LOOSE CONTINUITY: THE POST-APARTHEID AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE MOVEMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of PhD, Bloemfontein, South Africa, May 2013
DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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I declare that my thesis consists of 99,873 words (pp. 10–301).

Statement of inclusion of previous work and conjoint work:

In their infancy, the ideas expressed in this thesis – and then particularly in chapters 3, 4 and 5 – were published as part of the following articles or book chapters: Kriel 2006a; 2006b; 2010a; 2010b and 2012 (all listed in the bibliography). In each case, I stipulated that I drew on research that I was doing for my PhD at the LSE, and I acknowledged the guidance of my supervisor as well as the financial assistance of the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission. To a very limited degree, I included material (in reworked format) from the following publications that preceded my PhD study: Kriel 2003; Kriel 2004a and 2004b. This thesis also contains a few paragraphs (no more than 3,000 words) that I wrote, on the basis of research that I conducted without any help, for the South African Language Rights Monitors of 2006 and 2007 (Kriel 2010c and Kriel 2010d). These reports formed part of the South African Language Rights Monitor project, which was sponsored by the Pan South African Language Board. For a brief explanation of my role in the project, cf. footnote 154.
ABSTRACT

What happened to Afrikaner nationalism? Did the end of apartheid spell the end of the nationalism with which it had become synonymous? Was the decade that lay between South Africa’s first universal suffrage elections of 1994 and the collapse of the Afrikaners’ National Party in 2004 the final chapter in the history of Afrikaner nationalism? If so – and that is the question posed in this thesis – how is one to interpret the Afrikaner campaign that gained momentum during that very same decade in defence of Afrikaans – the language that gave the word apartheid to human history?

Contra the lay and scholarly consensus, I argue that Afrikaner nationalism has outlived apartheid. What we are witnessing today, if only in certain elite circles, is not the end of Afrikaner nationalism but its revival. To substantiate this claim, chapter 3 of the thesis develops a definitional and theoretical framework from which I argue in chapters 4 and 5, by means of a diachronical comparison, that the latest movement represents a continuation of the Afrikaner nationalist past. First, however, the scene has to be set. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the political and ideological background without which no analysis would be possible of Afrikaner nationalism’s consecutive language and cultural movements.

It needs to be stressed, though, that while language and cultural activism has the central attention in this study, it also considers the relationship between cultural and political nationalism – both as concepts and as actual movements – and questions the notion of a dichotomy. In seeking a historical explanation for the contemporary Afrikaner movement, I revisit what Kellas regards as the problem that studies of nationalism have classically addressed, namely the relationship between politics, economics and culture “which in any particular case brought about the transition from ethnicity to nationalism”? (1991:35). Focusing on the Afrikaner case, my thesis explores the role of language in these dynamics – something that has not been done in a systematic manner.
Springbokke

Astrale magte op hul bloed
en soute in die grasse het bepaal
dat uit woestyn en vlakte
hulle as één groot trop ontmoet
en dae lank eers in ’n stofwolk maal
tot een meteens koers snuif wat almal vat
en dan geen weerstand duld
dreunend oor veld en bult
waar hoef en horings alles plat
trap en voor hul vaart wegjaag,
elkeen gewillig om sy lyf te gee
dat die trop oor slote en riviere jaag
en onkeerbaar afstort in die see:
‘Ons is geroepe om ’n groot afspraak
met die dood te maak.’

For my mother and my father –
_Die meetsnoere het vir ons in lieflike plekke geval._

And for the man in my life who has always been, to my delight,
a metropolitan among provincials

“That was the river, this is the sea.”
The Waterboys

“It is a kind of continuity, I suppose.”
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This has been a lengthy project. It started in the British Settler city of Port Elizabeth in 2003 with an application for a Commonwealth Scholarship and has since been interrupted by other projects and too many Treks, the last of which brought me to the former Boer Republic capital of Bloemfontein. (And the Treks were always Great – maybe these things are in one’s blood after all). In between, I spent about two and a half years in the erstwhile British imperial capital. Along the way, I have incurred more personal and intellectual debts than I could possibly hope to repay.

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I must also thank John Hutchinson, who works with John on the nationalism programme at the LSE, as well as everyone else who participated in the nationalism workshop between October 2004 and June 2007. I benefited greatly from these seminars. Thanks are also due to the administrative staff of the Government Department at the LSE and to the staff of the Research Degrees Unit.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 10

Chapter 1
Afrikaner nationalism and the state: 1910–1948 ................................................................. 16

1.1 Union without unity ............................................................................................................. 16
1.2 The Hertzog years .............................................................................................................. 29
1.3 Fusion and the birth of “purified” Afrikaner nationalism .................................................. 39
1.4 South Africa at war and Afrikanerdom divided ................................................................. 42
1.5 “South Africa belongs to us!” ........................................................................................... 48

Chapter 2
The land which they once owned and lost again: 1948–1994 ............................................. 62

2.1 Apartheid: the new face of Afrikaner nationalism ............................................................. 62
2.2 The ideology of apartheid .................................................................................................. 70
   2.2.1 The point of departure ................................................................................................. 70
   2.2.2 Contributions from the south ..................................................................................... 72
   2.2.3 The lay of the land to the north ................................................................................. 76
   2.2.4 The nationalist principle qualified and compromised ................................................. 81
2.3 From ideology to policy ...................................................................................................... 84
   2.3.1 Laying the legal foundation of apartheid: from the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act to the Terrorism Act ................................................................. 84
   2.3.2 Resistance against apartheid: from the defiance campaign to the Rivonia trial ........... 94
   2.3.3 Of rising phoenixes and falling flagpoles ..................................................................... 96
2.4 On the banks of the Rubicon, and after the crossing ......................................................... 101

Chapter 3
Language, the new land: The contemporary Afrikaans language movement in theoretical perspective ......................................................................................................................... 111

3.1 Activists for Afrikaans, but no longer Afrikaner nationalists (or so they say): a question of definition .......................................................................................................................... 111
3.2 The philosophical, social and psychological dimensions of nationalism ................. 119
3.3 Nationalism and the nation ............................................................................................... 122
3.4 Nationalist ideologies and language ................................................................................ 126
   3.4.1 Nationalism as ideology .............................................................................................. 126
   3.4.2 The role of language in nationalist ideologies ............................................................ 130
3.5 Nationalist movements and language ............................................................................. 139
   3.5.1 Nationalism as cultural, political and economic activism ........................................ 139
Chapter 4
“A language which makes every modest woman blush”: The contemporary Afrikaans language movement in historical perspective, I .................................................. 173

4.1 A longitudinal approach to understanding Afrikaans language activism .................................................................................................................. 173
4.2 Afrikaans, Afrikaners, and “the Great Debate on nationalism” .......... 179
4.3 Afrikaans’s life as vernacular under VOC rule .................................. 190
  4.3.1 The origins of Afrikaans ............................................................. 190
  4.3.2 The dialects of Afrikaans ............................................................. 197
4.4 The catalyst and the context for Afrikaner nationalism’s “false start”: anglicisation and modernisation ................................................................. 201

Chapter 5
Loose continuity: The contemporary Afrikaans language movement in historical perspective, II ...................................................................................................... 219

5.1 Before apartheid: building a nation from words, monuments and festivals ................................................................................................................. 219
  5.1.1 The first Afrikaans language and cultural activists ...................... 219
  5.1.2 The post-Boer War language and cultural movement .................. 236
  5.1.3 The Afrikaner Broederbond and the FAK, and the Oxwagon Memorial Trek of 1838 ................................................................. 251
5.2 After apartheid: preserving a nation through words, monuments and festival ............................................................................................................. 262
  5.2.1 Of swansongs and new beginnings ............................................ 262
  5.2.2 Reading between the lines ......................................................... 266
  5.2.3 The Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan movement: a new generation of Gustav Prellers? .................................................................................... 270

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 293

Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 296
INTRODUCTION

What has become of Afrikaner nationalism – the force that was born at the turn of the nineteenth century and, by the middle of the twentieth century, had managed to seize full political power in a country where Afrikaners constituted barely twelve percent of the population? What happened to the Afrikaner nationalist movement when apartheid – the one Afrikaans word that requires no translation or explanation – began to crumble in the 1980s? What was the fate of that movement when it finally, after a reign that spanned the entire Cold War period, surrendered control of the South African state to the African National Congress? Did the end of apartheid spell the end of the nationalism with which it had become synonymous? Was the decade that lay between South Africa’s first universal suffrage elections of 1994 and the collapse of the Afrikaners’ National Party in 2004 the final chapter in the history of Afrikaner nationalism? If so – and that is the question posed in this thesis – how is one to interpret the massive campaign that gained momentum during that very same decade in defence of Afrikaans – the language that had given the word apartheid to human history?

The reason why post-apartheid Afrikaans language activism has been called the New or the Third Afrikaans Language Movement is because it has two predecessors, at least according to mainstream historiography: the so-called First and Second Afrikaans Language Movements. During the late 1800s and early 1900s, these movements set themselves the task of cultivating and institutionalising (to use terms that I shall adopt in chapter 3) Afrikaans – the variety of Dutch that was spoken on southern African shores (by colonists, slaves and a considerable section of the indigenous population) since the late 1600s. There was nothing purely linguistic or even purely cultural about the First and Second Afrikaans Movements: the ultimate, expressed aspiration of virtually all the leading language activists was to make Afrikaners – or rather, a united
Afrikaner *volk*¹ – out of white speakers of Afrikaans and to empower this *volk* (and themselves) culturally, economically and, last but not least, politically. Fritz Ponelis (arguably Afrikaans’s Noam Chomsky and also, together with Vic Webb, Afrikaans’ William Labov) puts it plainly: “The Afrikaans language was employed to mobilise [its white speakers] against British domination and to seize power from the hands of their English-speaking co-citizens” (1998:19).

The First Afrikaans Language Movement had its birth in 1875 as the *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* [Society of True Afrikaners]. Carried, for the most part, by two brothers, the project eventually lost momentum, yet not before the way was paved for the Second Afrikaans Language Movement. The latter emerged in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)² and culminated two decades later in the recognition of Afrikaans as a co-official language of the Union of South Africa (alongside of English). Unlike its forerunner, the Second Language Movement was successful in its endeavour to transform Afrikaans into a standardised written language equipped for modernity and urbanity.

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¹ There is not a book on Afrikaner nationalism in the English language that does not complain in a footnote about the near-impossible task of translating “the Afrikaner nationalist lexicon” (O’Meara 1996:xxi), and then especially the word *volk*, into English. Linguists, regarding the claims that are sometimes made about the nature of languages, may blush. Dan O’Meara, to mention but one example, suggests that one of the features of Afrikaans that enables “blunt, muscular” political discourse in the language is the fact that it has no fewer than six diminutive suffixes (1996:xxi). When it comes to the word *Afrikanervolk*, though, O’Meara is right: a direct translation as “Afrikaner nation” is inadequate. Part of the problem is that the Afrikaans language has a synonym of Romance origin for *volk* (as it has for many words of Germanic origin), namely *nasie*. Yet these two words are not absolute synonyms: *volk* has acquired connotations of organic ethnic unity that *nasie* (which can accurately be translated as “nation”) lacks. Since this primordialism implicit in the term *volk* is lost when *Afrikanervolk* is translated as “Afrikaner nation”, authors such as O’Meara prefer to retain the Afrikaans word. The disadvantage of this practice, as Moodie (1975:xi) notes, is that *volk* may evoke false associations with Nazism or the *volkisch* tradition in German nationalism. Arguing that the original meaning of the Afrikaans word *volk* “was closer to Rousseau than to Hitler (although the latter sense became significant in the 1930s)”, Moodie opts for “Afrikaner People”. The capitalisation, he explains, points to Afrikaner nationalism’s essentialist understanding of the concept *volk*. Without dismissing the validity of Moodie’s objections, I leave *volk* untranslated as O’Meara does, especially when quoting.

² Among historians there is a debate whether this conflict – “the bloodiest and most extensive war that has ever been waged among whites in Southern Africa” (Wessels 2011:19) – should be called the Anglo-Boer War or the South African War. I tend to agree with Johnson (2004:105): “[D]espite the large numbers of blacks involved it was never their war. They did not start it, nor could they end it and irrespective of which side won Africans had no say in defining their own future fate. In this sense it was, indeed, the Anglo-Boer War and theirs alone.”
Traditionally, the official recognition of Afrikaans in 1925 has been regarded as the successful completion of the Second Afrikaans Language Movement. For Afrikaner activism in the field of language and culture during the 1930s and 1940s, the term *movement* has generally not been employed. This is perhaps ironic, not only because these two decades saw the formation of a mass movement of political opposition among Afrikaners, but also because the organisational coherence that the First and Second Language Movements lacked was finally achieved when the secret *Afrikaner-Broederbond* [League of Afrikaner Brothers] (est. 1918) founded the *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge* [Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations] (FAK) as its major front organisation in 1929. Through the FAK, with which all mainstream extra-parliamentary agents of Afrikaner nationalism were affiliated between 1929 and the end of apartheid, the Broederbond virtually controlled organised Afrikaner culture as it controlled, according to some commentators, Afrikaner politics.

This study treats the pre-apartheid Afrikaner Broederbond-FAK project as a distinct Afrikaner movement, and then as a cultural rather than a language movement. Within the framework of Joep Leerssen’s model of nationalism as the “cultivation of culture” (2006:559–578), I also consider the First and Second Language Movements to be cultural movements, simply because language activism was complemented with the production of a national(ist) literature and history, the creation of a material national culture, and the invention of national practices and traditions.

My proposal for a re-periodisation of Afrikaner nationalism’s language movements and my reinterpretation of these movements as politically directed cultural movements are fairly uncontroversial. What is contested, and fiercely so as I shall demonstrate in the introduction to chapter 3, is the claim that Afrikaner nationalism lives on as a non-state-oriented ethnic-based language and cultural movement. To substantiate this claim, chapter 3 develops a definitional and theoretical framework form which I argue in chapters 4 and 5, by means of a diachronical comparison, that the latest movement represents a continuation of the Afrikaner nationalist past.
First, however, the scene has to be set. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the political and ideological background without which no analysis would be possible of Afrikaner nationalism’s consecutive cultural movements. Focussing on the first half of the twentieth century, when electoral politics in South Africa was marked by constant shifts in the relationship between Afrikaner nationalism and the state, chapter 1 covers the rise of the National Party, and chapter 2 its rule and demise. This party-political part of the story, like the cultural part (the focus of chapters 4 and 5), has been told and interpreted – over and over again for more than a century – by an array of commentators: historians and linguists (lay and academic), Afrikaners and non-Afrikaners, Afrikaner nationalists and their critics, liberals and Marxists, and revisionists of all kinds and creeds. And yet it merits to be retold and reinterpreted here, not least because my key objective – namely to identify patterns of continuation and discontinuation in the long history of Afrikaner nationalism – requires, as a first step, a reconstruction of that history.

In retelling the story, I adopt a theoretically guided approach, hoping to offer some novel perspectives. More specifically, I attempt to apply certain classic theories of nationalism as well as more recently developed models (particularly that Leerssen (2006)) to the Afrikaner case. My first (rather clumsy) efforts in this direction date back to 2003 (cf. also Kriel (2004a) and Webb and Kriel (2000)). A similar (but un-clumsy) approach is adopted by the German scholar Christoph Marx in his book Oxwagon Sentinel. Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewabrandwag (2008). According to Marx, “Afrikaner nationalism is a highly complex phenomenon because various movements overlap and influence each other, making it difficult to place it in the framework of theoretical models” (2008:94). He nevertheless shows that the work of Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner “open up avenues to analysis that are compatible” (2008:90). It is further possible, says Marx, “if not easy, to apply Hroch’s phases to South Africa, when the focus is limited to cultural nationalism and one is not dazzled by the meteoric rise of the [National Party]” (2008:94).

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Despite the fact that this thesis splits its focus between political nationalism (chapters 1 and 2) and cultural nationalism (chapters 4 and 5) it questions the notion of dichotomy between these concepts and demonstrates the applicability of Miroslav Hroch’s periodisation model (1985) to the genesis of political-cum-cultural Afrikaner nationalism. Like the smaller nationalisms of nineteenth century Europe which Hroch studied, Afrikaner nationalism began as a concern on the part of members of a non-dominant ethnic group about their inferior status, both in the realms of politics and culture. Marx may also underestimate, as I intend to show, the relevance of Gellner’s theory to the Afrikaner case.

The existing literature does contain studies of Afrikaner nationalism which draw on nationalism theory, including Dunbar Moodie (1975 – Elie Kedourie), Fritz Ponelis (1998 – Gellner) and Eric Louw (2004a – Anderson and Gellner). However, such theory-based orientations represent the exception rather than the rule. For the most part, the remark made by George Schöpflin about the trend in international historiography between the end of the Second World War and the “beginning of what might be called the Great Debate on nationalism” (circa 1980) is acutely true of histories of Afrikaner nationalism, also recent histories such as that of Hermann Giliomee (2003): they “chronicle the story [but do] not enquire too closely into the nature of nationalism itself” (Schöpflin 2000:2–3). They lack, as Dan O’Meara puts it, theoretical road maps.

Needless to say, O’Meara’s analysis of Afrikaner nationalism (Volkskapitalisme covers 1934–1948 and Forty lost years 1948–1994) is marked by internal theoretical consistency, as is the work of scholars such as Saul Dubow (1992; 1994; 2006), Isabel Hofmeyr (1987; 1988), Jonathan Hyslop (1995; 1996), Merle Lipton (1986), Debra Posal (1987; 1991) as well as Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (1987). All these studies stem from the era (post 1985) when “leading liberal historians started including class categories and using approaches from the

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4 In a footnote to Forty lost years, O’Meara recalls a prominent South African historian telling him at a seminar at Yale University: “I don’t have any pre-conceived theories or ideas. I just try to be hellish receptive to the evidence.” O’Meara was sceptical, and rightly so: “the evidence never speaks for itself, it simply resonates (or not) with the analyst’s own mental maps” (1996:468).
history of mentalities”, and when “social historians started to take cognisance of anthropological approaches that appreciated the dynamics of religion, worldviews and ideology, without subordinating this to a crude economic reductionism” (Marx 2008:10).

The point that I am trying to make, though, is that (intentional) applications of/contributions to nationalism theory are few and far between in the literature on Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid. This is one area where theories of nationalism have been underutilised as interpretative frameworks. Giliomee’s Afrikaner biography (2003), for example, pays no heed to “the Great Debate on nationalism” between the “primordialists” or the anthropological-essentialist school on the one hand, and the “modernists” or the social historical-functionalist school on the other hand. Giliomee is no crude primordialist. Unlike less sophisticated nationalist historians and authors of apartheid-era school textbooks he is careful not to present Afrikaner nationalist mythology as Afrikaner history, or worse, as the most important part of South African history. But he shares the nationalist believe that Afrikaner history goes back three and half centuries.

This study argues, as other modernists have done, that Afrikaner nationalism produced Afrikaners, and that this production process only started in earnest in the twentieth century. Afrikaner nationalism, which has arguably perfected the art of using culture in the service of politics, has telling supporting evidence to offer for a constructivist, modernist interpretation of nationalism. And in the post-apartheid South Africa, Afrikaner language and cultural activism has telling supporting evidence to offer for Manuel Castells’s claim that contemporary nationalism may be “more oriented toward the defense of an already institutionalised culture [and a discursively constructed identity] than toward the construction or defense of a state” (1997:30).
CHAPTER 1
AFRIKANER NATIONALISM AND THE STATE: 1910–1948

‘Afrikaners, here in mines and factories,
when I look at you, contemplating
how we have been disinherited of a Republic
and drown insults and pain in drink at night

think of ’22 when we, white against black
fancying ourselves as labour fighting capital,
hoping to win with hand grenade, but from the grief
could gain nothing but the same bread and beer;

[or, when I think of the Rebellion or the famed Trek,]
then I have no choice but to interpret our ways as follows:
In these struggles and crusades
– Come, honestly, man to man! – we are no volk
but a failed bunch of reactionaries!’


1.1 Union without unity

2010, the year during which this chapter was drafted, marked the centenary of the creation of the South African state within its present boundaries. The South Africa Act of 1909, which formalised the existence of the new country, was passed by the imperial parliament at Westminster, but its terms were drawn up locally. Represented at the negotiation table – or, more specifically, at the National Convention which met in various South African cities between October 1908 and May 1909 – were four British settler colonies. The oldest was the Cape of Good Hope, where European settlement first took place in the mid-1600s. Initially under

6 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Afrikaans sources are my own.
the control of the *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* [Dutch East India Company – VOC], the Cape became a British possession in 1806, and was granted representative government in 1853 and responsible government in 1872.

Also present at the meetings of the National Convention were delegates from the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies where responsible government had just been achieved (in 1906 and 1907, respectively, following the electoral victory of the Liberal Party in Britain). Until the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, during which they were conquered by British forces, these colonies were the Boer republics of Transvaal (also called the *Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek* [South African Republic – ZAR]) and the Orange Free State. They were established by Dutch-speaking farmers – known today as Voortrekkers [pioneers; literally: those who travel ahead]⁷ – who had left the Cape Colony in the late 1830s to escape colonial rule. The independence of the ZAR and the Orange Free State was recognised by Britain in 1852 and 1854 respectively. But then, in 1867, diamonds were discovered in Griqualand West⁸ and nineteen years later gold on the Witwatersrand [white waters reef; henceforth, Rand],⁹ and the writing was on the wall for Boer independence. From then on, as Robert Ross notes, “mining, and the industry associated with it, would always be at the centre of South African economic, social and political life” (2008:59).

The final participant in the constitution-making process of 1908–1909 was Natal – also a former Boer republic but one with a much shorter history. The majority of the Voortrekkers who had settled in what they (but not Britain) considered to be the independent Republic of Natalia left for Transvaal after the annexation of “their land” to the Cape in 1843. They were replaced by immigrants from England and Scotland. Until 1856, when it received its own Legislative Council, Natal was an autonomous district of the Cape Colony. Responsible government was

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⁷ To simplify matters: the Voortrekkers became the Boers.
⁸ On the banks of the Vaal River, just north of its confluence with the Gariep River. In 1871, Britain annexed the diamond fields – which were claimed by both the Free State Boers and the Griquas (cf. footnote 200) – to the Cape Colony. Kimberley was born out of the ensuing diamond rush and the city’s mine was to become the richest in the world.
⁹ The gold rush, in turn, gave birth to the city of Johannesburg.
achieved in 1893, and four years later, the former Zulu kingdom (which had been annexed by Britain in 1887) was incorporated into Natal.

A unified – or at least a confederated – South Africa was a British ambition dating back to 1875. The confederation policy introduced at the time, as Ross explains, was an “attempt to establish safer conditions for investment in land, labour recruitment and, more generally, the advance of civilisation in Africa and the general interests of the (British) Empire” (2008:64). Yet neither the Free State nor the Transvaal was prepared to surrender their sovereignty. The annexation of the latter republic in 1877 was tolerated by the Boers, but only until the British army (with the help of the Swazi, in November 1879) did what the republicans had long failed to do: eliminate the Pedi threat. During 1880, the Transvalers [inhabitants of the Transvaal] rose in revolt and on 27 February 1881 they defeated the British forces sent against them in battle – more specifically in the Battle of Majuba, which would become a key part of the myth on which Afrikaner nationalism would feed.

It was not worth Britain’s while to try to regain the region – the poorest in southern Africa – and in August 1881, self-rule was returned to the ZAR. Stephanus Johannes Paulus (Paul) Kruger, who had emerged as the chief negotiator and the military leader of the Transvaal Boers, was elected president of the newly independent republic and the Empire abandoned its hopes of a confederated South Africa. For the time being, control of the country’s coasts (the colonies of the Cape and Natal) would suffice. “The time being”, however, proved to be fairly brief: within two decades of re-establishing its independence, the ZAR was producing more than a quarter of the world’s “premier strategic metal – gold, and thus money” (Ross 2008:75). Accounting for 96 percent of its exports by 1896, gold had transformed the state into southern Africa’s wealthiest (Saunders and Southey 1998:78–79).

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10 George Grey, then governor of the Cape Colony, also proposed, but never pursued the idea in the late 1850s.
It was gold, then, or rather the desire to create an environment within which South Africa’s mineral wealth could be exploited optimally by British-based conglomerates, that drove Britain to war with the Transvaal and its Orange Free State ally in October 1899 (Butler 2009:12). Yet it was also imperial pride – the desire to defend British pre-eminence in southern Africa and with it, as Giliomee (2003:248) puts it, British honour. In the late nineteenth century, however, “British politicians could not have said publicly that the goal of [the war] was control over the gold fields and gold production; they could probably not even have said it to each other in private” (Ross 2008:77). What they could say, echoing gold-mining capitalists on the Rand frustrated with their lack of political influence, was that the Transvaal was politically and economically too backward to cater for the requirements of the emerging industry. And they could raise the issue of the ZAR’s restrictive franchise laws, which made it difficult for uitlanders [foreigners] who had flocked to the gold fields – many of them Britons – to acquire citizenship and the vote. Whatever the justification, in the years following the discovery of gold, British imperialists concluded that “ZAR [...] power had to be broken so a strong (Anglo imperial) state could be built with enough power to radically transform Southern Africa” (Louw 2004b:10).

Britain’s victory in the Boer War did not straightaway result in the unification of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, the Cape and Natal, but all four territories now came under the administration of Alfred Milner, who had been governor of the Cape Colony and British high commissioner in South Africa since 1897. Before he bid South Africa farewell in 1905, Milner oversaw, inter alia, the establishment of an inter-colonial council, the amalgamation of the railway networks of the four colonies, and the creation of a South African customs union.

The dream of a united South Africa was, however, not only an imperial one. In 1875 – the same year, ironically, that Carnarvon (inspired by his recent success in Canada) set in motion plans to confederate South Africa – an early Afrikaner nationalist organisation in the Cape Colony (the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners – cf. chapter 5) expressed the desire to see the four South African “states” under one flag (Meiring 1949: 21). That flag – and this was the crucial part of the Cape
Afrikaners’ dream – was to replace the Union Jack that flew over their colony. In the wake of the Anglo-Boer war, however, many Boer leaders began to see “in Union and the imperial connection enhanced possibilities for economic progress, which would benefit their fellows as much as anyone” (Ross 2008:88). Prominent among them was Paul Kruger’s former right-hand man, Jan Christian Smuts, who believed that unification of the four colonies would eventually eliminate “the disturbing influence of Downing Street” (Smuts, quoted in Moodie 1975:73). A leading delegate to the National Convention of 1908–1909, Smuts was the main architect of South Africa’s first constitution.

It was, finally, on 31 May 1910 that the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies and those of the Cape and Natal became the constituent provinces of the Union of South Africa – a new dominion in the British Empire. Natal, which feared Afrikaner domination, had hoped that the state would take the form of a federation as it did in Canada and Australia, but the proponents of a unitary form of government won the day at the National Convention. With the exception of the Orange River Colony, which reverted to its old name of Orange Free State, the provinces retained their colonial names but without the “colony”-part (cf. Map 1.1).

Image removed for copyright reasons

**Map 1.1 South Africa’s four provinces in 1910**

An expensive compromise (with which South Africa is saddled to this day) was reached on the issue of the national capital: Cape Town was to be the legislative capital (the seat of parliament), Pretoria the administrative capital (the seat of the Union Building), and Bloemfontein the judiciary capital (the seat of the appellate division of the Supreme Court). The all-white National Convention also reached a compromise on the issue of the franchise. But before I turn to the political lay of

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11 Until 1994, this province in east-central South Africa was also referred to simply as the Free State. After 1994, the word “Orange” was officially dropped from the name.
the land, it is necessary to make some remarks about the make-up of the South African population at the time the state was created.

In 1910, black Africans, who spoke a variety of Bantu languages (of which the standardised versions are today known as the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Tswana, Sotho, Tsonga, Swati, Venda and Ndebele), constituted two-thirds of the inhabitants of South Africa, while little more than a fifth of the new country’s populace were white (or considered to be of full European descent). As indicated in Table 1.1, so-called coloured people accounted for nine percent of the population, and people of Asian (mostly Indian) origin for another three percent. The majority of “coloureds” lived in the Cape Province, and the majority of Indians in Natal. Of the latter group, some had come to South Africa as traders and merchants, but most had been imported (since 1860) as indentured labourers for the sugar plantations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African/Black</td>
<td>3,956,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1,278,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>517,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>148,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,899,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 Composition of the South African population: 1910 (Source: Giliomee 2003:356)

In the course of the century, these figures would change as indicated in Table 1.2:

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13 Listed here in order of size, with the biggest language group (according to the 2011 census) first (Statistics South Africa 2012:24).
14 In terms of apartheid legislation, every individual was classified at birth or upon entry into the country as white, black, coloured or Indian. Today, needless to say, any analysis of South African society – past or present – in terms of these categories smacks of racism. Particularly controversial, so that some scholars completely ignore it, is the distinction between Africans/blacks and coloured persons/coloureds (Afrikaans: kleurlinge). Jonathan Jansen, for example, states early on in his book on race and the apartheid past (*Knowledge in the blood*, 2009:vi) that “[t]he author uses the word “black” to mean every person who is not ‘white’, since he does not acknowledge apartheid-era classifications of people by colour”. For reasons that will become clear, Jansen’s practice is simply impossible to follow in this study. It may also be criticised for distorting reality. Jansen may disapprove of it, but many people continue to identify themselves as coloureds, even if they signal their discomfort with the term and the apartheid category (as I have done in this paragraph) by using the word “so-called”. What is more, recent years have seen coloured Afrikaans language activists asserting what they call a “brown” (i.e., neither a black nor a white) identity – a phenomenon that I discuss briefly in chapter 5.
Who were the coloured people in 1910? Christopher Saunders and Nicholas Southey explain:

During the 19th century, and particularly in the decades after the emancipation of slaves in 1838, a nascent shared identity developed among [...] diverse components of the labouring class in the western Cape [who were not considered to be white]. As the social changes brought about by industrialization and the mineral revolution began to take hold at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, a more distinct ‘Coloured’ identity emerged. The arrival of significant numbers of Africans in the western Cape led Coloureds to assert their difference, on the basis of partial descent from European settlers and generations of incorporation into colonial society, but the category was an extremely fluid and ill-defined one.

Though Coloureds had long had close contact with whites, and spoke the same language (Afrikaans rather than English), they were not accepted into white society and came to occupy an intermediate position in South Africa’s racial hierarchy (1998:45).15

The white population of the Union consisted mainly of two language groups. Slightly less than half of the whites spoke English as a first language, while slightly more than half spoke Dutch and/or the Dutch-like language Afrikaans – the origins of which are covered in chapter 4 of this study. Suffice it to say here that Afrikaans was still in the early stages of being codified at the time of South Africa’s unification. In the discussion that follows, white speakers of

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15 In 1911, the Cape Supreme Court found that there was no clear way in which coloured people could be distinguished from whites (Saunders and Southey 1998:45). The distinction was, of course, socially constructed, just like the distinction between “coloured” and “African/black”. It was for social reasons, too, that all the Afrikaners with a non-European progenitress (an estimated seven percent of all Afrikaner families – Giliomee 2003:18) came to be regarded as white and not as coloured.
Dutch/Afrikaans are referred to as Afrikaners. It should be borne in mind, though, that many of these people would not have identified themselves as Afrikaners early in the twentieth century, not least because the nationalist project of creating Afrikaners out of white Afrikaans speakers had only just begun. By 1910, it should also be noted, Afrikaners in the former Boer republics were still known as Boers [literally: farmers], but the ethnonym was falling into disuse because of urbanisation (Giliomee 2003:356).

As can be seen in Table 1.3, some 1.3 million white people had made South Africa their home by 1910. Afrikaners, who constituted 54 percent of the white population, outnumbered English speakers in two of the provinces. In the Orange Free State, the ratio of English-speaking whites to Afrikaners was roughly 1:4, compared to 1:1.5 in the Cape. In the Transvaal, the two linguistic communities were almost of equal size. Only Natal’s white population was predominantly English speaking. Here Afrikaners comprised one out of eight whites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Afrikaner total</th>
<th>Afrikaners as % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>175,435</td>
<td>137,955</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>583,177</td>
<td>339,585</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>420,881</td>
<td>204,058</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>98,582</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,278,075</td>
<td>693,898</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.3 Composition of the white population of South Africa: 1910 (Source: Giliomee 2003:356)

Black, coloured and Indian inhabitants of the yet-to-be-created South African state were not represented at the constitutional negotiations of 1908–1909: the thirty men who made up the National Convention were drawn from the all-white parliaments of the four self-governing colonies. In the Cape, at the time, one tenth of the voters were coloured and one twentieth were African. A system of economic qualification allowed 80 percent of all white men, thirteen percent of all coloured men and 2.25 percent of all black men in the colony to vote (Ross 2008:88). Members of parliament (MPs), however, had always been white. Natal’s franchise was also non-racial, but only in theory. Indians were barred from the vote, while Africans who wished to qualify had to obtain exemption from
customary law, which was almost impossible. In the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies the franchise was limited to white men and extending it to non-whites was unthinkable, at least as far as these colonies’ representatives at the National Convention were concerned.¹⁶ The Cape delegates, on the other hand, refused to disenfranchise anybody (Saunders and Southey 1998:73, 120). Only the real chance that the Convention might break up made both sides agree that each territory was to retain its own franchise system. Non-whites, however, would not be entitled to stand for election to the bicameral Union parliament (comprising a house of assembly and, until 1980, a senate). A governor-general was to represent the British crown.

South Africa’s first constitution thus left the vast majority of the country’s population unenfranchised. In this sense it was “profoundly flawed” as George Devenish (a legal scholar turned politician) described it in one of the few articles that appeared in the local newspapers of May 2010 in commemoration of the centenary of unification.¹⁷ The Cape liberals, Devenish argued, only accepted the constitution because they “fervently hoped that their enlightened race policies would in the fullness of time be extended to the north in the newly established Union”. Liberals in the UK, too, “naively believed [the constitution] would lead to a victory of the Cape’s relatively enlightened policies in relation to people of colour” (Sunday Times, 2010/05/23). The opposite, as we know, happened. Time would also prove the South Africa Act of 1909 to be flawed in another respect as Devenish pointed out: had its election system not been weighted in favour of rural constituencies, the apartheid party would not have won the general election of 1948.

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¹⁶ In terms of the (magnanimous) Vereeniging peace treaty, which concluded the Anglo-Boer War, the issue of “native enfranchisement” was left for the Boers to resolve once they were granted some form of representative assembly – a concession by Britain which translated into the betrayal of all the Africans who had supported and even fought for the British cause during the war.

¹⁷ Centenary celebrations were largely limited to white circles. This was hardly surprising: to most South Africans, the state they found themselves in had lacked legitimacy for the first 84 years of its existence.
According to Giliomee (2004:30–31), the franchise was not the only issue which threatened to derail South Africa’s political unification in 1910. Language policy, too, was a bone of serious contention. Dutch was the official language of the Boer republics and was used alongside of English in the Cape parliament since 1882. After the Boer War, however, the British authorities introduced English as the sole official language in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies – a step that provided the catalyst to the development of the Second Afrikaans Language Movement. This movement, which forms part of the focus of chapter 5 of this thesis, enjoyed one of its early victories at the National Convention when two delegates from the Orange River Colony – former Free State president Marthinus Theunis Steyn, and former judge and Boer War general, James Barry Munnik Hertzog – successfully demanded absolute equality of the English and Dutch languages, at least before the law. As a result, the Union of South Africa had a constitution stipulating in Article 137 that

> both the English and Dutch languages shall be official languages of the Union, and shall be treated on a footing of equality, and possess and enjoy equal freedom, rights, and privileges; all records, journals, and proceedings of Parliament shall be kept in both languages, and all Bills, Acts, and notices of general public importance or interest issued by the Government of the Union shall be in both languages (South Africa Act 1909, quoted in Giliomee 2003:276.)

This stipulation formed one of only two “entrenched clauses” in the constitution, the other being the clause that protected the voting rights of non-white men in the Cape. To change either of them required a two-thirds majority in a joint session of both houses of parliament. The rest of the constitution could be amended by a simple majority in each house.

Together with Abraham Fischer18 and ex-Boer War general Christiaan de Wet, the language activists Hertzog and Steyn were the political leaders in the Orange River Colony on the eve of Union. Their party, the *Orangia Unie* [Orangia Union] (est. 1906), had won the general election that had been held in November 1907, 

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18 Grandfather of the anti-apartheid activist and communist Bram Fischer (cf. footnote 73).
following the granting of responsible government to the colony. In the Transvaal Colony, too, the first responsible government was led by two Afrikaners after the victory of their party, Het Volk [The Volk] (est. 1905), in the election of February 1907. They were the former republican guerrillas, generals Louis Botha and Jan Smuts.19 Botha, as Giliomee describes him, was “a powerfully built man with a face that seemed to come straight from a painting by Frans Hals or Hans Holbein” (2003:357). The son of Voortrekker parents (like Paul Kruger), he had little formal education and could not deliver a speech in English until late in his political career (which was preceded by a successful farming career – Giliomee 2003:271). Smuts, on the other hand, grew up in the Cape Colony and entered university (the Victoria College at Stellenbosch, now Stellenbosch University) at the age of sixteen. He went on to study law at Cambridge University and upon his return home he was appointed state attorney of the ZAR.

Unlike the representatives of the Orange River Colony, neither Botha nor Smuts arrived at the inter-colonial convention as Dutch/Afrikaans activists. In the 1890s, Smuts did articulate the view that the young Afrikaans language was second to none for “expressing wit or humor as well as the primary emotions of the human heart”. In this, he said, it revealed “the character of the [Afrikaner] people” (Hancock 1962:359). Like a typical language activist, the Cambridge graduate (and former bencher of the Middle Temple) insisted on the use of an interpreter when speaking to Joseph Chamberlain during the latter’s visit to South Africa in the wake of the Boer War (Le May 1995:129). Yet, by 1905, Smuts had come to believe that English should be the official language of the future South Africa, with the use of Dutch allowed (Giliomee 2003:272). His language-in-education policy for Transvaal schools, introduced in 1907 to the dismay of Hertzog, made English the main medium of instruction. When the official language issue arose at the National Convention, Smuts, according to Giliomee, “kept silent” (2003:276).20

19 President Paul Kruger died in exile in Switzerland in 1904.
20 Four decades later, just before he was defeated at the polls by the apartheid party, Smuts (then prime minister) would complain: “They asked what I did for the Afrikaans language,
Holding power in the Cape at the time of unification was the South African Party – the newly established parliamentary wing of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr’s Afrikanerbond [League of Afrikaners] (est. 1880).21 The Cape prime minister, John Xavier Merriman, was an English speaker but one who defended the Boer cause during the war of 1899–1902 and afterwards worked towards the achievement of self-rule for the defeated republics. From an Afrikaner perspective, only Natal was “in English hands”. Here it is vital to note, though, that Afrikaner dominance in the political arena was not mirrored in other spheres of public life. By 1910, an Anglo-imperial economic and cultural hegemony that would prevail for decades to come had been firmly established in South Africa (Louw 2004b:21).

Determined to demonstrate how well it could make amends to its former enemy, London advised the first governor-general of the Union of South Africa to invite not Merriman, but Botha to become prime minister.22 (Natal premier Frederick R. Moor was hardly a contender for the position, and the Free State candidate, former president Steyn, was unavailable, owing to ill health.) In choosing his cabinet, Botha drew from the governments of all four colonies (now provinces) and tried to include as many English names as Dutch/Afrikaans names. He appointed his deputy and closest associate, Jan Smuts, as minister of the defence, mines and interior ministries and Barry Hertzog as minister of justice (and, soon afterwards, as minister of native affairs). Together, the parties that had governed the former colonies defeated the predominantly English and pro-empire Unionist and Labour Parties in South Africa’s first general election, which took place four months after unification in September 1910. A year later, Het Volk, the Orangia Unie and the South African Party of the Cape merged to become the South African Party

21 The party was founded to represent white agrarian interests but gained some black support, following an alliance with the mining magnate and imperialist, Cecil John Rhodes.

22 Ironically, the Dutch language activists, Hertzog and Steyn, supported Merriman. To Moodie (1975:74), this is proof that talk of intra-white cooperation after the Boer War was not simply empty rhetoric. But South Africa was never to have a first-language English speaker as its head of government.
(SAP). Two thirds of the delegates at the party’s founding congress were Afrikaans speakers (Giliomee 2004:32).

The SAP would remain in power for fourteen years. After Botha’s death in 1919, Smuts took over as prime minister. This period in South African history saw the consolidation of a racially segregated state with an economy based on racial capitalism (that is, a white-owned economy with blacks providing cheap labour – cf. Louw 2004b:20–21). The SAP government supported (mainly English-owned) mining capital and (mainly Afrikaner-owned) agricultural capital *inter alia* through laws that were designed to maximise African participation in the formal labour market. Among the first to be enacted was the 1911 Mines and Works Act, which reserved certain jobs for whites and denied black workers the right to organise and strike. The Natives Land Act demarcated white-conquered farming territory from the so-called native reserves and prevented Africans (in all provinces but the Cape) from leasing and purchasing land outside the reserves, thus forcing many black renters and sharecroppers\(^{23}\) into wage labour. At the time of the act’s passage in 1913, the reserves totalled a mere seven percent of land in South Africa. Structures to manage the reserves (including a government-appointed “Native Conference of African Leaders”) were set up by the Native Affairs Act of 1920, while the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 introduced a system of influx control – a term that the apartheid government would later also use to describe its efforts to curb black urbanisation. According to the latter act, only Africans who served white labour needs would be tolerated in the towns and cities of South Africa. They had to live in separate “locations”\(^{24}\) on the outskirts of the designated white neighbourhoods or typically, if they were migrant mineworkers (with homes and families in the reserves), in single-sex compounds.

\(^{23}\) Sharecropping – “the practice whereby blacks were able to make use of white land and to recompense the landowner in any form except labour” (Ross 2008:96) – were in effect outlawed.

\(^{24}\) Unlike the term “township” that came to replace it, “location” (Afrikaans: *lokasie*) has a strong pejorative connotation and is therefore used here – though not henceforth – in inverted commas. The Afrikaans language has thus far failed to produce an equivalent for “township”.

28
All men had to carry “passbooks”\textsuperscript{25} as proof that they were authorised to be where they were. And so the white citizens and the black “non-citizens” of the Union were segregated on the land, in the residential areas, and in state administration.

1.2 The Hertzog years

In the all-white country they were trying to create, conciliation between Afrikaners and local Anglos was the first priority of the SAP leadership. The aim was to combine “the best elements of both parts of the colonial population” in “a compact South African nationality” within the British Empire (Smuts, quoted in Moodie 1975:73). This is perhaps ironic: barely a decade after the end of the Boers’ second war of liberation\textsuperscript{26} against the British Empire, two of their former generals were advocating loyalty to the empire. Yet not all the senior Boer War veterans shared the view of Botha and Smuts. Late in 1911, Hertzog began to tell public meetings that imperialism was “only good insofar as it [was] useful to South Africa” (quoted in Moodie 1975:77), and soon it cost him his cabinet position.

On the platform of “South Africa (and not the British Empire) first”, the axed minister went on to found the National Party (NP) in Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State on 7 January 1914. It was the first Afrikaner nationalist party that appealed to Afrikaners across the old colonial boundaries. Afrikaners, as Hertzog defined them, included English-speaking South Africans who “[had] learned to unite their concerns with those of the land which they have made their home” (quoted in Moodie 1975:74). The founding father of the NP was opposed to exclusivism based on language. To Hertzog it was a matter of principle: as early as 1891, while completing a doctorate in law in Amsterdam, he expressed the view that “France, Holland, Germany, England each had a share in the origin of this People, and thus the name Afrikaner includes them all, both Hollander and

\textsuperscript{25}A legacy of slavery in South Africa.
\textsuperscript{26}The Battle of Majuba, referred to in the previous section, was the first.
Englishman” (quoted in Moodie 1975:73–74). This, however, did not mean that he was unconcerned about the inequality between what he regarded as the two constituent streams of the Afrikaner volk. On the contrary, Hertzog challenged the English economic and cultural hegemony in South Africa by committing his party to compulsory bilingualism in education and the civil service.

Yet, however welcome they were in the new party, English-speaking South Africans did not identify themselves as Afrikaners in 1914 (or ever). Nor were they likely to flock to a man who had policies in mind that would compel them and their children to learn a language of lesser status than their own. Dutch would have been bad enough, but by 1914, all indications were that it was on its way out to make room for a language even less prestigious – Afrikaans. Unsurprisingly, Hertzog’s following was Dutch/Afrikaans speaking. Foremost among them was one Daniël François Malan, a dominee [clergyman] in the Dutch Reformed Church with a PhD in theology from the University of Utrecht in The Netherlands. When Cape Nationalists founded the newspaper De Burger [The Citizen; today: Die Burger] to promote their cause in 1915, Malan left the ministry to become its first editor. During the same year he was elected as the NP’s provincial leader in the Cape.

The first congress of the NP, held on 26 August 1914, unanimously condemned South Africa’s active participation on the side of Britain in the First World War. Some 12,000 Afrikaners (many of them poor farmers) from the north-western Transvaal, the northern Free State and the northern Cape went further and took up arms against the SAP government when the latter decided, on Britain’s request, to invade the German colony of South West Africa. At the time, one observer made

27 Hertzog was even prepared, as we shall see below, to accommodate coloured South Africans in the nation, albeit to a limited extent.
28 The paper was published by Nasionale Pers [National Press] – a publishing house established by Cape Nationalists in 1914.
29 South Africa conquered the territory and was mandated by the League of Nations to administer it. When the League was disbanded in 1946, its successor, the United Nations (UN), requested that South West Africa (SWA) be placed under its trusteeship system. South Africa refused and it was only in 1966, after a legal battle of twenty years, that the UN succeeded in revoking the mandate. Armed conflict about the status of the territory (that would last a quarter of a century) ensued in the northern parts of SWA between South
the following remark: “I will not say that every follower of Hertzog is seditious, but every seditious person claims to be a follower of Hertzog” (Merriman, then in retirement, quoted in Giliomee 2003:383). Unlike other famous Boer generals (including the commander-in-chief of the Union Defence Force, Christiaan Beyers), Hertzog did not participate in the three-month shootout between rebels and government troops that came to be known as the 1914 Rebellion. However, in the election of 1915, his party capitalised on the government’s suppression of the uprising and exploited public outrage over the imprisonment of the ringleaders, and the execution of one of them, Jopie Fourie.

An army officer who had not resigned his commission before rebelling, Fourie was court martialled and executed by firing squad (on a Sunday, without a blindfold). Afrikaner nationalist mythology would turn him into a martyr and Smuts, who as minister of defence and justice ignored pleas for mercy (including those of D.F. Malan), into a murderer of his own people. In the history of Afrikaner nationalism, the era of the rebels was also the era of the myth manufacturers (cf. section 5.1.2) – men such as Jan F.E. Celliers who, in 1915, wrote the following poetic tribute to Fourie (in Afrikaans, of course):

There goes a bullet, with speed, with speed,  
it’s wet with Afrikaner blood,  
and grief the message it conveys;  
it comes from Afrikaner rifle,  
it comes through Afrikaner heart.  
But with the mourning, the grief,  
it brings the heart’s strengths across.  
Sleep softly, true heart so brutally pierced,  
because, moving, moving time and tide,  
still the bullet shall spread its tidings;  
and where it hits, its wound never heals;

and what it hits, it is sanctified!

(Opperman (ed.) 1983:43).

The NP captured half the Afrikaner vote in the party’s first election, drawing mainly on the support of lower-class Afrikaners (smaller farmers and the urban poor), but also attracting votes of affluent western Cape farmers and a petit bourgeoisie “insecure in the face of anglicisation and urbanisation” (Thompson 2000:154). Five years later, in the election of 1920, it received enough votes to become the ruling party, but Smuts and the Unionists merged to form a new SAP which won the 1921 election comfortably. What led to the SAP’s eventual defeat at the polls was Smuts’ suppression of another militant uprising: the so-called Rand Revolt, which broke out on the second day of 1922, when white mineworkers went on strike in protest of a decision by the Chamber of Mines to start using black labour in semi-skilled jobs that had previously been reserved for whites. What the mine bosses were trying to do was to cut costs: at the time, as Moodie (1975:90) explains, the ratio of white miners to black miners in South Africa was 1:9; yet, the total wages paid to blacks was barely more than half of the white total. Stated differently, the wages of white miners were fifteen times those of black miners, who could easily be employed in semi-skilled positions (Thompson 2000:155).

January and February of 1922 saw white workers (and their wives) marching the streets of Johannesburg under banners proclaiming, rather incongruously: “Workers of the world unite and fight for a white South Africa”. While the leaders were English speakers, the majority of the strikers were Afrikaners. They formed commandos as in the days of the ZAR and defiantly raised the old ZAR flag as their English-speaking counterparts waved the red flag. As was the case in 1914, nostalgia for the old Boer republics was part and parcel of Afrikaner protest in 1922. A commission of inquiry into the Rand Revolt found afterwards that “the majority of the revolutionary forces” were aimed at “the destruction of the

31 The commercial maize farmers of the eastern and western Transvaal would not be converted to the National Party before 1948.

The strike became increasingly violent, and by March, it had escalated into a full-blown insurrection. Ten thousand workers virtually seized Johannesburg. Smuts declared martial law and sent in twice as many soldiers, armed to the teeth. For the first time in history, a government used an air force against its own civilians as it bombed white working-class suburbs (Louw 2004b:23). After a week of fighting, leaving close on 700 people injured and at least 150 dead, the workers surrendered. Many were imprisoned and four were executed. If earlier suppression of strikes had not yet alienated the white workforce from the SAP, Smuts’ conduct in 1922 finally did.32

One outcome of the Rand Revolt was a seemingly unlikely electoral pact between Hertzog’s anti-imperialist Afrikaner nationalist party33 and the predominantly English Labour Party, led by Colonel F.P.H. Creswell, which valued its imperial connections very highly. Yet the alliance, formed in 1923, was only natural, as the two parties would target the same constituency in the election the following year: white workers whom they would promise to protect not only from a capitalist regime with blood on its hands, but also from black job competition. In his election campaign, Hertzog accommodated his ally and steered clear of anti-imperialist propaganda.

Despite its call for intensified racial segregation, the Nationalist-Labour Pact also sought the support of the Cape’s black and coloured electorate (who could only

32 One would assume that white workers would have supported the Labour Party, and some Afrikaner workers did. Others, however, preferred the SAP to an imperialist party with no Afrikaners among its MPs.
33 According to Johnson, the NP was at that stage also an embryonic labour party: its supporters were “instinctively anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, tending to argue that capitalism and imperialism were indivisible” (2004:199). To them, Smuts now stood too closely not only to the British Empire but also to the English-speaking Randlords (i.e., the mining magnates). For a while, Hertzog even styled himself as a communist. In 1919 he expressed support for the Bolshevik revolution, leaving most of South Africa stunned and the International Socialist League, the forerunner of the South African Communist Party, unconvinced. Five years later, in his campaign for the 1924 election, he declared the plight of white workers “the most important issue for the survival and welfare of the country” (quoted in Giliomee 2003:335).
vote for white candidates) and managed to capture the majority of the coloured vote. In the end, the 1924 election saw the Nationalists gain sixteen parliamentary seats and Labour five, which was more than adequate to bring the so-called Pact to power. It was the first of only three elections in the history of South Africa (so far) that produced a change of government, and the only one in which class conflict played an overt role.

Hertzog has been described as “a pragmatist who recognized the extent of Anglo power [in the Union and] opted to work within the empire’s framework to improve the Afrikaners’ lot” (Louw 2004b:21). During his first term as prime minister, that was exactly what he did – blatantly to the detriment of black workers. “The native cannot blame us if we look after the interests of our people first”, he told parliament as he introduced legislation in terms of which “civilised” or white labour was entitled to higher wages than “uncivilised” or black labour (Davids 1996:57–58). This law, the Wage Act of 1925, was designed to protect the interests of unskilled white workers. The rest of the white labour force benefited from the so-called Colour Bar Act of 1926 (the Mines and Works Amendment Act) which reserved skilled and semi-skilled positions for them. The Pact government further addressed the high levels of white unemployment through the expansion of secondary industries and the establishment of a state sector in these industries. Amongst other things, a state corporation for the manufacture of iron and steel (ISCOR) was created. In accordance with government policy, black workers were replaced with higher-paid white ones in state-owned or controlled enterprises. Of these, the railways became the foremost employer of white labour.

The Pact’s industrial and labour policies should be seen against the background of the so-called poor white problem or, more accurately, the problem of poor Afrikaners, which accompanied their urbanisation during the first four decades of the twentieth century. Afrikaner poverty had been a feature of the rural landscape since the late nineteenth century, but the disintegration of the community’s pastoral way of life after the Boer War and the mass urbanisation that followed dramatically had intensified the problem. For Afrikaners, as Giliomee sums it up,
early urbanisation was “a rapid, chaotic, and almost always traumatic process” (2003:323). It did result in the development of a small middle class (which grew steadily over the decades), but the vast majority of Afrikaners who arrived in the cities and mining towns became wage labourers (if they were lucky enough to find work in the hostile English environment) and were extremely impoverished. The situation of black workers was, of course, even bleaker. But the distance was shrinking, and from the (obviously racist) point of view of Afrikaner nationalists that was the heart of the poor white problem: “[Urban Afrikaners] were working like black people, taking orders like black people, living in shabby residential streets adjacent to black shanty towns” (Salomon, quoted in Giliomee 2003:324).

In what Louw (2004b:22) describes as racial capitalism’s ethnic class-ranking system, Afrikaner workers formed an intermediate group between English-speaking capitalists and professionals and a small Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie on the one hand, and black migrant workers on the other hand. Hertzog’s mission was to facilitate the upward mobility of these white workers or, at least, prevent their downward mobility.

Facilitating the upward mobility of middle-class Afrikaners would require a different strategy. John Hall (1995:17), amongst others, points out that the decision of a state to conduct official business in a single language has virtually always placed some in the position of facing blocked or downward mobility. That was not quite the case in South Africa when Hertzog took over the reins as prime minister. As a result of his campaign at the inter-colonial convention of 1908–1909, the South African constitution compelled the state to conduct its business in both English and Dutch. This, however, did not solve what the Afrikaners of the early 1920s regarded as two language problems. The first was that Afrikaans, which had boasted a standardised orthography since 1917, had replaced Dutch as their language. The second problem was that the SAP government appeared to have paid only lip service to the achievement of societal bilingualism (i.e., the implementation of the constitution’s language clause). Afrikaners who were employed or who sought employment in the civil service were not rewarded for being bilingual. When the Pact came into power, almost a third of the Union’s 13,000 civil servants could not speak Afrikaans, while the proportion of
monolingual Afrikaans-speaking civil servants was negligible (0.1 percent – Brits, Spies and Grundlingh 2007:253). Both problems were addressed by Hertzog’s minister of the interior, education and public health, D.F. Malan. In 1925, owing to his efforts, the meaning of Dutch in the Union Constitution was redefined to include Afrikaans, which thus became an official language of South Africa. Malan was also responsible – directly or indirectly – for the appointment of more bilingual individuals (i.e., Afrikaners) in the civil service. If anybody’s upward mobility was affected negatively, it was that of monolingual English speakers.

The position of white farmers, the majority of whom were Afrikaners, also improved under Hertzog, inter alia as a result of market control activities (Thompson 2000:156). In short, the cause of the Hertzog administration was that of Afrikaner upliftment, [...] and its method was that of state intervention. ‘Socialist nationalism’ [...] was soon to undergo a sinister inversion as some of the young Turks in Hertzog’s party became infatuated with a new political philosophy that arose in Europe. But for the moment it was simply socialism intermixed with nationalism (Sparks 1990:134).

With the ardent activist for language equality he had in Malan, Hertzog could pour his energies into the realisation of another major goal that he had set for the NP at the time of its formation: South Africa’s independence. At the Imperial Conference of 1926, he played a key role in the drafting and acceptance of the Balfour Declaration, according to which the United Kingdom and its dominions formally became autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations (quoted in Davenport and Saunders 2000:303).
For Hertzog, the old Boer dream had come true: we are just as free as the English volk, he proclaimed on his return from London,

and he who seeks more freedom seeks the impossible. With respect to the empire, there ought to be no fear of schism because it is in our interest to remain within it. We should be stupid to withdraw (Scholtz, quoted in Moodie 1975:92; Moodie’s translation).

South Africa was now entitled to a national flag. On the question of whether the Union Jack should form part of it, parliament was split along linguistic lines and the debate was bound to be prolonged and acrimonious. In the end, the Afrikaner nationalists capitulated, but only because the flag of their old enemy was dwarfed in the final design by their own symbols: the flag of the Prince of Orange and those of the old Boer republics (cf. Figure 1.1). On Union Day in 1928, two years after Malan had first introduced the Nationality and Flag Bill, South Africa’s Orange-white-blue (as the tricolour became known among Afrikaners) was hoisted alongside the “flag of the Empire” – the latter, Hertzog told parliament, now merely an expression of “our relationship with the other members of the commonwealth of nations” (quoted in Davenport and Saunders 2000:304).

Figure 1.1 South African flag 1928–1994

A decade after the flag debacle, shortly before the end of Hertzog’s premiership, the government would adopt Die Stem van Suid Afrika [The Call of South Africa] as the Union’s national anthem alongside of God save the King/Queen. Only in 1957, when it became South Africa’s only national anthem, was Die Stem officially translated into English. Written by language activist C.J. Langenhoven and set to music by M.L. de Villiers, the song had four verses, of which only the first (quoted below) was normally sung:

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after him, Hertzog failed to convince Britain to allow South Africa to incorporate the protectorates of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Basutoland (now Lesotho) and Swaziland.
Apart from introducing discriminatory labour legislation, Hertzog also contributed to the existing body of segregationist legislation during his first term as prime minister (when he was also minister of native affairs), adding inter alia the Native Administration Act and the Immorality Act, both of 1927. The former act laid the foundation for apartheid’s system of indirect rule by formalising the role of traditional African leaders within the local government of the reserves, while the latter outlawed sexual relations between whites and Africans. In its approach to the coloured population – whose support it wished to retain – the Pact was more accommodating. It increased government spending on coloured education by more than half (but continued to spend much more on white education) and introduced old-age pensions for coloureds (which were smaller than white pensions). Theoretically, in terms of government policy, white and coloured workers had to be given preference in the job market over black workers, but in practice whites were always favoured over coloureds (Giliomee 2004:37–38).

With South Africa “just as free as the English volk”, at least in Hertzog’s mind, and with not much to gain from anti-big capital propaganda, the Nationalists fought and won the 1929 election on their own (i.e., without the Labour Party) under the slogan of the swart gevaar [black peril]. This issue – the so-called

native question\textsuperscript{37} – was the theme of only two elections in South Africa prior to 1948: those of 1929 and 1938. It is crucial to understand, though, that no party ever opposed white supremacy. Racial segregation \textit{per se} was not at stake in 1929: the SAP stood by the segregationist principles it had embodied in legislation while in government. What distinguished Smuts’s campaign from that of Hertzog was the way in which the latter completely ignored the question regarding justice for all in South Africa. Unsurprisingly, the NP lost most of its coloured support to the SAP.

After the NP victory in 1929 more segregationist legislation followed. Hertzog failed to secure the two-thirds parliamentary majority that he needed to remove Cape Africans who qualified from the common voters’ roll, but in 1930 he reduced that segment of the electorate from 3.1 percent to 1.4 percent by enfranchising white women (Davenport and Saunders 2000:326). The proportion of coloured voters shrunk from eleven percent to six percent (Giliomee 2004:38).\textsuperscript{38}

\section*{1.3 Fusion and the birth of “purified” Afrikaner nationalism}

Despite the bitterness that marked the election of 1929, differences between Hertzog and Smuts were not of such a nature that it prevented them from forming a coalition government before the 1933 election and fusing their parties into the United South African National Party – shortened to United Party (UP) – in 1934. Hertzog remained prime minister and Smuts became his deputy. The move was, for the most part, an attempt to stabilise a country that found itself in the midst of the Great Depression and a severe drought. For some, though, it spelled the end of Afrikaner nationalism. Resenting the English/imperialist/pro-big-capitalist

\textsuperscript{37} At the time, the term \textit{rassevraagstuk} [race question] was still used to refer to tensions between the two white communities, which were thought of as two races.

\textsuperscript{38} The government’s initial plan was to enfranchise both white and coloured women, but to remove coloured people born from liaisons with Africans from the voters’ roll along with all Africans who qualified for the franchise. According to Giliomee (2004:38), this attempt to classify coloured people alienated them from the NP. The latter’s efforts to win the coloured vote would end with coalition and fusion in 1933 and 1934.
element that Smuts brought with him into the new party, a quarter of the NP’s parliamentary representatives broke away to form the Gesuiwerde [Purified] National Party (GNP) under the leadership of D.F. Malan. They were the republican faction in the NP who had not shared Hertzog’s enthusiasm about the Balfour Declaration back in 1926. Prominent among them was N.J. van der Merwe – a former dominee like the party leader. “Our ideal is the Republic of South Africa”, he had proclaimed in 1930 shortly after establishing a parliamentary pressure group to promote this ideal within the NP (Moodie 1975:92–95). Within the new UP, Van der Merwe and his fellows knew, it would have been a still-born cause.

The break between Hertzog and the “purifieds” has been described in many ways but Sparks’s analogy probably summarises it best:

[W]hen after nine years as prime minister [Hertzog] felt he had achieved [his goal], that all the rights he had claimed for Afrikanerdom were now secured and that the time had arrived for its act of reconciliation [with the English stream of the volk], the booster fired and Hertzog fell away like the spent shell of a launching rocket while Afrikaner nationalism soared away on its new course (1990:149).

In the first election after fusion, which was held in May 1938, Malan’s party won 27 seats against 111 for the UP (and eight for the Dominion Party).39 Although this meant that there were seven more men on the opposition benches than before the election, all bar one of the GNP’s new MPs represented constituencies in the party’s stronghold: the rural Cape.40 In the Transvaal, the UP lost no seats to the GNP, and in the Free State only one (O’Meara 1983:119–120). Judging by its performance at the polls, Afrikaner nationalism was hardly “soaring away on a new course”. Yet outside parliament, it was gaining momentum, and the decade to

39 Led by Colonel C.F. Stallard and confined mainly to Natal, this staunchly pro-empire Dominion Party broke away from the SAP in 1934 for reasons diametrically opposed to Malan’s reasons for leaving the NP.

40 The “purified” NP started out as a party dominated by Kapenaars [inhabitants of the Cape Province]. Of the nineteen founding MPs only five were northerners: four represented Free State constituencies, while a single one, the hardliner Johannes Gerhardtus Strijdom (who would become prime minister of apartheid South Africa in 1954), hailed from the Transvaal (Van der Westhuizen 2007:23).
follow would provide an object lesson in the power of culture or, more accurately in Afrikaner case, *kultuurorganisasies* [cultural organisations] in the lives of nationalist movements. Chapter 5 of this study examines the role of these organisations – and then particularly the secret Broederbond – in the rise of “purified” Afrikaner nationalism.

The mid- to late-1930s marked the peak of segregation in South Africa’s pre-apartheid history. In 1936, with the old SAP now behind him, Hertzog finally had enough support in parliament to change the constitution and close the common voters’ roll to Africans in the Cape. In fact, he had overwhelming support: when the Native Representation Bill was laid before a joint session of the upper and lower houses, 94 percent of the senators and MPs voted in favour of it. According to the new act (the Natives Representation Act), the disenfranchised Cape Africans could now only elect three white people to represent them in the house of assembly, while black people in all four provinces could indirectly elect a total of four white senators. The act introduced communal representation in the form of a consultative (i.e., powerless) Natives Representative Council and was supplemented by the Native Trust and Land Act (also of 1936), which enlarged the reserves from the existing 10.4 million to 17.6 million *morgen*41 – purportedly to compensate blacks for the loss of the common-roll franchise. In truth, the latter act reinforced the principle of territorial segregation and imposed further restrictions on Africans outside the reserves (which now made up thirteen percent of land in South Africa).

