

**THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN NATIONAL-EU RELATIONS:
THE CASES OF GREECE AND TURKEY**

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role of religion in national-EU relations. The focus is on how EU membership (or potential membership) may affect nations of a particular religious background in a particular way and, furthermore, whether religious difference affects national-EU relations in a particular way. The study is based on an *internal* perspective to two countries—Greece and Turkey—whose religious traditions stand outside a ‘core’ of religious traditions within the European Union (that is, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism). On the basis of these two cases I argue that neither religion *per se* (as theology or doctrine), nor the prevalence of a particular faith are definitive factors in national-EU relations. Rather, it is mainly in the domain of institutional interests of the ‘church’ vis-à-vis the ‘state’, that we find religion influencing national-EU relations. These institutional interests are, in turn, shaped by the relationship between religion and national identity in each case, and the relationship between ‘church’ and ‘state’. The *differences* in these relationships in the cases of Greece and Turkey yield vast differences in the way ‘religion’ affects national-EU relations.

The empirical research which undergirds this thesis comprises a series of interviews with religious, political, and academic elites in each country. Beyond seeking insight into attitudes to the EU and perceptions of the role of religion in national-EU relations, the interviews focus on specific issues in each case. In the case of Greece, my focal point is the church-state conflict which arose around the ‘identity card issue’, when the state decided to remove reference to religious identity from the national identity cards. In the case of Turkey, my focus is on Islamists and their ‘conversion’ to pro-Europeanism in the wake of the ‘February 28th process’ and what I identify as its ‘legacies’—i.e., state measures through which Turkish Islamists were increasingly limited in their freedoms. Each ‘case within a case’ was chosen as a fruitful basis upon which to examine the complex role played by religion in national-EU relations.

As background information to the interview research, secondary sources are used to explain the relationship between religion and national identity, and between ‘church’ and ‘state’ in each case.

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Introduction

The aim of this study is to explore the role of religion in national-EU relations. The critical approaches to the relationships between nations and the European Union are lacking in attention to one crucial factor: religion. Religion has been a somewhat neglected area of research in studies of European integration and in discussions of the relationship between national identity and European integration. This fact stands in stark contrast to the history of European integration which was, indeed, strongly marked by religion. The works of the most prominent 'historians of Europe' provide us with the theoretical and historical underpinnings of 'European identity' as it was widely conceived of in the early stages of European integration¹. Such works reveal religion as a crucial factor underlying their conceptions of Europe. Through their common attention to such themes as the influence of Christianity on early projects to unite Europe, a religio-cultural distinction between East and West, and a focus on unity in western culture (often equated with European civilisation), Europe is largely portrayed as united in Western Christianity. Furthermore, the 'founding fathers' of the European integration project (e.g., Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, and Jean Monnet) were all Roman Catholic trans-territorialists. And, considering the Cold War context in which the European integration project began, it is clear that the post-War divisions provided a dynamic in which the ideas of Europe as Christian (as opposed to Communist atheism), and especially Catholic or at least Western Christian, were accentuated and solidified.

¹ E.g., works by Christopher Dawson (*Understanding Europe*, 1952; *The Making of Europe*, 1946), Denis de Rougemont (*The Meaning of Europe*, 1963; *The Idea of Europe*, 1966), and Oscar Halecki (*The Limits and Divisions of European History*, 1950).

Thus my interest in this subject began with the question of whether Europe's religious heritage plays a role in contemporary EU developments. The crucial background to my examination of this question was comprised of two factors. **First**, the Maastricht Treaty's introduction of the concept of 'European identity' as part of the integration project: the Treaty indicates the development of a common 'European culture' as an objective of the European Union. The fact that religion is a fundamental aspect of culture in general, and of conceptions of Europe's cultural heritage in particular, gave rise to questions of whether this Maastricht Treaty project for the development of a European culture might reflect Europe's particular religious (Western Christian) heritage in a fairly exclusive fashion. In other words, I wished to know whether this EU expansion into the realm of culture might be problematic for nations which stand outside a 'core' of European religious culture. **Second**, the waves of intellectual debate following Samuel Huntington's works on the 'clash of civilisations': Huntington's thesis is particularly interesting because it places Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam outside of Western civilisation. In light of these debates, I wished to know the extent to which relations between the EU and nations of non-Western Christian backgrounds effectively support Huntington's thesis.

In spite of the lack of scholarly attention to such questions, they are currently rising to the fore within the European Union. Evidence of this can be found in the intense debates over whether reference to religion should be included in the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union. There have been equally protracted debates about the conditions for entry of predominantly Muslim Turkey into the European Union. Both these issues point to the same questions: what is the role of religion in the European Union? does the

EU represent a 'Christian', or more specifically a 'Western Christian' Europe? At the broadest level, the question of religion's role in the European Union is especially important in light of post-Cold War theories on the replacement of ideological conflict with cultural, civilisational and religious conflict. Through its treaties and its enlargement policy, the EU has the potential to either confirm or refute such theories. This is one dimension of the role of religion in the European Union. Another is the extent to which religion is a factor in national-EU relations.

This thesis focuses on this second dimension. It examines, specifically, the role of religion in relations between the European Union and nations whose religious identity stands outside a 'core' of religious traditions within the European Union (that is, outside Western Christianity)². Such an approach is instructive in showing how EU membership (or potential membership) may affect nations of a particular religious background in a particular way and, furthermore, whether religious difference affects national-EU relations in a particular way.

The cases chosen for this study are Greece and Turkey³. My interest in these cases was stimulated by *observation* of expressions of anti-Europeanism within religious circles in Greece, and a *curiosity* as to how this phenomenon would compare with Turkish Muslim attitudes to the EU. I have chosen these cases for three further reasons. First, the two countries stand outside the Western Christian tradition which prevails within the EU. Second, they are the two countries with such religious difference which currently have the closest proximity to the European Union (Greece is presently the only

² I.e., outside Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

³ These are border cases, both in geographic and in religious terms. Of course, these two dimensions are interrelated, in the extent to which religious divisions—particularly those between 'Eastern' and 'Western' Christianity, and those between Christianity and Islam—were largely shaped by geography.

Eastern Orthodox member, and Turkey is the only Muslim country with a long-standing application for membership). Third, the difference between their religious traditions allows an examination of whether *degree* of difference from such a 'core' of European religious identity is a defining factor in national-EU relations.

The argument

My examination of each case revealed a very fundamental but *complex* role of religion in their relations with the European Union. Neither the Maastricht Treaty's promotion of a common European culture as such, nor Huntington's thesis are at all helpful in understanding this role. The role of religion in national-EU relations is not dependent on difference from or similarity with theological traditions predominating in the European Union: doctrine and theology, and the prevalence of a particular faith are relevant only in their social and institutional context. Rather, it is to the *place* of religion in state and society that we should turn our attention⁴. The place of religion in state and society determines certain interests on the part of the 'church' and on the part of the 'state'. And membership (or potential membership) in the EU has a particular and important effect on the institutional interests of the 'church' vis-à-vis the 'state', and vice versa. Thus, it is in the domain of institutional interests that we mainly find religion influencing national-EU relations.

The elaboration of this argument requires an examination of three dimensions.

First, the relative relationships between religion and national identity in the cases of

⁴ Bryan Wilson speaks of the place of religion in state and society in terms of 'the significance religion has for the operation and organisation of the social system'. See A. Davidson, *Secularism and revivalism in Turkey*, p.92.

Greece and Turkey: the differences between these relationships in Greece and Turkey yield vast differences in how religion influences national-EU relations. On the basis of these two cases, I argue that religion is important in national-EU relations not because of theology or doctrine in themselves; rather, the crucial nexus is the relative ways religious tradition feeds into national identity--either positively or negatively or, as in the case of Turkey, in a bifurcated manner.

The relationship between religion and national identity largely underlies the relationship between 'church' and 'state' which develops in a particular country context⁵. Church-state relations form a second dimension which I examine in this thesis. As will become clear with reference to these two cases, it is not so much the particular constitutional provisions for church-state relations that affect national-EU relations, but the way the institutions of 'church' and 'state' relate to one another *in practice*⁶. As mentioned above, each of these institutions has particular interests concerning the place of religion in state and society. Their active defence of these interests entails manifest problems in national-EU relations.

⁵ 'Church' and 'state' are placed in inverted commas because whilst in the case of Greece I refer to an institutional structure called the Church, there is not such a comparable institution in Turkey. Rather, I use the term 'church' with reference to Turkey to indicate the diffuse force of Islam, which includes the *ulema*, (a community of scholarly 'men of religion' who are generally more informed on the precepts of Islam than the rest of believers), and a number of religious sects and brotherhoods. (For more on distinctions between 'church' and religion in Turkey, see Serif Mardin, 'Laïcité en Turquie et en France: propositions pour une meilleure compréhension', pp.291-295). My use of the term 'state' in the case of Greece is also relatively straightforward, whereas in the case of Turkey it indicates a state structure which also includes the military, due to its significant influence on state matters. Finally, where 'church' is written with a capital 'C', this refers to a specific church (e.g., the 'Church' of Greece).

⁶ There is a broad variety of church-state traditions within the EU and the EU does not, so far at least, regulate these relations as such. The formal *type* of church-state relations tells us very little about the role of religion in national-EU relations. Greece's type is similar to those of England, Denmark, Sweden and Finland (i.e., close links of great consequence between state power of decision and the existence of the church), yet it has far more in common, in terms of the social relevance of religion, with Spain, Italy, or Ireland rather than with Denmark or England. Thus, an examination of church-state relations without reference to the intricacies of the relationship between religion and national identity is far too limited for my purposes. For, a *combined* approach offers insight into why problematic aspects of 'church'- 'state' relations (that is, aspects which negatively affect national-EU relations) persist in individual country cases.

Finally, the third dimension examined is how membership, or potential membership in the EU, affects the institutional interests of 'church' and 'state'. It is important here to introduce the framework through which the EU affects institutional interests. On the one hand, the EU is devoted to the safeguarding of the cultures of the member states and their national identity, and it shows special respect towards traditionally developed institutions of ecclesiastical law in member states. Accordingly, it does not directly involve itself in religious matters, nor does it prescribe a particular form of church-state relations. At the same time, though, the EU espouses the principle of neutrality in questions of religion and philosophy, claiming to show tolerance towards different religious and philosophies and to grant equal treatment to religious communities. In short, the EU itself espouses the principle of pluralism. By defending religious freedom, the EU creates freedom of action for the religiously motivated activity of religious communities. Religious communities within the EU are in principle subject to the Community legal requirements of freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, free distribution of services and the prohibition of discrimination. Meanwhile, according to the Treaty on the European Union, the EU respects fundamental rights as they are guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 9 of the ECHR protects the freedom of religion as a right of the individual and of communities. This article dictates that individuals, churches and religious communities have a privilege of complaint in their own right before the bodies of the ECHR. This right is designed to secure the free exercise of religion in the Community by adherents of particular faiths. The jurisdiction of the ECHR, as ascertained in its foundational Article 9, safeguards the right of the churches to unhindered organisation and carrying out of services, instruction

and the exercise of religious rites⁷. Clearly then, through its potential influence on the activities of religious communities in individual nations, and on state activities in relation to these, the European Union has a particularly important effect on the institutional interests of both 'church' and 'state'.

Applicability beyond the two cases

My examination in this thesis of the relationships between religion and national identity and 'church' and 'state', as well as the ways in which the EU affects the interests of the 'church' vis-à-vis the 'state', is specific to these two cases. Again, there is a great deal of complexity in how each of these factors is manifested in each case; I do not aim to present a full causal argument of how religion affects national-EU relations⁸. Instead, I draw attention to a number of correlations between the role of religion in national identity, on the one hand, and 'church'-'state' relations on the other, and I examine how these correlations significantly shape the role of religion in national-EU relations.

Furthermore, the complexity in these two cases is not conducive to a neat comparison. Accordingly, I treat each country as a distinct case and, on the basis of my

⁷ The information on the ECHR is drawn from G.Robbers, 'State and Church in the European Union'. The ECHR has also, to a great degree, acknowledged the right of self-determination of the religious communities. According to the practice of the European Court of Justice, the highest standard valid in a Member State must be used as basis in determining common constitutional traditions using evaluative comparative law. Insofar as fundamental rights and other legally protected third party rights are affected, the best possible combination of both legal positions must be accepted as a general principle of Community law. The principle of subsidiarity governs EU policy on religious matters and acts as a restriction on the action of Community law in matters of the law of religion in the Member States of the EU. TEC Article 3b provides that the Community, according the principle of subsidiarity, takes action only if and insofar as the goals of the particular measures cannot adequately be achieved at the level of the Member States and thus, because of their scale or their effects, may be better achieved at the Community level. See G.Robbers, 'State and Church in the European Union', p.330.

⁸ For instance, 'religious' attitudes to the EU are surely affected by other factors beyond institutional interests which arise from religion's place in state and society (e.g., economic factors). Space limitations do not allow a thorough examination of all related factors.

examination of each, perform a comparative analysis in my concluding chapter. The primary aim of this study is not to generalise conclusions across Europe on the basis of one case or the other. Rather, by offering a deeper understanding of each case, I seek to dispel essentialist assumptions about how particular faiths relate to the European Union.

However, I do believe that there are broader lessons to be learned from this study. The fact that one cannot generalise about religious activities and interests is one such lesson: it is important to understand, with respect to any nation, the particularities of religion-nation and 'church'-'state' relations, *and*, especially, the intersection between the two. Thus, it is with reference to such particularities that the broad theme of the role of religion in the European Union should be examined. Furthermore, one cannot generalise about religious attitudes to the European Union. It is not the case that the further from a 'core' of religious traditions within the EU, the more anti-European a religious group's adherents are. Also false is the assumption that the less 'modern' a religion, the more prone are its adherents to resist 'European secularisation'. I contend that, beyond these two cases, attitudes to Europe and to secularisation depend on the relative experiences of religious groups within their national contexts and the relative interests of religious groups which stem from these experiences. This argument deserves a preliminary introduction, with reference to each of my cases.

'Religious' attitudes to the European Union

Based on interview research with religious leaders and spokespersons in both countries, I argue that crucial to their respective contemporary attitudes to the EU are the

different perceptions of the European Union's potential influence on the place of religion in relation to the state. Both national religious traditions—Turkish Islam and Greek Orthodoxy—have a history of anti-Europeanism. An examination of religious publications of previous decades in each country reveals quite similar criticisms of the European integration project, and common reasons for resistance to participation therein. But the contemporary rhetoric about the EU of religious groups in each country is significantly changed. My aim is to identify the causes and the theoretical implications of such change⁹.

Turkish Islamists' change has been more drastic, from outright anti-Europeanism and resistance to Turkish membership in the EU to extreme pro-Europeanism¹⁰. Besides the factor of worsening national economic conditions and heightened attention--across all sectors in Turkey--to the economic benefits expected with EU membership, a major element of religious groups' changed perspectives on the EU is increased attention to rights to political and religious freedom for Turkish Islamists. Beyond the forced closure of a succession of religious-oriented political parties in Turkey, religious journalists, intellectuals and politicians have faced arbitrary convictions for 'inciting the public to religious hatred'¹¹, and civil servants and military personnel have lost their jobs through

⁹ As Casanova declares, 'the interesting sociological question is not whether religious and salvation needs remain universally constant across time and space...but rather the changing character of their cultural manifestations across societies and through history'. See Casanova, 'Religion, the new millennium and globalisation', p.11.

¹⁰ See chapter five for an explanation of my use of the term 'Islamist'. Also, there are significant nuances to the above-mentioned 'extreme pro-Europeanism' which should be noted: whilst all interviewees consulted for this study expressed support of Turkish membership in the EU, the pro-Europeanism of some was not without concern for possible negative social and religious implications. In these cases, the EU was presented as a somewhat lesser evil than the Turkish secularist state. Accordingly, the 'change' to which I refer above should be recognised as a multifaceted concept, as contemporary Islamist pro-Europeanism is, for some Islamists, a dramatic volte face on this matter, a transformation of outlook, and for others a moderate modification of perspective.

¹¹ Such convictions have been made under Turkish Penal Code Article 312.

purges of people accused of being 'reactionaries' (in reality, individuals with links to religious groups). For Turkish Islamists today then, the EU entails guarantees of relative religious freedom in general, and specifically the protection from banning of religious-oriented political parties, the protection of employment rights for Islamist civil servants, and enhanced freedom of speech. Furthermore, Turkish Islamists' contemporary rhetoric on the European Union includes praise of European and Anglo-Saxon models of secularism and *true* separation of church and state.

The direction from which the Orthodox Church of Greece approaches the EU is quite different¹². The Church has historically played a powerful role as preserver of national identity, and has enjoyed an especially strong position vis-à-vis the Greek state. Today, it finds challenges to both these facts in Greece's membership in the European Union. First, as member of this supra-national project, the Greek state is moving in the direction of *de*-nationalisation (or so many in the Church fear, at least)¹³. Second, in its efforts to conform to European norms, the government is in the process of revising its relations with the Church, particularly through limitations of the latter's privileges over and against other faiths represented in Greece. This process entails changing the content of the mandatory religious courses in public schools (which are currently catechetical in nature and focused on Orthodoxy); changing the strict legal provisions for the building of non-Orthodox places of worship (the approval of the local Orthodox bishop is currently sought by the relevant Ministry), as well as the strict provisions against proselytism

¹² It is critical here to emphasise that the Greek Orthodox Church is not a monolith. My focus here is mainly on the Church hierarchy, but even here there are significant divisions. Within recent years especially, certain hierarchs have openly criticised policies pursued by the current Archbishop.

¹³ Of course, the extent to which membership in the EU entails a degree of 'de-nationalisation' is controversial. The term is used here with reference to public discussions in Greece on how membership has changed the nature of Greek government in recent years in the direction of significantly less emphasis on purely national interests in its policymaking and in conformity with EU-related objectives.

(which have led to numerous arrests of non-Orthodox citizens¹⁴); and easing the process through which conscientious objectors are allowed alternative service (a concession which the Church has vehemently opposed). These developments have led to an ambiguous, often subtle and indirect criticism of the EU on the part of the Church. My interview research suggests that current attitudes to the EU fluctuate in accordance with whether the *EU* or the *Greek state* is perceived as responsible for changes to the status quo in the Church's place in the Greek state and society.

Asymmetries in the cases

There are some obvious asymmetries to these two cases. First, one is a member of the European Union, and the other an aspiring member. But within my focus on how membership or potential membership may affect 'church'-'state' relations, the asymmetries begin to fade, as the demands from the EU on both countries with regards to religion are quite similar today¹⁵. Furthermore, one might argue that the two countries are incomparable because they are at such different stages of modernisation¹⁶. This discrepancy, however, is a critical aspect of my broader argument, which is that

¹⁴ In fact, the 1993 'Kokkinakis v. Greece' case at the European Court of Human Rights was the first case on proselytism in an international tribunal (See N.Lerner, 'Proselytism, change of religion, and international human rights'). The number of arrests in Greece on the basis of proselytism is unclear. According to a report by the Greek Helsinki Monitor, 'Thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses are said to have been arrested and to have served long prison sentences for proselytism' (see 'Minority Rights in Greece'). The number of such cases are said to have decreased since the Kokkinakis case, and the 'Larissis v. Greece' case (which reached the ECHR in 1998); according to an OSCE Report, since December 2001 (when 14 Pentecostals were tried in Greece for proselytism but were acquitted), there has been no case where representatives of minority religions have been prosecuted (see 'Problems of Religious Freedom and Tolerance in Selected OSCE States'; see also 'Human Rights in Greece: a snapshot of the cradle of democracy').

¹⁵ The reforms demanded of Turkey before accession talks begin were not preconditions for Greek accession, but are being applied now (particularly as a result of several convictions against the Greek state by the European Court of Human Rights).

¹⁶ I refer here specifically to economic development and political institutionalisation.

preconceptions of religious groups based on relative degrees of modernisation are arbitrary: as indicated above, this is evident in the comparison between Greek and Turkish religious groups' attitudes with regards to modern conceptions of religious freedoms and human rights.

This fact heightens the importance of including a case like Turkey in a political-sociological study of religion. The case reminds us to be aware of the fact that, as Nikkie Keddie notes, there are significant differences between secularisation processes in western and non-western contexts¹⁷. Namely, in the latter secularisation was often lacking the intellectual or philosophical base existent in western societies but was very much state-driven, on the basis of political or economic interests¹⁸. Thus, by examining cases which are at different stages of modernisation, we are better able, in theoretical terms, to consider assumptions about the relationship between modernisation and secularisation.

There are also significant asymmetries in the way the two case studies are managed, due to the vast differences between the two cases. Accordingly, whereas in the case of Greece my focus is on the politicisation of the Orthodox Church of Greece, in Turkey it is on political Islam. This difference is due to the fact that these two 'institutions', though not strictly comparable, are those most relevant in terms of religion's effect on national-EU relations. It is important to note here that, when considering the 'Church' in Greece, I do not denote the Church as a body of Orthodox believers in Greece; I am focusing on the Church as an *institutional body*. But when

¹⁷ See Nikki R. Keddie, 'Secularism and the state: towards clarity and global comparison'.

¹⁸ Likewise, the inclusion of the Turkish case entails a significant contribution to studies of the relationship between religion and nationalism, since in this case religion feeds into national identity in a very ambiguous manner.

addressing political Islam in Turkey, I also indicate its representation of *Islamism* which, in Turkey, is a very diffuse force. Thus, in the chapters devoted to the Turkish case I make a special effort to indicate differences between strands of Islamism.

Clarification of scope

My thesis is based on an *internal* perspective to the case studies. The question of whether a nation's religious identity affects the *EU's* attitudes and policies towards individual nations is a large and important issue, but it lies beyond the scope of this thesis¹⁹. Explicit attention to the European Union level is mainly limited to the Union's demands regarding religious rights and freedoms which are, at least formally, standard for all (applicant and member) countries with which it has relations.

Furthermore, I do not examine the effect of the European Union or of Europe in general, on *national identity* as such, in each of these two cases. There is a great deal of literature devoted to the development of European identity in relation to the 'other', including the religious other. The same applies to definitions of Turkish national identity and Greek national identity in accordance with, and/or in opposition to, 'European identity' and the European 'other'. Furthermore, both cases have in common a history of fluctuation and tension between two conceptions of their national identity as either 'eastern' or 'western'; this too is a subject about which much has been written and with which I do not deal explicitly in this thesis. Nor can I analyse the foundations of national

¹⁹ For attention to the role of religion in shaping EU attitudes and policies, see Elizabeth Prodromou, 'Toward an understanding of Eastern Orthodoxy and democracy building in the post-Cold War Balkans', and 'Paradigms, power, and identity: Rediscovering Orthodoxy and regionalizing Europe'. Though these texts focus on Orthodoxy and, to a large extent, on the Greek case, many of the themes explored apply equally well to Islam in the case of Turkey.

identity in general (eg., culture, language, kinship, territory); rather, my study of national identity in each case is mainly limited to the relationship between *religion* and national identity.

Again, my argument is that it is in the domain of institutional interests, rather than in theology or doctrine, that we mainly find religion influencing national-EU relations. Thus, attention to religion as doctrine or theology is not critical to this thesis, and space limitations do not allow for such an examination. It is true that in historical events as the Great Schism and the Crusades, theological differences were important to political developments in the countries studied in this thesis. In contemporary terms, though, it is simply worthy of note here that Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy are 'total religions', indicating a 'way of life' and not only formal doctrine and practice. The fluctuating effects of this fact on 'religious' attitudes to the EU will become clear in my coverage of each case.

Finally, my study examines the subjects at hand through the attitudes and actions of *elites* (political, religious and social) in each case. Mass opinion and the role of the public at large are only dealt with to the extent that these can be seen to influence attitudes and actions of national elites (only minor attention is devoted to mass surveys, where applicable)²⁰. This focus on the elite level is in line with my argument that the role of religion in national-EU relations is not about religion in and of itself (and not about the belief systems of the masses) but about interaction between institutions and their respective interests.

²⁰ For a study of the role of religion in mass attitudes to the European Union, see B.Nelsen, J.Guth and C.Fraser 'Does religion matter?'. For a general study of national identity as a factor in mass attitudes to the EU, see S.Carey, 'Undivided loyalties: is national identity an obstacle to European integration?'.

Sources and methods

The empirical research which undergirds this thesis comprises a series of interviews with religious, political, and academic elites in each country²¹. The interview questions were designed to glean information on attitudes to the EU and perceptions of the role of religion in national-EU relations. In my selection of interviewees I tried to cover a broad range of perspectives (from relatively conservative to relatively liberal, in both political and religious terms). A general balance was struck between the number of 'secular-minded' and 'religion-minded' elites consulted for this study. This balance was sought for the purpose of determining the extent to which there are tensions and contradictions between secular and religious leaders' perspectives. Such tensions and contradictions did indeed arise through the research, and they form a basis for an understanding of how these tensions and contradictions underlie trends in 'church'-'state' relations which, in turn, affect national-EU relations.

Furthermore the interview method, which entailed considerable time spent in both Greece and Turkey, allowed a much more in-depth and first hand understanding of the internal situation in these two countries. My interviews were conducted at a time when there were intense debates on the issues presented in this thesis. Thus, by following the local press carefully and through conversation with local elites, I was able to witness the intensity of the debates—the intensity itself being an important dimension of my study.

²¹ In the case of Turkey, I also conducted extensive interview research with journalists, civil servants and businessmen. This imbalance was in part intentional, because of my knowledge of the Greek language and lack thereof in the case of Turkish: in order to secure my own thorough understanding of the Turkish case, I thought it constructive to conduct a wider interview survey there. However, a further reason for the imbalance is addressed below. See Appendix for further information on the interview method as applied to my study.

