the general exercise of power throughout the world. Nevertheless, despite calls by Laura Nader (1972) to “study up” and demonstrations by Marcus (1983a, 1983b, 1992) on how this might be done, up to the present elites have attracted relatively limited anthropological interest (Shore 2002). While many anthropologists have contributed valuable and penetrating studies of how unequal power relationships affect the disenfranchised, our knowledge of those who exercise significant power over them remains relatively limited.

In a recent edited volume, “Elite Cultures” the editors and contributors issued a fresh call to focus anthropological attention on those who wield power (Shore and Nugent 2002). Shore (2002) suggests that, to better understand such questions, anthropologists must expand beyond the current “preoccupation with literary criticism, textual analysis, deconstruction and symbolism” to wider issues of economics, power, politics and social change (2002: 9). This does not mean abandoning interests in the cultural or symbolic behaviours of elites, but rather acknowledging both the material and social bases of power. According to Shore “…
the external conditions that promote and sustain local or national elites must also be matched with an analysis of the norms, values and shared interests that characterise and unite such elites…” (2002: 13).

Perhaps due to the comparative dearth of the ethnography of elites recent discussions on the structure of power seem to echo the old pluralist/power elite debate. While many Marxist inspired studies of the 1970s and 1980s took positions similar to those described by studies influenced by the “power elite” concept, the more recent collapse of class-based politics and a growing interest in identity politics often take positions closer to the pluralist position. These studies raise important questions, such as whether the growth of identity politics has destroyed the notion of “class for itself” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). Yet it is doubtful that the answers will be uniform. More research needs to be done on how these trends are understood and acted upon locally. This is an issue of great importance for this thesis and in Chapter Four I examine how class standing can also become an identity for elites in addition to and in some cases beyond other forms of identification such as race.

1.4 African Elites

Traditionally anthropologists in Africa studied what could be termed “local” elites, such as village headmen and chiefs, with far less focus on those involved in power structures on a national level. Even studies that moved beyond investigating “traditional” forms of power tended to focus on local elites. A prime example is the work of Joan Vincent (1971). Her work was pioneering for the time, as she understood that African villagers were integrated into wider transnational structures such as the emerging global economy. She examined how village elites in Uganda operated as a buffer between the forces of the market and the state and the wider society that they represented. Yet as researchers became increasingly concerned with national level politics during the post-independence period in Africa shades of pluralist/power elite debate began to appear (R. Cohen 1983). Although studies of national power structures in independent Africa took a variety of theoretical and political positions, many leaning towards the pluralist side of the debate, there is one influential trend that was closer to the power elite camp that I want to examine further. The trend in question tended toward a more critical Marxist/political economy standpoint and was primarily concerned with the ways in which the post-
independence state in Africa had become the central source of accumulation, both political and personal, for newly empowered elites.

This trend studied the formation of what was termed the “national bourgeoisie”. Writers demonstrated how political power, and the opportunities for accumulation that came with it, was central for the creation and reinforcement of other forms such as economic or social power. Thus, like those in the power elite camp, these researchers studied the ways in which power, and the holders of power, were fused and held together by the patronage base of the state. The national bourgeoisie was initially formed in the colonial period, usually arising out of the “petty bourgeoisie” whose members had access to higher education who then formed the core of cadres for the ruling party after independence (Allen and Williams 1982). Although those who formed the national bourgeoisie were comparatively privileged during the colonial period, they had limited ability to access resources independently of the state. This contributed to a blurred distinction between state and personal power and often gave the national bourgeoisie a comprador nature (Hodgkin 1982; O’Brien 1982).

These characteristics were also the central process in the formation of African class structure. Thus, in Africa: “… classes are categories of people sharing common political and economic interests arising from their access to public authorities and the public resources and opportunities which they control. Other classifications ignore the fundamental political origins of social mobility” (M. Cohen 1982: 181). Although coming from a broadly Marxist influenced tradition, M. Cohen argued that the particular way in which the bourgeoisie was formed in post-colonial Africa meant that, unlike the classical Marxist definition of class, control of the means of production is almost secondary and political capital is seen as the defining factor. According to Leys (1982) this type of class structure had particular political and economic effects. With the bourgeoisie and those staffing the bureaucracy often being the same people, a situation was created in which little time or effort was available for, or given to, the creation of productive capital or the search for profits. The mainstay of the national bourgeoisie was rent-seeking. In this conception societies in Africa (at least sub-Saharan Africa) are shaped as a unitary pyramid with the political elites at the top able to dominate all other sources of power and wealth, but without any solid productive basis for this wealth.
A similar situation has been described in post-independence Mozambique. Adam and Gibbon argue that although the Frelimo leadership was initially deeply opposed to the idea of having a national bourgeoisie, high-ranking members of the Frelimo party are increasingly taking on the characteristics associated with it (1991). They chart the development of Frelimo: a party that started as a loosely-based front of peasants and urban-based nationalists that later became an alliance between high-ranking party officials and the state bureaucracy after independence. Now, according Adam and Gibbon, there is a new social base for Frelimo, an alliance between the party and elements of the bureaucracy and foreign capitalists (Adam and Gibbon 1991: 4). Adam and Gibbon argue that these trends in Mozambique have closely paralleled, indeed been typical of, the formation of a national bourgeoisie in other countries. Frelimo’s victory opened the way for the consolidation of power for a variety of predominantly urban-based class elements, usually drawn from those who formed the “petty bourgeoisie” under colonialism. Under socialism these groups used the state bureaucracy to rise to positions of importance and later, during the introduction of neo-liberal capitalism, these groups were ideally placed to amass wealth given the changing economic circumstances and to forge connections with foreign capitalists. What has not changed dramatically, according to Adam and Gibbon, is the position of large numbers of the peasantry, who continue to play a similar role to the one they held throughout colonialism, state socialism and neo-liberalism. They remain the providers of goods and labour. The formation of a national bourgeoisie is described here as creating a tightly-linked, state-dependent elites who use their position to accumulate wealth through a combination of acting as a comprador for foreign interests and the extraction of resources both from international networks and the local population.

The ethnographic research of Abner Cohen (1974, 1981) among a group that could be termed a “national bourgeoisie” greatly increased our knowledge of African elite formation by going beyond the examination of the effects of unequal power relationships in a generalized African context. He focused on how members of one specific regional elite understand their role in society. Abner Cohen’s research explored elite formation among the “Creoles” of Sierra Leone, a group descended from repatriated slaves from the early colonial period. Creoles were distinctive from

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Adam and Gibbon do point to the fact that some of the party’s leaders have rural connections who have also benefited from these processes.
other groups in Sierra Leone as they had embraced Christianity, spoke English as a first language, had relatively high educational qualifications and adopted a self-consciously European life style. This group also had a strong ideological unity, or class-consciousness, based on the premise that they were the “civilised” and Christian section of the population. Throughout the colonial period and into independence, Creoles formed the majority of the civil service and governmental bureaucracy. When Sierra Leone became independent, many Creoles realised that if they were to keep their bureaucratic niche it was no longer advisable to publicly demonstrate a strong Creole identity as it had associations with colonial rule. Instead, given that they were not tied to any of the major ethnic groups, Creoles began to stress that they were “authentically” Sierra Leonian. Whereas during the colonial period the practise of giving Creole children European names had emphasised the group’s distinctiveness, they now began giving their children African names to demonstrate their connection with the new country. As Creoles formed only 1.9% of Sierra Leone’s population during A. Cohen’s fieldwork, and because an effort to form a Creole political party foundered soon after its beginning, they knew that they could not retain their positions by engaging in “identity politics”. Instead they kept their social base in the civil service and bureaucracy; as with other cases of a national bourgeoisie government, positions were often held alongside professional and business occupations. Their ability to act as a neutral buffer between the two major ethnic groups of Sierra Leone, the Mende and the Temne, allowed them to retain these positions.

What makes A. Cohen’s work remarkable is that it focused not only on the material bases of elite power, but also on the symbolic patterns and behaviours that came to characterise and internally legitimise an elite. His work deals with the ways in which elite groups create symbolic boundaries between themselves and “outsiders” such as mythologies of descent, ritual beliefs and practises, moral exclusiveness and specific ideologies which demonstrate their uniqueness and solidarity (1974). From these insights, A. Cohen seems to have anticipated later concerns with performativity and how power relationships are acted out in everyday life. This body of work also helped to raise questions as to how elite power is demonstrated in more banal, seemingly everyday ways. Similar questions have been systematically developed in another tradition by Bourdieu (1984) who showed how certain forms of consumption and certain styles or tastes demonstrate “symbolic” capital that serve as markers of
social position. The symbolic expression of social power is a central concern of this thesis and is examined in Chapter Three.

While the work of A. Cohen and M. Cohen, Leys and others who developed the idea of a national bourgeoisie have done much to clarify our understanding of political power by demonstrating how access to the resources of the state is central for the creation of African class structures, unanswered questions remain. One of the more pressing questions is what constitutes the class basis for non-elite groups and what avenues of social mobility exist for them? This is especially important if the boundaries between elites and non-elites are often quite ambiguous in practice (A. Cohen 1981: 18). One possible answer to this question, for a specific group of non-elites, is hinted at in the works of Karanja (1987), Mann (1985) and Obbo (1987). They point to the importance for members of less powerful groups of having access to elites. Their work demonstrates that although elite families in sub-Saharan Africa are often officially endogamous, unofficial sexual liaisons and the tendency for elite men to take “outside wives” is a crucial avenue for women from non-elites groups to acquire access to resources. This raises the wider question of the role of social proximity in African class structures. Does a close social relationship create an avenue of social mobility for less powerful actors as it enables them access to elites and by extension to resources that elites control? My thesis shall endeavour to examine if social proximity mitigates lower class standing and how barriers are formed between socially close groups and how they are permeated.

Although the examples given above investigated groups that, for the most part, could be broadly defined as belonging to a national bourgeoisie whose power grew from their relationship to the state, they did so in very different ways. These different conceptualisations helped to launch the two major trends in conceptualising African elites today. One trend is built around the concern displayed by the national bourgeoisie school, if not its broadly Marxist inspiration, on the tendency for elites to combine political power and public enrichment while at the same time displaying little concern for increasing the productive capacity of their respective countries. This trend focuses on the prevalence of behaviours among the elite that are often labelled corruption and patrimonialism. Although there are divergent opinions within this

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17 In contrast to the typology I have presented, some political scientists prefer to speak of five basic types of state/party systems found in Africa. While this argument is beyond the scope of my chapter, for details see Gledhill 1994 for a concise summary.
school of thought, overall it shares similar concerns with the ideas discussed in Bayart’s work dealing with the “politics of the belly”. The other major trend tends to be more interested with many of the questions examined by A. Cohen. Researchers using this approach study the ways in which African elites manage to institutionalise their power and create durable structures to govern society. Once again there are divergent opinions within this group, but I broadly refer to this trend as the “institutionalisation”. I will now examine both of these schools before moving on to a discussion of the Mozambican case in the next section.

The Politics of the Belly

The most famous example of this stance, as well as the man who coined the phrase the “politics of the belly”, is Jean-Paul Bayart. His work was influenced by previous studies of the national bourgeoisie. Bayart also described the state as the primary means of accumulation and the bureaucracy as the backbone of elite power, but unlike earlier works he was also critical of the tendency to see this bourgeoisie as a colonial creation without deeper roots in African political cultures: “The theme of a ‘national bourgeoisie’ sheds no light at all on the ancient classes to which this bourgeoisie is defined in Africa” (Bayart 1993: 103). Throughout Bayart’s work he offers a complicated argument; the reason the post-colonial state is both authoritarian and weak is a combination of the colonial legacy and African cultural practises, which encourage corruption amongst the dominant class as the struggle for power is chiefly a struggle for wealth. The dominant classes in Africa are not neo-colonial lackeys, as some would have, but skilful agents, who manipulate their contacts with the outside world to increase their wealth and, by extension, shore up their power base (1993: 93). Using contacts with outsiders to extract resources is not a new development, but is in fact part of a longstanding cultural practise of “extraversion” which has historically enmeshed local African actors in world-wide networks that are instrumental in bolstering actors’ local power (1993, 2000). In some ways Bayart echoes the concerns expressed by Marcus (1983a, 1983b) when Bayart contends that those writing about “national bourgeoisies” have not fully taken African agency or the historical roots of the modern system of stratification into account.
On the whole, the term “comprador class” would be preferable to that of “national bourgeoisie” if it were not tainted with infamy and misconception: the compradors served their own rather than foreign interests, and the coloniser, who understood this well, made it his priority to break them. The phenomenon we are faced with, and which we cannot examine in more depth here, is the crystallisation of social stratification astride the international system (1993: 102).

To Bayart, the international connections that have long been one of the key bases of African elite power were only altered by colonialism, not destroyed: “These societies have never been and, even after their military defeat, could never have been the passive objects of dependency. Colonisation did not radically weaken their ability to pursue their own strategies or produce their own modernity” (1993: 20). The cause of many internal crises in African states has been the elite’s strategy to bolster their power by increasing the exploitation of dependents and the mobilisation of resources gained from the outside world for personal use. Due to these longstanding cultural practises and the nature of the African elite, Bayart is broadly pessimistic about wide-scale institutional reform. He, instead, sees processes such as democratisation and privatisation more as new avenues for the elite to build personal bases than as far-reaching societal reforms.

In another recent well-known book “Africa Works” (1999), the authors, Chabal and Daloz came to many similar conclusions as Bayart, although they do not believe in the existence of a dominant class in the African context. They too claim that Africa has a characteristic social and cultural make-up to which western models of economics, politics and development are simply inapplicable. According to Chabal and Daloz, the long-running state of political and economic crises that exists in many sub-Saharan African countries is actually beneficial to these nation’s rulers as it allows them to use their dependence to extort more outside resources. Like the national bourgeoisie school they see the state as the primary fulcrum of power, political and economic, yet, as with Bayart, they also feel the idea of a national bourgeoisie misreads African reality. They contend that one of the central mistakes of many earlier analysts was attempting to understand Africa through western analytical models, such as social class, which they claim does not exist as such in Africa. For them, the state in Africa and its rulers are not differentiated from the wider population, but like Bayart’s “rhizome state” deeply intertwined with society. The people are connected to the elite through horizontal links, primarily networks of patronage that give the leaders legitimacy. These patrimonial obligations are why,
after the wave of democratisation that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, many former authoritarian leaders were voted back into power or “recycled” in the new governments. The authors see recent events in Africa as leading to a process of “re-traditionalisation” in which leaders base their power on clientelist networks, ethnic social bases and the resurgence of occult practices, therefore leading to a new “African” form of modernity.

The above authors challenge the idea of a unified national bourgeois on a number of points, but they do share a common set of concerns with this tradition. While they may differ on the reasons why, all have pointed to the fact that dominant elites in the post-colonial state are not setting up relatively neutral or viable institutional frameworks, but instead are using the benefits of office to create personal power bases and to extract wealth. Authors such as Bayart would further contend that the stated western political objectives for African states, such as “good governance” and the elimination of corruption are based on fundamental misunderstandings of the social and political realities found in Africa. Besides the obvious colonial overtones of dictating how African governments should work, many of these plans are doomed to failure anyway and actually result in the strengthening of the practices they were supposed to abolish. Yet not all studies of post-independence African elites have focused on how political structures were corrupted to prompt personal gain. Another prominent trend came to a very different conclusion and investigated how elites tried to use their social power to build durable institutions.

Institutionalisation

Although focusing on similar social groups as Bayart and Chabal and Daloz, researchers interested in institutionalisation have come to very different conclusions. The Creoles Abner Cohen (1981) worked with may have had a specific identity, an elitist outlook and an ethnic power base in the bureaucracy, but he did not report widespread corruption, nor the building of personal power bases per se. Instead he described a group with what amounted to a tradition of public service, trying to build the institutions of their new nation and to act as neutral mediators between Sierra Leone’s two dominant ethnic groups. In order to do so they made sure that neither could staff the ranks of the bureaucracy with personnel overly receptive to one group or the other. Werbner (2004) explores these kinds of points even more forcefully.
Werbner argues against the prevailing climate of “afro-pessimism”. His research is based in Botswana, a country that has managed to avoid the cycles of wars, dictatorships, coups and collapsing economies that have characterised other African nations after independence. Werbner worked with a Botswanan elite, whom he describes as “reasonable radicals”. This elite is drawn from members of an ethnic minority, the Kalanga. While this group has some, often unacknowledged, similarities with the elites described by Bayart and Chabal and Daloz, such as the reliance on personal and ethnic ties and the tendency to use a power base in the national bureaucracy as a basis for branching out into personal business enterprises, the conclusions drawn by Werbner are completely different from those of these authors.

Werbner argues that the Kalanga elite in Botswana is primarily concerned with the general good of the nation. According to this argument this elite has been instrumental in helping to create neutral and impartial bureaucratic institutions that do not serve as the power base of a specific leader or political party or for strictly personal or ethnic enrichment, but are responsive to the nation as a whole. These bureaucratic structures have been institutionalised by the general political culture, buoyed by an independent and functioning media, so they will survive the eventual retirement of the current elite from public life. Werbner further states that we must focus on a “second post-colonial era”:

Instead of a focus on violence in collapsed states, the ethnography of the second postcolonial era has to pay more attention to reasonable deliberation, to the political art of negotiated power in good governance, and to the analysis in ethnic relations of the build-up of trust and accommodation, rather than merely conflict and competition (Werbner 2004: 9).

Thus, unlike the work of Bayart, or Chabal and Daloz, Werbner does not see the state primarily as a centre of elite accumulation. On the basis of his observance of these Kalanga bureaucrats, he points to Botswana as a thriving example that democracy can work in Africa.

The arguments put forth by Cohen and even more forcefully by Werbner come to a very different conclusion from Bayart and Chabal and Daloz as to the role of the elite in post-colonial African states. Much of the divergence may come from the specific focus of the analysts. For example, both Bayart and Werbner claim to provide models that help explain an African-wide post-colonial condition. Yet much of their actual research tends to be drawn from specific areas, Cameroon and Mobuto’s Zaire
for Bayart (although he does make efforts to incorporate many more African nations as well) and Botswana for Werbner, countries which have had radically different post-colonial experiences. My investigation of Mozambican elites hints that perhaps the views associated with the “politics of the belly” and institutionalisation are not really incommensurate with each other. Can elites institutionalise themselves in state and economic structures while at the same time enriching themselves? Are both aspects present in differing degrees in different historical periods? It now remains to be seen how these questions and the insights mentioned throughout this introduction can be used for understanding the role of elites in Mozambique.

1.5 The Mozambican Case and Modernity

As we have seen from the examples provided so far one of the major debates in elite studies concerns whether elites form a centralised ruling class or a decentralised aggregate of competing interest groups. Following the examples of Gledhill (1998, 2002), Spencer (2002) and vom Bruck (2005) I argue that the way forward is to examine the unifying political cultures that bind elite together, even if allowing space for intra-elite competition. As I have stated earlier, changing ideological conceptions of modernity among elites’ have provided this unifying political culture in Mozambique. Thus for Mozambican elites modernity was not only the social goal to be strived for, but their role as “modernisers” is also an attempt to provide a powerful legitimising factor for their assumption of high-status positions in society, both internally and to key non-elite constituencies although to differing degrees at different historical periods. In addition, the elite’s role as the “modern” sector of the population allows them to acquire the practical skills to staff positions that allow them to access the resources of the state and increasingly of the international community, and the less tangible abilities, such as the ability to “fit in” among powerful foreigners who currently play such a key role in Mozambican society. To demonstrate this I follow the examples of A. Cohen (1974, 1981), Marcus (1983a, 1983b) and others by not attempting to simply “map” elite positions of power, but instead to understand how they explain their own “folk” conceptions of both power and the discourses that bind them together.

The second point of importance raised by the review of elite literature is to understand the basis for “local” class structures and for African elites this has
primarily been access to the resources controlled by the state. Therefore African elites tend to form a national bourgeoisie who channel state resources towards their own strategies of personal accumulation. While authors such as Bayart (1993) agree that one of the primary bases of African elites is the state, he argues that an excess of attention on the role of the state has neglected older forms of power that find their continuation in modern African elites. It is important not to neglect the possible continuities of pre-colonial forms of power amongst modern elites, but Bayart’s view does not seem to hold in the case of Mozambique. For the elites who are the focus of this study, their formation in the colonial period was deeply tied to their role as lower-level state functionaries. The connection between these elites and the state has grown in importance following Mozambique’s liberation and remains a bulwark of elite status today. What this thesis will examine is how different generations of elites have used their (or in the case of the independence elite their parents’) powerbase within the state to expand into different centres of power, such as the “international community”.

The final point raised by the review of elite literature that will be discussed here concerns the relationships between elites and the wider populations of the countries they control. Analysts like Chabal and Daloz (1999) state that elites in African are not really socially differentiated from the wider population due to the horizontal links created by patronage networks. The evidence arising from my fieldwork in Mozambique serves to complicate this assertion. While links are created between elites and some groups that share a similar social background, other groups are more fully excluded. Furthermore social closeness can continue to exist with groups that are not strongly integrated into elite patronage networks. My thesis shall investigate how social boundaries are continually re-drawn and contested. I argue that patronage networks are not the only, or even necessarily the primary factor in linking elites to other social groups in Mozambique, but rather the group’s perceived relationship to the project of modernity. Modernity is an ambiguous term that often holds multiple meanings. The following section will explore how I use modernity for this thesis and why it is central to social power.

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18 Other high-status groups such as the top levels of the Indian merchant class follow a very different historical trajectory. An in-depth examination of this trajectory is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Modernity

The ideology of modernity for the Mozambican elite has its roots in the colonial period, but came to fruition during the liberation struggle and independence. Unlike many popular understandings of the meaning of modernity, for the revolutionary elite, the term did not necessarily entail increased individualism as social roles become steadily unmoored from societal institutions and its resulting uncertainties, as exemplified by Marx’s famous statement: “All that is solid melts into air” (Berman 1982). Instead modernity, for the early Frelimo party, gave the ideological foundations for a vast, disciplined effort where the needs of the individual would be subsumed to the social good and the country would be united in its attempts to utterly transform society. Thus the initial goal of the Frelimo leadership was not to create a form of “African Socialism” which enjoyed wide popularity in the 1970s, but what Donham calls a “Marxist Modern” (1999). This type of modernity was predicated on the example of the Russian and Chinese revolutions, where tiny elite groups from “backwards” countries seized power and were able to “catch up” with the west by creating strong industrialised societies built, at least theoretically, upon secular and rationalist principles (ibid). Socialism was seen to provide a blueprint for how exploited and marginalized groups could beat the powerful at their own game. Like the “French modern” described by Rabinow (1989), “top-down” technocratic efforts of state-lead social engineering were seen by the revolutionary elite as central to achieving their form of modernity. The primary focus of the revolutionary elite’s project of social engineering was the countryside, which they wanted to transform into “cities in the bush”. Scattered hamlets would have to be centralised into large communal villages, education would be made widely available, gender relations would be equalised, “superstition” and religion would be banished in favour of scientific rationalism, and rural inhabitants would be freed from the “feudalism” of traditional power structures (Fry 2000; Hall and Young 1997; West 1997).

These dramatic transformations also legitimised the need for the revolutionary elite to centralise their hold on power. The concentration of power among the Frelimo leadership was thought of as necessary as they tended to view the population as a passive mass that could be mobilised from above and the nation as a “blank slate” which after the removal of “backwards” cultural traits could be created anew. (Geffray 1991; Hall and Young 1997). The reality of this ambitious programme fell
far short of its lofty goals. Although some parts of Frelimo’s modernisation were popular with some segments of the population, others were less so. The party’s heavy-handed methods of implementation were less popular still. The brave new world the party leadership hoped to build had proved to be unrealisable by the late 1980s, surrounded by the ruins of economic crisis and civil war. Some commentators feel that the Frelimo leadership “learned their lesson” after the tragedy of the civil war: they have now revised their former hostility to “tradition” and view their nation with a less elitist, more open gaze (Fry 2000). I argue that this is not entirely the case. Modernity is in fact a badge of social distinction and elites are still ideologically wedded to and legitimised by their relationship to the overall project of modernity, even if its forms vary in different historical periods. Thus, unlike the Cameroonian elite described by Rowlands, Mozambican elites spend little time trying to rise in “traditional” hierarchies or investing wealth in neo-traditional titles (2002). Instead, both the revolutionary and independence elites are justifying their positions due to the needs of a new project of modernisation that will transform Mozambique from a war-torn, poverty-stricken socialist state to a vibrant and prosperous capitalist democracy. As noted by West, there are many aspects of the current process of capitalist democratisation that echo the dogmatism and messianic ambition of socialism, far more than appears to be the case at first glance (1997: 676).

The central factor of my understanding of the changing ideology of modernity in Mozambique is that it needs to be examined as an analytic device and not necessarily a social condition. Recently much academic attention has been focused on the creation of “alternative” modernities in Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Geschiere 1997). While these works have provided valuable insights into the way modernity is conceived on a local level, questions have been raised as to whether the term “modernity” itself is in fact necessary as a descriptive device or if it masks the presumptions of the researcher (Cooper 2005). Cooper asks:

…is modernity a condition – something written into the exercise of power of political and economic power at a global level? Or is it a representation, a way of talking about the world whose key element is the use of a language of temporal transformation while bringing out the simultaneity of global unevenness, in which “tradition” itself is produced by telling a story about how some people became “modern”? If we are talking about a condition then the question is whether modernity, as an analytic category, encourages us to ask good questions about what that condition is. If we are talking about representations, then the question is whose? (2005: 114)
I respond to Cooper’s challenge by following Ferguson’s (2006) advice to use modernity as a “native category” and to explain how it has become, for my informants, a discourse of identity based on a universal, singular, instead of alternative and multiple, conception that places some ahead and others behind on its scale of progress. This ideal of universal development still has a powerful hold on the imaginations of many people throughout the world, and although it has become popular in academia to equate a universal modernity with a hegemonic and imperialist European ideology, outside academia it represents a hoped-for alleviation of the plight of many. As shown by Nugent (1994, 1998), the initial “modernisation” of a peripheral region in Peru by the central state was not locally seen as an imposition or colonial venture, but as a way to bring economic and political progress and free the population of the often cruel and arbitrary rule of the local aristocracy. Although modernisation theory may be dead as an academic analytic device, it seems it is still thriving as a popular discourse, and in Mozambique, a discourse that is deeply interconnected with social power (Ferguson 1999, 2006).

1.6 Research Setting

An important aspect of my fieldwork was that it was based in a major city, Maputo. The fact that most of my informants are urbanites and often have been for at least two generations is an important factor in their self-identity and a component of their “modernity”. As one Mozambican friend once remarked to me in a discussion about witchcraft: “Well that is what they tell me, I don’t personally know as I am a city person. I stay away from that kind of thing”. Although the practise of witchcraft is alive and well within the city limits of Maputo many of my informants felt that their status as “city people” almost automatically separated them from what they see as elements of “tradition” such as sorcery. The connection between urbanity and modernity was deeply ingrained in many of informants and being urban was in many ways part of being modern. This is not to say that all urbanites are equally modern, as shown by Rotenberg: “In cities, people force the spaces around them to take on meaning” (1993:xiii). Therefore for most of my informants, members of the Mozambican elite or middle class, the epitome of urban modernity was found in the city centre, not the outlying suburbs.
Maputo is Mozambique’s largest city with a population of around three million people. Among the numerous divisions of Maputo, one of the most basic is between the cidade de cimento (cement city), and the cidade de caniço (cane city). During the colonial period, the cement city was reserved for the colonial population. It has European style apartment blocks, houses (usually made from cement rather than brick-built, hence the name) and services. The cane city grew on the outskirts of the cement city and consists of shanty dwellings built by the African population. There were neighbourhoods that blurred the boundaries between these two sections, such as Xipimanine, which was reserved for relatively privileged groups under colonialism, such as mulattos and assimilados. These areas were not as deprived as some sections of the cane city, although they did not have the same standard of amenities as the cement city. After independence and the large-scale exodus of Portuguese settlers, the social make-up of the cement city was transformed. It was no longer a white preserve, but was settled by multiracial (although predominantly black) urbanites. The cane city was also transformed after independence, and grew dramatically, especially after the onset of the civil war, which drove large numbers of internal refugees to the capital seeking the relative security that could be found there. Although the divisions of the city are no longer imposed by a state-held racist ideology, the populations of both sections still live, to all intents and purposes, in two separate worlds. The divisions within the city are symbolic of many of the issues dealt with in this thesis.

Maputo, at least at its centre if not towards its sprawling shantytown margins, is a beautiful city. During the colonial period, Maputo, or Lourenço Marques as it was then known, was widely considered to be one of the most breathtaking cities in Africa and while it suffered from years of neglect and lack of funds during the civil war it is beginning to reclaim its title. Many of the streets are pot-holed and several buildings are still run down, but the city still exudes a tropical charm. Strolling down the wide tree-lined avenues and gazing at the colonial architecture, one appears to be in a setting far distant from the squalid realities of the African urban slum. This impression of the city centre as a self-contained world is borne out by an examination of its inhabitants’ geographical orientation. Almost all of my informants live in the city centre, and the majority of them in the three well-off areas of Polana, Sommerschield, and Bairro Triunfo (neighbourhood of triumph). The city centre is also where most of my informants work and spend their leisure time. Many of my younger informants had limited experience of Maputo outside of the city centre and
some of the wealthier suburbs. One young woman, who works for an international NGO and was sent to the slums just outside of Maputo to collect data, told me of her shock at seeing such squalid living conditions just kilometres from her home. The experience sent her into a deep depression. Rutheiser observed in his work in Belize that social characteristics such as class and occupation are central features for creating distinctive social topographies with poorer parts of cities appearing as “empty zones” for more privileged urban residents (1993: 108-109). Although the slums in Maputo are just a short distance away they do not belong to the world most of my informants normally inhabit.

The world of the city centre which my informants inhabit reminded me of a privileged version of the socially self-contained “urban villages” studied by the Chicago school in the 1920s or William Whyte’s Italian slum (Hannerz 1980; Whyte 1993). Mozambican friends would often complain to me about how Maputo was such a small town that everyone knew everyone. Whenever I would mention that Maputo is a city of around three million people I would receive a bemused look and the response: “You know that is not what I meant, everyone around here (meaning the city centre and the well-off neighbourhoods) knows everyone else”. One can easily see how the conception comes into being. Whenever I accompanied any Mozambican friends to one of Maputo’s beachside cafes, restaurants, bars or night clubs they were sure to run into at least one person they knew well, usually many more. Numerous conversations with informants over coffee were interrupted when someone would walk in and inquire as to the health and general well-being of the informant’s family. Social visits for elites tended to rotate around the same set of well-appointed houses whose furnishings usually appeared similar to upper-middle class residences the world over. During the hot season people would spend the day relaxing by the pool. Even for the houses of the middle classes which were not nearly as grand, family and friends would come over and crowd the living room to watch the latest Brazilian telenovelas (soap operas) on cable television. For elites, visits outside the city centre are usually jaunts to beach towns along the coast or trips abroad to South Africa or further afield. If it not for the endless streams of workers pouring into the city centre from the suburbs and the presence of empregadas (servants) in the houses of elites, the city centre can easily pass for a self-contained bubble floating slightly above Mozambique. As with many aspects of the lives of elites and even the urban middle class, life in the city is quintessentially of Mozambique. These patterns of behaviour
have their roots in the colonial period and assumed their current shape starting with the independence of the nation. Yet compared to the experiences of the vast majority of the population, it is alien enough to border on fantasy.

1.7 Methodology

One of the major difficulties encountered by researchers interested in the elite is the problem of access (Nader 1972; Shore 2002). Elite social circles are difficult to enter for the uninitiated and due to the importance of positions that elites usually occupy; they often have good reasons for limiting the access of outsiders to things that could be considered sensitive (Shore 2002). I circumvented part of this problem through good fortune. I had met some of my initial informants before I undertook this study. I obtained my master’s degree at the University of Cape Town, which is a popular destination for elite Mozambican students when they study abroad. During my fieldwork I was able to become reacquainted with some of the people I had met in Cape Town. As with C. W. Watson (1999) in his fieldwork in Indonesia, I met many of my other informants through previous personal relationships. Needless to say my access was not total. Many of informants and their parents had sensitive jobs, and I had limited access to their places of work. In addition, Maputo is also a busy urban centre, which limited direct empirical observation of some aspects of both work and family life as people had crowded social schedules and were not always available. While this is a drawback to some degree, I think the breadth of contacts I was able to make in a widely varied environment offsets this.

My primary informants were 23 members of the independence elite that I knew well. This group was relatively young with ages ranging from the early 20s to early 30s. Of these 23 informants, 22 had studied abroad for university (the one who did not had to remain in Mozambique for family reasons but he sent his younger siblings to study in South Africa). Thirteen of them had also studied abroad for at least part of their secondary school education as well. The most popular countries for education were South Africa (for both secondary school and university) and the United Kingdom (for university). Other countries included Portugal (for both secondary school and university), the US (secondary school and university), Brazil (university) and Swaziland (secondary school). Of the 22 informants who studied abroad, 21 took university degrees in law and the social sciences and one in
architecture. One other informant obtained an MBA after an undergraduate degree in the social sciences. Many had started working for various governmental ministries after their education and then moved to the more highly remunerated international agencies. Government salaries were typically about £160 per month and international agencies tended to start at around £385 and the top positions could pay up to £825 per month. Of the 23, three were still studying. A further two worked for family businesses; the rest worked for the government or international agencies. Many were able to supplement their incomes with money from their families, or more occasionally through rents earned from properties they or their families owned.

Through my connections with my primary informants among the independence elite I was able to gain access to members of the revolutionary elite, often family members of my initial informants. This was supplemented with contacts I made through my affiliation at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. All together I was able to perform a series of semi-structured interviews with 40 people. In addition to my informants among the elite I also had 16 primary informants among the urban middle classes and one middle class family that I was especially close to. All were studying or had studied within Mozambique and while they held a diverse selection of jobs, (although many were also employed by international agencies) salaries tended to average around £200 per month, although two with relatively high positions at international agencies earned around £650.

In addition to more formal interviews one of my major techniques for gathering data was through participant observation. As with William Whyte’s (1993) “Street Corner Society” I found that pulling out a notepad and a pen in social situations outside formal interviews made my informants uncomfortable. Following Whyte’s advice I trained myself to remember casual conversations that I could write down later. In many cases the information obtained from more casual social settings was just as informative, if not more so, than that gleaned from formal interviews. More casual information was used to incorporate Gluckman’s famous method of situational analysis, typified in his study of the opening of a bridge in Zululand (1958). Following Gluckman’s lead I watched the social interactions of elites with each other and members of wider social groups to understand how these interactions: “create a wider social and historical analysis” (Hannerz 1980: 132-133). Yet participant observation alone could be a one-sided and somewhat daunting method in a large, busy African city where: “Network chains run on without visible end, new
faces keep showing up while others drift out of the picture unpredictably” (Hannerz 1980: 312 cf Ferguson 1999). I supplemented participant observation with the collection of over 30 life histories and case studies. Life histories were crucial for understanding a situation, which due to its urban nature and an extended period of political and social change, was extremely fluid. Through life histories I could gradually see patterns in social relationships emerge and also attempt to trace how they had changed over time (Bernard 1988; Bertaux 1981; de Camargo 1981). In addition I found it useful to combine observations from life histories and case studies with that of participant observation to attempt to build on Turner’s extended case study (1957). Thus through observation I could watch how the repercussions of an interaction, or series of interactions, often ones that I had only had described to me during life histories, played out over time. This was a key factor in understanding both the formation of social roles and how they had changed through recent history.

Following the lead of Gupta (1995) I was also interested in forms of popular media such as television, radio, and the newspaper. I used these to understand how representations of class were formed on the national and global level. Practically, this was done by discussing news and media stories with my informants, especially those concerning the government and corruption. Two pivotal stories were of particular importance. One suggested the possible involvement of members of the current government in the South African plot to assassinate Mozambique’s first president, Samora Machel. The other was the second nationally televised trial in Mozambique, concerning the assassination of a prominent journalist, Carlos Cardoso. Cardoso had been investigating a serious embezzlement scandal that occurred in some of Mozambique’s banks, during and immediately after privatisation. A powerful family was implicated and allegations were made against the President’s eldest son. This trial captured the attention of the city and was a constant topic of conversation. I spent many hours discussing the trial and watching it on television with various families, exploring the gulf between the elite and popular opinions concerning the facts of the trial and looking at how they exposed the nature and morality of the current regime and its primary beneficiaries.

The high social profile of many of my informants and the relative smallness of their community raises several ethical issues. While the discipline of anthropology has established relatively strict (although frequently debated and often challenged) ethical guidelines, there tends to be an underlying assumption that most anthropological
informants belong to groups that are poor and oppressed (cf. Gledhill 1994). The types of protection advocated for these groups are not necessarily the same for groups of higher social status. In this respect I found myself in slightly less well-charted waters. While I always made sure to stress to my informants my role as an anthropologist, it can be difficult for people to keep this in their mind for 24 hours a day over the course of 20 months. I was occasionally told things that could be quite damaging; both for the informant and for other people and my analysis did not always coincide with peoples’ self-representations. I have tried to the best of my ability not to include anything in this thesis that I feel could overtly compromise any of my informants. In addition I did not pose questions of a financial nature. These could be very delicate, especially when standards of living appeared to be in excess of stated resources. Due to the small size of the study group and their widespread fluency in English I have also made an extra effort to protect the identities of my informants. Names have been changed, unless requested otherwise, and actual positions (i.e. Minister of Information) have been purposely left vague unless it is a matter of public record or if I was interviewing someone in their political capacity. In addition this thesis contains no photographs as people and often even their houses are easily recognised.

1.8 Thesis Chapter Outline

The following chapter provides a historical outline, giving a brief general overview of Mozambican history and then focuses on the late colonial period and the post-independence period in the south of the country where my research was based. In this chapter I argue that the particular structure of the colonial elite distanced them from “traditional” power structures and helped make ideas of “modernisation” attractive to their descendents the revolutionary elite. Chapter Three examines what it means to be modern for the Mozambican elites in different periods of history and how this conception of modernity confers both social power and a sense of uniqueness in a country that the elite have seen and continue to see as still fundamentally “backward”. I examine the elites’ changing conceptions of modernity from the liberation struggle to the present and the types of social power that were exemplified by different forms of modernity. The chapter argues that, despite the fact the Mozambican elite has held differing ideological conceptions of the overall project of modernity, throughout
various stages in history elites connections to the ideology of modernity both legitimises the ruling group and entitles them to their social status. The chapter specifically investigates the role of education abroad, showing how it inculcates a sense of cosmopolitan modernity. It also discusses elite patterns of consumption that demonstrate this modernity on an everyday basis.

In Chapter Four I discuss the local connotations of racialised discourse in Mozambique from the colonial period to the present. The chapter explains why young elites in the current period often use a derogatory racialised vocabulary to speak about people even when they belong to the same racial group. It argues that the concept of race for my informants is drawn from a larger idiom that originated in the colonial period and was used to express social difference, not just in relation to Europeans or the Portuguese, but also to the larger population. I further argue that although this discourse has colonial roots, it was grounded in the liberation struggle and early independence period, including an attempted coup by extreme Portuguese settlers and an outbreak of racial violence that formed the “transitional moment” for the modern elite’s understanding of race. I contend that although independence was won through a long peasant-based struggle, the Frelimo leadership shared a predominantly urban background and a commitment to modernity that caused deep distrust, which sometimes verged on contempt, for much of the peasant population and for what the leadership saw as “traditional” ways of life. I then investigate how political and social changes that have followed the fall of socialism have been accompanied by a different kind of racial discourse, which is used against other high-status groups as former bonds of solidarity begin to fray. I argue that in Mozambique racial discourse does not speak of biological differences per se, but of social position and behaviours that are thought to accompany certain groups.

In Chapter Five I examine the complicated relationship of elites to the urban middle classes in Maputo. Although the Frelimo leadership was initially suspicious of the urban middle classes shortly after independence, the similar social background of the latter helped make them the most receptive to the party’s message of modernity. They also had the skills to staff the growing state apparatus. The middle class soon became one of the bastions of party support and the boundaries between them and elites began to blur. The chapter argues, however, that the intertwined processes of democratisation and neo-liberalism, which were theoretically supposed to enfranchise the population, have in fact created a growing social gap between the two and Frelimo
is losing its legitimacy among its former staunch supporters. The chapter further demonstrates, by using a famous scandal as an example, how the elite’s utilisation of social networks has created a growing sense of conspiracy among the middle classes.

In Chapter Six, the final ethnographic chapter, I examine the often contradictory effects of Frelimo’s plans to introduce “modern” relationships and emancipate women. This chapter argues that considerable tensions have arisen from the social closeness of elites and the urban middle classes and the imperatives of elite consolidation which have stressed endogamy, both during socialism as the need to strengthen the “ideological family” and in the present capitalist era to consolidate resources often through marriage and minimizing ties with poorer kin. However, while there may be an elite ideal of endogamy, it is frequently circumvented on the ground. I examine the individual strategies used by my informants to achieve their objectives within the existing social constraints.

Chapter Seven is the conclusion. In this chapter I outline the major points of the thesis which demonstrate how an ideological conception of modernity has been central in the formation of the Mozambican elite and ensuring their continued social dominance. In addition I describe the strengths and weakness of the study and examine the contributions it makes and the further research questions it poses.
Chapter Two

The Modernity of Elites: a Historical Background

The Blacks in Africa must be directed and moulded by Europeans but they are indispensable as assistants to the latter.... The Africans by themselves did not account for a single useful invention nor any usable technical discovery, no conquest that counts in the evolution of humanity, nothing that can compare to the accomplishments in the areas of culture and technology by Europeans or even by Asians. (Former Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano 1950 quoted in Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 27).

When the whites came to our country we had the land, and they had the bible; now we have the bible and they have the land (Popular saying, quoted in Mondlane 1969: 23).

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the historical background for the growth of the modernist elites in Mozambique. In this chapter I argue that the elite ideology of modernity drew, in part, on the elites’ colonial experiences. The nucleus of the revolutionary elite had its origins as an urban-based petty bourgeoisie, and despite the fact that many of Frelimo’s leaders came from families that had connections with powerful or royal African families, they often became enmeshed in the colonial system instead of African “traditional” power structures such as chieftdoms or lineage based organisations. This group was mostly of southern origin and was participating in an economic system firmly tied to that of the country’s more powerful and industrialised neighbour, South Africa. Many members of the embryonic colonial elite were concentrated in the more “modern” sectors of the economy, and their economic background was primarily based in state employment, migratory labour, the service industry, and, more rarely, commercial farming. I argue that the social and economic origins during the colonial period of the Mozambican elite were influential in sowing the seeds of a modernist ideology with a strong anti-rural and anti-traditional bias. This is not to say that the elite ideology of modernity is a mechanical outgrowth of Portuguese colonial policy. In some ways it is counter-intuitive to the manner in

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19 The actual growth and formation of the elite’s modernising ideology is examined in the following chapter.
which Portugal tried to rule Mozambique for much of the colonial period, but the nucleus of this ideology was shaped by the relationship and interactions between the colonial elite and the colonial state. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the historical processes that have contributed to the particular formation of a state-based, modernising revolutionary elite. This chapter focuses on the formation of a particular colonial elite in the south of Mozambique in general and in the capital in particular.20 I begin my historical examination with Portuguese contact and do not attempt an analysis of pre-colonial history; instead my general concentration is on the 100 years preceding independence and primarily on the formation and rise of Frelimo.

2.2 Portuguese Contact

The paradox of Portuguese imperialism was that although they had one of the great colonial empires, their internal weakness served to limit the effective penetration of Portuguese rule for much of the colonial period. The Portuguese often had to align themselves with local leaders and the early years of their rule provided the indigenous elites with opportunities to increase their power. Although Portuguese propaganda stressed that they were the master of one of the oldest and most durable colonial empires in Africa, one lasting close to 500 years, their ability to actually rule the lands they claimed was limited throughout much of the colonial period. The formation of Portugal’s colonial empire did not stem from the subordination of the colonies to supply resources for growing mercantile and later industrial strength, as may be argued for Great Britain, but from internal weakness. The ruling elite of a small state that had difficulties in supplying enough food to feed its own population, looked to foreign shores for the resources necessary to enrich themselves (Alpers and Ehret 1975; Axelson 1973; Newitt 1981, 1995). Their internal weakness, combined with fierce foreign military and economic competition, resulted in the empire being constructed on shaky foundations. The continuing weakness at the political centre was to have far-reaching consequences for the type of colonialism practised in Portugal’s imperial possessions and even for their version of colonialism’s eventual demise.

Portugal first made contact with sub-Saharan populations in West Africa in 1443 (Newitt 1981, 1995). At the time the Portuguese elite was less concerned with

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20 With the exception of the discussion of the liberation struggle (1964-1974) which was concentrated in the far north of Mozambique.
extending their control to new territories than they were with discovering and securing a ready supply of slaves, gold and other commodities that could be marketed in Europe (Newitt 1981, 1995). As the Portuguese arrived in Mozambique in 1498 and their empire expanded along the west and east African coast in the 16th Century, they began to view Africa in a new light, hoping to replicate the recent conquests made by Spain in the new world and find their own fabulous sources of wealth (Axelson 1973; Isaacman and Isaacman 1983; Newitt 1981, 1995). However the societies that the Portuguese initially encountered in what was to become central and northern Mozambique were very different from those found in Central and South America. There was no unified empire which a small group of Portuguese soldiers could neutralise with a decisive blow to the capital, nor was there large-scale infrastructure or apparatus for administration and domination that could be co-opted for colonial rule. Instead the Portuguese encountered a widely varied social mosaic of coastal merchant towns. These towns were deeply involved in long-standing Indian Ocean trade networks that were often dominated by Arab, Indian and Swahili traders who were connected to the inland, matrilineal polities through a complicated set of relationships involving intermarriage, trade and patronage (Alpers and Ehret 1975; Newitt 1981, 1995). The Portuguese King ordered that these networks be reformed and brought under imperial control. But for agents on the ground, it was far more feasible to focus on creating a niche in the existing system. Many Portuguese agents employed the selective use of their limited military forces to bargain for an advantageous position within these networks rather than attempting outright domination.