Eleven lone liberals voted against the proposed legislation, foremost among them the Afrikaner, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (nephew of the *Afrikanerbond* leader), who had replaced Malan in 1934 as minister of the interior, education and public health. African reaction, as Johnson sums it up, “was one of outrage and despair – for it was now brutally obvious that the government, far from evolving towards more progressive policies, was heading steadily backwards” (2004:123). To

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41 One *morgen* equals 0.856 hectares. The term is Dutch for “morning” and originally referred to the amount of land that could be ploughed before midday.
Malan and his party the new policies represented a step in the right direction, but not nearly a big enough step. Unlike Hertzog, who believed that, “if we want to do justice to the Coloured person, we should have to include him among the Whites industrially, economically, and politically [read: though not socially]” (quoted in Tatz 1962:262), the GNP wanted to see the Cape’s coloured voters disenfranchised too. This would eventually happen (in 1956), but not before the Nationalists had seized power and had fabricated for themselves the two-thirds majority required to change the constitution (cf. Van der Westhuizen 2007:44–50).

In its 1938 election manifesto, the GNP declared that it would put a stop to any form of black/coloured representation in parliament, to the transfer of more state-purchased land to the reserves, and to “the uncontrolled influx of redundant blacks into urban areas” (Brits 1994:100). In short, the Nationalists vowed to reverse the “undesirable” practices of racial integration that were taking place in South Africa, despite the country’s segregationist laws. Theirs was a policy of complete segregation between black and white in all spheres of life. It was not the policy of apartheid yet, but in the studies of volkekundiges (apartheid’s anthropologists – cf. section 2.2) and other Afrikaner academics that policy was beginning to take shape.

1.4 South Africa at war and Afrikanerdom divided

On 4 September 1939, a day after Britain had declared war on Germany, Hertzog was marginally defeated by Smuts (80 votes to 67) in a parliamentary vote on South Africa’s participation on the Allied side. Smuts believed the future of humanity was at stake. Hertzog, who proposed neutrality, could not see why South Africa should pay in blood and money42 to defend Britain and her empire.

42 In the end, South Africa’s participation in the war contributed to a long boom in the country’s economy, which lasted from the mid-1930s through to the 1960s. Yet South Africa did pay in blood. For all operations outside the Union the government relied on volunteers only. Some 200,000 uniformed South Africans took part in the war, half of whom were Afrikaners. Among the latter was “Sailor” Malan, who flew for the Royal Air
As was the case in respect of the flag debate of the previous decade, the house of assembly was divided along linguistic lines: most English-speaking MPs voted along with Smuts, and most Afrikaner MPs along with Hertzog. When the governor-general refused the latter’s request to dissolve parliament and call a general election, Hertzog resigned and Smuts became prime minister for the second time. On 6 September 1939, South Africa, too, was at war with Germany. In her diary, a seventeen-year-old Afrikaner nationalist, Elsa Joubert, interpreted the developments as follows:

Monday 5 September 1939
Wrote [a] history [examination]. Badly. Who can study history when we are making history ourselves? A terrible excitement reigns. Hertzog made a speech as last in 1914. Of national destination [volksbestemming] and of loyalty. Tears were shed over it. But when Parliament had to vote, the National Party plus Hertzog people got only 68 votes and the Smuts people 81. Therefore, Smuts’s plan went through – S.A. declared war on Germany! Hertzog resigned as prime minister. But it does not matter, our volk is together again! (Joubert 2005:212).

6 September 1939
Still, huge excitement [...] Hertzog is off to the Free State, Smuts is prime minister with a majority of 13, and forms his new cabinet. [N.C.] Havenga and [Oswald] Pirow [cf. below] are on Hertzog’s side, great joy about that but terrible war news, Poland is being invaded on all sides, Germany is bombing the area, England is calling up troops. Dr Malan says: Gen Hertzog proposed neutrality, I follow him again as my leader, it is terribly noble of him [Dr Malan], I [the diarist] really admire him. Huge farewell for Malan and Hertzog at the station in Cape Town, the crowd weeps [...] singing: Now encouraged we venture out again, trusting unwaveringly in thy word [Nou treën wij weer bemoedigd voort, in vast vertrouwen op U woord]44 (Joubert 2005:213).

Force in the Battle of Britain. Nearly 9,000 South Africans were killed in action. (Cf. Davenport and Saunders 2000:346; Giliomee 2003:441.)

43 Four decades later, Elsabé Antoinette Murray Joubert would achieve international acclaim for her novel The long journey of Poppie Nongena which tells the story of a black woman’s suffering under apartheid. Originally published in Afrikaans as Die swerfjare van Poppie Nongena (1978), it was translated by Joubert herself for publication in English in 1980. Translations into twelve other languages followed.

44 Note that the language of this hymn is Dutch and not yet Afrikaans.
7 September 1939
On Saturday there will be a grand reunification festival at the [yet to be completed] Voortrekker Monument, there is talk of a rebellion. And of a republic (Joubert 2005:213).

12 September 1939
Most of the countries for example The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Russia, Italy etc. are staying neutral. Father says he cannot see how England can win. He says he hopes she gets her arse thoroughly kicked [...] Everywhere UPs are deciding whether to follow Hertzog’s or Smuts’s policy. The majority are following Hertzog. Saturday’s festival at Monument Hill was wonderful – 10 000 cars and not a single accident. 400 000 people. Hertzog says the UP is done with, he and Malan stand united (Joubert 2005:214).

In the event, thirty-seven parliamentary representatives of the UP followed Hertzog into a new party, the Volksparty [Volk’s Party], which merged with Malan’s GNP in January 1940 to become the Herenigde [Reunited] National Party (HNP). For a brief moment, it seemed as if the NP was reunited under its founding father. But Afrikaner nationalism had outgrown Hertzog. He had abandoned republicanism more than decade earlier and continued to insist that white English speakers were “also entitled to a place in the South African sun” (Wilkins and Strydom 1978:61). Among the Malanites, by contrast, there were by now quite a few extremists – including Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, editor of the Transvaler45 – who advocated the establishment of a Christian-national Afrikaner republic in which Afrikaans would be the sole official language. And the more moderate Malanites were advocating separate single-medium Afrikaans and English schools – a cause which Hertzog, who believed in Afrikaans-English bilingual schools for all white children, had always condemned. Within a year of the NP’s “reunification”, in November 1940, Hertzog stormed out of a provincial party congress and retired from politics. A few of his loyal followers formed the Afrikaner Party (AP), but the majority of MPs who had left the UP with him

45 Established in 1937 and published by Voortrekkerpers [Voortrekker Press], the paper was the GNP’s mouthpiece in the Transvaal. When the British royal family visited South Africa in 1947, Verwoerd’s coverage of the event was confined to a single sentence: “The presence of certain visitors [in Johannesburg] today will cause some dislocation to the traffic” (Hopkins 2006:40).
remained in the HNP, now led again by Malan. Aged 76, an embittered Hertzog died in 1942.

In general, Afrikaners opposed South Africa’s entrance into the Second World War (even though it would soon provide numerous of them with job opportunities). 46 True to his materialist approach to history, O’Meara (1983:121) ascribes this to the fact that “the economic interests of neither farmers nor white workers nor Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie dictated support for the war”. He stresses, however, that anti-British sentiments played an equally important role. At this point, again, it is worth considering a diary entry by the young Elsa Joubert. On 5 September 1939, after learning that opponents of Hertzog had put out the flame which had been kept burning since the Ossewagedenk trek [Oxwagon Memorial Trek] of the previous year (in which she had participated – cf. section 5.1.3), Joubert wrote:

The Voortrekker torch is quenched. Tied to it is a Union Jack with the words: ‘To Hell with Hertzog and neutrality’.

I begin to cry. Mother says: ‘Come now, Elsa,’ but I cannot help myself, our torch, our flame that had to burn until we were free, why did they have to do it, it was low and mean, I hate the man who did it, I hate all the English, they could not have thought up anything meaner, there will now be a deep wound, together with the joy about the reunification of our volk (Joubert 2005:213). 47

South Africa’s wartime cabinet was the first to contain a majority of English speakers. It was headed by two Afrikaners, but in the eyes of the Nationalists Smuts was “the handyman of the Empire”, while his deputy and heir apparent, Jan Hofmeyr, personified that dangerous ideology called liberalism. Smuts, who had led successful military campaigns in German South-West Africa and in East Africa during the First World War, now became a field marshal in the British army. Once again, he served in the British war cabinet. Jan Smuts was the only

46 According to Grundlingh, most Afrikaners who volunteered to serve in the war did so not out of idealism, but out of “rather more prosaic pecuniary considerations” (1999:360).
47 Phrases in italics are in English in the original text. Note also the entry of 7 September 1939: “Read in the paper at lunch time: there is another flame, the extra one was not put out. It still burns and is now guarded day and night. The holy flame still burns” (Joubert 2005:213).
person to have signed the peace treaties that concluded both the First and the Second World War, and the only person to have signed the charters of both the League of Nations and the United Nations – two organisations, which he helped to create. When South Africa went to the polls in 1943, the prime minister’s status as an international statesman and the fact that the tide was turning in favour of the Allied forces augured well for the UP. Yet, while the governing coalition of the United, Labour and Dominion parties still controlled almost half of Union’s rural constituencies and virtually all the urban ones after the election (O’Meara 1983:133), the UP’s share of the Afrikaner vote was down from 40 percent to 32 percent (Davenport and Saunders 2000:353).

Anti-imperial (and pro-German) sentiments among Afrikaner nationalists translated not only into votes for the HNP but also into support for a range of pro-Nazi, proto-fascist movements. With their hopes pinned on a victory for the Axis, these movements sought to transform South Africa into a national-socialist Afrikaner republic, “severed from the British Crown and founded on the principle of ‘state authority’ and national discipline” (O’Meara 1983:125). They shared a contempt for the parliamentary system and rejected democratic elections (even those that catered for whites only) in favour of rule by the will of a Führer (or, in the Afrikaner case, the will of a general and field-cornets – Malan 1959:189).

Most formidable among these movements was the gender-inclusive Ossewa-Brandwag [Oxwagon Sentinel – OB], which in 1941 claimed a membership of between 300,000 and 400,000 (Malan 1959:188; Van der Westhuizen 2007:34).48 Established in February 1939 to preserve the “oxwagon spirit” of the centenary celebration of the Great Trek (cf. section 5.1.3), the OB reinvented itself late in 1940 as a paramilitary political organisation. Under the leadership of J.F.J. (Hans) van Rensburg, who had resigned as administrator (or governor) of the Free State to take up the position, the organisation’s Stormjaers [Storm Troopers] embarked on a sabotage campaign aimed at disrupting the war effort. The government

48 Giliomee (2007:301) puts the estimate much lower at 100,000. Yet even if his information is closest to the truth, it means that roughly one out of every ten Afrikaners had joined the OB by 1941.
responded by interning many senior OB members, including the young lawyer Balthazar Johannes Vorster, who would become prime minister of South Africa in 1966.

Smaller Nazi-inspired organisations that sprang up in South Africa before and during World War II included the anti-Semitic South African Christian National Socialist Movement or Greyshirts of Louis Weichardt (which never had more than 2,000 members – Giliomee 2007:300) as well as the Nuwe Orde Studiekring [New Order Study Circle – NO]. The latter was established in September 1940 by Oswald Pirow, who had met with Hitler the year before while travelling Europe as Hertzog’s defence minister. Several of the HNP’s parliamentary representatives joined the NO, but they were ostracised by the party leadership, not least because virtually all of them were ex-UP members. After a short period of cooperation with the OB, the HNP set out to neutralise that organisation too. Malan, as Sparks explains, “could live with many of Pirow’s and Van Rensburg’s ideas, but not with the political rivalry they represented” (1990:172).49 What Malan and other senior members of his party could not live with was the idea of a dictatorship. When election time came in 1943, the schism between the HNP and the national socialist splinter groups had deepened to the extent that the party “concentrated its main fire not on the governing coalition under Smuts, but against what its manifesto termed ‘the wreckers of Afrikanerdom’” (O’Meara 1983:132). Had the opposition not been fragmented in 1943, and had thousands of OB and NO supporters not abstained from voting (in accordance with their view of elections as obsolescent), the election results would have looked differently and the UP might have approached the next election – that fateful one of 1948 – with less complacency.

49 The question arises as to just how many ideas the NO/OB and the HNP did share at the time. In his 1990 book, The mind of South Africa, Sparks argues that “the extent to which Afrikaner nationalism was influenced by the ideas and political ethos of Nazi Germany during these formative years of the apartheid ideology is something that has been heavily downplayed since the collapse and exposure of the Third Reich” (1990:160; cf. also Furlong 1991). However, subsequent studies (inter alia Brits 1994) have shown – in my view, convincingly – that authors such as Sparks overrate the impact of national socialism and fascism on Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid. Following Van der Weshuizen (2007:36), one may conclude that the relationship did not progress beyond flirtation, but that the flirtation was “more than skin-deep”.

47
1.5 “South Africa belongs to us!”

By the end of the war, national socialism had lost its appeal and Malan had convinced the northern extremists in his party that it would be “the epitome of political idiocy to ignore the facts and to act as if those 45 percent English speakers in our country [i.e., 45 percent of South Africa’s white population] do not exist” (Malan 1964:50). The desired republic, he asserted, could only be a “democratically” elected, bilingual, bi-ethnic one. This did not mean that the party leader was lukewarm towards republicanism. In the run up to the 1943 election, he had told the national congress of the HNP emphatically: “The British connection must go; in its place we must have a republic” (Malan 1964:47):

> There, before us, lies the object of our aspiration. There lies the promised land of our freedom. There lies the hope of those who had fallen on the Path of South Africa since the days of Piet Retief and Andries Pretorius and Hendrik Potgieter. 50 There lies the free, independent, contented republic for which the blood-stained plains, strewn with dead man’s bones, are yearning. There lies our God-ordained destination (Malan 1964:43).

But one does not share with the electorate everything one shares with party congresses. As the 1948 election drew closer, the Nationalists stripped their policy of controversial attributes. White English-speaking South Africans were assured that an HNP government would neither demote their language nor force a republic upon them. The aim was not so much to attract the English vote as it was to appease moderate Afrikaners who otherwise might have voted for the UP. The Rand Daily Mail, for one, remained unconvinced. Supporting the UP, the newspaper announced on the morning of 26 May 1948:

> Today is polling day. The main issue before the electorate is whether the present Government, represented by the United Party under the leadership of General Smuts, will continue to administer the State, or whether the Nationalist Party, led by Dr Malan, shall be placed in power to establish a republic.

> The United Party has 139 candidates in the field and the Labour Party, which is collaborating with the United Party, has eight candidates. The Nationalist Party has

50 Voortrekker heroes – cf. chapter 5.
nominated only 93 candidates, the Afrikaner Party 11, the Central Group (Cadmanites) 11, the South African (Dominion) Party 11 and the Communist Party three. There are also 28 Independent candidates.

With about 63 members of the Afrikaner Broederbond standing as Nationalist Party candidates, it is apparent that the Broederbond is using this election as its springboard to obtain full representation in Parliament, as a prelude to the achievement of its main objective – the establishment of an Afrikaner republic (quoted in Cameron-Dow 2007:54).

As far as the Nationalists (and the members of the Broederbond) were concerned, the issue before the electorate was not their republican ideals, but their policy of apartheid. The latter, they believed, was their ticket to power in a country where the Second World War had accelerated industrialisation and black urbanisation, and where black opposition to racial discrimination was taking on an assertive character.51 Exploiting white fears of “miscegenation” and black domination, the HNP – which contested the election in collaboration with N.C. (Klaas) Havenga’s AP52 – told voters that South Africa’s existing policy of segregation had failed to neutralise the swart gevaar and to prevent the oorstroming [swamping] of the cities by Africans. Only their unique model of segregation, the Nationalists claimed, could save “white civilisation” and Afrikanerdom. In the Free State, the election-day edition of Die Volksblad [The Volk’s newspaper] put it as follows: “Break the SAP government or it will break white South Africa” (quoted in Brits 1994:113). Die Transvaler, still under the editorship of H.F. Verwoerd, called on its readers to vote early and to vote against Hofmeyr: “VOTE, THEREFORE, FOR THE HNP, THE AP AND INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES THAT STAND FOR THE APARTHEID POLICY” (quoted in Brits 1994:114). For Die Transvaler and Die Volksblad – as for Die Burger in the Cape Province – election day marked the end of a very busy time, during which they collectively emerged as the mass ventilator of the apartheid ideology (Rhodie 1968:53) and as a resourceful propaganda machine (Brits 1994:126).

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51 August 1946 saw a strike by close on 70,000 African mineworkers.
52 This electoral pact between the Malanites and the Hertzogites (which was opposed by radical northerners such as Verwoerd and Strijdom) would eventually culminate in the amalgamation of the HNP and the AP in 1951.
The HNP-AP campaign against Hofmeyr was a campaign against liberalism, which, in the minds of the Nationalists, was often indistinguishable from communism. To them, the danger of these ideologies lay therein that both preached *gelykstelling* [racial levelling]. The truth, as J.P. Brits (1994:131) points out, is that liberalism had no hope of making a political breakthrough in South Africa in 1948. No party that spoke the language of liberalism stood a chance at the polls. In its election campaign, the UP kept asserting that neither the ruling party nor its deputy leader (Hofmeyr) supported *gelykstelling*. Yet while it remained a white supremacist party, the UP was less rigid in its approach to “the native question” and not as racist in its rhetoric as the Nationalists with their master plan to keep the towns and cities of South Africa white. At least some UP MPs quietly believed that black and white were *potentially* equal. This relatively liberal stance, according to a widely held view, was what cost Smuts the election. To white farmers annoyed by the flow of black labour from the countryside, and to white workers frustrated by black competition for jobs, the choice between a party that had relaxed influx control and one that promised to tighten it up was obvious (O’Meara 1983:242–247; Marks and Trapido 1987:20).53

Revisionist studies suggest, however, that the importance of apartheid as a vote-catching factor in the 1948 election has been overestimated (cf., *inter alia*, Stultz 1974; Moodie 1975; Brits 1994). If one views votes against the HNP-AP as votes against apartheid, it can be concluded that the policy failed to inspire the enthusiasm of more than half of those South Africans who had voted in 1948.54 The trickier question is whether all the crosses next to the names of HNP and AP candidates – the vast majority of which were put there by Afrikaners – were primarily votes for apartheid. The evidence points to a more complex picture.

To be sure, Afrikaners voted for the HNP and the AP because they perceived Africans as a threat and because they stood to benefit materially from apartheid.

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53 Afrikaner commercial and financial interests, in turn, were to benefit indirectly from an agriculture-friendly government.

54 The position of those who did not turn up at the polls – some 58 percent of all potential voters (Van der Westhuizen 2007:37) – will, of course, never be known.
But politics, and then especially nationalist politics, is about interests and identity. Afrikaners also supported the two Afrikaner parties simply because they were Afrikaners (or, more accurately, because the nationalist movement had made Afrikaners of them by then—a project that I detail elsewhere in this study). An anonymous respondent in a survey conducted by Brits explained the reason why she voted for the HNP as follows:

Those days we so to say assumed that an Afrikaner should be a [N]ationalist and that was often the case. Look how many of the rural constituencies were undisputed. Here among us, one could count the Afrikaners who were [United Party supporters] on one hand. You know, [...] many Afrikaners had never trusted General Smuts, because there was still Jopie Fourie [the martyr of the 1914 Rebellion] etc. and now again he had dragged us through a war and with General Hertzog out of the picture those people [Hertzog’s followers] had come back to the National Party (Brits 1994:126).

According to Brits (1994:119–120), sentiments such as these played a more decisive role in the election of 1948 than support for apartheid. His argument is twofold: If the swart gevaar and swart oorstroming [black swamping of the cities] had been foremost in the mind of Afrikaners, (a) these themes would have featured far more prominently than they did in letters to the Afrikaans press during the run-up to the election, and (b) more urban voters would have deserted the UP.

The belief that it was not primarily enthusiasm for apartheid that brought the Nationalists to power is shared by Hermann Giliomee. Implicit in his interpretation of the election’s dynamics is the view that apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism were two discrete role-players. “The disastrous aspect of the 1948 election”, as Giliomee sees it, “was that everybody thought afterwards that it was apartheid, and not Afrikaner nationalism or anti-war sentiments,55 that had clinched the NP’s victory” (2003:14). The same nationalism/apartheid dichotomy underlies his thinking when he claims in an autobiographical essay: “As staunch

55 At this stage, the anti-war vote was largely a vote against the government’s response to the social and economic problems of the post-war years (such as housing and food shortages).
[H]NP supporters my parents were Afrikaner nationalists rather than zealous supporters of apartheid” (2003:14–15). Afrikaner nationalists, unlike apartheid enthusiasts, were committed to what Giliomee portrays as noble projects:

- a republican project, which longed to see Afrikaners as a community playing their role with self-confidence in a country that was as independent from Britain as possible;
- a populist project, which was against the big English corporations, especially the Anglo American Corporation, that towered over the economy. [...] The nationalists insisted that the state as well as the Afrikaner community as a whole should take responsibility for poorer Afrikaners. (My mother played an active role in the Afrikaanse Christelike Vrouevereniging [Afrikaans Christian Women’s Association], a women’s organisation which was committed to the upliftment of poor Afrikaners); and
- a cultural project, which valued mother-tongue education and active involvement in the Afrikaans language and cultural movement (2003:14; free translation).

That the Nationalists owed their 1948 victory in no small measure to anti-imperialist, anti-big-capital and anti-English sentiments (in short: anti-Smuts sentiments) has been firmly established in the literature. What Giliomee seems to suggest, however, is that the bearers of these sentiments – those Afrikaners who longed to be as free, as affluent and culturally as sophisticated as the local Anglos or the British – were Afrikaner nationalists, while the defenders of apartheid were driven by a different, less righteous cause. I would argue, instead, that republican, populist and cultural sentiments were one side of the coin. The flip side was a racist belief in white supremacy. The latter might not have been what inspired Afrikaners to vote for the HNP-AP, but it was part and parcel of the Afrikaner nationalist movement, which, like all nationalist movements, sought to maximise its political power. And in a country where Afrikaners formed barely twelve percent of the population, power was unattainable without a policy that restricted

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56 Giliomee (2004:33) does not deny that control of the state was the ultimate goal of Afrikanerdom’s pre-apartheid economic and cultural movements. Here, however, he appears to claim that “the Afrikaner nationalist elite was somehow different to elites the world over – that the promotion of their self-interest was tempered by a race and culture-specific altruism” (Van der Westhuizen 2007:3).
the franchise outside the reserves – or, in apartheid’s terms, the black “homelands” – to whites.

Of those Afrikaner voters who were passionate about apartheid, Giliomee claims, many were not racists, but “idealists” who believed that the policy was something positive aimed at the upliftment of “black and brown communities” through the provision of better social services (2005:14). He draws a similar distinction with respect to apartheid’s ideologues (or what he calls theorists): there were those who wanted “to keep down all those who were not white and those who wanted to rehabilitate them and recognize their human dignity” – _inter alia_ through the large-scale development of the reserves (2003:482). What needs to be pointed out, however, is that even these moderate adherents of apartheid – ideologues and voters alike – were guilty (at the very least) of racial paternalism.

Whether the NP had racists or nationalists to thank, the state of the parties in the tenth Union parliament (as announced on Friday 28 May 1948) was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Party</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaner Party</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Smuts was defeated in his own constituency of Standerton. Ironically, as Thompson notes, “the United Party would have won the election if the rural electoral divisions had not contained fewer voters than the urban divisions, as laid down in the [1909] constitution for which Smuts had been primarily responsible” (2000:181). The HNP received only 41.5 percent of the votes cast. It was because of South Africa’s election system and the way in which constituencies had been delimited that the party and its AP ally were able to secure 8 seats more than the UP-Labour coalition. Had seats been allocated in proportion to votes received, UP-Labour would have had 80 seats, the HNP-AP pact 60, and other parties 10 (Brits 1994:116). Or: had “ninety-one people out of more than a million, strategically placed, [...] voted differently, then the United Party would have won
four more seats and hung the Parliament – and might have been able to govern with the help of the three white representatives of the Africans” (Ross 2008:122).

To conclude: Two issues dominated white politics in South Africa between 1910 and 1948: the country’s relationship with Britain, and the relationship between local English speakers and Afrikaners. Occasionally, economic and labour issues were also high on the agenda. The “native question” (or what Malan called the “colour question”) only rose to prominence in the elections of 1929 and 1938 when Hertzog’s NP and Malan’s GNP ran campaigns based on racist metaphors, and then especially the _swart gevaar_. Recognising the potential of such slogans as vote catchers, the Nationalists set out to turn the 1948 election into an election about apartheid (Brits 1994:118). In many respects, though, the apartheid election was still an election about South Africa’s status _vis-à-vis_ Britain and about intra-white relations. While the _Rand Daily Mail_ (quoted above) was mistaken in its assumption that an HNP victory would immediately lead to the establishment of an Afrikaner republic, fears among English speakers that it would lead to Afrikaner domination was well founded. We need only consider one of Malan’s first speeches as prime minister. On 1 June 1948, after a victorious train journey from Cape Town to Pretoria, he hailed the outcome of the election as a miracle for “us Afrikaners”:

No one expected this to happen. It exceeded our most optimistic expectations. Afrikanerdom has lived under a dark cloud and the future has been black for many years. We feared for the future of our children. But the cloud has disappeared and the sun is shining once more.

In the past, we felt like strangers in our own country, but today South Africa belongs to us once more. For the first time since Union, South Africa is our own. May God grant that it always remains our own.57

Such was the source of the new prime minister’s gratitude to God: political power was now exclusively in our – that is, in Afrikaner – hands. A horrified Hertzog would have said that he was right back in 1935 when he claimed that

when Dr Malan denies that he was influenced, and is still influenced, in his refusal to co-operate with the United Party and national unity by [intra-white] racial animosity and the desire to dominate over the English section of our population, he makes an inaccurate statement (quoted in Wilkins and Strydom 1978:64).

But Malan soon toned down the rhetoric of an Afrikaner victory. In a radio address broadcast on 4 June 1948 (three days after the station speech in which he had triumphantly proclaimed that “South Africa belongs to us [Afrikaners]”), he sounded almost like Hertzog. There was no mention of a republic. The prime minister merely stated that cooperation with Britain would be subject to it not affecting the Union’s status as an independent sovereign state. All local English speakers who “prioritised the interests of South Africa above those of any other country in the world” (Malan 1964:241) were welcomed into the fold. The definition of “National” in “National Party”, Malan explained, was inclusive rather than exclusive and encompassed “all sections [read: both white sections] of the South African population whose prosperity and happiness we, in all sincerity, would like to promote along with mutual friendship and cooperation” (Malan 1964:241). In a further attempt to allay English fears, he told white South Africa that the government’s policy of equal language rights – “the only basis upon which our national unity can be built” – would eventually lead to “the total elimination of the so-called [intra-white] race question from the political life of South Africa” (Malan 1964:242). As the prime minister saw it, the process of “racial” conciliation and nation building could only benefit from the fact that “today, for the first time since the formation of the Union, a government exists of which the members are all fully bilingual and therefore able to serve both population groups each in its own language” (Malan 1964:243).

English-speaking members of the Opposition would not have described the new Government as “bilingual”. To them – and in reality – it was a government of Afrikaners, just as its predecessor was a government of English speakers headed by an Afrikaner who spoke English most of the time. It must have been this lack of language loyalty on the part of Smuts that had prompted Malan to make the following remark in the house of assembly on 10 March 1944:
There, on the opposite side, next to each other, sit the prime minister [Smuts] and the minister of finance [Hofmeyr] – both brilliant students who know Afrikaans and English well; I think their level of bilingualism is exceptional. But the prime minister will excuse me if I say that, despite his English education, he seems unable to part ways with his Swartland ascent. All of us have two hands but only one right hand. That, quite obviously, is also true about language. As for the minister of finance who comes from an equally privileged background […] if he switches from Afrikaans to English, he reminds one of a fish thrown back into the water. Regardless of how bilingual or trilingual one may be, only one language is really one’s own – your mother tongue (Malan 1964:248; free translation).

Despite its reputation, then, South Africa’s tenth general election was not only about white domination. The question before the electorate was rather: what form should white domination take? Or: which one of the two white communities should dominate? (Cf. Giliomee 2003:487.) To say this is not to suggest that the white electorate was neatly divided along linguistic lines in 1948: the UP still managed to garner a fifth of the Afrikaner vote and the apartheid policy attracted some English-speaking support for the Nationalists. However, after the election no more than a single predominantly Afrikaans-speaking constituency was still in UP hands (Brits 1994:117).58 This was the scenario Malan had in mind when he told the crowd who came to meet him at the Pretoria railway station on 1 June 1948, “South Africa belongs to us”.

Three days later, when he addressed South Africans over the airwaves, the 74-year-old prime minister realised that the occasion called for a watered-down version of Afrikaner nationalism. Afrikanerdom’s freshly acquired grasp on power was precarious, and the language of ethnic-linguistic exclusivism, like the language of republicanism, could only harm what would be his government’s primary project: the implementation of apartheid. Curiously, for a man who had claimed in 1942 that “there are many questions in this country, but the most serious one […] is the colour question” (Malan 1964:61), Malan had very little to

58 It was Jeppe, a working-class suburb of Johannesburg, which was represented by Bertha Solomon from 1938 to her retirement in 1958. The daughter of Russian Jewish immigrants, Solomon was one of South Africa’s first women’s rights activists and played a key role in the local woman suffrage movement.
say about apartheid in his radio address. And yet his preoccupation with the intra-white “race question”, rather than the “colour question”, did not mark a shift in his thinking. If he advocated Afrikaans-English integration, it was because he saw it as part of his party’s plan to curb the trend toward integration across the black-white divide; if he promoted the idea of an inclusive (white) South African nation whose interests took precedence over those of Britain and the Commonwealth, it was because Afrikaner nationalists believed, as Giliomee explains, that “white unity, as the bedrock of white supremacy, could only be built through the development of a single [...] loyalty to South Africa” (2003:494).

On Monday 7 June 1948, *Time* magazine published these prophetic words:

Jan Christian Smuts, the wise, venerable, oak-solid Prime Minister [of the Union of South Africa] was out of office. South Africa, which had been considered safe in the fold of the British Commonwealth [...] had suddenly embarked on a perverse, isolationist, acutely race-conscious road that might lead to secession from the Commonwealth and to maltreatment and oppression of the country’s 9,000,000 non-Europeans.\(^59\)

The Nationalist response to such condemnations of apartheid was that the policy was misunderstood: it would not entail the oppression of one race by another, but the separate, independent development of the different “races”. For non-whites, as Malan put it in his radio address of 4 June 1948, apartheid would bring a greater measure of self-reliance and self-respect, while at the same time creating more opportunities for “free development in accordance with their own nature and ability” (Malan 1964:243). Black and white would be “separate but equal”.\(^60\)

Statements such as these have led some commentators to conclude that the apartheid ideologues were insane. In an academic article in 1991, the literary scholar (and later Nobel Prize for Literature laureate) J.M. Coetzee diagnoses apartheid as “a form of hubris or madness” (1991:1). Based on an analysis of the

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60 In the mid-1950s apartheid was reinvented by its ideologues as *afsonderlike ontwikkeling* [separate development].
writings of one such an ideologue (to be discussed in the next chapter), Coetzee argues that “for at least the phase 1945–48, Geoffrey Cronjé, or the ‘Geoffrey Cronjé’ that matters, was crazy [and] the electorate which bought the package offered by Cronjé and his friends, besides being deceived or self-deceived, was also for a time crazy, or at least crazed” (1991:30). A more widely held opinion is that apartheid “had grown out of a deep underlying racism” (Johnson 2004:141) which compelled its ideologues to develop a whole language to justify the policy in an era when the United Nations was about to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, to denounce the apartheid ideologues as insane or their labours as a simple case of rationalising racism would be an oversimplification. In the next chapter, I trace the development of the apartheid ideology, arguing that it was rooted not only in racism but also in the logic of ethnic nationalism.

For almost forty years, the National Party – which formally dropped Herenigde from its name in 1951 when it incorporated the AP – defended apartheid, as did the Calvinist church that became known as “the National Party at prayer”. Only in the late 1980s would these two key institutions of Afrikaner nationalism begin to admit that South Africa took a retrogressive step in 1948. The stance adopted by the Dutch Reformed Church in 1986 was that “apartheid as a political and social system that wronged people and wrongfully favoured one group above another [can no longer] be accepted on Christian-ethical grounds” (quoted in Van der Westhuizen 2007:142). A decade later, the last white president of South Africa, F.W. de Klerk, made the following apology before the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission:

Apartheid was wrong. I apologize in my capacity as leader of the National Party to the millions of South Africans who suffered the wrenching disruption of forced removals in respect of their homes, business and land. Who over the years suffered the shame of being arrested for pass law offences. Who over the decades and indeed centuries suffered the indignities and humiliation of racial discrimination. Who for a long time were prevented from exercising their full democratic rights in the land of their birth. Who were unable to achieve their full potential because of job reservation. And who in any the way suffered as a result of discriminatory legislation and policies. This [...] apology is offered in spirit of true repentance, in
full knowledge of the tremendous harm that apartheid has done to millions of South Africans.\(^{61}\)

Could this unspeakable human suffering have been avoided, had the Nationalists lost the 1948 election? Would a UP victory have been a progressive step? Albert Luthuli, who was president of the ANC from 1952 until his death in 1967, did not think so:

For most of us Africans, bandied about on the field while the game was in progress and then kicked to one side when the game was won, the election seemed largely irrelevant. We had endured Botha, Hertzog and Smuts. It did not seem of much importance whether the whites gave us more Smuts or switched to Malan. Our lot has grown steadily harder (Luthuli 1962:97).

On the eve of the election, it was far from clear what “more Smuts” would mean for black, coloured and Indian South Africans. If the UP could have had its way, the election would not have been fought on the “native question”, not least because the ruling party’s “native policy” was vague, contradictory and confusing (Brits 1994:118). In August 1946, Smuts had appointed a commission under the relatively liberal Judge H.A. Fagan to investigate, \textit{inter alia}, the impact of the pass laws and the system of migrant labour on the lives of urban Africans. The commission found that black urbanisation was inevitable, as was black-white integration, at least in the economy. It recommended the “stabilisation of labour, which implied acceptance of the movement of black families from rural areas to live with their breadwinners” (Wilson 2009:83). Yet, whether a UP government would have implemented Fagan’s proposals – which were vehemently opposed by the Nationalists when his report was released in February 1948 – will remain a point of speculation.

What can be said with certainty is that the UP as an opposition party was feeble in its challenge of apartheid. During the final years of their reign, Smuts conceded, 

\(^{61}\) Source: http://ccmlab.uwaterloo.ca/pad/gov.html#apartheid (accessed April 2010). The TRC’s response was that De Klerk did not go far enough. What the committee also wanted to hear, as Giliomee explains, was that “the State Security Council, of which De Klerk had been a member, had authorized or condoned the murder and torture of state enemies” (2003:651).
“segregation [had] fallen on evil days” (Lewsen, quoted in Thompson 2000:176), while Hofmeyr would go further, advocating “the ultimate removal of the colour bar from [the Union] constitution” (Lipton 1986:21). This was not to be the UP’s stance on the issue after Hofmeyr’s unexpected death (at age 54) in December 1948, followed two years later by Smuts’s death (at age 80). Until its disbandment in 1977, the party’s “central contradiction was its refusal to abandon white supremacy while opposing a government committed to upholding white supremacy in an extreme form” (Saunders and Southey 1998:183).

When, in 1959, the UP adopted a position to the right of the NP and opposed government plans of transferring more land to Africans (as part of the “homeland” development programme), eleven liberal-minded MPs (out of a total of 53) broke with the opposition party and established the Progressive Party (PP). For thirteen years (1961–1974), the only PP member to win an election was Helen Suzman (1917–2009) – a former lecturer in economic history who represented the Johannesburg constituency of Houghton, the richest in South Africa. In international terms, as Ross (2008:144) points out, Suzman was hardly a leftist: the PP was funded substantially by Harry Oppenheimer, a founder member of the party who had succeeded his father Ernest as head of the Anglo American Corporation and De Beers Consolidated Mines in 1957. At the time, the Oppenheimers controlled, *inter alia*, 80 percent of the world’s diamonds and 40 percent of South Africa’s gold (Thompson 2000:201). What cannot be denied, though, is that “[t]here is basis for believing that as the sole voice of the voteless, [Helen Suzman] actually [represented] more South Africans than all the other members of Parliament combined”. By 1966, when this commentary appeared in the *New York Times* (quoted in Berger 2009:130), coloured voters had been

62 The UP continued to outpoll the NP in the elections of 1953, 1958 and 1961, but its support was dwindling.

63 Another party born out of frustration with the UP was the Liberal Party (est. 1953). The latter was quicker than the PP to adopt a policy of universal suffrage. When the apartheid government outlawed multiracial political parties in 1968, the PP survived by ditching its few black members. The Liberal Party, by contrast, decided to dissolve itself as a matter of principle.
disenfranchised (1956) and African representation in parliament (provided by a few elected whites) had been abolished (1959).

After the election of 1974, Suzman was joined in parliament by six more PP candidates, including the charismatic Afrikaner Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (1942–2010). Previously a professor of sociology at Stellenbosch University (whose chancellor he would become in 2008), Slabbert played a key role in converting the party’s qualified franchise policy into one of universal suffrage. Following amalgamations with smaller groups, the PP was renamed the Progressive Federal Party in 1975 and became the official parliamentary opposition in 1977, only to be replaced a decade later by the ultra-right Afrikaner nationalist Conservative Party (which had split from the NP in 1982.) But never was the NP to be defeated at the polls. In the end, the once mighty party negotiated itself out of power, lost some support to the (Afrikaner) nationalist right and a lot to the liberal left and, aged 80, collapsed into the African National Congress – a saga that forms part of next chapter.
CHAPTER 2
THE LAND WHICH THEY ONCE OWNED AND LOST AGAIN:
1948–1994

‘This is after all the fatherland, the inherited land, the birth land [...]:
the land which they once owned and lost again. They took owning it
for granted, without ever reflecting upon the value or meaning
thereof, and the loss never forced them to their senses’
(Schoeman 2007:74–75).

‘All that interests you is the house in which your grandparents spent
their life, your mother, your people, when they still owned and ruled
the whole world, the earth and all the stars’
(Schoeman 2007:175).

2.1 Apartheid: the new face of Afrikaner nationalism

In 1947 – the year before the Nationalist accession to power – a liberal historian
from the University of the Witwatersrand (who later became professor of history
at Queens University in Canada) published a notable political satire cum Wellsian
First published in 2015. In a vivid, detailed narrative the author, Arthur Keppel-
Jones, predicted a Nationalist triumph at the polls in 1952, an NP split to the right
on the issue of a republic in 1959 (which was accompanied by a split in the Dutch

64 This novel by Karel Schoeman, entitled Na die geliefde land [To the beloved country]
(translated into English as Promised Land), is today widely regarded as an eerily prophetic
masterpiece. First published in 1972, it tells the story of a young man who returns to South
Africa (from Switzerland where he lives) to visit the farm he had inherited from his mother.
Details about the political dispensation in the country are sparse, but what is clearly
suggested is that the Afrikaner characters in the book live under black majority rule. The
following comment came from Alan Paton, founding member of the Liberal Party and
renowned author of Cry the beloved Country (first published in 1948): “Na die geliefde
land] is written in Afrikaans, but it speaks to me about my own country more powerfully
than any other book has done. It is – whatever the oversensitive critics say – the story of
the death of Afrikanerdom. In Schoeman’s story, the language still lives on, but it is now the
language of grief and desolation. Will that be the fate of Afrikaans, of the language in
which the aspirations of the Afrikaner were sung and spoken? May it be preserved from
such an end” (1987:65).
Reformed Church), and an election victory for the right-wingers – the Christian National Party – in 1962.

Once in power, Keppel-Jones’s prophecy continues, the Christian National Party declared Afrikaans the sole official language of South Africa and restricted citizenship to all white people, excluding Jews, who were born in the country. This meant that the vast majority of South Africans were denied all civil rights. In the long run, such domination could be assured “only by silencing criticism and destroying the political system which made criticism possible” (Keppel-Jones 1947:84). Thus censorship act after censorship act was passed to stifle those “whose writings could be regarded as offensive to the feelings of the Volk, in that the feelings of the Volk was Christian National Republican” (Keppel-Jones 1947:62–63). Initially, organised black resistance against white oppression was timid, but political consciousness among Africans grew steadily – owing to a small, educated class – and in 1964, it culminated in a major uprising that was put down forcefully:

Thousands of Natives were roughly handled by the police and many arbitrary arrests made. The events produced the premature rising of February, 1964, which took the form of attacks on the police at many places in the eastern Free State and ugly demonstrations by Indians in Durban and by Coloured people in Capetown [sic]. There were also riots in many town locations. Troops were mobilised in the Free State and the main urban centres; special constables were enrolled [...] Many natives were shot and order quickly restored (Keppel-Jones 1947:103).

65 In reality, apartheid did not discriminate against Jews, at least not officially. Yet Afrikaner nationalism was not free of anti-Semitism. In the 1920s, it came to the fore in the Hoggenheimer cartoons, which D.C. Boonzaier created for Die Burger. With his silk hat, the bloated Hoggenheimer figure was a caricature of mining magnate Ernest Oppenheimer, who came from a family of prosperous German Jews. A naturalised Briton and Anglican convert, Oppenheimer immigrated to South Africa 1902 where he founded the Anglo American Corporation and gained control of the De Beers diamond company. To Boonzaier, Hoggenheimer represented “the cosmopolitan capitalist without attachment to the country except as a place where he could grow rich [...] at the expense of the honest patriot” (Le May 1995:148). In the 1930s, prominent Afrikaner nationalists, including Hendrik Verwoerd, opposed the immigration of German Jewish refugees to South Africa, arguing that their presence would pose a threat to Afrikaners in the professional and business world (Giliomee 2007:314).
According to the chronology of events in *When Smuts goes*, the primary aspiration of the Christian National Party government was realised in 1966 when the long-yearned-for Afrikaner republic was inaugurated. Within a decade, however, the republican government was overthrown by Anglo-American forces and black majority rule was instituted. Ironically, Keppel-Jones concludes his satire of Afrikaner nationalism’s anti-black racism with a scene that is blatantly Afro-pessimistic: South Africa “returns to barbarism”, and the country’s fate is finally sealed by the outbreak of a devastating plague in 2010.  

In crucial ways, of course, Keppel-Jones got it wrong. Yet, at the same time, it is remarkable how many passages in his forward-looking history read like the actual history of apartheid South Africa. In 1947, the future had all of these in store for the country: the Nationalists’ assumption of power; the realisation of the republican ideal; the interpenetration of party and church (and of political ideology and religion); the bitter split of the party and the church despite a desperate quest for *volkseenheid* [unity of the volk]; a parliament in which both the ruling party and the official opposition represented Afrikaner nationalists; the ruthless and brutal suppression of a liberation movement; and, finally, the demise of quasi-totalitarian white minority rule.  

In reality, the Afrikaner nationalist dream of a republic became true sooner than Keppel-Jones had expected it would, while both Nationalist solidarity and Nationalist rule lasted longer than he had predicted. 1951 saw the Malanites of the HNP and the Hertzogites of the AP reunited in one National Party (NP), and for almost two decades there would be no more (noteworthy) “births, rebirths and splits” in the party (Johnson 2004:140). The first splintering worth mentioning occurred in 1969 when the *Herstigte* [Re-established] National Party was founded under the leadership of Albert Hertzog (1899–1982), son of the General. In the actual saga, as in Keppel-Jones’s fantastic one, the NP split to the right. At issue,  

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66 In the 1940s, Keppel-Jones was not the only white liberal to whom a Nationalist victory spelled doom for South Africa. Jan Hofmeyr’s reaction to the 1948 election results was, “There is no hope for this country [...] unless they fight among themselves [and] they always do, don’t they?” (quoted in Giliomee 2003:482).
however, was the maintenance of apartheid, and not republicanism. It took the Re-established National Party until 1985 to win a seat in a general election. By then, however, another far more popular ultra-right wing party had broken with the NP. Formed in 1982 by Andries Petrus Treurnicht (1921–1993) and 22 other MPs who could not stomach the political reforms that were introduced by the second-last head of the apartheid state at the time (P.W. Botha), the Conservative Party (CP) replaced the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) as South Africa’s official parliamentary opposition in 1987. Two years later, on 6 September 1989, the CP won almost a third of the vote in the country’s last all-white general election.

However, I am getting ahead of myself. The first head of the apartheid state retired in 1954. Aged 80, D.F. Malan told the Cape congress of the NP in a farewell address that the time was not ripe for a republic. Having seen the Promised Land from afar, Malan had made his peace with the fact that he would not enter it. Nor would his successor, the harder-line *Transvaler* [inhabitant of the Transvaal], J.G. (Hans) Strijdom (1893–1958). But Strijdom began to pave the way: under his premiership both the Union Jack and “God save the Queen” lost their status as the co-official national flag and anthem of South Africa. On Strijdom’s death in 1958, his closest associate, H.F. (Hendrik) Verwoerd, became premier. It was the latter who, on Union Day (31 May) in 1961, declared South Africa a republic, following a referendum on the issue. Barely more than half (52 percent) of the whites who participated in the referendum voted for a republic, but a simple majority was all Verwoerd needed.

67 In Malan’s opinion, the republic had to wait until the NP had established itself securely in power. For, “if each election is about the republic,” he argued, then our opponents – as you very well know – will seize their opportunity. Many who voted with us in the last election [in 1953] are against a republic, but they agree with us on the colour question. Now, if you combine these two issues in an election the Opposition will tell them, ‘However you feel about the colour question, do not vote for the Nationalists because to them it is about the republic’ [H] every election is about the republic, then we jeopardise the republic and we jeopardise apartheid along with it (Malan 1964:101).

68 Dual citizenship of Britain and the Union of South Africa was outlawed in 1949.
The founding of the republic meant the end of South Africa’s membership of the Commonwealth, as the local Anglos had feared it would. Otherwise, little changed in the transition from Union to Republic: a decimal currency system (one rand equalling 100 cents) replaced the British currency, and a ceremonial state president took over the role of the British monarch (represented locally by the governor-general) as the head of state. However, the constitution of the Union remained virtually intact. The Nationalists did not seek to change the political system. What they hoped would happen in a republic, as Giliomee (2003:494) explains, was that the white English speaking citizens of South Africa would come to regard the country as their only fatherland.

By 1961, however, tensions between South Africa and Britain and between Afrikaners and local English speakers – those themes that took centre stage in white politics before 1948 – had become sideshows. Certainly, the Anglo-Afrikaner rivalry for status and symbolic power, to borrow Giliomee’s phrase (2003:xv), was far from over. Nor did apartheid end Afrikaners’ relative educational and economic backwardness; at least not soon. But after 1948, intra-white economic inequality was of secondary importance in Afrikaner nationalist politics. The struggle for symbolic or cultural power, too, took a back seat. What happened, as Giliomee (2007:311) interprets it, was that the apartheid aspect of the NP’s policy gradually sidelined that aspect of the policy that appreciated

69 The referendum was held on 5 October 1960, and during March of the following year, Verwoerd attended a meeting of Commonwealth premiers in London. When it appeared that South Africa’s application to remain a member of the organisation might be rejected because of apartheid, he withdrew it.

70 Under South Africa’s 1983 constitution, both this position and the position of prime minister were abolished and replaced by an executive presidency.

71 As South Africa entered the 1970s in the midst of an economic boom, the proportion of white English-speaking persons who had completed school was twice as high as that of Afrikaners, while there were two English-speaking university graduates for every Afrikaner with a degree. Afrikaners, who constituted 60 percent of the white population, earned only 45 percent of the total white income and a mere four percent of them – compared to thirteen percent of the Anglos – were in the highest income stratum (Giliomee 2003:544, based on Adam 1971). While Afrikaners’ aggregate share of the South African economy (excluding agriculture, which had always been dominated by them), had doubled in the first three decades after 1948, 80 percent of the economy remained in English hands. By 1975, Afrikaners controlled only 25 percent of the finance sector, eighteen percent of the mining sector, sixteen percent of the trade and commerce sector and fifteen percent of the manufacturing and construction sector (Giliomee 2003:543, based on Adam and Giliomee 1979).
Afrikaner culture and took pride in what had been achieved. This was hardly surprising: the cultural movement might have helped to bring the Nationalists into power (as described in chapter 5), but it could not keep them in power in an era of rising (Pan-)African nationalism. Only apartheid could. Faced with a new, far more threatening enemy, Afrikaner nationalism thus redefined local Anglos as potential allies. This explains why Malan who, in the early 1940s, had declared that the National Party was organised Afrikanerdom itself – a Christian National Republican party open to Afrikaners who wished to serve their volk (Malan 1964:57, 58) – would tell that very same party a decade later that

our nationalism is not for speakers of Afrikaans only. Nationalism should not be built on the basis of anti-English or anti-England. We are not a racial party [...] Our motivation in our political life should not be hatred against whoever. The only real motivation should be love. And therefore our door should always be open. Open to English speakers, and there are many who agree with us on the important issues. Open to English speakers to enter into our midst, and there are some of them – they are increasing in numbers – who will heartily cooperate with us and belong to our Party (Malan 1964:108).

It is here where Keppel-Jones’s prophecy lost the plot: while white English speakers had every reason to fear that a Nationalist government would compel all children in its schools and all employees of its civil service to learn the (generally) deeply unloved Taal [Language], anxieties about the status and rights of English and its speakers would not materialise. By the end of World War II, as noted in the previous chapter, the NP (then the HNP) had come to realise that it had to relinquish the nationalist luxury of an officially monolingual state if it wanted to have any state at all. In time, this Anglo-tolerant stance would pay off politically. Despite the fact that virtually no white English-speaking South Africans favoured a republic in the referendum of 1961, almost a fifth of Natal’s voters supported the NP in the general election of the same year. The Nationalists doubled their share of the vote in that predominantly English province in the 1966 election – the first

72 There were, of course, exceptions. Alan Paton once wrote, “Although Afrikaner nationalism outlawed the Liberal Party and inflicted grave punishments on many of my friends, I have never felt any animus against the Afrikaans language. It still remains for me one of the most vigorous and expressive languages in the world” (Paton 1987:65).
one since 1948 in which they won a clear majority (Van der Westhuizen 2007:39, based on Giliomee 1994). By the end of the 1970s, a significant number of English speakers countrywide were voting for the NP or, more specifically, for the party’s policy of apartheid. In my final high school year (1988), a mere two years before F.W. de Klerk released Nelson Mandela from prison, the English teacher let us copy the following texts from the blackboard as “Model letters to the press”. She was a mother-tongue speaker of English:

(a) Sir

HORRIFIED BY ONCE RESPECTABLE AREA

I am horrified at what has happened to the flat area [of Hillbrow] to which I have returned after an absence of some years. Protected by influx control and group areas [The Group Areas Act – cf. below], it resisted the Third World pressures of the station and bus termini for Black [sic] taxis. The repeal of influx control and the defiance of group areas have changed it into a slum. Now the streets reek with litter, washing hangs from the balconies, buildings are neglected, muggings and worse occur. Those Whites [sic] who can, are moving out.

[The only solution to the problem is] properly defined grey areas in which those who want to live as the Third World do, can do so without compromising those who don’t [sic].

(b) Sir

CONSUMERS PAY INCREASES

I notice that Pick and Pay [a major supermarket chain] has agreed to increase the salaries of Black [sic] workers by R100 a month forthwith and that May Day and 16 June [the commemoration of the Soweto uprising] are to be to paid holidays. These costs will, of course, be passed on to the customer. The effect is that every time the unions hold a pistol to the heads of the employers, the customers have to pay up.

If the increases are justified and are not a result of highjacking, why didn’t [sic] Hood and Ackerman [the supermarket bosses] pay them when they legitimately became due?

Of course, apartheid did not unite white South Africa. Among whites most, though by no means all, of the policy’s fiercest critics were English speakers. Local English-language newspapers as well as predominantly English organisations such as the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and the Black Sash gained international acclaim for their anti-apartheid campaigns. To Afrikaner nationalists, these activists continued to represent the *Engelse gevaar* [English peril]. The nature of the peril, however, had changed: it no longer lay in the Anglos’ loyalty (real or perceived) to Britain and their contempt (real or perceived) for Afrikaners and their culture, but in their “susceptibility” to either liberalism or communism, which made them enemies of apartheid. Apartheid had become, and would remain for four decades – in election after white election – the issue before South African voters.

The birth, life, death and legacy of apartheid constitute the topic of this chapter. It has been documented in texts too numerous to cite, and this is no place for another comprehensive account of South African politics after 1948. As in the previous chapter, I shall concentrate on those events in history that are relevant to my analysis of the interface between politics and culture in the development of Afrikaner nationalism. However, a focus confined to events alone would be too narrow. Any overview of the political developments in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa has to begin with an overview of the ideology of apartheid.

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73 The list of Afrikaner anti-apartheid activists includes, most famously, Abraham Louis (Bram) Fischer (1908–1975) and Christiaan Frederich Beyers Naudé (1915–2004). The grandson of the last president of the Republic of the Orange Free State, Fischer defended Nelson Mandela and his co-accused during the 1964 Rivonia Trial (cf. below). Afterwards he went underground to help to rebuild the banned South African Communist Party. Within a year, however, he was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment to be released only when he was dying of cancer. Beyers Naudé started out as a “Broederbond golden boy” (Giliomee 2003:528) and a minister in the DRC, but broke with the Bond and the Church after the Sharpeville massacre (cf. below). He was banned in 1977 and spent the following seven years in house arrest.
2.2 The ideology of apartheid

2.2.1 The point of departure

Apartheid was Afrikanerdom’s answer to the problem which always faces ethnic exclusivist nationalists – those who believe that the political and the national (read: ethnic-linguistic) unit should be congruent. Early on in his seminal work, *Nations and nationalism*, Ernest Gellner explains the nature of this problem as follows:

[V]ery many of the potential nations of this world live, or until recently have lived, not in compact territorial units but intermixed with each other in complex patterns. It follows that a territorial political unit can only become ethnically homogenous, in such cases, if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals (2006:2).

The founding father of the Afrikaners’ National Party, as has been pointed out in the previous chapter, opposed the anglicisation of Afrikaans speakers, but did not regard white English-speaking South Africans as non-nationals. It went without saying that Africans were non-nationals and that assimilating them into the Afrikaner volk was out of the question, but before the Second World War, it was still possible for white supremacists to deal with black non-nationals in the way Hertzog did by expelling them to “native reserves”.

To many of the “purified” Nationalists, who broke away from the NP after its coalition and fusion with the SAP in 1933 and 1934, respectively, Hertzog’s idea of a bilingual, bi-ethnic white nation was anything but appealing. However, as we have seen, they eventually had to concede that an ethnically homogenous Afrikaner state was unachievable. About one thing, though, Afrikaner nationalism was adamant, and would remain adamant for decades to come: South Africa had to be a racially homogenous state – a white state. The political and the racial unit should at least be congruous. The problem, from the perspective of the “purified” and later the “reunited” Nationalists, was that they found themselves in a country
where Africans outnumbered whites by a ratio of roughly 3.5:1,\textsuperscript{74} and in an era where tolerance with black exclusion from politics was wearing thin. Therefore, they came up with what they portrayed as a just alternative to segregation, called it apartheid, and presented it to the white electorate in 1948.

In the watershed election of that year, the NP’s manifesto was based on the report of its “colour question commission”. Appointed in 1947 (partly in response to the Fagan commission – cf. section 1.5) and led by Malan’s closest confidant, Paul Sauer, the commission proposed and defended a policy which can be regarded as the consolidation of the various contributions to apartheid that I shall consider below. In direct contrast to the Fagan report, which called for better management of black urbanisation, \textit{inter alia} through proper urban planning, the Sauer report notoriously stated:

\begin{quote}
The cities are the white man’s creation and the black man may enter them so long as he ministers to the needs of the white man, but must depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister (quoted in Wilson 2009:83).
\end{quote}

In this respect, apartheid ideology represented a continuation of segregationism: it strove to keep urban South Africa white.\textsuperscript{75} What distinguished apartheid from old-style segregation, besides the fact that it entailed “radical and total” segregation (Coertze et al. 1943:5), was an emphasis on linguistic differences among Africans (which were assumed to be ethnic differences). According to the apartheid ideologues of the 1930s and 1940s, speakers of the various African languages constituted volke and the reserves had to be transformed into “fatherlands” (later called “homelands”)\textsuperscript{76} for them. Here, under the guardianship of whites (preferably Afrikaners), each volk could develop – culturally and politically – in accordance with its own (divinely determined) character. For every volk in the world, so the ideologues believed, “has an inherent right to live and to develop

\textsuperscript{74} In 1946, according to census figures, the Union South Africa was home to 2,376,000 white and 8,618,000 black people (Giliomee 2003:595).

\textsuperscript{75} During its first decade in power, the apartheid government was relatively successful in this regard. By 1960, only 17 percent of blacks were urbanised, compared to 65 percent of whites (Thompson 2000:290).

\textsuperscript{76} Henceforth without inverted commas.
[just like every individual, and] the personal and national ideals of every individual and of every ethnic group can best be developed within its own national community” (M.D.C. de Wet Nel, quoted in Moodie 1975:265; Moodie’s translation). Detribalised Africans thus had to be retribalised, and future detribalisation had to be prevented by rooting the education of a tribe’s (or a volk’s) children in their ancestral culture (cf. Brits 1994:81–86). As Werner Eiselen (1899–1977) – arguably the pioneering architect of apartheid – put it, the duty of black leaders was “not to become black Europeans [read: black Englishmen] but to raise their people to a higher Black culture [read: higher black cultures]” (quoted in Sparks 1990:194). Such was the paternalistic logic of the ideology of apartheid, the origins of which can be traced to Stellenbosch University in the south and the Afrikaner Broederbond to the north of the Union of South Africa.

2.2.2 Contributions from the south

While the term apartheid only entered the lexicon of Malan and Die Burger around 1943, the birth of the concept of apartheid roughly coincided with the birth of the “purified” NP. The party, however, was not primarily responsible for the formulation and dissemination of the apartheid ideology between 1934 and 1948. That task was taken on by newspaper editors – notably Albert Geyer of Die Burger and Hendrik Verwoerd of Die Transvaler – and by Afrikaner academics in a range of fields, including history, sociology, politics, “native administration”, “Bantu languages” and, last at but not the least, volkekunde [study of volke]. The latter discipline was established in South Africa in 1926 when Werner Eiselen founded the department of Bantoeökunde [Bantology] at Stellenbosch University. Taught at Afrikaans-medium universities and “ethnic” universities (cf. section 2.3.1) until late in the twentieth century, Bantoeökunde and later volkekunde was a version of anthropology that studied African culture from an essentialist
perspective. Of apartheid’s early ideologues many were volkekundiges (practitioners of volkekunde), and Eiselen lead the way.

The son of a Berlin missionary, Eiselen spent his childhood and adolescence among the Pedi (speakers of Northern Sotho) and went on to study phonetics and anthropology at the universities of Berlin and Hamburg. He left Stellenbosch University (where he had met Verwoerd) in 1936 to become chief inspector of “native” education in the Transvaal, but returned to the academia a decade later for a brief stint as professor of volkekunde at the University of Pretoria. When Malan succumbed to northern pressure and appointed Verwoerd as minister of native affairs in 1950, Eiselen became his secretary – a position that he held until his retirement in 1960 (which, according to Moodie (1975:273), might have stemmed from his disillusionment with apartheid). As chairperson of the Bantu Education Commission appointed in 1949, Werner Eiselen was the principal draughtsman of one the most oppressive pieces of apartheid legislation: the Bantu Education Act of 1953.

Eiselen’s early input into (what had yet to be called) apartheid dates back to his Stellenbosch days and entailed a plea for what modern sociolinguists (and present-day Afrikaans language activists) would call the maintenance of linguistic diversity:

> It will be clear to everyone that the factors which favor the continued existence of the Bantu languages (Holy Writ, schools, literature) do not weigh up against those against it (white opposition to [a] third official language, multiplicity of Bantu languages). But there is one factor, and that the most important, which I have not yet

77 Anthropologists at South Africa’s English-language universities held a more sophisticated constructivist view of society and regarded volkekundiges as “apartheid’s anthropologists” (Gordon 1988). Like most other social scientists, anthropologists were organised in separate Afrikaans and English associations during the apartheid era. Anthropology was one of the last of the social sciences to overcome its language-ideology-based organisational schism when the South African Society for Cultural Anthropology (previously the Association for Afrikaans Volkekundiges) and the (predominantly English) Association for Anthropology in Southern Africa merged in 2001 to form Anthropology Southern Africa. (Cf. Van der Waal and Ward 2006:17.) South African historians still have to overcome their schism: the Historical Association of South Africa (and its journal Historia) and the Southern African Historical Society (and its journal South African Historical Journal) continue to co-exist, albeit no longer in isolation from each other.
mentioned. That is the will of a People to stand on guard [handhaaf], to remain immortal as a People. If such a will exists, then it can operate only through the medium of a unique ethnic language. From the history of the Boer People we learn how a People can retain its identity despite insuperable difficulties and enormous economic disadvantages.

The future will teach as whether the Bantu have a sufficient ethnically conscious stratum to persist and win for their languages a firm and abiding place in South Africa. From our side we can do much to encourage these Peoples in their struggle for cultural existence if we try to understand and respect their language and culture (Eiselen, quoted in Moodie 1975:272–273; Moodie’s translation).

It was in 1934, in an article entitled “What will become of the Bantu languages in South Africa?,”78 that Eiselen expressed these sentiments. The length of the quote is justified by its relevance to a key contention of this study, namely that certain contemporary efforts by white Afrikaans-speaking language activists to promote the African languages of South Africa have its roots in the racial paternalism of apartheid. As demonstrated in section 5.2.3, the argument still seems to be, “From the history of the Boer People we learn [and black South Africans can learn] how a People can retain its identity [and language]”. The paternalism of Eiselen, as Moodie interprets his writings, was fostered not by racism but by anthropological interests. Eiselen’s commitment to what he perceived to be the welfare of Africans, claims Moodie, was genuine (1975:273). Brits, too, remarks that Eiselen promoted apartheid because he believed that it would benefit South Africa’s “Bantu volke” by protecting them from the eroding effects of “Westernisation” (1994:86; cf. also Sparks 1990:193–194). Later on in his career, Eiselen would advocate politically (relatively) independent black homelands as a means of preserving and strengthening the ethnic and linguistic identities of Africans (Brits 1994:82).

What Eiselen came to envisage, in Gellnerian terms, was the satisfaction of the nationalisms of all the linguistically defined “potential nations” of South Africa. Since its inception, however, African nationalism in the country – of which the

78 The short answer to this question is: they would become official languages of the country in 1994.
leading exponents have been the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) – was “a struggle of natives to be recognised as a transethnic identity, as a race, as ‘Africans’” (Mamdani 2009:127). It was a form of nationalism that dealt with linguistic differences in its midst by ignoring them. English was adopted as a lingua franca and preferred to the mother tongue as the language of education – a stance that apartheid reinforced rather than changed. Eiselen’s opposition to such anglicisation might have been based on a sincere belief that it was not in the interests of Africans. But to speculate on the true motives of politicians is pointless. What cannot be denied is that apartheid ideologues knew all too well that it was in their own interest to try to replace “negative racial nationalism” in the black community with “positive cultural nationalism” (Moodie 1975:265). Those in the liberation movement – not all of whom were, of course, African or Black nationalists79 – saw through this divide-and-rule strategy.

When Eiselen left Stellenbosch in 1936, he had done enough to convert many a student to the notion of a “multinational” South Africa. Among them were two men who would become leading volkekundiges, P.J. (Piet) Schoeman80 and P.J. (Pieter) Coertze. In 1943, the latter co-produced what Giliomee (2003:467) regards as the first book that promoted a policy called apartheid in the language of the social sciences. In the publication, boldly entitled, Die oplossing van die Naturelleervaagstuk in Suid-Africa [The solution of the native question in South Africa], Coertze and two of his colleagues at Stellenbosch University, F.J. Language (!) and B.I.C. van Eeden, argued for the unscrambling of both the racial and the “black ethnic” egg in the country. The authors went as far as to propagate the withdrawal of black labour from white South Africa, claiming (naively) that “[a] progressive policy with respect to the reserves would gradually bring about a

79 Other important agents of liberation included the trade union movement and, after 1983, the multiracial United Democratic Front. The contribution of religious bodies should also not be underestimated.

80 Schoeman retired as professor of “Bantology” in 1947 to become a full-time writer. His novels are situated, virtually without exception, in the South African countryside and were popular among apartheid’s prescribers of schoolbooks.
whole range of national self-supporting economic units” (quoted in Giliomee 2003:467; Giliomee’s translation; emphasis added).

