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Abstract

By the late 1930s, it became clear to informed Americans that the international system in East Asia had failed. The outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1937 demonstrated that the current system could no longer provide stability in the region. Four years later, Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor ended American neutrality and united the regional conflict with the World War. Even as war raged, Japanese aggression raised questions for the future. If Imperial Japan, the most powerful country in Asia, were defeated, what might replace its regional dominance? What would become of its colonies? What had caused Japanese militarism, and how could its resurgence be prevented? If America were to emerge from the war powerful enough to reshape global politics, what future for Japan would best serve American interests? The story of how these questions were answered and why a particular set of responses became American policy is the subject of this dissertation.

This work provides an account of the post-war planning process and the deliberative period which shaped American policy towards Japan after surrender in 1945. It will look at how these questions came to be answered, both in terms of the formulation of actual policies implemented after the war and the inputs and environment in which responses developed. Much has been written on the outcome of these choices, there have been many histories of the postwar occupation of Japan and postwar US-Japan relations. But very little attention has been given to where the eventual policy came from. By bringing the aims and intentions of the planners to light, this work provides a new perspective on the policy that the United States imposed on Japan during the occupation period and after.
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Introduction

“I am honored to have been asked to talk to you who have played your part in turning the world's greatest peace time industries into the mightiest military arsenal the world has ever known. That is one reason why we will win this war.

But once the battle is won, where are we?”¹

By the late 1930s, it became clear to informed Americans that the international system in East Asia had failed. The outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1937 demonstrated that the current system could no longer provide stability in the region. Four years later, Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor ended American neutrality and united the regional conflict with the World War. Even as war raged, Japanese aggression raised questions for the future. If Imperial Japan, the most powerful country in Asia, were defeated, what might replace its regional dominance? What would become of its colonies? What had caused Japanese militarism, and how could its resurgence be prevented? If America were to emerge from the war powerful enough to reshape global politics, what future for Japan would best serve American interests? The story of how these questions were answered and why a particular set of responses became American policy is the subject of this dissertation.

This work provides an account of the post-war planning process and the deliberative period which shaped American policy towards Japan after surrender in 1945. It will look at how these questions came to be answered, both in terms of the formulation of actual policies implemented after the war and the inputs and environment in which responses developed. Much has been written on the outcome of these choices, there have been many histories of the postwar occupation of Japan and postwar US-Japan relations. But very little attention has been given to where the eventual policy came from. By bringing the aims and intentions of the planners to light, this work provides a new perspective on the policy that the United States imposed on Japan during the occupation period and after.

The answers reached by the US government during the war came in the form of an audacious plan to radically reshape Japan. This aim was by no means predetermined; it faced opposition at different points

from President Franklin Roosevelt, congressmen, popular media, and high-level officials. The far-reaching liberal internationalist plan was developed through the interaction between government officials and elites in think tanks and the media, but within limitations set by the actions of Roosevelt. FDR and his bureaucratic planners had divergent views on postwar Asia. Until his death in spring 1945, the American vision for the postwar world was still a work in progress. Harry Truman adopted existing bureaucratic plans as reflective of his predecessor’s policy, which it was not, making American policy on postwar Japan an accident of Roosevelt’s death. Congress, the remaining body with the ability to check postwar plans, moved steadily towards supporting an active and internationalist orientation during the war, and did not block liberal planning. Policy was largely set, unexpectedly, by a small group of Japan experts in State Department deeply influenced by ideas-based interactions with non-state actors.

Structure and approach

This research offers a view of the environment in which American planning toward Japan took place, and how specific policies emerged from the diverse options available. Its purpose is not to provide day-to-day account of the evolution of US policy, but rather to describe the forces that helped to shape it. Although officials were also interested in domestic issues such as education reform and the status of the emperor, the focus here is on American aims related to Japan’s postwar role in international relations, an issue of more global significance.²

Because there was not one defined source of planning, this story is told by examining a range of actors. This approach is inspired by *Pearl Harbor as History*, an edited volume on different groups involved in Japanese-American relations during the 1930s, which demonstrated the value of examining a variety of actors in understanding America’s policy toward Japan.³ The selection of actors to be examined in this study has been informed by the work of Marlene Mayo and Makoto Iokibe on State Department planning, Robert Divine’s focus on the influence of internationalists during the Second World War, and Steven Casey’s research on the connection between “opinion-leaders” and the presidency.⁴ By taking a thematic rather than a chronological approach, this work gives a better sense of the nature of the planning process.

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² Domestic issues generated academic interest and are, together with the decision to drop the atomic bomb, are the best known themes of US-Japanese relations and the end of the war.
The first five chapters are therefore organized thematically, each focusing on one of the groups identified as key to the planning process. The first two chapters look at the major sources of official planning, the Roosevelt administration and the bureaucratic agencies concerned with foreign policy. As seen in chapter one, Roosevelt had mercurial opinions on the treatment of postwar Japan and Germany. This chapter examines Roosevelt’s thinking on the subject, and how his actions as president influenced American policy in a postwar world he would not live to see. The second chapter demonstrates how, despite interagency wrangling and some struggle between high and mid-level officials, a small group of specialists in the State Department came to dominate bureaucratic planning.

The third and fourth chapters consider unofficial and quasi-official sources of policy planning, looking at think tanks, the media, and expert “opinion leaders.” These chapters reveal that experts outside government became deeply enmeshed in the official planning process through wartime think tank programs and specialist publications. Social and professional connections amplified the voices of individuals in these groups, who were often consulted by officials or invited to take part in government planning. A final official group, Congress, is the subject of chapter five. This chapter argues that while Congress itself was not a significant part of Japan planning, the need for congressional approval loomed over the process. Rejection by Congress had doomed American peace plans after the Great War, as the country was unable to join the international organization whose creation it had championed. Thus, the steady movement of Congress from isolationism to support for robust internationalism was a prerequisite if the plans created elsewhere in government were to be enacted.

Each of these groups is a distinct source of Japan planning, and although they are examined individually, the interactions between them are highlighted across the dissertation. The final chapter breaks from the thematic approach and is arranged chronologically from April to September 1945. It is in this last phase of planning, from the death of FDR to the start of the postwar occupation, that the final lines of policy were set. Chapter six examines how existing plans were changed in this chaotic period, bringing together the previously introduced groups and examining the creation of official policy and responses to it. This last chapter moves toward connecting the planning phase to implementation in the occupation period. However, bringing the perspective of wartime planning into the analysis of later policy is left as an avenue for future efforts. This thesis follows the development of postwar planning, which includes but is not limited to planning for the occupation. Between 1939 and 1945, American policy-makers built a consensus to reorient rather than punish or restrain postwar Japan, to transform a foreign country into a “responsible” international actor, to redistribute its colonial possessions, and to guarantee the security of

its neighbors against future aggression. By looking at the groups involved in American post-war planning on Japan and East Asia, this dissertation explains why and how these ideas became embedded in official policy at the end of World War Two.

**Historical Background**

When America gained its independence from Great Britain in the eighteenth century, Japan was a “closed country,” having cut off diplomatic and trade relations with the rest of the world at the start of its late feudal period more than a hundred years before. US-Japanese relations began in the mid-nineteenth century with the arrival of Commodore Perry and his black ships to demand Japan open diplomatic relations with the implied threat of force. Five years later, in 1858, the United States and Japan signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, bringing the latter back into an international system it had chosen to avoid. As Japan began to grow and develop into a major economic, military, and finally political power, it presented a challenge to Western imperialism in Asia. At the end of the century Japan defeated China, the traditional Asian hegemon, in the First Sino-Japanese War. In 1905, it became the first non-European power to defeat a major European power in combat, challenging the global image of European superiority. Japan’s rise was also marked by its expansionism, as the country built its own empire, and pursued growing interests across the mainland of Asia. By 1910 it held colonies in Korea and Formosa (Taiwan). Japan fought in World War One alongside Great Britain and the United States, but also used the opportunity of conflict to expand its influence in China.\(^5\)

At the start of the 1930s, a decade which would see China and Japan engaged in a second major war, the US had interests and relations with both nations. America had initiated and championed the idea of an “open door” from the last year of the nineteenth century, nominally freeing China from colonization by allowing colonial powers equal access to its market. American businessmen and government advisors expected national interests to grow, especially once the country began to modernize under the pro-west, pro-business Nationalist government from 1928 onwards. But links with already modern and industrialized Japan were deep and well established. That country had become a world-class power and signatory to many major peaceful international agreements. Japan had been a founding member of the League of Nations, a signatory to the Washington Naval Conference, and a long-standing ally of America's close political and cultural cousin, Great Britain. However, the early 1930s was marked by political chaos and abrupt changes in Japanese foreign policy. The country invaded Manchuria, set up a

puppet state there, and withdrew from the League of Nations in response to international censure. Even as this “Far Eastern Crisis” expanded, business and trade links between Japan and the United States increased. Japan ranked as America’s number three trade partner and in turn the United States provided a quarter of Japan’s imports.

The consistent, palpable public sympathy with China reflected in the national media before and during the Second Sino-Japanese War is therefore perhaps surprising. While certainly untrue of the Asia experts, ordinary Americans did not understand Japan’s stake in Asian expansion. Rather, it appeared that “madness… led Japanese ‘warlords’ to embark on an aggressive quest for regional domination in the 1930s.” In addition to a popular perception of China as a victim of senseless aggression, the population and late development of China seemed to offer a huge potential economic and political benefit for the United States. As House Representative Will Rogers later explained to his fellow congressmen, “Half a billion paupers are no good as customers. But half a billion people starting to use radios and transparent plastic tooth brushes become a possibility for trade and material advancement.” The need for reconstruction loans to repair war damage only increased China’s potential value for American investors. Echoing the wartime sentiment of President Roosevelt, Rogers declared, “I want the United States to be closely allied with this coming giant.”  

The Sino-Japanese War created a struggle of loyalties and interests within the United States. However, because Japan was able to purchase American war materials, the US found itself in a position of materially supporting a conflict with which it was deeply uncomfortable. This led to a series of American embargos on the sale of oil and iron to Japan, and, after failed negotiations in 1941, Japan’s desperate decision to attack the American fleet.

The early war phase was marked by rapid success for Japan. In 1942 America’s former ambassador to Japan warned “The strong Japan which had defeated us and our allies momentarily in the Far East has become Japanese East Asia. If Japan could defeat indomitable China, organize her present holdings, consolidate her position, Japan – not Germany, not Britain, not Russia, not ourselves – Japan could

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9 90 Congressional Record, 3798-3802. 28 April 1944.
10 Minutes of Imperial Conference, 1 December 1941 in Akira Iriye, Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays, (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999).
become the strongest power in the world.”11 Japan’s war rhetoric of pan-Asianism, a vision of regional cooperation for development and ending European imperial exploitation, presented a picture of the future fundamentally at odds with the interests of the United States.12 At the same time, Japan’s military victories weakened traditional Western powers in Asia as British, American, Dutch and French colonies fell under Japanese control. This process sped up an existing global movement toward decolonization and national independence, while events in Europe also dealt a major blow to the capacities of those countries.13 When the tide began to turn against Japan, the relative strength of the United States skyrocketed, and the country became positioned to take a leading position in global affairs.14 The foundations of the postwar world were being laid.

Eight years of deliberation about American interests in East Asia created an idea of postwar Japan based on a series of assumptions about the postwar situation. Planners assumed that the United States would be able to reshape the coming world. In the case of Asia, many believed along with Representative Rogers that “The Orient and the Pacific is still malleable. Its patterns and forms are still fluid. It is our actions, after this war, that will give the Orient the mold in which it will harden.”15 Traditional allies would be part of this new world, but there was little consultation or cooperation in planning. As powerful Asia expert Stanley Hornbeck wrote to the secretary of state about America’s most important ally, “We are in a position to get from the British agreement to and cooperation in any reasonable course of action upon which we may choose to insist… they are to a great degree dependent on us for their preservation.”16 Moreover, the Soviet Union did not enter the war against Japan until August 1945 and thus was not deeply involved in postwar planning beyond its interests in acquiring territory. Following an end to hostilities, the international system would be rebuilt and become more stable and peaceful than in the past, and free trade would take on an important role in global security as economies recovered from the war. Within this context, planners sought to create a disarmed, non-imperial and economically strong Japan firmly committed to the new international system. With the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Americans began their occupation with the aim of creating this new Japan from the ashes of the enemy.

14 Because the Soviet Union and Japan had signed a neutrality pact in 1941, Russia was not a combatant in the Pacific theater until August 1945.
15 90 Congressional Record, 3798-3802. 28 April 1944.
16 Hornbeck to Hull, 3 Jan 1944, Hornbeck Papers, box 181, as cited Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 390.
Literature review

Occupation

Histories of the American-led occupation of Japan can be divided into three categories, reflecting a change in perspective over time. These are: conservative, revisionist, and international. Other historians recognize a “progressive school” in the literature, but as representative works of this school were published only during the occupation, they have been left out of this review.¹⁷ The conservative school represented the dominant perspective of the occupation until the late 1960s. The pioneers of the academic study of Asia in the US, such as Edwin Reischauer, provided a positive and uncritical perspective on the occupation period. These works clearly reflected the outlook of the period. Postwar America was characterized by liberal triumphalism, which, along with the then dominant modernization theory, indicated that the world could be reshaped for the better through American activism.¹⁸ The first occupation scholars had typically been involved in the planning for or worked during the American occupation of Japan with this sort of hopeful and exuberant viewpoint. It is unsurprising, then, that they should declare their efforts to have been success. Works of this type tend to overstate the role of MacArthur as a benevolent and farsighted figure single-handedly guiding Japan into a new era.¹⁹ Although the suppositions of this school were later challenged by the revisionists, the images have endured in popular memory.²⁰

Three factors caused a rethinking of the occupation in American scholarship from the late 1960s. These were the war in Vietnam, the availability of newly declassified documents and published memoirs, and the political shift to the left in America. New criticisms of the American government and a sense that American expansion into Asia had gone horribly wrong led to reinterpretations of the occupation period. Revisionist scholars, such as Michael Schaller and Howard Schoenberger identified a “reverse course,” shift in occupation policy away from an idealist reform of Japan and towards the building of an ally in East Asia for political advantage.²¹ Positive idealist American plans for Japan, they argued, were

¹⁷ China expert Owen Lattimore is the leading figure in this “progressive school,” which advocated sweeping and radical social and political reforms in Japan. Members of this school were on the far left and were persecuted in the period as communists. For an account of anti-communist persecution of an Asia specialist, see Owen Lattimore. Ordeal by Slander, (Boston: Little, 1950).
²¹ This school is often labeled “new left.” See for example, Carol Gluck’s excellent and international historiography of the occupation, “Entangled Illusions- Japanese and American Views of the Occupation.” in Warren I. Cohen ed.,
subverted by American business and security interests between 1947 and 1948, to the detriment of both
countries. These scholars tended to see the “reverse course” as a missed chance to build an equal and
democratic Japan, and contended that the old power and class structures had been left intact by the
occupying powers. The revisionist approach has remained the dominant perspective since the 1970s.
Revisionist accounts provide a valuable contribution to the literature with their fuller use of archival
sources and critical assessment of the goals of American occupiers. However, the assumptions made
about early aims which underpin the “reverse course” argument require scrutiny.

Recent work on the occupation period has given greater attention to non-American actors in the
occupation. By exploring the agency of other involved states, and individuals of other nationalities, this
new literature, which I term “international”, has provided a broader perspective on the occupation period
and opens new avenues of research. These works discussed the impact of British, New Zealander, and
Japanese action on the occupation. John Dower’s work on the Japanese experience during the
occupation also falls into this category. Eiji Takamae’s thoroughly researched Inside GHQ, the fullest
picture of the occupation administration to date, relied on both English and Japanese language sources to
build the case that Japanese bureaucrats wielded significant power in implementing directives.
Because my work, although acknowledging that American planners were not working in a vacuum, is nonetheless
centered on American planning based on American interests, these works are not directly related to the
approach taken here. Despite this, international school literature can provide relevant insight. For
example, a recent article on Japanese policies and the postwar economic boom provided a useful account
of “agency slack” in the early occupation period caused by the vagueness of the policies emanating from
Washington.

Although it does touch on postwar planning, and provides useful perspectives on the outcome of wartime
planning, the literature of occupation history does not sufficiently examine the presurrender period. These

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New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations. (New York: Columbia University, 1983). Major works include
America’s Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), Michael
1987), and Howard Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952, (Kent, OH:
Kent State University, 1989).

22 See especially Roger Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945-1952,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1982), Peter Bates, Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force
1990), and Yoshio Miwa and Mark Ramseyer, “The Good Occupation,” Harvard Law and Economics Discussion


Swann, (New York: Continuum, 2002).

25 Miwa and Ramseyer, 4.
works have not adequately addressed where occupation policies came from. Nor have they engaged with the main questions of this research, which remain unanswered in the literature. Occupation literature does not sufficiently weigh the significance of the 1937-45 planning period in establishing American goals for the occupation and plans for the future of Japan as a power in East Asia. It does not ask what groups were involved in the planning, or with what intentions. This is important because the fact that the literature is not well versed in the planning period means that its interpretations and conclusions sometimes contain misunderstandings of the aims behind the occupation.

Works on the occupation of Japan have provided useful accounts of the outcome of wartime planning, but have largely neglected the presurrender origins of the policies they observe. While many of these works offer a brief treatment of the planning period by way of introduction, the cursory accounts can be misleading. Michael Schaller, in his *The American Occupation of Japan*, writes that early planners were on the margins of policy and that “influential officials” did not begin to consider the outlines of the postwar era during the war.\(^{26}\) This is to ignore the years of planning by middle- and senior-level officials, outside advisors, and the president. John Dower stated that “due in good part to the impressive activities of a small State Department group… planning for postsurrender Japan at the lower levels of the bureaucracy was in fact well advanced when the war ended.”\(^{27}\) This assertion, though brief, is more accurate. However, the aims and intentions of this group are poorly understood. Some historians of the later period have argued that the primary goal of wartime planners was to stabilize postwar Japan by bringing its prewar liberals to power.\(^{28}\) As seen in chapter two of this dissertation, the reality was more complex. They have also conflated economic issues with concern about the imperial institution in Japan.\(^{29}\) Understanding such points is necessary to understanding the nature of the occupation. Despite such issues, the broad outlines of policy plans do appear elsewhere. For example, historian Akira Iriye correctly described US wartime plans as aiming to create a non-aggressive country, stripped of colonial possessions, whose survival was tied to economic interdependence.\(^{30}\)

**WWII planning**

Very little has been written on the American planning towards Japan which took place during the war. Several officials involved in the process, such as Japan expert Hugh Borton, later wrote accounts based on

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 4.
their experiences.\textsuperscript{31} Theodore Cohen, who worked with the Army’s Civilian Affairs Division, is another example. In his \textit{Remaking Japan}, Cohen went into unusual detail about policy planning for the occupation. However, as the result of his personal experiences, he argued that it was the CAD which was responsible for creating usable policy. His narrative was peppered with unflattering descriptions of the State Department planners and charges that State Department planning was both inadequate and irrelevant. Cohen highlighted a flaw of vagueness in State Department policies toward Japan. However, as demonstrated across this dissertation, his case is overstated.\textsuperscript{32} The group leading bureaucratic planning was made up of Asia experts based in the State Department, and these were the drafters of what became postwar policies.

Only one full length study has been published specifically on the subject of American postwar planning for Japan. Rudolf Janssens’ \textit{What Future for Japan?} has been an invaluable resource for detailing the various channels of policy planning.\textsuperscript{33} Marlene Mayo also provided an overview of one important facet of wartime planning in her chapter on the State Department planning in an edited volume on the American-led occupations of Japan and Germany.\textsuperscript{34} In addition to these, there are two important works on the international dynamics of wartime policy in East Asia. Xiaoyuan Liu’s \textit{Partnership for Disorder} examined and juxtaposed American and Chinese postwar planning for Japan.\textsuperscript{35} While an interesting lens, Nationalist China was a great power in name only during the war and not deeply engaged in the American planning process. This approach can therefore tell only part of the story. Christopher Thorne’s \textit{Allies of a Kind} highlighted the interplay of American and British interests in the Far East.\textsuperscript{36} While not focused on policy planning, and necessarily concerned with Anglo-American relations, the work is very useful in thinking about the contexts and considerations underlying actions and plans outside the domestic realm. Leon Gordenker has written on the creation of global institutions, such as the United Nations Organization and financial structures based on the Bretton Woods agreements, which also grew out of the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{31} Hugh Borton, \textit{American Pre-surrender Planning for Postwar Japan}, (New York: Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967).
\bibitem{35} Xiaoyuan Liu, \textit{A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945}, (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
\end{thebibliography}
policy environment and the process of postwar planning examined here. Gordenker’s approach to examining the bureaucratic process is similar to chapter two of this dissertation.  

US-East Asia policy

A study of American postwar planning for Japan and East Asia raises questions regarding the basis of American interest in Asia. Dorothy Borg provided a comprehensive account of the period immediately preceding this study with her *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938*. She argued that before 1937 the US government was very reluctant to respond to events in East Asia. American interests were best served by remaining neutral in the local conflict between Japan and China. After the start of the Sino-Japanese war, Borg wrote, it was the need to uphold international norms in the light of events in Europe, rather than any particular interests in Asia, which caused pressure on the American government to check Japan’s expansion. Seen from this perspective, American interest in Asia was driven by internationalism, not by any perceived national interests in the region.

Waldo Heinrichs identified two very different perspectives on America’s East Asian policy from the turn of the century to the end of World War II. He described historians of American-East Asian relations as being divided between adherents to a “large policy” of American over-involvement in the region and those who, like Borg, saw a cautious and modest policy based on marginal interests in Asia. Heinrichs argued that subscribers to the “large policy” idea of sustained US pursuit of business interests in Asia fell into the “New Left” school pioneered by Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams. This school critiqued American foreign policy as a pursuit of American economic interests and access to foreign markets, which was viewed as essentially damaging to America and Asian countries. However, the thesis of American economic expansionism does not explain America’s cautious and limited policy toward China and Japan in the period before World War II.

Business links were certainly a large part of the US-Japan relationship. Merchants and investors were the individuals connecting the two countries. Mira Wilkins, an expert on US-Japanese economic relations,

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40 Ibid, 77.
divided the American business community into subgroups based on their interests in Japan. Her aim, in common with this study, was to explain the viewpoints and activities of different groups, and evaluate their influence (or lack thereof) on Washington’s Asia policies. Another work on US-Japanese business relations, from the Japanese perspective, provided another perspective on the relationship by looking at the experience of a well-connected individual. The business community is a complex and heterodox group which has not been given separate treatment here in order to limit the scope of research. Despite this, the voices of businessmen have been included through their involvement in think tanks and the media.

Postwar expansionism

Histories of America’s prewar relations with Japan and China provide useful background on America’s policies and interests in the Far East, which changed dramatically during and after WWII. The policy examined here was created in the context of America’s shift from isolationism to global involvement. Gregory McLauchlan examined the new wartime thinking on American military, economic and political global commitments. McLauchlan pointed out that it is necessary to study how the war affected “the interests, organizational capacities, and world views” of class and bureaucratic actors in order to understand the development of policy, although he does not himself pursue this line of inquiry. He also argued that the process of war stimulated new thinking on American policy by creating a “double moment” in which the government was required to elaborate strategic aims for the postwar world and given a rare opportunity to “decisively shape other states, and the larger system of international relations between them.” While before the war “state managers” did not hold “fantastic global ambitions,” McLauchlan explained that international developments during the war and the need to iterate postwar goals resulted in the creation of America’s expansionist postwar orientation.

Jeffrey Legro, by contrast, has examined the wartime shift towards internationalism from a bottom up perspective. Rather than focusing on elites and planning, Legro argued that American postwar expansionism resulted from a “shift in the dominant ideas held by Americans regarding foreign policy

during World War II.” According to Legro, isolationism was discredited by the collapse of world order and the coming of the Second World War. This left the American public looking for a new orthodoxy and made space for a “social movement that helped to develop and spread internationalism as a plausible policy idea.” The social movement in Largo’s thesis is made up of informed individuals such as international bankers and pacifists, working through organizations such as the Foreign Policy Association and the Council on Foreign Relations. Isolationist groups lost influence over policy when they lost the leverage to “sway larger society.” However, Legro’s work did not examine the internationalist’s influence on the public, or the relationship between public support for internationalism and government policy. Because Legro did not attempt to explain the link between public sentiment and government policy, his implied causal relationship is not convincing. As seen in chapter three of this dissertation, the Council on Foreign Relations was far more concerned with influencing government officials than the public, and postwar planners were working on American internationalist policies ahead of the curve of public opinion. However, Largo correctly stated that the war discredited isolationism, which in turn gave room to existing internationalists and allowed the idea of American postwar hegemony to spread.

The significance of the wartime period in American postwar expansion is an important justification for this study of wartime planning in particular and continued interest in World War II in general. In the summer of 2001, Diplomatic History published a group of articles surveying the current state of World War II history. The authors agreed that this is an area of continued interest because of the lasting and important impact of the war. The authors also brought forward new areas of research and the valuable new input of other academic fields in examining WWII. The historian Warren Kimball wrote that history of the Second World War had been marginalized by recent scholarship in two ways. First, the war was often regarded as mere “seed time” until the start of the more important Cold War. Looking at WWII for origins of the Cold War has a distorting effect. As Antony Best has pointed out, concerns of the Cold War extend back far earlier than 1946, and were therefore already well progressed by the time America entered the Second World War. Certainly, as we move further from the end of the Cold War in Europe, Western historians are increasingly able to reconsider WWII in its own right. Second, and more important to this study, Kimball noted a sharp separation between pre and post Pearl Harbor history, leaving out the wartime period. He argued that the wartime period is necessary to understanding the

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49 Ibid., 275.
51 Antony Best, “‘We are Virtually at War with Russia’: Britain and the Cold War in East Asia, 1923-1940,” Cold War History, Vol. 12 No. 2 (Spring 2010): 205-225.
52 Given the rising power of communist China and remaining division of the Koreas, the Cold War continues in Asia.
“liberal triumphalism” which seemed at the end of the war to herald an American century. Opinion leaders such as Henry Luce, who first popularized the phrase “American century”, spread such ideas to the public and policy makers. That phenomenon, tied to both postwar planning and later expansionism, is examined in chapter four of this dissertation. Mark Stoler also stressed the importance of studying the Second World War in order to understand American postwar power. The war, he wrote, “made the United States the most powerful and prosperous nation the world had ever seen.” During the war Americans redefined their concept of national security and were eager to use this new power and to embrace internationalism after the disappointment which followed World War I.

Any analysis of wartime planning must of course consider the role of Franklin Roosevelt, and the power transition which followed his death in April 1945. Roosevelt was an inscrutable figure, and the wealth of literature on his foreign policy has sought to interpret the sometimes contradictory nature of his speeches, letters and recorded meetings. Although the literature has not focused on Roosevelt’s thinking on Japan, it provides insight into his wider plans for the postwar world. The enigma of Roosevelt’s foreign policy strategy has left historians with a number of questions. Many have argued that, despite public and private protestations otherwise, the president was an internationalist throughout the 1930s and supported America’s entry into World War II. Wayne Cole described him as “an internationalist who was also a patriot and a nationalist.” Robert Dallek shared this interpretation and argued that Roosevelt was compelled to limit references to internationalism until public opinion caught up with his views. Steven Casey has demonstrated that the president was engaged in a dialogue with popular opinion, bounded by what the public would accept even while working to alter opinion. Added to this is Roosevelt’s tendency to agree with others in conversation and then present contradictory ideas to his next visitor. Many records exist of the words and conversations of “this most elusive and dissembling of presidents.” Roosevelt’s thinking on Japan’s future and the role of his advisors in developing his ideas on the subject are still largely unknown. Janssens used the president’s remarks about eugenics in order to piece together his thinking on postwar Japan, but this, while certainly interesting, is only a small part of the picture.

57 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade.
59 See note 33.
The impact of the change of leadership from Roosevelt to Truman on policy has been considered elsewhere, particularly with reference to the onset of the Cold War and US policy toward the Soviet Union. Historians agree that in the early period of Truman’s presidency he relied on conflicting opinions from a number of advisors in order to determine policy. Arnold Offner has argued that this advice and the new president’s desire to appear decisive led to inconsistent policy. Melvyn Leffler offered a similar view of the early period. He wrote that Truman, afraid to appear ignorant, made snap decisions and tended to agree with whomever he was talking to. The end of the Pacific war has also been addressed by historians who view Japan policy through the lens of worsening US-Soviet relations. Building on these discussions, chapter six of this dissertation argues that the new Truman leadership did alter the course of postwar planning and thus changed American policy and actions. This shift therefore had profound implications for Japan.

Ideas and influence

Although this project is a historical study, as an analysis of policy creation it is also informed by the fields of international relations and political science. Assessing the impact of ideas in the formulation of policy is notoriously difficult and presents a challenge to historians wishing to consider the role of influence in foreign policy. Ideas and expertise certainly play a role in policy making; informing the process and providing theoretical frameworks or “mental maps.” Decision-makers use these maps to understand developing situations, define the parameters of debate, and decide what outcomes are possible or desirable. Political scientists Goldstein and Keohane defined ideas as world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs, and argue that all influence foreign policy. Political theorist John Ikenberry has characterized the same planning period as a moment in which influential elites created and used mental maps to define national interests. Looking at economic policy during World War Two, Ikenberry finds that “particular historical moments can provide expert groups wielding new policy approaches and

61 Arnold A. Offner, “‘Another such Victory’: President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War.” Diplomatic History, Vol. 23 No. 2 (Spring 1999).
64 Mental maps are explained in Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright, Mental Maps in the Era of Two World Wars, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): xiii.
philosophies with opportunities to decisively shape a government conception of the national interest.”

While working on a different aspect of policy planning, and through the lens of historical analysis, this work shares that observation.

The connection between ideas and influence is especially important in examining think tanks in the policy making process, as their major contributions are intangibles like “knowledge” and ideas. The place of think tanks in policy making has been the subject of increased attention, rising in tandem with interest in non-state actors and more nuanced approaches to diplomatic history. Inderjeet Parmar has renewed the call for more work on think tanks and the philanthropic foundations which support them in his most recent book. Because Parmar is interested in the rise of American internationalism, the organizations on which he has chosen to focus are also relevant to this study. Thinking broadly about ideas, James Allen Smith combined careful historical research with political science methodology, using an impressive range of outside approaches in order to create a compelling case for the importance of think tanks in twentieth century governance. He argued that the issues in foreign policy have become more complex as globalization and interlinkage have increased, forcing policymakers to rely on specialists for issues outside their own knowledge.

A 2002 article by the director of Policy Planning at the State Department highlighted the importance of think tanks in US foreign policy. He wrote, “of the many influences on U.S. foreign policy formulation, the role of think tanks is among the most important and least appreciated.” Organizations generate original ideas, supply a pool of experts, and offer venues for high level discussion, all of these services were provided by these think tanks during wartime. Political scientist Mahmood Ahmad provided a useful set of criteria against which to evaluate the effectiveness of think tanks, in particular “impact indicators” and measures of relevance and potential to shape outcomes. If the policy recommendations of think tanks are considered by decision makers, or if think tank members are invited to take on advisory roles, they

67 A discussion of this question can be found in Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy and Politics of Expertise, (Cambridge University Press, 2004): 4.
70 James Smith, The Idea Brokers.
can be considered influential. Such work is helpful in thinking about wartime interactions with the government, in which such conditions were met.

The Council on Foreign Relations, one of two think tanks considered in this study, has become a subject of interest to several historians in the past thirty years. Lawrence Shoup and William Minter published the first academic study of the CFR in 1977, which argued that the council, driven by business interests, had consistently used its elite connections and extensive resources to influence government and public opinion in favor of American imperialism. This is an example of ideas “mattering” in policy when they become embedded in institutions. The next major study on the organization, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs, questioned the influence of the council and argued that the similarity between its goals and official policies was not causal. Rather, thinking within government agencies and the Council on Foreign Relations was similar because the members of each group came from the same elite social set. Findings in this dissertation support Shulzinger’s point. Despite disagreement on the nature and significance of the council’s role in American politics, studies of the CFR have all highlighted the early war period as the “golden age” of council influence. However, these studies have tended to focus their attention on wartime planning on Europe and the development of the United Nations and neglect the part played by the council in developing Asia policy.

The Institute of Pacific Relations, the only expert group focusing on Pacific affairs, has also been recognized as significant in policy making. With funding from the internationalist Rockefeller Foundation, the rare resource of area specialists, and a mission to promote Pacific regionalism, the IPR was well placed to play a role in US-Asian relations during WWII. Because the institute, unlike the CFR,

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was international, it was unique in drawing together elites and experts more globally, as well as maintaining its Asia focus. As Tomoko Akami has argued, the institute was therefore valuable in creating “sounding boards” and spaces for ideas to be exchanged informally between Allied governments through international conferences. Yukata Sasaki also made a comparison of the IPR and the CFR in the context of wartime planning. He too highlighted several wartime programs which make these organizations significant. However, his chapter relied on a very limited analysis of wartime planning, and did not emphasize the importance of creating policy networks in the movement of ideas between official and unofficial planners, which I argue is a central contribution.

Half of this dissertation is given over to the role of academics, intellectuals and experts in wartime planning. While, as Parmar has recently pointed out, focus on elites has become unfashionable in some quarters of the academic field, these are the figures most deeply engaged in shaping government policy. Political scientist Ole Rudolf Holsti has argued that “all other things being equal, the more protracted the decision process, the more likely are policy makers to be subjected to the impact of public opinion through the activities of Congress, interest groups, the media, and opinion leaders.” However, this research does not support Holsti’s argument. Partly because of the very low level of public interest or understanding of Asia, and partly because the plans adopted after the war were the product of a small circle of Japan experts working in and with the State Department, public opinion played a limited role in this case.

As Robert Divine argued in Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II, internationalists were able to effectively reshape America’s foreign policy orientation through think tanks and pressure groups and collaboration with like-minded officials during the Second World War. This research provides a specific case which bears out Divine’s argument, the groups considered here were composed of elites and their ideas were not reflective of public opinion. However, as Steven Casey has pointed out in the case of German policy, Roosevelt and his administration did closely monitor

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78 Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific.
79 For example, he does not include the CFR study groups which brought leading officials and outside parties together for regular extended discussions, and does not point out that many important government figures were at the same time Council members. Yukata Sasaki “Foreign Policy Experts as Service Intellectuals. The AIPR, the CFR and Planning the Occupation of Japan during World War Two,” in Kurt Piehler and Sidney Pash eds, The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War and the Home Front (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010): 297.
80 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century, 8.
the press as an indicator of public opinion and take opinions into account in decision-making. Several works on American media and public opinion have been useful to this examination. John Chappell, in his *Before the Bomb*, evaluated American wartime popular opinion towards Japan through contemporary journalism, and popular anti-Japanese sentiment is also examined in John Dower’s *War without Mercy*. The ideas held by journalists and editors will be examined in light of congressional and presidential concern about public opinion, but are mainly significant here because of the influence of those “opinion leaders” on elite thinking.

In addition to considering ideas and influence, this work is also informed by recent developments in diplomatic history, especially a new interest in analyzing the influence of previously under-considered factors in foreign policy making. These include the place that perceived shared interests, religious and cultural values, and worldviews have on the way in which states approach one another and manage relationships. David Reynolds has observed that recent work on WWII has benefited from new subsections of history. He wrote that the “human experience” of the war, drawing from social and cultural histories, allows for reinterpretations of familiar subjects and bringing in new actors and trends into the history. Cultural history, Reynolds noted, is useful in examining the relations between combatants and has provided new perspectives on the Pacific war. Akira Iriye’s classic *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941-1945*, now more than thirty years old, has been deeply influential to both the study of the Pacific War and the field of diplomatic history more broadly. Arguing that popular racism made fighting in the Pacific theater more brutal, John Dower later tied cultural prejudice to both the conduct of the war and public perception of the conflict. These new lenses allow scholars to understand familiar histories in richer and more nuanced ways.

Sources

84 I have explored the connection between American media and wartime planning elsewhere. Dayna Barnes, “Plans and Expectations: The American Media and Postwar Japan,” *Japan Studies*, forthcoming.
87 See Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture*.
In addition to engaging with the academic literature along the lines introduced above, this research draws on organizational and government records, the papers of key officials, published memoirs and diaries, and contemporary articles. Archival research has included institution, university and government archives in the United States, Australia and Great Britain.\textsuperscript{90} Many of the sources used in this study are familiar to historians of the Second World War. However, they are being used to examine an under-researched area and answer new questions.

In researching the development of policy \textit{Occupation of Japan: US Planning Documents, 1942-1945}, an edited collection of primary material, has been an invaluable reference.\textsuperscript{91} The microfiche collection contains the documents of bureaucratic planning committees, including multiple versions of draft reports and minutes of meetings, pulled together and reordered for ease of access from the Records of Harley A. Notter and other collections at the US National Archives and Record Administration in College Park, Maryland (NARA) and elsewhere. The published \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States} (FRUS) volumes provided access to documents from government departments in the period, and were particularly useful in examining wartime Allied conferences. Records from the Roosevelt administration are available at the Roosevelt Study Centre (RSC) in the Netherlands, and the FDR Office Files and Map Room Messages assisted in understanding the relationship between the White House and planning groups, and American foreign relations. At the Harry S Truman Presidential Library, the “Occupation of Japan” Student Research File and the Matthew Connelly papers, which contain notes on cabinet meetings, were useful in understanding the constraints on Japan policy in the later period. Information on Congress was drawn from the Lexis Nexis Congressional Hearings Digital Collection, available online, and the Records of the US Senate at NARA. The Post Hostilities Planning Papers and other records of the Department of External Affairs at the National Archives of Australia (NAA) provided international context and commentary on the planning and interests of the British and American governments, and were also valuable in connecting the Institute of Pacific Relations to official planning.

In order to address this research’s major concern with the spread and development of ideas, this work has relied heavily on the collected papers of individuals involved in the planning process as officials, area experts and journalists. These sources have provided access to the letters, notes and records necessary to piece together who planners corresponded with, what opinions they held, and how these views were shared. Oral histories and unpublished memoirs gave further insight into both the planning process and the thinking of actors. Consulted collections are housed at Princeton’s Seeley Mudd Library, the Hoover

\textsuperscript{90} While the author is aware of sources, particularly secondary literature, on the topic in Japanese, research on this project has been carried out in English.

Institution at Stanford University, Columbia University’s Butler Library, The Yale University Sterling Memorial Library, the Library of Congress, and the Truman Library. This research also relies on the published diaries and memoirs available on more prominent political figures.

The institutional records of involved nongovernmental organizations provided further insight. The America First Committee Records at the Hoover Institution offer a picture of the diverse membership and policy positions within the largest isolationist organization, tied to public opinion and prewar congressional politics. The Institute of Pacific Relations papers at Columbia University and the Council on Foreign Relations Archives at Princeton capture substantive debates and correspondence, as well as the day-to-day administrative activities of each organization. Because both of the think tanks examined here received substantial financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation during the war, the Rockefeller Foundation Archives (RF Archives) contain grant applications and reports which indicate the aims and progress of the wartime programs of each. The papers of the Far East Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA, also known as Chatham House), are located at the School of African and Oriental Studies (SOAS). The records from a quasi-official British think tank offer a view into British and American planning, and also demonstrate a close relationship with the American branch of the IPR and the CFR.

Finally, contemporary publications have been used for further understanding of the historical moment and ideas in circulation. Articles in mainstream publications like the *New York Times*, *Time*, *Fortune*, and *Harpers* reveal how events and policies were explained to the reading public. The articles of syndicated columnists who contributed to these titles were especially important because they reached a large audience on a regular basis. As seen above, politicians used these media pieces in order to understand and respond to public opinion. The actors involved in wartime planning, especially academics and area experts involved with think tanks, also published works in specialist journals such as *Foreign Affairs*, *Far Eastern Survey*, and *Pacific Affairs*. These articles encapsulate the ideas and recommendations of the opinion leaders who wrote them, and have been used to understand the intellectual debates on Japan’s future carried out in the 1930s and 1940s.
Discerning the foreign policy intentions of Franklin Delano Roosevelt is a famously difficult task. The president rarely gave clear indications of his postwar aims and made conflicting statements to his advisers. Roosevelt was also not an expert on East Asia, and postwar Japan was not at the top of his agenda. Nonetheless, FDR considered identifying goals for the postwar world during the war to be “a very valuable thing.”¹ This chapter will address the role of the presidency in policy planning by looking at the involvement and ideas of Roosevelt around postwar planning for Japan. Roosevelt explained in 1942 that he hoped the State Department planning project would provide him a basket of plans into which he could reach to find postwar policy at the end of the conflict.² In his view, planning and speculation about postwar Japan in the government, media, and informed circles all fit neatly into this metaphor. Wartime discussions on postwar plans were not meant to set a definite course, but to build a framework and make future decisions easier. As Roosevelt saw it, during the previous war victors had been left without clear agreed aims because not enough postwar planning had taken place. The participants of the Versailles peace conference had been like ladies packing for a husband's trip moments before his departure. Everyone, Roosevelt recalled, was “rushing around, grabbing things out of closets and throwing them into suitcases.”³ His new basket approach would be more orderly than the ill-considered frenzy which had created a failed peace in 1919.

Roosevelt’s simple picture of the planning process was complicated by his own administrative style. As will be seen below, the president created a deep rift between the White House and the State Department through his reluctance to consult or inform his official experts and advisers. This rift in turn meant that Asia experts in the State Department, who would frame postwar actions, were isolated from actual policy made during the war. Casually made commitments, preconceived ideas, irregular consultation with experts, and rivalry between would-be advisers marred long-range planning in the Roosevelt era.⁴ Before

² Advisory committee initial meeting, 12 Feb 1942. Post-world War II Foreign Policy Planning, State Department Records of Harley Notter, 1939-1945, Bethesda Maryland, File 548-1.
⁴ This characterization of Roosevelt’s administration style is shared by historian Christopher Thorne and, as seen in the evidence below, many contemporary observers. Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978): 113-115. More recently, Frank Costigliola has argued that the disintegration of Roosevelt’s loyal inner circle of advisers left the president alone with his decision making and less able to work with bureaucrats and Congress. Frank Costigliola “Broken Circle: The Isolation of Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 32, No. 5 (November 2008): 689.
April 1945 State Department officials were not the only or even the most important idea generators for postwar plans. It is a challenge to divine which policies Roosevelt considered pulling from the policy basket before his death. In the absence of clear evidence, the president's thinking must be pieced together from his favored sources of information and management of advisers, his postwar plans for Germany and China, his comments on Japan, and the commitments he made at international conferences.

Sources of information and analysis

Roosevelt's particular management style created an atmosphere of policy confusion which characterized postwar planning. The president's relations with his official advisers were particularly strained by his idiosyncrasies. A “cynical man [who]... distrusted everybody”, Roosevelt rarely spoke frankly with his advisers. In 1940 Ambassador Joseph Grew requested information on the president's thinking on Japan. The country, Grew wrote, had veered towards militarism, waged a war of aggression in China, and appeared to be on a collision course with the United States. The ambassador needed to understand his president's views in order to calibrate American policy on the ground. In his understated manner, Grew wrote that without this information, he “at times... felt just a little out on a limb here.”

Roosevelt replied to this reasonable request with vague platitudes. “The problems we face” Roosevelt informed his ambassador, “are so vast and interrelated that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas.” Such a comment left America's ambassador to Japan with very little in the way of guidance from Washington.

The president's lack of interest in official expertise was matched by his desire to find information through unusual channels. As Secretary of War Henry Stimson reflected in his diary, FDR's “ardent” enjoyment of getting “firsthand news... in an irregular way” was a “great mixture of good and bad qualities.” This enthusiasm kept him engaged and supplied with fresh information. However, his preoccupation with getting an inside scoop caused him to undervalue and even ignore the sort of “mature and solid information which comes from orderly processes through the regular channels.” Stimson believed that this was an unfortunate habit which “we shall never be able to cure.”

Officials exploited the president’s

While a cadre of trusted figures able to criticize the president might have tempered some of Roosevelt’s decisions, his management style would still have resulted in rivalries and policy confusion.

5 Reminisces of Walter Lippmann, Columbia Oral History Project. Walter Lippmann, a journalist with extensive links within Government, was in a unique position to evaluate Roosevelt's presidency. His own role in postwar planning is discussed in chapter four.


7 Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Joseph Grew, 21 January 1941, Stanley K Hornbeck Papers, Box 3, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

ad hoc style of decision-making and fascination with “outsider” information by sending him articles and reports, as well as making personal appeals in an attempt to shape Roosevelt’s opinion. For example, Lauchlin Currie, the president’s economic adviser and a China hand, wrote to a colleague that he had been “pushing, scheming, wrangling, bluffing and pleading all the time” to get support for the Chinese Nationalists. 9 Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau also privately resolved to “continue to feed the President suggestions” even when it appeared they would not be heeded. 10 Others asked the president’s secretaries to “slip [documents] into his bag” and aids to forward items on to him. 11 While the approach of collecting bits of information informally gave the president varied information on the issues, his opinion was necessarily colored by the process. Roosevelt was vulnerable to novel ideas presented by enthusiastic favorites and his sources lacked the context and thoughtfulness provided by formal processes.

With no clear channel between the president and his diplomatic corps at the State Department, the president was more likely to receive lengthy field reports from his personal envoys than from stationed embassy officials. Roosevelt had a habit of appointing personal ambassadors when he wanted “inside” information about situations in Europe and Asia. He encouraged foreign leaders to consider these men as his “personal representatives” and to “talk to them frankly.” The presence of unofficial “ambassadors” with the mandate and ear of the president undermined the authority and mission of official ambassadors. 12 Although ambassadors in Asia sent reports back to Washington, these needed to pass from the chief of the division of Far Eastern affairs to the secretary of state, and from there onto the president. 13 For such a document even to reach Roosevelt through normal channels, it needed to suit the interests of both the division chief and the secretary of state, which was no easy task. By contrast, personal representatives had a direct line to the president who was less interested in official reports. The former ambassador to Japan later recalled that “reporting to our Government was like throwing pebbles into a lake at night; we were not permitted to see even the ripples.” 14 While after December 1941 the point was moot for the embassy in Japan, this structural bias remained important to Roosevelt’s understanding of the complicated issue of the internal situation in China. The president’s predilection for sending personal ambassadors provided

9 Lauchlin Currie to John Carter Vincent, 18 September 1941. Lauchlin Currie Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
13 Stanley Hornbeck served as special adviser to the secretary of state during the war but retained his influence in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and his place on the information chain. His personal biases in regard to Asia are discussed in chapter two.
him with observations from brief visits abroad, rather than relying on reporting from officials with more experience in the region. This gave him an understanding of distant countries based largely on anecdotal observations rather than expert analysis.

Roosevelt’s management of his advisers in Washington caused further difficulties. The president viewed the foreign policy-making process as selecting among the recommendations of his advisers, both formal and informal, as it pleased him. This practice caused problems within the administration. FDR’s refusal to consult and collaborate with his experts led to a disconnection between official planning and his own thinking. As Secretary of State Cordell Hull dryly observed, “The President runs foreign affairs. I don't know what's going on.”15 Dean Acheson, assistant secretary of state during the war, later argued that by excluding the secretary of state from his formulation of strategy, Roosevelt created a State Department whose planning process was “theoretical and unreal…absorbed in platonic planning of a utopia.”16 While this work argues that the postwar planning process for Japan did create a solid set of useful and flexible postwar aims, it is certainly true that planners worked in a vacuum, unaware of executive thinking or the relevant international commitments into which the president had entered. Without any assurance that the policies resulting from the bureaucratic planning process would not be cast aside by presidential prerogative after the war, planners must too have felt they were casting stones into a lake at night.

The president’s management of his advisers, with his support of favorites and tendency to play staff against each other, left officials frustrated and confused.17 FDR on occasion enthusiastically adopted new policies which he “handed down” as ready-made decisions “that brooked no rebellion.”18 He also encouraged rivalry. His decision-making process often consisted of setting up a quarrel and then deciding the best course after hearing both sides, a practice which drove officials “absolutely stark, staring mad.”19 Roosevelt so preferred Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Hull that the former was widely recognized as the unofficial secretary until the end of his career.20 As a result of such behavior, Cordell Hull openly considered resignation at least twice, complaining that he was “constantly affronted and

20 Welles was forced to resign, much to the resentment of Roosevelt, after political enemies threatened to create a scandal around his sexual orientation and misconduct. For more on Welles' work on postwar planning, which particularly focused on Latin America, see Christopher D. O'Sullivan, *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
made unhappy by having… somebody… spring a fast diversion in foreign policy over his head, and finding out that the President stood by some favorite.”

In an egregious example of this, Roosevelt in 1944 suddenly adopted Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau’s radical plan to transform postwar Germany into an agrarian society after lunching with him. The president maintained his support for the plan over vocal protests from his cabinet, and in spite of the fact that the plan contradicted a consensus on postwar Germany created by years of planning. Hull considered this “a repudiation.” A colleague reported that the secretary was “worried sick and had not slept for two or three nights…” as a result of the president’s poor management.

Although Roosevelt abandoned the plan as quickly as he had adopted it, the secretary of war noted that the incident illustrated the “chaotic” nature of the administration because Roosevelt would easily “sign any paper… presented to him by one of his advisers without waiting for the criticism and counsel of the others.” Later, when Hull did resign, the president selected the younger and weak-willed Ed Stettinius to replace him. Roosevelt informed Stettinius that James Byrnes, a powerful and well-qualified senator, had been considered for the position, but that he had decided on Stettinius because “Jimmy might question who was boss.” Stettinius agreed to take the position, tactically conceding that the president had sole decision making power in the realm of foreign policy, on the condition that Roosevelt keep the State Department better informed of his plans. There is little evidence that even this small promise was kept.

China as Great Power and ally

Roosevelt’s hopes for postwar China were clearer than his thoughts on Japan. Because it was assumed that the former would take on the role of leading Asian power, and would cooperate with American interests, postwar Japan could be marginalized. In turn, policy towards China was shaped by the fact that, from 1942, the administration supported the idea that a collective security system maintained by an international police force should be created after the war. President Roosevelt took this idea a step further. As he explained to his secretary of state in the spring of 1943, he hoped to achieve the goal of disarmament which had failed after the First World War. To his way of thinking, America, Britain, Russia and China would act as a “world police” while the other powers disarmed, with the eventual goal of

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22 September 26, 1944. The Adolf A Berle Diary, 376. The position of Morgenthau and his Treasury Department in postwar planning will be considered again in the next chapter.
universal disarmament. The president was a vocal advocate for China’s future place as a member of the “big four.” In 1943 Roosevelt stated in a closed meeting that he “thought that China might become a very useful power in the Far East to help police Japan and that he wanted to strengthen China in every possible way.” Such support was crucial, as Roosevelt was opposed to the idea of long-term expensive American military commitments abroad. This plan limited the potential role that Japan might play in the postwar world and helps to explain why Roosevelt so rarely discussed Japan’s future.

Roosevelt's personal connections to China may have played a role in his faith in the future of US-China relations. His maternal grandfather, Warren Delano, had made his fortune in trading tea and opium as a businessman in Canton in the previous century. Indeed, the president’s mother had lived in Hong Kong for several years as a young girl. As a child, FDR was treated to stories about his mother's life there, and the house in which he grew up was decorated with artifacts from his grandfather's period in China.

As an adult, Roosevelt's views were likely influenced by the pro-China sentiment prevalent in the popular media in the 1920s and 1930s and American support for the “open door” policy. In 1923, he admitted that it was often difficult for Americans (a group in which he presumably included himself) to see the Japanese perspective on international events because of a widely held pro-Chinese attitude. It was also believed that the Nationalist regime (KMT) had a deep affinity with American interests and values. The KMT defined itself in opposition to three other domestic political forces; the imperial dynasty which had collapsed in the revolution of 1912, the chaos and warlordism which the party had overcome to assume power in 1926, and its major political rival, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Thus, Nationalist China tied its political legitimacy to the idea of a unified China marked a by stable, rule-based political system which was opposed to “despotism” and communism. This model of modernism seemed to harmonize with the American ideals of democracy and free trade, especially given the significant number of American-educated Chinese officials within the party. The Roosevelts also enjoyed a good relationship

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27 In February 1944, the advisory committee noted that the “President does not want any plan under which the U.S. would be bound to send troops on the Western Hemisphere and perhaps in the Pacific.” “Passages in the minutes of Advisory committee and it’s subcommittees Reflecting Consultation with the President” 8 February 1944. Post-war II Foreign Policy Planning, State Department Records of Harley Notter, 1939-1945, Bethesda Maryland. File 548-1.
28 Thorough searches of Roosevelt’s papers, as well as records of interaction with planners and Asia experts, have revealed no presidential level discussion of Japan’s postwar position beyond the treatment of the Japanese people.
29 T Y Wickham to Henry Wallace, 27 March 1941, Box 88 Reel 41. Henry Wallace Papers, Roosevelt Study Center.
31 Media and popular opinion is discussed in chapter four of this work. For more on positive American views on China, see T. Christopher Jespersen, *American Images of China, 1931-1949* (Stanford University Press, 1996).
33 Christopher Thorne uses the presence of American educated officials to explain the KMT's pro-American, as opposed to pro-British, orientation. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, 80.
with China’s first couple, the Chiangs, who were popular Westernized figures in the United States.\textsuperscript{34} Finally, Allied portrayal of China as a great power could provide “rhetorical compensation” against Japanese wartime propaganda which depicted the war as a struggle for Asian liberation from foreign domination.\textsuperscript{35} Such factors were reinforced by the pro-Chinese bias held by many of Roosevelt’s close advisers, including Lauchlin Currie, the State Department’s most powerful Asianist Stanley Hornbeck, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. For example, in 1943 Roosevelt was assured by an adviser that Chiang would “follow your leadership” because China favored “democracy and liberty... [as] opposed to the principals of imperialism and communism.”\textsuperscript{36} China seemed a natural ally to the United States.

Roosevelt’s support for China and the KMT remained a driving force for the country’s inclusion on the list of great postwar powers throughout the war. In 1942, at an Anglo-American meeting on postwar problems initiated by the president, FDR sought to build a consensus on China’s future status as “one of the four controlling powers after the war.”\textsuperscript{37} Although an agreement was reached at this and other meetings, the British were never fully convinced of China’s viability as a great power, which the Prime Minister referred to as “the great American illusion”.\textsuperscript{38} Roosevelt and his top advisers continued to support China as one of the four great powers even though the latter became increasingly unstable.\textsuperscript{39} At the Tehran Conference in fall 1943, Roosevelt qualified his support for China in conversation with the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. He explained that he understood the current weakness of China, but continued support out of consideration for the long-term potential of the country.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, even as troubles in China became apparent the United States remained its champion amongst the Allies.