Of course, there are significant limitations to the interview method. Mainly, the researcher is dependent on individuals' willingness to speak with him or her, and the researcher hears only what the interviewee wishes to tell him or her. There was a considerable discrepancy between the two cases in terms of the relative willingness of people to meet with me and to speak openly with me. Religious group representatives in Turkey were much less concerned with confidentiality than were their Greek counterparts, who were in general more guarded in their responses²².

However, I find the interview method especially valuable in the sense that, as expressed by Andrew Davidson, '[it is] imperative to reflect on and communicate with those whose lives we seek to make authoritative claims about'; through the interview method, we are exposed to 'the self-understandings of those whose political lives we seek to explain'²³. And through attention to the rhetoric used by a broad range of interviewees, the researcher is better able to identify elements of coherence and inconsistency in the perspectives within and between particular target groups. The interview method also offers a propitious basis upon which to study institutions: it is 'impossible to identify an institution except in terms of beliefs of those engaged in its practices'²⁴. Accordingly, we must seek to understand institutions within the meanings they represent in a given context. Such an approach is critical to an understanding of both 'church' and 'state' in Greece and Turkey respectively.

²² One can only guess at the reasons for this discrepancy, but I believe it has to do with the fact that the specific issues I was examining in the Greek case were more recent and, accordingly, more awkward, than those I examined in the Turkish case.

²³ A. Davidson, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*, p.4.

²⁴ See Davidson, *ibid.*, p.77.

Mark Juergensmeyer too employs the interview method in his study of religious nationalism²⁵. My work is similar to his in spirit, as Juergensmeyer's intent is to address general assumptions westerners have (e.g., 'that something is seriously wrong with religion in the non-Western world'), and to present these alongside the perspectives of religious activists in various contexts (from whose viewpoint, according to Juergensmeyer, it is secular nationalism that has gone wrong, and not religion). But the questions guiding his research, and his geographical scope, are completely different from mine²⁶. Furthermore, Juergensmeyer essentially pits secular nationalism against religious nationalism; such a distinction is not helpful for the cases of Greece and Turkey. In the case of Turkey, Islamism and Turkish/Kemalist nationalism have often gone hand in hand, and Turkish Islamists share many of the fundamental principles of Turkish secular nationalism. Religious nationalism in Greece *usually* goes hand in hand with state/secular nationalism. The relevance of nationalism to the Greek case stems from the fact that the Church is able to *use* nationalism during periods of conflict with the state. But such conflict is sporadic, and is aimed at preservation of a certain status quo, rather than the replacement of the secular state. Also, perhaps due to the *breadth* of his geographical foci, Juergensmeyer's use of the interviews is somewhat lacking in historical depth. In general, I think my work complements that of Juergensmeyer, by covering cases outside his geographic scope, and cases which exhibit more complex relationships between secular and religious nationalism, *and* by offering thorough historical backgrounds for the issues which I address.

²⁵ M.Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*.

²⁶ Juergensmeyer studies the Middle East, South Asia and formerly socialist countries, and does not address Turkey or Greece specifically.

Beyond seeking insight into attitudes to the EU and perceptions of the role of religion in national-EU relations, my interviews were focused on particular issues in each case. In the case of Greece, my focal point was the church-state conflict which arose around the 'identity card issue', when the state decided to remove reference to religious identity from the national identity cards. In the case of Turkey, my focus was on Islamists' change to pro-Europeanism in the wake of the 'February 28th process' and what I have identified as its 'legacies'—i.e., 'state' measures through which Turkish Islamists were increasingly limited in their freedoms. Each 'case within a case' was chosen as a fruitful basis upon which to examine the complex role played by religion in national-EU relations.

As background information to the interview research, secondary sources were used to explain the relationship between religion and national identity, and between 'church' and 'state' in each case. In the case of Greece, the study is quite straightforward and divided into sections on 'religion and national identity' and 'church-state relations'. In the case of Turkey, the same relationships are studied, but through the more relevant prisms of 'Islam and Islamism' and 'secularism and laicism'.

Plan of thesis

The above considerations help to explain the plan of my study. In the chapter which follows, I place my argument within the context of theories of nationalism and the sociology of religion in order to examine the relationships between religion, state and national identity. I explain here how relationships between religion and national identity

underlie developments in the relationships between church and state. The latter relies heavily on a thorough exploration of the concepts of secularism and secularisation and how they variously apply to my chosen cases. On the basis of the above, I then examine forms of religious mobilisation in theoretical and empirical terms. Finally, I introduce the concept of an EU norm in church-state relations, thus introducing an examination of the extent to which *form* of church-state relations may be a factor in national-EU relations for each of my case studies.

Chapters three and four are devoted to the case of Greece. In the first I examine the historical development of the relationship between religion and national identity. Following this historical overview, church-state relations are studied through the prism of constitutional provisions relating to religion. I address here, in particular, aspects of church-state relations in Greece which represent problematic points in national-EU relations. Finally, I present a survey of expressions of anti-Europeanism within the Church and wider Greek Orthodox circles, including special attention to their manifestation in religious publications. Chapter five focuses on the 'identity card issue'. I examine here state and church perspectives on the issue, and close with a consideration of the implications of this issue for domestic politics, for church-state relations, and for national-EU relations.

Chapters five and six deal with the case of Turkey. In chapter five, I examine the historical development of Islam and Islamism in Turkey, with a special emphasis on the diversity of these in the Turkish context. A section on secularism and laicism explains the very specific meaning of these terms in the Turkish case. This section also explains fluctuations in secularist policies, and the erratic relationship between secularism and

Islamism in Turkey. The chapter closes with a consideration of Turkish Islamist anti-Europeanism, as presented in Islamist publications. Chapter six focuses on Turkish Islamists' 'change' to pro-European stances in the light of the 'February 28th process'. The interview research on this subject presents a powerful debate in Turkey over whether Islamists' 'change' can be considered sincere and over whether *Islamism* or the Turkish version of *secularism* represents the greater barrier to Turkey-EU relations.

It is mainly with reference to the vast differences between the two cases that I turn, in my concluding chapter, to a thorough examination of how the place of religion in state and society plays a significant role in each nation's relations with the European Union. This examination is conducted under the broad themes of religion and national identity, 'church'-'state' relations, and national-EU relations. I close with a consideration of future prospects with regards to the role of religion in Greek-EU relations, in Turkey-EU relations, and in the European Union itself.

CHAPTER TWO

Religion, state and national identity

As explained in the first chapter, this thesis examines the role of religion in national-EU relations in the cases of Greece and Turkey. The central argument made is that this role is contingent on the place of religion in state and society, and on the relative institutional interests of 'church' and 'state' with regard to this place. I take an internal perspective to these two cases, studying religious groups' attitudes to the EU; forms of religious mobilisation in each case; and how religious groups affect domestic politics in ways which, in turn, affect each nation's relations with the European Union. In this chapter I shall explain how each of these above dimensions is subject to two *interrelated* factors: the relationship between religion and national identity, and the relationship between 'church' and 'state'. An interdisciplinary approach to this subject is thus necessary, drawing on theories from within the study of nationalism and the sociology of religion. The former offers analyses of religion in relation to national identity and nationalism; and the latter offers analyses of secularism, secularisation and church-state relations.

The main terms used in this chapter are much-disputed in the respective fields of their study. It is thus important to set out working definitions for each at this stage, before revealing the specificities of their use in relation to my case studies. A basic definition of the 'nation', as proposed by Anthony Smith, is 'a named community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common

public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members'¹. However, there are often--within each named community--differing conceptions of 'the nation', with some myths held as more relevant for parts of the community, and other myths for other parts of the community. 'National identity' is also a debated concept, as there may be 'official' (i.e., state-promoted) conceptions of national identity which are different from 'popular' conceptions of national identity. I offer as a working definition of national identity the following: 'the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements'². By 'nationalism' I mean 'an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential "nation"'³. 'Secularism' too may be considered an ideology, one which denotes 'a negative evaluative attitude towards religion'⁴. 'Secularisation', on the other hand, denotes 'an aspect of processes of structural change in society'⁵. A number of texts within the sociology of religion have addressed the 'theory of secularisation', identifying a number of processes involved in the concept of 'secularisation'⁶. My concern is mainly with the process of *institutional*

¹ See Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, p.13.

² *Ibid*, p.18.

³ *Ibid*, p.9.

⁴ See Bryan Wilson, "'Secularisation": religion in the modern world', p.196.

⁵ *Ibid*, p.196.

⁶ Meredith McGuire provides a useful, though limited, introduction to the intellectual debate on 'secularism'. See M.McGuire, *Religion: The Social Context*, pp.285-9. As McGuire points out, we should distinguish between our use of the term at the 'macro-level', and at the individual level. I do not address secularisation at the *individual* level at all in this thesis, except where the subject was addressed by my interviewees.

differentiation—i.e., the separation of the religious and the secular spheres of activity⁷.

An understanding of both secularism and secularisation is critical to this thesis, as they entail ideologies and processes which variously shape the forms of ‘church’-‘state’ relations that develop in a given society. Finally, the term ‘religion’ requires special attention. A functional rather than substantive definition best serves the purposes of this thesis⁸. In other words, this study is not concerned with the *substance* of religion (what religion *is*), but with its function in the societies under examination. The function with which I am concerned is that of religion as a definer of group identity. Accordingly, my focus is on public, institutionalised and, where applicable, politicised religion, as opposed to private religion. Such a focus allows an examination of the social location of religion and changes therein⁹.

In this chapter I examine first the historical links between religion and national identity, and the changes to these links with the onset of liberalisation and secularisation. Special attention is given to the relationship between religion and nationalism. I then focus on ‘church’-‘state’ relations mainly through the prism of trends in secularism and secularisation as applicable to each case. The latter subject forms the basis upon which I examine forms of religious mobilisation in Greece and Turkey respectively. I close with an analysis of the extent to which religion-state relations in Greece and Turkey are compatible with European norms.

⁷ Or, in other words, a separation of ‘church’ and ‘state’. For an astute study of institutional differentiation, see James Beckford, *Religion and Advanced Industrial Society* (especially chapter five, on ‘Differentiation and its discontents’, p.108-128).

⁸ As McGuire explains, functional definitions of religion tend to be better for encompassing cross-cultural, trans-historical, and changing aspects of religion. See M.McGuire, *Religion: the Social Context*, p.12.

⁹ Adherents of both Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam claim that theirs is not only a religion but a ‘way of life’. Of course, I do not propose to understand religion according to the self-definitions of the societies under study. But it is important to emphasise that I am not studying religious belief, ritual, or experience, but *religious community/ies*. Thus, my focus is not on religion at the individual level but at the community level and, in particular, on religion as linked to the culture and identity of a given community of believers.

Religion and national identity

A linkage between religion and national identity is the product of a long historical development. According to René Rémond, there are three eras to the relationship between religion and nation: the era of holy nations, of modernity, and of liberalisation¹⁰. The era of holy nations is characterised by a close interdependence between religion and nation which reached a state of symbiosis. That development is attributed to the fact that, in Europe, the birth of a nation often coincided with the transition from paganism to Christianity: people simultaneously attained a consciousness of both religious and national identity¹¹. This era lasts from the early conversions to Christianity to a second phase of evangelisation of the continent around the year 1000 (i.e., the countries of northern, central and eastern Europe). The key feature of the second era—that of early modernity—is the division of territories along confessional lines. The partitioning of the continent into separate entities, from then on, had its counterpart in the religious domain. Characteristic of this era is the concomitant emergence of modern nations and national churches in the sixteenth century. According to Rémond, the almost perfect simultaneity between religion and nation, ‘hallowed by the principle *cuius regio, eius religio*, increased national feeling and turned religious adherence into the criterion and foundation of political society’¹². Thus, the religious reference became a popular means of affirming national singularity and a particular identity within the European ensemble¹³.

¹⁰ R. Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe*. See especially Chapter 7, ‘Religion and nation: two universal realities’, pp.107-123.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.109. Rémond’s reference to a sense of a specifically ‘national’ identity in this early period is, of course, debatable.

¹² *Ibid*, p.113-114.

¹³ *Ibid*, p.112.

This point about national singularity and particularity is also an important theme in Max Weber's writings on 'the nation'. Weber posits that the nation's significance is usually rooted in the superiority or irreplaceability of a particular group's culture¹⁴. For Weber as well as for Durkheim (and many sociologists after them), religion functions as a major source of solidarity of a given group by marking its specific identity and culture. Liah Greenfeld too argues that nationalism is the most common and salient form of particularism in the modern world: 'In a world divided into particular communities, national identity tends to be associated and confounded with a community's sense of uniqueness and the qualities contributing to it'¹⁵. According to Greenfeld, these social, political, cultural and ethnic qualities (including religion) thus become important elements in the formation of every specific nationalism. Likewise, Anthony Smith identifies religion as amongst the fundamental elements of the nation-building process. For Smith, religion is part of the 'designation, cultivation, and transmission of "authentic" elements of shared culture of the "people"'¹⁶. With regard to the sense of irreplaceability of the nation's culture, Smith explains that this often stems from 'a strong shared conviction of moral superiority, which can be traced back to the earlier cultivation of a myth of ethnic election by elites of pre-modern *ethnies*'. Such myths were generally religious in character in the past; it was in later periods that they translated into 'secularised expressions' of national superiority¹⁷.

This brings us to Rémond's third era of the relationship between religion and national identity: that of liberalisation. This was the period of European revolutions

¹⁴ M. Weber, 'The Nation', pp.21-25.

¹⁵ L. Greenfeld, 'Types of European nationalism', pp.166-7.

¹⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, p.89.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.98. Smith argues that even today, there is a religious content underlying the sense of superiority and exclusiveness of some nations.

which inaugurated a separation between religion and nation 'that would not be completed until much later, and in some instances is not complete even today'¹⁸. Confessional states began transforming themselves into religiously neutral states, and nation was often set in opposition to religion. Where previously associated in the minds of individuals, nation and religion became foes in the contest for peoples' loyalty.

But, as Rémond notes, entering into a new era does not mean an end to the relationships of previous epochs. Because the period of strong linkages between religion and national identity was long in duration, these linkages survived well after the causes of their appearance had vanished: 'the long gone circumstances of their formation continued to live on in people's memory, imagination and conscience'¹⁹. Or, as David Martin puts it: 'These relationships obtain in terms of the persistent "image" of a religion long after the actual events have taken place'²⁰. Finally, Anthony Smith makes a similar argument, in stating that the role of religion in the past continues to shape many present national profiles. Smith cites Ireland, Poland, Serbia and Greece as obvious examples in Europe, but he further suggests that even Scandinavians' 'cooler' response to the idea of a united Europe may be interpreted as a specifically Protestant suspicion of a Catholic-led project²¹.

My intention here is to understand how, in this era of liberalisation, the role of religion in the past continues to shape present Greek and Turkish national profiles. The influence of religion on these national profiles is quite different, and it is important that we understand the historical causes, and theoretical and empirical implications, of such

¹⁸ R.Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe*, p.119.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p.113.

²⁰ D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.7.

²¹ A.D.Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, p.166, footnote 21.

difference. To this end, I find Martin's perspective very useful for approaching these two cases²². Martin too sees religion as a particularly significant and powerful aspect of a given culture, but he emphatically rejects the assumption that religion constitutes '*the* active dynamic, causally prior element in society' [emphasis mine]²³. He describes a number of 'universal processes', but stresses that these processes are not 'universal' in the sense that they '*must happen*'. Rather, the processes tend to occur all things being equal; 'But things are not equal--ever--and it is central to [Martin's] argument that they are most conspicuously not equal with respect to the particular cultural...complex in which they operate'²⁴. Indeed, crucial to our understanding of the role of religion in Turkey and Greece is identification of the different cultural complexes in which religion operates.

For Martin, one of the main components of a given cultural complex is the relationship of religion to the growth of nationalism and cultural identity. As Adrian Hastings also notes, the more influential a religion was in the construction of nationhood, the more likely it is to influence every expression of nationalism²⁵. The relationship of religion to the growth of nationalism is quite different for the cases of Greece and Turkey. In the case of Greece and from the establishment of the modern Greek nation, religion has been a fundamental aspect of Greek national identity. This almost to the extent that, for the wider public at least, 'Greek' and 'Orthodox' are coterminous²⁶.

Religion thus has a very positive relation to the growth of nationalism and cultural

²² This is in spite of the fact that Martin's work (that cited here) is limited to Christianity. Martin justifies this with the explanation that secularisation occurred initially within Christian societies. Thus, his 'general theory' is based on his study of secularisation in the Christian context. The theory can, he notes, be applied with modifications to contexts beyond the Christian ambit.

²³ D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.1.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p.3.

²⁵ A.Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, p.187.

²⁶ See V.Makrides, 'The Orthodox Church and the post-war religious situation in Greece', p.226.

identity (see chapter three)²⁷. In the case of modern Turkey, the relationship between religion and nation identity is, at best, ambiguous. Mustafa Kemal's (Ataturk's) nation-building project was based on a more *civic* notion of national identity that tended to exclude religion. His reforms reflected the perception that religion was responsible for backwardness and was a major impediment to Turkey's westernisation and modernisation. But there is a great deal of debate over Mustafa Kemal's intentions, and the extent to which his policies were designed for separation of the religious and political domains, for control of the religious domain, or for a strict suppression of religion. It is clear that in the period just before and during the revolution, both Mustafa Kemal and his fellow revolutionaries relied heavily on Islam and on religious symbolism in order to unify and mobilise the peoples²⁸. Critical to an understanding of the Turkish case is a distinction between 'official' and 'popular' narratives of national identity, and between conceptions of national identity at the time of the establishment of the modern Republic, on the one hand, and those following decades of fluctuations in secularist policies, on the other²⁹: it is through attention to such distinctions that we can understand the ambiguity

²⁷ For more thorough attention on this subject, see also V.Georgiadou, 'Greek Orthodoxy and the politics of nationalism'; N.Prevelakis, 'The spirit of Greek nationalism: the Greek case in light of Greenfeld's conceptual framework'; M.Rinvoluceri, 'Religious nationalism and a broader view', in his *Anatomy of a Church*; N.Demertzis, 'La place de la religion dans la culture politique grecque'; A.Dutu, 'Traditional toleration and modern pluralism : the case of "Orthodox Europe"'; G.Mavrogordatos, 'Orthodoxy and nationalism in the Greek case'; and A.Koumandaraki, 'The evolution of Greek national identity'.

²⁸ For an especially thorough discussion of the debate over Ataturk's policies, see Andrew Davidson, *Secularism and revivalism in Turkey: a hermeneutic approach* (see in particular chapter four). On the blending of ideals of secular nationalism and Islamic symbols, see U.C.Sakallioglu, 'Parameters and strategies of Islam-state interaction in republican Turkey' (see esp. pp.231-236). For more general discussion on Turkish secularism, see: B.Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*; S.Ayata, 'Patronage, Party and the state: the politicization of Islam in Turkey'; A. Kadioglu, 'The paradox of Turkish nationalism and the construction of official identity'; and N.Gole, 'Laïcité, modernisme et Islamisme en Turquie'.

²⁹ According to Sami Zubaida, 'Kemalist secularism, with its history of controlling religion, continues to influence the formation of Turkish national identities. Yet, a relaxation of the secularist stances of the state, during Turgut Ozal's leadership in the 1980's, has led to the admission that Islam, too, is an essential component of Turkish national identity. S.Zubaida, 'Turkish Islam and national identity', p.10.

of the relationship between religion and national identity in the case of Turkey (see chapter five).

With reference to my above-cited definition of national identity as ‘the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations’³⁰, in the case of Greece, Orthodoxy and the Church and their surrounding myths, symbols and memories are continuously reproduced, both through the national education system and even, in many cases, by state leaders. In the case of Turkey, the corresponding symbols, memories and myths prevailing in the education system and reproduced through state rhetoric are those surrounding Kemalism and the army as a symbol of the state³¹.

In any case, this divergence between the two cases leads to a completely different applicability of Weber et al’s conception of religion as an element of national specificity. As a key aspect of Greek culture, religion is central to notions of Greek national specificity. And the Church in particular acts to reinforce such notions of the Greek nation as superior and irreplaceable *because* of the Greek Orthodox faith, traditions and ‘way of life’. In the case of Turkey, the nation’s superiority and irreplaceability—as promulgated by the secularist elite—is located in notions of Turkey as a modern, western, and secular nation within an Islamic, non-western region. This fact relegates Turkish Islamists to a position of inferiority within dominant conceptions of Turkish national identity³².

³⁰ See A.D.Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, p.18.

³¹ And as revealed through various general surveys conducted in Turkey, the army is *the* institution which generally receives highest votes of confidence by the Turkish population. See Ferhat Kentel, ‘L’Islam, carrefour des identités sociales et culturelles en Turquie: Les cas de Parti de la Prospérité’, p.218.

³² On this point, see Ayse Kadioglu, ‘The paradox of Turkish nationalism and the construction of Official Identity’.

David Martin argues that in the European context, the social power of religion is dependent on a positive relation to the national consciousness, 'particularly as this is highlighted in a myth of national origins'³³. If national myth and religion are contradictory, the social power of religion is restricted: 'in most countries of contemporary Europe, it is of enormous importance that the existence of the nation and its heroic folk memory is either rooted directly in religion, or positively related to it'³⁴. Martin contends that the relationship between religion and nationhood remains strong across Europe, but in some cases the relationship is more direct, and in others more implicit or dormant. Factors which determine a strong relationship include the following: a significant role played by the church in defending the nationality against foreign domination³⁵; the coincidence of the national struggle with the age of romantic nationalism; the dominated group's sharing of borders with another faith; and, finally, unions of faith and nation based on past glory³⁶. This theme is echoed by René Rémond, who posits that '[f]or a people who have been conquered, oppressed, subjected to foreign domination, especially if their faith is different from that of their oppressor, religion ensures the preservation of their personality and encourages awareness of their identity. The church becomes...the repository of the nation's soul'. From this point on, further events and circumstances conspire to render the church and its ministers guardians of the

³³ D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.101.

³⁴ *Ibid.* See p.104 for exceptions to this, such as the case of Yugoslavia.

³⁵ I would add to this, 'even if symbolic, or historically inaccurate': in the Greek case, the role of the Church in the national revolution against the Ottomans is highly overstated and, many historians argue, simply mythical. However, what is important is the *perception*, amongst the Greek population, of such a role played by the Church. This point is further developed in chapter three. Furthermore, Martin contends that in those societies in which the Church has stood in for the state under conditions of external domination or external threat, any pluralism is usually associated with extraneous ethnic intrusions. See p.55 of D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*. This point is especially pertinent to the Greek case, and bears relevance to the discussion in chapter four on how the Greek Orthodox Church's resistance to pluralizing measures forms a problematic point in Greek-EU relations.

³⁶ D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, pp.106-7.

national memory³⁷. Finally, Adrian Hastings too emphasises the conflation of religion and national identity which arises out of conflict with a 'religious other': 'Whenever a people feels threatened in its distinct existence by the advance of a power committed to another religion, the political conflict is likely to have superimposed upon it a sense of religious conflict...so that national identity becomes fused with religious identity'³⁸. In such cases especially, the clergy have played an important role in the affirmation of nationhood, not least because they were often the only literate group in a particular society in whose hands education was entrusted³⁹.

Here too, then, we find vast distinctions between the Greek and Turkish cases. The explanations of Martin, Rémond and Hastings apply well to the modern Greek situation. In Greece, though historically inaccurate, the mere *existence* of the Greek state was widely attributed to the Church because of its role in preserving Greek national identity during the four centuries of Ottoman rule. Particularly the fact that the Ottomans' *millet* system allowed some 'national' education to continue within the religiously-defined 'nations', meant that the Church was *the* institution accredited with maintaining a continuity in Greek national identity⁴⁰. Religion, since then, has been a fundamental aspect of prevailing conceptions of national identity. The role of religion in the establishment of the modern Turkish nation was nearly the opposite as, again, Islam was characterised by the new elites as a backward force responsible, in part, for the

³⁷ R.Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe*, pp.115-116.

³⁸ A.Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, p.190.

³⁹ *Ibid*, pp.192-3.

⁴⁰ As Martin notes, 'where religion is imposed from above by a conqueror it is thereby weakened; whereas when it is the focus of resistance to a conqueror it is thereby strengthened (unless the conqueror disposes of a total monopoly over education)'. D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.9. This point is substantiated by Steve Bruce, who argues that 'in European countries where religion remains popular it does so as part of an inherited and ascribed social identity, deeply embedded in painful struggles for ethnic and national autonomy'. See S.Bruce, 'The supply-side model of religion: the Nordic and Baltic states', p.44.

Ottoman Empire's downfall. Although religion was utilised in the Young Turks' revolution which established the Turkish Republic (a revolution which was described, at the time, in terms of *jihad*), Ataturk's strict and (at least outwardly) *anti-religious* reforms which soon followed dispelled any possible correlations between religion and the new nation's glory. Based on this comparison then, and with reference to Martin, Rémond and Hastings, we might judge Greece as—historically at least—quite consistent with European developments, and Turkey as inconsistent. Can we, on the basis of this similarity with or difference to European historical trends, draw any conclusions about a country's place and performance in the European Union? A response to this question requires first an analysis of how the relationship between religion and national identity manifests itself in forms of nationalism, and second of how this relationship manifests itself in forms of 'church'-'state' relations.

Varieties of nationalism

Theorists of nationalism describe a variety of nationalisms: eastern versus western nationalism⁴¹, civic versus ethnic, cultural versus political, religious versus secular. In general terms, western, civic, political, and secular nationalism tend to be aligned against their counterparts of eastern, ethnic, cultural, and religious. The intent here is to ascertain whether any theoretical conclusions may be reached regarding the influence that a particular form of nationalism (in terms of its relationship to religion) may have on national-EU relations. Introducing these distinctions is instructive for our Greek and

⁴¹ Or, better yet, western and non-western. See A.D.Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, p.113.

Turkish cases because, superficially at least, the dominant forms of nationalism in each case fall on opposite sides of the abovementioned dimensions.

