

THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

PERFORMANCE, ENDORSEMENTS, AND TACTICAL SPENDING:  
ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF LEADERS AND PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA

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## DECLARATION

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I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work with the exception of the third paper “Tactical Spending and the Consolidation of Presidential Support in Transitional Mexico.” I co-authored this paper with Piero Stanig and certify that we divided the workload equally in terms of theoretical ideas, data collection, empirical analysis and writing up.

I also certify that this thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Nicholas Thompson. Contact details are available upon request.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## ABSTRACT

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This thesis investigates electoral accountability for incumbent leaders and their parties in Latin America. It addresses two central questions. First, it seeks to explain sources of contextual and institutional variation in the degree to which voters punish and reward incumbents. Second, it asks how voters hold incumbents accountable for other areas of government control besides the macro-economy. The first paper develops a framework of executive accountability as dependent on the degree to which the presidential candidate of the incumbent party is identified with the performance of the outgoing president. It differentiates between presidents running for re-election, successors, and non-successors. Estimating random-intercept random-slopes models on an original dataset, it shows different levels of accountability for the three types of candidates. The second paper examines whether endorsements from incumbent politicians to co-partisans lead to more electoral sanctioning. It uses a randomised experiment embedded in a national survey conducted in the run-up to the 2012 Mexican general election to demonstrate that Senate candidates endorsed by the outgoing president are held more electorally accountable. Using a difference-in-difference design, the third paper finds causal evidence of tactical allocation of federal funds to municipalities governed by co-partisans of the president in the run-up to the 2006 Mexican presidential election. It shows that voters rewarded the party in the federal government for these additional transfers to their municipalities by voting for the ruling party. Taken together, the three papers have important theoretical implications for the study of electoral accountability, comparative electoral behaviour, and the quality of democracy in Latin America.

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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ADN	<i>Acción Democrática Nacionalista</i> (Nationalist Democratic Action) – Bolivia
ALN	<i>Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense</i> (Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance)
ANR	<i>Asociación Nacional Republicana</i> (National Republican Association) – Paraguay
AP	<i>Alianza PAIS</i> (PAIS Alliance) – Ecuador
APSA	American Political Science Association
ARENA	<i>Alianza Republicana Nacionalista</i> (Nationalist Republican Alliance)
ATE	Average Treatment Effect
ATT	Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
BIIACS	<i>Banco de Información para la Investigación Aplicada en Ciencias Sociales</i> (Databank for Applied Social Science Research) – Mexico
C-90	<i>Cambio 90</i> (Change [19]90) – Peru
CATE	Conditional Average Treatment Effect
CBPS	Covariate Balancing Propensity Score
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfers
CEP	<i>Centro de Estudios Públicos</i> – Chile
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
CVAR	Compositional Vector Autoregression
DC	<i>Democracia Cristiana</i> (Christian Democracy) – Chile
DF	<i>Distrito Federal</i> (Federal District) – Mexico
D-in-D	Difference-in-Difference
FA	<i>Frente Amplio</i> (Broad Front) – Uruguay
FISM	<i>Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social Municipal</i> (Fund for Social and Municipal Infrastructure) – Mexico
FORTAMUNDF	<i>Fondo de Aportaciones para el Fortalecimiento de los Municipios y las Demarcaciones Territoriales del Distrito Federal</i> (Fund for the Strengthening of the Municipalities and the Communes of the Federal District) – Mexico
FPV	<i>Frente para la Victoria</i> (Front for Victory) – Argentina
FSLN	<i>Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional</i> (Sandinist Front of National Liberation) – Nicaragua
GAN	<i>Gran Alianza Nacional</i> (Grand National Alliance) – Guatemala
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IFE	<i>Instituto Federal Electoral</i> (Federal Electoral Institute) – Mexico
INEGI	<i>Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía</i> (National Institute of Statistics and Geography) – Mexico

# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MAS	<i>Movimiento al Socialismo</i> (Movement for Socialism) – Bolivia
MP	Member of Parliament
MRP	Multi-level Regression and Post-stratification
MVR	<i>Movimiento Quinta República</i> (Fifth Republic Movement)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA	<i>Partido Arnulfista</i> (Arnulfist Party) – Panama
PAN	<i>Partido Acción Nacional</i> (National Action Party) – Mexico
PAN	<i>Partido de Avanzada Nacional</i> (National Advancement Party) – Guatemala
PC	<i>Partido Colorado</i> (Colorado Party) – Uruguay
PC	<i>Primero Colombia</i> (Colombia First)
PJ	<i>Partido Justicialista</i> (Justicialist Party) – Argentina
PLC	<i>Partido Liberal Constitucionalista</i> (Constitutional Liberal Party) – Nicaragua
PLD	<i>Partido de la Liberación Dominicana</i> (Party of Dominican Liberation)
PLH	<i>Partido Liberal de Honduras</i> (Liberal Party of Honduras)
PLN	<i>Partido Liberación Nacional</i> (National Liberation Party) – Costa Rica
PNH	<i>Partido Nacional de Honduras</i> (National Party of Honduras)
PRD	<i>Partido de la Revolución Democrática</i> (Party of the Democratic Revolution) – Mexico
PRD	<i>Partido Revolucionario Democrático</i> (Revolutionary Democratic Party) – Panama
PRD	<i>Partido Revolucionario Dominicano</i> (Dominican Revolutionary Party)
PRI	<i>Partido Revolucionario Institucional</i> (Institutional Revolutionary Party) – Mexico
PRONASOL	<i>Programa Nacional de Solidaridad</i> (National Solidarity Programme)
PS	<i>Partido Socialista</i> (Socialist Party) – Chile
PSDB	<i>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira</i> (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy)
PSUV	<i>Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela</i> (United Socialist Party of Venezuela)
PT	<i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i> (Workers' Party) – Brazil
PUSC	<i>Partido Unidad Social Cristiana</i> (Social Christian Unity Party) – Costa Rica
SUR	Seemingly Unrelated Regression
U	<i>Partido Social de Unidad Nacional</i> (Social Party of National Unity) – Colombia
U.S.	United States
WDI	World Development Indicators

## INTRODUCTION

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General elections worldwide are considered referenda on the state of the economy and the performance of the government. During election campaigns, political commentators as well as members of the general public discuss how economic conditions affect the incumbents' electoral fortunes. In good economic times, incumbent politicians or their parties are considered to be a certain lock for re-election. In economic downturns, the challengers are thought to have a chance of making it to office. Voters, in short, are considered to focus on the performance of the macro-economy – or on their evaluations thereof – when casting a vote. In the words of Norpoth (1996: 317), “[t]here are signs that [economic voting] is hard-wired into the brains of citizens in democracies.”

Latin America is no exception to this electoral narrative, as the presidential elections in Bolivia in 2009, Chile in 2005, and Mexico in 2006 illustrate. According to journalistic accounts of these elections, incumbent parties were able to secure re-election due to the good economic times over which they presided. In the case of Bolivia, the media emphasised the fact that the country's economy had grown an average of 5.2 percent during Evo Morales' presidency, and that economic growth in 2009 had been the highest in all of Latin America – 3.5 percent in the midst of a global recession (*El País*, 3 December 2009; *Público*, 6 December 2009). In the Chilean case, post-election accounts underscored that the good state of the Chilean economy had been instrumental in securing the election of Michelle Bachelet, the candidate of the ruling *Concertación*<sup>1</sup> (*El País*, 29 January 2006). A newspaper editorial less than a month before the Mexican presidential election suggested that Felipe Calderón, the candidate of the incumbent *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN), would benefit from the “recovery of the Mexican economy, without any doubt, the central topic of the election.” (*El País*, 8 June 2006).


While economic conditions certainly helped incumbent parties achieve re-election in these three cases, the difference in the magnitude of economic voting between them was considerable. Figure 1 shows the probability of voting for the incumbent parties based on different levels of economic

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<sup>1</sup>The economic legacy of Lagos' presidency was impressive. During his time in office GDP per capita had risen from 4860 U.S. dollars in 2000 to 5903 in 2004. Unemployment had fallen from 9.7 to 8.1 percent, while the minimum salary had gone up by 29 percent. Minimum pensions, furthermore, had risen by 15 percent, and exports had more than doubled (Angell 2007: 113).

perceptions. The slopes for the three candidates are clearly different. The slope for the re-running Morales is the steepest, while the slope for Bachelet is steeper than the slope for Calderón. This comparative approach suggests a more nuanced view of economic voting than the straightforward accounts depicted in the media.

Figure 1: Economic Voting in Three Latin American Cases



*Notes:* Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evaluations of the national economy in Bolivia (Evo Morales), Chile (Michelle Bachelet), and Mexico (Felipe Calderón). The figure is based on binary logistic regression models in which the dependent variable is the incumbent vote, the main predictors are economic evaluations, and socio-demographic controls are included for gender, age, education, marital status, and socio-economic level. Estimations are for a non-married man between 18 and 24 years of age who has a university degree and is in the highest socio-economic category.

*Source:* *Latinobarómetro*.

What explains these differences in the magnitude of economic voting across these three cases and, more generally, across Latin America? In other words, why do voters hold incumbent parties more accountable for the performance of the government in some cases than in others? Do other factors besides perceptions of the national economy play a role in how voters punish and reward incumbents? This thesis explores how variation in the institutional and political context in which elections take place affects how voters reward and punish incumbent parties for their performance

in government. It also investigates the mechanisms by which voters hold incumbents accountable for other areas of government control besides evaluations of the national economy.

As my review of the literature will show, these questions are not new to political science. Yet, I provide new theoretical ideas to the electoral accountability debate, and investigate a region, Latin America, that until recently has been neglected by the accountability literature. In contrast to the classic view of retrospective voting, which suggests that voters hold parties collectively accountable for the performance of the government, the first two papers of this thesis argue that the identity of the candidates of the incumbent party matters for electoral accountability. These two papers show that voters hold incumbent parties more accountable in presidential and legislative elections when the candidates are closely associated with the performance of the outgoing government. The third paper – an in-depth study of the 2006 Mexican presidential election – shows how voters hold incumbents accountable for other areas of government control besides evaluations of the macro-economy. It demonstrates that the incumbent PAN allocated disproportionately more funds to municipalities ruled by co-partisans, and that voters rewarded the party for this behaviour. A simulation of the 2006 election shows that these additional funds were instrumental in securing the presidency for the PAN in an election that was decided by half a percentage point.

The arguments and evidence I present in this thesis shed light on the varying magnitude of economic voting demonstrated in the three cases above. These cases share several important features relating to the political context, which have been shown to mediate retrospective voting in previous studies. In all three cases incumbent parties did not enjoy a legislative majority, presidential and legislative elections were held concurrently, and the incumbent presidents were not policy switchers – i.e. politicians that run on a particular platform, but implement policies in the opposite direction. Yet, they differ in the type of candidate that ran for president. In Bolivia, voters could directly sanction Evo Morales for the policies of his government, as the president was running for re-election. In Chile, Michelle Bachelet had been president Lagos' favourite candidate in the *Concertación* presidential primary, and was running on a platform of economic continuity. In contrast, in Mexico the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderón, was an internal party opponent of president Vicente Fox, and was critical of several of the outgoing government's policies.

The remainder of this introduction is organised as follows. I first discuss the concept of electoral accountability, focusing on the distinction between selection and sanctioning models. I then discuss the major contributions of the economic voting literature, in particular regarding how the institu-

tional and political contexts in which elections take place mediate the magnitude of the economic vote. The following section presents the two central gaps in the literature that I address in this thesis. I argue that the literature has not convincingly addressed in which ways the relationship between incumbent politicians and the candidates of their parties affects how voters sanction incumbent parties, and has not paid enough attention to other areas of government control for which voters hold incumbents accountable. The subsequent section discusses the contributions of this thesis to the electoral accountability literature in Latin America. The introduction concludes by discussing the central questions of this study against the background of existing research.

#### THE STANDARD PERSPECTIVE ON ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

In this section I summarise the standard view on electoral accountability that emerges from the economic voting literature in established democracies. I first discuss the concept of electoral accountability, followed by the major contributions of the literature for our understanding of how the political and economic context of elections mediate the magnitude of the performance-based vote.

#### *Conceptualising and Measuring Electoral Accountability*

The degree to which voters hold incumbent governments accountable is a central concern of democratic theory. From a normative perspective, scholars have sought to justify representative democracy not only in the Curchillian sense as “the worst form of government, except for all the rest,” but as effectively superior in providing a combination of both representation and accountability (Sartori 1987; Manin 1997; Maravall 2007). The normative value assigned to accountability is so strong, that contemporary theorists of democracy treat representative democracy and accountability virtually as equals. For Robert Dahl (1971: 1), “continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens [is] a key characteristic of democracy.” Walter Lippmann (1925: 126) finds that “[t]o support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they seem to be going badly, this [...] is the essence of popular government.”



Accountability can be understood as an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between rulers and citizens “in which the former agree to keep the latter informed, to offer them explanations for decisions made, and to submit to any predetermined sanctions that they may impose” (Schmitter 2005: 18). This exchange of responsibilities has been conceptualised in terms of principal-agent theory, in which there is a relationship of delegation and accountability that goes from the voters to the civil servants through the elected representatives (Strøm 2003).

Theorists of democracy as well as empirical researchers agree that a central mechanism by which citizens can hold their representatives to account is the vote. At its core, the literature on electoral accountability treats voters as instrumentally rational actors. Since Downs (1957), it is standard to assume that individuals make vote choices based on their comparison of expected utilities for each of the main political parties. At the time of Downs’ groundbreaking publication, the notion that voters behaved as utility maximising agents constituted a significant departure from approaches grounded in social psychology (Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960). The utility maximising assumption became the basis of all subsequent research on electoral accountability (Kramer 1971; Stigler 1973; Ferejohn 1986).

By suggesting that voters were future oriented and that they compare the platforms of competing parties when deciding their vote, Downs pointed the way towards a rational model of electoral accountability based on the selection of competent politicians. In the “mandate” view of accountability, which he pioneered, voters use information about the past performance of the government – such as the state of the macro-economy – to assess the future competencies of the candidates (Stigler 1973; Alesina et al. 1997; Duch and Stevenson 2008). Building on these insights, formal models drew out the implications of rational expectations and competency signals for electoral accountability (Persson and Tabellini 1990; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995).

The fact that voters do not have any institutional devices to force incumbent politicians to adhere to promises, makes the concept of prospective voting inherently weak.<sup>2</sup> Politicians will often have incentives to deviate from the mandate, and may choose to do so in an unresponsive fashion, pursuing their own or a minority’s interests over the interests of the majority of the electorate (Stokes 1997: 215).<sup>3</sup> Politicians may also promise what median voters want to hear, in order to increase

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<sup>2</sup>An exemption may be the rule that allows for presidential recall. However, this is a costly process and most constitutions do not include this provision.

<sup>3</sup>However, policy switches will not always be unresponsive. As Stokes (1997: 215) suggests, politicians may act in what they believe to be the best interest of citizens, even if that is in their perceived self-interest as well. Circumstances may change in such a way that the implementation of the mandate is no longer best for voters.

their chances of being elected. They may then choose to pursue their preferred policies expecting that voters will become persuaded that this was the best course of action and therefore choose to re-elect them. As Manin et al. (1999: 38) point out, voters “may not like governments that betray promises, but they will not punish politicians who made them sufficiently better off by deviating from the mandate.”

In contrast to the selection model, the sanctioning model claims that voters use elections to judge the past actions of incumbents. As a famous quote by V.O. Key (1966: 61) suggests, “[v]oters may reject what they may have known; or they may approve what they have known. They are not likely to be attracted in great numbers by promises of the novel or unknown.” The sanctioning model assumes that voters are more concerned about actual outcomes than the particular means of achieving those outcomes. As Fiorina (1981: 8) puts it, “citizens care about *results* rather than the *policies* that produce those results.” The attractiveness of the punishment model lies in the fact that it does not demand much political sophistication from the average voter.

Nevertheless, the notion of retrospective voting is not exempt from problems either. According to Maravall (2007: 935), one potential flaw lies in the assumption that citizens can establish a threshold for re-electing incumbents that generates incentives for governments to be representative. This mechanism becomes extremely difficult under conditions of low clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993), or when information is concealed. According to Maravall, the notion of pure retrospective models in which no selection is involved at election times is also problematic.

While the literature has gained conceptual clarity by thinking of accountability both as a selection and a sanctioning device, empirically, the overwhelming majority of studies rely on measures of past government performance to measure electoral accountability. Most accounts of retrospective voting rely either on economic evaluations measured at the individual level (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; Anderson 2000; Hellwig 2001; Duch and Stevenson 2008), or on objective measures of the state of the economy – such as GDP growth, inflation or unemployment – measured at the aggregate level (Kramer 1971; Tufte 1978; Hibbs 2000; Samuels 2004; Hellwig and Samuels 2007).

Both ways of measuring the economic vote have advantages and disadvantages. The main strength of the aggregate measures is that they cannot be subject to the “endogeneity critique” that individual economic perceptions often face – I return to this issue below. Their main weaknesses are that they cannot capture the mood of the voters, and are only useful for estimating a single average magnitude of the economic vote across elections (Duch 2007: 811). The main advantages of the

individual measures are that, “if available for several different elections, [they] can be used to construct (and compare) estimates of the magnitude of economic voting in each election” (Duch 2007: 811). They can also be estimated controlling for other individual-level factors, making estimates more precise. However, they face the critique that, by being endogenous, they may be simply a measurement artefact.

### *What We Know About Electoral Accountability*

The early literature on economic voting assumed that the relationship between economic performance and the vote was an unquestionable empirical fact. Tufte (1978: 65) summarised this idea very succinctly: “[w]hen you think economics, think elections; when you think elections, think economics.” Not surprisingly, this early literature was mainly focused on finding the right way to model the economy-voter relationship. Some points of contention were whether to study the behaviour of individuals or the behaviour of aggregates, or whether voters react to growth, unemployment, or inflation. Scholars disagreed, furthermore, over whether individuals react to national economic performance (sociotropic voting) or their own economic situation (egotropic voting). As Anderson (2007: 275) suggests, the early literature was convinced that “a relationship existed between economics and political attitudes/behavior and that the “true” relationship between economic conditions and public support could be demonstrated if we only looked hard enough.”

In contrast to such early efforts, recent works claim that the economy-voter relationship is not as straightforward as originally assumed, suggesting it is contingent on both institutional and psychological factors. Regarding the latter, scholars argue that economic evaluations are not exogenous. According to Nadeau et al. (1999), and Sanders and Gavin (2004), the media’s presentation of economic developments, rather than objective changes in the economy, determines how citizens evaluate the economic performance of the government. Similarly, recent studies raise the concern that voters’ ideology or partisanship influences how they perceive the economy depending on whether a co-partisan is in power (Duch et al. 2000; Rudolph 2003; Zaller 2004; Evans and Andersen 2006; Stanig 2013). In sum, the literature focusing on psychological factors argues that citizens’ biased perceptions undermine the correct translation of actual economic conditions into voters’ economic evaluations.

In the past two decades, studies focusing on the institutional and contextual factors that mediate the economic vote have dominated the literature. The central finding of these studies is that the institutional and political contexts in which elections take place matter – in some cases a great deal – for how voters punish and reward incumbents. Powell and Whitten (1993) opened up the debate about the mediating effect of institutions with the concept of “clarity of responsibility.” Their cross-national study of established democracies demonstrates that there is more retrospective voting when voters can clearly identify who is responsible for policy outcomes, i.e. in high clarity situations. The highest clarity of responsibility is achieved when a highly cohesive majority party forms the government, controls the committee chairs, and enjoys a legislative majority in both chambers.

The theoretical underpinnings and results regarding clarity of responsibility identified by Powell and Whitten (1993) resonated positively with scholars of comparative economic voting. In the two decades since the publication of their seminal article, several studies confirmed that differences in the magnitude of the economic vote arise from variation in institutional and political context. Anderson (2000) and Hellwig (2012) demonstrated that there is more retrospective voting when viable alternatives to the incumbent government exist. Hellwig (2001) and Duch and Stevenson (2008) showed that democracies that are more integrated in the world economy enjoy lower levels of economic voting, because governments have less control over the management of the national economy. Hellwig and Samuels (2007) showed that voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to account under separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Within presidentialism, Samuels (2004) identified more retrospective voting when presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently. He argues that non-concurrence attenuates the impact of national factors, such as the macro-economy, on the vote.<sup>4</sup>

Recently, Kayser and Peress (2012) have shown in a highly original contribution that voters benchmark across borders: When only the economy in their own country contracts, voters punish their government much more than when the economies in many countries deteriorate. They thus show that the international context matters for the domestic vote. This effect “arises not from

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<sup>4</sup>According to Samuels (2004), when legislative and presidential elections are held concurrently, candidates for both positions have strong incentives to coordinate election campaigns, in order to benefit from organisational advantages and coattail effects (Golder 2006). This encourages voters to hold presidents and legislators accountable for the same things. In contrast, non-concurrence attenuates the impact of national factors, focusing voters’ and candidates’ energies on local (legislative elections) and personality issues (presidential elections) (Samuels 2004: 427).

highly informed voters making direct comparisons but from “pre-benchmarking” by the media when reporting on the economy” (Kayser and Peress 2012: 661).

## TWO CENTRAL GAPS IN THE LITERATURE

After reviewing the existing literature on electoral accountability, in this section I argue that there are two central aspects that have not been adequately addressed in the literature. First, empirical accounts of economic voting have, for the most part, assumed that voters hold incumbent parties collectively accountable for the performance of the government, without taking into account how intra-party factors – such as the identities of the candidates – may affect how voters assign responsibility for past performance. Second, studies have not paid enough attention to the mechanisms by which voters hold incumbent governments accountable for other areas of executive control besides the macro-economy – such as the tactical allocation of federal transfers from central to sub-national governments. I discuss these gaps in this section.

*Collective Party Responsibility*

The literature on electoral accountability generally assumes that voters hold incumbent parties collectively accountable for the performance of the government. From a normative perspective, modern political science has had a preference for collective party responsibility at least since the 1950s, when the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association published its influential report on the state of the American two-party system. The report emphasised the need for cohesive parties, and suggested that collective responsibility was contingent upon the cohesion of the party in power (Katz 2006: 35). A widely quoted passage of the report explained this idea very clearly: “An effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs” (APSA 1950: 1).

While the notion of collective party responsibility came to dominate political science in the 1950s, the origins of the concept go as far back as the 1830s. Martin Van Buren argued that parties would only render an important public service if they were organised around issues of principle

(White 2006: 10). Later, in 1900, Frank J. Goodnow made a more explicit case for collective party responsibility, claiming that “[t]he individual candidate must be sunk to a large extent in the party,” and that “[i]ndividual responsibility must give place to party responsibility” (cited in White 2006: 11). Others disagreed. Among the early critics, M.I. Ostrogorski (1910: 380) argued that collective responsibility “was not borne out by the facts,” while William Graham Sumner (1914) claimed that individual politicians and not parties could be held responsible for the actions of the government (cited in White 2006: 11).

Despite these critiques, the collective party ideal proved to be resilient. This was, to a large extent, due to its normative appeal. Strong party government, so the theory goes, gives voters a clear choice in election campaigns and endows the winning party with a clear mandate for governing (White 2006: 10). Moreover, collective party responsibility is the best antidote against irresponsible behaviour by party leaders. If parties are cohesive organisations led by a national party council who ensures that party responsibility flows from the top down – as the APSA report envisioned – parties should not be able to avoid responsibility for their time in office (White 2006: 11). At election time, voters can observe the official party line, and are thus able to hold the party accountable as a whole.

In the past four decades, the overwhelming majority of the empirical economic voting literature has adhered to the strong party government ideal. With few exceptions (Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Norpoth 2002; Campbell et al. 2010),<sup>5</sup> economic voting studies have assumed that voters hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the government’s record in office. As a result, most studies have not even accounted for the possibility that the magnitude of the economic vote may vary depending on the identity of the presidential or prime ministerial candidate (Erikson 1989; Powell and Whitten 1993; Hibbs 2000; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Fisher and Hobolt 2010). Yet, there are good reasons to believe that Ostrogorski was right when he claimed that collective party responsibility “was not borne out by the facts.”

As Ostrogorski’s (1910) pioneering study on parties in the U.S. showed, parties are not homogeneous organisations in which all party members hold the same views. Parties have factions, and these factions usually reflect different views about how to handle the affairs of government (Belloni and Beller 1976; Sartori 1976). Factions, moreover, fight for power with the ultimate goal of securing the top positions in general elections, which are the presidential and prime ministerial

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<sup>5</sup>These studies investigate whether there is more retrospective voting when American presidents run for re-election. The three papers find this to be the case.

nominations (Strøm and Müller 1999; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008; Samuels and Shugart 2010). The media often report primary elections as contests between the left and right factions, or between the conservatives and the moderates. Within parties, there are the *ins* and the *outs* that Lippmann (1925) described for the party system more generally. The *ins* are the party elite in charge of governing or in control of the key party posts, while the *outs* are the group of politicians waiting for their turn to take over the party reigns.

Moreover, in contemporary democracies, parties centre their election campaigns around their leading candidates, and the media report elections as if they were contests between leaders rather than between party organisations (King 2002; Karvonen 2010). During election campaigns, the media scrutinise every detail of the trajectories of the main candidates. A wealth of research in the past three decades has investigated a phenomenon called the ‘personalisation of politics,’ both in presidential (Miller and Miller 1976; Wattenberg 1991, Linz 1994; Bartels 2002), and parliamentary democracies (McAllister 2007; Costa Lobo 2008). Some of these studies find evidence that candidate specific variables are important predictors of vote choice, even after controlling for party identification (Andersen and Evans 2003; Johnston 2002).

There is, thus, growing evidence that candidates’ characteristics matter for vote choice. In this thesis, I argue that voters assign responsibility for past government performance based on the candidates’ identities. They assign more (less) responsibility for the executive’s past actions if the candidates are closely (weakly) identified with the policy outcomes of the outgoing government. In other words, voters hold incumbent parties – both in executive and legislative elections – more to account, if their candidates have close ties to the outgoing government than if they do not.

The first two papers of this thesis investigate how candidates’ characteristics affect how voters reward and punish incumbent parties. The first paper examines whether there is more performance-based voting in Latin America when the presidential candidate of the incumbent party is a re-running president, than when she is a successor or a non-successor. Successors are political allies of the outgoing president, while non-successors are internal party opponents of the president. The results show that re-running presidents are held more accountable than successors and non-successors. In open seat elections, successors are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than non-successors. The paper reveals that when there is a strong connection between the outgoing president and the candidate of her party, leaders’ reputations are transferred more to their successors. Empirically, the paper estimates random-intercept random-slopes models on an original dataset that combines

information on the different types of candidates with individual-level observations for 51 elections in 18 Latin American countries between 1995 and 2012.

The second paper explores whether endorsements from incumbent politicians to co-partisans increase the magnitude of the performance-based vote. Endorsements provide voters with specific information about the distribution of power within a party by signalling that the endorser has a hold over the candidates' nominations. Empirically, the study uses a randomised experiment embedded in a survey conducted two days before the 2012 Mexican general election. The study randomises the endorsements of the outgoing president Felipe Calderón to the Senate candidates of his party. The results show that voters who identify with the incumbent PAN assign responsibility for past performance in a different way than voters who do not identify with the party of the president. The latter hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the performance of the government, whereas among voters who identify with the incumbent party, the vote for the PAN Senate candidates is more tightly linked to the performance of the president when voters are exposed to a Calderón endorsement than when they are not.

#### *Accountability Beyond the Macro-economy*

As alluded to above, the economic voting literature has long justified relying purely on economic factors to measure electoral accountability, on the grounds that citizens have only limited willingness and capacity to process complex information about politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Since in most contexts the economy is the most talked-about issue in the public opinion, and most importantly during election campaigns, it is assumed that judging macro-economic performance is more straightforward for average citizens than judging other areas of government control. As Anderson (2007: 277-278) points out, “[a]ccountability rooted in economic voting thus constitutes a minimalist but nevertheless legitimate vision of democracy as a form of government that allows ill-informed electorates to exert a circumscribed measure of control through their ability to “throw the rascals out.””

In recent years, however, studies have speculated that the salience of the macro-economy is context specific. Cheibub and Przeworski (1999: 287) justify not finding positive results on the relationship between macro-economic performance and leader survival rates on the grounds that “voters [...] may decide to keep governments accountable for matters other than [macro-]economic.”



According to the studies that model the economy's salience, citizens base their vote more on economic factors when the economy is in a recession (Harrington 1989; Soroka 2006; Singer 2011), and less in cases of foreign policy crises (Wilcox and Allsop 1991; Edwards et al. 1995), and terrorist attacks (Bali 2007). In addition, some studies have found over the years that voters are primarily egotropic (Nannestad and Paldam 2000; Echegaray 2005) – i.e. they care more about their personal finances than the state of the national economy. Singer and Carlin (2013) show that voters emphasise personal finances over macro-economic outcomes more in contexts of under-development and extended poverty.

Given Singer and Carlin's (2013) finding, it is reasonable to expect voters in low-development countries to reward governments for allocating more funds to their own constituencies, as these additional funds are likely to have a strong impact on their personal finances (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Yet, despite the attention the American and comparative literatures have paid to distributive politics in the last decade, little is known about when and how voters reward incumbent parties in presidential elections for increasing spending. Most empirical studies focus either on detecting political favouritism in governments' transfers (Levitt and Snyder 1995; Larcinese et al. 2006; Lauderdale 2008; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008; Arulampalam et al. 2009; Brollo and Nannicini 2012; Albouy 2013), or on explaining the electoral consequences of government spending, irrespective of its allocation (Levitt and Snyder 1997; Lazarus and Reilly 2010; Kriner and Reeves 2012).<sup>6</sup> The third paper of this thesis uncovers the mechanisms that incumbent parties in the federal government use to politicise public spending, and also shows that voters reward them for this behaviour.

Studying the presidential election returns of political favouritism in federal spending is very important. First, it sheds light on how voters attribute responsibility for the behaviour of politicians in contexts in which there is one principal – the voting population – but potentially more than one agent – the president, members of parliament and mayors. It is not self-evident that incumbent presidents (or their party's nominee) should be rewarded or punished for actions that mainly affect local economies, and for which lower-level politicians, such as legislators and mayors, also claim responsibility (Kriner and Reeves 2012). In fact, the retrospective voting literature reviewed earlier

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<sup>6</sup>Studies of distributive politics in Latin America have examined the electoral effects of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes in Mexico (Díaz Cayeros et al. 2009; Díaz Cayeros et al. 2012; De la O 2013) and Brazil (Zucco 2013). These studies show that CCT beneficiaries are more likely to reward incumbent parties in presidential elections. However, scholars have found little evidence of political manipulation in the allocation of CCT programmes' funds in these two countries (Díaz Cayeros et al. 2012; Sugiyama and Hunter 2013), and in Latin America more generally (Díaz Cayeros and Magaloni 2009).

finds that executives are rewarded mainly for the state of the national economy, while the literature on distributive politics focuses on the electoral returns for legislators of delivering patronage (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Weitz-Shapiro 2012), pork (Samuels 2002), and government spending more generally (Levitt and Snyder 1997; Lazarus and Reilly 2010).

Second, examining the returns of the political manipulation of government spending also has normative implications. If governments allocate funds tactically to benefit co-partisans and harm opponents, and voters reward governments for this behaviour, this constitutes a perverse form of accountability, as governments are rewarded for the “wrong” reasons. If politicians become aware that politicising spending pays off, then incentives are created for politicians to continue this practice in the future. Moreover, profound political conflicts can arise over the manipulation of public goods, which are rooted in the losers’ perception that the political process was rigged against them. If the legitimacy of electoral competition rests on losers’ consent, as Anderson et al. (2005) claim, then manipulation of public spending can lead to the loss of electoral legitimacy by the losers’ rejection of the election result.

The third paper of this thesis finds causal evidence of tactical spending to the municipalities in the run-up to the 2006 Mexican presidential election, and shows that the incumbent party in the federal government was rewarded for this spending in the presidential contest. Using a difference-in-difference design, the paper shows that the party of the president allocated more funds to municipalities that had a co-partisan as mayor. The evidence indicates that these transfers were instrumental in securing the victory of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party in an election that was decided by a razor-thin margin. They were particularly important in increasing the PAN vote when they were allocated to deprived municipalities: The PAN vote shares were three percent larger in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than one standard deviation above the mean, than in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than one standard deviation below the mean. Simulations of the election results based on one of the regression models shows that if the federal government had not targeted transfers to aligned municipalities, the probability of a PAN victory would have been lower – 45.8 instead of 50.9 percent.

## ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

The link between economics and the vote has received considerable attention from studies investigating electoral accountability in advanced industrial democracies. A literature review from 2007 estimated the number of articles and books published at over 400 (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). However, the same cannot be said of transitional democracies, including Latin America. According to a literature review from 2008 (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008), the publications on economic voting in Latin America included only two cross-national studies (Remmer 1991; Benton 2005), and a few single-case studies on Peru (Stokes 1996; Weyland 2000; Kelly 2003; Arce 2003; Echegaray 2005), Mexico (Dominguez and McCann 1992, 1995; Brophy-Baermann 1994; Buendía 1996), Argentina (Remmer and Gélinau (2003); Canton and Jorrat (2002); Echegaray 2005), Chile (Panzer and Paredes 1991), and Venezuela (Weyland 1998, 2003).<sup>7</sup> These studies focused on asserting that the economy impacts the popularity of the president or the vote function of the incumbent party after controlling for other factors such as political violence, border conflicts, coups, and party identification.

The number of studies published on electoral accountability in the region has picked up considerably since 2008. In recent years, three cross-national studies have shed light on the particularities of economic voting in Latin America. Benton (2005: 417) argues “that thanks to years of economic adversity, Latin American voters have developed long, sophisticated economic memories,” and punish not only incumbent governments for economic downturns, but also non-incumbent parties that were previously in government. Non-incumbents are also punished electorally when electoral systems are permissive, and allow for the entry of smaller parties.<sup>8</sup> Johnson and Ryu (2010) show that there is greater electoral sanctioning when incumbent presidents break campaign promises.<sup>9</sup> They argue that “presidents who abandon their promises assert the executive’s responsibility for the economy and raise the salience of economic issues in the next election. Consequently, voters respond

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<sup>7</sup>Until recently, an important reason for the low number of studies on electoral accountability in Latin America was data availability. In the first years after the democratic transitions of the 1980s, the number of general elections that could be pulled together for analysis was small. As a result, researchers had to study single countries, and use a presidential approval function over a period of months (Buendía 1996; Stokes 1996; Arce 2003; Kelly 2003). This changed with time, as the number of democratic elections available for study increased, and as individual-level data became readily accessible.

<sup>8</sup>The author identifies this effect using aggregate-level data from 39 presidential elections across 13 Latin American countries between 1980 and 2003.

<sup>9</sup>Stokes (2001) has shown that several Latin American presidents implemented neoliberalism “by surprise,” by campaigning against free market reforms but later breaking their electoral mandate.

rationality to these policy switches, rewarding them when they succeed and punishing them when they fail” (Johnson and Ryu 2010: 1). Using individual-level data for 18 Latin American countries between 1995 and 2009, Singer and Carlin (2013) demonstrate that prospective voting predominates early in the election cycle, but retrospective voting is the norm at the end of presidential terms.

While these studies have provided new insights about electoral accountability in the region, there is still a lot of unexplained cross-national variation in the magnitude of the performance-based vote. In addition to investigating how candidates’ identities matter for electoral accountability, the first paper examines several institutional and political factors that have been found to mediate the economic vote in other contexts. The results only find partial support for the thesis that high clarity of responsibility leads to more electoral sanctioning (Powell and Whitten 1993), and do not find evidence of more retrospective voting in contexts of low trade dependence (Hellwig 2001), and when presidential elections are held on the same day as legislative elections (Samuels 2004). I return to these issues in the conclusion.

From a cross-national perspective, Latin America is a good region on which to test my theory about the relationship between incumbent politicians and their parties’ candidates. First, due to the existence of term limits, presidentialism offers greater variation in the type of candidates – re-running presidents, successors and non-successors – than parliamentarism. This is so because, in contrast to prime ministers, most incumbent presidents are not allowed to re-run. As a result, their parties have to either choose a candidate with close ties to the outgoing administration, or a candidate who offers an alternative project. Second, in Latin America, presidential nominations are not endogenous to economic perceptions or the popularity of the president. As I show in the first paper, when voters have positive evaluations of the performance of the government, candidates with close ties to the president are not more likely to be nominated than candidates without close ties to the president. This means that my measure of candidate type is not contaminated by endogeneity bias.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>This is not likely to be the case in parliamentary democracies. In good economic times, the prime ministerial candidate of the incumbent party is likely to be the incumbent prime minister herself. Why would a prime minister choose not to re-run when things are going well? Moreover, in many parliamentary systems prime ministers can call early elections and, not surprisingly, research shows that they do so when the economic cycle is looking upwards (Kayser 2005, 2006). In contrast, a candidate other than the prime minister is likely going to run in economic downturns, when the incumbent prime minister faces party internal pressures to step aside, and allow for the nomination of a new leader. The case of the incumbent Spanish prime minister, Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who in the midst of a severe recession chose not to lead his party into the 2011 general election, is a good example. It is likely that when incumbent prime

In addition, the study of Mexico in the first presidential term after democratisation (2000-2006) constitutes a very good case for investigating how voters hold the government accountable for increasing spending to the municipalities. First, it provides a unique opportunity to examine the strategies that “new” parties rely on to consolidate their electoral support after the opening of electoral competition. While a wealth of research investigates how authoritarian regimes use federal resources to remain in power (see Magaloni 2006 and Greene 2007, 2010 for the Mexican case), little is known about how parties previously in opposition to authoritarian regimes consolidate their support once they enter office. The third paper of this thesis demonstrates that the tactical allocation of federal resources, together with the control of local administrations, allowed the PAN to make electoral inroads in poor areas of the country, which were traditionally strongholds of the formerly authoritarian *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) and the leftist *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD). Second, in developing democracies like Mexico, the potential for political manipulation of federal resources is much larger than in consolidated democracies (Golden and Min 2013). As a result, it is more likely that the tactical use of federal monies may help swing an election in favour of the incumbent party, as this thesis shows to be the case in the 2006 presidential election.

#### A LOOK AT WHAT FOLLOWS

This thesis is an effort to explain, on the one side, why incumbent parties are subject to more retrospective voting in some contexts than in others and, on the other, to explain what voters hold governments electorally accountable for. It is also an effort to explore the implications of Latin American electoral politics for the quality of democracy in the region, and for democratic theory more broadly. Are incumbent parties held more electorally accountable when incumbent presidents run for re-election? Is there more retrospective voting when the presidential candidates of the incumbent party are successors rather than non-successors? Do endorsements from incumbent politicians to co-partisans lead to greater electoral sanctioning? In which ways do incumbent governments politicise the allocation of federal resources, and do voters hold them accountable for this? These are the questions this thesis sets out to answer.

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ministers step down, their parties nominate a candidate who is not closely associated with the outgoing government, i.e. a non-successor.

The central part of this thesis consists of three papers. In the first, I create a new dataset on presidential candidates in Latin America – included in Appendix 2 of that paper – which captures whether the presidential candidate of the incumbent party has strong or weak ties to the policies of the outgoing government. I match this information with an individual-level dataset that measures vote intention, economic evaluations, and presidential approval for 51 election years in Latin America. Matching these two datasets allows me to test whether the type of presidential candidate of the incumbent party has an effect on retrospective voting. In the second paper I conduct a survey experiment that sheds light on the degree to which voters hold the incumbent party in the 2012 Mexican general election more electorally accountable when the Senate candidates are endorsed than when they are not. The third paper analyses a dataset on federal transfers to Mexican municipalities that has not been investigated before. The analysis of this data shows that the government of Vicente Fox allocated disproportionately more funds to municipalities governed by co-partisans, and that voters rewarded the government for these additional funds. The thesis concludes with a summary of the main findings, and with a discussion of the theoretical, empirical and normative implications of the results.

## THE SUCCESSOR FACTOR: ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES

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### ABSTRACT

Do voters sanction incumbent parties collectively for the performance of the government, or do they hold politicians accountable individually? Most economic voting studies assume that voters hold the incumbent party collectively accountable, and that candidate-specific factors do not have an independent effect on how voters punish and reward incumbents. This paper develops a framework of executive accountability in which voters weigh the past executive's performance differently, depending on the degree to which the presidential candidate of the incumbent party is identified with the performance of the outgoing government. Focusing on Latin America, it differentiates between presidents running for re-election, successors – i.e. political allies of the outgoing president – and non-successors – i.e. party-internal opponents of the president. The paper shows that re-running presidents are held more accountable than the other two types of candidates, and that successors are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than non-successors. Empirically, the paper estimates random-intercept random-slopes models on an original dataset that combines information on the different types of candidates with individual-level observations from 51 election years in 18 Latin American countries.

*“On the one hand, I’m the candidate of the governing party. At the same time, I don’t need to take on the burden of being the government’s candidate. People know that my candidacy developed not only outside the government but in spite of the government.”* Felipe Calderón, *Houston Chronicle*, February 15, 2006. Quoted in Shirk (2009: 319).

## INTRODUCTION

In a mass rally on 2 October 2010, Dilma Rousseff, the candidate of the incumbent *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT), closed her electoral campaign for the presidency of Brazil. Dilma, as she is popularly known in her country, chose the city of Sao Bernardo do Campo, the industrial centre of the state of Sao Paulo, for her final campaign event. The choice of location was charged with symbolism – this was where her political mentor, Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva, had initiated his political career 30 years earlier. In the course of the campaign, the media had depicted Dilma as “Lula’s handpicked successor,” and essentially every media outlet had tied her name to Lula’s, the outgoing, term-limited president. According to a poll conducted days before the election, voters perceived that an administration headed by Dilma would guarantee the continuity of Lula’s economic and social policies (Hunter 2012: 227). This was not surprising given that Dilma had been until recently Lula’s Chief of Staff, responsible for drafting many of the government’s policies. On the night her campaign came to an end, she once more reminded her followers that she would continue the policies adopted by her mentor, in particular the popular *Bolsa Família* conditional cash transfer programme that had granted money to 11 million families. Three days earlier, in the last televised political advertisement before the election, Lula had made a final appeal in favour of his *protégée*: “Like me, Dilma loves the poor. When you vote for Dilma you are voting for me” (*MercoPress*, 2 October 2010).

A clear counter-example to Dilma’s campaign was the 1998 presidential election campaign of the incumbent *Partido Liberación Nacional* (PLN) in Costa Rica. During the campaign, the media emphasised the fact that José Miguel Corrales, the PLN presidential candidate, was an internal opponent of president José María Figueres, who had “kept his distance” from the outgoing administration (LAWR, 8 July 1997). As a member of the PLN left, Corrales was a staunch critic of neoliberalism, whereas the administration of his co-partisan had continued the market reform process initiated in the early 1990s. According to media reports, it was well known that Corrales



had “fundamental differences with President Figueres over economic policy” (LADB, 3 July 1997). Corrales, a member of parliament, had not occupied a cabinet position in Figueres’ administration, which made his appeal for change credible. In the party primary, he had defeated the candidate favoured by the president (Picado León 2007).

The cases of Dilma and Corrales are two examples of how parties fight election campaigns, and how the media report on them. They are, by no means, exceptional. In contemporary democracies, parties centre their national election campaigns around their leading candidate (King 2002: 4), and, depending on the leader’s trajectory, parties and the media emphasise different issues: If incumbents run for re-election, their campaigns emphasise their accomplishments, and the media hold their record in office under great scrutiny. In cases of no re-election, parties and the media underline the candidate’s<sup>1</sup> links – or lack thereof – to other prominent party figures, such as the outgoing head of government. As a result, voters are usually well aware of the identity and background of the candidate of the incumbent party.<sup>2</sup> As Felipe Calderón’s quote in the epigraph suggests, voters likely understand the difference between being the presidential candidate of the *incumbent party*, and being the presidential candidate of the *government*.