Roosevelt’s administration began to consider working with rivals to Chiang’s leadership in the face of mounting evidence of corruption and incompetence within China’s Nationalist government. Reaching out to Chiang’s rivals within the KMT and to leaders in the Communist Party would provide the basis for continued Sino-American relations in case of a coup, civil war, or the collapse of Chiang’s regime. In 1944 and 1945, officials had a remarkably ambivalent attitude toward Chinese communism, and many

\textsuperscript{34} Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and his wife were named “Man & Wife of the Year” by Time Magazine in 1937, a symbol of the popularity the couple enjoyed. The press made much of the American education and accent of Madame Chiang (Soong Mei-ling), and the couple’s Christian faith. The corresponding article noted, “no woman in the West holds so great a position as Mme Chiang Kai-shek holds in China. Her rise and that of her husband, the Geralissimo, in less than a generation to moral and material leadership of the ancient Chinese people cover a great page of history.” Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, \textit{Time}, 3 January, 1938.


\textsuperscript{36} Patrick Hurley to Roosevelt, as cited in Thorne, \textit{Allies of a Kind}, 307.

\textsuperscript{37} Memorandum of Conversation, 27 March 1943. Reel 30. Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress.

\textsuperscript{38} Edward Stettinius to Harry Truman, 18 April 1945. Reel 15. Truman Office Files Part III, Roosevelt Study Center.


reports crossed the president’s desk which frankly enumerated the faults of the ruling party. Chinese communists were often described as having strong morale and solid public support gained through practical reforms. As a result of the failure of the KMT to absorb the competing political forces into a unified government, American officials began to stress a more flexible approach to the Chinese leadership. As early as May 1944, officials suggested showing “a sympathetic interest in the Communists and liberal groups in China” because the present leadership rendered China “too weak to serve as a possible counter-weight to Russia.” Communist and leftist groups would be an important force in any democratic China and, it was believed, would “naturally gravitate” to the US. Shortly before his death, Roosevelt demonstrated both his frustration with the KMT and willingness to consider alternatives to Chiang by writing a cordial letter to the leader of the Communist group, Mao Tse-tung.

In practice, rather than abandoning support for Chiang's regime, Americans approached the conflict between the KMT and CCP with a mix of aid and good offices. Policy-makers like Roosevelt and Hull argued that solid American backing, rhetorical and financial, was the best chance for stabilizing Chiang’s leadership. China's continued resistance to Japan was vital to America's war effort in the Pacific. Beyond its value in fighting the Japanese, Chinese cooperation with Western powers undermined Japanese war propaganda about ending European imperialism and creating an “Asia for Asiatics.” This was particularly important after Japan granted rhetorical independence to former British, American and Dutch territories. It would have been a severe blow to the Allies had China surrendered or allowed the creation of a puppet state, as had France in Europe. A strong, politically unified China was the best safeguard against such an eventuality, and a compelling reason to side-line Chiang's rivals, none of whom offered the hope of a legitimate alternative to the current government.

42 For example, Harry Hopkins to FDR, 6 September 1944. Reel 6, FDR Office Files Part II, Roosevelt Study Center. This reel contains several reports on the strength of the Communists and describing them in a positive light.
44 Roosevelt did not reply to a letter from Mao which he received in November 1944 until March 1945, following four months of frustration at Chiang’s unwillingness to compromise with the powerful Chinese communists in his country. FDR to Mao Tse-tung, 10 March 1945. Reel 6, FDR Office Files Part II, Roosevelt Study Center.
45 Henry A. Wallace to FDR, 10 July 1944, Reel 6, FDR Office Files Part II, Diplomatic Correspondence.
46 Memoranda of Conversation, Foreign Policy, 24 July 1944. Subject File, Japan. Cordell Hull Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
47 This concern was common among the Allies. For example, British Joint Intelligence Committee reports, 7 June 1942 and 4 Jan 1943. Cited in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 192.
48 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 339.
49 Hull made this point about importance of China's continued resistance, with the unspoken contrast to France, in an NBC radio address in 1943. “Text of Radio Address By Secretary Hull Outlining Policies of the State Department,” New York Times, 12 September 1943.
China’s role as a military ally became less important as the American island-hopping campaign built up momentum in early 1944. By summertime, attacks on central Pacific islands had put the allies within bombing range of Japan proper using B-29 aircraft. American troops could close in on Japan through islands in the Pacific, shifting the focus of strategic plans away from mainland Asia. This new situation corresponded with a low ebb in US-China relations, as American generals voiced criticism of Chiang’s commitment to and value in the present war. American army planners argued that the war with Japan would be over before the Chinese army was properly trained and equipped through aid and lend lease. China was thus marginalized in wartime military plans, and also appeared less important to postwar plans. However, the existing consensus and lack of support for any alternative resulted in policy inertia over the China issue. Although forced to consider the real possibility of China descending into civil war, Roosevelt maintained his faith and support in Chiang’s regime and a strong postwar China which could share the burden of building peace and stability in the region. In January 1945, Roosevelt still argued that despite its current weakness, China would unite and modernize to assume leadership of the entire area that Japan had tried to seize. The position of the US in regard to China at the end of the war thus remained one of cautious but committed support.

**Enemies: the case of Germany**

The fate of Germany, the other major Axis power, was closely tied to postwar Japan. The link between planning for Germany and Japan is not surprising. Each country was the dominant enemy in a major theater of the conflict, and both would have to be disarmed and pacified by the Allies upon surrender. Given this connection, it is quite natural that the president would choose to base his policy toward Japan, a country about which he knew little, on an evolving policy toward Germany, a country about which he felt he knew a great deal. Europe, and by extension Germany, was culturally and geographically closer to the frame of reference of the president, whose Dutch heritage was tied to his identity. Roosevelt had a

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52 Memorandum of Conference with the President, 2 January 1945, Campbell and Herring, *The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.*, 210.
53 As noted above, the depiction of the Roosevelt administration offered here is broadly in line with that of Christopher Thorne. However, there is good reason to take a more sympathetic view of Roosevelt's China policy than does Thorne, who calls Roosevelt's China policy “ill-conceived, inefficient and irresponsible.” China had great potential value as a postwar ally and very real value in the present conflict. In addition, as we have seen, there was a broad range of possible shared interests between the US and Chinese Nationalist governments.
54 Roosevelt was by no means alone in this approach. For example, Stalin argued that Germany would again become a threat unless harshly dealt with and strictly monitored, and added, as an afterthought, that the same was true of Japan. Bohlen minutes, Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, 29 November, 1943. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961): 532.
55 Roosevelt’s temper was often described as “getting his Dutch up”, see for example, Hubert Kay, “Wendell Willkie”, *Life*, 13 May 1940, 100.
further connection which was important to his thinking on Germany. As a boy he had taken a bicycle trip around the country, and often cited this as evidence of his deep understanding of the German people.\textsuperscript{56} He had little such first-hand experience to ground his impressions of the Japanese.

For President Roosevelt and others, learning the supposed “lessons” of the First World War was the key to proper treatment of postwar Germany and the prevention of future conflict. In a 1944 speech Roosevelt linked the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan to “the 1918 situation”, in which Germany had avoided occupation through surrender. Because Berlin had successfully “dodged” occupation and had gone on to create a new conflict, following the current war Germany and Japan would be occupied by Allied troops “regardless of when or how they surrendered.”\textsuperscript{57} Japan's fate was thus sealed by the imagined lessons learned from the behavior of the Germans after the Great War, a war in which Japan had fought on the same side as the United States and Great Britain.\textsuperscript{58}

The president's adoption of the Morgenthau plan was another link between planning for Japan and Germany. As noted above, in August 1944 Roosevelt suddenly embraced his treasury secretary’s enthusiasm for inflicting punishment on the German, and by extension the Japanese, people. This was a radical shift from existing policy. Up to that point, postwar planning for Germany had progressed along similar lines to planning for Japan.\textsuperscript{59} It was assumed that postwar Germany, with its large and productive population and strong industrial capacity, would play a part in rebuilding Europe, and similar plans were developed for Japan in Asia.\textsuperscript{60} Under the new plan, Germany would be stripped of its industrial potential, reducing the country to an agricultural economy and removing it from future economic or political power in Europe. This entirely contradicted the consensus created in the planning groups but had some precedent in Roosevelt's thinking. In 1943 Roosevelt, ignoring the debate within bureaucratic planning groups about whether heavy industry would be needed to sustain the Japanese economy, drew up his own memorandum on postwar aviation. Policing would be needed to make sure that neither the Germans nor the Japanese

\textsuperscript{56} Reminiscences of Walter Lippmann, 219. Occupation of Japan Project, Oral History Research Office of Columbia University, 1969. The crippling polio which made it impossible for Roosevelt even to stand without leg braces did not strike until 1921, at which time Roosevelt was already building his career. Greg Robinson, \textit{By Order of the President}, 33.
\textsuperscript{57} “Foes Won't Escape Occupation Again, President Asserts,” \textit{New York Times}, Aug 18, 1944.
\textsuperscript{58} For more on Japan in WWI, see Frederick Dickinson, \textit{War and national reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919} (Boston: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001).
\textsuperscript{59} As in the case of Japan, plans for Germany were developed in area subcommittees of the State Department and later the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee. For an analysis of this bureaucratic planning process, see chapter two.
were able to “fly anything larger than one of those toy planes that you wind up with elastic.” Japan planners believed that crushing industry and impoverishing the country would undermine future security by fuelling desperation and radicalism. A Japan reliant on trade, by contrast, would be tied into the regional system and support postwar rehabilitation throughout the region. Roosevelt did not necessarily agree.

FDR’s support of the Morgenthau scheme lasted only a few weeks, during which time he signed up to the policy, brought Morgenthau to an international conference in Quebec to push for British support, and just as quickly denounced the plan after it received negative response in the press. However, the administrative changes made in this brief window altered the planning process for Germany until the end of the war. The German subcommittee was replaced by a new group, the Informal Policy Committee on Germany (IPCOG), in order to include the Treasury Department in planning. Because Japan was not as pressing an issue for Morgenthau, the move to include Treasury in postwar planning for Japan did not come until much later and was successfully contained by officials in the State Department.

Although the bureaucratic planning structure for Japan was not affected by Morgenthau’s intervention into Germany policy, as long as Roosevelt supported the plan for Germany he considered that it applied to Japan too. Without consulting other officials, Roosevelt allowed his enthusiasm for the new German plan to override the recommendations of other advisers and experts on both countries. Morgenthau recorded the president’s passionate support for a punitive peace in his diary. “You either have to castrate the German people,” Roosevelt told him, “or you have to threaten them in such a manner that they can’t just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.” Morgenthau left the meeting with no doubt about FDR’s support of the plan, even if the president’s other advisers violently opposed it. Roosevelt was convinced of the inherent militarism of the German people, arguing that uniforms, parades, and “marching of any kind” ought to be banned in postwar Germany to avoid future

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62 The idea of Japan as an engine of regional recovery entered the public discourse after Dean Acheson’s famous 1947 speech which called Japan the workshop of Asia, but it was a familiar line of argument in wartime planning circles. Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, *The Requirements of Reconstruction*, 8 May, 1947. Text of the speech is available at http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/nss/documents/acheson-reconstruction.html. Accessed May 2012.

63 The story is recounted by Henry Stimson, who was frustrated and angered by Roosevelt’s support of the plan over the objections of his other advisers. 29 March 1945, 207-210. Reel 9. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. The British, eager to garner further American aid through an extension of the lend lease program, accepted this plan at the Quebec conference. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, 389.

64 As will be explained in chapter two, by the time Morgenthau made his request for involvement in planning for Japan, FDR had died and the Treasury Secretary’s influence had waned. This allowed Joseph Grew, a former ambassador to Japan deeply interested in the country’s future, to use his position as acting secretary of state to block Morgenthau’s request.

aggression. The president also “used some example about Japan,” to illustrate his support for the plan by “showing how tough he is going to be.”\(^{67}\) Without consulting Asia experts or other advisers, Roosevelt tied the Japanese to Morgenthau's plan for Germany.

Unwilling to devolve decision-making to area specialists, Roosevelt based his plans for both countries on irregular sources of analysis and what he thought he knew about German people and history. Roosevelt was content to attach Japan to his prescriptions for Germany, despite the fact that Japan’s rapid population growth and comparatively low agricultural output made the Morgenthau plan impossible to implement without the threat of mass starvation. However, Roosevelt may not have been aware of the unsuitability of the Morgenthau plan for Japan because, although a report on the question had been approved and was the basis of further official planning for Japan’s economy, Roosevelt did not read or request many reports from the bureaucratic planners. He would have been informed had he consulted the Asia specialists before adopting Morgenthau’s plan.\(^{68}\) Roosevelt's plans to strip Japan of its colonies, discussed below, would make it particularly vulnerable. Unlike Germany, which had a rich agricultural base, Japan's arable land was insufficient to feed its population.\(^{69}\) It is clear from this that the president’s policy direction for Japan, though not clearly articulated during the war, was based firmly on his mercurial and ill-suited plans for postwar Germany.

**Defining Japan**

Several factors suggest that racial bias was involved in Roosevelt's thinking on Japan itself. The president certainly believed that set characteristics were carried in the blood of peoples and races. Roosevelt's racial thinking on the Japanese began with his views on mixing that population and other races in the 1920s. Roosevelt supported the 1924 exclusion act, which had caused friction between the American and Japanese governments by banning Japanese immigration. He argued in a published column that such restrictions were justified because Japanese nationals could not assimilate with white Americans. “Mingling of Asiatic blood with European or American blood produces,” he wrote, “in nine cases out of ten, the most unfortunate results.” This was not, however, intended as a slight against “pure” Japanese,

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who he imagined would feel the same “repugnance” that he did at intermarrying or mixing populations.⁷⁰ His columns made a distinction between European immigrants, who were deemed to be useful in revitalizing American communities, and Asian immigrants, whose genetic influence would be detrimental to the future American population.⁷¹ This idea that Europeans were able to assimilate, while Asians were not, demonstrated the perceived distance in culture and blood between Americans and Japanese. These were long-held beliefs, reflected in Roosevelt’s writings over a period of years.⁷² A decade later, Roosevelt privately observed that aggression was “in the blood” of the Japanese leadership.⁷³

During the war, Roosevelt ordered funding for research on relocating displaced groups around the world following the long conflict. This research, known as the M Project, considered “problems arising out of racial admixtures” resulting from moving populations. FDR was a product of a time in which scientific racism and the idea of a yellow peril held significant currency in American thought. As part of the project, he wrote an involved professor and asked him to consider if the “less developed skulls” of the Japanese might explain the racial characteristic of “nefariousness.”⁷⁴ Craniometry, which attempted to identify and explain behavioral traits by examining the shape of the head, was a trend within nineteenth-century scientific racism. If Japanese militarism were caused by racial flaws, rather than the social, political or economic factors considered by Asia experts, peace could not be assured by social engineering. In such a case, a “hard peace” of repression and monitoring would be necessary.

Roosevelt’s actions toward Japanese-Americans provide a more mixed picture. Roosevelt considered the treatment of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War in two different contexts, internment and military service.⁷⁵ In 1936, fully five years before the US and Japan went to war, FDR wrote to his chief of operations in Hawaii about identifying Japanese and Japanese-Americans to be put on a list as “the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble.”⁷⁶ Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt responded to a request by the secretary of navy to remove “people of Japanese blood” from the strategically important island of Oahu to another island “where they can be made to work for their living and produce much of their own food.” Roosevelt agreed and added that he did “not worry about the constitutional question.” Neither man referred to the Americans of Japanese ancestry as American citizens.

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⁷¹ Franklin Roosevelt, “We Lack a Sense of Humor If We Forget That Not So Very Long Ago We Were Immigrants Ourselves,” 21 April 1925, in Donald Carmichael ed, F.D.R., Columnist, 38.

⁷² For example, these ideas were included in two other articles published by Roosevelt in the 1920s quoted in Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 11 and 38.

⁷³ Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 49.

⁷⁴ Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 159.

⁷⁵ Internment is considered again in chapter five.

⁷⁶ Franklin Roosevelt to Chief of Operations, 10 August 1936. Reel 33. FDR Office File Part 3, RSC.
in this correspondence beyond Roosevelt’s reference to constitutionalism, but instead called for the evacuation and supervision of “Japanese.” However, when considering the question of Japanese-American military service, Roosevelt took an entirely different position. He argued that any loyal American ought to be allowed to serve his country, as “Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry.” These two examples indicate that his treatment of Japanese-Americans was a matter of expediency rather than moral conviction. Race was certainly an important issue in Roosevelt’s thinking on Japan. However, the case of his treatment of Japanese-Americans suggests that racism was not an insurmountable feature ingrained in his thinking, but could be overcome as a matter of convenience.

Roosevelt’s personal knowledge of individual Japanese was to a great extent limited to his relationship with two men, Kichisaburo Nomura and Otohiko Matsukata. When Roosevelt wrote in 1925 that his position against Japanese immigration was not anti-Japanese, he noted that he knew “a great many cultivated, highly educated and delightful Japanese.” This is likely a reference to Matsukata and Nomura. Roosevelt met socially with Nomura, the Japanese naval attaché in Washington, during his service as assistant secretary of the navy. Although the two maintained occasional correspondence until the mid-1930s, the relationship did not appear to impact Roosevelt's thinking on Japan as a nation. Otohiko Matsukata was more influential. He was a former classmate of Roosevelt's at Harvard, at the time the only Japanese national enrolled there. Although Matsukata had been a personal friend in this period, the connection ironically helped to harden the Roosevelt's later perception of Japanese foreign policy. As university students in 1902, Matsukata and Roosevelt had apparently had a conversation about Japanese expansionism and plans for the conquest of Asia. After Japan's shift toward militarism in the 1930s, Roosevelt repeatedly recalled this discussion in private conversations, remarking that the Japanese “seem to be carrying out this plan.” Thus, speculative conversation between two young people came to serve an American president as evidence of a Japanese conspiracy for domination.

A people capable of holding on to secret plans made decades in advance would be a great threat to the postwar world, unlikely to be neutralized by military defeat alone. The president presented such a picture of Japanese history in a speech before Congress in 1942. “Japan’s scheme of conquest,” he informed them, “goes back half a century. It is not merely a policy of seeking living room, it was a plan which

77 Correspondence between Frank Knox and Franklin Roosevelt, 23 and 26 February 1942. Reel 5. FDR Office Files Part 1, RSC.
78 Franklin Roosevelt to Henry Stimson, 1 February 1943. Box 88 Reel 41. Henry Wallace Papers, RSC.
80 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 11.
81 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 49.
included the subjugation of all the peoples in the Far East and in the islands of the Pacific…” In apportioning blame for Japan’s aggression, Roosevelt made no distinction between leadership and the people. A study by the Office of War Information (OWI) study found that the president differentiated between German leadership and the German people about 75 percent of the time, referring to “Hitler” and the “Nazis” as the enemy. By contrast, Roosevelt referred almost exclusively to “Japan” as a whole when referring to the enemy, in 105 of 116 references identified. Other important figures in the administration, the secretary and undersecretary of state, and Harry Truman’s predecessor as vice president, Henry Wallace were better able to draw a distinction between the Japanese people and military leadership than was Roosevelt. They did so in only about half of their references.83

In a campaign speech made in late summer 1944, Roosevelt specifically linked the acts of the Japanese government to the people. The Japanese cannot be trusted, he informed a crowd of reporters, because “whether or not the people of Japan itself know and approve of what their warlords have done for nearly a century, the fact remains that they seem to have been giving hearty approval to the Japanese policy of acquisition of their neighbors and their neighbors’ lands and military and economic control of as many other nations as they can get their hands on.” Shortly before Roosevelt’s adoption of the Morgenthau plan for Germany, he publicly stated that after its surrender Japan must be “sealed off” from the rest of the world until it proved “willing and able to live with peaceful nations.”84 The question of separating ordinary people from their leaders was important in handling postwar treatment of enemy countries. “Indiscriminate hatred may be a mighty weapon,” the report stated, “but it is likely to be impeding to a satisfactory peace.”85 Roosevelt’s conflation of the Japanese people and government, along with his suspicions about Japanese racial characteristics, indicate that he might very well have supported a hard peace to punish and restrain the Japanese people after the war.

Wartime conferences and international agreements

While his ideas on postwar plans above have been inferred from conversations, statements and publications, Roosevelt’s record on wartime commitments is clearer. Roosevelt took direct control of policy-making at conferences and international agreements with America’s allies, often to the exclusion of the State Department and other agencies.86 Publicized announcements on the results of these conferences

82 FDR speech to congress, 6 Jan 1942, Quoted in “The Nature of the Enemy” 11 August 1942, OWI, Bol, reports and special memoranda, RG44, MLR: 171 Loc 130 : 41/40/1-4. Box 1849. NARA.
83 Ibid.
86 Of the wartime conferences, those taking place at Cairo and Tehran (November-December, 1943), Quebec (September 1944) and Yalta (February 1945) were most relevant to Japan planning and are discussed here.
were the major source of popular understanding about postwar plans. Bureaucratic planners, largely isolated from presidential thinking or approval, adjusted their recommendations to incorporate the public commitments made at international conferences. Although planners were unaware of some of the secret outcomes from these conferences, Roosevelt’s international commitments became his biggest contribution to postwar planning. They formed the basis of public and world expectations.

The first such major contribution to postwar planning came while America was still neutral. The Atlantic Charter, signed by the American president and Britain’s prime minister on August 14, 1941, publicly committed both countries to a set of common principles for the postwar world. Several of these principles would later be significant for the treatment of postwar Japan and the disposition of its territories. The section on international trade and resources was incorporated into bureaucratic planning and became an issue of contention amongst officials. The first and second of the Atlantic Charter principles rejected territorial aggrandizement and stated that any territory changes would be made in accordance “with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.” As seen below, these commitments would sit uncomfortably with Allied plans later in the war.

On occasion, the president made commitments privately without the knowledge of anyone in Washington. Shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Allied leaders anticipated the failure of US-Japan negotiations to prevent conflict, and assumed that Japan would strike out in order to gain access to new supplies. It was generally believed that the Japanese would press further into Dutch or British possessions in Southeast Asia in search of oil. What the American response to such a move would be was unknown. In view of the strong isolationist and anti-imperialist sentiments in popular opinion, would the US be reluctant to provide military support or declare war on Japan in defense of European colonies? The question was handled in a particularly Rooseveltian manner. On December 2, 1941, during a conversation with the British ambassador, the president “threw in an aside” that “we should obviously all be together” fighting Japan in case of an attack. Roosevelt repeated this pledge to the ambassador two days later, but it appears that he never informed the members of his cabinet or other high-level officials that he had committed the country to war.

In 1943 the heads of the three major powers engaged in war against Japan met at Cairo. At this summit, the US, China and Britain considered concerted plans for postwar East Asia. While the secretaries of state, war and navy, and lower-level regional experts had a difficult time getting the president’s ear in the

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87 See chapter two.
89 Halifax Diary, 2 December 1941, CAB 65/20. As cited in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 77.
90 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 88.
run up to Cairo, the ideas FDR brought to the summit were developed gradually and in conversation with representatives of Britain and China. In March 1942 Roosevelt invited Britain’s foreign secretary Anthony Eden to meet with himself, the secretary and undersecretary of state to discuss the future of East Asia. The principles Roosevelt proposed in this meeting match the key points agreed at Cairo a year and a half later. The president suggested returning Manchuria and Formosa to China, creating an international trusteeship for Korea, and “internationalizing” Japan’s mandated islands for the purpose of keeping peace. Eden indicated approval of Roosevelt’s proposals. In the Cairo Declaration, the US, Great Britain and China declared that Japan would be “stripped” of Pacific islands it had occupied since 1914, Korea would be administered by the allies until fit for self-governance. The return of Manchuria and Formosa to China was also agreed at the conference.

The Chinese too were included in executive thinking before Cairo. Chiang’s regime was kept informed about the outlines of these plans through the personal emissaries sent by Roosevelt to China’s wartime capital Chongqing, and the subject was discussed at high-level meetings in Washington. In 1942, Roosevelt sent both Lauchlin Currie and his defeated campaign challenger Wendell Willkie on missions to China. Currie and Chiang discussed the reversion of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty after Japan’s defeat, which Chiang insisted must go ahead in spite of potential objections from the Soviet Union, Japan, or Chinese communists. Owen Lattimore, a respected if opinionated expert on the Far East and Roosevelt-appointed adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, also kept the Chinese informed on Roosevelt’s postwar plans.

**Occupation forces**

The Chiang-Roosevelt meeting at Cairo also briefly covered unformed ideas on an occupation of Japan. Both sides were interested in a substantial Chinese role in an Allied military occupation. On the American side, the presence of Chinese troops would weaken the perceived connection between Allied policy and European imperialism, while reducing the costs and manpower burden of the project for the US. China

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91 Mem-con, Post-war Problems, 27 March 1942. Subject File, Japan, Reel 30, Hull Papers, Library of Congress. The idea of “internationalization” for Japan’s island mandates would be presented at Cairo as UN-appointed American trusteeship of the islands for bases in the Pacific.
92 Cairo Declaration, 1 Dec 1943, FRUS Cairo and Tehran, 448-9.
95 For example, a 1942 letter from Lattimore to Chiang sketched out Roosevelt’s concept of the “big four” powers, the US, Soviet Union, China and Great Britain, as “policemen”, guaranteeing peace in the postwar world. America, Russia and China were to be the three big powers in the North Pacific. Lattimore’s insight into Roosevelt’s thinking came from Currie, who discussed Asia issues with the president. Final draft letter from Owen Lattimore to Chiang Kai-shek. 28 December 1942. Box 5. Lauchlin Currie Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
was interested in asserting its place as a new great power and demonstrating its value as a partner in the region. In 1942 the quasi-official Chinese delegation to a conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations recommended “Allied Asiatic troops” occupy Tokyo after Japan’s defeat. This position was repeated for a domestic Chinese audience in April 1943 through a government-approved lead newspaper editorial.96 Although there is no record of discussion between Roosevelt or his emissaries and Chinese officials on an occupation before the Cairo meeting, he may well have known about China’s interest in participation through Currie or Welles, who had been present at the IPR conference.97 However, when Roosevelt proposed that China should take the leading role in the occupation of Japan, Chiang refused, stating that China was unprepared for such “considerable responsibility”.98 Although eager for recognition as a great power, China imagined itself in an auxiliary role supporting American-led management for postwar Japan.

Dividing territory

President Roosevelt, the State War and Navy Departments, and the Allies largely agreed on plans to dismantle Japan's empire after the war.99 This was partly because of anti-imperialist sentiment in the US and China, and partly because, regardless of statements to the contrary in the Atlantic Charter and Cairo Declaration, the Allies had territorial interests in Japan’s possessions. Major prizes included island chains in the north and south of Japan, and the Pacific islands that had been granted to Japan as mandates after the Great War. The Declaration established that Formosa and Manchuria would be returned to China.

When discussing Japanese-controlled territories with Chiang at Cairo, Roosevelt brought up the Ryukyu Islands in southern Japan, inquiring “more than once whether China would want” them.100 The Ryukyu Islands had historically been an independent kingdom, but were formally incorporated into Japan proper as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. Because the offer was made without consultation with Japan experts, this was likely the result of the president's ignorance, rather than an attempt to partition the Japanese home islands.101 Unsurprisingly, Chiang refused the offer, which would have involved the complicated task of

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97 As stated above, Currie was particularly interested in China and often discussed the subject with the president, and Welles was a Roosevelt favorite.
98 Liu argues that Chiang was surprised by Roosevelt’s proposal and that his hesitation was a ploy to secure further American military aid. Liu, A Partnership for Disorder, 134. Neither of these points are convincing. China had previously expressed interest in providing troops for an occupation, and, as seen below, did receive a commitment for substantial postwar military aid during this meeting.
99 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 371.
100 Chinese Summary Record, Roosevelt-Chiang Dinner Meeting, 23 Nov 1943. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, 323-324.
101 Marc Gallicchio argues that Roosevelt’s offer of Japanese Okinawa was not an error but part of a larger plan, discussed below, to surround the former belligerent with Allied “strong points” to maintain postwar security. Marc Gallicchio, “The Kuriles Controversy: U.S. Diplomacy in the Soviet-Japan Border dispute, 1941-1946,” Pacific
annexing a part of Japan proper with a significant civilian population.\textsuperscript{102} As publicly stated later, it was agreed that Formosa and Manchuria would both be returned to China.\textsuperscript{103} The US was inclined to support the reversion of Formosa to an ally, and insistence on Chinese rights in Manchuria had been a sticking point in prewar negotiations between America and Japan.

America also had interests in Japan's League of Nations mandate islands. While these islands, collectively known as Micronesia, were small in terms of landmass and population, they spread out as points covering an ocean area nearly the size of the continental United States.\textsuperscript{104} Both Washington planners and the president agreed that the US should use these Pacific islands as bases, either through international trusteeship or direct control, to increase American power in the region and to deny them to potential future aggressors. It was important, however, that the annexation of bases across the Pacific would appear to be motivated by peace and collective security, rather than imperialism and territorial expansion which had, been explicitly rejected by the Atlantic Charter and Cairo Declaration. This tension is apparent in Roosevelt’s explanation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the summer of 1944. Although stating that the country was “seeking no additional territory as the result of this war,” Roosevelt noted that the as-yet-uncreated United Nations organization could ask the US to “act as a trustee for the Japanese mandated islands.” This would give America the “military authority to protect” the populations of these islands, which would justify building fortifications.\textsuperscript{105} While the trusteeship solution exposed America to accusations of hypocrisy, it also prevented an open scramble for territorial spoils.\textsuperscript{106} Americans sought to use strategic bases and free trade as an alternative to traditional colonialism. Independence for America’s colony in the Philippines, for example, was predicated on the assumption that America would be invited to continue its military presence there.\textsuperscript{107} During the war, this thinking was applied to Japan's empire, and would later be applied to the country itself.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Historical Review} Vol 60 No 1 (Feb 1991): 77. If so, it would be the only Chinese involvement in a plan discussed between the Americans and Russians.

\textsuperscript{102} Liu offers a different explanation for Chiang’s response to Roosevelt’s offer of the Ryukyus. He suggests that Chiang rejected the offer as “gesture of self-denial”, possibly to ease American concern over Chinese expansionism. Liu, \textit{A Partnership for Disorder}, 137.

\textsuperscript{103} Formosa had become Japan’s first colony in 1895 in the settlement which followed the first Sino-Japanese War.


\textsuperscript{105} As quoted in Thorne, \textit{Allies of a Kind}, 491.

\textsuperscript{106} D. Michael Green, “America’s Strategic Trusteeship Dilemma: Its Humanitarian Obligations,” 33.

\textsuperscript{107} For example, a Council on Foreign Relations WPS report declared that the US would likely need to retain bases and “use” of the Philippines in an uncertain postwar situation. However, the report assured that political leaders there would “certainly agree” to continuing American military presence. “Post-war United States- Philippine Relations” (preliminary draft), Territorial Group, 18 August 1942. Call No. 104.3, Box 299, Folder 3. Council on Foreign Relations Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University.

\textsuperscript{108} The 1952 peace treaty which ended the Allied occupation of Japan was negotiated simultaneously with a US-Japan security treaty which allowed for American retention of bases in Japan.
The dismemberment of Japan's empire, announced in the Cairo Declaration, was confirmed by the Allies in 1944. This time, the Soviet Union was included in the discussions. Stalin had been supportive of American base ambitions at Tehran in 1943, stating that the victors must “occupy strong points” in the area in order to prevent Japan from becoming aggressive again. Roosevelt, naturally, “said he agreed 100%”. 109 Just before Yalta, Chiang and Stalin agreed on the key points of the Cairo Declaration, that Japan would be stripped of her possessions, and, as America wanted, that “necessary air and naval bases” would be created so that the United Nations could police the Western Pacific. Stalin accepted that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores would be returned to China, and agreed that a tutelage period was needed for Korea.110 At the same time, as seen below, Russia was negotiating with the United States over claims to Japanese islands to the north as a price for entering the war with Japan. Thus, the interests of China, the Soviet Union and America converged in carving up and reapportioning Japan's empire.

Outcomes and responses to Cairo

The format for the discussion between Chiang and Roosevelt at Cairo on the evening of November 23 1943 led to secrecy and confusion. In an unusual move, Roosevelt objected to keeping records from the three-hour meeting. As a result, no records were made on the American side. The only people present were the president, his advisor Harry Hopkins, Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. Because of objections from Chiang, an agenda for the meeting was not agreed on beforehand.111 During talks that evening, Roosevelt made a “vague and loose” commitment to arm ninety Chinese divisions at the end of the war in an effort to modernize the Chinese army, a massive undertaking. The agreement was not written down and Hopkins could not later recall whether the agreement had been made unconditionally or if military aid was contingent on the stabilization of the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The agreement only came to light in September 1945, five months after the president's death and one month after the war ended, when the Chinese Nationalist government demanded supplies to make good on this promise.112 The incident highlights Roosevelt's lack of regard for his advisers, whom he neither consulted nor informed of major decisions. It also demonstrates the confusion caused by Roosevelt’s private initiatives in foreign policy-making.

The most important aspect of the Cairo Declaration, which was released to the public on December 1, 1943, was that it seemed to guarantee cooperation between the Allies for postwar security. In addition to the Declaration itself, which laid out the basis for dismantling Japan’s empire, planners had access to

109 Bohlen minutes, Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, 29 November, 1943. FRUS Cairo and Tehran, 532.
110 Minutes of a Meeting of the Pacific War Council, 12 January 1944. FRUS Cairo and Tehran, 868.
111 Liu, A Partnership for Disorder, 127-130.
112 This agreement, but not its 1945 reappearance, is mentioned in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 428. The situation was explained in James Byrnes to Harry Truman, 3 September 1945. Reel 25. Truman Office Files, Part 3, RSC.
media sources for analysis and information.\textsuperscript{113} The statement in a \textit{New York Times} article covering the conference that “Tokyo’s co-prosperity sphere, which gingerly commenced with the seizure of Formosa in 1895, will be entirely scrapped,” for example, was quite accurate. Likewise, the article’s prediction that a “new and greater China” would rise “from the ashes” of a Japan-dominated Pacific is in line with Roosevelt’s expectations for both nations.\textsuperscript{114} Other sources of policy ideas and planning had to adapt their positions to match this new reality of commitments made at Cairo. But the bureaucrats tasked with drafting American policy were not aware of secret agreements such as Roosevelt’s promise to arm Chinese troops or his offer of the Ryukyu Islands.

\textbf{Soviet entry and Yalta}

The issue of Russia's entry into the war against Japan was one on which the American president, the State Department and China’s leadership were particularly far apart. The Soviet Union had signed a non-aggression pact with Japan in 1941, and was therefore not involved in the Pacific theater. However, Roosevelt’s plans for postwar East Asia assumed a major role for the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{115} The Chinese, by contrast, hoped for a Pacific sphere controlled by the Americans and Chinese alone. As Chiang explained to one of Roosevelt’s emissaries, the influence of Great Britain in postwar Asia ought to be limited because it was an imperialist power, while the Soviet Union presented a communist threat to the region.\textsuperscript{116} Given the civil war brewing between Chiang’s Nationalist regime and the Chinese Communist Party, the threat to the KMT of an ascendant and ideologically opposed Soviet Union was real. Competing territorial aims were a second reason for China’s reluctance to accept a major role for Russia. Before Cairo, both Chiang and his brother-in-law, the well-regarded diplomat and financier T.V. Soong, expressed concern to American officials that Russia might challenge the reversion of Manchuria to China in light of its past rivalry with Japan for influence in the area.\textsuperscript{117} Indeed, Stalin was interested in reclaiming rights in Manchuria, particularly over the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Dairen, which had in the nineteenth century given Russia access to a valuable Far East warm water port.\textsuperscript{118} Roosevelt and Welles were sympathetic to Russian interests in northern China, counseling Soong that the country would have to recognize the Soviet Union’s legitimate commercial interests in Manchuria.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{113} The Cairo Declaration is available online at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46tx.html. Accessed December 2012.

\textsuperscript{114} C.L. Sulzberger, “Conferences Fixed the Shape of World to Come”, \textit{New York Times}, December 12, 1943.

\textsuperscript{115} From 1942 Roosevelt imagined that the US, Soviet Union and China would be the dominant postwar powers in the North Pacific. Final draft letter from Owen Lattimore to Chiang Kai-shek. 28 December 1942. Box 5. Lauchlin Currie Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

\textsuperscript{116} Liu, \textit{A Partnership for Disorder}, 108-110, 121.

\textsuperscript{117} Liu, \textit{A Partnership for Disorder}, 107, 113-114.


\textsuperscript{119} Soong responded to Roosevelt’s support for Russia’s railway claim by challenging its historical basis, which Roosevelt avoided by stating that he was not well informed on the issue. Liu, \textit{A Partnership for Disorder}, 113-114.
American Far East experts in the State Department were also skeptical about Russia’s future role in the region. They were shocked to hear about Roosevelt’s aim of involving the Soviet Union in the Pacific War, and his willingness to give concessions which would increase Russia’s postwar strength in the region in order to reach this aim. As one planner explained “We saw no reason why the U.S.S.R. should have been paid for entering the war against Japan, when it would have served our interests better to have the Soviet Union stay out.” However, they were not consulted on the subject. The State Department drew up detailed briefs to prepare Roosevelt ahead of Yalta, but the president did not read them. Unbeknownst to the State Department, FDR personally encouraged Soviet participation from at least July 1943 using the carrot of territorial gain. At that time, Roosevelt proposed a meeting with Stalin, informing the Soviet charge d'affaires through his own representative that he “would surprise Stalin by how far he, Roosevelt, is ready to acknowledge our [Soviet] rights, in particular, on territorial issues.” At this point, the Soviets expected Roosevelt would bring up the issue in any meeting between the heads of state, but were not yet prepared to abandon their neutrality pact with Japan.

A year and a half later, at Yalta, Roosevelt finally secured a commitment from the Soviets to enter the war against Japan two to three months after the defeat of Germany. This agreement was conditioned on territorial gains for Russia at the expense of both Japan and China. From China, Russia would regain leased control of Port Arthur, which had been lost after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, have its preeminent interests recognized in an internationalized Dairen, and gain a measure of control over Chinese railways in these areas. Japan would lose islands to the north along its border with Russia, namely all of Sakhalin and “islands adjacent” to it, and the Kurile Islands. As a price for Soviet entry into the war against Japan, Franklin Roosevelt approved what was essentially a reversal of one of the key achievements of his cousin and hero, former President Teddy Roosevelt, who had been awarded a Nobel Prize in 1906 for brokering the peace treaty after the Russo-Japanese war.

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121 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 509.
124 Sovereignty of these islands had been a matter of contention between Imperial Russia and Japan in the nineteenth century, but had been resolved in 1905. Marc Gallicchio argues convincingly that Roosevelt’s secret Kuriles commitment was not, as some have argued, the result of his misunderstanding of the long history of sovereignty disputes over the islands between Russia and Japan, but rather a knowing compensation for the Soviet Union in return for its entry into the war. Marc Gallicchio, “The Kuriles Controversy,” 70-76.
Roosevelt had good reason for his differences with the State Department on the issue of Soviet involvement in the war. Bureaucratic planners believed that the initiative for planning and policy in postwar Asia ought to be held by the United States, which had borne the brunt of fighting in the Pacific. The postwar situation could be more easily handled without the Russians. By contrast, Roosevelt and the War Department were eager to gain Soviet support in Asia, even if this would strengthen the Soviet Union's hand in the postwar region. Military intelligence indicated that Soviet involvement would shorten the war and make Allied victory more likely. The Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria was believed to be very strong, and military planners expected the Japanese would draw on it in case of an Allied land invasion of Japan's home islands, the dominant end-of-war scenario before the atomic bomb was successfully tested. The Soviet Union, which bordered Manchuria, could tie up the Japanese there and limit potential reinforcements ahead of a land invasion. In addition, Stimson pragmatically argued that the Allies were in no position to prevent the Soviets from simply taking whatever territories they coveted after the war, and so might as well collect a price for them.126

FDR did not agree with the planners that the US ought to have predominance over postwar policy. In addition to strengthening the Russian hand, he sought to include China in decision making and hoped the country would take on a major role in occupying and monitoring Japan. During his talk at Cairo with the Chinese leader, he asked Chiang's position on the retention of the Emperor after Japan's defeat, which was an issue of marginal practical importance but huge symbolic value. As discussed above, he also offered China Japanese territory and suggested China take the leading role in the military occupation of Japan, burdensome honors which Chiang politely refused.127 Roosevelt dealt with this difference in opinion on the Soviet question by simply ignoring and excluding the side with which he disagreed. Even senior members of the State Department were denied records from the Yalta conference. Bureaucratic planners were kept in the dark about the secret agreement with the Soviets, although the pact was significant to postwar planning, having territorial implications and giving the Soviets an unexpected stake in postwar Japan.128 Thus, although all known Roosevelt commitments were incorporated into any policy proposals, secret agreements left wartime planners to draw up their plans while lacking significant information.

Conclusion

Roosevelt's health declined rapidly in the last year of his life and presidency. By early spring 1944 he had become, in the words of historian Christopher Thorne, a “part time president.”129 Although he remained active on the issues most important to him, this limitation touched every aspect of the administration. But,

126 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 526.
127 Chinese Summary Record, Roosevelt-Chiang Dinner Meeting, 23 Nov 1943. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, 323-324.
128 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 509.
129 Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 120. This point is also the main thrust of Jim Bishop, FDR's Last Year.
even as his personal role declined with his health, the expanded executive control over policy which
Roosevelt had created stayed in place. There was no clear line of policy approval apart from presidential
sponsorship of ideas, and Roosevelt's ability to make agreements or change course without consultation
was still a wild card for planners. Roosevelt’s mixed management of Far East policy thus left uncertainty
about the future of the postwar plans for Asia.

Even as FDR held the policy reins and his intentions close, his actions and ideas set parameters for
postwar planning. This is particularly true in the case of territorial issues. The outlines of future action
were set by the public commitments and international agreements made by Roosevelt during and
immediately before the war. All plans from any quarter of government would need to reflect the
commitments made by the president to Allied governments and in the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo
Declaration. Further, because presidential approval was needed to turn recommendations into official
policy, proposals had to incorporate Roosevelt’s ideas and interests to the extent that these were known by
the planners. President Roosevelt showed little interest in the work of official experts working on postwar
issues, preferring to find analysis from outside official channels. As a result, planners sometimes worked
in a vacuum, without a voice in wartime agreements and uncertain of their president’s plans. Had he lived
to see Japan’s surrender, FDR might not have approved the recommendations of his planners as policy.
He may well have impulsively adopted suggestions from advisers outside the planning process without
consulting experts, as with his temporary championship of the Morgenthau plan. Certainly, he was
sympathetic to the idea of a tough peace for Japan. Thus, the eventual adoption of the policy developed
within the bureaucratic apparatus, which defined America’s approach to Japan once the war ended, was an
accident of Roosevelt’s death.
Chapter Two

Taking Victory for Granted: Bureaucratic Planning for Postwar Japan, 1940-1945

In the early days of the war, postwar planning was at best an optimistic enterprise. America’s wartime government was torn between hope for a brighter future and the reality of a violent conflict with an uncertain outcome. Although most state resources were tied up in the day-to-day conduct of the war, a few Americans grappled with how to use their country’s rising power to reshape the international system and bring stability to the world. Taking victory for granted, a group of men in the Department of State began working to redefine US interests abroad and plan for a new world order after the collapse of the Axis Powers. The planners for postwar Japan had a particularly difficult task. This group was composed of a few Asia experts working in a subcommittee of a larger planning program. They sought to determine what a defeated Japan might look like, and what American interests in Japan’s future might be. These men had little reason for enthusiasm about the success of their efforts. The committee for which they worked was only one within an “alphabet soup” of acronymed bureaucratic committees, and, as seen in the other chapters, these together represented only one possible source of future policy. Even if America did win the war in the Pacific, and were able to shape the peace agreement, there was no guarantee that the recommendations of low-level area specialists would be taken into account.

This chapter will focus on the creation of postwar policy for Japan. It will begin by locating East Asia planning within official postwar planning as a whole, and emphasize how the State Department came to lead bureaucratic planning. Next, the chapter will look at the key figures behind Japan planning and how sources of information and the experiences of these individuals affected their understanding of Japan. The third section will examine the evolution of the recommendations made by the Japan planners. It will explain how the thinking of the Asia experts, as reflected in the reports they wrote, developed into the final policy document, entitled United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC150/4), which became official policy in September 1945. This document was authorized by President Truman and sent to General MacArthur to serve as a policy guide for the occupation. After tracing the development of the planning for Japan, the paper will consider government efforts to prepare the public for postwar policy.

Overview of postwar planning

As will be seen in the next chapter, postwar planning first began in 1939 when the State Department, lacking the funding and manpower to consider long-range questions, accepted help from an enthusiastic
Council on Foreign Relations. State began its own planning program in 1940, although cooperation with the CFR continued. This project became a massive undertaking, encompassing thousands of man hours in meetings and report writing as the leading minds in international relations, area studies and policy making carved out a vision for the US and the postwar world. Over the course of the war, the project encountered many obstacles. Officials involved in planning shared the assumption that the US would win the war in Europe and Asia, and would be in a position to reshape those areas through foreign policy. State Department planners were so certain in this conviction that the progress of the war was not discussed in planning meetings. Many leading figures, including Cordell Hull, Joseph Grew, and Franklin Roosevelt, at times criticized postwar planning as a fool’s errand.\(^1\) Allied victory was by no means certain, and even if secured, the United States would not necessarily be in a position to dictate the peace. Further, the future was filled with so many unknowns that the best-laid plans could well prove useless.

In addition to skepticism, Japan planners had to contend with rivalry and the need for collaboration with other departments, especially War and Navy, but also Treasury and the Office of War Information. As seen below, they had to get the approval of higher-level bureaucrats for all policy recommendations and build a strong consensus within the Far East Division to keep draft recommendations from being torpedoed. Beyond the bureaucratic apparatus, any recommendation would need the president’s signature to become policy, and, as discussed in the previous chapter, Franklin Roosevelt took little interest in the work of this group. Finally, even with bureaucratic and presidential approval, the congressional rejection of the postwar plans in 1920s served as a warning that policy would have to survive the political process and by extension ran the risk of failure if elite plans ran afoul of popular opinion.

The project’s early period was marred by lack of resources, as planners retained their full normal workloads in addition to the project.\(^2\) Therefore, official planning did not begin in earnest until February 1942, when the Division of Special Research and the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy were created. The new division was staffed with ten research assistants, three stenographers and a messenger. It grew quickly and by October it had expanded to include 52 research assistants and nine stenographers.\(^3\)

Several of the individuals brought on to the project, who will be introduced below, were Foreign Service officers or academics with expertise on East Asia. In the fall of 1942, these came together to create the

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\(^1\) For example, Grew noted that he had reservations about “any discussion of this problem” because there were too many “imponderable factors” to set views on future courses of action. Grew to Vera Dean, 9 August 1943, Joseph C Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, MS am 1687 (115).


\(^3\) Borton, *American Pre-surrender Planning*, 82.
Inter-Departmental Area Committee on the Far East, or IDAFE. Because the membership of this sub-group was largely consistent even as the larger structure of planning changed, the group will also be referred to as the Subcommittee on the Far East (SFE). This group had a mandate to provide reports and recommendations on Asia to non-specialists and higher-level planning committees, and became the center of bureaucratic policy planning for Japan.

The IDAFE was the most active area committee in the State Department’s postwar planning project. The group was composed of an equal number of academics and Foreign Service officers specialized in Asia. It met 234 times between its creation in 1942 and the autumn of 1945, and had between seven and thirteen members present at any given meeting. In each meeting before SWNCC was created, Eugene Dooman would set the agenda based on queries from the other planning committees, the War and Navy Departments, or senior officials. The group would assemble relevant facts, identify underlying arguments, and weigh realistic options under the guidance of Joseph Ballantine. The goal was to create “lucid, convincing and sound” recommendations. The area subcommittee group grew out of and was deeply influenced by State’s collaboration with non-governmental organizations. Postwar planning began with the Council on Foreign Relations with the approval of the State Department. Once the department began its own planning project, it borrowed its organizational structure and draft reports from the CFR group. The government also hired members of the CFR and Institute of Pacific Relations, who brought with them ideas from the think-tank programs.

With no basic consensus to work from, the very early planners explored an array of options for postwar Asia. The key question the early planners considered was whether Japan, China or the US should play the role of a stabilizing hegemonic power in postwar East Asia, with some officials suggesting that Japan or China be built up as a counterbalance to Russia in the Far East. One planning report written shortly before the creation of the IDAFE envisioned a postwar Asia dominated by a “loose political and economic Chinese federation,” encompassing Korea and Indochina, to which Japan would be subordinated. Japan's resumption of regional hegemon status was not considered as an option for the postwar period. It was accepted in the earliest IDAFE drafts that Japan would be prevented from being a menace in the future through disarmament. In contrast to Roosevelt, who supported a major role for China

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6 See chapter three.


8 Political Subcommittee Minutes 20, Meeting of August 1 1942. Stanley K Hornbeck Papers, Box 350. Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
and the Soviet Union, the bureaucratic planners agreed that “the responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the Far East [would] for many years devolve principally on the United States.” America would become the region’s dominant power, subordinating both Japan and China.

State Department planners benefitted from a significant amount of contact with the president in the early planning period. This was the case because Roosevelt was most interested in receiving recommendations on issues about which he was undecided, and because of the close relationship between the president and Sumner Welles. In a meeting with Norman Davis, CFR president and a key member of the postwar planning project, FDR warned that while he would accept briefings from planners, his “mind [was] already pretty well made up on some of these matters.” Where his ideas were not fixed, however, State Department planners were in a position to influence Roosevelt’s thinking. In the fall 1942, Roosevelt began considering the question of League of Nations mandates and requested a report on colonies and trusteeships “at an early date.” A few months later, after defining his position, Roosevelt met again with the top planners to explain his position on trusteeships and the disposition of East Asian territories. This information flow between bureaucratic planners and the president was reinforced by Welles, who felt responsible for keeping Roosevelt informed about planning developments. The link was so strong that in 1943 Leo Pasvolsky, head of the Division of Special Research which housed early State Department postwar planning, advised discontinuing regular meetings between planners and the president. Such meetings, Pasvolsky argued, were dominated by Welles and caused jealousy amongst officials. The undersecretary’s forced resignation in late 1943 left a gap between the two sources of policy. Regular communication between the president and his planning staff never resumed.

As planners considered the limits of US war aims, events in 1943 helped to tip the scales in favor of a muscular program for pacifying postwar Japan, even though such a project would be expensive, would require substantial long term commitments, and implied a more active role for the United States in the Far

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East. In particular, the Cairo Declaration, which followed the conference of Allied Powers in the fall of 1943, seemed to guarantee continued cooperation between the Allies for postwar security, and ensured that Japan would be disarmed and stripped of its colonies.\textsuperscript{15} Approved by the president and expected by the public, these terms had to be included in any postwar plan for Japan.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, Congress passed bills supporting American membership in any postwar organization after a highly publicized press campaigns to drum up popular support. This meant that American isolationism would not block extensive commitments abroad or active internationalism as it had in 1920.\textsuperscript{17} In this context, planners could agree on aims for Japan’s place in the postwar international system. In July 1943 the PWC territorial group wrote that “the ultimate objective of the United Nations is to restore Japan to full and equal membership in a family of nations bound together by an international organization and protected by an effective security system.”\textsuperscript{18} The term “United Nations” was synonymous with “Allied Powers” during the war, and was not a reference to the later United Nations Organization. The expression “friendly” toward the United States was also a regular feature of planning documents for Japan from 1943.

IDAFe plans were challenged and amended as the State Department responded to War and Navy requests for collaboration in spring 1944. Although the State Department was responsible for developing political policy, the War and Navy Departments argued for their inclusion because postwar plans were linked to military issues such as occupation policy and future security strategy. As Secretary of Navy James Forrestal explained, “Both the Army and the Navy are aware that they are not the makers of policy but that they have a responsibility to define to the makers of policy what they believe are the military necessities of the United States.”\textsuperscript{19} Because both departments had begun considering these issues independently from State, exchange of information and collaboration among the departments was needed to avoid creating a tangle of conflicting policies.\textsuperscript{20} This process began with a list of specific questions drawn up by Navy in February 1944 regarding State’s plans for postwar Japan. State responded by sharing planning information and sent relevant reports to the other departments. Between February and August of that year, it sent forty-one documents, mainly IDAFE reports, to the Navy Department.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{15} See chapter one.
\textsuperscript{17} See chapter five.
\textsuperscript{19} Walter Millis ed., \textit{The Forrestal Diaries}, 45.
\textsuperscript{20} “Coordination of State, War and Navy Departments in Matters of a Diplomatic-Military Nature – Considerations Supporting Establishment of a Coordinating Committee by Executive Order,” 18 April 1945. Alvin Franklin Richardson Papers, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives.
In response to the queries on Japan planning from the War and Navy Departments, Blakeslee drafted a key document which summarized the earlier reports. The new report, PWC108, laid out the committee’s broad recommendations for postwar Japan. This was then submitted to the high-level committee for approval in April 1944, where it met with criticism and underwent alteration. Several areas were deemed to be too lenient on Japan. The IDAFE’s plans for Japan’s postwar economy and its place in international relations were put under particular pressure. The wording of US aims for postwar Japan’s political and economic reorientation was changed to appear less “soft” from April 1944 onward.

This need for coordination between military and political plans resulted in the creation of a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) in January 1945. The new committee replaced the State Department’s Postwar Programs Committee as the center of official postwar planning. SWNCC’s new Far East Subcommittee (SWNCCFE) was composed of key members from the State Department’s Interdivisional Area Committee on the Far East and chaired by a member of State’s Far East Department. The continuity of membership between the IDAFE and the SWNCCFE ensured that State maintained the initiative for political planning. However, this new collaboration between departments meant that all recommendations from the former State Department group had to get approval from the secretaries of state, war, and navy in order to reach the president's desk.

As collaboration between State, War, and Navy increased, the Department of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau sought a leading role in official postwar planning for Germany. As seen in the previous chapter, Morgenthau was able to use his relationship with President Roosevelt in order to secure Treasury’s participation in planning over the opposition of the State and War Departments. At a cabinet meeting after an informal discussion with Morgenthau, Roosevelt announced that he would set up a State, War, and Treasury committee to consider postwar Germany. Cordell Hull and Henry Stimson were shocked at the announcement which led to the creation of IPCOG, thereafter the main source of policy on Germany. However, Treasury did not press for a role in planning for postwar Japan at that time.

Morgenthau, himself a Jew, had been interested in Nazi Germany as a vocal advocate for German Jewish refugees from the early 1930s. Of course, Treasury’s focus on Germany in 1944 depended on more than the secretary’s interests. Japan and Asia received less attention than Germany and Europe in government planning generally, and victory seemed closer to hand in Europe than in Asia.

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Treasury’s lack of interest in Japan planning in August 1944 ensured that the department did not play a role in that project. By the time Morgenthau’s focus turned to Japan in May 1945, Roosevelt had died and the secretary’s influence had faded. In these new circumstances, State Department Undersecretary Joseph Grew and the head of the SWNCC Far East Subcommittee Eugene Dooman effectively kept Treasury out of Japan planning. Grew and Dooman, both Japan hands, strongly disagreed with Morgenthau’s tough economic proposal for the reversion of Germany to an agrarian society and wanted to avoid such input in Japan policy. For this reason, Grew advised Dooman that if approached by the Treasury he ought to respond that the SWNCC subcommittee was best suited to handle planning and that the involvement of an additional department would complicate the process. In June, Morgenthau called Grew to enquire why Treasury, which had been “in” on planning for Germany and Austria, was being kept out of Japan planning. Grew replied that the Germany planners were not Asia experts, and that one had to understand “all about conditions in Japan, the psychology of the people and all the rest of it,” in order to consider the country’s future. Grew responded to the request for inclusion by adding that he would let Morgenthau “have a look” at the policy “in due course.” As a result of Undersecretary Grew’s outright rejection of Morgenthau’s request and Dooman’s careful handling of other approaches, the State Department’s Japan experts maintained control of official planning and Treasury was shut out of planning for postwar Japan.