2.2.3 *The lay of the land to the north*

Stellenbosch University was not the only hub of apartheid-related ideological activity during the early 1940s. In the inland provinces of South Africa that function was fulfilled by the Broederbond, where the term apartheid had been in use since 1935 (when it was coined by a front organisation of the Bond, the *Suid-Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie* [South African League for Racial Studies] (est. 1935)). The apartheid debates in the Broederbond – which formed part of the organisation’s “ideological counter-offensive to fusion” (Bloomberg 1989:131) – brought a secular dimension to Bond thinking, which had long been characterised by Kuyperian Calvinism (after the Dutch theologian/politician Abraham Kuyper). To be sure, the *Broeders* did not become any less “Christian” in their approach to nationalism, but in the post-fusion years, they turned to “academic disciplines” other than theology for ideas that could justify the course Afrikaner nationalism was taking.

The heartland of Kuyperianism was Potchefstroom University in the north-western Transvaal, and by the late 1920s, academics from this institution had taken control of the Bond. L.J. du Plessis, a professor in political science, became deputy chairman in 1928, and chairman in 1930, to be succeeded by the theologian, J.C. van Rooy, in 1932. According to the version of Calvinism to which these men and their followers subscribed, nations – just like individuals –

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81 In 1933, the thousand-member strong Broederbond had 28 branches in the Transvaal, nineteen in the Orange Free State, four in the Cape Province and two in Natal. The Bond was indeed a predominantly northern organisation, as Giliomee (2003:421) describes it. Over the following two decades, however, the picture changed. The number of branches in the Cape doubled from 21 to 42 between 1938 and 1943, and totalled 54 in 1948 (compared to 58 in the Free State and 73 in the Transvaal). In 1953, the Cape branches outnumbered the Free State ones by 22. Throughout its existence, though, Transvaal was home to the majority of the Broederbond’s branches (Stals 1998:763).

82 Though prevalent in the Broederbond in the 1920s and 1930s, Kuyperianism was associated with the smallest (and most conservative) of Afrikanerdom’s three churches, namely the *Gereformeerde Kerk* [Reformed Church]. The largest church, the Dutch Reformed Church, adhered to a different stream of Calvinism, which emphasised the organic relationship between a volk and its church. (Cf. O’Meara 1983:67-71.)
had a God-ordained character and destiny. Certain nations even had a godly
calling and the Afrikaner volk, so the Potchefstroom scholars claimed, was one of
them. To the political philosopher and leading Kuyperian H.G. Stoker, the proof
lay in Afrikaner history:

God willed the diversity of Peoples. Thus far he has preserved the identity of our
People. Such preservation was not for naught, for God allows nothing to happen for
naught. He might have allowed our People to be bastardized with the native tribes as
happened with other Europeans. He did not allow it. He might have allowed us to be
anglicized, like for example, the Dutch in America... He did not allow that either. He
maintained the identity of our People. He has a future task for us, a calling laid
away. On this I base my fullest conviction that our People will again win back their
freedom as a People. The lesson of our history must always be kept before our eyes
(Stoker, quoted in Moodie 1975:67; Moodie’s translation).

One could be forgiven for mistaking German Romanticism as the inspiration
behind Stoker’s brand of nationalism and republicanism (“our volk will again win
back their freedom as a volk”). Should his “diversitarian view of the world” – the
belief that national diversity is patently the design of God (Kedourie 1985:56–57)
– not be traced back to Johann Gottfried Herder? Is Stoker’s view of the Afrikaner
volk as a natural division of the human race with its own character, which must be
preserved purely (Kedourie 1985:58) not also Herderian in origin? Did Stoker not
get the idea that each volk had a special role in God’s master plan from Friedrich
Schleiermacher, who once wrote that “it is God who directly assigns to each
nationality its definite task on earth” (Kedourie 1985:58)?

Stoker and his ilk, however, were inspired not by German Romanticism but by the
Kuyprian doctrine of soewereiniteit in eie kring [sovereignty in own sphere]. To
them, volke represented independent spheres in which the sovereignty of God was
absolute (O’Meara 1983:67–70). It was a new generation of ideologues who
introduced the Broederbond to German Romanticism, or what Moodie (1975) has termed, neo-Fichteanism. Most influential among them were:

(a) Hendrik Verwoerd (1901–1966), who turned down an Abe Bailey scholarship to Oxford University after receiving a doctorate in philosophy from Stellenbosch University. Instead, he opted for post-doctoral study in psychology at the universities of Hamburg, Berlin and Leipzig. After a year or two in Germany, Verwoerd visited universities in the United States in 1927 before returning to Stellenbosch in 1928 as professor of applied psychology. By the time he left Stellenbosch University to become editor of *Die Transvaler* (1937), he also held a professorship in sociology and social work. (Future career: senator 1948; minister of native affairs 1950; prime minister 1958–1966.)

(b) Nicolaas (Nic) Diederichs (1903–1978), who studied at graduate level in Munich, Cologne and Berlin before obtaining a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Leiden in 1929. On his return to South Africa, the University of the Orange Free State appointed him as professor of philosophy and political science. (Future career: MP 1953; several economic ministerial portfolios; state president 1975–1978.)

(c) Piet Meyer (1909–1984), whose nationalism, like that of Verwoerd, stood between him and an Oxford degree. In the early 1930s he declined a Rhodes scholarship and went to the Free University of Amsterdam instead where he completed a doctorate in philosophy and education. Meyer also spent time in Germany, attending the Berlin anti-Comintern school (Bloomberg 1989:137). (Future career: head of the state-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation 1959–1976; Broederbond chair 1960–1972.)

(d) Geoffrey (Geoff) Cronjé (1907–1992), who earned a doctorate in sociology and criminology from the University of Amsterdam. In 1933, he became a

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83 Moodie (1975:154, 299) uses this term to refer to nationalism as Elie Kedourie (1960) interpreted the concept — that is, as ethnic exclusivist nationalism of which the prime source has been Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s “Address to the German nation”.

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lecturer and in 1936 a professor in the department of sociology at the University of Pretoria – a position he held until his retirement.

These men, as Moodie (1975:x) summarises it, arrived home with a neo-Fichtean social-philosophical framework, rose rapidly in the ranks of the Broederbond and steered the organisation into political, economic and cultural activity. They also charted a new ideological course for the Bond. Meyer became the full-time secretary of the Broederbond’s front organisation, the *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge* [Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations] (FAK, est. 1929), in 1937, while Diederichs replaced Van Rooy as chairman of the Bond in 1938 after having served in the executive council since 1934. Verwoerd, in turn, joined the Bond’s executive council in 1942 (Stals 1998:759).

Two years into his chairmanship, Diederichs was appointed to the FAK’s Commission for Racial Relations which Cronjé convened (Serfontein 1979:52–53; Pelzer 1979:162). In 1944, this commission organised an FAK volkskongres [volk congress] on the Afrikaners’ “colour policy” with the aim to neutralise “malevolent misrepresentations and distortions” of the policy. A two-day meeting of “specialists in the field” preceded the congress, which was open to all and attended by representatives of about 200 church and cultural bodies (Swart and Geyser 1979:28, 31). The “experts” (all of them *Broeders*) presented papers, and in the end the congress agreed with them

that *gelyksstelling* [racial levelling] of whites and non-whites would be fatal to whites; that blood-mixing was detrimental to both black and white (according to ‘scientific evidence’) and should thus be avoided; that the Bible made it clear that God had made provision for different nations since the creation and that racial separation in South Africa was therefore justified (Brits 1994:80).

In their report, the congress organisers supported the apartheid idea without developing it into a comprehensive and detailed ideology. That challenge was taken on by Cronjé in his book, *’n Tuiste vir die nageslag: die blywende oplossing*

84 The Bond’s activist initiatives of the post-fusion era (1934–1948) are revisited in chapter 5 of this study. Of concern here is the organisation’s contribution to the ideology of apartheid.
van Suid-Afrika se rassevraagstukke [A home for posterity: the lasting solution of South Africa’s racial problems]. Published in 1945, it became the Broederbond’s political bible and was soon supplemented by three related books – all by Cronjé: Afrika sonder die Asiaat: die blywende oplossing van Suid-Afrika se Asiatevraagstuk [Africa without the Asian: the lasting solution to South Africa’s Asian problem] (1946); Regverdige rasse-apartheid [Just race apartheid] (1947); and Voogdyskap en apartheid [Guardianship and apartheid] (1948). Through articles in newspapers and magazines Cronjé popularised his teachings, most of which concurred with those of the volkekundiges at Stellenbosch University. Like Coertze, Language and Van Eeden, he believed that white dependency on African labour could be eliminated or, as he later conceded, at least reduced, and that the reserves could become economically viable, self-governing black states (under white trusteeship). The coloured population of South Africa, too, should constitute themselves as a nation, while Indians should be repatriated to India. Only along this route, Cronjé warned, could the dangers be overcome that was posed to the white race by “miscegenation” (which implied “biological degeneration”), liberalism (with its emphasis on racial equality) and communism (with the appeal it held for a detribalised black proletariat). (Cf. Marks and Trapido 1987:19–20.)

Not all of the abovementioned neo-Fichteans shared Cronjé’s preoccupation with “South Africa’s racial problems”. In their work (most of which did not make for easily digestible reading), Diederichs and Meyer were primarily concerned with the development of their own volk. Nor was neo-Fichteanism the only thought current, as Charles Bloomberg (1989:137) once put it, in which the post-fusion generation of Broederbond ideologues fished for justificatory ideas. The social

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85 If it proved impossible to replace black workers with white immigrants or with machinery, it was argued, the various black volke were to live separately in the locations.
86 This was still the stance of apartheid’s defenders in the early 1980s. Cf. Coertze (1983:138).
87 As Broederbond ideologue, Diederichs is best known for his booklet Nasionalisme as lewensbeskouing en sy verhouding tot internasionalsime [Nationalism as Weltanschauung and its relation to internationalism], which was published by Nasionale Pers in 1935. For a discussion of the work and the debate it provoked among the Afrikaner nationalist elite, cf. Moodie (1975:156–165).
science that came out of the United States – and particularly the American doctrine of “separate but equal” – impressed Verwoerd more than anything he had discovered in Germany (cf. Miller 1993). Diederichs and Meyer, on the other hand, were influenced by the ideology of national socialism (as were the Kuyperians, L.J. du Plessis and H.J. Stoker), at least to a significant degree. It has been argued, notably by Moodie (1975:274–275) and Sparks (1990:176–181), that Cronjé, too, drew on German Rassenkunde [racial studies] in his influential work, 'n Tuiste vir die nageslag. Not only was the book published by the Nazi-imitating Ossewa-Brandwag (cf. section 1.4), but it emphasised racial differences and “the superior position of the whites” (quoted in Moodie 1975:275). In this respect, Cronjé departed from ideologues such as Eiselen who couched their defence of apartheid in the less overtly racist discourse of ethnic pluralism.

2.2.4 The nationalist principle qualified and compromised

In summary, it can be said that apartheid was the brainchild of “purist” Afrikaner nationalists who – unlike Hertzog – adopted the Fichtean formula that “wherever a separate language is found there a separate [divinely created] nation exists which has the right to take independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself” (Williams 1994:5). In the Afrikaner case, however, the formula was more complex: speakers of the same language constituted members of the same nation, if they belonged to the same “race”. In fact, as a principle of inclusion/exclusion, race took precedence over language. For potential candidates with the right language but the wrong skin colour (i.e., for the majority of South Africa’s coloured population) there was no hope of becoming Afrikaners. Immigrants from Europe, on the other hand, who were prepared to learn Afrikaans could become “thoroughbred” Afrikaners.

88 Meyer called his son Izan, which is “Nazi” spelled backwards, only to claim that it was a coincidence after the war (Sparks 1990:162).
89 Hendrik Verwoerd was born in The Netherlands and came to South Africa with his parents as a two-year-old boy. D.F. Malan and his wife adopted a German girl who was orphaned during the Second World War and no doubt came to regard her as an Afrikaner child. James Thomas (Jimmy) Kruger, who was South Africa’s minister of justice and the police from
In another respect, too, Afrikaner nationalism was not entirely consistent in its Fichtean approach to the relationship between language, nation and state: it tolerated white English speakers in the national territory. However, in the space that really mattered – there where modern nations are moulded and where their existence is preserved (as Fichte put it in his “Addresses to the German nation” – Kedourie 1985:83), where “the will of the young [is bent] to the will of the nation” (Kedourie 1985:84) – the Anglos would not be tolerated: inside the walls of classrooms. Afrikanerd़om’s mother-tongue education/“own schools” project, which insisted on separate educational institutions for Afrikanders and white English-speaking South Africans, was originally a Broederbond initiative and, by the Broeders’ own admission (through chairman Piet Meyer in 1968), among their most important ones:

The Christian national education of our Afrikaner youth in and by own mother-tongue institutions from kindergarten and primary school to university and other institutions of tertiary education, was one of the primary objectives of our Brotherhood from the beginning [...] Our participation [...] in the establishment of mother-tongue schools and the Afrikanerisation of our universities is the golden thread that runs through all our activities (quoted in Wilkins and Strydom 1978:253; their translation).

In his history of South Africa, Thompson explains the mother-tongue education policy that was introduced by the NP shortly after 1948 as follows:

Although [the government] treated whites as a single entity in politics, in defence of Afrikaans culture it insisted on separation between Afrikanders and other whites in

1974 to 1979 (and who notoriously claimed that Steve Biko’s death in 1977 left him cold) was born in Wales and adopted by Afrikaner parents.

At the end of apartheid, five of South Africa’s ten white universities were exclusively Afrikaans: the University of the Orange Free State (est. 1904), the University of Pretoria (est. 1908), Stellenbosch University (est. 1918), Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (est. 1919) and the Rand Afrikaans University (est. 1967). The latter was a creation of the Broederbond, as was the bilingual University of Port Elizabeth (est. 1964). Of the post-apartheid successors of these universities, only Stellenbosch is ranked among the top 400 in the world, whereas three of the four historically white English universities have made the list (namely the University of Cape Town, the University of the Witwatersrand and the University of KwaZulu-Natal). Source: http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-13/world-ranking/region/africa (accessed March 2013).
the public [read: state] schools. Building on the policy that JBM Hertzog had initiated in the Orange Free State, the government maintained parallel sets of white public schools throughout the country and made it compulsory for a white child to attend a public school that used the language of the child’s home – Afrikaans or English (2000:190).

The one glaring error in this otherwise accurate portrayal of apartheid’s approach to white education is the claim that its origins can be traced back to Hertzog. The latter, as has been mentioned, was an ardent opponent of separate single-medium Afrikaans and English schools. From the moment that the Broederbond started to promote single-medium schools, Hertzog rejected the idea, not because nationalism was absent from his agenda, but because his was a different brand of nationalism. Like Jan Smuts (and J.H. Hofmeyr during his stint as minister of education in the fusion government), Hertzog advocated Afrikaans-English bilingual schools where, he believed, “the white children who worked and played together and spoke each other’s language [...] would grow up with the conviction of being brothers and sisters within the same nation” (Hancock 1962:256).91

Thompson can also be faulted for interpreting apartheid’s language-in-education policy as an initiative in defence of Afrikaans culture. It was not as innocuous as it seemed. “Purist” Afrikaner nationalists insisted that white Afrikaans-speaking children and white English-speaking children in South Africa should attend separate schools so that Afrikaners could receive a Christian National [read: nationalist] Education in their “own schools”. Before 1948, the Broederbond-led movement for mother-tongue-based Christian National Education for Afrikaners was yet another example of nationalists looking to education to provide them with the key to the power of which they were in search (Kedourie 1985:82).92

Clearly, the idea was that a system of separate Afrikaans schools would provide the purveyors of Afrikaner Nationalism with a system which would more conveniently lend itself to the cultivation of the spirit of exclusivity. Once the children were

91 This was no minor political issue. The provincial election of October 1943 became known as the dual-medium-education election. Cf. Broodryk (1994).
92 This, as Kedourie sums it up, is what Fichte did in the first of his “Addresses to the German Nation” (1985:82–84).
herded into their separate schoolrooms, the Afrikaner children could be nurtured on the philosophy of republicanism, based mainly on glorious memories of the past. In the course of time, they would become the ruling political force in South Africa (Wilkins and Strydom 1978:258).

Once Afrikaner nationalists had become the ruling political force, mother-tongue-based Christian National Education for the children of the volk became a means – a crucial means – of safeguarding their power.

To conclude: I introduced this section (2.2) suggesting that apartheid’s ideologues proceeded from the nationalist principle that “the political and the national unit should be congruent”. However, as I hope to have demonstrated, this principle was compromised twice: if the political and the national unit could not be congruous, the post-fusion Afrikaner nationalists argued, (a) the political unit had to be congruous with the racial unit; and (b) the national unit had to be congruous with the educational unit. White educational institutions, in others words, had to be monolingual Afrikaans or English. To apply this rule to civil service institutions was not an option, but through a rigorous policy of bilingualism, the NP government would largely Afrikanerise these institutions. While English speakers continued to dominate the higher echelons of the civil service for the first decade of NP rule, new entrants were overwhelmingly speakers of Afrikaans. By 1970, the number of Afrikaners in the service was twice as high as in 1948 (Giliomee 2003:493). But English-speaking civil servants were hardly the real victims of apartheid. In the next section, I shall turn to the far more devastating impact of the system on the lives of black South Africans.

2.3 From ideology to policy

2.3.1 Laying the legal foundation of apartheid: from the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act to the Terrorism Act

For all the emphasis that apartheid’s architects lay on regverdige rasse-apartheid [just race apartheid] – to borrow one of Geoff Cronjé’s titles – for all the assurances that the policy would entail neither domination nor discrimination but
mere differentiation, the first apartheid laws were characterised by their “undisguised racial malevolence” (Butler 2009:17). Enacted during the NP’s first term in office (1948–1953), these laws heralded the so-called petty apartheid\(^93\) of the 1950s (which, to its victims, was anything but petty) and laid the foundation for the “grand” apartheid – the homeland project – of the 1960s. They included, \textit{inter alia} and in chronological order:

1949 The \textbf{Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act}, which extended the existing ban on white-black marriages to future marriages between whites and members of all other “races”, including coloureds and Indians. (Repealed in 1985.)\(^94\)

1950 The \textbf{Immorality Amendment Act}, which made it an offence for a white person to have (or attempt to have) any sort of sexual relations with a black, coloured or Indian person. This entailed an extension of Hertzog’s Immorality Act of 1927, which outlawed white-black sexual liaisons. By 1985, when the act was finally repealed, about 11,500 people had been convicted of this form of “immorality” (Giliomee 2003:505). The maximum sentence was seven years’ imprisonment.

1950 The \textbf{Population Registration Act}, which formed the basis of all apartheid legislation. In a more rigid way than earlier race classification laws, the act distinguished between “Whites”, “Bantus/Natives/Africans/Blacks” and “Coloureds”. Initially, the latter category included “Indian” and “Chinese” (along with the subcategories of “Cape Coloured”, “Cape Malay” and “Griqua”), but in 1959 “Asian” was added as a separate category. The Population Registration Act required that every individual should be

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\(^93\) The term was coined in 1959 by Piet Cillié, who was editor of \textit{Die Burger} from 1954 until 1977 and who opposed Verwoerd on issues such as the disenfranchisement of the Cape coloureds. Petty apartheid in the form of “Whites/Europeans Only” and “Non-whites/Non-Europeans” signage, Cillié argued, “irritated without achieving anything” and endangered the grand apartheid plan of homeland-creation (Giliomee 2007:313, 316).

\(^94\) In 1975, a decade before it was repealed, the Mixed Marriages Act was still defended along the following lines: “The Nationalist Government’s policy is separate development. Now is a white man marries a black Transkeian woman, the man will be voting for the white parliament, the [woman] for the Transkei parliament and the children for the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council. I do not think this makes for a happy family life” (F.W. de Klerk, quoted in Wilson 2009:94).
identified and registered at birth as belonging to one of these “racial
groups”. It was an incredible venture in what Johnson describes as “an
already Creolised society”. He adds, “This bizarre and often cruel process
had to proceed without researching family trees for many Afrikaners might
themselves have fallen foul of [the test for whiteness]” (2004:141). In
disputed cases, the majority of which involved persons who were classified
as coloureds, the final decision lay with a Race Classification Board.
(Repealed in 1991.)

1950 The **Group Areas Act**, which empowered the government to declare any
urban living space as white/black/coloured/Indian territory, and to evict
those who happened to live outside “their group’s areas”. In the end, 25
percent of South Africa’s coloured population and seventeen percent of the
country’s Indian population (as against only 0.15 percent of whites) were
“relocated” under the Group Areas Act. Most controversially, more than
60,000 coloured people were bulldozed out of their homes in District Six in
central Cape Town (Giliomee 2003:505). The act affected the coloured and
Indian communities, rather than urban Africans who were already confined
to black locations in terms of the Urban Areas Act of 1923. In the
government’s opinion, however, some of these settlements were too close to
white suburbs and after the **Natives Resettlement Act** had been passed in
1954, urban black communities (most notably the residents of Sophiatown
in north-west Johannesburg) fell victim to forced removals as well.

Among the estimated three million people (“surplus” people as they were
regarded) who were “resettled” during the apartheid era were also black
South Africans who lived in rural areas on land which they had purchased
before 1913. Movement to town was not an option and families were

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95 The story of Sandra Laing, on which director Anthony Fabian based his award-winning
film *Skin* (2008), is but one story about the cruelty of apartheid’s racial classification
system: Born to white parents unaware of their black ancestry, Laing was judged too dark
to attend a white school. She was reclassified as coloured and later again as white
(following a court decision that the “race” of the parents should have been the decisive
factor). In the end, she left her family, became part of a black community, and applied to be
reclassified as black.
dumped (in the literal sense of the word) in the overpopulated homelands where there was no work. In short, apartheid’s forced removals “damaged, if not destroyed, the asset base of people who did not have much to start with” (Wilson 2009:86). (Progressively amended and finally repealed in 1991.)

1950 The Suppression of Communism Amendment Act, which outlawed the Communist Party of South Africa and the propagation of communism in the country. Communism, as Johnson notes, was defined so broadly that “the Act could be – and was – applied to anybody who made a political nuisance of themselves”, including liberals (2004:144). (Progressively amended and finally repealed in 1991.)

1952 The Native Laws Amendment Act, which narrowed the category of Africans who had the right of permanent residence in any particular black location to those who were born there or had lived there continuously for not less than fifteen years. Africans who had worked for the same employer for at least ten years were also allowed to stay. All others, however, had to make their permanent homes in the overcrowded, under-resourced homelands.

1952 The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act, which, despite its ironic name, constituted the notorious pass laws that underpinned the apartheid government’s (attempt at) control over black urbanisation (influx control). The act forced all Africans over the age of sixteen – men and now also women – to carry identification in the form of an internal passport with them at all times. Dubbed a *dompas* [dumb pass], this “reference book”, as it was formally renamed, contained everything from the bearer’s “ethnic affiliation” to her/his criminal record (the latter including “crimes” prohibited by laws which were, in themselves, criminal). Most importantly, it stipulated whether permission was requested to be in a certain area at a certain time, and whether it was granted or denied. The act also reduced the time that black work-seekers were allowed in an urban area from two weeks to 72 hours. In 1964, the Bantu Labour Act went further
and prohibited the employment of black labourers, who were not channelled through the state labour bureau.

Through the pass laws, as Wilson succinctly puts it, apartheid “did more than divide black from white; it also divided the black man in half: labour unit in town, husband and father in the rural area [read: homeland]” (2009:85). During the early 1970s, up to half of South Africa’s black labourers were living, as migrants, in single-sex accommodation (Wilson 2009:84). By then, pass law prosecutions had reached half a million per year with “more than one person charged every minute, day and night” (Wilson 2009:102).

Despite the harsh enforcement of the pass laws, the tide of black urbanisation was unstemmable – as Fagan’s 1948 report had predicted it would be – and in 1986 influx control was finally abandoned (Saunders and Southey 1998:130–131). Apartheid, to quote Wilson again, was stripped of its moral fig leaf: “For if people were to live permanently in town, what value was separate citizenship in some rural ‘Homeland’?” (2009:102).

1953 The Bantu Education Act, which was to be supplemented six years later by the Extension of University Education Act (1959). The latter segregated tertiary education and prohibited black students from attending the liberal English-language universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand without a permit. It also paved the way for the establishment in the 1960s and 1970s of the University of the Western Cape (for coloureds), the University of Durban-Westville (for Indians) as well as a range of “ethnic” universities in the homelands, including the University of the North, the University of Zululand, the University of Transkei, the University of Bophuthatswana and the University of Venda.  These so-called bush colleges have been described as “pathetic mockeries of universities, usually staffed by third-rate Broederbonders” (Johnson 2004:143). Yet far from producing pro-apartheid

96 The University of Fort Hare, which was founded by Scottish missionaries in 1916 as Africa’s first university for blacks, also came under NP control after 1959.
ethnic nationalist black leaders as the government had hoped they would, these institutions soon became breeding grounds of (transethnic) Black Consciousness.

1953 The **Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act/Natives Settlement of Disputes Act**, which prohibited strike action by black workers. The latter were not allowed to join registered trade unions. In 1979, however, the government succumbed to pressure from workers and adopted the **Industrial Conciliation Act**, which officially recognised black trade unions. The formation of the racially inclusive Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in December 1985 marked a shift in the balance of power in South Africa’s political economy.

1953 The **Public Safety and Criminal Law Amendment Acts**, both of which were passed in response to the defiance or civil disobedience campaign of 1952. The latter act made civil disobedience punishable by a jail sentence of up to three years, while the former provided for a state of emergency to be declared (which would first happen in 1960). Under a state of emergency, authorities could place a ban on meetings and detain anybody whom they believed threatened public safety. These acts were supplemented in 1960 and 1967 by the **Unlawful Organisations Act** (which banned the ANC and the PAC) and the **Terrorism Act**, respectively.

1953 The **Reservation of Separate Amenities Act**, which saw “Whites/Europeans Only” and “Non-whites/Non-Europeans” signs going up in every conceivable public place: above the entrances to toilets and the counters of municipal buildings, police stations, post offices and banks, on beaches and park benches, on buses and train coaches, in hospitals and cemeteries – even on ambulances and hearses. In terms of a court decision, the facilities provided for “Whites/Europeans” and “Non-whites/Non-Europeans” did not need to be of equal standard.

With the exception of those laws which were enacted before he took office as minister of native affairs on 18 October 1950, the majority of the abovementioned
acts were the designs of Hendrik Verwoerd – a man whose forte was the uncompromising logical consistency with which he converted ideology into policy, and policy, in turn, into legislation. Of his early contributions to the body of apartheid legislation, the Bantu Education Act acquired particular notoriety and merits more detailed attention here.

Resulting from the work of the Eiselen Commission, the Bantu Education Act entrusted Verwoerd’s department – and not the provincial departments of education, which administered white education – with the administration (or rather, control) of black education. It also empowered the state to take control of the existing church and mission schools (some of which were of the highest quality, catering for a privileged few). The syllabi of the latter, Verwoerd suggested as he introduced the second reading of the bill in the senate, were irreconcilable with the apartheid policy. By turning out Africans with “white-collar ambitions” who “strut in the plumes of the English civilisation”, these schools were bound to cause “widespread frustration” (Verwoerd 1963:62, 71). Under apartheid, the native affairs minister reminded the senate,

there is no place for the Bantu in the white community above the level of certain forms of labour [...] It is, therefore, of no use to him to receive an education aimed at his incorporation in the white community where he will not and cannot be incorporated. Up until now, he has been subjected to a school system which lured him away from his own community and practically misled him by showing him the green pastures of the whites, yet still would not allow him to graze there. [The resultant frustration] disrupts the community life of the Bantu and endangers the community life of the whites (Verwoerd 1963:77–78).

“The Bantu”, Verwoerd argued, had to be furnished with an education “which does not concentrate on the interests of the individual but which is geared towards the progress of the Bantu community” (Verwoerd 1963:59). Africans had to be prepared for serving their own community – either in the homelands where “all doors were open to [them]” (Verwoerd 1963:78), or as teachers, nurses and policemen in the locations (Giliomee 2003:508). Black ambitions beyond that were “ill-directed and volksvreemd [alien to one’s own volk]” (Verwoerd 1963:68).
Despite calls from black teachers’ associations for equality between black and white in education, the Bantu Education Act envisaged a differential curriculum for black schools countrywide – in the reserves, on white farms and in the locations. Designed for what Verwoerd regarded as “the needs of the Bantu/native community”, such a curriculum would prescribe the teaching of reading, writing, arithmetic, Christian principles as well as “hand-work, song and rhythm” during the first four years of schooling. The medium of instruction would be the mother tongue, yet African children would be expected to learn English and Afrikaans as well. In order to prepare them for blue-collar employment in the white-controlled economy, the two official languages of the Union would remain compulsory subjects in the higher primary phase. The mother tongue, too, would be an obligatory field of study (Verwoerd 1963:70, 72–73).

It is not difficult to see why Bantu Education, as it became known, was from the outset synonymous with “education for inferiority and subservience”. It was introduced by Afrikaner nationalist politicians who were primarily concerned about the political consequences of identical education systems (not to mention a single education system) for blacks and whites in South Africa. For political reasons, education had to be taken out of the hands of the missions “that were producing the despised and dangerous ‘black Englishmen’” (Sparks 1990:195). In his speech before the senate, however, Verwoerd defended Bantu Education as a project of retribalisation or what he termed volksontwikkeling [national development – Verwoerd 1963:71] – that is, development of the (white-defined) black volke of South Africa. This was also the position that the Eiselen report adopted: “African cultures were dynamic and could provide the context for the modernization of entire peoples”. The challenge facing Bantu Education, so the

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97 As Verwoerd hoped to withdraw all white teachers from black schools, this meant that black teachers would have to teach (in) both these languages. Language subjects – and then particularly Afrikaans – Verwoerd said, would thus receive priority in teacher training programmes (of which the government now also planned to seize control).


99 “The point of reference in the provision and organisation of education in the Bantu community should, where possible, be the tribal organisation” (Verwoerd 1963:77).
report claimed, was to inculcate a *groepsgevoel* [group feeling] and a sense of pride in the *volkseie* [what is unique to the *volk*] among Africans. Unsurprisingly, the report “evinced a strong belief in the superiority of mother-tongue education” (Giliomee 2003:508). To apartheid’s ideologues, it should be borne in mind, mother-tongue education meant separate mother-tongue schools (i.e., separate tribal/ethnic/volk schools) for the speakers of the various African languages. The principle of “congruity between the national and the educational unit” was thus applied not only to the own *volk* but to the whole of South Africa.

Like Afrikaner nationalists before him and Afrikaner nationalists to come, Verwoerd presented the choice for mother-tongue instruction as a choice informed primarily by pedagogy. When taught in English, he told the senate in 1953, “the Bantu child – unlike our white children [who are taught in their home languages] – [cannot] achieve a thorough understanding of the reading material” (Verwoerd 1963:71). White English liberal commentators rejected this emphasis on the mother tongue, arguing that it was an attempt to bar Africans from English – South Africa’s only international language (Johnson 2004:143). Among the urban black elite, Verwoerd’s language-in-education policy, like all his other plans for Bantu Education, was met with profound dismay – a reaction that the Nigerian-born scholar Kole Omotoso has explained as follows:

In an attempt to ensure that all Africans were united against the imperialists and colonisers of Africa, the African political and intellectual elite deliberately rejected African ethnicity and tribalism [and, as a result, many] Africans picked up European languages to replace their various ethnic and tribal languages. [In South Africa,] the Afrikaner rulers of the National Party insisted on dividing the Africans [according to] their ethnic and tribal languages, the very opposite [position from that which was adopted by] the political and intellectual leaders of the African struggle against European colonisation (*Citizen*, 2006/11/08).

Not long after the introduction of Bantu education, the apartheid government also took control of the education of coloured and Indian children (who were, sometimes, slightly better off than their African counterparts). While only an apartheid apologist would claim that black education in South Africa improved in the decades following 1953, it is true that the proportion of Africans who received
some form of education grew considerably. In 1949, as Ross (2008:130–131) points out, no more than a third of black children between the ages of seven and sixteen attended school. By 1976, that figure had risen to an estimated 50 percent and towards the end of apartheid, it was probably as high as 85 percent. During the four decades of apartheid, the number of black students at South African universities (i.e., the homeland universities and the non-residential University of South Africa) increased ninety-fold. However, these figures can be misleading, as was proved by a test conducted in South Africa in 1995. This test, which measured functional literacy and numeracy at a level equivalent to seven years of schooling, was failed by 80 percent of black adults and 40 percent of whites (Ross 2008:131). Against the backdrop of apartheid’s education landscape the surprising aspect of these results is the poor performance by whites:

Education was compulsory for white but not black children. White children had excellent school buildings and equipment; black children, distinctly inferior facilities [...] In 1978, when there were five times as many African children as white children in South Africa, only 12,014 Africans passed the matriculation examination or its equivalent (similar to American graduation from high school), whereas three times as many whites did so. The government spent ten times as much per capita on white students as on African students, and African classes were more than twice as large as white ones. Moreover, most teachers in African schools were far less qualified than the teachers in white schools; African teachers were paid less than whites even when they did have the same qualifications; and they had to teach African schoolchildren from textbooks and to prepare for examinations that expressed the government’s racial views (Thompson 2000:191).

Bantu Education would backfire badly on Afrikaner nationalists. Not only did it leave South Africa ill-prepared for the recession in the world economy during the early 1970s, but with the introduction of the system the apartheid government sowed the seeds of its own destruction. For it was at black township schools, when children rebelled against Afrikaans and everything it represented, that the

100 Except in the eastern Cape, the area in South Africa with the longest history of mission education (cf. Ross 2008:103–131).
tide against apartheid turned. The repercussions of that event – the Soweto student uprising of June 1976 – is the story of South Africa’s liberation from apartheid.

2.3.2 Resistance against apartheid: from the defiance campaign to the Rivonia trial

There had been earlier uprisings, and like the one in Soweto they started out peacefully. Under the premierships of Malan (1948–1956) and Strijdom (1956–1958), when Verwoerd was minister of native affairs (1950–1958), apartheid did not go unchallenged by those at the receiving end of the policy. During April 1952, shortly after the introduction of the first apartheid legislation, an estimated 100,000 people country-wide took part in an Indian National Congress-inspired and ANC-led campaign to defy these laws openly. On 25 June 1955, more than 3,000 delegates102 assembled in an open space at Kliptown near Johannesburg to

101 The struggle against apartheid is most closely associated with the ANC. Like the Union of South Africa and the NP, the organisation had its birth in the Free State capital of Bloemfontein – 32 months after the Union and two years, almost to the day, before the NP. Established by young overseas-trained lawyers in protest against the Union constitution and the pending Natives Land Act, the ANC (named the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) until 1923) initially adopted a deferential and non-confrontational approach in its fight against racial discrimination. During the early 1940s, however, a new generation of young lawyers and other professionals (now locally trained, notably at Fort Hare) challenged “the polite gradualism [...] mild exhortations [and] moderate stance of their elders in the ANC” (Berger 2009:112). Prominent among these Young Turks were Walter Max Ulyate Sisulu (1912–2003), Anton Muziwakhe Lembede (1914–1947), Oliver Reginald Tambo (1917–1993) and Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (1918–) who, in 1944, breathed new life into the moribund organisation through the formation of the ANC Youth League. Five years later, in December 1949, the ANC adopted the Youth League’s “Programme of Action” as official policy: the days of deputations and petitions were over; the era of mass action, civil disobedience, boycotts and strikes had begun.

As I was revising this chapter during January 2012, I found myself in Bloemfontein where the ANC was celebrating, on the 8th of the month, its 100th birthday. This followed after the military wing of the organisation, Umkhonto we Sizwe [spear of the nation] or MK as it is known, commemorated its 50th birthday in December 2011 (on the 16th, that sacred day in Afrikaner nationalist mythology – cf. chapter 5). Media coverage – not only of the jubilee and centenary celebrations of but also of the ANC’s history – was extensive and made me acutely aware of the inadequacies of the discussion of the anti-apartheid struggle that follows here. But this is not a thesis on South Africa’s liberation movement. The latter is relevant only in as far as it had shaped the course of Afrikaner nationalism.

102 They represented all the constituting members of the newly formed ANC-led Congress Alliance: the South African Indian Congress (est. 1923), the South African Coloured People’s Organisation (est. 1953), the (small) predominantly white Congress of Democrats (est. 1953) and the multiracial South African Congress of Trade Unions (est. 1953).
approve a “Freedom Charter for the democratic South Africa of the future”,\textsuperscript{103} and on 9 August 1956, some 20,000 women marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria to petition against the pass laws.

Time and again, however, non-violent protesters – armed with stones, if anything at all – came up against the full force of the apartheid state. Nearly 80,000 people were arrested during the defiance or civil disobedience campaign of 1952. The Congress of the People, as the Kliptown meeting identified itself, was broken up by police and shortly afterwards 156 Charterists (supporters of the Freedom Charter) were charged with high treason. They included Z.K. Matthews, the driving force behind the Congress of the People and one of the drafters of the Freedom Charter; Nelson Mandela, who had been serving on the national executive committee of the ANC since December 1949; and Albert Luthuli, the president of the ANC, who would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1960. All the accused were acquitted, but only after four years.

Organised opposition to apartheid intensified when Verwoerd succeeded Strijdom as prime minister in 1958. During that year, the Africanists (as they called themselves), who had misgivings about white involvement in the liberation movement, walked out of the Transvaal conference of the ANC. They went on to form the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) during April 1959, electing Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe (1924–1978) as their president.\textsuperscript{104} A year later, Sobukwe issued a call for people to hand in (or burn) their passes en masse at local police stations. What happened at the Sharpeville police station prompted the (reluctant) move to armed resistance against apartheid. On Monday 21 March 1960, as Ross recounts the events,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} This is how Z.K. Matthews phrased it. Source: http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/campaign-congress-people-and-freedom-charter-origins-and-nature (accessed March 2013).
\item \textsuperscript{104} PAC nationalism was a “racially assertive nationalism”: Africa, the slogan of the organisation went, was for the Africans, “and although their definition of Africans could include whites, they saw most whites as settlers without valid claim to the land they owned” (Saunders and Southey 1998:129).
\end{itemize}
large demonstrations were held throughout the Vaal region. Some 20,000 people converged on the police station at Evaton, and another 4,000 on that at Vanderbijlpark [to hand in their passes, as part of the PAC-led campaign]. These demonstrations were dispersed by baton charges and threatening, low-flying jet aircraft. However, such tactics did not have the same effect on the 5,000 people or so who had gathered around the Sharpeville police station. Faced with a melee they could not control, the inexperienced police constables panicked and fired on the crowd […] The gunfire killed sixty-nine people – including eight women and ten children – and wounded 180 (2008:139).

The government responded by banning the ANC and the PAC, forcing them to go underground. Both organisations now established military wings, but before long the high command of Umkhonto we Sizwe – the ANC’s armed division under the command of Nelson Mandela – was arrested at Liliesleaf Farm in Rivonia outside Johannesburg. Charged with high treason, they faced being hanged, but the judge in the case was wary not to turn them into martyrs. He found eight of the accused guilty of sabotage and, on 11 June 1964, sentenced them to life imprisonment. Mandela and the other black prisoners were taken from the courtroom to Robben Island. In a statement from the dock, the man who would become South Africa’s first democratically elected president – and, arguably, the world’s most beloved statesman – spoke these prophetic words:

the ideal of a democratic and free [South Africa] in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities […] is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve.105

2.3.3 Of rising phoenixes and falling flagpoles

It would be another three decades, however, before “the wind of change” that was blowing down from Ghana – who gained independence from Britain in 1958 – would reach the southernmost tip of the continent of Africa.106 In South Africa,

105 Mandela added that it was also an ideal for which he was prepared to die. Fortunately, he did not have to. Source: http://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/mini-site/introduction-from-the-book (accessed March 2013).
106 The wind reached Anglophone southern Africa during the mid-1960s and Lusophone Africa during the mid-1970s, adding to the existing international pressure on the apartheid regime. Botswana and Lesotho became independent in 1966, Swaziland in 1968, and
black political opposition was crushed under Verwoerd, owing in no small part to his minister of justice and the police, Balthazar Johannes Vorster (of Ossewa-Brandwag fame – cf. section 1.4). Verwoerd’s misguided response to “the wind of change” – as Harold Macmillan described the decolonisation of Africa in an address to the South African parliament on 3 February 1960 – was to introduce the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959)\textsuperscript{107} – an extension of the Bantu Authorities Act (1951) and a forerunner of the Bantu/Black Homelands Citizenship Act (1970). This was grand apartheid legislation, the ultimate aim of which was to ensure that there would be no black South African citizens.

As we have seen, the idea that non-whites should be evicted from white South Africa was put forward by the Afrikaner nationalist ideologues of the late 1930s and early 1940s. They defended the proposed policy, which clearly entailed racial cleansing, in the language of German Romanticism. Linguistic frontiers, it was argued in Fichtean fashion, were the natural frontiers not only of nations but also of states (Alter 1990:60). As a state in which members of different nations were living together (increasingly so after the Second War World), South Africa was thus “unnatural, oppressive, and finally doomed to decay” as “the different nations [ran] the risk of losing their identity” (Kedourie 1985:58–59). The apartheid notion of black homelands – one for each black language/ethnic group – was consistent with this nationalist view of the world.

To say this is not to suggest that Fichte would have approved of the map of South Africa as it came to look after the introduction in 1970 of the Bantu Homelands Citizen Act. National Party ideology notwithstanding, linguistic frontiers in apartheid South Africa did not coincide with the frontiers of the homelands or so-called Bantustans, at least not neatly (cf. Map 2.1): the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Tswana, Sotho, Tsonga, Swati, Venda and Ndebele “nations” were hardly united

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\textsuperscript{107} Renamed the Promotion of Black Self-government Act and later the Representation between the Republic of South Africa and Self-governing Territories Act, both of 1959.
as far as each of these languages was heard.\textsuperscript{108} With the exception of QwaQwa (for Sotho speakers), Venda (for Venda speakers) and KwaNdebele (for Ndebele speakers), all the homelands were fragmented, mainly because white farmers were not prepared to sacrifice their land on the altar of apartheid: KwaZulu (for Zulu speakers) consisted of eleven separate pieces of land, Lebowa (for Pedi speakers) of five, Bophuthatswana (for Tswana speakers) of seven, Gazankulu (for Tsonga speakers) of two and KaNgwane (for Swati speakers) of three. Xhosa speakers ended up with not one but two homelands, separated by a stretch of “white” territory and the mighty Kei river, hence their respective names: the Transkei in the north and the Ciskei in the south.

Image removed for copyright reasons

Map 2.1 Apartheid South Africa\textsuperscript{109}

A general lack of territorial (and economic) integrity was not the only reason why the nine black homelands – four of which would eventually accept “independence” (Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979 and Ciskei in 1981) – were doomed to failure. If ever a system of social engineering proved Walker Connor’s point that “[w]hile an ethnic group may [...] be other-defined, the nation must be self-defined” (– and, one may add, must choose its own leaders – 1994:430; emphasis in the original), it was apartheid. Regardless of how hard the social engineers tried to coax speakers of South Africa’s Bantu languages into the idea that “wherever a separate language is found there a separate nation exists”, black nationalism in the country was not Fichtean in spirit. It might have accentuated the black-white divide at times, but from the outset it downplayed, if not ignored, intra-black linguistic differences.

When they formed the ANC Youth League in 1944, Nelson Mandela and his comrades aspired to become “the brains-trust and power-station of the spirit of

\textsuperscript{108} I borrow this phrase from a song by one of Fichte’s fellows, Ernst Moritz Arndt, in which the latter expressed the vision to see the whole of Germany united “[a]s far as the German tongue rings out and praises God with songs!” (“Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?” – Arndt, quoted in Düding 1987:30).

African nationalism; the spirit of African self-determination”.110 Rejecting the class analysis of the Communist Party of South Africa, the Youth League maintained that “Africans, as a conquered race, were oppressed ‘by virtue of their colour as a race – ... – as a nation!’ not as a class” (quoted in Berger 2009:112). However, despite this initial exclusivist approach, the ANC adopted the Freedom Charter in 1956 according to which “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white”, and in 1969 opened its membership to whites. Through the Charter, the ANC committed itself to the principle of a non-racial civic nation – “a democratic state, based on the will of all the people [that] can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief”.111 The point is: the ideals of grand apartheid were irreconcilable with the ideals of ANC nationalism, both in its Africanist and in its non-racial manifestations.

Hendrik Verwoerd did not live to see the flagpole falling down – as if on cue – when the Ciskeian flag was about to be raised during the homeland’s “independence celebrations”. Eight years into his premiership, Verwoerd was assassinated in parliament by a mentally ill employee112 and Vorster113 took over as prime minister. The Vorster years saw “a hardening of apartheid rule, which from then on exhibited its most repressive characteristics” (Ross 2008:144). In his book, Pale Native – Memories of a renegade reporter, veteran Afrikaner journalist Max du Preez reflects upon the impact of Verwoerd’s death (on 6 September 1966) on the Afrikaner psyche:

It was a time of great fear. I was only fifteen years old, but I sensed that the community in which I lived felt lost, rudderless and scared. They had blindly placed

111 The Freedom Charter, as quoted in Segal and Cort (2011:29). It was to remain the ANC’s basic policy statement throughout the struggle against apartheid despite its ideological inconsistencies. In addition to (racially inclusive, South African) nationalism, both socialism and liberalism somehow found their way into the Charter. Cf. Thompson (2000:203) and Dubow (2012:68–74).
112 In his biography of the assassin (Een mond vol glas (1998), which appeared in English as A mouthful of glass (2000)), Henk van Woerden suggests, contrary to popular belief, that there might have been a political motive. In 1960, Verwoerd had survived an attack on his life.
113 Vorster’s middle name Johannes was, ironically, anglicised to John.
all their trust and hopes in the hands of their Leader. Suddenly, their Moses was
gone. That was the mentality of Afrikaners in the time after the Anglo-Boer War:
find a strong leader and follow him without question [...] All was well with Afrikanerdom under [Verwoerd’s] rule. He finally ‘liberated’
them from British imperialism by withdrawing South Africa from the
Commonwealth and changing the country’s status to that of a republic in 1961.
Between 1960 and his death, South Africa experienced extraordinary economic
growth. His cocksure rationalisations of apartheid on moral and religious grounds
stayed with many Afrikaners long after his death.

They got another strong leader to replace Verwoerd: John Vorster. But where
Verwoerd earned the reverence he enjoyed through his (rather twisted) intellect,
Vorster had to get it through pure kragdadigheid [forceful and uncompromising
tactics] and an aggressive leadership style and body language. It was easier to
discard him in the end, and even easier in the case of his successor, PW Botha”

By the time Botha replaced Vorster, the phoenix of South Africa’s liberation
movement – inspired by Black Consciousness – was rising from the ashes. This
became abundantly clear in Soweto on the morning of 16 June 1976 when
thousands of teenagers converged to march in protest against the government’s
decision to introduce Afrikaans as a language of instruction into black secondary
schools (outside the homelands). These children, who preferred to be taught in
English, now had to study half of their school subjects through the medium of
English and half through Afrikaans. Failing to disperse the crowd, police opened
fire. Among the first victims to be gunned down was a twelve-year-old boy who
would become the martyr of the Soweto uprising, Hector Pieterson.

In what has been described as a “[y]ear of fire, year of ash” (Hirson 1979), the
revolt spread through the townships of South Africa, leaving more than 600
people dead (according to the official count), most of them schoolchildren. Steve

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114 Vorster was forced to resign, soon also as state president, due to his role in the so-called
information scandal or Muldergate scandal (after Connie Mulder, the minister of
information who, until then, had been the prime minister’s heir apparent). The scandal
involved the secret use of taxpayers’ money to finance government propaganda efforts,
inter alia the establishment of a pro-apartheid English-language newspaper, The Citizen.

115 The photo of Pieterson’s sister and another youth carrying his dead body made the
headlines worldwide and remains the symbol of the Soweto uprising.
Biko (1946–1977), the founder of South Africa’s Black Consciousness Movement and of the all-black South African Students’ Organisation, was arrested on 18 August 1977 and died three weeks later at the hands of police. “The harsh measures taken to suppress the uprising”, as Saunders and Southey summarise the outcome of the events, “aroused much international condemnation, and created a crisis of legitimacy for the apartheid regime that led eventually to the negotiated settlement of the1990s” (1998:161). Yet external boycotts and sanctions alone did not bring the apartheid government to its knees. In the wake of the Soweto uprising, a protest culture took root in South Africa: “Students and workers, children and adults, men and women, the educated and the uneducated became involved in efforts to liberate the country from apartheid” (Thompson 2000:222). Of the “Soweto generation”, many sacrificed their education, left the country to receive military training and returned as guerrillas.

2.4 On the banks of the Rubicon, and after the crossing

White South Africa had to “adapt or die”. This was what P.W. Botha told his electorate shortly after assuming office as prime minister, and eventually he would abolish the pass laws, begin tentative talks with the ANC and agree to cooperate with a United Nations-monitored independence process in Namibia. But Botha will be remembered as the man who did not cross the Rubicon. The furthest he was prepared to go, constitutionally speaking, was to provide for limited coloured and Indian participation in central government through a tricameral parliament, and to establish so-called black local authorities. Under the tricameral constitution (adopted in 1983), the Big Crocodile – as the irascible Botha was nicknamed – became the executive state president of South Africa.

For the right wing of the governing party, Botha’s reforms were too much. They quit the NP, as noted above, to form the Conservative Party (CP). For the vast

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116 In August 1985, as Sparks explains, “Botha was supposed to announce a giant step away from apartheid – a ‘Rubicon speech’, according to the advance publicity hype – which turned out to be a damp squib that disillusioned South Africa’s few remaining friends in the world and triggered the start of serious international sanctions” (1995:1).
majority of South Africans, however, the reforms were too little, too late. Out of their frustration the United Democratic Front (UDF) was born — “a mass-based popular front of oppositional bodies and organisations [with close links to the ANC-in-exile] that took the country by storm” (Segal and Cort 2011:39). The townships became ungovernable, and in June 1986 the first of a series of states of emergency was declared.

After suffering a stroke in January 1989, Botha resigned as NP leader and eight months later, under pressure from his cabinet, also as state president. F.W. de Klerk took over the reins and led the Nationalists through a difficult election in September, solving nothing. South Africa was on the edge of an abyss. But then, rather unexpectedly, the world changed. In November, the Berlin Wall came down and with it the threat — real or perceived — of communism. At parliament’s opening on 2 February 1990, F.W. de Klerk crossed the Rubicon, announcing

the end of apartheid, the unbanning of all proscribed organisations, the release of Mandela and the remaining ANC prisoners, a welcome back home of all exiles and the invitation to the ANC and all other parties to talks on a new democratic constitution. By the time [he] had finished speaking, South Africa had changed completely and for ever [sic] (Johnson 2004:198).

Afrikaner nationalism, too, had changed completely and forever. It was about to lose — completely and forever — what nationalists value most: control of a state. According to Sparks, De Klerk did not foresee this total loss of state power:

Just as Gorbachev could not have known that his restructuring of the Soviet system would lead to the loss of his East European empire, the collapse of communism, and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union itself, so, too, De Klerk did not expect his reforms to lead to black-majority rule and the end of Afrikaner nationalism before the end of the decade (1995:7).

About one thing Sparks is right: De Klerk, by his own admission (in November 1993), “would have liked to have seen something closer to the power-sharing in the Swiss or Belgian model [and] more clearly defined rights for the regions and [religious, political and cultural] minorities” (quoted in Segal and Cort 2011:119, 160). But — and this is the central contention of my thesis — Sparks is mistaken in
suggesting that black-majority rule of South Africa meant the end of Afrikaner nationalism. He would not dispute that Afrikaner nationalism lives on in organisations such as the Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging [Afrikaner Resistance Movement] (AWB, est. 1973) and the Boeremag [Boer Force/Power] (est. 1994), which entertain dreams of overthrowing the ANC government and restoring the old Boer republics. Nor would he dispute that it lives on in the all-white rural village enclave of Orania – the only place in South Africa where statues of Hendrik Verwoerd are still publicly on display. I go further, however, and argue that Afrikaner nationalism also lives on in the far more rational, numerically much stronger minority rights/civic republican/radical democracy movement in contemporary Afrikaner circles, which adopts (rather opportunistically) the rhetoric of European multiculturalist discourses.

Without suggesting that the “lunatic fringe” of post-apartheid Afrikaner nationalism is not worth studying, my study limits its focus to the “respectable core”. Unlike the fringe, the core does not aspire to be a nation state again, yet the difference between the projects is one of degree rather than kind. This argument is developed in the next chapter. First, however, it is necessary to conclude the narrative of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy. Owing to constraints of space, I shall concentrate on two sub-narratives that are directly relevant to the argument: the fate of the NP, and the politics of language in the constitution-making process.

Nelson Mandela was released from prison on 11 February 1990, but it took almost two more years for negotiations to get underway, mainly because a wave of violence had engulfed the townships of South Africa. From the outset, the CP boycotted all talks and soon the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) followed suit, demanding that the province of Natal be declared an independent, sovereign Zulu state. Predictably, the key role players – first in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) and finally in the Multi-party Negotiating Forum – were the NP and the ANC, with Roelf Meyer (deputy minister of constitutional development) and Cyril Ramaphosa (lawyer and former president of the National Union of Mineworkers) soon emerging as the leading negotiators.
A two-stage transition process was agreed upon. First, an interim constitution containing a set of constitutional principles would be negotiated. Then, following a general election, South Africa’s new parliament would be responsible for writing the final constitution in keeping with the constitutional principles. Crisis after violent crisis threatened to derail the first stage – the Boipatong massacre, the Bisho massacre, the assassination of Chris Hani (former MK commander and general-secretary of the SACP) and, last but not least, the armed invasion of the World Trade Centre (where negations took place) by the AWB. But talks continued as “both the ANC and NP leaders wanted a negotiated settlement” (Johnson 2004:202). Finally, in November 1993, the Multi-party Negotiating Forum adopted a new interim constitution for South Africa.

The election date was set for 27 April 1994. Only at the last minute were the IFP and the Afrikaner right persuaded to participate. By now, the latter was led by the charismatic General Constand Viljoen, the former head of the South African Defence Force. With “his options shrunk to a stark choice between leading the right-wingers into a civil war or joining the election,” Viljoen eventually registered a party, the Freedom Front (FF), into which several leading members of the CP followed him (Sparks 1995:170). The leader of the IFP, Chief Mangosotho Gatsha Buthelezi, too, registered his party for the election after reaching a compromise with the ANC on the position of the Zulu king and the relative power of South Africa’s future provinces.

In the event, the FF received 2.2 percent of all the votes, half a percentage point more than the white liberal Democratic Party (DP), which was launched in April 1989 following the merger of the PFP, the National Democratic Movement and the Independent Party. The NP managed to get one fifth of the vote (20.4 percent) and the ANC almost two thirds (62.6 percent). After four decades of NP endeavours to nurture “national consciousness” in South Africa’s black community, only the Zulus voted along ethnic lines, though not en bloc: 10.5

117 All the election statistics in the remainder of this chapter are from http://electionresources.org/za/ (accessed March 2013).
percent of the vote went to the IFP, which won control of the province of KwaZulu-Natal.\textsuperscript{118} Within the new system of proportional representation, the ANC had 525 seats in parliament, the NP 82, the IFP 43, the FF nine, the DP seven, the PAC five and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) two. The ANC, NP and IFP formed a Government of National Unity and on 10 May 1994, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as president of a South Africa with nine newly demarcated provinces and no more native reserves, Bantustans or apartheid homelands (cf. Map 2.2).

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\textbf{Map 2.2 South Africa today}\textsuperscript{119}

Two years later, on 8 May 1996, South Africans could face the world “with the finest legal framework to protect human rights then in existence” (Wilson 2009:109). The irony did not escape commentators such as Johnson: the new South African constitution (Act 108 of 1996) was “a liberal document written by parties which were both passionate opponents of liberalism” (2004:206).\textsuperscript{120} I would suggest, however, that certain ostensibly liberal clauses in the constitution were included on the insistence of Afrikaner nationalists who styled themselves as liberal language activists.

\textsuperscript{118} Since 1994, the Zulu vote has shifted towards the ANC. Compare the following election results:

\begin{tabular}{lll}
  & Year & Party & Percentage \\
 1994 & IFP & 48.6\% & ANC 31.6\% \\
 1999 & IFP & 40.5\% & ANC 39.8\% \\
 2004 & IFP & 34.9\% & ANC 47.5\% \\
 2009 & IFP & 20.5\% & ANC 64\% \\
\end{tabular}


\textsuperscript{120} It might have been ironic, but it was hardly surprising that the Nationalists were by now staunch advocates of the liberal principles of property rights and a free market economy. As regards the ANC, it has been argued that the party’s negotiators failed the bottom 50 percent of the South African population, who had played such a key role in the liberation struggle. From the point of view of these people – the poor, powerless masses – the timing of the negotiations for a democratic South Africa was unfortunate: in the wake of the end of the Cold War, the West was triumphantly uncritical of neoliberal capitalism and the ANC elite was persuaded to abandon any socialist agendas and to “play the economic game according to the neoliberal rules as dictated by the USA and the Washington Consensus and by corporatism – local as well as global” (Terreblanche, \textit{Die Vrye Afrikaan}, 2006/03/17:8, 9).
Allow me to explain. Towards the end of 1993, when the official status of Afrikaans was at stake at the Multi-party Negotiating Forum, threats like the following were nothing unusual and did not necessarily come from the far right: should anyone tamper with Afrikaans, it was warned, they can expect a Bosnian situation on the terrain of language (spokesperson for Die Stigting vir Afrikaans [The Foundation for Afrikaans] quoted in Die Volksblad, 1993/11/03); the reaction of Afrikaners will make the struggle of the IRA, the Basques and the ANC look like crèche cowboy games (Ton Vosloo, managing director of Nasionale Pers [National Press], quoted in Beeld, 1991/05/04), and the feud between the Flemings and the Walloons like a Sunday school picnic (Henno Cronjé, chief executive officer of the FAK, in a letter to Beeld, 1993/08/21).

The decision to grant all major South African languages official status at national level was widely seen as a compromise to satisfy the Afrikaans lobby.¹²¹ Novelist Chris Barnard explained it as follows in a letter to Die Burger:

One wonders what else they could have decided. One official language, English? Then all hell would have broken loose. Two official languages, Afrikaans and English? A worse-case scenario of hell breaking loose. Afrikaans, English and Xhosa? Then eight million Zulus would have broken loose. And so down the line to eleven languages (Die Burger, 1993/11/20).

The cause of the Afrikaans language activists found further support in the South African Bill of Rights (Act 108 of 1996, chapter 2), and then particularly in sections such as the following:

Section 9(3)
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including [...] language.

¹²¹ In terms of section 6 of the final constitution, eleven languages have official status at national level, and the state is required to “elevate the status and advance the use” of the historically marginalised nine African languages. The language clause also prescribes mechanisms, notably the Pan South African Language Board (PanSALB), for the development of these languages and for the promotion of multilingualism in general. Language-related rights such as the right to a fair trial are also protected.
Section 30

Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.

Section 31

(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of the community –
   (a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; and
   (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.

(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.

The most controversial language-related clause in the South African Bill of Rights, which continues to be a source of conflict, is section 29(2). To the NP, “own education” – that old Broederbond principle of “education of our Afrikaner youth in and by own mother-tongue institutions from kindergarten and primary school to university” (Wilkins and Strydom 1978:253) – remained non-negotiable up until the very end of the constitution-making process. The night of 18 April 1996, Segal and Cort report, did not start well:

At a meeting between the ANC and the NP on the education clause, the two parties could not reach agreement. The NP was still arguing for the protection of single-medium institutions, while the ANC insisted, as they did many times before, that this would perpetuate inequalities in education. The conversation between the representatives of the two parties revealed their utter frustration and despair:

Cyril Ramaphosa:
   ‘What are we going to do, Piet?’

Piet Marais:
   ‘I don’t know. That’s why we are sitting so many people around the table now, to try to resolve the matter. I believe we must admit that we are more or less deadlocked.’

Cyril Ramaphosa:
   ‘We have to adopt the constitution on the 8th [of May] and how do you go to the 8th and deadlock on a simple issue like this?’

Piet Marais:
‘I’m just the messenger.’

By 4 May 1996, the parties were still deadlocked, to the irritation of Blade Nzimande (currently South Africa’s minister of higher education), who knew very well that the right to mother-tongue education was not the real issue:

The principle in negotiations, which I learnt pretty quickly, is that in order to negotiate in good faith, you have to respect the other side. But to be quite honest, on the education issue, I couldn’t help but feel that I despised the Nats because they were trying in all sorts of ways to really entrench apartheid. In that way, I preferred the Freedom Front, because they were very straight and honest with us (quoted in Segal and Cort 2011:181).

In the end, the following formulation, suggested by Nzimande, was acceptable to both parties:

Section 29(2)
Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single-medium institutions, taking into account –
(a) equity;
(b) practicability; and
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.

Since 1996, numerous underutilised Afrikaans state schools122 have been forced to introduce English as an additional medium of instruction in order to accommodate black pupils from overfull, under-resourced township schools. These children, the government would argue, have the right in terms of section 29(2) “to receive education in the official language […] of their choice [i.e., English] in public educational institutions”. Evoking the very same constitutional right, quite a few

122 As Ponelis explains, “enrolment at Afrikaans secondary schools is tapering off on account of both population dynamics and the fresh impetus that the practice for Afrikaans children to attend English schools has gained” (2004:131). Afrikaans language activists are trying to reverse this trend.
Afrikaans schools have taken the government to court in an effort to maintain their single-medium status.\textsuperscript{123} Parallel-medium education, the governing bodies of these schools would argue, is fiscally unsustainable and leads to anglicisation, thus violating the language rights of Afrikaans pupils.

The first language-related case to be heard by South Africa’s Constitutional Court (late in 2009) was brought by a high school (Hoërskool Ermelo) which sought to remain exclusively Afrikaans. In my view, this aspect of the post-apartheid campaign against the demise of Afrikaans as a public language reveals most about the nature of the campaign. What is really at stake? Afrikaans speakers’ constitutional right to mother-tongue education? Or the \textit{modus vivendi} of single-medium Afrikaans schools, their way of doing things? If it turns out to be the latter, we have to entertain the possibility that we are witnessing a final compromise to the Afrikaner version of the nationalist principle: if a government of co-nationals is no longer an option, Afrikaners at least have to go to school with and be educated by co-nationals. More than anything else, the resilience of Afrikanerdom’s mother-tongue education/“own schools” project suggests that Afrikaner nationalism has not run its course.

Claims to the contrary, namely that Afrikaner nationalism has become extinct, are often based on the collapse of the NP. In 1996, the party withdrew from the Government of National Unity and reinvented itself under De Klerk’s successor, the young Marthinus van Schalkwyk, as the New National Party (NNP). But it was not new enough: in the election of 1999, the NNP’s share of the vote was down from 20.4 to 6.9 percent. The FF also lost ground. The DP, however, fared much better than in the previous election and replaced the NNP as the official opposition. According to Giliomee (2003:660), more than half of the Afrikaner vote in the 1999 election went to the DP, which was then led by Tony Leon, an English-speaking South African Jew.

\textsuperscript{123} These court cases included: \textit{Governing Body of Mikro School and others v Western Cape Minister of Education and others} (2005); \textit{Governing Bodies of three Northern Cape Schools and others v Northern Cape MEC for Education and others} (2005); \textit{Ermelo High School v Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education} (2007). The list is not exhaustive.
Following its poor performance at the polls, the NNP merged with the DP in 2000 to form the Democratic Alliance (DA), only to withdraw from the alliance within a year. A mere 1.7 percent of South African voters supported the NNP in the election of 2004, and in 2005 the party dissolved itself and merged with the ANC. Support for the FF – which became the FF+ in 2003 following right-wing mergers – has remained low but constant. Under Helen Zille, a white English-speaking woman who is also fluent in Afrikaans and, to a lesser degree, in Xhosa, the DA has kept growing. The party drew 16.7 percent of the vote during the last election (2009) and took control of the Western Cape Province, where coloured people constitute the largest group and just under half of the population speak Afrikaans as a first language (Statistics South Africa 2012:21, 25). But election statistics, as will emerge towards the end of this study, tell only half of the story of post-apartheid Afrikaner identity politics.