Despite the differences in trajectories of the candidates, the electoral accountability literature has not explored this internal party variation in any detail. With few exceptions, economic voting studies assume that voters hold the incumbent party collectively responsible for the performance of the government. As Samuels’ (2004: 426) study of presidentialism claims, “there is no reason why voters could not hold political parties as a whole and presidential governments as a whole [...] accountable in a retrospective voting fashion.” Yet, for collective party accountability to exist, a key condition must apply: Candidate-specific variables cannot have an independent effect on the magnitude of the economic vote. As the examples above show, this is a very demanding condition, given that, in some contexts, the candidate of the incumbent party has a stronger connection to the economic policies of the government than in others. Thus, by holding to the strong party ideal, the electoral accountability literature failed to account for the possibility that incumbent parties may avoid responsibility for their time in office by nominating a candidate with weak ties to the executive.

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<sup>1</sup>“Candidates” and “candidates of the incumbent party” are used interchangeably in this study. Unless otherwise noted, both terms are used to describe politicians seeking an executive position.

<sup>2</sup>By incumbent party, I mean the party of the head of government.

This study constitutes the first systematic attempt at understanding if, and under what conditions, the relationship between the candidate of the incumbent party and the outgoing president matters for electoral accountability. Do voters sanction incumbent parties collectively for the performance of the government, or do they hold politicians accountable individually? The paper theorises that voters do not hold incumbent parties collectively accountable, and develops a framework of executive accountability in which voters use the candidate's trajectory to assign responsibility for government performance. Voters assign more (less) responsibility for the executive's past actions if the candidate is closely (weakly) linked to the policy outcomes of the outgoing government.

Empirically, the paper focuses on presidential democracies in Latin America, but I expand on the external validity of my findings in the conclusion. While the prospect of evaluating politicians individually is not particular to presidentialism,<sup>3</sup> focusing on presidential democracies in Latin America has three main advantages: First, due to the existence of term limits, presidentialism offers greater variation in the type of candidate. In contrast to prime ministers, most incumbent presidents are not allowed to run for re-election. In this scenario, incumbent parties can either choose a candidate who is closely related to the outgoing administration, or a candidate who offers a fresh start. Second, in Latin America, the nomination of a presidential aspirant is not endogenous to the evaluation of the economy or the popularity of the president. As I show below, when voters have positive perceptions of the performance of the government, candidates with close ties to the president are not more likely to be nominated than candidates without. This means that my results are not contaminated by endogeneity bias. Third, by focusing on Latin America, home to almost half of the world's presidential democracies (Cheibub et al. 2010), I can build a homogenous dataset consisting of survey data based on an identically measured set of questions. This allows me to estimate a pooled multi-level model in line with Duch and Stevenson (2008).

The paper demonstrates that in Latin American presidential democracies, re-running presidents, and successor candidates – i.e. presidential candidates who have strong ties to the outgoing president – are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than candidates of incumbent parties who have no

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<sup>3</sup>There is, in fact, a growing literature on the personalisation of politics in parliamentary democracies (McAllister 2007; Costa Lobo 2008). Empirically, these studies explore the effects of leader images in countries such as Canada (Johnston 2002), the United Kingdom (Bartle and Crewe 2002; Bartle 2003; Andersen and Evans 2003), Israel (Rahat and Sheafer 2007), and Germany (Anderson and Brettschneider 2003). Some of these studies find that candidate-level variables are not significant predictors of vote choice once a party identification variable is introduced (Bartle and Crewe 2002; Bartle 2003; Anderson and Brettschneider 2003), while others do find that leader images have an impact independent of party images (Andersen and Evans 2003; Johnston 2002). None of these studies, however, look at the interaction between candidate-specific variables and government performance.

close links to the president – i.e. non-successors.<sup>4</sup> Thus, when there is a connection between the outgoing president and the candidate of her party – as there was between Lula and Dilma – leaders’ reputations are transferred more to their successors. Moreover, the paper shows that voters are attentive to intra-party dynamics and, in particular, to the cues they receive from party leaders and the media.

The paper is organised into six sections. I first discuss the existing literature on the effect of institutional and political contexts on the economic vote, and develop new hypotheses regarding the effect of candidate type on electoral sanctioning. The second section provides a detailed definition of the three types of candidates, and describes the criteria used to code each case. The third section presents the dataset, which combines original data on the different types of candidates with survey-level data. The fourth section presents the results and shows that the main expectations of the study are corroborated. The fifth section addresses threats to causal inference, including reverse causation and omitted variable bias. The final section summarizes the results, and discusses the normative implications of the findings.

#### WHAT DETERMINES ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY?

The question of what determines electoral accountability lies at the heart of democratic theory (Manin et al. 1999). Answers to this question are usually framed in terms of reward-punishment models of retrospective voting. In these frameworks, voters reward incumbents that perform well, and punish those that perform poorly. As Stokes (2001: 13) suggests, “voters use the past performance of the government to predict future performance and see the government as responsible for that performance.”

Yet, despite normative preconceptions that electoral accountability should exist, empirical studies show that the link between the economy and the incumbent vote is often weak and unstable (Lewis-Beck 1988; Paldam 1991). Scholars have been able to show that national differences in the magnitude of the economic vote arise from variation in institutional and political context: There is greater electoral sanctioning when there is high clarity of government responsibility (Powell and

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<sup>4</sup>I consider a presidential aspirant to be a successor when she is the preferred option of the outgoing president among the group of candidates seeking to clinch the presidential nomination of the incumbent party or coalition. Conversely, presidential candidates are categorised as non-successors when they are not the preferred option of the outgoing president.

Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999); when incumbent presidents “switch policies”<sup>5</sup> (Johnson and Ryu 2010); when viable alternatives to the incumbent government exist (Anderson 2000); when presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently in presidential systems (Samuels 2004); and when the economy is dominated by domestic relations rather than foreign trade (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Hellwig 2001). However, even after accounting for context, much instability remains (Anderson 2007; Dalton and Anderson 2011).

This paper argues that at least some of the variation in magnitude and remaining instability of the economic vote emerges from a failure to account for the identity of the candidate of the incumbent party. With few exceptions,<sup>6</sup> the economic voting literature assumes that voters hold incumbent parties accountable in the same way, irrespective of the identity of its leading candidate (Powell and Whitten 1993; Erikson 1989; Hibbs 2000; Fisher and Hobolt 2010; Hellwig and Samuels 2007). Since parties benefit from projecting an image of unity during election campaigns, the assumption is that even term-limited presidents “ought to convince voters that they share a personal and political affinity with their successor-candidate” (Samuels 2004: 426).

However, even if Samuels is right and outgoing presidents always try to persuade voters that they share an affinity with their parties’ candidate, it is not clear that they will be successful in persuading voters that this affinity is real if voters do not perceive the two politicians to share the same policy positions – most notably on the economy. Clearly, political parties are not monolithic entities in which every single party member holds the same views. We know at least since Ostrogorski (1910) that parties have different factions, and that these different factions are often a reflection of the cleavage structure that exists in society (Sartori 1976). Faction leaders and their supporters fight for power, and their ultimate goal is to secure the prime ministerial or presidential nomination (Strøm and Müller 1999; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008; Samuels and Shugart 2010). As a result, if the candidate who secures the nomination has no ties to the outgoing government – i.e. she belongs to a faction that advocates different policies from the ones put in place by the executive – the magnitude of the economic vote may be significantly dampened.

There is, in sum, good reason to believe that the identity of the candidate of the incumbent party matters for electoral accountability. I argue that the magnitude of the performance-based vote varies

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<sup>5</sup>Johnson and Ryu (2010) find that economic performance is more salient in Latin America when the incumbent president is a “policy switcher,” i.e. someone who runs on a particular set of policies, but implements policies in the opposite direction once in office.

<sup>6</sup>Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001), Norpoth (2002), and Campbell et al. (2010) test whether electoral sanctioning increases when American presidents run for re-election. The three studies find evidence in support of this hypothesis.

depending on whether a president runs for re-election, or whether the incumbent party nominates a successor or a non-successor. When incumbent presidents re-run, voters can directly punish the person in charge of running the government. There is no discrepancy between the policies of the government and the individual politician in charge of them. As Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001: 169) suggest, a “president running for re-election is the economic manager personified. Voters can look at his or her record in office and cast a ballot accordingly.” Voters’ ability to attribute responsibility is facilitated by the way incumbents run their campaign for re-election, and by the way the media report their campaigns: The candidates emphasise their achievements, and the media put their performance under great scrutiny. In addition, when presidents run for re-election, voters can use the incumbents’ past performance to predict the outlook of the future government’s policies.<sup>7</sup> Discounting major external shocks, voters can expect the president to follow a similar policy trajectory in her consecutive term.<sup>8</sup> Thus, I expect electoral sanctioning to be highest when presidents re-run.

When presidents do not re-run, the nomination of a successor signals to voters that the presidential candidate has at least some association with the policies of the outgoing government. Even if a successor candidate wanted to distance herself from the president – due for example to a weak economic performance – this attempt would likely lack credibility and the media and the opposition would remind voters of the connection between both politicians. Furthermore, when assessing an outgoing government’s record in office, voters can use the information about past performance to predict the policy outlook of the new government more effectively when the candidate is a successor than when she is a non-successor. The nomination of a successor gives voters greater certainty that the new government will follow a similar policy trajectory to the one already in place. In sum, I expect greater electoral sanctioning when the candidate is a successor than when she is a non-successor.

When incumbent parties nominate a non-successor, it is not evident to voters that the presidential candidate has a clear association with the performance of the government. Non-successors are intra-party opponents of the president, and usually do not share the same policy preferences as the

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<sup>7</sup>Most models of electoral accountability separate prospective from retrospective voting. Empirically, however, voters have only one instrument – the vote – to reach both goals. As a result, even “voters who use their vote prospectively have good reasons to rely on retrospective information” (Manin et al. 1999: 46). Along these lines, Duch and Stevenson (2008) rely on a retrospective voting question to develop a selection model of electoral accountability.

<sup>8</sup>Bartels (1988) finds that the past performance of U.S. presidents is a good predictor of their future performance. Similarly, Stokes (2001) finds that Latin American presidents who are re-elected for a consecutive term, do not make policy switches in their second terms.

outgoing government. In fact, most non-successors secure their parties' nomination by opposing the policies or the candidate backed by the president. Moreover, during election campaigns, the media usually highlight the fact that these candidates do not belong to the same faction as the president, or that they do not have the president's support. When assessing the executive's record in office, voters cannot use the information about past performance as effectively to predict the policy preferences of the new government. I thus expect the lowest levels of electoral accountability when incumbent parties nominate non-successors.

The discussion about the type of presidential candidates leads to the following hypotheses:

*H1: Electoral accountability is highest when incumbent presidents run for re-election.*

*H2: Successor candidates are held more electorally accountable than non-successor candidates.*

#### TYPES OF CANDIDATES IN LATIN AMERICA

As suggested in the introduction, the measure of *candidate type* proposed in this paper consists of three categories – *re-running presidents*, *successors*, and *non-successors*. I consider a presidential aspirant to be a successor when she is the preferred option of the outgoing president among the group of candidates seeking to clinch the presidential nomination of the incumbent party or coalition. Conversely, presidential candidates are categorised as non-successors when they are not the preferred option of the president. Empirically, two different scenarios describe how these candidates are nominated. In the first scenario, there is contestation for the presidential nomination, i.e. two or more candidates face or are scheduled to face each other in an internal election.<sup>9</sup> If the candidate who has the president's support wins the internal election, she becomes a successor. If, on the other hand, a candidate who is not supported by the president wins the internal contest, she becomes a non-successor. In the second scenario there is no contestation to determine the presidential aspirant. Successors are either handpicked by the president, or emerge out of an overarching consensus among different factions.<sup>10</sup> Non-successors, on the contrary, are handpicked by a faction that opposes the president.

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<sup>9</sup>The internal election is either a primary – open to at least all party or coalition members (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006) – or a contest in which only party delegates are allowed to vote.

<sup>10</sup>While neither handpicked, nor consensus candidates face internal contestation, there are differences between them. Consensus candidates do not face a challenger because they can gain enough support from different factions of the party. Handpicked candidates do not face a challenger because some party leaders are so influential that they can impose their preferred choice on the party.

Empirically, I code candidates as successors and non-successors based on five criteria:

1. Media and/or election reports document public statements of support from the outgoing president to a candidate during the nomination process. If the endorsed candidate clinches the nomination, she becomes a successor. If one of the candidates not receiving a public statement of support wins the nomination, she becomes a non-successor.
2. Media and/or election reports describe candidates seeking nomination as the preferred option of the outgoing president during the selection process. This is indicated by expressions like “favourite,” “*protégée*,” “preferred candidate,” “ally,” “confidant,” etc. Alternatively, candidates seeking nomination are described as opponents of the outgoing president. This is indicated by expressions like “rival,” “critic,” “opponent,” “defeated the preferred candidate of the outgoing president,” etc. If the former clinches the nomination, she becomes a successor. If the latter wins the nomination, she becomes a non-successor.
3. Even if expressions like “*protégée*,” “favourite,” or “rival” and “critic” are not used explicitly, media and/or election reports make it unambiguously clear whether the candidate is a successor or a non-successor. For each case I indicate the sources in Appendix 2.
4. In cases in which coalition governments nominate a single candidate, candidates who belong to the party of the president are coded as successors unless criteria 1 to 3 indicate otherwise. Candidates who do not belong to the party of the president are coded as non-successors unless criteria 1 to 3 indicate otherwise.
5. Candidates who have occupied positions of trust, like Chief of Staff or Minister of the Presidency are coded as successors unless criteria 1 to 4 indicate otherwise. Candidates that have not occupied such positions are coded as non-successors unless criteria 1 to 4 indicate otherwise.

The measure of *candidate type* proposed in this paper captures: a) the degree to which voters identify the presidential candidate with the performance of the outgoing government, and b) voters’ perceptions of continuity between two administrations of the same party. Focusing on the political relationship between outgoing presidents and candidates of the incumbent party in cases of no re-election has the advantage of providing a highly identifiable measure of intra-party variation, while still capturing differences in policy positions. Both presidents and candidates are highly visible figures who are heavily scrutinised by the media. When a candidate receives the support of the

outgoing president during the nomination process, voters are provided with a highly informative cue. In addition, Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) demonstrate that presidents' policy positions in Latin American presidential democracies differ systematically from their own parties' positions by being closer to the median voter in the electorate and the median party in parliament. This suggests that the distinction between successors – who are closer to the presidents' ideal points – and non-successors – who are closer to the incumbent parties' ideal points – also capture important differences in candidates' policy positions.

Table 1 describes the 51 cases analysed in this study. The first column reports the year and the country in which the election took place, and the second column the name and party affiliation of the candidate. The third column reports the type of candidate, i.e. incumbent presidents seeking re-election (15 cases), successors (19 cases), and non-successors (17 cases). The fourth column reports how each case was coded based on the five criteria described above. Columns five and six report the vote percentage obtained by each candidate,<sup>11</sup> and whether the candidate won the election. The average vote for re-standing presidents was 55.1 percent, for successors 38.9 percent, and for non-successors 37.5 percent. Re-running presidents were re-elected in 93 percent of the cases, while both successors and non-successors won 53 percent of the time. The seventh column reports whether the presidential candidate occupied a cabinet position in the outgoing administration, and the eighth column describes how media reports framed the relationship of the outgoing president to the candidate of her party.

Three main points emerge from Table 1. First, the operationalisation criteria allowed for a straightforward coding of the candidates as successors or non-successors. In 28 of 36 cases I relied on the first and second criteria, which means that the media consistently reported candidates as being presidents' "favourites," "*protégées*," "preferred candidates," "allies," or, alternatively, "rivals," "critics," "opponents," etc. I was able to confidently code the remaining eight cases by relying on the remaining criteria, which similarly provided unambiguous information (Appendix 2 includes a detailed description of each case).<sup>12</sup> Second, the fact that 84 percent of successors and 35 percent of non-successors held cabinet positions in the outgoing administrations, further underlines that successors were much more closely connected to the outgoing government than non-successors.

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<sup>11</sup>I report the first round vote for double-round systems.

<sup>12</sup>As a robustness check, I re-estimate the main models of the paper – shown in Table 2 below – without the eight cases for which I was not able to use the first two coding criteria. The results hold (see Appendix 6).



Table 1: Types of Candidates in Latin American Presidential Elections

Election	Candidate	Type	Oper.	Vote	Wins	Cabinet Minister	Media Description
Argentina 1995	Carlos Menem (PJ)	<b>R</b>		49.9	Yes		
Argentina 2007	Cristina Fernández (FPV)	S	1, 2, 3	45.3	Yes	No	Handpicked by President Kirchner
Argentina 2011	Cristina Fernández (FPV)	<b>R</b>		54.1	Yes		
Bolivia 2002	Ronald MacLean (ADN)	NS	2, 3	3.4	No	No	Defeats president's favourite
Bolivia 2009	Evo Morales (MAS)	<b>R</b>		64.1	Yes		
Brazil 1998	F. H. Cardoso (PSDB)	<b>R</b>		53.1	Yes		
Brazil 2002	José Serra (PSDB)	S	2, 3	23.2	No	Health	Close confidant / preferred candidate
Brazil 2006	Lula (PT)	<b>R</b>		48.6	Yes		
Brazil 2010	Dilma Rousseff (PT)	S	1, 2, 3, 5	46.9	Yes	Chief of Staff	Handpicked / political heir
Chile 1993	Eduardo Frei (C-DC)	S	4	57.9	Yes	No	Coalition: Belongs president's party
Chile 1999	Ricardo Lagos (C-PS)	NS	4	47.9	Yes	Public Works	Coalition: not president's party
Chile 2005	Michelle Bachelet (C-PS)	S	2, 3, 4	45.9	Yes	Health / Defense	President Lagos' preferred candidate
Chile 2009	Eduardo Frei (C-DC)	NS	4	29.6	No	No	Coalition: Not president's party
Colombia 2006	Álvaro Uribe (PC)	<b>R</b>		62.4	Yes		
Colombia 2010	Juan M. Santos (U)	S	1, 2, 3	46.7	Yes	Defense	President Uribe's heir
Costa Rica 1998	José M. Corrales (PLN)	NS	2, 3	44.6	No	No	President's internal opponent
Costa Rica 2002	Abel Pacheco (PSUC)	NS	2, 3	38.6	Yes	No	Defeats president's favourite
Costa Rica 2006	Ricardo Toledo (PSUC)	S	2, 3, 5	3.6	No	Chief of Staff	President's close confidant
Costa Rica 2010	Laura Chinchilla (PLN)	S	1, 2, 3	46.8	Yes	Justice	Favoured candidate / close confidant
Dom. Rep. 2004	Hipólito Mejía (PRD)	<b>R</b>		33.7	No		
Dom. Rep. 2008	Leonel Fernández (PLD)	<b>R</b>		53.8	Yes		
Dom. Rep. 2012	Danilo Medina (PLD)	S	3, 5	51.2	Yes	Chief of Staff	Consensus between main factions
Ecuador 2009	Rafael Correa (AP)	<b>R</b>		51.9	Yes		
El Salvador 1999	Francisco Flores (ARENA)	S	2, 3	51.9	Yes	Information	Backed by President Calderón
El Salvador 2004	Antonio Saca (ARENA)	S	2, 3	57.7	Yes	No	Openly supported by president
El Salvador 2009	Rodrigo Ávila (ARENA)	S	2, 3	48.7	No	Head of Police	Imposed by President Saca
Guatemala 1999	Oscar Berger (PAN)	NS	3	30.3	No	No	Conflict with president Arzú
Guatemala 2007	A. Giammattei (GANA)	NS	2, 3	17.2	No	No	President's favourite withdraws
Honduras 1997	Carlos R. Flores (PLH)	NS	3	52.7	Yes	No	Different faction from president

(Continued)

Election	Candidate	Type	Oper.	Vote	Wins	Cabinet Minister	Media Description
Honduras 2001	Rafael Pineda (PLH)	NS	3	44.2	No	No	Different faction from president
Honduras 2005	Porfirio Lobo (PNH)	NS	3	42.2	No	No	Conflict with President Maduro
Honduras 2009	Elvin Santos (PLH)	NS	2, 3	38.1	No	No	Defeats President Zelaya's favourite
Mexico 2000	Francisco Labastida (PRI)	S	2, 3	36.1	No	Agricult. / Interior	President Zedillo's favourite
Mexico 2006	Felipe Calderón (PAN)	NS	2, 3	35.9	Yes	Energy	Defeats president's apparent choice
Nicaragua 2001	Enrique Bolaños (PLC)	S	2, 3	53.6	Yes	Vice president	Handpicked by President Alemán
Nicaragua 2006	E. Montealegre (ALN)	S	2, 3	29.0	No	Finance	Supported by President Bolaños
Nicaragua 2011	Daniel Ortega (FSLN)	<b>R</b>		62.5	Yes		
Panama 1999	Martín Torrijos (PRD)	S	2, 3	37.8	No	Vice-min. Interior	Endorsed / <i>protégée</i>
Panama 2004	José M. Alemán (PA)	S	2, 3	16.4	No	Foreign Affairs	President Moscoso's chosen successor
Panama 2009	Balbina Herrera (PRD)	NS	2, 3	37.7	No	Housing	Beats president's supported candidate
Paraguay 1998	Raúl Cubas (ANR)	NS	2, 3	55.3	Yes	Finance	Beats president's endorsed candidate
Paraguay 2003	Nicanor Duarte (ANR)	NS	2, 3	38.3	Yes	Education	Staunch critic / defeats president
Paraguay 2008	Blanca Ovelar (ANR)	S	2, 3	30.6	No	Education	President's favourite candidate
Peru 1995	Alberto Fujimori (C-90)	<b>R</b>		64.4	Yes		
Peru 2000	A. Fujimori (Peru 2000)	<b>R</b>		49.9	Yes		
Uruguay 1999	Jorge Batlle (PC)	NS	2, 3	32.8	Yes	No	Defeats president's chosen candidate
Uruguay 2004	Guillermo Stirling (PC)	S	2, 3	10.6	No	Interior	Consensus between main factions
Uruguay 2009	José Mujica (FA)	NS	2, 3	47.9	Yes	Agriculture	Beats president's preferred candidate
Venezuela 2000	Hugo Chávez (MVR)	<b>R</b>		59.8	Yes		
Venezuela 2006	Hugo Chávez (MVR)	<b>R</b>		62.8	Yes		
Venezuela 2012	Hugo Chávez (PSUV)	<b>R</b>		55.1	Yes		

Finally, the last column indicates that the media followed the trajectories of the candidates and reported on their relationship to the outgoing president. Given the strong media effects identified in the literature on political communication (Sanders and Gavin 2004; Fridkin Kahn and Kenney 2002), it is not unrealistic to expect most voters to have been aware that successors were closely linked to the incumbent president, and that non-successors were not.<sup>13</sup> If voters were unaware about the identity of the candidates, it would be more difficult to detect the patterns of electoral accountability that I find.


Examples of prominent successors and non-successors include, in addition to Dilma and Corrales, Danilo Medina, and Balbina Herrera. Medina, a member of the incumbent *Partido de la Liberación Dominicana* (PLD), had the internal party support of president Fernández in the 2012 Dominican presidential election. In fact, his running mate was Fernández' wife, the First Lady Margarita Cedeño. Not surprisingly, Medina ran on a platform of continuity with the macro-economic policies of the outgoing incumbent (*El País*, 18 May 2012). He profited from the strong growth rates experienced under Fernández and won the presidential election with 51.2 percent of the vote against 46.9 for Hipólito Mejía of the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD).

The economic and political context was similarly favourable in Panama in 2009, with growth rates averaging over eight percent in the three years preceding the election (World Bank 2013), and president Martín Torrijos enjoying approval ratings of 53.9 percent (Dichter y Neira 2009). Despite these auspicious conditions, Herrera could not capitalise on the economic performance of the government. In the primary of the incumbent *Partido Revolucionario Democrático* (PRD), she defeated the Mayor of Panama City, Juan Carlos Navarro, whom the media described as Torrijos's candidate (LARR, March 2008). As the leader of the 'social democratic' faction within the PRD, Herrera was widely regarded as being further to the left of Torrijos, who had pursued market friendly policies. During the campaign, the media compared her to the leftist president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, with whom she, allegedly, had a close relationship. She lost by a landslide to the centre-right candidate, Ricardo Martinelli, 60.1 to 37.5 percent.

Figure 1 compares the probability of voting for the incumbent party when the candidate is a president seeking re-election (the Venezuelan Hugo Chávez in 2006), a successor (Medina) and a non-successor (Herrera). The y-axis reports the incumbent vote, while the x-axis reports economic perceptions (left panel), and presidential approval (right panel). The figure in the left panel is based

<sup>13</sup> As a robustness check, Appendix 2 summarises whether media reports described the candidates' economic and social policies as being of continuity, change, or a mix of both. Successors ran on a platform of continuity, while non-successors advocated a mix of continuity and change, or only change.

Figure 1: Incumbent Vote and Government Performance in Three Cases



*Notes:* Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evaluations of the national economy (left panel) and presidential approval (right panel) for a re-running president (Hugo Chávez), a successor (Danilo Medina), and a non-successor candidate (Balbina Herrera). Estimations are for a non-married man between 18 and 24 years of age who has a university degree and is in the highest socio-economic category. Slope A in the left panel is significantly different from B for *economy got better* ( $p=0.00$ ) but not for *economy got worse* ( $p=0.18$ ). Slope A is also significantly different from C for *economy got better* ( $p=0.00$ ) and *economy got worse* ( $p=0.00$ ). Slope B is significantly different from C for *economy got better* ( $p=0.00$ ) and *economy got worse* ( $p=0.00$ ). Slope A in the right panel is significantly different from B ( $p=0.00$ ) and C ( $p=0.00$ ), while slope B is significantly different from C ( $p=0.00$ ).

*Source:* LAPOP, and *Latinobarómetro*.

on binary logistic regression models in which the dependent variable is the incumbent vote, the main predictors are economic evaluations, and socio-demographic controls are included for gender, age, education, marital status, and socio-economic level. The panel on the right is based on the same regression, adding presidential approval as a predictor. The economic context is similarly favourable in all three cases, as Chávez also ran during an economic expansion.<sup>14</sup> The difference in slopes is large and statistically significant. Consistent with my two hypotheses, in both panels, electoral sanctioning is highest for the incumbent Chávez, while successor Medina is held more electorally accountable than non-successor Herrera.

The examples of Chávez, Medina, and Herrera illustrate how my theory works in individual cases. In the remainder of the paper I investigate these patterns of electoral accountability more systematically using time series cross-sectional data for the 18 Latin American countries over a period of 17 years (1995–2012).

<sup>14</sup>The Venezuelan economy had grown an average of 10 percent in 2005 and 2006 (World Bank 2013), and Chávez had approval ratings of 64 percent at the time of the election (*Latinobarómetro* 2006).

## DATA AND MEASUREMENT

This section introduces the data and the methods that I use to test the hypotheses outlined in the theory. I model the effect of candidate type, political context, and perceptions of government performance on the probability of voting for the incumbent party or coalition. I focus on presidential elections in Latin America, in the period between 1995 and 2012, for which individual-level data is available. Using individual-level data has two advantages. First, it allows to control for individual-level covariates, making estimates more precise. Second, it does not raise the usual ecological inference problems. Due to the hierarchical structure of the data, I estimate random-intercept random-slopes logit models.

The empirical study relies on data from four Latin American surveys: *Latinobarómetro* (34 studies), LAPOP (13 surveys), CEP (three surveys), and CSES (one study).<sup>15</sup> Between 1000 and 1800 respondents were interviewed in each survey.<sup>16</sup> Sixty-eight presidential elections were conducted in Latin America in the period under study – i.e. 1995–2012. However, 18 of these elections were left out of the final dataset.<sup>17</sup> In 12 cases, the party of the incumbent president did not field a presidential candidate from its own ranks, and did not join a coalition.<sup>18</sup> In a further six cases, surveys were conducted before the incumbent candidate was chosen, or after the new government had taken office.<sup>19</sup> In total, the dataset comprises 62041 individual observations from 51 different surveys.<sup>20</sup>

The dependent variable is a measure of national vote intention for the incumbent party or coalition. *Latinobarómetro* uses the standard formulation of: “If there was an election tomorrow/this Sunday, which party would you vote for?” The LAPOP, CSES, and CEP surveys ask for the names of the specific candidates.<sup>21</sup> The dependent variable is coded as binary in all models, in which 1

<sup>15</sup>Note that in contrast to Duch and Stevenson (2008) and Singer and Carlin (2013), I cannot use non-election-year surveys because the identity of the incumbent candidate has to be known to the respondents at the time the survey is conducted.

<sup>16</sup>In the few cases in which more than one survey was available for a particular election, I used the one which was conducted closer to the election date.

<sup>17</sup>Appendix 8 re-estimates the main models of the paper without the four cases that scored below 6 in Polity IV – Peru in 1995 and 2000, Ecuador in 2009, and Venezuela in 2012. The results remain virtually unchanged.

<sup>18</sup>These were the cases of Bolivia 2005, Colombia 2002, Ecuador 1996, Ecuador 1998, Ecuador 2002, Ecuador 2006, Guatemala 2011, Nicaragua 1996, Peru 2001, 2006, 2011, and Venezuela 1998.

<sup>19</sup>Argentina in 1999 and 2003, Bolivia 1997, Colombia 1998, Guatemala 2003, and Mexico 2012.

<sup>20</sup>I also included the case of Chile in 1993, for which individual-level data was publicly available.

<sup>21</sup>I re-estimate the main models of the paper using only the *Latinobarómetro* data. The coefficients on the main effects and on the interactions between *candidate type* and *government performance* remain in the same direction and very close to the point estimates using the whole sample of cases.

represents a vote for the incumbent party, and 0 represents a vote for any other party or candidate (following standard practice, undecided voters are excluded from the analysis). Forty-nine percent of respondents across all surveys planned to vote for the incumbent party.

The main predictors are measures of government performance, candidate type and the interaction between these two variables. I use two different measures of government performance. First, I use a standard economic sociotropic retrospective indicator for all 51 election studies included in the sample.<sup>22</sup> The consensus in the field is that assessments of the national economy generally trump pocketbook considerations (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Kiewiet 1983). The choice of a retrospective over a prospective indicator reflects the theoretical importance of the retrospective model (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981), and is also based on the recent finding by Singer and Carlin (2013) that in Latin America, prospective voting predominates early in the election cycle but retrospective voting dominates as the presidential term nears its end. Following Duch and Stevenson (2008; 2005), I recode the economic indicator into three categories – *worse*, *same*, and *better*.<sup>23</sup> Twenty-two percent of respondents in the sample thought the economy had improved over the previous year, 38.6 percent thought it had stayed the same, and 38.9 thought it had deteriorated. The crucial factor is that these proportions are balanced between cases of successor and non-successor candidates, as I show below.

The second measure of government performance is constructed for a subset of 37 surveys. The *Latinobarómetro* and CEP surveys ask respondents whether they approve or disapprove of the president. Respondents who approve of the president are coded 1, all others are coded 0. LAPOP asks respondents to rate the job performance of the president on a Likert scale. Respondents answering *good* and *very good* are coded 1, all others are coded 0.<sup>24</sup> In total, 48.3 percent of respondents in the sample approved of the performance of the president. By using *presidential approval* in addition to economic evaluations, I avoid reducing government performance to a pure economic measure. In fact, Singer (2011) demonstrates that the economy does not always figure at the top of voters' concerns. He shows that it is likely to dominate voters' evaluations under conditions of economic recession, volatility, and economic underdevelopment. In addition, all the models control for *gen-*

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<sup>22</sup>In six surveys – Argentina 2007, Chile 1993, 1999, and 2005, Guatemala 1999, and Guatemala 2007 – the sociotropic retrospective question was not available. In these cases I used questions about the current economic situation of the country.

<sup>23</sup>I re-estimate the economic voting models using a continuous measure of economic evaluations in which *better* and *much better* are coded 1, *same* is coded 0, and *worse* and *much worse* are coded -1. The substantive results do not vary when using the continuous variable (see Appendix 5).

<sup>24</sup>Two recent retrospective voting studies by Fisher and Hobolt (2010) and Hellwig (2011) also rely on presidential/government approval as measures of government performance.

*der*, *age*, *education*, *marital status*, and *socio-economic status* at the individual level<sup>25</sup> (see Appendix 1).

The key second-level predictors in all the models are the three different types of candidates – *re-running presidents*, *successors*, and *non-successors*. The models include further second-level predictors to account for variation in the political, institutional, and economic contexts of elections. Four dummy variables capture whether the party of the president is in a *majority situation*,<sup>26</sup> whether presidential elections are held on the same day as parliamentary elections (*concurrent elections*), whether presidential candidates are nominated via a *primary election*,<sup>27</sup> and whether incumbent presidents are *policy switchers*. In addition, I also account for the levels of *trade dependence* (measured as imports and exports as a percentage of GDP), and for the levels of *party system fragmentation* (measured as the effective number of parties that won seats in the previous election). Excluding these variables from the analysis could have an effect on the overall levels, though not on the nature of the performance-based vote (Singer and Carlin 2013). Therefore, I include these variables and interact them with the government perceptions measures.

Table 1 in Appendix 1 summarises the coding of each institutional and contextual dummy variable for each election year. Regarding the type of candidate, presidents ran for re-election in 15 cases, while successors were chosen in 19 cases and non-successors in 17 cases. As for the clarity of responsibility, the party of the incumbent president enjoyed a legislative majority in only 13 cases. This reflects the fact that most legislatures in Latin America are elected by proportional representation (Mainwaring 1993). Furthermore, most presidential elections – 40 in total – were held on the same day as legislative elections, and in 22 cases primaries were scheduled to nominate the presidential candidate. Finally, five incumbent presidents in the dataset were policy switchers.

## ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This study employs multi-level models to test whether performance-based voting is conditioned on known contextual variables such as the type of candidate and the majority status of the government.

<sup>25</sup>I re-estimate the main models of the paper controlling for left-right self-placement on a subset of cases for which this variable is available (see Appendix 7). After controlling for this variable, the point estimates on the main effects and on the interactions between *candidate type* and *government performance* remain in the same direction and very close to the values reported in Table 2 below.

<sup>26</sup>Presidents are in a majority position whenever their party enjoys a legislative majority in both chambers (in cases of bicameralism) or only in one chamber (in cases of unicameralism).

<sup>27</sup>Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006) show that candidates nominated via primaries get a ‘primary bonus.’ I define as primaries elections in which at least all party members are allowed to vote.

My approach follows Duch and Stevenson (2008; 2005), in that I pull multiple individual-level surveys from different sources. For the pooled strategy to be effective, variables need to be identically measured. In the case of this study, this is not a constraint, because the wording of the question and response sets in the different election studies are similar enough as to be represented by a single variable (Duch and Stevenson 2005: 392).

In this hierarchical structure, level-1 units are individual respondents and level-2 units are the surveys themselves. A set of individual characteristics, i.e. perceptions of government performance, affects vote choice, while case-specific variables, e.g. the type of candidate, predict differences in the effect of the individual-level variables across cases. I estimate random-intercept random-slopes models in which the individual-level evaluations of the economy and the performance of the president are allowed to vary from cluster to cluster.<sup>28</sup> Models like these have become standard in political science, and have been mainly used to study vote choice (e.g. Duch and Stevenson 2008; 2005; Huber and Stanig 2011; Kayser and Peress 2012), but also turnout (Ghitza and Gelman 2013).

Table 2 reports the results of the full models (the coefficients are on the logit scale).<sup>29</sup> The dependent variable is the vote for the incumbent party or coalition (1, 0), and the main predictors are *economic perceptions*, *presidential approval*, and the interaction of these two variables with the *type of candidate*. The first model uses *economic evaluations* as the indicator of government performance. This variable is broken into three dummies: *worse*, *better*, and *same*. Two of these, *worse* and *better*, are included in the models. The second model uses the dummy variable *presidential approval* to capture government performance, and includes *economic evaluations* as a control variable. The key second level predictor measuring the type of candidate is also broken into three dummy variables: *non-successors*, *successors*, and *re-running presidents*. *Non-successor* is the reference category.

In both models in Table 2, the main effects of the coefficients on the government performance measures are for a non-successor candidate. As candidates of the incumbent party, non-successors are expected to be associated, at least to some degree, with the performance of the government. Therefore, in Model 1, the two dummy variables *economy got better* and *economy got worse* are expected to be statistically significant and have opposite signs, with the former being positive and the latter negative. However, the results do not fully conform to this expectation, as the coefficient on the *economy got better* dummy is positive but not statistically significant at any conventional level.

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<sup>28</sup>The results do not change if random slopes are included for all the individual-level covariates.

<sup>29</sup>The models are estimated using the `xtmelogit` command in Stata.




Table 2: Candidate Type and Performance-based Voting

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	P> Z	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	P> Z
Economy Better	0.31 (0.35)	0.38	0.29 (0.08)	0.00
Economy Better*Successor	0.44 (0.18)	0.01		
Economy Better*Re-run	0.80 (0.22)	0.00		
Economy Worse	-0.91 (0.25)	0.00	-0.41 (.07)	0.00
Economy Worse*Successor	-0.36 (0.12)	0.00		
Economy Worse*Re-run	-0.64 (0.16)	0.00		
Presidential Approval			1.43 (0.77)	0.06
Presidential Approval*Successor			0.72 (0.36)	0.04
Presidential Approval*Re-run			2.30 (0.46)	0.00
Successor	-0.00 (0.28)	0.99	0.04 (0.37)	0.92
Re-running President	0.77 (0.35)	0.03	0.19 (0.49)	0.70
Economy Better*Majority Situation	0.35 (0.17)	0.04		
Economy Worse*Majority Situation	-0.17 (0.12)	0.16		
Presidential Approval*Majority Situation			0.62 (0.37)	0.09
Majority Situation	0.39 (0.27)	0.15	-0.05 (0.39)	0.89
Economy Better*Concurrent Elections	0.07 (0.18)	0.70		
Economy Worse*Concurrent Elections	0.29 (0.12)	0.02		
Presidential Approval*Concurrent Elections			0.37 (0.36)	0.30
Concurrent Elections	-0.43 (0.28)	0.13	-0.50 (0.38)	0.19
Economy Better*Primary	0.05 (0.17)	0.79		
Economy Worse*Primary	-0.13 (0.12)	0.30		
Presidential Approval*Primary			0.19 (0.37)	0.61
Primary	0.52 (0.27)	0.05	0.88 (0.38)	0.02
Economy Better*ENPS	-0.04 (0.04)	0.39		
Economy Worse*ENPS	0.11 (0.03)	0.00		
Presidential Approval*ENPS			-0.12 (0.09)	0.21
ENPS	0.06 (0.07)	0.41	0.13 (0.10)	0.18
Economy Better*Trade Dependence	-0.003 (0.00)	0.24		
Economy Worse*Trade Dependence	0.001 (0.00)	0.38		
Presidential Approval*Trade Dependence			-0.01 (0.01)	0.32
Trade Dependence	0.001 (0.00)	0.74	0.003 (.01)	0.62
Economy Better*Policy Switch	-0.07 (0.21)	0.73		
Economy Worse*Policy Switch	-0.22 (0.15)	0.14		
Presidential Approval*Policy Switch			-0.37 (0.58)	0.53
Policy Switch	0.17 (0.33)	0.61	0.33 (0.61)	0.59
Male	-0.16 (0.02)	0.00	-0.19 (0.03)	0.00
Age	0.02 (0.01)	0.01	0.00 (0.01)	0.63
Education	-0.11 (0.01)	0.00	-0.12 (0.01)	0.00
Married	0.02 (0.02)	0.39	-0.02 (0.03)	0.62
Socioeconomic Level	-0.02 (0.01)	0.18	-0.03 (0.02)	0.09
Intercept	-0.07 (0.55)	0.90	-1.32 (0.81)	0.10
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.74		0.86	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyBetter}}$	0.39		0.36	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyWorse}}$	0.26		0.33	
$\sigma_{\text{PresidentialApproval}}$			0.81	
Number of observations	38501		29313	
Number of elections	51		37	

This suggests that in cases of positive economic perceptions, voters do not identify non-successor candidates with the economic record of the government.

Model 1 provides a direct test of H1 and H2 using economic evaluations to measure government performance. Two main findings emerge from Model 1. First, re-running presidents are subject to higher levels of electoral accountability than successors and non-successors.<sup>30</sup> This constitutes evidence in favour of H1. Second, in line with H2, successor candidates are subject to more electoral sanctioning than non-successors. The *successor* dummy interacted with each of the *economic perception* variables, is statistically significant at the one percent level, and signed in the predicted direction.

Figure 2: Incumbent Vote, Candidate Type, and Government Performance



Notes: Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evaluations of the national economy (left panel) and presidential approval (right panel) for a re-running president, a successor, and a non-successor candidate. Estimations are for a non-married man between 18 and 24 years of age who has a university degree and is in the highest socio-economic category. The left panel is based on Model 1 in Table 2, while the right panel is based on Model 2. Slope A in the left panel is significantly different from B ( $p=0.07$ ) and C ( $p=0.00$ ) for *economy got better*, as well as from B ( $p=0.05$ ) and C ( $p=0.00$ ) for *economy got worse*. Slope B is significantly different from C for *economy got better* ( $p=0.01$ ) and *economy got worse* ( $p=0.00$ ). Slope A in the right panel is significantly different from B ( $p=0.00$ ) and C ( $p=0.00$ ), while slope B is significantly different from C ( $p=0.04$ ).

Sources: CEP, CSES, LAPOP, and *Latinobarómetro*.

The panels in Figure 2 show predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evaluations of the national economy (left panel) and presidential approval (right panel) for a re-running president, a successor, and a non-successor. The purpose of the figure is to show how the differences in the probability of voting for each type of candidate change as a function of economic evaluations and presidential approval. The panel on the left, which is based on the results of Model 1, shows that the three types of candidates are subject to different levels of economic voting. The three

<sup>30</sup>However, the difference in the interaction coefficient on *successors* and *re-running presidents* is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level for *economy got better*. I estimate these differences using the delta method.

slopes are statistically significantly different from each other. The slope for re-running presidents is clearly steeper than the slope for successors and non-successors, while the slope for successors is steeper than the one for non-successors. This illustrates the finding from the hierarchical model that re-running presidents, successors and non-successors are subject to different levels of electoral sanctioning.

Model 1 includes further institutional and contextual variables discussed in the economic voting literature. According to Samuels (2004), there is more economic voting when presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently. However, the results of Model 1 do not conform to this expectation. The *concurrent elections* variable, interacted with *economy got worse*, has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that the impact of negative economic evaluations on the vote is lower when presidents are elected on the same day as the legislature. Johnson and Ryu (2010) claim that there is more retrospective voting when presidents switch policies. Yet, there is also no support for this claim, as the *policy switcher* dummy, interacted with each of the *economic perceptions* variables, is not statistically significant.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, there is partial support for the thesis that high clarity of responsibility increases the size of the economic vote (Powell and Whitten 1993) – *majority situation* is statistically significant and in the expected direction when it is interacted with *economy got better*, but not when it is interacted with *economy got worse*. Finally, in contrast to Duch and Stevenson (2008) and Hellwig (2001), there is no evidence that presidents are held less accountable for the economy when elections take place in contexts of higher exposure to global economic forces. *Trade dependence* is not statistically significant when it is interacted with *economic perceptions*.

Model 2 examines the hypothesised impact of candidate type on performance-based voting, using *presidential approval* as the measure of government performance (*economic perceptions* are included as a control variable). The *economic evaluations* coefficients are statistically significant and in the expected direction. The main effect for the *presidential approval* variable is positively signed and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that voters identify non-successors only marginally with the performance of the president. More importantly, the coefficients on *successor* and *re-running president*, when interacted with *presidential approval*, are in the expected direction and statistically significant at the five and one percent levels, respectively. This is consistent with H1 and H2: Re-running presidents are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than successors and non-successors, while successors are held to greater account than non-successors. Model 2 also

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<sup>31</sup>This may reflect the declining prevalence of policy switching in my sample (only five cases).

accounts for the other contextual variables. However, none of these variables, when interacted with *presidential approval* reach statistical significance at the five percent level.

The panel on the right in Figure 2 shows predicted probabilities based on Model 2. The line for re-running presidents is clearly the steepest, while the line for successor candidates is steeper than that of non-successors. Re-running presidents get on average 37 percent more votes than successors, and 54 percent more than non-successors when voters approve of the president.