Until very late in the 19th Century the Portuguese Empire in Mozambique was a somewhat ramshackle edifice (Atmore 1985; Smith and Clarence 1985). Imperial rule was limited to a few small isolated outposts and much of the actual power and commerce was in the hands of foreign capital, sertanejos (Portuguese hunters and rural traders), Swahili, Indian and Arab merchants, African chiefs, and prominent Afro-Portuguese families (Alpers and Ehret 1975; Axelson, 1973).21 Much of the territory that makes up the modern nation-state of Mozambique was not brought fully under Portuguese government control until after the First World War. For hundreds of years the Portuguese colonialists who settled in Mozambique were of limited number.

21 Even in isolated outposts, Portuguese representatives often concentrated on building up their own economic networks at the expense of the state (Newitt 1995).
They frequently married into locally prominent families and, unlike some other colonial powers such as the British, they tended not to introduce new methods of production or new technologies (until very late in the colonial period) but rather to adapt themselves and make use of what was already there (Newitt 1995: 29-30, 100). Portugal’s style of colonialism, the brutality and lack of overall development that accompanied their rule, the apparent permissiveness towards “miscegenation”\(^{22}\) and the tendency for local officials to adopt African social patterns, caused wide-spread condemnation and contempt among the other colonial powers, particularly Great Britain (Chabal 2002; Fry 2000; Newitt 1995; Penvenne 1995).

This sense of siege combined with the long-term political weakness in Portugal itself, its dependence on outside foreign capital and numerous attempts by other colonial powers to seize territory claimed by Portugal, gave rise to a sense of national humiliation in the metropole. Many Portuguese felt the other European powers viewed them as “little better than the natives” themselves. The combination of these factors resulted in an extremely nationalistic colonial policy, which meant that a peaceful process of decolonisation was unlikely. These trends were accelerated after the advent of a quasi-fascist dictatorship in Portugal in 1928 known as the “New State”. The dictatorship’s colonial policy consisted of attempts to draw the colonies ever more tightly within the Portuguese grip (they later became known as overseas provinces) and to use the colonies’ resources and markets to try to modernise Portugal itself. Colonial possessions also became a symbol of Portuguese national pride, proof that Portugal was not just a small and poor country.

Indeed, the cultural and material factors of Portuguese colonialism helped to create many of the crucial difficulties of the post-colonial state. Frelimo inherited a country characterised by weak internal cohesion, with a few highly developed cities and agricultural areas that were connected to neighbouring countries rather than to the vast surrounding hinterlands, which had little real infrastructure and overwhelming illiteracy. In addition to the physical difficulties of trying to rule the new nation, there was a wide divergence between the social outlook of the relatively educated revolutionary elite, whose members tended to hail from the urban areas and the most

\(^{22}\) Portugal’s multiracial rhetoric only became stressed in government propaganda towards the end of the colonial period as they attempted to win over critics and deny possible support to Frelimo. Much of this rhetoric was marred by utter hypocrisy, as noted by Eduardo Mondlane who commented that despite the government’s statement about the Portuguese having a “special and close” affinity with their African subjects there are far fewer mulattos in Mozambique than in South Africa, where interracial unions were barred by law (Mondlane, 1969).
economically developed parts of the country, and that of the mass of the population. Considerable tensions resulted, and these have lasted, and even intensified, up to the present day.

2.3 The Founding of Delagoa Bay and Colonialism in the South of Mozambique

The south of Mozambique was long considered a backwater by the Portuguese, but its eventual pacification resulted in almost contradictory effects. Unlike many areas of Mozambique that were formally administered by chartered companies, the south was brought under direct control of the Portuguese state. Yet, at the same time, due to its geographical position and years of colonial neglect the south had already become deeply intertwined in the British dominated regional economy and Portuguese firms were often at a disadvantage.

During the first three centuries of the “empire” Portuguese officials concentrated their attention on the central and northern port cities of the area that would become Mozambique. As if to demonstrate their commitment to international trade and their lack of interest in the land itself, Mozambique was officially ruled from Goa until 1752. Then the capital was then moved to the Island of Mozambique, off the coast of the present province of Nampula in the north. Although the far south of Mozambique had a natural deep water sea port in Delagoa Bay, which later became Maputo, contact was limited and most Portuguese in the area were survivors of shipwrecks. This gradually began to change with the expansion of the ivory trade. By 1589 the Portuguese had a limited official presence in the area that eventually became the colonial capital of Lourenço Marques and later the independent capital of Maputo. In addition to the Portuguese presence, Delagoa Bay was already inhabited by African societies drawn to the area because of the abundant opportunities to engage in whaling (Newitt 1995: 160-162).

The Portuguese attempted to draw these societies and the groups inhabiting the hinterlands into their already existing trade networks and installed a barter system for ivory. While significant profits were made from the ivory trade, the populations the Portuguese encountered in the south were structurally very different from those in the other areas of Mozambique and were more difficult to incorporate into the existing system. Much of the south was semi-arid and lacked the rich agricultural land of the centre of the country. The area was populated more sparsely and the
populations were patrilineal, with wealth and political power concentrated in the ownership of cattle. Young men would work for elders to gain the cattle necessary for lobolo (bride-price in many southern languages). While Portuguese trade goods were in use, they did not gain the significance that they held in other parts of the country and more attention was focused on the internal cattle economy (Feliciano 1998; Newitt 1995). Portuguese manpower was limited and most colonial governors found it more profitable to focus their attention on the slave trade that was primarily run from the port cities in the centre and north of the country. The south was barely incorporated into existing imperial political structures and, outside small outposts, was left to its own devices until the 1885 “Scramble for Africa”, when it was decreed that effective occupation was the primary basis for a colonial power to claim hegemony over territory (Axelson 1973; Newitt 1981, 1995).

Although the south of Mozambique may have initially been a backwater even by the standards of a ramshackle empire, it was by no means isolated. By the end of the 18th Century the town of Lourenço Marques, which had been founded on Delagoa Bay, was becoming an area of commercial importance. English ships from India were calling to trade for ivory and an Englishman in the service of Austria had set up a permanent trade factory (Atmore 1985; Newitt 1995). The Portuguese presence was still relatively weak, especially after the outbreak of the revolutionary wars in Europe. French ships often attacked the Portuguese in the area and local chiefs found they could get higher prices from English and Dutch merchants. These cosmopolitan connections increased in the 19th Century. South African labour recruiters were active in bringing southern Mozambican labourers into the Transvaal republic, and British Indian merchants dominated the local trade networks, dealing with and competing against sertanejos and local African leaders and prominent Afro-Portuguese families (Harries 1994; Penvenne 1995). The cosmopolitan make up of Lourenço Marques and Britain’s designs on the area worried the Portuguese administration. In addition to European threats, strong African polities had also established themselves in southern Mozambique.

The competition amongst colonial powers for African territories threatened to become dangerous and destabilising and efforts were made to settle boundary disputes between European states in the famous Conference of Berlin in 1884-85. Portugal came with the mapa cor de rosa (pink or rose coloured map) that stated their claims for a large swathe of central Africa, from the Atlantic coast of Angola to the
Mozambican coast on the Indian Ocean. Although Portuguese explorers had followed the tried and tested colonial formula of signing treaties with anyone who could pass as an African authority figure, many of Portugal’s claims were rejected. At the Berlin conference it was decided that effective occupation would be one of the major criteria in assigning territories. While Portugal claimed vast amounts of Africa were subject to its suzerainty the reality was very different. The south was already being economically incorporated into neighbouring South Africa, and the central section of Mozambique was divided into prazos. Prazos were theoretically land grants, usually to Afro-Portuguese families that ruled in the name of the king and were subject to royal renewal. In actuality, prazos tended to resemble personal fiefdoms, in which loyalty to the king operated in name only and the actual power was that of the “feudal lords” backed by personal slave armies. Other territories in the centre and the north of the country were held by chartered companies that effectively wielded the powers of a government (Roberts 1986). The companies had their own police forces, they printed their own currencies and profited through the extraction of taxes. Many of these companies were owned by foreign capital. The Niassa Company for example in the far north was around 80% British owned (Newitt 1995). Portugal’s grand claims were rejected and envious eyes were cast towards their remaining territory. Britain and Germany long considered dividing Mozambique between them. However, Portugal’s diplomatic defeat at the Conference of Berlin unleashed a wave of colonial nationalism among the metropolitan population and the government tried with renewed vigour to extend effective control over its remaining possessions.

One of the targets for suppression was the Gaza Empire in the south of Mozambique. The Gaza Empire had grown out of the series of regional conquests and disturbances known as the Mfecane, unleashed by the growth of the Zulu Empire. Renegade Zulu generals had fled into Mozambique and used their disciplined armies and new tactics to establish their hegemony over local groups (Feliciano 1998; Newitt 1995; Smith and Clarence 1985). By 1894 the Portuguese had decided that the Gaza Empire had to be destroyed. Although the then emperor, Gungunhana, had officially aligned himself with the Portuguese, he had allowed Swiss Protestant missionaries from across the border with South Africa in his court, and the Portuguese colonial establishment suspected him of favouring the British and Kruger’s then Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek. With the Portuguese government increasingly aware of the fragility of their empire after the Conference of Berlin and with the temptation of
securing the valuable commerce flowing through Lourenço Marques for their cash-strapped operations, the threat of a strong, independent African polity that could possibly side with colonial rivals was simply too much. Following the example of the recent military victory by Cecil Rhodes in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese government declared war on the Gaza Empire in 1895 and resistance was completely crushed by 1897.

The Gaza Empire had internal weaknesses that could be exploited. Its rulers had exploited and dominated other ethnic groups, subjecting them to repeated raids and obliging them to pay tribute (Feliciano 1998; Honwana 1988; Newitt 1995). The Portuguese sent a relatively strong force of European soldiers to forge military alliances with the disaffected groups who had suffered under Gaza rule. When war broke out the Gaza Empire had some successes and even managed to infiltrate and attack Lourenço Marques, but the superior firepower of the Portuguese and their allies soon brought the war to a close. In 1895 Gungunhana was defeated and captured. The Portuguese then exiled him to the Azores Islands. One of Gungunhana’s chief commanders, Maguinuana, continued the fight against the Portuguese, but he was captured in 1897 and beheaded, thus ending not only the Gaza Empire, but any significant, independent African polity in the south of Mozambique.

The Gaza wars were to have great significance for the future forms of Portuguese colonialism. The victory restored Portuguese pride in their colonial empire, after the humiliation at the Conference of Berlin and military setbacks in other parts of Mozambique. The Portuguese commander, António Ennes, became a national hero and was made the next colonial governor. During his period of office he reinvigorated the administration and began to solidify Portuguese control over Mozambique. The capital was also moved from Mozambique Island in the north to Lourenço Marques in 1898 as the area was directly under state control (Newitt 1995; Penvenne 1995).

However, the effects of the Gaza wars went beyond a revitalised colonial administration. Although Frelimo was later to portray Gungunhana as a proto-nationalist hero, at the time his influence was deeply divisive. As previously stated other ethnic groups, tired of Gaza depredations, had joined the Portuguese war effort. When Gungunhana was captured his own men began to chant: “Away with you,

23 Although foreign capital would continue to be pre-dominant in the economy until the advent of the New State in 1928.
vulture, slaughterer of our chickens” (quoted in Honwana 1988: 43). Despite Gungunhana’s ignominious departure from the political scene his resistance later became a nationalist myth. Samora Machel stated that he began to develop his political consciousness as a young man through hearing the stories of his grandfather who was a commander in Gungunhana’s armies (Christie 1989). Machel’s successor, Joaquim Chissano, also had ancestors who fought with Gungunhana and in Frelimo mythology Gungunhana became one of the first proto-nationalists. Like many nationalist myths the reality was in fact far more contradictory. This can be seen in the ancestry of other members of the Frelimo leadership. For example, Eduardo Mondlane, the founder of Frelimo, came from the Chope, a coastal group living further to the north and whose people had been victimised by the Gaza Empire and had on occasion sided with the Portuguese. Members of other southern groups, such as the Ronga, also aided the Portuguese in the conquest of Gaza. One such example is the father of Raúl Honwana, the patriarch of a prominent Frelimo family. He had fought with the Portuguese during the Gaza war and later served as a translator.

The destruction of the Gaza Empire was to have wider implications for the future structure of the colonial and eventually the revolutionary elites beyond the formation of a nationalist myth. When the Portuguese went to war with the Gaza Empire they made no attempt to preserve its structures and utilise them for the purposes of indirect rule after the conflict. They simply destroyed them. This act of destruction left behind the seeds of what would become a nationalist myth, but it also left a significant “traditional” power vacuum, which was filled by the Portuguese administration. This situation accelerated the penetration of international capital and the importance of migrant labour, a process that had begun under Gungunhana’s rule. In Gaza Portuguese allies were being promoted to positions of power and the remainder of the population had to find sources of income that could pay the ever-increasing government taxes. The future for ambitious African youths in the south, especially the areas near Maputo, no longer resided so much with rising in the ranks of “traditional” power structures, as these were being filled by outsiders, but with finding employment, in the mines of South Africa or in the growing southern capital. These developments helped, in part, to weaken the links between the indigenous southern colonial elite and traditional power structures, a development that was to have momentous consequences in the post-colonial era. Ironically, the destruction of the Gaza Empire and the incorporation of the south into the colonial state set the
scene for the formation of an urban-based modernising elite who would eventually overthrow Portuguese dominion over Mozambique.

2.4 The Formation of the Colonial elite

After the destruction of the Gaza Empire, the future colonial elite became more tightly bound with Mozambique’s new capital, Lourenço Marques. In the last years of the Portuguese monarchy, from 1877 to 1910, Lourenço Marques had an open economic policy (in contrast to other Mozambican ports) and in combination with the growth of the mining industry in the Transvaal, changed Lourenço Marques from a half-forgotten backwater fort to a centre of commerce, although the lion’s share of trade was controlled by British capital. Yet Lourenço Marques’ growing prosperity did not impress visiting Europeans and for many neighbouring colonial powers Portuguese imperialism was synonymous with misrule. An early British visitor described the city as follows:

The future of Delagoa Bay (the English name for Lourenço Marques) under Portuguese rule can be but decay and death… This mass of grass huts, reed fences, decayed forts… and stench is enclosed by a wall about six feet high. At one time the slave and ivory trade must have made this an important station, but the abolition of the former and the failure of the other… have reduced the place to the most miserable condition (quoted in Penvenne 1995: 32).

Other British observers were even harsher in their judgement, stating that Lourenço Marques was a symbol of the racial degeneracy of both Africans and the Portuguese and demonstrated that the Portuguese were unfit to rule the territory: “… set in a land of loveliness, surrounded by rich luxuriant vegetation (Lourenço Marques) is cursed with malaria and given over to lazy people who wallow in their filth…” (Penvenne 1995: 32). However by the first decade of the 20th Century the city had a modern port with a hydraulic crane, forty or so miles of macadam roadway, hotels and handsome villas with mosquito proofed verandas (Penvenne 1995: 33). While the colonial capital developed modern amenities for the white population, this was the beginning of the steady disenfranchisement of the African population and the colonial elite.

24 One observer described the Portuguese of Lourenço Marques as: “dissolute, immoral and useless” (Penvenne 1995: 32).
There is a current debate in African studies concerning whether there were substantial differences among the colonial systems implemented by different European powers or if, despite rhetoric, they effectively followed the same logic differing primarily in extremes (Mamdani 1996). While the finer points of this debate are beyond the scope of this chapter, I argue that the Portuguese colonial model did have specific characteristics that derived both from the specific ideological conceptions of what the empire was to be and from the political and economic weakness of the mother country itself. This does not mean Portuguese colonialism was static; it took different forms throughout the periods of monarchy, republican rule and Salazar’s “New State”. In addition much of the practical implementation, until the advent of the New State, depended on the personality of the colonial governors, who, in practice had considerable autonomy from Lisbon and often implemented their own policies.

Throughout much of the empire’s history the Portuguese presence in Mozambique was extremely limited and many of the predominantly male colonialists would marry into African families, often recognising and giving their nationality to the children of these unions who were then able to find relatively high-ranking positions in trade or the colonial administration (Hedges 1999; Mateus 1999; Penvenne 1989, 1995). Although the phenomenon of local elites obtaining high positions was not unknown in other parts of Africa, it tended to characterise only the early periods of colonialism; barriers became tighter during the 19th and 20th Centuries with the growth of so-called “scientific racism” (Dubow 1995; Mann 1985; Stoler 1997).

The fact that the Portuguese men often intermarried or at least kept mistresses among the African population, and that they often recognised their children, led to charges of miscegenation and degeneracy from other European powers. The Portuguese responded by stating that they were bringing European civilisation to the “natives” and that this demonstrated the Portuguese’s ability to understand and interact with their subject population. They used this supposed

25 António de Oliveira Salazar was made the minister of finance for the military junta that overthrew the Portuguese Republic in 1926. After accomplishing the Herculean task of balancing the budget he became the dominant voice in the junta and was appointed Prime Minister in 1932. He held power until incapacitated by a stroke in 1968. Salazar established a quasi-fascist authoritarian regime that borrowed heavily from Mussolini’s corporativist ideology and local nationalism, it was called o Estado Novo (the New State). He kept Portugal neutral in the Second World War and was later able to become a member of NATO and benefited from their assistance during the liberation wars in Africa (Newitt 1981).

26 This is not to say that forms of “scientific racism” were not influential among the Portuguese during the colonial period. They were, there were simply some differences in implementation.
enlightened attitude to try and deflect charges of Portuguese complicity in the illegal slave trade. During the last stages of the “New State” (1932-1974) it became a full-blown ideological justification of Portuguese colonial domination. This ideology, known as *lusotropicalismo*, stated that, unlike the racist rule of other colonial powers, Portugal was uniquely endowed with the ability to reign over Africans in harmony and advance their level of civilisation (Hedges 1999; Newitt 1981; Roberts 1986).

Although many of the claims of *lusotropicalismo* were hypocritical at best and outright falsehoods at worst, this form of colonialism did give the Mozambican elite a distinctive character. As stated earlier in this chapter, the colonial elite was primarily urban-based. Although many members of this group found the grand claims of Portuguese colonialism laughable and only participated to gain its benefits for themselves and their families, it did begin to create an identification with a form of metropolitan culture, if not the specific metropolitan power (Honwana 1988; Sithole and Ingwane 1977). It also created an indigenous elite that was complicit, to a degree, with the colonial system.

While the Portuguese may have made some concessions to colonial elites, their rule was characterised by poverty and brutality for the majority of the population. In the charter concessions in the centre and north of the country, companies were free to make their profits by using the population in whatever way they saw fit. The situation was slightly different in the south, which was under direct government control. The government soon found that its major resource, outside of a deep-water port, was the local population (Hanlon 1990). By 1897 Portugal had signed treaties with the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek over the amount of migrant labour that would be exported to South Africa. This treaty survived the Anglo-Boer war and it was decided that the South Africans would also send workers’ salaries directly to the Portuguese colonial administration, where they would take a portion and then deliver the rest to the worker (Harries 1994; Norman 2004). In addition the south saw the widespread use of *chibalo* (forced labour).27 It was declared that it was an African’s duty to work, and if someone did not have a job they were sent to do *chibalo*, with minimal, if any payment, either for public works or for private companies (Hedges 1999; Newitt; 1995; Penvenne 1995). Conditions of *chibalo* were little better than slavery. Although the workers were often called “volunteers”, the

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27 There are various spellings of the word *chibalo*; it can also spelled as *shibalo* or *chibaro*. I have used the most common spelling.
name was a fiction. Raúl Honwana recalled a Portuguese official presenting 12
chibalo labourers to his boss and saying “I hereby present 12 volunteers, all duly
manacled” (Honwana 1988: 87).

While many members of the colonial elite were spared this indignity and
many, especially in the elite associations of Gremio (a Catholic, mulatto dominated
association of powerful old families) and Instituto Negrofilo (a black and protestant
dominated elite association with fewer ties to the Portuguese state)28 raised their
voices against colonial abuses, some of these same people also directly profited from
them (Casimiro 1979; Penvenne 1989, 1996). Despite the fact that many of their
members spoke passionately against the injustices suffered by the majority of the
population, these institutions (Which, in many ways they served as early attempts for
elites to institutionalise themselves) were formed for the protection of elite interests
and often displayed a sense of superiority which frequently earned them the distrust of
the common people (Penvenne 1989, 1996).29 In addition, although the colonial elite
also suffered discrimination, some forms of discriminatory measures also served the
class interests of some members, such as chibalo. Some African elites also made use
of chibalo and one of the most eloquent voices against colonial abuses, that of João
Albasini, was directly involved in the chibalo trade (Penvenne 1996). While colonial
elites criticised government abuses, their attitude towards the majority of the
population was often characterised by class-based attitudes and patronising
condescension towards what they viewed as “backwards” or “bush blacks” (Penvenne
1989).30 Due to the ambiguous position of some members of the colonial elite, as both
champions of the people and government lackeys, the majority of the population
viewed them with hostility and saw them as a local outgrowth of the Portuguese
(Penvenne 1989, 1996). They occupied an uneasy place between the Portuguese and
the majority of the population, and were regarded with suspicion by both.

The high point for the colonial elite in southern Mozambique was the period
between the end of the Monarchy and the beginning of Republican rule (1910-1926).
The latter was the start of their decline, especially for mulattos, who were formerly
known as brancas da terra (whites of the land, or local whites). White immigration

28 Protestant Missions offered superior educational facilities that allowed some of their members to join
the African elite, but the missions also were the subjects of state hostility. This is explained in more
detail in Chapter Three.
29 This is discussed in more detail in Chapters Three and Four.
30 These elite institutions and elite attitudes towards the majority of the population are examined in
more depth in Chapter Three.
increased and the administration no longer needed to rely on Mulattos, instead they started to become more of an embarrassment and were marked as a separate and inferior racial group (Penvenne 1979: 17-18). As the colonial state consolidated its hold on Mozambique, the status of and opportunities for the colonial elite began to dwindle. The political and economic weakness of the mother country, which had originally empowered them, was now beginning to work against them. The Portuguese government wanted to consolidate its hold over its colonial possessions and increasingly the state tried to do this by importing administrators and settlers it felt it could control and whose undivided loyalty it commanded. The state attempted to carry out this goal by increasing white immigration and by intensifying older imperial strategies. During the Monarchy, the Portuguese had not relied solely on African members of the colonial elite to undertake the colony’s administrative burden, but had also imported Indians from their possessions in Goa. Goans were well-established in both the lower and middle ranges of the administration and Indians connected with British colonies and the long-standing trade diaspora had a filled a mercantile niche in Mozambique, who later formed one of the key components of the Indian merchant class. The course of the often-troubled relationship between this group and the post-independence elites was influenced by this early competition. In addition, white immigration that began to increase after the republican revolution became a flood during the “New State”, especially after the Second World War. The competition for suitable positions became a tripartite racial struggle (Birmingham 1992: 15-16).

In many British colonies there were whites from relatively poor backgrounds, but with perhaps the exception of large segments of the Afrikaans population in South Africa, whatever their class standing was at home, white migrants could reasonably assume that they were destined for high-ranking positions upon arrival in Africa. Portuguese immigration tended to follow a different pattern. Migrants were frequently from the mother country’s rural poor and they often had low levels of education and literacy. The state systematically starved Africans of resources to build amenities for whites and ensure a relatively high standard of living for Portuguese migrants, but despite their continuing efforts many whites only had sufficient skills to take on menial positions (Hedges 1999; Penvenne 1995). In contrast to their higher status in most British colonies, white settlers in Mozambique worked as taxi-drivers, waiters.

31 More detail on the relationship between the Indian merchant elite and elites are provided in Chapter Four.
and barbers. By the 1950s, “Black cobbler, street vendors, bakers, housemaids, bus-conductors, bar tenders and prostitutes all found their jobs threatened by poor whites…” (Birmingham 1992: 21). Urban African workers were under constant strain as they had to compete for positions with immigrant whites who were systematically favoured by the state. The path for upward social mobility was increasing blocked. The original colonial elite found their economic interests threatened by Indian competition while at the same time white immigration was slowly squeezing them out of high and mid-level bureaucratic positions. In addition, the black and to some extent the mulatto elite found its old position as civilizados (civilised) coming under attack as the colonial state began tightening the regulations and privileges of those with this status. Although local structures of Portuguese colonialism allowed for the formation of an urbanised, metropolitan oriented colonial elite, the political and economic weakness that allowed this elite to come to prominence also made for a situation that eventually blocked their social mobility and progressively alienated them from the colonial system.

2.5 The Assimilados (the assimilated) and the Indígenas (natives)

The result of the state’s discriminatory policies was the hardening of the indigenous class structure as the Portuguese state implemented specific legislation to divide the population into categories that had different privileges and rights. Although a small minority gained some benefits from these legal categories, they also created a sense of shame and racial humiliation that was to deeply embitter a section of the colonial elite against the colonial state. Between 1913 and 1927 the Portuguese state began to tighten and regulate the definition of urban African elites. As white immigration increased, the government set about disenfranchising the small existing African elite and controlling its numbers and privileges by introducing the álvara de assimilação (certificate of assimilation) which gave its bearers honorary white status as opposed to the mass of the population who were deemed indígenas and subject to a different legal code (Penvenne 1979: 18). This was vigorously resisted by members of the colonial elite, who were insulted by having to apply for what had previously been their birthright. During the Republican period legislation dealing with assimilação was being continually and repeatedly drawn up but political weakness, irregular implementation, local resistance and a bewildering succession of governments who
rapidly gained and just as quickly lost power in Portugal limited its effects. However there was a political hardening after the overthrow of the republic and local resistance to assimilação faded as the consequences of this resistance became more severe (Hedges 1999; Penvenne 1989)

The overall result of the new legislation was that the previous measures of independence and power available to the colonial elite were drastically curtailed. While assimilados still enjoyed many privileges in comparison to the majority of the population their role had been transformed from a self-confident indigenous elite to low level functionaries of the colonial administration. Their very existence was now dependent on the state and governed by the colonial bureaucracy as one can see by the requirements necessary to gain the status of assimilado. To become an assimilado one had to apply to the colonial government and satisfy a set of criteria:

1. He must read, write and speak Portuguese fluently.
2. He must have sufficient means to support his family.
3. He must be of good conduct.
4. He must have the necessary education and individual and social habits to make it possible to apply the public and private law of Portugal to him.
5. He must make a request to the administrative authority of the area, who will pass it on to the governor of the district for approval (Mondlane 1969: 48).

Once approval was given one was then theoretically given the same rights and privileges as a white person. This, however, was not the case in practise. Assimilados received lower wages, had to live in specific parts of town and suffered routine discrimination. Despite the blatant double standards connected to assimilação (for instance white people did not have to be literate to enjoy civil rights), people continued to seek this status and to subject themselves to the humiliation of certification, since there were significant advantages in being an assimilado. Assimilados were exempt from forced labour or military service, they could travel freely within Mozambique and were allowed urban residence, they had increased access to education for themselves and their families and they enjoyed relatively more opportunities for advancement, especially in the civil service (in many cases assimilado status was a requirement for many positions). In all these respects, assimilados were considerably advantaged by contrast with indígenas. Until the legal category was abolished in the 1960s, assimilados were never more than a tiny minority of the population. In 1950 they numbered 4439, under one percent of the population (Sheldon 2002: 59). As the requirements show, it was assumed that an
assimilado would be a man, although wives and children of assimilados were normally granted the status as well. Out of the 4439 assimilados in 1950, 2651 were men and 1788 were women (ibid). Even after the status of assimilado was obtained, one had to be careful with one’s actions, as the status could be rescinded for “backsliding” into former “heathen” habits like polygyny or traditional religions.

Although the actual numbers of “assimilated” Africans in Mozambique was miniscule, the colonial state used the existence of assimilados to justify their claims of developing a uniquely harmonious and non-racialist form of colonialism. As noted by Hall and Young (1997), while Portuguese colonial territories avoided some of the crudest aspects of the colour bar, at least for the colonial elite, the sense of racial humiliation and grievance among assimilados was perhaps even more profound than what was found in other colonies. The memoirs of many former assimilados reflect this sense of humiliation. Raúl Honwana bitterly explained to an interviewer after independence the process one had to go through to become an assimilado:

Africans who wanted to be considered “civilised” had to pass an examination by answering certain questions and by allowing a committee to go to their homes to see how they lived and if they knew how to eat at a table the way whites did, if they wore shoes, and if they had only one wife. When Africans passed these examinations, they were given a document called the “certificate of assimilation” for which they paid half a pound sterling or its equivalent (Honwana 1988: 52).

Another former assimilado described the humiliation of it in an interview shortly after independence:

You see, comrade, an assimilado was one who was taught to despise his own mother. To despise his own father. To have nothing to do with his relatives.
Q. But the Portuguese did treat assimilados as they did themselves?
R. Nothing of the sort. They taught us to despise our own people and to praise them.
Q. Them who?
R. The Portuguese… They taught us to be ashamed of ourselves… We were ashamed to be found together with our friends and relatives who were not assimilados… Then you were in danger of becoming a non-assimilado (Sithole and Ingwane 1977: 5-6).

In addition to what many felt as being forced to refashion oneself as a pale imitation of those who were oppressing them, there were also thousands of petty injustices assimilados had to suffer. Despite being theoretically equal to the Portuguese, assimilados had to live in segregated areas in Lourenço Marques, that while better than the shacks of the majority of the population were still staggeringly expensive and lacked the amenities and transport links of the white areas (Penvenne
1995). Assimilados also suffered discriminatory wage scales, as a Frelimo militant explained to Eduardo Mondlane:

I also worked in a mine store doing the accounts, where I earned 300 escudos. When a Portuguese came to do the accounts, he earned nearly 4,000 escudos and did less work than I had done. I was alone while he had an assistant, but he still earned 13 times as much as I did. In fact, it was his African assistant who did all the work; he just signed it. The African got 300 escudos a month like me; the Portuguese got 4,000 (Mondlane 1969: 49).

As the colonial period progressed and assimilados realised that their social mobility would be permanently blocked under this humiliating system, many became progressively more alienated from the colonial state. This was especially the case with Protestant educated assimilados, who historically had an insecure relationship with the state, as Protestant missions were suspected of “de-nationalising” Portuguese subjects and were treated with suspicion. As African nationalist movements elsewhere began to score successes and liberate their respective countries, many among the colonial elite began to feel that a far better future was promised in an independent nation than as a province in the Portuguese Empire. However, in contrast to the case with other colonial powers such as Britain and France, an authoritarian government that had firmly invested its legitimacy on the continuance of the empire ruled Portugal. There was thus no question of a peaceful or negotiated settlement that would lead to independence. In the bloody conflict that followed, the revolutionary movement was led by modernist revolutionary elites, who were often drawn from assimilado or prospective assimilado origins but were ashamed of its servile and collaborationist connotations. The Frelimo leadership was a group that became progressively more radical as they envisioned the entire re-creation of society to yield something that was not based on what existed before colonialism, but rather was completely new (Hall and Young 1997; Mateus 1999; Newitt 1995).

2.6 A Luta Armada (The Armed Struggle or Liberation Struggle)

In many ways it is surprising that a small coalition of educated, urban, former assimilados, many of whom hailed from the south, combined with some often less educated guerrilla leaders from the north came to control the national liberation party.

32 The reasons for this are discussed in more depth in the following chapter.
Furthermore, many of these initial leaders became the dominant force in the revolutionary elite after independence. To understand how this happened one has to focus on developments that took place during the liberation struggle against the Portuguese. The path to independence in Mozambique was long and torturous. As previously stated, until the very end Portugal refused to countenance any thought of independence for its African colonies and internal political action was forbidden. The colonial secret police, PIDE (International Police for the Defence of the State), were very efficient in discovering and suppressing political activity among the African population. The movement that grew into Frelimo had a fragmentary beginning. It was based on disaffected southern intellectuals and central and northern embryonic political movements that had grown among migrant workers residing in neighbouring Tanzania, Malawi and Rhodesia. Due to political constraints the party of Mozambican nationalism had to be formed on foreign soil and, until independence, had its headquarters outside of Mozambique’s borders.

Frelimo was formed on the 25th of June 1962 in Tanzania. It was an amalgamation of Udenamo (National Democratic Union of Mozambique) which had been formed in Rhodesia and was heavily influenced by Joshua Nkomo’s National Democratic Party; MANU (Mozambican African Union) which was formed in Tanzania and modelled after KANU of Kenya and TANU of Tanzania and grew out of the ethnic based Makonde African National Union; and finally UNAMI (National Union for Mozambican Independence) which was based in Malawi and also drew heavily on ethnic and regional support from Tete province (Munslow 1983: 79-80). Leaders of the three movements, under pressure from the OAU (Organisation of African Unity), decided to broaden their appeal by forming a united front to work for the liberation of Mozambique. Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, a foreign educated prominent southern intellectual, nationalist figure and the first black Mozambican to obtain a PhD, was elected as the overall president. Dr. Mondlane was able to utilise international contacts he made through his previous post at the UN to bring the movement to international attention. He was also able to recruit educated southerners through NESAM (Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students), a movement founded by him and later banned by the Portuguese, whose membership included future top-ranking Frelimo officials such as Joaquim Chissano, Armando Guebuza.

33 In the post-socialist era many of the less educated northerners have apparently been eased out of the top positions of the party leadership.
and Pascal Mocumbi (Casimiro 1979).\textsuperscript{34} Frelimo was aware that Portugal would not negotiate for independence. After witnessing the bloody suppression of the abortive Angolan rebellion of 1961, Frelimo decided that a well-planned armed struggle was the only way to achieve independence.

Almost immediately after Frelimo was formed, the party was beset by factionalism and internal disputes (Finnegan 1992; Mondlane 1966, 1969; Opello 1975). The original leaders of MANU, Udenamo and UNAMI were soon displaced and leadership positions were often filled by an influx of better-educated southerners who had come with Mondlane (Cabrita 2000). Many of the displaced former leaders responded with accusations of growing southern domination. While Frelimo absorbed most of the rank and file members of the former parties, especially MANU, these displaced former leaders attempted to reconstitute their organisations with small numbers of followers (Opello 1975). MANU was reorganised by Matthew Mmole (former leader of MANU) and Lawerence Millinga (former Secretary-General of MANU). Others who lost power struggles within Frelimo formed various splinter groups. They appeared and disappeared with a bewildering succession of acronyms, ideologies and overall goals. The majority were still-born paper organisations based upon the personality of the leader and had little overall influence. In 1964 four of these groups, MANU, Moreco, Udenamo-Moçambique and Undenamo-Monomotapa joined to form Coremo (Mozambican Revolutionary Committee) and were later joined by further dissidents from Frelimo (Opello 1975). Coremo was the closest thing Frelimo faced to a nationalist rival, but was for the most part politically and militarily ineffectual (Finnegan 1992; Opello 1975).

Despite the internal turmoil within Frelimo, the party was able to launch the armed struggle after two years of preparation on the 25\textsuperscript{th} of September 1964. Frelimo had its primary headquarters in Tanzania and devoted its initial efforts towards infiltrating the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and the sparsely populated Niassa. Their greatest early successes were in Cabo Delgado, in the Mueda Plateau among the Makonde. Makonde immigrants who were originally trying to escape the slave trade in Mozambique had settled the Mueda Plateau; it was relatively inaccessible and ideal for guerrilla tactics. The Makonde also had a history of hostility towards the Portuguese, based among other things a recent massacre when a

\textsuperscript{34} Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza later became presidents of independent Mozambique and Pascal Mocumbi was Prime Minister under Chissano.
demonstration by primarily Makonde protestors had been fired upon by the Portuguese military causing large numbers of casualties. Building from the former MANU’s strong base among the Makonde, Frelimo was well-established in the Mueda Plateau and the Makonde served as Frelimo foot soldiers. In the early period of the struggle Frelimo put relatively little thought into administering the areas where it was dominant. Initially regulos (“traditional” chiefs, often originally appointed by the Portuguese) who were thought to side with the colonial state were assassinated. However, during the struggle Frelimo leaders and militants tried to develop a working relationship with regulos who were more sympathetic to their cause (Munslow 1983: Opello 1975).

Although Frelimo had early successes in parts of Cabo Delgado, by 1966 they suffered a series of military setbacks. The campaign in Niassa stalled shortly after its launch and suffered some reverses. Frelimo cells in the capital were discovered by PIDE and rounded up. Frelimo was seen as a Makonde movement by the Makua, a northern ethnic group that was probably the largest in the country with a history of hostility towards the Makonde and the Makua generally sided with the Portuguese. Finally efforts to open new fronts in provinces in the centre failed and Frelimo was driven back.

This series of set-backs combined with the fact that Frelimo was organised as a broad front of Mozambican nationalists and incorporated people of various ethnicities, class positions, and overall political opinions, led to still more internal conflict. Different groups within the party had drastically divergent ideas as to how to win independence and what form the country would take afterwards. There were two principal groupings in the second round of power struggles that racked the party. The first coalesced around Mondlane and the relatively well-educated and cosmopolitan southerners. Many members of this group had studied in foreign universities and were influenced by the socialist ideas they encountered abroad. However, southerners of lesser education such as Samora Machel and some of the younger generation of northern guerrilla commanders, such as Alberto Chipande, were also leading members (Finnegan 1992). The southerners and the younger generation more generally tended to follow a radical line that became more pronounced through the struggle. They

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35 Estimates of the massacre vary from a low of 6 dead to over 600 by Frelimo sources. Whatever the actual cost, the experience of the massacre helped make the local population receptive towards Frelimo’s message.
defined social class as the central point of oppression and felt that in addition to ending colonial rule it was also necessary to fight a protracted “people’s war” that would lead to an egalitarian social revolution to re-make Mozambique (Hall and Young 1997; Newitt 1995; Opello 1975). This group tended towards socialism and was multiracial. The radical younger generation’s principal opposition came primarily from older, mission educated and more conservative members of the leadership from the centre and the north of Mozambique. They defined race as the central cause of oppression and opposed allowing non-buffs to hold leadership positions. They leaned towards capitalism, as many of them had business interests that would be threatened by the plans of the radical younger generation. In general they broadly distrusted the “social revolution” and elements of the younger generation’s anti-traditional stance (Cabrita 2000; Hall and Young 1997; Newitt 1995; Opello 1975).

As the internal conflict continued throughout the 1960s, Frelimo’s leadership was deeply divided. The ages of the members of the central committee ranged from barely 30 for the youngest member, Jorge Rebelo, to close to twice that for the oldest, Lazaro Nkavandame. Besides the generation gap, the ideological differences between the radical younger generation and their older compatriots became more pronounced. These differences soon spilled over to strategy. The younger radicals wanted to politicise the army and prepare for a long, drawn out “people’s war”, while older conservatives wished to concentrate on the war and not social revolution (Newitt 1995). There was growing conflict between the two factions (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983; Munslow 1983; Newitt 1995).

Frelimo dissidents in the central committee became alarmed at the growing strength of southern assimilados within the leadership and charged that northerners were being discriminated against (Mateus 1999; Minter 1994). In 1966 Felipe Magaia, the head of the military and a northerner, was killed and replaced by a southerner, Samora Machel. This infuriated some Makonde leaders who claimed that their people were doing all the fighting while southerners monopolised the leadership positions. Some claimed Magaia had been assassinated and that this was part of a southern/Shangaan coup. In 1968 conflict broke out in bases in Tanzania as a priest and instructor at the Frelimo School, Father Mateus Gwenjere, helped instigate a revolt amongst students who claimed they were being denied foreign scholarships that had been promised them, and refused to fight in the struggle. The revolt had to be put down by the Tanzanian police. Others were furious at the high-ranking positions of
the southerners, Jorge Rebelo, of Goan descent, and Marcelino Dos Santos, a mulatto. The internal conflict reached a fevered pitch between what became known in Frelimo mythology as the “two lines”, which represented the principal groupings in the power struggle. One was composed of the more conservative party members from the central and northern parts of Mozambique. This group included Gwenjere, Uria Simango, Vice-President of Frelimo, and Lazaro Nkavandame, head of the Department of Commerce. They were alarmed at the growing strength of the radicals, especially as they now controlled the army and Nkavandame increasingly entertained ideas of a federal state with autonomy for the Makonde (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983; Newitt 1995). The other “line” was the radical bloc, which contained many prominent southerners such as Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, Marcelino Dos Santos, and Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Joaquim Chissano, a senior member of the executive committee. This group also included younger northerners such as Chipande, a military commander who led the first attack in the struggle and Raimundo Pachinuapa another military commander. This group, fuelled by the desire to completely remake the country felt that liberating Mozambique from the Portuguese was only the first step for a far wider social revolution.

The conflict between these two lines demonstrated some of the underlying weaknesses of Frelimo’s original formation in 1962 as a broad “national” front united by their desire to end colonialism. While all the opposing groups within Frelimo agreed that the current system of colonial rule had to end, there was little agreement as to what would follow. As stated earlier there was a wide divergence of social background between the leaders of the opposing lines. The older generation, with their attempts at creating an ethnic power-base and petty mercantile backgrounds thought that a federal state with the removal of the Portuguese would gradually open up opportunities for Mozambicans while safeguarding “traditional” structures. For the more radical younger generation, which contained many urban southerners (who tended to lack an ethnic power base) this was exactly what they wanted to avoid. This aversion towards the proposals of the conservatives grew from both idealism and political realism. The radicals sincerely believed the only way to bring prosperity to the people was to eradicate the colonial influence and create a strong, “modern”, unitary socialist nation. For this goal to succeed the radicals felt that “obstacles” to modernity, such as ethnic nationalism and many aspects of traditional culture had to be swept away. They also knew that with their multiracial members and the conflict
based in the north they often lacked an ethnic power-base and could not compete with their rivals along these lines. Each of these two groups began to increase their struggle against the other to make sure that theirs’ was the voice that prevailed.

Conflict crystallised in 1968 over where the second party congress would be held. The conservative line wanted it in Tanzania where they felt strongest, while the radicals wanted to hold the congress in liberated territory in Mozambique that was held by their military power-base. The radicals won this conflict and the second congress was held in Niassa, a province in the north of Mozambique in July of 1968. As prominent members of the opposing line did not attend the conference the radical platform was accepted with minimal opposition (Cabrita 2000; Newitt 1995). Efforts were made by Mondlane to heal the breach with Nkavandame, but attempts at reconciliation failed. Nkavandame was the subject of increasing criticism from the radicals for corruption. He ran a network of cooperatives that supplied commercial needs for the liberated areas, and he was accused of profiteering since prices at his cooperatives were actually far higher than in Portuguese held territory. He was also accused of assassinating political opponents within the movement, which he claimed was a “trumped up” charge (Cabrita 2000; Isaacman and Isaacman 1983; Newitt 1995; Munslow 1983). Nkavandame again declared a “southern/Shangaan coup” and called for Makonde soldiers to desert. His calls for ethnic solidarity went unheeded by the majority of Frelimo troops and his attempts to take over Frelimo-held areas in the liberated territories were beaten back by Frelimo loyalists (Opello 1975). Some analysts claim that the ideological struggles between these groups simply masked elites jockeying for position, as the claims of the various factions of the leadership had relatively little effect on the rank and file of the party (Opello 1975). Although there is undoubtedly a measure of truth to this, it is instructive to note that many of the primarily Makonde troops of Frelimo did not heed calls for ethnic solidarity but cast their lot with the modernising plans of the radicals, many of whom were southerners, presumably due to their ideological appeal. Furthermore the internal conflict made a deep impression on the surviving members of the Frelimo leadership, causing them to place great value in unity and fuelling their suspicion and intolerance of ethnically or racially based social organisation and quasi-traditional power structures which they saw as representing the ever-present threat of disunity and discord.

In 1969, after five years of revolutionary war and with a further five years of conflict in the future, Mondlane was assassinated with a parcel bomb, allegedly
arranged by PIDE. Although Uria Simango was vice-president, his leadership bid did not have the support of the rest of the executive committee. Instead Mondlane was succeeded by a “Council of the Presidency” consisting of Simango, Machel and Dos Santos. The struggle for power continued throughout 1969 with several defections from Frelimo, one causing the collapse of the military front in the Tete province. By 1970 with Machel’s assumption of unitary leadership, the revolutionary elite was firmly in power and the conservatives were defeated. Simango was accused of complicity in the death of Mondlane and was expelled from Frelimo. He eventually joined Coremo. Samora Machel was installed as the leader in 1970 and held the post – which he later combined with that of President - until his death in 1986. The party leadership remained remarkably cohesive after Machel’s ascent to power; they were now united in their desire for radical social change.

Throughout the period of internal strife in Frelimo, Portugal was refining its counter-insurgency tactics, studying the example of the Americans in Vietnam and the British in Malaysia. In addition to Portugal’s massive military superiority (at the height of the war they had around 60,000 troops as compared to the 8,000-10,000 Frelimo guerrillas), they constructed aldeamentos (fortified villages) to sever contact between the population and the guerrillas; used defoliants to destroy tree cover used by the guerrillas; and increasingly employed African troops - both fresh recruits and “turned guerrillas” - to infiltrate Frelimo areas. Using indigenous troops in attack allowed the state to keep Portuguese soldiers out of the line of fire as much as possible in an effort to keep down white casualties. The large numbers of African soldiers, who were considered traitors by Frelimo, proved to be a source of recruitment by opposition forces in the later civil war (Minter 1994).

In 1970 the Portuguese launched “Operation Gordian Knot” which was to destroy Frelimo and the areas it controlled. Although the Portuguese captured many bases, most had already been deserted and Frelimo pulled its troops back and then attacked in the centre of the country. The Portuguese were spending much of their effort guarding the massive Cabora Bassa dam, the symbol of Portuguese permanence in Africa. Although Frelimo was unsuccessful in its attempts to destroy the dam, they successfully concentrated Portuguese military strength in its defence, leaving its own soldiers free to spread their attacks in the centre and further south. In Portugal itself major changes were taking place. After the replacement of Salazar in 1968 Portuguese leaders began to question the necessity of the empire, especially as closer economic
ties were being developed with Europe which were far more profitable than never-ending wars in far-off corners of the world (Davidson 1984; Newitt 1981, 1995).

