Shifting Paradigms: Null Remedies for National Minorities
From Civic Egalitarianism to Ethnic Multiculturalism
A Context Sensitive Approach

By
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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work.

The part entitled 5.1.3 Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (pp.150-170) in this thesis is a result of my previous study towards the MSc. degree in Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The same piece was also published by the Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe.

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Abstract

National minorities, who claim autonomy and self-government rights, have always been a controversial problem in the fields of international law, political theory and nationalism. Multiculturalism and egalitarianism are two approaches that have long been discussed in all of these fields and implemented in various contexts. The success of policies that seem to be associated with these two approaches, however, has varied from one case to another. This study asks if failures of these approaches have anything to do with the contexts in which they take place. If so, what is the context in which these approaches prove to be futile? Theorists themselves explain aspects of an ideal context under which their theories can become fruitful. These ideal contexts and circumstances are, however, unrealistic; and their assumptions about the nature of social relationships do not always correspond with the reality. This study aims to find a more reliable criterion to assess the applicability of multiculturalism and egalitarianism. The thesis explains the relationship between national minorities and the state through a phenomenological paradigm. In this paradigm national minorities, the thesis argues, vary according to the state nationalisms they have experienced in the past. The thesis analyses the relational nature of minority and state nationalisms from this inter-subjective perspective. Within this framework, this study posits the hypothesis that multiculturalism and egalitarianism cannot produce viable solutions to the problems of national minorities who were persistently exposed to the policies of forced assimilation and civic state nationalism. The study reveals that a certain strand of multiculturalism that is ethnocentric cannot come to terms with such national minorities under the integrationist civic state nationalism because, from an inter-subjective perspective, the boundaries between the majority and the minority communities in this context are more fluid and diverse than they would otherwise have been. In such cases, resorting to ethno-centric multiculturalism and promoting the ‘authentic’ ethnic identities hampers the very diversity it seeks to promote. The thesis suggests that difference-blind egalitarianism is equally problematic in such cases because it cannot come to terms with the systematic injustice and the concomitant conflict that the policies of forced assimilation have created. As such its implementation weakens the very equality it seeks to promote. In order to explore and test this hypothesis, the dissertation makes use of a single in-depth case study of Turkey. In the period of candidacy for accession to the EU, Turkey is currently experimenting with ethno-centric multiculturalism to accommodate its Kurdish population more equitably. In Turkey, however, neither the contemporary discourse of ethno-centric multiculturalism nor the historical implementation of difference-blind egalitarianism seems to be a viable option from a liberal perspective. Observing the reasons for this failure enables the reader to develop a new insight to identify the cases where those theoretical perspectives could be more successful. Mindful of the fact that generalizing from a single case study is difficult, the case of Turkey will also be situated within a study of comparative cases to test the consistency of the hypothesis in this dissertation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

National minorities who claimed autonomy and self-government rights have always been a controversial problem in the fields of international law, political theory, nationalism and conflict studies. In each one of these fields scholars have raised different points that need to be considered in attempts to accommodate minority claims under a political system where equality, peace, and freedom can be jointly achieved. The issues elaborated by liberal theories include how to approach the national minorities and what role the state should have in dealing with citizens coming from different backgrounds. In this thesis I will focus mainly on two liberal approaches that have different answers for the problems in question. These are the multiculturalist and the egalitarian approaches that have respectively defended cultural group rights and individual human rights for the members of national ethnic groups (Jones 1999, Donnelly 1990, Galenkamp 1998).

For the first category, members of a national ethnic minority should have differentiated group rights that would emanate from their membership of the cultural community. In a general sense this is necessary to rectify unjust practices that have neglected, excluded, discriminated against or forced the minorities to assimilate to the

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2 This study uses Capotorti’s definition of minority as ‘a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of the state—possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language’ (Jackson Preece 1998:28). This definition does not include migrant minorities but only focuses on national minorities that inhabited a given territory and have already been accustomed to using their own languages before their involuntarily subordination to the state project.

3 I will examine multiculturalism and egalitarianism because these two are the mainstream approaches that have informed actual existing political institutions and actors who deal with the problems in question. Uses of these two by international organizations can also be seen from the following account.
majority in the past (Kymlicka 1995). In response to the inevitability of cultural diversity, the classical liberal view emphasized the significance of liberal toleration, freedom of association and the liberal state’s neutrality. This view is supported by Kukathas, who thinks that

[The toleration] neither forbids outsiders from entering nor forces them to join… At the same time it will not give special protection or advantages to any particular group or community… It will not deter anyone from pursuing particular goals or from trying to sustain particular traditions, yet neither will it promote others, or subsidise ones that are specially preferred (Kukathas 2008: 39).

This view of approaching diversity, however, is simply utopian because given the obligation of using at least one language at the state level, no political community can remain culturally neutral. Having considered this deficiency of tolerance-based neutrality in classical liberalism, the strong view of multiculturalism argues that if representing culture at the state level is inevitable, then representing the cultural identities, not only of dominant groups, but also minorities, would lead us to a fairer society.

Like-minded scholars have gathered under the banner of liberal culturalism, according to which, groups should have differentiated rights and therefore become arbiters on issues related to their own community. For them, the state should make adjustments and apply positive discrimination in regulating the rules to be imposed on these groups, because some rules are more compatible with the cultural norms of the majority. State policies may have an unequal impact on different cultures and put different groups in a disadvantaged position. From this perspective it is suggested that members of religious groups should be exempted from laws infringing their beliefs; linguistic minorities should be exempted from mandatory use of the official language that is not their own. Within this framework, Kymlicka (1995) claims that national minorities, who historically inhabited a given territory and were accustomed to use their own language before their subordination to the state, should now be entitled to self-government rights just like the majority, who have had the right to
decide which language is to be officially used in relation to the state. For him, these self-government rights, like regional autonomy, multi-national federalism or the right to use their own languages in public life can increase the cultural freedom of minorities whose will was previously ignored and oppressed in the nation-building process of the dominant ethnic core (Smith 1986). Although multiculturalism is a contemporary political theory that only emerged in the 1990s, its fundamental premises had previously been accepted by the League of Nations and its national minority guarantees between 1919 and 1939. 4

At this time, distinct linguistic and cultural characteristics were widely accepted as proof of nationhood. If the peoples inhabiting a particular area had a unique language and culture then they could legitimately claim a right to national self-determination… if an ethnic nation was unable to form its own independent political unit and instead was forced to exist as a national minority within another ethnic nation’s state, then this minority nation was entitled to preserve its own distinct identity as reflected in its language and culture (Jackson Preece 1998:73).

However this principle created many problems. National minorities stirred a wave of conflicts between their kin states. Germans who had been mistreated in Poland gave Germany a reason to treat its Polish minority badly. A chain of revenge had started a game in which the kin states used their ethnic fellows in other countries to justify their irredentist policies. The League of Nations’ “minority guarantees” championing an ethnic conception of nationhood, provided an ideological base for Nazism that Hitler would later use to justify his irredentist policies abroad and racism at home.

4 Before the League of Nations was established in 1919 ‘the most detailed consideration of national minority protection was conducted by certain private organizations. Two noteworthy examples are the Office des Nationalités and the Central Organization for a Durable Peace. The Office des Nationalités held two conferences in 1915 and 1916, which culminated in a Draft Declaration of the rights of Nationalities. This document laid down general principles of racial, religious, and linguistic freedom and recognized the rights of homogeneous nationalities to independent statehood wherever possible and, failing that, to local, religious, and educational autonomy in states where they formed a significant national minority. The Association for a Durable Peace took these ideas one step further. In 1917, it released a Draft International Treaty on the rights of National Minorities. This proposed treaty gave national minorities civil and political equality as well as control over educational and religious institutions and proportional representation in government’ (Jackson Preece 1998: 71).

5 ‘Irredentist nationalism occurs with the attempt to extend the existing boundaries of a state by incorporating territories of an adjacent state occupied principally by co-nationals (as in the case of the Sudeten Germans)’. (Hechter 2000: 17).
In contrast to this differentialist, ethno-centrist perspective, the egalitarians stressed individual equality that is blind to cultural differences. For this second category, members of any cultural group should have the same rights before the law and everyone should be equally entitled to live and perform their cultural practices in the private sphere so long as these practices do not infringe upon the rights of other individuals. This latter category represents the idea that injustices of the past cannot be rectified through granting underdog groups differentiated rights like self-determination, or exemption from citizenship law. This is because bringing cultural identities of descent to the forefront in politics would not only violate the equal opportunities of individuals in various ways but would also fuel the mobilization of the conflict between ethnic groups (Barry 2001, Benhabib 2002, Okin 1999). How the League of Nations and its minority guarantees escalated the conflict between ethnically separated groups was a proof of this. In less than 200 states there are about 600 language groups and 5000 ethnic groups (Gurr 1993). Quinn (2008: 37) states that only 174 out of these 600 language groups are in struggles for self-determination. The explanation for this is that not all groups have the same capacity to mobilize and claim autonomy. From the egalitarian perspective, the liberal state loses its neutrality if it recognizes the groups that are most able to mobilize for claiming the right to self-determination. Those critiques of multiculturalism are grounded in three points that follow. First, the multiculturalist politics of recognition would violate the neutrality principle of liberalism. Second, it would have negative effects on vulnerable members within the minority like children, women, or political dissidents who are maltreated by their own cultural traditions. Third, it would increase the cost of exiting from such traditions, from which vulnerable individuals should be protected by the liberal state even at the expense of the cultural freedoms of those who violate the principle of equality.

This second way of thinking has long dominated the framework of international law. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The UN
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (1992), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1955) did not attribute any normative value to cultural identities but only valued equal rights of free individuals to live their cultural identities without being exposed to discrimination. As Claude (1955) stated, and Donnelly (1990, 2003) further supported, ‘The doctrine of human rights has been put forward as a substitute for the concept of minority rights, with the strong implication that minorities whose members enjoy individual equality of treatment cannot legitimately demand facilities for the maintenance of their ethnic particularism’ (Claude 1955: 211). All these conventions and declarations have identified the individual as the only legitimate agent of liberal rights. In this framework, minority rights were simply subordinated to human rights that grant minority members the freedom of association (Higgins 1994:119-121).

The first category of political thought–multiculturalism or liberal culturalism–however, started to earn credibility in the international agenda since the sources of human rights mentioned above in the latter category proved, in time, to be insufficient to settle ethnic conflicts and rectify the injustices of assimilation or exclusion. In accordance with the 1990 Copenhagen criteria and the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the protection of linguistic minorities in candidate and member countries became more important, and members of the European Union were advised to allow the use of minority languages in public education and services. According to article 15 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National

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Minorities ‘states should endeavour to ensure adequate opportunities for being taught in the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language’. Moreover, in 1993, the EU found it necessary to extend these to self-government rights, which would generate regional administrative units for minority communities. Along with this requirement Article 10 (2) of the same convention states that

In areas inhabited by national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, and only if those persons so request and where such a request corresponds to a real need, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions which would make it possible to use the minority language in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities (Wright 1998:11).

The EU minority norms have been created with reference to best practice cases like the Catalans in Spain, the Flemish in Belgium, the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol in Italy and the Alanders in Finland. All of these cases were used as examples to show that the problems of national minorities can be solved through granting minorities differentiated group rights that in some cases can be extended to include self-government rights. These success stories encouraged international and supranational organizations to export the same policies to solve the national minority problems in other contexts and countries.

However, during the process of incorporating the multiculturalist paradigm into the European Union legal framework, we witnessed that the compatibility of multiculturalist policies with some cases was considered doubtful. In some instances it was unsuccessful in promoting equality or pacifying ethnic conflicts, and in some cases it could not even be put into practice despite government attempts to do so. The Roma people in Hungary who were given self-government rights to educate in their own language still suffer from inequalities that even a multicultural discourse could not rectify (Koulish 2005). In France, the idea of legalizing Corsu as the language of public education in Corsica could not be achieved, despite the French

As this study is related to the problems of national ethnic groups, the term multiculturalism will primarily refer to the views of Kymlicka, who clearly described the way in which national minorities should and would be treated in compliance with the general lines of the liberal multiculturalism perspective as summarized above.
government’s intention to do so when posing the referendum in 2003 (Benedikter 2009). In Turkey, Kurdish identity started to be officially recognized in the 2000s and Kurds were gradually granted simple cultural rights like state broadcasting and private language education in Kurdish (Kurban 2003, Ozbudun & Yazıcı 2004). Nevertheless, this raw inclination of the Turkish government to adopt the weak multiculturalist policies in the period of accession to the EU could not evolve into the strong multiculturalism policy of the EU that requires the state to provide the Kurds with state-funded education in their own language (ECRI 2005). The multiculturalist idea of differentiation between ethnic groups created a great turmoil among people who thought it would lead to further inequalities. Moreover, minority radicalism has long prevented the state from maintaining negotiations with political parties who did condemn the violent tactics of the insurgent organization PKK–Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Tezcur 2010)].

Mindful of this preliminary evidence it is apparent that the applicability of these approaches in real politics varies from one instance to another. I should clarify that this thesis does not intend to defend one over the other; the aim of this study is not to find out which one of these two approaches, egalitarianism or multiculturalism, offers a truer answer (if there is one at all) that then might be generalized in dealing with the whole range of problems about national minorities.

Rather, the aim of this thesis is to discover if these approaches’ deficiencies have anything to do with the contexts in which they take place? If so, what is this context in the face of which these approaches then prove to be futile? In other words what types of national minority are less likely to be led to the results of equality, peace and freedom through the employment of multiculturalist or egalitarian policies?
1.1 Applied Political Theory and Political Sociology of National Minorities

The applicability of those theories to real world cases is usually judged by looking at their success in creating the fundamental principles of equality, liberty and peace in diverse societies. Theorists themselves explain the ideal context under which their theories can become fruitful. For instance, Kymlicka (2004), makes it clear that self-government rights can only be proposed for national minorities who are sizeable enough, geographically concentrated to a degree, and not on the road of assimilation. He also argues that ethnic conflict driven by such groups cannot be resolved by any means other than regional autonomy (Kymlicka 2004 [b]: 5, 13). Barry (2009) argues that his own arguments favouring the principle of equality can be viable only if the law commanding the principle of equality ‘can be justified as advancing some legitimate public objective’.

These ideal contexts, however, are not easily found. As concerns multiculturalism, the ideal context, one in which the given minority should have an institutionally developed societal culture, cannot be found without difficulty. This is mainly due to Kymlicka’s problematic conceptualization of societal culture. Kymlicka’s definition of societal culture does not say anything about the political behavior of minority members and the level of their cultural institutionalization (Young 1997). For example, some members of sizeable and demographically concentrated groups may fight for cultural autonomy and give the message that they have not assimilated to the dominant majority. However, the same minority may lack institutionalization in a way that regional autonomy would decrease the opportunity of its members to ‘make good choices over good lives’ in their own vernacular. In this framework, Kymlicka’s multiculturalism does not precisely explain what to do when a radical sub-group within the minority is in ethnic conflict but the minority as a whole is lacking an
institutionalized societal culture. Neither can it come to terms with a national minority, where most of its members have voluntarily assimilated into the majority and do not share the nationalist sentiments of its radical factions.

As concerns the egalitarianism of Brian Barry (2009), the ideal context is the one in which ‘a law commanding the principle of equality must be justified as advancing some legitimate public objective’. Regarding this idea, we have to consider whether there is a universal source of legitimacy and if there can be a public objective that is legitimate for both a national minority and the majority within the same state. Sources of legitimacy are different for groups whose interests are driven by different concerns that vary depending on the context. This echoes Hume’s ‘depiction of circumstances of justice which plays an essential part in his account of what justice is and why it is valuable’ (Miller 2008: 36-37). Moreover, the implications of a particular context might be different for different groups. This is usually the case in the state where the minority’s cultural freedom was restricted for the sake of the nation building process. While the majority sees the state as the guarantor of their rights, some minority members can see it as the violator of their most fundamental freedom. This is to speak their own language in every phase of life, including both the public and the private sphere. What these suffering groups understand from the legitimate public objective is usually quite different from how the majority perceive it.

According to Habermas, drawing on Barry’s views, different cultural groups find the justification of a law reasonable if the law’s ‘burden appears reasonable [preferable] to them in comparison with the burden of the discrimination which is thereby eliminated’ (Habermas 2005: 13). Granting official status to the language of the majority and forcing minority members to learn it may be justified—for an egalitarian—on the grounds that knowledge of the official language provides members of all ethno-cultural groups with equality of opportunity and higher levels of mobility outside the limitations of their own cultural group. Nevertheless, this might not be the primary concern of minority members who want to speak their own language in a
public discourse more than anything else. They might not care for equality, but only freedom. It does not make any sense to talk about a public legitimate objective as a justification for any decisions that the state can make, if some minority members do not even share with the majority a sense of belonging to the same public.

In this framework, I argue that assessing the applicability of multiculturalism and egalitarian approaches requires a further elaboration of circumstances that Kymlicka and Barry did not take into consideration when defining the ideal context for their own theories. This thesis aims to reveal under what circumstances these theories are unlikely to promote the liberal values of freedom, peace and equality that they defend.

For this reason this study can be categorized as being with the field of applied political theory, yet it also falls in the category of political sociology as the evidence against which these theories are tested is drawn from social-political dynamics. As Miller argues, ‘political theory should aim to engage with the political issues that arise in contemporary societies, in circumstances that are usually far from ideal’ (Miller 2008:30). As Kymlicka (2010:260) listed ‘Sociologists such as Brubaker (2006), Joppke (2004); political scientists such as Laitin (1998) and Jung (2007); and anthropologists such as Turner (1993) or Cowan (2001)’ followed a similar line of argument with Miller (2008). They all argued that theories should pay more attention to ‘evidence about their underlying assumptions about human behaviour ~ or about the strategic and political context in which cultural claims are formulated’ (Kymlicka 2010: 260).

At this point it is important to stress that both Barry and Kymlicka have also been informed by realities under which, their theories, they supposed, would be consistent. The problem with the applied political philosophy of both Barry and Kymlicka, however, has been selection bias. Aiming to inform the policy directives in practice, they explain and justify their position with examples that would best support their arguments. Kymlicka’s (1998) theory of multiculturalism in his work Finding Our
Way is generated from the case of Canada\textsuperscript{8} where state–minority relationships have been exceptionally peaceful (Choudhry 2007:623). Although he is positive that his model of multiculturalism can be safely exported to all national minorities with a ‘mature’ societal culture, he avoids providing much information on cases where his multiculturalism in different forms and degrees does not seem to be able to resolve violent conflicts or rectify the problems of inequality. Corsica in France and the Kurds in Turkey are the cases in point which I will later both expand upon and explain.

Similarly, as Arneson (2007:393) argued, Brian Barry ‘brushes aside empirical facts that are in fact problematic for the policies he wants to defend’. His fundamental principle of equality is merely considered to be the equality of opportunity. Without accounting for the inequality of outcome and its causes, Barry closes his eyes to what he does not want to see. As such, he neglects cases in which the recognition of cultural rights is necessary to guarantee a fair start for those who would have otherwise been put in a disadvantaged position. For instance, Brian Barry never considers that pupils from a minority background may need a bilingual education in school so that their cultural disadvantage is compensated. For him, ‘the on-going promotion of a minority language – that is, a language with less power and prestige in a given (national) context – is actively detrimental to the mobility of minority language speakers’ (May 2005:1560). He thinks that education in minority language only works against the minority’s equality of opportunity to participate in socio-economic life in the broader state. In defence of his argument that bilingual education decreases people’s potential to succeed in the majority language he gives the example of Puerto Rican students in the USA. ‘In New York, only 16 per cent of Puerto Rican students earned academic high school diplomas, qualifying them for admission to college – The situation was much the same for Puerto Ricans in Boston and Chicago’ (Barry

\textsuperscript{8} Kymlicka (2004 [a]:13) states that ‘I should acknowledge the right away that the origins of my reflections on these issues lie in Canada, and I suspect that the Canadian experience continues to shape and influence my theorizing, perhaps even in ways that I am unaware of’.
2001). He blames it on the bilingual education that hampers the prospects for Puerto Rican students in America.

The archetypal example of this thinking is best represented by the judge in Amarillo Texas who ordered a mother as a condition of keeping custody of her child not to speak Spanish to that child at home on the grounds that this was equivalent to a form of ‘child abuse’: If she starts [school] with the other children and cannot even speak the language that the teachers and others speak, and she’s a full-blooded American citizen, you’re abusing that child… Now get this straight: you start speaking English to that child, because if she doesn’t do good in school then I can remove her because it’s not in her best interests to be ignorant (May 2005: 1561).

In short, both ethno-centric multiculturalists and civic egalitarians look at the supportive cases and circumstances under which their propositions are verified. They do not consider ‘how the selection of cases for study on the basis of outcomes on the dependent variable biases conclusions’ (Geddes 1990: 131). For example, Kymlicka chooses cases where the model of multinational federation works with relative success; by glorifying these cases he concludes that national minorities with a ‘societal culture’ should follow the same route. In this proposition, he assumes that most ethno-national minorities that possess this societal culture want autonomy. He never looks at cases where ethno-nationalist parties are not widely supported by their ethnic constituency. ‘Apparent cause(s) that all the selected cases have in common may turn out to be just as common among cases in which the effect they were supposed to have caused has not occurred’ (Geddes 1990:149). Ignoring this, Kymlicka never controls for the cases where multiculturalism does not seem to be working despite having a ‘similar’ national minority. He never verifies the reliability of his argument in cases that contradict his explanation. Kymlicka then generalizes a false proposition about the causal relationship between his variables: the societal culture of the national minority generates minority consent to ethno-nationalist politics and the consent upon which the solution of autonomy is founded justifies the normative applicability of his multiculturalism theory.
Departing from this self-fulfilling prophecy and the method of using supportive cases and ideal contexts in the applied political philosophy of both Kymlicka and Barry, this thesis instead focuses on circumstances under which neither of these two approaches works. I anticipate that exploring why they do not work in some cases will sharpen our understanding of why and where they are more likely to work. In the above section, I proposed that the ideal contexts for multiculturalism and egalitarianism are not easily found. It became clear that the politics of recognition, as the multiculturalism argument promotes it, is incapable of dealing with past injustices when the national minority in question is politically divided. When the most minority members are not in agreement with the more radical and nationalist factions in their own group, the multiculturalism argument seems rather insufficient to address which segment of minority’s choice is legitimate and which one should be decisive. Multiculturalism that is based on a differentiation of cultures in the public domain is also problematic in cases where there is no clear cut division between the majority and the minority; where the equality of opportunity is the norm and minority members are more likely to enjoy it. This is observable in countries such as Turkey⁹, America¹⁰.

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⁹ In 2007 41% of South Eastern Kurds supported the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Justice and Development Party) instead of pro-Kurdish DTP (Demokratik Toplum partisi, Democratic Society Party (Schleifer 2009). This has also been supported by the Konda Research survey (2010) conducted with more than 10,000 people in 59 cities of Turkey. Findings reveal that only 16.8% of Kurds in the South East want the Local administration to be autonomous and make its own decisions. A similar trend has continued in the 2011 general election as well. The Kurdish nationalist party BDP claims rights to autonomy and state funded education in the Kurdish language in 15 East and South-East Anatolian cities with a significant Kurdish population. In the 2011 general election, however, the independent candidates supported by the BDP could only win the majority of the votes cast in 5 out of these 15 cities (Hurriyet: the 2011 General Election Results).

¹⁰ The Puerto Rican question remains a conundrum. These are a people who have been American citizens since 1917 and have been under American rule since 1898. Who, when asked what status they wanted for their future, in three referenda, over the course of the 20th Century, have not so far been able to give a definitive majority answer. Commonwealth status has always won, statehood has been gaining considerable ground, but it is far from the two thirds majority; while the choice for Independence has remained very low’ (Brau-Cebrian 2004).
and France. They all have adopted a conception of civic inclusive nationalism and assimilation was the only method they used in relation to their national minorities.

Egalitarianism, on the other hand, seems to be in a hard position in cases where there is a clear cut distinction between the minority and the majority; where the minority has a shared sense of belonging and political orientation when it comes to decisions about the future of their community. The actual problem is that although the decisions of the state are based on an objective of public legitimacy, ethnic groups may not have the sense of belonging to the same public as the majority in the country. This is the case in Canada, Belgium, and Spain. However this is also relevant for the above cases like Turkey and France where the radical factions of both the Kurdish and the Corsican minorities detach themselves from the majority along the lines of ethnicity. In these cases, the problem is more that the assimilation is forced for those who resist and that it is very likely to radicalize those who are affected by the policies of forced assimilation. Consequently, the radical-nationalist factions in these minorities do not share the same objectives with the state, and they do not even identify as belonging to the same public domain with the majority.

While the multiculturalism of Kymlicka is problematic in cases where the segmented forms of assimilation are prevalent and integration is the norm, as in France, America and Turkey, egalitarianism is problematic in cases where there is no consensus on the terms of the common good or the shared public realm.

1.2 Hypothesis Based on this preliminary observation this thesis argues that neither multiculturalism nor egalitarianism is likely to promote the liberal principles of equality, freedom and peace in cases where the national minority were consistently exposed to the integrationist ideal of a civic state nationalism and forced to assimilate

11 ‘A total of 114,970 voters cast their ballots on July 6 in a referendum that would allow the island of Corsica to exercise a degree of autonomy. The referendum asked voters whether they would accept a new territorial assembly and executive body that would manage more of the island’s affairs. Based on the results released by the French Ministry of the Interior, 57,180 voted against limited autonomy compared to the 54,990 who voted in favor of a new government structure’ (Election Guide–Country Profile: Corsica. 07.08.2003).
into the majority culture. In these cases, multiculturalism cannot cope with high levels of heterogeneity, while egalitarianism will not be accepted by minority members whom the forced assimilation has radicalized and who do not share the same public realm with the majority on practical and ideational levels.\textsuperscript{12}

1.3 Contextualization and Empirical Case Study Since the next step is to operationalize the argument between egalitarianism and multiculturalism and show that neither of these works in the above-mentioned context, I will use the case of the Kurds in Turkey. I am choosing the case of Turkey because the relationship between the Kurds and the state in Turkey has been portrayed to be representative of the above-mentioned context. Turkey is somewhat distinct in practicing both assertive assimilation and being relatively open to Muslim minorities that take part in the civic nation.

\textsuperscript{12} It should be clarified that neither multiculturalism nor egalitarianism is used as a generic concept in this thesis. The former of the two refers to Kymlicka’s approach of ethno-centric multiculturalism and the latter refers to Brian Barry’s difference blind egalitarianism. As David Miller (1995:131) suggests ‘multiculturalism implies some views about the nature of cultural differences and about how we should respond to them individually and politically. This means that there can be different versions of multiculturalism (and of the corresponding policies such as multicultural education), and the question is not whether one wants be a multiculturalist at all but the kind of multiculturalist one wants to be’. The primary task of this thesis is to show that ethno-centric multiculturalism put forward as a solution by Kymlicka for the problems of national minorities is a viable solution for only those ethnic groups whose members had been consistently differentiated by the state. In cases where neither difference-blind egalitarianism nor ethno-centric multiculturalism is able to promote the values of equality and freedom, a third way seems to be the most optimal solution. This third way is identified by Kukathas as ‘weak multiculturalism’. The weak multiculturalism ‘begins by accepting the reality and desirability of cultural diversity’ (Parekh 2000:340) yet it also puts emphasis on equality, individual rights and freedom of exit. Although not explicitly specified as weak multiculturalism the emphasis on these three points will also be explained with reference to the liberal culturalists in chapter 3 and to post-multiculturalism literature in chapter 5. Chapter 3 and 5 will discuss that ethno-centric multiculturalism, in its attempt to recognize authentic identities, has the potential to generate isolationism and polarization between ethnic groups while the difference blind egalitarianism is likely to cause excessive interventionism to achieve equality between people with disparate capacities. The weak multiculturalism stands against both isolationism and interventionism (Kukathas 2008) in doing so it makes sure that the liberal solution for the problems of national minorities will not be informed predominantly by concerns with either cultural freedom or individual equality.
The hypothesis in this study suggests that this context of forced assimilation radicalizes some segments in the group who now disagree vehemently with centralist state nationalism, yet at the same time the system incorporates those who voluntarily assimilated into the majority and provides a base for heterogeneous practices that cross ethnic boundaries. This disagreement about the way in which the nation is defined on the one hand, and the heterogeneity that the policies of assimilation and integration facilitated on the other, explains why neither multiculturalism nor egalitarianism is likely to be a solution for the problems of national minorities. In the literature there is a consensus that the Kurds have been exposed to the policies of assimilation and integration; and that those who resisted were forced to follow this line. This creates a context that is exactly in parallel to the one mentioned above. Tezcur (2009), Heper (2007), White (1995), Cornell (2001), Yegen (2011) all argued that the Kurdish community in Turkey is deeply divided in terms of their cultural practices and political orientations. While the multiculturalism that is based on an understanding of minorities as a monolithic category seems non-operational, there is also a huge literature on the ethnic conflict between the radical Kurds and the armed forces in Turkey that the stringent interpretation of egalitarianism cannot come to terms with (Akcam and Asal 2005, Kirisci and Winrow 1997, Barkey and Fuller 1998, Mango 2005, McDowall 2000, Olson 1989).

By focusing on this case study, I will inform the Kurdish question from these theoretical approaches. This thesis will explain principles deriving from both egalitarianism and multiculturalism, with concrete examples from the Kurdish case. It will also demonstrate that one-sided actors defending the principle of either cultural autonomy or egalitarian individuality unknowingly perpetuate the problems in Turkey. I will explain how the political actors and state policies defending the egalitarian position are violating the freedoms of radical nationalists, and how the nationalist minority parties, freedom fighters and ‘liberal’ multiculturalists defending the principle
of autonomy are so blind to the potential that their demands are in conflict with the individuals’ equality.

Two out of seven chapters in this study will be about this single case. This is because the illustration of how the core values supported by different theoretical perspectives were deployed by political actors would not be possible without deeply tracing the process in an historical context. Investigating the circumstances under which theoretical approaches are tested requires both historical and sociological analysis, which also enables me to take into consideration some other relevant factors that have not been considered so far. As I am mainly focusing on why current theoretical arguments that inform political institutions cannot promote equality, I should clearly show how these theoretical values were employed by political actors in discussing the issues in question, and how the policies representing these perspectives resulted in further inequalities, increased conflict, and led to the violation of freedoms. This observation requires a concentration on studying speeches, news, political party manifestos, and public opinion. Such an observation of complex relationships and materials in their historical order cannot be made by using any method other than the approach of process-tracing through an in-depth single case study.

1.4 Data Collection and Analysis To be able to contextualize the use of multiculturalism and egalitarian approaches, I have analysed the relevant articles of the Turkish Constitution, state legislation proposals, draft bills, decisions and discussions from sessions of the Turkish parliament. The European Union’s recommendations to Turkey and its reports on the progress were also investigated and considered. In respect to public opinion, there is a vast number of surveys that provide us with valuable information about people’s perceptions of their own identity and their different attitudes towards possible solutions in respect to the problems of the Kurds in Turkey. These survey findings are priceless in terms of the demographic
information they provide. These surveys also informed me about Kurds’ group cohesion, heterogeneity and societal culture. I have also visited the eastern provinces of Turkey, and have had open-ended discussions with people from different economic, educational, and religious backgrounds. I have consulted the digital archive of the newspaper *Hurriyet*, which chronologically lists relevant news, to detect the extent of group polarization, public tension and democratic initiatives. How radical minority members reacted to the weak multiculturalist policies was ascertained by comparing chronological lists of terrorists’ violent activities that followed the government’s ‘democratic’ initiatives. Needless to say, all these resources were used to assess the viability of the theoretical argumentation that required me to engage with the vast number of theory papers. Moreover, the context under which the theoretical argumentation takes place required me to read historical materials, which enabled me to explain precisely the problematic relationship between the Kurds and the state in Turkey.

1.5 A Comparative Perspective In order to comprehend a complex issue like this, an in-depth case-study research is essential; however, this study is supported by a variable-oriented comparative case study. My aim is not only to contextualize the theoretical argument and inform the solution in Turkey, but also to reflect back on the theories by looking at the reason why they have failed to induce the fundamental principles of liberalism in Turkey. As I explained it before the earlier studies in the field of applied political philosophy only followed one direction in a two-way street, in the sense that they only used theories to inform the solution of minority problems in specific cases. They have frequently indicated the difficulties with these theories in their examples, but they have hardly used their examples to generate an explanation as to where these theories can or cannot work. By looking at why the extremes of ethno-centric multiculturalism and difference-blind egalitarianism fail to work in Turkey, this empirical study will provide a basis to reflect back on these theories, explaining
where they can be applied and where they cannot be applied, how they might be refined.

Since the applicability of the current theoretical perspectives under a given context, clarified in the hypothesis, is tested over one single in-depth case study, making generalizations related to the applicability of this theory is difficult. Mindful of the limitations of this methodology, to be able to validate the hypothesis I have to look at other cases to illustrate the relationship between the variables of this study. Mindful of the fact that ‘the variable-oriented strategy is incapacitated by complex, conjectural causal arguments requiring the estimation of the effects of a large number of interaction terms or the division of a sample into many separate sub-samples’ (Ragin 1987:69), I will use this method in the final part to find further evidence for testing my argument and to allow a reasonable generalization about which theoretical perspective is more likely to be viable in which context.

1.6 Thesis Structure

Chapter 2: National Minorities under the Civic Assimilationist-Ethnic Exclusionist Dichotomy of State Nationalism.

Objective: The objective is to conceptualize the context under which I will question the applicability of the theoretical approaches. I will mainly talk about varieties of nationalism with reference to the civic-ethnic dichotomy, the methods used in these different constructions of the community, and their implications for national minorities. The conceptualization will be made in a manner that is sensitive to the layers of exclusion and different methods of assimilation, like forced assimilation and a passive neglect of cultural differences. I will conceptualize the nature of state nationalism depending on its relationship with the minorities in question because it is not possible to categorize an entire movement of nationalism as civic or ethnic.
Link to the Overall Research: As I will be arguing that the different types of national minorities can be accommodated best by different methods; this chapter enables me to clarify in what ways these minorities differ from each other depending on the different constructions of the community and the state in which they live. As the hypothesis includes the variables of civic state nationalism and assimilation I will conceptualize these phenomena.

Chapter 3: A Context-Sensitive Approach to Difference-Blind Egalitarianism and Ethnocentric Multiculturalism

Objective: The objective is to give a detailed theoretical background and my own argument in relation to the best way to accommodate national minorities. With this purpose I will explain Will Kymlicka’s multiculturalism and Brian Barry’s egalitarianism as theoretical approaches that seem to inform most states and international and supranational organizations in their efforts to find a liberal democratic solution for the problems of national minorities. Throughout the chapter, I will explain what they have to say for the solution of the national minorities problem; elaborate on the remaining problems with these theoretical approaches; and show why we still need a new insight to deal with problems of national minorities. In what follows, the chapter will focus on my argument with reference to the context that, I suggest, explains the failures of these specified theories.

Link to the Overall Research: The main aim of this research is to show that egalitarianism as described by Barry and multiculturalism as described by Kymlicka are not viable options in a certain context that has been dominated for a long time by the policies of forced assimilation and the integrationist ideal of civic state nationalism. This chapter will therefore allow me to explain both the substance of these theoretical approaches and my argument about their viability under the contexts I specified in the second chapter.
Chapter 4: Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma

Objective: The objective is to illustrate my argument with an in-depth single case study. For this reason, the historical context will be explained through depiction of the history of Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis Kurdish identity from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey up until the 2000’s. Both the heterogeneity problems with regard to the Kurds in Turkey and the absence of ideal contexts that are pre-conditions for the success of specified theoretical approaches will be explained as the result of this historical path of forced assimilation and civic state nationalism in Turkey.

Link to the Overall Research: This chapter will take on the conceptual discussion between civic and ethnic state nationalisms and their impacts on national minorities. Chapter III has discussed that the theories of multiculturalism and egalitarianism are at odds with cases that represent civic state nationalism and forced assimilation. This chapter will operationalize this context in the case of Turkey and familiarize the reader with its implications on Kurdish community in the country.

Chapter 5: When Multiculturalism Does not Fit. Kurds and Turkey in the 2000s

In this chapter I will apply the arguments from the second chapter to the contemporary relationship between the Kurds and the state in Turkey. I will demonstrate how egalitarianism and multiculturalism have been represented by political institutions and the political actors who appeal to these ideas, while discussing the problems in question in Turkey. I will also explain that the implementation of the given approaches—ethnocentric multiculturalism and difference blind egalitarianism—in Turkey results in further inequalities, violation of freedoms and
ethnic conflict under the conditions that the state nationalism created in Turkey as I have explained in chapter IV.

**Link to the Overall Research:** Why neither egalitarianism nor multiculturalism can promote liberal democracy in a context identified with historical assimilation and putatively civic nationalism will be explained by the inequalities that they create in Turkey. How the institutions and political actors, whose ideas seem to be correlated with the given theoretical perspectives, indeed exacerbate the problematic relationship between the Kurds and Turkey, and how this process results in further violations of freedom and equalities, will be explained under the guidance of the theoretical discussion that is given in the third chapter. This chapter therefore is intended to provide key empirical evidence for my hypothesis.

**Chapter 6: A Comparative Outlook: The Francophone in Canada, The Flemish in Belgium and the Muslim Turks in Greece**

**Objective:** The thesis argues that ethno-centric multiculturalism is problematic only in cases where the minority was previously exposed to the policies of forced assimilation and 'open' integrationist civic state nationalism at the same time. In order for my hypothesis to make sense, I will support it with evidence from the 'contrast spaces', which are the cases that lack either one or both of the factors (forced assimilationist policies or an integrationist ideal of civic nationalism) that define the context under which my hypothesis would maintain its validity. I will explain why it is easier to justify normatively – from a liberal egalitarian perspective – the rationale behind Kymlicka's multiculturalism in cases whose history characterizes an ethnic state nationalism or civic ideals with some layers of exclusion, but not forced assimilation. I will also suggest it is much easier and more possible to develop the societal culture of the minority in a manner that would not violate the freedoms of its own members in cases where forced assimilation was never aimed at absorbing the
minority into the mainstream community rather than intimidating or forcing the minority to leave.

**Link to the Overall Research:** Some contextual and theoretical explanations with respect to the contrast spaces will have been made briefly throughout the previous chapters, but this chapter will allow me both to demonstrate the consistency of my argument in the contrast space and to rule out some alternative explanations, like the necessity of the region’s economic development for multiculturalist policies to be both justified on a normative basis and to be proven practical. The hypothesis of this study is further supported by evidence from Turkey. The implementation of these theories is really not likely to promote the fundamental principles of liberalism they defend in Turkey where integrative assimilation is the only option and ethnicity has been discarded from public life and politics. This comparative part will then provide a basis to test this argument and see if multiculturalism is really able to work in contrast cases where ethnicity has historically been a relevant source of social and political division between the majority and the minority, unlike the intermingled Kurds and Turks in Turkey.

**Chapter 7: Conclusion**

This concluding part will have three functions: (1) summarizing the findings, (2) explaining theoretical and case specific contributions, and (3) projecting policy implications.
Chapter 2: Civic-Ethnic State Nationalisms and National Minorities

The aim of this chapter is to investigate how civic state nationalism and ethnic state nationalism have impacted upon national minorities in different ways. The broader aim of this thesis is to show that national minorities vary from each other in many respects and that their differences are of the utmost importance to political theorists who dwell on ‘the minorities problem’. This chapter argues it is impossible to understand different problems of national minorities without looking at different state nationalisms that they have experienced in the past. In what follows, I will therefore provide the reader with a rigorous discussion on this matter and contextualize the conditions of national minorities against which the theories of multiculturalism and egalitarianism will later be tested.

The study of nationalism can at times seem like a minefield. The factors that underlie its emergence as well as its passionate, often violent, expression have led scholars to seek out models and categories by which to simplify their task. The civic-ethnic distinction of nationalism has been the most important of these categories in
dealing with the problems of national minorities. It is so because the dominant state nationalism, and its conception of nationhood\textsuperscript{13} in the country, informs the prospects for its national minorities. It informs the state in its decisions as to how minorities will be treated: whether they should be assimilated or differentiated. As an outcome of this variation, problems with national minorities vary too. For some national minorities, the problem is discrimination and dispossession of equal citizenship rights and for some, the problem is that the state forces them to assimilate.

It is obvious that both civic nationalism and the ethnic nationalism raise particular problems. Scholars in the field, however, have refuted the dichotomy on conceptual, empirical and normative grounds. In what follows I will elaborate on how the dichotomy has been used; what the problems with its scholarly usage are; how it should be qualified further to make it analytically useful and, most importantly, why it is still crucial for the study of national minorities.

2.1 The Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy: False Opposites?

The differentiation’s origins can be traced back to the 1870s, as public controversy grew over the Alsace region of France. At the time, Germany disregarded the will of the Alsatian majority, which wanted to become citizens of France, by not accepting their wish on the basis of ‘language, blood and soil’ (Zimmer 2003:175). The French scholar Renan (1882) argued against this claim, maintaining ‘that the nation was essentially a voluntary community whose continued existence depended on a recurrent civic plebiscite’ (cited in Zimmer 2003:175). This provoked a reply from

\textsuperscript{13}As I will later explain in detail the state’s conception of nationhood is not a static notion neither does it stem from one particular understanding of what nation is. It is relational and changeable; and the relationship of the state with national minorities as Harris (2007: 46) suggested ‘are fluid and depend on many variables: the policies of the residence state, the political, historical and socio-economic position of the minority, the political environment in the ‘external’ homeland and international position of both’. However, no matter what the driving source for its occurrence, in its final formula, the relationship between the state and the national minority is always formed through either civic inclusive or ethnic exclusionist policies.
the German historian Friedrich Meinecke, who introduced the distinction between the cultural nation (*Kulturnation*) and the political nation (*Staatsnation*) (Alter 1994:8). In the classic version of the argument, the ethnic conception of the nation purports that national identity is inherited rather than a matter of choice. The nation is a fact of nature. The German romantic Johann Gottfried Herder argued that nationality is “‘as much a plant of nature as a family, only with more branches’” (Zimmer 2003:175). A German cannot *not* be German. A Turk cannot be German, whatever his grasp of the German tongue. Nationhood is less a matter of political voluntarism and more of organic determinism. Human will is subordinate to naturalistic criteria. Whatever one’s migratory movements, the individual remains ‘ineluctably, organically, a member of the community of birth, [being] for ever stamped by it’ (Smith 1998: 180).

Orthodoxy has it that the civic nation meanwhile derives its ‘legitimacy from its members’ voluntary subscription to a set of political principles and institutions’ (Zimmer 2003:175). Ignatieff, meanwhile, conceived of the civic nation as ‘a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values’ (Yack 1996:195). Ernest Renan (1882 [1995]) famously described the nation as ‘*un plebiscit de tous les jours*’ (a daily plebiscite), suggesting voluntary association is the cornerstone of national identity. According to this view, ‘man is the slave neither of his race, nor his language, nor his religion’, leaving ‘man, with his desires and his needs’ to determine his national belonging (Renan 1882 [1995]: 154). Those scholars who support the use of this model see civic nationalism as built upon the foundations laid down by the French Revolution; this nationalism comes after, or coincides with the development of a politically and territorially defined unit and has inclusive and voluntarist characteristics. However, whilst there is much evidence to distinguish nationalisms based on these categories, it is difficult to find one nation that exclusively embodies these prerequisites. The reason is conceptual and empirical.
2.1.1 The Conceptual Critique

First of all much significance is attached to common origin by some ethnicities; however, it is clear that the term suggests a much wider social identity. The concept of *ethnie*, according to Smith, for example, cannot be limited to its primordialascriptive characteristics like genealogy, blood and colour of skin. For him ‘ethnic community is a type of cultural collectivity... recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, language, customs and institutions’ (Smith 1991: 20). Brubaker (2004) similarly attempts to incorporate culture into the definition of ethnic nationalism, yet finds this endeavour problematic. If one stresses a common culture, a common language, for example, surely we are crossing the line into the territory of civic nationalism. The reason for this is that each civic nation, no matter how much it claims to be acultural or free from descent, is to some extent carrying cultural components and is therefore ethnic at the same time.

The term ‘civic’ has not been given any enduring meaning in the context of nations and nationalisms either. Scholars explaining this type of nationalism often highlight the important role of choice in the deciding of one’s nationality. Renan, as mentioned earlier, used the metaphor of a ‘daily plebiscite.’ He defined civic nation as the ‘voluntary association of culturally unmarked individuals’ (cited in Brubaker 2004:137). However, in the same work Renan also placed significance upon ‘possession in common of a rich legacy of memories’, suggesting that the choice is only open to those who were not ‘given’ this nation at birth and the one that does choose it will not possess this ‘rich legacy of memories’ (Brubaker 2004:138). Yet once one removes any idea of history, purporting a civic nationalism based upon a politically defined territory, it is difficult to attach the term ‘nationalism’ to whatever loyalty this fact evokes. Once one expands this to include common institutions,
culture, and a national language, such characteristics attached to ethnic nationalism are being trespassed upon.

In short the conceptual ambiguity inherent in the civic and ethnic distinction generates a problem to categorize nations along this dichotomy. Some claim that most modern nation states are civic because they allow the integration of those who are willing to adopt their political project. Some on the other hand may call them ethnic because their political element of nationhood is only communicated in the language of the dominant ethnicity and that the civic concept exhibits its own brand of ethnocentrism and superiority. So the irony is that in disputing a romantic (ethnic) explanation of nationalism, proponents of the civic model reflect a rose-tinted ideal-type as lofty as anything from the German romantic tradition. As Yack (1996: 198) suggested ‘a purely political and principled basis’ for national solidarity is the stuff of fairy-tales.

2.1.2 The Empirical Critique

Brubaker’s ‘case study’ of the ethnic-civic division in nationalisms is useful for moving beyond the theoretical grappling that is unavoidable when addressing this debate. For Brubaker (1992: 1-17), the French nation, ‘conceived in relation to the institutional and territorial frame of the state’ embodies ‘civic’ nationalism, whereas the German national sentiment which, unlike its French counterpart, emerged prior to the formation of its own nation-state, is a prime example of ‘ethnic’ nationalism. Brubaker attributes this to a cultural particularism engendered by German intellectuals in the nineteenth century in response to French universalism. Whereas French national feeling developed along with the emergence of the territorial state and its institutions, the German nation was conceived outside of the framework of the state, and eventually became opposed to its construction as it was (Brubaker 1992).
One suggests that a person’s nation is predetermined, the other, that it can be chosen. The assimilationist and inclusive policies of France, and the exclusive, particularistic approach of Germany can be seen in the historical immigration policies implemented in each state. Whereas France has an expansive definition of citizenship and a relatively open immigration policy that has been fervently preserved despite the growing impingement of the European Union on national sovereignty, Germany’s borders remain relatively closed, importantly, to non-German speaking people (Brubaker 1992).

However, whilst as a general principle this example of the civic-ethnic distinction is useful, it could be deemed over-simplistic. Empirical examples suggest that this dichotomy is unable to put Germany and France into respective categories of ethnic exclusion and civic inclusion. For example the apparent ‘civic’ French nation warranted the expulsion of supposed political opponents in the wake of the Revolution, whilst ‘enemies of the Reich’ were forced out of Bismarckian Germany for their apparent political threat, despite their shared ‘ethnicity’ with the elites (Brubaker 2004:142). John Breuilly also points out that major territorial and civic elements existed in mid-19th century Germany, while French nationalism often suppressed regional languages in favour of Parisian French (Smith 1998: 126).

Having considered the indefinite place of culture in each type of nationalism, by which both ethnic and civic values were used to exclude the opponents, Brubaker suggests that, ‘it is often impossible or at best problematic to characterize an entire state or an entire national movement simply as civic or ethnic’ (Brubaker 2004: 135).

It is clear that not even the terms, let alone the nations that they are supposed to describe, can be sufficiently pinpointed, and the line between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ cases remains blurred.

2.2. From Understanding Nations to Analysing Nationalisms
I argue that use of the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms proved to be limited only because the above critiques (both empirical and conceptual) have used the terms of nation and nationalism interchangeably and in a freewheeling fashion. Instead of focusing on nationalism, they all employed it in their attempts to define nationhood and nationality or categorize nations and nation-states. Based on these careless empirical and conceptual critiques many scholars found the dichotomy problematic and discredited it as a whole. Kuzio’s (2000) work ‘The Myth of Civic state: a critical survey of Hans Kohn’s framework for understanding nationalism’ and Yack’s (1996) ‘The Myth of the Civic Nation ’ are just two examples. It is misleading to analyse states and nations and then reach the conclusion that civic and ethnic nationalisms are false opposites. What follows will give three reasons to explain why this way of approaching the dichotomy obscures more than what it could have explained.

First, the nature and the definition of nation changes depending on what the social actors and proponents of the nationalist movement understand it to be. It changes depending on which element of identity is idealized and energized by the given nationalist movement. Nations may possess the ethno-cultural (Smith 1986, Hutchinson 2001), genealogical, objective (Shils 1957), civic territorial (Kohn 1944, Muller 2007), subjective imagined (Anderson 1983) and political plebiscitary (Renan 1882) elements at the same time. However, it is the ideology of nationalism that usually prioritizes one or more than one of these elements either to create (Gellner 1983) and redefine the nation or to attain and maintain its autonomy (Smith 2001) at some point in history. Therefore it is not nation but only the ideologies of nationalism prioritizing either civic or ethnic sources that can be placed along the civic-ethnic dichotomy.

Second, the idealization of one, or more than one, of these sources of nationhood cannot be used to describe the state’s relation to all groups in a generic sense. As the empirical evidence suggests, the same state can promote different
sources of nation in its relation to different groups. In relation to some groups, political elements of the nationhood and integration can be idealized by the state; and accordingly the method of assimilation is put into practice. In relation to some other groups, ethnic and organic sources of the nation are energized and those who do not fit can be excluded. In Greece the Muslim Turks have been excluded from the nation on the basis of ethnic and religious differences, whereas the Macedonians have been forced to assimilate (Kalampakou, 2009). The Kurds in Turkey were forced to assimilate in a consistent way whereas the non-Muslim Greeks and the Armenians were excluded from the nation, deported and decimated. At this point Zimmer’s approach appears to be far more rooted in the reality of a constantly altering political and social landscape, which the national movements must respond to; in comparison, the views of other scholars on the subject seems far too benign and one-dimensional. He demonstrates that depending on domestic and international circumstances, nations rely on different resources to express their nationhood, often drawing from both the civic and ethnic arsenal. Apparently, it is not the nations but only the individual relationships of the state with particular groups that can be categorized through these ethnic and civic lenses of nationhood.

Third, it is also etymologically confusing to use voluntary-organic signifiers of nationhood to make a distinction between ethnic-civic nationalisms. It is not nationalism, but nationality and citizenship that can be inherited in an organic way by birth or acquired by voluntarily choosing it. Different nationalisms, as I explained, have more to do with the idealization of different-organic and/or voluntary-characteristics of the nationality. It is a conscious choice to idealise something and follow it. Although the culture of birth is given, this by no means implies that the people of particular cultures will follow it as a political cause. Anti-Zionist Jews who challenge the legitimacy of Israel are not uncommon. The number of liberal and secular Jews is not small. Similarly half of the Corsicans identify more with the civic French nationality than their Corsican ethnicity (Sanchez 2008). Civic and ethnic
nationalisms are the outcomes of the nationalists’ conscious decision to idealize civic and ethnic elements of the nation. As such, neither can be understood as an organic phenomenon. Nationalism, like any other ‘ism’, is always chosen and so it does not make any sense to conceptualize the civic-ethnic nationalisms through the voluntary-organic dichotomy.

2.3 The Civic–Ethnic Dichotomy as an Independent Variable

What is it then, if it is not the voluntary-organic terminology and the political-cultural distinction that can be used to point out the dichotomy of civic–ethnic nationalisms? I argue that the most relevant dimension of the dichotomy is about the inclusive–assimilationist and exclusionist–differentialist methods that the civic and ethnic nationalisms have used respectively.

This is in agreement with Zimmer (2003: 181) who suggests that ‘what matters with regard to the construction of national identities is less what resources political actors draw upon than how they put these resources to practical use’ (my emphasis added). Each nation comes with its cultural baggage; as Yack (1996:196) notes, civic identities cannot escape the fact that they too are loaded with ‘cultural baggage’. However what matters more than culture is the way and direction in which it is used. In Keating’s words, ‘It is not the existence of language and culture policies, which determine whether a nationalism is ethnic or civic, but the uses made of language and culture, whether to build a civic nation or to practise ethnic exclusion’ (Keating 1996:10).