### *Summary of Results*

The evidence provided in this section is consistent with the main prediction of this study: The type of candidate has an effect on the magnitude of the performance-based vote. Electoral accountability is highest when presidents re-run. In cases in which the incumbent does not seek re-election, successors are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than non-successors. Regarding the other contextual variables, there is only partial evidence that the majority status of the government explains differences in the magnitude of the economic vote.

## ADDRESSING THREATS TO CAUSAL INFERENCE

In this section I address two threats to causal inference: Reverse causation and omitted variable bias.

### *Reverse Causation*

Retrospective voting models usually treat economic evaluations or government approval as exogenous with the implicit assumption that they reflect some objective measure of government performance. However, in recent years scholars have raised the concern that voters' political preferences may influence their perception of government performance depending on whether a co-partisan is in power (Duch et al. 2000; Evans and Anderson 2006; Zaller 2004; Stanig 2013). If evaluations of the government are not exogenous to party support, vote choice is potentially contaminated by problems of reverse causation. This could inflate or dampen the magnitude of the performance-based vote (Duch and Stevenson 2008), which in the context of this study would mean that no

clear conclusions can be drawn about overall or average levels of retrospective voting (Fisher and Hobolt 2010).

Yet, even if government evaluations are to a certain extent endogenous, it remains possible to make inferences about the micro-macro interaction terms found in my models. However, there are two different interpretations to these interactions. Fisher and Hobolt (2010: 362) hold that “[i]f the association between government evaluations and vote choice appears to be conditioned by a macro variable, it either means [...] that the strength of retrospective voting is affected by the macro variable, or that people’s partisanship affects their evaluations of government differently according to the level of the macro variable.” In the case of this study, this means that either performance-based voting is weaker when the candidate is a non-successor, or voters’ partisanship or personal affinity with the president affects their evaluations of the government less when the candidate is weakly connected to the president. Either way, my results indicate that voters assign different levels of importance to government performance depending on the type of candidate. For clarity of exposition, I follow Fisher and Hobolt in reporting and discussing my findings in terms of the direct interpretation.

While the political bias in retrospective evaluations has received most attention in the literature, there also are two ‘second order’ concerns with reverse causation in this study. The first concern is that the (expected) incumbent vote may cause the type of candidate and not the other way around. This would be the case if successors (non-successors) are only nominated when the outgoing president is positively (negatively) evaluated or if only presidents who expect to win re-election decide to re-run. The second concern is that the institution of re-election may be endogenous to the performance of the president. Ten out of 15 presidents in my dataset were able to re-run only after passing constitutional reform to allow immediate re-election.<sup>32</sup> The process of changing the constitution may focus the public’s attention on the president’s record, increasing the overall salience of the economy.

First, I address whether the nomination of a successor or a non-successor is endogenous to the popularity of the president and to the evaluations of the economy. Table 3 shows average economic evaluations and levels of presidential approval in cases in which presidential candidates are successors and cases in which they are non-successors. The differences are negligible. Economic evaluations are slightly better in election years with successors – the difference lies in the lower proportion

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<sup>32</sup>These presidents were Carlos Menem (Argentina), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Fernando H. Cardoso (Brazil), Álvaro Uribe (Colombia), Hipólito Mejía (Dominican Republic), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), Alberto Fujimori (Peru) and Hugo Chávez (Venezuela, twice).

Table 3: Economic Evaluations and Presidential Approval (In Percentages)

	Successors	Non-successors
Economy improves	18.8	19.3
Economy stays the same	40.3	36.9
Economy deteriorates	40.9	43.8
Presidential approval	41.4	47.0
Number of cases	19	17

of respondents who think the economy deteriorates – while the percentage of respondents who approve of the government is actually higher in election years with non-successors – 47 against 41.4 percent.

In addition I run a series of logistic regressions on the 36 cases in which there is no incumbent president re-running. The dependent variable is a dummy coded 1 if the candidate is a *successor* (19 cases), and 0 if she is a *non-successor* (17 cases). Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 have only one predictor, *economic evaluations*, measured as the percentage of respondents in each country who think the economy has improved, and the percentage of respondents who believe the economy has deteriorated in the previous year. The coefficients are not statistically significant, suggesting that *economic evaluations* do not predict whether a candidate is a successor or not.

Models 2 and 4 include further economic and political controls. The aggregate-level economic controls are *election year GDP growth per capita*, *change in the percentage of unemployed*, and the *log of the inflation rate*. The political controls are *party system fragmentation*, whether a *primary* is scheduled to nominate the presidential candidate, whether the incumbent party is a *personalist vehicle*,<sup>33</sup> the *age of the incumbent party*, and the *level of institutionalisation of the party system* – measured as the average age of all parties that gained more than 10 percent of the vote in the previous election.<sup>34</sup> None of the additional controls in these models achieve statistical significance.

Second, I look at potential endogeneity problems in the decision to run for re-election. When the economy is underperforming, presidents may anticipate a defeat and may choose not to re-run. There is, however, no evidence of such calculations taking place. In fact, incumbent candidates like Menem in Argentina, Cardoso in Brazil, and Mejía in the Dominican Republic re-ran in the midst of severe economic crises. The only president in the dataset who chose not to seek another term

<sup>33</sup>Appendix 3 explains how *personalism* is conceptualised and coded.

<sup>34</sup>Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999) have used this measure of *party system institutionalisation* in previous studies.

Table 4: Economic, Political Factors, and Successor Candidates

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z		Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z		Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z		Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	
Positive economic evaluations	-0.004 (0.03)	0.90		-0.07 (0.05)	0.19		-0.01 (0.02)	0.52		-0.003 (0.03)	0.90	
Negative economic Evaluations										0.17 (0.17)	0.31	
Per capita GDP growth				0.15 (0.17)	0.37					-0.08 (0.34)	0.82	
Change unemployment				-0.27 (0.38)	0.48					-0.21 (0.50)	0.67	
Inflation logged				-0.16 (0.56)	0.77					0.37 (0.38)	0.33	
ENPS				0.50 (0.37)	0.18					-39 (1.23)	0.75	
Primary				0.11 (1.29)	0.93					-1.01 (1.54)	0.51	
Personalist vehicle				-1.21 (1.53)	0.43					0.003 (0.01)	0.81	
Age party				-0.01 (0.01)	0.57					-0.01 (0.02)	0.51	
Party system institutionalization				-0.01 (0.02)	0.58					0.21 (2.22)	0.92	
Intercept	0.19 (0.67)	0.78		0.80 (1.86)	0.67		0.70 (0.96)	0.47				
Number of observations	36			36			36			36		
Pseudo R2	0.00			0.23			0.01			0.19		

despite being allowed to do so by the constitutional arrangements already in place is the Argentine Néstor Kirchner, who according to all indications would have been easily re-elected in 2007.<sup>35</sup>

Third, I address concerns regarding the endogeneity of the re-election institution. Ten out of 15 presidents in this study were only allowed to re-run after passing a constitutional reform in their first terms. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which poorly performing presidents would have been able to pass such reforms. Since institutions in Latin America are generally fluid, most popular presidents could have attempted to change the constitution in order to re-run. Moreover, after 1995 – the year in which my dataset begins – Latin American presidents could look back at the examples of Fujimori and Menem, who had been successful in passing reform and achieving re-election. Why would other popular or well-performing presidents not follow the same course of action?

I first address this problem by testing whether constitutional reform is endogenous to economic evaluations. In Table 5, I run logistic regressions on the 45 cases in which the constitutional rules previously in place did not allow presidents to seek another term.<sup>36</sup> The dependent variable is the dummy *re-run after reform* which takes the value of 1 for presidents who re-run after changing their constitutions, and 0 for presidents who pass no reform and do not re-run (no president changes the constitution and later does not re-run). The predictors in Models 1 and 3 are *average economic evaluations* for all but the last year of a term-limited presidency – i.e. the percentage of survey respondents who think that the economy has improved in the previous year, and the percentage of respondents who think it has deteriorated – as well as the *personalism* dummy. I assume that constitutional reform will not be initiated in the last year of a presidential term, due to the proximity to the next election.<sup>37</sup> Models 2 and 4 include one further economic control – *per capita GDP growth* – and one additional political control – the *majority status* of the president's party.

Results in Models 1 and 2 show that economic evaluations up to the last year of a presidential term do predict constitutional change, as *positive economic evaluations* are associated with constitutional change at the five percent level of significance – *negative economic evaluations* is statistically significant at the ten percent level in Model 3. The party-level control is statistically significant and positive in Model 1 (at the ten percent level), and in Models 3 and 4 (at the 5 percent level of

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<sup>35</sup>Argentina had experienced a GDP growth of 8.65 percent in the year of the election, and Kirchner's approval rating was at 60 percent two months before the election.

<sup>36</sup>There is no individual-level data available for the first years of Menem's (1989-1995), Mejía's (2000-2004), and Fujimori's (1990-1995) first terms. As a result, the number of observations is reduced to 42.

<sup>37</sup>This is not an unrealistic assumption. No president in my dataset attempts to change the constitution in the last year of her presidency.



significance). This suggests that presidents from personalistic vehicles have an easier time changing their constitutions. This is not surprising considering the fact that outsider politicians have been particularly successful in changing their countries' institutional settings through plebiscitarian politics (Philip and Panizza 2011). None of the additional controls in any of the models reach statistical significance.

The fact that presidents who perform well at the beginning of their terms are better positioned to pass constitutional reform does not mean that they should also be significantly better evaluated by the time the following election arrives. Most of them pass constitutional reforms up to two years before running for re-election, which leaves enough time for the economic situation to change before the next election. In fact, former Dominican president Hipólito Mejía was able to change the constitution after a strong showing in a mid-term legislative election in 2002, only to lose his re-election attempt by a landslide two years later in the midst of a severe recession (Sagás 2005).

The models in Table 6 show that in the last year of their terms, presidents who change their constitutions to run for re-election are not significantly better evaluated than presidents who do not pass such reforms. The dependent variable is once again the dummy *re-run after reform* and the predictors are *economic perceptions* and *per capita GDP* on the year of the election, along with the other two political controls from Table 5. This time, *economic evaluations* are not statistically significant, while *personalism* remains positively signed and significant.

Table 5: Economic, Political Factors, and Re-election (First Years Effects)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z		Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z		Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z		Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	
Positive economic evaluations	0.14 (0.05)	0.01		0.14 (0.06)	0.02		-0.08 (0.05)	0.1		-0.07 (0.05)	0.17	
Negative economic evaluations										0.05 (0.15)	0.73	
Per capita GDP growth	1.93 (1.10)	0.08		0.02 (0.18)	0.93		2.32 (1.01)	0.02		2.14 (1.04)	0.04	
Personalist vehicle				1.82 (1.14)	0.11					0.48 (1.22)	0.70	
Majority situation				0.50 (1.26)	0.69					-0.13 (1.88)	0.95	
Intercept	-5.56 (1.63)	0.00		-5.55 (1.62)	0.00		0.45 (1.62)	0.78				
Number of observations	42			42			42			42		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.39			0.39			0.26			0.27		

Table 6: Economic, Political Factors, and Re-election (End of Term Effects)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z		Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z		Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z		Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	
Positive economic evaluations	0.05 (0.03)	0.12		0.04 (0.04)	0.22		0.02 (0.03)	0.50		-0.01 (0.03)	0.74	
Negative economic evaluations										0.08 (0.13)	0.52	
Per capita GDP growth	1.93 (0.85)	0.02		0.06 (0.13)	0.65		1.91 (0.84)	0.02		1.68 (0.89)	0.06	
Personalist vehicle				1.77 (0.89)	0.05					0.52 (0.95)	0.58	
Majority situation				0.23 (1.01)	0.82		-1.11 (1.11)	0.31		-1.72 (1.32)	0.19	
Intercept	-2.99 (0.96)	0.00		-2.97 (0.96)	0.00							
Number of observations	45			45			45			45		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.18			0.19			0.14			0.16		

Table 7: Constitutional Reform and Presidential Re-election

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Economy Better	1.26 (0.36)	0.00	1.12 (0.31)	0.00	0.29 (0.08)	0.00	0.22 (0.07)	0.00
Economy Better*Const. Change	-0.20 (0.25)	0.42						
Economy Better*Successor	-0.49 (0.25)	0.05	-0.32 (.21)	0.11				
Economy Better*Non-successor	-0.92 (0.26)	0.00	-0.76 (0.21)	0.00				
Economy Worse	-1.78 (0.26)	0.00	-1.65 (0.29)	0.00	-0.41 (0.07)	0.00	-0.38 (0.07)	0.00
Economy Worse*Const. Change	0.30 (0.19)	0.11						
Economy Worse*Successor	0.48 (0.19)	0.01	0.49 (0.18)	0.01				
Economy Worse*Non-successor	0.83 (0.19)	0.00	0.85 (0.19)	0.00				
Presidential Approval					3.55 (0.80)	0.00	2.94 (0.90)	0.00
Pres. Approval*Const. Change					0.25 (0.59)	0.67		
Presidential Approval*Successor					-1.44 (0.52)	0.01	-1.35 (0.55)	0.01
Presidential Approval*Non-successor					-2.17 (0.56)	0.00	-2.08 (0.58)	0.00
Constitutional Change	0.18 (0.42)	0.67			0.34 (0.62)	0.59		
Successor	-0.65 (0.42)	0.13	-0.78 (0.45)	0.08	0.04 (0.55)	0.95	-0.22 (0.54)	0.69
Non-successor	-0.65 (0.44)	0.13	-0.71 (0.45)	0.12	-0.01 (0.59)	0.99	-0.22 (0.57)	0.70
Intercept	-0.56 (0.59)	0.34	0.84 (0.67)	0.21	-2.64 (0.88)	0.00	-0.72 (0.89)	0.42
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.73		0.74		0.86		0.83	
$\sigma_{\text{Economy Better}}$	0.39		0.25		0.36		0.30	
$\sigma_{\text{Economy Worse}}$	0.26		0.23		0.33		0.33	
$\sigma_{\text{Presidential Approval}}$					0.80		0.82	
Number of observations	38501		31073		29313		24627	
Number of elections	51		41		37		31	

Having established that in the last year of their terms, presidents who change the law to re-run are not significantly better evaluated than presidents who do not make such changes, I investigate whether incumbent presidents who re-run after a constitutional reform are subject to different levels of performance-based voting than presidents who do not need to pass reform in order to re-run. I re-estimate the models from Table 2 adding a fourth category to the *type of candidate* variable for cases in which presidents re-run after a constitutional change. Model 1 in Table 7 reports interactions of the four different *types of candidates* with *economic evaluations*, while Model 3 reports interactions of the four *types of candidates* with *presidential approval*. In both models, the baseline performance indicator is for an incumbent president who seeks re-election without changing the constitution. The baseline performance variables when interacted with *constitutional change* are not statistically significant in either model. This provides evidence that incumbent presidents who change their constitutions to re-run are not held more accountable than presidents who do not need to make such changes to run again.

To provide an additional robustness check, I re-estimate the models from Table 2 only taking into account the six presidents that would have been allowed to re-run by the constitutional rules already in place – i.e. Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández in Argentina, Lula in Brazil, Leonel Fernández in the Dominican Republic, Alberto Fujimori in Peru (for his third term), and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (also for his third term). Since Kirchner did not seek a second term in Argentina in 2007, Models 2 and 4 in Table 7 repeat the full multi-level models from Table 2 with only five re-running presidents instead of 15. The substantive results do not change. Models 2 and 4 show that government performance still matters more when presidents re-run and when the candidate of the incumbent party is a successor rather than a non-successor. This suggests that the main findings hold, assuming that institutions such as term limits are exogenous and presidents cannot change them for their own advantage.

#### *Omitted Variables*

Omitted variable bias occurs when an omitted variable is a determinant of the dependent variable and is also correlated with one or more of the predictors. To rule out the possibility that an omitted variable could be causing the relationship between candidate type, economic evaluations and the incumbent vote, the models estimated in Table 1 are repeated with additional controls for various features of the political system and the economic context. *Personalism*, *age of incumbent party*,

*party system institutionalisation*, and *coalition* are four features of the political system that may be correlated with the type of candidate, while also explaining the incumbent vote (see Appendix 1 for a codebook). Since incumbent presidents leading personalist vehicles and/or recently established parties are less likely to face intra-party opposition, they may be in a better position to either change the constitution to run for a consecutive term, or to impose the nomination of a successor candidate. In a similar way, due to the absence of consolidated parties capable of putting a stop to their re-election attempts, incumbent presidents in weakly institutionalised party systems may be more successful in their attempts to change the constitutional rules to re-run. In addition, incumbent presidents may not be able to secure the nomination of a successor if their parties are in a coalition and, as a result, have to cede the presidential nomination to one of the coalition partners. Finally, three features of the economic context – *per capita GDP growth*, *change in unemployment*, and the *log of the inflation rate* in the year of the election – are expected to be correlated with economic evaluations.

Table 8: Main Effects with Additional Controls

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Economy Better	0.29 (0.36)	0.42	0.29 (0.08)	0.00
Economy Better*Successor	0.47 (0.17)	0.01		
Economy Better*Re-running President	0.85 (0.21)	0.00		
Economy Worse	-0.86 (0.26)	0.01	-0.41 (0.07)	0.00
Economy Worse*Successor	-0.34 (0.13)	0.01		
Economy Worse*Re-running President	-0.60 (0.16)	0.00		
Presidential Approval			1.56 (0.75)	0.04
Presidential Approval*Successor			0.54 (0.33)	0.1
Presidential Approval*Re-running President			2.10 (0.43)	0.00
Successor	1.50 (0.68)	0.03	2.49 (0.55)	0.00
Re-standing President	3.19 (0.93)	0.01	6.00 (1.06)	0.00
Intercept	-1.28 (0.76)	0.09	-3.01 (0.63)	0.00
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.63		0.41	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyBetter}}$	0.36		0.37	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyWorse}}$	0.25		0.33	
$\sigma_{\text{PresidentialApproval}}$			0.71	
Number of observations	38501		29313	
Number of elections	51		37	

To examine how these contextual variables condition individual-level voting behaviour, I interact the various features of the political system with the individual-level measures of government performance. I also include interaction terms for the aggregate-level economic controls and the type of candidate. Table 8 presents the results of these models.<sup>38</sup> The coefficients on the interactions between *candidate type* and *individual-level government performance* are essentially unaffected by the addition of these new variables – they remain in the same direction, are statistically significant, and are very close to the values reported in Table 2.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

A central claim of democratic theory is that democracy induces governments to be responsive to the preferences of the people. In modern representative democracies, governments are responsive because they are elected, and citizens exert influence over policy makers by holding them electorally accountable. Since political parties structure elections in most democracies, observers claim that voters sanction incumbent parties collectively for the performance of the government. This view of elections has become the dominant model of electoral accountability and has remained virtually unchallenged for over 50 years.

This study contests the notion of collective party responsibility. It develops a framework of executive accountability, in which voters use the candidate's identity to assign responsibility for government performance. Voters assign more responsibility for the executive's past actions if the candidate is closely linked to the policy outcomes of the outgoing government. Empirically, the paper focuses on presidential elections in Latin America between 1995 and 2012. The results show, first, that re-running presidents are subject to higher levels of electoral sanctioning than successors – i.e. political allies of the outgoing president – and non-successors – i.e. party-internal opponents of the outgoing president. Second, they demonstrate that successors are held more accountable for the performance of the government than non-successors.

Figure 2 displayed a graphic illustration of the main results. The slope for non-successors can be interpreted as the lower bound of party accountability, i.e. accountability associated with the party brand. The fact that this slope is not statistically significantly different from zero for *positive economic evaluations* suggests that when the economy is performing well, voters do not give credit to candidates without close ties to the executive. The slope for successors represents the upper bound

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<sup>38</sup>Appendix 4 includes a table with the output for all the additional covariates.

of party accountability, and the lower bound of individual accountability, while the slope for re-running presidents represents the upper bound of individual accountability. When a president runs for a consecutive term, her individual performance contributes to the accountability equation. In sum, the differences between the three slopes, and in particular between the slopes for successors and non-successors, confirm that voters do not hold incumbent parties collectively responsible for the performance of the government.

Taken together, these findings have important implications for our understanding of electoral accountability. The results suggest that presidents' reputations are not equally transferred to all the presidential candidates of the incumbent party or coalition. Thus, even if Samuels (2004: 426) was right, and presidents always tried "to convince voters that they share a personal and political affinity with their successor-candidate," at the very least, the results of this study show that presidents are not always equally effective in convincing voters of this affinity. Voters clearly consider whether candidates have close ties to the outgoing president, and take these ties into account when deciding their vote. Furthermore, the fact that different types of candidates are subject to different levels of performance-based voting is indicative of voters' sophistication. It suggests that voters are attentive to intra-party dynamics and, in particular, to the cues they receive from party leaders and the media. This is true even in Latin America, where voters have been described as poorly informed (Carreras 2013).

The results presented in this study also indicate that voters do not attribute responsibility for good and bad economic evaluations in equivalent ways: Voters punish all three types of candidates – even non-successors, to some degree – when they perceive deteriorating economic conditions, but only reward successors and re-running presidents when their evaluations of the state of the economy improve. This finding is consistent with previous literature that identifies a cognitive phenomenon called "negativity bias," by which individuals react more to negative than to positive stimuli of similar magnitude (Taylor 1991; Baumeister et al. 2001). Along these lines, Stanig (2013) shows that retrospective evaluations respond to economic downturns more strongly than to recoveries. In downturns, citizens of different ideological persuasions and partisan affiliations tend to agree that the economy is underperforming, while in recoveries, evaluations are polarised along partisan and ideological lines.

The foregoing analysis suggests that voters' evaluations of the economy and assessments of how good a job the president has done are not fully equivalent measures of 'government performance.' Voters hold incumbent parties in majority situations more accountable for the economy, but only marginally for the perceived performance of the president. This suggests that the context in which



elections take place matters more when the measure of government performance is economic evaluations, than when it is presidential approval. Why this is the case is not fully clear and leaves room for further research. However, one hypothesis comes to mind. It is likely that many voters approve of the president for reasons that are not directly associated with the policy performance of the government, but with other characteristics, like the president's charisma, or whether her party hands out particularistic benefits (Stokes 2005). For these voters, the political context in which elections take place may not matter as much as for voters concerned with the actual policy performance of the government. The latter may better understand the complexities of politics, and may therefore consider that presidents who have less political control over economic policies – e.g. because their party is in a minority in the legislature – cannot be held equally accountable as presidents who have more discretion over the policies that their governments can implement.

The results of this paper also have direct implications for the debate about the advantages of allowing presidents to run for consecutive terms (Carey 2003). I show that the re-election rule is an important tool for enhancing electoral sanctioning. As long as elections are not conducted in an “uneven playing field” (Levitsky and Way 2010a), the advantages of allowing presidents to run for re-election seem to be clear on normative grounds. Thus, if the re-election provision enhances accountability when used in the right context, we should start thinking about the stage in the process of democratic consolidation at which a country can start contemplating its introduction.

To conclude, regarding the external validity of the findings presented in this study, it needs to be pointed out that because presidential candidates campaign and are elected separately from the legislature, presidentialism may provide additional incentives for voters to hold individual politicians accountable independently from their parties (Samuels and Shugart 2010; Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009). Moreover, Latin America is a region in which several party systems are weak (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring et al. 2006) and individual politicians are very influential. Yet, there are no theoretical reasons to expect that the connection between the outgoing head of government and the candidate of the incumbent party would not matter for electoral accountability in parliamentary and mixed democracies as well. In fact, as suggested in the introduction, case studies of consolidated parliamentary democracies such as the United Kingdom and Canada find that leader images have an impact on the vote independently of party images (Andersen and Evans 2003; Johnston 2002). Thus, if voters in established parliamentary systems also take candidate-level factors into account when casting a vote, it is likely that they will assign responsibility for past performance differently depending on the identity of the candidate of the incumbent party.

## THE EFFECT OF ENDORSEMENTS ON ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A SURVEY EXPERIMENT

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### ABSTRACT

Do endorsements from incumbent politicians to co-partisans lead to more electoral accountability for the performance of the government? To answer this question, I use a randomised experiment embedded in a national survey conducted two days before the 2012 Mexican general election to examine the effect of endorsements by the outgoing president Felipe Calderón to the Senate candidates of his *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN). My results show that voters who do not identify with the PAN hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the performance of the government. In contrast, among voters who identify with the incumbent party, the vote for the PAN Senate candidates is more tightly linked to the performance of the president when voters are exposed to the Calderón endorsement than when they are not. I improve on the current standing of the accountability literature by showing that the relationship between an outgoing politician and the candidates of his party matters for electoral accountability. My results imply that during election campaigns, the strategic decisions of incumbent politicians have an effect on how voters assign responsibility: By nominating candidates without close ties to the endorser in cases of weak government performance, parties can use nominations strategically to diffuse responsibility.

## INTRODUCTION

In election campaigns, do prominent incumbent politicians transfer their reputation to all co-partisans in the same way, or do voters associate them more with certain candidates than others? This question is central to our understanding of democratic accountability. Yet, most economic voting studies assume that voters hold incumbent parties *collectively* responsible for the performance of the government, without accounting for the possibility that some candidates may be more closely associated with the reputation of incumbent politicians than others<sup>1</sup> (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981; Erikson 1989; Powell and Whitten 1993; Hibbs 2000). As a result, we lack a clear understanding of whether collective party responsibility exclusively dominates the accountability process, or whether individual reputations also shape how voters reward and punish incumbents.

A good way of uncovering whether individual reputations are transferred more to certain politicians is investigating whether endorsements from incumbents to co-partisans increase electoral accountability for government performance. There are very good reasons to think that endorsements affect how voters reward and punish incumbents. First, endorsements are a common feature of election campaigns, and incumbent politicians often endorse co-partisans running for lower-level offices. Given that the former already have a trajectory in government upon which voters can evaluate them, it is reasonable to think that incumbent parties<sup>2</sup> are held more electorally accountable when candidates are endorsed than when they are not.<sup>3</sup> I call this the “accountability effect” of endorsements.

Second, democracies around the world – both presidential and parliamentary – have become more personalised in recent years. The comparative party literature has devoted considerable attention to identifying (Wattenberg 1991; Poguntke and Webb 2005) and explaining (McAllister 2007; Rahat and Sheafer 2007; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) the “personalisation of politics.” According to these studies, voters are attentive to leaders’ characteristics in addition to (Andersen and Evans 2003; Johnston 2002), or even as a substitute of party platforms (Manin 1997). Not surprisingly,

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<sup>1</sup>In the words of the 1950 report of the American Political Science Association, collective party responsibility means “that parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves,” and that voters hold parties as a whole accountable for the policies they implement (APSA 1950: 1).

<sup>2</sup>By incumbent party, I mean the party of the endorsing politician – i.e. the president in this study.

<sup>3</sup>There are two underlying mechanisms to this. First, voters exposed to an endorsement are likely to associate the candidates of the incumbent party to the actual *past performance* of the endorsing politician. In addition, endorsements inform voters about the policy *preferences* of the candidates by signalling that their preferences coincide with those of the endorser, and thus suggest that they will adopt similar policies if elected. In both cases, endorsements increase the impact of the performance-based vote.

leaders' characteristics and attitudes shape public opinion more during election campaigns than at any other point during the electoral cycle (Barisione 2009). If voters indeed follow leaders' cues, as this literature suggests, it is likely that they are responsive to leaders' endorsements of co-partisans. Thus, the increasing personalisation of politics in all democracies suggests that voters are influenced by whether candidates have close ties to the leader or not.

Endorsements provide voters with very specific information about the distribution of power within a party: They signal that the faction of the endorser has a hold over candidates' nominations. This information is likely to have different implications for voters who do and voters who do not identify with the incumbent party. The former are likely to be more aware and care more about the differences between the factions of their own party. As a result, they may want to hold these factions accountable in different ways, and endorsements may allow them to do so. In contrast, voters who identify with other parties may not be informed or may simply not care about intra-party differences in the incumbent party. They may be more likely to hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the performance of the government. Given these expectations, this study also investigates the different effects of endorsements among voters who do and do not identify with the party of the endorsing politician.

I use a randomised experiment embedded in a national survey conducted two days before the 2012 Mexican general election to examine the effect of endorsements by the outgoing president Felipe Calderón to the Senate candidates of his *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN). My results show that voters who identify with the PAN assign responsibility for past performance in a different way than voters who do not identify with the incumbent party. The latter hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the performance of the government, whereas among *panistas*, the vote for the PAN Senate candidates is more tightly linked to the perception of the performance of the president when voters are exposed to the Calderón endorsement than when they are not.

This study improves on the current standing of the accountability literature by showing how the relationship between an incumbent politician and the candidates of his party matters for electoral accountability. In particular, my findings reveal that the magnitude of the performance-based vote depends, albeit to a limited extent, on the identity of the candidates, i.e. whether they are endorsed or not. This implies that during election campaigns, the strategic decisions of incumbent politicians have an effect on how voters assign responsibility. By nominating candidates without close ties to the endorser in cases of weak government performance, parties can use nominations strategically to diffuse responsibility for their past actions.

The findings of this study are of particular importance in contexts of term limits. The results suggest that in the absence of re-election, endorsements can compensate – in part at least – for the individual accountability effect that is lost due to an incumbent not re-running (Campbell et al. 2010). This is because the performance in office of a term-limited incumbent affects the success of candidates she endorses in future elections. In other words, the reputation of an outgoing politician is transferred more to the co-partisans she endorses. This process may be conceptualised as an “indirect accountability effect,” in the sense that it operates not on the incumbent’s own electoral success but on the success of endorsed candidates.

Conducting a survey experiment in the course of a general election campaign had one key advantage: Since cues are not expected to shape public opinion on straightforward issues and in contexts of high information such as a general election campaign (Druckman 2001; Kam 2005), any results identifying an accountability effect of endorsements are particularly significant, because they arise in a scenario in which such effects are least likely. Conducting an experiment among voters who were not aware that they were subjects in this experiment allowed me to maintain the internal validity of laboratory experiments that also study endorsements (Lau and Redlawsk 2001; 2006), while examining behaviour in a real setting (Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009).

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the literature on source cues and draws on studies of political persuasion to develop three competing claims that are later tested in the empirical section. I then describe and present the results of the experiment, and address alternative explanations. I conclude with a summary of the findings, and with some suggestions for further research.

#### ENDORSEMENTS AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

A large body of literature going at least as far back as *The American Voter* shows that citizens have, on average, minimal knowledge of, and interest in, politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Sniderman 1993; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). This finding is not exclusive to American politics: In contexts as different as Latin America and Europe, the public has also been described as poorly informed about politics (Carreras 2013; Reif and Schmitt 1980). In the last two decades, scholars studying political behaviour have examined the cognitive processes and efficiency mechanisms that help citizens to reduce the complexity of evaluating politics (Mondak 1993a; Druckman et al. 2013; Kam and Utych 2011). These studies show that a lack of knowledge about politics does not preclude citizens

from making reasoned choices (Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 2000), as they may use information shortcuts or heuristics, including endorsements, to compensate for information deficits (Nicholson 2012; Sniderman et al. 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).

A heuristic or cue is “a piece of information that allows individuals to make inferences without drawing on more detailed knowledge” (Druckman et al. 2010: 137). In judging either policies or candidates, citizens can use the statements of politicians that they trust as cues (Mondak 1993a). Alternatively, “they can consider the positions of interest groups whose policy preferences they are generally inclined to support or oppose” (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000: 155). In short, they can use endorsements to make reasoned choices without having to acquire deep knowledge of the issue at hand. There is ample empirical support in the literature for the notion that source cues – the political actors behind an issue – shape public opinion (Nicholson 2012; Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009; Arceneaux 2008; Boudreau 2009; Kam 2005; Lupia 1994; Mondak 1993a, 1993b; Lau and Redlawsk 2006).

In recent years, the literature on source cues has made important steps in identifying the conditions under which heuristics cause opinion change. Source cues have greater potential for opinion change on difficult or unfamiliar issues (Mondak 1993b), in situations of increased partisan polarisation (Druckman et al. 2013), and when citizens are unsophisticated (Boudreau 2009). While we are now confident about who can give or receive which cues and when (Boudreau 2009), some important aspects about how source cues shape public opinion remain understudied. One such aspect is the effect that endorsements have on electoral accountability for policy outcomes.<sup>4</sup>

This omission in the literature is surprising given that endorsements are a common feature of politics. Perhaps in no other context are endorsements more relevant than during election campaigns, where candidates receive endorsements from other politicians, interest groups (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Lupia 1994), and media outlets (Turner 2007; Ansolabehere et al. 2006). Regardless of who is the source cue, endorsements have one thing in common: The attempt to use a source’s reputation to successfully change citizens’ attitudes or behaviour. As Arceneaux and Kolodny (2009: 757) suggest, whether a candidate “has the backing of trusted political groups may communicate just as much about the candidate’s issue positions and job qualifications as an in-depth study of all available information.”

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<sup>4</sup>While a few studies examine whether endorsements diminish or enhance accountability for policy positions (Lupia 1994; Arceneaux 2008), the existing literature does not explicitly address the effects of endorsements on accountability for policy outcomes.

In the following, I derive two different sets of claims from the social psychology literature about how endorsements affect performance-based voting. The first one focuses on the general accountability effect of endorsements, regardless of partisanship, and suggests two contrasting arguments, namely that endorsements do and do not have an accountability effect. The second set of claims takes into consideration the different effects of endorsements among voters who identify with the party of the source cue, and voters who do not identify with the incumbent party.

The argument suggesting that endorsements increase the performance-based vote draws from studies in the tradition of the Yale communication programme, which argue that a group of variables relating to the characteristics of the source have great implications for whether the audience accepts a message or not (Janis and Hovland 1959). Along this line, Brady and Sniderman (1985) argue that citizens use a *likability heuristic* to estimate the ideological positions of political groups, following the cues of the groups they like, and rejecting the cues of the groups they do not like. Lupia and McCubbins (1998) focus on knowledgeability and trustworthiness, and show that citizens follow the advice of speakers whom they perceive to have these characteristics, while ignoring the advice of sources who lack them.

Based on these theories and findings, one can argue that past government performance operates in a way similar to the *likability heuristic* or trustworthiness: Voters follow the source cue more when they approve of her performance, and reject it more when they do not approve of her record in office. This implies that persuasion plays an important role in electoral accountability.<sup>5</sup> Voters who have higher levels of approval for the source are persuaded to vote for the incumbent party, while message recipients who do not approve of the source are not.

In contrast, other scholars claim that the public is not so easily persuaded, and that there are limits to the ability of source cues to move public opinion (Nicholson 2011). This line of research argues that endorsements only cause opinion change under particular circumstances, regardless of the source's likability, trustworthiness or past performance. According to these studies, source cues are only effective in shaping public opinion about difficult or unfamiliar issues (Mondak 1993b), and in contexts of low political awareness (Kam 2005; Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009), i.e. the means-oriented, technical and low-salience "hard issues" identified by Carmines and Stimson (1980). These contrast the high-salience ends-oriented "easy issues" that are easier for citizens to comprehend, and for which source cues are not expected to be effective.<sup>6</sup> The vote in a national

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<sup>5</sup>Lupia and McCubbins (1998: 40) define persuasion as "one person's attempt to change the beliefs of another."

<sup>6</sup>The idea that the effectiveness of source cues depends on the complexity or difficulty of an issue is consistent with theories of social and cognitive psychology. These theories propose two types of information processing: One less arduous

election fits the description of an “easy issue.” In sum, this stream of the persuasion literature suggests that source cues neither shape public opinion, nor have an electoral accountability effect in general elections.

With regards to the differential effects of partisanship, the social psychology literature suggests a third perspective about the effect of endorsements on electoral accountability. Endorsements may not have a homogenous accountability effect. In particular, in-party source cues may cause opinion change, but out-party source cues may not. For voters who identify with the party of the source, the incumbent vote may be more tightly linked to the source cue’s past performance in cases in which the candidates of the incumbent party are endorsed than in cases in which they are not. However, the same does not necessarily apply to voters who do not identify with the party of the source. These voters may simply hold the incumbent party collectively accountable.

Two different but related mechanisms could explain these heterogeneous accountability effects. The first one is related to how people view in- and out-groups. Research shows that individuals view their own group as holding diverse opinions on different issues, but view out-groups as holding homogeneous opinions (Quattrone 1986; Quattrone and Jones 1980). Based on this research, a voter who does not identify with the party of the source cue may think that everyone in the out-groups holds the same opinions, and may therefore hold the incumbent party accountable as a whole. In contrast, a voter who identifies with the party of the source cue may think that there are diverse views on key issues within her party. A statement of support by an incumbent politician may signal to her that the endorsed candidates are associated with the views held by the source cue. As a result, depending on her level of approval for the source cue, she may be more persuaded to vote for the incumbent party.

The second mechanism is linked to the fact that different groups of voters may have different levels of information about and interest in the intra-party politics of the incumbent party. Voters who do not identify with the party of the source cue are likely to be less informed and care less about the differences between factions and the role that they played in shaping policies for the out-party. As a result, the fact that some candidates are endorsed may not carry any weight. On the contrary, partisans of the source cue may not only view their own group as holding diverse opinions, but may also be more informed and care more about what the different individuals and factions within their

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relying on heuristics, and one more demanding requiring deep engagement of an issue (Chaiken et al. 1989; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Systematic processing requires individuals “to look beyond easily-processed information (such as source cues) and take the cognitive effort to interpret harder-to-process information, such as arguments that resonate with issue-relevant values” (Kam 2005: 165). Heuristic processing, on the contrary, is cognitively less demanding, largely ignoring the content of a message, relying instead on rules of thumb such as cues.



own party stand for and the role that they played in shaping policy. If exposed to an endorsement, they may want to hold their party more accountable for the performance of the government.

The second mechanism suggests that endorsements are activated as accountability mechanisms among voters who are more informed about the intra-party politics of the incumbent party. This stands in contrast to most of the literature on heuristics, which as suggested above, argues that cues are more effective in causing opinion change among unsophisticated citizens. It is, however, worth noting that there are dissenting views in this literature. Chaiken et al. (1989) argue that an information shortcut can only be effective and efficient if it is both accessible and activated in the individual's mind. Without the contextual information to gauge the political implications of a particular heuristic, individuals are not better off receiving than not receiving a cue (Zaller 1992; Lau and Redlawsk 2001).

The following section provides a brief overview of the Mexican political system and of the 2012 general election. The subsequent section describes the experiment and shows that the patterns in the responses of the subjects are consistent with the claim that endorsements have an accountability effect only among respondents who identify with the party of the incumbent president.

#### THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE 2012 GENERAL ELECTION

Mexico is a federal presidential republic consisting of 31 states and a federal district. The president – elected by plurality rule – and the senators serve six-year terms, while members of the lower house – the Chamber of Deputies – serve three-year periods.<sup>7</sup> The rules governing parliamentary elections are different in each chamber. The lower house has 500 members, 300 of whom are elected in single-member districts by plurality, with the remaining 200 members elected by proportional representation in five regional constituencies. The upper house elects 128 members, 96 of whom are in three-seat districts, and 32 in a nationwide PR-list.<sup>8</sup> A particularity of the Mexican political system is that immediate re-election is prohibited at all levels.<sup>9</sup>

In contrast to other Latin American party systems, which have experienced a process of partisan dealignment (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring et al. 2006), and have seen political outsiders rise to prominence in recent years (Carreras 2012), the three main Mexican parties have been

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<sup>7</sup>The lower house is renewed entirely at the midpoint of the presidential term.

<sup>8</sup>In the state constituencies two seats are awarded to the plurality winner and one to the first runner-up.

<sup>9</sup>Members of parliament, governors, and mayors can run for re-election after sitting one term. Presidents are not allowed to ever run again after serving one term.

able to monopolise political power at all levels. Together, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI), the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN), and the *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD) ruled every single state government, and controlled 92 percent of all lower and upper house seats at the time of the 2012 general election. In addition, the levels of party identification have remained constant across time and well above the Latin American average (Medina Vidal et al. 2010). As Table 1 shows, the number of Mexicans who identify with a party has oscillated between 60 and 70 percent in the last two decades. These numbers are similar to those of other OECD countries.

Table 1: Party Identification in Mexico, 1994–2012 (In Percent)

Year	PRI	PAN	PRD	Other	Independents	N
1994	45	21	9	2	23	4629
1997	31	13	12	3	41	2900
2000	38	23	9	0	30	2255
2003	28	22	8	5	37	1945
2006	25	22	22	0	30	2317
2012	24	18	15	4	39	12830
Average	32	20	13	2	33	

Sources: Medina Vidal et al. (2010), *Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica*

The 2012 electoral contest was the third free and fair general election since the 1996 electoral reform that granted independence to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Until that year, the authoritarian PRI was a hegemonic force, and the Mexican political system was characterised as one of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010b). Under this system, other parties, such as the main opposition party PAN,<sup>10</sup> were allowed to compete in elections and even win a few seats in parliament. The PRI, however, won every meaningful election,<sup>11</sup> often by engaging in electoral fraud.<sup>12</sup> A second serious challenger to the PRI's hegemony emerged in 1988, when a leftist faction of the party split off to form the PRD. However, it was not until 2000 that the PRI lost its 71-year monopoly over the presidency when Vicente Fox, the PAN presidential candidate, defeated the PRI's Francisco Labastida, by a six-point margin.<sup>13</sup> Six years later, the PAN was able to retain the presidency, in an election in which, for the first time, the PRI was not one of only two major players.

<sup>10</sup>The socially conservative and economically liberal PAN was founded in 1939.

<sup>11</sup>The PRI lost a gubernatorial election for the first time in 1989 in the state of Baja California.

<sup>12</sup>The most obvious case of vote rigging was the 1988 general election, in which a former PRI member, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, was prevented from winning the presidency.

<sup>13</sup>The PRI had lost its legislative majority in 1997.

The presidency of Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) was marked by the rise of violence originating from the Drug War among rival cartels fighting each other and the Mexican armed forces. According to conservative estimates, the death toll of the Drug War was at least 60,000 for the six years of the Calderón administration (*Washington Post*, 27 November 2012). Despite these dramatic figures, the president had approval ratings of 48 percent at the time of the 2012 election (Buendía y Laredo 2012). His administration had other accomplishments to show for: The Mexican economy had rebounded strongly from the 2009 economic crisis, growing 5.5 and 3.9 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively (World Bank 2013).

The 2012 general election was a major success for the PRI. In contrast to 2006, when the party nominated a representative of the old authoritarian guard, this time the party chose a member of the “new PRI.” Enrique Peña Nieto, a former governor of the state of Mexico, ran a media-savvy campaign that emphasised his accomplishments as governor from 2005 to 2011. His main opponents were the PRD’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador,<sup>14</sup> a former mayor of the federal district, and Josefina Vázquez Mota, a former minister of education and PAN congressional leader. Peña Nieto was ahead in the polls throughout the campaign, never by less than four percent, and most of the time by double digits. On 1 July, he obtained 38.2 percent of the vote, ahead of López Obrador who captured 31.6 percent, and Vázquez Mota with 25.4 percent.

The legislative election campaign followed a similar trend, with the PRI enjoying a comfortable lead over its two main rivals in the months leading to the election. Some polls even predicted that the PRI would win a legislative majority in at least one of the chambers. This, however, did not materialise. The formerly authoritarian party won 212 of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, with the PAN coming in second place with 114 seats, and the PRD coming in third with 104. The results were very similar in the Senate. The PRI was again short of a majority, capturing 52 of 128 seats, with the PAN and PRD obtaining 38 and 22 seats, respectively.

#### EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY EXPERIMENT

In order to test the three competing claims about the effect of endorsements on electoral accountability, I embedded an experiment within a survey during the 2012 Mexican general election campaign. The survey was conducted face-to-face by *Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica*, a polling company,

<sup>14</sup>In 2006, López Obrador lost the presidency against Calderón by less than 0.6 percent. He contested the election results and demanded a recount of all the votes. However, the electoral authorities denied a full recount and confirmed Calderón’s victory.

two days before the election. Between 400 and 410 respondents were interviewed in each of the 31 states and the Federal District, adding up to 12,830 respondents. The experiment used a between-subjects design in which respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment and a control group.<sup>15</sup> A randomisation check confirmed that the available covariates did not predict experimental assignment (see Appendix 1). Table 2 contains the specific wording used in each condition, with the differences between conditions presented in italics.