While thinking on Japan within this group was on the whole consistent, it underwent significant change at key junctures in March and April 1944 and the summer of 1945. In order to ensure that its recommendations would be adopted the SFE sought to incorporate the views of influential officials from outside the Committee into its drafts. This meant that the documents coming out of the SFE “represented a consensus of views within the department at the working level.” Members of the committee frequently had informal discussions with key Asia experts like Hornbeck and Dooman while preparing their summaries. Collaboration between officials allowed for a consistency in policy over time. For example, when Dooman took over as chairman of the group in 1945, he had already approved the earlier IDAFE reports in his previous position as special assistant to the secretary.

April 1945 was a turning point in official planning for Japan. On the 12th of that month, Franklin Delano Roosevelt died after a long declining illness. A new addition to the Roosevelt ticket, former Missouri Senator Harry S Truman had been Vice President for only three months when he succeeded FDR as the leader of a nation at war. Truman had not been included in his predecessor’s foreign policy making, and

26 Hugh Borton, American Pre-surrender Planning, 11.
27 Hugh Borton, American Pre-surrender Planning, 12.
had little knowledge of the manifold problems facing him. Truman's stated goal after Roosevelt's death was to continue Roosevelt's policies, and he relied heavily on his advisors for information and analysis to this end. With the little time between his assumption of the Presidency and the shocking sudden end of the war in the Pacific, and a great deal else to focus on, Truman relied on the preexisting plans drafted by the SWNCC to define American policy which Roosevelt might well have ignored.

In the early summer of 1945, with a new president in the White House and an end to the Pacific War in sight, the area committee, now known as SWNCCFE, began to draw together a final draft of its policy recommendations. Incorporating the 1944 changes, the SWNCC drafts drew heavily on PWC108 and the earlier IDAFE reports, borrowing structure as well as entire phrases. With changes made during the summer of 1945, the Far East group’s wartime plans culminated in a document entitled United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, or SWNCC150/4, which was announced as the basis of policy in Occupied Japan following the signature of Harry Truman on 6 September 1945. The detailed and military-focused occupation plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also based on documents provided by the SFE, were revised in collaboration with the group in the fall of 1945 and became JCS 1380/15. MacArthur received an advance copy of SWNCC150 shortly before his arrival in Tokyo and was sent JCS 1380/15 as a military directive on November 3, 1945. These two documents became the basis of American policy in postwar Japan. Postwar planning for Japan was therefore carried out in collaboration between bureaucratic area specialists and outside experts, approved and amended to avoid rejection by higher level officials, the president, and Congress.

**Asia experts in the State Department**

Because of the important place of the State Department in American postwar planning, a handful of men played an outsized role in defining America’s goals for a new Japan. These were low and high-level bureaucrats and area specialists drawn from the Foreign Service and academia. Most of the individuals involved in postwar planning on Japan had worked together for many years, and had previously considered US-Japanese relations together at the State Department’s Far Eastern Department, the American Embassy in Tokyo, or international relations think-tanks such as the CFR and IPR. In particular, three Foreign Service officers, Eugene Dooman, Joseph Ballantine and Robert Fearey and two academics, Hugh Borton and George Blakeslee dominated IDAFE planning. Higher-level officials, Cordell Hull, Stanley Hornbeck, and Joseph Grew were also heavily involved in the process.

Members of this group formed opinions on Japan and East Asia in several ways. In this period, “Asia” experts usually had experience of either Japan or China. There were no officials with a specialty in Korea,
Indochina, or other parts of Asia within the IDAFE. Academics involved in planning were members of America’s developing Asia studies field. A few had experience of living in Japan or China. Meanwhile, the department’s Foreign Service officers understood Asia through the lens of their postings in Japan or China. Because officers served only in one or the other country, they often absorbed the antagonism and biases between these warring neighbor countries. One officer, for example, observed in his memoirs “an emotional hatred” of Japan amongst China Foreign Service officers.

Other sources of information and ideas on Asia for the planners included media, non-governmental expert groups, and social networks. Planning documents in the IDAFE, territorial, and political planning groups often included media summaries. These media overviews kept members informed about relevant ideas expressed in contemporary newspapers, books and journals. Planners also circulated newspaper articles and academic papers amongst themselves. For example, Hornbeck regularly sent China-related articles to Hull, Lauchlin Currie, and the president himself. Members also sometimes cited media pieces in IDAFE reports. In addition, several key members of this group including Hull, Hornbeck and George Blakeslee, were active in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Study Groups on Asia. The study groups acted as a regular forum for officials, experts, and businessmen with interests in Asia to discuss the future of East Asia in an unofficial environment. As will be argued in the next chapter, study groups exposed planners to a wider range of ideas and gave members space to develop their own views.

Planners also met socially with officials and experts to discuss ideas. In some cases, this provided a counter to the lack of cooperation between government departments. In the summer of 1943 for example, Grew invited Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to lunch to discuss an article on postwar Japan. While no records were made of these types of conversations, discussion and information-sharing in an informal environment did lead to a consensus between the men who would later work together to approve draft policies on Japan through the SWNCC group. Social meetings also allowed for dialogue between American planners and their Allied counterparts. One British historian of Japan in particular had a voice.

30 The media in postwar planning is addressed in chapter four.
31 Hornbeck sent articles to Hull, and also to Ed Stettinius who replaced Hull as Secretary of State in 1945. Stanley K Hornbeck Papers, various boxes, Hoover Institution Archives.
in State Department planning, this being the counselor at the British embassy in Washington, George Sansom. He was well respected by the Japan crowd, liked by Grew, and had been an early mentor of Japan expert Hugh Borton. Sansom presented his own ideas on the Japan question through correspondence and informal lunches; the content of one such meeting on British and American postwar plans for Japan was written up and sent in summary to other planners by Borton and Blakeslee.34

*The Japan crowd*

The “Japan crowd” tried to move policy along the lines of developing postwar Japan as a future partner. Important members of the group included Joseph Grew and two key IDAFE foreign service officers, Eugene Dooman and Joseph Ballantine. Grew remained outside the postwar planning process until 1943 and was initially critical of the project.35 However, as the government’s most senior Japan expert, he remained important. Grew had arrived in Japan late in his career. He was appointed ambassador to the country because President Herbert Hoover wanted an experienced diplomat to handle an increasingly difficult post. He continued to serve there under Roosevelt, who knew Grew personally as a fellow alumnus of Groton preparatory school and Harvard University. Grew arrived in Japan in 1932, a year marked by violent conflict in Manchuria and the beginning of Japan's turn away from internationalism toward increasing militarism. He remained there throughout the Far Eastern Crisis; Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, the creation of a Japanese puppet state in Manchuria, the outbreak of war between Japan and China, and the breakdown in relations between Japan and the United States. Grew left Japan in 1942, after a short period of internment in the American embassy in Tokyo following the Pearl Harbor attacks.

Although he never learned even basic phrases in Japanese, during his decade in the country Joseph Grew developed a deep respect for Japanese officials.36 The ambassador, firmly part of the East Coast elite and shaped by the gentlemanly tradition of the nineteenth-century American diplomatic service, felt a connection with the western-oriented liberal elite in Japan.37 Colleagues observed that his formal manner

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36 Grew was hard of hearing, which goes some way in explaining his reticence in learning a new language in middle age. He spoke to Japanese diplomats in English, German or French. Henri Smith-Hutton, Oral interview by Captain Paul Ryan, 22 February 1974. Henri Smith-Hutton Papers, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
37 The world changed dramatically during the course of Grew’s career. His early assignments included attachments to embassies in Imperial Russia and Austria-Hungary. He recalled elaborate social gatherings held in the court of Czar Nicholas II. For more on the changing American diplomatic tradition in the interwar period, see Hannah
was well suited to Japanese culture and that he got along well with his local counterparts. The Grews were socially active and often entertained Japanese officials. They also had a historical connection with Japan. Mrs. Joseph Grew, born Alice Perry, was the grand-niece of Commodore Perry, whose mission to Japan in 1853 had marked the beginning of Japanese-American relations, and indeed, Japan's emergence on the international stage.

Two major trends, a hierarchical conception of Japanese society and a belief in an oriental mind, underpinned Grew's thinking on postwar Japan. His own privileged background and the language barrier which restricted his ability to speak with ordinary Japanese perhaps explain his views. “The Japanese people,” he believed, “are somewhat like sheep in following leaders. Without intelligent leaders, they tend to disintegrate. Without intelligent leaders, chaotic conditions might develop.” In addition, unlike the area experts who made up most of the Japan crowd, Grew believed in the stereotype of oriental inscrutability. He argued that the thinking of Asians was fundamentally different from people of European descent. “We westerners,” he wrote to a colleague, “must avoid measuring the psychology and mentality of Japanese by western yardsticks or assume reactions we would consider logical.” These twin convictions that the Japanese people were by Western standards illogical and incapable of maintaining a functional society without strong leadership gave Grew a paternalistic perspective on Japan. While he believed that rehabilitation of postwar Japan was possible, he held that any changes would have to be top-down and could not be left to the Japanese people. Specialists argued that cooperation would require convincing the Japanese people that peace was in their own interests through economic incentives, but Grew also called for marshaling Japan's metropolitan police and civil authorities to maintain order. Thus, although long experience in Japan gave him some insight into and sympathy towards the Japanese, Grew's approach was rather different to that of the lower-level planners in the Far East subcommittee.

After returning from internment in Japan, Grew became assistant secretary of state in 1944 and often served as acting secretary in the spring and summer of 1945. Although he rarely became directly involved in planning for Japan, the advocates for a “soft peace” gained credibility from having a like-minded

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39 Prior to Perry's arrival, feudal Japan maintained a “closed country” policy, shutting itself off from foreign relations and trade.
official in a senior position. Grew had faith in the ability of Japan’s prewar liberal elite, but he was careful to avoid hard-liner criticism by being vocal about the need to defeat Japan soundly. He also made it clear that American interests were best served by supporting economic growth. Without industry as an outlet for Japan's energy, Grew believed, postwar Japan would be like a closed container filling with steam. The pressure would build into an explosion.\(^{43}\) By framing a soft peace in terms of American security interests, Grew made a powerful argument which could be accepted even by those who believed the Japanese were inherently militaristic.

\textit{Foreign Service officers and academics}

Eugene Dooman, born to missionary parents in the southern Japanese city of Osaka, was the best Japanese-language speaker in the project. His education was in classics and he had hoped to become an archaeologist, but Dooman instead joined the foreign service at the insistence of his mother in 1911.\(^{44}\) His early training gave him a passion for language which he applied to writing reports “outstanding in... quality of penetration, knowledge and understanding.”\(^{45}\) It also filled him with a grand sense of the historic importance of his work. A divisive figure, Dooman was disliked by many of his colleagues. He was unflatteringly described by one as a “swarthy, pudgy... BIJ [Born in Japan]” who fancied himself a gourmet, peppered his speech with Latin phrases, and corrected other people's sentences.\(^{46}\)

Dooman had served at the American Embassy in Tokyo under Grew as counselor and acted as the ambassador’s principal adviser. His long experience in Japan gave him an unusual perspective on Japan’s militarism. He believed that the country’s aggressive orientation had been caused largely by American anti-Japanese behavior in the 1920s. As Dooman saw it, the US had antagonized Japan with its 1921 insistence on abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, its 1924 exclusion act, and its refusal in 1928 to support Japan’s protests against China’s treaty violations.\(^{47}\) Dooman believed that because Japan’s militarism had begun as a response to legitimate grievances, the country’s aggressive orientation was not deeply rooted. Japan could therefore be made fit for international cooperation during a brief period of postwar oversight by convincing the Japanese people that peace would secure the economic well-being of


\(^{47}\) Eugene Dooman to Herbert Feis, 8 July 1949. Eugene Dooman Papers, Box 1. Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
their country. As special assistant to the secretary, Dooman set the agenda for the IDAFE. He later served as the chair of the SWNCC Far East Subcommittee. The SWNCC reports drafted by his group in the spring and summer of 1945 became the policy basis for America’s occupation of Japan. His social behavior, however, seems to have limited Dooman's influence in the postwar period. Although Grew recommended him for a top post in the occupation administration, he was passed over for the job, possibly because he was personally disliked.

Joseph Ballantine was another officer close to Grew who had long experience in Japan. He had been sent to Tokyo as a student interpreter in 1909 and learned Japanese from “an old samurai” with whom he had classes at six in the morning for six days a week. Although his teacher spoke not a word of English, and Ballantine not a word of Japanese at the start, he quickly developed proficiency in the language. Like Dooman, Ballantine had been born abroad to missionary parents, which he believed had shaped his character. He later reported that his childhood in India had allowed him to grow up “without any idea whatsoever about race differences.” Ballantine believed that he was able as an adult to relate to “Chinese or Japanese or anybody as human beings,” without feelings of racial superiority. As a foreign service officer with experience in both Japan and China, he was in a unique position in the government. Trusted by both Grew and Hull, Ballantine served to balance the rift between supporters of hard and soft peace in the department. His view of Japan was shaped both by his own positive experiences in Japan and disgust at the behavior of the Japanese army that he had observed while serving as a consul general in China at Canton in 1932 and Mukden in 1934.

Ballantine reconciled his opposing experiences by blaming the militarists, who had suppressed pro-western liberals, for Japan’s wartime aggression. He believed that he understood the power of militarism in Japan in a way other members of the Japan crowd, who saw only “the Japanese at home and their nice ways”, could not. As a result, during the negotiations between the US and Japan before Pearl Harbor he

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49 Although this fits in with a decline of “Japan crowd” influence after August 1945, former Dooman colleague and naval attaché in Japan Henri Smith-Hutton argued Dooman had been passed over because he was “the sort of person who bred grudges.” Henri Smith-Hutton, Oral interview by Captain Paul Ryan, 22 February 1974. Henri Smith-Hutton Papers, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
51 While of course such self-descriptions ought to be taken with a grain of salt, the sentiment and Ballantine's experience abroad are significant to his understanding of the world. Reminiscences of Joseph Ballantine, 13. Occupation of Japan Project, Oral History Research Office of Columbia University, 1961.
52 Reminiscences of Joseph Ballantine, 112. Occupation of Japan Project, Oral History Research Office of Columbia University, 1961. Chinese officials, however, did not recognize Ballantine as equally knowledgeable on China issues, or at least not sufficiently sympathetic toward China. T.V. Soong requested to Roosevelt advisor Harry Hopkins that Ballantine not be involved in any State Department preparation for the Cairo conference because he was “essentially an expert on Japan”. Liu, Partnership for Disorder, 123.
did not believe the civilian leadership would be able to broker or maintain any modus vivendi agreement. To remedy this in the future, Ballantine advocated supporting pre-existing liberal elements in postwar Japan. These ideas were the basis of the “soft peace” argument. Ballantine, who had been given “carte blanche” by Grew on postwar planning and was trusted by Secretary Hull, was a powerful voice within the government for rebuilding a US-friendly Japan through support for the existing pro-western liberal elite. When Grew became undersecretary of state in 1944, Ballantine took over the position of director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Despite being firmly in the Japan crowd, his understanding of anti-Japanese sentiment played an important role in toughening the planner’s “soft peace.”

Robert Fearey, a young officer who had served as special secretary to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo was another foreign service officer in this Japan crowd. Grew thought of his special secretaries as trainees for a career in the Foreign Service. He selected them from Groton, the elite secondary school from which he and President Roosevelt graduated, based on the requirements of enthusiasm and the ability to get along personally and professionally with the embassy staff. As part of that training, Grew allowed Fearey to read secret embassy correspondence and to draft letters. Fearey had served in Japan for only eight months before the Pearl Harbor attack, after which he was interned with Grew, Dooman and others in the American Embassy for several months. He later recalled this as a “not unpleasant” period spent playing golf as Grew’s favorite partner and eating through supplies of specialty groceries ordered from the US. Upon his return to Washington, Fearey became involved in postwar planning for Japan, and was particularly interested in Japan’s economy, which he believed was vital to peace.

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56 Secretary Hull had developed respect for Ballantine after the latter worked under him on negotiations with Japan in 1941. Hull was so determined to keep Ballantine on hand after war broke out that he appointed him Consul-General to Canada for three days in order to get around fieldwork requirements which would have forced Ballantine to leave Washington. Reminiscences of Joseph Ballantine, 38. Occupation of Japan Project, Oral History Research Office of Columbia University, 1961.
Fearey shared Dooman’s conviction that international trade was the key to pacifying Japan, but also believed that domestic inequalities needed to be addressed as a source of instability. The academics involved in postwar planning were interested in his ideas on land reform, but he was rebuffed by Dooman and Ballantine when he tried to broach the subject. Of course, such ideas were at odds with the general support for the liberal elite class favored by Ballantine and Grew. Fearey’s plans for land distribution were, however, eventually incorporated into the policy document in late summer 1945, although both Dooman and Ballantine would later attribute this to the “hijacking” of sound plans by young communists within the American government. Fearey went on to serve in the occupation, and drew on the proposals he drafted in the IDAFE for action in Japan.

The IDAFE’s academics were Hugh Borton, a professor of Japanese history at Columbia University, and George Blakeslee, a Harvard graduate who had lectured in history and international relations at Clark University. Hugh Borton was an enthusiastic member of the IDAFE. He had first become interested in Japan in 1928 after his arrival in that country on a trip to assist the American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organization. Borton stayed in Tokyo for three years, during which time he was inspired to engage in academic study of Japan by George Sansom. In 1931 he left Japan to pursue his studies, but returned for fieldwork at Tokyo Imperial University during his PhD research. By the outbreak of the war Borton was a pioneer of Japan studies in the United States. His plain-spoken manner, genuine affection for Japan and pacifist Quaker beliefs all made him well suited for the task of planning a peace which would avoid future conflict.

George Blakeslee, a senior academic, was selected by Joseph Ballantine to chair the IDAFE in August 1942 because of his reputation as the “dean of all Far Eastern experts”. Although he did not speak Japanese, Blakeslee was deeply interested in the country and believed that international trade was the answer to pacifying postwar Japan. The IDAFE appointment fit Blakeslee’s interests. Before his appointment he had been working with Asia experts, including Borton and Hornbeck, on the question of US-Japan relations at the Council of Foreign Relation’s Far East Study Group. Five months before his

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60 This was a common argument amongst academics in this period. See chapter four, 137.
64 Borton later authored a very useful short publication about his experiences in postwar planning for Japan, American Pre-surrender Planning for Postwar Japan.
invitation into government planning, Blakeslee had suggested that the group ought to aim their discussions toward creating concrete recommendations to offer officials. Shortly before joining the State Department’s postwar planners, Blakeslee submitted an article to the journal *Foreign Affairs* suggesting that the US ought to impose favorable economic conditions on a defeated Japan in order to ensure future peace. The article was rejected for being “too gentle” toward Japan, and the editor suggested that highlighting the economic causes of Japanese militarism could be misunderstood as blaming the US for the present war. Blakeslee did not change his thesis, and continued to advocate the soft economic treatment of postwar Japan from his new official position. As chairman of the IDAFE, he wrote the majority of the group’s recommendations for postwar Japan between 1942 and January 1944. The reports Blakeslee composed were accepted as the starting point of Dooman’s SWNCC subcommittee, and became the basis of SWNCC150/4, the document which outlined occupation policy.

*High-level officials*

Outside the IDAFE, Cordell Hull and Stanley Hornbeck tended to act as a check on the group known as the “Japan crowd.” They were able to do so because their support was necessary to approve subcommittee recommendations. Hull and Hornbeck shared a personal dislike for Japan which translated into support of a “tough peace” for that country. Cordell Hull had been influenced by a long and frustrating relationship with Japan at the start of his work as secretary of state in 1933. His opinion of the country’s future was shaped by his experience in failed negotiations with a country he perceived as a duplicitous and expansionist. Hull’s distrust of the Japanese was well known. Foreign service officer John Emmerson described Hull as a man with a “definite conviction that Japan had no intention whatsoever of honoring treaties and would regulate her conduct by the opportunities of the moment.” This is borne out by Hull’s remarks to a British colleague about the last-ditch negotiations between himself and the Japanese Ambassador in 1941 to avoid war and establish a modus vivendi between the US and Japan. During the negotiations, there were rumors that elements within the Japanese leadership were interested in turning away from expansionism and continued war with China. Hull explained that he “had thus far not treated it

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67 Hamilton Fish Armstrong to George Blakeslee, July 1942. Box 8, Folder 17, Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Yale University.
68 Akira Iriye credits Borton and Blakeslee with trying to establish a “clearly Wilsonian” liberal policy for Japan “designed to reintegrate it into the world community through economic interdependence”. Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture*, 150. However, this conception was shared across the area committee for Japan.
69 Hornbeck served as special adviser to the secretary during most of this period.
seriously.” During the war, this distrust informed Hull’s support for a “tough” peace and his sympathy with anti-Japanese public sentiment. As seen below, Hull’s approval was required on the reports written by the area committees. In April 1944, Hull roundly disapproved of the postwar plans of the Japan crowd, and served as a brake on the planners’ enthusiasm for a “new Japan,” ensuring that more muted language appeared in future policy statements.

Stanley Hornbeck had worked with the IDAFE’s academics at the Council on Foreign Relations and its foreign service officers as head of the Far East Department. Hornbeck, who had taught in China after graduating university, was an ardent supporter of the Chinese Nationalist cause, and was known as “the foremost friend of China in the department.” He was remembered unkindly by many of his colleagues, who considered him to be ill-disposed toward Japan. Dooman described working with Hornbeck as “unpleasant” because of his lack of objectivity as seen in his “abnormal sympathy for China” and “pathological hatred of Japan.” Many Japan planners later stated that Hornbeck was dismissive of the opinions of Japan experts. One officer petulantly noted in his memoirs that “we were better judges of Japanese psychology than was Hornbeck, functioning in his own, Chinese-made, bureaucratic straight-jacket.” Another officer involved in US planning for Japan was so disgusted by working with Hornbeck that years later he wrote a play using him as the villain. In a publisher’s rejection letter, the reviewer wrote that the Hornbeck character was such a straw man that audiences would not even enjoy seeing him knocked down. Ignoring the advice of his Japan experts, Hornbeck consistently advocated a tough and punitive peace for Japan. Because he believed that population and economic pressures had been “more of a pretext than a reason for Japan’s conquests,” Hornbeck did not agree with the other Far East experts that Japan could be easily pacified, nor did he believe that America had much to gain from future relations with Japan. His view was that the country could be allowed to sink into chaos and obscurity without damaging US interests.

71 Memorandum of Conversation, Cordell Hull and Lord Halifax, 16 May 1941. Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress.
72 Lauchlin Currie to John C Vincent, 14 February 1942. Lauchlin Currie Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
76 P-Minutes, 20, 1 August, 1942. Stanley K Hornbeck Papers, Box 350, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
The rivalry between the China hands and the Japan crowd is well known, but it did not prove to be a central obstacle in the case of postwar planning.\(^78\) Certainly China experts did generally favor a tougher peace for Japan and the elevation of Chinese power at the expense of the former. In particular, China hands highlighted the value of China as an ally, called for heavy reparations from Japan to rebuild and develop Chinese industry, and rejected the rationales of economic necessity and the demands of population growth as explanations for Japanese expansionism. As seen in other chapters, these sentiments held considerable sway outside government in specialist and popular media, and with the president through his advisers. Hull, as secretary of state, was a China sympathizer who could and did challenge IDAFE recommendations. However, with the exception of Ballantine, whose mixed career placed him in both camps, the IDAFE was made up only of Japan crowd members. This left the group relatively free to base policy recommendations on their ideas of Japan. Moreover, after Hull's retirement in 1944, the Japan crowd was in the ascendancy in the department. Hull's successor Edward Stettinius relied on the opinions of Grew, the highest-placed member of the Japan crowd, who became undersecretary and often served as acting secretary of state. This new power combination increased the influence of Japan crowd ideas in the top levels of policy making.

Despite divergent approaches to Japan, the planning process led to considerable consensus about what should be done with the country. Members of the Japan crowd disagreed about the origins of Japanese expansionism, and some struggled to reconcile the personal affinity they felt for a country to which they had dedicated part of their lives with the horrific behavior of Japanese soldiers in China, Manchukuo and Southeast Asia. Many within the group held that reorienting Japan would be a simple matter of encouraging the existing moderate elements in that country.\(^79\) The planners did agree that whatever one thought of Japan, America would have to accept it as a neighbor in the future. Given that Japan could not be repressed indefinitely, it had to be modeled into a non-belligerent, US-friendly nation. IDAFE members believed that Japan was capable of reintegration into a peaceful world system, and that economic links would convince the Japanese that peace was in its national interest.

**US policy aims for postwar Japan**

*Economics and Japan*

As seen above, Japan’s economic future was an important topic for postwar planners. The idea that the economy of Japan could be destroyed to prevent future menace was popular in the Treasury Department

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and amongst some officials unfamiliar with Japan. By contrast, IDAFE reports recommended that peacetime industry be usefully developed. Grew, Dooman, Fearey, Norton and Blakeslee all firmly believed that integrating Japan into the postwar world economy was the key to pacifying the country. The SFE recommended that it would be in American interests for Japan to “share in the world economy on a non-discriminatory basis, looking toward a progressively higher standard of living.” As Dooman explained to a colleague in the War Department, the most important goal of an occupation period would be “providing them [the Japanese] with an opportunity to convince themselves that their economic well-being is inseparably bound to the pursuit of peace.” Supporting Japan’s economic power would promote peace by giving the Japanese an outlet for their energies, help rebuild the international economy, and serve US trade interests. The revival of Japanese industry was therefore central to SFE plans for reorienting Japan into a peaceful country.

The economic plans developed by the SFE were put under particular pressure as the State Department prepared to circulate its recommendations outside the department in 1944 through its summary document PWC 108. Concern for the standard of living for millions of ordinary Japanese seemed out of sync with calls for a “tough peace” from other quarters, including the presidency. These concerns were raised first at a meeting between the Japan specialists, resulting in an amended policy document. In the meeting led by Ballantine, Japan planners asked themselves whether the “ultimate objectives” they had established were “too rosy in the light of public opinion.” They worried in particular that the clause allowing Japan to participate in the world economy “on a non-discriminatory basis”, a central component of SFE planning, would make it appear that Japan “would escape punishment”. The specialists agreed amongst themselves that the tougher-sounding phrase “on a reasonable basis” would be better.

These charges of “softness” were echoed in a top-level PWC meeting the following week. Secretary Hull took issue with existing goals, arguing that “American public opinion [was not] prepared to listen to serious discussion of non-discrimination with respect to Japan.” The expression “full and equal membership in the family of nations”, which had been used in a range of reports across the planning

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81 Eugene Dooman to Truman Martin, January 12, 1944. Eugene Dooman papers, Box 1. Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
groups to describe Japan’s future, also came under fire.\textsuperscript{85} Thereafter, postwar Japan was described in planning documents as a country “properly discharging its responsibilities in the family of peaceful nations.”\textsuperscript{86} Postwar Japan would be a member of the new family of nations, but no longer necessarily an equal one. After this series of meetings, “non-discrimination” was permanently cast aside. To connect evolving planning documents, Borton requested that the goal of Japan sharing “in the world economy on a reasonable basis” be included in all future economic policy drafts.\textsuperscript{87}

The SFE group maintained its radical position on economic plans despite these amendments. As noted above, Morgenthau advocated the reversion of Japan, along with Germany, to an agrarian economy, while Roosevelt vacillated between that position and allowing Japan limited light industry. Public opinion can be neatly summed up in the cheerful pronouncement of a \textit{New York Times} column that after the war was over “Japan will be shoved back into the days of the Genro.”\textsuperscript{88} Bureaucratic planners by contrast insisted that Japan ought to be allowed both light and heavy industry. They pointed out that Japan would face new economic challenges after the war. The loss of empire would cost Japan raw materials, protected markets, and an outlet for overpopulation. Light industry alone, planners predicted, would not be enough to meet the minimum needs of the population because developing Asian nations would build their own textile industries and would be reluctant to import from Japan due to war “bitterness”. Tough restrictions on heavy industry were based on fear that Japan could use such capacity to remilitarize. Planners argued that heavy industry was needed for a range of peaceful activities. Steel was needed for domestic infrastructure, oil and ships for fishing and trade, machine tools and chemical plants for agriculture.\textsuperscript{89} For the IDAFE, heavy long-term economic controls were not an option.

Planners made several points to support this “soft” economic position in their draft policy documents. They denounced the “inhumanity” of proposals to prohibit heavy industry, which by crippling Japan’s economy would “condemn to slow death from malnutrition and starvation millions of men, women and children.” A “machine gun,” they observed, “would be more humane and safer” than the desperation which would be caused by Treasury policies.\textsuperscript{90} One IDAFE member observed to his colleagues that “if
this policy [allowing for industry and “reasonable” trade] were considered soft, then a hard policy would mean one which threatened the very existence of the Japanese people.” 91 A stable Japanese economy capable of supporting its population would have important benefits beyond the demands of humanitarianism. Democracy, believed to be a stabilizing counterbalance to militarism, would hold little appeal for a hopeless, hungry masses. The chance of “future benefit,” by contrast, would encourage the Japanese to accept peace. 92

Postwar plans also considered the need for restructuring the economy to secure peace. As discussed in chapter four, academic E.H. Norman’s work was deeply influential amongst academics and Japan planners, including Borton and Fearay. Borton echoed Norman’s argument that deep inequality, left over from the feudal era, had fueled Japanese militarism. 93 This led to some of major domestic objectives of the occupation, such as the breaking up of the zaibatsu, Japan’s industrial combines, and the land and labor reforms. Dooman and Ballantine agreed with these actions, but were uncomfortable with the “communist” implications. In a planning meeting they made it clear that the problem with the zaibatsu was the monopoly and the privilege granted these combines, which had collaborated in and benefitted from the war effort, and not the size of the companies per se. 94 The resulting policy document noted that “certain features” of Japan’s economy “interfered with the development of… a climate of general prosperity… [which encourages] a contented and peaceful attitude among the people.” 95 George Sansom, summarizing for his home government an early draft of SWNCC that had been presented to him, noted that encouraging a “more extended ownership of the means of production, financial organs, etc.,” was a key goal. 96 In short, planners believed that redistribution of wealth was needed to give ordinary Japanese a stake in the status quo and prevent future radicalism.

The need to justify plans to non-specialists and hardliners outside the department in 1944 forced a reevaluation of Japan policy. In order to get PWC 108 approved when it was sent to the War and Navy Departments, its “rosy” language had to be dimmed. However, IDAFE members stood by their basic

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93 Historians Donald Robinson and Ray Moore incorrectly associate planner’s concerns about “feudalism” to the institution of the Emperor, rather than economic issues. Moore and Robinson, Partners for Democracy, 28, 34. See chapter 4, 138.
support for reviving Japan’s industry and economy. While these ideas were vastly different from popular sentiment and the arguments put forward by the president and officials in other departments, State Japan experts justified their position with appeals to human decency and the need to build lasting peace. They might also have expected support from the White House because their position reflected article four of the Atlantic Charter, which promised “all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.” SFE members acknowledged that they were not economists, and that other experts would be needed to draw up more detailed plans. However, they were resolute about their aim. They maintained that the “question of a soft or hard peace was irrelevant” and that hate and emotion must be kept out of policy-making. Planning documents reflected the hope that a sound economy and dependence on foreign trade would stabilize Japan and tie it to the new international system.

**Allies and territories**

The plans which emerged from the SFE group were quite different from the ideas of President Roosevelt. These two potential sources for American policy developed with little reference to each other after the end of president-planner meetings and Welles’ retirement. As seen in the previous chapter, Roosevelt’s thinking on Japan was shaped by his sympathy for China, his ideas for Germany, and the irregular advice and reporting he received from personal emissaries and unofficial advisers. He was also concerned with public opinion and dealt directly with America’s allies, who had different stakes in the issue. Bureaucratic planners, former academics or Foreign Service officers with experience in Asia, brought in ideas from their own experiences, published research, and from the networks built by the IPR and CFR. This group worked to incorporate the thinking of high-level officials and the president by including any publicized plans into their own recommendations. However, they were not consulted as the president made postwar commitments and had little idea of executive planning. As a result of these differences, the plans made by working-level bureaucrats were “softer” than the ideas held by Roosevelt, Hull, Morgenthau and others. Unlike Roosevelt, who expected that Japan should be restrained as an international actor; area experts instead envisioned a positive role for the country.

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100 See chapters three and four.
IDAFE planners expected that the US would lead both action and decision making on the treatment of Japan. Planners were unaware of Roosevelt’s attempts to involve allies in the process. They were not consulted or informed of the president’s request at Cairo that the Chinese take on leadership of the occupation of Japan. On the contrary, bureaucratic planners advised that the “…preponderance of forces used in occupation… designated commander of all occupational forces… [and] principle subordinate commanders should be American.”

They likewise roundly rejected the idea of transferring Okinawa (often referred to in planning documents as the Liuchius) to Chinese sovereignty based on what the IDAFE called “tenuous historical claims.” In addition to the questionable legitimacy of such a move, planners noted that the Chinese were not in a military position to claim or defend the islands and that the sizable Japanese population would present a “real minority problem.” Such factors were also probably behind Chiang’s polite refusal when Roosevelt, unbeknownst to his experts, offered the territory to China at Cairo.

Although the Administration did not take their opinions on the subject into account, State Department officials also opposed the idea of involving the Soviet Union in the Pacific War because it might act as a check on American postwar dominance in the region. His planners were not informed that Roosevelt began offering territorial gain as a carrot for Soviet entry from at least July 1943. Joseph Ballantine later recorded that he and Hornbeck had believed US interests would be best served by keeping the Soviets out of Japan. The planners only discovered six months after the Yalta conference that the Soviet Union had been “paid” to enter the Pacific theater. In May 1945, Grew wrote as acting Secretary of state that the Far East Department believed the Soviets should be kept out of East Asia unless they agreed to cooperate with a wide range of American postwar objectives.

Two related areas in the north of Japan, the large island of Sakhalin and the Kurile island chain, were considered separately by the IDAFE. Borton explained that in the case of Sakhalin the real question was “whether the problem was important enough for the United States to take issue with the Soviet Union.” Planners agreed that it was not, and that the island should go to Russia if requested. The group took a

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103 See chapter one.
104 Joseph Ballantine Memoir, 266. Joseph Ballantine Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
more nuanced approach to the Kurile Islands question in their recommendations ahead of the Yalta conference. Noting that the population was entirely Japanese and that the islands offered important fishing rights, they advised that the southern islands in the chain remain part of Japan regardless of Soviet action. The Soviet Union could be offered administrative control, but not full sovereignty in order to make continued Japanese fishing access to the entire chain more likely. \(^{107}\) Roosevelt agreed at Yalta that both Sakhalin and the Kuriles would go to Russia in return for its entry into war. These failures of information sharing not only caused divergence between bureaucratic and executive thinking, they slowed down the planning process and made it more inefficient as planners wasted time and resources considering matters which had already been secretly settled.

*Reorienting Japan*

Wartime planners agreed that there would be two major goals for postwar Japan. First, the country should never again be a menace, and second, it should act “responsibly” within “the family of nations” on the international stage. \(^{108}\) The Japan experts in the State Department argued that policy toward defeated Japan must not be motivated by emotion, but should rather be guided by calculations about how to reach the two goals. \(^{109}\) To that end, Japan should be occupied for three distinct phases, one of “stern discipline” as Japan demilitarized, followed by a period of vigilant policing by the Allies, and finally, a transition to an independent and self-governing Japan in line with the goals noted above. \(^{110}\) The State Department plan for a phased occupation responded to the concerns of the War and Navy Departments, which wanted a shorter and more limited occupation than State believed necessary to meet its goals. In the short term, peace would be harsh and restrictive, gradually shifting into a more “soft” treatment of Japan as the goals of the occupation were met with Japanese cooperation. \(^{111}\)

From this starting point, further and more detailed recommendations addressed the methods needed to reach those goals. The simple fact of utter defeat and strict disarmament in the first phase of the occupation would demilitarize Japan and allow for the repealing of the “obnoxious laws” which had fostered ultra-nationalism and guaranteeing Japan’s future security would prevent future aggression.


Transforming Japan into a cooperative member of the international community would require convincing the Japanese people that their future “betterment” was tied to that system. Supporting democracy and encouraging the return of liberal elites sympathetic to Anglo-American culture and values to public life were also recommended methods of bringing about the larger aims.\textsuperscript{112} The argument that existing liberal elites should be fostered and returned to power as a key element of postwar planning, however, has been overstated.\textsuperscript{113} While Grew and Ballantine certainly imagined this group to be a source of leadership for new Japan, the pervasive idea of an “unfinished revolution” as the cause of Japanese radicalism was a direct challenge to prewar elites.\textsuperscript{114} The idea of rehabilitating prewar liberals was included as one of many options in planning discussions. It was also at odds with plans for redistribution of wealth, which would have undermined the position of established elites.

Planners also justified differences between the policy they drafted and the plans for the treatment of Germany. Reparations, they decided as early as 1944, should be taken off the table in the case of Japan because of the economic difficulty it would face in light of its lost empire.\textsuperscript{115} In addition, Japan, unlike Germany, ought to be predominately administered by America and not carved into zones of occupation. Likewise, the lack of sufficient Japanese language and government experts in the United States made direct Allied governance of Japan impossible. Therefore, the occupation would have to be carried out in collaboration with the existing Japanese government bureaucracy and Japanese officials would have to be induced to cooperate.\textsuperscript{116}

During the Second World War, State Department planners developed a clear image of Japan’s future as an international power. Because Japan had been the leading Asian power and administered colonies and League of Nations mandate islands, planning for Japan’s future was contemplated in the context of wider plans for the region. Thus, post-surrender planning for Japan was deeply connected to plans for China, which, it was hoped in many quarters, would be in a position to take Japan’s place as regional hegemon while remaining close to the United States. The plan created by the US government envisioned a Japan which would cooperate in a balance of power or international organization according to the interests of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{113} For example, Juha Saunavaara, “Occupation Authorities, the Hatoyama Purge and the Making of Japan’s Postwar Political Order”, \textit{The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus}, Vol. 39 No. 2, (September 2009) and Moore and Robinson, \textit{Partners for Democracy}, chapter one. As seen in this chapter, the reality was more complex.
\item\textsuperscript{114} See chapter four, 137.
\item\textsuperscript{115} 2-B-35, IDAFE Minutes, April 15 1944. Makoto Iokibe, ed., \textit{Occupation of Japan: US Planning Documents, 1942-1945}.
\item\textsuperscript{116} 5-C-1 Annex 1, Recommendations for the Treatment of Japan, 1 January 1945. Makoto Iokibe, ed., \textit{Occupation of Japan: US Planning Documents, 1942-1945}.
\end{enumerate}
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the United States.\textsuperscript{117} These plans differed substantially from the thinking of President Roosevelt on the subject. Because the planners had only minimal influence over American policy during the war, they were sidelined and even kept in the dark about Roosevelt’s wartime commitments. Further, it was not clear until mid-1945 that the recommendations of the area committee would ever see the daylight which shone outside the offices and the corridors of the State Department. However, as seen in chapter six, the culmination of this planning, is clearly in language and spirit a continuation of the policy recommendations made by the IDAFE and SWNCC subcommittee from its creation in 1942 and summer 1945.

**Preparing the public**

While government bureaucratic agencies managed to establish the basic principles for the future of Japan, they were not as successful in preparing the American public for these plans. With few exceptions, public opinion was ignored by the unelected bureaucratic experts who wrote the first draft of postwar policy. Renowned Japan expert Edwin O. Reischauer, who was involved in the State Department project, later explained that public opinion had not been seen as important in policy planning. “Maybe there was a certain sense of elitism,” he explained, the idea that “if the government decides something the people will go along, [was] very common.”\textsuperscript{118} The role of public opinion was limited to an occasional excuse for rejecting policy proposals which officials disliked.\textsuperscript{119} This fit into a long trend of distance between the State Department and the American people. Public relations held little appeal for the department. In addition to being difficult and time consuming, it complicated diplomacy.\textsuperscript{120} Given the very limited public interest in or knowledge of Japan, experts disregarded uninformed opinion.\textsuperscript{121} A specialist in American foreign policy concluded after his study of State Department bureaucrats that “…to the extent that they even thought about the public, it was as an entity to be ‘educated’ rather than as a lodestar by which to be guided.” His work quotes one official as remarking, “To hell with public opinion… we should lead, and

\textsuperscript{117} Akira Iriye’s description of US wartime plans to create a non-aggressive, colony-less country who’s survival was tied to economic interdependence is therefore accurate. Iriye *Power and Culture*, 61.


\textsuperscript{119} As in Secretary Hull’s intervention against a “soft peace” above.

\textsuperscript{120} Andrew Johnstone, “Creating a ‘Democratic Foreign Policy’: The State Department’s Division of Public Liaison and Public Opinion, 1944-1953”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 35 No. 3 (June 2011): 487.

\textsuperscript{121} This trend was noted in Tae Jin Park, “Guiding Public Opinion on the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931–1941: The American State, Department and Propaganda on the Sino–Japanese Conflict” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* Vol 22, No 3 (2011): 388.
not follow." The absence of discussion about popular thinking within planning circles indicates that wartime planners shared this sentiment.

In a democratic nation, however, public opinion matters. During the war, the government informed citizens about developing postwar plans through several types of activities. The Office of War Information was created in June 1942 to manage the release of war and post-war related information to the public. The new office drew popular legitimacy from its use of well-known and respected journalists. It took as its head Elmer Davis, a broadcaster and newspaperman, and Edgar Ansel Mowrer, the editor of the *Chicago Daily News*, and committed itself to make available to the public through the media all available information except that which could provide aid and comfort to the enemy in wartime. That caveat was problematic, because a great deal of information could potentially “aid the enemy” in wartime by undermining morale and public confidence or causing friction between Allied powers, in addition to the more straightforward issue of providing military and tactical information. The work of the OWI was matched by separate public-education efforts by the State and War Departments, which aimed to inform and sway public opinion. However, a lack of coordination or agreed goals, and strict limitations on release of possible plans limited the effectiveness of government outreach during the war. This resulted in stifled public debate on key issues of planning for the peace.

The particularly difficult period during which the OWI was created played a role in the balance between making information available and supporting morale. 1942 was a year marked by dramatic defeats and setbacks for the Allies, especially in the Pacific, where Japan stunned the world with its rapid conquest of Western possessions. The early months of war were marked by the loss of Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines, as well as Japanese attacks on Australia. In light of this situation, the government cast about for positive messages in order to maintain morale as the country fought a losing war. With this necessity firmly in mind, propaganda became a core function of the office. It took up and held this task during the war through careful restriction and release of information to journalists, support and recommendation of news pieces and longer articles favorable to the US, as well as writing and producing radio programs itself in order to reach the American public with its message. Later in the war, the OWI monitored film depictions of China and Japan through its Bureau of Motion Pictures. The bureau created a manual for

124 Betty Winfield, *FDR and the News Media* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990): 157. Mowrer had served as a correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News* in both Berlin and Tokyo in the 1930s. His wife later reflected on her feelings toward Germany, which the couple had not wanted to leave. “Looking back on it all is like seeing someone you love go mad- and do horrible things.” It is a sentiment with which many of the Japan planners would have been able to sympathize. Lillian Mowrer, as quoted in Larson, *In the Garden of Beasts*, 106-107.
reference on American policy, reviewed screenplays, wrote dialogue, and encouraged changes to scripts.\textsuperscript{125} This group worked to project particular images of America’s allies and enemies. “China,” the OWI manual asked movie-makers to remember, “is a great nation, cultured and liberal, with whom, inevitably, [the US] will be closely bound in the world that is to come.”\textsuperscript{126} Hollywood was encouraged not to stoke race hatred in the case of Japan. Rather than showing caricatures of the “little buck toothed treacherous Jap,” the OWI manual advised writers that fascism, not race, was the issue.\textsuperscript{127} Such a distinction would make the “soft” treatment for ordinary Japanese envisioned in the IDAFE more palatable to the American people.

Preparing the American citizens for the postwar world was a particular challenge for the OWI. In 1943, the year in which the tide began to turn in favor of the Allies and postwar planning moved beyond the State Department, the OWI began to concern itself with providing accurate information without undermining morale by revealing splits within the US government or between the Allied powers. To this end, OWI officials followed news articles on postwar plans throughout the war, and the Office generated reports on public opinion regarding enemy states and the postwar world.\textsuperscript{128} It also began to promote magazine articles on the question of treatment of Japan in particular.\textsuperscript{129} However, there was no direction from President Roosevelt on the subject, so it was unclear which plans represented official policy and merited approval. The work of the OWI was also undermined by a lack of cooperation between the office and other parts of government.

The story of wartime planning for Japan is in many ways a story of rivalry between centers of policy making. The above sections outline the maneuvers within and between the State, War, Navy and Treasury Departments, and other chapters consider the executive and Congress as they competed for control over the reins of planning. All of these actors were interested in public opinion and engaged in their own efforts. As a former OWI member complained, “Neither the army nor the State Department was happy with our independence. They kept treating us as amateurs.”\textsuperscript{130} None of these more powerful actors were interested in relinquishing their own activities to the OWI, and collaborated with the office only when convenient. Of course, given the narrowness of policy circles, there was overlap and as a result

\textsuperscript{128} For press clippings on postwar planning gathered by OWI Section Head Mowrer, see Edgar Ansel Mowrer Papers, Library of Congress and OWI, RG 44 MLR:149 Loc:130 : 41/37/3-5 Box 171. Bureau of Special Services, Records of Research Division, NARA.
\textsuperscript{129} Articles on Japan promoted by the OWI are listed in OWI Special Services, RG 208, MLR 45, Box 161, Bureau of Special Services, Records of Research Division, NARA.
information sharing took place between agencies. William Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and Owen Lattimore, an influential member of the Council on Foreign Relations and through that position Roosevelt-appointed advisor to Chiang Kai-shek, both took up positions with the Office of War Information. The State Department created a new position, undersecretary of state for public and cultural relations, in order to recruit the assistant director of the OWI, Archibald MacLeish, into the department.

The young office was stunted without the solid backing of the president. As seen in the previous chapter, personal relationships were vital to cooperation with the White House because of Roosevelt’s management style and interest in gathering information through informal channels. Before assuming his post, OWI head Elmer Davis had never met FDR, and the two lacked the personal rapport which was necessary to gain the executive ear or insight into official planning. An outsider, Davis was conspicuously absent from key events. As one reporter publicly noted, “All of the U.S. remember that the President did not take Elmer Davis to Cairo and Teheran. [Sic] In fact, Davis wasn't even invited to Quebec.”

Roosevelt’s interests overlapped with those of the OWI because he was deeply interested in public and editorial opinion, but the president disapproved of public debate on postwar plans even when broadly in line with his thinking.

The State Department also maintained an active relationship with the press under its own initiative. Although prewar public relations had been limited, important speeches by the department’s leaders had occasionally helped define American policy. The department was far more active during the war. Hull and Stettinius made public speeches on the world after war and the future treatment of Japan, and the department also coordinated speaking tours for former Ambassador Grew on the subject.

The aim of Grew’s speaking tour, begun after his return to Washington from internment in Tokyo, was to educate the public about the Japanese enemy. Grew consulted with other planners in the department before speaking about Japan’s future. In a letter to IDAFE member Robert Fearey, Grew asked his opinion on economic rehabilitation and reintegration ahead of an NBC radio broadcast for the series “Why We Fight.” These speeches reached a wide audience, including Senator Albert “Happy” Chandler, who read a Grew CBS broadcast speech on the Senate floor and included it in the congressional record.

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132 Memo for Hon Lowell Melett, 21 July 1941. PSF (Subject) Mellett. Roosevelt Library. Chapter five includes several examples of Roosevelt dampening debate on postwar plans.
133 A 1943 speech on national interest and postwar plans by Hull, for example, was first broadcast on NBC radio stations across the nation. The transcription was then published in newspapers to reach the widest audience possible. “Text of Radio Address by Secretary Hull Outlining Policies of the State Department” The New York Times, 12 September 1943.
135 89 Congressional Record, 4505-4512. 17 May 1943.
also worked with the press and distributed pamphlets and other materials. In the last year of the war alone, State Department officials gave 329 public speeches.\textsuperscript{136} The State Department's efforts to influence popular opinion through bulletins and radio broadcasts throughout the war were sometimes quite transparent. The well-known writer Walter Lippmann, not wanting to openly criticize the department in wartime through his column, outlined the flaws of the department's use of media in a scathing letter to the secretary of state in 1944. Lippmann charged that the “vulgar” style of recent broadcasts resembled the “lower forms of commercial advertising.” Rather than informing the public, the series represented “crass propaganda which can only mislead the ignorant and infuriate the well-informed.”\textsuperscript{137} Despite such concerns, the State Department continued its own media projects in addition to those carried out by the OWI.

The War and Navy Departments also expressed interest in public sentiment, and attempted to influence postwar opinion by distributing pamphlets to troops during the conflict.\textsuperscript{138} Congress, itself a heterogeneous group embroiled in debates over future foreign policy, provided another source of difficulty for the OWI. Congressional approval was required for budgetary spending, and in 1945 there was discussion about pulling the plug on the office. Although a reduced operating budget was ultimately approved, Congress remained uncomfortable about funding what appeared to be an arm of government propaganda.\textsuperscript{139} These concerns extended beyond the OWI. In the spring of 1945, for example, the Senate appropriations subcommittee examined State Department releases on the United Nations Organization in response to criticism that they constituted, as one Senator put it, “deliberate policy of nationwide propaganda adopted by the State Department.”\textsuperscript{140} In the absence of approved policy, public outreach was vulnerable to such objections from critics of particular policies.

Despite considerable public relations work across government agencies, the public was given little solid information on postwar plans. Media figures expressed concern about this reality, telling officials that they had a responsibility to lead public opinion. In 1943 internationalist columnist Anne O'Hare McCormick publicly called on the government to make information available in order to “give them [the American people] the lead” in thinking about foreign policy, since the people could not initiate policy themselves. To McCormick’s mind, policy planners were benign figures who ought to keep the public informed, not in order to factor public opinion into their plans, but to explain to “anxious” citizens “why,

\textsuperscript{136} Andrew Johnstone, “Creating a ‘Democratic Foreign Policy,’” 492.
\textsuperscript{137} Walter Lippmann to Edward Stettinius, 17 January 1944. Box 103, Folder 2000, Reel 92. Walter Lippmann Papers, Manuscripts and Archives. Yale University.
\textsuperscript{138} See chapter five.
\textsuperscript{140} Robert Taft, as quoted in Andrew Johnstone, “‘Creating a ‘Democratic Foreign Policy,’” 495.
where and how they are going” on the road set for them by the government. Media magnate Henry Luce made a similar argument in a personal appeal to Hull. Other outlets expressed frustration and criticism over the exclusion of the public from postwar planning. Accusations of information hoarding were behind the sharpest criticisms of bureaucratic planning. It seemed that “all sorts of official and unofficial groups are planning, whispering, improvising and tapping barometers without mandate or authority.” While that is in many ways an accurate account of planning, the accusation that the process was without mandate or authority was of course inaccurate. The State Department was officially tasked with advising the executive on matters of foreign policy, and unofficial groups and individuals who contributed to preparation for that advisory role were able to do so only through the consent and cooperation of officials.

However, even if legitimate, this sense of “cloak-and-dagger” planning raised the suspicions of critics. The outlines of America’s future foreign policy were being made by “little groups of eager thinkers at Washington and elsewhere who are sure they have discovered the key to the universe,” and at “scattered United Nations conferences at remote places behind closed doors.” That the shape of these plans was hidden from the American people understandably raised hackles in certain quarters. These concerns, taken in context, ran deeper than their conspiracy theory tone might seem to suggest. Memories of the Great War colored perceptions of current events twenty-five years later. The postwar plans and the ideas advocated by Woodrow Wilson had been undermined by the secret agreements made by America’s allies in the wake of the First World War. Cynical agreements over indemnities and dividing territorial gain appeared to be the antithesis of Woodrow Wilson’s war aims, and had shocked the American public when they were revealed.

Officials across government were interested in selling the war and their visions on postwar plans to the public through careful use of the media. When asking, “What will the people think?” bureaucrats added “And how can we keep them from thinking it?” The Office of War Information, the body which nominally acted as the bridge between government and the public, faced competition from other departments as it set out to supply and control information made available to the public. With no known consensus on postwar plans from the executive or bureaucratic departments, and faced with the challenge

145 Andrew Johnstone argues that public backlash against secret dealings after the Great War provided impetus in the State Department for better public relations during World War II. Andrew Johnstone, “Creating a ‘Democratic Foreign Policy,’” 491.
146 Catton, The War Lords, p 74, as quoted in Betty Winfield, FDR and the News Media, 164.
that highlighting policy debates could undermine the office's mission to deny comfort to the enemy, the OWI was directionless and weak in this area. Indeed, the anger, suspicion and confusion about government plans voiced by writers and journalists during the war seem a natural result of the limited and conflicting information being provided by competing arms of government during the war. In terms of swaying opinion, or even the more modest goal of educating and preparing citizens for the end of the conflict, bureaucratic public relations campaigns were a qualified failure.

Conclusion

Two years after the Second World War ended, James Forrestal, who had participated in SWNCC as secretary of the navy, recalled that little thought had been given to postwar planning. “We regarded the war, broadly speaking, as a ball game which we had to finish as quickly as possible,” Forrestal wrote in his diary, “but in so doing there was relatively little thought as to the relationships between nations which would exist after Germany and Japan were destroyed.” While it is true that relatively few people were engaged in serious planning, the area committee members of the postwar planning program devoted much of their professional lives to that project during the war. The Asia experts involved in postwar planning sought to build a durable peace in the Pacific and considered American objectives in a new East Asian system.

The work of the area committees on the Far East resulted in a comprehensive and flexible set of recommendations. The State Department’s Japan planners considered the future of an enemy country with which many felt a deep connection. These personal experiences with the country provided the planners with a very different view of Japan than was common among the wider public. The academics and foreign service officers on the planning staff believed that the Japanese were not inherently militaristic, and would participate in America’s new order if convinced this was in Japan’s national interest. For this reason, officials made Japan’s economy and need for international trade central to their plans to pacify the country. In response to the criticism of several influential officials, such as Hull and Hornbeck, the planners were forced to tone down their rhetoric to demonstrate that they were not being too “soft” on the enemy. However, the ideas behind the rhetoric remained intact, and became American policy towards Japan.