By 1974 it became obvious that although the Portuguese were not defeated, they could not win. In addition the strain of fighting three colonial wars at once was also becoming unbearable. In 1974 leftwing officers formed the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) and overthrew the government of Marcelino Caetano, Salazar’s successor. Although more conservative members were opposed to this, the MFA formed a transitional government with Frelimo in 1974 and granted full power to the party as the only legitimate representative of the Mozambican people, without a general election, in 1975.36

2.7 Independence and War

When Frelimo declared independence and assumed full power on the 25th of June 1975, they were unquestionably the only major political force in Mozambique. Unlike the case of Angola, another former Portuguese colony, the ruling party faced no significant internal rivals. Frelimo also enjoyed a wide degree of legitimacy among the population for overthrowing the generally detested colonial rule. While only a minority among the population may have understood the implications of the social revolution Frelimo promised to unleash after the expulsion of the Portuguese their programme faced few internal challenges. The party’s promises to remedy previous injustices and create a prosperous nation for all were popular. Despite Frelimo’s seemingly secure hold on power the party leadership was uneasy for reasons that will be explained below and an underlying tendency toward elitism became increasingly manifest, egalitarian rhetoric aside. This became more pronounced after Frelimo declared itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in 1977. As the leadership became more insulated there was a widening gap between the educated revolutionary elite’s ideas as to what was necessary to modernise the country and the expectations of the fruits of independence for large segments of the population. The rift between the leadership and the majority of the population grew as latent weaknesses in the party’s control came to the fore and Frelimo’s hold over the country became more tenuous.

36 Although Frelimo had no credible opposition and would have won an election with ease, the party was suspicious that foreigners could manipulate it. This was to cast doubts as to the legitimacy of Frelimo for some foreigners later who supported Renamo in the civil war.
Even during the jubilation of the first days of independence there were serious problems looming on the horizon. Frelimo had governed sections of territory during the liberation struggle, but these were sparsely populated, predominantly rural areas. The majority of Mozambique’s population had almost no contact with Frelimo prior to independence. Furthermore the colonial economy had been geared towards providing services to neighbouring colonies, and although the Portuguese had built more tarred roads during the war, most transport links were focused on connecting neighbouring territories to Mozambican ports leaving weak inter-regional links. In the decades preceding independence the Mozambican economy had grown, especially in the 1960s, and Mozambique was supposedly the 8th largest industrial economy in Africa before independence. But much of this growth was speculative capital and achieved through debt. The new government was left with the bill. Despite Frelimo’s proclamation of a multiracial society, the relationship between the party and the majority of the Portuguese settlers soon deteriorated. There was an abortive settler rebellion during the transitional government that resulted in many deaths.\textsuperscript{37} In addition many Portuguese felt victimised by the nationalisation of health, educational and legal services, coupled with new laws stating that one had to give up Portuguese nationality and take Mozambican citizenship if one wanted to stay and work in the country. The majority of the Portuguese population soon left Mozambique. As they left, numerous acts of petty sabotage were committed and houses and businesses were left empty, forcing the government to nationalise abandoned properties and industries.\textsuperscript{38}

The Portuguese had made few provisions for African education during their rule and the rate of illiteracy at independence was staggering (Hanlon 1990; Newitt 1995). The government was left to run both the country and its economy with few educated or experienced people. Although there were serious economic repercussions, this did increase Frelimo’s urban popularity as the level of social mobility was drastically increased, clerks became directors and anyone with any education could be sure of finding employment, often at a high level (Hanlon 1990). Finally, the newly independent Mozambique shared borders with two hostile white minority regimes on which they were economically dependent. Frelimo complied with international

\textsuperscript{37} The rebellion is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

\textsuperscript{38} The government had not initially planned nationalisations of this scope, at least at that time, but the situation did lend itself to many of Frelimo’s more radical member’s long-term plans.
sanctions against Rhodesia and allowed ZANU PF (Zimbabwe African Nation Union, Patriotic Front, the major liberation movement in Zimbabwe) to operate from bases in Mozambique. This decision was economically devastating and resulted in low-level war with Rhodesia. The Rhodesians also began to train and equip Mozambican dissidents with terrible future consequences.

Somewhat in contrast was Frelimo’s relationship to its southernmost, and far more powerful, neighbour. While Frelimo was outspoken in their support for the ANC (African National Congress, the main liberation movement in South Africa), they did not wish to overly antagonise the regime in that country, with which they had numerous economic links. Throughout the first five years of independence Frelimo generally sought an uneasy peace with South Africa and was initially successful, but the political climate changed in the 1980s. With the election of Ronald Reagan in the United States, the previous practise of cold war détente was jettisoned in favour of “rolling back” international communism and the Reagan government funded numerous proxy wars throughout the world to aid in this effort. At the same time a more hard-line and militarist government, under P.W. Botha, had come to power in South Africa and once again theories of détente were jettisoned for a new theory of “total onslaught”. Yet, despite the Frelimo state’s limited capabilities and hostile international environment, or perhaps in desperation because of their weak position, the government decided to attempt a massive restructuring of Mozambican society by trying to industrialise the nation, create communal villages and large scale state farms and abolish traditional leadership. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these grandly ambitious plans soon to fell into difficulties. After the fall of Rhodesia, South Africa, angry at Frelimo’s support of the ANC and nervous about the example a successful Black Marxist state could set, became the pay masters of the Rhodesian-trained Mozambican dissidents. The country was soon plunged into a brutal civil war between Frelimo and Renamo (Hanlon 1990; Minter 1992; Newitt 1995, 2002).

Many analysts have questioned whether one could actually characterise the post-independence war in Mozambique as a “civil war” since the rebels were trained, supported and financed from the outside, primarily by South Africa (Hanlon 1990; Minter 1992).39 Although the war did feed off internal discontent, it is extremely unlikely that the war could have ever reached the levels it did or last as long without

39 I continue to refer to the post-independence war as a civil war because, despite international involvement on both sides, the vast majority of combatants were Mozambican
the direct involvement of South Africa. As noted by Chabal (2002), the leaders of Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance, the rebel movement) knew (at least initially) that the Frelimo government was widely regarded as legitimate and that they could not prevail in democratic elections against Frelimo. Furthermore Frelimo would never allow elections that could challenge its power to take place. The apartheid government of South Africa also seemed to realise this and their overall strategy was not to overthrow Frelimo and install Renamo as the government, but rather to weaken the Mozambican state (Minter 1992). Indications point to the fact that both the South African government and Renamo realised that the movement had questionable legitimacy; its support tended to come from the situation created by the war rather than having preceded it (Chabal 2002).

Yet, it is also true that the direction of the social revolution undertaken by the Frelimo leadership alienated sections of the population and made them more receptive to anti-government rebels. Foreigners funded the civil war but it also grew out of the cultural gap between the revolutionary elite and large segments of the population. The Frelimo leadership’s social backgrounds and modernist ideology tended to mean that they had a poor understanding of the role of “tradition” in society. For the revolutionary elite “tradition” was an obstacle to modernity and held connotations of the defeats and humiliations of the colonial period and could be overcome through centralised planning and education. In their defence, the party’s plans for social revolution were relatively successful in some parts of the country, especially the south, but in others they disrupted finely nuanced modes of social organisation without providing an adequate replacement. Normon (2004) recounts how, following the destruction of previous homes in a flood and a pre-existing distrust for traditional authority due to its role in forced labour, Frelimo’s plans to house the population in communal villages and abolish regulos were broadly popular in the southern province of Gaza. In the work of West (1997, 2001), we see how, in a Frelimo stronghold in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, Frelimo’s social revolution had contradictory effects. Elements of their villagisitation programme were popular, such as the new opportunities for sociability as scattered populations were concentrated in a single site, but these programmes had unintended consequences, such as the inability to control witchcraft among so large a population. In other areas, such as the Erati district of the northern province of Nampula, Frelimo’s directives to abolish traditional authority and create communal villages seriously upset the local social
system. When Renamo arrived in this area they were initially treated as liberators (Geffrey 1991). The success or failure of Frelimo’s social revolution often depended on local conditions that were rarely accounted for in planning sessions in Maputo.

These difficulties were compounded by the fact that in many cases the grand designs of Frelimo lacked sufficient resources and were chaotically implemented. It is possible to speculate that the more radical social programmes of Frelimo, such as the communal farms, would not have resulted in civil conflict without the impetus of neighbouring hostile regimes, nor did they necessarily cause a groundswell of popular support for Renamo. But they did cause an atmosphere of discontent that the rebels could prey upon during the course of the war. If Renamo lacked widespread popular support through much of their history, they could capitalise on an existing atmosphere of indifference as to who won the war as long as it would stop, an atmosphere that became more pronounced as the war dragged on. Finally as in all wars, while they may bring misery to the majority they bring opportunities to a few. Some young men in rural areas with few prospects found new avenues of social mobility through one armed force or another. In addition the chaos of conflict allowed numerous local scores to be settled under the cover of competing movements (Cabrita 2002; Dinerman 1994; Geffray 1991; Vines 1991).

Another question debated by many scholars (and debated in modern day Maputo as well) is whether Frelimo was “actually” Marxist (or Marxist-Leninist) or if they used “Marxism” instrumentally to gain support from the Soviet Bloc (Chabal 2002; Hall and Young 1997). While there are many competing opinions, this seems to be somewhat beside the point. At its ideological core, Frelimo was a radically modernist movement whose leadership was made up of many urbanised, relatively well-educated elites with weak links to “traditional structures”. They wanted to drastically transform the nation and, as stated earlier, Marxist-Leninism seemed, to the Frelimo leadership at least, the most viable and socially just way to do so without re-creating the kinds of oppressive forms of exploitation that characterised colonial rule. While Chabal (1999, 2002) contends that Frelimo built a patrimonial system, similar in many ways to other regimes found throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the evidence suggests the contrary. While patrimonial relationships have established themselves within the system, the party leadership, at least initially, specifically tried
to avoid patrimonial politics and corruption.\textsuperscript{40} This was the reason for the party’s stress on \textit{poder popular} (people power) and efforts to create democratic channels within the party (Newitt 2002). But, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, one of the major problems was not to be corrupt patrimonial connections, but elitism and a lack of connection between the party leadership and the wider population.

After the first heady days of independence, the Frelimo leadership reacted to growing social problems and a mounting insurgency by falling back on previous military models of organisation. Hierarchy became more pronounced and official pronouncements dealt with social problems in military terms, there were “campaigns” for increased production on the labour “front”. Officials were supposed to obey orders and not question the leadership. While, in theory, Frelimo was a vanguard party of the workers and peasants in a country where around 85% of the population lived in rural areas it began to depend on: “… a numerically weak but relatively privileged urban proletariat, a burgeoning state bureaucracy, and an external network centered on Moscow” (quoted in Newitt 2002: 206). The Frelimo leadership had initially distrusted the urban middle classes as few had been involved in the struggle. Yet they soon came to depend on them; they shared a similar social origin and outlook and they were one of the few groups that had the skills to staff the growing bureaucracy. As Frelimo’s dependence on these groups increased so its distance from the peasantry also grew. It was the peasants, some of whom had worked closely with the party during the struggle, who found themselves marginalised. These trends were exacerbated, ironically, by the very social mobility the victory of the revolution had allowed. The party leadership soon worried about the lack of qualifications amongst its cadres and education became the key to social advancement, highlighting an already existing elitism (Hanlon 1990). Joseph Hanlon was present at a meeting at the Ministry of Education that described this trend perfectly:

\begin{quote}
In 1980 I attended a seminar on mathematics teaching. At one session led by Education Minister Graça Machel, several educators spoke in flowery Portuguese about didactic methods and teaching aids. Finally, a primary school teacher from Niassa stood up. In basic but clear Portuguese he pointed out that this elevated discussion was meaningless when he did not have a blackboard or textbooks, taught classes of 60 pupils or more, and he and his fellow teachers only had four years of primary schooling themselves. The audience broke into laughter. It was a time when an astute political intervention could
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{40} One could argue that any socialist state, or state for that matter, is a patrimonial system as resources are specifically directed towards sections of the population in return for political support, yet this was not supposed to be done for personal gain.
have reversed the meeting. The Minister could have said it was important to consider the problems of the bulk of the teachers. Instead, she joined in the laughter. The embarrassed teacher sat down and the colonial-trained educators continued their discourse (Hanlon 1990: 199).

This is a prime example of the social gap between the revolutionary elite and those who lived in rural areas. Although the category of assimilado had been abolished, the social distance that characterised the previous colonial elite still existed. Many of the reforms enacted by the Frelimo leadership, such as the abolition of traditional leadership and the construction of communal villages, were deeply unpopular in parts of the nation and added to the flames of the post-independence war. The revolutionary elite had an ideal of modernity that was attractive to some segments of the population, but a distant abstraction to many others. What started as a radically egalitarian movement became increasingly distant and cut off as the party leadership and the mass of the population often shared deeply different assumptions as to the nature of the society they shared. These trends are still prevalent today.

2.8 Conclusion: A Luta Continua? (the struggle continues?)

On October 15th 1992 Frelimo and Renamo finally signed a peace agreement that brought the civil war to an end. Although peace was greeted with guarded optimism, the country was devastated. Up to a million people had died, both due to the conflict and associated diseases and starvation. In addition many of the impressive gains of the revolution, such as widely available heath care services and education provision had been knocked back to pre-independence levels. Rural areas had suffered worst during the civil war; infrastructure in these areas generally lay in ruins. The Frelimo leadership’s dream of presiding over a “modern”, industrialised and egalitarian society also appeared, by the end of the war, to have been stillborn. Mozambique’s structural adjustment programme resulted in the slashing of government subsidies and services for the poor, while simultaneously devaluing the currency and making thousands of workers redundant (Hanlon 1996). Although conditions for many urbanites appeared to be precarious, levels of government corruption seemed to be increasing and state officials were now, in contradiction to previous egalitarian norms, openly displaying their new wealth (ibid). Mozambique’s economy appeared to mirror its pre-independence role, serving as a transport hub for
South Africa and Zimbabwe and as a producer of primary agricultural products. Mozambique was also a transport hub for a growing illegal economy. Both drugs from Asia and cars stolen in South Africa found their way to Europe through Mozambique’s ports (Ellis 1999; Hanlon 1996; Hibou 1999). Although Frelimo still ruled Mozambique, the country bore only the slightest resemblance to the vision they had proclaimed at independence.

Despite all the changes that had affected Mozambique in the first 17 years of independence, there was an underlying theme of continuity through the colonial elite to the revolutionary and independence elites. While there had been a series of political changes, the revolutionary elite remained a group where many members have shared origins as urban-based elites with weak ties to traditional power structures in the colonial period. As the political system shifted away from socialism and earlier ideals were abandoned one continuity that remains is the role of elites as the “engine of modernisation” Through all the trials and chaos of the civil war period this remains central to the self-justification of elites and informs the way they view the nation they control. When Frelimo first took power after the liberation struggle the leadership tended to view Mozambique as a “blank slate” on which they could impose their models of a modern nation. Despite all of the changes that have convulsed through society since independence this elite view of Mozambique as an empty canvas has not entirely disappeared. After the civil war the nation was to have another “new beginning”, this time refashioned as a capitalist democracy (Hall and Young 1997: 219-220). The following chapter examines the elites’ relationship to the changing project of modernity and discusses the ways in which modernity can be translated into social power.
Chapter Three

Cosmopolitan Modernity and Mozambican Elites

But our friends in the West say that if we go about well dressed, if we shave, if we have decent housing we shall lose our African characteristics. Do you know what African characteristics are? A skin, a loincloth, a wrap around cloth, a stick in the hand behind a flock, to be skinny with every rib sticking out, sores on the feet and legs, with a cashew leaf to cover the suppurating wound, jiggers in the toes – that is the African. That is what they see as African characteristics. So when tourists come, they are looking for an African dressed like that. Since that is the “genuine African”. Now when they find us dressed in a tunic and trousers – we are no longer African. They don’t take photographs (Samora Machel, quoted in Munslow 1985: 91).

3.1 Introduction

One night during my fieldwork in Maputo I met a friend, Josina, who is a member of the independence elite, at a bar in a nice part of town. Over drinks she explained to me that although her parents were high-ranking members of Frelimo and had fought in the liberation struggle and served the government during the socialist period, she herself was a fervent capitalist and advocated Thatcherite-style reforms for Mozambique. I voiced doubts as to whether the current neo-liberal model would ever do more than benefit the elite, leaving the majority of the population in desperate poverty. Josina told me that my problem was that I had seriously misunderstood Mozambique and the nature of Mozambican society. It was not so much that the poor were being denied opportunities, but that they (the poor) were not actually interested in them.

There is a huge difference here that I do not think you understand. You spend all of your time here with people like us; we are educated, westernised and modern. We are very different from most of the people. There is a vast difference in style of living between the rich and the poor here, yes, but it is not what you think. Those of us who are privileged have tastes and desires that are different from the rest of the people. It is really a question of interest. Most people in this country are peasants, they have a machamba (a small plot of land) that they farm and they are interested and satisfied with that. More needs and education are not really necessary and most people do not really want it. For instance my father came from a poor background in a rural area. He liked to read, but he was not that interested in education. He did not become interested until he saw the Portuguese and how

41 The vast majority of the population was illiterate during the pre-independence period; the fact that her father could read and had access to books demonstrated that he came from a relatively privileged rural background.
much they had compared to how little he did. Even still my grandmother has stayed a villager at heart. We invited her to come and stay with us here (in Maputo), but she was never comfortable. She could not get used to this kind of house and would sleep out with the *empregadas* (maids, her grandmother would sleep in the servants quarters that many houses in Maputo are equipped with). She never did get used to things here and eventually made us send her back to her village, where she still works on her *machamba*. Most people in Mozambique are like her. They just want to be left alone to farm their *machambas*. It is those of us who are privileged, we are the ones who want and need all of these modern things (Field notes 7 February 2004).

What interested me about Josina’s response was not just its resemblance to some of the former colonial justifications of inequality. It was also noteworthy for being a not uncommon attitude among the independence elite of Mozambique, despite the fact that many of their families had achieved their positions under a supposedly egalitarian socialism. Throughout my research I noticed there was an almost implicit assumption with both the revolutionary and independence elites that because they are educated and “westernised” (modern) they are fundamentally different from the vast majority of the nation’s population in many important ways. This sense of difference, as demonstrated in Josina’s statements above, often served as a justification for continuing social inequality.  

This chapter examines what it means to be modern for Mozambican elites and how, through different periods of history, this sense of modernity confers a sense of uniqueness in a country that they see as still “backward”.

Through tracing the elites’ relationships with modernity in different periods of history I argue that although “modernity” has been a strong continuing factor in conferring legitimacy and social power to elites, the elite project of modernity has been by no means static. In the first section of the chapter I examine the concept of “nationalist modernity”. I argue that modernity in the initial post-independence period was conceived along universal and hierarchical lines and consisted of mass mobilisation for sweeping social change. To make sure that Mozambique was never again brutalised, exploited and humiliated under the rule of foreigners the nation would have to “catch up” to the western powers and become a strong, unified industrial state. This grand project did not involve simply improvements of infrastructure but a vast reformation of the society as a whole. After the chaos, destruction and near economic collapse of the post-independence civil war, the mass mobilising strategies of nationalist modernity lost legitimacy among many members of both the revolutionary and, especially, the independence elites, although some of

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42 I examine reactions to this elite justification for social inequality by members of some non-elite groups in Chapter Five.
the moral aspects of nationalist modernity have a continuing legitimacy amongst other social groups. This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Five.

A new manifestation of modernity has come into being, intertwined with yet another great “top-down” reformation project in Mozambique, the transformation from a one-party socialist system to multiparty capitalist democracy. The forms of social power that have grown through this transformation are symbolic of the new version of modernity; they are more individualistic and technocratic. In the later sections of the chapter I examine the reasons for the emergence of nationalist modernity and the later manifestations of modernity that has supplanted (although not eradicated) the earlier forms of modernity. I argue that changing social experiences among the independence elite, especially through the roles of elite education and changing habits of consumption, are key for the construction of the new form of modernity. Throughout the chapter I demonstrate that although the elites’ relationship with modernity is always changing, modernity, in one manifestation or another is central to elite social class position; in a sense elite modernities both create and are created by the structures that sustain it.

3.2 Modernity and Nationalism

“Modernity” has been a hotly debated, although often vague concept in Africanist anthropology. During late colonialism and the early independence period many liberal observers felt Africa, following prevalent social evolutionary theories, would join the supposedly inevitable advance of modernity. This was usually described as the end point of a linear progression that would move away from small-scale “tribal” societies and evolve into centralised state structures, increased infrastructure and education, and for many, widespread adherence to Christianity; in other words, to become more like the “west”. In the post-colonial period the linear nature of modernity has come under attack for its underlying ethnocentrism (for examples see Asad 1973; Ferguson 1999; Moore and Sanders 2001; Rowlands 2002). In addition, the widespread political and economic crises that have characterised much of Africa following independence and the continuing prevalence of cultural practices such as sorcery and the importance of ethnic identities have raised serious doubts as to the overall western character of modernity (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Ferguson 1999; Geschiere 1997). Africanists such as Chabal and Daloz (1999)
have argued that post-colonial developments in Africa actually point to a process of “re-traditionalisation”, which paradoxically leads to the formation of a new type of specifically African modernity based, in part, on ethnicity, sorcery and patronage as opposed to earlier visions of an eventual western homogenisation.

In fact, as much recent ethnography has shown, modernity is in many ways a collection of local cultural constructs, instead of a completely homogenised prevailing worldview (Chakrabarty 1989; Donham 1999; Moore and Sanders 2001). Recently though, as demonstrated in the introduction to this thesis, some scholars have begun to question what exactly is meant by academic uses of the word “modernity” (Cooper 2005; Ferguson 2006; Miller 1994). Ferguson (2002, 2006) has observed that while the idea of “alternative modernities” may be influential in academic circles, the conception they were meant to replace, a hierarchical and universal modernity still has a strong hold on the imaginations of many in post-colonial Africa.

This appeared to be the case for members of the revolutionary and independence elites in Mozambique. For many of my informants modernity is still viewed as something approaching a universal linear progression and, in fact, they are in that process of progressing. The idea of a specifically African modernity based on witchcraft and ethnicity would inspire horror in many of my Mozambican friends. The view of modernity that inspired many of my informants’ parents, the revolutionary elite, during the late colonial period and the early days of independence and continues to have an impact, albeit in a very different form, in contemporary Mozambique is the modernity of nationalism. This view did not involve a distinctive or re-traditionalising process so much as it was based on the need to catch up with those who had so brutally exploited them. The modernity that grew from the liberation struggle in Mozambique is similar to what Donham (1999) described for Ethiopia during its revolution. Like Ethiopia, a local elite led the Mozambican revolution. This elite, through their experiences with colonialism and their contact with the Portuguese, created their own conception of a linear view of development that put some nations and societies ahead and others behind on a hierarchical scale. For the revolutionary elite, one of the central preconditions of creating a new and just society was to “catch up” to the colonial powers (Mondlane 1969; Newitt 1995).

The desire to “catch up” and create a strong nation often inspires nationalist elites under colonialism, yet this also creates a problem. As stated by Morris, the European narratives of modernity that have influenced colonial and revolutionary
elites also say that modernity is something that has already happened somewhere else (quoted in Chakrabarty 1997: 373). This leaves something of a problem, as nationalism is legitimised by a sense of national uniqueness. Yet in some ways nationalist modernisers are engaged in a task that seeks to emulate those who oppress them (Chakrabarty 1997; Chatterjee 1986). The way forward then for many nationalist elites was to “re-discover” the essence of the nation and create new ways of being different but modern. In Tanzania a vast state sponsored project of social engineering was given the name “African Socialism”, which supposedly recalled Tanzania’s pre-colonial golden age which was reminiscent of Marx’s “primitive communism”, yet recreated for the needs of a modern nation-state (Donham 1999; Freund 1981; Nursey-Bray 1980; Samoff 1981). Here nationalist modernisers, consciously or not, tried to disguise the full meaning of their vision for the new state by claiming it was a return of older values.

In post-independence Mozambique there was also a need to find a “Mozambican identity” for the new nation. Yet the Frelimo leadership’s plans for modernisation were in many ways more ambitious than the previous examples mentioned. Certain forms of cultural expression, such as dance and the arts were encouraged as they demonstrated national identity (Mondlane 1969: 183-187). But many cultural behaviours were not. They were labelled as inimical to the social progress of the new state. For the revolutionary elite in Mozambique, the choice of political ideology was to form the core of the new national identity not traditional cultural forms. The use of ideology as a basis of identity combined with the rejection of the old has often been used by radical movements. In Peru Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) a Maoist movement recruited embittered modernists of Amer-indian descent by attacking “traditional” Indian culture. “The ‘coldness’ of Sendero ideology – its appeal to ‘science’ and its rejection of things indigenous as superstition – gave it emotional power and gave those who embraced it a meaningful new identity” (Gledhill 1994: 175). Thus for regimes like the Derg of Ethiopia and Frelimo, their adherence to socialism, and later Marxist-Leninism, gave them the theoretical weapons necessary to modernise their nations without overtly aping those who had exploited and humiliated them. Socialism was often extremely attractive for nationalist elites for a variety of reasons that will be discussed in this chapter, a very important one being that it is an ideology of modernity from the west that is also critical of it and of the oppression meted out by the colonisers (Donham 1999).
While the creation of a socialist developmentalist state may have given new modernising ruling elites a form of identity and a sense of mission, they were not always successful in transmitting these values to the wider population, or even in understanding exactly what the population actually wanted (Cooper and Packard 1997: 9). The leaders of new nations spoke in the name of their people, and many may have sincerely believed in what they were doing, but the “developmentalist” state they created remained in many ways an elite project. Despite the nationalist rhetoric frequently employed by new leaders, a substantial social gap remained between them and the subjects of their nations. By giving the party a monopoly of all power Frelimo hoped to dramatically reform Mozambican society in a matter of mere decades. Although when Frelimo came to power they spoke in the inclusionary language of nationalist mobilisation and socialism that was born of a long peasant based liberation struggle, the leadership of the party viewed their nation with a specific gaze. This gaze was affected by the revolutionary elite’s social position during the colonial period and was in many ways unique to them. The revolutionary elite’s fundamental goal was not only to create a better more just society for their citizens, but to build the Novo Homem (new man), a new modern citizen for a new and modernising nation.

As shown by Josina’s statement at the beginning of the chapter, elements of nationalist modernity, such as its linear and hierarchical nature are still present for the independence elite. Most of my informants from this group believed in a modernity that would be similar to what they imagined – and had experienced to be characteristic of Europe and the west, a sort of “high modernity”. This encompassed a strong centralised state built on “rationalist” principals, increased education and infrastructure, changing gender relations and social roles, transparency and a lack of corruption among the government. These ideals of the nature of modernity have been at the forefront of elite conceptions, although in different forms, during the colonial period, socialism and the current “democratic” period. Yet the mass mobilisation and stress on unity of the early socialist period no longer appears as a major feature of current concepts of modernity. In its place a more individual sense of patriotism appears. Perhaps due to the ambiguities inherent in the transition from nationalist modernity to a more individualist form, uncertainties are expressed at the direction the country was taking and may even be phrased in a racialist vocabulary more characteristic of the colonial period. As one member of the independence elite explained to me, the problem with Mozambique lay with its inhabitants.
The problem is we blacks are still two hundred years behind. I mean politics here is a joke, it’s all about lining your own pockets, we are totally corrupt. When we get power we just become lazy and don’t do anything but steal. There is no impersonal bureaucracy; everything depends on who you are and who you know. When something goes wrong we just blame the outside. It’s the west or spirits it’s always something. I mean the whites and the Indians can steal this country and we just give it to them. If a black guy opens a shop in an Indian area all the other Indian shopkeepers will combine and close him down. We never do that, we just ask for money. It’s more than just politics here. Everything comes down to the ancestors. If something goes wrong everyone goes to a witchdoctor to find out what it was. It’s not just disease, I mean they know something about herbalism and that can actually work, but for stupid things, like problems with a boyfriend or girlfriend. Women think magic can keep a man from cheating on her. You would be surprised about the people I am talking about; I mean people that have been to university, they are educated and should know better. I am telling you we’re two hundred years behind (Field notes 9 January 2003).

In the above quote my friend expresses aspersions on the supposed modernity of members of the revolutionary and nationalist elites, but she does not question the overall modernising goal. Members of the revolutionary and independence elites are still supposed to be paragons of modernity in Mozambique, even if the immense setbacks of the civil war period and claims of growing corruption and political rot in the democratic period have dented their self-confidence. This does not mean that elites are becoming more like their “pre-modern” people. My friend often described herself and her family as “modern” and felt this did make her significantly different from the wider population. What really galled her in the above quote was that “backwardness” was being expressed by people who are “educated and should know better” as opposed to the rest of the population. They have had the necessary training such as university to make them modern. Failures to act in a “modern” way damage the legitimacy of the elites, as modernity is one of the central justifications for their high social status.

My informant’s quote and its expressed distaste for “tradition” reveal much about the continuing legacy of nationalist modernity. As with other Marxist movements in Africa, socialist modernisation came with officially sponsored attacks on elements of traditional culture that were viewed by party leadership as impediments to the building of new nations. Neto, the leader of the MPLA stated his party’s cultural goal in Angola as: “We are trying to free and modernise our people by a dual revolution: against their traditional structures which can no longer serve them’ – such as ethnic separatism, witchcraft belief, the oppression of women – ‘and against colonial rule” (Davidson 1984: 800)

In Mozambique Samora Machel explained his party’s motivation as follows:
When Frelimo took up arms to defeat the old order … We felt the obscure need to create a new society, strong healthy and prosperous, in which people freed from all exploitation would co-operate for the progress of all. In the course of our struggle, in the tough fight we had to wage against reactionary elements, we came to understand our objectives more clearly. We felt especially that the struggle to create new structures would fall within the creation of a new mentality… (Davidson 1984: 800).

In the above quote Samora Machel speaks in the terms of nationalist mobilisation for sweeping change, yet the underlying message seems to be that the ideas for the new society will flow from the party to the population and it is the people who will have to change to adapt to them. This is not uncommon among nationalist politicians and political parties. In a similar vein, Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, would publicly laud the peasantry for their great contribution to the cause of independence and the founding of a new nation. In private he viewed the peasantry paternalistically and would describe them as: “dull, personally uninteresting and carried away by passions” (Chatterjee 1986: 148). In practice Nehru, like Frelimo, put his faith in a secular and paternal state that would rise above all of the social divisions and complications of everyday life and carefully plan the development of the nation in what he viewed as the best interests of all (ibid). Ideological differences of these two examples aside, this view of the state (or the party that controls the state) as the originator, moral guardian and engine of social change while the population is a passive mass which exists to carry out plans that are ultimately for their own good, is central to the developmentalist state.

In a very different social setting, Rabinow describes state centred developmentalist tendencies as “middling modernism” (Rabinow 1989). In his work on French bureaucrats, Rabinow states that “middling modernism” was expressed as:

In their discourse society became its own referent, to be worked on by means of technical procedures which were becoming authoritative arbiters of what counted as socially real. Discursively, both norms and forms were becoming increasingly autonomous – freed from their previous historical and natural constraints, defined by their own operations, and claiming universal status (Rabinow 1989: 13).

According to Rabinow there was also a socialist variant of “middling modernism”, in this case the greater good would be achieved by state through its focus on: “The welfare of the population, the maximizing of individual potential, and the linkage of the two engineered by an efficient administration manned by committed specialists dedicated to the public good” (Rabinow 1989: 320). The revolutionary elite shared a
similar conception of the role of the state and its abilities to act for public good. In addition their insistence on the central role of the state as the engine of social change was not entirely unpopular. As shown in Chapter Two, while Frelimo did encounter resistance, elements of their social programmes were popular in diverse communities. One of the central problems was that, unlike France or even India, Frelimo did not have the power to actually enact their ideologically driven proposals.

The party’s attempts to abolish aspects of “traditional culture” such as witchcraft, traditional healing, lobolo, polygamy, traditional leadership, “tribalism”, and various religious practices floundered not only because they were “culturally insensitive” (which indeed they were), but also because, outside certain groups of the population like educated urbanites, Frelimo could not offer much in the way of a coherent replacement. For much of Mozambique’s population, especially peasants, the benefits of the promised modernity never seemed to be coming. It is difficult to introduce sweeping social changes with a lack of qualified cadres, a population that does not entirely understand the party’s message and a climate of economic instability that undermines the social programmes at the same time as they are being enacted. The result was a party leadership that was becoming increasingly out of touch with the population and one that tried to overcome local resistance to their initiatives with growing coercion. The final blow to nationalist modernity (or at least its outward, socialist expressions) was the civil war, which destroyed many of the signs of progress that Frelimo had made.\textsuperscript{43} The increasingly poisonous social environment allowed Renamo to portray their war, to at least some embittered sections of the population, as a “war of the spirits” against the culturally distant and oppressive cities and: “… their literate, educated and lusophone inhabitants (that) belonged to FRELIMO” (Geffray, quoted in Fry 2000: 120). Frelimo officials also recognised their failure in this respect. Once at a coffee shop I was introduced to the former Minister of Agriculture. He asked what I was doing in Mozambique and I explained I was studying post-socialist elites. He looked at me, shook his head and boomed: “No, you are incorrect. This is not post-socialism; we never managed to actually achieve socialism. You are studying post-centralisation that is what we managed to do”. Through his statement he acknowledged that the socialist state (in name only

\textsuperscript{43} Sections of the population, such as the urban middle class, still yearn for some of the moral underpinnings of nationalist modernity though. This is explored in depth in Chapter Five.
according to him), while always exhorting its citizens to further sacrifices, rarely was able to deliver the prosperity that was supposed to result from such heroic effort.

The form of modernity that the revolutionary elite initially subscribed to had, as one of its primary purposes, the role of legitimising Frelimo’s control of the state and by extension the commanding social positions of the party leadership. This was to be achieved by utilising the state to reform society and create a better, more socially just nation for Mozambique’s population. The nationalist modernity of the revolutionary elite differed in many important ways from the currently popular academic ideas of “alternative modernities”. Many members of the revolutionary elite (and the independence elite of today as well) would have a difficult time understanding how “alternative modernities” are not actually descriptions of “pre-modern” cultural traits that continue to exist today. For them modernity was a universal and linear scale on which, sadly, Mozambique ranked low. What was necessary was mass mobilisation and a Herculean effort to “catch up”. In the Mozambican case many of nationalist modernity’s failures were evident. The question remain though as to why a radical expression of this form of modernity, coupled with a disdain for existing cultural practices within Mozambique, were so attractive to the revolutionary elite. An examination of the social origins of this group will go some way towards answering this question. In addition, through this, we can better understand in what ways later manifestations of modernity, such as those expressed by the independence elite, draw upon these origins and in what ways they have changed.

### 3.3 The Social Origins of Changing Modernities

The core of Frelimo’s leadership and by extension, the revolutionary elite, was heavily drawn from southern, Protestant *assimilados* (Cruz e Silva 2000).\(^4^4\) Members from this group made a common cause with alienated members of other groups, also primarily from the south, but including some northerners as well, that were privileged in comparison to the population as a whole, but were subordinated to the ruling factions of the colonialists. Many of these members came from Mulatto, Indian and

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\(^4^4\) This does not mean that all Protestants joined Frelimo or that there were no Catholic members. I examine one of the reasons why Protestant *assimilados* were well-represented in Frelimo in the following section.
Segundo (white Portuguese who were born in Mozambique and were discriminated against for this reason) backgrounds, although as stated in the introduction there were exceptions. The social origins of many members of the revolutionary elite, especially its strong *assimilado* component, influenced the society they tried to create after independence.

Fry (2000) argues that socialism in Mozambique followed a very *assimilado* logic. Although the stated goal of Portuguese colonialism was to incorporate their African subjects into the glories of Portuguese and European culture, it was based on deeply racist foundations. Therefore it was thought that while assimilation would take generations, only small numbers of *assimilados* could be created while the vast majority of the population would be left as a repository of exotic customs (Fry, 2000). Frelimo was far more ambitious and inclusionary; they felt they could recreate the entire society in a short period of time. Yet there are underlying, if probably unintentional, similarities of logic between their version of socialism and *assimilação* (assimilation).

In spite of the anti-colonial discourse of the center and FRELIMO in general, it is impossible not to observe that the socialist project for Mozambique was if anything more “assimilationist” than the Portuguese ever dared to imagine and it is tempting to suggest that this is one of the reasons why the Mozambican elite found the socialist program so attractive. Structurally speaking there was little difference between an authoritarian capitalist state run by a small body of “illuminated” Portuguese and assimilados and an authoritarian socialist state run by an equally diminutive and equally enlightened vanguard party (Fry 2000: 129).

This ideological outlook came under increasing pressure though as the civil war progressed, and faced serious challenges at the end of the conflict. Fry (2000) suggests that since the end of the civil war in 1992, Frelimo’s re-conceptualisation of tradition and its place in national life led to the party taking a more locally based, less elitist view. In addition, the powerful international aid agencies which have become increasingly dominant since the end of socialism have also become strong supporters of “tradition”, perhaps disillusioned by the failures of the previous “modernist, universalist” development regimes (ibid). Fry (2000) argues that the party’s efforts to embrace tradition exemplify the changing logic of power as the leadership tries to broaden its base and distance itself from its *assimilado* roots. For Fry, when speaking of Frelimo’s abandonment of their former Marxism and modernism and of the moves to reclaim the place of “tradition”: “It is as if the universalist pretensions of both the
forms of external power (Marxism and modernism) have finally succumbed to the imperatives of the *usos e costumes* (usages and customs) they (Frelimo) so despised” (Fry 2000: 135).

Fry makes an important point by recognising some of the ideological continuities between *assimilação* and the post-independence socialist project. These conclusions are based on the fact that the colonial practice of *assimilação* envisioned that generations were needed to bring the social level of the colony’s African inhabitants to a sufficient stage where they could become members of a European culture. Furthermore, for immediate purposes the process was to involve only relatively small numbers of people and was theoretically based on personal choice (one could choose to become an *assimilado*) (Fry 2000: 129). As previously shown, the nationalist modernity and socialism of the revolutionary elites tried to turn these assumptions upside down.

While there is undoubtedly an element of truth to Fry’s argument, it misses some of the very real differences in the way modernity was conceptualised by the Mozambican elites between the colonial and socialist periods. For much of the revolutionary elite, nationalism was based, in part, on a deep sense of personal grievance and racial humiliation (Hall and Young 1997: 65).45 For many *assimilados*, and the colonial elite in general, there was a love/hate relationship with the colonial power. They admired aspects of the modernity the colonialists represented but hated the fact that they were only allowed partial and subordinate entrance to it (ibid).

Although many members of Frelimo’s leadership had *assimilado* backgrounds, the idea of *assimilação* was an anathema to what they wanted to create. *Assimilados* drew their prestige from, and were seen as, the modern section of the African population due to their close contact with the Portuguese. Frelimo felt that *Assimilados* closeness to the Portuguese was not only a betrayal of the nationalist cause, but also a deeper sign of humiliation; they were seen as “uncle Toms”. As I was once warned by a friend who was arranging an interview for me with her uncle, a man who was once an *assimilado*: “Watch it, he hates the word *assimilado*, if you call him an *assimilado* he will throw you out of his house”.

Yet a “retreat” into traditional culture was also not a viable option. Members of the revolutionary elite associated “traditional culture” with defeat, humiliation and

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45 This theme is explored in more depth in Chapter Four.
subjugation. For them it was exactly this “cultural backwardness” that made Mozambique weak and easy prey for the Portuguese. Despite Frelimo’s vaguely Maoist rhetoric of worker and peasant alliances, peasants, the embodiment of “traditional culture” were often viewed with deep contempt by the leadership (Hall and Young 1997: 84).\(^{46}\) For the revolutionary elite the “tradition culture” of the peasant masses was not a vision of Mozambique’s future, but a symbol of its shameful past and it would have to be drastically reformed for the state to advance. This played a large role in Frelimo’s insistence on the creation of the *Novo Homem*, the new man who was not corrupted by what had happened before independence. Frelimo wanted to create a state and society that could beat the Portuguese at their own game, one that was progressive and modern, yet sovereign and had overcome of the legacy of humiliation and defeat.

The revolutionary elite’s nationalist modernism grew, in part, from their personal social experiences of colonialism and the victorious example of the liberation struggle that proved that almost anything could be accomplished with sufficient discipline and will. It was a way to be modern like the Portuguese, but different and critical of them at the same time. Furthermore it was a way to expand and deepen the superficial modernisation that had gone on during colonialism and create a new and unified nation. Like Donham’s “Marxist Modern” in Ethiopia, nationalist modernity was a way to: “cut history off at the pass” (1999: 127).

After the fall of socialism the outward display of nationalist modernity was, to a large degree, discredited and the younger generation of independence elites do not have the same personal experiences of rancour with the former system that gave nationalist modernity its immediacy for previous generations. The modernity of preceding elite incarnations drew its inspiration from the Portuguese or the socialist world; the modernity of the independence elite is more widely cosmopolitan and eclectic. It is influenced by Europe, America, South Africa and Brazil, where they have often studied and worked. For the independence elite the fact that they were modern never suffered the same degree of doubt as their parents, who grew up under colonialism. They were raised at the pinnacle of an independent state that is both a creation and a symbol of Frelimo’s modernity (Bertelsen 2004) This does not mean that members of the younger generation do not suffer doubts as to Mozambique’s

\(^{46}\) The implications of the revolutionary elite’s view of the majority of the population are examined in the following chapter.
place in the world. Many of my friends from this group have travelled widely and compare the situation in foreign nations with what they perceive as the poverty, political and cultural shortcomings they see at home.\textsuperscript{47} There are also frequent complaints about the power that aid agencies and foreigners in general are able to wield in Mozambique, which can be ironic as many of my informants work with these same people and organisations.

Despite the problems of contemporary Mozambique, few of my informants among the independence elite feel personally responsible for them and, in many cases, through their daily experiences it seems as if things are gradually getting better. I was once at a café with four members of the independence elite and I listened, as they got into an argument about the place of nationalism in contemporary Mozambican society. While all present claimed to be proud of being Mozambican a young man asked why this was so rarely demonstrated in the post-socialist period. He compared the example of Mozambique with that of Angola whose population, according to him, was famous for their rabid nationalism. He could not understand why a country that was in his terms a “disaster” inspired such fervent devotion among its citizens. A reply came from a young woman sitting at our table. She said: “That is exactly why they are such nationalists, Angola is an absolute disaster and they do not have anything else. We do not need to be”.

As with the life experiences and social conditions of different generations of elites, the manifestations of modernity have changed from independence to the present day, although previous manifestations influence the following ones. This has not been a seamless evolution. In actual practice the world is filled with ambiguities and many, both among elites and the wider population, wonder in what direction the present manifestation of modernity will lead.\textsuperscript{48} But one factor that has remained is the importance for some form of modernity to legitimise the social position of elites. To follow the lead of Gledhill modernity in Mozambique, through its various incarnations, creates the unifying political culture in which various Mozambican elites operate (2002). This political culture is built on the belief that the elites of Mozambique have their positions because they will lead the country to progress, whether through socialist nationalism or capitalist NGO driven development. In the current era there is increasing cynicism towards this belief. It is often a cynicism with

\textsuperscript{47} As shown by the quote on pages 84.
\textsuperscript{48} This is explored in greater depth in Chapter Five.
a basis in reality. Despite the best intentions of the party leadership the revolutionary elite has developed some of the characteristics of what Leys (1982) and M. Cohen (1982) described in this thesis’s introduction as the “national bourgeoisie”. In practice social and family connections are crucial in maintaining the position of elites. But there are still efforts to legitimise this by pointing to the fact that it is the members of the elites who have the “modern” skills to fulfil these positions. This is true for the Frelimo cadres of the socialist period and the NGO field representatives of the capitalist period. The remainder of this chapter examines two crucial ways in which elites are “modern”, education and consumption. I argue that education and consumption serve the dual purpose of both the means to inculcate elites with the values of their generation’s dominant modernity and as symbolic markers of it.

3.4 Education

Portugal’s colonial record for providing education in Mozambique was dismal at best. A common saying among the older generation was that the former British colonies got schools, roads, railways and general infrastructure, while Portugal was only good for building churches. There is some truth to this statement; comparatively Portugal invested little in their overseas colonies and official state education for “natives” was left primarily in the hands of the Catholic Church (cf. Cruz e Silva 2001; Pitcher 2002). Toward the end of the colonial period some measures were taken by the state to widen the educational system to include a larger percentage of the population. Even so, the overall numbers of students remained incredibly low. When independence was declared in 1975 the nation was facing a crisis due to the lack of trained personnel.

Frelimo was left to run an effectively bankrupt country with virtually no trained people. The illiteracy rate was over 90 percent. There were six economists, two agronomists, not a single geologist, and fewer than a thousand black high school graduates in all of Mozambique. Of 350 railroad engineers working in 1975, just one was black and he was an agent of the Portuguese secret police (Finnegan 1992: 30).

Other estimates put the rate of illiteracy at independence between 95% and 97% (Hanlon 1984; Munslow 1983). The limited educational facilities that did exist primarily benefited the white population. Like the British in South Africa, the educational system that was available for Blacks was first and foremost targeted at
creating a local elite whose interests were tied to the regime (Krige 1993). Yet even this limited goal was inadequate and discriminatory in practice. Access to good state or Catholic schools in colonial Mozambique was a rarity among the colonial elite and for the majority of the population it was far worse. For someone of a non-elite background to gain access to any schooling at all was a challenge. The most the majority could hope for would be a few years of catechism from the local Catholic mission, or access to so-called “native” teachers, who were those who had some education and gave rudimentary classes to the children of neighbours in return for labour on their lands (Cruz e Silva 2001). The following example shall detail the types of education that were available for one of the lucky few who came from comparatively privileged background: Educational opportunities often depended on luck and white patronage.