Table 2: Question Wording for Experiment

Control	Treatment
How likely is it that you vote for the PAN candidates for the Senate?	<i>Given that President Calderón is supporting the PAN candidates for the Senate</i> , how likely is it that you vote for them?
5. Very likely	5. Very likely
4. Somewhat likely	4. Somewhat likely
3. Don't know	3. Don't know
2. Not very likely	2. Not very likely
1. Not at all likely	1. Not at all likely

Given that the focus of this research is on electoral accountability, I use vote intention as the dependent variable.<sup>16</sup> Subjects placed their answers to the vote intention question on a five-point Likert scale. Respondents who answered *don't know* were placed at the centre of the scale.<sup>17</sup> As Table 3 shows, the percentage of respondents who report to be *very likely* to vote for the PAN Senate candidates is almost three points larger in the control than in the treatment group – 21.47 against 18.6 percent. On the contrary, subjects assigned to the treatment are one and two percent more likely to be in the *somewhat likely* and *somewhat unlikely* categories than subjects in the control group. The *very unlikely* and *don't know* categories are more balanced between treatment and control group.

<sup>15</sup>This means that two versions of the questionnaire were administered.

<sup>16</sup>Scholars investigating source cues have examined a variety of dependent variables. Policy opinion is the most common choice (Nicholson 2011; Nicholson 2012; Mondak 1993a; Kam 2005; Popp and Rudolph 2011), but some studies also use vote intention (Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009).

<sup>17</sup>The results generated by this approach are consistent with those generated by the alternative strategy in which subjects answering *don't know* are left out of the analysis (see Appendix 4).

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics – PAN Senate Vote

	Control Group		Treatment Group	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
Very likely	1375	21.5	1195	18.6
Somewhat likely	1787	27.9	1857	28.9
Don't know	598	9.3	568	8.8
Somewhat unlikely	779	12.2	920	14.3
Very unlikely	1865	29.1	1886	29.4
Total	6404	100	6426	100

To identify the causal effect of endorsements, respondents were randomly assigned to a control group that received no source cue and a treatment group that received a cue indicating that president Felipe Calderón was endorsing the list of PAN candidates for the Senate (see Table 2). I chose an incumbent politician heading an executive position to be the source cue due to my interest in explaining how past government performance interacts with endorsements to shape public opinion. In choosing the source cue and the politicians receiving the endorsement, I considered two other options: A Calderón cue in favour of the PAN presidential candidate, Josefina Vázquez Mota, and the endorsement of Mexican governors to the gubernatorial candidates of their parties, in the states that were also holding gubernatorial elections.<sup>18</sup>

Ultimately, however, two reasons convinced me to rule out these alternatives. The first was related to the dynamics of the nomination process. At the PAN presidential primary, Calderón had endorsed Vázquez Mota's main rival, Ernesto Cordero. Thus, a Calderón cue in favour of Vázquez Mota would have provided respondents with conflicting information. The same argument applied to some governors whose favoured candidates had lost their parties' nominations. The second reason was methodological. Experiments conducted at the state level would not have provided large enough samples to test for heterogeneous treatment effects.

To investigate whether endorsements have an accountability effect, the survey included a measure of *government performance*, which I interact with the treatment. Survey respondents were asked, how much they approved of the performance of President Felipe Calderón on a scale from 5 (*failure*) to 10 (*excellent*).<sup>19</sup> I treat this variable as continuous. In an additional test, I turn this measure

<sup>18</sup>These states were Chiapas, Mexico D.F., Guanajuato, Jalisco, Morelos, Tabasco, and Yucatán.

<sup>19</sup>The overwhelming majority of the literature on retrospective voting relies on economic perceptions (e.g. Anderson 2000; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Kayser and Peress 2012) or objective measures of economic performance (e.g. Kramer 1971; Hibbs 2000). Recently, some studies have used a broader measure of government performance at the individual level, which is the level of approval for the performance of the president/government (Hellwig 2011; Fisher and Hobolt 2010).

into a binary variable by collapsing the lower three categories – 5 to 7 – into 0, and the top three categories – 8 to 10 – into 1. The results obtained from this approach are consistent with those generated by using the continuous variable (see Appendix 5).

In addition, subjects were asked about standard *party identification* and socio-economic items. Eighteen percent of respondents identified with the PAN, 24.2 percent with the PRI, 14.7 percent with the PRD, and 4.4 percent with minor parties. The remaining 38.6 percent described themselves as independents. The socio-economic items were gender, age, and education – the latter two measured as continuous variables (see Appendix 2 for a codebook). In the survey, both the *party identification* and socio-economic items were asked before the intervention – i.e. pre-treatment – and are therefore not affected by the experimental assignment (Gerber and Green 2012).

## ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In accordance with studies using similar experimental designs, I estimate the effects of the treatment condition using regression analyses (Arceneaux 2008; Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009; Popp and Rudolph 2011). I follow the approach outlined by Arceneaux (2008) and estimate, first, a set of linear regression models in which the continuous dependent variable is based on the five-point Likert scale described above. For the second set of models I follow Lupia and McCubbins' (1998) approach and collapse the response variable into binary categories and estimate binary logistic regression models<sup>20</sup> I collapse the top two categories – *very likely* and *somewhat likely* – into 1, and the lower three categories – *don't know*, *somewhat unlikely*, and *very unlikely* – into 0. In both sets of models, the experimental treatment is included as an independent variable, and is also interacted with presidential approval. To account for heterogeneous accountability effects among partisans and non-partisans of the president, I analyse the data by partisan subgroups.

The models in Table 4 report average treatment effects (ATEs). Models 1 and 2 use the continuous five-point dependent variable and estimate linear regression models, while models 3 and 4 use the binary dependent variable and estimate logistic regression models. Each set of models is estimated with and without the additional covariates for gender, age, and education.

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<sup>20</sup>In addition, I estimate the same set of models using ordered logistic regression, and the results remain in the same direction and close to the values reported in Tables 4 and 6 (see Appendix 3).

Table 4: Average Treatment Effects

	LINEAR REGRESSION			BINARY LOGIT		
	Model 1	Model 2		Model 3	Model 4	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.07 (0.03)	0.01	-0.07 (0.03)	0.01	-0.07 (0.04)	0.03
Male			-0.14 (0.03)	0.00	-0.15 (0.04)	0.00
Education			-0.02 (0.01)	0.01	-0.004 (0.01)	0.64
Age			0.0001 (0.00)	0.99	-0.03 (0.01)	0.00
Intercept	3.00 (0.02)	0.00	3.18 (0.06)	0.00	0.22 (0.07)	0.00
Number of observations	12830		12673		12830	12673
R Squared	0.00		0.00			
Pseudo R Squared					0.00	0.00

As the coefficient and standard errors for *endorsement* indicates, the treatment has a negative and statistically significant effect in all four models. Voters, in other words, are less likely to vote for the PAN candidates when they are exposed to a Calderón endorsement. In Model 1, the average respondent in the control group lies at 3.00 on the five-point Likert scale, while the average respondent in the treatment condition lies at 2.93. Predicted probabilities based on Model 3 show that 49.4 percent of respondents in the control group are very likely or somewhat likely to vote for the PAN Senate candidates, while 47.5 percent of respondents in the treatment condition are likely to do so.<sup>21</sup>

To test the proposition that *presidential approval* and *partisanship* condition the treatment effect, I estimate conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) using *presidential approval* and *partisanship* as conditioning variables. CATEs can be approached in a straightforward way by estimating causal effects separately for different subgroups of voters and comparing them using regression. In these models, a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of treatment assignment with *presidential approval* among voters who identify with the incumbent PAN, as well as among non-*panistas*, provides evidence that endorsements have a general accountability effect. Alternatively, a non-significant coefficient on the same interaction term among neither group (i.e. *panistas* and non-*panistas*) indicates that endorsements do not affect electoral sanctioning. Finally, a positive and statistically significant interaction coefficient only among *panistas*, provides evidence that endorsements only have an accountability effect among partisans of the source cue.

The models in Tables 5 and 6 report the interaction effects of treatment assignment with *presidential approval*. The models in Table 5 use the continuous dependent variable, while the models in Table 6 repeat the analysis conducted in Table 5 using the binary dependent variable and estimate logistic regression models. The first two models in each table report the interaction effects for voters who identify with the incumbent PAN, while Models 3 and 4 report the same interactions for non-*panistas*.<sup>22</sup> As in Table 4, I include models with and without socio-demographic controls.

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<sup>21</sup>I estimate predicted probabilities using the *margins* command in Stata.

<sup>22</sup>I re-estimate the models for non-*panistas* subdividing by partisanship. *Priistas*, *prdistas*, and independents do not hold the incumbent party more accountable for the performance of the government when the Senate candidates are endorsed than when they are not (see Appendix 6).



Table 5: Conditional Average Treatment Effects – Linear Regression

	PANISTAS			NON-PANISTAS		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 3	Model 4	Model 4
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.50 (0.15)	0.00	-0.46 (.15)	0.00	-0.06 (0.06)	0.34
Presidential Approval	0.11 (0.02)	0.00	0.11 (0.02)	0.00	0.32 (0.01)	0.00
Endorsement*Approval	0.07 (0.02)	0.03	0.06 (0.03)	0.05	-0.01 (0.02)	0.76
Male			-0.02 (0.04)	0.63	-0.06 (0.03)	0.02
Education			0.06 (0.01)	0.00	-0.05 (0.01)	0.00
Age			0.01 (0.01)	0.14	-0.02 (0.00)	0.00
Intercept	4.00 (0.11)	0.00	3.59 (0.13)	0.00	2.09 (0.07)	0.00
Number of observations	2307	2290	10181	10061		
R Squared	0.05	0.07	0.11	0.12		

Table 6: Conditional Average Treatment Effects – Binary Logistic Regression

	PANISTAS			NON-PANISTAS		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4		
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z  Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z  Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z  Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.95 (0.46)	-0.82 (0.46)	-0.1 (0.1)	-0.09 (0.1)	0.31	0.34
Presidential Approval	0.21 (0.08)	0.23 (0.08)	0.39 (0.02)	0.40 (0.02)	0.00	0.00
Endorsement*Approval	0.12 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.003 (0.03)	0.001 (0.03)	0.91	0.97
Male		-0.04 (0.14)		-0.08 (0.04)		0.07
Education		0.1 (0.03)		-0.4 (0.01)		0.00
Age		-0.05 (0.02)		-0.06 (0.00)		0.00
Intercept	1.49 (0.37)	1.04 (0.44)	-1.64 (0.07)	-1.12 (0.11)	0.00	0.00
Number of observations	2307	2290	10181	10061		
Pseudo R Squared	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.07		


First, I analyse the models reported in Table 5. The coefficient on the interaction of treatment assignment and *presidential approval* is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level in Models 1 and 2, i.e. among partisans of the president. This suggests that, among voters who self-identify with the incumbent party, the PAN Senate vote is more tightly linked to the performance of the president when respondents are exposed to the Calderón treatment than when they are not. In contrast, in Models 3 and 4, the interaction terms of treatment assignment and *presidential approval* are not statistically significant at any conventional level. This suggests that, among non-*panistas*, the incumbent vote is not more tightly linked to the performance of Calderón when the PAN Senate candidates are endorsed. In sum, these results are consistent with the notion that endorsements lead to more accountability for the performance of the president only among voters who identify with the incumbent party. Table 6 presents the results of the analysis using the binary dependent variable and estimating logit models. Since neither the statistical significance, nor the direction of logit coefficients can be directly interpreted (Berry et al. 2010), the inferences for the logit models are based on the predicted probabilities shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 shows CATEs based on Model 1 (top left panel), and Model 3 (lower left panel) from Table 5, and Model 1 (top right panel), and Model 3 (lower right panel) from Table 6. The slopes in the four panels have one element in common: Subjects are responsive to the performance of the government, irrespective of whether they are exposed to an endorsement or not, or whether they are *panistas* or not. This suggests that voters, in general, hold the incumbent party electorally accountable for the performance of the government, even in contexts in which the candidates of the incumbent party have no close ties to the outgoing president. This is consistent with the notion that past performance matters for the vote.

This finding has two implications: First, it indicates that there is a “minimum level” of party accountability – i.e. accountability related to the party brand (Lupu 2013). This is because the executive’s reputation is transferred, at least to some degree, to all the candidates of the incumbent party, even to non-endorsed ones. Second, this result suggests that parties, even if they want to, cannot fully avoid responsibility for their time in office by asking the president to refrain from endorsing key candidates. Even when candidates are not closely linked to the president, the performance of the government still matters to voters when deciding whether to reward or punish the incumbent party.

The top two panels in Figure 1 show that endorsements provide an *additional* accountability effect among respondents who identify with the PAN. The slopes for subjects in the treatment group

Figure 1: PAN Vote by Treatment, Partisanship, and Presidential Approval



*Notes:* Vote intention for endorsed and non-endorsed PAN Senate candidates among *panistas* and *non-panistas* with different levels of *presidential approval*. The left-side panels show linear predictions of voting for the incumbent party, while the right-side panels indicate predicted probabilities of voting for the PAN. Vertical lines with bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel 1 is based on Model 1 in Table 5, panel 2 on Model 1 in Table 6, panel 3 on Model 3 in Table 5, and panel 4 on Model 3 in Table 6.

*Source:* Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica.

are clearly steeper than the slopes for subjects in the control group. As the levels of approval for President Calderón decrease, *panistas* exposed to an endorsement are less likely to defect their party than *panistas* who are not exposed to an endorsement. Whereas the point estimates in the top level of presidential approval are almost identical among treated and non-treated, the gap in the lowest level of approval is wide – half a point in the Likert scale in the top left panel, and 15 percentage points in the top right panel.<sup>23</sup> In sum, the panels for *panistas* provide evidence that the intra-party dimension matters for voters who identify with the incumbent party, i.e. they do not hold the incumbent party collectively accountable. This suggests that the relationship between incumbent politicians and the candidates of their parties has a considerable effect on electoral sanctioning.

<sup>23</sup>The difference between point estimates at a level of presidential approval of 1 is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in the logit model for *panistas*.

Voters who identify with the incumbent party hold their party more electorally accountable when the outgoing president and the party's candidates have a close connection – i.e. they are endorsed – than when this is not the case.

In contrast, among non-*panistas* (lower panels), endorsements do not provide an *additional* accountability effect. The slopes for treated and non-treated subjects run parallel to each other, and the point estimates are almost identical across the presidential approval scale. This constitutes evidence that voters who do not identify with the party of the president, hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the performance of the government. As suggested in the discussion of the literature, it is likely that voters who do not identify with the party of the president, either do not care about who turns out to be the candidates of the incumbent party, or simply do not perceive any differences between endorsed and non-endorsed candidates.

#### ADDRESSING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

In the previous section I showed that endorsements increase the magnitude of the performance-based vote among voters who identify with the party of the president. However, one potential problem of my framework is that I cannot randomise presidential approval. There might be unobserved factors that explain voters' opposition to President Calderón and their responsiveness to the endorsement. For example, there could be a type of *panista* voter who does not approve of the president and is also suspicious of endorsements. This could be a fixed type in the population, such that nothing the president does can affect the proportion of people like this. If this were the case, I would obtain the same results that I displayed in the previous section, but there would be no accountability of the kind I describe.

In Mexico a residual suspicion of handpicked candidates exists due to the country's particular history. This suspicion could, in part, explain the negative ATEs, and also the negative CATEs identified even among *panistas* who approve of the president. During the years of PRI hegemony, presidential candidates were imposed by the outgoing president (Cornelius 1996; Weldon 1997). This practice was dubbed in the media and public opinion as *dedazo*, freely translated as finger-pointing appointment. The *dedazo* was introduced in Mexican politics during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), and remained intact well into the 1990s. According to Langston (2006: 144), it ensured regular leadership turnover in the hegemonic party, “while at the same time creating mechanisms to limit internal conflict.” By the end of the 1990s, this informal institution

had lost credibility and had become highly unpopular, forcing then president Ernesto Zedillo to call open primaries to choose the PRI presidential candidate for the 2000 election (Langston 2006).


Table 7: Presidential Approval Among *Panistas*

	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Male	-0.23 (0.06)	0.00
Education	0.03 (0.02)	0.07
Income	0.05 (0.02)	0.04
Age	0.06 (0.01)	0.00
Intercept	3.92 (0.12)	0.00
Number of Observations	1647	
R Squared	0.03	

To demonstrate convincingly that the patterns of electoral sanctioning that I identify among *panistas* are truly an accountability effect, I need to show that the degree of scepticism of endorsements does not depend on the levels of approval for the president in a way that would undermine my results. I show this in two different ways. First I characterise the voters who identify with the party of the president so as to better understand which group of *panistas* approve and disapprove of the president. I regress approval on socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education and income. The results displayed in Table 7 indicate that men are less likely to approve of Calderón and that older people are more likely to approve of him. The results also show that more educated and wealthier *panistas* are more likely to support the president.

The results for income and education are particularly interesting. The fact that less educated and poorer *panistas* are more likely to disapprove of Calderón should make it more difficult to identify the patterns of electoral accountability that I detect. If anything, less educated and poorer voters – less likely to support the president – should be more receptive of endorsements than more educated and richer voters. During the years of PRI hegemony in which presidential candidates were handpicked, the PRI obtained disproportionately more votes among uneducated and poor voters. This is also consistent with the literatures on clientelism and tactical spending, which suggest that these practices are more favoured by poorer and less educated voters (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Weitz-Shapiro 2012).

Figure 2: Treatment Effect and GDP Growth



*Notes:* Average treatment effects in each state – calculated as the difference between treatment and control conditions in the state – against state-level per capita GDP growth in the quarter previous to the 2012 election. The sloped line represents the regression line, and the shaded area indicates the 95 percent confidence interval.

*Sources:* INEGI, *Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica*.

Second, I use state-level data to show that the levels of approval are linked to actual developments in the economy. Given that I have a sample of between 400 and 410 respondents per state, I can estimate the conditional treatment effect of endorsements among *panistas* for each of the 32 states. I plot these conditional average treatment effects against state-level per capita GDP growth in the quarter previous to the 2012 presidential election (Figure 2). The regression line shows that there is a larger treatment effect in the flourishing than in the stagnating states. Given that it is highly unlikely that *panistas* who are suspicious of endorsements self-select into well-performing or stagnating states, this constitutes a second piece of evidence that the accountability effect that I identify is performance related.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

There is ample support among political scientists and social psychologists that source cues – the political actors behind an issue – shape public opinion. In recent years, a wealth of research has narrowed down the conditions under which source cues cause opinion change. However, little is still known about the relationship between endorsements and electoral accountability. To address this gap in the literature, this study investigated whether there is more electoral sanctioning in cases in which the candidates of the incumbent party are endorsed than in cases in which they are not.

To answer this question, I embedded an experiment within a survey conducted two days before the 2012 Mexican general election. I randomly assigned respondents to a treatment condition (an endorsement of the outgoing president to the Senate candidates of his party) and a control group (no endorsement). My results are consistent both with the classic performance voting model, and with the thesis that endorsements provide an additional accountability effect. Performance, in general, guides voters' retrospective evaluations, as voters, irrespective of party identity, were more (less) likely to vote for the PAN Senate candidates if they approved (disapproved) of the president's performance. However, persuasion only has an accountability effect among voters who identify with the party of the source cue, i.e. among *panistas*.

Intriguingly, the findings of this study allow for two competing, and in fact conflicting, normative interpretations. The existing literature favours the “responsible party government” model, which implies that parties should always be held accountable collectively. From this point of view, the results of this paper, i.e. that voters who identify with the party of the president punish the incumbent party more for perceived bad performance when the candidates are endorsed, are rather discouraging. They imply that parties can use nominations strategically to avoid responsibility for their time in office. When the economy deteriorates, they can nominate candidates who are critical of the executive.

I suggest a more critical view of the “responsible party government” model and favour a more flexible approach, in which the party brand matters for accountability but there is also room for voters to hold particular candidates more accountable, depending on their ties to the government. This alternative model thus takes into account the notion that parties are not homogenous organisations in which all party members are equally associated with the performance and policies advocated by the government. From this point of view, the findings of the paper are rather encouraging – those more closely associated with the president are held more electorally accountable. Voters who iden-



tify with the party of the president exercise a “minimum level” of party accountability, while at the same time holding particular politicians more accountable.

The results of this study also have implications for our understanding of the context in which source cues shape public opinion. Research on heuristics has found that source cues play an influential role in shaping public opinion on difficult or unfamiliar issues (Nicholson 2011; 2012). Mondak’s (1993b) study of judicial decisions shows that source cues do not have an effect on questions in which citizens are highly conversant. The literature on direct democracy has also underscored this point by choosing complex policy issues that voters cannot easily comprehend (Lupia 1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998). Yet, I show that source cues can also cause opinion changes on highly salient and straightforward issues – the vote for Senate candidates – and in contexts of high information – a general election campaign.

Given the renewed interest in the “personalisation of politics” that has emerged in recent years, future research should investigate in more detail how the accountability effect of endorsements varies in contexts of high and low personalisation. It is likely that endorsements have a stronger effect in the former than in the latter. Future studies should also continue to explore the conditions under which source cues matter for electoral accountability. First, it would be important to investigate whether endorsements shape retrospective voting in presidential elections, i.e. by randomising endorsements from the outgoing president to the presidential candidate of her party. Second, researchers should examine how voters respond to different source cues from the incumbent party. For example, do endorsements from the president have a stronger accountability effect than endorsements from a lower-level politician such as a senator or a governor?

As with all surveys, my findings capture public opinion at a particular point in time. Additional studies should investigate whether these findings are particular to the Mexican case, or whether they travel to other contexts. Research on source cues should continue to expand its empirical focus to new democracies, and develop new theoretical insights based on the particularities of these democracies. One characteristic that many developing democracies share is the weakness of political parties, and the lack of credibility of political institutions and politicians (Randall and Svasand 2002; Mainwaring et al. 2006; Sanchez 2009; Doyle 2011). Studies might also examine how voters respond to endorsements from politicians and from public opinion leaders without partisan attachments. Such studies would also benefit from randomising the credibility of the source, so as to compare politicians and public opinion leaders with and without credibility.

## TACTICAL SPENDING AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT IN TRANSITIONAL MEXICO

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### ABSTRACT

We examine distributive politics in Mexico in the immediate period after its transition away from authoritarianism (2000-2006). We find causal evidence of tactical allocation of federal funds to aligned municipalities, and demonstrate that voters rewarded the party in the federal government for this increase in transfers to their constituencies in the 2006 presidential election. Using a difference-in-difference design, we show that the party of the president allocated more funds to municipalities that had a co-partisan as mayor in the run-up to the 2006 election. Our evidence indicates that these transfers were instrumental in securing the election of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party. A simulation of the election results shows that if the federal government had not distributed more federal grants to aligned than non-aligned municipalities, they would have lost the election with a probability of 54 percent.

## INTRODUCTION

The allocation of federal funds from central to subnational governments is a central concern in political economy.<sup>1</sup> A vast theoretical and empirical literature has devoted considerable attention to show how politicians use intergovernmental transfers for political gain. Theoretical contributions emphasise the role of office-seeking politicians in allocating federal funds tactically to increase the probability of being re-elected (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987). Some studies argue that politicians target funds to swing voters (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996), others expect them to reward core supporters (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Besley and Coate 1997), while a third group of studies suggests that they allocate more grants to constituencies ruled by members of their own party (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Existing empirical studies focus mainly on the role of the U.S. Congress in delivering distributive gains through powerful committee members (Alvarez and Saving 1997; Lauderdale 2008), and majority party leaders (Albouy 2013; Levitt and Snyder 1995). Most inquiries into the electoral consequences of federal spending look at the re-election prospects of legislators, primarily but not exclusively (Calvo and Murillo 2004) in the U.S. context (Levitt and Snyder 1997; Lazarus and Reilly 2010). In contrast, we focus on the role of the president in distributive politics, and study the case of the first post-transition presidential election in Mexico. Our main contribution is empirical: We provide causal evidence that the government of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) targeted federal funds tactically towards municipalities controlled by the incumbent *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN), and that these federal funds helped the PAN retain the presidency in 2006.

While most accounts of distributive politics focus on established liberal democracies, studying Mexico in the first presidential term after democratisation provides a unique opportunity to shed light on the dynamics that allow “new” parties to consolidate their support after the opening of electoral competition. While a large body of literature has explored how authoritarian regimes use federal resources to consolidate their grip on power (Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007, 2010), little is known about how parties previously in opposition to authoritarian regimes, solidify their support once they access government. We show that the politicisation of federal resources, together with the control of local administrations, allowed the PAN to make electoral inroads in poor areas of the country, where its support had previously been meagre. Our simulation of the election results

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<sup>1</sup>This paper is the result of joint work with Piero Stanig.

shows that if the federal government had not distributed more transfers to PAN than non-PAN ruled municipalities, it would have lost the election with a probability of 54.2 percent.

While we are not the first to estimate the effect of partisan alignment on central government spending, our empirical strategy differs from standard accounts of distributive politics in two ways. First, our empirical design allows us to causally claim that the Fox administration allocated funds tactically to benefit municipalities ruled by co-partisans of the president. From a methodological standpoint, attempts to identify causal evidence of tactical spending face endogeneity issues. Without exogenous variation in partisan identity, and political alignment between different levels of government, the empirical relationship between the independent variables and government transfers is likely determined by socio-economic factors that are difficult to account for. As a result, the estimates are likely contaminated by omitted variable bias. We solve this problem by estimating difference-in-difference (D-in-D) designs.<sup>2</sup> The D-in-D estimations show that PAN-aligned municipalities received around 40 pesos per capita larger increases in transfers in the run-up to the 2006 presidential election – amounting to 3.67 dollars in 2005 values. To put this number in context, the mean increase (taken over the entire sample) in transfers from the non-election years 2001-2004 to the election years 2005-2006 is around 125 pesos per capita, and 50 percent of the distribution is between 53.61 and 224.60 pesos per capita. Hence the favouritism we detect is considerable.

Second, in contrast to most studies of distributive politics, which only provide evidence of tactical allocation of the federal budget, we also demonstrate that these federal funds were instrumental in securing the re-election of the incumbent PAN in the 2006 presidential election. We show this in two different ways. First, we collect information on the partisanship of the mayor, the vote shares of major parties in the presidential elections of 2000 and 2006, along with data on transfers to municipalities. We estimate multi-level compositional vector autoregressive models to show that controlling the municipal administration conferred a significant advantage in the 2006 presidential election. We demonstrate that this advantage was stronger in poorer or more deprived municipalities when the municipalities received more federal transfers. Second, we simulate replications of the 2006 presidential election results by examining how the election result would have looked if the federal government had not allocated more funds to aligned municipalities. The probability of the PAN winning decreases from 50.9 in the replications of the actual election results to 45.8 percent in the simulation of the counterfactual scenario.

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<sup>2</sup>The D-in-D estimations are based on the parallel trends assumption. Treatment induces a deviation from the common trend (Angrist and Pischke 2009).

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature on tactical allocation of federal spending. We then briefly describe the Mexican political system, focusing on the role of the central government in the allocation of federal funds. Next, we provide an overview of the democratic transition and the 2006 general election. The following section lays out our empirical approach, and presents the main results. In the final section, we discuss our findings and conclude with some implications for further research.

## ALIGNMENT, FEDERAL SPENDING, AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS

Previous studies have explained the tactical allocation of federal funds by focusing on the policy preferences and electoral incentives of politicians. While these two types of considerations are not mutually exclusive, they are clearly distinct.

First, incumbent governments may be concerned with policy when targeting politically aligned circumscriptions. If sub-national governments have some discretion in how they can spend federal funds, then the central government may prefer to allocate more funds to administrations that share the same policy preferences. For the U.S., Albouy (2013) shows that Democrats and Republicans have different spending priorities. An all-Democrat state delegation in either the House or the Senate procures more grants for housing and urban development, while an all-Republican delegation garners considerably more funds for defence and transportation. In addition, heads of government may attempt to advance their legislative agenda by allocating more funds to key co-partisans in Congress. Jacobson et al. (2004) show, also for the U.S., that presidents reward members of their own party for their support on important legislative initiatives.

Second, incumbent governments may target more federal funds to aligned municipalities to improve their own electoral fortunes or to debilitate the prospects of their opponents. Arulampalam et al. (2009) develop a theoretical model in which parties at the centre target grants to co-partisans in swing states to avoid sharing the benefits of additional expenditure with politicians of opposing parties. Incumbent parties at the centre thus try to avoid a “leakage” effect. The authors test their model with data on India, and find that both aligned and swing states receive 16 percent higher transfers than unaligned and non-swing states. Using a regression discontinuity design, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) find that the federal government in Brazil penalises municipalities ruled by opposition mayors – what they call the “tying hands” effect. They show that municipalities

controlled by the opposition receive one-third fewer discretionary transfers for infrastructure than municipalities in which the mayor is a co-partisan of the president.

While these studies emphasise the role of central governments in the allocation of federal grants, few scholars have been able to show empirically, whether voters hold the incumbent head of government accountable for federal spending. With the exception of Kriner and Reeves (2012), most scholarship has focused on whether members of Congress who bring more federal spending to their constituencies enjoy an electoral advantage (Levitt and Snyder 1997; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Lazarus and Reilly 2010). However, there are good reasons to expect the allocation of federal spending to have an effect on the outcome of presidential elections.

First, studies on the U.S. have demonstrated that presidents play a central role in allocating the federal budget (Larcinese et al. 2006; Berry et al. 2010; Arceneaux 2006). Given the centrality of the presidency, it can be expected that voters will want to hold the president's party accountable for that spending in the next presidential election. Second, research on the U.S. (Gasper and Reeves 2011) and Latin America (Singer 2011) shows that voters do not only hold the president accountable for the state of the macro-economy, but also for other factors – some of them unrelated to politics (Healy et al. 2010). As Kriner and Reeves (2012) note, federal spending likely has an important effect on the economies of local communities, and it can thus be expected that voters will want to reward (punish) the incumbent head of government for more (less) transfers.

In the Mexican context, several studies have shown that the politicisation of federal resources allowed the PRI to keep its hegemonic position within an authoritarian setting (Greene 2007, 2010; Magaloni 2006; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2007). Greene (2007) develops a formal model in which dominant parties are able to win elections continuously when they can politicise public resources, and fail when privatisations put the state's fiscal power out of their reach. Empirically, he shows that voters rewarded the PRI for providing them with particularistic benefits. Magaloni (2006) demonstrates that, in order to secure mass support, the PRI created a poverty trap. Peasants were unable to rise from poverty because the state distributed land without property rights. As a result, peasants were not able to access credit and become profitable farmers, remaining largely dependent on state patronage and clientelism. Voters rewarded the PRI for providing cash transfers, targeted side payments like food subsidies, credit, construction contracts, and land titles. Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2012) show that the National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL) – the main poverty-relief programme of the presidency of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) – was highly discretionary and partisan.

The introduction of *Progresa* – a conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme – by the administration of Ernesto Zedillo in 1997, constituted a landmark in the history of Mexican social policy.<sup>3</sup> Eligibility for *Progresa* funds was determined using fixed criteria based on poverty, and was made explicitly non-partisan (De la O 2013). The presidency of Vicente Fox expanded the coverage of the programme from 2.6 million families in 2000 to almost five million in 2005, and renamed it *Oportunidades* (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2009). In addition the Fox government introduced *Seguro Popular*, which provides health coverage to uninsured citizens. As Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2009: 232) note, this “program was intended to remedy the truncated nature of health care delivery, which grants access only to those working in the formal sector of the economy.” Under Fox, *Oportunidades* and *Seguro Popular* transfers were allocated following technocratic principles (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012).

Despite the programmes being non-partisan, research conducted in recent years shows that beneficiaries were considerably more likely to reward incumbent parties in the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections. According to De la O (2013), early assignment to *Progresa* funds led to a seven percent increase in turnout, and to a nine percent increase in the PRI vote in 2000. Using a matching estimator, Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2009) show that *Oportunidades* and *Seguro Popular* recipients were 11 and seven percent more likely to vote for the PAN in 2006. They argue that these social programmes were instrumental in securing the PAN re-election.

While social programmes were insulated from political manipulation after 1997, we show that, after the 2000 democratic transition, the new party in the central government did find ways to manipulate federal transfers – albeit in a more subtle way than during the PRI heyday. Social programmes such as *Oportunidades* and *Seguro Popular* became highly scrutinised, but transfers to the municipalities did not receive the same attention from public opinion and the media. As we show below, this allowed the federal government to manipulate transfers at the margins. This has a clear normative implication: Studying the electoral consequences of the politicisation of federal transfers is much more important than examining the electoral returns of non-partisan social spending. Golden and Min (2013) note that “if allocations are welfare maximizing, then the political conflicts that lie behind them are spurious, incidental, or irrelevant.”

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<sup>3</sup>As De la O (2013) notes, the Zedillo administration introduced *Progresa* in response to the peso crisis of 1995, after which 16 million Mexicans fell below the poverty line.

## INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL SETTING

*The Mexican Political System*

Mexico is a federal presidential democracy with a bicameral legislative structure. Its territory is divided into 32 states – including the Federal District (DF) – and 2457 municipalities. Together with the federal government, the states and municipalities comprise the three levels of government. Both houses of congress and the president are elected concurrently every six years, but the Chamber of Deputies is renewed entirely at the midpoint of the presidential term. The president, governors and mayors are directly elected through plurality rule. Governors serve six-year terms while mayors are elected every three years.<sup>4</sup> A particular characteristic of the Mexican political system is the absence of immediate re-election at any level. Three large parties – the conservative *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN), the leftist *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD), and the formerly authoritarian *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) – dominate the Mexican party system. Together they ruled 81 percent of all municipalities, every single state government, and controlled 90 and 95 percent of all house and senate seats, respectively, at the time of the 2006 general elections.

Despite being the lowest level of government, municipalities fulfill important functions in education, health, and infrastructure. They are ruled by a directly elected mayor (*presidente municipal*) and city council (*ayuntamiento*) and vary greatly in size – the largest being Iztapalapa in the Federal District (1.815.596 inhabitants), and the smallest Santa Magdalena Jocotlán in the state of Oaxaca (less than 100 inhabitants). For the election of 60 percent of the members of the Federal Chamber of Deputies, all of the municipalities are integrated into 300 single member districts. Large municipalities, usually in urban areas, are divided into several districts, while small municipalities – mostly in rural parts of the country – are incorporated into large districts composed of several municipalities. The remaining 40 percent of the lower house is elected by proportional representation.

Municipalities obtain their resources from three different sources: 1) local revenues such as service taxes, residential property taxes, and fines; 2) transfers from their states; and 3) transfers from the federal government. The federal transfers that are allocated directly to the municipalities are located in a section of the federal budget called *Ramo 33*. The *Ramo 33* is composed of eight

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<sup>4</sup>Each governor is elected on the same day as the mayors of her state and, in some cases, also on the same day as the president. Since mayors only serve for three years, they are also elected in non-concurrent elections at the midpoint of the governors' term.



different funds, two of which are allocated entirely to the municipalities<sup>5</sup> – i.e. FISM (*Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social Municipal*), and FORTAMUNDF (*Fondo de Aportaciones para el Fortalecimiento de los Municipios y las Demarcaciones Territoriales del Distrito Federal*). We focus on the transfers that are directly allocated to the municipalities.

The executive and legislative powers play a crucial role in defining how federal transfers are allocated. The president drafts the annual budget law (*Ley Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria*), which is then subject to amendments by members of the lower chamber. However, the extent to which legislators can amend the law is limited. The budget committee, in charge of authorising the bill, has only six to eight weeks to revise the law and is clearly understaffed. After a period of discussion, the bill is sent to the floor for a final vote. After its approval, the president has to sign the bill, without having a chance to veto any parts of the law.

### *The Mexican Transition and the 2006 Presidential Election*

Until 2000, Mexico was a paradigmatic case of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010b). Between 1929 and 1997 – the year in which the opposition first managed to win a legislative majority in the Lower House – the hegemonic PRI won virtually every meaningful election,<sup>6</sup> often through fraudulent practices.<sup>7</sup> The PRI's hegemonic rule came to an end in 2000, when the PAN's Vicente Fox defeated the PRI's presidential candidate, Fernando Labastida.

After the 2000 electoral debacle, many observers hastily wrote the PRI off for the foreseeable future. However, the PRI bounced back in 2003, taking a plurality in the mid-term legislative elections. Three years of divided government had generated a perception of political immobilism in the electorate. In addition, the country's economy had been stagnant, averaging a growth rate close to zero between 2000 and 2003. As a result, the PRI was able to stage a major comeback in the 2003 mid-term elections, capturing the vote of economically dissatisfied voters (Moreno 2007).

The strong showing in the mid-terms and in gubernatorial elections in 2004 and 2005 gave the PRI hope of returning to the presidency in 2006. However, the party's electoral prospects were seriously damaged by its choice of presidential candidate. Roberto Madrazo, an established high-ranking party figure from the state of Tabasco, reminded too many voters of the corrupt practices

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<sup>5</sup>The other six funds are first allocated to the states. The states then transfer around 20 percent of those funds to the municipalities.

<sup>6</sup>The PRI lost a gubernatorial election for the first time in 1989 in Baja California.

<sup>7</sup>In 1988, massive fraud prevented Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a former PRI member, from winning the presidency.

of the PRI years, and alienated vast sectors of the party's base – most notably the powerful teachers union, and the governors, in particular those from the north of the country. Throughout the campaign, Madrazo had the highest negative voting ratings of the three major candidates (Langston 2007).

By mid-2005, the electoral campaign was well underway. The PAN's presidential primary turned into a major upset when a relatively unknown figure, Felipe Calderón, ousted the interior Minister Santiago Creel, who was openly supported by President Fox.<sup>8</sup> The PRD nominated Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a popular former mayor of Mexico City. His 10-12 point advantage during most of 2005 and early 2006 made him the candidate to beat.

With the PRI out of government, the regime cleavage was no longer dominant, and the election polarised into a contest between left and right. The PAN defended the free market economic model and a conservative policy agenda on non-economic issues, while the PRD favoured a larger role for the state in the economy, and liberal non-economic policies. The PAN's appeal for economic stability was credible thanks to average economic growth rates of four percent in the three years preceding the election. Moreno (2007) shows that, other things being equal, the probability of voting for Calderón, among voters who thought the economy was somewhat and much better off was 60 and 75 percent, respectively.<sup>9</sup> In contrast, the probability of voting for López Obrador among those same groups of voters was 24 and 12 percent, respectively. The PRD candidate was able to capture the vote of the economically dissatisfied voters: The probability of voting for López Obrador was 49 and 59 percent among voters worse off and much worse off, respectively.

The analysis of survey data representative at the national level paints an unsurprising picture of the 2006 election – i.e. rich and economically satisfied voters vote for the PAN, while poor and economically dissatisfied voters vote for the PRD. However, analysing the election at the national level might miss (or average over) significant variation at the sub-national level. In the remainder of the paper, we demonstrate that movement at the municipal level does account for a substantial portion of the variation in the 2006 election results. In particular, we show that presidential election returns, disaggregated at the municipal level, are predicted by control of local administrations, after accounting for uniform swings, state-level swings, and a host of other predictors, including results in the 2000 presidential election, and party popularity in the state. We then show that the tactical

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<sup>8</sup>Calderón had served as PAN congressional leader and as Secretary of Energy until 2004, but resigned in protest to Fox's open support of Creel (Shirk 2009).

<sup>9</sup>Moreno estimates these probabilities from a multinomial logit model on national exit poll data collected by the *Reforma* newspaper.

allocation of spending towards municipalities aligned with the federal administration, was one of the mechanisms that the PAN used to improve its chances of retaining the presidency in 2006.

#### EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Our empirical strategy consists of three parts. In the first we show how controlling municipal governments conferred an electoral advantage to the three main political parties in the 2006 presidential election. To show this effect, we analyse aggregate municipal level election returns and estimate compositional vector autoregression (CVAR) models. In the second part we show that the tactical allocation of federal funds from the central government to the local level constitutes the main mechanism by which municipal control leads to increased presidential election returns. In this part, we estimate two different sets of difference-in-difference (D-in-D) designs, one using matching and the other using weighting methods. The D-in-D estimators show that PAN-aligned municipalities received significantly more federal transfers in the two years preceding the 2006 election than in the first four years of President Fox's presidential term. In the third and final part we return to the CVAR models including transfers data. We show that municipal control was associated with presidential electoral results more tightly when it was coupled with more generous transfers from higher levels of government.

#### *Municipal Control and Presidential Election Returns*

To analyse the effect of municipal control on the 2006 presidential election returns, we rely on aggregate municipal level returns. We collect the official presidential returns at the municipal level for the 2000 and the 2006 elections, and match them with each other and with information about the municipality. For each municipality, we know the name of the party in control of the local administration at the time of the 2006 presidential election, the population, the percentage of residents living in settlements of less than 5000 people, the illiteracy rate, and the percentage of MPs for each of the three main parties. We also create an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for municipalities categorised as “very high” or “high” deprivation (*grado de marginacion*), and 0 otherwise (see Appendix 1 for a codebook). We have information for almost all of the municipalities in the country, for a total of 2446 observations nested in the 32 sub-national units.

In addition, our models also account for three variables measured at the state level: The party identity of the governor, the proportion of senators of the three main parties, and party identification. The latter is obtained from several surveys carried out in the months leading to the 2006 election, for which it was possible to obtain information on the respondent's state of residence. By pooling different surveys, we achieved suitably large samples for each state.<sup>10</sup> Ideally, one would use MRP (multi-level regression and post-stratification), combining census data and survey estimates, to create such state-level summaries (Lax and Phillips 2009). Unfortunately, the level of aggregation at which the census data is reported is almost impossible to match with the coding of individual demographics in the surveys – hence we rely on survey averages rather than MRP estimates. Given that the size of the survey samples is small for many states, using the simple average (e.g. the proportion of PAN identifiers among the respondents in a given state) is not recommended: The estimate at the state level can be noisy.

Instead, we use multi-level regression to create state-level summaries that constitute a compromise between the state-level summary and the nationwide average. For those states in which the average is estimated precisely (because of a larger sample size) the estimate is shrunk only very mildly towards the grand mean. In those states in which, due to small samples, the estimate is not very precise, the summary is an average of the state-wise mean and the grand (national) mean, weighted by the precision with which the state-wise mean is estimated. In practical terms, we run a random-intercepts logit model, with no covariates, where the response variable are PAN identification, PRI identification, and PRD identification, respectively. We then use the predictions of the state-level intercepts as our measures of popularity. These are more conservative than the simple averages, in that they vary less across states than the simple averages do. The main advantage of measuring party identification in this way is that it is a truly exogenous measure.<sup>11</sup>

We estimate the models for aggregate presidential returns as compositional vector autoregression models (CVAR) along the lines of those presented by Brandt and Williams (2007). The analysis of compositional multi-party data has received considerable attention over the years, most notably by Katz and King (1999) and Tomz et al. (2002). We estimate CVAR models with a symmetric log ratio specification, which makes the interpretation of results more straightforward than choosing

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<sup>10</sup>There is considerable variation in the sample sizes, from the 52 respondents in Baja California Sur and Campeche to around 1600 both in the Federal District and in Estado de Mexico.

<sup>11</sup>With the exception of Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Larcinese et al. (2012), all previous studies of distributive politics measure party identification, or partisan leanings using proxy variables obtained from voting data. As Larcinese and co-authors (2012: 2) note, this approach is clearly problematic “since within models of distributive politics, voting decisions are – by assumption – endogenous to the distribution of government funds.”

one party as the baseline, as suggested by Katz and King (1999) and in Tomz et al. (2002). In the approach we follow, each model comprises three equations, one of which is redundant. We estimate each equation separately, including random effects at the state level.<sup>12</sup> It is worth noticing that there is no efficiency gain by estimating the three equations together (as in a seemingly unrelated regression) if predictors are the same across equations. The model would have to be estimated in “reduced rank” form in a SUR framework, because the covariance matrix of the errors of the three equations clearly is singular. Following the practice in American politics of modelling the two-party vote, we estimate the models as percentages of the three-party vote. We report the estimates for each model in three columns of each table. The interpretation of the model estimates is straightforward, with the caveat that the regression coefficients describe changes in expected vote shares on the logit scale.