In both Greece and Turkey, in contemporary terms at least the picture is much more complex, thus pointing to problems in such strict distinctions and compartmentalisations of 'types' of nationalism. These distinctions certainly present problems for a contextualisation of Turkish nationalism. Though Turkey is not treated as 'western' in relevant texts on nationalism, its prevalent form of elite nationalism best fits descriptions of western, civic, secular and political nationalism. In his seminal work on Turkish nationalism, David Kushner indicates that:

The relatively quick transformation of the Turks from imperial rulers, loyal primarily to Islam and to the Ottoman dynasty and state, into ardent nationalists has puzzled even the Turks themselves...It is one of the peculiarities of Turkish history that the people who were the first Muslims in our century to proclaim their adherence to the idea of the secular national state had in the past gone furthest in submerging their identity into the wider Islamic one...⁴²

This peculiarity is less puzzling when one considers Turkish nationalism as a multifaceted and changing conception. Kushner describes, on the one hand, the early effects of 19th c European nationalism on some members of Ottoman elite wishing to base the state on a new, non-Islamic, kind of national identity which could unite all ethnic and religious groups within the Empire (i.e., a territorial unity) and, on the other, the prevalence, amongst most Turks, of a more Eastern kind of nationalism influenced by romanticism and emphasising ethnicity and culture⁴³. Furthermore, texts on Islamic nationalism do not apply well to the case of Turkish Islamists, because of Turkey's particular history of secularism and the relative concerns of Islamists specific to this

⁴² David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908*, preface and p.1.

⁴³ See D.Kushner on 'The Sources of Turkism', *ibid*, p.7.

country. As Sami Zubaida notes, in spite of the strength of Kemalist secularism in contemporary conceptions of Turkish nationalism, 'Turkish Islam is tied up with Turkish nationalism in a unique fashion...probably a majority of Turks do not perceive a contradiction between Islam and their attachment to Kemalist symbols, viewing both as integral to national identity'⁴⁴. Crucial to this seeming paradox is the specific historical development, in Turkey, of a nationalism which at times embraced, and at times rejected religion.

As for Greek nationalism, Elie Kedourie, Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson capture well the complexity of this case. Greek nationalism, as Smith and Hutchinson describe, was 'at once a "rational" and westernising movement of merchants and intelligentsia for a revived Hellas along the lines of ancient Athens, and a yearning for an ethno-religious revival of the Orthodox Byzantine empire in Constantinople among the clergy and peasant communities'⁴⁵. Opposing conceptions of the Greek nation—eastern and western, Byzantine and Hellenic—did indeed exist in competition; but there were also simultaneous efforts, in both secular and religious circles, to reconcile the two dichotomous views. According to Kedourie, 'there is little doubt that the appeal of modern...Greek nationalism derives the greater part of its strength from the existence of ancient communal and religious ties which have nothing to do with nationalist theory, and which may even be opposed to it'. And, indeed, though Greece too has witnessed an 'oscillation' between Hellenistic and Byzantine/Orthodox nationalisms, Kedourie notes that the tension between the two has largely disappeared: 'today, with the spread of

⁴⁴ Sami Zubaida, 'Turkish Islam and national identity', p.10.

⁴⁵ J.Hutchinson and A.D.Smith, 'Introduction' (in eds. J.Hutchinson and A.D.Smith, *Nationalism*), p.7.

nationalist doctrine, this opposition between Hellenism and Orthodoxy is itself rejected.

Orthodoxy and Hellenism are thought to go together and imply one another...⁴⁶.

To a certain extent, the differences in types of nationalism (and their relation, or not, to religion) can be explained with reference to Liah Greenfeld's discussion of different circumstances under which nationalism infiltrated national contexts⁴⁷. Greenfeld emphasises that when nationalism started to spread in the 18th century⁴⁸, the emergence of new national ideas was not 'new' at all, but entailed the importation of an already existing idea⁴⁹. She explains that the adoption of nationalism must have been somehow in the interest of the groups which imported it, thus reflecting 'a dissatisfaction of these groups with the identity they had previously'⁵⁰. Accordingly, nationalists in different contexts adapted ideas of national identity according to the changes they wished to achieve. However, the importation of a foreign idea suggests a sense of inferiority on the part of the 'importer', who is portrayed as an imitator of things foreign. This often leads to *ressentiment*, a term which refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred. Partha Chatterjee describes a similar phenomenon in his understanding of eastern nationalism as an attempt to combine both

⁴⁶ Elie Kedourie, 'Nationalism and self-determination', pp.51-2.

⁴⁷ See Liah Greenfeld, 'Types of European nationalism', pp. 165-171. Adrian Hastings takes this argument perhaps 'further', by arguing that the nation and nationalism are characteristically 'Christian things which, in so far as they have appeared elsewhere, have done so within a process of westernisation and of imitation of the Christian world, even if it was imitated as western rather than Christian'. (A.Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, p.186). The question of whether the nation and nationalism are essentially *Christian* in origin lies beyond the scope of this thesis. In my view, most important in the adaptation of conceptions of the nation and of nationalism (in Hastings' words, 'as they have appeared elsewhere'), is how the adaptation took place in the context of *westernisation* specifically.

⁴⁸ It should be noted that Greenfeld assumes nationalism was 'spreading' from England, the first nation and thus nationalism's original source.

⁴⁹ We see, then, a recurrent theme of adaptation, such as that described by Martin with reference to secularism born in Christian Europe but adapted with modifications outside that context. See Greenfeld, 'Types of European nationalism', p.168.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p.169.

French and German models of nationalism: '[this attempt] is both imitative and hostile to the model it imitates. It is imitative in that it accepts the value of the standards set by the alien culture. But it also involves a rejection...of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished marks of identity'⁵¹.

These concepts apply, to a certain extent, to both Greece and Turkey. In both cases, the modern nations were established as part of a westernisation project. According to Ayse Kadioglu, official Turkish nationalism represents a paradox by embracing a kind of eastern nationalism as described by Chatterjee, which attempts 'to transform the nation culturally while at the same time retaining its distinctiveness'⁵². This, Kadioglu claims, is a leitmotiv in Turkish nationalism as it evolved alongside Turkish modernisation and westernisation. Expressions of resentment over imitation of the West were especially prevalent within religious circles in Turkey, where the new nationalism entailed stark contrasts to indigenous and traditional religious traits. Thus, efforts towards what Greenfeld describes as the 'transvaluation of values' were more imperative in the Turkish case, in order to win popular support. Ataturk himself engaged in such efforts by asserting that many of the 'importations' from the West actually entailed a return to indigenous aspects of Turkish (particularly pre-Islamic) culture⁵³. For Greece, the westernisation project during the establishment of the modern Greek state constituted a break from the Ottoman Empire, a heightened emphasis on its ancient Hellenic culture and a concurrent suppression of its eastern, Byzantine (Orthodox) cultural elements. However, it did not entail a clear break from the link between religion and national

⁵¹ P.Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse*, p.2.

⁵² A.Kadioglu, 'The paradox of Turkish nationalism and the construction of official identity', p.179.

⁵³ See M.Matossian, 'Ideologies of delayed development', for specific examples to do with the language and dress code reforms.

identity because, again, in popular Greek conceptions, independence from the Ottomans was largely attributed to the Church and its maintenance of Greek national identity under Ottoman rule. Thus even the establishment of the national church, which ultimately served the state's interests of subordinating the Church to the state, simultaneously functioned to enhance national unity⁵⁴.

Can we ascertain whether the relationship between religion and nationalism in either the Greek or Turkish case is more liberal, or more compatible with European norms? Here I think we should take into consideration Anthony Smith's discussion on civic versus ethnic nationalisms⁵⁵. As Smith notes, it is often assumed that ethnic nationalism—that which tends to bear religious elements—inevitably leads to exclusiveness and intolerance. Smith argues that this view fails to grasp the nature of civic nationalism: 'From the standpoint of affected minorities, this kind of nationalism is neither as tolerant nor as unbiased as its self-image suggests. In fact, it can be every bit as severe and uncompromising as ethnic nationalisms'⁵⁶. With reference to the example of how Jews and blacks were treated by French civic nationalism, Smith concludes that in both ethnic and civic nationalism (the one inclusive and the other exclusive of religion), minority cultures and heritages may be depreciated and suppressed. 'Hence', he states, 'not only ethnic but also civic nationalisms may demand the eradication of minority cultures and communities qua communities, on the common assumption, shared by Marxists and liberals, not just of equality through uniformity, but that "high cultures" and "great nations" are necessarily of greater value than "low" cultures and small nations or

⁵⁴ See A.Hastings for a discussion on the development of autocephalous state churches within the Orthodox tradition. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, p.196.

⁵⁵ A.D.Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, pp.100-1.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.101.

*ethnies*⁵⁷. In other words, it is important that one consider the *consequences* of a particular type of nationalism, rather than drawing judgements based on the *type* of nationalism.

As to whether the one or the other form of nationalism is more compatible with European norms, Philip Schlesinger accurately observes that that it is often wrongly assumed that the formation of a supranational European identity entails a rejection of nationalisms based on myths and grand narratives: 'the supranationalising European Community [is] heavily dependent upon convincing us that tales of solidarity within bounded communities are both plausible and desirable'⁵⁸. Although the new reality of global interdependence has ushered in a certain abandonment of 'the old model of national sovereignty', this has not meant—even within the project of European integration—that we do not see the search for new identities based on ethnic, regional, religious or extreme nationalist perspectives. Thus, the project for developing a sense of 'European identity' is largely geared toward the reconciliation, rather than rejection, of regional, religious and ethnic identities within a grand narrative of European identity.

How are we to judge the Greek and Turkish cases in light of this reality? The two countries represent very different patterns of 'reconciliation' and 'rejection' of religious identities. It is important here to address the question of whether such differences should be viewed in terms of a 'time lag'. René Rémond argues that the development of the relationship between religion and national identity, and the disassociation brought about by the process of secularisation, 'spanned a period that varied from one country to

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.101.

⁵⁸ P.Schlesinger, 'Europeanness: a new cultural battlefield?', p.318.

another...even today it is not complete everywhere'⁵⁹. He mentions 'time lags' in such developments, but he warns that we must be cautious in speaking about 'delays', as if there were some ideological *a priori* to the path of historical development, leading to expectations that all countries will eventually arrive at the same place. Yet many scholars, *Rémond included*, maintain that there is a 'general pattern' in religion-nation and church-state relations across Europe and, today, within the European Union⁶⁰.

It is to the subject of 'church'-'state' relations that I now turn. My intent is to understand where Greece and Turkey stand in relation to European trends in religion-state relations. Such an understanding requires an evaluation of Greek and Turkish 'church'-'state' traditions and relative forms of secularism and secularisation, as well as attention to forms of religious mobilisation in each case. Upon this basis, I shall then revisit the concepts of 'time lags' and 'delays' with reference to what many theorists controversially describe as 'evolutionary' European norms.

'Church'-'state' relations

Secularisation is a concept born in Europe: 'Europe was, after all, the site of the original battle between Church and Enlightenment'⁶¹. Furthermore, secularisation initially occurred within the ambit of Christian societies⁶². Hence our understanding of it,

⁵⁹ R.Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe*, p.127.

⁶⁰ Relevant works are discussed below. Rémond, furthermore, cites Greece as *the* major exception within the European Union: 'Of the current fifteen members of the European Union, Greece is the only one that still mentions religion on its citizens' identity card. This practice has already earned it reprimands and formal notices from Brussels; a proof that nowadays in Western Europe there is complete disassociation between religion and people's individual status, and it is acknowledged as a modern imperative of democracy'. See Rémond, *ibid*, p.138.

⁶¹ D.Martin, 'The secularization issue: prospect and retrospect', p.468.

⁶² D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.2.

as noted by David Martin, requires attention to its development within the European context: a general theory can be developed with reference to societies influenced primarily by Christianity, and can then be qualified for cases outside its scope⁶³.

The battle between the Church and Enlightenment, Martin explains, either entailed the nationalisation of the Church by an enlightened aristocracy, or its repression by an enlightened republic. Thus, religion was either made a buttress of power, or became a buttress of reaction. Most importantly, though, Martin emphasises that 'these two processes of incorporation or repression...constitute specific historical conditions, not ineluctable components built into the social machinery of change'⁶⁴. Applying Martin's concepts to Greece and Turkey we see that, in *general* terms, the first case—incorporation as a buttress for power—applies to Greece, and the second, that of repression leading to reaction, to Turkey. But neither of these circumstances was constant, stable, or linear, as religion-state relations have fluctuated in each case. Thus, as Martin argues, it is crucial that we understand the specific historical conditions underlying such fluctuations, if we are to understand the contemporary role of religion in these countries.

Clearly secularism and secularisation are very much about *power*, and the struggle for it between secular and religious institutions⁶⁵. There are various types of

⁶³ As explained by Martin, such a theorising process is reasonable, considering the fact that secularisation itself was *exported*, with modifications, to other societies. Again, as noted earlier in this chapter (footnote 47), Adrian Hastings views the nation and nationalism as not only originating in Christian societies but as *essentially 'Christian things'*. A.Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, p.186.

⁶⁴ D.Martin, 'The secularization issue: prospect and retrospect', pp.468-9.

⁶⁵ As Peter Berger notes, 'Minimally, one must note that counter-secularisation is at least as important a phenomenon in the contemporary world as secularisation...clearly, one of the most important topics for a sociology of contemporary religion is precisely this interplay of secularising and counter-secularising forces'. P.Berger, 'Secularism in retreat', p.42.

relationships of power⁶⁶. *First*, a skewed balance set within agreed limits of tolerable fluctuation (or 'diversity', in Martin's terminology). This type usually stems from a past in which each side (church and state) had to recognise that total victory was impossible and thus settled for limited bounds of tolerance. The balance, developed over such a long period of time, has become so institutionalised 'as to seem normatively necessary'. *Second*, a confrontation of irreconcilables which attempt to skew the balance heavily in one way or the other. This type of power relations is shaped by a past in which 'rival forces have had a taste of total authority and desire to taste it again'. And *third*, there are cases of overwhelming monopolies of power, following the victory of either one or the other side. The first case, that of a balance within agreed limits of tolerable diversity, is that which has generally prevailed in Europe⁶⁷. And we can certainly place Greece in this category. The second and third cases apply to various stages in Turkish history. With regard to the third category, monopolies of power⁶⁸, Martin notes that differentiation was imposed so rapidly that religion was thrown into that sector of social forces that would press for freedom, *or* its extensive cultural power was redeployed as a means to national unity in the face of external pressure. Accordingly either liberalism, *or* nationalism, became an ally of religion⁶⁹. In contemporary Turkey we find Islam thrown into that sector pressing for freedom and psychic space, and thus allied with liberalism⁷⁰.

⁶⁶ As David Martin notes, the relationship of religion to power arises because it is not only the bearer of identities but a source of legitimacy and of philosophies supporting legitimacy. *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.108.

⁶⁷ D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, pp.108-109.

⁶⁸ Examples of which Martin finds only in Catholicism and Marxism.

⁶⁹ D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.238.

⁷⁰ Or, perhaps one should say 'unofficial Islam', indicating expressions of religion outside the 'official', state-sanctioned religion linked to the *Diyanet* (Directorate of Religious Affairs). See chapters five and six. Again, it was not always the case, historically, that religion was allied with liberalism against the state, and at several points in Turkish history Islam was allied with nationalistic causes. The periods of the Young Turks' revolution (1908-9) and of the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' (1960's-1980's) are two cases in point.

In order to understand properly the nuances in these power relations, I will now consider more specifically the terms 'secularisation' and 'secularism' as they apply to Greece and Turkey. In Greece, we are dealing mainly with the term 'secularisation'. The founders of the modern Greek state instigated secularisation as institutional differentiation, by transferring to the state legal and administrative powers which the Church had enjoyed under Ottoman rule. Through the establishment of the Autocephalous Church of Greece, the Church was subjugated to the state, but it continued to receive significant support from the state and privileges vis-à-vis other faiths. Thus the 'battle' to which Martin refers took place, and continues to take place, in the domain of institutional differentiation, as church and state struggle over the boundaries of power. Quite often though, religion has been used by the state as a buttress for its power. In general, the Church was not confronted with explicit anti-clericalism or direct rejection of its values, but by the state's efforts towards bureaucratic efficiency asserted in certain areas (e.g., in the sphere of education)⁷¹. Furthermore, in cases like that of the Church of Greece, where the Church has played the role of guardian of the culture and—at times—a substitute state, additional roles naturally accumulate and tend to continue even after the transition to independence. This accretion of roles simply fortifies the union between church and state and, particularly, the Church's bargaining position in relation to the state⁷². The state is required to reach compromises far more

⁷¹ D.Martin, *The Dilemmas of Contemporary Religion*, pp.45-6.

⁷² This point (made by D.Martin in *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.55) can be related to that made by John Madeley on the strength of various Orthodox churches: 'where religion finds other work to do beyond "its own" it often thrives mightily even where secularism would be expected to prevail'. See J.Madeley, 'Towards an inclusive typology of church-state relations in Europe, north and south, east and west: a Rokkanian approach', p.12. Madeley cites here the work of J.Haynes, *Religion in Global Politics*, 1997.



favourable to the Church than is the case in other countries⁷³. Furthermore, as David Martin points out, the Church experiences continued after-effects of standing against rather than standing for authority: it continually struggles to handle the state's move to diminish the Church's powers⁷⁴.

In Turkey, we are dealing mainly with the term 'secularism'. 'Secularism' as a political concept which connotes a political sphere that is separated from and rejects the influence of religion does *not* strictly apply to the Turkish case. The form of secularism launched by Mustafa Kemal is more precisely called *laicism*⁷⁵: religious institutions were placed under the direct control of the state (rather than being separated from the state), with a view to limiting religion's political, legal *and* cultural hold over Turkish society. Yet such complete control was never maintained. Rather, as Martin notes, 'the country oscillates between two versions of the sacred, one provided by Islam, the other by Kemal Ataturk'⁷⁶. And this oscillation is reflected in fluctuations in Turkish secularist policies (see chapter five). But it is the 'Kemalist version of the sacred' which has prevailed within Turkish power structures, and in this context all expressions of Islam *beyond* that promoted by the state have had to compromise to a great extent and conform to the status quo⁷⁷.

⁷³ For an examination of Greek church-state relations as compared to other European countries, see G.Mavrogordatos, 'Orthodoxy and nationalism in the Greek case', and P.Foundedakis, 'Religion and state in Europe: secularisation and functional differentiation'.

⁷⁴ D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.55.

⁷⁵ See chapter five for a fuller explanation of the distinction between secularism and laicism. For purposes of convenience, the term 'secularism' is often used throughout this text with reference to the Turkish case, but the reader should bear in mind that the term has a very particular meaning as applied to Turkey.

⁷⁶ D.Martin 'The secularization issue: prospect and retrospect', p.472. Furthermore, Martin notes, 'the intelligensias in the van of movements against colonialism were susceptible to strong definitions of their native traditions which stressed Islamic purity and severity. They intended to modernise in their own way, and the only way sufficiently rooted in long-term history was Islamic'.

⁷⁷ According to Joseph Szyliowicz, when Kemal Ataturk entered the realm of Turkish politics, he faced 'two kinds of Islam': the Islam of the state and a 'parallel' or unofficial Islam consisting of religious orders, convents and sects; 'Both of these, in [Ataturk's] view, were reactionary forces but he followed different

The religious response

I examined above how 'church'-'state' relations developed in Greece and Turkey variously in relation to secularism and secularisation. I now turn to a study of religious groups' attitudes and interests as they have arisen in relation to the above. A recurring theme in my coverage of each case is the particular relationship between religion and national identity in each country, as this relationship largely affects the types of religious mobilisation chosen by a given religious group. My scope is mainly limited to the activities of the Orthodox Church of Greece, for the Greek case, and on 'Islamist' political parties, in the case of Turkey (although in the latter case I do give considerable attention to various religious groups as well). This focus, as explained in the Introduction, is due to the fact that these are the 'institutions' whose interests and activities are most relevant to national-EU relations. I also explained in the introduction that my emphasis is on the leadership of these institutions, rather than on mass attitudes and perceptions. The latter are only dealt with to the extent that these can be seen to influence attitudes and actions of national elites. This emphasis is in line with my argument that the role of religion in national-EU relations is not about religion in and of itself (and not about the belief systems of the masses) but about interaction between institutions and their respective interests.

Peter Berger argues that there exists an international, secular elite subculture of people with western-type education: 'a purely secular view of reality has its principal social location in an elite culture that is resented by large numbers of people who are not

policies towards each. He moved quickly to eliminate the latter whereas he adopted a policy in regard to the former that suggested that he wished to create a new, modern, official Islam'. J.Szyliowicz, 'Religion, Politics and Democracy in Turkey', p.194.

part of it but who feel its influence'. Accordingly, religious upsurges have a strongly populist character: 'over and beyond the purely religious motives, these are movements of protest and resistance against a secular elite'⁷⁸. David Martin describes a similar phenomenon, but in terms of tension between centre and periphery -- a universalistic, cosmopolitan, liberal centre, and a particularistic, nationalistic periphery centred on ethnicity and language⁷⁹.

In both cases of Greece and Turkey there is, indeed, a secular elite subculture which exists at the centre, and against which religious groups—at the periphery of power—protest. However, we cannot generalise about a distinction between a universalistic, cosmopolitan and liberal centre, and a particularistic and nationalistic periphery. In Turkey, the centre is often *illiberal* in its secularist policies, and religious groups at the periphery are not considered nationalistic in the dominant sense of the term in Turkey: there is in Turkey an 'official nationalism' which is essentially the domain of the secular, Kemalist elite centre. And in both the Greek and Turkish cases there is a very active *religious elite* with which the secular state elite must contend.

This brings us to Jose Casanova's argument that the public character of any religion is primarily determined by the particular structural location of that religion between state and society⁸⁰. This certainly applies to the cases of Greece and Turkey. But Casanova's scope is limited to Western Christendom and to the two circumstances he finds there: religions which seek to remain compulsory (or, established) institutions, or those which--like the Catholic Church after Vatican II--have conformed to

⁷⁸ P.Berger, 'Secularism in retreat', pp.45-6.

⁷⁹ D.Martin, *The Dilemmas of Contemporary Religion*, p.94.

⁸⁰ J.Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, p.9, and p.70. Please see below for Casanova's explanation of factors which have changed this phenomenon within Western Christian contexts.

disestablishment from the state and operate as part of a pluralistic civil society. The circumstances are quite different for public religion in both Turkey and Greece. It is thus necessary to examine the different ways that the position of religion between state and society affects the public character of religion in these two cases.

Much as I disagree with the conclusions of Stark and Iannaccone's 'supply-side interpretation of secularisation' (which posits that the secularisation or religiosity of a society hinges on the degree of competition in the religious market), some of its starting points are pertinent to the case of Greece⁸¹. Stark and Iannaccone contend that to the degree that a religious 'firm' (i.e., religious group)⁸² achieves a monopoly, it will seek to exert its influence over other institutions and the society will thus be sacralised; that is, 'the primary aspects of life, from family to politics, will be suffused with religious symbols, rhetoric, and ritual'. The examples of sacralisation provided by these scholars illustrate well the public place of Orthodoxy in Greece: they describe annual ceremonies when priests bless the fishing fleet, classrooms dominated by religious symbols, and religious ceremonies as intrinsic to the public, political spheres of life. Religious leaders are often central figures in political occasions; and politicians often conspicuously attend religious ceremonies. Accordingly, 'sacralisation of the political sphere is the *quid pro quo* by which a particular religious firm enlists the coercive powers of the state against competing firms'⁸³.

⁸¹ See R.Stark and L.N.Iannaccone, 'A supply-side reinterpretation of the "secularization" of Europe'. See also Steve Bruce's astute critique of Stark and Iannaccone's theory: S.Bruce, 'The supply-side model of religion: the Nordic and Baltic states'.

⁸² In line with their thesis in general, which interprets secularisation as a matter of 'supply and demand', Stark and Iannaccone employ terminology from the field of economics and refer to religious groups as 'firms'. See also Pierre Bourdieu's *Raisons Pratiques*, for a discussion of the functions of churches in business terms.

⁸³ Stark and Iannaccone, 'A supply-side reinterpretation of the "secularization" of Europe', p.234. See also J.Madeley, 'Towards an inclusive typology of church-state relations in Europe', p.15. Here Madeley notes

But this *quid pro quo* is changing. The Greek state is currently under increasing pressure to provide enhanced religious rights to non-Orthodox citizens of Greece. The large number of convictions against the Greek state in the European Court of Human Rights has encouraged government efforts to alter the status quo in such domains as those mentioned above: education, freedoms of assembly and expression, and military service⁸⁴. Such changes are perceived by the Church as threats to its privileged status within the state and vis-à-vis other faiths in the country⁸⁵. The European Union is resented by the Church hierarchy inasmuch as it is perceived to be the reason behind any changes to the status quo; where evidence arises that the Greek state, rather than the EU, is the driving force behind such changes, complaints are directed to the state. Meanwhile, the Church struggles to maintain its privileged status through all the forms of religious mobilisation described by George Moyser: by acting as a pressure group, lobbying, making contact with the executive apparatus, taking its causes to court, making links with political parties, and organising mass protests⁸⁶.

The Church's main strength in its mobilisation efforts is the link between religion and national identity; it is on this basis that the Church manages to mobilise the Greek public to rally to its causes. This strength is what N.J.Demerath has termed 'cultural power': even where religion lacks access to the political instruments of 'structural power', it may have the capacity to use cultural resources to affect political outcomes.

that 'Insofar as the confessional monopoly in a particular territory is maintained by positive state support on the one hand and the repression of challenges on the other, established churches tend to become less vital as organisations. They no longer depended for their sustenance on mobilising support within civil society, looking instead to those in authority within the state to provide, pursuant to the bargain of mutual support between "Crown and Altar"'.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Between 1999 and 2003, there were 102 ECHR cases against the Greek state (See Council of Europe website for details).