The plans that were drawn up envisioned a new, America-friendly Japan. From 1943, planners agreed that Japan would be a responsible member of the international community, disarmed and prevented from

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148 A poll on public opinion towards Japan in 1945 stated that most Americans perceived the Japanese people as “barbaric” and “beyond the pale of civilized behavior.” Quoted in John David Chappell, Before the Bomb: How America Approached the End of the Pacific War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1997): 24.
rearming, and would again become an economic power. Such sweeping changes, it was acknowledged, would only be possible with the collaboration of the Japanese people, who would need to be convinced that reform was in their own interests. Selecting among recommendations and setting official policy, however, was the responsibility of the president. Although Roosevelt had no defined plans for Japan, his record indicates sympathy for a tougher peace than that developed by the SFE group. His death dramatically increased the importance of bureaucratic plans, ensuring that these objectives became the basis of American policy toward Japan from surrender into occupation. Because planners had limited resources and were part of a small group of American Asia experts, their work was in turn influenced by unofficial sources like think tanks and opinion leaders. It is to these groups that we now turn.

Chapter Three

Think Tanks and a New International Order in the Far East

On the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) wrote a letter about private political organizations in America. In this letter, Walter Mallory challenged the claim that his organization had a special role in American political life. The council, he claimed, was not exceptional. There were many “groups in the United States dealing with or capable of dealing with questions of our foreign relations.” “Every club,” he argued, had such a forum and “every church deals with such matters in some form or another. At every dinner party (of intelligent people) the conversation these days turns on foreign policy.” He estimated that there were twenty thousand such organizations in America at the time.¹ Despite Walter Mallory’s protestations, the Council on Foreign Relations was in an unusual position. There may indeed have been twenty thousand groups interested in foreign relations at the eve of America’s entry into the Second World War, but few were significant in the country’s policy-making process. Two organizations, Mallory’s council and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), held a special place in policy planning. Through their wartime programs the CFR and IPR became both directly and indirectly involved in official postwar planning for the future of East Asia and America’s role there.

In the early wartime period, official long-range planning was stunted by a lack of government resources and interest in the subject. The bureaucrats in charge of American foreign policy therefore came to rely on information and expertise from outside the government as they formed their views. Specialist research organizations, later known as “think tanks,” leapt to fill gaps in official expertise, providing reports and recommendations informed by the specific points of view held by that institution.² The IPR and CFR were both established, well-regarded institutions which could draw on relevant member expertise. The IPR benefitted from its regional specialization, it was the largest and most important group focused on the Pacific. The CFR, an outspoken advocate of American expansionism, gained influence through its elite membership and connections. Think tanks provided significant and accessible information, maintained

² For more on the history and development of think tanks, which grew out of the turn of the century progressive Era but not called by this term until after WWII, see Mahmood Ahmad, “US Think Tanks and the Politics of Expertise: Role, Value and Impact,” The Political Quarterly, Vol. 79 No. 4 (October-December 2008): 530.
personal networks between members and policymakers, and created space for officials and private experts from the business and scholarly communities to discuss ideas. Their fingerprints are apparent on the plans with which America embarked on the project of radically reshaping defeated Japan.

This chapter will begin with a description of the background of these two organizations and the wartime programs which linked them to postwar planning. It will consider the needs of the State Department which made it open to possible cooperation with non-state organizations. It will then describe the methods of direct and indirect involvement employed by the IPR and CFR in the official planning processes. During the war, both organizations became directly involved in planning through collaboration with government agencies and became semi-official spaces for research work and meetings. The groups also supported and influenced planning indirectly through providing unofficial “thinking spaces” for the use of officials, sharing resources, and through the social and professional relationships between members and officials. Because think tank forums were not official, individuals and governments could use them as “sounding boards” to test new positions without commitment. Finally, both organizations had international reach, and contributed to the sharing of information and ideas by linking planning groups in the United States with those in other Allied nations.

**Background on the organizations**

*The Council on Foreign Relations*

The Council on Foreign Relations was created in 1921 through the merger of two very different groups of East Coast internationalists. One was the American Institute of International Affairs, an organization of scholars brought together to advise President Wilson after the Great War, the other was a group of internationally-minded and successful businessmen and lawyers who met at exclusive dinners to discuss the issues of the day. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the council brought together outside experts and political leaders to discuss with its carefully-selected elite membership important issues of international...
affairs and regional developments through study groups, dinners, and reports. During this period, the council also excluded women and, in practice minorities, from membership. From 1922 the council reached beyond its influential membership to influence the informed public through a journal, *Foreign Affairs*. The journal took as its mission to “guide American public opinion” by becoming the “natural medium of the best thought” in America and Europe. As a result of council activities, its members were well-informed about current events around the world.

As Japan’s foreign policy grew increasingly aggressive following its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, the council’s members frequently debated the potential impact of this Far Eastern crisis on American interests and the appropriate American response. The council’s dinner series, appealing to a wide section of council membership, drew fire for its contentious choice to invite representatives of the Japanese government to address the group in the first half of the decade. The *Foreign Affairs* journal, under the editorial guidance of the fiery internationalist Hamilton Fish Armstrong, devoted many of its pages to expert analyses of the situation in Asia and in 1938 an entire issue dealt with the war in China.

In addition, the Far East Study Group focused the council’s East Asian experts on the breakdown of order in Asia in the face of Japanese militarism. The council members with an interest in Asia were for the most part businessmen with economic interests in Asia, government officials working on the region, and academics who specialized in the study of China or Japan. At the time of the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939, the Council on Foreign Relations was one of the few groups engaged in informed debate on events in Asia and on American interests and policy options in an increasingly unstable world system.

The Council on Foreign Relations has been viewed with suspicion by conspiracy theorists because of its elite membership of influential and wealthy representatives from the East Coast establishment. Corporate leaders within the council certainly pushed the organization toward the promotion of expanded

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7 Henry Stimson, Secretary of War and council member, wrote scathing letters to the council in response to such invitations. Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Whitney Shepherdson, 14 June 1934. Box 57, Folder 19. Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University.
8 *Foreign Affairs* and its editor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, are examined in chapter four.
9 This information is gathered from the Far East Study Group reports between 1937 and 1945, which include a list of members present. See Box 132, Council on Foreign Relations Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University.
American trade and investment abroad. 11 Such aims fit with the organization’s approach to foreign policy. Within the wider organization, and in sharp contrast to public sentiment, members shared a vision of an active US defending its growing interests around the world. 12 This positive internationalist view had been held by the council since its creation, and has directed council discussions and publications ever since. In the introduction to a council-commissioned history of the organization written in 1996, the president of the CFR explained the unifying vision of council members. “If the Council as a body,” he wrote, “has stood for anything these 75 years, it has been for American internationalism based on American interests.”13 While this common starting point by no means led to agreement between members on interpretations of specific issues, it did ensure that whatever position council members might take would support an increased American role, working to protect American interests.

*The Institute of Pacific Relations*

The IPR was established in Honolulu in 1925 with the mission of supporting the creation of a Pacific regional community. 14 It quickly expanded to include national councils representing the major Asian and Pacific countries, including the United States, Soviet Union, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, as well as European powers with colonial holdings in the Far East - Britain, France and the Netherlands. In the United States and across the English-speaking world, the institute became the major vehicle for collaboration between East Asia experts and for initiating and publishing research on the region. As renowned historian John Fairbank explains, "In the 1930s and '40s a great part of the literature available in English on contemporary East Asia was produced... [under the] inspiration and supervision" of the IPR.15 The influence of the IPR on the field of Asia studies and amongst experts and government officials was so strong because the discipline was small and the organization had little competition.16 As American interaction with Asian countries increased, so did the reliance of government officials on the

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11 Shoup and Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust*, 23.
12 The “great debate” between isolationism and internationalism is considered in the context of congressional activity in chapter five.
13 Leslie H Gelb, president of the CFR, in introduction to Grose, *Continuing the Inquiry*.
14 A concise introduction to the IPR can be found at the Introduction to the IPR Collection at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. http://libweb.hawaii.edu/libdept/archives/mss/ipr/index.htm Accessed June 2011.
IPR for information and analysis.\textsuperscript{17} During WWII, officials had to lean particularly hard on the IPR, the only expert group focusing on Pacific affairs, because the potential pool of specialists was so shallow and the level of common knowledge so low.

The IPR was a more complex type of organization than the Council on Foreign Relations. It can be considered both an American think tank and an international non-governmental organization (INGO) because it had a multi-level organizational structure. During the war period, the organization was composed of an International Secretariat, located in New York, which sat above a number of national councils representing academics, experts and businessmen with an interest in the Pacific region. Each of the national councils maintained its own research programs and relationship with its home government. For example, the Far Eastern Committee of Chatham House, sister organization of the Council on Foreign Relations and during the war closely connected with the Foreign Office, served as the British national council of the IPR.\textsuperscript{18} The IPR as a whole is therefore best seen as an INGO, but the vast majority of funds and major research initiatives came from American members and American philanthropic organizations. As a result, the organization was viewed in other member countries as a potential vehicle for American influence or, as one Australian member put it, “an American Propagandist organisation.”\textsuperscript{19} Certainly, the International Secretariat in New York, which set the agenda for the wider organization, was dominated by Americans. For these reasons, and because it is mainly the International Secretariat and the American Council (ACIPR) which were involved in Washington planning circles, this chapter will not consider the work of other national councils, except as they interacted with the ACIPR and participated in its wartime international conferences. The term “IPR” is used here to indicate the International Secretariat and the ACIPR, which in the context of wartime policy-planning activities can be considered a single American think tank.

The IPR moved from Hawaii to New York City in 1934. With the move, the organization shifted its focus from economics and culture to politics and international relations. The developing crisis in Asia further

\textsuperscript{17} It is generally the case that the issues in government foreign policy have become more complex as globalization and interlinkage have increased, forcing policymakers to rely on specialists for issues outside their own knowledge. James Allen Smith, \textit{The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite} (New York: Macmillan/Free Press, 1991): xix.


reinforced this trend. Because of the international aspect of the organization, which included national councils from warring China and Japan, the IPR was impacted by the conflict in Asia and was subject to increasing demands on its resources even before Pearl Harbor in a way in which domestic or Atlantic-focused organizations were not. In 1938 and 1939 the IPR sponsored a series of conferences on American Far East policy and the Sino-Japanese War, inviting academics, businessmen, and influential figures to discuss policy options and strategy. In order to address these issues and increase the amount of useful information available to the public and policymakers, the IPR set up a publication series entitled “the Inquiry”, which published volumes on domestic and international situations, including postwar plans for Japan, throughout the war. With the rare resource of area specialists and a mission to promote Pacific regionalism, the IPR was well placed to play a significant role in US-Asian relations during WWII.

Wartime programs

At the start of the Sino-Japanese war, both organizations were interested in affecting policy-making. Networking brought these groups into official planning, and members were absorbed into the government during the war. As will be discussed in the next chapter, both groups also developed publications which increased the amount of available knowledge on Asia. In addition, the IPR engaged in resource sharing with government agencies and hosted “semi-official” domestic and international conferences attended by officials. The Council on Foreign Relations’ single most important wartime program was the War and Peace Studies Project, an unprecedented secret collaboration between the body and the State Department. It also continued to host study groups which became involved in planning. The Far East Study Group attracted key figures in Japanese-American relations, including high-level government officials and leading experts. As the situation in Asia deteriorated, it became a forum for long-range planning on Japan and East Asia. Members, informed by study group debates, were or would become actively involved in American interactions with Japan. The study group provided planners with a forum to discuss key questions of American policy in East Asia with other government officials, academics, and business leaders.

22 For the records and agendas of these conferences, see Box 465, Institute of Pacific Relations Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University.
23 Excerpt from Trustee Confidential Bulletin, Jan 1 1940. RG 1.1 200S Box 354 Folder 4212. Rockefeller Foundation Archives. The Inquiry series is examined in more depth in chapter four.
The increased wartime activity of these organizations was made possible by funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, a philanthropic organization with the mission of promoting “well-being of humanity around the world.”

Like the CFR and the IPR, it was an internationalist organization which envisioned a greater American role in global affairs. The foundation supplied both organizations with substantial additional emergency funds to cover the cost of increased activities, as well as earmarked funds to support special programs. Crucially, increased Rockefeller Foundation support began well before America’s entrance into World War Two. This gave the IPR and CFR a “head start” in handling the issues which would later be absorbed into the Pacific theater of the war. With the help of the Rockefeller Foundation, think tanks could engage in in-house research and thoughtful planning on issues and interests. Before Pearl Harbor, these were luxuries which cash-strapped government agencies like the State Department could not afford.

**Explaining collaboration**

Despite America’s growing worldwide interests, the State Department in the 1930s was not the vast, well-resourced institution that it later became. The Great Depression had forced hiring freezes and fifty percent salary cuts within the department in the early 1930s. In 1937, the year the Sino-Japanese War broke out, the Far East Division of the State Department was therefore poorly resourced and understaffed. Division Chief Stanley Hornbeck reported that year that his section was unable to do all the work he felt it ought to. He noted that “a great deal of ‘planning’ might to advantage be engaged in” by the division. However, long-term thinking was not possible for his “overworked” staff, which struggled to handle “day-to-day current questions which are presented to it and which require immediate attention.” Without additional resources or staff, Hornbeck explained, it would be “almost impossible” for the division to give “concentrated thought and careful study to questions of major policy and to the formulating of suggestions for possible programs of future action.”

The outbreak of war in Europe and Asia exacerbated the situation, and the State Department was forced to focus almost exclusively on immediate

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24 A statement on the founding and mission of the Rockefeller Foundation can be found at http://m.rockfound.org/ Accessed May 2012.
25 As stated above, the Council on Foreign Relations aimed to promote American business interests abroad, while the ACIPR sought to promote a Pacific regional community in which the US would be an active player.
26 For a record of the Rockefeller Foundation’s early research on the proposed project, see, Memorandum of Conversation with Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith, Joseph H Willits 11 October 1939. Series 100S, Box 99, Folder 893. RF Archives. The foundation also supported IPR projects such as a 1938 series of studies on the “Far East situation.” Institute of Pacific Relations Grant Approval, 18 February 1938. RG1.1 200S, Box 354, Folder 4212. RF Archives.
issues. The Far East Division, for example, had a staff of only eleven officers in 1939.\textsuperscript{28} For this reason, officials at the department were eager to accept the outside expertise and resources that the IPR and CFR were able to offer.

Expertise on Asia was particularly hard to come by in this era both within and outside the State Department. Acknowledging this difficulty, a leading China expert at the Council on Foreign Relations wrote that while there were many authorities on European countries to be found, government and private institutions quickly discover “how hard it is to find people who really know what’s what in Asia.” “A natural result of this,” he went on, “is that in our councils and deliberations, in the discussion that goes on before policy is determined, the preponderant weight is on Europe.”\textsuperscript{29} The specter of war in Europe compounded this problem, dominating foreign policy discussions in the second half of the 1930s. Hornbeck, who was a member of the CFR Far East Study Group, noted in 1940 that “it is undoubtedly true that the European war has taken attention away from the Far East.”\textsuperscript{30} Even for groups specifically interested in events in Asia, the lack of experts limited discussion. In 1944, a CFR Economic and Financial planning group working on postwar Asia suggested that debate about the future of China “might be a topic which the Group might discuss further and fruitfully even though experts are not available to discuss China’s problem in a detailed way.”\textsuperscript{31} In this and similar cases, generalists were left to speculate about the politics of Asian countries in the absence of expert guidance.

This was a particular problem for policy planners in Washington and at the Council on Foreign Relations, which was headquartered in New York. Most individuals involved in postwar planning for Japan lived within easy traveling distance of the American capital or the CFR’s elegant brownstone on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. This regional bias affected the world view and focus of planning groups. While there was considerable interest in and involvement with Asia on the West Coast of the United States,


\textsuperscript{29} Owen Lattimore, America and Asia: Problems of Today’s War and the Peace of Tomorrow (Claremont: Claremont Colleges, 1943): 33.  


Americans on the East Coast were further removed and tended to have closer links with Europe. A survey of regional committees of the Council of Foreign Relations carried out during the war highlights the impact of locational bias on the views of council members. The report observed that proximity affected attitudes towards wartime enemy states. “The four Pacific coast committees tended to be easier on Japan than on Germany. The situation is just the reverse on the Atlantic Seaboard.” Despite a “great deal of sympathy” for the Chinese in all of the regional committees, there was “little understanding” of actual conditions in China outside San Francisco.32

As a result East Coast policy planners, lacking in background and detailed knowledge of Asia, were even more dependent on the limited number of Asia experts to develop ideas for the future of Asia and American interests in the Far East. These experts sometimes used this influence to push personal biases. Owen Lattimore was a particularly influential member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was involved as an Asia expert in each of the CFR projects discussed in this chapter.33 Lattimore had spent years in Asia and was one of the few Americans who spoke fluent Chinese in this period. He impressed many people as America’s foremost Asia expert. He was also a Sinophile who hoped to use his knowledge of China to build American support for the Chinese cause in general and for Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in particular. Lattimore was described by a contemporary as “widely known in this country [America] both for his scholarship and for his steadfast championship of China’s cause.”34

Lattimore’s personal identification with China may, however, have undermined his analysis of current events and limited his value, if not his reputation, as an expert. He referred, in lectures, to the feelings of “we Chinese,” and was known for his unshakable belief in the inherent democratic nature of China. 35 While he admitted that China was not yet democratic in a political sense, Lattimore informed his colleagues that China represented “a democratic type of society.” He argued at a planning meeting in 1942 that he was able to assess political developments in China from Washington by reading Chinese newspapers. Although uniform, centrally disseminated, and limited to topics approved by the government, Lattimore stated, Chinese news was free, first class, and a reliable source for information on the domestic political situation. Lattimore’s connection with China also colored his view of Japan and the

33 For a history of Lattimore’s career, see Robert P Newman. Owen Lattimore and the “Loss” of China, (Berkeley: University of California, 1992). Unfortunately, Newman does not discuss Lattimore’s position within the council on Foreign Relations. Lattimore’s influence as a public intellectual is also considered in chapter four.
35 Box 29. Owen Lattimore Papers, Library of Congress. Of course, events proved this assumption false.
Japanese. He wrote in a War and Peace Studies report that while “the Chinese would carry on the fight regardless of economic trials and tribulations,” the Japanese were “unusually subject” to mass panic and hysteria, and so could be easily defeated.\(^{36}\) Asia specialists like Lattimore were in a position to influence the thinking of officials and council members who were often without recourse to second opinions on events in Asia.

Although also located on the East Coast, the Institute of Pacific Relations was focused primarily on Asia. It therefore did not struggle with the bias of Euro-centrism or lack of Asia experts as did the government and the CFR. The IPR too sought a greater role in official policymaking during the war. The IPR aimed to establish close liaison with key Allied governments in London, Ottawa, Canberra, and Chungking. The creation of a Washington office, however, was to be the primary driver of IPR influence. The organization hoped that proximity and personal networks would encourage officials to draw on IPR publications to inform their decisions, and that IPR resources could provide official planners with “imaginative thinking about the broad problems of the war and post-war period.”\(^{37}\)

The institute also aimed pamphlets and more popular publications at the public, “to develop in America a realistic understanding of the Pacific half of the world.”\(^{38}\) As seen below, although the government recruited specialists from the ranks of the IPR, the group had more limited and indirect influence on policymaking than did the CFR.

The IPR’s interest in the region did not begin with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War or in response to threats to American interests. All of its members were interested in Asia, and the IPR became an important source of information and expertise for the government during the war. The institute fostered its networks with policy planners, hosted conferences which, like the CFR study groups, facilitated focused debate. As an organization with an international, not only American, character the IPR also played a crucial role by moving the debate beyond domestic forums and highlighting for American planners the different viewpoints and aims of other nations. Especially in the period before Pearl Harbor, the State Department lacked the resources to carry out extensive work on long-range issues in East Asia on its own. For this reason, the CFR and IPR were able to take on a significant role in policy planning by making their organizations available for government use.


\(^{37}\) Changes in 1942, as reported to Rockefeller Foundation: Memorandum on IPR Program, 4 February 1942. Box 60. IPR Papers, Columbia University.

\(^{38}\) William Lockwood to Joseph Willits, 2 November 1942. Box 60. IPR Papers, Columbia University.
Direct involvement

The War and Peace Study Project

The outbreak of war in Europe provided a catalyst for the Council on Foreign Relations to move beyond its usual activities and try to affect policy directly. In September 1939 council leaders visited Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith. They struck a deal for the creation of a secret project to provide the State Department with studies, memoranda, and policy recommendations based on the long-term foreign policy interests of the United States as seen by the council. The WPS was created to “investigate the effects of war upon the interests and policies of the United States, to prepare for the Government’s use material bearing on the postwar settlement, and to provide background for the transmission to the office of the Secretary of State of such information and reliable opinion as may be of use in the formulation of policy.” Messersmith wrote that he believed the project “could prove extremely helpful” because, although the department would give thought to the same problems, “its staff was so preoccupied with current questions requiring immediate action on matters of policy, that it did not have the time to devote to long-range considerations.” Through the WPS Project, members of the Council on Foreign Relations became “external bureaucrats,” directly involved and writing draft policy memorandum.

WPS working groups created reports and recommendations on specific issues at the request of State Department officials and on their own initiative. Copies of these memoranda were sent to the State Department, the president and vice president, and were forwarded to other departments and outside individuals at the State Department’s discretion. High-level officials sent glowing testimonials about the value of this secret project to the council’s funding body throughout the period. In 1940 Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote in a letter to the CFR President Norman H. Davis that the “excellent memoranda” of the WPS had been “very useful,” and that he felt “sure that they will be of even greater use when the day for reconstruction comes at the end of hostilities (sic).” The memoranda were also circulated and commented on between government departments throughout the war. In 1944, a document entitled

39 Council on Foreign Relations Grant Approval 1 Dec 1943. RG 1.1 Series 100S Box 99, Folder 896. RF Archives.
40 Trustees’ Bulletin, The War and Peace Studies, 1 Jan 1946. RG 1.1 Series 100S Box 99, Folder 896. RF Archives.
42 Cordell Hull to Norman H Davis, 12 November 1940. RG 1.1 Series 100S Box 99, Folder 893. RF Archives. This letter was likely written with the intention of its being forwarded to the Rockefeller Foundation in support of securing further financial aid for the project.
“Security Policy Vis-à-vis Japan” was sent to the Japan Branch at the War Department for comment and back to Eugene Dooman of the State Department’s Far East Division. Dooman wrote of the report, “the paper under examination is the most satisfactory discussion of the subject I have seen.” Such statements and decisions to circulate drafts outside the State Department demonstrate that WPS reports on Japan were integrated into government planning.

Although State Department officials chose to circulate WPS reports outside the department, the CFR kept the goal of War and Peace Studies project “limited to helping the State Department do its job well.” The decision was deliberately taken by the council, because senior members agreed that the selection process for wider circulation “might be invidious,” especially as distribution would have to be limited in order to keep the project secret and the reports confidential. The council rejected requests from the State Department’s Director of the Division of Special Research Leo Pasvolsky and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles for the group to distribute its memoranda more widely within the government. Although council reports were shared with other departments, the WPS continued to work exclusively with the State Department throughout its existence.

In 1942 the State Department created a postwar planning project of its own, but continued working closely with the council. The WPS project had been divided into working groups, of which the Political, Territorial, and Economic-Financial groups handled East Asian issues. The new official project mirrored this structure, and council research secretaries were hired by the government to act as liaisons between the corresponding State Department and Council on Foreign Relations committees. The decision by the secretary of state to approach official postwar planning by “setting up a parallel organization [to the WPS] within the State Department itself” was a tribute to the council’s influence in policy-making. The council prepared outlines for structuring the new State Department groups, although Armstrong was careful to point out that the council had no “idea of telling the State Department how it ought to organize

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45 Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Leo Pasvolsky, 12 March 1942. Box 2. Norman H Davis Papers, Library of Congress. For this reason, the Council on Foreign Relations was not involved in the inter-departmental rivalry seen in the previous chapter.
46 Trustees Bulletin, The War and Peace Studies. 1 January 1946. RG 1.1, Series 100S, Box 99, Folder 896. RF Archives.
its own work,” but intended merely to facilitate decision making.\textsuperscript{47} The new Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, which would approve the drafts produced by the State Department’s working groups, included several top representatives of the Council on Foreign Relations. Pasvolsky, who headed the whole project, was himself a council member.\textsuperscript{48}

However, cooperation between the council’s War and Peace Studies and State Department committees was not always easy. Pasvolsky was ambitious and eager to build up his own team. He was therefore sometimes reluctant to accept CFR help and advice. Council research secretaries, hired by the government to act as liaisons between the department and council, were “rather miffed” to find they were not always welcome at meetings or privy to reports.\textsuperscript{49} However, because training new experts was a difficult process, the War and Peace Studies Project remained an important source of policy planning long after the creation of a State Department committee. Isaiah Bowman wrote that despite the “Department’s heroic efforts to assemble a team of so-called experts and train them in the preparation of memoranda on significant questions,” it was not unusual that “Council Memoranda were the only things available in semi-mature form.”\textsuperscript{50} The “head start” provided by the WPS groups, and the inclusion of top CFR members in the Postwar Programs Committee, ensured that the council remained enmeshed in the official planning process.

The State Department’s Advisory Committee was suspended in July 1943 and replaced with a series of country and area committees which prepared policies for the approval of the new Postwar Programs Committee. The council’s involvement continued even after this change.\textsuperscript{51} The PWC was still headed by council member Pasvolsky and retained key members of the WPS, including Norman Davis and Isaiah Bowman, who had headed the WPS territorial group. In December 1944, the State Department’s Postwar Programs Committee was replaced again, this time by an interdepartmental committee, the SWNCC. Although CFR members were not included in this new committee, which was composed of department secretaries and under-secretaries, the new Far East sub-committee did contain council members. It was also given previous reports, with which the council had been involved, as a starting point for further postwar planning on Japan. Since the War and Peace Studies project was still closely involved in the

\textsuperscript{47} Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Norman H Davis, 19 Feb 1942. Box 2. Norman H Davis Papers, Library of Congress.
\textsuperscript{49} Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Isaiah Bowman, 26 March 1942. Box 12, Folder 2. Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University.
\textsuperscript{50} Isaiah Bowman to Willits, 23 November 1943. RG 1.1 Series 100S Box 99, Folder 896. RF Archives.
\textsuperscript{51} The evolution of bureaucratic planning is explained in the previous chapter.
Postwar Programs Committee’s planning, the work of the Council on Foreign Relations thus fed directly into the official policies drafted under SWNCC and were adopted as official policy after Japan’s surrender in 1945.

**WPS plans**

In keeping with the organizational outlook of the Council on Foreign Relations, the WPS project consistently provided the State Department with recommendations for increasing American control in East Asia. This went so far as advocating the expansion of American imperialism in order to replace the crumbling European empires in Asia. In the early days of planning, uncertainty about the postwar situation made it difficult for the WPS to develop recommendations for the postwar international system. While members hoped for stability based on some kind of regional organization, they doubted the possibility of international cooperation in the Pacific. They were, however, certain of the need for an expanded American role in the region. In 1940 the WPS Territorial Group made a remarkable suggestion for increasing American influence in the Pacific. The group suggested that the US might take on naval support of British interests in the Pacific until Britain was in a position to return with “full power and prestige,” even though this could lead America into undesirable long-term imperial commitments if Britain were not able to resume her role in the region quickly.52

The long-term picture remained unclear after America’s sudden entrance into the war. In 1942, planning for future engagement in the Pacific was difficult because council members did not know if America would “be forced… to carry heavy responsibilities in this region virtually alone,” or if it would be able to share responsibilities “with other strong and reasonably stable political units.”53 In this uncertain environment, the WPS presented the option of American control over the region if “complete Asiatic freedom [from Western imperialism]” proved impractical and wrote that security had to take precedence over the aspirations of the Chinese. A report pointed to America’s “good neighbor policy” in Latin America as evidence that “overwhelming power need not result in that abuse of power characteristic of imperialism.”54 In other words, American imperialism in Asia would be no bad thing. This suggestion was a radical departure from the anti-imperialism that could be seen in both official and public sentiment.

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Rather than an American empire, some members of the WPS believed that a new balance of power in Asia would be the best option for American interests. As “Japan will no longer be in a position to act as a balance against the Soviet,” this argument went, “it will be to America’s interest to strengthen China to the point where that gap will be filled.” Isaiah Bowman sounded an unusual note of caution against making such commitments in Asia. He noted that although America could be “forced to play an active role in Far Eastern politics” after the war, that was a serious decision for the American people to take. The Council on Foreign Relations generally supported an active foreign policy, but its discussion groups had room for a range of options within that framework.

After the Cairo declaration in 1943, WPS planners began to expect that international cooperation would be a key feature of postwar Asia. However, even if such cooperation were possible, WPS members concluded, any arrangements would need to recognize “widespread” American interests “throughout the Pacific.” In addition, US military strength would be reinforced by installations in the Philippines and seized Japanese territories. Members of the WPS Armaments Group expected that the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China and Canada would be the great powers in the postwar Far East, with no role for Japan. Despite the involvement of many countries, Britain and the US would dominate as the “chief nuclei” for regional organization with responsibility for enforcement in much of Asia. Russia and the US would determine security policy for the North Pacific.

Resource sharing and building capacity

A major contribution of the Institute of Pacific Relations was in improving the resources available to officials for establishing a long and close engagement with Asia. The IPR was a leader in directing and publishing research on East Asia in the period. The reports, pamphlets and books of the IPR were used by officials for information on an unfamiliar region, and for analysis on Japan and postwar East Asia. A 1945 study of Korea published by the IPR is a useful example. The IPR supported the “careful research study” on a “country whose very existence [Americans] had almost forgotten” as a colony of Japan.

57 Wartime international conferences are examined in chapter one.
58 The Regional Organization of Security (discussion draft), Armaments Group, 4 April 1944. Box 300, Folder 2. Council on Foreign Relations Papers, Seeley Mudd Library. Princeton University.
59 IPR publications will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter.
Rather than a “quickly confected tract for the times,” this research considered the resources and political situation of a poorly-understood area which the Allies were about to occupy. Such output provided planners and administrators with invaluable information.

These works were circulated and read by influential figures in policy circles. The publications of the IPR national committees were requested and collected by the Council on Foreign Relations library, and the New York library of the IPR was used “extensively” by government officials. The Office of War Information regularly requested IPR publications to inform its work. The IPR sought to amplify this effect by circulating special confidential reports on Japan and the Far East to American and foreign officials. Staff members responded to “all sorts of inquiries” on the Far East. In addition to carrying out and circulating research, the IPR sought to build expertise and specialist capacity in the United States. It did this by gearing high-quality research material toward the general public in an attempt to improve the poor level of general knowledge about Asia. Finally, the IPR set up and supported Asian language courses to create a supply of Japanese-language speakers to meet postwar demands.

**Thinking spaces**

**Study Groups**

Another of the CFR’s programs, the Far East Study Group, indirectly influenced postwar planning on Japan by providing a forum for officials and experts to discuss the future of East Asia. The study group ran annual sessions during which members would meet regularly to discuss key issues in East Asia. The study group served both to educate interested council members and provide a “thinking space” for specialists. Members of the Far East Study Group included Stanley Hornbeck, Henry Stimson, and

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62 Numerous OWI requests for microfilm copies of IPR reports can be found in IPR Papers, Columbia University, box 73. The OWI is discussed in the context of wartime planning in chapter two.
63 Japan and the Chinese War, Jan 1938. Box 16. IPR Papers, Columbia University.
64 The ACIPR included examples of resource sharing in an appeal to the Rockefeller Foundation for additional funds. William Lockwood to Joseph Willits, 2 November 1942. Box 60. IPR Papers, Columbia University.
65 Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific*, 256.
leading Asia experts and advisers. Several members of the study group were later involved in the administration of the occupation of Japan. Major General Frank McCoy, for example, would become the head of the Far East Commission, which advised the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.

By creating a shared conceptual framework among influential study group members, the Far East Study Group helped to define American interests and potential actions. The study groups were useful for “clarifying and giving precision to the thinking of the participants on key issues of American foreign policy.” More importantly, the CFR hoped that the groups would “serve as a medium in which responsible opinion may be formulated and transmitted to policy-making officials.” In response to Pearl Harbor, the Far East Study Group made the preparation of policy recommendations a priority. Because the CFR records were closed for the lifetime of involved members, study group participants were offered a unique forum for thrashing out positions with the aid of other Asia experts and without concern for outside criticism.

**Responses to Japanese expansionism**

From early on Japanese expansionism was viewed as a threat to the CFR ideal of increasing US trade and investment. At the zenith of trade in the mid-1930s, Japan had been America’s third-largest trade partner. Japan remained economically important for the US even while pursuing an aggressive foreign policy at odds with American interests. Between 1935 and 1939, fully a quarter of Japan’s imports came from the US. In this period, the Far East Study Group considered the paradox of America’s deep economic ties with Japan and its support for China in the Sino-Japanese war to be the key issue in East Asia.

A report of the Far East Study Group in 1939 explains the problem made by America’s conflicting interests with Japan. Continuing trade with Japan would also require abandoning support for China. “The

66 Professor George Blakeslee, for example, was appointed to head the State Department’s Area Committee on the Far East which made policy recommendations to the Postwar Problems Committee and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on postwar Japan.
67 Council on Foreign Relations Grant Approval 2 Dec 1942. RG 1.1 Series 100S Box 99, Folder 896. RF Archives.
70 Imports from the US to Japan were mostly cotton, iron and oil. Despite strong imports, Japan’s exports to the US declined from a high in 1925-1929 of 37% to 14.3% by 1939. William Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, 211.
present policy of trading with Japan and at the same time morally supporting China makes enemies of both.” Accepting Japanese expansion, “a policy of appeasement” would also act against US interests in the long run because Japanese domination in Asia would undermine American business there. Influential figures voiced similar concerns in Council forums. In 1940 Lattimore argued that an “unfriendly or monopolistic nation” in control of Southeast Asia would damage US interests, a clear reference to Japan. America was interested in raw materials located there, such as tin and rubber, as well as sea and air routes. Cordell Hull pointed out that this would also threaten America’s allies. Japanese expansion could cut Great Britain off from much needed supplies. This would be “more damaging to British defense in Europe perhaps than any other step short of a German crossing of the channel.” The group thus considered an embargo against Japan to be in American interests even at the cost of losing an important trading partner.

Members continued to debate the merits of appeasement and embargo. After a series of discussions on the basis of peace between the US and Japan a month before the attack on Pearl Harbor, members agreed to a set of minimum requirements for accommodation with Japan. The US could resume friendly relations if Japan would agree to two points: the withdrawal of troops in China to north of the Great Wall and allowing the US greater economic security and opportunities in China. In return, study group members agreed that America could accept Indochina as a Japanese protectorate and Japan’s retention of Manchuria. These remarkably generous terms are explained by the group’s concern for American trade interests with Japan, and by the group leadership of Blakeslee, who had a great deal of sympathy for Japan. Lattimore’s opposition to accommodation with Japan has already been seen. Stanley Hornbeck too was consistent and outspoken in his commitment to the return of Manchuria to China. In his copy of a China Study Group memorandum, Hornbeck double underlined in red a passage about the importance of returning Manchuria to China and wrote “Hear hear!” in the margin. He had spoken against accommodation with Japan in previous meetings, commenting that America would “get nowhere by sympathizing with Japan’s needs in the present situation.” However, Hornbeck had been involved in

72 Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust, 141-142.
73 Study Group Digest of Discussion, Japan’s Peace Terms. Second Meeting, Do Bases for a Real Peace Exist Between the United States and Japan?, 26 November 1941. US in the Far East Series, Box 1, 1940-1948. Royal Institute for International Affairs Far East Department Papers, SOAS.
negotiations with Japan throughout the previous summer and was aware that the US was not willing to make the concessions considered by the study group.

Barring accommodation with Japan, the study group considered the necessity of an embargo to weaken the Japanese position. One report from January 1940 explained that “there is an increased feeling that we should do something for China, and the most frequently suggested way of doing something is to embargo our exports to Japan.” Other methods of checking Japan’s expansion, including the threat of armed intervention, were not seriously considered by the group. Group members felt that the public supported an embargo “not because people have much conviction in this particular measure but because they felt something must be done.” However, the strong and opposing opinions of some members prevented the group from reaching a consensus on the issue.

William Herod of International General Electric made the case for business opposition to embargo. He informed the group, “I do not believe in the imposition of an embargo as an expression of moral indignation.” Herod argued that the use of embargo as a political tool in any situation would be damaging to American business interests. “If we pursue an ‘in and out’ policy in respect to foreign trade,” he explained to his fellow group members, “American foreign businesses can have little confidence in the future.” Moreover, Herod stated that an embargo was likely to be costly “in the loss of trade and opportunities” and ineffective as a deterrent to Japan. China expert Nathaniel Peffer took a different view. He argued that “by refusing to buy goods from Japan, the United States would stop helping Japan with the war.” Peffer believed that an embargo would be an effective means of reducing Japan’s ability to make war in the Far East. He stated that by employing an embargo on “cotton and silk alone it would do tremendous damage.” This dispute was never resolved within the group, and the question of an accommodation with Japan was overtaken by events.

A new order in the Far East

The most important question which the Far East Study Group faced during the Second World War was creating a plan for what they called a “new order in the Far East.” Between 1942 and 1945, study group

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members debated whether a balance of power system, regional, or international system would best suit American interests in postwar East Asia. Nicholas Spykman, chair of the International Relations department at Yale University, argued that America ought to keep postwar Japan and China balanced as powers. He explained that a weakened Japan “would be at the mercy of China.” For this reason, Spykman argued, the US should make adjustments to “allow Japan to be strong enough for self-defense and yet prevent her from over-running China.”

In 1944, a China Study Group was added to the Far East program. This group made a case similar to Spykman’s, suggesting that the US needed a strong postwar China to check Japanese resurgence. Postwar security required that China “restrain the Japanese until it is clear that their word can be trusted.” The Chinese-American Study Group, however, was not concerned with Japan’s defense against China. They argued that Japanese heavy industry was new and entirely military in character, and could be destroyed after the war.

The majority of group members supported the idea of creating a US-dominated regional organization in postwar Asia to ensure security and economic integration. When the issue was raised in 1942, Hornbeck rejected the idea because he believed that the Allies would not be able to agree on a regional partner for the organization. He explained that the regional organization plan “raises the question as to where the center of gravity would be in the Far East. Would it be Japan or China? If the former, the United States would object; if the latter, we would approve but either the U.S.S.R. or Great Britain or some of the Dominions might object.” Despite Hornbeck’s comments, it was agreed at the meeting in April 1942 that the Far East Study Group “as a group,” believed in “the principle of organized international cooperation for the Pacific with the United States as a partner either in a regional or global organization.” The group consensus was ahead of its time. Congress would pass similar resolutions a year and a half later, after an extended period of debate and public outreach. The regional organization plan later gave way to the idea of an international organization when the plan to replace the League of Nations gained saliency in postwar planning.

The Far East Study Group provided its influential members with a “thinking space” for reflection and hashing out ideas. Group meetings identified key issues in US-Japanese relations and postwar order in

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79 Study Group Digest of Discussion, Japan’s Peace Terms, Fourth Meeting, Do Bases for a Real Peace Exist Between the United States and Japan?, 3 March 1942. US in the Far East Series, Box 1, 1940-1948. Royal Institute for International Affairs Far East Department Papers, SOAS.
81 Study Group Digest of Discussion, Concrete Issues in a Post-War Settlement with Japan, Sixth Meeting, Do Bases for a Real Peace Exist Between the United States and Japan?, 7 April 1942. US in the Far East Series, Box 1, 1940-1948. Royal Institute for International Affairs Far East Department Papers, SOAS.
East Asia and worked to build a consensus on American strategy. They spent time considering courses of action to curb an aggressive Japan before the war, and various international systems to replace the shattered order in postwar East Asia. Participants discussed the value and viability of building a strong regional partner, Japan or China, to work with the US, and the merits of an America-dominated regional organization. Even when consensus could not be reached, the group exposed members to a range of opinions. Many members of the study group were or would become actively involved in wartime planning or the occupation of Japan. The study group thus indirectly influenced postwar planning by providing government officials, academics, and business leaders with a forum to discuss key questions of American policy in East Asia.

Social and professional networks

Human connections between official policymakers and think-tank members were a particular strength of both the IPR and CFR during the war. As seen above, WPS members were hired by the State Department to aid in planning, and many officials were already council members. IPR members were also recruited into official advisory positions as the government increased its resources after 1941. In fact, so many IPR members had gone into government to meet war demand that the institute was forced to break tradition and invite officials to its conferences. In one notable case, this absorption of personnel went in the other direction. In September 1943 Sumner Welles, former undersecretary of state and close confidant of President Roosevelt, became the branch head of the ACIPR in Washington. Welles had been a favorite of Roosevelt, and was seen as de facto secretary of state during his tenure because of this relationship. In 1943, however, he was forced to resign after a scandal regarding his sexual activities and orientation. Still an influential and connected figure, Welles was well placed to feed ideas from the IPR into the State Department.

As has been noted previously, Asia experts were a scarce resource in Western countries in the middle of the twentieth century. Speaking of the wartime period, one famous American scholar explained, “we all

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82 Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific*, 252-3.
85 For more on Sumner Welles, see Christopher O’Sullivan *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
knew each other in the China field in those days.” Area specialists inside and outside government knew each other through previous work as colleagues in academia or public research. For example, IPR secretary William Lockwood had been a favorite graduate student of George Blakeslee, who was a council member, a founding member of the IPR and a Far East expert at the State Department. Moreover, The Journal of International Affairs, which Blakeslee founded, merged with the CFR journal in 1922, and he remained on its editorial board. High-level and influential members of the State Department supported the work of the institute by attending conferences and hosting informal gatherings including members. In 1945, former Ambassador to Japan and current Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew organized a cocktail evening and invited IPR conference attendees. Grew asked the secretary of state to attend as well, declaring that “the Institute of Pacific Relations is an important organization and I think we should support it.”

The high-level council members working on the War and Peace Studies Project were generally well connected with government officials. Norman Davis is an obvious example. Described by one reporter as “gray and graceful,” Davis had been Undersecretary of State during the Wilson administration and served as Roosevelt’s “ambassador at large” in the mid-1930s. He maintained friendly relations with senior government officials throughout his career. Davis was particularly close to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. They played croquet together and Davis regularly visited Hull at work. The wives of these men were also friendly and the couples planned vacations together. Hull and Davis, at the request of President Roosevelt, had worked together to draft the “Quarantine Speech” given by the President in October 1937 in response to Japanese militant expansionism and the war with China. Hornbeck was also on friendly terms with Davis, and sent him news articles of interest on Asia. While the value of such links is hard to quantify, these networks made official cooperation with the council on WPS easier.

87 George Blakeslee to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, n.d. MC002. Box 74 Folder 17, Correspondence 1942. Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University. Blakeslee’s role in postwar planning is discussed in chapter two.
90 “War in China,” Time, 15 November 1937.
91 Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State, 116.
92 Many letters between the four are included in the Davis Papers. Box 27, Hull Folder. Norman H Davis Papers, Library of Congress.
94 Box 139. Stanley K Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
than it might have been otherwise. The project also brought council members into official capacities, as several were hired by the government to continue planning work. The combination of existing relationships and the circulation of think tank members into the government thoroughly enmeshed the CFR and the IPR in the State Department’s official planning. In her analysis of the Institute of Pacific Relations, historian Tomoko Akami stated that there was a “not oppositional” relationship between liberal intellectuals and the state during the war.\textsuperscript{95} This point deserves to be taken further. The extent of interlinkage between the State Department and non-state actors and the fact that many key planning figures wore both hats make it impossible to draw a clear delineation between these groups.

**IPR conferences**

The single greatest IPR contribution to postwar planning was its domestic and international conferences. Like the CFR study groups, IPR conferences offered officials a venue for informal and unofficial discussion. What the IPR termed “conference diplomacy,” in modern political science called “track II diplomacy” or “nongovernmental and unofficial forums,” offered important benefits to official policy formulation.\textsuperscript{96} These were semi-official spaces, unofficial gatherings of officials in a private capacity. Here, information, perspectives and ideas were shared more openly between experts and interested parties inside and outside of government. During the war, the IPR hosted a number of domestic conferences through the ACIPR. These helped circulate ideas between IPR members, opinion leaders, and government officials. The national councils of other countries could also submit papers for the Americans to consider.\textsuperscript{97} It also held two international conferences, both of which considered the treatment of postwar Japan and the aims of any future occupation.\textsuperscript{98}

Partially because of the value of the conferences as “sounding boards” for national policy, and partially because so many IPR members were drawn into government service during the war years, the major IPR conferences included many officials acting as observers or delegates. These men attended in a private capacity, but because of their closeness to policymaking were considered by other attendees as

\textsuperscript{95} Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific*, 278-80.
\textsuperscript{97} For example, the British Chatham House group sent a report on reform and the treatment of postwar Japan to an ACIPR meeting in January 1944. Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific*, 261.
\textsuperscript{98} These are the December 1942 Mont Tremblant and January 1945 Hot Springs Conferences. Because discussion records are not available, the content of these conferences is gathered from conference agendas, media coverage, IPR published summaries, and delegate reports.
representing the perspectives of their home nations. In addition, attending officials brought information back to their home governments and drew on discussions while developing policy. Robert Fearey, a young IDAFE member, was appointed by the State Department group to write a paper on the possibility of creating a regency system in postwar Japan “in view of his familiarity with the discussions on this subject at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference.” IPR conferences brought experts together, established valuable personal working relationships, spread ideas and generated energy around policy issues. This was particularly important because national viewpoints on the Japan question differed dramatically.

Disagreements between allies

In order to maintain Allied unity, governments were reluctant to discuss divergent postwar plans, especially through formal channels. The treatment of postwar Japan was a potentially explosive issue, as highlighting the different national interests of the allies could potentially undermine the war effort. The IPR played a particularly important role in relaying viewpoints and building consensus on the Japan question. American planners intended that their country would lead policy after victory, but, as seen in previous chapters, there was no set official American line on postwar plans before summer 1945. As a result of the reluctance to share information on an official level, competing interests between Allies, and policy uncertainty, the discussions and position papers at the wartime international conferences provided a crucial link between experts and officials from Allied nations.

Three countries dominated the debate on postwar East Asia; the United States, Great Britain, and Australia. The Soviet Union did not enter the war with Japan until August 1945. Although the Chinese delegation was outspoken at IPR conferences, the country’s influence was undermined by the weakness of the KMT. The Netherlands and France maintained stakeholder positions as colonial powers, but had been crippled by German occupation. Of this group, the Americans held the preponderance of power in directing Allied policy.

The head of the British Foreign Office Far Eastern Department provided a neat summary of Britain's position on postwar planning generally: “our objectives are simple – to recover and revive our territories, to beat the Japanese and to build a better world. I do not see that we need hesitate to proclaim the

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99 Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy, 32.
programme to Americans or despair of cooperating with them on the basis of it.”  

This view, of course, was overly optimistic. Americans and other Allied nations were deeply suspicious of British imperial interests, and divergent views on Japan were a source of contention. For example, unlike the American case, in which Japan had been a lucrative market and trading partner, the possible economic rehabilitation of Japan would create a rival for British industry. In addition, Britain, as an empire and a monarchy, supported a moderate policy of limited reform in postwar Japan, marked by reliance on an “old guard” of westernized prewar liberals and the retention of the Emperor. Suspicion of continued British imperialism, along with concern about America’s willingness to make and keep substantial postwar commitments, were the main sources of tension in inter-Allied planning during the early phase of the war.

Australia also held a distinct line on postwar Japan. Unlike Britain, or, despite the events at Pearl Harbor, the United States, Australian domestic security was directly threatened by Japanese expansion. As a result of this, the country had a significant interest in developing a system of international collective security and monitoring Japan to guard against future remilitarization. The Australian Council also called for soft peace terms on trade and recognition of some of Japan's war aims, notably ending European imperialism in the Pacific and even the possibility of special access to the Chinese market. The Australians advocated a combination of containment and conciliation for postwar Japan.

Understanding and adapting to American policy was the chief priority for postwar planning on Japan in both Great Britain and Australia. While the British, as seen above, did have a clear position on the Japan question, it was by no means the country's most pressing concern. British officials and politicians were willing to compromise and defer to the Americans in return for concessions elsewhere. Despite this flexibility, the British had only very limited access to detailed American plans. The war revealed the illusion of security guaranteed by the British Empire, and the Australians were frustrated by Britain’s “deplorable tendency…to relegate Australia to a subordinate status” and fail to consult with them on

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102 Roger Buckley, *Occupation Diplomacy*, 201.
important issues. The Australians were therefore anxious to understand American plans to contain the Japan threat and rebuild stability in the region. As the Department of External Affairs observer to the Mont Tremblant conference reported, achieving the postwar aims of Australia would “depend largely on the collaboration of the United States.” However, these allies were offered only a vague picture of future United States policy on which their own national security depended.

The Americans too used IPR conferences to gauge the aims of their allies. In December 1942, for example, Roosevelt asked his vice president, who attended the Mont Tremblant conference, if the British had taken a hard line on imperialism there. IPR conference discussions were cited and used in State Department planning groups. Given the resistance to discussing postwar plans on an official level, and the importance of the issue, the wartime conferences of the IPR offered a rare and valuable chance to discuss national approaches to the question of Japan. Thus, the Institute of Pacific Research influenced the occupation of Japan by facilitating planning between Allies.

Princeton and Mont Tremblant

By the start of the first wartime conference, the national council of Japan had ceased cooperation, and as there had never been councils for Italy or Germany, the IPR became an organization of Allied member states. Thus, international conferences were regarded as “Allied policy forums,” an impression reinforced by the fact that almost half of conference attendees were government officials. Both the American and international conferences were instrumental in formulating plans for handling Japan after defeat. The two 1942 conferences, although held at a time when defeat of Japan was by no means a foregone conclusion, considered questions about the requirements for future peace in the Far East, the role of the US in the region, and the future of Japan and its colonies.

107 Herbert Evatt, Minister of Internal Affairs. “Evatt Charges Britain is Denying Australia a Place in Peace Talks” The Evening Star, 24 August 1945.
110 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 132.
112 Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 258, 262.
The conference held at Princeton University in August, set the agenda on Far Eastern postwar planning in preparation for the larger international conference at Mont Tremblant in December. American attendees of the Princeton conference included Stanley Hornbeck and IPR leaders Edward Carter, William Holland, and William Lockwood. Britain’s minister to the Washington Embassy, the renowned scholar George Sansom, New Zealand’s minister to the US and representatives from Canada and the Netherlands ensured that the conference included international voices. Mirroring the debate within government circles in 1942, conference members debated the merits of regional and universal security organizations, arms limitation, and control of Japan’s island mandates. Attendees also discussed the treatment of Japan and its dependencies.  

Postwar Japan was not the focus of the Mont Tremblant conference. The conference centered on postwar cooperation between the Allies and the future of Europe’s colonies. On the American side, the conference was attended by high-level and influential officials including Leo Pasvolsky, Under-Secretary of State Adolf Berle, and Roosevelt’s economic advisor Lauchlin Currie. As previously noted, the president asked about Britain’s position from the conference. In addition, Currie provided Roosevelt with a written summary of the conference. The conference reinforced policy networks and brought specialist attention to key issues relating to postwar East Asia. A note from Currie's correspondence reflects this. He wrote, “I attended the big IPR conference in Canada [at Mont Tremblant]... I am still full of all kinds of ideas and enthusiasms for a technical mission to China for post-war reconstruction.” Delegations from other nations, mindful of America’s failure to join the League of Nations after the First World War, pressed for American commitment to international cooperation. Referring to Roosevelt’s famous “Four Freedoms” speech, one British delegate asked “What meaning is there in the words freedom from fear if the United States goes back to isolationism?” Other delegations, particularly America, China and Canada, questioned the European commitment to the principle of self-determination. Criticisms on this issue were especially leveled at Great Britain, which was seen as backing away from its agreement to the Atlantic Charter. A Chinese editorial noted that “if Britain and America will not keep to the principles which were laid down

114 The SWNCC, responsible for American policy on Japan, grew out of Pasvolsky's Division of Special Research. Lauchlin Currie was a passionate China-hand who used his position to pass favorable reports and articles on China to FDR.
115 Lauchlin Currie to FDR, 18 December 1942. Box 5. Lauchlin Currie Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
by themselves, there is no doubt that post-war world peace will not be realized.” The point neatly summarizes the criticism that dominated the Mont Tremblant conference.

Although the treatment of postwar Japan was a side-issue at the 1942 conferences, it may have had an important impact in shaping policy. While the Chinese delegation called for a brief occupation of Tokyo by “Allied Asiatic troops,” thinking on postwar occupations was not yet developed in 1942. Attendees did agree that defeated Japan should be disarmed, and that it should be stripped of territorial acquisitions including Korea, Manchuria, and the mandated islands. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles shared these ideas and spoke at the IPR luncheon at which the conference report was made public. The Welles connection is potentially significant. In fall 1943, even after he was forced to resign from his official position and took up the role of ACIPR Washington branch head, Welles remained a close confidant of Roosevelt. The two privately discussed ideas about the Cairo summit. The consensus from the IPR conference, of which Welles approved, is a likely source for key agreements made at Cairo.

Hot Springs

As would be expected in early 1945, the plans for reconstruction and postwar policy dominated the agenda of the second wartime international conference at Hot Springs, Virginia. Delegates debated issues which would determine Japan's future; the treatment of the defeated nation, the status of her colonies, reparations and industry, and collective security in the Pacific region. As they had in 1942, conference members agreed that Japan should be disarmed and stripped of overseas territories and mandates. State Department officials later cited consensus at this conference between American and foreign delegates on the question of American use of Japanese bases in support of establishing “permanent [American] control” of the former mandates. Fearey also informed the IDAFE of other positions taken at Hot

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117 These quotes are taken from a translated summary of "On the Report of the Institute of Pacific Relations", Ta Kung Pao [Independent] 9 April 1943, which was made by and circulated in the Australian Department of External Relations as indicative of Chinese views on postwar planning. Series A989, 1943/650/1 Part 2. National Archives of Australia.
120 Xiaoyuan Liu, A Partnership for Disorder; 122.
Springs, such as treatment of Japanese private property in former territories. In keeping with the ideas of the Canadian IPR member E. H. Norman, who presented a paper at the conference, the American delegation advocated limiting the influence of Japan’s zaibatsu corporate combines and agrarian reform to raise peasant living standards. During the conference, delegates agreed that in place of a “Draconian” peace, Japan could be pacified by allowing it international trade and educating the Japanese people about democracy.

The connections made at these conferences formed an important part of future policymaking. As one commonwealth delegate enthusiastically observed, “...the value of international conferences of this kind is that in out-of-session discussions a number of persons from various countries who are working in the same field get to know each other, learn from each other and are hence better equipped to work with each other in the future.” Events like the informal cocktail event hosted by Joseph Grew for IPR conference delegates formed the basis of both idea sharing and future working relationships on a national and international level. Attendees could both provide representations of current thinking and bring new ideas from other conference attendees back into the policy circles in which they worked. Conference materials were retained for government use, and delegates had access to important official documents brought to the conferences. As with other wartime projects, IPR conferences were most influential in the early phases. Although American policy was uncertain before Roosevelt’s death, the outlines of planning for postwar Japan in the SWNCC were largely set well before the Hot Springs conference.