124 The daughter of parents who fled Germany in the 1930s (her maternal grandfather and paternal grandmother were Jewish), she also speaks German.
3.1 Activists for Afrikaans, but no longer Afrikaner nationalists (or so they say): a question of definition

The Afrikaner campaign of the early 1990s for the continued official status of Afrikaans in a democratic South Africa was followed after 1994 by a language preservation campaign which has, since then, continued to increase in intensity. What distinguishes this Afrikaans language movement from its predecessors is the fact that it is not an exclusively white endeavour. From the rise of Afrikaner nationalism until the end of apartheid, Afrikaans language activists were, virtually without exception, Afrikaners (or, more accurately, Afrikaner nationalists). For its black or coloured speakers (i.e., more than half of its speakers), Afrikaans was, as Jakes Gerwel once put it, “a completely sober thing” (1988:16) – “simply a medium in which they live[d] naturally” (1987:26). They would have died in the language, but not for the language (Gerwel 1985:193).

After the end of apartheid the situation seems to have changed as coloured speakers of Afrikaans were taking up prominent positions in existing and new Afrikaanse taal- en kultuurorganisasies [Afrikaans language and culture organisations]. To some, this involvement of non-Afrikaners in the language campaign rules out the possibility that any form of activist behaviour in defence of Afrikaans could nowadays be regarded as Afrikaner nationalist behaviour. These

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125 Gert Johannes Gerwel (1946–2012) was a coloured anti-apartheid activist who, during the 1980s, turned the University of the Western Cape into the intellectual home of the Left (first as professor and head of the Afrikaans department, then as dean of the arts faculty and finally as vice-chancellor). In 1994, Nelson Mandela appointed him as director-general in the office of the presidency. Gerwel held a doctorate in literature from the University of Brussels which was published in 1983 as Literatuur en apartheid: konsepsies van “gekleurdes” in die Afrikaanse roman tot 1948 [Literature and apartheid: conceptions of “coloureds” in the Afrikaans novel until 1948].
commentators would concede that the language movement is neither integrated nor united. They tend to argue that coloured language activists – or “brown” activists as they identify themselves – stress the role of Afrikaans in socio-economic development, while white activists generally invoke language rights.

However, debates that took place in the media from 2005 onwards suggested that the “brown”-white schism in the primary Afrikaans speech community ran much deeper. Towards the end of the decade, Christo van der Rheede, arguably the most prominent “brown” activist on the language front in the South Africa, described the “white Taalstryd [Language Struggle]” as reactionary, parochial and “embroiled in controversy and hidden agendas”. With reference to efforts to maintain Afrikaans as a language of tuition at certain universities, Van der Rheede remarked that “the Taalstryders [Language Strugglers] failed to grasp the complexity of the language problem by focusing only on Afrikaans and regard[ing] transformation as an assault on Afrikaner heritage and identity” (Cape Times, 2009/07/29). Did he mean to suggest that the white language activists were acting as Afrikaner nationalists? Maybe not, but this is the hypothesis of my thesis: that the white branch of the movement for the maintenance of Afrikaans as a public language in the post-apartheid South Africa constitutes, for the most part, a continuation of the Afrikaner nationalist project. The aim of the present chapter is to develop a theoretical framework within which this hypothesis can be tested. The major question that presents itself is whether a non-state-oriented ethnic-based language struggle qualifies as a nationalist struggle. In order to answer this question, it is imperative that the definition of nationalism be revisited.

“Nation, nationality, nationalism”, as Benedict Anderson phrases it in the introduction to Imagined Communities, “all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse” (1991:3). The meaning of these terms is neither obvious nor uncontested. To say that there are as many definitions of nationalism as there are theorists of the subject would be an exaggeration, yet there can be no denying that definition is a contentious issue and that the existing body of literature is characterised by (sometimes sharp) divergences. So is public discourse, and post-1994 public discourse in South Africa is an interesting case in
point. In the debate within and surrounding the Afrikaans language movement questions such as “Is this/that nationalism?” and “Are we/they nationalists?” are emotionally charged. This is hardly surprising in the light of the association of apartheid with what nobody seems to deny was Afrikaner nationalism. What is often denied – directly or indirectly – is that latter-day language activism in the white Afrikaans-speaking community is an expression of Afrikaner nationalism. In the pages that follow, I provide examples of arguments to this effect that were raised between 2000 and 2006 by Afrikaner scholars in various fields. The result is a rather lengthy introduction, but the purpose is to give the reader some sense of the peculiarity of the definition problem in this particular case.

In an article that appeared in Die Burger on 8 October 2003, Hein Willemse – a coloured Afrikaans-speaker who was, at the time, head of the department of Afrikaans at the University of Pretoria – expressed the view that language activism has been central to Afrikaners’ “cultural achievement, their sense of uniqueness, their political control, their loss of political control, the earlier triumph and the present setback of their nationalism” (quoted in Giliomee 2004:53; Giliomee’s translation). Yet the white Afrikaans language activists of the post-apartheid era generally do not identify themselves as Afrikaner nationalists. Quite often, the label is explicitly discarded. For instance, when linguistics professor Ernst Kotzé, observes (with unmistakable approval) that the issue of language discrimination has become a standing item in the letter columns of Afrikaans-language newspapers, he adds that “the authors are no longer necessarily language nationalists, as was previously mostly the case, but also ‘ordinary’ mother-tongue speakers of Afrikaans” (2004:118). Even if these letter-writers protest because they believe, as Hermann Giliomee does, that the survival of Afrikaans is the minimum requirement for the survival of an Afrikaner identity, that does not make them nationalists.

126 Giliomee (2001:20) ascribes (the alleged) post-apartheid defeatism among Afrikaners to the fact that they were always made to believe that control of the state was a precondition for their survival. Many Afrikaners, he says, now feel that they have finally lost the battle. He
Giliomee’s take on the matter is that the Afrikaners of the post-apartheid era have “to come to terms with [their] history, to nourish and replenish [their] love for language and land and to accept the responsibility to hand over their cultural heritage to the next generation” (Giliomee 2003:666). What needs to be passed on, however, is more than a love of language and culture. According to the author of the Afrikaner biography, the crucial question is: “Can this generation ensure that Afrikaans as a public language is transmitted to the next generation and is it possible in this struggle to form alliances with other languages?” (Giliomee 2001:24; emphasis added). For at least some theorists, though apparently not for Giliomee, an approach such as this would qualify as nationalist in nature: it values the continued existence of a language-based ethnic identity and lays on others a duty to preserve that identity, *inter alia* by preserving the language.

What Giliomee does present as nationalism, is – as he describes it – the ANC government’s “nation-building creed of one history, one public language, and one ‘patriotic’ party” (2003:666). To this project, he claims, Afrikaners are not attracted, and time and again participants in the language debate have proven him right. Consider, for example, the degree of hostility towards “the Mbeki government” in an article by law professor Koos Malan:

> What South Africa describes as affirmative action is a self-deceiving code for something else.

> A decoding soon reveals that ‘affirmative action’ is one of the key instruments of the Mbeki government’s sectional nationalist project, which is entrenching black domination in all spheres of society.

> An additional side effect is the establishment of English monolingualism in the public service, in civil society and in education. Since black domination is the principal aim and English monolingualism its inevitable spin-off, Anglo-Afro nationalism is an apposite label for this project.

> Anglo-Afro nationalism puts the congenial liberal and human rights codes of the affirmative action concept at its service. Draped in human rights camouflage, this nationalism acquires a mobility that would otherwise be lacking.

suggests a different take on the matter: the prerequisite for the continued existence of an Afrikaner identity is the continued existence of Afrikaans as a public language.
Malan’s piece appeared in the now defunct English-language newspaper Thisday (2003/11/11) under the heading “Anglo-African Gevaar” – a title which contains an unambiguous negative comment on his stance. But while the author of the article clearly reminded the sub-editor who chose the title of the Afrikaner nationalists of yore and their swart gevaar rhetoric, Malan seems to believe that modern-day Afrikaner opposition to “black domination” as well as “English monolingualism in the public service” is not an expression of minority nationalism: the black majority are the nationalists; theirs is a sectional nationalist project, “[d]raped in human rights camouflage”.

During January 2005, the concept of “Afro-nationalism” was also employed by the philosopher and political commentator Johann Rossouw in a review essay in Die Vrye Afrikaan [The Free African]. In more explicit terms than Malan, though, Rossouw insists that the Afrikaner reaction (or at least the reaction of what he calls the new Afrikaners) to “Afro-nationalism” is not a form of nationalism. Rossouw does not deny that it is a political reaction: the “New Afrikaans Movement” (as he has labelled it – 2003:81) envisages the Afrikaner community as a “smaller political community” as opposed to “larger power blocs (the nation, the colonial motherland, the imperium, the market)”.

According to Rossouw, there are two types of post-apartheid Afrikaners: those who seek “political salvation” within the South African nation, and those who believe that their only salvation lies within the Afrikaner community. The former group, he claims, favour the discontinuation (opheffing) of their identity as Afrikaners (henceforth “self-destructors”, in lieu of a better translation for selfopheffers). Within the latter group he identifies two sub-types: old backward-looking Afrikaners – whom he calls “the nationalists” – and new forward-looking ones. Rossouw asserts that, unlike the more traditional Afrikaners, the new

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127 During its three-and-a-half-year existence (September 2004–February 2008) as the mouthpiece of the post-apartheid FAK, Rossouw was the editor of Die Vrye Afrikaan. All quotations in the next few paragraphs are from the following source: “O moenie huil nie, o moenie treur nie, die jollie bobbejaan kom weer”: oor Marlene van Niekerk se Agaat” [“Oh do not cry, oh do not grieve, the jolly baboon comes again”: on Marlene van Niekerk’s Agaat” – Die Vrye Afrikaan, 2005/01/21, www.vryeafrikaan.co.za (accessed March 2005).
Afrikaners – among whom he includes himself – are not nationalists: they favour “a different or new Afrikaner identity”. 128

Rossouw continues to argue that a distinguishing feature of the post-1990 Afrikaans world has been a mass production of symbols – by the self-destructors, the nationalists and new Afrikaners alike. Of these three “political positions”, the pro-new South Africa orientation of the self-destructors has attracted, in his opinion, the largest proportion of media attention by far. This he ascribes to the fact (?) that they cooperate with governmental and corporate South Africa. Compared to their symbolic production process, the respective projects of the nationalists and the new Afrikaners have received poor publicity, mainly because they stand in tension with governmental and corporate South Africa. Yet in Rossouw’s assessment, both the nationalist and new movement “probably enjoy considerable support in the broader community”. He adds:

Their one advantage over the self-destructors – and this is particularly true of the new Afrikaners – is their intellectual depth. Nevertheless, due to the limited scope of media at their disposal, the new Afrikaners can at present not compete with the self-destructors on an equal basis, and they are constantly subjected not only to attempts by the self-destructors to cast suspicion on them, but also to flagrant efforts to lump them with the nationalists: today, if one mentions the idea of a new Afrikaner, you are accused by the self-destructors that you want to return to the old Afrikaner of the nationalists.

It is not difficult to anticipate the kind of questions that some scholars of nationalism may raise, especially in response to the last part of this argument. Not nationalists? A group of people who regard themselves as intellectuals and who aspire to reconstruct an ethnic identity, lamenting their lack of access to the forms of mass media without which they cannot facilitate the process through which a new community is imagined?

128 It is interesting, though, that the “new Afrikaners” do not seem to be uneasy in the company of the “nationalists”. Rossouw apparently had no qualms joining the FAK (during 2004) or organising a conference in Orania (during 2007).
Following the publication of his review, Rossouw was indeed accused of being a “closet nationalist”, and his position criticised as one that could far too easily be interpreted as an apology for a new, more sophisticated version of apartheid. This particular reaction came from philosophy professor Anton van Niekerk, who identifies himself as a South African, “unashamedly Afrikaans and proud of it”, but not an Afrikaner. What is worth noting is that Van Niekerk rejects Rossouw’s position out of loyalty to his mother tongue:

I think it is extremely unwise, and I particularly think that, in our efforts to protect Afrikaans, also its higher functions in South Africa, such a position will endlessly complicate cooperation between us and our brown [sic] and black co-speakers of Afrikaans, who in most cases do not want to hear anything more about the concept Afrikaner.

Van Niekerk’s response would have annoyed not only Rossouw but also Giliomee. The latter, too, takes a critical view of white Afrikaans speakers who dissociate themselves from the ethnonym Afrikaner. “Is it not ironic,” asks Giliomee, “that people who have served cosily in the Broederbond until recently now regard the term ‘Afrikaner’ as stuffy?” (Beeld, 2005/07/19). What seems to concern him is the fact (?) that these no-longer-Afrikaners occupy important strategic positions in society: “it is they who will eventually determine the future of Afrikaans”. According to Giliomee, they are driven by guilt and constitute one of three categories of post-apartheid Afrikaners. Just like Rossouw, Giliomee distinguishes two further types, and their typologies are remarkably compatible, as

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129 This echoes Kotzé’s belief: it is entirely possible to be loyal to Afrikaans, not as an Afrikaner nationalist, not even as an Afrikaner, but as an “ordinary” mother-tongue speaker of the language. However, the concern voiced by Van Niekerk (and, almost on a daily basis, by “ordinary” Afrikaans speakers in letters to the press) about the weakening institutionalised position of Afrikaans – “its higher functions in South Africa” and by implication the power of its speakers – suggests that it is not disinterested loyalty.

130 This quote and the one in the preceding paragraph are from Van Niekerk’s letters: (a) “Oor die wegbly van die jollie bobbejaan: wie is dit wat regtig treur?” [“About the jolly baboon not coming: who really grieves?”] – www.litnet.co.za/seminaar/agaat_avniekerk.asp (accessed March 2005); and (b) “Gemeenskap, identiteit en verantwoordelikheid: hoe ek en Johann Rossouw verskil” [“Community, identity and responsibility: how Johann Rossouw and I disagree”] – www.litnet.co.za/seminaar/avn2.asp (accessed March 2005).

131 Clearly, this is not meant to imply that everybody who rejects the term in this spirit was a member of the Broederbond.
are their respective individual positions. Rossouw’s portrayal of self-destructors matches the way in which Giliomee depicts guilt-driven Afrikaners: they supported the Truth and Reconciliation Commission all too enthusiastically, and would have subsequently sacrificed almost anything to be assimilated into the new South African nation, including “any protection of Afrikaans, the term ‘Afrikaner’, historical roots of a university as well as academic and professional integrity”.

In direct opposition to the guilt-driven Afrikaners, in terms of Giliomee’s classification, stand the grievance-driven ones. Like those Afrikaners whom Rossouw classifies as nationalists, they will never accept a predominantly black government. Giliomee labels his third category principle-driven Afrikaners, and this is clearly where his sympathy lies. What is striking about this group, he argues, is the way in which they defend the South African Constitution: they pay their taxes, lodge complaints with the Pan South African Language Board about the neglect of Afrikaans and defend the right to mother-tongue education (i.e., single-medium Afrikaner schools) in court – exactly what Rossouw’s new Afrikaners would do. They are not nationalists but good democrats.

Consider, in conclusion, the following statement that was made by one of Rossouw’s fellow “new Afrikaners”, the philosopher Pieter Duvenage, in a contribution to Die Vrye Afrikaan (2006/03/17:11):

> Unfortunately one is confronted time and again with the stubborn criticism that you are relapsing to a type of nationalism or pre-94-mentality. The group of people to which I belong are trying to make a clear distinction: [ours] is not a nationalist agenda, but rather a pluralist project to be a post-national Afrikaner.

The list of examples can go on, but I think the problem is clear: participants in the Afrikaans/Afrikaner debate of the post-apartheid era neither spell out nor defend the respective definitions of nationalism to which they subscribe. The viewpoint expressed in each of the cases quoted above seems to be a conclusion reached through deductive argumentation (this is not nationalism, that is nationalism) with the different general starting premises (nationalism is...) – the reason for the
different conclusions – only implied and for the most part unclear. About one thing there is consensus: whatever nationalism is, it is bad, or at least a bad label to bear. To be called a nationalist is an accusation; nationalism is always the unfashionable hidden agenda of some or other out-group.

There would be ample reason to question the merit of this study if it were to set out and “expose closet nationalists” in the spirit of the ongoing public debate. That is not my intention. Yet I do think that the tendency among white Afrikaans language activists, as demonstrated above, to reserve the (clearly stigmatised) label “nationalist” for ideological opponents (both within and outside the Afrikaner community) – without defining the general concept nationalism, let alone explaining defining preferences – may have inhibited scholarly attempts to understand what has happened over the past decade or two to the once powerful force which everyone can agree was Afrikaner nationalism. The general consensus appears to be that “Afrikaner nationalism is alive approximately 100 years since its birth” but that it is “most certainly ailing”. This is how local sociologist Janis Grobbelaar puts it in her contribution to Abebe Zegeye’s volume Social identities in the new South Africa (2001:301–315). Grobbelaar, like many other commentators, equates nationalism with its extreme manifestations: she regards as nationalists only those Afrikaners who are “concerned with the relative or federal political autonomy option and, ‘if all else fails’ with that of radical militarised secession” (2001:313).

I wish to propose a definition of nationalism that is wider in scope, not as an attempt to confine ever more Afrikane rs (who do not want to be there) to the nationalist camp, but because I believe it will bring us closer to explaining the contemporary Afrikaans language movement. In terms of a broader definition, as will become clear, it is possible to argue that Afrikaner nationalism is alive and well, co-existing with South African nationalism (a term that I would prefer to “Afro-nationalism”). It is to the development of such a definition that I now turn.

3.2 The philosophical, social and psychological dimensions of nationalism
A cursory glance of scholarly definitions of nationalism reveals there to be a fair degree of consensus at the most general level. At least when it comes to the broad conceptual categories to which the phenomenon of nationalism belongs, theorists seem to agree that nationalism is one or more of the following:

(a) an ideology;
(b) a movement; and/or
(c) “a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment” (Snyder 1968:247).

Not everybody includes all three categories in their definitions, but many authors do and it seems safe to conclude, then, that nationalism has:

(a) a philosophical dimension (nationalism being an ideology);
(b) a social dimension (nationalism being a movement); and
(c) a psychological dimension (nationalism being “a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment”).

Nationalism is not only defined but also explained in terms of these categories with theories varying according to the emphasis they lay on the philosophical, the social or the psychological causes of the phenomenon. The concept “social” is used here to include political, cultural and economic aspects of nationalism – sub-categories that become important when explanatory theories are considered. While most scholars agree that cultural, political and economic factors played a role in the origin and spread of nationalism, some single out one set of factors – cultural or political or economic – as the decisive determinant.

One way to establish the extent to which “the struggle for Afrikaans” is a nationalist struggle is to consider the philosophical, social and psychological features of the language struggle, asking whether its ideology and programme of action are nationalist in nature. Are language sentiments – love for and loyalty towards Afrikaans – nationalist sentiments? These questions can, of course, only be addressed once the specific content of the ideology of nationalism, the nature and goals of nationalist movements and the object(s) of nationalist sentiment have been defined. For the purpose of this analysis I suggest (a) that the term “activism” be employed alongside “movement” given the similarity of their
respective dictionary definitions, and (b) that the defining category “condition of mind/feeling/sentiment” be substituted with a lesser-used but perhaps more accurate and more helpful category: “attitude”.

The reason for the latter choice is simply that the meaning of all the general-level categories in terms of which the psychological aspect of nationalism is defined – condition/state of mind, consciousness, outlook, sense, feeling and, perhaps the most widely used one, sentiment – are included in the meaning of “attitude” as the term is used in social psychology, more specifically in the widely accepted ABC model which distinguishes between (A) affect, (B) behaviour and (C) cognition as the constituent components of attitudes. According to the model, the cognitive aspect of attitudes refers to thought in whichever form: assumptions, beliefs, ideas, motives, outlooks, principles, values, and the like. It also includes the cognitive processes of interpretation and evaluation. Any attitude has, in the second place, an affective or emotive component: those somatic or physiological reactions that the object of the attitude evokes. Finally, attitudes comprise behavioural dispositions or “readiness for action” – the conative component (cf., inter alia, Baron and Byrne 1987:116). The value of the concept “attitude” – both in a definition of nationalism and in an analysis of the interrelationship between language and nationalism – lies in its structured inclusiveness.

At least one example is called for here to illustrate the interplay between feelings, actions and thought (Affect, Behaviour and Cognition) in attitudes. Let us consider a letter to the editor of a Sunday newspaper that appeared three days before South Africa’s 1994 elections. It was written (as were countless similar letters) in reaction to a decision by the national carrier, the South African Airways (SAA), to use English only – and no longer English and Afrikaans – for in-flight

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132 movement: “a campaign undertaken by a group of people working together to advance their shared political, social, or artistic ideas”

activism: “action of using vigorous campaigning to bring about political or social change”

announcements. “If the SAA wants to become English”, the author of the letter advised his fellow Afrikaans speakers,

fly with another domestic airline that still uses Afrikaans and with any other airline when travelling aboard. The latter may not address you in your own language, but at least you will not have to sit there boiling with rage about the betrayal by your own people (Rapport, 1994/04/24).

The crucial point here is that Cognition (which may be rational or irrational, conscious or unconscious) rather than Affect is in the driver’s seat. What triggered both the rage (the “gut-level” feeling) and the resolution to boycott the SAA (“readiness for action”) was the assumption that the step taken by the airline constituted betrayal of Afrikaans speakers/Afrikaners by Afrikaans speakers/Afrikaners. People, in the words of Epictetus, “are not upset [or pleased] by the things that happen, but by their opinions about what has happened” (quoted in Muller, Claassen and Van Tonder 1986:108). Explained in terms of another ABC theory (which is not to be confused with the ABC/three-component attitude model),

[i]t is rarely the stimulus, A [SAA’s decision to drop Afrikaans], which gives rise to a human emotional reaction, C [rage]. Rather, it is almost always B – the individual’s beliefs regarding […] or interpretation of A – which actually lead to his reaction C (Ellis, quoted in Swanepoel 1992:129).

All this suggests that any attempt to explain nationalist (language) attitudes should start with an attempt to lay bare the cognitive content of such attitudes.

3.3 Nationalism and the nation

Underpinning all definitions of nationalism is the assumption that any manifestation of the phenomenon involves a particular social unit, usually referred to as a nation. But what constitutes a nation? While nationalists seldom have any difficulty in defining their own nation, this question is the source of ongoing debate among theorists of nationalism. Anthony Smith identifies three issues on which conflicting views have developed over the years:
the ‘essence’ of the nation as opposed to its constructed quality; the antiquity of the nation versus its purely modern appearance; and the cultural basis of [the nation] contrasted with its political aspirations and goals (1998:170).

There has been a fourth, less contentious area of disagreement in the literature with regard to the definition of the concept nation. Scholars such as Elie Kedourie and Walker Connor have interpreted nationalism to imply ethnic nationalism only. Stating explicitly that “[n]ationalism does not refer to loyalty to one’s country” (1994:196; emphasis in the original), Connor, like Kedourie (1985:73–74), employs the term “patriotism” for devotion of this kind. Eric Hobsbawm (1996) reminds us, however, that the notion of ethnicity was absent from what he calls the revolutionary-democratic or liberal definition of the nation which emerged from the French and American Revolutions. These nations were defined (as the United States and many other nations are still defined) in terms of citizenship and mass participation or choice (Hobsbawm 1992:18). It was only during the late nineteenth century that ethnicity became, as Hobsbawm puts it, “one way of filling the empty containers of nationalism”. In contemporary Europe it is a popular way:

If there is any standard criterion today of what constitutes a nation with a claim to self-determination, that is, to setting up an independent territorial nation-state, it is ethnic-linguistic […] Every separatist movement in Europe that I can think of bases itself on ethnicity, linguistic or not (Hobsbawm 1996:256–258).

However, what makes each of these nations a nation is not the fact that its members share a tangible attribute such as a language. Nor is it a “sense of shared blood” (Connor 1994:197). For Hobsbawm they qualify as nations on the basis of their specific political programme. Following Hobsbawm (1992:14), one may therefore argue that the basic characteristic of the modern nation is not only its modernity, but more specifically its embeddedness in modern politics. This may take the form, to borrow Michael Billig’s (1995) terms, of “banal” nationalist politics in the case of state-owning nations, or “hot” nationalist politics in the case

133 The article in which Hobsbawm made these observations was first published in 1992 when the problem of separatist nationalism in Europe was more acute than today.
of stateless nations with a claim to self-determination (or state-owning nations aroused at a time of crisis). It may also involve, I would argue, the defence and expansion of an ethnic-specific institutional base in a “host” state.

Here I depart from Hobsbawm who classifies groups as nations only if they claim the right to “form territorial states of the kind that have become standard since the French Revolution” (1996:256). Nations may (have to) settle for less. As long as they are “more or less institutionally complete”, Will Kymlicka (1995:11) is prepared to call them nations. One may set the bar even lower: a nation must have some modern institutions of its own: trade unions, schools, newspapers and magazines, television and radio channels, language academies and other cultural organisations, museums and heritage societies, cultural festivals (or arts festivals as the Afrikaners call them), and so forth. It has in fact been claimed – notably by Manuel Castells – that contemporary nationalism is “more oriented toward the defense of an already institutionalised culture than toward the construction or defense of a state” (1997:30). Whether this makes the nationalism, as Castells suggests, “more cultural than political” is debateable. Politics, in the words of John Breuilly, is about power, and “[p]ower, in the modern world, is principally about control of the state” (1993:1). To me, however, this indisputable fact does not disqualify ethnic struggles for lower-order forms of power – legal power, economic power and cultural power\textsuperscript{134} – as nationalist politics.

Nations, then, are groups that assume a either a civic character or an ethnic character. In the latter case, (potential) state-ownership is not a prerequisite for nationhood. Yet ethnic nationhood is not to be equated with ethnicity. A nation, as Michael Mann puts it, “is a community affirming a distinct ethnic identity, history and destiny” (1995:44; emphasis added).\textsuperscript{135} Nationalism, in other words, entails the mobilisation or politicisation of ethnicity. Attempts to define nations of the

\textsuperscript{134} It was Michael Mann (1993), of course, who distinguished between these four sources of social power: political, military, economic and cultural/ideological. Max Weber has drawn a similar distinction between political power, class and status as three broad categories of power (Turner 1988:65–67).

\textsuperscript{135} To this Mann adds; “and claiming its own state”. According to my interpretation of the nature of a nation, its political project need not be state-oriented.
ethnic type most often take the form of checklists. According to the list proposed by Miroslav Hroch, for example, members of an ethnic nation should, at the very least, share

(1) a “memory” of some common past, treated as a “destiny” of the group – or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all members of the group organised as a civil society” (1996:79).

However, the compilation of these kinds of lists is perhaps best left to nationalists themselves. Unlike Hroch, Hobsbawm is reluctant to distinguish criteria for ethnic nationhood. Where available, he says, language is likely to become the primary symbol and expression of ethnicity. But language is not always readily available: the Croats and the Serbs, like the Hutus and the Tutsis, share a language. In at least one of his contributions (1996:255–266), this has led Hobsbawm to insert phrases such as “whatever it is” or “whatever its basis” after using the term “ethnicity”. Breuilly, in similar vein, leaves nation undefined except to identify the claim that “a nation with an explicit and peculiar character” exists as one of three basis assertions upon which a nationalist argument is built (1993:2).\(^{136}\)

To conclude, echoing John Hall: nations depend on political projects for the reason that “[t]here is no firm sociological mooring whatever to the nation, not in language, not in religion, and not in ethnicity, and Gellner is quite right to insist in consequence that the nation is far harder to define than is nationalism” (1995:11).

In the next part of this chapter I return to the definition of nationalism. The aim is to identify the distinguishing features of nationalist ideologies, nationalist movements and nationalist attitudes and to explore the (potential) role of language in each of these dimensions of nationalism: the philosophical, the social and the psychological. Which of those language ideologies identified by sociolinguists are nationalist ideologies? When does a language movement become a nationalist movement? What about language attitudes make them nationalist attitudes? Only

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\(^{136}\) This allows him to include supra-ethnic groups such as Arabs and Africans as nations in his typology of nationalism (1993:9).
once these questions have been answered can one begin to draw defensible
conclusions about the interrelationship between Afrikaans and Afrikaner
nationalism in the post-apartheid South Africa.

3.4 Nationalist ideologies and language

3.4.1 Nationalism as ideology

Within the modernist paradigm (which, as should be clear by now, is also the
paradigm adopted here), two classic studies on nationalism are introduced in a
rather assertive manner with the claim that nationalism is, above all, a political
ideology. I am thinking, of course, of Elie Kedourie’s *Nationalism* (first published
Kedourie begins by stating that “[n]ationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at
the beginning of the 19th century” and adds that “the doctrine holds that humanity
is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics
which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is
national selfgovernment” (1985:9). Gellner is even briefer: “Nationalism is
primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit
should be congruent” (2006:1). At a superficial level, as far as the basic content of
nationalist ideology is concerned, Gellner thus concurs with Kedourie, as do the
majority of scholars. It is when explanations for the genesis and spread of the
ideology are provided that differences of opinion become clear.

Kedourie traces the origins of the nationalist doctrine/principle/ideology back not
only to German Romantic thought and Herder’s “diversitarian view of the world”
as is common practice in the literature, but further down the history of ideas to
Immanuel Kant’s concept of self-determination. In the hands of people like
Fichte, Kedourie claims, “full self-determination for the individual came to
require national self-determination” (1994:137). The validity of the causal link
between Kant and nationalism has been questioned by Kedourie’s critics,
including Gellner (1983:130–134). Breuilly, too, has reservations about the
suggested mode of invention if it implies that Kant, Herder and Fichte together
produced the ideology of nationalism (1999:188). He does not dispute that the work of Herder – and then particularly his historicist concept of community – had been a major intellectual source of nationalist ideology, but emphasises that Herder was neither the first nor the only writer to defend diversity from a historicist and organicist position. Herder did not invent an ideology; his thoughts – which might have been “disinterested attempts to understand the world” – were “translated” into nationalist ideologies (1993:54–56). The use here of the plural form suggests that there cannot be talk of one coherent, monolithic ideology of nationalism, and elsewhere Breuilly indeed makes the point that variations upon the basic theme are possible: nationalist intellectuals can appropriate and adapt the core ideas to suit their own circumstances and objectives (1993:62). Their endeavours can be viewed, according to Breuilly’s theory, as an intellectual response to a crisis of political modernisation (1999:222). I think one may go further and argue, as Hroch does (with specific reference to post-1989 central and eastern Europe), that the “basic precondition of all national movements – yesterday and today – is a deep crisis of the old [political] order” (1996:96).137

To have any appeal, the intellectual response clearly needs to be appropriate to the specific crisis situation; it has to outline credible options and set realistic goals. If the classic ambition of nationalism – a state of one’s own – is unachievable for whatever reason, one has to compromise. A key question in this chapter is under what conditions such a compromised response may still be regarded as a nationalist ideology. Hobsbawm (1996:258) feels strongly that “ethnic politics, however embittered, are not nationalist [if] the programme of setting up separate territorial, ethnic-linguistic states is both irrelevant and impractical”. As argued above, I do not agree with him in this respect, at least not as far as contemporary Afrikaner (language) politics is concerned. In this case, more than one ideologue has suggested that language should act as a substitute for the lost, never-to-be-found-again state. Language can become the new land. In 2001 alone, both Hermann Giliomee (in an academic article) and Johann Rossouw (in a public

137 Consider also Alter (1990:80–81): “in almost every historical instance [...] nationalisms [...] were occasioned by real or perceived crises”.

127
lecture presented at the very popular Klein Karoo National Arts Festival) tried to persuade their fellow-Afrikaners that they do not need a state to survive (as Afrikaners). After 1994, Rossouw concedes, it is at any rate not a viable option “for us”:

The pressure put today on the state by the globalisation process [...] makes the establishment of an Afrikaner state at this stage also an almost impossible idea. As it is, Afrikaners are citizens of South Africa and it would make much more sense to find our place within this state rather than to establish our own elsewhere (Rossouw 2001:8).

Rossouw adds, nevertheless, that some form or other of an Afrikaner state is not forever after out of the question. In his talk, entitled “‘This place is no longer a place’: a new beginning for democracy among Afrikaners?”, he puts it to his audience that the transfer of political power in South Africa had left Afrikaners without a “place”. After eliminating material capital and religion as potential new metaphorical homes for the Afrikaner, he concludes that only language can provide a place where Afrikaners can feel at home again. Like Giliomee (2001), Rossouw insists though that it is not enough for Afrikaans to be spoken; it must remain a language of public domains: schools, universities, courts of law, business chambers, markets and churches (Rossouw 2001:12). Afrikaans must, in a word, retain its institutionalised status.

More recently, the idea that language should replace the lost state was also suggested to Afrikaners by the veteran author, poet and playwright, Hennie Aucamp. The latter, however, has a more pessimistic take on the situation than Giliomee and Rossouw as is evident from the following ideas he raised in an interview with Beeld (2007/12/08):

In a sense, the Afrikaner is also stateless. Camus said: ‘I have a fatherland – the French language.’ But I do not know with how much conviction we will be able to say for much longer: ‘Yes, we have a fatherland, the Afrikaans language.’ Because the attempts to undermine this language [as a pure, literary and institutionalised language...]
In my view, these responses by the Afrikaner intellectual elite to the post-apartheid crisis contain what Breuilly (1999:221) considers to be essential ingredients of political ideologies: a principle of inclusion/exclusion (who “we” are – notice the use of the first person plural pronoun by both Rossouw and Aucamp) as well as a principle of political order (how “we” should be governed). While the latter principle no longer requires that Afrikaners should have a state, it still requires that they should be, in other ways, “collectively and freely institutionally expressed”. This phrase, which I borrow from Brendan O’Leary (1998:40), captures the essence of nationalism. As a definition of nationalist ideology it is broad enough in scope to encompass both state-centric and non-state-centric approaches.

In terms of this less conventional definition, activist initiatives by an ethnic group without state power aimed at the formation or defence of its own institutions amount to nationalist activism. Following Schöpflin (2000:8), one may go further and argue that “symbolic expression” will suffice if “institutional expression” is only partially realisable. The nationalist quest for symbolic expression may be more than a means to a political end. For those nations which have to abandon the ideal of political self-determination and the prospect of securing any significant degree of lower-level institutional power, “symbolic articulation and presence” (Schöpflin 2000:8) may be an end in itself – a form of compensation.

Such cases, where ethnic conspicuousness or ethnic survival/revival has been (portrayed as) the major or even the sole aspiration of a social movement have been described as cultural nationalism (Hutchinson 1987; 2013). Its agents are not politicians but intellectuals and artists (of all kinds and abilities, one would assume). Instead of political parties they form academic and cultural societies. Cultural nationalism, as Hutchinson interprets the concept, is a force which recurs in times of (perceived) national decay, seeking “the moral regeneration of the national community rather than the achievement of an autonomous state” (1987:9). Cultural nationalism, in other words, is more concerned with the nation’s symbolic power or prestige than with its political power. But power, as will become clear towards the end of this study, remains at the heart of all
nationalist ideologies. In the following section, I trace the historical role of language in these ideologies.

3.4.2 The role of language in nationalist ideologies

Given that an investigation into the role of language in nationalism can include everything from a phonological analysis of the intonation patterns in Hitler’s speech to a rhetorical analysis of his speeches, it is necessary to specify the ways in which language concerns us here. Language clearly is, in the first place, an instrument of communication. It is also an instrument of thought. While no one will claim that communication cannot take place without language, it is considered by many to be a prerequisite for thought. Psycholinguists would phrase it more cautiously, saying that language facilitates conceptualisation. In some anthropological studies, however, language has been equated with thought and thought, in turn, with culture (read: tribal/ethnic culture). The latter half of this equation is not as illogical as it may seem: if culture is a way of life, it is also a way of thinking about life; any given cultural group (which is always socially constructed and never natural) is identified not only by its artefacts and practices, but also by the Weltanschauung of its individual members – their outlooks, beliefs and values (which some members of the group may reject). At the same time, a language is one of the tangible attributes of a cultural group and as such a basis of differentiation and both a source and a marker of social identity. All these things it has been since pre-modern times: an instrument of communication and thought, an aspect of culture, a prerequisite for certain forms of group membership and an important cue for inter-group categorisation. In the era of nationalism, however, language came to assume another function: that of a political symbol. For this Herder set the tone, even if it was not his intention.

Herder believed that “the greatness of a people was its uniqueness and that its uniqueness depended originally and primarily on its language” (Fishman 1994:89). Defending his “diversitarian view of the world” (partly against the universalism of the Enlightenment), he proceeded from the premises that language
is (a) thought; (b) learnt in a community; and (c) unique. Breuilly summarises the subsequent line of argumentation as follows:

If language is thought, and can be learnt only in a community, it follows that each community has its own mode of thought. Furthermore, to go on to argue that languages are unique could lead to the conclusion that each language is not simply a particular way of expressing universal values. Rather it is the manifestation of unique values and ideas (1993:57).

The claim, in short, is that cultures are unique because languages are unique. In the twentieth century, the American anthropologist Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf would set out to prove this experimentally. While the strong version of their hypothesis – that the grammatical structure of the language one speaks determines one’s culture or Weltanschauung (linguistic determinism) – has thus far eluded scientific validation, many linguists are prepared to accept the hypothesis in its weaker version, arguing that linguistic structure does not determine culture but can certainly influence Weltanschauung (linguistic relativity). Also widely held is a view that inverts the direction of causality: a language, it is said, is an index or a reflection of “its” culture, partly because domains of experience which are important to that culture get grammaticalised into the language (Romaine 1994:29). Culture, according to this view, determines language; languages are unique because cultures (and the physical and social environments in which they emerge) are unique, not *vice versa* (cf. Fishman 1991:20–24; Fishman 1994:84–88; Wardhaugh 1986.)

Since the mid-1980s, the dominant position in linguistics has shifted back towards that of Sapir and Whorf. Language, critical linguists now believe, is a “reality-creating social practice” (Fowler 1985:62). According to this view, a systematic and consistent discourse not merely reflects but may reinforce cultural change. At issue here, however, is not whether Herder, Sapir and Whorf were right or wrong about the nature, strength and causal direction of the relationship between language and thought/culture. What is important, as Fishman (1994:89) puts it, is that “there are still many who believe in relative linguistic determinism, both in the scholarly world and in the world at large, and this view provides strong
support for the views of those who believe that it is not possible to be Xmen [sic] without Xish” (i.e., for example, Afrikaners without Afrikaans).\textsuperscript{138} In other words: if nationalist ideologues wish to claim – as they have done since Herder in those cases where it served their political programmes – that their language is the (expression of the) soul of their nation, there is a whole intellectual tradition to which they can resort.\textsuperscript{139} It is in claims such as these that both language and nation become symbols: they represent each other. Given the centrality of language to human existence, it is potentially a very powerful symbol as Fishman explains:

Language can become the \textit{ultimate} symbol of ethnicity, since in expressing, referring to, and evoking something else in addition to itself, it becomes valued in itself (quoted in Giles and Johnson 1981:205).

Thus far, the focus has fallen on the role of language in the first part of the Herderian-inspired nationalist doctrine which, to quote Kedourie again, “holds that humanity is naturally defined into nations [and] that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained”. Of these characteristics, the German Romanticists believed, language was the decisive one: it was \textit{the} criterion of differentiation between one nation and the next and, in the light of its “obvious” naturalness, national boundaries were assumed to be natural too. These convictions, however, did not have the status of political ideology. They were “translated” into ideology when the claim was added that linguistic frontiers were also the natural frontiers of states (Alter 1990:60). And so the “fateful link between language and politics” (Kedourie 1985:61) was established: language

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\begin{enumerate}
\item[138] Though it may have an impact on the definition of that identity, language shift does not imply loss of a cultural identity. In reality, it is entirely possible to be a Xman [sic] without Xish: one can be Jewish with neither Hebrew nor Yiddish, Irish without the Irish language, Scottish without Gaelic and Suba without Olusuba (cf. Kembo-Sure 2004), to name but a few examples. Conversely, as in the case of coloured speakers of Afrikaans, having Xish as a mother tongue does not necessarily makes one a Xman.
\item[139] With reference to the German case, Breuilly (1999:220) makes the point that changes in political practice have, to some extent, determined the idiom of the nationalist argument. It always tended to juxtapose “the ‘natural’ to the ‘artificial’, the ‘organic’ to the ‘mechanical’, the ‘pure’ to the ‘polluted’”, but the idiom shifted from language to history to ethnicity to race, and the major intellectual source accordingly from linguistics to historical studies to anthropology to biology. It is possible, I think, to argue that the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism followed a similar route, returning a century after its inception to language/linguistics.
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became central not only to the nationalist principle of inclusion/exclusion, but also to the principle of political order.

In earlier nationalist ideologies language did not assumed this role. It was not linked to the principle of self-determination in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (cf. Özkirimli 2000:19), nor did it feature, as mentioned above, in the original revolutionary definition of the French or the American nation. In France, though, it was not long before the idea started to appeal to revolutionaries such as Henri Grégoire and Bertrand Barére that “the language of a free people should be one and the same for all!” (Grillo 1989:27). For the Jacobins, French became “a revolutionary device for bringing the truths of liberty, science and progress to all, ensuring the permanence of citizen equality and preventing the revival of ancien régime hierarchy” (Hobsbawm 1992:103). The nation might have been defined not as a linguistic community but as “an act of association”, yet the actualisation of the practices of association came to require linguistic homogeneity (Grillo 1989:23). Whereas the German nationalist writer Ernst Moritz Arndt wanted to see all the lands where German was the dominant language united (Alter 1990:60), Grégoire propagated the Frenchification of those citizens of France with mother tongues such as German, Breton, Basque and Catalan (who, in the wake of the Revolution, made up more than half of the population of the state), and the “improvement” of those who spoke “bad” French (an additional twelve to thirteen percent of the population; cf. Hobsbawm 1992:60–61).

In contemporary language policy studies, the French model still represents one of two divergent approaches that multilingual states may adopt. Alan Patten and Will Kymlicka (2003:1–51) identify it as the nation-building approach which sees the desired outcome of a national language policy as convergence on a common language. Implementation of such a policy would entail, as it did in post-revolutionary France, “[t]he eventual elimination, by education or decree, of all but one language, which is to remain as the national language” (Stewart 1968:532). The (nowadays far more fashionable) diversity-preserving approach, by contrast, defends the value of multilingualism and favours policies that offer protection for minority languages. The former type of policy usually aims at
eliminating not only linguistic but also cultural diversity, whereas the latter is generally part of a broader policy of recognising cultural pluralism. Underlying these policies, to use the terms sociolinguists do, are the respective ideologies of linguistic assimilation and linguistic pluralism (Cobarrubias 1983:63).

On the basis of its nation-building programme and its objective of national unity and cohesion, the ideology of assimilation has to be regarded as a nationalist ideology. It does not proceed from the Herderian assumption that language-group and nation are congruent, but it insists, like the French revolutionaries did, that state, nation and language-group should be made congruent. The ideology of linguistic pluralism is nationalist in a different sense: it is in the name of this ideology that minority language communities such as South Africa’s white Afrikaans speakers pursue their goal of finding “collective and free institutional expression”, thus resisting assimilation.

Among sociolinguists, one would be hard-pressed to find a single scholar who does not adhere to the ideology of linguistic pluralism (cf. Green 1987:653). Quite often, they base their defence of linguistic diversity – i.e., their defence of “threatened” languages – on the claims (a) that languages are intrinsically valuable, and (b) that “linguistic diversity contributes to our quality of life, in the same way as bio-diversity does” (Grin 2004:147). To François Grin, an economist by training, there is an “analytical resemblance” between languages and “environmental assets” such as animal or vegetal species (2002:91–92). Other authors – notably Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) and Luisa Maffi (2000) – go much further and argue that the relationship between linguistic and cultural diversity on the one hand and biodiversity on the other hand is not only correlational (where linguistic and cultural diversity is high, biodiversity is too, and vice versa – Skutnabb-Kangas 2000:83), but also causal (“linguistic and cultural diversity may be decisive mediating variables in sustaining biodiversity itself, and vice versa, as long as humans are on the earth” – Skutnabb-Kangas 2000:91; emphasis in the original). If one accepts these assumptions, the

140 Politics of recognition, as Charles Taylor (1994) has called it.
protection of linguistic diversity – and, by implication, the “survival struggle” of any individual language – becomes as justifiable a cause as the protection of biodiversity.

Unsurprisingly, Afrikaans language activists have found in sociolinguistic literature an ally which is, on the face of it, very reputable. In their writings, too, statements such as the following recur:

[Afrikaans is] considered as valuable in its own right (Giliomee 2004:53).

[T]he loss of any language is an impoverishment of the experience potential of the people. It is similar to a loss of biodiversity (Breyten Breytenbach, quoted in Beeld, 1993/12/14).

The effect of [globalisation] on the plurality of languages and cultures is comparable to the extinction of species in the biological order. Languages disappear like species (Fragmente editorial 2000(2):4–5).

In truth, however, sociolinguistics is not the most reputable of intellectual allies. Both the intrinsic value approach to languages and the bio-ecological or “green” approach to linguistic diversity have been discredited. If we believe that languages are valuable in themselves, as Patten and Kymlicka point out,

then we should acknowledge that speakers of vulnerable languages have not just rights to maintain their language but also duties to do so. They should be encouraged, and perhaps even compelled, to maintain their language, even if some of them are not interested in doing so (2003:47).

To Daniel M. Weinstock, this implication of the intrinsic value approach makes it an illiberal approach:

The problem with the intrinsic value strategy for the defence of minority languages is [...] that if the argument upon which it is based goes through, it is not individual speakers of a language who have a right against others that they be allowed to use their language. Rather, minority languages themselves have rights against all others, including their own speakers, to have their intrinsic value affirmed (Weinstock 2003:255; emphasis in the original).
Languages are not inherently valuable, and in view of their “historical, social and political constructedness” (May 2001:4; emphasis in the original) they are not comparable to species in the natural world (cf. Hamel 1997). Yet perhaps Walker Conner is right: “what ultimately matters [in social analysis] is not what is but what people believe is” (1978:76; emphasis in the original). And language activists – both inside and outside of academia – who regard minority languages in any given context as threatened species that deserve protection remain undeterred by their critics.

A final note on nationalism as ideology and the role of language in nationalist ideologies is necessary here. The preceding discussion on these topics took as its point of departure two definitions of nationalism which are, at a first glance, remarkably similar: those of Kedourie and Gellner. Yet the explanations offered by these scholars for the rise of nationalism could not be more removed from each another. Gellner opposes Kedourie’s view of nationalism as something accidental and rejects the allusion that we might well have been (and would have been far better off) without nationalism (Gellner 1964:151). Gellner, who belongs to the group of modernists who explain the emergence and spread of nationalism as “the necessary consequence or correlate of certain social conditions” (Gellner 1997:11), emphasises the role of industrialisation. The major point of criticism against theories of this nature is that “one can establish no general ‘social condition’ which can be correlated with the emergence of a powerful nationalism” (Breuilly 1999:191).141

What is convincing about Gellner’s theory, though, and of direct relevance to this study, is his explanation for the rise of shared “high” codes and cultures. In the agrarian age, Gellner reminds us, the language of landowners was “a matter of considerable indifference” to peasants:

Life is a difficult and serious business. The protection from starvation and insecurity is not easily achieved. In the achievement of it, effective government is an important

141 John Breuilly mentioned to me that he has always thought that what Gellner explains best is the definition of modern cultural and political identity as national, rather than the politics of nationalism.
factor. Could one think of a sillier, more frivolous consideration than the question concerning the native vernacular of the governors? (Gellner 1964:152–153; emphasis in the original).

When and how did it happen, then, that the language of the governors – the language of government – became a matter of concern for the subjects? Why do modern day subjects have to share not only a language, but, if they want to maximise their social mobility, a certain variety of that language? According to Gellner’s theory, the answer lies in the nature of modern industrial societies, specifically in the nature of work within such societies.

In contrast to technologically stable agrarian societies, industrial societies (and, one may add, industrialising and post-industrial societies) are characterised by scientific and economic growth (Gellner 1997:25). This development has had a profound impact on, amongst other things, the nature of work. Work in the industrial age has become what Gellner terms “semantic”: “[i]t consists not of the modification of things, but in the manipulation of meanings and people” (1998:27). The very process of communication now makes up the working lives of people (1997:29). Most work presupposes not only a capacity for communication, but, what is more, a capacity for context-free communication. Gellner explains:

In the stable, intimate, restricted communication of agrarian sub-communities, context – status of the participants, their tone, expression, body-posture – was probably the most important constituent in the determination of meaning. Context was, so to speak, the principal phoneme. Only a small number of specialists – lawyers, theologians, bureaucrats – were able, willing or allowed to take part in context-free communication (1997:29).

The reverse is true of the modern age: “precision of articulation, such as enables a message to transmit meaning by its own internal resources, without making use of context [...] is now a precondition of employability and social participation and acceptability” (1997:29).
When work is semantic, when it involves the constant encoding and decoding of messages (quite often technically complex ones) without making use of context, the need for a standardised, modernised, technicalised code – a high code – arises:

The standardization of idiom is [...] imposed on this kind of society by the nature of the work within it, which ceases to be physical and becomes predominantly semantic: work is now the passing and reception of messages, largely between anonymous individuals in a mass society (1994:105).142

Gellner’s interpretation of the term “high code” as a script-linked, educationally transmitted code corresponds roughly with the definition of a “high variety” supplied by Charles A. Ferguson in his classic work on diglossia: “a highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety [...] which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes” (quoted in Schiffman 1997:206). In sociolinguistics, since the work of Ferguson and Joshua Fishman, the distinction between “high” and “low” is not an unfamiliar one: high varieties/languages perform high (formal, public) functions in high (secondary) domains of life, and low varieties/languages perform low (informal, private) functions in low (primary) domains. (Cf. Fasold 1984:52.) Certainly, the labelling of certain varieties/languages as “low” is not meant to imply that other varieties/languages are intrinsically “better” (“higher”). The descriptions of high and low merely indicate functional differences between languages, and, contrary to popular belief, any low language can become a high language.143

Translated into sociolinguistic terms, Gellner’s high code is a high function language – a formally standardised language that is used as an instrument of work, be it in the field of technology, commerce, publishing and broadcast, government, government,

142 What Gellner has to say about the nature of work in industrial societies is probably more true of middle-class work than of working-class work. Yet, as he rightly remarks, “what passes for manual work [in the industrial age] presupposes a level of literacy and sophistication which must often be well above that of the professional scholar of the agrarian age” (1997:28).

143 It is no mean feat, however. If Giliomee’s (2003:xvii) information is correct, only four languages – Afrikaans, Hebrew, Hindi and Indonesian – could achieve this in the course of the twentieth century, and not without massive state support.
judicature or education (the co-called higher or secondary domains of modern society). The concept “high culture” is defined by Gellner (1997:75) as a codified, literate culture that an industrial society uses as its main tool of work. This suggests that any particular high code – or, in sociolinguistic terms, any particular high function language – is the essence of its associated high culture. The code does not merely reflect or symbolise the culture: a high code is the most important constituent part of a high culture.

To summarise Gellner’s explanation for the emergence of shared high codes and cultures: Work in the industrial age is based on communication; work is communication. Communication requires a shared code, and modern communication-based work requires a high code that is shared on a large scale; it requires a widely spread high culture. Put differently: modern communication-based work necessitates a certain degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity, at least in the public sphere, in the domain of work. To Gellner, then, the nationalist principle which holds that the political and the national (or cultural) unit should be congruent is not “the [bitter] fruit of idle pens and gullible readers” (Gellner 1997:10–11); it is a matter of necessity. Towards the end of chapter 4, I demonstrate the applicability of Gellner’s theory to the (near-simultaneous) birth of South Africa’s mineral revolution, Afrikaner nationalism and the high code Afrikaans. Then, in the final chapter of this study, I go further, arguing that Gellner may also provide us with an explanation for the emphasis on the public (or high) functions of Afrikaans in the post-apartheid language campaign.

3.5 Nationalist movements and language

3.5.1 Nationalism as cultural, political and economic activism

As products of social crises, political ideologies typically form part of social movements which “come into being and act as levers of change” (Giddens 1989:278). The kind of change sought by a nationalist movement, as dictated by the conventional ideology of nationalism, is increased unity and independence for the nation or, when the nationalism is assimilationist in orientation, increased
homogeneity within an existing state. This may involve military action or less violent forms of separatist, reformist or unification politics (cf. Breuilly 1993:9). More often than not it also involves activism in the sphere of culture. Some authors, notably Joep Leerssen, have gone so far as to claim that nationalism always begins as the “cultivation of culture”.

In an article that focuses on the meaning and role of culture in nationalism, Leerssen (2006:560–562) evaluates existing approaches and rejects both modernist and anti-modernist explanations for the cultural expressions of nationalism as inadequate. Rather than explaining the cultural aspect of any particular nationalism as some derivative of a corresponding political movement or as “the ongoing manifestation of a pre-existing fact” (Leerssen 2006:561), Leerssen proposes that we conceive of cultural nationalism as a universal intellectual movement analogous to – and directly related to – Romanticism.144

In with the same way as Miroslav Hroch, Leerssen traces the origins of nationalist movements – their phase A – to the studies of authors, poets, folk song and tale collectors, grammarians, lexicographers, schoolmasters and (pre-professional) historians who devoted their time to “scholarly inquiry into and dissemination of an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social and sometimes historical attributes” of the nation (Hroch 1996:81). These cultural nationalists, as Leerssen describes them, typically formed the “unwitting avantgarde” for their political counterparts – the phase B nationalists (Leerssen 2006:562). Like Hroch, who depicts the latter group as “a new range of activists” (Hroch 1996:81), Leerssen regards the political activists in any particular movement as a set of nationalists chronologically distinguishable from the cultural activists of phase A. He argues more strongly than Hroch, though, that the earliest phases of Europe’s nationalist movements in that long nineteenth century did not involve political action. Whereas Hroch would say, for example, that phase A activists on the whole seldom made political demands on behalf of their nation (Hroch 1996:81) or that

144 In the discussion that follows, I think I overstate my criticism of Leerssen’s emphasis on culture at the expense of politics, overlooking the value of this insight: that nationalism is produced not “nationally” but “trans-nationally”. 

140
they usually did not attempt to mount a patriotic agitation (Hroch 1985:23), Leerssen believes that nationalism is always born as a purely cultural movement (Leerssen 2006:562).

The history of Afrikaner nationalism does not support this claim. Early preoccupations with the Afrikaans language, as we shall see in the final chapter, were born out of political (or material) frustration; the cultural projects of the last quarter of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century were, for the most part, not endeavours in their own right but a means to a political (or an economic) end. Phase A Afrikaner activists may have styled themselves as language activists, but quite a few did so while earning their livelihood as politicians. Regardless of their respective contributions to the promotion of the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner culture, people such as S.J. du Toit, C.J. Langenhoven, J.B.M. Hertzog and D.F. Malan, do not qualify as phase A cultural nationalists in the exclusive sense that Leerssen defines the term, nor can the vast majority of their fellow activists in the First and Second Afrikaans Language Movements be classified as such. Of course, not every one of these individuals aspired to become a parliamentarian, but virtually all of them cherished political hopes for their nation.

To be fair, Leerssen does not claim validity for his generalisations outside modern Europe yet here, too, history has produced counter-examples. French nationalism, for one, began as political nationalism and in many of the later, smaller national movements where cultural activists did take the lead, political motives cannot be ruled out. Hroch, for his part, developed the periodisation model as a comparative framework only for the latter category; that is, for those smaller nationalisms that embarked on the nation-to-state route at various points in the 1800s and with varying degrees of success. In these cases, as in the case of German and Italian nationalism (Hobsbawm 1992:102–103), language and/or culture was the criterion of potential nationhood – the principle of inclusion/exclusion. Unsurprisingly, nationalism found its first expression in the sphere of language and culture. Yet to insist that all nationalism is, first and foremost, cultural nationalism is to forget about those national movements in history – also in European history – that were originally based on territory and citizenship. That it is common for nationalism to
rear its head as a linguistic and cultural beast is beyond dispute: the first agents of many nationalist movements – including the Afrikaner one – were not political parties but “cultivators” of language and culture. What is unsound is the claim that this is always the case, and the suggestion that the nationalist beast has, in its infancy, no political bone in its body.

Leerssen continues to argue that a nationalist movement, once it is born, never ceases to be a cultural movement because cultural concerns are not restricted to the embryonic phase of nationalism – an idea that is far less contentious than the claim that nationalism always begins as a “cultivation of culture”. In this regard, it has been argued that a purely political or civic conception of the nation is hard to sustain, hence the tendency for such conceptions to turn into cultural ones, at least in part (Spencer and Wollman 2005:13).

In the case of Afrikaner nationalism, political change – the kind of change classically sought by a nationalist movement – was eventually brought about “by a conscious, planned, organised and politically directed attempt to provide for key economic, social and cultural interests neglected by those forces favouring the incorporation of [the Afrikaner] within a broader South Africanism”. This is how Dan O’Meara (1996:447) interprets the role of culture and economics in the post-fusion (post-1934) Afrikaner nationalist project, and in Volkskapitalisme (1983) he demonstrates persuasively how the Broederbond-led (i.e., petit bourgeois-led) economic movement of the 1940s resulted not only in the growth of Afrikaner capital but also in cross-class national unity that was sufficient to bring the National Party to power.

The economic movement was complemented by a language and cultural movement which constitutes part of the subject of the final chapter of this thesis. What needs to be pointed out here is that O’Meara may overstate his critique of discourse analysis as a theoretical framework when he asserts that the Afrikaner nationalist movement achieved success “not by proclaiming the ‘truth’ of [an Afrikaner] subjectivity either in intellectual journals or from the rooftops” but by addressing the material and other interests of its target group (1996:447; emphasis
in the original). To accuse O’Meara of economic reductionism and determinism would be unfair: he concedes that “ideology and systems of legitimation have real, determinate effects in society” (1996:447). Still, he remains convinced that ideological/discursive practices – even in the form of “symbolic rituals and routines” – are not the salient shapers of national identities:

Discourse does not explain identity, even less those key episodes in South African history when large numbers of people began to act in terms of identities different from those apparently underlying their previous socio-political actions (1996:447).

But national identity formation cannot be explained solely in terms of interests either. To be sure, when confronted with a choice between two competing national identities\(^{145}\) – represented by two sets of nationalist elites – one’s material interests may determine one’s decision. Yet nationalist elites would not be nationalists if their programmes focused on interests exclusively. Their first task is to establish the criteria for membership of their nation – i.e., the principle(s) of inclusion/exclusion – and then, indeed, to proclaim the “truth” from the rooftops. Potential members must be told that they belong to the nation. Consider as an example the following question that was put to Afrikaner mothers in an article that appeared in a widely read Afrikaans magazine (*De Huisgenoot*) in 1919:

Does the child know that he is an Afrikaans child and because he is Afrikaans that he must speak his own language, know the history of his volk, be familiar with his Bible [...] By the seventh year the child must know what the word Afrikaner is (quoted in Hofmeyr 1987:113; her translation).

The important point here – and in this respect O’Meara is right – is that propaganda alone would not have turned white Afrikaans speakers into Afrikaners. To work effectively at a popular level, as Breuilly explains, nationalist ideology needs simplification, concreteness and repetition:

Simplification involves above all the construction of stereotypes. There are stereotypes of the nation in terms of history or racial characteristics or cultural practices as well as stereotypes of enemies. Repetition through speeches, newspaper

\(^{145}\) South African (*à la* Smuts) or Afrikaner (*à la* Malan), for example.
articles, rallies, songs, etc., is an essential part of the work of a nationalist party [or
movement]. The turning of these simplified and repeated themes into concrete form
is achieved primarily through symbolism and ceremonial (1993:64).

To summarise: However crucial the role of economic and other interests,
successful nationalist mobilisation also requires the discursive construction of a
national identity. The latter process entails the popularisation of the nationalist
ideology *inter alia* through the creation of myths, stereotypes, symbols and
ceremonies. It is upon this process of simplification and concretisation that I shall
focus in my analysis of the rise of the Afrikaner nationalist movement as a
politically directed language and cultural movement (section 5.1). For the
purposes of the analysis, I shall rely on a model developed by Leerssen in the
same article which claims that all nationalism begins as and remains cultural
nationalism. While this sweeping formulation overstates the case, Leerssen’s point
that the role of culture in nationalism warrants more structured attention is a valid
one, and the model that he puts together in an attempt to systematise what are
commonly considered to be nationalism’s cultural endeavours is not without
merit. In fact, if the Afrikaner case is anything to go by, it is a valuable analytical
tool – also beyond European shores – provided that the reservations expressed
here about Leerssen’s points of departure are borne in mind.

Leerssen’s model, reproduced here as Table 3.1, can be regarded as a taxonomy of
cultural activism.146 Calling it a “typology of [...] cultural nationalism” (Leerssen
2006:560) is perhaps misleading because culture-related nationalist activism is
more often than not political nationalism at heart, and is oriented in the final
analysis not toward cultural aims but toward control of the state or lower-level
public institutions.

146 What we have here is an attempt to systematise neither nationalist ideology nor nationalist
sentiment but nationalist activism as it relates to culture. Virtually every concept that
appears in the table is a noun derived from a verb: description, maintenance, activism,
planning, editions, translations, writing, criticism, education, commemorations, protection,
investment, studies, revival. It is an inventory of things that nationalists do, not what they
believe or feel.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of cultivation</th>
<th>Productivity</th>
<th>Propagation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural fields</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Language description</td>
<td>Language maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Text editions</td>
<td>Translations, literature, history-writing, criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material culture</td>
<td>Archeography</td>
<td>Monument protection, musealisation, architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices performed</td>
<td>Folklore studies</td>
<td>Folklore revival, national music, rustic literature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|  | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|----------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Table 3.1 A taxonomy of culture-related nationalist activism |

(Or: “‘Culture’ and its ‘cultivation’ arrayed in a matrix” – Leerssen 2006:571)

The argument has been made that the applicability of Leerssen’s model is limited to those nationalisms that emerged as movements of “cultural cultivation”. In the history of Europe these were movements of opposition, born under circumstances that Hroch explains as follows:

[A]n ‘exogenous’ ruling class dominated ethnic groups which [...] lacked ‘their own’ nobility, political unit or continuous literary tradition. [At some point,] selected groups within the non-dominant ethnic community started to discuss their own ethnicity and to conceive of it as a potential nation-to-be. Sooner or later, they observed certain deficits, [attributes that] the future nation still lacked, and began efforts to overcome one or more of them, seeking to persuade their compatriots of the importance of consciously belonging to the nation (Hroch 1996:80).

What Leerssen does is to identify four **fields** in which activism of this kind, aimed at the transformation of a nation-to-be, typically took place:

(a) language;
(b) “the discursive realm of literature and learning” or discourse;
(c) material culture; and
(d) performance culture.¹⁴⁷

As a second step, these “cultural fields” are juxtaposed with three types of cultural activism:
(a) salvage, retrieval and inventory;
(b) fresh productivity; and
(c) propagation/proclamation in the public sphere.

In the field of discourse (literature and history production), for example, salvage might have involved the edition of existing texts by phase A nationalists. This would have been followed by “fresh productivity” in the areas of literature and history-writing and finally, in the propagation phase, by the introduction of literary awards and the commemoration of historical events. In the field of material culture, cultivation could have entailed the salvation of an ancient building, its restoration (productivity) and its dedicatory (re-)naming (propagation).

A quick glance at Table 3.1 – which Leerssen describes as a matrix coordinating culture and its cultivation – will lead sociolinguists to identify certain problems. To begin with, I would suggest that the terms “language maintenance” (under “productivity” – block 2) as well as “language activism” and “language planning” (under “propagation” – block 3) should be avoided, as the scope of these endeavours is much broader than their respective locations on the matrix may seem to imply. Language maintenance, language activism and language planning all form part of what Leerssen calls the salvation, production and propagation of a language. However, if we were to list all three terms in all three columns (blocks 1, 2 and 3), this would still leave us in the dark as to what is entailed by maintenance, activism and planning at the various stages of a linguistic cultivation process. Instead, such processes should be understood in terms of language planning alone. More specifically, they should be explained with reference to the

¹⁴⁷ Leerssen uses the term “performative culture”, but I prefer “performance culture” given the well-established status of the related term “performance art”.

146
sociolinguistic distinction between corpus planning and status planning. Corpus planning, as Nancy Hornberger (2003:452) defines the concept, refers to “those efforts [or activism] related to the adequacy of the form or structure of languages”. Following Ferguson (1968), she identifies the goals of corpus planning as:

(a) standardisation (the selection of a standard linguistic norm which overrides regional and social dialects);
(b) graphisation/codification (the development of an orthography);
(c) modernisation; and
(d) renovation (including “purification”).