Formally, call  $\mathbf{P}_{it} = [p_{1it}, p_{2it}, p_{3it}]$  the vector of vote shares  $p$  for parties 1, 2, 3 in municipality  $i$  at time  $t$ . We first log-transform the vote shares to obtain  $\mathbf{Y}_{it} = [\log(p_{1it}), \log(p_{2it}), \log(p_{3it})]$ . We then estimate the three-equation model of the form

$$\mathbf{KY}_{it} = \alpha + \gamma X_{it} + \beta \mathbf{Y}_{it-1} + \eta_{j(i)t} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{I}_3 - \frac{1}{3} \mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}'$  is the matrix that divides the vote shares by their geometric mean, the term  $\eta$  is a state-level random effect,  $\epsilon$  is an observation-level error, and  $j(\cdot)$  is a function that maps municipality  $i$  to the state  $j$  in which it is located.<sup>13</sup>

For each model, we get three coefficients per predictor. In the tables, the coefficient in the first column is the effect of an increase in the predictor on vote for the PRI, the second column the effect on vote for the PAN, and the third on vote for the PRD. The coefficients in a given row sum to zero (apart from rounding discrepancies) because all the gains for one party have to be compensated by losses for the other two, given that fourth parties are excluded from the analysis. For example, the coefficients in the row labelled “Log PAN Vote 2000” in Table 1 tell us that every unit increase in the measure of PAN Vote in 2000 leads to an increase by 0.31 in the (logit-scaled) vote share of the PAN, a loss of 0.11 (on the logit scale) for the PRD, and a loss of 0.21 (on the logit scale) for the PRI. As a second example, the row labelled “PRI Mayor” in Table 1 implies that having a PRI mayor as opposed to having a mayor from a fourth party – i.e. other than the PRD or PAN – leads

<sup>12</sup>We also estimate the same models with state fixed effects, and the main results of interest remain unchanged (see Appendix 2).

<sup>13</sup>We estimate each of the three equations via restricted maximum likelihood as implemented in the function `lmer` in the R environment.

to an increase of 0.06 in the (logit-scaled) vote share for the PRI, a result of taking votes from the PRD (0.02 on the logit scale) and the PAN (0.04 on the logit scale).

One aspect of the model deserves special attention. The lags of the election results (namely, the municipal-level presidential returns for each party in 2000) are included as controls. This explicitly accounts for differential patterns of election-to-election persistence of electoral preferences, as well as systematic patterns in transfers of votes from one party to another over the Fox presidency. All the results for the exogenous variables that are of direct scientific interest have to be interpreted as holding past support in the municipality constant: Therefore, the effects of the exogenous variables can be considered as creating additional electoral advantages over something conceptually close to the “normal vote” in a given municipality (Converse 1966).

Table 1: Municipal Control and Deprivation

	PRI Coefficient (Standard Error)	PAN Coefficient (Standard Error)	PRD Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	0.02 (0.08)	0.02 (0.1)	-0.04 (0.09)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.21*** (0.01)	0.31*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.01)
Log PRI Vote 2000	0.52*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.38*** (0.04)
Log PRD Vote 2000	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.17*** (0.01)	0.3*** (0.01)
Log Population	-0.02*** (0)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
PAN Mayor	0.07*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)
PRD Mayor	0.07** (0.03)	-0.07* (0.04)	0 (0.04)
PRI Mayor	0.06** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
High Deprivation	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation	0.02 (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation	0.01 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation	0.07** (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.22	0.33	0.22
Number of observations	2367		
Number of states	32		

\*p&lt;0.1. \*\*p&lt;0.05. \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

The simplest specification for the models that assess the importance of local administrations control is found in Table 1. We regress the vote shares in 2006 on the indicator for high deprivation municipalities,<sup>14</sup> the party identity of the mayor (the reference category being a mayor from a party other than the three main parties), and their interactions. We also account for the (log) vote shares in the 2000 presidential election, and the (log) of the population of the municipality. Among the control variables, vote shares in 2000 (unsurprisingly) predict the vote in 2006. Population is also predictive of the vote: The PRD performs better in larger municipalities, while the PRI's electoral returns decrease in more populous locales. As the interaction coefficients indicate, the effect of local level power is stronger in deprived than in non-deprived municipalities. This difference is statistically significant: The coefficient on the interaction between deprivation and PAN Mayor dummies in the equation predicting PAN vote is 0.13, with a standard error of 0.04, and in the equation for PRD vote is -0.15 with a standard error of 0.04. In deprived municipalities, a good part of the contest between PAN and PRD is predicted by control of local administrations.

In Table 2, we report the estimates for a model that includes additional socio-demographic and political controls. The former are all measured at the municipal level: Percentage of residents living in settlements of less than 5000 people, and illiteracy rate. The political controls are measured at the municipal level – percentage of MPs of the three main parties – and at the state level – party of the governor, average party identification, and the proportion of senators of the three largest parties. The measure of party identification is particularly important, as it accounts for party popularity in the state. One could suspect that the percentage of local administrations controlled by a given party simply reflects the buildup in popularity of the party between 2000 and 2006. If this were true, then the model would simply show that being more popular in a state predicts higher support in the presidential election. This would not explain why this would matter more in deprived communities than in non-deprived ones, but it would still make it less tenable to infer that political control of local administrations confers an advantage in presidential elections *per se*. By controlling for a measure that reflects how many voters identify with each party in a given state, and that reflects, directly, how popular each party is in the months prior to the election, we can be more confident that our results are picking up a genuine effect of local administration control.

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<sup>14</sup>We repeat all the models reported in this section with a continuous measure of deprivation and the results do not change (see Appendix 3).

Table 2: Municipal Control and Deprivation with Additional Controls

	PRI Coefficient (Standard Error)	PAN Coefficient (Standard Error)	PRD Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	0.56 (0.61)	-0.28 (0.9)	-0.26 (0.55)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.19*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.01)	-0.12*** (0.01)
Log PRI Vote 2000	0.51*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.36*** (0.04)
Log PRD Vote 2000	-0.12*** (0.01)	-0.17*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)
Log Population	-0.02*** (0.01)	0 (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
PAN Mayor	0.07** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.1*** (0.03)
PRD Mayor	0.08** (0.03)	-0.08* (0.04)	0 (0.04)
PRI Mayor	0.06** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
High Deprivation	-0.01 (0.03)	0 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Illiteracy Rate	0.06*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Less 5000 Residents	0 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
PAN ID	-0.14* (0.08)	0.49*** (0.12)	-0.35*** (0.07)
PRI ID	0.15*** (0.06)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.09* (0.05)
PRD ID	-0.13* (0.08)	0.12 (0.12)	0.02 (0.07)
PAN Governor	0.11 (0.07)	-0.17* (0.1)	0.06 (0.06)
PRD Governor	-0.31* (0.18)	0.22 (0.27)	0.09 (0.16)
PAN MPs	0.06* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
PRI MPs	0.03 (0.02)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
PRD MPs	0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	0 (0.05)
PRI Senators	-0.68 (0.59)	0.42 (0.87)	0.24 (0.52)
PRD Senators	-0.13 (0.65)	-0.06 (0.96)	0.16 (0.58)
PAN Senators	-0.47 (0.63)	0.23 (0.94)	0.23 (0.56)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation	0.03 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation	0.01 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation	0.08*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.1*** (0.04)
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.14	0.22	0.12
Number of observations	2335		
Number of states	31		

\*p&lt;0.1. \*\*p&lt;0.05. \*\*\*p&lt;0.01



Interestingly, once we account for party identification, the magnitude and statistical significance of the interactions between municipal control and deprivation are virtually unchanged. This evidence shows that the municipal control variable is not simply proxying for party popularity: There is evidence that party strength in municipal administrations is systematically related to electoral success in the presidential election, and that this advantage is stronger in more deprived communities. At the same time, party popularity as captured by our identification measures is statistically significantly associated with vote shares in the presidential election, holding everything else constant.<sup>15</sup>


In the plots in Figure 1 we display the expected vote shares (in the 2006 presidential election) for the three main parties, as a function of deprivation. In each panel, we isolate one configuration of partisan control of the municipality. The plots are based on the estimates reported in Table 1, but using a continuous measure of deprivation for illustrative purposes. We set the other variables (vote shares in 2000 and log population) at their median. So for instance, the plot labelled PAN Mayor displays the expected vote shares for the three parties in municipalities with varying levels of deprivation. Three main messages can be extracted from these plots. First, the PAN benefits considerably more than the other two parties from moving from controlling a non-deprived to controlling a deprived municipality. The PAN slope in municipalities with a PAN mayor is much steeper than the PRI slope in PRI-controlled municipalities and the PRD slope in PRD-ruled areas. Second, the PRI vote remains constant across levels of deprivation when the other two parties control the mayor. The PRI slope in non-PRI municipalities remains essentially flat. Third, the PRD is the biggest loser of these three-way races. In municipalities it does not control, its vote is much more depressed when deprivation increases – particularly in PAN-controlled entities.

In sum, the picture that emerges from the models reported in Tables 1 and 2 is that a significant part of the competition in the presidential election takes place between the PAN and the PRD, and that the outcome of this competition depends significantly on the strength of the party at the local level and levels of deprivation. While the PRI lost electoral support across the board between 2000 and 2006, the PRI vote is stable across values of the other predictors. In other words, patterns of PRI support seem to be unaffected, in the sense that the strongest predictor of the PRI vote in 2006 is voting for the PRI in 2000, and party identification in the state. This implies that the PRI did not capitalise on strategies that rely on control of local administrations to break into new constituencies, nor were the other parties able to erode the PRI support using these strategies.

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<sup>15</sup>We also estimate a model in which we control for vote shares in the latest municipal election. The main results of the key interaction terms hold after introducing this control (see Appendix 4).

Figure 1: Party Vote by Municipal Control and Deprivation



*Notes:* Expected vote shares in the 2006 presidential election for the three main parties, as a function of deprivation. Each panel isolates one configuration of partisan control of the municipality. The plots are based on the estimates reported in Table 1, but using a continuous measure of deprivation. The other variables – vote shares in 2000 and log population – are set at their median.

One could hypothesise that the electoral benefits conferred by municipal control simply is a “good governance” effect: By demonstrating their party’s ability to govern, mayors indirectly increase the reputation of the party at the national level. However, this would not directly explain why such an advantage is so much stronger in more deprived municipalities. One could also conjecture reasons of why good performance may confer a stronger advantage in more deprived places: For instance, local governance might matter most to poor people, or to not necessarily poor people living in deprived areas. This optimistic view would imply that the targeting of benefits to specific voters or groups of voters does not play any role in generating electoral support. Yet, Calvo and Murillo (2004) and Weitz-Shapiro (2012) show that middle class voters punish clientelism, while working class and poor voters reward clientelistic practices. The expectation is, thus, that good governance should be an effective strategy in rich rather than in poor municipalities.

### *Favouritism in Spending*

In this subsection, we explore how federal funds were allocated to sub-national governments during the Fox presidency. Our goal is to identify causal evidence of any systematic patterns in central government transfers to the municipalities. To credibly claim causal evidence, assignment to treatment needs to be exogenous, i.e., independent of potential outcomes conditional on observed pre-treatment variables. We rely on two D-in-D estimators to solve the problem of random assign-

ment. First, we estimate a semi-parametric D-in-D estimator, as proposed by Abadie (2005), and then we estimate D-in-D on a matched dataset. Both methods are based on the same propensity score and, unsurprisingly, yield very similar results. They both find that municipalities controlled by the PAN received more transfers from higher layers of government and that they did so *because* they were governed by the PAN.

The D-in-D estimator is founded on the simple idea that “when only a fraction of the population is exposed to the treatment, an untreated comparison group can be used to identify temporal variation in the outcome that is not due to the treatment exposure” (Abadie 2005: 1). While the idea is simple, the conventional parametric D-in-D estimator is based on a very strong assumption, which is that in the absence of treatment, the treatment and control groups would have followed parallel trends. Often, this assumption is implausible, because of imbalance between the treated and untreated group regarding the pre-treatment characteristics thought to be associated with the dynamics of the outcome variable (Abadie 2005). This is of particular relevance in our framework, as we cannot credibly assume that federal transfers would have followed the same path in PAN and non-PAN municipalities. These two groups differ under many observables that are clearly related to how much money they received.

The two D-in-D estimators deal with this problem in slightly different ways. The semi-parametric D-in-D estimator relaxes the parallel trends assumption by running the D-in-D on two groups that are very similar but not identical. In practice, the Abadie estimator down-weights the control municipalities that do not resemble PAN-aligned municipalities, and assigns more weight to those control municipalities that are more similar to PAN-mayor municipalities. The matching D-in-D estimator matches each treated unit to a number of untreated units with similar values for the pre-treatment variables. It uses a single continuous covariate to match (nearest-neighbor, one-to-one), instead of a fixed number of untreated units. This results in a gain of efficiency and consistency (Abadie and Imbens 2006).

The balance statistics presented in Table 3 show that our concern about the differences between treatment and control groups are well justified. In the 2000 presidential election, municipalities with a PAN mayor support the PAN more (37 percent of the vote, on average, versus 25 percent for the control group), and the PRI (47 versus 49 percent) and PRD (13 versus 21 percent) less. PAN-governed municipalities are also less deprived than municipalities in the control group (-.26 on the deprivation index as opposed to 0.05 for the control group). In addition, PAN-controlled municipalities are more urbanised (65 percent of the population live in settlements of less than

Table 3: Before Balance

	Control Group	Std. Deviation	Treatment Group	Std. Deviation
PAN Vote 2000	24.89	1.58	36.68	2.33
PRI Vote 2000	48.71	3.53	46.55	3.37
PRD Vote 2000	21.41	1.55	12.87	0.93
I(PAN Vote 2000 <sup>2</sup> )	852.51	0.90	1539.97	1.62
I(PRI Vote 2000 <sup>2</sup> )	2569.02	1.78	2331.29	1.62
I(PR D Vote 2000 <sup>2</sup> )	658.82	0.89	257.25	0.35
Deprivation	0.05	0.05	-0.26	-0.26
Less 5000 Residents	75.01	2.16	65.17	1.87
Illiteracy Rate	17.20	1.57	14.28	1.31
ENP in 2000	1.58	10.82	1.57	10.74
I(Deprivation <sup>2</sup> )	1.01	0.79	0.88	0.69
I(Less 5000 <sup>2</sup> )	6783.07	1.63	5595.22	1.34
I(Illiteracy <sup>2</sup> )	422.09	0.81	289.59	0.55
I(ENP in 2000 <sup>2</sup> )	2.52	5.59	2.48	5.49
Log Population	9.21	5.96	9.83	6.36

5000 inhabitants, against 75 percent in control municipalities), more literate (14 percent illiteracy as opposed to 17 percent in control municipalities), and have larger populations.

To fix this problem, we estimate Imai and Ratkovic's (2013) covariate balancing propensity score (CBPS). The propensity score is the conditional probability of receiving treatment given covariates. The main advantage of Imai and Ratkovic's (2013: 2) method is that it "guards against the potential misspecification of a parametric propensity score model by selecting parameter values that maximize the resulting covariate balance, regardless of modeling assumptions." This improves the empirical performance of propensity score matching and weighting methods like the ones used in this study. Specifically, we estimate a propensity score model with the following variables: The (log) of the population of the municipality, the vote share of each of the three largest parties in the 2000 presidential election, and the effective numbers of parties at the municipal level in the 2000 presidential election. The model also includes quadratic polynomials for the deprivation index, population in settlements of up to 5000 people, and the illiteracy rate. As Table 4 shows, the propensity score greatly improves balance.<sup>16</sup>

After estimating the propensity score, we can turn to the D-in-D estimations. The dependent variable in these models is the difference between central government transfers in election years (2005-2006) and in non-election years (2001-2004). The models estimate the average effect of the treatment for the treated (ATT), where the treatment is "having a PAN mayor during the run-up

<sup>16</sup>We calculate the balance statistics following the procedure outlined by Sekhon (2011).

Table 4: After Balance

	Control Group	Std. Deviation	Treatment Group	Std. Deviation
PAN Vote 2000	36.66	2.33	36.68	2.33
PRI Vote 2000	46.57	3.37	46.55	3.37
PRD Vote 2000	12.87	0.93	12.87	0.93
I(PAN Vote 2000 <sup>2</sup> )	1538.25	1.62	1539.97	1.62
I(PRI Vote 2000 <sup>2</sup> )	2332.34	1.62	2331.29	1.62
I(PR D Vote 2000 <sup>2</sup> )	257.46	0.35	257.25	0.35
Deprivation	-0.26	-0.26	-0.26	-0.26
Less 5000 Residents	65.18	1.87	65.17	1.87
Illiteracy Rate	14.28	1.31	14.28	1.31
ENP in 2000	1.57	10.74	1.57	10.74
I(Deprivation <sup>2</sup> )	0.88	0.69	0.88	0.69
I(Less 5000 <sup>2</sup> )	5595.45	1.34	5595.22	1.34
I(Illiteracy <sup>2</sup> )	289.50	0.55	289.59	0.55
I(ENP in 2000 <sup>2</sup> )	2.48	5.49	2.48	5.49
Log Population	9.83	6.36	9.83	6.36

to the presidential election.” As explained above, the data on government transfers comes from a section of the federal budget called *Ramo 33* or *Aportaciones Federales y Estatales*. For the most part, the federal government assigns these funds directly to the municipalities, but a small part is transferred by the state governments to the local governments. Clearly, if both the federal and the state level governments target funds strategically – or, at a minimum, display some partisan bias in the allocation of funds to municipalities – then, when the state is controlled by a party other than the PAN, the generosity in federal allocation of funds might be offset by decisions at the state level. This should make it harder for us to detect patterns of favouritism in the allocation of funds.

Both D-in-D estimators yield very similar and statistically significant results. Using D-in-D with matching, we obtain that municipalities which have a PAN mayor in the run-up to the 2006 election, receive an increase in federal transfers of 40 pesos per capita, with a standard error of 18. The Abadie semi-parametric D-in-D gives a very similar point estimate of 39 pesos per capita, with a standard error of 15. To put these numbers in context: The mean increase (taken over the entire sample) in transfers from the non-election years 2001-2004 to the election years 2005-2006 is around 125 pesos per capita, and 50 percent of the distribution is between 53.61 and 224.60 pesos per capita. Hence the favouritism we detect is meaningful.

*Municipal Control, Federal Transfers, and Presidential Election Returns*

In this subsection we show the effect of federal spending on the 2006 presidential election results. In particular, we demonstrate that municipal control and deprivation were associated with presidential election results more tightly when they were paired with higher levels of federal transfers. To show this effect we estimate CVAR models like the ones estimated in the first part, but include a measure of federal transfers. Like in the previous subsection, we use the federal transfers located in the *Ramo 33* of the federal budget, and include the (log) per capita of *aportaciones* at the municipal level.

The model displayed in Table 5 regresses the vote shares in 2006 on the indicator for high deprivation municipalities,<sup>17</sup> the party identity of the mayor, and the (log) of the federal transfers. We also account for the (log) vote shares in the 2000 presidential election, and the (log) of the population of the municipality. In Table 6, we report the estimates of a model that includes an additional statistical control for the vote of the three main parties at the municipal level. Controlling for municipal vote allows us to capture the “pure” bonus of controlling the municipality, and not only the effect of being popular in a municipality. The main results hold after introducing this control.

For the substantive interpretation, the most important coefficients come from the three interactions and their main effects: A two-way interaction of federal transfers with mayor’s party identity, a two-way interaction of the indicator for high deprivation with mayor’s party identity, and a three-way interaction of the three variables of interest. The main effects of the coefficients for mayor’s party identity estimate the difference with a mayor from a party other than the main three in a non-deprived municipality with average transfers. The coefficients on the interaction of mayor’s party identity and transfers estimate how the results change when the levels of federal transfers increase by one unit in non-deprived municipalities. The interaction of mayor’s party identity and deprivation estimate the effect for deprived municipalities with average-level transfers. Finally, the three-way interactions identify the effect in high deprivation municipalities with increased levels of transfers.

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<sup>17</sup>We repeat all the models reported in this section with a continuous measure of deprivation and the substantive results do not change (see Appendix 3).

Table 5: Transfers, Municipal Control, and Deprivation

	PRI Coefficient (Standard Error)	PAN Coefficient (Standard Error)	PRD Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	0.18** (0.08)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.1)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.2*** (0.01)	0.31*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.02)
Log PRI Vote 2000	0.48*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.36*** (0.04)
Log PRD Vote 2000	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.17*** (0.01)	0.3*** (0.01)
Log Population	-0.03*** (0.01)	0 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
PAN Mayor	0 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)
PRD Mayor	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
PRI Mayor	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Transfers 2005	0.15** (0.07)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.1)
High Deprivation	-0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
PAN Mayor*Transfers	-0.15* (0.08)	0.07 (0.1)	0.07 (0.11)
PRD Mayor*Transfers	-0.2** (0.09)	0.17 (0.11)	0.03 (0.12)
PRI Mayor*Transfers	-0.18** (0.08)	0.03 (0.1)	0.16 (0.1)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation	0.12*** (0.04)	0.13** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.06)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation	0.07 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation	0.13*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)
Transfers*Deprivation	-0.26*** (0.08)	0.06 (0.1)	0.19* (0.1)
PAN Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	0.1 (0.1)	0 (0.13)	-0.1 (0.13)
PRD Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	0.28*** (0.1)	-0.27** (0.13)	-0.01 (0.13)
PRI Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	0.33*** (0.09)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.26** (0.11)
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.22	0.34	0.21
Number of observations	2052		
Number of states	31		

\*p&lt;0.1. \*\*p&lt;0.05. \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Table 6: Transfers, Municipal Control, and Deprivation with Additional Controls


	PRI Coefficient (Standard Error)	PAN Coefficient (Standard Error)	PRD Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	-0.18* (0.1)	-0.1 (0.14)	0.28** (0.13)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.19*** (0.01)	0.27*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Log PRI Vote 2000	0.37*** (0.03)	-0.1** (0.04)	-0.27*** (0.04)
Log PRD Vote 2000	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)	0.27*** (0.01)
Log Population	-0.04*** (0)	0 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Log PAN Municipal Vote	-0.02*** (0)	0.08*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Log PRI Municipal Vote	0.14*** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)
Log PRD Municipal Vote	-0.02*** (0)	-0.01** (0)	0.03*** (0)
PAN Mayor	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
PRD Mayor	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
PRI Mayor	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.1** (0.05)
Transfers 2005	0.07 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.12)
High Deprivation	-0.08* (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)	0 (0.06)
PAN Mayor*Transfers	-0.06 (0.09)	0.01 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)
PRD Mayor*Transfers	-0.07 (0.1)	0.08 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.13)
PRI Mayor*Transfers	-0.09 (0.09)	0 (0.11)	0.09 (0.12)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation	0.15*** (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation	0.08 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation	0.17*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.13** (0.06)
Transfers*Deprivation	0.16 (0.1)	-0.46*** (0.14)	0.3** (0.14)
PAN Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	-0.3*** (0.12)	0.52*** (0.15)	-0.22 (0.16)
PRD Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	-0.16 (0.12)	0.31** (0.15)	-0.16 (0.16)
PRI Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	-0.09 (0.11)	0.44*** (0.14)	-0.34** (0.15)
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.21	0.33	0.19
Number of observations	1826		
Number of states	31		

\*p&lt;0.1. \*\*p&lt;0.05. \*\*\*p&lt;0.01



The plots in Figure 2, which are based on the estimates from Table 5, illustrate our findings. In these plots we display the expected vote shares in the presidential election for the three parties, as a function of the transfers measure – centred to have mean 0 and standardised dividing by two standard deviations, as suggested by Gelman (2008). In each panel, we isolate one configuration of deprivation and partisan control of the municipality. We set the other variables – i.e. vote shares in 2000 and log population – at their median. So for instance, the plot labelled “PAN Mayor in Deprived Municipality” displays the expected vote shares for the three parties in a deprived municipality as a function of federal transfers. Municipalities towards the left of the plot receive less than average funds, municipalities at 0 receive average transfers, and municipalities towards the right receive more funds than average.

Figure 2: Party Vote by Municipal Control, Spending, and Deprivation



*Notes:* Expected vote shares in the 2006 presidential election for the three main parties, as a function of transfers – centred to have mean 0 and standardised dividing by two standard deviations. Each panel isolates one configuration of deprivation and partisan control of the municipality. The other variables are set at their median. The plots are based on the estimates reported in Table 5.

Three main messages emerge from these plots. First, vote shares in non-deprived municipalities are less affected by generosity of transfers, regardless of which party controls the administration. The slopes are flatter in non-deprived municipalities, as one could already observe by inspecting the three-way interactions between partisanship, transfers, and deprivation. Second, there is a stronger relationship between success in the presidential election and generosity of transfers in deprived municipalities. In particular, the advantage conferred by control of the municipality to the PAN increases by four percentage points when the transfers are more generous. The same pattern applies for the PRD, which enjoys a larger advantage over the PAN and the PRI in municipalities it controls, when they are well funded. Third, municipal control by the PRI seems to matter much less than municipal control by the two other parties. It confers an advantage to the PRI in deprived municipalities, but the advantage itself does not seem to be related to generosity of transfers. In non-deprived municipalities – predicted as a median sized municipality with median results in 2000 – the PRD is expected to receive more votes than the PRI in the 2006 presidential election.

#### *Summary of Empirical Results*

The analysis conducted in the three previous subsections reveals the following patterns. First, we find that controlling the sub-national levels of government was strongly related to electoral outcomes in the 2006 presidential election. In particular, the analysis of aggregate presidential returns shows that the control of municipal administrations conferred a strong advantage in deprived municipalities, and a somewhat weaker (and, in many specifications, statistically undetectable) advantage in non-deprived locations. Second, relying on a D-in-D design, we show that municipalities which had a PAN mayor in the run-up to the 2006 election received a considerable increase in federal transfers. Third, we demonstrate that part of the electoral advantage in deprived communities is explained by the way in which federal transfers are distributed to the municipalities. In particular, we demonstrate that municipal control and deprivation were associated with presidential election results more tightly when they were paired with higher levels of federal transfers.

## SIMULATING REPLICATIONS OF THE ELECTION

Do these results imply that municipal incumbency, and the moderate extent of targeting, allowed the PAN to secure the presidential election in 2006? Unlike other presidential democracies such as the United States, presidential elections in Mexico are decided by national plurality rule. Strategies at the local level might move some votes but do not necessarily affect national election outcomes. Since the 2006 election was decided by only half a percentage point (243934 votes), it is very likely that the election outcome could have been different if only some of the determinants of voting behaviour had been different.

In order to understand and illustrate the political significance of the effects we detect, we simulate the election under various counterfactual conditions, following the approach outlined by Gelman and King (1994). To simulate new elections, we draw from the posterior of the model in Table 5. In practice, for each of the three equations we simulate  $M = 1000$  vectors of coefficients  $\beta$ ; the stochastic variability of the returns at the municipal level  $\sigma$  ( $M$  scalars); and  $M$  vectors of state intercepts  $\eta$ . In every simulation  $m$ , and for each party  $s$ , we get

- $\beta_s^{(m)}$ , one draw from the posterior distribution of the regression coefficients
- $\eta_s^{(m)}$ , one draw from the posterior distribution of the state-level intercepts
- $\sigma_s^{(m)}$ , one draw from the posterior distribution of the standard deviation of the municipal-level errors

We draw the municipal-specific stochastic component  $\epsilon_{si}^{(m)}$  from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation  $\sigma_s^{(m)}$ . We then predict, for each municipality, the vote shares for the three parties. In the replication of the actual election results, we predict the vote shares from a model like Equation 2. Specifically, call  $LP_{si}$  the linear predictor for party  $s$  in municipality  $i$ . Then, the predicted value is

$$LP_{si} = \beta_s^{(m)} X_i^{(\text{hyp})} + \eta_{sj}^{(m)} + \epsilon_{si}^{(m)} \quad (2)$$

For notational simplicity, we include the lagged presidential vote results in  $X$ , while the vector  $\beta$  also includes what is called  $\gamma$  above. The predictors  $X^{(\text{hyp})}$  can be the actually-observed values (when we replicate the election that took place) or they can be different, encoding a counterfactual scenario under which the election could have been run.

From the linear predictors, we can move back to vote share scale. For every district, we get the predicted vote shares (as proportions of the three-party vote). In order to calculate the national vote for each of the three parties, we multiply the vote shares by the number of votes cast for the three parties in the municipality. This gives us, for every municipality, the *number* of votes cast for each of the three presidential contenders. We can then sum the votes over all the municipalities in the country, to get a national presidential vote tally.<sup>18</sup> This is one simulation of the election. We repeat the procedure  $M$  times. For each of these, we get a winner (the party that is predicted to have the most votes). By looking at the proportion of simulations in which a given party wins, we can estimate the probability that each party had to win, under a given set of conditions (captured by the values of  $X^{(hyp)}$ ). In practice, we estimate the models as percentages of the three-party vote, following the practice in American politics of modelling the two-party vote.<sup>19</sup>

Before moving to the simulations, we need to explain our strategy for dealing with missing values. Most of the missing data is from the DF, for which there is no spending data available. In order to predict the election outcome, we use the *actual* results from the DF, adding them to the total number of votes predicted from the simulation for the rest of the country. This means that the simulations are for hypothetical elections that were to take place throughout the country, except in the DF – for which we have no model.<sup>20</sup> Before summing the predicted vote tallies to the actual vote tallies in the DF, we have to make sure that the total prediction equals the number of votes cast at the national level – minus those cast in the DF. Not accounting for this might give excess weight to the DF in the simulation. Hence, we count the total number of votes involved in our prediction, and we multiply them by a constant so that the total number of votes modelled matches

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<sup>18</sup>We can also sum them by state. While state-level vote is not of any political relevance in the Mexican presidential election, the IFE reports official vote totals at the state level, and we can compare our predictions with the actual results.

<sup>19</sup>By simulating the election results in this way, we make two assumptions, which, albeit plausible, should be explicit for sake of transparency. The first one is that turnout would not have been different in these hypothetical elections. If the municipal incumbency effect is driven by the ability of local administrators to get out the vote – i.e. increase turnout among supporters of their party – we are underestimating the effect of incumbency. In addition, we also assume that municipal incumbency does not affect votes for minor parties. In other words, we assume that the most important role played by municipal incumbency is that of affecting the competition among the three major parties (those with reasonably high expectations of winning the presidential race), and that this competition takes place among those voters that actually showed up to vote in the 2006 presidential election.


<sup>20</sup>In the counterfactual simulations, this might give some advantage to the PRD, which had a particularly strong showing there. We also aggregate the election results *excluding* the DF, which is informative about the national pattern but clearly gives an advantage to the PAN in the simulations, given that the PRD stronghold is removed from the analysis.

the total number of votes cast in the election.<sup>21</sup> Based on this adjustment, the total votes cast in our simulations exactly match the national tally as reported by IFE.

### *Replicating the Actual Election Results*

Before estimating the substantively interesting counterfactual scenarios that allow us to estimate how the election might have looked under slightly different conditions, we evaluate the model’s ability to simulate the results of the actual election. We follow the procedure outlined above, using as  $X^{(\text{hyp})}$  the observed matrix of predictors  $X$ . In other words, we look at hypothetical election outcomes under the assumption that all other covariates – including past vote shares, state and municipal characteristics, municipal incumbency, and transfers – are exactly the same as they were in the actual election. The randomness comes from three sources: The uncertainty about the parameters of the model (which are estimated, not observed), the uncertainty about the state-level heterogeneity, and the random component at the municipal level (which incorporates those determinants of voting behaviour that our model does not capture.) Does the actual election we observe look “ordinary” according to our model?

Figure 3: Simulation of Actual Election Results



*Notes:* Histograms for the simulation of the actual election results for the PRI (left plot), PAN (centre plot), and PRD (right plot). The dashed vertical lines represent the actual election results as shares of the three-party vote.

First, we investigate whether the model is able to correctly describe the actual election. If this is the case, then the election we actually observed should look “ordinary” among those that the model

<sup>21</sup>The constant is calculated from the ratio between the total votes for the three parties, as reported by IFE (subtracting those reported to be cast in the DF) and the total votes cast for the three parties in the municipalities that enter our estimation sample. The constant is approximately 1.04.

can simulate. The plots in Figure 3 display the histograms for the simulated vote shares, and the actual election result, for the three parties. The actual election results, as shares of the three-party vote, are 38.41 for the PAN, and 37.78 for the PRD. The mean vote share in the simulated elections is 38.07 for the PAN, 37.99 for the PRD, and 23.94 for the PRI. Thus, the model accurately captures the election, although the PAN vote is slightly lower, and the PRD vote slightly higher than in the actual election results. Given that the election was so close, it is worth noting that the probability of the PRD of winning an election analogous to the one that took place, but with different realisations of the random components of the election, is considerable. In 49.1 percent of the simulations, the PRD gets more votes than the PAN. In all these, the PRD would have won by a small margin: The median margin in the simulations in which the PRD wins is 1.3 percentage points. In 50.9 percent of the simulations, the presidential race is won by the PAN. The median margin, in the hypothetical elections won by the PAN, is 1.3, which is slightly larger than the observed one – less than 0.6 percent.

*Counterfactual Scenario: Less Funding to PAN Municipalities*


As detailed above, we find evidence of a modest, but detectable bias in the allocation of transfers to municipalities. This biased allocation leads to PAN-controlled municipalities enjoying slightly less than 40 pesos per capita extra funds compared to otherwise similar non-PAN-controlled municipalities in the two years preceding the election. In this subsection we examine how the election result would have looked if the federal government had not allocated more funds to aligned municipalities. To estimate this counterfactual scenario we do not assume that every municipality controlled by the PAN received exactly 39 pesos per capita more than they would have otherwise received. This is because 39 pesos is the average effect for the treated, and the effect need not be constant. In the analysis of targeting, we do not explore causal heterogeneity, hence we have no reason to model it in a specific way in the simulations. Thus, we can average over the uncertainty. In particular, the effect is estimated to be 39, with a standard error of 15.

In order to capture both our uncertainty about the size of the effect, and the heterogeneity of the targetings, we proceed as follows. First, we draw one replication of the average effect size from a normal distribution with mean 39 and standard deviation 15: Call this  $\theta^{(M)}$ . This implies that, in a minority of the simulations, the *average* targeting effect is negative. We then simulate the municipality-specific targeting effect by drawing  $\theta_i^{(M)}$  for each municipality  $i$  from a normal dis-

tribution with mean  $\theta^{(M)}$  and standard deviation  $|\frac{\theta^{(M)}}{2}|$ . We then subtract this quantity from the *aportaciones* received in 2005 by PAN-controlled municipalities only. We then predict the vote shares, according to the procedure outlined above.<sup>22</sup>

The results of the simulations show that the PRD would have won the election with a probability of 54.2 percent if the PAN had not allocated disproportionately more funds to aligned municipalities. In other words, in 54.2 percent of simulations the PRD gets more votes than the PAN, while in 45.8 percent the PAN gets more votes than the PRD. The average PRD vote in this counterfactual scenario is 38.35 – up from 37.99 in the simulations of the actual results. The average PAN vote is unaffected, which means that the PRD increases its vote shares by subtracting votes from the PRI, which loses 0.36 percent. The PRI vote decreases from 23.94 in the simulations of the actual results to 23.58 in the counterfactual scenario. The median margin of victory – in the simulations won by each party – is the same for the PAN and the PRD: 1.4 percentage points.

Figure 4: Simulation of Counterfactual Scenario



*Notes:* Histograms for the simulation of a counterfactual scenario in which PAN-aligned municipalities receive, on average, less transfers following the results of the D-in-D estimations (39 pesos per capita with a standard deviation of 15). The left plot is for the PRI, the plot in the centre for the PAN, and the plot on the right for the PRD. The dashed vertical lines represent the actual election results as shares of the three-party vote.

The plots in Figure 4 display the histograms for the simulated vote shares of the three main parties averaging over the uncertainty of the D-in-D results. Again, the dashed vertical lines represent the actual election results as shares of the three-party vote. The plot for the PRD shows that 66.6 percent of the distribution is to the right of the actual election result. This means that in two thirds

<sup>22</sup>Note that, by construction, the uncertainty about the voting model and the uncertainty about the targeted spending effect are orthogonal, as they come from two different estimations. Hence, we can draw the  $\theta^{(M)}$  and the set of parameters  $\xi = (\beta, \sigma, \eta)$  from independent distributions. When averaging the distribution of the predicted vote shares, we are incorporating both the uncertainty about the targeting effect, and the uncertainty about the parameters of the voting model.

of the simulations the PRD obtains a larger share of the vote than it actually obtained. The plot for the PAN shows the opposite result. Almost two thirds of the PAN distribution is to the left of the actual result. In 633 out of 1000 simulations it obtains a smaller share of the vote than it actually received in the election.

In sum, the results of the simulations demonstrate that the allocation of funds to aligned municipalities paid off electorally for the PAN in the 2006 presidential election. It turned an election that was looking very much in favour of the PRD into a virtual tie. Had the PAN not allocated more funds to municipalities governed by co-partisans, it would have lost the election with a probability of 54.2 percent. The additional transfers gave the PAN a marginal advantage, increasing its probability of winning the election to 50.9 percent, according to our simulations.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper we find causal evidence of tactical motivations in the allocation of federal funds to the municipalities during the presidency of Vicente Fox in Mexico (2000-2006). Using a D-in-D design, we show that in the run-up to the 2006 presidential election, the ruling party in the central government allocated more transfers to municipalities that had co-partisans as mayors. The favouritism we detect in the allocation of federal grants is considerable. Municipalities which had a PAN mayor in the run-up to the 2006 election received an increase in federal transfers of 40 pesos per capita – equivalent to 3.67 U.S. dollars in 2005 values.

We also show that federal transfers were instrumental in securing the election of the PAN presidential candidate, Felipe Calderón, in 2006. They were particularly important in increasing the PAN vote when they were allocated to deprived municipalities: The vote shares of the PAN were three percent larger in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than one standard deviation above the mean, than in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than one standard deviation below the mean. Our simulation of the 2006 election results shows that if the PAN had not allocated more funds to aligned municipalities, it would have lost the election with a probability of 54.2 percent.

By focusing on the case of Mexico in the first presidential term after its democratic transition, we shed light on the dynamics that allow parties previously in opposition to authoritarian regimes to consolidate their support once they access office. Until 2000, the PAN was the main opposition party to the PRI, and the staunchest critic of its clientelistic practices. After 2000, some progress was



made in the way the central government allocated social policy funds. Social programmes which were for decades highly politicised, were handed over to technocrats. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this paper clearly indicates that the PAN was able to politicise funds which – in contrast to social programmes such as *Oportunidades* and *Seguro Popular* – were not subject to heavy scrutiny. Thus, while the PAN used federal monies in a more subtle way than the PRI in its hegemonic period, it was very effective nevertheless. The politicisation of federal resources, together with the control of local administrations, allowed the PAN to make electoral inroads in poor areas of the country, which were traditional strongholds of the formerly authoritarian PRI and the leftist PRD.

The finding that the PAN was able to consolidate its electoral support between 2000 and 2006 using federal funds tactically, has clear implications for the debate about the Mexican transition in particular, and democratic transitions more generally. First, in accordance with previous studies, it suggests that an open electoral market does not necessarily lead to programmatic competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), but can also open up the possibility for former opposition parties to also politicise federal resources – i.e. there is a “democratisation” in the politicisation of central government funds. Second, it also suggests that the politicisation of federal resources is very difficult to eradicate in newly established democracies in which the cost for “new” parties of moving back to the opposition ranks is higher than in established democracies, and voters as well as local-level politicians have traditionally relied on political connections for access to funds.

The results of this study also have implications for our understanding of the electoral strategies that incumbent heads of governments, and their parties, adopt in different contexts. These strategies may be different in centralised and decentralised political systems. In the former, incumbent heads of government may be able to establish a direct connection with key group of voters, and may be able to target them directly – e.g. with campaign handouts or *ad hoc* social programmes (Roberts 1995). In contrast, in decentralised systems, such as federal Mexico, politicians at the local level may have a gatekeeping function, limiting the ability of federal governments to directly target constituents. To reach voters successfully, parties at the centre may thus have to focus their efforts in allocating more funds to allied local politicians. It is not surprising that studies of distributive politics have found empirical evidence of the alignment hypothesis in decentralised systems such as the U.S. (Larcinese et al. 2006), Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini 2012), India (Arulampalam et al. 2009) and Spain (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008).

While this paper was primarily interested in the role of the central government in the allocation of resources to subnational entities, our study also relates to the literature on political clientelism.

This literature focuses on the electoral gains that political machines make by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for electoral support (Stokes 2005; Brusco et. al. 2004). We show that parties that dispose of well-organised clientelistic machines – like the former authoritarian ruling PRI – need to rely less on the control of local administrations than relative newcomers who do not control established party machines at the local level – like the incumbent PAN and the leftist PRD. While the outcomes of the presidential competition between the “new” parties (the PAN and the PRD) can be predicted based on municipal control and spending, the PRI vote shares are not explained by these variables. In contrast, the PRI vote is most strongly associated with past presidential election results.

To conclude, regarding the external validity of our findings, our results have particularly strong implications for countries with a similar governance structure to Mexico: An executive with strong (in)formal powers to allocate funds to the municipalities, and a clear pattern of alliances between the parties in the central and the sub-national governments. It is thus likely that the results uncovered in this study can also be found in other federal countries in which heads of government have discretionary powers to allocate spending, and in which it is relatively straightforward for voters to identify which parties at the local level are allied with the party in the federal government. In the Latin American context, our findings should be of particular importance for students of Brazilian and Argentine distributive politics.

## CONCLUSIONS

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*“I cannot trust a party; I can trust a man. I cannot hold a party responsible; I can hold a man responsible. I cannot get an expression of opinion which is single and simple from a party; I can get that only from a man”* (Sumner 1914: 367, quoted in White 2006: 11).

*“[The theory of collective party accountability] appeared alluring enough to be adopted by some writers of prominence, and expanded in certain cases, with brilliancy of literary style. It has, however, one defect: it is not borne out by the facts”* (Ostrogorski 1910: 380, cited in White 2006: 11).

## INTRODUCTION

The general motivation of this thesis was to better understand electoral accountability for incumbent leaders and their parties in Latin America. The thesis addressed two central questions. First, it was concerned with explaining sources of contextual and institutional variation in the degree to which voters hold incumbents accountable for their performance in government. In particular, I sought to explain how the relationship between a prominent incumbent politician, such as the sitting president, and the candidates of her party, both in presidential and legislative elections, affects performance-based voting. The first two papers address this question. Second, I examined how voters hold incumbents accountable for other areas of government control besides the macro-economy. The third paper investigates whether Mexican voters reward the incumbent party in the federal government for allocating more federal spending to municipalities governed by co-partisans. In this concluding chapter, I summarise the main results, and empirical contributions of the thesis. After reviewing the empirical findings, I discuss the theoretical and normative implications of my results. The chapter concludes with ideas for further research.

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

*The Successor Factor in Latin American Presidential Elections*

The first paper of this thesis introduces a new dataset that describes the intra-party variation in the type of presidential candidates in Latin America. Combining this data with individual-level information on vote intention and evaluations of the performance of the government, the paper identifies a very strong empirical regularity in how voters hold incumbent parties to account: Voters assign more (less) responsibility for the executive's past actions if the presidential candidate of the incumbent party is closely (weakly) linked to the policy outcomes of the outgoing government.

To test the argument that the relationship of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party to the outgoing government affects electoral sanctioning, the paper matches two datasets. The first consists of individual-level information on vote intention, economic evaluations, and presidential approval, along with socio-demographic controls, for 51 election years in Latin America between 1995 and 2012. Second, I created an original dataset that describes the type of presidential candidate of the incumbent party. This dataset captures how closely or weakly related the presidential candidate is to the policy outcomes of the outgoing government. It identifies three types of candidates: Re-standing presidents, successors and non-successors. Re-running presidents are most closely associated with the policies of the outgoing government. In the words of Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001: 169), they are “the economic manager[s] personified”. In cases of no presidential re-election, successors have the closest connection to the policy outcomes of the executive. They are political allies of the outgoing president and her preferred option among the candidates seeking the presidential nomination of the incumbent party. Third, non-successors are only weakly associated with the outgoing government, as they are internal party opponents of the president, having defeated the president's preferred candidate to clinch the presidential nomination.