Conclusion

The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations exerted direct and indirect influence on official postwar planning on the future of East Asia between 1937 and 1945. The Council on Foreign Relations’ War and Peace Studies Project was the most successful. It allowed a small section of

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124 The significance of Norman’s work is discussed in the next chapter, 137. For an overview of the American delegation, see also Yutaka Sasaki, “Foreign Policy Experts As Service Intellectuals”, 299-303. The paper Norman presented, “Feudal Background of Japanese Politics,” was later published as Secretariat Paper No. 9 (IPR: New York, 1945).
125 Sir Frederick Whyte, "When Japan is Beaten" The Times [Australia], 13 February, 1945 and "Japanese Ruler Must Lose His Autocracy" Observer [Australia], 28 Jan, 1945.
127 Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 258, 270.
council members direct involvement in official postwar planning. Walter Mallory wrote that the project “marked the first time, so far as I know, in which the service of private individuals, though a private organization, were put at the disposal of the Government systematically and which had a direct and continuing impact of the formulation of policy.” A Rockefeller Foundation report declared that “practically everything the Council did [with the WPS project] was meshed closely into the interests and activities of the State Department’s Advisory Committee, and the final results were a collaboration.”

This program brought the voice of the Council on Foreign Relations and its support for expanding American influence and interests into official planning. A small subsection of council members became quasi-official members of the government, directly involved with the State Department in working to determine the shape of the postwar world.

The council’s Far East Study Group and IPR conferences indirectly influenced postwar planning by providing its influential members with a “thinking space” for reflection and hashing out ideas. Both spaces involved official planners, but also other types of American elites involved in US-Japanese relations, such as businessmen and academics. The study group framed the debate for current and future policy toward Japan and exposed members to a range of expert opinion. Many members of the wartime Far East Study Group later grappled with the key questions debated in the council forum while actively involved in America’s postwar relationship with Japan. Domestic and international conferences on Pacific relations established networks and a body of careful research for the use of planners and later administrators. This established program indirectly influenced postwar planning through honing the ideas of its members.

The IPR was influential in creating these plans, and also provided knowledge and networks which were useful throughout the planning phase and the occupation, even as the institute itself declined. Connections between officials and IPR members, as well as institute publications, allowed for a flow of information and new ideas on Japan into government policy circles. Because of the difficulties surrounding official discussion of postwar plans on an international level, IPR conferences provided a major source of information on American policy to its allies and created a forum for inter-Allied planning. This ensured that although the US took on a leadership role in the occupation, its allies had a voice in shaping the project. American wartime planning for Japan benefitted significantly from the involvement of non-state

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129 Trustees’ Bulletin, The War and Peace Studies, 1 Jan 1946. RG 1.1 Series 100S Box 99, Folder 896. RF Archives.
actors in the process of policy creation. The work of the IPR and CFR was an integral part of bureaucratic planning. Through these organizations, members of the relatively small group of political and intellectual elites with an interest in Asia established useful relationships for policy deliberation, and also created a network that could be relied on during postwar implementation and as events on the ground required alteration of existing plans. A related group, opinion leaders and media figures, also entered into official plans and added to the ideas in circulation.
During the war, popular media was the main source of opinion and information on postwar planning for most Americans. Radio was a new format for news, playing a leading role in wartime public discourse for the first time. Large broadcasters, like the now-familiar National Broadcast Corporation, had nationwide reach and a place in government-public relations from the 1930s. Roosevelt’s prewar “fireside chats” brought the voice of the president with an informal tone into the homes of ordinary Americans on a regular basis through radio waves. This outreach campaign is remembered as an example of the political genius of FDR, and certainly contributed to the extraordinary popularity which allowed him to serve more terms in office than any other president in US history. Radio was also used to broadcast key speeches from leading figures to explain to the masses the outlines of American foreign policy. Landmark speeches on the Far East first reached the public through the airwaves, notably Roosevelt’s 1937 Quarantine speech, which was an attempt to turn away from isolationist policy and which called for firm action against “aggressor nations.” Roosevelt famously described December 7th, the date of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, as one “which will live in infamy”. The line, which is still taught to American school children and remembered each year, first reached Americans who had tuned in to their radios in search of reassurance and explanation as their country was unexpectedly attacked and drawn into a terrible war.

Despite the rise in new technology like radio and newsreels, newspapers remained the primary format for news. It was a source of information on events as they unfolded, and also provided analysis to help readers make sense of the turbulent world in which they were living. Cross-publishing, both across newspaper titles and types of media, helped to increase the impact of articles and speeches. Major speeches were broadcast on radio and reprinted in newspapers. Top columnists had syndicated opinion editorials printed in papers across the country, presenting ideas from internationalists like Walter Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson, as well as critics of the administration such as Drew Pearson, to large swathes of American society. Lippmann, perhaps the best-known commentator on world affairs of the

1 Government agencies’ use of the media has been discussed in chapter two.
2 The text of these chats is available online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/fireside.php. Accessed April 2012.
4 For more on the speech, see Dorothy Borg, “Notes on Roosevelt's "Quarantine" Speech”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 3, (1957).
5 A 1943 speech on national interest and postwar plans by Cordell Hull, for example, was first broadcast on NBC radio stations across the nation. The transcription was then published in newspapers to reach the widest audience possible. “Text of Radio Address By Secretary Hull Outlining Policies of the State Department,” The New York Times, 12 September 1943.
time, had columns reprinted in 160 newspapers with a combined circulation of eight million. This kind of cross-printing was also seen across print formats, for example a high-impact article in Life magazine would be reprinted whole or in digest form in other magazine titles and major newspapers. Taken together, official speeches and editorials formed the basis of popular understanding about plans for the postwar world, while popular films and magazine pieces provided images and cultural context. This combination amplified particular points of view and helped homogenize public perception across the United States.

As the major source of information available to the public on current and foreign affairs, popular media played an important role in both reflecting and shaping public opinion. However, there are limitations on the conclusions one can draw from this source. Basic problems emerge in using popular media to evaluate public opinion. Journalists and editors had an interest in publishing controversial or popular viewpoints in order to attract an audience or sell print publications, regardless of their personal opinions. Popular media also provided a platform for the ideas of media figures, especially editors, who were driven by a desire to proselytize their own beliefs. In addition, the arguments and opinions of better-informed journalists were curtailed or oversimplified due to the limits of public interest and understanding. Public opinion polls in the period reveal a shocking ignorance of basic knowledge about the world, and especially Asia. In a public survey carried out in 1940, for example, respondents expressed opinions on Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia and an oil embargo, but only 1.3 percent claimed to know where Singapore, a strategically important British holding, was located. The geography, history, politics and cultures of East Asia in the American mind were like the blank interiors of unexplored continents in maps from previous centuries. Finally, the images and tropes used in the media can rarely be linked clearly to policymaking. The relationship between media, public opinion, politician’s perception of opinion and decision making is complex.

Despite these serious limitations, popular media is useful for capturing a sense of the “public mood” in this period. This is clear from the interest that political leaders took in popular media and in newly-created scientific opinion polls. Certainly, contemporary politicians were greatly concerned with the media as both an indicator of public opinion on specific issues and as a powerful factor in forming that opinion. President Roosevelt, for example, requested and read weekly reports on these op-ed pieces and

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6 Steven Casey, *Cautious Crusade*, 21. Walter Lippmann’s ideas on international relations and Japan planning are considered in the context of his influence on officials below.

7 Steven Casey, *Cautious Crusade*, 17. This dynamic is covered later in this chapter.

8 Of course, not all journalists were particularly well informed about Asia. At the end of the war, one famous news correspondent complained to a colleague, “I feel that the Americans understand their domestic affairs fairly well and their foreign relations not at all – largely because so much writing on this subject is done by rank amateurs.” Edgar Mowrer to Dorothy Thompson, 7 August 1945. Box 28. Edgar Ansel Mowrer Papers, LoC.


surveys of newspaper clippings. Foreign leaders also had access to American media output. As domestic politicians used summaries of the press in order to understand their constituents, America's allies used them to draw conclusions about US interests and intentions. This window, dim and distorting as it may have been, was especially important in subjects like postwar planning where US diplomats were secretive and unclear about national aims. Thus, despite the flaws of using popular media to evaluate public opinion, it was indeed regarded as measure of that phenomenon by American and Allied policy makers. Media was therefore the major connection between the American public and American policy-making. And, to the extent that it did convey a sense of the “public mood” in a broad sense, media indicators are important in understanding how Americans thought about the role of their country in Asia and the future of Japan.

Opinion leaders

Public relations and popular opinion are only a part of the story of how the media influenced American policy toward Japan. During World War Two, the journalists, editors, politicians and bureaucrats who published on this question drew influence not just from their connection to the reading public, but also from their ties to policy-making circles. This group of “opinion leaders” targeted planners, not the public, for their audience. Wartime publications - popular newspaper opinion columns, specialist book series, and journal articles - provided a source of information and analysis to policy makers. As seen in the previous chapter, elites outside government were drawn into planning by quasi-official activities and personal connections. More than simply outlining a range of available options to decision makers, these men became a part of the debate; a crucial component in the policy-making process.

What made the media and figures considered here important was not only that they dealt with the relevant questions, but that their work was read and relied upon by policy makers during the war. It thus became part of the official planning process and influenced the as yet unwritten policy on the treatment of Japan. It is clearly difficult to measure the impact and chart the spread of their ideas. However, through the personal correspondence of decision makers and thinkers, it is possible to reconstruct what sources these figures were reading, recommending, and discussing amongst themselves. This circulation moved ideas in both directions. In many cases, the thinking of government experts and media figures became

11 Memorandum to Lowell Mellett, 21 July 1941. PSF (Subject) Mellett, Roosevelt Library.
13 Steven Casey uses the term “opinion makers” to group “journalists, editors, and commentators.” Cautious Crusade, 16.
14 Rudolf Janssens relied on reading lists in his analysis of government consumption of published material on Japan. Rudolf Janssens, What Future for Japan?, 79. However only a handful of government departments, which I consider to be tangential to the process of planning for Japan, created such lists. I have therefore relied on correspondence and other evidence in collections of personal papers.
integrated into books and articles that they read and commented on before publication. Opinion leaders also wielded influence as editors and simply as connected elites. Publishers and editors played a key role in relaying published information to target audiences, acting as gatekeepers through their power to select the opinions and ideas made available through their platforms. *Foreign Affairs, Pacific Affairs* and *Amerasia*, all tied to the think tanks considered the previous chapters, are examples of publications which expressed elite opinion. Published material was not the only, or even the most important, connection between opinion leaders and policy makers on the Japan question. Media elites, bureaucrats and politicians also shared ideas informally through telephone conversations, over dinners, and at social events. Especially powerful or respected figures were invited to become involved in planning committees and informal deliberation.

This group is particularly influential because its reach was not hemmed in by hierarchies and rival centers of planning. Political leaders, high-level bureaucrats and low-level area experts all grappled with the ideas promoted by opinion leaders during the war. Taken together, popular and specialist publications formed the basis of elite discourse on East Asia. They filled the sea of ideas in which policy-makers swam. The men behind those publications, tied to planners by personal and professional relationships, swam alongside them.

**Asia coverage before Pearl Harbor**

Prior to 1941, most Americans with personal experience in China fell into one of two camps. They were either, like Roosevelt’s maternal grandfather, businessmen interested in China trade, or, like the parents of many mid-century Asia experts, missionaries. America was not unique in this respect. Missionaries and traders were at the forefront of early East-West interactions. Missionaries went to places other Westerners did not go, interacted with locals as they made converts and provided social services, and remained in the country for extended periods. As a result, they had a special position as the “face” of their home country in China, and were also key sources of information about exotic locales back home.\(^{15}\) Because of differences in the treaties China and Japan had signed with the Western countries in the mid-nineteenth century, the missionary link was far stronger with China. The connection resulted in a sense of a historical “special relationship” for the United States, and created the impression of a China in need of American help.\(^{16}\)


\(^{16}\) As seen in chapter five, this “special relationship” idea was laid out before Congress during the war. See also Tae Jin Park, “Guiding Public Opinion on the Far Eastern Crisis,” 393.
Events in the early 1930s also swayed popular sympathy toward China ahead of the coming crisis. Chiang Kai-shek’s conversion to Christianity endeared his regime to existing sinophiles, many of whom came from missionary backgrounds, and helped to make the Chinese appear more “like” the Christian-majority United States. The most famous novel on China, *The Good Earth*, first published in 1931, was made into an Academy Award winning film in 1938. Its author, Pearl S Buck, was raised in China by missionary parents and developed a rosy image of that country based on the foggy and uncritical nostalgia of childhood.\(^17\) Buck parlayed her popularity into the publication of pro-Chinese articles in the American media. In addition to the China hands active within the government, influential figures like Buck, media mogul Henry Luce and Owen Lattimore championed China in the national press.\(^18\) In addition, many American reporters preferred working in China to Japan, partially because it had a larger established expatriate community. The majority of reporting on the Sino-Japanese conflict was done in China, which meant that American reporters saw the war alongside the Chinese. Foreign journalists experienced Japanese aerial bombings on Chungking, even sharing shelters with Chinese officials, and these reports were subject to Chinese censorship before transmission.\(^19\)

In contrast to China coverage, the 1930s media portrayed Japan as a dangerous actor, even as business links between the countries continued. Unlike China, Japan had not been home to large numbers of American missionaries or businessmen, and had no equivalent to the “open door” sponsorship on which to hang a narrative of patronage.\(^20\) The country also lacked popular champions in the American media. China was praised for its affinity with the United States as a “democratic-type” society by Luce, Buck and Lattimore, creating a false impression of Chinese politics in American minds. Japan, which had a Western-style constitution and parliament, and since 1925 had universal male suffrage, was not referred to as a democracy or a “democratic-type” society in public discourse.\(^21\) For informed citizens, Japan menaced America's colony in the Far East, the Philippines. In the 1930s the danger of Japan swallowing whole a newly-independent Philippines was a major factor in slowing American disengagement there.\(^22\) In the run-up to Pearl Harbor, the press was vocal in supporting China by pushing for an embargo against


\(^{18}\) Luce and Lattimore are discussed as part of a group of “opinion leaders” below.


\(^{20}\) This is not to say there was no business or missionary link with Japan. IDAFE member Eugene Dooman, for example, was born in Japan as the child of missionary parents. Haruo Iguchi writes about business links in *Unfinished Business: Ayukawa Yoshisuke and U.S.-Japan Relations, 1937-1953*, (Boston: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003). There were also a small number of expatriates resident in Japan before the war. Wilfrid Fleisher, former editor of the *Japan Advisor* in Tokyo is an example. His book on postwar plans was published and reviewed by American news outlets.

\(^{21}\) Japan took a distinct turn away from democracy in the 1930s when the country formed “national unity cabinets” in response to political violence and instability. These cabinets shifted power from political parties in favor of the military. Nevertheless, it the political system in Japan from the late nineteenth century was intentionally based on “modern” Western models.

Japan. The resulting pressure to take a tough line with Japan caused Roosevelt to complain to his
Secretary of the Interior “I think the whole business of exports to Japan was made difficult by the press
and the press only.” Government reports noted that the “an extraordinarily bellicose tone toward Japan”
in the press was not reflected in Gallup polls surveying public opinion.

The crisis in the Far East was far from the top of the national agenda. Media support for action in East
Asia was predicated on the assumption that involvement would not be costly for the US. Concern for
China did not translate into public support for serious American intervention in the conflict. Gallup polls
in 1937 and 1938 demonstrated that the vast majority of Americans wanted to limit US interests in the
area by having its nationals leave the country and were opposed to loans or arms shipments to China.
Although the subject was certainly covered by the press, the Sino-Japanese War was treated as a “distant
sideshow,” far less important than domestic issues or events in Europe.

Wartime coverage

As will be seen in the next chapter, racism and anti-Asian sentiment were common strands in American
thought prior to World War Two. During the war, however, negative racial stereotyping was made more
complicated by the fact that America’s chief ally and enemy in the Pacific were both Asian nations. In
1942, liberal columnist Anne O’Hare McCormick declared optimistically that ideology alone, not race,
would be an issue in the war. The “color line,” she wrote, had been “broken down” by axis aggression, so
that “light peoples and dark peoples [could] see that the peril is not yellow or white. China is on our side
and Japan is on Germany's because common ideas override superficial differences.” This was further
reinforced by stories of loyalty and shared suffering endured by Filipinos after Japan’s occupation of the
American colony. As one article noted, the Filipinos, “representing many different racial strains, have
proved themselves to be as fine a people as is to be found anywhere on this earth.” As seen in chapter
two, the Office of War Information actively discouraged Hollywood from employing racist
caracterizations in film depictions of the Japanese, and was concerned that the Japanese people be
separated from their leadership in the public mind.

References

23 FDR to Harold Ickes, 1 July 1941, PSF (Dept) Interior, Ickes. Roosevelt Library.
24 Alan Barth to Ferdinand Kuhn, 8 August 1941. PSF (Dept) Treasury, Editorial Opinion. Roosevelt Library.
26 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade, 29.
28 “Post-war Amity with Japan Urged” New York Times, 10 April, 1945.
29 See chapter two.
From the outbreak of the war, media coverage reinforced existing support for China, highlighting its long resistance against what had now become a common enemy. The impression of China as a strong ally with deep political, cultural and spiritual commonalities to the United States was supported by sympathetic journalists and well-regarded patrons. *Time* responded to the Asian issue by attempting to differentiate the Chinese from the Japanese in racial and cultural terms. In late December 1941 it published a feature piece to help readers distinguish “your friends” the Chinese from “Japs” using a checklist of physical and behavioral characteristics. Chinese facial expressions, for example, were “more placid, kindly, [and] open” while Japanese were “dogmatic, [and] arrogant.”  

Chinese were taller, not stocky, and had toe placement similar to Europeans. By reporting that the Chinese were physically closer to Europeans, *Time* echoed the “like us” rhetoric typical of the period.

An optimistic view of China as an ally was also reflected in the media and public expectations for the country’s future. Vice President Henry Wallace announced in a national radio broadcast that trade with China and Russia would revitalize the American Pacific Northwest region and create factory jobs that would smooth the transition back to a peacetime economy. Japan, which had been America’s largest trade partner and the most developed economy in the region, was notably absent from Wallace’s “Era of the Pacific.” But trade and investment were not the only benefits postwar China had to offer. Pearl S Buck anticipated that China would make moral and political contributions to the coming new world order. “What has China to offer a post-war world?” Buck asked in a speech at New York’s Carnegie Hall, “China will be the wisest of all. She will have more than any other country to contribute to that [postwar] world out of her 4,000 years of human history, out of her wisdom in human relationships, out of her knowledge of the human mind and its behavior, and out of her conviction of the worth of the individual.” Such statements built up unrealistic expectations about the contributions of this war-torn and politically unstable nation.

While in-country reporting certainly helped foster sympathy for China, it also resulted in negative accounts once perceptions began to change. As American congressman Walter Judd pointed out, reporters rarely had the benefit of long experience in the country. As a result, Americans were “being deluged nowadays with a flood of reports from people who do not have an adequate background of experience in Asia.” Lacking context and background, such reports were based on brief impressions and previously held ideas. New correspondents were influenced by early over-enthusiastic accounts of “a country endowed with more than human qualities… a democracy pure and Jeffersonian,” led by selfless and noble

32 “Chinese Envoy Sees Offensive in Asia,” *New York Times*, 8 July 8, 1943; Pearl S Buck at United China Relief “Tribute to China” Rally at Carnegie Hall.
leadership. A report from Britain’s Washington Embassy noted in July 1944 that “those sections of the public who think about it at all are now rather bewildered. They are beginning to doubt whether China will be a friendly democracy protecting American interests in the Pacific and whether the China market will be so lucrative after all.” Once skepticism set in, they unfavorably compared the China they encountered to a previously-held idealized version or to the United States itself.

Media coverage of the war also helped to harden views against Japan, an enemy nation. The Japanese were portrayed as fanatical, deeply conformist and even subhuman. The wartime press depicted the Japanese using the images of monkeys, and described the nation’s population as a mere collection of “reproductions from the same negative.” Such characterizations, combined with accounts of war crimes, “eroded nearly all compassion for the Japanese, soldiers or civilians,” in the United States. Revelations in 1944 boosted anti-Japanese sentiment and led to calls for retribution in place of a soft peace. These were followed by desperate and bloody battles as America’s island-hopping campaign moved forward. A *Time* piece published in August described to readers the “gruesome deeds, incomprehensible to the occidental mind” of Japanese civilians who “elected to die for the Emperor.” Accounts of fighting to the death and civilian suicide reinforced the existing characterization of the Japanese as racially distinct fanatics.

Postwar plans

No clear policy on postwar Japan was made available to the public during the war. Outreach and public relations campaigns were carried out by government agencies and congressmen to prepare the public for a soft peace and a more active American role. However, because of the policy confusion under President Roosevelt, there were no officially adopted plans to publicize. It was not clear until the late spring of 1945 that the SFE recommendations, approved by top advisers, would be the basis of policy toward Japan. Furthermore, it was felt that public discussion about postwar plans could put the Administration in a difficult position. Committing to a set position during the war would make it more difficult to make concessions to allies or change course if the situation required. While using the media as a mechanism for

35 Quoted in Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, 422.
38 John David Chappell, *Before the Bomb*, 98.
39 Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, 492.
informing the public about major decisions and non-secret international agreements, the Administration aimed to limit discussion of the postwar world in the press.\textsuperscript{42} Set public expectations could hamper diplomacy and limit the range of options. “I have not the slightest objection towards your trying your hands at an outline of the postwar picture,” Roosevelt told planners, but cautioned, “for heaven’s sake don’t even let the columnists hear of it.”\textsuperscript{43} The government’s plans for dealing with defeated Japan were largely a mystery to ordinary Americans.

Despite these limitations, major newspapers were able to provide readers with a remarkable range of voices on the subject of postwar Asia. They offered citizens considerable insight into the thinking of the official and unofficial groups examined in this study. Letters to the editor, book reviews, reprinted speeches by leading figures and conference summaries provided nuanced perspectives on the Japan question. Many of these views, especially from officials or experts close to official planning circles, were quite close to the IDAFE’s recommendations. Joseph Grew’s 1943 speaking tour in particular brought the debates from closed planning circles into the public sphere. The speeches and subsequent news reports included key elements of IDAFE plans for Japan. As did the Far East planning group, Grew argued before the public that it would be “folly” to make Japan a permanent outcast from the family of nations. While retribution would leave Japan “a festering sore” on the international body politic, stability depended on convincing that Japanese people that they stood to “gain by playing the game with the rest of the world,” especially in terms of economic growth and trade.\textsuperscript{44} This sentiment was echoed throughout the war as the press covered liberal and intellectual groups like the Universities Committee on Post-war International Problems and the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.\textsuperscript{45} The postwar planning commission of the latter group was chaired by John Foster Dulles, at the time a well-connected Republican political adviser. Its recommendations reflected the key points developed by the IDAFE. Postwar Japan would be demilitarized and “re-educated” by fostering pre-war “liberal elements”, made a member of the international community and given access to markets.\textsuperscript{46} Such thinking was at the heart of bureaucratic plans for a soft peace and reported on in the press.

\textsuperscript{42} For example, reporting on the Cairo declaration, a \textit{New York Times} journalist explained plans for Japan’s disarmament and loss of territory, and the rise of China as a world power. “Tokyo's co-prosperity sphere,” he wrote, “will be entirely scrapped.” And “from the ashes” of Japan’s empire a “new and greater China” would rise. C.L. Sulzberger, “Conferences fixed Shape of World to Come” \textit{New York Times}, 12 December 1943. As noted in chapter two, Asia experts within the government were not privy to these conference proceedings, so Japan planners received information about international agreements from press reports such as this.

\textsuperscript{43} FDR to Adolf Berle, 26 June 1941. Box 22. PSF (Dept) State, Roosevelt Library.


\textsuperscript{45} The Universities Committee on Post-war International Problems argued that “we must teach Japan not only that aggression does not pay, but that peaceful international collaboration does pay.” “Would Readmit Japan”, \textit{New York Times}, 9 April 1945.

Media coverage also offered views that were not included in official planning, including calls for a tough peace or for vengeance against the enemy. Book reviews provided neat summaries of alternative plans. *Pacific Charter*, written by a New York Times correspondent, declared that the Pacific theater of World War Two was not a war against the militarists currently in power but against “Japan, the nation, the race.” The book called for Japan’s towns and villages to be crushed after the war so that the “Japanese people will know from their own experience what they have been inflicting on other peoples.” A 1945 *New York Times* book review began with a disturbing anecdote about well-heeled Americans at a dinner party cheerfully discussing wiping out the population of Japan after the war. The writer made a blithe segue to reviewing a work by longtime Japan resident Wilfrid Fleisher, asking, “assuming… that we can't and won't kill 73,000,000 people - what can we do with them?” Major George Fielding Eliot's *Hour of Triumph* took quite a different approach. He warned that plans focusing on preventing future violence by containing current enemies were nearsighted. While agreeing that postwar Japan would need to be monitored but also allowed industry and trade, “60,000,000 Japanese can't live by raising rice.” Eliot anticipated future causes of unrest. Focusing on Japan and Germany at the expense of anti-colonialism in Asia and Anglo-American rivalry with Russia in Europe, he argued, would be dangerous. Postwar plans for Japan, Eliot wisely noted, were “in danger of preparing to avert the last war, not the next.” Wartime coverage of postwar plans thus exposed readers to a range of nuanced and informed opinion in addition to racist and extreme views.

**Opinion leaders and circulating ideas**

Like most Americans, politicians and bureaucrats read opinion pieces and analysis in popular publications. In addition to providing thoughtful analysis of current events, these writings were used by elected officials to evaluate the public mood. Opinion pieces were read by congressmen and other officials, who corresponded with their authors and debated the ideas they presented. Popular opinion writers therefore had an outsized role in the thinking of the nation’s leaders. During the war prominent figures stood out in their influence on Washington thinking, including author and columnist Walter Lippmann and Life Inc. publisher Henry Luce. Popular media brought the ideas of these men on the subject of American foreign policy out of the public realm and into the halls of power.

*Walter Lippmann*

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Walter Lippmann enjoyed influence during the war as a result of his published work. A native New Yorker, Lippmann attended Harvard six years behind FDR. As author of several well-received books and a widely syndicated columnist, Lippmann was already an established public intellectual in the years before the war. His first book, published in 1912 when Lippmann was just twenty-three years old, was admired by Teddy Roosevelt, who began correspondence with the young writer. Lippmann then served during the Great War as the youngest member of “the Inquiry”, Woodrow Wilson's postwar planning project. As a result of this experience, he well understood the problems faced by planners in WWII, and had even worked with a few figures, like James T Shotwell and Isaiah Bowman, who were involved in both the CFR and State Department planning projects. Lippmann considered himself to be a political realist, but, like Henry Luce, advocated a more active American engagement in world affairs. For Lippmann, protecting American interests, military and strategic, ought to be the primary driver of American policy. His column on current affairs and American foreign policy, “Today and Tomorrow,” was read by leading lights of the establishment and brought into debates on foreign policy and the postwar world. Congressmen with quite different views wrote him throughout the war to praise or challenge his articles, and his work was also read into the congressional record.

Senior statesmen professed themselves to be deeply influenced by Lippmann’s publications. In 1940 Edward Stettinius, then administrator of the Lend Lease program and later to become Secretary of State, wrote to praise a recent article and declared that he had “followed [Lippmann’s] writings for years.” James F. Byrnes, who would succeed Stettinius as secretary of state, also felt “compelled” to write Lippmann in June 1945 to share his thoughts on an article about postwar power structures. Outside the State Department, Henry Stimson remarked that he agreed with Lippmann’s approach to postwar planning and informed the journalist, “I have been recommending a reading of your book to everybody that I can.” Although not a policy maker himself, Lippmann became an important figure in postwar planning

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51 Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann, 128-40.
53 See, for example, Walter Lippmann to Senator Borah, 24 February 1939. Box 57, Folder 258, Reel 48. Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale University, and Senator Vandenberg to Walter Lippmann, 14 December 1944. Box 132, Folder 2589, Reel 93. Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale University.
as a result of the currency of his ideas through newspaper articles and book publications. The approval of the figures he influenced was needed to move the policy drafts of the SWNCCFE up for presidential consideration before they could become policy, and congressional support was needed to fund any planned occupation or reorientation efforts, as well as to ratify a peace treaty with defeated Japan.

What kind of ideas did Lippmann spread with regard to Japan in particular? Like many generalists, his attention was focused mainly on the Atlantic and relations with European powers. However, as the Far Eastern Crisis began to threaten American security, leading to war against Japan, Lippmann’s views on US-East Asian relations underwent a significant shift. In 1931, he had argued that the United States ought not become involved in the Manchurian crisis, because it had “no particular political interest” in the “whole great region.” Rather, he believed that any response to the crisis should be taken by nations which, unlike America, had a “definite stake in the area.” Already by 1937, this viewpoint was coming under scrutiny. In a review of an article submitted to *Foreign Affairs*, the editor and then close friend Hamilton Fish Armstrong remarked that Lippmann ought to make it clear in his piece that the US did in fact have important interests in what he called the “Eastern Pacific.” During the war, Lippmann’s best-selling book *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* revealed the dramatic turn his thinking had taken. Moving on from his prior view that East Asia was a region in which the US had no significant interests, Lippmann argued that from the nineteenth century the US had “placed itself at the geographical center of the empires of Eastern Asia” with the acquisition of Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines. This change was crucial to Lippmann’s views on American relations with the nations of the northern Pacific, because in his conception of foreign policy “interest” was the prerequisite for heavy involvement abroad. It was also an influential view. Hull and Stimson debated Lippmann’s ideas as expressed in the book shortly after its publication. Stimson specifically urged Hull to read again the chapter on “historical analysis of American policy,” which outlined America’s deep and entrenched interests in the Pacific.

*Lippmann and postwar plans*

From 1943 until the end of the war, Lippmann’s recommendations for the treatment of postwar Japan remained unsettled and even contradictory. He neatly described his stark view of an empire-less Japan’s future as a sidelined nation, “She is to be an island nation near a continent where she has no foothold, and in an ocean which others command.” The problems Lippmann foresaw in dealing with defeated Japan

56 Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Walter Lippmann, 31 March 1937. Box 52 Folder 105 Reel 42. Walter Lippmann papers, Yale University.
were twofold. First, the Allies needed to create a peace treaty and postwar order that the Japanese themselves would accept. Like the area specialists drafting Japan policy in the State War Navy subcommittee, Lippmann argued that a harsh or punitive peace could not last. Japan had to be assured access to markets and raw materials, and must “be able to earn a decent living peaceably.” His reasoning for this position, however, was slightly different, for it was based on a conservative assessment of America’s ability to impose terms or radical changes on a foreign country. In stark contrast to the far-reaching plans being developed within the government, Lippmann rejected the proposition that America should “run” postwar Japan during a transformative occupation, writing “we cannot manage a Japanese revolution.”

Lippmann drew his second idea on the danger of postwar Japan from the balance of power arguments of Professor Nicholas Spykeman. He argued that the potential existed for Japan’s power to be reconstituted as a counterweight in case of any postwar rivalry between the Allies. Discord between China, Russia and the United States might lead to any one of those countries supporting a Japanese revival and courting the former enemy for support. In *US War Aims*, Lippmann argued that there was a the possibility of strife between any of the three Allied Powers in East Asia, but thought it most likely that China or Russia would support Japan in order to strengthen their positions in any territorial conflict along their long shared land border. It was therefore competition between the Allies which might make Japan a danger in the future.

Despite confirmed American interests in Asia and the potential for postwar Japan to be a possible source proposed by rivalry, Lippmann held the unusual position that the United States should not take leadership in handling Japan after the war. Rather, he argued that China ought to take the initiative in reconstruction and rehabilitation, and possess the final say in the length and character of the occupation, as well as any issues of reform might arise. This position was radically different from the mainstream belief of the Allies as well as Washington that the United States ought to set the agenda for Japan and international security in the Pacific. Where might such an unorthodox idea come from? No expert on Asia, Walter Lippmann was himself deeply influenced by the ideas of Owen Lattimore on China. In common with many leading figures, including President Roosevelt, Lippmann believed that “the peace of the Pacific has turned and will turn upon China,” which would emerge from the war as a “new great power in the modern world.”

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60 Walter Lippmann *US War Aims*, 105-106.
61 Spykeman, who died in 1943, had been an advocate of balance of power arguments in the Council on Foreign Relation’s Japan Study Group. See previous chapter. Walter Lippmann *US Foreign Policy*, 171.
62 Surprisingly, Great Britain did not play a major role in postwar East Asia in Lippmann’s analysis. However, he does note its value to America as an ally, especially because of its available bases around the world. Walter Lippmann *US War Aims*, 104.
63 Lippmann cites Lattimore in his discussions of China in both books. Lattimore, a Sinophile blinded to the weakness of Chiang’s government, was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, editor of an IPR journal, and a government adviser during the war. See chapter three.
64 Walter Lippmann *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, 154-156.
While such an optimistic appraisal of Chinese power was common, if not universal, the idea that China would not only participate but would lead the occupation of Japan was not.

Readings of Lippmann, a well-known and respected analyst, thus reinforced the hopeful thinking and expectations about China's role in the postwar world which would ultimately be disappointed. Thus, although he was in accord with the idea that peace terms would have to be “soft” enough that the Japanese would accept them over time without coercion and enforcement, Lippmann's ideas on the nature of the occupation of postwar Japan were fundamentally at odds with those circulating at the lower levels of policy-making, the levels where the drafting of recommendations took place. In common with Roosevelt but unlike Asia experts, Lippmann advocated ceding policy control in the Pacific to a precarious ally.

Specialists and spreading ideas

In addition to reading and responding to published material, policy makers were often invited by writers to comment on prepublication drafts of essays and articles. In this way, they became engaged in the ideas circulated in the media in a more complex fashion, both shaping and being shaped by media discourse. This is not surprising, given the small field of intellectuals interested in East Asia, the movement of people between academia, think tanks, the media and government during the war, and, as will be discussed below, the personal relationships between officials and experts as members of the same social circles. Examples of this kind of collaboration abound. Stanley Hornbeck, the former head of the State Department's Far Eastern department and influential Sinophile, sent Lippmann a memorandum of his “observations” on the collapse of the Hull negotiations which led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although Lippmann did not cite the memorandum, it is possible that Hornbeck's views on Japan and China, which were similar to Owen Lattimore's, contributed to Lippmann's perspective on the Far East presented in his wartime publications.65 Lippmann in turn both offered comments on a draft manuscript for Stettinius, and asked Grew to read and give opinions on Japan-related sections of his own book manuscript.66 This practice was also common within respected but unofficial policy circles. In 1941, John Foster Dulles, who was then working on postwar planning within the Christian community and would later become Secretary of State, wrote to the secretary of the American Council, Edward C. Carter, to comment on a draft monograph “postwar worlds” before its publication.67

65 Stanley Hornbeck to Walter Lippmann, 21 February 1942. Box 78, Folder 1078, Reel 68. Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale University.
67 John Foster Dulles to Edward C Carter, 14 January 1941. Box 48. Institute of Pacific Relations Papers, Columbia University. The recommendations of this group were quite similar to those of the IDAFE, and were made available to the public through media coverage.
One particularly good example of the way in which these draft reviews helped circulate ideas begins with Joseph Grew's prereading of “What Future for Japan?”, a draft article by Asia specialist Lawrence K. Rosinger.68 Grew offered suggestions for Rosinger to incorporate, including disagreements with some of the author's assumptions about postwar Japan. In his comments, Grew noted that "among all the papers on our post-war relations with Japan that I had read, I am particularly impressed with that of George Sansom, read before the Council [sic] of Pacific Relations."69 Grew's comment about the IPR demonstrates the extent to which ideas gained currency and permeated intellectual circles. Grew did not read the IPR reports directly, but was exposed to them through other means. Influential ideas spread not only through direct transmission but also became part of the landscape.70 A month later, Grew sent both Rosinger’s draft article and his own comments to Navy Secretary James Forrestal, suggesting that they meet over lunch and discuss the ideas presented. “I am sure,” Grew wrote, “that a talk [about the treatment of postwar Japan] would be mutually helpful.”71 Although no record exists for this and other informal meetings, they form an important part of consensus building among officials. Such discussions, sparked by media articles, brought the State and Navy departments closer together and had a direct impact on American policy toward postwar Japan.

Editors: gatekeepers to publication

Editors were powerful figures in the unfolding debate amongst opinion leaders. By serving as gatekeepers to publication, editors decided what information would be disseminated. This was the case not only in the traditional popular media, but also in the specialist publications created by think tanks. In Western political systems, think tanks have become a common source of unofficial information, research and analysis for government use. In the United States, this process began during the Second World War, when a few early think tanks worked to influence American foreign policy through research output and other activities.72 The Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations were major sources of information on East Asia during this period. Niche publications like the CFR's Foreign Affairs and the IPR's journal titles and book series were targeted toward area specialists and policy makers. These efforts

had particular importance for the issue of Japan planning, because the low level of general knowledge about Asia increased the need that government officials had for information and analysis as American interaction with Asian countries increased. In addition, the work of individual think tanks was amplified by the small number of such organizations in existence at the time.

Luce and Time Inc.

Henry Luce, head of Time Inc and a commentator in his own right, played a double role as author and editor. In common with many Westerners interested in Far Eastern affairs in the 1930s and 1940s, he had been the child of missionaries stationed in Asia. Born in Shandong, China, at the end of the nineteenth century, his upbringing deeply influenced his world view. As an adult Luce felt sympathy with Nationalist China and a missionary zeal for spreading American values around the globe through a robust and active foreign policy. Encouraging the support and development of China using the patronage of the United States, which he saw as a mutually beneficial relationship, was a driving passion in his life.

In 1941, he wrote his most influential piece, an editorial in Life entitled “The American Century.” The article was circulated widely. First published in a magazine with a readership of three million, it was reprinted across other titles, with abstracts appearing in the New York Times and other newspapers.

Luce’s piece was a call for robust American internationalism and assumption of global leadership. It was published during, and became absorbed into, the debate between isolationist and interventionists over the role of the United States in the world. Public comments poured in from around the country in response to the piece, and politicians took the ideas to the floors of Congress. As will be seen in the next chapter, Luce's arguments were taken up by interventionists. Representative Martin Kennedy, for example, specifically invoked the “American century” in support of a resolution he put before the House of Representatives in March 1941. Of course, not all official response to Luce's article was positive. In 1942 Vice President Wallace criticized the “American century” thesis in an article of his own, arguing that the future ought not to be dominated by one nation, but by the common mass of people globally.

73 For more on the life of Henry Luce, see the recently biography by Alan Brinkley, The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century, (New York: Knopf, 2010). An indicator of this conviction, and its connection to traditional missionary activity, is Luce's role in founding United China Relief in 1939.
75 Luce kept these response letters, both negative and positive. They make up several folders within his personal papers. Box 180, Henry Luce papers, LoC. His article was read into the Congressional record. U.S. Congress, House, 77th Cong., 1st session, 5 March 1941, Congressional Record 87:1828–31.
Regardless of whether one agreed, however, Luce’s arguments became deeply influential in the discourse on America’s Asia policy, and could not simply be ignored.

Luce’s beliefs had implications for postwar planning on Japan. He thought that America had a special destiny as the inheritor of western civilization, and that Asia would desire, take up, and benefit from American technology, culture, and patronage. The article reinforced the circulating ideas that China would become the new Asian Great Power and America’s most important ally in the Pacific, supplanting Japan as the most modern and powerful Asian nation. This vision of postwar East Asia imagined a diminished world status for Japan, making its future less important. But Luce’s call for the country to commit itself to the spread of American values worldwide also fitted neatly with the idea of a long, potentially expensive, American intervention in postwar Japan. The bold naivety of the “American century” was reflected in the most radical proposals for how Americans might deal with defeated Japan.

It is difficult to overestimate the place of Luce’s Time Inc. publications in American life during the late 1930s and World War II. Its major output was comprised of three magazine titles, *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune*. *Time* and *Life* were popular, accessible publications. *Life* in particular used an image heavy format to appeal to the middle classes. *Fortune*, better researched and more reflective, targeted a narrower audience of educated businessmen. In addition to these publications, Time Inc increased its media presence with widely consumed newsreels and radio programs. It has been estimated that by the end of the war 30 million Americans read or at least skimmed a Time Inc. publication every week.79

Henry Luce, the man behind the company, took a deep editorial interest in the content of his publications. Two issues, both tied to the treatment of Japan, were of particular interest to him: representations of China and postwar planning. His sympathies toward China in general and the Nationalist regime in particular were reflected in the editorial policy of Time publications, especially following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In a demonstration of the popular publication’s support, the Chiangs were named “Man & Wife of the Year” by *Time* in 1937. The corresponding article offered a characteristically positive view of the American-educated Madame Chiang, noting that “no woman in the West holds so great a position as Mme Chiang Kai-shek holds in China. Her rise and that of her husband, the Generalissimo, in less than a generation to moral and material leadership of the ancient Chinese people cover a great page of history.”80

78 For an overview of Luce’s ideas on East-West relations, see Donald White, “The ‘American Century’ in World History,” 114.
80 “Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek”, *Time*, 3 January 1938.
Luce used such promotion, in addition to positive accounts and simplifications to help American readers relate to China, in order to generate support for his view of the country.  

Luce's dogged support for the KMT and editorial intervention along these lines drew both support and criticism amongst contemporaries and is remembered by historians as the hallmark of his editorial influence. In 1946 China expert John Fairbank remarked that Luce, in his support for Chiang, had “prostituted the truth and his own staff for policy purposes.” Criticisms of the regime and reports of political instability in China did find their way into Time Inc publications from time to time, but editors and journalists were aware of Luce's slant and altered their work to accommodate it. In 1942 Pearl S Buck wrote to Luce with a general overview of their shared position on China's value to the United States, and ended the letter with the comment that she would like to write a piece on the subject for Life “with pleasure and wrath”. Despite this common ground and the article being written with Luce in mind, the submitted piece was critical of the corruption which permeated the KMT. After some personal struggle over printing a perspective he disagreed with and which he believed would be harmful to the cause so near his heart, Luce decided to run the article, rationalizing that he did “not want to be found guilty of misleading the American people” by failing to report on negative developments in China. Still, such decisions were rare, and remained firmly in the hands of one powerful figure.

Henry Luce became interested in postwar planning quite early. Days after Pearl Harbor, Time inaugurated what it called its “Q” or “Postwar” Department. The group was meant to provide all Time Inc. publications with articles and opinion pieces on the coming world. The group was quiet until 1943, when Luce became more actively engaged with its work. In February of that year, Luce visited Washington to meet with the nation's top officials in order to better understand the state and content of government planning. After his return from Washington Luce became more involved in the group, rechristened the “Policy Formulation Committee”, attending brainstorming sessions and providing his own opinions for circulated memos. Although he delegated day to day work to editors, Luce maintained final authority over decisions across Time Inc. titles, and expected publications to reflect his own views. As he reminded his editors, “if there is any gospel around here it is the Post-War Memos” which he approved and

81 *Life* editorial policy made China more familiar to Americans by drawing comparisons with the United States in its articles, referring to key cities with American equivalents, for example, “China's Chicago.” Christopher Jespersen, *American Images of China*, 39-43.

82 As cited in Herzstein, *Henry R. Luce*, 60. For an orthodox description of Luce's pro-China editorial policy, see Michael Hunt, “East Asia in Henry Luce's 'American Century,'” 326.

83 Pearl S Buck to Henry Luce, 2 November 1942. Box 1. Henry Luce Papers, LoC.

84 Alan Brinkley, *The Publisher*, 294.


circulated. Luce's need to delegate and willingness to accept some opposing views undermined the totality of his influence as editor. However, his ideas, well known and deeply entrenched on two issues close to the Japan question, certainly indicate the importance of Henry Luce as a gatekeeper to the news and views presented in America from 1937 until 1945.

_Carter, Holland and the IPR_

The Institute of Pacific Relations was a powerhouse for information and analysis on the Far East during the war. The reports, pamphlets and books it produced were used by officials for information on an unfamiliar region, and for analysis on Japan and postwar East Asia. Its national council system structure, well-funded research programs, and recognized status as the leading, indeed only, organization focused on the Pacific region gave the IPR a unique ability to support and disseminate material on the regional crisis which became the Pacific theater of World War Two. In the United States and across the English speaking world, it was the major vehicle for collaboration between East Asia experts and for initiating and publishing research on the region. As John Fairbank explained, “In the 1930s and ‘40s a great part of the literature available in English on contemporary East Asia was produced... under... [the] inspiration and supervision [of the IPR].”

The most important of the IPR publication series were its quarterly journal _Pacific Affairs_, biweekly American council periodical _Far Eastern Survey_, and its book publication series, the Inquiry. The volume of output during the war is truly staggering, it has been estimated that between 1937 and 1945, the IPR sponsored the publication of 1,961 articles and book reviews, and 384 books and pamphlets.

The research output of the IPR during the war was not only the result of circumstance. Three editors of IPR publications, Edward C Carter, Owen Lattimore and William Holland, agreed that the organization ought to become policy relevant by shifting its focus towards current affairs. Ed Carter had been a figure in Pacific relations circles even before the creation of the IPR in 1925, and was respected as a man who had taught Chinese to a generation of missionaries. In 1933 he became Secretary General of the IPR, and threw his support behind proposals to move the IPR’s headquarters from Hawaii to New York. With the move, the organization shifted its focus from economics and culture to politics and international relations. The developing crisis in Asia further reinforced this trend.

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87 Alan Brinkley, _The Publisher_, 309.
89 Herzstein, _Luce_, 66.
90 Herzstein, _Luce_, 65.
The new direction within the organization was reflected in the type of articles printed in *Far Eastern Survey*. Established in 1932, the content of its early issues were in keeping with traditional scholarly and economic focus of the organization as a whole. Articles on Japan were concerned with fisheries, trade, industry and materials like steel, coal and iron. However, when the American Government and public began to look at toward the world after war in 1943, the *Far Eastern Survey* devoted its pages to postwar Pacific. Wartime issues considered topics such as postwar trade relations, education in defeated Japan, postwar international agreements and collective security.

Owen Lattimore, that impassioned advocate of Nationalist China, served as the editor of the IPR’s quarterly journal *Pacific Affairs* throughout the Far Eastern Crisis until his appointment as Roosevelt’s political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. During his tenure, Lattimore's own work interests were reflected in his editorial decisions. In the 1930s and 1940s, he championed the cause of American intervention and support to the region, and maintained his lifetime research interest in northern China and Mongolia, where he had travelled on a 1,400 mile camel caravan journey in the 1920s. For example, the edition released after the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 mirrored his political and geographical interests by including an update on the state of the communists in northern China by the famous radical journalist Edgar Snow, and articles on strengthening China through rural reforms and railway development. Altogether, Lattimore weighted the journal toward his own regional specialty, and the journal became a “lively frequently controversial academic quarterly” under his stewardship.

This interest in current affairs and policy relevant debate also matched the ideals of Carter, who took over editorship of the publication from 1941-42, and again in 1945. In between, the position was held by William Holland, a New Zealand native who worked on the institute's research and publication programs. Holland, who was deeply involved in IPR research programs, is remembered for his excellent and fair-minded editorial skills. He was a “truly devoted facilitator of free international discussion, never grinding an axe himself but getting others on all sides to sharpen their instruments.” At *Pacific Affairs*, this translated into coverage of a broad geographical range, in line with the membership and focus of the IPR as a whole. Wartime issues included articles on the past and prospects of India, the Philippines, Indonesia, and, most relevant here, Japan. Under Holland's tenure, *Pacific Affairs* brought the ideas of respected

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94 Report on Owen Lattimore, 23 Oct 1933. RG 1.1, Series 200, Box 30, Folder 333. RF Archives.
Japan specialists to its readership, as well as criticism of developing American policy from scholars outside the United States. Regular wartime contributors on Japan included the left-wing Japan specialists Thomas Arthur Bisson and E. H. Norman. In March 1944 *Pacific Affairs* published a Bisson article on postwar Japan which was remarkably close in content to the draft policies circulating in the SWNCCFE. Bisson argued that disarmament, loss of territory since gained since 1895, and possibly reparations were required to neutralize the Japanese threat. He also believed that it would be impossible to enforce harsh peace terms that the Japanese would not accept, and that the country would be pacified by its stake in an international system of free trade.  

The following issue included an international response, which agreed broadly with Bisson's view of treatment of Japan, but made the point that American plans must be developed and carried out with the participation of its allies.  

This emphasis on representing multiple viewpoints on a single issue is characteristic of Holland's work as editor.

Like Lattimore and Carter, Holland was primarily interested in China. In 1944 he adopted US citizenship in order to serve in the OSS office in Chungking. Although the IPR's leading editors were left-leaning Sinophiles, and all were later painted with the brush of communism, *Pacific Affairs* remained a respected journal throughout the wartime period, thanks to the commitment of Holland and Carter to presenting a variety of views. This concern for neutrality was so palpable that it was constricting to other members involved in editorial work within the organization. Laurence Salisbury, who became the editor of *Far Eastern Survey* in 1944, resigned because he felt the pressure to publish “only 'balanced' and 'non-controversial' material” restricted his decision making and “circumscribe[d] the publication of accurate, unbiased material.”  

Although the unwritten policy Salisbury complained of was in line with the long-standing editorial style of Holland and Carter, the IPR was already engulfed in accusations of communist subversion at the time of his resignation and had special reason to be careful with its reputation.

Though not an IPR title, the journal *Amerasia* was also closely linked to the organization. The publication was established following discussions at the 1936 IPR Yosemite conference, replacing Editor Philip Jaffe’s home-published *China Today*. The title was widely associated with the IPR for several reasons. Jaffe had become close to leading IPR members Lattimore and Bisson during a trip to the communist stronghold in Yenan in 1937, and the journal operated out of the same building as the IPR’s New York headquarters. Because *Amerasia* was a leftist publication, radical members of the IPR found it a more convivial home for their work than the more ideologically balanced IPR journals. While editor of *Pacific Affairs*, Lattimore sometimes sent submissions on to *Amerasia* for publication.

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Amerasia became engulfed in scandal in 1945, when a raid on its offices turned up leaked secret State Department and OSS papers. Although found guilty of illegal possession of secret documents, Amerasia staff were cleared of espionage and malicious intent at the time. John Service, a China specialist in the State Department not involved in postwar planning, was found to be a primary source of the leaks. The connection ultimately cost Service his career in government. It also fueled later conspiracy theories led by Senator Joseph McCarthy about American communists and the “loss” of China. The disgraced publication continued to operate at a loss and closed its doors in 1947. While the link between Amerasia and the IPR was damaging to the Institute’s reputation, the blow did not come until the end of the wartime period, at which point the impact of the IPR’s formal wartime publication series had already been made.

The Inquiry

The Inquiry series was another key publication program designed to further Carter's vision of the IPR as an active, policy-relevant organization. The monograph series began shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War “to inquire into the issues of durable peace in the Far East,” and was expressly intended to create “a body of carefully thought out and conveniently arranged material” on the Far East for official policy planning. This new activity fit with Carter and Holland's vision of the IPR as a more politically-oriented organization, and justified large new grants from the Rockefeller Foundation to support its publications on the Far East. Holland poured his energy into the project, working through “the whole process of conceiving and defining the subject for a book or article, finding a researcher-writer, getting him financed, editing his product and getting it into print.” Major works in English on Japan and American policy in the region were initiated, supported and made available through the Inquiry. These works include famous titles like E.H. Norman's Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (1940), Hugh Borton's Japan since 1931 (1940), Nathaniel Peffer's Basis for Peace in Far East (1942), and T.A. Bisson's America's Far Eastern Policy (1945).

103 Excerpt from Trustee Confidential Bulletin, Jan 1 1940. Box 354 Folder 4212, RG 1.1 200S. RF Archives.
Inquiry titles were deeply influential, read by specialists and also recommended to generalists as a source for understanding the Japan question.\textsuperscript{107} *Japan's Emergence* was the only history book published in the inquiry series. In it, Norman argued that the Japanese militarism was the result of feudal legacies which had survived the Meiji Restoration. Norman’s work focused attention on the domestic economy and social structure of Japan as a cause of its aggression abroad. The dramatic disparity between peasants and commercial and landowning classes shaped Japanese foreign policy in two ways. First, rural poverty fed radicalism by fostering discontent and creating a base of idle manpower on which the military could draw. Second, Japan’s masses were unable to afford the goods produced by the country’s industry. With a stunted domestic market, finding outlets abroad became an impetus for foreign adventures.\textsuperscript{108} Norman’s ideas were the basis of later plans to redistribute wealth through land reform and breaking up *Zaibatsu* corporate combines as a method of stabilizing postwar Japan.\textsuperscript{109} These ideas appear to have influenced Robert Fearey’s recommendations on land redistribution.\textsuperscript{110} Hugh Borton was so impressed with Norman’s work that he took it as the starting point for his own Inquiry publication, *Japan Since 1931*. This book, an expansion of Borton’s PhD dissertation, provided a detailed and knowledgeable reference work on the individuals and groups shaping Japanese politics in the 1930s. Borton restated Norman’s case that agricultural and land reform were needed to halt Japan’s slide into radicalism.\textsuperscript{111} He later became an integral member of the IDAFE planning group, and worked on relevant recommendations which became occupation policy.

Nathaniel Peffer’s *Basis for Peace in Far East* was an accessible and popular text which was used by journalists and public speakers in media debates about postwar Japan.\textsuperscript{112} As did Joseph Grew in his public speaking tour, Peffer argued that Japan would have to be utterly defeated in order to make genuine reform possible. The Japanese needed to learn the “lessons of war” through invasion and the destruction of their cities. Like Borton, Peffer accepted Norman’s thesis that modern Japanese authoritarianism was a leftover from the feudal era. After defeating Japan and removing the traditional elites from power, Peffer’s prescription for the postwar period shared characteristics of the “soft peace” being developed by State Department experts. Because Peffer believed a long occupation would be impractical, and an enforced

\begin{footnotes}
\item[107] These and other IPR series books appear on government reading lists described in Rudolf Janssens, *What Future Japan*, 87.
\item[109] In the introduction to the 60th anniversary reprinting of *Japan's Emergence*, Lawrence Woods makes the case that the work provided “intellectual impetus” to the idea of “completing” the Meiji revolution as a way to pacify Japan. E.H. Norman, *Japan's Emergence*, xix.
\item[110] See chapter two, page 65.
\item[111] Hugh Borton, *Japan since 1931* (IPR: New York, 1940), xi-xii, 93.
\end{footnotes}
peace ultimately untenable, the Japanese would rather need to be convinced to cooperate in an international order which would offer them the chance to prosper. In addition, the country could be stabilized by encouraging increased social mobility and agricultural living standards.