Roberto’s Early Education.

Roberto was born to a relatively affluent family in the province of Inhambane during the late colonial period. Although his family were not legally considered assimilados, his family had long connections with Swiss Protestant Missions that were strong in the area and though this connection they were well-educated and affluent by local standards, with access to education, a well and a sewing machine. Roberto’s father became a teacher for Methodist Missionaries and operated a one-room mission school across the border in South Africa, although his family remained in Mozambique. Roberto attended a Catholic Mission School as there were no others available at the time, although this was not his parent’s first choice. When describing the Catholic Mission School to me, Roberto said it was basically a joke. There was one large room that was filled with children of all ages all reciting the alphabet. The rest of the day would be filled with some religious training and then student labour, usually farming the Mission’s fields. The produce collected from the fields were then given back to Mission, although the students still had to pay fees for their attendance. Roberto moved to Maputo with his mother and his brothers when he was five years old. He was enrolled in another Catholic school when he arrived, but his mother was worried about the quality of the education offered by the Missions. He attended a Catholic Mission school until the 3rd year, but then his mother decided to try and move him to a different school. It would be very difficult for a black child to move to the fourth year immediately, even though Roberto had top marks, and delay would be costly as one could not attend secondary school if one was past 14 years old. Through the intercession of Roberto’s white godfather, a good friend of his father’s, Roberto’s mother managed to have him placed at an privileged white school. The new school was next to the elite Portuguese commando’s headquarters. Roberto stated it was rather rough, he was one of about ten black students in the school and he took a lot of racial abuse, both from the students and the neighbouring commandos. Roberto said that the most overt abuse eased over time. Despite his high marks, Roberto was put into the lowest academic category.

49 There was an alternative route to acquiring education through Protestant Swiss Mission schools. These schools were only located in the south and due to their limited numbers and state harassment they only provided educational opportunities to a tiny minority of the population. Their social effect though was far greater than their enrolment. This will be described later in this section. 50 Roberto’s identity card states his age as two years younger then he actually is, to try and avoid school age limits. It was common to doctor birth certificates for Black men of his generation who attended Catholic schools.
Later he had a new teacher from East Timor, who was more sympathetic to the idea of revolution. She placed him into a higher academic category (Field notes 13 April 2005).

Roberto was comparatively lucky for a Mozambican of his generation. Only a few had the sufficient social connections to be able to bypass the official schools available for Africans and obtain a higher quality of education. During our interview Roberto told me that the purpose of African education for the majority was to create loyal workers who knew the rudiments of Catholicism. The few history lessons he received at the African school basically ignored Mozambique entirely and focused instead on the glories of Portuguese civilisation. This was the concept of assimilação at its lowest and most basic level. African students were taught that there is no such thing as Mozambique, or Mozambican history, independent of Portugal and Portuguese history. The logic of assimilação greatly intensified as he progressed up the educational ladder. Roberto only secured a place at an elite white school through white patronage. While the racial abuse he suffered lessened over time as the student body gradually became used to his presence, like assimilados throughout Mozambique, to progress he had to try and make himself as much like the Portuguese as possible and even then he remained a junior partner. For the fortunate few though, there was another avenue to obtain an education in the colonial period.

As shown with Roberto’s parents in the example above, the Swiss Protestant Mission provided one of the alternative sites of education for colonial elites in the south. The Swiss Mission made contact with the authorities of various indigenous kingdoms of the south and had established themselves even before the Portuguese consolidated their hold on this area (Cruz e Silva 2001). Because of their relationship with indigenous kingdoms, the Mission was initially greeted by the Portuguese as possible sites of subversion. This distrust grew as the dominant Catholic Church complained about Protestant Missions usurping their educational role. The Catholic Church was allowed free reign in education provided they would also educate their students to become Portuguese subjects. There was a real fear that foreign Missions would teach in languages other than Portuguese and “de-nationalise” students by bringing them into the orbit of other European powers (ibid). While the state allowed the Swiss Mission to exist, the schools generally faced petty official harassment, restrictions on areas they could operate and pupils they could enrol. Graduates often
faced a pervasive sense of governmental suspicion, and the Mission occasionally faced more serious actions such as temporary closures and threats of expulsion.

Aside from the Swiss Mission’s possible role in “de-nationalising” Portuguese colonial subjects and the competition they provided the approved Catholic schools, their style of teaching also caused friction with the colonial state. Many Mission schools provided education and religious services in vernacular languages as opposed to Portuguese, which was official national policy. In addition their curriculum often set them at odds with official state procedure. While Mission staff did not knowingly promote a nationalist agenda among their students, there were serious differences between what they taught and the government educational methods. Lessons were far more comprehensive than those of the typical “native” school and it is possible that teachers communicated their sense of frustration with the colonial state and wider Protestant critiques of Portuguese colonialism more generally to their students. In general the Mission was one of the few places that provided an atmosphere that was at least permissive of anti-colonial sentiment before the beginning of the liberation struggle (Cruz e Silva 1998:224). Of equal, if not more importance, according to Cruz e Silva (1998, 2001), were informal methods of teaching. The Mission adapted certain local social structures to their pedagogical purposes. What is especially interesting in the terms of this discussion is the mintlawa (group), which was based on age grade organisations. The purpose of the mintlawa was as follows:

… were intended to stimulate self-reliance, develop individual skills, broaden knowledge, promote Christian values and a new worldview. It placed particular emphasis on fostering skills such as information gathering and interpretation, critical analysis, and encouraging individuals to reflect on, and understand, their own position. This amounted to a form of “capacity development” which enabled youth to adapt their education to their own individual and collective advantage (Cruz e Silva 1998:226).

Interviews collected by Cruz e Silva with former Mission graduates who later became high-ranking Frelimo members frequently pointed to the mintlawa as an institution where students developed the skills to critically analyse situations (1998, 2001). These groups were originally intended to discuss and interpret the bible, but members were able to also begin a critical engagement with the ideas of colonialism and of Mozambique as a nation. This aided students’ abilities to conceive of a Mozambican identity separate from Portugal.
Much has been made of the role of missionaries in the formation of overarching identities in colonial Africa. Ranger persuasively argues that mission involvement in colonial Rhodesia was a crucial component in the development of a wider Shona identity amongst groups of people who shared linguistic traits, but had never before thought of themselves as sharing an overall identity (Ranger 1989). Harries (1989) demonstrates how the Swiss Mission was an integral feature in the creation of a Tsonga identity in both South Africa and Mozambique. According to Harries, a mission educated petty-bourgeoisie was a major component in the emergence of a wider Tsonga ethnic identity. This happened in part due to instrumental reasons involving South African ethnic politics and also through the codification of disparate Tsonga languages as the bible was translated into the vernacular. The evolution of disparate groups into a broad Tsonga ethnicity is evident in the writings of one of the more famous Swiss Missionaries, Henri Junod. Arising from Junod’s time in Mozambique in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, his exhaustive work “Life of a South African Tribe” (1962a, 1962b) uses the “scientific” criteria of the day to categorise linguistically related groups into a unified tribe, albeit one split into four major clans.

While a wider “Tsonga” consciousness was important in introducing Mission students to a world wider than their particular villages and home regions, by the middle of the 20th Century the students’ relationship with the Mission was producing an even wider, if still embryonic, national identity. Cruz e Silva makes a strong point in locating the Swiss Mission as an important part of the formation of nationalism among an emergent elite. The permissive atmosphere allowed students the freedom to engage critically with the wider social situation. This, coupled with a sense of a hostile government and the humiliation of graduates who saw less educated Catholics promoted ahead of them, increased alienation towards the state. The influence of the Mission can also be seen in revolutionary policy and the idea of the Novo Homem. While the Mission used vernacular languages and adopted certain customs and forms of social organisation to their own use, they were very critical of cultural behaviours they saw as “heathen”. While they respected elements of local use, they also wanted to construct a new kind of Christian subject free of previous “superstitions”. If anything, the Frelimo leadership was to go much further in their anti-traditional bias. Finally, the Mission’s policy of securing scholarships for some gifted students to study abroad allowed the formation of a more cosmopolitan elite who could compare
their situation in Mozambique to those they found in other nations. As a result, they were able to engage with other theories, such as socialism, which were critical both of colonialism and the missionaries. Thus it is also important to understand how this embryonic sense of nationalism soon outgrew its original home.

Upon their assumption of power the Frelimo leadership displayed overt hostility not only towards Catholicism, but also toward organised religion more generally. Certain missionary activities and their educational freedom were severely curtailed. The new state was militantly “anti-tribalist” and discouraged any outward display of ethnic consciousness. While many militants may have stated that the mintlawa system deeply influenced their ability to engage critically with the colonial system, no efforts were made to reproduce this kind of educational model in schools after the revolution. In actual practice, shades of the former colonial educational system were more evident as Portuguese was the only language of instruction and students were punished for speaking African languages. It seems as if the freedom provided by the Swiss Mission allowed an emergent elite to discard not only the colonial logic of oppression, but also many of the core teachings of their missionary allies.

The revolutionary elite may have turned against some of the specific methods of education found in the Swiss Missions but they tended to fetishise the concept of education as a vehicle to introduce nationalist modernity. Education was thought to be the foundation of all of the wider goals of the struggle (Mondlane 1969). As I have mentioned earlier, Frelimo’s ideal of modernity was embodied in the concept of the “Novo Homem” (new man), one free of the evils of colonial exploitation and African “ignorance”. The creation of the “New Man”, in part, depended on education. In fact the idea of the New Man was central to the socialist educational system. Frelimo defined their system’s educational goals as follows:

The New System of Education has as its central objective the formation of the New Man, a man free from obscurantism, superstition, and the colonial-bourgeois mentality, a man who will assume the values of a socialist society (People’s Republic of Mozambique, 1985, quoted in Gómez 1999: 356, translation, mine).

Education during the socialist period was a prime expression of what some analysts have termed Frelimo’s “blank slate” ideology, the idea that Mozambique was unformed clay (after the eradication of inappropriate cultural behaviours) waiting to be shaped. Frelimo’s educational policies would ideally bind the populace, especially
much of the peasantry who were thought to be the most “obscurantist” sections of the population, more tightly to the party and serve as a means of transmitting the values of nationalist modernity to the people.

Education was also crucial to the revolutionary elite’s goals for pragmatic reasons. After independence there was a mass exodus of Portuguese settlers and the incoming government lost much of its managerial personnel; there was a desperate need to train replacements as soon as possible. It has now become common for the party and some sympathetic international agencies to blame many of the failures that occurred during the socialist period on the lack of qualified personnel to run the nation’s administrative apparatus. As a former officer in the liberation struggle and general in the post-independence army told me:

Those were very exciting days. We were sure that we could do a better job than the Portuguese had. They were foreigners and they wanted to exploit the country for their own purposes. We were Mozambican and we were going to make things better for our people. We were very ambitious and very young; we had immense responsibilities for people our age. That was part of the problem I guess. We wanted to educate the nation, but we were barely educated ourselves (Field notes 28 September 2002).

A former Frelimo supporter who is now a Professor at Eduardo Mondlane University told me: “The problem was we had an elite big enough to run a revolution, but not big enough to run a country”. These statements show some of the contradictions, however practical they may be, between Frelimo’s utopian ideology of socialist assimilation for the entire nation and the needs of consolidating the power of the revolutionary elite. The new Frelimo government did make dramatic gains in education. Schools were opened throughout the country and in urban areas adult education was available (in some cases obligatory) for all. Those who could read and write were enlisted as “barefoot” teachers in emulation of revolutionary Cuba and China’s literacy campaigns (Hanlon 1990). The new teaching conditions were not always ideal as a Mozambican friend, who attended school shortly after liberation before she left for Portugal, explained to me.

It was a strange time. Former guerrilla soldiers would just come to schools and start classes. Many of them did not have any education, but they had just freed the nation from the Portuguese and they thought that was enough. They would sit in front of the students and just talk about their lives. They thought that was teaching. Even the other teachers had almost no experience. Many of them were very young and they just had a few years of school themselves. When I first came to Portugal I was terribly behind in math and sciences because very few of the teachers we had knew anything about them. Oddly
enough though I was ahead in reading and writing, I think it is because my teachers in Mozambique did not really know how to read and write either and we were learning together (Field notes 17 October 2004).

The above quote demonstrates a problem that was to bedevil many of the revolutionary elite’s grand plans to transform the nation. The plans were incredibly ambitious but the ability to carry them out was limited and implementation was often haphazard and erratic. Yet not all who attended school in the initial revolutionary period were so disparaging and Frelimo’s efforts improved over time. Naema, who now works as a teacher in a private school, was a secondary school student when Frelimo took power. Although she made no comment about the academic quality of schooling during this period she strongly appreciated the attempts at nation building.

It was all very exciting. We did not know much about Frelimo when they came. I remember before liberation I had seen the word Frelimo written on a wall and I asked my uncle what it meant. He told me I was never to say this word, especially if there were strangers around, we could get into trouble. When they came and got rid of the Portuguese we were all rejoicing, especially the young. We were going to build a new Mozambique. They would come to schools and teach us about our new country. They (Frelimo) would often have demonstrations, everyone would hold a placard and together it would form the flag, you know like the North Koreans do. I was always picked for the demonstrations; I was very small and cute. They would also give those who took part in the demonstrations lunch and it could be hard to get food then. We would do voluntary cleaning in the city on Sundays; they wanted us to be good citizens. That was really good. Now the city is filthy and no one does anything. Many of my students do not even know the words to the national anthem. Patriotism does not mean anything anymore and they do not try and teach it like they did before (Field notes 7 July and 8 November 2003).

Naema greatly approved of the strong emphasis on nation-building and nationalism, which was transmitted through education during the socialist period. As her comments show there was a sense that everyone was being drawn together in a unified nation and individual interests were subordinated for the good of the many. The manner in which Naema was educated, with its focus on the nation, is in direct contrast to that of Roberto under the Portuguese. In this sense the revolutionary elite was successful in transmitting their modernist goals. Yet Naema was educated in the capital of Mozambique, at the centre of power, and the party’s goal to reproduce this experience throughout the vast nation was far more problematic.

The revolutionary government did make concerted efforts to bring their ideal of educated modernity to the nation as a whole, although as previously stated in a rather chaotic manner. As with other socialist nations in Africa, such as Angola and
Tanzania, education was rapidly expanded, but the infrastructure to absorb increasing numbers of students was inadequate (Hodges 2001; Samoff, 1979). In the effort to provide teachers, as the first example illustrated, many were not properly trained. Furthermore, even in the capital, according to many informants, schools were overcrowded, with huge classes. The demand was so great that many schools had to run throughout the day and evening in shifts, a practice that continues today. The outbreak of the civil war and the following economic collapse put intolerable strain on an already overburdened system.

In addition to the inadequacies of the educational system, Frelimo itself was instrumental in creating an educational class structure. The Frelimo leadership had always been an elite and their “elitist” tendencies became more pronounced after Frelimo redefined itself as a “vanguard” party in 1977. Although nationalist modernity was predicated on mass mobilisation it required an enlightened vanguard to lead the way. Soon after independence the party created the Frelimo School, which was to exclusively service the children of high-ranking party members. As the following example will demonstrate, despite the school’s underlying socialist ideology, it offered concrete educational benefits to its students.

**Catarina**

Catarina was born in 1975 and came from a Frelimo family. Her father had been a Minister in the socialist government. Catarina was educated at the Frelimo School until the ninth grade (year). There were 30 people in her class and all were the children of high-ranking Frelimo members. She remembered the discipline was extremely strict. When the teacher entered the room all the students had to stand at attention and greet the teacher and wait for permission to sit. The curriculum was rigorous and students were also required to work in the fields as part of the party’s efforts to keep the elites close to the people during the early socialist period. There were advantages to attending the Frelimo School. The teachers were mostly expats from other socialist countries; many were East German and well trained. The students were provided with better food than other schools. In addition, students were provided with a bus to transport them to and from school. The normal students walking to school would often mock them and make comparisons with the school bus and cattle transport trucks. Another friend of mine remembered resenting the Frelimo schools and its privileges and recalls her friends throwing rocks at the bus as they walked to school. Towards the end of the socialist period Catarina recalled that many students started to leave to study abroad or be sent to the increasing number of private schools available in Maputo. Catarina’s father felt that she should experience school as normal Mozambicans do and was sent to a state run institution. For Catarina it was something of a shock, she had wanted to be sent to a private school in Swaziland. Discipline in her new school was lax and the teachers were not often very good or very interested in their job. Catarina now had to walk 45 minutes to school and had to arrive early to be sure to get a desk, materials were very scarce. At this time Renamo was periodically attacking Matola, a town on the outskirts of Maputo.

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51 As Fry (2000) noted, this policy does bare a strong, if probably unintentional, resemblance to many members of the revolutionary elite’s former status as *assimilados.*
and students were made to undergo military training and dig trenches, measures, which were ineffective and cut into teaching time. (Field notes 28 April 2005).

Catrina’s example does not only demonstrate the prevalent inequalities between the education reserved for the children of the revolutionary elite and everyone else; this example also coincided with the shift away from nationalist modernity and towards a more distinctive and technocratic form. The revolutionary elite was increasingly shifting their children from the party school, which was steeped in socialist and nationalist values, and sent them to private and foreign schools where the young members of the independence elite learned a wider, more cosmopolitan form of modernity. As demonstrated by Simpson in his study of a Missionary Boarding School in Zambia, access to education, even despite the intentions of the school’s founders, became the site of the social reproduction of the nation’s bourgeoisie, and created significant social barriers between the lives the students now aspired to and the realities of the lives of the vast majority of the nation’s population (2003). In Mozambique the elitism inherent in the idea of a social vanguard began to harden into a class structure expressed through differing access to education.

In the post-socialist period a quick stroll through Maputo is usually enough to demonstrate the difference in schooling between the elites and the rest of the city’s residents. Although there are multiple schools on the streets, some dating from the colonial period while the socialist government constructed others, many are in bad repair. The paint of the school is peeling and many of the windows are broken. Wave after wave of students issue from the schools as overcrowding still necessitates operating the schools in shifts. On the other side of town, in Bairro Triunfo (neighbourhood of triumph), the situation is rather different. In a somewhat secluded cul-de-sac slightly off the main road is a street housing many of Maputo’s private schools and international schools, such as the Portuguese and American Schools. The road is still unpaved, but the difference between the schools here and those in other parts of the town is striking. Many of the schools are two or three stories, the paint is fresh, all of the windows are intact and the students are dropped off by an array of expensive cars and 4x4s. While many of the younger members of the Mozambican elite study abroad for at least part of their academic career, they complete much of
their initial schooling within Mozambique.\textsuperscript{52} The state’s initial attempts to consolidate elite social reproduction through superior schooling have gained momentum in the post-socialist period. Currently elite children are beginning to bypass the state system entirely; in their youth they attend either private or international schools within Maputo, gaining the skills to study abroad. Class divisions among urbanites can be demonstrated, in part, by those who have to rely on the national education system and those who do not.

The growing educational class structure is enhanced by the ability for elite families to send their children abroad. Foreign education is prized by elite Mozambican families for the qualifications it bestows, but also because of the status it confers and the social networks it fosters. Although the effects on the children can be somewhat traumatic as they are sent away from home and exposed to different social systems and often high degrees of racism, there are benefits. Many of the young elites I knew had formed long lasting friendships that were created when they studied together in various places. They also formed relationships with the children of other African elites. In some ways these relationships are perhaps the most important part of foreign education. It also assists in the formation of the current form of modernity by inculcating the values of cosmopolitanism in the independence elite, while giving them high qualifications and the ability to “fit in” and easily interact with international elites, such as those who run the aid agencies. As the next section will show, the inculcation of these values are the foundation of the everyday demonstration of elite status in Mozambique; it both legitimises and is symbolic of their social position.

\textbf{3.5 Distinction}

The social importance of certain modes of consumption and self-presentation was brought home to me at a conversation during a friend’s birthday party. At this party I met the daughter of a high-ranking Frelimo official. After a while we started talking about the government. She said although there were problems with corruption she and her family were still strong Frelimo supporters. She felt that, corruption aside,

\textsuperscript{52} As demonstrated in the introduction, of the 23 members of the independence elite I knew well during fieldwork, 22 had studied abroad. The major destinations were South Africa, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Brazil, Swaziland and the United States.
there was no one else who was capable of running the country. In her opinion the opposition, Renamo, were simply uneducated peasants. To illustrate her point she told me a story.

I remember in 1992 when peace was declared and Renamo came out of the bush. They were given houses, at least the big guys in the party were. It was one of the conditions for peace. Dhlakama (the leader of Renamo) said he would not come to the capital because he did not have a house. The government finally had to give him one; it had originally been built for the European Union. When they (Renamo) came here they had no idea how to live in a city, they were fresh from the bush. They used to wash their clothes and leave them on the front lawn to dry! Can you believe that? These people think they could run a country. It’s a joke; they had never been out of the bush before (Field notes 28 September 2002).

At the time I found it remarkable that after all the horrors of the civil war, this woman disqualified Renamo for political leadership because they displayed “peasant habits” with their washing. I asked her if members of Frelimo did not act in a similar way when they returned from the bush after a ten-year liberation struggle. She just laughed and replied: “Are you kidding? Frelimo knew far more than that”. I did not realise it at the time, but my friend was alluding to a common conception amongst elites that equates the display of “peasant habits” with poverty and a fundamental backwardness. This chapter’s introductory quote by Samora Machel demonstrates the humiliation in thinking that outsiders equate being “African” with poverty and loincloths. This frustration was also evident in the ideology of nationalist modernity with its stress on “catching up” and earning the respect of the west. This is again seen in Machel’s quote through his seemingly thwarted attempts to make people understand their modernity: “we wear tunics and trousers”. During the socialist period there were efforts to bring this form of modernity to the nation, although as the vanguard, the revolutionary elite were already thought to embody it. After the fall of socialism, these forms of consumption and self-presentation have increasingly become the distinctive mark of the independence elite. For young elites, the distinction that flowed from certain forms of self-presentation was not only about differentiating themselves from the wider population, as the above comment shows. For them this was often all too obvious. It was also about making outsiders (i.e. the west) understand the distinction between elites and the rest of the population. If one cannot make outsiders understand that the entire nation is cosmopolitan and modern

53 The ways in which elites conceive of the rest of Mozambique’s population are explored in more depth in following chapters.
(although there are still undercurrents of this) at least they should be able to recognise that the independence elite are.

This manner of consumption and self-presentation has its roots in the colonial period. *Assimilados* were noted for their European dress; it was a mark of distinction (Penvenne 1979; 1989). Granjo, in his work on *lobolo* in Mozambique relates the story of an older *assimilado* man during the colonial period who, due to the restrictions of *assimilação*, was no longer able to request bride wealth for the marriage of his daughters. He circumvented these restrictions by asking his daughter’s suitors to give him a tie if their proposal was accepted. This symbolic payment not only helped to fulfil the requirement of *lobolo*, but it acknowledged the man’s status and position. A tie was almost a badge of rank for *assimilados* (personal communication). By adopting European fashions, *assimilados* were demonstrating their modernity and status, showing themselves both worthy of respect from those below them in the social hierarchy and demonstrating that they were worthy of equal treatment from the Portuguese. While the symbolic roots of the importance of elite consumption have their genesis in the colonial period, the introduction of socialism and its resulting “economy of privation” was a crucial influence for current understandings of the role of consumption.

In her work on republican elites in Yemen, vom Bruck (2005) observed the crucial link between forms of consumption and elite status. Thus in contrast to older displays of status associated with the monarchy, such as a cultivated aestheticism and religious knowledge, for the republicans: “The ability to acquire, display and distribute wealth has become one of the defining criteria of the new elite…” (vom Bruck 2005: 257). It was not simply consumption itself that indicates status, but specifically the ability to consume high-status foreign goods. The ability to access foreign products becomes a symbolic marker of social worth and a display of the cultural capital of the ruling elite (ibid). As shown by Granjo’s example of the *assimilado* and the tie, a similar logic operates in Mozambique and has longstanding roots. Certain forms of consumption not only act as markers of one’s relationship to the project of modernity, but the ability to access western goods also serves as a symbolic statement of equality. Yet one of the major problems of nationalist modernity and socialism was that they resulted in chronic shortages that made these symbolic displays ever more difficult, even for privileged urbanites and the revolutionary elite themselves.
Once when attending a dinner given by a middle-class Mozambican family, the mother pulled out a photo album filled of pictures of her and her husband marrying and establishing a family shortly after the revolution. Her children and some other relatives were present during the dinner and they all began to laugh while looking through the pictures. As with teenagers everywhere, the children were amused by the pictures of the now outmoded fashions of their parents, in this case flared trousers and large afro-hair styles. They were also shocked at how thin everyone was and the shabby quality of the clothes and home furnishings. The eldest daughter was particularly offended by the sandals everyone wore, while her mother tried to explain that there were no others available. The mother mentioned many times that it was the *tempo de fome* (the time of hunger). During much of the socialist period and the civil war, urban residents were on a strict system of rationing. Many of the old socialists in Maputo made the strong point to me that while food was not plentiful, at least the state tried to make sure that everyone was fed. Yet many others referred to the system of rationing as kilo-kilo, a derogatory reference to the pitiful monthly amounts that were allowed. As many explained to me it was one kilo of rice per person, one kilo of beans, small bony fishes that taste terrible and are still hated to this day and so on. A friend of mine from the independence elite, who used to date the son of Samora Machel, was once invited to dinner at the *Presidencia*. She was later devastated to find that they ate the same rations there as everyone else (or at least they did when company arrived) and the dream of a good dinner was no closer to fulfilment. Other friends told me that one of their favourite games was to sneak into the Foreign Exchange Shops, shops that sold rare and hard to find goods for foreign currency. They were for foreigners, as there were many legal restrictions for Mozambicans regarding the possession of foreign currency. As I was told that while the shops would not be all that impressive now, they were a cornucopia of goods in this era. Children would gaze longingly at ice cream displays before being chased out by guards. It was not always light-hearted though; the husband of the family with the photo album was briefly imprisoned when he tried to buy milk from a foreign exchange store for his sick child with 20 US Dollars.

Shortages went beyond foodstuffs; almost all consumer goods were difficult to obtain. In certain parts of the country, the monthly wage of an industrial worker was a shirt, and this was considered a decent wage, as they were impossible to find and could easily be bartered (Finnegan 1992). The rational behind the socialist
programme espoused by Frelimo was that it would modernise the nation and bring prosperity. Thus a new and modern Mozambique would serve an assertion of equality with the rest of the world. Instead the economy was ruins, as all of the party’s previous economic mistakes had now been compounded by an incredibly destructive civil war. Access to rare consumer goods increasingly became a mark of distinction for the elites, as they were among the few who had the ability and the social connections to obtain them and even then in limited supply. I was told that the Maputo airport would take on the appearance of a street market when those who had been visiting relatives in Portugal returned laden with consumer goods. Furthermore for the young, when anyone was returning from a trip abroad one made sure to bring many copies of cassettes of popular music. With those one enjoyed great esteem amongst one’s friends. Access to rare consumer goods, while bringing esteem, could also be dangerous and inspire jealousy, I was told of one example where an informant’s mother was denounced to the police when a schoolteacher noticed that her daughters were wearing high quality shoes that could not be obtained normally and must have come from the black market.

Since the end of socialism the shops in Mozambique have gradually replenished their stock. During the time of my fieldwork, from 2002 to 2004, I was amazed by how many boutiques were opening on the main streets. The streets were clogged with new model 4x4s and there is even a café that specialises in crepes. The prosperity brought by capitalism is only enjoyed by a select few, but the shortages of the past no longer apply to elites, and they are free to engage in modern consumer capitalism. Despite this relative abundance, the social meaning of consumption as a marker of modernity has probably increased. In today’s neo-liberal dominated world, levels of consumption often serve as a benchmark of modernity. In an example that probably just about every African abroad has encountered, a Mozambican friend, who had grown-up in the capital, was once telling me about a trip he had taken to Sweden. He was both amused and insulted by the questions posed to him by Europeans who were raised on a steady diet of National Geographic Magazine. He was frequently asked if his country had cars and electricity, or if he had any experience with wild animals and hunting. Another Mozambican friend who worked at the US Embassy related to me with amused disgust stories of new American officials who arrived in Maputo with a year’s worth of toilet paper and canned food, convinced that these items would not be available in Mozambique. She told me that one of the Marines
who works as an embassy guard had mentioned to her that he had thought that he
would spend his time in Mozambique living in a tent and that the embassy would
have been a much bigger tent. She could not understand why Mozambique is still
considered a hardship posting when, if one has a steady salary life is actually quite
pleasant in Maputo.

While the examples given above may seem just another in a long list of
instances demonstrating western ignorance, cultural arrogance and the enduring
power of colonial stereotypes, I posit that one of the many reasons elites found this
insulting is that it denied the notion of modernity that has so long been the ideological
underpinning of their social position. The ability to access this ideal of modernity is
both the cause and the effect of the elite’s privileged place in society. This ideal of
modernity is not simply displayed at elite parties, but in all aspects of life. While
Mozambique may not be the centre of the global economy, through a specific mode of
consumption, elites can still access the attributes of modernity and demonstrate their
equality with the wider world. This can be seen in the imported clothes from Brazil,
South Africa and Europe that the elites wear, the cars they drive, the small, expensive
cell phones, often around twice the monthly wage of an urban worker, and the ability
to spend half of the monthly salary of the average domestic worker at lunch in one of
the many restaurants and cafes where the elite spend their leisure time.54 The patterns
of expenditures had become marks of elite status. Families usually paid for their
children to study abroad, in the case of the UK this would average between £3000 and
£9000 a year in tuition alone. Even for less expensive universities such as those in
South Africa, families would usually spend between £2000 and £3000 per year for
tuition and living expenses. These patterns of expenditure were reproduced in
Mozambique as well. Elites would purchase their cars in South Africa, where they are
cheaper than in Mozambique, but still averaging around £4000, a sum it would take
the average worker years to earn. The entrance fee to the discos frequented by young
elites had a cover charge of around three or four pounds, between two and three times
the daily wage of an urban worker.

These patterns of consumption and expenditure are part of elite self-image. As
shown by Baudrillard: “Consumption no more homogenizes the social body than the
education system homogenizes cultural opportunities, it even highlights disparities

54 For example, the empregada (maid) at my house earned around £20 a month, which was considered
a good salary. The minimum wage for an industrial worker was about £30 per month.
within it” (1998: 58). The patterns of consumption among elites display their modernity, which, ideally, justifies their status. Elite privilege is demonstrated through a mode of consumption that helps to create what Bourdieu termed “distinction” (1984). For Bourdieu:

…social status involves practices which emphasize and exhibit cultural distinctions and differences which are a crucial feature of all social stratification…Status may be conceptualised therefore as lifestyle; that is, as the totality of cultural practices such as dress, speech, outlook and bodily dispositions…While status is about political entitlement and legal location within civil society, status also involves, and to a certain extent is, style (Turner, quoted in Jenkins 1992: 130).

The patterns of elites’ consumption and self-presentation, or “style” demonstrate their modernity and its inherent social power both to the wider population and abroad. The elite are not simply flaunting their wealth but showing their privileges exist because they are the only ones capable of running the country and the economy. The meaning of the symbolism of status is not unrecognised by members of the wider population. Although they may dispute the justification of the elites’ social position, they understand how certain forms of consumption demonstrate social power. Once in a café I was approached by a Mozambican man who felt as a foreigner I was duty bound to help him find external funding for his revolution against the unjust state of affairs that currently exist. When I asked him what the outcome of his revolution would be, he smiled and replied: “I will be the one driving the Mercedes”. Although this man was decrying an unjust state of affairs, he was also operating under a similar logic as displayed by elites. He made no arguments about a form of redistribution, but instead argued that as a foreigner I should recognise that the markers of modernity and social power (i.e. a Mercedes, the car issued to government Ministers) are being held by the wrong people. His revolution would make sure these objects were possessed by the “proper” people, i.e. him.

3.6 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have examined how the social power and status of the revolutionary and independence elites in Mozambique has been closely tied to their relationship with modernity. While these incarnations of modernity have

55 This is often deeply contested though and is examined in more depth in Chapter Five.
undergone significant changes since independence, one continuity is that, unlike recent academic trends of multiple or alternative modernities, in Mozambique it is conceived of as universal, hierarchical and linear. Thus some nations, and some groups of people within nations, are ahead on the scale of modernity and others are behind. After the revolutionary elite won independence, there was an attempt to create a nationalist modernity, which through heroic effort and mass mobilisation that would transform the nation and bring the population to the level of modernity already achieved by the revolutionary elite. After the failure of this vast effort, the form of modernity epitomised by the independence elite was more personal and technocratic. Instead of the leadership acting as a beacon to lead the nation on the way to progress, modernity became more of a distinguishing feature of the elite, with progress for the nation pushed away to the distant future. One of the primary mediums for transmitting the values of changing forms of modernity is through education. In this sense, modernity both structures and is structured by changing forms of education. Stemming from the cultural mores associated with education, elites have developed a “distinction” buffered by modes of self-presentation and specific patterns of consumption, which not only distinguish them from the wider population of their own country but act as an implicit statement of equality with powerful outsiders.

In the following chapter I examine in more depth how elites’ ideology of modernity effects their conceptions of the wider population within Mozambique through the discourse of race. As with the ideology of modernity itself, the elites’ discourse of race has its roots in the social experiences of the colonial period, but has undergone a continuous evolution through the liberation struggle and the independence period. I specifically examine the connections between race and the wider project of modernity.
Chapter Four

Race and Elites in Mozambique

“Not so very long ago, the earth numbered two thousand million inhabitants: five hundred million men, and one thousand five hundred million natives” (Jean-Paul Sartre, in Frantz Fanon’s “The Wretched of the Earth” 1963: 7).

4.1 Introduction

During fieldwork I was often struck by the contradictory way in which the independence elite in Maputo would speak about race. I frequently heard that racism was a growing problem in Maputo. This caused concern as many elites were proud of the non-racial ideals that Frelimo had championed; and many held Mozambique as a model of tolerance in comparison to neighbouring South Africa. Still people made frequent comments about other racial groups, ranging from casual joking to the truly venomous. For example, I was once told by a Mozambican of Indian descent that the problem with black people is that their hearts are as black as their skin. At certain White and Indian social gatherings one could easily forget that Mozambique’s population was predominantly Black, as the gatherings seemed to demonstrate the opposite. Yet when racially “mixed” social gatherings occurred, people mingled with ease. People of different races had known each other since childhood and were often related to each other as well. Elite bars and discos were usually quite integrated with all groups cheerfully chatting and dancing together. In fact it was not uncommon to hear people in mixed groups make apparently derogatory remarks about race that did not seem to cause any offence but rather prompted hilarity. Almost no one, regardless of background, used the word negro (black person), but instead always used the more pejorative preto (literally the colour black, derogatory when used for a person). Relatively early in my fieldwork I was speaking to a black friend, who in the past, had made bitter remarks concerning the ways in people of Portuguese and Indian descent treat black Mozambicans. During our conversation I told her of some negative remarks I had previously overheard some white Mozambicans make about black people. To my surprise, instead of being offended she started to laugh. When I asked her why she replied: “Admit it, you know it’s true”. At the time I thought this implied an acceptance of inferiority on her part. As I spent more time in Maputo I realised that
her response was symptomatic of a wider, and to me at least, seemingly contradictory understanding of race.

Elements of this racial discourse seemed to expand beyond their original meaning and to permeate the way in which relationships of status and power were expressed between members of both the independence and revolutionary elite and the wider population. On occasions this happened to such a degree that it almost appeared as if the members of the black elite who had gained their dominant position through the liberation struggle had taken on some of the practises held by the former colonisers. An example of this occurred when I was driving with a black friend, João, a member of the independence elite, to a country house he had in Namaacha, about 60 kilometres outside the capital. Namaacha is an old colonial town nestled in the mountains near the border with Swaziland. It was a popular vacation spot with the Portuguese during the colonial period, as it is much cooler than the coast. It is a beautiful town whose colonial architecture managed to survive the civil war largely unscathed. My friend’s father had acquired a factory and a house from a former colonialist. The house was a large bungalow on two to three hectares of land. João proudly demonstrated how he was going to rip out the maize the caretakers had planted and add a swimming pool and a tennis court. We went around the back to a collection of ramshackle huts, where the caretakers lived. My friend had bought some boots to give to one of the caretakers. The caretaker was not in and his wife came out to greet us. She referred to my friend as patrão (master). João absent-mindedly handed her the boots while relaying orders for what needed to be done around the house and she knelt, bowing her head and putting her hand under her elbow, supporting the arm (a gesture of respect) to receive the boots, even though she was his senior by about 20 years. I thought she must have acted in a similar way for the Portuguese colonialist who formerly lived there. Later over gin and tonics my friend explained to me that the advantage of living in the UK, in his opinion, is a highly stratified class system where everyone knows their place and what is expected of them. It seemed he had not noticed the deference shown towards him, and had failed to recognize that his remarks about stratification and hierarchy were equally applicable in Mozambique.

Throughout the day I kept thinking about the scene of a woman in late middle age bowing before a 30 year old man. I had seen countless similar scenes during fieldwork. These, while they struck me as seemingly neo-colonial, went unnoticed by
everyone else. In everyday practise they were completely banal for the independence elite. I then began to realise that, contrary to my friend’s remarks about the UK, independence elite racial discourses did describe a system of social stratification with strong class overtones. When they spoke about “Blacks” their remarks presumed equivalence between blackness and low social status: their remarks about “Blacks” were referred not to themselves but to others.

Independence elite racial discourse is not directly reducible to class position though. In certain situations racialised stories also purport to describe the “defining traits” of various groups, even ones of comparatively high status. Once, when relaxing at a cafe with two black friends who were members of the independence elite, a mutual acquaintance, who is a Mulatto, came up to show off his new mobile phone. It had a colour screen and a camera and a range of games including “Battleship”. Phones with all of these accessories were relatively uncommon at the time, and mobile phones in general were prestige items. After he had left, both of my friends started to laugh. I asked why and they said: “Oh, that guy, he is a classic mulatto”. When I asked what that meant they replied by telling me a joke. “A mulatto guy wins a contest and he is given a choice, he can have a Mercedes and a gold chain for a week, or a free, all-expenses paid, trip around the world. The Mulatto says give me the car and the chain, and the announcer of the contest asks if he is sure, he can only have them for a week. The Mulatto says I know, but if I take the trip no one will know about it, but everyone in my neighbourhood will see me driving around in the car with the gold chain”. This stereotypical portrayal dovetails neatly with widely-held ideas about the place of Mulattos in the post-independence elite hierarchy. While Mulattos in general are disproportionately represented in the elite, they often hold mid-level positions and enjoy the trappings of power although it is less common for them to be able to enter its highest echelons and wield “real” power. Thus my two friends were referring to a commonly held attitude that mulattos in general tended to prefer style over substance, the symbolism of power over its actual exercise.

As well as being contradictory, racial discourse in Mozambique is shifting and unstable. One heard frequent expressions of pan-racial solidarity when various elites

56 There appear to be differences in the conceptualisation of race between the ways in which members of the revolutionary and independence elites and members of other high-status groups, such as members of the Indian merchant class. This will be mentioned later in this chapter but an in-depth examination is beyond the scope of my analysis.

57 There are of course exceptions to this general rule. For instance during the socialist period the position of Vice-President of Frelimo was held by Marcelino Dos Santos who is of mulatto descent.
recalled instances of racism they had suffered in their personal lives. Yet even solidarity could be inscribed with racial difference. A friend from an Indian/Mozambican family told me a story about the racism of South Africans. She was enraged when at a petrol station, a South African tourist had told her children: “Let the kaffir (an extremely pejorative Afrikaans term for black people) go first,” as they queued for the toilet, assuming my friend did not speak English and could not understand what they were saying about her. She used this example to explain how racism was much worse there than in Mozambique, but she ended her story by saying: “anyway, why kaffir? I am not black, I am coloured”\(^\text{58}\) One could also hear examples of negative solidarity, such as the example quoted in Chapter Three from the informant who declared: “We Blacks are two hundred years behind”, or when one asked about corruption, why people were late, or why something did not work, a not uncommon joking reply was a cheerful shrug of the shoulders and the statement “Oh you know us Blacks/Africans”.

When the independence elites talked about race, it often had multiple meanings depending on who was being spoken about. Race for my informants was often drawn from a larger idiom that originated in the colonial period and was used to express social difference, not just among Blacks, Mulattos, Indians and the Portuguese, but also, between members of the colonial elite and the larger population. Thus assimilados would often use the idiom of race to draw social distinctions between the “savagery” of the majority of the population and their mastery of European “civilisation”. In the current era this discourse, although greatly changed over the course of time, fulfils a similar function in demonstrating the “cosmopolitan modernity” of the independence elites in contrast to the “backwardness” of the general population. In turn various non-elite groups, both then and now, point to the racially mixed nature of the revolutionary and independence elites and use the idiom of race to cast them as foreign parasites that were exploiting them. One of the most common examples of this appeared in numerous conversations concerning the privatisation period. I was frequently informed that during socialism Indians had dominated the Ministry of Finance. Supposedly during privatisation Indian employees of the Ministry had used their connections to take over various economic enterprises.

\(^{58}\) This conversation took place in English, which is why I think my friend used the common South African term for a person of mixed descent, although it is interesting she did not at this time identify herself as Indian, perhaps because she more resembles a Mulatto and was referred to as one while residing in South Africa.
and basically rob the state and its people of their patrimony. Frelimo had stressed non-racialism as a way of uniting the various ethnic and racial groups of Mozambique into one national identity. This had been re-interpreted by some members of non-elite groups as giving the opportunity, often in return for bribes, for corrupt groups of dubious national loyalty to enrich themselves at the expense of the nation.

As I mentioned earlier in the section, the racial discourse of independence elites had a strong class component and it can be tempting for the analyst to reduce it to a coded way of speaking about class differences. This situation is not unique to Mozambique. Posel warns about a tendency in Southern African anthropology and other social sciences to “reduce racial identities to mere effects of class position” (1999: 101). Outside of the African context there has been a tendency to see a more totalising model of race as the norm. A prime example of this is the racial model usually ascribed to the United States, where race is thought to be based strictly on descent and is one of the major factors in determining one's place on the social hierarchy (Wade 2002: 123). Thus nations with a more fluid concept of race are judged to be “less racist” over all. A prime example of this is Brazil, which is often referred to as a “racial democracy” as racial categories are thought to be superficial, based on changing gradients of appearance and “really” refers to class position (ibid). Members of the independence elite often use a similar argument, stating that because their system is more fluid they are not really racist, South Africans are. Wade makes a convincing case that many manifestations of racism contain elements that are more fluid and class based and totalising at the same time. The problem with much of the analysis of race, according to Wade, is that it tends to follow the dichotomies inherent in the Brazil vs. the US model of class vs. descent. “The phenomenon has been placed in a debate about the theoretical and empirical relations between race and class, rather than in a consideration of how racialized phenotypes are constructed differently in different regions” (Wade 2002: 5).

In this chapter I attempt to follow Wade’s insight by examining how racial discourses are specifically constructed by the elites in Mozambique. For the independence elite race is a way of expressing social difference that is intimately tied to existing power structures, yet also variable and situational. The racial discourse of the independence elite does tend to follow class lines in the ways in which it separates the black elite from “poor blacks”. This is often how it is understood by members of the independence elite, I was quite bluntly told by one young woman that in
Mozambique when people talk about race they are talking about class differences: “You hear it all the time, when people talk about race they really mean poor people”. In situations like this high status black people could enjoy derogatory remarks about Blacks made by other racial groups, as they knew these remarks did not refer to them. But racial discourse is also situational and in almost the same breath can be used to describe the negative character traits of members of high status groups during intra-elite squabbles. For Wade racial discourse, despite its ability to be fluid and totalising at the same time, is still based on local ideas of biology.

… if the (apparent) specificity of “nature” or “biology” is abandoned to include cultural racism, it becomes increasingly hard to see what racism is, as distinct from other forms of discrimination. Class discrimination would be classifiable as racist if “socially inherited characteristics” or difference in a “culturalist idiom” were the defining feature (2002: 8).

The vocabulary of racial discourse in Mozambique can take on seemingly biological connotations. Yet local ideas of biological difference are rarely the reason for social or racial difference given by members of the independence elite. After years of anti-racist Marxist indoctrination, most explanations for the causes of social and racial differences are based on history, patterns of behaviour and the groups’ relationship to Mozambique’s power structure independent of biology and descent. This is far more obvious when examining the descriptions given by black elites for lower status Blacks. In Mozambique racial discourse provides a ready vocabulary of difference that has been expanded beyond biology, as noted by Balibar: “… culture can also function like a nature, and it can in particular function as a way of locking individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable and intangible in origin” (1991: 22, original italics).

This chapter argues that the racial discourse of the independence elite has elements that are both totalising and fluid. It is totalising to the extent that independence elites tend to think that as “modern” and educated urbanites they are fundamentally different from much of the wider population, especially the peasantry. Yet this sense of difference is based on history, not biology, which allows elements of fluidity. A peasant is not a genetic category and can change over time. In addition, the status of being an educated urbanite does not necessarily exempt one from being included in negative racial categories. This discourse is not an entirely new creation but both a continuing outgrowth of earlier elite ideologies and a response to the
changing social conditions following the introduction of capitalist democracy. To understand how racial discourses in Mozambique have taken their shape we must trace their genesis and evolution through the colonial period and socialism.

