IDENTITY AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION:
THE CASE OF MUSLIM YOUTH IN BRADFORD

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ABSTRACT

What are the dialectics of the endogenisation of ‘otherness’? This thesis is a study into the interaction between social representations, identities and power in relation to South Asian, Muslim, male youth in Bradford (UK) within the historical context of the ‘Rushdie affair’. The methodology is structured in order to investigate alternative locations of the identity-representation interaction. The studies include participant observation followed by 18 interviews with ‘specialists’, a rhetorical analysis of five television programmes that were aired on national television during and on the Rushdie affair, and an examination of the manner of reception of one of these programmes through 8 focus group discussions. The findings are that ‘otherness’ and difference are central to notions of identity for South Asian Muslim male youth, as they are surrounded by representations of themselves as ‘Muslim’ and ‘Paki’. Their identities take the form of three ideal-types – ‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and ‘extremists’ – which rhetorically engage differentially with the representations. The Rushdie affair is interpreted firstly as a moment of subaltern contestation of its representation through ‘identity politics’ discourse, and secondly, dialogically as both rhetorical positions (hegemonic and subaltern) attempt to psychologically distance themselves from each other – through the construction of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ on the hegemonic side. However, both positions shared techniques of rhetoric, types of discourse, and a common narrative. Furthermore, ‘identity politics’ discourse (for two of the ideal-type identities) acted as the interpretative prism through which the reception of the programme made sense in relation to, for example, the content and manner of reception, the reception of representatives and the call for strategic essentialism. The thesis shows that attempts to escape negative evaluation result in the incorporation of representations, discourses and rhetorical techniques that position identities firmly within the hermeneutics of the hegemonic discourse.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates the interplay between social representations and identity in a South Asian, Muslim community in Bradford, United Kingdom. The study of difference has been a regular theme in social representations studies as exemplified by Marková and Farr (1995) in their study on disability, and Jodelet (1991) in her study on madness. This study continues this theme on the social representations of difference by studying the social representations of Muslims in Bradford and their interaction with identity processes for Bradford Muslim youth.

Is Islam ‘other’? Said (1978/1995) would suggest that Islam was made ‘other’ through the practice of British and French orientalism for the purposes of empire. This view has been criticised for its leanings towards essentialism (Turner, 1994; MacKenzie, 1995). And indeed, it would be difficult to employ such abstractions in order to explain a relationship that has lasted for over a thousand years, across several continents. Nevertheless, there have been ‘moments’ in the history of this relationship when such a ‘self-other’ bifurcation has made sense. Watt (1991) has summarised twelfth and thirteenth century Christian views of Islam as, for example, being spread by violence and, the converse of this, that Christianity is the religion of peace, and that Islam is a religion of self-indulgence, especially in sexual matters. Said (1978/1995) provides the example of Cromer who juxtaposed the rational, logical, evidence-requiring European to the irrational, self-contradictory and lacking in lucidity Oriental. Grosrichard (1998) has examined through Lacanian analysis the interpretation of the Ottoman Caliphate as despotic by Montesquieu in contradiction to the emerging (European) rational society through, for example, depictions of the harem and the seraglio.

To continue this theme, Turner (1994) concludes after examining Weber’s sociology of oriental society that “the Orient simply lacks the positive ingredients of Western rationality. Oriental society can be defined as a system of absences…” (p. 39). Similarly, Woodward (1997a) has noted that a resurgent European identity has “been produced against the threat of ‘the Other’. This ‘Other’ often includes workers from North Africa… who are construed as representing a threat from Islamic fundamentalism” (p. 18). The above examples show that the discourse of Islam as
‘other’ ranges from the academic to the popular. This thesis is an examination into one such moment when ‘otherness’ became the subject of discussion in the British national public sphere: the ‘Rushdie affair’.

The ‘Rushdie affair’ was an event in British social and political history that began as a result of the publication of the book The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie, an award-winning, post-colonial British author of Indian origin who wrote in the style of magical realism. The book contained sections which satirised the life of the Prophet of Islam. A campaign began against the book initially asking for the book to include a note reminding the readers that the book was a work of fiction. The campaigners then moved on to burning a copy of the book at public demonstrations. A public book burning in Bradford followed by a death threat against Rushdie led to what is popularly referred to as the ‘Rushdie affair’. One result of this is that Haroun (1997) found in his thesis on the social representations of Islam that the representation of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ was common in letters to the editors of newspapers during the ‘Rushdie affair’; it will be suggested in this thesis that a ‘Bradford Muslim’ “carries far more associations than merely a geographical reference” (Cottle, 1993, p. 169).

This thesis will be examining the representation of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ as part of a study into the dialectics of representation and identity amongst Bradford Muslim youth. What does it mean to be represented as ‘other’? What are the effects of such a representation on identity? What are the dialectics of the endogenisation of ‘otherness’? This thesis is a study into such an interaction. I must admit at the outset that my interest in these issues is not purely theoretical. I was preparing for my GCSE’s at school in Bradford at the time of the ‘Rushdie affair’ and was involved in the campaign against the book. And so I was one of those ‘Bradford Muslims’. I was, in the words of Hall (1997a), representing a ‘node of difference’, and if I didn’t know it, I certainly felt it.

I should also add at the outset that this thesis has a specific empirical focus. It is suggested here that the processes for identity assertion are different for three different sections of the community. These three sections are the elders, the young Muslim men and the young Muslim women. The elders in their assertion of Muslim identity have a different history and experience to the younger generations whom have been
raised within the British educational system. This means that their representations of the world, of themselves and of wider society are different to the representations of the younger generations.

The younger generations have similar experiences in terms of the educational system but the issue of gender seems to be an additional factor in the processes of identity. This is for several inter-connected reasons. First of all, there is a history of identity assertion based upon gender differences in British society and this pervades the public sphere and British social history. Secondly, the issue of women and Islam is a greatly-debated subject focusing on several issues such as the wearing of the headscarf, female circumcision, gender-segregated schooling and arranged marriages. Thirdly, there seems to be a distinction being made specifically by Muslim women between culture and religion (Knott and Khoker, 1993) which is a direct contribution to the debate on Muslim identity for young Muslim women. This means that there are considerable differences between identity processes for young Muslim men and young Muslim women. It is suggested that the representations, the type of anchorings and objectifications, and the identity processes involved are sufficiently different for young Muslim women as compared to young Muslim men that this study should be focused on the study of one or the other. It is also suggested that the insider/outsider distinction is pertinent to this issue¹, so this study will be specific to young, Muslim men.

The thesis is divided into three parts: theory, methodology and results. The first part of the thesis consists of two chapters that position this thesis within debates in Muslim identity and social theory (especially social psychology). The first chapter consists of a review of the literature on Muslim identity and the second chapter covers the theoretical approach of this thesis. The second methodological part of the thesis consists of chapters three and four which provide details on the specific community under study and the methodological procedure respectively. The third part of the thesis consists of four chapters: three chapters on each of the three empirical studies and a conclusion.

¹ The insider/outsider distinction is discussed in chapter four. Generally, the same points mentioned there apply to the gender of the researcher and that is why the researcher has focused on young, Muslim men.
The thesis will examine the representation-identity interaction through examining the interplay between the representational field of the South Asian Muslim community and the programmes that depicted such a community in the national public sphere. Consequently, the three empirical studies are: one study on the representations, identities and discourse of Bradford Muslim youth, a second on the actual programmes themselves in terms of their rhetorical composition, and thirdly on the reception of one such programme by Bradford Muslim youth.

The first chapter is a review of the literature on Muslim identity and the main issues that are raised by the literature. The ‘Rushdie affair’, though not the subject of extensive analysis itself, has certainly initiated a whole new body of work on what can loosely be described as ‘Muslim identity’. Research on Muslim identity has been conducted by researchers from several disciplines including anthropology, sociology, social psychology and political science. The analysis of Muslim identity literature is divided into two sections: the first looking at the outsider representations of the community and the second being an examination of some of the social scientific explanations of Muslim identity. This incorporates an analysis of the reasons suggested by researchers for the rise of Muslim identity, and will include an exploration of the global and historical dimensions of local processes of identity.

The second chapter is a discussion of the theoretical approach of this thesis. My initial interest in this area of work stemmed from the desire to understand the extent to which a theory derived from within a European intellectual framework could help explain what I could as an insider to the Muslim community, and a political activist, see around me as a rise in Muslim identity. My involvement in, and knowledge of, ideological groupings within the Muslim community (and their limited effects) made me aware that such a widespread social phenomenon could not be traced to the efforts of religious activists, rather it seemed that this widespread social phenomenon was in fact due to social processes which were massive in their nature. The theoretical approach developed in the second chapter is therefore an elaboration of an explanatory tool which will be used later in this thesis. The basic component of such an approach is the theory of social representations which is a theory of the sociology of knowledge as developed by Serge Moscovici (2000). I relate this theory to other
contributions in social theory especially in relation to identity, power and the media in order to increase its utility for this particular thesis.

The third chapter provides a history of Muslims in Britain and in Bradford specifically. The history of Muslims in Britain has as its major turning point the immigration that occurred during the nineteen sixties. Before this, the Muslim community in Britain was numerically quite small and tended to be concentrated around a few urban areas. The labour shortage following the Second World War led to the immigration of hundreds of thousands from the Indian sub-continent and the Caribbean. The Muslim community in Britain today is formed mainly of Muslims from South Asia. These Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi Muslims tended to settle around major urban industrial areas such as West Yorkshire and the West Midlands.

One industrial, urbanised area that became a focus for immigration was the city of Bradford in West Yorkshire. The wool industry flourished in Bradford and at least two major mills, Salt’s Mill and Lister’s Mill, helped to employ thousands for decades. Such opportunities for employment, albeit at a low-skilled level, attracted economic migrants. The South Asian Muslim community in Bradford is numbered at approximately eighty thousand. The community in Bradford has initiated a series of political campaigns that have maintained Bradford as a regular focus for exposure and analysis, the third chapter includes a review of these events, political and otherwise.

The fourth chapter outlines the methodology employed to investigate Muslim identity in Bradford. This is directly linked to the theoretical approach since the methods of research have to be, for the sake of consistency, related to the philosophy that underpins the approach of the research (Farr, 1993). The three studies that form the main empirical work of this thesis are constructed within the framework of triangulation (Flick, 1992) and are based upon Morley’s (1992) suggestion that the study of the reception of media has to include three aspects: the community, the text, and the reception of the text. Particular attention is paid to the nature of insider research in terms of its difficulties and benefits.

The fifth chapter provides a detailed study of social psychological processes amongst South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. The study entailed participant observation for
nine months in Bradford and interviews with eighteen key informers. The chapter analyses both the representations held by outsiders of South Asian Muslim youth (of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’) and the representations of outsiders by South Asian Muslim youth (of ‘white society’). It also examines the variety of identities amongst South Asian Muslim youth (‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and ‘extremists’) and relates them back to the representations. Finally, the relationship between Muslim identity discourse and pervasive stereotyping is explored.

The sixth chapter offers a rhetorical analysis of the television coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’. Five programmes that were aired during and on the ‘Rushdie affair’ were analysed for their rhetorical content to uncover how the argumentative nature of the affair affected the social representations of the Bradford Muslim community. The campaign against The Satanic Verses had begun in September 1988 and assumed national importance after a book burning in Bradford and a fatwa attracted mass media coverage. Four of the five television programmes were aired in the months after the fatwa. The coverage of the affair raised issues concerning multiculturalism, minority rights, international law, the law on blasphemy and freedom of speech. This chapter summarises the contents of the argument and shows how the argumentative process differs in content and structure. In content, the positions move towards bipolarisation as they represented themselves and each other in radically alternative and converse forms. However, in structure, the arguments shared rhetorical styles, narratives and structures.

The seventh chapter is an analysis of focus group discussions that were conducted around one of the television programmes chosen for rhetorical analysis. One programme that had been used for rhetorical analysis was a travelogue of a writer that had visited Bradford in order to understand the perspective of the Muslim community. The programme was shown to groups of young, South Asian males and this was followed by a discussion focused around issues of representation. The particular use of this programme was pertinent to this thesis because it highlighted the difference in access to the national public sphere that was experienced by a minority during a crisis. Such that those who control the representation of the minority argument in the national public sphere were in fact representatives of the alternative viewpoint. The main findings are that the programme was perceived to enhance
difference in its representation of the Bradford Muslim community, and the focus groups responded to such a representation by adopting an identity politics discourse which served to minimise difference.

The main theoretical contributions of this thesis are in three areas. The first is an examination of the utility of the theory of social representations. For example, Moscovici (2000) has suggested anchoring and objectification as two mechanisms for social psychological functioning. This thesis will, therefore, examine the relevance of cultural memory and symbolism to the processes of identity and representation in a South Asian Muslim youth community. Secondly, this thesis will investigate some of the noted absences in social representations theory, especially in relation to power and identity. This will mean that the researcher will be investigating the inter group nature of representational activity especially in relation to the representations themselves and how the groups respond to such representations. Thirdly, this thesis will examine the extent to which it is possible for a subaltern identity to distinguish itself from hegemonic representations. Such that, even though the subaltern may view itself as engaged in an emancipatory strategy, it may in fact be articulating itself through hegemonic representations.

The theory of social representations’ understanding of the interaction between the media and lay thinkers has the potential to provide a sense both of the power of the media, and the creativity of its audience. Unfortunately, these two components are seldom integrated by the principal proponents of the theory (Rose et al., 1995, p. 154).

The thesis attempts to explore such an interaction and relate it to communication through difference. The constant pulling and pushing, “You are different to us!”, “We are the same as you!”, the oscillation between the exacerbation and the reduction of difference – the dialectics of the endogenisation of ‘otherness’ – and the consequences of this upon those who are represented as ‘other’, these are the themes that I will attempt to explore throughout this thesis.
1.0. THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSLIM IDENTITY: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

I will review the major contributions to the literature on Muslim identity in this chapter while drawing from a wide variety of disciplines: social psychology, social anthropology, sociology, political science, cultural studies, and ethnic and racial studies. The literature review is provided for three reasons. Firstly, I will review these works here to provide some background to the discussions that are occurring within the academic world on the topic of Muslim identity. Secondly, I will identify the main themes that inform a social psychological analysis of the Bradford Muslim community in terms of social representation and social identity. This will require that the literature be interpreted through the language of social psychology, and in so doing, I will, where relevant, explain the benefits (as I see them) of using a social psychological approach. Thirdly, the literature review should serve to locate my work within the body of literature.

The South Asian Muslim community in Britain was understood and explained by social scientists through the use of categories such as race and ethnicity and most of the research prior to the late eighties was from this perspective. For example, Macey (1999) writes: “…until the publication of *The Satanic Verses* (Rushdie, 1988), religion received little attention in the sphere of ethnic relations (Rath *et al.*, 1991)” (p. 856). Similarly, Saeed *et al.* (1999) writes:

> During the 1990s interest in the whole Muslim community in the UK has increased significantly. Beginning with national issues such as the ‘Rushdie affair’ and international matters such as the Gulf War, a series of events brought Muslims into the media spotlight... (p. 821).

As I review the work, it will become clear that though many pieces of work have been published which provide a useful insight, there remains a gap in the literature in that there is no theoretically-grounded explanation for the development of Muslim identity in a local community like Bradford within the field of social psychology\(^2\). It is my intention that this thesis will contribute towards providing such an explanation.

\(^2\) Jacobson (1996b) has recently finished her doctoral thesis on religious and ethnic identity amongst young, British Pakistanis in Walthamstow, North East London. She uses Barth’s theory of boundaries and her thesis was submitted to the department of sociology at the LSE.
The first section of the review will focus on the issues surrounding the social representations of the community by those outside of it. The second section will examine various aspects of Muslim identity assertion including its relation to these representations.

1.1. Representations of a local community

The social representation of a local community is an integral part of its identity process. This representation for a community like the South Asian Muslim community in Bradford takes several forms. The first is the approach of the government itself. The second is the portrayal of the community in the media, this including the relations between the community and the media. Stereotypes of the community, in terms of the public and its social representation of the community also play a part in the identity process. The nature of these stereotypes and anti-racist attempts to respond to them are discussed in this section.

1.1.1. The government and a local community

The government plays an important role in the identity process of a local community by the manner in which it seeks to address the community, especially whether this is regarded as being interactive or authoritarian, open or closed, understanding or rejectionist. This is particularly important in relation to dealing with an ethnic minority community which views itself as being marginalised, alienated or misunderstood i.e. that it views itself as a minority in statistical, social and political terms. This point is of particular importance for the Muslim community as a minority community because of its religious nature. The religion of Islam differs from other religions especially Christianity with its refusal to acknowledge the distinction between the public and the private as defined by secularism. All sectors of society are subject to religious guidance for Muslims, including law and government.

This is not true for most European countries since secularism as a result of the Enlightenment and the Reformation seeks to distinguish between the public and the private especially with regard to law and government. The private domain can be the domain for religious activities, however the public domain is to be kept purely secular.
i.e. non-religious. This is, however, a simplified view towards secularism since there are major differences in practice between European countries in terms of how they acknowledge the role of religion in their societies. For example, France does not accommodate a role for religion in political matters, whereas Britain has a recognised Church of England which is officially linked to the political system.

Schnapper (1994) raises this point in reference to the degree of integration on behalf of the Muslim community in a western, democratic society. He discusses these difficulties as follows, “The practice of Islam goes beyond the strictly religious domain, religious laws compel recognition in every aspect of social and personal life. Put differently, religious issues are not separated from social and political issues, whereas modern societies take freedom of speech as axiomatic” (p. 148). Schnapper resolves this problem by later suggesting that:

Given that they have the means of playing an active part in economic and social life, Muslims have no reason not to settle in a democracy and establish durable relations with government just as other religions do, but on the understanding that they agree to redefine Islam as a religion on a par with other religions. Whatever the relationship between the state and a religious body amounts to in practice, the principle of neutrality requires in every instance that Islam is regarded as a religion and that it no longer is, whether for community or individual, an all-embracing way of life (p. 156).

The overlap between the public (secular) and private (religious) is resolved by regarding Islam as a religion that limits itself to the domain of the private. According to another researcher:

To impose a single philosophy of religion is to impose a single interpretation of what is public and private upon civil society, and this is to defeat the very claim that secularism is an entailment of religious diversity. It is not clear that there can be an ideologically neutral interpretation of what is public and what is private; traditionalists, liberals, communitarians and utilitarians have been engaged in argument over this for some time, more recently they have been joined by feminists bringing with them the view that ‘the personal is the political’ (Modood, 1994b, p. 69).

The official recognition of Islam varies across Europe. Belgium offers several political and financial rewards to recognised religious communities and in 1974 it
recognised the Islamic Cultural Centre as the representative of the Muslim community through the unanimous support of its parliament. The Dutch government revised its constitution in 1983 and one of its articles called for equal protection for religious and non-religious convictions (Rath et al., 1991). Viorst (1996), for example, suggests that Germany seeks to repatriate its Muslim population; France seeks to integrate its Muslim population; and that Britain is ignoring (sic) its Muslim population. For the case of Britain, this was during the period of the Tory government. The Labour government which came to power in 1997 has acceded to some of the issues which have been raised by the Muslim community. The first is the recognition of voluntary aided status for Muslim schools and the second is on the issue of whether or not religious discrimination should be incorporated into the Race Relations Act.

1.1.2. A variety of stereotypes

Identity processes in a local community are not isolated from other social processes. Tajfel and Turner’s theory of social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) proposes that in-group identification is related to out-group representations. This is especially true for the South Asian Muslim community in Bradford, which is a minority in a religious and ethnic sense.

Hutnick (1991) asserts that much of the work on ethnic minority identity in social psychology has focused on the minority aspect i.e. the ethnic part of identity has not been studied as much as the minority aspect. This is because social psychology has studied identity mostly within the paradigm of the laboratory experiment (for example, much of the work of Tajfel’s social identity theory has used the experimental paradigm). This reduces ethnic minority identity to minority identity. More fundamentally, this is because the ‘minority’ status can be defined operationally in numerical terms, whereas the ethnic status requires an investigation into political, cultural and historical processes. The ethnic aspect of identity requires a cultural-historical perspective which can be studied by the social representations approach. This point is all the more important for the study of identity processes in a South Asian Muslim community.
The South Asian Muslim community faces three separate types of stereotype: racial, cultural and religious. The Muslim community in Bradford is from South Asia and South Asians generally tend to have a different skin colour to the English. This difference in skin colour means that the South Asian Muslim community can be the recipient of racism due to a prejudice based upon stereotypes. The South Asian Muslim community in Bradford is not only of a different colour, but also has a different culture with a different language. This cultural difference is expressed through different clothes, foods and mannerisms. Some of these cultural differences are tolerated by the English community and even accepted wholesale such as the curry restaurant. Others such as dressing in shalwar kameez\(^3\) are less accepted and can become a focus for prejudice. This research will also ask whether racism remains an important factor in local community relations after almost two decades of multiculturalism as the official government policy.

A third type of difference is that of a religious nature. The relationship between Islam and Christendom has ranged from being mutually beneficial to being directly confrontational. A recent report published by the Runnymede Trust (The Runnymede Trust, 1997) advocated a new term ‘Islamophobia’ which describes a fear of Islam and Muslims. Sociologists and social psychologists, who group these three quite different factors under the term ‘ethnicity’, are in danger of confusing several culturally and historically distinct issues. A question to be asked by the research will be whether prejudiced outsiders distinguish between these three aspects of stereotyping. Harba et al. (1989) found on this point that there was a hierarchy of discriminatory views towards ethnic groups in the Netherlands, with Islamic groups coming below groups from ex-colonies in the hierarchy.

Vertovec (1998) suggests that racism is on the increase in local quarters of British society and that an enhanced Muslim identity is a form of resistance to such discrimination. This thesis will examine this issue. Ahmad (1992) suggests that the resistance to the discrimination faced by the Muslim community may lead to excessive reactions. For example, stereotyping by the media may lead to a response such that, as Ahmad suggests, the media “may even succeed in changing Muslim

\(^3\) Shalwar kameez is a traditional dress from South Asia. The shalwar is a baggy form of trousers, the
character” (p. 48). This highlights the importance of the media in this issue, especially with regard to the portrayal of the community within the media. The importance that the community attaches to its portrayal in the media can be ascertained by the number of media monitoring organisations that have been set up, which are at present six. The complaints against the media on behalf of the Muslim community focus around Islamophobia, misrepresentation, stereotyping and imbalance. This issue will also be examined in this thesis.

The connection between stereotyping and history has been emphasised by Husband (1994) who suggests that “historically derived stereotypes of Islam and ‘the Orient’ are continuously latent within British popular culture and learning” (p. 80). He quotes Watt (1991) who suggests that images of Islam were formed in the twelfth and thirteenth century by Christian scholars. The extent to which these stereotypes are embedded within European intellectual history has been highlighted by Grosrichard (1998), such that the Ottoman despot provides the phantasmic ‘other’ for the Enlightenment project. Dolar (1998) writes in the introduction to the book:

> It is the time of spectacular endeavours proposing a rationally based society, a new concept of state, civil society, democratic liberties, citizenship, division of power, and so on; but in a strange counterpoint, there was the image of Oriental despotism as the very negative of those endeavours, their phantasmic Other (p. xi).

These cultural stereotypes inform present day interactions (e.g. Said, 1997). This thesis will be examining the extent to which the past informs the present in relation to these stereotypes.

1.1.3. A forced form of labelling

The South Asian Muslim community found itself defined as ‘black’ during the seventies and early eighties. ‘Black’ as a focus of identification came into prominence during the civil rights campaign in the sixties in the United States of America. It was

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4 The book takes the specific example of Montesquieu, and notes that others like Voltaire had an alternative opinion.

5 kameez is a long shirt, both are usually made from the same material in type and design.
used in preference to ‘negro’ or ‘coloured’ and was an assertion of identity in the face of racism. The term was adopted by anti-racists in Britain and all ethnic minority communities were asked to define themselves as black, including the communities from the Indian sub-continent, so that the anti-racists could unite under one banner. However, the situation now in the United States of America is that ‘African-American’ is preferred to black (Philogène, 1994). This development is related to the wider issue of labelling which has assumed controversy in the United States of America where a variety of groups are claiming the right to label themselves, this being connected to pride and self-esteem. Philogène (1994) writes:

Public debates over naming processes have recently been particularly pronounced in the United States. During this past decade alone we have witnessed vigorous debates over the most suitable names for a variety of groups. One only has to recall the controversies over Hispanics preferring Latinos/Latinas or a nationality-specific term; Indians becoming Native Americans; Oriental being replaced by Asian American; or the most recent struggle over how to call Mexican Americans (referred to as the ‘battle of the name’... The switch from black to African American is only the latest manifestation of a continuous effort by Americans of African descent to find a label that will instil pride and self-esteem... (p. 90).

But ‘black’ as an identity had little cultural or historical significance for South Asian Muslim communities and eventually they began to call themselves ‘Asian’, and then, ‘Muslim’. Hutnick (1991) found that religion was an important means of self-identification for South Asians with 80% of Muslims identifying themselves as so, while only 26% chose the Asian category. She notes, “Probably this category is an outside imposition by the host culture; people in it like to think of themselves in more specific terms” (p. 302).

Saeed et al. (1999), conducting research on social identities amongst Scottish Asian Muslim youth, found that 97% (61 out of 63) identified themselves as Muslim, whereas only 8% identified themselves as Pakistani and 26% as black. When asked three important statements concerning identity, 85% chose Muslim, 30% chose Pakistani, 11% chose Black, 8% chose Scottish and 8% chose Asian. Rath et al.

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6 For more on this issue, see Modood (1988) and Modood (1994c).
(1991) notes that social researchers are included as amongst those who regarded migrants as black or ethnic minorities and the “ideological view held of migrants seldom referred to religious attributes” (p. 102) and took little notice of the significance of religion in the community’s affairs and in the community itself. Nielsen (1987) writes that members of the Muslim community leadership felt that “the structures of white British society are, at best, blind to the existence of a Muslim community in this country or, at worst, ignoring it by insisting on what are, from a Muslim point of view, divisive concepts of ethnicity or assimilationist concepts of race” (p. 384).

1.2. The development of Muslim identity

...there has been a growing tendency for Pakistani immigrants in Britain to suppress their ‘Pakistani’ identity in the wider, national public sphere; instead, Pakistani ethnic leaders and elders evoke a singular identity, that of being ‘Muslims’. Increasingly they have distanced themselves from the broader ‘Asian’ identification, and they also reject an activist ‘black’ self-representation, espoused by some anti-racist left-wing groups. On most occasions they insist on being labelled ‘British Muslims’ (Werbner, 1996, p. 59).

This section is a discussion on some of the issues concerning Muslim identity especially in relation to representations, culture, globalisation and history. The British tradition of social science research, specifically in the area of ethnic relations has treated religion as a factor of peripheral significance (Beckerlegge, 1991; Knott, 1986). The concept of ‘ethnicity’ is occasionally used to encompass religious issues but, as Christie (1991) points out, there has recently been a revival of a specifically Islamic consciousness. Also, Islam as a religion, downplays the significance of ethnic identity though it allows for cultural difference. Furthermore, Jacobson (1996b) found that the religious and ethnic dimensions of a social group can not only be different but can also be contradictory. Jacobson (1996b) provides an analysis of this religion-ethnic distinction which suggests that young Muslims differentiate religion from ethnicity in two ways. The first distinction is the religion-ethnic culture distinction which differentiates between the universal applicability of religious teachings and the

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7 Knott and Khoker (1993) found that this was the case with some young Muslim women. Similarly, see Shaw (1988), and Mirza (1989).
limited relevance on issues based upon culture. The second distinction is the religion-ethnic origins distinction. This proposes that ethnicity implies attachment to a homeland, while religion implies attachment to an ‘ummah’, the global Muslim community. This is a useful distinction but it remains incomplete because nationalism and ethnicity are understood as one under the religion-ethnic origins distinction. This is problematic for the South Asian Muslims originating from Pakistan, India or Bangladesh because there are multiple ethnies under one nation in these countries. This complicates the ethnic question because two identities are involved, one linked to nationalism e.g. Pakistani and one to an ethnie e.g. Sindi.

Jacobson (1996b) uses Barth’s theory of social boundaries to further explain the religious-ethnic issue. She proposes that religious boundaries are not permeable, that they are clear and fixed since they are derived from religious texts. The ethnic boundaries however are permeable and can be crossed, for example in music and style of dress. This point can be a possible explanation for the new hybrid Asian music bands such as Asian Dub Foundation and Cornershop (though both bands have non-Muslim, Asian musicians, there are Muslim Asian bands such as Fun-da-mental which began in Bradford). These ethnic boundaries are boundaries of cultural expression, they are not ethnic, as Jacobson points out, in the sense of racial boundaries since these cannot easily be crossed. Religious boundaries are maintained, according to Jacobson, through formal practice such as the five daily prayers and fasting during Ramadhan, and through the maintenance of routine behaviour such as the avoidance of alcohol and pork. She explains:

> What is being argued here is that many actions of the young people contribute to the collective construction and maintenance of religious boundaries which act to preserve and enhance the integrity of the religious community and the internal logic of expressions of religious identity (Jacobson, 1996a, p. 12).

The present discussion may seem to present ‘Muslim identity’ as one monolithic, homogenous entity. This is not the case. Several writers point to the internal heterogeneity of the Muslim community. For example Lewis (1994) specifically adopts the phrase ‘Muslim communities’ to “underscore the empirical fact that Muslims belong to a variety of linguistic, regional and sectarian groups” (p. 8).
Halliday (1995) makes a similar point and asks to what extent the label ‘Islam’ is able to help explain how such groups behave socially and politically. He states later that a sociology of religion alone cannot provide a complete explanation without an investigation of how religion interacts with ethnic, cultural and political forces. It is certainly possible to particularise from any specific/particular abstraction, as it is similarly possible from any abstraction. The choice of one particular abstraction, however, does not make it invalid, except if the employment and analysis of such an abstraction ignores possible and important structural contributions towards an explanation of the process involved. It is because of this, that it is deemed useful for the purposes of this thesis that ‘Muslim identity’ be used, though this does not preclude the possibility of later particularisations (or generalisations).

The question of definition and terminology is an important one, especially with regards to the use of ‘identifying labels’ such as ‘Asian’ or ‘Muslim’. However, reference to the rise of institutions within the South Asian Muslim community reveals that institution-building was an important part of identity formation in the early seventies, especially in the form of mosques. Halliday (1995) lists the number of mosques in Britain as 51 in 1970, this number rising to 329 in 1985. Shaw (1994) links this rise to the decreasing relevance of the ‘myth of return’.

Thus at the same time as the myth of return has faded, its role has been replaced by concerns about the issue of Muslim identity, with the result that the mosque has gradually become an increasingly important focus for religious, social and political activity (p. 48).

But this British Muslim identification is a contested issue, especially the suggestion of it being multi-ethnic and non-partisan. Numerous attempts to form organisations that represent such a British Muslim identity have floundered, including the Muslim Parliament, the Union of Muslim Organisations and the UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs. A recent attempt, the Muslim Council of Britain, remains in its embryonic stages. The reason for the failure of the previous organisations was their inability to create multi-ethnic and non-partisan platforms, and this remains as the principal challenge facing the Muslim Council of Britain. It remains to be seen whether any one particular organisation will be able to represent the British Muslim
identification. Nevertheless, the British Muslim identification seems to be pertinent as a social representation.

The term that has come to be associated with Islam is ‘fundamentalism’. The term and its usage is an example of Moscovici’s (1984b) concept of anchoring or Bartlett’s (1932) conventionalisation. Muslim identity is a foreign and unfamiliar phenomenon to British citizens and the knowledge industry. This unfamiliar phenomenon is then anchored within the familiar history of ‘Christian fundamentalism’. ‘Christian fundamentalism’ arose as the literalist approach of American Protestants to the scriptures, meaning that they advocated a return in the practice of the faith (and in the derivation of such practice) to the original text. ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is, therefore, an Islamic version of ‘Christian fundamentalism’.

The exact meaning of ‘fundamentalism’ however remains problematic. If the analogy from Christian theology is to provide the location of anchoring, then the Salafiya movement would be the closest towards such a hermeneutic appreciation of the texts, as this approach advocates a return to the original texts of Islamic law. However, even the most sophisticated social scientists seem to use the term ‘fundamentalism’, and more specifically, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, to refer to quite different phenomena. For example, Bhabha (1994) uses ‘fundamentalism’ as a name for those who campaigned against The Satanic Verses (which included representatives from most sections of the Muslim community in Britain), while Eagleton (1991) begins his introduction to the theory of ideology with “In the Middle East, Islamic fundamentalism has emerged as a potent political force” (p. xi).

The first author refers to a political campaign which included many who do not interpret the religious texts in a ‘fundamentalist’ manner, and also many who do not envisage Islam as a political force. Simultaneously, Middle Eastern Islamic fundamentalists (though in itself referring to a huge variety of political organisations encompassing vast differences in approach to interpretation and political methodology) were absent from the campaign against The Satanic Verses, and are

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8 Popular and established Muslim media such as Q News, Muslim News, Impact and Trends magazine assume such an identity.

9 See Sayyid (1997) for a dissection of the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’.
either silent on matters of interpretation, or disagree with the ‘fundamentalist’ approach to the text.

The term Islamic fundamentalist is therefore used to explain three social phenomena: literalist interpreters of religious texts, campaigners against The Satanic Verses (see later) and Islamist movements in the Middle East. An acute observer of these three social phenomena would know that any term (other than Islamic or Muslim) that attempts to incorporate all three has little semantic value. Giddens (1990) (who also uses the term ‘fundamentalism’) writes about the term ‘socialism’: “‘Socialism’, of course, means so many different things that the term is often little more than a cover-all for whatever putative social order a particular thinker wishes to see created” (p. 164). Perhaps, to paraphrase Giddens, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is similarly little more than a cover-all for whatever putative social order a particular thinker wishes not to see created. Lewis (1994) writes about this term “…it is almost totally useless for either description or analysis. Its pejorative overtones of religious fascism obscure the diversity of traditions and groupings within Islam” (p. 5).

1.2.1. ‘Between two cultures’

The conflicts that the new generation face have often been discussed in the literature under the theme of ‘Between Two Cultures’ (e.g. Community Relations Commission, 1976; Watson, 1977). This view suggests that the youth face a conflict between the culture of their parents and the culture of wider society. The home environment maintains ethnic traditions and religious interests, while the school offers secular, western alternatives (Knott et al., 1993). Gillespie (1995) suggests that cultural consumption amongst South Asian second generation youth is hybrid in its extraction from ‘parent’ sources. This thesis will examine the manner in which identity and culture are related for South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford.

Whether the thesis of ‘Between Two Cultures’ is pertinent or not, there are still several options for the new generation and these options are related to contradictory pressures, one source being the family, the other being wider society. Hutnick (1986) found four distinct coping strategies amongst ethnic minority identities. These were assimilation, marginality, acculturation and dissociation. She found, however, that
there was little direct association between ethnic identity and type of behaviour. She conducted this study using ten identifiers, six of which were extracted from previous studies and four which she derived from a pilot study. These were language usage, films, arranged marriage, culture preferences, choice of friends, religion, dating patterns, preference in clothes, music and food. Kitwood (1983) similarly found that there seems to be little reflection on the anomalies of identity and behaviour.

Ballard (1994) offers an almost dramaturgical perspective in that he suggests the youth from ethnic minorities have to discover the best ways to behave in any given context as long as members of other contexts do not see them behaving in such a manner in the first context. This discrepancy between identity and behaviour or practice is also true for Muslim identity. Samad (1992) notes that even after the ‘Rushdie affair’:

> It was the perception that they were again humiliated which was responsible for making religious consciousness dominant over other identities. But there was no increase in religiosity and restaurants still served alcohol and attendance for prayer in mosques remained thin (p. 516).

Similarly, Vertovec (1998) notes that a strong ‘Muslim identity’ does not necessarily entail increased participation in religious activity. The discrepancies do not seem to provoke a crisis. Gillespie (1995) found a similar discrepancy between identity and practice amongst Sikhs in Southall, London. This thesis will examine the extent to which there is or there is not a correlation between identity and practice.

The ‘Rushdie affair’ has made a major contribution towards the history and formation of the South Asian Muslim community. Samad (1992) suggests that:

> The groups which are now designated as British Muslims have also been studied by sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists as working class, Pakistani, Bangladeshi’s, Mirpuri’s, Sylheti’s etc. (Rex et al., 1987, 1991; Saifullah Khan, 1976; Shaw, 1988; Eade, 1989; Anwar, 1979). This shift in semantics from ethnic minorities to religious groups reflected developments taking place within the communities concerned. The Satanic Verses controversy added a new claim of authentic identity, a Muslim identity, which challenged the other loyalties (p. 508).
More recently, Samad (1998) has said that “Islamic identity became the metaphor and idiom for social discontent” (p. 68-69) during the ‘Rushdie affair’.

The ‘Rushdie affair’ was an example of a clash between these two cultures. The arguments for both sides were central to their notions of identity, but the ‘Rushdie affair’ also made a significant contribution towards the development of the South Asian Muslim community in Bradford. Even in a small town like Keighley in West Yorkshire, Vertovec (1998) writes “The ‘Rushdie affair’ in Keighley, like elsewhere, did much to fortify Muslim identity and pride, especially among Muslim youth” (p. 95). This thesis will further examine the relation between Muslim identity and the ‘Rushdie affair’.

One important point about the ‘Rushdie affair’ that has not generally been noticed, though it was central to the campaign, was the influence of the Barelvis. The Barelvis have a special role for the Prophet in their theology and this leads to a devotionalism that is centred on the personality of the Prophet, and Rushdie’s novel was an attack on the very character of the Prophet. Both Modood (1990) and Samad (1992) point out the specific importance of the Barelvi pirs (saints) in the campaign against The Satanic Verses.

One result of this is that the ‘Rushdie affair’ made Bradford a laboratory for community relations, especially after the book-burning. The continuous focus upon Bradford and its Muslim population has lead one researcher to comment:

As a resident of Bradford I have become used to seeing the town televisually constructed as ‘alien’, with selective shots of the only mosque with a typical ‘oriental’ golden dome, and of women with their faces veiled, in order to ‘contextualize’ an interview with a Muslim community leader (Husband, 1994, p. 95).

One consequence of this focus on Bradford by the media has been the construction of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ – this was noticed in Haroun’s (1997) work on letters sent to

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10 The Barelvis will be described in chapter 3.
newspaper editors during the ‘Rushdie affair’. This thesis will investigate the notion of a ‘Bradford Muslim’.

1.2.2. Explaining Muslim identity

Several researchers have outlined varying reasons for the development of Muslim identity. For example, Jacobson (1996b), providing a sociological perspective, suggests that religious identity remains pertinent because of the impermeability of its boundaries, and identity assertion is thus maintained through the maintenance of the boundaries. Halliday (1995) highlights, as an international relations expert, a number of reasons that have led to the assertion of Muslim identity: the non-applicability or non-relevance of ‘the myth of return’, the rise of racist attacks on Muslims, sponsorship from Muslim governments, and international events such as the Iranian revolution, the attacks on Libya, the Palestinian *intifada*, and the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Vertovec (1998), a social anthropologist, lists a number of factors such as socialisation during a period of ethnic/religious mobilisation, the attraction of Islam as a symbol of resistance and a hardening of the distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘ethnicity’. This thesis will be examining these issues, but from a social psychological perspective, especially with reference to identity processes in a local community in their relation to media representation.

1.2.2.1. Responses as strategies

The responses that differing parts of the community adapt to the situation of being an ethnic, religious minority are varied. The description of such differing responses is also variable. Two researchers have suggested differing responses to being an ethnic minority community. Hall (1992a) suggests that the defensive retreat from cultural racism results in four different strategies. The first of these is the formation of new identities around terms chosen and inflected to encompass differences. The second is a re-identification with the culture of origin. The third is a construction of strong counter-ethnicities as forms of symbolic identification. The fourth is a revival of cultural traditionalism, religious orthodoxy and political separation.
Hutnick (1991) provides four alternative strategies as responses. These strategies differ according to the degree of identification with the majority group and the degree of identification with the ethnic minority group. The first strategy is assimilation which involves a high level of identification with the majority group and a low level of identification with the ethnic minority group. The second strategy is acculturation which involves a high level of identification with the majority group and a high level of identification with the ethnic minority group. The third strategy is dissociation and this involves a high degree of identification with the ethnic minority group and a low degree of identification with the majority group. The fourth strategy is marginality, which involves a low degree of identification with the majority group and a low degree of identification with the ethnic minority group. Hutnick traces three of four of her strategies back to Tajfel (1978e), The Social Psychology of Minorities. A clear difference can be noticed between Hall’s and Hutnick’s account of the strategies adopted by differing sections in the ethnic minority community. Hall’s account incorporates the notion of culture, whereas Hutnick’s account focuses on the minority aspect of identity. Hutnick’s complaint against some of the work in social psychology is that there has been much focus on the minority aspect of identity, at the expense of the ethnic aspect of identity. Hall’s work suggests that the cultural component of identity needs to be incorporated into an analysis of identity processes.

Several accounts have been offered explaining the responses of the Muslim community. Peach and Glebe (1995) state that the Muslim communities have been offered three options by rival attempts for leadership of the community: ghettoisation, political organisation, and liberalisation. This could reflect different ideological responses. Modood (1993) in an analysis of the responses to a commission of a Racial Equality Consultative Paper by Muslim organisations, identifies three perspectives: conservative, centrist and radical. The first, conservative, is an approach based on the call to equal and fair application of human rights. The second, centrist, is based on the extension of the anti-racism discourse so that it includes prejudice against Muslims. The third, radical, is the advocacy of separation and self-assertion. Modood notes, that the responses far from being unfamiliarly Islamic, are familiar types of strategies adopted by minorities in modern, secular society.
While each of these approaches can in various ways draw upon aspects of Muslim thought and practice to vindicate themselves, it cannot be a coincidence that these three approaches approximate to a remarkable degree the main political approaches of recent decades in American and British racial equality perspectives. They reflect not so much obscurantist Islamic interventions into a modern, secular discourse, but typical minority options in contemporary Anglo-American equality politics, and employ the rhetorical, conceptual and institutional resources available in that politics (Modood, 1993, p. 518).

Specifically in reference to young, Muslim women, Knott et al. (1993) suggests three typical responses. The first of these is cultural synthesis, the second is an anti-religious feminist strategy and the third is a religious identity strategy. King (1993) notes that Muslims will chose different variants of Islam that are not different in their interpretation as such of the religious texts, but rather are different in terms of their level of concession to modernity and to different degrees of permissable individuality. Werbner (1996) similarly identifies three cultural domains: the pan South Asian aesthetic, anglicised post-colonial Western culture and Islamic reformist culture. Finally, Jacobson (1996b) in her analysis of the persistence of religious and ethnic identities notes four main types of responses amongst Muslims. The first is learning to be Muslim, the second is prioritising religious identity over ethnic identity, the third is protesting as Muslims and the fourth is radical Islam. These are all examples of the type of responses that the South Asian Muslim community is experiencing. This study will examine whether any of the responses in Bradford resemble the responses and strategies outlined above, and it will seek to provide an explanation for these strategies from a social psychological point of view.

1.2.3. Global and historical dimensions of identity

The development of Muslim identity in a local community like Bradford can no longer remain independent of the influence of globalisation and history. Islam has the concept of the ‘ummah’ – the global Muslim community, and the pilgrimage to Makkah can in one indirect way be seen as an assertion of the notion of the ummah. Muslims from all over the world travel to Makkah for the yearly pilgrimage and the
compulsory wearing of two white pieces of cloth for males means that ethnic and cultural diversity is reduced as religious identity is asserted. The notion of the ‘ummah’ has a central place in Islamic teaching. For example, one saying of the Prophet is “Believers are all like one body, if one part of it feels pain, then the rest of it feels pain as well”. Though there are numerous ethnicities that belong to the Islamic faith, this notion of the ‘ummah’ remains significant in identity processes.

Pre-modern society experienced a slow rate of information flow as compared to today, and as such interaction across different continents and different countries was almost impossible in a social psychological sense. It would be a long time before the Muslims of Morocco became aware of events affecting Muslims in Malaysia. Modern communication technology, especially with regard to the internet and news communication, has meant that events occurring on the other side of the planet can be relayed across and around the world almost immediately. On occasion, the whole world has been able to follow a ‘live’ political event through the television camera. Recent examples include the Gulf war, the Yugoslavia war, the bombings of Iraq and the Pakistan nuclear tests. Such rapid information transfer has also narrowed the gap between parts of communities such that ethnic, national and religious bonds can be strengthened as a direct result of the transmission of information. An ‘ummah’, an ethnie or a transnational community all benefit from such technology. This work will discuss the relationship between ethnic, national and religious identities, especially in relation to the ‘ummah’ and its impact upon a local community.

The influence of history is also an important contribution to identity processes. As an example, Beckerlegge (1991) links the South Asian community back to British imperialism in India. Nielsen (1991) notes that the restrained anger exhibited in The Muslim Manifesto published by the Muslim Parliament is not only due to the experiences of a minority, but also as a result of “an older experience of having been colonial victims” (p. 474). Modood (1990) deems it necessary to provide a brief history of Islam in South Asia in order to explain the ‘Rushdie affair’ and claims that an ahistorical sociology or purely materialistic history cannot provide an adequate explanation. Ahmad (1995) notes though that this reference to history or historiography is ideological in its analysis of past events i.e. that it is selective. This shows that the employment of history serves rhetorical ends which then act to
strengthen, and on occasion, to polarise group relations. This thesis will examine whether history has in important impact on the development of identity processes in the local community in Bradford.

1.3. Conclusion

I have attempted to introduce the reader to some of the issues in the literature on Muslim identity in this chapter. The analysis is from the perspective of social psychology, and I hope that I have demonstrated the benefits of employing a social psychological approach. Such an approach will be able to examine the content and effects of stereotypes. I have also attempted to demonstrate that the description and explanation of a local community, as in this case study, requires a theoretical construction that connects between representation, culture, history, rhetoric and identity. I intend to derive such a construction from recent developments in social psychological theory in the next chapter. The specific issues that have been raised in this chapter will be investigated in the empirical studies.
2.0. THE DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SOCIAL IDENTITIES

The chapter will provide the intellectual location of this study i.e. to situate my work within the theoretical literature while simultaneously developing the theoretical apparatus that will be required for the empirical analysis. The aim is therefore threefold. Firstly, to argue for the advantages of social representations theory. Secondly, to discuss some of the absences in social representations theory especially in relation to identity and power, that is an understanding of social representations theory within an intergroup context. Thirdly, to articulate a theoretical framework for the possibility of subaltern identities to ‘escape’ hegemonic representations.

This chapter will therefore begin with a brief description of the sociological turn in social psychology. This will be followed by an introduction to the theory of social representations. The chapter will then include an examination of various theories of identity and their relation to the theory of social representations. The specific example of the identity politics movements, and their social psychology, will be covered. Finally, the chapter will examine the relation of social representations to the public sphere as a site of contestation. Ultimately, however, the aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical approach that will be able to accomplish one of the aims of social psychology as identified in the words of Henri Tajfel in his introduction to The Context of Social Psychology:

However one wishes to define or describe social psychology, there is no doubt that it is a discipline which, in principle, should be able to contribute a great deal to the interpretation of contemporary social phenomena; and that its aim is either the ‘explanation’ or the ‘understanding’ (in the traditional sense of these terms) of the social life of individuals and of groups, large or small. (Israel and Tajfel, 1972, p. 1).

2.1. The sociological turn in social psychology

The history of social psychology is expressive of the philosophical heritage, and its associated, derivative tensions, that underlies an understanding of the study of human nature (Farr, 1996b); an example is the ‘rise and fall’ of the positivist empire
One consequence of the ‘fall’ of the positivist empire, or at least a weakening in its theoretical inviolability, has been that new theories have emerged. An example is the theory of social representations as initially expounded by Moscovici (1961), which represents in itself a sociological turn in social psychology through its elaboration of a view towards a sociology of knowledge which emphasises the social nature of knowledge, memory and identity (Flick, 1998b).

The emergence of the theory of social representations was in part possible due to the so-called ‘crisis’ in social psychology during the 1970s. The ‘crisis’ was covered in several books and articles which raised serious questions about the nature of the development of social psychology, focusing around the following issues: the use of the experimental paradigm, the influence of reductionism and the absence of social explanations (especially with reference to communication). Israel and Tajfel’s (1972) The Context of Social Psychology is a collection of papers on the crisis in social psychology. Moscovici (1972) asked in this book whether social psychology was social enough? He suggested that social psychology required an explicitly more social theory which could account for and explain the social nature and functioning of man. The theory of social representations is an attempt to provide a sociological form of social psychology (Farr, 1996b), by drawing upon the work of Durkheim, through the adoption and modernisation of Durkheim’s (1912/1995) ‘collective representations’.

2.1.1. The theory of social representations

The first work on social representations was Moscovici’s analysis of the effects of the diffusion of knowledge of psychoanalysis upon French society in La Psychanalyse: Son Image et Son Public, published in 1961. Several articles provide useful attempts at explaining social representations. These include Moscovici’s (2000) Social Representations, the introduction to Jodelet’s (1991) Madness and Social

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11 This ‘crisis’ was so called because it undermined the whole positivist project, but obviously to those who were questioning the use of positivism, this was not a ‘crisis’ for social psychology. Instead it was a point of liberation for social psychology. The ‘crisis’ according to these social psychologists did not occur in the 1970s but the ‘crisis’ in social psychology began with the individualising and mechanising of group processes as social psychology fell under the influence of behaviourism in the earlier part of this century.

12 For examples of crisis literature, see Gilmour and Duck (1980), Harré and Secord (1972), Parker (1988) and Strickland et al. (1976).
Representations and Farr’s (1987a) article “Social Representations: A French Tradition of Research” in The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Jodelet and Farr are two of a whole variety of social psychologists that have contributed towards the development of the theory of and research into social representations, these include Marková (e.g. Marková and Farr, 1995), Duveen (e.g. Duveen and Lloyd, 1990), Wagner (e.g. 1996) and Flick (e.g. 1998b) amongst many others. Studies in social representations have flourished, for example, recent theses have examined the social representations of death (Bradbury, 1994), public space (Jovchelovitch, 1995a) and nature (Gervais, 1997).

So what are social representations? Since his early work on psychoanalysis, Moscovici has refused to provide a definition of social representations because he did not wish to restrict work in this area. Rather, he felt that clarity in the definition of social representations should be an outcome of, rather than a prelude to research. Nevertheless, Moscovici (1973) provides a basic description of social representations, defining them as “‘theories’ or ‘branches of thought’ in their own right, for the discovery and organisation of reality” (p. xiii). And their purpose? The purpose of “all representations is to make something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar” (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 24). Moscovici (1988) later relates this to Bartlett (1932): “…whenever material visually presented purports to be representative of some common object, but contains certain features which are unfamiliar in the community to which the material is introduced, these features invariably suffer transformation in the direction of the familiar” (p. 178). Consequently, the domain of communication is one of security, confirmation and corroboration (Moscovici, 1984b). Moscovici (1984b) proceeds to define two roles for social representations: they conventionalise and prescribe. The power of convention is due to the dominance of the past over the present, such that the representations prescribe the manner and content of social thinking (Moscovici, 1984b).

Social representations are generated by two mechanisms. These twin processes are central to the whole theory. Anchoring is the process whereby unfamiliar knowledge becomes assimilated to and associated with familiar social representations. Objectification is the process whereby the abstract (e.g. an idea) becomes transformed into a concrete form (e.g. an image). An important function of anchoring is that the
present is linked to the past. In this sense, anchoring is the process by which an unfamiliar concept is understood by connecting it to a familiar concept, the concept being familiar in that it is stored in the memory of society. Remembering, used in this manner, is a collective process (Halbwachs, 1950/1980) and occurs through the anchoring of unfamiliar concepts by social groups. This is similar to Bartlett’s notion of conventionalisation which also advocates the influence of history upon cognitive processes. Objectification requires the discovery of “the iconic quality of an imprecise idea” (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 38), intensifying “the figurative character of representations and their specific nature confirming Wittgenstein’s comment: ‘The act of thinking is quite comparable to drawing pictures’ (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 172)” (Moscovici, 1988, p. 238). The consequence of this is that the act of perception replaces the act of conception (Moscovici, 1984b).

Moscovici (1988) describes three different types of representations: hegemonic, polemical and emancipated. Hegemonic representations are uniform and coercive, and inform all symbolic activity. Essentially, they are the modern equivalent of collective representations. Polemical representations are associated with antagonistic relations between groups within society, as such, they are not shared by society as a whole. Emancipated representations are the result of exchange and concordance of symbolic representations between sub-groups in society that share close contact.

The nature of consensus and disagreement in the theory of social representations has been discussed by Rose et al. (1995) who suggest that though hegemonic representations may not seem initially apparent, argumentation and disagreement over specifics by a dominant group may conceal an actual consensus in representational practice. Rose et al. (1995) aim to distinguish between “the level of immediate social interaction which involves disagreement and argumentation” and “the level of underlying ground-rules of social representation formation…” (p. 152) which possesses a consensual dimension. They write in reference to the work of Jodelet (1991) that she found:

…that it was at the level of consensual ritualistic practices… that the most exclusionary representations [of the mad] were given form. At the same time, there was constant discussion and disagreement amongst the villagers concerning their lodgers in respect of who was
dangerous and who was harmless. At the level of manifest discourse they would agree and disagree. Yet, they would enact the same rituals to express the unspeakable. (p. 153).

The sociological turn in social psychology, that is manifested in this case by the theory of social representations, can be substantiated through reference to the intellectual ancestry of the theory of social representations. For example, Moscovici regularly quotes sociologists such as Durkheim, Mead and Lévy-Bruhl (see for instance Moscovici, 1984b, 1988, 1998). The link with Durkheim is especially apt as Moscovici translates the notion of social representations as a modern equivalent of the Durkheimian collective representations, which by way of example, Durkheim (1912/1995) employed in order to explain Australian aboriginal religion. According to Moscovici (1988), the Durkheimian conception of collective representations is useful to those societies which “…shared one and the same representation, gave it credence, and celebrated it by rites and sacrifices” (p. 219). However, the nature of change that has been instituted by modernity has meant that:

This view does not match or no longer matches the historical reality with which we are familiar. It is unlikely that even in communities where tradition is still dominant, there would be as much uniformity and invariability as anthropologists expected to find… (Moscovici, 1988, p. 219).

As such, it was Moscovici’s intention, through the introduction of the theory of social representations, to initiate an “anthropology of modern culture” (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 514).

An associated reason for the replacement of ‘collective’ with ‘social’ is that the Durkheimian collective representation was coercive by virtue of its universal, almost invisible nature. Moscovici (1988) is, however, of the view that there is a creative element to representational activity and chooses instead to employ the term ‘social representations’. This does not mean that there are no collective representations in the modern period. One collective representation in the modern period and in Western society (that is relevant to this thesis) is individualism (Farr, 1991a).
Social representation researchers have also employed the phrase ‘representational field’, this is the semantic matrix within which social representations function. Rose \textit{et al.} (1995) write on this:

Against notions of monolithic and homogenous representations, we propose the idea of a representational field, susceptible to contradiction, fragmentation, negotiation and debate. In such a representational field, there is incoherence, tension and ambivalence. Yet, permeating all these disparate elements there is a consensual reality, which forms the common ground of historically shared meanings within which people discuss and negotiate. (p. 153).

The above is a brief summary of the theory of social representations and some of its basic constructs. The question remains, why use the theory of social representations? I would suggest that there at least five advantages in using the theory of social representations. These advantages, in themselves, are not unique to the theory of social representations and simultaneously, they do not preclude the possibility of outstanding absences that remain as limiting factors for the explanatory potential of the theory.

The first advantage is that the theory permits theoretical orientations, methodological analysis, and post-research explanations that incorporate the social nature of communication, i.e. that which lies beyond the individual, e.g. media texts, dialogue, practice. Secondly, the theory incorporates the importance of history and cultural memory into social psychological functioning through the notion of anchoring which serves to conventionalise the representation.