Brubaker (2004), however, highlights, whereas one basis of this differentiation is inclusivity versus exclusivity, whether a nation is built on civic or ethnic foundations, nationhood is, by definition, always exclusive to a degree. It is exclusive in the sense that the nation provides its members with opportunities that are not available to the members of other nations (Tamir 1993).
Civic nation is based on citizenship and on a global scale, citizenship is an immensely powerful instrument of social closure... citizenship is everywhere limited; even it is open, in principle, to persons regardless of ethnicity, this is small consolation to those excluded from citizenship, and even from the possibility of applying for citizenship, by being excluded from the territory of the state (Brubaker 2004:141).

Moreover, it is claimed that, when the opportunities are limited there will always be exclusion and the civic nationalism that is founded on the idealization of civic values will be used to exclude those who do not share them. Inclusion and assimilation in civic nationalism is a distant possibility to many immigrants. A contemporary example came from a recent study on civic nationalism and exclusion. Halikiopoulou, Mock and Vasilopoulo (2013) suggested that the radical right parties in Europe, at times of economic crisis, used the rhetoric of civic nationalism to exclude immigrants. The anti-immigrant propaganda of radical right parties has not been founded on the idea that immigrants are ethnically different. Instead they have been excluded from nationalist projects of the radical right parties on the grounds that Muslim immigrants, because of their religious culture, are unable to adopt the civic values of tolerance, equality and freedom. Surely this is not the first time that the inclusive characteristic of civic nationalism has been challenged. Similarly in America

the earliest leaders were opposed to immigration. George Washington fervently believed that immigration would have a deleterious effect on the country’s national character and should be discouraged because immigrants ‘retain the language, principles and habits (good or bad) which they bring with them.’ Similarly John Adams and Thomas Jefferson both opposed immigration from absolutist monarchies because they argued that such would bring their antidemocratic beliefs to the United States and undermine the country’s government (Motyl 2000:16)

The argument, that civic nationalism is exclusive, is flawed because of two reasons. First, Halikiopoulou, Mock and Vasilopoulo (2013) dwelling on this argument use an outdated conception of what civic nationalism is. Second, Brubaker uses the term ‘civic’ to examine if there is a civic state that is not exclusive; as such his focus is not on nationalism but on the state; based on his analysis on the state however, he makes a generalization about the nature of civic nationalism. He is, too, confused
about the unit of analysis in his inquiry. What follows is an elaboration of these two points.

First, as explained earlier, the character of nationalism is ‘less about what resources political actors draw upon than how they put these resources to practical use’ (Zimmer 2003: 181). Nationalisms of the above-mentioned radical right parties in Europe and conservative leaders in early America still fall in the category of ethnic nationalism no matter how they use the rhetoric of civic values. They still qualify as ethnic nationalists because their assumption is based on the belief that Islam is by its very nature incompatible with the civic values. In radical right party manifestos, which suggest that Muslims are unable to integrate, lies exactly the same exclusionist principle as ethnic primordialism according to which the boundaries between ethnocultural identities are authentic and fixed. What makes them ethnic nationalists is not the civic values they use to describe their own nation but this primordialist and essentialist mentality that freezes Islam and Muslims into particular traits, practices and values. This conservative and exclusionary logic becomes even clearer in manifestations of the radical right party of Le Pen in France who stated ‘it is we, the real French, who have our own right to be different, our own right to preserve our own ‘identity’ from unwanted admixture’ (Brubaker 2004: 122). At the cost of repeating myself, I should emphasize that whether a nationalism is civic or ethnic is not about if the nationalists use ethnic or civic elements of nationhood; it is about whether they use them to differentiate or assimilate people. The mentality of ethnic nationalism prevails and thrives as long as the civic-cultural, political values or ethnic or religious identities are used in a way that differentiates between people as if the boundaries between them are natural and cannot change. If this is a ‘civic zeitgeist’, one can safely assert that it amounts to nothing else than a ‘socially constructed idea of race’ (Eriksen 1993:7). Despite adopting a constructivist civic notion of nationality within a changing environment, for all practical purposes radical right wing parties assume this primordial mentality of exclusion. This can also be observed in many examples; the
exchange of Muslim and Orthodox populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923; Stalin's deportation of ethnic Germans in the USSR in 1941; the partition of British India on the basis of religious demographics in 1947; and the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 all reflect this mentality.

Second, it is not useful to make the argument that civic nationalism based on citizenship is always exclusive because citizenship, in practice, is an ‘instrument of social closure’ (Brubaker 2004:141). Such a generalization cannot account for the reality of some national minorities. The reason for this is methodological. The problem with Brubaker’s method is that his primary concern is to examine if there is any civic state that is not exclusive. His focus is still on the state and nation, not on nationalism. Although he is aware of the problem, Brubaker himself falls into the same trap as others who interchangeably used the terms of nation and nationalism in their analyses. As suggested earlier, it is not useful to employ the dichotomy when endeavouring to understand what the nations and the states are or what they are not. I argue that the dichotomy of civic-ethnic nationalism is useful only if it is used as an independent variable. This methodology as Wimmer (2008:981) argues ‘can lead us away from the somewhat romantic pre-occupation with the question what is the nation to the more analytical question of how to comparatively explain the varied manifestations and diverging consequences of nationalism’. From this perspective I argue that civic nationalism’s existence is a matter of whether or not it is utilized by the state or political actors. My aim is rather to focus on and understand how it impacts upon national minorities when it is used. Lacking this perspective, the simplistic conception of ‘exclusive citizenship in civic state’ cannot capture the problems of ethno-national minorities. The reason for this is that most minorities at stake are the groups who already survived the political or cultural citizenship barriers in their states of residence. National minorities are citizens of the ‘nation-state’ in which they reside yet they still remain differentiated and excluded at the margins of the majority or suffer from the integrationist policies of forced assimilation. The idea
that nationhood is based on citizenship and therefore inclusive is more than a symbolic 'consolation' to national minorities. It has been the reality and was even an obligation for some minorities such as the Kurds in Turkey, Corsicans in France and Aboriginal People in Canada.

2.4 National Minorities under Civic and Ethnic State Nationalisms

For national minorities, what makes the dichotomy between civic and ethnic state nationalisms relevant is the difference between their respective policies of forced integrationist assimilation on one hand and social-political exclusion-differentiation on the other. Actually this is an accepted difference with respect to the ways in which the state approaches its national minorities. However this time political theorists and post-modernist historians alike find the methodological difference between the civic policies of forced assimilation and ethnic policies of social exclusion-differentiation barely useful.

From the normative perspective, the phrase 'nationalism' has developed negative connotations over recent years. This is particularly emphasized due to the frequent occasions of ethnic discrimination and violence related to ethnic nationalism that took place throughout the twentieth century. The Holocaust in Germany, the East Timor genocide and Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia are just a few examples. Kymlicka (1995), however, suggests that instead of denoting one type of nationalism as negative and the other positive, neither implies that the society will take on a liberal form. Furthermore, Kreuzer (2006) in his 'Violent civic nationalism versus civil ethnic nationalism: Contrasting Indonesia and Malay(si)a' demonstrates that the ethnocentric bias does not always apply as in this case the ethnic nationalism of Malaysia was peaceful, whilst Indonesia was brutally and violently consolidated on the basis of a civic nationalism (Kreuzer 2006:141-142). Forced assimilation
deployed in France, as the prototype of a civic nation, was as violent and oppressive as the policies of discrimination and genocide in Germany. In French Algeria, which was once regarded as an indivisible part of France, the authorities suppressed Algerian independence movements with shocking brutality. It is fair to say that the French authorities would never have been able to get away with exerting the same brutality on ethnically French citizens (Kymlicka 1995: 233). For these reasons political theorists tend to think that it does not matter whether the source of injustice is forced assimilation or social exclusion as in both cases state nationalism is by no means tailored to generate equal citizenship or freedom. In both scenarios it is in contradiction with toleration, one of the foundational principles of liberalism that, for Kukathas (2008: 39), 'neither forbids outsiders from entering nor forces them to join'. As such, political theories are not concerned with, or intended to account for varying implications of the forced assimilationist or the exclusionist versions of state nationalism.

Post-modernist historians, too, ignore the distinction but from an empirical perspective. They argue that politicians selectively pick up on diverse historical symbols, and political values depending on what they need the most to legitimize their decisions, and mobilize the masses in the present. Within this dynamic process, one stream of nationalist movement or ideology in power replaces one another. None of them, it is asserted, stays in power long enough to shape and dominate the entirety of the state’s relation with one national minority on either a purely assimilationist or an exclusionist basis. Zimmer’s contention, for example, is that ‘particular definitions of national identity rise to prominence in particular historical situations where they serve to address specific political problems’ (Zimmer 2003:182). Similarly, Hutchinson (2001) points out that the emphasis on organic principles becomes ‘energised’ in times when the state seems vulnerable. Within this dynamic environment, minority members who were socially excluded from the nation in the past may get to be recognized as full members of the body politic and society later in time. ‘The centennial of the US
revolution in 1876 [for example] ignored blacks, new non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants, Native Americans, and women as not being part of the nation. The nineteenth century US republic had no room for Native Indian, black, Spanish or French culture’ (Kuzio 2000:16).\textsuperscript{14} American nationalism gradually proceeded in time to be an example of the most inclusive and assimilationist nationalisms in the world. Social exclusion, however, has never ceased to be a problem in the States. Although the USA has an inclusive definition of citizenship and a multicultural society, American nationalism remains to be defined in relation to other ethnic, national, cultural or ideological groups. USA citizens, who are also members of ethnic, cultural or even political groups, against which American nationalism justifies itself, became automatically subjected to the hostility of the rest of the American community (Schildkraut 2002). For instance, after 9/11, the radical Islamic groups’ terrorist attacks on the USA, Arab Americans were marginalised within the country (Jamal and Naber 2008). The State’s nationalist policies, which had targeted the Islamic radicalism abroad, consequently derogated the social status of its own domestic Muslim population in the country (Leonard 2002, Agathangelou 2005). As the example of American nationalism suggests, the subject of exclusion in a country is volatile and it is determined by the ever changing ‘us’ vs. ‘them,’ ‘self’ vs. ‘other’ structure. The ‘other’ is usually perceived as having an association with a historical rival, enemy or an external threat. This threat can be genuine or fabricated. Some groups are excluded even in the absence of a danger posed to the majority of the community. Non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants and blacks in 19th century America for example were excluded when they posed no real threat to the security of the country. Reasons for exclusion can be internal contestations, competition for economic resources; and cultural incompatibilities that are all open to change. It is the politics

that creates, maintains and promotes certain categories of minorities for various reasons.

I agree with both normative and empirical critiques. From the empirical perspective we should elaborate on the fluidity of political structures and expediency of the political actors. It is the political structure that creates minorities, initially excludes and then tries to integrate or assimilate them later when the power-relations shift or conditions change. Neither is it of any use to make a normative judgment between the policies of civic inclusion and ethnic exclusion. As the evidence supports, they both can be illiberal especially when the former is forcibly imposed on national minorities and when the latter is associated with negative discrimination or extermination.

I argue, however, that the dichotomy between social exclusion-differentiation and forced assimilation becomes much clearer, more consistent and, most importantly, useful when the focus is on its impact on national minorities that have been consistently affected by one of these two types of policies. Although nationalism is a dynamic phenomenon, I argue that some national minorities have been consistently exposed to the ethnically exclusionist, differentiating policies while some others to policies of assimilation. Just because nationalism is a dynamic phenomenon, as the post modernists have proclaimed, does not necessarily mean that it has always changed and that there is no such thing as continuing nationalism. As the following account will show, it is quite possible to trace some continuing nationalisms in the relationship between national minorities and the state.

As concerns the state nationalism and boundary making mechanisms that national minorities have experienced, we can identify three different categories. The first group is minorities who were forced to assimilate into the dominant ethnic core of the majority in the state. The Kurds in Turkey, the Corsicans and the Bretons in France, as well as the First nations in Canada and Native Americans are examples in this category. The prohibition of the use of minority languages in education
(Aboriginal people of Canada until the 1980s), punishment of the use of such languages in public as well as in the private sphere (Kurds in Turkey until 2000s), resettlement of minorities from their historical homelands, state policies that are completely blind to ethnic differences (Corsicans in France until the 1990s), are examples of the policies that minorities have experienced under this category. Such minorities became relatively mobile after the forcible displacement of their populations. Today for example, almost 40% of the Kurds in Turkey live across the country rather than their historical homeland. Having experienced state policies punishing the use of their languages in public, and banning ethnic associations, members of such minorities are usually found deprived of a sense of shared belonging or political orientation.

Today’s Aboriginal people in Canada have always been divided as Inuit, Metis, and First Nations (that fracture further into Beothuk, Maliseet, Innu Abenaki and Micmac along the Atlantic Coast; Tlingit, Slavey, Tutchone and Tli Cho Athapaskan speaking people in the Northwest; Blackfoot, Kainai, Sarcee and Northern Peigan in the plains; the Cree and Chipewyan in the Northern Woodlands; the Anishinaabe, Algonquin, Iroquois and Wyandot around the Great Lakes; and the Haida Salish, Kwakiutl, Nuu-chah-nulth, Nisga’a and Gitxsan along the Pacific Coast) (Morrison and Wilson 1986). In these cases, the state has refused to use ethnicity to draw a boundary between the majority and the minority. Their religious particularities, subcultures and class divisions remained to be more relevant than what could otherwise have developed to become their unified ethnie. The Indians’ initial lack of unity had nothing to do with government policy. The thesis argues the reason they could not eventually develop a shared sense of common ethnic identity can partially be explained by their never having had the opportunity to do so. Canada has not genuinely empowered the Indians to institutionalize their culture. The prohibition of Aboriginal languages in education until the early 1980s was a barrier to their cultural institutionalization. In the light of this information it would be wrong to argue that the
government policies have had no role in their lack of unity. (The same argument also applies to the Kurds in Turkey).

In most cases, under this category, state nationalism has long denied and ignored minorities. It has been suggested by scholars such as Horowitz (1985) and Gurr (1993) that forced assimilation is a source of radicalization and this radicalization has typically translated into politics, if not violence. While we have nationalistic groups who turned radical after having been forced to assimilate, the same system also accommodates the people who voluntarily assimilate. In such cases most national minority members require the rectification of economic and social inequalities more than the political rights that their radical fellows think primarily derive from ethnicity.\textsuperscript{15} It seems to be a hard case to recognize the national minority when it is deeply fragmented in cultural, economic and political respects. In such cases there are so many possibilities and options for the minority members to benefit from in the society. There are evidently some minority members who are primarily concerned with their material well-being and they are convinced that only assimilation into the majority can guarantee this. Some other minority members take pride in, or benefit from, their cultural distinctiveness and resist assimilation for various reasons. In such cases it remains a question of whether the economic opportunities of voluntarily assimilating groups or cultural freedoms of ethno-nationalists who resisted the assimilation should rule over the other when the two are in conflict about the future of their community. What demands are legitimate and who should be listened to?

The persistence of cultural, political and social boundaries between ethnic groups, on the other hand, is stronger and more solid in cases where and when the integrationist assimilation has not been an option for the members of national minorities. This second group comprises minorities who survived the barriers of

\textsuperscript{15} Self-government rights of Aboriginal people in Canada, for example, is in the form of land rights and exemptions from seasonal limitations to commercial activities that are associated with their culture such as fishing and lumbering. Similarly the majority of Kurds in Turkey according to a research survey done in 2010 by Konda, think that their problem and concomitant demands are mostly economic. See Chapter 5 pp.178-183.
exclusionary citizenship regimes yet have been socially and politically excluded from the majority on a consistent basis. The reader should be reminded that assimilation does not always mean inclusion. Many ethnic exclusionists are also assimilationist even as they continue to exclude. Uyghur Turks in China (Becquelin 2004), Muslim Turks in Greece (Alexandris 2003), non-Muslims in Turkey (Heper 2007), Indian Tamils of Sri Lanka (Edrisinha 2005), and Hungarians in Slovakia (Gyurcsik and Satterwhite 1996) are examples of this category. Although they experienced policies of assimilation in the sense that they were not allowed to use their own languages in most public spheres, they were never accepted as members of society in the fullest sense of the term. Discrimination against these groups was historically evident in job applications, university admissions and class divisions. In such cases, differentiated and marginalized, the minority members are positioned against the majority along ethnic lines. Although internal divisions remain, members of such minorities have typically united also as a political group around this ethnic line. As the first category suggested this was not the case for minorities who had an option to assimilate, cross the ethno-cultural boundaries and fully integrate into the majority.

The third group consists of national minorities who have been given the options to assimilate and integrate into the majority, or remain to live in their own vernacular through special arrangements such as language rights and federalism. Quebecers in Canada and Flemish in Belgium are examples of this category. Although assimilation was an option the minority has never been forced to assimilate like those in the first category were. Kymlicka suggests that the ‘British in Canada stripped the Quebecers of their French language rights and institutions, and redrew political boundaries so that the Quebecers did not form a majority in any province’ (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001:25). This reductionist account of Canadian history, while true to some extent especially between 1840 and 1867, omits a very important fact that ‘although the Canadian Model continued to evolve well into the 1980s, many of its key features had been in place since the mid-nineteenth century’ (Choudhry
French culture was never thought to be a part of English Canadian culture, whereas the Kurdish culture was believed to have originated in ancient Turkic history. On the contrary, historical rivalry and enmity between French and English since the Battle of Hastings in 1066, has echoed throughout history and the boundary between the two communities has persisted in Canada. The French-speaking people have never been exposed to the policies of assimilation in the way that Aboriginal people were forced to assimilate to English culture in Canada (Battiste and Henderson 2000). The 1876 Indian Act that banned the use of Aboriginal languages in education has never applied to the Francophone. They have always had the right, albeit limited, to use their language in a whole range of activities including education and administration. The idea of being the same was not evident in Canada, there was always the split English and French. For these, the historical relationship between Francophone and British in Canada can be defined as ‘domination’ and not the ‘forced assimilation’ as we have seen in the first category.

2.5 What Does It Have to Do With Political Theory?

The dichotomy between civic-inclusion and ethnic-exclusion is an important analytical tool to understand why and how this variation exists between national minorities. Understanding of this variation as a reality becomes even more important, insofar as the concern is about what to do with national minorities whose characteristics vary from each other depending on policies that they have experienced. In the first group

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16 The details of the historical relationship between Francophones and the state in Canada can be found in the sixth chapter of this study. Similarly the information regarding the other examples in this part of the study can be found in later chapters. This only is to familiarize the reader with typologies of national minorities along the lines of the civic assimilationist and ethnic differentialist state nationalisms that they experienced.

17 For a detailed account of assimilationist policies imposed on Aboriginal people of Canada, see Woods (2012), The Anglican Church of Canada and the Indian Residential Schools: A meaning Centered Analysis of the Long Road to Apology, Doctoral thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics.
there are national minorities like the Francophone in Canada and the Flemish in Belgium that have been accommodated by federalism and language rights for a long time. They have institutional facilities to maintain a modern education, economic networks, and job opportunities in their own language. In the second group there are national minorities like Muslim Turks in Greece, Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Hungarians in Slovakia. Compared to Quebec and Flanders, economic networks of the national minorities in this second group are relatively backward because of institutional barriers and discriminatory policies. Nevertheless this second group of minorities, similarly to ones in the first group, have a shared sense of discrimination against their ethnic-religious group members and now asking to be granted autonomy and allowed to use their own language in all spheres of public life with no further hindrance or question.

In the third group, differently from the first and the second groups, there are national minorities who were forced to assimilate and integrate. Their radical factions have similar demands as those minorities that have been differentiated and discriminated against in the first and second group. The majority of such minorities in the third group however, choose to opt into the language of the majority in the state where everyone is accepted to be undifferentiated citizens. Corsicans in France and Kurds in Turkey are such minorities whose members are divided as to whether to vote for ethnic nationalist factions within their ethno-cultural community or integrate in the mainstream where opportunities are far too many to turn back.

It is hardly possible to approach all these different national minorities in a standard way. In contemporary political theory liberal multiculturalism, however, has come to inform the liberal paradigm. It has focused on the possibility of solving the problems of all national minorities through ethno-national autonomy mechanisms like federalism and the devolution of power, as we have respectively seen in Canada and the UK. Based on these examples it is suggested that minorities should be given self-government rights and territorial autonomy within the state, provided that they
comprise the majority in their historical homelands and they are not on the road of assimilation (Kymlicka 1995). Kymlicka suggests that indigenous people and ‘national minorities have typically responded to majority-nation building by seeking greater autonomy which they use to engage in their own competing nation-building, so as to protect and diffuse their societal culture throughout their traditional territory’ (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001: 23) This line of argument was also suggested by Brubaker (2006) who thinks that the policies of forced assimilation ‘rarely work, they are indeed more likely to strengthen than to erode differences, by provoking a reactive mobilization against such assimilatory pressures’ (Brubaker 2004: 119). Furthermore, citing Smith (1993: 131) and Connor (1972: 350-51) Kymlicka suggests that ‘whenever and however a national identity is forged, once established, it becomes immensely difficult, if not impossible, (short of total genocide) to eradicate’ (Kymlicka 2004: 26).

This line of argument is, however, at odds with the conditions of national minorities who were subjected to the state’s assimilationist policies and integrationist ideal of the civic state nationalism for a long time. The multiculturalism theorists are unable to respond to the heterogeneity of minorities such as Kurds and Corsicans. Neither can they ‘explain how millions of Kurdish speaking citizens [in Turkey] voluntarily adopt Turkish identity and avoid any identification with Kurdish nationalism’ (Tezcur 2009: 4).

I argue that Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism is unable to explain these cases for two reasons. Both of these reasons, I argue, stem from the fact that Kymlicka and likeminded scholars neglect the categorization of national minorities under the dichotomy of civic assimilationist and ethnic exclusionist state nationalisms.

First of all, in his interpretation of Smith (1991), Kymlicka (2004) mistakenly treats national identity independently from its agents whose beliefs decisions and interests are actually open to change with indefinite possibilities. Furthermore, the national minority is not one person who can make individual decisions for her\himself.
It is a collection of people whose interests may lie in different causes. Moreover, as Hutchinson (1987) suggested, cultural 'national identity' does not necessarily translate into the kind of nationalism that Gellner (1983:1) defines is 'primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'. For these reasons this picture of national minority-state relation is too simplistic to capture the complexity of a national minority group some members of which may choose to resist, while some others voluntarily assimilate. This is evident in many examples, such as Corsicans in France (Sanchez 2008), the Kurds in Turkey (Tezcur 2009), and the Scottish in the UK (Keating 2001). Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism presumes that ethno-cultural distinctiveness is all that matters in defining and catalysing the political nationalist aspirations of minorities. He does not attempt to focus on various circumstances under which ethnic cultures are translated into the politics of ethno-nationalism and supported by masses in a consistent manner (Reitz 2009:2). I argue that there is nothing inherently deterministic in the culture informing its members to make certain political decisions. What people make of their culture varies depending on options as to what they can do with it, and those options have been dominantly limited to the decisions of the modern state, which is still the ultimate arbiter in world politics. It is, therefore, important to examine the nuanced state policies and options that the state makes available to national minorities before making overarching presumptions about the reactions of national minorities to the state’s nation building project.

Second, this account of Kymlicka and other like-minded scholars such as Young (1990) and Connor (1972) is also problematic in the sense that they define assimilation as the equivalent of cultural annihilation. Young (1990: 179) states that the ‘norm of the homogenous public is oppressive… [as] it requires that persons transform their sense of identity in order to assimilate. Self-annihilation is an unreasonable and unjust requirement of citizenship.’ Their interpretation is based on an assumption that for people to become American they have to stop being Spanish,
Italian or Arabic. The difference between additive assimilation and absorptive assimilation is absent from their analysis. (Zolberg 1997, Baubock 1998: 43, Barry 2001: 81). The first category refers to the assimilation into a culture while preserving one’s own culture of birth. The latter implies the kind of assimilation that requires one to give up on his or her culture of birth in order to acquire a new one. While the first category is especially relevant to linguistic minorities who can develop bilingual identities, the latter is more about the mutually exclusive groups of religious minorities who cannot be both Muslim and Christian, or Protestant and Catholic at the same time. When the assimilation is additive, as is usually the case with linguistic minorities, it is hard for multiculturalism approach to locate individuals at one side of the line between resistance and assimilation. In such cases people may resist to preserve their native culture yet voluntarily assimilate into another at the same time. So portraying the reaction of most national minorities to assimilation as resistance does not represent the reality in such cases where boundaries are permeable and assimilation is additive. Some members of the minority choose to embrace assimilation like Bretons in France; some resist against assimilation in any form and generate concomitant conflict as illustrated by radical Chechens in Russia; and some others develop hyphenated national identities like British Scots, Latino Americans or Catalans in Spain. At this point the dichotomy of civic and ethnic state nationalisms becomes important in terms of the options that they make available to national minorities. When assimilation was not an option, when it was not aimed at integration, or when differentiation between ethnic groups has strongly persisted and facilitated discrimination in social life, national minorities did not have many options other than choosing to opt into their own ethno-national communities. The policies of segregation, discrimination, and differentiation along ethnic lines seem to be the most relevant sources of motivation for people to develop a shared sense of belonging and

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18 For example, ‘In an opinion survey taken in Catalonia in 1982, 26% of the population considered itself Catalan; 40% felt dual Catalan-Spanish identity; and 30% felt primarily Spanish’ (Miller 1995:117).
claim ethno-national autonomy. Wimmer, drawing on Weber, stated that ‘ethnic group formation is a process of social closure [and that] high degrees of closure imply that the boundary cannot be easily crossed’ (Wimmer 2008:977). This view is relevant to explain why differentiation and segregation increase support for ethno-nationalism. I will elaborate on this later in Chapter VI. Before that, I will point out the difficulty with multiculturalism in cases where it is hard to find a monolithic group of national minority whose majority support the political autonomy solution as seen in Canada or Belgium (Keating 2001). In such cases of heterogeneity, there is a problem in representing a deeply politically divided minority. As such, multiculturalism theory that is primarily concerned with minority demands lacks the capacity to answer the following questions. What should the state do if members of such minorities are not in agreement about what political form that this recognition of their culture should take? What happens to the demands of ethno-nationalist factions of those minorities in countries where the integration is the norm for the majority within the minority? Should the nation state be reformulated and the national minority recognized in a way to create a solution like Québec where French is the compulsory medium of instruction for children of Francophone families? Should the solution resemble more the case of Catalan where education is bilingual? Should it be like Scotland where the compulsory language of education in school is English and Gaelic is only an optional course? The next chapter will offer a theoretical discussion which deals with these problems.

2.6 Conclusion

The significance of this chapter for the thesis is that it defines the varieties of national minorities that emerge depending on the state policies they have experienced in the past. As the thesis argues, the applicability of the theories of multiculturalism and egalitarianism is contextual, this chapter fulfilled the task of defining what these
varying contexts are. It is the convention in the literature that civic and ethnic nationalisms are false opposites for the two have so much in common, they both are illiberal, political and cultural at the same time. At the same time however, it is also true that all sub-state groups have become minorities through the lenses of either ethnic or civic state nationalisms. Some were assimilated and some were differentiated or discriminated against. This chapter argued that all the criticisms directed towards the dichotomy are concerned with the definition of what nation is or what states can be categorized through this dichotomy. Departing from this methodology this chapter used nationalism as an independent variable and analysed its impacts on national minorities. In this chapter the further qualification of the terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’, and their association with nationalism has been made with the help of earlier critiques. I concluded that the dichotomy is useful only if the three conditions are satisfied: 1) only when it is used as an independent variable not to understand whether a nationalism is political, cultural, voluntary or liberal; 2) only when the ethnic nationalism is associated with discriminatory exclusion and policies of differentiation, whilst the civic is associated with integrationist ideal and the practices of forced assimilation; and 3) when it is used to understand its impacts on national minorities and not to label the state itself, which practices different policies in relation to individual minorities. In the rest of the thesis when I use the terms civic or ethnic state nationalism it will only refer to the phenomenon that is founded on these three conditions outlined above. Neither will imply a normative presupposition. Although it is not possible to create a normative hierarchy between civic and ethnic nationalisms, they have analytical power to explain why some liberal approaches are very problematic in some cases but not in others. The thesis argues that Kymlicka’s approach is problematic only among the ‘open’ subtype of the civic nationalist side of the dichotomy. Before the thesis explains this relationship thoroughly, I will first explain what particular approaches are in place to solve these varying problems of national minorities.
Chapter 3: A Context-Sensitive Approach to Egalitarianism and Multiculturalism

The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background of the liberal approaches of multiculturalism and egalitarianism that inform solutions for national minorities in real world cases. The previous chapter has contextualized the problem and explained the varieties with respect to its occurrence in different cases. The variety of conditions and problems raise the question of whether it is possible to have one solution that fits in all cases. The chapter will first familiarize the reader with what the theories of multiculturalism and egalitarianism have to offer for the solving national minority problems; I then situate my argument about the applicability of these two approaches in different contexts. The context-sensitive argument will examine which approach is more likely to correspond to the conditions of different types of national minorities. To this end, I will first explain the view of multiculturalism and its critique of classical liberalism, which is more associated with the egalitarian
perspective. Later on, I will explain the egalitarian perspective and its critique of multiculturalism. In what follows, I will argue that the inability of these two approaches to promote the principles of equality peace and freedom in some cases mainly stems from the absence of ideal contexts. In the last part of this chapter I will show that the absence of these ideal contexts is strongly associated with historical assimilation of minorities that had to live under a civic state nationalism. Therefore I will suggest that it is not rational to expect that either would offer mechanisms that would be able to democratically settle the problems of national minorities who have been marginalized by the policies of forced assimilation in civic state building.

3.1 Theoretical Background

3.1.1 Political Liberalism and Civic Nationalism

The solution of minority problems has been seen in attempts to enhance the inclusiveness of polities that have so far excluded minorities from the body politic and public life on the basis of their race, religion, gender, language or cultural practices.

In order to raise the inclusive nature of the body politics, civic nationalism has been idealized. Hans Kohn (1944) who defined this as the nationalism in which ‘political reality was based on individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism and the government was considered to be dependent upon trust from freely consenting citizens’ (Kuzio 2000:2-3). From the same perspective Michael Ignatieff (1993) and William Pfaff (1993) saw liberalism compatible with only this type of civic nationalism. From the same perspective political theorists like Muller (2007) and Habermas (1998), who called themselves constitutional patriots, defended that the criteria upon which
political legitimacy is based should be different from ethno-cultural affiliations, ascriptive characteristics and descent. This means that the state should acknowledge and respect all individuals as citizens, no matter what their ethnic identity is, so long as they commit to the civic values of the shared political community. Similarly, in his *Political Liberalism*, Rawls (1993) argued that those civic values, upon which the construction of the body politic is to be based in a liberal state, should stem from and evolve around the concepts of overlapping consensus and public reason on common goods that will be considered in the decision-making process.

### 3.1.2 Multicultural critique of Political Liberalism and Civic nationalism

The Multiculturalist approach questions if there is such a common good or whether it is possible to reach such an overlapping consensus through the public reason as Rawls assumed. Starting from this point the multicultural critique of political liberalism, and of so-called civic nationalism, revolves around four main points.

First, Kozma (2006) drawing on Raz and Margalit’s (1990) argument, indicates that liberalism is arrogant as ‘it presumes the perpetual inclusion of minority nationals in an on-going civic project that is not their own. By couching their theories in the language of social contract theory, political liberals act as if there is a universal agreement to build an ideal state, and so the inclusion of minority nations in this project is unproblematic’ (Kozma 2006: 2).

Second, in deeply diverse societies, where the conflicting interests of the groups in the public discourse leave no room for finding a common good, Kohn’s civic nationalism, Habermas’ constitutional patriotism and Rawls’ political liberalism can only be an elusive ideal which is hardly possible to realize. Claims of national minorities over the body politic and their unending demand for autonomy are clear indicators of the impracticality of an overlapping consensus in civic nationalism. In the
application of political liberalism to the real world this consensus was taken for granted, national minorities were never asked if they had really wanted to be part of this consensus. This is why they have been problematic from the outset of civic projects and will remain so, unless their desired will is taken into consideration.

Third, scholars like Gutmann (1992) and Young (1990) have also pointed out the elusiveness of this ideal by referring to the on-going correlation between descent and the socio-economically undermined status of minorities in putatively civic nation states. Moral membership in the community and legal citizenship are two different concepts that need to be carefully elaborated. Tunisians who became citizens of France but not French (Bassino and Dormois 2006), Pakistani and Bangladeshi who became British by citizenship but not English, mostly remain in the lowest income groups in these countries (London Poverty Report 2009). For the proponents of liberal culturalism, the role of culture in making use of the available options is important. The unfair start of minority pupils at schools has a great impact on their motivation and successes for their future life. Moral membership of a different culture may prevent group members from making use of the available options that seem to be more compatible with the culture of dominant groups.

Fourth, Brubaker (2004), Kymlicka (1989), Young (1995), Taylor (1992) and some others argued that Kohn’s (1944) idealization of civic Western nationalism as opposed to the exclusive Eastern ethnic nationalism does not make any sense since civic nationalism, just like the ethnic one, employed the ‘cultural heritage of dominant ethnic core’ (Smith 1986). As a consequence, it has not been free of unegalitarian outcomes for cultural ethnies who were not in the dominant position. These scholars emphasized that ‘Kohn’s division of nationalism into two groups idealises nationalism in the West as a community that was always fully inclusive of all social and ethnic groups’ (Kuzio 2000:7). When the issue was about the use of language in recreating a common national identity, even the nations who claimed to be civic and inclusive could not avoid choosing the official language that was to be used by its subjects in
relation to the state. France used French to create a common national identity and the consciousness among Corsican and Breton peoples, whose mother language were thereby oppressed (Jacob and Gordon 1985). It was also the case in Turkey. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the administrative power was concentrated in the hands of an elite group who identified the new Turkish nationality on the basis of its citizenship and commitment to the liberal political values of the new state. Turkish was declared as the only official language of the country and all citizens, no matter if they came from different linguistic backgrounds like Kurdish or Arabic, have since been required to use Turkish in public discourse (Kushner 1977, Canefe 2002). Even American nationalism, known to be the most inclusive and civic, forced non-English speaking Hispanic people to learn English. Reactionary Puerto Rican nationalism (Guerra 1998) is proof of how the imposition of a dominant culture on national minorities was evident even in the most ideal example of civic nationalism as described by Ignatieff (1993), Kohn (1944) and Pfaff (1993). That said, assimilation has been the most problematic aspect of the civic nationalism and political liberalism, which requires every single person to learn and use the official language as the common tool of communication in the public sphere.

In the presence of distinct cultural traditions defining the different groups in one territory, as is the case in the real world, the nation building, according to Smith, has become a process that ‘welded together different peoples into a single community based on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic core’ (Smith 1991:68). Therefore most civic forms of nationalism indeed employed the culture of the dominant ethnic core to unite people around a common sense of belonging. Maybe not the ideal goal of creating the shared sense of belonging, but the tool–i.e. the culture of the dominant ethnic core employed to this end–was excluding for minorities whose cultural practices diverge.
3.1.3 Multiculturalism as Liberal Culturalism

In response to the internal inconsistencies and inegalitarian outcomes of allegedly inclusive civic trajectories that I discussed above, Kymlicka and some other scholars such as Iris Young (1990, 1995), Charles Taylor (1992), and Bikhu Parekh (2000) have claimed that cultural groups should be treated differently and given special rights to remedy their disadvantaged position in the communities in which they live. Young argued that ‘inclusion and participation … in full citizenship remains the goal but ‘differentiated citizenship’ now presents itself as a better route to that goal than equal treatment for all groups…Equality, defined as the (equal) participation and inclusion of all groups in institutions and positions is sometimes better served by differential treatment’ (Young 1995:176,195). Parekh explained the rationale behind multiculturalism. He argued that providing people with undifferentiated rights and duties cannot achieve equality of opportunity in any real sense. For him ‘opportunity should be understood as subject-dependent and a facility, a resource, or a course of action is just a mute and passive possibility and not an opportunity for an individual if she lacks the capacity, the cultural disposition, or the necessary knowledge and resources to take advantage of it’ (Parekh 2000:241). From this perspective it does not mean anything to have the opportunity if their cultural practices prevent them from making use of these opportunities. In civic polities, people of a particular identity are not systematically prevented from being entitled to the same opportunities with everyone else. The context in which these opportunities are offered, however, indirectly causes discrimination between people who are fully capable of participating in this context on the one hand and those who have cultural preservations that put them off on the other. For example, Sikhs who have the equal right to apply for construction work indeed are not equally treated if the construction job requires them to wear a helmet instead of the turban, the use of which is a part of their cultural practice. Similarly females who are required by their belief to wear the hijab are not
equal and free in France where the education system requires girls to remove their hijab. Again, in putatively civic nations, no matter how the same opportunities are offered, linguistic minorities cannot take advantage of these opportunities without leaving their own language behind, at least while participating in the public sphere, where everyone is required to use the official language of the state.

On the face of this argument the liberal culturalists’ position seems to be informed by the positive and negative freedom distinction that Isaiah Berlin made in his work Two Concepts of Liberty (1958). In his distinction, negative freedom refers to the absence of coercion while positive freedom implies an active effort to enable the individuals’ capability of using the freedom (MacCallum 1967). From the view of scholars who adopt the latter as a more inclusive definition of liberty, those who lack the capacity to take advantage of opportunities are not free even in the absence of any coercion. Adopting this view Parekh, and like-minded colleagues like Young and Kymlicka, defend their multiculturalism by which the ‘understanding of freedom is repositioned from negative to positive, that is, from protecting against coercion to providing the context of autonomy’ (Silian 2002:36).

There is this common rationale in the minds of scholars who label themselves multiculturalists. Nevertheless multiculturalism, understood as liberal culturalism, is not a unified perspective and the proponents of it differ from each other on some very important points. The most important aspect of all is which groups should be entitled to what types of differentiated rights. ‘Who is going to get what rights?’ is an important question that liberal culturalists answer differently.

According to this view, an extensive variety of state measures can be devised to facilitate the values and distinct ways of life of such groups. For example, the ‘group’s members might be exempted from certain laws, or the group’s leadership might be awarded some degree of autonomous jurisdiction over the group’s members’ (Shachar 2000:65). Modood (2007), for instance, argues that multiculturalism should
be concerned with any group of people with a ‘stigmatized or marginalized’ identity.

On the other hand Kymlicka’s multiculturalism has a monistic notion of group or culture, meaning that the cultural context that is capable of generating self-respect and dignity would be found only in the societal culture ‘which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres’ (Kymlicka 1995:76). The societal culture mainly refers to institutional completeness and the common economy, and on these grounds resembles Smith’s (2001) definition of nation. Kymlicka valued ethno-national identities with reference to their capacity to provide their members with life opportunities; and he justifies his over-emphasis on societal culture by arguing that it is the most comprehensive context that can offer opportunities for people and ultimately all other non-societal cultures themselves are already and inevitably reliant on the existence of a wider societal culture (Watson 2009).

3.1.4 Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism and Its Flaws

At this point, Kymlicka differs not only from cosmopolitan scholars like Jeremy Waldron (1992) who positioned against ethnic boundaries, but also from his liberal culturalist colleagues, like Modood and Young, who saw not only national minorities, but also other marginalized cultural identity groups, as the ones that should be entitled to differentiated rights. One more important critique of Kymlicka came from Joseph Carens (2000), who critiqued his argument with the following statement:

_19_ Smith revised his perspective and dropped the common economy from his definition of nation. Nevertheless, Kymlicka still seems to be standing very close to the ethno-symbolists’ perspective while bringing the definition of nation much closer to that of ethnie. For him nations are reflection of _ethnies_ more than they are of anything else; the modernist project of constructing civic nations on political values beyond ethnicity is a fallacy; yet ethnically defined communities can be civic as long as they do not close their doors to strangers. I will later explore this view with reference to the concept of ‘liberal ethnicity’ that was defined by Kaufmann (2000).
Instead of claiming (as is plausible) that the language and national culture of the place where one lives will normally play an important role in shaping the sorts of choices one faces, Kymlicka presents societal culture as if it were the sole and comprehensive determinant of one’s context of choice. Societal culture is what makes freedom possible (Carens 2000: 69).

Having focused on national minorities, Kymlicka turned out to be defending particularly the rights of ethno cultural groups within his broader argument for multiculturalism.

Within the framework of this perspective, Kymlicka defined two different categories of minority rights that he thinks would be more convenient for two different types of minorities. These are self-government rights for national minorities and poly-ethnic rights for immigrant minorities.

Kymlicka argues that an immigrant minority group needs the state’s differential policies to help its members integrate into the societal culture of the host country. He indicates that immigrants ‘have accepted the assumption that their life chances and even more the life chances of their children will be bound up with participation in mainstream institutions operating in the majority language’ (Kymlicka 2001: 30). He, however, argues that this integration process still continues to be a source of unequal outcomes for the minority members unless the state does not employ some accommodation policies that comprise poly-ethnic rights. (Kymlicka 1995:38). Minority religious holidays, new work-shift scheduling, can be counted among these poly-ethnic rights of immigrant minorities. Citizenship rights for immigrant minorities who clearly contributed to the history and development of those countries is another type of the poly-ethnic rights that, Kymlicka argues, can increase the immigrant’s sense of belonging to the country in the process of integration.

On the other hand he claims that national minorities, who inhabited a given territory and have already been accustomed to use their own languages before their subordination to the state, should now be entitled to self-government rights, just like the majority who have had the right to decide which language is to be officially used in
relation to the state. For him, these self-government rights like regional autonomy or the right to use their own languages in public life can increase the cultural freedom of those minorities whose will was previously ignored and oppressed in the nation building process of the dominant ethnic core (Smith 1986). Along with this argument, according to Kymlicka, equality can be achieved only if these national minorities who, insist on living in their own societal culture, are given equal chances to voice their demands through acquiring self-government rights.

According to Kymlicka, self-government rights are not feasible and cannot increase the equality for immigrant minorities because these immigrants lack a concentrated population and a socio-economic network, which are deemed to be important elements of the societal culture that in every aspect can accommodate its own members. In the absence of this societal culture, any right to get education and government services in their own languages would be likely to prevent immigrants from learning the language of the dominant socio-economic network which seems to be the only option for them to adopt within the borders of the states in which they now reside.

Kymlicka also accepts that, as with immigrants, ‘the extent to which national minorities have been able to maintain a separate societal culture also varies considerably’ (Kymlicka 1995:79). Having considered post-communist Eastern European countries, Kymlicka shifted his argument to the extent where he expressed that having the right to enjoy one’s culture instead of having self-government rights can be more realistic for national minorities ‘in countries which are essentially ethnically homogenous—e.g. where the dominant group forms 90-95% of the population—and where the remaining ethnic groups are small, dispersed, and already on the road to assimilation…’ (Kymlicka 2004 [b]: 13). He accepts that ‘none of the minorities in these countries are in fact capable of exercising regional autonomy, or of sustaining a high degree of institutional completeness (e.g. of sustaining their own universities), and most already show high levels of linguistic assimilation’ (Kymlicka
The case of the Roma people in Hungary provides empirical evidence for the argument that self-government rights would not increase the equality between the majority and the minority, if the national minority was not concentrated and lacking an institutionally mature societal culture.

The on-going inequality between the national Roma minority and non-Roma citizens who form the majority in Hungary is a clear indication of the fact that self-government rights are not the right prescription for those minorities who could not develop a single institutionalized economic unit. Segregated minority education did not become successful as there was no qualified human resource to maintain a good quality education in the Romani language, although the number of minority students in segregated elementary schooling increased, disadvantaged minority pupils’ educational quality profile remarkably decreased and correspondingly the unemployment rates among Roma people increased (Koulish 2005). The majority’s prejudices against the Roma people who were known for their unqualified profiles remained unchanged and recognition of their differences in public discourse did not raise the mutual respect between non-Roma and Roma citizens in Hungary as Raz (2001) and Tamir (1993) claimed.

Although Kymlicka accepted that not all national minorities could generate societal culture as discussed before, he sees no reason not to give self-government rights to national minorities who are sizeable and territorially concentrated like the Flemish in Belgium, the Catalan in Spain and the Quebeccers in Canada (Kymlicka 2004[b]: 9). He argues that such national minorities have the capacity to offer all types of socio cultural institutions in which their own members would have the ability to make ‘good choices amongst good lives’ (Kymlicka 2001: 21).

However his perspective is insufficient because, ‘whether a cultural group can be thought of as a societal culture, which Kymlicka calls a nation, whose practices and institutions cover a full range of human activities, is certainly a matter of degree, rather than the either/or distinction Kymlicka makes it’ (Young 1997:51).
Kymlicka also emphasizes that national minorities who enter into conflict to gain autonomy should be given self-government rights, too, simply because those minorities cannot be satisfied with poly-ethnic rights like the people’s right to practice their own culture within their community.

This view is also flawed in terms of his assumptions. Kymlicka interprets the subject of assimilation as an undivided group and therefore overlooks how different group members, contrary to what separatists claim, might have different interests and may well be willing to integrate with the dominant community while enjoying their culture in the private sphere. Kukathas (1992) states that ‘cultural groups are not undifferentiated wholes but associations of individuals with interests that differ to varying extents’ (Kukathas 1992:114). For instance in the referendum of 2003, the majority of Corsicans with a narrow margin voted against the proposal of the radical Nationalist Liberal Front group that demanded education in the mother language. The majority of the people in Corsica did not want education in Corsu to be made obligatory, as it would be against their children’s interests that, they considered, could be better pursued by being educated in French (Sanchez 2008).

Moreover, seeing ethnic conflict as a war that is driven by the minority’s desire to rectify injustices is not always true, as sometimes the injustices are just used as a justification for the violent movements of those whose primary goal is indeed to maintain the survival of their organization (Scott 1992:9, 23), and the distinctiveness of their ethnic identity at any cost (Byman 1998). In support of this view, Abrahms (2008) argues that radical aggressive groups ‘routinely engage in actions to perpetuate and justify their existence, even when these undermine their official political agendas’ (Abrahms 2008: 102).

All cultural relativists’ arguments, other than those of Kymlicka, emphasized that the idea of multiculturalism based on the availability of a societal culture is flawed, as there are other elements of identities through which people choose to identify themselves. If the culture sets the limits of what is imaginable, it might be the culture
of homosexuality, or it might be the culture of a religious belief, too. The culture is not as monistic as Kymlicka assumes in his studies.

Secondly, the idea of taking the societal culture as a dichotomous variable that either exists or does not, is flawed because it is a continuum. At some specific point on this continuum one can possibly find the traces of habitual unity, the shared vernacular, high population and concentrated settlement, but not the institutionalization, common expectations from the polity, similar experiences and shared memories which are also important to the definition of societal culture that Kymlicka calls Nation. I suggest that most of the egalitarian critiques of multiculturalism, as I will later explain, are valid, when the given minority is on the lower side of the societal culture continuum. Before elaborating on this claim, I will explain why Kymlicka still insists on the significance of a national or a societal culture in spite of those critiques coming from his culturalist colleagues. At this point, the arguments of the liberal nationalists, according to whom the national bond is crucial to the functioning of liberalism, become relevant.

3.1.5 Multiculturalism as Liberal Nationalism

According to the proponents of this view (Miller 1995, Tamir 1993) nationalism provides us with three important elements that are crucial to the maintenance of liberalism. These three inter-dependent components of liberalism that would be promoted by following the liberal nationalism are deliberative democracy, individual freedom and the social justice.

As concerns social justice

Most Liberals like Smith, John Stuart Mill (1861 [1991]), Jurgen Habermas (1990) and Cohen and Rogers (1995) referred to the significant role of solidarity
amongst people in the process of making democracy smoothly operate and of ensuring that social justice remains. From this perspective, if the sense of solidarity disappears, democracy cannot function properly and social justice is then diminished. This problem is convincingly explained by Stilz (2009), who draws on Rousseau’s view on the role of solidarity within the liberal state.

Rousseau claims that in order to legislate generally and impartially on one another’s behalf, the citizens of a democratic state must share a special bond of identity, one that motivates them to show concern for the freedom and welfare of their compatriots. In Rousseau’s view, in order to legislate impersonal laws—laws that will truly protect each citizen’s freedom equally—each citizen must be capable of taking up the viewpoint of the general interest or common good, a perspective that requires solidarity with her fellow citizens (Stilz 2009:23).

In the view of Liberal nationalists, this solidarity can only be possible when people share the same national identity, which cannot be simply discussed like other normative issues.

Concerning Deliberative Democracy

‘Deliberative democrats claim that parties to political conflict ought to deliberate with one another and through reasonable agreement try to come to an agreement on policy satisfactory to all ’ (Young 2001: 671). In order for parties to be able to reasonably argue and to come such an agreement in deliberative democracies there are three preconditions. These are as follows;

- In order to be able to deliberate, counterparts need a common language. Mill (1861 [1991]: 428)
- Reasonable argument (Rawls 1993, Brock 2002) can be possible only when parties to deliberation share the same understanding of the terms.
- Agreement requires reciprocal trust (Brennan 1998).
According to liberal nationalists, all these three requirements of deliberative democracy can be found in a national community as it provides its members with a common language, common past and shared memories of what is good or bad. In respect to the third point, national community defines itself in relation to others who are excluded on the basis of this definition (Tamir 1993), and therefore generates trust between nationals who are assured that their own interests, no matter how internally conflicting, would be protected and prioritized against those of other nations.

Concerning Individual Freedom

From the liberal nationalists’ perspective, nationalism is an ideology that serves individual freedom because nationalism is a form of ideological commitment to the preservation of a national culture which would provide its members not only with a shared vocabulary for evaluating and understanding their life options, but also with opportunities to make choices amongst them (Kymlicka 1995: 83, David Miller 1995: 86, Raz 1994: 83). Cultural nationalism promotes the context where rules, duties and rights are compatible with the beliefs and the cultural practices of its subjects so that nationals can become free to make good life choices without having to face any cultural barrier (Patten 1999). In this sense, the subject-dependent view of opportunity and positive freedom also seem to be informing the rationale behind liberal nationalism.\(^{20}\)

With reference to these three important points, Kymlicka explains how the national culture is important to the conservation of a liberal polity. If the national culture is really that important then this brings us back to the questions that Kymlicka tackled in the first place: how are we going to protect the national culture and how will we elevate national unity and make it politically relevant to the deliberation process as

\(^{20}\) See p.62
to make liberal democratic government a reality?

For Kymlicka, undoubtedly the answer is self-government rights. However with this approach Kymlicka differs from Miller who supports the state’s nation-building projects that would ease the pursuit of liberalism and who (Miller 1995: 153-154) ‘pretends that the dialogue nationalism can be made non-exclusive’ (Silian 2002: 28). For Kymlicka, liberalism should not justify the nation-building project of the state that indeed consists of more than one nation, but acting as if there were only one within its boundaries. Kymlicka (1995) drawing on Connor’s argument emphasized that liberal nationalism cannot survive under a polity where the majority nationalism is either implicitly-unintentionally or explicitly-deliberately inclined to destroy the minority nationalism within the borders of the state (Connor 1972). Peace, equality and freedom can be achieved only within the framework of liberal nationalism not within the elusive ideal framework of civic nationalism that seems to be serving the human rights but indeed proves to be working in favor of the majority nationalism.  

Kymlicka’s position on liberal nationalism can be located against that of Appiah (2005), and Levy (2000) who thought that ‘Nationalism and policies of minority cultural preservation gain the most plausibility when the alternative to some particular national or cultural community is imagined to be either undifferentiated humanity or alienated individualism. In fact, however, the alternative is often some other community to which persons also have some attachment’ (Levy 2000: 71). At this

In resembling the liberal culturalists to an extent the communitarian scholars including Van Dyke (1977), McDonald (1991) argued that the liberalization of this persistent context that has been so far associated with the concept of nation state could not be achieved by simply respecting the universal human rights regime that was designed to protect the individual liberties. From this perspective, only the additional collective minority rights could enable groups to survive the gradual assimilation implied by the state that could not avoid representing the culture of the dominant ethnic core in the public sphere. Kymlicka (1995) shows that human rights cannot protect the survival of minority culture as they cannot solve the problems stemming from the absence of such governmental rights to which national minorities should be entitled in the liberal state. For instance the centralized homogenizing official-language policies and decisions on internal migration and settlement issues being made by the state that respects human rights like freedom of residence and travel would nevertheless gradually lead to the evaporation of minority cultures, Kymlicka argued. When national minorities are not allowed to decide who can immigrate to their historical territories they would at the end usually face the danger of being outnumbered in their own territorial communities.
point the national culture that Kymlicka has in his mind seems to be deriving from ethnic identity, which cannot be left in the name of assimilating to another community that provides an alternative healthy cultural context.