The cover term that Leerssen uses for these processes – “from grammar-writing to purism” (Leerssen 2006:569) – is “language description”. It would be possible, therefore, to employ the term “corpus planning” as a substitute for “language description” in block 1 of the matrix. But corpus planning as a type of cultural activism does not seem to belong solely in that block. It also fits into the blocks where “language” and “productivity” and “language” and “propagation” intersect (blocks 2 and 3): the “salvation” of a language is normally followed by the “production” of grammars and dictionaries, and once the language has been “propagated” in the public sphere, it is subject to constant modernisation and renovation. The spread of a language in the public sphere implies the dissemination of whatever was the result of the initial corpus planning process. However, it also implies status planning – “those efforts [or activism] directed toward the allocation of functions of languages” (Hornberger 2003:452). If the status planners are nationalists, a more accurate definition of their project would be “activism directed toward the conquering of public domains for a language”. Given that we are dealing with newly established and hence largely unknown linguistic norms, it is not surprising that the domains of education and the media have generally been targeted first.

Table 3.2 represents my attempt, motivated in the preceding paragraphs, to refine Leerssen’s categories of cultural activism in the field of language. As regards the fields of discourse, material culture and performance culture, the model remains
essentially a reproduction of Leerssen’s. In the Afrikaner case, as will become clear in chapter 5, nationalist productivity in the field of discourse often entailed national myth-making rather than national-history writing, while “the invention of tradition” is a more apt description than “folklore revival” for the developments that occurred over the course of time in the fields of material and performance culture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of cultural activism</th>
<th>Salvage, retrieval, inventory</th>
<th>Fresh cultural production</th>
<th>Propagation/Proclamation in the public sphere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural fields</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Corpus planning: standardisation, codification, etc.</td>
<td>Corpus planning: grammars, dictionaries, etc.</td>
<td>Corpus planning: modernisation, renovation, etc. Dissemination of linguistic norms Status planning: spread across public domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Editions of older literary and historical texts</td>
<td>Translations/ adaptations (Bible, classics) National/historical poetry, drama, novels National history-writing</td>
<td>Literature and history in education Literary awards and prizes Commemorations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material culture</td>
<td>Archeography</td>
<td>Restoration Musealisation Historicist architecture</td>
<td>Dedicatory investment of public space: monuments, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance culture</td>
<td>Folklore studies: oral literature, folk music and dances, manners and customs</td>
<td>Folklore revival</td>
<td>Folk pageantry: festivals and similar events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2 Leerssen refined: a taxonomy of culture-related nationalist activism

148 Cf. the elaboration of his Table 1 (2006:571) in his Table 2 (2006:572).
149 This is, of course, the title of a major book by Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (first published in 1983).
To account for what he calls the social and institutional framework of cultural nationalism, Leerssen expands his model with two further categories. Under the heading “social ambience”, as can be seen in Table 3.3, he lists *inter alia* associations, academies, reading societies, book clubs, conferences, newspapers and periodicals. In the history of nationalist movements, says Leerssen, these were the products of “bottom-up” organisation by the professional and middle classes. Their work, if they were lucky, was complemented in the more advanced stages of the movement by that of government agencies, which, in a “top-down” fashion, created an “institutional infrastructure” through the establishment, funding and management of universities, libraries, archives, museums, galleries and so forth. These are inventorised in the bottom row of Table 3.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural fields</th>
<th>Types of cultivation/Cultural activism</th>
<th>Productivity</th>
<th>Propagation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Corpus planning: standardisation, codification, etc.</td>
<td>Corpus planning: grammars, dictionaries, etc.</td>
<td>Corpus planning: modernisation, renovation, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Editions of older literary and historical texts</td>
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<td>Material culture</td>
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<td>Dedicatory investment of public space: monuments, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance culture</td>
<td>Folklore studies: oral literature, folk music and dances, manners and customs</td>
<td>Folklore revival</td>
<td>Folk pageantry: festivals and similar events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social ambience</td>
<td>Associations, congresses, academies, publishing ventures, reading societies, book clubs, periodicals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional infrastructure</td>
<td>Universities/chairs, libraries, archives, state museums, state academies, government agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 Culture-related nationalist activism contextualised
(Or: “A matrix coordinating aspects of the cultivation of culture in nationalism” – Leerssen 2006:572)

By adding the dimensions of “social ambience” and “institutional infrastructure” to the matrix that coordinates the fields and the types of cultural activism, Leerssen attempts to contextualise culture-related nationalist activism. This part of his model, too, raises certain questions. We can agree that associations, academies, reading societies and book clubs are the kind of cultural organisations that nationalists have traditionally formed. But do conferences, newspapers and periodicals not belong under discourse as propagation? Universities are listed...
under “institutional infrastructure”, but do state schools not belong there as well, along with libraries, archives, museums and galleries that are (completely or partially) state-sponsored? Apart from these apparent misplacements in the model, Leerssen’s categories of “social ambience” and “institutional infrastructure” seem to conflate three categories in an illogical way:

(a) the agents of cultural activism;
(b) their modes of organisation; and
(c) the institutionalisation of culture.

I would suggest that efforts aimed at the institutionalisation of a national culture constitute a type of cultural activism. In truth, the institutionalisation or official recognition of a language and its culture appears to be the long-term objective – expressed or unexpressed – of the entire range of activities that Leerssen lists as examples of cultural salvage, cultural productivity and cultural propagation.

According to Hroch, the goals of ethnic-linguistic national(ist) movements include three broad demands that correspond to felt deficits of national existence:

(1) the development of a national culture based on the local language, and its normal use in education, administration and economic life;
(2) the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration, initially in the form of autonomy and ultimately [...] of independence;
(3) the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group, including educated elites, an officialdom and an entrepreneurial class, but also – where necessary – free peasants and organized workers (Hroch 1996:81).

Only when all three demands have been met, says Hroch, can a movement be regarded as successful. Success, in other words, implies not only political sovereignty and class-transcending national unity but also institutionalisation of the national culture, especially the national language. Fully fledged nationhood requires more than one’s own language and culture; it requires that the national culture should be embodied in a state in which all the structures operate in the national language. Phrased in Gellnerian terms, fully fledged nationhood requires the transformation of the national language and culture into a high code and culture. Given that the movements under consideration here are opposition
movements, language and culture become sites of political conflict as soon as their institutionalisation is demanded. For what is demanded, in effect, is that the language and culture of the current rulers are substituted with (or at least complemented by) the language and culture of the aspiring ones.

Finally, a case can be made that Leerssen’s model should be expanded to include initiatives to maintain/preserve the national culture as a fifth type of cultural activism. This would reflect his (valid) point that culture remains a concern in nationalist politics after the achievement of self-government. As it stands – that is, with Leerssen’s category of “institutional infrastructure” scrapped – the model is representative only of nationalist movements on the rise. Salvage, productivity and propagation are identified as types of cultural cultivation but they also represent the early stages of the cultivation process. From this perspective, cultural activism aimed at institutionalisation would follow after activism aimed at propagation, while post-institutionalisation activism would entail the maintenance/preservation of the national culture.

All of this suggests that cultural nationalism – contrary to Leerssen’s claim – does not develop separately from political nationalism according to “a chronology and dynamics of its own”, pursuing “concerns of its own” (2006:573). The concerns of cultural nationalism are political concerns because they involve the authoritative (re)allocation of resources. Not only are culture and politics in constant interaction in nationalist movements, but – as indicated in Table 3.4 – the five types/stages of culture-related nationalist activism that have been identified earlier correspond roughly with either oppositional or state nationalism (that is, with a certain phase of a political movement).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of cultural activism</th>
<th>Associated with oppositional nationalism</th>
<th>Associated with state nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salvage, retrieval, inventory</td>
<td>Fresh cultural production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fields of cultural activism</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Corpus planning: standardisation, codification, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Editions of older literary and historical texts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Material culture</td>
<td>Archeography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance culture</td>
<td>Folklore studies: oral literature, folk music and dances, manners and customs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4 The interaction between culture and politics in nationalism: skeleton of a model
The term state nationalism, as it is used in Table 3.4, refers to a nationalist movement in control of a state. According to this definition, Afrikaner nationalism was transformed from oppositional nationalism into state nationalism in 1948. The four decades that followed produced numerous nationalist endeavours that fit onto our model as examples of activism aimed at the maintenance/preservation of Afrikaner culture and, ultimately, at the maintenance/preservation of Afrikaner power. On the basis of these examples it would possible to complete the final two columns of Table 3.4, at least provisionally.150 That is part of the aim of the final chapter of this study where I shall apply the Leerssen model to the rise, rule and post-apartheid life of Afrikaner nationalism by mapping the intentions and/or actual achievements of Afrikanerdom’s most significant taal- en kultuurorganisasies [language and culture organisations] onto the matrix.151 In this way, I believe, new light will be shed on the way in which Afrikaner nationalism has expressed itself over the years in the four fields of culture, especially language. This is not exactly the kind of research project for which the model was designed. Leerssen had cross-national comparisons in mind:

What happened in Iceland in 1820, what in Slovenia in 1850? Which came first? Is it possible to see certain pursuits more heavily represented in established nation-states like Denmark, others in marginal minority cultures such as Estonia? (Leerssen 2006:572)

My question, by contrast, concerns trends in a single case of nationalism over time. Still, the mere application of a model based on European data to an example from colonial Africa does imply a cross-national comparison. It makes it possible to determine, amongst other things, whether Afrikaner culture was cultivated in a manner similar to European national cultures. Was the route one of salvation, 

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150 Provisionally, because this contribution to the model will be based on the Afrikaner case alone. Yet it will be a first attempt to specify what the institutionalisation/official recognition of a culture and its maintenance/preservation imply in the fields of language, discourse, material culture and performance culture.

151 Nevertheless, it should be stressed that cultural and academic societies, as Hutchinson (1987:9–15) describes them, are not the only agents of culture-related nationalist activism. The role of individuals should be considered as well, along with the role played by nationalist political parties while in opposition or in government.
productivity, propagation, institutionalisation and, after 1948, maintenance? And, crucially for this study, what has happened since 1994? To accommodate post-apartheid Afrikaner activism aimed at the “defense of an already institutionalised culture [and language]” (to quote Castells (1997:30) again) Leerssen’s model requires one more column as indicated in Table 4.5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of cultural activism</th>
<th>Associated with oppositional nationalism</th>
<th>Associated with state nationalism</th>
<th>Associated with post-power oppositional nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salvage, retrieval, inventory</td>
<td>Fresh cultural production</td>
<td>Propagation/ Proclamation in the public sphere</td>
<td>Institutionalisation/ official recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fields of cultural activism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td>Corpus planning: standardisation, codification, etc.</td>
<td>Corpus planning: grammars, dictionaries, etc.</td>
<td>Corpus planning: modernisation, renovation, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discourse</strong></td>
<td>Editions of older literary and historical texts</td>
<td>Translations/ adaptations (Bible, classics) National/historical poetry, drama, novels National history-writing</td>
<td>Literature and history in education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material culture</strong></td>
<td>Archeography</td>
<td>Restoration Musealisation Historicist architecture</td>
<td>Dedicatory investment of public space: monuments, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance culture</strong></td>
<td>Folklore studies: oral literature, folk music and dances, manners and customs</td>
<td>Folklore revival</td>
<td>Folk pageantry: festivals and similar events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.5 The interaction between culture and politics in nationalism: skeleton of a model for the Afrikaner case**
3.5.2 Language activism and its explanations

In the previous section of this chapter, I considered the relation between nationalist ideologies and nationalist movements, and then particularly those movements which originated as language activism and as activism in the spheres of discourse (literature and history production), material culture and performance culture. These forms of activism, as will emerge in chapter 5, provided Afrikaner nationalists with the means to simplify and concretise their ideology, thus facilitating the spread of national consciousness on a mass basis. Through the print media (newspapers, magazines, novels and poetry collections), nationalist history was popularised and individuals came to imagine themselves (to borrow Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase) as Afrikaners. A nation, as Isabel Hofmeyr once explained it (in a title she chose – cf. Hofmeyr 1987), was built from words. Yet that is only half the truth: it was also built, so to speak, from monuments and festivals. Put differently, in terms of the Leerssen model: ideology and history also found expression in material or visual culture (artefacts, the linguistic landscape) and performance culture (practices) – before and after 1948.

The end of apartheid did not mean the end of Afrikaner activism in the fields of discourse, material culture and performance culture. We need only consider the centenary commemoration, through literature and journalism, of the Anglo-Boer War; the renovation and preservation of existing Afrikaner monuments, museums and other heritage sites, and the creation of new ones; and the resistance against certain name changes. If one accepts that nationalism need not be directed at gaining and maintaining state power, a case can fairly easily be made – as is done in the final chapter of this thesis – that the lion’s share of these initiatives are examples of nationalist activism. What is more difficult to argue is that Afrikaner

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152 In terms of Hroch’s periodisation model, this achievement constituted Phase C of the nationalist movement: the period of mass mobilisation. As the theory goes, the latter period was typically preceded by “the period of patriotic [read: political] agitation” (Phase B) which, in turn, followed after “the period of scholarly interest” (Phase A – cf. Hroch 1985:22–23).

153 In sociolinguistics, the term “linguistic landscape” refers to “the visibility and salience of languages on public and commercial signs in a given territory or region” (Landry and Bourhis 1997:23).
activism in the field of language constitutes nationalist activism. The question is: does the occurrence of language activism in South Africa continue to be what it so often has been – here and elsewhere: an indicator of ethnic nationalism? In a scholarly contribution to the existing body of literature on language rights, Theodorus du Plessis (2006:71) claims the exact opposite. According to him, the occurrence/absence of language (rights) activism could serve as a barometer of the general social condition of the civically defined South African nation (Du Plessis 2006:89): the more widespread the activism, the healthier the nation.

Du Plessis (2006:71) maintains that the contemporary Afrikaans language movement – like any other language movement – should be studied in terms of its relationship to the international language rights movement. In addition to more obvious examples, he defines activism in the field of place names as language rights activism, presumably on the grounds that the non-visibility of a language in the public sphere may, under certain circumstances, constitute the non-recognition of a language right. While Du Plessis’s contribution reports on an empirical investigation into the status quo of language activism in South Africa, it is written from a normative perspective. Citizens should, as a matter of duty, defend their language rights. Following Angéline Martel (1999), Du Plessis insists that

154 This contribution was the pilot study in the ongoing South African Language Rights Monitor (SALRM) project. Published in the format of an annual report, each Monitor aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the developments on the language front in South Africa, as reflected in the country’s mainstream newspapers. Although the major focus is on language rights, the Monitors cover other language-related problems as well, including the contentious issue of name changes in contemporary South Africa. Newspaper coverage of aspects of language promotion and language research also receive attention, and a whole chapter is devoted each year to a discussion of instances of language activism that had made the headlines. Together, these chapters constitute perhaps the most comprehensive record of language activism in the post-apartheid South Africa. It is a scene dominated by Afrikaans. Year after year, language (rights) activism in relation to the African languages of South Africa receives scant attention in the media. Even in 2007, when the SARLM survey included the KwaZulu-Natal-based Zulu-language papers, Ilanga and Isolezwe, the ratio of newspaper clippings that dealt with the maintenance of Afrikaans to those that dealt with the maintenance of other South African languages were 10:1.

Despite my own involvement in the SALRM project (between April 2008 and December 2009 as editor of both the monthly Bulletin and the Monitors of 2006 and 2007), this thesis takes a critical view of the Monitor’s approach to language activism, arguing that an analysis of language activism in terms of its manifestations remains at the level of description and is of little value in explaining language activist initiatives.

155 By implication he is criticising not only “inactive” Afrikaans speakers, but also the lack of activism in relation to the African languages of South Africa.
language rights activism is “essential, and even inevitable, in a process aimed at democratizing a multilingual society” (2006:71). To strengthen his point, he highlights Tollefson’s (1991:211) remark that “a commitment to democracy requires a commitment to struggle for language rights” (2006:71; emphasis added). The willingness to participate in language struggles is by implication a civic virtue.

Drawing on newspaper coverage during 2002 and 2003 as his primary source, Du Plessis analyses language activism in South Africa in terms of seven instruments, the first six of which were originally identified as such by Martel (1999:47): litigation, the formation of pressure groups (lobbying), research, community mobilisation, media coverage, violence and (Du Plessis’s addition) the lodging of complaints. As sub-instruments of community mobilisation, Du Plessis further distinguishes between petitioning, boycotting, threats of litigation, pressurising the masses and demonstrations. In the model that serves as a framework for his discussion – reproduced here as Table 3.6 – these instruments are located on a scale ranging from moderate to confrontational.
**Instruments of language activism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M</th>
<th>Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Media coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Language complaints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Petitioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Boycotting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Threat of litigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Pressurising the masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Litigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.6 Hierarchy of instruments of language rights activism** (cf. Du Plessis 2006:73 – Table 1)

Du Plessis’s model provides us with a tool to describe what the defence of an already institutionalised language has entailed over the past two decades in the case of Afrikaans. As such, it can be incorporated into Table 3.5 in the block where “language” and “defence of acquired status” interact. Beyond that, his hierarchy of instruments of language rights activism is of limited analytical value: it does little more than listing and organising the instruments that activists – all kinds and creeds of activists in the modern world – have at their disposal.
Even more problematic is Du Plessis’s normative approach to the study of language campaigns, and then particularly the post-apartheid campaign for the preservation of Afrikaans and Afrikaans place names. His suggestion that the latter is a disinterested and virtuous endeavour is challenged in this thesis. Language activism may be “a phenomenon that is increasingly prevalent in contemporary democracies” (Coulombe, quoted in Du Plessis 2006:71), but it may be because minority nationalism is increasingly prevalent in the world. For language conflicts, as Alan Patten and Will Kymlicka (2003:6) remind us, have virtually always been linked to nationalist conflicts. White Afrikaans language activists may claim to be inspired by a commitment to democracy or to the South African constitution, but it may be because apartheid has given ethnic loyalty a bad name. That brings me, in the final part of this chapter, to the psychology of language activism and nationalism.

3.6 Nationalist attitudes and language

3.6.1 Nationalism as attitudes

Thus far in this chapter, the focus has been on nationalist ideologies and nationalist activism. Nationalism also refers, in the third and final place, to popular sentiment: it exists in the minds of individuals as feelings of belonging and loyalty and pride; time and again it erupts, as Anthony Giddens puts it, from feelings of threat and insecurity. According to Giddens, nationalism is first and foremost a psychological phenomenon (Billig 2005:191). Whilst explanatory theories of nationalism that stress the role of the human need to belong to a group are generally rejected (the rise of nationalism certainly cannot be explained as the solution to a psychological problem, cf. Breuilly 1993:414–418), those theories that do not seem to account for the feelings that nationalism engenders – its emotional power, its spell – have also been criticised. Özkirimli (2000:141) cites the example of Anthony Smith who put the question to Gellner as to why people should ardently identify with (that is, nothing less than love) an invented high linguistic culture.
Responding to his critics, Gellner asserted that passion was not absent from his theory. Individuals, he explained, tend to find themselves in stressful situations if the nationalist requirement of congruence between their culture and their environment is not satisfied (cf. Özkirimli 2000:141). To Gellner, environment meant state; part of the argument in this chapter has been that the requirement of congruence can be satisfied at lower institutional levels. But his point remains valid either way: in the modern world, incongruence between an ethnic culture and its institutional environment – the inability to participate in a job market that functions in an unfamiliar high code, for example – is bound to cause stress and insecurity, which may or may not lead to nationalist resentment. Reactions of this nature are probably best understood not as feelings or sentiments but, within the framework of the ABC model, as attitudes comprising affective and behavioural and cognitive aspects. Put differently: these attitudes involve emotion, (readiness for) action and thought. And, as has been suggested earlier in this chapter, the stimuli for both emotion and action are to be found on a cognitive level – the level of thought.

Cognitive determinants of nationalist attitudes have material and immaterial dimensions. Concerns about access to resources may draw individuals into responding to a nationalist ideology, embracing the beliefs, norms and values that it embodies. Once internalised, these beliefs, norms and values shape nationalist emotion, which may lead to nationalist action (or activism). Such, it seems, is the nature of the relationship between ideology, activism and attitudes in the minds and lives of nationalists: nationalist sentiment (the affective component of nationalist attitudes) and readiness for nationalist activism (the behavioural component of nationalist attitudes) presuppose the endorsement of a nationalist ideology, and this act of endorsement constitutes (part of) the cognitive component of nationalist attitudes.

3.6.2 Language attitudes and their explanations

It may be an exceptional case – it certainly is when it comes to language monuments – but the history of Afrikaner nationalism contradicts Smith’s
suggestion that people are unlikely to identify with an invented high linguistic culture.\(^{156}\) Following the official recognition of Afrikaans in 1925, Afrikaners – or at least the Afrikaner \(\textit{petty bourgeoisie} – \textit{celebrated}\) their language \(\textit{as} a young human-made institutionalised high code,}\(^{157}\)

\[
\text{Nobody breaks it, lawyer pleads it, cleric preaches it: Afrikaans!} \\
\text{Schools teach it, politician honours it: Afrikaans!} \\
(\textit{FAK} 1937, \textit{song 9}).
\]

The focus of the song, it should be added, was not limited to the public domains that the newly standardised language had conquered. The “un-artificial”, “unprocessed”, “organic” characteristics of Afrikaans, and its role in the private lives of its speakers, were acknowledged too:

\[
\text{Father speaks it, Mother nourishes it, baby warbles it,} \\
\text{everybody caresses it: Afrikaans for me!} \\
(\textit{FAK} 1937, \textit{song 9}).
\]

Titled \(\textit{“Afrikaans vir my” [Afrikaans for me]}\), this song was written and composed by the composer of the apartheid national anthem, M.L. de Villiers. In 1937, it was included in the first edition of the \(\textit{FAK-sangbundel [FAK Anthology of song]}\) – Afrikaners’ “authorised” collection of folksong.\(^{158}\) Together with 46 other songs of known authorship, \(\textit{“Afrikaans vir my”} form part of the opening section of the \(\textit{FAK Anthology which deals with “Volk en vaderland” [Volk and fatherland]}.\(^{159}\) It is not the only song in this section that portrays Afrikaans as a language of both the private and the public sphere – a language that is simultaneously old and young, traditional and modern, natural and constructed. Consider as further examples the lyrics of song 20 (\textit{“Ek ken ‘n land” [I know a

\(^{156}\) If ever a high code was rapidly invented, it was Afrikaans: it took a low-function vernacular, literally a kitchen language, a mere two to three decades – from the beginning of the twentieth century to the early 1930s – to be “firing on all cylinders” (Ponelis 2004:122).

\(^{157}\) If truth be told, I would be surprised if this “folksong” was ever sung. The lyrics as translated here sound as awkward in the original Afrikaans.

\(^{158}\) Henceforth, \textit{FAK Anthology}.

\(^{159}\) Some of these more “serious” songs (though not \textit{“Afrikaans for me”}) have become as popular as the more typical light-hearted and anonymous folksongs in the rest of the \textit{FAK Anthology}.\]
country]) and song 36 ("Uit die chaos van die eeuw" [Out of the chaos of the centuries]):

I know a language oh so dear,
my own language, my heritage
almost lost
but now reborn,
so young and fresh!
(FAK 1937, song 20).

Hear it rustling purely over our fields – sweetest tongue of young and old:
First sounds in our ears, and last when death is near.
It is the language of our forebears, of their national assemblies;
on our pulpits, in our law courts, rises the sound of Afrikaans.
We shall preserve you, we shall build you up, we shall carry your flag high;
in our Love for our Language we shall be strong, South Africa
(FAK 1937, song 36).

There are more examples to be found in the "Volk and fatherland" section of the FAK Anthology (and elsewhere in the Afrikaans literature), but I think the point is clear. It is possible for a nation to love its language as a Blut-und-Boden mother tongue – a language born from “an intensely passionate embrace between a robust people and an unforgiving soil” (Kruger, quoted in Kok (ed.)1974:35), a language that “sits in our marrow and blood” (FAK 1937, song 41), a language learned at mother’s knee from her “pious mouth” (FAK 1937, song 42) – and to love the language as a high code equipped for modernity and urbanity. In fact, in the dual nature of the national language may lie the dual explanation for “the love of a language”, which so often complements “the love of a volk and a fatherland”.

What has to be borne in mind here is the distinction between the communicative function of a language on the one hand (including thought), and its symbolic function on the other hand. Human languages, sociolinguistic textbooks tell us, are both instruments of social (and intrapersonal) interaction and symbols of identity. Following Gellner, one may go further and argue that the nature of language – both as a tool of communication and as a marker of identity – has been redefined by industrialisation, modernisation and nationalism. In the course of
history, languages that survived the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society and/or the transition from the world of empires to the world of nation states acquired communicative and symbolic functions that they had previously not performed. Industrialisation, to simplify one effect of the process, turned language into the tool of virtually all trades, while nationalism turned languages into national symbols.

To understand the symbolic role of language in nationalism we need only consider songs 20 and 36 from the *FAK Anthology* again, now in their entirety. In the life of a nation, as in these folksongs, *nation, country* and *language* are substitutable in the sense that they symbolise – or, as Joshua Fishman (1994:87) explains it, stand for or represent – one another:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{I know a } \textit{country} \text{ of oxwagon […]} \\
&\text{I know a } \textit{volk} \text{ so great and free […]} \\
&\text{I know a } \textit{language} \text{ oh so dear} \\
&(\text{FAK 1937, song 20; emphasis added).}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{[I]n our Love for our } \textit{Volk} \text{ we shall be strong, South Africa […]} \\
&\text{[I]n our Love for our } \textit{Language} \text{ we shall be strong, South Africa […]} \\
&\text{[I]n our Love for our } \textit{Country} \text{ we shall be strong, South Africa} \\
&(\text{FAK 1937, song 36; emphasis added; unconventional use of uppercase in the original).}
\end{align*}
\]

Song 40 may serve as another example of the threefold nature of the object of national love:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{I cherish my } \textit{country} \text{ with all my heart, fatherland South Africa […]} \\
&\text{I cherish my country with all my heart, my beloved South Africa.} \\
&\text{I cherish my } \textit{volk} \text{ with all my heart, Afrikaans [sic] volk so free […]} \\
&\text{I cherish my volk with all my heart, my beloved volk so free.} \\
&\text{I cherish my } \textit{language} \text{ with all my heart, mother tongue so soft, so sweet.} \\
&\text{Wherever I may wander, never will a foreign language rob me of my love.} \\
&\text{Language of pious predecessors, my beloved language oh so sweet.} \\
&\text{I cherish my language with all my heart, mother tongue so soft, so sweet} \\
&(\text{FAK 1937, song 40; emphasis added).}
\end{align*}
\]
Like a flag, it is often said, a language may symbolise a nation and a state. There are, however, obvious differences between languages and flags: the latter have no value beyond the symbolic; the former are potential sources of material power. This goes some way to explaining why people would (claim to) love an artificially constructed high linguistic culture and defend it as such: only when the national language functions as a high code, when it is *more* than the tongue of the mother and the language of the home – *more* than the soul of the nation – can it facilitate upward socioeconomic mobility in the modern world. During South Africa’s transition to democracy, when the future status of Afrikaans was still uncertain, at least some commentators acknowledged this fact. “Let us admit it,” an Afrikaans speaker wrote to *Die Burger* during November 1993,

> [i]t is not Afrikaans that is under threat. It is *us* who feel threatened because we fear that our positions – those positions that have to do with Afrikaans – will be become redundant in a new dispensation (*Die Burger*, 1993/11/17; emphasis in the original).

To summarise: In the vocabulary of the ABC model of attitudes, love for a language is determined, on a cognitive level, by a positive evaluation of the nation that the particular language symbolises, and/or by a calculation of the opportunities that the language creates (or in future may create) as a high code. The question that arises is: is that always the case? Can language love *always* be explained as opportunistic love of a *volk* and a fatherland? Are sentiments about language *necessarily* nationalist sentiments? Can one deduce from the following declaration of love that the *Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging* [Afrikaans Language and Cultural Association] (ATKV, est. 1930) continues to be an Afrikaner nationalist organisation?

At the ATKV we are unequivocally, decidedly and without hesitation in love with Afrikaans and for those who share our love there are more than enough projects [which provide you with the opportunity] to breathe in the language of your heart [and] declare your love to Afrikaans (*Taalgenoot*, 2013, Summer, p. 59).

This little advertisement appeared during 2013 in the summer edition of the ATKV’s glossy magazine *Taalgenoot* [Language Companion]. It suggests that the love affair between Afrikaans and Afrikaans speakers – as linguist Piet Swanepoel
described it in the title he chose for his professorial inauguration lecture in 1991 – is all but over. Yet it has not been an exclusively nationalist love affair, not least because prominent coloured speakers of Afrikaans such as Franklin Sonn would describe their language – or rather their dialect – as “the Afrikaans that we call our mother tongue and the Afrikaans that we love” (1988, quoted in Swanepoel 1992:123; emphasis in the original). Quite a few white opponents of Afrikaner nationalism, too, remained loyal to Afrikaans over the years. Beyers Naudé (cf. footnote 73), for example, said in 1991:

Afrikaans is my mother tongue. It is a language that I love and that I would like to see promoted (quoted in Swanepoel 1992:123).

A decade after his release from prison, where he spent seven years for high treason against the apartheid state, the Afrikaner poet, playwright, author and visual artist Breyten Breytenbach wrote (in Afrikaans):

Every time one has been away, and you get back, you realise how you have missed it: the texture of everyday life. The sounds, the colours, the language, the humour. I know a few languages, and I can adapt, I can play my role if necessary. As European, perhaps even as Frenchman. But one never gets deeper than a certain level. You can never relax instinctively; you are never intuitively fully part of where you are. Afrikaans is possibly more important to me than to many other people. Overseas it has been a coat against the cold. One holds on to such an old coat, even though it is worn to shreds, even though it has holes in it, even though the original label is long gone–like a child clinging to a blanket because it smells of the mom and the dad (Beeld, 1993/12/14).

Similar language attitudes have been articulated by non-nationalist fictional characters. Obi Okonkwo in Chinua Achebe’s No Longer at Ease is not an Ibo nationalist, yet:

[f]our years in England had filled [him] with a longing to be back in Umuofia. This feeling was sometimes so strong that he found himself feeling ashamed of studying English for his degree. He spoke Ibo whenever he had the least opportunity of doing so. Nothing gave him greater pleasure than to find another Ibo-speaking student in a London bus (1988:214; emphasis added).
Consider also the following excerpts from Peter Høeg’s novel *Miss Smilla’s feeling for snow*. The first-person narrator, Smilla Qaaviqaq Jaspersen, is the daughter of a female Inuit hunter and a Danish physician who spent her early childhood with her mother in Greenland. “When we moved from the village school to Qaanaaq,” she recalls,

we had teachers who didn’t know one word of Greenlandic, nor did they have any plans to learn it. They told us that, for those who excelled, there would be an admission ticket to Denmark and a degree and a way out of the Arctic misery. This golden ascent would take place in Danish. Then you arrive in Denmark and six months pass and it feels as if you will never forget your mother tongue. It’s the language you think in, the way you remember your past (1996:105).

Joshua Fishman would have phrased it slightly differently: the mother tongue is the language in which you remember your culture of origin. If these are fond memories, chances are that you will become conscious of and even defensive about your ancestral language when a (threatening) new language arrives on the block. The reason, according to Fishman, has to do with the fact that a language is

Eventually, however, the high code Danish supplants Miss Smilla’s Greenlandic, leaving her melancholic: “It is freezing, an extraordinary –18°C, and it’s snowing, and in the language which is no longer mine, the snow is *qanik* – big, almost weightless crystals falling in stacks and covering the ground with a layer of pulverised white frost” (1996:3).

It should be stressed, however, that the notions of a mother tongue and a single culture of origin have become alien to the modern world, also to modern Africa. In fact, according to Neville Alexander, “one of the most pernicious elements of the colonial legacy is the Eurocentric interpretation of the relationship between language and culture and, specifically, the assumption that the language group and the cultural group are identical” (*The Sunday Independent*, 1996/06/23). Consider the experience of the narrator in J.M. Coetzee’s autobiographic novel *Youth* – a young man whose mother tongue (in the literal sense of the word) is English:

He leaves a message at the Earls Court address. Some days later there is a call: not from Ilse but from the friend, the companion, speaking English clumsily, getting it and are wrong […] Her name is Marianne […] For a while they speak English, then he relents and switches to the language of [his father’s] family, to Afrikaans. Though it is years since he spoke Afrikaans, he can feel himself relax at once as though sliding into a warm bath (2002:127).

But then the character takes the Afrikaans-speaking girl for a walk along the Thames Embankment:

In her hiking boots, with her no-nonsense haircut, Marianne from Ficksburg is out of place among the fashionable London girls, but she does not seem to care. Nor does she care if people hear her speaking Afrikaans. As for him, he would prefer it if she lowered her voice. Speaking Afrikaans in this country, he wants to tell her, is like speaking Nazi, if there were such a language (2002:127).

The language(s) in which you remember your culture(s) of origin, it seems, does/do not always evoke feelings of belonging and pride.
related to “its” culture in part-whole fashion: “Language is (part of) culture because much of culture” – songs, rhymes, stories, idioms, religious scripts and the like – are “inherently and inescapably linguistic” (Fishman 1994:86). When translated, these texts seem to lose their emotional appeal; somehow they no longer evoke the same “associations and memories” (Fishman 1991:24).

Like “a coat against the cold” and “a blanket [that] smells of the mom and the dad”, to use Breytenbach’s metaphors, languages are loved for the memories they bring of home and youth. Such sentiments hardly qualify as nationalism. The problem is that they are exploitable and ever so often have been exploited by activist-ideologues who believe that “wherever a separate language is found there a separate nation exists which has the right to take independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself [in as far as possible]” (Fichte paraphrased by Williams 1994:5). If “history is the raw material for nationalist […] ideologies, as poppies are the raw material for heroin addiction” (Hobsbawm 1997:5), then harmless language love is the raw material for potentially harmful nationalist language attitudes.

When the status of a language as a high code comes under threat, ostensibly harmless love for that language is particularly at risk to be exploited by a nationalist movement. Consider the following language attitudes – all of which were expressed by leading figures on the Afrikaans literary scene during 1991:

Chris Barnard (not to be confused with the heart surgeon):

One speaks and protects and promotes your mother tongue because it is your only true home (quoted in Swanepoel 1992:137).

Hans du Plessis:

Mother tongue is […] the only language in which you can spontaneously perform

162 Except when first learnt in translated form: “There were some songs, such as the British national anthem, which he could only sing in Yoruba; books such as Booker T. Washington’s Up from slavery and John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s progress that he remembers only in their Yoruba translation” (Omotoso 1994:101).

163 Since its publication in 1980, Jaap Steyn’s (well-researched but nationalist) history of Afrikaans, titled Tuiste in eie taal [At home in one’s own language], has become the bible of Afrikaner language activists, some of whom seem to regard Steyn’s metaphor of “mother tongue = home” as an adequate justification for linguistic human rights claims.
intellectually. It is identity. Rob a speaker of his [sic] mother tongue and you rob him of his basic human rights, namely to be himself spontaneously (quoted in Swanepoel 1992:131).

Lina Spies:
Mother tongue is a precious human possession. In the mother tongue one thinks, lives, is. In any other language – which one normally acquires second-hand and artificially – one comes across smaller. Exceptions to this rule are rare” (quoted in Swanepoel 1992:130).

I do not wish to suggest, on the basis of these quotes alone, that Barnard, Du Plessis and Spies were, at the time, Afrikaner nationalists. Yet in South Africa in 1991, holders of beliefs such as those cited here must have been attracted to a movement which vowed to protect the institutionalised status of Afrikaans. Such a movement was on the rise, and some of its leading members also undertook to ensure that white speakers of Afrikaans would remain collectively and freely expressed, both institutionally and symbolically, in a future dispensation.

3.7 Concluding the conceptual analysis

In a classic book dating back to 1970, Albert Hirschman distinguishes between “exit, voice and loyalty” as potential minority responses to a majority regime. The ideal solution to Koos Malan’s problem with “black domination” and “English monolingualism in the public service” is the “exit” option which is also, in terms of conventional definitions, the nationalist solution: an independent Afrikaner state. However, in South Africa today exit is impractical, if not unthinkable, and Malan chooses the “voice” option, not least because exit loses its attraction when it is possible to have voice (i.e., to be published, to lodge complaints with the Pan South African Language Board, to defend language rights in court, etc.; cf. Hall 1995:18). Is the “voice” option any less nationalist than the “exit” option? The argument in this study is that it is not. Nor is the “loyalty” option if it entails, however banal, a belief in the primacy of the South African nation and a corresponding sense of a civic (as opposed to an ethnic) obligation.
The variety of nationalist ideologies, nationalist movements and nationalist sentiments does not rule out an overarching definition of nationalism: nationalism, as it is defined here, is an ideology which holds that the nation should be collectively and freely expressed, both through symbols and institutions (which may or may not include the state). The term is also used to refer to a programme of action of which the objectives are to preserve the identity of the nation and to protect its interests. In the third and final place nationalism concerns identification with and loyalty towards a nation – be it civicly or ethnically defined.

Language can play and has played a central role in nationalist ideologies, nationalist movements and nationalist attitudes. In nationalist ideologies, it has come to be the principle of inclusion/exclusion par excellence and as such also the principle upon which political order is based. By defending a language, nationalist movements can revive national identities and secure sectional interests. The object of language attitudes is often not a language, but the nation that it symbolises.

Not only the fact that a language, like a nation, can be the object of love, loyalty and pride but the intensity of these emotions, the fervour of language movements, the fierce way in which speakers normally react to negative comment of whatever nature on their language, the whole idea that people have often tried to purify their language from (certain) foreign elements – all this suggests that concerns about language are not really about language. And yet they are not necessarily nationalist concerns.

In bringing this chapter to a close, I would like to propose a preliminary test that might help us to determine whether non-state-oriented language activism and language attitudes are nationalist in nature or not. It revolves around three concepts: duty, border and threat. Once these concepts enter the discourse – once a language is represented as a clearly demarcated territory that must be protected – it becomes a nationalist discourse. In such discourses, it seems, the borders of languages are perceived to be threatened at (at least) three levels. When language activists represent emigration and lower birth rates as threats to Afrikaans (e.g., Steyn 1980:20), they are defending the demographic border of the language.
When they lay on young Afrikaners the duty to “ensure that Afrikaans as a public language is transmitted to the next generation” (Giliomee 2001:24), they are defending the functional border of the language – the domains within which it operates as a high code. When they oppose the impure use of any particular language and by implication Afrikaans-English code-mixing (e.g., Goosen 2002; Scholtz in Die Burger, 2003/08/29), they are defending the linguistic or structural border of the language.

Language nationalism, then, involves efforts to increase, or at least stabilise, the number of speakers as well as the range of public functions of a language. It also involves purism: the elimination of lexical insurgents or the naturalisation of lexical immigrants – all in an attempt to guard not only the linguistic but also the national frontier. When all efforts have failed to make the linguistic unit and the political unit congruent, when the geopolitical boundaries of the nation have become blurred beyond recognition, nationalist concerns about the demographic, functional and structural boundaries of the national language seem to become all the more acute.
CHAPTER 4
“A LANGUAGE WHICH MAKES EVERY MODEST WOMAN BLUSH”: THE CONTEMPORARY AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE MOVEMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, I

[The English tongue] *is of small reach, it stretcheth no further than this Iland of ours, naie not there ouer all* [...] *But our state in no Empire* (Richard Mulcaster, 1582).

4.1 A longitudinal approach to understanding Afrikaans language activism

Judged against the criteria that I proposed and defended in the previous chapter, a non-state-oriented ethnic-based language movement – such as the Afrikaner branch of the movement for the preservation of (the institutionalised status of) Afrikaans in contemporary South Africa – may qualify as a nationalist movement. However, my argument in favour of a general definition of nationalism that allows for the classification of (certain) present-day Afrikaans language activists as Afrikaner nationalists can rightly be dismissed as the imposition of a model on the evidence. What also needs to be established is the degree to which the post-1990 language movement – or a segment thereof – is an extension of pre-1990 Afrikaner nationalism. That is the aim of the remainder of my thesis: to substantiate the claim that Afrikaner nationalism has outlived apartheid by juxtaposing movements old and new.

Set against the political background sketched in chapters 1 and 2, the focal point of this diachronical comparison will be activism, and then particularly activism in the extra-parliamentary arena. To compare political activism – in the narrow sense

164 It was at the beginning of this year, as mentioned in the previous chapter, that F.W. de Klerk opened his first parliamentary session as South Africa’s president with the announcement that his government intended to enter into a process of negotiation with the liberation movement. At this point, rather than four years later when the ANC came into power, did Afrikaner nationalism begin to reinvent itself as an opposition movement.
of the word – by Afrikaners before and after 1994 would be pointless, given the way in which the rules of South Africa’s party-political game had changed in the election of that year. In the vocabulary of the Leerssen-based model that I developed in chapter 3, the primary concern of chapters 4 and 5 will be cultural activism, and then particularly language activism. The rationale behind past and present Afrikaner language movements – the ideology underpinning the activism and the expressed and unexpressed ambitions of the activists – will form part and parcel of the comparison. What will not be compared, simply because it would require a sophisticated attitude study among modern-day Afrikaners that falls beyond the scope of this thesis, is the impact or mass appeal of pre-apartheid and apartheid Afrikaans language movements on the one hand, and the post-apartheid movement on the other hand.

It needs to be stressed, though, that while cultural rather than political activism has the central attention in the final two chapters of this thesis, I also revisit the relationship between cultural and political nationalism – both as concepts and as actual movements – and question the notion of a dichotomy. To study Afrikaner nationalism’s successive cultural movements in isolation from contemporaneous political and, one should add, economic movements would be pointless. For the Afrikaner nationalist project, to misquote O’Meara slightly, started out and remained for at least a century a “politically directed attempt to provide for [Afrikaners’] key economic, social and cultural interests” (O’Meara 1996:447; emphasis added). Only when the interplay between culture, politics and economics in any particular phase of the nationalist movement has been explored synchronically can an attempt be made to identify diachronic trends in the history of Afrikaner nationalism, including (what I claim to be) its post-apartheid history.

The question posed here thus concerns the role of cultural activism in the development of Afrikaner nationalism vis-à-vis that of political activism and economic activism. It is a question that corresponds closely to what Kellas regards as the problem that studies of nationalism classically seek to address, namely: what was “the particular relationship between politics (power, authority), economics (wealth, occupation, class) and culture (identity, status, language)
which in any particular case brought about the transition from ethnicity to nationalism”? (1991:35).

With the Afrikaner case in mind, I would modify Kellas’s question in several ways. First, I would not explain politics as “power”, given that economics and culture, as has been suggested, can also be sources of power. Second, I would be more specific with regard to agency. Political and/or economic and/or cultural activists, rather than politics, economics and culture, are the leading actors on the nationalist stage. In the third place I would rephrase Kellas’s question to reflect the fact that the work of activists is not done when “the transition from ethnicity to nationalism” has been established. As Leerssen explains it, cultural activists – and, one may add, economic activists – do not leave the stage once the politicians have made their entrance:

Culture [and economics remain] on the agenda even when national movements have obtained a full-fledged social and political activist presence […] Even after the achievement of a nationalist objective in the establishment of sovereign statehood, one can see undiminished concern for the cultivation of the national culture [and the development of the national economy] in the set-up of the new state (2006:563).

Finally, I would argue that the role of language in the birth and life of a nationalist movement merits more focused attention than it receives in Kellas’s question. As should be clear even at this juncture of my thesis, Leerssen’s answer to the general question, “what is culture?”, is acutely true of Afrikaner nationalist culture:

Foremost among these four [types of cultural fields] is clearly that of language. From Herder to the generation of the Humboldts, Schlegels and Grimms, language comes to be seen as the essential soul of the nation’s identity and position in the world. An extraordinary number of cultural-nationalist initiatives are concerned with language: from grammar-writing to purism, from language revivalism to language planning (2006:569).

I would go further: the other cultural fields identified by Leerssen – discourse, material culture and performance culture – have also been intimately concerned with language, at least in the case at hand. From the outset, even before the
language was standardised, Afrikaner nationalist literature and history were written in Afrikaans. *Di geskiedenis fan ons land in di taal fan ons volk* [The history of our country in the language of our volk] was published in 1877, four decades before the official *Afrikaanse Woordelys en Spelreëls* [Afrikaans Word List and Spelling Rules]. The linguistic landscape of Afrikaner monuments has always been an Afrikaans landscape. It is inconceivable, for example, that the inscription *Ons vir jou, Suid-Afrika* [We for thee, South Africa] on the cenotaph in the Voortrekker Monument could have been in any language but Afrikaans. And only Afrikaans could have been the language of speech and song during the lavish spectacle that was the Oxwagon Memorial Trek of 1938, and during all the Day of the Vow celebrations that were to follow (cf. chapter 5).

One can go even further and make the claim that the issue of language are central not only to cultural nationalist initiatives but also to nationalist activism in the domains of politics and economics. Yet whilst the role of language in cultural nationalist activism is fairly easy to explain (as I tried to do in the preceding paragraph), the relationship between language and political and/or economic activism is more obscure and may only be uncovered through a thorough analysis

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165 This is not the whole truth. The monument that Afrikaners regard as their first language monument (cf. section 5.1.1) was in reality a monument for Dutch with an inscription in Dutch: *Vrijheid voor de Hollandsche Taal* [Freedom for the Dutch language]. What needs to be borne in mind, though, is that the term “Dutch” was used to include Afrikaans at the time of the monument’s unveiling in 1893. Up until the early 1900s, Afrikaans was also known as *Afrikaans-Hollands* [Afrikaans-Dutch] and Dutch as *Hooghollands* [High Dutch] (Ponelis 1998:47). The point is that the inscription could not have been in English. We need only consider the outrage with which the following event was met in *Die Patriot* and *De Zuid-Afrikaan*. The reason why these newspapers denounced it as an error of judgment, a scandal and a farce is abundantly clear from Siegfried Huigen’s (2008:153) account of the occasion:

A few days before the unveiling of the language monument an ‘Amateur Entertainment, in aid of the *Taal* Festival Fund’ was held on the initiative of the leading activist, Uncle Daantjie. Children received English book prizes and staged performances of all kinds in English. The only Dutch item on the programme was a reading of Nicolaas Beets’s *Het Noord-Brabantsche Meisjen* [The Girls from North Barbant]. After the anthem of the *Afrikanerbond* was sung, the evening was concluded with ‘God save the King’ (freely translated summary).

The following anecdote, as told by Giliomee (2003:433), is also worth considering here: Hertzog did not participate in the ceremony to lay the Voortrekker Monument’s cornerstone in Pretoria [in 1938]; he was invited but made his acceptance conditional on the organizers inviting the governor general since the state would contribute most of the funding for the monument. The implication was that ‘God save the King’[...] had to be sung, which caused and outcry.
of the relevant historical evidence in any given case. Such an analysis constitutes part of the final chapter of this study. Relying on both primary and secondary sources, chapter 5 dissects the nature of the relationship between (a) language (activism) and cultural activism; and (b) language (activism) and political and economic activism in the history of Afrikaner nationalism, concluding that language activism in contemporary Afrikaner circles is not only related to but is, at heart, what it always has been: cultural, political and economic activism aimed at the maximisation of Afrikaners’ symbolic, political and economic power. It is, in a word, still Afrikaner nationalism.

One provisional remark: What makes the role of language in nationalism more complex than that of discourse, material culture and performance culture is its dual nature. Like artefacts such as history books and monuments, and practices such as festivals, any particular standardised language is the product of cultural labour. Yet languages are also instruments of communication in an era where communication forms the basis of economic and political activity. As such, the language of a nation is directly linked to the economic and political empowerment of the (potential) members of that nation. A cultivated language is of little value to its (potential) speakers if it does not provide access to educational and economic opportunities and political participation. To rephrase it in Gellnerian terms: in the industrial age – and even more so in the information age (or the age of informatisation á la Hardt and Negri 2000:280), in the network society (á la Manuel Castells 1996) and in modern knowledge economies (á la Peter Drucker and Fritz Machlup) – where work is semantic, a cultivated language is of little value to its (potential) speakers if it does not function as a high code. Unlike history books, monuments and festivals, language is

always entangled – at some level
with power relations
that ultimately are a matter of who may or may not do what,
where and when,
under what conditions of control (if any),
with power relations
that en-gender and class-ify
that otherwise simultaneously open up and restrict
the times and spaces of human action,

Adjusted for the purposes of this study, the Kellas question reads as follows:

1. What was the particular relationship between political, economic and cultural forces and counter-forces which
   (a) in 1875, resulted in what may be called Afrikaner nationalism’s false start;
   (b) in the first half of twentieth century, contributed to the successful formation and politicisation of an Afrikaner national identity;
   (c) in 1948, eventually brought the nationalist movement to power;
   (d) between 1948 and the 1994, help to enable the National Party to stay in control of the South African state?
2. What was the role of language in these developments?

What remains to be done, once these questions have been addressed, is to test the central hypothesis of this thesis, which can now be rephrased as follows:

Certain patterns of continuity in Afrikaner activism outside the party-political arena indicate that post-apartheid activism constitutes an extension of the Afrikaner nationalist project.

To summarise: the final chapters of this thesis comprise a longitudinal comparison between the contemporary Afrikaner cultural movement – which manifests primarily as an Afrikaans language movement – and its apartheid and pre-apartheid antecedents. Such a comparative approach challenges the normative, often a-historical interpretation of language activism prevalent in the South African sociolinguistic literature. This literature, as I illustrated in section 3.5.2 with reference to Du Plessis (2006), tends to sanction and sanctify language activism without any attempt to explain the phenomenon. In search of an explanation for the ongoing Afrikaans language campaign it would be a mistake to consider the campaign solely from a cross-national comparative perspective as
Du Plessis proposes and to ignore its roots in the development of Afrikaner nationalism. However, it would also be a mistake to interpret all present-day expressions of Afrikaans language activism as expressions of Afrikaner nationalism. To tell the nationalists from the non-nationalists, as will become clear towards the end of chapter 5, Afrikaans language activism in the post-apartheid South Africa has to be studied in conjunction with activist behaviour by Afrikaans speakers in other spheres of life – culture, the economy, and, last but not least, politics. And never should one lose sight of the fact that activism implies the endorsement of a set of beliefs, norms and values (an ideology). Only an analysis of language activism which takes into account other forms of cultural activism, as well as economic and political activism, and which takes into account the ideological origin of the activism, will bring us closer to an understanding of the latest Afrikaans language movement.

4.2 Afrikaans, Afrikaners, and “the Great Debate on nationalism”

The obvious starting point for a reconstruction of the history of Afrikaans language activism is the history of the Afrikaans language. Afrikaans is a product of the colonial era. Whilst the significance of various other influences on its vocabulary and structure cannot be denied, the language essentially stems from seventeenth century Dutch that was brought to southern African shores by settlers from Holland three and a half centuries ago. If dialects are mutually intelligible forms of the same language, as the lay definition goes, modern Afrikaans has to be regarded a dialect of modern Dutch in the same way that South African English is a variety of English. Afrikaans is related to Dutch to such an extent that speakers of each language can make themselves understood by speakers of the other, albeit with some effort. Yet linguists will be quick to point out that mutual intelligibility is not a reliable criterion to distinguish between different languages on the one hand, and varieties of the same language on the other hand (or between autonomous and heteronomous linguistic varieties). According to such a definition, standard Danish and Norwegian qualify as dialects while Cantonese and Mandarin have to be separate languages – neither of which inferences is a
reflection of reality. When the boundaries of languages are drawn, politics, rather than linguistics, can play the decisive role.\textsuperscript{166} Afrikaans and Dutch is a telling case in point: it was Afrikaner nationalist politics that turned the former into a language autonomous from the latter. Languages are said to be dialects with armies and navies. The example of Afrikaans calls for a slightly different definition: a language is a dialect that was hijacked by nationalists.\textsuperscript{167}

It was, however, only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that Afrikaans became entangled with nationalist politics. By then, the language had had a long existence as a vernacular – the sociolinguistic term for a linguistic variety without a written standard (Ponelis 1998:47). Afrikaans’s life before the nationalist hijack – its life as a vernacular – forms the narrative around which this chapter revolves. It is a saga that dates back to 1652.

In most English-language histories of South Africa, 1652 is simply described as the year during which the \textit{Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie} [Dutch East India Company] (henceforth, VOC or the Company) established a small, armed settlement at the Cape of Good Hope (Johnson and Jacobs 2011:326). In the northern spring/southern autumn of that year, as more poetic authors have interpreted the event, Europe returned to Sub-Saharan Africa:

\begin{quote}
More than 50 000 years were to pass before human beings, who had first walked out of Africa to inhabit the rest of the world, came back to the southern tip of Africa, where long-established hunters and gatherers (San) as well as pastoral people with cattle and sheep (Khoe)\textsuperscript{168} were living. Desire for gold and spices were two of the
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{166} So can religion: Hindi and Urdu are closely related Indo-European languages, but Hindi speakers are predominantly Hindus and Urdu speakers predominantly Muslims.

\textsuperscript{167} Such a nationalist highjack, as we have seen in the previous chapter, initially entails ostensibly innocuous activist initiatives aimed at language standardisation. Yet metaphors of terror and war (languages being hijacked; languages possessing armies and navies) are perhaps not entirely inappropriate in this context. For the standardisation of one linguistic variety usually implies the stigmatisation, marginalisation and exclusion of other varieties and their speakers. It implies language conflict. To mention but one example: When first entering school, speakers of non-standard varieties are at a double disadvantage: not only are they unfamiliar with the language of education, but they also have to endure condescending attitudes towards the only language they know.

\textsuperscript{168} Also Khoi or Khoikhoi. The latter term, a self-identification meaning “men of men” or “real people”, is preferred henceforth.
\end{flushright}
main factors that drove the bold seafarers of the Mediterranean to venture far from home during the 15th century. After rounding the Cape, the Portuguese 169 established themselves in India and south-east Asia at the beginning of the 16th century, but in Southern Africa it was not for another century and a half that a European maritime power would decide to establish a permanent presence. In 1652 Jan van Riebeeck was sent by the Dutch to set up a refreshment station halfway on the arduous sea journey to the East Indies. And so began the long, turbulent process of colonisation... (Wilson 2009:43).

For the Afrikaner nationalist historians of the twentieth century (and then particularly those who authored school text books), 1652 marked another, far more significant beginning: the birth of the Afrikaner nation. It was not before 1707 that a Cape settler of European descent would identify himself as an Afrikaander. The incident (the first recorded case of such self-identification) occurred on the evening of 6 March in Stellenbosch – a town founded by Cape Commander Simon van der Stel in 1679 (his first year as Commander). The story goes that a small group of raucous drunken young men were celebrating the dismissal of Van der Stel’s son and successor, Willem Adriaan, as Commander.170 Among them was the sixteen-year old Hendrik Bibault. When the magistrate confronted them, Bibault (born at the Cape) challenged the authority of the VOC official (not born at the Cape) with the words:

[I]k wil niet loopen, ik ben een Afrikaander, al slaat die landrost mijn dood, of al setten hij mijn in den tronk, ik sal, nog wil niet swygen. [I shall not leave, I am an

169 The first European “to gaze upon Africa’s southernmost point” (Johnson 2004:30), in 1488, was Bartolomeu Dias – a knight of the Portuguese royal court. Dias named the area the Cape of Storms (Cabo das Tormentas). Later, however, when it proved to be a sea route to the east, it was renamed by King John II of Portugal the Cape of Good Hope (Cabo da Boa Esperança).

170 By then, Willem Adriaan van der Stel had been in control of Cape for eight years. After succeeding his father in 1699, Van der Stel Jr. entered into private farming (on what is today the esteemed wine estate Vergelegen) on a scale that enraged the farming elite. Accusing the VOC official of inappropriate conduct – though perhaps more concerned about their own economic interests than about Company regulations – a group of men led by Adam Tas and Henning Hüsing staged a revolt and in 1707 managed to force Van der Stel from office.
Afrikaander, even if the magistrate beats me to death or puts me in jail, I shall not, nor will be silent.

Unsurprisingly, this defiant declaration of identity found its way into that part of the Afrikaner nationalist myth which depicts VOC rule at the Cape as less than sympathetic, and solidarity among non-VOC officials as the root from which the Afrikaner nation’s love of freedom sprung. Yet whatever Bibault was trying to assert on that evening of his arrest in 1707, it could not have been an ethnic identity, at least not according to Christoph Marx and other so-called modernists or constructionists who argue (as I do in this study) that the notion Afrikaner “became infused with ethnicity only from about 1870” (2008:91).

But three and a half centuries of Afrikaner history sounds better than 150 years of Afrikaner history, and whilst the Afrikaner activists of the twenty-first century may no longer believe that “the Afrikaner nation, with its own characteristics and destiny, was placed in [South Africa] by God the Three-in-One”, they continue to believe that “over 350 years, through religion, politics, art, science, technique and thought, we [Afrikaners] have created an indigenous symbolic tradition [read: nation]” (Rossouw, Die Vrye Afrikaan, 2005/09/16:7).

The claim, then, is that the Afrikaner nation-building project – whether God- or human-inspired – commenced on 6 April 1652 when the Drommedaris, the Goede Hoop and the Reijger docked at Table Bay. These were the first three ships of a

171 Giliomée’s translation. For a more detailed account of this confrontation and the consequences for Bibault, see Giliomée (2003:22). Note that he gives preference to the spelling Biebouw.
172 Consider the following observation by Hobsbawm:
For history is the raw material for nationalist or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw material for heroin addiction. The past is an essential element, perhaps the essential element, in these ideologies. If there is no suitable past, it can always be invented [...] The past legitimizes [...] I recall seeing somewhere a study of the ancient civilization of the cities of the Indus valley with the title Five Thousand Years of Pakistan. Pakistan was not even thought of before 1932–3, when the name was invented by some student militants. It did not become a serious political demand until 1940. As a state it has existed only since 1947 [...] But 5,000 years of Pakistan somehow sounds better than forty-six years of Pakistan (1997:5).
173 The induction formulary of the Afrikaner Broederbond, quoted in Wilkins and Strydom (1978:379).
fleet of five\textsuperscript{174} to arrive at the Cape after having set sail three months earlier from the port of Texel. Ashore walked some eight dozen Europeans under the command of Jan Anthoniszoon van Riebeeck. Van Riebeeck’s orders from the VOC were to establish not a colony but a mere fortified base: a halfway resupply camp for ships \textit{en route} to the East. He was to hoist the Dutch flag, build a fort and a hospital, trade for cattle, grow crops and, last but not least, produce vegetables and fruit to curb the high mortality rate among Company sailors due mostly to scurvy.

Jan van Riebeeck was not the VOC’s first choice for the Cape expedition, not least because his employment record with the Company was tainted by allegations of corruption: in 1648 he had been recalled from his position in Tongking (Tonkin in present-day Vietnam) after defying a ban on private trading. At the Cape he did not particularly \textit{want} to stay. After the fort (which became known as the Castle) was built at the foot of Table Mountain and fresh produce was in sufficient supply to cater for passing ships, he bid the settlement farewell in 1662.

Such were the facts. Jan van Riebeeck was “a pragmatic Dutch East India Company servant who set out to establish an outpost of a trading empire in workmanlike fashion” (Dubow 2004).\textsuperscript{175} And yet, when the rand replaced the pound as the currency of newly found Republic of South Africa in 1961, banknotes bore his portrait and would continue to do so for the following three decades. By then, the Afrikaner myth had somehow managed to turn the 33 year-old founding father of the city of Cape Town into the founding father of an entire nation: a “\textit{volk}-planter” and a hero.

Unlike the “\textit{volk}-planter”, who packed his trunks after a decade, the rest of the Dutch settlers had come to stay. They were joined, initially on a small scale, by more immigrants, also from elsewhere in Europe. Of those who arrived before 1680 the majority were sailors and soldiers from The Netherlands. In 1657 the

\begin{flushright}
first of these VOC employees were released from Company service and given land to farm as so-called free burghers\textsuperscript{176} – an early sign that the Cape of Good Hope was, after all, turning into a colony of European settlement. In the course of the next four decades, wine and wheat settler farmers would steadily fill up the fifty miles radius around the Cape settlement, and by the end of the century so-called \textit{trekboere} [white nomadic or frontier farmers] would begin to cross the first coastal mountain range, leaving behind the Mediterranean climate and the markets of the Cape and turning to subsistence stock farming.

The party of two hundred Huguenots who arrived, as families, between 1688 and 1692 (following the revoking of the Edict of Nantes in 1685) did much to stabilise the burgher community and – with their experience in grape growing – to establish the Cape’s wine industry. The French settlers were assimilated into the Dutch-speaking population within two or three generations and hold a place of honour in the Afrikaner myth of origin. It is a reputation well earned: their descendants, as Giliomee points out, “were to establish positions of leadership in Afrikaner society out of all proportion to the numbers of the original immigrants”\textsuperscript{177} (2003:11). Yet even if history took a different course, the myth would have attached significance to these religious refugees: for a nationalism rooted in Calvinism they made good ancestors.

In sum: according to their creation story, Afrikaners were Calvinists of western European origin who became a nation in its own right during the first Dutch occupation of the Cape (1652–1795). It was, so the myth goes, “the harsh rule of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape and the hard life on the frontier [that] fostered a spirit of unity and independence within the pioneer settlement” (Moodie 1975:2). This retrospective projection of something resembling national self-consciousness and patriotic unity is not entirely absent from scholarly accounts of

\textsuperscript{176} According to Saunders and Southey (1998:75), the term “free burghers” was originally used to refer to ex-officials of the VOC, but later came to be used for all whites who were not Company officials. Free burghers, as Giliomee explains, “were released from their contract with the Company, but continued to be subject to the Company’s regulations for the Cape settlement and the decisions of the Cape authorities” (2003:6).

\textsuperscript{177} After their arrival, the Huguenots represented almost a quarter of the burgher population of 856 (De Villiers 2012a:45).
settler/pioneer mentality. Giliomee, for example, is convinced that few of these immigrants “ever went back or looked back”:

They were among the first colonial peoples to cut most of their family and community ties with Europe and to develop a distinct sense of self-consciousness; they made the new land genuinely their own (2003:xiv).

Even the work of the liberal historian Cornelius de Kiewiet portrays the formation of the “Boer race” in “the long quietude of the eighteenth century” as the emergence of a unique “national character” in response to a uniquely hostile environment. In contrast to Afrikaner nationalist mythology, though, De Kiewiet highlights the (alleged) negative consequences of this particular encounter between humans and nature:

Their life gave them a tenacity of purpose, a power of silent endurance, and the keenest self-respect. But this isolation sank into their character, causing their imagination to lie fallow and their intellects to become inert. Their tenacity could degenerate into obstinacy, their power of endurance into resistance to innovation, and their self-respect into suspicion of the foreigner and contempt for inferiors (quoted in Giliomee 2003:35).

In the eyes of outsiders, the appeal of this interpretation could only have been enhanced by the way in which the story of Afrikaner nationalism unfolded in the decades following the publication of De Kiewiet’s A history of South Africa in 1941. Yet national psychoanalysis is a risky business and belongs, perhaps, only in nationalist myths. What can be said with certainty is that the eighteenth century saw the development of a degree of cultural homogeneity among the heterogeneous European settlers at the Cape (Davenport and Saunders 2000:22; Johnson 2004:35). Afrikaners they were not. And rather than “the hard life on the frontier” it was a politico-economic institution that directed the process of homogenisation through assimilationist religious and language policies even if that institution, obsessed as it was with profits, was “largely devoid of idealistic motives” (Giliomee 2003:19).
Once settled at the Cape, the VOC founded a Dutch Reformed congregation and for more than a century it did not permit any other churches, not even a Lutheran one for German immigrants. When the French Huguenots tried to form a congregation of their own, the initiative was rejected as brazen: soon, Commander Simon van der Stel warned, the French would be demanding “their own ‘magistrate, Commander and Prince’” (Giliomee 2003:11–12; 41). At stake in both instances was not only religious uniformity but also linguistic uniformity. The Huguenots, historians agree, might have remained a distinct community, but in a calculated way Van der Stel settled them among Dutch farmers along the Berg River. Instructions from the Lord XVII (the board of directors of the VOC which met in Amsterdam) were unambiguous: the Cape Commander was to “ensure that the French language [would] gradually become extinct and disappear” (Giliomee 2003:11). In the case of German-speaking settlers, who during the eighteenth century outnumbered immigrants arriving from Holland, the dynamics of demography was on the side of the VOC: they were mostly single men who went on to marry Dutch-speaking women, including daughters and granddaughters of Huguenots and, occasionally, non-European women. The resultant intergenerational language shift was away from German. As Van der Stel summarised VOC policy, all newcomers to the Cape – that is, all European newcomers – had to “learn our language and morals, and be integrated with the Dutch nation” (Giliomee 2003:11).