The last book to be published in the Inquiry series was written by T. A. Bisson, who was also an IPR research associate. This text drew on the previous Inquiry publications, and expected that the Allies would militarily and economically reorient Japan towards peace through a lengthy military occupation. America’s Far Eastern Policy included several points not emphasized by earlier Inquiry works. He cautioned that the emperor institution and Shinto religion would both remain dangers to demilitarization if left unchecked, and argued that the treatment of Japan should not be a unilateral American affair. Again drawing on the “feudal legacy” argument, Bisson asserted that pacifying Japan in the long term would require a breakup of the “Zaibatsu-landlord monopoly” on economic power, and redistribution of wealth. During the occupation of Japan, Bisson had the opportunity to advocate his ideas as advisor to the Chief of Government Section within GHQ. Both Basis for Peace in Far East and America’s Far Eastern Policy were requested by the Office of War Information in 1945 to be microfilmed for staff reference. A major goal of IPR publishing activity was to provide official planners with “imaginative thinking about the broad problems of the war and post-war period,” and the Inquiry series played a large part in making that possible.

The broad editorial aim of the IPR, led by Carter and Holland, was to create a body of high-quality policy-relevant output under the support of the organization. Regardless of personal beliefs, the various editors working at the institute strove to ensure that IPR publications reflected a range of geographical interests and ideological viewpoints. Inquiry titles and IPR periodicals both deepened the level of knowledge on the region and broadened the range of debate by providing a platform for academics and specialists to critically engage with these issues for the first time. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, American policy in East Asia was hamstrung by lack of knowledge and nuanced understanding about a region which was culturally and geographically distant from the centers of American political power on the East Coast of the United States. The IPR was invaluable in combating that problem.

113 Peffer continued to question the idea of occupation even as it became an established expectation later in the war. See Nathaniel Peffer, “Occupy Japan?” Harpers, April 1944.
114 Nathaniel Peffer, Basis for Peace in Far East (IPR: New York, 1942): 72, 76, 135-6, 171.
116 A biographical note for Thomas Arthur Bisson is available at http://www.library.umaine.edu/speccoll/FindingAids/BissonTA.htm
117 “List of IPR Publications Sent to the Office of War Information to be Microfilmed”, n.d. Box 73. IPR papers, Columbia University.
118 Changes in 1942, as reported to Rockefeller Foundation: Memorandum on IPR Program, 4 Feb 1942. Box 60. IPR papers, Columbia University.
during the war permanently expanded the base of available information on East Asia and the Pacific available to English speakers.

Hamilton Fish Armstrong and Foreign Affairs

The Council on Foreign Relations also published its own prestigious journal under the editorial guidance of Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Foreign Affairs took as its mission to “guide American public opinion” by becoming the “natural medium of the best thought” in America and Europe. Armstrong, called “Ham,” by friends, exercised a high degree of personal editorial control over the content of Foreign Affairs. A member of the journal’s advisory board later explained that all the board members were aware that they were nothing more than “a group of people Ham likes to talk to.” The chief function of the board, another member explained “has been to admire Ham.”

Armstrong, an internationalist with an interest in East Asia, attempted to use his editorial control to influence the opinion of his readership on the situation in Asia. During the war, Foreign Affairs provided its readers with articles on the future of Asia. Armstrong was keenly aware of the sway his journal had on informed opinion about international relations. As he explained in a letter to President Roosevelt in 1944, although the “circulation is not large (only 15,000),” it was nonetheless a leading publication because its readership included “the most influential people all over the country, as well as many key people in foreign governments.” Indeed, draft reports from the State Department's IDAFE explicitly referenced articles from Foreign Affairs as a source of ideas. For example, Fearay cited a Foreign Affairs article as the basis for his report on Japanese reparations. Understanding the political value of the journal’s elite readership, Armstrong attempted to use the journal to shape informed public opinion and influence the course of American policy. Under this guidance, articles in Foreign Affairs were selected and timed in order to “exercise the maximum effect on public issues.”

Even before the outbreak of war between Japan and the US, Armstrong’s Foreign Affairs had become a forum for discussion on the Sino-Japanese War. From July 1937 until December 1941 Armstrong solicited and commissioned a number of articles on the threat of Japanese militarism and the significance of

119 For a brief biographical note on Armstrong, including his connections to New York, see Shoup and Minter, The Imperial Brain Trust, 103.
122 Armstrong to Roosevelt, 1944, as cited in Priscilla Roberts “‘The Council has been your Creation,’” 71.
124 Priscilla Roberts, “‘The Council has been your Creation,’” 72.
Chinese resistance. He sought through the publication to ensure that its elite readership were aware of the crisis unfolding in East Asia, and understood that the situation was a matter of importance to the United States. After America’s entry into the war, Armstrong kept the publication in line with his own views by rejecting articles which proposed a “soft approach” toward postwar Japan. Throughout the war, articles from Professor George Blakeslee of Clark University on the nature of the future settlement with Japan were rejected. Blakeslee was not only a leading Japan specialist and a long-time member of the *Foreign Affairs* advisory board, but also a member of the CFR’s Far East Study Group. Moreover, from 1943, he was the head of the State Department’s Far Eastern Area Subcommittee of the Postwar Problems Committee, which was in charge of drafting US postwar policy toward Japan. Armstrong's editorial policy kept from *Foreign Affairs* readers the work of a key figure in drafting policy and the ideas on which future American policy toward Japan would be based.

A submission by Blakeslee in July 1942 suggested that the US ought to impose favorable economic conditions on a defeated Japan in order to ensure future peace. In response, one of Armstrong’s referees noted, “Blakeslee has given more thought and study to this question than (sic) almost anyone else. But isn’t he a bit gentle in his approach to it. Do WE want to start worrying about Japanese prosperity? Wouldn’t that give her the ‘chance to do it again?’” The review concluded that, although the reader did not have answers to the questions which Blakeslee’s submission raised, he was “fearful of gentle people dealing with lions!” Armstrong echoed this criticism in his rejection of Blakeslee’s article. He suggested that Blakeslee rethink his argument and pointed out that highlighting the economic causes of Japanese militarism could be misunderstood as blaming the US for the present war. Blakeslee, however, did not change his thesis, and as a result his work was excluded from *Foreign Affairs* throughout the war. By contrast, a number of articles supporting “tough” treatment of postwar Japan were printed in the journal. An article published on the subject in 1942 is typical. Its author, S.R. Chow, argued that it was “erroneous and dangerous” to believe that “a policy of moderation and generosity would help to pacify the Japanese and reconcile them with their former enemies.” Through Armstrong’s editorial guidance, the informed and influential readership of *Foreign Affairs* was regularly presented with this perspective during the war.

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126 See, as an example, Armstrong’s encouragement to Walter Lippmann to highlight American interests in East Asia above.
127 Unclear to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, no date, 1942. Box 8, Folder 17. Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, Seely Mudd Library.
128 Hamilton Fish Armstrong to George Blakeslee, July 1942. Box 8 Folder 17. Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, Seely Mudd Library.
Armstrong’s interventions were not limited to restricting policy ideas. Personal issues also affected publication decisions. In the 1930s, a close friendship between Walter Lippmann and Hamilton Fish Armstrong had brought one of the leading public thinkers on international affairs and the editor of the leading elite journal on the subject together. “Ham” and Walter were close friends, as were their wives, and the couples often met socially. Lippmann contributed articles to *Foreign Affairs*, which gave him a venue for thoughtful medium-length articles presented for a worldly audience. This was a useful addition to his popular short opinion pieces, which had to be produced often and to tight deadlines, and his longer book projects, which, because of the time they took to write and publish, were not a good vehicle for responding to current events. The relationship, however, was suddenly cut off when Armstrong discovered Lippmann had been carrying on an affair with his wife. The scandal resulted in divorce for both the Armstrongs and the Lippmanns, and the marriage of Walter Lippmann to Armstrong’s former wife. The two men, well-known figures in a small set of elite New York internationalists, never spoke again. Mimicking the Roman practice of *damnatio memoriae*, during his long tenure as editor Armstrong never again allowed Walter Lippmann’s name to appear in the journal’s pages. As a result of this personal conflict, one of the most well-known public intellectuals of the time was entirely omitted from *Foreign Affairs*.

Through personal conviction and force of personality, one member of the Council on Foreign Relations was able to control the editorial slant of the council’s prestigious journal. Armstrong used this powerful forum to direct debate on events in China and the future of Japan on his terms. Before Pearl Harbor, Armstrong commissioned articles to highlight the plight of China in the Sino-Japanese War and the perils of Japanese militarism. After America entered the war against Japan, Armstrong’s own convictions about the need to be “tough” on postwar Japan kept the journal from publishing other viewpoints, even from a member of the journal’s advisory board and an official responsible for drafting policy on postwar Japan. In addition, personal issues caused Armstrong to bar a leading figure in foreign policy from the journal. Described by colleagues as a man “as temperamental as he is able,” Armstrong effectively sidelined dissenting voices and used *Foreign Affairs* to provide the informed public with accounts of the problems and possibilities of Asia as he saw them. Armstrong’s views in favor of a harsh peace for Japan were in line with those of China sympathizers close to FDR like Lauchlin Currie and Owen Lattimore. Had Roosevelt lived to preside over the occupation of Japan, these views may have been reflected in official policy. Because it was not clear that the group Blakeslee headed would ultimately be responsible for policy, Armstrong misjudged his importance and, rather than using is position to sway the former merely excluded the elderly former professor from the pages of *Foreign Affairs*. Despite this missed chance,

130 Despite these utterly severed relations, Lippmann clipped and saved his old friend’s obituary on Armstrong’s death in 1973. Box 52 Folder 105 Reel 42. Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale University.
132 Bowman to Willits, 23 November 1943. Box 99, Folder 896. RG 1.1 Series 100S, RF Archives.
Foreign Affairs influenced informed thinking and indirectly affected postwar planning by providing a readership of officials and experts with a particular view of postwar Japan.

Publishers and editors had a great deal of influence over what books, articles and opinion pieces were selected. Because research support, salaries and reputations were based on the decisions of publishers, these individuals had influence over what authors chose to write and control of what was made available to readers. During WWII, Luce, Holland, Carter and Armstrong all used this powerful position to support publications which reflected their personal beliefs and interests. These decisions had a significant impact on the way in which Japan was portrayed in key popular and specialist publications. The publications of Time Inc. overstated the stability and viability of Chiang's regime in China, and actively projected a future in which the United States, aided by a strong and America-friendly China, would lead the Pacific and the world into a missionary-tinted “American century.” IPR editors used their control of scholarly book series and journals to release a broad base of well researched, political and policy-relevant academic knowledge on an under-researched region. Armstrong used the pages of Foreign Affairs to advocate his image of a harsh peace for Japan, and excluded the voices of important figures like Blakeslee and Lippmann for his own personal and professional reasons. Of course, this did not stop authors from continuing their work elsewhere. Blakeslee remained central to official planning, and his exclusion from Foreign Affairs merely meant that the publication’s readers were not introduced to the ideas developing in the State Department. While not necessarily decisive, these men did wield unusual force in guiding the debate on the Japan question.

Personal connections and reputations

The influence of some media men went beyond circulated opinion pieces, collaboration on publications, and publisher control over released material. In The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schulzinger argued that elites outside the government often reflected official policy because bureaucrats, politicians, businessmen and academics came from the same sorts of elite social circles. Thus, shared ideas were the result of the similarities across types of elites. But in the case of leading media figures, the connection is deeper than Shulzinger suggested. These people were part of the same social circles, with human relationships built on informal social connections. Through these personal networks, media elites joined the policy-making process as active elements in the evolution of ideas out of which formal policy grew and was accepted. Ideas were discussed and defended, assumptions and visions were shared in unrecorded, informal environments. These individuals were already part of official and unofficial planning groups and were invited to share ideas and join associations, committees and government Departments, further enmeshing them in the process.

Soft connections knit a few important media figures into influential circles. Although many interactions were not directly policy relevant, they established friendships which allowed for the sharing of ideas between men who were well educated, informed and deeply interested in world affairs. For example, their shared passion for the Chinese cause generated correspondence between Henry Luce and Cordell Hull through the United China Relief organization.\textsuperscript{134} Walter Lippmann, charming and worldly, was a part of the social networks of New York and Washington. The Lippmanns' wartime social calendar included meals with the Dean Achesons, the Henry Stimsons, and Admiral Kirk.\textsuperscript{135} In 1939 the Lippmanns rented the house of future OSS Director and Roosevelt confidant William Donovan.\textsuperscript{136} These social interactions formed bonds of amity, trust and mutual respect which are the bedrock of collaboration. Gift giving too was a source of warmth in relationships. Senator Vandenburg, having received from Luce a box of cigars, included in his thank-you note an invitation to meet at Luce's convenience.\textsuperscript{137} Birthday, Christmas, and get-well cards were sent and saved; they reinforced the human bonds between policymakers.

Regular correspondence also made for easy sharing of information between journalists and officials. Throughout the war, powerful figures like Forrestal and Stimson wrote to Lippmann to set up lunches and meetings and discuss the ideas presented in his columns.\textsuperscript{138} In May 1944 Walter Lippmann telephoned Joseph Grew to tell him about a conversation with Soviet diplomat Vladimir Sergeyvich Pravdin. The two discussed Russian interests in the Pacific. Russia, Lippmann told Grew, had renewed territorial ambitions in Port Arthur, a warm-water port in the Far East which had been a source of imperial rivalry since the nineteenth century. The Soviets were also concerned about how cooperation with the Chinese communists in fighting the Japanese would be perceived in Washington and Chungking. Grew had this information typed into a memorandum, which he then passed to the secretary of state.\textsuperscript{139} Later that year, Lippmann visited Henry Stimson after returning from a trip to France. He took the opportunity to express his views on the planned occupation of Germany, arguing that the country would remain a threat even under occupation and suggesting that the country be permanently divided.\textsuperscript{140} Information and ideas moved between formal and informal channels at such meetings.

\textsuperscript{134} Cordell Hull to Henry Luce, 5 September 1941. Box 2. Henry Luce Papers, LoC.
\textsuperscript{135} Dean Acheson to Lippmann, 31 May 1939. Box 50, Folder 4. Walter Lippmann Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 6 February 1943, 29. Reel 8. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
\textsuperscript{136} Lippmann to William Donovan, 7 April 1939. Box 67, Folder 629. Walter Lippmann Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
\textsuperscript{137} Senator Arthur H Vandenberg to Henry Luce, 20 December 1943. Box 3. Henry Luce Papers, LoC.
\textsuperscript{139} Memorandum of Conversation, Walter Lippmann and Joseph Grew, 17 May 1944. MS Am 1687.3 Mem cons Vol 6 (1944). Joseph Grew Papers, Harvard University. Sino-Russian territorial issues were examined in chapter one.
\textsuperscript{140} 11 May 1943, 31. Reel 8. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University.
Opinion leaders developed reputations as active members of policy circles, and as a result were invited to join planning groups and committees. In 1943 Lippmann was asked to become a member of the American council of the IPR. Luce, who was already an IPR member and served on its board of trustees, received invitations to participate in discussion luncheons for postwar plans developed by John Foster Dulles and the Federal Council of Churches and to join a series of closed-door meetings on China sponsored by the CFR. This tendency to include opinion leaders in new projects also gave media men a voice in official planning. Shortly before America went to war, Bill Donovan began preparing for his new position as coordinator of defense information, a position which would later become head of the Office of Strategic Services. To begin this new project, Donovan wanted a group of eight or nine well informed individuals to meet informally and create a set of future scenarios for his staff to use as the basis of their first reports. Archibald MacLeish, working for Donovan, wrote to Luce that as “the world's greatest” editor, “we have to have you as one of the group.” Henry Luce joined what they called the “glass ball shooting committee,” which met at Donovan's home to set the agenda for OSS research. The connection with MacLeish continued to bring Luce into informal government advising. In 1943, MacLeish, then assistant director of the OWI, wrote to Luce again, asking for opinions and comments on a draft background sheet on China because of his authority on the subject.

A man with clear views on America's place in the world, Henry Luce sometimes attempted to use his connections to influence policy directly. In 1943 Luce tried to drum up popular and elite support for his cause during Madame Chiang's visit to the United States. Luce's publications covered her tour, and he hosted a “marvelous affair” in her honor, a reception and dinner attended by Luce's elite associates. Luce's actions and the solicitation of his views by officials reveal both Luce’s desire to be an actor in policy making and the extent of his political influence.

Personal connections and reputations in the field of international affairs also led to offers of jobs in government planning positions. At a time when East Asia experts were lacking in government, authors and editors were invited to take up official posts on the basis of their publications and recommendations. IPR members, especially the academics who published in its outlets, were recruited into advisory positions to such an extent that the organization had to break its tradition of excluding officials from its

141 Alice Jaymon to Walter Lippmann, 27 July 1943. Box 79, Folder 1123, Reel 69. Walter Lippmann Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University.
142 John Foster Dulles to Henry Luce, 8 March 1943. Box 1. Henry Luce Papers, LoC. Walter Mallory to Henry Luce, 25 March 1944. Box 33. Henry Luce Papers, LoC.
143 Archibald MacLeish to Henry Luce, 27 August and 9 September 1941. Box 2. Henry Luce Papers, LoC.
144 Archibald MacLeish to Henry Luce, 11 January 1943. Box 2. Henry Luce Papers, LoC.
145 John D Rockefeller to Henry Luce, 4 March 1943. Box 1. Henry Luce Papers, LoC.
conferences simply because so many IPR members had gone into government to meet war demand.\textsuperscript{146} It was in this manner that Owen Lattimore, then editor of \textit{Pacific Affairs} at the IPR and vocal China advocate in CFR study groups, was appointed by Roosevelt to serve as Advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. Roosevelt did not know Lattimore, who was recommended as a leading sinologist because of his activities at the IPR and CFR. Meanwhile, Hamilton Fish Armstrong pre-emptorily turned down an advisory position in the State Department.\textsuperscript{147} As noted in chapter two, well-known men from popular media were chosen to take up leading positions at the OWI. Walter Lippmann, who enjoyed both public regard and personal associations with men in the highest level of government, was asked to become undersecretary of state in 1945, a position which he politely refused.\textsuperscript{148}

\textbf{Conclusion}

As media analyst Jonathan Alter argues, “logic can convince but only emotion can motivate.”\textsuperscript{149} Popular sympathy with China and visceral hatred of the Japanese were driving forces of public morale in the Pacific theater. What provided the driving force for America's emotional response to Japan as an enemy nation during World War Two? Lacking first-person experience of Asia or Asians on which to hang news reports, how did citizens understand “the nature of the enemy” or know “why we fight”? The answer is that popular media and entertainment created lasting images and broad pictures of Japan, China, and the people who lived in these countries. These impressions were particularly powerful for ordinary Americans because most lacked a nuanced understanding or personal experiences to critically examine or contextualize the tropes presented to them as they opened the newspaper or visited a movie house. The resulting impressions on the public mind in turn informed the public response to American action and the limits of the transformation possible in postwar Japan.

Rosy coverage helped create unrealistic expectations for a postwar China which would be a close ally and the dominant power in postwar Asia. As with Roosevelt’s conception of the region, this important assumption made it possible to sideline Japan as a major power. Because of disillusionment with both the KMT government and the prospects for China as a whole which later took hold of public opinion, this became much less important after 1943. Before and during the war, popular media reinforced anti-Asian racial stereotypes and the dehumanization of the Japanese, stirring wartime race-hate. However, print media also made the work done by the opinion leaders and other groups involved in wartime planning available to the public. Newspapers published analysis on postwar Japan from books, conferences

\textsuperscript{146} Lawrence T Woods, \textit{Asia-Pacific Diplomacy}, 32.
\textsuperscript{147} Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Norman H Davis. Box 2. Norman H Davis Papers, LoC.
\textsuperscript{148} Walter Lippmann to James Byrnes, Aug 23 1945. Box 59, Folder 355, Reel 50. Walter Lippmann Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University.
\textsuperscript{149} Jonathan Alter, \textit{The Promise: President Obama, Year One} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010): 140.
summaries and speeches. These short distillations of careful and nuanced approaches to complex issues ensured that ordinary Americans were not strangers to the broad outlines of postwar Japan policy. The lines of future policy were uncertain within and outside government, particularly during the Roosevelt Administration. However, during the war the news media provided a crucial service in exposing the reading public to ideas that would prepare them for what was to come.

Opinion leaders - editors, journalists and expert contributors - comprised a clear group of actors interested in Japan's future and active in shaping policy. Distinct from wider public opinion and media, though tied to publications, the cases examined in this chapter reveal an internationalist in-group involved in planning. Opinion leaders both shaped and reflected the ideas of planners because of their shared personal backgrounds and social interaction, control over available material, correspondence and collaboration. The divide between officials and outside elites during the war was porous. Through personal connections and established reputations, journalists, authors and editors shared ideas and knowledge, engaged in formal and informal planning, tried to influence policy based on personal beliefs, and were invited to join the government themselves. Individuals and ideas moved in both directions. Just as it is difficult to chart the spread of ideas, it is difficult to distinguish between shaping and being shaped in such a two-way flow of information. The patterns of interaction examined here expanded what might be called the “policy making community” to include area specialists, opinion columnists, editors, and publishers.

This group had an impact on America's Far East policy in the long term. The crisis of war provided a powerful catalyst for developing the infant field of Asian studies in the English-speaking world. The flood of publications created by opinion leaders as a result of the processes examined here provided a place for academics and researchers to provide careful and considered input to policy making. It also created a body of useful information available to policy makers during the war and after. This knowledge base allowed occupation-era policy makers to make informed decisions and adapt policy in response to unforeseen changes on the ground. The groundwork of research created by opinion leaders during the war thus shaped both initial plans and helped smooth the transition from policy planning to the difficult task of implementation. Popular opinion and opinion leaders also had an impact on the final group examined here, Congress.
Chapter Five

An End to Isolation: Congress and Asia Policy

As with the advisers, bureaucrats, and politicians considered earlier, congressmen saw the present and future in terms of the recent past. The First World War and the imperfect, unstable peace which followed made a profound impact on policy makers, who had experienced the period as adolescents or young men. However, the past held different lessons for the legislative branch. The groups considered thus far can all be labeled as internationalist, advocating a more active role for the US in the world and East Asia. For internationalists, what had followed the Great War was a “missed chance” for American leadership in a new international system marked by cooperation through the League of Nations. Later world problems, they contended, resulted from the failure of the United States to join and fully support this international organization as a path to secure peace, and could not be allowed to happen again.\(^1\) Opinion within Congress was neither so unified nor broadly internationalist, especially before 1941. Among those concerned with foreign relations, some representatives drew a different conclusion from the same historical precedent. These men were skeptical that Wilsonian idealism could overcome power politics and entrenched European rivalries. They argued that America had been dragged into fighting the last war in Europe against its interests, and had accordingly learned the lesson of neutrality and non-involvement. The connection between Congress and postwar planning during the present conflict was deeply tied to the body's rejection of Wilson's peace and dramatic refusal to join the League of Nations.\(^2\) Without the support of Congress, which approved budgets and treaties, any postwar plans would be made in vain.

This chapter will examine the various ideas about America's role in Asia and the future treatment of Japan expressed by congressional leaders. By looking at congressional activity in the year leading up to Pearl Harbor, this chapter will capture the debate over response to Japanese expansion, support for China, and America's role in East Asia before an act of war made discussion of disengagement from Asia impossible. Views on Asia can be discerned from legislative hearings on Asians, both Japanese and Chinese, resident

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\(^1\) This is the meaning of the title given to Robert Divine’s *Second Chance: the Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1967).

\(^2\) As a sign that both the State Department and Congress had the previous conflict in mind, in 1942 State provided Congress with more than 600 pages of collected documents on postwar planning and peace negotiations from World War One as background in preparation for resolving the current conflict. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Serial Set Digital Collection, Department of State, 1942. 10699 Congress-Section: 77-2 (1942) Sessional-Volume: 20. S1.1:919/pt.3/v.1. Lexis Nexis Congressional Hearings Digital Collection.
in America, and from speeches made by key congressmen. Politicians began public education and outreach campaigns in order to rally popular support for or against increased American commitments abroad. Support for an active foreign policy was a necessary precondition for the type of peace being planned in the State Department's IDAFE group and the postwar world envisioned by President Roosevelt. Positions on post-surrender plans were often taken in the context of American military and financial commitments and a postwar international organization or in light of Japanese war atrocities.

The wartime congressional experience reflected an important shift in American foreign policy. During the Second World War, support for deep American engagement with the world, once confined to a narrow circle of internationalist elites, replaced isolationism as the dominant paradigm in American political discourse. In early 1941 the majority of the American public and a number of influential congressmen had been committed isolationists. The attack on Pearl Harbor and America’s abrupt entrance into the war necessarily unified opinion behind the war effort, but the question of America’s role in the postwar world remained unresolved. The long debates and introduction of bills on postwar foreign policy in Congress during the summer and fall of 1943 revealed a sea change toward congressional support for an active postwar foreign policy and extensive commitments around the world. This change in Congress reflected the shift in American opinion as the isolationists and non-interventionists lost the national debate on the country’s future. By the presidential campaign of 1944, traditional isolationism had been abandoned by both major American political parties in favor of cooperation and an active foreign policy around the world. In 1945 the occupation of the defeated Axis Powers and broad security commitments in Europe and East Asia were a given. The remaining challenge from the defeated isolationists concerned the extent of funds for the reconstruction and reorientation of defeated Germany and Japan.

**Congress and public opinion**

Congressional leaders as a group share similar traits with those considered in previous chapters. They were based in Washington and some were involved in the social and professional circles which linked bureaucrats, academics, businessmen and advisers in think tank and government wartime planning clusters. However, there are factors which differentiate this group from those handled so far. Congressmen hailed from and maintained strong links to geographic areas across the United States and represented a wider range of backgrounds. In contrast to bureaucratic planners, these men were largely

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4 In the case of the executive, Franklin Roosevelt, an Ivy League educated New York native, was unquestionably part of the East Coast elite. Harry Truman, who rose up from the ranks of Senate in 1945 and imagined himself an outsider in Washington, fit more neatly into this characterization of Congress.
generalists without any specialized knowledge of or interest in Asia. Like the president but in contrast to bureaucrats and policy experts, however deep their interest in foreign policy might be, the primary concerns of congressional representatives were domestic issues affecting their constituents. In order to keep their jobs, these politicians needed to keep a close eye on public sentiment and election cycles. The positions taken by congressional leaders needed to harmonize with the interests and ideas of the citizens for whom they spoke. Congressional leaders are therefore the most heterogeneous group considered thus far, in terms of composition and ideology, and the most reflective of dynamic popular opinion.

Congressional action was one of the few routes through which public opinion might enter the postwar planning process. The bureaucrats, advisers and unofficial experts who drafted what became postwar policy were unelected and unaccountable to the public. As seen in chapter one, President Roosevelt was a skilled politician and sensitive to public opinion as it registered in surveys and opinion pieces. However, even during the 1940 and 1944 election campaigns, he was insulated by his immense popularity and the perceived need for continuity during wartime. Congressmen, by contrast, were often in a more precarious position with their constituents, and were therefore careful to be seen by voters as acting in their interests. Appealing to congressmen was one of the few avenues for public involvement in wartime planning for the country's future foreign policy.5

Foreign Policy before Pearl Harbor

In the late 1930s American foreign policy debates centered on the proper response to aggression and conflict in Asia and Europe. Ought America intervene in these crises or should it avoid involvement? If the former, what kind of intervention would be desirable? Two opposing schools of thought, isolationism and interventionism, defined the political debate on this subject. Each had implications for America’s role in the world generally, as well as the country’s Asia policy. Isolationism was the dominant paradigm in American foreign policy in the 1930s. A broadly used term, isolationism can be defined as support for American unilateralism, unfettered by political or military alliances with the European powers and participation in foreign wars.6 Isolationism was a powerful strain in American public opinion, and one which became a source of congressional opposition to the foreign policy of the Roosevelt Administration.

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5 The public had even less access to information about wartime plans and proposals on postwar Japan than did members of Congress. Public opinion on these important issues was stunted as a result.

6 This definition is adapted from Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990): vii. It is distinct from other related movements such as non-interventionism and pacifism. Support for isolationism did not preclude support for military action abroad per se, but the rather avoidance of “entangling commitments” which would limit America’s ability to take unilateral action or commit the country to actions not in its interest.
Before Pearl Harbor, American isolationists were deeply influenced by what they considered to be the lessons of the Great War. Large sections of American society had the sense that their country had been drawn into a European conflict in 1917 against its interests and at great cost.

As a movement against American involvement in the European conflict, isolationism was a rallying point for a broad political coalition. The largest and most influential constituency was the America First Committee. As seen below, the significant interaction between America First and isolationist politicians brought the organization into the “great debate” on Capitol Hill and the conflict between the Administration and Congress on foreign policy. America First members included traditional isolationists, non-interventionists, religious and left-leaning pacifists, and Anglophobes, as well as racists, ultra-nationalists, and fascists. The heterodox membership of this organization bent on keeping the US out of a European war is a testament to the broad public desire to avoid war in Europe, and the rapid growth of a national popular movement. By December 1941 membership had swelled to 800,000 with 450 chapters and sub-chapters across the country. These numbers did more than evidence a popular movement. Congressmen could point to America First as a demonstration of widespread support for their challenge to Roosevelt’s policy, strengthening their hand in the battle to reshape America’s policy orientation.

Isolationists were not the only critics in Congress of Roosevelt’s ambivalent prewar foreign policy. As seen in previous chapters, internationalism enjoyed support amongst well-connected elites in business, media, academics and government. Before Pearl Harbor, internationalists and interventionists called for active military support of Britain and China, and advocated American leadership on the global stage. These men were motivated by an interest in expanding American trade and investment, believed that the military defeat of a major ally like Great Britain would threaten national security, and often shared a missionary zeal for the spread of “Americanism” abroad. Internationalists in Congress and the media were deeply influenced by the thinking of Henry Luce as expressed in his article “The American Century.” Specifically referencing this piece, Representative Martin J Kennedy submitted a proposal to the House of Representatives calling for the creation of a Committee to Preserve and Propagate

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7 The “great debate” refers to the struggle between isolation and intervention in US foreign policy which raged in the popular media and in Congress between outbreak of war in Europe and the bombing of Pearl Harbor. For a useful overview of the literature on this topic, see Justus Doenecke, “U.S. Policy and the European War, 1939-1941,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 19 No. 4 (Fall 1995).
8 For more on the formation of America First, see Wayne S Cole, America First - The Battle Against Intervention 1940-1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953): 10-16.
9 Wayne S Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 381.
10 See chapter four.
Democracy to “assist” democracy abroad. The resolution would extend “the friendly neighbor policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt... to the entire world” because global leadership would benefit America and create material progress everywhere. The breathtaking scope of this mission is in keeping with the exuberant internationalism seen in other planning groups considered in this study. It was, however, the ideological antithesis of isolationism.

Despite the divide, isolationists and internationalists were not necessarily at odds on policy toward Asia. Isolationism was largely focused on Europe, concerned that the US might be drawn into European wars as the “sucker” of the British and the financial industry. The 1930s, remembered as the heyday of isolationism in America, was also a decade of deep involvement in Latin America and Asia. Isolationist convictions did not lead to a public outcry against deeper American involvement in East Asia. Indeed, after 1937, there was significant popular approval for sending aid to China and checking an expansionist Japan. However, isolationists were often outspoken critics of American foreign policy, and set a high bar to justify intervention abroad. Possible American responses to the Sino-Japanese War were evaluated not by ideological opposition to intervention, but in terms of American interests and the potential cost of involvement.

Some isolationists took the position that the US did not have interests worth fighting for in East Asia. A 1940 opinion piece in the isolationist Saturday Evening Post pointed out that the bulk of American trade in Asia was with Japan and asked why the country ought to weaken itself in the Atlantic by moving naval forces in support of a “scarcely recognizable” democracy in China. Because American interests in Asia were limited, events there were “...quite literally none of our business.” This sentiment was combined with Anglophobia in a later piece, which demanded that the Roosevelt Administration “persuade the public and Congress that it is protecting American and not British imperial interests in the Far East, and

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13 The term is borrowed from a letter sent by an isolationist congressman to Roosevelt warning that the British would make America “the prime sucker Nation of the world again” if it became involved in European affairs. James O’Connor to FDR, 6 May 1941. Reel 7. FDR Office File, Part IV, RSC. For more on the “Devil theory”, which blamed bankers for America’s involvement in the Great War, see Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 142-4.
14 In 1933, Roosevelt announced his Good Neighbor Policy to increase US trade and non-military influence in Latin America.
15 This support can be seen in the press and public opinion polls, as discussed in the previous chapter. For more on America’s East Asian policy in the 1930s, see Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1965).
that American interests there are worth risking war with Japan..."17 Senator Burton Wheeler agreed, stating publically that “the only excuse we would have for war with Japan is for the purpose of protecting the British Empire.”18 The New York Chapter of America First echoed this position, writing, “the Administration has taken it upon itself to demand actions from Japan that in no way concern the national interests of the United States. None of our territorial possessions are in any way involved.” Under such circumstances, Americans ought not “send their sons to the battlefield of China... to tell the people of Asia how to manage the affairs of Asia...”19 Other isolationists, such as the long-time congressman and frequent America First speaker Hamilton Fish, pointed out the hypocrisy of American criticism of Japan's Asia policy given America's adherence to the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America.20 From this perspective, what little benefit involvement might bring would outweighed by the cost of intervention.

On the other hand, many Americans believed that neutrality and non-involvement were not possible in the East Asian context, or that the cost of intervention would be very low. By not taking sides in the Sino-Japanese War, the US was in effect supporting Japan, which was more able than China to purchase American war materials. As explained in a broadcast debate on American policy, “…we have been helping Japan. We have been selling Japan everything under the sun she needs to fight China.”21 This was largely in line with public sentiment, which was sympathetic toward China and underestimated the possibility of Japan actually going to war against the US.22 Both popular media and official writing during the period revealed a pervasive orientalist bias in American opinion that “a firm hand was the only thing Asians understand.”23 The idea that Japan could be easily checked became the basis of calls from the media and Congress for stern diplomatic rhetoric and an embargo on oil and scrap metal exports to Japan.24 The country could take a tough line in Asia without being drawn into conflict or affecting the situation in Europe.

18 Wayne S Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 498.
19 Wayne S Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 499.
22 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade, 29-30.
24 As an example of the public pressure on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for tough economic measures toward Japan, see constituent letters to Senator Walter L. George, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee. Box 174. RG 46 Records of US Senate, 77th Congress SEN 77A-F11 Committee on Foreign Relations. NARA.
This assumption was undermined when Japan joined the Axis in September 1940, connecting the European and Asian conflicts. The day after Pearl Harbor, the well-known isolationist Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg reflected that it would have been a relatively simple matter to appease Japan. Recognizing the status quo of Japanese domination in Manchuria might have been sufficient. This, Vandenberg thought, would have been painless for the US, prevented involvement in war in the Pacific, and dealt Hitler a blow in Europe by denying him a key ally. Vandenberg's European focus played an important role in this thinking. He displayed an easy willingness to acknowledge the loss of Manchuria, declaring, “may I frankly add that I think China is big enough...” to stand losing territory. This stands in sharp contrast with the belief of China sympathizers like Cordell Hull and Henry Stimson that such a compromise would be a “betrayal” of China. Vandenberg’s ideas went further than justifying the appeasement of Japan in order to maintain peace in the region. Again on December 8, a day if any when emotion might cloud calm judgment in favor of vengeance, the senator wrote to himself, “without condoning for an instant the way in which Japan precipitated hostilities, I still think we may have driven her needlessly into hostilities through our dogmatic diplomatic attitudes.”

Vandenberg is not alone in his assessment. His point that the price of peace in East Asia would be to acknowledge Japan “North of the Great Wall” was also agreed by the Council of Foreign Relations Far East Study Group. Such thinking united Vandenberg and other isolationists with anti-interventionists and anti-imperialists, but also with pro-British Americans who did not want the conflict with Japan to distract from the situation in Europe, in support for appeasement of Japan.

Thus, before America's entrance into World War II, isolationists put pressure on Washington's Japan policy from various directions. Those who shared popular sympathy with China as an underdog against an aggressive neighbor, or who believed America could decisively shape policy there without recourse to arms, pushed along with the internationalists for a tough Japan policy. Isolationists who believed that wider conflict was a possibility in the Far East, and who were concerned about strengthening Germany's position by further isolating Japan and reinforcing its commitment to the Axis, argued for engagement and, if necessary, concessions, as a price for stability in the Far East. The label "isolationist" describes an active group which challenged plans for foreign policy held by private internationalists, bureaucrats, and the executive. However, isolationists did not have a common position on Japan before December 1941.

Isolationists and the Roosevelt Administration


26 Vandenberg, The Private Papers, 18.
Isolationism represented a powerful challenge to Roosevelt’s foreign policy in Congress and public opinion. Before America's entrance to war, isolationists strongly resisted involvement in the situation in Europe, but pushed a mixed agenda for the Far East. The Roosevelt Administration regarded the isolationist movement as a challenge to its freedom in policy-making, and responded to it as such. The Administration pursued three tactics to limit the influence of this movement. First, Roosevelt avoided consultation and information sharing with Congress on matters of foreign policy. Second, the Administration launched an oratorical campaign to sway American voters toward interventionism. Finally, personal attacks and investigations were carried out against leading members of the isolationist movement in America First and Congress. Using these three techniques, the Administration successfully contained the isolationist challenge as public opinion and events on the ground changed.

The first line of defense against challenges to the Administration's orientation was simply to monopolize the reins of foreign policy by restricting information and consultation. Isolationist legislators bristled at being kept in the dark as the Administration appeared to be moving away from the president's famous election-time promise not to “send your boys into foreign wars” and entangle the country more deeply with the conflict in Europe. The Administration's decision in 1940 to sell naval equipment without consulting the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, for example, sent the chairman, David Walsh, into a “towering rage” and put the “whole committee in a lather.” Consultation on the issue of naval sales was more than a matter of courtesy toward elected officials. Although public opinion was sympathetic to Britain and France, material support for these countries endangered the United States, and popular sentiment was still opposed to joining the war. As Vandenberg explained, America could not be “an arsenal for one belligerent without becoming a target for another.” This statement and the wider sentiment it captured, it must be noted, related only to the European situation, although the public remained skittish about similar involvement in the Asian theater.

President Roosevelt showed little sympathy for either the rights of the legislature to information or to the real danger posed by the sale of military equipment. In response to a letter from a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs insisting that the group was entitled to an honest statement about naval support, Roosevelt blithely replied that, although he had no intention of increasing supplies at present,

28 Copy of memorandum by Charles Edison, 14 June 1940. Reel 41. FDR Office File, Part IV. RSC.
29 David Walsh to Franklin Roosevelt, 19 August 1940. Reel 41. FDR Office File, Part IV. RSC.
30 *Congressional Record*, October 4, 1939, 72.
“actually I am not a crystal gazer and naturally I decline to say what I would do under new circumstances in the future.” Of course, this strategy was by no means limited to the Administration’s interactions with Congress. The dismissive tone of this reply echoes a letter written by Roosevelt in the same year to his ambassador to Japan in reply to a query about America’s East Asia policy. In the case of Congress, an example of this can be seen in the signing of the Atlantic Charter in mid-August 1941. Details about this important agreement, which laid out the basis of American foreign policy aims, were only communicated to Congress in a presidential message a week later. This failure to consult or even inform seriously undermined the importance of Congress in the conduct of foreign affairs, leaving the body with little recourse but to approve faits accomplis.

Oratorical campaigns

The president and his administration used oratory to garner public support for increasing American involvement in the war in Europe and Asia. Two of FDR’s best-remembered speeches, on the lend-lease program and the four freedoms, were delivered during the period of the “great debate” with the intention of swaying the public and Congress towards greater interventionism. At a press conference on lend lease, a system to support the war efforts of Britain and China through the “loan” of war materials, Roosevelt demonstrated his skills as a master politician. In the speech, he famously likened the program to lending a garden hose to a neighbor whose house was on fire. Such simple, relatable analogies clearly demonstrated to ordinary Americans the country's interest in aiding Britain. The speech, coupled with the dramatic German victories of 1940, was effective in reshaping public opinion on the issue. The fall of France in June, followed by the start of the Battle of Britain in the autumn, made it clear that America's moral allies would not be able to handle the German problem alone.

In his “four freedoms” state of the nation speech in January 1941, Roosevelt went further and issued a direct challenge to isolationism. He made the case for internationalism, stating that “the safety of our country and of our democracy are overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders.” What followed in the address to Congress was a specific attack on both the pacifist and non-interventionist

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31 Correspondence between Senator Charles Tobey and FDR, 14 and 17 February 1941. Reel 41. FDR Office File, Part IV. RSC.
32 Chapter one, notes 6 and 7.
35 Wayne S Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 11.
planks of the isolationist movements. In reference to pacifists, the president warned that, while “softhearted[ness]” was a laudable quality, the country could not “afford to be soft-headed.” Roosevelt took particular aim at non-interventionists, warning Congress and the American people to “always be wary of those who with sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal preach the ‘ism’ of appeasement.”

The direct attacks on these popular ideologies clearly separated Franklin Roosevelt from his opposition, and his appeal to idealism and “American values” as a popular and respected political figure was a challenge to his critics.

Isolationist members of Congress tried to increase their influence and bolster popular support for isolationism using the America First Committee. In 1940 members of Congress, including leading isolationist Senator Burton K. Wheeler, participated in an America First-funded plan to tour the nation and rally support for the cause. Representatives worked with America First on such campaigns in order to oppose “any plans that the President might have in bringing the country to war.” They became linked to the Committee by the membership of spouses and friends. Isolationist congressmen brought the ideas of the Committee into the official debate through speaking invitations and by reading America First material into the congressional record. America First speaker and aviation hero Charles Lindbergh was invited to speak before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1941, and had an article introduced into the congressional record by Senator Gerald P. Nye.

The Administration reacted to the successes of the America First Committee’s speaking campaign and continued public support for isolationism by attempting a counter-campaign. Officials were concerned that America First was good at targeting messages using popular speakers and effective rallies, and as a result Roosevelt's more interventionist message was not being sufficiently represented in the press. To remedy this, Roosevelt's liberal vice president Henry Wallace was scheduled to give monthly speeches and to enlist popular senators as speakers in order to “meet the isolationist challenge”. Wallace himself urged stronger action. He assured the Administration that the American Middle West, the demographic stronghold for isolationism, was prepared to shift. Midwestern farmers, Wallace wrote Roosevelt, “are

38 The wife of Senator Wheeler, for example, was a prominent member of the America First Committee.
40 Barry Bingham to FDR, 5 November 1941. Box 88, Reel 41. Henry A Wallace Papers, RSC.
ready for more forceful and definite leadership than we have given so far.”

In the months before Pearl Harbor, Administration officials planned public speeches and cooperation with internationalist congressmen to win the national “Great Debate” and counter the work of isolationists and America First.

**Smear campaigns**

Roosevelt thus effectively managed dissent from Congress by limiting consultation while shifting public opinion towards the Administration's position. A third effective method of handling isolationists, both in Congress and the America First Committee, was to challenge the patriotism of the movement's key figures. The Administration displayed a ferocious animosity towards isolationists. Conservative members of the president's own party were not excluded from this wrath. Branded “The Hater's Club” by Roosevelt, Democratic isolationists and non-interventionists were accused of courting “strange bedfellows” within the Republican Party to force the president to drop more liberal elements from his administration. Worse epithets were applied to staunch Republican isolationists. A report in the president’s files on Representative Hamilton Fish accused him of being “in very close touch with fascist influences here and abroad,” and cited Fish's participation in a German day parade to imply he was a Nazi sympathiser and anti-Semite.

The accusation that isolationists were somehow unpatriotic, sympathetic to foreign fascist governments, or anti-Semitic, was not limited to the White House. It was a common charge in internationalist popular media. The sentiment was clearly expressed in a description of the isolationist speeches of Lindbergh for America First; “the voice is the voice of Lindbergh, but the words are the words of Hitler.” Of course, the task of tarring isolationists was made easier by the very real presence of racists, extremists and pro-German elements in the movement, a result of the “big-tent” nature of isolationism before Pearl Harbor.

Attacks on character or patriotism were not the most serious efforts taken by the Administration against leading isolationists. Recent research has found substantial evidence of politically motivated investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the period between January 1940 and December 1941, the FBI conducted searches for damaging personal information on Lindbergh and other leading isolationists associated with America First Committee. Roosevelt himself did not request political

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41 Wallace to FDR, 26 May 1941. Box 88, Reel 41. Henry A Wallace Papers, RSC.
42 Specifically, conservative democrats wanted Roosevelt's liberal vice president Henry Wallace dropped from the 1940 election ticket. FDR to George Norris, 21 July 1940. Reel 41. FDR Office File, Part IV. RSC.
44 “His Birthright for a Mess of Pottage,” The San Francisco Chronicle, 13 September 1941.

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surveillance against his opposition. Rather, as when King Henry II lamented of Thomas Becket “Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?” Roosevelt loyalists acted on their own initiative to curry favor. Responding to an America First pamphlet criticizing his four freedoms speech, the president asked his press secretary if it was possible to “find out from someone – perhaps the F.B.I. – who is paying for this?” The request was duly forwarded to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and within weeks a report on America First was delivered to the White House. Especially for leading members of the movement outside Congress, suspicions of such investigations had a chilling effect on campaign efforts.

The Administration’s activities successfully limited the influence of a popular movement on policy until the events of December 1941 drew the country into war. This in turn had an impact on wartime planning for Japan because it stunted public debate on America's role in the world, a crucial starting place of American involvement in East Asia. As discussed below, the bombing of Pearl Harbor and America's entrance into WWII dealt a death blow to the America First Committee, as priority changed to supporting the war-effort. And yet, December 1941 did not mark the end of isolationism. The ideas and support for these ideas continued, and evolved, throughout the war period, with implications for thinking about the postwar treatment of Japan.

The fallout from Pearl Harbor

Before December 1941, Congress attempted to reassert its influence in directing America's foreign affairs with limited success. Internationalists pushed for active military support to Great Britain and China or American leadership and intervention across the globe. Meanwhile the isolationist movement was divided in its approach to Japan, but presented a strong challenge to increased American involvement in Europe and was treated as a serious threat by Roosevelt. However, even before Pearl Harbor, support for isolationism was weakening as events in Europe made it clear that America's allies faced a real threat of defeat without its support. The Japanese attack and declaration of war shocked the nation and permanently undermined the argument that geography could insulate America from foreign threats. As leading isolationists like Vandenberg and Senator Robert Taft later recalled, “convictions regarding international cooperation and collective security for peace took firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl

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47 Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 221.
Harbor attack. That day ended isolationism for any realist.” It suddenly became clear that America could not guarantee its security merely by standing alone. The America First Committee was dissolved shortly thereafter. In the wake of the attack, American citizens, politicians and dissenters included, adopted a stance of support for their country at war.

**Perceiving Asians**

As seen above, Asia was not at the forefront of debates on American foreign policy in the lead-up to war. However, wartime perceptions of Asia shaped ideas about what could be done to neutralize a defeated Japan, whether military leadership or the Japanese people as a whole were accountable for the conflict, and if China as an American ally might take over Japan’s role as the dominant regional power. Congressional thinking on Asia is apparent from the hearings and debates on Asians in America, in particular the internment of Japanese and Japanese-Americans as well as the future of the legal restrictions on Chinese immigration. The West Coast of the United States, geographically nearest to East Asia and home to the vast majority of Asian immigrants, was more focused on these issues than was the rest of the country. Hearings on internment were held along the Pacific coast, and politicians from the region were naturally the most interested in internment and immigration, which disproportionately affected their constituents.

The question of internment touches on two key issues related to postwar planning; racism and the relation between the people and the governments of enemy states. As discussed in chapter one, the decision to distinguish between ordinary people and leadership has important implications for the postwar treatment of civilian populations. It is a decisive factor between the alternatives of regime change and collective punishment. In March 1942 the House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration held hearings in Seattle, Portland, San Francisco and Los Angeles in order to determine the treatment of ethnic Japanese populations in the United States. The “Tolan Committee”, named after its chairman, Representative John Tolan of California, received letters and heard testimony from governors, attorneys general, and city mayors across the Pacific coast. The issue at hand was whether all persons of Japanese ancestry ought to be interned or if a more targeted practice of identifying and detaining only suspicious individuals would be possible. As one representative summarized, “practically the entire delegation from California and from the West Coast has on the floor of Congress declared that an evacuation should be

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had and that it should be all-inclusive.” Reflecting wartime hysteria and popular anti-Japanese sentiment, the idea of universal internment was supported by politicians from the region. During the war, Japanese citizens and Americans of Japanese descent were relocated to concentration camps because of the supposed security threat from disloyal populations.

Of course, persons of Japanese descent were not the only immigrant population with a potential link to enemy countries. The United States was home to far larger numbers of Germans, Italians, and the descendants of immigrants from those places. Yet Japanese were singled out because of prejudice against Asian immigrants in the United States, and were viewed with significantly more suspicion than their European counterparts. Popular support for anti-Asian immigration restrictions and segregation had a long history on the West Coast in particular. In 1906, for example, the San Francisco-based Japanese and Korean Exclusion league had lobbied Washington for strict race-based immigration restrictions and supported the segregation of Asian-American public school children.

At a Senate hearing on internment, it was argued that although Japanese-Americans born in the United States were American citizens, they could be legitimately grouped with resident aliens. Because the Japanese government counted all persons of Japanese ancestry as Japanese citizens, the loyalty of all Japanese-Americans was necessarily suspect. The Senate Committee concluded, “there is no such thing as a Japanese not being a subject of the Emperor of Japan.” All persons of Japanese descent, whether US citizens or not, were therefore tied through the Emperor to the policies of the government of Japan. Japanese citizens were uniquely subject to their government and therefore could not be separated from the actions of that government. This double standard was particularly clear given the circulation in the United States of Nazi propaganda pamphlets encouraging German-Americans “to think of themselves always as Germans and owing… allegiance to the fatherland.” Japanese-Americans were less “American” than German and Italian-Americans, and were to be treated accordingly.

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52 “Memorandum of Conversation with Chancellor Hitler”, 8 March 1934. As quoted in Erik Larson, In the Garden of the Beasts, 235.
Familiar racial prejudices were used by West Coast politicians to advocate the universal internment of Japanese and Japanese-Americans. First, as had Roosevelt, senior figures argued that the Japanese were “not of an assimilable race” and therefore could not become fully American or contribute to American communities. The Attorney General of Washington State wrote in support of internment, noting the “undesirable presence of Japanese in the United States”, a presence which had already “harmed” the Pacific coast to an extent which Americans in other regions could not understand.\(^{53}\) Mayor Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles, the city with the largest ethnic Japanese population in America, wrote a letter to the Senate and testified before the Tolan Committee on this issue. His letter praised the blatantly racist “White Australia” policy, regretting that the Americans had not had the “good sense and the forethought of the Australians, who have kept all Japanese out of their country.” In his testimony, Bowron stated that he believed “a large number” of Japanese in Los Angeles had been aware of plans for the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.\(^{54}\) He did not explain why what was largely a second and third generation agricultural community would be privy to secret war plans made by the Japanese government.

California Governor Culbert Olson, while admitting that “there are loyal Japanese [resident in America]”, including US citizens who spoke only English, nonetheless argued for universal detention. This, he explained, was because loyal Japanese-Americans would willingly accept detention and because racial characteristics made identifying individual Japanese difficult. While Italian and German individuals could be easily recognized and could therefore remain free, “the average Caucasian can’t distinguish between the Japanese. They all look alike.”\(^{55}\) The positions of Olsen and Bowron on the removal of Japanese, in line with established support for exclusion of Asians from the West Coast, were communicated back to a supportive public through local press reports.\(^{56}\) War hysteria and the perceived fifth-column threat reinforced the existing prejudice against a traditionally unpopular population. Universal internment is evidence of the deep suspicion and predisposition against Japan and the Japanese held by American citizens and their political representatives.

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55. One might wonder whether all Asians might be a danger under this logic. Indeed, in 1941 *Time* responded with a checklist of racial characteristics to help readers distinguish between Japanese and “your friends” the Chinese. “Home Affairs: How to Tell Your Friends from the Japs,” *Time*, 22 December, 1941.

Even as the war progressed, anti-Asian sentiment on the West Coast was not restricted to persons of Japanese descent. As in the past, the presence of Chinese in America was viewed with concern. In 1943 the Senate debated repealing the Chinese Exclusion Act which forbade immigration of Chinese nationals to the United States. The move from exclusion to a limited quota system was intended to cement relations between the US and China as wartime allies. It was not intended to seriously change America’s immigration policy, but rather to offer a face-saving token quota to bring the policy nominally in line with immigration from other nations. Under the proposed change, only 105 Chinese per year would be admitted. As Senator Charles Andrews of Florida explained, given the importance of China as a military ally, “I am interested in winning this war and this little 105, it’s so small, it looks peculiar to me that we haggle over it.” California Senator Hiram Johnson disagreed. Too ill to attend the hearing personally, he sent a letter outlining his views on the proposal. His opposition to Chinese immigration was similar to the anti-Japanese arguments made by his fellow statesmen on the subject of internment the year before. Chinese immigration must be banned because the people are “unassimilable in America”, and because “ Asiatics” could outcompete Caucasians in low-cost, labor-intensive agricultural work.57 Echoing Washington’s Attorney General, Johnson declared that “The working people [of the West Coast] were the pioneers in urging legislation to exclude Asiatics… There are those who now maintain that Chinese immigrants were never a menace to our country but the record speaks for itself.” Furthermore, he warned that allowing even limited immigration from China could open the door for other types of Asians.58 Although the Exclusion Act was ultimately repealed in 1943, the opposition to anything other than a token level of immigration, and objections even to that by West Coast politicians reveals an anti-Asian bias within Congress during the war.

China as an Ally

Despite the serious anti-Asian bias in domestic issues, Congress viewed China quite differently within the international context. The country was of course an important member of the Allied Powers, and part of the “big four” envisioned by President Roosevelt. As seen in previous chapters, expectations for China were fundamental to the postwar structure of East Asia and the future of Japan. Although rosy assumptions were later challenged, the early war years were marked by public and official support. Congressmen were offered historical narratives of US-Chinese cooperation and mutual esteem by

57 That Chinese, Japanese, and Latin Americans were racially adept at “squatting”, the physically demanding task of picking vegetables which grow low to the ground, appears in Congressional hearings and media coverage on Japanese internment and Chinese immigration.
prominent Cabinet members, Chinese officials, and of course, the president himself. The positive view of China is apparent in the debates about war loans to the country and statements made by congressmen during the war. However, even when hopes for China were at their height, skepticism about the country’s viability was visible among isolationists and West Coast representatives.

*China hands*

Connected and enthusiastic, China hands were well represented on Capitol Hill. Shortly after the war began, members of Roosevelt’s Cabinet were invited to speak on the Senate floor during hearings over aid to China. Secretary of War Stimson made the case for increased support based on a special relationship and affinity between the US and China. The Asian country, he argued, “has traditional relations with the United States which are quite different from those which any other nation has with her.” Beyond strong commercial relations, the United States had been especially influential on Chinese development through missionary, medical and educational charitable activities. Further, the “people who are now in a dominant position in China” had been educated in America. Stimson thus sought to convince Congress that China was a stable country worth supporting by drawing on the missionary history of American “patronage” and the cultural closeness of China, and especially Chinese elites, to America. Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau, whose tough line toward postwar Japan (and Germany) was later demonstrated in the provocative Morgenthau plan, also spoke in favor of the loan, although his stated rationale was limited to China’s credit worthiness. In February 1943 Madame Chiang Kai-shek made a similar case as she spoke before Congress in an effort to drum up support for her husband’s regime. Like Stimson, she called on the “traditional friendship” between the two countries, and described the “great many similarities” and “identity of ideals” between Americans and Chinese as “the basis of our friendship.” She too argued that China was open to American leadership, assuring the House of Representatives that “China is eager and ready to cooperate with you” on postwar plans.