3.1.6 Multiculturalism as Liberal Ethnocentrism?

As explained above, the nationalism that can be of help in easing the pursuit of liberalism, according to Kymlicka, is the nationalism of people who share the ethno-cultural identity not of the state that tries to create one national identity around the dominant ethnic core. Self-government rights in this project were seen as the tool that is to be used not only in protecting minority nationalism and its societal culture but also in attributing political autonomy to this societal culture that provides the only context where freedom and equality can be achieved.

Yet, what he understands from nationalism in supporting the minority nationalism as compatible with liberalism in this framework requires clarification. I suggest that his understanding of nationalism cannot be perceived as entirely civic or ethnic nationalism since in his studies he refers to nationalism as an ideology that seems to be combining both civic and ethnic elements of the national community.

As concerns the ethnic elements, he argues that ethno-cultural identities should be recognized in the public sphere. ‘Liberal nationalism is non-aggressive and does not seek to dismantle the self-governing institutions of other national groups within the same state… People are free to urge the adoption of a different national language, or even to seek the secession of a region to form a separate state’ (Kymlicka 2001: 40-41). So, in his defence of the state formation by a nation that is defined on the basis of ethnicity, he differs from his liberal colleagues who argue that ‘cultural membership cannot be the basis for determining membership in the polity. Our political responsibilities to each other must be based on a concept of justice as
fairness that transcends all cultures, as opposed to one that is mediated by culture' (Harty 1999: 676).

Concerning the civic elements of nationhood, Kymlicka argues ‘Liberal nationalisms as a rule have a more open definition of the national community. Membership in the national group is not restricted to those of a particular race ethnicity or religion’ (Kymlicka 2001: 40). At this point, he should accept that any willing person would indeed be able to develop a feeling of membership to a civic national community and that therefore identity does not necessarily and always has to be dominated by an ethno-cultural descent that nevertheless remains relevant. It is possible for people to live equally and freely in a community, even when the body politic in this community does not use their mother language in the public sphere (Kymlicka 2001: 245). Tamir, as another proponent of liberal nationalism, makes a more constructivist assumption by stating that ‘membership in a nation is elective, since individuals can leave the nation of their birth and create new national affiliations, and this turns the adherence to culture and the assumption of national obligations into the voluntary acts rather than inevitable consequences of fate’ (Tamir 1993: 87).

Kymlicka, however, does not go that far. Neither does he approve of the idea that national identity can always be chosen or left as Tamir argued. On the contrary, he states ‘We can't just transplant people from one culture to another, even if we provide the opportunity to learn the other language and culture. Someone's upbringing is not something that can just be erased; it is, and will remain, a constitutive part of who that person is. Cultural membership affects our very sense of personal identity and capacity’ (Kymlicka 1989: 175).

In this ethno-culturalist approach to identity he seems to be departing from his own ‘constructivist interpretation of ethnic behavior’ (Kaufmann 2000: 1096) and the civic conception of a national community that also recognizes strangers as capable of learning and living the language and culture of any community that allows them to do so. Nevertheless his detachment from the constructivist-instrumentalist model does
not make him one of the primordialists (Connor 1972, Shils 1957) who are inclined to think that nations are communities of fate, and identity is just a matter of descent not a choice. He rather seems to be accepting ‘the uniquely human capacity for additive learn and use more than one language, and for transforming many aspects of the self’ (Zolberg 1997: 151). Yet, Kymlicka’s strong inclination to prize the ethno-cultural approach to identity in his demand for self-government rights to national minorities seems to be deriving from his observation that most of the time most of the national minority members are just unwilling to relegate their ethnic particularity to a private discourse (Kymlicka 1995: 90, Levy 2000). It raises the question: if not all the time, not all national minorities prioritize their ethnic identity in defining the polity under which they want to live then, when and which national minorities do not develop such a particularistic pan-ethnic orientation? This is the question I will later endeavour to answer with reference to the implications of ethnic exclusionist-civic assimilationist policies to which minorities have been previously exposed, but before that I will touch upon the egalitarian group whose critiques of multiculturalism will be reference points for explaining the inapplicability of multiculturalism under certain circumstances.

3.1.7 Egalitarianism and ‘Civic Nationality’

We saw that Kymlicka’s constructivist view of ethnic behavior that stresses the concept of ‘willingness to engage’ (Ulf Hannerz 1990: 239) gets him back closer to the vantage point of civic nationalism. However, he keeps attributing utmost significance to the use of an ethno-cultural identity in drawing political boundaries which indeed is against the very civic nationalism that attempts to make the ethnic boundaries indistinct within the state (Hollinger 1995). Kymlicka’s attempt to combine the liberal values of civic nationalism and ethnic communitarianism can best be

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explained by the term ‘liberal ethnicity’ (Kaufmann 2000), which varies from traditional ethnicity on some important points. Kaufmann explains, ‘barriers to entry to the [liberal] ethnic community would be minimal...Ethnicity is not a source of exclusive membership but only a beacon or resource of identity and the liberal ethnicity would treat all groups as equal’ (Kaufmann 2000: 1086-1119).

Egalitarian scholars like Barry (2001), Benhabib (2002), Okin (1999) and constitutional patriots like Muller (2007) and Habermas (1995) suggest that it is inevitably problematic to bring together the liberal universalism and politicization of ethnicity since no matter how open it is to strangers, an ethnically defined polity would be necessarily excluding for members of another ethnic group and would be restrictive to even its own members when the survival of group identity is threatened.

Moreover, in the case of granting autonomy to ethnic groups that need protectionist measures for their own survival, liberalism cannot be achieved, as the need to protect the survival of ethnic identity inevitably leads to the violation of the fundamental freedoms of individuals who should also have the right to exit from it. Any concern to protect and promote ethnic values may freeze the culture of group in a way that the future chances of its members to make different choices become limited. As Kukathas drawing on Brian Barry’s view explained ‘Given that many forms of association such as group membership, are unchosen, the critical issue is whether or not individuals can exit from an association’ (Kukathas 2002: 186).

Aside from this, according to the civic egalitarian perspective, nation-building on the basis of ethno-cultural membership, as recommended by Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism, disregards and underestimates the extent to which minority groups are

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23 Alternatively Thomas König used the concept ‘quasi-primordial’ to define Kymlicka’s conceptualization of the nation. By this term König means ‘a nominally constructivist notion of nationality, which for all practical and theoretical purposes assumes primordial properties’ (König 2001: 51).
fragmented in their own vernacular.\textsuperscript{24} In such a realm ‘for those national minorities that are linguistically defined, the lingua franca argument would not lend itself to the multiculturalist policies Kymlicka style, but to the state nationalism of the XVIII century France’ (König 2001: 54).

For instance the Tamil nationalism that has been mostly defined by language has never been successful in Sri Lanka where the Sri Lankan Tamils are segregated by religion. ‘The Hindus constitute 85\% of the Tamil community. A well-organized and well-funded Tamil Christian minority also exists. The Moors define themselves by the Muslim religion, not by language’ (Jayaratnam, February 17, 2010). The group of Sri Lankan Tamils that is captured by Kymlicka’s definition of national minority lacks a consensus and for this reason Tamil nationalism is not likely to guarantee a deliberative democracy. The idea that people can more easily compromise just because they are members of the same ethnic group overestimates the coherency of national culture.

Furthermore, Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism foresees that the liberal democracy can exist only if distinct societal cultures are allowed to live the life in their own vernacular and only if they are represented as a separate entity, whose leaders would have the right to protect the interests of their group’s members. This type of democracy is not free of critiques. Reynolds (2000: 169) emphasizes that by congealing distinct groups into place, the system strengthening the nationalisms of

\textsuperscript{24} Indeed one of the most important critiques of group rights is about the individuals who would be systematically maltreated by the autonomy of their illiberal cultural community. Okin (1999) argued that if the state accommodates such a politics of difference, in patriarchal groups where female identity is systematically undermined and discriminated against in violation of the equal citizenship law, female group members’ demands for equal treatment and protection by the state authority are denied and those female members who tacitly or expressly advocate an intra-group change may become vulnerable to the accusation of cultural treachery, and may accordingly be punished or shunned. Nevertheless I do not touch upon this issue here as Kymlicka makes it clear that ‘From a legal point of view, policies of multiculturalism operate within the larger framework of liberal constitutionalism, and as such any powers devolved to autonomous minority institutions are typically subject to the same common standards of respect for human rights and civil liberties as any other public institution’ (Kymlicka 2007: 93). This view is also criticized on the grounds that it is in contradiction with the liberal tolerance and neutrality, as this would mean privileging one kind of lifestyle (liberal) over other cultural identities. However this problem is intrinsic to the liberalism itself and therefore it should be studied under another study, which is concerned with the limits of liberal toleration.
two different groups, no matter how liberal they are, may in fact strengthen the conflict it is designed to settle. In Barry’s words:

> What we might find out by experience is that institutionalizing group representation offers opportunities and incentives for political entrepreneurs to whip up intragroup solidarity and intergroup hostility in the pursuit of power. And indeed this has happened all over the world virtually every time group representation has been introduced (The Northern Ireland ‘power-sharing system is simply the latest illustration of this process of polarization) (Barry 2002: 211).²⁵

Especially if parties to the deliberation in a democratic system have a history of conflict this isolation may exacerbate the prejudices of distinct cultural constituencies against each other. ‘Deliberation confined within segments succumbs to Sunstein’s (2002) ‘law of group polarization’ (Dryzek 2005: 223). Such a polarization of groups may damage the social status of minority members who dispersedly reside within the majority community. In this respect, recognition of their cultural identity in a pejorative way might turn minority members into a target of the majority’s anger instead of providing them with dignity and self-respect. Aside from this, group polarization may also have negative implications for the social justice.

In his argument that self-government rights, like having an education in one’s mother tongue, can be granted only to the national minorities who could develop societal cultures, probably Kymlicka was assuming that those societal cultures would be materially rich enough to provide their members with economic welfare in their own vernacular. If not, then he seems to be neglecting to explain how the group polarization in consociational democracies may harm the wellbeing of those minority members who are primarily concerned with their economic prosperity. In cases where the national minority suffers an economic disparity due to various reasons the state should consider increasing its budget to develop the regional economy.²⁶ To be able

²⁵ This is not to say that the polarization started with the peace process, the group polarization in Northern Ireland long preceded the institutionalization of the group representation. However what was stressed in this sentence is that this multicultural solution to the problem has not decreased the polarization as assumed by Kymlicka but ‘whipped up’ it to a greater extent. ²⁶ For similar arguments see Aaron Wildavsky.1985. ‘Federalism means inequality’ Society Volume 22 (2): 42-49; and Michael Keen and Christos Kotsogiannis. 2002. ‘Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes? The American Economic Review 92(1): 363-370
to do so in a democratic state, the consent of the majority is required. This majority consent, however, might not be obtained in a multicultural discourse where the sense of solidarity would be derogated by allowing subgroups to live in their autonomous regions (Stilz 2009: 23).

Another important standpoint of Barry's egalitarianism in opposition to multiculturalism is related to the previous two critiques of multiculturalism on exit option and social justice. It is about whether principles of liberalism should be derived primarily from the good of autonomy or from the good of equality. 'Barry rejects the neo-Kantian idea that liberal principles must be derived from the core value of autonomy. His core value is equality not autonomy, and equality is basic and not derived from some prior commitment to autonomy' (Kelly 2002: 119).

Those who see individuals as the only legitimate agent that have the right to exercise liberal rights approve of the collective action of individuals who should have the autonomy to live the way of life they choose. For them, however, there is only one principle that would justify limiting this autonomy. That is the harm principle (Mill 1991 [1861]) according to which the individual's autonomy can be limited only when it infringes upon the autonomy of another individual.

It [the Harm principle] frees individuals from having to bear the burdens of others but it does so only when they are coercively imposed. It is the coercive imposition and not the burdensomeness that matters to Mill...As long as an association is not able to restrain members or constrains members from leaving, then they are sufficiently self-determining (Kelly 2002: 123).

Barry goes beyond the harm principle. According to him the state may and should find it necessary when the autonomous parents' cultural interests limit the capacity of their children to enjoy their liberty. It becomes apparent in education policy. According to Kelly (2002), parents' decisions on educational issues do not imply any restriction on their children's freedom to leave the community of their cultural language when they become mature enough to do so if they wish. Nevertheless,
Barry argues, parents’ freedom for and interest in sending their children to schools where the medium of instruction is in the mother language would violate the equal opportunity of those pupils to learn the language of dominant socio-economic network, which is in any case open to them on the basis of merit. This would be contrary to the main responsibility of the liberal state to provide students from different backgrounds with equality of opportunity to take advantage of the available options in higher education, which is the most important gateway to well-paid employment.

Having considered this trade-off between equality and autonomy, Barry argues that liberalism should be derived from the core principle of equality not liberty since the liberty principle is not sufficient to provide every individual with equal opportunities, but the prior commitment to the good of equality provides equal protection of autonomy to all (Barry 2001).

3.1.8 Shortcomings of Barry’s Egalitarianism

However in his argument Barry misses an important point which is that unless all citizens across all cultural groups become equally able to benefit from public services, equal citizenship cannot be achieved (Conover and Crew 2004: 1037). Until this is achieved, taking the needs of different groups into account to promote equal citizenship does not necessarily have to be incompatible with the civic construction of community and liberal egalitarianism.

The remaining autonomy requirements of marginalized group members to use their own language in public education and their destructive initiatives have been given as a reference point by multiculturalists. This has been done to explain why Barry’s egalitarianism that prioritized the value of equality over individual autonomy is not feasible for a liberal egalitarian and peaceful solution of minority problems.

For cultural relativists, public education in a minority language may increase the cost of exit option, but the most just way of dealing with this issue is not and
should not be to exclude those cultural identities from the public discourse. Outlawing the use of minority language at school would keep creating inequalities for those minority children who do not have a fair start. Those children who come from a linguistic minority community where their parents use the minority language at home need a bilingual education at the school to be able to learn the medium of instruction properly and in a timely way. Therefore, indifference to the cultural identity of children in education would result in inequalities that arise from the unfair start that those minority pupils face at the school (Corson 2001: 49).

Given that account, denial of the cultural difference in public discourse and entitling the state to make decisions on solely the basis of equality is proven to be one of the elements that radicalize the cultural group whose members’ right to autonomy is ignored. Moreover, radical groups exploit these inequalities to justify their existence and violent tactics (Shanhan 2009: 82-83). In this way they do not only justify their position but also find support from their community members who continue to suffer these inequalities.

3.1.9 Ideal Contexts Argument

Barry asserts that his arguments favouring the principle of equality can be viable only if the law commanding the principle of equality ‘can be justified as advancing some legitimate public objective’ (Barry 2009). The legitimate public objective that was used by Barry in justification for the same treatment as equal treatment is, however, not easily found in diverse societies where only the minority groups suffered from the nation-building projects that legitimized only the majority’s cultural identity and language in the public sphere. Having experienced the inegalitarian consequences of the state formation or nation-building project that uses the majority’s language as its medium, the minority groups’ perception of the public objective usually turns out to be quite different from how the majority perceives of it. While the majority sees the state as the guarantor of their rights, some minority members can
see it as the violator of their most fundamental freedom. This is to speak their own language in every phase of life including both in the public and the private sphere. For this reason, the egalitarianism favoring the civic conception of nationality that is primarily based on the principle of equality fails to settle down the persisting conflict, which is driven by minorities according to whom autonomy is superior to equality.

Under these circumstances, the remaining questions of why individual freedom and equality cannot be protected and why national fusion seems to be unlikely even in these cases, where the politics is endeavouring to be more civic rather than further ethnicized, require us to accept the inadequacy of this particular view of strict egalitarianism. This fact implies that Barry’s egalitarianism on its own lost by default. However this does not mean that the multiculturalism won by default as Kymlicka assumed. In the rest of the study I will suggest that the circumstances under which Kymlicka can be supported are available in cases that even his own explanation is not nuanced enough to point out. Like Barry, Kymlicka also explains the ideal context under which his theory can become fruitful. He makes it clear that self-government rights can only be proposed for national minorities who are sizeable, concentrated and not assimilated.

The clarification of this ideal context and circumstances, however, does not go beyond making starry-eyed assumptions about the nature and availability of these circumstances in real cases. For example, according to Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, ethnic conflict cannot be resolved by any means other than through regional autonomy; (Kymlicka 2004[b]: 5, 13) but if the given group lacks a societal culture it should not be given self-government rights (Kymlicka 1995: 76). Then the problem arises: what to do when a radical sub group within the minority is in ethnic conflict but the minority as a whole is lacking a societal culture? In this paradoxical framework, it is not made clear by Kymlicka’s multicultural theory which paradigm should be preferred over the other. Should these kinds of minorities be given autonomy to subdue the ethnic conflict or should they not be allowed to have autonomy because
they are not self-sufficient? Kymlicka’s multiculturalism theory does not have anything
to say on whether ethnic conflict can be solved justly by self-government rights when
the given group is semi-assimilated and not capable of exercising self-government
rights in a way that would promote the equality and freedom of its members.
Moreover as Young pointed out ‘Whether a cultural group can be thought of as a
societal culture, which Kymlicka calls a nation, whose practices and institutions cover
a full range of human activities, is certainly a matter of degree, rather than the
either/or distinction Kymlicka makes it’ (Young 1997: 51).

3.2 A Context-Sensitive Approach: When Multiculturalism Does Not Fit

On the face of it, I take the argument one step forward by asking that if the ones
Kymlicka described are not always readily available in the world; then which national
cultures can use self-government rights in a way that would promote individual
freedom and social justice? Moreover, which national cultures can become
recognized polities by following the path as defined by Kymlicka’s multiculturalism?
For which national minorities is multiculturalism feasible?

In this study I will suggest that multiculturalism cannot achieve the ideals of
equality, peace and liberty in cases where the national ethnic group was exposed to
the violent assimilating policies of the civic state. The applicability of multiculturalist
approach in real politics will be measured by looking first at its capacity to produce the
ideals mentioned above, and second its feasibility. The critiques summarized
throughout the previous pages will be reference points while measuring the capacity
of multiculturalist approach to accomplish its own ends in the context I stated above.
As regards the feasibility, Kymlicka himself tried to explore the role of factors that prevent multiculturalism from being adopted. He identified five preconditions for multiculturalist arguments to start shaping the political agenda. These were demographic change that indicate the increasing population of culturally distinct groups; increasing rights consciousness mainly driven by the domination of human rights regime; consensus on these human rights; free political mobilization; and de-securitization of ethnic relations that is to mean no fear of a fifth column. (Kymlicka 2007: 122). Moreover, for him

It would be unreasonable to expect liberal multiculturalist models to be adopted in contexts where states have a reasonable fear that it could lead to instability. It is important therefore to distinguish what is feasible in the short term from what is desirable in the long term…. [in such cases] we can imagine a theory of the progressive implementation of liberal multiculturalism with different minority rights provisions kicking in as the underlying conditions are established. While statues undergoing democratic transition or in unstable regions would not be expected to meet the highest standards of liberal multiculturalism, they would be expected to explain what they are doing to enable those standards to be progressively met over the long term (Kymlicka 2001: 304-305).

My perspective is going to be different from that of Kymlicka who takes the good of multiculturalism for granted and who mostly disregards how the multiculturalism itself, as an idea employed by political institutions and actors causes instability and perpetuates inequality under the context I specify. I am not rejecting the significance of important external factors like security concerns that hinder the likelihood of multicultural politics to be realized. Differently, however, I will show that the gradual implementation of multicultural discourse itself proved to be destructive of a democratic political life in cases where national minorities were previously exposed to the forced assimilation policies of the putatively civic nationalism on a consistent basis.

27 The Fifth column is an internal group that is ‘likely to work for a neighbouring enemy. This is particularly a concern where the minority is related to a neighbouring state by ethnicity or religion, so that the neighbouring state claims the right to intervene to protect ‘its’ minority’ (Kymlicka 2002:19).
3.2.1 Civic Nationalism, Forced Assimilation and Multiculturalism

Why the critiques of multiculturalism that have been mentioned so far are more relevant, within this particular context, is the question that I will answer in the rest of this paper. The main point I will elaborate on to attempt to answer this question follows the cultural relativists’ arguments that I summarized at the end of the part called ‘Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism and its flaws’. Specifically I will focus on Young’s critique of the way Kymlicka defined the societal culture. Kymlicka sees it as a matter of dichotomy meaning that it either exists or not. It is actually a matter of degree, as Young assumed. I suggest that the degree of societal culture which, according to Kymlicka, implies a concentrated settlement, standard language, shared practices and expectations is lesser in the cases where the given group has been continuously exposed to the forced assimilation under putatively civic nationalism.  

In my suggestion I basically follow two similar ideas:

• [group] interests exist, or take their particular shape, only because of certain historical circumstances or because particular political institutions prevail and not because they are a part of some natural order (Kukathas 1992: 111).

• Rival visions [of a nation] have staying power since they reflect the diverse heritages of populations whose territorial location continues to expose them unpredictable impacts from several directions. The nation is not simply a space but a geographical milieu and subjected to recurring and multiple influences from peoples, north, south, east and west. It is also situated in time with a layered past, and its different pasts are brought into play to cope with shifting challenges. There can be no final definition of a national identity (Hutchinson 2005: 111).

Drawing on these ideas, I suggest that in-group visions of national identity, group members’ interests and expectations of group members from the polity are more diverse within groups whose members have been simultaneously exposed to

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28 The particular context defined by cases where the minority was exposed to the forced assimilation under civic state nationalism can be better understood by looking at the second chapter.
the forced assimilation and open door policy of putatively civic nationalism. I suggest that the coherency or harmony within such a minority is less likely to be found due to differing individual experiences, disparate economic gains and changing social status of its members.

3.2.1.1 Role of forced assimilation in dismantling the minority’s societal culture

Some of the forced assimilation policies employed in putatively civic nationalism are the prohibition of language in the public sphere including the exclusion of minority language from education, the punishment of distinct identity expression in the public, imprisoning the minority’s educated and intellectual class on the grounds of involving in the ethnic propaganda, and banning the ethnic symbols of the group. Another indicator of forced assimilation is the displacement of people to different regions to dismantle the shared sense of belonging to a particular community other than the state. Given this account we can see that most of the minorities who have been continuously exposed to forced assimilation under putatively civic nationalism are usually lacking a complex vernacular and economic network. They are usually found dispersed. American Indians (UCLA Report 2002), Kurds in Turkey (Konda 2006), Corsicans in France (Carillet and Roddis 2007) are three examples demonstrating this.29

The reinforcing and causal relationship between mobilization and assimilation was studied by Deutsch who found out that ‘rate of assimilation among a population that has been uprooted and mobilized is usually considerably higher than the rate of assimilation among the secluded populations of villages close to the soil.’(Deutsch 1966: 152) This view, while being consistent with my argument, nevertheless omits one important criterion that makes sense of different levels of ethnocentric orientation

29 Minority groups’ dispersed population does not mean that they do not dominate some regions; nevertheless their population being dispersed has strong implications for their societal culture staying very weak.
amongst those who have been assimilated.\textsuperscript{30} This criterion is about whether people were assimilated forcibly or voluntarily. I suggest that those who (or whose relatives) have been forced to assimilate and who have been victimized by these aggressive assimilationist policies are more likely to adopt an ethnocentric view and to mobilize around it (Gurr and Moore 1997). This also suggests that the reason why those who are successfully incorporated into the mainstream community yet started some of the most radical and secessionist movements has something to do with how they experienced the assimilation process. I will explain later how the existence of these radical groups will be important in making multiculturalism and egalitarianism inapplicable under putatively civic nationalism.

Why minorities sometimes do not have unified characteristics is related to the assimilationist policies that prevent the group from developing a coherent vernacular. The utilitarian value of language also remains low in this context leading minority people to opt in to the language of the community that offers greater opportunities.

\textsuperscript{30} By the state of being ‘assimilated’ I simply refer to those who do not know their mother language or who successfully incorporated into the mainstream community but this does not mean that they would not adopt an ethno-centric orientation. An example of this is that even the most radical Kurdish MPs do not know Kurdish. Moreover assimilation according to Breton (1999: 91) consists of two steps ‘the first step consists in learning a second language; the second in dropping the original language. Dropping a language means that the language is unused, unlearnt, and eventually forgotten. In general, this is not likely to be experienced by individuals in the course of their lifetime as only a few are likely to forget a language in which they were once fluent. It is therefore best to think of the process of linguistic assimilation as taking place over two generations or more.’ Actually as discussed in the second chapter seeing assimilation, as a way of complete absorption is misleading because in most cases assimilation has an additive nature, people can objectively assimilate to another culture and still preserve their subjective ethnic particularities, on a cognitive level. Most Scots who speak English for example are objectively assimilated and have lost their linguistic distinctiveness yet they are still preserving their Scottish identity from a subjective perspective. Scotland is one of the examples that Kymlicka often uses to support his argument that national minorities who are not on the road of assimilation should have self-government rights. Hence in Kymlicka’s study the criterion must be rather the willingness or unwillingness of the people to identify with their ethnic particularities when it comes to making a decision as to whether or not that group actually is ‘on the road of assimilation’. If Kymlicka attributes any meaning to an objective criterion of assimilation in the sense that it is one losing his language, then he should be careful not to use examples where most minority members have lost touch with their ethnic language as in the case of Scots.
3.2.1.2 Why civic state nationalism matters

I suggest the integrationist ideal of civic nationalism, for which the assimilation policies were used in the first place, is a more important factor that leads to the persistence of remaining differences within the group. Civic nationalism offers people from different backgrounds an opportunity to identify themselves as an equal member of the community in which they can make choices like everyone else.

Essentially, civic nationalism,\(^{31}\) accepts people with different backgrounds into its own vernacular in contrary to ethnic nationalism that rejects the incorporation of people with different ethno cultural backgrounds into the dominant core. No matter how much the minority members are willing to integrate into the mainstream community, this is not an option in an assimilationist state that adopted ethnicity as a criterion for membership. Indian Tamils of Sri Lanka\(^{32}\) are a group who obviously suffered from ethnic nationalism of the Sinhalese Majority, which did not recognize citizenship to up country Tamils in 1949 and discriminated against them in university admissions (Edrisinha 2005: 247). Similarly, Uyghur Turks in China cannot enjoy a healthy cultural context in Chinese mainstream community, which even discriminated against Uyghur Turks who became fluent in Mandarin (Becquelin 2004). Such groups have no option other than choosing to live in their own vernacular.

\(^{31}\) Although given in the second chapter, I remind the reader why this particular type of nationalism is still civic although it uses forced assimilation and promotes an ethnic character in the public sphere. Having accepted that it is an illiberal form of civic nationalism I nevertheless suggest that it is not ethnic, because the distinction here I made between civic and ethnic nationalism mainly refers to the distinction between methods they used with the aim of creating a homogenized nation. My conception of civic state nationalism in this paper only refers to its assimilationist method that aims to make the minority indistinct from the ethnic core. Therefore its aim is to increase the homogeneity through the method of fusion. On the other hand ethnic nationalism will be conceived of by its method of exclusion and differentiation. Both civic and ethnic nationalism serve the same goal and imply certain injustices; however, their impacts on the minorities’ societal culture and consequently the perceptions, experiences and expectations of minority members differ from each other to a great extent.

\(^{32}\) There are two groups of Tamils in Sri Lanka, the first are the Sri Lankan Tamils, who either descended from the Tamils of the old Jaffna kingdom or who migrated to the East coast. The second are the Indian Tamils or Hill Country Tamils, who are descendants of bonded labourers sent from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka in the 19th Century to work in tea plantations’ de Silva, K. M. (1997: 171). This second group of Hill Country Indian Tamils has been consistently excluded from Sinhalese majority whereas the first group has mostly been forced to assimilate.
On the contrary, people of the minority can choose to adopt the culture of a civic state and can equally make use of opportunities it would offer as Appiah (2005) and Levy (2000) assumed. As Patten, drawing on Waldron (1992), stated ‘it does not matter if one’s own cultural structure is destroyed so long as one has access to some sufficiently rich and healthy alternative cultural materials’ (Patten 1999: 10). At this point ethnocentric multiculturalism as liberal ethnicity starts to be irrelevant for minorities under civic paradigm. As indicated before, Kymlicka’s point is still relevant for cases where the group refuses to adopt another culture.

I suggest that so long as the doors are opened in civic projects there will always be some subgroups that want to enter into the mainstream community and adopt its culture. The fact that forced assimilation policy is used in a civic state building project does not mean that nobody might voluntarily participate in it. 

Voluntary participation into civic projects happens for various reasons. It happens because the subgroup may share some basic characteristics of the dominant culture, as it manifested in Northern Ireland where Protestant Irish people have spoken for union with Britain. It happens because the group may want to make use of advantages offered in the mainstream community, as was the case for some Puerto Ricans who chose to live in United States where the job opportunities were greater (Larsen 1973).

Espiritu (1992) suggested that pan-ethnicity occurs only when a clear-cut competition between ethnic groups (like ethnicization of bureaucracy or uneven distribution of materials to the certain minority groups) does exist. When people of a certain ethnic group are discriminated against, they would be more likely to identify themselves with their ethnic descent (Zhou 1997). In putatively civic communities, people are allowed to run offices equally, and given same educational opportunities. Those who voluntarily integrated into the mainstream community and could gain

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33 I assume the concept of assimilation can be affixed with the label ‘forced’ only after having observed the resistance of those who are subjected to the assimilation. In other words the assimilation is forced only for those who resist.
important positions proved to be less likely to prioritize their descent in defining the polity under which they want to live.

Moreover, the combination of equal opportunities and voluntary assimilation under civic nationalism might diminish the extent of ethnic mobilization\(^{34}\) in time (Gordon 1964, Alba and Nee 1997) and subgroups may develop a different vision of their broader community depending on their experiences, class position, religious belief, and similarity to dominant culture.

3.2.2 In Relation to the Contextual Applicability

3.2.2.1 Applicability on the Normative Basis

In such cases where the societal culture is more fluid than Kymlicka assumed, I have to agree with Barry’s statement ‘[Kymlicka’s] multiculturalist policies are not simply a passive adaptation to an ineluctable fact of cultural diversity. Rather multiculturalism actually creates the reality which is then, in a circular process of self-reinforcement, appealed to as a justification for further extension of multiculturalist policies’ (Barry 2001: 315).

In this process of self-reinforcement, developing the societal culture of minority groups and prizing their nationhood requires multiculturalism to stick to the essentialization of ethnic culture that itself, as mentioned before, would have some inegalitarian outcomes for some group members who do have different interests, values or perceptions (Kukathas 1992, Gorenburg 2000).

In this context, civic nationalism provides an exit option to cultural groups. As suggested before, there is always someone who might want to use this option. It is

\(^{34}\) Interviewed by Peonidis, Kymlicka (2008) argues that ‘Too many countries still cling to the hope that once societies democratize, modernize, and develop economically, then ethnic politics will disappear. So far as I can tell, there is no evidence for believing this and much evidence to the contrary’. However the concept of democratization in this sentence refers to consociational democracy where groups are granted autonomy on the basis of their ethnic identity. Civic nationalism with its integrationist ideals and assimilation policies definitely refers to a different conception of democracy under which ethnic mobilization can diminish.
usually the case that minority groups choose to teach their children the language of mainstream community if the utilitarian value of their own language has remained very low due to the assimilationist policies of the past. In such a realm, establishing an autonomous administrative region, where the leadership would stick up for the cultural essentialism, impedes the opportunities of members who might want to use this exit option. Allowing the regional administration to require the minority group to receive standard public education in its mother language might decrease their children’s chances of success in exams and in finding employment in the language of majority. This increases the cost of exit and this increasing cost restricts minority language pupils’ capacity to use this option. Indeed this is one of the most important reasons why multiculturalist policies tailored to these sizeable, concentrated minorities do not fit and of why the political movements defending multicultural argument cannot be successful under this context.

Those minority members who would be put at a disadvantage by the essentialization of ethnic culture choose to opt into the majority language. In doing so, they complicate the multiculturalist aim of creating an autonomous region where boundaries are drawn along the lines of ethnicity. The Corsican case in France supports this suggestion. In the 2003 referendum, the majority of Corsicans—with a narrow margin—voted against French legislation that attempted to accord autonomy to Corsica in 2002 (Sanchez 2008). The Corsican minority that is sizeable, concentrated and not assimilated has been one of the groups that clearly fit into the minority definition that Kymlicka purports. However, the results of the 2003\textsuperscript{35} referendum where the majority of the Corsicans said no to autonomy must have disappointed Kymlicka who thought France would soon join the bandwagon of states that experienced ‘a shift from suppressing the sub-state nationalisms to accommodating them through regional autonomy and official language rights’ (Kymlicka 2007: 70). Kymlicka thought that it was the Constitutional Court of France that prevented the

\textsuperscript{35} See the footnote 11. p.21
implementation of regional autonomy and self-government rights. However he never considered it likely that the Corsicans would choose to opt in to the present political system of the centralized French administration which legitimizes only the use of French as the language of instruction in public education. It was also the case in Turkey where the private institutions that were allowed to teach Kurdish closed due to lack of interest from Kurdish society.

As concerns the radicalizing impact of the forced assimilation on some minority members, those radicalized members might be leaders who are able to mobilize enough to get elected in certain regions and they might acquire the opportunity to represent their whole group. Yet they still might not have the same interests as the majority of group members, and accordingly this may impede benign minority members’ democratic right to shape the future of their cultural community. This was the case for Kurds in Turkey, where the pro-Kurdish DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) was disappointed by Southeastern Kurds 41% of whom instead supported the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in the 2007 general election (Schleifer 2009). It was also the case for Corsicans in France where in the 2010 regional elections, the Corsica Libera that wanted independence and did not condemn terrorist FLNC (Fronte di Liberazione Nazionale Corsu: National Liberation Front of Corsica) could gain only 9.85% in turn out. Even PNC (U Partitu di a Nazione Corsa: Party of the Corsican Nation), which rejects terrorist activities and wants only limited autonomy, could gain only 25.88% in turn out (World Elections 2010).

As concerns the implications of assimilation on development of the minority’s vernacular, different linguistic and religious factions in the same group usually cannot develop common understanding of belonging and standard terminology. The protection of one cultural minority may automatically perpetuate the inequality between subgroups of that minority. It especially disadvantages the sub-group that is of lesser capacity to mobilize (Barry 2001).
As was shown, most of these inequalities stem from the immaturity of the minority’s societal culture. Therefore, one may assume, as Kymlicka would probably think, the societal culture can be developed in time through the progressive implementation of multiculturalism. This idea, however, seems impractical under the context I specify. This impracticality is the result of the reaction of radical groups to weak multicultural policies.

3.2.2.2 When Multiculturalism Rekindles the Radicalism

As concerns the forced assimilation policies within some of these minorities, there are radical factions which keep expressing their nationalistic claims with violent means. These violent tactics of minority organizations themselves are forming a barrier to the realization of programs that would increase peace, equality and freedom. I suggest that multiculturalism seems to be feeding this process under the context specified by this study.

In the cases where putatively civic nationalism is observed, forcible assimilation policies are often put into practice to create a common identity to make minority group members downgrade, or even forget, their particular distinctiveness and adopt the cultural identity of the mainstream community. Ethnic identification in this framework reactively becomes more relevant and important for radical factions to revitalize and constantly maintain their ethnic awareness in an opposite direction of the state’s forced assimilationist policies (Prilleltensky and Gonick 1996, Bulhan 1985).

Moreover, within these cases, as mentioned before, the forced assimilation can be understood to have created a more radical group that is now ready to undertake the role of revitalizing the ethnic distinctiveness. I already suggested that their (radical factions’) conception of the good life as autonomous life differs remarkably from that of other minority members who experienced a relatively more voluntary integration or who more easily accepted assimilation in order to attain material equality or some other legitimate goal (Wolf 1986). In such cases the radicalized terrorist
organization’s own survival seems to become possible only with a sustained level of recruitment and in this respect the radical movement requires popular support that would provide the organization with necessary human resources. This popular support can be guaranteed by strengthening the salience of causes that justify the radical organization’s existence (Walker 1983). Mindful of this fact, radical organizations use terrorism as a tool for making their cultural identity a constant target for state’s repression. Accordingly they create awareness of separation (Fisher and Sonn 2003: 119, Trickett, Watts and Birman 1994) and anti-state feeling among new generations and group members of the minority who otherwise would have been likely to compromise with the central administration for various reasons. An example of this cyclical relationship between government repression and ethnic terrorism is ETA which ‘sought to force the government to lash out blindly and create a backlash that would increase popular support for guerrillas’ (Byman 1998: 155, also in Sullivan 1988: 44, Conversi 1997: 99). Akcam and Asal (2005) also explain this issue with reference to the Kurdish question in Turkey where the radical factions deliberately create instability to provoke government repression. ‘Government repression on ethnic groups increases disadvantages for ethnic group. The existence of collective disadvantages creates opportunities for ethnic leaders to mobilize ethnic group for their movement’ (Akcam and Asal 2005).

As mentioned, the PKK in Turkey is one of these organizations whose operations did not come to an end even when their cultural identities were recognized, and the progressive implementation of multiculturalism gradually took place. They did not stop, because in these cases, progressive implementation of multiculturalism worked in opposition to the interests of radical factions whose main goal is to promote the separation (Fearon and Laitin 2000) and to prevent compromise. The need for sustaining the feeling of being disadvantaged, which is an important source of ethnic radicalization, requires terrorists to constantly sabotage any democratic state enterprise that would be to the advantage of the minority community’s members
In return, the continuation of ethnic terror and increasing numbers of casualties simply feed nationalistic sentiments of the majority community. In this regard, not only does respect for minority members and their economic prosperity diminish within the major community but also the likelihood of furthering the multicultural project. It becomes unlikely because the increasing hostility of the majority against the radical and violent factions of the minority generates a pressure on representative governments to take action against continuing violent. This in turn results in the closure of the ethnic minorities’ political parties that do not condemn the terrorist operations. This process blocks the democratic ways and means of negotiating further possibilities for a pluralist democracy.

I am not arguing that ethnic mobilization or radicalization of minorities occurs only when they are exposed to the assimilationist policies of putatively civic state nationalism and not when exposed to the exclusionary policies of ethnic state nationalism. On the contrary, the ethnic rebellion is primarily a product of state suppression (Horowitz 1985, Gurr 2000) and ethnic terrorism is more likely to occur when there is not enough political opportunity for negotiation (Tarrow 1998). Moreover, the ethnic mobilization is also facilitated by the availability of resources (Barany 2002) and intense efforts of the educated classes to mobilize masses (Smith 1982, Marshall and Gurr 2003).

Nevertheless I suggest that when the state starts to welcome multiculturalist policies, the nature and aims of minority ethnic mobilization vary depending on whether the host state previously used ethnic or civic lenses of nationhood to deal with the minority under question. As Arline and McCord (1979: 427) stated, ‘for a separatist movement to emerge people must first be convinced that they share something against an enemy’. I suggest if the group is already negatively defined by ethnic nationalism of the majority community that excluded or discriminated it, there would be no need for ethnic terrorism to mobilize the members of the minority against
the majority. The sole aim of the ethnic mobilization in such cases is not to constantly
revitalize a common identity but to acquire public recognition and self-government
rights for its community, already being mobilized with the help of other
aforementioned factors. When the political context is eased through the progressive
implementation of multiculturalism, the ethnic mobilization of such groups proved to
be peacefully maintained in the political sphere to reach the final aim of self-
government rights or autonomy.

3.2.3 Multiculturalism in Contrast Cases

Canada is an example of this phenomenon. Both French and English identity
has been defined in opposition to each other throughout history therefore ‘French
Canadian cultural community itself was never in question, never threatened with
unwanted extinction or assimilation …’ (Kymlicka 1989: 167). Although English
Canada required French Quebecers to learn English to be equal members of the
community it never forced them to be English. This remaining difference between the
two cultures mostly resulted in negative discrimination against minority. Discrimination
against the French by employers in the mainstream community, if not by state
mechanism, was the main point that helped increase the common sense of being
disadvantaged among the French group. Although the ethnic mobilization of
Quebecers, against the English rule, which was blind to difference in public sphere,
was obvious, neither the state's forced assimilation\textsuperscript{36} nor the reactionary radicalization
of French that would have otherwise catalyzed the oppression-conflict cycle was
evident in Canada. Such an example supports the view that the absence of forced
assimilative policies creates a context under which multiculturalism seems to be more

\textsuperscript{36} I am not arguing that this was the standard policy of English Canadian rule. The nature of
the English nationalism in respect to the Aborigines highly differs. Forced assimilation of
Aborigines into the dominant English community under the civic ideal of nationalism gets this
case closer to the context I was primarily discussing with reference to the civic state
nationalism.
viable.

Those who emphasize the significance of the economic development of the region in explaining the success of self-government rights in terms of creating peace, freedom and equal opportunities, however, can reasonably question the explanatory power of my hypothesis. One of them indeed is Brian Barry who argues that the ‘existence of different linguistic communities within a single country is compatible with equality of opportunity on the condition that these communities are able to maintain educational and economic institutions capable of providing a range of opportunities of roughly equal value’ (Barry 2001: 105). Therefore my hypothesis needs further evidence, which can be found only in places where the economic development of the region is very backward yet nevertheless the multiculturalism seems to be applicable according to my hypothesis.

The case of Muslim Turks in Greece provides me with a very fitting example of such a context where the economic development of the region is very low. Although it is very well known with its assimilationist policies, Greece differs from the context that this study shows as the reason of the inapplicability of multiculturalism. The foremost reason for this is that it was never the aim of the assimilationist policies to integrate Muslim Turks into the majority rather they were designed to intimidate or exterminate them. The Muslim Turks in Greece were deprived of citizenship rights between 1955 and 1998 (Human Rights Watch 1999), discriminated against before law, ignored, and left to their own destiny (Borou 2009).

As a result of the exclusionist past of the ethnic state nationalism the Muslim Turks can be found demographically concentrated in Western Thrace. The past exclusionist policies of the Greek state isolated Muslim members of minority and left them with no other option than developing an inferior socio-economic network within which they could work and earn separately from the Greek majority. Mostly they were confined to stay in a rural area of the country and earn their living in agriculture. Their
participation in body politics and economic life of the vast majority has always remained limited (Rumeli 2005).

It can be seen that the Muslim Turkish minority in Greece is economically backward. I suggest that multiculturalism is, nevertheless, more applicable in such cases. The progressive implementation of multiculturalism in the period of developing the societal culture of the minority, as Kymlicka suggested, is both more feasible and less likely to create further inequalities for several reasons.

Firstly it is more feasible to provide public services and education in the language of minority members who are demographically concentrated in certain regions. Secondly as mentioned before, due to discrimination, ethnic mobilization of the minority is therefore evident but not in radical ways that otherwise could have increased the hostility against minority. In these cases, therefore, progressive implementation of multiculturalism is not hindered by the cycle of repression-radicalism-weak multiculturalism-increasing radicalism. Lastly, and most importantly, those Muslim minorities, including non-Turks, who have been identified and historically excluded by persistent Orthodox Christian characteristics of Greek identity, are inclined to mobilize around Turkish ethnicity on a voluntary basis (Triandafyllidou and Anagnostou 2007). Therefore multiculturalism’s essentialist self-reinforcing policies do not create an injustice for even the most distinct people so long as they voluntarily attach themselves to this essentialist orientation.

This very short analysis about the Muslim Turks in Greece provides me with preliminary evidence to rule out the hypothesis that the applicability of multiculturalism is only possible when the economic development of the region is high. It can be shown that multiculturalism is justified on a normative basis and can be progressively implemented in such contexts if the authorized state appeals to it.
3.3 Conclusion

To sum up, in this chapter I located the problem and my approach within a theoretical framework. Within this framework I began with the idea that meanings of theoretical perspectives used in dealing with the problems of national minorities are more consistent in some contexts and less so in others. It has been suggested that ideal contexts clarified by proponents of these theoretical perspectives are not available all the time.

Having observed that these ideal contexts are not always readily found, I asked if there could be other criteria to assess the applicability of these theories, in other words, if there can be a more reliable way to point out an ideal context under which these theories can become more viable. The aim of this attempt is of course to prevent any unwanted consequences that might arise from the intention of promoting liberalism by sticking up for either of these two distinct sets of arguments.

To do this, the chapter argued that both theories are likely to fail when the national minority under question had previously been exposed to the forced assimilationist policies of putatively civic state nationalism.

It was seen that minority members experiencing forced assimilation have been inclined to prioritize their cultural freedom over equality. Therefore in such cases it turned out to be impossible to find a common public reasoning and shared conception of what is good. While most of the constitutions in civic states stress the principle of equality, the terrorist organizations call themselves freedom fighters.

For this reason, this chapter suggested that a strictly difference-blind egalitarianism has an infatuation with equality even at the expense of freedom and as such it may not be able to generate peace between those who do not share the same concerns.
As concerns the attempt to find a criterion for assessing the applicability of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, this chapter concentrated on the liberal culturalist and egalitarian critiques of him. It is suggested that the egalitarian critique of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism does make sense mostly when societal culture is not developed in the way and as much as Kymlicka has assumed in his proposition. I conceptualized the immaturity of the minority’s societal culture with reference to not only the low utilitarian value of this minority vernacular but also the fragmentation within the minority itself. I showed the minority members’ different visions of national identity, different experiences of citizenship and different expectations from the polity as indicators of this intra-group fragmentation. How the forced assimilation policies and the integrationist ideal of putatively civic state nationalism jointly created these indicators were explained and the chapter consequently discussed how even the sizeable and concentrated groups captured by the national minority definition of Kymlicka showed some of these characteristics. Under these circumstances Kymlicka’s multiculturalism proved to have a potential to generate further inequalities.

Since most of the inequalities which I mentioned in relation to the implementation of multiculturalism, stem from this in-group fragmentation, and immaturity of the minority’s societal culture; in the following part of the paper, the idea that the societal culture can be developed as the progressive implementation of multiculturalism takes place was also elaborated. This idea was shown to be impractical with respect to important points. First, it was shown to be infeasible, especially when those who prioritize the material wellbeing of their children rather than political autonomy of their cultural community do not consent to this ethnocentric project. Without considering how much the economy in their own vernacular can develop in time, some of the members in the ethnic community believe that their children’s chances to prosper would be higher if they were educated in the language of mainstream community. This was the case in France when the majority of Corsicans voted against the referendum for autonomy and obligatory education in
their mother language. This was also the case for majority of the Kurds in Turkey when allowed Kurdish courses were not attended. Second, multiculturalism’s infeasibility under this context was shown in relation to the repression-radicalism-weak multiculturalism–increasing radicalism–repression cycle where the weak multiculturalist initiatives seemed to be contributing to the acceleration of violent activities and hatred between cultural communities. I suggested the multiculturalism that might be used in rectifying the inequalities, for which the egalitarianism could not provide us with a proper insight, indeed exacerbates the activities of terrorist organizations, as in such times these organizations increasingly become in need of convincing their own ethnic community that the state is still their enemy. This increasing conflict hinders the possibility of furthering multiculturalists’ policies in a non-violent political arena as this ethnic conflict provokes majority nationalism, which in turn prevents the governments from entering into dialogue with minority’s political parties that insist not to condemn terrorism.

This chapter not only showed why egalitarianism and multiculturalism are not viable options for the context I specified but also touched upon the contrast spaces to make the argument much clearer to the reader. It was shown that the progressive implementation of multiculturalism in the period of developing the societal culture of the minority, as Kymlicka suggested, is both more feasible and more likely to promote equality in cases where the group was never exposed to the assimilationist policies of putatively civic nationalism. I suggested this premise not only because those groups, who were not assimilated, could have a chance to develop their own network to accommodate their own members, but mainly because any healthier option was not available to these minorities in the mainstream community. Moreover, it was suggested that the egalitarian argument, that accuses the multiculturalism of hindering people from using the exit option, loses its validity when the group members voluntarily participate into this ethnocentric construction of their own community. I suggested that minorities who were previously excluded on ethnic basis are more
likely to adopt an ethnocentric project for the construction and development of their own community.

In such cases, multiculturalism seems viable without regard to the socioeconomic development of the region in which the given minority has lived. In such cases, the national minority members’ experiences of citizenship, interests and expectations from the polity seem to be more homogenous. For this reason the essentialization of ethnic culture that is associated with Kymlicka’s multicultural project seems to be less likely to create inequalities between sub groups so long as those different groups within the minority are voluntary participants in this project.

Throughout the chapter I discussed that the differentiation between national minorities and immigrant minorities, as Kymlicka made it, is not sufficient to indicate what types of rights should be given to which groups. I suggested that we should also make a differentiation between two different types of national minorities: those who had previously been exposed to ethnic exclusionist policies on one hand and those who had previously been exposed to the putatively civic assimilationist policies on the other hand. I argued that Kymlicka’s multiculturalism is an ethnocentric project and it can be used for groups who had already been ethnically remarked by the authority that did not try to forcibly assimilate them into the dominant ethnic core. On the other hand I suggested that ethnocentric multiculturalism is not applicable to the latter type of national minorities who had been forcibly assimilated under putatively civic state nationalism.

All in all, although the particular context that characterizes both assertive assimilation and open subtype of civic nationalism lets us point out only a very limited number of cases where neither multiculturalism nor egalitarianism would become a viable option, this chapter provides us with an insight into how the civic-ethnic nationalism dichotomy has analytical power in explaining the applicability of multiculturalism and how the injustices of exclusion and forced assimilation should be differently rectified. This insight is of great importance when dealing with much larger
numbers of national minorities as most of the national minority problems are the result of either exclusionist or assimilationist policies and most of the national groups became minorities under a state that has used either civic or ethnic lenses of nationhood. It was already indicated that even under the same state, application of these lenses and policies varied depending on the nature of the relationship between the dominant ethnic core and the minority under question, for this reason examples of national minorities that we can approach by using this analytical dichotomy of ethnic expulsion-civic fusion can be multiplied to a great extent. And even those few groups who have not been consistently exposed to one of these two methods can be of help in deciding the degree of applicability. However this premise requires studying vast numbers of cases. In the rest of this study I will start focusing on one case, which is to be identical to the context under which I argued that neither the multiculturalism as has been described by Kymlicka nor the egalitarianism as described by Barry can be a viable option for the solution of national minority problems.
Chapter 4: Turkey’s Kurdish Dilemma ‘Segmented forms of Assimilation’

The aim of this chapter is to illustrate in practice that civic state-building and the policies of assimilation create complexities under which, the previous chapter has argued, neither ethno-centric multiculturalism nor difference–blind egalitarianism can work. This chapter will focus on the historical relationship between the Kurds and the state in Turkey. In providing this analysis, this chapter will also explain where the relationship between the state and Kurds fits in the conceptual categorization that the second chapter has explained.
Since the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, the Kurds who today make up almost 15% of the population in Turkey have been expected to live under the authority of the state that has used only the Turkish language in its relation to all citizens. A number of Kurdish rebellions that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s were repressed by the armed forces. Use of the Kurdish language in public offices and education was banned and any movement that is based on ethnicity has not been tolerated.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Separatist PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) was in an armed conflict with Turkish government forces that caused the death of more than 35,000 people from both sides of the conflict (Heper 2007:1). All ethnic differences in the country have been ignored by the ‘state that constitutionally consists only of ‘citizens of Turkey’ (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 1). According to Article 66, paragraph 1 of the Constitution: ‘Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk’. The term ‘Turk’ was comprehensively explained in the 1924 Constitution stating; ‘The nation of Turkey with respect of citizenship is called Turk, irrespective of religion or ethnicity’. In Turkey, nationality has been reduced to citizenship. According to the Turkish Nationality Act No. 403, citizenship can be determined by either ‘jus soli (right of land: children born in territories of Turkey do not acquire the nationality of either parent at birth, but acquire Turkish nationality from birth) or jus sanguinis (right of the blood: either of the parents must be a Turkish citizen at the time of birth)’ (Turkish Nationality Act No: 403: Legislative provisions concerning nationality). The 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which gave minority status to non-Muslims, is still accepted as the unique source of the minority regime in Turkey. It is well known that this treaty simply excluded Muslim groups like the Kurds, Caucasians, Laz and Romani people, who spoke languages other than Turkish (Smith T. 2005). ‘The Turkish constitutional scheme solves the question of minorities without ever addressing it. There is no reference in the constitution to the word minority, not even the Lausanne Minorities’ (Minority Rights Group 2007). Although
Turkey used religion as the most important factor in defining minority and majority, the Constitution made the definition of ‘Turk’ solely on the basis of citizenship (Cornell 2001, Heper 2007). ‘The ethnicisation of bureaucracy that has caused ethnic conflict in many newly independent countries has not been pervasive in Turkey (Wimmer 1997). Many Ethnic Kurds have achieved positions of influence and power within the bureaucracy and are integrated into Turkish society (Cornell 2001)’ (Tezcur 2009: 3).