The implementation of this policy was only partially successful. French- and German-speaking settlers did learn Dutch, but it was not the Dutch of the educated classes of the Low Countries, and it is hard to tell if they or their descendants ever saw themselves as belonging to the Dutch nation. If they did, they did not articulate it in writing, at least not on a significant scale, for the majority of them were semi- or illiterate. Whether these settlers self-identified as members of an Afrikaner collectivity instead is equally hard to tell. Giliomee (2003:51) seems convinced that a sense of being Afrikaners (Africanes/Africaanders) rather than being Dutch or French or German had

178 Until the first church was inaugurated in 1704, the congregation met in the Castle.
crystallised among white African-born Dutch speakers towards the end of the 1700s. He bases his claim *inter alia* on observations of visitors to the Cape, and then particularly R.B. Fisher and W.J. Burchell. In 1816, Fisher reported meeting a white community in the colony who “speak a very bad sort of Dutch language... and style themselves as an original nation, Africanes”. Six years later, in his *Travels in the interior of South Africa* (London: Batchworth, 1822) Burchell claimed that “all those born in the Cape Colony who were [...] of German, Dutch or French descent, and who spoke Dutch called themselves ‘Africaanders’” (both quoted in Giliomee 2003:52).

But how reliable are the accounts of these travellers of yore? By the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as Fritz Ponelis reminds us, the best part of the burgher population was sparsely distributed over a vast territory. Space and mobility (and lack of enthusiasm on the part of the VOC) prevented the development of social structures and institutions that could facilitate the formation of a collective identity:

> The [Dutch-speaking] nomadic stock farmers were ardent individualists and by no means docile citizens of an orderly and disciplined society. They trekked until they could no longer see smoke coming from a neighbouring chimney (1998:19).

There was, of course, the Dutch Reformed Church, and burghers (whether based in the colonial hub of Cape Town and Stellenbosch, on the frontier, or somewhere in between) almost certainly identified themselves as Christians, as colonists elsewhere were doing at the time, thus signalling their European or “civilised” descent which entitled them to preside over “heathens” and “barbarians”. The *trekboere*, however, were not the most devoted church-goers, at least not until the 1790s when “something of a religious awakening swept over the colony, and the proportion of confirmed members of the church in the burgher population rose steadily” (Giliomee 2003:41–42).

The question that arises here is the very question at the heart of “the Great Debate on nationalism” (Schöpflin 2000:2–3): are nations ancient cultural entities, modern political constructs or something in between? Applied to the case at hand,
the question is: which came first – Afrikaners or Afrikaner nationalism? Was an Afrikaner community – constituted around origin, language and religion – already in existence when nationalist associations and newspapers were first established in 1875? Was this community, as Giliomee claims, a clearly recognisable group by then, who self-identified as Afrikaners? (2012:220). Or was the notion Afrikaner, as authors such Christoph Marx and Fritz Ponelis assert, a product of Afrikaner nationalist thinking? According to the latter view, an Afrikaner ethnicity was projected onto a group of people (Ponelis 1998:19). Ethnicity, says Marx, “is not self-evident, but a construct that can become a politically significant factor by means of mobilisation techniques” (2008:89). It is, as Saul Dubow phrases it, “a form of social identity which acquires content and meaning through a process of conscious assertion and imagining” (quoted in Cherry 1993:15). Ponelis understands this process of ethnic construction as follows: the bigger the group, the more difficult it is to define its ethnicity. Only through “ideology, in the form of nationalism”, can one arrive at such a definition (1998:18–19):

The group that was ideologically brought into being, namely the Afrikaner volk, was projected by that ideology as 'n oergegewe [a primeval given],179 that is, as an entity which had already existed before the ideological mythologisation [of Afrikaner history] in Jan van Riebeeck’s time and even earlier (1998:20).

The evidence presented in the remainder of this study supports Christoph Marx and Fritz Ponelis rather than Hermann Giliomee:180 Afrikaner nationalism, to

179 Giliomee, it should be stressed, is not an uncritical nationalist historian. He has no qualms, for instance, debunking the myth of Slagtersnek.

180 The Slagtersnek Rebellion, Afrikaner children were taught during apartheid, began early in 1813 when a Khoikhoi labourer, named Booy, laid a complaint of assault and wage withholding against his master, one Frederick Bezuidenhout. When the latter refused to appear before the magistrate, the Cape Regiment, comprised of non-white troops under white officers, was sent to arrest him. A brief shoot-out ensued at Bezuidenhout’s house and he was fatally wounded.

So far so good. But then the history textbooks of yore went on to report (and I quote from a textbook titled Pionierspore [Pioneer Trails] that was published in 1981 – my fifth school year): At Bezuidenhout’s funeral, “his brothers and friends swore that they would not let the killing of a [white] man by Khoi troops go unanswered” (Graves 1981:97). Bezuidenhout merely gave Booy a pak slae [spanking]. The rebellion that followed was put down and five of the leaders were hanged for treason.
borrow Ernest Gellner’s phrase (1964:169), invented a nation where it did not exist. The question that I seek to address is how it was done. In this respect Ponelis is vague. How did Afrikaner nationalist ideology “produce” Afrikaners? How was the Afrikaner volk “ideologically brought into being”? What did the “ideological mythologisation” of Afrikaner history and the “projection” of an Afrikaner ethnicity onto potential Afrikaners entail? What triggered these processes, and how did they unfold?

Dan O’Meara, for one, would challenge the weight attached by Ponelis to ideology. O’Meara’s take on the matter, as outlined in section 3.5.1 above, is that the Afrikaner nationalist movement succeeded in making Afrikaners out of white Afrikaans speakers (“Frenchmen out of peasants” à la Max Weber) by promoting their material and other interests and not by projecting an Afrikaner identity onto them (to use Ponelis’s metaphor or, as O’Meara himself puts it, “not by proclaiming the ‘truth’ of [an Afrikaner] subjectivity either in intellectual journals or from the rooftops” – 1996:447; emphasis in the original). It was, however, not an either-or scenario: the formation and politicisation of an Afrikaner national identity in the first half of the twentieth century required both the promotion of Afrikaner interests and the dissemination of the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism. But before any attempt can be made to analyse these dynamics, it is necessary to tell the now widely accepted demythologised version of Afrikaans’s early life story.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ This story, as will become clear, hardly fits into Afrikaner nationalist mythology. A suitable history, which overemphasised the Germanic and Dutch roots of the language, had to be invented. All through primary school and high school, from 1977 to 1988, I was taught this mythologised version of the history of Afrikaans. It was Christo van Rensburg and Vic Webb who, in Afrikaans linguistics courses at the University of Pretoria, introduced me to the truer, more interesting story. During the late 1980s, these white Afrikaans-speaking...
4.3 Afrikaans’s life as vernacular under VOC rule

4.3.1 The origins of Afrikaans

The late 1700s saw the emergence of the first texts that are classified – on the basis of linguistic features, and obviously with hindsight – as more Afrikaans than Dutch (Ponelis 1993:73). By then, contrary to the impression that might have been created in the discussion thus far, Afrikaans was anything but a “white man’s language”.

On their arrival at the Cape, the Dutch settlers came into contact with the Khoikhoi (whom they condescendingly referred to as “Hottentots”, mimicking their “click” language) and the San (whom they called “Bushmen”). In recent decades, the Khoikhoi and the San have generally been studied as one group, the Khoisan, not least because both sub-groups spoke varieties of the Khoisan language. The Khoisan are believed to be the first inhabitants of southern Africa with an archaeological history dating back to 25,000 B.C. On the eve of their encounter with European colonists, however, the Khoikhoi and the San were readily distinguishable communities even if the border between them was permeable. The Khoikhoi were livestock farmers who lived in villages, while the San were primarily migratory hunter-gatherers.

What started out as cattle trading between the Khoikhoi and the settlers ended in two wars over grazing land and water (fought in 1659–1660 and 1673–1677 respectively). Yet despite a hedge of wild almond trees planted by Van Riebeeck after the first Dutch-Khoikhoi war in an attempt to demarcate the boundary of the settlement and to prevent cattle theft, sexual liaisons between Europeans and Khoikhoi women prevailed. Of relevance for the present discussion is the fact that scholars – along with others such as Theodorus du Plessis and the late Fritz Ponelis – played a key role in the demythologisation Afrikaans’s past. Equally, if not more significant was the contribution of black Afrikaans speakers (some of whom might also have identified themselves, at the time, as brown or coloured.) They included the late Neville Alexander, Achmat Davids, the late Jakes Gerwel, Alwyn van Gensen and Hein Willemse.

182 Regarded today as a less derogatory term than “Bushmen”, San (also: Sana, Sonqua, Obiqau), which literally translates as thieves of murderers, is the name that the Khoikhoi gave to the “Bushmen”.

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speakers of different native tongues – be they traders or lovers – had to communicate with one another.\textsuperscript{183} From 1658 onwards, VOC officials and slave owners\textsuperscript{184} also needed to communicate with the slaves who were brought to the Cape from various parts of Africa and the East,\textsuperscript{185} and slaves required a lingua franca among themselves \textit{and} to communicate with the Khoikhoi – many of whom came to work and live alongside them, sometimes having children by them (Johnson 2004:38; Sparks 1990:77).\textsuperscript{186} There was no question what this lingua franca was going to be. What Frenchmen and Germans were coaxed into, locals and slaves were forced to do:

When the first slaves were imported, [the VOC] issued firm instructions that only Dutch was to be spoken to them. Slaves could not be manumitted without being able to speak and write Dutch. When an official drew up a glossary of Khoikhoi words, the Company undertook to publish it, but added that it was more important that the Khoikhoi learn the Dutch language than the other way round (Giliomee 2003:19).\textsuperscript{187}

This basic rule of “Dutch only” was enforceable, yet to prescribe the \textit{kind} of Dutch that was to be spoken was beyond the Company’s powers. The VOC could not have prevented the dynamic process of creolisation – or, more accurately, creoloidisation – that followed.

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\textsuperscript{183} Initially, four Khoikhoi speakers who had learned Dutch acted as interpreters. They were Autshumao (alias Herrie/Harry de Strandloper [the beachcomber]), his niece Krotoa (alias Eva); Doman (alias Anthonie) and Claas Das (De Villiers 2012a:42).

\textsuperscript{184} Shell (2012:64) distinguishes between four groups of slave-owners: the VOC, VOC officials, burghers and so-called free blacks. (The number of slaves in the service of the latter was negligible.)

\textsuperscript{185} Between 1658 and 1808, when the slave trade was abolished, approximately 63,000 slaves were brought to the Cape: an estimated 26.4 percent from Africa, 25.1 percent from Madagascar, 25.9 percent from India and 22.7 percent from Indonesia (Shell 2012:63). In addition to other languages, they spoke the lingua franca of the trade routes, creoloidised Portuguese. By 1710, there were almost as many slaves as burghers in the Cape Colony. In the end, the number of indigenous slaves (people born into slavery) nearly equalled the number of slaves who were originally imported (Shell 2012:69).

\textsuperscript{186} The Khoikhoi were “legally free, but in practice their position was not much different from that of the Cape slaves” (Saunders and Southey 1998:99). Detribalised and dispossessed of their land, many had no choice but to offer their labour to white farmers.

\textsuperscript{187} To this end, a Dutch teacher for the Khoikhoi was appointed in 1661 (De Villiers 2012a:48). De Villiers (2012a:51) also notes that privately owned slaves were only allowed to wear a hat once they could speak Dutch.
Some general notes on pidgin, creole and creoloid languages are necessary here as the creoloid characteristics of Afrikaans are among the things that set the language apart from Dutch. For the purposes of this discussion, pidgins and creoles can be defined as products of a colonial world in which speakers of different languages (called source languages) were somehow compelled to learn the colonial language (or target language) in the way that the Cape’s indigenous population and the slaves who were brought to its shores had to learn Dutch. According to sociolinguistic theory, the transition from pidgin to creole was marked by the use of the colonial language as a first language (and no longer merely as a lingua franca) by its “new” speakers.

A creole language is not to be equated with the colonial language on which it is based. Nor is it some kind of cross breed between the source language and the target language. Pidginisation and creolisation entailed the simplification – or, as linguists would depict it, the resourceful recreation – of the colonial language by speakers who tried to master the language without any formal tuition. Young children can pick up languages as if by osmosis, but in adults the result of informal additional language acquisition is normally approximate acquisition of the target language (Ponelis 1993:27). The language that was born in the mouths of first generation Cape slaves, for example, deviated significantly from Dutch. What is remarkable, as written text-based research would later demonstrate, is that this deviation was systematic to the extent that it corresponded with deviation in other Dutch-based creoles of the time such as the so-called Negerhollands that was spoken in the Virgin Islands – an area completely isolated from the Cape. In fact, all pidgins and creoles – or at least all those based on European languages – display striking similarities in grammatical structure.

It would be inaccurate to call modern-day standard Afrikaans is a creole language. To describe languages such as Afrikaans, Peter Trudgill (1983:102) coined the term creoloid. Like creolisation, creoloidisation is “is the result of the influence of

188 Authoritarian sociolinguistic texts on pidgins, creoles and creoloids include Romaine (1988) and Trudgill (1983; 2002).
imperfect learning by relatively large numbers of non-native adult speakers” (Trudgill 2002:71). Unlike creoles, however, creoloids have no pidgin history in the sense that they always had mother-tongue speakers.

The creoloid features of Afrikaans – lack of nominal gender and case, lack of subject/object distinctions in pronouns, etc. (cf. Markey 1982; Gilbert and Makhudu 1984) – had survived the standardisation process and even the re-Dutchification of Afrikaans in the early twentieth century. As Giliomee (2003:53) interprets the process, slaves and Khoikhoi servants were responsible for the initial creolisation (read: creoloidisation) of Dutch in the latter half of the seventeenth century while both burghers and their servants, in interaction with each other, took the process further in the eighteenth century. Equally, if not more significant must have been other forms of interaction, more intimate than between master and servant.

The creoloidisation of Dutch cannot be understood separately from what some authors describe as the “creolisation” or miscegenation of the Cape settlement during the first 75 years of its existence. By 1690, as Giliomee (2003:37) points out, the ratio of male to female burghers was 2.6:1. Unsurprisingly, exogamous unions between European men and non-European women (mostly manumitted slaves) were commonplace. Under the VOC, about a 1,000 of these unions were formalised in Western marriage (Shell 2012:69). The most famous cases include the 1658 wedding of Jan Zacharias to the slave Maria from Bengal, and the 1664 wedding of the surgeon Pieter van Meerhoff to Krotoa (renamed Eva) – a Khoikhoi woman whom Van Riebeeck and his wife took into their household in 1653.

Marriages of Europeans to so-called heelslag [full-caste] slave women (of “pure” Asian or African origin) were prohibited in 1685, but not to marriages to halfslag

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189 This process involved reconstructing the vernacular by, among other things, “eliminating those elements reflecting poverty and lower-class origins” (Marks and Trapido 1987:12).
190 In the South African case, unlike in the Latin American case, the term “creole” does not denote a person of European descent born in the colony.
191 There are only two recorded cases of marriages between liberated male slaves and European woman. Slave men caught with white women were burnt alive.
[half-caste] slave women (i.e., slave women with a European father). For at least another four decades, children born from such marriages stood a fair chance to be absorbed into the burgher community, as did children born out of wedlock to a white father and a slave mother. Of the latter category of children many were born in the Slave Lodge –“a huge building without windows [...] at the upper end of the main street, next to the Company’s vegetable garden of nine acres and opposite the big Company hospital”. Virtually all slaves in the service of the VOC lived in the Lodge, which was seldom visited by Europeans “except for one hour each night when it became a brothel for the local garrison [and others]” (Shell 2012:64).

Racial fluidity, it should be stressed, did not imply racial equality. On the contrary: the early Cape was stratified according to racial categories constructed by the European settlers. From the outset, everybody else had been “relegated to, or confirmed in, a position of legal and political inferiority” (Davenport and Saunders 2000:33). The paradox, as Johnson (2004:41) points out, is that the racially mixed settlement was at the same time a racially divided one. Divisions grew steadily more rigid, and from the 1730s onwards the “white” community became progressively endogamous – a development that Giliomee attributes not only to the increasing availability of marriageable white women but also to the power they held within the family.¹¹² Yet white endogamy did not mean the end of communication across racial divisions. Accordingly, it did not mean the end of the creoloidisation of Afrikaans. In fact, that process had just begun.

To conclude the story of the birth of the Afrikaans language: at the Cape, as is always the case, language was “entangled [...] with power relations” (Pred 2002:172), and the powers that be spoke Dutch. The resultant communicative arrangements had repercussions on various levels. On a micro-linguistic level (that is, the level of language structure), one of the outcomes was the emergence

¹¹² Once the ratio of male to female burghers stood at 1.5:1 (in 1730), “European women could now use their relative position of power to employ sanctions against mixed marriages and against legitimizing the racially mixed offspring of their husband and sons” (Giliomee 2003:37).
of a “simplified” form of Dutch – a typical creoloid. On a macro-linguistic or sociolinguistic level, the long-term consequences involved large-scale language shift: for descendants of the Khoikhoi, the San and the slaves Afrikaans became a first language.\(^{193}\) As time went by, some – to use a crude colloquialism – “passed for white”, but the majority eventually ended up – to put it equally crudely – in apartheid’s category of “coloureds”. Let me rephrase, following Johnson and Jacobs (2011:263): many coloured – and, one should add, white\(^{194}\) – South Africans can trace their roots to the Khoisan and the Cape slaves.

Despite a significant shift towards English in the coloured community under apartheid, some 75.8 percent of these South Africans still identify Afrikaans as their home language (compared to 60.8 percent of white South Africans – Statistics South Africa 2012:27). According to the latest (2011) census statistics, Afrikaans has 731,703 more coloured speakers than white ones (Statistics South Africa 2012:26). It is, then, simply preposterous to claim, as Afrikaners had done for decades, that Afrikaans is the language they had made from Dutch:

> Afrikaans is Dutch that was recreated in the mouths of whites [blankes]. It is a white man’s language, and had developed alongside the Afrikaanse volk. [It] is our self-acquired own possession, and was not borrowed back from skew speakers (emphasis in the original).

This statement, as quoted by Ponelis (1998:20), was made by the linguist G.S. Nienaber in 1949, 35 years after one of Afrikaans’s most zealous activists, C.J. Langenhoven, had (by now infamously) asserted:

> Afrikaans is the one and only white man’s language which was made in South Africa and which had not come ready made from overseas (quoted in Giliomee 2003:369; emphasis added).

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\(^{193}\) The Khoisan languages have become virtually extinct.

\(^{194}\) Consider the following tale as told by Shell: “The slave Armosyn Claasz gave birth to the children of four different fathers in the Company’s Slave Lodge, some described as halfslag [half-caste], which means that the father was white. Many of these children and their descendants were absorbed into what became prominent Afrikaner families” (2012:68).
This accurately depicts the creation process, but certainly not the creators. It is, further, indeed ironic that a “wonderfully expressive and cosmopolitan new language”, to echo Alistair Sparks, “which the slaves invented out of their necessity for communication and then passed on from black nanny to white child while the sophistication of High Dutch wilted on the dry and distant veld, should have become the talisman of a narrow racist nationalism dedicated to the oppression of its real creators” (1990:77). Two qualifications are called for here. First, as has been suggested, there were variations to the “black nanny to white child” scenario: black wet nurse to white child, black mother to white child, black child to white child in play. Second, while “proper” Dutch did disappear from this kind of interaction in the home and on “the dry and distant veld”, it remained the (official) language of the Company and the church. In sociolinguistics terms, the language situation was one of simple diglossia: Afrikaans speakers (who could read) could read Dutch but few of them could write the language “properly”, and even fewer could speak it “properly” (Ponelis 1998:47).

By implication, Sparks admits that the slaves, like the Khoisan, were forced (or at least had no choice but) to learn Dutch and in this sense his description of the Cape creoloid as “a language invented out of necessity” is, in my view, closer to the truth than Giliomee’s portrayal of Afrikaans as “one of the genuinely multi-racial achievements” of South Africa (2003:xiv). The latter claim – first articulated in 1975 by white, leftist Afrikaans author Jan Rabie and in recent years often quoted in the South African language debate – should be seen as a corrective to the now debunked myth of Afrikaans’s lily-white history and ownership. And yet one has to ask: is imposition rather than accomplishment not a more honest interpretation of what happened at the Cape, at least initially?

196 During the nineteenth century, a situation of complex diglossia would develop “with Afrikaans as the vernacular and both standard Dutch (in the church, in private education and in the media) and English as languages of culture” (Ponelis 1993:50).
For all the emphasis it continues to lay on the injustice of anglicisation, Afrikaner nationalist mythology has always turned a blind eye to Dutch’s/Afrikaans’s own acts of linguicide (as sociolinguist and language activist Tove Skutnabb Kangas controversially interprets the process of language shift or death.) To this day, the myth represents the English as the inventors of linguistic imperialism. Commenting on anglicisation policies of the nineteenth century – to which I shall soon turn – even non-nationalist Afrikaner scholars would remark, for example, that British imperialism in South Africa “was myopically and chauvinistically loyal to English” (Ponelis 1993:59). But was Dutch imperialism any less shortsighted and arrogant? And did Afrikaner nationalism not come to epitomise (dramatically so in Soweto in 1976) what it means to be myopically and chauvinistically loyal to a language?

What can be said with certainty is that English jingoism shaped the language consciousness of white Afrikaans speakers in a way that Dutch linguistic chauvinism did not shape the language consciousness of the Khoisan and the Cape slaves. In the 1870s, Afrikaans language consciousness – or more accurately, awareness among white Afrikaans speakers of the inferior status of their language, literature and heritage vis-à-vis the English language, English literature and British/English heritage – found expression in language activism. Nationalism got in the way of anglicisation. Dutch assimilationism, by contrast, achieved its goal of wholesale language shift and culminated in the emergence of the western dialects of Afrikaans.

4.3.2 The dialects of Afrikaans

The creoloid language that was born in the shade of Table Mountain would in time spread far beyond that shade. Today, in main-stream dialectology, a distinction is made between three overarching dialects of Afrikaans (each with its own sub-dialects): the south-western, north-western and eastern variety. The differences between these varieties are not very substantial, and they are on the decrease. This is because Afrikaans entered the era of modernisation and industrialisation – which was also, in this case as in many others, the era of
language standardisation – relativity soon after its birth. Before the three dialects could deviate drastically from one another, the process of dialect levelling was set in motion by formal mass schooling – a domain of the standard language.

The geographical distribution of Afrikaans’s dialects – like the distribution of North American English dialects – tells tales of migrations, both voluntarily and forced. Represented on a map (4.1), the dialects of Afrikaans mirrors a centrifugal dynamic, to borrow Johnson’s phrase, “in which all problems, ambitions and conflicts could be overcome by outward movement” (2004:44).

Map 4.1 The spread of Afrikaans in the eighteenth century

Up until the end of the second Dutch-Khoikhoi war in 1677, as has been mentioned, settler farming at the Cape was limited to the peninsular plains. The following century, however, saw enormous colonial expansion as white trekboere pushed the boundaries of the VOC-governed territory deep into the interior – northwards towards the Gariep River, and eastwards towards the Great Fish River. Khoikhoi and, to a lesser extent, San resistance to land occupation should not be underestimated, but it was the Xhosa (a Bantu-speaking people) who, in 1778, finally brought the white advance to a halt at the Great Fish River some six hundred miles east of Cape Town.

Afrikaans was eventually standardised on the basis of the language that the trekboere took with them all the way to the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony. Here, west of the Great Fish River, some of the farmers continued to regard themselves first as Dutch and later as British colonial subjects, while others sought to escape British rule in the so-called Great Trek of the 1830s. It is through

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198 In 1779, the Gariep River was renamed the Orange River, in honour of the Dutch royal house. After the end of apartheid, the river’s original Khoisan name was reinstated.

199 It was the most turbulent frontier: within the span of two decades no less than three wars were fought (in 1779, 1793 and 1799), and more would follow.
the direct descendants of the latter group – the Voortrekkers – that eastern frontier Afrikaans (as the eastern variety is also known) reached the northern parts of present-day South Africa where the Pretoria-Johannesburg area is now the hub of the dialect.

The two remaining dialects of Afrikaans – the south-western variety and the north-western variety – are historically associated with non-native speakers of the language: south-western Afrikaans with the slaves and their descendants, and north-western Afrikaans with the Khoikhoi, groups of whom (notably the Korana and the Griqua)\textsuperscript{200} settled north of the colonial border in the vicinity of the Gariep river during the late eighteenth century. By then, after wars and waves of smallpox epidemics\textsuperscript{201} had taken their toll, there were only about 20,000 Khoikhoi left in the colony – a detribalised, landless proletariat impoverished by colonialism. Some of them were bilingual but many were no longer fluent in their original language and spoke Afrikaans. The Khoikhoi who left the Cape were the first Afrikaans speakers in the north-western parts of southern Africa (Ponelis 1998:14).

At present, according to Johnson and Jacobs (2011:263), the Khoikhoi population of South Africa and Namibia totals no more than 55,000. Even fewer San people have survived. Their pre-colonial way of life as hunter-gatherers brought them into conflict not only with colonist farmers, but also with Khoikhoi pastoralists and Bantu-speaking migrant groups. The best grazing land, as De Villiers (2012a:49) explains the source of the conflict, was also the best hunting ground.\textsuperscript{202} Agile and armed with bows and poisonous arrows, the San did their best to protect their territory against the invasion of livestock farmers, but to little avail. Bands of San who were not massacred or dislocated (by white and black forces) were fragmented, with individuals becoming part of exogenous economies.

\textsuperscript{200} The Griqua – as the group formally named itself in 1813 – was hardly a “pure” Khoikhoi clan. Initially led by the manumitted slave Adam Kok (circa 1710 – circa 1795), members also included other former slaves, runaway slaves, mixed-race people and even a few white people. In language and lifestyle, the Griqua resembled the white frontier farmers.

\textsuperscript{201} These epidemics are believed to have been linked to infected laundry that was brought ashore from visiting ships.

\textsuperscript{202} Cf. also Visagie (2012a:99–100).
The distinguishing feature of north-western Afrikaans – also called Orange River Afrikaans – is influence by the Khoisan language. South-western Afrikaans, on the other hand, is characterised by Malay, Portuguese and Arabic influences. These are detectable not only in the vocabulary of the dialect (better known as Cape Afrikaans or Kaaps), but also in its phonetic features (cf. Ponelis 1993:65–67). While a considerable number of Malay loanwords found their way into standard Afrikaans,203 there has been a much higher degree of borrowing from Malay in south-western Afrikaans, particularly in the sub-variety of this dialect that is associated with Cape Town’s Muslim community.

Islam was introduced to the Cape in the seventeenth century via convicts and political exiles as well as slaves from Bengal, India and Indonesia. By the end of the eighteenth century, the religion was wide-spread among the Cape slaves (who enjoyed a fair degree of religious freedom). The first Muslim school or madrasah was founded in 1793, and the first mosque a few years later. In the madrasahs, children were taught to read and write in the Arabic script through the medium of Malay. Within two generations, however, the Afrikaans creoloid had replaced Malay as the language of the Cape Muslim community. By the mid-1800s – according to an observer quoted by Giliomee (2003:101) – “all the Malays [sic] in Cape Town” spoke Dutch (read: the Afrikaans creoloid) while only the upper classes understood and wrote Arabic and Malay. Afrikaans also became the language of instruction in the madrasahs, leading to the establishment of what has become known as the Arabic-Afrikaans writing tradition.

Though this fact has long been ignored in Afrikaner nationalist historiography, it was the Cape Muslims who first devised an orthography for the Afrikaans they spoke so that it could be used in written form. It was they, too, who produced what has to be regarded as the first Afrikaans books (printed circa 1856).204

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203 Most famous among them is the word for many/much, namely baie. Others examples include piering [saucer] and piesang [banana].
204 The first Afrikaans book in the Latin alphabet was published in 1861. Authored by L.H. Meurant, the magistrate of the town of Cradock, it formed part of a minor movement that propagated the segregation of the eastern from the western Cape. This movement was hardly, as Du Plessis (1986) has characterised it, a nationalist movement.
Arabic script was employed, and one can hardly ask for a better record of how the south-western variety of Afrikaans must have sounded at the time. By the end of the nineteenth century, about a dozen Arabic-Afrikaans works had been published, and the writing tradition would survive another century.  

But non-nationalist language activist initiatives such as the invention of the Arabic-Afrikaans writing tradition, as well as literary production in Kaaps and Orange River Afrikaans, fall beyond the scope of this study which is concerned with the development of the Afrikaans language and Afrikaans literature only to the extent that it is relevant to the development of Afrikaner nationalism. In the remainder of my thesis, the focus is thus confined to the history of nationalism-inspired Afrikaans language activism.

### 4.4 The catalyst and the context for Afrikaner nationalism’s “false start”: anglicisation and modernisation

In 1795, VOC control of the Cape was terminated – a development that has to be set against the background of the tumultuous aftermath of the American and French Revolutions. Inspired by the revolutionaries (and by the Dutch Patriot Movement of the time), a group of Cape Town dwellers and farmers from the surrounding area staged a revolt against VOC “despotism”. The Cape Patriots, as the rebels called themselves, were no doubt influenced by Enlightenment thinking: some literature did reach the Cape and delegations to The Netherlands met with anti-Orangists. However, for all their pro-revolution sentiments (as 

206 In scope – both thematically and chronologically speaking – this section overlaps with a key text from the body of pre-apartheid Afrikaner nationalist literature, titled Die Afrikaner en sy taal, 1806–1875 [The Afrikaner and his language, 1806–1875] and authored by the leading Afrikaans linguist and language activist, J. du P. Scholtz, the book first appeared in 1939 and was dedicated it to “the memory of all those who devoted themselves to the preservation of the Dutch-Afrikaans language and culture at the Cape during the years 1806–1875”. To reflect a truer picture, however, the book should have been titled The Afrikaans-speaker and the Dutch language, 1806–1875, and the dedication should have read: “to the memory of all those who devoted themselves to the preservation of Dutch as a public language at the Cape during the years 1806–1875”. To think in terms of Afrikaners as Afrikaans language activists before 1875, I argue, is premature. His primordialist orientation notwithstanding, Scholtz’s research provides a valuable overview of newspaper coverage of the language-related issues at the Cape during the period under review.
opposed to local Company officials who were Orangists and anti-revolutionary – Giliomee 2003:56), the burghers essentially stood for the opposite of popular sovereignty and universal rights. They insisted, amongst other things, that

white men should not be arrested by ‘caffers’ (slaves who served as auxiliary police), that burghers should be allowed to punish their own slaves [...], that Englishmen and Frenchmen should be denied residential rights, and that Chinese, Javanese and convicts should not be allowed to live among the burghers and run businesses in competition with theirs (Davenport and Saunders 2000:38). 207

Blind to the inconsistencies in their version of the ideology, the Cape Patriots happily used the new language of liberalism to legitimise their grievances. In a series of petitions to the Lord XVII, they demanded more political and economic rights and freedoms for their “fellow citizens of the Cape of Good Hope”. (Cf. Davenport and Saunders 2000: 27–29, 36–40; Giliomee 2003:54–57.)

In at least one of these petitions the Cape Patriots identified themselves as Africaners – something that future Afrikaner nationalists would not leave unexploited. At the time, however, the term was still not an ethnonym, and certainly not one that was confined to white Afrikaans-speaking burghers. It could refer to anybody “who identified with, and was usually born in, South Africa rather than Europe” (Saunders and Southey 1998:8), including, for example, the Khoikhoi and mixed-race followers of the notorious Jager Afrikaner (circa 1750–1823) – a man of Khoikhoi and slave descent – and his son Jonker Afrikaner (1790–1860). Only in the twentieth century did the name Afrikaners acquire its current meaning as an ethnonym. Those whites who came to be known as Afrikaners were also called Cape Dutch in the Cape Colony and Boers in the Boer republics.

The nationalist ideal of Cape Dutch and Boers united in an independent Afrikaner state only surfaced in the 1870s – a century after the Patriot movement. To be sure, the earlier campaign displayed elements of nationalist politics. The burghers were self-declared patriots. Nationalist revolutions, however opportunistically

207 In the end, none of these demands were met.
interpreted, were their sources of inspiration. They were promoting the interests – both material and existential – of the citizens of the Cape of Good Hope – a collectivity which, they believed, was politically and economically not as independent as it could have been. To Giliomee, the noteworthy aspect is that the burghers’ petitions addressed “the issue of their survival in a way that transcended the immediate self-interest of the authors” (2003:55). Yet the Cape Patriots were hardly Afrikaner nationalists. For the time being, despite their situation being comparable to that of the frontier population in Britain’s American colonies, they aspired only to the status of “free citizens of a colony of the free United Netherlands, sharing the same rights and privileges” (Giliomee 2003:6; cf. also Davenport and Saunders 2000:29).

But then another colonial power, alien in ways that the Dutch authorities had not been, appeared on the scene. On 11 June 1795, a British fleet sailed into False Bay – the eastern bay of the Cape Peninsula. The Netherlands had been under French occupation since January of that year, and to prevent the same fate from befalling the Cape, Prince William V of Orange – the Dutch Stadtholder on exile in England – had asked his host to seize the colony. Unconvinced of Britain’s good intentions, local authorities resisted occupation and mustered forces to defend Cape Town, but to no avail. In terms of a conciliatory treaty of surrender, signed on 16 September 1795, the Cape became a British possession.

Before long, however, die Kaap was weer Hollands [the Cape was Dutch again]. The Peace Treaty of Amiens (25 March 1802) required Britain to relinquish the Cape Colony to The Netherlands, and on 21 February 1803 the flag of the Batavian Republic was hoisted on the Castle in Cape Town. Under commissioner-general J.A. de Mist and general Jan Willem Janssens colonial administration improved remarkably. But their time in office was short-lived. Early in January 1806, British battleships were approaching the Cape Peninsula once again – now from the western side via Table Bay. This time they had not come on behalf of the Prince of Orange. The sea battle of Trafalgar, fought less

208 An Afrikaans idiom meaning “everything is all right again”.
than three months earlier, had confirmed Britannia as ruler of the waves. After
defeating the Cape garrison in the Battle of Blaauwberg [Blue Mountain] on 8
January 1806, she came to rule the waves of the Cape – the Gibraltar of the Indian
Ocean – too.

In Afrikaner nationalist mythology, the Battle of Blaauwberg marked the
beginning of Eene eeuw van onrecht [A century of wrong] as an old Dutch-
language book on intra-white (Dutch/Afrikaans-English) relations in nineteenth
century South Africa is titled. Its actual authorship is unclear,209 but Eene eeuw
van onrecht was published on the eve of the Anglo-Boer War (in 1899) by Francis
William Reitz (1844–1934) in his capacity of state secretary of the Boer republic
of Transvaal. The book, like the Afrikaner myth, assumed that Afrikaners had
already constituted a volk when the century of wrong began. Contrary to this
assumption, as I shall demonstrate below, Afrikaners – or rather, Afrikaner
nationalist activist-ideologues – only managed to construct an Afrikaner volk once
the “century of wrong” had passed. In the course of that century, however, British
rule in South Africa – uninterrupted in the colonial south but interrupted in the
republican north (cf. section 1.1) – provided the catalyst and created the context
for the rise of Afrikaner nationalism.

The question that presents itself is, once again, a “how” question: How was that
achieved? How did British control of South African territories fertilise the ground
for the seed of Afrikaner nationalism? Following the convention, I argue that it
happened in two non-consecutive phases: in the Cape Colony from the 1820s
onwards, and in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies in the aftermath of the
Anglo-Boer War. The first phase is covered in the remainder of this chapter and
the second phase in the last chapter of this study.

British control of the Cape Colony – and later the Transvaal and Orange River
Colonies – provided the catalyst for the rise of Afrikaner nationalism through
formal policies of anglicisation. On this historians generally agree, and it is not

209 It is believed to include contributions by Jan Smuts.
disputed in this study. What is challenged, is the lay and scholarly belief that white Afrikaans speakers, in the face of anglicisation, collectively and simultaneously began “to feel a sense of unity and pride in their own identity” (Watermeyer 1996:102). Following Miroslav Hroch, I argue quite the opposite: shame and embarrassment – and, of course, a fair amount of resentment and ambition – on the part of a few, rather than widespread pride, triggered the language activism that constituted the earliest expressions of Afrikaner nationalism.

Despite all the contextual differences, there are ways in which Afrikaner nationalism is comparable to those European nationalisms that Hroch included in his periodisation model. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Afrikaners were a group under exogenous rule – in the Colonies of the Cape and Natal from 1806 and in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies from 1902 onwards. The language they spoke lacked not only a continuous literary tradition but any written tradition at all.²¹⁰ If the English press in the Cape was to be believed, there could be no literature with such a language (Cape Argus, 1857/12/19, quoted in Ponelis 1993:59). It was when a new class of educated but marginalised men observed these deficits, “[attributes that] the future nation still lacked, and began efforts to overcome one or more of them” that Afrikaner nationalism was born. Like the intelligentsia in Hroch’s examples, they started to talk about their ethnic identity, conceived of it as a national identity, and set out to “persuade their compatriots of the importance of consciously belonging to the nation” (Hroch 1996:80).

More than national prestige was at stake. As will emerge, the cultivation of Afrikaans was part and parcel of attempts to empower white speakers of Afrikaans economically and politically. Cultivation, the language-cum-nationalist activists knew, would pave the way for institutionalisation, and the institutionalisation of Afrikaans would facilitate Afrikaners’ access to economic and political resources. The vernacular had to be adapted for the modern institutions of print-capitalism (à la Anderson), schools, churches, courts of law

²¹⁰ Or, to be more accurate, it lacked a written tradition in the Roman alphabet.
and, last but not least, parliament and other structures of government. Explained in Charles Ferguson’s terms, Afrikaans had to be converted into a high variety that performed formal functions in the public domains of life. Explained in Ernest Gellner’s terms, the language had to become a high code with a high culture.

When English first arrived on the scene, Dutch was the cultivated (high) language of the Cape Colony and, as such, the primary target of anglicisation. The ultimate target, however, was the Cape Dutch way of life: the Cape as a colony had to be anglicised. In intention, as Davenport and Saunders sums it up, “British policy was to adjust the cultural life of Colonial society to the legal realities of British rule” (2000:45). Giliomee agrees, but his bias is clear to see – the inverted commas alone an indication of where his empathy lies:

[After gaining control of the Cape Colony,] Britain had resolved to develop it, extend it, and ‘civilize’ it. The first big step was a new language policy (2003:197).

Less sophisticated nationalist interpretations of the “stranglehold of anglicisation” at the Cape are less subtle in their bias. Apartheid-era school text books, for example, would assert that

[t]he conqueror intended to turn the Cape [...] into a British colony in the true sense of the word. This should have happened by means of anglicisation of everything and everyone, and language, that after all determines nationhood, was the first to suffer (Meiring 1949:6).

The problem with this idea – that Britain sought to destroy a long-existing Afrikaner nation by destroying the Afrikaans language – is (at least) two-fold: First, as has been established above, there could be no talk of Afrikaners as a nation with a language prior to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Second, the language that “suffered” as a result of anglicisation programmes was not Afrikaans, the national language-to-be, but Dutch, the language of public institutions.

The statement that Dutch was the language of the Cape’s public institutions must be qualified: Dutch was the language of those public institutions that existed in
the colony before 1806. These included government, legal and religious structures, but virtually excluded schools (not to mention universities) and periodical publications. It was during the “century of wrong”, and particularly between 1811 and 1813, on the initiative of governor John Cradock, that state-sponsored formal education began to replace the (very basic) church-based education of the Dutch era. And it was two British settlers, John Fairbairn and Thomas Pringle, who introduced the printing press to a community unfamiliar with newspapers and magazines. In 1824, Fairbairn and Pringle established the weekly South African Commercial Advertiser – South Africa’s first newspaper. The Dutch magazine, Het Nederduitsch Zuid-Afrikaansch Tijdschrift [The Nether German South African Journal] was launched during the same year, and in 1930 followed the bilingual Dutch-English newspaper De Zuid-Afrikaan. [The South African]. Ironically, the Cape’s first Dutch-language periodicals owed their existence to British imperialism.

Fairbairn and Pringle had arrived in Algoa Bay (modern-day Port Elizabeth) in the eastern Cape during the first half of 1820, along with some 4,000 of their countrymen from all corners of the British Isles. They had been recruited and assisted by the British government as part of a broader undertaking in the early nineteenth century to populate the empire with British subjects. By settling them on the eastern frontier of the colony, on land seized from the Xhosa, Cape authorities were hoping they would serve an additional purpose, namely as a buffer against the Xhosa. Some settlers turned out to be successful stock farmers, and many who gave up farming came to dominate other sectors of the colony’s economy, not least because they had brought with them “the ideology of free trade and progress” (cf. Giliomee 2003:194). The 1820 settlers – or, to be exact, Fairbairn, Pringle and George Greig, the printer of The South African Commercial Advertiser – were also instrumental in the achievement of press freedom for the Cape in 1828.

211 The DRC was the most important institution of the conquered Cape Dutch (Giliomee 2003:199).
According to Saul Dubow, Britain’s imperial ambition to anglicise the institutions of the Cape Colony – old and new – was first articulated by Cradock in 1811. Pressures for anglicisation, Dubow adds, “were given further force by senior administrators like Henry Ellis, who helped to prepare the way for the 1820 settlers” (2006:21). Yet the first British official to introduce a formal policy of anglicisation in colonial South Africa was Charles Somerset.

Somerset became governor of the Cape in 1814 after Britain had officially acquired the territory in terms of the Anglo-Dutch treaty (also known as the Convention of London). In 1822, he issued a proclamation which sought to replace Dutch by English as the official administrative language of the colony. Two years later, in a report to the governor, one of his trusted advisers, J.A. Truter, warned that

an apprehension is fast spreading among the public, that their children will not be allowed to receive any further instruction in Dutch, and that the language is to be totally proscribed (quoted in Scholtz 1964:29).

According to the 1822 proclamation, English was to become the sole legal language of the Cape Colony on 1 January 1827. Shortly before the policy was enacted, on 6 November 1826, officials of the district court of Stellenbosch voiced their concern:

although we would willingly submit to all laws and orders of Government, [...] it cannot possibly be required of us that we shall sign the daily records, sentences, acts of judgment upon criminal misdeeds, and other documents if drawn up in a language that [we] are unacquainted with (quoted in Ponelis 1998:48).

Officials of the district court of Graaff-Reinet went a step further and resigned (Ponelis 1998:48). Attempts to anglicise school and church were also met with protest. Writing to The South African Commercial Advertiser in 1832, a reader observed that “the Dutch colonists, tenacious of the customs or their fathers, still consider [...] Dutch as the language of the country and are desirous that their children shall before all be taught the parental language” (published on 5 May 1832; quoted in Scholtz 1964:57) Two and a half years later, on 7 November
1834, the following question cropped up in the editorial columns of *De Zuid-Afrikaan*: “Why would we not be allowed to pray to our God [...] in our own language?” (quoted in Scholtz 1964:73). One of the founder members of the newspaper (who would become its editor in 1939), Christoffel J. Brand, summarised Cape-Dutch discontent as follows: “England has taken from the old colonists of the Cape everything that was dear to them: their country, their laws, their customs, their slaves, yes even their mother tongue” (quoted in Giliomee 2003:199).

But there was a flip side to the coin. Appreciating the instrumental value – and, of course, the prestige – of English in a British colony, a considerable proportion of the urban educated Cape Dutch elite were not only prepared but eager to have their children study (in) English. Gradually, town and city life became predominantly an English life, several upper-class Cape Town families became English families, and quite a few prominent leaders in the Cape Dutch community became, as they were called, Anglomanne [Anglomen]. “A colonist of Dutch descent”, it seemed, could after all become “an Englishman”, contrary to what *De Zuid-Afrikaan* believed. It was in on 17 October 1853, seven months

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212 With a doctorate in law from the University of Leiden (obtained in 1820), Brand was one of the first well-educated Cape Dutch colonists. Together with John Fairbairn he agitated for representative government and, when it was finally achieved in 1853, became the first speaker of the Cape house of assembly – a position he held for two decades. In 1872, on the introduction of responsible government, he also became the first speaker of the Cape parliament. Christoffel Brand was, perhaps ironically, knighted in 1860.

213 Brand made this statement in 1837, three years after the British parliament abolished slavery (on 1 December 1834). Provision was made for a four-year apprenticeship period, but in 1838 the last of the Cape’s slaves were emancipated.

214 Only four South African cities had their birth during Dutch period: Cape Town (est. 1652), Stellenbosch (est. 1707), Swellendam (est. 1745) and Graaff-Reinet (est. 1786). During the British period six more were added to the map: Port Elizabeth (est. 1820, on the arrival of the British settlers), Durban (est. 1824), King William’s Town (est. 1835), East London (est. 1845), Kimberley (est. 1871) and, last but not least, the city of gold, Johannesburg (est. 1886). The capitals of the Boer republics, Bloemfontein (est. 1846) and Pretoria (est. 1855), were born as rural towns, as were other cities founded by the Voortrekkers.

In an interesting observation, Scholtz (1964:82) points out the English names of towns in the Cape Colony of the nineteenth century drew little, if any, protest from their Afrikaans-speaking inhabitants. Examples include Beaufort, Caledon, Clanwilliam, Colesberg, Cradock, Darling, George, Napier, Prince Albert, Richmond, Somerset, Victoria, Wellington and Worcester.

215 De Villiers (2012b:75) cites the Cloete, Van der Bijl and Mijburgh families as examples.
after Britain had granted representative government to the Cape Colony, that this opinion was expressed by the newspaper’s editorial team:

[i]t is a mistake that we have frequently opposed to assume that as British subjects were are obliged to adopt a British nationality. A colonist of Dutch descent cannot become an Englishman, nor should he strive to be a Hollander (quoted in Scholtz 1964:83).

According to *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, the challenge facing “enlightened” colonists of Dutch descent was to become Kapenaars [Capetonians] by “learning to combine the fundamental features of the English national character with those of the Dutch national character in a harmonious way” (quoted in Scholtz 1964:83). But the newspaper, like many of its readers, was ambivalent about the matter. It also predicted, with approval, that “the Dutch nationality” at the Cape would slowly but surely be assimilated into “the English nationality” (*De Zuid-Afrikaan*, 1857/05/21, quoted in Scholtz 1964:94).

By the mid-nineteenth century, however, this debate was no longer relevant to all Afrikaners-to-be, simply because roughly one-third of them could no longer be called Cape Dutch. During the late 1830s, as has been mentioned, some 14,000 men, women and children (at the time about a tenth of the Cape Dutch population) escaped anglicisation and assimilation into “the English nationality” when they left the colony *en masse*. This series of migrations, which came to be known as the Great Trek, would supply the basic raw material (*á la* Hobsbawm 1997:5) to Afrikanerdom’s myth manufacturers of the early twentieth century.

To say that the migrants or Voortrekkers escaped anglicisation is not to suggest that Somerset’s language policy *per se* (or even indirectly) caused the Great Trek. The Trek, as Davenport and Saunders (2000:53) warn, was not “a demonstration against alien government [just] because it was alien”. The burden of anglicisation, to use their metaphor, was lighter than Afrikaner nationalists would like to

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216 For the most part, however, *De Zuid-Afrikaan* “committed itself to resist the eclipse of the Dutch heritage; it denounced those who, in a desire to present themselves as ‘civilized’, abandoned ‘their ancestors’ language, morals, outlook, in short, their own nationality and, eventually also, their own religion’.”
believe, especially in the remote rural areas of the Cape Colony, including its eastern frontier from whence the various journeys that made up the Trek commenced. It was for a complex combination of other reasons that the eastern frontier farmers and their families decided to load their belongings into oxwagons and head off northwards into the unknown.

Johnson and Jacobs (2011:131) are right in claiming that the white farmers “were running out of land for pasture since there was little additional land to conquer”. Yet it is doubtful, as the editors of the Encyclopaedia of South Africa also claim, that they “feared that their culture and identity were being threatened” (Johnson and Jacobs 2011:131). After six frontier wars with the Xhosa, the last of which (fought in 1835) cost them £290,000 in losses, the settlers must have felt threatened, and the Cape government could not have been popular on the frontier. But if the local British authorities were loathed, it was for their failure to provide protection, not for their language laws. Frontier settler life in colonial Africa, not unlike peasant life in agrarian Europe, was “a difficult and serious business” (to stretch the applicability of Gellner’s idea):

The protection from [Xhosa warriors] is not easily achieved. In the achievement of it, effective government is an important factor. Could one think of a sillier, more frivolous consideration than the question concerning the native vernacular of the governors? (1964:152–153; emphasis in the original).

The final chapter of this thesis analyses the mythologisation of the Great Trek within the framework of the modified Leerssen model. Suffice it to say here, where the focus is on language matters, that the Voortrekkers settled in the interior of South Africa and eventually managed to found two republics: the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek [South African Republic] (ZAR) or Transvaal, and the Orange Free State (OFS). The independence of the former was recognised by Britain in the Sand River Convention of 1852 and the latter became independent two years later in terms of the Bloemfontein Convention. By the mid-1860s, white Afrikaans speakers constituted 90 percent of the white population of the republics, compared to 75 percent in the Cape Colony (Giliomee 2003:201). Unsurprisingly,
the official language of the republics – in as far as pastoral republics needed an official language – was Dutch.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the ZAR government terminated state grants to schools using English as medium of instruction. Paul Kruger, the last president of the ZAR (form 1880 through the Anglo-Boer War), believed that “[e]very attempt to expand education in English will help towards the destruction of the *landstaal* [language of the country]” (Giliomee 2003:237). Yet virtually nobody spoke Dutch. Even Kruger’s (as yet unstandardised) Afrikaans was better than his Dutch:

Visiting Rotterdam […] in 1884 as part of a Transvaal delegation, he stopped using his broken Dutch for the first time and switched to Afrikaans. A Dutch report noted the great difference: in his own language the speech was ‘lively, glowing and spirited’ (Giliomee 2003:224).

The language set-up in the Free State was similar. Dutch was the official language but the *Zuid-Afrikaansche taal* [South African language] was the “unofficial language that was not written but spoken and understood” (Dutch educationist Johannes Brill, quoted in Nienaber 1975:86). The Dutch of Kruger’s counterpart, Marthinus Theunis Steyn (the last president of the OFS, 1896–1902) was equally poor. As a student he opted for English when he could not cope in The Netherlands and went to London to complete a law degree. He corresponded with his English-speaking wife in English and included several English speakers in his cabinet. Though as president he, too,

began to take the issue of language and culture more seriously, as an embodiment of nationhood. If the Dutch language languished, he declared, the Free State nation would decline. He instructed his officials to switch to Dutch in corresponding with the Natal and Cape governments, and gave Dutch-speakers preference in appointments to the civil service. Departments were told that Dutch was the official language, and pressure was put on the schools which predominantly used English to introduce Dutch as the language medium (Giliomee 2003:245).

217 A British colony since 1843 – cf. section 1.1.
As a marginal but important note, Kruger’s description of Dutch as the language of the country along with Steyn’s portrayal of Dutch as “an embodiment of nationhood” – the language of the nation – have to be considered here. It would be difficult to deny that these language attitudes – and the language activism to which they gave rise (e.g. language-in-education policies) – were nationalist in nature. In fact: can there be a more unambiguous expression of nationalism than the establishment of a republic? Why, then, is the rise of Boer republicanism not interpreted as the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, at least not by Christoph Marx and others belonging to the modernist/constructionist school. Marx explains:

There is a contradiction between Afrikaner nationalism and republicanism, since the latter was initially confined to specific areas [of present-day South Africa], while the former strove to include all Afrikaans-speaking white people in the country. It is ahistorical to regard them as one and the same with hindsight, as many nationalist historians who make no distinction between Afrikaner nationalism and for instance OFS nationalism (2008:120).

Quoting Stadler, Marx concludes: “The [Boer] republic was not a precise statement of political objectives but [...] served as a model of harmony for a society rent by conflict, of certainty in an age of uncertainty (2008:120).

To conclude: The genesis of Afrikaner nationalism must be cast against the backdrop of imperial dreams of an anglicised Cape Colony. In this respect, I share the view of both Afrikaner nationalist historians such as Hermann Giliomee (2003:194) and non-nationalists such as Leonard Thompson (1985:239–240) and Robert Ross (1999:4–6): Afrikaner nationalism was a reaction against British Imperialism. Unlike the nationalists, however, I do not defend Afrikaner nationalism as a justified response to oppression. Before convicting the local British authorities of oppression, as Davenport and Saunders (2000:46) warn, one should distinguish their intentions from the manner in which they implemented their policy of anglicisation. If Dutch did “suffer” badly, it was only in secondary state schools. The Scots clergy imported by the Somerset regime were sent to The Netherlands to learn Dutch, and interpreters were provided in courts of law. The actual source of Cape Dutch discontent in 1827 was more likely the abolition of
their traditional legal structures than Somerset’s new language policy. Now the law and its enforcement were in the hands of “higher, generally alien authorities, who legislated in English [even though they] gazetted the law in Dutch as well”. What Davenport and Saunders seem to suggest – and this is also the point I am trying to make – is that concerns about language per se might not have been what prompted the lawyers of Graaff-Reinet, for example, to resign. In the final analysis, they probably resigned in frustration borne out of their loss of power to legislate and to execute the law.

By no stretch of the definition can the Graaff-Reinet language activists be regarded as Afrikaner nationalists. Nevertheless, the power constellations in the Cape Colony in 1827 already resembled those that typically produced the smaller nationalisms of Europe on which Hroc based his periodisation model: a potential nation X under exogenous rule Y, the language of Y boasting (inter alia) a longstanding and proud literary tradition, the language of X lacking (inter alia) a written tradition (in the Roman alphabet – the only one known to nation-to-be X). At the Cape, an additional ingredient was added to the mix: language Z. The first Afrikaner nationalists could claim Dutch – a language, like English, with an age-old written and literary tradition – as theirs. Lack of widespread fluency in the national language-to-be had not deterred nationalists elsewhere. But there was another dimension to the problem: not only was Dutch virtually a foreign language in the colony; it was also an unattractive one, as least according to the local English-language press. In a leading article that appeared on 19 September 1857, the Cape Argus minced no words:

>[S]upposing the Dutch of Holland was the vernacular of this country, which it is not, why seek to perpetuate it here in an English colony. Dutch has no status among the languages of Europe. Nobody ever learns it; and all ranks above the lowest in Holland prefer to speak French. The fact is, that Dutch, with some very good points about it, is not an attractive language. Very well fitted for pulpit eloquence, no doubt, but shockingly unsuited for sentiment and poetry (quoted in Scholtz 1964:91; emphasis in the original newspaper article).

Eliezer Ben-Yehuda is perhaps the classic example.

218
The real thorn in the side of the author(s) of the article was, however, “the present atrocious vernacular of the Cape” – Afrikaans:

The language of the Cape! As if the miserable, bastard jargon, which is the vernacular of this country, is worthy of the name of language at all. [...] The poverty of expression in this jargon is such, that we defy any man to express thoughts in it above the merest common-place. People can hardly be expected to act up to sentiments which the tongue they use fail entirely to express. There can be no literature with such a language, for poor as it is, it is hardly a written one (quoted in Scholtz 1964:91).

The article concluded with an appeal to the Cape Dutch:

preach English from your pulpits, and encourage your children to learn and use, in familiar discourse, the language of Shakespeare and Milton [...] Let [...] your language and nationality go (quoted in Scholtz 1964:91–92).

In similar vein, The Cape Monitor of 14 October 1857 told Afrikaans speakers that their language

is doing you and your children incalculable harm. It cramps up your thoughts. It impedes you energies. It brings the blush to every modest woman’s cheeks, and makes the educated recoil with disgust too often (quoted in Scholtz 1964:92).

A case can be made that such attitudes might have contributed more to the anglicisation of the Cape than any formal language policy. One need not ban a language, as the late Flemish sociolinguist Kas Deprez used to say; given enough prestige, all you need to do is ask: What can you do with that language? Who wants to speak that language? The explanation for the shift towards English in the towns and cities of the British-ruled Cape Colony lay as much in the instrumental value of English as it did in the symbolic value of the language – its cultural power or social currency.

219 Personal observation as a student in the European Studies Masters Programme at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1995.
Thus far, this section overviewed British attempts in the nineteenth century to anglicise the Cape Colony. These imperialist endeavours were partially successful. Eventually, however, they would provoke a nationalist response form an intelligentsia who weighed their culture, found it wanting and set out to rectify the problem. But the rise of Afrikaner nationalism can hardly be explained as a remedy for an elite inferiority complex. Language and cultural imperialism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the rise of an oppositional language and cultural movement; assimilationism may catalyse a nationalist reaction, but not under any and all social circumstances. At the Cape, British rule did not only provide the spark for Afrikaner nationalism through anglicisation; it also created the climate for Afrikaner nationalism through modernisation.

By 1806, the Cape Dutch – as Giliomee (and not the Cape Argus!) characterises them – “were a rural, isolated, relatively backward people with only a few who received more than a rudimentary education”. They “could boast of no great economic advances or cultural achievements, apart from the Cape Dutch homesteads” (2003:195). But then came the British, and with them print-capitalism and other forces of modernisation, not least of all mass schooling. After Britain took control of the Cape, the number of school-attending children in the colony kept growing and quintupled between 1842 and 1860 (from 4,000 to 20,000 – Giliomee 2003:201). In the minds of these children – to tweak Gellner (1964:152–153) once again for the purpose of my argument – “the question concerning the native vernacular of the governors” was no longer a silly, frivolous consideration. To those who (partially) completed school, work had become semantic. The native language of the governors was also the language of employment and upward social mobility. De Zuid-Afrikaan might have denounced those who, “in a desire to present themselves as ‘civilized’”, abandoned their native language (Giliomee 2003:203), but in the Cape’s modernising economy English was what Afrikaans was not (and Dutch was only to a limited extent): a valuable tool and a source of status.

The empathy of latter-day commentators – Afrikaner nationalists and non-nationalists alike – more often than not lies with those Afrikaans-speaking
colonists who resisted “the eclipse of [their] Dutch heritage” (Giliomee 2003:203). They were brave in the face of British arrogance, conceit and condescension which motivated – so the line of reasoning goes – the introduction of the hegemonic, unfair and unjustifiable policy of anglicisation. Giliomee, for one, believes that the Cape Colony of the nineteenth century provides a textbook example of “the contempt British imperialists so often showed for what they regarded as lesser cultures and breeds of men” (Giliomee 2003:xiv):

Although more sympathetic to the Afrikaner colonists then the officials, the English-speaking journalists, like the businessmen, reinforced the image of Afrikaners as unprogressive and parochial. The great majority of Afrikaner colonists were farmers, for whom the benefits of free enterprise and free trade as a prerequisite of colonial progress were far less obvious than they were for the merchants. The British merchants deemed unprogressive the demand [...] for tariff protection of colonial products from cheap imports. The concern for the survival of the Dutch language was seen as similarly unprogressive. [...] Trying to transplant something of the British Isles to the harsh African soil, they formed literary societies and discussed the latest books they had ordered from ‘home’. They went to their own churches [...] and they played their own games. They did little to get to know the Afrikaners and their ways, preferring to keep their own company or occasionally that of an anglicized Afrikander. In their way they themselves were also parochial (Giliomee 2003:196).

However, the debate about the fairness of programmes of linguistic assimilation is far from closed. To have claimed, as the Cape Argus did, that nothing “will advance the moral and social progress of the colony [more] than the substitution of the English language for the present Cape Dutch” (19 September 1857; quoted in Scholtz 1964:91) was to overstate the case. Yet it is true, given the semantic nature of work, that modern economies function predominantly in “high codes” and that fluency – or, in Gellnerian terms, a capacity for context-free communication – in the language of the economy

is essential if all citizens are to have an equal opportunity to work [...] and, conversely, if businesses are to have at their disposal a labour force possessing the linguistic competences necessary for flexibility, trainability, and mobility in the modern workplace (Patten and Kymlicka 2003:39).

217
In the modern world, as Patten and Kymlicka (2003:37–38) argue, linguistic homogenisation has been as much the result of formal assimilationist policies at it has been a by-product of justifiable programmes of modernisation such as the massification of education and the improvement of all kinds of infrastructures. Positive attitudes towards English among the Cape Dutch were due, in no small measure, to “the benefits that the British government’s invasive social reorganisation brought to the whole population” (Ponelis 1998:48).

But not everybody was enchanted by English. In a poem mockingly titled *Fooruitgang* [Progress] that eventually became part of the Afrikaans literary canon, one C.P. Hoogenhout famously complained:

English! English! All is English! English all you see and hear;
In our schools and in our churches, Mother Tongue is [fouly] murdered.
Bastard is our People now; in this the clergy do comply;
Dutch in schools is a deception – nothing more than Dutch in name.
Those who refuse anglicization are derided and disdained:
Even in Transvaal and Free State, everywhere the self-same pain.
‘It is progress,’ cry the loudmouths, ‘Civilization on the march!’
Out-of-date and very stupid are all of those who don’t agree.
(Moodie’s 1975 translation, p. 40).

Hoogenhout belongs to the first generation of activists who, in August 1875, set themselves the task to prove that Afrikaans was worthy of the name of language – that it could have a written form and, in time, a Shakespeare and a Milton. The rest is history: the history of Afrikaner nationalism.
CHAPTER 5
LOOSE CONTINUITY: THE CONTEMPORARY AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE MOVEMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, II

‘Dates of battles all of which were won, names of people all of whom were heroes, lofty words and noble gestures, long lists of heroic deeds, injustices to remember and never to forget [...] They wasted years of our lives with those things, with their folksongs and speeches and vows
(Schoeman 2007:106).

All in this ridiculous little language, virtually without a literature, that they claim to cherish, hugging it like a teddy bear
(Rousseau 1995:36).

5.1 Before apartheid: building a nation from words, monuments and festivals

5.1.1 The first Afrikaans language and cultural activists

In the third chapter of this thesis, I challenged Joep Leerssen’s argument that “nationalism is always, in its incipience at least, cultural [rather than political] nationalism” (2006:562). A crucial piece of evidence in support of my claim to the contrary – namely that nationalism may, and Afrikaner nationalism did originate as a politically directed cultural movement – is to be found in the public lecture that ushered in the First Afrikaans Language Movement (or, in Leerssen’s terms, the first efforts to cultivate Afrikaans and Afrikaner culture). Speaking in the Free State capital of Bloemfontein during May 1875, the rector of the prestigious Grey College in the city, Johannes Brill, put it to his audience that

[i]f we yearn for an independent national existence, a language of our own, one day even our own South African literature, the responsibility rests on our shoulders to support the national movement and to defend it against powerful foreign influences,

220 In this section, I relied primarily on Nienaber (1974; 1975) for factual information.
to love and nurture the national consciousness, and to protect and maintain the national life with everything at our disposal (GRA 1909:53).

Brill, an immigrant from the Netherlands, delivered his lecture in Dutch, but spoke as an advocate of another language, “the unofficial tongue [of the colonies and republics of South Africa] that was not written but spoken and understood from Cape Town to deep in the interior without which no stranger – Englishman or German – who travelled through the country [sic] could do, the South African language” (GRA 1909:53). This unofficial language, Brill predicted, would in time replace the official ones – English in the British colonies of the Cape and Natal, and Dutch in the Boer republics of the Free State and Transvaal – provided that a movement of national unification analogous to the German example developed among Afrikaners. Conceding that his observation applied to the political and intellectual elite rather the volk at large, Brill claimed that

the African [read: Afrikaner], whether he belongs to the Colony, to Natal, to the Free State or to the Transvaal, thinks of himself as an African and thinks of South Africa as his fatherland just like the Prussian, the Saxon, [...] and the Swabian felt in the first half of this century that his fatherland was larger and that Germany should be one country (GRA 1909:51–52; emphasis in the original).