However, proposals for a “blank check” loan to China were met with muted opposition from some quarters in Congress. Senator La Follette, before the war a prominent isolationist, was careful not to openly contest a program of aid to a wartime ally before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, especially one backed by key members of the Administration. But while stating that he was “not

indicating any hostility to the program”, La Follette called for a full and frank discussion of what increased aid to China, in the form of loans which might not be repaid, would mean for the United States. Not surprisingly for a politician suspicious of binding international commitments, La Follette was “anxious to understand what we are really starting out to do,” by providing economic support of Chiang Kai-shek’s China, “…what we are getting committed to do, and what the implications of it are.” Senator Johnson of California, whose opposition to Chinese immigration has already been seen, also doubted the wisdom of the loan. “This loan… or whatever you choose to term it,” he objected, “is accorded to Chiang Kai-shek for military purposes, without regard to whether we get it back or not.”

Isolationists, opposed to extensive international commitments, and West Coast politicians, colored by regional anti-Asian bias, thus questioned American patronage of China.

Despite such challenges, pro-China rhetoric had a significant impact on congressional thinking about the country’s future. Congressmen, the majority of whom knew little about China, were regularly presented with images of the country as a sympathetic ally with common interests. Lauchlin Currie noted that following the efforts of China hands within government to influence opinion, “the loan itself went through like magic, with all the Cabinet members and congressmen determined not to be outdone in their love for China.” Indeed, the hearings included strong statements that more “ought to be done” to support America’s Asian ally. Senators Pepper and Gillette noted that lend lease and previous loans to China were only a small gesture given the country’s importance, and indicated that more ought to be done. Senator Gillette wondered, “Why the limitation [on loan value]? If you are going to bolster morale with 500,000,000, why not bolster it more?” Of course, support for China went beyond loan debates in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Representatives hoped to base future plans in the Pacific “on the great feeling of friendship that the people of our country have for the Chinese.” Chiang’s wife in particular had an influential presence on Congress. Minnesota Representative Walter Judd was the congressman with the most experience in China, having spent ten years as a medical missionary there. He explained, “Madame Chiang came to this country and she captured the American imagination as few foreigners ever had, and certainly as no Asiatic ever had.” Following Madame Chiang’s speeches before

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65 89 Congressional Record, 7830. 21 September 1943.
Congress and her national speaking tour, “our estimate of the Chinese soared...” Her American education, southern accent and personal charisma underlined her message of the proximity between Chinese and Americans.

However, thinking on China evolved in Congress as it did elsewhere. Under the guidance of China enthusiasts inside government and out, “China became a country endowed with more than human qualities” from the 1930s in American popular opinion, but as the war progressed China’s star began to fade in the American imagination. Like the president’s advisers, congressmen had to grapple with the reality of corruption within the KMT, the significant communist opposition, and the possibility that, far from being a pillar of postwar Asia, China would collapse into chaos even before the end of war with Japan. Walter Judd recognized that in 1944 America was experiencing “a swing-back into over-disillusionment. Those who a year ago could hardly find words good enough with which to describe our Chinese allies, now can hardly find words bad enough.” Congress wondered if the survival of Chiang’s regime was possible and, if not, whether China might still be a reliable ally around which to base America’s plans.

Asia specialists in Congress

The body’s most qualified members offered different answers to these concerns. In the fall of 1944 Representatives Mike Mansfield and Walter Judd made trips to China in order to assess the situation, and reported their conclusions before Congress. Mike Mansfield of Montana had developed an interest in Asia during his service there as a Marine in the early 1920s. Before serving in Senate, he undertook graduate studies and taught history and international relations at the University of Montana. Mansfield was well-versed on Asia issues; his master’s thesis was on US-Korean relations prior to Japanese colonization, and his teaching included courses on Asia. A Democratic member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mansfield’s visit to China was a special mission requested by Roosevelt. The resulting report underplayed

68 Struggle over the China question is also considered in chapter one.
the danger of communist opposition in China and reaffirmed support for Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. Mansfield’s characterization of the CCP resembles the non-ideological outlook which would later be expressed by Harry Truman. Indeed, Truman consulted with Mansfield on Asia issues after taking office. The interests of the CCP, Mansfield declared, “seem to focus on primarily agrarian reforms,” and thus did not undermine US aims. Americans “do not care whether a Chinese is an agrarian [communist] or not, just so he fights Japan and takes that much of the burden off our shoulders.” Mansfield, as a Roosevelt emissary, spoke for his country and informed Chiang that “he had had and would continue to have, our full support.” Of the leader, Mansfield reported to Congress that “he and he alone, can untangle the present situation… he is China.” For Mike Mansfield, despite flaws in the KMT, internal problems need not undermine the stability of China. American support for Chiang, coupled with encouragement for reforms, would help ensure that China remained a useful ally in the future.

Walter Judd offered quite a different view of the situation. First, he was far more conservative in his expectations. Second, he made it clear that the CCP represented a serious threat to a united China. Judd’s speech before Congress in March 1945 was provocative. He argued that China had only limited potential in the near term. Demonstrating a nuanced understanding of historical context unusual for the time, Judd explained that the KMT had only had a short period to begin the project of modernization and unification. Its starting point had been the warlordism and chaos which had marked China since the collapse of the Qing dynasty some thirty years before. Countering the characterization of China as a unified, democratic, America-like nation, Judd explained that the factionalism and internal dissent in modern China were a significant improvement over the previous anarchy. Further, in contrast to the prevalent belief that China was an inherently democratic nation, he stated that “neither Chiang Kai-shek’s government nor the Communists are democratic in our sense of protecting the full rights of minorities and of opposition parties. China has never in her history had a political democracy…” In addition to this more grim characterization of the situation in China, Judd described the KMT-CCP rivalry as very dangerous. This was not a domestic dispute like Republican opposition to liberal policies under Roosevelt. Rather, the Communists “are not just a political party. They are an armed rebellion.” Judd, like Mansfield and the Roosevelt Administration, stated that “victory in Asia is not just defeat of Japan but a strong and independent China.” However, Judd sought to manage expectations on this goal. China would likely lose

71 Truman’s thinking on China and Russia is covered in chapter six. Consultation between Truman and Mansfield is described in Dale M. Hellegers, We the Japanese People: World War Two and the Origins of the Constitution (Stanford University Press, 2001): Vol 1, 150 note 76.
regions to a separatist Communist movement, and progress toward “strength” would have to be measured slowly against its current underdeveloped, undemocratic and disunified state.73

Congressional opinion of China thus shifted dramatically during the war, from enthusiastic support for an idealized nation to more cautious assessments of a collapsing ally. Officials debated the potential of China as a postwar pillar, and whether some accommodation of the CCP was possible within the Nationalist government. Lack of apparent alternatives and continued Administration statements about the importance of postwar China led to continued, if reluctant, support of Chiang Kai-shek. In the face of criticism for the weakening regime, plans for postwar China were fit within the context of an expanded American role in the Pacific made possible by new island bases, and by collective security through international organizations.

The fight for public opinion

Congress continued its involvement in questions of American foreign relations despite its lack of involvement with bureaucratic planning and opposition from the White House. Even before Pearl Harbor, congressmen complained about being cut out of the decision-making process and lamented that under a strong, popular executive “Congress has delegated many of its powers in the last few years...” as a result of “constant, effective attrition, predicated on emergencies.”74 Asserting policy control was a difficult task, particularly because of the actions the Roosevelt Administration had taken to sideline congressional debate by avoiding consultation, hoarding information, and requesting that the body not undermine unity in wartime by holding public debates about the future. Congressmen complained about “lack of information, particularly regarding postwar understandings, at [international conferences held in] Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo and Teheran.”75 Without knowing the extent of the postwar commitments made by the executive in international conferences, it was difficult for congressmen to formulate opinions on postwar foreign policy. However, Congress did debate key issues such as international cooperation and new military bases in the Pacific.

Although the isolationist movement was checked by the Administration before Pearl Harbor and effectively ended with America’s entry into the war, former isolationists remained influential figures in

Congress and continued to have a perspective on foreign policy based on isolationism. Even as popular and official consensus shifted towards greater international cooperation, the echoes of isolationism were heard in cynicism about the prospect of long-term cooperation with allies and in reluctance to take on large commitments after the war. Consequently Administration officials and internationalist congressmen worried about a potential popular resurgence after the war ended. In 1943, two of the most influential members of Roosevelt's cabinet, Hull and Stimson, discussed strategies to manage a possible return of isolationism amongst Republicans in Congress after the war. The men predicted that “after election they [Republican congressmen] will be as violently isolationist as they were after the last war.” Hull and Stimson worried that such a position would be particularly dangerous for internationalism if it were bolstered by a “never again” sentiment from returning troops “which would be tantamount to isolationism.” In order to counter this possibility, the men discussed "missionary work with the soldiers", including distributing a “white book” setting out the internationalist case: “why we had to fight and ... anti-isolationism.” In addition, Vice President Henry Wallace continued to advocate internationalism and interventionism. He announced in his speeches that American interests would be served if the country, through its businessmen and missionaries, lent a “helping hand” to China and India in the postwar world. It would be impossible to extend that “helping hand” abroad or pursue a more active foreign policy in the face of obstruction by isolationists in Congress and the public.

The B2H2 and Fulbright resolutions

Internationalists in Congress also worried about postwar isolationism and sought to neutralize the threat by committing the country to an internationalist path before the war ended. It was not until spring 1943 that such a commitment seemed possible. At that time Allied military victories shifted attention toward postwar planning, as triumph appeared distant but inevitable and early consensus on the world to follow took shape. The House and Senate debated bipartisan resolutions between spring and fall 1943 on the necessity of an international organization for peace and American membership in such an organization. In Senate this was called the Ball-Burton Hatch-Hill (B2H2) resolution. As one supporter, Representative John Vorys explained, “I think there is a real danger [of resurgent isolationism]. I think that the way to prevent that danger is to create and crystallize the sentiment of our own people and the best time to do it is now, not after the war is over.” The B2H2 resolution would have a number of benefits beyond

76 29 June 1943, 155. Reel 8. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
78 Prevention of Future Aggression and the Maintenance of Peace (H. Con. Res. 25 and Related Resolutions, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.) House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 8 June, 1943. Selected Executive Session
checking isolationists. It was a chance to engage in public education and constituted a direct response to Congress’ rejection of League of Nations membership after World War One.

To rally public support for the policy initiative, members of the House and Senate from both parties travelled around the country in eight bipartisan teams on a speaking campaign. The tour was intended to dovetail with the debate stirred by the resolutions in order to educate and inform Americans about the need for greater international involvement. In a discussion on the House counterpart to B2H2, the Fulbright resolution, Representative Howard McMurray from the traditionally isolationist state of Wisconsin explained that one “cannot decide international policy in a democratic country unless the people understand what is possible.” In this case, the Congress needed to take on a mission of “educational leadership” with the paternalistic goal of correcting the public’s “wrong assumptions”, like the idea that American security could be ensured through non-involvement in international affairs. What was needed was a short, clear resolution the American people would understand, “something that can be put in a box in a newspaper...” so that, “even the readers of the picture papers would be capable of reading that much.” During the speaking campaign, McMurray argued to an audience at Carnegie Hall that “Woodrow Wilson was the great realist of his time,” and that his ideas on international cooperation were needed after this war.

In addition to priming the ground of public opinion, the B2H2 speaking campaign of 1943 brought Congress and the executive together in an unexpected way. Missouri Senator Harry Truman, a supporter of the resolution, was not one of the main speakers on the tour because, as Walter Judd explained, “he wasn't very much of a speaker and he wasn't as well-known.” Still, he was asked to come in as a substitute when another senator became unavailable. When Senator Truman became president in April 1945, the executive then was taken over by a man who shared the consensus of leading members of the House and Senate on America’s role in the postwar world. The B2H2 debates were crucial to postwar planning because they demonstrated that Congress was not fundamentally opposed to the various

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internationalist postwar commitments being developed by Roosevelt and the State Department planners. This allowed planners to continue to work on the assumption of a large American role as an active player in the Far East and part of a “big four” without concern that Congress would use its power to block their plans after victory.

Challenges to internationalists

Not surprisingly, the B2H2 resolutions were met with criticism from former isolationists. In response to the B2H2 debates, the New York Times invited Senator Wheeler to speak on behalf of isolationists on the question of postwar planning. The resulting opinion piece revealed the thinking of those isolationists who had only abandoned their beliefs after Pearl Harbor. Wheeler agreed that cooperation may be necessary in the postwar world, but, in classic isolationist fashion, rejected membership of an international organization or any sort of postwar commitment which would limit American freedom to decide its own actions and interests. Wheeler roundly rejected the B2H2 proposal for an international police force, one of the more provocative points in the plan for a postwar international organization. The force would require high cost in terms of manpower and create a “peace that America would underwrite that would depend for its execution on the continuous use of force.” Such a peace, he argued, "would not be a peace at all."83 Senator Wheeler suggested that American support for free trade, not military intervention on a global scale, would create lasting peace. However, public opinion had swung the other way. In July 1943, four months after B2H2 was proposed, a Gallup poll found that 74% of Americans supported the creation of an international police force.84

As it had done before the war, the Roosevelt Administration moved to block any congressional challenge to its dominance over foreign policy. This is somewhat surprising, as the policy advocated in B2H2 was similar to Roosevelt’s own thinking on postwar plans. However, FDR was cautious about limiting his future range of action by making specific commitments during the war. He instead preferred vague statements which could be interpreted as he wished in the still uncertain future.85 In order to stifle public and congressional debate and maintain his grip on postwar policy, Roosevelt issued a statement in March 1943, shortly after the resolution was introduced. In the statement, he praised the “broad principles of a Senate resolution [B2H2]... pledging international cooperation to maintain peace after the war, but he implied that the time was not ripe for a detailed statement of the organization.”86 Senators ignored this

84 “U.S. At War: The Great Debate,” Time, 12 July 1943.
85 Roosevelt’s approach to postwar planning is examined in chapter one.
challenge and continued to insist on a full debate on the subject. Perhaps in response to this pressure, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom Connally put forward his own resolution as a substitute for B2H2. Senators rejected the new statement as too vague to be meaningful and continued to campaign for the original resolution. As Henrietta McCormick Hill, the wife of Senator Hill, recalled in her diary, the Connally resolution was referred to as a “mother Hubbard – it covers everything but touches nothing.” In November 1943, the Administration asked Senator Connally to put forward instead a statement of congressional approval of the American position on the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. This new Connally resolution was similar to B2H2, but had the benefit of Secretary Hull’s approval and having been previously circulated to America’s allies.

In this way, the Roosevelt Administration effectively sidelined Congress in its planning for postwar internationalism. At the same time, in signing a compromise resolution, Congress approved a bill recognizing “the necessity [of] …a general international organization [for]… maintenance of international peace and security.” Congressmen did not want or expect the approval of a watered down B2H2 resolution to be the end of their involvement in postwar planning. As Representative John Hinshaw said of his yes vote, it was not intended as a “blank-check endorsement… [or] an authorization for the President to bind this country to a plan that he may deem appropriate, without further legislative approval.” Approval of this resolution did, however, make a repetition of Congress rejection of postwar internationalism as happened after the Great War unlikely.

The future of Japan

As seen in chapter one, Japan’s island mandates, awarded by the League of Nations after the Great War, were the most attractive territorial prize for the United States. These islands could be used as military bases to increase the American military presence, and by extension security, in the Pacific. Like the president, Congress was supportive of American appropriation of Japanese islands. However, the president was mindful of the Atlantic Charter and his vision of “Americanism”, both of which would

89 Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, 1-3. It is interesting to note that in her memoir Mrs. Hill recalls the switch from B2H2 to Connally Resolution differently. In her estimation, the switch was made at the insistence of the other senators in spite of Connally. Henrietta McCormick Hill, A Senator’s Wife Remembers, 169.
90 The Connally Resolution, Senate Resolution 192-Seventy-Eighth Congress. 5 November, 1943. in Pamphlet No. 4, “Pillars of Peace, Documents Pertaining To American Interest In Establishing A Lasting World Peace,” January 1941-February 1946 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Army Information School, 1946).
91 89 Congressional Record, 7830. 21 September 1943.
preclude unilateral seizure and annexation of overseas territories by the United States. For this reason, although American possession of the islands was discussed between the Allies throughout the war, Roosevelt was careful to avoid accusations of territorial aggrandizement by making it clear that any control would be taken under a UN-approved trusteeship. Congress was not as subtle.

At several points between 1943 and 1945 congressmen spoke out directly about the need for American annexation of Japan’s island possessions. An early public call came from Senator Millard Tydings, the Chairman of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. Tydings had a long interest in American involvement in the Pacific region and had co-sponsored the Philippine Independence Act in 1934, which had redefined the US-Philippine relationship and set a ten-year deadline for independence of the colony. In the fall of 1943, as the Congress was still debating B2H2 and involvement in postwar international security organizations, Tydings spoke on the issue of bases on the Star and Blue Network National Radio Forum. Tydings declared that the islands ought to be taken from Japan for use as US bases, thus securing the postwar Pacific. Several months later, concerned by moves in Australia and New Zealand, the House began planning to create a committee to discuss postwar military policy in the Pacific. The new committee was to focus on developing bases using both former Japanese mandates, and "and other valuable territory." Although discussions within the House Naval Affairs Committee continued, the subcommittee examining the “acquisition, use, retention, and development” of Pacific islands was not created until January 1945.

Representative Will Rogers proposed carving up the Japanese empire between the Allies in a manner similar to Roosevelt’s proposals. Like State Department officials, Rogers was unaware of secret territorial commitments being discussed with China and Russia, but he imagined correctly that the Sakhalin and the northern Kuriles would go to Russia, and that China would be offered Formosa and the Ryukyus. New Zealand and Australia, he argued, would support US annexation of the mandated islands, because the move would guarantee regional security. Tennessee Senator Kenneth McKellar took these ideas further, and in August 1944 submitted a resolution calling for the United States to permanently retain not only...

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92 The issue of UN seizure of Japan’s island mandates for use as bases was discussed at international conferences during the war. See Bohlen minutes, Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, Nov 29, 1943. FRUS Cairo and Tehran, 532, and Minutes of a Meeting of the Pacific War Council, 12 Jan 1944. FRUS Cairo and Tehran, 868. See also Roosevelt’s carefully worded explanation of the base issue to his Joint Chiefs of Staff, chapter one, 45.
96 He did not know, however, that Chiang Kai-Shek had rejected Roosevelt’s offer of the Ryukyus at Cairo. See chapter one.
97 90 Congressional Record, 3798-3802. 28 April 1944.
Japan’s League of Nations mandated islands, but the Ryukyus and Formosa as well. Although Formosa had been taken from China following the first Sino-Japanese war, McKellar argued that it was in safer hands under US ownership, and therefore in the best interest of all parties. Occupied areas, he stated, “belong to us under the rules of war. We can do with them what we like.” 98 The resolution was attacked in the press, a Time article entitled “Brotherly Greed” characterized the proposal as “the inward stirrings of manifest destiny.” 99 Regardless, congressional discussions about territorial acquisitions continued.

Shortly thereafter, Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Naval Affairs committee, met with the SWNCCFE about plans for island bases. He requested copies of the recommendations made by the group to serve as a starting point for the new subcommittee discussions. Significantly, Vinson specifically requested drafts on the Kurile Islands. Like bureaucratic planners, congressmen were not informed about secret agreements made by Roosevelt and therefore based their planning work on misinformation. Vinson explained to SWNCCFE planners that for the Naval Committee, “control” of island bases would necessarily mean American sovereignty over them. This did not fit in with either Roosevelt or the planner’s conception of UN mandates as a mechanism for allowing American use of bases without openly contradicting the principle of non-aggrandizement. Ballantine explained this position and “after considerable discussion” convinced Vinson to accept the idea of transferring sovereignty to an international organization, which would in turn grant control of the territories to the United States. 100 After the meeting, the House Committee on Naval Affairs put forward a proposal for a bill declaring that islands in the Pacific taken from Japan would be kept for American defense. 101

Congressional activity on this issue raised hackles in the White House, where it was believed that overt expansionist claims could cause embarrassment and also problems between the Allies. As Roosevelt explained in his final State of the Nation address, “The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors. We must not let those differences divide us and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in winning the war and building the peace.” 102 Roosevelt asked James Byrnes to intercede on his behalf in response to the proposed Committee for Naval Affairs bill. The legislation should be dropped, Byrnes told Vinson, because it would be an embarrassment to Roosevelt who had repeatedly declared that the US had no

98 90 Congressional Record, 7074-7075. 18 August 1944.
101 James Byrnes to Franklin Roosevelt, 23 March 1945. FDR Office File, Part IV, Correspondence. RSC.
interests in territorial gain. As with B2H2, the White House discouraged congressional debate and activity even when the two branches were broadly in agreement. However, the actions of leading congressmen make it clear that members of Congress, like Roosevelt, supported a circumscribed Japan, stripped of territory, and a new strong American military presence in the Pacific.

Disarmament

Across the government, wartime planning for postwar Japan assumed that the country would be demilitarized and rendered incapable of future aggression. Congress was no exception. Regardless of party membership or ideological affiliation, congressmen consistently supported plans to destroy Japan’s military capability. Because the current enemies were seen as the greatest possible threat to future peace, “permanently and conclusively and effectively disarming Germany and Japan” was at the top of the postwar agenda. Senator Vandenberg, speaking as an opposition leader before Senate in response to Roosevelt’s 1945 State of the Nation address, stated that it was “simply unthinkable that America, or any other member of the United Nations, would allow this Axis calamity to reproduce itself again.” In order to avoid such an occurrence, America would have to go down a path of increased involvement and cooperation with foreign nations. The former isolationist proposed that treaties be signed with the Allies to pledge commitment to keeping Germany and Japan demilitarized and to put down any future aggression by the defeated nations. Disarming Japan would require an invasion and occupation after the war, and, in common with President Roosevelt, congressmen argued that the heavy involvement of China as an ally would defray American costs and also preclude accusations of a “conquering white man’s war.” Policing would be required to limit Japan’s trade and industry for a long probationary period. Such statements reassured internationalists that even costly plans for Japan could “be carried out without recurrent congressional obstruction and debate.” The permanent demilitarization of Japan, a key hallmark of the postwar country, was thus settled without challenge.

103 James F Byrnes to Franklin Roosevelt, 23 March 1945. FDR Office File Part IV, Correspondence. RSC.
105 Vandenberg read this article into the congressional record. Speech of Arthur H. Vandenberg in the Senate of the United States, 10 January 1945. MC no.051. Box 141, Folder 3. James V. Forrestal Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University.
107 90 Cong. Rec. 3798-3802, 28 April 1944.
Neutralizing Japan: what caused the war?

Beyond simple disarmament, congressmen sought to avoid a future war by understanding the causes of the current conflict. As one senator explained, “it is not enough to annihilate Hitler. We must eliminate the factors which gave rise to Hitler.” The same was true of Japan’s military leadership. Disagreements on the answer to this question lay behind divergent opinions on the postwar world and Japan’s place in it. While not offering recommendations, Walter Judd suggested that Western logic could not provide alternatives the Japanese might accept. Judd believed that Japan had rejected a modus vivendi with the United States in 1941 against its own financial interests for reasons of national psychology. Any planned treatment of the Japanese, therefore, would have to take into account the flaws of the Japanese character. Although “infantile”, he explained to his fellow congressmen, a “terrific inferiority complex” caused by interaction with the more “physically impressive” Chinese and Westerners “is a dominant feature in Japanese psychology.” The Japanese, Judd argued, were also “singularly unimaginative”, “conforming” and suffered collectively from a “persecution psychosis”. These factors had made the Japanese into “the most moody, self-pitying, and morbidly introspective people in the world.” Given this oversensitivity to slights, successful management of Japan would depend more on “face-saving” than on developing legitimate shared interests between victor and vanquished.

By contrast, for internationalists who called for a world government or at least an organization modeled on the League of Nations it was not an inherent flaw in the Japanese state which had caused the current conflict. Rather, warfare was the natural result of an anarchic international system. Just as individuals behaved according to laws under government, a world government was needed to constrain and regulate the relations between nations. As Representative Howard McMurray argued, good and bad people existed across national boundaries, the cause of conflict was not populations of evil individuals. In this liberal view, the solution for neutralizing Japan lay not in radically changing the country itself, but in creating a supra-governmental system through which all nations could work. Of course, this conception met with opposition, especially from former isolationists. As Vandenberg observed, “the clash of rival foreign interests, which have motivated wars for countless centuries, are not likely suddenly to surrender to some simple man-made formula, no matter how nobly meditated.” One view thus required the creation of a

110 89 Congressional Record, 1342-1347. 25 February 1943.
powerful international organization to constrain Japan in the future, while the other demanded that America must remain strong enough to deter or repulse challenges from foreign powers when interests conflicted. Disarming Japan and building American strength in the region, both generally accepted courses of action, would be needed to neutralize the Japan threat.

Unexpectedly, isolationist Senator Wheeler’s views on neutralizing Japan mirrored thinking within the State Department’s IDAFE. Speaking about Germany, Senator Wheeler argued that the Axis Powers became a danger as a result of “the clogging and distortion of the channels of trade.” This, and population growth, had led to “the debasement of their standards of living,” which in turn had caused political turmoil. IDAFE planners reached the same conclusion about Japan, and had consequently made tying the country to the international system through trade and increased living standards a keystone of postwar plans. Mike Mansfield, whose experience with China has been considered above, added an additional requirement for the long-term pacification of Japan. While he did not argue that the Emperor was responsible for Japanese aggression, Mansfield believed that the imperial system needed to be removed to prevent future menace. If the emperor were maintained, “the Japanese warlords could use him to build back up into a military nation.” Representative Rogers agreed, stating that America could not indulge the “fairyland” approach of the Japanese toward their emperor. “We should treat the emperor precisely as we would treat any other responsible leader of a cruel people.” Although independent of other wartime time planning groups, during the war Congress considered key questions on how best to neutralize defeated Japan.

Alternate voices: vengeance

Congress, as representative of the American people, was exposed to ordinary voices on the Japan question in a way which other planners were not. Congressmen met with the families of servicemen and received constituent letters as news of Japanese atrocities was released during the war. As a result, this source of policy making was uniquely colored by rage, war hate, and calls for vengeance. Shortly after the War Department released its account of Japanese abuse of POWs in the Philippines, including the now infamous Bataan Death March, Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico took to the Senate floor to read letters sent to him by military families. In his emotional presentation, Chavez named each author as the wife or parent of a soldier imprisoned by the Japanese, “if not dead.” Many of the telegrams called on

114 Dale Hellegers, We, the Japanese People, Vol 1, 150.
115 90 Congressional Record, 3798-3802. 28 April 1944.
Congress to redouble the war effort in the Pacific. Chavez and his constituents expressed anger at the War and Navy Department’s decision to keep reports about the atrocities from the Congress and the public. One soldier’s wife wrote to ask “Since Japan has taken such a great authority in mistreating our boys, why don't we do the same thing to the imprisoned Japs in America…?”\(^\text{116}\) Her desire for retaliation was matched by many congressmen.

The morning that press reports on Bataan were released, the senate floor was flooded with outrage and anti-Japanese vitriol which impacted the senators’ views on postwar Japan. Senators James Davis and Carl Hatch, co-author of the progressive B2H2 bill, agreed that the day’s news “disqualifies Japan from even being considered one of the civilized nations of the world.” This view of Japan was entirely at odds with the “soft” peace plans developed by the State Department to reorient Japan into a cooperative member of international society through a period of occupation. If the Japanese were indeed “heathens… uncivilized pagans… brutes and beasts in the form of men,” the senate majority leader wondered “whether anybody could under any conditions, over any period of years, open Japan up to civilization.” If reorientation would not be possible, three themes for dealing with Japan emerged from that morning’s session. Japan could be taught a lesson through cruelty, isolated from the world, or utterly destroyed.\(^\text{117}\)

Senator Hill, another B2H2 author, hoped that America would soon reach “the heart of Japan and bomb and burn and scorch them with fire and teach the Japanese that war is indeed hell in all its fury.” Senators that day were clear that retribution ought to be meted out not only to the leadership but to the Japanese people as a whole. This would not only prevent Japan from future aggression through a harsh lesson, but would also “satisfy every mother’s and every father’s heart which has been wrung today.” Alternatively, Japan might be “forever isolated within the borders and confines of their little islands, and never again allowed any contact with the outside world.” Senators likened this to a lifetime prison sentence for violent criminals. Finally, some suggested that “Japan as a nation should be wiped off the face of the earth.”\(^\text{118}\) Months later, Representative Rogers quoted a radio commentator to explain his position on the treatment of postwar Japan. “Well,” Rogers quoted, “I haven't heard very much news from Carthage lately.”\(^\text{119}\) The horrors of war generated powerful feelings of rage and hate toward Japan within Congress, radically challenging the views of more insulated Asia experts in think tanks and bureaucratic circles.

\(^\text{116}\) 90 Congressional Record, 929-931. 31 January 1944.
\(^\text{117}\) 90 Congressional Record, 869-873. 28 January 1944.
\(^\text{118}\) 90 Congressional Record, 869-873. 28 January 1944.
\(^\text{119}\) 90 Congressional Record, 3798-3802. 28 April 1944.
Cost of policing and rebuilding

Despite broad support for disarming Japan and international security agreements, scattered opposition remained. Dissension on the Japan question arose from an unwillingness to shoulder the extensive costs of rehabilitating an enemy. Old isolationist arguments reemerged diluted. La Follette admitted that Americans could not "wash our hands of the whole business and refuse to take on the responsibilities our participation in the war has thrust upon us." However, he argued that America could do the most good on the world stage by becoming a model for other nations through government domestic investment in full employment, housing and education. Putting its “own house in order”, not foreign reconstruction, ought to be the top spending priority. Instead of rebuilding other nations, La Follette supported short-term relief programs, to be replaced by loans and credits. Ending a discussion on the treatment of Japan in 1943, Representative Herman Knutson asked the House “is it about time we began to think about America and the future of the American people, rather than concerning ourselves about putting a bottle of milk upon everybody’s doorstep?” Senator Taft, meanwhile, identified the major flaw in Administration thinking as the idea “that American money and American charity shall solve every problem.” The American people, Taft thought, were happy to “give up any idea of ruling the world or telling other countries how to manage their own affairs.” There would be “no reason for occupying Germany [and Japan] after every military weapon has been destroyed.” Other representatives made similar criticisms, that by supporting the reorientation of postwar enemies Uncle Sam was in danger of becoming Santa Claus.

Such criticism stood in stark contrast with the costly and extensive plans for occupying and restructuring Japan being developed in the IDAFE. As congressional approval was needed for spending, such challenges were dangerous for postwar planners. However, the critics remained in the minority, and were unable to seriously challenge plans. Most congressmen, Democrats and Republicans, recognized that a period of occupation would be necessary to reach the goal of disarming Japan. They also acknowledged that some measure of international cooperation would be needed to contain and monitor Japan in the

120 The importance of this speech in setting out the ideas of former isolationists is demonstrated by its redistribution. For example, James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, had five copies of the speech in his papers. La Follette Jr speech on framing peace 31 May 1945. Box 139, Folder 7. James V. Forrestal Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University.
121 La Follette Jr speech on framing peace 31 May 1945, Forrestal Papers, Box 139, Folder 7. James V. Forrestal Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University.
122 89 Congressional Record. 1342-1347. 25 February 1943.
future. Speaking for Roosevelt’s rival candidate Thomas Dewey in 1944, John Foster Dulles explained that Japan would be policed by the US, Britain, China and possibly Russia after disarmament.\textsuperscript{125} Whichever party controlled the White House, it was clear that the postwar Administration would support an expensive and expansive foreign policy.

**Conclusion**

During World War Two, Congress moved from being a largely isolationist body to one marked by general support for internationalism and an active foreign policy. Congress members held views on Asia formed by personal expertise or regional and ideological perspectives. These in turn affected legislation and expectations for American relations with China and Japan. Plans for Asia in Congress were bound up in the great isolationist-interventionist debate. Congressmen had limited interaction with bureaucratic planners, and the body was effectively side-lined by the Roosevelt Administration throughout the period. However, this support for internationalism was necessary if wartime plans were to become policy and action after victory.

Looking forward to the postwar world in 1945, members of Congress had decisively answered a question posed by the America First Committee five years earlier. “Are we to take policing of the entire world upon our shoulders?”\textsuperscript{126} The answer was a qualified yes. Throughout the war years, political leaders in Congress moved steadily toward the internationalist and interventionist line seen in bureaucratic planning.\textsuperscript{127} More and more, members of Congress came to agree with the postwar planners that “we have found that we are not secure, that we are continuously vulnerable to attack” because small conflicts in “remote corners of the world” had the potential to “grow into world conflagrations” and threaten the United States. Keeping peace, political leaders agreed, was only possible through “continuous thought and effort.”\textsuperscript{128} Reflecting the shift in broader American thinking, Congress came to accept the immense costs of reorienting and reconstructing former belligerents, making security commitments, and supporting international organizations.

\textsuperscript{125} Warren Moscow, “Dulles Says Goal is Basic Unity Here on Plan for World,” *New York Times*, 20 August 1944.
\textsuperscript{126} “Address delivered at an American First Committee Meeting by Charles A Lindbergh,” 10 May 1941. Box 1. America First Committee Papers, Hoover Institution Archive, Stanford University.
\textsuperscript{127} See chapter three.
Through their wartime efforts, the Roosevelt Administration and internationalists in Congress pushed the legislative branch out of the way of postwar planning. Congress would not, as it had after the Great War, block peace plans on the grounds that the burden on the US was too heavy. The expensive, sweeping plans developed by bureaucratic planners to reorient Japan and build up American leadership in the Pacific would not be obstructed by congressional veto over spending and treaty agreements. With this potential obstacle overcome, and with the approval of a new president, the way was clear for ambitious plans developed by official area experts, with the input of think tanks and opinion leaders, to be put into action. Congressmen were rarely involved in the evolution of planning in the White House and State Department, and the body was home to diverse views on Japan and the postwar world. These politicians would respond with surprise and criticism to the SWNCC policies put into place as the postwar occupation began.
Chapter Six

Transition into Action

On April 12, 1945 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died after a long period of declining health. Historian Frank Costigliola describes the months after Roosevelt’s death as a “critical juncture in history,” alongside the moments before the outbreak of WWI or the collapse of the Soviet Union; an “elastic” time of uncertainty in which events might develop along dramatically different paths.¹ The impact of this leadership change on policy has been considered elsewhere, particularly with reference to the onset of the Cold War and US policy toward the Soviet Union.² The end of the Pacific war has also been addressed by historians who view Japan policy through the lens of worsening US-Soviet relations.³ This chapter will consider the final stages of wartime planning for Japan, which took place in this tumultuous and uncertain time. It will consider how the president, his advisors, and bureaucratic planners responded to the unfolding events in the summer of 1945 as they maintained and altered existing policy aims. While necessarily covering some familiar ground, this chapter will look specifically at planning for postwar Japan. It will focus on the ideas and actions of the actors examined in previous chapters; the presidency, bureaucratic groups, non-state actors and congress, in developing the final policy for Japan which was implemented with the occupation of Japan from September 1945.

When Harry Truman took office, he assumed a position for which he was poorly prepared. Lacking background on America’s complex relations with the rest of the world, the popular mandate and the political savvy of Roosevelt, Truman attempted to create policy continuity between administrations. He did this by relying heavily on Roosevelt’s advisers and existing recommendations, a practice in which FDR himself had rarely engaged. Over the summer of 1945, Truman began to develop his own opinions on foreign policy and the allies and enemies with which America interacted. The short period between Truman’s assumption of the presidency and the surrender of Japan was a time in which many other issues

arose. Staff changes altered the nature of the Administration and the terms of Japan’s surrender were considered in light of complicated international relations and the creation of the atomic bomb. As victory neared and in the transition to the postwar period, key issues such as international cooperation, the division of Japan’s territories, and general American goals for Japan were reevaluated. Once agreed, the sum of American planning was made public, open to response from experts, elites and politicians. At the same time, new actors emerged with the task of implementing policy on the ground in Asia.

At the time of Roosevelt’s death it was by no means certain that the bureaucratic planning seen in chapter two would become the center of policy. Although these plans were altered in response to events and new inputs in summer and fall of 1945, the widespread acceptance within the Administration of the ideas and aims advocated by the planners is the big development of this period. The course of events in the early Truman Administration opened the door for the recommendations of a small group of Japan specialists in the State Department to become American policy. In the transition from war to victory, these recommendations were approved and legitimized as SWNCC 150/4, the document which was both made public and sent to occupation administrators to guide American actions in defeated Japan. A broad consensus developed after Roosevelt’s death supporting the radical policy goals of the planners.

**Harry S Truman, heir to a “terrible job”**

At five in the afternoon on April 12, 1945, Vice President Harry Truman received a telephone call from FDR’s secretary requesting that he come to the White House as soon as possible. Arriving that afternoon at what would become his residence for the next eight years, Truman first heard the devastating news. The vice president had not known Roosevelt well, but admired the skilled politician as the “great leader [who] came forward and rescued the country from chaos” during the political challenges of the 1930s. The “great leader” was dead, and Truman was needed to take over the presidency immediately. Two hours later, Truman stood with his wife, daughter, and such cabinet members and key congressmen as could be assembled on short notice on that Thursday night. The oath of office, made over a hastily located bible, took only a minute. Late in the clear and mild night, when he found himself home at last, Truman ate his first meal as president, a supper of leftover turkey supplied by the neighbors. On that day, Truman began keeping a diary to record his experiences in his new position. He recalled of that night coming home exhausted and hungry.

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4 Undated 1946 (1 of 2). Harry S Truman long hand notes, PSF. Box 281. Truman Library.
Until recently a Midwestern Senator, Truman had been vice president for only three months when he succeeded FDR as the leader of a nation at war. Although he had been a voice for international cooperation in Congress, Truman had not been included in his predecessor’s foreign policy-making. He had little knowledge of the manifold problems which would face him as president. A small-town American from a rural satellite of a Kansas City suburb, Harry Truman lacked the internationalist perspective of Franklin Roosevelt. However, the new president had a voracious appetite for books, which he attributed to his lack of athletic ability as a child, and an interest in history and distant places. An anecdote from the wife of Dean Acheson demonstrates the international character of Truman’s reading interest. When central Asia was mentioned in passing in a dinner conversation, Truman launched into an impromptu lecture on the long history of the region, to the surprise of his fellow diners. In his typical plain-spoken, self-depreciating style Truman later explained that he was “not a scholar” and read “the wrong books.” However, he offered, “I read a lot, and I suppose I get some good ones now and then.”

This ad-hoc self-guided study informed Truman’s understanding of the world beyond Missouri.

The new president had much to learn in order to guide the complex foreign policy of a nation at war, and his lack of a popular mandate only made the job more difficult. Although triumph over Germany and Japan seemed likely in April 1945, victory yet appeared far away. In April and May Truman informed top advisers in Washington and government representatives abroad “to stay on and carry on just as [they] had been doing” and “continue… efforts to accomplish the purposes outlined… by President Roosevelt.” During that time, the new president worked with Roosevelt’s top advisers to gain an understanding of America’s foreign policy and far-flung interests.

Several members of Truman’s cabinet recorded their impressions of the new president. A year earlier, Stimson had held a negative opinion of then Senator Truman. “Truman is a nuisance and a pretty untrustworthy man,” Stimson noted, “he talks smoothly but acts meanly.” However, thirteen months later and under entirely different circumstances, Stimson was willing to give Truman the benefit of the doubt. He wrote that the new president was “very friendly in his manner and words” and commented, “on

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6 For example, as noted in chapter five, Truman had participated in the 1943 B2H2 speaking tour to drum up public support for a postwar international organization.
7 By contrast, FDR received an elite and cosmopolitan upbringing as part of a wealthy and well-connected family. As a boy, he greatly admired his cousin President Teddy Roosevelt. His education included trips to Europe and schooling at Groton and Harvard.
9 13 April 1945, 30. Reel 8. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. And Harry Truman to Ambassador Hurley, 12 May 1945. Reel 2. Map Room Messages of President Truman, RSC.
10 13 March 1944, 95. Reel 8. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
the whole my impression was favorable.” Truman appeared to be quite open with his new advisers, frankly admitting to Secretary Morgenthau on his second day in office “I need help.” Morgenthau, who had been close to Roosevelt, was pleased that Truman “was most courteous…and made a good impression.” However, Roosevelt’s advisers did not immediately trust in Truman’s sincerity or ability. “After all,” Morgenthau recorded in his diary, “he is a politician, and what is going on in his head only time will tell.” General Marshall had a similar response to his meeting with the new president, warning his colleagues, “we shall not know what he is really like until the pressure begins to be felt.” Secretary Stimson wrote of Truman’s difficult position that, although the man was “willing and anxious to learn and to do his best”, he would have to grapple with “threads of information… so multitudinous that only long previous familiarity could allow him to control them.” In the days and months after Roosevelt’s death, the deceased president’s staff sought to help an unprepared Truman manage the cat’s cradle of American foreign policy issues through briefings and forceful policy recommendations.

**Briefing the new president on Japan**

The briefings Truman received from his advisers during the critical first days of office seemed to indicate that Japan and its future were not pressing issues. To begin with, surrender, especially for Japan, was not expected in the near future. On Truman’s second day in office, he was informed in a gathering of top military advisers that while Germany was expected to surrender within six months, Japan would likely continue to fight for another year and a half. The long time horizon to Japan’s surrender certainly did not make postwar handling of the country top among the many immediate issues facing the nation. That same day, Secretary of State Stettinius sent Truman a six-page “summary of world events” to help the president get up to speed on US foreign policy. The report made no mention of Japan or even Asia in the Europe-centered list of developments.

As time went on, the new president was introduced to the key issues in America’s East Asia policy. Two weeks into the new administration, Acting Secretary Joseph Grew provided Truman with the outlines of America’s policy toward China, the critical issue in American plans for postwar Asia. Truman learned that the Government considered “the establishment of a strong and united China as a necessary principal

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11 13 April 1945, 30. Reel 8. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.  
13 General Marshall, as quoted in 13 April 1945, 30. Reel 8. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.  
14 Jim Bishop, *FDR’s last Year*, 633.  
16 Joseph Grew, undersecretary of state, often served as acting secretary in the spring and early summer of 1945 as Edward Stettinius was busy with the creation of the United Nations Organization.
stabilizing factor in the Far East,” and was working to help China gain recognition as a great power. As discussed in chapter one, Roosevelt had hoped this policy would create a strong China which could share the burden with the United States and “contribute to peace and security.” The briefing also included the statement that America was flexible and willing to work with leaders in China other than Chiang Kai-shek, although there had been little evidence of that flexibility beyond Roosevelt’s friendly letter to Mao in February 1945. William Donovan, the head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), had sent President Roosevelt regular reports about strategic issues in American policy abroad, and continued doing so for Truman. European issues dominated these reports, and the first OSS report mentioning Asia did not cross Truman’s desk until early May. This report highlighted the danger of Russian domination of East Asia after the collapse of Japan. “Once Japan is defeated,” the report warned, “the position of Russia in Asia will be strengthened enormously. Even though China may, in a sense, replace Japan as the leading Oriental power” she would not be able to “hold her own” against Russia. These early briefings alerted Truman to the potential for instability in East Asia after the surrender of Japan, and advocated Roosevelt’s policy of supporting a strong China to help the United States rebuild order in the region without Japan.

Harry Truman was much more reliant on formal advisers for information than his predecessor had been. Truman’s treatment of China expert Owen Lattimore in the summer of 1945 is indicative of the new president’s more conventional style of information-gathering. Lattimore, who, in addition to having been a Roosevelt-appointed adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, had accompanied Vice President Wallace on a 1944 mission to China, wrote Truman to offer advice on China policy in preparation for the Potsdam Conference. This was the sort of informal analysis in which Roosevelt would have been interested. Truman, after a distinctly unwelcoming reply, agreed to meet with Lattimore to discuss the Soviet Union and China. Lattimore later recalled of the short meeting, “[Truman] told me, in less than three minutes, that he had Stalin under control, he had Chiang under contro, (sic) so please go home, which I did.” The place of the president in the planning process had changed.

Truman and bureaucratic planning

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18 Joseph Grew to Harry Truman, 27 April 1945. Reel 15. Truman Office Files Part 3, RSC.
19 Chapter one, 34.
21 Lattimore played an important role in postwar planning through the Council on Foreign Relations, as was seen in chapters three and four.
22 See chapter one.
23 Correspondence between Owen Lattimore and Harry Truman, 10, 14 and 20 June, 1945. Box 28, Folder 1. Owen Lattimore Papers, Library of Congress.
In addition to providing Truman with information, advisers pressed for formal adoption of their recommendations, which had always been a challenge during the Roosevelt administration. This had a particular impact on planning for postwar Japan because top advisers now pushed for formal approval of bureaucratic plans. During the president’s first week in office, the secretaries of State, War and Navy submitted a planning document on trusteeship at a meeting with the president. The issue of the ownership of territories to be taken from Japan and European colonies in Asia had, like the question of treatment of postwar Germany and Japan, long remained unsettled because of Roosevelt’s indecision on the topic. However, the recommendations were presented to Truman as the “result of many conferences between the three Departments and had now been approved by all.” Faced with the consensus of his advisers and a sense of pre-existing policy, Truman signed his approval of the recommended policy without further discussion.  

While, as seen below, the question of partitioning Japan’s possessions remained uncertain even after surrender, the legal status of the territories was finally settled. Thus, in the name of continuity, Truman made a commitment to policy which Roosevelt had actively avoided.  

Days after Roosevelt’s death, the planners drafted a new document to replace PWC 108 as the most up to date summary of Japan planning. This document, called SWNCC150, would be revised several times over the summer before being sent to MacArthur to guide occupation policy and released to the public in the fall. Like PWC 108 before it, the catalyst for SWNCC150 was a War Department request for approved policy on which to base its military plans for the occupation. In response to the Civil Affairs Division’s call for a short policy statement of recommendations approved by the president, a summary of SWNCC150 was sent over by the interagency planning group, now called the Secretary’s Staff Committee (SC) on June 23. The statement contained the main objectives described in chapter two of this work, but, as discussed below, it was intentionally ambiguous on the question of unconditional surrender and the status of the emperor. 

Roosevelt had at best an ambivalent attitude toward the peace plans developed by the bureaucratic planners. At times, as with his adoption and extension of the Morgenthau plan in 1944, his support for “tough” treatment of ordinary Japanese and Germans, and his opposition to maintaining heavy industry in defeated Axis economies, his approach was in direct opposition to the corpus of SFE work. By the end of  

25 Memorandum of Conference with the President, April 18 1945. Reel 128. Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.  
26 See, for example, Roosevelt’s discouragement of Congressional discussion on the bases issue in the previous chapter.  
27 This process is also covered in Janssens, 352-364 and Takamae, 213-214. The document in its seven stages of development is available with commentary at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/022shoshi.html. Accessed April 2013.  
June, officials were able to disseminate the goals of those planners as recommendations approved by SWNCC and the president. Truman’s presidency and the acceptance of existing plans legitimized that branch of planning and the ideas of the State Department’s Far East experts. The relationship between the president and the SWNCC group had changed even as final plans were taking shape.

**Staying the course and deviating from the path**

*Truman’s thinking about the Allies*

Despite Truman’s desire to “follow Roosevelt’s policy” by relying on formal advisers, the new president did have his own ideas about the world. In his first months in office, and especially in the month prior to the July 1945 Potsdam conference, Truman’s personal hand-written notes capture his struggle to define opinions on America's relationship with its allies and the world. These helped shape Truman's approach to what he called “this terrible job I fell heir to”. As was the case with Roosevelt, Truman’s own thinking on China, Japan, and increasingly Russia had an impact on his response to the events which unfolded over the course of the summer.

Harry Truman was later remembered as an inflexible cold warrior, but in 1945 his uncertainty about his new office, Christian faith, and self-study of the world led him to take a position of remarkable tolerance and flexibility in guiding his country’s international relations. In the summer of 1945, this was displayed in his judgment and approach toward a wartime enemy, Japan, and America's wartime allies China and the Soviet Union. With the defeat of Germany in May, the major precondition for Soviet entry into the war against Japan had been met. Drawing on agreements between Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta, within two or three months the Soviet Union would become an ally in the Pacific, expanding the field of Soviet-American cooperation. Truman did not yet see communism as an ideology that precluded cooperation. On the contrary, Truman’s personal notes from this period refer to his understanding of communist ideals and his willingness to work with the Soviet Union.

As in the Roosevelt administration, ideology was not a decisive factor in selecting or working with allies. In his recent book on the origins of the Cold War, Frank Costigliola characterizes Truman as being “skeptical of foreigners” and uncomfortable with the ambiguity of gradual and evolving policies. Although one must be careful in drawing too much from self-written declarations of unbiased viewpoint, Truman’s long-hand notes are at odds with Costigliola’s description of a man “neither temperamentally

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30 Harry S Truman long hand notes, 5 June 1945. Box 281. PSF, Truman Library.
nor intellectually inclined toward… patience.” 32 Weeks before his trip to Potsdam Truman wrote, “I am not afraid of Russia. They’ve always been our friends and I can’t see why they shouldn’t always be.” He argued that differences in political systems could be put aside; “they evidently like their government… I like ours so let's get along.” 33 He argued that, although the Soviet “Godless Peasant System” would not work, “Honest Communism” fit easily into the teachings of the bible as well as “Confucius, Buddha (sic), and Christ.” 34 He applied the same tolerant perspective to American policy in China. “We send missionaries and political propagandists to China… and everywhere to tell those people how to live. Most of’em know as much or more than we do.” 35 Truman privately disavowed xenophobia. “Fact is”, he jotted in his diary, “I never thought God picked any favorites. It is my studied opinion that any race, creed or color can be God's favorites if they act the part…” 36 Such reflections indicate that Truman, like Roosevelt, was willing to take a flexible approach toward Chinese and Russian leadership.

Truman explained and defended his China policy in an interview a decade later. He reported that he had been convinced by top Chinese figures “that Chiang Kai-shek had a government which was firm and established and which the people wanted.” 37 While Truman may well have genuinely believed in the KMT’s ability to govern a stable and democratic China as a result of such conversations, he was certainly aware of the intense criticism of the Nationalists both within China and among American officials, having regularly received reports to that effect from the OSS and State Department. He also consulted his former congressional colleague, Mike Mansfield, on issues regarding China. 38 Truman repudiated the accusation that he was to blame for America’s failed China policy and the resulting “loss” of that country. He had believed Chiang had a serious and popular government and that the Chinese communists were “agrarian reformers”, and thus that he was not dealing with two irreconcilables. 39 In that case, while waiting for a stronger alternative leadership to emerge, the American policy of supporting Chiang while encouraging concessions did not exacerbate a deteriorating situation but rather represented a sound and cautious policy.

Allied cooperation thus remained an expected feature of managing postwar Japan. The War Department provided Truman with conflicting views on the subject early in his presidency. General George

33 Harry S Truman long hand notes, 7 June 1945. Box 281. PSF, Truman Library.
34 Harry S Truman long hand notes, 23 May 1945. Box 281. PSF, Truman Library.
35 Harry S Truman long hand notes, 7 June 1945. Box 281. PSF, Truman Library.
36 Harry S Truman long hand notes, 1 June 1945. Box 281, PSF, Truman Library.
38 Dale Hellegers, *We, the Japanese People*, Vol 1, 150 note 76. Mansfield’s ideas on China are described in the previous chapter.
Marshall’s position was that, although American forces were prepared to move into conquered territories immediately and would probably be the only forces in Japan for some time, the Chinese, British and Russians should assist in the occupation as soon as possible. His concern was that the US should not become the sole focus of Japanese ill will. Like the bureaucratic planners, but in contrast to Roosevelt and Marshall, Stimson prioritized keeping Russia out of Japan. Presaging the nascent Cold War, the secretary argued that a friendly Japan would be useful to support American activities in case of a Russian challenge. Stimson was probably unsuccessful before July 1945 in convincing Truman of the need to gain Japan’s sympathy “in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria.” The president still hoped for cooperation with the Soviet Union at that point. Truman later recalled that he decided to exclude Russia from the administration of postwar Japan only after his experience at Potsdam. However, Stimson’s recommendations matched bureaucratic planners’ prescription for an American-centered approach to allied cooperation and the occupation of Japan.

Staff changes

The development of Truman’s own thinking on enemies and allies was coupled with his replacement of Roosevelt’s advisers as the summer progressed. The personnel changes demonstrated his growing confidence as a leader, but also left Roosevelt-era officials uncertain of their position. The most significant change from the perspective of Japan policy was Truman’s selection of James Byrnes to replace Edward Stettinius as secretary of state. As discussed in chapter one, Roosevelt had also considered Byrnes for the post, but had opted for Stettinius because of Byrnes’ domineering style. Truman’s administrative style was quite different than Roosevelt’s, and as a consequence he was less concerned with challenges to his authority. Because Truman had no vice president, the secretary of state would be next in line to become president should Truman die in office. Although a strong-willed and even arrogant figure, Byrnes was well informed and had connections within Congress, making him a better presidential successor than Stettinius would have been.

The decision to replace Stettinius had important repercussions for the State Department, and in turn, policy on postwar Japan. Byrnes announced that he would not discuss personnel changes during the

40 Memorandum for the President, Chief of Staff, War Department, no date. Reel 13. Truman Office Files Part 3, RSC. Although undated, this memorandum is from June or July of 1945.
Potsdam Conference, as a result the under and assistant secretaries in Washington did not know who would remain in office or for how long.44 By August most had resigned, preferring to leave on their own rather than wait to be “tilted out”.45 Grew remarked to Stettinius that “it is very sad to contemplate the disintegration of the team which you set up and which, by and large, has worked so well together.”46 Grew, Ballantine and Dooman, the key architects and advocates of SWNCC “soft” Japan plans, had all left their positions by the fall.

The new set up was dominated by Byrnes, who accepted little input from the outgoing team.47 Dean Acheson, who was chosen to replace Grew, lamented that though he was promoted to a “position which was supposed to be important,” he had “no idea of what went on… no connection with anything.”48 Although Byrnes offered Grew, now sixty-five years old, an advisor position in Japan, he chose to ignore Grew’s staff suggestions to assist in the occupation of Japan.49 The new secretary intentionally bypassed the men who had composed America’s postwar policy in favor of fresh personnel, in particular replacing Japan specialists with generalists and China hands.50 Positions within the State Department changed hands just as the end of the war was coming into sight. Although a core set of aims and recommendations was firmly established by the outgoing group of Japan hands, a very different group of men would be left to implement the plans composed during the war.