Yet for the last two decades, state policies have slowly begun to change. With amendments to the laws that for so long prohibited its use in education, media and public events, the Kurdish language in Turkey has now become more apparent and publicly used than ever.

In June 1989 President Ozal announced that he himself had Kurdish blood. In December 1991, the deputy Prime Minister Erdal Inonu called for the recognition of cultural identity of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. In March 1992 Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel openly announced that he recognized the reality of Kurdish ethnic presence (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 113).

Since then the problem extended beyond one of the recognition, yet then the debate turned out to be about the forms that it could take, about whether recognition should be construed as the toleration of differences in the private sphere or should it be extended into the appreciation of diversity in public life by governmental regulations.

The Constitutional Amendment Law no. 4471 of 2002 and Law no. 4903 of 2003, guaranteed the legal basis for the use of ethnic groups’ languages or dialects in non-state funded education or media. And even going further than mere toleration of differences in the private sphere, the state started funding a television channel to broadcast in Kurdish only.

As the politics of recognition gained momentum, the discussion has developed to the point where the Kurdish political leaders then claimed their right to autonomy. In doing so they also challenged the above given definition of Turkishness in the Constitution. This has not only prompted polarization and deepened the tension
between the two communities but also created an identity crisis across all ethnic groups in the whole of the country. There is still a tension between the two different approaches to the national minorities in Turkey. One clings to the monolithic definition of citizenship and the other strives for the decentralization of the state along ethnic lines. Answering questions on what direction Turkey will change and whether this transformation will be a liberal one requires a careful analysis of the complexities that Turkish modern history has created. This chapter will explore the complexities that the above mentioned minority regime and the order of the republican constitution have created in Turkey.

4.1 Turkey’s Kurdish Dilemma: Civic State Nationalism and Assimilation

It is not possible to single out one dominant feature that is capable of characterizing what kind of nationalism in Turkey has been salient throughout its history. The literature on Turkish nationalism has embraced a conception of the Turkish nation that combines both civic and ethnic elements. As Canefe argued ‘Turkish nationalism exhibits a highly hybrid character’ (Canefe 2002: 135, Kadioglu 1996: 17, Tezcur 2009: 2). For this reason I need to clarify that when I talk about civic nationalism in Turkey, it is only to define the nationalism to which Kurds have been exposed to, not to define the entirety of Turkish nationalism that might be quite exclusionary in its relation to other groups. When I talk about civic state nationalism in Turkey I am referring to an illiberal form of civic nationalism: to an integrationist ideal on the part of the state, which does not necessarily translate into the voluntary incorporation of all of the Kurds. I will show that those Kurds who were unwilling to assimilate have been forced to do so. In articulation of this particular nationalism I will follow two main points.

First of all I will illustrate the inclusionary dimension of Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis Kurds by comparing it to the exclusionary dimension of Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis Non-Muslims. Whether a particular nationalism is conceived of as ethnic or civic
has much to do with whether its conception of nation is informed by primordial or constructivist lenses of nationhood. Although the constructivist approach was accepted by the 1924 constitution in making the Turkish nation it can be safely stated that cultural components such as language, religion and ethno-symbolic resources limited the boundaries of its construction. For this reason, to define Turkish nationalism by looking at its relation to particular groups at certain periods of time would be to fall prey to the fallacy of dismissing any degree of complexity to its history. Within this framework I will argue that due to the historical contingencies it is quite possible to see Turkish nationalism as exclusionary in its relation to the Non-Muslim population whereas this is not the case for Non-Turkish speaking Muslim groups, including Kurds. They have always been addressed by the civic French conception of nationhood, in which the assimilation into the mainstream community was the only option.

Secondly I will focus on the assimilation of Kurds in Turkey and discuss whether this can be entirely portrayed as either voluntary or forceful. As concerns these problems I will argue that neither ethnic groups nor ‘the state in Turkey should be seen as a monolithic and static entity’ (Tezcur 2009: 5, Somer 2004). Hence to focus on a limited numbers of actors and sources to illustrate the entirety of Turkish nationalism as ethnic wouldn’t be doing justice to the complexity of the reality.

37 All other dimensions of the dichotomy have been refuted on the grounds that both are cultural in some respects, exclusionary in different degrees, and illiberal in their practices. For a detailed argument see Chapter 2.

38 Here I am going to focus on Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis the position of Kurds not because I assume that it provides us with a more accurate picture of the nationalism in Turkey but because the paper is specifically concerned with the peculiarities of the nationalism to which Kurds in Turkey have been exposed. The reader should be reminded that this study is helpful to understand the evolution of nationalist ideology in Turkey yet it is not for the sake of categorizing the nature of Turkish nationalism per se but rather for exploring its results. This chapter’s main task is to explain the segmented societal culture of Kurds in Turkey. This segmented forms of assimilation will be used later to analyse to what extent it is viable, in both practical and normative sense, for Turkey to transform from a centralizing tradition to a multiculturalist system where the cultural groups would be differentiated and power would be devolved along the lines of ethnicity.
Nationalism is an ideological phenomenon which changes depending on the context and those people who interact with it. For this reason, a careful analysis requires one to trace this dynamic process by accounting for the ‘multiple reference populations and correspondingly segmented forms of assimilation’ (Brubaker 2001: 540, Neckerman 1999). Assimilation is a social phenomenon that can only be perceived and experienced subjectively (Teske and Nelson 1974) and for this reason anyone, who tends to describe the relationship between the Kurds and the state as a forceful assimilation of the former by the latter, has to engage with the heterogeneity of Kurdish communities that have evidently not emerged as a monolithic entity and some members of which voluntarily assimilated into the mainstream community (Heper 2007). ‘The relationship between Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms cannot be adequately captured as the resistance of the latter to the domineering attempts of the former’ (Tezcur 2009: 8). Those scholars like Mann (2005: 12) who insist on a narrow account of forceful assimilation to depict the position of Kurds in Turkey do not allow the past the dignity of complexity that they would surely grant to the present. In so doing, their theory tends towards the elevation of mere fragments into totalising and ‘authentic’ entities. I will explain that Kurds, who have experienced state policies from different angles in the past, vary in their opinions today and this variation also corresponds to their diverse political orientations and expectations in modern Turkey.

Now I will elaborate on the first point of my argument, which is about who has been the subject of exclusion in Turkish nationalism and what it meant for the Kurds.

During the assembly debates on the 1924 constitution, the French conception of nation ‘universalist, rationalist, assimilationist and state centered’ (Brubaker 1990: 386) has been accepted to constitute the foundation of the citizenship regime in Turkey (Killi 1971). It was stated in the Article 88 of the 1924 constitution (the founding constitution of Turkey) that ‘The people of Turkey regardless of their religion

\[39\] Mann (2005: 12) in a totalizing manner asserts that Kurdish speaking people in Turkey has suffered 'institutional coercion, policed repression, violent repression, and unpremeditated mass killings' (Tezcur 2009: 3).
and race is called Turk by citizenship’. It is also stated in Article 54 of the 1961 Constitution that ‘Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is Turkish’. Article 66 of the 1982 constitution repeated the same (Killi and Gozubuyuk: 2000: 186,283; Yegen 2009: 606). Moving from this point, Sherman (1960) argued that the Turkish case is an example of constructive nationalism in which the nation has been embodied by the agency of the state, not vice-versa. Heper (2007: 95) argued that ‘Turkey emerged as a state-nation rather than as a nation state’ and Shankland (1999) claimed that there is not a clear direction of influence between ethnic Turk and Turkishness. Atatürk in his speeches made it clear that ‘The inhabitants of modern Turkey, whom we call the Turks, and who of course are the Turks in the sense that they compose the modern Turkish nation, are really a people formed over many centuries out of a mixture of races such as pre-Hittites, Hittites, Phrygians, Celts, Jews, Macedonians, Romans, Armenians, Kurds and Mongols… [At some point] Turks from Asia added themselves to the stock…’ (Heper 2007: 84, Hotham 1972: 72).

This idea however has been challenged in two respects: one in theory and the other in practice. As concerns the theoretical level, Yegen (2004) argues that what is implied by the constitution refers to a Turkishness in terms of citizenship which, according to him, automatically yields itself to a meaning that there was ‘another—more authentic—Turkishness’ which cannot be acquired by only citizenship. For instance, ‘the law enacted in 1926 specified Turkishness, instead of Turkish citizenship, as a requirement for becoming a state employee. The fourth item of article 88 stated that being Turkish is a precondition for becoming a state employee’ 40 Moreover in Cumhuriyet Newspaper of 2 July 1938 a precondition for admission to the Military Veterinary School as well as to the Air Forces was announced as ‘being a

40 This does not have any discriminatory implications because the term Turkish in this sentence might also be understood as described by the Constitution that accepts all citizens of the country as Turkish (by citizenship). Moreover ‘this law was in use until 1965… Article 657, which is currently in use specifies ‘Turkish citizenship’ instead of ‘Turkishness’ as a precondition for becoming a state employee….’ (Yegen 2004: 56).
citizen of Turkish Republic and being of Turkish race’ (Yildiz 2001).

4.1.1. Non-Muslims and Exclusion

Application of these undeniably exclusionary regulations, however, was mainly limited to Non-Muslim citizens who were believed\(^{41}\) by the state to be unable to assimilate into the Turkish community or rather thought to be constituting a fifth column (Baer 2004) within the country.\(^{42}\) Non-Muslim constituencies had still not been accepted to the military schools and many other security related institutions in Turkey by 2007.

Heper suggested that the ‘recognition of the Non-Muslim as citizens was only in legal, not in sociological, terms’ (Heper 2007: 91). The Non-Muslim minorities have been either excluded from the body politic or deported from the country. Cagaptay (2006), drawing on statistical year books of 1929 and 1934 as cited in the work of McCarthy (1982: 60-8), revealed that ‘Christians made up 20 per cent of Turkey’s population; fifteen years later, in 1927, they had dropped to as few as 2.64 per cent’ (Cagaptay 2006: 62). Historical examples are also rich to illustrate this religious essence of the nationalism in Turkey. The Lausanne Peace Treaty, according to which only non-Muslims have been accepted as a minority, is a clear indicator to the fact that despite the civic rhetoric employed in the Constitution the boundary of Turkishness at that time was primarily drawn by Islam and not the language (Taspinar 2005).

\(^{42}\) There were two reasons for it. Firstly, it is true that some national minorities are relatively more compact, culturally distinct and have developed an internal awakening even before their host state started its own nation-building project. In such cases, the ethnic conflict regulation/integration policy of a state is shaped not only by its past ethnic conflict regulation/integration policy but by the pre-political qualities of a minority. For example, the Young Turks did not have any choice other than to embody Turkishness with a strong link to Muslimness and thereby in opposition to Christianity or Judaism as being the primary ‘other’. This was mainly because the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was facilitated by the nationalisms of Christian subjects the majority of whom had already demarcated themselves as the ‘other’ in the first place. As Canefe stated ‘it is only in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the massive loss of life and land these caused that Turkism began to appear as a viable alternative to the Ottomanist agenda’ (Canefe 2002: 143). Secondly, the definition of Turkishness was not only an internal matter of self-identification to be dealt at the hands of an elite within the Turkish Republic it was also given a meaning by how the Europeans described it. The word Turk in the European context was a generic term used to signify the Muslim people of Ottoman Anatolia regardless of their ethnicities. (Kushner 1977)
The population exchange between Turkey and Greece is also an important case in which this religious conceptualization of the nation could be observed. In this exchange, Non-Turkish speaking Muslim groups have been accepted to Turkey while Turkish-speaking Non-Muslims who resided in Anatolia for centuries were deported to Greece (Hirschon 2003). Moreover works on early immigration to Turkey reveals that non-Turkish speaking ‘Bosnians, Greek, Serbian, Macedonian, Albanian and Bulgarian Muslims, who faced extermination or repression in the newly independent Balkan states, fled to Anatolia’ (Cagaptay 2006: 62). While Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire were easily accepted in Turkey and naturalized on the condition that they would learn Turkish, the case for Non-Muslim residents of Anatolia was quite the opposite (Ahmad 1993). In the wake of the Republican regime, the ‘Armenian population of the Ottoman Anatolia was already decimated’ (Canefe 2002: 145) and a majority of the Greek Orthodox Community was also displaced and those who remained in the country were intimidated and terrorized through the policies of discrimination. The Property Tax Law (Varlık Vergisi Kanunu) was only one of those policies deployed to this effect.

On 12 November 1942, an additional tax, levied exclusively on non-Muslims, was introduced on the basis of law 4305. This law concerned 4 to 5 thousand of an estimated 28,000 Armenians, Greeks, Jews and even Dönme (Jews or Christians converted to Islam)…Those who could not pay up were exiled or condemned to forced labour in ‘Turkey’s Siberia’, namely in the quarries of Aşkale near Erzurum, where 21 forced laborers died (Hoffman 2002: 16).

Although an inclusive civic rhetoric has been used in its constitutions, an exclusionary nationalism in Turkey was obviously prevalent for Non-Muslim minorities. Yegen thinks ‘it may be safely stated that the pre-eminent other of extreme nationalism, especially in the sixties and seventies, was not the Kurds but rather non-muslimhood…’ (Yegen 2007: 135). Mustafa Kemal, before and during the first years of Republic, was in a tactical alliance with the clerics to gain the support of all Muslim subjects and mobilize them around a nationalist goal (Toprak 1981). During his speech to the Turkish Parliament in 1920, Ataturk said ‘you the members of this
dignified assembly, are not only Turks, or Circassians, or Kurds or Lazies, you are the Islamic element made up all of these’ (Ataturk’s speeches and declarations, I-III, pp: 74-5, also in Cagaptay 2002: 69). In his letter to the Caliph, Mustafa Kemal used praising words such as ‘Our Great Khan’. It was not the military quarters but the mosques where people were mobilized through Cuma Khutba (sermon delivered at the noon prayer on Fridays and on certain other occasions). The Assembly of the Turkish Republic was opened for the first time in 1920 on a Friday with the accompaniment of prayers. Finally in the founding 1924 constitution of Turkey it was stated that ‘Islam is the religion of the state’ and this was not revoked until 1928 (Stirling 1958: 395-408).

4.1.2 Kurds and Inclusion

Yet the boundary drawn by Islam in Turkey was only able to create a circle of Muslim people whose linguistic differences remained as a barrier before the nation-building.\(^{43}\) Andrews (1989) articulates the number of ethnic groups in Turkey of the early Republican era as 49 whereas Soysu (1992) claims that this number was

\[^{43}\text{In fact, in the first place the political order, in Ataturk’s mind, was not of a highly centralized government that would be dominated by one language. It is known from a telegram Mustafa Kemal sent to the deputy Commander of the 13th Army Corps, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, in the Southeast that his first intention was to grant autonomy to Kurds. In this telegram Ataturk was saying that ‘I am in favour of granting all manner of rights and privileges in order to ensure the attachment to the state and the prosperity and progress of our Kurdish brothers, on the condition that the Ottoman state is not split up’ (Mango 1997: 7). Another telegram to the commander of the Southern front Ataturk was saying that ‘in the areas inhabited by Kurds, we consider it a necessity to set up gradually a local government…it is expected that the Kurds by that time would have completed the setting up of their local government’ (Mango 1997: 33). However, these ideas have not been put into practice for two reasons as explained by Heper’s (2007) account. Firstly because after 1922 Some Kurds especially in southern and eastern part of the country started to develop a hostile approach to the officers sent from the center. Heper (2007) drawing on the writings of Arslan (1991), who collected observations about Kurds between 1919 and 1923 in a book, explains the atmosphere in the region as follows; ‘In Diyarbakır, in such public places as coffeehouses and reading rooms the local people are saying to officers. What business do you still have here?’ ‘When will you go away?’(Heper 2007: 121). The second reason for failing to put this idea into practice was rather about practical and demographic constraints. Ataturk’s words on the issue is translated by Shaw (2000: 745) as follows ‘Within the national boundaries of Turkey, many Kurds live. However, they are settled in such a way that they are in the majority only in a few places. As Kurds have spread out from the places where they had lived before and started to live among Turks, a situation had arisen such that if one wanted to draw a boundary around some places where Kurds also lived, that would have led to the disintegration of Turkey’\]
indeed 100. It was clearly impossible for a newly founded state to operate with such a high number of languages. Moreover creating a national consciousness and solidarity without establishing a uniform language was also deemed impractical by the founders of the republic (Saatci 2002, Barkey 2000). The significance of the one official language in Turkey was continuously accentuated. ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign was launched in 1928 (Aslan 2007: 252). In the same year Arabic alphabet was replaced with Latin script not only to ensure a clear break from the Ottoman and Islamic past but also to make it easier and quicker for the people to become literate and to bring up the Turkish nation with a ‘modern’ European outlook.

The barriers before the nation building were not just of linguistic diversity but also the supremacy of religiosity inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Just after the republican regime was established, the foundation of the Republic was depicted by the republican cadre as an attempt to move away from the Ottoman Empire. An empire that evoked failure and backwardness associated with Caliph and the asymmetric powers of Sheikhs who maintained a feudal order under his divine authority (Barkey 2000). ‘In Atatürk’s opinion it was the scholastic interpretation of Islam and the irrational approach to religion that were to be blamed for the fall of the Ottoman Empire’ (Demir 2005:11). The Republicans’ mission in this context was to secularize and centralize the administration and most of all to liberalize the country similar to its European models that also replaced divine authority and regnal loyalties with national sovereignty and citizenship. As early as 1921, Ataturk implicitly revealed his intention to transform the ideological base of the political order from dynastic loyalty to national sovereignty when he said that ‘Authority, without any condition and reservation, belongs to the nation’. Only after the republican regime was established, however, could he gradually realize this idea by introducing a series of laws, which would ultimately eradicate the institutional power of Islam and its political function. ‘The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 was the first step in the de-institutionalization of religious involvement in the politics. This was followed by the
abolition, on the same date, of the Office of the Seyhu-I Islam and the Ministry of Religious affairs and Pious Foundations (Seriye ve evkaf vekaleti). These three offices had provided an institutional base for the din-u devlet (Sharia or theocratic state) concept.\(^4^4\) (Toprak 1981: 46). John Palmer and Charles Smith argued that ‘Mohammedan fanaticism was outraged by Mustafa Kemal’s policy of secularization’ (Palmer and Smith 1942: 12, Heper 2007: 148). The (Sunni) Kurds who had been very loyal to Caliph were also outraged by this idea. Indeed it was especially traumatic for Sunni Kurds because Mustafa Kemal had won their hearts and minds partly through appealing to their religious sentiments during the War of Liberation, which occurred just a few years previously. Now with the abolition of this institutional bond between the various ethnic Muslim groups in Turkey, the primary tool employed in the nation-building process, became nothing but the idea of sharing a territorial boundary within which the language of the state would be Turkish only. Sheikh Said in his effort to mobilize an uprising was trying to incite other Kurdish and particularly Zaza Sheikhs with the following words ‘Earlier we had a common Caliphate, and this gave to our religious people a deep feeling of being a part of the community that the Turks also belonged to. Since the abolition of the Caliphate, the only thing we are left with is Turkish repression’ Bozarslan (2003: 180). Seal (1996: 238) and Houston (2001: 99) emphasize that ‘on the very day the Republic abolished the Caliphate [3rd March 1924] it also published a decree banning all Kurdish schools, associations and publications’.\(^4^5\) It has been the very start of an assimilation policy that would facilitate the construction of the modern Turkish nation with a strong emphasis on the territorial integrity.\(^4^6\)

\(^4^4\) ‘Religious sects and orders, dervish monasteries and mausoleums of local saints were closed and in order to break with the past he went even further’ (Heper 2007: 166) and in 1926 a secular Civil Law code was adopted.

\(^4^5\) Tevhid-i Tedrisat was mainly about the centralization of education and it was not particularly aimed at banning the Kurdish language but all languages other than Turkish.

\(^4^6\) Although Islam was to be a cultural bond among the majority of the population and Turkish was to be only official language in the country for practical reasons, the real emphasis of the Kemalist nationalism was on the territorial definition of the nation. This ideal was obvious in
Before going any further there are two important points requiring clarification. They are about the conceptualization of assimilation and the civic nationalism that I will often employ to illustrate the historical relationship between the state and Kurds in Turkey.

Firstly, erroneous interpretations of civic-ethnic dichotomy extend so far as to amount to an assumption that civic nationalism should be acultural and in any case of nationalism, where there is representation of ethno-cultural aspects, this should be categorized as ethnic. Here the reader should be reminded that, as the ontology of nationalism would suggest, the dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalisms has less to do with the presence or absence of cultural or ethnic aspects in their ultimate productions (Brubaker 2006). This is inevitable that any social entity has to have a cultural ingredient and therefore the invisible boundaries of a nation are limited by socio-historical contingencies. From an ontological perspective, each so called civic nationalism, no matter how much it claims to be based on territorial and political values, also rests on a cultural component (Kymlicka 1989, Raz and Margalit 1990, Kozma 2006). Ethnic boundaries affect policy and politics as much as the reverse. When the issue comes to the use of language in recreating a common national identity, even the nations that claim to be the most civic and inclusive cannot avoid choosing an official language to be used by its subjects in relation to the state. Turkey used Turkish to create a common national identity and consciousness among Kurds, Lazes, Arabs, Romanis, Albanians and Circassians whose mother tongue were

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**Ataturk**’s declaration that ‘Neither Islamic union nor Turanism can be.. a logical policy for us to adopt. Henceforth our policy will be that of living independently and enjoying sovereignty within our national frontiers’ (Allen 1935: 541, Heper 2007: 87).

47 This is not only articulated by ethno-symbolist scholars like Smith and Hutchinson but also suggested by theoretical works of even those who think that ‘nation’ in the modern sense is primarily an entity of construction, invention or imagination. Their emphasis on the construction of nations does not automatically translate into the view that the stuff of imagining or constructing (the nation) can be invented ex nihilo. Those who insist so are few and far between. Hobsbawm (1990) who argued that inventions’ of modern nationalists must resonate, otherwise their project is doomed to fail; Breuilly (1993) who concedes that nationalist intellectuals and politicians use myths and symbols from the past to promote a particular national identity; Anderson (1991) who defined nation as a ‘sovereign and limited imagined community’—my emphasis added—can be given as examples of those modernists who would inevitably accept that the stuff of imagining can be found in pre-existing cultural identities.
thereby excluded from the public sphere. As can be seen, each nation has a cultural boundary and therefore what makes the dichotomy relevant is not the suggestion that the ethnic one is based on exclusion while the civic one is not. They both are exclusionary to some extent (Brubaker 2006) but what differs in these nationalisms is indeed the fact that in the civic nationalism people of other cultures are permitted and accepted to become a member of the respective nation provided they are ready to adopt the political values, culture and language of the dominant ethnic core (Jackson Preece 2005). Whereas in ethnic nationalism the people of other cultures, language or religion are not anticipated to become a member of the respective nation because ethnic nationalism—in the primordial sense—assumes that the boundaries of nation are given by nature and thus nationality cannot be attained later (Connor 1972, Shils 1957). It means that in ethnic nationalism there is no project for incorporation (Barry 2001: 83). Unlike in Turkey the state policies have always been informed by the goal of eventual incorporation and assimilation of Kurds and other Muslim ethnies into the mainstream community. To this effect Kurds, like any other citizens of non-Turkic ethnie, have been expected to relegate their ethnic identities and cultural differences to their private lives.

Secondly it is also another erroneous interpretation of the dichotomy to assume that civic nationalism is necessarily associated with liberalism whereas eastern ethnic nationalism is accepted as illiberal (Kohn 1944). This wrong use of the dichotomy has obviously led some scholars to associate assimilationist policies in Turkey with ethnic nationalism. For example Kutschera (1979: 89-90) who speaks of Kurdish genocide, and Van Bruinessen (1994), who termed it as ethnocide, think that it was the Kurdish identity per se that the state in Turkey endeavoured to ‘eliminate’. Within this

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48 Brubaker suggests that there are few ethnic nationalists that would have got so far if the members of the minority adopt the language or religion of its majority. The primordialist conception of ethnic nationalism leaves us with a very few examples that can qualify within this category. I argue that although a civic conception of nation is adopted in most examples, politics of exclusion and differentialism in all cases is informed by the primordialist idea that the boundaries between people of different ethno-cultures are fixed and will always be so. For a more detailed argument see Chapter 2.
perspective assimilation is pre-supposed to have a pejorative meaning and is wrongly associated with ethnic nationalism, foundations of which, as explained above, are indeed very against the formation of identity by any means of construction such as forceful or voluntary assimilation, amalgamation or acculturation. Behind the argument that links the assimilation to ethnic nationalism, there is a more serious problem in the sense that assimilation is confused with the concept of cultural annihilation reducing the former to a process of absorption after which the identity of origin on the part of the one who is being assimilated ceases to maintain its distinct character. Whether assimilation may imply cultural annihilation for the one who is being assimilated depends upon whether or not the culture that the one assimilates into and the culture of origin that the one assimilates from are mutually exclusive. One may not become half Christian and half Muslim at the same time, yet one can be half Turkish and half Kurdish, or one may identify her national identity as Turkish while preserving her ethnic Kurdish identity. As suggested by Zolberg (1997) in his work ‘modes of incorporation’, learning and using Turkish does not necessitate one to forget her knowledge of Kurdish. While the sort of assimilation that implies cultural annihilation can be called absorptive assimilation, the second type of assimilation where a ‘previous cultural membership is retained while acquiring a new one’ (Baubock 1998: 43) should be understood as an additive assimilation (Barry 2001: 81). Those who think that assimilation is annihilation usually assume that one has to cease to be Kurdish in order to become Turkish. Thus assimilation has been conceptualized by some scholars like Kutschera (1979), Nezan (1980) and Entessar (1992) to epitomize the Kemalist Turkish nationalism as if it were, in essence, something of ethnic nationalism that systematically targeted the cultural annihilation of non-Turkish speaking Muslim minorities in the course of homogenization.

This is what Heper (2007) does not accept. In his response to the ethnicist interpretation of Turkish nationalism, Heper dedicated a book to argue that what happened in Turkey is not assimilation of Kurds (in an absorptive sense). In his
account of ‘the state and Kurds in Turkey’ Heper makes a differentiation between the terms of assimilation and acculturation arguing that ‘the state in Turkey has not resorted to forceful assimilation of the Kurds, because the founders of the state had been of the opinion that for long centuries, both Turks and Kurds in Turkey particularly the latter had gone through the process of acculturation, or steady disappearance of cultural distinctiveness as a consequence of a process of voluntary, or rather unconscious, assimilation’ (Heper 2007: 6). Although Heper is right in his defence of the view that acculturation (in the sense of additive assimilation) has not been systematically translated into absorptive assimilation of Kurds, there is an irrefutable fact that undermines the legitimacy of Turkish Nationalism in its relation to the Kurds. It is the absorptive and forceful characteristic of state policies against those Kurds who rejected the relegation of their identities to their private sphere and who resisted the idea of additive assimilation for various reasons. In what follows I will argue that in these resistance cases civic ideals of additive assimilation have been derogated by policies of repression that even reached to the extent of absorptive assimilation.

In what follows I will endeavour to bring the complex relations to the forefront by focusing on these two dimensions of Turkish nationalism: first, an ever remaining idealization of civic nationalism-incorporation, and later the historical forceful assimilation in practice.

4.1.3 Some Kurds and Voluntary Incorporation

The emphasis on the voluntary incorporation of Kurdish community to the mainstream community in Turkey has often been challenged or ignored, by those who take the roots of Kurdish nationalism for granted, assuming that the Kurdish nationalism was derivative of a Kurdish nation. In his arguments Entessar (1992: 81) states that ‘No country has been as preoccupied with the eradication of Kurdish national Identity as Turkey in the twentieth century’. That which persists, it is implicitly
asserted, is all that there was. Along the line of this argument likeminded scholars tend to assume that the state’s oppressive policies radicalized the Kurdish ‘national’ movement. It should be emphasized that here the word is not ‘nationalist’ but ‘national’ which presumes that there had already been a nation in the name of which the nationalist movement was justified. Just like those who insist on matching the Turkish nation with one particular ethnic root in the past, those scholars such as Entessar (1992), Nezan (1980) who approach the Kurdish nation in the same manner, also suffer from their one sided view of history that neglects whose culture and expectations would be scotched, suppressed and silenced in the formation of both ethnic and national identities. Having said that I will explain how diverse, like any other groups, the Kurdish community has been, and how some of the Kurdish groups, on the contrary of nationalist segments, supported the centralized administration in Turkey and chose to incorporate to the mainstream community for a variety of reasons such as religious affiliations and maximizing material benefits. Those who reached important positions in the administration and society of Turkey will also be given to illustrate that only in the presence of ideal of civic-inclusive nationalism this incorporation could be possible.

Kurdish nationalists and some scholars interpret the Lausanne Peace Conference where the non-Turkish speaking Muslims were left out of the minority definition as a disappointing moment which led Kurds to start an armed struggle against the Republic. Olson (1989: 39-41) and White (1995) states that after the Lausanne treaty all possibilities and talks of granting autonomy to Kurds disappeared and after then, ‘Bitterly disappointed, the Kurds turned again to armed struggle in 1925 led by Sheikh Said and was organized by Azadi’ (White 1995: 73). On the other hand the record of March 1923 confidential sessions in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey reveals that almost all Kurdish deputies spoke strongly in favor of the inseparability of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples. Heper’s account of the Kurdish MPs’ approach to the Lausanne Peace conference is also quite different from what
has been depicted by White (1995), Olson (1989), Entessar (1992) and Nezan (1980).

In Heper’s account, examples of Kurdish MPs’ expressions to support the unity of Kurds and Turks are summarized as follows,

‘We (Kurds and Turks) are no different from each other ... We have no conflict among ourselves. We have neither a Turkish nor a Kurdish problem. We are all brothers (Diyop Agha), ‘If you can lay bare the true sentiments of the Kurds and the Turks, you would see that They have the same vision for the future of this country. The Turks and the Kurds became so mingled together that our nation that, (the allies) are trying to tear apart, constitutes one single entity.’(Necati Bey from Erzurum whose mother was Kurd); ‘In the invitation to the (Lausanne Peace) Conference, there is the term ‘Non-Turks’. I am a Kurd... I beg our delegates to tell everybody that the Turk and Kurd together constitute one single nation. I ask our delegates to reject such a reference to the Kurds in the strongest terms possible (Kurd Necib Bey from Mardin)’

(Heper 2007: 117).

Entessar (1992) in his account of the Sheikh Said rebellion accepts that ‘the rebellion failed because the Azadi leaders were unable to coordinate the Kurdish officers rebellion with the anticipated uprisings of tribal leaders’ (Entessar 1992: 83) but this author and his likeminded colleagues like Nezan (1980) avoid asking why it was the case. Those scholars who wrote on Kurdish national movements are rather reluctant to accept that tribal and religious matters were the overriding determinants of these movements, which did not resonate with those Kurds who lacked national consciousness or integrity of any sort. On April 19 1920, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George made the following observation:

When it comes to Kurdistan, it is difficult to decide which policy to adopt...Once it was thought that separating Kurdistan from Turkey and granting autonomy to it would have been the best policy .Yet it has never been clear what exactly the Kurds themselves preferred. On the basis of a study of this issue that I had asked to be made in Istanbul, Baghdad and elsewhere, I now have the impression that a Kurd does not represent any entity other than his own tribe. ...’ (Arslan 1991: 47 cited in Heper 2007: 113)

Given the absence of a unity on the part of Kurds, Mustafa Kemal and his associates did not think that they would be challenged by a remarkable threat in the long run

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49 Azadi (freedom) is an organization that was established sometime between 1921 and 1924 and whose objectives according to Olson (1989: 45) were as follows: ‘to deliver the Kurds from Turkish oppression; to give Kurds freedom and opportunity to develop their country; and obtain British assistance, realizing Kurdistan could not stand alone’ the republican cadre saw this as a merely a product of foreign complicity. From a perspective of chronological order it was meaningless for Kurds to oppose Turkish oppression because there was neither any remarkable trace of such oppression nor an ethnic interpretation of Turkishness by the authorities that preceded 1924 (Somer 2004: 241).
(Barkey and Fuller 1998: 11). After all as can be understood from the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the state’s policies happened to be only in favour of those Kurds who defended unity and incorporation as opposed to Kurds who did not. Targeted incorporation of the Kurds into the mainstream has been facilitated by resorting to a territorial definition of the nation including equal opportunities and cultural commonalities such as religion and common history. Particular segments of Kurdish society have complied with state policies and not developed resistance to this ideal. First of all, in the very beginning of the Kurdish resistance movements, the ordinary Kurdish peasantry did not attach themselves to the rebellions led by Sheikhs and tribal leaders because the Sheikh’s revolts ‘promised them no relief from exploitative landlords, while Ankara had already announced its desire to curtail feudalism’ (Romano 2006: 106). There are European parallels in Hungary and Poland. Along the same line of this argument Bulloch and Morris (1992) identified the main motivation behind these Kurdish rebellions as being of the desire of Sheikhs to ‘be left alone to exercise their feudal tyranny over as many of their countrymen as they can contrive to control’ (Bulloch and Morris 1992: 97).

The religious division between the Alevi and Sunni Kurds has also been a relevant factor to explain the incorporation and resistance patterns among members of Kurdish society. This division is accepted to be one of the elements that explain the failure of Sheikh Said to invoke an ethnic mobilization among Kurds in 1925. Olson explains this as follows:

The core of the Sheikh Said rebellion’s military leadership was drawn from Sunni former Hamidiye commanders, such as Xalid Beg Gibran, to whom Sheikh Said was related by marriage … Mindful of the depredations of the Hamidiye the Alevi tribes refused to join the rebellion, considering themselves better off in a secular Turkey, nominally Sunni, than in a self-declared Sunni Kurdistan in which the Naksabandi (Sunni) tarikat would assume a major role. The Alevi rejection of his overture greatly limited the potential area of the rebellion (Olson 1989: 94).

Similarly the Dersim uprising, which I will explore later in this chapter, failed chiefly because ‘it appeared to most Sunni Kurd at the time to be merely an Alevi uprising –
and thus not in their own interest’ (White 1995: 71; van Bruinessen 1978: 374-75). This historical distinction between more secular oriented Alevis and religious Sunni segments of the Kurdish population remained a relevant factor to explain their changing political orientations.

There were, in 1920 and 1937-38, rebellions of Kurdish Alevis against the Kemalist movement and the Republic, but at no time until today did Kurdish Alevis in significant numbers join forces with Sunni Kurds against the Kemalist regime. By and large, Kurdish as well as Turkish Alevis were supportive of the secular and populist ideals of Kemalism; many Kurdish Alevis voluntarily assimilated to Turkish culture and came to identify themselves as Turks rather than as Kurds’ (van Bruinessen 1996: 8).

Indeed not only a remarkable proportion of Alevis have been incorporated into the mainstream Turkish community by the secular ideals of the republic, but some Sunni Kurds have also been integrated to the mainstream by the political parties of the right wing with an Islamic flavor to some degree (Narli 1999). A great number of Sunni Kurds most of the time made their decisions in general elections to vote for parties of this kind. As can be deduced from party programs; Islam has always been pragmatically employed in Turkey to win the support of the Sunni Kurds. The right wing political parties with this aim have usually been successful to different degrees in incorporating the Sunni Kurds to the body politic. When the first multi-party politics began in Turkey in 1946, The Democrat Party—as the only alternative to Ataturk’s Republican People Party—came to represent and voice the traditional Sunni Islamic values in the social and institutional strata that beforehand the republican revolution had sought to secularize. During the era of DP—the first political party that won an election against Ataturk’s Republican Party—the relevance of Islam increased in the

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50 Known to have an Islamist branch, the ANAP—Anavatan Partisi: the Motherland Party— campaigned on a secular platform and adopted an accommodationist stance toward religion. For example, when asked about Islamist political activity, Yilmaz replied that the secular nature of the Turkish state was secure and that therefore Islamists should be permitted to express their views freely. On the positive end of the scale are those parties that explicitly include Islam in their platform and champion anti-secularist issues such as women’s rights to wear the headscarf in universities and other public offices. The MHP—Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi: the Nationalist Movement Party—includes a religious plank and supports Islamist struggles, but does not advocate the Islamicization of the state. The RP—Refah Partis: the Welfare Party—, at the Islamist pole of the continuum, argues that Islam represents the true identity of the Turkish state’ (A.J. Secor 2001: 549).
eastern regions. For example, ‘after 1950, within a year, 250,000 Quran and thousands of religious books, many of which aimed to lessen Kurdish nationalism, were sold in the region’ (Alis 2009: 55, Karpat 1967: 244). While being concerned with undermining the Kurdish nationalism, The DP’s policies were simultaneously accompanied by a means of incorporation and inclusion. This is shown by the fact that, like many other Kurdish figures from the eastern regions, Abdulmelik Firat, who is Sheikh Said’s grandson, could also become a member of the parliament between 1950 and 1960 (Akar 1996). Like the DP, succeeding AP (Adalet Paritsi–Justice Party) was also similarly supported by the Kurds. Again the DP’s emphasis on the urgent need to rectify regional disparities between the eastern and western parts of the country was rejuvenated by the AP (Kokce 2010: 89). This approach was evident in AP’s 1965 government program one part of which is as follows:

> To realize a balanced development in a social justice framework, we have to narrow the development gap among the regions. There are great gaps in terms of life and living standards in most parts of the country, especially in East and Southeast regions (Kokce 2010: 89, Yeğen 1999: 163).

In the 1961 elections The Justice Party and New Turkey party shared the votes of the electors in east. Doctor Yusuf Azizoglu from the New Turkey Party who became the minister of health in 1962 was a Kurd. Prime Minister and later the president Özal who thought it is very likely that the ethnic differences could be overcome by a recourse to Islam and equal citizenship was also of Kurdish origin, and he frequently said so in public (Leezenberg 2001: 26, Genckaya 2001, Akyol 2006:221, Heper 2007: 125). According to Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 112), after the 1980 coup even the military that used to be known as the guardian of the secular regime ‘viewed religion as a political tool to boost national unity and weaken the influence of Marxist and separatist ideas’. Duran (1998) argued that Islam was again a salient factor to explain the collaborative attitude and political behaviours of those Kurds who voted for the Islamist-Welfare Party with 34 members of Kurdish origin in the 1995 general
elections (Barkey and Fuller 1998:106). Lastly in 2007’s parliamentary elections, for example, ‘the Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) managed to collect 56 percent of the southeast’s votes. Even in Diyarbakir, considered a pro-Kurdish DTP stronghold, the AKP took 41 percent of votes’ (Schleifer 2009). Moreover as of 2007 elections the AKP has 75 MPs who are of Kurdish origin. ‘It has been estimated that by the end of the twentieth century … at least one-fourth of the deputies elected to Parliament since 1923 have been of Kurdish origin’ (Heper 2007: 118, Ergil 2000: 126). Hotham (1972: 180) states that

‘Many Kurds in Turkey (though their ethnic origin is never publicly referred to) have reached high positions in the Turkish state and enriched many walks of life, in the same sort of way it seems to me as Scotsmen, Welshmen, or Irishmen, have done in Britain’ (Heper 2007: 118, Cornell 2001).

Those Kurds who have been elected to the Parliament though could only operate within the boundaries of the official ideology dictating that the only official language is Turkish, and the politics of ethnicity has no place in the office. These people have been evidence of the fact that the citizens of any ethnicity could enjoy influential positions in Turkey so long as they have not made their ethnicity an issue. Indeed these Kurds who cooperated with the state were to be condemned and attacked by radical Kurdish nationalists.

‘Texts such as The Way of the Kurdish Revolution, distributed in 1975 contained extremely brutal attacks on the Kurdish bourgeoisie, accused of collaboration with the Turkish state’ (Chaliand 1994: 47)

‘Some of the former DEP (a pro-Kurdish party) deputies were also very intolerant of Kurds in other political parties. According to Yasar Kaya, many prominent deputies of Kurdish origin serving other parties such as Hikmet Cetin, Kamran Inan, and Fehmi Isiklar were traitors who had betrayed the Kurdish cause…The PKK, too, in accordance with its Decree on Village Raids has attacked and burned ‘non revolutionary villages that do not support national struggle for liberation’ (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 131-147).

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51 Barkey and Fuller (1998: 106) argue that ‘Had there been no national 10 percent threshold blocking (pro-Kurdish) HADEP’S entry into parliament, Welfare’s representation in the south east would have been seriously reduced’. Nevertheless this does not undermine the fact that remarkable number of Kurds in east instead of abstaining from voting, chose to vote for Welfare that ‘obtained majority of the votes casts in Bingol city with 51.6 percent’ (Celebi 1996: Appendix 3).
4.1.4 Some other Kurds and Forced Assimilation

Although the majority of Kurds who chose to integrate into the mainstream community were given ‘equal opportunities’ as everyone else, no solution other than forceful assimilation was anticipated for those Kurds who were not willing to relegate their ethnic identity to their private sphere and who had rejected becoming Turkish in any form. ‘This, in a nutshell, was the problem of a significant portion of the Kurdish population’ (Cornell 2001).

The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 and the declaration of the decree banning the use of any language other than Turkish in public offices and schools was followed by a series of laws on secularization as explained before. In Mardin’s opinion this secularization process, the centralization of all administration and education for all in the Turkish language have been the primary factors that politicized the Kurds (Mardin 1993: 100-101). Resistance to these above mentioned developments steered a wave of mutinies in the 1920s and 30s. ‘Of the 18 rebellions that broke out between 1924 and 1938 17 were in Eastern Anatolia and 16 of them involved the Kurds’ (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 100, Simsir 1972). The first of these insurgencies was Sheikh Said rebellion (Olson 1989). As already mentioned before, Ataturk read this rebellion, as being more an outcome of religious fundamentalism or feudal resistance rather than Kurdish nationalism. This view is also supported by so many scholars since the rebellion had been led only by one Zaza speaking Sunni tribe. Moreover it was not supported by other Kurdish tribes let alone Alevi Zazas who felt more secure under the authority of the semi-secular Republic\textsuperscript{52} than the rule of Hanafi Sunni Kurds.

\textsuperscript{52} It is semi-secular because the day when the Caliphate was abolished witnessed the establishment of the directorate of Religious affairs (today the presidency of religious affairs) that would work under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Directorate of Religious Affairs has been given the responsibility to construct mosques, advise on issues of religious education, and administer the worships. The aim with the foundation of this institution was rather to keep the religious activities under state control and avoid the development of religious movements that would otherwise have challenged the authority and principles of republican regime.
Moreover even today Kurmanci has nothing to do with the language of Zaza (Kirmanci) people who demarcate themselves from Kurmanci Kurds in the strongest terms possible\(^\text{53}\) and for this reason it would be meaningless to assume that the Zazas at that time might have revolted in the name of Kurmanci people to whom they could not even communicate properly. Whatever the main reason behind the rebellion was, the government’s reaction to this movement had certain assimilative implications for both Zaza and Kurmanci people who lived in the region.

While this rebellion was going on, Atatürk declared martial law and introduced ‘the 4 March 1925 Law on Maintenance of Order and Peace’—*Takrir-i Sukun*—which would create Independence Tribunals (*Istiklal Mahkemeleri*). These had complete authority of arrest and execution of those who committed treason and endangered the public order (Mumcu 1992). Independence tribunals authorized by the Martial Law sentenced Sheikh Said and 52 of his partisans to capital punishment. Police forces were established there and authorized with extraordinary powers to maintain tranquillity. The application of repression policies was not only confined to those who engaged with mutiny but also extended to ordinary people in the region who had been intimidated. One of the most important initiatives to prevent a further rebellion was formulated through the plan for the reformation of the East—*Sark Islahat Plani*. On 8th September 1925 this plan was issued by the prime ministry with the resolution number 2356 (Bayrakli 1993). According to article 14 of the Plan for Reformation of the East

People who speak a language other than Turkish in state and municipality, institutions, and other organs and administration, in schools, at the marketplace in the district and regional centers of Malatya, Elaziz, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Van, Mus, Urfa, Ergani, Hozat, Ercaş, Adilcevaz, Ahlat, Palu, Çarsancak, Çemişgezek, Ovacik, Hisnransur, Behisni, Arga, Hekimhan, Birecik, Çermik, (would) be brought before the courts (Fernandes 2008: 45).

\(^{53}\) As recently as the 1990s, when a former Kurdish separatist leader, Seyfi Cengiz, tried to convince villagers in his region that they were Kurds, the latter responded to him with the following words: “We are Kirmanci (Zaza). You are saying we are Kurdish. We are not Kurdish” (Heper 2007: 113).
In the meantime the government also initiated a plan to mix the populations of different ethnicities and introduced the resettlement law to this effect. More correctly the government employed its resettlement policies to strengthen the Turkish character of the population at the national level. Based on the resettlement law, no: 8885, 31 May 1926 Cagaptay (2006: 67) stated that

On 15 October 1925 Directorate General for resettlement decided that the Maras province whose inhabitants were of various elements, needed Turkish immigrants… 2nd resettlement law also focused on domestic population issues. Accordingly, it authorized the ministry of interior to relocate the nomadic tribes and others around suitable centres.

Fuat Dundar (2001: 137-54) also indicated that this policy was principally aimed at assimilating Kurds into the Turkish population. Kokdemir (1952: 28-30) argued that Turkey deployed this forced resettlement policy as a means to bully the mutinous elements in the country. Heper on the other hand argued that the law was ‘aimed at creating a new nation through integration rather than assimilation—forcing one ethnic community to adopt the ethnic primary identity of another ethnic community’ (Heper 2007: 169). To this end again, the government passed, in 1927, the Law Nr.1097 (Law on the transfer of certain people from the Eastern regions to the Western provinces). By this law almost fourteen hundred individuals from Agri province and the Eastern regions were resettled to the Western provinces (Cagaptay 2006: 68).

Another policy deployed against separatism was to ban any associations and political organizations established on the basis of ethnicity. Associations as such were banned by the Law no 765 published in the official Journal of the Turkish republic on 3rd March 1926, Articles 141 and 142 contain the key provisions:

Article 141-4 Any attempt, on the basis of race, to suppress or eliminate the rights recognized by the Constitution, the creation or attempted creation of organizations aiming to weaken or diminish national sentiment and the leadership or administration of such organizations are criminal offences punishable from eight to fifteen years' incarceration. Article 141-5: Membership to such organizations is punishable from five to twelve years' incarceration. 141-8: For the purposes of this legislation, an organization shall consist of any gathering of two or more persons to pursue a common goal. ….142-6: If any of the above mentioned criminal offences is committed

54 Cagaptay (2006) emphasized that, in the jargon of the time, nomad people were simply referring to the Kurds and Roma people.
by way of publication, the sentence will be increased by one half’ (Chaliand 1994: 31).

When the oppressive policies were in practice there were some other insurgencies taking place around The Agri Mountain. These uprisings that Captain Ihsan Nuri did lead and the Kurdish Nationalist organization the Hoybun55 supported were to be repressed by the government in 1930. Article 1 of the law no 1850 published on 29th July 1931 specified that:

Killings, and other acts committed, either individually the state or of its provinces, by civil or military personnel, as well as by local authorities, guards or the militia, or any civilian having aided them or having acted in accord with them, from the 20th June 1930 to the 10 December 1930, in the pursuit and extermination of uprisings which took place at Ercis, Zilan, Agri Dag and surrounding area, also including the region of the first inspectorate and the district of Pulumur, in the province of Erzincan, will not be considered as crimes (Chaliand 1994: 38).

The Dersim region had been problematic for almost a century. Inhabitants of the region consisted of Alevi Zazas by and large. Sheikhs and tribal leaders in the region did not accept any authority other than their own control and Dersim had remained as the last part of Turkey that could not be controlled by the mid-1930s. Tribal chiefs and Sheikhs insisted on maintaining their exercise of unlimited authority over the masses, whom they often abused economically (van Bruinessen 1994: 144-45). The US ambassador to Turkey stated in his Dersim report that ‘Although the Turkish government tried to solve the problem by means of economic reforms, tribal chieftains resisted these reforms, refused to pay taxes, and disrupted the constructions of bridges, roads and schools in the region’ (Cay 1993: 422-424). To subdue the insurgencies and revoke the feudal order, the government issued the 1934 Law on Resettlement–‘İskân Kanunu’ Law No.2510, 13th June 1934. In 1934, 25,381 people

55. The ruling government under Ismet Inonu saw this rebellion as an insurgency of feudal tribal chieftains because the Hoybun was led by leaders who belonged to the ‘great feudal (that is to say tribal) Kurdish families’ (Chaliand 1994: 37). Moreover ‘the rebellion obtained the tacit support of Reza Shah’s government in Iran and as a result Ihsan Nuri’s forces were able to freely cross into Iran and receive equipment and supplies from sources in Iran Kurdistan. Reza Shah apparently was intent on using his Kurdish card to force Turkey to settle some of its territorial disputes with Iran’ (Entessar 1992: 85).
from 5,074 households in Eastern and South Eastern cities were resettled to the western parts of Turkey (Tekeli 1990: 49).

Besikci (1990: 20) and van Bruinessen (1994: 146) in their studies on Dersim rebellion revealed that, as a second step, the Government had commanded the Army to ‘round up and deport the people in the rebellious districts… to render those who have used arms or are still using them once and for all harmless on the spot, to completely, destroy their villages and to remove their families’ (The secret Decision of the Council of Ministers on the Punitive Expedition to Dersim of 4 May 1937 quoted from van Bruinessen 1994: 6). After the Dersim rebellion was subdued in 1938, 7,954 persons were reported killed or caught alive yet Kurds claim that the number of death in Dersim was much higher (Kirmizitoprak, 1970). After the rebellion was subdued and mutineers were executed, reforms have been intensively realized in Dersim, the name of which was also changed to Tunceli in 1935. Schools were built and children were educated so intensively along the lines of Republican ideology that most of the later generations in the region not only assimilated into the mainstream very successfully but also ended up being proud of holding Turkish nationality (Selek 2006: 528-529). As of April 2011 the current leader of the mainstream Republican People’s Party (CHP) Kemal Kilicdaroglu is only one of those Alevi Zazas from Tunceli (Dersim) who has strongly opposed the politicization of ethnicity in Turkey in the modern era.

After all the number of Kurds deported to western Turkey in 1930s was in total 25,381 (Tekeli 1990: 49-55). Repressions of these rebellions between 1924 and 1938 resulted in the displacement of Kurds who would later mix with people of other ethnicities in the places they were resettled to.

In the 1930s and 1940s these assimilationist-integrationist policies went so far as to deny the very existence of a distinct Kurdish ethnicity. It was declared that Kurds were indeed (Mountain) Turks and they forgot their Turkishness in time. Those were the only times when Turkishness was defined as being something of ethnic
origin rather than citizenship. This deviation from the constitutional spirit that defines Turkishness primarily as a category of citizenship was however only prevalent between 1930s and 1940s until the racist storm in Germany and Italy had vanished from Europe. According to Heper (2007: 107) ‘German influence was particularly effective vis-à-vis at least some officers’. It was also effective on a very limited number of civil servants like the Minister of Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, who stated that ‘The Turks are the only lords of this country, its only owners. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock have in this country only one right that of being servants, of being slaves’ (Van Bruinessen 1994:54). A careful analysis of the newspaper reveals that before and after this sentence Bozkurt was referring to Non-Muslims who previously dominated commercial activities and owned most financial assets in the country.\[^{56}\] It should be stressed that even in those times between the 1930s and 1940s Kurds had not been excluded from ethnically defined Turkish community but they were represented as being of Turkish descent. ‘On the historiographical level this has been expressed by the Turkish Historical Thesis and the Sun Language Theory, according to which the Turkish language is the source for all existing languages in the world’ (Hirschler 2001: 147). According to this, the word ‘Kurd’ was a name given to the one of the 24 grandsons of Oguz Khan, the mythological founder of the Turks, so the Kurds, it is asserted, were indeed Turks.