Thirdly, the theory allows for a perspectivist approach. There are differences between some of the researchers in the field of social representations as to the extent and nature of constructionism within the theory (see Gervais, 1997). However, there is generally an acceptance of the constructed nature of social reality. And Moscovici (1988) asserts the common ground between the theory of social representations and the theory of the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) though he says that “…the principle of social reality construction takes on an arbitrary meaning and has no empirical prospects, as long as the representations of the members of the society are left out of account” (Moscovici, 1988, p. 227).
Fourthly, the theory of social representations advocates the study of meaning and form. So the analysis and deconstruction of meaning, and its relevance, is related to the nature of representational activity. The theory conjoins (and interrogates) the dialectics between content and process. Fifthly, the theory highlights the need for specificity in the understanding of social representations through accessing the semantic relevance of representations. Social representations are not equivalent, and their difference is related to the representational field from which they emerge. An investigation into the nature of anchoring and objectification of social representations, and their relation to representational fields, are the means by which this specificity can be established.

There are, however, some theoretical absences\(^\text{13}\) in the theory of social representations that are relevant to this study. The first is the issue of power in relation to the distribution of representations. Moscovici (1988) rejects the determinist nature of Durkheim’s collective representations and concomitantly asserts agency through the possibility of a transformation of social representations. If agency is to be distributed alongside social representations, then it will be distributed to all. However, although representations are distributed universally, some representations represent more than others. This aspect of social representations has been explored by Joffe (1995) in her work on social representations of AIDS.

The second issue is the connection between social representations and social identity. Social representations are shared constellations of knowledge. It is this act of sharing and its relation to identity that is of interest here. The act of sharing itself has been problematised by, for example Harré (1984) and Potter and Litton (1985), but I wish to examine the nature of interaction between social representations and social identity. This interaction has previously been investigated by, among others, Duveen and Lloyd (1990) and Elejabarrieta (1994).

The theory of social representations incorporates a sociological approach to social phenomena, accounts for the weight of history upon contemporary events, allows for

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\(^{13}\) For an elaboration of ‘absence’ in relation to social representations theory, see Gervais et al. (1999).
a perspectivist approach which values the social psychological reality of those being
studied, attempts to grasp the meaning of the representation itself and recognises the
need for specificity, and therefore, difference. The five advantages are however to be
counter-balanced by two major absences in the theory which researchers in the field
have attempted to address. I will examine these attempts in the next section.

2.2. The interdependence of social representations and social identity

Social representations… are the representations of something or of someone. (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 67).

The theory of social representations is a theory of the distribution of knowledge. As
the quote mentions above, these representations are representations of objects and
people. Those representations which involve people will impact upon their sense of
identity. As such social representations and social identities are inextricably linked.
This is, obviously, a crude simplification of the inter-relation. Social identities are, in
many cases, founded upon a web of connections between objects and people, in
history and in the present, as symbols and representations thus composing the texture
of meaning upon which these identities are based. This thesis is an examination into
the intricacies of such an inter-relation.

To what extent does the act of sharing a constellation of knowledge constitute the act
of being? That is, what are the implications of social representations, and their shared
nature, for social identity? This question assumes that there may be a generic answer.
And so a further question arises: Are all identities the same? Without wishing to
develop a typology for identity, I would suggest that there are certain differences
between types of identity and knowledge structures.

The types of identity can be related to social representations depending upon the level
of consensus. The first type is a collective identity, associated with a collective
representation (in a Durkheimian sense) and an example could be an identity that is
derivative of individualism. The second type is a social identity associated with a
social representation, but one which does not involve contestation. An example of
this type is pre-feminism gender identity. The third type is a social identity that is
politically marked and involves contestation, it is normally associated with polemical representations. Examples of this type include those identities that are associated with the ‘identity politics’ movements.

An example of the second type of relation between identity and social representations can be elaborated through the lead of Elejabarrieta (1994) in suggesting that the notion of positioning can act as a useful meeting point for social representations and identity. The notion of positioning suggests that knowledge structures locate identity and difference. So anchoring and objectification are not only directing specificity in knowing, but they also direct specificity in identifying. I will also discuss here Duveen and Lloyd’s (1990) suggestion that social identities are embedded within and emerge from social representations.

On this relation between identity and knowledge, a question should be asked, are some identities valued less than others within certain societies? If there is difference, then how is this structured? The answer to this question lies in the uneven distribution of representational power. Some social representations are hegemonic: they are distributed more widely and are more salient through their connections to wider ideological perspectives. Some are polemical i.e. contested, and some are emancipated. Polemical representations “must be viewed in the context of an opposition or struggle between groups” (Moscovici, 1988, p. 221-222). Those identities which are the subject of polemical and negative representations are subjugated and there are essentially three actors involved. The first is the producer and maintainer of the social representation of the stigmatised identity, the second is the represented, and the third is the audience for the representation - the site of contestation being the public sphere. This ternary nature of identity has been highlighted by Jodelet (1991) in her questioning of a binary approach to group identity:

…we have encountered demands for discrimination arising from the experience of proximity and the risk of identification. This risk implies observation by another, judgement by a party external to the two groups involved in the contact. Is this third element not a determining factor in the processes delimiting the relationships which form between the patients and the population which receives them? We think it is. (p. 79).
This leads onto a specific type of identity consciousness – one that is related to the ‘identity politics’ movements that emerged during the sixties and seventies. Centering around a single unit of classification and reducing the importance of other categories, these movements advocated the emancipation of subjugated identities – for example identities based on race and gender. This type of identity and identity assertion is a specific category of identity functioning. Its inverse relation to (initially) hegemonic representations differentiates it from other types of category which do not involve the challenging and ultimately reversal of hegemonic representations. As such, these identities assume a political significance, as does their representation.

This challenge highlights the contentious nature of social thinking. In this instance, this social phenomenon represents less Moscovici’s (1984b) thinking society than it does Billig’s (1996) argumentative society. The ‘identity politics’ movements are useful example of this because their rhetoric is dialogically structured against the hegemonic representation. Essentially, social representations and identities, in the case of the identity politics movements, are counter-positioned through dialogic and oppositional forms of rhetoric. I will now proceed, after this short introduction to my main theoretical perspective, to elaborate upon these issues below.

2.2.1. Social representations, social identity and positioning theory

Ichheiser (1949a) recognised that representations are linked to identities in a reciprocal and symbiotic manner: “The way we are seen by others determines the way we see ourselves. And the way we see ourselves determines essentially how we ‘really’ are…” (p. 10). This quote from Ichheiser emphasises the dependence of social identity upon outsider representations. The outsider representation can, in the case of hegemonic representations, constitute the fundamentals of social identity (e.g. Fanon, 1986), if only to trap identity within a binary logic (Hall, 1997a). Oyserman and Markus (1998) similarly found:

In the case of minority ethnicity in the US, representations from the in-group have to be connected in some way with the social representations from larger society and these representations of one’s group in larger society, are likely to reflect misunderstandings,
inaccuracies, and negative or narrow portrayals of one’s group’s capabilities (McLoyd, 1990). (p. 120).

The question is, how are social representations related to social identities? One answer which deals with the relation of social identities to knowledge, though not social representations specifically, is social identity theory. Social identity theory is a theory of inter-group relations and in one of its classic formulations14 (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), it is directly related to knowledge structures15.

Social identity theory states that certain categories are evaluated positively and certain others negatively. Those whose group membership includes a negative social identity will attempt to change their situation since a negative social identity will lead to a lower sense of self-esteem. The type of attempt made to change the situation will depend upon the subjective belief structures, this being of two types: social mobility and social change. The social mobility subjective belief structure is the individualistic approach and holds that group boundaries are permeable and that the individual is therefore able to pass from one group to another.

But this is only a strategy for the individual and the individual is not able to take the group with him/her. In some cases, it is not possible e.g. skin colour. The social change subjective belief structure holds that the boundaries between groups are impermeable and that one cannot pass from one group to another. The only option is to improve the social status of the in-group. This is a group strategy and there are two types: social creativity and social competition. Social creativity is adopted when no possible actual alternative is conceivable and here the group can opt for three different strategies: it can choose different dimensions of inter-group comparison, or it can re-evaluate a previously negative characteristic in a positive manner, or it can choose another comparison group against which they can make their comparison.

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14 Social identity theory has been developed into self-categorisation theory, I will be only be dealing with social identity theory as presented in the paper by Tajfel and Turner (1979).

15 The knowledge structures to be introduced below as subjective belief structures and strategies of social creativity could be understood as social representations, though this would involve theoretical inconsistencies (around the issue of the social and dialogic nature of communication), this will be covered later in the chapter.
Social competition occurs when the subordinate group is able to conceive of an alternative arrangement in society. In such a case, the subordinate group could decide to question the status quo and co-ordinate its strategies towards changing that status quo so that its identity can be more positively evaluated.

The shared representation (in this case of the group itself which is sharing the representation) is related to a classificatory system that imposes a hierarchy upon society. This hierarchy is derivative of the representational field within which it is located. As groups become situated within this hierarchy, so does their self-esteem. Those that suffer from being at the lower end of the hierarchy will attempt to break away from the knowledge structures which impose their negative self-esteem upon them. This act, being termed ‘social creativity’, is one link between groups and constellations of knowledge. So it could theoretically be possible to achieve some over-lap between the two theories. However, researchers in the field of social representations have raised doubts about such an endeavour.

According to Farr (1996a), social representations theory is a sociological form of social psychology (partially through its incorporation of the notions of history and culture) and social identity theory is a psychological form of social psychology with its emphasis on experimentation in the minimal group paradigm. Elejabarrieta (1994) similarly criticises the theory: “Since 1973 the theory has sought methodological rigour rather than theoretical explanation…” (p. 247). Duveen (1996) states three problems resulting from this type of approach when one attempts a rapprochement between social identity theory and social representations theory. The first is that the theory of social identity does not explain how the categories are derived, how they are used and how they are applied. A second problem is that the theory of social identity is an individualist theory and is based upon a theory of individual motivation, whereas the theory of social representations cannot be reduced to the individual level of explanation. The third problem is that the social identity theory is one that offers a general theory of identity which is independent of context and content. There is an explanatory mechanism offered but this is at the expense of any content based analysis.
Elejabarrieta (1994) even questions the notion of category itself and suggests that it has to be understood as a social representation:

Several authors… have suggested that it may be wrong to deal with social identity, in the form of social-category membership, as realities which may be apprehended independently of the social relations and social representations by which these categories and their social positions are represented in society. (p. 250).

The approach of social identity theory to the relation of social identity with social representations suggests that social identities are derivative of processes of categorisation which then lead to structure and organise social representations through the various types of social creativity. The direction of influence has been questioned by Elejabarrieta (1994) asserting that: “Social representations are not the ideological condition of defence and maintenance of a given social identity” (p. 250).

But as stated earlier, social representations need to be linked to social identities. This has been noted by Jodelet (1991) who, in arguing against a cognitive isolationist perspective, writes: “What is more, this kind of cognitive isolationism, which focused on the what is known and how it is known, says nothing about the who knows it and the perspective from which they know it” (p.10).

Duveen and Lloyd (1986) offer an alternative position to the social identity theory approach. They suggest that the notions of individuality and sociality are themselves social representations and that “…social identities reflect individuals’ efforts to situate themselves in their societies in relation to the social representations of their societies”. (p. 220). Duveen and Lloyd (1986) then proceed to provide a definition for social identity: “Membership in particular social categories provides individuals with both a social location and a value relative to other socially categorized individuals. These are among the basic prerequisites for participation in social life, and can be described as social identities.” (p. 221).

Elejabarrieta (1994) advances this definition by advocating the notion of positioning which he has retrieved from discourse theory (Davies and Harré,1990; Harré and Van Langenhove, 1991). Elejabarrieta (1994) suggests that social representations lead to
active position taking and the insertion of individuals in groups such that: “If one considers social positioning as negotiated expressions of social identities that intervene in the communication between individuals and groups, this may open up a new way of analysing social representations” (p. 251).

This positioning is derivative of contextual, historical and practical factors and evolves out of communication and negotiation. This allows for a multiplicity of identity positions. The difference between Duveen and Lloyd (1986) and Elejabarrieta (1994) is this multiplicity, in that Elejabarrieta (1994) allows for more agency in identity positions: “The negotiable and arguable nature of the contents of social representations is derived, to a great extent, from the multitude of strategic practical positions that individuals can adopt in everyday life” (p. 246). This notion of identity as positioning through language and history has also been advocated by Hall (1988) in relation to ethnicity as a form of identification: “The term ethnicity acknowledges the place of history, language and culture in the construction of subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all discourse is placed, positioned, situated, and all knowledge is contextual…” (Hall, 1988, p. 29).

But are all representations equivalent in their authority? Are some forms of positioning more dominated (or dominant) than others? Does power influence the nature of identification? Hall (1990) in the following lengthy passage provides an answer to these questions:

The ways in which black people, black experiences were positioned and subject-ed in the dominant regimes of representation were the effects of a critical exercise of cultural power and normalisation. Not only in Said’s ‘Orientalist’, were we constructed as different and other within the categories of knowledge of the West by those regimes. They had the power to make us see and experience ourselves as ‘Other’. Every regime of representation is a regime of power formed, as Foucault reminds us, by the fatal couplet, ‘power/knowledge’. But this kind of knowledge is internal, not external. It is one thing to position a subject or set of peoples as the Other of a dominant discourse. It is quite another thing to subject them to that ‘knowledge’, not only as a matter of imposed will and domination, by the power of inner compulsion and subjective confirmation to the norm… (p. 225-226).
Similarly, Rose et al. (1995) write:

A relativist position denies the fact that social representations held by certain groups in a society have a greater authority than those of other groups. There is *power* to be found in the symbolic field, in which very unequally equipped agents must compete to exert their influence… The mass media, for example, is one of the institutions which establishes the representational field in which people take up their (often contradictory) positions… The theory of social representations’ understandings of the interaction between the media and lay thinkers has the potential to provide a sense both of the power of the media, and of the creativity of its audience. (p. 154).

Power can be included into a discussion on the nature of positioning through reference to Harré and Van Langenhove (1991) from whom Elejabarrieta (1994) derives the notion of positioning. They distinguish between first order and second order positioning as follows:

First order positioning refers to the way persons locate themselves and others within an essentially moral space by using several categories and story-lines …second order positioning occurs when the first order positioning is not taken for granted by one of the persons involved in the discussion. (Harré and Van Langenhove, 1991, p. 396).

Second order positioning is therefore related to the act of contestation and includes the type of positioning of identity that involves a group rejecting its representation by a dominant group.

2.2.2. Representational subjugation and forms of contestation

I would like to relate these two types of positioning to the three identity types which I specified earlier. The three identity types were a collective notion of identity, a politically marked identity type and a non-politically marked identity type. I would like to relate the two forms of positioning to the second two types of identity. The politically marked identity is associated with second order positioning and the non-politically marked identity is associated with first order positioning. The social representations that are associated with second order positioning are polemical representations and the social representations associated with first order positioning are hegemonic.
Table 2.1. Types of positioning

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<th>Type of positioning</th>
<th>First order positioning</th>
<th>Second order positioning</th>
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<tr>
<td>Social representations</td>
<td>Hegemonic representations</td>
<td>Polemical representations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of identity</td>
<td>Politically neutral</td>
<td>Politically marked</td>
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The dominant representation, if negative, is contested by those that are imprisoned by the cage of stigmatisation which descends upon them with the full weight of centuries of culture, history and language. This contestation of the dominant representation can take a rhetorical and a practical form. The practical form is exemplified in social identity theory by the social strategy of social competition. This study will be examining the alternative rhetorical form of contestation. The study of rhetoric is derived here from Billig’s work (Billig, 1991, 1996) on argumentation in society.

Billig was Tajfel’s student at Bristol University and wrote his thesis there on intergroup processes. He later however moved towards advocating a type of social psychology that analysed the contents of social discourse in order to investigate the contents and patterns of argumentation. The issue of compatibility between the theory of social representations and the rhetorical approach has been discussed by Billig (Billig, 1993), in which he concluded that there was no theoretical opposition between the two approaches. Moscovici (1984a) has written about the study of the thinking society. However, in cases of contestation such as those involving second order positioning, the type of social discourse is more akin to argumentation than it is to thinking. Billig (1993), though, makes an argument for a universal form of communication:

Moscovici (1984) has claimed that the social representations approach aims to study ‘the thinking society’ and, in this respect, he emphasises both the social nature of thinking and the importance of thinking in social life. The rhetorical approach does not dispute either of these two assumptions. What it claims is that thinking, which is to be found in the thinking society, has a particular characteristic: such thinking is essentially rhetorical… the rhetorical approach suggests that such rhetorical, or argumentative, skills are integral to thought, for when people think they are explicitly or implicitly arguing, whether with others or with themselves… there is no theoretical opposition between the assumptions of social representation theory and the rhetorical approach. (p. 39-40).
I, however, would wish to employ Billig’s theory of rhetoric as a form of communication that is specific to the subject-matter of this study. Argumentation, itself, can be studied from several angles. There is the tension between particularisation and generalisation such that “Not only can anchors be dropped, but they can also be hauled in.” (Billig, 1993, p. 50). Similarly, criticism can be rebutted by justification and vice versa, Billig (1996) relates such argumentation to positioning:

…it could be suggested that the meaning of discourse used in an argumentative context must be examined in terms of the contest between criticism and justification. Therefore, to understand the meaning of a sentence or whole discourse in an argumentative context, one should not examine merely the words within that discourse or the images in the speaker’s mind at the moment of utterance. One should also consider the positions which are being criticised or against which a justification is being mounted. Without knowing these counter-positions, the argumentative meaning will be lost. (p. 121).

It is suggested that the subjugated identity (which exemplifies second order positioning) will attempt at rhetorical contention of the dominant representation. But how, and is there any structure to the rhetoric that subjugated identities employ? Two sets of rhetorical strategies have been suggested, the first by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and the second by Hall (1997a). Tajfel and Turner advocate the strategy of social creativity when no possible actual alternative is conceivable and here the group can opt for three different strategies: it can choose different dimensions of inter-group comparison, or it can re-evaluate a previously negative characteristic in a positive manner: “The classic example is ‘Black is beautiful’” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, p. 43), or it can choose another comparison group against which they can make their comparison.

Hall (1997a) advocates the practice of trans-coding: “…taking an existing meaning and re-appropriating it for new meanings (e.g. ‘Black is beautiful’)” (p. 270). Three types of trans-coding are proposed: reversing the stereotypes, substituting positive images in contradistinction to negative images by expanding the range and complexity of representation, and trying to contest the stereotype from within by situating the identity perspective within the complexities and ambivalence of
representation. These patterns of contestation establish “a ‘politics of representation’” (Hall, 1997a, p. 277).

One difference between Tajfel’s social creativity and Billig’s rhetorical strategy is that Tajfel’s social creativity is a strategy employed specifically by representationally subjugated groups, whereas Billig suggests that thinking itself is structured dialogically through rhetoric and argumentation, and therefore the rhetorical nature of identity thinking is only one example of a more universal phenomenon. Using rhetoric as opposed to social creativity also allows for bipolarity in representational activity. Tajfel does not advocate means by which the dominant group maintains its hegemony other than through the stereotype as a negative representation16, whereas Billig allows for a dialogic appreciation of disputation concerning polemical representations.

2.2.3. The social psychology of identity politics

The reader will have noted that the example ‘Black is beautiful’ was used by both Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Hall (1997a). I believe that this is significant. The slogan ‘Black is beautiful’ was used by the civil rights movement in the United States of America during the 1960s and 1970s. Researchers in the area of identity such as Tajfel and Hall, through referring to this example, are highlighting the centrality of the civil rights movement as a case study in identity processes. Specifically, it is an example of what came to be known as the ‘identity politics’ movements. These ‘identity politics’ movements questioned the hegemonic representations, that had led to negative evaluations of their identities and the associated discrimination, through the fracture or inversion of the category system that upheld the negative representation.

Social science as a whole has “paid only intermittent attention to issues of identity and identity politics” (Calhoun, 1994, p. 23). One social psychologist who has written specifically about the ‘identity politics’ movements is Gergen (1995). Gergen (1973) advocates understanding social psychological research as “primarily the systematic
study of contemporary history” (p. 319) and it is this understanding that leads him to provide a social psychological analysis of the ‘identity politics’ movements.

On the question of definition Gergen (1995) writes:

Identity politics differs from many social movements, such as left-wing or fundamentalist Christian activism, in that the constituents of the former – such as women, Afro-Americans, gays – are politically marked as individuals. Politics and personal being are virtually inseparable. This inseparability is owing largely to the natural production of the political categories. One may by virtue of reason or impulse join the National Rifle Association or the Praise the Lord Club. Not so with being a native American or a black Muslim. One simply is, by virtue of nature or thrown condition, an Asian American, a lesbian, or a member of a lower class.

Calhoun (1994) provides further clarification to the category of ‘identity politics’:

The pursuits labelled ‘identity politics’ are collective, not merely individual, and public, not only private. They are struggles, not merely groupings; power partially determines outcomes and power relations are changed by the struggles. They involve seeking recognition, legitimacy (and sometimes power), not only expression or autonomy; other people, groups and organisations (including states) are called upon to respond... Finally, identity politics movements are political because they involve refusing, diminishing or displacing identities others wish to recognise in individuals. (p. 21).

Calhoun (1994), however, problematises the commonly assumed definition of associating the ‘identity politics’ movements with liberation and lifestyle (sic) movements such as the women’s movements, the anti-racist movements, the gay movements and the counter-cultural movements. These movements have been termed new social movements in some academic writings (e.g. see Melucci, 1989; Touraine, 1985; Cohen, 1985). Calhoun (1994) questions the scope of this definition:

The new social movements idea is, however, problematic and obscures the greater significance of identity politics. Without much theoretical rationale, it groups together what seem to the researchers relatively ‘attractive’ movements, vaguely on the left, but leaves out such other

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16 Tajfel and Turner (1979) mention enhanced group distinctiveness as a means of achieving security for high status groups when threatened by low status groups.
contemporary movements as the new religious right and fundamentalism, the resistance of white ethnic communities against people of colour, various versions of nationalism, and so forth. Yet these are equally manifestations of identity politics and there is no principle that clearly explains their exclusion from the lists drawn up by NSM theorists. (p. 22).

The width that Calhoun (1994) advocates above can be justified if ‘identity politics’ movements are understood as the descendents of western, individualist ideology (Gergen, 1995). One consequence of this is that the group is attributed with the characteristics of the individual such that the processes of differentiation that lie at the heart of individualism now affect group processes. This would be due to similar social representations which would, for example, emphasise distinctiveness thus signifying alternative positions (one more collective than the other) on the ‘individual-society’ interface (Duveen and Lloyd, 1986). So the group adopts the phenomenology and social psychology of the individual. Consequently, group identity shares the same characteristics that are attributed to individuals, the right to rights, agency (good and evil) and responsibility (and therefore praise and blame) (Gergen, 1995). However, this shift towards the social transfers the antagonistic relations that are derivative of individualism to the level of group interaction (Gergen, 1995).

This antagonistic relation initiates a form of dialogue of claim and counter-claim that is rhetorical in nature, deploying criticism against justification (as examples), consequently positioning both sides within a dialogic, oppositional frame – a frame that is constituted in its very structure by the imbalance of power. The nature of communication degenerates and simultaneously identity assertion is substantiated. Gergen (1995) describes this in the following passage:

At the outset, the prevailing rhetoric has been of little influence outside groups of the already committed. For the targets - those most in need of ‘political education’ – such rhetoric has more often been alienating or counter-productive. By and large identity politics has depended on a rhetoric of blame, the illocutionary effects of which are designed to chastise the target (for being unjust, prejudiced, inhumane, selfish, oppressive, and/or violent). In western culture we essentially inherit

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17 For an interpretation of the phenomenology and social psychology of the individual, see Ichheiser (1949a).
two conversational responses to such forms of chastisement – incorporation or antagonism. The incorporative mode (“Yes, now I see the error of my ways”) requires an extended forestructure of understandings (i.e. a history which legitimates the critic’s authority and judgement, and which renders the target of critique answerable). However, because in the case of identity politics, there is no pre-established context to situate the target in just these ways, the invited response to critique is more typically one of hostility, defence and counter-charge.

Such antagonistic replies are additionally invited by virtue of the differing discourse worlds of the critic as opposed to the target. What are viewed as ‘exploitative wages’ on the one side are branded as ‘just earnings’ on the other; ‘prejudicial decisions’ on the one side are excoriated as ‘decisions by merit’ on the other; attempts to combat ‘exclusionary prejudices’ are seen as disruptions of ‘orderly and friendly community’; ‘rigid parochialism’ for the critic is understood as ‘love of enduring traditions’ by the target. Under such conditions those targeted by the critiques are least likely to take heed, and most likely to become galvanised in opposition.

This section has explored the interaction between social representations and social identities. I have followed Elejabarrieta’s lead in utilising the notion of positioning as a means of connecting social identities to social representations. This approach needs to integrate the influence of power and this is achieved through the use of Moscovici’s (1988) suggestion of hegemonic representations and the relation of this to forms of positioning which differ due to the extent of contestation (Harré and Van Langenhove, 1991). This contestation is linked to an argumentative form of communication (Billig, 1996) and two specific examples of structured rhetoric are provided (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hall, 1997a). The historical experience of the ‘identity politics’ movements provides a practical space for the employment of the theory that has been developed through the chapter. The sites of contestation are numerous, I will now examine the public sphere as media as a site for the contestation of hegemonic representations.

2.3. The public sphere and the identity-representation dialectic

Moscovici (1984b) traces the origin of the concept of social representations to Durkheim’s notion of collective representations. One point of difference between the two concepts is that a collective representation is universally accepted and
subliminally utilised by a society at a given time and place, so much so that it almost becomes coercive in a determinist sense. Social representations permit polysemic interpretations as several social representations may be held about a similar idea within a given society.

Another point of difference between the two forms of representations is linked to the manner in which the technology of information transfer has improved from late nineteenth century Europe (i.e. when Durkheim wrote about collective representations) to late twentieth century Europe (i.e. when Moscovici wrote about social representations). The improvement in the methods of communication through newspapers, television, radio, satellite and now the internet has led to a situation in which the transfer of knowledge has become much more dynamic. Therefore, ideas change and are exchanged across a wider space and shorter time period (Giddens, 1990). It is in light of this situation that social representations are said to be different to collective representations:

…one of the reasons why Moscovici abandoned the Durkheimian concept of ‘collective representations’ was precisely because it was too static and was appropriate only to a previous era and type of society. It could not account for the centrality of representational diversity, tension and even conflict in modern life. (Rose et al., 1995, p. 152)

The evolution of collective representations to social representations was in part due to the “structural transformation of the public sphere” (Habermas, 1984). Indeed, the social nature of the theory of social representations anticipates a theoretical affinity with the notion of a public sphere. Jovchelovitch (1995b) suggests that the notion of the public sphere provides the habitat for social representations:

Public life, with its specific institutions, rituals, and meanings is the very locus in which social representations develop and acquire a concrete existence. It is in such a space that they incubate, crystallise and are transmitted to others. It is when people meet ‘out there’ to talk and to make sense of their everyday lives that social representations are forged. When that happens social representations themselves become part of the fabric of public life. Social representations and public life therefore stand in a dialectic relationship to one another. (p. 94).
Habermas has, however, been criticised for several absences within his theory of the public sphere which are mainly derivative of an idealised notion of a critical-rational discursive potential within the public sphere (e.g. Calhoun, 1997a). He has also been criticised for a lack of discussion of identification within and through the public sphere (Calhoun, 1997b), though Habermas (1984) does write of identification through counselling in the public sphere. Generally, though, there is little discussion of identity issues in relation to the public sphere:

Habermas discusses ways in which the literary public sphere helped to prepare the kinds of subjects needed for public political discourse, but once it has fulfilled its role as precursor to the political public sphere, the literary discourse drops out of Habermas’s picture. He does not consider the continuing transformations of subjectivity wrought not only in literature but in a host of identity-forming public spheres… Neither does he consider how identity might be transformed through public political activity. (Calhoun, 1994, p. 35-36).

The public sphere as habitat for social representations was mentioned earlier. Fraser (1997) advocates the public sphere as habitat for social identities: “public spheres are not only arenas for the formation of discursive opinion; in addition, they are arenas for the formation and enactment of social identities” (p. 125). I will now elaborate upon the media as a site of contestation and then link such a view (covering media theory and the public sphere) to the previous section on contestation, positioning and polemical representations. I will end by explaining how such theoretical perspectives will help in the analysis of the subject-matter of this thesis.

2.3.1. The media as a site of contestation

Hall’s (1980b) encoding/decoding model of media communication is relevant to this study because it has an explicitly social rendering of the processes of communication and incorporates the notion of ideology (as derived from Gramsci, 1971. in relation hegemony) into the processes of encoding and decoding. The encoding/decoding model is useful because it incorporates the notion of power into the reception of media texts.

The codes of encoding and decoding may not be perfectly symmetrical. The degrees of symmetry – that is, the degrees of
‘understanding’ and ‘misunderstanding’ in the communicative exchange – depend on the degrees of symmetry/asymmetry (relations of equivalence) established between the positions of the ‘personifications’, encoder-producer and decoder-receiver. (Hall, 1980b, p. 131).

Recently, however, Hall (Morley et al., 1996) argued that the model is not complete in that the frameworks of knowledge by which the material is decoded are part of the same social world as the frameworks of knowledge from which the programme is encoded. Though the frameworks of knowledge, or in the case of this thesis, social representations, are connected by being part of the same social world, their connection may only be in an oppositional manner. However, such a connection in an oppositional manner does not preclude the knowledge of alternative representations, Billig (1991) has found that committed royalists are aware of and have articulated arguments against anti-royalist rhetoric.

This reception differential is pertinent to a discussion on the identity-representation dialectic, especially in relation to the ‘identity politics’ movements. This is primarily because media sites are not only habitats for social representations, but also the sites for contestation of hegemony. The hegemonic representations are contested by the ‘identity politics’ movements in several arenas. The arena that is of specific interest to this study is the media. The relation between social representations and the public sphere has already been stated (Jovchelovitch, 1995b). So how does the notion of the public sphere incorporate an understanding of hegemony? And what happens when this hegemony is challenged?

Perhaps, one should first problematise the notion of the public sphere, especially in the context of late modernity. Technological advancements in the field of communications has resulted in repeated structural transformations of the public sphere, such that a theory of social communication can become obsolete before it gains acceptance in the academy. For example, Thompson (1990) proposed a theory of communication in relation in the main to television. However, the introduction of digital television, the development of the internet, and the probable combination of the two later will affect social life and the ‘practice’ of the public sphere. Nevertheless, there are several forms of public sphere. For example, there is a
national public sphere, a global public sphere, a local public sphere (at the level of municipality), and all are related, in greater or lesser extent, to hegemony.

The lack of conceptualisation of hegemony in Habermas’s formulation of the public sphere has been raised by theorists of the public sphere (Eley, 1997). I would like to discuss hegemony in the context of identity politics. Calhoun (1997b) states that the public sphere is structured according to dominant ideologies, hegemonic powers and social movements. The nature of hegemony, however, requires discussion also for hegemony is not a universal, all-encompassing category referring to an elusive yet elite group, rather it is a term that is binary in its logic. Hegemony is domination. But domination of an ‘other’. There can be no hegemony, without a subject of the hegemony. The ‘identity politics’ movement are in their existence the obverse and proof of hegemony. But the hegemony in each instance is the mirrored reflection of the ‘key category’ that is championed by the ‘identity politics’ movement. The ‘identity politics’ movement is therefore an attempt, at the social psychological level, to trans-code a hegemonic representation. This representation positions its designated identity in an oppositional manner to the representation itself. The contestation of the hegemonic representation in the public sphere has historically precipitated a variety of crises. I intend to study one example of this. Gervais et al. (1999) have noted the value of studying a crisis because “crises generate a problematisation of what was previously taken for granted”. (p. 427). Moscovici (1984b) has outlined some of the social psychological phenomena that are associated with a crisis:

…(t)he character of social representations is revealed especially in times of crises and upheaval, when a group or its image are undergoing a change. People are then more willing to talk, images and expressions are livelier, collective memories are stirred and behaviour becomes more spontaneous. Individuals are motivated by their desire to understand an increasingly unfamiliar and perturbed world. Social reconstructions appear unadorned, since the divisions and barriers between private and public worlds have become blurred. (p. 54).

The public sphere of Habermas was the centre for critical and rational debate in which consensus would be achieved through discussion and argumentation. It has already been stated that there is no one single, comprehensive public sphere (Fraser, 1997). So if we are considering the public sphere, we should consider it at one
particular level, say the national public sphere (which is pertinent to this thesis), which can be objectified in the case of the media to include, as examples, the national newspapers and television channels. However, the above discussion on hegemony and crises should highlight the need for an alternative function of the public sphere. The national public sphere can be an agent towards the maintenance of hegemony, and it can be oppositional or argumentative in its nature. An oppositional or negotiation-based public sphere has been suggested by certain researchers of the media (Curran, 1991; Fraser, 1990). This definition includes the public sphere as subaltern counterpublics as well as an alternative public sphere in which rival sides discuss pre-prepared arguments.

I would like to focus on the argumentative aspect of the proposed definition, and suggest that some of what occurs in the national public sphere can be deemed as belonging to an argumentative public sphere in which rival sides present to each other pre-prepared arguments in order to convince the audience. This alternative view towards the public sphere corresponds well with a rhetorical perspective in social psychology (Billig, 1996). Certainly, the ‘Rushdie affair’ as a media event is an example of argumentation in an oppositional type of public sphere in which rival sides discuss pre-prepared arguments. It is the challenging of hegemony by the ‘identity politics’ movements, and the consequent criticism-justification rhetorical contest that merits a public sphere as argumentative as opposed to critical-rational. It is through this contestation that the hegemony is open to modification, and even, according to Eley (1997), transformation.

So how does hegemony relate to representation? Hall (1997b), through referring to Foucault, advocates the ‘subject’ and the subject-position. ‘Subjects’ “personify the particular forms of knowledge which the discourse produces. These subjects would have the attributes we would expect as these are defined by the discourse: the madman, the hysterical woman, the homosexual, the individualized criminal, and so on.” (p. 56). The subject-position is that position from which the discourse makes most sense. But the subject-position can only make sense if the representational resources are available. Morley (1992) writes in relation to the reception of a television programme:
Whether or not a programme succeeds in transmitting the preferred or dominant meaning will depend on whether it encounters readers who inhabit codes and ideologies derived from other institutional areas which correspond to and work in parallel with those of the programme, or whether it encounters readers who inhabit codes drawn from other areas or institutions which conflict to a greater or lesser extent with those of the programme. (p. 87).

So the successful maintenance of hegemony requires the sharing of a representational field, and the rejection and even decomposition of hegemony, or rather a hegemonic representation, requires the availability of an alternative representational field. It is the struggle between hegemonic representations and ‘identity politics’ movements that I wish to study.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has been an examination into the nature of interaction between social representations and social identities. I would suggest that the two absences from the theory of social representations as expounded by Moscovici of identity and power need to be addressed if the theory is to be related to social identities. The nature of interaction differs according to the type of representation involved, hegemonic representations can lead to contestation through rhetorical counter-positioning by those that are subjected to the representation. The nature of identity expression alters in such a circumstance so as to institute a distinctive social phenomenon, that of the ‘identity politics’ movements. These identity politics movements questioned the hegemonic representations that had led to negative evaluations of their identities and the associated discrimination. The site of contestation is the public sphere.
3.0. THE BRADFORD MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND THE ‘RUSHDIE AFFAIR’ – A CASE STUDY

This thesis will be examining the issues raised in the previous chapters through the form of a case study. I will be taking the Bradford Muslim community as the location for the study, and the ‘Rushdie affair’ as the historical context. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a background to both the Muslim community in Bradford and the ‘Rushdie affair’. I will begin this chapter with a history of the Muslim community in Britain. This will include a review of some of the research on the history of Muslims in Britain. Subsequently, I will describe the composition of the Muslim community in Bradford and this will be followed by a summary of the recent social and political history of Bradford in relation to the South Asian Muslim community. Then, I will describe the ‘Rushdie affair’, this will include a short account of its coverage in the media. Finally, I will summarise an analysis of the print media’s coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’. This short account should provide some insight into the contents of the debate that became the ‘Rushdie affair’.

3.1. Muslims in Britain

The history of Muslims in Britain as communities can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century. From 1850 onwards, Yemeni sailors began to settle down and start local businesses in South Shields, Cardiff and Liverpool. Traces of these communities are still evident today. Other early communities included William Quilliam’s English community in Liverpool which centred around the Liverpool Mosque and a small community based around Woking mosque near London.

But these communities numbered only in the hundreds. The largest influx of Muslims into Britain to date has been due to the immigration policy of Britain during the fifties and the sixties which opened the doors to thousands of mainly manual workers. These Muslims were predominantly from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, however, today Muslims in Britain represent most of the Muslim world, whether this be from Morocco, Algeria, Malaysia, Egypt, Turkey etc. The 1991 census did not ask for

18 Part of my empirical work will involve the analysis of the televisual coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’.
religion as a category for self-identification but it did ask for country of origin and from such information, Anwar (1994) suggests the following breakdown:

Table 3.1. Breakdown of Muslim community according to country of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region of Origin</th>
<th>Numbers (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Muslim countries</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Muslims</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generally, the majority of Muslims from other than South Asia generally live in London, whereas the majority of Muslims from South Asia live outside of London in large conurbations such as West Midlands, Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire. This is because these Muslims were mainly manual workers who found employment near large industrial areas e.g. Birmingham, Manchester and Bradford.

3.1.1. The history of Muslims in Britain

By far the most comprehensive account of the history of the Muslims in Britain is by Ally (1981). He charts the history of the Muslims in Britain from 1850-1980. Ally distinguishes between pre-migration and post-migration in his account of the history of Muslims in Britain. The turning point for the history of the Muslims in Britain according to this account was the mass migration of thousands of workers during the fifties and the sixties. Prior to this there were very few Muslims in Britain. The account below will be similarly divided into pre-migration and post-migration.

3.1.2. Three Muslim communities pre-mass migration

According to Ally, “the number of Muslims resident in Britain during the period 1850-1949 was quite small” (Ally, 1981, p. 1). He quotes The Islamic Review as estimating the number of Muslims in Britain to be approximately 10,000 by 1915. The first group of immigrants were known as the Lascars. These were Indian and Arab sailors. Since many of these sailors were illiterate, they were employed in workhouses, or, some of them tried to open small businesses. The poverty of the
Lascars raised concern amongst various Christians and eventually a ‘home’ was bought on the West India Dock Road, Limehouse, London. Joseph Salter, a missionary, was appointed to look after the home and it was his duty to provide temporary residence for those seeking employment. His work would mean travelling to cities such as Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Cardiff, Southampton and Bristol. Salter worked with the Lascars for 39 years and during this time he helped set up an Asiatic Rest which was a meeting place for the Lascars. The Stranger’s Home was eventually bought in 1935 by the Stepney Borough Council.

3.1.2.1. The zawiyas

Foreign seamen were initially employed as cheap labour. However, industrial action led by Wilson in 1911 succeeded in securing equal pay for foreign seamen. This meant that many of the foreign seamen became financially more stable and hence coffee houses, delicatessens and spice shops became more visible as the community began to prosper. This was especially true for the communities in Cardiff and Tyneside. A census in 1948 numbered the Muslims of Tyneside as 850 (Collins, 1957, p. 152). Many of the Muslims married local English women, and their wives began to play an important role as intermediaries between the Muslims and the English population. Muslim families began to be housed together as they were offered better housing opportunities. Here, the Yemenis began to focus upon their cultural and historical roots. They became involved in the Shadhili tariqah (a sufi order) led in North Africa by Shaykh Ahmad al-Alawi. One of his pupils, Abdullah al-Hakimi, migrated from Yemen to Britain to spread the sufi order. He lived in Cardiff and there he established a zawiya. A zawiya was a “complex of religious buildings which grew up around the shrine of a local marabout or Muslim saint. These buildings would vary in size and number, but would always include a place for prayer, a Qur’an school and a room for guests who might come as pilgrims, travellers or students” (Ally, 1981, p. 32). The zawiyas became key centres for socialising as well as for providing financial assistance, and because of their success, the zawiyas spread to other ports around Britain especially Tyneside. The Shaykh would hold classes in religious teachings on a weekly basis as a way of introducing the English.

19 A Shaykh is a spiritual or religious teacher.
wives to Islam. Shaykh Ahmed of Tyneside succeeded Shaykh Abdullah al-Hakimi after the latter’s death and moved to Cardiff. Shaykh Ahmad was more politically active than Shaykh Abdullah and this caused a controversy within the Yemeni community in Britain around the issue of the break-up of Yemen, eventually leading to a split. The zawiyas as social institutions began to lose their importance with the migration of some Yemenis to the munition factories of Sheffield and Birmingham. This eventually led to the decline of the zawiyas.

3.1.2.2. The Liverpool mosque and the Muslim institute

Khan’s (1980) work on Islam and the Muslims in Liverpool provides insight into an early Liverpool Muslim community. This community centred around the activities of a lawyer from Liverpool, William Henry Quilliam. Quilliam was a solicitor and had a large advocacy practice, but this caused him to become fatigued and he was eventually told by his doctor to retire to the South of France for a temporary break. While there, he crossed over to Morocco where he came into contact with the Shadhili sufı order. He embraced Islam in 1887 and returned to Liverpool in 1889 after studying Arabic. He started preaching in Liverpool and soon his sons Ahmad, Alfred and Omar, and his mother Harriet all become converts. Others followed including a Professor Nasrullah Warren and a Professor Haschem Wilde. Eventually, he was able to set up a small prayer room in Mount Vernon Street. In the same year he wrote The Faith of Islam and Fanatics and Fanaticism. The first book had three editions published and was translated into thirteen languages. In 1891, they established a Liverpool Mosque and Institute. In 1896, they established a Medina Home for Children which provided accommodation for the growing number of illegitimate children in Liverpool. Further to this, the Liverpool community was able to develop the facilities at the Institute to establish a Muslim college which conducted courses in the pure sciences, history and languages. By 1896, there were estimates of approximately 150 people embracing Islam within Liverpool. Quilliam’s political views became more and more openly anti-British, and this eventually led to his leaving Liverpool in the autumn of 1908.

20 Khan (1980) suggests that Quilliam went to London and lived amongst the Woking community. He suggests that Quilliam changed his name to Professor Marcel Leon, and lived in Bloomsbury. Apparently, both names Leon and Quilliam were used in his funeral at Brookwood cemetery.
3.1.2.3. The Woking Muslim mission

Another early feature in the history of Muslims in Britain is the Woking Muslim Mission. This mosque based upon classical Muslim architecture was built in 1889 and was the first mosque to be constructed in Britain. It was paid for mainly through the contribution of Shajehan Begum, the ruler of the Indian state of Bhopal. It was built according to the design of Dr Leitner. After his death, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din (who arrived in 1912 to Britain as a missionary) assumed responsibility for the mission. Kamal ud-Din was a successful lawyer in Peshawar, Pakistan. He came to Britain in 1912 and in 1913 he took control of the Woking Mission. He had it repaired and appointed an Imam, Maulvi Sadr-ud-Din. Another leading personality of the Mission was Lord Headley who publicly announced his conversion upon meeting Khwaja Kamal ud-Din. Together they attracted a large group of converts mostly from the middle classes and the aristocracy of British society. In 1914 a ‘British Muslim Society’ was formed with Lord Headley acting as its president. By 1924, the number of British Muslims was estimated at about 1000.

3.1.3. Post-war mass migration

After the second world war, Britain experienced a rise in immigration from Commonwealth countries. Muslims were amongst those who came at this time, arriving mainly from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cyprus, the West Indies, West Africa and East Africa (Ally, 1981, p. 90). Migration from Pakistan to Britain came mainly from the following areas: i) Mirpur district in Azad Kashmir (this was related to the displacement of 100,000 Kashmiris due to the Mangla Dam project), ii) Chhacha area in Campbellpur, iii) certain villages around Peshawar, and iv) certain villages around Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Lyallpur (Ally, 1981, p. 95). Many of the Bangladeshis came from a village called Sylhet because of the worsening of agricultural conditions there. Turkish Cypriots came to Britain during these times as well, most of whom were from rural areas. The Muslims who came from the West Indies were part of an Indian community which had migrated to the West Indies in the mid-nineteenth century. The Muslims from West Africa were Nigerian Muslims who came as students between 1961 and 1966, but as Nigeria experienced civil war, their source of funding was...
withdrawn and they, therefore, had to rely on themselves whilst in the UK. Some of these Nigerian Muslims decided to stay as a way of supporting their families in Nigeria. Indian Muslims living in East African countries decided to migrate to Britain once the African governments decided to nationalise the economic institutions of the adopted countries.

3.1.3.1. The influence of Islamic debates in South Asia on the Muslim community in Britain

By now the migrants had decided to secure at least a temporary future for themselves in Britain, though the initial intention had been that of returning to their land of origin. Anwar (1979) calls this the ‘myth of return’. This was exacerbated by the arrival of their families, and the subsequent growth of communities. Ethnic minorities formed visible communities in many cities including Manchester, Newcastle, Birmingham, Blackburn, Leicester, London, Glasgow and Bradford. Community formation was accompanied by the emergence of institutions serving the cultural and religious needs of the community, foremost amongst these being the mosque.

The Muslims who arrived during these times were predominantly from South Asia but the migration to Britain did not serve to sever the links between the migrant community and the countries of origin. This was to such an extent that the Islam that is predominant amongst Muslims in South Asia is the Islam that is culturally reproduced in Britain especially with reference to the specific type of factionalism that is present in South Asia. This point will be elaborated further by providing a brief history of Islam in South Asia because it will help to explain some of the factors affecting the development of Muslim identity in Bradford. Nielsen (1987) states that “It is seldom realised among teachers, community workers, and even sociological researchers, how deeply involved the history and continuing perspectives of some of these movements are in an Islamic ‘revival’ that predates by at least a century the one which currently monopolises the headlines” (p. 388).
It is in the years following the ‘Indian mutiny’ *(sic)* that the four main trends in South Asian Islam have emerged. These trends are the Deobandi movement, the Barelvi movement, the Ahl Hadith movement and the Aligarh movement. In one way or another, all claim Shah Waliullah (d. 1762) as one of their own and the method of interpretation of Islamic law is a major cause of difference between them. The Deobandi movement takes its name from the town of Deoband which is situated North of Delhi in Uttar Pradesh. The Deobandis are strict followers of the *hanafi* school of thought and tend to be involved in Chisti *tariqahs*. The Barelvi movement takes its name from the town of the founder, Ahmad Riza Khan (d. 1921), who came from the town of Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh. Ahmad Riza Khan was a charismatic scholar/sufi as well as a prolific writer. The Barelvis are also followers of the *hanafi* school of thought and tend to be Qadiri and Naqshbandi sufis. The main division in South Asian Islam is between the Deobandis and the Barelvis. It dates back to the discussions and disagreements that occurred between Ahmad Riza Khan and certain exponents of the Deobandi school especially Ashraf Ali Thanwi centring on the place of the Prophet in Muslim theology. A war of fatwas and counter-fatwas ensued and this lead to the formation of two distinct group identities. Though the two groups share many opinions in that they are both sufis (sometimes from the same *tariqah*), and *hanafis*, their difference on a number of issues has led to the formation of two strong and conflicting identities.

A third movement, the Ahl Hadith, is known as such because of their stress upon using the original sources in order to derive legal rulings without reference to the intricate workings of a school of thought. The Ahl Hadith are different to both the previous movements in that they are opposed to a traditionalist framework and to the influence of sufism, claiming that its influence has led to the neglect of the Shariah (*Islamic law*). A fourth school emerged after the ‘mutiny’ as the Aligarh movement. The movement takes its name after the town, Aligarh, in India. This town houses the

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21 The four main trends of Islam referred to here are all within the Sunni school of thought. There are Shia Muslims in South Asia, and some of them also participated in the migration to Britain and as such there are numerous mosques associated with the shia branch of Islam in Britain. There is at least one shia mosque in Bradford, the Hussainia Islamic Mission.

22 There are four main schools of thought in Sunni Islam, the *hanafi* school is the predominant school in the Indian sub-continent. See Metcalf (1982) and Sanyal (1996) for more on Islam in India especially in relation to Deobandis and Barelvis.

23 *Tariqah* literally means way and describes the spiritual path of the mystic. There are numerous *tariqahs* in South Asia. For more on the varieties of mysticism within Islam, see Nasr (1991).
Aligarh Muslim University, formerly known as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College. The college was founded in 1875 in Aligarh by Sayyid Ahmad Khan and was recognised for its modernist leanings. These four main movements became prominent in the years following the ‘mutiny’ and represented different strategies on the part of Indian Muslims. Two further movements that emerged are the Nadwa movement and the Jama'at Islami. The Nadwa movement is based in the educational institution Nadwa-tul-Ulama in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. The Jama'at Islami is a political-religious organisation that was set up by Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi in an attempt to revive the practise of the religion. It was formed in 1941, and originally intended to be non-partisan, though it eventually became distinct and separate from the other movements.

The movements were formed as a result of the historical experience of the Indian Muslim community. However, the movements have, contrary to expectation, exerted their influence on Muslim identity in Britain. All of these six movements have some representation in the British Muslim community. The majority of the mosques in Britain are divided between the Barelvis and the Deobandis. The rest are divided approximately evenly between the Ahl Hadith and the Jama'at Islami. Much of the activity within the Muslim public sphere in Britain, and in Bradford, can be explained through reference to these movements.

3.2. The Muslim community in Bradford

The city of Bradford is situated in West Yorkshire towards the South East of the Pennines. The Bradford District (according to the City Hall Research section and the 1991 census estimation) covers a population of approximately 488,000. Of these, 388,000 are white, 68,000 are Pakistani, 13,500 are Indian, 5,500 are Bangladeshi, 6,000 are black and 7,000 are other. Assuming that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are predominantly Muslims, this would suggest that there are at least 73,500 Muslims in

24 There is no clear-cut correlation between these movements and the varying political strategies adopted by the Indian Muslims as responses to the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the authority of the British in India. For example, amongst the Deobandis, Hussain Ahmad Madani was in favour of the Congress Party and a united India whereas Shabbir Ahmad Usmani favoured the Muslim League and the Pakistan movement.

25 To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the extent of these organisations’ influences on the many platforms and institutions which have been set up in Britain.
Bradford, which is approximately 15% of the population. Many of the Indians are probably also Muslim but it is difficult to provide an estimate of just how many.

Bradford was a centre for the wool and textile industry, especially in the mid-nineteenth century. This industry attracted a whole series of migrants to Bradford: Irish immigrants arrived in the early nineteenth century, and approximately a century later eastern and central Europeans namely from Poland and the Ukraine arrived to work in the textile mills. A labour shortage following the second world war together with the economic mobility of the previous migrants meant that manual jobs became available again at the textile mills. The decline in the textile industry during the eighties reduced employment prospects in the city and unemployment has concomitantly risen sharply. This has especially affected those migrant communities which had come to work in the textile industry, such that unemployment is high amongst the migrant communities, especially the youth.

The majority of Pakistani Muslim migrants in Bradford originate from Mirpur, Jhelum and Attock. The Bangladeshi Muslim migrants are mainly from Sylhet and the Indian Muslim migrants are mainly from Gujarat. The Bangladeshis from Sylhet and the Gujarati Indians are generally associated with the Deobandi movement and the Pakistani migrants are divided between the Barelvi and the Deobandi movement.

3.2.1. Institution-building for a local community

The most visible evidence of religious identity is the number of mosques. The Muslim Directory lists twenty-eight mosques in Bradford, of which some are converted terraced houses. The larger mosques in Bradford number fifteen. These are the Abu Bakr mosque on Leeds Road, the Jamia Masjid on Howard Street, Masjid Quba on Bundria Court, Nur al Islam on St Margaret’s Road, Jame Masjid Ahl-e-Hadith on Hastings Street and the Jamiyat Tabligh ul-Islam mosques on Victor Street, Shearbridge Road, Toller Lane, Southfield Square and the Roxy Building, Suffat ul Islam UK Association on Sunbridge Road, the Jamia Islamiyah on Cross Lane,

26 For more detail, see Lewis (1993).
Hanafia mosque on Carlisle Road, Tawakullia Islamic Society on Cornwall Road and the UKIM mosque on Byron Street.

Of these mosques, the first four and the Tawakullia Islamic Society are associated with the Deobandi movement. They have close ties with the Markaz masjid based in Dewsbury which acts as the main centre in Britain for the Tablighi Jama’at. The UKIM mosque on Byron Street is affiliated with the UK Islamic Mission which is ideologically linked to the Jama’at Islami. The Jame Masjid Ahl-e-Hadith is affiliated with the Ahl Hadith movement. The Suffat ul Islam mosque and the Jamia Islamiyah on Cross Lane are both mosques associated with the Barelvi movement though they are independent of the main Barelvi Pir (saint) in Bradford, Pir Maroof Hussain. He leads the Jamiyat Tabligh ul Islam mosques in Bradford, which include five major mosques. At present, he is responsible for the construction of a central mosque in the centre of Bradford, a twenty-year-old project. The Bradford Council of Mosques is a committee comprised of representatives from the mosques in the city.

The mosques are used for congregational prayers on Friday and for the five daily prayers. Each mosque has an Imam (some have more than one) who leads the prayer and the teaching of the religion to the children. Each mosque also has a committee which manages the administration of the mosque. Some mosques run weekly study circles which focus on topics of religious practice, or understanding of the Qur’an. Many of the mosques have madrassahs (or religious schools) affiliated with them. Children from around the mosque are taught at the madressa either every morning before school or every evening after school for a further two hours. The children are taught Arabic with reference to reading the Qur’an, and some madressas also teach Urdu.

Other local structures and institutions include youth clubs, youth organisations and school societies. There are approximately six main youth centres which cater for Asian, ‘Muslim youth’. Generally, youth clubs do not tend to cater for any particular religious persuasion. The Pakistan community centre runs a local youth club three

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27 The Tablighi Jama’at is a revivalist organisation that was initiated by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas who was a student at Mazahir Ulum in Saharanpur in Uttar Pradesh, this college being a sister college to the Dar al Ulum in Deoband.
times a week for approximately three hours. The activities offered include group discussions on issues such as drug awareness, and sports such as football, snooker, and table tennis. Other youth clubs such as Laisterdyke Community Centre, Karmand Community Centre, Thornbury Youth Centre, Girlington Community Centre and Grange Interlink offer similar types of activities.

The past decade has seen the proliferation of numerous Islamic youth organisations in Bradford including the Young Muslims UK, the Jamiat Ihya Minhaj As-Sunnah, Hizb-ut-Tehrir and Minhaj al Qur’an\(^\text{28}\). This includes activities inside and outside of Bradford. Activities inside of Bradford include group discussions, lectures and distribution of leaflets and literature. National conventions, conferences and camps are held outside of Bradford by those organisations that have a national structure such as the Young Muslims UK, the Jamiat Ihya Minhaj as-Sunnah and the Hizb-ut-Tehrir. Attendance at such local youth programmes is minimal as it is at the youth clubs with five to ten attending Islamic discussions, fifteen to twenty attending the youth clubs. Islamic societies have been set up in many of the middle schools over the past decade. At the moment, there are between fifteen to twenty Islamic societies in Bradford, though again, attendance tends to be minimal.

3.2.2. Episodes in the political history of the Bradford Muslim community

The Bradford community has been at the heart of race relations since the early eighties because it has experienced numerous campaigns involving ethnic minorities, and over the years this has had the compounding effect of focusing the media’s attention on Bradford. The following is a short summary of some of the main events in Bradford’s recent history.

\(^{28}\) The Young Muslims UK is the youth wing of the Islamic Society of Britain, an organisation set up by sympathisers of the Muslim Brotherhood (in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world) and the Jama’at Islami of Pakistan. The Jamiat Ihya Minhaj As-Sunnah is an organisation mainly aimed at young people and university students. Though independent, it is aligned with the Ahl Hadith group and has connections to Arab Ahl Hadith scholars (the AhlHadith are known as salafis in the Arab world). Hizb-ut-Tehrir is part of an international organisation focusing on political awareness and revival formed in the 1950s by Nabhani, a Palestinian Islamic scholar. Minhaj al Qur’an is a youth orientated group whose leader Tahir al-Qadri is a Pakistani scholar and associated with the Barelvi movement.
Twelve youth were arrested in 1981 in Bradford for being in possession of incendiary devices i.e. dangerous explosives. This incident occurred at the same time as the riots in Brixton and Liverpool. The defendants claimed that they were in possession of such material for self-defence against racist attacks. The claim was that their community had suffered racial and arson attacks and the police had not protected them sufficiently. A local campaign was mobilised which called for the release of the twelve youth because “self-defence is no offence”. The jury found the twelve not guilty (Taimuri, 1996). This incident occurred within the context of the much more serious Brixton riots. Bradford was in this case a footnote to a larger, national conversation. The halal meat controversy and the Honeyford affair, however, were however both specific to Bradford and consistent national coverage of both issues turned the spotlight towards Bradford’s Muslim community.