⁸⁵ Again, as noted in chapter one, the Greek Orthodox Church is not a monolith; I refer here mainly to the Church hierarchy, but even here there are significant divisions.

⁸⁶ See G.Moyser, 'Politics and religion in the modern world: an overview', pp.6-8.

Symbols, ideologies, moral authority and cultural meanings can be employed to legitimate or delegitimate political outcomes or actors; to control whether issues become public or are kept out of the public eye; and to frame the terms with which issues are discussed when they are public. However, Demerath argues, religion *is* limited in the types of political outcomes it may yield:

First, religion is less apt to manifest 'positive power' than 'negative power', where the former involves the ability to initiate action and create change, and the latter entails blocking or vetoing an impending course. Second, religion is less likely to engage in 'primary power' than 'secondary power', where the former involves the capacity to seize and carry through a policy-making transaction as the prime mover, whereas the latter engages in fine-tuning from the sidelines. Third, religion is less likely to wield 'public power' than 'private power', where the former refers to actions on the part of the government itself and the latter refers to the actions of the citizenry as individuals⁸⁷.

This description applies well to the Orthodox Church of Greece: the Church often succeeds in blocking or vetoing certain state policies; it tends to affect such policies 'from the sidelines' (i.e., it is not a prime actor in policy-making); and in many cases it relies on the actions of individual citizens in support of the Church's causes at a given time.

In Turkey, the situation is quite different. Returning to Casanova's position that the public form a religion may take is contingent on its place between state and society, the fact that Islam in Turkey has generally faced a hostile state and could not effectively engage nationalistic sensitivities has led to different types of religious mobilisation. The primary option available to Turkish Islamists has been to try to work within the democratic political system through the formation of Islamist political parties. After a succession of party closures, political Islamists have had to increasingly modify their

⁸⁷ N.J.Demerath III, 'Religious capital and capital religions: cross-cultural and non-legal factors in the separation of church and state', pp.31-2.

discourse, to the extent that the most recently formed religion-oriented party⁸⁸, though comprised mostly of leaders of formerly banned Islamist political parties, has repeatedly denied the characterisation of an 'Islamist' party. Contrary to the cultural power which Demerath describes, religion-oriented parties in Turkey must mobilise on issues other than culture and religion, particularly on platforms such as the struggle against corruption, dissatisfaction with other political parties' performance, and a strongly pro-EU stance which claims to be able to advance beyond the gridlock within other parties over EU reforms (a gridlock largely in the domain of human rights provisions). And contrary to Demerath's description of the types of political outcomes religion may have, Turkish Islamism *is* in a position to yield positive, primary, and public power.

Perhaps more instructive for our understanding of religious mobilisation in Turkey are explanations of how religious groups conform to the changing power structures by modifying their rhetoric and activities. According to Talal Asad,

the only option available for a deprivatised religion to appeal effectively to the consciences of those who do not accept its values is to act as secular politicians do in liberal democracy. Where the latter cannot persuade others to negotiate, they seek to manipulate the conditions in which they act or refrain from acting. And in order to win the votes of constituents they employ a variety of communicative devices to target their desires and anxieties⁸⁹.

This is a fitting description of political Islam in Turkey. Islamist political parties have had to carefully adjust themselves to the strictly secularist political system, on the one hand, and to campaign on the basis of desires and anxieties insufficiently addressed by other political parties. This point is substantiated by Lilian Voye's claim that, in order to be listened to, religious spokespersons modify their discourse and its presentation.

⁸⁸ The Justice and Development Party (or, AKP), led by Tayyip Erdogan and formed in 2001.

⁸⁹ T.Asad, 'Religion, nation-state, secularism', p.182.

Institutional survival is often contingent on the religious actor's demonstration of 'a capacity to solve problems generated in other fields but not solved there' –in other words, a development of religion's 'performances'⁹⁰.

As Casanova notes, explanations of the public character of religion tend to be of two types: *utilitarian secularist explanations*, which describe an instrumental mobilisation of available religious resources for non-religious purposes, or an instrumental adaptation of religious institutions to the new secular environment; or *secular-humanist explanations*, which refer to fundamentalist anti-modern reactions of hierocratic institutions unwilling to give up their privileges, or the reactionary mobilisation of traditionalist groups resisting modernisation⁹¹. At first glance, it seems that Turkey falls perfectly within the first category, and Greece within the second. Casanova goes on to argue that such explanations are far too rigid 'to deal with the historical "contingencies" of a yet unfinished modernity and of a not yet completed secularisation', and that they tend to ignore 'the intrinsically religious character of the phenomenon'⁹². Such interpretations leave no room for a potentially *positive* role to be played by religion. Casanova contends that, in Western Christianity, two developments have paved the way for such positive potential: first, the emergence of the modern system of centralised absolutist states and of national territorial churches; and second, the emergence of the secular state with its claims of separation from the church and liberation from the religious-normative type of integration of the political community. Following these developments, according to Casanova, the public character of religion ceases to be *necessarily* or primarily determined by its institutional location in relation to the state;

⁹⁰ See Lillian Voye, 'Secularisation in a context of advanced modernity', p.276.

⁹¹ J.Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, p.214.

⁹² J.Casanova, *ibid*, p.38 and p.216 respectively.

rather, official changes in the self-definitions of religious actors may significantly affect the structural location of a given church. Thus, religious institutions in Western Christian contexts have generally conformed to acting as part of civil society in their respective contexts.

A European model of religion-state relations?

To what extent are religion-state relations in Greece and Turkey compatible with European norms? In both cases, public religion is still largely determined by the institutional location of religion in relation to the state, *and* public religion does not operate as part of a pluralistic civil society (the two criteria of positive public religion set out by Casanova). In Turkey, the barrier to such a civil society seems to be the Kemalist tradition of laicism. And the European Parliament has suggested as much in a recent draft report on Turkey's application for EU membership⁹³. Here Azzam Tamimi's words apply well: 'The major challenge to [secularists] has been the Islamists' commitment to the values of democracy, pluralism, civil liberties and human rights, which contemporary...secularists claim to hold but fail to respect'⁹⁴. Turkish Islamists are more prone than 'secularists' to support enhanced religious pluralism because the entailed religious freedom benefits them primarily.

In the case of Greece, where anti-European expressions do arise within the Church they are often connected to any EU-related reforms which might increase religious pluralism in Greece—reforms which, in turn, might threaten both its

⁹³ See chapter six.

⁹⁴ A.Tamimi, 'The origins of Arab secularism', p.28.

institutional place vis-à-vis the state, and (in the long run) its traditional role as representative of Greek national identity. Here David Martin's observation is pertinent: 'where Orthodoxy has stood in for the state [as was the case under Ottoman rule], any pluralism is usually associated with extraneous ethnic intrusions'⁹⁵. And so, through its resistance to such reforms and by virtue of its influence on domestic politics, the Church seems to be a barrier to a religiously plural society in Greece⁹⁶.

An understanding of the extent to which public religion in Greece and Turkey is compatible with European norms requires us to consider the situation in Europe⁹⁷. In an article entitled 'Secularism in retreat', Peter Berger cites Western Europe as an exception to that trend. Indeed, much work within the field of the sociology of religion has ceased discussing the 'American exception' to the secularisation thesis, and has turned to the 'European exception' to the 'desecularisation thesis' (i.e., that thesis which seeks to explain the 'return of religion' in various contexts)⁹⁸.

⁹⁵ D.Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, p.55.

⁹⁶ For a general analysis of how the question of pluralism poses a challenge to churches and states, see eds. S.Monsma and J.C.Soper, *The Challenge of Pluralism: church and state in five democracies*. The editors' starting point in examining this 'challenge' is 'recognition of each nation's unique history and cultural assumptions about the proper place of religion in public life'. They argue that two major questions facing contemporary states are a) how far a polity can go in permitting behaviour contrary to societal welfare and norms that is nevertheless justified on the basis of religion?, and b) should the state encourage consensual religious beliefs and traditions in an attempt to support the common values and beliefs that bind a society together and make possible limited, democratic government? These are questions faced both by individual states and by the *supranational* state of the European Union.

⁹⁷ The reader is encouraged to consult Jean-Paul Willaime's study of 'Religion, state and society in Germany and France', in order to draw interesting parallels between the cases of Greece and Germany, on the one hand, and Turkey and France, on the other. Willaime examines how the political and religious histories of Germany and France mark contemporary church-state relations in each case and, in turn, affect the compatibility of each country with developing European norms.

⁹⁸ For insight into the scholarly path from the 'secularisation thesis' to the development of a 'theory of desecularisation', see Peter Berger's *The Sacred Canopy* (1967) and his edited volume *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (1999).

Efforts to explain the European exception tend to hone in on the regulation of religious markets⁹⁹. John Francis and N.J. Demerath provide useful explanations of both state and church positions on religious regulation¹⁰⁰. Francis posits that the church's negotiation of support in exchange for some measure of regulation by the state appears to be the emerging norm of convergence in state-church policy throughout Europe. For their part, churches benefit from this situation in terms of tangible resources and a competitive advantage in dealing with other churches. Meanwhile, states have freed themselves from the complex business of becoming immersed in questions of doctrine and personal selection. *Over*regulation has been abandoned, not least as a result of lessons learned through the Eastern European experience of churches gaining in strength as a voice for more general opposition to the state¹⁰¹. Demerath describes the state's path to a minimum of regulation in terms of an effort to disentangle religion from politics (sacrificing short-term gains for fear of long-term losses): 'Once religion is introduced into politics, it can be very difficult to pull it back. Not only do its absolute criteria clash with the politics of compromise, but religion tends to be emotionally "hot" and accompanied by its own experts who are frequently difficult to control...As a cultural wild card in the frequently fixed game of state politics, religion poses a threat to established policies and policy makers'¹⁰².

⁹⁹ E.g., the aforementioned supply-side argument posits that Europe is not inherently more secular than other societies, but that the difference merely lies in the over-regulated and limited religious market. Although this body of theory is much debated, the focus on regulation of the religious market is indeed prominent in work on European secularisation.

¹⁰⁰ J.Francis, 'The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships'; N.J.Demerath III, 'Religious capital and capital religions: cross-cultural and non-legal factors in the separation of church and state'.

¹⁰¹ J.Francis, 'The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships', pp.775-9.

¹⁰² N.J.Demerath III, 'Religious capital and capital religions', p.30.

Francis also emphasises what he calls the *evolutionary* nature of the convergence within regulatory regimes in Europe, by tracing developments from the 19th century until today, when religious leaders speak from insulated positions as moral authorities rather than as heads of broad-based movements which legitimate or delegitimize the state¹⁰³. Thus there seems to be a trend towards a homogenisation of the religious situation of Europe, a trend seen less and less as a general secularisation of Europe but as a shift in the institutional location of religion. This theme is echoed by John Madeley, who suggests that what we see in Europe is not so much the disappearance of Christianity but ‘its return instead to the socially and politically marginal position it occupied before Constantine elevated it into the official religion of the Roman Empire one and a half millennia ago’¹⁰⁴. Religious individuals will continue to make a distinctive contribution to the political life of their respective societies, and perhaps more distinctive *because* of their marginality. But, Madeley argues, in so doing ‘they are likely to find themselves as only one among a number of different minority constituencies attempting to make their voice heard; the triumphalist days when the Christian church could claim the allegiance and obedience of men of power as well as their subjects are surely gone forever’¹⁰⁵.

Finally, this concept is also a central part of Casanova’s thesis in his *Public Religions in the Modern World*. His argument that contemporary religion may have a positive public role is based on the assumption that, at least in Western Europe, ‘this historical epoch, the “age” of reactive organicism, of secular-religious and clerical-anticlerical cultural and political warfare, of catholic action, or religious pillarisation, and

¹⁰³ J.Francis, ‘The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships’, pp.803-4.

¹⁰⁴ J.Madeley, ‘Politics and religion in Western Europe’, p.64.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p.64.

of Christian democracy has come to an end'¹⁰⁶. This is a modern structural trend which, according to Casanova, is of 'providential' character for Western Christendom and its colonial outposts. And so, only public religions at the level of civil society are considered to be consistent with modern universalistic principles and with modern differentiated structures. The examples of the 'caesaropapist' British monarch and the established Scandinavian churches are considered 'rather residual anachronisms' which *are* compatible with the modern democratic public sphere¹⁰⁷. Practically all other cases of mobilised public religion at the political society level are, according to Casanova, 'transitional' types: they are either religious movements resisting secularisation and secularist movements (and, again, Casanova argues that the age of secular-religious cleavages has basically come to an end in the historical area of Western Christendom), or they are movements in defence of religious freedoms¹⁰⁸.

We have seen in this chapter, with reference to both the relationship between religion and national identity and between 'church' and 'state', the use of such terms as 'time lags' and 'delays', and descriptions such as 'evolutionary' and 'transitional'. As noted above, René Rémond warns against use of such terms (although the concepts

¹⁰⁶ J.Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, p.61.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p.218.

¹⁰⁸ See Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, pp.218-220. Also pertinent here is a discussion touched on by John Madeley. Madeley points to differences between East and West in terms of church-state relations: 'in the Orthodox East "the heritage of Byzantium, taken up by Tzarist Russia practicing Caesaro-papism, partly explained the tradition of the eastern churches' submission to the will of the sovereign. In none of the nations in which orthodoxy was the religion did the churches ever enjoy true independence. To this specifically historical fact may perhaps be added a spiritual tradition turned more towards union with God than to sustaining the body of society, thereby implying a passive acceptance of temporal events". By contrast "[n]ot only did [the Roman Catholic church] expect the secular powers to recognise it as the perfect society, but it also made it their duty to support the faith in the exercise of its spiritual mission...for the Catholic Church relations between religion and society were especially close, and ran counter to the idea of a total separation between the two...Catholicism is always characterised in its relation with society by its attitude of maintaining an active presence". See p.16 of J.Madeley, 'Towards an inclusive typology of church-state relations in Europe' (Madeley refers here to R.Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe*, pp.24-6).

remain implicit in his work). In my view, such terms are not only somewhat contentious, but they are also unhelpful in understanding the role of religion in national-EU relations in the cases of Greece and Turkey. Far more constructive, I contend, is the approach offered by Nicos Mouzelis in his discussion of underdevelopment¹⁰⁹. I have focused above on the importance of *differences* between my two cases in the relationships between religion and national identity and ‘church’ and ‘state’. I submit that also critically important is these countries’ *similarity* in terms of the form and effects of their westernisation process and how this has variously affected certain institutional interests and the means used to defend these interests. At the establishment of their modern states, both countries experienced a sudden ‘injection’ of western culture and institutions which was vastly different from those which had developed during the previous decades. Neither Greece nor Turkey experienced the great socio-political transformations which had ‘completely changed the face of Western Europe’, including the Enlightenment, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the industrial revolution. Accordingly there was, in Mouzelis’ terms, an insufficient organic connection (i.e. a disarticulation) between the new dominant culture and the live cultural traditions which had developed in the previous centuries. Mouzelis explains that where institutions did not develop endogenously but, together with advanced technologies, were introduced or *imposed* by the West, ‘the organic links between native and imported institutions are often lacking’¹¹⁰. The

¹⁰⁹ N.Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of underdevelopment*. See especially Chapter 8, ‘On Greek formalism: political and cultural aspects of underdevelopment’, pp.134-148.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* p.138. Antonis Liakos, writing on ‘the canon of European identity’, echoes Mouzelis’ assessments as applied to the Greek case (but with a focus on social, rather than economic, underdevelopment). Liakos describes a ‘negative consciousness’ which has prevailed in Greece, which defines the ‘self’ not as what it is but what it is not: ‘Greece was described [by 20th century scholars] as having a history of absences: the absence of Renaissance and Reformation, the lack of bourgeoisie and industrial revolution and liberalism—and all these absences distorted development’. See A.Liakos, ‘The canon of European identity:

imported institutions either play a purely decorative role or, when they take strong roots in the host country, they do not merge effectively with the older institutional structures. As a result, neither the old nor the new institutions function properly. *One* of the results of this disjunction is usually formalism on both the institutional and action levels, i.e., 'political and cultural arrangements [develop] which ensure perpetuation of the infrastructural bottlenecks and contradictions. This precisely is the distinctive contribution of formalism to the maintenance of the *status quo*'¹¹¹. In Mouzelis' terms, political and cultural underdevelopment is 'the process whereby the importation of western political and cultural institutions results in the mobilisation of ideological resources (political support, legitimation) for the maintenance of the *status quo*'¹¹².

Again, Mouzelis' work is *mainly* concerned with economic underdevelopment, but we may apply it to our subject to understand, in particular, the Greek Church's efforts to maintain a certain status quo in its position in the Greek state and society and, by the same token, the efforts of the Kemalist elite (not least, the military), to preserve their positions of dominance in Turkish state and society. Furthermore, Mouzelis' description of the various possible ways of perpetuating the status quo also applies well to the Greek and Turkish cases: for example, the use imported bourgeois parliamentary institutions in such a way that the masses are either kept outside active politics or are brought into the political process in a dependent, 'safe' manner. The resulting 'dependent integration' may involve, for instance, a restriction of parliamentary freedom to bourgeois parties only and using a variety of legal, quasi-legal or illegal techniques for excluding certain

transmission and decomposition', p.133. See also R.Panagiotopoulou, 'Greeks in Europe: antinomies in national identities'.

¹¹¹ N.Mouzelis, *Modern Greece*, p.138.

¹¹² Again, Mouzelis' primary interest in this text is economic underdevelopment, thus he means maintenance of the status quo in terms of 'the development of economic underdevelopment'.

forces from the political process¹¹³. We see such developments in both the Greek and Turkish cases (see chapters three and five).

The same point about preservation of the status quo is hinted at by David Martin (but specifically in relation to church interests): ‘the social *a priori*, chosen as an assumption and not accepted automatically as a frame of being, has to devise protective clauses...The break with the automatically given must restore part of the automatically given to survive. This is the underlying economy of society: to achieve change you must make heavy concessions to the status quo’¹¹⁴. In the Greek case, the state is often forced to compromise, in favour of the Church and the status quo in terms of the Church’s strength in Greek society and politics; in Turkey, political Islamists thus make concessions and conform—in rhetoric and policies/activities—to the Kemalist status quo and *its* strength in Turkish society and politics.

Mouzelis’ and Martin’s perspectives, then, provide a critical link in my study. They offer insight into the relative interests of ‘church’ and ‘state’ in terms of preserving a certain status quo. Again, my argument is that the place of religion between state and society determine certain interests on the part of the ‘church’ and the ‘state’. We see here that *different* institutions in each case have prevailed through maintenance of the status quo: in Greece, the Church, and in Turkey, the Kemalist elite structure. Membership (or potential membership) in the EU affects institutional interests in each case, as it challenges some of the effects of the Greek Orthodox Church’s predominance in Greece, and the Kemalist elite’s predominance in Turkey.

¹¹³ N.Mouzelis, *Modern Greece*, p.139.

¹¹⁴ D.Martin, *The Dilemmas in Contemporary Religion*, p.24.

Conclusion

I have examined above the relationships between religion and national identity and forms of nationalism in the Greek and Turkish cases. This examination is important because, as explained in the introduction, the relationship between religion and national identity is largely the foundational principle upon which ‘church’-‘state’ relations are built. And, in the context of my broader argument, the latter is important because it is in the domain of ‘church’-‘state’ relations—specifically, in the contending interests of ‘church’ and ‘state’ over the place of religion in state and society—that religion plays a significant role in national-EU relations.

Meanwhile, secularism and secularisation entail the ideologies, policies and processes through which ‘church’-‘state’ relations are formed. Thus, I also considered how ‘church’-‘state’ relations developed in Europe variously in relation to secularism and secularisation, and I examined the Greek and Turkish cases against this background. Special attention was given to religious groups’ attitudes and interests as they have arisen in relation to religion-nation and ‘church’-‘state’ relations. Finally, I closed with an analysis of each case with reference to European and EU norms in religion-state relations.

In this chapter I have indicated that the role of religion in national-EU relations (from an internal perspective to individual nations) has to do with the place of religion in state and society and the relative interests of ‘church’ and ‘state’ with regard to the place of religion in state and society. I have also introduced ways in which membership (or potential membership) in the European Union affect the relative interests of ‘church’ and ‘state’. Again, my aim is to understand the implications that religion-nation and church-

state relations have on national-EU relations in each case. We have seen here that the place of religion in a given state and society is the product of two interrelated factors: the relationship between religion and national identity, and between 'church' and 'state'.

Upon this basis I shall argue that *differences* in these relationships yield large differences in the way religion plays a role in national-EU relations. Elaboration of this argument requires a detailed study of the historical development of these relationships in each case. In the following chapter, I commence with such a study for the case of Greece. This is followed by an examination of a specific issue in chapter four: the 'identity card issue', which exhibits the links between religion, national identity, 'church'-'state' relations, and national-EU relations. A similar study for the case of Turkey follows, (with the 'case within the case' focusing on the February 28th process and its 'legacies').

CHAPTER THREE

Religion and national identity, church and state in Greece

This chapter is devoted to an examination of the relationships between religion and national identity, and between church and state, in Greece. Through this examination we shall come to understand how the Orthodox Church of Greece has historically played a powerful role as preserver of Greek national identity, and how this fact translated into close relations between church and state. Again, the main argument made in this thesis is that the role of religion in national-EU relations is to be located in the place of religion in state and society and in the contending institutional interests of the ‘church’ and of the ‘state’. This chapter serves to locate historically our analysis of the contending church and state interests and the effects of these on Greek-EU relations.

By religion in the case of Greece, I mean Greek Orthodoxy—the faith to which approximately 96% of the Greek population claims to belong. The church to which I refer is the Orthodox Church of Greece, headed by the Archbishopric of the Autocephalous Church of Greece, which is based in Athens¹. The church administration

¹ ‘Orthodox Church of Greece’ is the official title for the ecclesiastical body we examine here; it is, for simplicity’s sake, usually referred to as ‘the Church’ in this text. I use the term ‘church’ to mean *not* a body of believers but an *institutional* body. Also for simplicity’s sake, with reference to the Orthodox peoples the term ‘Orthodox’ is often used; and, in the case of the faith, the term ‘Orthodoxy’. This must not, of course, be confused with other forms of religious orthodoxy. Finally, it should be noted that the Orthodox Church of Greece does not officially represent all of Orthodoxy in the country. Mount Athos (or, Agio Oros, a peninsula in Northern Greece, home to a number of monasteries) remains under the direct ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and is, according to Art.105 of the Greek Constitution, a self-administering part of the Greek State. The Church of Crete is autonomous and has its own Charter: its archbishop is elected by the Synod of the Patriarchate, following the suggestions of the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs and three bishops of the Church of Crete. The churches of the Dodecanese also remain under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, since the annexation of the Dodecanese Islands to the Greek State in 1947. See P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.85 [in Greek]. My use of such terms as ‘Greek Orthodoxy’, ‘Official Church’ and ‘the

throughout the country is divided into 81 Metropolises, each led by a Metropolitan bishop. Beyond the Official Church, there are also a number of religious brotherhoods, the most well-known of which are Zoe, Sotir, Stavros, and Paraklitos. Whilst there is some debate as to whether these groups should be considered as sects because of their historically critical stances towards the Official Church, it is generally agreed that the brotherhoods exist in dogmatic union with the Church². Clearly outside the Official Church are the 'Old Calendarists' (those Eastern Orthodox who did not conform to the adoption of the Western Christian calendar) and the Uniates (Christians who follow Orthodox traditions but profess loyalty to the Pope)³. Finally, beyond Greek Orthodoxy there are a number of other faiths represented in Greece, including Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Islam, and several Protestant sects⁴.

Below I examine the historical development of a close relationship between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity through the prism of a selection of specific periods or events. I then consider the relationship between church and state with reference to the constitutional provisions relating to the Church, the privileges these

Church' (with a capital 'C') is always in reference to the 'Orthodox Church of Greece' specifically, and not to the other Orthodox churches and institutions mentioned above.

² For a discussion of whether the Greek Orthodox brotherhoods fit into Ernst Troeltsch's typology of sects, and for information on the historical development of these brotherhoods, see B. Jioultsis, 'Religious brotherhoods: a sociological view', and V. Makrides, 'The brotherhoods of theologians in contemporary Greece'.

³ The recognition of the Uniate Church by the Roman Catholic Church remains a point of contention between the Orthodox Church of Greece and the Roman Catholic Church. See P. Dimitras, 'L'anti-occidentalisme grec', p.351. The Uniate Church resulted from the 16th century Venetian efforts to convert Greek Orthodox subjects to Catholicism. The Uniate Church was officially recognised by the sultan of the 16th century and thus ended dialogue between the Orthodox and the Catholics. The Uniates are in full communion with the Roman Catholic Church, but they do not follow the Latin rite nor are they directly subject to the Pope. They are also called *Eastern Catholics*. These churches accept Catholic dogma, but retain their own hierarchies and liturgies, and follow some Eastern Orthodox doctrines and customs.

⁴ There are also, of course, followers of a multitude of other faiths living in Greece. The number of citizens belonging to these faiths, as well as the number of places of worship for these faiths, are unclear. This is a matter of controversy as many in Greece argue that the unavailability of such information is due to efforts to portray Greek society as religiously homogenous.

entail for the Greek Orthodox Church vis-à-vis other faiths represented in Greece, and examples of church-state conflict. Finally, I present a spectrum of ‘Greek Orthodox’⁵ perspectives on Europe and the European Union, mainly through a selection of religious publications.

Religion and national identity

My study of the relationship between religion and national identity in Greece begins with the experience of the Orthodox Church under the Ottoman Empire and in the Greek national revolution⁶. A second climactic period in this relationship is the establishment of the Autocephalous Church of Greece and its eventual recognition by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Third, I examine Greek irredentism, particularly with reference to the *Megali Idea*. This selection is necessarily limited, but it serves our purposes by providing insight into how the relationship between religion and national identity translated into close church-state relations and the patterns, in the latter, of cooperation, conflict, and compromise.