Part of the objective of this chapter is to apply my adapted version of Leerssen’s model of nationalism as the “cultivation of culture” (represented in Table 3.5, and below again in Table 5.1) to the life of Afrikaner nationalism, including its post-apartheid life. As will be recalled, I proposed that institutionalisation / official recognition and maintenance / preservation should be added to the three types of cultural activism identified by Leerssen, namely salvage / retrieval / inventory, fresh cultural production and propagation / proclamation in the public sphere. The citations above confirm the need for such a modification to the original model, especially if one seeks to apply it to the Afrikaner case. To Johannes Brill, “a [standardised] language of our own, one day even our own South African literature” was not an aim in itself; on the contrary, these goals were of secondary importance to the official recognition of Afrikaans. As Brill interpreted the causality between (what Leerssen would call) cultural and political
nationalism, the former would not lead to the latter. He believed that the political and territorial unification of Afrikaners – or at least a nationalist movement towards unity and independence – was a prerequisite for the successful cultivation of Afrikaans. As this chapter attempts to systematise the intentions and achievements of the Afrikanerdom’s extra-parliamentary agents by mapping the specificities of Afrikaner nationalism onto Table 5.1, it will become clear that Brill’s approach represented the rule rather than the exception among Afrikaans language activists. From the outset, there was nothing “purely cultural” about the cultivation of language and culture.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Cultural Activism</th>
<th>Associated with Oppositional Nationalism</th>
<th>Associated with State Nationalism</th>
<th>Associated with Post-power Oppositional Nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salvage, Retrieval, Inventory</strong></td>
<td>Fresh Cultural Production</td>
<td>Propagation/Proclamation in the Public Sphere</td>
<td>Institutionalisation/Official Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corpus planning: standardisation, codification, etc.</td>
<td>Corpus planning: grammars, dictionaries, etc.</td>
<td>Corpus planning: modernisation, renovation, etc. Dissemination of linguistic norms Status planning: spread across public domains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Editions of older literary and historical texts</td>
<td>Translations/adaptations (Bible, classics) National/historical poetry, drama, novels National history-writing</td>
<td>Literature and history in education Literary awards and prizes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Culture</td>
<td>Archeography</td>
<td>Restoration Musealisation Historicist architecture</td>
<td>Dedicatory investment of public space: monuments, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Culture</td>
<td>Folklore studies: oral literature, folk music and dances, manners and customs</td>
<td>Folklore Revival</td>
<td>Folk pageantry: festivals and similar events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 The interaction between culture and politics in nationalism: skeleton of a model for the Afrikaner case
Outside parliament, the story of Afrikaner nationalism is largely a story of political activists establishing *taal- en kultuurorganisasies* [language and culture organisations]. Three months after Johannes Brill had delivered his speech, on 14 August 1875, it happened for the first time when eight men – six of them younger than thirty – met at a private house in Paarl, a town some 35 miles northeast of Cape Town. They were invited by Stephanus Jacobus (better known by his initials as “S.J.”) du Toit (1847–1911) – a twenty-eight year old minister in the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC).

In July of the previous year, under the pseudonym *Ware Afrikaner* [True Afrikaner], Du Toit contributed a series of three articles on the topic of *De Afrikaansche taal* [The Afrikaans language] to *De Zuid-Afrikaan*. His concern was the anglicisation of his people. Writing in Dutch, he condemned not only the language policies and practices of the colonial authorities at the Cape, but also Afrikaans-speakers’ poor evaluation of their own language. Such anti-Afrikaans attitudes, Du Toit warned, advanced the cause of anglicisation as it was beyond the powers of Dutch to survive the English tide. “Can you not see where we are heading?”, he asked the Cape Dutch (whom he regarded as part of the Afrikaner nation) and urged them to wake up before it was too late (Nienaber 1975:190–193).

What prompted Du Toit to call the meeting, though, was a tentative offer by the British and Foreign Bible Society (BFBS) to publish the bible in Afrikaans. For three years, one of the invitees, the Dutch-born Casper Peter Hoogenhout (1843–1922), had been propagating the idea of an Afrikaans bible along with his countryman, friend and mentor, Arnoldes Pannevis (1838–1884). Appealing to “reasonable Afrikaans Christians who were committed to the expansion of God’s Kingdom”, Pannevis provoked a debate in *De Zuid-Afrikaan* when he defended an Afrikaans translation of the bible on the basis that it would benefit the “coloured population” whose “only access to knowledge of God’s Word was through a half-strange and poorly understood language” (quoted in Nienaber 1975:116). Hoogenhout pointed out that the Dutch bible was equally inaccessible to a significant section of the Cape Colony’s white community. To him, it was a
matter not only of Christianisation but also of education, and, ultimately, of economic empowerment. In a letter to *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, he took Pannevis’s argument further: “[i]f there were a bible and other books in the Afrikaans language”, Hoogenhout wrote, “a poor Afrikaner would be able to learn more in six months than he can now learn in six years” (quoted in Du Plessis 1986:41).

Suiting the action to the word, Hoogenhout tried his hand at bible translation and sent an Afrikaans version of Matthew 28 to the mouthpiece of the DRC, *De Kerkbode* [The Church Herald], where it ended up in the wastepaper basket. Pannevis, for his part, decided to go through the official channels and wrote to the BFBS in November 1874. While London was not at all keen to “perpetuate corrupted languages by printing the bible in them” (Nienaber 1975:115), the BFBS’s secretary in Cape Town, the Reverend Geo Morgan, was more sympathetic and approached Du Toit, whom Pannevis had recommended as translator. Du Toit indicated that he knew a few men who would be supportive and promised to take the matter up with them.

It was, then, as champions of an Afrikaans bible that A. Ahrbeck, S.J.’s brother D.F. du Toit (nicknamed Uncle Locomotive), another D.F. du Toit, S.G. du Toit, C.P. Hoogenhout, G.J. Malherbe and P.J. Malherbe – “a closely knit group of teachers and clerics from wine farming backgrounds in and around Paarl” (Hofmeyr 1987:97) – were invited to the mid-August meeting. Yet at that very occasion they revealed themselves as champions of a much worldlier cause. The time was not ripe for bible translation, it was decided. The argument, as Nienaber explains, was that speakers of Afrikaans – or, more accurately, white speakers of Afrikaans – did not recognise the language as theirs and had far too little respect for it to embrace it as a language of religion (1975:125). To be worthy of respect, Afrikaans had to be standardised. Before the language could have a bible it needed a dictionary and a grammar book. The important point, though, is that the meeting regarded an Afrikaans translation of the bible as but one of the fruits that language standardisation would bear. Even more sweet would be the fruit of an Afrikaans “commonly recognised in all respects as the *volkstaal* [national language] of our country” (manifesto of the GRA 1909:71–76).
This position of the Paarl meeting on the issue of bible translation was at odds with that of Pannevis, who was rather pessimistic about the survival prospects of Afrikaans, at least at the time when he wrote to the BFBS. In his letter, Pannevis complained that “civil and church authorities [were] conspiring to exterminate the remains of the Dutch language completely in order to ensure the absolute and universal reign of the English language”, yet he apparently accepted that they would probably succeed and that “all the inhabitants of South Africa [would] eventually use and understand only the English language” (quoted in Nienaber 1975:121). But until such time, Pannevis told the BFBS, the lack of an Afrikaans translation of the bible was a “fearful prospect” as it would remain “one of the causes of degradation [...] among the colonists, especially the coloured population” (quoted in Nienaber 1975:121–122). To the meeting of eight men, by contrast, the idea of an anglicised South Africa was a prospect far more fearful than a South Africa temporarily without an Afrikaans bible. They did not share Pannevis’s defeatism about the future of Afrikaans, and if they shared his concern about “the spiritual welfare of the coloured population” (quoted in Nienaber 1975:116) it did not prevent them from founding an organisation from which coloured speakers of Afrikaans were excluded.

The Genootskap fan Regte Afrikaanders [Fellowship of True Afrikaners] (GRA) that came into being on that August afternoon in Paarl had a racially exclusivist nationalist agenda. Its objective, formulated a month later at its second meeting (attended by some forty new members), was to “to stand for our language, our nation, and our land”. It went without saying that the nation was a white one. As for the definition of the land, we only need consider the emblem of the GRA (cf. Figure 5.1).

Image removed for copyright reasons

**Figure 5.1** Emblem of the GRA

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Joined at the bottom by a diamond, a bowed vine-shoot (on the left) and a bowed ear of corn (on the right) encircle four farm animals, two flags and, in the centre, three symbols of faith and one of love: a bible, a cross, an anchor and a heart. The slogan at the top reads: “VERENIGDE SUID AFRIKA” [UNITED SOUTH AFRICA], “Ver Moedertaal en Vaderland” [For Mother Tongue and Fatherland], while the wording on the flags identifies the constituent parts of the as yet to be united fatherland: the colonies of the Cape and Natal, and the republics of the Free State and Transvaal. The GRA’s dream was a political one; what the organisation ultimately wanted to see, said the designer of the emblem, G.R. von Wielligh, was the four South African “states” under one flag (Meiring 1949:21). It was a dream reminiscent of Arndt’s vision expressed in his song of 1813 (“Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?”) to see the whole of Germany united “[a]s far as the German tongue rings out and praises God with songs!” (Düding 1987:30).

It should be borne in mind that when the GRA members vowed to stand for their language, their nation, and their land the position of that language was not the same as the position of Hebrew, for example, when Eliezer Ben-Yehuda committed himself to “the renaissance of the Jewish people, their land, and their language” 222. In fact, the challenges facing Ben-Yehuda and the GRA were exactly the opposite of each other. When Ben-Yehuda left Russia in 1878 to settle in Palestine and lead the revival of the Hebrew language, there was an ancient written tradition to which he could resort. The trouble was that nobody spoke the language. Afrikaans, by contrast, was widely spoken by 1875 but, lacking a standard orthography, it was hardly a written language and it had no literature to speak of (at least not in the Latin alphabet – cf. section 4.3.2) To the GRA, this was no reason why Afrikaans could not be their organisation’s language of record. Article IV of the “Rules and Regulations of the Genootskap fan Regte Afrikaanders” (GRA 1909:64–68) stipulated that

At all our meetings and in all official documents the Afrikaans language must be used.

A guiding principle for anyone who wished to use Afrikaans in writing had already been laid down in 1874 in contributions to *De Zuid-Afrikaan* by S.J. du Toit and C.P. Hoogenhout. It was a simple one: write as you speak (Nienaber 1975:119). Before long, the GRA now promised, normative sources of reference would be available. In Article XIV of its “Rules and Regulations”, the Fellowship undertook to publish a dictionary and a grammar as soon as possible along with other little school booklets.

Intention soon translated into action or, more precisely, Afrikaans language activism. The political hopes of Afrikanerdom’s pioneering language activists, as sketched above, belie Leerssen’s claim that nationalism is *always* born as a purely cultural movement (2006:562). But regardless of their ultimate aspirations, the initiatives of the GRA men in the fields of language, discourse, material culture and performance culture mirrored those of their European counterparts and fit comfortably into the model represented in Table 5.1. Already at its founding meeting, the Fellowship identified an existing Afrikaans grammar for revision and those present were requested to compile lists of “pure” Afrikaans words. The immediate aim, in terms of the Leerssen model, was to salvage or inventorise Afrikaans. Within a year, *Di eerste beginsels fan di Afrikaanse taal* [The first principles of the Afrikaans language] appeared in book form – a typical example of productivity in the field of language.

What is noteworthy, however, is that the publication of a dictionary, a grammar and “little school booklets” was not the GRA’s priority. Our first task, reads Article XII of the “Rules and Regulations”, will be to publish a monthly newspaper called *Die Afrikaanse Patriot* [The Afrikaans Patriot]. The thinking, one can assume, was that an Afrikaans-language newspaper could do almost all

223 Henceforth, *Die Patriot*. 

227
that lists of spelling and grammar rules could do and more. Die Patriot would disseminate linguistics norms (form) as it was disseminating its patriotic message (content); an instrument of linguistic standardisation would be at the same an instrument of nationalist mobilisation.

The second meeting of the GRA (held on 25 September 1875) elected an editorial team for Die Patriot and on 15 January 1876, the first edition of the paper appeared with S.J. du Toit as editor. During the following year, Du Toit published a textbook example of what Leerssen calls national history-writing: a booklet entitled Di geskiedenis fan ons land in di taal fan ons volk [The history of our country in the language of our nation]. This “history of the Afrikaner in Afrikaans” was complemented in Die Patriot by “poems” – many by Hoogenhout – on the topic of “fatherland and mother tongue” (Nienaber 1975:24). Together with Pannevis and the Du Toit brothers, Hoogenhout was also responsible for the first (unofficial) Afrikaanse folksliid [Afrikaans national anthem]:

Each and every nation has its LAND,
We dwell on Afrikaans strand.
To us there is no better soil
Anywhere in the whole wide world.
Proud we are to carry the name
Children of South Africa.

Each and every nation has its LANGUAGE,
We speak from the Cape to the Transvaal
A language that everyone can easily understand,
What do we care about the other languages?
We speak like Dad and Granddaddy,
The language of South Africa.

[...]

For all the nations have one God.
He determines the destiny of every volk;
He determined the language of every volk,
its land, its law, its time.
Who disbelieves this will bear His punishment.
O God, protect South Africa!
(Brink (ed.) 2000:7).

Hoogenhout’s second attempt to create an anthem for the Afrikaner volk was a solo one. Entitled Ons toekomstige folklied [Our future national anthem], the lyrical poem envisions a united nation living in a united country that stretches, like the one in the original anthem, from Table Mountain to the Transvaal. Again, language is the concern of the second stanza after land has been dealt with in the opening stanza:

The Afrikaans language, it sounds so sweet to us;
It is our mother-tongue – sits in our marrow and blood;
For no other tongue, however beautiful, do we give it up,
For it we suffered scorn, insult and mockery
(Brink (ed.) 2000:8).

In the field of discourse, then, as in the field of language, GRA activism fits into Leerssen’s categories. There were hardly any old Afrikaans texts to salvage (though later activists would discover a few – cf. Table 5.2b below), but a considerable body of “literary” and “historical” texts (read: nationalist propaganda) were freshly produced by D.F. du Toit and Co – a firm established by S.J.’s brother which also published Die Patriot. And notwithstanding the GRA’s decision to put the project on hold, S.J. du Toit spent much of his time doing what first-generation nationalists typically did, at least in Europe.224 His was the earliest significant attempt to translate the bible into Afrikaans.

Following Leerssen, one may conclude that S.J. du Toit and his followers were late-coming “relay stations in a spreading cultural movement” (2006:566) or, to be more accurate, a cultural-cum-political movement. What certainly had spread to southern African shores by 1875, as is clear from the poetry quoted above, was that basic Herderian principle that lay at the heart of virtually all historical cases

224 According to Leerssen (2006:570), bible translation was normally the first sign that a vernacular language was aspiring to literary prestige.
of ethnic nationalism in the Judeo-Christian world: that God created languages to
differentiate between nations. Roughly a third of the manifesto of the GRA
(1909:71–76)\(^{225}\) was dedicated to the promotion of this idea:

OUR DEAR LORD put different nations on the earth and gave each nation its
language. Because of the sins of man, our Dear Lord separated the *volke* and
confused the languages at the tower of Babel (Genesis 11). And this institution has
always been respected and reinforced by God himself. Just think about the Day of
the Pentecost (Acts 2:5–12). God could have made his will known in one language,
in the language that all people had spoken before the confusion (Genesis 11:1) [...] –
But no, through the Holy Ghost our Dear Lord let ‘divided tongues’ sit on the heads
of his disciples: ‘tongues’, to preach God’s will; ‘divided tongues’, to do so in all the
languages. It was therefore indeed according to the will of God that ‘Parthians and
Medes and Elamites’ etc. had to call out, ‘we hear them speak, each in our own
language in which we were born’.

Quoting from the book of Revelations, the authors of the manifesto went on to
argue that “even in heaven, before the throne of God, the variety of *volke* and
languages are recognised” – all in an attempt to persuade potential Afrikaners “to
acknowledge along with us that the Afrikaans language is our mother tongue that
the Dear Lord gave us”.

Had the appeal to Afrikaners-to-be ended here, one could have made a case that
the GRA project was one of cultural consciousness raising for the sake of cultural
consciousness raising – a manifestation of purely cultural nationalism. Yet
Afrikaners were called upon not only to embrace Afrikaans as their language and
to see themselves on that basis as a nation, but also to stand for their language
“through thick and thin” (GRA 1909:76) and not to rest before it was – to use one
of the terms that I introduced into the Leerssen model – *institutionalised*. Right
from the start, the demand was that Afrikaans – or at least, initially, Dutch –
should be used in the Cape Colony’s schools, churches and courts of law. Most
importantly, Afrikaans/Dutch had to become a language of parliament.

\(^{225}\) First published in pamphlet form as an open letter to Afrikaners, then in *De Zuid-Afrikaan*,
and finally in the first edition of *Die Patriot* (Nienaber 1974:3).
As the GRA manifesto represented the state of affairs at the Cape, the English authorities “have done everything in their power to disregard our language and to supplant it by importing their language”. In a protest that echoed the well-known Hoogenhout poem on anglicisation (cf. section 4.4), the manifesto drew attention to the colony’s language policy:

Look at OUR parliament: the assembly of our country must be conducted in THEIR language [...] Look at OUR courts of law: there, too, they have imported THEIR language [...] And how are things going in OUR schools? Even worse. Their rules stipulate that the ENGLISH language [...] is the language of tuition (GRA1909:73; emphasis in the original).

The programme of anglicisation was threatening not only the Afrikaner identity but also Afrikaner interests, and the leading members of the GRA made no attempt to conceal this concern of theirs. “We must stand in our own courts of law”, complained their manifesto, “like strangers while being accused and convicted in a strange language that we do not understand.”

In “our” schools “our” children have become parrots: “they must learn a strange language so that they can be taught further in that language”. And, last but not least,

we cannot send the Fathers of our country [to parliament] because they know no English. Now only strangers, merchants, fortune seekers and all such kinds of people are going there only because they can speak a bit of English; and they are utterly incapable of looking after our interests (GRA1909:73–74).

It should be borne in mind that the Afrikaans-speaking section of the Cape’s electorate had had the numerical advantage over English-speakers ever since representative government was granted to the Colony in 1853. The problem, according to J.H. (Onze Jan) Hofmeyr, who in the 1880s would become the political leader of the Cape Dutch, was that “[i]f it comes to the election of a parliamentary representative... then the influential [community leader] felt that he ought not offer himself as a candidate because he could speak no English” (quoted in Giliomee 2003:203). Afrikaner nationalist linguist and historian P.J. Nienaber

226 The manifesto added: “And even if the judge knows our language, he must pretend that he does not, and we must rely on an interpreter” (GRA 1909:73–74).
explained it as follows: “the Boer, who was on one hand not used to having a voice in national affairs, was on the other hand not attracted to politics for understandable reasons, among which the language issue was paramount” (Nienaber 1975:2). This could not continue, felt the GRA, hence its “aim and aspiration”, as Von Wielligh phrased it, “to have Afrikaans recognised as a language of South Africa: then Afrikaners can go to parliament to fight for our legitimate rights and our share in the government of our country” (quoted in Meiring 1949:21–22). GRA Activism in the field of language was, ultimately, political activism.

To claim, then, as Davenport did in his study of 1966, that the GRA “paid next to no attention to the question of political organization [...] but its nature was such that it could, without incongruity, step into the political arena at any time” (p. 50) is perhaps to underemphasise the Fellowship’s desire to change the political status quo and its labours in the “cultural” arena toward that aim. Linguistic and cultural nationalism did not follow “a separate dynamic and chronology from political nationalism” (Leerssen 2006:559); from the outset, linguistic and cultural nationalism was political nationalism. The GRA men shared Brill’s dream of Afrikaners producing “the finest fruits on the terrain of language and literature”; in fact, they made a start at that production. But part and parcel of the dream of “an own language and one day, perhaps, an own literature” was the dream of an “own independent national existence” (Brill quoted in Nienaber 1975:102) – a united Afrikaans-speaking South Africa and a government of co-nationals.

The GRA faded away before it could step into the party-political arena, but its founding fathers eventually did. In 1880, S.J. du Toit established the Afrikanerbond and Die Patriot (then under editorship of his brother) became the mouthpiece of the Cape Colony’s new political party (Du Plessis 1986:91; Nienaber 1975:196). By the following year, the newspaper, which started with fifty subscribers in 1876, was the second biggest “Dutch” paper in the Cape with sales reaching 3,700 (Davenport 1966:34). As Hofmeyr argues, it must have been the Colony’s Afrikaans-speaking petty bourgeoisie who preferred Die Patriot (where they first saw the language they spoke in print) to De Zuid-Afrikaan.
(which continued to use “proper” Dutch). The populist programme of the Afrikanerbond, says Hofmeyr, to which *Die Patriot* gave some cultural and historical content, would have appealed to “the legion of dubiously certificated teachers, the clerics in poor parishes, faced with having their state stipends removed and small shopkeepers and traders” (1987:97–98). In language activism, these men (and perhaps a woman or two) on the margins “must have glimpsed a partial solution to their clogged careerist mobility” (1987:106). Language activism was economic activism.

According to Du Toit, shopkeepers had an important role to play in the language movement:

> Just one thing, the Boer shops must be exclusively Dutch or Afrikaans. No English signboards; no English advertisements in English newspapers; no English bookkeepers; no English accounts; everything Dutch or Afrikaans. Just as the English shops help to sustain English newspapers, English schools and an English community in the towns, our Boer shops must work in the opposite direction and prevent the English element from controlling the towns; they must protect the Afrikaner spirit in the towns against the English (quoted in Du Plessis 1986:54).

If we map these demands onto Table 5.1, some belong in the block where *language* and *propagation* intersect: Du Toit wanted to see the spread of Afrikaans/Dutch as a language of commerce. The call for Afrikaans/Dutch signage, however, constituted *propagation* in the field of *material culture*. In Leerssen’s European examples, the latter process aimed to “suffuse the public sphere with a sense of collective national identity”:

> Historical monuments proclaim the nation’s rootedness and presence. Historicist architecture (neo-Gothic or otherwise) is used; newly built streets are given dedicatory names taken from the nation’s past (2006:571).

To phrase it differently, propagation in the field of material culture entailed the “dedicatory investment of public space” (Leerssen 2006:571). It also must have entailed the *linguistic* investment of public space. It certainly did in the case at
hand. The visibility of the Afrikaans/Dutch language on public and commercial signs in a town,\textsuperscript{227} as Du Toit interpreted it, was a reflection of the Afrikaner spirit of that town; non-visibility of Afrikaans/Dutch meant that the town was an English one, with an English spirit.

The point that I am trying to make is this: language (as has been pointed out more than once) is both an instrument of communication and a symbol, and material culture, as the term is used in Leerssen’s model, refers to both artefacts (“painting, sculpture, antiquities, monuments, architecture”) and symbols (“flags and heraldry” – Leersen 2006:569). While the promotion of a language as a medium of communication constitutes cultural activism in the field of language, I would argue that its promotion as a visible symbol (comparable to a monument or a flag) constitutes cultural activism in the field of material culture. The promotion of a language as a communication instrument (activism in the field of language), as we have seen, may be part and parcel of a quest for political and economic power. What is at stake when language visibility is promoted (activism in the field of material culture) is cultural power or “symbolic articulation and presence” (Schöpflin 2000:8).

Significant accomplishments by the first Afrikaner nationalists in the fields of material culture and performance culture only followed after the GRA had met for the last time in January 1878. A lesser-known story that merits to be retold here is that of the first Afrikaans language monument and the first Afrikaans language festival (Nienaber 1975:1–3). It began in 1882, when the use of Dutch was finally allowed in the Cape parliament, following a campaign led by Onze Jan Hofmeyr. The occasion, Hofmeyr and S.J. du Toit decided, called for a monument. Funds were raised and a life-size female statue was ordered from Italy and brought to Burgersdorp in the district of Albert, where many of the supporters of Hofmeyr’s campaign resided. There, on a three-metre-high pedestal, the white marble figure was erected as a symbol of the mother tongue. The latter was identified on the inscription as “the Dutch language”, yet on the basis of Du Toit’s

\textsuperscript{227} In other words, an Afrikaans/Dutch linguistic landscape. Cf. footnote 153.
involvement alone, it is reasonable to assume that the term was understood to include Afrikaans (cf. also footnote 165).

The female statue was only unveiled on 17 January 1893 during celebrations which assumed, ironically, a male and militarist character:

The festival lasted quite a few days and took on a national character. From all corners of the country, festival-goers streamed into Burgersdorp. The two most prominent champions of the Dutch language, Onze Jan and the Reverend S.J. du Toit, were there. A mounted commando of 500 burgers [literally: citizens] drove out to meet Onze Jan; leading the commando he entered the town. Two salvos, fired in his honour, were followed by a speech. The Reverend Du Toit was also honoured in a speech: he was hailed for his part in the victory, and especially for the support he had offered through his paper, Die Afrikaanse Patriot [...] Impressive was the arms exhibition in which 500 burgers participated [...] The unveiling of the monument [...] was the climax of the festival. Silence prevailed as telegrams from President Kruger of the Transvaal and President Reitz of the Free State were read [...] The Reverend S.J. du Toit presented the keynote lecture. Referring to the monument, he declared: ‘It is a national altar where we pledge our loyalty to the language. It is an image of future greatness. Like the marble of the statue, the language is solid. The statue will melt before the Dutch language will disappear from South Africa.’

The festival was concluded that night with a huge banquet, during which Onze Jan proposed a toast to the Dutch language (Nienaber 1975:2–3).

Marble may not melt, but many a nationalist monument has been destroyed in other ways. So it was in the case of the first Afrikaans language monument. After it had been vandalised and eventually toppled during the Anglo-Boer War by “enemies of the Boers and their language” (Nienaber 1975:3), Alfred Milner ordered that the site should be cleaned up. In the wake of the war, the inhabitants of Burgersdorp demanded an exact replica of their white marble woman from Britain, who replaced it. The statue was re-erected on the old spot, along with the vandalised one and a Boer War monument (cf. Figure 5.2), and unveiled on 28 May 1907 during “the second language festival in our country” (Nienaber 1975:4). Among the dignitaries this time were General J.B.M. Hertzog and former
Free State president M.T. Steyn. One of the public lectures at the second language festival – Advocate F.S. Malan’s reply to the Reverend D. Postma’s toast to Onze Taal [Our Language] – was entitled, “Of what use is it to talk about language rights if nothing practical is accomplished?” (Nienaber 1975:4). In the course of the following two years, as will be recalled (cf. section 1.1), Hertzog and Steyn would lead a successful lobby for the recognition of Dutch as a co-official language of the Union of South Africa, accomplishing something practical. These men, however, belonged to a new generation of language activists – the Second Afrikaans Language Movement, to which I turn in the next section.

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Figure 5.2 The Language Monument at Burgersdorp

5.1.2 The post-Boer War language and cultural movement

The GRA barely survived three years, but the broader language and cultural movement did not lose momentum when the organisation disintegrated, as noted above, early in 1878. For the following decade, S.J. du Toit in particular remained committed to the cultural, political and economic empowerment of Afrikaans and its speakers. By the 1890s, however, efforts to promote Afrikaans seemed to have fizzled out as Giliomee (2004:29) recounts: the Afrikaans/Dutch-speaking Cape elite preferred Dutch as the language of their church and newspapers and used English in the letters and diaries they wrote. Afrikaans, observers believed, stood no chance of surviving.

But then came the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) and, in its aftermath, the modernisation and anglicisation programme of Alfred Milner. The latter played a key role in the events that led to the war. An “ardent imperialist and a doctrinaire social engineer” (Saunders and Southey 1998:113), his bold ambition was to “turn South Africa into a modern capitalist state with Johannesburg as its economic heart, and begin the process of sweeping away pre-modern black and Boer

pastoralism” (Louw 2004b:8). As far as Milner was concerned, Dutch and Afrikaans belonged the pre-modern era. His language-in-education policy for the conquered Boer republics was simple: “Dutch should only be used to teach English, and English to teach everything else” (quoted in Davenport and Saunders 2000:239). This was a crucial part of his nation-building project which, as Louw sums it up (2004b:19, quoting Pyrah), aimed to create one nation out of the “two white races” of South Africa by assimilating “backward Boers” into “progressive British” culture. The effect was quite the opposite: anglicisation contributed to the shaping of a distinct Afrikaner identity and provided the catalyst to the development of the Second Afrikaans Language Movement.

Unlike the first one, the second movement was a truly trans-colonial – or, as those involved would have viewed it, national – movement.229 This time, the Transvaal Colony and the Orange River Colony (as the former Boer republics had been renamed) took the lead when their representatives founded Die Afrikaanse Taalgenootskap [The Afrikaans Language Society] (ATG) in Pretoria on 13 December 1905. In November of the following year, a meeting in Cape Town led to the establishment of Die Afrikaanse Taalvereniging [The Afrikaans Language Association] (ATV). A Bloemfontein branch of the ATG was created early in 1907 (cf. Pienaar 1920:29–47).

These organisations fought a battle on two fronts. The intensified struggle against English was complicated by an internal struggle between Afrikaans speakers who propagated Dutch as the national language, and those who agreed with D.F. Malan when he said in 1908:

> Raise the Afrikaans language to a written language, make her the bearer of our culture, our history, our national ideals, and in that way you will also raise the volk who speak the language (included in Malan 1964:175).

229 To say this is not to suggest that the First Afrikaans Language Movement was exclusively a Cape Dutch initiative. We only need consider Brill’s Bloemfontein speech and Hoogenhout’s reaction to it: “I would say we can count on [Brill’s] cooperation. Our helpers increase by the day [...] many who have been quick to attack Afrikaans, are now heart and soul for it” (quoted in Nienaber 1975:85).
The Afrikaans-Dutch part of the battle was a war of words, which Onze Jan Hofmeyr started in March 1905 with a talk he gave at Stellenbosch. Titled “Is het ons ernst?” [Are we serious about it?], the speech advocated Dutch as the official and cultural language of South Africa. Within a month, the Pretoria-based journalist, Gustav Preller, responded with a series of fifteen newspaper articles under the heading “Laat ’t ons toch ernst wezen!” [Let us be serious about it!]. The interests of Dutch, Preller argued, should not be protected to the detriment of Afrikaans. The battleground shifted back to the Cape Colony in October 1906 when the twenty-five-year-old D.F. Malherbe, who had just returned from Germany with a doctorate in linguistics, asked the following question in a public lecture: Is Afrikaans a dialect? Speaking in Afrikaans, Malherbe delivered a powerful plea for the cultivation of the language. There was a rebuttal from the Dutch lobby but, as Frits Ponelis (1998:50) sums it up, the latter was being outsmarted by the intellectually more sophisticated Afrikaans lobby. During 1909, both sides were united in the Zuid-Afrikaansche Akademie voor Taal, Letteren en Kunst [South African Academy for Language, Literature and the Arts]. For the time being, the working language of the Academy would be Dutch, just like the co-official language of the Union of South Africa would be Dutch rather than Afrikaans, but Dutch was on its way out.

A cursory glance of the constitutions of the ATG and the ATV (as reproduced in Pienaar 1920:30–31; 41–42) reveals there to be significant resemblances between their projects and that of the GRA. Activism in the post-Boer War language movement was also primarily aimed at the “national awakening” of Afrikaners and at the cultivation and institutionalisation of their language. While I would not go as far as Du Plessis (1986:39, 69), who claims that the role of the ATG and the ATV in the rise of the Afrikaner nationalist movement was negligible compared to that of the National Party, it is true that the prominent members of the ATG and ATV made their significant contributions to the nationalist project in other

230 Henceforth, Academy. In 1940, the Academy merged with the Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Tegniek [Afrikaans Academy for Science and Technology] to become the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns [South African Academy for Science and the Arts].
capacities: J.B.M Hertzog (1866–1942) as the founder of the NP; Eugéne Marais (1871–1936) as poet and journalist; C.J. Langenhoven (1873–1932) as author and journalist, and as the politician who in 1914 successfully proposed that Afrikaans replaced Dutch as medium of tuition in primary schools; D.F. Malan (1874–1959) as newspaper editor and as the cabinet minister who saw the official recognition of Afrikaans through in 1925; and Gustav S. Preller (1875–1943) as the “historian” and filmmaker who almost single-handedly created the Afrikaner myth of origin.231

According to Giliomee (2003:367), Langenhoven was “[t]he man who did most to [demonstrate the truth of] the argument that the Afrikaners should use Afrikaans for all purposes”. Isabel Hofmeyr, in turn, seems to think that the contribution of Gustav Preller cannot be overemphasised. Preller’s mission, as Hofmeyr interprets it, was to “professionalise” Afrikaans in an attempt to enable its speakers to find occupational mobility on the basis of their linguistic skills (1987:104). Activism aimed at the propagation of Afrikaans in the public sphere and the professionalisation (or what I would call the institutionalisation) of the language constituted, once again, economic activism.

The institutionalisation of Afrikaans did not hinge entirely on the political success of the Afrikaner nationalist movement. Afrikaans would not become an official language of South Africa before two of Afrikanerdom’s most prominent language activists became prime minister (J.B.M. Hertzog) and minister of the interior, education and public health (D.F. Malan), respectively. However, by then (the mid-1920s), Afrikaans had already replaced Dutch as the medium of instruction in primary schools across the Union of South Africa. Afrikaans now boasted a growing collection of works of literary merit – the first of which had appeared even before the Academy could appoint a Taalkommissie [Language Commission] in 1914 to standardise the orthography of Afrikaans. In 1917, the Language Commission published the first edition of what was to become the ultimate

authority on Afrikaans: the Afrikaanse woordelys en spelreëls [Afrikaans word list and spelling rules]. Dutch newspapers and magazines were switching to Afrikaans. 1932 saw the first Supreme Court judgement being delivered in Afrikaans. When the Afrikaans translation of the bible was completed in 1933, some Afrikaner churches had already been using the language for a decade.

The Second Afrikaans Language Movement was successful. However, like its less successful predecessor, it was more than a language movement. Nationalist activists were cultivating (i.e., salvaging, producing, propagating and institutionalising) not only a language but also a literature and a history, as well as an “own” material culture and performance culture – all in an effort to create an Afrikaner nation and to empower its members. In the English-language literature, this process is best documented in Isabel Hofmeyr’s aforementioned contribution from 1987, titled “Building a nation from words: Afrikaans language, literature and ethnic identity, 1902–1924”. Hofmeyr explains the post-Boer war expansion of “the Afrikaans and literary industry” in Marxist-inspired terms: an ignorant proletariat was mobilised by a marginalised petty bourgeoisie (journalists, teachers, clerics, clerks and small farmers), who realised that the proletariat “could turn language and educational broking into a new professional avenue for [them]” (1987:103).

The process can also be explained in Gellnerian terms. As Gellner’s critics would have it, he assigned too strong a role to industrialisation as a source of nationalism. However, unlike those historical cases where industrialisation was not accompanied by nationalism and vice versa, the rise of Afrikaner nationalism supports Gellner’s thinking. South Africa’s mineral revolution – the discovery of diamonds and gold in 1867 and 1886, respectively – and the resultant shift in the country’s economic base away from agriculture proved to be fertile ground for the seed of Afrikaner nationalism.

Industrialisation per se did not produce Afrikaner nationalism, but it did contribute to mass and rapid Afrikaner urbanisation. The Boer War marked the beginning of the end of the Afrikaners’ agrarian age (which was soon to be
mythologised in nationalist literature, particularly in *plaasromans* [farm novels]).

Between 1890 and 1926, the proportion of urbanised white Afrikaans speakers grew from two or three percent to 41 percent. Ten years later, every second Afrikaner was living in a town or a city (Giliomee 2003:323). In the urban environment, work was semantic and required a shared high code. Both English and Dutch were available, but Afrikaans suited the purposes of Afrikaner nationalism – and particularly its efforts to mobilise the poor – best.

While she does not mention the work of Ernest Gellner, Karl Deutsch or Benedict Anderson, Hofmeyr’s argument supports those parts of their theories which attribute the rise of nationalism to industrialisation (Gellner), modern communication facilities (Deutsch) and print-capitalism (Anderson). Echoing Anderson, whose theory essentially holds that print-capitalism “made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves [...] in profoundly new ways” (1991:36), Hofmeyr points out that “nationalisms can find a broader popular resonance by entering into a communication network which unites previously divided communities and promotes a sense of commonality among citizens [read: potential members of a nation]” (1987:106).

It was in an attempt to promote a sense of commonality among white Afrikaans speakers – an attempt to make Afrikaners of them – that nationalists set up publications such as *Die Brandwag*, *De (later Die) Huisgenoot*, *Die Boerevrouw* and *Landbouweekblad* early in the twentieth century. Within the growing press infrastructure of the Union of South Africa, these magazines, like the newspapers and the novels in Anderson’s examples, “provided the technical means for ‘representing’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (Anderson 1991:25; emphasis in the original). Hofmeyr explains:

The pages of *Die Brandwag* and *Die Huisgenoot*, for example, carried articles, advertisements, pictures and stories which took every imaginable phenomenon of people’s worlds, and then repackaged all these phenomena as “Afrikaans”. A brief list would include food, architecture, interior decoration, dress, etiquette, health, humour, landscape, monuments, the plastic arts, music, handicrafts, transport, agriculture, nature study and so on. For the readers of these articles, what had
previously been furniture became “Afrikaans” furniture and what had been a house became an “Afrikaans” house built in an Afrikaanse bouwstijl (an Afrikaans style of architecture) (1987:111).

This is but one example of what early Afrikaner nationalist activism entailed in the fields of material culture and performance culture: the invention of Afrikaner artefacts and Afrikaner traditions, manners and customs. During the 1910s and 1920s, as Hofmeyr (1987:108) points out, it also involved the establishment of debating societies, drama associations and reading circles. However, the men traditionally associated with the Second Afrikaans Language Movement are best known for their labours in the fields of language and discourse (literature and history production). In Table 5.2, their endeavours are mapped onto Table 5.1, along with other activist initiatives mentioned thus far in this section. Owing to constraints of space, these initiatives cannot be discussed in detail.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Cultural Activism</th>
<th>Field of Cultural Activism: Language</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salvage, retrieval, inventory</td>
<td>1914 Language Commission tasked by the Academy to standardise Afrikaans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fresh cultural production</td>
<td>1917 1st edition of the <em>Afrikaanse woordelys en spelreëls</em> [Afrikaans word list and spelling rules] published by the Language Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Propagation/Proclamation in the public sphere</td>
<td>1903 <em>De Goede Hoop</em> [The Good Hope] established (with Afrikaans contributions)</td>
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<td>Institutionalisation/Official recognition</td>
<td>1914 1st Afrikaans sermon in the Mother Church in Stellenbosch</td>
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<td>1914– Gradual introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of tuition in schools</td>
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<td>1925 Official status</td>
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<td>1930s–Universities of Stellenbosch, Potchefstroom, Pretoria and the Orange Free State “Afrikaansified”</td>
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<td>1932 1st supreme court judgment in Afrikaans</td>
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<p>| 1917 <em>Afrikaanse taalboek</em> [Afrikaans grammar book] published by D.F. Malherbe |
| 1923 <em>Oor die Afrikaanse sintaksis</em> [On Afrikaans syntax] published by J.J. le Roux |
| 1923 <em>Afrikaanse spraakkuns</em> [Afrikaans phonology] published by A.C. Bouman and E.C. Pienaar |
| 1924 <em>Afrikaanse spreekwoorde en verwante vorme</em> [Afrikaans proverbs and related forms] published by D.F. Malherbe |
| 1917 Journalists such as Eugène Marais and Gustav Preller start to use Afrikaans in newspapers |
| 1910 <em>Die Brandwag</em> [The Sentry] established |
| 1914 <em>Nasionale Pers</em> [National Press], publishing house for the NP, established |
| 1915 <em>De Burger</em> [The Citizen], organ of the NP, established (with Afrikaans contributions) |
| 1916 <em>De Huisgenoot</em> [The Family Companion] established |</p>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1918</td>
<td><em>Die Boerevrouw</em> [The Boer Woman] – 1st Afrikaans magazine for women established</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td><em>Landbouweekblad</em> [Agricultural Weekly] established</td>
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**through education**

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1914</td>
<td>Afrikaans introduced as a school subject</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Afrikaans introduced as a university subject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.2a Afrikaner nationalist activism in the field of language: 1914–1930s*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Cultural Activism</th>
<th>Field of Cultural Activism: Discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salvage, retrieval, inventory</strong></td>
<td>1917 Diary of Voortrekker leader Louis Trigardt published by Gustav Preller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918– Letters and diaries of Voortrekkers published in six parts by Preller as <strong>Voortrekker-mense</strong> [Voortrekker people]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905 “Winternag” [A winter’s night], poem by Eugéne Marais; “first significant demonstration of the creative potential of Afrikaans” (Giliomee 2003:366)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1906 Piet Retief, Preller’s biography of the Voortrekker leader, published</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1908 Poetry debut of Jan F.E. Celliers: <strong>Die vlakte en ander gedigte</strong> [The plain and other poems]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908 Poetry debut of Totius: <strong>By die monument</strong> [At the monument]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 Prose debut of C.J. Langenhoven: <strong>Stukkies en brokkies</strong> [Bits and pieces]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fresh Cultural Production</strong></td>
<td>1905 <strong>Example of a competition:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905 Short story competition announced in <em>De Volksstem</em> (1905/06/14). Theme: The Afrikaans life. Opening sentence of a story (titled: ‘The story of a nickname’) provided as an example: ‘We have a custom – a good old Afrikaans custom...’ (Hofmeyr 1987:121)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Propagation/Proclamation in the Public Sphere</strong></td>
<td><strong>Example of commemorations:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918– Afrikaner Broederbond promotes <em>volk</em> festivals and the commemoration of highlights in Afrikaner history such as the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck, the Battle of Blood River and the birthday of Paul Kruger (Stals 1998:22, 59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalisation/Official Recognition</strong></td>
<td>1914 Prestigious Hertzog Prize for Afrikaans literature (arguably an institution) introduced by the Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915 1st Hertzog Prize awarded to Totius for <strong>Trekkerswee</strong> [Trekkers’ woe]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Poetry debut of C. Louis Leipoldt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Novel debut of D.F. Malherbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Novel debut of M. Jansen-Pelissier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Preller produces the 1st Afrikaans film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Novel debut of Jochem van Bruggen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Doctoral thesis (Utrecht)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Fresh cultural production**

(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Drama debut of J.F.W. Grosskopf: <em>'n Esau</em> [An Esau]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>A “history” by S.P.E. Boshoff: <em>Volk en taal van Suid-Afrika</em> [Nation of language of South Africa]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Novel debut of Sangiro: <em>Uit oerwoud en vlakte</em> [Out of jungle and plains]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Doctoral thesis (Amsterdam) of P.C. Schoonees: <em>Die prosa van die Twede</em> [sic] <em>Afrikaanse Beweging</em> [The prose of the Second Afrikaans Movement]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>A “history” by Eric Stockenström: <em>Beknopte handboek in Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis</em> [Concise handbook of South African history]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fresh cultural production
(continued)

1924 A “history” by S.F.N. Gie: Geskiedenis vir Suid-Afrika – Deel I [History for South Africa – Part I]

1933 Afrikaans bible appears (delayed by Dutch opposition to Afrikaans as a language of religion)

Table 5.2b Afrikaner nationalist activism in the field of discourse: 1905–1933: Selected examples
The volumes of poetry listed in Table 5.2b under *fresh cultural production* took the Anglo-Boer War as dominant theme, thus transforming Afrikaans into what Malan had hoped it would become: the bearer of the volk’s history. In poems such as “Dis al” [That is all], “Vergeewe en vergeet” [Forgive and forget], and “Oom Gert vertel” [Uncle Gert’s story] – by Celliers, Totius, and Leipoldt respectively – the focus was on “Boer suffering and heroism” (Moodie 1975:41). The poetry debut of Totius – the pseudonym of S.J. du Toit’s son (who, like his father, was also a minister of the church and a bible translator) – merits special mention. The title, *By die monument* [At the monument], refers to the National Women’s Monument in Bloemfontein (cf. Figure 5.3), which represents the most significant achievement of Afrikaner nationalist activists in the field of *material culture* during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Built between 1911 and 1913, the monument commemorates the women and children who lost their lives during the Boer War (90 percent of them in concentration camps – Grobler 2012:16).

Image removed for copyright reasons

**Figure 5.2** The National Women’s Monument in Bloemfontein, with detail; the inscription (in Dutch) translates as follows: “To our heroines an beloved children”

The Boer War also featured prominently in the work of nationalist historians such as Boshoff, Stockenström and Gie. For a group of people to constitute a volk, however, a shared history of “suffering and heroism” that goes back further than a decade is necessary. A myth of origin is needed. Gustav Preller must have realised this when he dug up the Great Trek and started to write a series of articles on the Voortrekker leader Piet Retief, the first of which was published in *De Volkstem* early in December 1905. Within a year, the series appeared in book form. Nine

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233 To a lesser degree, the focus was also on Voortrekker suffering and heroism. Consider, as examples, *Verse van Potgieter’s Trek* [Poems on Potgieter’s Trek] (Totius 1909), *Trekkerswee* [Trekkers’ woe] (Totius 1915) and *Dingaansdag* [Dingane’s Day] (Leipoldt 1920).

234 Other examples include the statue of Onze Jan Hofmeyr in Cape Town (unveiled 1920).

editions were to follow and some 15,000 copies were eventually sold. Ten years after the publication of Piet Retief, Preller turned the story of the Great Trek into what can be regarded as the first Afrikaans film, titled De Voortrekkers (cf. Hofmeyr 1988).  

Before the 1880s, as Hofmeyr (1987:109–110) explains, the term Great Trek was not used to refer to the mass migration from the Cape Colony in the 1830s, which resulted in the establishment of the Boer republics. The white farmers who participated in the Trek were thought of as emigrants, not Voortrekkers. By the late 1820s, the Day of the Covenant, 16 December, was hardly observed in the Union of South Africa (Moodie 1975:97). On this day in 1838, the so-called Battle of Blood River was fought between the Zulu warriors of uDingane and the Voortrekkers. The latter won, and believed they owed their victory to God, with whom they had made a pact a few days earlier, vowing to commemorate the battle each year.

But then Afrikaners read Preller’s books and saw his movie, and they discovered their roots. They must have done so, for in 1938 they celebrated the centenary of the Great Trek in extravagant fashion, with an oxwagon procession that retraced the footsteps of the Voortrekkers, “calling at all the sacred sites along the way, and culminating in a great rally of people on a hill outside Pretoria where a monument was to be erected that would be Afrikanerdom’s most sacred shrine” (Sparks 1990:168). An estimated 100,000 people – roughly one-tenth of the white Afrikaans-speaking population of South Africa – attended the closing ceremony on 16 December 1938, when the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Monument was laid. Those Afrikaners who could not join the celebrations had the opportunity to meet the wagons en route in their home towns, where men had grown beards and women were wearing Voortrekker dresses that they had specially made for the occasion; where babies were christened “Eufeessia” (the English equivalent would be something like Centuriana); where streets were

236 It was a silent film, but the subtitles appeared both in English and Afrikaans. This marked the first use of Afrikaans in this manner.
renamed and monuments erected; where at night “folks would gather around the
campfires of the trekkers in their hundreds and thousands to sing traditional
Afrikaans liedjies (“folksongs”) and the old Dutch psalms” (Moodie 1975:180–181).

There was, however, nothing spontaneous about the symbolic oxwagon trek of
1938. It was, as Christoph Marx has demonstrated, “a well-organised event, which
was skilfully manipulated from behind the scenes by the Broederbond”
(2008:267). Before I return to the events of 1938, the origins of this now notorious
organisation must be revisited.

5.1.3 The Afrikaner Broederbond and the FAK, and the Oxwagon
Memorial Trek of 1838

The Afrikaner Broederbond was born in Johannesburg – the urban centre where
the “poor white problem” was most acute in the early twentieth century. Here, in
the city of gold, “[t]he Afrikaner professional stratum was much smaller in
relative terms than in Cape Town or Pretoria” (Giliomee 2003:400) and the
majority of semi-skilled and unskilled white workers were speakers of Afrikaans
(Stals 1998:11). One of them was Henning Klopper. He epitomised the new,
urbanised Afrikaner as described by Sparks:

[H]e was a product of the painful process of urbanisation. He had left the paternal
farm at the age of fifteen in the bleak years of Afrikaner discontent during World
War I and, clutching a Bible given to him by his mother, gone to Johannesburg to
join that haven of poor-whiteism, the railways (1990:167).

It was at a railway station that the idea of a secret organisation of young
Afrikaans-speaking men was born. On Sunday 14 April 1918, Klopper was on
duty at the Boksburg station. The previous evening he had attended a political
meeting at the Johannesburg city hall along with his friend and fellow junior
railway official, H.W. van der Merwe. The speaker was D.F. Malan – Cape leader
of the NP and editor of De Burger. Malan’s speech was blatant propaganda for a
republic. Only republicans were true Afrikaners, he claimed and told his audience
of about 1,500 people that Prime Minister Louis Botha and his deputy Jan Smuts
were not to be trusted with the Afrikaner ideal of independence from Britain (Stals 1998:12–13).

In 1918, Johannesburg was a dangerous place to express such sentiments and to remove the Union Jack, as Malan’s supporters had done prior to the meeting, from the stage of the city hall. The Allies were winning the war in Europe, but the bitter row between the SAP and the NP about South Africa’s participation on the side of Britain raged on. During the two hours that Malan was speaking, a hostile crowd of SAP men, many of them soldiers, gathered outside the hall. When the chairman adjourned the meeting, he warned the Nationalists that “the English” were waiting for them and Malan left through a side entrance. In front of the main entrance, violence broke out that soon spread to the NP club. The building was vandalised and furniture was set alight in the street. Following the event, De Burger expressed its sympathy with “our National friends in Johannesburg”, urging them to endure the onslaught as the day of reckoning would certainly come (Stals 1998:12–13; Wilkins and Strydom 1978:44).

But the friends in Johannesburg had plans of their own. Disturbed by what had happened on the Saturday night, Van der Merwe went to see Klopper the next morning at work. Organised Afrikaner action had become imperative, they agreed and decided to meet later to discuss the matter. That afternoon they were joined by yet another railways colleague, D.H.C. (Danie) du Plessis. The young men – all three still in their late teens – met up again towards the end of April 1918, this time at Cleveland station from where they took a walk. There, “on the open field, in moonlight”, as Van der Merwe noted in his diary, they contemplated their volkstoestand [the state of their nation] and made plans for the future (Stals 1998:14). These included, as a first step, the creation of the Afrikaner Broederbond or, as the organisation first called itself, Young South Africa.

The founding meeting took place on 5 June 1918. Fourteen men were invited. Klopper acted as chair and Du Plessis as secretary. Yet curiously, despite being elected to the management of the new organisation, the two friends did not see themselves as the leaders of the project they had initiated. Klopper told the
meeting that he had been in contact with the Reverend Jozua F. Naudé – a DRC minister whom he described as the “real leader of the movement” and as the ideal link to “the best brains in the country” (Stals 1998:15). In reality, the long-term goal of the founding members of the Broederbond – who at their second meeting elected the Reverend Naudé as their president – was to recruit “the best [Afrikaner] brains in the country” into the organisation. The Broeders had nothing less than a nation-wide network in mind: “Our terrain is vast,” said Naudé, “from Table Mountain to the far north; the influence of our association must be felt throughout South Africa” (Stals 1998:19).

Naudé’s words were prophetic ones, at least according to most latter-day commentators. Sixty years after they were uttered, Wilkins and Strydom would claim in an exposé that South Africans, black and white, were ruled by “the most exclusive and influential underground movement in the Western world”, the then 12,000-member-strong secret Afrikaner Broederbond (1978:1).

237 Father of the dissident DRC minister and anti-apartheid activist, Beyers Naudé (cf. footnote 73).

238 Much like a political party, the Afrikaner Broederbond had branches in the towns and cities of South Africa. Unlike a political party, though, the Bond’s doors were not open to everyone. On the contrary, the point of departure as reiterated at the organisation’s general meeting or national congress (Bondsraad) in 1970 was the that “the AB should remain a nucleus organisation, that a mass organisation is by no means envisaged, and that the high standards of membership should always be borne in mind”. The basic entrance requirements included being an Afrikaner “with a love for the Afrikaner cause” and a willingness to serve the Afrikaner volk, a Christian and a dedicated church-goer, a community leader with integrity and a respected professional. Taking also the degree of occupational diversity in its ranks into consideration, a branch could annually recruit one new member who had to be under the age of forty. The most important area of recruitment was the Bond’s youth league, the also secret Ruiterwag [literally: horse guard], whose members qualified for membership of the parent organisation in their early thirties. In the case of Ruiters [literally: riders] more than one new member per branch per year were allowed. For the sake of exclusivity and confidentiality, branches of the Broederbond should ideally have comprised no more than twenty men in urban areas and no more than fifteen in rural areas (AB 12/4, 1970).

Branches appointed representatives to a central committee and/or a regional council which respectively coordinated local activities (in urban areas with more than one branch) and regional activities. Each branch also sent one delegate to the national congress or Bondsraad which met almost every year between 1921 and 1972 and for the following two decades more or less every other year. Generally, regional conferences were held in years the Bondsraad did not sit. The executive authority of the Broederbond – the council and the chairman – were elected by the Bondsraad and supported by a secretariat based in Auckland Park, Johannesburg, in a building called Die Eike [The Oaks]. Members of the secretariat were the Broederbond’s only full-time, paid employees and included, ironically, a few women who were hired, among other things, to type all the secret documents. The
however, historians who dismiss such statements as hyperbole. Giliomee, for one, feels that “opponents of the Broederbond have attributed an importance to the organisation that is out of all proportion” (2003:420–421). What cannot be denied is that the Bond’s contribution to the consolidation and dissemination of the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism – both in its anti-imperial and its white racist manifestations – was significant. For what started out in 1918 as meetings in church halls of railwaymen, policemen and a DRC minister or two, who thought of their association as an Afrikaner version of the Freemasons or the Sons of England, was transformed within two decades into an organisation led by the ideologues not only of republicanism but also of apartheid – the concept that won the general election for the NP in 1948 (cf. section 2.2.3).239

From the outset, the Broeders’ primary concern was power – their own and their nation’s. The motto of the Broederbond through all seventy six years of its existence was, “Be strong”. Unsurprisingly, given that “[p]ower, in the modern

fifteen members of the council (or sometimes only the six members of its management committee) met as often as circumstances required but were not remunerated for their work (Stals 1998:741, 753–755; Wilkins and Strydom 1978:358–362). Decisions of the executive council and information about its activities were communicated via circulars which served at branch meetings. More than anything else these documents – each of which concluded with a specification of the date at which it had to be destroyed – contributed to coherence in the Broederbond or, as it was put at the 1970 Bondsraad, “served as a unifying factor for the whole organisation” (AB 12/4, 1970). Circulars typically dealt with “topical affairs”, as did the so-called study documents that were distributed from time to time. Study documents were produced by study committees which were asked to look into specific matters. Always on the agenda, however implicitly, were the twin concerns of ethnic nationalism: the preservation of the identity of the nation and the protection of its interests. For that was the raison d’être of the Broederbond: to ensure the continued existence of the Afrikaner volk with its own peculiar qualities and values and to promote Afrikaner interests (Stals 1998:57, 408).

In the four decades that followed the nationalist victory, virtually every NP member of the South African parliament and every cabinet minister belonged to the Bond. To imply then, as Giliomee does, that the Broederbond never governed South Africa is to understated the fact that between 1948 and 1994 virtually all power in the country was in the hands of Broederbonders: those men who, once a month, secretly met in their cells to debate a new piece of nationalist writing. In the morning they returned to work. As politicians, they translated Afrikaner nationalism into apartheid policy and as lawyers and civil servants they implemented that policy. As press barons, editors of Afrikaans-language newspapers, board members of the South African Broadcasting Corporation and ministers of the Afrikaans churches, their potential influence on public opinion – the power to govern the minds of Afrikaners – knew no bounds. Most importantly, as principals of universities and teachers training colleges, professors, provincial heads of education, school inspectors, headmasters and teachers they had every opportunity to “bend the will of the young to the will of the nation” (Kedourie 1985:84).
world, is principally about control of the state” (Breuilly 1993:1), all Broederbond activism was ultimately state-oriented. The Bond might have represented itself as a non-party political cultural organisation, but in reality it was an organisation of NP members (GNP members after 1934) who paid very little attention to “purely” cultural affairs (cf. Wilkins and Strydom 1978:445). To say this is not to suggest that cultural concerns were absent from the agenda. The Broeders dearly appreciated the power of culture as a key to obtaining – and, after 1948, maintaining – control of the state.

In a speech at the Bond’s founding meeting, Henning Klopper stressed the need for a body that could promote Afrikaner culture. Afrikaners, he said, had to be taught to be proud of the history and traditions of their volk; they had to be led to self-awareness (Stals 1998:15). In an attempt to achieve that goal, branch meetings of the young Broederbond would combine a lecture on a topic such as “the influence of language on the national character” with song and recitals in Afrikaans. The emphasis was on action at the local level. Every town that acquired a Broederbond branch also acquired one or another association – inspired by Broeders – which organised eisteddfods and similar events. Bond members further formed art associations and library committees – all, of course, to promote Afrikaner art, culture and literature. Last but not least, branches were expected to arrange and support volk festivals to commemorate highlights in Afrikaner history such as the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck, the Battle of Blood River and the birthday of Paul Kruger (Stals 1998:22, 59).

1928 saw the executive council of the Broederbond drawing up a “focussed, deliberate and consolidated plan of action to command more respect for Afrikaans” (Stals 1998:60), which had become a co-official language of the Union of South Africa three years earlier. In circular 2/28 of 19 July 1928 (AB 3/3/7) branches were asked to set up “vigilance committees” that could monitor language practices in the public sphere, and individual members were instructed to use Afrikaans in all written and oral communication with state departments, municipalities and school boards. Strangers, professionals and shop assistants had to be addressed in Afrikaans and not in English. In fact, according to the
Broederbond plan, Afrikaans speakers had to be discouraged from supporting English speakers when they chose a doctor, a dentist, a lawyer or a business. Of particular concern to the Bond leadership was the dominant position of English in the economy. Members of the organisation (and their wives and girlfriends), it was thought, could help to rectify the situation by placing orders in Afrikaans and insisting on invoices, catalogues and advertisements in their language. From banks they should demand Afrikaans cheque books and from the Receiver of Revenue Afrikaans income tax forms. If all else failed, English forms should be completed in Afrikaans.

The reasoning behind these appeals must have been identical to Hertzog’s line of thinking in 1916, when he explained in a speech how easy it was for Afrikaners to provide for one another at a material level:

Through speaking Afrikaans to civil servants and through standing on your language rights you make room for an Afrikaner in the civil service, through insisting on your child being educated in Afrikaans you make room for an Afrikaner teacher, through addressing a businessman in Afrikaans you make room for an Afrikaner assistant in his shop (quoted in Nienaber 1965:94; Giliomee’s translation (2003:372)).

The 1928 campaign set the tone for every other campaign that the Broederbond would launch in the field of language, including the promotion of Afrikaans as a legal language (circa 1932–1938) and the promotion of mother-tongue education for Afrikaners in single-medium schools (1934–). The aim of these endeavours was the “Afrikaansification” of public spaces or, at least, their transformation into Afrikaans-English bilingual ones. Put differently: the Bond wished to see Afrikaans institutionalised. Yet the Broeders must have sensed that the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner culture were also in need of cultivation at “lower” levels by organised activists who could operate in the open. To this end they established the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge [Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations] (FAK) in 1929 as their major front organisation. In 1944, a

240 Source: uninventorised archival material.
prominent Afrikaner nationalist historian, G.D. Scholtz, evaluated the work of the FAK during the first decade and half of its existence as follows:

It was the F.A.K. which was the first to urge that Afrikaans music examinations be set up; it was the F.A.K. which was the first to concern itself with the right of Afrikaner to equality on the radio; it was the F.A.K. which began to gather Afrikaans folksongs in a single volume; it was the F.A.K. which initiated the establishment of ‘Culture Days’; it was the F.A.K. which arranged Afrikaans art exhibitions and book weeks; it was the F.A.K. which first thought of the great centenary festivals of 1938; it was the F.A.K. which endeavoured in all possible ways to awaken concern for the People’s past in the Afrikaner; it was the F.A.K. which first strove for an Afrikaans national anthem (Scholtz quoted in Moodie 1975:109; Moodie’s translation).

This is hardly a complete picture of pre-apartheid FAK activism in the fields of language, discourse, material culture and performance culture, but the examples mentioned confirm the applicability of Leerssen’s model to the Afrikaner case. In one respect, it should be pointed out, Scholtz was mistaken. It was not FAK “which first thought of the great centenary festivals of 1938”. It was Henning Klopper. The founder chairman of the Broederbond “had long harboured the wish to trek in the footsteps of the forefathers” (Marx 2008:270). In 1937, soon after he was elected chairman of the Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging [Afrikaans Language and Culture Association] (ATKV) – an organisation established in 1930 by and for railway employees – Klopper proposed the memorial trek project to an ATKV congress (Moodie 1975:177). Soon afterwards, the FAK (and via the FAK the Broederbond) did come on board, as did the Voortrekker movement (est. 1931), Afrikanerdom’s imitation of the Boys Scouts and Girl Guides movement. One of the Voortrekkers who participated in the festivities of 1938 – first in her hometown of Paarl and later in Pretoria – was Elsa Joubert (cf. section 1.4 and footnote 43). In her diary, the sixteen-year-old described the arrival of the nine oxwagons, which crossed South Africa along 15 routes, at Monument Hill (as the future site of the Voortrekker Monument outside Pretoria was called):
14 December

Their hearts are singing again, their fatigue is forgotten, because look, in one corner of the festival terrain the crowd is parting, like the sea that Moses parted […] and the first oxwagon is coming through the tunnel of people like a mole (Joubert 2005:147–148).

This is followed in the diary by a description of the arrival of two torches – one from Cape Town and one from Umgungundlovu, the former seat of the Zulu king uDingane in what is today KwaZulu-Natal. “Literally every single member of the Voortrekker movement”, according to Jackie Grobler (2001:54), “was given the opportunity to carry one of the two torches for a part of the distance”, thus contributing to “the splendour of the occasion”:

We are leaving our camp [at Monument Hill] in rows of four […] The hills are moving, from the thousands of tents in this vast, vast town of tents people are streaming. We start to sing, “En hoor jy die magtige dreuning?” [Do you hear the mighty roar?]241 […] Tears are welling in my swollen eyes, there is a huge lump in my throat, the sky is flame red from horizon to horizon […] Then the runners with their torches come into sight. By now it is pitch dark […] We stand shoulder to shoulder on either side of the road, waiting for our small torches to be lit, so that we can fall in line behind the big torches [and march towards] a big open space on the festival terrain where a gigantic fire is burning – a fire ignited by the two flames which were carried so far, which we helped carrying, around which we are now marching in circles until it is time to throw your torch into the big fire […] Everything around me is silenced by the crackle of the flames, which will devour our torches and launch them into the high dark night to become stars. In my hear the Wagner music that Herr Metzler [her violin teacher] used to play, I think of Herr Metzler, I feel his moist kiss on my mouth – from the faraway little green town of Paarl to these rough, brown, cruel hills of the north come the words of Herr Metzler: as Siegfried is burnt at the stake, Brünnhilde turns around on her horse and storms into the fire; I am Brünnhilde, I am approaching the stake, I must throw (Joubert 2005:152–153).

In her book, *History after apartheid: Visual culture and public memory in a democratic South Africa*, Annie Coombes interprets the symbolic oxwagon trek of

241 FAK 1937, song 39.
1938 as “a calculated attempt to invent a coherent Afrikaner identity where none actually existed” (2003:26). It is probably more accurate to argue, as Moodie (1975:180) does, that the event marked the spread of national consciousness among Afrikaners. While this viewpoint is widely accepted in the literature, Giliomee (2005:13) believes that the role of the Trek in the political mobilisation of the Afrikaners is overrated. As he sees it, the major catalyst for the formation of a mass nationalist movement was provided, not by the grand festival of 1938, but by the decision of the South African parliament nine months later to join Britain in the Second World War.

Suffice it to say that by 1949, when the Voortrekker Monument was inaugurated, the Afrikaner nationalist movement had gained control of the state. Had South Africa not entered into the war, to the dismay of many Afrikaners, D.F. Malan’s Purified National Party might not have won the election of 1948. But Malan also might not have been victorious had it not been for Henning Klopper, who must have appreciated, however subconsciously, the political potential of activism in the field of performance culture. And had it not been for Gustav Preller and his activism in the field of discourse, the idea of replicating the Great Trek might not have occurred to Klopper.