The halal meat controversy began in 1983 when the Bradford Council started to serve halal meat in its schools to Muslim pupils. The Council’s Education Committee had met with Muslim community leaders the previous year and had agreed to their demands that halal meat should be introduced at schools which contained at least ten Muslim pupils. The key issue of this campaign was the right of the Muslim children to eat the meat that suited their religious requirements. Animal rights activists objected to the Muslim method of slaughter because they viewed it as causing unnecessary pain and called for pre-stunning and groups such as the Animal Liberation Front and the Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals began to campaign against the Council’s decision. Some sections of the far right also joined in the campaign. The Council agreed to debate the issue and in response the Muslim community campaign called for the withdrawal of Muslim children from schools on the day of the debate (6th March 1984). 4,000 Muslim protesters staged a demonstration outside the City Hall on 6th March 1984. Forty-one speakers debated the issue over four hours and the vote was fifty-nine in favour of the introduction of halal meat and fifteen against.

Ray Honeyford was the headmaster at Drummond Middle School in which the majority of the students came from ethnic minority communities. He wrote a series of

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29 One of the twelve, Aki Nawaz, went on to help establish the popular rap group ‘Fun-da-mental’.
articles for the media (including one particular article published in The Salisbury Review) which aroused considerable opposition for what was said to be his racist views, especially concerning multi-cultural education, Asians and West Indians (sic). A lobbying group called the Drummond Parents’ Action Committee was formed and a series of protests began mainly organised by the ethnic minority community which included the withdrawal of the children from school by their parents and the opening of alternative school in a local community centre. The key issue of this campaign was that the parents felt that it was unacceptable that the headmaster of their children’s school could hold such views which were against the interests of their children’s education. The campaign was followed in the national media, and both left wing and right wing groupings organised themselves around the campaign, the right wing lobby was upholding Honeyford’s right to free speech. The campaign lasted for two years and ended with Honeyford’s acceptance of early retirement and a cash settlement in late 1985. This was after he had been invited to 10 Downing Street by the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, for a cup of tea. This was an initial example of a local issue assuming national, symbolic significance\textsuperscript{30}. 

The Bradford riots began on the 9\textsuperscript{th} June 1995 after an incident at Garfield Avenue, off Oak Lane in Manningham, Bradford. Police were called after a complaint about a “noisy game of football”, and this led to arrests. The police conducted themselves in what was seen to be a heavy-handed way through the excessive use of force. This led to certain situations which formed the core ‘gossip’ for the riots: the manhandling of a young Asian mother, a police car running over the foot of an Asian lad, and the arrests of complainants against the police arrests\textsuperscript{31}. Fifteen official complaints were made against the police that night and crowds started to gather around Lawcroft House (a recently built police station, where the arrested youth were being detained) demanding the release of those who had been arrested. The arrival of riot police led to clashes between the police and the protestors. The following day, Saturday, several demands were made by councillors acting on behalf of the youth which were not met by the police and clashes resulted again on Saturday evening, and most of the damage that occurred to local shops and cars, occurred on this night. The tension died down

\textsuperscript{30} For further details of the halal meat issue and the Honeyford affair see Lewis (1994) and Siddique (1993).

\textsuperscript{31} Taimuri (1996) provides a full account of the riot and its causes.
by Sunday night. There was approximately one million pounds worth of damage. Thirty cars and fifty buildings were damaged, six business premises were burgled, eight arson attacks took place and two reports were taken of assault and wounding. A commission was asked to investigate the causes for the riots and its report was published in 1996\textsuperscript{32}. The riots were reported in the national media.

3.3. The ‘Rushdie affair’ and Muslims in Britain

The Muslim community had experienced some coverage in the media as a religious community before 1988. For example, the media covered an application for state funding made by Islamia school in Brent, London and the issue of the two Alvi sisters who had been sent home from a school in Manchester because they refused to remove their headscarves. The ‘Rushdie affair’\textsuperscript{33}, however, has become one of the largest points of exposure for the Muslim community in the national media. It began with the publication of \textit{The Satanic Verses} by Salman Rushdie in September, 1988\textsuperscript{34}. An organisation The UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs was formed in the weeks following the publication of the book. This was followed by a petition campaign which called for its withdrawal made on behalf of the Muslim community.

The book was banned in India, Bangladesh, Sudan, South Africa and Sri Lanka by the end of December 1988. A campaign to lobby the British government continued including a meeting with a Home Office minister and protest rallies across the country. Two events in early 1989 lead to the campaign assuming national and international significance. These two events were the book burning in Bradford in 14\textsuperscript{th} January 1989 and the pronouncement of a \textit{fatwa}\textsuperscript{35} by Ayatollah Khomeini\textsuperscript{36}.

\textsuperscript{32} The ‘official’ report into the riots was published by The Bradford Congress authored by Allen and Barrett (1996). The third and only South Asian Muslim member of the committee withdrew his name from the report and published his own report: Taj (1996).

\textsuperscript{33} The ‘Rushdie affair’ is in itself a social representation, descriptive of a time in British and international public history from late 1988 to late 1989. The letters received by the editors of British national newspapers show that the affair occupied some part of the public sphere at least until the middle of 1989 (Haroun, 1997).

\textsuperscript{34} A full history of the main events leading up to and beyond the ‘Rushdie affair’ is given in the Appendix.

\textsuperscript{35} A \textit{fatwa} is a religious verdict given by a qualified scholar.

\textsuperscript{36} The \textit{fatwa} read: “I inform the proud Muslim people of the world that the author of \textit{The Satanic Verses} book, which is against Islam, the Prophet and the Koran, and all those involved in its publication who were aware of its content, are sentenced to death. I ask all the Muslims to execute them wherever they find them” (Akhtar, 1989).
which called for the assassination of Rushdie. This was met with international condemnation. Rushdie had to go into hiding with the protection of the British government. Demonstrations and protests continued against the book climaxing with a large demonstration in late May 1989 in central London. Writers similarly began to campaign for diplomatic pressure to be exerted onto Iran to revoke the fatwa. The ‘Rushdie affair’ peaked as a media event in the period immediately after the fatwa. There were occasions when it again assumed national coverage including on the anniversary of the fatwa and during Rushdie’s conversion to Islam in December 1990, both events receiving prominent coverage in the national media. The main emphasis of the campaign against the book was focused on the publication of the paperback version of the book and the extension of the blasphemy law. The governments of Britain and Iran attempted to restore diplomatic links which were severed in the aftermath of the fatwa, this being achieved in late September 1990. I would follow Haroun (1997) in his depiction of three phases to the affair though I would name them as pre-crisis, immediate post-crisis, and reconciliation, in that though the differences remained, the style of language and the manner of engagement were both in the direction of reconciliation. An announcement by the Iranian government that it would not prosecute the fatwa in September 1998 concluded the diplomatic rapprochement.

The Muslim position during the ‘Rushdie affair’ (in its minimalist form of advocating the withdrawal of the book) was received with severe opposition and this is for four reasons. The first was that the issue in contention at the centre of the ‘Rushdie affair’ was the right to freedom of expression which is a central value of secular society - in America it is covered by the First Amendment of the Constitution. The restriction of this freedom was not considered to be a matter of peripheral importance. The second was that the relative importance of religion in British secular society was and has been declining. Religious identity and religion generally are associated with a traditional, pre-modern period and key classical sociologists such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber viewed modernity to be antithetical to religion and therefore religious identity as incongruous with late modernity. The third was that the relation between Islam (and the East) and Christianity (and the West) has been complex. As Said (1997) points out Islam and the East was constructed as a ‘cultural other’ for Christianity and the West in a diametrically oppositional manner. The presence and
assertion of this ‘cultural other’ within a Christian, western society (i.e. that Muslims were living in British society as British citizens) was one of the factors that caused the crisis. Fourth, the media which was reporting the crisis had a conflict of interest in reporting the affair in that it was in the media’s interest to maintain the standards of freedom of speech.

There was considerable discussion on the ‘Rushdie affair’ on the anniversary of the fatwa. The ‘Rushdie affair’ continued for approximately one year, and has still not been completely resolved. A Japanese translator of The Satanic Verses was assassinated, approximately 60 demonstrators were killed in demonstrations around the world, the Iranian government has recently stated that it will not act upon the fatwa, and The Satanic Verses remains in print and available in libraries and book shops.

I have chosen the point of interaction between the ‘Rushdie affair’ and the Bradford Muslim community because it represents a cathartic moment in the discussion of multiculturalism that has followed the immigration of South Asian Muslim communities. This moment captured and expressed the tensions that exist between the apparent contradictions of alternative world-views. The argumentation that surfaced in the media during this affair expressed simultaneously the anxieties of an immigrant community and a national society. The immigrant community witnessed its deeply-held values being challenged by its own act of migration, whereas the national society experienced the challenging of its most cherished qualities: liberty and tolerance.

3.3.1. Coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’ in the media

The ‘Rushdie affair’ was in many ways a national and international crisis. Many of the issues raised by the affair are fundamental to a secular, democratic system e.g. the right to freedom of expression, the role of religion within a secular country and minority rights. Much of the affair was conducted within the media since there were numerous articles in local and national newspapers, some documentaries and discussion programmes. Prominent Muslims such as Yusuf Islam and Kalim Siddiqui were invited onto chat shows to discuss the affair. The discussions focused on the extent of the right to freedom of expression, the rights of one government to sentence
a citizen from another government to death, the legality of supporting the fatwa, and the extension of the anti-blasphemy law.

The Muslim community became the object of media scrutiny through a variety of ways. The most prominent were the front page headlines and first item television news reports in the national media. Then, there were the reports, articles, editorials, commentaries, discussion programmes and documentaries. There was also the feedback mechanisms such as the letters page in newspapers, the Right to Reply programmes on the television and the late night radio phone-in programmes. There has not been, to this day, a comprehensive analysis of the full media coverage (both electronic and print) of the ‘Rushdie affair’. Haroun (1997), however, has analysed the print media’s coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’. His findings are summarised below.

3.3.2. A summary of an analysis of the print media’s coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’

Haroun (1997) has conducted a content analysis of the letters to the editor that were published in the print media between 1st January and 31st December 1989. The letters to the editor were used because they were viewed to be an example of Moscovici’s notion of the thinking society since they involved debate between the readers and the press (and between the readers themselves), though the debate is ultimately controlled by the editors.

The sample used for Haroun’s study consisted of tabloid newspapers, middle-sized dailies and broadsheets. The tabloid newspapers used were The Sun and The Daily Mirror. The two middle-sized dailies were The Daily Mail and The Daily Express. The broadsheets used were The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times and The Observer, the first four being daily newspapers and the last one being a weekly.

A sum total of two hundred and sixty four letters were published. These letters were classified into one of four types: pro-Rushdie, anti-Rushdie, mixed and undecided. A pro-Rushdie letter was classified as such if it expressed support for Rushdie’s right to free speech or for the publication of the book. A letter was classed as anti-Rushdie if
the writer expressed some reservation about the book. A letter would be classed as mixed if the writer supported Rushdie’s right to freedom of expression while regarding the book as damaging to community relations. And a letter was classed as undecided if the letter expressed some point of view regarding the issues relating to the affair while at the same time remaining ambiguous on the main issues of the affair.

Haroun identified three main phases for the debate: pre-fatwa, post-fatwa and legal reform. The debate began with a discussion on the issues surrounding the publication and withdrawal of the book, this included the issue of the burning of the book. Then after the fatwa, the debate focused on the right to freedom of speech and international law. This then became a discussion on the nature of British society as multi-faith and multi-cultural.

The discussion pre-fatwa centred around the burning of the book in Bradford. References were made to “the Bradford Muslims”, “the fanatical Muslims in Britain”, “the Bradford incident” and “Bradford Islam” as a backward type of village Islam. The anti-Rushdie writers were mostly Muslim community leaders and tended to represent themselves as the voice of the Muslim community or even of the Muslims world-wide.

The discussion post-fatwa centred around the fatwa itself. References were made here to “the death threat”, “the Ayatollah’s incitement to murder” and “the Ayatollah Khomeini’s writ”. The majority of the responses to the fatwa were of overwhelming opposition because of the breach of the right to freedom of expression. The discussion then moved on to cover the issue of the blasphemy law and whether it should be extended to cover minority religions. The discussion on the blasphemy law then became linked to the discussion on censorship and this led on to a discussion of the multicultural nature of British society.

With regards to the distribution of the letters, Haroun notes that over 75% of the letters were published within the first three months of the year. There were 44 letters printed in the pre-fatwa period, 163 letters in the post-fatwa period and 57 letters in the legal reform period. Of the sum total of letters published, 34% appeared in The
Independent, 25% appeared in The Times and 20% in The Guardian. The rest were distributed at levels below 10% amongst the rest of the newspapers.

The letters were coded according to a manual devised by Haroun. This coding manual contained two sections. The first section contained seven points of background information. These were the number of the letter, the newspaper in which it appeared, the date of publication, the time of publication, the letter history, the type of writer (e.g. civil liberty activist, non-Muslim clergy etc.) and the letter classification (as pro-Rushdie, anti-Rushdie, mixed or neutral). The second section of the coding manual contained six salient themes concerning the ‘Rushdie affair’: the British law of blasphemy, Bradford Muslims, British society, fatwa, freedom of expression and Islam. Haroun then investigated through statistical analysis whether there was any significant relationship between letter classifications as pro-Rushdie, anti-Rushdie, mixed or neutral and the salient themes in the letters. Haroun found that there was little statistical significance between letter classifications and the themes of the British law of blasphemy and the nature of British society. However, there were significant relationships established between letter classifications and the themes of Bradford Muslims, fatwa, freedom of expression and Islam.

Haroun highlights the significance of choice of titles for the letters section. This choice of title not only represents the editor’s representation of the letter but it also reflects the editorial policy of the newspaper. For example, a sharp contrast is drawn between The Daily Express, The Times and The Independent. The Daily Express had “Show these Iranians the iron fist” as its title immediately after the fatwa. The Times has titles such as The Satanic Verses, “Not simple to test blasphemy” and “Rushdie and the freedom of speech”. The Independent chose titles such as “Hard-won freedom”, “Rally to Rushdie”, “Rushdie and Galileo” and “No deception by Rushdie”. The Times, Haroun notes, observed neutrality in its choice of titles whereas the Independent was “conspicuously vocal on freedom – the freedom of expression in particular” (Haroun, 1997, p. 214).

This is a summary of an analysis of the some of the print media’s coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’. He surveys the main themes in the letters and hence accesses the main representations which were involved in the affair at the time. This provides an
overview and coverage of the social representations that were involved in the ‘Rushdie affair’ during that year. I will be doing the same to the electronic media and then specifically relating it back to issues of identity for a local community like that of the Muslims in Bradford in this thesis.

3.4. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide a historical context to the subject matter of this thesis. I have described the historical development of the Muslim community in Britain through three early Muslim communities to the period of mass migration during which hundreds of thousands of Muslims of mainly South Asian origin migrated to Britain. This led to the establishment of Muslim communities throughout Britain, mainly in the inner city areas of major cities. The initial intentions of return began to change towards permanent settlement as a second generation was raised through the British schooling system. The concern for cultural and religious maintenance coupled with an ascending sense of citizen consciousness led to participation in public life around issues of recognition. The ‘otherness’ that is represented by the South Asian Muslim community meant, however, that a demand for recognition was simultaneously a demand for the national society to accept difference. This was, and remains, problematic. The ‘Rushdie affair’ is in itself an example of the consequences of a breakdown in the tense equilibrium that is the result of negotiating these competing, and often contradictory, claims.
4.0. PHILOSOPHY AND METHODS OF RESEARCH

This chapter provides the rationale for the methodology being employed in this study as well as describing the methodological procedure of the research itself. The chapter begins with a discussion of some of the issues surrounding the type of methodology adopted in this thesis. The three studies that have been employed are then described. There then follows a discussion on the insider/outsider debate which is relevant to this thesis since the researcher is an insider himself to the community that is being studied.

4.1. Methodology for a sociological form of social psychology

This study is relevant to a certain time and place. The understanding of social psychology as the study of history has been asserted by Gergen (1973), a social psychologist involved in the elaboration of an explicitly more social psychology37, who writes: “In essence, the study of social psychology is primarily an historical undertaking. We are essentially engaged in a systematic account of contemporary affairs” (p. 316). This discussion can be extended in another direction. If social psychology is similar to history in that it is the study of the processes of communication and interaction at a particular moment in time, then I would further suggest that, in certain circumstances, social psychology is the study of processes and interaction at a particular location. In fact, some social processes can only be studied at certain places. Jodelet (1991) could only study madness in the way that she did at Ainay-le-Château. Similarly, the involvement of the Bradford Muslim community in the ‘Rushdie affair’, and its simultaneous projection in the media and the academic world as a prototypical community, make it unique for social psychological investigation. Therefore, following on from Gergen (1973), social psychology can not only be delimited by time, but also by location.

The methods advocated for the study of identity processes amongst Muslims in Bradford are in line with methodological assumptions of Hegelian frameworks of research. An example of an approach that is derived from the Hegelian framework is
symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism has three assumptions according to Denzin (1978). The first is that social reality is a social production which interacting individuals produce and define through their own definitions of situations. The second assumption is that humans are capable of engaging in self-reflexive behaviour, and the third assumption is that interaction occurs, is emergent, negotiated and often unpredictable. It also involves the use of symbols such as words and signs.

The methodological implications of symbolic interactionism are that symbols and interactions must be viewed together. This would highlight the relative merit and importance of the symbols and their influence upon social life. Another methodological implication is that the social scientist must take the perspective of the ‘acting other’ and view the world from the subject’s point of view i.e. ‘participate’ in his/her symbolic world. The social scientist should also link the subject’s symbols and definitions with social relationships. The situated aspects of behaviour should be studied and this would include examining the behavioural settings. These are some of the methodological implications of symbolic interactionism as advocated by Denzin (1978). These Hegelian principles epitomise the background assumptions that underlie the methodological approach of this thesis.

The studies in this thesis are based upon the methodological principle of triangulation. Triangulation has been defined by Denzin (1978) as a “combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomena” (Denzin, 1978, p. 291). Denzin suggests three principles for triangulation. The first requires the method to be relevant to the particular research problem. The second is that each method has its own strengths and weaknesses. The third is that the methods should be selected according to their compatibility with the theory being adopted.

Denzin (1978) also outlines several different types of triangulation. The first is data-triangulation. This involves the use of different data sources that have been extracted from different times, places and people. The second is investigator triangulation, which involves the use of different researchers so as to minimise individual bias. The third is theory triangulation which involves “approaching data from different multiple

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For further information on issues of social psychology and methodology from a critical perspective
perspectives and hypotheses in mind” (Denzin, 1978, p. 297). The final concept is methodological triangulation which involves the use of different methods. Methodological triangulation, according to Denzin, “…involves a complex process of playing each method off against the other so as to maximise the validity of field efforts” (Denzin, 1978, p. 304).

The enhancement of validity is a key reason for the use of triangulation according to Denzin (1978). This is questioned by Silverman (1985) who asks whether there is any particular master reality that can be objectively studied. Is it not the case, asks Silverman, that the way we study a subject affects the subject itself? Silverman asserts that different methods highlight different realities. Leading on from a similar form of criticism, Fielding and Fielding (1986) suggest that theories and methods should be combined for “the intention of adding breadth and depth to our analysis but not for the purpose of pursuing ‘objective truth’” (p. 33). Denzin (1989) responds to his critics by suggesting that the goal of triangulation is to interpret reality, not to arrive at some form of objective reality. By approaching that same reality from different angles, the likelihood for error or misperception is reduced.

The methodological procedure of triangulation has been indirectly advocated by two researchers, Thompson (1990) and Morley (1992), as a means of studying the processes of communication that involve the media. Though they do not actually refer to triangulation, these two approaches take triangulation to refer to three separate locations of the communication process and advocate a methodology that approaches the research topic at these three separate locations. Thompson (1990) proposes a ‘tripartite approach’ that examines three object domains. The first is the process of the production, transmission and distribution of the symbolic forms. The second is the construction of the media sign itself. The third is the reception and appropriation of this sign. Similarly, Morley (1992) suggests that a complete study of mass communications has to examine three aspects of the process: the study of the production of media artefacts, the study of the product as a constructed sign, and the process of decoding.

These two approaches can be related to Hall’s (1980b) encoding/decoding model\textsuperscript{38} so that in the study of interaction\textsuperscript{39} between identities and representations through the media, there are five sites of analysis labelled A to E as in the diagram below.

Figure 4.1. Sites of study for media analysis

\begin{figure}
\centering
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node (A) at (0,0) {A. social representations of encoding community};
\node (B) at (2,2) {B. encoding/production};
\node (C) at (6,2) {C. representation};
\node (D) at (8,0) {D. decoding/reception};
\node (E) at (10,0) {E. social representations of decoding community};
\draw [->] (A) -- (B);
\draw [->] (E) -- (D);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{figure}

The first two sites are situated at the site of production i.e. the construction of the, for example, programme/article itself, the third is the content of the programme/article, and the fourth and fifth are at the site of reception. These processes of production and reception can be related to social representations theory by suggesting that both processes can be interpreted through social representations which rely on a representational field that acts as the context for the production and the reception of the media message.

This thesis will adopt the methodological procedure of triangulation by examining three aspects of the identity-representation dialectic. The following are the three methods which I intend to use in this thesis. The first study is a study of the representational field of the identity processes within the Bradford Muslim community. Such a representational field is related to the social representation of

\textsuperscript{38} This connection is not unexpected for Morley since he worked with Hall at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham.

\textsuperscript{39} The directionality and lack of circularity of influence has been criticised by Hall (Morley \textit{et al.}, 1996) himself in that representations across sites of encoding and decoding are inter-connected in the social world, however, this thesis would suggest that in this particular case study such a connection takes an oppositional form.
group identity in the public sphere. The second study is a rhetorical analysis of televisual representation of the ‘Rushdie affair’ in order to provide content and therefore meaning to the processes being studied. The third study is an examination of the reception to one media portrayal of the Bradford Muslim community (during the ‘Rushdie affair’) by South Asian Muslim youth i.e. it is an examination of how the social representation of group identity can affect reception of the media. All three studies together provide access and analysis to the processes of representation and identity in the community itself, in the media and in the reception to the media. They are each described below.

4.1.1. Studying the community

The main method employed for investigating the identity-representation dialectic amongst Bradford’s Muslim youth was interviews with ‘specialists’ on the Bradford community. Participant observation was used initially, to help formulate the questions used in the interviews rather than being used as data in its own right. Denzin (1978) lists three assumptions of participant observation. These include the social scientist sharing in the subject’s world, having direct participation in the symbolic world and finally, playing a role in the subject’s world. Jorgensen (1989) says on this point that the methodology of participant observation is especially appropriate when little is known about the phenomenon, there are important differences between insiders and outsiders and the phenomenon itself is obscured from the view of outsiders. All of these points are relevant to the study of identity processes within the Muslim community in Bradford.

The researcher visited Islamic societies, mosques, youth clubs and snooker centres, though the most useful form of feedback was provided by participation in everyday conversation with groups of friends or casual acquaintances. The researcher’s professional identity was made explicit in all scenarios. The researcher, though, found that the boundaries around the object of study were sometimes difficult to establish. This essentially meant that most if not all activities in the researcher’s life became the

40 The youth workers that work in the clubs have recently adopted an alternative strategy in which they spend more of their time walking around the area local to their youth club instead of waiting to receive the youngsters at the youth club itself.
object of study. This is not the case for the outsider. The outsider, by definition, in their normal life, remain outside the object of study. Entering the world of study within a participant observation framework requires the outsider to cross the line that actually divides the object of study from other areas of social life. The researcher therefore had to objectify the research by using interviews in which the actual issues raised by the literature review and the participant observation could be explored.

A related issue which leads to the requirements of alternative means of verification is that of bias. If an insider is studying his own community, then he needs to check against his perceptual biases in the analysis of the community (Ichheiser, 1949a), especially if the only method of research is participant observation. It could be argued, as Agar (1980) does, that the process of study and research, especially in terms of involvement with a supervisor and an academic community, serves to reduce the level of bias. This may be true, but it is not sufficient in itself to provide an adequate guarantee of freedom from error due to bias. However, if the researcher were to explore the issues raised by the participant observation with other members of the community then this could provide alternative forms of verification for the researchers’ analysis of the community.

The method used for the exploration and verification of the issues raised by the participant observation was interviewing. Six individuals were chosen for each of three separate categories. The central object of study was the South Asian, Muslim youth scene and this formed one category. The other two categories were two out-groups to South Asian, Muslim youth. One out-group was that of the South Asian, Muslim elders (category 2) and the other out-group were similarly outsiders to the youth scene, but from an English background (category 3). Six individuals were chosen from each category, the key characteristic of these individuals is that they had to be informed of the youth scene from an occupational or vocational perspective i.e. that they possessed specialist knowledge of the community. Moscovici (1988) writes of those who manufacture social representations, but here I am concerned with those whose occupation requires them to specialise on the observation and analysis of the subject matter that is of interest to this study.

4.1.1.1. Participating in the Muslim community
The researcher attended mosques, weekly study circles, weekly meetings at the Islamic Society, private study circles in homes and group discussions at youth clubs. The Islamic Relief charity shop, and the two bookshops - the Rolex Trading Company and the Book Centre (which sell a wide range of Islamic books as well as Asian cultural artefacts and music cassettes) - were also visited on a regular basis. Discussions were held around various dinner invites about the issues facing Bradford Muslim youth. Two meetings were also attended for the purposes of research. The first was an informal gathering of local youth leaders. The meeting was arranged in order to discuss the problems of Bradford Muslim youth. A second, much larger meeting was organised in support of a local race relations activist who had recently been charged for personal misconduct and was under investigation for financial impropriety. The meeting was organised by the Action for Racial Justice and over two hundred of Bradford’s prominent leaders of all religious persuasions attended.

A variety of materials were also collected as aids during the period of participant observation. The criteria used for the selection of these materials were the following: they had to be marketed at least partially towards the group that I was studying, they had to be released into the local public sphere at the time of the research (September 1998 – May 1999) and they should have been aimed at mainstream markets – i.e. they should not be too obscure. The materials, therefore, include a series of Islamic book catalogues, two issues of the latest Trends magazine, the brochure for the annual Bradford Festival, the first three issues of the magazine The Voice of Manningham, the first issue of Asian Buzz, the first two newsletters of The Debate (the newsletter for the Bradford Racial Equality Council), two issues of Eastern Eye and issues 3-5 of Bradford Asian Eye (a monthly newspaper produced for free distribution by the local newspaper The Telegraph and Argus).

The participation in events and everyday life in the public sphere combined with a review of several magazines which served as examples of local and national media provided a broad view of public social life in a local community like Bradford. The researcher, by virtue of being an insider, also gained access to backstage discussions where the conversations were more intimate. Though, this may have been natural for certain encounters in which the researcher was and had been acquainted with the
interviewee or discussant for at least a few years, it was not immediately natural for other encounters, but this did not prevent the interviewees or discussants adopting a tone of intimacy. Several times during the interviews, the researcher was told certain pieces of information, though they were “off the record”. An analysis of all this information led to the identification of several themes which were used to formulate the questions in the interviews.

4.1.1.2. Topic guide and analytical framework

The first issue highlighted for investigation is the ‘Between Two Cultures’ model. This suggests that young South Asian Muslims are faced with two conflicting cultures. The first is that of their parents which is rooted in the tradition, culture and religion of their pre-migration home and the second culture is that of British society with its liberal values. This issue is raised by numerous researchers in the field (e.g. Community Relations Commission, 1976; Watson, 1977; Knott et al., 1993; Hutnick, 1986; Kitwood, 1983). A question on this issue was asked to the interviewees: “How do you think the second and third generations are adapting to living in British society, and Bradford in particular?”.

The second question related to the interaction between the South Asian Muslim youth with wider English society. Participant observation had revealed that there was a feeling of ‘isolation’ on the part of the South Asian Muslim youth, and that this was due to the perceived and actual racism and prejudiced behaviour of some of their English counterparts. Bradford has been celebrated as a multi-cultural city through its annual festival every year for the past decade. Yet, it seemed that communities are still living in separation from each other. This was a pertinent issue in relation to housing choice since it had been pointed out that when members of the South Asian Muslim community moved into an ‘English area’, then the English would slowly and eventually move out. This issue also provided a question for the interviews: “Do you think that there is a sense of isolation amongst the South Asian Muslim community in Bradford? Are the communities separated?”.
This was related to a third question which was put to the interviewees on the nature and context of stereotypes. The interviewees were asked about stereotypes, whether there was a stereotype of Muslims and Asians and what are the factors that cause this stereotype? For example, Husband (1994) suggests that stereotypes are latent in British popular culture, this questioned focused upon this issue. The report on Islamophobia by the Runnymede Trust (1997) describes a specific type of prejudice which is targeted against Muslims, rather than being targeted at skin colour. This issue was also investigated within this category of question.

The fourth topic concerns the range of responses that emerge from South Asian Muslim youth as a result of the previous three issues. Several types of responses have been offered by researchers in the area (e.g. Hutnick, 1991; Peach and Glebe, 1995; Werbner, 1996; Jacobson, 1996b). The range and type of response amongst Bradford’s Muslim youth was investigated by asking the interviewees the following question: “Do you think that there are differences between the youth in the way that they respond, or are they all responding in one way?”. Black culture as exemplified by Los Angeles street culture or rap music and the signifiers associated with that particular lifestyle has been suggested to be influential on Asian youth culture (Gillespie, 1995). The interviewees were asked whether they thought this was also the case for the Bradford South Asian, Muslim youth culture. The sixth area of study is the question of the rise of Muslim identity (Samad, 1992; Werbner, 1996; Christie, 1991; Shaw, 1994) and whether the interviewees viewed this to be the case in Bradford. This led onto another question, which investigated the apparent discrepancy between identity and behaviour as discussed by Samad (1992) and Vertovec (1998).

The relation between global events and local identity is the seventh area of study. The recent Gulf War and Yugoslav War are examples of international events that have been covered by the world’s media and researchers such as Halliday (1995) have suggested that they have a direct effect on Islamic consciousness. The following question was asked: “Do you think that international events such as the Gulf War or

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41 A situation comedy called Love thy Neighbour based on this idea was shown on national television in the seventies.
the Yugoslav War have an impact on local youth in the sense that it makes them question their own identity?”.

Haroun (1997) referred to a ‘Bradford Muslim’ as a representation in his analysis of letters to the editors of newspapers after the book burning of *The Satanic Verses* and the *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie. The ‘Bradford Muslim’ seemed to be a particular type of Muslim as a social representation and the interviewees were asked whether they had noticed a representation of the ‘Bradford Muslim’. A question on the riots formed the ninth area of study, examining the explanations given for the riots and the possibility of any connection between the riots and identity processes in Bradford. This was followed by the presentation of six photographs, all are pictures42 of buildings in Bradford acting as objectifications. The six pictures were shown in three pairs of two. The first pair were pictures of Haq Halal supermarket and Rolex Trading Company (a multicultural book shop), the second pair were of Lawcroft House (a police station) and Lister Mills, and the third pair were of two mosques, one at Carlisle Road and the second at Westgate in the town centre. The pictures were then presented to the interviewees and they would then be asked to comment on the pictures.

4.1.1.3. Interviewing the specialists

The interviews43 were conducted in the first six months of 1999, mostly in formal settings and were recorded by dictaphone. The order of interviews was such that members of the ‘elder’ category were interviewed first and the youth were interviewed later. The interviewees44 were chosen specifically because their occupation and participation in public life (in a social and political sense) required them to specialise on the subject matter of the South Asian Muslim community in Bradford. The participants chosen came from amongst the youth themselves. They were chosen for their high profile and because they were viewed as key members of the youth community. The ‘elders’ were taken from two sections of the Bradford community: those who were viewing the youth scene from outside the Muslim

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42 All pictures are in the appendix.
43 The interview schedule appears in the appendix.
44 A table describing the distribution of the interviewees is in the appendix.
community, and those who were viewing the youth scene in Bradford from inside the Muslim community. Key members of both communities were chosen for their specialist knowledge of the youth scene. Six members were chosen from each category.

The non-Muslim interviewees were all contacted by letter, the rest were contacted by phone, though an official letter was shown at the beginning of the interview. The use of the letter, as opposed to informal contact (i.e. through the phone), was employed for non-Muslims because it was deemed necessary in order to arrange the interviews. The non-Muslim specialists\textsuperscript{45} chosen for interviewing were a local member of Parliament who had served as a local councillor for eight years before he became an MP, a head teacher of an inner city primary school, a police inspector involved in community and race relations, a businessman who previously owned a famous local hotel and now owns a major night club, a senior youth worker and a local reporter for a regional newspaper. The Muslim elders chosen for interviewing were a leading councillor involved in local politics for over two decades, a leading race relations worker also with two decades’ experience, a local businessman, a religious leader and businessman, a youth worker for a major community centre, and a bookshop owner who specialises in multi-cultural books. The South Asian Muslim youth chosen for interviewing were a charity worker, a primary school teacher, a youth worker, a youth leader, two businessmen, one owning a pizza takeaway service and another who owns a curry take-away service.

4.1.2. Studying the electronic media.

The second area of study is the media text. I conducted a rhetorical analysis of how the Muslim community is framed in the media, especially the electronic media. Crises such as the ‘Rushdie affair’ lead to more programmes, documentaries and news items than normal. A rhetorical analysis of these programmes shows how the Muslim community is portrayed in the media, and in turn allows access to the social representation of the Muslim community in the media. The study of the media text within the theoretical framework of this thesis allows for an opportunity to examine

\textsuperscript{45} All interviewees were male for reasons outlined in the introduction.
dominant representations. There is, however, a problem in that ideology is, in the words of Lewis (1991), like an octopus. It manifests itself across multiple forms of media through multiple mechanisms. Hegemonic representations are, therefore, heterogeneous in their structure and distribution. The most widely disseminated form of hegemonic representations appear on the ‘face’ of the most widely consumed media such as ‘The Six O’Clock News’ on BBC1 or the tabloid front page headlines. Researching such forms of media provide access to hegemonic representations in their clearest forms. I have, however, chosen to study a form of television programming that provides access to the argumentation involved in the Rushdie affair. The hegemonic representations though present in these programmes are placed within a rhetorical context that permits rebuttal and counter-rebuttal (between the hegemonic and the subaltern) such that the ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) that essentially constitute the central crux of ‘the Rushdie affair’ become apparent.

The televisual media covered the ‘Rushdie affair’ through a variety of means: news broadcasts, late night and early morning discussion programmes and documentaries. There does not exist any comprehensive account of the electronic media’s coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’. I surveyed the television schedules for the BBC, ITV and C4 networks from 1st July 1988 through to 31st December 1990 at the British Library of Newspapers at Colindale, London. I surveyed the schedules through scanning the TV Times and the Radio Times for this period. These dates were chosen because the ‘Rushdie affair’ generated national media coverage for over a year after the issuing of the fatwa. By doing so, I was able to compile a list of all the television programmes that were transmitted during this period that had any relevance to Islam or the situation of the Muslim community in Britain. This list is provided in the appendix. The list does not include news programmes, though undoubtedly, many of the news programmes would have covered the ‘Rushdie affair’, especially around the main events such as the book-burning and the issuing of the fatwa.

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46 There was much media coverage on the anniversary of the issuing of the fatwa. This included a televised lecture, a lengthy article in the Independent, plus many letters of correspondence.
From these programmes, I selected five\textsuperscript{47} television programmes which were particularly relevant to this thesis. The criteria used for the selection of the television programmes were: firstly, whether the programmes covered the issues surrounding the ‘Rushdie affair’; and secondly, whether the programmes had a rhetorical/argumentative structure, for example in the case of documentaries or discussion programmes. The programmes that I finally selected are listed in the table below in chronological order:

Table 4.1. Television programmes used for rhetorical analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title and number of programme</th>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Date of broadcast</th>
<th>Transmission time</th>
<th>Television genre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: The Late Show</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>22 Feb 1989</td>
<td>11.15 p.m.</td>
<td>Interviews followed by group discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: The Late Show</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>8 May 1989</td>
<td>11.15 p.m.</td>
<td>Ignatieff on Bradford Muslim community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Iranian Nights</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>20 May 1989</td>
<td>10.25 p.m.</td>
<td>Play about issues raised by RA\textsuperscript{48}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Hypotheticals</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>30 May 1989</td>
<td>10.35 p.m.</td>
<td>Structured discussion on RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Everyman</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>27 May 1990</td>
<td>10.35 p.m.</td>
<td>‘Mock experiment’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These programmes represent five of eight programmes\textsuperscript{49} broadcast over this eighteen month period on the ‘Rushdie affair’. Two of the other three were written pieces read out on television representing the writer’s viewpoint, one by Fay Weldon (broadcast on 30 March 1989) and the second by Salman Rushdie, though presented and read by Harold Pinter (broadcast on 6 February 1990). The third broadcast (31 March 1990) was a general programme on the ‘Rushdie affair’ which included an interview with Salman Rushdie. These programmes were not selected for the rhetorical analysis because they were viewed to have less dialogical content than the other five programmes i.e. they were an identity position statement within an argument, though this does not preclude their incorporation of social representations associated with the

\textsuperscript{47} The programmes can be obtained from the researcher, as can the transcripts of the programmes. The transcript of \textit{The Late Show} programme broadcast on 8 May 1989 is provided in the appendix as an example.

\textsuperscript{48} RA is short for the ‘Rushdie affair’.
‘Rushdie affair’. In fact such an incorporation would be necessary for a successful attempt at argumentation. The five programmes were constructed as dialogic argumentation, including the play which provided a dramatised form of the same argumentation.

The programmes cover different genres. The first is a series of interviews followed by a studio discussion, the second is the ‘travelogue’ of a writer’s visit to Bradford, the third is a play, the fourth is a structured, studio discussion enacted as a hypothetical scenario and the fifth is a ‘mock experiment’ in which people representing different positions live together in a hostel while discussing the issues. Though the genres are different for all five programmes, the issue that is being discussed is the same: the ‘Rushdie affair’. This means that the same issues are highlighted in each programme. The programmes are interpreted by audiences across genres, this phenomenon being termed ‘intertextuality’ (e.g. Hall, 1997a). Rose (1996) in her examination of social representations of madness on British television employs this concept to demonstrate:

…how in reading one television text, the viewer draws on knowledge gained, both as content and as form, from a whole range of other television texts, films and secondary literature as well. So, in interpreting a scene involving a mentally distressed person on a drama programme, the viewer might make sense of it by drawing on knowledge gleaned from a news programme (p. 108).

The social representations involved in the discussion of the affair are therefore similar across the programmes, and this allows for a rhetorical analysis which examines the different, opposing views while simultaneously connecting them to the social representations with which these arguments are associated.

The programmes were all broadcast late night. The summaries of the programmes can be found in the appendix. The five television programmes were transcribed. The analysis is based upon these transcripts of the programmes. The transcripts were then read and any form of rhetorical content was highlighted, and separated. The entire rhetorical content was examined and deconstructed according to three units of analysis. Firstly, key argumentative positions were identified according to the

49 The researcher has one other programme, again The Late Show, but this cannot be dated. It involves
argument being presented and the person articulating the argument. So the rhetorical element was categorised according to position and the articulator of the rhetoric. Secondly, the rhetoric was broken down according to the type of rhetoric since the researcher had identified three types of rhetoric depending upon the style and depth of argumentation\textsuperscript{50}. Thirdly the rhetoric was categorised as either pro-liberal or anti-liberal, since these were the two main bi-polar positions during the affair. An exposition of the results of this study including an exploration of the dialectic between rhetorical positioning and social representations will be presented in chapter six.

4.1.3. Studying the responses to the media

The third study involves the analysis of a local community’s response to its representation in the media as portrayed in one particular programme during the ‘Rushdie affair’. This decoding of the programme will be examined through the use of focus groups. Focus groups have been used before in studies of audience interpretation (Morley, 1980b; Liebes and Katz, 1990). Liebes and Katz, for example, used naturally occurring social groups\textsuperscript{51} in order to examine the socially negotiated interpretation of a soap opera. The theory of social representations would suggest that the programme is interpreted through the representational field of the audience. Lunt and Livingstone (1996) note the compatibility of the theory of social representations and focus group research. They further add that the discussions themselves may take an argumentative turn which could allow access to the dialogical dimension of the topic being discussed.

What is the relationship between this programme and social representations? Is the programme itself a social representation? Does it contain a variety of representations? How are they related to the process of encoding? Rose (1996) suggests that:

\[\ldots\text{television programmes are social representations. No one individual produces or authors a television programme. It is multi-authored and}\]

\textsuperscript{50} These distinctions will be explained in chapter six.
\textsuperscript{51} Morley (1980b) similarly used focus group discussions as a way of analysing audience interpretations of \textit{Nationwide}, a current affairs programme.
manufactured by a panoply of people so that each voice contributes to a harmony that is more than the sum of the individuals taking part (p. 111).

I would suggest that this programme contains a variety of social representations that have been encoded or constructed semantically and symbolically by those involved in the production of the programme. These social representations are to be understood against the back-cloth of a social crisis that involved argumentation in the national public sphere. The particular programme used in this study becomes salient to the process of argumentation in the public sphere because the construction of the nature of the argument (and all the associated consequences) is administered by those who represent one side of the argument. Furthermore, in the case of this particular programme, the social representation that is being constructed is of those that represent the other side of the argument. The dialectics that form the identity-representation interaction are, in this case, ruptured by an imbalance in access to the site of dialogic contestation. This study is therefore an examination into how this imbalance affects the nature of reception of a social representation that represents the viewer.

The programme to be shown to the focus groups was chosen because of its central relevance to this thesis. This thesis is an exploration into the dialectic between social identity and social representation through the media, and the programme chosen for discussion lies at the centre of this dialectic. The programme was a documentary fronted by Michael Ignatieff, a writer, who visited the Muslim community in Bradford during the ‘Rushdie affair’. The programme was an edition of the series *The Late Show*, a late night arts programme that devoted a few of its editions to the ‘Rushdie affair’. A previous edition of *The Late Show* (the programme broadcast on 22 February 1989 and used in the rhetorical analysis that forms the second methodological component of this thesis) concluded with the following answer of Shabbir Akhtar, the representative from the Bradford Council of Mosques, to Michael Ignatieff, who was chairing the discussion:

Ignatieff: …I want a quick comment from each of you to sum up, what can we do to close this gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in this country in practical terms beginning with you, Dr Akhtar?
Akhtar: Umm… well, I think that err… what is needed today badly and which has not at all appeared in the press is a reasonably intellectually adequate defence of what I call the virtues of fundamentalism. I think that there has been a complete operative veto on allowing funda… the virtues of fundamentalist position to be… I mean what has been… what has been happening throughout the media has been an unargued assumption on the part of the press and indeed of academic writing that fundamentalism has no intellectual basis, that it always has certain stereotypical and undesirable features. I think that they should be… err… some… people should be allowed to defend the better sides of fundamentalism.

One consequence of this answer by Akhtar was that The Late Show decided to respond to this challenge by attempting to understand the Muslim side of the debate during the ‘Rushdie affair’. Ignatieff begins the programme aired on the 8th of May 1989:

On February 22nd I hosted The Late Shows debate on the ‘Rushdie affair’. On that show, Shabbir Akhtar of the Bradford Council of Mosques, a philosopher by training, defended the fundamentalist position and argued that Western liberals had never taken the trouble to truly understand Islam. I decided to take up this challenge. He had been on my home territory, it was time for me to go to his.

The programme itself has been transcribed according to audio and visual content and this transcript is in the appendix. A summary of the programme is presented alongside the other summaries in the appendix. The following is a brief description. The programme lasts for thirty-eight minutes and fifty seconds. There are a total of twenty-one scenes. These scenes include a table conversation/dialogue between Ignatieff and Akhtar at Akhtar’s home, a group discussion involving Muslim teenage girls, an interview with the headteacher of a Muslim girls’ school, an interview with the English headteacher of a local comprehensive school, a discussion between Ignatieff and a restaurant owner (and later his waiters) and participant observation by Ignatieff in a Muslim family. Ignatieff provides a commentary on the issues under discussion throughout the programme.

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52 The programme was recorded live by the researcher himself. The first few seconds of the programme were not recorded. The researcher approached the BBC archives department for the programme but was not successful. The British Film Institute also did not stock a copy.
The choice of the Bradford Muslim community as the subject matter for this documentary (and their views on the ‘Rushdie affair’) relates directly to the aims of this thesis. The issues of definition, credibility, objectivity and bias were the source of the greatest amount of debate according to Aron (1999) in her focused group discussions around the reception of documentary programmes. It was hypothesised that these issues would similarly cause debate in the focus group discussions after the viewing of this programme. In the case of this particular study, the television programme *Visit to Bradford* was shown to naturally occurring social groups and a focus group discussion was conducted around the programme. Eight focus groups were conducted over a six week period in August and September 1999. The groups ranged in size from four to eleven participants, totalling 52 discussants. The following table describes the composition and location of the focus group discussions.

Table 4.2. Description of focus groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group number</th>
<th>Group typology</th>
<th>Number of discussants</th>
<th>Place of discussion</th>
<th>Age range of group (approx.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>Working men</td>
<td>Six</td>
<td>Snooker club</td>
<td>30-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>Youth club attendees</td>
<td>Eleven</td>
<td>Youth club</td>
<td>15-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>Youth club attendees</td>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>Youth club</td>
<td>15-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>Youth club attendees</td>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>Youth club</td>
<td>15-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>A-level students</td>
<td>Six</td>
<td>House (friend’s)</td>
<td>17-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>Graduates</td>
<td>Six</td>
<td>House (researcher’s)</td>
<td>22-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>Working men</td>
<td>Five</td>
<td>House (friend’s)</td>
<td>22-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight</td>
<td>A-level students</td>
<td>Four</td>
<td>House (friend’s)</td>
<td>17-19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All groups were naturally occurring, meaning that the discussants were known to each other (with a few exceptions) and so there was a lack of formality within the groups. The discussants tended to share the same socio-demographic background and identity position. The purpose of the discussion and the presence of the dictaphone ensured a sense of formality and structure to the discussion. All but one of the discussions were arranged through initial informal contact with acquaintances of the researcher. The discussions would last from about twenty-five minutes to over an hour.
The focus group discussion would begin with a short description of the programme by the researcher. The discussants were informed that the discussion would be recorded for the purposes of transcription but that their names would not be revealed. The programme would then be shown. Any reaction of the audience during the viewing of the programme that would aid the analysis was noted later by the researcher. The discussion would begin with an open-ended question about the initial response to the programme. This was followed by questions about their response to Ignatieff, the questions that he asked, the Muslim representatives on the programme, the coverage of the affair itself and the image of the Bradford Muslim community. Towards the end of the discussion they were asked if there were any specific scenes that they wished to discuss, and if they had anything generally to say before the end of the discussion. The researcher would later note any remarks that the discussants had made after the formal discussion.

This open-ended conclusion to the discussion was used as a safety mechanism so that any views that were held and that had not been expressed could then be allowed such an opportunity. Care was taken to ensure that the dynamics of the discussion remained as free-flowing as possible, though on occasion, the researcher had to act in order to prevent a minimal level of formality from degenerating. Care was also taken so as to ensure that any less opinionated discussants had the opportunity to air their views towards the programme. Disagreement in the group itself was neither entirely encouraged nor discouraged. If however, the group tended towards disagreement, then the researcher would probe the causes of disagreement.

The responses of the discussants and the discussion itself are examples of decoding. The discussions were transcribed and analysed for semantic content, such that the units of semantic themes could be isolated and categorised. The responses to each question were categorised under the theme of the question itself. Any part of the discussion which was relevant to the subject matter but did not fit under the designated categories was also isolated and categorised under a semantic theme. The semantic themes were then viewed together to see if social representations could be

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53 The actual identity positions will be discussed in chapter five.
identified as the organising mechanism of these semantic themes. The connection between social representations and social identities is also examined in the analysis. The results of this analysis are presented in chapter seven.

4.2. Insider research

There is another important debate in social psychology and indeed in most other social sciences which is relevant to the current study. That is the insider/outsider debate. I will argue below for the benefits of insider research. It is standard practice across the social sciences for outsiders to study communities, this being regarded as a guarantee of objectivity. However, I suggest that the researcher’s status as an outsider raises important methodological issues concerning access, data quality and interpretation. These are discussed below. This will be followed by an outline of some of the benefits of insider research. These benefits are counter-balanced against the main criticism against insider research which is bias. Techniques for dealing with this bias are discussed. This is then followed by a discussion on the insider/outsider debate within the Hegelian framework, and this is then counter-balanced by a discussion on the issues of race, culture and religion. This section is then concluded with a statement on the researcher’s position on this issue.

4.2.1. Access and knowing the language

Goffman (1959) makes the distinction between the ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ of everyday social life. He asserts that social encounters have different levels of meaning. Obviously, if the social scientist wishes to study the processes in such social encounters, then he/she has to have access to both the frontstage and the backstage areas. The outsider, however, may find it difficult to access the backstage areas in many cultural settings. This could become quite problematic especially when the inaccessible areas include critical pieces of information for the research.

Billig (1996) argues that the researcher cannot access the rhetorical component of representations if he/she is only dealing with the frontstage of social life. He refers to

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54 The discussion schedule can be viewed in the appendix.
actual theatre to point out that all the argumentation occurs backstage, when the actors do not have to appear in character anymore. He, therefore, suggests that access to the backstage is important for social research if one wishes to investigate the rhetorical component of representations. Denzin (1978) makes the point that some researchers need access to homes, offices, the confessional etc. and if these places are closed to them, then this reduces the quality of their work.

Outsiders may find it difficult both to access and interpret social processes. Hall (1959, 1966) says that not knowing the language and culture (and all the associated meanings) of the area under study can lead to crude notions of the insider’s world. Jorgensen (1989) states that accurate findings are more likely in participatory strategies because the researcher can understand the meanings attached to existence and he quotes Hall (1976) on what happens when people misunderstand other cultures by viewing them from their own cultural perspective. Accessing the meanings attached to symbols and ideas becomes more important when one considers how dependent actions are upon meanings attached to symbols and ideas. The theory of social representations is clear about the importance it accords to language and to understanding its function in social processes.

A more relevant example is the ‘Rushdie affair’. The book The Satanic Verses received criticism from the Muslim community because of its treatment of the Prophet’s character. The reaction to the book was in some ways proportional to the importance that is given to the Prophet in Muslim culture. Because historical and cultural roots are not immediately accessible, some issues become difficult to access even if in some cases they are basic issues. Another example, is that of language. Many of the researchers are unable to access the language adopted by Muslims, whether this be the language of religion or even a different language altogether. Schutz (1944) states on this:

He who wants to use a map successfully has first of all to know his standpoint in two respects: its location on the ground and its

55 It should be remembered that one of the two leading factions amongst British South Asian Muslims is the Barelvi faction which places reverence for the Prophet at the centre of its theology. Also, a centuries old South Asian musical tradition is partially based around love poems that are devoted to the Prophet.
representation on the map. Applied to the social world this means that only members of the in-group, having a definite status in its hierarchy and also being aware of it, can use its cultural pattern as a natural and trustworthy scheme of orientation (p. 504).

4.2.2. Distorting effects of the act of observation

Other disadvantages related to the act of observation by an outsider include the reliability of the informant, defence mechanisms on the part of the informant, and the possibility of distortive effects of the observer’s presence and interpretation. Dean and Whyte (1969) highlight four factors which might influence the informant to give unreliable information: Are there any ulterior motives? Are there any bars to spontaneity? Does he/she have desires to please? Are there any idiosyncratic factors involved? They then highlight ways for detecting distortion in the reporting of data. These include implausibility of the account, knowing the informant’s mental set and how it might influence his/her account and comparing the informant’s account with other accounts.

In another paper on the disadvantages of being an outsider, Argyris (1969) highlights the defence mechanisms that a researcher can encounter from individuals and organisations. With regards to the defence mechanisms of individuals, Argyris lists manifestations of fear, surface collaboration, problem denial, the silent treatment, by-path seduction and stalling as mechanisms that the interviewee may use. The interviewee would feel the need to use these mechanisms because contact with an outsider would be a cause for anxiety for the interviewee. On this point Goffman (1959, 1974) and Douglas (1976) both note that subjects of study manipulate and negotiate meanings in different situations, sometimes intentionally and sometimes unintentionally. In doing so, they hide or conceal meanings from the view of outsiders.

McCall (1969) highlights three main concerns for participant observation research. These are the reactive effects of the observer’s presence, distortion effects of selective perception and interpretation by the observer and the limitations on the observer’s ability to witness all the relevant aspects of the phenomena. Leading on from this they provide a check list for observational data and interview data. The check list for the
observational data includes checking against reactive effects (i.e. does the observer’s presence have any effect on him/her?), ethnocentricity (does an observational item reflect the researcher’s imposition of a foreign, uncongenial perspective?) and going native (does the researcher over identify with participants or with a particular faction?). The check list for the interview data includes checking against knowledgeability (what is the interviewee’s knowledge like?), reportorial ability (what is his/her memory like?), reactive effects of the interview situation (is he/she combative, hesitant, attentive?) and ulterior motives (was he/she trying to expose someone or rationalise a fact?).

4.2.3. Participant observation and insider research

The social scientific study of community by insiders is regarded as flawed since the insider is regarded as subjective while the outsider is regarded as objective. As stated earlier, it is normal practice in social science for outsiders to study other communities. Participant observation theorists are not in universal agreement, however, concerning this normative view towards insider research. For example, Jorgensen (1989) looks on insider research positively by stating that personal interests in the topic of study allow for new insights and creativity which can be inspired by emotional and intellectual identification. He gives an example of Ferraro (1981) who conducted a study into wife battering, while she herself had had similar personal experiences. He says “Ferraro’s battering experiences enabled her to establish rapport quickly and very satisfactorily with battered women” (Jorgensen, 1989, p. 27).

Furthermore, Jorgensen (1989) gives examples of studies in which researchers have acted as insiders without this resulting in a loss of objectivity. An example is given of Jules-Rosette’s (1975) work on native African, Christian fundamentalist groups. Jorgensen concludes that “Her report provides confirmation of the observational advantage of this strategy with little indication that a loss of objectivity resulted” (Jorgensen, 1989, p. 63).

However, insider research is generally regarded as disadvantageous because of the pertinence of bias to the researcher himself/herself. It is possible if the researcher is an insider that he/she can start studying what he/she thinks ought to be happening
rather than what is happening even unconsciously. It may not necessarily be the case that he/she is biased towards his/her community, it could quite possibly be the case that the insider is biased against his/her own community.

4.2.4. Insider research and bias

Schwartz and Schwartz (1969) note that there can be a problem of affective participation on behalf of the researcher. The researcher could become affectively involved in a way that may even be beyond his/her own awareness. The form of affective participation can range from sympathetic identification to projective distortion. The researcher’s experience, awareness and personality construction can all affect the form of participation in which the researcher engages. Schwartz and Schwartz (1969) suggest that it is possible to counteract these distorting influences through raised awareness of the biases, and of their causes and consequences.

Schwartz and Schwartz (1969) also note that participant observation is a process of registering, interpreting and recording. The researcher’s bias can affect this process through several ways. These include blind spots, unconscious motivations, attitudinal sets, personally significant images, symbols and meanings which can all affect the process of perception (i.e. registering) and interpretation. Furthermore, his/her bias can be sociocultural, intellectual or theoretical and can similarly affect the registration and interpretation of data. Schwartz and Schwartz (1969) ask certain questions to the researcher on this issue: Is the researcher cautious or incautious? How much does he/she need to be right? Will he/she tend to see what he/she wants to see or expects to see from his/her data? How much failure can the investigator sustain without being discouraged or distorting the data? What does he/she believe people ought to be? What perspectives does he/she have on human activity? They suggest that bias can be dealt with in three ways. The researcher should be motivated to look for the biases, he/she should look for their meanings and ramifications actively and he/she should look upon the uncovering of bias as a continuous process of discovery.