After matching these two datasets, the paper estimates random-intercept random-slopes logit models. While these models have become standard in political science, few scholars have used them to study voting behaviour in Latin America. The results for the model using economic evaluations as the measure of government performance, show that when economic perceptions move from *worse* to *better*, the probability of voting for a re-running president increases by 53 percent – from 17 to 70 percent. In the case of successor candidates, an analogous change in economic perceptions increases the probability of voting for the incumbent party by 33 percent – from 10 to 43 percent. Finally,

in the case of non-successors, a similar change in economic perceptions increases the probability of voting for the incumbent party by only 16 percent – from 17 to 33 percent.

The results for the model using presidential approval to measure performance are very similar. The probability of voting for a re-running president when voters move from not approving to approving of the president's performance, increases by 72 percent – from 10 to 82 percent. In the case of successor candidates, an analogous change in presidential approval increases the probability of voting for the incumbent party by 33 percent – from 10 to 43 percent. Finally, in the case of non-successor candidates, a similar change in perceptions of the performance of the president increases the probability of voting for the incumbent party by only 19 percent – from nine to 28 percent. In sum, the slopes for the different types of candidates are statistically significantly different from each other. The paper thus provides evidence that the magnitude of the performance-based vote varies considerably by candidate type.

The quote by Felipe Calderón – the presidential candidate of the incumbent PAN in the 2006 election – in the epigraph of the first paper effectively summarises that paper's central idea. He suggests that there is a difference between being the candidate of the incumbent *party*, and being the candidate of the *government*. According to Calderón, this difference is noticeable to voters. The paper indeed provides systematic evidence that voters throughout Latin America differentiate between these two types of candidates. The paper shows that successors – the *government* candidates in the words of Calderón – are held more electorally accountable for the performance of the government than non-successor candidates – the candidates of the incumbent *party*, according to the PAN leader. The paper further reveals that re-standing presidents are subject to greater electoral sanctioning than successors and non-successors.

### *The Accountability Effect of Endorsements*

Although some very good survey experiments conducted in Latin American countries have recently been published (Lupu 2013; Samuels and Zucco 2014), the use of surveys for the study of political behaviour in the region is still in its early stages. The second paper of this thesis uses a survey experiment conducted in the run-up to the 2012 Mexican general election to investigate whether endorsements increase the magnitude of the performance-based vote, and whether they affect partisans and non-partisans of the source cue in the same way.

I embedded my experiment in a survey carried out by *Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica*, a polling company, two days before the election. Between 400 and 410 subjects were interviewed in each of the 32 Mexican states, for a total of 12830 observations. This survey asked respondents to evaluate the performance of the outgoing president, Felipe Calderón, along with other questions about the 2012 general election and their socio-demographic background. For the purpose of my experiment, respondents were randomised into two different questionnaires, which varied in an additional question on the presidential endorsement of Senate candidates. Subjects in the control group were asked how likely it was that they would vote for the Senate candidates of the incumbent *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN). Respondents in the treatment group were asked the same question, but were told that President Calderón was endorsing the PAN candidates for the Senate.

The empirical setting of the experiment allowed me to estimate conditional average treatment effects (CATEs), using *presidential approval* and *partisanship* as conditional variables. Among voters who identify with the incumbent party but do not approve of the president's performance, the results show that exposure to an endorsement depresses the vote for the incumbent party. In the models that use a binary dependent variable, *panistas* in the treatment group who do not at all approve of the president, are 15 percent less likely to vote for the PAN Senate candidates than *panistas* in the control group with the same levels of presidential approval. The results are analogous for the models using the continuous dependent variable. Among voters in the lowest level of presidential approval, the gap between *panistas* in the treatment and control groups is half a point in the five-point Likert scale.

In contrast, among voters who do not identify with the incumbent party, the results show that endorsements do not have an effect on retrospective voting. The slopes for non-*panistas* in the treatment and control groups run parallel to each other and the point estimates are almost identical across the presidential approval scale – regardless of which dependent variable is used. This suggests that voters, who do not identify with the party of the source cue, hold the incumbent party collectively accountable for the performance of the government.

In sum, the paper shows that the incumbent party in the 2012 Mexican general election was subject to more electoral accountability when the outgoing president endorsed its Senate candidates than when he did not. However, endorsements only had an “accountability effect” among voters who identified with the incumbent party. Among voters who do not identify with the incumbent party, endorsements did not affect how voters reward and punish the incumbent party.

*Tactical Spending and Presidential Election Returns*

The third paper of this thesis consists of an in-depth investigation of the 2006 Mexican presidential election and, in particular, of the electoral returns of tactically allocating inter-governmental grants. The paper departs from the recent trend in studies of distributive politics in Mexico of investigating whether conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes increase incumbent voting (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2009; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012; De la O 2013).<sup>1</sup> Instead, the paper exploits a dataset on federal grants allocations that has not received much attention from the literature on federal spending. This dataset consists of two funds that are allocated directly to the municipalities – i.e. FISM (*Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social Municipal*), and FORTAMUNDF (*Fondo de Aportaciones para el Fortalecimiento de los Municipios y las Demarcaciones Territoriales del Distrito Federal*).

The paper focuses on the role of the presidency in allocating funds to municipalities, and examines the extent to which voters hold the president's party accountable for this spending. The paper uncovers the mechanism that the incumbent party in the federal government used to politicise public funds: It shows that in the two years before the 2006 presidential election the PAN allocated disproportionately more funds to municipalities governed by co-partisans. The evidence indicates that these transfers were instrumental in securing the victory of the PAN presidential candidate in an election that was decided by less than 0.6 percent of the vote. Transfers were particularly important in increasing the PAN vote when they were allocated to deprived municipalities.

Empirically, the paper uses a difference-in-difference (D-in-D) design to show that the party of the president allocated more FISM and FORTAMUNDF funds to municipalities that had a co-partisan as mayor. Both the semi-parametric, and the D-in-D estimator with matching show that the levels of spending in PAN and non-PAN controlled municipalities followed a parallel trend in the first four years of the administration of Vicente Fox (2001-2004). However, in the two years preceding the election, PAN-aligned municipalities received an average of 40 pesos per capita increases in transfers. This amounts to 3.67 dollars in 2005 values.

To estimate the presidential election returns of tactical spending, the paper adopts two different strategies. First, it estimates multi-level compositional vector autoregressive models, which show that controlling the municipal administration conferred a significant advantage in the presidential election, particularly in deprived municipalities that received disproportionately more funds. The

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<sup>1</sup>Given that social programmes such as PRONASOL – the precursor of the CCT programme *Oportunidades* – were highly politicised until the last years of the PRI authoritarian period, the literature on distributive politics in Mexico has focused mainly on investigating the electoral consequences of CCT spending since the demise of the PRI.

PAN vote shares were three percent larger in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than one standard deviation above the mean, than in deprived municipalities that received transfers slightly less than one standard deviation below the mean. Second, the paper simulates replications of the 2006 presidential election results in which it investigates how the election result would have looked if the federal government had not allocated more funds to PAN-controlled municipalities. The probability that the PAN wins the election decreases from 50.9 percent – in the simulations using the actually observed data – to 45.8 percent.

## THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS

The empirical findings discussed in the previous section have far-reaching theoretical implications not only for the study of electoral accountability but also for comparative electoral behaviour, and the quality of democracy in Latin America. In the following, I first address the implications of my findings for the Mexican transition to democracy, the debate about the electoral returns of tactical spending, and the contextual factors in economic voting, before concluding with general implications for the study of parties and electoral accountability.

*Implications for the Study of the Mexican Democratic Transition*

How do parties previously in opposition to authoritarian regimes consolidate their electoral support once they access office? This is a central question for the study of democratic transitions, particularly in countries with a previous history of fraudulent practices in the conduct of elections. However, despite its importance, this question remains relatively unexplored in the Latin American context, where most research focuses on party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring et al. 2006), or party consolidation (Levitsky 2003; Randall and Svasand 2002). As a result, little is known about the strategies that new governing parties follow to win the all-important second election after a transition away from authoritarianism (Huntington 1993).

The 2006 Mexican presidential election constitutes an ideal case study to investigate these dynamics. For 71 years, a single political party, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) dominated Mexican politics. In its heyday, the PRI controlled every level of government and won every significant election, not least by politicising the allocation of federal resources to sub-national lev-



els (Greene 2007, 2010; Magaloni 2006; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2007). Levitsky and Way (2010b) describe the Mexican political system in the years of PRI hegemony as one of competitive authoritarianism. By the late 1980s, the authoritarian system began to show signs of exhaustion (Magaloni 2006). In 1988, the party had to commit fraud to retain the presidency, and in 1989 it lost its first gubernatorial election in the state of Baja California. Eight years later, the opposition managed to take a majority of lower house seats in the mid-term legislative elections, and three years later, the PRI lost the presidency to the conservative PAN.

After winning the presidency in 2000, the PAN made some important breaks with the past, most notably on social policy. The federal government refrained from using social programmes such as *Oportunidades* and *Seguro Popular* to provide direct benefits to its constituents (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2009; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2012). However, while the PAN handed control over social policy to technocrats, it did retain some discretion in the allocation of other central government funds, as the third paper of this thesis shows. The PAN administration politicised central government funds such as FISM and FORTAMUNDE, which were subject to less public scrutiny than CCT programmes. Thus, the PAN used central government grants in a more subtle way than the PRI, but in a very effective way nevertheless. In fact, the tactical allocation of federal resources to aligned municipalities in the run-up to the 2006 general election allowed the PAN to make electoral inroads in poor areas of the countries which were traditional strongholds of the PRI and the leftist *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD).

The finding that the PAN was able to consolidate its electoral support by using federal funds tactically has clear implications for the debate about the Mexican transition in particular, and democratic transitions more generally. First, it qualifies the rosy view emerging from studies that only evaluate the politicisation of social policy transfers, according to which the PAN did not allocate funds tactically. Second, in accordance with previous studies, it suggests that an open electoral market does not only lead to programmatic competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), but can also present former opposition parties with the possibility of politicising federal resources themselves. Third, it also suggests that the tactical allocation of central government funds is very difficult to eliminate in young democracies in which the cost for “new” parties of moving back to the opposition is higher than in established democracies, and voters as well as local-level politicians count on political connections for access to funds.

While the results of the third paper suggest that, after the defeat of the PRI, the presidency retained a central position in shaping the electoral fortunes of the incumbent party by allocating

funds tactically, two findings in the first two papers qualify the notion of a presidency with excessive powers. First, neither President Fox, nor President Calderón were able to secure the nomination of their preferred candidates in the 2006 and 2012 PAN primaries (Shirk 2009). This stands in stark contrast to the years of PRI hegemony, in which outgoing presidents could handpick, and if necessary impose their preferred candidates on the rest of the party (Weldon 1997; Langston 2006). While PRI presidents could avoid “lame duck” status by retaining a central role in the political process through the appointment of their successors, the two PAN presidents have not been able to occupy such a central role.

Second, the survey experiment conducted in the second paper shows that the endorsement by the outgoing president Calderón depresses the PAN Senate vote regardless of voters’ presidential approval. The average treatment effect estimated for the model using the binary dependent variable shows that respondents exposed to a Calderón endorsement are almost two percent less likely of voting for the PAN than subjects not exposed to an endorsement. While further research needs to clarify whether this is a Calderón effect, or whether this effect can be extended to other presidents, the finding suggests a certain level of voters’ fatigue with presidents intervening in the electoral process. The fact that presidential endorsements cannot be considered a strategy of boosting electoral support is likely to further decrease the president’s power.

### *Implications for the Debate About the Returns of Tactical Spending*

Which parties benefit from politicising public resources to favour co-partisans? In recent years, this question has received considerable attention from the literature on distributive politics. Answers to this question have focused on socio-economic factors, ideology, and the interaction of these two variables.

Kriner and Reeves (2012) study the effect of spending on presidential election results in the United States. Using individual-level data, they show that liberal voters reward incumbents more than conservative voters for increases in public spending. Calvo and Murillo (2004) focus on legislative elections in Argentina and find that the Peronist party is rewarded for increasing the number of public employees, but that the vote shares of the second main party, the Radicals, are not affected by increases in public employment. Using more disaggregated data at the municipal level, Nazareno et al. (2006) find an even starker effect: Patronage spending by Radical mayors depresses their party’s vote shares.

What explains the different electoral returns on patronage for the Radicals and the Peronists? The authors of both studies provide similar answers: For the middle-class constituents of the Radical party, spending on patronage indicates an inefficient use of government resources. In contrast, for the typical working-class Peronist constituent, patronage has rather a positive connotation (i.e. access to jobs). This argument resonates positively with the findings of a recent study, also on Argentina, which shows that high electoral competition is compatible with clientelism when poverty is high, but decreases the incentives for clientelism where poverty is low (Weitz-Shapiro 2012).

Along these lines, the results of the third paper constitute an interesting puzzle. The paper shows opposite results to the findings of Kriner and Reeves, Calvo and Murillo, and Nazareno and co-authors. The paper demonstrates that the Mexican party that traditionally appeals most to conservative, educated middle- and high-income voters – the PAN – is clearly rewarded for increasing spending to sub-national governments. It is not completely clear what the differences between the PAN and the Radicals in Argentina are, and further research needs to investigate the Mexican findings in more detail. However, some hypotheses come to mind. It is likely that these results are related to the interaction of two main factors: The three-party strategic environment, and the high levels of income inequality in the country.

In Mexico, the media constantly exposes cases of corruption, and allegations of clientelistic practices by the three major parties.<sup>2</sup> As a result, voters are likely left with the perception that all three main parties politicise resources, which leaves no option for middle-class and affluent conservative voters other than voting for one of the minor parties – thereby effectively wasting their vote. In addition, the fact that Mexico has a very unequal social structure suggests that there is a large demand for targeted spending in poor areas of the country. Given that non-poor voters who would otherwise oppose the politicisation of public resources are not likely to defect, conservative parties like the PAN may be encouraged to target poor voters with the expectation of gaining their vote without sacrificing their natural constituents.

### *Implications for the Debate About Contextual Factors in Economic Voting*

The main theoretical development emerging from the comparative economic voting literature in recent years is that the political and institutional contexts, in which elections take place, mediate the

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<sup>2</sup>The formerly authoritarian PRI, which has the largest network of political brokers and controls the largest numbers of governorships and municipalities, is particularly well-known for manipulating different aspects of the political process.

magnitude of the economic vote. The notion that context shapes economic voting was introduced by Powell and Whitten (1993), who argue that incumbent parties are held to higher account when clarity of responsibility is high rather than low. Since the publication of this seminal article, countless other studies have shown that several contextual factors affect how voters sanction incumbents (Whitten and Palmer 1999; Samuels 2004; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Dalton and Anderson 2011; Singer and Carlin 2013). The first paper of this thesis shows that Latin America is no exception to this view of elections. In accordance with the central thesis of that paper, the results show that the type of presidential candidate the incumbent party nominates affects the magnitude of the economic vote. In open seat elections, successor candidates are subject to more economic voting than non-successors. When presidents run for re-election, the magnitude of the economic vote is higher than it is for the other two types of candidates.

The type of presidential candidate is not the only factor mediating the economic vote in Latin America. The first paper corroborates the finding obtained from developed democracies that the clarity of responsibility affects how voters punish and reward incumbents. Model 1 in Table 2 shows that the magnitude of the economic vote increases when the party of the president has a legislative majority. *Majority situation* is statistically significant and in the expected direction when it is interacted with *economy got better*, but not when it is interacted with *economy got worse*. Model 1 in Table 2 also tests whether there is more economic voting when presidential elections are held on the same day as legislative ones, in contexts of low trade dependence, and when incumbent presidents switch policies. However, none of these variables have the predicted effects on the magnitude of the economic vote.

The models presented in Table 2 and Appendix 4 of the first paper estimate how the different contextual variables mediate the magnitude of the economic vote all at once, i.e. paired with each other. Estimating the models in this way has two advantages. First, they show that the main relationship of interest – that the type of presidential candidate affects attributions of responsibility – has the hypothesised effect even after controlling for all the other variables. Second, following Duch and Stevenson (2008), the models produce at least some order-of-magnitude estimates of the relative importance of the contextual variables for the economic vote.

However, due to some level of collinearity in the sample, and the fact that there are only 51 observations of contextual variables in the models, it is difficult to estimate the independent effect of each contextual variable. One important consequence of combining all the contextual variables

in a single model is that, in some cases, the interaction effects are statistically significant only in one direction, and in others, not statistically significant at all despite being in the predicted direction.

As more individual-level studies that estimate contextual variation in economic voting become available in future years, researchers will get better estimates of the independent effect of each variable (Duch and Stevenson 2008: 351). In the meantime, one can get a sense of how each contextual variable would affect economic voting if more contextual observations were available, by estimating individual models for each of these variables. Table 1 does precisely that. Model 1 estimates the effect of *candidate type* on the economic vote. In accordance with the main findings of the first paper, successor candidates are held more electorally accountable than non-successors in open seat elections, while re-standing presidents are subject to more economic voting than the other two types of candidates. Model 2 shows that incumbent parties are subject to greater electoral sanctioning in high clarity situations, i.e. when incumbent parties enjoy a legislative majority. In contrast to Model 1 in Table 2 of the first paper, *majority situation* is not only statistically significant and in the expected direction when it is interacted with *economy got better*, but also when it is interacted with *economy got worse*. The results of Model 3 do not conform to the expectation that there is more economic voting in concurrent presidential and legislative elections. As in Table 2 in the first paper, the fact that *concurrent elections* when interacted with *economy got worse* is positive and statistically significant, suggests that the impact of negative economic evaluations on the vote is lower in concurrent elections. Model 4 shows that there is less economic voting in cases of high exposure to the global economy. *Trade dependence* interacted with *economy got better* is negatively signed and statistically significant at the five percent level. Model 5 shows that incumbent parties are not subject to higher electoral standards when incumbent presidents switch policies. Although *policy switcher* is signed in the hypothesised direction when interacted with *economy got better* and *economy got worse*, it is not statistically significant.<sup>3</sup>


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<sup>3</sup>This may be due to the low number of policy switchers in my sample – only five cases.

Table 1: Political Context and Economic Voting

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	P> Z	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	P> Z	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	P> Z	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	P> Z	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	P> Z
Economy Better	0.18 (0.12)	0.14	0.43 (0.09)	0.00	0.70 (0.19)	0.00	0.91 (0.18)	0.00	0.54 (0.09)	0.00
Economy Better*Successor	0.32 (0.17)	0.05								
Economy Better*Re-run	0.84 (0.18)	0.00								
Economy Worse	-0.37 (0.10)	0.00	-0.56 (.08)	0.00	-0.98 (0.14)	0.00	-0.78 (0.16)	0.00	-0.62 (.07)	0.00
Economy Worse*Successor	-0.27 (0.14)	0.05								
Economy Worse*Re-run	-0.58 (0.15)	0.00								
Successor	-0.08 (0.27)	0.78								
Re-running President	0.65 (0.29)	0.02								
Economy Better*Majority Situation			0.45 (0.18)	0.01						
Economy Worse*Majority Situation			-0.31 (0.15)	0.04						
Majority Situation			0.57 (0.27)	0.03						
Economy Better*Concurrent					-0.18 (0.22)	0.39				
Economy Worse*Concurrent					0.42 (0.16)	0.01				
Concurrent Elections					-0.48 (0.30)	0.11				
Economy Better*Trade Dependence							-0.01 (0.002)	0.03		
Economy Worse*Trade Dependence							0.002 (0.002)	0.29		
Trade Dependence							0.002 (0.004)	0.64		
Economy Better*Policy Switch									0.11 (0.25)	0.66
Economy Worse*Policy Switch									-0.15 (0.20)	0.46
Policy Switch									0.24 (0.35)	0.50
Intercept	0.28 (0.20)	0.17	0.30 (0.14)	0.03	0.83 (0.27)	0.00	0.56 (0.28)	0.05	0.41 (0.14)	0.00
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.79		0.82		0.83		0.85		0.85	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyBetter}}$	0.42		0.51		0.55		0.52		0.55	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyWorse}}$	0.37		0.41		0.40		0.43		0.43	
Number of observations	38501		38501		38501		38501		38501	
Number of elections	51		51		51		51		51	

Figure 1: Political Context and Economic Voting



Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party by evaluations of the national economy for different levels of five contextual variables. Estimations are for a non-married man between 18 and 24 years of age who has a university degree and is in the highest socio-economic category.

Panel 1: Slope A is significantly different from B ( $p=0.00$ ) and C ( $p=0.00$ ) for *economy got better*, as well as from B ( $p=0.04$ ) and C ( $p=0.00$ ) for *economy got worse*. Slope B is significantly different from C for *economy got better* ( $p=0.05$ ) and *economy got worse* ( $p=0.05$ ).

Panel 2: Slope A is significantly different from B for *economy got better* ( $p=0.01$ ) and *economy got worse* ( $p=0.04$ ).

Panel 3: Slopes A and B are not significantly different from each other for *economy got better* ( $p=0.39$ ), but are significantly different for *economy got worse* ( $p=0.01$ ).

Panel 4: Slopes A, B, and C are significantly different from each other for *economy got better* ( $p=0.03$ ), but not for *economy got worse* ( $p=0.29$ ).

Panel 5: Slope A is neither significantly different from B for *economy got better* ( $p=0.66$ ), nor for *economy got worse* ( $p=0.46$ ).

Sources: CEP, CSES, LAPOP, and *Latinobarómetro*.

Figure 1 plots predicted probabilities of voting for the party of the president against different values of economic perceptions. In each plot I include slopes for different values of each contextual variable. Panel 1 looks at the effect of *candidate type*, and shows how the probability of voting for each type of candidate changes as a function of *economic evaluations*. The three slopes are statistically significantly different from each other. Panel 2 shows how the probability of voting for the incumbent party changes in *minority* and *majority situations* as a function of *economic evaluations*. The slope is much steeper in *majority* than in *minority contexts*, suggesting that incumbents are held more accountable for the economy when they have a legislative majority. Panel 3 looks at the effect of having *concurrent* presidential and legislative elections. The slope is steeper in non-concurrent elections when economic evaluations move from *same* to *worse*, which is not consistent with the claim that incumbent parties are held more accountable when presidents and legislatures are elected on the same day. Panel 4 shows how the incumbent vote changes in situations with average levels of *trade*, and with one standard deviation above and below the mean as a function of *economic perceptions*. When evaluations move from *same* to *better*, voters hold the incumbent more accountable in cases of low trade dependence. Finally, Panel 5 looks at the effect of having versus not having a *policy switcher* as president. The two slopes are not statistically distinguishable from each other.

Taken together, the results of the first paper and the this section show that context matters a great deal for the economic vote in Latin America. The analyses show that a contextual factor that has not been previously studied – the type of presidential candidate – significantly affects the way in which voters sanction incumbent parties for the performance of the government. The results also show that some of the key contextual factors that have been shown to mediate performance-based voting in developed democracies – most of which have a parliamentary form of government – also have an effect on the economy-voter relationship in the presidential systems of Latin America. Voters hold incumbent parties more electorally accountable in contexts of high rather than low clarity of responsibility, and in contexts of high rather than low exposure to global economic forces. In contrast, the factors that are particular to presidential systems and to Latin America – the concurrent election of the president and the legislature, and whether a president is a policy switcher – do not have an effect on the magnitude of the economic vote.



*Implications for the Study of Parties and Electoral Accountability*

The publication of the report of the American Political Science Association on the state of the American two-party system in 1950 constituted a landmark in the study of political parties. The central message of the report was that the American political system needed to develop “responsible parties” to perform its main functions properly. According to the report, the notion of a responsible party implied that party organisation had to dominate all aspects of the democratic process, from candidate selection to campaigning, government formation, and policymaking. Even though in the decades after the publication of the APSA report, students of American politics bemoaned the absence of responsible parties, “the notion of a responsible party [erected] a normative standard by which scholars judge the quality of collective representation and accountability under democracy” (Samuels and Shugart 2010: 24).

The “responsible party government” model had a long lasting impact on the electoral accountability literature. The vast majority of further work conceptualised electoral accountability in terms of the standards set by the APSA report. Retrospective voting studies focused on explaining the vote for the incumbent party as a whole, without accounting for the possibility that the magnitude of the performance-based vote may vary depending on the identity of the candidates of the incumbent party. Thus, the normative fixation with collective party accountability resulted in a lack of theorising about the effect of intra-party politics and candidate-specific variables on how voters assign responsibility for past behaviour. The few studies that did touch upon this issue mainly reinforced the views held by the responsible party government model.<sup>4</sup>

In the past decade, three studies on economic voting in American presidential elections have begun to address the possibility that intra-party variation in the type of candidate may have an effect on the magnitude of the economic vote. Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001), Norpoth (2002), and Campbell et al. (2010) show that incumbent parties are held more electorally accountable when presidents re-run. Campbell et al. (2010: 1084) make their theoretical contribution very explicit: “[A]ccountability for government performance is partly a matter of party responsibility and partly a matter of personal responsibility associated with the president. When an incumbent

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<sup>4</sup>The early work of David Samuels (2004) is a good example. He claims that because presidents’ legacies are “shaped by who succeeds them to office, they also care about who that person turns out to be,” and therefore “ought to attempt to convince voters that they share a personal and political affinity with their successor-candidate” (Samuels 2004: 426). This implies that whether a president runs for re-election or not should not have an effect on the magnitude of the economic vote. As he later summarises, there is “no reason why voters could not hold political parties as a whole and presidential governments as a whole [...] accountable in a retrospective voting fashion” (Samuels 2004: 426).

is rerunning, both personal and party responsibility apply. When the incumbent is not rerunning, only party responsibility applies to the vote [...].”

The results of the first paper show that in Latin America, voters also hold incumbent parties more accountable when the sitting president re-runs, than when the party has to nominate another candidate in open seat elections. This suggests that there is an accountability effect due to an incumbent president running for re-election. However, in contrast to the three studies on the American presidency discussed above, I move beyond the dichotomous distinction between individual and party accountability, and disentangle the notion of party accountability into two components.

The performance-based vote that is associated with non-successors in the first paper, and with non-endorsed candidates in the second, can be conceptualised as the “lower bound” of party accountability. These types of candidates have no close ties to the outgoing government, and thus constitute a good measure of something close to a “pure” party accountability effect. In contrast, the performance-based vote that is associated with successors, and endorsed candidates can be conceived as the “upper bound” of party accountability. This is clearly not a pure party accountability effect, because voters associate successors and endorsed candidates more closely with the reputation of the outgoing president.

The finding that, in open seat elections, voters distinguish candidates with close ties from candidates without close ties to the president, indicates that disentangling the “party accountability” effect into two components provides a better picture of how voters hold incumbents accountable. It also suggests that voters can hold a *party* accountable, despite not holding it *collectively* responsible. In the classic accountability literature, “party accountability” and “collective party responsibility” are used interchangeably (White 2006). Yet these are two different phenomena. For collective party responsibility to take place, voters must hold incumbent parties accountable to the same degree when a president re-runs, as when the candidate is a successor or a non-successor. My results disprove this assumption. At the same time, I provide evidence that, while the magnitude of the performance-based vote varies by candidate type, voters also hold the *party* accountable for the performance of the executive – even when the presidential nominee is a non-successor, or the candidates do not receive an endorsement.

In the conclusion to *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers*, Samuels and Shugart (2010: 255) leave the question open as to “whether voters in presidential elections are retrospectively punishing an individual, a party, or both.” The findings of the first two papers of this thesis suggest that the answer to this is question is clearly *both*.

## NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS

The empirical findings summarised at the beginning of this chapter have normative implications for our understanding of how candidates' characteristics affect the way in which voters sanction incumbent parties, as well as for the presidential re-election debate in Latin America. I discuss both normative implications in this section.

*Avoiding Responsibility or Differential Attributions of Responsibility?*

The results of the first two papers allow for two conflicting normative assessments of how candidates' characteristics affect the way in which voters sanction incumbents. The first normative position favours the classic notion of "collective party responsibility." In this view, the fact that voters hold incumbent parties more accountable when candidates have close ties to the outgoing president has negative implications. It suggests that parties can use nominations strategically to avoid responsibility for their tenure in office. During economic expansions, parties can nominate candidates with close ties to the government, and when the economy contracts, they can nominate candidates who are critical of the executive.

The alternative normative interpretation sees the fact that voters hold the incumbent party accountable in different ways depending on the identity of the candidates as less problematic because even when candidates are not closely related to the outgoing president – i.e. non-successors in the first paper, and non-endorsed candidates in the second – voters still associate, at least to some degree, the candidates of the incumbent party to the performance of the outgoing government. In other words, voters exercise a "minimum level" of party accountability. Indeed, given this "minimum level" of accountability, the fact that voters punish and reward the incumbent party more when its candidates have close ties to the executive, can be seen as a desirable outcome. It suggests that voters punish and reward those politicians with closer ties to the executive more than politicians with weak ties to the government. As suggested in the conclusions to the second paper, this second normative view favours a more flexible approach, in which the party brand matters for accountability but voters also hold particular candidates more accountable, depending on their ties to the government. This view recognises the role of intra-party groups and factions in shaping policy outcomes and voters' perceptions of these outcomes.

*The Presidential Re-election Debate in Latin America*

The institution of presidential re-election has been a source of contention throughout Latin American history. In contrast to the United States, which settled the presidential re-election debate at the outset of the republic, Latin American countries experienced both periods of no re-election and phases in which presidents were allowed to re-run – in some cases even without term limits. In most cases, presidents who abolished term limits ended up concentrating excessive power and personalising the presidency. The case of Porfirio Díaz, who was re-elected five times in late nineteenth century Mexico, may be an extreme example but is by no means an exception. In recent years, Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, have sought to follow in his footsteps.

The argument against presidential re-election in Latin America is that democracies in the region are yet fragile and that re-election provisions thus entail too high a risk of presidents ending up concentrating excessive power. If Latin America did not have a history of *caudillismo*, and presidents governed within the limits provided by their constitutions, re-election would probably not be a cause for concern. On the contrary, allowing presidential re-election could have several advantages, most notably for electoral accountability. As Carey (2003: 126) notes, re-election “should improve democratic responsiveness and accountability by aligning the incentives of incumbent presidents more closely with those of voters.”

The first paper of this thesis provides empirical evidence in support of the argument that re-election enhances accountability. It shows that there is greater electoral sanctioning when incumbent presidents re-run than when incumbent parties nominate another candidate in open seat elections. However, this finding does not mean that Latin American countries should necessarily rush to abolish term limits. If the additional accountability associated with having a re-running president opens the door for presidents to abuse their powers, policy-makers should choose democratic stability over electoral sanctioning. The key question then is which countries can afford to change the constitutional rules to introduce presidential re-election and which ones cannot.

Developments towards establishing re-election in Latin America since the Third Wave of democratisation offers some clues. In this period, incumbent presidents in nine countries managed to introduce constitutional changes to run for a consecutive term, while ten presidents in seven Latin American countries sought to make similar constitutional reforms without success. In some countries – most notably Brazil, Argentina and Colombia – the introduction of presidential re-election did

not lead to presidents abusing their powers to stay indefinitely in power.<sup>5</sup> In other cases, however, the results were less auspicious. In Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, incumbent presidents relied on extra-constitutional means to introduce reforms on term limits.

What are the differences between these groups of countries? The first and, arguably, most important difference, is that – with the exception of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua – the presidents in the second group of countries were all political outsiders, while none of the presidents in the first group fit that description.<sup>6</sup> A second important difference is that the presidents in the second group governed in the context of a collapse of the traditional party system and, as a result, did not face strong sources of opposition (Mainwaring et al. 2006). A third important difference is that horizontal accountability was much more robust in the first than in the second set of countries (O'Donnell 1998).

Based on the above observations, one can cautiously conclude that the consolidated democracies in the region – i.e. Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica – should be able to introduce presidential re-election without any threats to the stability and quality of their democracies. These three countries do not allow presidents to run for a consecutive term, although they are by most measures of party system and democratic consolidation more stable than Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, where the experience with re-election has not been detrimental. The evidence presented in this thesis about the accountability enhancing effects of presidential re-election should incite policy-makers in the consolidated countries of the region to consider the adoption of re-election provisions.

#### AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The findings of this thesis offer several avenues for further research. First, the literature on electoral accountability should continue to investigate how variation in political and institutional context affects how voters punish and reward incumbents. Despite the progress made in recent years, there is still room for more. Do the findings about the effect of candidate type on electoral accountability identified in the first paper carry over to parliamentary democracies? The fact that presidential candidates campaign and are elected separately from legislators in presidentialism, may provide additional incentives for voters to hold individual politicians accountable independently from their

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<sup>5</sup>In Argentina and Colombia, presidents Carlos Menem and Álvaro Uribe did attempt to change the rules to run for a third consecutive term. In both cases, their attempts were unsuccessful, and the presidents accepted these outcomes.

<sup>6</sup>Álvaro Uribe in Colombia can be described as a *maverick* – i.e. a politician who leaves a traditional party to run for president as an independent (Carreras 2012) – but not as an outsider.

parties (Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009; Samuels and Shugart 2010). However, as suggested in the first paper, this does not mean that the effect of candidate type should not also be detectable in parliamentarism. After all, parties in all regime types have different factions and politicians with varying levels of identification with the policies of the government. Moreover, research has shown that leader images have an effect on the vote independently of party images in established parliamentary systems like the United Kingdom (Andersen and Evans 2003) and Canada (Johnston 2002). This suggests that if voters in consolidated parliamentary democracies also take candidate-specific factors into account when casting a vote, it is likely they will hold the party of the prime minister accountable in different ways depending on the candidate's identity.

This thesis shows that intra-party variation in the type of candidate has considerable effects on the magnitude of the performance-based vote. Future work should explore variation across types of parties. The fixation with the "responsible party government" model in the accountability research programme has slowed down theoretical progress on the relationship between party organisation and electoral sanctioning. It is likely, however, that voters hold programmatic and non-programmatic parties accountable in different ways. Moreover, it is likely that this is contingent on whether incumbent presidents run for re-election or not.

In studying the effect of candidate type on electoral accountability without investigating in any detail why successors are nominated in some contexts and non-successors in others, I have put the cart before the horse. Future work should therefore devote close attention to the issue of presidential nominations. Besides suggesting that economic factors do not drive the selection of successors and non-successors, the analysis conducted in the first paper did not provide any further clues. From a theoretical perspective, investigating the factors behind the selection of successors and non-successors sheds light on the sources of intra-party conflict and the mechanisms available to solve those conflicts in "presidentialized parties" (Samuels and Shugart 2010). The central question is how two principals – the outgoing president's faction, and the intra-party challengers – agree on one single agent. Empirically, this research should include data across time and from presidential democracies around the world.

The first paper also provided some clues on which types of incumbent presidents are more likely to be successful in passing constitutional reform to introduce immediate presidential re-election. I found that positive economic evaluations in the first years of a presidential term are positively correlated with the introduction of presidential re-election. I also found that presidents leading personalist vehicles are more likely to succeed in their attempt to introduce re-election. However,

I was able to show this in a limited sample of only 51 observations. Future work should explore a larger sample of presidential democracies and investigate a larger set of explanatory variables, such as the level of party system institutionalisation, and the popularity of the president. The re-election debate is clearly a central issue in most presidential democracies, and finding clues as to why some presidents are more successful than others in changing the rules of the game would constitute a major step forward in our understanding of how these systems operate.

As suggested in the conclusions to the second paper, future research should continue to explore the conditions under which source cues matter for electoral accountability. First, it would be important to investigate whether endorsements shape retrospective voting in presidential elections, i.e. by randomising endorsements from the outgoing president to the presidential candidate of her party. Second, researchers should examine how voters respond to different source cues from the incumbent party. For example, do endorsements from the president have a stronger accountability effect than endorsements from a lower-level politician such as a senator or a governor?

Research on source cues should also continue to expand its empirical focus to new democracies, and develop new theoretical insights based on the particularities of these democracies. One characteristic that many developing democracies share is the weakness of political parties, and the lack of credibility of political institutions and politicians (Randall and Svasand 2002; Mainwaring et al. 2006; Sanchez 2009; Doyle 2011). Studies might also examine how voters respond to endorsements from politicians and from public opinion leaders without partisan attachments. Such studies would also benefit from randomising the credibility of the source, so as to compare politicians and public opinion leaders with and without credibility.

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APPENDIX TO PAPER 1

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## APPENDIX 1: CODEBOOK

The regression analyses include the following individual-level variables:

**VOTE FOR INCUMBENT**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent votes for the incumbent party, 0 if she votes for any other candidate (“no answer” and “don’t know” are coded as missing).

**POSITIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent thinks the economy improved in the past 12 months, 0 otherwise.

**NEGATIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent thinks the economy deteriorated in the past 12 months, 0 otherwise.

**GOVERNMENT APPROVAL**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent approves the performance of the government, 0 otherwise.

**AGE**

Age of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:

- 1 — 18–24
- 2 — 25–34
- 3 — 35–44
- 4 — 45–54
- 5 — 55–64
- 6 — 65 and over

**EDUCATION**

Education level of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:

- 1 — Illiterate
- 2 — Elementary uncompleted
- 3 — Elementary completed
- 4 — Secondary uncompleted
- 5 — Secondary completed
- 6 — Higher education uncompleted
- 7 — Higher education completed

## **MALE**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is a man, 0 if she is a woman.

## **SOCIOECONOMIC LEVEL**

Socioeconomic level of respondent. Continuous variable based on the interviewers' observations of respondents' living conditions. Coded as follows:

- 2 — Very bad
- 1 — Bad
- 0 — Regular
- 1 — Good
- 2 — Very good

## **MARRIED**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is married, 0 otherwise.

In addition, the study employs the following case-specific variables:

## **RE-RUNNING PRESIDENT**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the incumbent president re-runs, 0 otherwise.

*Sources:* See Appendix 2.

## **SUCCESSOR**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the incumbent candidate is a successor, 0 otherwise.

Appendix 2 explains how this variable is conceptualised and operationalised, and provides a list of sources used to code this variable.

## **NON-SUCCESSOR**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the incumbent candidate is a non-successor, 0 otherwise.

Appendix 2 explains how this variable is conceptualised and operationalised, and provides a list of sources used to code this variable.

## **MAJORITY SITUATION**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the party of the president has a majority in both chambers – in cases of bicameralism – or in only one chamber – in cases of unicameralism, 0 otherwise.

*Sources:* Nohlen (2005), National Electoral Institutes.

## **CONCURRENT ELECTIONS**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the presidential election takes place on the same day as a legislative election, 0 otherwise.

*Sources:* Nohlen (2005), National Electoral Institutes.

## **PERSONALISM**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the incumbent party is a personalistic vehicle, i.e. a taxi party, 0 otherwise. Appendix 3 provides a summary of how this variable is conceptualised and operationalised.

**PRIMARY**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the incumbent candidate is chosen in a primary election, 0 otherwise. I define primaries as elections in which at least all party members are allowed to cast a vote.

*Sources:* Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006) dataset, Latin American Weekly and Regional Reports, Latin American Database.

**POLICY SWITCHER**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the incumbent president is a policy switcher, 0 otherwise. I follow Johnson and Ryu's (2010) definition of policy switchers as politicians who run on a particular set of policies, but enact policies in the opposite direction once in office.

*Sources:* Johnson and Ryu (2010) dataset.

**COALITION**

Dummy variable coded 1 if there is a coalition government in place at the time of the election, 0 otherwise.

*Sources:* Cheibub et. al. (2004) dataset, Latin American Weekly and Regional Reports, Latin American Database.

**AGE OF INCUMBENT PARTY**

Continuous variable equal to the election year minus the year in which the incumbent party was founded.

*Sources:* Nohlen (2005), political parties' websites.

**PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALISATION**

Continuous variable equal to the average age of all parties that gained more than 10 percent of the vote in the last legislative election. This variable has been previously used by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and by Roberts and Wibbels (1999).

*Sources:* Nohlen (2005), National Electoral Institutes, political parties' websites.

**EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES**

Continuous variable equal to the effective number of parliamentary parties winning seats in the previous election.

*Sources:* Singer and Carlin (2013) dataset.

**TRADE DEPENDENCE**

Continuous variable measured as imports and exports as a percentage of GDP.

*Sources:* World Development Indicators (2012).

**PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH**

Continuous variable that measures the level of per capita GDP growth in the year of the election – for elections conducted in the last six months of the year – or in the year previous to the election – for elections conducted in the first six months of the year.

*Sources:* World Development Indicators (2012).

**CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT**

Continuous variable that measures the change in unemployment in the year of the election – for elections conducted in the last six months of the year – or in the year previous to the election – for elections conducted in the first six months of the year.

*Sources:* World Development Indicators (2012).

**LOG OF INFLATION RATE**

Continuous variable that represents the percentage change in the cost of goods and services consumed by the public in the year of the election – for elections conducted in the last six months of the year – or in the year previous to the election – for elections conducted in the first six months of the year. This variable is logged, due to some extreme values found in the data.

*Sources:* World Development Indicators (2012).

The following table summarises how the institutional and contextual variables were coded for each election in each country.



Table 1: Institutional and Contextual Variables

Election	Candidate Type	Majority Position	Electoral Cycle	Primary	Policy Switch	Coalition	Perso-nalism	Source
Argentina 1995	<b>R</b>	MIN	C	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Argentina 2007	S	MIN	C	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	<b>PERS</b>	LTB
Argentina 2011	<b>R</b>	MIN	C	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	<b>PERS</b>	LAPOP
Bolivia 2002	NS	MIN	C	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	<b>PERS</b>	LTB
Bolivia 2009	<b>R</b>	MIN	C	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Brazil 1998	<b>R</b>	MIN	C	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	NP	LTB
Brazil 2002	S	MIN	C	NP	<b>PS</b>	<b>COAL</b>	NP	LTB
Brazil 2006	<b>R</b>	MIN	C	NP	<b>PS</b>	<b>COAL</b>	NP	LTB
Brazil 2010	S	MIN	C	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	NP	LTB
Chile 1993	S	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	NP	CEP
Chile 1999	NS	MIN	<b>NC</b>	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	NP	CEP
Chile 2005	S	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	NP	CEP
Chile 2009	NS	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	NP	LTB
Colombia 2006	<b>R</b>	MIN	<b>NC</b>	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	<b>PERS</b>	LAPOP
Colombia 2010	S	MIN	<b>NC</b>	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	<b>PERS</b>	LAPOP
Costa Rica 1998	NS	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	<b>PS</b>	NC	NP	LTB
Costa Rica 2002	NS	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Costa Rica 2006	S	MIN	C	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Costa Rica 2010	S	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LAPOP
Dom. Rep. 2004	<b>R</b>	MIN	<b>NC</b>	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Dom. Rep. 2008	<b>R</b>	<b>MAJ</b>	<b>NC</b>	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LAPOP
Dom. Rep. 2012	S	<b>MAJ</b>	<b>NC</b>	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LAPOP
Ecuador 2009	<b>R</b>	<b>MAJ</b>	C	NP	NPS	NC	<b>PERS</b>	LTB
El Salvador 1999	S	MIN	<b>NC</b>	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
El Salvador 2004	S	MIN	<b>NC</b>	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LAPOP
El Salvador 2009	S	MIN	<b>NC</b>	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Guatemala 1999	NS	<b>MAJ</b>	C	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LAPOP
Guatemala 2007	NS	MIN	C	NP	NPS	NC	<b>PERS</b>	LTB
Honduras 1997	NS	<b>MAJ</b>	C	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Honduras 2001	NS	<b>MAJ</b>	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Honduras 2005	NS	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Honduras 2009	NS	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Mexico 2000	S	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	CSES
Mexico 2006	NS	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Nicaragua 2001	S	MIN	C	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Nicaragua 2006	S	MIN	C	NP	NPS	NC	<b>PERS</b>	LTB
Nicaragua 2011	<b>R</b>	MIN	C	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LAPOP
Panama 1999	S	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	<b>PS</b>	NC	NP	LTB
Panama 2004	S	MIN	C	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	NP	LAPOP
Panama 2009	NS	<b>MAJ</b>	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Paraguay 1998	NS	MIN	C	NP	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Paraguay 2003	NS	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Paraguay 2008	S	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LAPOP
Peru 1995	<b>R</b>	<b>MAJ</b>	C	NP	<b>PS</b>	NC	<b>PERS</b>	LTB
Peru 2000	<b>R</b>	<b>MAJ</b>	C	NP	NPS	NC	<b>PERS</b>	LTB
Uruguay 1999	NS	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	NP	LTB
Uruguay 2004	S	MIN	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LTB
Uruguay 2009	NS	<b>MAJ</b>	C	<b>PRIMARY</b>	NPS	NC	NP	LAPOP
Venezuela 2000	<b>R</b>	<b>MAJ</b>	C	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	<b>PERS</b>	LTB
Venezuela 2006	<b>R</b>	<b>MAJ</b>	<b>NC</b>	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	<b>PERS</b>	LTB
Venezuela 2012	<b>R</b>	<b>MAJ</b>	<b>NC</b>	NP	NPS	<b>COAL</b>	<b>PERS</b>	LAPOP

## APPENDIX 2: DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALISATION OF THE TYPE OF CANDIDATE VARIABLE

The purpose of this appendix is to summarise the criteria used to conceptualise and operationalise presidential candidates as successors and non-successors. The appendix also provides information about the context in which these candidates were nominated, and a description of their policy preferences based on newspaper end election reports.