4.2 Colonial Influence on Elite Racial Discourse

In this section I examine the effect of colonialism on racial discourses. I start by discussing an author who was extremely influential among the revolutionary elite, Frantz Fanon, and how they re-interpreted his writings to re-form some of the divisions inherited from colonialism. Frantz Fanon, one of the prophets of the anti-colonial movement, investigated the subjective effects of colonial racism on populations suffering colonial occupation. A psychologist by training, Fanon described how indigenous cultures, in his view, inevitably began to crumble under foreign onslaught and the colonised populations internalised racist ideologies and identified with the dominant culture of the colonial state (1967). Fanon was particularly worried about the role of African elites. Having been educated under the colonial system, he felt they would equate civilisation with the metropolitan culture and view the masses of their own populations as ‘backwards’ (1963, 1967). This was an accurate characterisation of the positions of various African elites, such as early elites in Lagos, Nigeria, where a small group of elites who had embraced Christianity, gained access to education, and managed to use their closeness with the colonial rulers and their mastery of aspects of colonial culture to create a local power base (Mann 1985). Fanon’s account was equally applicable to assimilados in Mozambique. Yet the question of how to counter this kind of slavish imitation was not easy to answer. Fanon felt that the cultural revival of pre-colonial forms would be pointless. These forms had been corrupted beyond repair and were in reality simply another form of “mystification”. To revive them would be to lull the masses with past glories yet to leave them trapped in colonial, or neo-colonial relations (ibid). Fanon theorised that the only way to create a new and viable form for colonised countries was through the purifying violence of a liberation struggle. Only then would a new and free national culture be born (Wolf 1973).

During the struggle for freedom, a marked alienation from these practices (traditional beliefs) is observed. The native’s back is to the wall, the knife is at his throat (or, more precisely, the electrode at his genitals): he will have no more call for his fancies. After
centuries of unreality, after having wallowed in the most outlandish phantoms, at long last the native, gun in his hand, stands face to face with the only forces which contend for his life – the forces of colonialism. And the youth of a colonised country, growing up in an atmosphere of shot and fire, may well make a mock of, and does not hesitate to pour scorn upon the zombies of his ancestors, the horses with two heads, the dead who rise again, and the djinns who rush into your body while you yawn. The native discovers reality and transforms it into the pattern of his customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom (Fanon 1963: 45).

Therefore, according to Fanon, the only way that the negative effects of colonial racism could be overcome is the creation of a new national culture that is constructed through protracted independence struggles. Influenced by Fanon as well as bringing to bear their own set of experiences, the leadership of Frelimo felt that this was the only way to create a nation from the brutalised and fractured society that had been created by Portuguese colonialism. Yet the underlying theme of these ideas is an ideal of “modernisation”. The goal is to move beyond the pre-colonial past and beat the Europeans at their own game, as shown by Nandy: “Let us not forget that the most violent denunciation of the West produced by Frantz Fanon is written in the elegant style of a Jean-Paul Sartre” (1988: xii). Nandy further points out that the great evil of colonialism, in his view, is that it creates a culture in which the oppressed are constantly tempted to strike back within the parameters of colonial culture (1983). For Nandy: “Colonialism is first of all a matter of consciousness and needs to be defeated ultimately in the minds of men” (Nandy 1983: 63). While the Frelimo leadership was aware of this, they perhaps underestimated how deep its effects could be. The society Frelimo wanted to build, based upon the “Novo Homem” (new man), held legacies from the colonial past that were internalised in the structures that they themselves created. While the party was committed to ending the system of racial privilege that existed in the colonial period, echoes of colonial ideas of superiority reappeared in the post-colonial society.

Racial ideologies, both those in colonial settings and those stemming from the metropole, take many different forms throughout history. Foucault places the beginnings of the modern form of racism at the end of the feudal period in Europe (Stoler: 1995: 64-65). According to Foucault (as read by Stoler), as feudalism ended, the myriads of private wars fought by various nobles were subsumed into national struggles. Ironically the growth of the “King’s peace” created a permanent state of war as now one “people” was set against another (ibid). Yet this was a not a rapid development. Racism was initially an aristocratic pastime. In the early colonial
period, rank-and-file Europeans often adopted the dress and customs of colonial populations, intermarried intensively and recognised their offspring (Stoler: 1995, 1997). The situation began to change with the rise of the bourgeoisie in Europe; and the growing acceptance of ideals of “universal rights of man”. Within this conception lay a paradox though, and entire sections of humanity were declared subhuman to explain why the “rights of man” did not apply to them (Cooper 1997, 2000; Cooper and Stoler 1997; Stoler 1995, 1997). The new type of racism, the so-called “scientific racism”, came to fruition in the 19th Century, forming a “transitional moment”. For the new colonial bourgeoisie, it was not only colonial subjects who were seen as potential agents of “pollution”. Those who blurred boundaries, such as “educated natives”, mixed-race colonial subjects, and citizens of the metropole who had been born in the colonies and who were potentially prone to “backsliding” into native habits, were all viewed with alarm.

In Mozambique these anxieties were expressed in the rhetoric of assimilação. In the beginning of the 20th Century, the more “open” colonial society came under growing pressure to promote white supremacy. As will be demonstrated later in the chapter, assimilados, Mulattos, and Segundos (white Portuguese who were born in Mozambique and therefore ineligible for the highest colonial positions) were gradually but steadily disenfranchised. The older form of social advancement for Mozambican elites, assimilação, the ability to develop Portuguese cultural attributes for social advancement, rang increasingly hollow. While the transitional moment for mainstream European racial ideologies may have been in the late 19th Century, for Mozambican elites disgruntled by the growing permanence of their inferior social status under the Portuguese, this transition truly began during the liberation struggle and came to fruition though the transition to socialism. Modern elite racial ideologies, although derived in part from older ones, began to take their current shape.

In Mozambique, the legacy of racial discourses began to openly reappear after the fall of socialism. In a recent article, Bridget O’Laughlin (2000) recounts some of the difficulties Frelimo encountered as they tried to refashion the socialist constitution for the new political order. One of the major problems was citizenship. The previous constitution had been unitary and inclusive. Given that the vast majority of the population is Black African, but there is a minority of European, Indian and Mulatto descent who often wield disproportionate economic and bureaucratic power, there were serious questions about whether a unitary and inclusive model should continue.
to be employed. The question before the party was whether citizenship should be limited to those of “Mozambican origin” and what exactly that meant. One argument that was advocated by Hami Thai: “member of parliament and the political bureau of the ruling Frelimo party, a general, and veteran of the national liberation struggle” (O’Laughlin 2000: 5). He stated that:

If I were to define who is of Mozambican origin, I would put it this way: the original Mozambican is anyone who in the colonial period was known as a native (indígena). Of Mozambican origin is anyone who in the colonial period paid the hut tax. Of Mozambican origin is anyone whose ancestors or descendents were deported to São Tomé and Príncipe, to Angola and to other unknown places. And I would say more, of Mozambican origin are all those who did forced labour (chibalo), all those who after Gungunhana’s defeat in 1895 were deported with him to Fourth Island or Third Island or whatever it was exactly, to die there far away, separated from their wives, never more to father children of Mozambican origin (O’Laughlin 2000: 6).

Thai’s response is unusual in at least two respects. Firstly, Thai’s definition of who should be a Mozambican national is not based strictly on geography, or even nation of origin in the extreme case, but on descent, labour and former colonial categories. In the second case Thai’s response, if taken to its logical extreme, has the potential to exclude former assimilados and those from other racial groups who were exempted from many of the forms of oppression he describes. In effect Thai was asking politbureau and Central Committee members, many of whom have assimilado or mixed race backgrounds, to declare themselves as foreigners. Perhaps this is why Thai’s argument did not carry the day.

The dual role of the elite as a colonial creation yet the overthrower of the colonialist regime exemplifies the ambiguity of racial discourses in Mozambique. Although Frelimo overthrew the colonial regime and promised a non-racial, unitary future, the gap between rhetoric and practise remains and is perhaps increasing as the formerly socialist revolutionary elite consolidates its power and privileges. As noted by Wallerstein, former colonial categories of race linger in the construction of divisions in post-colonial Africa (1991: 123). While the discriminatory legislation of the colonial regime has been abolished, elites continue to use a discourse of race that began in the colonial period to express their class difference, modernity, and ability to rule over the larger population.

59 As mentioned in Chapter Two, Gungunhana is the former ruler of the Gaza Empire who was later lionised as an early resistance hero by Frelimo due to his ill-fated war against the Portuguese.
The remainder of the chapter investigates how a specific racial discourse was formed in the colonial period. I then examine how the transition to socialism became the “defining” moment for the elite conception of race. Finally I discuss how a shifting discourse of race has to come to inform the way current elites express difference and superiority.

4.3 The Colonial Ideal of Race

In the volume “Tensions of Empire” Stoler (1997) describes the very specific place of mixed race Indo-Europeans in Dutch colonial rule and the terrific effort and anxiety that was attached to determining who was “Indo” and what their place in the empire would be.

In 1884 legal access to European equivalent status in the Indies required a “complete suitability (...) for European society,” defined as a belief in Christianity, fluency in spoken and written Dutch, and training in morals and ideas. In absence of an upbringing in Europe, district authorities were charged with evaluating whether the concerned party was “brought up in European surroundings as a European” But European equivalency was not simply granted on the display of a competence and comfort in European norms. It required that the candidate “no longer felt at home” (...) in native society and have already “distanced” himself from his native being (...). In short the candidate could neither identify nor retain inappropriate senses of belonging or longings for the milieu from which she or he came. The mental states of potential citizens were at issue, not the material assets alone. Who were to be the arbitrators? Suitability for which European society and to which Europeans? The questions are disingenuous because the coding is clear: cultural competence, family form, and a middle-class morality became the salient new criteria for making subjects, nationals, citizens, and different kinds of citizens in the nation-state (Stoler 1997: 216).

There are many similarities in Dutch thinking about Indo-Europeans and the Portuguese policy of assimilação (assimilation). As shown in previous chapters assimilação became part of the overall ideological basis of Portuguese colonialism in that they were bringing the grandeur of European and more specifically Portuguese civilisation to the wider world. Assimilação “proved” the non-racial aspect of their colonialism as opposed to that of some other European powers. Anyone could join the greatness of Portuguese civilisation regardless of colour; all that was necessary was to assume Portuguese cultural attributes and to distance oneself from “African” culture. Yet this claim was largely false. Assimilação only affected a tiny segment of the population and even they continued to deal with racial discrimination and humiliation on an everyday basis.
Despite the grand-sounding intentions of *assimilação*, *assimilados* occupied an ambiguous place in colonial society, like the mixed-race Indo-Europeans Stoler spoke of. They were in many ways the middle-men of colonialism. This was understood by some *assimilados* and Portugal’s civilising mission did not impress them. They became *assimilados* for pragmatic rather than more high-minded reasons: it made life more bearable and allowed increased opportunities for their children. In addition to this pragmatism though, *assimilação* also operated as a partial entrance to modernity and the basis for new forms of identity. Though the origins of *assimilação* were rooted in colonial oppression and came into being as Blacks were increasingly losing power and position in the south to newly immigrated Portuguese, it also lay at the basis of a new colonial elite with a common language, a growing common identity and a sense of grievance against the colonial state.

In various ways *assimilados* became a group apart, one that had African roots but also was beginning to master the middle-class bourgeois manners of the Portuguese elite. *Assimilados* often held low-level petty-bourgeois positions in the colonial administration; they wore European clothes and communicated in Portuguese. Portuguese (and increasingly English in some contexts) remains the primary language of Mozambican elites today; many among the young cannot speak an African language or *dialecto* (dialect) as they are called in Portuguese. There are similarities with other colonial “middle-men”, such as Anglo-Indians. Caplan (2001) describes how English has remained a status marker in post-colonial India. According to Caplan many of his informants, often with a “hint of pride” (2001:9), claim they cannot speak or even learn Tamil. The clothes, manner and language of *assimilados* (and Mozambican elites today) were markers of difference showing that they had mastered colonial forms and were the “civilised” or “modern” segment of the population.

Despite their privileges, *assimilados* were in a vulnerable position in relation both to the colonisers and to the rest of the population.

Assimilados were always vulnerable to white tolerance, due in part to their own aspirations for equal treatment, and their historical role as a comprador group. Thus, they often found themselves the first to be sacrificed to white ambition. They were harassed and humiliated by whites and tolerated, distrusted, or despised by other blacks. They were called “pocket whites” or “paper whites,” black men who, due to the legal papers they carried in their

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60 For other examples see F. Cooper for the role of colonial “middle-men” in the west African labour market (1997, 2000).
pockets, were encouraged to identify with whites, as distinct from “natives,” but only when it suited white needs. They enjoyed token material benefits as favoured sons, but the fragility of their position became increasingly obvious as the century progressed and the white population grew (Penvenne 1979: 18).

The increasing numbers of white immigrants in Mozambique and the decline of the African elite’s position drew worried responses from the elite from the early 20th century onward. Yet the early colonial elite often seemed more upset by the fact that Portuguese settlers, especially those who were illiterate and uneducated, denied their modernity and civilisation, than by the oppression of African blacks more widely. These attitudes can be seen in early editorials in African newspapers decrying discriminatory treatment. In subtle ways it seemed that many early assimilados were internalising elements of the colonial racial discourse at the same time as they were decrying it.

…leave the native in a state of primitive ignorance so that the Negro only serves as manual labour under the yoke of the white man, illiterate though he may be, so that the white man can honestly issue his whip lashes if the black does not tip his hat or doesn’t stand when [the white man] goes by… All this would be tolerable if it were simply the case with bush country blacks, but Merciful Lord, this is spreading to the middle classes (quoted in Penvenne 1989: 270, italics added)!

As the 20th Century progressed it became increasingly obvious that the Portuguese would never accept the Mozambican elite as equals. The more embittered and alienated sections of the elite began to see a common cause between themselves and the wider population as victims of colonial oppression and humiliation. Newitt demonstrates this with wry understatement: “It is difficult not to conclude that the New State made a fundamental error in allowing a small assimilado class to emerge and then systematically subjecting it to personal humiliation and depressed status (1995: 477).

This “fundamental error” can be seen in the writings of former assimilados. Luis Honwana is the son of Raúl Honwana, a man who has been introduced previously in this thesis. As stated previously the Honwana family were assimilados, although Raúl became an assimilado for the privileges it bestowed rather than because he aspired to the goals of assimilação. Raúl Honwana worked for the colonial civil service and the family, while not wealthy, was relatively privileged by African standards. In addition to Raúl’s position with the state, the family also owned a small freehold farm, livestock, and employed the services of a young African empregada.
Luis Honwana wrote a book of short stories where he describes his upbringing in colonial Mozambique. Many of his stories describe the racism, brutality and humiliation that even Mozambicans from the higher social strata had to endure. In one of his most famous stories, “Papa, the snake and I”, Luis recalls the ways in which the racial domination at the heart of the colonial system could poison the relationships between people in even the most mundane situations. In this case a snake killed a white neighbour’s hunting dog.

At that point Senhor Castro’s (the white neighbour) car drew up in front of our house. Papa walked up to him, and Mama went to talk to Sartina. I followed after papa.

‘Good afternoon, Senhor Castro…’

‘Listen, I have just found that my pointer is dead, and his chest is all swollen. My natives tell me that he came howling back from your house before he died. I don’t want any back chat, and I am telling you – either you pay compensation or I’ll make a complaint at the Administration. He was the best pointer I ever had.’

I’ve just come back from work – I don’t know anything…’

I don’t care a damn about that. Don’t you go to pay or aren’t you?’

‘But Senhor Castro…’

‘Senhor Castro nothing. Its 700 paus. And its better if the matter rests here.’

‘As you like, Senhor Castro, but I don’t have the money now…’

We’ll see about that later. I’ll wait until the end of the month, and if you don’t pay then there will be a row.’

‘Senhor Castro, we’ve known each other such a long time, and there’s never…’

Don’t try that with me. I know what you all need – a bloody good hiding is the only thing…’

Senhor Castro climbed into his car and pulled away. Papa stayed watching while the car drove off.

‘Son of a bitch…’

‘Papa, why didn’t you say that to his face?

He didn’t answer. (1969: 45).

Later in the story, Luis Honwana sees his father praying and asks why he always prays when he is upset.

Papa looked at me as if he were seeing me for the first time, and exploded. “My son, one must have hope. When one comes to the end of the day, and one knows that tomorrow will be another day just like it, and that things will always be the same, we have got to find the strength to keep smiling, and keep saying; ‘This is not important!’ We ourselves have to allot our own reward for the heroism of the everyday. We have to establish a date for this reward, even if it’s the day of our death! Even today you saw Senhor Castro humiliate me: this formed only part of today’s portion because there are many things you didn’t see. No, my son, there must be a hope. It must exist! Even if all this denies him, he must exist!”

Papa stopped suddenly, and forced himself to smile. Then he added: ‘Even a poor man has to have something. Even if it is only hope! Even if it is a false hope!’ (1969: 46)

Although Raúl Honwana describes himself as a poor man in the story, by the standards of the time he was quite well off for an African man. Yet in comparison to white colonialists he would always be poor and not just in the material sense. Despite everything he achieved in his life under colonialism, he would always be of
subordinate status to whites, no matter what the papers in his pocket said. This story expresses the lie at the centre of assimilação; although he was legally the equal of a Portuguese colonialist he could always be reduced to powerless humiliation by a passing white’s whim.

Disillusionment was not confined only to segments of the assimilado colonial elite. Senhor Ferrão, is a man of part Goan descent who later became Frelimo’s ambassador to the United States, was non-political as a youth but had also formed nationalist sympathies due to his experiences with Portuguese colonialists. As a boy he had heard the speeches of Nehru about the re-unification of Goa with India. Once when he mentioned these speeches to a friend on the street some passing Portuguese beat him. Later, in 1961, when the Indian army marched into Goa and re-unified it with India, enraged Portuguese colonialists again beat Senhor Ferrão on the street. He was lucky, as the colonial secret police then started to round up Indians of Goan descent and confine them to camps to await deportation. His family managed to avoid that fate. He explained to me that this was when he began to see the strangeness of the colonial situation. He told me that other Goans in Mozambique held blacks in absolute disdain, but became utterly servile when whites entered a room. He felt that this amounted to self-defeating hypocrisy. This and his other dealings with the Portuguese convinced him to join the nationalist cause, while the rest of his family stayed loyal to the Portuguese. When he came back from the liberation struggle his family was preparing to leave Mozambique for Portugal. They were not impressed by the fact that he had joined Frelimo, nor were they happy that he had married a mulatta woman during the struggle. His sisters regaled him with stories of atrocities committed by Frelimo during the liberation (Senhor Ferrão told me none of them were actually true) and relatives warned him that his wife would be unfaithful to him. “When I told people about my wife an older relative kept making a gesture with her two fingers that meant I should be careful because my wife would be unfaithful; she said I should be careful because that is what Blacks are like”. This statement epitomised the insidious nature of colonial racism for Senhor Ferrão. Goans had also been badly treated by the Portuguese and denied equality. But since they were given more privileges than the Blacks and allowed to think they were superior instead of siding with other oppressed groups, they despised them and sided with their oppressor, the Portuguese.
Bitterness among segments of the *assimilado* population towards the state increased as it became obvious that despite the rhetoric of *assimilação* social advancement and equality were blocked to them. During the colonial period they found themselves suffering numerous humiliations at the hand of the state. The most radical members began to make common cause with the wider population, despite the history of ambiguous relations with these people. It was this wider population that had suffered so much more under colonial rule. Rural inhabitants had had little access to schools and were obliged to participate in forced labour and compulsory cultivation under the frequently arbitrary rule of Portuguese appointed “traditional” authorities. For those lucky enough to live in urban areas and find work, conditions were also grim. “Legally without citizenship and effectively without civil rights, Africans were frozen in menial professions with minimum wages, relegated to separate and inferior schools, subject to arbitrary beatings, life-long banishment in penal colonies, and forced labour on plantations, railroads and docks” (O’Laughlin 2000: 15). By capitalising on the widespread atmosphere of discontent, the revolutionary elite was able to build the movement that successfully propagated the liberation struggle. After independence the racial discourse of the Portuguese and even the previous colonial elite had been utterly discredited during the liberation struggle and the ascendancy of socialist ideals created a discourse of solidarity. Social differences could not be expressed (at least in public) in racial terms. Instead the revolutionary elite adopted a discourse of modernism, and although it shared some similarities with the earlier discourse of civilisation, there was a major difference. Under socialism, modernity would be brought to the entire nation. The ascendancy of this discourse was solidified by incidents that occurred shortly after liberation that showed the danger of the expressing social difference in racial terms.

### 4.4 Race and Socialism

There has been considerable debate about the place of the black bourgeoisie under colonialism. Leo Kuper (1965) describes the particular niche that the black bourgeoisie in South Africa occupied under apartheid. In comparison with the traditional European meaning of the word (since the industrial revolution), which conjures images of the owners of capital and the professional classes as stolid, conservative and politically powerful, in South Africa and in fact the wider African
context under colonialism, it describes those who are allowed to advance into the lower and middle levels of the colonial system. Yet those relative advantages bordered on meaninglessness in comparison to the privileges of the whites and in light of the way the black bourgeoisie continued to suffer discrimination and humiliation. Due to the colonial restraints, members of the African bourgeoisie were often attracted to radical ideologies of social change. Kuper states that part of the peculiarity of the African bourgeoisie is that they were often the focal point of social and political change in colonial Africa.

The term bourgeoisie is thus chosen not only to describe the upper occupational categories in African society with certain tendencies to class formation but also to emphasize in terms of social change and prospective power is their role at the apex of the subordinated society. It is their interests which will shape African action and aspirations perhaps along evolutionary lines through the raising of the colour bar and progressive recognition of achievement. Or the bourgeoisie, thrown back on the African masses by the denial of entry into the dominant society, may interact with them to forge a nationalist movement with the goal of African domination, in which case the development would be from political power to bourgeois property and not from property to power. Or the bourgeoisie may be divided, and sections may seek fulfilment in a revolutionary struggle aimed at the creation of a socialist state and the destruction of bourgeois property (Kuper 1965: 8).

Although Kuper was speaking about South Africa in the 1960s, his description is also apt for Mozambique. A section of a tiny African elite, which was denied social advancement after a point, tried to create a socialist state and crush the remnants of opposed bourgeois elements in the settler community. This same revolutionary elite later used political power to assume some of the trappings of the old bourgeoisie. What initially united this revolutionary group was a sense of grievance about what they had suffered under colonialism and a feeling that they could rule the country more effectively in the interests of the vast majority of the population.

According to Hall and Young (1997: 64-65), the humiliations suffered by the embryonic Mozambican elite under colonialism were deeply influential on the society that Frelimo tried to build after independence. Although the Portuguese colonial state avoided some of the most blatant forms of racism found in the neighbouring states of South Africa and Rhodesia, its version of racial prejudice was nonetheless invidious. It made its victims experience themselves as its perpetrators. The blending of the categories of oppressed and oppressor caused members of the early Mozambican elite to feel somewhat complicit in the colonial system. Samora Machel once stated: “The colonial bourgeoisie…wanted to mould society to such an extent that it reached the
point of forcing a Mozambican to deny his personality, to transform himself into a little black Portuguese” (quoted in Hall and Young 1997: 64). The fact that despite all this effort on the part of the assimilado, one would still be a second-class citizen at best added even more bitterness to an already humiliating situation. The members of the colonial elite who became the leadership of Frelimo were left in an uncomfortable situation. They venerated western civilisation as they had first hand experience of its power and they felt that it was the only way to develop their nation, yet they loathed it at the same time as the cause of their humiliation (Hall and Young 1997: 64-65). This sense of grievance was strongest amongst the younger more radical members of Frelimo, who became dominant in the party as a whole. During the liberation struggle this caused great tension between the younger members of Frelimo, led by Mondlane and later Machel, and the older members who had a different vision of the nation’s future. The radical wing of Frelimo championed non-racialism as part of their wider project. Their vision went far beyond just ridding the nation of the Portuguese to encompass dramatic transformation. By reaching out to radical Whites, Mulattos and Indians they formed a leftwing bloc within the party that took power after the death of Mondlane. The sense of racial humiliation suffered by members of the revolutionary elite became the basis for the party’s strident non-racialism after independence.

Despite Frelimo’s proclamations of non-racialism much of the white population in Mozambique eventually fled the country after independence. Part of this was due to certain laws that could have been seen to have specifically targeted the white population, including those that decreed the nationalisation of businesses and properties that were owned by the Portuguese population. Yet whites were not specifically attacked as whites, instead attacks were framed as being against a colonial bourgeoisie or capitalist exploiters. The revolutionary government, in a move to distance themselves from the past, and due to the disorders that followed independence, was rather scrupulous in avoiding the mention of race as a social issue.

61 The most famous law would be what was known as the 24/20 decree, which stated that any one who held a foreign passport would need to take Mozambican citizenship to continue living, working and holding assets in the country. If not they would have to leave in 24 hours and they could take 20 kilos of goods with them. Many who held Portuguese citizenship were affected, although Frelimo claimed it was not a move against whites, but against foreign exploitation. In addition some white property was nationalised, primarily real estate, as Frelimo would not allow anyone to own more than two house at a time. Most businesses that were nationalised were nationalised because they were abandoned by white owners instead of being taken over outright by the state.
The events that immediately followed independence reinforced the necessity of explaining social difference through the idioms of class and modernity.

As shown in Chapter Two the Portuguese military, facing collapse due to the need to fight three seemingly never-ending colonial wars, rose up and overthrew the remnants of the Salazarist system in 1974. The newly empowered Officers Movement offered independence to the leading liberation movements in the former colonies. When the coup occurred Frelimo’s military forces were based in the north and central parts of the country and they had not advanced past the central provinces. Some disaffected Portuguese settlers in the south who were opposed to independence sensed the power vacuum and revolted against the new authorities, trying to retain control of Mozambique or least to keep power from Frelimo. The settler movement was known by the acronym FICO, which also means “I stay” in Portuguese. FICO started a series of attacks and took control of the radio station to broadcast their demands. The resulting incitements to rebellion influenced the most extreme elements of FICO, which started to attack the outlying black suburbs of Maputo. This soon degenerated into a killing spree. FICO had badly misjudged the political situation and their own power. They had not realised that without the backing of the state, they were likely to cause a fierce reaction as anger over the killings combined with long resentments due to brutal treatment during colonialism exploded against them. The resulting violence caused the deaths of around 9,000 people (Newitt, 1995: 551).

Frelimo’s presence in the capital was almost non-existent, but the masses spontaneously rose against the Portuguese and engaged in bloody street battles to put down the Portuguese counter-coup. The attacks against FICO soon spread to encompass the white population in general and then some Mulattos and Indians as well. In political terms the counter-coup was a disaster for the reactionary settlers. They were crushed, and anti-Frelimo black politicians who were seen to support them were easily branded as traitors and sent to re-education camps. The masses came out to support Frelimo and they even helped to force the hand of the military government in Portugal, increasing pressure on them to agree to Frelimo’s demands to transfer power to the party as the sole legitimate political force in Mozambique (Hall and Young, 1997). Yet it was a somewhat nervous victory for Frelimo as the chaos that followed the counter-coup demonstrated how limited their control really was, especially in the face of the continuing violence of racial passions amongst the population. The following vignettes will show how the experience of the counter-coup
was interpreted by three urbanites who were broadly similar in colonial class position and in support for Frelimo, but who come from different racial backgrounds.

Roberto

Roberto is a black Mozambican; he came from a relatively affluent family in the Inhambane province. He moved to Lourenço Marques as a small child with his family. Roberto was 12 years old when the counter-coup began. Like many people in Maputo he had only minimal knowledge of Frelimo, both because he was very young and because the information blackout about the party had been relatively effective. Despite this he had heard bits of Frelimo’s programme from occasional illicit gatherings that played Radio Frelimo, and members of his family had told him that Frelimo would come and help the blacks. On the day the counter-coup erupted, Roberto was playing football with his friends in his bairro, Machava, on the outskirts of Maputo, which was also near the house of the headquarters of PIDE (the colonial secret police). During the game Roberto noticed trucks full of white people with guns pulling up near where he and his friends were playing. Roberto was not overly worried because he knew some of the men and he told me that when the shooting started he and his friends were laughing thinking that the whites were shooting in the air to scare them. It was not until two of his friends were hit that Roberto ran home terrified and told his mother. They waited in the house to see what would happen. That evening local groups of Frelimo-sympathising militants started going through the African section of town knocking on all the doors and demanding that every male above the age of ten must come with them and prepare to defend the area from the settler rebels. Roberto ran to his mother and asked if he could go as well, she said yes, if he did not they would be doomed. The boys were given two tasks, the first was to hunt down collaborators, although Roberto explained to me that most had left the bairro when the violence started, and the second was to defend the bairro from attack. I asked him if he was scared, he told me although he saw horrible things such as killing and looting in fact he was excited, it was his chance to be with the men and do something important. The most dangerous activity he was involved in was forming human barriers. Groups of militants would line up on the roads and form barriers to stop cars from entering Machava, when the car reduced speed due to the pressure of their bodies they would overturn the cars and burn them.

The violence was not entirely random. Whites who were well-liked were often spared violence and looting. Roberto’s Portuguese godfather had his shop looted, but there was strong community pressure to return his goods. Roberto is somewhat ambivalent today about the counter-coup. Although it was a terrible time, it was also a great victory, as he later explained to me: “This was before the Frelimo army arrived, we won the battle ourselves and victory was waiting for them” (Field notes 29 March 2003 and 13 April 2005).

Roberto felt the fighting was traumatic, but it was also a part of the wider liberation struggle. It was a victory to be won to protect the fruits of the revolution. Residents of the capital lived far from the fighting during the liberation struggle and this was their chance to strike a blow for the cause. For other people who were present during the fighting the violence was far more ambiguous. For those of mixed race it was a terrifying time as both the white population and the black population suspected them of disloyalty. The revolution highlighted the uncertain position that those of mixed race occupied under Portuguese colonialism. They had privileges denied the
vast majority of the population, and that caused resentment at the same time they were also discriminated against by the colonial state. They were caught between the proverbial “rock and a hard place”. Under continued Portuguese rule they would continue to be second-class citizens, but subjected to a “black revolution” they might be disadvantaged in new and unpredictable ways. Frelimo may have held a non-racial ideology and much of the leadership came from a wide variety of racial backgrounds, yet concrete information about the party was often limited, especially in the capital. For many the future appeared dangerous and very uncertain.

Rosa

Rosa is a mulatta and was born in Lourenço Marques. She was raised by her mother as her father left when she was a small child. Rosa was six when the counter-coup began. She lived in Matola, a bairro outside of Maputo. Her neighbours were an Indian family who owned a car and they often gave Rosa a ride to school in the morning because she attended the same school their daughter. Her memories of the counter-coup are fragmentary, more impressions of violence. There was a bomb that someone had planted at her school. She remembers the explosion and how it knocked a wall down. She also recalled hearing shooting and that her mother was terrified. As they were mulattos, they were at risk from both the white vigilantes and the black reaction as they belonged to neither and were suspected of having sympathies for both depending on who was in charge of the questioning. The incident most firmly implanted in her mind is of driving with her neighbour and his daughter during the battles to put down the counter-coup. They were stopped at one of the anti-rebel checkpoints that were appearing at random all over the city. One of the cars further up in the queue contained a white man and the car was doused in petrol and set alight. There was no way to leave the queue and to do so would be certain death so they waited. When the guards approached them they saw an Indian man and what they took to be two Indian children and ordered them out of the car and took them over to a spot where the guards were performing executions. The father was terrified, but neither of the girls really understood what was happening at the time. One of the women guarding the checkpoint took pity on them because the girls were so young. Although they had never met her before she told the other guards to let them through because Rosa was her goddaughter. It was a lie that saved their lives. Rosa was traumatised for some time to come and kept dreaming of all the corpses that littered the ground around the checkpoint (Field notes 17 October 2004).

As the examples of both Roberto and Rosa demonstrate, although the violence was racially based, race relations were not a clear-cut matter. The enemy may have been broadly defined as Blacks, Whites, Indians or Mulattos, but individual acts of friendship or pity could alleviate the violence. Ties between people, especially in the urban areas, cut across communities in complex ways. As shown by Roberto’s example and the following one, personal ties and long term co-residence often resulted in people being protected from the violence, no matter what their racial background was.
Naema came from an Indian family (although her father was white, but she had very little contact with him and broadly defines herself as Indian) that was relatively well-off before the revolution. Members of her family even lost some of their social standing after the consolidation of liberation. Despite this, in the early days of independence Naema was an enthusiastic supporter of Frelimo. She was about twelve years old when independence happened and the white counter-coup and the black reaction occurred. Although her father had been imprisoned for running guns for Frelimo in the mid 1960s and remained in prison until after the war and her mother was in difficult financial circumstances, they had wealthy relatives in Maputo who took care of them. Their life was relatively privileged. Naema, like many young people in Maputo, did not know much about Frelimo, but was excited at the prospect of an independent government. Although Naema expected the Frelimo government to bring great and positive changes to the lives of the people, she remembers the year-long transitional government as a time of fear and uncertainty. When the black reaction to the coup started her family became worried about their great-aunt who lived in a primarily black bairro on the outskirts of town. Naema and her uncle drove into the bairro to bring her great-aunt to the relative safety of the city. They got into the neighbourhood without much trouble and their great-aunt was surprised to see them. She did not feel that she was in any danger; she had lived in that neighbourhood for many years and was well-known. Her neighbours had protected her from any of the fighting that occurred. Naema’s uncle was still worried about her staying in an area that was primarily black; he did not feel she would be protected for long. They eventually convinced her to come along. As they were driving on the road outside of the bairro a black “mob” sighted the car and attacked it with stones and sticks. The road was littered with debris and the car could not drive very fast. As they pulled away, the patrol followed. Naema and her family eventually found refuge at the hospital, which had a military guard and managed to keep the “mob” at bay. They had to stay there for 24 hours before it was safe to leave (Field notes 7 of July and 8 of November 30 2003 and January 2004).

In Naema’s example, her family’s attempts to rescue their great-aunt actually put her in greater danger. Ironically she was probably safer in her “black” bairro as she was well-known and would be spared from any violence that occurred. While the notion of an exception; i.e. “I don’t like blacks except for Jim who is a nice guy”; is common to racial discourse the world over, I posit that in Mozambique this was especially influenced by the nature of colonial racism. As this chapter has already demonstrated, colonial racism in Mozambique had a strong biological component and built up rage after independence was directed against broad racial categories. But the simple existence of a concept like assimilação, even if it was basically a farce in practice, moved the idea of race away from biological difference and pointed towards social position. Therefore Naema’s great-aunt was not targeted as an Indian because she lived among Blacks and was not thought to “act” like an Indian: i.e. exploitative. After the victory of the revolutionary elite and the suppression of the coup the outward and biological aspects of racial discourse were banned, but the racialisation of social position survived in a new form.

The violence of the coup and the counter-coup helped to solidify Frelimo’s policies concerning race in the independent state they were going to build. As shown
in Chapter Two, these policies began to take their modern shape during the revolutionary elite’s struggle against the conservative northern faction of Frelimo during the liberation war. These events formed a drawn-out “transitional moment” of racial ideologies in independent Mozambique. Although the revolutionary elite had worked out their ideas and policies for a unitary non-racial state they still had to transmit these values to the wider population. Their previous experience of government had been limited to the sparsely populated liberated zones during the liberation struggle, and the coup and counter-coup demonstrated that there might be considerable resistance as the revolutionary elite attempted to introduce their ideas and policies concerning race to the nation at large.

Frelimo was taken by surprise by the violence of the coup and counter-coup. Their surprise highlighted their lack of control over the nation, as they had to request help from Portuguese troops to help put down the disorders. The financial results of the violence were also catastrophic, as growing numbers of the white managerial class left the country. Frelimo was anxious to assure the remaining Whites, Mulattos and Indians that they would be safe, pointing to the fact that many party leaders belonged to these populations as well. However, the violence did have beneficial outcomes for the party as it helped to rid Frelimo of a segment of the population – conservative Portuguese - that was most likely to be opposed to their future programmes. The party leadership felt that the majority of the population, peasants, had relatively little idea of internal differentiation among the peasantry itself (O’Laughlin, 2000). By stressing the leadership’s version of the class nature of colonial oppression as opposed to its specific racial aspects, they could try to rally and unify the population by downplaying internal differences and could point to the departing Portuguese (and any ideas the revolutionary elite claimed were associated with them) as the source of all current problems.

Yet, the departure of the majority Portuguese did not entirely reassure the Frelimo leadership; they still felt surrounded by enemies (Hall and Young, 1997: 52). This was due to the weakness of the party at independence, but also to the specific type of Marxist class analysis used by Frelimo as a result of their colonial experiences. For the revolutionary elite, class, as it expressed itself in public speeches or rallies, was more than just a relationship to the means of production. It was also a type of moral relationship to the nation (Hall and Young 1997: 65-66). As stated by Henriksen: “Frelimo castigates capitalism more as a wicked instinct than as a mode of
production” (quoted in Hall and Young 1997: 66). When Frelimo took power they were suspicious of urbanites, as urban areas had been outside of their control during the liberation struggle. Urbanites were thought to be those who were the most influenced by the “decadence” of Portuguese culture, and were potential “class enemies” (Hall and Young, 1997: 84). Class enemies and “agents of imperialism” were not defined solely by class status, but also by personal behaviour, those who used drugs, went about badly dressed or had long hair, criminals, prostitutes, or those who wanted higher wages and went on strike were all seen as enemies of the people and had to be swept away for the growth of a new and “pure society” (Hall and Young 1997: 66). The class struggle was about a relationship to the means of production, but it was also defined in terms of those who did not share the party leadership’s ideals of modernity.

The revolutionary elite harboured deep suspicions concerning the urban population, but a shared social background mitigated some of these doubts. The major difference between the revolutionary elite and urbanites of a petty bourgeoisie background was that the revolutionary elite had been cleansed of their “impurities” through the liberation struggle and the others had not. The shared social background between urbanites and the revolutionary elite not only gave urbanites the skills necessary to take up party posts, but enabled them to understand the nuances of the revolutionary elite’s message, as this message grew from shared social experiences.

The revolutionary elite had a different view of the peasantry. Although peasants were often publicly lauded in Frelimo’s vaguely Maoist rhetoric, in private the party tended to view peasants with contempt for their “backwardness”. The leadership frequently spoke of the “hut habits” of the peasantry, which they believed described the condition of “unrelieved ignorance” that could be found in the rural areas (Hall and Young 1997: 84). Urban dwellers may have absorbed the decadence of the colonisers, but the peasantry, as it currently existed, was the symbol of everything the party felt was wrong with “traditional” African culture. Here one had superstition, tribalism, witchcraft, and the oppression of women, everything that had to be erased from the new society. The rhetoric is very different, but one can see similarities between the ways in which earlier assimilados described “bush blacks” and the way the party conceived of the peasantry. The biological elements of racial discourse had been banished after Frelimo’s assumption of power, yet the totalising manner in which the revolutionary elite conceived of the peasantry grew from earlier
racial discourses and in practice took a quasi-racial form. The major difference from the more “familiar” Anglo-American discourse of race being that it was thought the peasantry could change over time, although in other respects this appears as an extension of the concept of *assimilação* on a far grander scale.

In practice those who did not accept Frelimo’s version of modernity and clung to “hut habits” were classed as enemies who must be vanquished in the struggle to build a nation. Once enemy elements were reformed of impurities or removed, the revolutionary elite felt that what remained would constitute a “blank slate” that they could build upon, and one of the fundamental goals was to establish unity amongst the people. This was a central factor of the non-racialism that characterised the regime, the multi-racial make up of the leadership was a demonstration that the party had moved beyond racism, tribalism and regionalism and spoke for the entire Mozambican people (Hall and Young, 1997: 52, 83). Yet the official stance of the regime meant that continuing problems dealing with race, ethnicity and regionalism could not be mentioned in public, and those who did were “reactionaries” trying to sow division amongst the people. Paradoxically the inclusionary stance taken by the government began to create new enemies, especially after the violence that preceded independence.

Despite the official non-racial discourse, things worked differently on the ground and in private: Race was still a contentious issue. According to Senhor Ferrão, a former high-ranking government official with access to private governmental discussions, Samora Machel frequently complained in politbureau meetings about the impossibility of making any social progress with the bankrupt state and the brutalised, uneducated society the Portuguese left him with. In this case Samora Machel’s remarks were both anti-peasant and anti-Portuguese. Ironically Samora Machel was far more delicate when speaking publicly of the Portuguese, as he knew that his remarks could easily lead to another outburst of violence directed at those who remained. Residual racial tension existed outside the ranks of the ruling revolutionary elite as well. As a young girl Naema was an enthusiastic Frelimo supporter and had joined the youth wing of the party shortly after independence. Her mother on the other hand remained unconvinced and was having a difficult time adjusting to the growing fluidity of formerly fixed social positions. In the early days of the socialist period the party demanded that the population participate in voluntary labour on Sundays. It usually consisted of the inhabitants of neighbourhood blocks cleaning the streets and
sidewalks of their area. Naema always contributed; it was mandatory and she felt it was a good idea. Her mother however consistently refused. She balked at the idea of doing work usually associated with an *empregada*, and she did not want to clean for the “Blacks” who should, in her mind, be cleaning for her. Another friend of mine, Lina, who comes from a mixed Goan and Portuguese background, explained to me that in the current era everyone tends to romanticise parts of the socialist period. One of the most common statements is that there was no racism during this period. Lina feels that is only partly true. Work places and neighbourhoods were mixed, students attended mixed schools and children of all backgrounds played together. Yet at the same time she remembers black students chasing her sister home trying to pull her hair because it was straight. Lina felt that although the socialist period was less outwardly racist than the current one, racism still existed and people were still defined by the social positions they inhabited during the colonial era. Another informant, a mulatta who was a member of Frelimo, recalled being stopped by former Frelimo guerrilla soldiers in the street and asked why she was still in the country. When she asked a soldier his reason for this challenge, he replied: “Because we fought the struggle to get rid of bourgeois like you”. In his mind she was automatically bourgeois as a Mulatta. The roots of the post-socialist racialism, with its assertion of fundamental difference from the majority of the population and continuing squabbles and jockeying for position among the racially mixed elite slowly grew from these sources.

4.5 Race and Post-socialism

In a manner similar to Kuper’s (1965) description of how the African bourgeoisie belied its commitment to the status quo by acquiring an insatiable appetite for change, Frelimo originally formed itself as a socialist movement with the aim of drastically recreating society based on radically egalitarian principals (Pritchard, 1996, 2002). Although Frelimo’s overall control of Mozambique was somewhat tenuous at independence, they enjoyed wide popular support throughout the country and there were high expectations of future prosperity among both the revolutionary elite and the population. Samora Machel gave speeches about how they would dramatically overcome underdevelopment in just ten tears. The revolutionary elite felt that they could recreate the new nation by sweeping away what came before and
rebuilding it in their ideal of modernity in the foreseeable future. The pursuit of this goal was accompanied by frequent attacks against aspects of Mozambican society that the leadership felt needed to be destroyed in order for the new society to advance. These attacks fit the logic of the revolutionary elite’s totalising and quasi-racial view of the peasantry, but instead of transforming them, large sections of the peasantry were alienated from Frelimo and this contributed to the civil war (Geffray 1991).

As the civil war worsened during the 1980s the economy faced collapse and many areas were struck by famine. During the civil war the party’s control over rural areas was sporadic at best and they managed to maintain a firm hold only over urban areas, where Frelimo generally had the greatest support. After the end of the war Renamo managed to poll a surprising amount of support in rural areas of the centre and north of the country. Although Frelimo maintained firm support in the rural areas of the south, increasing social distance has grown between the party and sections wider population, especially the rural majority of the centre and part of the north of Mozambique. This growing distance has been recognised by members of the revolutionary elite as well. As the former Frelimo Minister of Finance told me: “What we (Frelimo) had in the socialist period to excess, a desire to be with and work with the people, is gone now”.

For Frelimo residents of rural areas are not just the repositories of “backwards” traditions that have proven amazingly difficult to dislodge, but in many areas of the country they are now also considered receptive to the political opposition. But the leadership did not just conceive of the peasantry as a possible site of political opposition. The peasantry also provided a mirror in which elites (both revolutionary and independence) could define themselves against. In Wade’s study of race and ethnicity in Latin America, he argued that popular conceptions of Amer-indians as “backwards” and “archaic” in Panama serve the political needs of the state. Thus the state can define itself as the opposite, a progressive and civilising force (1997: 92). In Mozambique the peasantry, although racially the same as many members of the

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62 It is tempting to see continuing apathy towards the peasantry as following ethnic divisions due to the fact that many members of the revolutionary elite come from southern ethnic groups, particularly the Shangaan. While there may be an ethnic component to this division, I never heard any reference to it during fieldwork from elites. As stated in the introduction to this thesis, aside from being racially mixed, many members of the revolutionary elite married women from other ethnic groups hailing from the north and centre of Mozambique during the liberation struggle. Their children are often “ethnically mixed” and most people I knew were proud that they did not regard themselves in terms of ethnicity, but as Mozambicans.
revolutionary and independence elites, serve a similar purpose. This has most likely intensified as new, more personal forms of modernity supplant the former nationalist modernity with its focus on mass mobilisation. The modernity the revolution once promised to bring to the nation is becoming more the factor that distinguishes the independence elite from much of the wider population. The continuing social distance between elites and the peasantry also serves a pragmatic purpose. During fieldwork around 60% of the government’s budget was foreign aid and the development industry was one of the biggest industries in Mozambique, it was also a major employer of the independence elite. In some ways the continuing poverty and “backwardness” of the majority rural population is the nation’s greatest resource.

Despite the fall of socialism the peasantry remain a site in need of development; and elites, both revolutionary and independence, remain those who will bring development, whether it is in just a few years as promised under socialism, or in the distant future as with the current era. The elite paternalism evident in the colonialist and socialist era still exists today and can sometimes take rather bizarre forms. According to interviews with a former Frelimo member who now works on land issues, the government’s current plan for the rural areas is to try and dispossess the peasantry and create a rural proletariat. In the party’s opinion this would modernise not only agriculture, but also the population: they would be drawn into the global economy and settled in concentrated areas accessible to the state. In a seemingly neo-colonial throwback one minister felt this would also aid the “Christianisation” of the population.

These attitudes of fundamental difference between elites and the peasantry have their roots in the previous generations but they are apparent with the independence elite as well. Although the differences between elites and the peasantry are often expressed in racial terms, as many of the people making the remarks are also black it is not seen as real racism. One young member of the independence elite who strongly disapproved of this trend still explained to me that since racism in Mozambique is based on class it is different from “real” racism.