The way to deal with bias is through an initial open statement of interest on behalf of the researcher and then clear, methodological tools used for the elimination or at least reduction of bias. Agar (1980) offers certain strategies for dealing with bias. He
suggests that bias-awareness training can be built into the programme of research. He suggests that the researcher could be trained against cultural persuasions. He also suggests that the same material could be viewed in different ways, examining the possibility of how different biases could lead to alternative explanations. He also suggests the use of more than one social scientist in examining the same area of research - Denzin would call this investigator triangulation. These are all possible mechanisms for dealing with the problem of bias.

Another disadvantage of being an insider is tied to an advantage of being an outsider. By being an insider, one is able to access information that outsiders are unable to access. At the same time, one becomes blind to certain points because they are so much a part of everyday life. Ichheiser (1949a) asserts on this point that: “We are unaware of even very striking features of our own culture, for example, and it is frequently the stranger who is able to perceive things to which ourselves as members of the society are totally blinded” (p. 1). An outsider, however, would come from the outside of the community, and because of the stark differences, would be able to detect something which the insider would not be able to see.

4.2.5. Hegelian and Cartesian perspectives on the insider and outsider debate

This distinction between the insider and the outsider is one that can be viewed as a false distinction if viewed within the context of the Hegelian framework. If the insider is subjective and participates, and the outsider is objective and observes, then this could be seen to be a Cartesian distinction. This is because such a distinction ignores the reflexive and interactive nature of social functioning. This reflexive and interactive nature is all the more important within the framework of a sociological form of social psychology. If the self is formed through social processes, especially with regards to how groups view the self, then this perspective reduces the differences between the perceptual processes of the insider and the outsider – because they would both be more able to see ‘through the eyes of the other’.

This point can be illustrated with reference to Muslims in Britain. As a Muslim in Britain, one has continuously been provided with opportunities to see ‘through the eyes of the other’ whether this be in the media which have continuously, over the
years, represented the Muslim community in British public life, or in school in which one is similarly able to access other’s views of one’s community through discussions with peers.

4.2.6. Race, culture and religion

The insider/outsider discussion, from a social psychological perspective, views the distinction between insiders and outsiders as one of perception and the ability to perceive. This would be a reductionist account of social processes, especially if it fails to incorporate the notion of history and culture. The South Asian Muslim community in Bradford represents difference in three ways. Each of these sources of difference serves to separate the communities further in an experiential manner, which makes the insider/outsider distinction more profound.

The first source of difference is race. Racism remains prevalent in Bradford, actual or perceived. If the racism is not actual, it is certainly ‘perceived’ and as such differentiates the South Asian Muslim community from the English community. The centrality of race to social psychological interaction is noted by Ichheiser (1949b): “Looking at each other is the most primary form of conversation. Between white people and Negroes (sic) the initial and basic part of the ‘conversation’ is concluded before they start to talk to one another” (p. 396). The South Asian Muslim community is viewed and views itself as a different race, which in practical terms, means being of a different colour.

The second source of difference is culture. The culture of the South Asian Muslim community is considerably different to English culture, in terms of dress and language, type of food, and mannerisms. This culture tends to be found more in the ‘backstage’ of the community’s life, and there it is vibrant and self-confident. The South Asian Muslim community does differ within itself culturally, in styles of dress for example, however its extent of cultural difference is much greater when compared to English culture. The pertinence of this point towards the debate on difference or ‘otherness’ can be highlighted by examining the difference between black communities in Britain that tend to be more culturally assimilative and Asian communities that tend to be more culturally different (Beckerlegge, 1991).
The third source of difference is religion. The South Asian Muslim community is
different to the English community in its religion as well, and is viewed as such. This
means that there are certain beliefs and practices on an individual and communal
level that relate to religion which differentiates the communities. Participating in such
practices leads to the formation of a certain world-view and a sense of purpose
relating directly to the Islamic belief-structure.

These three sources of difference are anchored deep in the history of both
communities, and they play an important part in everyday processes in a local
community. The difference between the insider and the outsider is not only a
difference based upon a social psychological perspective, about not being able to
access the backstage, or about going native, or about the researcher becoming so
much a part of the furniture that some processes become invisible to the researcher.
These issues certainly form part of the debate, but the difference between the insider
and the outsider is one that also incorporates the historical and cultural differences
that together contribute to the identity processes in a local community in Bradford
such that events in Bradford are connected to previous centuries which inform
present-day debates. A social psychology of identity processes in the South Asian
Muslim community in Bradford must incorporate such perspectives into its analysis
and its methodology, and any researcher, whether he/she be an insider or an outsider,
must recognise the importance of these processes in terms of their effect on present-
day events. The insider/outsider debate itself must accept that the barriers that exist
between insiders and outsiders are not only those of social interaction and language,
for example. But rather, the differences derived from race, culture and religion
contribute to the debate also and research methodologies have to incorporate the
importance of such differences into their approach.

The benefits and harms of insider research have been discussed in relation to the
study of intergroup processes within a minimalist paradigm (i.e. in the absence of
culture and history). It is suggested, here, that the benefits of having an insider study
his own community are all the more pronounced when the insider/outsider distinction
is one that involves race, culture and religion (with their histories and associated
consequences).
4.2.7. Limitations to insider research

Though the insider has a greater degree of access to various aspects of social life, there are several issues which nevertheless limit such access. First of all, by definition, the insider may find it difficult to access outsider perspectives of the area of study (for the opposite of all the reasons that are advantageous for insider research). For example, if the insider is trusted by youths who are on the fringes of criminal activity, the police may simultaneously decide to view him/her with distrust. Or if the insider is examining outsider representations of the local community, then those involved in the manufacture of such representations may hesitate in participating in such research.

Secondly, the insider/outsider discussion tends to exaggerate the homogeneity of communities such that though this insider is indeed an insider to the Muslim community in Bradford, there remain nevertheless various parts of the community to which he would not be able to gain access. For example, it is difficult for a male researcher to gain sufficient access to the social psychological world of young Muslim girls due to the segregated nature of the Muslim community in Bradford. That is one key reason why this thesis has focused on young men. Other examples of inaccessible areas of Muslim life include extremist groups and elder patriarchs.

A third limitation of insider research is that there is a limit to the extent of questioning. Though the researcher did ask at times some pertinent questions, there was still a point beyond which the researcher could not proceed for fear of damaging the trust that enabled the access in the first place. Several of the interviews were arranged with prominent members of the Bradford community and sensitivity over the politicised nature of the interview itself (and any repercussions for the interviewee) necessitated care in the framing of questions in order to ensure the completion of the interview and an acceptable degree of trust.
4.2.8. Ethics in social research

A question of ethics that faces researchers, apart from the methodological issue of bias, is whether it is acceptable to gain access to a community, to study them for a few years, and then to leave them, without having helped deal with some of their problems, though the research may provide some answers to their problems. For example, if someone is researching into the social processes surrounding riots then one way of using that research would be to educate local communities and their local police forces in how to prevent riots. One could find, through conducting research into riots, that social understanding is based on, as Ichheiser (1949) has suggested, misunderstanding. For example, the police force misunderstand the youth, the youth misunderstand the police, and riots feed off such antagonistic feelings. This is an example to show how important it is to connect areas of research to the subjects of the research. I am in agreement with those social scientists who suggest that the ethical dimension should not be ignored especially in the case of social psychologists who are studying natural, social phenomena. Gramsci (1971) makes a similar point in his advocation of organic intellectuals in that he stated that the study of social life should not be separated from participation in social life and that the outcome of such studies should serve emancipatory ends. I would hope that, through my research, I would be able to help offer possible ways of bridging the gap that exists today between the Muslim community and the wider society.

But this creates another problem, this relates to the question of deciding what exactly is useful or ethical? As Denzin (1978) writes: ‘While most sociologists now agree that it is impossible to conduct research in the absence of personal and political values, few are agreed on the exact nature of these values and the precise role they should occupy in their activities’ (p. 325). This relationship between values and research should be distinguished from the methodological problem of bias. Research in social science can be and normally is decided according to a value-system either of the researcher or the sponsoring body. Any practical programmes that may emerge as a direct result of such research would similarly be based upon the corresponding value-system. This incorporation of a role for values within research paradigms can be acceptable, however, such a role can prove problematic if it affects the acquisition and examination of evidence in pursuit of research themes. The researcher here has to
be careful that his/her own value-system does not affect the outcome of the results of the research in a conscious or unconscious manner. Essentially this means that the researcher has to be open to and to accept the possibility of findings that are against his/her own value-system. This methodological form of bias has to be prevented from affecting the research by using the techniques outlined above. This is one area in which the researcher has to maintain an ‘objective’ outlook, whether he/she is an insider or an outsider.

4.2.9. Conclusion

The above discussion makes clear the several advantages of insider research e.g. access, knowing the language and trust. These being simultaneously disadvantages of outsider research which have been recognised by theorists of methodology (Dean and Whyte, 1969; Argyris, 1969; McCall, 1969). More recent theorists such as Jorgensen (1989) feel able to extol the benefits of insider research. However, the issue of bias remains. The researcher has adopted mechanisms for dealing with this through the suggestions of Schwarz and Schwarz (1969) and Agar (1980) as detailed above. A Hegelian view towards communication reduces the extent of difference between insiders and outsiders, however, in the case of this particular study the additional factors of race, culture and religion (as sources of differences) serve to increase the extent of difference between insiders and outsiders. The researcher has chosen to adopt a methodology that will position the researcher as insider and the research was conducted with the above constraints in mind. A post hoc discussion of such an approach is provided in the conclusion to the thesis.

4.3. Conclusion

The methodology has been constructed in order to investigate three separate points of the identity-representation dialectic. This is in the specific context of the ‘Rushdie affair’ and the Bradford Muslim community. The three sites of the community, the text and the reception of the text provided access into the relation between identity

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56 A Foucauldian perspective, as exemplified by Said (1978/1995), would however suggest that the issue of bias is as much, if not more, the problem of outsider research, in terms of the relation between industries of knowledge and power.
and representation. Interviewing the ‘specialists’ provided access to the Weltanschauung of Bradford Muslim youth in terms of their social representations, identities and discourse. Analysing the rhetoric during the ‘Rushdie affair’ provided access to the nature and content of dialogic contestation. And returning one form of representation back to those who are represented provided insight into a moment when the hegemonic met the subaltern.
5.0. REPRESENTATIONS, IDENTITIES AND DISCOURSE AMONGST BRADFORD MUSLIM YOUTH

This chapter documents and analyses the findings of the first empirical study which was an examination into the social psychological world of South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. I will first outline the two main social representations that act as stereotypes of the community under study. These are of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’. I will then describe two issues both of which concern the manner of relationship between the South Asian Muslim youth and ‘white society’. This will be followed by a section which examines the range and type of response to such a social environment and connects the response to the representations involved. I will examine, following on from Samad (1998) and Vertovec (1998), the nature and content of Muslim identity discourse in Bradford and its relation to key recent events and processes such as the ‘Rushdie affair’ and mediatic globalisation. The data used in this chapter are derived in the main from the interviews. I will hope to have provided, by the end of the chapter, an overview of some of the main themes that inform and structure the social psychological worldview of South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford.

5.1. Social representations of identities

As stated earlier, social representations “are the representations of something or of someone” (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 67). This section will describe representations of identity categories that are relevant to South Asian Muslim youth. I will be examining social representations here as stereotypes. Stereotypes have been variously defined in social psychology (e.g. Allport, 1954b; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) but here I would like to apply a particular definition of stereotypes which corresponds with its lay understanding. Stereotypes are social representations of specific groups of people. They usually involve negative evaluation consequently stigmatising the identity, and tend to be disputed by the group subject to stereotyping. Three social representations were investigated in this study with the interviewees: the ‘Paki’, the ‘Muslim’ and the ‘Bradford Muslim’. There are levels of generalisation and particularisation concerning social representations (Billig, 1996). I wish to examine the two representations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Paki’ as general representations which provide a social psychological background to identity processes amongst South Asian Muslim
youth in Bradford. I will describe the representation of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ towards the end of this chapter.

5.1.1. Social representations of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’

Kelly (1990) has found that ‘Paki’ was universally utilised by school children against children with brown skin, irrespective of their being Indian or Bangladeshi. The researcher similarly found through the interviews that ‘Paki’ is used as a general category against those with ‘brown’ skin. There does not seem to be much differentiation between the various communities, and separate categories are not utilised.

I think it’s quite mixed up. I think most of the time, you must have heard the phrase ‘Paki’, it doesn’t matter whether you’re from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, you know, it’s lack of understanding amongst white people when they stereotype certain people into one category. (2-5)57

I mean, if a Sikh person do something then they won’t say it’s a Sikh, they’ll say it’s a ‘Paki’ because anybody black, brown, they’ll see them as ‘Paki’. (1-6)

I mean, I think, I grew up in Huddersfield and I think they just lump everybody together to be honest with you. I think if people use terms, I mean this is from my own personal experience growing up in Huddersfield, I think people just lump them together. I don’t think it’s to do… they’ll use the same terms of abuse towards a Sikh as against a Muslim even I mean, there was a lad at my school who was slightly dark skin who was an Italian, he wasn’t Asian at all, he was a Catholic but because his skin was slightly darker than everybody else, he used to be called ‘Paki’. (3-6)

The ‘Paki’ was mostly described in the interviews as a racial taunt. The anchorings of ‘Paki’ is of someone with different colour skin. The interviewees generally did not refer to ‘black’, instead they referred to ‘brown’ as skin colour. This suggests some difference from representations concerning African-Caribbeans. Several other characteristics were mentioned once, these being that a ‘Paki’ is someone who is

57 The labels at the end of each quote refer to the group and interview number of the interviewee respectively, see appendix (iii).
‘thick’\textsuperscript{58}, smells, is a noisy neighbour, is part of a large family, is a parasite on the state, is fraudulent and unclean, and is involved in drug-pushing and violence. The only positive representation was of ‘Pakis’ as honest workers in factories. All of these descriptions came from the South Asian Muslim youth interviewees, as such they are depictions of how they see themselves categorised.

Eight of the nine attributes (all except thick) could all be understood as rule-breaking behaviour, and in the examples quoted above, the rule-breaking would relate to rules of health and hygiene (smell, are unclean), social interaction e.g. upholding the norms of politeness and civility (are noisy neighbours, are part of a large family, are involved in violence) and of following the law (are parasites on the state, are fraudulent, are involved in drug-pushing). The general representation is that of the ‘Paki’ as rule-breaker. To uphold the standards of health and hygiene, politeness and civility, and the law is to uphold civilisation, as in civilised behaviour itself. And conversely, to denigrate, disrespect, ignore or be ignorant of such norms is to be characterised as uncivilised. So the representation is anchored as rule-breaker i.e. uncivilised. Jahoda (1999) has suggested that the etymology of the term ‘civilisation’ is founded upon a notion of rule following behaviour whether it be in terms of following the law or in keeping within standards of politeness. So the social representation of the ‘Paki’ is anchored as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘non-white’.

The second social representation is that of the ‘Muslim’. This representation is particularised to that of the ‘fundamentalist’, which is anchored as backward/anti-modern and aggressive.

I think they afraid of that the Muslims will impose their own views, they wanna have four wives and they wanna chop our hands off and they want to stop us from drinking …and this image is like they are terrorists and they want to impose their views and they are living in the dark ages and they mistreat their women and they want to force us to become like them yeah, and they’re very intolerant. (1-2)

They perceive Muslims to be those kind of people who don’t assimilate into society who want to remain distinct and separate although they live in this society. Also issue about arranged

\textsuperscript{58} A slang term for someone of less than average intelligence, usually used in reference to others.
marriages...There’s an assumption that the people who are Muslims, the older generation is forcing their kids to become practising, and there’s also stereotypes about women and the oppression of women. (1-4)

The ‘Muslim’ represents the past to British society, not only the past of the ‘other’, a distant civilisation with its own manner of living, but also the past of its own society. The themes of arranged marriages, sexual inequality and barbaric forms of punishment are as characteristic of pre-modern British society as they are of ‘other’ cultures. In this sense, the ‘Muslim’ as backward represents the past as the present. The assertiveness not only represents an obstinate refusal to change, to maintain the space that they have been allocated, but furthermore it represents an attempt to expand their area of control.

I think if we’re getting really down to basics, the thing that probably frightens people is, they might feel that the Muslims are trying to take over. Erm... I think that is a deep seated feeling, to take over the culture, yes. (3-4)

Well, basically, that these people, they don’t fit in, they don’t want to fit in... And they’re here on one form and that is cause of crusade, they're here on a mission, that is a religious mission, and they want to dismantle and change and convert everything, you know fly the flag at 10 Downing Street. (2-2)

The mutual contradictions between the two forms of anchoring suggest a psychological process, one that is based upon fear, a fear of returning to the pre-modern and a fear of being over-run by ‘others’. A report commissioned by the Runnymede Trust (1997) identified the notion of Islamophobia – a fear of Islam and Muslims. The social representation of the ‘Muslim’ is therefore one that is intrinsically related to fear.

Moscovici (1988) has identified three separate types of representations: hegemonic, polemical and emancipated. Hegemonic representations are characterised as uniform and coercive, and polemical representations are understood as involving vocal, open, direct contestation. If the difference between the two representations is understood as one of degree with the variables being the extent of awareness and contestation, then I would suggest that though the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ are not prototypical examples
of hegemonic representations, they are nevertheless more hegemonic than polemical. This is because of the lack of contestation of the content of both representations in the public sphere.

5.1.2. Social representations of ‘white society’

I now wish to describe the social representations of ‘white society’ by South Asian Muslims. A key ‘other’ to South Asian Muslims in this study is itself subject to representational processes as it is referred to as ‘white society’. The shorthand for this is ‘goreh’ – ‘goreh’ is the plural for the Urdu word for white. The transition from adjectival status to nominal status is indicative of the representational process in which one characteristic, namely skin colour, assumes classificatory predominance.

If ‘goreh’ was the name for this representation, then discrimination was their practice. This being a common complaint throughout the interviews. This discrimination was manifested through two forms of social interaction. The first is a direct form of abuse behaviour exhibiting prejudice on racial grounds, involving the vocalisation of clear-cut, prejudiced statements. The second is a more subtle, polite, indirect and hidden, though present, form. This tending to be associated with official forms of social encounters. Examples of the second form of social encounters are work and classroom situations i.e. situations in which the social relations involve contractual arrangements which leads to familiarity between the persons involved, a greater sense of responsibility towards the maintenance of social relations and a higher probability of accountability before the law. The reason for this difference is that racism and racist stereotyping have become unacceptable from a legal and cultural point of view. This distinction has been referred to by Wieviorka (1994): “Some scholars, relying on American studies, oppose the old ‘flagrant’ racism to the ‘subtle’ new versions” (p. 182). Consequently, in those situations in which racist stereotyping does occur, the prejudice can only be exhibited in a non-accountable way such that the person involved can alleviate himself/herself from any sense of responsibility, this has meant that racist behaviour assumes a subtle character. One South Asian Muslim politician said about the new second and third generation:
They are in a better… able to understand the subtleties of white, racist society. (2-2)

A Muslim youth leader from Manningham said:

A. I think it’s taken a different diversity now, a different form of racism.

Q. In what sense?

A. In the sense that it won’t be direct. It’d be subtle. (1-1)

An English youth worker said:

I think racism has always been… yeah it’s under the carpet, it’s not as overt as it used to be… (3-5)

An example of such forms of subtle racism was provided by one interviewee when he spoke of his experience at work:

For example, if I need a holiday there are a different sort of curriculum, a different sort of rules for me than for my white counterparts, why should that be the case. I mean I wanted to swap the shifts when I’m working yeah and it’s taken me like two months, why, whereas the goras when they want to swap it’s like there’s no problem, no matter what position they are, whereas for us they make some sort of excuse… (2-2)

A common theme throughout the interviews was separation. This was objectified by two particular issues. The first is the changing pattern of geographical distribution and the second concerns Lawcroft House, a recently built police station in Manningham, Bradford. I will deal with the changing pattern of geographical distribution first. Historically, ethnic minority communities tended to concentrate around the inner-city areas of Bradford, around the textile industry which acted as their initial place of employment. The decline in the textile industry during the eighties has led to massive concentrations of unemployment for most, yet a considerable minority has found other forms of employment mostly through small business initiatives and this has led to economic and social mobility. For some, this has meant that they have tried to improve their social and economic status by moving
away from the inner city areas towards the suburbs of Bradford i.e. they have tried to move from working class areas towards middle class areas.

This social mobility experienced by a considerable minority within the community should result in the dissolution of the geographical boundaries. However, this is not the case. This is because as one Asian Muslim family moved into Heaton, then slowly, one by one, the English families moved out, such that the English families became minorities in the same street where they were once a majority. This process was repeatedly referred to in the interviews as an example of the social and geographic separation that remains in certain parts of Bradford.

We moved to Heaton and we moved there about thirteen years ago, I think there was only one Asian family on our street, now there’s one white family left, no sorry two white families left and the others moved out. But… I don’t know whether it’s because they don’t see us as good neighbours or it’s the stereotyping image that they’ve got of us… (1-1)

As for us, I can give you hundreds of examples of cases in Heaton and certain parts of Bradford, people have moved from inner cities into outer cities, and as soon as they see one or two ethnic minority people moving in, the English people start moving out. (2-6)

As the Muslim community has moved from this traditional area into Oak lane and now further on Toller lane and thereafter further on into Heaton, as the community has moved outwards, the white community has also moved out of that area into Bingley, Cottingley and Shipley. (3-2)

The social representation of ‘white society’ is one that aims to maintain social distance, and consequently, difference. Two other factors that are associated with and qualify social separation are individualism associated with English neighbours and the religious restrictions concerning socialising in public houses. The interviewees contrasted the openness of South Asian Muslims in comparison to the individualism of English neighbours. The rules of social encounters for English neighbours were perceived to be aimed at maintaining a relatively greater amount of distance. Secondly, the main social meeting place is the public house and this caused an obstacle to social engagement as Muslims are forbidden from drinking alcohol or sitting at a table at which alcohol is served. This religious behaviour has symbolic
significance for South Asian Muslims and its maintenance seems to be important for their religious identity. This has meant that the main area for socialising in English society is stigmatised by the Islamic religion thus reducing the probability of social contact. Gervais and Jovchelovitch (1998b) found that social drinking which occurs at the pub also affects the socialisation of Chinese as they perceive themselves as drinking less. One of their respondents is quoted: “…if you don’t go to a pub with them, you can’t be friends with them, because that’s the only way that you can actually get to know them…” (p. 19).

Lawcroft House is a newly built police station that is situated in the centre of one of the residential concentrations of the South Asian Muslim community in Bradford. The riots of 1995 were centred around demonstrations outside Lawcroft House, since the persons who had been arrested were being held inside. The police station is an objectification of an extreme sense of separation between the South Asian Muslim community and the police. The words used in viewing the photograph were “fortress” (some used “fort”), “castle” and “watchtower”. The word “fortress” was used most often and across all three groups.

If you’re trying to foster community relations you don’t build a huge police station that looks like a fortress at the top of a hill. It just looks like a watchtower and I think that’s how people perceive it. (2-1)

The key message symbolised by the police station is separation. The wall was especially criticised for being unnecessary.

And there’s the police station that’s basically telling you that, you know… basically I think the wall, it creates ‘us’ and ‘them’ situation and it’s very intimidating. (2-5)

It shows… it gives an image of this is a place not to be approached, you’re not welcome here…. (1-3)

59 The police station was built in the years 1992-1993.
60 One interviewer suggested that the police station had been labelled as ‘the fortress’ by the media after the disturbances/riots in Bradford in June, 1995.
This separation is seen to be due to a perceived threat or fear on behalf of the police and associated with this is a sense of mistrust and suspicion on behalf of the local community.

The wall itself, that looks like there’s something they’re hiding or they’re afraid of and they are frightened, what are they frightened of? (2-6)

There’s nothing inside which you can see, that gives a picture that there is something they hide from you. And when you hear the story of people… those people were interrogated, and that person was arrested, and that person committed suicide in police custody, these sorts of stories, it makes you wonder… (2-4)

The police station objectifies power and control to the interviewees. This is linked to a perceived threat in that the symbol of power is required in order to control the perceived threat.

Yeah, I mean this police station, firstly that wall right, it’s so big and so imposing and it seems like right alien right. It’s like you’ve got natives living in a certain area so build a big castle to keep them in control. If you look at people who come from other countries yeah, and the first thing they do is right, they build a big, big imposing castle or… what they call encampment or something yeah where the army is safe inside it and they can always come out and some communities get a bit yeah. And the message is given to the community is right, that “We’re not a part of you”. If they felt that the Muslim community was part of their community right, what’s the need to build big walls in the police station for? They’re telling the local community that “Look, we’re not a part of you”. If they felt that the Muslim community was part of their community right, what’s the need to build big walls in the police station for? They’re telling the local community that “Look, we’re not a part of you, we are in here, and we are here to control you, we’re different from you and we don’t trust you” yeah. And this institutional racism right, to me this wall portrays that so well yeah. I can’t see them going in a white area, yeah and building a police station with big walls like this telling the community “Look, we’re not part of you, we don’t trust you, we feel that you might attack us right with smaller walls so we need big walls to…”, it’s a proper us and them mentality that it gives. (1-2)

The police station. Horrible building, never liked it, it reminds me of the British empire… it’s like a fort they built and sometimes they defend themselves. I thought when it was built, people criticised them but what I personally think I mean they built it deliberately, I think it’s simply to show the community there, well look it’s a kind of symbol of power, “We’re here to watch you. If you don’t be careful, you know where we are”. It represents power, institutional power. (2-3)
This interviewee, in his response to what the photograph of the police station represents to him, stated that it reminds him of the British empire. This connection to antagonistic, conflict-associated representations of history was frequent as references were made to the Napoleonic prisons, Colditz, Northern Ireland, the British empire, and fifteenth and sixteenth century castles (sic). The building is anchored into antagonistic representations from history, and the anchoring is into situations involving conflict and an imbalance of power relations.

Moscovici (1984b) has stated that representations are of things and people. The social representation of the police station is of an object which itself objectifies representations of people since the representation of the police station as a fortress objectifies the fear of the local population on behalf of the police. The police station is an example of the close dialectic between buildings and people, thereby increasing the semantic connection between objects and people. In conclusion, the police station is an objectification of institutional power that leads to a sense of separation between the police and the local community. The building itself raises levels of suspicion and mistrust by signifying the need for clear separation. The local community anchors it as a representation of conflict in social relations. The police being an ‘other’ to the local community is objectified by the local community as separate, confrontational, intimidating and frightened.

The social representations of ‘white society’ are generally anchored as subtle in their racism through, for example, the maintenance of social distance. The police station as an objectification of power, specifically white power, continues the theme of maintenance of social distance and is anchored as separate, confrontational, intimidating and frightened (though the view of racism as subtle is no longer applicable). The inclusion of the equation of power introduces the anchorings of confrontational, intimidating and frightened.

5.2. Identities as responses to stereotypes

The response of the second and third generation that is associated dialectically with this representational field is varied. A typology of the responses, though providing
clarity to the interpretation of a complex social process, can provide a simplistic
analysis of a social phenomenon which includes post-migration, transnational
communities, globalisation and international relations, post-modernist cultural
transformation, post-industrial decline, identity hybridisation, historiographic
controversies surrounding cultural stereotypes, intergenerational conflict,
misunderstanding, alternative conceptualisations of the relationship between the
secular and religious, and the subliminal acquisition of hegemonic discourses. The
complexity of such a social process does suggest that any attempt at providing a
typology would be an attempt to provide structure to a situation which does not admit
much structure. However, the researcher has identified three generalised types of
response from the participant observation and the interviews. The

The three types are firstly, a group that is associated with successful attempts at social
mobility and that tends to, at least, neglect cultural and religious practice. The second
type celebrates a counter-culture which includes significations of rejection of
authority. This group is associated with higher levels of unemployment, a mixture
and range of cultural and religious identification and practice and tends to be based
around a street culture. The third type advocates a distinction between cultural and
religious practice, by valorising religious practice, even if it is contrary to cultural
practice. There does not seem to be a correlation with an economic strategy for this
type. I will be referring to the three types as ‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and
‘extremists’. The first type are known as ‘coconuts’, since they are viewed to be
brown on the outside and white on the inside. This stereotype suggests a betrayal of
culture and history. The second strategy of the indifferent majority can be known as
‘rude boys’. This stereotype suggests an aggressive and indifferent approach. The

61 These three types were identified repeatedly, though there was a clear Muslim/non-Muslim
distinction here in that the non-Muslims did not identify the three types at all, though they were
identified and referred to repeatedly by the Muslim interviewees. The only member of category three
to provide a typology was the senior youth worker. The overall typology was reconstructed from
answers to a question in the interview on the range of response of Muslim youth to living in Bradford.
They provided descriptive elements which when accumulated lead to the identification of three types.
As I work through each identity type below, I will provide a quote from each of the two Muslim
interview groups as examples of convergence of different perspectives on a similar form of
identification.

62 The interviewees did not refer to the labels as types, however, their answers to this question can be
mapped onto the three categories. These labels are in common usage in Bradford Muslim youth culture
and were identified as relevant by the researcher after the interviews had been conducted.
third strategy of the ‘Muslim identity’ approach is stereotyped as ‘extremists’. This stereotype suggests an overzealous and intolerant approach.

All three stereotypes are definitions of the group imposed from outside the sub-group but from within the South Asian Muslim community. The identification of all three strategies through the use of inter-group categories from within the youth sub-cultures points to the inter-group rivalry that exists between the members of each type. The categorisation of alternative types as strategies is indirectly an affirmation of the strategies adopted by the in-group as type. The identification of these three types was made by the interviewees acting as specialist observers (and in some cases recent participants) i.e. they are outsiders to the youth groups they are discussing. There were occasions in the interviews when the interviewee referred to a type outside of this general consensus. I will discuss this below after a short description of each type.

5.2.1. The ‘coconuts’

The ‘coconut’ identity position is the smallest numerically with very few opting for this strategy since they are unable to either because of a restrictive family environment or lack of economic opportunities. This option corresponds with the social mobility strategy, in that the members of this category opt to social psychologically separate themselves from the representation of their identity through the stereotypes of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ by increasing the distance between themselves and the South Asian Muslim community since they do not wish to be associated with the stereotype. Their ties with the culture and religion of their families are kept to a minimum, a minimum which is required to keep some form of attachment to the culture and religion of their parents.

Yeah definitely, I mean I think some people leave Islam completely… (1-2)

I would say there are some people who wouldn’t their religion, their culture, don’t want to do it, they want to know about their family, move away… (1-3)

63 A similar form of appellation is described by Gervais and Jovchelovitch (1998b) in their research on the health beliefs of the Chinese in Britain. Those that were deemed to be too assimilative were known as ‘bananas’: yellow on the outside, white on the outside.
There are others of course who are... whose parents and the environment hasn’t presented that culture in a positive way to them and they have seen discipline, in life, they have seen something they don’t like and therefore they are disaffected. (2-4)

Their social mobility is usually associated with economic mobility which has meant that those who opt for this strategy usually move out of Bradford towards areas of higher economic opportunity. Of those that have moved away some tend to return to Bradford because of their attachment to their families. Complete detachment or separation is rare.

Q. So what they tend to do, they tend to move away from Bradford yeah…

A. Yeah, but that’s only for a short while, short period, only during, during study times and very rare cases is if they’re employed in elsewhere, for example down south, you know midlands or wherever but even that only tends to happen for a short while. For a year away from Bradford they usually end up coming back home. (1-5)

There is a high degree of correspondence between the three types that were identified in this study and the types of the responses that were identified in the review of the literature. The ‘coconut’ that accepts the dominant discourse can be related to Hutnick’s (1991) strategy of assimilation in which the minority group has a high level of identification with the majority culture and a low level of identification with its in-group culture. Similarly, this type can be related to Peach and Glebe’s (1995) liberalisation political strategy, Knott et al.’s (1993) anti-religious feminist strategy (involving young women in their study) and Werbner’s (1996) anglicised post-colonial identity. The common denominator in these strategies is the acceptance of the dominant discourse which includes the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’ and the ‘Paki’.

64 Three ideal types of identity have been discussed above and there seems to be a considerable amount of overlap between these identities and those mentioned in the literature. There are, however, some types that have been identified in the literature which did not correspond with the types identified in the interviews. For instance, Hall (1992a) writes of the formation of new identities around terms chosen and inflected to encompass differences. Similarly, Hutnick (1991) discusses two strategies which were not identified in the interviews. These are the strategies of acculturation and marginality. Acculturation involves a high level of identification with the majority group and a high level of identification with the ethnic minority group and marginality involves a low degree of identification with the majority group and a low degree of identification with the ethnic minority group.
5.2.2. The ‘rude boys’

The second type, the ‘rude boy’ identity, seems to be the identity adopted by the majority. This identity type is usually associated with disaffected, usually unemployed young males. They do not distinguish between religion and culture and have a strong sense of Pakistani religious nationalism. The distinction between religion and culture is not made since they are taught through the madrassahs and/or their parents a cultural identity which includes religious and cultural values and makes no distinction between the two. The practice of the previous generation is required to be perpetuated through the maintenance of cultural identity.

And then you got people on the bottom of the scale right, which is around here, the majority of people around here I’d say are unemployed I dunno they’re in a culture now where they’re just thrown around together in groups right and over here there’s sad stories, what do they do, my mate’s got a job, what’s he doing, he’s packing and he getting piss-rate. That’s nothing for… (1-1)

I think they’re a significant minority. I mean I’m talking about people who seem very, very disenfranchised and totally at a loss, who’ve got no idea where they’re coming from, pick up on little bits of identity, mainly maybe you know I’m talking particularly about the Mirpuri community, they will pick up on the chauvinism of where they come from and certain aspects of, it’s almost tribal really, feudalistic, so they’ll pick up on that in terms of giving themselves a sense of identity but there is this whole mixture of street culture and sort of LA gangs… (2-1)

The third people are that they don’t know much about their faith, their parents don’t know about it, they have had no… they haven’t done their own research about the faith, they have very little education themselves and the parents didn’t have the education and they don’t know Islam, what Islam is, and therefore they are intertwined with the Pakistani culture, or Kashmiri culture, or Bangladeshi culture and Islam. They don’t know, they can’t separate, and therefore they sometime innocently see that this part of Islam while it isn’t, and to some extent we’re all guilty of that. (2-4)

Their cultural consumption is a mixture of signifiers and identifiers from the American black culture industry, the Indian film industry based in Bombay, and South Asian folk music, usually the Punjabi *bhangra*. Religious and ethnic identity is
strong, though religious practice varies considerably within this type ranging from the fully practising to the twice yearly mosque visitors. The three sub-components of this identity are the bhangra/Bollywood component, the rap/hip-hop component and the post-industrial, Northern ghetto component. The first two components are examples of social creativity. The bhangra/Bollywood component re-evaluates a previously negative characteristic – that of being Asian – in a positive manner by celebrating the entertainment dimension of the Asian cultural diasporic experience.

So I think there is something in the subconscious of our young people in terms of their cultural heritage, their cultural affiliation and identity that they don’t feel at ease still with reggae although in any young community you always have a minority but the majority of them are into bhangra, are into qawwalis, into Alaap… (2-2)

The rap/hip-hop component similarly re-evaluates a previously negative characteristic as a positive characteristic, in that being non-white and living in a ghetto can be associated with power and esteem in the form of rappers or hip-hop artists – both of which are widely celebrated within the popular music industry. Some of the interviewees alluded as to why black cultural artefacts were so popular amongst South Asian Muslim youth:

I think that is also the case, especially a lot of the rap music talks about the situation of the Negroes in America, about racism, about problems with the police and other things. The other thing also is that a lot of the young people lack role models, within their own community who they can look up to, say this is my role model, this is the person I’d like to follow cos he does this, this and this. So there’s a lack of role models, so Muslim children or Asian or white kids they see people like Tupac and Snoop Doggy Dog they see them as role models because they know how to speak, talk the language, the designer gear they wear, so they went to emulate that person. (1-3)

… the black culture is seen as anti-authority and stick two fingers up at the establishment, so they feel that they’re part of that culture right, they’re saying “Look, we’re bad as well and we’re outside your laws as well and we’ll do what we like”. (1-2)

Q. So, why black people, why not white people?

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65 Eid is a twice yearly festival in which the day of festival begins with prayers at the local mosque.
A. Because from the early days through their educational life and work life, because of that discrimination that they’ve suffered, they can associate with themselves more with black people than with white people. (1-5)

However, this appropriation of culture simultaneously involved the appropriation of representations of the ‘black man’, i.e. there was an internalisation of the representation of the ‘black man’ as criminal and dangerous (Howarth, 2000):

Yeah maybe because they’ve lost in a sense, yeah… they’re fighting white people, generally I think personally when a white person sees a black person they have that fear inside them that the black man is strong right, and if you say ought to ‘em they’re gonna knock ya. Whereas at one time right, Muslims right we were passive society, and a gora would say “Ya black bastard, Paki” whatever right and our parents would say “No puttar don’t say anything, forget it, he’s only using his mouth”, maybe it’s because of our religion right because it preaches peace. But the black man, the black person is a lot stronger. White people are scared of them. So they think bring a bit of culture in right so white people are not gonna mess about with us. Personally that’s what I feel, it’s probably got something to do with that. In a sense, they can relate to black people a bit more because they’re persecuted the same as us… (1-1)

This cultural transference has meant that black youth culture in North America has become a source of identifiers for young South Asian Muslim males in Bradford. This acceptance and projection of cultural symbols that are associated with black culture is in contrast to the rejection of the term ‘black’ as a unificatory label to be adopted by all ethnic minority communities in opposition to racism as was suggested by anti-racist groups during the seventies and eighties. The community leaders rejected the term ‘black’ in favour of ‘Asian’, yet, Asian youth cultures have come to identify strongly with black youth cultures. The influence of American-based black youth culture on Asian youth culture was obvious for the insiders, yet most of the outsiders, especially the non-South Asian Muslims, failed to recognise the relevance of the question.

This social strategy involves the rejection of a negative stereotype, that of the ‘Paki’, and a simultaneous celebration of South Asian culture and racial victimisation.

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66 *Puttar* is Punjabi for ‘son’.
through the championing of forms of culture, such as the qawwali, bhangra, or hip-hop (or a hybrid mixture of all three), which act as strategies of social creativity. The negative is evaluated as positive. The ‘rude boy’ strategy similarly presents a number of shared attributes with other types offered in the literature. This strategy is equivalent to Hall’s (1992a) counter ethnicity, Hutnick’s (1991) strategy of dissociation (involving a high level of identification with the in-group culture and low level of identification with out-group culture), Peach and Glebe’s (1995) political strategy of ghettoisation, Knott et al.’s (1993) strategy of cultural synthesis and Werbner’s (1996) identification of a pan South Asian cultural aesthetic.

5.2.3. The ‘extremists’

The third ideal type is characterised by an assertive religious identification that seeks to resist the dominant representations of Muslims. The move towards an authentic religious practice in a non-Muslim society initiates a tension between what is regarded as balanced and normal, and what is regarded as extreme and unreasonable. Much of those signified by this ideal type either tend towards the path of rejectionism, or are concerned that they are heading in that direction.

…then there’s a great number who are aware who are in Muslim groupings, maybe they’ve found some other expression for being in this society for trying to define their identity. (2-1)

Some people do the other extreme and become very narrow and rigid in their Islam as a defence mechanism against what they feel is an attack upon them, because they don’t think they can answer the questions they become very dogmatic, yeah. (1-2)

There are those who are trying to define their Islamic identity, of trying to become good role models, becoming good Muslims, trying to live by the tenets and teachings of Islam which doesn’t mean ok, doesn’t mean that you become an extremist in everything, that Islam teaches you to be a balanced person, to live in the society that you live with, to progress, to move forward, to change the status quo, to improve the situation of the people, that’s what Islam is about. (1-3)

This strategy requires the challenging of the dominant social representation, and as such, the representations involved with this social strategy are polemical.

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67 The only English outsider to be aware of this was the senior youth worker.
representations. In this particular case, the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’ is portrayed as backward and anti-modern, and the response of the Muslim identity option is, for instance, to take an example of anti-modern practices such as the wearing of the headscarf and to trans-code it or re-evaluate it in a positive manner by suggesting that it allows for women to be judged according to their character and ability and not their physical appearance. This example is an example of polemical representations being used as social strategies by minority groups.

This type of response is one that explicitly makes a distinction between religious values and cultural values. Jacobson (1996b) suggests that this development occurs because religious boundaries are more clear-cut and provide more essential meaning than cultural boundaries.

Right I think a lot of young people are experiencing Islam and let me give you a bit of the history here, because many of the parents that came here they didn’t know much about Islam themselves, they saw Islam as certain ritualistic things so when the child is five, six, seven, they make he learns the Qur’an, he knows how to pray but the basic teachings of Islam are ignored, the children are sent to the mosque so they go for three four hours every day, they read the Qur'an rote learning but they don’t… but they don’t learn the essence of its message, you know, they don’t… the parents don’t develop the child’s character, the love of Islam, the respect for parents, respect for the community, teachers, all those things that are imbibed in the Qur’an and Islamic teachings, so as young people are older and those who come to Islam they realise that on there is a dichotomy here between Islam and culture, Islam says this, but the culture and my parents say this, do you understand, so there is that thing, young people are breaking away from this cultural mould and they are trying to develop their identity as Muslims who are living in Europe, in Britain, and not in essence say because my parents are from Pakistan… (1-3)


5.2.4. Identities as ideal types
A general reference to these three types is provided in the following quotes:

I would say the majority are in two type but there could be more than two types yeah. One who understood their culture, religion and background and have good understanding with their parents and one who are not sure and there are some who are opposing it. (2-6)

I mean I think some people leave Islam completely, some people do the other extreme and become very narrow and rigid in their Islam as a defence mechanism against what they feel is an attack upon them… And, but the vast majority is just becoming indifferent, they say “I’m Muslim” but they’re indifferent to Islam. (1-2)

The following long discussion provides an overview of the three types as identified by a South Asian Muslim politician:

A. I’m not sure. I mean.. I think it’s… I also see the emergence amongst Muslim youth either they go extreme over there or… Those who have gone, for instance some of the Muslim youth organisations, I’m not naming but there are few of them who are probably moving forwards to the extreme and there are those who have become totally pathetic, and those who are moving towards the extreme, they can be assertive but their assertion is sometimes not acknowledged. The white establishment write them off saying you are just a fringe group, not representing the mainstream of Muslim youth and there are those who are simply preoccupied with their economic development, they’re not… as long they have their money. Then there’s the majority, so becomes very retreated, you see…

Q. Into themselves?

A. Yeah, and become cynics.

Q. So there you have identified three main groups, there’s the…

A. Activists.

Q. The activists, then there is shall we say, people who are…

A. Who are aspiring to be middle-class, they are quite capable of doing things, they have the abilities, they’ve got the intelligence, they’ve got the qualifications, the ability to organise, but they’re not investing in their community or whatever it is, they’re only interested in themselves…

Q. And this is the assimilative type?
A. I think that they are not assimilated yet but I think that they are because I mean they believe that in order to be accepted and in order to be able to succeed in this society they have to make some compromises. And the third group which is the most unfortunate, they have either retreated to their own enclaves, they have become cynics, they have become cynical. They think that…

Q. What do you mean by enclaves?

A. Into their own sort of areas of where we have heavy concentrations of Muslims in certain conurbations, from a country in certain areas of the cities like in Oak lane…

Q. Leeds Road?

A. And they are the ones, they in a way have become very despondent. There is a permanent sense of hopelessness… (2-3)

The above quote provides clear identification of the three types. These three types represent a typology, and as stated at the beginning of this section, a typology can simplify the complexity and heterogeneity of actual lived experience, and though these three types were the most oft-mentioned, some interviewees did refer to other types.

There’s people that are Islamic… middle class people that are just trying to get on in their lives, they got their own, they got their religion, they’re into their religion right but not too heavily, they got a decent job to got to, they got a decent house and that’s ok, and they don’t really want to mess it up. (1-1)

Then there is a very large group of young people who having from Muslim homes, having come from Muslim countries, their affiliation and links with Muslim is only as far as they have Muslim names or they come from Muslim families. Equally I think they have a very vague notion about the countries of origin they come from. In terms of society here, they feel that for a variety of reasons they feel that they are not having opportunities given to them whereby they can compete on equal level with the society in terms of employment, businesses, in terms of their own personal development (2-2)

The interviewee in the first quote is referring to an Islamic identification that is combined with social mobility, and the interviewee in the second quote is identifying a cultural assimilationist approach that is detached from opportunities for social mobility. I would suggest that the three types of identity should be understood as
ideal types, representing three points on a triangle that represents the variety of ideal positioning that is available to South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. The three ideal types can be diagrammatically represented as below in figure 5.1., such that an identity can be positioned at any point in the circle around the triangle. Each point on the triangle corresponds with alternative discourses and social and cultural practices.

The spatial depiction of such identity positioning permits a certain level of flexibility for identity expression, that is, it allows for the possibility of numerous forms of identity expression which do not correspond exactly with the three identity ideal types. For example, the two alternative types identified above could be understood as being positioned between two points on the triangle. The first would be positioned in between the ‘coconut’ and the ‘extremist’, and the second would be positioned in between the ‘rude boy’ and the ‘coconut’. So for example, the two positions could be depicted as occupying points A and B respectively in figure 5.1. below.

Figure 5.1. Distribution of ideal types as potential identity positions

![Diagram of ideal types as potential identity positions](image)

The identities are examples of hybridity (Bhabha, 1994) in relation to their extraction from cultural reservoirs i.e. they are not monolithic and so it is not the case that one option is exclusively Western-sourced, another Asian-sourced and a third Islamic-
sourced. There is a tension in each type that is at least tri-polar, as the youth attempt ‘to achieve equality and recognition in British society without affronting their parental values’ (Gillespie, 1995, p. 5).

5.3. The emergence of Muslim identity discourse

Participant observation led to the identification of the incorporation of identity politics discourse by South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. ‘Rights talk’ had assumed common currency. Such talk centres around the rejection of a hegemonic representation which has the result of discriminatory practices. The stereotypes of ‘Paki’ and ‘Muslim’ as hegemonic representations have the combined effect of spoiling the identities of South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford which they see objectified through the police station and the patterns of house moving which act as examples of what are perceived to be discriminatory practices. The exacerbation of difference calls for the discourse of identity rights. But in this case, the source of self-identification is religion such that the identity being advocated is Muslim identity. This section will examine the relation between Muslim identity and the ‘Rushdie affair’ initially, and will then move on to discuss the perceived influence of mediatie globalisation upon Muslim identity. That there has been an emergence of Muslim identity in the face of stigmatising hegemonic representations, and that this is down to an enhanced self-perception, was recognised by the interviewees. I wish, however, to begin by discussing the content and nature of identity discourse itself. The following is an extract from the interview with a senior youth worker:

Q. Do you think in looking at Bradford over the last ten/fifteen years, there has been a an emergence of Muslim identity?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Why do you think that has been the case?

A. Because, people are becoming less afraid to show it. There’s something about passageways and rites, that people will have the confidence to say, “It’s alright, I’m a Muslim and I do this and that’s ok, and I’m gonna damn well do it”. And people say “It’s ok”.

68 The nature of the data in this section is such that one can conclude that the ‘specialists’ perceived an emergence of Muslim identity, but it is not possible to categorically state from this data alone that this emergence is directly related to the ‘Rushdie affair’.
Whether it is, or the Sikhs or whatever… And that’s a general acceptance but it’s also starting as a general confidence as an individual. That’s the interesting…

Q. Yeah, do you think it’s something that has come from behind the scenes, that they might have prayed at home, and kept quiet about it, and now they’re more confident about saying… not even saying, about being as they are, being open, public?

A. I think it’s always happened, except now people saying “I feel strong enough to say, I feel confident”, and being very open about it.

Q. So why do you think, what causes that change? Is it just a passage of time or is it something else?

A. It’s not just time, it is passage. It is passage, but it is not just about passage of time. I think it is about individual’s unnecessary fears being diminished so they feel more capable of doing it. I think it is about the indigenous population’s fear diminishing, therefore allowing it to happen. It is about people’s confidence and understanding their rights, to say, “I am allowed to do this so I will do this”. There’s too many simplistic answers in this world and I’m not sure there is answer to why. (3-5)

The youth worker has provided an account of the feelings and thought processes that stigmatised identities’ experience as they emerge in the public sphere. A close reading of the above extract reveals the essential structure of identity politics discourse. I will refer to the second and fourth answers quoted above in order to outline the structure.

Identity discourse is characterised by a decreasing sense of fear: “people are becoming less afraid to show it”, “I think it is about individual’s unnecessary fears being diminished”. This is coupled with an increased sense of self-confidence: “people will have the confidence to say ‘It’s alright, I’m a Muslim and I do this and that’s ok, and I’m gonna damn well do it’”, “…they feel more capable of doing it”. In the first answer the increased self-confidence is related to defiance. This in turn is related to an increased sense of acceptance from wider society: “And people say ‘It’s ok’. Whether it is, or the Sikhs or whatever… And that’s a general acceptance”, “I think it is about the indigenous population’s fear diminishing, therefore allowing it to happen”.

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The reverse of the above quotes from the extract provides an insight into the social psychological situation before the emergence of identity politics discourse. This is characterised by a fear on behalf of the wider community (“it is about the indigenous population’s fear diminishing”), there is similarly a fear on behalf of the stigmatised identity (“people are becoming less afraid to show it”) which affects their self confidence (“people will have the confidence to say, ‘It’s alright, I’m a Muslim and I do this and that’s ok, and I’m gonna damn well do it’”), meaning that the identity is not expressed publicly (“people saying ‘I feel strong enough to say, I feel confident’, and being very open about it”) since it is not permitted in the public sphere (“to say, ‘I am allowed to do this so I will do this’”).

Identity politics is, in this example, about the assertion of a spoiled identity in the public sphere. Two interviewees spoke of the relation of signifiers in the public sphere to Muslim identity.

…there’s been an emergence of people… if you look at sisters now, they wear hijab whereas ten years ago… there’s a massive jump, so many sisters are now wearing it yeah, to show they’re Muslims, to be proud that we are Muslim. If you look at the brothers who’ve got beards yeah, who go to the mosque, it’s a lot more. (1-2)

Q. Do you think these stereotypes make youngsters embarrassed about being Asian or being Muslim?

A. Yeah I think they do I think they find it hard to exhibit their Muslim identity, I mean you’ll rarely find a Muslim walking round with a hat or a beard, and sisters it’s much harder for women, cos obviously they’ll stand out. If they’re wearing hijab or whatever…

Q. There seems to be a lot more of that though, there’s a lot more young guys wearing beards and things like that?

A. I mean that’s I think more and more people are reasserting themselves, those people that have come back as it were in inverted commas they are reasserting their identity and that’s only a small minority I think. (1-4)

Identity politics discourse has so far been characterised by a decreasing sense of fear coupled with a increasing sense of self-confidence and acceptance which leads to the public display of identity signifiers. Identity politics discourse is also characterised by a sense of victimisation around a particular category, this being the cause of
victimisation: “We are being persecuted because we are members of category X”. This type of discourse has been central to the development of Muslim identity and has assumed, after mediatic globalisation, worldwide resonance.

…so people do talk about it, they do realise, that Bosnia who are they, predominantly Muslims, people of Kosovo, Albania, who are they, predominantly Muslims, the people of Iraq, who are they, they are Muslims, the people of Kashmir, who are they, they are Muslims, the people of Palestine, who are they, they are Muslims, you know, even Sudan when they Bomb the pharmaceutical – Sudan is a predominantly Muslim country, so I’ve quoted you seven countries of places around the world, all seven are Muslims, so obviously when Muslim young people see this on the TV… obviously it makes you realise and it strengthens your identity… (1-3)

The reporting of global Muslim-related events has had a compound effect on Muslim identity in Bradford. The nineteen nineties witnessed a series of major international events that involve Muslims or Muslim countries. This included the Palestinian intifada, the Gulf War, the war in former Yugoslavia, the bombings being linked to Usama bin Laden, the 1998 bombings of Iraq, the nuclear test explosions in Pakistan and the war in Kosovo. The notion of the ummah – the global Muslim community – requires the local Muslim community to, at least, appreciate and empathise, if not more, with the Muslim ummah and those parts of it that are experiencing suffering. The effect of a series of such continuous international episodes on a local identity such as the Muslim community in Bradford has led to a concomitant strengthening of Muslim identity, if only at the symbolic level. The global events augmented Muslim identity in Bradford in several ways: they were a reinforcement and universalisation of the stereotype that was previously viewed to be locally-specific and the discrimination and victimisation that they experienced at a local level is globalised, the identity discourse therefore assumed global proportions. The above analysis provides a transitional account of the emergence of identity discourse. This account suggests that the process of transition is without resistance. It is my suggestion that this is not the case in this particular study. I will examine below the consequences of the use of rights discourse centred around religious identity during the ‘Rushdie affair’.
5.3.1. Religion as the basis of rights discourse

A study of the social psychology of identity politics has to include an historical approach. This is because identity politics movements are tied to key historical events (Calhoun, 1994). I would suggest that Muslim identity discourse is tied to the ‘Rushdie affair’ and mediatic globalisation. I would further suggest that a study of Bradford is relevant to this theme since Bradford was, and perhaps is, perceived as a key location for assertive forms of Muslim identity politics discourse. Race had been a source of political identification during the eighties, the publication of *The Satanic Verses*, however, led to the adoption of rights discourse but in relation to religion as a identificatory category.

The ‘Rushdie affair’ was not just about the protest about the book as someone who was at the centre of the protest and the organisation of it in Bradford. Our protest was… in Bradford… was not just about the book itself, it was about putting Muslim religious agenda and Muslim religious identity very much on the map and saying to society “We are also here and our presence matters and our presence should be…” We begin to accept the rights of minorities, black and Asian minorities to live here, within that, the Muslim also had a right to live and to be respected and their identity to be recognised and to be seen in a positive light as a religious identity because that was their source, that is the source of energy for Muslims and that… (2-2)

The issue highlighted here is one of relevance, religion was seen as a source of identification and the ‘Rushdie affair’ was about recognition and respect according to the choice of identification on behalf of the minority. However, such demands were met with rejection by the wider society. One campaigner, who was similarly at the heart of the campaign in Bradford in calling for the withdrawal of the book, spoke at length about these feelings of rejection. After describing in great length the experience of economic discrimination in Bradford over a twenty year period he said:

So I think the young people have experienced quite a bit of obstacles in that way and they were expecting when the time comes they will fully be able to share that, they fully be accepted. Then they were hoping that they would be fully accepted and they felt that they were a part of it til this Satanic Verses came and then many of the young people who made remarks, some of them had written letters, which we have bags and bags of it at the council for mosques, they say they don’t know what’s… they fully… they’re so grossly rejected, every
contribution this society has done, every good thing these young people or old people have done in this society for many, many years, decades, just one thing all they were asking for is a we are a faith community and we want to be treated with fairness and respect. They weren’t asking for favours or any materialistic thing, all they were asking for recognition of their wholeness, not just part of the Muslim community but the whole of the Muslim community. And that was the experience of that time. (2-4)

It is the relation between contribution and recognition that was felt to have been disrupted by the ‘Rushdie affair’. The result of this has been a turning inwards, an introspective look away from the gaze of the disrespectful, dominant ‘other’.

…when you are rejected by the society at large, you will look inwards and you will try to investigate who you are and I have heard comments from the library particularly Mr Qureshi - the Book Centre, that although The Satanic Verses after we started protesting would have sold perhaps but he said that many, many times more Islamic books were sold to the young Muslims, young peoples who took keen interest in the Islamic literature, and some of the non-Muslims bought some Islamic literature as well to try and find out what it is… and we have got more experience that many, many of the young Muslims have started to take a keen interest in finding out what Islam is. …it’s mostly the rejection of the society at large which made the young people look for their identity. (2-4)

I think it did, it made them realise that there is elements of racism, religious hatred, misunderstanding, so I think to a lot of young people that was the case and it helped them mould an identity and especially young people, it made them think who they actually are, where do they fit within this spectrum of Britain, are they Pakistanis, are they British, are they white, are they Muslims, are they Asians, who are they, it questions people who am I at the end of the day? (1-3)

The peculiarity of the chain of events require some comment. The ‘Rushdie affair’ as stated above was a call for recognition of religious identity. This was met with rejection. This was followed by an increased religious identification that was somehow due to rejection. I will return to a possible explanation of this later in this chapter.