Ottoman rule and national revolution

The fall of Constantinople in 1453 signalled the end of the Byzantine Empire and the inclusion of much of its territory under Ottoman rule. Under the Ottoman *millet*

⁵ In inverted commas because I do not claim that the views presented represent the *full* spectrum of Greek Orthodox perspectives on Europe and the EU.

⁶ A full historical analysis of the relationship between religion and national identity in Greece would take us as far back in history as the Byzantine Empire and the Great Schism, but space limitations do not allow for such historical depth.

system, non-Muslim communities were divided into religious groups and given 'protected' status: in exchange for the payment of a special tax, they were allowed to live within the Muslim state without converting but as second-class subjects⁷. The *millet*s enjoyed a measure of autonomy and were represented by their religious leaders in their dealings with the *high porte*⁸. By the decree of Sultan Mehmet II, the Patriarch of Constantinople was recognized as the highest religious and political leader (*millet bashi*) of all Orthodox peoples—regardless of ethnicity—living within the Ottoman Empire. The entailed privileges and responsibilities were immense: the Patriarch and higher clergy were themselves exempted from taxes, but they were responsible for collecting them from the Orthodox *millet* for the Islamic state and for guaranteeing their subjects' full obedience to the Sultan. The *millet* system also granted the Patriarchate full juridical authority over the Orthodox (on matters of marriage, dowry, property, inheritance, education, and social welfare)⁹. Thus, with this vast expanse of functions, the Church was legitimised by the Ottoman State as a religio-political institution¹⁰.

Although the Orthodox *millet* was ecumenical and multinational in nature, in reality it was largely Greek-dominated: the succession of Patriarchs was Greek, and the social administration was almost exclusively in the hands of Greeks. This latter fact was due to the simple reality that the Greek population living in Constantinople, the *Phanariots*, were already the leaders of business there and had become directly involved

⁷ See E.Zürcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.12. The *millet* system was in line with Islamic law traced back to the Prophet Mohammed: conquered people have the option either to convert to Islam or to retain their religion but be loyal and pay taxes to the Islamic political regime. See N. Kokosalakis, 'Church and State in the Orthodox context with Special reference to Greece', p.239.

⁸ E.Zürcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.12.

⁹ N. Kokosalakis, 'Church and State in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', pp.239-40.

¹⁰ See V.Makrides, 'Orthodoxy as a *conditio sine qua non*: religion and state/politics in Modern Greece from a socio-historical perspective', p.284; see also P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.52.

in the administration of the Ottoman Empire itself. The *Phanariots* thus exercised special influence over the Patriarchate in terms of day-to-day affairs and in relation to the *high porte*¹¹. According to Victor Roudometof, 'the Ottomans...facilitated the legitimation of the Grecophone ecclesiastical elites over the Balkan *ethnies*...The conflation of Greek ethnic identity with that of the *Rum millet* [as the Orthodox millet was called] was an indispensable component of the Ottoman social system'¹². Furthermore, with a Greek Patriarch carrying out secular and ecclesiastical functions, and a largely Greek hierarchy in control of the Orthodox millet, 'Greek interests came to dominate a Church that became increasingly involved in the preservation and perpetuation of Hellenism and it became more and more difficult to separate Hellenism from Orthodoxy'¹³. Indeed, the Church was the main institution which provided for national Greek education, by establishing schools, printing presses, scholarships, and food for school children. Accordingly, beyond the institutional role of the Church—in its economic, legal, and political dimensions—one must also note the important psychological function it had for the Greeks under Ottoman rule: the Church was seen as provider and protector of the people and preserver of their national identity. As Makrides explains, 'the Church and — abstractly — Orthodoxy were of great importance to the Greeks and became *an essential*

¹¹ N.Kokosalakis, 'Church and State in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', p. 240.

¹² V.Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, pp.53-4. See text for explanation of the extent of this conflation of 'Greek' with 'Orthodox' in the perceptions of Western Europeans as well as in merchants' circles within the Ottoman Empire and beyond.

¹³ J. Rexine, 'The Church in Contemporary Greek Society', p.201. Rexine goes on to say that the Church expressed greater concern for the revival of the Greek nation rather than for the ideals of Christian Orthodoxy. (The question of the Church's interest in a 'revived Greek nation' is discussed below). Paschalis Kitromilides offers an opposing perspective. He argues that 'the Orthodox church in the Balkans did contribute to the preservation of collective identity under Ottoman rule by institutionalising and safeguarding the distinction of the Christian subjects from their Muslim rulers. But the distinction was religious, not national, in content....It was only the confusions arising from the coincidence that power in the Orthodox Church was wielded by a Greek-speaking hierarchy that created 'ethnic' antagonisms within it before the age of nationalism. See Kitromilides, "'Imagined communities" and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans', pp.52-3.

*part of their collective identity*¹⁴. Such facts naturally led to the widespread interpretation—later to prevail in Greek historical memory—expressed here by theologian Evangelos Theodorou:

It was the Church which kept the Greeks spiritually free and revived their national conscience, by means of its deposit of tradition, and through the medium of the Greek language, Greek letters, and, above all, through the liturgical life of the Church. In the darkest period of the Turkish domination, the main cultural force which maintained the Greek national spirit was the liturgy and the whole of the worship of the Church¹⁵.

However, it is important to distinguish between the Church's efforts to preserve Greek national identity, on the one hand, and its will to 'revive the Greek nation', on the other—a distinction which leads us to question Theodorou's perspective. The Church was in a highly comfortable position under Ottoman rule. Besides the aforementioned power and privileges, the Church also became especially wealthy: many Christians transmitted their land to the Church and the Monasteries since, under the *millet* system, ecclesiastical property was protected from confiscation by the Turks¹⁶. Therefore, the high clergy were not entirely supportive of revolutionary ideas which might threaten their relatively privileged positions¹⁷. Likewise, as Roudometof notes, the wealth and power of the *Phanariots* rendered many of them also relatively negative towards a Greek

¹⁴ V.Makrides, 'Orthodoxy as a *conditio sine qua non*: religion and state/politics in Modern Greece from a socio-historical perspective', p.285.

¹⁵ E. Theodorou, *The Church of Greece*, p.13. Charles Frazee argues that the bishops and clergy had almost unanimously supported the revolution (See C.Frazee, 'The Orthodox Church of Greece: the last fifteen years', p.89). The debatability of this point is addressed below.

¹⁶ N.Kokosalakis, 'Church and State in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', p.240.

¹⁷ See V.Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p.56. Also, in 1821 Patriarch Grigorios denounced the revolt in the Danubian principalities and excommunicated the revolutionaries, but he was still hanged for not having maintained control over his flock. Greek Catholic islanders also did not support the revolt (pp.64-5).

national revolution: 'the *Rum millet* was not an oppressed people in need of liberation, rather, its progress could be achieved under the rule of the *Phanariot* and religious elites'¹⁸. Thus, neither the *Phanariots*, the high clergy, nor the Orthodox peasantry fully advocated nationalist ideas or, by extension, plans for a Greek national revolution.

This is arguably the case prior to the 1750's, when revolutionary ideology was limited to the religious-political division between the Ottoman privileged class of the *askeri* (which was almost entirely Muslim by the late 18th c), and the subordinate class of the *reaya* (which was mainly Greek Orthodox). However, as education and Grecophone secular literary production expanded in the post-1750 period, the reemergence of classical antiquity in the discourse of the western Enlightenment reached the *Rum millet* and strongly influenced its secularisation¹⁹. The ecclesiastical establishment and many *Phanariots* opposed these new ideas since they correctly perceived that secularization would shift the religious foundation of solidarity among the members of the *Rum millet* and lead to the delegitimation of the Church and the *Phanariots*. In the case of the clergy this is logical and evident in the Patriarchate's condemnation of the 'godless Voltaires'²⁰. Meanwhile, merchants, peddlers, intellectuals and other petit-bourgeoisie valued the new western ideas, and gave financial support for the importation of western-style education methods; but they were unwilling to risk their fortunes in open revolt against the *Porte*. Thus a major ideological conflict developed between much of the

¹⁸ V.Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p.55.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, pp.56-8. He goes on to note: 'the reception of the Enlightenment by the Orthodox Balkan society led to a growing trend toward secularisation and critical thinking...The central place of ancient Greece in the Western Enlightenment led to a reconstitution of the relationship between the modern 'Greeks' (Greek Orthodox) and the ancient Greeks (Hellenes)' (p.69). Accordingly, we see in this period the gradual development of Enlightenment thinkers' replacement of the term 'Rum' or 'Romeic' with *Greek* or *Hellene*, and use of the term nation (*ethnos*), reflecting a slow transformation from religious to secular identity (p.60).

²⁰ Roudometof, *ibid*, p.61.

hierarchy and Greek population, on the one hand, and the western-minded individuals seeking Greek national independence, on the other²¹. The French Revolution intensified this battle between conservative and liberal factions, with Church leaders denouncing 'franco-masonic' ideas, while proponents of the 'enlightened reason' accused the Church of 'voluntary slavery'²².

Yet many clerics did fight for Greek independence. According to Nicos Mouzelis, though originally hostile to the revolution, they joined the revolution when they realised its irreversibility²³. In any case, the symbolic importance of those clergy members who did fight for Greek independence remains embedded in the memories, and historical chronicles, of many. Kokosalakis summarizes well the reason why this is the case: 'Although the role of the church during the Greek uprising has been at times exaggerated the fact remains that the Church's contribution was outstanding. This was not because the Church was or is a revolutionary Church but because she was and continues to be a Church tied to the ethnic identity of the Greeks'²⁴. It is thus that one of the most renowned aspects of the revolution is the act of a Greek bishop, Germanos of Patra, who on the 25th of March, 1821, raised as the banner (*lavaron*) of revolution the curtain of the sanctuary of the Cathedral of Patras²⁵. And it is thus that the 25th of March is now celebrated as Greek national independence day. So in spite of conflicting perspectives on the attitudes and actions of the clergy throughout the national revolution,

²¹ Such ideological conflict is a recurrent theme throughout the history of modern Greece: many future 'national divisions' would later be interpreted through the same mould as that which developed in the 18th and 19th centuries.

²² V.Roudomentof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p.61.

²³ N.Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, p.61. Mouzelis cites here the work of J.Kordatos, *The social significance of the 1821 revolution* (in Greek), Athens, 1972.

²⁴ N.Kokosalakis, 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', pp.230-31.

²⁵ See J.Rexine, 'The Church in contemporary Greek society', p.203.

the prevailing interpretation in school books and in popular opinion is that the Church saved the Greek nation throughout the four centuries of Ottoman rule, and that there would have been no 'nation' to rebel against the Ottomans had the Church not played this role.

Establishment and recognition of the Autocephalous Church

Newly independent Greece was ruled by the Regency of the young Bavarian King Otto, who was installed by the Great Powers (Britain, France and Russia). Georg von Mauer was the member of the regency responsible for issues of Church, Education and Justice. Mauer believed that complete political independence for Greece required a disentanglement of the Church from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Contact of the Church with foreign centres of decision-making was deemed contrary to the interests of the new political leadership. Mauer also proclaimed that the Church should be modernized and the educational standards of the clergy should be improved. Accordingly, he formed a Commission to discuss the problems facing the Church and to establish a Statutory Charter for the Church. The Commission decided that political independence required also ecclesiastical independence²⁶. Thus in spite of the Patriarch's staunch protests, the Autocephalous Church of Greece was proclaimed by royal decree in July of 1833²⁷.

The declaration of autonomy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate entailed also legalisation of the Church's subordination to the state. The administrative leader of the

²⁶ See P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, pp.55-58. See also N.Kokosalakis, 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p.235.

²⁷ See C.Papastathis. 'State and church in Greece', pp.75-6. See also J.Rexine, 'The Church in contemporary Greek society', p.204.

highest ecclesiastical power, a five-member Synod, was to be the King (though Roman Catholic). The latter was in accordance with the Bavarian prototype whereby the King was also the 'supreme bishop'²⁸. The members of the Synod were hired by the government, and a royal commissioner would represent civil power at each of its meetings. The layman's presence was required for the drafting of Synodal decisions, which were then subject to government approval²⁹. Thus, the 1833 decree of 'The Independence of the Church of Greece' made the state the exclusive legislative ruler and declared the Church subject to the Monarch³⁰. The situation was, as one scholar describes it, a cultural and political anomaly: not only was the head of the Greek (Orthodox) nation a Catholic and foreigner, but the three-man regency council was Bavarian and Protestant³¹.

As Nikos Kokosalakis notes, 'despite its declared intention to modernise the church and to improve the educational standard of the clergy, the Bavarian administration adopted in fact antiquated and even reactionary policies towards the church'³². The most vivid example of this consists in the second wave of church subjugation by the state: an attack on the monasteries and their properties. By an 1833 royal decree, all monasteries with less than 6 monks were closed; with a second decree, a few months later, almost all the female monasteries were also shut down. Of 593 monasteries, 412 were closed, and their properties were confiscated by the monarchy³³. In some cases the consolidation of

²⁸ N.Kokosalakis, 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p.235.

²⁹ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.59.

³⁰ This was later institutionalised in the Constitution of 1844, Article 105, stipulating that Church administration matters would be regulated by the state. C.Papastathis, 'State and church in Greece', p.76.

³¹ N.Kokosalakis, 'Church and State in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', p. 241.

³² N.Kokosalakis, 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p.236.

³³ See P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church : a Difficult Relationship*, p.60; T.Stavrou, 'The Orthodox Church and political culture in Greece', pp.43-4; and N.Kokosalakis, 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p.236.

the monasteries took violent form, with the Bavarian Army forcefully expelling the monks for placement in the remaining monasteries³⁴. Finally, a royal decree also forbade any future gifts of land estate to the Church. The strict measures were, according to Dimitropoulos, an effort to dissolve important sources of power which could become centres of resistance to state policy³⁵. But of course these developments incited a great deal of discontent, both within the clergy and amongst the wider population.

A number of other circumstances during this period further pressed on Greek Orthodox sensitivities. For example, Protestant and Catholic missionaries in the country were increasingly active on several fronts. Plans had been made for the foundation of a Protestant university in Athens. Over one hundred Protestant publications had been approved as adjunct schoolbooks. The British Bible Society trod on especially sensitive ground in 1834 by publishing a translation of the Old Testament into modern Greek. The translation was considered inaccurate by many Orthodox who insisted that the Greek version was the only legitimate one. But the deeper source of controversy was over the concept of providing 'unmediated' access to the Bible, and the differing Orthodox and Protestant views on this. The practice of translating the Bible into the local vernacular was interpreted by some as an attempt to convert Greeks to Protestantism. Furthermore, when a personal letter of a Protestant missionary in Greece, which announced the conversion of a number of Greek school girls, was leaked to Greek press, debate over the missionaries' activities became explosive. Henceforth popular discontent was expressed over a number of related issues, such as the exemption offered to the Greek Catholic

³⁴ V.Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p. 103.

³⁵ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church : a Difficult Relationship*, p.60.

monasteries which remained unaffected by the consolidation; the fact that the regency and the king were not Orthodox; and the harsh suppression of local bandits³⁶.

Thus, under a widespread impression of an attack on Orthodox traditions, many began to interpret the separation of the Greek Church from the Patriarchate as a conspiracy aiming to convert the people to Protestantism and Catholicism. Between 1833 and 1852 there were fourteen peasant revolts. As Roudometof carefully notes, most of these actually reflected popular discontent over the intensive power centralisation and burdensome taxation under Otto, or were goaded by local overlords hoping to exact financial rewards from the state. Nonetheless, the revolutions were expressed in terms of a struggle against an 'infidel' (i.e., non-Orthodox) administration in favour of the protection of local religion and custom. And they took place within the context of a broader debate between spokesmen of western trends and of Eastern Orthodox conservatism which was, in many ways, simply a continuation of the ideological conflict which existed before and during the Revolution of 1821³⁷. We also see here a mixture of undercurrents behind conflicting ideologies, including power struggles and financial interests.

Assessing the significance of the establishment of the Autocephalous Church is difficult. Scholars' interpretations conflict over whether it was primarily an act of Europeanisation, modernisation, and secularisation, in conformity with the patterns of state-building in Europe, *or* if it was an arbitrary subjugation of the Church by the state

³⁶ V.Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans* pp.103-4.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p.104.

for the purpose of manipulating it on the part of the state³⁸. Though the initial intentions of the state remain unclear, two points are certain. First, the literal *creation* of the Autocephalous Church by the state clearly signals the radical beginning of Church subordination to state interests. Second, the consequent relationship between Church and state is complex: while the right of the state to interfere in ecclesiastical matters was legalised, ecclesiastical issues were recognised as public issues³⁹. In other words, as Dimitropoulos points out, the autocephaly did entail subjugation of the Church and thus the affirmation and institutionalisation of liberal ideas, but it also entailed the paradox that 'as political power became disentangled from religion, the Church became bound to the State'⁴⁰. A final certain effect of the establishment of the autocephaly is the enhanced ethnic character of the Church: the newly independent Church became a symbol of national identity. Particularly the fact that its establishment was a *revolutionary* act—i.e. a split from the Patriarchate without the latter's consent—meant for most Greeks that the autocephaly was the attainment of the fullest extent of national independence and national identity⁴¹.

³⁸ The establishment of the autocephaly was, according to Vasilios Makrides, an attempt to limit the influence and jurisdiction of the Church solely to the religious domain, as was the prevailing pattern of centralised administration and state-building in Europe. Makrides emphasises that the aforementioned secularisation process was effective solely at the 'surface' of Greek society: 'both the popular sentiment and the official state ideology the Church still remained inextricably interwoven with the historical struggles and social values of Greece'. See V.Makrides, 'Orthodoxy as a *conditio sine qua non*: religion and state/politics in Modern Greece from a socio-historical perspective', p.287.

³⁹ Antonis Manitakis, 'The Autocephalous Church of Greece between State and Nation', pp.328-331 [in Greek]. By emphasising the *extension* of Church influence into the realm of public policy, Manitakis' view is in clear contrast with Makrides' aforementioned perspective (on the limitation of Church influence, see footnote 38).

⁴⁰ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.61. This theme is repeated with reference to the acting Archbishop Christodoulos: the state moving in a non-national direction while the Church is becoming increasingly 'ethnicised'.

⁴¹ According to Sia Anagnostopoulou, the subjugation in the autocephaly of the Church to the state did not mean, in that period, a programmatic slavery of the Church to the aims of the state; it meant first the Church's subjugation to the secularisation of politics and of the public space. Thus, with autocephaly the state does not accept cooperation with, but the submission of the Church on two levels: the practical and the symbolic. The autocephaly of the Church of Greece thus constitutes, in her opinion, the ultimate

Following the establishment of the Autocephalous Church, the next climactic point in our historical overview is the repairing of relations with the Patriarchate, with the latter's official recognition of the Autocephalous Church of Greece. Unease over the state's extensive control over the Church, its ensuing attacks on monasteries and its failure to 'protect' the Church and nation from 'threats' of other faiths, led many clergy and lay people to call for renewed relations with the Patriarchate⁴². Conservatives sought a reunion with the Church of Constantinople and security against proselytizing efforts of other faiths, whilst liberals sought the constitutional substantiation of the Autocephalous Church and the separation of Church and state. The ideological debate between the two factions initially resulted in the Constitutional recognition of the Orthodox Church as the 'prevailing' church, which 'existed' in dogmatic union with the Church of Constantinople. In the context of common compromise, the King ceased to be the head of the Church and its administration was left to a Synod of hierarchs. The Church remained under the control of the state and its holy canons were applied to the extent that they were not contrary to the canons of the state. And finally, all acts of proselytism committed 'against' Orthodoxy were strictly prohibited.

Conservative factions of society remained unsatisfied, however, and the clergy in particular continued to request normalisation of relations with the Patriarchate in hopes that this would also entail an enhancement of their wages. Thus, as a further concession, the Greek government issued a formal request to the Patriarchate for its recognition of the

justification of the Greek revolution of 1821. Sia Anagnostopoulou, 'The historicity of the "national role" of the Church of Greece', pp.349-352 [in Greek]. See text for her effective reference to texts of that period in support of her argument.

⁴² See P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.62.

Church of Greece as Autocephalous⁴³. The Patriarchate, for its part, was favourable towards anything that might strengthen its role: the gradual proliferation of national churches across the Balkans had threatened to render it powerless. Hence in 1850, the Patriarchate officially recognised the Autocephalous Church of Greece⁴⁴. The recognition was greeted with great enthusiasm by political and ecclesiastical circles. Beyond repairing relations of both the Greek Church and state with the Patriarchate, the move also normalised church and state relations internally to Greece. Thus, the official recognition of the Autocephalous Church clearly added ideological strength to the national aspirations and ethnic ideology of the Greek state⁴⁵. According to Roudometof, the 1850 recognition of autocephaly ended the conflict between Orthodox conservatives and western liberals: 'the conservatives succeeded in uniting the national church with the Patriarchate even if only in form and not in substance; the liberals preserved the substance of the 1833 Church constitution. Even if at first glance the conservatives appear to have won only a hollow victory, the true losers were the liberals'⁴⁶.

This view is expanded upon by Sia Anagnostopoulou. She argues that the recognition of the Autocephalous Church, rooted as it was in the ideological conflict which followed its establishment in the first place, signifies a clear reversal of the revolutionary policy which led to its establishment:

Through a paradoxical road, [the autocephaly] becomes the link in the chain for the development of the ideology of Greek = Orthodox. The meanings of nation and religion acquire a new

⁴³ N.Kokosalakis, 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p.239.

⁴⁴ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.63. In ecclesiastical terms this means that the Greek Orthodox Church was in communion with the other Orthodox churches, and that matters relating to dogma or faith must be referred to the Patriarchate. See also J.Rexine, 'The Church in contemporary Greek society', pp.204-5.

⁴⁵ N.Kokosalakis, 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p.239.

⁴⁶ V.Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p.106.

functionalism in Balkan history in the latter half of the 19th century...The religionisation of the national and the identification of the public with spirituality--*with* the mediation of the national--takes place definitively in 1850, with the issue of the Synodal Tomos, with which the Patriarchate not only recognises the Autocephaly of the Greek Church, but...signals the beginning of a new era under which the revolutionary nature of 1833 is nullified: the autocephaly no longer represents the will of the independent Greek nation, as expressed in its political leadership, but the will of the timeless Greek Orthodox nation⁴⁷.

Thus, we are cautioned to 'be careful to distinguish between periods, to understand why that which in 1833 was revolutionary, came in 1850 and afterwards, to satisfy the ideology of those who fought the autocephaly'⁴⁸.

Greek irredentism and the Megali Idea

The reason is, in short, the consolidation of religious and nationalist aspirations in Greek irredentism—in particular, in the *Megali Idea* ('Grand Idea'). Here then the aims of the state for its expansion coincided with the visions of religious nationalists for 'redemption' of Orthodox peoples—visions which were expressed with reference to Byzantine glory. In 1844 John Kolettis, a politician favoured by the King, first articulated the doctrine of the *Megali Idea*, a romantic vision of re-establishing modern Greece with its pre-Ottoman occupation boundaries⁴⁹. The speech with which Kolletis introduced the concept 'blended millenarian hopes of a restored Christian Empire with secular Greek state-sponsored nationalism; it gave the masses a clearly understandable

⁴⁷ S.Anagnostopoulou, 'The historicity of the "national role" of the Church of Greece', p.353. The term used here for 'Greek Orthodox' is '*Ellinorthodoksia*' (or, Greco-orthodoxy), a term which indicates an especially close blending of 'Orthodox' and 'Greek'.

⁴⁸ S.Anagnostopoulou, *ibid*, p.349.

⁴⁹ N.Kokosalakis, 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', pp.238-9.

vision while it transformed millenarianism into modern nationalism'⁵⁰. The King became an ardent supporter of the vision as did most of the Greek people. According to Richard Clogg, 'almost all Greeks subscribed to this vision, the only argument being as to how it might be best implemented'⁵¹. The manifestation of this idea in government policy, and its tragic termination in 1922, are well-documented in historical texts⁵². Our intent here is simply to emphasise that the vision revived the historical connections between Orthodoxy and Hellenism in a fusion which became the basic cultural orientation of modern Greece. This tendency, as Nikos Kokosalakis notes, was strengthened in the face of such 'threats' as represented by Jacob Fallmerayer, who openly doubted the historical continuity of Greece's cultural identity from the classical to the modern period. Hence also Spyridon Zampelios' coining of the term '*hellenochristianos*' in 1852, to emphasise the unbroken continuity between ancient Greece, Byzantium and Modern Greece⁵³.

Whereas there is much disagreement amongst scholars, as noted above, with regard to the relationship between church, state, and national identity throughout Ottoman rule, the revolution, and the establishment of autocephaly, there is general agreement that the *Megali Idea* acted as a an ultimate synthesis of church, state and national identity. Thus, in Dimitropoulos' interpretation, the place of the Church in the state structure did not differ significantly from that of other churches in Europe before the period of the *Megali Idea*: as the 'prevailing' Church, it had a number of privileges and

⁵⁰ V.Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p.105.

⁵¹ Clogg is cited by N.Kokosalakis, in 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', p.238.

⁵² For one English-language study, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, pp.110-117 (on 'The Greeks and the 'Great Idea').