You know racism in Mozambique is very different. It’s not like South Africa. There if you are black you are black. People will say they do not want to talk to you because you are black. It’s all very out in the open. In Mozambique it is more about class. It’s like these jokes Samito is always telling (a mutual friend and she is referring to racist jokes). Everyone always laughs. I said something about it to some friends, but they asked how can
The racial discourse of independence elites, as explained to me, does not appear to have an ideological bedrock in ideas of biological difference. Instead it is concerned with behaviours and social position and has its roots in the colonial and socialist periods. Blacks are objects of derision for the independence elite when they come from social backgrounds that influence them to act like the stereotypical Africans of colonialist discourse.

But as I mentioned in the introduction of this paper the racial discourse of independence elites is variable and situational. As the ban against the open expression of racial differences has slipped away after the fall of socialism many pre-existing tensions and new ones that have arisen in the capitalist era are now expressed in racial terms. This is especially apparent amongst the independence elite since they are not bound by the residue of the party discipline of the socialist period and can express disagreements openly and publicly. A prime example can be found amongst whites from Frelimista families. Although white families generally have a high standard of living in Mozambique and white poverty is basically unknown there is a feeling among many young whites that they are slowly being pushed out of positions of power. There is some truth to this assertion. Renamo has tried to portray itself as a “black power” alternative to Frelimo and they pointed to the racially mixed membership of the Frelimo government as an example of its elitism and its distance to the black majority. Frelimo is sensitive to criticism of this nature and took steps to respond. The public face of the Frelimo government during my fieldwork, the ministers and vice-ministers, is now predominately black. This does not mean that members of the revolutionary elite from other racial backgrounds were expelled, quite the contrary. Many willingly left ministerial service to take up positions with aid agencies or the private sector, although they have retained their party membership and are still members of party policy making bodies, such as the central committee. For young whites whose families gave up their Portuguese citizenship to take part in the revolution this perceived glass ceiling is still quite galling, even if it has not resulted in the loss of material benefits. As a young white man from a well-off Frelimista family once told me: “Não sou elite, não sou preto” (I am not elite, I am not black).
There were tensions between different sections of the revolutionary and independence elites that were often spoken about it with a racialised vocabulary, but these groups also often knew each others’ families and frequently mingled socially. The situation between many members of the independence elite and Indians, specifically the Indian merchant class was different. There were prominent Indian members in the revolutionary elite, but they often came from Goan backgrounds or from Indian families that had been in Mozambique for generations and had intermarried with members of the local population (although this was not always admitted either). Like other members of the revolutionary elite this group tended to have backgrounds based in state bureaucracy and professions and came from a similar social background.63

The Indian merchant class have long tended to be a group apart. There is a history of racial antagonism between the black population and Indians generally and the merchant class is also accused of economic exploitation. During the socialist period Indian merchants expanded to fill the gap left by fleeing Portuguese merchants. This aroused the suspicion of the revolutionary elite because they were trying to centralise the economy under the control of the state and independent merchants, often with transnational economic links, were suspected of having divided loyalties. Frelimo established severe punishments for many forms of independent economic activity. It was labelled “economic sabotage”. In practice Indian merchants were often singled out under these laws. A former Frelimo cadre told me of his embarrassment when he was giving a group of visiting Soviet experts a tour of a communal farm and they saw an Indian man tied to a tree being whipped for the crime of smuggling. He told me this was not uncommon, but foreigners were not supposed to see it. The experts reacted badly: “One of the women in group started to cry and said how could you? We have not had this since the time of Tsar”. Another friend told me about the father of a mutual acquaintance who was from the Indian merchant class. Her father was convicted of black marketeering in 1983 (I was told he was actually guilty). He was to be punished publicly. As Mozambique did not have a state television channel until 1987 his execution by firing squad was broadcast on the radio.

These types of punitive measures have been largely abandoned in the post-socialist period and many Indian merchants have formed partnerships with members

63 As shown in the introduction of this chapter, this group garners far less trust from elements of the wider population.
of Frelimo, but distrust remains. Although members of the Indian merchant class can command great wealth and work with members of the revolutionary and independence elite on occasion, they are very weakly incorporated into the social networks of the revolutionary and independence elites. Social differences between young members of the Indian merchant class and the independence elite could grow into mutual hostility and throughout fieldwork it was the norm for both groups to characterise each other negatively. One black friend of mine, Varnya, from the independence elite told me this was because Indians (specifically the Indian merchant class) are not secure in their social position in Mozambique.

I don’t know man, Indians seem like they have to show off. I mean all these Indian families have drivers to take them everywhere. They do not have any more money than we do. They just have to make a statement. I was at a club recently and I saw an Indian guy bump into a black guy. I guess the black guy did not move out of the way quick enough or something because the Indian started shoving and a fight broke out. The Indian guy called all his friends who immediately backed him up. It did not matter what happened, but because he was fighting a black guy they all joined in. They really keep to themselves. Mulattos used to be like that a long time ago, but they mellowed out and are not so cliquey anymore. I think it is because Indians are insecure. This is not really their home, but they have nowhere else to go (Field notes 23-25 June 2003)

Interestingly, Varyna never made similar statement about other groups with foreign roots, such as white Mozambicans, not “belonging” in Mozambique. Nor does she feel members of the Indian merchant class could return to India: “they have nowhere else to go”. It is not through descent that members of the Indian merchant class are “quasi-foreign” but because of the ways in which they behave and their ambiguous social position. As astutely observed by Stoler earlier in this chapter, race does not always act as a marker of biological differences but physical appearance can act as a marker of cultural and behavioural differences. This is neatly summed up in a popular Mozambican joke concerning Indians. “How can you tell if an Indian is a Mozambican or a recent immigrant from Pakistan? If he is sitting at a bar having a beer with his wife he is Mozambican, if he is sitting at a bar having a beer with another Indian man he is Pakistani”. Although the racial discourses of the independence elite take on very different forms depending on who one is talking about (i.e. peasants or Indians) it rarely makes reference to any ideas of biology or

64 In Mozambique the word Indian is used to connote anyone of south Asian background regardless of the country of origin.
descent, but instead to behaviours and social position that are in many ways independent of biology or descent.

4.6 Conclusion

In Mozambique racial discourse is a pre-existing vocabulary used to describe categories of social difference that are connected to race but not entirely dependent on it. This discourse has its roots in the colonial period. More specifically, it originates within the particular form of colonialism practised by the Portuguese and within the colonial elite’s role therein. Like all types of colonialism, the practise found in Mozambique eventually became legitimised by reference to the supposed racial “superiority” of the colonisers. Yet through the institution of *assimilação* members of the indigenous population were able to participate as quasi-equals in colonial society. To some degree, they thus became complicit with the system of colonial domination. Many *assimilados* found this complicity deeply humiliating and some distanced themselves from it and eventually from the colonial state as well. But even for these, its rejecters, *assimilação* had more insidious effects. Although the most radical *assimilados* made common cause with disgruntled peasants and overthrew the colonial state, many had already internalised a sense of difference between themselves and the wider population. Through the “transformational moment” of elite racial discourse, through the liberation struggle and independence, this sense of difference was no longer phrased in explicit racial terms (at least publicly), but instead came to refer to people’s relationship with the project of modernity.

In the post-socialist period, as the constraints of the past lessen, this sense of difference is once again being phrased in a racialised vocabulary. Yet, the independence elite’s racial discourses remain a way to speak about people’s relationship to the project of modernity and, increasingly, to social position. In the following chapter I will examine another growing sense of difference between two groups that were, and remain in many ways, closely united. They are elites and the urban middle classes. As with racial discourses, I examine the ways in which the onset of democratic capitalism created a sense that the elite are growing ever more distant from their previous bases of support.
Chapter Five

Legitimacy and Modernity

…to be raised in the house of power is to learn its ways, to soak them up, through that very skin which is the cause of your oppression. The habit of power, its timbre, its posture, its way of being with others. It is a disease, (…), infecting all who come too near it. If the powerful trample over you, you are infected by the soles of their feet (*The Satanic Verses*, Salman Rushdie 1988: 211).

5.1 Introduction

Relatively early into my fieldwork I was invited to the birthday party of a French aid worker. At the bar where the party was held, I soon fell into a conversation with some of her Mozambican fellow employees. Talk turned to politics and a young man sitting near me launched into a litany of abuse against Frelimo. For at least five minutes he described a catalogue of what he felt to be the ruling party’s faults, errors, penchant for corruption and overall and general uselessness. This young man, a Mulatto, was born in Maputo and belonged to the urban middle classes. It would therefore be rather unlikely for him to vote for Renamo, yet he obviously considered Frelimo a distasteful option. I asked him who his family supports and he said: “Oh, they vote for Frelimo”. I then asked who he would vote for and he said: “Frelimo”. I was puzzled by his response and asked why he would vote for Frelimo if he disliked them so much. He replied: “Because the pockets of Frelimo are already full while the pockets of Renamo are still empty”. He was implying that Frelimo would not have to steal too much more to support themselves in their current life style, while Renamo officials would have to begin from the bottom and work their way up. A vote for Renamo would thus be a vote for even greater levels of corruption.

At the time I found the response very witty, but further into my fieldwork after I had heard many similar statements I began to see these types of comments as symbolic of the growing tension between the revolutionary elite and their children and the urban middle classes. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, although the Frelimo leadership initially viewed the urban middle classes with suspicion, their shared skills and social origins helped to create a growing bond. The urban middle classes soon became one of the party’s bastions of support. Following the introduction of neo-liberal democracy the formerly close relationship between these groups is
beginning to seem increasingly strained. While most of my middle class friends and acquaintances felt they were materially better off since the fall of socialism, many of them felt alienated from Frelimo, whom they view as increasingly isolated and dependent on international networks to bolster their power and therefore more willing to ignore internal opinion. However, as the introductory response shows, many of them do not feel there is another viable group to whom they might offer their allegiance.

This feeling of alienation appeared among other former supporters of the regime as well. For one such group, it appeared that the only way they felt they could make themselves heard now was to go “over the heads” of the party. They did this by means of political protest, now legal after the introduction of the democratic constitution in 1990. During my time in Maputo there was a weekly demonstration along Av. 24 de Julho (24th of July Avenue), a major street in the city that is named after the day when the Mozambican government instituted their programme of nationalisations during the socialist period. One could hear the demonstrators coming long before one saw the official police outriders that guided the march. Many of the 150 or so marchers that appeared advertised their presence by blowing whistles, beating drums and singing. I was walking down the street the first time I heard them coming and I stopped to watch. No one on else on the street seemed very concerned; in fact very few people seemed to notice them. The public’s lack of interest might have been accounted for by the fact that, as I later found out, the march had been a regular fixture for some time. As they passed by, one participant noticed my attention amidst a general atmosphere of indifference and he tried to get me to join the march. Perhaps he thought it would demonstrate that the protesters’ cause had some extra significance. Almost all of the marchers were black men in their 30s and 40s, maybe the presence of a white foreigner would have been a manifestation of international interest in their cause.

Since I suspected the demonstrators were probably members of Renamo, a group that I did not want appear to be visibly supporting, and I had no idea what they were marching for, I refused. Their repertoire of flags and symbols did little to enlighten me. Many were carrying signs and flags of Germany, the United States and a few other assorted European nations. The signs declaimed governmental corruption and after the Second Gulf War of 2003, many signs called upon the American President George Bush to overthrow the “gang of thieves” that made up the
Mozambican government. This surprised me as Bush and his Iraq war were generally unpopular amongst many of the people I knew, especially the revolutionary and independence elites, most of whom were positive about the rise of Iraqi resistance against the American occupation forces.

I eventually found out that these men had been working in the former East Germany through a contract arranged by the Frelimo government. The East German government paid these men’s wages directly to the Mozambican government, which, in a bizarre parody of the earlier practise with mine workers in South Africa, retained part of the money and returned the rest to the workers. In this case the wages had disappeared. Although the former Minister of Labour was widely held responsible, nothing had been done and their salaries had never been refunded. I then understood why they were carrying German flags, but I still wondered why they included American, British and various others European flags in their weekly demonstration. Barring an imminent invasion of the “Coalition of the Willing”, which seemed extremely unlikely, I could not see what these governments had to do with the matter. Upon later reflection it seemed the demonstrators, after numerous rebuffs at the hands of the state, were trying a strategy that had worked so well for the Mozambican elite in general. They were attempting to speak to one of the most important constituencies in the country, the foreigners who run the international agencies that have such a powerful presence in Mozambique. Using this method they hoped to go “over the heads” of their own rulers, in whom they had lost faith, and try to obtain justice from one of the few groups that could make their leaders listen: the “international community”. Unfortunately for the demonstrators, they did not - unlike elites - seem to be able to make their message successfully heard and their calls fell on the deaf ears of a world almost completely unaware of their plight. As with the disillusioned voter mentioned earlier, Frelimo had once relied on members of this urban middle class group for support. Now, however, they could use powerful international contacts as a means to bypass internal opinion. Former supporters, in contrast, were finding it ever more difficult to make themselves heard.

5.2 Which Constituency?

The practise of sending workers to foreign nations and keeping part of their wages was not entirely uncommon with socialist governments. See Bayly (2004) for a description of this practise in Vietnam.
As the example above demonstrates, many people in Mozambique, both elite and otherwise, recognise the importance of international opinion in the formation of national policy. International actors are able to influence local political decisions through the distribution or withholding of aid and through insisting on structural reform. This has led some authors to claim that the fall of socialism has brought forth new sets of relationships between the Mozambican state and international agencies that strongly resemble aspects of the colonial period (Hanlon 1996: 80-83). It is, however, a rather different aspect of the interconnections between Mozambique and international agencies on which I seek to focus attention in this chapter. I will discuss how the changing political circumstances that have accompanied the fall of socialism have made it imperative for the revolutionary elite to appear legitimate in the eyes of the international community, which provides power and resources that allows the government to treat previous sources of support, such as the urban middle classes, more casually. While there are aspects of these relationships that resemble older colonial forms of power, I draw attention to the internal freedom of manoeuvre that elites’ reliance on foreign aid allows.

Many Mozambicans, not simply those connected to the revolutionary and independence elites, have found employment with international agencies. It is estimated that they are among the largest employers in country (Hanlon 1996; Pitcher 2002). Positions range from the more humble, such as driver and secretary to the more glamorous, such as field representative or project coordinator. In addition to direct employment, I knew many middle class Mozambicans who had tangential connections with which they supplemented their incomes, such as offering Portuguese lessons to foreign personnel. Yet despite this seeming openness of opportunity, elites have the ability effectively to monopolise the highest positions. Aside from the fact that elites, especially the independence elite, often have higher degrees of education, or at least attended more prestigious universities, they derive an immense advantage through their social networks. Elites can call on a wide range of friends and family who currently hold, or held, high positions in both aid agencies and the government and sometimes both on an almost rotating basis. Throughout this thesis I have argued that elite social structures, comprising the revolutionary and independence elites,

66 Although some middle class examples used in this chapter deal with informants from the Indian merchant class, I do not focus my argument specifically on this group and they have a slightly different social trajectory.
foreign capitalists and the international community and the more power members of the Indian merchant class, in Mozambique share strong similarities with those described by Gledhill in Mexico (1998, 2002). As shown in the introduction in Mexico, under the PRI government, power was held by multiple elites, some whose power bases grew from politics and others who were predominant in the economy, although many had interests in both spheres. Yet despite the often-fierce rivalries between sets of elites they were united in an overall political culture that buttressed their high status positions. While this is generally true for Mozambique as well, there are certain cases where power appears even more tightly centralised. As Frelimo’s commitment to socialism started to progressively weaken, members of the revolutionary elite were able to expand their political power base into sectors of the economy and to obtain positions with the aid agencies of the international community. The revolutionary elite may not be the only set of powerful actors in the economic or aid based spheres, but the fact that they are active in all means that the revolutionary, and by extension the independence elite, appear to be, in this case, something more akin to the interlocking “power elite” described by Mills (1956). Therefore, like the “power elite” there are structures of power that link elites, the government and the international agencies in mutually beneficial and self-sustaining ways.

Many members of the urban middle classes may have similar social origins to the elite and broadly similar if less prestigious qualifications, but they cannot access these social networks to the same degree. They thus view elite monopoly of these networks as “sinister and conspiratorial”. In this chapter I deal with what many Mozambicans feel is the paradox of democratisation: The introduction of democracy and free market policies were supposed to enable the “will of the people” to make itself felt by a government whose former socialist policies were also based on a supposed “will of the people” but were thought by many to have become elitist and out of touch. Yet many members of the middle classes feel they are now ignored and denied access to high positions.

During the transition to multiparty democracy, Frelimo spent most of its energies addressing and seeking to enlist support amongst its traditional audience, educated urbanites (Manning 2002: 132). As was the case during the socialist period, the urban middle classes constitute a loosely-connected group which shared Frelimo’s dream of creating a “modern nation”. This group understands and identifies with the society the elite claim they want to create. Therefore competition for the spoils of the
new system in many ways remained an urban “privileged” activity for the elite and urbanites who had the education and the social connections (although as previously stated, to differing degrees) to take advantage of the new types of opportunities that had been created. Some members of the middle classes managed to achieve certain levels of prosperity in the new, more open economic system, yet the benefits they enjoy pale in comparison to the wealth that elites have able to accumulate. The fact that there is now an internationally recognised democratic system in place in Mozambique has not necessarily meant that many members of groups outside the elite feel that they can effect meaningful changes in their social system. Broadly stated, the purpose of democratic elections is to give the victor the legitimacy of the popular will. Yet despite the historical closeness and blurred boundaries between elites and the urban middle classes, the introduction of democracy seems to be sapping Frelimo’s legitimacy, as they are perceived to be increasingly aloof from the population. Democratisation and electoral victories have given the revolutionary elite legitimacy with international agencies and Mozambique’s major donors. The question remains though, in whose eyes legitimacy must be sought: those of the local electorate or those of the international community?

5.3 Legitimacy

In a recent and influential book on African politics, Chabal and Daloz (1999) claim that African societies are held together by patronage networks, which, in their view, means the links in African societies, are horizontal instead of vertical.

Indeed, if class is defined (in keeping with standard sociology) as a self-consciously constituted group organised to defend its economic interests and assert these interests against other similar ensembles, then the continent is largely devoid of social classes. That this is so is not surprising, as should be clear from the arguments we have presented so far in this book. Even if it had achieved the economic means of its hegemonic ambitions, any elite which became a ruling ‘class’, thus cutting itself from the rest of society, would rapidly lose prestige, influence, and thereby legitimacy (Chabl and Daloz 1999: 41).

There may be elements of truth to this assertion when describing certain interactions at the local level, but if one reads it as referring to Mozambique overall, it is an oversimplification of a set of complex processes. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, members of the Mozambican elite have long cultivated connections with powerful
groups of foreigners to bolster their power or enhance their status. By the time of my fieldwork in 2002-3, elites had started to rely more on these connections than previously. In answer to my earlier question, while internal constituencies retained some importance, elites are now finding it more expedient to cultivate legitimacy with the international community than with the internal population.

This type of “balancing act” of trying to cultivate new constituencies, while retaining, or at least ensuring the neutrality, of former ones is not specific to the Mozambican case, but widely found throughout the post-colonial world. Nor is it restricted solely to elites. In his recent work on the Sinhalese elite of Sri Lanka, Spencer (2002: 92) questions the utility of using the term “elite” as an analytical category by showing how other actors were able to use democratic and nationalist agendas of the elite to push their own local interests. Spencer’s ethnography demonstrates the existence of many “old” political families who occupied positions of power during the colonial period and whose members later became the leading lights of post-colonial governments. Yet he is cautious of examining nationalism as an instrumental ideology that serves the interests of an elite class (Spencer 2002: 92). This is an important point and one should recognise the role of agency in what is often described as “hegemonic discourses”. I do not doubt that many local actors in Mozambique have been able to harness various elite agendas for their own purposes. Seen overall, however, the advent of national ideologies from socialist nationalism to democratic capitalism has tended to serve the instrumental interests of elites. In this respect the Mozambican case appears to differ from the Sri Lankan one.

Despite the historical specificity of post-colonial African nations, the advent of widespread democratic transitions appears to demonstrate elements of a certain “continent-wide” logic. Manning’s (2002) study of the politics of the post-conflict democratic transition in Mozambique notes that while many democratic transitions throughout sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s had significant measures of popular support from sections of the populace, most were carried out by governments for instrumentalist reasons. In Mozambique the case appeared even more expedient. When the Frelimo leadership was contemplating the transition from a single-party to multiparty state they sent out party cadres to canvass opinion. Admittedly this was only possible in areas where the government exercised a high degree of control, so areas where Renamo was strong and may have been able to count on popular support were not canvassed. Yet the results of the study indicated that the majority of opinion
was against the transition to multiparty democracy on the grounds it could create more conflict in a country already mired in a civil war (Manning 2002: 19). International agencies and most of the donor countries, on the other-hand, operated under the assumption that: “... democracy was expected to bring greater accountability, better governance, and their improved economic management and performance (Manning 2002: 16). As the civil war had reached a situation of stalemate and both sides’ cold war sponsors were losing interest in the conflict, as wider political and economic changes were demanding attention at home, the international community felt democratisation might finally bring the war to a negotiated end. Both the Frelimo-controlled state and the rebel Renamo movement were dependent on international aid to differing degrees. Democratisation was one of the most promising strategies to access foreign funds, and the process was undertaken as much to please the international community as for local concerns. During the first elections, voting patterns tended to follow the military developments of the civil war, in areas where Renamo was strong they dominated the vote, an equivalent monopoly was held in areas where Frelimo held sway. Instead of the population “exercising their democratic will” in many cases it appeared that the voting was, in part, determined by the desire of the population to placate the strongest force in their area (Manning 2002). Internal legitimacy thus appears to have been low on the list of concerns due to the very fact that multiparty elections owed its existence to an externally - rather than an internally-generated set of priorities.

Although international actors were influential in pressing for democratic transition, I do not mean to argue that Mozambican elites were completely held hostage by these actors and unable to influence the course of events. As demonstrated by Manning, the transition to democracy was not formed by pressure from below so much as through an intense process of elite bargaining between members of Frelimo, Renamo, and international agencies (Manning 2002: 19). Renamo did not think they would actually win the elections and knew they could not compete with Frelimo as a “legitimate” national government. Nor was Frelimo initially worried about losing the election. Democracy was thus a matter of the division of spoils (Chabal, 2002). Paradoxically the democratisation process actually weakened ruling groups’ legitimacy among some former supporters as ideologies were jettisoned, former soldiers were abandoned to their fate as they were no longer useful, and parties,
especially Frelimo, operated under new constraints that meant they lost some of their older patronage functions (Manning 2002: 131).  

This observation about the severing of patronage networks and hence the loss of legitimacy was borne out by my own fieldwork. Both elites and non-elites frequently told me that since the fall of socialism the gap between the elites and the people seemed to be growing. Non-elites, especially the middle classes, would frequently point to the growing wealth and frequent corruption scandals of government officials, their families and close associates as a repudiation of the former morality that was enshrined in nationalist modernity. They spoke with bitterness as many contemplated their own precarious circumstances. As the introductory example shows, there was hope that the “international community” would be able to redress some of the more blatant injustices that have occurred in the post-socialist era. In private though, many middle class urbanites were sceptical, stating that as long as elites did what they were told by their external/international partners they would have a free hand to accumulate wealth. 

The growing social distance between elites and “the people” did not, however, necessarily translate into a direct loss of support for Frelimo. Although there were those among the middle classes who felt they were too disillusioned to bother to vote, and while voter turnout was very low, Frelimo won the 2005 election by a landslide. The party seems to have retained support in their traditional heartlands of the south, far north and urban areas (Manning 2002). In a seeming reversal of patrimonial politics, many who criticised Frelimo continued to vote for them as shown in the introductory example. One woman came to the heart of the situation by responding: “Because we have already been through this with Frelimo, the houses, the cars, education for their children. With Renamo we would have to start all over again”. Unlike Chabal and Daloz’s formulation, which states that the wealth of a “big man” is a measure of pride for community and beneficial as it will be re-distributed through vertical social links, many middle class Mozambicans seemed to sense a flow of wealth in the opposite direction. They made a reasoned choice between those who were already rich and those who would have to steal more and leave them with even less (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 42). 

Although in some cases local Frelimo officials have claimed that projects funded and run by NGO are government projects and have attempted to gain political capital from them (Norman 2004).
Beyond the matter of simple “theft”, Frelimo’s growing reputation for corruption endangered their legitimacy with urbanites in other ways. “Being corrupt” damaged Frelimo’s and the more general Mozambican elites’ ideological claims of being a modernising force in the nation. The revolutionary elite had long claimed that they were the only available group who had the capabilities necessary to build an independent, modern Mozambique. Although these claims were articulated more forcefully during the socialist period, they are still a key legitimising factor of elite status today. The growing corruption puts this ideal of modernity in doubt. I was often told that this type of corruption would be impossible in Europe, the supposed paragon of modernity. In Maputo gossip about various corruption scandals is heard constantly. Popular rumours concern not only grand acts of corruption; even minor cases can cause outrage. One middle class informant told me a story concerning the wife of a very highly placed official who supposedly stole alcohol from government residences and then had it resold at a *baraca* (an informal and typically unlicensed bar/kiosk) she owned. My informant finished telling the story and shook his head in disgust saying: “This is sad, even in the worse places this kind of corruption is just petty, the wife of Idi Amin would never bother with something so small”. Disquiet exists among the ranks of the elite itself as the former ideals of nationalist modernity seem increasingly irrelevant in today’s society. In response to a question I asked one member of the independence elite as to whether democracy actually exists in Mozambique; she replied “no” and then described the government as an “incompetent oligarchy”. The growing pervasiveness of corruption causes doubts as to the ability of elites to modernise the nation - will they simply enrich themselves at its expense? Although the elite may be losing legitimacy within one of their traditional bases of support, the ideal that has been promised for so long, at least some kind of, modernity, is still seen as a legitimate goal. If this goal were to be compromised, the loss of legitimacy might begin to be truly harmful.

In this chapter I argue that the democratisation process in Mozambique has contradictory effects amongst elites and the urban middle classes. Urbanites have long been a major base of support for the Frelimo party and were one of the principal, internal groups to which Frelimo tried to “sell” democratisation. Yet, while the democratisation process has strengthened the revolutionary elite’s legitimacy with

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68 The power of the claim of modernity extends beyond urban constituencies as well (Norman 2004).
powerful foreigners, it has made them less accountable – in contrast to the scenario described by Chabal and Daloz - to the internal groups it used to rely upon. Democratisation has increased the resentment of the middle classes, but has not left them with a suitable replacement. Many urbanites share aspects of the elite ideology of modernity and, although there are growing doubts as to the revolutionary elite’s intentions, there is currently no one else they believe to be capable of nurturing an ideology of, or delivering the fruits of, modernity.

The remainder of the chapter examines the question of legitimacy by focusing on the opportunities and the limits the middle classes have in accessing the new forms of wealth that have become prevalent in the post-socialist period. I also describe the mistrust that has accompanied elite social mobility, even as many middle-class Mozambicans seem to be internalising new elite values. Finally, by using the example of the Carlos Cardoso trial, I examine how elite efforts to build legitimacy with international backers have simultaneously created conspiracy theories among urbanites.

5.4 Elites and the Privileged. Who is Legitimately Modern?

Cohen, when speaking of the Creole elite in Sierra Leone, remarked that elites in open societies are often very difficult or define or delineate (1981: 18). This is certainly the case in Maputo, where the boundary between elites and the urban middle classes is a blurred one. These groups are connected both by shared social origins and an aspiration towards “modernity”. Yet neither elites nor the urban middle classes are monolithic, static categories. Can one define where the elite ends and the urban middle class begin? Although the middle classes in general cannot equal elites in influence or international connections, many – especially those tracing their origins to the colonial petty bourgeoisie - share similar social backgrounds, compete for some of the same career options, share elite aspirations and as the following chapter will show, sometimes form intimate relationships and on occasion marry members of the elite. These blurred boundaries are compounded by the fact that the origin of social difference between elites and the urban middle classes stems from service in the

For instance the connections between the revolutionary and independence elites, the urban middle classes and the Indian merchant elite can be more diffuse. An in-depth exploration of these connections is beyond the scope of this chapter.
liberation war, not different social backgrounds. Even though few members of the urban middle classes fought in the liberation struggle, due to educational qualifications, shared ideological aspirations and broad social similarity to the ruling groups have allowed them to overcome suspicions and find places within the rapidly expanding government and party bureaucracies.

During the post-socialist period urban groups were once again poised to take advantage of the new opportunities created by the growing presence of International Aid agencies and NGOs and their stated desire for the creation of “civil society”. Ironically though, although the urbanites had “proved” their loyalty by staying with Frelimo through the civil war, their influence began to wane precisely when new opportunities were presenting themselves. Despite the public claims to the contrary, the growth of Mozambican “civil society” and the NGO development economy has been an intensely political and politicised process (Pitcher 2002). This has even been recognised by aid agencies. A former Peace Corp volunteer once told me that during an orientation meeting for incoming volunteers an official from the American Embassy stated that the goal for the American aid programme was not simply poverty alleviation, but to create a “ruling class” whose wealth would presumably “trickle down” through the wider society. Bayart (1993) has recognised how the formation of “civil society” is deeply involved in the practise of politics and the accumulation of wealth in African states.

In one way, it is possible to see how the superlative relations of the State to accumulation, the interlinking of systems of “straddling” with those of concatenation, and the active inter-penetration of “civil society” and “political society”, could be resolved in many cumulative “spirals”. These processes work towards the production of a dominant class based on the reciprocal assimilation of the social elite. The extent of this molecular process of assimilation, and its degree of realisation vary considerably from one historical situation to another. It is important to continue to argue against the abundant literature and to refuse to relate the postcolonial state to an existing dominant class, which is its tenant. As George Balandier has already put it, “contemporary political life does not seem to manifest a structure of constituted classes, but rather acts as an instrument of class formation (Bayart 1993: 176).

In Mozambique the links between the state and NGOs and “civil society” have allowed for a degree of social assimilation between the middle classes and elites and have created space for material and social advancement, but many members of the middle classes continue to feel at a disadvantage. They may be in state employ, join

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70 For wider examples outside of Mozambique see Gledhill (1994), Power and Its Disguises, Chapter Eight.
international agencies, or even open businesses, but in many cases they do not have
the same level of qualifications (such as degrees from prestigious foreign universities)
as the established elites. Nor do they have the same kinds of social connections
necessary to accumulate and enjoy new wealth. While they remain privileged in
comparison to the population as a whole, their relative deprivation when compared
with elites remains. In some cases it is growing as elites amass yet more wealth. In the
following section I provide four case studies. Two illustrate the avenues of
advancement open to some of the more privileged, young, members of the middle
classes - and their limits. The other two illustrate the ways in which their avenues of
advancement differ from those followed by members of the independence elite.

Osvaldo was in his early 30s when I conducted fieldwork (he was born in 1969 in Maputo).
He comes from an old southern assimilado family that was well off during the colonial
period. His elder brother had been a member of the Portuguese scouts, despite the fact that
it was almost unheard of to be able to enter this organisation if one was black. His father
worked with the Portuguese army and also owned several houses. He derived a good
portion of his income from the rents of his properties. Independence was a traumatic event
for the family; they stayed in their house listening to the sounds of the riots outside and
worried about their father who was with the Portuguese military. Many of his relatives that
were involved with business and politics during the colonial period fled the country,
although his father stayed because he was happy about some aspects of independence.
Despite Osvaldo’s father’s guarded welcome of independence, he was declared an “enemy
of the people” and most of his properties were nationalised. The family’s fortunes
dropped somewhat and his father ended up working at the state-owned national brewery,
2M. Osvaldo had conflicting emotions about the socialist period in Mozambique. On the
one hand he said it was “too communist”, government officials were everywhere, you were
not allowed to publicly voice disagreement and the rights to private property were severely
limited. On the other, as a child he had worshipped Samora Machel. He remembers when
Machel would give impromptu speeches at his school. During one of these visits, Machel
brought the headmaster of the school on stage and proceeded to give him a public dressing
down in front of the students for the fact that the school was in a state of disrepair. The
students considered the headmaster a terror and his humiliation was a day of joy that
demonstrated there was someone who would protect them from dictatorial, arbitrary
authority. Machel’s speeches were marathon affairs, sometimes running up to six hours or
more, but according to Osvaldo, they were not boring and it was obvious he really cared
about the nation. Osvaldo blames many of the problems that followed independence on the
bad advisers that surrounded Samora Machel. Although he appreciates the freedoms of the
new era and prefers many aspects of it to the old, he worries about the increasing amount of
corruption. Unlike the days of Machel, it is no longer obvious that there is anyone in
authority putting the good of the nation above their own self-interest. During the socialist
period children were taught to love Mozambique and it was stressed that everyone had a
role to play in the new nation He does not think that is the case anymore and is worried that
Mozambican identity is being killed by capitalism. He agrees with private property but
thinks that the state should have remained in control of health care and social welfare to
ensure that provisions remain to care for Mozambicans throughout society. He is especially
troubled by the children of the revolutionary elite, many of whom he knows socially. He
told me that although they have been groomed to rule and have had everything handed to
them, most of those he has met are lazy and, in his opinion, only concerned with living the

71 During the initial nationalisations those affected were allowed to keep two houses as personal
property, the house of primary residence and a holiday home, strictly for personal use.
good life. He feels one of the major problems is that the elite is still composed of the exact same people as during the socialist period. This means that even though the political system has supposedly changed, they still control everything. Osvaldo continues to vote for Frelimo, although with reservations. He does not like many current aspects of the party but he has no real affinity for Renamo. His father avoids talking about politics, but Osvaldo thinks he supports one of the minor parties that appeared after the fall of socialism.

Osvaldo studied accounting at the Commercial Institute in Mozambique. He was interested in social work, but his family felt accounting would provide a more viable future and there were not many choices available when he studied. His first job was with an aid agency in Niassa (the northernmost province). His job was to help people who were forcibly removed during Operation Production. He found the area interesting, he had not been exposed to much of life in rural areas and he told me he spent his free days visiting villages and asking questions as an “amateur anthropologist”. He found it fascinating, although strange, especially local beliefs about witchcraft, although he does not personally believe in any of this. He saved up money from this post and went travelling through South Africa in the early 1990s. This ignited a life long love of travel and he has been backpacking through Europe, Southeast Asia and The US. His second job was with Oxfam in Zimbabwe, where he met his wife, an American aid worker. He speaks flawless English, which he said he picked up from music, movies and books. Unlike many Mozambican elites he never had much in the way of formal training in English and he did not study abroad. He then returned to Mozambique and tried to enter the private sector by working as an accountant at a Cashew Factory. This was not a success, he lasted only three months in the job. He then became an accountant for USAID and after his marriage he and his wife relocated to the Washington D.C. home office. He is not sure if he will return and when I last spoke to him he was talking about applying for American citizenship (Field notes various dates, compilation).

In many ways Osvaldo’s background is parallel to those of many of my informants from the independence elite and he probably would have been a member of this privileged category if his father had not been an “enemy of the people”. He came from an urban, southern assimilado background, his family had been relatively privileged in the colonial period, he is well-educated, and he has travelled and seen the world. Up to the present day, his career has been mostly successful as well. Osvaldo also shares much of the Frelimo ideal of modernity, the goal of building a “rational” and modern state. Although he does not display some of the antagonistic contempt of the early Frelimo towards rural areas, or the sometimes thinly disguised condescension of young, independence elites, he nonetheless found rural life strange and disquieting, if interesting.

In other ways, however, he differed significantly from his elite counterparts. His family’s history was too compromised, and showed too much evidence of collaboration, to allow it a place in new party structures. Even though the education level and skills of his father enabled him to find a job that would not leave them destitute, thus allowing him and his family to maintain a broadly middle class life

72 Operation Production forcibly removed unemployed and “unproductive” citizens from urban areas and sent them to “build cities in the bush”, primarily in Niassa.
style, they do not have the social connections within the party elite to reach the summit of society. Nor does Osvaldo have a social base outside the aid industry – perhaps for this reason his foray into the private sector ended badly. He is bitter about the continuing social dominance of the revolutionary elite and the unearned benefits of their children, but there is no other party that embodies the ideal of modernity with which he identifies, even if Frelimo seems increasingly unlikely to deliver it for the rest of the population. In Osvaldo’s view his best chances lie outside Mozambique. Thus the move from socialism to neo-liberal democracy, which promised to increase the access of the “people” to the political system, has paradoxically left those who are dissatisfied with the state few options but individual alienation and retreat.

The second case study displays the structures of middle class advancement in a case where the person in question came from a family not weighed down by political baggage after independence.

Joana is in her mid 30s and was born in Maputo. Her father was an assimilado but, unusually for a member of this category, had two wives and 12 children. Joana is the daughter of the junior wife. The family was essentially apolitical, although they welcomed independence. Her father worked in a furniture factory and earned a relatively good salary but did not join any party organisations, outside of the obligatory work units set up by the party at places of work. Despite this, Joana had many social contacts among the independence elite from parties they used to throw during the socialist period, and she has maintained these contacts in the present day. Joana became pregnant at 15 but she managed to continue her schooling and eventually went to UEM to study law. During university her father died of cancer. He had arranged for his company to split his pension between his two wives, but the money was not enough to support Joana’s family. Joana had to drop out of school and find work to help support her mother and siblings. Joana got various part time jobs to help pay for food and schooling for her brothers and she also enrolled in various courses in typing and English. She then got a job as an administrative assistant at a company that imports agricultural implements. While working at this company she met a man whose wife worked for the American Embassy and she was told she could apply for an upcoming position there. She started as a receptionist but has worked her way up the hierarchy and now has a mid-level position. Her job pays well, but she has probably gone about as far as she can in the Embassy. She now hopes to leave Mozambique and try to work in Europe, she had a long-term boyfriend who is Danish and she would like to move northern Europe and join him, or perhaps work in Britain. She has also been working to obtain a scholarship for her daughter. Her daughter had been studying medicine at UEM, but Joana feels she would have a much better future if she obtained her degree abroad (Field notes 20 May 2003).

While Joana does not have the compromised political past of Osvaldo, she shares many of the overall limitations which served to restrict his upward mobility. Although she has a nice house, a well-paying job, shares a similar social scene with the elite and may even be able to send her daughter to study in South Africa or

73 A polygamous man could not be a member of Frelimo during the socialist period (Sheldon 2002).
Portugal, it will be very difficult for her to continue to advance beyond her present circumstances. Joana is essentially apolitical and tries not to mention many political scandals, especially since many involve the families of close personal friends. Yet she also occasionally talks about the corruption and cronyism of the revolutionary elite and she feels that she would have a better chance of living a good life abroad where the social horizon seems, at least from the vantage point of Mozambique, more open.

The following two case studies demonstrate independence elite methods of social advancement. If one compares them with the cases of Osvaldo and Joana one can note significant differences between urban middle class and elite trajectories.

Varyna, studied in South Africa. Upon her return to Mozambique she obtained a job at a government Ministry. I asked her what her if the interview process for obtaining a government job was difficult and she responded with a bemused look. She told me that she when she arrived at the Ministry for her interview she was told that she was hired. Her parents had connections with both the major governmental Ministries and International organisations and Varyna felt that they probably had a hand in her hiring. As her Ministry was not a major one, she also had the best English, which quickly made her invaluable. Varyna later felt that she was not being paid enough at the Ministry (around £160 per month) and she utilised connections she had made there to branch out into the more remunerative international agencies (around £825 per month). She worked for a major international agency and a major national one before winning a scholarship for post-graduate study in the UK. During fieldwork she would often speak about obtaining a development job somewhere else in Africa for a while to broaden her horizons, but due to the opportunities available to her it is more than likely that she will choose to base herself in Mozambique after her studies (Field notes various dates, compilation).

Unlike Osvaldo and Joana, when Varyna returned from her studies abroad she had a ready-made social network waiting for her. Through parental influence she easily acquired a job, which, while it offered relatively low pay, allowed access to further social networks that eventually brought better-paid employment. Varyna’s career pattern to date has relied almost completely on the state and international agencies.

The next example demonstrates the ways in which these employment opportunities also co-exist with private sector prospects.

Halima’s father was once an engineer for a state-owned company during the socialist period. He is well-connected with many members of the Frelimo elite and after the fall of socialism he went into business by buying and selling privatised industries. He also developed consortiums with various high-ranking Frelimo members and co-owned companies with them. Halima studied in South Africa and then did a degree in the UK. Upon her return she studied marketing at a private university in Maputo. After her completion of the marketing course she has divided her professional time between industries owned by her father and working at an environmental NGO. She then did a MBA in Spain and has returned to Mozambique to take a position in her father’s business. Although she has siblings, Halima has demonstrated the keenest interest in the family business and is considered the heir apparent. During fieldwork she used to talk about
working in Europe and only returning to Mozambique to retire. Like Varyna she wanted more experience of the wider world, but as she has taken a position in her father’s company she will now be based in Maputo (Field notes various dates, compilation).

There are differences between the two independence elite cases I have demonstrated. One family’s operations are primarily based in institutions while the other’s are centred on business. Yet there are significant degrees of overlap. Both were able to utilise family connections to achieve relatively high positions by their early to mid 20s. In addition, while both considered leaving Mozambique for a time, it was for very different reasons than those that motivated Osvaldo and Joana. It was not because they felt alienated and wanted greater opportunities that they were keen to leave. Neither was particularly political: indeed, with their social connections they did not really have to be. They wanted to leave to experience new things in a world that is wider than Maputo. Their eventual decision to base themselves in Mozambique was because this is where they had the greatest opportunities.

The above case studies demonstrate a level of privilege among elites and the urban middle classes that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the majority of Mozambique’s population to achieve. Unlike the two examples from the independence elite, neither Osvaldo nor Joana has managed to develop the social and family connections, nor have they benefited from markers of elite status, such as education abroad, to advance beyond the urban middle classes. In a similar manner to Leys (1982) and M. Cohen’s (1982) formulation of the African national bourgeoisie social position in Mozambique is not based as much on the ownership of the means of production as it is on the ability to access political and foreign networks which lead to wealth and status in Mozambique. Although the barriers between classes are not impossible to transcend, the examples above demonstrate how the lack of a certain level of social connections makes advancement difficult. This directly contradicts the Frelimo government’s early socialist promise of equality for all of Mozambique’s citizens. Although many of the people I knew from the urban middle classes, including those featuring in the above case studies, appreciate the new freedoms of the post-socialist era, they feel that they are ultimately blocked, despite the promise of a new and open civil society. Often, like Osvaldo and Joana, they feel that they would have better chances living abroad.

Another aspect of privilege, which is shared, but somewhat differentially enjoyed, by elites and the middle classes respectively, is their access to influential
outsiders. Although factions exist among the revolutionary elite, even dissident members are able to access social networks that can secure them employment within the government, businesses or the international community. While some members of the middle classes were able - unlike those mentioned in the opening vignette - to find well-paid careers in international agencies, they did not have the educational requirements to rise to the highest levels. Thus they found it far more difficult to blend positions in international agencies with positions in business or politics, as elites are often able to do. The revolutionary elite is not yet in great political danger, as many urbanites are still able to secure at least reasonably well-remunerated employment. Furthermore, even the more critical of urbanites, such as Osvaldo, still believe in the overall ideal of modernity that elites represent. Yet there is growing awareness that some benefit far more from this system than others and the sense of solidarity that underlay nationalist modernity is steadily fading. Cohen (1981) spoke of the need for elites to create and believe in a “universalistic mystique”, the idea that elites are not acting out of pure self-interest, but for the good of the nation. In the post-socialist era, the revolutionary elite is having increasing difficulties in convincing groups they have traditionally relied upon, such as the urban middle classes, that this is the case. Thus, the revolutionary elite face a potential problem. At the moment they can afford to alienate former supporters because they can rely on international agencies; and for many middle class urbanites, Frelimo still remains the only realistic political option. Yet there is a danger of estranging the urban middle classes completely. Currently these groups still share strong bonds of shared social origins and similar social ideals, yet these bonds are strained by what seems to be the increasing inequality of opportunity in favour of elites. The next section examines these strains and the growing social mistrust that has come with post-socialist mobility.

5.5 Social Mobility and Social Mistrust

Early in my fieldwork I spent an afternoon at a café with two students from UEM who were in their mid 20s. We were talking about how things have changed since the fall of socialism. They were telling me that while upward mobility seemed difficult given the slow and ponderous transition to a market-based society, it was different for the elite: after the death of Samora Machel many high-ranking members
of the party and their families seem to have become rich overnight. As they explained, although the socialist period was arduous, with many privations and with the danger that one might be denounced as an enemy of the regime by any one of a widespread network of informers, at least there were efforts to make sure that everyone got a share of what little there was. They told me: “There was more equality back then. Sure the government people got better rations, but even the ministers were thin, they did not wear flashy suits or drive their Mercedes to their mansion like they do now”. In contrast they both deeply resented the repudiation of nationalist modernity symbolised by conspicuous displays of wealth that have become common amongst elites in the post-socialist period. Both of them made the point emphatically that sometimes it was better for everyone to have very little than for some to have everything while others were left with nothing but the bitter knowledge of what they lack, as they claim is the case today.