A decade after the Dersim rebellion the first easing in the relations came just before the election in 1950 (Kilic 2007: 65, Simsir 2009: 447). The CHP—Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: Republican People’s Party—had allowed those previously displaced Sheikhs and Aghas to return to their hometowns in 1947 hoping that these chieftains in return would use their tribal potency to generate local support in the coming election (Besikci 1969: 220). Moreover, 22,516 people of 4,128 households returned

\[^{56}\] For the original text see Aksam Gazetesi (19 September 1930:2). Taking the sentence out of context and presenting it as if it was to be used to portray the relationship between the Kurds and the Turks, as Van Bruinessen (1994: 154) and Mateescu (2006: 234) did, is an example of historical disinformation. Far from taking history seriously, actually, these scholars seem to be treating it far too lightly.
to their homes in 1947 (Tekeli 1990: 55). However it was too late for CHP to win the support of the Kurdish chieftains who were ready to blindly support any opposition to the previous regime that had been very harsh on them. In the 1950 election the Democrat party came to power with the support of the conservative majority and Kurdish chieftains who thereby became MPs of the new parliament. Resettlement of Kurds by state coercion laws were followed by a wave of voluntary migration on the part of Kurds who wanted to benefit from the development of a national market economy in the urban industrialized regions of the 1950s (Yegen 2009). From that time onwards until the outbreak of the violent conflict between PKK and the armed forces of the State in 1984 there was not going to be a serious uprising on the part of the Kurds. All political activities of rather a smaller scale by that time were to be repressed without any difficulty. It was illegal to establish a political party that was based on ethnicity. For this reason political activities of nationalist Kurds who adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology were to be maintained under the Workers’ Party of Turkey—TIP: *Turkiye Isci Partisi*—the main consideration of which was to bring socialism to Turkey. This party in 1971 was closed down on the grounds that its Eastern Region Demonstrations—*Dogu Mitingleri*—turned out to be a base for the politicization of the Kurdish ethnicity. Later on in 1974 Kurdish members of the former workers party of Turkey established an underground organization called the Socialist party of Turkish Kurdistan. Members of this organization tried to disseminate the

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57 The first one of those activities emerged as a student movement that embodied a Kurdish independence party in 1958. These university students had adopted a Marxist Leninist ideology which was in strong contradiction not only with the official ideology of Republican regime but also with those Kurdish MPs most of whom were tribal chieftains and maintained the feudal order to their own interest (Simsir 2009: 515, Cay 1993: 431). 52 of the participants to this party, who also came to be known as 49s or Easterners, were arrested in 1959 and freed in 1961. Most of them were going to take active roles in politics later. On 30th April of 1963 two university students were arrested on an accusation of publishing a magazine in Kurdish. In the same year police forces arrested 13 Turkish Kurds who were either communist or nationalist and whose aim was to establish an independent Kurdish state in Turkey. Those students were also to be freed due to insufficient evidence against them. In 1965, Faik Bucak established Turkey branch of Kurdistan Democratic Party (TKDP) illegally under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani who controlled the party from Iraq. The number of the party members in Turkey could only reach to 30 by 1971 when the party members were arrested and 10 of them were sentenced to 7 years in prison (Simsir 2009: 548).
leftist ideas of Kurdish identity 'yet they continued to believe in Kurdish – Turkish coexistence within a socialist system (McDowall 2000: 412). This Kurdish organization was not well accepted by those Kurdish groups who were rather committed to the traditional tribal and Islamic values. During those times the PKK—Partiya Karkari Kurdistan: Kurdistan Worker Party—emerged out of a group led by Abdullah Ocalan who was previously a former member of the Ankara Higher Education Association and arrested for distributing ideological bulletins. 'In 1977 the Apocular (partisans of Abdullah Ocalan) identified the enemies of the Kurdish people as the fascists; agents of the state and those (no matter whether Turks or Kurds) who supported them, the Turkish left which subordinated the Kurdish question to the leftist revolution and finally the exploitative Kurdish Landlord class.' (McDowall 2000: 419).

What separated PKK from all other Kurdish organizations was its ultimate goal to create an independent Kurdistan (Entessar 1992: 95). To this effect Apocular fought not only with the tribal Kurdish chieftains and villagers, who did not support them, but also the Kurds who preferred to stay loyal to the state and any Kurdish leftist group that strayed from PKK's violent techniques and ultimate goal to create a separate Kurdistan. The foundations of which were justified by Marxist ideology had indeed been adopting a fascist and intolerant approach leaving no room for the opposition of any sort within its own community. Not surprisingly the first attack of the PKK was on a Kurdish tribal leader, Bucak, who was also an MP from the conservative Justice Party.\(^{58}\)

While the Kurdish movement was operating clandestinely the political atmosphere all over the country was chaotic as the vicious conflict between rightist and leftist factions went so far as to be described as anarchy with '231 political murders in 1977, 832 in 1978, 898 during the nine months between December 1978

\(^{58}\) It should be noted that all the logistic support, equipment and the human force that Ocalan needed at the time was provided by another tribal leader who was the enemy of Bucak tribe. The first armed forces he enjoyed before 1984, therefore, had not come out of the participant's commitment (if any) to Kurdish nationalist cause.
and September 1979, and 2,812 during the following twelve months’ (Mango 2005: 16).

McDowall (2000: 415) states that the Ataturk legacy ‘was under assault not only from the war between leftist and rightist groups, but also from Kurdish nationalists, Marxists and Islamic revivalists’. With the 1980 military coup the army declared a state of emergency and suspended the civil government for two years. According to official statistics police forces arrested 175,000 political activists and civilians in these two years (Karasapan 1989: 8). Most of the detainees consisted of Marxists and leftists. Given that Turkey had been a strong ally of the US in the cold war\(^{59}\), it can be safely asserted that the target of police forces during and after the 1980 coup, by and large, has been the communists not the Kurds per se. It was not only Kurdish leftists but also so many Marxists of Turkish origin that had to flee the country. The ‘other’ \textit{vis-à-vis} the Turkish nation in this context was not Kurds \textit{per se} but rather the communists and separatists. Most of the Marxist but not necessarily separatist Kurdish detainees were tortured until 1984. Hundreds of testimonies of torture in the prison can now be read in the works of Hasan Cemal (2003) and Faruk Bildirici (2008). It is a well-known argument that the PKK would have never been able to generate the first wave of support to its cause if those leftist Kurds in Diyarbakır Prison had not been repressed, tortured and marginalized by the police forces (Cemal 2003). As can be inferred from this argument, those religious Kurds who had nothing to do with Marxist leftist ideology were not considerably marginalized by the state in the first place. It is also known that a massive support for the PKK, even 11 years after its establishment, could not be generated among Kurds. For which Abdullah Ocalan was to admonish his deputies, stating that ‘When we look at the experience in other countries, we see that they started with 300 guerrillas. Within two years their

\[^{59}\text{Turkey joined NATO; supported the US in the Cuban missile crisis; installed an American base in Incirlik; and endorsed the principles of the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine. Finally Turkey accepted nearly 2.5 billion dollars in military aid from the US between 1950 and 1970 (Karasapan 1989).}\]
numbers rose to 10,000. We also started with 300, but we are still only 1,500. Why?' (Mango 2005: 38). The PKK was still not a massive movement at the time, yet its existence was posing a great threat to Ataturk’s legacy of national unity and the patriotic conception of nation in the country.

The new policy measures to prevent the acceleration of separatist movements were not going to be different from the previous ones that had already impeded the emergence of a distinct Kurdish societal culture in Turkey. In October 1983 the government introduced the Law 2932 that forbade ‘express, diffusing or publishing in any language other than the official language of the states recognized by the Turkish state. Until 1992, Kurds were not allowed to be engaged in cultural activities and perform songs and plays in Kurdish, or identify certain customs as Kurdish’ (Heper 2007: 164). Those who wanted to give their children Kurdish names were not allowed to do so by the law (1587) that articulated that names contradicting the national culture, traditions and morality and offending the public opinion cannot be legally registered on birth certificates (HRFT 2002). By 1986, 2842 out of 3254 villages in mostly Kurdish populated cities had been given Turkish names for further integration and ‘to obliterate Kurdish identity’ (McDowall 2000: 425). The government applied the deportation policy again and evacuated 2,253 villages by 1995 for security reasons (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 131). In addition to these, some other villages have been vacated by those villagers who escaped both the terror of the PKK and banditry of the village guards who abused their power in the region. Some of the villages had been left by the inhabitants who found themselves under crossfire between the PKK and the security forces. The war on PKK was to be carried under

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60 Kurdish villages that did not want to support the struggle for national liberation were attacked by the PKK. A long list of the villages attacked and burned by the PKK is available in Simsir’s documentary work (2009: 642-648).
61 ‘The controversial village guard system was introduced in April 1985 because of the enormous logistical difficulties of ensuring security in the mountains and rural areas of Eastern and South Eastern Turkey. The aim was to enable villages to defend themselves against attacks from the PKK’ (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 129). Yet these village guards were later detected to have abused their power in brigandage and smuggling.

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the state of emergency (*OHAL: Olaganustu Hal Durumu*) which was declared and issued in July 1987, it was to be renewed every four months by the Parliament (Yavuz 2001). Civilian governors were authorized by this law to exercise certain powers, which would not be subject to the supervision of the constitutional court. Practices of the Civil Governors who held this power included limitations on the press and elimination from the area of persons whose actions were thought to be inimical to the public order. Under the state of emergency both the police forces and Civil Governors violated a great number of human rights like the right to speak one’s mother tongue (HRFT 2002). In the meantime however the governments inevitably recognized the existence of a Kurdish ethnicity in Turkey. Governments that used to see the problem as merely a security issue have gradually evolved to become more concerned with the consolidation of the democracy in Turkey. One of the reasons why this shift gradually took place is Turkey’s candidacy for membership to the European Union that put the protection of minorities as a condition for accession. Moreover the Kurdish nationalists increasingly came to voice their demands with the rhetoric of democratization, rather than independence claims, so the government as well as so many liberals started to hope that the conflict would wane if liberal democracy was consolidated. However as I mentioned in the introduction, different approaches to the liberalism have arisen mainly due to the problem of agency, meaning that who should be considered as the ultimate holders of rights, if not only individuals. This discussion has not been derived from an informed philosophical view on the part of the government but as a result of the practical problem of diversity within the country and among the Kurds in particular.

4.2 Conclusion

The state versus the Kurds paradigm is not able to capture the complex relations of the diverse groups within Kurdish society, and their reflections on the agency of the
Considerable groups of Kurds have cooperated with the state whereas radical nationalists have been fighting against its armed forces (Tezcur 2010, Heper 2007). As this chapter has shown, the significant other vis-à-vis the Turkish nation has never been the Kurds per se but rather, communists and separatists as well as non-Muslims. Under the subtitle of ‘Some Kurds and Incorporation’ I endeavoured to show that the conflict was not only between the state and separatist Kurds but also between the nationalist Kurds who rejected Turkish identity in any form and moderate Kurds who have wanted to maintain their multiple identities within the current framework (Kirisci 2000). This fragmentation among Kurds has remained and could not be overcome by resort to the ethnic root they share, not only because the state tried to oppress any nationalist mobilization around particularistic ethnicities, but also because those Kurds who can occupy any position in the mainstream have chosen not to adopt an ethno-centric approach.

This chapter has shown that the assimilation of different segments of the Kurdish community to the system has been facilitated through the equal opportunities, religious sentiments, semi-secularism, and anti-feudal regulations at different points in the past. Yet those who could not be incorporated into the system by any of these means experienced the oppression and forced assimilation becoming more radical than their contemporaries (Watts 2006, Somer 2007). Legitimate public objectives for the majority turned out to be something irreconcilable with Kurdish nationalists’ prioritization of cultural autonomy. In Turkey, Turks and Kurds have not only fought together in the independence war but they have also shared a religion and a territory for so long a time that Kurdish nationalists’ intent to put one likeness (ethnicity) above all others is now being rebuffed by a group of intermingled Turks and some Kurds. Mixed marriages and the resettlement of the Kurds into the western parts of the

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62 Approximately 2,708,000 Turks and Kurds are related to each other by marriage. This figure does not even account for people who are of Kurdish origin yet identify with Turkish language as their mother tongue. This is by no means uncommon; as it will be explained in the coming chapter, a remarkable number of Kurdish couples communicate their children in Turkish to
country created an enormous number of people who came to hold multiple identities. Given that nationalism affirms the importance of certain likenesses above all others (Calhoun 1993: 229), the nationalist mobilization also happened to be problematic for some Kurds who are more concerned with their future prospects, linguistic and religious particularities than their overall Kurdishness. Zaza and Alevi Kurds' demarcation of themselves from the majority of Sunni and Kurmanci Kurds, as has always been the case throughout history, is still evident (Neyzi 2003, White 1995). An important part of the Sunni Kurds is also valuing their religiosity, which is represented more by some political parties whose members are of diverse ethnicities (Somer 2007). All these fragmentations are still present because the Kurds per se have not been constantly marked by their ethnicities and never excluded from the mainstream on the basis of their ethnicity in a way that would lead them, in turn, to merge around it. Obviously what the system is ‘transitioning’ from affects the limits of transition or change itself. In what follows I will explain the difficulties with this transformation in Turkey on both normative and practical levels.

support their education in school. (Gultekin 2012) Given that the average fertility rate in Turkey is 2-3 children per family there are about 7 million people who are half Turkish and Kurdish in Turkey.
Chapter 5: When Multiculturalism Does not Fit. Kurds and Turkey in the 2000s

The previous chapter has illustrated the heterogeneous nature of the Kurdish minority under the historical relationship between the state and Kurds in Turkey. I argue that the assimilation policies and integrationist ideals of civic nationalism together discarded ethnicity from public life. This has facilitated a great deal of fragmentation in political orientation, social status, and economic power of the citizens across their ethnic identities. As the Chapter IV has shown there is a tension between Zaza and Kurmanci Kurds; Alevi and Sunni Kurds, the conciliatory and the radical Turks; the Western Kurds and the Eastern Kurds; the Religious Kurds and the Marxist Kurds. This fragmentation has been presented as an outcome of the historical narrative in Turkey. It is now these circumstances under which ethnocentric multiculturalism fails to capture the complex and dynamic conception of the nation beyond its ethnic components. In such cases like Turkey where the societal culture and the meaning of ethnic distinctions are more fluid than Kymlicka assumed, Barry’s
statement holds true: ‘[Kymlicka’s] multiculturalist policies are not simply a passive adaptation to an ineluctable fact of cultural diversity. Rather multiculturalism actually creates the reality, which is then, in a circular process of self-reinforcement appealed to a justification for a further extension of multiculturalist policies’ (Barry 2001: 315).

The aim of this chapter is to contextualize this argument in Turkey and show how the strong ethno-centric multiculturalism is bound to lead to further inequalities and limit the freedom of people within the minority it seeks to empower. The chapter will show that the difference-blind egalitarianism is equally problematic. Its extremely stringent interpretation of individual equality damages the very equality it seeks to promote. In what follows, I will first explain how multiculturalism has become an issue, and what its fundamental premises are to justify the need for a change in Turkey. I will then explain egalitarian critique of multiculturalism which is followed by an account of why the stringent version of egalitarianism in Turkey itself is not a viable option either. The thesis will focus on an alternative view of liberal egalitarian multiculturalism that departs from both ethnocentric multiculturalism of Kymlicka and difference-blind egalitarianism of Barry. This part will offer a post-multiculturalist politics of recognition that is equally sensitive to the problems with both equality and freedom. Post-multiculturalists will propose a third way in which the two must be combined and the last part of the chapter will take on the practicality of this third way in Turkey.

5.1 Kurds and Turkey: Journey of Multiculturalism and Egalitarianism

In spite of the heterogeneity that marks out Turkey from other multinational countries, there is a similar political discourse present in Turkey. There is a strong pressure to transform the country in a way that the central administration is expected to devolve its power between Turkish and Kurdish blocks. In Turkey, the culture of politics is
being changed to the politics of culture. The territorial conception of ‘nation-state’ is slowly being replaced by an ethno-cultural conception of multinational state. In this changing environment, the pressure for the transformation in Turkey has so much in common with arguments of the ethno-centric ‘liberal multiculturalism’ theory of Kymlicka.

Chart 1

What do you think your ethnic origin is?

Chart 2

What's your mother tongue?
The demographic information also suggests that the Kurds are large enough and its majority did not assimilate to the mainstream as other ethnicities did in Turkey. Sizeable enough and ‘not assimilated’, the Kurds are captured by the definition of national minority that Kymlicka thinks should be given self-government rights.

As already explained in the previous chapter, Turkey is a country where ethnic differences have been subordinated to the Turkish citizenship in public life ‘where the republic clings to its imagined monolithic identity’ (Taspinar 2007). ‘Between 1924 and 1990 the Turkish state denied this aspect of the Kurdish question, perceiving it primarily as a social issue generated by the endurance of backward social structures and even occasionally as a security concern posed by foreign rivals’ (Yegen 2011: 72).

5.1.1 The Story of Multiculturalism in Turkey

However as of the 1990s Turkey has seen a gradual increase in the recognition of Kurdish identity and a remarkable difference from what previously used to be known as a denial policy. As suggested by Kahraman’s work ‘From culture of politics to politics of culture’, ‘under the pressure of the European Union, Turkey has undergone a remarkable change toward a better liberalism’ (Kahraman 2007: 66). The application of differentiated cultural rights for minority groups was prescribed by the EU as a mechanism to reduce the extent of cultural inequality in Turkey and develop democracy. In its 2009 Progress Report on Turkey the Commission of

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63 Here it is important to clarify that the EU does not have either a consistent and agreed definition of what constitutes a national minority, or a standard minority regime that could be applied to all member countries, the minority policies of which vary considerably. Nevertheless, the EU has introduced minority rights as a condition of the enlargement process, and implicitly accepted the terms and policy advice of other international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe; the conventions and reports of these organizations are referred to as decisive in the European Commission’s progress reports on candidate countries. For this reason the EU’s stance on the Kurdish problem of Turkey will be presented within the conceptual framework of the conventions, charters of the above mentioned organizations whose recommendations have
European Communities, an executive body of the European Union, made its concerns explicit:

Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. There is a need for a dialogue between Turkey and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

Protection of linguistic minorities in candidate and member countries became more important with the 1990 Copenhagen CSCE Document and the Council of Europe’s 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Members and candidate members of the Union were advised to allow the use of minority languages in public education and services. According to Article 14 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ‘states should endeavour to ensure adequate opportunities for being taught in the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language’. Even these linguistic rights were deemed insufficient by Joost Lagendijk, the co-chair of the Turkish–EU Joint Parliamentary Commission, who suggested that ‘Turkey should consider regional autonomy to help solve its Kurdish problem’.

The same tone in compliance with the multiculturalist policies has been repeated among the intellectual stratum. Hirant Dink who was an important intellectual in Turkey stated that

the history almost every geography has such a multicultural environment in which the cultures have lived together, but it has recently been accepted that multiculturalism requires more than this; since it is vital to recognize these different beings and specific rights derived from such an existence. Indeed it is what the politics of multiculturalism tries to achieve so in this respect it is different from the concepts of pluralism and difference, which have no historical dimension and can emerge at any time. (Gulec 2003: 163 Interview with Hirant Dink)

Another intellectual Beyaz claimed that

obviously implied a set of standards that the EU expects Turkey to meet on its road to membership.
the State should recognise the identity, linguistic and cultural rights of the Kurds, take measures for Kurdish children to be taught and educated in their own language and for the promotion of Kurdish culture and by taking into consideration the historical and regional conditions, the state should constitute autonomous self-government regions for the Kurds in places densely populated by Kurds (Ibid: 163).

In order to meet the minority criteria for accession to the European Union, in 2002 Turkey reformed its policies to allow teaching of minority languages in private institutions. Moreover, one of the state funded national channels (TRT 6) today broadcasts 24 hours a day only in Kurdish (Siddique 2009).

Somer (2007)’s ‘comprehensive content analysis of the mainstream nationalist Turkish daily Hurriyet’ also upholds the claim that

Since 1999 the mainstream discourse has been undergoing a transformation that prepares a basis for liberal nationalism. The analysis covers all issues of Hurriyet from 1984 through 2003. All articles that were fully or partially related to the Kurdish question were identified and their contents were analyzed with respect to their subject matter…Comparison made between the periods of 1984-1998 and 2000-2004 shows that there’s a considerable shift in the mainstream discourse in the sense that ‘non-secutity (social and identity–and human rights–related) aspects of Kurdish issue have become considerably more visible (Somer 2007: 123).

The following analysis of the articles that appeared in Hurriyet daily news from 1997 to 2011 also shows that the cultural dimension of the issue has been steadily increasing.
Chart 3

What accompanied this increasing visibility of the Kurdish question with its cultural dimension and possible liberal solutions in the media and public debates and discourse has been a series of policy reforms. International Crisis Group (2011) listed these reforms as follows;

- First of all, the Extraordinary Situation Region (Olağanüstü Hal Bölgesi, OHAL) designation was lifted from the last two provinces of southeastern Turkey where it applied, the death sentence was abolished, and some early, partial steps towards freer broadcasting and education were implemented.

- AKP passed five laws in 2004-2005 to strengthen provincial assemblies and municipalities, replacing laws from the 1930s. ‘The new laws adopted in 2004-2005 have introduced a drastic shift in the relationships between central and local administration, to set them in line with the standards and criteria laid down in the European Charter of Local Self-Government (Article 8)’. (UNDP 2010.)

- In 2005, Erdoğan signalled a change in policy on the Kurds that led to the launch of the Democratic Opening in July 2009.

- In 2005-2006, he replaced the military team holding exploratory talks with jailed PKK leader Öcalan with one led by civilian intelligence agents closer to him.

In this analysis articles with the word ‘Kurdish’ has been counted. It should be emphasized that the word ‘Kurdish’ refers to the language of Kurds, and all the articles analyzed here were on the linguistic dimension of the problem.
In his 12 August 2005 speech in Diyarbakir, Erdogan expressed that ‘The Kurdish problem is my problem too … we will relax this area. Turkey has always looked through the security window; we will look through a different window’.

In July 2009, he summoned several ministers to his residence to put the final touches on the Democratic Opening.

On 29 July, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay gathered the media to announce a ‘broadening and strengthening of our citizens’ democratic rights and ensuring that each of our citizens, wherever they live, feel themselves to be equal and free individuals of the state’.

On 1 August, a broad group of civil society activists and intellectuals met Atalay at Ankara’s Police Academy to discuss the project. The optimism that day was reflected by veteran commentator Hasan Cemal, a leading Turkish proponent of a Kurdish compromise: ‘this is the first time the Turkish government approaches the Kurdish problem so seriously.’

In April 2010, the ruling party removed the bar on all languages other than Turkish in elections, changing the outright ban in the election law to the more flexible ‘in principle, political parties and candidates should use Turkish for electoral propaganda.’ (Law on the Basic Regulations of Elections and Electoral Rolls, No. 298 (1961).

Even Perihan Sari, a member of the Republican People Party that has consistently opposed the use of any local language other than Turkish, communicated to the people of the Southeast region in Kurdish. Several ministers in the government also made declarations in the Kurdish language and legal barriers to the foundation of TV channels to broadcast in Kurdish for 24 hours a day were abolished. The State has allowed renaming the places in Southeast region with their old Kurdish versions. During my visits to the region in 2011 I also observed many commercial activities and advertisements conducted in Kurdish. On 12th April 2012, Erdogan declared that the Kurdish language and the Ottoman would be elective courses in the curriculum. The Sabanci University and the Bilgi University offer the Kurdish language as an elective course. And the Higher Education Institute even approved the opening of a Kurdish Language and literature department in the State University of Mardin Artuklu.

However, this transformation that to some extent complies with the expectations of normative theorists like Kymlicka (who sees group rights as a remedy to the injustices in diverse societies), did not bring either peace or equality. The PKK
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) maintained the conflict in a time when the state had abandoned its policy of forced assimilation. Radical members of the cultural group remobilized and increased the extent of ethnic conflict when the state started to recognize their cultural identity in the public discourse. Obviously there are some further levels of recognition such as the establishment of autonomous regions with legislative powers, and the state funded education in mother tongue. It is these levels of recognition that the Kurdish nationalists keep demanding and it is these demands on behalf of which the Kurdish nationalists justify their recourse to violence.

These remaining problems compel the political actors to think further about whether the historical idealization of ethnicity-blind civic nationalism in Turkey on the constitutional level should be from a liberal perspective, and can be, deconstructed. Should and can Turkey change its minority regime ‘in the shift from an individualist, opportunity oriented, difference-blind to a collectivist interpretation of civil rights legislation; in generalized opposition to the centralizing claims of the modern nation state’ (Brubaker 2001: 532)?

In Turkey there are fundamentally two different approaches on the possibility and desirability of this transition. One is the egalitarian perspective that favours the persistent application of a difference-blind approach on the constitutional level and the other is the ethno-centric multiculturalism that stands for the elevation of particularistic identities to form a decentralized body politic. Whereas the former view yields itself to civic nationalism that inevitably favours the culture of the dominant

65 Articles 10 and 24: all citizens are entitled to equal rights before the law without any discrimination on the basis of language, race, colour, conscience and religion. Moreover, CHP (the Republican People’s Party) and MHP (the Nationalist Movement Party) also have a long tradition of supporting this conception of this constitutional nationality. In parallel to its idealization of equality of opportunity, CHP historically adopted individualistic difference-blind approaches and strongly criticized any argumentation that favors the differentiated group rights. Although this has changed in the rhetoric as the party manifestation before 2011 has illustrated, their message has not reached out to the public in election rallies. For a detailed analysis on the mainstream Turkish political parties’ stance on the Kurdish Issue, see also Nil S. Satana. (2012) ‘Kurdish issue in June 2011 Elections: Continuity or Change in Turkey’s Democratization’. Turkish Studies 13(2): 169-189.
language, the latter is translated into the minority’s ethno-cultural nationalism that often becomes essentialist in a way that would violate the freedoms and equalities of its own population (Somer 2007). Proponents of these competing nationalisms in Turkey try to justify their positions by criticizing each other for having violated the fundamental principles of liberalism.

As has been argued before, in order to generate the liberal values of equality, freedom and peace, these approaches need some pre-conditions in theory. I assert that these are not available in Turkey due to the historical narrative of state nationalism vis-à-vis the Kurds. Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis the Kurds created a population of complexities, which, I assert, neither the ethno-centric multiculturalism nor the difference-blind egalitarianism can accommodate along with the liberal values they defend. What follows is an account of these theories’ normative and practical infeasibility in Turkey.

5.1.2 Multiculturalist critique of Civic Nationalism and Political Liberalism in Turkey

Increasing support for multiculturalism in Turkey has been informed by the presumption that the homogeneity in the public sphere has a pejorative meaning in the sense that it is destructive of particularities. So far as the homogenization is concerned, the private and public sphere distinction has been given as the ultimate logic in classical liberalism as well as in the constitution of Turkey. It is suggested in the constitution that differences should be lived in the private sphere, and that they should not be a matter in the regulation of public life. It has been suggested that the public sphere is the place for everyone to have equality of opportunity and not to compete on cultural grounds. But this conventional perspective adopted in state offices has been highly criticized by ‘libertarian’ scholars of Turkey like Baskin Oran (2000), Mustafa Erdogan (1998: 355) and Atilla Yayla (1997).
As suggested by Balaban (2007: 76), critiques of the state nationalism in Turkey focus on this private-public distinction and the authoritarian implications of universal citizenship in the sense that the state of universal citizenship disregards the cultural particularities of its own population. This culminates in public ‘homogeneity’ which indeed represents the ‘logic of nationalism’. Actually this might sound like an unusual inference because universal citizenship in classical liberalism is informed by an individualistic perspective whereas the nationalism as an ideology is known to champion the value of community as its pivotal concern. However, the analogy made here between universal citizenship and nationalism might be given credibility only if the conception of nationalism at stake is being primarily informed by a consensus on civic values of individual equality and freedom as the regulative basis of community in the public domain. Starting from this point, Balaban (2007), Smith, T (2005) and likeminded scholars stress that in general neither universal citizenship nor an ethnicity-blind civic state nationalism that is supposed to facilitate this citizenship regime can really offer a liberal paradigm for the reasons I have already explained in the theoretical background to this study.66 So their stance in defending liberalism revolves around the critique of this ethnicity-blind civic nationalism as an elusive ideal.

In the rest of his argument Balaban (2007) argues that in the case of Turkey, the creation of public-private distinction, and prioritization of the former in making the nation has been motivated more by the nationalist discourse of homogenization as the ultimate concern than by anything else. According to him, liberal principles of individual equality and freedom that informed the private-public distinction and thereof the nationalist ideology in the early years of the republican regime were only of secondary importance. The ideational characteristics of nationalism in Turkey were inspired by the French ideals of la patrie and sovereignty (Akman 2004) but this inspiration in Turkey was confined to the very limited number of elites whose

66 Their analysis on this incompatibility is very likely to yield itself to an assumption that nationalism as an ideology and nation as a socio-political entity cannot be solely based on civic values.
motivation to modernize the country was in conflict with traditions and interests of local Sheikhs and tribal chiefs. As explained by Sahin and Yilmaz (2006) in their work *Modernity and Economic Nationalism in the Formation of Turkish Nationalism*, this modernization project was in conflict with local and regional interests. First this is because the material modernization in a country like Turkey with a very backward industry necessitated the use of a standardized language for educational and working purposes. This happened to be at the expense of other local languages in public domain. Second it brought about a central administration of the regional lands that used to be governed by local powers. The modernization in Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire therefore has posed a great challenge to the very existence of a feudal ownership regime and the status of local powers that used to rule it.

Therefore the modernization process in Turkey is usually depicted to have started an illiberal and destructive trajectory in the sense that the state has continuously worked against what was already there, which is usually associated with pre-existing ways of life and the will of people whose loyalties lie in these tribal, religious or ethnic traditions (Smith T 2005). There is, of course, nothing wrong about having loyalties in tribal, ethnic or religious traditions; uniting around a particular cultural or political identity is, after all, an individual’s freedom of association. Critics of modernization are, however, blindly over-enthusiastic to take for granted the pre-existing loyalties and usually they do not question the way in which pre-existing loyalties themselves have been forcibly homogenized by the feudal politics of ethnicity. In the critique of modernization and its ethnocentric variations, all distinctions between Alevi and Sunni, land owners and villagers, rich and poor, western and eastern, religious and secular, Kurmanci and Zaza as shown in the previous chapter are subordinated to an overall Kurdishness as one overarching marker of identity.

The problem with this perspective revolves around the question: why is the state as an agent of power guilty for creating its own culture of the public with a
discourse of homogenization whereas the same illiberal logic relevant in creation of pre-existing ethnic loyalties is accepted to be immune to these critiques? This question is not raised to justify the position of the state and its homogenization discourse. It is rather to show the inconsistency within the argument of ethnocentric multiculturalism itself, which, in the guise of defending liberalism, tends to favour one injustice (pre-existing cultural hegemonies) over another (order of state domination). As Miller suggested, ‘what we must avoid is thinking of the ethnic identities that we wish to support as “genuine” or “authentic” in contrast to other identities which are “manufactured” or “imposed” ’(Miller 1995: 135).

If both the culture of state and the culture of pre-existing loyalties are artefacts of one or another political project and historical conditions, if they both are equally constructed (Horowitz 1985) in time, then why should we favor one over the other? And more importantly should we favour any at all (Kukathas 1992)?

Answers to these questions in liberalism mainly come from two ideological sources; one is informed by an overarching libertarian and a cultural relativist perspective and the other derives from egalitarianism. In almost all their premises both libertarians and egalitarians share the idea that ‘the principle of justice that specify our rights do not depend for their justification on any particular conception of the good life’ (Sandel 1998: 185). As suggested by Sandel (1998), however, libertarians and egalitarians differ from each other on what rights we have, and the discussion turns out to be about the agency and the subject of rights. What are the rights that matter first and foremost: the right to be equally free (from a libertarian perspective), or the right to have equal opportunities (from an egalitarian approach)?
5.1.3 Egalitarian critique of multiculturalism in Turkey

For egalitarians, the idea of seeing groups as an agency of rights, and the representation of cultures\(^{67}\) as a matter of equality cannot be compatible with the classical liberalism because it generates new inequalities between individuals and among groups.

The following section will assess the extent to which the politics of recognition in the form of ethno-centric multiculturalism can create equality for members of the Kurdish community as well as for other citizens in Turkey. Looking at the issue from the perspective where equality is taken as an important concern is useful because people’s understanding of injustice is informed by their sense of discrimination\(^{68}\) that derives from inequalities. This in return leads those people who feel discriminated against to free from this systematic injustice. This is also suggested by the equity theory (Lemer 1977, Waltster 1978) attempting to introduce notions of justice into the calculus of individuals. According to this theory, ‘people strive for justice in their relationships and feel distressed when they perceive an injustice’ (Taylor and Moghaddam 1994: 97). ‘The main motivation for action and conflict, thus, appears to be issues of fairness and not self-interest’ (Kotsovilis 200: 16).\(^{69}\)

Moreover it is important because even those who prioritize freedom over equality use the rhetoric of the latter in the sense that they want to be ‘equally’ free, in most cases, to live their culture as everyone else in the society. In this logic, if

\(^{67}\) The representation of the cultural group is given in this context as an alternative to the representation of individuals with varying cultural affiliations.

\(^{68}\) The survey research done by Konda in 2010 suggests that there is a negative correlation between level of education and perception of discrimination; another research done by Duman in 2008 suggests that education level and income are positively correlated and the direction of influence is reciprocal in Turkey. From the combination of these two researches we can infer that worse off people are more likely to develop a sense of discrimination than better off members even in the same ethnic category.

\(^{69}\) Equity theory is flawed in two senses. First it presumes that there is an agreed and fixed definition of fairness, second it overlooks the significance of self-interest that becomes more relevant when it comes to explaining the reason why radical organizations accelerate the conflict in times when injustices, previously given as their justification for fight, are recognized and eased. Nevertheless the equity theory is relevant to understand fairness, as a motivation and justification for people to fight in the society that they know is more about order than anarchy.
multiculturalism is not able to promote equality, people's demand to be free from the system that generates these inequalities will be even more persistent in a circular trend. It will be more persistent in the sense that conflict for freedom repeats itself so long as inequality remains to be the problem as a source of motivation and justification for conflict. Therefore interpretation of multiculturalism from an egalitarian perspective in Turkey is not only a matter of its capability to promote equality as a good in itself, but also a matter of its ability to generate equality as a source of motivation for people to opt into the system available in the country.

5.1.3.1 Multiculturalism and intra-group inequalities

As indicated before, the EU’s minority conditionality expects Turkey to provide certain rights to Kurds. This policy is in line with the multiculturalist argument of scholars like Kymlicka (2001), Young (1995), and Modood (2005), who all argue that special rights for minority groups can counterbalance circumstances in which people have been subject to discrimination as a result of their distinct cultural practices. However, their interpretation of these special rights varies to some extent.

Will Kymlicka’s proposal for promoting equality and freedom is to grant self-government rights to national minorities in the form of regional autonomy. In practice, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly also supported this idea with its Recommendation 1201 in 1993. The Recommendation’s Article 11 stated that:

In the regions where they are a majority, the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching this specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the State. v

Article 10 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which concerns the administrative authorities and public services, vi also indicates that
minorities should be able to use their mother tongue within the borders of their local or regional authorities, as recommended by Article 2(1) of the Draft European Charter of Self-Government drawn up by the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE). Moreover, ‘on November 4th 2008, Joost Lagendijk, the co-chair of the Turkish-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission, suggested that ‘Turkey should consider regional autonomy to help solve its Kurdish problem.’

However, it is clear that self-government rights in the form of regional autonomy cannot provide all Kurds in Turkey with the same opportunities to maintain their cultural identity in public discourse.

The first reason for refuting the proposal of regional autonomy is the lack of its representative capacity. Kukathas states that ‘cultural groups are not undifferentiated wholes but associations of individuals with interests that differ to varying extents’ (Kukathas 1992: 114). This is the case in Turkey, where ‘Kurds’ approach to the solutions is different. 52.1% of Kurds in Turkey think that ‘the only way (of solving the problem) is to end terrorism’ix. However, no Kurdish leaders can represent the whole group. The argument that group leaders might not represent the interests of group members is supported by the case of the Kurds in Turkey. For example, members of the DTP refused to condemn the Kurdistan’s Worker Party (PKK), a terrorist organization that used to demand a separate homeland for Kurds in southeastern Turkey, and which has caused the deaths of more than 30,000 people through guerrilla attacks. Most ethnic Kurds in Turkey did not vote for the DTP because it was seen as supporting the violent tactics of the PKK. ‘In 2007’s parliamentary elections, for example, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) managed to collect 56 percent of the Southeast’s votes. Even in Diyarbakir, considered a DTP stronghold, the AKP took 41 percent of votes, up from only 16 percent in the previous general elections in 2002’ (Schleifer 2009). This data shows that the vast majority of Kurds support a peaceful approach and ‘democratic’ opening of the AKP government, rather than the DTP. In light of this information, it is clear that
the Kurdish leadership in Turkey does not represent the majority of Kurdish citizens; so granting them the right of veto may constitute a violation of the rights of conciliatory Kurds to make decisions about their future.

Another reason for the egalitarians’ disagreement with the self-government proposal is chiefly because of the dispersed demography of Kurds in Turkey. Through its assimilationist or acculturative government policies, the Turkish state intended not to exclude but to integrate the Kurdish population into the rest of the community. From the beginning of the 1950s, Kurds were willingly moving to the Western provinces in order to have better employment opportunities and better economic conditions. After the armed fighting between the PKK and military forces started, a large number of villages inhabited by Kurds were vacated for security reasons. The exact number of Kurds who were internally displaced is not known for sure, but the official estimate of the Turkish government in 1998 was about 350,000.x

As a result of this evacuation process, the Kurdish population became relatively dispersed. Although some cities are still intensively populated by Kurdish people, the overall population in Turkey is quite mixed; and therefore it is not possible to assume that there is a clear distinction between cities dominated by different ethnic groups. According to the social structure surveys conducted by the KONDA Research and Consultancy Institute in 2006 and 2010, 1,571,000 Kurds live in Istanbul, compared with 618,000 Kurds living in Diyarbakir. It is clear then, that the greatest number of Kurds live in Istanbul, not in Diyarbakir. ‘The level of the Kurdish population in Istanbul is striking, demonstrating the high percentage of ethnic mixing among society and how inseparable ethnic groups are’.xi The same survey also calculated that 66% of Kurds live in North-eastern, Middle-eastern and Southeastern Turkey, while 34% are dispersed across the country.
Chart 4: Ratio of Kurds to Others by Region

Chart 5: Distribution of Kurds by Region

Other: East Marmara: 3%, West Marmara: 0.5%, West Central Anatolia: 4%, East Central Anatolia: 0.5%, Mediterranean: 3%, Aegean: 5%, West Black Sea: 0.5%

70 The demographic information used in this graph was drawn from Konda Survey (2011) Perceptions and Expectations in Kurdish Question. Istanbul: Iletisim.
Distribution of Kurds by regions and their ratio to the people of other ethnicities in their region of residency show that even in regions where they comprise the majority approximately 30% of the population is still made up by people of ethnic groups other than Kurdish.

This information suggests that regional autonomy in Southeastern Turkey would not provide Kurds who live across the country with the same opportunities as Kurds who already reside there. If regional autonomy was granted, Kurds who lived within the authority of the regional administration could use their mother tongue in public life and schools, while Kurds residing in other parts of the country would be prevented from enjoying those same rights. Moreover, the KONDA survey indicated that, unlike those Kurds who could not integrate into the socio-economic life of the cities to which they moved years ago, more than half of the Kurds now feel settled in western cities and would not be willing to move away.
As illustrated in Table 1, the percentages of Kurds who answered ‘no’ to the question, ‘Would you like to move away from this city or village for good?’ are 41.5% in Istanbul, 51.9% in the Aegean, 72.4% in Eastern Marmara, 47.2% in Western Anatolia and 52.1% in the Mediterranean. This raises the issue of what would happen to these people if regional autonomy were declared in the Southeast. Kurds who already live there would benefit from the advantages of the federal solution at no cost, while Kurds with good jobs and homes in the West would have to move away and risk losing their jobs to be able to enjoy the advantages of regional autonomy.\(^7\) It is clearly not an equal opportunity for all Kurds, some of whom are already integrated into the socio-economic life of the country.

This argument can be criticized on the grounds that Kurds who have already been integrated into the community do not need or prefer regional autonomy anyway as much as Kurds who do not have equal access to socio-economic opportunities.

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\(^7\) One may argue that this is in parallels to Canada where 1/7 of the French population live outside Quebec. It does not seem to be a major problem there and why would it be in Turkey? It is always the case that we make a choice and accept the tradeoff between different options we have. This does not constitute a problem if we are free to make that decision. I argue that this is actually an important problem in Turkey because of the stigmatization that differentiation creates in the environment of violent conflict. For that argument in detail please see the section ‘Stigmatization and Self-respect’ pp. 191-192
However I argue that regional autonomy is an ill-advised proposal because it creates further inequalities among the Kurds.

Instead, it seems that a higher level of investment by the state in places dominated by Kurds who have suffered inequality of educational and vocational opportunities would be more likely to promote equality for all citizens. Socio-economic disparities have been the most prominent inequality problem for Turkey. Demographic studies show that Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia are the most underdeveloped regions of Turkey (see Figure 2) and consequently local Kurds living in these lands have been most affected by material difficulties and illiteracy.

There is no doubt that the state should increase the extent of its investment to underdeveloped regions, in order to increase equality among citizens who live in different areas of the country. By contrast, the multiculturalist solution of self-government seems far from enabling the state to remedy this regional inequality. Granting such public rights to a distinct cultural group in a deeply diverse society would erode the sense of solidarity among communities. According to Rousseau and Habermas, if the sense of solidarity disappears democracy cannot function properly (Stilz 2009). This problem is convincingly explained by Stilz, who draws on Rousseau’s view of freedom in an egalitarian state.

Rousseau offers us one kind of controversial answer to these problems: he claims that in order to legislate generally and impartially on one another's behalf, the citizens of a democratic state must share a special bond of identity, one that motivates them to show concern for the freedom and welfare of their compatriots. In Rousseau’s view, in order to legislate impersonal laws—laws that will truly protect each citizen’s freedom equally—each citizen must be capable of taking up the viewpoint of the general interest or common good, a perspective that requires solidarity with her fellow citizens (Stilz, 2009: 23).

Egalitarian liberals like Brian Barry also support the view that different groups in a country can develop mutual understanding only ‘in the presence of fellow feeling’ (Barry 1983: 141). According to him, common language is an important mechanism for developing this feeling and it cannot be obtained in a multicultural discourse where
the sense of solidarity would be diminished by placing subgroups in their autonomous regions. Moreover the state needs the majority’s support to increase the budget for rectifying regional disparities. The majority members of which lack such a fellow feeling and therefore might not be willing to reciprocate the needs of self-governing minority groups and regions (Barry 1983: 141). What happened in Turkey after a destructive earthquake struck the city of Van, a city densely populated by Kurds, in 2011 is a striking example of this phenomenon. The earthquake struck just after 24 soldiers were killed by PKK. The public outrage which was generated by this increasing cost of terrorist attacks spurred a hostile approach towards Kurds, even at a time when Kurds are in desperate need of help to recover from what remained after the earthquake. The aid transferred to the region was immense and the parts that celebrated this disaster were in the margins of the society. Nevertheless this indicated that employment of ethnic distinctions to promote the group autonomy has a potential to diminish the social solidarity that is a vital condition for democracy to operate and for equality to emerge.

Intra-group inequalities that can arise from differentiated multicultural rights are not limited to the unjust elements of the regional autonomy proposal. For example, Kymlicka also proposes the permanent use of minority languages in public services. From the perspective of egalitarians this solution, in the case of Turkey, would also cause intra-group inequality within minorities that accommodate linguistic, religious or racial subgroups. These subgroups should ideally have an equal opportunity to represent and shape their cultural community, but in practice cultural communities are usually dominated, recognized and identified by the characteristics of the subgroup(s) that has the greatest power in terms of size and capacity. This is also evident in the Kurdish community, where the rights of the Zaza-speaking minority are overlooked while the Kurmanci-speaking majority represents the Kurdish cultural identity as if it were an undivided whole. The exact number of Zaza people in Turkey
is not known because the last census, which noted ethnic affiliation, was conducted in 1965 and in it, people who declared their ethnic language as Zaza were recorded as Kurds. Since then, different surveys have provided some idea of the approximate number of Zaza people in Turkey. The most detailed social structure surveys, performed by the KONDA Research Company in 2006 and 2010, indicated that 8.6% of 50,000 respondents who were randomly interviewed across the country in 2006\textsuperscript{72} identified themselves as Kurdish, while 0.41% defined themselves as Zaza. This data shows that Zaza speakers evidently constitute at least 5% of the Kurdish-speaking population in Turkey. The 2010 Survey suggests that this ratio may be higher by as much as 10%.

As an outcome of assimilative policies in Turkey, Kurds who already speak different dialects of the Kurdish language could not generate a common understanding of belonging. Today, the Zaza and Kurmanci-speaking groups of the Kurdish community can hardly communicate with each other. Scholars such as White and O’Neil indicate that ‘there are substantial differences between Zaza and other Kurdish dialects’ (O’Neil 2007: 74). This fact was also evident when a remarkable number of DTP parliamentarians from a Zaza background could not understand the speech of their leader (Ahmet Turk) in Kurmanci dialect. A Zaza member of parliament (MP), Ayse Tugluk from Diyarbakir, stated that ‘I could hardly understand the speech; some of us do not even know Kurdish at all’\textsuperscript{xiii} The following Zaza MPs also did not understand the Kurmanci dialect of Ahmet Turk: Sellahattin Demirtaş from Diyarbakir, Ayla Akat Ata from Batman, Şerafettin Halis from Tunceli, and Sabahattin Tuncel from Istanbul. This is a clear indicator of the substantial difference between the Zaza and Kurmanci subgroups of the Kurdish community in Turkey, and prove that it would be unjust to equate the linguistic identity of Kurds with the dominant dialect of Kurmanci speakers, although these are more numerous and more

\textsuperscript{72} 2006 survey was conducted in 3000 locations all over Turkey with a staff of over 1500 people and 47,958 people were interviewed face-to-face.
present in public discourse. For instance, when the state-owned channel TRT 6 broadcasted most of its programs in the Kurmanci dialect, the Zaza group understandably complained on the grounds that their right to media access in their mother tongue had been ignored and that their dialect was becoming extinct.xiv The claim for a separate TV channel in the Zaza language also raised questions about the viability of providing all subgroups with differentiated cultural rights in public life. As seen from the case of the Zaza people, whose culture and language were subordinated to the broader Kurdish cultural community in a multicultural discourse, the protection of one cultural minority may automatically perpetuate inequality between subgroups within that minority. In this respect, according to Shachar, ‘it (the state) also indirectly partakes in the on-going process of redefining the established traditions that constitute a group’s Nomo’s’ (Shachar 2000: 74), and thereby loses its neutrality.

5.1.3.2 Multiculturalism and inter-group inequalities

‘Irrespective of the discourses of the democracy and human rights that the groups use, they fight for their own political interests and concerns not for the general interests of the society. This is a general weakness of the identity politics and has its own reflections in Turkey, too’ (Gulec 2003: 14).

Self-government rights such as the permanent use of minority languages in public education and services not only give rise to intra-group inequalities, but also create and deepen inter-group inequalities. This will be discussed from the perspective of two main arguments. In the first place, it will be argued that the rights of different cultural groups to be treated equally in public life would be violated if multicultural principles were implemented in genuine politics, because in such cases the state’s neutrality—a condition of equal treatment—would wane (Shachar 2000: 74). Second, it will be argued that allowing some minority groups to receive public
education in their mother tongue might decrease their competiveness in a labour market dominated by the majority community. In such cases, education in a minority language might violate the right of minority pupils to access employment opportunities in the majority language (Barry 2001: 107).

The multicultural paradigm, supported by the EU and the Council of Europe, requires states to provide their minorities with certain linguistic rights. Public education and public services in minority languages are among those requirements. In Turkey there are about 16 distinct linguistic groups, who have been settled in Turkey for centuries. The percentages of those groups in the whole population of Turkey were assessed by KONDA Research and Consultancy Company in 2006 as follows:

**Table 2: Population by native language in 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>% as Mother Tongue</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>% as Mother Tongue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>84.54</td>
<td>Balkan Languages</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>11.97</td>
<td>Caucasian Languages</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zazaki</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>Laz</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>Circassian</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Turkic Languages</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>Romani Language</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish languages</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West European Languages</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ‘A social structure survey: Who are We?’ Conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy in 2006.

Despite the abundance of different linguistic groups in Turkey, the EU only recommended that Turkey provide the Kurds with the right to public education in their

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73 The more up to date data is available at the beginning of this chapter. This is just to give the reader an indication of the linguistic diversity in Turkey.
own language. No other linguistic group was mentioned in negotiations. This raised the question of the conditions under which a cultural group is entitled to the special rights as advocated by the multicultural discourse (Forst 2001: 133).

If the criterion for deciding whether a minority is entitled to receive public services in the mother language is its size. This undermines the starting point of the multicultural discourse, which is to secure equal rights for disadvantaged minority groups. According to Kymlicka, all national minorities who are adequately large (more than 10% of the whole population) and could develop a societal culture should be given rights of self-government (Kymlicka 1995: 111). However, implementation of this proposal violates the equal opportunities of people whose cultural group is too small to develop an institutionally complete societal culture. Even if the claims and grievances of a particular group warranted the application of special rights, there would nevertheless be a potential inequality between groups with a greater or lesser capacity to voice their claims. This idea is also supported in Brian Barry’s view that ‘multiculturalism (understood as normative policy implying the recognition of identity groups) is only a formula for manufacturing conflict, because it rewards the group that can most effectively mobilize or make claims on the polity’ (Barry 2001: 21).

This is the case in Turkey where culturally distinct groups, such as the Laz, Roma, Arabic, Kurds and Circassians, are assumed by the state to have an equal right to promote their cultural identities in the private sphere. However, the Kurds—who are greater in number than other cultural groups—have been able to mobilize most effectively to claim public recognition, and the EU’s support of linguistic minorities in Turkey has been confined to the Kurdish group (Yildiz 2005). Turkey

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74 Kymlicka does not give an exact number, though in his account of national minorities that cannot exercise self-government rights he refers to ‘countries which are essentially ethnically homogenous, e.g., where the dominant group forms 90-95% of the population, and where the remaining ethnic groups are small, dispersed, and already on the road to assimilation’ (Kymlicka 2004[b]: 13). It can be asserted then that if the minority comprises more than 10% of the whole population then it is entitled to those rights.
initiated state television broadcasting in Kurdish; thereafter, other Laz, Arabic and Georgian cultural groups demanded the same treatment.\textsuperscript{xiii}

Thus, inter-group inequalities that stem from differentiated rights for members of cultural minorities in public life can be traced back to the inability of the multicultural discourse to explain which groups should be entitled to differentiated rights, and on what basis. It is clear that to decide which group would be entitled to certain rights is a matter of power politics and is inconsistent with the non-aligned status of the liberal state. However, as Kukathas stated:

The liberal state should take no interest in these interests or attachments – cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic or otherwise – which people might have; it should take no interest in the character or identity of individuals, nor should it be concerned directly to promote human flourishing. It should have no collective projects; it should express no group preferences. Its only concern ought to be with upholding the framework of law within which individuals and groups can function peacefully (Kukathas 2003: 24).

Official language policy limits minorities’ freedom to benefit from public services in their own language. At this point, multiculturalist ‘liberals—who see this policy as unfair—often align themselves with national demands raised by “underdogs”, be they indigenous peoples, discriminated minorities or occupied nations, whose plight can easily evoke sympathy’ (Tamir 1993: 11). Multiculturalists argue that the institutional framework, which the state is supposed to maintain for equality, should be improved and reconfigured. According to Kymlicka, this reconfiguration for cultural equality can be achieved if minority languages are also accepted as a legitimate means of communicating with the state (Kymlicka 1995: 30). In line with this argument, minorities should also have the right to receive public education in their own language. According to Patten and Kymlicka, implementation of this proposal would not prevent minority pupils from having equal access to jobs working in the majority language. According to them, ‘minority language speakers may be able to learn the dominant language and generally equip themselves for success in the modern economy even while receiving a significant portion of their schooling in their
home language’ (Kymlicka and Patten, 2003: 40). However, Kymlicka and Patten do not explain how linguistic minorities who undergo public education in their mother tongue can become as fluent in the majority language as native speakers, and how this would not constitute a disadvantage in a state where the majority language is the medium of business.

In the Turkish education system, students are required to take a central exam to enter university, and the grades achieved in this exam are the only decisive factor for admission. The exam is conducted in Turkish and requires extensive knowledge of grammar. It would be absurd to expect that 17-year old Kurdish students, with no motivation other than their own will and a partial requirement in public education to learn Turkish, could be as successful in this exam as native speaker candidates.