Once in power, Afrikaner nationalists did not lose their taste for volksfeeste [volk festivals]. More often than not, the Voortrekker Monument – a colossus inspired by the Battle of the Nations Monument in Leipzig (cf. Figure 5.4) – was at the heart of it all. Each year on 16 December, a religious service was held in the monument’s Hall of Heroes, where an impressive marble frieze of 27 panels portrays the “history” of the Great Trek. At noon, a ray of sun would fall though an opening in the domed roof on a cenotaph bearing a phrase from Die Stem: Ons vir jou, Suid-Afrika [We for thee, South Africa].
There is no shortage of other examples of apartheid-era activism in the fields of material and performance culture. Space allows for one more monument and one more festival to be singled out here: the Language Monument and the Language Year. To celebrate the centenary of the establishment of the GRA, the NP government declared 1975 the Year of the Language. The FAK published a colourful 325-page hardcover book containing contributions from 22 authors and ample coloured photographs. Titled Afrikaans, ons pêrel van groot waarde [Afrikaans, our pearl of great value], it was a sequel to another FAK publication, which appeared a decade and a half earlier to commemorate the 30th birthday of the FAK, namely Die wonder van Afrikaans [The wonder of Afrikaans].

The highlight of the Language Year, however, was the unveiling of the newly-erected Afrikaans Language Monument in Paarl (cf. Figure 5.5). It was not a bronze bust of a poet in the front garden of a museum that had once been the poet’s house (even though the language has been honoured in this way as well). Nor was it anything similar to Gallimard’s Pléiade series of classical French literature which can, arguably, be regarded as a language monument (Huigen 2008:152). Situated on a hill in the Cape winelands and visible from the national road, the Afrikaans Language Monument is a 57-meter-high concrete spire surrounded by smaller ones – a phallic symbol, as Allister Sparks once described it, of a chauvinist ideal (1990:77).


To claim, as a major book on the legacy of apartheid has done (Jansen 2009:33), that the Afrikaner nationalist movement was the only one in history to produce such a monument would strengthen the point I make in this paragraph. One can even go further and draw attention to the fact that the nationalist ideal also found expression in quite a few other, humbler, language monuments, including the one at Burgersdorp. But this Afrikaner tradition is not entirely unique. The Shaheed Minar monument in Dhaka, Bangladesh and its replications elsewhere were by-products of the Bengali nationalism.
In August of the Language Year, the celebrated South African novelist and liberal-minded anti-apartheid politician, Alan Paton, noted in a newspaper article that “[i]t would be a fool or a philologist that would think it possible to discuss Afrikaans and not to discuss Afrikaner Nationalism [sic]” (The Daily News, 1975/08/08; reprinted in Paton 1987:65). That was, perhaps, an understatement: even the philologists of the 1970s could not have been unaware of the intimate association that had developed by then between the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner nationalism. Just how intimate this association was in the minds of outsiders was plain for all to see a year later, when young demonstrators took to the streets of Soweto with placards declaring: “We do not want Afrikaans”; “To hell with Afrikaans”; “Afrikaans is a sign of oppression, discrimination – To hell with the Boers”; “Today is the burial of the Boere Taal”.

When nationalists are in power, they can protect and promote their language and culture through legislation and official policies. In 1976, Afrikaner activism of this nature – the attempt to expand the institutional base of Afrikaans by introducing the language as a medium of instruction into black schools – amounted to linguistic imperialism. The plan, as we have seen, boomeranged. Rather than strengthening the position of Afrikaans vis-à-vis that of English in South Africa, it led to a revolt that marked the beginning of the end of apartheid.

Has Paton’s remark lost its relevance in the post-apartheid South Africa? Is it possible now to disregard Afrikaner nationalism when discussing Afrikaans and, more particularly, the contemporary Afrikaans language movement? Has an era dawned, as the leaders of this movement are asserting, in which Afrikaner nationalism had finally run its course? (Giliomee, Die Vrye Afrikaan, 2005/09/16:8). In the final part of this thesis I return to these questions,

demonstrating that Afrikaner nationalism has outlived apartheid. What we are witnessing today, if only in certain circles, is not the end of Afrikaner nationalism but its revival.

5.2 After apartheid: preserving a nation through words, monuments and festival

5.2.1 Of swansongs and new beginnings

For its national congress or Bondsraad of 1991 – the first to be held after F.W. de Klerk’s landmark speech of 2 February 1990 – the Afrikaner Broederbond chose the theme of “Afrikaans and education in the new dispensation” (Stals 1998:755). Compared to previous themes, this was a telling choice. On the basis of the topics that were selected for Bondsraad discussion between 1931 and 1993, four broad concerns of the Broederbond can be identified: (state-oriented nationalist) politics, economics, culture and education, and the organisation itself. The relative importance of each of these broad fields is represented in Chart 5.1 below. For every congress that was dedicated to culture and education, 3.5 congresses were dedicated to politics. Economics was half as important as politics at Bondsraade, but almost twice as important as culture. At approximately a quarter of all the Broederbond’s national congresses (including the final two which took place in 1993) stock was taken of the organisation.246

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246 Thematic analysis based on Stals (1998:753–755). It should be stressed that none of the Bondsraad themes fits neatly into a single category: in 1946, for example, economics and culture were on the agenda and in 1964 economics and education. What is more, politics was never absent from the agenda: debates on economics, culture, education and the Broederbond as an organisation were always framed within the context of (state-oriented) nationalism.
The 1991 Bondraad was the first in the history of the Broederbond to focus pertinently on language. And yet, to quote Hobsbawm slightly out of context, “problems of power, status, politics and ideology and not of communication or even culture” (1992:110) continued to lie at the heart of the Bond’s project. The new emphasis on language did not signal a shift in interest away from “heavy-weight” politics toward “light-weight” culture; rather, it signalled a shift in nationalist politics away from the state toward lower-level institutions, and then particularly those institutions where “the will of the young [is bent] to the will of the nation” (Kedourie 1985:84).

The turn that the Broederbond took at its national conference in 1991 was an indicator of the trajectory on which Afrikaner activism in the field of language was about to embark. In the course of the following two decades, education would become the primary site of language conflict — or, more accurately, conflict between Afrikaner activists and the government in South Africa. These activists would complain to the Pan South African Language Board (PanSALB) about the neglect of their language in every imaginable context — from municipal

247 Today, name changes come a close second as a source of conflict.
accounts to televised rugby commentary, from vehicle number plates to automatic
teller machine facilities 248 – but the serious cases, those which would end up in
court, time and time again, would be brought by Afrikaans schools opposing the
introduction of English as an additional medium of tuition. (Cf. section 2.4, where
I discuss these court cases against the background of the South African Bill of
Rights, arguing that they constitute a continuation of Afrikaner nationalism’s
“own schools” crusade.)

During the same year that language politics replaced state-oriented politics at the
Bondsraad, the Broederbond appointed a committee to devise a strategy for
Afrikaans in a post-apartheid South Africa. 249 The majority of the committee
members were university professors. For this first time, the Broeders invited a
woman to join them. Crucially, the managing director of the prosperous printing
house Nasionale Pers [National Press] or Naspers, 250 member 23162, was also
invited. In June 1991, as negotiations for a new South African constitution were
slowly getting underway, the Broederbond circulated a study document under the
telltale title “The power of Afrikaans”. Broeders were called upon to make the
presence of their mother tongue be felt – courteously yet firmly – “at all times in
all places and at all levels, especially in commerce and at the negotiation table”
(AB 12/44, June 1991). Broederbond activism in the field of language had
become a desperate attempt to defend the territories that Afrikaans had conquered
prior to and during apartheid, and then particularly the territories of economics
and politics.

One of the outcomes of the Broeders’ “strategy for Afrikaans” was an
organisation which is bankrolled, to this day, by Naspers. The establishment of
the Stigting vir Afrikaans [Foundation for Afrikaans] during May 1992 was part of
the Broederbond’s swansong, yet it marked the beginning of a major Afrikaner

248 Cf. Kriel (2010c:67–72; 2010d:71–75) for examples of complaints that have been lodged
with PanSALB in recent years.
249 Source: AB archival file marked as “Strategy for Afrikaans”. The Afrikanerbond allowed
me access to this file on condition that I do not mention any names.
250 Cf. footnote 28. Today, Naspers is one of most diversified and successful media companies
in the world.
initiative to create a racially inclusive Afrikaans language movement. This endeavour was met with a fair degree of scepticism, especially if it entailed efforts to foster a new, non-racial, inclusive Afrikaans identity. Explicitly rejecting the term Afrikaanses that some proposed for such an identity, commentators such as Breyten Breytenbach (*Die Burger*, 1996/10/05) defined all those who use Afrikaans as mother tongue as Afrikaners. They promoted the concepts of white and “brown” Afrikaners in the media, but with little success. Apart from rejecting the term “brown” as an apartheid category and even more offensive than “coloured”, black commentators in progressive circles viewed this as a transparent and opportunistic attempt at co-optation – too little too late. For Neville Alexander the idea was absurd: “no one in their right mind,” he remarked in 1999, “would suggest that people labelled coloureds are Afrikaners, in spite of the fact that some 90% of them continue to speak Afrikaans as a home language” (Alexander 1999:27; cf. also Alexander, quoted in *De Kat*, 2002/09). Seven years later, he rephrased his opinion more cautiously, warning that he “would not advise Afrikaners to try to attach others to their own identity” (*Die Burger*, 2006/04/24).

On the face of it, however, a racially inclusive Afrikaans language movement was on the rise. The late Professor Tony Links was appointed as the first deputy chair of the *Stigting vir Afrikaans*. When the latter transformed itself into the *Stigting vir Bemagtiging deur Afrikaans* [Foundation for Empowerment through Afrikaans] (SBA) in 2000, another academic, Christa van Louw, became its chief executive officer. She was succeeded in 2005 by Christo van der Rheede, a former teacher. Three years later, the ATKV (then aged 78) asked Danny Titus, a professor of law, to be the organisation’s executive director of culture. Titus also currently serves on the *Afrikaanse Taalraad* [Afrikaans Language Council] (ATR, est. 2008), as do Van der Rheede, Waldy Kastoor, Michael le Cordeur, Ria Olivier, and Hendrik Theys. All the role players mentioned in this paragraph identify themselves as “brown” South Africans, though not “brown” Afrikaners.

By no stretch of the definition of Afrikaner nationalism can the term be applied to a movement of which the SBA forms part. There is nothing nationalist about the Foundation’s activist initiatives, which had come to include:
Basic reading, writing and numerical skills development programmes for adults
Life skills development programmes for adults
Career-oriented skills development programmes for adults who wanted to enter the labour market
The Funda programme at primary and secondary school level, aimed at overcoming reading problems and developing a love of reading
The Bravo programme, aimed at releasing the creativity of learners and exposing them to career possibilities in Afrikaans
The provision of support to Afrikaans teachers
Cultural programmes to encourage learners to develop an interest in music, drama and poetry recitals
Special programmes such as comedian festivals, language conferences, youth leadership excursions, campaigns against drug abuse, lectures and career expos (Die Burger, 2007/11/14).

However, the SBA is but one branch of the contemporary Afrikaans language movement. In the section that follows, I shall consider views that have been expressed in the press and in public lectures by prominent language activists in the white Afrikaans-speaking community, all of whom support the principle of a racially inclusive movement. My objective is to read between the lines in an attempt to establish what the group of primary identification in any particular instance is. Is it the multiracial language community to which the activist belongs, or is it his\textsuperscript{251} ethnic group? If it turns out to be the latter, the question arises as to whether these activists and their kindred spirits share the SBA’s enthusiasm for broad-based empowerment through Afrikaans. Or are they preoccupied with the preservation of an ethnic identity and the protection of ethnic interests?

5.2.2 Reading between the lines

In 2005, the University of the Free State (UFS) invited two of its own professors, H.P. van Coller (at the time chair of the Academy) and J.C. Steyn (author of Tuiste in eie taal – cf. footnote 163), to present the D.F. Malherbe memorial lecture. To say that Van Coller and Steyn’s lecture contained normative reflections on language activism would be an understatement; preparing and

\textsuperscript{251} All the activists quoted below are men.
delivering the lecture was an activist initiative in itself. The speakers were equally
critical of Afrikaans parents who send their children to English schools (p. 40), of
Afrikaans scholars who “timidly avoid using Afrikaans in their scientific
publications and academic discourse” (p. 40), and of Afrikaans novelists and poets
who “write increasingly, and even exclusively, in English” (p. 42) or who use an
“English Afrikaans blend” (p. 43). “[W]hen a small language is threatened,” Van
Coller and Steyn asserted, “indifference and a comfortable unconcern are
inappropriate reactions” (p. 46): Afrikaans must “be preserved as a fully
established cultural language”; it must “remain the language of the creative
imagination, of science, and of the universities”; “the Afrikaans political, business
and academic elite [must] be persuaded not to desert Afrikaans” (p. 40).

These appeals are illiberal as they violate the liberal principle of individual
autonomy which endows people with the capacity to reject their mother tongue
(Laitin and Reich 2003:91). However, none of them amounts to a nationalist
appeal. Were the tone less authoritarian, they might have been made by a non-
Afrikaner. Somebody as opposed to Afrikaner nationalism as the late Neville
Alexander might have written the sentence which concluded the lecture: “The
awareness is growing that language activism will be needed to bring about a truly
democratic multi-lingual society [in South Africa]” (p. 47). But a non-Afrikaner
would probably not have complained in a lecture on language activism about
affirmative action (p. 37), about racial quotas in rugby – “a favourite sport among
Afrikaners” (p. 38), about the fact that South African universities are now “open
to all” to the detriment of Afrikaans (p. 39), or about “enforced” racial

252 Note also the following remark by Laitin and Reich (2003:87):
[M]any nationalist commentators write despairingly of individuals who have lost
‘their’ language as if they had some obligation to speak the language of their
ancestors. Children of Welsh parents who speak only English are speaking ‘their’
language, whether nationalists like it or not. Claiming that people of Maori or Welsh
ancestry have an obligation to carry on the language of their ancestors is to
primordialize culture, and to force people into cultural milieus from which they
might want to exit. In disregarding the preferences of potential assimilators,
nationalist commentators are fundamentally illiberal.

253 In recent years, critics of parallel-medium tuition at the UFS – including Higher Education
Minister Blade Nzimande – have often expressed the view that the practice keeps apartheid
on the campus alive. Steyn’s response to this is that “the mixing of the [black and white]
races is not in itself a positive thing, especially where tension already exists between
integration in university residences (p. 42). These are Afrikaner grievances, and they are recurring themes in Steyn’s newspaper columns along with the process of political and social transformation in South Africa, land reform, the changing of Afrikaans place names, Afrikaner emigration, Afrikaner poverty and the lack of Afrikaner self-determination. (Cf., inter alia, Beeld, 2006/06/22; Rapport, 2006/12/17; Die Volksblad, 2008/11/21, 2009/05/27). According to Steyn’s view, 1994 marked the beginning of “the disregard of Afrikaans and the marginalisation of Afrikaners” (Die Volksblad, 2009/05/27).

At this point, one particular column that Steyn had contributed to Die Volksblad of 21 November 2008 is worth considering in more detail. It provides an overview of the activities of the Vereniging van Regslui vir Afrikaans [Society of Legal Practitioners for Afrikaans] (VRA). The latter is a 600-member-strong society of legal practitioners who seek to promote Afrikaans in the judiciary; further the interests of Afrikaans-speaking legal practitioners and law students; and protect the legal interests of the Afrikaans-speaking community.

The establishment of the VRA in 2002 was prompted by the anglicisation of the judiciary, at least according to Steyn, who ascribes the decline of Afrikaans in this domain to “the state’s transformation policy of which the cornerstones are representativity and unfair affirmative action”. In the early years of its existence, the VRA resorted to lobbying: the organisation tried, for example, to persuade the department of justice that the linguistic demographics of a specific geographical region should be taken into consideration when judges, magistrates and prosecutors were appointed. When all such efforts proved to be futile, the VRA opted for a more “direct strategy”, as explained by Koos Malan, a founding member of the organisation: “Do not ask anybody else to do something for you. Do not even try to influence the government [...] There are many things that you can do yourself for your language and your people” (quoted by Steyn).

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groups” (Beeld, 2007/09/10). Quoting a study that was done among Israeli and Palestinian students at the University of Haifa, Steyn claims that the integration of Afrikaans and English lectures (i.e., predominantly white and predominantly black classes) at the UFS may increase racial tensions. Some would argue that such a stance would annoy critics of the UFS’s language policy even further.
What, then, has been done? And, more importantly, for whom? Who does Malan consider to be “his people”? To further the interests of Afrikaans-speaking law students, the VRA has introduced bursaries and internships; to protect the interests of the Afrikaans community, the organisation has started to translate laws into the language for publication on the internet. On the surface, the preservation of a language-based ethnic identity seems to be absent from the agenda. Yet the following remark by Malan may suggest that language is not the sole criterion for inclusion in the in-group – that is, the group whose interests are being promoted:

“A lawyer does not even have to leave his office [to do something for Afrikaans]. He simply takes in a student for two weeks, offers him/her exposure and training, and in this manner provides a service [...] to a young Afrikaner” (quoted by Steyn; emphasis added).

This might have been a mere slip of the tongue; the VRA may be just as concerned about the interests of black (including “brown”) Afrikaans-speaking law students in an era where, as Steyn asserts, “state institutions are collapsing as a result of transformation”. Yet any reader of Steyn’s column could be forgiven for suspecting that, even if the VRA is “politically independent”/“untainted by party politics”, the raison d’être of the organisation is related to identity politics. In the final example to be considered here, the primary group of identification was revealed not through a slip of the tongue or through the expression of Afrikaner grievances, but through identification with a nationalist myth.

Speaking in Brussels on 30 April 2009 at the official opening of a foreign relations office for Afrikaans, former South African state president F.W. de Klerk added his voice to the chorus of those who, at the time, were expressing their concern about the future of single-medium Afrikaans schools and predominantly Afrikaans universities:

I am particularly worried about the erosion of Afrikaans at our universities. The truth is that Stellenbosch, Pretoria, the Free State and Potchefstroom will cease to be predominantly Afrikaans in the foreseeable future unless our language community works together to develop a clear preventative strategy (Rapport, 2009/05/03; cf. also Beeld, 2009/05/01).
It is safe to assume that the speaker’s definition of “our language community” was a racially inclusive one. In another talk, given a month earlier in Pretoria (“What is the Credo of the Afrikaners in 2009?”, declaration to the IFP Forum, 2009/03/27), De Klerk had claimed that “Afrikaans now comprises a much wider community than ever before and is proudly spoken as a home language by more than seven million brown, white and black South Africans”. However, while they may be regarded as (potential) allies in the language struggle, “brown” and black South Africans are excluded from De Klerk definition’s of “we” as is clear from the way in which he introduced the Pretoria speech:

We as Afrikaners have had sad, disquieting and even glorious moments in history. We experienced and survived many crises: on the borders of the eastern Cape; during the swoeg en sweet of the Great Trek; at Dingaan’s [sic] kraal and at Weenen; on the battlefields and in the concentration camps of the Second War of Independence (Consensus 6(1):11).

Was it about the survival of this identity that De Klerk was primarily concerned when he told his audience in Brussels that “the struggle to preserve our diverse identity in an increasingly homogeneous world is the greatest challenge of this century”? (Rapport, 2009/05/03). If it was, the former president’s language sentiments qualify as nationalist sentiments: when it forms part of a broader effort to protect the identity and the interests of any specific ethnic group (even if others stand to benefit as well), activism aimed at the defence of an institutionalised language becomes nationalist activism.

5.2.3 The Fragmente-Vrye Afrikan movement: a new generation of Gustav Prellers?

A decade and a half after 1991, in November 2006, the no longer secret, open to all yet largely deserted Afrikanerbond (as Broederbond renamed itself in 1994) was still trying to demonstrate its philosophy of inclusivity by involving “brown” speakers of Afrikaans in a panel discussion on “Afrikaanses and their culture”. Christo van der Rheede was invited along with Allan Boesak (a cleric, politician and former anti-apartheid activist) and Franklin Sonn (a former South African ambassador and at the time a businessman and university chancellor). All three
men expressed their doubts about the existence of a community of “Afrikaanses”. Boesak said that he still mistrusted the motives of some taalstryders [language warriors] and their overtures to “other” speakers of Afrikaans. Power, he suspected, continued to be the hidden agenda (Die Burger, 2006/11/09). The SBA head remarked that “[w]e have a long way to go before we are likely to reach this ideal [of a single Afrikaans community]” (Die Burger, 2006/11/08). Sonn, in turn, added that if the new inclusive Afrikaans movement were to succeed, it would have to be led by “bruines” [brown people] (Die Burger, 2006/11/09).

Just how difficult (impossible?) the creation of a united and non-racial community of Afrikaans language activists was going to be, became clear in the course of 2007 – the year of the De la Rey uprising (to which I shall return below). In April 2007, in a newspaper article titled “Denkendes lei nou Afrikaner – Führer-loos kaap hulle meesterlik kernkringe” [Thinkers now lead Afrikaner – Without a Führer they are highjacking core circles masterly] (Beeld, 2007/04/30), the Afrikaans research consultant, writer and publisher Charles Malan celebrated what he clearly regarded as an Afrikaner revival:

The unheard of has happened lately: the biggest, once ultra-conservative cultural fortresses such as the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK), the Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging (ATKV), and the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns have been conquered by liberal intellectual leaders.

Also in domains such as the churches, the Afrikaans media and in trade unions, Afrikaners are being led towards a change of direction by strong, thinking leaders.

Academics and thinkers are taking over everywhere. In a masterly manner, the once old-fashioned FAK has been hijacked by the philosophers Danie Goosen and Johann Rossouw to publish the unprecedented Die Vrye Afrikaan. Within the Akademie, two scholars of literature, Hennie van Coller and Jacques van der Elst, are trying their best to establish a new Akademie for all Afrikaanses. The Renaissance man, Coenie de Villiers, is in charge of culture at the ATKV after the pioneering work of Frits Kok.

Logical, well-considered viewpoints are put forward in the ranks of the church

According to Malan, this emergence of a “new leadership corps” demonstrated which kind of guidance was needed most in Afrikaner ranks at the time: “not that of a sole political fighter, but intellectual leadership on various levels”. Other observers might have characterised and explained it differently, yet by 2007 few would have disputed the existence of a “new” Afrikaner movement. Its supporters still defined their mission as the defence of multilingualism and minority rights or the defence of the Afrikaans language, but increasingly they added, unashamedly, that they were standing up for Afrikaner rights and interests. While not monolithic in any way, the new Afrikaner movement was a self-conscious project that soon became consolidated around a number of organisations.

Today, the leading agents of the new Afrikaner movement are most likely the 120,000-member-strong trade union Solidariteit/Solidarity, which grew out of the white Mine Workers’ Union (MWU, est. 1902), and its independent civil rights initiative, AfriForum (est. 2006). Solidarity has expanded its membership base in recent years to include workers from other industries as well as professionals. On its English-language website, AfriForum defines its mission as follows:

Let your voice be heard… AfriForum will directly contribute to giving you and your community a voice in a society where minorities are increasingly being ignored. AfriForum offers a Forum for the constructive activation of minorities to participate in public debate and action, in order to ensure a future for us in Africa.256

Curiously (or rather, tellingly), the Afrikaans version is not equivalent to the English version. A direct translation of the organisation’s mission statement on its Afrikaans-language website reads as follows:

255 Henceforth without inverted commas.
Let your voice be heard... Membership of AfriForum is a direct way to ensure that your voice and that of your community are heard in a society where minorities – such as Afrikaners and the Afrikaans community – are increasingly being ignored. AfriForum offers a Forum for the constructive activation of minorities to participate in public debate and action, in order to ensure a future for us in Africa (emphasis added).257

AfriForum styles itself as the solution to the problem of “apathetic withdrawal” among Afrikaners:

Civil societies in general, and minorities in particular [or, according to the Afrikaans website: Minorities in general, and especially Afrikaners] have fallen into a spiral of withdrawal that holds negative consequences for the minorities themselves, for democratic principles and for the country as a whole [...] AfriForum, an independant [sic] initiative of the trade union Solidarity, is a non-profit institution which endeavours to eradicate this cycle of withdrawal. The process motivates minorities to participate constructively in public life (emphasis added).

In the remainder of this chapter, however, I shall concentrate on another sector of the new Afrikaner movement, not least because the philosophy and work of Solidarity and AfriForum have been well researched and documented by Jacob R. Boersema (2012). Of interest to me is the role of the intellectual elite, and then particularly the contribution of two activist-ideologues who have been described as a “new generation of Gustav Prellers” (Van Niekerk 2008:84): the philosophers Danie Goosen and Johann Rossouw. It was the two of them who, at the turn of the millennium, identified “apathetic withdrawal” as a crisis in Afrikaner circles (cf., i.a., Goosen 2005).

According to the argument put forward here, Goosen and Rossouw – the leaders of what I call, after their major publications, the Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan [Fragments-Free African] movement258 – bore a closer resemblance to the apartheid ideologues of the 1930s and 1940s than they did to the activists of the Second Afrikaans Language Movement. I do not wish to suggest that they shared

258 Below, I sometimes refer to the leadership of this movement as the Vrye Afrikane [Free Africans].
the racism of apartheid’s architects. But they did share their nationalist view of the world – the belief that South Africa was divided along ethnic-linguistic lines that had to be preserved. The *Vrye Afrikane* [Free Africans] might have rejected the concepts *nation* and *volk* in favour of *community of origin*, *historical community* or *indigenous symbolic tradition*; they might have asserted that the era of states, nations and *volkere* was over and that we lived in the age of continents and communities (Goosen 2000:64), yet in the final analysis both Goosen and Rossouw defined the units that made up South Africa’s “precious” diversity in terms identical to those that the Broederbond and the National Party used, namely language and ethnicity.

The story began in 1998, when Goosen and Rossouw founded a journal for philosophy and cultural criticism with the help of two philosophy colleagues and two creative arts scholars. No fewer than 23 men and five women – the vast majority of them academics (including four from universities in the Low Countries) – served on the editorial board. Titled *Fragmente*, the biannual publication added a local flavour to the postmodern critique of modernity.

It should be noted that *Fragmente* was not an uncritical disciple of postmodernism. For Goosen and Rossouw, the appeal of postmodernism lay in its “fundamental criticism of the universal”, in its “recognition of the linguistic nature of our reality and of the role that our historical context plays in our reflection” and, finally, in its preference for “small stories and the ethics of the particular” rather than grand narratives (*Fragmente* editorial, 2005:5). These elements of postmodern thought they appeared to embrace: the linguistic turn, historicism, cultural relativism, localism, particularism. Yet at the same time they were critical of certain aspects of postmodernity, above all consumerism and neoliberal globalisation (which was understood as “an exponential expansion of the same desire for geometric control” that underlies the nation-state – *Fragmente* editorial, 2005:5).

In the 2005 edition of *Fragmente* (numbers 14 and 15), postmodern philosophy was criticised for not sufficiently opposing these trends in postmodern culture. The criticism was directed specifically at the nomadic thoughts of Deleuze and the radical ethical thoughts of Levinas and Derrida. Neither the details nor the validity of the philosophical arguments are important here. Of significance for this discussion is that the conclusions drawn by *Fragmente* suggested a preoccupation not only with community, but with their own community. Deleuze’s work on nomadic/aesthetic energy was rejected since it was said to reinforce existing patterns of production and consumption, thus prioritising private needs and preferences and perpetuating “a fundamental indifference towards the communal”. As regards Levinas and Derrida, *Fragmente* had reservations about their emphasis on the appeal of *the other* because, so the argument went, it left *the self* “subjected to feelings of powerlessness and paralysis” (*Fragmente* editorial, 2005:5–7). The obvious analogy was between the diagnosis of the postmodern subject in general (powerless and paralysed) and post-apartheid Afrikaners in particular (alienated and
the position it adopted the revival of Afrikaners and their language could be easily promoted:

[I]f modernity reduces human beings to free-drifting individuals, *Fragmente* seeks, by contrast, to understand them through their participation in and commitment to a plurality of communities [...] [I]f modernity never stops trying to dissolve traditions, *Fragmente* continues to emphasise the necessity of a creative maintenance of the diversity of ‘pre-individual finds’; if modernity persists in establishing its hegemony through geometric structures such as the nation-state and the market, *Fragmente*, on the other hand, stresses the importance of democratic practices through which reality can into her [sic] own right (*Fragmente* editorial, 2005:4).

Under the banner of *Fragmente*, Goosen and Rossouw invited the “who’s who of Afrikaans-speaking writers, philosophers, economists, political scientists, futurologists, educationists, lawyers, historians and classicists” (*Mail and Guardian, 2000/05/19*) to a meeting in May 2000. Sixty-three of the (predominantly white male) invitees attended and decided to form the Group of 63 with Rossouw (and later Goosen) as chair. The media was told that the new organisation represented “Afrikaans and Afrikaans interests on the whole” (*Business Day, 2000/05/08*). It formed part of what Rossouw still portrayed as “the New Afrikaans Movement” (2003:81) rather than a new Afrikaner movement. In his biography of the Afrikaners, Giliomee described the mission of the Group of 63 (of which he was a founding member) as “a search for new myths in the campaign to secure the future of Afrikaans as a public tongue” (2003:664). Officially, however, the Group identified itself with reference not only to language but also to culture and politics as “a meta-political forum which stands for a radical democratic South Africa within which the diversity of linguistic and cultural communities will obtain complete recognition” (Prinsloo 2004:67).

By 2003, the Group of 63 claimed to have “one of the most active intellectual electronic mailing lists in Afrikaans” (Prinsloo 2004:67). The problem was that it had little more than virtual assets. It could do with an office, a secretary and a withdrawn). From postmodernism *Fragmente* seemed to borrow (one is tempted to say, in true postmodern style) only those ideas that that could be appropriated to support their case.
little money – all things that the FAK, which had been in the business of Afrikaner culture since 1929, still had. What followed has been described as a takeover. According to Malan’s newspaper article of 2007, Goosen and Rossouw highjacked the FAK. I would use a different metaphor: the two parties entered into an all but loveless marriage of convenience. Welcoming the new blood, the FAK appointed Goosen to its managing board in 2003 and soon afterwards as chair. Rossouw, in turn, was offered a position as communication and research officer whose task it would be to communicate the new vision of the FAK “to the broad Afrikaans world in a comprehensible and appropriate manner” (Ferreira 2004:162). To this end he established Die Vrye Afrikaan (henceforth, DVA) – a newspaper that was published monthly (and later bi-monthly) in print and online.

The FAK officials also contributed articles and columns to the mainstream Afrikaans press – as they had done as members of the Group of 63 – and addressed Afrikaner audiences of all sorts and sizes whenever the opportunity presented itself. Like the cultural nationalists featured in the work of John Hutchinson (1987), they diagnosed a national crisis – “apathetic withdrawal” – and set themselves the task to solve it by inspiring their fellow Afrikaners “to break free from their withdrawal and alienation” (Rossouw, DVA, 2005/09/16:7). At the time, Afrikaans arts (read: cultural) festivals “were multiplying like rabbits” and there was an explosion in Afrikaans cultural production (even if quality was in short supply). The problem, as the self-appointed revivalists identified it, was that Afrikaners were not participating in politics as Afrikaners. They suffered from collective post-apartheid depression:

whilst the ethnic identity of Afrikaners had been a source of inspiration and creativity to them at different points in their history – the Great Trek, the establishment of various republics in the 19th and 20th century, the reconstruction

260 Journalist and author Max du Preez suggested that the newspaper should change its name to Die Etniese Afrikaner [The Ethnic Afrikaner], in view of its “obsession with Boer matters” (Beeld, 2007/05/19).

261 In the posthumously published Fractured times. Culture and society in the twentieth century (2013:34), Eric Hobsbawm makes this remark about cultural festivals in general. It is particularly true of the post-apartheid South Africa.
after the Anglo-Boer War – it is today a source of depression (Rossouw, DVA, 2006/02/17:10).

Like so many nationalists before them, locally and elsewhere, Danie Goosen and Johann Rossouw recognised the potential of myths and symbols to unite and mobilise a nation (or a community as they called it) and to sustain its identity and cohesion over time. By the turn of the twentieth century, these philosophers had come to see their primary task as “myth-making” or, in Goosen’s own words, as the production of “a viable network of meaning-giving symbols and space-creating myths” (2000:61) that could “unleash new cultural-political energy and lead Afrikaners out of the cultural-political impasse of the present” (2000:62). In February 2000, at an FAK seminar on minorities, Goosen appealed to Afrikaners “to activate the cultural-political processes through which the decay of our community life [can be] reversed and through which our own worlds of thought – that is, our networks of symbols and myths – [can be] imagined in a such way that they will have an irrepressible attraction, especially for the intellectual and creative elite”:

When these symbols and myths lose their power and persuasiveness, minorities fade away and eventually surrender their place in history to others. The opposite is also true. When these symbols and myths captivate minorities and inspire them to identify with [their mythology] actively and in a creative way, such minorities enter into and participate in history (2000:61).

Following Hutchinson, one may argue that the Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan movement was a cultural nationalist movement. In fact, Hutchinson’s “profile of cultural nationalism” (1987:8–15) reads like a profile of the Goosen-Rossouw project: just like the examples of cultural nationalist projects described by Hutchinson, it attracted “a rising but disaffected intelligentsia” who challenged the traditionalism of “ossified political and cultural elites” in an effort to “re-create” the idea of the nation as a living principle in the lives of people” (1987:9, 15). It was, however, not as nationalists but as adherents of civic republicanism and radical democracy (as they interpreted these political philosophies) and as
opponents of the (alleged) individualism of liberalism, the consumerism of neo-liberalism and the imperialism of “Afro-nationalism” (a term used to include both black African nationalism and non-racial South African nationalism) that Goosen and Rossouw participated in the Afrikaner debate.

We Afrikaners are communitarians, they told audiences, not liberal individualists; we have a long tradition of community-based politics (Rossouw, DVA, 2006/03/17:2). Both liberalism and neo-liberalism, so the argument went, stood in tension with “the radical-democratic attempt of the multiplicity of cultural communities to achieve a say in their respective histories” (Goosen 2000:65). Afrikaners had a choice: “we can either take refuge in liberal privatism,” said Goosen, “or we can pursue the good life made possible by republican politics” (2000:73); we can either “celebrate ‘the end of history’ in some kind of privatist orgy of consumption” (2000:72), or we can participate in history as a “unique historical community” (2000:61).

The anti-neoliberal, anti-consumerist and anti-corporatist stance of the Vrye Afrikane was a rather curious one that prioritised non-material political issues:

[T]he free market strives to turn human beings into free-standing individuals and cuts them off from everything that makes them human beings (religion, ethnic bonds, gender, class, language). […] Over the past fifteen to twenty years neo-liberalism has taken this trend to new heights (Rossouw, DVA, 2006/03/17:2).

In “Afro-nationalism” neo-liberalism had found an ally. Together, as DVA editorials warned incessantly, these two forces posed a threat to the identity, symbols and institutions of South Africa’s communities of origin/historical communities/traditional communities – terms which Goosen and Rossouw understood to mean ethnic-linguistic communities (Rossouw, DVA, 2006/03/17:1). In short, the claim was that “[t]he market and the state strip man

262 Charles Malan’s portrayal of the FAK project as liberal thus constitutes a misinterpretation. The discourse of rights, it should be noted here, was eschewed by the Vrye Afrikane in accordance with their rejection of the individualism of liberalism. Yet for every non-liberal in the broader Afrikaner movement there was a self-acclaimed liberal who, rather disingenuously, availed himself or herself “of the language of minority rights as deployed in European multiculturalist discourses” (Wasserman 2009:68).
[sic] from his most significant association, namely his linguistic-cultural community” (DVA editorial, 2006/04/21:2). In this respect, Afro-nationalism was alleged to be an extension of apartheid:

I am not saying that Afrikaner nationalism and the new Afro-nationalism are identical. But let us also not overemphasise the differences to the extent that we lose a clear perspective of the many aspects they have in common. Whilst one was exclusive and the other is inclusive, they share a pathological incapability to recognise the diversity of communities [and] a resistance against meaningful policies that recognise the variety of voices, communities and so forth (Goosen 2005).

I would argue exactly the opposite: the Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan movement, rather than “the new Afro-nationalism”, constituted a continuation of the apartheid project, and then particularly that part of the project that sought to replace “negative racial nationalism” in the black community with “positive cultural nationalism” (Moodie 1975:265; cf. section 2.2.2). Their motivation might have been self-serving, but apartheid’s ideologues were never “hostile towards diversity” (Goosen 2005) – not when they developed the policy in the 1930s and 1940s and not when they were desperately trying to defend it in the 1980s. The development phase was covered in chapter 2 of this study. From the defence phase we need only consider the Broederbond’s attempt of 1984 to devise an “Afrikaner strategy” following the spilt to the right in the NP. A study document on the topic included the following objectives under the heading volkeverhoudinge (relationships between volke):

Maintenance of the diversity of volke in South Africa. Own identities [...] Respect for other cultures and ways of being human (AB 12/28, August 1984).

In a subsequent study document, entitled “The AB’s goals and tasks for the Afrikaner”, these ideas were fleshed out:

The question that currently faces our country and all its people [...] is without any doubt the issue of [internal] national relationships [volkeverhoudinge – relationships between volkere].

[...] Whatever concrete policy we decide to follow, it will have to do justice to both
the unity and diversity of our population. Every community, group or nation will have to be able to maintain, enrich and develop its own identity to the full (AB 12/32, February 1986).

Like the Herderian/Fichtean diversitarian view of the world, the chauvinism of apartheid also resurfaced in the *Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan* movement. This claim, made in section 2.2.2 of this study where I argued that certain post-apartheid efforts to promote multilingualism in South Africa have their roots in the racial paternalism of apartheid, is not difficult to substantiate. “As a rule,” according to editorial comment in *DVA* (2005/08/19:2), “Afrikaans language activists are activists for multilingualism.” As a rule, one may add, their thinking echoes that of Werner Eiselen: “From the history of the Boer People we learn [and black South Africans can learn] how a People can retain its identity [and language]” (quoted in Moodie 1975:272–273). Consider the following examples:

Lawrence Schlemmer, a founding member of the Group of 63: [South Africa] is being homogenised through the use of English as the official language, cultural diversity is being lost, and in time even indigenous groups will find that they have to rebuild their languages (quoted in *Business Day*, 2000/05/09).


Rossouw’s condescension, in particular, knew no bounds. Afrikaners, he asserted, were proud anti-imperial and anti-colonial democrats. Only between 1948 and 1994, when they colonised themselves and their fellow Africans, did they lose their dignity. Afrikaners did not only contribute to Africa’s past struggles for freedom, but could now play a leading role in the continent’s most important liberation movement ever: the battle against the forces of community destruction (*DVA*, 2005/09/16:7). South Africa had to become a country of “self-respecting communities” (*DVA* editorial, 2006/03/17:1). And as “a self-aware community with a long history”, Afrikaners were best positioned to lead a movement of ethnic-linguistic self-determination (*DVA* editorial, 2006/01/20:2). Rossouw warned, though, that
as the indigenous community who succeeded to maintain the strongest sense of self-consciousness in opposition to the local colonial situation. Afrikaners must [...] not expect all South Africans to embrace their communities of origin at the moment. For the time being, those who wish to express themselves via the state-corporate system and those who wish to express themselves via the community will have to accommodate one another, while the onus is on the communities to continue the struggle to decolonise the state-corporate system (DVA, 2005/09/16:7).

If the Vrye Afrikane were radical democrats, one may argue, apartheid’s ideologues were too. Were they true civic republicans? For the most part, Goosen and Rossouw explained the idea of republican politics in metaphorical terms: Afrikaners were encouraged to follow the example of the old Athenians for whom the highest accomplishment in life was to step out of the private (or economic) domain and to “appear” in the public (or political) domain, thus serving common interests and acquiring immortality in the eyes of their fellow city-staters. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of classical republicanism in The Human Condition (1958), Goosen argued in a speech before the FAK that such political participation is intrinsically valuable (2000:67; cf. also 2001:8–29). In a later lecture, however, presented in 2001 at the Klein Karoo National Arts Festival, he adopted a more pragmatic approach and demanded all of the following in the name of civic republicanism:

(a) the conservation of “recognisable Afrikaans spaces [in the] streets, city squares and coffee shops of [our] towns and cities” (2001:49);
(b) the protection of single-medium Afrikaans schools and universities; (at the time, Goosen insisted along with other language activists that two of South Africa’s historically Afrikaans universities had to remain exclusively Afrikaans, while the remaining three had to implement parallel-medium tuition in Afrikaans and English – 2000:49–50); and
(c) the establishment of “a politically-negotiated and state-supported representative council” for Afrikaners through which they could take control of their own affairs (2001:50).
Had Goosen been speaking in the latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century after South Africa had embarked on a process of mass-scale geographical renaming, he would also have called for the retention of Afrikaans place names. Within the definitional framework of this study, demands such as these for spaces where “our language [is] audible and visible”, where its “sounds and images are reflected back at us” (Goosen 2001:49), as well as demands for “our own” schools, universities and political structures, are nationalist demands. At stake is the collective symbolic and institutional expression of Afrikaners.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the civic republicanism that was preached by the *Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan* movement in the early 2000s was *ethnic-nationalist* civic republicanism. The Afrikaner community was assumed to be the metaphorical equivalent of the classical city-state republic. While other Afrikaans speakers might have benefited from Afrikaner activism, they were not in-defined as fellow Athenians. Those common interests which, in the minds of civic republicans, take precedence over “private desires and interests” (Goosen 2000:67) were Afrikaner interests. To the *Vrye Afrikane*, this did not constitute a choice for ethnocentrism but a “republican choice for plurality” (Goosen 2000:70) – something that was threatened, so they argued, by the nation state and by neo-liberal globalisation. Yet one has to ask: if the city-state was populated only with Afrikaners, would it not be stripped from the very “plurality of shades, accents, idioms, shadows and nuances” (Goosen 2000:68) that the Afrikaner disciples of civic republicanism claimed to value so highly? This appears to have been the line of reasoning of the veteran anti-apartheid activist Justice Albie Sachs when he put the following question to a single-medium Afrikaans school which was defending its right to remain exclusively Afrikaans in the South African Constitutional Court during August 2009: do you not overlook – as apartheid had done – the educational value of diversity?263

To me, the clearest indication that the *Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan* movement was apartheid reincarnated was the reaction it provoked in the coloured community.

263 Personal observation by the author who attended the court case.
The tension reached boiling point during August 2007, when Goosen and Rossouw came under attack from “brown” Afrikaans language activists for propagating the idea that cultural/ethnic diversity within the primary Afrikaans speech community should be preserved (Rapport, 2007/08/12). What is more, said the philosophers, the various cultural/ethnic groups should be mobilised independently. Earlier in 2007, Rossouw had explained this position as follows in a letter to Beeld (2007/04/12):

One of the most important reasons why reconciliation amongst Afrikaans-speakers and the establishment of an Afrikaans language council are being delayed, is that there is a large group of people in Afrikaans-speaking circles who have not yet been able to constitute themselves as a community, and whose identity was forced upon them in the past, and used to discriminate against them.

Other Afrikaans communities, by contrast, such as the Afrikaners, the Cape Muslims, the Griquas and the Namas, have succeeded in constituting themselves and in writing an own history. Cooperation and progress in Afrikaans will depend on the extent to which different communities can meet each other with self-confidence.

In other words: only when all speakers of Afrikaans had been led to ethnic self-awareness would it be possible for them to be partners in an inclusive Afrikaans language movement. While they rejected the notion of xenophobic ethnicity, the FAK officials argued that the answer is neither post-ethnicity nor non-ethnicity, but democratic ethnicity “which is recognised world-wide as an important condition for successful language politics” (Rapport, 2007/08/12).

For all its emphasis on democratic politics, however, this line of reasoning was eerily reminiscent of Afrikaner Broederbond thinking in the early 1980s when one of apartheid’s most prominent volkekundiges, P.J. Coertze, concluded his book on Die Afrikanervolk en die Kleurlinge [The Afrikaner volk and the Coloureds] with the following appeal to Afrikaners:

One cannot call [“the Coloureds”] a volk yet, but that they form a separate ethnic entity is beyond doubt [...] They are neither Bantus [sic] nor Whites [sic] but people with their own identity [...] It is imperative that they are now provided the opportunity to develop into a dignified ethnos alongside the other etnieë [ethnic
groups] in South Africa. It is our duty to help them in the fulfilment thereof (1983:138).

In his reaction to the FAK’s proposal of “separate development”, journalist Heindrich Wyngaard reminded readers of Rapport (2007/09/23) that ethnic mobilisation among Afrikaners had almost caused the then head of the SBA, Christo van der Rheede, to withdraw from the movement, which had been trying, since 2004, to establish an Afrikaans Language Council.\textsuperscript{264} Van der Rheede himself rejected the philosophy of Goosen and Rossouw as shameless paternalism. How could they claim, he asked, that an ethnic revival is the answer to poverty and underdevelopment in the “brown” community? As Van der Rheede saw it, the “nonsense of compartmentalising Afrikaans-speakers on the basis of ethnic, cultural-historical and unscientific assumptions is complicating [“brown”/white] relationships even further” (Die Burger, 2007/09/04).

The wife of Allan Boesak, Elna, was equally critical of Goosen and Rossouw. By advocating the idea of “Afrikaners as a unique cultural community”, Boesak argued, the FAK philosophers are slamming the door, in a breathtakingly unapologetic manner – which reveals much about their true intentions – in the faces of coloured/black Afrikaans-speakers. Now and then, they rub salt in the wound by opening the door just wide enough to leave a chink – when they need statistics, or a brown face, in order to imbue their Afrikaans language policy with just the right “colouring”, along with a sprinkling of plausible statistics (Beeld, 2007/03/02; translation by Alice de Jager).

The \textit{Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan} project did not survive much longer. \textit{Fragmente} was discontinued in 2005 and \textit{Die Vrye Afrikaan} in 2008. Johann Rossouw left for Australia to complete a PhD at the University of Melbourne.\textsuperscript{265} He was replaced as executive officer of the FAK (a position he held since 2007 in addition to the editorship of \textit{Die Vrye Afrikaan}) by Linette van der Merwe who, on assuming her

\textsuperscript{264} The council eventually came into being on 24 May 2008.
\textsuperscript{265} On his return in 2012, shortly after Pieter Duvenage had been appointed as head of philosophy at the University of the Free State, Rossouw joined the department as a lecturer.
duties, described *Die Vrye Afrikaan* as “an elitist political newspaper” and “a sorry mistake”:

Never again such a project! It cost the FAK a lot of money. I was among the few who recognised its value, and who published in it, but it went over the heads of ordinary people (*Rapport*, 2009/10/31).

She hit the nail on the head. Scholarly reflection is of little value for anyone whose aspiration it is, as Rossouw once put it, to inspire “the broad mass of Afrikaners [...] to break free from their withdrawal and alienation [and] to build a new vision and a new movement” (*DVA*, 2005/09/16:7). Community mobilisation of this nature – or, to call a spade a spade, nationalist mobilisation – requires for philosophy to be translated into appropriate ideology, which the *Vrye Afrikaner* managed to do, but also for ideology to be concretised, which they failed to do. To work effectively at a popular level, to quote Breuilly (1993:64) again, nationalist ideology needs simplification and repetition. In the words of Isabel Hofmeyr (1988), nationalist history needs to be popularised. A nationalist movement needs Eiselen and Prellers. By 2007, when commentators such as Charles Malan were expressing their support for the Eiselen of the new Afrikaner movement, the Prellers were already on the rise.

Perhaps the best example form the time of an Afrikaner activist initiative that did not “go over the heads of ordinary people” – an example of nationalist history popularised – was the De la Rey uprising (as it has been called). At the end of 2006, Bok van Blerk (the stage name of Louis Pepler) released a popular song of which no fewer than 200,000 copies were sold – an unparalleled achievement in the Afrikaans music industry.²⁶⁶ The lyrics of the song and the imagery of the accompanying video featured the experiences of the Boers on the battlefields of the Anglo-Boer War and the suffering of their wives and children in the concentration camps:

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On a mountain in the night
We lie in the dark and wait
In the mud and the blood
As rain and grain bag cling to me
And my house and my farm were burnt to the ground so they could capture us
But those flames and those fires now burn deep, deep within me

[CHORUS]
The Khakis that laugh
A handful of us against a massive force
With our backs to the cliffs of the mountains
They think it’s over for us
But the heart of a farmer [in Afrikaans: Boer] is deeper and wider, they will come to see
On a horse he comes, the lion of West Transvaal

[CHORUS]
Because my wife and my child are in a camp dying
And the Khakis are walking over a nation that will rise again

[CHORUS]
(Translation: The Weekender, 2007/03/18).

In the chorus – which was described at the time as “the most famous and most controversial South African chorus of the past decade or so” (The Weekender, 2007/03/18) – Boer-War hero General Jacobus Hendrik (Koos) de la Rey was called on to “come and lead the Boers”.

De la Rey, De la Rey, can you come and lead the Boers?
De la Rey, De la Rey
General, General, we will fall around you as one
General De le Rey
(Translation: The Weekender, 2007/03/18).

The general consensus among commentators was that the thousands of fans who sang along as if in a trance whenever they heard the song – whether at concerts or at barbecues – identified with the leaderless Boers. Contrary to what Charles Malan believed, intellectuals were not providing leadership, at least not at grassroots level.
As De la Rey fever was running high, Afrikaners in Pretoria took advantage of the popularity of the song and incorporated it in protests against government attempts to change the name of South Africa’s administrative and diplomatic capital to Tshwane. During August 2007, as the *Pretoria News* reported, the ANC organised a protest march to the Pretoria high court in a show of support for the name Tshwane. The Freedom Front Plus staged a similar protest but in support of the bid to prevent the council from changing road signs from ‘Pretoria’ to ‘Tshwane’. Led by singer Steve Hofmeyr, the 50-strong group sang *Die Stem* and the Bok van Blerk hit *De la Rey* to counter the ANC’s struggle songs (2007/08/29).

November saw a much larger demonstration when 10,000 people gathered on Church Square in Pretoria around the statue of Paul Kruger to hear their favourite Afrikaans singers in action. Among them was, again, the very popular Steve Hofmeyr, who had emerged in the course of the previous year as an ardent defender of the Pretoria name and of Afrikaner heritage in general. This time, Bok van Blerk himself gave a rendition of his song. The event, which was organised by AfriForum and sponsored by the Afrikaans newspaper *Beeld*, also included the launch of new songs composed in support of Pretoria’s name (*Beeld*, 2007/11/14; *The Times*, 2007/11/14; *Pretoria News*, 2007/11/19).

Within the framework of the adapted Leerssen model, the anti-renaming protests described here constituted activism in the field of *performance culture*. Their goal was to save that component of Afrikaner *material culture* which this study has termed the *linguistic landscape of Afrikaner nationalism*. The visibility of the Pretoria name was at stake, and with it Afrikaners’ “symbolic articulation and presence” (Schöpflin 2000:8). Before 1994, Afrikaner nationalist activism in the field of material culture entailed the “dedicatory [including the linguistic] investment of public space” (Leerssen 2006:571). Now, it had come to entail efforts to prevent the “disinvestment” of public space. Pretoria was, of course, the capital of the Boer republic of Transvaal and was named after the hero of the Battle of Blood River, the Voortrekker leader Andries Pretorius. The way in which DVA objected to the proposed renaming of the city during June 2005 is worth noting:
Pretoria is one of the few places in South Africa that came into being as a political act and not as the result of agriculture or commerce. It was a republican city. Later the city would be central in the anti-colonial and anti-imperial freedom struggle of the Afrikaners […] By rediscovering their anti-colonial, anti-imperial and republican traditions, [present-day] Afrikaners may reinvent themselves along with Africans in Pretoria (DVA editorial, 2005/06:9; emphasis in the original).

Consider also the following view that was expressed by Fransjohan Pretorius, a professor of history at the University of Pretoria, at a prestige FAK event during 2006. The topic of his lecture was “Afrikaners and the democratic future” and name-changing was one of the main focal points:

We can dispose of [names such as] Rietfontein, Bultfontein and Warmbad. But the ANC must be aware that Afrikaans names with a cultural-historical meaning are dear to us and that we wish to retain them. Of these, Pretoria, Potchefstroom and Lydenburg are three prominent examples (Beeld, 2006/09/18).

Today, not all activists in the field of Afrikaner material culture (including the linguistic landscape) identify the in-group to which they belong – the “we”/“us” – as Afrikaners. The ethnonym is absent from both the English and the Afrikaans websites of the Heritage Foundation where the activities of this organisation are summarised as follows:

The Heritage Foundation (Non-Profit Company) was founded in 2002 with the purpose of looking after endangered heritage objects, specifically those that the Afrikaans speaking [sic] people of the population consider of value. The Heritage Foundation raised ±R13.8 million [at the time of writing, £1=R14] towards the construction of the Heritage Centre on the grounds of the Voortrekker Monument Heritage Site, and also raised nearly R2.5 million for the Research Trust, to be awarded for relevant research. […] During 2010, the Heritage Foundation was fortunate enough to raise an amount of R3 million towards the rescue effort launched at the Nasionale Afrikaanse Letterkunde Museum en Navorsingscentrum [National Afrikaans Literature Museum and Research Centre] (NALN) in Bloemfontein. […] [T]he South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) appointed the Heritage Foundation to repair, maintain and control all Burger [civillian], Concentration Camp en [sic] Prisoner of War graves nationwide. An amount of R750 000 was provided to the Heritage Foundation by Government for the first year of the project. The Heritage Foundation already controls, and in many
cases owns various heritage sites nationwide that include; Danie Theron Memorial in Gatsrand (Gauteng), the Concentration Camp Cemetery in Mafikeng (North West), Bloukrans (KZN), Doornbult Camp and the Orange River Station (Northern Cape), and the Louis Tregardt Memorial in Maputo. […] Members of the public, who care about heritage conservation, can become members of the Heritage Foundation (emphasis added).267

It is difficult to tell the extent to which the emphasis on inclusivity as reflected in the wording “Afrikaans speaking [sic] people of the population” is mere lip-service. The “rescue” of the National Afrikaans Literature Museum and Research Centre might have been welcomed in non-Afrikaner circles, and it is unlikely that the government-funded grave restoration project would be confined to the last resting places of white Afrikaans-speaking concentration camp victims and prisoners of war. But Louis Tregardt was a Voortrekker leader; Bloukrans was the site where some 500 Voortrekkers were killed by Zulu warriors, then days after the murder of Piet Retief (Grobler 2001:108); and Danie Theron was a Boer War hero – “the hardest thorn in the flesh of the British advance” as Field Marshall F.S. Roberts described him.268 Moreover, the Heritage Centre is situated on the grounds of the Voortrekker Monument Heritage Site. Here, the remembrance of the Battle of Blood River continues to takes place on 16 December each year, albeit in a watered-down fashion. The Heritage Foundation is, ultimately, an Afrikaner organisation.

To conclude: The Afrikaner initiative of the 1990s to create a racially inclusive movement for the maintenance and promotion of the Afrikaans language was only partially successful. Within a decade, a significant segment of that movement had morphed into an exclusive Afrikaner movement. Afrikaner activism in the field of language, the lion’s share of which was aimed at the defence of the institutionalised status of Afrikaans, was complemented with activism in the fields of material culture and performance culture, of which a few examples were mentioned above. This was nationalist activism: it was informed by Afrikaner

nationalist mythology and it was aimed at the remobilisation of an Afrikaner identity through the revitalisation of Afrikaner “history”.

Afrikaner language activism has also been complemented with activism in the field of discourse. The centenary of the Anglo-Boer War, for example, spawned extensive literary activity, especially at a popular level. Like the “De la Rey” song, these novels and plays reactivated Afrikaner nationalist myths. But the most significant development in the field of discourse has been the re-mythologisation of Afrikaner history by mainstream Afrikaner historians (i.e., historians employed by universities). One of them is Jackie Grobler from the University of Pretoria. For the second chapter of his history of the Afrikaners, published in 2007 as Uitdaging en antwoord. ’n Vars perspektief op die evolusie van die Afrikaners [Challenge and answer. A fresh perspective on the evolution of the Afrikaners], he chose the title Die volksplanting [The planting of the volk] to depict the onset of European colonisation in southern Africa. Elsewhere, in a booklet celebrating Afrikaner monuments, Grobler describes the Cape Town statues of Jan van Riebeeck and his wife, Maria de la Queillerie, as follows: “The statue monument of Jan van Riebeeck commemorates the founder of the white [blanke in the original] society in South Africa” (2012:24).

The glorification of Van Riebeeck’s role in the history of South Africa is back in fashion. According to Johan de Villiers, emeritus professor and research fellow at the University of Zululand,

Jan van Riebeeck was a conscientious official of the [VOC] in the ten years he served at the Cape. His gumption, ability to adapt and negotiation skills on various terrains made him a pioneer. As leader of the community in Table Valley he acted fairly and justly. [...] His ungrateful job as commander in times of crises was not always properly appreciated by his contemporaries (local subordinates and his superiors abroad) (2012a:44).

This quote is from one of De Villiers’s contributions to Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. Van voortye tot vandag [History of South Africa. From pre-historic times to today]. Published in 2012 and funded, inter alia, by the Research Trust of the Heritage Foundation, this hardcover of 640 pages was the South African
Academy’s response to black-centric state school syllabi which, so the Academy claimed, were demonising the role of the Afrikaners in South African history. The aforementioned Fransjohan Pretorius was the editor, and Hermann Giliomee contributed six of the 29 chapters. Belying the title, a single chapter was devoted to South Africa’s pre-colonial history.

When reading what the book has to say about the Great Trek, one cannot help but recall S.J. du Toit’s attempt in 1877 to write *Di geskiedenis fan ons land in di taal fan ons volk* [The history of our country in the language of our volk]:

> With the Great Trek, private Afrikaner initiative assumed leadership relatively successfully for the first time in the 1830s. The emigration was marked by great suffering and sorrow, but it gave rise to a stronger sense of solidarity and identity. By the end of the nineteenth century, Afrikaners could look back proudly to the achievements of their forebears (Visagie 2012b:149). 269

Such interpretations of the Great Trek, I would argue, constitute a revival of the tradition in Afrikaner historiography which “has represented the Trek as a milestone in the development of conscious Afrikaner nationalism, portraying the Voortrekkers as ‘nationally aware Afrikaners’ [and] linking the Age of the [Cape] Patriots with the age of Paul Kruger”. As we have seen, however undemonstrable, in the strict sense, this proposition may be, its existence became of great significance historically in helping to build up the Trek as perhaps the central event in the evolution of an Afrikaner mystique (Davenport and Saunders 2000:53)

Eric Hobsbawm, who regarded it as “the primary duty of modern historians to be […] a danger [to nationalism]” would have been disappointed in his South African colleagues. 270 Quoting Ernest Renan, Hobsbawm reminded us in his final book that “[f]orgetting history or even getting it wrong is one of the major elements in building a nation” (2013:151). In the Afrikaner case, it seems,

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269 Johan Visagie is a research fellow of history at the University of Stellenbosch.
270 He would also have been disappointed, one must admit, by certain African nationalist histories of South Africa.
forgetting history and getting it wrong has become part of a campaign to reunite and preserve a nation that has lost its state.
CONCLUSION

To the late Eric Hobsbawm, both the Jewish and the Irish nationalist movements provided evidence that “problems of power, status, politics and ideology and not of communication or even culture, lie at the heart of the nationalism of language” (1992:110). If communication or culture had been the critical issue, he argued, Zionism would have opted for Yiddish – at the time a leading literary language spoken by the majority of the world’s Jews – and not for modern Hebrew. By the same token, Irish nationalism would have opted for English. The choice that Afrikaner nationalists faced at the beginning of the twentieth century was not entirely comparable to the one the Jews and the Irish had to make. Like Yiddish and English, Afrikaans was widely spoken. However, unlike these two languages, and unlike Dutch, it lacked a literary tradition. Afrikaans was a patois, a kitchen language, an inferior, debased tongue of questionable origin. And yet, as I hoped to have demonstrated in this thesis, the history of Afrikaner nationalism too proves that “problems of power, status, politics and ideology and not of communication or even culture, lie at the heart of the nationalism of language”.

Problems of power also lie at the heart of the Afrikaner-led Afrikaans language movement of the post-apartheid era. Afrikaners may have lost state and military power, but they still control a significant amount of cultural capital and, as Rebecca Davies (2009; 2012) has shown, material culture accumulated under apartheid. One way to secure these forms of power is through minority rights activism, including language activism. If not as an attempt to protect their own economic power, how is one to understand organised Afrikaner resistance against the ANC’s policies of affirmative action and so-called Black Economic Empowerment? Or Afrikaner projects in the fields of labour relations, poverty alleviation and technical education such as those that have been initiated by the trade union Solidarity? Afrikaners may have lost political “control over the means of symbolic production” (to borrow a phrase from Brenda Yeoh (1992)), but they
retained a fair degree of economic and legal control in this area. They can afford, for example, to take the government to court to prevent place name changes.

If not as an effort to retain their cultural or symbolic power (or their prestige), how is one to explain the legal challenges that have been brought by Afrikaners to prevent the renaming of places such as Pretoria, Louis Trichardt and Potchefstroom? The establishment of these towns, it should be borne in mind, marked the end of the story of the Great Trek – that core myth of Afrikaner nationalism. Was it not also a concern for national prestige that prompted an Afrikaner businessman to withdraw millions of rands’ worth of advertisements from a British magazine following the publication of an article which described Afrikaans as the “ugliest language in the world”?271 Finally, if not as a struggle for power, how is one to interpret the Afrikaner campaign for the preservation of the institutionalised status of Afrikaans, and then particularly the campaign for Afrikaans-only schools?

This study claimed that present-day Afrikaner struggles for power, such as those mentioned above, are nationalist struggles. To substantiate this claim, chapter 3 developed and defended a definition according to which nationalism need not be aimed at gaining and maintaining control of a state. Nationalism, as I defined it, is the desire of an ethnic community to preserve its identity and express itself collectively and freely through symbols and institutions (which may or may not include the state).

The formation and politicisation of an Afrikaner national identity, as has been argued, was the ultimate objective of the Afrikaans language and cultural movements of the late 1800s and early 1900s. By the 1930s, this goal had not been reached. Had all Afrikaners voted in the general elections of 1938 and 1943 as Malan-defined Afrikaners and not as South Africans (Smuts/Hertzog-defined Afrikaners) or as workers, they would have been in a position to take control of

271 Johann Rupert of Remgro and Richemont (Rembrandt). After the Oppenheimer, the Ruperts are the second wealthiest South African family. All these examples are discussed in Kriel (2010c; 2010d).
the state. But the “divinely-created Afrikaner nation”, as O’Meara succinctly sums it up, was “politically divided, culturally disunited, and wracked by severe class divisions” (1983:71). That was the reason why the Broederbond induced the rebirth of the Afrikaans language and cultural movement in August 1929 (at the founding congress of the FAK), and induced the birth of an Afrikaner economic movement a decade later in October 1939 (at the FAK’s first ekonomiese volskongres [economic volk congress]). The economic activists succeeded to create a cross-class alliance without which political power would have remained out of reach for the “purified” Nationalists. They had help from the cultural activists, in whose minds economics and politics were foremost most of time.

But volkseenheid [unity of the volk] alone would not deliver the political kingdom to the Afrikaners. In the long term, they could only govern themselves if they could make the political unit, in Gellnerian terms, congruous with the racial unit. That was what apartheid had hoped to achieve. It was a strategy, as Mahmood Mamdani (2009:142) explains it, that enabled a minority to rule over a majority through institutions that “unified the minority as rights-bearing citizens and fragmented the majority as so many custom-driven ethnicities”. Put differently, the ideology of apartheid made it possible for the minority to claim that there were “no majorities, only minorities”.

This continues to be the premise from which Afrikaner activist-ideologues – whether they style themselves as liberal multiculturalists or radical democrats or civic republicans – defend their case. They refuse to be called nationalists, most likely because the moral status of nationalism remains a highly contested issue, especially in South Africa. According to multiculturalists such as Patten and Kymlicka (2003:5), the global shift towards official recognition of language rights – and, one may add, the realisation that minority language maintenance may require ethnic mobilisation – have led to increased acceptance of the legitimacy of minority nationalism. In the contemporary Afrikaner case there seem to be certain conceptual, theoretical and explanatory advantages to calling a spade a spade and not, because it can be also used to kill people, “a tool for digging ground”.

295
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