As with Osvaldo, they also felt that despite the problems and some bad decisions, Samora Machel had been a great man. As they explained to me: “Samora was both good and bad, but more good than bad. Samora was a good man, the problem was that he believed the wrong people, he believed his informers and they would denounce people just because they had an argument or something like that”. Throughout fieldwork I heard many people explain that the problems of the socialist period were not really Samora’s fault. Samora Machel has become an icon among members of the urban poor and parts of the disaffected middle classes; many youth in Maputo sported t-shirts with pictures of Samora Machel on the front and his slogan a luta continua (the struggle continues) on the back. At public protests against corruption it was common to see signs emblazoned “Naõ a via acontecer se Samora estivesse vivo” (this could not happen if Samora was alive). Many of the problems of the period were explained by means of the “good Tsar, wicked Ministers” allegory. Such ideas seem to have evolved as a direct response to the party’s claims of continuing legitimacy from the heroic era of the liberation struggle and the early socialist period. As many of the “bad advisers” continue to play a role in politics today, a clear line of demarcation is drawn between what the party once stood for (as symbolised by the quasi-martyred figure of Samora Machel74) and the perils of the

74 Interestingly, while Samora Machel was widely respected and normally publicly venerated among elites, in private a significant number, especially the independence elites, were far more likely to focus
new capitalist period (as symbolised by the supposed venality of the surviving Frelimo government). It was often hinted darkly that certain current prominent government figures had had a hand in Samora’s death.

It was common among non-elites and even some prominent Frelimo members who have continued as adherents of leftist/socialist ideas to speak of elites in these dichotomous terms: counterpoising old/nationalistic/pure against new/involved with international interests/venal. White Mozambicans who had abandoned their Portuguese citizenship and joined Frelimo for ideological reasons in the early days of independence often made contemptuous comments about the perceived acquisitiveness of prominent members of the revolutionary elite and referred to them as *nouveaux riches*. One white former Frelimista told me in despair: “They (the revolutionary elite) are just thieves now. Look at the country now, they are acting like the colonialists used to”. These critiques of the present are firmly based in growing social inequality, yet their nostalgic idealisations appear retrospectively to downplay the existence of status differences during the socialist period. But such differences did exist and became more pronounced as the government became increasingly authoritarian, even while Samora Machel was alive. By the mid-1980s, high-ranking party members were given special rations, special housing, special sections of hospitals, special schools for their children and access to special stores and restaurants. In Beira, the second city of Mozambique, the leadership was driven in military convoys and passers-by were required to stop, move out of the way and salute (Hall and Young 1997: 76). Yet among many non-elites, whatever status differences existed during the socialist era these faded in comparison to what they see as the starker differences of the present. What their remarks suggest is that negative memories of chronic shortages and the difficulty of life in general were compensated by the more positive memories of “socialist equality”. I frequently heard, from both elites and members of the urban middle classes, that while in general times were now better and life now much easier than in the socialist period, this had been accompanied by a great loss in national identity and social solidarity that were the mainstays of nationalist modernity. There is no longer much emphasis on Mozambican nationalism. Many negative features of the post-socialist period are widely perceived to be the result of elites “selling out” to the World Bank and to his mistakes and refer to him as dictatorial in contrast to what they viewed as the more open system that exists now.
foreign business interests. Despite the disasters of the socialist era, according to many of my informants, the nationalist modernity of the socialist era, epitomised by Samora Machel, seemed more successful in creating a sense of common purpose and unity, at least among the urban middle classes and the revolutionary elite.

Although the relationship of elites and the urban middle classes generally remain close as the boundaries between them are blurred in countless everyday ways, the modernity of the capitalist period tends increasingly to exclude those who are not able to marshal elite social networks. This is typified by the fact for many of the members of the middle classes I knew there is no longer a sense that “everyone is in this together”. Standards of living have improved for both of these groups (although this argument is more difficult to make for the rest of the nation), and very few wanted to return to socialism per se. The middle classes feel barred from obtaining many of the accoutrements of wealth that elites now display so prominently.

Many aspects of modern elite life, such as multiple holiday homes, weekend trips to privately owned beach houses, large country estates, and foreign education for children, are criticised by members of the urban middle classes as being the unjust rewards of growing corruption. But they are also intensely desired. Thus many students of the national university, UEM, complained at the perceived discrimination in the awarding of scholarships. They claimed that it is the independence elite, those who do not need financial assistance, who received government bursaries while those, more worthy of scholarships (namely themselves), were ignored. Naema, who was also introduced earlier in the thesis, is a middle class secondary school teacher who works at a private school. She is very critical of conspicuous consumption and corruption of elites, but her frequently mentioned dream was to have a massive house with a pool and a white 4x4, and to be able to take trips to Disney World. These are the features of the good life that were supposed to come with modernity. Instead many urbanites have found themselves occupying a middle ground. They are socially close enough to elites to be aware of what they have, but not close enough to obtain these things.

While many members of the urban middle classes decry what they see as the “arrogance” of the ways in which elites display their wealth and interact with the rest

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75 Members of the urban middle class frequently told me that although socialism was appropriate for that time, it would not be now. There is a feeling though that some of the better aspects of socialism and nationalist modernity that should be incorporated into the new society were also abandoned.
of the population, they often act similarly in relation to those who lack their privileges. Like the elites, the middle classes often employed one or more household servants, had cable television (although not the satellite TV which is common among elites) and tried to surround themselves with the attributes of “modern” life. They could be just as disdainful towards the rest of the population. I was told numerous contemptuous stories by middle class friends of the “failures” of recent rural immigrants to adjust to an urban life style. This was shown by the way they tried to keep animals on the balcony of apartment buildings and failed to understand the purpose of indoor plumbing. There was even a sliding scale of morality depending on class standing. Naema was once complaining to me of elite corruption and nepotism in securing places in universities and using influence to change grades. I asked her if she ever changed a grade for the child of a friend or family. She replied: “Of course I have”. When I asked if that was not nepotistic as well, she responded: “No, what they (the elites) do is corruption. I am simply helping my family or a friend, there is nothing wrong with that”. In many ways it seemed members of the urban middle classes were in the process of internalising elite values and ways of being, while steadfastly denouncing them at the same time.

Throughout this chapter I have been exploring the relationship between the elites and the urban middle classes. I argue that these groups are both connected and divided by relationships of “blurred” domination, which involve both deeply intertwined social closeness and definite hierarchy. Many of my middle class informants are deeply critical of this hierarchy, yet they tend to replicate similar patterns of social superiority in relations with groups that they see as socially subordinate to themselves. While many elites spend their weekends at family parties or at holiday houses, older, middle class men often like to visit the outlying bairros of Maputo, usually where they were born and often where their families still live. One weekend I accompanied Roberto, a man in his early 40s who straddled the divide between the urban middle class and the elites, to his mother’s home in the bairro of Machava, about 20 minutes outside of the city centre. His aged mother still lives there and one of his brothers runs a small baraca (kiosk) in front of his mother’s house. The area is what used to be known as “cidade de caniço” (cane city) as most of the

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76 Roberto’s family was not prominent in Frelimo, but he shared a very similar social background and he had worked as a journalist for the Ministry of Information during the socialist period. He was able to make many social connections with prominent Frelimo members and elites in general which are necessary for social advancement.
dwellings were huts built out of wood. While the majority of the houses remain characteristic of the “cane city”, visible social divisions are growing as some families have members who work in the city and can afford to provide them with cement houses and electricity. Roberto’s family compound had hut outbuildings, but the central house was now made of concrete, was electrified and had a television, all of the marks of middle class success. We briefly visited his mother. They discussed upcoming projects that had to be undertaken for the house and then he gave her some money. As we left we strolled through the dirt path that separated many housing compounds and stopped at a neighbour’s house. It was impoverished even by the standards of the area. The owner was a man who had fought for the Portuguese during the liberation struggle and had lost both his legs in the fighting. He had no family to help support him and he was suffering from malaria. Roberto stopped, chatted with the man and gave him some money to purchase malarial medication. The unfortunate man was obsequious in his thanks and kept referring to Roberto as *patrão* (master).

We then walked into the town centre, which was filled with numerous *baracas*. Many men in their late 30s and 40s were sitting at the *baracas* drinking and barbequing meat. Some of the men were notable for being particularly smartly dressed, in dress shirts and slacks. They sat in groups that were slightly separate from everyone else there, although interacting with them sporadically. Roberto told me that many men who had decent jobs in the city would come back to Machava for the weekend to drink and eat. We stopped at a *baraca* where many people Roberto knew who worked for an aid agency were having lunch. As with the gatherings at the other *baracas*, although the guests of the luncheon knew many of the town’s residents and would occasionally greet them, they stayed slightly separate from, yet visible to, everyone else. On a smaller scale than the more established elite, they too were demonstrating their status and showing how far they had come in the world. This was displayed through certain forms of consumption as well, the plentiful food at the lunch, the cars everyone drove to it, and the imported beer and whisky they were drinking. As one of the guests said to me when we ran out of Heineken and had to switch to 2M, a national Mozambican beer, “It seems we have been exiled from the middle classes and now have to live like everyone else”.

Many of the objections the urban middle classes make towards elites concern the decline in moral standards that has occurred since the early days of independence. That people feel outraged about a perceived increase in corruption is undoubtedly
true, but on the level of practice it seems middle class urbanites are equally worried about being specifically excluded from new wealth, regardless of the prevailing morality. For many members of the urban middle classes, the transition has brought a modest level of prosperity, one that is displayed to the wider population in a manner very similar to the way elites display their new-found wealth. Yet it has also highlighted their relative level of deprivation in comparison to elites and has brought increasing insecurity. The fact that the widely touted “opening” of society has actually increased the wealth and power of their former socialist rulers, now with the assistance of new groups of international backers, strikes many as a sinister perversion of what was supposed to happen under democratisation. As the next section will examine, a common discourse used by the urban middle classes to explain the changes that have occurred in Mozambique since the fall of socialism is the discourse of conspiracy.

5.6 Conspiracy

In a recent edited volume, Harry West and Todd Sanders (2003) have noted that, although calls for governmental transparency are gaining strength internationally, this has been accompanied by the increasing visibility of popular conspiracy theories. According to the authors of this volume, the use of the word transparency by government planners and international agencies derives from a particular view of “beneficial” modernity, yet it is one that is opaque and strange to many people across the world. Therefore conspiracy theories become a way to seek to discover the “real truth” by uncovering the pervasive conspiracies that exist behind the façade of transparency. In this way the disquiet about a modernity beyond the control of many is tamed.

… modernity is experienced by many people as a fragmented, contradictory, and disquieting process that produces untenable situations and unfulfilled desires and that power is, in the modern world, perceived by many to be something that lies beyond their grasp. Modernity, paradoxically, generates the very opacities of power that it claims to obviate. Rather than simply resist power, however, the peoples considered in this volume seek to reveal and to steer the hidden forces that they believe animate their world, to explore the nuances of power and to take advantage of its ambivalence (Sanders and West 2003: 16).
In this volume many bewildering paradoxes and stunning inequalities that have appeared throughout the world are explained under neo-liberal transparency by references to “occult economies”. Thus, people in the southern Nigerian city of Owerri connect the growing wealth of the capitalist elite in an era of structural adjustment and “austerity” to the ritual murders of children and their use in magical practises (Bastian 2003). In northern Mozambique, residents of the Mueda plateau interpret the process of voter registration and use of identity cards for the first multiparty elections through the lens of their own experiences with the liberation struggle and its connections to the older idiom of witchcraft (West 2003). As observed by Geschiere (1997) the logic of neo-liberal capitalism can dovetail neatly with the logic of witchcraft in sub-Saharan Africa.

During my fieldwork Maputo was rife with conspiracy theories, yet few dealt overtly with the supernatural. Hellinger (2003) found that conspiracy theories in the contemporary United States often highlighted popular fears of the growing difference between the foundational ideals of the Republic and its role as an expansionist imperial power. The conspiracy theories I heard, like those discussed by Hellinger, tended to highlight the growing difference between the foundational ideals of nationalist modernity and the current practise of power. Conspiracy theories seemed to be a popular way of explaining and relating to the power of elite social networks that excluded the majority of the population and thus appeared mysterious. Yet there was a clear difference, even among the privileged of Maputo that I knew best. The conspiracy theories popular among members of the urban middle classes expressed less anxiety about their restricted entrance into modernity than about the possibility of regressing from the modernity they had already achieved.

Many conspiracy theories were popular among elites as well. I spent hours having discussions about who really killed Princess Diana and the likelihood of CIA involvement with the attacks of the 11th of September. Some elites also worried about the nature of Mozambican capitalism. I was told more then once by elite friends that Mozambique had a “savage or gangster capitalism” and one man mentioned to me that the country had managed to regress to a form of capitalism found in Chicago during the time of Al Capone. Yet many elites, interested though they were in these “international conspiracies”, were often far more equivocal about popular local conspiracy theories.
The most popular local conspiracy theories I encountered during fieldwork seemed to involve the decline of the earlier socialist morality. One dealt with the death of Samora Machel. It has long been assumed, and most likely correctly, that the apartheid State of South Africa engineered Samora Machel’s plane crash in 1986.\textsuperscript{77} In Mozambique the involvement of South Africa was taken as a given; yet many middle class urbanites frequently speculated to me that the South Africans had not acted alone. I was often told that Samora Machel had planned to engage in a massive party purge and weed out the corrupt elements. According to this story, these members of Frelimo, who occupy high offices today, then gave the South Africans Machel’s flight plans, thus facilitating his demise.

Another major theory involved the death of General Mabote. He was accused of planning a coup against the Frelimo leadership to stop the transition to multiparty capitalism. His subsequent trial was the first televised trial in Mozambique. He was eventually acquitted due to lack of evidence, but died a few years later in a swimming accident while on holiday in the beach town of Bilene to the north of Maputo. Once again many middle class Mozambicans assured me that his death was no accident, but a cleverly planned assassination because he “knew too much”. Most of my elite informants tended to be sceptical of these theories, but they held an enduring fascination on the ground.

But the main topic of this section of the chapter is one of the more divisive local conspiracy theories that erupted during my fieldwork, of interest to elites and non-elites alike. It involved the assassination of a local journalist, Carlos Cardoso, and the subsequent trial. This trial, like the other examples, symbolised for many members of the urban middle classes both the “hidden evil” at the centre of elite social networks and the possible regression of modernity as the state no longer appeared to be run on “rationalist” principles, but by Byzantine conspiracies.

Carlos Cardoso had been one of the senior managers of the Mozambican State News agency during the socialist period. Although he came from a wealthy white Mozambican/Portuguese family and had studied abroad during the late colonial period, he was a committed socialist and quickly returned to Mozambique upon independence (Fauvet and Mosse 2003). While he had occasional confrontations with the Frelimo government, he cultivated ties with the more hard-line socialist wing and

\textsuperscript{77} A former South African general in the armed forces has testified to this effect at the hearings held by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa (AIM 73 2003).
was a strong supporter of Samora Machel. After Samora’s death and the transition to capitalism, Cardoso became increasingly critical of government policy, which he felt primarily benefited the wealthy. He left the state-run news agency and formed two independent papers, *Mediafax* and later the *Metical*. Although these papers were distributed by fax, they became very influential beyond their limited circulation of a couple of hundred, especially among the urban middle classes and elites. Cardoso began advocating economic nationalism, as he felt the revolutionary elite was selling the country out from beneath the feet of its citizens (Fauvet and Mosse 2003). He also began aggressively to report cases of corruption, especially bank scandals and allegations of money laundering during the real estate boom in Maputo of the 1990s.  

On November 22nd, 2000, Cardoso was assassinated while being driven home from work. Although the government was initially reluctant to pursue the case, their hand was forced by mounting pressure, both internal and international. Six people were eventually arrested, and the murder was blamed on the Satars, a prominent Indian family with alleged mafia ties, who were involved with embezzling funds from one of the banks Cardoso was investigating. All six defendants were found guilty and three received sentences of 28 years in prison. During the trial one of the accused claimed they were acting on the behalf of Nyimpine Chissano, the son of the then president. Nyimpine had been employed by one of the banks in question as a consultant when its assets disappeared and he was also rumoured to have made immense, but illegal, profits in the real estate boom. Nyimpine was called to testify, but as yet no charges have been filed against him.  

Cardoso was not the only well-respected Mozambican to be assassinated in connection with the widespread banking scandals. A senior officer at *Banco Austral* named Siba-Siba had been killed after he published the names of 1,500 people who refused to pay back longstanding loans. Many of the names were of prominent elite families. The Cardoso case was different though. In addition to the public outrage his death caused within Mozambique, he was white, well-connected both internationally and to members of the Frelimo government, and his wife was Danish and involved with Danish aid to Mozambique. The government was under intense

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78 When major banks were privatised, assets worth millions of pounds were embezzled; the BCM (Commercial Bank of Mozambique) and *Banco Austral* (Southern Bank) were two of the worst cases.  
79 Siba-Siba’s case came under investigation after the Cardoso trial and was going trial towards the end of my fieldwork. I am unaware of the final result.  
80 Denmark is one of Mozambique’s major donors.
pressure by the international community to deal with the case in a manner that
demonstrated the donor’s goals of “good governance” and transparency. Accordingly
the trial became the second ever televised trial in Mozambique’s history.  
Internationally this had the desired effect, and that year Mozambique was awarded
more foreign aid from the World Bank than they had requested, effectively shoring up
the losses from the bank scandal (Hanlon 2003). Domestically however, outside the
ranks of the elites at least, it sparked ever more speculation of a wide-ranging
conspiracy.

The trial was electrifying. Throughout its duration one could not enter a shop
without seeing all of the staff and the customers huddled by the radio listening to its
progress. Talk in every taxi or bus concerned the possible fate of the filho de galo
(son of the rooster, referring to Nyimpine Chissano). My elite informants would rush
home during their lunch hour to watch the trial on TV. Many middle class informants
took the day off when Nyimpine was first called before the court and invited friends
and family over to watch the unfolding spectacle. I was present at a friend’s home and
I watched how the audience initially took great joy in watching the heavyset young
man in a designer suit, who was rumoured to be wealthy beyond their wildest dreams,
uncomfortably mumble answers to the judge’s questions. They had finally seen the
epitome of the “arrogance” of the elites’ new wealth and its repudiation of the former
socialist goals of nationalist modernity publicly humbled. For a brief time it appeared
that the social networks at the heart of the state had been defeated and their power
brought out “into the open”. The owner of the house delightedly told me a story about
Nyimpine being forced to leave a shop because the other patrons started loudly
jeering when he arrived.

Yet as the trial progressed and it became apparent that Nyimpine would
survive his encounter with the law with his wealth intact, this joy turned to
resentment. Nyimpine had long had a bad reputation and was cast in popular
imagination as a gangster and a drug smuggler. As the trial continued, the stories
about Nyimpine became increasingly elaborate. Middle-class informants would tell

81 The first was the treason trial of General Mabote.
82 This was also due to irregularities that occurred during the trial. The man accused of actually
planning the murder, Anabalzinho, escaped from prison when someone forgot to lock all three of the
locks on his cell door. He then fled the country. Many felt he was the link between Nyimpine and the
Satar family. He was sentenced in absentia, but was captured in South Africa the day before the
sentences were confirmed. He was re-arrested, but did not give testimony. He then escaped from prison
again and was recently recaptured in Canada.
me how Nyimpine had threatened them with a gun, beaten up local police, tried to coerce women to have sex with him by the power of his family name, and how he had been shot in the leg by the presidential security detail when he drew a gun and tried to attack his father in a fit of rage. While some middle-class informants would insist that the son had been doing the father’s dirty work, most of the overall blame fell upon Nyimpine’s mother, Marcelina Chissano. She had an even worse reputation than her son and was thought to be thoroughly venal and corrupt. She was seen as the shadowy mastermind behind many of the scandals. The stories began to take on all the elements of a Jacobean drama, with corruption, nepotism, brutality, murder, a scheming mother and a son who raises his hand in anger towards his father. It was the antithesis of what modernity was supposed to bring. Many middle-class informants were convinced that the results of the trial were flawed and those truly responsible had managed to avoid justice because of their political contacts.

Many (but not all) of my friends among the independence elite, however, perceived the situation very differently. Although few would rally to the defence of Marcelina Chissano, her reputation among many elite circles being only slightly better than in the popular imagination, most felt Nyimpine was innocent. Many of them knew Nyimpine personally. They stated that he was arrogant and this did not help his public image, but he was not a murderous drug dealing Mafioso, simply a successful, if sometimes questionable, businessman whose accomplishments had aroused jealousy. The elites I spoke with felt Nyimpine had been accused as part of an effort to misdirect blame and attention away from the guilty and that he was being made a scapegoat because he came from a powerful family. When I mentioned the other stories I had heard involving his various alleged acts of misconduct, most simply rolled their eyes. I was told that these stories came not from people who actually knew him, but from hangers-on: such stories were said to be simply expressions of jealousy because he is successful and they are not. While many of my elite friends, both independence and revolutionary, said there were problems with the trial and there are mafia connections with the government, this is the result of individual corruption and not part of a wide-ranging conspiracy. The majority felt that justice was done and those responsible had been sent to prison.

The divergence between elite and the middle class interpretation of this trial fits within the wider framework of the changes that have happened in the transition from socialism to multiparty capitalism. What elites see as jealousy from those who
begrudge them their success, the middle classes see as a conspiracy that explains why wealth and power are still concentrated in the same hands, the hands of those who once promised a form of modernity that would bring prosperity and equality to everyone. Yet the reason conspiracy theories have not turned into action is because there is not really all that much that can be done. The revolutionary elite that once relied on the middle classes has far stronger backers now and few harbour any illusions that the opposition would be any better. Many of the urban middle classes think it may be worse. This is not to say that elites need no longer concern themselves with securing internal legitimacy. The numerous scandals that surrounded President Chissano did hurt him politically and lost him party support in a bid for the continuation of his presidency (Hanlon, personal communication). In his inaugural speech in 2005, the new President, Armando Guebuza, promised to put an end to the spirit of *deixa andar* (let it go, let it roll, a phrase that refers to Chissano’s perceived permissive attitude towards corruption and the misuse of power), in a bid to win back support from the disaffected (ibid). Yet what the conflicting attitudes towards the Cardoso case demonstrate is that while securing internal legitimacy is important, it is secondary to securing external legitimacy.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed one of the central paradoxes of the democratic project in Mozambique: that the process of democratisation has left people feeling that they have become disenfranchised and that, despite the social closeness between the elite and the middle classes where the differences between the two are measured more by gradients of wealth and the power of their respective social networks rather than overall difference, the elite currently have less need to rely on them than previously. This analysis is accurate in as much as democracy in Mozambique was introduced less to legitimise the government with the people as to legitimate it with the “international community” and end the civil war. Unlike Chabal and Daloz’s conceptions of power in Africa, in which elites derive internal legitimacy through patrimonial networks, for the urban middle classes in Maputo at least, I have demonstrated that while the ideals elites are supposed to embody remains legitimate, the elites themselves, through their accumulation of “illegitimate” wealth, appear less so.
Although Mozambican society has supposedly experienced an “opening” since the transition to democratic capitalism, many members of the urban middle classes feel that they are being excluded from new opportunities because they lack the social connections to break into the existing elite. While urbanites frequently decry the repudiation of the former discourse of equality in favour of a new discourse that places a premium on the acquisition of wealth and individual success, it seems that the middle classes are in the process of internalising these values as well. The dissonance between the stated rhetoric of the new political order (which promises that all can participate) and the perceived reality (that is characterised by elite monopolisation of opportunity) is widely recognised, if differently explained by elites and non-elites. For the middle classes this dissonance between rhetoric and reality is often explained with the language of conspiracy, with the Carlos Cardoso affair appearing as the epitome of everything that has gone wrong with the transition. For elites, the conspiracy theories that have arisen from this case show a very different story, one characterised by the jealousy of those who have not managed to achieve the same degree of success in a new political and economic environment. What the case also symbolises is a worry, shared by elites and the urban middle classes but to differing degrees, that the current form of modernity espoused by elites may actually mask a regression to a form of “primitive” accumulation. The following chapter examines another expression of elite modernity concerning marriage and intimate relationships. This chapter also focuses on how shared ideals and social backgrounds can connect the urban middle classes and elites while differing levels of wealth and social status can create new barriers.
Chapter Six.

Gender, Intimacy and Power

The emancipation of women is not an act of charity, the result of a humanitarian or compassionate attitude. The liberation of women is a fundamental necessity of the revolution, the guarantee of its continuity and the precondition of its victory. The main objective of the revolution is to destroy the system of exploitation and build a new society which releases the potential of human beings, reconciling them with labour and with nature. This is the context within which the question of women’s emancipation arises (Samora Machel, quoted in Newitt 1995: 548).

6.1 Introduction

As was often the case, after my interview with Olga I was invited to have lunch with her family. Olga suffers from a progressive bone disease that leaves her housebound. I had known Olga for quite some time during my fieldwork and I would often visit just for a chat, in addition to interviews and the collection of a life history. Olga and her family are of Portuguese descent. She was raised in Lourenço Marques (Maputo) by her mother who worked as a nurse. Her father had left the family when she was a small child. During the 1960s while Olga attended university in Lourenço Marques she became radicalised, following the example of the 1968 May Rebellion in France. She and her then future husband, Sergio, joined leftwing student groups, who sided with Frelimo in advocating independence for Mozambique. Although her mother strongly opposed her political views, Olga continued her involvement with leftwing groups until she and Sergio came to the attention of PIDE and were forced to flee the country to avoid arrest. They settled in Belgium and Olga began to work for a network of African independence organisations that put them in touch with Frelimo. They joined the party and left for Frelimo’s headquarters in Tanzania to participate in the liberation struggle. Because of their comparatively high levels of education they were made teachers at the party school located in a Frelimo base camp near the Mozambican border. After independence they were made the headmasters of another party school in Nampula before eventually being transferred to direct the Frelimo School in East Germany. Upon their return Olga and her husband worked at the Ministry of education, but Olga’s disease forced her to take early retirement.

I enjoyed talking to Olga and her family; unlike many people Olga always made time for interviews. As she is currently studying anthropology at UEM she is
sympathetic to fledgling fieldworkers. I also think the interviews also helped her pass the time. Although Olga and her family are very well-off by Mozambican standards (they have a large apartment with servants and can afford to send both their children to university while allowing their eldest son to indulge in his hobby, sailing) and have strong political connections, they are not in the current top ranks of the revolutionary elite. They belong to the “old socialist” wing of the party and both Olga and Sergio are increasingly nervous about the capitalist direction that Mozambique has taken since 1991.

Like many in Maputo, the entire family would often take advantage of the generous lunch siesta and come home and eat together. The empregadas (maids) would spend much of the morning preparing the lunchtime meal. During one lunch that I attended the family began to argue about a recent scandal involving the Minister of Education, Sergio’s boss. The Minister had been implicated in stealing money from an NGO scholarship fund and using the money to send his children to private schools in Switzerland. The children began attacking the perceived corrupt practices of the government in general and the Minister of Education in particular. Olga stayed silent, but Sergio began, half-heartedly, defending his Minister, which caused his children to laugh at him. The eldest son remarked bitterly: “Come on Dad, you know he did it, they always do, but you always defend them. Samora is dead and things have changed. Why do you defend them? You know what they are like now”. Sergio took offence to this and stated: “Yes, I defend them; look at what they have done for this country!” Sergio paused for a minute, trying to think of a policy enacted by the government that he supported and was still in practice after the fall of socialism. Finally he said: “The emancipation of women! That is what Frelimo has done. I will continue to support the party that has accomplished that in this country”!

As both the quote by Samora Machel and Sergio’s comments show, the role of women in society has long been a major concern for the Frelimo party leadership and the revolutionary elite in general. Currently Frelimo reserves one third of its parliamentary seats for female delegates and has recently appointed a female Prime Minister, the highest-ranking woman in Mozambique’s history (Sheldon 2002). While these are important milestones, when Frelimo took power their concern went beyond simply empowering women to vote and hold political office. According to the party, the oppression of women was symptomatic of the wider “feudal” character of Mozambican society and the oppression of women was part and parcel of the
oppression all Mozambicans suffered (Sheldon 2002). In the revolutionary elite’s view this oppression was deeply rooted within Mozambican society, stemming, in part, from the brutality of Portuguese colonialism and the arbitrary power of “traditional chiefs” who, in practise were often appointed by the Portuguese. Yet this idea of oppression also went beyond the political realm. The revolutionary elite felt that Mozambicans were socialised to accept arbitrary authority both because of colonialism and due to the “backwards” nature of the family that supposedly made the patriarch all-powerful within his limited domain (Sheldon 2002: 131-135). It was these “backwards” attitudes shared by the population at large which had to be overcome for the creation of a modern society epitomised by the (unintentionally ironic) “Novo Homem”. While the emancipation of women was seen as a social necessity, it was because it served as a crucial part of the revolutionary elite’s wider project of modernity.

After coming to power in 1975, Frelimo attacked polygyny and lobolo (bride wealth) as distasteful remnants of the old society. They argued that these practises relegated women to mere property, like goods that could be sold at a shop. For society to advance and for the creation of an industrial state, the party leadership argued that these attitudes would have to be overcome and abolished and women must be free to enter the economy at all levels. Shortly after independence the party took steps to try and enforce their ideal of gender equality on the nation. Polygamous men were banned from party membership and the practise of lobolo was officially outlawed (although it continued to be widely practised). The party also introduced legislation that was intended to address the plight of women and make them equal under the law. Furthermore, efforts were made to re-educate the population and create a wider understanding of the new role of women in a socialist society (Sheldon 2002; West 2001). The steps taken by Frelimo to try and redefine the role of women in society after independence were similar to many measures taken throughout the socialist world (Molyneux 1981; Sheldon 2002). Moore (1988. cf.) demonstrates through case studies in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba that the liberation of women was one of the major objectives common to all of these revolutionary parties. Although, as in the case of Mozambique and to a lesser extent, Tanzania, the liberation of women was not seen as a goal in itself, but as part of the wider objective of transforming societies in general. Legal provisions to create a state of equality between women and men and communist/socialist parties’ efforts to change the family structure were often
constrained by patriarchal attitudes of many (male) members of the party leadership and; as women’s liberation was part of a broader goal, it was often subsumed in importance to wider social objectives (Mbilinyi 1972; Moore 1988; Sheldon 2002). Yet, despite the limits that communist/socialist parties placed on feminist agendas, it has been widely observed that the role of women in society generally increased and communist/socialist parties generally made efforts to reform some of the most blatant expressions of patriarchy (Gal and Kligman 2000; Rosemblatt 2000).

As with the case studies provided by Moore (1988), while the emancipation of women (and eventually society in general) was the stated goal of Frelimo, the primarily male, former *assimilado*, urban, mission-educated party leadership had specific ideas as to what this would mean in practise. While the “backwards” ideas related to gender, intimacy, marriage and family were attacked by the revolutionary elite, the discourse they promoted, publicly at least, had similarities to the conventional model that had been espoused by the Portuguese upper-class and the mission schools, although it was based on legal equality for women. Prostitution was deemed a decadent and bourgeoisie crime and sexual relationships outside of marriage were officially frowned on by the party, and according to Sergio, discovery could lead to punishment (Hall and Young 1997). If a couple was living together or sexual relations resulted in pregnancy, Frelimo would often force the responsible parties to marry, especially if one of the people was a high-ranking member of Frelimo. This was often the explanation given for the presumed marital troubles of the then president, Joaquim Chissano, whose supposedly turbulent family life had become the stuff of legend in Maputo. My friend Sergio had also been forced by the party to marry Olga. When they fled Mozambique they had been in a committed relationship, but Sergio had no desire to marry as he felt the institution was bourgeois. Upon joining the party he found that he and Olga’s relationship was considered unorthodox and they were told to remedy that. Although they did not know him very well, Marcelino Dos Santos, the Vice-President of Frelimo, stood in as his godfather during the ceremony, demonstrating the importance that the party attached to the regulation of its members intimate lives. Upon returning to Mozambique after the liberation struggle, Sergio and Olga found that their marriage documents had been lost and they were forced to marry again. Sergio had always intended to stay in a committed relationship with Olga; still he often joked that he was the only man he knew of that had been forced to marry the same woman twice. The revolutionary elite felt that the
role of women in society and the “modernisation” of the role of women and of the relationships between men and women was a central plank of the revolution. But the emancipation was not seen as a question of individual liberties or as a matter for specific individuals. It was seen by the revolutionary elite as a societal need and these processes occurred simultaneously as the leadership of Frelimo felt the compulsion to ever more closely regulate the intimate lives of its members and bind high-ranking Frelimo officials more tightly together in what was known as the “ideological family” (personal communication Harry West).

Anthony Giddens (1992) argues, somewhat controversially, that modernity brings about a revolution in romantic intimacy that is taking place throughout the world. The “modern” form of intimacy, according to Giddens, is based on a self-reflexive personhood that holds itself as the primary reference, not the wider social group. It is in fact a “plastic sexuality” that is severed from its age-old integration with reproduction and kinship and it depends on being mutually fulfilling to the self to survive. In simple terms Giddens states that under modernity relationships are now based on social and emotional equality and are entered into for their own sake, and can be ended by either partner at will. As with many who speak of the changes brought about by modernity, the universalism of the tone is contradicted by the fact that most of the examples used tend to be drawn from the generic and idealised experiences of the western middle and upper-middle classes. Predictably Giddens has drawn criticism from his universalising tendencies. Kapila (2004) and Parry (2001) have demonstrated that in India ideas of intimacy are deeply connected with caste and class. Local ideas of modernity, in conjunction with strong programmes of state intervention have created an ideal that modern relationships are not based on the idea of free de-coupling, but on the idea of permanence (Kapila 2004). In west Africa, Oppong (1981) observed that among Ghanian civil servants in Accra, entrance into the state economy and the adoption of “modern” forms of marriage did not destroy older forms of kin-based social organisation so much as reform them. As the examples above show, “modernity” is a complicated process that can take different forms in various societies. While it is undoubtedly true that many people throughout the world feel that processes often known as “modernisation” bring about fundamental changes in romantic intimacy and of the relationships between men, women and the wider society, generic descriptions of what these changes are will often be misleading at best if not grounded in specific social settings.
This chapter examines the often-contradictory effects of the party’s emancipation of women and Frelimo’s project of modernity on romantic intimacy and family structure among the Mozambican national elite. Like Giddens, the revolutionary elite also assumed that nationalist modernity and socialism would bring about a dramatic change, not only in the role of women, but also in the relationships both between men and women and between men, women and their wider families (Sheldon 2002). Many members of the revolutionary elite came from assimilado backgrounds and as shown in previous chapters, assimilação as a legal concept carried certain restrictions of the types of family relationships that would be allowed. Assimilados were not allowed to be polygamous (although some people did manage to circumvent these restrictions) and many were educated at mission schools. The Frelimo leadership spoke the language of nationalist modernity and socialism and viewed the religious establishment with suspicion, but elements of many of the revolutionary elite’s early Christian education helped to shape their later worldview. In many ways Christianity served as an initial entry into modernity for the colonial elite, and many of the customs their descendants, the revolutionary elite, later attacked were also previously condemned by the Church. Familiarity with elements of Christian tradition (both Protestant and Catholic) was common among the urban petty bourgeoisie of the south during the colonial period. This helped to bind the party leadership with many members of the urban middle classes, as Frelimo’s plans to transform intimate and family life held aspects in common with Christian teachings. The revolutionary elite felt that to build a new society it was essential to “modernise” gender and family relationships in Mozambique. Due to their ideological stance and the residual influence of Christianity, reformed gender and family relations were to be more in line with what was thought to occur in the “west”. Yet “modern” relationships for the revolutionary elite were to be very different than the model described by Giddens. The new form of family and romantic intimacy was not to be based on its ability to be fulfilling solely to the self, but to society. Initially personal choice was of limited ideological importance and despite the gradual “opening” of society since the fall of socialism; romantic intimacy and family structure have remained a key factor in the elite consolidation. Even under democratic capitalism individual fulfilment can often be a secondary consideration.

Mann’s (1985) study of Nigerian elites in the early colonial period demonstrated that “Christian” forms of marriage and family structure became
emblematic with a specific section of the indigenous elite. This was a small group whose power was not based primarily in traditional structures, but whose status grew in relation to the new opportunities provided by contact with the British. This elite included some successful traders, but the majority of its (male) members filled the growing need for professionals and the civil service, before there were a sufficient number of whites to fill these occupations. The Nigerian elite adopted western “Christian” marriages as an outward symbol of their status, but also because monogamous marriages conserved resources for the nuclear family unit and more could be invested into the educational needs and future positions of the children of these unions. Finally elite women generally advocated for this form of marriage as it both increased their status and guaranteed their place and that of their children could not usurped by a new wife. Similar marriage patterns have been observed amongst post-colonial elites in Sierra Leone and Ghana, both for the emphasis of status and the consolidation of resources (Cohen 1981; Oppong 1981). Yet despite the efforts among elites to consolidate resources in the nuclear family unit, there is a continuing tendency for elite men to form outside liaisons or “outside wives” as they are known in east Africa. While the nuclear family unit is legally recognised, the domestic primacy of elite women still faces threats (Karanja 1987; Mann 1985; Obbo 1987; Oppong 1981).

The Frelimo-based national elite, although initially radically socialist, anti-religious and egalitarian, has also undergone a period of domestic elite consolidation and has also had similar contradictory effects. While women were to be emancipated, the process was conceived and decided on by a ruling, predominantly male elite and undertaken in a “top-down” manner. In doing so the new legal framework for women followed the social vision of the party leadership. Families were not to be abolished, but instead, based upon a stable and monogamous husband and wife pair which would be the base of society. In reality the party never had sufficient power to enforce their views on the country in general and changing forms of marriage and romantic intimacy were concentrated among the revolutionary elite and the urban middle classes.

Yet as these changing patterns became characteristic of elites and ever more concerned with elite consolidation, it became harder to distinguish elites from the urban middle classes. These two groups were drawn closer together threatening the unity of elites, as observed by Robertson: “Reproduction poses the most serious threat
to the maintenance of class power” (1991: 100). Like the example of the “power elite” described by Mills (1956) in the introduction of this thesis, growing social stratification has been accompanied by attempts by elites to police their boundaries and maintain endogamy. This chapter examines the efforts of elites to harness the changing role of women to ongoing processes of class consolidation through endogamy thereby surviving the “dangers of reproduction” that threaten to dilute scarce resources. Yet, as with the other African examples mentioned above, these processes of elite consolidation are never total, and elites in Mozambique have never achieved the levels of centralisation of the “power elite”. Although elite endogamy is broadly successful, their social closeness to the urban middle classes makes it more difficult to keep the groups separate. The chapter describes elite attempts to draw distinctions between themselves and others and how these social pressures are circumvented. Following the lead of Moore I examine both: “…how individuals become engendered subjects and come to organise their social practices in a way as to reproduce dominant categories, discourses and practices” (1994: 51) and how individuals try to manoeuvre around dominant social categories. I argue that while overall class barriers between elites and the urban middle classes may be hardening, romantic attachments do allow these barriers to be transcended on an individual level without endangering the system of stratification as a whole. Unlike the model proposed by Giddens, the form of modernity that has taken effect after Frelimo came to power has left romantic intimacy a question of concern not just at an individual level, but still deeply intertwined with questions of reproduction and kin. The social changes that followed the liberation struggle and that have gathered strength since the fall of socialism make it harder for elite families to exercise overall parental control. This chapter draws upon information from many different sources I encountered during fieldwork, but is primarily based on the experiences of six elite families (encompassing the revolutionary and independence elites) and five middle class families in Maputo and how these groups interact with each other. The remainder of the chapter will examine the processes by describing intimacy and courtship from independence to the present day, the process of class consolidation and the relationship of the elite with the urban middle classes, and changing patterns of marriage.

6.2 Intimacy and Courtship
As shown by Sheldon (2002) in her in-depth study of women’s history in Mozambique from the late pre-colonial period to the present, in many ways intimate relationships that did not directly lead to marriage and child birth are relatively new for most of Mozambique’s population. In the view of the party leadership, intimacy historically was directly tied to social and biological reproduction and, theoretically at least, was under the control of the wider family. Frelimo described this as the “feudalism” of the family. They felt this had to be abolished so women could enter society as full citizens and no longer be traded “like goods in a shop” according to the famous phrase of Samora Machel (Sheldon 2002). Some of the roots of this desire for change can be traced to the revolutionary elite’s social background under colonialism. During the colonial period traditional practices of marriage were considered “backwards” and the state prohibited them for many elites. Yet an “ideal” marriage focused on its wider social function, the creation of a strong and stable nuclear family unit dedicated to the production of children. Therefore marriages were often too important to be left to the choice of the couple alone, and familial supervision attempted to police relations both to consolidate social class and because of possible state sanctions (Sheldon 2002). While pre-material relationships and infidelity obviously occurred (sanctions were also much weaker for men) considerable effort was often expended on being discreet. The colonial state could rescind assimilado status for “immoral” conduct or what they viewed as “backsliding” into “heathen” African customs such as polygyny. Despite the numerous differences between the urban petty bourgeois and the majority of the population, concerned parents of both groups often tightly supervised sexuality and romantic intimacy. As one older Mozambican friend explained to me, when she began her courtship with her future husband, she was always chaperoned. The most daring activity she engaged in was to have secret phone calls from her fiancé that were unmonitored by her family. As numerous other informants explained to me, courtship was often very short and led to the immediate establishment of a family.

This began to change after the revolution. The education system was expanded and more young people came into contact with one another outside of the confines of home and familial supervision. As I have previously stated, one of Frelimo’s prime concerns was the regulation of its militants’ (and by extension their families’) intimate lives, yet some of the social forces they unleashed by the revolution began to put that
goal into jeopardy. This has become gradually more pronounced since the fall of socialism and the “liberalisation” of society. Paradoxically, as the perceived need for elite consolidation has become ever greater, the social control of families has weakened in some respects. Many friends of mine spoke of frequent parties that were held by school friends and neighbours during the socialist period. Under the austerity of wartime socialism these parties were one of the principal means of recreation. They were rather tame affairs compared to the discotheques that have flourished under capitalism. Alcohol was hard to obtain and available only in limited quantities and drugs were quite rare. The parties often started quite late and the owners of the house (usually the parents) typically went to bed early, leaving the young free to interact and form potential romantic attachments with only limited supervision. This trend has continued after the fall of socialism with the growth of capitalist individualism and the revolutionary elite practice of sending their children to study abroad where they are relatively free of parental supervision. Despite the revolutionary elite’s puritan roots, public sexual relationships that do not necessarily entail long-term obligations are becoming more common. Yet their meaning is still contested and many elite families worry that these relationships could lead to more permanent liaisons. Non-permanent sexual relationships are generally known by the Portuguese verb namorar (to go out with someone, to have a girlfriend or boyfriend). There is pressure for independence elites to marry other elites (of which I will speak about more later in the chapter). But the preservation of endogamy is often very difficult in practice as there is extensive social contact between elites and the urban middle classes that can lead to romantic attachments.

Weekends among the independence elite and the urban middle classes often followed a predictable pattern in Maputo. On Fridays people would meet after work for drinks and perhaps dinner, then they would go home to rest and get ready for the night. My friends would often meet again around eleven in the evening for drinks at a bar, leaving for a disco at around midnight or one in the morning. One did not usually go home until around five in the morning. The popularity of any given disco was often fleeting and they opened and closed with great regularity. Although there were frequently changing venues, the discos themselves tended to rather similar. They were dark with flashing lights and played similar combinations of popular western dance music combined with Latin music and occasional African songs. The dance floors were usually full and surrounded by large groups of people who carefully watched
and commented on the proceedings. Women were usually dressed in their best and most revealing Brazilian fashions, while hip-hop and faux-gangster styles were the height of fashion for men, although some of the older men wore suits. The president’s sons and their entourage were usually lounging in the corner of whatever was the most fashionable club at the moment wearing white panama suits and white fedoras while smoking Cuban cigars and drinking Johnny Walker.

In a successful club, the balconies were teeming with people coming off the dance floor for more generalised flirting and to greet people. Most of the participants were well-known to each other and often connected through webs of work, school, familial and social relationships. The goal of these occasions was to relax and enjoy one’s self, but there were also frequent conflicts. Due to the perceived prevalence of adultery, couples often watched each other with a jealous eye and relationships were frequently regarded with a degree of mild paranoia. Occasionally violence would break out, usually as men accuse one another of trying to steal their girlfriends. More rarely violence would escalate and sometimes panic would ensue as one of the people involved in the fight would go to his car for his gun or knife. Less frequently women would be involved in violence, once again, usually prompted by accusations that someone had tried to steal someone else’s boyfriend. While many go to the discos to relax, dance and spend time with friends, one of the primary goals of the evenings was to form a romantic relationship.

Although elite families were concerned with maintaining elite endogamy, their (now adult) children were able to exercise a considerable degree of freedom. The types of social activities practised by the independence elite (and the urban middle classes) are displays of the cosmopolitan modernity that the independence elite is supposed to embody, which demonstrate their easy familiarity with international trends and fashions. The price of urban leisure activities was prohibitive for the vast majority of the population, but young members of the urban middle classes were able to enjoy the same facilities and take part in the same activities. The disparity in consumption patterns between the elite and the urban middle classes was often a question of degrees as opposed to overall difference. In these mixed environments it was easy to form cross-class relationships, although as this chapter will show these relationships were not always on an equal basis. As the above example illustrates the social mix can be volatile and is often characterised by mistrust.
6.3 The Invention of Social Divisions and Machismo

There is a great deal of social mixing between the elite and the urban middle classes. As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the elite and the middle class share very similar social origins, but both independence and revolutionary elites speak of the different type of behaviours that supposedly characterise each group. Young women from the independence elite would often speak of the prevalence of machismo, or more sexist and less “enlightened” attitudes towards women, which was seen as concentrated among the less wealthy who are not as cosmopolitan. As Halima and Varyna, two members of the independence elite told me, they would be reluctant to form a serious relationship with someone who had not been abroad as they would be too “provincial” and would not have been exposed to more modern forms of relations, built upon notions of equality and respect. If pressed though, young elite women would often make similar characterisations about the machismo of men belonging to the independence elite as well. This section examines how members of the independence elite continually create and re-define the social boundaries and different behaviours between these two groups, even if they do not always maintain the boundaries that they set.