5.3.2. The ‘Bradford Muslim’: The social construction of radical Islam

Identity politics movements are rooted to location and history, and certain events and places are related to the emergence of identity politics discourse as they are perceived
to be the representatives of the more assertive branch of the movement. The community in Bradford is perceived as such a prototype of an ethnic minority community (in this case the Muslim community) in a multicultural setting engaged in identity politics assertion. Its pressures, tensions, crises, structural arrangements, patterns of development, resolutions, endurance and stability are seen as typical of the development of an ethnic minority community within a multi-cultural city. It is therefore regularly under the observant eye of the political scientist, social planner, journalist, sociologist and government advisor. This focus on Bradford is due to a social representation of Bradford and the Muslim community in Bradford that dates back to the early eighties as the Bradford Muslim community was involved in three campaigns: a campaign against Ray Honeyford, a campaign for halal meat in schools and a campaign against The Satanic Verses. The media themselves are viewed as constructing their own social representation of the experience of multiculturalism in Bradford:

I’d say this is a media concoction in that when, if you study umm… anti-racist politics in the history of Bradford, there were lots of local authorities that were coming up with anti-racism initiatives through mid to the late seventies, for some reason, I’m not quite sure why, Bradford was seen as one of the initial or prime movers in multicultural politics or multicultural relations… This is going back to the early eighties and Bradford specifically came out, and again it wasn’t anything different that was being done from places like Slough or Birmingham but for some reason the media latched onto us and the with the Honeyford affair and the work that was… the orchestrated campaign from the far-right part of this sort of Thatcherite revolution really, they homed in on Bradford and I think that’s done a lot of disservice to Bradford as a positive community. It’s always the case of people coming to Bradford for research and there was no reason to focus on Bradford as being anywhere… particularly different from anywhere else and I think as a consequence of Honeyford which went on for a couple of years, but then immediately when the book was burnt in eighty nine they sort of latched onto it straight away. I think that’s sort of rooted in a media creation really… (2-1)

Bradford is perceived as a laboratory for race relations and particularly for relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, a laboratory for not only Britain but for Europe, from just the number of visits we have in this office from all over Europe. In fact we had yesterday a delegation from Russia, looking into the whole aspect of how the city’s coping with its multi-faith identity so certainly I think Bradford issue of race identities, people are much more interested how this large Muslim community is coming to terms with and how this wider society coming
to terms with this very large growing... So certainly, Bradford is very much in news, very much in... So therefore Bradford Muslims are kind of barometer, it's a measurement to the state of affairs of the Muslim community throughout UK. So anything we do becomes a standard and partly that is about *Satanic Verses* and partly that is about Bradford’s Muslim community’s kind of vocal protest, some of the most significant political protests which affected this country and society came from Bradford. Halal meat issue... multi-cultural education policy issue, the whole aspect of teaching R.E. in schools and alternative worship to Christianity came from Bradford, Honeyford affair which was a major kind of breakthrough on highlighting racism within schools was Bradford. So if you look Bradford has this history of organised, not one off, organised, sustained, long-term campaigning... The Honeyford affair went on for years and *Satanic Verses* went on for years, halal meat went on for years, so from 1981/1982 to almost 1988 there isn't a single year in the history of Bradford Muslims when the Bradford community was not campaigning and protesting on a given issue. So what you call a decade of Muslim protest and it came from Bradford and that to some extent elevated the Muslim community’s position within the Muslims community as a whole... and it also became a focus for media attention as well as criticism. (2-2)

I’ve had CBS in America, NBC, French TV, BBC, ITN, I’ve lost count quite honestly of the people that want to come here. I’ve had the *New York Times* here wanting to do stories about Bradford and about community sometimes, sometimes we’ve said yeah, most of the time we’ve said no because all they’re trying to do is use Bradford to tell a story, and have a go. (3-3)

Whether or not the Bradford Muslim community has been more assertive in relation to other communities, it has certainly become the object of media and academic attention. However, the mediatic and academic narrative that was constructed was repeatedly criticised.

...we try to promote Bradford and there’s an awful lot of things that we think Bradford should celebrate, a lot of good things, but what is happening is the media, if they want a bad news story they’ll come to Bradford and find one, they won’t look for the good things, they’ll look for the bad and they’ll come and find the bad things or show the bad things and give Bradford, put it on the spotlight once again, and show it in a negative light and it’s so frustrating... (3-3)

I think at every opportunity available, you may quote me here, I think they are busily engaged in depicting us as negative, fanatical, uncompromising community because of our history, they know. (2-3)
The frustration at the depiction of events as components of a constructed narrative was due to the community being subject to the processes of representation. The community itself was viewed as prototypical in its identity politics assertion and consequently, a leader in the challenging of the hegemonic discourse. The response to the challenge was the construction of a representation of the assertive subaltern: the ‘Bradford Muslim’ – a radicalised version of an already existing representation. The event that initiated such a representation during the ‘Rushdie affair’ was the book burning and has become one of the two key significant events of the ‘Rushdie affair’ as described within the media. However, the response to the book burning was post hoc. One interviewee, a key member of the campaign, spoke of the discrepancy between the construction and wide diffusion of the representation through the popular image of the book burning in Bradford and the actual presence of the media at the demonstration.

The interesting thing about Bradford is when the book was burnt, there was no media present. No one knows that… There was one photograph taken by a freelance journalist, a friend of mine who happened to be there. But there was no media present even to the extent of the local Telegraph and Argus… didn’t turn up. The Bradford… the book burning actually became important when Khomeini actually made the fatwa… Now the interesting thing is that all the footage which the media uses about the book burning, either the footage was based on the book which was burned in Blackburn or they used the footage from the video which we made ourselves. Okay, so the media itself has no record of the book burning other than these were the photographs… The week after, the freelance, once they became interested then they were digging for… and the only photograph they could find was the freelance photographer and when the TV wanted to show, initially they showed Blackburn and then they realised that Bradford made its own video so they actually bought it from the Council of Mosques. (2-2)

The focus upon the book burning in Bradford led to a focus upon Bradford as a whole which in itself was a continuation of the representation of Bradford as a source of protest. The focus during the ‘Rushdie affair’ however led to a binary juxtaposition between identities. That of the liberal versus the Muslim.

And I think most of that (the image) came from the Salman Rushdie time where the media was intentionally using people who were least eloquent and more stereotypical image as spokespersons for the Muslim community. These were persons not picked by the Muslim community, but picked by the media because they best fitted the image
they wanted to portray because they wanted to show that Salman Rushdie was enlightened and liberal and modern and good person and these were people who supposedly were backward and awful and intolerant. So they had to pick people in the community who best fit that image. So they find a guy, you know big beard and wore a hat, couldn’t speak English properly, ask him questions and then contrast that to Salman Rushdie or people, some white liberals defending his point of view. So I think from that the image stuck about the Muslims in Bradford as being sort of backward. (1-2)

The interviewee attributed agency in this quote to the media, which is similar to the response to the police station i.e. that there is agency in those situations which involve objectifications of relations of power. One result of this in the ‘Rushdie affair’ was the construction of the ‘Bradford Muslim’.

As noted earlier, the social representation of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ was found in Haroun’s (1997) analysis of the letters sent to the editors of newspapers during the ‘Rushdie affair’. This representation was investigated in the interviews and was found to be anchored around three categories. The first is that of a religious community that is backward, living in the past and rigid in its application of law, essentially the antithesis of modernity.

More fundamentalists, more narrow, more rigid, more stuck in the traditions, less willing to change, that kind of image is given yeah. …So, I think from that the image has stuck about the Muslims in Bradford as being sort of backward. (1-2)

The second is that of a united community but in a politically challenging way and for a purpose that is held to be subversive, and so the community is represented as political, (and politically uncompromising), up-front/in your face, militant and consequently untrustworthy.

…they probably see Bradford as more militant and more up front in terms of Islam than elsewhere… (3-3)

One interviewee, when asked about the ‘Bradford Muslim’, described them as incorporating both of the above characteristics:

More political, more in your face, highly religious, and living when people talk about the older generations living in the past, living in the
past, trying to create a Pakistan that disappeared ten/fifteen years ago… (3-5)

The third category is that this is an ex-rural community (and only recently so) due to a large portion of the community having been displaced because of the building of a new dam and the chain migration that is associated with immigration to Britain from the Indian sub-continent (Shaw 1994). This category anchors the community as illiterate/uneducated, tight-knit, tribal and working class.

The thing is when you’re talking about Bradford Muslims as people were at that time, they did have particular image of the Bradford Muslims as a separate entity and it was rightly or wrongly because I mean again factually I can’t back this up but there will be material there. It was migration from a rural community in the main, so that you were talking about families, people who had come not only from rural communities but fairly tight-knit local community and therefore would have different characteristics than maybe in other areas who maybe come other sorts of community, maybe more industrialised or something of that nature. (3-1)

I would suggest that this is an example of the construction of a representation of an identity politics movement as an unreasonably assertive subaltern which attempts to challenge the hegemonic discourse.
5.4. Conclusion

The first empirical study involved participant observation followed by interviews with eighteen key informers/specialists. The aim of this study was to explore the social psychology of South Asian Muslim youth with respect to identity and representation. This was divided into social representations of identities, identity responses as ideal types, and a new form of identity politics discourse.

In terms of social representations of identities, the ‘Paki’ is anchored as uncivilised and non-white. The ‘Muslim’ is anchored as backward/anti-modern and aggressive. The social representation of ‘white society’ is anchored as racist (and subtly so), the police station as an objectification of ‘white power’ is anchored as separate, confrontational, intimidating and frightened.

The three ideal types of identity response are ‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and ‘extremists’. Each is related to the stereotypes of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’. The ‘coconut’ ideal type involves the rejection of the stereotype and the maintenance of distance from the source of such stereotypes. The ‘rude boy’ ideal type involves an engagement through social creativity with the stereotype of the ‘Paki’. The ‘extremist’ ideal type similarly involves an engagement through social creativity with the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’.

The third area of study is the development of an identity politics discourse that focuses around the issue of Muslim identity. This is historically and geographically particular to Bradford, as it is perceived as a spring of Muslim identity assertion, from which activism flows to other parts of the country. The employment of rights discourse for religious identity through campaigns that begun or were situated in Bradford led to the focusing of attention upon Bradford that was intensified during the ‘Rushdie affair’. This led in turn to the construction of an assertive antagonist, the ‘Bradford Muslim’, one that challenges hegemony. The rights discourse, though by now had assumed common usage and, after a series of international crises involving Muslim populations, international relevance.
A key question of this thesis is how does the indigenous population respond to a resident internal ‘other’? The findings of this particular study are that it maintains its psychological integrity by maintaining distance. The stereotypes of the ‘Paki’, the ‘Muslim’, the separating out of neighbourhoods, the police station – all these function to maintain separation and difference. The ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ are stereotypes that depict ‘otherness’ on the grounds of major Western discourses. Modernism and progress through civilisation are both central discourses in Western intellectual history and very much define what it is to be a British, European, or Western individual. So to be accused of being anti-modern and uncivilised is to be accused of being against the very essence of British, European and Western identity. The stereotypes therefore maintain ‘otherness’ at the most essential level. It is therefore hardly surprising that patterns emerge which suggest that community separation is being maintained. Similarly, the police station objectifies a necessity on the part of the police, and therefore authority, to maintain and highlight separation. As Eagleton (1991) writes: “Once power nakedly reveals its hand, it can become an object of political contestation” (p. 116). The problem with the police station is its naked aggression. If social psychology is in part the study of what is hidden and accepted even in disagreement, then the police station makes studying the social psychology of racism in Bradford an easier enterprise. The subtleties of racism, or the new type of racism, make the victim of racism wonder whether their perception of discrimination is nothing more than a delusion of victimisation. But the police station objectifies in a crude manner the racism that is perceived (and often difficult to detect) in representations of authority. The police station therefore in attempting to fulfil the remit of policing the community merely serves to confirm the community’s fears that the police are racist. The importance of the police station is that it objectifies the view of authority towards the internal ‘other’: a brick wall embodies a psychological barrier to integration.

The South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford respond to the stereotypes of their ‘otherness’ in two separate ways. They either internalise the stereotypes (e.g. the ‘coconuts’) or they resist the stereotypes (e.g. the ‘rude boys’ and the ‘extremists’). Internalisation of the stereotypes necessitates the maintenance of distance from the source of the stereotypes. This strategy is similar to that of those members of ‘white society’ who are seeking to maintain psychological and actual distance from the
South Asian Muslim community as mentioned above. The other two strategies involve the resistance of the stereotypes. One type, the ‘rude boys’, involves the resistance of the stereotype of the ‘Paki’ and the other type, the ‘extremists’, involves the resistance of the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’. The resistance in both cases takes the form of trans-coding or social creativity. That is, a previously negative characteristic is re-interpreted rhetorically in a positive manner. The representation is therefore contested and ceases to be hegemonic.

Though both ‘rude boy’ and ‘extremist’ ideal types involve a rejection of stereotypes through linguistic reflections, their engagement with the hegemonic discourses is more complicated through the incorporation of the identity politics discourse. This utilisation of rights discourse was initially around the issue of race, for example in the campaigns involving the Bradford 12 and the Honeyford affair. But the halal meat campaign and the ‘Rushdie affair’ brought religion into the identity discussion. In fact, the ‘Rushdie affair’ was in part, according to some of the key leaders of the campaign in Bradford who were interviewed for the purposes of this chapter, a campaign for self-definition as a religious minority seeking identity rights. The issue of The Satanic Verses was particularly problematic because the book was perceived to be essentially undermining, through sarcasm and sacrilege, a central foundation of belief in Islam: Prophethood. The campaign against the book was therefore a campaign to maintain the bare necessities of a religious identity.

The South Asian Muslim community in Bradford had been categorised as an especially assertive community and the burning of the book in Bradford combined two factors that accelerated the campaign. First of all, a book was burnt, and secondly it was burnt in Bradford. The importance of Bradford is that the Bradford South Asian Muslim community was seen as prototypical of the Muslim community as a whole. The ‘Bradford Muslim’ then emerged as a social representation, this being a developed form of the representation of the ‘Muslim’. The ‘Bradford Muslim’ was anchored as backward, political and ex-rural. So the campaign for protection from stereotypes through identity politics discourse resulted in the construction of another stereotype, that of the ‘Bradford Muslim’. The challenge of the hegemonic resulted in the assertion of representational power by the hegemonic discourse through the construction of a representation of those that contested the hegemonic representation.
Difference is therefore maintained, and previous stereotypes of the ‘Muslim’ are superseded by developed versions of their previous forms, the ‘backward’ and the ‘assertive’ are now more ‘backward’ and more ‘assertive’, because not only do they burn the book, but they are also willing to kill the author.

This response to identity assertion (i.e. rejection) has, however, peculiarly led to an assertion of Muslim identity. This is because the response has confirmed what the identity discourse had assumed. Identity discourse assumes discrimination, subjugation and victimisation. The response to Muslim identity assertion, by the media at least, confirms such assumptions. It was during the ‘Rushdie affair’ that these issues were raised in the national and international public sphere and it is the argumentation during the ‘Rushdie affair’ and their connection to social representations that we will examine next.
6.0. DIALOGICAL ARGUMENTATION DURING THE ‘RUSHDIE AFFAIR’

This chapter contains the results of an examination into the nature and content of dialogical argumentation during the ‘Rushdie affair’. Five television programmes that were aired during the ‘Rushdie affair’ have been analysed for their rhetorical content. Bi-polar positions were identified and the arguments will first be listed according to their main points, examples being provided in each case. This detail has been provided so that the reader can access the contents of the arguments during the ‘Rushdie affair’. This will be followed by a structural analysis of some of the processes of argumentation that the sides adopted. The manner in which social representations are utilised to support argumentation has been found to be similar for both sides, though they represented radically different views. The use of social representations will be seen to be integral to the form and nature of argumentation.

6.1. The identification of rhetorical positions

Four main rhetorical positions were identified, representing different lines of argument, each reflecting different social groupings. These were: the radical liberal position, the moderate liberal position, the moderate Muslim position and the radical Muslim position. Each position corresponds to a group identity that is associated with certain representations of the affair. The two polarised views at the time of the affair were the Muslim/fundamentalist viewpoint and the liberal/writer’s viewpoint. These two categories form general viewpoints, though particularisation could point to differences between different groups within these categories. For example, within the Muslim category, there were some groups who argued against the book but did not agree with the fatwa, while other groups supported the banning of the book and the fatwa. The two extreme opinions, signifying the poles of the dialogical axis, were represented by a fundamentalist form of Islam and a similarly extreme form of Islam.

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69 It is not necessary that the position is articulated by someone who holds the same view (Billig, 1991).
70 This typology has been suggested by Modood (1998).
71 These two viewpoints are, for the sake of convenience, referred to as the liberal viewpoint and the Muslim viewpoint. It is acknowledged that there may be some liberals who share some views with the Muslim viewpoint, and vice versa. Similarly, many people participated in the debates who were neither liberal nor Muslim.
liberalism. The four positions can be related to the ‘Rushdie affair’ in the following table.

Table 6.1. Rhetorical positioning on issues relating to the ‘Rushdie affair’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorical position</th>
<th>Book burning</th>
<th>Fatwa</th>
<th>Islamophobia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical liberal</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate liberal</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Muslim</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Muslim</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The moderate positions were, in the context of the ‘Rushdie affair’, rhetorically hybrid. The hybrid nature of these rhetorical positions was related (in different degrees) to the bi-polarised positions. They represented positions of compromise and, as such, shared rhetoric with both bi-polar positions as depicted in the table above.

Each rhetorical item in the transcript was categorised according to four properties. Firstly, the position being articulated, secondly the articulator, thirdly the type of rhetoric and fourthly the direction of rhetoric. Table 6.2. below describes the distribution of the frequency of rhetorical items according to the person who articulated them. The table shows on average a high frequency for the radical liberal, a very low frequency for the moderate liberal, a moderately high frequency for the moderate Muslim, and a fairly low frequency for the radical Muslim position. The frequencies for the moderate and the radical Muslim positions vary considerably for the first four programmes which were aired in the immediate aftermath of the ‘Rushdie affair’ (the fifth being aired a year later).

Table 6.2. Frequency of rhetorical items per identity position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorical Position</th>
<th>Pro. 1</th>
<th>Pro. 2</th>
<th>Pro. 3</th>
<th>Pro. 4</th>
<th>Pro. 5</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical liberal</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate liberal</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Muslim</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Muslim</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.3. describes the distribution of ‘extreme’ position statements. These are those rhetorical items that represented polarised debate. Such that an ‘extreme’ rhetorical item would, in the case of the liberal position, articulate a radical liberal position, be articulated by a radical liberal, contain a primary\textsuperscript{73} form of rhetoric and be pro-liberal. The frequency of such ‘extreme’ items reveals the nature of rhetorical exchange during a crisis event. The table shows that ‘extreme’ items account for almost half of all rhetorical items.

Table 6.3. Frequency of extreme rhetorical position statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorical Position</th>
<th>Pro. 1</th>
<th>Pro. 2</th>
<th>Pro. 3</th>
<th>Pro. 4</th>
<th>Pro. 5</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extreme liberal item</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Muslim item</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.1. The liberal rhetorical position

**The right to freedom of imagination:** The campaign against the book by sections of the Muslim community had begun in India in September 1988 (Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991). The campaign did not receive much attention until the book burning and the declaration of the *fatwa*. The liberal position had not been articulated extensively in the national press prior to these events. However, both the book burning and the *fatwa* precipitated discussion in the national public sphere. The issue of freedom of speech was central to the ‘Rushdie affair’. The liberals were defending Rushdie’s right to publish and the Muslims were advocating boundaries to such notions of freedom. The liberal position stressed the importance and the value of a writer’s imagination and suggested that freedom for writers will mean that offence will be caused to some. McEwan\textsuperscript{74} stated on this that:

I think that it is important to bear in mind that if you live in a free society, one of the freedoms you have is to be daily outraged by what you read. We all are outraged and sometimes even insulted by other people’s opinions. And it’s the very nature of a pluralist society that

\textsuperscript{72} The frequencies in this table and in the following two tables are provided as percentages.
\textsuperscript{73} See later for explanations about types of rhetoric.
\textsuperscript{74} Readers wishing to check the identities of the individuals referred to in this and later sections should consult appendix (viii).
we just learn to live with the scuffs and rubs of those… of that kind of life.

Peter, a bookseller in the *Everyman* discussion said: “We must as minorities and individuals be prepared to be offended, as I am… books that I sell in my shop many of them in some way or another the contents offend me”.

The limitations of freedom of expression were acknowledged by those defending this position. Weldon admitted that she would be willing to consider changes to a text: “You change manuscripts for all sorts of reasons if it does not affect what is called the integrity of the text”. The issue of incitement to hatred is related to this point. Ignatieff said to Akhtar in *The Late Show* programme of 8th May 1989:

You’re making this as a tactical move, because you know that incitement to racial hatred is an absolute no, no. Even the free speech people on… on my side would be with you if you could prove that it incited to racial hatred, and that’s definitely true. If you could prove to me that it makes, you know, white citizens, or non-Asian, or non-Islamic citizens of Bradford hate Muslims, I would definitely be with you…

Winner said in *Hypotheticals* on a similar point: “I think the issue as to whether the film *(sic)* would enrage and turn people against any one religion or race is an issue”. This highlighted some of the dilemmas faced by the liberals on the issue of free speech. Winner was questioned on this in the *Hypotheticals* programme in which he said that he did not consider a brief suspension against marching for the National Front as a major infringement of the freedom of the nation. A suspension of book sales, however, was a different matter because that was a “suspension of the transmission of ideas”.

Though the book may have been accepted as offensive, it was still regarded as worth defending under the right of freedom of expression. Waterstone, the owner of the chain of book stores expressed similar statements:

I personally find *Satanic Verses* to be deeply offensive book, I have a… a… an instinctive dislike on anything which verges towards blasphemy but at the same time it is an important work. It is an interesting examination of the reaction of an intelligent atheist towards
divine revelations and believers. Now these are important issues. They may be offensive to... to see an examination but they are issues which are important to raise and should be raised.

The liberals regarded the protection of this freedom as necessary. Mailer on this point said: “...people who sell books but don’t care enough about them to defend them are equal to writers who write books who don’t care enough them to stand up for them”. Steiner described his reaction against those who refused to publish the book as: “Complete outrage and shame at that kind of cowardice”.

**The experience of the ‘Rushdie affair’**: The liberals chose to describe the affair in dramatic ways: “These are extraordinary days for British culture”, “this whole business is one of the cruellest, most outrageous pieces of blackmail that we have ever lived through” and “the conflict between Islam and the West has escalated into a total confrontation of values and culture, not just between East and West but within the already strained multicultural fabric of British society” were some of the descriptions of the crisis used to begin television programmes.

The liberal viewpoint perceived the affair as generating a climate of fear which would reduce the freedom that they had to write or speak. *The Late Show* programme of the 22nd February began with the following statement as part of its introduction: “Only fear can stop a writer from writing. Only fear can stop a book from being sold.” Mailer, when asked why the affair had become an issue of conscience for American writers, said:

I obviously have been thinking about that for the last six days or so. And you know, we start writing, when we begin as novelists and we’re young, we usually write in great fear, we’re so afraid of the consequences of our work. We don’t know what’ll happen when the book comes out, we get the feeling that we will be killed when the book comes out. As you get older and you get more blase and you also get withered and professional and you know... you know where you’re at and you lose that fear. And this has brought back what I would call the primal fear of novelists. So in that sense, aah, it’s had enormous importance for us, just directly, selfishly, we’ve all put ourselves in Salman Rushdie’s place.
The writers identified with Rushdie as someone in the same trade and as someone who faced the same pressures as they did in writing, and they feared that what had happened to Rushdie may happen to them. Winner, on the programme *Hypotheticals*, gave an example of this fear when he said:

Well, I was at a very important Writer’s Guild seminar on censorship a few weeks ago, and they were asked to sign a petition for Salman Rushdie and a large number of people stood up and said that they feared that their names and addresses would be given and it didn’t get many signatures.

The climate of fear felt by the liberals raised the possibility of worsening conditions. The liberal argument was that the book should not be banned because if it was banned then this could lead to much worse situations in which greater freedoms could be lost. Mailer said on this, “Once they start issuing bomb threats and sniper threats to bookstores, there’s gonna be hell to pay”. Ignatieff summarised this point when he asked Akhtar: “The problem… the problem, Shabbir, is 1935. The problem is the Nuremberg laws. You start with Rushdie, you burn Rushdie, then where do you stop?” He explained further in the same programme:

Because people say to me, they say to me, I can understand in their outrage about *The Satanic Verses*, they burn *The Satanic Verses*, it’s a bad thing, I disapprove of burning books but what bothers me is then they start objecting to something else. Soon, we don’t just have one book burning, we have nice, big bonfires in the middle of… in front of the Mayor’s office in Bradford. Nice, big bonfires and a lot of stuff goes into it, a lot of stuff that you as a philosopher wouldn’t want burned at all.

Weldon expressed similar fears: “It is said ‘Books today, people tomorrow. Burn the books today, kill the writer tomorrow’.”

**The depiction of ‘otherness’**: The representation of Muslims was quite varied, the following are examples of how some liberals viewed Muslims. Ignatieff in the introduction to his visit to Bradford said that he expected to find “‘otherness’, difference, a gulf of culture and language. I expect not to feel at home”. This statement is immediately followed in the programme by a discussion in which Ignatieff and Akhtar express radical disagreements. The representation of the Muslim
position on the *fatwa* was provided by Robertson in *Hypotheticals* when he asks the Muslim participants the following questions: “You don’t think that this man deserves to die?”, “And do you have a duty to be his executioner?” and “Let’s just… but don’t you have some duty to condemn him, or to capture him or even to kill him?”. The liberals perceived the Muslims as not having read the book. On occasion the Muslims were linked to violence. Steiner said: “And in the horror of this whole story, in the lunatic, murderous horror of what is being visited on Salman Rushdie” and “Nobody forces anyone to read a book. And of course, the murderous screamers and burners of books from Bradford onto today haven’t even tried to open it”. Weldon said on *Hypotheticals*: “Alas, it has fallen into the hands of those who do not understand the nature of fiction or the revelatory nature of fiction”.

The liberals had views about the way they felt the Muslims should have responded. Robertson asked whether the campaign had in fact increased support for the book? McEwan suggested that the proper way for the Muslims to have responded was through the level of ideas. Peter, the bookseller, suggested that if this was done, then:

…you’ll give a very impressive contradiction to what you see as the abuse in the book. The fact that you feel that you’ve got one hand tied behind your back because you’re being decent and you feel that he was being indecent err… doesn’t actually… isn’t actually the case. You can… if you want to present your view and you do so with the teaching of Muhammad, this will be very much respected…

Some perceived the Muslim response as agitative. Robertson asked on this issue whether the Muslim representatives would prevent further escalations in violence: “Shabbir Akhtar, obviously some younger members of the community are taking things a bit too far. Would you do anything to pacify them?”. Rees, a former Home Office Minister said:

But people who are organisers had better think that there are other people who react to these things, not just the feelings of the people who are marching themselves. Because a march is not just a march, it also sparks off those innate anti-Muslim, anti-coloured which are pretty deep in the community…

Ignatieff, in his visit to Bradford, expected a split identity, or a community in tension:
It could be said that I’m hearing someone who’s putting a very, good
gloss on a rather divided identity. Someone who’s actually very torn
between a devout Muslim and a secular person. You make it sound as
if you’ve brought the two together. But someone listening to you,
across what you’re saying, might say, this guy is just papering over the
cracks...

Commenting on the family that he spent the most time with, he said: “Everyday in the
classroom and on TV, Rehan is learning to want things that may lead him to break
with his Islamic past. Keeping a faith in the media age isn’t going to be easy”.

The play *Iranian Nights* covered many of the issues dealing with this particular point
and as such, the play provides a view from which we can derive the liberal’s
representations of the Muslim community. The scene in which the young Muslim
activist described his conversion to Islam explains the liberal’s explanation of the
Islamic youth. His conversion is on the night in which he received some severe racial
harassment, and the humiliation that he received forced him to find his pride in his
faith. The young man’s turn towards faith is also depicted in the play as a rejection of
the strategy adopted by his father: “Can’t you see you failed? Five years a labour
councillor, result? Fifteen years, chairman of the multicultural committee for racial
integration. Result? Nothing!”.

The point of discrimination is directly
linked to the ‘Rushdie affair’ in the *Everyman*
programme, when John, the chair of the discussion, said:

I mean the implications of what you’re saying is that… that Muslim
community is deeply hurt and is making an issue about *The Satanic
Verses*. And that’s really a symptom of feeling discriminated against
as a… as a racial and cultural group so that this is all the symptom of a
deeper level of racism that exists out there.

The play also questions the sincerity of the Muslim position in several places. The
poet in the play asked a religious tyrant: “Do your threats actually have anything to
do with Islam or is it the same old story of power, terror and realpolitik?” The father
rebuked the son in the play when he told him that the mullahs were “Ignorant, corrupt
hypocrites” and the son himself was portrayed as a hypocrite as he arranges
prostitutes for Arab Sheikhs and as he arranged financial deals for drug smugglers. The perception is that the Muslim community is experiencing difficulty in adjusting to life in Britain and that those who do become Islamic do so because of rejection from mainstream, British society. Also, that those who do become Islamic tend to exhibit contradictions in their behaviour, either consciously or unconsciously, as a result of negotiating their lifestyle in Britain.

The possibility and mechanism for dialogue within a multicultural setting was a central issue throughout the ‘Rushdie affair’. Two of the five programmes ended in contrasting ways. Peter, the book seller in Everyman, showed how these dilemmas can lead to different answers depending upon what he knew about the book:

> My views are very liberal with a small ‘l’, and it’s easy to pat yourself on the back for tolerating other people and it’s only when I have actually come to meet err… individuals and hear what they’ve got to say and what their concerns are and what their values are, that you actually… that I actually can put flesh on what can be a rather academic idea. Without this, I can see things happening which might make me a lot more aggressive and a lot more provocative. That’s the kind of mistake I couldn’t possibly now make. Because I would understand the weight of genuine feeling, of true, valid feeling in the Muslim community.

Ignatieff ended his visit to Bradford with the following:

> There are such things as radical, complete disagreements. A liberal who walks around thinking that everything can be fudged, we can all be good friends, we can all be brothers, we can all get inside each other’s heads. As I said to Shabbir at the end of this is that what multiculturalism comes down to is getting inside the head of someone from another culture, another world. And if you think that’s easy, you got another think coming.

6.1.2. The Muslim rhetorical position

**The right to freedom from sacrilege:** The central issue of the ‘Rushdie affair’ was the treatment of the Prophet’s character in Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*. The novel is in the style of magical realism and mixed imagination with history. This led to a number of sections in the novel which caused consternation to the Muslim
community. A Muslim girl from Bradford stated: “And if the Prophet’s wives are prostitutes, then where does that leave us? That’s because err... as women, we look to the Prophet’s wives as examples as how we should live”. The motive for the book was given as hate, Essawy saying: “I think the prime motive for this book was hatred. He hated Islam”. And Rushdie was blamed for reviving a medieval portrayal of Islam by Akhtar: “It umm... uses words like Mahound which on any literary ground is totally unjustified... Well, Mahound means the devil. It’s a Christian term used in the Middle Ages”.

The experience of the ‘Rushdie affair’: The Muslim response to the affair was quite varied. There was much commentary on the perceived helplessness that the Muslims experienced, Siddiqui said: “I think err... there is no other way the Muslim community can proceed... if you want to change the law, sometimes you have to break it”. Akhtar said:

And many groups as you know have had to break the law in order to change the law, women’s movements, trade unions and so on. And Muslims of course, will probably engage in similar kinds of civil rights or civil disobedience movements to get these things done. And it is interesting to note that the majority of British Muslims have in fact taken that stance.

The Muslim campaigners were suspicious and dismissive of the media. They did not feel that were given a fair say in the ‘Rushdie affair’, Akhtar said in The Late Show studio discussion: “what has been happening throughout the media has been an unargued assumption on the part of the press and indeed of academic writing that fundamentalism has no intellectual basis”. At the same time, Muslim participants in programmes complained of stereotyping. Tahir said on Everyman, “…the Muslims in general have been branded as militant, and all we hear from the radio and the media as such…” Some accused the media of aggravating the affair, Siddiqui said on Hypotheticals that: “Already here, within twenty four hours, the media here had created a hysteria in the country which to me is unforgivable”.

The experience of ‘otherness’: There were repeated references throughout the programmes to the different ways in which Muslims felt besieged. Essawy ended The Late Show programme shown on 22nd February 1989 with the dramatic: “…the
‘Rushdie affair’, is seen by the Muslim as a continuation of the Crusades, and someone please stand up and say the Crusades are over”. Akhtar spoke of: “The issue is about Islam versus, you know, certain very militant forms of secularity”, and later he mentioned the “liberal inquisition”. And Siddiqui said: “You see, alarm bells ring in my mind and in the minds of all Muslims that there is a conspiracy at the back of it, a literary conspiracy, explain to me the literary prizes?”.

Two Muslims at different points of the same programme (The Late Show, 8th May 1989) spoke of their insecurity as a result of the affair. This feeling of insecurity was in relation to calls for repatriation of immigrant communities:

There is no question about me leaving here. This is our country, we’ve got nowhere to go back so don’t… I don’t think anyone should be threatening us, you know, if you want to live here. As though we’ve got a choice, we have no choice. This is our country, we’re gonna live here and we want to live here with dignity.

Some of the Muslim representatives spoke about the pressures that they faced as they tried to maintain their faith in a secular society. Arshad, a restaurant owner spoke of the contradictions that he faced:

The line for me, yeah, as far… as far as I’m concerned, I’m… I’m already considering ways of getting out of it. I mean, if you… if you want to ask me as to why… what I’m doing at a personal level, this ‘Rushdie affair’, although I’ve been involved in this business for the last three or four years. I’m… it’s been in the back of my mind but there are certain things that I want to do now. I mean… I want to… my kids are growing up, I’ve got one daughter, my wife is expecting. I want to be teaching them a version of Islam which is not compromised, which… which does not say that, yes, daddy is selling alcohol because he is making a living. But I want to say it’s wrong and I’m not doing it.

The feeling of representational subjugation was articulated by Saima in the Everyman programme. She spoke of how she felt, as a Muslim woman, trapped within a view of herself that is held by others:

When I want other people to see me, I have to see… It’s fighting against what I really want to be. I can’t be myself, you tell me to be a hundred per cent truthful to myself and I can’t because it would
distort, it would do more damage for Muslims. I have to go out of my way to wear Western clothes so people just don’t think of me as foreign, really, I have to do these things. Not that I feel ashamed not to wear western clothes, to wear Pakistani clothes, you know, I feel much more comfortable in them actually. But I have to make a positive effort because people would automatically discard me.

Tahir elaborated upon this theme in the same programme: “we are trapped in a stereotype image of ours, that we are just the followers of mad mullahs and Islam is an insagacious, anti-intellectual, dark, medieval religion”.

6.2. Rhetorical positioning and social representations

Argumentation requires the use of social representations. This interaction between social representations and rhetoric is multifarious. This section will examine how the content of social representations is connected to the rhetorical position. The two rhetorical positions examined here, the liberal and the Muslim position, formed the dialogical axis of the ‘Rushdie affair’. They were both associated with their respective identity positions. The social representations to be associated with the liberal rhetorical position centred around the theme of ‘a writer fighting totalitarianism’, and the social representations to be associated with the Muslim rhetorical position centred around the theme of ‘an oppressed minority’. I will now examine both of these competing representations.

6.2.1. The liberal position and social representations

The book burning, and its reporting, had already merited comparisons with the Nazis. The fatwa on Salman Rushdie compounded such a representation as Rushdie was anchored as a writer in the face of totalitarianism and censorship. The play Iranian Nights ends with a list of writers that includes Oscar Wilde, D. H. Lawrence, Vaclav Havel and ends with Salman Rushdie. This list anchors the ‘Rushdie affair’ and the liberals/writers who support Rushdie into a narrative view towards history as a story of censorship and oppression.

75 The previous section examined the contents of social representations during the ‘Rushdie affair’. The chapter will now proceed towards examining the structure of rhetoric. In doing so, I will be using
This view of the writer was related to a representation of the Muslim community which anchored the community into a history of fascism. Ignatieff on The Late Show spoke of Khomeini as similar to Hitler and Stalin. As such, the Muslim community was represented as an example of totalitarian fascism, and anchored within a historical narrative that connected the Muslim community in Britain to the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin.

The Muslim community was further anchored in several ways. First of all, the community became the subject of a category prototype such that social representations of specific types of Muslims became common, an example being the ‘Bradford Muslim’. The representations associated with the ‘Bradford Muslim’ of backwardness and militancy were found in these programmes. Secondly, there was an anchoring of representatives of the community as hypocritical. The hypocritical aspect was exemplified by a campaigner in The Late Show who sold alcohol in his restaurant. Thirdly, the community was represented as socially determined in that their religious assertion was seen as a response to racism. This theme was repeated in Everyman and Iranian Nights.

These three representations of a writer in the face of persecution, an authoritarian collectivity and the nature of religious fascism were combined to form a rhetorical stance that positioned the writer against an authoritarian collectivity which had assumed, during the ‘Rushdie affair’, the face of religious fascism.

6.2.2. The Muslim position and social representations

The Muslim rhetorical position was centred around the experience of a minority culture as the ‘Rushdie affair’ was anchored into the history of struggle for minority rights, one campaigner making the comparison with the civil rights struggle in the United States of America. The feelings of subjugation that the affair aroused, especially in relation to the lack of recognition, were related to the Muslim community’s self-perception as an oppressed minority. The intensity of the ‘Rushdie
affair’ had the added effect of enhancing a persecution complex with some of the key campaigners. A lack of access to the channels of communication during the affair led to a sense of negative over-representation by others, a sense of representational subjugation. This helped feed a besieged mentality, such that the community felt simultaneously oppressed representationally and rhetorically.

The social representations of being an oppressed minority and having a persecution complex were representations not only of their own lived experience, but also of the manner in which they felt they were treated by others. This leads onto the third representation, that of a minority culture advocating minority rights, this providing an emancipatory narrative to the community. The language of identity politics was utilised repeatedly by campaigners during the affair. The experience of being an oppressed minority as well as the associated persecution complex calls for an emancipatory narrative that provides the community with an exit strategy from an environment of representational subjugation.

The three social representations of being an oppressed minority, having a persecution complex and the advocacy of an emancipatory narrative formed the core of the Muslim rhetorical stance during the ‘Rushdie affair’. The relation of these two sets of representations to rhetoric will be examined in the next section.

6.3. Levels of rhetorical functioning

The nature of dialogical, rhetorical contestation in a national crisis such as the ‘Rushdie affair’ is heterogeneous. Though the argumentation is across a dialogical axis, in that it is bi-polar, the actual content and nature of rhetoric is three-fold. That is, the attempts to argue against a counter-position in the ‘Rushdie affair’ took three forms. I would like to name these forms of rhetoric: primary, secondary and tertiary.

Primary rhetoric is the actual surface dialogical contest itself and refers to the content of the discussion. Therefore, it is necessary to access the contents of argumentation in order to access the primary level of rhetoric. The primary level of rhetoric in the
‘Rushdie affair’ is represented by the argument for the extension of the laws on blasphemy by the Muslim community and the protection of freedom of speech by the writers. An example of such a form of rhetoric is the following from the *Hypotheticals* programme:

Robertson: Dr Akhtar is asked to give expert evidence for the prosecution on how this book shocks and offends the Muslim faith. What do you say, doctor?

Akhtar: Well. It umm… prostitutes the reputation of the Muhammad and his companions and insults certain female values by depiction of scenes in the brothel of al *hijab*.

Robertson: Uhum, and…

Akhtar: And moreover, uses words like Mahound which on any literary ground is totally unjustified.

Robertson: Words like Mahound being… what is the significance of that for Muslim believers?

Akhtar: Well, Mahound means the devil. It’s a Christian term used in the Middle Ages.

Robertson: So it likens the Prophet to the devil.

Akhtar: Yes.

Robertson: And that is what makes it blasphemous.

Akhtar: Indeed it does.

Secondary rhetoric is rhetoric about rhetoric. This includes justification and criticism of rhetorical style, structure and mannerism. Though this type of rhetoric is analytical of the nature of argumentation, it nevertheless remains as part of the argumentative process. A rhetorical style that does not seem to ‘suit’ the situation can be criticised and this serves to undermine the counter-position as a whole. For example, in *Everyman*, Peter says:

But if you remain true to your views of civilisation and not abusing other people, and preserving your… your… your dignity, you’ll give a very impressive contradiction to what you see as the abuse in the book.

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76 These distinctions are not intended as prioritisng one particular type.
The fact that you feel that you’ve got one hand tied behind you’re back because you’re being decent and you feel that he was being indecent err… doesn’t actually… isn’t actually the case. You can… if you want to present your view and you do so with the teaching of Muhammad, this will be very much respected, I’m sure by most people and they will understand you and understand the fact that you’re hurt and so on. And that the negative impact of that book, if you think it has a negative impact, will be dissipated.

Tertiary rhetoric is the ‘explaining away’ of rhetoric, and can take the form of psychological and sociological explanations for identity counter-positions. This form of rhetoric refuses to take the primary rhetoric of the counter-position at face value and attempts to provide an explanation that seeks to find the ‘hidden’ reasons for such positions, and in doing so, undermines the counter-position as a whole. An example is from *Iranian Nights* when a young Islamic leader explained his religious awakening to his father as being due to a severe racial assault at university. Though this type of rhetoric is usually targeted against primary forms of rhetoric, it will, nevertheless, be found alongside primary forms of rhetoric. The frequency of each type of rhetoric is provided in the table below.

Table 6.4. Frequency of items of rhetoric according to type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Rhetoric</th>
<th>Pro. 1</th>
<th>Pro. 2</th>
<th>Pro. 3</th>
<th>Pro. 4</th>
<th>Pro. 5</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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6.4. Individualism as ideology and identity politics

The ‘Rushdie affair’ was taken as an example of highlighting the limits of multiculturalism as political practice. The book burning and the call for the death of Rushdie by some members of the British Muslim community represented the limits of acceptability for secular tolerance. In this sense, multiculturalism had failed (Weldon, 1989). The bi-polarised argumentation between the writers and the Muslims, as discussed above, was the result of this act of confrontation. However, the three-fold distinction in types of rhetorical disagreement veils a hidden level of rhetoric, a level
at which the two bi-polarised sides are in agreement. I will proceed for the rest of this chapter to examine the similarities in rhetoric.

The first manner in which the two rhetorical positions are in agreement is at the level of ideology. Farr (1991a), leading on from Ichheiser (1949a), has identified individualism as a collective representation i.e. at the level of collective, universal ideology. Gergen (1995) has traced identity politics back to individualism. It is the connection between individualism, identity politics and ideology that I wish to discuss next.

Moscovici (1984a) writes that the “Individual is a historical fact and one of the most vital inventions of the modern age…” (p. 521). Elsewhere, he says: “…if asked to name the most important invention of modern times, I should have no hesitation in saying that it was the individual” (Moscovici, 1985, p. 13). This historical approach to the individual does present some problems in that the notion of the individual is not monolithic. Lukes (1973b) identifies eleven different types of individualism. Moscovici (1984a), however, identifies three types of individualism:

If individualism corresponded to a single social representation, all would be straightforward, and one would know what one had in mind. In our culture, however, there are three representations, each of which has different origins and different features. First, there is the representation of the individual who has become ‘emancipated’ from the servitudes of tradition, who defines himself in opposition to the collectivity, with his rights and duties and his specific consciousness. Secondly, there is the representation of the ‘sublimated’ individual, who sacrifices his pleasures, his ordinary feelings, to gain his salvation and to carry out the goals of the collectivity… And finally there is the representation of the individual as an ‘outsider’ who is compelled to pursue his selfish aims by dint of calculations and to act in a most impersonal way, ignoring values and prior relationships with others… the first representation was an outgrowth of the Renaissance and the French Revolution, the second an offspring of the Reformation, and the third a product of the money and market economy. (p. 520-521).

Moscovici outlines several versions of individualism and relates them to three historical moments. A question here is, how does the ideology of the individual understood as a collective representation relate to these representations of the individual? Certainly, the individual of the Enlightenment is the type of individualism
that was being defended during the ‘Rushdie affair’ by the writers. However, this was not the type of individualism that assumed common usage. I will return to this issue towards the end of this chapter.

The pervasiveness of individualism in the ‘Rushdie affair’ is demonstrated in the following extract from *The Late Show* programme in which Ignatieff visited Bradford. The extract is from the beginning of the programme and begins with Ignatieff’s voice-over as he explains his feelings about visiting the Muslim community in Bradford. This voice-over is accompanied by a collage of images depicting the Muslim community in Bradford, and is followed immediately by the conversation below:

Ignatieff: I don’t know the first thing about Islam, and the Asian friends I have in London live just like me. So coming to Bradford, I don’t know what to expect. I have this image of an Asian community which lives in a kind of bell-jar, sealed off from the rest of British society in its own ghetto, with its own food, its own religious rituals, and its ties to countries like Pakistan that I’ve never even visited. I expect ‘otherness’, difference, a gulf of culture and language. I expect not to feel at home.

Akhtar: Salman Rushdie doesn’t matter, I mean I keep on saying this to everybody…

Ignatieff: *Why doesn’t he matter? He’s an individual…*

Akhtar: Well, *in that sense of course*, but I meant in this cause, in this debate. The issue is not about Salman Rushdie, the issue is not about me or you either. The issue is about ideas. It is… the issue is about Islam versus, you know, certain very militant forms of secularity, which are opposing it. I mean, what I mean when I say that Salman Rushdie doesn’t matter, *of course not as an individual, he does matter*, but in this debate Salman Rushdie is quite dispensable… (italics mine).

The sequential juxtaposition of a disagreement over the value of an individual (in the context of the ‘Rushdie affair’) with the introductory comments made by Ignatieff (concerning his expectations of cultural ‘otherness’) implicates a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, this statement should be delimited by the following. The reason why Rushdie matters according to Ignatieff is because he is an individual. This
invoking of the ideology of individualism by Ignatieff as an “Of course!” resembles the naturalising tendencies of ideology as highlighted by Eagleton (1991): “Ideology… offers itself as an ‘Of course!’, or ‘That goes without saying’… Ideology freezes history into a ‘second nature’, presenting it as spontaneous, inevitable and so unalterable” (p. 59). This invocation of ideology as spontaneous and inevitable in this particular instant is also incontestable. Akhtar can only respond with the actual “Of course”, twice. So the rhetorical disagreement at one level dissipates to agreement at the level of ideology. Whether this agreement is on an Enlightenment version of individualism, or on a much more generalised form of individualism is difficult to say. Lukes (1973b) describes a religious form of individualism which Moscovici (1984a) relates to the Reformation, but it is difficult to say whether the individualism that is agreed upon incorporates such notions.

This discussion has so far presented the writer’s position as upholding an Enlightenment form of individualism. This simplifies the discussion because it ignores the collectivist nature of the writer’s identity as depicted in the ‘Rushdie affair’. Mailer spoke of the fear that the affair had revisited upon writers on The Late Show (broadcast 22 February 1989):

I obviously have been thinking about that for the last six days or so. And you know, we start writing, when we begin as novelists and we’re young, we usually write in great fear, we’re so afraid of the consequences of our work. We don’t what’ll happen when the book comes out, we get the feeling that we will be killed when the book comes out. As you get older and you get more blasé and you also get withered and professional and you know…you know where you’re at and you lose that fear. And this has brought back what I would call the primal fear of novelists. So in that sense, aaaah, it’s had enormous importance for us, just directly, selfishly, we’ve all put ourselves in Salman Rushdie’s place.

Here, Mailer was drawing upon a collective sense of identity: that of the writer. Ignatieff spoke similarly on his visit to Bradford. The campaign is therefore perceived as antagonistic towards their own identity. Their social organisation, therefore, assumes the character of identity rights, consequently pursuing a collectivist strategy. One that draws upon a social sense of identity. This difference can be further

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77 For further details see the transcript in the appendix.
explained by reference to Ichheiser’s (1949a) distinction between interpretation in principle and interpretation in practice. The interpretation in principle, in this particular case, is that of Enlightenment individualism, however the interpretation in practice is identity rights.

The Muslim rhetorical position incorporated an identity politics discourse in that references were made to the civil rights struggle. This incorporation was necessary for proper engagement with the outside world. Gervais (1997) found that Shetlanders had to “establish a dialogue and to engage with alien representations, if not to make them their own” (p. 282) in order to communicate their argument to the outside world. Gergen (1995), as stated in chapter two, suggests that identity politics is derivative of Western, individualist ideology. This means that the discursive strategy that the Muslim rhetorical position employs is derivative of individualism as ideology.

The differences between the two positions, therefore, at the level of primary, secondary and tertiary rhetoric subside at the level of ideology. The adoption of collectivist notions of identity and the advocation of identity rights by both groups relates both rhetorical positions back to individualism. I will examine below other examples of similarities between the two sides in terms of rhetoric.

6.5. A common argumentative technique across rhetorical positions

An argumentative technique was noticed to be shared across both rhetorical positions. This was a tendency towards radicalisation. The ‘Rushdie affair’ was an unfamiliar event to both sides in British social and political history. This meant that it had to be made familiar. This process initially occurred in the news rooms. Nevertheless, the beginning of the television programmes had opening sequences that tended to provide radicalised versions of the positions of various protagonists. For example, Ignatieff, who began two of the programmes, began one with “These are extraordinary days for British culture”. He began the second with “…the conflict between Islam and the West has escalated into a total confrontation of values and culture”. The introduction to the play *Iranian Nights* described the play as being “…written as a response to the cultural crisis caused by the ‘Rushdie affair’”. The *Hypotheticals* programme began
with a scene in which certain Muslim participants were asked whether they would have been willing to kill Rushdie if they had seen him in a restaurant. The Muslim representatives similarly tended to radicalise the position, one such representative stating on *The Late Show* that this affair could lead to a third world war. The unfamiliar ‘Rushdie affair’ was anchored according to radical depictions of the arguments and their consequences.

The affair was also radicalised in the way in which it was anchored into history. Since it was a first-time occurrence for British society and for the Muslim community in British society, it had to be anchored (as Moscovici suggests) into history. But both sides chose a confrontational view of history in their choice of anchors. For example, the writers chose to link the campaign against *The Satanic Verses* to the Nazis, the Nuremberg trials, especially with regard to the burning of the book. The struggle against the campaign became likened to the struggle against fascism. This was a regular theme throughout the programmes. Ignatieff stated so in his visit to Bradford and the play *Iranian Nights* suggested so as well. The Muslim representatives tended to anchor this affair in their version of a confrontational view of history which meant that they linked the affair to the Crusades, and hence suggested the affair was viewed as part of an ongoing struggle between Islam and Christianity, Essawy stated such a position on *The Late Show*.

This tendency towards radicalisation was linked to a fear that this issue could be the first of many. A tendency towards radicalisation was therefore linked to a view towards the future. Ignatieff spoke of a possible bonfire of books in front of the mayor’s office in Bradford, and Weldon replied “Burn the books today. Kill the writer tomorrow” to the question of whether freedom of speech entailed the right to burn a book.

The tendency towards radicalisation could be qualified by reference to the considerable representation of the moderate Muslim position in four of the five programmes. The moderate Muslim rhetorical items were, however, generally framed within dialogic encounters which involved rebuttal and exchange between radical liberals and moderate Muslims. The direction of conversation occasionally, though,
revealed a tendency towards radicalisation. For example, Ignatieff in the visit to Bradford had the following exchange with Akhtar:

Akhtar: Christianity has not produced err… the kind of quality of allegiance that Islam has. Because what you’ve got to remember is that Islam, even in the twentieth century, manages to produce a discrepantly large number of martyrs which Christianity doesn’t. I think that actually is some measure of enthusiasm in a faith: to what extent people are prepared at a crisis point to give their lives, it’s not an easy thing to do. And I think that Islam, the fact that it manages to do that so routinely, is to its…

Ignatieff: Why is martyrdom such a value in Islam? Why… why…

Akhtar: Well, it’s a value in Christianity too. It used to be a value in liberalism as well.

Ignatieff: But giving your life is almost a definition of fanatical surrender of personal judgement on certain views.

Akhtar: Is there anything you’d be willing to kill for?

Ignatieff: If err… by some ghastly mischance, this became a theocratic Islamic state. I would frankly fight, not only to be an agnostic minority, but err… I’d fight to protect the rights of… I would have fought against the Germans in the Second World War, I would have fought against the… err… I would fight against the Soviet state. Simply, on the same grounds that my freedom to have wayward and difficult opinions is… is worth fighting for. I think Hitler threatened everything, I think Stalin threatened everything and I have to say the Ayatollah Khomeini threatens everything. I don’t equate the three. They’re different phenomena but he threatens everything that I stand for and believe. Err… if he was simply a religious teacher who held his views and confined them to the Iranian state and to his particular branch of the Moslem faith, no problem, no problem at all. But he’s a man, who is calling for holy war against the Western world, against secularism, and I’m a convinced secularist, so he’s making war on me and he stands for everything I oppose. He’s also threatening an author, a writer, a member of my own trade. He’s threatening him with death, he’s ruined the man’s life. He is… he is anathema to me and if it came to a fight, indeed, I would fight the Ayatollah.

This example begins with Akhtar defending the issue of martyrdom, and ends with Ignatieff defending and advocating his right to fight. Both positions move from discussion on the issue of martyrdom to a point of mutual disagreement. Another example is taken from Hypotheticals, Robertson asked Siddiqui about his reaction to
a hypothetical situation in which he found himself sitting in the same restaurant as Rushdie:

Robertson: Dr Siddiqui, you’re dining with Shabbir and Yusuf. What do you do in that situation?

Siddiqui: I would totally ignore the man, I would just walk out of the restaurant.

Robertson: You would walk out of the restaurant.

Siddiqui: Yeah.

Robertson: Let’s just… but don’t you have some duty to condemn him, or to capture him or even to kill him?

Siddiqui: No, no, no. I have condemned him, he has been condemned as err… any man has ever been condemned by a world jury of a thousand million Muslims. Err… but as a British citizen, I have a duty, if you like, a social contract with the British err… state not to break British law.

Here, Siddiqui, a prominent supporter of the fatwa, was being asked whether he would kill Rushdie. He initially avoided the question, but the moderator pursued the line of questioning. Though Siddiqui, in this instance, didn’t directly advocate the murder of Rushdie, he later indirectly did so. Both examples involve the move towards increased distanciation between representatives of counter-positions. The Everyman programme was an exception to this tendency as it was the only programme to contain more moderate items than extreme items and it also provided a counter-example to the tendency towards radicalisation. Being aired a year later, it involved a scene in which Dawn, a Deacon in the Church of England, intervened in a disagreement to attempt to move the conversation in the direction of moderation.

Shabbir: There you go again, I have… who… which Muslim is saying you don’t have the freedom to say what you want?

Rashida: But you are!

Shabbir: I am saying don’t insult somebody.

Saima: Yes, that is a…

Shabbir: Insult! Insult! There is a very big difference. Can’t you see…

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Rashida: I appreciate how deeply it’s hurtful, but I would still defend Rushdie’s right to publish. Umm… and I would also say that the bloodshed and so on that has resulted, I can’t make him responsible but the people who fought…

Dawn: I wonder whether why the thing has stirred up so much feeling is because the Muslim community as a whole in this country is feeling misunderstood and is feeling inhibited, and… and… I just wonder whether one of the things about ‘The Satanic Verses’, what has been actually satanic about it, umm… has been that it’s… it’s almost made the division greater. It could have done that.

John: Just to, just to pursue this a bit. I mean the implications of what you’re saying is that… that Muslim community is deeply hurt and is making an issue about ‘The Satanic Verses’. And that’s really a symptom of feeling discriminated against as a… as a racial and cultural group so that this is all the symptom of a deeper level of racism that exists out here.