Indeed statistics show that, even in countries where instruction of the official language is compulsory, students from linguistic minorities are less successful than native speakers (Grubb 1974: 52-94). The reason for this is that there is usually no additional programme to help minority pupils when they face the official language for the first time in school. Similarly, for instance, most of the children of naturalized Turkish families in Germany hardly speak German at all in elementary school; consequently their educational success is relatively low. ‘In 2006, out of the 12,258 students successfully graduating from gymnasium in Berlin, there were only 165 Turks, i.e. a total of less than 1.5 percent’ (Jungius 2007). This data indicated that additional language courses should be provided in public education, with teachers who are experts in both the official and the minority language helping children from non-majority language communities to improve their official language skills (ibid). This bilingual education facility should also be open to all citizens who require it. This is equally applicable to Turkey, where Kurdish children require extra assistance to learn Turkish when they begin their schooling (Grubb 1974: 52-94).

However, scholars like Parekh, Kymlicka and Patten overlook this need for additional programs at elementary school level, and in fact propose something quite
different: public education of all grades in the minority language. I think it is obvious that allowing those children to receive most of their education in their first language would not increase their chances of success but damage their educational and economic opportunities, for example by failing to prepare them for college admission exams in the majority language. This would be contrary to the main responsibility of the liberal state to provide students from different backgrounds with equality of opportunities, in relation for example to access to higher education, and subsequent employment (Rex 1998: 203–19). Howe suggests that the state should be concerned with the promotion of equal opportunity on a much broader scale than multiculturalist scholars, who confine their argument to equality of cultural identity in public life (Howe 1992: 460). In Howe’s own words:

> Education is, no doubt, valuable in its own right, but it also is enabling in the sense that it serves (however imperfectly) as the gateway for obtaining other societal goods, such as desirable employment, adequate income, and political power. For this reason, equal educational opportunity is related to equal opportunity more generally because it serves as an important link in what might be termed an opportunity chain (Howe 1992: 460).

Barry indicates that egalitarian liberalism is mainly concerned with equality of opportunity. In the case of Turkey, equality of opportunity is more about the opportunity to learn the official language to achieve educational distinction and be fully equipped for the job market (Barry 2001: 107). For the reasons I have explained above, multiculturalism is unlikely to generate such long-term opportunities in Turkey. Kymlicka also argues that:

> Some language minorities are sufficiently large and institutionally complete, they constitute their own societal culture so that individual members can find a relatively full range of economic, social and cultural options and opportunities in their own language (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 40).

Egalitarians would argue that if Kurdish became the main language of education in minority public schools, the ability of minority pupils to benefit from that socio-economic network would automatically decrease, as the Kurdish population could not
so far develop a network that would be sufficiently broad to act as a counterweight to the opportunities available in the majority language.

There are two clear indicators of this insufficiency of Kurdish societal culture. Firstly, its dispersed demography and fragmented cultural structure would make it difficult to develop an institutional network sufficiently broad to accommodate the Kurdish population in their mother tongue. It is striking that half of Kurdish group leaders in parliament cannot communicate with each other, and that MPs from the DTP, such as Akin Birdal and Emine Ayna, cannot speak any Kurdish dialect at all.\textsuperscript{ix}

Another indicator of the institutional incompleteness of the Kurdish community is the low level of industrialization and recruitment opportunities in the Southeast region, where some local Kurds have claimed self-government rights. Geographic and climatic hardships (Baycan 2002: 337), and the insecurity of the region following PKK’s terrorist activities,\textsuperscript{xx} are among the reasons why industrial progress and employment opportunities have stagnated in the region (Albayrak, Kalayci and Karatas 2004: 101–30). These factors clearly indicate that the Kurdish community in Turkey could not so far develop a societal culture, which is capable of providing socio-economic opportunities for its members in their own language. This perspective does not have any sort of patronizing sense whatsoever yet it stresses that ‘whether a cultural group can be thought of as a societal culture, which Kymlicka calls a nation, whose practices and institutions cover a full range of human activities, is certainly a matter of degree, rather than the either/or distinction Kymlicka makes it’ (Young 1997: 51). Under current circumstances, while public education of all grades in Kurdish may give Kurds some cultural freedom, in the long term it could prevent their children from integrating into the Turkish-speaking network, which at present seems to be the only option that can offer a wide range of socio-economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{75} The argument that the societal culture can be developed by weak multiculturalist policies to the extent that it may ultimately become mature enough to provide all means of opportunities for its members will be elaborated in the following pages of this chapter.
Figure 2: Socio-economic Development of Regions in Turkey

Source: (Albayrak, Kalayci and Karatas, 2004: 104)

The preceding section demonstrated that the ethno-centric theory of multiculturalism is not a viable solution for Turkey’s Kurdish problem as it violates the principle of equality. As was shown, most of these inequalities stem from the immaturity of the minority’s societal culture. This study conceptualized the societal culture through examining the indicators such as economic development, settlement patterns, political orientations, linguistic unity, and basic agreements on the symbolic identity borders of the minority members. Therefore, one may assume, as Kymlicka would probably think, the societal culture can be developed in time through the progressive implementation of multiculturalism. I am going to elaborate its feasibility later in this chapter, but before this I will explain why we should still be committed to multiculturalism in principle. At this point the liberal culturalists’ arguments and their critique of egalitarianism in Turkey have become important.

5.1.4 Why the Difference-blind Egalitarianism is not a Liberal solution for Turkey?

Egalitarianism is helpful in spotting the further inequalities that multiculturalism is bound to create in Turkey, yet far from being able to guarantee the freedoms and
the very equality it seeks to promote. Liberal culturalists unlike strict egalitarians support the recognition of culture in the public sphere arguing that ‘the formal equality in the enjoyment of the rights, do[es] not guarantee the equality of respect, access to labour markets on an equal footing or making use of the welfare measures like free health and education services… The combination of all these factors, as Castles argues, marginalises the minorities and blocks the formation of extensive and inclusive concept of citizenship (Castles and Davidson 2000: 127-128)’ (Gulec 2003: 45-46).

Imposition of one official language in public education can be justified on the grounds that everyone should have sufficient knowledge of the official language to be able to communicate with public authorities, benefit equally from public services, and compete on an equal footing for education or for employment opportunities. However, even if everyone in the country is given an equal opportunity to learn the official language, there is still an older generation who cannot learn Turkish and so need to use their mother tongue in relations with the public authorities. ‘A semi-official survey on internally displaced persons (IDPs) conducted by Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies shows that ‘not speaking Turkish’ ranks third among reasons for IDPs’ lack of access to health services; 27.4 per cent of IDPs, the vast majority of whom are Kurds, responded positively to this question’ (Minority Rights Group 2007: 19). To ensure that such persons are accorded equal citizenship rights they should be provided with services in their own language, at least on ad hoc needs basis. This arrangement would not violate individual equality so long as all citizens from different linguistic groups within the country could benefit from it.

The same logic has already been discussed with reference to minority pupils, who need help in their own language in order to be able to learn the official language when they first face it in the elementary school. Those minority pupils who do not learn the official language at home suffer from this disadvantage in the initial years of their education when they encounter the official language for the first time. Their
educational success and motivation are seriously affected by this unfair experience at the beginning of their formal education. They frequently score badly in examinations, get into worse colleges than they would otherwise have gotten, stuck with unqualified and less well-paid jobs. Those Kurds with lesser paid jobs, and therefore less money to invest in their children’s education, pass on this systematic injustice to the next generation and this vicious circle of systematic inequality between the Turks and Kurds repeats itself. There are of course many Kurds in Turkey who break this chain, have the best education and reach to positions of influence that many Turks cannot. However this happens at the expense of freedom of many Kurds to speak to their own children in Kurdish. Many Kurds think they must speak to their children in Turkish to support their education in school, slowly surrounding to the domination of the majority culture in the public realm.

An extreme interpretation of equality is not only destructive of cultural diversity but also creates systematic inequality for those who value their cultural freedom to speak to their children in Kurdish. This takes us to the point of the cultural relativists: that culture is a source of difference and we should take this into account so as to be able to understand if one can really enjoy the opportunities guaranteed by the principle of formal equality (Fraser 2009). Furthermore, the liberty of people belonging to minority national ethnic groups is violated when they are forced by the state into a civic project that is not their own. Secondly, the violent assimilationist policies marginalize and radicalize members of these groups, some of whom thereby become terrorists. The KONDA (2010) research survey shows that those who support the violent tactics of PKK in Turkey are also the ones with a low level of education, income, and a concomitant sense of discrimination. In this sense, denial of difference in the public realm marginalizes people not only because it limits their cultural freedom but also because it creates a systematic injustice and a sense of discrimination. It is this injustice that most Kurds want to defeat in Turkey.

Theorists of liberal culturalism also argue that the standard application of a civic
law is unjust and universalistic human rights are not adequate because they are
usually a product of one culture amongst others. For this reason, imposing civic laws
that are more compatible with the cultural identities of majorities than those of the
minorities is an unequal policy. In his reply to this view, Brian Barry argued: ‘All laws
have a different impact on different people depending on their preferences and beliefs,
for instance speed limits inhibit only those who like to drive fast. This does not
constitute unequal treatment provided the law can be justified as advancing some
legitimate public objective’ (Barry 2009). However what these legitimate public
objectives are, and who decides what they are, are still vague issues. This way of
thinking continues to legitimize the standard exercise of the majority rule. Those who
resisted assimilation have never had a sense of belonging to the same public as the
majority. The egalitarians are incapable of accounting for this reality.

5.2 Post-Multiculturalism Critique in Turkey

5.2.1 Politics of Recognition: Freedom for Kurds?

As neither of the two perspectives that this chapter has explained so far are
able to correspond to the complexities of Kurdish question in Turkey, the post-
multiculturalism critique will be elaborated to demonstrate a third way. In this third
way, denial of the difference is not an option yet the recognition as defined in
Kymlicka’s theory is equally problematic. ‘Recognition is undoubtedly a matter of
justice, but it cannot be reduced to that alone, since it operates within a more
personal psychological domain, and requires the unique bonding of two subjects,
which will necessarily be different every time’ (Wynne 2000: 10).

Politics of recognition as argued by Kymlicka and Taylor is dominantly informed
by a responsive conception of recognition by which it is asserted that there is an
authentic self, awaiting to be recognized (Heyes 2003). Here, to recognize someone in a responsive sense is

to acknowledge them as they already really are...The demand for recognition in a response-model is produced and justified through pre-existing characteristics of a person.... in the generation-model it is the act of recognition itself which confers those characteristics onto a person through their being recognized as such. The former is a case of person ‘knowing’, whilst the latter is a case of person ‘making’ (McQueen 2011).

I argue that securing the recognition of differences in a responsive way so that they are institutionalized as such is misleading. The reason for this is that ‘our individual identity is not constructed from within and generated by each of us alone. Rather, it is through dialogue with others that we negotiate our identity’ (McQueen 2011). Given that there are too many ‘others’ and that they change depending on the context, there cannot be only one ‘self’ to recognize as such across the time.

5.2.2 Inter-subjectivity, ‘Significant Other’ and Multiculturalism in Turkey

Given that we have more than one pre-existing characteristic, what matters in responsive recognition is about the question of what characteristics are to be recognized. In the context of this study Calhoun (1993: 229) asks: given that nationalism consists not only of claims to social and cultural identity, but an affirmation of the importance of certain likeness above all others, why has selected likeness been chosen as the ‘single’ definition of the political community in question? Given that the subjects composing a group have their own differences and conflicting interests, as well as commonalities other than the overarching identity marker, we should understand the reason why those other commonalities of its members do not

76 Taylor refers to these others as ‘significant others’, meaning those people who have an important role in our lives. The idea that our sense of who we are is determined through our interaction with others initiates a shift from a monologic to a dialogic model of the self (McQueen 2011). In Miller’s words ‘ethnic and other group identities are by no means fixed, and groups adapt their self-conceptions to their surroundings. Very often the identity of one group is worked out in relation to other groups and develops along with changes in the groups’ relative standing’ (Miller 1995: 134).
matter, or why all internal distinctions and conflict cannot prevent the binding marker of group identity from occurring as politically relevant.

The answer lies in ‘the significant other’ (Gillespie and Cornish 2010). What is distinctive about a group can only be explained in relation to its ‘significant other’ (Taylor 1995, Brubaker 2000, 2002), and for this, our focus should be moved from the ‘authenticity’ of the group to the contexts within which individuals collectively develop a sense of distinctiveness around one specific difference. This phenomenological understanding of the self encourages us to look at the context and source of motivation for people to stick to one particular sense of belonging.

In applying this dialogic perspective to the Kurdish case I argue that we have to look at the ways in which the ‘Kurdish ethnic group’ is defined in relation to its significant other which is, in this case, wrongly portrayed to be the ‘Turkish ethnic group’ by Zeydanlioglu (2008) in his work called ‘The White Turkish Man’s Burden’: Orientalism, Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey’. At this point Chapter IV on the historical relationship between Kurds and the state in Turkey becomes relevant, as it gives us the necessary information about the context. A careful analysis of this context suggested the Kurds per se had never been the significant other vis-à-vis the Turkish identity until the 2000s. Turkishness has dominantly been defined as a citizenship category on an ideational level and any group formation on the basis of ethnicity was strictly prohibited rather than crystallized and stigmatized. Assimilation was the main method used in homogenization discourse within which differences

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77 It is wrong because he bases his argument on a structure where, it is asserted, the process of ‘othering’ which was inherent in the relationship between the Western Imperial powers and their oriental Colonies is also relevant to explain the unequal relationship between the Kurds and the state in Turkey. To prove his point about this unequal relationship, the Author gives an account of denial and assimilation policies in Turkey. However, the evidence he used to exemplify the assimilationist policies contradicts his main argument, which is about the othering process. The ‘othering’ process requires a continuous differentiation, not acculturation or assimilation that works against the crystallization of differences. From this emerges the question his study cannot explain: how the State in modern Turkey could be ‘othering’ the Kurdish identity when it did not even recognize its existence. In Turkey the existence of a distinct Kurdish nationality was denied for a very long time until the late 1990s. If you do not even accept that such a distinct nation exists how can you then be ‘othering’ that nation. It is this logical gap that renders his argument somewhat paradoxical and rather inconclusive.
have been moulded into Turkishness.

This process of assimilation has been given in the conventional literature as the primary cause of Kurdish nationalist radicalization and the politicization of ethnicity (Zeydanlioglu 2008, Yegen 2006). This has also been supported by Honneth (1995:169) who offered a detailed theoretical account of how ‘the denial of recognition provides the motivational and justificatory basis for social struggles’ (McQueen 2011).

The scholars who suggest this relationship between assimilation and social struggle, however, cannot account for why during the time between 1938 and 1984 there was not a mass Kurdish struggle. ‘All the present paradigm of the assimilation-resistance-assimilation model in respect to ethnic conflict remains less than satisfactory to explain the Turkish case’ (Heper 2007: 2). Neither can the same paradigm explain remaining and increasing levels of social struggle and conflict on the part of the Kurds in times when their identity is recognized and accommodated by the state (Tezcur 2010).

The proponents of the ‘assimilation-resistance–assimilation’ model have the presumption that the assimilation process poses a challenge to the very existence of the subject’s identity and therefore the subject who senses a danger of extinction develops a motivation for social struggle. The reason why they have this misconception of what happened in Turkey and why ‘they cannot explain the periods of relative peace and quiet’ in the past (Tezcur 2009: 3) is because their interpretation of assimilation is not informed by the distinction between absorptive and additive types of assimilation. Their argument lends itself to a serious problem in the sense that additive assimilation is confused with the concept of cultural annihilation reducing the former to a process of absorption after which the culture of origin ceases to exist. This can only happen when the culture of origin and the receiving culture which one is expected to assimilate into are mutually exclusive.

Those who want to reverse the policies of assimilation are informed by this erroneous reading of the problem in which it is asserted that Kurdishness and
Turkishness are mutually exclusive categories and binary oppositions. Almost all scholars of ‘liberalism’ in Turkey who think of Kurdish and Turkish identities as being of binary oppositions advised to reverse the assimilation and recognize the ethno-cultural distinctions. Recognition has been translated into the demand for a body politic where each social segment has its own sphere of authority, either territorially or functionally.

Supporters of this view in Turkey accept that people of Kurdish origin, have enriched all walks of life in Turkey where this has been facilitated by an understanding of formal equal citizenship. They also accept that ethnicity as such has not been the criterion for exclusion from the body politic when it comes to explaining the state’s problematic relationship with the Kurds. The historical discourse of assimilation and heterogeneity that it constructed within and across ethnic groups has not been analysed in terms of its implications for the contemporary politics of recognition they have championed.

Proponents of ‘reverse assimilation’ never examine what to recognize if there is not such a unanimous category of Kurds who have been excluded on the basis of their ethnicity per se and merged around it in return. Immaturity of the minority’s societal culture is rather interpreted by ‘liberals’ in Turkey to be the outcome of the unjust historical discourse of assimilation that they think should be reversed. They usually do not approach the societal implications of the historical narrative as an independent variable. The reason for this is that liberalism in the minds of radical minority members and some ‘liberals’ in Turkey is wrongly associated with just the opposite of everything done by the state in the past. Their definition of unfairness is informed, dominated and blinded by their hatred of the historical injustices and everything associated with them. I am not going to dwell on the normative problem and these past injustices; it is already a widely accepted fact that the state nationalism in Turkey has been illiberal. In this study I will rather focus on

78 Ethnicity as such was not a reason for exclusion but the politicization of ethnicity was.
What follows is an account of the heterogeneity in Kurdish societal culture. In this study it is suggested that only by way of showing what these in-group differences are, we can go further to explain the injustices that a generative model of recognition is bound to create in Turkey. The data about these differences and the societal order in which we operate is drawn from my field work in Eastern cities of Turkey including Diyarbakir, Mardin, Tunceli, Bitlis, Van and Hakkari that I visited twice between 2009 and 2011; another important source of information is the broader survey researches done by KONDA research institute in 2006 and 2010.

5.2.3 Additive Assimilation and Heterogeneity

As explained in the previous chapter, Turkishness has been defined by the constitution as a category of citizenship and as such it has been internalized by a huge number of minority citizens in the country. Most of the people from different ethnic groups even refused to be identified as a minority in the sense that the concept of minority refers to a group of citizens who are deprived from fundamental rights on the basis of their differences from the majority. 38.2% of Kurds in the Southeast and Central-East Anatolia claim that their ethnic Kurdishness is in no conflict with their Turkishness so long as the latter is defined to be a category of citizenship, 29.8% of them implied that their sense of Kurdishness and Turkishness as being of a binary opposition and this has been inaugurated only recently and not in their childhood. Only 32% of Eastern Kurds refuse to accept Turkish identity in any form in opposition to the 68% of Eastern Kurds who do not see their ethnicity and Turkishness by citizenship as mutually exclusive categories.
Chart 6 Q: You know it is compulsory in elementary schools to read an anthem every day, which starts as follows; ‘I am Turkish, I am Honest and I am Hardworking’. How did or does it make you feel?

![Chart showing responses to the question.]

The question was only directed to those Kurds who reside in Southeast and Centraleast Anatolia.

The Kurds' varying perceptions of Turkishness are also reflected on the variety of demands that they have for the education in their mother tongue. 82.1% of Kurds want education in their mother tongue (KONDA 2010: 124) but what they understand from education in mother tongue differs to a great extent. 56% of the Kurds who demand education in their mother tongue think of it as an optional language course beside Turkish as being the medium of instruction in all taught courses. Only 19% of Kurds in the region claim all grades of education to be in Kurdish. Open ended conversations I had with Kurdish people in the region revealed that although they believe that their demand for cultural recognition is represented by the BDP (Pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party), its leaders' insistence for education in Kurdish for all grades does not in fact represent the interest of the majority of Kurds who think that the future of their children lies in Turkish. ‘Most Kurdish couples speak Kurdish between themselves but the communication process in Kurdish is cut off when they
communicate with their children at home; they speak Turkish with their children in order to support their school life and future interests’ (Gultekin 2012: 156). One of the many likeminded people I spoke explained that

Most of the children in the region already know Kurdish as its their mother tongue, those Kurds who want education of all grades in Kurdish wants to develop a societal culture in Kurdish, their wish is not to be recognized as such, they want to live in that language and for this reason they need to institutionalize the language in a way that everyone here in the southeast can ultimately live without a need to speak and write Turkish at all. I believe that majority of the Kurds think that their children need to learn Turkish as well so that they can have equal chances in education and job market all over the country.

**Chart 7 Q: What do you understand and expect from education in mother tongue?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The medium of instruction in all courses is Turkish but those who wishes to learn Kurdish can take the Kurdish language courses</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the courses can be given in Turkish and some others in Kurdish</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All courses from the start to the end can be given in Kurdish</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Series1**
Chart 8 Q: Can you live your identity freely?

The Kurds who think that they cannot live their identity because there are legal barriers to them comprise less than one quarter of all Kurdish society in places they comprise the majority. The half of the Kurdish respondents in the region thinks that they either can fairly live their identity or do not have any problem in living it at all.

Chart 9 Distribution of Ethnic groups by income

It is argued that ‘economic disparities can cause people to develop a heightened
awareness of their class or regional identity. But because the Southeast of Turkey is both the poorest region and the only predominantly Kurdish part of the country, economic disparities lend themselves particularly well to heightened, politicized ethnic identity formation’ (Icduygu, Romano and Sirkeci 1999: 998). According to statistics 29% of Kurds live under the poverty line whereas this figure for Turks is around 20% (KONDA 2010: 96). The reason why this sense of economic disadvantage is felt more and more deeply among Kurds than Turks is that the majority of those Kurds who live under the poverty line are concentrated in the Southeast region. That clearly gives an idea that the economic dimension of the problem is regional rather than ethnic, but the discourse of differentiation and the politics of grievance itself creates misguided analogies between ethnicity \textit{per se} and economic deprivation.

The survey results as shown in the above graph reveal that there is an economic disparity between the Turks and the Kurds, but the disparity between different income groups within the same ethnicity proves to be far greater than the level of disparity that we observe between Turks and Kurds. The economic inequality that matters in terms of justice can only be recognized by a comparison between the worse off and the better off. With this logic in mind, I argue that there is no point in explaining the disparity with ethnicity \textit{per se}, because none of the better off categories in opposition to the least advantaged lowest income groups are exclusive to the members of the dominant ethnicity.

Duman’s (2008) work ‘\textit{Education and Income Inequality in Turkey: Does Schooling Matter?}’ suggests that the income disparity between Turks and Kurds can be explained better by their access to education:

There is a wide gap between the educational levels of the poorest and richest socioeconomic groups in Turkey. For example in 1987, 53% of the lowest income quintile had a primary school leaving certificate while this ratio was less than 40% for the richest quintile. Only 0.75% of households with a university degree belonged to the lowest quintile in the same year. These ratios got even higher over the years as the share of households with primary school completion, which is in the poorest segment, rose over 56% whereas the ratio of university graduates in the same category declined to 0.5%. Within the richest portion, households with university educations started to have a share of almost 28% in
2005. The numbers suggest that higher educational levels are associated with higher incomes (Duman 2008: 377)

Chart 10 Education by ethnicity

This argument is also indicated by the number of Kurds and Turks with different levels of education. The percentage of illiterate Kurds is almost identical to the percentage of Kurds with the lowest income as shown above. Figures also suggest that educational opportunities like income and material sources have not been exclusive to one ethnic group or another. It is, however, true that those who couldn’t have equal access to education also comprised the lowest income group and this in turn made them less likely to invest in the education of their own children. Those Kurds who are stuck in this vicious circle of injustice were also found to comprise the group with the deepest sense of discrimination in Turkey. As shown before in this Chapter recognition of linguistic differences is a matter of justice in terms of its capacity to provide equal access to education. It is, however, misleading to depict the problem as being of ethnicity only and then formulate solutions on the basis of this criterion to
promote the ethnic character of the body politic. The reason why it is problematic is because it overlooks the way in which equal access to education is violated by factors other than ethno-linguistic differences. As shown by the research (Duman 2008) access to education seems to be associated more with family income and class differences than ethnicity in the first place.

**Chart 11. Perception of Discrimination and Education Level**

![Perception of discrimination chart]

Legend:
- Perception of discrimination
- Perception of discrimination
Chart 12 Q: What should be the primary action to take as to make the Kurds happy?

As seen on the chart above, 37.8% of Kurds think that improvement of their economic conditions is the most important and necessary action to make things better for all Kurds in the region. 21.2% think that recognition of their Kurdish identity will be enough and only a very small portion of them 16.8% want the local administration to become autonomous and make its own decisions. What complicates the feasibility of multiculturalism in Turkey therefore is that only a very small proportion of the Kurdish population is asking for administrative autonomy with legislative powers. Nevertheless this is still quite problematic as only small proportion of Kurds –16.8%– maintains the remaining conflict and as long as the conflict is an issue, an amnesty is far from being an option in the country where the majority has a tendency to interpret it as a form of surrender to violence. This recognition is still an issue because Kurds in the region are not exactly sure what it means and their demand for recognition is most likely to be conflated by radicals with regional autonomy as well. Multiculturalism still remains as an option and a desirable idea, but in what forms and how? Can ethno-centric
multiculturalism equally promote freedom for all these segments of Kurds with their different interests?

5.2.4 Generative Recognition and Ethno-centric Multiculturalism

If the Kurds have not been directly envisaged as other by the state discourse; if there is not such a unanimous category of Kurds who have been excluded on the basis of their ethnicity per se and merged around it in return; if the differences among Kurds as I illustrated above have been relevant to the extent, that they do not even share the same view about the causes and solutions of the problem; then what distinction will the ethno-centric multiculturalism recognize?

I argue that the ethno-centric multiculturalism in Turkey is complicated by the complexities I explained above. The politics of recognition has to fabricate distinctions to overcome the problem of complexities. In doing so it is also bound to violate the freedom of the Kurds because it segregates and puts them into one cultural block. What follows will also argue that the segregation diminished the dignity that the Kurds would have derived from recognition in different forms. This argument is informed and suggested by post-multiculturalist scholars like Phillips (2007), Cowan (2001) and Benhabib (2002) who are indeed sympathetic to idea of multiculturalism. Nevertheless their account is nuanced enough to be able to track the difference between the ‘recognition of identity’ and ‘the politics of identity’. In other words this is the difference between the recognition of culture as ‘knowing it’ and the recognition of culture as ‘making it’. Their critique is based on the illiberal implications of the latter. Bringing their arguments all together I will suggest that the violation of freedom by ethno-centric multiculturalism takes four different forms in Turkey: violation of the freedom of exit, essentialization of the culture, reification of the identity, and stigmatization of minority.

I should remind the reader that what I am criticizing here is the application of
ethno-centric liberal multiculturalism in Turkey and the violation of individual freedoms it causes, not the theory itself. As I will be arguing in the following chapter, it can work in some other cases and does not create what is bound to imply for the Kurdish question in Turkey. In this sense I suggest the condition that renders the ethno-centric multiculturalism theory of Kymlicka illiberal is only contextual and not inherent in his theory.

5.2.4.1 Freedom of Exit

Benhabib argues that ‘no authority should impose cultural membership on a person with reference to where he or she is born. It also means that a person must be totally free to leave his or her cultural group and to join any group of his or her own choice, i.e. the ‘freedom of exit and association’ (Benhabib 2002: 19). Similarly Kukathas, drawing on Brian Barry’s view, explained that ‘Given that many forms of association such as group membership, are unchosen, the critical issue is whether or not individuals can exit from an association’ (Kukathas 2002: 186). Education in the mother language is the crucial point where the multiculturalism may come to be very problematic. Under its egalitarian critique, multiculturalism has been assessed in terms of its capacity to provide children from different ethnicities with the equality of opportunity. At the very heart of the argument championed by scholars who defend the ‘freedom of Exit’ lies this concern. Drawing on Mill’s concept of ‘harm principle’, it has been asserted by Barry that the decisions about the language of the education should not be left to the hands of the parents only. This is because freedom of exit is possible only if the people are well equipped to use that option. As education is the only means to attain the qualifications that open the exit door, the state should make sure that education is given in the language that then opens the door to the largest range of opportunities available in the body politic.
According to Barry, the state may and should find it necessary when the autonomous parents' cultural interests limit the capacity of their children to enjoy their liberty. According to Kelly (2002), parents' decisions on educational issues do not bring about any limits to their children's freedom. Children can leave the community of their mother language when they become mature enough to do so. Nevertheless, Barry argues that parents' freedom for and interest in sending their children to schools where the medium of instruction is in the mother language would decrease their chances to leave. Given that the societal culture of the Kurdish community is not yet developed as much as and in the way that Kymlicka defined as necessary, the education of all grades in Kurdish would halt children from enjoying the opportunities available in broader society. As I suggested before this is only a contextual condition that might be developed in time and therefore might not be a problem in the future if the gradual implementation of multiculturalism (in the case of education the minority language as an elective course in the curriculum) starts to take place. This is indeed what is currently happening in Turkey, yet it creates another problem in the sense that radical nationalists in the minority group see this weak multiculturalism as only another manipulative way of the state discourse to integrate the Kurds into the mainstream community. On these grounds, they exacerbate the conflict to gain what they ultimately want. The problem becomes more serious in light of evidence which shows that the number of Kurds (56%) who want to have Kurdish only as an elective course, far exceeds the number of those Kurds (19%) who insist on the education of all grades in Kurdish. Even if everyone is given what they want in this context the development of the societal culture in a way that is necessary for the foundation of a stronger multiculturalism regime is not so likely with such a small number of people who are willing to use it in every stage of life.

The only strategy the radical nationalists can follow is to win the support of minority members. Any means used to this end has to do with them promoting either the environment of insecurity, a sense of injustice or an increasing alienation from the
broader society. Taspinar suggests that ‘It does not take much to see that Turkish nationalism begets Kurdish nationalism and violence begets violence. Instead of a nationalist straitjacket, the real challenge—and solution—that awaits Turkey is multiculturalism’ (Taspinar 2007). Indeed as clearly as it can be seen, what begets Kurdish nationalism is the multiculturalist initiatives of the state, not the oppressive Turkish nationalism as we used to know it. I will come back to this point when we need to assess the feasibility of the weak multiculturalism and its likelihood to be transformed into a stronger multiculturalist regime in Turkey. Before that what follows will explain remaining three forms where ethno-centric multiculturalism limits freedom in Turkey.

5.2.4.2 Essentialism


reductive sociology of culture [in multiculturalism] risks essentializing the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or race, it risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasizing the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimise repressive demands for cultural conformity; and by treating cultures as badges of group identity, it tends to fetishize them in ways that put them beyond the reach of critical analysis

As has been argued in the previous chapter, state nationalism in Turkey has been informed by its ideational sources like equal citizenship, patriotism and rights on one hand and resort to religion as a source of mobilization on the other. A secular, ethnicity-blind, civic and French formulation of nationhood in Turkey on the ideational level has been supplanted in practice by religious sources of mobilization. The Kurds who belong to the same religion as the rest of the population have always been incorporated in the system by this commonality. The outcome of this can be observed in the survey done in 2010. It shows the most important source of identity that binds people and especially the Kurds to Turkey is now religion, and according to the same survey, almost half of all Kurds tend to identify with Islam before their ethnicity. Evidence has already been given under the egalitarian critique that almost half of the
Kurds even in the Southeast region let alone the other Kurds who are scattered across the country vote for the AKP which is a pro-Islamic party. Its program strongly resonates with religious Kurds and the party has 75 Kurdish MPs in the cabinet. After the electoral victory of the AKP in 2007, Emine Ayna who was a Kurdish nationalist MP from DTP said that ‘Whoever becomes an AKP candidate is not a Kurd, even if she says I am a Kurd’ (Tezcur 2009: 5).

It is not only ‘who is not a Kurd’ that is decided by the activists, ‘who is a Kurd’ also becomes a matter to be decided by the dominant narrative and the activists. Zaza people, who assert that they are not Kurds, are treated as traitors by radical Kurdish nationalists. This is also supported by the factual evidence that I observed during my visit to the city of Tunceli where the Zaza people I spoke communicated their Zazaki (Alevi Kirmanci) identity as being distinct from Kurdish in the strongest terms possible. This was also evident when the city of Elazig, which has a large Zaza population, organized a very well attended protest against ‘PKK terrorism’ on October 24, 2007. The participants, many of who are Zaza Kurds, shouted, ‘we are all Turks, we are all Mehmets’ [a generic name given to soldiers of the Turkish Army]’ (Tezcur 2009: 7).

As clarified before, of course this is not an inherent malfunction in the multiculturalism theory that Kymlicka offers. He especially stresses that theory of multiculturalism is not a single unified force that walks and talks out there in the world. According to critics, multiculturalism is actively ‘encouraging’ people to think in essentialist terms, ‘pressuring’ people to act in essentialist ways, even ‘forcing’ and ‘imposing’ essentialist identities and practices on people. Multiculturalism isn’t a single actor or force that speaks with a single voice. It operates at different levels: theorists of multiculturalism say one set of things; laws, bureaucratic regulations and court decisions tell us another set of things; the media tell us yet another; and activists have their own message. (Kymlicka 2013: 22).

So Kymlicka’s multiculturalism theory as such cannot be accused of encouraging essentialism and it is true that political actors are more responsible than the theory for
its practice and implications. Yet the problem is deeper than suggested because it is not only about how the political actors arbitrarily interpret and use multiculturalism in practice. It is much more about the context in which agents sometimes have no other option but to define what constitutes a group, unless it has already been agreed by people themselves from an inter-subjective perspective. As Ivor Jennings (1956: 55-56) famously suggested ‘the question of who has the right to self-determination complicates the principle. On the surface, it [self-determination] seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people’. This account does not leave any room for us to claim the responsive way of recognition may also hold true. We must, however, accept that some groups, more than others, are defined by its members having a deeper sense of togetherness, consent and willingness to be recognized as such. As I have argued before, people’s sense of ‘us’ is entrenched as much as, and so long as, they are defined as ‘the other’ by their significant collocutor.

I argue that ethno-centric multiculturalism is more likely to result in the essentialization of ethnicity when the ‘group’ at stake has not already been defined as ‘the other’ by the system.

5.2.4.3 Reification

Anne Phillips argues ‘Multiculturalism … solidifies differences that are currently more fluid, and makes people from other cultures seem more exotic and distinct than they really are. Multiculturalism then appears not as a cultural liberator but as a cultural straitjacket’ (Phillips 2007: 14, Kymlicka 2013: 2).

In applying this argument to the Kurdish case, I argue the way the meaning of Kurdishness is generated reduces the multiple identities of its members into one. This is in the sense that members of the Kurdish group are Kurdish before anything else; before their religion, sex, profession, ideology, motherhood, and so on. Of course this is not a barrier to the other things that they can be, but if the creation of their group
identity is primarily dependent on their prioritization of this ethnic distinction, the discourse generates the ways in which people are primarily represented by their ethnicity. For example, a meeting of intellectuals may increasingly be described as a meeting of ‘Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals’ instead of just intellectuals’ (Somer 2007: 105).

This can also be seen in the KONDA (2010) survey where the opinions of the Kurdish and Turkish respondents on discrimination are attributed to their ethnicities. One problematic perspective in these kinds of analyses is that the discourse itself leads us to think that those who say that they cannot live their identity are saying so because they are Kurdish. A more accurate analysis requires us to develop an awareness that the members of the Kurdish group are not only Kurds but they also hold other identities that might be subject to discrimination in society. Gay people and Alevis are some of the other marginalized groups in Turkey. The Kurds’ sense of deprivation might be informed by one of these other identities that lead to them being excluded and marginalized. All in all components of identity are many, and definition of the ‘self’ changes, depending on the context where one particularity becomes more relevant than others in relation to the ‘significant other that ‘the self’ communicates. It is also true for the vice versa: only by looking at those Kurds who say that they can live without any problem, we cannot infer that these Kurds are not stigmatized or they are fairly free to live their ‘Kurdish’ identity. What the information here says can be interpreted rather as an indication to the existence of those Kurds who might come to define their identity primarily with Sunni Islam that has always been financed, maintained and promoted by the state. If this is the case, they think, they can live their identity freely. What I stress here is that everything people do or say should not be attributed to their Kurdishness or Turkishness. This especially becomes a more important problem in Turkey where ‘Turks’, who have been indoctrinated since the foundation of the Republic that Turkishness is a category of citizenship, are now forced to define it in ethnic terms in relation to Kurds. Not only those Kurds who resist
it but also Turks who refuse to acknowledge ethnic conception of their identity complicate the feasibility of multiculturalism. Emina Ayna who is a hardliner of the Ocalan (the PKK’s founder and now its honorary leader) faction insists that the Constitution should use a language where the population of the country should be referred to as the ‘citizens of Turkey’ but not ‘Turkish’. This claim yields itself to the suggestion that Turkishness is a category of ethnicity and not citizenship. Apparently, minority activists are not only dictating who is Kurd and who is not, but they also define who is a Turk. By refusing this ethnic conceptualization of their identity, the majority of the people in Turkey blame the nationalist Kurds for creating false categories and psychological warfare.

5.2.4.4 Stigmatization and Self-Respect

‘Social Identity theory posits that individuals choose to affiliate with social groups primarily because such affiliation serves to enhance self-esteem’ (Tajfel and Turner 1979). From the inter-subjective perspective as the chapter argued before self-esteem cannot be generated from within. ‘It is through dialogue we negotiate our identity’ (McQueen 2011). What dignity Kurds can make out of recognition will be dependent on what image of Kurdishness is generated by the politics of recognition in the eyes of the majority. After all what makes it liberalizing for Kurds is not the recognition itself but rather the rights and advantages that it entails (Inwood 1992: 245-47, Margalit 2001: 128-129). If the recognition and prioritization of their ethnic particularity in political sphere is bound to create inequalities and injustices, as shown above, then it is suspicious what self-respect Kurds can derive from this image.

In this context the politics of recognition is more likely to create new stereotypes about the minority, rather than liberating its members. For example, the Turks have increasingly started to hold the Kurds responsible for escalating the conflict. As an outcome of this stigmatization, the military conflict between the PKK
and Turkish armed forces has almost turned into a civil war. In October 2011 thousands of civilians attacked the pro-Kurdish BDP centers in Bursa, Eskisehir, Konya and Erzincan to protest against the PKK’s killing of 24 soldiers in Hakkari. Most of the Kurds I spoke to in the Western cities of Turkey complained to me that they are increasingly stigmatized in daily life just because people tend to think that any Kurd who is proud of being Kurd would necessarily support the PKK.

This might not be a problem in an ideal context where members of different groups live in their own societal culture under territorially concentrated self-governments, but given that almost 40% of Kurds are scattered across the country, this seems to be quite a problem.

All in all, the context as I theoretically defined in Chapter III, and illustrated with the case of Kurds in Turkey in Chapter IV and V, renders the ethno-centric multiculturalism less conducive to equality and freedom than it can be in other places.

As was shown, most of the ways in which multiculturalism either reduces autonomy or create/exacerbate inequalities stems from the immaturity of the minority’s societal culture. Therefore, one may assume, as Kymlicka would probably think, the societal culture can be developed in time through the progressive implementation of multiculturalism. This approach, however, seems to be impractical in Turkey.

5.3 Practicality: Violent Ethnic Conflict and Multiculturalism

This impracticality seems to be the result of the reaction of radical groups to weak multiculturalist policies that seem, from a liberal account, to be in due course the optimal solution. However the orthodoxy that nurturing democracy would settle the ethnic conflict in Turkey is challenged by Tezcur (2009), asking

Why did the insurgent PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), which was militarily defeated, which renounced the goal of secession, and whose leader was under the custody of the
Turkish state, remobilize its armed forces in a time when opportunities for the peaceful solution of the Kurdish question were unprecedented in Turkey? (Tezcur 2010: 775).

Tezcur’s work focuses on the democratic competition that challenges the authority of the dissident PKK over its ethnic constituency. For him, this explains why democratic initiatives bring about the increasing need for the PKK to resort to conflict and mobilize its constituency. This account is relevant to explain the persistence of the conflict. Implications of this persistence for the feasibility of further democratization and multiculturalism is, noticeably, missing from his analysis and this is what I am endeavouring to capture in this part of my study.

Chapter III explained why the weak multiculturalism discourse rekindles radicalism in countries where the minority has been deeply divided. Division has emerged due to the fact that the boundaries between the majority and the minority have always been fluid and the members of ethnic groups crossed the boundaries easily. The policies of civic integration and forced assimilation prevented what would have otherwise been, in Weber’s words, a social closure. As there is no social closure or systematic exclusion that mobilizes the Kurds in Turkey the ethno-nationalists need to fabricate a sense of segregation. This is because the very existence of their political presence is founded on the idea of a distinction between the Kurds and the Turks in the country. The sustainability of the ethno-nationalist movement depends on whether it is capable of mobilizing the ethnic constituency. Arline and McCord (1979: 427) stated ‘for a separatist movement to emerge people must first be convinced that they share something against an enemy’. Maintaining an environment of insecurity is crucial for nationalists (Walker 1983) because it is the only way of reminding all members of the Kurdish minority that the state is their enemy.

Tezcur’s observation is also supported by Akcam and Asal (2005) who argue that the radical factions deliberately create instability to provoke government repression. ‘[Government] repression on ethnic group increases disadvantages for ethnic group. The existence of collective disadvantages creates opportunities for
ethnic leaders to mobilize ethnic group for their movement’ (Ibid).

Not only by provoking the government repression but also by directly attacking on health and education facilities in the region, The PKK creates an environment of insecurity. The climate they create discourages medics and teachers from taking up posts in the region through a fear of intimidation and murder. This consequently reduces the quality of the services people can benefit from in the region and also increases the Kurds’ sense of discrimination. ‘5219 citizens, 1330 Village Guards, 325 public officials and 123 teachers that the PKK killed–in Kurdish regions–between 1984 and 2006’ are the proof of this fact (Usak Research Report 2009).

Chart 13 PKK Conflict Graphic 2000-2012

As seen in the above graph, the PKK-inspired incidents of conflict steadily increased from 2004 to 2009, which is the period when the AKP Government continuously initiated reform policies that I have listed under the title ‘story of multiculturalism in Turkey’. This evidence supports the view that multicultural policies rekindle and bring about further radicalization in Turkey. It does so because reforms

79 The Chronological account of PKK attacks I used in generating this graph is available at the PKK Terrorism blog (http://www.pkkterrorism.org/) and Usak Research Report (2009).
have the potential to work against the mobilization effect that the environment of insecurity has created in Turkey. At those times it is more crucial for the ethnic insurgency to remind its constituency that the state is still their enemy.

The low conflict profile in 2009 and 2010 is also consistent with the argument in the sense that AKP policies started to reverse for a while after what happened in Habur on Monday 19th October 2009. The oppressive policies of the AKP government since April 2009 did the job for the PKK and gave the Kurds a reason to mobilize around the radical nationalist cause. The backstory to this turning point on 19th October 2009 is crucial to understand why the weak multiculturalism, albeit ideal from a liberal point of view, is far from being a realistic and viable option in Turkey.

The story goes as follows: 'The Turkish authorities and the PKK leadership had negotiated the arrival of 34 Kurds as an initial step toward the PKK’s ‘coming down from the mountains’, that is, ending their insurgency’ (ICG Report 2011: 8). Eight PKK fighters and 26 people from the PKK refugee camp in Northern Iraq came, and they were welcomed by a group of DTP officials and hundreds of people who walked and shouted slogans to celebrate. Their ostentatious celebrations were broadcasted in the media and interpreted by the majority as the victory for the PKK. The PKK’s killing of 24 troops near the Iraqi border on the very same day confirmed and strengthened this message (Hurriyet Daily News). After the event a poll showed 51 per cent of the population opposed to the Democratic Opening and that the AKP’s popularity plunged 7.1 percentage points between August and November 2009 (ICG 2011: 9, Aydoğan 2011).

The continuation of ethnic terror and the increasing numbers of casualties simply prompted the nationalistic sentiments of the majority community that in turn halted the feasibility of furthering the multiculturalist projects. The backfire that resulted in the closure of the pro-Kurdish political party DTP was on the grounds that it was associated with the PKK. Its hawkish leaders were barred from politics for 10 years. The BDP succeeded the DTP with the same set of goals and the party
program but the same continuous circle of provocative relationships between the activists and the state has since repeated itself. ‘According to the announcement of the BDP, 7748 party executives and employees were taken into custody and 3895 were arrested between 14th April 2009 and 6th October 2011’\textsuperscript{xxi}. This process blocked the democratic ways and means of negotiating further possibilities for a pluralist democracy.

The observation suggests anything that is short of the strong ethno-centric multiculturalism will not suffice to subdue the violent ethnic conflict in Turkey. Yet the strong multiculturalism, this chapter has showed, is also bound to exacerbate the inequalities and limit the individuals’ freedom in Turkey. It is not my aim to explain the causes of ethnic conflict in Turkey. The political oppression and many other factors including the density of the elite's effort, financial resources and geopolitics can be of help in explaining the occurrence and endurance of the ethnic insurgency. None of these accounts can fully explain why the ethnic conflict in Turkey continued in such a violent fashion when there was a real chance of success for political deliberation and the politics of recognition was closer than ever before.

I argued that when the terror is primarily aimed at mobilizing its constituency rather than protecting its rights, radicals will see the weak multiculturalism as another strategic action of the state to challenge their authority. As I suggested earlier, if the group is already negatively defined by the ethnic nationalism of the majority community that excluded or discriminated against it, there would be no need for the ethnic terrorism to mobilize the members of the minority against the majority. This is not the case in Turkey as both chapter II and chapter IV have explained and demonstrated.
5.4 Conclusion

All in all, I argued that the ethno-centric multiculturalism of Kymlicka is not likely to promote equality or freedom in Turkey. The argument was supported by the egalitarian critique of multiculturalism and its application in Turkish case. In what followed, however, this egalitarian account was shown to be an excessive concern with the principle of equality at the expense of the freedoms of the people. Those whose understanding of injustice is primarily informed by their experiences of historical suppression then come to prioritize cultural freedom over equality. For this, the difference-blind egalitarianism is seriously inoperative in the environment of ethnic conflict. Turkey is a clear example of this. In most cases where there is so much historical baggage and memories of violent conflict, it is next to impossible to find a common legitimate public objective which, according to Barry, can be the only justification for the law that commands equality. Nevertheless, the egalitarian critique of multiculturalism in Turkey is important because it helps us understand the failure of multiculturalism in generating equality as a source of motivation for people to opt into the society. Moreover it is important because even those who prioritize freedom over equality use the rhetoric of the latter in the sense that they want to be ‘equally’ free, in most cases, to live their culture the same as everyone else does in the country.

At the end of the day it is the primary role of the state in liberalism to secure an impartial system, where individuals are free to follow their own conception of good to the utmost extent, insofar as that does not contravene someone else’s freedom to do the same. Barry’s suggestion, that education should be given in mother language so that children are equally equipped with qualifications opening the exit door to the best opportunities available in the society, is an eloquent argument. It becomes even more consistent with equal citizenship when it is complemented with a bilingual education. This is the proposal of liberal culturalists whose understanding of opportunity is
informed by a positive liberty and therefore is conducive to multiculturalism.

The cultural relativist argument becomes very relevant for the discussion on multiculturalism in Turkey but it differs from the multiculturalism of the Kymlicka type. Post-multiculturalists find ethnocentric multiculturalism dependent on Kymlicka’s erroneous definition of societal culture, and restrictive of individual freedom because it essentializes, reifies, and stigmatizes the identity.

Both cultural relativist and egalitarian critiques of ethno-centric multiculturalism proved to be relevant in Turkey only because the societal culture of the Kurdish community is more fluid than is suggested by Kymlicka.

When it comes to the recognition of rights that derive from membership to a group, I showed that the disparity between groups becomes even more relevant in Turkey where the system has not already been dominated by the categories of ethnicity and where the individuals across ethnic groups have different sources of political behaviour. Group autonomy seems to be more likely to limit individuals’ autonomy when their multiple identities are very hard to confine into one. My focus on the context represented by Turkey in this sense can be criticized on the grounds that the fluidity of societal culture is not exclusive to one case or another. It is by definition relevant for every group whose members are individuals with dynamic interests and a changing motivation to follow their non-ethnic particularities in different times. I agree with this. What is relevant as shown by Kymlicka is, however, the willingness of people to put their differences aside and merge around one ethnic particularity. Kymlicka’s strong inclination to prize the ethno-cultural approach to identity in his demand for self-government rights to national minorities seems to be deriving from his observation that most of the time most of the national minority members are just unwilling to relegate their ethnic particularity to a private discourse. Willingness is of the utmost importance in his theory and therefore attention to this should be paid.

In the rest of my argument, I brought these two different sets of approach
(fluidity of societal culture and willingness) together by introducing the inter-subjective paradigm of identity according to which the autonomous self is primarily informed by its relation to the significant other and space that surrounds it. In application of this understanding of the ‘self’ to the group psychology I argued that if any opposite categories of binary distinction are not readily available, any recognition claim on them has to generate the meaning of the distinction first. This recognition thereby transforms this collection of individuals into a group. In Turkey the only difference that is readily available between Kurds and others is the language and it is the primary concern for the parts claiming autonomy to use their language freely. However the distinction does not itself create a binary opposition. Kurdishness and Turkishness are not mutually exclusive categories and individuals can be both Kurdish and Turkish so long as they speak both languages and especially because the latter is rather a broader and inclusive category of citizenship. Moreover the level of significance attributed to the use of the mother tongue in public life is only a matter of individual choice that may be informed by many independent variables other than the value of the language as a good in itself. What is complex about the language question however, is that those who prioritize the use of their mother tongue in public life is dependent on the participation of others. This is because the language has a function only, in a dialogical environment where one needs one another person to speak it. One’s freedom to use it in public is, therefore, wholly dependent on the participation of others.

As was shown in the case of Turkey and suggested by the theoretical literature, the consent of people to ascribe meaning and value to the use of their first language in public should not be taken for granted. When it is an option, learning, using and living in another language may be even more liberating than imbibing what we are already given by birth and by our parents subsequently. This argument however totally depends on the definition of the receiving culture one may assimilate into. In Turkey, Kurds are accepted as peers in the society; a society in which they are not
only equal by citizenship but also equal in a way that they share the religious characteristics which primarily define the symbolic boundary of Turkish nation.

In such a context it is quite possible for one to preserve his Kurdish identity in a private discourse and assimilate into Turkish identity as a public phenomenon. Nevertheless those who challenge that fabric of pluranationality (Keating 2001) or hyphenated identities (Miller 1995) should be equally free to use their language in public if this is what they want to do. As I have argued in theory and illustrated in the case of Turkey their freedom to use their first language in public is wholly dependent on their ability to generate an awareness or belief that it is crucial for all Kurds to use their mother tongue in relation to the state. What has been shown in this chapter is the ways in which this generative model of recognition with ethnocentric multiculturalism is bound to limit the individual autonomy, exacerbate the disparity, and perpetuate the conflict in the society. What follows will show that these contextual deficiencies lose their relevance in countries where the national minority has been constantly marked out by its ethnicity or excluded from the mainstream in a way that led its members, in turn, to merge around their ethnic identity.

Notes


3 The commission is composed of an equal number of members from the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the European Parliament.


viii Above note vii.


xvi Above note xv.


xviii Above note xvii.


Chapter 6: Comparative Politics and Ethno-centric Multiculturalism

The third chapter of this study has examined many of the arguments against Kymlicka’s multiculturalism theory. All critiques suggested that cultural groups comprise individuals with different interests and that ethno-cultural categorization of individuals cannot account for the complex networks of their overlapping group identities. I have also illustrated in empirical Chapters IV and V how these critiques might hold true in practice. Departing from critiques of multiculturalism, however, I focused on Kymlicka’s point about the willingness of minority members to identify with ethno-politics. I argued that what complicates ethno-centric multiculturalism is neither the diversity itself nor the fact that the groups consist of individuals with different interests. Diversity becomes problematic only if people are not willing to overcome their conflicts of interest or confirm a collective attachment to ethno-national politics. This is however not a major problem for either the Francophone in Canada or the Flemish in Belgium who are exemplary of groups whose members are by and large attached to ethnopoltics.
Yet, I have also departed from the scholars of ethno-centric multiculturalism who ‘base their case on a somewhat simplistic model of the support of ethnic minorities on a purely cultural level’ (Rex 1997:31). Kymlicka for example takes it for granted that most people of the same ethno-culture will most of the time support ethnic politics that claim to represent their culture. He then focuses on whether this culture is institutionally developed ‘enough’ to exercise self-government rights and offer good lives for its members. Increasing debates on the accommodation of Kurds in Turkey, however, illustrated that the majority of a group like Kurds\textsuperscript{80}, can still be found unsupportive\textsuperscript{81} of ethno-nationalist politics.

Interestingly both sides of the discussion on multiculturalism neglected a huge literature on motivations for ethnic/non-ethnic voting/mobilization and what it means for their studies. It is my aim to bring the theory of ethno-centric multiculturalism to a more realistic conception of ethno-nationalism that would go beyond a purely cultural explanation.