⁵³ N.Kokosalakis, 'Religion and modernization in 19th century Greece', pp. 238-9. See also Michael Herzfeld, 'Past glories, present politics'; 'National character, national consciousness'; and 'Attack and reaction', in *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*; and Loring Danforth, 'The ideological context of the search for continuities in Greek Culture'.

responsibilities. However, he continues, in beginning to operate as a public authority in a state with 'unredeemed dreams', though submitted to the state, the Church began to be 'politicised' with the intention to serve the interests of state policy; 'the process of its ethnicisation would lead to the "religionisation" of the nation, and to the elevation of the ideology of identification of orthodoxy with Greekness'⁵⁴. Likewise, Manitakis argues that Orthodoxy as an element of national identity was only discovered and developed by the leaders of the revolutionary Greek state when they began to cultivate ideas of national completion and the *Megali Idea*⁵⁵. And finally, Anagnostopoulou maintains that in the context of irredentism, state and Church become interdependent: the Church, as daughter of the Patriarchate, as heir of the past of the genos, simultaneously legitimises the identification of Greek with Orthodox; the Greek state, though, is that which legitimises the inheritance of the Church'⁵⁶. The three historical facts of the establishment of the Autocephalous Church, its recognition by the Patriarchate, and the development of the *Megali Idea*—particularly in relation to one another—carry a great deal of importance in terms of understanding certain trends which we see repeated later: first, the tendency of the state to compromise in the face of church demands; second, the tendency of the state to see the Church and Orthodoxy as expedient factors of national unity and to *use* the Church and faith for its purposes; and third, the tendency of the Church to identify itself with such national causes⁵⁷.

⁵⁴ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.65.

⁵⁵ A.Manitakis, 'The Autocephalous Church of Greece between State and Nation', p.336.

⁵⁶ S.Anagnostopoulou, 'The historicity of the "national role" of the Church of Greece', p.356.

⁵⁷ Again, this is a necessarily selective overview of periods in Greek history which shaped a close relationship between religion and national identity. One further historical period which has had a powerful, *ambiguous* affect on the relationship between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity is the military dictatorship of 1967-74. This period represents perhaps the most intense identification of church and state which, because of the particularly violent character of that military regime, left negative marks on the relationship between religion and national identity in Greece. The manipulation of religion by military

Church-state relations

We have seen above how the relationship between religion and national identity led to close relations between church and state in Greece. I now turn to a more in-depth examination of church-state relations. Through a special focus on constitutional provisions dictating the place of the Church in the Greek state, I indicate a number of privileges enjoyed by the Church vis-à-vis the state and, most importantly, vis-à-vis other faiths represented in Greece. I then examine particular problems arising from these privileges, in terms of religious freedoms and equality for the non-Orthodox in Greece. Here we are introduced to ways in which privileges afforded the Church pose some potential, and some real, problems in Greek-EU relations. As we shall see, it is not necessarily *legislation* which is at issue here, but *practices* which derive from both the historical relationship between Orthodoxy and national identity and the constitutionally-informed church-state link. Finally, I close with a few examples of church-state conflict, thus introducing us to certain implications of conflicting interests on the part of the Church and on the part of the state.

leaders during the 1967-74 junta (the slogan of which was 'A Greece of Christian Greeks') bears similarities with the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' during the Turkish military dictatorship of the early 1980's (see chapter five). In both cases, military leaders used religion as a buttress against communism. For a thorough study of the Church under the 1967-74 military dictatorship in Greece, see G.D.Kent, *The political influence of the Orthodox Church of Greece* (a PhD thesis written during this period). See also N.Kokosalakis, 'Church and state in the Orthodox context with special reference to Greece', pp.248-9; E.Prodromou, 'Toward an understanding of Eastern Orthodoxy and Democracy Building in the Post-Cold War Balkans, pp.132-4; and C.Yiannaras, *Chapters of Political Theology*, pp.116-7 and 132-139 [in Greek].

Constitutional provisions

Constitutional provisions for church-state relations evolved considerably during the time period covered above⁵⁸. Prior to the 1975 Constitution (which is in force today), the President of the Republic was required to be Orthodox and to take an oath before Parliament promising to 'protect' the Greek Orthodox faith, and proselytism perpetrated against Orthodoxy (only) was prohibited. According to the 1975 Constitution, the president is no longer required to be Orthodox nor to take such an oath⁵⁹. Furthermore, with the new constitution the clause forbidding proselytism was moved from Article 3 (where the subject of proselytism was treated as a matter of protecting solely the Orthodox Church) to Article 13 on human rights (thus prohibiting proselytism perpetrated against *any* faith)⁶⁰. The articles of the 1975 Constitution in force today which determine Church-state relations are mainly Articles 3, 13 and 16. The first affirms recognition of Orthodoxy as the 'prevailing' faith; the second guarantees

⁵⁸ Space limitations do not allow for a thorough historical examination; see P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, and Antonis Manitakis, *The Relations of the Church with the Nation-State* [in Greek].

⁵⁹ The president's oath no longer pledges protection of the Orthodox faith, but it does make reference to the deity. There is no alternative oath, as is provided for members of Parliament in Article 59 of the 1975 Constitution (See Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.67). According to Papastathis, 'this is an indirect way of promoting the election of a Christian president only and does not conform to the principle of equality (as set out in Article 4 of the Greek Constitution)'. C.Papastathis, 'State and church in Greece', p.84.

⁶⁰ There was also, in previous constitutions, a provision prohibiting *any* activity aimed against the Greek Orthodox faith (this clause was aimed to limit conversions from Orthodoxy to other faiths). This too was omitted from the 1975 Constitution. Likewise, according to the 1975 Constitution, confiscation of newspapers and other publications upon their distribution is allowed in cases where any 'known' religion (not only Christianity) is offended. (For an explanation of the term 'known', see below). P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, pp.133-5.

religious freedoms of conscience and of worship⁶¹; and the third sets out 'development of religious conscience of youth' as one of the aims of national education.

Many of the changes in the 1975 Constitution were designed to extend religious freedoms to other faiths as well, and to limit the extent to which the Orthodox Church has a privileged and protected status. However, these aims have not been fully met. This is due, in part, to the wording of Article 3 of the Constitution, which indicates that Greek Orthodoxy is the 'prevailing' faith: it is unclear whether the term 'prevailing' indicates a statement of fact (i.e., reflecting the predominance of the faith, representing approximately 97% of the population in Greece), or whether the term entails a normative statement (i.e., that Orthodoxy *ought to be* the prevailing religion, and is thus deserving of protective privileges)⁶². The former is the predominant view amongst constitutional specialists and within Greek courts⁶³. However, there is a great deal of debate over whether, regardless of constitutional terminology and predominant interpretations, in practice the faith *is* treated as if it ought to prevail in Greece, thus granting the Orthodox Church of Greece privileges vis-à-vis the state and over other faiths represented in the country.

In terms of privileges vis-à-vis the state, the clergy of the Orthodox Church of Greece are remunerated and pensioned by the state: the state pays the salaries and

⁶¹ Paragraphs 1 and 2, respectively, of Article 13. According to Paragraph 2, 'known' religions are protected by this provision. To be 'known' the religion must not have a secret dogma or a hidden cult; it must apply to the Greek state for recognition; and the cult should not offend public order and moral principles. The latter includes the whole set of civil, moral, social and economic principles and beliefs prevailing in Greek society at a given period. The above conditions are enforced by the public administration and, ultimately, by the courts. See C.Papastathis, 'State and church in Greece', p.84.

⁶² Nicos C. Alivizatos, 'A new role for the Greek Church?', p.25.

⁶³ According to specialist in Ecclesiastical Law, Ioannis Konidaris, the concept of 'prevailing religion' is not to be construed as the right to dominate other religious communities; it now has no normative content. Instead, it has a mainly declaratory sense: namely, it denotes that the overwhelming majority of Greeks belong to this Church and that state occasions are only celebrated according to the rites of this Church. See I.Konidaris, 'The legal parameters of Church and State relations in Greece', p.226.

pensions of the clergy, preachers and lay employees of the Orthodox Church, and the Church is exempted from taxation⁶⁴. Furthermore, Metropolitans are given a role in the issuance of licenses for the building of places of worship for minority faiths. The lessons of religion in public schools reflect official Orthodox positions. State holidays are based on the religious calendar, so that the holidays of the Greek Orthodox Church are acknowledged as official national holidays⁶⁵. Also significant is the fact that the Statutory Charter of the Church must be passed by the Plenary Session of Parliament⁶⁶. Meanwhile, the Archbishop presides over each opening session of Parliament and blesses with Holy Water each of the Parliamentarians. Of especially symbolic impact is the fact that Church and state leaders often jointly preside over state functions and national holiday celebrations⁶⁷. Finally, one cannot underestimate the role of politicians themselves in entrenching such church-state links through their own presence and contributions to religious functions⁶⁸. Each of these facts, in varying degrees, entails an especially close relationship between church and state in Greece.

⁶⁴ I.Konidaris, *ibid*, pp.227-228. As Papastathis notes, the state also receives 35% of all parish revenues. Furthermore, certain tax exemptions apply to other faiths as well. C.Papastathis, 'State and church in Greece', p.86.

⁶⁵ As Konidaris explains, this is the case significantly beyond the celebration, in other European states, of Christmas and Easter as public holidays.

⁶⁶ I.Konidaris, 'The legal parameters of Church and State relations in Greece', pp.227-228.

⁶⁷ A small but telling example is that National Independence Day, 25th of March, is also a major religious holiday (the annunciation of Mary), and the celebrations across the country are jointly presided over by Church and state leaders. It is interesting to note that, during one of the most intense church-state conflicts in history (over ecclesiastical property; see below), one of the Church's most severe reprisals was refusal to be present at the 25 March celebrations.

⁶⁸ This is a tremendous topic for which space does not allow full attention. The subject is, however, more thoroughly addressed in the following chapter on the national identity card issue. For further information about politicians' emphasis on church-state links with regard to other matters, see N.Kokosalakis, 'Greek Orthodoxy and modern socio-economic change' (especially the sections on 'The functions of religion in Greek society', and 'Religion and recent socio-economic change', pp.257-265); 'Orthodoxie grecque, modernité et politique'; and 'Orthodoxy and social change in modern Greek society'. See also T.Stavrou, 'The Orthodox Church and political culture in Greece', pp.35-54; N.Demertzis 'La place de la religion dans la culture politique grecque'; V.Georgiadou, 'Greek Orthodoxy and the politics of nationalism' (especially pp.307-310); and A.Paparizos, 'Du caractère religieux de l'état grec moderne'.

Problems of religious freedoms and equality

Of particular importance to us here is how some of the privileges of the Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the state entail restrictions on religious freedoms of heterodox citizens and limitations on the principle of equality. These restrictions raise problems with regard to Greece's status as a signatory to the European Charter for Human Rights. Thus, we will now focus on specific privileges afforded to the Orthodox Church of Greece over and at the cost of other faiths. Again, it is not so much the formal constitutional establishment of the Orthodox Church of Greece as 'prevailing' which is problematic, but the advantages to the Orthodox Church which exist in practice. These privileges, as we shall see, continue to exist due to the complex interaction between the religion-national identity link, historical trends in Church-state relations, and the political impact which results from both of these factors. We identify here three domains of the Orthodox Church's privileges in particular: the building and operation of places of worship for non-Orthodox peoples in Greece; the application of legal provisions against proselytism; and the aim and content of the religious courses in public schools. A fourth issue, that of the inclusion of religious persuasion on the national identity cards, will be discussed at length in the following chapter⁶⁹.

It is a 1939 law, enacted under the Metaxas dictatorship, which remains in force as determinant of the rights of minority faiths to construct churches and operate places of worship. According to this law, beyond the usual building permit, the construction of

⁶⁹ For more analyses of each of the aforementioned issues from both legal and sociological perspectives, see A.Pollis, 'Greek national identity: religious minorities, rights and European norms'; M.Stathopoulos, *State and Church Relations* [in Greek]; M.Stathopoulos, 'The constitutional provision of religious freedom and state-church relations' [in Greek]; and N.Alivizatos, *The Uncertain Modernisation* [in Greek], especially pp.260-67, and 299-324.

any church or place of worship requires an application for permission submitted to the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs who, in turn, seeks the approval of the competent (relative to the district) Greek Orthodox bishop⁷⁰. If a church is built without license, this is punishable with jail and the local Metropolitan has the right to call for the tearing down of the building. It is important to note, however, that this is one of the most misinterpreted aspects of Greek legislation. For instance, Alivizatos states that the approval of the local bishop is *required*. The approval of the local bishop is actually, in legal terms, an 'opinion' which the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs is required to hear, but not to obey, in deciding on issuance of the permits⁷¹. What remains especially problematic, however, is that this whole legalistic process of permit authorisation gives the sense that all members of minority faith communities are, from the start, suspect and likely to act in ways which are antithetical to public order and

⁷⁰ The application must be signed by 50 families residing in the area. The local bishop is to forward his opinion to the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs on the 'necessity' of such a building (the law states that, for the license, there must be a real need for worship which cannot be satisfied due to the lack of other churches/houses of worship of the same dogma in the geographical area). See N.Alivizatos, 'A new role for the Greek Church?', p.31.

⁷¹ The Metropolitan's permission is only a recommendation which does not bind the Ministry; but if the Ministry did permit the establishment against the Metropolitan's recommendation, it would have to justify its decision. In practice, the Metropolitans are almost always against such developments and the Ministry does not as a rule oppose them. Therefore, the interested party has to appeal to the Council of State; such appeals are usually accepted. See C.Papastathis, 'State and church in Greece', p.85. Furthermore, Alivizatos writes that the faith must be 'known' in order to receive approval, and he declares that only two non-Orthodox faiths are 'known': Judaism and Islam. Indeed, the Constitution only makes reference to these two 'known' faiths; this because, at the time of its drafting, only those two faiths had official presence in Greece in terms of formal administration of their places of worship. However, the legal provision which, in practice, determines 'known' faiths today includes any sect whose initiation process does not include secret rituals. The Ministry of Education, and the Official Church, 'recognise' a far larger number of faiths. Also, the relative significance of the 'known' clause, in practical terms, is exhibited by the fact that far more openly problematic has been approval of the building of a mosque in Athens (with Islam as a known faith), than of places of worship of other, 'unknown' faiths. Furthermore, one should note that there is an alternative, much less strict process for the building and/or operation of places of worship, but which would legally come into existence as 'religious meeting places'. In this case, the interested party, without needing some minimal number of co-signatories, submits an application to the Ministry of Education, simply stating his/her address for confirmation that a 'meeting place' for the same dogma does not exist in the same area.

upright morals⁷². Also, the discriminatory enforcement of this legislation by Greek authorities has been the subject matter of the only case leading to unreserved condemnation of Greece by the European Court of Human Rights for practices against religious minorities⁷³. Thus, in reality, the prevailing tendency today still gives priority to the safeguarding of the prevailing religion over true religious freedom⁷⁴.

The second problematic issue relates to legislation against proselytism. Although the 1975 Constitution extended the law against proselytism to protect *all* faiths and not solely Orthodoxy, the prevalent tendency is use of this legislation mainly to defend the Orthodox Church against the spread of other faiths in Greece⁷⁵. This also has led to several indictments against the Greek state in the ECHR⁷⁶. As in the case of licenses for the building and running of places of worship, the operative legislation on proselytism goes back to the time of the Metaxas dictatorship. In specific terms, the definition of proselytism is set out in a 1939 law as: 'the attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion...by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect, or naïveté'⁷⁷. Especially problematic here is the vague wording of the clause, which has allowed for extremely strict interpretation of *specifically* non-Orthodox actions. As Alivizatos notes, the mere distribution of pamphlets and brochures, and the mailing of books and periodicals, have led to prosecution and even to prison sentences⁷⁸.

⁷² P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.139.

⁷³ N.Alivizatos, 'A new role for the Greek Church?', p.32.

⁷⁴ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.144.

⁷⁵ Or, perhaps more precisely, against the threat of conversions from Orthodoxy to other faiths.

⁷⁶ See pp.134-5 of Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, for details of individual cases.

⁷⁷ Law 1672/1939. See N.Alivizatos, 'A new role for the Greek Church?', p.30. See text for the full operative definition of proselytism (the above quotation is only part of the definition), and for an analysis of problematic aspects of the definition. See also Introduction (chapter one), footnote 14, for further details.

⁷⁸ Alivizatos also notes, however (p.30), that the ECHR missed an opportunity to change this state of affairs through its ruling on the Kokkinakis case, which reached the ECHR. It condemned Greece for unmotivated enforcement of the anti-proselytism provision, but ruled that member states have a legitimate interest to

Finally, the religion courses in public schools are problematic on two fronts. Again, Article 16 (Paragraph 2) of the 1975 Constitution sets out that the intention of education is, amongst other things, ‘the development of religious conscience of the Greeks’. This decree does not explicitly call for a mandatory lesson in religion, nor does it state that the development of religious conscience must be one-denominational and catechetical in character⁷⁹. But the implementation of this decree puts into question guarantees of freedom of conscience (set out in Article 13 of the same Constitution). In primary and secondary education the mandatory lesson⁸⁰ is of catechetical character: according to law 1566/1985, the intention of the course is, amongst others, to ‘help the students possess faith towards the fatherland and towards the genuine elements of the Orthodox Christian tradition’. In the case of tertiary education, the intention of the programme includes development of the students’ ‘awareness of the deeper importance of the Orthodox Christian ethos’⁸¹. According to Dimitropoulos, the purpose of this religious education is neither to acquire knowledge about religious phenomena nor to understand the religious and cultural environment in which students live, but to make students good Christians, faithful members of the dominant religious community and

prosecute ‘improper proselytism’. The ECHR did not provide its own definition of the term ‘proselytism’ or explain what it interprets to be ‘improper proselytism’.

⁷⁹ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.145.

⁸⁰ Mandatory for Orthodox Christians, that is; other-denominational students may be excused from the course upon provision of proof of other denominational status.

⁸¹ This is a matter of open debate, with the StE (Council of State, ie. Supreme Court of Greece) having issued an ‘opinion’ that a. the religion courses should have a *thriskeiologiko* (of the history of religions), not catechetical, character—an opinion which, of course, has received great criticism from the Church. Furthermore, both the StE and the Data Protection Authority expressed the opinion (in November 2002) that the current process by which one may be exempted from the course—requiring proclamation of another faith—should also be amended. See ‘History of religions, not catechism’, *Ta Nea*, 12 November 2002, p.27 [in Greek]. Finally, the current character of the religious courses may also be considered to be in conflict with the operating laws against proselytism (that is, under the aforementioned loose definition of the term, the religious courses in public schools could also be interpreted as proselytism).

supportive of the perspectives of the Official Church⁸². Furthermore, the religion course also raises questions concerning the principle of equality provided for in Article 4 of the Constitution. A 1949 decision of the Council of State ruled that only Orthodox individuals could teach the course. Accordingly in primary schools, where there is only one teacher for all the subjects taught, a non-Orthodox teacher could not be hired⁸³. In secondary schools, the exclusion of non-Orthodox teachers only applied to teachers of the religion course. In practice though, the administration has resisted hiring heterodox teachers even for the teaching of courses which have nothing to do with religion: 'the non-Orthodox teacher was seen as suspect for proselytism...since he was not enlightened by the 'truth of faith'⁸⁴. Against the staunch resistance of the Church, the law was changed in 1988 so as to allow for heterodox teachers to be able to teach all subjects but the lesson of religion. Now a non-Orthodox may be appointed as teacher in a primary school with at least two posts, in which case the religion course is taught by his/her Orthodox colleague⁸⁵. The latter fact effectively means that non-Orthodox teachers still may not be hired at schools with posts for only one teacher⁸⁶.

⁸² P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.146.

⁸³ C.Papastathis, 'State and church in Greece', pp.83-4.

⁸⁴ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.147.

⁸⁵ C.Papastathis, 'State and church in Greece', p.83-4. Teaching of the religion courses is carried out by teachers in primary schools and graduates of theology in secondary schools; both are considered civil servants and receive a salary from the state, while their appointment and the subject-matter taught are not controlled by the Church. Each religious denomination can have its own schools in Greece. The state is also in charge of schools for the Muslim minority in Western Thrace as well as of an academy for future teachers in these schools (Papastathis, p.89).

⁸⁶ Some schools hire two teachers for each class, so that the courses are shared between two teachers, one of which must be Orthodox so that he/she can teach the course on religion. This too is currently under discussion at the StE, which issued its opinion (in November 2002) that non-Orthodox teachers should be allowed to teach even the course on religion (this opinion was issued at the same time with the aforementioned judgement on the content of the courses). This also received harsh criticism from the Church. See 'History of religions, not catechism', *Ta Nea*, 12 November 2002, p.27; M.Antoniadou, 'The battle over the religion courses', *To Vima*, 8 December 2002, p.A50; and V.Fotopoulou, 'Heterodox teachers also in the schools', *Eleutherotypia*, 13 November 2002, p.55. The human rights issues examined above have generated a great deal of debate in political and academic circles in Greece (for one excellent overview, see G.Sotirelis, 'The separation of church and state: the revision which did not happen').

Church-state conflict

All of the above explanation of close links between church and state should make it clear that the Church is a powerful force to be reckoned with in Greek politics and society. Our focus below, and in the following chapter, is on the national identity card issue. But we will give brief attention to its most important precursors in terms of church-state conflict. With such background information we will be able to identify some common patterns in church-state conflict, and some important distinctions with regard to the identity card issue. The first major conflict between church and state following Greece's 1974 return to democratic governance reveals some important patterns which deserve special attention: in particular, staunch, defensive battles waged by the Church, and the tendency of the state to compromise its stances⁸⁷. In 1985 a PASOK⁸⁸ government came to power after an intense campaign including the revision of church-state relations. Arguing that the state's covering of the whole of the Church's functional expenses was a large burden on the state budget, the government proposed reform in the management of Church estate and the yielding of part of the vast Church property to the state⁸⁹. The then Minister of Education and Religious Affairs Antonis Tritsis introduced laws 1700/1988 on 'the regulation of issue of church estate', and 1811/1988 on 'the yielding of forest and agricultural estates of the monasteries of the

Internally to the Orthodox Church, however, the most substantial approach to human rights issues is offered by Anastasios Yannoulatos (Archbishop of Albania). See, for example, his papers 'Social co-existence in religious pluralism' and 'Eastern Orthodoxy and human rights'.

⁸⁷ Both tendencies are reminiscent of the conflict over the 'attack' on monastery properties under King Otto.

⁸⁸ Panhellenic Socialist Movement.

⁸⁹ This was also seen as legally justifiable since much of the church estate was informally given (i.e., without legal titles of ownership) to the Church during the time of the Ottoman occupation, simply because only thus could Greeks ensure that the property would not be claimed by the Ottoman state.

Church of Greece to the public'. The plan provoked acute reactions from the Church, which argued that the provisions were unlawful in their lack of provision of an *exchange* in favour of the Church⁹⁰. A counter-proposal was offered to the state, whereby 4/5^{ths} of the church estate would be transferred to the state, and rights would be given to the Church for the development of the remaining land for construction or tourism. This was not accepted, and the hierarchs heightened their reactions to the state's proposals by boycotting the 25th March national independence day celebrations and by organising a mass demonstration in Constitution Square (*Syntagma* Square). The Church took the case to the Greek Supreme Court ('Council of State', StE), which ruled in favour of the state. Finally, following threats from the Archbishop that the Church would publicly declare itself as 'under prosecution', a series of personal meetings between the Archbishop and the Prime Minister yielded a 'temporary' impasse which continues until today⁹¹.

Under the same government there was also considerable tension over the state's 'progressive' efforts to reform the civil code. The government introduced legislative change towards equality of the sexes, decriminalisation of adultery, end of the dowry system, etc. One such proposed change was to make civil marriage required; this became a central point of intense struggle between church and state. It is merely significant to note that again, in this case, the state compromised under pressure from the Church, and civil marriage was simply made an option and legally equal to religious marriage. This too remains a sore issue, with repeated calls on the part of certain scholars and politicians

⁹⁰ The argument was made with reference to Constitutional Article 17, which states that no one may be stripped of his/her rights to ownership without proper compensation.

⁹¹ The 1988 law were never fully applied; Minister Tristis resigned in personal protest; and certain monasteries took their cases to the ECHR.

for reform of marriage laws, and defensive expressions of fear, on the part of the Church, that the state might try again to 'get its way' on the matter⁹².

In the following chapter I examine one particular incidence of church-state conflict: that over the removal of religion from the national identity cards. This issue is particularly important for our purposes because it illustrates a clash between church and state interests which was intricately linked to the European Union. A thorough understanding of this complex subject, however, requires a grasp of 'traditional' attitudes to Europe and the EU prevailing within Orthodox circles in Greece.

Greek Orthodoxy and Europe

My focus here is on attitudes towards Europe and the EU specifically, as expressed both by the Church and within wider Greek Orthodox circles. I aim to present a range of perspectives, though I emphasise expressions of anti-Europeanism. Thus, what follows should not be understood as a 'general view' of Greek Orthodox attitudes to Europe: within both Greek Orthodoxy and Eastern Orthodoxy in general, there are (and always have been) strong trends of pro-Europeanism. However, negative attitudes to European integration, Europe in general and the West are common within most expressions of Greek Orthodoxy, and were especially prevalent in previous decades. Scrutiny of attitudes is useful as background information for our understanding of the Church's stance on the identity card issue (chapter four). Because a certain negative

⁹² See E.Prodromou, 'Democracy, Religion and Identity in Socialist Greece: Church-State Relations under PASOK, 1981-1989', pp. 227, 249 and 283. See also A.Pollis, 'Greece, a problematic secular state', pp.157-159. Again, our focus in this section is on post-1974 events. For a thorough analysis of church-state conflicts before this period, see G.D.Kent, *The political influence of the Orthodox Church of Greece*, pp.333-383.

attitude to (Western) Europe is rooted in history, I will begin with a brief historical overview of this stance within the Church. I will then examine attitudes to Europe and the European Union as expressed in a selection of religious publications. Finally, I will give special attention to the so-called 'Neo-Orthodox' movement in Greece, which has traditionally highlighted distinctions between Orthodoxy and Europe/the West.