Shabbir: Yes, as a whole of them, the Muslim community. Part of it maybe they think exactly that. That is the main reason, that they have objected to this book. But you see, we all know, that… a form of racism has always been there. People always joked and laughed about Islam and the Muslims which we did not mind, they criticised it heavily, we did not mind. But with this particular book he went over the mark. And the Muslim was not prepared to take it, not any longer. So he just erupted.

Matloob: I’ve heard young people who I’ve come into contact saying that previously in the seventies, they were known as ‘Pakis’, anybody who was Pakistani. He might be… the person might be Indian, might be Chinese or might be anything. They were referred to as ‘Pakis’, now the term of abuse is a ‘Muslim’.

John: I mean I think this perspective does make much more sense, that… that… that it’s a community crying out, how can you allow, you’ve oppressed us for years in this society. How can now you allow the very thing that we deeply depend on to uphold our faith and strength to be insulted?

The Everyman programme distinguished itself from the other four programmes by including scenes in which the tendency of dialogue was towards moderation. It is difficult to ascertain whether this was due to the editing of the programme or the fact that it was aired a year after the ‘Rushdie affair’ when the issues had become less contentious. Incidences of the tendency towards radicalisation or moderation as a function of conversational context were, however, rare.
This tendency towards radicalisation has been noted by another media researcher. Cottle (1993) analysed the televisual portrayal of the ‘Rushdie affair’ by a regional television company. He similarly found a tendency towards radicalising the story. Two television reporters had compiled a report which included them following a march against the publication of The Satanic Verses by Muslim residents of Birmingham and a random selection of ‘vox pops’ in which residents of Birmingham were asked as to their response to a possible banning of The Satanic Verses by the local council. Cottle (1993) analysed the imagery associated with this report as well as the reporting of individual opinions and he concluded that the reporters tended to emphasise conflict and controversy. As an example, one reporter when asking passers-by about their opinions on the issue informed them that the book was about to be banned by the council, though this was not the case.

The rival sides exhibited a tendency to particularise and caricaturise the opposing sides by constituting certain positions as category prototypes. The writers/liberals constructed and repeated a particular social representation which anchored Muslim campaigners as violent, ignorant, illiterate and hypocritical. For example, Steiner said on The Late Show: “Nobody forces anyone to read a book. And of course, the murderous screamours and burners of books from Bradford onto today haven’t even tried to open it”. Weldon said in Hypotheticals that: “Alas, it has fallen into the hands who do not understand the nature of fiction...”. The play Iranian Nights has a line: “The inhabitants of the earth are of two sorts. Those with brains and no religion. And those with religion but no brains!” Later on, the play described the mullahs as “Ignorant, corrupt hypocrites!”. Hypocrisy and contradiction was a recurrent theme. The play Iranian Nights has the Islamic revolutionary dealing with drug suppliers and Ignatieff in his visit to Bradford asked Arshad, the restaurant owner, why he sold alcohol in the restaurant.

The Muslim discussants also exhibited a tendency to caricaturise the liberal position. The advocates of freedom of speech were described as belonging to the “liberal inquisition” and as exhibiting “militant forms of secularity” by Akhtar in the visit to Bradford by The Late Show. The campaign of the liberals/writers was anchored and objectified as a conspiracy as advocated by Siddiqui on Hypotheticals: “You see,
alarm bells ring in my mind and in the minds of all Muslims that there is a conspiracy at the back of it, a literary conspiracy…”.

6.6. A common narrative across rhetorical positions

Both rhetorical positions assumed a narrative that employed representations of victimisation and heroism. Each representation is discussed separately below:

**Portrayal of self as victims:** Both sides showed a similarity in their patterns of argumentation in that they both portrayed themselves as victims. The liberals/writers portrayed Rushdie as a victim of a violent form of fundamentalism which made them fearful since they identified with Rushdie, and the Muslims portrayed themselves as victims of abuse and discrimination. For example, Steiner, on *The Late Show* began one of his points with: “And in the horror of this whole story, in the lunatic, murderous horror of what is being visited on Salman Rushdie…” The image of oppression is repeated in the play *Iranian Nights* as a poet argued for his freedom from a religious tyrant. Ignatieff similarly makes his case against suppression of freedom of speech in the visit to Bradford by *The Late Show*.

The Muslims felt that they had been victimised as well. This was in two ways. One was in regard to the issue of immigration. The ‘Rushdie affair’ had raised the issue of immigration to Muslim participants in television programmes. Arshad in *The Late Show* on its visit to Bradford said: “I don’t think anyone should be threatening us, you know, if you want to live here. As though we’ve got a choice, we have no choice. This is our country, we’re gonna live here…” A person working in Arshad’s restaurant said later “You know, we… we work here, we pay taxes, everything. And then at the end of the day we’re called immigrants which is not right”.

The second way in which the Muslim had been victimised was with reference to the way that they felt portrayed. Tahir in *Everyman* spoke at the beginning of the programme as if he felt that he was not understood: “I would like you to feel how much hurt we are”. Saima in the same programme later said:
It’s fighting against what I really want to be. I can’t be myself, you tell me to be a hundred per cent truthful to myself and I can’t because it would distort, it would do more damage for Muslims. I have to go out of my way to wear Western clothes so people just don’t think of me as foreign, really, I have to do these things… I have to make a positive effort because people would automatically discard me.

Tahir said on this point: “…we are trapped in a stereotype image of ours, that we are just the followers of mad mullahs…”. The Muslim participants in the discussion were identifying themselves as victims either of direct racism or stereotyping. Gergen (1995) links identity politics to portrayals of the self as victims. This can be seen here as well in that both sides were representing themselves as victims, and this can be linked to their assertion of, and appeal towards, their respective identities as liberals/writers and Muslims.

**Portrayal of self as heroes:** Both opposing views present themselves as heroes, championing their respective causes. The liberals/writers represented themselves as championing the cause of freedom, in this case, in the name of a novelist. For example, Steiner said on *The Late Show* that: “Wherever this book does not appear, we have lost an essential battle for the sheer freedom of a human being not to read a book”. The representational background for such an anchoring is that of the writer seeking to write freely in the face of restrictive authority. The play *Iranian Nights* concluded with a list of writers who have been persecuted for their writing, the list includes Omar Khayyam, Oscar Wilde, D. H. Lawrence, Vaclav Havel and ends with Salman Rushdie. Those writers that stand up to the oppression are regarded as heroes such as Wilde and Havel, and by mentioning Rushdie’s name at the end of the play, the writers of the play are suggesting that Rushdie is a similar type of hero. Consequently, by association, so are all those who support him.

The Muslim participants in the programmes similarly viewed themselves as heroes, though they were championing their own cause. The Muslim campaigners viewed themselves as arguing for equal treatment under the law for protection against blasphemy. This campaign for equal treatment was an extension of the campaign against the book. The campaign for equal treatment was anchored by the Muslim campaigners as similar to the struggle for civil rights in America. Akhtar said in the visit to Bradford by *The Late Show*: 

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And many groups as you know have had to break to law in order to change the law, women’s movements, trade unions and so on. And Muslims of course, will probably engage in similar kinds of civil rights or civil disobedience movements to get these things done.

Similarly, Siddiqui said on Hypotheticals: “…I have been advising the Muslim community having looked at British traditions on this, if you want to change the law, sometimes you have to break it”. This identification with the civil rights struggle and the history of oppressed minorities not only provided an anchor for the Muslim campaigners, but also categorised them as heroes championing the rights of minorities. This can be linked to Modood’s (1993) point mentioned in the first chapter that Muslim responses to living in British society tend to be derivative of familiar, secular approaches as opposed to being obscure, Islamic options. That is, the options chosen by the Muslim community are associated with, for example, the civil rights struggle. This reflects Saito’s (1994) findings in which British practitioners and non-practitioners of Zen had a different view of Zen to Japanese practitioners and non-practitioners of Zen. This is because the British interviewees in her study had anchored their perception of Zen into their own European-based view of Eastern society.

6.7. Conclusion

This rhetorical analysis of the televisual coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’ has attempted to show that, though the positions were dialogically opposed, the differences in rhetoric decreased at the level of ideology and structure. The differences in rhetoric, indeed, their oppositional nature, were expressed through primary, secondary and tertiary forms of rhetoric. The nature of argumentation, though it was dialogical, was not homogenous. The argumentation took the form of criticism and justification of the binary opposite view, however, this form of rhetoric does not account for all of the argumentation. Much of the rhetorical engagement occurred at the level of secondary and tertiary rhetoric.
The disagreements however did not extend to the domain of ideology. At the level of ideology, there was agreement on the importance of the individual. Similarly, both rhetorical positions assumed the language of identity politics which itself is derivative of individualism. There was agreement at the level of structure as well. Radicalisation was found to be a rhetorical technique that was common to both positions. This technique of argumentation can be seen to be a function of rhetoric in the public sphere, especially with reference to the representation of others. The opposing sides use these techniques as a way of anchoring their opponent’s argument at an extreme position. The question to be asked is, are these radicalised positions examples of unfamiliar representations, or of negatively evaluated or even dialogically oppositional familiar representations? Rose (1996) in her work on television representations of madness asks “…are all kinds of unfamiliarity equivalent?” (p. 56). And in answer to this she writes:

In making identifications such as ‘barbarian’, are we rendering the unfamiliar familiar (everyone knows what a barbarian is and does) or are we maintaining the other as Other? These options are not mutually exclusive. Dangerous or ambiguous categories of people are to some extent made intelligible by assimilating them to a familiar, if fearful, category or space of Otherness… I would suggest that the argument that the central purpose of a social representation is to make the unfamiliar more familiar is too general. It cannot deal with those very cases where the representations function precisely to marginalise and exclude certain groups and cope with the ambiguity they represent. It cannot deal with the tenacity of social representations whose central purpose appears to be to maintain, at a symbolic level, the ‘outsider’ quality of some groups. (p. 56-59).

This relates to Hall’s (1997b) comment about the relation of subjects such as the hysterical woman and individualised criminal to the discourse within which it is situated i.e. they are ‘necessary’ subjects that are required for the proper functioning of language. The radicalised and particularised portrayal of the Muslim position as violent, ignorant, illiterate and hypocritical is, I would suggest here, a ‘necessary’ subject of individualism as ideology. It is because of this, that I would suggest that all forms of unfamiliarity are not equivalent. Those forms of familiar ‘otherness’ that represent the binary opposites to the self that lies at the heart of an ideology of

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78 Saito (1994) uses Bartlett’s theory of remembering as opposed to Moscovici’s theory of social representations. Bartlett’s term for Moscovici’s anchoring is social conventionalisation, though they
individualism will have a salience in the social world which other forms of difference will not. I would suggest that the binary opposite to the representation of the Muslim (during the ‘Rushdie affair”) as violent, ignorant, illiterate and hypocritical is humane, educated, literate and genuine – and that this constitutes the liberal individual.

The Muslim rhetorical position radicalised the liberal position as well, but whether this has salience will depend upon ideology and access to the channels of communication. A lack of both would suggest minimal success at communication of their rhetorical position. I would suggest that a study of non-Muslims’ perceptions of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ during the ‘Rushdie affair’ would provide some answers to this issue.

The two narrative themes of victimhood and heroism may seem contradictory at first, but are in fact compatible. This is to do with the notion of the hero in the modern public sphere. The victim can become a hero, and the hero is, or was, a victim. In this sense, the victim emerges as a hero after overcoming his/her victimisation, and this is the case for the Muslim position as well as the liberal position. Both perceived themselves as victims, and then both pursued strategies which portrayed themselves as heroes. In this sense, there is no contradiction with the two themes of argumentation.

The question that could be asked here is, is there any relation between the narrative of victim turned hero with the ideology of individualism? I would suggest that there is. I would further suggest that this narrative is the narrative of the heroic individual who is humane, educated, literate and genuine and has overcome a period of victimisation. This links the ideology of individualism with the identity politics movements. Gitlin (1993) writes of the notion of victimisation in identity politics, and certainly, in the dialogical argumentation examined here, a feeling of victimisation is related to identity politics. I will examine in the next chapter the nature of reception to one form of hegemonic representation.

are similar processes.
7.0. DECODING REPRESENTATIONS OF THE BRADFORD MUSLIM COMMUNITY

This chapter is the third in a series of empirical studies, this study being an analysis of the transcripts of eight focus group discussions conducted around one of the television programmes used for the previous study. The analysis found that the discussants adopted, in the main, an oppositional stance towards the representation of the Bradford Muslim community in the national public sphere. This will be examined in relation to their views towards the presenter of the programme, Michael Ignatieff. A discussion on the nature of representation follows with an analysis of the discussants’ reception of the representatives of the community as depicted by the programme which was found to be related to identity politics discourse. This is followed by a discussion of the discussants’ ambivalent attitudes towards the issue of stereotyping. The chapter ends with a discussion on the contestation of representation as a political act.

7.1. Oppositional decodings of hegemonic representations

The discussants generally exhibited an oppositional type of decoding. Of the fifty two discussants, three tended towards negotiated types of decoding though they remained oppositional in general. The oppositional type of decoding was expressed in relation to the media as a whole, the presenter of the programme, and a variety of criticisms concerning the presences and absences of certain topics and representatives. This critique formed the skeletal structure of the discussants’ responses to the programme.

7.1.1. The media as site for assertion of hegemony

The media, through its depiction of Islam and the Muslim community in Bradford, is itself an oppositional ‘other’ to that which it is representing. This was the constant theme throughout the discussions. This oppositional view, though shared by all, was heterogeneous. It was heterogeneous in its intensity and in its critical analysis, and a broad oppositional approach did not prevent positive receptions of the programme. After viewing the programme, all of the groups began with negative, critical
comments towards the programme. These included accusations of bias, dishonesty and misrepresentation.

You get the media’s view of what’s going on, you get a biased view, you never get the actual truth of what’s going on. (2-479)

This view towards the programme can be located within a wider Weltenschauung which perceives the media as antagonistic towards Muslim concerns.

I just wanna say that there is a media campaign against Muslims in general all over the world, not just in Bradford, everywhere, I think they see Muslims as a threat and they’re scared basically. (5-2)

When asked if the discussants could recount positive portrayals of Islam in the media, two replied in the negative, for example.

No I can think many examples where I thought that was not a good programme but not when it was actually a good programme. (8-2)

The manner in which this programme was anchored was revealed by a question from a discussant just before the end of the focus group discussion. He asked the researcher:

Were you on about the Tottenham Ayatollah that programme? (1-7)

This was a programme that had been aired a few years earlier on Channel Four in which a television crew, led by the journalist Jon Ronson, followed an exiled Islamic leader who was based in Tottenham. The programme had received critical reviews from sections of the community after its transmission. The remembering of this programme and its relation to the discussion shows that the discussant had anchored the discussion about The Late Show programme into a view towards the media as antagonistic.

79 The numbers in brackets following quotes from the interviews indicate the discussion group number and the number assigned to the participant respectively. The letter ‘M’ when following the group number indicates ‘moderator’. 
Thompson (1990) writes on the issue of asymmetry between representation and reception:

Unlike the dialogical situation of a conversation, in which a listener is also a potential respondent, mass communication institutes a fundamental **break** between the producer and receiver, in such a way that recipients have relatively little capacity to contribute to the course and content of the communicative process. Hence it may be more appropriate to speak of the ‘transmission’ or ‘diffusion’ of messages rather than of ‘communication’ as such. (p. 218-219).

This particular study on South Asian Muslim youth has found that the continuous transmission of representations of their identity and their community has led to the rejection of the messenger itself as biased and untrustworthy. This was the general approach of the youth to the programme, however, as this chapter will show, the decodings reveal a much more complicated process of interpretation, one that is not trapped within the deterministic confines of ideological opposition. The next section will examine the reception of the presenter of the programme.

### 7.1.2. Presenter as agent for assertion of hegemony

Michael Ignatieff, a writer, was the presenter of the programme. He spoke for thirteen minutes and fifteen seconds throughout the programme (34.1% of the whole programme). This format portrayed Ignatieff as an outsider travelling to Bradford in an attempt to understand the position taken by the Muslim community during the ‘Rushdie affair’. Ignatieff said at the beginning of the programme:

> I don’t know the first thing about Islam, and the Asian friends I have in London live just like me. So coming to Bradford, I don’t know what to expect. I have this image of an Asian community which lives in a kind of bell-jar, sealed off from the rest of British society in its own ghetto, with its own food, its own religious rituals, and its ties to countries like Pakistan that I’ve never even visited. I expect ‘otherness’, difference, a gulf of culture and language. I expect not to feel at home.

---

80 He appeared visually less than this and shared some scenes with members of the Bradford Muslim community.
This demarcation of an ‘otherness’ within the liberal self of British society is later modified by Ignatieff when he said:

I expected a community in a bell-jar. Instead, I found a community that’s deeply, militantly British. Even down to the Yorkshire accent.

As such, the ‘otherness’ was the construction of Ignatieff himself. However, though Ignatieff consequently ceased to present himself as an outsider, but since the ‘otherness’ was not substantiated, the reception of Ignatieff was as an outsider. Though he is Canadian with a clear and obvious Canadian accent, and stressed so in the programme, he was referred to repeatedly as a “white guy”. Others referred to him as “typical goré” and “white bastard”. A minority praised the presenter for asking difficult questions, though the majority expressed a strong dislike for the presenter, for example:

Absolutely, he was just grabbing… he made no concerted effort to actually try to overcome any stereotype umm… the impression I got from some of the things he said, some of the things he was provoking, the questions that he was asking… prompts, some of the prompts that he was giving it seemed to me that he was just trying to reinforce his own stereotypes. Rather than bridge the gaps so he actively didn’t do anything… actively didn’t do what he set out to do… (2:2)

Ignatieff was variously described as opinionated, pressurising, one-sided, exhibiting a pretence, taking the biscuit, a con man, a cross-examination lawyer and a person with his own agenda. He was perceived as not willing to change his mind, making the interviewees answer the questions the way he wanted them to, attempting to break down the interviewees, talking over his interviewees, providing immediate objections to them, reinforcing his own stereotype and playing with the interviewees. This characterisation of Ignatieff emphasised two aspects: the rhetorical and the dramaturgical. The rhetorical in their descriptions of Ignatieff as one-sided, opinionated, not willing to change his mind, and attempting to break the interviewees down. The dramaturgical in their descriptions of Ignatieff as exhibiting a pretence, taking the biscuit, playing with people and having an implicit agenda.

81 This did not prevent the discussants from viewing certain scenes as depicting ‘otherness’, see later.
Billig (1996) connects these two approaches to social discourse in public life in the following:

It would not take great imagination to consider the rituals of a parliament or those of a law-court as beings pieces of pure theatre. The orators, whether politicians or lawyers, delivered their speeches like actors, often combining the gestures of tragedy with those of pantomime. Defence and prosecution, government and opposition, judge and speaker, all have their allotted roles in the conventions of oratorical drama… (p. 39).

However, such a notion should be delimitied by his later qualification:

If all the world is a stage, then what goes on backstage is being excluded. Thus, a complete sub-world, that of the theatre, is not being considered as the model for social life, but only one element of that sub-world: the public performance. The problem is that this is the one part of the theatrical world which demands the suppression of arguments. During a performance, all members of the cast must leave their disagreements in the wings, and must work together to produce the drama. (Billig, 1996, p. 45).

The metaphor of the theatre suggests that there are therefore two types of rhetoric in the television programme depending upon the presence of the audience’s gaze. The finished television programme contains the staged rhetoric. The same themes and arguments would have been covered (albeit from a different identity position) in the second type of rhetoric described above by Billig and that is the backstage argumentation. This will include the disagreements that would have occurred between the producers, writers, editors and the presenter in the production (i.e. at the site of encoding) of the programme.

The previous chapter suggested that the liberal position was identified as humane, educated, literate and genuine. The discussants, however, categorised Ignatieff as, for example, not willing to change his mind, attempting to break the interviewees down, exhibiting a pretence, and having an implicit agenda. Why did the discussants interpret him as inflexible and insincere? One answer may be that it was an attempt by the discussants to undermine the dominant, rhetorical position of the ‘other’. The focus on the style of argumentation (i.e. on secondary as opposed to primary rhetoric) was in itself a rhetorical attempt to trans-code the liberal, open ‘other’ to a rhetorical,
dramaturgical and ultimately oppressive ‘other’. A question for future research is how is Ignatieff received in this programme by those who are closer to his own rhetorical position.

7.2. Representation and its discontents

The discontentment surrounding the issue of representation of the Muslim position during the ‘Rushdie affair’ focused on three types of representation. The first is the choice of quote itself. The second is the choice of topic to be covered. The third is the choice of representative. The discussants had no direct knowledge or experience to be able to suggest that the presences and absences in such cases were deliberate. However, knowledge of the ‘Rushdie affair’ and a general view towards the media as antagonistic were sufficient to warrant a suggestion of agency on behalf of the programme producers. I will examine each source of discontent below.

7.2.1. Choice of quote

The discussants made references to the editing of the programme and suggested that the programme had been constructed so as to weaken the Muslim position:

Umm well I think when he was speaking to Shabbir Akhtar, some of the things that maybe Shabbir Akhtar put in a positive way they were cut off or shortened and he was seen to have the last say and leave a negative image of Islam. (7-1)

He wasn’t looking for a point of view, he was just there to defend. I bet you interviewed a few people that they good competition and they showed him what they felt about it, and he didn’t put it on that show. Half of the stuff that they said he probably cut it. That’s what I think. He just put the bits in that people wanted to hear. (5-1)

Even when a positive aspect was mentioned, such as a perceived successful defence on the issue of martyrdom in Islam by Akhtar, the discussants voiced their surprise at its inclusion in the programme.

He got him good on the martyrdom issue didn’t he? He trapped him nicely in that. (2-6)
I’m surprised… I’m surprised they actually left that in the editing. (2-2)

An admission that the programme makers may have attempted to provide a balanced account would have provided an anomaly to the consensus view that the programme makers were biased. Hence, the immediate rebuttal to a suggestion that the programme included scenes in favour of the Muslim position.

7.2.2. Choice of topic

The choice of topic was also raised. For example, the choice of topic was questioned by the discussants due to the mention of arranged marriage and the lack of discussion or mention of the law on blasphemy. This issue was highlighted further in another question in which the discussants were asked about the coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’. The discussants were mostly under the age of fourteen during the ‘Rushdie affair’ yet most were aware of the issues raised by the affair. They felt that the affair itself was not comprehensively covered, and that the Muslim argument had not been fairly represented. The book itself was not discussed, the law on blasphemy was not discussed and the affair itself was viewed as being reduced (or radicalised) to a civilisational conflict. They questioned the inclusion of stereotypical scenes of inner city life, a discussion on arranged marriage and one group spoke at length about the suggestion of incompatibility between science and religion in the programme (though the majority felt that Mirza had dealt with this question well).

The group discussion would end as it began, with an open-ended question. The discussants would be asked if there were any scenes that they particularly wished to comment upon. The answers to this question also tended to reveal an oppositional reception to the programme. Though the question was non-directive, the majority of scenes recounted were done so as criticisms of the programme. The negative scenes that were remembered at this point in the discussion were those that highlighted the incongruities of a South Asian Muslim presence in Bradford.

The scenes that signified incongruity included one scene in which the educational wishes of the Muslim parent are contrasted with the child’s media environment after
the child expressed a desire to become a mechanic “like Charlene in Neighbours”. The contrast that Ignatieff made between social and public life and the wishes of parents was objected to in the focus group discussions. Some of the discussants wished to emphasise compatibility between social and public life and an Islamic lifestyle. Another example of a scene involving incongruity, though of a different nature, was a camera shot of graffiti on a wall which read “Paki’s out”. This suggested that a far right movement was active in Bradford and its presence suggested that the argument of repatriation still had some resonance even if the subjects for such repatriation were second generation South Asian Muslims. The discussants felt uncomfortable with this short scene (for nine seconds), in that they felt it promoted inter-racial tension. The picture itself is shown during a conversation between Ignatieff and Akhtar on the possibility of a link between the publication of *The Satanic Verses* and increasing racial tension. The discussants did not refer to the conversation during the camera shot of “Paki’s out”, though such a reference would have qualified the shot, but instead the shot itself was perceived as provocative. This suggests that the discussants prioritised visual over oral representation. The two groups which mentioned this particular scene were based in youth centres and consequently around a street culture which was more alert to issues of race.

Both of these objections in the focus group discussions were aimed at reducing the difference that they perceived the programme had projected. Along these lines, they similarly objected to a comment made by Ignatieff in which he categorised Khomeni with Hitler and Stalin, though he qualified such a categorisation, the discussants felt that this was a deliberate attempt to link the Muslim position with fascism.

And another thing that he tried to portray, the Ayatollah is even though he used a rebuttal if you like to say that he’s not linking the three but the images have already been stuck into each other’s minds that he compared it with Hitler and Stalin and then said Ayatollah. And so you have an image of these tyrants within this century and he’s linking Ayatollah with Hitler and then he says, “Oh no I’m not trying to make any connections between them”, but the image has already been… (7-1)

This did not preclude the rehearsal of scenes that were deemed to be positive representations. The positive scenes that were recounted concerned the
commensurability of a South Asian Muslim identity with what is perceived to be a British lifestyle. The scenes viewed as positive representations involved the Muslim girls’ school in Bradford. The issue of the apparent contradiction between science and religion, the traditional and the modern was raised in the programme and the school was perceived through its headmistress to have represented itself (and consequently the community) well, though the discussion was about the teaching of Darwinian theory and the incompatibility of Darwinian theory with Islamic teachings. The school’s resolution of incongruity, as perceived by some of the discussants, offered a positive representation. As can be seen from above, the discussions around the choice of topic tended to centre on the issue of difference. The discussants objected to scenes which emphasised difference and praised scenes that emphasised compatibility.

7.2.2.1. A confirmatory manner of decoding

The discussants were generally alert to detail throughout the programme and they would refer to phrases and incidents throughout the discussions. Most of the references were accurately recollected. However, there were two occasions when the discussants had misread a scene and both were in the direction of oppositional decoding. For example, one discussant said:

Do you see the American guy, he was saying, “Well I’m just as British as you”, what does that mean? (1-7)

When in fact Ignatieff had said: “…you’re more British than I am, cos I’m a Canadian”. And in another discussion one discussant said the following:

Clips of what’s normal and what’s in bondage like a woman if you saw her in hijab, that was a deliberate focal point to feed point to see which looks right and which looks wrong. Right there was this woman with an hijab walking with her children looking really locked up with no freedom and then there was this really big poster, massive poster, now she was small and that was big your eye can catch that to make it look that is the normal way, you know there was a woman who was half naked and you understand so there’s freedom on one side, and there’s a woman with total no freedom on the other side and I think that clip there was built to purposely feed the viewer which is obvious to me that was engineered. (6-4)
However, though there were numerous shots of women in ‘purdah’, the actual shot with *The Sunday Sport* advert in the background had an old, bearded, Muslim man walking in front of the poster. So the contradistinction pointed out by the above discussant was in the direction of oppositional decoding and so was the result of psychological remembering. This relates to Moscovici’s (1984b) point about the conventional nature of social representations and the dominance of the conclusion over the content. The majority of the recollections were, however, by far, accurate.

### 7.2.3. Choice of representative

The third form of contention focused around the choice of representative. Cottle (1993) notes the use of personalisation in news stories, and this programme similarly used three persons as representatives of the Muslim community such that these representatives personalised the issues at the heart of the ‘Rushdie affair’. Three members of the Bradford Muslim community that participated in this programme were Shabbir Akhtar (a representative of the Bradford Council of Mosques), Nighat Mirza (a headteacher of a Muslim Girls’ school) and Arshad Javed (a restaurant owner). The amount of time that each contributed orally is presented in the table below.

**Table 7.1. Frequency of appearance of Muslim representatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of representative</th>
<th>Time on air (secs)</th>
<th>Percentage of total Muslim representatives</th>
<th>Percentage of total of programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shabbir Akhtar</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arshad Javed</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nighat Mirza</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>812</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The discussants were asked about the representatives and how they felt about them as representatives of the Bradford Muslim community. Shabbir Akhtar was asked about the campaign against the book, the tensions experienced by a Muslim living in British society and the negotiation between freedom of expression and community rights. Nighat Mirza made one comment about racial integration and then engaged in a discussion about the limits of religious education. Arshad Javed is a restaurant owner.
in Bradford. His family was provided as an example of a typical Muslim family. The typicality was represented through elaborations on the extended nature of the family lifestyle, shots of women in the kitchen and shots of the family having an Asian dinner while seated on the floor. Javed was asked about his family and business lifestyle, the campaign against *The Satanic Verses* including the book-burning, and the *fatwa* issued by Khomeini.

Shabbir Akhtar was the central representative of the Bradford Muslim community in the programme. He spoke on behalf of the Bradford Council of Mosques and it was his challenge to Ignatieff in a previous edition of *The Late Show* programme that led to Ignatieff travelling to Bradford in order to understand the Muslim position. Shabbir Akhtar had studied philosophy at Cambridge and was now working for the local Racial Equality Council. His discussions with Ignatieff were conducted across a table from which both could be seen throughout the programme. Their conversation, though separated into sections, was distributed towards the beginning and the end of the programme and lasted for a total of ten minutes twenty three seconds. Of this, Ignatieff spoke for four minutes twenty four seconds (42.3% of the conversation), and Akhtar spoke for five minutes fifty nine seconds (57.6% of the conversation).

The most recurring view of Shabbir Akhtar in the group discussions was that he agreed too much with Ignatieff due to being pressurised or scared, or that he “backed off” on too many occasions i.e. the representative as apologist. The discussants also felt that he did not represent the community well in the direct exchanges.

I actually think he didn’t want to be open or straight forward, because I think he was scared that we would take the wrong idea or something. I reckon I think he knew it, he could have been more straight forward and this is to the point, I think he was trying to just explain a lot more which he didn’t really listen to, he just used to move to the next point and didn’t really give him full time. (8-3)

There were, however, several discussants who viewed Shabbir Akhtar positively in that he represented the position well and that he did not rescind from the general Muslim position. Similarly, there were several discussants who viewed Akhtar more
negatively suggesting, for example, that he was only representing or advocating himself.

Nighat Mirza, the headmistress of a Muslims Girls’ School, was the subject of two short scenes in the programme. She was received as a positive representative of the community in that she was understood to be more in tune, less afraid and knowledgeable (through her references to the Qur’an). She did not actually quote Qur’anic text but instead inferred from the Qur’an, but this was sufficient for the discussants. This did not prevent one discussant from criticising her for lack of proper wearing of the headscarf. This positioning of Mirza was made in comparison to the other two key representatives in the programme, as she was seen as the only one “who stood up”.

I think she was really spot on, I thought she was, when she was talking she was talking short sentences and to the point. (8-1)
Yeah she was good. (8-2)
She wasn’t moving away to the side like the other guy it was much more convincing, much more convincing. (8-1)

The only educated Muslim person who stands up for Islam is Mrs Mirza, she is the only one who stood up for Islam... (3-1)

She was not without criticism though, as she was criticised for appearing narrow minded and exhibiting a general level of education.

Javed was involved in long discussions with Ignatieff towards the end of the programme mainly on the issue of the fatwa and whether he would carry it out himself. Though Javed held a forthright stance in this conversation, he was universally criticised in the discussions. The criticism focused around a scene in which he admitted to selling alcohol in his restaurant which is forbidden in Islamic law. This was during a discussion on the challenges facing Javed in attempting to raise his children with a sense of Muslim identity. His admission was met with laughter during the actual viewing in some groups and the discussants themselves dismissed him as being “clocked”, having “got stuck”, being “lost” and a “fake”.

82 This is in contrast to Bowen (1992) who describes Akhtar as “incisive, disconcerting and often devastating in debate” (p 10).
Personally I think he picked his people out well cos at the end of the day… (1-1)
… he had the weak people didn’t he? (1-3)
He had him in his car, he had him in his car, and he asked him about Rushdie and he asked him we’re going to your restaurant and you sell alcohol there don’t you, he’s clocked him straight away… (1-1)
That’s true, that’s true… (1-11)
He knew who he picked out, and the guy didn’t have a leg to stand on… (1-1)

The researcher had wished to examine the relationship between reception of a programme and identity positioning. The researcher had identified three identities for South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford, these being ‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and ‘extremists’. The focus groups mainly consisted of members from the second and third categories but there was no obvious or systematic difference between these two identities in the way that they interpreted the television programme. The three representatives were received polysemically but this did not correspond towards a pattern across particular individuals, nor did the discussions themselves repeat any obvious patterns. Contradictions and rejoinders were part of the discussion on occasion but there were only a few incidents of this nature. It was the researcher’s view that this difference would be most prominent in the representations of representatives of the community, but this did not occur. The differences could be more prominent if focus group discussions are conducted with ‘coconuts’ as well.

The discussions revealed a dominant view towards each representative. Shabbir Akhtar was received as “scared” and “backing off”, Arshad Javed was received as “fake” and “lost”, and the third, Nighat Mirza was received as standing up for what she believed. Mirza was received and explained through contrasts with the other two.

It was alright, only the lady she gave a good answer for that against the guy, all the rest of them didn’t have a clue. (4-5)

She defended everything he questioned… (1-1)
Defended it well… (1-M)
Yeah I think she did, gave a good argument, whereas others were trying to pussyfoot their way round it… (1-1)
The discussions on the representatives highlighted two important characteristics which the discussants required of the representatives. The first is veracity, that is self-representation in as straight-forward manner as possible almost to the point of defiance\textsuperscript{83} i.e. in a non-compromising manner. The second is authenticity and integrity. The discussants felt that representatives of the community should only represent the community if they were themselves in a ‘moral’ position to do so, this implied and required authenticity and integrity.

Mirza was received positively because she was perceived to be veracious and authentic, especially because of the discussion on the teaching of Darwinism in Islamic schools. Akhtar was perceived to be genuine but not veracious enough. So he was accused of “beating about the bush”, “agreeing too much”, “backing away” and “being scared”. Javed was perceived to be veracious and defiant but lacking in authenticity. Though he spoke about killing Rushdie which was raised by Ignatieff, he had earlier admitted to selling alcohol in his restaurant and the discussants did not view this positively as they felt that he was not genuine in his convictions. The table below summarises the above.

Table 7.2. Relationship between representatives and characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Authenticity</th>
<th>Non-authenticity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Veracity</td>
<td>Community worker</td>
<td>Hypocritical fundamentalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Veracity</td>
<td>Apologist</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will return to this theme towards the end of this chapter when I will examine the nature of reception to representation in relation to identity politics and the challenging of hegemony. The selection of representatives (as a form of misrepresentation) which was the theme of some of the discussions around this topic leads onto the next section which examines the absence of other types of representatives (also as a form of misrepresentation).

\textsuperscript{83} The close relation of defiance to identity politics discourse can also be noted in the interview extract from the first methodological study in which the senior youth worker paraphrased Muslim identity talk as “It’s alright, I’m a Muslim and I do this and that’s ok, and I’m gonna damn well do it”. 

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7.2.3.1. Projection of the identity position

The previous discussion on the choice of representative highlighted three different types of representative: the ‘apologist’, the ‘hypocritical fundamentalist’, and the ‘community worker’. Multiplicity of representation within the same programme has been noted by Rose (1996):

For within a single programme, that is Casualty, there are many different representations of madness. There is the violent maniac (‘Running amok in the waiting room’), the self-mutilator who is also dangerous (‘Self-inflicted cigarette burns’), the self-injurer who is in no way dangerous but is distressed (‘The bulimic dancer’), the mildly odd (‘Wandering about in the waiting room’) and the possibly miraculous (‘Hysterical blindness’). (p. 280).

However, this did not prevent a second issue being raised as a form of misrepresentation, this being misrepresentation through the absence of ‘appropriate’ representatives. The main absence was that of Islamic scholars according to the discussants. Another absence was that of practising, activist youth, those that had been involved in the campaign.

You notice that there were no Islamic scholars representing or any people actively promoting Muslim groups, or you know…a six year old kid from school, a restauranteur, a waiter with shoulder length hair with broken English, things like that so there was no… I wouldn’t say this was representative of the community or Islam. (7-1)

The lack of an ‘appropriate’ representative became a source of embarrassment:

You pick a guy who’s probably come from Pakistan in the last eighteen/nineteen months, who doesn’t understand much English, and you ask him what do you think of pseudo-liberalism ideas. And what do you think of freedom of speech, the essence, the core of democracy, and the guy goes, “Hang on, what are you talking about?”’. And then he doesn’t want to come across thick on TV so he answers it in the best manner he can and that’s what he comes across as, thick. (3-1)
Yeah so that’s what we see there yeah, other people watching this saying, all people like that… (3-2)
I mean we were laughing… (3-1)
… this is embarrassing. (3-2)

The cause of embarrassment is due to the perceived imbalance in argumentative ability. The suggestion of alternative representatives is an attempt at representation through strategic essentialism. The suggested representatives therefore reverse the source of negative self-evaluation and allow for a prototypical presentation of the identity position in the face of hegemonic representations. Lukes (1974), by quoting Polsby (1963), provides an answer to the question of which absences are significant:

> Then which non-events are to be regarded as significant? One satisfactory answer might be: those outcomes desired by a significant number of actors in the community but not achieved. (Lukes, 1974, p. 38)

According to this approach, a significant absence in the programme was that of scholars. Six out of the eight groups mentioned scholars (or Mawlanas or Imams) as a noticeable absence:

> Yeah but that was the side they wanted to see, innit. That’s the side they wanted to present, them Asians, the media that’s what they want to show so most of the people they… that’s why they went to the people at the restaurant, cos that’s the sort of Bradford that they want to show the Asians are like, if they were worried about the proper answer they could have gone to some Mawlana, there’s loads of Mawlanas in Bradford, instead they go to some cowboy in a restaurant. (4-6)

Other examples of absences included a Muslim who agreed with liberalism, a “proper fundamentalist”, an “intellectual”, and a businessman who was Islamically practising. The majority of the discussion around this topic though focused on scholars. This shows that the central issue for the discussants was not that of a wide representation of the community which revealed the heterogeneous nature of the community, but more of a projected image of the community through its scholars. This is because these same scholars could satisfy the earlier two criteria of veracity and integrity. The argument used in favour of the use of scholars was that they would have provided an authentic position on the ‘Rushdie affair’, authentic in relation to the sources of religious practice.
7.2.3.2. The difficulty of strategic essentialism

The call for the inclusion of scholars and practising, activist youth as representatives of the community resembles the strategic essentialism that Gervais (1997) noted amongst Shetlanders:

Which strategies did Shetlanders adopt to resist the imposition of dominant meanings and to restore a sense of agency? First and foremost, they resorted to what can be described as ‘strategic essentialism’. They put forward a consensual image of the ‘real Shetlander’ derived from myths, traditions, and reconstructed history… The long-term consequence of this strategic essentialism – which in the short-term may be necessary to protect the community – is that it leads to the exclusion of significant numbers from the collective definition of ‘being a Shetlander’. (p. 291).

The strategic essentialism, that was adopted by some of the discussants as a means of contesting negative representations, was itself contested. Other discussants felt that such a representation did not reflect the true composition of the Bradford Muslim community. Such a strategy also made some of the discussants question their own practice, and hence, a self-referential aspect to their reception qualified a call for strategic representation.

I think it does, you guys are arguing yeah they should have chosen someone who was educated, but are all Muslims in Bradford educated? Are they all scholars? (3-3)

Do you understand he’s picking on a person, he’s not talking to a true Muslim here now. Do you understand? (6-4)
I debate that. That’s not the point. It’s not for us to say whether somebody’s a true Muslim or not? I think he wasn’t an educated Muslim. (6-2)
Not educated enough. (6-3)
He didn’t know why? (6-4)
He fell into traps and he fell into holes that the guy was digging for him ages before in the conversation, he just if he’d have come… I’ll put it into perspective if he’d had come even here to talk to us the guy doing the we would have torn him to shreds. Honest to God we would have torn him to shreds because those people who he selected and they were selected there must have been a vetting procedure before the programme was made, those people were selected because of their
ignorance and that is all, you can make any argument right or wrong depending on the people arguing it. (6-2)
Alcohol in his restaurant… (6-4)
Even that isn’t a problem, that would not have been a problem, he could have said, “Fine I’m a sinner, I sell alcohol, that’s my… I’m gonna take that with me”. (6-2)
“That’s my personal thing”. (6-4)
“That’s my downfall”. (6-1)
“Yeah, that’s my weakness”. (6-2)

Nevertheless, even those who were sceptical about strategic essentialism viewed the programme as constructed:

He’s got to represent the Muslims. (3-2)
There’s only one guy representing Muslims… (3-5)
I’m not saying every single Muslim, as himself, yeah as a Muslim, he’s saying ok you’re a Muslim, ok he set him up innit, he’s saying oh he’s selling alcohol… (3-2)
You know the way they did it… (3-1)
I know they did set him up… (3-5)

The above exchange exemplifies the problem of representation and its effects upon those that are represented. This holding of simultaneous yet contradictory views towards representation will be explored further later.

7.2.3.3. The internalisation of hegemonic discourse

Though the discussants expressed much discontent with the programme, and in doing so they presented themselves as being able to reject the rhetoric and representations that constituted the programme through an oppositional positioning, they nevertheless showed throughout the discussions that they adhered to the ideology of individualism. One discussant said:

Everyone’s an individual, aren’t they? (5-4)

This understanding of individualism related to the representation of the Bradford Muslim community:
We shouldn’t stereotype the Bradford Muslim, cos everyone’s their own individual. Yeah there’s a lot of different type of Bradford Muslims out there. There’s them which are more westernised, there’s them which are more backwards, there’s them which are holding onto culture, there’s them trying to find true Islam. (2-3)

I mean you can’t have one person actually representing to give an opinion on the whole of Bradford on the whole of the Muslim community. You’ve got to have a few people who can actually contribute and discuss the matter cos not one person can actually give the whole... like I said give an opinion on everybody, on everybody’s account. (5-2)

Here, the discussants advocated individualism as a check against a monolithic representation of the Bradford Muslim community. The discourse of identity politics would attempt to strategically promote one representation of the identity position and this was suggested by many of the discussants. However, others resorted to individualism as a check against a form of representation that concealed differences underneath the strategic representation. Ignatieff’s use of individualism was criticised in one discussion when the discussants suggested that Ignatieff was treating Salman Rushdie as an individual whilst simultaneously stereotyping the Bradford Muslim community.

7.3. The ambivalent decoding of stereotypes

There was beneath the surface of the discussions a tension between representation and reality that manifested itself several times during the discussions. One of the issues at the centre of these discussions was the nature of stereotyping. The discussants could not escape the fact that the programme contained ‘real’ images of Bradford and the Muslim community, and yet they complained about stereotypes in the programmes. I will proceed below through a description of some of the key points that were made on the issue of stereotypes.

7.3.1. Invalidity of stereotypes

The starting point is strategic misrepresentation, as it actually was in many of the focus group discussions. A specific example was repeatedly used. Ignatieff conducted short interviews towards the end of the programme with two waiters (which lasts for
one minute twenty eight seconds) in a restaurant. The first engaged in a discussion about the book itself, the second criticised the Home Secretary’s comments about the affair. The discussants felt that the inclusion of these scenes was inappropriate.

But that’s what bugs me, every time these programmes come up, they’ll get some restaurant guy or go to a taxi stand and speak to someone there who don’t know anything yeah, don’t even know how to speak English, “But this, but that”, and they’ll put people like that on TV on national TV to kind of represent the Muslim… (2-5)
But what they say is that there’s a lot of Muslims who work in restaurants, there’s a lot of Muslims who work in… we’re misrepresenting them, I mean, you can’t pretend that they don’t exist? (2-M)
But if that’s an intellectual programme then why don’t they go and see an intellectual about it? (2-4)
That’s what we’re saying… (2-5)
Yeah and if Shabbir Akhtar is so intelligent… (2-3)
I mean if it was a cookery programme you wouldn’t go to the mosque and ask the mullah there what ingredients do you put in the chicken korma? (2-4)

7.3.2. Validity of stereotypes

The discussants were critical of the representations of the Bradford Muslim community in the programme (including these two short conversations with the waiters), however, there was a tendency in some of the discussions for the criticism of the representations to be followed up by a criticism from another discussant who would suggest that the representations were fair.

What bad bits? (1-M)
Messy streets. (1-6)
Come on that’s just Bradford. (1-7)

Say you took a random sample… (3-3)
Random sample, you would have got some educated people had you took a random sample, I guarantee you. (3-1)
Not necessarily. Think of the number of illiterate people there are, butchers, God knows what yeah. (3-3)
They took every single illiterate person they could find yeah? (3-1)
I think it was fair, them guys they did pretty well. (3-3)
7.3.3. Universality of stereotypes

The discussants raised concerns about the problems of representation and its relation to stereotyping. However, they also recognised that they themselves viewed other communities stereotypically, and that such stereotypical representations were flawed as descriptions of other communities.

You know, what people have to understand is when they meet one Muslim, that Muslim does not represent all of the other Muslims. (3-5)
Yeah, stereotyping… (3-2)
You know I don’t think people understand that. (3-5)
Oh come on, we do that to say… (3-3)
Everyone does it… (3-5)
Say a Christian, or Hindus, we meet one, and we say alcoholic blah blah, and we take an image yeah from them subconsciously… (3-3)
Surely that’s human nature… (3-5)
Yeah exactly… (3-3)

The discussions on the subject of stereotypes, therefore, raised some internal contradictions. The discussions would begin with the complaint against the programme that the programme misrepresented the Bradford Muslim community, especially in its use of stereotypes which were viewed to be false. However, the discussants, sometimes the same discussants, would later in the discussion suggest that the stereotypes were true and simultaneously state that the stereotypes were false, and that they stereotyped others as well. So the two rebuttals to the claim of misrepresentation were “Come on, we do the same!” and “Let’s face it, it’s true!”.

Not only are the rebuttals contradicting the initial statement of misrepresentation, but they also contradict each other. The contradictions between the three views on stereotypes did not prevent the discussants from articulating them.

Table 7.3. Variety of opinions on stereotypes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion on stereotype</th>
<th>It’s not just!</th>
<th>Let’s face it, it’s true!</th>
<th>Come on, we do the same!</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes are true</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes are false</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes of in-group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stereotypes of out-group | No | No | Yes

The researcher would suggest after observation during the focus group discussions that a sense of rejection led through the discussion to a sense of dejection. That stereotypes are too powerful to be challenged. So the common sense view (perhaps the liberal consensus) that stereotypes are typically false became transformed into its anti-logoi that stereotypes are true. This depiction of the trajectory of the focus groups discussions could be explained through a conversational analysis of the group context such that as the group began its discussion of the programme, the discussants were addressing the out-group presenter (hence their negativity) and that the respondents proceeded to discuss the programme between themselves rather directing the conversation towards an out-group. This explanation could be supported if the response of the discussants to the stereotypes were distributed in such a manner that the criticism of the programme would be found towards the beginning of the discussions and the introspection of the discussants would be found towards the end.

This was, however, not the case. The criticism of the programme was uniform throughout the discussions: the beginning, the middle, and the end. The moments of dejection and introspection were distributed irregularly throughout the discussions. For example, in two discussion groups the comments were made towards the beginning of the discussions. In another, the comments were made towards the end. The comments were made consistently throughout a fourth discussion group within a dialogical argument between two sections of the group, one arguing that the representations were true, the other arguing that they were false (though both agreed that the programme was set up). In another focus group discussion the comments were prompted by the moderator towards the middle and end of the discussion. The comments did not seem to fit into a pattern in relation to conversational context.

The distinction between the two rebuttals is that one suggests that stereotypes are true, and the other suggests that stereotypes are necessary. Or are they true and necessary? We will deal with the second point first. There is a tradition within social psychological thought that suggests that stereotypes are cognitively and perceptually necessary (Allport, 1954b; Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963). There is another tradition within social psychological thought that similarly suggests that stereotypes are necessary but from within a psychodynamic perspective (Gilman, 1985). There is a third tradition
which also suggests that certain stereotypes are necessary and that they emerge from within discourse itself (Hall, 1997b). Ichheiser (1949b) similarly proposes a position which suggests that stereotypes are necessary.

Billig (1985) criticises the perceptual approach to stereotyping because it seems to side against tolerance as the norm. The rule is prejudice according to this approach, and the exception is tolerance. Billig (1985) suggests instead that the notion of particularisation should be used to counter the notion of categorisation such that the space for tolerance is made available. So Billig (1985) suggests that stereotyping and prejudice are not necessary psychological phenomena. The psychodynamic and discursive arguments are more problematic. The identification of key positions within discourse such as madness allow for the proper functioning of language. A positive evaluation of self-identity and a negative evaluation of others leads to a psychological identity structure that requires notions of ‘otherness’ for the maintenance of identity (Gilman, 1985).

Ichheiser’s (1949b) notion of prejudice and the consequent stereotyping suggests that prejudice is necessary for the proper functioning of society because difference is the norm, and to suggest otherwise is prejudice according to Ichheiser (1949b). The problem with this suggestion is the skewed nature of the content of stereotypes. Ichheiser calls for the acceptance of difference as in itself necessary. However, if difference is necessary, and therefore prejudice and stereotypes are similarly necessary, then does this also mean that stereotypes are true? Even if on occasion the overwhelming character of a stereotype can be negative? And how does one account for the numerous absences in social representations? I would suggest, in line with Hall (1997a, 1997b), that the combination of psychodynamic and ideological interventions necessitates strategic misrepresentation such that positive and negative evaluations are asymmetrically distributed. This does not mean that the representations in themselves are false, they may be true, but that they are used to over-represent the subject matter in the historical example of the identity politics movements.
7.4. The contestation of representation as a political act

Morley (1992) criticises the encoding/decoding model because it allows for an attribution of intentionality towards the producers of the programme. The nature of consciousness and unconsciousness at the level of ideology is difficult to assess from the programme itself, and even studying the production of the programme may not lead to the answers to these questions. Certainly, the type of programme would affect the intentionality of the producers (e.g. entertainment, current affairs), and a possible distinction between the conscious intentions and unconscious motivations should not be neglected. I would suggest that the issue of agency should neither be outrightly dismissed nor enthusiastically pursued. The direct site for study of such intentionality is the site of production. A question to be asked here is, is it possible to assess intentionality, even at the level of ideology, through a study of the reception of the programme by those whom it is representing? I would suggest that such a study, while not providing a definitive answer, may nevertheless provide evidence of the possible presence and direction of intentionality.

The focus group discussions were designed to occupy the discursive space where subjugation meets domination. Here, agreement and consensus are absent as hegemonic representations are contested. The oppositional readings of representations of, for example, the hypocritical fundamentalist and the proposed counter-representation of strategic essentialism were both social psychological attempts at emancipation from representational subjugation.

The central theme through which the programme was interpreted was the congruity of a South Asian Muslim presence in Bradford. To what extent was multiculturalism possible? Or conversely, what are the limits of multicultural policy? It was the programme’s perceived destabilising effect upon this discussion which caused much consternation in the discussions:

The questions were wholly inadequate, they were, like I said he made no attempt to get to the real questions, the real issues, he was reinforcing his own stereotypes, now this is what came across to me, I don’t know if it was his intention, what came across to me was some
of the questions specially asked on the way to the guy’s restaurant were about Islam’s… the next Muslim on the street is a threat to you and your way of life, speaking to the average person living in this society, that even your next door neighbour would at the end of the day would be willing to take up arms, he’s a threat to you, he’s a threat to your way of life. Umm… that’s what came across to me… (2-2)

It was this attempt at accessing the back-stage of social interaction and its consequent projection into the national public sphere which was deemed to be subversive. “Part of the shock value of television and other media… is that it routinely makes available behaviour which, in most contexts of face-to-face interaction, would generally be regarded as belonging to back regions” (Thompson, 1990, p. 232). The feelings of rejection that reflected this form of representation were repeated in a conversation in which the themes of racism and immigration were not too far behind:

Ok, let’s take your average English villager who’s never been to any major city, yeah… (3-M)
Fair enough, it will affect the non-Muslims… But I’m saying the Muslims… (3-5)
What would they say, to them, how would they feel, this programme? How would they interpret this programme? (3-M)
“Eee bye gum, son, these foreigners are taking over aren’t they?”. (3-1)
That’s right, it’s all immigrant thing, that’s it, it’s all about race, not about religion. (3-4)
“… next ship home”. (3-1)

This extract shows the close semantic relationship between the issues raised in the ‘Rushdie affair’ and the language of racism. Here, such language has been recounted as the perceived reception of the non-Muslim community. A study into the social representations in the media during the ‘Rushdie affair’ and their relation to the language of racism could highlight the extent of such a correlation. It is the consequence of radical incongruity that threatens their sense of national and local belonging. Their hesitant desire to be a ‘British Muslim’, without compromising their religious tradition, encourages a spirit of willingness to attempt to combine views of collectivity, religion and morality which are at times contradictory in nature. Nevertheless, they continue to try, in the words of Shabbir Akhtar, most live according to a modus vivendi. The Late Show, however, was perceived as a programme that set out to highlight the contradictions (in what they accept is a
confusing experience) of a South Asian Muslim presence in Britain. Morley (1992) writes:

Whether or not a programme succeeds in transmitting the preferred or dominant meaning will depend on whether it encounters readers who inhabit codes and ideologies derived from other institutional areas (e.g. churches or schools) which correspond to and work in parallel with those of the programme or whether it encounters readers who inhabit codes drawn from other areas or institutions (e.g. trade unions or 'deviant' subcultures) which conflict to a greater or lesser extent with those of the programme. (p. 106-7).

In light of this quote, the focus group discussions that were conducted in this study showed that this particular programme was met with creative and critical resistance by those whom it was representing.

7.5. Conclusion

Social representations are contested by identity politics movements at various sites, essentially all those sites that involve the cultural maintenance and reproduction of social knowledge e.g. the school, the media, the arts. The media has, historically, been one site for contestation of power in terms of representation. This study involving focus group discussions with South Asian Muslim youth living in Bradford around a programme that claimed to represent the rhetorical, identity position of the Bradford Muslim community during the ‘Rushdie affair’ is an investigation into the synergy that is the result of a meeting of representations that are oppositionally and asymmetrically related. The immediate and obvious outcome is one of opposition, criticism and deconstruction. The discussants showed a high degree of awareness and alertness in their viewing of the programme. The researcher was surprised several times during the discussions by the level of analysis of the discussants as some pointed to details in the composition of the programme that suggested a high level of perceptual and analytical awareness. Perhaps, the politically marked nature of the identities stimulates a heightened state of awareness.

The discussants raised problems with the media as a whole, the presenter and the composition of the programme. The attribution of agency and the attribution of
intentionality to the presenters and the producers was common. This ties in with the identity politics perspective which assumes that there is agency in the preservation of domination by the representatives of the hegemonic discourse. The writer, Ignatieff, came under huge criticism during the discussions as the discussants focused their criticism onto him specifically. He objectified to them what they understood to be the manners and practice of a dominant ‘other’. Ignatieff, as somebody in a position of power, was anchored as clever, deceptive, intolerant and obdurate. This objectification of Ignatieff represented an impenetrable wall that cut across the dialogical axis of this debate. Such a representation of Ignatieff and the media means that meaningful dialogue itself is impossible.