Based on the case study of Turkey, I argued that the most important reason why most Kurds do not share the same ethno-political orientation is because they

\textsuperscript{80} The Kurds in Turkey comprise the majority in their historical homeland although 40% of their whole population lives across the country. They are not assimilated in the sense that their members still hold their Kurdish identity on a cognitive level although they might not be literate in Kurdish. Its population is as sizeable as 15% of the whole population in the country.

\textsuperscript{81} Ali Carkoglu (2011: 55) states that’ Although the independent candidates supported by the BDP have expanded their support, this expansion came primarily in the smaller Eastern and Southern Anatolian Provinces where the AKP was still able to hold on to a significant electoral support’. The BDP claim rights to the autonomy and to the state funded education in the Kurdish language in 15 East and Southeast Anatolian cities with a significant Kurdish population. In the 2011 general election, however, the independent candidates supported by the BDP could only win the majority of the votes cast in 5 out of these 15 cities. 52.12% in Mardin, 72.69% in Sırnak, 79.88 % in Hakkari, 58.72 % in Diyarbakır, 51.84% in Batman, 17.3% in Sanliurfa, 42.79% in Siirt, 26.04% in Bitlis, 44.50% in Mus, 24% in Bingöl, 41.02% in Ağrı, 48.7% in Van, 19.29 in Kars, 12.29% in Ardahan, 31.53% in Iğdır. (Hurriyet 2011—Turkey’s 2011 General Election Results). I also had extensive discussions with Kurds in the cities of Diyarbakır and Mardin. From this emerged a different emphasis than was indicated by the numerical data on the 2011 election results in these two cities. This was that even those who voted for the BDP do not have an agreed upon definition of what exactly is meant by the regional autonomy that its leaders voraciously claim. The striking theme of my observation in the region is that the demands of the conciliatory Kurds’ are not actually reflected by the hawkish MPs from the BDP despite having voted for them. See Chapter 5 especially the Chart 7, p.178 and Chart 12, p. 183 for more details.
were never recognized as an ethnic minority that could have otherwise developed a sense of shared ethno-political identity. The state approached cultural groups as ‘equal’ Turkish citizens and denied them any political right to freedom of association on the grounds of their ethnic particularities. Their experiences of state nationalism varied depending on their choices, cultural values, income or education levels and whether they experienced assimilation forcibly or voluntarily. Kurds not only remained culturally divided but also diverged in terms of their political orientations because of this variety of experiences. On one hand there is an increasing Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and the radical faction PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) has been fighting against the state armed forces for thirty years. On the other hand, most Kurds do not support ethno-nationalist politics in a militant sense nor do they accept separatism or the exclusive claims of an overarching ‘Kurdish’ culture in the region. It is not only because their dialectic and sectarian differences are still more important for them but also because of the fact that most Kurds have integrated into the majority. Nearly 40% are scattered across the country because they voluntarily moved in addition to those forcibly moved to other parts of the country. They shared the same religion and similar physical characteristics with the majority and could easily integrate and assimilate into it. They were given equal opportunities and, as Turkish citizens, reached all walks of life and attained influential positions throughout society.

I argue it is the absence of such an historical relationship between the minority and the state (like the one between the Kurds and the state in Turkey\(^\text{82}\)) that provides a more suitable context for the applicability of ethno-centric multiculturalism theory. This context is suitable for the autonomy models that Kymlicka defends in his theory for two reasons. First, the absence of such an historical account has facilitated the institutional development of the minority culture, as in Canada and Belgium. This also provided a base for the concentrated settlement of the minority members like Muslim

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\(^{82}\) See chapter 4 for more details of this historical narrative of the relationship between the Kurds and the State in Turkey.
Turks in Greece most of whom live in Western Thrace. Secondly, it provided a framework in which national minorities were more likely to develop a shared sense of positioning against the majority and subsequently support the ethno-nationalist politics of identity. I showed that Kymlicka has reduced popular support for ethno-nationalism to a natural outcome of cultural-attachment. I argued that for this very reason his theory could not explain why most Kurds did not identify with ethno-nationalist politics in Turkey. I came to this conclusion from a detailed study of the Kurds in Turkey, but for the reliability and external validity of my argument, this hypothesis should be tested, and this chapter fulfils this goal. The test has two missions. First is to verify that ‘when the state has historically used ethnicity as a political tool for better or worse the national minorities in that state are more likely to stick to the politicization of ethnicity and support the ethno-centric multiculturalism’

Some argue that there may be other, more important, reasons for ethno-nationalism in these cases than the historical narrative I suggested. Economic development, material interests or incompatibilities of the cultures involved are some of the alternative factors suggested to explain ethno-nationalism. For this reason the second mission of the test will be to show why the particular narrative I offer is more relevant than other explanations for understanding the lounge durée nature of mass mobilization for ethno-nationalist politics. In what follows I will first explain why popular

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83 This is not to say that groups who are forced to assimilate are less likely to develop an ethno-nationalist orientation than those who have been ethnically differentiated by the state. On the contrary the theoretical chapter showed that the forced assimilation policy is one of the reasons why people are more likely to support ethno-nationalist politics. However generalizing this account and ignoring those segments of the minority who voluntarily assimilated in the majority would be to overlook the permeability of the cultural boundaries under the integrationist ideal of civic state nationalism in those cases. In the absence of such a social closure, there is more space for individuals to go beyond ethnic boundaries. It is this cultural mobility and the lack of social closure that makes those minorities more heterogeneous and less supportive of the ethno-politics than other minorities whom the state has ethnically differentiated and segregated.

84 Ethno-nationalism in the rest of this chapter will refer to a mass movement rather than an ideology, which may be limited to a group of elites who do not necessarily represent the majority of their community. At the core of my argument lie the popular sovereignty and willingness of the people and this chapter is only concerned with reasons why peoples support and follow ethno-nationalist ideology in masses. I am, therefore, not going to attempt to explain why ethno-nationalism as an ideology emerges in the first place and why it translates into opposition and ethnic conflict.
support for ethno-nationalist projects makes multiculturalism theoretically consistent and practically feasible. Secondly I explain why the historical approach I provide is more relevant in explaining ethno-nationalist mobilization than purely cultural or economic factors. I will illustrate this with examples such as the Flemish of Belgium, Quebecers of Canada and the Muslim Turks of Greece. This chapter will explain how this has impacted positively upon the applicability of ethno-centric multiculturalism in these cases.

6.1 Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization and Multiculturalism

Studies in contemporary political theory (Young 1995, Kukathas 1992, Benhabib 2002, Barry 2001, Phillips 2007), nationalism and ethnicity (Brubaker 2003), human rights law (Jones 1999, Jackson Preece 2005), electoral behaviour (Huber 2012), and ethnic conflict (Gurr 1993, Horowitz 1985) all indicated the difficulties with ethno-centric projects of self-government such as consociational, legislative and administrative autonomy. For example, it is argued by Young (1995) that societal culture as defined by Kymlicka (1995) is hard to pinpoint. It is a dynamic concept and reaching unanimity is impossible due to multiple agencies that constantly compete to define it. Kukathas (1992) similarly argued that groups are composed of individuals who have different interests; representation of one interest group over the other creates further inequalities between them. Hutchinson (2005) in his historical account of nations, although similar to the societal cultures as defined in Kymlicka’s work, argued that the elevation of particular cultures to define the nation in a totalizing manner would have the effect of creating zones of conflict. Liebich (1995), Burg (1993) and Choudhry (2007:621) suggested that as a form of multiculturalist policy ‘multinational federalism had the perverse effect of fuelling precisely those political forces it was designed to suppress in Eastern and Central Europe’. The Marxist
critique of multiculturalism (Zizek 1997, Pavlov 2011), the post-modernist critique (McLaren 1993) and gender studies (Davis 2011, Phillips 2007) provided examples of cases where other social divisions, like class and gender, are obscured by overarching claims of ethnicity. From the perspectives of ‘civic patriots’ (Habermas 2005), ‘civic republican individualists’ (Rawls 1993), or cosmopolitans (Waldron 1992) ethno-centric multiculturalism is ‘responsible for exaggerating the resilience of ethnic divisions, and for interrupting the human capacity to generate new cross cutting identities’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995). These arguments hold true in most cases given that all cultural societies have always been fragmented. This has been evident especially in the age of globalization where both state-centric and ethno-centric conceptions of nation are constantly challenged by emerging, crosscutting and multiple identities (Fetherstone 1995). Exponents of this paradigm are also critical of the role attributed to ethnicity in arguments of collective action: even if the collective representation is shown to be consistent with electoral democracy, the critics still argue it is not clear why people who are entitled to use their ‘collective will’ in the political realm should primarily be regarded as members of an ethnic group but not as equal citizens (Carens 2000).

These critiques have proved to be evident in the cases of Turkey and France where, respectively, the Kurds and Corsicans have never been recognized as a minority. One who wants to regulate the relationship between the minority and majority in such cases has to create this distinction before anything else. In Turkey and France everybody who is tied to the state by citizenship is equal before the law, and therefore cannot be recognized as a minority on the ground of ethnic distinctiveness. In these cases cultural boundaries are fluid and the structure has allowed for crosscutting identities to emerge very easily and become politically relevant at the same time. Under such circumstances Kymlicka barely acknowledges the various agents of assimilation and he does not even attempt to explain what it means to actually be assimilated. Also problematic is his lack of a good argument.
when the separatist nationalists within the minority group do not represent the integrationist majority of their community. Critics argue that these problems remain to complicate the process of deciding what groups are not assimilated and who should be entitled to self-government rights.

Critics of multiculturalism, however, have very little to say in cases like Quebec in Canada and Flanders in Belgium, where the ethno-national divisions do produce representative blocs. De-constructivist critics of multiculturalism whose focus is on internal diversity cannot come to terms with such cases where national minorities are evidently mobilized around their ethno-national identity in democratic and peaceful ways.

This collectivist tendency, exemplified by national minorities such as Quebeckers and Flemish, cannot be explained by de-constructivist analysis of ethnicity. As seen earlier, critiques of multiculturalism mostly center on its essentialist and totalizing tendency where there is actually not a unanimous group to be recognized as such (Benhabib 2002, Phillips 2007). Any attempts to recognize group rights would necessarily require the construction of an overarching identity for that group; and any attempt to construct such an identity will, in one way or the other, exclude and oppress differences. As explained before, the critical literature comes from various schools of thought including cosmopolitanism (Waldron 1992), egalitarianism (Barry 2001), and liberal culturalism (Young 1995). Despite their differences there is an overarching doubt about the term ‘collective identity’. For them, the activists who base their self-government argument on this very concept of collective identity ignore

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85 For such cases critiques generally focus more on wrongdoings with the institutional forms and practices of the multiculturalism theory than its fundamental premises to accommodate national minorities through self-government rights. I will touch upon those issues later in this paper.

86 Here there is no insinuation that these groups are not internally diverse. What the collective tendency refers to is the mass movement of people who are different on many levels, yet still want to be primarily recognized as an ethno-cultural group and derive their political rights from this recognition.
the conflicts of interest among people who are expected to lead the collective action (Kukathas 1992).

However, in Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism it is not the very ‘suspected’ collective identity per se that legitimizes the self-government claims of minority nationalists. What matters in his theory is rather the commitment of people to gather around their ethno-cultural identity. Popular sovereignty and collective-will, therefore, are the cornerstones of his theory that is thereby in parallels with the oldest and most literal definition of democracy. Kymlicka does not reject the possibility of crosscutting identities or their changing impacts on electoral behaviour but he recognizes that in spite of their differences most people do choose to support ethnocentric politics when it comes to regulating the relationship between minorities and the majority. Critiques lose ground to ethno-centric multiculturalism especially when conflicts within the minority are too insignificant to cast shadow on the collective will of the group. I suggest that ethno-centric multiculturalism should not be discounted because of the diverse and conflicting nature of people’s interests. People’s cultural belongings and interests are and will always be diverse. The problem, I suggest, is whether or not the members of ‘national’ minority are disposed, ready and able to overcome their cultural differences and conflicts of interest for the sake of creating or maintaining an overarching ethno-cultural boundary.

The consistency of self-government projects is by and large dependent on the loyalty and consent of those who are involved in those projects. Hence I suggest it is critical to know under what circumstances a minority group almost unanimously adheres to the ethno-cultural politics and self-government solution. In the first part of what follows I will elaborate on such cases and explore five factors put forward to

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87 For the earlier discussion on ‘willingness in Kymlicka’s theory’ see pp. 75, 198.
explain why there is popular support\textsuperscript{88} for ethno-centric multiculturalism and the self-governance rights for national minorities that it offers.

6.1.1 Why Ethno-Politics: Longue Durée and En Masse?

First, the pre-existing homogeneity of ethnic groups is usually given as the most important factor explaining ethno-nationalist mobilization. The myth of pre-existing homogeneity, however, has already been refuted by earlier accounts of deconstructivism and post-modernism. All ethnic communities are internally segregated by linguistic, religious, gender, class-related, geographical or political divisions. The Muslim community in Greece is, for example, not ethnically homogenous. ‘There are an estimated 120,000 Muslim Turks in Greece’ (Bahceli1987: 109), yet approximately 35,000 of them are Pomaks\textsuperscript{89} whose mother tongue is actually a Bulgarian dialect and there are nearly 5000 Muslim Gypsies who are of Romany origin. Although the Muslim community in Greece is fragmented as shown they still find it more appealing to classify themselves as Turkish (Demetriou 2004, Adamou 2010). Alexis Alexandris (2003: 126) states that ‘in fact most of the nationalistic

\textsuperscript{88} The popular support for ethno-cultural movements or ethnic partisanship itself cannot be taken as the ultimate variable to explain the prospects for ethno-centric multiculturalism in the long run because factors that generate ethnic partisanship within the minority community can be more salient at particular times for certain factions and their temporary significance may not in any case last as long as suggested. For example Reilly and Reynolds (1999) and Wilkinson (2004) found a correlation between institutional design and ethnic voting (as an indicator to support for ethno-politics) suggesting that the proportional system politicizes ethnicity. Huber (2012:1) in his statistical work on measuring the voting of ethnic groups argued that ‘economic development is associated with higher levels of ethnic voting behavior’. The problem with these studies is that variables they offer are changeable over time and they cannot explain cases where the popular support for ethno-politics remains stable across time. Similarly Long (2012) in his study about the determinants of ethnic voting suggested that the extent of in-group attachment and fear for the opposing ethnic groups are the drivers and causes of ethnic voting, however this approach overlooks the reasons why group attachment or fear for the opposing ethnic group arises in the first place. To omit an overarching framework that facilitates the salience of all these explanations above prevents us from understanding longue durée nature of the popular support for ethno-politics in some cases. Therefore we need to find a more comprehensive explanation as to why ethno-nationalism constantly resonates to varying degrees with minority members en masse in some cases but not in others.

\textsuperscript{89} The latest official estimate of the number of Pomaks in Greece was given by the Coordinating Office of Minority Schools in 1994, and was 35,000’ (World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Minority Rights Group 2013).
(Turkish) minority figures in Thrace are of Pomak or Roma descent’. Similarly in Quebec although ‘the Liberal Party and the Parti Quebecois, differ dramatically on some policy issues, the degree to which, they are in agreement regarding culture policy is quite striking’ (Kresl 1996: 499).

This is not to say that all Quebecois are nationalists in the sense that, for example, members of the independentist Parti Quebecois are; even the Parti Quebecois in power since 1976 and the most successful by far of all Quebecois nationalist political parties, was unable, in 1980, to win a referendum concerning the independence of Quebec from Canada. In a less militant sense, however, most French-speaking Quebecois—even those loyal to Canada—are Quebecois nationalists, for most of them are at least nominally committed to their identity as French-speaking Quebecois (Handler 1984: 59).

This part of the chapter will explain why the majority of a group such as the Muslim Turks in Greece, Flemish in Belgium, or Quebecers in Canada are likely to overcome their internal divisions and appeal to the ethno-political representation en masse and why the groups like the Kurds in Turkey or Corsicans in France do not.

Second, political repression is assumed to be another reason why members of an ethnic group develop a resistant mobilization (Olzak 2006; Marshall and Gurr 2003, Birnier 2007). However, this is not particularly relevant in the context of this study because the research is only concerned with cases where ethno-centric multiculturalism, with varying degrees, has already been introduced as a solution for the problems of national minorities. The political domination, which may account for the emergence of the conflict in the first place, can no longer have an explanatory power for continuing and increasing levels of support for ethno-nationalist politics in places such as in Basque, Catalonia, Flanders or Quebec.

Third, ranked systems: It has been argued by the literature on political domination that the people are more likely to mobilize around ethno-cultural identity if their hosting state has systematically discriminated against them on the basis of their membership to an ethnic group. This is, as suggested by Horowitz (1981), particularly
relevant where there is a significant overlap between ethnicity and class. Rupesinghe’s (1987) account of Horowitz’s approach to the issue is relevant.

Horowitz (1981) makes a distinction between ranked and unranked ethnic groups. He sees the distinction as resting upon the coincidence of social class with ethnic group. When the two coincide it is possible to speak of ranked ethnic groups. Where groups are cross-class, it is possible to speak of unranked ethnic groups. In unranked systems, on the other hand, parallel ethnic groups coexist, each group internally stratified. Ethnic conflict, however, impedes or obscures class conflict when ethnic groups are cross class, as they are in unranked systems (Rupesinghe 1987).

I agree that in cases where members of an ethnic group also share a common social class, the depth of separateness between them and other ethnic groups cannot be perceived of as simply a fabrication or an overstatement by ethno-nationalist projects. Although all national or collective identities are imagined and can be interpreted as an outcome of political projects, some are by no means imaginary and will strongly resonate with many people for different reasons. Clear-cut competition between ethnic groups, bureaucratization of ethnicity and material inequality are some of the reasons given to explain the strong boundaries between ethnic groups and their members’ support for ethno-cultural politics (Cornel and Hartman 1998). These elements are strongly associated with what Horowitz calls ‘ranked societies’.

The ranked systems and hierarchical relationship between groups explain why minority members’ electoral behaviour can primarily be motivated by their ethno-cultural identity. What it cannot explain however is the en masse support for ethno-national politics in cases like Catalonia, Flanders and Quebec, where the national minorities are now doing fairly well and their persistent claim to self-government or even independence, is no longer grounded on class-ethnicity correlation or a sense of economic discrimination and injustice. In Canada, for example, Saphiro and Stelcner (1997), Breton (1998), Belan (2003) all showed in their research that the Francophone wage gap in Quebec had disappeared by 1985. Alouy (2006: 1212) has illustrated statistically that actually, ‘in Quebec, Francophones now earn
significantly more than similarly skilled Anglophones.’ Yet the nationalists’ claim for independence is still an on-going issue. It is also the case in Belgium where the Dutch-speaking Flemish people with a claim to independence are doing financially outperforming the French-speaking Walloons\(^90\).

**Table 3 Flanders and Wallonia Relative Weigh in Economy (Row percentages)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Flanders</th>
<th>Wallonia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population % (1970)</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>32.3</td>
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Figures do not add up to 100 because Brussels has been omitted (Covell 1986:265).

Stemming from this change in economic balance, Flemish people, who make up the 60% of the population in Belgium, are resentful about ‘exorbitant and inefficient financial transfers amounting to over 10 billion Euros per year (about 1,734 Euros for each Flemish person)’ that they are required to make to Wallonia and Brussels (Mnookin and Verbeke 2009:152-153). The Flemish people’s persistent call for independence can thus better be explained by their desire to get rid of what they see as a burden (Covell 1986:261-281).

Fourth, at this point ‘the material interests’ argument appears relevant in explaining the popular support for ethno-cultural politics with its capacity to maximize the material interests of its followers. Richard Jenkins (2009) argues that ‘identity and

\(^{90}\) It is a common mistake that regional disparity is usually seen as an outcome of ethnic discrimination. It is important to stress here that the economic disparity is not primarily between ethnic groups, but the regions dominated by those groups. Regional disparities, that may be due to various demographic factors like population ageing (Covell 1986) or geography (Gidengil 1989) cannot be alone an indication of an ethnically ranked society where the social classes would necessarily coincide with ethnic groups as explained by Horowitz earlier.
ethnicity do not, *sui generis*, cause people to do things. They must always be understood in political and economic contexts in particular with respect to the pursuit of local material interests'. For example, salience of an overarching Protestant identity in Northern Ireland that, Jenkins thinks, is only possible because of the socio-economic benefits and advantages that its community has enjoyed in the UK. Similarly Hale (2008) in his relational theory suggests that, 'ethnicity has no intrinsic motivational implications; instead, it determines the strategies that individuals use to maximize their life chances by pursuing ends such as wealth, power, security, self-esteem and status' (Breuilly, Hale, Sasse and Hechter 2011: 683).

This perspective is also often used to explain why more prosperous and relatively self-sufficient former USSR countries like Ukraine were first to leave the Union whereas more economically dependent Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan were unenthusiastic to endorse the fall of the Union and leave its collectivized economic structure (Strokov and Paramonov 2006).

However, this approach does not seem to be able to account for some other cases. It cannot, for example, explain the cases where members of minority, who comprise the less prosperous group, almost unanimously support the ethnic cause when in theory whole or partial assimilation into the majority (adopting the majority language to benefit future employment prospects for example) would leave them better off. Muslim Turks in Greece fall in to this category. ‘Western Thrace is the least developed and the poorest region in Greece’ (Bahceli 1987: 114) and the Turkish language does not offer any prospects for having a good career beyond that of a farmer in rural Greece. The instrumentalist utilitarian approach, therefore, cannot explain why the Muslim community of Western Thrace is increasingly following an
ethno-cultural politics when speaking the Turkish language does little to maximize their material interests in Greece. 91

Fifth, binary cultures: starting from the relationship between Muslim Turks and Christian Greeks, the microcosm of Huntington’s ‘global clash of civilization thesis’ suggests that, independent of their instrumental roles, cultures will inherently be positioned and defined in relation to each other and that those members of mutually exclusive cultures will always support their own cause against one another. This difficulty at the national level is exemplified by, amongst others, the Catholic French who want to fully assimilate into Protestant Anglophone culture in Canada and have to give up their Catholic traditions, because Protestantism is primarily defined in contrast to Catholicism.92 A reflection of the same duality was observed in Northern Ireland where the conflict between unionist Protestants and separatist Catholics was primarily defined by the presumption that Protestantism and Catholicism are mutually exclusive categories. Under similar conditions the Muslim minority in Western Thrace cannot become Greek without giving up their Islamic identity, as historically to be Greek is to be Orthodox Christian. So the argument suggests that mutually exclusive nature of the cultures in relationship may have an explanatory power for the persistence of boundaries between them.

Duality of the cultures has an explanatory power to some extent in cases such as exclusive categories of religion.93 It cannot explain, however, why that boundary

91 The ‘Material interests’ argument may still hold true if we account for that ‘a great number of Turks from Thrace immigrate to Turkey which, they think provides more opportunities than Greek cities for Turkish speaking Muslims’ (Bahceli 1987: 112). For two reasons, it does not make any sense to think that the Muslim Turks of Thrace would be financially better off in Turkey. First, living standards in Greece used to be much higher than they were in Turkey; ‘the per capita income in Greece [was] four times that of Turkey [in 80s]’ (Ibid: 112). Second, the majority of those Turks who are not educated to university degree level in Greece are not likely to be qualified for a well-paid employment in Turkey either (Wilson 1980).

93 Even this can only be true to the extent to which the state makes the religion politically relevant as a criterion for exclusion. Religious similarities do, of course, have a power to
between mutually exclusive categories should be politically relevant anyway. Neither

can it explain the reason why members of linguistic cultures, which are not mutually
exclusive, do still have persistent support to keep the boundary between them. For
example, it is quite possible to argue that in Belgium linguistic difference between
Catholic French-speaking Walloons and Catholic Dutch-speaking Flemish does not
constitute a barrier for members of either group to assimilate into one another or
generate crosscutting bilingual identities. However we see that the historical
separation between the two communities in Belgium has always been made politically
relevant by the state; popularly supported; and increasingly strengthened by Flemish
claims to independence.

The hierarchical ranking systems, ‘power differentials between individuals of
different ethnic backgrounds’ as suggested by Horowitz (1981), Cornell and
Hartmann (1998) cannot explain ethno-nationalisms in unranked communities of
Canada and Belgium. ‘The pursuit of material interests’ as Jenkins (2009) suggested
does not seem to be a relevant motivation for Muslims in Greece to classify
themselves as Turkish, which has low utilitarian value in the country. Duality of the

explain why it is easier and more likely for some minorities to assimilate into the majority
community like the Muslim Kurds mixed with the Muslim Turks and the Scots did the same
with the English (Keating 2001; Somer 2008). It is by no means, however, generalizable that
the religious difference would make it especially difficult or inevitable to assimilate. The
Aboriginal people of Canada assimilated well through the policies of the Anglican Church in
Canada (Woods 2012). Similarly, non-Turkish speaking Muslims were, albeit very occasionally
and in small numbers, converted to Orthodox Christianity (Poulton 1997). The duality of
cultures argument on its own, therefore, cannot explain the situation of those people who may
still be willing to convert and leave their culture of their birth in order to become socially more
acceptable. When this happens what becomes more important is whether the majority
welcomes the assimilation of others and whether the state policies are regulated in a way to
make this possible. As the thesis has shown earlier, some groups like the Uyghur Turks in
China are not allowed to assimilate into the majority community no matter how hard they
worked to make this possible. Besides, the relationship between cultural groups cannot be
explained as a fixed mechanism because the culture always has a socially constructed
meaning and it can be challenged and changed. For example, the non-conformist eight million
people in the UK who identified with both Catholicism and their English ethnicity at once
challenge the dominant Protestant characteristic of Englishness (2001 national census).
Therefore this argument for the duality of cultures is yet to explain how the relationship
between different cultures can be stably fixed and highly predictable if the meaning of the
culture is volatile and unstable in the first place.
religious cultures involved cannot explain the separatist tendencies of linguistic
groups who share the same religion like the Flemish and the Walloons. My goal is not
to refute the points made by previous studies to explain ethnic mobilization. Each of
these arguments has its own merit to explain particular dimensions and some cases
of ethno-centric mobilization, but none can individually provide a general logic as to
why ethno-cultural politics of multiculturalism is widely supported by most members of
the national minority in some cases but not in others.

I suggest that what all these cases have in common, and what explains the
political persistence of a cultural boundary between the two communities is the state
discourse⁹⁴ that has facilitated it. This can be observed in all the cases above where
the state has historically facilitated the ethnic distinctions through either exclusion in
the forms of discrimination and deportation, or de facto and de jure recognition of
ethno-cultural groups in public. It is not to suggest that ethnic boundaries are only
driven by state policies. In fact it could be argued from an ethno-symbolic angle, that
language and religion, as well as memories and early mobilisation, are critical. What
the thesis rejects is Kymlicka’s presumption that ethnic and cultural identities will
almost inevitably translate into politics. A remarkable number of those Kurds in
Turkey and Corsicans in France who refused to politicize their ethnicities can be seen
as proof that not all cultural nationalisms are also political. As Hutchinson (1987)
suggested, cultural ‘national identity’ does not necessarily translate into the kind of
nationalism that Gellner (1983:1) defines is ‘primarily a political principle which holds
that the political and the national unit should be congruent’. This thesis criticized

⁹⁴ The state discourse refers to a hegemonic power that regulates the way in which the body
politic and social life is organized. In the context of my study it refers to the modern state
starting with the 1648 Westphalian system that gave it the monopoly of force within its own
territory. However, it is also possible to apply this to the Empires of pre-modernity where
subjects were most often recognized by their cultural particularities. The millet system in the
Ottoman Empire is a powerful case in point. The hegemonic power (of the Ottoman Empire)
facilitated ethnic separation through the method of religious differentiation and later itself came
to an end with the rise of ethno-nationalisms of those Non-Muslim communities it had
differentiated.
Kymlicka’s overemphasis on the political nature of nation and tried to understand under what circumstances a national minority is more likely to politicize its cultural distinctiveness.

6.1.2 Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism: A Prolonged Differentiation of Ethnicity

In what follows, I pick up on a multidisciplinary approach of political anthropology that explains the salience of ethnicity through a discursive context in which ethnic identity is made politically relevant by the state in both direct and indirect ways. Despite their varying focuses on different aspects of ethnic boundary-making all political anthropologists such as Barth (1969) Geertz (1973), Cohen (1985), Eriksen (1993) and Jenkins (1997), Wimmer (2008) emphasized the foundational role of socio-political interaction and cultural differentiation in explaining the emergence, survival and cohesion of ethnic groups. All these studies of cultural boundary-making in their attempts to epitomize this socio-political interaction, suggest that exclusion and assimilation are two methods widely used by states in their relations with cultural groups.

This distinction between assimilation and exclusion has also been associated with the difference between civic and ethnic nationalisms in this study, suggesting that the civic nationalism, in a constructivist fashion, uses assimilation, and the ethnic nationalism, in an organic sense, appeals to exclusion. This dichotomy requires further elaboration through the lens of political anthropology because the instrumental

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95It is evident that most nation states have used different methods in their relations to different groups. For this reason I specifically clarify that I focus only on the individual relationships between the state and particular minorities in point; and that I do not try to classify state nationalisms as entirely civic, ethnic, assimilationist, or exclusionist. For example ‘The courts stress that there is no Macedonian minority in Greece’ (Kalampakou 2009: 2), whereas the Muslims were recognized as a minority according to the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty and were evidently discriminated against in the country (Oran 1986). Similarly non-Turkish speaking Romani and Pomak Muslims have occasionally been converted to Orthodox Christianity and deported to other regions in the country for integration; whereas Turkish speaking Muslims have always been left out of these projects. ‘This was the case of Bishop of Florina who in the 1970’s had initiated a church mission to convert Muslim Roma (non-Turkish speaking) to Orthodox Christianity’ (Poulton 1997: 91).
value of the dichotomy between assimilation and exclusion in boundary-making is mostly drowned out by the normative baggage of civic-ethnic dichotomy (Brubaker 2001). Nationalism studies are generally concerned with defining what the dichotomy is about and whether it can be usefully applied to categorize nation-states. In their totalizing tendency to make normative categorizations, they fail to account for varying forms of associated concepts such as assimilation or exclusion. For this reason they also ignore the impacts of these varying degrees of assimilation and differentiation on the subsequent design of societies. Mindful of this, my analysis will be sensitive both to the heterogeneity/collectivity of personal assimilation experiences (Eriksen 1993), and to the differences between voluntary, forcible, additive and absorptive forms of assimilation as associated with civic nationalism (Zolberg 1997). Similarly exclusion as a method used by ethnic nationalism is mostly understood as a negative concept and associated with discrimination, deportation, extermination and population-exchange (Jackson Preece 2005). I will show that exclusion is also relevant for cases where the state did not force but allowed groups to exclude themselves from the majority along the lines of ethnicity. This kind of exclusion or differentiation, as Brubaker (2004) calls it, coincides with cases like Canada (Quebecers) and Belgium (Flemish) that have always left room for voluntary assimilation to the majority. As the cases in point suggest, categorizing the state-minority relations on a simple dichotomy of exclusion and assimilation as binary oppositions would be erroneous. For this reason I will focus on forcible assimilation in cases that still represent the ideal of integration and civic nationalism.\textsuperscript{96} I still put an emphasis on the civic ideal of state nationalism because it is actually what characterizes the permeability of the

\textsuperscript{96} These cases still represent this ideal of integration because their policies are aimed at incorporation, and not exclusion or differentiation. To remind the reader, the difference between civic and ethnic nationalisms in this study is not founded on a normative criterion. Illiberal state nationalisms that practice forced assimilation can still be civic if they are aimed at integrating and incorporating the minority instead of differentiating or discriminating those minorities.
borders and openness of the dominant socio-political entity to which the minority is expected to assimilate into.

In my account of the cases where the minority has not been forcibly assimilated I will illustrate that assimilation was merely an underused option or that there was exclusion or promotion of groups on the basis of ethnicity. Even when there were signs of forcible linguistic assimilation, as in Greece, I will show that it was not aimed at integrating the Muslim Turk minority to the mainstream but intimidating its members to leave the country which had not been welcoming to Muslims anyway.

What becomes relevant here is also the distinction between additive and absorptive assimilationist policies. I have explained and used these two types of assimilation many times throughout this thesis. The former refers to a type of acculturation that does not expect one to lose previous cultural membership while obtaining a new one (Baubock 1996), and the absorptive category assumes that ‘the identity formation is a constant-sum game, whereby the acquisition of a new identity occurs at the expense of the original one’ (Zolberg 1997, Barry 2001: 81). In what follows I will show that none of the culturally united and politically mobilized ethnic groups had been assimilated in the sense that some Kurdish people were forced to become Turkish in an absorptive fashion. Forced deportation of the minority, legal barriers to speaking the minority language in public or the legal framework banning the establishment of ethno-cultural associations are some of the forcible and absorptive assimilationist policies. In my analysis I expect to see that the minorities whose absolute majority support the ethno-centric multiculturalism as defined by Kymlicka are the ones that have never been exposed to these policies of forced absorptive assimilation and integrationist ideal of civic state-nationalism at the same time.
Once more I will repeat that this is not to say the other explanations such as material interests, ranked systems or cultural incompatibilities are completely irrelevant to understand the popular support for ethno-centric multiculturalism in masses. On the contrary, the explanations I examined earlier are helpful to see why and when they become important. Exemplary cases for each argument help me bring them all together and find out what they all have in common. I have observed that material interests correlate with ethnic identity; the ranked systems or bureaucratization of ethnicity occurs; and cultural incompatibilities become relevant at times when ethnic nationalism in the form of discrimination is a barrier facing minority people who could have otherwise assimilated; when influential positions are systematically exclusive to the dominant group; when ethnic separation is recognized positively (autonomy federation, self-government) or negatively (ghettoization) to be effective at different levels of society and politics. What follows is an illustration of such cases.

6.2 Case Studies: Ethnic State Nationalism and Multiculturalism

6.2.1 The Flemish in Belgium

Before Belgium detached from the Kingdom of the Netherlands a dialect of Dutch, which is called Flemish, was the dominant language in Flanders and had already been institutionalized. However under the hegemony of France it was downgraded and confined to the private interactions of people who lived in that region. That is to say, Flemish citizens already had the right to use their own language when communicating with each other in private or public meetings or when publishing magazines. Notwithstanding the existence of French as the official language, Flemish people were allowed to maintain their distinct economic and cultural unity and, therefore, a national political identity. They were never exposed to violent assimilation that would try to make them integrated with another dominant linguistic community. Flemish people could gain limited recognition to the extent that they had the chance
to lift their cultural unity up to a level where societal institutions in that language were gradually constructed. Flanders was also an economically developed region and, in spite of the oppressive policies of state nationalism, it remained so. Therefore the Flemish group enjoyed a developed industrial economy where its members could enjoy in practice the right to work in their own language when allowed:

Antwerp, dominated by the Antwerp Meeting Partij was the first province to declare Flemish as the official language of Antwerp in 1866. This was followed by the printing of parliamentary documents in both languages in 1879, and in 1888 speeches in Flemish were finally authorized. Flemish courts were subsequently set-up and reached even in the Francophones region in 1908 with a Flemish assize court set up in Brussels. The year 1878 saw the use of Flemish in administrative documents, but it was only after 1893 that pressure started to build up significantly with the demand of officially making Flemish a national language, which was achieved in 1898 thanks to the Flemish activists in Parliament. Laws in 1883, 1890 and 1914 extended the use of Flemish in schools in the Flemish Brabant. A Royal Flemish Academy for the Flemish culture (language and literature) was eventually set up in 1886 and the ‘Flemishization’ of the Belgian culture was pressed as a key issue for creating a Flemish University (Varin 2006: 6).

Throughout the nineteenth century, language legislation in Belgium included a personality principle according to which, in Flanders, people had the permission to speak Flemish in every stage of the public sphere. ‘The language laws of 1873 (court), 1878 (administration) and 1883 (education) enforced language rights for speakers of Dutch in Flanders. In 1898 the Equality Law was passed, which made Dutch an official language of Belgium alongside French’ (Linn and McLelland 2002: 125). In the 1930s, Dutch gradually became the sole language of administration and education in Flanders.

All members of the Flemish group without any detrimental fragmentation wanted to use their freedom of association and self-government rights. Moreover, as their ethnic identity in public has long been recognized, Flemish people have never needed to resort to violent conflict to earn their cultural rights. Such an example supports the view that the absence of forced assimilative policies creates a context, under which multiculturalism seems more likely to be viable.
Even the most enthusiastic egalitarian (Barry 2001) thinks that if a linguistic group maintains ‘an entire economy and polity within a state’ (as in Belgium and Canada) then it could be given autonomy and the right to govern its education system. I argue, however, the viability of ethno-centric multiculturalism is more than a simple adaptation of the demarcation between economically equal ethnic groups.

6.2.3 The Muslim Turks in Greece

When members of an ethnic category self-identify and are identified by others as ‘belonging’ to ‘a group’ with little ambiguity, ethnic identity will be thicker than in other cases, and group members will be prepared to incur high costs to defend the culture and honour of their community (Wimmer 2008: 1004).

The Muslim Turks in Greece, like the Flemish in Belgium, have been labelled by their ethno-cultural identity but with striking contrasts in terms of the way this label has impacted upon their lives. After the Lausanne Peace Treaty 1923, Muslims in Greece have been recognized as a minority and were given the right to education in their mother tongue. Muslims, however, were discriminated against in Greece in parallels with non-Muslims in Turkey, who were discriminated against at the time. They have been excluded from the body politic and mainstream community in daily life.

‘The field research conducted by a number of observers such as Oran and de Jong indicate that many Thracian Muslims leave to escape the discriminatory and oppressive treatment they experience at the hands of Greek officials’ (Bahceli1987: 112). Discriminatory policies regarding the Muslim Turks in Greece are many. For example ‘in accordance with a 1952 law, land holdings that exceeded the legally allowable five hundred donums [fifty hectares] were expropriated for subsequent distribution to landless peasants virtually no landless Muslims have benefitted from such re-distribution’ (Bahceli 1987: 113, Oran 1986: 122). Another discriminatory policy directed against Muslim Turks was clear in section 19 of Greek Nationality Law No 3370 dated 1955, ‘a person of non-Greek origin who leaves Greece with the
intention of not returning, may be declared as having lost Greek nationality’ (Bahceli

In addition to the legal documents and state policies, social life, economic
development and settlement patterns of Muslim Turks also give us a picture of
discrimination and exclusion that has been persistent in the modern history of Greece.
In theory Muslims can move to more affluent Greek cities to improve their conditions.
However the observation shows that ‘in practice this is not a credible option, since life
for a Muslim Turk is not easy in any part of Greece… Oran suggests that in 1986, it
was very rare to find any Muslim student enrolled in any of the universities in Greece’
(Bahceli 1987: 114).

The exclusionist policies directed against Muslims in Greece were not
inherently because of the mutually exclusive nature of religions. It is evident that
Non-Turkish speaking Muslim minorities have been, albeit very seldom, exposed to
missionary projects and occasionally converted in Greece. The target of the exclusion
in Greece was especially the Turkish speaking Muslims. Yiakoumaki (2006: 148)
also suggests that ‘throughout their modern history, relations among the populations
of Thrace were strongly shaped by Greek-Turkish relations’. As an outcome of this
historical path, Muslim Turks are found territorially concentrated. Although the
Muslims in Thrace have been internally fragmented as Pomak, Roma and Turkish,
they generally identify with Muslim Turkish culture in the region (Yiakoumaki 2006:
148). I argued that group cohesion, shared attachment and voluntary support for
ethno-nationalism in this case can only be explained with reference to this
exclusionary and discriminatory narrative in Greece that marginalizes all different
groups of Muslims in her territory as one united group. Recognition, I think, does not
create or further the essentialization and reification of the group when people identify
with one group on a voluntary basis. In an historical context where minority members
have already been stigmatized as the ‘other’ and dragged to the margins of the
country I do not see any way that positive recognition and autonomy solutions would
make their situation worse. Egalitarians are concerned that the material inequality between the minority and the majority will deepen in cases where the minority has a backward economy and a limited institutional capacity to provide good opportunities for its members. This is a completely materialistic point of view and does not account for the popular sovereignty of people who may be ready to embrace this economic burden, especially when compared to the injustices that they experienced in the past. It is not logical to suggest that recognizing their claim to autonomy would really be a problem if the people are fully aware that their chances to prosper with Turkish language is low in any other parts of the Greece, yet still ready and willing to pay the cost of their cultural autonomy (Alexandris 2003: 126).

6.2.4 The Quebecers in Canada

Similarly in Canada the contemporary relationship between Francophones and the State can be characterized as the continuation of a long historical state discourse that has always accommodated an ethnic boundary between Francophone and Anglophone communities as a politically relevant marker. As Choudhry (2007: 619) stated, ‘although the Canadian model continued to evolve well into the 1980s, many of its key features had been in place since the mid-nineteenth century’.

The United province of Canada, a British Colony, was founded by merging two previous colonies of Upper Canada (Ontario today) and Lower Canada (Quebec today). Francophone citizens have dominated the latter and the former has been largely populated by Anglophone citizens (McRoberts 1997). By the rights given to them in Constitution 1867 Act these two groups elected the same number of representatives to legislative assembly.97 The official language of the assembly was

97 Constitution Act 1867, 22: ‘In relation to the Constitution of the Senate Canada shall be deemed to consist of Four Divisions:1. Ontario;2. Quebec;3. The Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island 4. The Western Provinces of Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta; which Four Divisions shall (subject to the Provisions of this Act) be equally represented in the Senate as follows: Ontario by twenty-four senators; Quebec by twenty-four senators; the Maritime Provinces and Prince Edward Island
English and Francophone people were given no option but to use it if they wanted to participate in the assembly. Federalism was, however, soon introduced and ‘Quebec has been granted a mix of concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction over a wide range of policy areas that give it the tools to ensure the survival of a Francophone society’ (Choudhry 2007: 613). The federal solution created linguistic dualism and French was soon added as official language in addition to English. The Constitution Act 1867 21-24 has allowed the use of both English and French in the Quebec National Assembly and required legal provisions to be decreed and practiced in both languages. Through the enactment, the Charter of the French Language in 1977 the Parti Quebecois even endeavored to legislate and make French the only official language of the region. The Supreme Court of Canada, which is the ultimate arbiter on provincial matters, was also designed to guarantee regional representation and it secured three out of its nine seats for the judges from Quebec (Kymlicka 1998: 114, Hogg 2007, Thomson and Carswell 2007).

The voluntary assimilation into the Anglophone community has always been an option for Francophones in Canada but in practice it has mostly remained an underrated symbolic option amongst most French speakers. There are of course exceptions. One of them is those Francophone people who live in Alberta where the only official language was English (Bouchard 1994). Even in the North West, though, French has been recognized by the state to constitute an important role in education of Franco-Albertans.98 Franco-Albertans have rights to separate schools and other

by twenty-four senators, ten thereof representing Nova Scotia, ten thereof representing New Brunswick, and four thereof representing Prince Edward Island; the Western Provinces by twenty-four senators, six thereof representing Manitoba, six thereof representing British Columbia, six thereof representing Saskatchewan, and six thereof representing Alberta; Newfoundland shall be entitled to be represented in the Senate by six members; the Yukon Territory, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut shall be entitled to be represented in the Senate by one member each’ (Department of Justice Canada: 2013).

98 Section 11 of North-West Territories Act of 1875; 1901 amendment to 1892 Ordinance No. 22, Section 83; Section 184 of the School Ordinance in 1925 all facilitated teaching French in primary course. Association des instituteurs bilingues de l’Alberta (AIBA) was founded in 1926,
poly-ethnic rights, but the reality is one of large-scale assimilation to English. One has to acknowledge that the right to separate schooling that Franco-Albertans enjoy is quite different from the autonomy regulations in Quebec where French is the compulsory medium of instruction and business. This also supports the argument in this thesis that when integration and assimilation is a realistic option, there is no reason to presume that ethnic distinctions will keep determining political behaviour. Although they have been obliged to learn English language in Alberta those Franco Albertans have never been forced to become English in an absorptive fashion. However the state’s benign neglect of their culture in public life for long time actually increased the extent of their exposure to the predominant English culture. Subsequently Franco-Albertans have emerged as a strongly bilingual community in support of the multicultural Pan-Canadian idea. Today, diverse cultural and political orientations of Franco-Albertans constitute an example for arguments that question the presumptions of cultural homogeneity within Francophone community (Bergeron 2007, Abu-Laban and Couture 2010, Dallaire 2000,2003, Thompson 2012). As has been suggested by the example of Franco-Albertans the integrationist ideal of civic nationalism in Canada has facilitated a limited heterogeneity within the Francophone community of Canada. The same structure also allowed the emergence of a small English-speaking community as well as pan-Canadian nationalists within Quebec. Regarding the heterogeneity argument, Schertzer and Woods (2011: 207) suggest that today ‘some French Quebecers simply are not Quebec nationalists and some French Quebecers are even pan-Canadian nationalists in the same way that many English Canadians are’.

Association des éducateurs bilingues de l’Alberta (AEBA) was introduced in 1946. In April 1968, the Government of Alberta had legislated to allow French-language instruction for up to half of the school day. In 1988, six years after the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were introduced. Alberta initiated a new school legislation that facilitated separate French schools. In 1993, the Alberta government reformed the Alberta School Act and Francophones ultimately secured the right to govern and control their own schools.
However for the sake of comparison made here between Turkey and Canada, I should emphasize that the Francophone Quebecers who detach themselves from ethno-nationalism comprise only a small minority that does not pose an existential threat to the operational capacity of majority Quebec nationalists within their community. In such cases those marginal groups should and can be protected by a broader human rights framework that allows them to use their right to exit or freedom of association as suggested by Kukathas (1992). After all, Kymlicka too, accepts that multiculturalism as a normative framework, no matter how much it purports the cultural group rights, is fundamentally based on human rights and as such it should facilitate intra-group democracy, dynamic debates and on-going struggles over the way identities are recognized.

I argue that in some cases, where group rights and individual rights are in conflict, trying to bring them together in the way Kymlicka suggested creates an impasse. The Kurds in Turkey exemplify this. The evidence (Konda 2010) shows that notwithstanding their shared claim for cultural recognition, political reflections of this recognition take very different forms in their opinions. For example, the number of southeastern Kurds (56%) who want to have Kurdish only as an elective course, and 25% who think that some courses could be taught in Kurdish, far exceeds the number of those nationalist Kurds (19%) in the region who insist on the education of all grades to be offered in Kurdish. In that case, the nationalist leadership is numerically the minority within their group, and the practicality of their project is existentially dependent on the participation of the remaining group majority who oppose it. In the absence of majority participation within the group any sort of autonomy given to nationalist leadership would fall far short of the self-government model that Kymlicka thinks is the right solution to the problems of national minorities. This was supported by the example of Corsicans, whose majority voted against the extended autonomy solution and thereby deciding that Corsica remain French in the 2003 referendum.
In Kymlicka’s theory the rights are given to a cultural group rather than to its nationalist leadership. He suggests that once the minority language has been constellated as the official language of the minority region, deliberative democracy can then be used to manage differences among the people who speak the same language. This is problematic because, for the most part, while the masses of a cultural group seek greater autonomy, only the elites of the group can participate in broader political life. Furthermore, they do not go and consult with their constituency each time they need to make a decision about the community (Kuzu 2010). Besides, Kymlicka fails to recognize the possibility that unlike the majority of Quebecers or Flemish, some minority group members might not reach an agreement on the language issue in the first place. Kymlicka supports deliberative democracy as a solution for the management of internal diversity. Deliberative democracy, however, seems to be out of question in earlier stages of his project. He thinks no deliberation is necessary to manage the diverse views of minority members on the role that their language should play in constitutional reforms, social and political life. It is not necessary because the language is a common denominator for all who identify with the same ethnicity. Thus, he thinks that the culture and a shared language in particular constitute the basis of the claims to greater autonomy. As convincingly explained by Barry (2001), the case of Scotland in the UK demonstrates that national identifications may not always have to hold strong cultural linguistic components and as such cultural traits do not necessarily have to define the primary basis for political national autonomy.

For the United Kingdom is without doubt a multinational state, but one in which national identifications have a very low cultural component. In particular, Scottish nationalism is a well-established phenomenon whose political success is indicated less by the vote for Scottish National Party than by the Labour party’s reluctant electoral commitment to a referendum in Scotland on devolution and the large majority in favour of Scottish devolution in that referendum. Yet the key to the pervasiveness of national sentiment in Scotland has been the way in which Scottish identity has been carefully detached from any distinctive language and customs. To be a Scot in good standing it is not necessary to speak Gaelic (or even regret the inability to do so), to wear a kilt or to enjoy the music of bagpipes (Barry 2001: 309).
Similarly like the Scots in Britain, the Kurds in Turkey share the idea that their ethno-national identity should be respected and recognized by the state. However Kurds within their group differ extremely from each other on the forms that they think this recognition should take. As explained earlier, some Kurds are more concerned with their micro particularities like linguistic dialects (Zazaki-Kurmanci), religious sect (Sunni-Alevi), material interests, education and social status than their Kurdishness. For this very reason, Kurds are in an incommensurable disagreement with each other over the degrees and ways their ethnic identity should be recognized in the body politic. Based on this complexity, and so far as the principles of equality and freedom are concerned, the argument follows that any regional government as a political project should not be based on ‘Kurdish’ culture. Since the definition and ‘political’ relevance of Kurdishness differs from one actor to another, such a project both limits the freedom of those who do not want to take part in it at all and creates inequalities between those who incommensurably disagree on its possible forms. For the Kurdish case I therefore suggest that the Scottish model, which does not have strong cultural components, seems to have much more to offer than the Quebec model, which is based on the rule of culture and commands that children of those Quebecers who were not educated in English must attend French public schools.

6.3. Remaining Questions: Not a Coup de Grâce
First, I argued that the popular support for ethno-centric multiculturalism stems from a relational context and that it changes depending on state-minority relations. Picking up on this point the critics suggest that it would be unjust to make people permanently liable to a system that they only consented to on the basis of an unstable and temporal context. Similarly a well-known constitutionalist argument directed against the original social contract theory becomes relevant. Famously, D. Hume (1748) and A. Smith (1762) argued that the contractual foundation for government is not sufficient to generate political obligation since a contract of one generation would not be able to bind any other.

In the light of this critique, I shall argue that the popular support for ethno-nationalism is a dynamic phenomenon and its rule is subject to constant interpretation and contestation by those who take part in it. Kymlicka suggests that it should be acceptable if the minority ‘nation’ decides to separate from the broader state. With a similar logic, but from the other end of the discussion, I also argue that the minority ‘nation’, if its majority desires, must be able to downgrade the political relevance of its cultural basis, amend its character or indeed dissolve itself in the future. The direction of this relationship would, as I suggested earlier, be subject to the relational context of dialogical nationalisms. From a liberal perspective, it does not matter whether nationalism gets weaker or stronger so long as the individuals’ right to freedom of association and disassociation is protected. I illustrated that the freedom of disassociation does not necessarily indicate an existential threat to Kymlicka’s model of self-government in cases where the minority enjoys legislative autonomy and acknowledges the constitutional right of its members to bow out. This is especially relevant when the group is consistently put in a disadvantaged position on the basis of something that is not objectively legitimate. This is, after all, exactly the microcosm of the model that Kymlicka suggests so far as the relationship between the minority nation and the broader state is concerned. In cases like Quebec, Flanders and
Western Thrace, individuals whose ‘freedom of exiting is publicly safeguarded’ can be free to bow out of such projects and this does not pose a threat for the existence of the national autonomy of their ethnic fellows (Casals 1999). The point I am making is that the changing nature of nations and nationalisms can be well represented by a responsive system. Establishment and maintenance of such a system however is a matter of subsequent and continuous regulation rather than being a reason to refute the current state of popular sovereignty at a given time.

Second, from the egalitarian perspective, the idea of giving self-government rights to minorities where the majority have mobilized around their ethnicity is problematic. It is problematic because that would further the inequality between the powerful majority that has rich resources to offer and the minority that does not have complete economies and polities. Muslim Turks in Greece are an example of this because their economic activities in Greece are mostly confined to rural and small or medium sized business in Western Thrace. In his argument Barry overlooks two things. One is that the people may not always prioritize their material interests over their right to govern themselves. Second is that economic development is subject to the possibility of progress and decline in the future. Besides, the economic welfare of people does not have to be solely dependent on resources and jobs available within the territory of a self-governing group. External opportunities that are offered by kin-states or supranational organizations such as the European Union set up a strong example for this. Any egalitarian critique of multiculturalism must account for the conditional state of economic welfare and its complex nature which operates across boundaries.