The data on successor candidates were obtained from different sources, including the Latin American Weekly and Regional Reports, the Latin American Database, the CIDOB biographies of Latin American presidents, articles in local newspapers, and the election reports from *Electoral Studies*. The data on primary elections for 1995–2006 were obtained from John Carey’s website. I updated the remaining years.

### *Conceptualisation*

Conceptually, a successor is a presidential candidate who wins the nomination of the incumbent party or coalition with the support of the outgoing president. She is the preferred option of the outgoing president among the candidates seeking to clinch the presidential nomination. Conversely, a non-successor is a presidential candidate who secures the nomination of the incumbent party or coalition without the support of the outgoing president. She is not the preferred option of the outgoing president among the candidates seeking the presidential nomination.

Empirically, two different scenarios describe how successors and non-successors are nominated in my dataset. In the first scenario, there is contestation for the presidential nomination, i.e. two or more candidates face or are scheduled to face each other in an internal election. The internal election is either a primary – open to at least all party or coalition members – or a contest in which only delegates are allowed to cast a vote. In the second scenario there is no contestation to determine the presidential aspirant. The candidate is either handpicked by one of the dominant factions, or is chosen by acclamation – i.e. there is an overarching consensus among different factions on who the candidate should be.

### *Successors:*

#### 1) No Contestation:

- 1a) The president handpicks her preferred candidate, who clinches the nomination without the need of an internal election.
- 1b) There is a consensus candidate who has the president’s support. As a result of this consensus, the candidate does not face any intra-party challengers and there is no need to conduct an internal election.

#### 2) Contestation:

- 2a) The preferred candidate of the president defeats one or more candidates in an internal election.

2b) An internal election is scheduled to take place, but the main challenger of the candidate supported by the president withdraws from the race, anticipating a defeat.

The fact that an internal election is scheduled in scenario 2b indicates that, unlike scenarios 1a and 1b, there are sources of contestation inside the government camp. The fact that the challenger withdraws her candidacy before the internal election takes place suggests that she does not want to pay the political cost of a likely wipeout.

*Non-Successors:*

3) No Contestation:

3) A faction of the party handpicks a candidate who wins the nomination without the need of an internal election. The handpicked candidate is not the preferred option of the outgoing president.

4) Contestation:

4a) The preferred candidate of the outgoing president loses the internal election.

4b) An internal party election is to be conducted, but the the president's preferred candidate withdraws from the race.

*Operationalisation*

Empirically, I code candidates as successors and non-successors based on five criteria:

1. Media and/or election reports document public statements of support from the outgoing president to a candidate during the nomination process. If the endorsed candidate clinches the nomination, she becomes a successor. If one of the candidates not receiving a public statement of support wins the nomination, she becomes a non-successor.
2. Media and/or election reports describe candidates seeking nomination as the preferred option of the outgoing president during the selection process. This is indicated by expressions like "favourite," "*protégée*," "preferred candidate," "ally," "confidant," etc. Alternatively, candidates seeking nomination are described as opponents of the outgoing president. This is indicated by expressions like "rival," "critic," "opponent," "defeated the preferred candidate of the outgoing president," etc. If the former clinches the nomination, she becomes a successor. If the latter wins the nomination, she becomes a non-successor.
3. Even if expressions like "*protégée*," "favourite," or "rival" and "critic" are not used explicitly, media and/or election reports make it unambiguously clear whether the candidate is a successor or a non-successor.
4. In cases in which coalition governments nominate a single candidate, candidates who belong to the party of the president are coded as successors unless criteria 1 to 3 indicate otherwise. Candidates who do not belong to the party of the president are coded as non-successors unless criteria 1 to 3 indicate otherwise.
5. Candidates who have occupied positions of trust, like Chief of Staff or Minister of the Presidency are coded as successors unless criteria 1 to 4 indicate otherwise. Candidates that have not occupied such positions are coded as non-successors unless criteria 1 to 4 indicate otherwise.

Table 2: Incumbent Presidents and Candidate Types in Latin America

Election	President	Candidate	Type	Defin.	Oper.
Argentina 1995	Carlos Menem (PJ)	Carlos Menem	R		
Argentina 2007	Néstor Kirchner (FPV)	Cristina Fernández	S	1a	1, 2, 3
Argentina 2011	C. Fernández (FPV)	C. Fernández	R		
Bolivia 2002	Jorge Quiroga (ADN)	Ronald MacLean	NS	4a	2, 3
Bolivia 2009	Evo Morales (MAS)	Evo Morales	R		
Brazil 1998	F. H. Cardoso (PSDB)	F. H. Cardoso	R		
Brazil 2002	F. H. Cardoso (PSDB)	José Serra	S	2b	2, 3
Brazil 2006	Lula (PT)	Lula	R		
Brazil 2010	Lula (PT)	Dilma Rousseff	S	1a	1, 2, 3, 5
Chile 1993	Patricio Aylwin (C-DC)	Eduardo Frei (C-DC)	S	2a	4
Chile 1999	Eduardo Frei (C-DC)	Ricardo Lagos (C-PS)	NS	4a	4
Chile 2005	Ricardo Lagos (C-PS)	Michele Bachelet (PS)	S	2b	2, 3, 4
Chile 2009	Michele Bachelet (C-PS)	Eduardo Frei (C-DC)	NS	4a	4
Colombia 2006	Álvaro Uribe (PC)	Álvaro Uribe	R		
Colombia 2010	Álvaro Uribe (PC)	J. M. Santos (U)	S	1a	1, 2, 3
Costa Rica 1998	José Figueres (PLN)	José M. Corrales	NS	4a	2, 3
Costa Rica 2002	M. Rodríguez (PSUC)	Abel Pacheco	NS	4a	2, 3
Costa Rica 2006	Abel Pacheco (PSUC)	Ricardo Toledo	S	2b	2, 3, 5
Costa Rica 2010	Oscar Arias (PLN)	Laura Chinchilla	S	2a	1, 2, 3
Dom. Rep. 2004	Hipólito Mejía (PRD)	Hipólito Mejía	R		
Dom. Rep. 2008	L. Fernández (PLD)	L. Fernández	R		
Dom. Rep. 2012	L. Fernández (PLD)	Danilo Medina	S	2a	3, 5
Ecuador 2009	Rafael Correa (AP)	Rafael Correa	R		
El Salvador 1999	A. Calderón (ARENA)	Francisco Flores	S	2b	2, 3
El Salvador 2004	F. Flores (ARENA)	Antonio Saca	S	2a	2, 3
El Salvador 2009	A. Saca (ARENA)	Rodrigo Ávila	S	2a	2, 3
Guatemala 1999	Álvaro Arzú (PAN)	Oscar Berger	NS	3	3
Guatemala 2007	Oscar Berger (GANA)	A. Giammattei	NS	3	2, 3
Honduras 1997	Carlos R. Reina (PLH)	Carlos R. Flores	NS	4a	3
Honduras 2001	Carlos R. Flores (PLH)	Rafael Pineda	NS	4a	3
Honduras 2005	R. Maduro (PNH)	Porfirio Lobo	NS	4a	3
Honduras 2009	R. Micheletti (PLH)	Elvin Santos	NS	4a	2, 3
Mexico 2000	Ernesto Zedillo (PRI)	Francisco Labastida	S	2a	2, 3
Mexico 2006	Vicente Fox (PAN)	Felipe Calderón	NS	4a	2, 3
Nicaragua 2001	Arnoldo Alemán (PLC)	Enrique Bolaños	S	1a	2, 3
Nicaragua 2006	Enrique Bolaños	E. Montealegre (ALN)	S	1b	2, 3
Nicaragua 2011	Daniel Ortega (FSLN)	Daniel Ortega	R		
Panama 1999	Ernesto Pérez B. (PRD)	Martín Torrijos	S	2a	2, 3
Panama 2004	Mireya Moscoso (PA)	José M. Alemán	S	1a	2, 3
Panama 2009	Martín Torrijos (PRD)	Balbina Herrera	NS	4a	2, 3
Paraguay 1998	J. C. Wasmosy (ANR)	Raúl Cubas	NS	4a	2, 3
Paraguay 2003	L. González M. (ANR)	Nicanor Duarte	NS	4a	2, 3
Paraguay 2008	Nicanor Duarte (ANR)	Blanca Ovelar	S	2a	2, 3
Peru 1995	Alberto Fujimori (C-90)	Alberto Fujimori	R		
Peru 2000	A. Fujimori (Peru 2000)	Alberto Fujimori	R		
Uruguay 1999	J. M. Sanguinetti (PC)	Jorge Batlle	NS	4a	2, 3
Uruguay 2004	Jorge Batlle (PC)	Guillermo Stirling	S	2a	2, 3
Uruguay 2009	Tabaré Vázquez (FA)	José Mujica	NS	4a	2, 3
Venezuela 2000	Hugo Chávez (MVR)	Hugo Chávez	R		
Venezuela 2006	Hugo Chávez (MVR)	Hugo Chávez	R		
Venezuela 2012	Hugo Chávez (PSUV)	Hugo Chávez	R		

*Argentina 1995*

President Carlos Menem (*Partido Justicialista*) re-ran.

*Argentina 2007*

Incumbent: Néstor Kirchner (*Partido Justicialista — Frente para la Victoria*)

Candidate: Cristina Fernández

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: None. Fernández ran unopposed in the FPV.

Primary: No

Background: Kirchner was allowed to re-run, but chose not to do so, stressing the need to govern instead of campaigning. However, he actively endorsed the candidacy of his wife, Cristina Fernández. He praised her “transformational capacity” and claimed that she would “deepen the change and bring about Argentina’s consolidation.” He justified this decision to not seek a second term by claiming that their political project needed continuity of leadership (Singer and Fara 2008: 756). “Given that the [...] law allows former presidents to run again after sitting out an election, it has [...] been suggested that Kirchner is promoting his wife as the government’s presidential candidate in order to consolidate political support and run again in 2011” (LARR, July 2007).

Policies: Economic issues dominated the campaign. On job creation, Fernández “promised to continue her husband’s development programmes” (Singer and Fara 2008: 757). To keep inflation under control, she “promised to continue with price controls on food and petroleum, and to work with employers and workers for a social pact to keep down inflationary demands” (Singer and Fara 2008: 757).

*Argentina 2011*

President Cristina Fernández (PJ-FPV) ran for re-election.

*Bolivia 2002*

Incumbent: Jorge Quiroga (*Acción Democrática Nacionalista*, ADN). He becomes president after Hugo Banzer’s resignation due to illness.

Candidate: Ronald MacLean

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Tito Hoz de Vila, supported by Quiroga.

Primary: No

Background: Ronald MacLean won the nomination in an internal party contest in which over 1200 delegates cast a vote (*Bolivia.com*, 22 May 2003). He defeated the candidate favoured by Quiroga, former education minister Tito Hoz de Vila (LAWR, 19 March 2002). As a former Finance Minister in the second Banzer government (1997–2001), MacLean was closely identified with the neoliberal policies put in place in those years. In the same internal election, Quiroga, the leader of a centrist faction within ADN, won the party presidency (CIDOB, Jorge Quiroga).

Policies: Former Planning Minister Ronald MacLean was “the man most closely identified with the neoliberal policies adopted by Banzer” (LAWR, 19 March 2002). His main party rival, Tito Hoz

de Vila, a member of president Quiroga's faction, "made it clear that he was willing to review these policies" (LAWR, 19 March 2002).

#### *Bolivia 2009*

President Evo Morales (*Movimiento al Socialismo*) re-ran.

#### *Brazil 1998*

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*, PSDB) re-ran.

#### *Brazil 2002*

Incumbent: Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB)

Candidate: José Serra (PSDB)

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Tasso Jereissati. He withdrew his candidacy anticipating a defeat against Serra.

Primary: No

Background: Health Minister, José Serra, clinched the PSDB nomination after his main rival, the governor of the northeastern state of Ceará, Tasso Jereissati, withdrew his candidacy anticipating a defeat against Serra. "Jereissati justified his decision on the grounds that the internal wrangling was damaging the party's chances for the October presidential election" (LAWR, 2 January 2002). The media described Serra as Cardoso's "close confidant" (LARR, 16 October 2001), "preferred candidate" (LARR, 5 February 2002), and "chosen successor" (LAWR, 2 January 2002).

Policies: During the campaign, Serra praised the economic stability achieved under Cardoso. He defended the floating exchange rate, inflationary targets, and fiscal accountability measures introduced by the Cardoso administration (Nicolau 2004: 341).

#### *Brazil 2006*

President Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT) ran for re-election.

#### *Brazil 2010*

Incumbent: Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT)

Candidate: Dilma Rousseff

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: None. Dilma ran unopposed in the PT.

Primary: No

Background: Dilma Rousseff, Lula's former Chief of Staff and "handpicked successor" was ratified as PT's presidential candidate on 13 June 2010 in front of 1500 party delegates in Brasilia (LAWR, 15 June 2010). Four months earlier, a PT party convention had approved Rousseff's nomination by acclamation. Lula had chosen Rousseff as his "political heiress" in February 2009 (LAWR, 5 February 2009). During the campaign, the opposition accused Lula of violating the electoral law for going on the campaign trail with his party's candidate. During the campaign, Lula was quoted

as saying: “Like me, Dilma loves the poor. When you vote for Dilma you are voting for me” (*MercoPress*, 2 October 2010).

Policies: Rousseff tirelessly defended the economic and social policies adopted by her mentor Lula. In particular, she advocated the continuation of the popular *Bolsa Família* conditional cash transfer programme that had granted money to 11 million families (Hunter 2012: 227). According to polls, voters perceived that an administration headed by Rousseff would guarantee the continuity of Lula’s economic and social policies (Hunter 2012: 227).

### *Chile 1993*

Incumbent: Patricio Aylwin (*Concertación — Democracia Cristiana*, DC)

Candidate: Eduardo Frei (*Concertación — Democracia Cristiana*, DC)

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Ricardo Lagos (PS)

Primary: Yes.

Background: Senator Eduardo Frei and President Aylwin both belong to the DC, the leading party within the incumbent *Concertación* coalition. In the primary election held on 23 May 1993, Frei defeated former Minister of Education Ricardo Lagos. Frei obtained 62.9 percent of the vote against 37.1 percent for Lagos (CIDOB, Eduardo Frei).

Policies: During the campaign, Frei defended the policies pursued by Aylwin. On the economic front, Frei promised to continue the liberal economic policies inherited from the Pinochet years, which had largely remained untouched during the first *Concertación* administration.

### *Chile 1999*

Incumbent: Eduardo Frei (*Concertación — Democracia Cristiana*, DC)

Candidate: Ricardo Lagos (*Concertación — Partido Socialista*, PS / *Partido por la Democracia*, PPD)

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Andrés Zaldívar, who belongs to Frei’s party

Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population, excluding members of non-*Concertación* parties.

Background: Former Minister of Education (1990-92) and Public Works (1994-98), Ricardo Lagos and President Frei belonged to different parties within the incumbent coalition. In the primary election held on 30 May 1999, Lagos defeated the candidate of Frei’s party, Senator Andrés Zaldívar, by a 40 percent margin (71.3 to 28.6 percent) (Angell 2007).

Policies: As a member of the left of the *Concertación*, Lagos emphasised the need to implement stronger redistributive economic and social policies. After ten years of liberal policies under two presidencies of the *Concertación*’s right, Lagos promised to introduce an unemployment insurance and implement a wide public works programme (CIDOB, Ricardo Lagos).

### *Chile 2005*

Incumbent: Ricardo Lagos (*Concertación — Partido Socialista*, PS / *Partido por la Democracia*, PPD)

Candidate: Michele Bachelet (*Concertación — Partido Socialista*, PS)

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Soledad Alvear

Primary: A primary was scheduled for 31 July 2005, but Bachelet's main challenger withdrew two months before the primary after her candidacy lost support.

Background: Former Health and Defense Minister Michele Bachelet belonged to the same party as Lagos, who preferred her over the DC challenger, Soledad Alvear. The DC accused Lagos of favouring Bachelet and not remaining neutral during the selection process (Altman 2008).

Policies: During the campaign, Bachelet emphasised the need to give continuity to the social programmes introduced under Lagos. Indeed, Bachelet's economic and social platforms were "deliberately represented as a continuation of the policies of outgoing President Ricardo Lagos" (Heath 2007: 518).

### *Chile 2009*

Incumbent: Michele Bachelet (*Concertación — Partido Socialista*, PS)

Candidate: Eduardo Frei (*Concertación — Democracia Cristiana*, DC)

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: José Antonio Gómez

Primary: Yes

Background: Former president Eduardo Frei (DC) defeated radical Senator José Antonio Gómez in a nomination process plagued with criticism. Neither Frei nor Gómez, who belonged to other parties than Bachelet, had the support of the outgoing president. A socialist deputy, Marco Enríquez-Ominami, was not allowed to take part in the contest (Toro and Luna 2011: 229).

Policies: Frei's platform offered a mixture of continuity and change with the policies of the Bachelet administration. He promised to continue the social policies of the outgoing government (CIDOB, Eduardo Frei), but also committed himself to implement a fiscal reform to increment the tax burden of the mining industry (*La Tercera*, 23 December 2009).

### *Colombia 2006*

President Álvaro Uribe (*Primero Colombia*) re-runs.

### *Colombia 2010*

Incumbent: Álvaro Uribe (*Primero Colombia*)

Candidate: Juan Manuel Santos (U)

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Former Agriculture Minister, Andrés Felipe Arias, a member of the Conservative Party also sought Uribe's endorsement, but Santos ultimately won Uribe's support.

Primary: No

Background: Former Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos announced his presidential bid in May 2009. At the time of his announcement, he indicated that he would only run if the incumbent Uribe would not run for a third term. After the Supreme Court ruled out Uribe's second re-election bid, the three main parties of the Uribista coalition split and nominated their own presidential candidates. After a meeting with president Uribe on 27 February 2010, Santos came forward to say that he had received the backing of Uribe: "The president told me that 'you and I have had a number of goals in common for a long time, we agree fully on the basic ideals of this nation. Keep



going, Juan Manuel Santos, we're going to win” (Latinnews Daily, 1 March 2010). The media portrayed Santos as “Uribe’s heir” (Latinnews Daily, 20 May 2010).

Policies: Santos campaigned on a platform of continuity with the policies of his mentor Uribe. On the economic front, Santos promised to continue the trade and investment policies of the Uribe administration – in particular with its neighbors and the U.S. (Moreno 2011). The election of Uribe’s handpicked successor suggested “continued and strong support for many of the policies undertaken under the Uribe administration” (Moreno 2011: 571).

#### *Costa Rica 1998*

Incumbent: José María Figueres (*Partido Liberación Nacional*, PLN)

Candidate: José Miguel Corrales

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Walter Coto Molina

Primary: Yes

Background: Corrales, an internal opponent of president Figueres, won the party primary against Walter Coto Molina. He obtained 72.6 percent of the vote against 27.4 for Coto Molina (Picado León 2007). During the campaign, he “kept his distance from the administration of José María Figueres” (LAWR, 8 July 1997).

Policies: Corrales belonged to the PLN’s left as opposed to Figueres, whose administration continued the neoliberal reform process. According to a media report, it was well known “that [Corrales] has fundamental differences with President José María Figueres over economic policy” (LADB, 3 July 1997).

#### *Costa Rica 2002*

Incumbent: Miguel Ángel Rodríguez (*Partido Unidad Social Cristiana*, PSUC)

Candidate: Abel Pacheco

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Rodolfo Méndez Mata, supported by President Rodríguez

Primary: Yes

Background: Pacheco won the party primary with 68 percent of the vote (LADB 07 February 2002) despite “the strong support” given to Rodolfo Méndez Mata by President Rodríguez and by the party leadership headed by former president and PUSC founder, Rafael Angel Calderón (LARR, 17 July 2001).

Policies: In contrast to Méndez Mata, who defended the government’s record in office, Pacheco “ran a campaign critical of the President’s policies. He campaigned against the stringent neoliberal measures advocated by the incumbent president, and proposed more state intervention to resolve major ills” (Wilson 2003: 512-513). He was particularly critical of privatisation in the energy sector.

#### *Costa Rica 2006*

Incumbent: Abel Pacheco (PUSC)

Candidate: Ricardo Toledo

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Everardo Rodríguez. He was forced to step down as pre-presidential candidate, after being accused of receiving illegal funds for his campaign.

Primary: No

Background: Presidential hopefuls Ricardo Toledo and Everardo Rodríguez were to compete for the party nomination in a national convention to be held on 31 July 2005. However, the convention was cancelled after Rodríguez was forced to step down, accused of receiving illegal financial support for his presidential bid (Picado León 2007: 15). PUSC leaders knew that the party did not have any chances of winning the presidency, after a poor performance by president Pacheco and corruption allegations against former presidents Calderón and Rodríguez had damaged the party's image. Calderón, who ran the party machine, accepted the nomination of Toledo, a former Minister of the Presidency (chief of staff) and Pacheco's "close confidant." In exchange, Calderón put together the list for deputies (Picado León 2007: 15).

Policies: During his tenure as Minister of the Presidency, Toledo was behind many of Pacheco's least popular and controversial economic decisions, like caving to public sector unions, opposing the liberal economic policies of consecutive finance ministers, and wavering on free trade. In the course of the campaign, he could not distance himself from these policies.

#### *Costa Rica 2010*

Incumbent: Oscar Arias (PLN)

Candidate: Laura Chinchilla

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Johnny Araya

Primary: Yes, open to all Costa Rican voters.

Background: On 7 June 2009, former Vice-president and Justice Minister, Laura Chinchilla, defeated former Mayor of San José, Johnny Araya, and former Minister of Public Security, Fernando Berrocal, in a primary open to all Costa Rican voters. Chinchilla obtained 55.5 percent of the vote against 41.6 and 2.9 percent for Araya and Berrocal, respectively (CIDOB, Laura Chinchilla). The media described Chinchilla as President Arias' "favoured candidate" and "close confidant" (LARR, February 2009). According to Wilson and Rodríguez Cordero (2011: 232), a "central concern of the campaign was the possibility of continuismo: that Chinchilla would provide a front behind which the outgoing Arias could retain control." On the night of Chinchilla's primary victory, Arias was quoted as saying: "An old dream of mine comes true that Costa Ricans could one day choose a woman as president" (CIDOB, Laura Chinchilla).

Policies: Chinchilla campaigned on a platform of continuity with the policies of her mentor Arias. On the economic front, she promised to continue the trade policies of the second Arias administration. In particular, she promised to culminate the free trade agreement negotiations with the European Union and China (CIDOB, Laura Chinchilla). Her liberal economic policies contrasted with those of her main party rival, Johnny Araya, a member of the PLN left.

#### *Dominican Republic 2004*

President Hipólito Mejía (*Partido Revolucionario Dominicano*, PRD) re-ran.

*Dominican Republic 2008*

President Leonel Fernández (*Partido de la Liberación Dominicana*, PLD) ran for re-election.

*Dominican Republic 2012*

President: Leonel Fernández (PLD)

Candidate: Danilo Medina

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: José Tomás Pérez and two other candidates.

Primary: Yes.

Background: After tense negotiations, the two major PLD factions led by President Fernández and Medina, agreed on a single candidate, in order to avoid projecting an image of disunity (Latinnews Daily 15 May 2011). The chosen candidate was Medina himself, a former congressional leader and Chief of Staff to Fernández. In exchange for Fernández's support, Medina had to accept the nomination of First Lady Margarita Cedeño as vice-presidential candidate. In the party primary on 26 June 2011 he went on to defeat other minor PLD candidates with 87 percent of the vote.

Policies: In his acceptance speech, Medina praised "the economic record of the Fernández governments [...] and Fernández's personal leadership" (LARR, September 2011). However, his campaign also emphasised the need to focus more on social redistribution, and to develop a national industry to reduce the over-reliance on the tourism sector and the export of commodities (CIDOB, Danilo Medina).

*Ecuador 2009*

President Rafael Correa (*Alianza PAIS*) re-ran.

*El Salvador 1999*

President: Armando Calderón Sol (*Alianza Republicana Nacionalista*, ARENA)

Candidate: Francisco Flores

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Former President Alfredo Cristiani. Lacking support in the party hierarchy, Cristiani was forced to give up his hopes of running for a second term and did not run in the party convention.

Primary: No

Background: On 12 October 1998, Former Legislative Assembly President and Secretary of Information, Francisco Flores, secured the ARENA nomination in a party convention in which delegates were asked to ratify Flores (LADB 3 September 1998, 22 October 1998). Flores had announced his presidential bid in February, with "the backing of his 27 fellow Arena deputies, of President Armando Calderón Sol, a number of his ministers and of most of the 168 Arena town mayors" (LAWR, 24 February 1998). A faction within Arena had hoped to nominate former President Alfredo Cristiani (1989-94) for another term and Cristiani himself had "made no secret of his interest in making a comeback" (LAWR, 24 February 1998). Calderón's explicit support for Flores was interpreted as an attempt to stop Cristiani's return to the presidency (CIDOB, Alfredo Cristiani).

Lacking any major support in the party hierarchy, Cristiani was forced to give up his hopes of running for a second term.

Policies: During the campaign, Flores praised the policies implemented by the incumbent Calderón Sol. He promised to continue the orthodox and neoliberal economic policies of the outgoing government. In particular, Flores underscored the need to continue the efforts to cut the public deficit (CIDOB, Francisco Flores).

#### *El Salvador 2004*

President: Francisco Flores (ARENA)

Candidate: Antonio Saca

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Carlos Quintanilla

Primary: Yes

Background: On 4 June 2003, businessman Antonio Saca announced his presidential bid with the “open support” of President Francisco Flores (CIDOB, Antonio Saca). Over a month later, on 13 July, Saca defeated Vice-president Carlos Quintanilla in a primary in which 600,000 ARENA members were allowed to cast a vote (CIDOB, Antonio Saca). Saca received an unprecedented 98 percent of the vote (LARR, 22 July 2003).

Policies: As president of the employers association (ANEP), Saca endorsed the pro-market economic and monetary policies of the Flores administration. Throughout the campaign, he defended the dollarisation of the economy implemented by Flores, and emphasised the need to continue the strategy of export-led economic growth. He promised to ratify the Central America Free Trade Agreement signed during Flores’ presidency (CIDOB, Antonio Saca).

#### *El Salvador 2009*

President: Antonio Saca (ARENA)

Candidate: Rodrigo Ávila

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Ana Vilma de Escobar

Primary: No

Background: On 15 March 2008, the ARENA party convention chose Rodrigo Ávila as its presidential candidate. He defeated Vice-president Ana Vilma de Escobar and legal advisor Luis Mario Rodríguez. Ávila had “only entered the primary race in January at the behest of the party leadership committee” (COENA) (LARR, March 2008). De Escobar accused COENA and President Saca of conspiring to draw support away from her and direct it to Ávila (LADB, 24 April 2008). According to de Escobar, “party bosses, including Saca, had urged members not to vote for a woman” (LADB, 24 April 2008). Going into the nomination, polls had shown de Escobar with a clear lead, but, in the voting, she received just 2 percent of the 2,093 votes of the party representatives. Ávila and Rodríguez obtained 82 and 15 percent, respectively (LARR, March 2008).

Policies: During the campaign, Ávila endorsed the orthodox economic policies of the outgoing administration. Like Saca four years earlier, he “stood on a tough-on-crime and pro-security platform” (Greene and Keogh 2009: 667).

*Guatemala 1999*

President: Álvaro Arzú (*Partido de Avanzada Nacional*, PAN)

Candidate: Oscar Berger

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: None.

Primary: No

Background: On 27 June 1999, the PAN convention ratified the nomination of Guatemala City Mayor Oscar Berger almost unanimously (Oscar Berger, CIDOB). Berger and Arzú were former allies, but at the time of the nomination process their relationship had deteriorated. In February, Berger had momentarily renounced his nomination as PAN presidential candidate. According to media reports, the reason had to do with internal party disputes and differences with Arzú (LADB, 23 September 1999). The media also reported conflicts between both leaders in putting together the party's lists for the legislative election (Hernández Pico 1999).

Policies: During the nomination process, and later during the presidential campaign, Berger was very critical of some of the government's policies. On the economic front, Berger attacked the executive's privatisations policies, in particular of the state telephone company TELGUA (Hernández Pico 1999).

*Guatemala 2007*

President: Oscar Berger (*Gran Alianza Nacional*, GANA)

Candidate: Alejandro Giammattei

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: None. Giammattei was a last-minute candidate.

Primary: No

Background: According to media reports, president Berger "was biased" in favour of Álvaro Aguilar for the GANA presidential primary (*Prens Libre.com*, 2 May 11). However, the primary was cancelled after Aguilar's main challenger, Francisco Arredondo, withdrew his candidacy, claiming that the president and the party leadership were pulling the strings behind the scene in favour of Aguilar. The party found a last-minute candidate in Alejandro Giammattei, former head of the prison system. His presidential nomination was confirmed on 15 April (LARR, April 2007).

Policies: As an independent running on the GANA ticket, Giammattei was able to develop his own policy profile. During the campaign, he was critical of many of the government's policies. He emphasised the government's inability to combat the high levels of criminality in the country (*La Primerísima*, 08 September 2007).

*Honduras 1997*

President: Carlos Roberto Reina (*Partido Liberal de Honduras*, PLH)

Candidate: Carlos Roberto Flores

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Jaime Rolando Rosenthal Oliva

Primary: No

Background: On 1 December 1996, former Congress President, Carlos Roberto Flores, secured the party nomination with 70.9 percent of the vote in a contest limited to party delegates (CIDOB,

Carlos Roberto Flores). Among the three candidates that he defeated were former Vice-president Jaime Rolando Rosenthal Oliva.

Policies: President Reina and Flores did not belong to the same faction within the PLH, as the outgoing Reina belonged to the party's left (CIDOB, Carlos Roberto Flores). During the campaign, Flores "openly criticized the Reina administration and is promising a 'new agenda' stressing economic growth and stability" (LADB, 9 October 1997).

#### *Honduras 2001*

President: Carlos Roberto Flores (PLH)

Candidate: Rafael Pineda

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Pineda defeated six other candidates.

Primary: Yes

Background: On 3 December 2000, the PLH internal primary elected Rafael Pineda, head of the National Assembly, as its presidential candidate. According to the *Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones* (TNE) Pineda won 40.3 percent of the internal party vote, beating out six other candidates (LADB, 8 February 2001). Pineda, who was identified with former president Reina, was not the preferred option of the outgoing Flores.

Policies: As a member of the Liberal party identified with former president Reina and the party's left, Pineda was critical of the neoliberal economic policies of the government. His campaign emphasised the need for an encompassing education reform, and acknowledged the deficits of the government in this area (LADB, 19 November 2001).

#### *Honduras 2005*

President: Ricardo Maduro (*Partido Nacional de Honduras*, PNH)

Candidate: Porfirio Lobo

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Miguel Pastor

Primary: Yes

Background: On 20 February 2005, Congress President Porfirio Lobo clinched the PNH nomination in a party primary in which he defeated the Mayor of Tegucigalpa, Miguel Pastor, by 53 to 32 percent. Lobo was not Maduro's preferred candidate, and claimed that the two represented different political projects (LARR, November 2005). He campaigned in favour of re-introducing the death penalty – opposed by Maduro – and drafting a harsher anti-gang legislation. According to Lobo, the legislation introduced by Maduro had not provided enough of a deterrent to crime (LARR, 22 February 2005).

Policies: The policy differences between Maduro and Lobo were not only limited to the area of public security. Lobo favoured increasing the levels of public spending. During Maduro's term, he had clashes with the executive over the need to increase public spending. These clashes forced the resignation of Finance Minister, Arturo Alvarado, in August 2004 (LAWR, 10 August 2004).

*Honduras 2009*

President: Roberto Micheletti (PLH). He became the President of the Republic after a military coup deposed Manuel Zelaya on 28 June 2009.

Candidate: Elvin Santos

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Roberto Micheletti

Primary: Yes

Background: Vice-president Elvin Santos was not allowed to take place in the party primary on 30 November 2008. However, his surrogate, Mauricio Villena, defeated the president of Congress, Roberto Micheletti, by a margin of 52 to 32 percent (LAWR, 4 December 2008). Micheletti had Zelaya's "open support" (CIDOB, Manuel Zelaya). Santos claimed that "he had been prevented from running by [...] an under-the-table deal between Zelaya and Micheletti" (LAWR, 4 December 2008). During the primary campaign, Zelaya had broken his promise of no interference and "openly supported Micheletti" (*La Vanguardia*, 29 June 2009). According to several observers, Santos' majority in the primary was a direct punishment of President Zelaya (*La Vanguardia*, 29 June 2009).

Policies: In contrast to Zelaya, Santos belonged to a conservative faction within the Liberal Party (CIDOB, Manuel Zelaya). He opposed Honduras' membership in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), an international cooperation organisation founded by then president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. Instead of encouraging his party to not approve Honduras' entrance in ALBA, then president of Congress, Micheletti, negotiated the terms of the agreement with Zelaya (CIDOB, Manuel Zelaya).

*Mexico 2000*

President: Ernesto Zedillo (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI)

Candidate: Francisco Labastida

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Roberto Madrazo

Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population.

Background: With over 90 percent of the vote, former Interior Minister Francisco Labastida defeated Roberto Madrazo and two other minor candidates in the PRI open primary held on 7 November 1999 (CIDOB, Ernesto Zedillo). Labastida was "understood to be [...] Zedillo's favourite during the primary election" (Klesner 2002: 141). The other candidates accused Zedillo of continuing the traditional practice of *dedazo*.

Policies: According to media reports, "[t]he conventional view in Mexico City is that Labastida will continue with President Zedillo's current policies if he wins the presidential elections next year" (Latinnews Daily, 16 November 1999). Labastida's campaign emphasised the need to continue to implement market-based policies to achieve higher levels of economic development (Klesner 2002: 143).

*Mexico 2006*

President: Vicente Fox (*Partido Acción Nacional*, PAN)

Candidate: Felipe Calderón

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Santiago Creel

Primary: Yes

Background: Former Energy Secretary, Felipe Calderón, ousted the Interior Minister Santiago Creel, who was “Fox’s apparent choice” (Klesner 2007: 805) with 51.6 percent of the vote (CIDOB, Felipe Calderón). Calderón was a member of the *traditionalist* faction of the party, while Fox and Creel were leading figures of the *renovadores*. Calderón had resigned as Secretary of Energy in protest to Fox’s open support for Creel (Moreno 2007).

Policies: During the primary and general election campaigns, Calderón promised a mix of continuity and change (CIDOB, Vicente Fox). He promised to stay the course on macroeconomic policy, but emphasised the need to spend more on social policies to combat poverty and inequality.

#### *Nicaragua 2001*

President: Arnaldo Alemán (*Partido Liberal Constitucionalista*, PLC)

Candidate: Enrique Bolaños

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: None. Bolaños was handpicked by President Alemán.

Primary: No

Background: Vice-president Enrique Bolaños won the PLN nomination without facing opposition. 400 delegates ratified his candidacy in a party convention that took place in Alemán’s El Chile estate (LADB, 25 January 2001). Alemán had firm control of the party apparatus, and was directly involved in the selection of all major candidates. According to Samuels and Shugart (2010: 115) Alemán “had handpicked Bolaños to be his successor.”

Policies: Economic issues dominated the campaign in a country in which over 70 percent of the population was poor (CIDOB, Enrique Bolaños). Bolaños’ committed himself to continue the structural reforms, and austerity policies of his predecessor Arnaldo Alemán. The opposition *sandinistas* accused Bolaños of *continuismo* with the failed economic policies of the Alemán administration.

#### *Nicaragua 2006*

President: Enrique Bolaños

Candidate: Eduardo Montealegre (*Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense*, ALN)

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: None. After forming the ALN months before the election, Montealegre was the consensus candidate of his party.

Primary: No

Background: Bolaños and Alemán had a feud throughout Bolaños’ presidency. This limited Bolaños’ ability to discipline his party’s legislative contingent, which, for the most part, remained loyal to Alemán. Bolaños left the PLC. “When the time arrive[s] for the party to choose a presidential candidate, Aleman loyalists back his handpicked selection, Jose Rizo, while Eduardo Montealegre, who [had] served in Bolano’s administration and had hoped to win the PLC nomination, [is] shut out. Montealegre respond[s] by forming the ALN, with Bolano’s support” (Lean 2007: 830).

Policies: As Minister of Finance (2002–2003) under Bolaños, Montealegre was in charge of the economic and financial policies of the outgoing government. Like Bolaños, Montealegre was opposed



to el pacto, a political agreement between former presidents Alemán and Ortega in which the two had agreed to share the most important positions in the public administration (CIDOB, Enrique Bolaños).

#### *Nicaragua 2011*

President Daniel Ortega (*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*, FSLN) re-ran.

#### *Panama 1999*

President: Ernesto Pérez Balladares (*Partido Revolucionario Democrático*, PRD)

Candidate: Martín Torrijos

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Alfredo Oranges Bustos

Primary: Yes

Background: On 25 October 1999, Martín Torrijos defeated Alfredo Oranges Bustos and eight other party opponents with 57 percent of the vote in the PRD primary (CIDOB, Martín Torrijos). Oranges, who obtained 26 percent of the vote in the primary and did not have the president's support, had announced his candidacy first. As a result, Pérez Balladares endorsed Torrijos, who was depicted by the media as Pérez Balladares' *protégée*. Torrijos had supported Pérez Balladares' failed re-election attempt (CIDOB, Martín Torrijos).

Policies: On the economic policy front, Torrijos' campaign did not express "any intention of touching the main planks of Pérez Balladares's economic adjustment effort (trade liberalisation, privatisation, eliminations of subsidies and more 'flexible' labour regulations)" (LAWR, 16 February 1999).

#### *Panama 2004*

President: Mireya Moscoso (*Partido Arnulfista*, PA)

Candidate: José Miguel Alemán

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: None. Alemán was handpicked by president Moscoso.

Primary: No

Background: On 22 June 2003, the PA convention elected the Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Miguel Alemán, as presidential candidate. No other candidate ran against Alemán, who was described in the media as Moscoso's "chosen successor" (LARR, July 2003). Before the convention, President Moscoso publicly announced her support for Alemán, leading to criticism of interference in the nomination process from prominent PA officials (*La Prensa Web*, 12 June 2003). In addition, Moscoso revoked a law that made it obligatory for political parties to hold primary elections to elect their presidential candidates, so that Alemán could run unopposed.

Policies: During the campaign, Alemán endorsed the privatisation of social security proposed by his mentor Moscoso (Singer 2005: 534). He also "promised the continuation of Moscoso's social policies, which, he argued, had failed because of PRD's opposition in the legislature" (Singer 2005: 534).

*Panama 2009*

President: Martín Torrijos (PRD)

Candidate: Balbina Herrera

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Juan Carlos Navarro, who had the support of President Torrijos.

Primary: Yes

Background: In the PRD primary in September 2008, Balbina Herrera defeated the mayor of Panama City, Juan Carlos Navarro, who had “Torrijos’ support” (*Informe Latinoamericano*, 20 March 2008). Herrera obtained 37.6 of the vote against 29.9 for Navarro. Six months before the party primary, Torrijos had been re-elected general secretary of the PRD in an internal election in which there had been splits between the factions led by Torrijos and Herrera. In addition, Torrijos had secured five of the nine seats in the national executive committee (CEN), one of them going to Navarro. Herrera had been re-elected party president in that same election (LARR, September 2008).

Policies: Herrera was branded in the media as “a leftwing populist with an anti-US past” (*Election Watch*, 3 May 2009). A member of the PRD left, during the campaign she promised to combat “social exclusion through improving public services” (LAWR, 19 February 2009). She also promised to increase the salaries of public employees (LAWR, 19 February 2009).

*Paraguay 1998*

President: Juan Carlos Wasmosy (*Asociación Nacional Republicana*, ANR)

Candidate: Raúl Cubas

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Luis María Argaña

Primary: No

Background: On 7 September 1997, the ANR party convention chose Lino Oviedo as presidential candidate. Oviedo defeated Luis María Argaña by a narrow margin. Wasmosy “officially endorsed” his Finance Minister, Carlos Facetti, who came in third place (CIDOB, Juan Carlos Wasmosy). Oviedo was a retired general who was accused of organising a coup against Wasmosy. Before the presidential election took place, Wasmosy’s government imprisoned Oviedo. Oviedo’s running mate, Raúl Cubas, inherited the party’s nomination after promising amnesty for his boss (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 29-30).

Policies: Cubas emphasised the need to speed up the structural reform process of the economy. He promised the privatisation of state enterprises running a deficit, an idea rejected by the Wasmosy administration (CIDOB, Raúl Cubas). His campaign pledges also contemplated an encompassing programme of deficit reduction, focused mainly on reducing the number of state employees (CIDOB, Raúl Cubas).

*Paraguay 2003*

President: Luis González Macchi (ANR). He takes over as president after the resignation of Raúl Cubas.

Candidate: Nicanor Duarte

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Osvaldo Domínguez and seven other candidates.

Primary: Yes

Background: Former Education Minister Nicanor Duarte won the party presidency in 2001 in an election in which he defeated Bader Rachid, the candidate endorsed by González Macchi (CIDOB, Nicanor Duarte). Duarte became a “staunch critic” of González Macchi’s presidency. In the 2002 Colorado primary held on 22 December, he defeated the candidate of González Macchi’s faction (CIDOB, Luis González Macchi).

Policies: Duarte campaigned on a platform critical of neoliberalism. He promised not “to build his economic reform programme around privatisations, as did the outgoing government of Luis González Macchi” (LAWR, 01 June 2003). He also rejected the possibility of introducing further austerity measures.

#### *Paraguay 2008*

President: Nicanor Duarte (ANR)

Candidate: Blanca Ovelar

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Luis Alberto Castiglioni

Primary: Yes

Background: Former Education Minister, Blanca Ovelar, defeated Luis Alberto Castiglioni in the party primary held on 16 December 2007. During the primary campaign, the media depicted Ovelar as “the favourite candidate of president Nicanor Duarte” (LARR, February 2008). Castiglioni, a member of *Vanguardia Colorada*, a faction that opposed Duarte, claimed that Duarte orchestrated a fraud in order to favour Ovelar (*Informe Latinoamericano*, 25 January 2008).

Policies: According to media reports, the nomination of Ovelar suggested continued support for the policies implemented by Duarte (*Ultima Hora*, 20 April 2008).

#### *Peru 1995*

President Alberto Fujimori (*Cambio 90*, C-90) re-ran.

#### *Peru 2000*

President Alberto Fujimori (Peru 2000) ran for re-election.

#### *Uruguay 1999*

President: Julio María Sanguinetti (*Partido Colorado*, PC)

Candidate: Jorge Batlle

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Luis Hierro, supported by president Sanguinetti.

Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population.

Background: The PC was split into two major factions, the *Foro Batllista* and *Lista 15*, led by Sanguinetti and Batlle, respectively. “Sanguinetti sought a candidate who would ensure the continuity of his administration and his policies, particularly the opening up of the economy to international trade. Accordingly, he chose his Interior Minister, Luis Hierro” (Espíndola 2001: 652). On 25

April 1999, Batlle secured the party nomination after polling 55.1 percent against 44.9 percent for Hierro.

Policies: While *Foro Batllista* was identified with the European Third Way, *Lista 15* exposed liberal conservative ideas (CIDOB, Jorge Batlle). On the economic front, the faction led by Batlle was in favour of deepening the free market reforms – e.g. stronger deregulation of the economy and privatisation of state enterprises – while the faction led by Sanguinetti advocated more gradual economic changes.