The discussions concerning the themes raised by the programme centred around one issue: the congruity of a South Asian Muslim presence in Bradford, or as the discussants understood it, “You don’t belong here!” The depiction of a variety of incongruity-inducing themes throughout the programme such as arranged marriages and inner city life was criticised for its encouragement of ‘otherness’ and difference. Similarly, though conversely, the depiction of the possibility of congruity was encouraged as in the interview with the headmistress of the Muslim Girl’s school. The discussants were also aware that programmes such as these had an educative effect on a population which lived around them, such that, one community could access the backstage life of another through its portrayal in a television programme. The portrayal of difference and ‘otherness’ therefore exacerbated community relations according to one discussant. The circularity of representation therefore serves to increase a feeling of separation in this instance. The ‘Rushdie affair’ was interpreted as a response to a general perception of being treated with “genial contempt” by some of the discussants, and that the ‘Rushdie affair’ was an expression of frustration. It is ironic that the campaign which was meant to highlight frustration at a lack of recognition and respect in society was met with further attempts at (what was perceived to be) exacerbating difference (in a negative manner). The belief that the discourse of racism was underlying the criticisms of the Muslim position during the ‘Rushdie affair’ was stated by some of the discussants. This area is open to further research.
The type of representative was also a cause of much criticism. The representative who received the most criticism was the restaurant owner who was perceived to be a hypocritical fundamentalist. The two categories of veracity and authenticity were central to the reception of the representative, with the category of authenticity being more important than veracity since the representative as ‘apologist’ was more well received than the ‘hypocritical fundamentalist’. The relevance of these two categories of authenticity and veracity emerges from within the context of the social psychology of identity politics. If the general group seeking representation is understood as an example of the identity politics movements, then there is some sense in understanding veracity and authenticity as being key characteristics of representatives of the movements. Authenticity is important because the main premise of the identity politics movement is that it is based on an actual situation of oppression, and that the struggle for emancipation is from actual causes of subjugation. Those that represent the struggle for emancipation must therefore do so as genuine representatives. Any inconsistency between rhetoric and practice (on behalf of the key representative) within the identity politics paradigm serves to weaken the strength of the rhetorical position. The veracity of the key representative is necessary because he/she faces a hegemonic discourse and veracity – straightforwardness to the point of defiance – is therefore, psychologically a recognition, through defiance and denial, of a lack of representational power. The two characteristics of the key identity position were then related to the power and strategy of the dominant rhetorical position. Veracity was required in order to defy (and to deny) power. Authenticity was required to protect against charges of hypocrisy.

The dialogical nature of argumentation requires a representation of a key identity position which articulates the main rhetorical position of the identity politics movement against the hegemonic representation. This move towards strategic essentialism on behalf of the identity politics movements was resisted by some of the discussants. This was because they recognised that such a psychological stance was not representative of the diversity of experience within the Bradford Muslim community, this point was made through reference to individualism. Simultaneously, they recognised that they themselves were not able to meet the criteria of authenticity and veracity. So, for example, within the discussions, if one discussant called for strategic essentialism as a psychological device for rhetorical representation, then this
would be followed by a rebuttal by another discussant who felt that such forms of essentialism were unrealistic. The complaint to be made against the hypocritical fundamentalist of being inauthentic was now deemed as a charge that could be made against themselves, fearing this, they resisted calls for strategic essentialism.

Three positions on stereotypes were discussed. What psychological function can such contradictory positions fulfil? That stereotypes are true, and false, and universal, or somewhere in between these three positions, ultimately means that stereotypes are inevitable. Hall (1997b) suggests that an oppressive representation may result in a cycle of entrapment as attempting to break away from one form of stereotype may ultimately only mean the adoption of a position that reflects a binary opposite to the negatively evaluated stereotype, such that the hegemonic discourse remains as the source of evaluation. I would suggest that the descent of the iron cage of representation similarly leads to the entrapment of its subjects as they oscillate between the anticipatory strategic essentialism of identity politics which denies the validity of stereotypes and the subjugation that is the result of a coercive, hegemonic social representation which accepts the validity of stereotypes. This line of oscillation between emancipation and subjugation leads to a sense of ambivalence and ultimately dejection, as the inevitability of the iron cage of representation presents itself to those who are representationally subjugated.
8.0. Conclusion

To paraphrase Jodelet (1991), a transformation in immigration policy swings open the doors of a country, and the social situation which emerges overturns mental attitudes whose roots are to be found in the distant past. Mass migration in the post-war period resulted in the transformation of ‘otherness’ from an exogenous to an endogenous form. This act of economic migration unleashes a social process that is as complex as it is deep in its constitutive structure. It is deep because it draws upon a history of a thousand years which includes West-Muslim interactions such as the Crusades, Andalucia, the Mughal empire and the Raj, the Ottoman empire and colonialism. It is complex because it involves three types of ‘otherness’ – race, culture and religion - which are themselves polysemically received. The contradictory nature of legal and psychological denial of racism, the problem of incorporating a tolerant attitude towards cultures (or other cultures – this being at a time of rapid transformation of culture itself), and the vexed approach to religion per se and Islam in particular, serves to complicate an already complex picture. The maturing of the second generation of South Asian Muslims through the British educational system and under the umbrella of liberal ideology would raise the issues of ‘otherness’ that had otherwise remained in the background. What would be left in the past, and what would be carried into the future? How would British society respond to the endogenisation of ‘otherness’? And how would the second generation respond to British society’s response to the endogenisation of ‘otherness’?

These are some of the questions that this thesis has attempted to explore and I will now discuss them below. After an initial section which will reflect on the methodological procedure, I will examine the interaction between identities and representations, especially in relation to issues of ‘otherness’ and power, and in doing so, I will provide examples of objectifications of such relations. I will then proceed to interpret the ‘Rushdie affair’ within the theoretical context of this thesis. This will be followed by a discussion on the structure of rhetorical engagement during social conflict. The conclusion will end with a consideration of the main theoretical contributions of this thesis in relation to the theory of social representations, its relation to identity processes and the possibility of ‘escape’ from hegemonic representations.
8.1. Methodological reflections

Two advantages of insider research are ease of access and knowledge of language and culture. The importance of the issue of accessibility became evident during the first study. The interviewees had been divided into three groups of key informers. The first group consisted of young, South Asian Muslims – the researcher himself belonging to this group. The second group consisted of older, South Asian Muslims, and the third consisted of older, English residents of Bradford. Six interviews were required for each group. The first and second group interviews were relatively easy to arrange, each being arranged after one, or at the most, two phone calls or visits. The interviews were arranged and conducted within four weeks. The third group interviews, however, took three months to complete. Three interviews within this group were arranged immediately. The fourth interviewee was slightly delayed in responding to a letter which had been sent to him. The fifth and sixth interviews though took up to a month to arrange. Several candidates were chosen for this category, but the researcher was refused interview access by some outright. Four candidates refused to be interviewed, two from the local media, one from a local supermarket chain, and a fourth from the local council festival committee. The reasons given included lack of time and a lack of knowledge on the topic of interview. Repeated attempts at communication were required, most were unsuccessful.

The difference between those category members that agreed to interview immediately and those that didn’t was the power relation between the category members and the South Asian Muslim community. Those that responded immediately tended to occupy positions in which there was direct accountability to the South Asian Muslim community (e.g. politicians, headmasters, policemen) whereas those that effectively refused to be interviewed tended to occupy positions which lacked any direct and official accountability to the South Asian Muslim community (e.g. journalists, businessmen). The insider status was pertinent to the interview part of the study.

84 The fourth had originally agreed to an interview, however, the researcher missed the appointment, after which the fourth candidate stated that he did not have the time available through a third person.
The benefit of the researcher as insider is difficult to assess in the absence of a direct comparison. The key question for this debate is, what exactly is the researcher inside? Or conversely, what is it that the outsider is outside of that makes him/her an outsider? The contribution of Goffman and Ichheiser to this debate would suggest that this question is, basically, one of social psychology i.e. of perception and stereotyping, but in this specific example, the categories of race, culture and religion (and the associated and derived social networks) add to the complexity of the problem. That is, the difference between front-stage and backstage is not only of different social groups, for example, between members of a social movement such as the ecology network and those outside, but these differences here are also characterised by skin colour, and cultural, linguistic and religious signifiers. The extent to which these differences affect trust is difficult to assess in the absence of a direct comparison.

The researcher can testify to a high degree of access, up to as in some cases complete participation. Informal discussions with youth leaders, access to religious practice, access to backstage social arenas, and an ability to check the validity of comments during discussions by virtue of being an insider, are all advantages that this researcher experienced. The issue of trust, or mistrust, was hardly raised except once when the researcher was accused of providing information for non-Muslim think tanks and governments.

The issue of objectivity as a weakness of insider research is derivative of a Weberian and Cartesian view of social research. The assumption of this criticism is that the insider is disadvantaged methodologically, but the history of writers on Muslim identity shows that such a distinction is flawed. Gellner, Halliday and Lewis all have positions from which they conduct research on Muslim identity. These positions do not mean that their work is immediately and forever flawed, it means that their work is derivative of a certain perspective and should be viewed as such. Researchers in the field of social representations have conducted their work in areas of study that are of great importance and value to them, for example, work has been conducted on social representations of madness (Rose, 1996) and race relations (Philogène, 1999).

85 The researcher faced the same defence mechanism highlighted by Argyris (1969) listed as problems
Similarly, this research has been conducted from a certain perspective, that of the insider. The researcher would align himself with a weak version of the anti-objectivist argument. A strong version would suggest that there is no distinction between facts and values. A weak version suggests that there is a distinction, but that facts are related to ideological and political persuasions. The bias that may be derivative of this is to be located in the conduct of research and analysis of the data, not in the ideological or political persuasion *per se*.

This leads onto the relation between ideology and methodology. The researcher began the research as an insider, an almost complete participant. However, as the research progressed, the researcher found that he began to move social psychologically towards the outside of the community, that is the further the research developed, the less the researcher was an insider, as he began to progressively view the object of study as an object of study and separate from himself, though he remained inside the community and as participant. This shift in positioning has shown the researcher that the insider/outsider perspectives and distinctions are not absolute nor static, though they remain important for particular fields of research. With respect to ideology, if we take ideology to refer to a Durkheimian collective representation (as in liberal ideology) and an emancipatory strategy (as in identity politics), then the researcher has discovered that prolonged involvement in the act of research has made the researcher more sensitive to the varieties and particularities of ideological functioning. To discover what everyone else takes for granted, is simultaneously to discover what one takes for granted.

8.2. Social representations and identities

I have in this thesis employed the theory of social representations and combined it with a view to identity politics discourse. I identified three forms of identity in chapter two. The first was a collective notion of identity. The second and third were, respectively, a politically marked identity type and a non-politically marked identity type. The suggestion in the theoretical chapter was that a non-politically marked identity was subject to a hegemonic representation and that it became politically for access to outsiders. This is because the researcher was an outsider to this interview category.
marked once it rhetorically engaged with the hegemonic representation through trans-coding or social creativity. This suggestion was substantiated by the findings of this study which identified two identity ideal types that were related through trans-coding to hegemonic representations. The ‘rude boy’ was related to representations of the ‘Paki’, and the ‘extremist’ was related to representations of the ‘Muslim’.

There are two stereotypes as social representations of the South Asian Muslim community. These are that of the ‘Muslim’ and the ‘Paki’. The ‘Muslim’ is anchored as backward and aggressive. The ‘Paki’ is anchored as uncivilised and non-white. Within the confines of this study, the two stereotypes differ from each other in that ‘Muslim’ is media-generated whereas ‘Paki’ is culturally generated. However, this reverses the historical order of the two in that ‘Muslim’ has been subject to numerous cultural stereotypes throughout the history of Islam, whereas ‘Paki’ is derivative of ‘Pakistani’ and is, therefore more modern and hence should be more associated with the media since ‘Pakistan’ is a recent invention. The ‘Paki’ as a social representation is absent from the national media, though it is present as a cultural stereotype in local communities.

An analysis of the interviews with the key informers, led to the identification of three types of social strategy, as types of identity formation – there was a close parity with those identity types that have been identified in the literature. These were the ‘coconuts’, the ‘rude boys’ and the ‘extremists’. The first type differed from the second two in that it involved an acceptance and internalisation of stereotypes. This group then confronts its negative evaluation by assimilating to the values and representations of the dominant group, thereby creating a distance in terms of identity between its self-perception and self-presentation, and that of the community being stigmatised, which this group of ‘coconuts’ now constitutes as separate from itself i.e. it forms a boundary between itself and the group being stigmatised. This social

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86 The universality of ‘Paki’ as a racial taunt does raise some questions. First of all, Pakistanis are one set of Asians amongst Indians and Bangladeshis in Britain (numbering approximately 31% according to the 1991 census, see Ballard, 1994). So how does a minority attribute become the source of categorisation for the whole unit? That is, how does ‘Paki’ being a short form of Pakistani come to be adopted as the racist taunt against all South Asians? This question becomes more problematic when it is acknowledged that ‘Pakistan’ is a recent, modernist, nationalist invention which historically has little significance in that it is not involved in any significant encounter with Britain or the West, yet it seems so culturally salient.
strategy of social mobility is a social psychological strategy and sometimes is related to a strategy of economic mobility.

The second and third types of identity formation amongst South Asian Muslim male youth in Bradford are both forms of social creativity. They both reject the outsider representations of group identity and adopt either different dimensions of inter-group comparison or re-evaluate a previously negative characteristic in a positive manner – usually these two forms of social creativity are related. These two forms of social creativity involve polemical representations in that the subject of discussion is contested. The disputed nature of the social representations requires the incorporation of a rhetorical or argumentative approach towards the analysis and understanding of these identity processes. This will be returned to later.

The second type of identity formation, the ‘rude boys’, is an amalgam of three quite different cultural influences. These influences derive from a bhangra/Bollywood cultural matrix, a rap/hip-hop cultural matrix, and a Northern/post-industrial ghetto cultural matrix. The bhangra/Bollywood cultural matrix is the result of a second generational interpretation through translation of Punjabi folk dance and Indian cinema, this forming the basis of a second generation Asian cultural identity. The rap/hip-hop cultural matrix is associated with the rap/hip-hop industry in the United States of America especially amongst black/African-American artists. The third cultural matrix is the Northern, post-industrial ghetto cultural matrix which also provides key identifiers and patterns of behaviour for young South Asian Muslim males. An Asian cultural identity is celebrated through bhangra and the adoption of signifiers related to the rap industry is an example of the assertion of self-pride in a situation which previously stigmatised their notions of identity. So the two anchorings of ‘Paki’ as uncivilised and non-white are reflected through trans-coding and celebrated through bhangra and rap. So previous sources of negative evaluation (Asian culture and brown skin) are now positively evaluated.

The third type of identity formation is that of the ‘extremists’. This identity type is also an example of the social strategy of social creativity in that a previously negatively evaluated aspect of identity is now positively evaluated. So being a Muslim, though it is negatively stereotyped, is a source of esteem and pride for this
group. One example of such reversal is that in the aftermath of the ‘Rushdie affair’, Muslims were accused of being backward. The ‘extremists’ would turn this around and suggest that British society was too progressive, and that increasing immorality, as they viewed it, would have serious consequences for the stability of British society as a whole. So the anchoring of ‘Muslim’ as backward is reflected through transcoding as stable, such that a previously negatively evaluated identity is now positively evaluated.

The ideal types are integrally related to social representations of identities as the ‘coconuts’ are incorporating both stereotypes of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’, the ‘rude boys’ are creatively responding to the stereotype of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘extremists’ are creatively responding to the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’. These represent ideal positions and social reality will produce examples of compromises, hybridisations and contradictions between these ideal types. These findings reveal the close dialectic between representations and identities, especially in how identities are responses to the social representations of themselves. The social representations of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ serve to provide a representational field within which are positioned three responses, that of the ‘coconuts’, the ‘rude boys’ and the ‘extremists’, that are directly related to the representations in terms of how they engage with the negative evaluations.

Table 8.1. Identity-representation relation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hegemonic representation</th>
<th>Anchoring</th>
<th>Ideal identity type</th>
<th>Representation-identity dialectic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Humane, educated, genuine</td>
<td>Coconut, Coconut</td>
<td>Incorporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Backward, aggressive</td>
<td>Extremist, Extremist</td>
<td>Trans-coding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paki</td>
<td>Non-white, uncivilised</td>
<td>Rude boy, Rude boy</td>
<td>Trans-coding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The social representations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Paki’ as ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilised’ are examples of representations of difference. This difference is defined against discourses of ‘modernity’ and ‘civilisation’, discourses which are central to European and Western identity (e.g. Hall, 1992b; Jahoda, 1999). I would agree with Rose (1996) that Moscovici’s definition of social representations as familiarising the unfamiliar is not specific enough to explain those instances (in relation to identity) in
which the representations function in order to maintain a sense of ‘otherness’. There is anchoring and objectification in these instances, but the familiarisation of unfamiliarity leads to the construction of difference. This understanding of the functionality of social representations requires an incorporation of a view towards semantic space in which some anchorings will provide meaning to a representation of the Western, modern, European self (at a general level), and other anchorings will represent that which is different.

So how does this representation of ‘otherness’ affect life in Bradford? Both representations of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ contribute towards the construction of an ‘otherness’ which represents difference at its most basic. The result is separation. The erection and maintenance of barriers between ‘them’ and ‘us’ as manifested by the police station or house moving exacerbates a notion of separation and distance, such that the social psychological perception of ‘otherness’ is translated into an empirical reality. The police station provides an example of an objectification of a social representation that is directly linked to identity. One young South Asian Muslim said:

If they felt that the Muslim community was part of their community right, what’s the need to build big walls in the police station for? They’re telling the local community that “Look, we’re not a part of you, we are in here, and we are here to control you, we’re different from you and we don’t trust you” yeah.

Similarly, the house moving was related to inter-group representations: “I don’t know whether it’s because they don’t see us as good neighbours or it’s the stereotyping image that they’ve got of us…”. Both of these are examples of objectifications of social relations that are characterised by ‘otherness’. These examples and the above discussion should have highlighted the close relation between representations and identities.

8.3. When the subaltern met the hegemonic

87 Goffman (1963) writes on this that: “Thus in the stigmatised arises the sense of not knowing what the others present are ‘really’ thinking about him.” (p. 25). This issue has become more relevant now that racism is seen to have adopted a more subtle face (Wieviorka, 1994). The example of the police station, however, relieves the stigmatised of this particular problem.
I wish to proceed now to discuss the ‘Rushdie affair’ within the theoretical framework of this thesis. Rushdie’s *cri de coeur*: “I am being enveloped in and described by a language that does not fit me” (Rushdie, 1991, p. 405) encapsulates the feeling of being the subject of misrepresentation. It is ironic that this same feeling was the root cause of the ‘Rushdie affair’. The *Satanic Verses* was viewed as the postmodern face of a new form of orientalism (Sardar, 1998). The new community was struggling to free itself from the confines of centuries of cultural stereotypes, only to find that these same stereotypes were now being re-introduced into the modern conscience within the field of postmodern fiction. The character of the Prophet, which had been at the centre of orientalist attempts at critiquing Islam, now became the subject of the postmodern gaze. The consequence of a postmodern critique was the ‘Rushdie affair’, a refusal against cultural misrepresentation.

The rhetorical analysis identified two positions during the ‘Rushdie affair’. These were the liberal position and the Muslim position. These two positions represented the bi-polar positions in the debate and were each associated with certain social representations. The social representations surrounding the Muslim rhetorical position centred on the theme of a minority community advocating its rights against a majority, hegemonic culture. The social representations surrounding the liberal rhetorical position centred on the theme of writers being persecuted by totalitarian regimes. The item analysis found that the majority type of rhetoric in the television programmes was primary i.e. focusing on the actual contents of the central discussion of the affair, extreme items[^88] counted for almost half of all rhetorical content in the five programmes and similarly that radical liberals accounted for half of all rhetorical content. All of these factors are indicative of a general tendency towards radicalisation of the dialogue. This point however should be mitigated by the high instance of tertiary rhetoric[^89] and the high incidence of moderate Muslim rhetorical statements.

[^88]: Extreme items were those advocated as primary forms of rhetoric by the respective radical exponents.
[^89]: Especially programmes 2 and 5 which tended towards ‘understanding’ the Muslim position.
The language that began to be used to articulate the Muslim case was that of identity politics. But this presented another problem, one that has been alluded to by Jodelet (1991): “The unthinkable hybrid is not so much the child of the patient but the loony who has become a civilian” (p. 271). The racial, cultural, religious ‘other’ speaking through the language of identity politics represented an integration of contradictions that was unthinkable to the dominant position, and unacceptable towards its maintenance. Asad (1990) wrote on this:

In my view the fear aroused in the ‘Rushdie affair’ (and the often unrestrained language it generates among normally staid persons) has to do with a perceived threat to authority, not to power: More precisely, the fear is generated by the fact that people who do not accept the secular liberal values of the governing class are nevertheless able to use the liberal language of equal rights in rational argument against a hegemony of secular British culture and to avail themselves of liberal law for instituting their own strongly held religious traditions. (p. 475).

Asad (1990) posits the ‘Rushdie affair’ as a symptom of British postimperial identity crisis. The ‘unthinkable hybrid’ certainly challenges liberal hegemony in this instance. An acceptance of the Muslim position would have had the potential of precipitating ideological decomposition, especially since liberalism was so tied up historically with the notion of ‘otherness’ (e.g. Grosrichard, 1998). So, ultimately, a critique of domination is an invitation to a counter-critique since stereotypes “arise when self-integration is threatened. They are therefore part of our way of dealing with the instabilities of our perception of the world” (Gilman, 1985, p.18).

The threat to psychological integration during the ‘Rushdie affair’ was managed through the construction of the particular and radicalised ‘Bradford Muslim’. Those that were defiant in the face of hegemony, that is, those that challenged hegemony, were particularised as a type of Muslim that was to be negatively evaluated. The dominant position thereby avails itself of any criticism which may allege wholesale discrimination against a community. Criticism is against those who “go too far”. The assertive challenge against hegemonic representations is represented in such a manner (within the linguistic confines of the dominant discourse) that the challenge appears as a familiar ‘other’, but familiar as ‘other’ within the confines of the dominant discourse. The ‘Bradford Muslim’, a third media-generated representation, is
anchored as anti-modern, demanding and ex-rural, and was found repeatedly in the interviews, focus group discussions and the television programme that had set out to explore the Muslim position. The above discussion has shown that the contestation of dominant representations has the effect of creating further dominant representations, such that to contest is to radicalise oneself.

The differences in content, however, masked a similarity in structure in argumentative style, technique and narrative. The rhetorical analysis conducted for this thesis found that there were many similarities between the two positions. First of all, they shared types of rhetoric. Secondly, they were both derivative of an identity politics discourse, and consequently, liberal individualism. Thirdly, they shared the rhetorical technique of radicalisation, and fourthly, they shared a common narrative of the hero-victim. This similarity in structure shows that disagreement can mask agreement. However, the issue of power is pertinent to this issue. Because, although both positions shared structures of rhetoric, such that the liberal position particularised the Muslim position to that of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ and the Muslim position particularised the liberal position to that of the ‘radical secularist’, access to the sites of representation and the salience of certain forms of representation have meant that some representations represent more than others.

8.4. The social psychology of identity politics

One effect of this imbalance of power relations has been the internalisation of identity politics discourse. The question for the second generation in Bradford through the ‘Rushdie affair’ was how should they articulate their concerns to a wider society that seems so different? The ‘Rushdie affair’, an event that necessitated dialogue, required, just like the Shetlanders in Gervais’s (1997) study, “the engagement with alien representations, if not to make them their own” (p. 282, italics mine), i.e. those of identity politics. The argument of sacrilege fell mostly on deaf ears, deaf because the sacred itself had become a dying species. Religion symbolises different histories and different positions. Consequently, the employment of these terms during the ‘Rushdie affair’ had the reverse effect of compounding the oppositional viewpoint. An alternative argument was required, one that could not only resonate with the history of British society, but also its aspirations i.e. its future. The discourse of
identity politics was most suited for this purpose, the employment of a language that was understood by those for whom it was intended, even if it did not wholly represent (or even was relevant to) the Muslim community’s actual lived experience (in that identity politics discourse is derivative of Enlightenment individualism).

The social representations that suggest a negative evaluation of identity for the South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford emerge from and are embedded within a discourse, I would suggest that this discourse not only situates representations of their identities, but that it also provides the linguistic resources for emancipation from the negative evaluation. In the case of the South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford, this means that they rely on the discourse of identity politics as an emancipatory strategy. Identity politics discourse has been related to “powerful, meaningful, emotionally significant events” (Calhoun, 1994, p. 24) and the South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford have lived through several at the local and the international level. The halal meat campaign, the Honeyford affair, the ‘Rushdie affair’, the Gulf war, the wars in former Yugoslavia, the continued bombing of Iraq, the war in Chechnya and the Middle East peace process are all events that contribute sub-narratives to a total narrative that symbolises ‘otherness’ and victimisation. The international media network helps to globalise the narrative, and the associated representations of ‘otherness’ and victimisation. The generations (mainly the second and the third) that have been raised in Britain reached maturity at the same time as these local, national and international events.

The extent of internalisation of the identity politics discourse was highlighted through the focus group discussions in that much of the reception of the programme could be interpreted through the use of identity politics discourse as an explanatory framework. This was in relation to the content and manner of reception, the attribution of agency to the presenter (and the producers), the suggestion of incongruity, the reception of representatives, the call for strategic essentialism and against strategic misrepresentation. However, there was an acknowledgement of the limited utility of identity politics discourse within the discussions.

The aim of the focus group discussions (that covered in the main the ‘extremist’ and ‘rude boy’ identity positions) was to provide a meeting point for hegemonic
representations and their contestation. The response of opposition, criticism and deconstruction by the discussants highlighted the political nature of representation in this instance. Themes of incongruity (of a Muslim presence in Bradford) raised in and throughout the programme, even if they were covered in short scenes lasting a few seconds, were constantly criticised. Similarly, themes that suggested compatibility were praised. This was relevant to the notion of identity politics discourse as well because the central purpose of identity politics discourse is to achieve identity between difference. The criticism of representations of difference and praise of representations of similarity are therefore intrinsically related to identity politics discourse. The views expressed about the presenter and the representatives in the programme revealed a highly structured manner of reception. The representation of the dominant ‘other’ was objectified in the personality of Ignatieff and anchored as clever, deceptive, intolerant and obdurate. The attribution of agency confirms the feeling of victimisation that is constitutive of identity politics.

Similarly, the analysis of the reception of the three representatives in the focus group discussions found that identity politics was central to the manner of reception. The three representatives were distinguished according to the two characteristics of veracity and authenticity. Veracity is in response to power, or the lack of it. Authenticity is required because it is a defence against a common strategy of liberal individualism which is to point out the difference between rhetoric and practice. The distinction between identity and practice has been raised as Samad (1992) and Vertovec (1998) have pointed out, and this was noted by the interviewees. But the assumption underlying this question is that advocacy of the identity perspective requires consistency between articulation and practice. Any discrepancy between the two results in the invalidation of the argument itself, and by association, the contestation of the hegemonic discourse. Any challenge against a dominant position is met with the familiar “But do you practice what you preach?”.

The bursting of the contestatory bubble has the reverse effect of silencing all opposition to a dominant discourse, since only the ‘angels without blemishes’ can take a moral stance against a dominant hegemony.

The discussants were calling directly, and through their criticisms, for a type of representative that matched these two characteristics. This strategic essentialism was
in response to what they viewed to be strategic misrepresentation and this forms the core of the struggle over representation. The problem with representations, and specifically stereotypes, is that they can be simultaneously true, false and universal. How can stereotypes be simultaneously true and false? The representations of the Bradford Muslim community in the programme were undoubtedly of the community itself. In that sense, they were true and valid. But the selective nature of the representations as interpreted by the discussants suggested that as representations they were false in terms of the absence of positive representations and a substantial rhetorical challenge. This strategic misrepresentation necessitates strategic essentialism. But the trajectory of the discussions was such that calls for strategic essentialism, which in effect meant the sole representation of positive representations, were rebutted as being in themselves misrepresentative. There was further acknowledgement that stereotyping other communities in a negative manner was a characteristic of their own psychological functioning. It is from the oscillation between calls for strategic essentialism and against strategic misrepresentation coupled with the acknowledgement of stereotyping within their own community against others that emerges a sense of dejection and inevitability about representation. The above discussion shows that the social psychology of identity politics is intrinsically linked through absences and presences, projections and denials, to the politics of representation.

8.5. Theoretical contributions

The introduction identified three main areas of theoretical focus for this thesis. These are the utility of the theory of social representations, the intergroup nature of representational activity, and the possibility of emancipation from hegemonic representations. I will conclude by discussing these theoretical concerns in light of my empirical findings. The theoretical chapter identified five advantages of the theory of the theory of social representations. These were that the theory permits a sociological level of interpretation, incorporates the notion of history and culture, allows for a perspectivist approach, calls for the study of content and structure, and highlights the need for context-specific social psychological research. All five advantages proved pertinent to this study.
The study of the social nature of social psychological thinking has been central to this study since group interaction in focus group discussions and media texts, such as television programmes, have both been used to investigate issues of identity and representation. History and culture have been invoked in the interviews, television programmes and focus group discussions. For example, the connection between representation and history was evident in the interviews around the topic of Lawcroft House, the police station, which was symbolically associated with the British Raj and an imperialist mentality. History was, in this instance, conventionalising the present. The manner of response to the police station and to the television host Michael Ignatieff in the focus group discussions highlights the utility and interdependent nature of anchoring and objectification. Similarly, one can make sense of the representatives in the Late Show programme through the manner in which they were anchored and, consequently, objectified as representatives of alternative identity positions.

The connection between meaning and form can be found in the process of radicalisation which would make little sense if analysis was restricted to either of the two. The advantages of specificity and a perspectivist approach have meant that this research is specific to the group in this study and my interpretation of them. For example, the ‘Bradford Muslim’ as a representation is tied geographically and temporally to a certain place and moment in time. I would suggest that the ‘Birmingham Muslim’ or the ‘Glasgow Muslim’ would not make much sense within this context. The perspectivist approach has allowed me to study and delineate the social psychological world of South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. An outsider studying the same group may arrive at different conclusions. These two advantages could be better emphasised through comparison with alternative studies which could highlight how differences in subject-matter, or content and perspective, could lead to alternative findings.

The second area of theoretical focus is the intergroup nature of social representations. I identified two absences in relation to social representations theory, these are in relation to identity and power. The central aim of this thesis has in fact been an examination of this very issue, the interaction between representations and identities. This thesis has investigated this interaction in two specific instances. The first is
outlined in table 8.1. above in which three specific identities as ideal types in Bradford are related to social representations. The identities of the ‘coconut’, the ‘rude boy’ and the ‘extremist’ are found to be dialectically related to representations of the ‘Muslim’ and the ‘Paki’. The variety of identities highlights the complexity and the creativity of South Asian Muslim youth as each type attempts its own solution to a negative evaluation. The second is the example of the social construction of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ as a radical prototype. This representation has been shown to be the product of an intergroup crisis such that moments of antagonism between social groups can lead to the formations of social representations. Both examples highlight the dynamic nature of identity processes which remain in the late modern age in a constant state of flux. Furthermore, both examples reveal how social representations are intrinsically linked to intergroup formations and interactions.

The third area of theoretical focus is the possibility of emancipation from hegemonic representations. The empirical findings suggested that the subaltern in order to ‘escape’ from negative evaluations used the arguments of identity politics. Though the content of the rhetoric during the ‘Rushdie affair’ and the content of the focus group discussions would suggest that there were serious disagreements between the two positions, nevertheless, at the level of structure of argument and type of discourse, both occasions revealed a similar use of identity politics discourse. Though the discourse of identity politics is one essentially about freedom, there are two ways in which it is tied to determinism. First of all, not all identities are negatively evaluated, and there is heterogeneity between types of difference. Race, culture and religion are three types of difference and identities that organise around these categories will find themselves evaluated and received differentially. In one sense, those that have simultaneously been negatively stereotyped over centuries and in a grotesque manner (e.g. see Jahoda, 1999) and have the resources to linguistic emancipation (i.e. through identity politics discourse) have little choice but to challenge the negative stereotypes through identity politics discourse. Secondly, identity politics discourse is a derivative and a developed form of liberal individualism (Gergen, 1995), and as a linguistic, emancipatory resource it ties those who adopt it to liberal individualism. The subaltern identity therefore becomes subsumed within ideology by engaging through it. This linguistic determinism forces, in a subtle and subliminal way, the subaltern to incorporate the hegemonic.
To quote Eagleton (1991): ‘In pulling the rug out from beneath one’s intellectual antagonist, one is always in danger of pulling it out from beneath oneself’. (p. 108). Will the employment of identity politics discourse be useful, or more pertinently, will it remain relevant in the long-term? Is it a genuine reflection of what is essentially an identity based upon a religion with alternative epistemological and ontological foundations? Will the employment of identity politics discourse lead to a transformation of the subaltern – a liberalisation even? These are some questions which face the subaltern. The hegemonic must deal with issues of negative representations of a major minority in its midst. Jodelet (1991) suggests that transformations in mental health care are insufficient if they do not incorporate the representational dimension:

The transformations made in psychiatric practice, with the opening of hospitals and the development of a community therapy sector, are responsible for a change of perspective which, however, fails to focus on the real problem of the relationship with the mentally ill. That is the problem of the representation of their illness and their condition, out of which their ‘otherness’ and their social status are constructed. (p. 4).

However, even an incorporation of the representational dimension into the equation can be insufficient if the subject of representation is a necessary subject (Hall, 1997b). In such circumstances, the hegemonic discourse would have to re-adjust in order to maintain its integrity, especially if it is based upon binary oppositions which characterise ‘otherness’ in terms of race, culture and religion. A report by the Runnymede Trust (2000) suggests that this point can be dealt with by replacing closed views of the ‘other’ with more open views, which would allow for interaction, dialogue and difference. But this begs a further question, would the liberal individual have to be re-constituted for such an interaction to occur? And if so, then in the likely occurrence of this not happening, are stigmatised communities forever condemned to the periphery of value in order to maintain a positively evaluated identity for the dominant and hegemonic community?
BIBLIOGRAPHY


the Social Psychology section of the British Psychological Society, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.


Appendix (i)

Interview schedule for key informers

How do you think the second and third generations are adapting to living in British society, and Bradford in particular? Do you think that there are differences between Asians in the way that they deal with this issue? Why do you think that these differences are so? Do you think that there is one monolithic identity that is present on the social scene in Bradford? Or would you identify different types? What do you think it is that leads to these differences?

Do you think that there is a stereotype about Muslims and Asians? Is it responding in one way or in different ways? Is the response related to the stereotype? In what way? What do you think has the most effect on you, your family, your community or the media?

Do you think that there has been an emergence of Muslim identity in the last decade or so? Is this at the level of practise? If not, why not? Why is there a discrepancy between identity and practise? Do you think that this identity development is community based or media related?

And similarly for an Asian identity? What do you think characterises these identities? And what factors affect them? How do you see the influence of black culture on Asian youth in Bradford? Why do you think that it is so prevalent? Does it bring more pride?

What do you think about the ‘Rushdie affair’? Did it affect you, in what way? How do you think it affected Bradford? Do you think that international events like the recent US bombing of Iraq have an effect on young Asians in Bradford? What do you think of the Stephen Lawrence enquiry? How do you think it has affected Bradford? Are there differences in the ways that people respond to such events? Why is that the case?

How do you think that Bradford is perceived by the rest of the country? Why do you think that that this is the case? Is there such a representation as the ‘Bradford Muslim’? Is it not the case that it is Bradford’s fault? How do you see the situation developing? What is your view of the Bradford riots/disturbances?

Some would say that some of the factors causing these differences are a search for self-esteem, a search for meaning, a need for security and a need for power and control. Do you think that any of these factors are relevant as explanations for identity processes in Bradford?

How will the situation be in twenty or thirty years time? What would you like the situation to be in twenty or thirty years time?

Finally, I would like to show you some pictures, I would like you to tell me what these pictures mean to you.
Appendix (ii)

Photographs of buildings in Bradford used for interviews

Haq Halal supermarket

Rolex Trading Company (next to the Beehive inn)
Lawcroft House

Lister Mills
Carlisle Road mosque

Westgate mosque
Appendix (iii)

Table describing interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Setting for interview</th>
<th>Interview category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>Take-away restaurant</td>
<td>Young Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Charity worker</td>
<td>Interviewee’s home</td>
<td>Young Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Interviewer’s home</td>
<td>Young Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>Youth worker</td>
<td>Youth club</td>
<td>Young Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>Youth leader</td>
<td>Take-away restaurant</td>
<td>Young Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>Take-away restaurant</td>
<td>Young Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>Book shop owner</td>
<td>Book shop</td>
<td>Elder Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>Race relations worker</td>
<td>Race relations office</td>
<td>Elder Muslim</td>
</tr>
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<td>Councillor</td>
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<td>Business office</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Member of parliament</td>
<td>MP’s office</td>
<td>Elder non-Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3</td>
<td>Police inspector</td>
<td>Police station</td>
<td>Elder non-Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>Elder non-Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>Senior youth worker</td>
<td>Youth club</td>
<td>Elder non-Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>Local reporter</td>
<td>Newspaper office</td>
<td>Elder non-Muslim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix (iv)

Schedule for focus group discussions on The Late Show – A Visit to Bradford

This is a forty minute programme in which a writer travels to Bradford to discuss the ‘Rushdie affair’ with members of the Muslim community in Bradford. I would like you to watch the programme, after which we will discuss the programme and the issues raised by it.

So what is your initial response to the programme? Do you like it, dislike it? Why, why not?

What do you think of the questions and the way they were answered?

What do you think of Ignatieff himself? Do you think he was fair?

What do you think of the Muslim representatives in the programme e.g. Akhtar? Mirza? Arshad? Do they reflect Bradford well? Do you think other people should have been interviewed? Who? Why?

What do you think of the issues covered? Are you familiar with the ‘Rushdie affair’? Do you think the right issues were covered? If not, why not?

What sort of image does this portray of Bradford, and Muslims in Bradford?

Are there any scenes that you would like to discuss specifically?

What do you think of the ‘Rushdie affair’ itself, as portrayed in this programme?
Appendix (v)

A chronology of the ‘Rushdie affair’ (1st July 1988 – 31st Dec 1990)\textsuperscript{90}

26\textsuperscript{th} Sept 1988  

3\textsuperscript{rd} Oct 1988  
Objectionable passages from the book brought to the attention of Muslim organisations, mosques, and Muslim ambassadors in the UK. Penguin officials contacted for immediate withdrawal of the book.

5\textsuperscript{th} Oct 1988  
The Government of India bans The Satanic Verses.

11\textsuperscript{th} Oct 1988  
The UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs formed in London in order to mobilise public opinion against The Satanic Verses.

21\textsuperscript{st} Oct 1988  
Hundreds of thousands of Muslims sign the petition protesting against the publication of The Satanic Verses, and the calling for its withdrawal.

8\textsuperscript{th} Nov 1988  
The General Secretariat of the Riyadh-based Organisation of the Islamic Conference asks member states to take action against the publisher and the author if they fail to withdraw the work.

21\textsuperscript{st} Nov 1988  
Al-Azhar, the 1,000 year-old venerated Islamic seminary in Egypt, brands The Satanic Verses as blasphemous and calls on Muslim countries to take concerted action.

1\textsuperscript{st} Dec 1988  
Mr. Ken Hargreaves, MP, moves an Early Day Motion in the House of Commons, regretting the distress caused to Muslims in the UK by the publication of The Satanic Verses.

10\textsuperscript{th} Dec 1988  
A massive protest rally in London, organised by the Islamic Defence Council (UK), against the publication, earlier, of The Satanic Verses.

14\textsuperscript{th} Jan 1989  
Muslims in Bradford, Yorkshire (UK) burn a copy of The Satanic Verses in a symbolic expression of protest.

16\textsuperscript{th} Jan 1989  
W.H. Smith, Britain’s biggest retail outlet for newspapers and books, withdraws The Satanic Verses from the sale in its shops.

1\textsuperscript{st} Feb 1989  
Mr. Douglas Hurd, the British Home Secretary, addressing a Muslim gathering in Birmingham, rules out any change in the blasphemy law and, instead, asks the British Muslims to join ‘the mainstream’.

\textsuperscript{90} Much of this chronology is taken from Ahsan et al. (1991) and Haroun (1997).
14th Feb 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini proclaims that Salman Rushdie, for his apostasy, deserves the death penalty. Salman Rushdie and his wife, author Marianne Wiggins, go into hiding and are placed under armed guard.

15th Feb 1989 Iran proclaims a national day of mourning in protest against The Satanic Verses. Thousands of demonstrators chanting ‘death to Britain’ stone the British embassy in Tehran.

Viking/Penguin’s New York offices are evacuated for an hour following an anonymous bomb threat. Salman Rushdie cancels a planned three-week US tour to promote The Satanic Verses.

Harold Pinter leads a delegation of writers to 10 Downing Street to protest the fatwa against Salman Rushdie.

PEN American Centre condemns “the extreme action the Ayatollah Khomeini has taken in calling for the death of Salman Rushdie.”

16th Feb 1989 The British Government protests to the Iranian Charge d’Affaires in London over Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, says that ties with Tehran will be impossible if it fails “to respect international standards of behaviour”.

The British Arts Council issues a statement calling for tolerance and understanding, accepting that the Islamic community has the freedom to criticise Mr. Rushdie’s book.

Pakistan lodges protests against The Satanic Verses with both the UK and the United States governments and demands that the novel should be banned.

18th Feb 1989 Salman Rushdie issues a statement: “As author of The Satanic Verses I recognise that Muslims in many parts of the world are genuinely distressed by the publication of my novel. I profoundly regret the distress that publication has occasioned to sincere followers of Islam. Living as we do in a world of many faiths this experience has served to remind us that we must all be conscious of the sensibilities of others.”

21st Feb 1989 Iran withdraws ambassadors from the EEC countries.

23rd Feb 1989 More than 80 prominent Asians sign a statement defending Rushdie’s right to publish.

25th Feb 1989 Iran cancels a British trade exhibition over the ‘Rushdie affair’.

27th Feb 1989 A British Muslim delegation calls on Mr Patten, Minister of State at the Home Office, for fair treatment under the blasphemy law.

28th Feb 1989 The Iranian parliament votes unanimously to sever all diplomatic ties with Britain.
5th March 1989 The Vatican expresses solidarity with people who have been injured in their faith.

7th March 1989 Iran breaks off diplomatic ties with Britain.

13th March 1989 The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in London refuses to grant Abdul Hussain Chowdhury summonses against Rushdie and rules that the blasphemy law protects only the Christian religion.

16th March 1989 The Organisation of Islamic Conference resolves to ban Penguin publications in 45 Muslim countries.

1st April 1989 The Muslim Institute in London holds a conference on the ‘Rushdie affair’ in which the keynote speaker supports the fatwa publicly.

27th May 1989 A demonstration is organised by the British Muslim Action Front in London. It is the largest demonstration against the book to date. It eventually turns into a riot on Westminster Bridge.

29th May 1989 Two Labour MPs call for the withdrawal of The Satanic Verses.

20th June 1989 The British High Court grants the Muslim Action Front leave to challenge an earlier court ruling in March, refusing to issue summonses for a private prosecution.

4th July 1989 Mr John Patten, the Minister of State at the Home Office, writes to influential Muslims on issues confronting the Muslim community.

20th Oct 1989 A Harris poll conducted for the BBC Television shows that four out of five British Muslims want some sort of action taken against Rushdie.

16th Dec 1989 Muslims at 1,000 mosques in the UK raise their hands in a show of solidarity for the campaign against The Satanic Verses.

8th-12th Jan 1990 British Muslims conduct a 5-day vigil outside the offices of Penguin/Viking publishers.


7th Feb 1990 Harold Pinter reads out Rushdie’s essay Is Nothing Sacred? for the Herbert Read Memorial lecture at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London.

10th Feb 1990 Ayatollah Ali Khameini endorses his predecessor’s fatwa against Rushdie.

27th Feb 1990 The Council for the British Muslim Action Front argues in the High Court for equality in law.
6th March 1990  Lord Hutchinson and Lord Harris urge prosecutions against the British Muslims for their protests.

9th April 1990  The Queen’s Bench Divisional Court, under Section 4(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 dismisses the application for issuing a summons against The Satanic Verses for causing public disorder.

10th April 1990  The British Muslim Action Front seeks leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

28th April 1990  Rushdie expresses surprise that those threatening against his life have not been prosecuted.

8th May 1990  The Daily Telegraph publishes a Gallup Poll in which the majority of respondents say that Rushdie should apologise.

25th May 1990  The High Court refuses British Muslims leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

28th Sept 1990  Iran and Britain resume diplomatic links.

30th Sept 1990  Rushdie appears on ITV and speaks of his experiences for the last twelve months.

24th Dec 1990  Rushdie claims to embrace Islam in front of the Egyptian Minister for Awqaf and some Egyptian officials. He says that he will not publish the paperback edition or permit its translation while any risk of further offence exists.

26th Dec 1990  Ayatollah Khameini reaffirms the fatwa and states that it cannot be revoked. The UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs holds that Rushdie has not addressed the central issue of the total withdrawal of the book.

28th Dec 1990  Rushdie writes an article Why I have embraced Islam for The Times and explains why he cannot totally withdraw the book.

29th Dec 1990  The UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs rejects Rushdie’s conversion as insincere.

31st Dec 1990  Rushdie speaks on Radio 4’s Sunday Programme and reaffirms his earlier pledge of conversion and states again that he would not be publishing the paperback edition or permitting any further translations.
## Appendix (vi)

**A list of all the programmes shown on television concerning Islam and/or Muslims Between 1st July 1988 & 31st Dec 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description of programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 July 1988</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Exiles: A profile of an Iranian exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jul 1988</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>2.30 p.m.</td>
<td>The faiths next door: Looking at legal and Islamic recognition of marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Aug 1988</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug 1988</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>8.10 p.m.</td>
<td>Wideworld: Photographers on the civilisation of the Moors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug 1988</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Aug 1988</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>8.45 p.m.</td>
<td>Profile of Lawrence on centenary of his life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sept 1988</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>10.00 p.m.</td>
<td>True Stories: Beirut - Drama on life in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sept 1988</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>2.45 p.m.</td>
<td>Dictatorship or democracy? Pakistan after Zia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sept 1988</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>3.10 p.m.</td>
<td><strong>Network east: Extracts of the novel <em>The Satanic Verses</em> by Salman Rushdie</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Oct 1988</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Cities of Islam: Fez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct 1988</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Cities of Islam: Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct 1988</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Cities of Islam: Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 1988</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Cities of Islam: Jeddah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jan 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>7.50 p.m.</td>
<td>Open space: Turkish political exile on oppression and torture in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jan 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>11.30 p.m.</td>
<td>The Bangladesh story: History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jan 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>11.30 p.m.</td>
<td>The Bangladesh story: The Mujib years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>11.30 p.m.</td>
<td>The Bangladesh story: The military years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Feb 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Triumph of the West: Discussion between Christian and Islamic civilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Feb 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>10.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Everyman: Sudan’s civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Feb 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Panorama: Inside the Ayatollah’s Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Paradise of martyrs: Life in Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Mar 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Open space: The Palestinian Intifada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Mar 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>9.20 a.m.</td>
<td>Kilroy: Palestine (series of 3 programmes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Mar 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>9.20 a.m.</td>
<td>Kilroy: Palestine (series of 3 programmes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Mar 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>9.20 a.m.</td>
<td>Kilroy: Palestine (series of 3 programmes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>3.15 p.m.</td>
<td>Network east: East or West? The way forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Mar 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td><strong>Opinions: Fay Weldon on <em>The Satanic Verses</em> crisis</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Apr 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>10.55 a.m.</td>
<td>Suleyman the Magnificent: Documentary on the Ottoman Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Apr 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>12.20 a.m.</td>
<td>Friday prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Apr 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>12.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The Sons of Abraham: The history of Abraham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Apr 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>11.10 p.m.</td>
<td>The eleventh hour: The Arab Israelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Apr 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>12.20 a.m.</td>
<td>Friday prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Apr 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>12.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The Sons of Abraham: Shi’ites - Followers of Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Apr 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Shalom salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>12.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Friday prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>12.30 p.m.</td>
<td>The Sons of Abraham: The dervishes - Lovers of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.25 p.m.</td>
<td>Shalom salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>12.30 a.m.</td>
<td>Friday prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>10.10 p.m.</td>
<td>Everyman: Charles Glass’ Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 1989</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>12.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Visions: Muslims in Ramadhan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91 Those programmes in bold are related to the ‘Rushdie affair’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>11.15 p.m.</td>
<td>The late show: Michael Ignatieff visits Bradford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.25 p.m.</td>
<td>Shalom salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.25 p.m.</td>
<td>Shalom salaam</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 May 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>10.25 p.m.</td>
<td>Iranian nights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 May 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Dispatches: Story of Sayed Jaffar</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 May 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.25 p.m.</td>
<td>Shalom salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>10.45 p.m.</td>
<td>Islamic answers: Q&amp;A’s about Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 May 1989</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>10.35 p.m.</td>
<td>Hypotheticals: A satanic scenario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jun 1989</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>10.10 p.m.</td>
<td>Life under occupation: Palestinians and Israelis in occupied territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jun 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>12.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The Sons of Abraham: Sunnis and the forbidden Mecca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jun 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Voices from Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Aug 1989</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>1.00 a.m.</td>
<td>It’s my belief: Islam and women in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>3.45 p.m.</td>
<td>Dispatches: Iraqi gas warfare against the Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 1989</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>1.00 a.m.</td>
<td>It’s my belief: Declining religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sept 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Iran - The other side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sept 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>2.45 p.m.</td>
<td>Network east: The life of a mystic, Allama Iqbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Oct 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Panorama: Afghanistan - The squandered victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oct 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>11.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Keeping the faith – Women, religion and taboo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>10.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Documentary on Nasser (part 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Public eye: Major survey into the mood of British Muslim communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Oct 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>10.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Documentary on Nasser (part 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>11.45 p.m.</td>
<td>A Sufi tale</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Oct 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>10.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Documentary on Nasser (part 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Nov 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>2.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Network east: Discussion on young Asians in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Nov 1989</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>7.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Portrait: Interview with Yasser Arafat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Dec 1989</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>11.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The riddle of midnight: An examination of India’s forty years of independence (written and narrated by Salman Rushdie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>7.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Hostages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jan 1990</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Stolen: Drama about a mixed marriage (Part 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jan 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Reporting Lebanon: Effects of war on Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jan 1990</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Stolen: (Part 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>7.10 p.m.</td>
<td>A-Z of belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan 1990</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Stolen: (Part 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jan 1990</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Stolen: (Part 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Feb 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls: Babur- Through the Khyber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Feb 1990</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Stolen: (Part 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Feb 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>11.15 p.m.</td>
<td>The late show: Is nothing sacred?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Feb 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>7.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Visions: Interview with Dr Zaki Badawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Feb 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The Great Moghuls (Part 2): The young Akbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Feb 1990</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Stolen: (Part 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls (Part 3): The court of Akbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Feb 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls (Part 4): Jahangir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mar 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls (Part 5): Shah Jahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mar 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls (Part 6): Aurangzeb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Mar 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>12.05 a.m.</td>
<td>Ramadhan, a month to remember: Imam Muradadeen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Apr 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>12.05 a.m.</td>
<td>Ramadhan, a month to remember: Family life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Apr 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>7.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Fragile earth: Yemeni environmental problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Apr 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>12.20 a.m.</td>
<td>Ramadhan, a month to remember: Children and fasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Apr 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>12.05 a.m.</td>
<td>Ramadhan, a month to remember</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>10.35 p.m.</td>
<td>Everyman: A discussion with nine people from various backgrounds on the ‘Rushdie affair’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>5.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Flight over Spain: A look at the 13th century Granada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>12.45 a.m.</td>
<td>On the other hand - religion and politics: The rise of fundamentalism in South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jun 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>10.25 p.m.</td>
<td>Arafat – Behind the myth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Channel</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Program</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jun 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Under the sun: Can Israelis and Palestinians live in peace?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jul 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>10.45 p.m.</td>
<td>Heart of the matter: British families of relief workers killed by Palestinians in Sudan choose the resulting punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jul 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Present imperfect: An account of a middle class Pakistani family coping with living in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Jul 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>7.00 p.m.</td>
<td>East: An account of young Kashmiri men and women trying to get to Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug 1990</td>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>10.35 p.m.</td>
<td>Disappearing world: The Kalasha - Rites of a pagan tribe in the north west frontier of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Aug 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Rear window: Holy war of words - looking at literature of change and dissent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Aug 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Rear window: Women and Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Aug 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Rear window: Thanks be to God, we are secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sept 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>8.05 p.m.</td>
<td>Eyes on the prize: America on the crossroads, Martin Luther King and Malcolm X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sept 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Panorama: Saddam’s secret arms ring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Sept 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.25 a.m.</td>
<td>Settler’s tales: Portraits of first generation Asian immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sept 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Panorama: Saddam’s fifth column</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sept 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.25 a.m.</td>
<td>Settler’s tales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sept 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>The media show: Reporting the Gulf - A global crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Sept 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.25 a.m.</td>
<td>Settler’s tales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Sept 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The curry connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sept 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.25 a.m.</td>
<td>Settler’s tales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The curry connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.25 a.m.</td>
<td>Settler’s tales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>10.55 p.m.</td>
<td>Everyman: Muslim community’s dilemma over Saddam Hussain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The curry connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.25 a.m.</td>
<td>Settler’s tales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The curry connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>5.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Flight over Spain: Cordova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls: Babur - Through the Khyber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>7.10 p.m.</td>
<td>Open space: Lives of Palestinian children in the Intifada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The curry connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls: The young Akbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Dispatches: Discrimination in the police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls: The court of Akbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Nov 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls: Jahangir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Nov 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>9.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Critical eye: Kurdistan - The last colony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls: Shah Jahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Nov 1990</td>
<td>BBC1</td>
<td>10.15 p.m.</td>
<td>Heart of the matter: Should the Church push for peace?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Nov 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls: Aurangzeb - The fall of the Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Nov 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>7.45 p.m.</td>
<td>Assignment Turkey: One of us?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Dec 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Sufism: The heart of Islam - Living Sufism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Dec 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Sufism: The heart of Islam - Eternal life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Dec 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>The great Moghuls: Aurangzeb - The fall of the Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Dec 1990</td>
<td>CH4</td>
<td>8.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Sufism: The heart of Islam - Losing self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Dec 1990</td>
<td>BBC2</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>A letter to Christendom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix (vii)