As regards the second point above, however, it is argued that the role of the state should be to protect the equality of its citizens if things go wrong. It makes sense to think of what would happen if the kin state did not open its borders to its
nationals, or if the European Union ceased to exist and provide job opportunities across state boundaries. Regulations that protect the equality of the people cannot be left to probability, fortune and good luck so the state must be responsible for providing its citizens with equal access to the highest opportunities available within its boundaries (Barry 2001: 318). When this happens, the majority’s language that offers the greatest opportunities in the country becomes more important. This may not be desirable for those who voluntarily choose to pay the cost of their choice. It is, however, still a valid point for children who cannot make decisions on their own behalf.

As I suggested earlier, everyone should be publicly safeguarded to have the freedom to exit. However having freedom and being able to use it are different things. If the children are not equipped with necessary qualifications (linguistic, educational) to leave their community and enjoy the opportunities provided by the broader state then we cannot read their membership to the community as a free decision. The problem becomes about the role of the liberal state when there is a conflict between the equality of children and cultural freedom of parents to make choices on behalf of their children. There is a huge literature on the transfer of parental authority to the state (Schoeman 1980, Gregory 1999, Minow 1986) and the common wisdom is that

The natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency of the state (Rohlf 2009, Parham v. J. R., 442 US. 584 US. Supreme Court).

This is another field entirely, and goes beyond the scope of this study. However, I will suggest that when the risks are too high to be ignored, then the state and parents can share the responsibility. The best balance for sharing power on that matter, so far as national minorities are concerned, is the facilitation of bilingual education. Again, there is no reason why that would pose a great problem to the autonomy of the national minority or equality of individuals provided that the community members’ right to exist is publicly safeguarded. In these cases there is always the possibility of
developing an economically mature societal culture in minority vernacular gradually, this is more likely to be achieved in the absence of radical reaction to weak multiculturalist policies that hampers the prospects for multiculturalism in cases like Turkey and France. Chapter 3 has given a theoretical explanation for this and Chapter 5 has illustrated in detail through the case of Kurds and Turkey. The next section will also elaborate further on this matter through a comparative study of Northern Ireland in the UK and Corsica in France.

Third, another criticism might be that I am too focused on the group and its internal dynamics and that I ignore the relationships between different groups, and the asymmetric relationship between the majority and the minority in the model Kymlicka offers. It is important to acknowledge that in most cases various ethnic groups were treated differently by the same state. Canada is an example of this where Aboriginal people who were long exposed to assimilation policies of the Indian Act (Bartlett 1988) and the Anglican Church (Woods 2012) lived next to the Francophones who were accommodated by ethno-cultural policies of language rights and federalism. Would it now be just to give political legislative autonomy to Francophones on the one hand and individual cultural rights and administrative autonomy to the Aboriginal people on the other? Similar to Kurds in Turkey and Corsicans in France, Aboriginal people of Canada were also assimilated by force and integrated by inclusive civic nationalism in to the mainstream community. Prohibition of the use of Native languages by students was only one of the tools employed to that effect (Hawthorn, Tremblay and Bownick 1967). They were also left, scattered, and financially weak.

As an outcome of this long historical assimilation and inclusion policies the Aboriginal people of Canada (First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples) could not develop a shared sense of belonging as I explained earlier in the second chapter. Besides, Aboriginals’ diverse, often contentious, relations with the Canadian state
resulted in high variety of political orientations on their part. Today in Canada no one is forced to assimilate, but as the outcome of historical assimilation the majority of the native Indians are choosing to opt in to the Pan-Canadian idea instead of prioritizing their ethno-cultural ‘nationality’ in politics. Some Aboriginal groups, like some nationalist Kurds and Corsicans, have supported the autonomy solution but the number of them scarcely comprises 1% of the population in Canada (Leslie 1988). Government policy actually granted autonomy in the form of reservations and land rights. The self-government rights that most Aboriginal peoples claimed and acquired in Canada mostly concern land rights and administrative competencies with an economic dimension. However none of these rights are similar to the cultural autonomy that has been granted to French Quebecers. The reality is that the policies of cultural assimilation with respect to the Indians have never stopped in Canada. A closer look at the education policy shows this clearly. McCue (2006) argues that policy directions in aboriginal education have barely changed in practice.

Despite the constitutional reform in Canadian society, Aboriginal languages and knowledge are not yet flourishing in the education systems. The Canadian education system has not empowered the enormous creativity of Aboriginal languages and First Nations schools have not used them widely (Battiste 2012: 277).

The symbolic power they have in the area of education does not translate into the kind of cultural autonomy that we observe in Quebec and Flanders. The main language of education is still either English or French in most First Nations schools.99 The majority of Aboriginal people in Canada have already got their acclaimed right to

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99 See also Fallon and Paquette (2012: 11) ‘In spite of the emergence of a policy discourse promoting autonomy and control of aboriginal education by First Nations within a pluralistic society, the reality is that … the education clauses in these agreements [SGAs] clearly indicate that the federal government still supports their 1950 policy of integration – every one of the SGAs referred to [The Federal Framework for Transferring Programs and Services to Self-Governing Yukon First Nations, 1998 (YFN); Mi’kmaq Education in Nova Scotia, 1997 (ME); The Manitoba Framework Agreement, 1994 (MFA); Nisga’a Treaty Negotiation: Agreement in Principle, 1996 (NTM); The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA); The United Anishaabeg Councils Government Agreement-in-Principle, 1998 (UAC)] includes a clause or clauses that in effect say that the education that the affected First Nation(s) provides as a result of the SGA must be comparable to the provincial system, or that students must be able to move from the First Nations education program to a provincial school [at any time] without penalty’.
enjoy their culture in public and private spheres freely. And as such the autonomy of Quebecers does not necessarily put any parts in a disadvantaged position. I agree with Kymlicka (1998: 142) who argued that ‘critiques have failed to identify the nature of the inequality–to determine who gained an unfair advantage, or suffered from some unfair burden, as a result of asymmetry’. Barry (2001), however, clarifies the remaining inequality with the following account of asymmetrical power. ‘This is that representatives from Quebec take part in voting in the national parliament on issues that do not affect their constituencies, because whatever legislation is enacted will not apply on Quebec’ Barry (2001: 311).¹⁰⁰ This can, however, be regulated by further reformations that limit Quebec’s power to its own sphere. As can be deduced from the account of remaining problems, I am not arguing that Kymlicka’s propositions or the Canadian model itself is perfectly flawless as there is an on-going debate about the asymmetric federalism and its unequal implications for the parties involved. Moreover Schertzer and Woods (2011) argue that what Kymlicka presents as a blueprint for other cases of ethnic conflict is not even good for Canada. Like Barry, they too think that Canada should maintain its judiciary system as responsive as possible to represent the diversity within two mainstream communities of the country and among all ten provinces. This goes beyond the scope of this study but the point I make by mentioning these is that all the problems regarding ethno-centric multiculturalism in cases such as Canada and Belgium are of secondary importance and that they can be reformed within the structure of ethno-cultural autonomy solution.

Fourth, the last critique would come from Kymlicka who is more concerned with cases where I suggest that his proposal for strong self-government rights to national minorities is normatively inconsistent and practically infeasible.

When the conditions are not mature enough for his proposition to work, Kymlicka thinks that having the right to enjoy one’s culture or administrative autonomy

¹⁰⁰ This is known as the Midlothian question and applies to Scottish MPs in Britain, as well.
instead of having self-government right or exclusive power of jurisdiction and legislation can be more realistic for national minorities (Kymlicka 2004[b]: 13). He insists, however, that his proposition should be implemented gradually in such cases by recourse to relatively weak multiculturalism policies until the conditions are mature enough for the national minority to exercise self-government rights. After all, the context where I see multiculturalism not fitting is the outcome of a particular historical path. In cases where policies of forced assimilation have been the norm, reversing the process has its limitations. However I am not arguing that path dependency is a deterministic concept. As suggested by Wimmer himself (2008: 1004) 'under certain historical circumstances a path may be abandoned and change becomes possible'.

The feasibility of this change in practice is however very low for cases like Kurds in Turkey and Corsicans in France. But Kymlicka thinks that his theory should be taken seriously as a stepping-stone to reach a solution for ethnic conflict as well.

The reason why he insists on the multiculturalist direction in such cases is because the alternative would most probably be the continuation of a difference-blind egalitarianism. I have explained in earlier chapters that the entirely difference-blind version of egalitarianism is not to be a panacea for inequalities, which it is primarily concerned with. Neither can it be a solution for violent conflict. Kymlicka argues his position remains relevant not only because nationalists or communitarians’ right to cultural freedom is of importance in his multiculturalism theory, but also because, he thinks, the violent conflict that militant nationalist factions have created will not easily fade away until their group rights are granted.

\[101\] Patterns of boundary making and strategies of actors involved in these processes are usually determined by exogenous or endogenous shifts in the power politics. (Wimmer 1997, 2008) Intervention of international organizations to the ethnic politics of countries has been important in facilitating this change. The EU’s minority protection conditionality for the accession of candidate countries in Eastern Europe (Kymlicka 2003), or the UN’s protection of indigenous rights in Latin American countries are evidence of this. (Conklin and Graham 1995, Warren 1998) Similarly in the case of Kurds and Turkey the role of the EU has been undeniably important to start a reform process and challenge the state centric view of nation (Kuzu 2010).
6.4 Multiculturalism as a Conflict Solving Mechanism? A Comparative Analysis

Although deeply rooted in liberal theory, Kymlicka’s stance on multiculturalism, and his justification for exporting various forms and levels of self-government rights to national minorities in a generic sense, therefore comes from a broader observation. It is an observation that ethnic minorities’ call for autonomy is still at the centre of ongoing conflicts all over the world. Drawing on Connor (1999: 163-4), Kymlicka (2007) suggests that the

Phenomenon minority nationalism is a truly universal one. The countries affected by it are to be found in Africa (for example Ethiopia), Asia (Sri Lanka), Eastern Europe (Romania), Western Europe (France), North America (Guatemala), South America (Guyana) and Oceania (New Zealand). The list includes countries that are old (United Kingdom) as well as new (Bangladesh), large (Indonesia) as well as small (Fiji), rich (Canada) as well as poor (Pakistan) authoritarian (Sudan) as well as democratic (Belgium), Marxist Leninist (China) as well as anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India) and Judaic (Israel) (Connor 1999: 163-4).

Kymlicka (1995) and Connor (1999) implicitly suggest in their accounts that ethnicity is the cause of the conflict because it happens everywhere under many different sets of circumstances. Ethnic conflict, according to them, can therefore only be explained by itself. Their view is also supported by various scholars who come up with an answer as to why ethnicity is a common denominator for conflicts. For example Hardin (1995) interpreted ethnicity as a focal point that does let people locate the outsiders to cooperate with or fight against. Similarly Tajfel, Billig and Bundy (1971) argued that ethnicity structures actors’ preferences in masses; that it is the ethnicity, which provides the shared language of reciprocity among fellow members of a group (Bates 1983). ‘Much of this literature fails to specify the mechanisms that link ethnicity to political action, but studies that do typically build their accounts around the ability of ethnic groups to solve collective action problems’ (Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein 2002: 4). Kymlicka characterizes a similar failure in his suggestion that any attempts to resolve conflicts of national minorities have to find a way to recognize and accommodate ethnicity as a politically relevant category. Even though the societal
culture of the minority in conflict is fluid and nebulous, as suggested earlier by Young. Kymlicka thinks that the societal culture based on ethnicity should be supported and nurtured so that national minorities get their differentiated self-government rights; those historical injustices can simply be rectified; and the conflict arising from ethnicity would eventually be subdued.

Various scholars have challenged Kymlicka’s perspective on the role of ethnicity in the conflict and its capacity to offer a solution. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Laitin (2007) and Chandra (2004, 2006) claim that ethnic diversity per se is not a cause for the conflict as implicitly suggested by Kymlicka and Connor and ‘peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more common than is large scale violence’ (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Therefore those who think that ethnicity is the cause of conflict do not have a factual basis to support their argument. Similarly Reinares (2005: 119) argued that ‘Nationalist separatism does not in itself explain nationalist separatism terrorism’. He suggests that independent political objectives and an ample variety of organizational purposes can be more relevant than ethno-nationalist ideology to explain the emergence and survival of the terrorist organization (Reinares 2005). Tezcur’s (2010) study of expanding PKK activities at the time of reformation revealed that most of the nationalist-separatist guerrillas’ attacks ironically targeted the facilities in their homeland and harmed the members of their own community which they claimed to represent. It is therefore not logical to think that the radicals are really fighting for ‘the good’ of their people and that they will stop once that ‘good’ has been achieved. The idea that ethnicity is not the cause of conflict has also been supported by studies showing that its recognition will not be the solution either.

According to McGary and O’Leary (2006), most of the best examples of peaceful ethnic decentralization, like Quebec in Canada, South Tyrol in Italy, and Sami in Finland, have never been subject to violent conflicts as intense and wide as those in Kurdish, Palestinian, Corsican or Tamil questions. Hence the ethnic
decentralization and autonomy in peaceful disputes do not present good examples of solutions for the cases of violent conflict. McGarry and O’Leary (2006: 249) also argued that

Consociationalists have overly focused on peaceful disputes. This has led to a concentration on the design of legislative and executive institutions, and insufficient attention to matters that are profoundly salient in transitions from war to peace, such as military and policing reform, demilitarization, human rights reform and the treatment of prisoners and victims.

Earlier studies by Nordquist (1998) and Heintze (2002) also suggested that issues, which are salient in transitions from war to peace, complicate the feasibility and durability of autonomy as a solution in cases of violent conflict. ‘Practice indicates that the higher the degree of militarization of a conflict preceding the establishment of an autonomy regulation, the less likelihood there is of durable high autonomy’ (Hans–Joachim Heintze 2002: 334).

This account of the critiques against ethnic multiculturalism provides us with two general hypotheses about the prospects for multiculturalism and the autonomy solution, which is presented as a conflict solving mechanism. Firstly, autonomy as a conflict solving mechanism is more likely to endure and solve the problems of national minorities in cases where democratic tradition has been strong. Secondly, autonomy is more likely to be a solution when militarization of the conflict that preceded the solution has been low profile if any at all (Nordquist 1998, Heintze 2002: 325-343).

However this argument is at odds with some cases. The terror atmosphere that the IRA created in the UK, for example, was quite violent with almost 2000 casualties until the late 1990s (Reinars 2005: 121). Despite the bloodshed the solution that came with the devolution of power by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 has endured quite successfully (McGarry and O’Leary 2006: 259).
Why the solution in the UK has been durable and rewarding is explained by some with the strong tradition of democracy in the country. (Przeworski 1999, 2000, Davenport 2007) Some others also suggested that the dedication of the central government to initiate and maintain the autonomy as a solution was the key to success.\(^2\)

However this cannot account for the remaining conflict between radical Corsicans and the state in France. France has a strong democratic tradition yet its attempts to give gradually more autonomy to Corsica since 1982 failed in so many respects to satisfy the radicals and that conflict has remained to be a major problem in the politics of both the island and the mainland.

Kymlicka would suggest that multiculturalism in the extensive form of self-government rights and legislative autonomy was successfully established in the UK and only for this reason the violent conflict came to an end in Northern Ireland. However, according to him, this was not the case in France where the Constitutional court has constantly prevented a similar agreement from emerging and thus Corsican nationalist demands remained unaddressed.\(^3\) This account of centralized French weak multiculturalism vs. pluralist UK strong multiculturalism is, however, overly simplistic.

The Northern Ireland conflict was a religion-based conflict between the Republican Catholics and the Protestant Unionists as opposed to Irish vs. English. If

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\(^2\) Also the role of the Irish Republic is important in ensuring that the irredentist ambitions of the IRA were not viable. However this lack of support for the IRA from the Irish Republic cannot be used on its own to explain why it came to an end. If we take this factor as having an explanatory power then we cannot come to terms with stateless nations like the Kurds and the Corsicans and with their radical factions who maintained a violent conflict although they have never had support from a kin state.

\(^3\) This argument follows from the ‘Multiculturalism Policy Index’ generated in Queen’s University in Canada. The project categorizes the countries from 0 to 6 according to their multiculturalist policies, 0 being the least multicultural and 6 is the most. In this study as of 2010 the UK gets a 6 and France 2.
For more details see [http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/minoritynations/Tables.html](http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/minoritynations/Tables.html)
we are to explain it using the analogy of minority Francophone against majority Anglophone in Canada, the Catholic Republicans in Northern Ireland were the minority whose cultural autonomy would be recognized and guaranteed by the self-government rights against the domination of majority Protestant Unionists. Rights of Catholics were guaranteed by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 April. However, the Good Friday Agreement ensured that any constitutional changes regarding the autonomous decisions of the region including the Catholic Republicans would be subject to the consent of the majority (in this case the Protestant Unionists).

The most important constitutional provision in the GFA is the acceptance of the unionist veto over Irish unification. Against the republican movement’s long held arguments regarding national self-determination (i.e. the entire island North and South must decide together), both governments affirmed that constitutional change in the North will only come about through the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland…. the devolved political power promised by the agreement will remain in the hands of the pro-British unionist majority By accepting this provision, the republican movement agreed to administer a state they had spent thirty years trying to demolish. (O’Connor 2004)

Thus all that the Catholic Republicans could get out of the Good Friday Agreement in the end was consociational power sharing, administrative autonomy, the parity of esteem, and equal opportunities guaranteeing that they will never be discriminated against again. The limited legislative autonomy given to the Northern Ireland assembly by the central government therefore had only a symbolic meaning for the Catholic Republicans whose absolute cultural autonomy on the constitutional level is still dependent on the consent of the majority Protestants. Catholic Republicans in Northern Ireland therefore do not have an exclusive power of jurisdiction on the Island. For this reason it is indeed fallacious to assume that the IRA achieved what it aimed for and the most ideal form of self-government for the Catholic Republicans was installed, as Kymlicka suggested. As such the situation of Republican Catholics in Northern Ireland is far from representing the level of self-government rights as idealized in Kymlicka’s theory. Actually it resembles a rather
weak multiculturalism that characterizes more the situation of Corsicans in France\footnote{The regional Assembly of Corsica has the power to make certain decisions and regulations. Its powers are derived first from the 1991 Special Statue (as modified by the law of January 2002) The powers were reaffirmed in Article 72 of the French Constitution and include a limited right to dissent from the central French Parliament. Article 72-1 added in 2002 that local referenda can be organized in Corsica and since 1991 ‘the opinion of Corsican Assembly must be sought on proposed changes to the island’s status. Additionally, pursuant to the 1991 Special Statute, the centre must consult with the Corsican Assembly if ‘the draft laws or decrees’ will affect Corsica. The people of Corsica elect the Corsican Assembly that has been granted the right to adopt programs for teaching the Corsican language and culture… Corsica has also an increased control over fiscal affairs since the beginning of the autonomy process in the 1980s. Constitutionally laws may be passed by which tax revenues are provided to the periphery’ (Tkacik 2008: 382).} than Quebecers in Canada. Corsica has an executive council and a regional assembly with decision-making powers, four deputies and two senators guaranteed at the National Assembly (Loughlin and Letamendia 2000: 157). ‘The Assembly was earlier given the authority to adapt national decrees on the basis of the 1991 Statute and reaffirmed in 2002 by statute. Assembly has regulatory powers to define and implement policies with expanded spheres of competence (educational and fiscal matters)’ (Tkacik 2008: 382). Considering the equality of all citizens before the law, however, Corsica was prohibited from developing asymmetric solutions in the sense that their policy decisions are still checked and balanced by the central government (Ibid). Having remained controlled by the consent of the majority Protestants, the position of Catholic Republicans of Northern Ireland is, I suggest, similar to Corsicans in France. For this reason I suggest that although their rhetorical powers diverge on paper, these two national minorities are similar in terms of the levels of autonomy they enjoy in practice.

In spite of this similarity, the two cases differ from each other in terms of the ways their similar levels of autonomy have impacted upon the conflicts that they were designed to resolve. While the IRA in Northern Ireland agreed to ceasefire, the FLNC (\textit{Fronte di Liberazione Nazionale Corsu}: National Liberation Front of Corsica)
conversely increased its operations as a response to the limited autonomy solution. It is not my aim to find out the causes of ethnic conflict in Corsica or suggest a panacea for ethnic conflict by looking at the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, which is a very exceptional case. My aim is rather to show how the limited autonomy solution, as a form of ethno-centric multiculturalism, affected the conflict in these cases. As I explained earlier a long tradition of democracy, low profile of violence and higher levels of power devolved to the minorities have been suggested to explain the higher probability of autonomy to be a solution to the ethnic conflict. However these explanations cannot come to terms with the variance of outcome between Corsica and Northern Ireland, which are both located in democratic countries; had engaged in violent conflict; and were given similar levels of autonomy as a solution. I suggest the historical narrative of recognizing ethnicity as a socio-political marker in different ways has also an additional explanatory value to understand how ethno-centric projects of multiculturalism affect violent conflicts. I will argue that if the minority in conflict has been pejoratively or positively recognized on the grounds of its ethnicity in the past, the weak consociational or administrative autonomy solution will be more likely to settle the ethnic conflict, when implemented.

6.4.1 The IRA and Northern Ireland - UK

The case of Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland is exemplary of a context where the minority members were de facto recognized, discriminated against and systematically excluded from the mainstream community before the Good Friday Agreement. ‘Throughout the existence of devolved government in Northern Ireland there were allegations of discrimination against Roman Catholics in all areas of life’ (Leopold 1998: 232). The internal solidarity of the Catholics in Northern Ireland has been facilitated by the historical boundary that state discourse maintained between

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105 The recognition as I used in earlier parts of this study does not have to be positive. In order for the state to differentiate, discriminate against or exclude a group, it first has to recognize the group de facto or de jure. For this reason discrimination, extermination, federalism, cultural rights and autonomy regulations all will be used as indicators for recognition.
mutually exclusive categories of Catholicism and Protestantism. As O’Leary and McGarry (2006: 254) suggested ‘For over a century, historic Ulster and then the Northern Ireland that was carved from it, has been divided electorally into two rival ethno-national blocs and there has been no swing voting between the two ethno-national blocs over the last three decades’. Once the parity of esteem has been guaranteed by a constitutional reform and when the boundary between these ethno-national blocs were recognized as to be effective in the new regulation of the body politic, the IRA was no longer in need of furthering the violent conflict. In cases like Northern Ireland where the autonomy is introduced as a solution, separatist nationalists do not need to continue their violent tactics as a means of mobilization. In such cases the majority of minority members are already found to be mobilized by the exclusion they suffered in the past and a possible compromise with the state does not undermine their support for nationalist leadership. ss This is also supported by scholars of ethnic-conflict (Birnir and Inman 2010) and democratization studies (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, Busman and Schneider 2007) suggesting that mobilizing groups pose a greater risk for ethnic conflict than already mobilized groups do.

6.4.2 The FLNC and Corsica - France

The historical relationship between Corsicans and France before the autonomy solution is quite the opposite of what happened in Northern Ireland. Unlike Republican Catholics who were de facto recognized as different and constantly discriminated against in public, Corsicans have been denied the status of minority and treated as equal citizens by the state. In France the extremely centralized state discarded both institutional and ethno-cultural pluralism in politics. It is also a historical fact that the ‘British tradition of liberal pluralism which accords places to social orders, classes, and particularistic communities, has been opposed by the unitary French conception of citizenship’ (Safran 2003: 439). In all its attempts to
incorporate citizens with different background into the majority, the French state tried to fuse nationality and citizenship. Assimilation has been the fundamental method used to this effect for a century (Hargreaves 2000, Daftary 2008: 273-312). As a result

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most Corsicans identified with the French state. They joined the army, the police, customs and other branches of the French civil service. Identification with France reached its apex during the First and second World Wars, when thousands of islanders gave their lives for *la patrie* (Loughlin and Letamendia 2000: 155).

In cases like Corsica, minority members are found to be cooperating with the state that has assimilated and treated them on par with everyone else in the country. The loyalty of Corsicans can lie across the ethnic boundaries in France, as these possibly overlapping boundaries are very fluid and the state discourse is conducive for cross cutting identities to emerge.

Starting from the 1950s however, radical groups emerged and fought against the French state, especially at times of economic crises. However, the majority on the island supported none of the radical Corsican factions, the last of which was FLNC (*Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu*). In time the minorities have been openly admitted in France. Since 1968 Regional languages were allowed to be taught at school in Brittany and Corsica (Withol de Wenden 2011: 45-53).

With the heyday of Socialist power between 1981 and 1986, it was aimed to promote ethno-cultural pluralism by protecting and developing the cultures and languages of regional minorities. Affirming the ‘right to be different,’ policies included the subsidization of ethnic-language publications, ethnic museums, films, and music; the teaching of ethnic-minority languages at various levels of the educational system and the training of teachers for this purpose; the maintenance of ‘multicultural’ community centers and research programs; and the promotion of a variety of cultural activities (Safran 2003: 444).

Similar to Turkey, in France too ‘the ethnic violence increased in both quantity and intensity’ at times of reform and progress (Loughlin and Letamendia 2000: 157). Nevertheless, in 1991 a further action was taken and the 1991 bill was passed to
establish a regional Corsican assembly on the island. This assembly was given authority to define and implement policies on fiscal matters and education. Notwithstanding the recognition of their cultural differences in public, the aforementioned autonomy provisions have been given to Corsicans as a right to freedom of association and their group right to govern themselves on the island was based on this principle. The constitutional court’s persistent opposition to giving Corsican nationalists an exclusive power of jurisdiction on the island actually further radicalized the FLNC (Daftary 2008). This limited autonomy is justified on the basis of the fact that it protects the rights of individuals and the majority of the island’s population who voted against a higher level of autonomy for Corsica in the July 2003 referendum (Serrano 2007, Michelucci 2008, Filippidou 2007).

The IRA listened to the majority of its constituency and agreed to a ceasefire, although the autonomy that they can enjoy in practice is quite similar to the limited autonomy that Corsican people have on the island. The reason for this of course was that the IRA understood that not only were they unable to depose the British, but also that the Protestant Unionist mobilization blocked their hopes of achieving a united Ireland (Hutchinson 2013: personal communication). This is however, the same impasse faced by the FLNC in Corsica. Central French governments persistently fought against separatist factions in Corsica and the Corsican supporters of union with France have blocked their hopes of achieving an autonomous Corsica. I rather argue that why the IRA accepted shifting its battle to the political level when the opportunity arose is because they knew that their nationalist leadership in the political arena was not to be challenged by a possible cooperation between its constituency and the Protestants. This was not the case in Corsica.

The FLNC, unlike the IRA, increasingly continued its violent approach between 1990 and 2006 (Minorities at Risk Project 2013). This was observed to be evident especially at times of reforms that only helped to increase the support of Corsican people to mainland France. In the election immediately after the
establishment of the Corsican Assembly, the separatist candidate could win less than 13% of the vote (Hossa 2004: 416). In December of 1984, 25,000 Corsicans marched through the streets in favor of French unity. Their banners read: “No to Separatism, No to Terrorism” (Walker 2013: 25).

In such cases, the nationalists constantly need to make ethnicity a politically relevant distinction especially in times of relative liberalization that may render the cultural boundaries a lesser problem for the majority of their community. It has been suggested that, as in cases of FLNC, ETA and PKK, minority nationalists achieved this by accelerating an environment of insecurity and increasing the sense of victimization among their supporters (Reinals 2005: 125, Akcam and Asal 2005). It is suggested that those who have this sense of victimization, in return, are motivated further to support the ethno-nationalist cause. Sanchez and Aguilar (2009) have also tested this hypothesis in the context of Spanish transition to democracy. Their dataset clearly confirmed ‘that terrorism erupted in Spain when participation in demonstrations started to decline’ (Sanchez and Aguilar 2009: 428). Evidence suggests that the conflict in such cases continues until the majority of the minority begins to identify with ethno-nationalism, or the state eliminates terror by force.

As seen, to introduce limited autonomy or power sharing solutions is not helpful in moving the violent conflict into the political democratic arena in cases where the minority is not mobilized and the cultural boundaries between communities have always been blurred by the state. In such cases the liberal state has two options: either oppress the terror and provide its citizens with cultural rights defined as weak multiculturalism by Kukathas or compromise with terrorists’ claim to exclusive power and sacrifice the freedom and equality of the minority whose majority does not support its militant factions. To some, compromising with militant radicals is

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Snyder (2000: 37-39) suggests the increasing terrorist campaign is facilitated by fertile conditions that democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes usually create. This does not however explain the case of either the PKK or ETA whose activities were strongly opposed by the governments of Turkey and Spain at the times of liberalization.
acceptable if it is the only possible course to get the peace installed in cases where the violent conflict has been persistent for decades. However, it is questionable if such a peace arrangement would be endurably sustainable and fruitful where the original causes of the minority’s support to the conflict still remain. At this point, a careful security paradigm seems to be in agreement with a liberal perspective suggesting that ‘inequality is intolerable even if it would lead to more stability’ (Baubock 2001: 2).

The capacity and possibility of the state to ‘liberalize’ its system and fight against ethnic terrorism at the same time is a matter that needs to be researched separately and it goes beyond the scope of this study. However the dilemma shows that it is very likely to cause a bottleneck and render the ethno-centric multiculturalism practically infeasible.

6.5 Conclusion

As illustrated in the cases of the Kurds in Turkey and the Corsicans in France, I argued that granting cultural groups exclusive power of jurisdiction and legislation is not compatible with liberalism in cases where the minority were exposed to forcible assimilation and the ideal of civic nationalism at the same time.

This is not a normative tautology defending the egalitarian bias of civic nationalism over the cultural freedoms that multiculturalism theory aims to promote. I argued in earlier chapters that a completely difference-blind egalitarianism can promote neither the equality of outcomes nor the freedom of cultural groups. It is also far from being capable of establishing the peace in countries where too much blood has been shed over ethnic conflicts. Assimilation and civic nationalism, independent of their normative values, were analysed in this study in terms of the impact that they have had upon the maintenance and politicization of a cultural boundary between the majority and the minority communities.
One may also think that there is a tautology in the argument that multiculturalism is only a solution where multiculturalism already has a history of being in place, i.e. Quebec, Belgium, but not where it doesn’t, i.e. Turkey and France. The argument is not that multiculturalism is only a solution where multiculturalism already has a history of being in place, but that it is normatively more consistent and practically feasible in cases where the minority has always been differentiated along ethnic lines. As explained earlier this is not only limited to more liberal cases such as Quebec and Belgium where multiculturalism has already a history of being in place but also includes illiberal cases such as Muslim Turks in Greece and Non-Muslims in Turkey who were both assimilated and socially excluded at the same time. My argument holds true only in cases where the policies of assimilation and integration have been implemented together. In such cases politics of group identity is more likely to be in contradiction with individual equality and freedom because when the scale of separation is low as Wimmer argued (2008: 1011), ‘classificatory ambiguity and complexity will be high and allow for more individual choice’.

Following a multidisciplinary approach of political anthropology, I argued that assimilation and civic nationalism when implemented on a consistent basis reduces the political relevance of ethnic boundaries between the majority and the minority. Evidence suggests that when ethno-cultural boundaries are easy to cross and socio-politically irrelevant; and when the scales of separation and hierarchy are low as Wimmer argued (2008: 1011), ‘classificatory ambiguity and complexity will be high and allow for more individual choice. Accordingly boundaries will change more easily.’ This mechanism, I argue, creates an impasse that makes it impossible to find one single ‘people’ on a consistent basis. Ethno-centric multiculturalism relies on the unanimity and singularity of ‘the people’ in terms of their attachment to ethno-nationalist politics and is therefore not realistic for such cases (Kurds in Turkey, Corsicans in France). The salience of ethno-national identity proves to be very
powerful when the minority has never been forced to assimilate in the past, but ethnically recognized one way or the other as belonging to a group that is distinct from the majority. In such cases as Kymlicka suggested ‘when [ethno] nationalist parties compete in free and fair elections, they often do gain the support of the plurality or majority of the group on a consistent basis (in Flanders, Quebec, Catalonia, South Tyrol etc.)’ (Kymlicka 2011: 285).

I showed in the theoretical background to this study that diversity and conflicting interests of individuals are a problem to the extent to which ‘the people’ are not willing to overcome their differences and conflicts. Differently from Kymlicka I showed that agreement on ethno-politics within the community is not a natural extension of ethno-cultural attachments. This study has elaborated on why ‘the people’ are more likely to support ethno-politics. Comparative disadvantage, ranked communities, cultural incompatibilities, political repression and pre-existing group cohesion were some of the factors I have controlled for in this study. Later I provided an overarching framework that encompasses these various causes of popular support for ethno-politics. Drawing on this framework then, I presented popular support for ethno-politics as a basis for deciding where ethno-centric multiculturalism can be normatively consistent and practically feasible. I suggested that assimilation and civic nationalism policies or their absence provide us with a more sophisticated and realistic basis in locating the cases where multiculturalism fits. First of all the absence of forcible assimilation and an ideal of civic nationalism implies ethnic exclusion, discrimination or differentialist projects such as administrative autonomy and federalism. This broad category of minority-state relations did not only facilitate the concentrated settlement of minorities, but also substantiated the belief in shared culture, history and feeling amongst minority members. This belief is translated by repeating practices of ethnic differentiation so that they are positioned in contrast to the majority who already defined them with ethnic terms in the first place. Thus, I
suggested that this relational situation also explains the minority’s popular support to projects of ethnic nationalism. Through this criterion not only could I come to terms with cases like the Kurds and the Corsicans the majority of whom has absented from militant ethno-nationalism but also rendered the critiques of ethno-multiculturalism null and void in cases where the majority of the minority members support ethno-nationalist politics on a consistent basis.

It is important to emphasize that my aim was not to argue that Kymlicka’s theory or the Canadian model is flawless and can be exported with no revision to the cases where, I suggested, it fits. I elaborated on the remaining problems with theory in most ideal contexts. The context I provided is based on the popular sovereignty and mass nationalism, and the critiques of multiculturalism in this context came from egalitarianism (Barry 2001), and constitutionalism (Hume 1748). This chapter argued that all of the remaining problems that egalitarians and constitutionalists raise can be corrected through institutional reforms. I explained that none of those reforms necessarily pose a fundamental problem for the implementation of self-government rights in the contexts I provided. However my argument is not necessarily valid from the perspective of Kymlicka either. This is because he thinks that the self-government rights can be applied in all cases of national minorities as a generic category. On the contrary I argued that his theory is not likely to be a fit with cases that lack mass support for ethno-nationalism although they are developed ‘enough’ and not assimilated. I gave the historical path of forcible assimilation and civic nationalism as the reason why such minorities do not have popular support for ethno-nationalist politics. Kymlicka and Wimmer who worked on ethnic-boundary making and un-making suggest that this path dependency is not deterministic and thus it can change. Therefore it is suggested that if we start to recognize the cultural rights of the minority members in a weak fashion, minority members will gradually develop a common cause. I argued that the weak multiculturalism as suggested can be the best
approach in such cases because it neither creates further inequalities nor constitutes a barrier to the individuals’ freedom of exit.

It is observed that, however, this approach would be likely to rekindle radicalism and conflict. In what follows, I tested this argument through the comparative study of weak multiculturalism and its impact on ethnic conflict. It is found out that the weak multiculturalism can move violent conflict to a political arena in cases where the cultural boundaries between the majority and the minority have always been made relevant by the state’s discourse. The ethno-centric multiculturalism in such cases is just an adaptation to the divisions that have already been relevant on the ground. On the contrary, in cases where the minority members and the majority have been mixed and integrated by assimilation and civic nationalism, terror has the task of mobilizing its ethnic community. So long as there is a democratic competition over the minority constituency and that different parties with a non-ethnic agenda claim to represent them, radicals will be likely to see weak multiculturalism as a state manoeuvre for further assimilation and integration. As their aim is the mobilization rather than recognition, radicals are likely to maintain their violent approach to achieve it, even if they are then politically recognized and granted better rights.

In the previous chapters both normatively and practically I showed that the ethno-centric multiculturalism is not viable for cases with a historical path of forcible assimilation. This chapter has tested and verified my argument in the contexts that constitute a contrast to the historical path in Turkey. This chapter has not only brought the ethno-centric multiculturalism theory closer to a more realistic conception of ethno-nationalism but also established a new basis to locate the cases where the ethno-centric multiculturalism would be normatively consistent and practically feasible. I suggested that the distinction made between immigrant minorities and national
minorities is not sufficient. We also have to make a distinction between national minorities who were differentiated on the basis of their ethnic differences and those who were forced to assimilate and integrated to the society by the means of civic state nationalism. I argued that Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism is an ethno-centric approach and can only be applied to national minorities who have been recognized, differentiated or discriminated against along ethnic lines.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 The Central Argument in Précis

This thesis argued that national minorities differ from each other depending on the state nationalism they have experienced in the past. The second chapter explained this variation according to different impacts that civic assimilationist and ethnic exclusionist nationalisms had on national minorities and their societal culture. The thesis operationalized the degrees of ‘societal culture’ not only with objective indicators such as economic development, institutionalization of the culture, concentrated settlement and size of its population, but also with subjective indicators such as whether minority members who are the majority in their historical homeland share an ethno-political orientation. To be more precise, minority members’ will to follow a politics of ethnic group culture has also been considered by this thesis as an indicator of the societal culture in the national minority. The chapter concluded that those national minorities have been forced to assimilate into the majority culture have been more heterogeneous in terms of these indicators than national minorities who by contrast experienced differentiation.

The third chapter suggested that Kymlicka’s strong view of multiculturalism is ethno-centric and therefore is mostly problematic in cases where the national minority represents high levels of political and social heterogeneity across ethnic boundaries. In demonstrating this, the chapter explained that some minority members voluntarily assimilated into the majority resulting in the emergence of hyphenated identities like
the American Latinos, the French Corsicans and the Turkish Kurds. However, the policies of assimilation radicalized some of the other segments of the minority that resisted this process for various reasons and promoted an ethnic unrest.

Multiculturalism and legislative autonomy in the form of regional governments are not practically and normatively viable in such cases, because there are too many conflicts of interest both across and within the ethnic groups. No project of decentralization along lines of ethnicity would be able to correspond to this heterogeneity. Equally problematic in such cases is egalitarianism that is blind to differences and the ethnic particularities of the national minority as it is usually near to impossible to find a consensus on any matter between the state and radical factions of the minority. As Brian Barry suggested, all decisions that the liberal state makes are justified so long as the objective that the decision is grounded on is a publicly legitimate one. However this view is problematic in countries where some members of the national minority have lost or have never had a sense of belonging to the same public realm as the majority. Those who are less able to integrate with the mainstream public for various reasons are naturally more prone to developing a sense of isolation. Moreover the policies of denial and assimilation as I mentioned above also ignited and radicalized the ethnic strife between the state and those who resisted its policies of suppression. In this sense, radicals represent a deep line between the minority and the majority culture and hence pose a much more serious problem to the egalitarian presumption of the common good. Difference-blind egalitarianism is also far from being a reasonable option where ethnic differentiation

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107 This pluranationality as Keating (2001) suggested is also the case for Canadian Francophone, British Scots and Belgian Flemish who most of the time have been ethnically marked out and recognized by the state. (Keating 2001) Unlike the first group the deep split between ethnic groups in this second category can however be traced better when looking at the minorities’ support for political autonomy. Keating’s work ‘Plurinational Democracy’ clearly showed that in Quebec and Flanders, sovereignty arrangements and self-government rights that fall slightly short of the options of secession and independence are supported by the minority population. On the other hand almost all the Kurds want to be recognized culturally but only the 16.8% of them in the Southeast Turkey want to be governed under an autonomous administration. Similarly, more than half of the Corsicans voted No in the 2003 referendum that asked them whether they would like to be autonomous.
has been pervasive and the minority members *en masse* support territorial autonomy. This does not come down to the reductionist ‘solution’ of majoritarian democracy on a sub-state level. Those minorities whose majority population support cultural autonomy are still diverse and their judicial systems need to be responsive to this diversity. The egalitarianism that Brian Barry fervently supported provides a range of critiques that are still relevant for the further configuration of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism in such cases. However the egalitarian critique of multiculturalism in these cases is not quite as serious as in cases like Turkey and France where the minority members are not even in agreement on the levels and forms of the autonomy.

### 7.2 Significance for the Applied Political Theory of Multiculturalism

The most significant contribution of this study is in the field of applied political theory of multiculturalism by dwelling on the conundrum of what could be the best way to accommodate the national minorities. My perspective has been context sensitive and the thesis argued there is no universal ‘best’ solution applicable to the diverse range of problems faced by national minorities. The model of multinational federation in Canada has been prescribed by Kymlicka as a universal panacea to the problems of all national minorities with a societal culture. Kymlicka has suggested that: increasing ‘rights’ consciousness; consensus on human rights; free political mobilization; and de-securitization of ethnic relations are preconditions for the policies of multiculturalism to take shape in any context. On the other hand he also promoted multiculturalism as a stepping-stone to end ethnic conflict and liberalize countries in transition. This extraordinary claim is the main reason why his work has drawn so much attention from scholars all over the world. Will Kymlicka took part in most of this research and edited several books on the topic such as ‘*Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe*’ (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001), ‘*Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*’ (Kymlicka, Eyoh
and Berman 2004), ‘Multiculturalism in Asia’ (Kymlicka and Baogang He 2005), and ‘Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Arab World’ (Kymlicka and Pfostal forthcoming).

Although it is widely asserted that ‘one size does not fit all’, scholars and policy makers alike accepted the fundamental premise of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, that national minorities with their own societal culture should be given self-government rights one way or another. Many have studied the topic from a case specific perspective; and in finding out the peculiarities about their primary examples they have suggested necessary configurations in institutionalizing this approach. To my knowledge, however, no study has attempted to explain systematically why ethnocentric multiculturalism is more successful in some cases but not in others.

Political sociology has offered many studies of the conditions under which ethno-cultural distinctions translate into politics. The boundary studies contributed to our understanding of how the relational nature of identity shapes relations between ethnic groups. There are a few studies (Turner 1993, Cohen and Rogers 1995) that contextualized these perspectives in a historical fashion to look at the past and see how cultural communities have become national minorities. Except for Zimmer (2003)

108 The only exception to this is ‘Universal Minority Rights? A Transnational Approach’ by Yasutomo, Fumihko and Tetsu (eds.) (2004), in which commentaries on Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism have made a distinction between the Western and the Eastern communities wrongly suggesting that his theory is not applicable in the latter category where the countries have not adopted liberalism. The thesis has already showed that the theory is not only problematic in the Eastern communities, but also in liberal democracies such as France and America. The minorities-problem is universal but its nature and solution vary. I demonstrated that this variety is due to the type of the relationship between the minority and the state, which is hard to categorize geographically. Moreover this dissertation ascertainment that multiculturalism is not only the convention of some Western communities who already internalized liberalism to some extent and in different forms but also a potential model for some countries in transition both in the East and the West. The state of being liberal is not a dichotomous variable but a matter of degree that can be advanced in every country including ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ ones where all individuals are striving for more freedom and equality. It is, however, the tension between the fundamental principles of liberalism itself–equality and freedom–that makes problematic both extremes of ethno-centric multiculturalism and difference-blind egalitarianism under certain circumstances. The question therefore is not about whether liberal pluralism can be exported to ‘illiberal’ countries, but about which interpretation of multiculturalism, libertarianism or egalitarianism one should take on under certain circumstances if the goal is to advance liberalism.
and Wimmer (2008), however, none of these studies viewed civic and ethnic nationalism through the lenses of boundary making mechanisms (Barth 1969, Wimmer 2008, Jenkins 2009). Neither did they explain the variance of national minorities in terms of the civic or ethnic state nationalisms they have experienced in the past. This study, in agreement with Zimmer (2003) and Wimmer (2008), reconceptualised the civic and ethnic state nationalisms as boundary making mechanisms and examined their impact on minority societal cultures. In doing so this thesis also examined the prospects for multiculturalism that is supposed to promote the representation of these societal cultures. This study is important for its approach by bringing together studies on boundary making mechanisms, nationalism and theories of multiculturalism. As has been illustrated in this thesis, it is not adequate to differentiate between immigrant minorities and national minorities. When deciding what rights should be given to certain minorities from the liberal perspective we need to differentiate between national minorities that experienced ethnic state nationalism on the one hand and civic state nationalism on the other.

7.3 Contribution to Studies of Nationalism

Why this has also been neglected so far in the studies of nationalism is because the study of nations and nationalism is dominated by an approach that is aimed more at understanding what these concepts really mean than at explaining what the implications of their various manifestations are. The dichotomy of ethnic-civic nationalism has long been refuted on empirical and normative grounds. I have reconceptualised the dichotomy and worked out how it can still be analytically useful to understand the varying nature and problems of national minorities. This is surely an important contribution to the studies of nationalism which most of the time engages only with questions such as what nation, or nationalism, is. Departing from this conventional approach, this study has used nationalism as an independent variable,
and in doing so has shown one of many ways in which nationalism studies in general and the civic–ethnic dichotomy can be analytically useful. It is also useful to scholars who dwell on whether state nationalism and multiculturalism are compatible on theoretical and practical levels. The thesis explained that one who tackles this question would necessarily need to be sensitive to the different types of nationalism and their implications for different interpretations of multiculturalism. The comparative approach of this study has showed that the ethno-centric interpretation of multiculturalism is only compatible with cases where state nationalism has always been ethno-centric with respect to its national minority.

7.4 Significance of the Study for Policy Makers

A more significant contribution of this study is for the policy makers who used applied political theory to inform the solution of their minorities-problem. The argument that each case has its own unique circumstances holds true, and policy makers should be sensitive to those individual circumstances when dealing with problems of each national minority. Beyond this, however, the thesis has showed that it is possible to categorize the national minorities and their problems according to the state policies they have been exposed to in the past. It is hoped that with the help of this finding, policy makers and theoreticians may have an initial grasp of what approach is more likely to be a solution for the type of national minority they are concerned with and save both time and money. The latter is especially important for international and supranational organizations as well as NGOs who are engaged in extra efforts to finding a solution for national minority problems. The United Nations, the European Union, the OSCE and the European Council are just a few examples of these. More importantly, however, this study is useful for countries and national minorities that have been looking for alternative examples of the successful solution
to find their own way forward. In this sense the thesis’s contribution to Turkish studies is very important.

7.5 Contribution to Turkish Studies

There are many studies criticizing the unequal treatment of minorities in Turkey especially highlighting the need to improve equality between Kurds and Turks. Turkey is still a candidate country for EU accession and is therefore endeavouring to fulfil the conditions the EU has set for the protection of minorities. However, the means by which the improvement should be achieved in Turkey has not been argued on a theoretical basis from a comparative perspective. None of the academic studies pay sufficient attention to the new inequalities emerging from the multicultural discourse in Turkey. To what extent multiculturalism affects the ethnic conflict between the Kurds and the Turks has not been studied fully either. Recognition of minority identities and the viability of accommodating diversity in a liberal democratic system have been at the centre of argument in Turkey. But the most appropriate path to equality and peace in this context was not discussed with reference to systematic analysis of the effects of multiculturalism and egalitarianism.

In Turkey, as a country in transition to liberal democracy, 'liberalism' has been idealized by Turkish scholars, some political actors and institutions, but it has not been clarified which liberalism they are talking about or which principles of liberalism they defend. Neither is it argued what the limitations and consequences of the liberal principles they defend are in relation to the equitable accommodation of Kurds in Turkey. This study provided a detailed discussion on this matter. It followed the idea that 'In cases where we regard the basic principles not as holding unconditionally but as standing in trade-off relationships to one another, some amount of liberty may be sacrificed in order to achieve greater equality, say empirical evidence will be needed to tell us what the optimal mix of values will be for the society we are considering'
This study also provides that empirical evidence for Turkey. The problematic relationship between the Kurds and the State in Turkey could not be peacefully and equitably settled, although influential political actors and institutions representing these two perspectives have tried to solve the Kurdish question in their own ways.

If neither ethno-centric multiculturalism nor difference-blind egalitarianism is a viable option, then what appears to be the most viable liberal approach to the problems of national minorities under this context? The thesis concluded that it is necessary to recognize elements of many variants of liberal thought that should be incorporated in the process of accommodating the Kurds in Turkey. The thesis suggests that institutional reform in Turkey should be done in a manner that assures a particular model of liberalism would not dominate the process as a whole. As neither ethnocentric multiculturalism nor difference blind egalitarianism is a viable option in Turkey with respect to the Kurds, this thesis suggests focusing on an alternative liberal view in which neither equality nor freedom can be sacrificed to the other.

I suggest that such a liberal view should be based on the concepts of neutrality and non-domination. This alternative view is seen as too ideal to be realized but I will suggest that commitment to this ideal is indeed the most appropriate way to accommodate the cultural diversity in Turkey. It was not my aim in this thesis to give a rigorous description of what should be done with regard to the Kurdish question in Turkey, or what institutions should be developed and how the power should be ultimately distributed. The success of any multiculturalist or egalitarian project is conditional, and reading a future solution through abstract principles cannot do justice to the environment of socio-political change taking place in Turkey. In this thesis I rather presented a rigorous argument about what the liberal solution should not be like under current circumstances. From that account, however, it can be safely asserted that what is more suitable for Turkey from the liberal perspective is more
akin to a weak version of multiculturalism than the strong multiculturalism that blindly claims that the cultural distinction is the only source of political legitimacy. As the cultural boundary between the Turks and the Kurds in Turkey is very fluid, institutional arrangements and distribution of power must be made in a way that takes into account regional disparities rather than cultural distinctions. In this sense decentralization can be designed in a way that is more similar to Scotland in the UK than to Quebec in Canada. The focus should be directed on territorial needs and empowering the local administrations with economic competencies than legislative autonomy with an exclusive power of jurisdiction on culture, finance, security and education. Pushing a reform agenda too far risks the pendulum being swung only from one extreme to the other. Whatever institutional change takes place, it should be designed in a way that is sensitive to the tension between freedom and equality as this thesis has portrayed. At the time of writing this thesis a new reform process has begun in Turkey. As of late 2012 the government has initiated talks with representatives of both political and violent factions of the Kurdish movement. Abdullah Ocalan, the honorary leader of the Kurdish movement and currently in prison on the island of Imrali, wrote a roadmap for the solution and government representatives have met with him a few times. The autonomy solution that the ethno-centric multiculturalism promotes is now much closer to being realized in Turkey than ever. For that reason, it is now even more important for Turkey to

This is not to say that the strong ethnocentric multiculturalism will not emerge in Turkey. This depends on many factors. The government in Turkey has a religious vision, by which, the Prime Minister thinks, it will also be easy to hold the Muslim Kurds and Muslim Turks together in harmony even if the former is granted the regional autonomy. Another view is that the Government in its attempt to bring the presidential system to Turkey needs the support of Kurds and for this reason it is ready to compromise with radical Kurds on many issues that have recently dragged the country to the verge of civil war in October 2011. Moreover changing international dynamics in the Middle East and increasing tensions with the neighboring countries such as Syria and Iran are an important factor. It is suggested that the Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Syria will play an important role in the region and it is this dynamic that the government considers when approaching the Kurdish question in Turkey. The ethnocentric multiculturalism, for all these reasons can soon become the reality in Turkey. Yet it is completely another question whether this change will be a liberal one. This study has rather provided a theoretical and a sociological insight on this matter.
consider all the discussions that this thesis has portrayed.

The problem, however, in Turkey is that nobody has a clear idea of what the Government’s plans are and that meetings with Kurdish leaders are kept confidential. When there is no transparency and the platform is not open to the public, it limits the way in which people with different concerns on equality and freedom can negotiate their ideas and balance each other. It took many years and lives to see that policies and politicians representing the extremes of difference-blind egalitarianism and ethno-centric multiculturalism have not brought justice to Turkey, and now it is only the radicals and nationalist Kurds with demands for strong multiculturalism with whom the government is negotiating. The prime minister ‘Erdogan declared that ‘if drinking poison hemlock is necessary, we can also drink it to bring peace and welfare to this country’ (Gunter 2013: 94).

7.6 Potential Future Research

As the thesis argued, however, the strong version of ethno-centric multiculturalism contradicts with equalities and freedoms in too many respects under the current circumstances of Turkey. One of the findings of this thesis is that the ‘weak multiculturalism’ which incorporates the egalitarian and post-multiculturalist critiques into its own thread is ideal from a liberal perspective. Yet, it is at the same time what radicalized the PKK in Turkey. What appears to be the optimum liberal solution under current circumstances rekindles radical thought and resurrects ‘terrorists’ who call themselves freedom fighters in Turkey. This is the potential research topic that can flow from this work. What is the relationship between liberalism and terror, or is it possible, from a liberal perspective, to make a choice between peace and justice when the two are in conflict?
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