#### *Uruguay 2004*

President: Jorge Batlle (PC)

Candidate: Guillermo Stirling

Successor: Yes

Main Internal Challenger: Alberto Iglesias

Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population.

Background: The two major PC factions, the *Foro Batllista* and *Lista 15*, agreed on a single candidate, in order to avoid projecting an image of disunity after the severe 2002 economic crisis. Guillermo Stirling, a former Interior Minister under both Sanguinetti and Batlle, defeated other minor PC candidates in the party primary on 27 June 2004.

Policies: During the campaign, Stirling stressed that the economic recovery that the country was starting to experience (12.5 percent economic growth in 2004), was due to the policies of the outgoing administration. He tried to convince voters that this recovery “could be undermined with an electoral victory by the left” (Altman and Castiglioni 2006: 150).

#### *Uruguay 2009*

President: Tabaré Vázquez (*Frente Amplio*, FA)

Candidate: José Mujica

Successor: No

Main Internal Challenger: Danilo Astori, supported by President Vázquez.

Primary: Yes. Open to the national voting population.

Background: On 28 June 2009, former Agriculture Minister, José Mujica, defeated former Economics and Finance Minister, Danilo Astori, in the *Frente Amplio* primary. Astori was described as “the preferred candidate of outgoing President Vázquez” (Altman 2010: 534). Mujica received 52 percent of the vote against 40 percent for Astori.

Policies: Mujica was the leader of the *Movimiento de Participación Popular*, together with the Communists, the most radical party of the FA federation. During the primary and general election campaigns, he promised to continue the sound macroeconomic policies of the Vázquez administration, but also promised more active social policies (LARR, October 2009). Mujica advocated “moving the emphasis away from concentrating on opening Uruguay to financial services and tourism. Instead, he wants to embrace regional productive development” (LARR, July 2009).

#### *Venezuela 2000*

President Hugo Chávez (*Movimiento Quinta República*, MVR) ran for re-election.

*Venezuela 2006*

President Hugo Chávez (MVR) re-ran.

*Venezuela 2012*

President Hugo Chávez (*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela*, PSUV) re-ran.

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## APPENDIX 3: DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALISATION OF THE PERSONALISM VARIABLE

*Conceptualisation*

A personalist vehicle is a political organisation that is founded and dominated by a single politician. It serves as a platform for the electoral ambitions of its founder. Since incumbent presidents leading personalist vehicles are less likely to face intra-party opposition, they may be in a better position to either change the constitution to run for a consecutive term, or to impose the nomination of a successor candidate. Therefore, I include *personalism* as a control variable in the models predicting the type of candidate, and also as a statistical control in the hierarchical models explaining the incumbent vote.

*Operationalisation*

Empirically I code incumbent parties as personalist vehicles if:

1. The party is founded by the incumbent president with the clear goal of promoting her own political ambitions in an upcoming election and, before reaching the presidency, she has been the only presidential candidate of the party.
2. The party is founded during the incumbent president's term as a platform for the presidential aspirations of one of the president's protégés.

## APPENDIX 4: MODELS WITH ADDITIONAL CONTROLS

The following table re-estimates Models 1 and 2 from Table 2 of the paper with additional controls for various features of the political system and the economic context. The political controls are *party system institutionalisation*, *age of incumbent party*, *personalism*, and *coalition*. These control variables are interacted with the two individual-level measures of government performance. The economic controls are election year *GDP growth per capita*, *change in unemployment*, and the *log of the inflation rate* (see Appendix 1 for details on how these variables are coded). The coefficients on the interactions between type of candidate and individual-level government performance are essentially unaffected by the addition of these new variables, remaining in the same direction, and very close to the values reported in Table 2 of the paper.

Table 3: Main Models with Additional Controls

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Economy Better	0.29 (0.36)	0.42	0.29 (0.08)	0.00
Economy Better*Successor	0.47 (0.17)	0.01		
Economy Better*Re-running President	0.85 (0.21)	0.00		
Economy Worse	-0.86 (0.26)	0.01	-0.41 (0.07)	0.00
Economy Worse*Successor	-0.34 (0.13)	0.01		
Economy Worse*Re-running President	-0.60 (0.16)	0.00		
Presidential Approval			1.56 (0.75)	0.04
Presidential Approval*Successor			0.54 (0.33)	0.1
Presidential Approval*Re-running President			2.10 (0.43)	0.00
Successor	1.50 (0.68)	0.03	2.49 (0.55)	0.00
Re-standing President	3.19 (0.93)	0.01	6.00 (1.06)	0.00
Economy Better*Majority Situation	0.39 (0.17)	0.02		
Economy Worse*Majority Situation	-0.21 (0.13)	0.11		
Presidential Approval*Majority Situation			1.09 (0.37)	0.00
Majority Situation	0.17 (0.31)	0.59	0.49 (0.32)	0.12
Economy Better*Concurrent Elections	0.20 (0.19)	0.28		
Economy Worse*Concurrent Elections	0.37 (0.14)	0.01		
Presidential Approval*Concurrent Elections			0.25 (0.36)	0.48
Concurrent Elections	-0.59 (0.32)	0.07	-1.39 (0.30)	0.00
Economy Better*Primary	-0.06 (0.18)	0.72		
Economy Worse*Primary	-0.13 (0.13)	0.33		
Presidential Approval*Primary			-0.61 (0.42)	0.14
Primary	0.63 (0.32)	0.05	0.65 (0.36)	0.07
Economy Better*ENPS	-0.08 (0.04)	0.06		
Economy Worse*ENPS	0.11 (0.04)	0.00		
Presidential Approval*ENPS			-0.11 (0.09)	0.23
ENPS	-0.004 (0.08)	0.96	-0.06 (0.07)	0.37
Economy Better*Trade Dependence	-0.002 (0.00)	0.34		
Economy Worse*Trade Dependence	0.001 (0.00)	0.58		
Presidential Approval*Trade Dependence			-0.01 (0.01)	0.18
Trade Dependence	-0.002 (0.00)	0.97	-0.003 (0.00)	0.48

Continued...

APPENDIX 4: MODELS WITH ADDITIONAL CONTROLS

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Economy Better*Policy Switch	-0.13 (0.20)	0.53		
Economy Worse*Policy Switch	-0.28 (0.16)	0.08		
Presidential Approval*Policy Switch			-0.77 (0.60)	0.20
Policy Switch	0.04 (0.34)	0.91	1.22 (0.43)	0.01
Economy Better*Party System Inst.	0.004 (.00)	0.10		
Economy Worse*Party System Inst.	0.002 (.00)	0.26		
Presidential Approval*Party System Inst.			0.003 (0.00)	0.55
Party System Institutionalization	-0.002 (0.00)	0.54	-0.01 (0.00)	0.06
Economy Better*Age Incumbent Party	-0.003 (0.00)	0.15		
Economy Worse*Age Incumbent Party	-0.002 (0.00)	0.25		
Presidential Approval*Age Incumbent Party			0.01 (0.01)	0.06
Age Incumbent Party	-0.003 (0.00)	0.43	0.01 (0.00)	0.07
Economy Better*Personalist Vehicle	-0.28 (0.20)	0.15		
Economy Worse*Personalist Vehicle	-0.10 (0.15)	0.53		
Presidential Approval*Personalist Vehicle			-0.79 (0.43)	0.07
Personalist Vehicle	0.14 (0.32)	0.67	1.24 (0.31)	0.00
Economy Better*Coalition	0.30 (0.15)	0.05		
Economy Worse*Coalition	-0.12 (0.11)	0.30		
Presidential Approval*Coalition			0.40 (0.32)	0.22
Coalition	0.34 (0.29)	0.24	0.39 (0.25)	0.13
Per Capita GDP	-0.06 (0.07)	0.39	0.04 (0.06)	0.45
Per Capita GDP*Successor	0.11 (0.09)	0.23	0.20 (0.08)	0.02
Per Capita GDP*Re-running President	0.06 (0.08)	0.43	-0.10 (0.06)	0.11
Log of Inflation	1.06 (0.29)	0.00	1.87 (0.28)	0.00
Log of Inflation*Successor	-1.00 (0.35)	0.00	-1.80 (0.31)	0.00
Log of Inflation*Re-running President	-1.40 (0.45)	0.02	-3.29 (0.54)	0.00
Unemployment Change	-0.04 (0.13)	0.73	0.17 (0.11)	0.13
Unemployment Change*Successor	0.15 (0.16)	0.37	0.52 (0.17)	0.00
Unemployment Change*Re-running President	-0.003 (0.26)	0.99	0.22 (0.27)	0.42
Male	-0.16 (0.02)	0.00	-0.19 (0.03)	0.00
Age	0.02 (0.01)	0.02	0.01 (0.01)	0.59
Education	-0.11 (0.01)	0.00	-0.12 (0.01)	0.00
Married	0.02 (0.02)	0.39	-0.01 (0.03)	0.64
Socioeconomic	-0.02 (0.01)	0.17	-0.03 (0.02)	0.07
Intercept	-1.28 (0.76)	0.09	-3.01 (0.63)	0.00
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.63		0.41	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyBetter}}$	0.36		0.37	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyWorse}}$	0.25		0.33	
$\sigma_{\text{PresidentialApproval}}$			0.71	
Number of observations	38501		29313	
Number of elections	51		37	

## APPENDIX 5: MODELS WITH CONTINUOUS MEASURE OF ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS

The following table re-estimates the main models of the paper using a continuous instead of a categorical measure of economic evaluations. The sociotropic retrospective indicators are measured on the three point scale (*worse*: -1, *same*: 0, *better*: 1) used in the first rounds of *Latinobarómetro*. For the latter rounds, *better* and *much better* are coded 1, *same* is coded 0, and *worse* and *much worse* are coded -1. Model 1 in the Table below re-estimates Model 1 from Table 2, while Model 2 includes the additional controls from Appendix 4.

Table 4: Models with Continuous Measure of Economic Evaluations

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Economic Evaluations	0.66 (0.23)	0.01	0.65 (0.24)	0.01
Economic Evaluations*Successor	0.39 (0.12)	0.00	0.38 (0.12)	0.00
Economic Evaluations*Re-run	0.70 (0.15)	0.00	0.69 (0.15)	0.00
Successor	0.02 (0.28)	0.94	1.60 (0.69)	0.02
Re-running President	0.79 (0.35)	0.03	3.38 (0.95)	0.00
Economic Evaluations*Majority Situation	0.25 (0.12)	0.03	0.29 (0.12)	0.01
Majority Situation	0.45 (0.28)	0.1	0.19 (0.32)	0.54
Economic Evaluations*Concurrent Elections	-0.14 (0.12)	0.25	-0.12 (0.13)	0.34
Concurrent Elections	-0.33 (0.29)	0.25	-0.43 (0.33)	0.20
Economic Evaluations*Primary	0.11 (0.11)	0.34	0.06 (0.12)	0.61
Primary	0.51 (.27)	0.06	0.59 (0.33)	0.07
Economic Evaluations*ENPS	-0.07 (0.03)	0.02	-0.09 (0.03)	0.00
ENPS	0.08 (0.07)	0.28	-0.005 (0.08)	0.95
Economic Evaluations*Trade Dependence	-0.002 (0.00)	0.17	-0.002 (0.00)	0.31
Trade Dependence	0.001 (0.00)	0.88	-0.001 (0.00)	0.81
Economic Evaluations*Policy Switch	0.08 (0.14)	0.56	0.07 (0.15)	0.61
Policy Switch	0.12 (0.34)	0.72	-0.06 (0.35)	0.87
Economic Evaluations*Party System Inst.			0.0004 (0.00)	0.83
Party System Institutionalization			-0.001 (0.00)	0.75
Economic Evaluations*Age Incumbent Party			-0.0004 (0.00)	0.80
Age Incumbent Party			-0.004 (0.00)	0.30
Economic Evaluations*Personalist Vehicle			-0.10 (0.14)	0.46
Personalist Vehicle			0.07 (0.33)	0.83
Economic Evaluations*Coalition			0.22 (0.11)	0.04
Coalition			0.37 (0.30)	0.22
Per Capita GDP			-0.05 (0.07)	0.48
Per Capita GDP*Successor			0.10 (0.09)	0.31
Per Capita GDP*Re-running President			0.06 (0.08)	0.45
Log of Inflation			1.06 (0.30)	0.00
Log of Inflation*Successor			-1.02 (0.36)	0.00
Log of Inflation*Re-running President			-1.48 (0.46)	0.01
Unemployment Change			-0.04 (0.13)	0.76
Unemployment Change*Successor			0.14 (0.17)	0.40

Continued...

APPENDIX 5: MODELS WITH CONTINUOUS MEASURE OF ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Unemployment Change*Re-running President			-0.07 (0.26)	0.79
Male	-0.16 (0.02)	0.00	-0.16 (0.02)	0.00
Age	0.02 (0.01)	0.02	0.02 (0.01)	0.02
Education	-0.11 (0.01)	0.00	-0.11 (0.01)	0.00
Married	0.02 (0.02)	0.38	0.02 (0.02)	0.37
Socioeconomic	-0.02 (0.01)	0.19	-0.02 (0.01)	0.17
Intercept	-0.22 (0.56)	0.69	-1.36 (0.77)	0.08
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.76		0.65	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomicEvaluations}}$	0.29		0.28	
Number of observations	38501		38501	
Number of elections	51		51	

## APPENDIX 6: MODELS USING CRITERIA 1 AND 2 TO CODE CANDIDATES

The following table re-estimates the main models of the paper without the eight cases for which I was not able to use the first two criteria to code successors and non-successors. The coefficients on the interactions between type of candidate and individual-level government performance remain in the same direction, and very close to the values reported in Table 2 in the main text.

Table 5: Models Using First Two Criteria to Code Candidates

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Economy Better	0.35 (0.42)	0.40	0.32 (0.08)	0.00
Economy Better*Successor	0.44 (0.21)	0.04		
Economy Better*Re-running President	0.81 (0.27)	0.00		
Economy Worse	-1.05 (0.30)	0.00	-0.41 (.07)	0.00
Economy Worse*Successor	-0.31 (0.15)	0.04		
Economy Worse*Re-running President	-0.57 (0.19)	0.00		
Presidential Approval			1.71 (0.99)	0.08
Presidential Approval*Successor			1.00 (0.45)	0.03
Presidential Approval*Re-running President			2.31 (0.57)	0.00
Successor	-0.02 (0.34)	0.95	-0.11 (0.46)	0.81
Re-standing President	0.78 (0.43)	0.07	0.21 (0.59)	0.72
Intercept	-0.17 (0.66)	0.80	-1.60 (1.02)	0.12
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.78		0.89	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyBetter}}$	0.42		0.35	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyWorse}}$	0.28		0.32	
$\sigma_{\text{PresidentialApproval}}$			0.85	
Number of observations	31861		24025	
Number of elections	43		31	

## APPENDIX 7: MODELS CONTROLLING FOR LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT

The following table re-estimates the main models of the paper controlling for left-right self-placement. Because this variable is not available for three cases – Chile 1999, 2005, and 2009 – the models presented in this section are estimated on two subsamples of 48 and 34 cases. The measure of *left-right self-placement* is constructed using responses to the item “On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself?” The measure is recoded into a categorical variable – 0-2: *Left*, 3-4: *Centre-left*, 5: *Centre*, 6-7: *Centre-right*, 8-10: *Right*. To avoid missing values, individuals who do not respond to the self-placement question are included as an additional category. The baseline category is *Centre*.

Table 6: Models Controlling for Left-Right Self-Placement

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Economy Better	0.33 (0.39)	0.40	0.30 (0.08)	0.00
Economy Better*Successor	0.43 (0.20)	0.03		
Economy Better*Re-running President	0.82 (0.24)	0.00		
Economy Worse	-0.89 (0.28)	0.00	-0.41 (0.08)	0.00
Economy Worse*Successor	-0.39 (0.14)	0.01		
Economy Worse*Re-running President	-0.69 (0.17)	0.00		
Presidential Approval			1.57 (0.86)	0.07
Presidential Approval*Successor			0.90 (0.42)	0.03
Presidential Approval*Re-running President			2.43 (0.51)	0.00
Successor	-0.11 (0.31)	0.73	-0.04 (0.43)	0.92
Re-running President	0.72 (0.36)	0.05	0.15 (0.53)	0.77
Left	-0.12 (0.05)	0.01	0.10 (0.06)	0.09
Center-left	0.04 (0.04)	0.43	0.22 (0.06)	0.00
Center-right	0.03 (0.04)	0.45	0.01 (0.06)	0.85
Right	0.35 (0.04)	0.00	0.31 (0.05)	0.00
No Self-placement	0.16 (0.04)	0.00	0.24 (0.06)	0.00
Intercept	-0.27 (0.59)	0.64	-1.87 (0.90)	0.04
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.74		0.88	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyBetter}}$	0.42		0.38	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyWorse}}$	0.28		0.35	
$\sigma_{\text{PresidentialApproval}}$			0.84	
Number of observations	34273		25085	
Number of elections	48		34	

## APPENDIX 8: MODELS WITHOUT CASES SCORING BELOW SIX IN POLITY IV

Four presidential elections – Peru in 1995 and 2000, Ecuador in 2009, and Venezuela in 2012 – score below 6, and are therefore not considered “democracies” in the Polity IV Authority Trends. As the following table shows, the results are essentially unaffected by the subtraction of these four cases, remaining in the same direction, statistically significant, and very close to the results reported in Table 2 in the main text.

Table 7: Models Without Cases Scoring Below Six in Polity IV

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Economy Better	0.25 (0.35)	0.48	0.27 (0.08)	0.00
Economy Better*Successor	0.50 (0.17)	0.00		
Economy Better*Re-running President	0.90 (0.21)	0.00		
Economy Worse	-0.70 (0.24)	0.00	-0.39 (.07)	0.00
Economy Worse*Successor	-0.36 (0.12)	0.00		
Economy Worse*Re-running President	-0.62 (0.15)	0.00		
Presidential Approval			1.15 (0.83)	0.17
Presidential Approval*Successor			0.74 (0.36)	0.04
Presidential Approval*Re-running President			2.37 (0.49)	0.00
Successor	-0.01 (0.28)	0.98	-0.002 (0.38)	0.99
Re-standing President	0.70 (0.37)	0.06	0.04 (0.51)	0.95
Intercept	-0.04 (0.59)	0.95	-1.25 (0.88)	0.16
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.75		0.87	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyBetter}}$	0.36		0.36	
$\sigma_{\text{EconomyWorse}}$	0.24		0.30	
$\sigma_{\text{PresidentialApproval}}$			0.82	
Number of observations	35561		27845	
Number of elections	47		35	



## APPENDIX TO PAPER 2

## APPENDIX 1: RANDOMISATION CHECK

Table 1: Balance in Survey Response Assignment

	Treatment	Control	T-Test	Wilcoxon	KS	KS <i>p</i> value
<b>Presidential Approval</b>	3.41	3.41	0.90	0.99	0.006	0.99
<b>Education</b>	6.48	6.49	0.64	0.59	0.007	0.99
<b>Age</b>	4.81	4.84	0.61	0.81	0.02	0.22
<b>Partisanship</b>						
PAN ID	0.187	0.176	0.10	0.10		
<b>Gender</b>						
Male	0.447	0.443	0.69	0.69		

As Ho et al. (2007) note, there is no single way of assessing balance in random assignment. A thorough assessment of balance combines different tests (Bowers 2011). Table 1 displays several balance statistics. The first two columns report the means and proportions of each variable in the treatment and control groups.<sup>1</sup> The third column reports the *p* values for difference of means and proportions t-tests, followed by *p* values for Wilcoxon rank sum tests. The fifth and sixth columns report the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for non-categorical variables, and their *p* values.

The similarity in averages and proportions across conditions suggests that the treatment conditions are balanced. Indeed, the *p* values for the difference-of-means and proportions tests suggest no significant difference at the 95 percent confidence level between treatment and control groups. Further evidence that random assignment was not abrogated is provided by the *p* values of the Wilcoxon rank sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. None of these show significant differences between treatment conditions. Finally, an omnibus test following Hansen and Bowers (2008), which provides a single statistic for assessing balance, finds no imbalance ( $\chi^2=6.07$ ,  $df=7$ ,  $p$  value=0.537).

<sup>1</sup>For the categorical variables – *partisanship* and *gender* – a baseline category is omitted from the table.

## APPENDIX 2: CODEBOOK

**VOTE FOR INCUMBENT**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent votes for the incumbent party, 0 if she votes for any other candidate (“no answer” and “don’t know” are coded as missing).

**TREATMENT**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent was assigned to the treatment group, 0 if she was assigned to the control group.

**PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL**

Continuous variable coded from 1 (*failure*) to 6 (*excellent*).

**PANISTA**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent identifies with the PAN, 0 if she does not.

**PRIISTA**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent identifies with the PRI, 0 if she does not.

**PRDISTA**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent identifies with the PRD, 0 if she does not.

**INDEPENDENT**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent does not identify with any party, 0 if she does not.

**MALE**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is a man, 0 if she is a woman.

**EDUCATION**

Education level of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:

- 1 — Illiterate
- 2 — Incomplete Elementary
- 3 — Complete Elementary
- 4 — Incomplete Secondary
- 5 — Complete Secondary
- 6 — Incomplete High School
- 7 — Complete High School
- 8 — Incomplete Higher Education
- 9 — Complete Higher Education
- 10 — Postgraduate Degree

**AGE**

Age of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:

- 1 — 18-24
- 2 — 25-29
- 3 — 30-34
- 4 — 35-39
- 5 — 40-44
- 6 — 45-49
- 7 — 50-54
- 8 — 55-59
- 9 — 60-64
- 10 — 65-

**INCOME**

Income of respondent. Continuous variable coded as follows:

- 1 — Less than the minimum salary
- 2 — One to three minimum salaries
- 3 — Three to five minimum salaries
- 4 — Five to seven minimum salaries
- 5 — Seven to ten minimum salaries
- 6 — Over ten minimum salaries

**STATE-LEVEL GDP GROWTH**

State-level per capita GDP growth in the quarter previous to the 2012 presidential election

*Source:* INEGI.

## APPENDIX 3: ORDERED LOGIT MODELS

I re-estimate the main models of the paper using ordered logistic regression. Table 2 estimates ATEs, while Table 3 estimates CATEs. The first two models in Table 3 estimate the interactions for voters who identify with the PAN, while Models 3 and 4 report the same interactions for *non-panistas*. The point estimates on the treatment in Table 1 and on the interactions between the treatment and *presidential approval* remain in the same direction and close to the values reported in Tables 4 and 6 in the main text.

Table 2: Average Treatment Effects – Ordered Logistic Regression

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.09 (0.03)	0.01	-0.08 (0.03)	0.01
Male			-0.16 (0.03)	0.00
Education			-0.01 (0.01)	0.09
Age			0.00 (0.01)	0.94
Cut 1	-0.93 (0.03)		-1.07 (0.07)	
Cut 2	-0.35 (0.02)		-0.48 (0.07)	
Cut 3	0.02 (0.02)		-0.13 (0.07)	
Cut 4	1.34 (0.03)		1.19 (0.07)	
Number of observations	12830		12673	
Pseudo R Squared	0.00		0.00	

Table 3: Conditional Average Treatment Effects – Ordered Logistic Regression

	PANISTAS				NON-PANISTAS			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.88 (0.31)	0.00	-0.84 (0.31)	0.01	-0.07 (0.08)	0.39	-0.06 (0.09)	0.47
Presidential Approval	0.30 (0.05)	0.00	0.28 (0.05)	0.00	0.42 (0.02)	0.00	0.42 (0.02)	0.00
Endorsement*Approval	0.09 (0.07)	0.16	0.09 (0.07)	0.21	-0.01 (0.02)	0.81	-0.01 (0.02)	0.70
Male			-0.01 (0.09)	0.89			-0.08 (0.04)	0.03
Education			0.16 (0.02)	0.00			-0.06 (0.01)	0.00
Age			0.06 (0.02)	0.00			-0.03 (0.01)	0.00
Cut 1	-2.30 (0.25)		-1.10 (0.30)		0.62 (0.06)		0.04 (0.09)	
Cut 2	-1.51 (0.24)		-0.29 (0.28)		1.32 (0.06)		0.75 (0.09)	
Cut 3	-1.14 (0.23)		0.07 (0.28)		1.75 (0.06)		1.16 (0.09)	
Cut 4	0.63 (0.23)		1.87 (0.28)		3.53 (0.07)		2.95 (0.1)	
Number of observations	2307		2290		10181		10061	
Pseudo R Squared	0.03		0.05		0.04		0.04	

## APPENDIX 4: MODELS USING FOUR-POINT LIKERT SCALE

I re-estimate the linear regression models presented in the paper using a four-point Likert scale in which subjects answering *don't know* are left out of the analysis. Table 4 estimates average treatment effects, while Table 5 estimates conditional average treatment effects. The first two models in Table 5 estimate the interactions for voters who identify with the PAN, while Models 3 and 4 report the same interactions for *non-panistas*. The point estimates on the treatment in Table 4 and on the interactions between the treatment and *presidential approval* in Table 5, remain in the same direction and close to the values reported in Tables 4 and 5 in the main text.

Table 4: Average Treatment Effects – Four-point Likert Scale

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.06 (0.02)	0.01	-0.06 (0.02)	0.01
Male			-0.11 (0.02)	0.00
Education			-0.01 (0.00)	0.02
Age			0.002 (0.00)	0.62
Intercept	2.46 (0.02)	0.00	2.58 (0.04)	0.00
Number of observations	11664		11564	
R Squared	0.00		0.00	


Table 5: Conditional Average Treatment Effects – Four-point Likert Scale

	PANISTAS				NON-PANISTAS			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.37 (0.11)	0.00	-0.34 (.11)	0.00	-0.01 (0.05)	0.76	-0.01 (0.05)	0.81
Presidential Approval	0.1 (0.02)	0.00	0.09 (0.02)	0.00	0.25 (0.01)	0.00	0.25 (0.01)	0.00
Endorsement*Approval	0.05 (0.02)	0.04	0.04 (0.02)	0.07	-0.01 (0.01)	0.41	-0.01 (0.01)	0.36
Male			-0.02 (0.03)	0.54			-0.04 (0.02)	0.04
Education			0.05 (0.01)	0.00			-0.03 (0.00)	0.00
Age			0.02 (0.01)	0.00			-0.02 (0.00)	0.00
Intercept	3.17 (0.08)	0.00	2.78 (0.1)	0.00	1.40 (0.03)	0.00	1.73 (0.05)	0.00
Number of observations	2241		2226		9230		9151	
R Squared	0.05		0.08		0.13		0.13	

## APPENDIX 5: MODELS USING BINARY PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL VARIABLE

I re-estimate the models presented in Tables 5 and 6 in the main text using a binary measure of presidential approval. I collapse the lower three categories – 5 to 7 – into 0, and the top three categories – 8-10 – into 1. Table 6 estimates conditional average treatment effects using the continuous dependent variable, while the models reported in Table 7 use the binary dependent variable. The first two models in each table estimate the interactions for voters who identify with the PAN, while Models 3 and 4 report the same interactions for *non-panistas*. The point estimates on the interactions between the treatment and *presidential approval* remain in the same direction and close to the values reported in Tables 5 and 6 in the main text. Figure 1 shows CATEs based on Models 1 (top left panel), and Model 3 (lower left panel) from Table 6, and Model 1 (top right panel), and Model 3 (lower right panel) from Table 7. The panels show that endorsements provide an *additional* accountability effect among voters who identify with the PAN, but not for *non-panistas*. The slopes for endorsed candidates are clearly steeper than the slopes for non-endorsed candidates in the top left and lower left panels.

Figure 1: PAN Vote Using Binary Presidential Approval Variable



*Notes:* Vote intention for endorsed and non-endorsed PAN Senate candidates among *panistas* and *non-panistas* who approve and do not approve of the performance of the president. The left-side panels show linear predictions of voting for the incumbent party, while the right-side panels indicate predicted probabilities of voting for the PAN. Vertical lines with bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel 1 is based on Model 1 in Table 6 below, panel 2 on Model 1 in Table 7, panel 3 on Model 3 in Table 6, and panel 4 on Model 3 in Table 7.

*Source:* Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica.



Table 6: Conditional Average Treatment Effects – Linear Regression


	PANISTAS			NON-PANISTAS		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.42 (0.10)	0.00	-0.41 (.10)	0.00	-0.08 (0.04)	0.03
Presidential Approval	0.28 (0.08)	0.00	0.25 (0.08)	0.00	0.93 (0.04)	0.00
Endorsement*Approval	0.26 (0.11)	0.02	0.25 (0.11)	0.02	0.01 (0.06)	0.80
Male			-0.03 (0.04)	0.42	-0.07 (0.03)	0.01
Education			0.06 (0.01)	0.00	-0.05 (0.01)	0.00
Age			0.02 (0.01)	0.02	-0.02 (0.00)	0.00
Intercept	4.27 (0.07)	0.00	3.82 (0.10)	0.00	2.27 (0.03)	0.00
Number of observations	2307	2290	10181	10061		
R Squared	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.11		

Table 7: Conditional Average Treatment Effects – Binary Logistic Regression

	PANISTAS			NON-PANISTAS		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4		
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z  Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z  Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z  Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.89 (0.29)	0.00	-0.86 (0.30)	0.00	-0.13 (0.06)	0.03
Presidential Approval	0.43 (0.27)	0.11	0.43 (0.28)	0.12	1.09 (0.06)	0.00
Endorsement*Approval	0.57 (0.33)	0.09	0.51 (0.34)	0.14	0.07 (0.08)	0.42
Male			-0.06 (0.14)	0.68	-0.09 (0.04)	0.05
Education			0.11 (0.03)	0.00	-0.4 (0.01)	0.00
Age			-0.04 (0.02)	0.08	-0.05 (0.01)	0.00
Intercept	2.07 (0.24)	0.00	1.60 (0.35)	0.00	-0.34 (0.09)	0.00
Number of observations	2307	2290	10181	10061		
Pseudo R Squared	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.06		

## APPENDIX 6: MODELS FOR PRIISTAS, PRDISTAS AND INDEPENDENTS

I re-estimate the models for non-*panistas* subdividing by partisanship. The first two models in each table estimate conditional average treatment effects using the continuous dependent variable, while Models 3 and 4 use the binary dependent variable. The results show that *priistas*, *prdistas*, and independents, do not hold the incumbent party more accountable for the performance of the government when the Senate candidates are endorsed than when they are not.

Figure 2: PAN Vote Among *Priistas*, *Prdistas*, and Independents

Notes: Vote intention for endorsed and non-endorsed PAN Senate candidates among *priistas*, *prdistas*, and independents with different levels of *presidential approval*. The left-side panels show linear predictions of voting for the incumbent party, while the right-side panels present predicted probabilities of voting for the PAN. Vertical lines with bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel 1 is based on Model 1 in Table 8 in this Appendix. Panel 2 is based on Model 3 in Table 8, panel 3 on Model 1 in Table 9, panel 4 on Model 3 in Table 9, panel 5 on Model 1 in Table 10, and panel 6 on Model 3 in Table 10.

Source: Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica.

Table 8: Conditional Average Treatment Effects Among *Priístas*

	LINEAR REGRESSION			BINARY LOGIT		
	Model 1	Model 2		Model 3	Model 4	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	0.02 (0.11)	0.84	0.03 (.11)	0.76	0.03 (0.20)	0.87
Presidential Approval	0.26 (0.02)	0.00	0.26 (0.02)	0.00	0.37 (0.04)	0.00
Endorsement*Approval	0.002 (0.03)	0.94	-0.004 (0.03)	0.90	-0.01 (0.05)	0.89
Male			-0.01 (0.05)	0.89	-0.02 (0.08)	0.84
Education			-0.08 (0.01)	0.00	-0.09 (0.02)	0.00
Age			-0.03 (0.01)	0.00	-0.06 (0.01)	0.00
Intercept	1.49 (0.08)	0.00	2.14 (0.12)	0.00	-1.94 (0.14)	0.00
Number of observations	3054		3029		3054	3029
R Squared	0.08		0.10			
Pseudo R Squared					0.05	0.06

Table 9: Conditional Average Treatment Effects Among *Prdistas*

	LINEAR REGRESSION			BINARY LOGIT		
	Model 1	Model 2		Model 3	Model 4	
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.01 (0.13)	0.96	-0.00 (.13)	0.99	-0.11 (0.24)	0.65
Presidential Approval	0.34 (0.03)	0.00	0.33 (0.03)	0.00	0.46 (0.05)	0.00
Endorsement*Approval	-0.05 (0.04)	0.23	-0.06 (0.04)	0.19	-0.04 (0.07)	0.60
Male			-0.09 (0.06)	0.15	-0.18 (0.11)	0.1
Education			-0.06 (0.02)	0.00	-0.06 (0.03)	0.02
Age			-0.03 (0.01)	0.01	-0.05 (0.02)	0.01
Intercept	1.42 (0.09)	0.00	2.02 (0.17)	0.00	-2.04 (0.17)	0.00
Number of observations	1852		1837		1852	1837
R Squared	0.11		0.12			
Pseudo R Squared					0.07	0.08

Table 10: Conditional Average Treatment Effects Among Independents

	LINEAR REGRESSION				BINARY LOGIT			
	Model 1	Model 2			Model 3	Model 4		
	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	P> Z
Endorsement	-0.05 (0.09)	0.59	-0.05 (.10)	0.59	-0.07 (0.15)	0.64	-0.09 (0.15)	0.56
Presidential Approval	0.31 (0.02)	0.00	0.31 (0.02)	0.00	0.35 (0.03)	0.00	0.36 (0.03)	0.00
Endorsement*Approval	-0.01 (0.03)	0.62	-0.01 (0.03)	0.66	-0.00 (0.04)	0.94	-0.01 (0.04)	0.97
Male			-0.04 (0.04)	0.39			-0.03 (0.06)	0.63
Education			-0.03 (0.01)	0.00			-0.01 (0.01)	0.49
Age			-0.01 (0.01)	0.04			-0.06 (0.01)	0.00
Intercept	2.02 (0.06)	0.00	2.28 (0.10)	0.00	1.22 (0.10)	0.00	0.86 (0.16)	0.00
Number of observations	4711		4632		4711		4632	
R Squared	0.11		0.11		0.11		0.12	
Pseudo R Squared					0.05		0.06	

APPENDIX TO PAPER 3

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## APPENDIX I: CODEBOOK

The analyses include the following variables measured at the municipal level:

**PAN VOTE 2006**

PAN vote shares in the 2006 presidential election.

*Source:* IFE.

**PRI VOTE 2006**

PRI vote shares in the 2006 presidential election.

*Source:* IFE.

**PRD VOTE 2006**

PRD vote shares in the 2006 presidential election.

*Source:* IFE.

**LOG OF PAN VOTE 2000**

Logged PAN vote shares in the 2000 presidential election.

*Source:* IFE.

**LOG OF PRI VOTE 2000**

Logged PRI vote shares in the 2000 presidential election.

*Source:* IFE.

**LOG OF PRD VOTE 2000**

Logged PRD vote shares in the 2006 presidential election.

*Source:* IFE.

**LOG OF FEDERAL TRANSFERS**

Logged per capita transfers from the federal government to the municipalities.

*Source:* INEGI.

**PAN MAYOR**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the mayor belongs to the PAN, 0 otherwise.

*Source:* IFE.

**PRI MAYOR**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the mayor belongs to the PRI, 0 otherwise.

*Source:* IFE.

**PRD MAYOR**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the mayor belongs to the PRD, 0 otherwise.

*Source:* IFE.

**DEPRIVATION**

*Grado de Marginación.* Multi-dimensional continuous measure of deprivation developed by CONAPO.

*Source:* INEGI.

**HIGH DEPRIVATION**

Dummy variable coded 1 for municipalities categorised as “very high” or “high” deprivation in the *grado de marginación*, and 0 otherwise.

*Source:* INEGI.

**LOG OF PAN MUNICIPAL VOTE**

Logged PAN vote shares in the latest municipal election.

*Source:* IFE.

**LOG OF PRI MUNICIPAL VOTE**

Logged PRI vote shares in the latest municipal election.

*Source:* IFE.

**LOG OF PRD MUNICIPAL VOTE**

Logged PRD vote shares in the latest municipal election.

*Source:* IFE.

**LOG POPULATION**

Logged population in 2005.

*Source:* INEGI.

**ILLITERACY RATE**

Percentage of illiterate inhabitants in 2005.

*Source:* INEGI.

**MUNICIPALITIES LESS 500 RESIDENTS**

Percentage of residents living in settlements of less than 500 people.

*Source:* INEGI.

**PAN MPs**

Percentage of MPs in the municipality that belong to the PAN.

*Source:* IFE.

**PRI MPs**

Percentage of MPs in the municipality that belong to the PRI.

*Source:* IFE.



**PRD MPs**

Percentage of MPs in the municipality that belong to the PRD.

*Source:* IFE.

**EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES IN 2000**

Effective numbers of parties at the municipal level in the 2000 presidential election.

*Source:* IFE.

The following state-level variables were included in the analyses:

**PAN ID**

Percentage of respondents who identify with the PAN based on survey-level data.

*Source:* BIIACS.

**PRI ID**

Percentage of respondents who identify with the PRI based on survey-level data.

*Source:* BIIACS.

**PRD ID**

Percentage of respondents who identify with the PRD based on survey-level data.

*Source:* BIIACS.

**PAN GOVERNOR**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the governor belongs to the PAN, 0 otherwise.

*Source:* IFE.

**PRD GOVERNOR**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the governor belongs to the PRD, 0 otherwise.

*Source:* IFE.

**PAN SENATORS**

Percentage of senators elected in the three-seat state-level constituencies that belong to the PAN.

*Source:* IFE.

**PRI SENATORS**

Percentage of senators elected in the three-seat state-level constituencies that belong to the PRI.

*Source:* IFE.

**PRD SENATORS**

Percentage of senators elected in the three-seat state-level constituencies that belong to the PRD.

*Source:* IFE.

## APPENDIX 2: MODELS WITH STATE FIXED EFFECTS

We estimate similar models to the ones reported in the Tables in the main text using state fixed effects. As the tables below show, the results remain very close to the ones reported in the second paper. We omit the coefficients for each state.

Table 1: Municipal Control Models with State Fixed Effects

	PRI Coefficient (Standard Error)	PAN Coefficient (Standard Error)	PRD Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	-0.59*** (0.18)	0.22 (0.23)	0.37 (0.24)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.17*** (0.01)	0.27*** (0.02)	-0.1*** (0.02)
Log PRI Vote 2000	0.4*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.23*** (0.04)
Log PRD Vote 2000	-0.1*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.01)
Log Population	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Log PAN Municipal Vote	-0.03*** (0)	0.09*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Log PRD Municipal Vote	-0.02*** (0)	-0.01** (0)	0.03*** (0)
Log PRI Municipal Vote	0.1*** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
PAN Mayor	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
PRD Mayor	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
PRI Mayor	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
High Deprivation	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Less 5000 Residents	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Illiteracy Rate	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)	-0.16 (0.02)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation	0.04 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation	0.02 (0.04)	0 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation	0.1 (0.03)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.77	0.81	0.80
Number of observations	1959		

\*p&lt;0.1. \*\*p&lt;0.05. \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Table 2: Spending Models with State Fixed Effects

	PRI Coefficient (Standard Error)	PAN Coefficient (Standard Error)	PRD Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	0.1 (0.11)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.14)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.19*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)
Log PRI Vote 2000	0.47*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.33*** (0.04)
Log PRD Vote 2000	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.17*** (0.01)	0.3*** (0.01)
Log Population	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.0*** <sub>2</sub> (0.01)
PAN Mayor	0.08*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)	-0.2*** (0.03)
PRD Mayor	0.05** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
PRI Mayor	0.06*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)
Transfers 2005	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Deprivation (continuous)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0 (0.06)
Illiteracy Rate	0.08*** (0.03)	0 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)
Less 5000 Residents	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
PAN Mayor*Transfers	-0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0 (0.06)
PRD Mayor*Transfers	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)
PRI Mayor*Transfers	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation	0.04 (0.05)	0.19*** (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.06)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation	0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation	0.11*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.15*** (0.05)
Transfers*Deprivation	-0.06 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
PAN Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	-0.15* (0.08)	0.03 (0.1)	0.12 (0.1)
PRD Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	0.07 (0.07)	-0.18** (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)
PRI Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	0.1 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.70	0.78	0.80
Number of observations	2052		

\*p&lt;0.1. \*\*p&lt;0.05. \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

## APPENDIX 3: MODELS WITH CONTINUOUS MEASURE OF DEPRIVATION

We re-estimate the models presented in Tables 1 and 5, using a standardised measure of deprivation. As the two tables below show, the results remain very close to the ones reported in the tables in the main text.

Table 3: Municipal Control Models with Continuous Measure of Deprivation

	PRI Coefficient (Standard Error)	PAN Coefficient (Standard Error)	PRD Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	0.02 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.1)	-0.01 (0.09)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.2*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.01)	-0.12*** (0.01)
Log PRI Vote 2000	0.5*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.34*** (0.04)
Log PRD Vote 2000	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.17*** (0.01)	0.3*** (0.01)
Log Population	-0.02*** (0.01)	0 (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
PAN Mayor	0.08*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)
PRD Mayor	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
PRI Mayor	0.1*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Deprivation (continuous)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation	-0.01 (0.04)	0.22*** (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.04)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation	0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation	0.09*** (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.22	0.34	0.23
Number of observations	2367		
Number of states	32		

\*p<0.1. \*\*p<0.05. \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 4: Spending Models with Continuous Measure of Deprivation

	PRI Coefficient (Standard Error)	PAN Coefficient (Standard Error)	PRD Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	0.11 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.1)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.19*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)
Log PRI Vote 2000	0.46*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.32*** (0.04)
Log PRD Vote 2000	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.17*** (0.01)	0.31*** (0.01)
Log Population	-0.03*** (0.01)	0 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
PAN Mayor	0.08*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)	-0.2*** (0.03)
PRD Mayor	0.05** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
PRI Mayor	0.06*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.03)
Transfers 2005	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
Deprivation (continuous)	0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)
PAN Mayor*Transfers	-0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0 (0.06)
PRD Mayor*Transfers	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)
PRI Mayor*Transfers	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation	0.04 (0.05)	0.19*** (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.06)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation	0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation	0.11*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.15*** (0.05)
Transfers*Deprivation	-0.06 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
PAN Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	-0.15* (0.08)	0.02 (0.1)	0.12 (0.1)
PRD Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	0.05 (0.07)	-0.18** (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)
PRI Mayor*Transfers*Deprivation	0.1 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.22	0.35	0.22
Number of observations	2052		
Number of states	31		

\*p&lt;0.1. \*\*p&lt;0.05. \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

## APPENDIX 4: MODEL WITH PAST VOTE SHARES IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

We re-estimate the model displayed in Table 1 in the main text, controlling for vote shares in the latest municipal elections. As the table below shows, the results remain very close to the ones reported in Table 1.

Table 5: Municipal Control Models with Past Vote Shares in Municipal Elections

	PRI Coefficient (Standard Error)	PAN Coefficient (Standard Error)	PRD Coefficient (Standard Error)
Intercept	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.12)	0.24** (0.11)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.17*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)
Log PRI Vote 2000	0.39*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.04)
Log PAN Vote 2000	-0.1*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)	0.27*** (0.01)
Log Population	-0.03*** (0)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Log PAN Municipal Vote	-0.03*** (0)	0.09*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Log PRD Municipal Vote	-0.02*** (0)	-0.01* (0)	0.03*** (0)
Log PRI Municipal Vote	0.1*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
PAN Mayor	0.04** (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)
PRD Mayor	0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	0 (0.03)
PRI Mayor	0.02 (0.02)	0 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Deprivation (continuous)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
PAN Mayor*Deprivation	0.01 (0.04)	0.17*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)
PRD Mayor*Deprivation	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)
PRI Mayor*Deprivation	0.11*** (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)
$\sigma_{\text{Intercept}}$	0.21	0.33	0.20
Number of observations	1959		
Number of states	32		

\*p&lt;0.1. \*\*p&lt;0.05. \*\*\*p&lt;0.01