A transcript of the television programme *The Late Show – A Visit to Bradford*

### Scene 1: Ignatieff in television studio.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Transcription of audio content</th>
<th>Visual content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00.00</td>
<td>00.00. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> …believers in Palestine to embark on a campaign of murder and highjackings against Westerners in retaliation for so-called Zionist crimes. In the same week, Egyptian fundamentalists issued a death threat against the Arab world’s finest novelist, Naguib Mahfouz, for blasphemy. Meanwhile, Salman Rushdie enters the 83rd day of his enforced captivity and Muslims throughout Britain are planning a mass demonstration to protest against <em>The Satanic Verses</em>. In the eleven years since the Iranian revolution brought Ayatollah Khomeini’s fundamentalist regime to power, the conflict between Islam and the West has escalated into a total confrontation of values and culture, not just between East and West but within the already strained multicultural fabric of British society. On February 2 I hosted <em>The Late Show’s</em> debate on the ‘Rushdie affair’. On that show, Shabbir Akhtar of the Bradford Council of Mosques, a philosopher by training, defended the fundamentalist position and argued that Western liberals had never taken the trouble to truly understand Islam. I decided to take up this challenge. He had been on my home territory, it was time for me to go to his.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00.10</td>
<td>fundamentalists issued a death threat against the Arab world’s finest novelist, Naguib Mahfouz, for blasphemy. Meanwhile, Salman Rushdie enters the 83rd day of his enforced captivity and Muslims throughout Britain are planning a mass demonstration to protest against <em>The Satanic Verses</em>. In the eleven years since the Iranian revolution brought Ayatollah Khomeini’s fundamentalist regime to power, the conflict between Islam and the West has escalated into a total confrontation of values and culture, not just between East and West but within the already strained multicultural fabric of British society. On February 2 I hosted <em>The Late Show’s</em> debate on the ‘Rushdie affair’. On that show, Shabbir Akhtar of the Bradford Council of Mosques, a philosopher by training, defended the fundamentalist position and argued that Western liberals had never taken the trouble to truly understand Islam. I decided to take up this challenge. He had been on my home territory, it was time for me to go to his.</td>
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<td>00.20</td>
<td>Salman Rushdie enters the 83rd day of his enforced captivity and Muslims throughout Britain are planning a mass demonstration to protest against <em>The Satanic Verses</em>. In the eleven years since the Iranian revolution brought Ayatollah Khomeini’s fundamentalist regime to power, the conflict between Islam and the West has escalated into a total confrontation of values and culture, not just between East and West but within the already strained multicultural fabric of British society. On February 2 I hosted <em>The Late Show’s</em> debate on the ‘Rushdie affair’. On that show, Shabbir Akhtar of the Bradford Council of Mosques, a philosopher by training, defended the fundamentalist position and argued that Western liberals had never taken the trouble to truly understand Islam. I decided to take up this challenge. He had been on my home territory, it was time for me to go to his.</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>01.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.20</td>
<td>it was time for me to go to his.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Scene 2: Collage of images of Bradford with various voice-overs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Transcription of audio content</th>
<th>Visual content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01.23</td>
<td>01.23. Voices of demonstrators.</td>
<td>01.23. Terraced housing at night. Panning around houses at night</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.30</td>
<td>01.32. <strong>Radio reporter:</strong> Demonstrators were waiting outside, to give the Home Secretary, the full force of their views on the ‘Rushdie affair’. His visit was planned before the controversy but his speech was written to take account of the danger it imposes to community relations. 01.48. Second terraced housing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.40</td>
<td>01.32. <strong>Radio reporter:</strong> Demonstrators were waiting outside, to give the Home Secretary, the full force of their views on the ‘Rushdie affair’. His visit was planned before the controversy but his speech was written to take account of the danger it imposes to community relations. 01.48. Second terraced housing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Quote</td>
<td>Scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.45</td>
<td><strong>Hurd:</strong> You clearly feel as if the most sacred things of your faith have been insulted and wounded.</td>
<td>street at night.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.50</td>
<td>You feel shocked and you feel angry. But to turn such protests towards violence as has been suggested, not, I agree, in</td>
<td>01.53. Newsagents from outside. 01.59. Sunset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.00</td>
<td>this country but elsewhere, or the threat of violence, I must say, is wholly unacceptable. Talks of death, talks of arrows being</td>
<td>02.03. Akhtar at home, eating, reading. Shot from outside house. 02.07. Men taking shoes off while entering into mosque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.10</td>
<td>directed at hearts, such talk is vicious, it’s repugnant to civilised men or women. 02.17.</td>
<td>02.11. Shot from outside prayer hall of Imam giving sermon. 02.17. Young Asian girl outside sweet shop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.20</td>
<td>02.23. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> I don’t know the first thing about Islam, and the Asian friends I have in London live just like me. So coming</td>
<td>02.21. Women in chador walking away down street. 02.24. Two Asian kids on street. 02.28. More kids on street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.30</td>
<td>to Bradford, I don’t know what to expect. I have this image of an Asian community which lives in a kind of bell-jar, sealed off</td>
<td>02.33. Ignatieff entering Akhtar’s house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.40</td>
<td>from the rest of British society in its own ghetto, with its own food, its own religious rituals, and its ties to countries like Pakistan that I’ve never even visited. I expect ‘otherness’,</td>
<td>02.44. Street of terraced housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.50</td>
<td>difference, a gulf of culture and language. I expect not to feel at home. 02.55. <strong>Akhtar:</strong> Salman Rushdie doesn’t matter, I mean I keep on saying this to everybody… 02.58. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> Why doesn’t he matter? He’s an individual…</td>
<td>02.54. Women in chador on street.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scene 3** **Akhtar and Ignatieff in Akhtar’s home, discussing across table.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Scene</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03.00</td>
<td>03.00. <strong>Akhtar:</strong> Well, in that sense of course, but I meant in this cause, in this debate. The issue is not about Salman Rushdie, the issue is not about me or you either. The issue is about ideas. It</td>
<td>03.00. Akhtar in his house sitting at table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.10</td>
<td>is… the issue is about Islam versus, you know, certain very militant forms of secularity, which are</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
opposing it. I mean, what I mean when I say that Salman Rushdie doesn’t matter, of course

<p>| 03.20 | not as an individual, he does matter, but in this debate Salman Rushdie is quite dispensable err… Muslims don’t really care about Salman Rushdie. Salman, you’ve got to remember that Salman Rushdie… |
|  | 03.29. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: But isn’t that |
| 03.30 | exactly what drives people crazy on the other side? The casualness, I’m serious, the casualness with which you’re prepared to envisage the idea that another human being, formerly a Muslim |
| 03.40 | as it happens, is gonna spend the rest of his life in hiding. Because of the vengeful wrath of your religion? And it doesn’t |
| 03.50 | bother you, it doesn’t matter to you? |
|  | 03.52. <strong>Akhtar</strong>: Well, of course, I mean, that… that… that does trouble me… |
|  | 03.55. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: It isn’t a matter of regret? |
|  | 03.57. <strong>Akhtar</strong>: Well, it is of course sad that it has turned out the way it has. I mean, |
| 04.00 | obviously, if Rushdie had been more careful in some of his public statements on television before he went into hiding and had given greater thought to what he had done, had been prepared to enter into a meaningful dialogue with the Muslims, I |
| 04.10 | think this would have developed… |
|  | 04.12. Sound of cashier at shop. |
|  | 04.19. <strong>Muslim girl 1</strong>: It’s an insult |
| 04.20 | to our whole way of life and umm… our… our Western counterparts err… feel that why are all these people, these… you know, they’re just creating a mountain out of a molehill. I |
| 04.30 | mean, so what, one person’s written a novel and it’s only based on fiction, but, it’s… it’s… it’s not fiction, this fiction is based upon real people, real events. |
| 04.40 | 04.40. <strong>Muslim girl 2</strong>: Being women, it is a sense because certain points that he’s made, Solomon Rushdie umm… like he’s called the Prophet’s wives prostitutes, I mean it is affected to us. Because, |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04.50</td>
<td>if he’s talking about umm… the Prophet’s wives he’s including all the women in general, I mean the Muslim women, it is affected. 04.58. Muslim girl 3: And if the prophet’s wives are</td>
<td>04.58. Pan to fourth girl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.00</td>
<td>prostitutes, then where does that leave us? 05.07. Muslim girl 4: That’s because err… as women, we look to the Prophet’s wives as examples as how we should live. If you explain it to people that this is why we feel so offended, this is why we are resorting to such measures then… then… then some of them</td>
<td>05.07. Pan to one of three girls from before, left one speaking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.10</td>
<td>wives as examples as how we should live. If you explain it to people that this is why we feel so offended, this is why we are resorting to such measures then… then… then some of them</td>
<td>05.14. Back to first girl in discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.20</td>
<td>umm… do the more compassionate ones do realise and do understand. But then again, you get people saying well, you know, go back to where you came from. How dare you come to our country and… and… and tell us how to… you know, when in Rome, do as the Rom… when in Rome, do as the Romans do, err… that we are, that this is, that we are the Romans in Rome</td>
<td>05.44. Asian woman hanging washed clothes on line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.40</td>
<td>as far as I am concerned because I was actually born here. 05.44. Quiet. 05.49. Akhtar: In the long run it will alert the majority community here that within their ranks are people who think that they owe allegiance to something above the state, above the national… and that’s a very worrying thought, particularly for English people because of all the world’s nations the English people are the most nationalist, I think. 06.06. Ignatieff: It could be said that I’m hearing someone who’s putting a very, good gloss on a rather divided identity. Someone who’s actually very torn between a devout Muslim and a secular person. You make it sound as if you’ve brought the two together. But someone listening to you, across what you’re saying, might say, this guy is just papering over the cracks…</td>
<td>05.50. Alleyway between terraced houses. 05.55. Khokhar hair salon. 06.05. Religious old man in front of butchers. Zoom back to billboard advertising displaying pictures of women in swimwear. 06.16. Nun waking up street, zoom back to Asians in front of van. 06.22. Women in chador crossing street. 06.26. Women in dupatta crossing street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Scene 7 Akhtar and Ignatieff at table.</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.30</td>
<td>Akhtar: Well, I agree, I mean, it’s…</td>
<td>06.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.33</td>
<td>it’s not easy but of course, religion is not meant to be easy. Umm… I mean, the alternatives here would be, on the sexual side for example, to take human nature and to adjust say scriptural demands about sexuality to human nature i.e. reduce their severity. The alternative is to make human nature live up to these demands no matter how much temptation one feels. That, the latter course is the Islamic alternative. You do not change the law of God to suit human nature, you change human nature to suit the law of God. But I don’t of course, deny that it is much easier said than done. And in practice, of course, many people fail by these rules.</td>
<td>06.33. Akhtar and Ignatieff at Akhtar’s home across table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.40</td>
<td>07.00. Akhtar and Ignatieff at table.</td>
<td>06.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.50</td>
<td>much temptation one feels. That, the latter course is the Islamic alternative. You do not change the law of God to suit human nature, you change human nature to suit the law of God. But I don’t of course, deny that it is much easier said than done. And in practice, of course, many people fail by these rules.</td>
<td>07.00. Close-up shot on Akhtar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.00</td>
<td>07.07. Ignatieff: What does that actually mean? 07.09. Akhtar: It means in practice, of course, that there is no other legitimate form of relationship other than marriage. Umm… and a strong sense that any form of relationship other than that would be immoral.</td>
<td>07.07. Panning to Ignatieff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.10</td>
<td>07.20. Ignatieff: Did you find that tough as an adolescent to live with? 07.23. Akhtar: Yes, of course. It is very difficult to umm… live with that demand. Umm… umm… I think that umm… most surprisingly is the manner in which almost all of these people manage to come to some kind of <em>modus vivendi</em>, somehow they manage to live. And… and with… with a far lesser degree of moral and psychic tension that you might expect. I think that part of the reason for that is because, particularly in the case of Muslims, religion is such a strong anchoring force. It gives you a very firm sense of guidance. Doesn’t mean of course that you don’t occasionally stray or make errors, that’s a part of the failings of our common humanity but it does mean that you have a strong sense of what is right and wrong. Therefore, you do not create unnecessary temptations for yourself.</td>
<td>07.20. Panning back and focusing onto Akhtar.</td>
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<tr>
<td>07.30</td>
<td>Asian people, particularly women, find that it is always a difficulty to live up to demands of what their own culture and that of the Western culture. But actually, but what is truly surprising is the manner in which almost all of these people manage to come to some kind of <em>modus vivendi</em>, somehow they manage to live. And… and with… with a far lesser degree of moral and psychic tension that you might expect. I think that part of the reason for that is because, particularly in the case of Muslims, religion is such a strong anchoring force. It gives you a very firm sense of guidance. Doesn’t mean of course that you don’t occasionally stray or make errors, that’s a part of the failings of our common humanity but it does mean that you have a strong sense of what is right and wrong. Therefore, you do not create unnecessary temptations for yourself.</td>
<td>07.30. Panning back and focusing onto Akhtar.</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>08.17</td>
<td>Arabic recitation for beginning of prayer.</td>
<td>08.17. Dark, panning onto street at night.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.20</td>
<td>Akhtar: You can reply to a sensible critic to a fair critic by another book. I think that Rushdie is not a fair critic of Islam.</td>
<td>08.20. Akhtar: You can reply to a sensible critic by another book. I think that Rushdie is not a fair critic of Islam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>08.30</td>
<td>if it’s over the top…</td>
<td>08.30. Dark, panning to buildings at night.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.40</td>
<td>example, you know. I mean I thought I’d write a book, fiction-intent…</td>
<td>08.40. Men praying in mosque. 08.47. Man using prayer beads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.50</td>
<td>should be destroyed. So, I mean, I don’t see what’s the problem here. One who judges and discriminates…</td>
<td>08.50. Man in mosque, focusing onto younger man behind him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.00</td>
<td>Nuremberg laws. You start with Rushdie, you burn Rushdie then where do you stop?</td>
<td>09.00. Man in contemplation in mosque. 09.08. Man in mosque, panning to another man in mosque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.10</td>
<td>me, I can understand in their outrage about The Satanic Verses, they burn The Satanic Verses, it’s a bad thing, I disapprove of burning books but what bothers me is then they</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>09.20</td>
<td>start objecting to something else. Soon, we don’t just have one book burning, we have nice, big bonfires in the middle of… in front of the Mayor’s office in Bradford.</td>
<td>09.20. Branches in front of building. 09.29. Ignatieff walking up street during day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.30</td>
<td>lot of stuff goes into it, a lot of stuff that you as a philosopher wouldn’t want burned at all.</td>
<td>09.30. Science sign on door, opened to show</td>
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<tr>
<td>09.40</td>
<td>deeply, militantly British. Even down to the Yorkshire accent. But I’m also finding that the ‘Rushdie affair’ has been a trauma for them, leading them to draw back from us, to defend a</td>
<td>09.40. Muslim girls’ school sign, panning</td>
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<td>09.50</td>
<td>heritage they feel we don’t understand. The Muslim girl school in Bradford is five years old and was set up by parents who were afraid their children were slipping away from the true faith.</td>
<td>09.50. Science sign on door, opened to show</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>parents, many of whom are unemployed, pay £450 a year for true Islamic teaching. And I expected to go back to the Middle Ages.</td>
<td>girl’s in chemistry class. 10.05. Test-tube experiment,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>I had a surprise, the girls were doing the same science experiments I used to do and in the English class they were panning to girl doing experiment. 10.14. Girls doing experiment.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>reading Kes and sympathising with the humiliation of a little, white boy forced naked into the showers by a sadistic teacher. 10.29. Reading from English class for eight seconds.</td>
<td>10.20. One girl reading Kes in classroom. 10.26. Teacher in classroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>10.37. Mirza: The insecurity is from the main, indigenous</td>
<td>10.30. Young girl reading. 10.33. Girl listening. 10.35. Two girls following.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scene 9</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interview with Mirza.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>population. They feel that maybe we will not treat them as they expect and they don’t try it. So somebody has to make a move,</td>
<td>10.41. Nighat Mirza in room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>we have been making the moves for the past twenty one years. I have lived here for a long time, every time I have moved from</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>one house to another, it is us, it is the black people who have to go and knock on the next door, saying, “We are here, how are you?”. I think now, the time has come that the other population also comes across and say “How do you do, nice day isn’t it?”.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>also comes across and say “How do you do, nice day isn’t it?”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Scene 10</strong></td>
<td><strong>At mixed secondary school including quote from headmaster.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>11.15. Quiet.</td>
<td>11.15. Mixed schools playground, distant shot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>11.22. English headmaster: I am not in favour of separate faith schools. 11.26. Ignatieff: Why is that? 11.29. English headmaster: I think they will be divisive again, umm… I’m all in favour of Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus whatever umm… keeping their traditions, keeping touch with their homeland, however you wish to put it. But err… we’re all living together in a very, multicultural city and we need togetherness. I watch the kids play in my yard here, Muslims with…with their English friends, umm… it means a lot, that’s where we’re going to start</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.40</td>
<td>touch with their homeland, however you wish to put it. But err… we’re all living together in a very, multicultural city and we need 11.47. Kids in playground playing football, camera following game.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>togetherness. I watch the kids play in my yard here, Muslims with…with their English friends, umm…</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>it means a lot, that’s where we’re going to start 12.00. Young</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
winning the battle against racism… English girls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>in schools, in school playgrounds as well as in classrooms. 12.16. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> Rehan Khan is one of twelve Muslim children at Allerton Middle school. It was Rehan’s family that I got to know best in Bradford. 12.11. Asian girl with English friends. 12.18. Asian boy with English friends, camera following.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.20</td>
<td>12.30. <strong>Rehan:</strong> I like to play football so does Daniel and me other friends. Daniel is English and I play with him a lot. So I play with Alastair, Robert, Graham, Paul, Wayne and all the other people in the class.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scene 11</td>
<td><strong>Girls reading Qur’an in Muslim girls school, interview with Mirza and girls in chemistry lessons.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>13.00. <strong>Mirza:</strong> If the woman is not educated, then how is she going to pass on the values to her children and the education they want is not necessarily certificates at the end of it, but moral values which they carry out with them to the world at large and manage to survive with them. 13.18. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> I want to get a sense of the limits to your teaching, umm… we’ve seen a science class, you’re a chemistry teacher. I’m wondering whether there are scientific doctrines or theories that you wouldn’t teach. 13.01. Young girl reading Qur’an in school panning to another reading. 13.19. Another reading. 13.20. Two young girls reading. 13.30. I mean Darwinism, for example, is a controversial issue for Islamic people. 13.35. <strong>Mirza:</strong> We will tell them that there is such a theory around. We’ll also tell them… 13.39. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> There is a theory panning to two more and two more. 13.40. of Darwinism… 13.41. <strong>Mirza:</strong> Darwinism… and we’ll also say to them this is what Qur'an says. This is my belief, as a Muslim, this is what the… this is what the rest of the world believes. We got to understand what other people believe to be able to hold onto what we feel is right. Without that knowledge, then my own belief becomes a little bit shaky because I will not be able to make a decision if what I am is believing is correct. 14.06. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> What does Qur'an say about issues that are covered by the Darwinian theory? How big is the divergence, the difference, between the two theories? 14.13. <strong>Mirza:</strong> Well, Allah said that He 14.19. Girl in chemistry class, doing test-tube</td>
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<td>14.20</td>
<td>saying that we have come together as matter. There is a lot of difference and I believe I was created the way I am now, and I have not evolved from err... a development process. 14.33. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: So that you teach the two, but at the end of the day, it’s your wish as a devout believer that Muslim girls will end up believing as the Qur'an teaches them, surely. 14.44. <strong>Mirza</strong>: If we do our teaching right, yes. I am sure that they will. 14.48. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: Well then, can they be good scientists? 14.51. <strong>Mirza</strong>: I am a chemistry teacher, I think that my belief has not interfered with what I do in a science lesson. What it does make me appreciate is, yes, there is something there, there is a God, there is some Controller. And it makes me admire and become more close to Allah, rather than take me away from that.</td>
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<td>14.50</td>
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<td>15.50</td>
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<td>16.27</td>
<td>Announcer for demonstration against Rushdie for about 10 seconds in Urdu.</td>
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<td>16.30</td>
<td>Ignatieff: You’re making this as a tactical move, because</td>
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<td>16.40</td>
<td>you know that incitement to racial hatred is an absolute no, no. Even the free speech people on… on my side would be with you if you could prove that it incited to racial hatred, and that’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>definitely true. If you could prove to me that it makes, you know, white citizens, or non-Asian, or non-Islamic citizens of Bradford hate Muslims, I would definitely be with you. But I don’t see it,</td>
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<td>16.50</td>
<td>Panning up wall with NF on it. 16.55. Two Asian men standing on street. 16.59. Imam dressed in <em>shalwar kameez</em> in front of car.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>Shabbir, I just don’t see it?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scene 14</td>
<td><strong>Akhtar and Ignatieff at table. Interrupted visually by shots of Bradford.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>17.04</td>
<td>Akhtar: Well, ok, let’s suppose… let’s take an ordinary non-Muslim reading <em>The Satanic Verses</em>. what would his first reaction be? It would be an interesting question to ask. I think that someone who read this book without an adequate knowledge of Islam, and that’s the majority of the people in this country naturally, would tend to see in it certain stereotypes and stereotypical images of Muhammad, and of the Islamic faith in general, err… reinforced in an artistic mode. He has portrayed enough… The book does actually revive the image of the medieval idea that nothing can explain the phenomenal success of Islam other than the work of the devil. 17.43. Ignatieff: But the only protection you have is to get up out of your chairs and march down the street and say to the citizens of Bradford, citizens of the world, “I’ve had enough, can’t stand it”. And you’ve done that. What other protection do you want? That’s what I don’t understand. 17.56. Akhtar: Well, the protection would be, that like the government banned the Observer, we’d like to have the book banned. I don’t see if the government can do… 18.01. Ignatieff: But if you ban… if you ban Rushdie’s book, you then begin to infringe on the rights of those like me, who like to buy it. 18.08. Akhtar: Yeah, but by the same token, one could say that umm… the liberal inquisition as</td>
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<td>Time</td>
<td>Scene 15</td>
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<td>18.20</td>
<td>Akhtar:</td>
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<td>18.30</td>
<td>Ignatieff:</td>
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<td>18.40</td>
<td>Ignatieff:</td>
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<td>18.50</td>
<td>Akhtar:</td>
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<td>19.40</td>
<td>has come from an external source. 19.44. <strong>Rehan</strong>: Oh great, Neighbours is on.</td>
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<td>20.00</td>
<td>20.07. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: I go back with Rehan to watch <em>Neighbours</em> at his uncle’s house. Three brothers and their families plus the grandparents live in one street and they’re in and out of each other’s houses all day. No one I know in London lives in an extended family and I was drawn to its warmth. But I was worried that it might suffocate these kids one day. Everyday in the classroom and on TV, Rehan is learning to want things that may lead him to break with his Islamic past. Keeping a faith in the media age isn’t going to be easy.</td>
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<td>his uncle’s house. Three brothers and their families plus the grandparents live in one street and they’re in and out of each other’s houses all day. No one I know in London lives in an extended family and I was drawn to its warmth. But I was worried that it might suffocate these kids one day. Everyday in the classroom and on TV, Rehan is learning to want things that may lead him to break with his Islamic past. Keeping a faith in the media age isn’t going to be easy.</td>
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<td>may lead him to break with his Islamic past. Keeping a faith in the media age isn’t going to be easy.</td>
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<td>20.40</td>
<td>20.40. Quiet. 20.45. <strong>Moira Stuart</strong> on the news: Iran’s interior minister has called for an economic boycott of Britain over the Salman ‘Rushdie affair’. Iran wants the issue raised tomorrow at the meeting of the Islamic Conference Organisation in Saudi Arabia.</td>
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<td>20.50</td>
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<td>21.00</td>
<td>in Kuwait, the Prince and Princess of Wales have arrived… 21.03. Family eating dinner. 21.07. <strong>Arshad</strong> (father): Did anybody come to your school talking about this book? 21.09. <strong>Rehan</strong>: Yeah.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Action/Dialogue</td>
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<td>21.18</td>
<td>Whole family eating together.</td>
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<td>21.20</td>
<td><strong>Younger brother</strong>: Umm… <em>maulvi</em>. <strong>Arshad</strong>: <em>Maulvi</em> came? What did he say? <strong>Younger brother</strong>: He… he said he’s stupid. <strong>Arshad</strong>: What is stupid? The book is. <strong>Younger brother</strong>: No. Salman Rushdie is stupid.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.30</td>
<td><strong>Arshad</strong>: Rushdie is stupid. <strong>Younger brother</strong>: He brought this kind of monster in and said it’s Salman Rushdie. 21.35. <strong>Arshad</strong>: A monster? That’s very good. That’s very good. Has he told you about the book though?</td>
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<td>21.40</td>
<td><strong>Younger brother</strong>: Yeah, he gave us this little paper. <strong>Arshad</strong>: Yeah, and what did it say in the book? <strong>Younger brother</strong>: Loads of dirty stuff. <strong>Arshad</strong>: Dirty stuff? 21.49. <strong>Grandfather</strong>: These are instances like the… Peter Wright’s book. They spend millions of taxpayers money to ban that book coming into this country. What does the freedom of expression come there? 22.06. <strong>Arshad</strong>: There is no question about me leaving here. This is our country, we’ve got nowhere to go back so don’t… I don’t think anyone should be threatening us, you know, if you want to live here. As though we’ve got a choice, we have no choice. This is our country, we’re gonna live here and we want to live here with dignity. We know how to behave, we’ve been behaving for the last thirty years. We’ve been here thirty years? And there’s two million of us. Each one of us is offended on the issue and yet the government is not doing anything.</td>
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<td>22.30</td>
<td><strong>Ignatieff and Arshad travelling in car to restaurant, intermixed with interview with Rehan and cousins.</strong></td>
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<td>22.30</td>
<td>22.30. <strong>Quiet.</strong></td>
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<td>22.40</td>
<td>22.40. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: Every evening, Arshad, Rehan’s uncle and the oldest brother in the family goes out and visits one of the three restaurants he owns in the Bradford area. He never tells the staff Ignatieff and Arshad get into car.</td>
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<td>22.50</td>
<td>which one he’s going to visit. The one I’m driving him to is in Harrogate, forty miles away. 22.57. <strong>Quiet (in car).</strong></td>
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<td>23.00</td>
<td>23.02. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: Yours was an arranged marriage. 23.01. <strong>Arshad and...</strong></td>
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<td>23.10</td>
<td>just the difference. 23.11. Pause. 23.13. Arshad: What... well, in my particular case, what happened was that umm... I married my first cousin. And my mother...I mean, I... I'd known her, because she's my</td>
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<td>23.20</td>
<td>first cousin, I'd known her, I'd seen her. I'd met her, she... she knew me. And my... my parents thought it would make a good match. And they arranged it with my uncle and my auntie who</td>
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<td>23.30</td>
<td>are my sort of err... father and mother-in-law. And it was done, and I went to Pakistan and got married and brought her over here. I mean she's been to England in the last ten years, three or</td>
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<td>23.40</td>
<td>four times, visiting on, you know, school leave and stuff like that. So we knew each other and she knew me pretty well. But I</td>
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<td>23.50</td>
<td>mean we didn’t have a... an affair or we didn’t sort of err... go out together or we didn’t sort of err... I wasn’t courting her or</td>
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<td>24.00</td>
<td>anything. I just got married and I brought her over and then, you know, from then on we have been living as husband and wife.</td>
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<td>24.10</td>
<td>24.10. Rehan: Me and me cousin as you know, and she’s my auntie. And I’ve got... her mum is my auntie, her dad is my</td>
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<td>24.20</td>
<td>uncle. Her husband’s my uncle as well. And my granddad... my granddad is me mum’s dad and mum, gran... granddad and me</td>
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<tr>
<td>24.30</td>
<td>grandma. And me grandam’s son’s me uncle as well. 24.34. 24.36. Arshad: We have to have a very strong Muslim identity.</td>
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<td>24.40</td>
<td>You know, our women, have to be dressed in a positively Muslim way with the hijab. If you start compromising, then there is nobody higher... then no one has an idea where it’s going to</td>
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<td>24.50</td>
<td>end up. So, if you draw the line right from the very start... 24.54. 24.59. Ignatieff: But you’re...</td>
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<td>25.00</td>
<td>we’re driving to a restaurant where you’re selling alcohol? So what... are you saying that the line’s gonna change for you now? 25.07. Arshad: The line for me, yeah, as far... as far as I’m concerned, I’m...</td>
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<td>25.10</td>
<td>I’m already considering ways of getting out of it. I mean, if you... if you want to ask me as to why... what I’m doing at a personal level, this ‘Rushdie affair’, although I’ve been involved in</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.20</td>
<td>this business for the last three or four years. I’m… it’s been in the back of my mind but there are certain things that I want to do now. I mean… I want to… my kids are growing up, I’ve got one</td>
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<td>25.30</td>
<td>daughter, my wife is expecting. I want to be teaching them a version of Islam which is not compromised, which… which does not say that, yes, daddy is selling alcohol because he is making a living. But I want to say it’s wrong and I’m not doing it. 25.48. <strong>Rehan:</strong> I’d like to be a football player.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.40</td>
<td><strong>Ignatieff:</strong> Who do you want to play for? <strong>Rehan:</strong> Bradford city. <strong>Younger brother:</strong> Be an engineer, engineerer… for planes and</td>
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<td>25.50</td>
<td>err… fighter planes like in the RAF. I’d like to go in tha’ and be an engineerer. <strong>Younger sister:</strong> I know something else that I might be. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> What’s that? <strong>Younger sister:</strong> A mechanic.</td>
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<td>26.00</td>
<td>if it comes to just pulling the trigger, I assure you there will be a lot of people in Britain who will do that. Because, I mean, the Muslims, you know, if they’re provoked err… enough, they</td>
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<td>26.30</td>
<td>wouldn’t need somebody from Iran to come and pull the trigger for them. There will be people inside Belgium, people inside Britain for that matter, who would say “Fine, this has to be done”, and they would go ahead and do it. Regardless of the consequences, so Khomeini has not tried to frighten people into following him. It’s been quite the opposite, he has just given a</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.50</td>
<td>verdict. I think it must have been in the back of his mind that he will just give a verdict and all the other verdicts will follow.</td>
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<td>27.00</td>
<td>And then… 27.01. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> Arshad, what are you saying to me? Are you saying to me that if it came to it, you would be prepared to pull the trigger on Rushdie?</td>
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<tr>
<td>27.10</td>
<td>I mean, talking seriously? 27.12. <strong>Arshad:</strong> I am talking seriously, yeah, if it came to it and we were face to face… who knows? 27.19. <strong>Ignatieff:</strong> What do you</td>
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<td>27.20</td>
<td>mean who knows? 27.21. <strong>Arshad:</strong> I… I’m saying who knows? I might pull the trigger, yes because I am offended by what he has written, deeply offended by what</td>
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<td>27.30</td>
<td>he has written, and I’m not the only one. I mean, these peo… these kids, young kids who are</td>
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shouting on the streets, you know, “Kill Rushdie”, they’re not shouting cos it’s just a slogan, they mean it. Because… 27.39. **Ignatieff:** Are you saying that

| 27.40 | because you feel it or because you feel that there’s a… that that’s what you’re supposed to say? 27.46. **Arshad:** No, I’m not saying anything |

| 27.50 | that I’m supposed to say. I’m saying that this man has deeply offended me, he has hurt me, he has hurt me by ridiculing and making fun of things that I respect, I hold very dear to and… he |

| 28.00 | is basically… basking in publicity and in… in the wealth that he has gathered from this and the fact that now he is living in fear, I think is the price that he’s paying. Because… because Imam |

| 28.10 | Khomeini’s fatwa, I think to sum extent, was to frighten him as well. To sum extent, if Imam Khomeini wants to kill somebody, I mean, I don’t know whether he does or not, but if he did, |

| 28.20 | surely, if he is as awesome and powerful as the Western media make him out to be, he… he… he wouldn’t need to give out a fatwa. He would have just sent some people to get rid of Rushdie |

| 28.30 | and then Rushdie would have been dead without anybody knowing about |

| 28.40 | it. 28.41. **Ignatieff:** But Arshad, are you really thinking about what you’re saying here? You’re saying that when someone gives you |

| 28.50 | offence and when someone hurts your feelings, it’s right to threaten them, it’s right to frighten them and at the limit it’s right to kill them, is that what you’re saying to me? 28.50. Zooming back to include |

| 29.00 | 29.00. **Arshad:** I’m not saying that. What I am saying is that this man has offended my feelings and if… if I was to make the case to him, he should be made aware that he has offended a lot of |

| 29.10 | people, he has offended nearly a billion Muslims all over the world. 29.15. **Ignatieff:** Well, you’ve done that, but you don’t need to do it by threatening his life? 29.19. **Arshad:** No, no, but |

| 29.20 | he… he has not even come out to apologise. The man has not even unequivoc… not a single unequivococal apology has come either from him or the publishers. 29.29. **Ignatieff:** But why |

| 29.30 | don’t you see it as a matter of principle on his side? You say that you have a principle on your side, and I’ve come to Bradford to find out about it and I accept that there’s a principle on your side, |

| 29.40 | believe me. But why do you have such trouble accepting there’s a principle on his side? He’s a |
man who’s written a book, he takes the words he writes very seriously, he didn’t do it by accident, that’s precisely why you’re excited and angry about it. Well, he is prepared to defend his principle of writing freely as he chooses as to the end and that it seems to me is entitled to respect. 30.02. Restaurant music.

**Scene 17**  
**Ignatieff talking to workers in restaurant.**

30.09  
30.09. Wok with food in restaurant, panning across different dishes.

30.10  

30.20  

30.30  
30.32. **Ignatieff**: But what if I said to you that, it’s the sentence you began with “I think what everybody thinks”. Isn’t there a lot of pressure in the Muslim community to say just what you’ve said? If you said to me, “I think Salman Rushdie is actually a great guy, I think it’s a terrific book but don’t tell anybody”, then back to waiter.

30.40  
31.00  
31.10

30.50  
you’d be in trouble, right? 30.52. **Waiter**: I certainly would. I mean the people around me, I mean they wouldn’t agree with me, they’d just look at me and say “Right!” . 30.56. **Ignatieff**: Out! 30.56. **Waiter**: Yeah, he’s a black sheep. You know, they wouldn’t agree at all. Anybody who says anything about the book that doesn’t agree with what people have already said or done, you know, he’s just cast… out, you know, they won’t agree with him at all. I mean if I was to turn around and tell the papers or I can tell you, “Oh, the book is great, he’s a great guy!” You know, “I think he should write another one!” and that, I don’t think it will work very well. 31.22. **Ignatieff**: Certainly, not work for you. 31.24. **Waiter**: No, it wouldn’t. That’s right. 31.26. **Ignatieff**: But doesn’t it make you a little uncomfortable that you can’t…? I mean aren’t you saying that I can’t think for myself?

31.30  
before he wrote the book he should have thought…
31.39. **Ignatieff**: I’m asking about you,

<table>
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<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>31.40</td>
<td>I mean are you really free to say what you wanna say here? 31.47. <strong>Waiter</strong>: I think he’s done wrong. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: You think he has. <strong>Waiter</strong>: Yeah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.50</td>
<td><strong>Ignatieff</strong>: You really do. 31.51. <strong>Waiter</strong>: I really do. That’s my point of view, I think he’s done wrong. I mean, anybody… everybody else is saying it but I’m not saying cos they’re saying it. I’m saying it cos I’ve actually read the book, and I think it’s wrong. 31.59. Music.</td>
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<tr>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>32.02. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: The Home secretary gave a speech in Birmingham a while ago, telling Muslims to behave in a society… to fit in, 32.00. Chefs at work in kitchen. 32.03. Dish being cooked. 32.05. <strong>Ignatieff</strong> and waiter.</td>
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<td>32.10</td>
<td>what was your reaction to that speech? 32.13. <strong>Waiter 2</strong>: Well, I was quite annoyed actually. I mean for the past twenty. Thirty years we’ve been behaving and for this small reason, you know, he goes and tells all the Muslims off, and you should behave otherwise you’ll be put on the next ship home – which is wrong. We’re all legal. You know, I’m just as British as you are… 32.31. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: Sure, you’re more British than I am cos I’m a Canadian! 32.36. <strong>Waiter 2</strong>: The only difference between you and me is, right, the colour of our skin. We’re black and you’re white, this is what it all boils down to in the end. You know, we… we work here, we pay taxes, everything. And then at the end of the day we’re called immigrants which is not right. 32.45. <strong>Dishes being taken out of kitchen.</strong></td>
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<td>32.50</td>
<td>32.54. <strong>Akhtar</strong>: Christianity has not produced err… the kind of quality of allegiance that Islam has. Because what you’ve got to remember is that Islam, even in the twentieth century, manages to produce a discrepantly large number of martyrs which Christianity doesn’t. I think that actually is some measure of enthusiasm in a faith: to what extent people are prepared at a crisis point to give their lives, it’s not an easy thing to do. And I think that Islam, the fact that it manages to do that so routinely, is to its… 33.19. <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: Why is martyrdom such a value in Islam? Why… why… 33.23. <strong>Akhtar</strong>: Well, it’s a value in Christianity too. It used to be a 33.29. <strong>Zooming back to Ignatieff.</strong></td>
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**Scene 18**

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<tr>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>century, manages to produce a discrepantly large number of martyrs which Christianity doesn’t. I think that actually is some measure of enthusiasm in a faith: to what extent people are</td>
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<td>33.20</td>
<td>a value in Islam? Why… why… 33.23. <strong>Akhtar</strong>: Well, it’s a value in Christianity too. It used to be a 33.29. <strong>Zooming back to Ignatieff.</strong></td>
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<td>Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>33.30</td>
<td>value in liberalism as well.</td>
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<tr>
<td>33.30</td>
<td><strong>Ignatieff</strong>: But giving your life is almost a definition of fanatical surrender of personal judgement on certain views.</td>
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<td>33.40</td>
<td><strong>Akhtar</strong>: Is there anything you’d be willing to kill for? <strong>Ignatieff</strong>: If err... by some ghastly mischance, this became a theocratic Islamic state. I would frankly fight, not only to be an agnostic minority, but err... I’d fight to protect the rights</td>
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<td>33.50</td>
<td>of... I would have fought against the Germans in the Second World War, I would have fought against the... err... I would</td>
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<td>34.00</td>
<td>fight against the Soviet state. Simply, on the same grounds that my freedom to have wayward and difficult opinions is... is worth</td>
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<td>34.10</td>
<td>fighting for. I think Hitler threatened everything, I think Stalin threatened everything and I have to say the Ayatollah Khomeini</td>
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<td>34.20</td>
<td>threatens everything. I don’t equate the three. They’re different phenomena but he threatens everything that I stand for and</td>
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<td>34.30</td>
<td>believe. Err... if he was simply a religious teacher who held his views and confined them to the Iranian state and to his particular</td>
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<tr>
<td>34.40</td>
<td>branch of the Moslem faith, no problem, no problem at all. But he’s a man, who is calling for holy war against the Western</td>
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<td>34.50</td>
<td>world, against secularism, and I’m a convinced secularist, so he’s making war on me and he stands for everything I oppose. He’s also threatening an author, a writer, a member of my own trade.</td>
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<td>35.00</td>
<td>He’s threatening him with death, he’s ruined the man’s life. He is... he is anathema to me and if it came to a fight, indeed, I would fight the Ayatollah.</td>
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<td>35.10</td>
<td><strong>Scene 19</strong> Collage of images of Bradford with Ignatieff voice-over.</td>
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<tr>
<td>35.13</td>
<td>35.13. Panning across dump site behind</td>
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<td>35.20</td>
<td>terraced housing. 35.28. Panning across terraced housing to in front of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.30</td>
<td>car with ‘I love Kashmir’ sticker stuck backwards</td>
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35.40 Ignatieff: Does it change my view of the rights of wrongs?

35.50 I think not in the end, I think I come away feeling that the right to publish is such a precious right err… that it must be upheld. I think that there is something tragically symmetrical about the

36.00 principles being defended here. I am defending Salman Rushdie’s right to publish because I believe the word is sacred. It’s not because I believe freedom is sacred, but a writer’s

36.10 imagination for me is a… not a sacred thing but is such an important thing it must be defended at all costs. They on their side are defending a principle that sounds very similar, which is

36.20 the Word is holy, the Holy Word of the Qur’an is holy. You can’t make this into novels. You can’t make this into blasphemous speculations about the sexual life of the Prophet, praise be his

36.30 name. You see, both of us are defending a conception of the word as being tremendously important. The only good thing that has come out of this affair is the sense that all of us, secular

36.40 liberals and Muslims, have rediscovered words count. What goes on a page matters, people can be so offended by it that they’re prepared to die for it. People can be so committed to its defence

36.50 that they’re willing to spend the rest of their lives in… in solitary confinement, which is what will happen to Salman Rushdie if things don’t change.

37.00 Scene 20 Akhtar at table.

37.03 Akhtar: I think the discussion with Michael was very useful, in terms of mapping areas where we agreed and in

37.10 making me have some sense of where he stands, as it were. What are the principles, if you like, which are motivating him to take the stands he’s having. Cos I mean, part of the problem is that as

37.20 Michael himself admits, is the kind of mutual incomprehension, people talking at cross purposes and a lot of that’s been happening. So for me it’s been a truly informative experience.
| 37.30  | 37.30. **Interviewer:** You didn’t convince him did you, that the book should be banned? 37.33.**Akhtar:** Probably not, but equally he didn’t convince me of err… the opposite opinion. 37.38. **Ignatieff:** There are |

| Scene 21 | **Counter-posing images of Akhtar and Ignatieff.** |

| 37.39  | such things as radical, |

| 37.40  | complete disagreements. A liberal who walks around thinking that everything can be fudged, we can all be good friends, we can all be brothers, we can all get inside each other’s heads. |

| 37.50  | As I said to Shabbir at the end of this is that what multiculturalism comes down to is getting inside the head of someone from another culture, another world. And if you think |

| 38.00  | that’s easy, you got another think coming. And this society, I think, has tended to delude itself by a lot of loose, empty and unthinking rhetoric about multiculturalism. Everybody’s |

| 38.10  | brother… in favour of brotherhood, and when… but when push comes to shove as it has in this affair, we’re not such brothers as we thought. 38.16. 38.17. 17.13 to Manchester is approximately 10 minutes late. 17.13 to Manchester is approximately 10 minutes late. |

| 38.20  | to focus on Akhtar looking out of window. |

| 38.30  | 38.30. Asian music ending. |

| 38.40  | 38.40. |

| 38.50  | 38.50. Finish. | 38.50. Finish. |
Appendix (viii)

A summary of the five programmes

The Late Show, 22 February 1989

The Late Show was a late night arts discussion programme shown almost daily during the week on BBC2. This particular programme was shown in the immediate aftermath of the fatwa, about a week after the fatwa was issued. It was hosted by Michael Ignatieff, himself an author, and consisted of two sections. The first section involved three short interviews with authors from America and Europe. The second section consisted of a discussion with six panellists, each panellist representing a certain viewpoint in the affair.

The first section involved interviews taken by Michael Ignatieff with three authors. The first was with Norman Mailer, an American novelist, the second with Edward Said, an American university professor of literature, and the third with George Steiner, a European author. The first interview conducted with Norman Mailer began with a discussion of the latest developments in America where three book chains had decided to withdraw the book from sale. Writers in America had conducted a public meeting to protest against this and Norman Mailer was amongst them. The points of discussion were: Why are the American writers protesting about the withdrawal of the book? Will the book be put back onto display? Can the writers not understand the outrage felt by Muslims on this issue? What do the writers think of the booksellers?

The second interview was conducted with George Steiner, a European author. This interview also involved a discussion on the possibility of the German and French publishers cancelling their publication of the book. This interview covered the following main points: What is your view of the book? Why has the Islamic world taken such an offence? Does the secular world read texts differently to the Islamic world? Has the Islamic world proved that books are the most important things in the world? Have the French and German publishers decided to cancel their publication of the book? How do you feel about the book not being published in certain parts of Europe?

The third interview was with Edward Said. The points covered in this interview were: What is your opinion of the book? What is it about the book that makes it postmodern? Why do you think it gives deep offence to the Muslim community? Do you think Rushdie was irresponsible to have written the book?

The programme then shifted to a discussion between studio guests. Six persons, each representing a different perspective, were invited onto the programme. These were in the words of Ignatieff, “the English writer, Ian McEwan; the Muslim and feminist writer, Fadia Faqir; the exiled Iranian journalist and writer, Shusha Guppy; the professor of Islamic literature at Exeter University, Aziz Al-Azmeh; the chairman of the Islamic society for the promotion of religious tolerance, Dr Hessam El-Essawy; and representing the Bradford Council of Mosques, Dr Shabbir Akhtar”. Michael Ignatieff himself was the chair of the discussion. Of the discussants, two were representing the Muslim case (though to different degrees): Essawy and Akhtar.
Michaelf Ignatieff and Ian McEwan were representing the writer’s case, and the rest fell in between these two polarities of the debate at different levels of the spectrum.

The discussion began with Ignatieff asking each person their view of the book and their view on the banning of the book. A variety of opinions were given here, Akhtar said that the book should be withdrawn from publication whereas all the others said that it shouldn’t. There were differences in opinion on the merits of the book. Akhtar said it was an “inferior piece of literature” and McEwan described it as a “fabulous mosaic”. Ignatieff then asked Akhtar why the Muslim community viewed the book as an attack on its identity? Akhtar’s response was that the book is seen as abusive and vulgar.

Ignatieff then asked McEwan whether he thought that the fictional form is perceived as a threat by the Muslim community. McEwan’s response suggested that he thought that there was an inherent tension between a literary tradition which is sceptical of truths and enclosed systems which claim truth. Azmeh, when asked the same question, said that religious bodies “do not admit parodying”. There then followed a discussion on the Qur'an as a piece of literature, and the relationship that the Qur'an has with other literary works.

This is then followed by a discussion which is related to the previous discussion, which asked the question whether the global Islamic community felt that its faith was threatened by the novel? Answers were given to this question by Guppy, Akhtar and Essawy. Guppy expressed surprise that the Muslim community felt threatened by the novel, whereas Essawy denied this being the case. Akhtar made the remark that such precedents should not be permitted if a religion wishes to maintain its internal integrity. Ignatieff then enquired of Essawy and Akhtar whether they would they have been as equally offended if the writer had been a non-Muslim? They both answered that they would not have been as equally offended.

The panel then moved on to discuss the issue of tolerance and free speech. Ignatieff began by asking Essawy how he defined tolerance within the Islamic tradition. He then asked Faqir how she, as a Muslim writer, dealt with the issue of free speech while remaining within a tradition. This led on to a discussion on free speech within British society and its limitations. McEwan and Akhtar, representing both opposites of the spectrum on the debate, contributed to this part of the discussion.

The discussion then ended with Ignatieff asking everyone how they thought that the gap between the Muslim and non-Muslim community could be bridged. Akhtar suggested that the press should print a defence of the “virtues of fundamentalism”. Azmeh suggested that the Muslim community should not be subject to generalisation. Faqir suggested that Islam should be studied and any crude distinctions resulting in polarisations should not be used. McEwan argued against the death threat and asked for a “coherent, intellectually argued position for fundamentalism”. Guppy, similarly, suggested dialogue. Essawy suggested that old prejudices should be left behind. The discussion ends here.

Dr Essawy did not give his opinion on the banning of the book at this particular part of the discussion, but he did do so later in the programme.
The second programme to be used for this study is, in a way, a continuation from the previous programme. It was also hosted by Michael Ignatieff. It was aired on television two and a half months after the death threat, and three and a half months after the book burning in Bradford. The introduction to the programme leads on from the end of the previous programme in which Akhtar of the Bradford Council of Mosques had argued that Western liberals had “never taken the trouble to truly understand Islam”. So Ignatieff “decided to take up the challenge” by visiting the Muslim community in Bradford.

The programme is constructed as a documentary. There are several parts to the documentary which are interwoven throughout the programme. These parts include a table conversation/dialogue between Ignatieff and Akhtar at Akhtar’s home, a group discussion involving Muslim teenage girls, an interview with the headteacher of Muslims girls’ school, an interview with an English headmaster of a local comprehensive and participant observation by Ignatieff while he has close association with a Muslim family. Ignatieff provided a commentary on the issues under discussion throughout the programme.

The programme began with an introduction by Ignatieff. In this introduction, Ignatieff summarised the ‘Rushdie affair’ up to the date of the programme. The programme began with a playing of a recorded speech by Douglas Hurd, who was at the time, Home Secretary. The speech and the introductory comments by Ignatieff highlighted the conflict of interests that the ‘Rushdie affair’ raised for the British Muslim community and the conflict of values that resulted. This was followed by an example of such a clash of values in which Akhtar and Ignatieff discuss the role of Rushdie as an individual in the whole affair.

The programme then moved on to discuss the book itself and the issue of its offensive nature. A group of young Muslim women are taken as an example of the Bradford Muslim community and they offered their reasons why they found the book to be offensive. Akhtar and Ignatieff then discussed the difficulties faced by a Muslim community living in Britain, especially with regard to the maintenance of its religious values. This is in part connected to the next part of the discussion in which they both discuss how the Muslim community should have responded to the publication of the book.

The discussion concerning the maintenance of religious values led onto the issue of education, and specifically, how the Muslim community aimed to preserve its identity. Ignatieff visited a Muslim girls’ school to examine these issues. He examined the implications of such education for a multicultural city like Bradford by discussing some of these implications with an English headmaster of a local comprehensive.

The programme then moved back to Akhtar’s home as Akhtar and Ignatieff discuss the issue of freedom of expression and its limits. Ignatieff then moved on to examine how a Muslim family was dealing with the issues of maintaining their identity in Britain. He explored the tensions faced by their uncle, Arshad, since he sold alcohol.
in his restaurant, and he explored how the children are responding to the ‘Rushdie affair’.

Ignatieff then travelled with Arshad to his restaurant. He asked him on the way to the restaurant whether he would be willing to kill Rushdie. Arshad answered that he would, and the discussion revolved around this issue. He asked Arshad further whether his answer was the result of pressure from the community which was a theme that he explored further at the restaurant.

The programme then returned to Akhtar’s home. Akhtar and Ignatieff discussed the value of martyrdom, and both agreed that they would fight for their beliefs. This highlighted the tension between the two positions, which was the point on which the programme ended. Ignatieff ended the programme by saying that the ‘Rushdie affair’ involved radical disagreements, and that the project of multiculturalism had made some assumptions about mutual inter-community understanding which were difficult to achieve.

**Iranian Nights, 20 May 1989**

*Iranian nights* was a play written by Howard Brenton and Tariq Ali which opened on the 19th of April at the Royal Court Theatre in London for a two week run. It was then broadcast on Channel Four on 20th May 1989. It was written as a response to the cultural crisis caused by the ‘Rushdie affair’. The following is a summary of the play.

The play began in the courtroom of an Oriental king. He had around him Omar Khayyam, a poet, and Sheherezade, a story-teller. The play began with Omar Khayyam relating the story of a young Persian scholar who had become a heretic and who was then tried for writing books “which tore at the faith of the imams”. The scholar was killed in open court. The poet and the story-teller began to tell stories to the king from *One Thousand and One Nights*. They began with stories about lust. The king then asked them to narrate a moral story.

They narrated a story which is synonymous with the recent political history of Iran. A holy man overthrew a tyrant and became the leader of Persia. He fought war after war, and then wishing to unite his people, he issued a death threat against a poet in a far-off land. The poet then decided to travel towards Persia to talk to the holy man. The poet tried to convince the holy man but failed, and then decided to ask some questions. He asked why Islam is unable to progress like other religions? He failed to convince the holy man. He then asked more questions, all of these questions pointed to discrepancies in the holy man’s position. This story ended here. They then recounted another story of lust. The king then asked to hear some sayings of the Prophet, which are recounted. The king then said that he is tired of his tyranny and decided to migrate to Bradford, England.

The play shifted to a scene in England in which a father and son were discussing the book burning protest. The father tried to appease the son, but the son was adamant on the importance of his Islamic commitments. The father expressed his despair at his son, not understanding how he has become like this. The son recounted a story from his days at university where he received racial harassment. The son said that he turned to his faith to avoid such humiliation. The son then discussed his pride in his
faith and how this pride helped him. He then derided his father for not practising Islam. The conversation ended when the father referred the son to his own hypocrisy as he was a pimp for Arab friends. The scene changed, and the son answered a phone call in which a friend from university contacted him and arranged a deal between him and American drug distributors. The play ended with a speech by Sheherezade about the tensions faced by immigrants living in a different society.

**Hypotheticals, 30 May 1989**

*Hypotheticals* was a programme broadcast on ITV at 10.35 p.m. on the 30th May 1989. It involved the construction of a scenario in which seventeen participants were invited to discuss a hypothetical scenario and to act out certain roles (which were not that different from their every day life roles) within this scenario. The participants were chosen to cover the spectrum of debate on the issue. A lawyer was chosen to moderate the proceedings. The participants were Yusuf Islam, formerly Cat Stevens; Shabbir Akhtar, representing the Bradford Council of Mosques; Kalim Siddiqui, Muslim Institute; Fay Weldon, writer; Max Madden, MP for Bradford West; Michael Day, Commission for Racial Equality; Jack Acton, Superintendent, West Yorkshire police; Merlyn Rees, former Home Secretary; Matthew Evans, chairman, Faber and Faber; Michael Winner, film director and producer; Farrukh Dhondy, commissioning editor, Channel Four; Alan King-Hamilton QC, retired Judge; Andreas Whittam-Smith, editor, the Independent; Tim Waterstone, Waterstones & Co. Booksellers; Gita Sahgal, reporter, Bandung File, Channel Four; and Dr Michael Plint, chairman, Plint and Partners.

The scenario began in a restaurant with Yusuf Islam, Shabbir Akhtar and Kalim Siddiqui (all representing the Muslim community) dining in a restaurant. They noticed Salman Rushdie in the restaurant dining with Fay Weldon (representing the right to publish). Michael Day was also dining in the restaurant with Max Madden (both representing a view that is sympathetic to the Muslim community but at the same time acknowledge the right of freedom to write for the author). Yusuf Islam, Akhtar and Siddiqui were all asked how they would respond to Rushdie’s presence in the restaurant and whether they would kill Rushdie. All three said that they would not kill Rushdie, then Robertson asked whether they would prevent someone else killing Rushdie? This issue was connected to the issue of obeying British law, and whether the Muslim representatives were prepared to disobey British law in order to follow Islamic law. Robertson then asked Reverend Booth-Clibborn, Day and Madden MP on how they would respond to an attack on Rushdie. The issue here being whether those who express some sympathy for the Muslim case are prepared to defend Rushdie’s life. All three answered positively.

Robertson then began the scenario again, with a manuscript of *The Satanic Verses* being sent to the publisher. Robertson following on from this, proceeded chronologically, through the ‘Rushdie affair’. The first issue to be dealt with was the issue of the writer’s responsibility, and whether a book should be published if it is likely that the book will cause offence to a particular community, and these questions were put to Evans, Weldon, Dhondy and Winner. They answered that a book can still be published though it may cause offence to a particular community. The discussion then moved on to whether a book should be published if it is deemed blasphemous.
The question was asked whether the blasphemy laws should be extended to cover other faiths.

They then discussed the publication of the book, and the protests that followed. Akhtar was asked whether he would protest against the book. He was then asked about the form of protest he would wish to use. Would this include burning books, or burning effigies of Rushdie? The police representative was then asked about the legality of such demonstrations and whether the Muslim community has a right to demonstrate in such a manner and whether this form of protest should be allowed under freedom of speech? The question was also raised here about the benefits gained by protesting in such a manner. Did the Muslim representatives view such protests to be counter-productive? The media’s role was also questioned here, specifically, whether their role was provocative to the affair?

The scenario was moved on as a bomb was thrown at a Waterstone’s book store. The issue being discussed here was whether intimidation against the book sellers would eventually have led to their withdrawing the book? Robertson asked Winner and Weldon the same question about whether intimidation would work, and their response to such a situation. Robertson then moved on to ask how the Muslim community leaders would respond to such a situation, and whether they would seek to escalate or moderate the situation.

Robertson then asked the police representative whether he would allow the National Front to stage a demonstration in support of Salman Rushdie. The police representative replied that he would not allow the National Front to demonstrate because, in his opinion, this would have led to an escalation in the situation. A discussion then developed about the conflicts of competing freedoms that result from such an action.

The penultimate part of the scenario related to the business contracts that certain British businessmen have with Iran. Robertson asked a representative of these businessmen how he would have responded to the affair. He then asked further whether the business man would have been willing to aid the British government pursue its objectives in Iran. A discussion then followed on the extent to which one state should be permitted to interfere with the proceedings of another state.

The final part to the scenario involved a mock trial of The Satanic Verses after the blasphemy law had been extended. Akhtar was asked to give the case for the prosecution and Dhondy was asked to give the case for the defence. Robertson reported the jury as returning a verdict of “Not guilty” and the programme ended here.

*Everyman*, 27 May 1990

Eight individuals were invited from all over Britain to take part in this programme which was broadcast over a year after the death threat. They were from different cultural, religious and social backgrounds. They agreed to live in a remote house where they would live together for four days. They were strangers to each other and held opposing views on the subject of the ‘Rushdie affair’. The programme consisted of edited versions of discussions that they had together over four days.
Of the eight participants, three were practising Muslims: Saima, a university undergraduate from Cheshire; Shabbir, from Blackburn; Tahir from Manchester where he ran a shop selling clothes. A fourth Muslim was not as practising as the others. Peter was a bookseller in Bath. Rashida was a liberal Muslim from London. Ray Scott was a Wiltshire businessman and a free-thinking Christian. Sister Dawn was a Deacon in the Church of England. John Herand was the discussion leader.

The discussion began with the issue of freedom of speech and censorship. Ray stated that it was difficult to define parameters for censorship. This was followed by an explanation by Tahir as to the cause of Muslim discontent, and this was then followed by a discussion on the different forms of response that are available to the Muslim community. They then discussed freedom of speech, and the implications that such freedom entailed. This led on to the final part of this section, in which the participants discussed some possible underlying reasons that could have precipitated the crisis.

The second discussion began with Rashida altering her stance on the book. She noted that after having received some literature from Shabbir she was better able to appreciate the Muslim community’s position. They then discussed the death threat and whether Muslims supported it. This again led on to the question of how the Muslim community should respond to the book. The question was asked whether the Muslim representatives would accept the judgement of British law on this topic.

The third discussion revolved around the way the Muslims felt themselves perceived in British society. The Muslim representatives gave their account of how they felt judged, and then, of how they tried to orientate their actions to take into account such judgements. Rashida, here, talked openly about how she felt she would be perceived by the other Muslims, and her consequent fears of being judged.

The final discussion heard Peter change in his opinion about stocking the book, though the change was not dramatic. The Muslim representatives responded to his change in attitude, all of them positive. The programme then ended with Peter saying that he felt he understood the Muslims more after having “experienced a real relationship” with them.