In Roger Lancaster’s book, “Life is Hard” (1993) he describes machismo in Nicaragua as a stylised set of behaviours that affirms male dominance and patriarchy. According to Lancaster machismo is an ideal of male behaviour that is supposed to be characterised by an active, sexually dominant, aggressive man in contrast to the ideal of a passive and demure women. The “typical” machista is a heavy drinking, womanising, often violent man who dominates social and domestic life. In Mozambique similar patterns of behaviour are allowed for men (to a degree), although they were attacked under socialism (yet many members of the male leadership seemed to have had a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards machismo in practice), as these behaviours are often directly contradictory with the socialist ideal of destroying “feudalism” in the family. However, heavy drinking, multiple sex partners and on occasion multiple families were frequent occurrences among older male informants. Moore speaks of male violence directed towards spouses in Andean Columbia as explicable due to the prevailing set of gender relations: “…the self-representations of individual men as gendered persons included the right and the power to have extra-marital relationships as part of a definition of masculinity as
active and aggressive, and hierarchically defined in relation to femininity” (1994: 69). Men in this context often vent their frustrations at their lovers and upon their wives, because their wives are the only people explicitly under their control.

The case is slightly different for Mozambican elites who are able to exercise social power more widely than the examples cited by Moore. In addition I have no data concerning domestic violence between men and women. Yet despite these differences there are similarities with Mozambican machismo. By exercising their “privilege” to indulge in “outside” relationships, men manage to monopolise a degree of power, as they can spread resources outside of the domestic unit. Although the revolution enabled (in fact insisted) that the status of women be changed in the new society, machismo allows men to assert power independent of the wider familial and social circles where elite power is nestled. Women often state that machismo is more prevalent primarily outside of elite social circles, but in many cases this appears to be more wishful thinking, a statement of how “modern” elite males should act, rather than an actual statement of fact. This situation is compounded by the fact that many women feel at a disadvantage, as there is a common belief that women dramatically outnumber men in Maputo. I was frequently told that the ratio was seven to one. Although this statement does not withstand statistical analysis, it is widely believed. Many women I knew felt that the availability of multiple sex partners for men means that they have to make compromises or their partner could easily leave them and find someone else. Machismo in Mozambique is a site of great social tensions as it is feared to be inimical to class consolidation by breaking up marriages and spreading resources outside a tight social group. This is widely recognised and relationships with elite men are often one of the prime opportunities for material advancement for women of lower-ranking backgrounds.

The epitome of urban Mozambican machismo is o dia dos homens (the day of the men). The day of the men is not so much an official date as it is a running joke. It occurs on Fridays and is celebrated by both elites and members of the urban middle classes. The most enthusiastic participants were men in their late 20s and older who were involved in serious relationships or married, although it was observed by younger, more loosely attached men as well. As with other urban social activities, the day of the men also tended to follow a standardised pattern. Men would meet each other at a bar on Friday night and have drinks. Conversation focused on issues such as work, politics, drinking and, of course sex. Whenever I asked a man where his partner
was I would usually be given a look of contempt, often accompanied by the reply: “Ela esta na casa. Sexta-feira é o dia dos homens” (She is at home. Friday is the day of the men). This would normally draw exclamations of approval from the others present. Those present would continue with drinking and male bonding. As the night progressed men would often complain that there were no women present and suggest that the party be relocated to a disco that would have mixed company. The day of the men did not have to be spent entirely in male company; in fact meeting new women was often one of its goals. The day of the men is about stereotypically male conversations with friends, but it is also about asserting the independence that goes with the Mozambican version of machismo, something that women are usually aware of, but often unable to stop. It was more than male bonding; it was a symbol of male independence tied to a reassertion of female domesticity.

*Machismo* symbolises male power and independence (and conversely male “backwardness” as well) despite the gains from the revolution and post-socialist period, yet norms covering the behaviour of young women are also undergoing considerable cultural tension. According to most of my female friends from the independence elite, there has been a gradual and often contested relaxation of the rules covering female conduct. Currently women are able to openly talk about sex in mixed gender situations and could take the initiative in forming romantic relationships without incurring much in the way of social sanctions. These changes began in the socialist period and have increased due to the continued “liberalisation” of capitalism.

Halima, an informant in her mid-20s during fieldwork, had studied abroad for many years. She claimed that the increase in education abroad was a key factor for changing attitudes towards women.

When we came back from school we got a very bad reputation. There was a lot of gossip about us. Oh you know, the usual stuff. We learned a different lifestyle studying abroad and when we came back we did things differently. Things like clubbing, drinking, dating, smoking pot, that sort of thing. People thought we were really bad when we first came back. My father used to ask me why it was I, and not his sons who took after him. Things have calmed down now; many more people have studied abroad and come back. People are becoming more used to it, women acting independently (Field notes 5 July 2004).

As Halima’s statements demonstrate, the growth of “cosmopolitan modernity” through one of its key symbols, studying abroad, has coincided with an increased measure of freedom for young women from the independence elite. It also conveys a subtle connotation of difference. Due to the fact that she and her friends had studied
abroad their painstakingly acquired cosmopolitan modernity could only be appreciated by a select few who had comparable experiences, usually of studying abroad. As Halima says, even elites were initially shocked by new standards of behaviour. That is why Halima and her friend stated that they would be hesitant to become seriously involved with someone who had not lived abroad. Thus the idea of elite endogamy is not only reinforced by the material considerations of class position, but also by shared attitudes.

This sense of difference is evident in the ways in which different social groups view the changing standard of behaviour for young women. While young elites can lay claim to cosmopolitan sophistication, similar behaviour from women from the urban middle classes often draws harsh comments from the elder generation. One middle class woman I knew who was in her early 40s went so far as to claim that the crime of rape is now impossible because young women dress and act in such a provocative manner that any man could be excused for misreading a woman’s intentions. She had recently been at a disco with her husband and was furious that a younger woman had approached her husband and openly flirted with him, requesting drinks, right in front of her. As she told me: “I was with him, he had a ring on his finger and she did not even care”.

As with many of the divisions between the elite and the urban middle classes, the differential relationship with *machismo* exists more in theory than in practice. While elites speak of the types of behaviours that characterise the respective groups highlighting the social divisions between the cosmopolitan and liberal elites as opposed to the *machista* and materialistic middle classes, in actual practice many of the individual behaviours are the same, although the motivation behind them can differ. The difference lies primarily in the ways in which these groups can represent themselves, as either sophisticated or as unreconstructed sexists. Within these broad characterisations, many individual exceptions occur as well; but, while deeply meaningful on an individual level, exceptions do not tend to lead to an overall levelling of social difference. The following section will examine how the relationship between these two groups translates into the practise of class consolidation.

6.4 Class Consolidation
Alexander Robertson (1991) has observed that reproductive strategies are essential for the survival of upper class or elite groups and are a key factor in maintaining an elite identity and take a different form from those of the groups that they dominate.

Above all, one has to have demonstrated the capacity to reproduce within the privileged class: to endow offspring with competitive advantages and to consolidate gains from one generation to the next. Reproductive strategies are therefore of acute concern. Like any other enduring community, a ruling class gains real coherence from webs of reproductive relationships woven by strategic marriages. Class, it is often said, is a matter of “breeding”. Reproductive strategies protect class privilege; and class privileges protect the reproductive process. … Dependence on family ties – the relationships of reproduction – is a physical survival strategy for the working class, and a social survival strategy for those who dominate them (1991: 130).

In the Mozambican case, this can be seen by the reluctance demonstrated by young members of the independence elite to involve themselves with those who have not travelled abroad. In so many words this tends to restrict their relationships to other members of the independence elite. Some form of elite endogamy is not an entirely new phenomenon either. Since the colonial period there has been a tendency for elite families to “cut themselves off” from poorer kin. Part of this was a result of colonial policy as assimilado families were encouraged to disassociate themselves from “heathen” relatives for the fear of having their status rescinded (Sithole and Ingwane 1977: 5-6).

In the capitalist era this process continues on what seems to be a dual track with elite families cutting off poorer relations to focus on the nuclear family, on the one hand, and trying to form connections with other elite families of similar standing on the other, as will be demonstrated later in the chapter. Oppong (1981: 54-55) observes that, among Akan civil servants in Ghana, their privileged position in society tends to re-orient expenditure away from the matri-kin group and towards the nuclear family, although very few actually completely sever their ties with wider family groups. Parkin (1972) describes how wealthier Giriama farmers are possessed by Muslim spirits forcing them to convert to Islam, but also allowing them to distance themselves from non-Muslim family members and to stop participating in expensive ceremonies involving the redistribution of large amounts of meat and alcohol, which allows them to concentrate their resources among the nuclear family. In Zambia, Long (1968) noted a similar tendency among those who became Jehovah’s Witnesses, once again allowing these groups to stop participating in communal ceremonies and focus
on the nuclear family unit. In Mozambique, connections with the Frelimo party and elite status seems to have taken the place of religious affiliation and the process appears more extensive than the Ghanian case, most likely due to its greater historical depth. While there are many deep interconnections between elites and the urban middle classes, many of these appear to be focused on the level of an individual, as will demonstrated throughout this chapter, and elite families are more socially closed. An example of this process is the family of Varyna. Her mother is currently in conflict with the much of her extended family, especially the members who are not as prosperous. Varyna’s mother argues that her nuclear family should not be responsible for supporting poorer members of the family as their resources should be concentrated on assuring the security and future prosperity of their own children. In her view she and her husband have risen to where they are through their own effort and she does not see why other members of her family cannot take responsibility and try to help themselves. She also banned her husband from supporting the poorer members of his side of the family, as they have not made good use of any previous support. While Varyna’s nuclear family maintains relatively amicable relationships with her father’s side, her mother’s side has been filled with mutual recriminations.

Although there is an increasing tendency for elite families to cut off poorer kin, this process is contested. One weapon that poorer kin have at their disposal is to cause public scandal through witchcraft accusations. The ethnography of Comaroff and Comaroff (1993, 1999) and Geschiere (1997) argue persuasively that the practise of witchcraft in contemporary Africa is an intensely modern phenomenon fuelled, in part by, the increasing social inequalities of capitalism. West (1997, 2001) demonstrated though his research in northern Mozambique that despite the “rational” basis of Frelimo’s modernist agenda, many Mozambicans feel that witchcraft (the “sorcery of destruction”) remains a potent force during both socialism and capitalism as changing living conditions result in greater conflict and jealousy while traditional sanctions have decreased. Many of my informants agree with West’s analysis, even if they disbelieve in the efficacy of sorcery. I often heard my informants express concern that jealous subordinates who coveted their positions at work would bewitch them. Not only is there a danger of being bewitched, but also being accused of witchcraft is also embarrassing. Going back to the example of Varyna’s family, after a

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83 Although many claimed that did not believe in witchcraft they also claimed that witchcraft practices often included poison, which they felt was a dangerous threat.
series of family tragedies, Varyna’s maternal aunt accused her father (who was living with Varyna’s mother) and Varyna’s mother of using sorcery to kill various family members in return for their wealth. This caused an open schism in the family between those who felt that both the accusations and witchcraft itself was completely unfounded and beyond the realm of believability and those who backed Varyna’s maternal aunt. There is almost no contact between the two sides and Varyna’s mother found the public scandal deeply embarrassing. In addition to the charge of murder, they found the idea of witchcraft upsetting. Although Comaroff and Comaroff and Geschiere have spoken about the modernity of witchcraft, many Mozambican elites view it as the epitome of backwardness. Not only was Varyna’s mother publicly accused of murdering family members, but she also viewed it as an ideological attack against the very modernity the elite is supposed to embody.

While elites have been relatively successful (even if they face resistance) at consolidating themselves by linking their families and distancing themselves from poorer kin, the second strategy, the elite ideal of endogamy, is in practice extremely complex and often contradictory. As demonstrated by Oppong (1981) and Cohen (1981) post-colonial bureaucratic elites spent much time and attention trying to maintain endogamous relationships amongst themselves, although endogamy was never complete. There is a strong discourse of endogamy among the Mozambican elites as well, but this discourse is continually challenged by the social closeness of the elite and urban middle classes. This results in a confused situation where actions on the ground do not always resemble stated intentions. As mentioned earlier in this chapter there was a frequent complaint among young elite women that there was a lack of men in Maputo. After further observation it often seemed that it was not an absolute lack of men that was the problem, but a lack of “suitable” men. Class standing is a key factor in determining who is a suitable sexual partner, although there are differences between elite men and women and, despite the rhetoric of the importance of class, it is not always acted upon. Generally men are allowed more leverage in cross-class relationships with women, although marriage is often difficult for men as well. For many of the young elite men I knew, relationships with women of lower social standing were often more casual. In the case of serious liaisons, these cross group relationships, women of lower social standing often become “outside” wives. “Outside” wives may share their life with their partner and have children with them, but are often denied legal recognition. This will be discussed further later in the
chapter. Elite families can view cross-group relationships among women with more concern. There is the ever-present danger of a woman becoming pregnant, leading to the possibility of long-term ties between an elite family and a poorer one.

Even though cross-group relationships occur, they can result in confusion and inter-familial conflict. Theoretically romantic relationships should occur between the tightly-knit Mozambican national elite. Yet in many cases young elites had known each other since they were children, and as friends explained to me, this can create a sense of boredom. “You see it’s just so nice to see a new face, someone you have not known all your life”. While various ideas of being “modern” have encouraged changing ideas on romantic relationships, these processes have occurred in a climate of political instability. The end of the civil war and the fall of socialism have not dislodged the revolutionary elite from power, but have made their internal power base more vulnerable in some ways. Intermarriage remains a key factor in increasing social cohesion among the elite and concentrating resources within this small group, but these social networks are not impenetrable.

An example of these contradictory processes of exclusion and integration is Varyna, a young woman from the independence elite in her mid-20s. Towards the end of my fieldwork she formed a romantic relationship with a mulatto man from a middle-class background. He worked as a barman and had aspirations to become an artist. One day over coffee she mentioned to me that she was very nervous about introducing him to her parents, although she usually described her parents as very “modern” and liberal. When I asked why her parents might disapprove of her new relationship, Varyna said it was quite obvious. He had dreadlocks; he worked as a barman and he had never finished high school. She was worried as to what her parents would think and felt that they would be deeply disappointed in her. I was somewhat surprised; her father had been a soldier in a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary army. He had fought for equality. Varyna’s mother had also been a supporter of Frelimo during the liberation struggle. It seemed disconcerting that he could have become so class-conscious in such a short period of time. When I mentioned this Varyna simply looked bemused and replied: “He fought to develop this country; he did not fight for equality.” She explained that her parents’ experiences are what made them so class-conscious today.

84 This was similar to the former Soviet Union where intermarriage among the children of the Politbureau and high-ranking party officials was common (Montefiore 2003).
They had to fight to get where they are today. They have worked really hard to make sure that their children have a nice life and a good education. They will not sit still and watch me take a step backwards for some guy with dreadlocks and no education, and worse still, no real plans to fix the situation. They would think he is not serious. I mean what kind of life would I have (Field notes 7-8 January 2004)?

These class-based ideals were not simply imposed from above. Varyna had internalised them as well, although she was not directly acting upon them. She did finally introduce him to her parents, who, if uncomfortable about him, did their best not to show it. Varyna on the other hand continually pressured him to improve his life, cut his hair, and return to school. She wanted him to “make something” of himself and improve his social standing. In many ways Varyna was employing a dual strategy for trying to maintain the relationship she wanted while transforming her partner into someone more “suitable” at the same time. This strategy was not entirely successful and the relationship eventually ended badly and she left him. As with Varyna, many from the independence elite expressed concerns about jobs and the future prospects of their respective partners. Young women from the independence elite would often express reservations about a possible relationship if they felt that they would have to bear a disproportionate share of the economic burden. As I heard some friends explain to a woman who was involved with a poorer man and was expecting a baby: “Listen you have to understand that you will end up supporting him and the baby that is not going to change no matter what you think. Are you really willing to do that?” Despite their advice to others, it always seemed different when they themselves were involved. Many would try to employ a similar dual strategy to that of Varyna and form relationships outside of a restricted social circle while trying to transform their partner into someone they felt would be suitable for membership within this circle. Like Varyna’s case, these strategies often bore mixed results. As one woman from the independence elite told me after a failed relationship: “The differences in background and class were just too much”. She was deeply disappointed by his suspected infidelities and because their plans to secure for him foreign schooling and start various money making ventures had come to naught. Yet these differences do not form an airtight barrier, and the woman later resumed her relationship with the same man although his overall circumstances had not changed.

While elite men had a different set of gendered expectations, they often expressed similar concerns about cross-group relationships. Many, but by no means
all, of these relationships had an explicitly material basis, which did cause some men from the independence elite concern. Given that men were expected to provide generously for the women they were involved with, one common complaint was that women used them for their money and in pursuit of goals defined by the perceived material ethos of the current era.

I once accompanied a friend from the independence elite, João, to a nightclub one Friday evening. Towards the end of the evening he had been speaking with two women before we left and as we walked out of the club João seemed annoyed. He normally drove a large white Mercedes, but it was in the shop and his alternative vehicle was an old Toyota. According to João when the women he was talking to caught sight of the car he was using they lost interest and left. He began to complain to me about how women had become materialists who are only interested in how much money one has and about what one could provide. He said the only way to be sure that someone was not using one for their money was to form relationships with the wealthy and he was glad that his fiancé came from a wealthy family so he could be assured that her interest in him was “pure”.85

The perceived greed of women was a common complaint amongst elite men, but some, especially elites who occupied the highest ranks, seemed to glory in the attention of “materialists” as it demonstrated their lofty social status. I was once introduced to the son of one of Mozambique’s highest-ranking officials at a disco. During the following conversation I noticed he was surrounded by a group of women whose attitude towards him was almost fawning, even though he barely paid them any attention. When I mentioned this, he just laughed and asked if I wanted one. While I doubt he was under any illusions as to the source of his attractiveness on this occasion, the possible materialism of his admirers did not seem to cause him much concern, at least not for the establishment of a casual relationship. If anything it his enhanced his already high social status by demonstrating that he did not have to worry about the motives of his admirers as his material base is so secure he can afford it.

Endogamy is a broadly agreed upon goal of class consolidation among elites, but in practise it is a confused and contradictory process. As demonstrated in the previous section, young elite women create social distinctions between elite and middle class men (often on extremely flimsy evidence), yet in their own personal

85 Although as this chapter will later demonstrate, even this “pure” relationship was heavily determined by familial considerations and elite consolidation.
relationships they often try to erase these distinctions by “reforming” their partners. If these efforts failed, friends would frequently explain to me that one of the major problems of the relationship are differences in class standing and the “cultural” unsuitability that these differences created. Despite these warnings though, these relationships were not uncommon and those who failed in previous efforts would often try again. While young elite men shared similar concerns, their own strategies were very different. They generally had more leeway as there was less danger of the relationship becoming permanent and for some, these casual material based relationships served as a status marker. However, they expressed unease at the situation as well and felt that permanent relationships had a greater degree of “safety” among people of similar social standing, since these relationships tended to approach equality and there was less chance that they were being used. In the neo-liberal era in Mozambique, romantic intimacy has taken on paradoxical characteristics, as ideologies of elite endogamy have been internalised to a degree, yet that does not mean they will be acted upon. The remainder of this section will now discuss the strategies employed by women of the urban middle classes regarding romantic intimacy with the elite.

While ideally both middle class and elite families disapproved of romantic relationships that were based on a material basis, there was also a degree of ambivalence among many middle class families as romantic relationships were a recognised strategy of improving material circumstances. Naema, a middle class informant who been introduced earlier, frequently complained to me about the decreasing morals of the youth and she often singled young women out for increased promiscuity. Yet at the same time she understood that some moral relativity in regards to romantic intimacy was necessary for some, especially those with few other prospects. To illustrate her point she told me about her niece, Lara, an unmarried 27-year-old woman with two children. Naema told me that while her niece was very pretty, she was not overly bright or well-educated and had few prospects of social or material advancement. Six years ago Lara was in a relationship with a wealthy man from the Indian merchant class in his late 40s who was rumoured to have mafia connections. He took care of all of Lara’s material needs. She did not work and he provided her with an apartment, food, clothing and spending money. Naema felt that her niece should marry this man and secure a decent life for herself and her children. Lara disagreed though; she did not like the amount of control her lover exercised over
her life and she wanted to be able to go to discos and associate with men her own age. The relationship later fell apart and currently Lara is involved with an older Portuguese man who once again takes care of all of her needs. As with the previous relationship, Lara does not want to marry this man and would rather go to discos and associate with men her own age. Naema is worried as her niece’s looks will eventually fade and then she will have limited prospects at best. I asked Naema if there were not strong similarities between this kind of relationship and prostitution, something to which Naema is very opposed. Naema replied that it is the same thing but then shrugged her shoulders and said: “But what else can she do? You see a good house and security for one’s self and one’s children, that is all a woman really wants”. Lara’s strategy has not been uncommon throughout Africa. Women have frequently formed romantic relationships with higher status men for social and material advancement (Karanja 1987; Obbo 1987; Mann 1985).

In Mozambique these strategies are not purely restricted to lower status groups. Women from more privileged sectors of society also engage in relationships with a strong material component. Marta is a member of the independence elite, although her family does not belong to the highest ranks of the elite. I first met her at a party when she was preparing to leave for Portugal for university studies the next day. That evening she met Marcelino, the son of a very wealthy family with strong political connections. Although he had grown up abroad, his family had returned to Mozambique and his father had accepted a high-ranking government position. Marcelino now also worked in Maputo, in the financial sector. Although Marcelino and Marta met at this party the next day Marta decided that she was in love and decided not to undertake university studies in Portugal but to stay in Maputo with Marcelino. Most of my friends viewed her actions with disbelief. Although Marcelino was widely considered an advantageous match due to his family’s wealth and power many felt her strategy of social climbing was obvious. Furthermore she had not known Marcelino long and he had a strong reputation as a womaniser. Few thought her plan to become his wife or permanent companion would succeed. It was widely thought that she would have been better served by getting a degree, and then she could try to marry wealth. This way she would have something to fall back on if her plan failed.

While many elites try to “reform” partners when engaged in cross-group relationships, members of lower status groups are not without agency either. They too
try to utilise romantic connections to create a more secure social environment for themselves. Yet, as with many other differences between elites and the urban middle classes, the social strategies thought to be characteristic of one group are actually employed by members of both. The revolutionary elite has had some success in cutting family ties with members of the urban middle classes, but despite the ideology of endogamy there are still numerous cross cutting connections between these two groups. However these connections seem to be significant on an individual level and as of yet do not endanger the overall social structure, which gives elites their privileged position in society. The following section will examine how elite forms of marriage are instrumental in elite consolidation. However ideological models are once again often ambiguous in practise.

6.5 Marriage

The customs surrounding marriage were one of the primary targets to be attacked by the incoming revolutionary government. The slogan *abaixo com lobolo!*, (down with lobolo) was chanted at rallies and polygamous men were denied party membership and viewed as “obscuratists” who refused to take the opportunity to enter the modern era with the new regime (Sheldon 2002: 117). The abolishment of these “backwards” customs coincided with the social background of the party leadership. Some members of the revolutionary elite came from various ethnic and racial backgrounds and they did not practise *lobolo*. Among those that did, many came from *assimilado* backgrounds and this group had long been under ideological pressure to abandon “African” cultural practises. There was also a sincere belief among many members of the revolutionary elite that customs like *lobolo* reduced women to the status of goods, something that the revolution was determined to change (Sheldon 2002: 133). Yet the revolutionary elite’s distaste for these practises did not mean that they necessarily supported individual choice in matters relating to romantic intimacy, as Giddens (1992) model of modernity tends to assume. The party took great care in intervening in the personal lives of militants and used martial alliances to build a wider “ideological” family. After the fall of socialism the subject of romantic attachments continues to be a great concern for elite families.

This was especially evident in the connections between elite consolidation and marriage. During an interview with a former Frelimo MP, I asked if arranged
marriages ever occurred among elites. After thinking for a moment she replied: “Yes it does happen, especially among the top people.” She then listed four examples of arranged marriages that had taken place in extremely prominent families. She guessed that there are many more but said that she did not know the specifics. This was the typical response I encountered whenever I asked this question. Most of the people I talked to knew it happened, but due to the sensitive nature of the phenomenon (especially as the idea of arranged marriage was often thought to contradict the “cosmopolitan modernity” that elites embodied) I found it very difficult to collect much in the way of concrete, quantitative data. Yet the numerous stories I heard about arranged marriages does point to its importance to the processes of elite consolidation.

Part of the difficulty in studying arranged marriages among the elite was that these types of marriages were conducted in a very informal, almost ad-hoc manner. As one informant explained to me: “It’s not like India or someplace like that where a matchmaker sets up two people when they are still babies. It’s much more casual here”. The following example of a young member of the independence elite who had just returned from studying in South Africa will demonstrate that, despite its casual nature, the underlying meaning was often very clear.

It’s not like Cape Town here; you have to be careful who you talk to. If you are chatting to some girl and her family sees you they are going to start thinking about marriage. It goes like this. You are at some girl’s house and the father comes in and takes a seat. He will ask if you are still single. He will then say: “Our families have known each other for such a long time, why don’t you marry our daughter, it would be good. Why don’t you take my daughter out? Do you need some money? Here take this. Is it enough? Do you need more? Bring her back whenever, you are a good person and we trust you. Go out and have some fun.” It’s not very subtle (Field notes 1 February 2004).

Although interested families did not approach the parents of the prospective groom, but rather the prospective groom himself, my informant understood that his appeal was based not only on his own presumably bright future, but also on the fact that he comes from a wealthy and well-connected family. The idea of the match went beyond simply bringing together two young people, but for creating a stronger overall familial alliance as well. As with the Nigerian case described by Mann (1985) at the beginning of this chapter, intermarriage drew an already existing elite ever closer together, binding shared interests with kin ties. The following example demonstrates this even more clearly. It comes from a young woman from the independence elite,
who described the reason for arranged marriages among the elite to me in the following terms.

The thing that you have to understand is that Mozambique is different from Europe, or even other African countries, with natural resources like Angola. You see the rich here have money now, but it will not last, not for generations like other countries. At the end of the day it’s politics that ensures money, not the other way around like other places. Our parents fought very hard to get us where we are and they want to make sure we keep this standard of living. That is why they pay so much to send us to good schools. My father is always going on about how we must use the benefits we have been given because he will not always be around to help us. He has some money now, but when he dies all my sister and I will inherit is some property. They earn money from this property now due to the rent but after they are gone we will probably have to sell it to pay the debts.

It’s different for many people though. In a lot of families the parents have really suffered and they want their kids to have a good life. They are pretty indulgent and give their kids everything, but the money will not last. Look around, the businesses that people have started fail and shady deals only work for so long. There is nothing to fall back on. See that’s the thing. Life here, for the rich, does not teach people to work. It teaches people to be dependent on someone and money always comes from somewhere else. That is why marriages are arranged. My parents would not do that. They know that my sister and I would not stand for it, and they are more modern than that anyway. But there are many ways to arrange a marriage. It does not happen here like the movies, when two kids are paired up when they are babies. Many times it is just the family exerting pressure to marry the “right person”. See when families combine there is more security for the future; they combine their money as well. Many times it is just the family exerting pressure to marry the “right person”. See when families combine there is more security for the future; they combine their money as well. It’s part of the attitude that has grown up here. People always look for someone to provide for them. It’s a kind of dependence and that is how people maintain their standard of living (Field notes 7-8 January 2004).

Although she is speaking directly about the consolidation of the elite, in many ways the strategies she describes parallel those employed by the women from the urban middle classes in the last section. One of the reasons for this seems to be that despite the fact that the elite monopolise the dominant position in society, in many ways they are dealing with other social groups from a position of relative weakness. As of the time of field work the revolutionary elite had not managed to amass sufficient resources to ensure long-term elite status independently of political power. One strategy for dealing with this is to combine with other elite families to increase both material resources and the ever-important political connections that elite families have developed over time. Once again many elites in Mozambique have developed a resemblance to the national bourgeois described in the introduction where political access is one of the key factors in amassing material resources. Yet, despite the focus on elite consolidation, the lives of elites are so closely intertwined with that of the urban middle classes that social distance is difficult to maintain. As the following
section will demonstrate, the interconnection of the elite and the urban middle classes occurs amongst both the revolutionary and independence elites.

Official marriages among elites tend towards endogamy, but the goal of consolidating resources is often problematic, especially due to the prevalence of adultery. Karanja (1987) observed that although “western” monogamous marriages have become characteristic of the Nigerian elite publicly, many elite men often, discretely, marry further women through traditional ceremonies, the so-called “outside” wives. This trend has also been observed among elites in east Africa (Obbo 1987) and colonial Nigeria (Mann 1985). Male members of the revolutionary elite do not seem to be taking additional wives through traditional ceremonies, but adulterous unions and “second” families of semi-official standing are not uncommon. While “second” families usually lack legal recognition, these unions are often public knowledge. Adultery is often widely condemned, but many women, especially among the revolutionary elite, tend to blame the other woman more than their husbands; it was uncontrolled female sexuality that was seen as the danger to the stability of elite unions. The social sanctions that existed were often directed towards these women and their children.

Women from the independence elite tend to take a slightly more even-handed approach. Halima, a young elite woman in her 20s comes from a wealthy Mozambican/Indian family with political connections. Her parents have lived apart for many years although they are still officially married. Her father had an affair that resulted in pregnancy and the marriage fell apart. Halima’s father and mother come from families that have been intermarrying for generations and an official divorce would be very difficult. Although Halima’s father lives with his companion and their child, he still acts as the official head of the first marital unit. He presides over family dinners and ceremonies, he pays for the upkeep of his first wife, they appear at all family functions together (even though their actual circumstances are well-known among the extended family) and they even continue to go on holidays together. Halima’s mother has never re-married and still desires to rebuild her relationship with her estranged husband. Halima herself blames both parents (although she continues to live with her mother and works with her father with whom she is very close). She blames her father for having an affair and although he has lived with his companion for years, Halima has never met her or her half-brother, both because her father is not anxious to bring his official and unofficial families into contact and because she has
no desire to contact them. The extended family is also firm in their desire to maintain elite endogamy and they refuse to acknowledge the second family’s existence. Halima also blames her mother for acquiescing to the situation and not officially leaving her father and she feels that her mother should put more pressure on her father.

While there are differences between generational attitudes of female elites towards adultery, the general consensus seems to accept a certain amount of adultery. As one young informant mentioned when she found that her partner was having affairs during her pregnancy: “Face it, it is something all men do, there is nothing that can be done about it”. Sometimes this attitude appears as amused indulgence, as Halima once told me: “Our men are just naughty. You know they are like little children”. This tacit acceptance is conditional though; men can engage in affairs as long as the official family is not endangered. Although second families may divert resources from the marital unit, they rarely have legal recognition and their economic survival depends, to a degree, on the whim of the man. I posit that this is one of the reasons behind the double standard for female adultery, which is viewed much more negatively and results in far stronger social sanctions. When women had outside liaisons there was always the chance of a resulting pregnancy. Unlike the “second families” of men that only disrupted elite social patterns on an individual level, meaning that the “outside” wives and children of such a union could always be discretely ignored, with women the child is a concrete symbol and is far more likely to cause an open breach and endanger the family. Although it doubtlessly occurs, women must be far more discrete because if the affair becomes open knowledge there is much more pressure on the husband to react.

These rules are not absolute and elite families can assert pressure to keep a couple together. One of my friends, João was engaged to a young woman named Tara. Both came from elite families and the marriage would be a good match of wealth and political connections. Although João had engaged in multiple affairs during the engagement (Tara was studying abroad) when he found out that Tara also had an outside relationship he broke off the engagement. The respective families refused to accept this decision and eventually pressured João and Tara to renew their engagement. Despite this, the danger of an open breach was far greater when João felt betrayed and the relative youth of the couple made them more susceptible to familial pressure.
While some elite marriages result in unhappy stories of material and emotional betrayal, many women still feel that marriage is the best way to ensure security (regardless of increased education), entrance into the workforce and the goal of the revolution to turn women into free and independent citizens. Once, while at a café with João, Tara and two of Tara’s friends, I was surprised to hear Tara began to complain bitterly about men delaying marriage, a complaint her two friends evidently appreciated. This was a pointed remark as João had mentioned delaying their upcoming marriage for another five years. I was curious at Tara’s insistence and what the hurry was considering she was only 21 years old. Tara and her friends replied that as a man I would not understand. She said that men have the luxury of time and can wait to marry until their 30s or 40s and still start a family; women on the other-hand face severe difficulty if they wait past their mid-20s. While Frelimo had wanted to free women by reforming gender relations and destroying the “feudalism” of the family, close to 30 years after the revolution, marriage and family remain key sites of power, even among those who were once committed to act as the midwives of the new society.

6.6 Conclusion

One of the goals of the revolution was to free women from the “feudalism” of family and to allow them to enter society as full, free individuals. This was seen as an essential step in the wider modernisation of society and its effects are still pointed to with pride by otherwise disillusioned Frelimo militants. Yet the form of modernity espoused by the revolutionary elite was very different than that envisioned by western theorists such as Giddens (1992). For Giddens, modernity in the case of romantic relationships results in sexuality being divorced from conjugality and kinship being replaced by drive for personal fulfilment and serial monogamy. In Mozambique something different has occurred. Modernity in this case, with its nationalist roots and socialist outlook, was not necessarily about increased individual freedom or even personal fulfilment per se, but about a mass effort to transform society. There have been many changes since the fall of socialism, and the rights of the individual are now publicly trumpeted; but there are still wider considerations than personal happiness alone. While the revolutionary elite have managed to maintain their dominant position in the current capitalist era, the political environment remains precarious. The
management of kinship relations and romantic intimacy are crucial for the revolutionary elite to ensure the social reproduction of their status for future generations.

Yet the social closeness between the revolutionary and independence elites and the urban middle classes result in porous borders that are difficult to police. The trend for elite endogamy notwithstanding, frequent attachments occur across class lines. Men from both the independence and revolutionary elites form “secondary” families with “outside” wives and women often try and “reform” their partners and bring them closer to elite standards of behaviour. Yet these breeches in the walls of elite endogamy do not necessarily result in an overall weakening in the system of social stratification. Exceptions tend to take place on an individual level, which does not overtly challenge the dominant social position of elites.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

7.1 Remaining Questions

This thesis explored the social, economic, ideological and political processes that have accompanied the formation and growth of a set of interrelated Mozambican elites from the colonial period to the present day. Through my work I argue that a changing ideology of modernity has allowed these elites to attempt to legitimise their dominant social status, access positions of power and try to ensure the social reproduction of status for future generations. The conclusion of this thesis seeks to address some remaining questions and locate this particular research in the broader realms of anthropological inquiry. First I shall examine how my investigation was carried out and critically assess its strengths and limitations. I will then briefly describe three ways in which I think my research sheds light on wider questions concerning social power and transformation outside of a strictly Mozambican context. Finally, I will discuss how the issues examined in this thesis develop questions for further research.

7.2 Strengths and Limitations

In the introduction of this thesis I argue that ethnography has a vital role in the understanding of elites and that it is not enough to simply “map” out the various positions that members of powerful groups hold, but rather to investigate how these positions are understood both by those who hold them and the wider society (Hansen and Parrish 1983: 261). With this kind of investigation one can then attempt to grasp why structures of power take the shape that they do and what their actual role in society is (Marcus 1983a, 1983b). One of the primary ways in which I tried not only to follow these observations, but also to enhance them was to add historical depth to my ethnographic investigation. Due to both theoretical interest and more prosaic and pragmatic concerns (such as access), members of the independence elite were among the major sources for much of my ethnography. This being said, it would be impossible to understand their current social role without a wider examination of the
historical circumstances that helped to both create their place in society and influence how they conceive it. To take this into account, I framed my investigation by examining elites across three generations. In so doing, I was able to not only chart the historical formation of this elite from the late colonial period to the present day, but also to analyse both the transformations of elite formation through time and some of its continuities. Participant observation was crucial for gathering information concerning members of the independence elite and it also shed light on aspects of intergenerational relationships among Mozambican elites. Life histories though were central to my efforts to understand these processes historically. Not only could they help me reconstruct aspects of the past (if usually from the vantage point of the present), but they were also ideal for trying to understand what my informants viewed as transformations and continuities of elite formation. My collection of life histories was supplemented by archival data, in the form of biographies, newspaper articles and various other works concerning the Mozambican elite. In this case I was extremely fortunate to work with a group of people who are not only highly literate, but whose activities have been well-documented, both by themselves and by others.

If engaging in a historical investigation helped, in my opinion, to strengthen my analysis of Mozambican elites, this does not mean that my research does not suffer from very real limitations. As alluded to earlier in this section, access was a perennial problem. I may have had some advantages in gaining access to my informants due to relationships that pre-dated my research, yet there were parts of my Mozambican friends’ lives that were closed to me in many ways. For example, I was not able to gain much access to aspects of my informants’ public lives, such as their work. Given the type of research I conducted, I was also hesitant to collect certain kinds of quantitative data and my ability to access this forms of information was in many ways limited. Yet information of this nature would have been very valuable to paint a more detailed picture of certain kinds of the economic practices that have resulted from the transition to a more neo-liberal economy. In future research projects though, I will endeavour to include more of this type of data.

I did attempt to document the changing relationships between the elites and members of the urban middle classes, and present them from the point of view of both groups. Unfortunately, I was not able to do this with many poor urbanites or members of the peasantry. While this information would have been a welcome addition to my research, soon into my fieldwork I realised that it would be very difficult to gather,
and it would not be practical, at least for an inexperienced researcher. Therefore, outside some of the literature I have cited, depictions of the “poor” or “peasants” in my thesis are described from the point of view of the members of the elite or urban middle classes. The resulting “conceptual gap” in my analysis creates interesting opportunities for further study.

Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, research amongst members of an elite, or set of elites, forced me to encounter a particular set of ethical dilemmas. Working with a relatively small number of generally well-educated, bi-lingual and socially visible informants can pose serious difficulties. Despite all my well-intentioned attempts to disguise the identities of my Mozambican friends, there is always a danger that these pseudonyms would not withstand a sustained and careful scrutiny by an interested Mozambican who is familiar with Maputo. Throughout the thesis I have diligently tried to maintain my informants’ anonymity and I will redouble these efforts for future publications. In addition, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, my analysis does not always coincide with the self-representations of my informants. This is important because I do not want to cause unintentional harm or embarrassment. In addition many of my informants were personal friends and it could be possibly damaging to myself and to prospective future researchers if my friends felt that they were “used” or misinterpreted. All of the ethical issues I have mentioned so far tend to fall into the grey areas of traditional anthropological guidelines and ways of dealing with them is more of an evolving process then a strict set of rules. So far conversations with Mozambican friends about the findings of my research have generally elicited broad, if not always enthusiastic, agreement, yet future implications (if any), remains to be seen.

7.3 Wider Significance

The previous section discussed some methodological aspects that helped to shape this study and a few of the very real limitations of my thesis. In this section I will now focus on ways in which I feel my work might to speak to a broader audience outside Mozambican specialists. While my research is grounded in the Mozambican context and some of the nation’s social and historical particularities do not necessary translate well to the outside world, there are three main aspects of my examination that I feel could help inform wider debates.
The first of these is my focus on elites. While studies of power and domination are increasingly frequent in anthropology generally, they tend to focus primarily on those who do not have much in the way overt power. Perhaps this is why anthropologists in last 20 years have produced numerous, and frequently very valuable, studies of types resistance, yet have comparatively less to say as to how the regimes and power structures that are resisted so fiercely manage to stay in place. I have personally witnessed a worrying tendency where some researchers produce only the broadest generalisations of powerful groups and subject them to relatively little rigorous analysis. Many of these same researchers would be furious if similar generalisations were published about the poor. Throughout this thesis I have tried to demonstrate the manner in which the interests, social structures and ideologies of Mozambique have been crucial in shaping the post-independence nation. In many ways the idea of a sovereign and unified nation of Mozambique is the result of a “dream” of the Mozambican elites (Bertelsen 2004; Finnegan 1992). I do not mean to deny the agency of other sectors of the population; this has been vitally important and in fact posed significant and in some cases virtually unanswerable challenges to aspects of the elites’ nationalist vision. Both Chapters Two and Three trace the collapse and transformations of the dreams of nation held by elites. While agency and resistance must be taken into account, more attention needs to be focused on trying to understand both the ways in which, and the limits to, the abilities of elites to “set the stage” for the formation of social relationships and possible sites of social conflict. This being the case, I feel we must heed the challenge set by Shore (2002) to study the powerful with the same interest as we study the relatively powerless in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the relationships’ of social power in Mozambique, Africa and the world more generally.

The second aspect of this study that may have broader implications is its focus on the ideologies of modernity. Following the insights of Cooper (2005) who noted a distinct ambiguity in academic discourse concerning modernity, as it used as both a condition and an analytic devise and building on the work of Ferguson (2006), I have tried to understand modernity as a “native” category. In Chapters Two and Three I traced the social evolution, beginning with a particular set of “modernising” elites. In the colonial period this group tended to see themselves as the “civilised” or modern section of Mozambican society due to their comparatively high levels of education and close association with the colonial power. They were primarily urbanised,
forming a section of the colonial society’s petty bourgeoisie. Due to these social experiences and the particular historical factors surrounding southern Mozambique’s incorporation into the colonial state, this group had relatively weak links to “traditional power structures” and often harboured contempt for what they saw as the “backwardness” of the majority African population. Although the colonial elite had, in many ways, distanced themselves from the majority of the population due to the colour of their skin, they were also denied full entrance into colonial society as equals; and many members of the colonial elite became progressively alienated from the state.

The revolutionary elite, although coming from this social background, had developed very different ideas about the wider society. Although many came from assimilado backgrounds, this was often a source of shame, as assimilados were seen as complicit with not only their own oppression, but also that of the wider population. As I argue in Chapter Three, the idea of “nationalist modernity” deeply influenced the revolutionary elite and was seen as a universal and hierarchical goal upon which to build a nation that could “catch up” to the nations of the west (cf. Donham 1999). This concept differed significantly from colonial modernity in that the goal was no longer to modernise a small elite, but to bring the modernity of a small elite to the nation as a whole though mass mobilisation and heroic effort. Additionally the ideal of nationalist modernity differed from previous concepts of assinilacija not so much in its actual conception but through the depth and breadth of its ambition. After the chaos and destruction of the civil war and near economic and social collapse, many aspects of nationalist modernity have fallen out of favour with many members of the ruling revolutionary elite. Yet some of the underlying conceptions that informed nationalist modernity live on, although in an altered form. The form of modernity embodied by independence elites is more personal and technocratic. Instead of acting as a symbol of the glorious future all would soon share, modernity has become more of a distinctive feature of the ruling elite, symbolising their ability to occupy the highest-ranks of society. It is transmitted to the rising generation of independence elites through exclusive schooling, often abroad, and in forms of consumption unavailable to much of the population. However a form of modernity is still central to their social position.

While I have been speaking above about a specifically Mozambican set of circumstances, this discussion of modernity does have wider applications. It is
important to understand modernity as a “native” category, but it is equally important to investigate the social circumstances that give rise to these kinds of ideas of modernity and here we can see many similarities. From the “Marxist” moderns of Russia and China described by Donham (1999) to the secularist and “westernised” nationalist vision of Kemal Ataturk, the idea of modernity as a linear progression where some nation’s rank ahead and others fell behind has driven many groups of nationalist elites. Yet this idea was not limited to elites alone. As Ferguson (2002, 2006) so aptly demonstrates while “modernisation” theory may be academically discredited, it still embodies the hopes of millions around the world. Returning to the earlier discussion of developing a fuller understanding of social power, we must also be able to understand how our informants conceive of modernity and how this conception helps to legitimise certain power relationships and contest others.

The final point in which I feel my research can inform broader debates deals with neo-liberalism and its associated effects on practices such as corruption and legitimacy. Although I recognise the powerful impact of neo-liberalism on economic, political and social relationships, I do not mean to argue that it creates a “blank slate”. As shown in Chapter Four, while neo-liberalism has caused definite changes in elites’ (and also segments of the wider populations’) understandings of race, these ideas are rooted in an older construct that originated in the colonial period and was transformed during socialism. There are further similarities as well. To once again cite West’s observation, there is a strong yet often unspoken resemblance with the dogmatism and messianic ambition of neo-liberalism and the previous socialism it supplanted (1997: 676). Still, the adoption of the “democratic” neo-liberal model has brought about dramatic transformations.

In Chapter Five I argue that while the stated purpose of the introduction of democratic and capitalist reforms was to wrest power from the state and involve the “people” in the economic and decision-making process, often the opposite has occurred. The fact that the political opposition is disorganised and in many cases fails to present itself as a viable alternative allows Frelimo to prevail in elections even as their legitimacy is threatened by rising inequality and the perception that they are increasingly tolerant of corruption. This creates a potentially dangerous situation as a ruling elite can secure itself both power and wealth with strong international legitimacy while important segments of the population become ever more alienated and embittered. As stated earlier, the effects of neo-liberal transformation are not
limited strictly to the political sphere and Chapter Six examines the changes and continuities of elite consolidation in regards to marriage and family.

The goal of my research in this area is to move beyond a common trap that occurs when analysts focus on neo-liberalism and associated reforms such as democratisation and structural adjustment. In many cases the reality of the situation is submerged by a normative discussion; i.e. what should or should not happen is good or bad. I am not denying the moral implications of neo-liberalism, nor do I feel a researcher should avoid take a normative position; it is often almost impossible not to. The problem is that the focus can rest on an ideal type and its intended consequences. What I have tried to do in this study is to examine some of the actual consequences of the introduction of neo-liberalism and describe their social impact.

### 7.4 Future Research

The conclusions of my thesis in regards to the formation of an interrelated set of elites and their changing ideology of modernity, which has created a sense of internal legitimacy and social cohesion, raise new possible avenues of research. I focused on a “national elite” based in the capital. To develop a fuller picture of the transformations of social power in Mozambique since independence, further research should be done on other groups of elites in Mozambique. Possible candidates for this further could include regional Frelimo cadres or people with a weaker relationship to the national elites, such as Indian merchants. This could help describe how the ideologies of colonial, revolutionary and independence elites were understood, acted upon or rejected by relatively powerful members of the wider society and how this too has been transformed through time. In addition, by examining these groups within the neo-liberal context, one can better understand what kinds of transformations the introduction of capitalism has brought to areas outside the municipal limits of Maputo.
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