A careful examination reveals Orthodox attitudes to the West and to the EU as multi-dimensional, and shaped by particular time-periods, events, and people. Thus, it is impossible to make valid generalisations. One general point, however, must be made: the fact that there is a confusion in Greece between the terms 'Europe' and 'the West'⁹³. As we shall see in our consideration of expressions of 'religious anti-Europeanism', this confusion extends to the European integration project in general (from the ECSC, the EEC, and the EC to the EU).

According to Vasilios Makrides, a sense of Greek exclusivity and superiority towards others dates back to Greek antiquity and was strengthened during the Byzantine Period. This sense of cultural superiority over the Western Roman Empire took on religious dimensions when Charlemagne was consecrated 'Emperor of the Romans' by Pope Leo III. Religious tension between East and West was clear from the 9th century, and it culminated in the Great Schism between the Eastern and Western Christian Churches in 1054. The fall of Constantinople in 1204 under the 4th Crusade, in particular, marks the time from which 'the West began to represent a region full of perils for Orthodoxy and Byzantium'⁹⁴. It is after the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman

⁹³ This is a tendency which dates back to the 18th c. See V.Makrides, 'Aspects of Greek Orthodox fundamentalism', p.54.

⁹⁴ V.Makrides, 'Le Rôle de l'Orthodoxie dans la formation de l'antieuropéanisme et l'occidentalisme grecs', p.107.

Empire, in 1453, that 'the West' begins to be identified with 'Europe' in Greek Orthodox rhetoric. As we saw earlier in this chapter, a hostility towards Europe developed during the 18th century, in opposition to Enlightenment ideals emanating from Europe. The Europeanisation of Greece was considered by many conservatives and Greek Orthodox clergy as a threat to Orthodoxy. This sentiment existed throughout the Greek Revolution, and was strengthened during the rule of Bavarian King Otto, as European influence over Greece began to be negatively associated with the rule of a European king who seemed to be instigating the 'Protestantisation' of the newly independent country and the suppression of the influence of Greek Orthodoxy (through subjugation of the Church to the state). Certain socio-political and historical developments, then, served to forge disapproving attitudes to Europe, particularly within religious circles.

In recent times, we see negativity towards Europe as sporadic and specific to certain groups or certain clerics. A notable example is the vehement hostility expressed within Orthodox circles towards the EU because of the Schengen Agreement. The agreement called for the registration of all citizens of the European Union by means of a census requiring divulgence of personal information which, for many in the Church, constituted an infringement on individual liberty. Most alarming for ecclesiastical circles⁹⁵, was the fact that the census foreseen by the Schengen Agreement involved a computer system which somehow hinged on use of the number 666 (which, according to the Book of Revelation, is a number symbolising Satan). During the 1997 Easter season, the Church issued a 3-page encyclical warning the congregation of EU developments, including the Schengen Agreement, which 'pose a threat to the freedom of the individual

⁹⁵ But especially for Greek Orthodox 'fundamentalists'; Old Calendarists in particular rallied against the implementation of the Schengen Agreement because of its use of the number 666.

Greek'⁹⁶. The bulletin communicated sharp indignation over this European system which offended Orthodox Christianity by the use of the number symbolising Satan.

A further example is the reaction of some Orthodox to the EEC funding of a film which advocated the abolition of frontiers within Europe. The bishop of the diocese in which the production was filmed—Bishop Kantiotis of Florina⁹⁷—led a mass protest against the film, excommunicated the film's director (Theo Angelopoulos), proclaimed the film a danger for Orthodoxy and Greece itself, and condemned what he considered 'the interference of the European Union in Greek internal affairs'. Bishop Kantiotis denounced Angelopoulos as an 'agent of the European Union', and argued that the enemies of the Greek people are the 'EEC, anarchism, and internationalism'⁹⁸. The bishop had opposed Greek membership in the European Economic Community even from the 1980's, arguing that the EEC would impose decisions contrary to the Orthodox tradition⁹⁹.

Finally, the words of the then Metropolitan (now Archbishop) Christodoulos are also a powerful example of negativity towards the European Union:

The problem is very old. Directly after our liberation from the Turkish yoke the governing political and intellectual order in Greece became trapped in the perception that Hellenism could survive if it neglected its eastern mentality and if Greeks were to walk uninhibited in their course toward the West...I do not want to say that the integration of the EU is wrong. But it is dangerous...Today Hellenism is in danger of being absorbed into the European crucible...The Church should not isolate the Greek from Europe, nor though should it surrender him to Europe¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁶ The bulletin is Circulation No. 2626 of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, 7 April 1997. For further discussion of this bulletin, see K.Kotsiopoulos, *Orthodoxy and Europe*, p.73.

⁹⁷ A city in Northwestern Thrace, with a large population of Turkish Muslims and traditionally a strong centre of religious nationalism.

⁹⁸ V.Makrides, 'Le Rôle de l'Orthodoxie dans la formation de l'antieuropéanisme et l'occidentalisme grecs', pp.111-12.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p.111.

¹⁰⁰ Christodoulos, 'Hellenism and Europe', *To Vima*, 19 January 1997, p. A17. [in Greek].

I turn now to an overview of attitudes, often negative, to Europe as revealed in a selection of religious publications¹⁰¹. One representative example of these attitudes is the publication of cleric Ierotheos Vlachou, *Orthodoxy and the Western Way of Life*¹⁰². The book was published in 1994, under the pretext of ‘the critical condition of our times...since today with the vision and the reality of the European Union Orthodoxy meets more closely with the West’¹⁰³. Vlachou begins this text by emphasising that ‘East’ and ‘West’ are not simply geographical areas, nor intellectual or abstract terms, but indicative of specific ‘ways of life’¹⁰⁴. The text, according to its author, is devoted to showing the significance and magnitude of the Orthodox way of life as ‘the more authentic’ way¹⁰⁵. Chapter One of the book begins with the declaration that ‘we are at the threshold of our full integration into the European Community and everyone is talking about this issue. It is serious, because it has many consequences for the life of our Ethnos’. According to Vlachou, most discussion is on the economic consequences for Greece but ‘the problem is more serious from the spiritual side’, because ‘the European countries are under the spiritual dominance and influence of Papism and Protestantism’, which he sees as the embodiment of power-seeking and intellectualism respectively.

¹⁰¹ Due to space limitations, this overview is necessarily selective. The Church, individual clerics and theologians have produced a number of pamphlets and monographs which offer Greek Orthodox perspectives on the EU. See, for example, Metropolitan Anthimos (ed.), *Our Orthodox Church in the Accession of Greece to the EEC*; K.Kotsiopoulos, *Orthodoxy and Europe*; K.Mouratidou, *Orthodoxy in United Europe*; G.Tsetsi, *European Unity and Church*; G.Metallinos, *Orthodoxy and Hellenism in the Contemporary World*; Metropolitan Ierotheos, *The European Union and our Cultural Tradition*; Metropolitan Ierotheos, *Identity and Identities*. For more general Orthodox perspectives beyond the Greek context, see Metropolitan Damaskinos, *Orthodoxy and United Europe* [all of the above texts are in Greek]; O.Clément, *Conversations with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I* (especially chapter nine, ‘On Europe’); and G.Papathomas, ‘Internal Orthodox Mission’ (especially section on ‘Prejudice against European integration’).

¹⁰² I.Vlachou, *Orthodoxy and the Western Way of Life*. [in Greek]

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.19.

¹⁰⁴ This he defines as ‘a specific stance of life towards all issues which have to do with God, man and creation’.

¹⁰⁵ I.Vlachou, *ibid.*, p.19.

Though this has been the case mainly in *historical* terms, Vlachou continues, in contemporary terms it translates into a climate of prosperity and individualism prevailing in Europe¹⁰⁶.

Vlachou suggests that there are two main possibilities as to how EU membership will affect Orthodox Greeks: either 'we will be changed by the climate of prosperity and individualism which prevails in Europe, thus alienating ourselves from Orthodox Tradition', or 'we may change and metamorphose Europe with the whole Tradition which we have to offer'. The latter, Vlachou argues, is especially difficult today for two reasons: first, because contemporary Greeks (and particularly politicians who 'come into contact with the large European centres') are already, to a large extent, alienated from the Orthodox tradition; and second because today the unification of Europe is sought not on the basis of spiritual criteria, but economic interests¹⁰⁷. Accordingly, the Church itself is called to stand in opposition to Europeanising trends.

Vlachou then goes on to enumerate the differences between 'Orthodox' and 'western' 'ways of life'. One of these is the fact that in the Orthodox East the centre was always the village, the small city, the island (what he calls decentralization), whilst in the West, the centre was the bourgeois society and the industrialised city. The Church, the diocese, and the monastery were also always at the centre of Orthodox societies; in the West, the centre of social life became the factory and science. Vlachou also sees a fundamental difference between the Orthodox and western peoples in their professional contexts: in the East, these are characterised by cooperation and guilds, whilst in the West, syndicates prevail within a climate of class struggles. There, the syndicates and

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p.23.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, pp.24-25.

different occupational groups are interested more in prosperity and the increase of gross domestic product, all within a focus on individualism.

This theme of fundamental differences between Orthodoxy and the West (described in the context of discussions on Europe) is echoed in the periodical of the oldest and best-known religious brotherhood, *Zoe* (the publication bears the title of the group). In *Zoe* we find frequent references to ‘the material mentality which rules the western world today’¹⁰⁸. The journal calls upon European citizens to demand from their leaders a new balance not only between politics and economics, but a new balance between economics and spiritual values (which, the journal’s authors consider, is completely lacking in the European integration project). We see that the EU is approached from a particularly conservative lens. For example, one article noting the Amsterdam Treaty’s condemnation of capital punishment, complains of the Treaty’s failure to comment on the abolition of the capital punishment of innocent unborn life, and questions whether, for the EU, ‘the life of the atrocious murderers is more precious than that of the hopeful life of the embryo’. It goes on to cite the Treaty’s promise of greater transparency of EU mechanisms for the benefit of its citizens, and suggests that this is simply to ‘sweeten the dangerous pill of the Schengen Agreement’¹⁰⁹.

The subject of the Schengen Agreement is frequently visited in the pages of *Zoe*. We see here in particular the preoccupation with the use of the number 666 in Schengen’s consensus mechanism: ‘it seems paradoxical *on the one hand* for our country to be branded by the stamp of Christ and the Holy Trinity, in the Name of Which its Constitution has been voted in and devoted, and the holy Cross which literally adorns its

¹⁰⁸ *Zoe*, Issue 3918, 8 January 1997. [This and all other *Zoe* issues cited below are in Greek]

¹⁰⁹ *Zoe*, Issue 3902, 19 June 1997.

flag, and *on the other hand* for us to accept as a government and as a community to implement laws which presuppose the compliance of the Greek State with an electronic system, the basic element of which is the code number 666'¹¹⁰. The EU in general is seen through this particular prism: 'for the vision of the United Europe to become a reality, the unethical principles of self-interest and unclean diplomacy must be laid aside, and the human values of justice, freedom, and respect of the individuality of all citizens must be applied. With suspect electronic filing [i.e., the Schengen Agreement] they are building on sand'¹¹¹.

In general, the EU is portrayed as a negative influence on Greece in a range of domains. With reference to family values, a *Zoe* article declares 'Europe is in danger': 'With what materials is this grandiose structure being built? Is it being built strongly or simply with impressive materials?' The evidence, the article suggests, is not at all encouraging: explaining that the institution of the family is facing a big crisis, the article notes that approximately one of four marriages ends in divorce in the EU and that there are fewer and fewer weddings taking place in the member countries. 'It is', the article's author declares, 'truly an issue of life or death for the society -- either the progress or the collapse of the family. Without constructive families there are not constructive societies...The institution of the family is rooted in strong spiritual bases—i.e., in Christ. Accordingly, Europe will either become consciously Christian or it will disappear. Without Christian values the per capita income cannot save it'¹¹².

Conscientious objection is another domain in which the EU is seen to influence Greece negatively:

¹¹⁰ *Zoe*, Issue 3897, 15 May 1997. See also Issue 3882, 27 January 1997.

¹¹¹ *Zoe*, Issue 3898, 22 May 1997.

¹¹² *Zoe*, Issue 3940, 10 December 1998.

The government is compliant with our European partners and introduced the so-called 'alternative social service'. And already, according to journalistic sources, the first evaders of responsibility to the Fatherland have begun to offer their services in other community-natured services. But their demands don't stop here. Now they ask for social service to be in institutions independent of the Ministry of Defence; for the lessening of the length of service; for an increase in their wages...until finally they will ask for complete exemption. And this because they declare that, in the European countries, if you are a 'conscientious objector' you are without responsibilities. Of course from people whose souls were not warmed by the holy sentiments and the grandeur of patriotism, what else could one expect? Our questions are: is Greece in the same position as Belgium, Holland, Denmark and the other European countries which use the army only in parades? Do they have neighbours, like we Turkey, who constantly threaten our Fatherland?¹¹³.

Finally, in the domain of education as well Europe is considered a harmful influence:

We find ourselves these days in front of an especially worrisome phenomenon: the brushing aside of spiritual values in general and specifically the education of the youth. Obvious proof is the downgrading of the religious lesson even in secondary education...it is thus that some try to educate and shape a new generation, in accordance with the measures and demands of Europe, a freakish construction which will support gigantic heads on liliputian ethical shoulders. We do not want to believe that this is happening consciously. Probably rather from mimicry and thoughtlessness. So they won't seem inferior to our European partners. And they forget the specificity of the Greek. His history. His cultural roots. The treasure of his orthodox [*sic*] faith...If we do not arm the new generation with spiritual and ethical equipment, we risk the future of the Ethnos¹¹⁴.

¹¹³ *Zoe*, Issue 3940, 10 December 1998.

¹¹⁴ *Zoe*, Issue 3914, 13 November 1997. The issue of patriotism itself is much-discussed in *Zoe*. In one issue critics of primary school students' expression of patriotism are referred to as 'people whose soul was not warmed by the grandeur and the holy sentiments of love towards the Fatherland' (Issue 3921, 19 February 1998); and two issues later (19 March), after singing the praises of the Greek ethnos and its heroic figures, an article states that '[t]hat which we must proclaim today, towards every direction, is that an Ethnos which wants to live and grow does not attend only to the "per capita income" or for the Maastricht Treaty. It gives at least the same priority also to the spiritual values. And one such value is true patriotism' (Issue 3923, 19 March 1998).

The European Union is also presented, in the pages of *Zoe*, through the prism of policies on Cyprus, Turkey and Serbia. The journal's authors frequently express dismay over the EU's turning a blind eye to certain developments in Cyprus in order 'not to displease Ankara'. For instance, when the EU failed to act on southern Cypriots' complaints over the transformation of a monastery in northern Cyprus into a casino, a *Zoe* article identifies 'Western self-deceit' as a greater problem than 'Turkish barbarism'¹¹⁵. The critique is even sharper in the following journal issue: 'unfortunately in our times human rights, freedom, democracy and national dignity are exchanged for business, oil, and military bases. Spinelessness and caesaropapism control the fate of Europe, those which support the barbarian Asiatic and want him as their "partner" for reasons of cheap expediency; is it possible to expect of them [European leaders] a struggle for man and for humanity, for the ideals which distinguish the human community from the jungle?' With reference to Kosovo, the article goes on to ask why the West did not intervene in favour of the 6.5 million Kurds in Turkey by threatening Ankara with bombardment: 'Why are the massacres and persecutions perpetrated by the Turks accepted, such as those in the occupation of Cyprus?' The lack of EU justice on this front is considered evidence that the EU is not being built on solid ground¹¹⁶. Likewise, EU policy on Serbia is offered as evidence of 'the misery of United Europe': 'sometime, in its beginning, United Europe was an idea. It was not soulless funding schemes and the cold Euro. The 'Eurocrats' were the vanguards of the ambitious project of the building of a new Europe, which was buttressed on the foundation of ethical and spiritual values. Today, they have become political machines, without souls, without

¹¹⁵ *Zoe*, Issue 3944, 4 February 1999.

¹¹⁶ *Zoe*, Issue 3948, 1 April 1999.

vision, without ethnical values. When Serbia was burning...the European Commission had closed their ears to the wailings of the innocent victims'¹¹⁷.

Particularly interesting is the attitude to Europe expressed within the 'Neo-Orthodox movement' in Greece¹¹⁸. The movement is difficult to define precisely: the term has been used informally in Greece as a designation for certain intellectuals and artists—many of whom themselves deny the identification for themselves¹¹⁹. In general, Neo-Orthodoxy denotes a group of intellectuals who, beginning in the 1980's, engaged in a dialogue with a new generation of theologians, with the intention to 'rediscover the Greek Orthodox identity and to defend the Greek culture against western influences'¹²⁰. Rather than a direct criticism of the West and of Europe, the movement entails opposition to the 'way of life' of the West, which is considered diametrically opposed to that of *Eastern, Greek Orthodoxy*. The representatives of this current of thought often single out the EU, and Greece's membership therein, as a threat to Greece's cultural specificity¹²¹.

The emergence in the 1980's of the publication *Synaksi* (or, 'meeting') is widely

¹¹⁷ *Zoe*, Issue 3949, 15 April 1999.

¹¹⁸ The 'Neo-Orthodox' movement in Greece should not be confused with other forms of neo-orthodoxy (as prevalent, for instance, within Protestant traditions). Interesting parallels could perhaps be drawn between these, but space limitations do not allow for this. See V.Makrides, 'Conflicting views on Byzantium in contemporary Greece: Romeic/Neorthodox vs. Hellenic/Neopagan', for a fuller definition of the movement.

¹¹⁹ Many describe the Neo-Orthodox movement as the latest manifestation of 'revivals' of Orthodoxy in the 1930's and 1950's, which was carried by a number of Greek theologians and intellectuals. These earlier trends were rooted in a quest for Hellenicity and efforts to cleanse Greek culture of Western trends, and an attempt to fill a spiritual vacuum created by the internal crisis of various pietistic movements, respectively. See V.Makrides, 'Conflicting views on Byzantium in contemporary Greece', pp.7-8. The Neo-Orthodox trend has been most visible, in Greece, within intellectual and artists' circles: beyond some music and poetry, I would not say that their work has reached the popular level. However, though the 'popular level' may not be aware of or interested in the thorough research behind the 'neo-Orthodox' intellectuals' work, the acute awareness of and emphasis on differences between Greek and Western/European culture and identity certainly resonates with a large sector of society, far beyond religious circles (particularly as many of the leading intellectuals in this trend come from the left of the political spectrum, some of them even having formal links to the two communist parties in Greece).

¹²⁰ V.Makrides, 'Le Rôle de l'Orthodoxie dans la formation de l'antieuropéanisme et l'occidentalisme grecs', p.113.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, p.112. See also N.Mouzelis, 'Enlightenment and neo-Orthodoxy', *Civil Society*, Issue 7, 2001, pp.28-32. [in Greek]

considered a part of the Neo-Orthodox movement¹²². Its contributors are mostly theologians, and the texts are devoted to the subjects of theology, society, and politics, with several issues focusing on such matters as religious education in public schools, church-state relations, and the European Union. One of the journal's first issues is entitled 'Europe: a critical view' and includes Orthodox perspectives on the relationship between Orthodoxy and the idea of Europe¹²³. The volume is introduced by Sotiris Gounelas as follows: 'it is certain that if we cannot identify the differences between Orthodoxy and the newer Christian dogmas, we cannot identify even the value of that which we call tradition, [nor can we understand] what and why the difference with Europe'¹²⁴. Gounelas observes that since the Greek revolution, Greeks seem to be resigning themselves to the 'new values and new commands which are forced upon them from outside'. Every modern Greek, he declares, faces an inner struggle ('in his soul') between the traditional elements which make up his character and the 'novel' characteristics 'which, however, do not seek to befriend or merge with the old, but to take their place and to expel them'¹²⁵. Gounelas feels that Greece is so deluged with a plethora of foreign ideas, perspectives, impulses, feelings, theories and demands which strip modern Greek society of consciousness of its specific identity. He defines this specific identity as 'tradition, which is none other than that which we call Orthodoxy, which was maintained completely alive during the period of Turkish Occupation, and through which was saved that which after the Revolution became Greece, and which after

¹²² However, the journal covers a broad range of perspectives; the authors cited below are not necessarily part of the Neo-Orthodox movement.

¹²³ *Synaksi*, Issue 5, 1983. [This and all other *Synaksi* issues referenced below are in Greek]

¹²⁴ S.Gounelas, 'Europe and Us', *Synaksi*, Issue 5, 1983, pp.9-11.

¹²⁵ This statement echoes the point made by Mouzelis (see chapter two) on the difficulties involved in late modernisation in terms of the transposition of new, foreign modes of activity upon old ones with which the new are not compatible. This, he argues, leads to formalism within society.

Independence was persecuted, was distorted, was silenced and was limited by the incursion of a foreign incoherence which flowed throughout Europe in the last centuries and the waters of which overflowed and flooded reborn Greece'¹²⁶.

In another *Synaksi* issue (Issue 29, 1989), an article by Kostas Ganotis reveals an interesting mixture of positive and negative attitudes to Europe¹²⁷. Ganotis begins his article by declaring that the most honourable thing Orthodox Greeks can do is to not condemn the efforts of the Europeans for unity and cooperation, but to remember that those trying to unite now had once 'filled the valleys of Europe with blood'¹²⁸. Every Greek, he claims, has the responsibility to endow today's Europe with Orthodoxy's contributions in the form of united countries and cultures walking together¹²⁹: 'we, as honourable Greeks who are the godparents of Europe (who at least gave it its name) and also as Christian brothers, must "search ourselves", to see what we have this moment to offer to today's Europe. Personally I find nothing more valuable and useful to offer to Europe than Orthodoxy'¹³⁰. But in explaining the importance of such a contribution, he proceeds to level sharp criticism at Europe: 'Europeans, in the drunkenness of the Renaissance, took from Plato dualism and with this dualism they misconstrued and falsified Christianity. They saw as a value the idea...and in the name of the logic they embraced the material....[thus] driving Europe to materialism and from there to the final cataclysm of materialism, nihilism'¹³¹. Thus, he believes that Orthodoxy must show to today's Europe that the problems which it tried to solve are pseudo-problems and that, in

¹²⁶ S.Gounelas, 'Europe and Us', *Synaksi*, Issue 5, 1983, p.10.

¹²⁷ K.Ganotis, 'The contribution of Orthodoxy in the united Europe', *Synaksi*, Issue 29, 1989, pp.43-46.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, p.43.

¹²⁹ He also notes that 'those of us who worry about the future of our culture, should be comforted by the undeniable evidence that there is large quest for Greek culture today in Europe'.

¹³⁰ K.Ganotis, 'The contribution of Orthodoxy in the united Europe', p.44.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, p.44.

order to progress to something good, Europe must deny itself. Europeans, he suggests, have begun to sense this fact, because they have finally 'become enriched with the privilege of despair', through which they are able to learn the lesson¹³².

The next full *Synaksi* issue devoted to the subject of Europe is that entitled 'What does Europe mean for the Greeks?'¹³³. The question is addressed by a number of Greek intellectuals and theologians. According to Gounelas' introduction, there exists a tendency in Greece to gaze—spiritually or physically—outward, so that the view is 'always or almost always dependent upon the winds which blow periodically in Europe'¹³⁴. He declares that today's Greeks are called neither to share the perspectives of Europeans nor to 'walk with them', but to show to them, through the Orthodox Church and Greek history, the 'dead end of their culture: a culture which is going to be founded on an ECONOMIC COMMUNITY is finished'. Instead, Greeks should offer opposition to 'the deluge', and 'seek perhaps dialogue with the deep European roots which existed before the newer culture developed'. It is only in such roots, Gounelas claims, that a common ground can be found between Orthodox Greeks and Europeans¹³⁵.

In the same issue, Apostolos Apostolidis registers his concern that Greece's membership in the EU will, in the short term, lead to a further limitation on the social influence of Greek Orthodoxy and, in the long term, intensify the 'crisis in Greek society'¹³⁶. Because Greece is inundated with western influence, it is especially important that 'we supersede this western challenge with our spiritual chapters [of our history] and the rejuvenation of our tradition'. And this, he contends, would entail a

¹³² *Ibid*, p.46.

¹³³ *Synaksi*, Issue 34, 1990.

¹³⁴ S.Gounelas, 'Introduction to the issue of Greek and European afflictions', *Synaksi*, Issue 34, 1990, p.15.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p.15.

¹³⁶ A.Apostolides, 'Greece, Orthodox tradition and western world', in *Synaksi*, Issue 34, 1990, p.101.

positive influence on Europe. 'Europe needs us not as consumers', he proclaims, 'we are few for it to need us for this—but it need us as inheritors of another proposition for life'. At the same time, Orthodoxy needs Europe in order to reveal the catholicity of truth. Europe thus acts as an 'invitation for us to find our true selves'. Apostolidis further proposes that Greeks must resist blind nationalism *and* faceless internationalism, leaving them with only one alternative: 'the realisation of our specificity'. The mission of Greeks, then, is not to support Europe as an Economic community which levels peoples, but 'to reveal Europe as a spiritual community, in which the national and the ecumenical are not in opposition'¹³⁷.

The views expressed in subsequent pages reveal a comparatively greater focus on the national and ethnic dimensions of what Europe means for the Greeks. According to Metropolitan Irinaios, Europe took its name from Greece and was 'stamped by the Greek Spirit', and the cultures of classical, Hellenic, and Byzantine Greece have likewise marked the spirit of Europe and have become the foundations and roots of its culture, 'but no one can deny the contribution of modern Europe and modern and contemporary Hellenicity in terms of democracy, scholarship and technology'. With the accession of Greece to the European Community, he explains, there have developed new ties and new opportunities for cooperation with its peoples. He proclaims his support for membership in the European Community, but says that membership raises two critical questions: will Greeks be able to maintain their identity? And what will be their contribution to the EC? Metropolitan Irinaios declares, 'our first and most basic goal in living with other European peoples must be the maintenance of our Greek identity. And this maintenance of our identity will be supported, as always, on two foundations: our Greek language and

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, p.101.

our Greco-orthodox tradition'. With these two elements, he declares, Greeks are able to offer 'a new historical contribution to today's and tomorrow's Europe'. Europe has, for three centuries, been poisoned by rationalism, materialism, and nihilism and their resulting wars and revolutions; it needs a new Rebirth and a deeper spiritual renovation. And Orthodoxy, the Metropolitan declares, can help Europe in this, because it 'knows the metaphysical element better'¹³⁸.