Terms of Surrender

While the staff changeover was in progress between May and July, major debate arose about the terms of Japan’s surrender. At the heart of the issue were two questions. Would the Japanese government continue to exist and retain authority after surrender? And, would Japan be allowed to keep its emperor? Both of these questions fell under the category of “unconditional surrender,” and were important because while retaining the emperor might save thousands of lives by ensuring early termination of the war, it would leave in place a potential rally point for future militarism. The status of the government presented legal

50 Moore and Robinson, Partners for Democracy, 33.
challenges for the authority of Allied forces to set up a military government during the planned occupation. A conditional surrender might end the war more quickly, but ran counter to Roosevelt’s public statements and popular opinion.51

In late May Dooman wrote a first draft surrender document at the request of Grew, who wanted to allow for emperor retention.52 War Department figures Stimson and John McCloy agreed with Grew’s position, telling Truman “we ought to have our heads examined if we do not seek a political end to the war before an invasion.”53 Byrnes too supported an early end to the war, hoping to avoid Soviet entry.54 However, influenced by the advice of Hull and MacLeish, the incoming secretary did not believe this was worth potentially dangerous move of allowing emperor to remain. Japanese militarism, these men believed, could only be ended through the utter defeat and total surrender. Given the lack of consensus on the issue, and in light of ongoing military campaigns in late spring, the question was delayed until the Potsdam conference in July.55

The call for Japan’s surrender made by the Allies at Potsdam left these questions unanswered, a matter which was viewed differently in the War and State Departments. From the perspective of the military, ambiguity about the status of the Japanese government was necessary because of uncertainty around the situation in Japan and how the war would end.56 If Japan surrendered quickly, a transfer of power would be possible, but if an invasion were necessary to force the Japanese to accept defeat, the possibility of political collapse was real. In that case, it was not clear that any group would be left with the authority to declare surrender or transfer power to invading troops. For the State Department, the declaration did not guarantee the right of the Allies to establish military government after the war. At an IDAFE meeting set to analyze the declaration, Blakeslee “concluded by saying that if these terms were accepted by the Japanese he believed three-fourths of our papers would have to be rewritten.”57 In the resulting memorandum planners stated that the State Department would assume that all authority and power would pass to the allies after surrender, but expressed concern that it was not clear from the declaration if the occupation would encompass the whole of Japan or be limited to control of strategic points like population centers. Despite the ambiguity, planners insisted that “direct control in all parts of Japan” was

56 Michael Pearlman, Unconditional Surrender, 7.
necessary to achieve the agreed goals of the occupation.\textsuperscript{58} In the event, Japan’s resistance was cut short by the use of a new and terrible weapon.

\textit{The Bomb}

From early summer, Truman struggled with the use of diplomacy, land invasion, conventional and atomic bombs to force Japan's surrender.\textsuperscript{59} In mid-June, Truman wrote that deciding on a military strategy to force the surrender of Japan was his “hardest decision to date” but that he was ready to make it “once I have all the facts.”\textsuperscript{60} The note was written before the successful test of the atomic bomb, when the options available for Truman’s consideration were still either invasion or a combination of blockade and aerial bombing. A month later the atomic bomb provided a third military option.

Because of the secrecy around the bombs, the decision had to be taken without consulting the area specialists who had been involved in planning for postwar Japan. Joseph Grew, as acting secretary of state, was the only Japan expert in the government who was informed about the bomb before its use.\textsuperscript{61} Cabinet-level officials hoped to use the bomb to force surrender with limited impact on Japan's national consciousness. Despite the devastation wrought by atomic bombing, the decision to use the weapon was made within the context of a war marked by aerial bombing of civilian populations in Europe and Asia. As many Japanese, for example, died in conventional fire bombings during the war as did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.\textsuperscript{62}

At the Potsdam conference, the president and his secretary of war agreed that America needed to be careful in selecting targets for its use of atomic weapons. This was necessary to avoid lingering “bitterness” which would prevent Japan from accepting the US as a sympathetic presence in East Asia after the war.\textsuperscript{63} The decision was made without full understanding of the horrible effects of the weapon. Truman, Brynes, Stimson and others were unaware about the potential for lingering radiation sickness, and evaluated the use of atom bombs within the context of regular conventional firebombing of Japanese

\begin{footnotes}
\item[58] 5-A-41, SSC considered on July 30 Dep State mem No. 1254, ND. Makoto Iokibe, ed., \textit{Occupation of Japan: US Planning Documents, 1942-1945}.
\item[59] A useful overview of this literature can be found in the recent volume Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, \textit{The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
\item[60] Harry S Truman long hand notes, 17 June 1945. Box 281. PSF, Truman Library.
\end{footnotes}
Thus the need for vengeance and threats, if it existed, was balanced by both humanitarian concerns and the desire to gain Japan's cooperation in the postwar period.

Truman’s decision to use atomic weapons against Japanese cities, a still-controversial event unique in human history, has come to dominate judgment of his wartime thinking about Japan. A key argument in condemning Truman’s decision has been that the bombs were unnecessary because Japan was nearing collapse and would have surrendered to reasonable terms without further force. A recent book on the end of the war in Asia postulates that, despite the alternative courses of action available, Truman believed use of the bomb was a just revenge on the Japanese. A more common revisionist argument is that the bombs were used, not out of military necessity to end the war, but to send a message to the Soviet Union. According to this argument, two cities and 140,000 Japanese were sacrificed merely to intimidate a wartime ally. These arguments share an assumption of disregard for enemy lives, and are supported by the willingness of Truman and others to use harsh and dehumanizing rhetoric against the Japanese during the war. While examples of hate speech abound, these do not indicate that the president lacked respect or concern for Japanese lives, or that he supported collective punishment of the Japanese people for their government's initiation of war.

The human cost of atomic bombings was controversial in the United States. In his own diary, Truman fretted about the implications of modern warfare for humanity. “I fear,” he wrote, “that machines are ahead of morals by some centuries and when morals catch up perhaps there'll be no reason for any of it.” On using atomic weapons he explained, “My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan.” Despite the continuing debate about the decision to use atomic weapons, given the brutal nature of the war and the expectation that Japan

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65 For a useful survey of literature on the use of the bomb, see J. Samuel Walker, “Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground” Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 2005).
66 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing The Enemy, 182.
67 See J. Samuel Walker, “Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision.”
68 This death toll figure covers August and September 1945 and is from the United Nations education website. The source puts the total figure, including deaths from abnormal cancers caused by radiation, at 200,000. http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/dnp/sub2.asp?ipage=hiroshimanagasaki. Accessed April 2012.
69 For example, Truman noted in his diary that the Japanese might be “savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic”. Quoted in Eduard Mark, “‘Today Has Been a Historical One:’ Harry S Truman’s Diary of the Potsdam Conference.” Diplomatic History, (Summer 1980): 324. See also John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Random House, 1986) for an account of the impact of racism and rhetoric on the conduct of the war.
70 Diary, July 16. Box 333 and Diary, July 16, "Ross, Mr. and Mrs. Charles G. (handwritten)." Box 322. PSF, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library.
would continue to fight, there is every reason to accept Truman’s own contemporary explanation, the new weapon would save lives on both sides by ending the war quickly.\textsuperscript{72}

Such consideration for Japanese life was outside the mainstream of the American public, a large portion of which harbored deep resentment and even hatred for the Japanese. In the wake of Hiroshima, one Senator wrote to Truman to ask that in retribution for Pearl Harbor the atomic bombings continue until the Japanese were “brought groveling to their knees.” In his reply, Truman appealed to the Senator’s higher instincts by remarking that even if the Japanese were “beasts” the Americans need not be. In the same letter, Truman expressed his opinion on the question of collective punishment in Japan’s case. He regretted the necessity of “wiping out whole populations” because of their leader’s “pigheadedness.”\textsuperscript{73} Many ordinary Americans disagreed. In December 1945, 22.7\% of Americans polled for a \textit{Fortune} survey reported wishing that the US had dropped “many more of them [atomic bombs] before the Japanese had a chance to surrender.”\textsuperscript{74} Such sentiments reveal the rage which lingered in the popular consciousness even months after the war ended, and how different public mood was from Truman and his advisors.

\textbf{Transition into action}

The postwar period came earlier than expected as the atomic bombs forced Japan’s abrupt surrender in mid-August 1945. Despite the work of bureaucratic planners in creating a consensus about plans for postwar Japan, disagreements appeared as implementation neared. The Truman administration reconsidered cooperation with allies, the creation of occupation zones, lingering disputes about territories, and final approval of occupation goals.

\textbf{Allies and zones of occupation}

After the bombing of Hiroshima, members of Truman’s cabinet met to discuss the terms of surrender and postwar treatment of the Japanese. As in the early summer, Stimson wanted to force a quick surrender agreement before the Soviets reached the defeated enemy. His undersecretary and the War Department’s representative to the SCWNCC took a different position. John McCloy argued that a swift end to the war was less important than getting an unconditional surrender so that postwar plans could be implemented with a free hand. Byrnes, unfamiliar with planning for Japan but sharing Stimson’s desire to exclude the

\textsuperscript{72} This assessment, that confronted with the options of atomic warfare and bloody land invasion Truman simply chose the lesser of two evils, is shared by Wilson D. Miscamble, \textit{From Roosevelt to Truman}, chapter six.

\textsuperscript{73} Correspondence between Richard Russell and Harry S. Truman, August 7 and 9, 1945; OF 197 misc.: Japan; Truman Papers. Student Research File: “Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952.”Folder 2. Harry S Truman Library.

\textsuperscript{74} Cited in John Dower, \textit{War Without Mercy}, 54.
Soviets, took a compromise position between the two. The British had played a significant role in drafting the terms of surrender at Potsdam, and Truman had signed his agreement to the “participation of Orientals” in the occupation to avoid the perception of “the war in the Pacific as a racial war and as one designed to spread ‘white imperialism’ throughout Asia.” Because of the precedent of allied cooperation during the war and the rhetorical value of Chinese participation, Truman approved in late June the creation of an allied advisory commission for the occupation.

However, the level of cooperation imagined in wartime planning was low. The final decision rested with Harry Truman, who chose between opposing positions from the bureaucratic departments and the military on this issue. The State Department-dominated SWNCC had been tasked first with defining American goals in the postwar world and composing policy recommendations to accomplish them. This group therefore jealously guarded American initiative. While they agreed that allies ought to have a voice in establishing policy, they believed that “United States should insist on control of the implementation of those policies.” Military leadership, concerned with calls for demobilization and postwar troop reduction, and sensitive to the issue of foreign command, made a different recommendation.

Both parties imagined the same initial situation, in which the majority of available troops would be American and the Allies would form a Far Eastern Commission to make recommendations which the American-led occupation Command would execute. In the next phase of the occupation however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff imagined that a large portion of American forces would be replaced by Soviet, Chinese and British troops. This difference would have significant consequences, because the JCS argued that Japan ought then be divided between the allies into administrative zones. Confronted with this division, Truman signed the SWNCC draft, guaranteeing the “principle of centralized administration.”

While allies, including those beyond the “big four,” would be encouraged to participate in the occupation, American control over implementation would be inviolate. Roosevelt, who had been a whole-hearted advocate of Russian participation in the Pacific War and saw Japan’s treatment in terms of Germany’s, would likely have mirrored the German case and sided with the JCS on zones of occupation. On August 75  Memorandum by Senator Warren R Austin, 20 Aug 1945, reprinted in Thomas Patterson, “Potsdam, the Atomic Bomb,” 228, and Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, 10 August 1945, p 74. (microfilm edition, reel 9), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven Connecticut, 1973.


77 See chapter two.


79 4-C-15, JWPC 385/1, 16 Aug 1945. This issue is pointed out in Makoto Iokibe, ed., Occupation of Japan: US Planning Documents, 1942-1945, vi.

18, Truman’s very different decision had a tremendous impact on the country’s future. Japan would escape the divided fate of Germany and Korea.

Territories

The transfer of Japan’s Kurile Islands, settled secretly by Roosevelt in February 1945, was revisited in light of Japan’s utter defeat at American hands in August. Many members of the Roosevelt administration, not privy to the president’s private commitments, had expressed skepticism about Soviet entry into the war and the territorial demands which would result. In May, Grew wrote to Stimson explaining the State Department’s position on Soviet entry. He wondered if it would be worth “paying” the Russians to engage the Japanese, and wanted the Soviet Union to commit to a range of agreements, including supporting the nationalist government over the CCP in China, the positions on Manchuria and Korea laid out in the Cairo Declaration, and guaranteeing America emergency landing rights in the Kurile Islands.81 State Department Far East experts also recommended that Japan retain at least the southern islands in the Kurile chain, and that the Soviets not be granted full sovereignty over the northern islands.82

The advent of the atomic bomb and the collapse of Japan in early August negated the value of Soviet assistance in the war effort. In light of this change, McCloy suggested to Byrnes that the Americans ought to occupy the Kuriles themselves. Although Byrnes responded by reaffirming Roosevelt’s commitment to the Soviets, the next day he instructed the Navy to occupy some of the south Kuriles and McCloy requested that the SWNCC consider which of the islands would be useful as an American airbase. Stalin responded by demanding that the Kuriles fall within the Soviet occupation zone and roundly refused Truman’s compromise position granting American air bases and landing rights there. Given the Russian response, Byrnes agreed to postpone discussion of American use of the Kuriles, but stated that any transfer of sovereignty from Japan to Russia would not be final until a peace treaty was agreed.83 Japan would later dispute the legality of Soviet occupation, and the Russians did not sign the peace treaty. At the time, control of the islands was a matter of prestige and fishing rights. Today natural gas reserves add to their value.84 Roosevelt’s secret commitment and the Truman administration’s eleventh hour vacillation created an issue of contention which lingers even today.

Aims of Occupation

82 See chapter two.
84 See, for example, “With Visit, Russia Reinforces Its Custody of Islands, Angering Japan,” New York Times, 1 November 2010.
The question of the treatment of the Japanese was brought to cabinet-level discussions in the interim between the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 8 Stimson presented the president with a report on the subject by an assistant to the Air Forces Chief of Staff, which argued for soft treatment of the Japanese people in the postwar period. Truman praised the report, calling it “a good paper.” The report’s key message, Stimson summarized, was “when you punish your dog you don’t keep souring on him all day after the punishment is over; if you want to keep his affection, punishment takes care of itself. In the same way with Japan.” Although the paper was not written by members of the State Department’s area committee, it was similar in tone. The author, new to postwar planning, likely discussed the issues involved in postwar Japan with his friend and roommate, Colonel William Chandler, who was involved in bureaucratic postwar planning as the acting head of the Civil Affairs Division during the summer of 1945. In addition, Truman had already approved the core principles of SWNCC planning, which included a tough first occupation phase for demilitarization and “softer” second and third phases to stabilize and reintegrate Japan into international trade and society in June. Truman also recognized, along with Roosevelt, the bureaucratic planners, and wartime internationalists, the need for a muscular and active America on the international stage. When questioned in a cabinet meeting why it was “necessary for the United States to be called upon to police the world,” Truman responded that, as courts have marshals, force was necessary to ensure justice internationally. The president’s point indicates his support expensive and expansive foreign policy, which would be necessary during a long and ambitious occupation. The August cabinet discussion indicates the pervasiveness of the State Department-led bureaucratic ideas within the government, the result of years of work.

However, McCloy’s concerns about implementation, unresolved at the cabinet level before surrender, did result in an alteration of fundamental SWNCC planning in late August. In order to remedy the problem of political control in occupied Japan and bring bureaucratic planning in line with the Potsdam declaration, McCloy made changes to the SWNCC 150 draft in circulation. The new version clarified that a Supreme Commander would exercise authority during the occupation through existing Japanese government machinery and agencies, including the emperor. This change also addressed the issues raised by Blakeslee in his formal response to the Potsdam Declaration, and fit with earlier documents created by the

85 Memorandum of Conference with the President August 8, 1945. Reel 128. Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
86 Dale M. Hellegers, We the Japanese People, Vol II, 387, footnotes 138 and 140. Rudolph Janssens, who refers to this paper as the “Van Slyke Document”, was not aware of this connection with existing planners and considers the document to be “alternative policy for postwar Japan” adopted by Stimson. What Future for Japan, 355 and note 72.
87 See above, 186.
88 Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 7 September, 1945; Matthew J Connelly Papers, Box 1. Truman Library.
89 Takamae, Inside GHQ, 226.
regional expert group. However, other insertions into the draft were radically different. These were economic changes which made the Japanese government responsible for resolving economic problems in the devastated nation, a declaration that the Allies would not accept the burden of Japan’s reconstruction, and a commitment to extract reparations for the countries damaged by Japanese aggression. These represent a significant alteration, “toughening” the accepted core aims of postwar planning.

In *What Future for Japan?* Rudolf Janssens expressed uncertainty about the origin of these radical changes to SWNCC 150/3, speculating that the State Department’s Edwin Martin or McCloy and Herbert Feis at the War Department were likely sources. Martin had been part of the SWNCC Far East group and was also active at the Institute of Pacific Relations, which later published his book on the occupation of Japan. Given Eiji Takamae’s assertion that McCloy was the source of the changed section on political authority, and that the “tough peace” tone of the new economic insertions was out of line with the State Department’s position that a moderate and economically stable Japan was the best hope for future pacification, it is reasonable to assume that McCloy was the source of all the changes to the draft. The new draft was sent to MacArthur on August 29, formalized as SWNCC 150/4, and signed by Truman on September 6. At that point, the document, entitled “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” became the major source of policy guidance during the occupation.

A second policy document, which also began in the SWNCC group, was sent to MacArthur in September. JCS 1380 was intended to provide SCAP with specific guidance for the military occupation in line with the broad political objectives laid out in SWNCC 150. It is therefore, alongside SWNCC 150, a descendant of PWC 108. Although harmonizing with the broader document, JCS 1380 was more detailed and specific. SWNCC 150 was publically released on September 22, while the JCS document remained top secret until later in the occupation. The final version, JSC 1380/15 was sent to Japan in October 1945 and provided the framework of SCAP activity. The directive was parceled out in a “copy and paste” fashion. Paragraphs from the document assigned to sections at SCAP General Headquarters, and sometimes parsed down to the sentence level, with sentences given as the basis of operation to division

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95 Takamae, *Inside GHQ,* 226, 228.
branches. Although there was some room for interpretation of details, this system ensured that broad policy during the occupation was set by the planners in Washington.

Wartime plans, summarized by SWNCC 150 as the primary political statement, came through the transition from surrender to the start of occupation largely unchanged. However, the few late amendments as the situation evolved in August 1945 had a lasting impact on Japan. The country would be kept whole through centralized administration, but issues surrounding the status of Russian-occupied Kurile Islands and Allied support for Japan’s economic recovery would be pushed into the postwar period.

**Outside planning groups and the end of hostilities**

*Think tanks and opinion leaders*

The policy planning activities of both the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations slowed down as the wartime period drew to a close. The CFR’s WPS program disbanded its territorial section (T-group) in January, stating that the work was complete. The entire WPS program was terminated in September 1945. The IPR hosted its last international conference concerning Japan in January 1945. Its postwar influence was limited by the scandal which engulfed an associated publication, *Amerasia*, from the spring of 1945 and tarnished the organization’s reputation with accusations of espionage and communist sympathies. However, the groups and individuals considered earlier did continue to their efforts to affect policy.

In the summer of 1945, as Japan’s military position weakened, *Time* editor Henry Luce began a quiet campaign to end the war quickly. Such was his influence that he was able to arrange private meetings with more than a third of the members of the US Senate in July 1945. He encouraged the politicians to accept a negotiated rather than unconditional surrender in the Pacific. This position is perhaps surprising for a man whose commitment to Asia centered on China, but Luce, with his missionary and humanitarian impulses, believed that saving lives through an early peace was worth the cost of compromise. He maintained his position even as the atomic bomb changed the calculus of the war. After the destruction at Hiroshima, Luce and Congressman Joseph Kennedy advocated a short truce to give Japan time to surrender. The men pressed Truman on the August 8, but failed to persuade the president. A second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki the following day. Although his efforts in the summer of 1945 were unsuccessful, Luce was able to arrange meetings and recruit allies in the highest levels of politics.

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97 Walter Mallory to Joseph Willits, 4 Jan 1945. Box 97 Folder 877. RG 1.1 Series 100S. RF Archives.
98 Roger Evans to Joseph Willits, 24 Sep 1945. Box 97 Folder 877. RG 1.1 Series 100S. RF Archives.
99 See chapter four, 135-6.
100 Herzstein, *Luce*, 49-50.
Other opinion leaders contributed after the war as they had in wartime, through popular and specialist publications. William Johnstone, an academic who had been involved in postwar planning through his organization of IPR conferences in Washington, published a monograph summarizing his recommendations for pacifying postwar Japan. Johnstone’s primary argument supported the underpinning idea of SWNCC planning; in the long run a hard peace imposed from outside was not sustainable. “Japan’s future,” he wrote “must be considered in terms of those reforms needed to give the Japanese people opportunities to profit by peace…” The book, published by an academic press, was intended for a specialist audience, but another active IPR member helped reach the general public by reviewing the book in the New York Times. T.A. Bisson recommended the book to general readers and echoed Johnson’s support for “drastic and fundamental political, economic, and social reforms” in Japan.

While the Council on Foreign Relations shut down its WPS program, its most significant means of shaping official policy, the organization did continue its efforts after the war. The CFR declared its intention to continue to offer policy advice and recommendations to government agencies. It also continued running its study groups to bring together officials and outside experts in “thinking spaces.” Crucially, the networks created by think tanks like the CFR and the IPR during the war had a lasting impact on the postwar environment, as “alumni” of wartime planning maintained connections or took on positions during the occupation.

From the State Department, Grew worked to secure his protégées positions in the occupation. While his efforts in the case of Eugene Dooman were ultimately ineffective, Robert Fearey went on to play an important role in land reform as part of the occupation administration. Although the issue had not been settled before the surrender of Japan, Fearey had introduced it into wartime planning, arguing that a more equitable distribution of wealth would promote the long-term stability of Japan. Fearey later raised the issue from Tokyo, and used his SFE drafts on the subject as the basis of land reform policy used in the occupation. As during the war, official and unofficial experts continued to move between the

101 The significance of these conferences in official planning was discussed in chapter three.
104 Roger Evans to Joseph Willits, 24 Sep 1945. Box 97 Folder 877. RG 1.1 Series 100S. RF Archives.
government and key think tanks. After the war John J McCloy, who had amended SWNCC150/3 as part of the War Department, became a trustee at the Rockefeller Foundation and later chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations itself. Retired Major General Frank R. McCoy had been member of the CFR Far East study group along with Blakeslee, Hornbeck, Luce and Stimson during the war. He became the American representative and chairman of the Far Eastern Commission, which was tasked with advising the occupation administration. Through such appointments, the influence of wartime official and unofficial networks, and individual planners, continued.

Congress

As noted in the previous chapter, congress could become a barrier to implementing any plans created by government agencies or approved by the president. Although the body had been effectively sidelined by Roosevelt during the war, congress still held the power to derail wartime plans. Its approval was needed to pass budgets and ratify treaties, and, unlike bureaucrats and area experts, congressmen were accountable to the mood of a deeply skeptical public. Grew wrote of the early occupation that “a radical operation must be performed in that misguided country [Japan], but it is a great mistake to rush the surgeon.” Congress would be the most likely source of such a rush. In light of popular anti-Japanese sentiment, calls from former isolationists to limit the aims of the occupation and the scope of postwar commitments, and “clamor on the home front for ultra-rapid demobilization” of the Army, the body was not entirely disposed to support a lengthy, ambitious and expensive occupation.

Senate confirmation hearings for Dean Acheson’s promotion to undersecretary of state provided an opportunity for critics of the Japan policy expressed in SWNCC 150 to voice their concerns. Republican Senator Kenneth Wherry led the protest. He wrote to Acheson before the hearing, demanding to know if he was a “hatchet man” for the administration or if he personally supported Japan policy. Robert Taft, also a Republican, called Acheson’s summary of SWNCC 150 “one of the most extraordinary statements on policy I have ever heard.” It was not a compliment. “How,” he wondered aloud, did the administration think it could “change the social system of another country?” Drawing on negative press coverage about the occupation, these Senators decried the postwar goals as unpopular, expensive, and perhaps impossible to attain. The plans, they argued, should not be carried out regardless of cost. Wherry recognized agreement across America about the need to demobilize Japan, but argued planners had gone too far. “I am not,” he told his colleagues, “for starting any revolution in Japan which will involve the sacrifice of

107 Grew to McCoy, 16 Nov 1945. Box 50. McCoy Papers, LoC.
the lives of thousands of American boys.”109 The concerns about American over-involvement in costly reconstruction commitments seen during the war did not end with Japan’s defeat.

An additional concern was the extent to which the legislature had been bypassed in the planning process. As seen above, the outlines of SWNCC planning were familiar across the administration and to unofficial planners working in well-connected think tanks. However, the connection between these groups and congress were limited. Wherry first read the broad outlines of Japan policy in a newspaper in September, and described himself as “shocked.” Even Tom Connally, head of the Senate Foreign Relations and an internationalist who defended the plans at Acheson’s confirmation hearing, claimed to have been unaware about policy development. He emphatically stated “I have not talked to the administration about this matter at all.” While Connally appeared untroubled by the slight, the issue was deeply problematic for Wherry, who pointed out that the Senate was charged to advise and consent on policy matters. “I have a right as a Member of this body,” he said, “to know what the policy is.”110 Wherry and other members of congress resented being kept in the dark about wartime plans until they were made public. In order to strengthen State Department-Senate relations, Byrnes began to meet with the Foreign Relations Committee on a bi-weekly basis from November.111

Despite these concerns, there was considerable support for the administration’s plans in Congress, particularly amongst Democrats. The body had already shown support for a more active role in the postwar world through its debates on American bases and approval of American involvement in a postwar international organization.112 Winning the war had been a struggle, but many believed it would be as costly and difficult to win the peace. As expressed in the House on the day of Germany’s defeat, “We cannot be selfish and maintain a lasting peace.”113 Connally shared the bureaucratic planner’s view that sweeping changes would be needed to keep Japan from re-arming in the future. This view justified a long and expensive occupation project. “…If it requires the destruction of these hard groups of industrial czars and social magnates to [dislodge Japanese Militarism],” the senator declared, “I am willing to do it.” Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois agreed. “If the social and economic orders are not changed, we can get ready for another war. If they are not changed, we have fought this war in vain.”114 Such statements show support for the audacious plans developed by the IDAFE group during the war. Wherry’s motion to reconsider the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ approval of Acheson was rejected. Critics of

109 91 Congressional Record, 8883-8916, 24 September 1945.
110 91 Congressional Record, 8883-8916, 24 September 1945.
112 See chapter five.
113 91 Congressional Record, 4308, 8 May 1945.
114 91 Congressional Record, 8883-8916, 24 September 1945.
SWNCC plans were unable to get enough traction to further disrupt the process, Acheson was approved for his new position, and the matter was dropped.

New actors during implementation

The start of the occupation brought a new group into Japan policy—Americans on the ground in Japan. At the policy level, this meant officials and administrators and especially General Douglas MacArthur, all tasked with turning Washington plans into Japan’s reality. Americans arriving in Occupied Japan were shocked at the damage wrought by years of war and especially by American aerial bombing. One language specialist, who had spent his childhood in Japan, recalled simply that “Tokyo was smashed.” Another described Japan as “totally and utterly decimated… helpless and hopeless.” Although many of the Americans in Tokyo came filled with hostility for a recent enemy, witnessing starvation and destruction quickly softened opinion. Military officers soon realized that the “small, thin and weak” civilian population was “in desperate need of everything.” Ignoring plans to destroy all Japanese military goods, they began to allow civilians to use anything that could be converted. Despite the chaos and desperation of the country, many young officers were enthusiastic about the implications of their work. “…[T]he job was exciting. The era was like the Meiji restoration. Everybody was trying everything. Then it was modernization, westernization, now it was democratization, Americanization.” Although some enthusiastic men on the ground saw “Americanization” and reform in Japan in terms of far left liberalism, the drafters of these policies had quite different aims. As seen in chapter two, economic links, wealth redistribution and social reforms were intended to neutralize Japanese militarism and create a body of ordinary Japanese with an interest in the status quo. However, the realities on the ground and the hopes of arriving officers were rather different from the expectations of the wartime planners.

The administration of the occupation made the relationship between planners in Washington and implementers in Tokyo unclear. Maxwell Bishop, a “Japan hand,” was sent to the Office of the Political Advisor in Tokyo. Bishop had been involved in postwar planning, but was not a member of Grew’s inner circle. Grew had politely rebuffed his appeal for aid in finding a post in the occupation administration.

115 As noted elsewhere in this work, there is a rich and well established body of literature on the occupation of Japan by historians such as Michael Schaller, John Dower, Eiji Takamae, and others. Takamae’s Inside GHQ is particularly strong on the political wrangling inside the occupation administration. The period will receive only a brief treatment here.


but, as one of a limited number of Japan experts, was able to secure himself a position there.\footnote{Joseph Grew to Max Bishop, 28 October 1945. MS Am 1687 (121) Letters 1945. Joseph C Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.} He recalled that in the chaos of the early occupation “[t]here was a feeling that ‘we’ occupiers didn’t know what American policy in Japan was to be.”\footnote{Interview with Max W Bishop by Dale M Hellegers, 21 May 1973. Box 1. Papers of Dale M Hellegers, Truman Library.} A September 1945 \textit{New York Times} article noted “serious concern… that our basic policies for the rule of conquered countries are by no means as firmly formulated as they should be.” However, as the author conceded, the unified and American-led administration in Japan made that situation less complicated than the German case.\footnote{Sidney Shallet, “Our Policy Toward Japan is Examined Anew,” \textit{New York Times}, 23 Sep 1945.}

This problem was compounded by the sense that General MacArthur, designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, had taken control of Japan policy from Washington.\footnote{The term SCAP referred to both General MacArthur and the General Headquarters of the occupation authorities in Tokyo.} MacArthur, described by Truman as “Mr. Prima Donna, Brass Hat, Five Star MacArthur” perpetuated this myth,\footnote{Harry S Truman long hand notes, 17 June 1945. Box 281. PSF, Truman Library.} which persisted long after the end of the occupation.\footnote{See introduction, note 12.} As the leading figure on the ground, MacArthur certainly had a great deal of influence in carrying out policy. However, it was the similarity between his ideas and those present in the bureaucratic plans which were his orders which made what was actually Washington policy appear to be MacArthur’s. His presurrender statements about the Philippines, where he had served as military advisor, indicate an affinity with the sorts of ideas expressed by the SFE group. In particular, he supported redistribution of wealth as a means of stabilizing an independent Philippines after America withdrew. In parallel with Japan planning, MacArthur argued that America ought to ensure that “the old economy whereby a small wealthy group dominated the country and exploited the common people would not be reestablished” in its former colony.\footnote{Grew to Truman 30 April 1945, Part 2, Reel 16. Truman office files. RSC.} Area experts were naturally interested in understanding and influencing MacArthur ahead of the occupation. Grew, unable to place his protégé Eugene Dooman in as the State Department’s political advisor in Japan, wrote to MacArthur recommending the General consider Dooman when he needed advice.\footnote{Grew to MacArthur, 22 Aug 45. MS Am 1687 (122). Joseph Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.} Former Ambassador Cameron Forbes wrote a letter to MacArthur setting out his own thoughts on Japan, which was sent to McCoy and from there on to Grew and other Japan hands.\footnote{Cameron Forbes to Thomas Wickham, 5 October 1945. Box 50. Frank R McCoy Papers, LoC.}
Religiosity was one of the most distinctive markers of MacArthur’s thinking on Japan. As noted in previous chapters, many American officials and opinion leaders involved in wartime planning came from and were informed by a Christian missionary background. Government plans, however, were not explicitly religious in character. MacArthur’s tone was quite different, he spoke of the occupation as a religious mission to fill a “spiritual vacuum” in Japan.\(^{128}\) This is not to say that Christian religion and values were absent from the minds of planners during or after the war. Future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was involved in wartime planning through his role at the Council of World Churches.\(^{129}\) On VE day representatives prayed on the congressional floor for “the early defeat of Japan and the establishment of peace and a just world social order, based on the moral law of God.”\(^{130}\) In 1947 Joseph Grew and others raised funds to open a Christian University in Japan in order to strengthen the moral character of the nation through the introduction of Christian values. Such examples offer glimpses of a significant if unspoken place for religion in American foreign policy, seen explicitly in MacArthur’s rhetoric.

Because staff in Tokyo had a better sense of the changing situation in Japan, MacArthur took the view that beyond the orders contained in wartime the planning documents, input from Washington on the details of the occupation were unnecessary.\(^{131}\) SCAP therefore resisted challenges to its authority and insisted on controlling the communication between the State Department’s Office of the Political Advisor in Tokyo and officials in Washington.\(^{132}\) As a result of distance and limited communications, policy men in the State Department were poorly informed about the situation in Japan, and were left to assume that MacArthur’s staff was following the policies laid down by Washington.\(^{133}\) This created a significant amount of agency slack for local officials to interpret policy. However, as seen above, SCAP was publicly committed to SWNCC 150 policy, and its organization had been structured specifically to carry out the secret JCS 1380 directive, both the products of wartime planning.

**Conclusion**


\(^{130}\) 91 Congressional Record. 4308, 8 May 1945.


\(^{132}\) This detail irked staff members who frequently cite it as an example of the troubled relationship between SCAP and Washington. Individuals worked around this restriction by sending addressed letters via pouch. Interview with Hugh Borton by Dale M Hellegers, 9 and 14 February 1973. Papers of Dale M Hellegers, box 1. Truman Library.

The course of America’s Japan policy was finally set between April and September of 1945. The most decisive change during that time was the change in administration between Roosevelt and Truman. The new president was unprepared for office and far more reliant on formal channels of analysis and advice than was his predecessor. Truman needed policy continuity because he had not been elected to his new position, and was not sure of the public support that Roosevelt could always rely on. Truman’s experience in developing the B2H2 campaign in Congress indicate his support for international cooperation, and his reflections on the atom bomb, his interest in international history, and his personal diary from the early presidency indicate a greater openness and human concern for ordinary people, whatever their nationality, than he is sometimes given credit for. Unlike Roosevelt, who privately fostered his own often divergent plans for a “tougher” peace, Truman was inclined to accept the plans drafted by sympathetic area experts. SWNCC recommendations could be presented to Truman as existing policy as long as they had the approval of the heads of the three most important departments for foreign policy. Ironically, Truman’s desire for continuity drove the adoption of policies which, while not new and certainly not unfamiliar to Roosevelt, were regardless far from his thinking on the subject.

Although the SWNCC plans were elevated to become the main source of policy after Roosevelt’s death, the transition and events of the summer altered some of the existing Japan plans. Staff changes made by Truman disrupted the established system and put entrenched officials, including the core members of the SFE group, in a precarious position until they resigned. At the same time, plans were reevaluated in key areas. The first issue, reconsidering whether occupied Japan ought to be divided into zones or remain whole under American-dominated administration, was resolved in accordance with SFE-group recommendations. The remaining two changes were contrary to previous Japan planning. Before August 1945, area experts had long advocated the retention of the southern Kurile islands by Japan, while Roosevelt had promised the whole chain to the Russians in return for their entry into the Pacific war. However, after Japan’s sudden surrender, Byrnes and McCloy considered American use of the territories, encountered Russian resistance, and left the matter unsettled. This change would cause later friction.

The final important change to SWNCC plans was McCloy’s insertion of “tough” economic language into the late August draft of SWNCC 150. The new sections, which stated that the Americans would not help rebuild or support Japan’s economy were reminiscent of the debate which went on within SWNCC a year previously about the standard of living required for peace in Japan.\textsuperscript{134} Within the SFE group it had been decided that “no people could be expected to become peace-loving and democratic unless they were assured of an economy adequate to support a democratic way of life”, and that reliance on international

\textsuperscript{134} See chapter two.
trade would convince the Japanese that peace was in their interest. This remained a fundamental element of Japan policy. The new language, preserved in JCS 1380 as guidance to the occupation authorities, therefore created a tension between opposing economic policies in Japan.

The activities of the official and unofficial planning groups changed once wartime planning was completed with the approval of the SWNCC 150 and JCS 1380 policy documents. Although the 1945 IPR conference was useful in creating a consensus between Allied nations, and the influential WPS project continued until fall 1945, the role of think tanks had been most pronounced in the early war period before the broad outlines of policy were set. The work of think tanks and their individual members did go on after wartime programs ended, publications and study groups continued. The most durable legacy of these groups, however, was the creation of personal and professional networks connecting the experts and officials who revolved between official and unofficial policy-making groups. Meanwhile Congress, confronted with publically released policy aims, continued its non-obstructionist behavior. Some voices within the body protested the sweeping aims of Japan policy, the cost in manpower and money required, and lack of congressional consultation during the long planning process. However, the majority was willing to go along with the administration’s plans, particularly as the occupation had already begun when the policy was announced. Congress, whose approval was needed for treaties and spending, did not obstruct American policy in Japan.

American officials on the ground in Japan, a new group created to administer policy, were left in some uncertainty in the early phase of the occupation. SWNCC 150 and even the more detailed and specific JCS 1380 were more focused on broad aims and general guidance than on the specific mechanics of administration. Certainly, there was space for new administrators to misinterpret the intentions behind the instructions they received in September and October. The sense of confusion was heightened by MacArthur, who blurred the line between official policy and his own ideas. However, given the broad affinity of thinking between MacArthur and the wartime planners, this practice was not as disruptive as it might otherwise have been.

Wartime planning for Japan, which had roots in government-think tank interaction even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, was thus finalized in the volatile summer of 1945. This policy was set out in SWNCC 150/4 and JCS 1380/15, but also and more importantly in the broad consensus which emerged on the ultimate goals of occupation and reorienting Japan. There was widespread agreement about what the “new Japan” should be like and what its place should be in the international community, and, broadly,

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how to make these changes happen. Four years into the occupation, the Far Eastern Commission, headed by a CFR study group veteran, stated the general American objective as the creation of “A Japan, peaceful, democratic according to western standards, internationally cooperative, economically stable and prosperous, and, if possible, friendly to the United States.”\textsuperscript{136} The outlines of SFE wartime planning for Japan proved durable, even through the realities of occupation and global changes in the postwar world. The summer of 1945 was a period of change, as America and Japan moved from war to its aftermath, postwar plans vaulted from armchair into action.

\textsuperscript{136} “US Policy in Regard to Japan,” nd, 1949. Box 73. Frank McCoy Papers. LoC.
Conclusions

Planning in wartime

During the Second World War, the United States faced the challenge of creating sound and useful policy for the postwar treatment of Japan. In order that Japan would never again threaten international stability, government bureaucrats, area specialists and political leaders spent the war years making plans to rebuild Japan as a peaceful nation and an ally of the United States. It was a heavy burden. The officials and experts working during the conflict believed that the current violence was the result of the failed peace which had followed the Great War. They labored to create something more lasting than the harsh terms which had been imposed on Germany, all the while aware of the horrors that another failure might cause.

The extraordinary human cost of WWII magnified these concerns. Civilians as well as soldiers around the world were subjected to the costs of mechanized warfare as never before. While the United States, buffered by vast oceans on either side, did not itself experience aerial bombing of its crowded cities, the terrorization of civilian populations had become part of a new reality of war. Edmund Wilson, editor of the New Yorker, thoughtfully observed that his American contemporaries knew “the liberation of some impulse to wreck and kill on a gigantic scale without caring and while remaining invulnerable,” experiencing the “vicarious thrill” of modern aerial bombing without ever themselves hearing planes drone overhead in the night. Mechanized warfare was “the pure gratification of the destructive spirit, as it were in a pure abstract form.” For the first time, citizens were killed on a grand scale as “collateral damage” when living or working around military targets, to undermine enemy morale, and as retribution, with the press of a button.

Years of total war had also ravaged civilian populations, causing food, material and labor shortages as the national effort was directed towards the front. Witnessing the devastation of Berlin, Truman mused on the particular tragedy of the Second World War. “What a pity,” he wrote in his diary, “that the human animal is not able to put his moral thinking into practice… I thought of Carthage, Baalbek, Jerusalem, Rome, Atlantis, Peking, Babylon, Nineveh, Scipio, Ramses II, Titus, Herman, Sherman, Genghis Khan, Alexander, Darius the Great... I hope for some sort of peace, but I fear that machines are ahead of morals.

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1 That war had not, contrary to the expectations of the time, become “a war to end all wars.”
by some centuries and when morals catch up perhaps there’ll be no reason for any of it.”

Truman, alongside men from all walks of life, was haunted by the losses caused by years of conflict. Wilson wrote about the strange sensation of going to an opera in New York City while so much human suffering was going on elsewhere, distant and unseen. “We are bombing Berlin to cinders, but nobody talks about it. We meet it mainly with a mixture of competitive satisfaction and a mental evasion of the matter.”

Planners, many of whom were experts who had devoted their lives to the study of Asia and cared deeply for its people, rarely discussed the conduct of war in the course of their work. And yet, atrocity and horror surely filled the shadows and corners of the offices where men worked to construct a peace which would ensure that those lives had not been lost in vain.

Summary of plans

The plans which were developed over the course of the war formed the basis of the policy implemented in the early occupation, and represented a massive and optimistic plan to reinvent an enemy country through military occupation. These plans were broad in scope, including outlines to alter the political, religious, and even linguistic make-up of an ancient and deeply patriotic nation. They centered around the goal of reorienting Japan as an international player by remaking it into a stable ally and economic power supportive of a postwar American order. This breathtaking task was intended to be carried out through a short and minimally staffed military occupation led primarily by the United States, a country which was dramatically culturally and linguistically different from the subject, and which had few skilled specialists to facilitate the undertaking. Occupation planners hoped to make up for this problematic deficiency by working through the existing Japanese government to carry out reforms. This approach was in stark contrast to the case of Germany, where the linguistic and cultural barriers were not so great and it was assumed that the occupation could be administered by the victorious powers directly.

Specialist planners enshrined economic cooperation as the cornerstone of a new demilitarized and internationalist Japan. Dooman explained that the central question in postwar planning was how to “fit Japan for future international cooperation.” The clear implication of the requirement for a “friendly” government with responsibilities in a “family of nations” was that postwar Japan would support American policies and initiatives in the region. This represented a radical departure from the intellectual currents of Japanese foreign policy in the 1930s, which had set Japan in a leadership role against Western influence in Asia and challenged the hypocrisy exposed by the distance between American rhetoric and action.

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4 Diary, July 16, “Ross, Mr. and Mrs. Charles G. (handwritten).” Box 322. Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF, Truman Library.
5 Edmund Wilson, 43.
abroad. Recommendations intentionally addressed what planners saw as the causes of Japanese militarism and the mistakes of WWI. First, it implicitly recognized the validity of the argument that Japanese expansionism had been fuelled by economic necessity and the requirements of an increasing population, and solved that problem through the concept of free trade. Second, the inclusion of support for Japan’s economic recovery into peace plans drew upon the “lesson” learned from German experience after the Great War; a harsh peace could not last. Because imposed conditions could not be enforced indefinitely, any plans would have to be accepted by the Japanese themselves to succeed in the long term.

The three phase plan for occupation addressed the tension between the advocates of “hard” and “soft” peace. Immediately after surrender, Japan would be occupied and disarmed with “stern justice.” As demilitarization and cooperation became apparent, controls and restrictions would be lifted, with the ultimate goal that the country would be reintegrated into the international system. The broad outlines of Japan planning were set in May 1944 with PWC 108b, although a few issues lingered to the last days of war. Truman accepted the sum of SWNCC planning on Japan in June 1945, and later sided with the SFE group on the creation of a centralized American-led occupation, over the objections of the JCS. However, other legacies of the unsettled summer resulted in lasting ambiguities. Truman intended to honor Roosevelt’s commitments to “pay” the Soviet Union in Japanese territory for entering the war, against the recommendations of the State Department. The president and his new secretary of state attempted to move away from that position in mid-August, but let the matter drop unresolved after Soviet resistance. Late insertions to policy drafts, likely from John McCloy in the War Department, undercut the economic underpinning of SFE plans to stabilize and gain the cooperation of Japan. These two late changes created ambiguity in policy and later problems.

**Ideology and observations**

The plans adopted after World War Two were in many ways surprising. The aims and methods they envisioned were broad and radical. Such an intervention and reorientation of a foreign nation had never before been attempted, and the idea of rehabilitating rather than punishing a defeated enemy was remarkable. The policy recommendations also reveal what kind of world American internationalist elites aimed for in the middle of the twentieth century. Planners envisioned a new international system to replace European imperialism with international organizations and free trade. Postwar Japan would be tied to the international community through its stake in open trade. Support for free trade was seen across American thinking in the 1940s, it was apparent in the State Department, Congress, the presidency and internationalist think tanks. The idea of free trade as an alternative to empire and competition in American ideology was not new; it was most famously demonstrated in American backing of an “open door” policy
in China. To many American elites, the collapse of faith in international trade which followed the Great Depression had led to the economic nationalism which drove expansion and rivalry which undermined the global system in the 1930s and had led to the present war. Significantly, the same planning process, although without the involvement of the Far East subcommittee members, gave rise to the Bretton Woods system and the United Nations Organization after the war.

A common factor in these different threads of planning was the attempt to square the circle between American interests and ideological values. Jingbin Wang explains that a “hallmark of realism is to privilege power and ultimately security over ideology.” However, mid-century American foreign policy was driven by the idea that it was possible to have both, that power and ideology might be mutually compatible. Representative Rogers encapsulated this idea on the House floor in 1944. His policy recommendations were, he said, “strictly from a United States point of view. In a sense, they are selfish, for they are aimed at what… would be best for this country.” Rogers then linked power and idealism. “In another sense,” he declared, “they are not selfish, because in trying to eliminate those frictions which can cause future antagonism to the United States, we will be making peace in the Pacific more secure for all nations.” This tying of American interests to universal gain marked a new phase of American exceptionalism.

The occupation

Planning for the future, however, is a tricky task. Wartime planners based their policy on assumptions about the postwar world, some of which turned out to be false. Disarmament of Japan was intended to take place in a stable region underpinned by international cooperation. However, planners failed to anticipate key events which changed the situation on the ground during the occupation, like a food crisis, the break down in relations with the Soviet Union, and China's civil war.

The dire state of Japan’s industrial potential was obvious from the first weeks of surrender. In an early situation report from Tokyo, it was noted that the machinery which had produced goods for export, and even basic items like telephones, had been converted into scrap for war production. Huge quantities of food would be needed to maintain the barest subsistence of the population. Given the current conditions, MacArthur warned that the Japanese could become “an albatross” around the neck of the United States.

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8 90 Congressional Record, 3798-3802, 28 April 1944.
10 Edwin Locke to Matthew Connelly with attachments, October 19, 1945; Japan; Foreign Affairs; Subject File; PSF; Truman Papers. Student Research File: “Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952.” Harry S Truman Library.
The food crisis continued to be the starkest indicator of Japan’s struggle throughout this period. In spring 1946, the Japanese ration diet was less than 1,000 calories a day, and civilians were left to supplement rations through the black market. People were “literally starving to death” and packed into trains through smashed out windows in order to reach the countryside and attempt to barter with farmers. Japanese exports could not be used to balance the import needs of occupied Japan, and the costs of food, textiles and other goods to Japan was carried by the United States. Because of the destruction of most production machinery during the war and damage to silk reserves caused by prolonged storage, Japan did not generate even one dollar of exchange through the export of goods in the first ten months of occupation. In a cabinet-level discussion, the secretary of war highlighted the impact of the crisis in Japan on US interests in the country. He noted that America was responsible for preventing famine in Japan, and failure to do so would undermine the goals of the occupation and damage American prestige abroad. The grim alternative would be to send more troops to keep order amongst a starving and desperate population.

Policy planners made adjustments to occupation priorities as a result of these unexpected international security developments and the mixed success of early occupation policy in accomplishing goals. American occupiers in 1945 were shocked by the level of devastation in Japan. As explained in chapters one and two, economic discussions in planning circles during the war had centered around redistributing wealth and the level of industry with which Japan might safely be trusted. Planners simply did not expect that Japan would be unable to feed itself for an extended period after the war. They also expected but did not encounter significant resistance to surrender and foreign occupation by Japanese troops and civilians. Other surprises also arose. China, which had been expected to take a large role in the occupation and in a new regional order, teetered on the verge of civil war. Relations with Russia, another expected partner, became increasingly difficult. All of these factors led to a rapid end to the first, harsh, phase of the occupation, and to some significant policy changes.

Eiji Takamae’s seminal work on the occupation located policy changes within the period as a “shift”, rather than the more dramatic “volte-face” turning point that was described in earlier “new left”

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12 Edwin W. Pauley Draft Diary, 11 May 1946; Edwin W. Pauley Papers, Box 2; Truman Library.
15 Notes on Cabinet Meeting, 8 March, 1946; Matthew J Connelly Papers, Box 1. Truman Library.
occupation histories as a “reverse course.””\textsuperscript{16} This point can be taken further. Existing occupation literature has underemphasized the influence of presurrender planning and ideas on the early occupation, and as a result missed the continuity between prewar plans and the postwar situation. The intention behind policy is important; the mid-occupation changes did not represent a shift in thinking on American aims in postwar Japan, only the need for a different strategy to bring about established goals.

Even as the character of the occupation changed, the goals of the Initial Postsurrender Policy (SWNCC 150) remained the same and, indeed, were reaffirmed by the Far Eastern Commission in 1949. The objective for post-occupation Japan was that it be “peaceful, democratic according to Western standards, internationally cooperative, economically stable and prosperous, and, if possible, friendly to the United States.”\textsuperscript{17} The work of wartime planners thus created a coherent and durable pattern for Japan’s new place in the international system and continued to define American aims for Japan well into the postwar period.

The consistency of the goals developed in wartime for the orientation of postwar Japan over the long term suggests that the “reverse course” was not a pivotal turning point. Similarly, by looking at the plans which were established before the war’s end, this dissertation corrects the view that later factors like the Cold War and the opinions of General Douglas Macarthur defined American policy when it was in fact already well established.

While mid-century policy aimed to combine realism and ideology, this dissertation has demonstrated that American wartime planning was from the beginning based on identifying and serving US interests in East Asia. In addition to the durability of the long-term goals for reorienting Japan, this is a second reason why the “reverse course” thesis, which describes a liberal early occupation phase inspired by the New Deal but abandoned in 1947 in favor of calculated American interests, needs revising. Any overlap between American interests and what was best for Japan beyond what would be required to ensure compliance was merely a happy coincidence. Even when planners made humanitarian appeals to ward off mass starvation in postwar Japanese population which tight economic controls might cause, they reinforced their case with the argument that a desperate population would be more dangerous and expensive to manage. Thus, the policy shifts made in the pursuit of American interests ought not be characterized as major changes in strategy, particularly because the defined aims remained consistent.

Summary

\textsuperscript{16} The term “reverse course” was used in Japanese newspapers from 1951 to describe the wider disappointment of Japanese liberals with Postwar Japan. Young American scholars of the New Left school adopted this term for their more specific meaning twenty years later. Takamae, Inside GHQ, 473.

\textsuperscript{17} United States Policy in Regard to Japan, Far Eastern Commission, nd. Box 73. Frank R McCoy Papers, Library of Congress.
The post 9-11 American-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan have generated new interest in the occupation of Japan.\textsuperscript{18} The “good occupation” has become a case study in transition to imposed democratic government, and economic development.\textsuperscript{19} In 2003, RAND analysts argued that the strength of postwar Japan and Germany as economic powers and staunch allies of the United States “demonstrated” that “democracy was transferable; that societies could, under certain circumstances, be encouraged to transform themselves; and that major transformations could endure.”\textsuperscript{20} The overwhelming success of Japan as an economic power, a committed internationalist and pacifist nation, and its successful reintegration into the “community of nations” in the western camp of the Cold War have all strengthened the appeal of a “Japan model” in understanding postwar interventions. However, there are serious limitations to applying such a model for the spread of development or democracy. The occupation of Japan was planned and carried out in a unique moment of global change, and Japan was a specific case. After World War Two the country faced devastated infrastructure and industry, but still had the bureaucratic, industrial and financial expertise of a world power.\textsuperscript{21}

Critics of the 2003 American-led “regime change” in Iraq charge that the US government acted rashly and was blindsided by the realities encountered on the ground as a result of insufficient planning. Regional specialists and experts, they argue, would have been better able to anticipate post-invasion developments.\textsuperscript{22} However, after years of careful planning by specialists, officials, politicians and elite stakeholders, American occupiers in Japan were surprised by the conditions on the ground and regional developments. Politicians, bureaucrats and experts, provided with resources from the US government and philanthropic foundations and a long period of deliberation, were unable to anticipate the course of key events.

However, this dissertation has demonstrated that wartime planning was valuable. Well thought-out policy helped smooth the early implementation phase of the occupation and gave officials valuable resources for revising and adapting plans to meet unforeseen challenges. It created professional and social networks among elites with an interest in Asia, many members of which went on to work in occupation administration and in Washington. These individuals could rely on network relationships and “mental maps” created in the planning period as they went on to new positions. The wartime activities of

\textsuperscript{18} John Dower has written several articles since 2003 comparing America in Iraq with his view of the occupation of Japan. See John Dower. “A Warning From History,” The Boston Review, January 2003.
\textsuperscript{19} Moore and Robinson, 15. The term “good occupation” is borrowed from Miwa and Ramseyer.
\textsuperscript{20} James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (RAND, 2003): xii.
government agencies and think tanks also increased what had been a very shallow pool of information on Japan available in English, allowing for more nuanced and informed policy in the future. Most importantly, the pressing questions asked at the outbreak of war were answered in the planning process. How could future Japanese militarism be prevented? What future for Japan would best serve American interests? These questions and their answers proved durable even as the situation on the ground changed.

This dissertation has revealed how a specific vision of American interests came to be accepted by the Truman administration. American goals for the occupation and plans for the future of Japan were established in the planning period between 1937 and 1945. During that time, planning groups worked largely independently, sometimes in tandem, and at times with links between them. Although it was not clear until June 1945 that it would be the case, the particular recommendations made by a small group of experts won favor over other potential sources. As seen across this work, the plans developed by the SFE group during the war were dramatically different than other options which arose from potential sources of US foreign policy. Popular perception was colored by a profound anger at Japanese aggression and atrocity. According to one survey, fully 42% of American GIs in the Pacific theater believed that wiping out the entire Japanese race was the only way to ensure peace in the future.23 Many Americans opposed the use of their tax money and manpower to rebuild and reorient a distant land. A return to isolationism, simple disarmament, and retribution were advocated in turns by the public, members of congress, the president and others during the war.

With so much uncertainty, it is remarkable that any useful planning for postwar Japan might have resulted from the State Department project. And yet, after Roosevelt’s death the recommendations written by that group spread across planning groups and became official policy towards Japan. The peace planned in American policy circles during World War II was intentionally different from the punitive peace of Versailles a generation earlier. The early postwar period would be marked by harsh military occupation and forced disarmament, but in the longer run Japanese cooperation was tied to hope and prosperity through the promise of access to international trade. Following Japan’s surrender, these ideas guided US-Japan relations and became the basis of one of the most important and enduring international relationships of the second half of the twentieth century.

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