Father George Metallinos offers a relatively grimmer picture, by focusing readers' attention on the EU's *History of Europe* text book funded by the European Commission (a project undertaken by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle)¹³⁹. Metallinos raises the point that the text contains no mention of Greece 'as cultural and spiritual provider of Europe', either through its ancient or Byzantine past or through its contemporary contribution. Metallinos also notes that the text was translated into eight languages, excluding Greek. This fact, he explains, 'rightfully heightened the [Greek] sensitivities towards this anti-Hellenic venture on the part of the EEC, indicative of its stance towards our country'. 'In this European conception of Europe', he declares, and 'even in the united Europe, Orthodox Greece, but also the other Orthodox peoples... have no place. In this Duroselle is honest'¹⁴⁰. Metallinos thus concludes that Greeks should be grateful to their European partners for forcing a consciousness of the specificity of their identity (spiritual, civilisational and cultural). The European integration project will, he maintains, be revealed as a true European union when Greeks fulfil their mission of revealing themselves to Europe as representative of the authentically Hellenic Europe of their Romaic Fathers (the vision of which Europeans lost at the end of the first Christian

¹³⁸ Metropolitan Irinaios, 'Europe and us Greeks', *Synaksi*, Issue 34, 1990, pp.80-82.

¹³⁹ Fr. George Metallinos, 'Greece and Europe', *Synaksi*, Issue 34, 1990, pp.83-88.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p.86.

century)¹⁴¹. This theme is echoed by Christos Vakalopoulou who states in the simplest of terms: 'I have the sense that we will fail as Europeans, and this will save us'¹⁴².

The perspective of Nikos Makris, expressed in the pages of the same *Synaksi* issue, are relatively more critical of ethnicity-focused pride which sees only superiority over Europeans¹⁴³. He declares that there are differences between the Orthodox and the Europeans but also common starting points and common theological and philosophical theses which Greeks would do well to always bear in mind. In this context, Orthodoxy is called to witness its spirit and not to condemn heretics, heterodoxy, etc... Orthodoxy is not Greek, as it is neither Russian, Byzantine, or Slavic, and contemporary Greece, in spite of its Orthodox tradition, is not more Christian than any European ethnos; 'unfortunately', he declares, 'the opposite is true'. This perspective is, of course, quite different from the majority of those presented above. The importance of this perspective should not be underestimated, as it is shared by a number of Orthodox theologians and clerics. On the whole, though, such self-critical views remain in the minority (at least, in terms of public, and published, expressions).

Conclusion

Thus, we see a great deal of divergence within 'Orthodox' attitudes to the EU. We find in these texts the recurrent themes of conservatism, traditionalism, and anti-westernism, but also specific reference to threats posed by Europe to Greek cultural and national identity. It is clear through the above citations that these attitudes are largely

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.87.

¹⁴² C.Vakalopoulou, 'Delusion or disguise?', *Synaksi*, Issue 34, 1990, p.96.

¹⁴³ N.Makris, 'Horizons of European tradition and Orthodoxy', *Synaksi*, Issue 34, 1990, pp.43-48.

shaped by the historical relationship between religion and national identity in Greece. Earlier in this chapter we examined how the Church developed a role as representative and protector of Greek national identity. Historically, this role has been buttressed by the Church's close relation to the state. Constitutional provisions afford the Church a great number of privileges, vis-à-vis both the state and other faiths represented in Greece. The constitutional provisions in themselves are not as important as the *reasons why* such Church privileges remain in place. This reason is, in short, that the privileges enjoyed by the Church represent—well beyond articles of the constitution—the traditionally powerful place of religion in Greek state and society. This place, as we have seen, is based mainly on the relationship between religion and national identity, a relationship which affords the Church a great deal of leverage in its dealings with—and conflicts with—the Greek state. We see clearly the Church's interests in preserving both the links between religion and national identity and the status quo in church-state relations.

This background information provides the necessary basis upon which to examine, in chapter four, one particular church-state conflict which illustrates the complex relationships between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity, between church and state, *and* between Greece and the European Union. This is the issue of national identity cards, which created such a furore in Greece recently and which revealed the conflicts and tensions in Greek society and culture when confronted with certain aspects of European society and culture.

CHAPTER FOUR

The European identity (card) crisis

Our focal point here is the church-state conflict which arose when the Greek state decided, in May of 2000, to remove reference to religious identity from the national identity cards¹. Our historical overview in chapter three is helpful for understanding this issue: the Church's perspective on the identity cards is intricately linked with its historical functions as protector of national identity and as affiliate of the state. The identity card issue challenged both these functions. The removal of religion from the national identity cards was interpreted by the Church as an affront to the relationship between Orthodoxy and national identity. And the state's decision to introduce such a change, *without* consulting the Church on the matter, was considered an affront to traditional church-state relations.

The identity card issue is a particularly useful basis for our examination of the role of religion in Greek-EU relations. European legislation and pressures concerning religious rights and freedoms were the pretexts upon which the Greek government based its decision. The conflict which arose between church and state on this issue offers insight into the European Union's influence on relative church and state interests, and the Church's influence on national-EU relations.

In the paragraphs which follow, I give a brief introduction to the 'identity card crisis'. This overview is followed by special attention to the *context* in which the identity

¹ The national identity cards are issued by the Greek police, on behalf of the Ministry of Public Order. They are used for the purposes of official identification, and in such public transactions as banking, employment appointments, and national and international (within Schengen member countries) travel.

card issue arose, in terms of the relative church and state interests at the time of the issue's appearance on the national scene. The perspectives of national political, religious, and scholarly elites are then addressed for a more thorough understanding of these interests and of the extent to which they are shaped by the European Union. Finally, I close with a consideration of conflicting views on the role of religion in Greek-EU relations and on what the EU means in terms of the place of religion in Greek state and society.

The 'identity card crisis'

The church-state conflict under examination here began in early May of 2000, when the then Minister of Justice Michalis Stathopoulos (appointed by the newly re-elected PASOK government) gave an interview in which he listed a number of religion-related legal reforms that he considered important, including the removal of religion from the national identity cards². When the issue of religion on the identity cards reached Constantinos Dafermos, President of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority³, the Authority's council produced the judgement that religious belief is an aspect of 'sensitive personal data' which should be excluded from national identity cards⁴. A few days later

² K.Marda, 'Our religion is over-protected: Interview with Michalis Stathopoulos', 8 May 2000, pp.6-7. [This and all newspaper coverage cited below is in Greek, as noted in the Bibliography (the few exceptions of English-language articles are also noted in the Bibliography). Where page numbers are not indicated, this is because the newspaper was accessed online].

³ An independent agency with an advisory role to the Greek State. The institution was established by law 2472/1997, which also sets out 'sensitive personal information' which the state should protect in the name of its citizens.

⁴ The matter reached the Authority through a letter sent to its president by Stefanos Manos, the leader of the Liberal Party (personal interview with Michalis Stathopoulos, 10.12.02; the letter was originally sent to Stathopoulos, who then forwarded it to Dafermos, as the issue was in his domain of work). The Council of the Data Protection Authority convened to discuss the matter on 15 May 2000. Together with the

the question was raised in parliament, and the Prime Minister confirmed then that the government would implement the Data Protection Authority decision: information regarding citizens' religious identity would not appear on national identity cards printed in the future⁵.

This issue came to dominate the national press for the remainder of 2000 and much of 2001. A political battle ensued between church and state, with protagonists Archbishop Christodoulos and Prime Minister Simitis (and, in the early stages, Minister of Justice Stathopoulos)⁶. Christodoulos reacted by warning that everyone, including the Prime Minister, should rally against the implementation of Stathopoulos' suggestion on the identity cards, for fear that other measures 'against religion' would soon follow (such as the lessening of the role of religious education in schools, the removal of religious icons and crosses from public spaces, the cancelling of the religious oath, and the requirement of civil, in addition to religious, marriage). He characteristically complained: 'no one from the government has formally declared that, "for better or for worse, the measure regarding identity cards has been taken by the government, but [the government] has no intention to progress to the other measures"'⁷. Several hierarchs demanded that the government 'take a stance' on Stathopoulos' statements, on the 'cutting off of relations between church and state' at the constitutional level, and on the

aforementioned decision, the Authority also listed a number of other national public documents from which reference to religion should be excluded (such as school and university certificates). Furthermore, the Council decided that fingerprints, marital status and profession were *unnecessarily* included in the identity cards; but the inclusion of religion was deemed unconstitutional.

⁵ The parliamentary meeting took place on 24 May 2000.

⁶ More precisely, in the beginning the Church treated as antagonists Stathopoulos and Dafermos. Simitis himself only became a target of criticism following the 24 May statement in Parliament.

⁷ N.Garantziotis, 'The Prime Minister should also sign', 6 November 2000. Archbishop Christodoulos' concern for the preservation of the status quo in church-state relations is made clear in a speech he made (ironically on the same day of Stathopoulos' interview in which he proposed the removal of religion from the identity cards), declaring that the separation of church and state would be 'a crime against the History of the land and against the Greek people'. See "'Crime" the separation of Church and state', *Ethnos*, 8 May 2000, p.20.

inclusion of religious affiliation on the identity cards. One Metropolitan in particular characterised the whole issue as an ‘underhanded attack on Orthodoxy and Hellenism’⁸. A newspaper article entitled ‘Holy war over the identity cards’, reported that the prevailing opinion then within ecclesiastical circles was that a ‘methodical move’ was underway: it could not be coincidental that, in the month following the formation of the new government, three of the Prime Minister’s appointees (to *non*-elected posts) supported the removal of religion from identity cards⁹.

For the government’s part, its then Press Minister Dimitris Reppas initially declared that Stathopoulos had expressed ‘personal opinions’ in the 8 May interview, but within days he stated that Minister Stathopoulos ‘does not act autonomously’¹⁰. This was interpreted by the press to mean that ‘[Stathopoulos] expressed the government stance on the identity card issue’¹¹. In the meantime, through a subsequent interview with a newspaper journalist, Stathopoulos explained that his statements should not be considered as introducing legal changes to church-state relations, but as calling for implementation of the law, voted in by Parliament in 1997, which was to guarantee the protection of personal data¹².

Indeed, in terms of the issue’s legal parameters, there is a great deal of complexity. The inclusion of religion on the identity cards has a volatile history. It dates back to the dictatorship of Metaxas, when identity cards including religion were issued: the official reason was the ‘strengthening of national religious convictions’, and the

⁸ G.Kalokairinos, ‘The state distances itself...’, *Kathimerini*, 9 May 2000, p.7.

⁹ G.N.Papathanosopoulou, ‘Holy war over the identity cards’, *Eleutheros Typos*, 13 May 2000, p.3. The reference here is to Dafermos, Stathopoulos, and Greek Ombudsman Nikiforos Diamandouros.

¹⁰ ‘Church annoyed at proposals for civil funerals, oath’, *Kathimerini*, 9 May 2000, p.1, and ‘Government message towards Church’, *Eleutherotypia*, 16 May 2000.

¹¹ ‘Government message towards Church’, *Eleutherotypia*, 16 May 2000.

¹² G.Kalokairinos, ‘The state distances itself...’, *Kathimerini*, 9 May 2000, p.7.

unofficial reason to ascertain who were the atheist communists in the country¹³. Later, under the Papadopoulos dictatorship, details which were to be included in national identity cards were officially set out in the legal decree 127/1969. In 1986, discussion of the constitutionality of inclusion of religious affiliation or belief on a public document such as the national identity card led to the drafting of law 1599/1986, which made the inclusion voluntary. The Church conducted a strong campaign then for mandatory inclusion of religion. Its wishes were implemented with the change in government, and in 1991 a new law (1988/1991) reintroduced mandatory inclusion of religion on each citizen's identity card¹⁴. Though voted in, neither of these laws was ever actually put into practice: Papadopoulos' original 1969 decree remained implemented by the Ministry of Public Order (which governs the police's issuance of the cards). The final legal measure relating to the issue is that of 2472/1997, which sets out religion amongst 'sensitive personal information' which the state should protect in the name of its citizens: the use of such information by the state should be 'relative to the aim' of its use¹⁵. Following the government's decision in 2000, discussion amongst specialists in constitutional law revealed a great deal of uncertainty as to the relevant legal provisions. Some argued that law 2472/1997 grants each citizen the right to decide whether certain elements of his or

¹³ Or, furthermore, to force those who were afraid to admit this, to carry identity cards revealing them as Orthodox Christians. The Metaxas dictatorship lasted from 1936-1940. See G.Kalokairinos, "Tough" Christodoulos; correction from the Patriarchate', *Kathimerini*, 30 May 2000, p.3.

¹⁴ See P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.152. According to Metropolitan Xrysostomos of Zakynthos, in 1993 also the then ruling ND party proposed the removal of religion from identity cards, but 'under pressure', the government compromised and made it a voluntary matter. See G.Kiouzis, 'Night tet-a-tet Christodoulos-Stefanopoulos', *Eleutherotypia*, 26 May 2000, pp.18/47.

¹⁵ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.153.

her 'personal data' may be revealed, thus making it *unconstitutional* to forbid citizens from revealing their religious identity on the national identity card¹⁶.

The Church's official stance was that at least voluntary inclusion of religion on one's identity card should be allowed (though its traditional position had been strictly for mandatory inclusion of religion on the identity cards)¹⁷. The Archbishop criticised the 'progressives' who 'fall on the church like savage dogs', and declared: 'We will not become grave-diggers of our ethnos. We are more than they who want to destroy the country. The People endorses [*sic*] what I say. Let there then be a referendum'¹⁸. The repeated argument for a national referendum was that 'the minority cannot force its terms on the majority'¹⁹. While the government was maintaining that 'it does not intend to lead to a rift in church-state relations', that 'the issue of the identity cards consists of a practice of harmonisation with European regulations and the protection of personal data', and that 'in no case does [the government] wish to lessen the role of Orthodoxy', ecclesiastical officials were declaring that 'Mr. Simitis, without realizing it, placed himself, the government, and his party within the ropes of the ring'²⁰.

¹⁶ This argument was made on the basis also of Article 13 on freedom of conscience and Article 9 of the European Treaty on Human Rights. See especially the opinion of constitutional law specialist Georgios Krippas, cited in G.N.Papathanasopoulou, 'Holy War over the identity cards', *Eleutheros Typos*, 13 May 2000, p.3. Also in question were whether the decisions of the Data Protection Authority are binding on the government, and whether law 2472/1997 automatically cancelled law 1988/1991. See V.Fotopoulou, 'What the StE [Constitutional Court] will examine in the case of an appeal', *Eleutherotypia*, 27 May 2000, pp.18/47.

¹⁷ It should be emphasised that the Holy Synod was quite divided on the issue, and this division was made quite public through press coverage. For a detailed presentation of the division within the Holy Synod over the issue of the identity cards, see especially P.Bailis, 'Church of three speeds', *Ta Nea*, 26 May 2000, p.9.

¹⁸ M.Antoniadou, 'Christodoulos from the pulpit: let there be a referendum for the new identity cards', *To Vima*, 15 May 2000, p.A3.

¹⁹ 'Referendum for the people to judge', *Ethnos*, 15 May 2000, p.18.

²⁰ K.P.Papadiouxou, 'Government hopes to avoid rift with the Church', *Kathimerini*, 26 May 2000, p.5. Final quotation from Father Eustathios Kollas, President of the Clergy. Father Kollas stated further: 'the Holy Synod does not care if religion is legally written on the identity cards or not, because either way it will be written, and with capital letters. I am considering proposing that citizens precede their signatures with the capital letters XO [i.e., Orthodox Christian]'.

Following the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament that the decision of the Data Protection Service on the matter would be implemented²¹, the Archbishop called for an extraordinary meeting of the Holy Synod for discussion of the Church's stance on the matter. Two demonstrations were planned, one to take place in Athens and one in Thessaloniki²². Meanwhile, the Archbishop met with the President of the Republic, Constantine Stephanopoulos, and requested the latter's intervention in the matter. Following the President's negative response²³, plans were made to take the case to the Council of State (StE)²⁴. Finally, at the demonstrations (attended by thousands²⁵), the Archbishop announced that the Church would begin a collection of signatures in appeal for a referendum on the government identity card decision²⁶. The aim, the Archbishop

²¹ The issue was raised during Prime Minister's questions by Maria Damanaki of SYN. Simitis responded: 'The inclusion of religion on the identity cards limits and offends the independence of the citizen. The citizen can and should be free to believe and not reveal what he/she believes. Therefore the inclusion of religion...can neither be required nor voluntary'. See F.Kalliagopoulou and N.Tsioutsia, 'With the stamp of Simitis religion off the identity cards', *Kathimerini*, 25 May 2000, p.5.

²² That in Thessaloniki was to take place on 14 June 2000 and that in Athens, one week later. See G.Kalokairinos, 'Hierarchs' fury and demonstrations', *Kathimerini*, 7 June 2000, p.3, and M.Antoniadou and I.Tsibidis, 'Invitation to demonstrations by the faithful in Athens and Thessaloniki', *To Vima*, 7 June 2000, p.A7.

²³ The meeting took place on 25 May 2000. Stephanopoulos stated that the Constitution does not give him (Stefanopoulos) the right to intervene in institutional matters. See 'Christodoulos' move', *Kathimerini*, 26 May 2000, p.1.

²⁴ The Council of State (*Symbouleio tis Epikrateias*, or StE) is the highest administrative court. See B.Chiotis, 'Church plans recourse to justice', *To Vima*, 25 May 2000, p.A.7, and 'Hierarchs in search of a way out', *Kathimerini*, 23 August 2000, for information on the planning of the case, which reached the court 1.12.00. The case was actually taken to the StE by a group called the 'Orthodox Movement of Constitutional Legality', but for most observers it was clear that this group acted on behalf of the Church. Their argument was that 'the government decision to remove religion from the identity cards is unconstitutional, because of the constitutional provision which declares that "the prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church"'. See 'No meeting under conditions of coercion', *Eleutherotypia*, 6 June 2000, pp.18/48. The case did not reach the court until December 2000. The court decided by majority that both the voluntary and mandatory inclusion of religion on the national identity cards are in antithesis with Article 13, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, in which freedom of religious conscience is set out. For a thorough analysis of the StE decision, see P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, pp.154-7.

²⁵ Police estimated 100,000 demonstrators at the 21 June Athens demonstration; the Church estimated over 500,000.

²⁶ The petition began on 14 September 2000 and was scheduled to end on 25 March 2001. But on 28 March (by which point the Church claimed to have collected 2.5 million signatures), the Church announced that the signature collection would continue until the end of April (2001), with the aim to match the number of votes with which the PASOK government had been elected in the April 2000 elections. There was much

eventually announced, was to gather more signatures than the number of votes with which the Simitis government came to power in the previous elections.

This declared aim set the scene for the role played by the identity card issue in domestic politics in Greece. First, it became a focal point for the opposition party's (New Democracy, ND) politics²⁷. The party was strongly in support of the Church's stance on the issue, and its leader—Constantinos Karamanlis—was amongst the first to sign the Church's petition. Karamanlis accused the government of embarking on a 'suspicious and dangerous' conflict with the Church, whilst the party's former leader (Constantinos Mitsotakis) publicly demanded that the Prime Minister meet with the Archbishop, as per the latter's repeated requests²⁸. Prime Minister Simitis faced a great deal of criticism over his refusal to meet with Archbishop Christodoulos to discuss the matter of the identity cards. But, according to PASOK spokespersons, Simitis felt that the Archbishop had 'crossed the borderline', particularly with the hierarch's declaration that 'the will of the people is above the Constitution and the laws'²⁹. The resultant heightened tension between the Church and the government provoked division within the ruling PASOK party. As one journalist explained, 'in reality, for most PASOK MPs, the greatest source of worry is the crisis in relations between the government and the Church...though generally they do not disagree with the removal of religion from the identity cards, they

controversy surrounding the Church's signature collection: besides the questioned constitutionality of this method of seeking a referendum (see below), there was considerable debate over who should be allowed to add their signatures in favour of the Church. The Church had extended its campaign to include Greek Orthodox citizens in those parts of Greece where the Church jurisdiction falls under the Patriarchate, rather than the Church of Greece (e.g., Crete, and the Dodecanese. See chapter three, footnote 1), and also considered including signatures of Greek diaspora.

²⁷ See 'The New Theocracy', *Eleutherotypia*, 28 August 2001, p.8.

²⁸ M.Antoniadou, 'The Prime Minister and Archbishop should meet', *To Vima*, 1 June 2000, p.A8, and G.Kalokairinos, 'Cries and whispers of the Metropolitans', *Kathimerini*, 13 August 2000, p.5.

²⁹ 'No meeting under conditions of coercion', *Eleutherotypia*, 6 June 2000, pp.18/48.

think that the whole handling of the issue provoked unnecessary political costs'³⁰. This much is evident in the statement made by one PASOK politician: 'it is foolish to place obstacles to ourselves... Whether we like it or not, the Church has a large network of influence in the country and it can cause us decisive damage'³¹.

The Archbishop too faced dissension within his ranks, as some hierarchs pressed for a more active fight against the government, whilst others criticised the Archbishop for involvement in what was clearly a governmental matter³². This dissension was only the beginning of many challenges facing the Archbishop's campaign. In December of 2000, the Church's argument against the state finally reached the StE, and the court ruled in favour of the government on this issue. But the Church continued its efforts through its signature-collection campaign: in August 2001 the Church announced that it had collected over three million signatures against the government decision on the identity cards³³. The Archbishop then met again with the President of the Republic, Constantine Stephanopoulos, formally requesting a referendum on the issue. The President declared that no amount of signatures can override the constitutional provisions for the calling of

³⁰ S.Ligeros, 'If there were not a crisis in ND...', *Kathimerini*, 4 June 2000, p.10.

³¹ The politician goes on to say that 'Stathopoulos et al. have never gathered votes from the people and think that elections are won only with rhetoric about modernisation'. See S.Ligeros, 'If there were not a crisis in ND...', *Kathimerini*, 4 June 2000, p.10.

³² See M.Antoniadou, "'Crows" and "doves" pressure the Archbishop', *To Vima*, 4 June 2000, p.A.48. See also M.Antoniadou, 'Ieronymos [Metropolitan of Thiva], the anti-Christodoulos against the demonstrations', *To Vima*, 8 June 2000, p.A6, and M.Antoniadou, 'Ierotheos: the "Benjamin" of the hierarchy in a balancing role over the identity cards', *To Vima*, 24 August 2000, p.A14. The Archbishop also faced dissensions from lay people who had served as advisors to the Church: Ioannis Konidaris, who had served on a number of the Church's committees, resigned from all of these in June 2000, declaring that 'the decision of the Hierarchy on the issue of the identity cards does not leave me room to offer, in the current phase at least, my services for the good of the Church'. See M.Antoniadou, 'Ieronymos: the anti-Christodoulos...', and T.Tsatsi, 'This is how we are going to organise the guerrilla fight on the identity cards', *Eleutherotypia*, 8 June 2000, pp.18/63.

³³ See T.Tsatsi, 'They are not talking politics, but... "the people has spoken"', *Eleutherotypia*, 28 August 2001, pp.18/47. It should be noted that this announcement came over one year after the government had emphatically declared that the identity card issue was closed. See K.P.Papadiochou, 'The government doesn't back down', *Kathimerini*, 13 August 2000, p.5.

referendums: a referendum on this issue could not take place, as it would be unconstitutional³⁴. A final legal effort to overrule the government's decision was made by one cleric and two laypersons who challenged the StE's decision in the European Court of Human Rights. The ECHR decided, without conducting a full trial, in favour of the Greek State³⁵.

In spite of these setbacks to the Church's campaign, the identity card issue again rose to the forefront of political debate in the context of the October 2002 municipal and prefectural elections. This fact was due, not least, to the Archbishop's own efforts to remind the public, and the politicians, of the issue³⁶. 'It is not possible', the Archbishop declared, 'for the parties to ask for the votes of the people when they ignore the will of three million voters...If the people want it, they can change the state's decision'³⁷. Accordingly, the Archbishop maintained that the elections would be held 'in the shadow of the identity card issue'³⁸, and he called on all political parties to 'honestly inform the electorate what they will do after the elections on the identity card issue'³⁹. Such

³⁴ T.Tsatsi, 'Presidential rod [of discipline]', *Eleutherotypia*, 30 August 2001, p.18. See also p.47, 'Commission: Forget religion on the identity cards', for a discussion on the European Commission's disapproval of inclusion of religion on national identity cards: following a question posed by Greek MEP Alekos Alavanos, the Commission declared that according to directive 95/46, 'the member-states prohibit the use of facts of a personal nature, including ethnic or national background, political stances, philosophical or religious orientation, membership in syndicates, health or sexual life'.

³⁵ See 'He [Christodoulos] revealed again his political identity', *Eleutherotypia*, 26 March 2002, p.54. See also ECHR Decision, 'Sofianopoulos and Others v. Greece', 20 December 2001.

³⁶ In March of 2002, the Archbishop stated that not only has the identity card issue *not* closed, but 'by its nature becomes an issue in the forthcoming municipal and prefectural elections'. See 'He [Christodoulos] revealed again his political identity', *Eleutherotypia*, 26 March 2002, p.54.

³⁷ It should be noted that the Archbishop did not consider these efforts on the part of the Church as an intermixing of the Church in politics: he declared that disrespect for the constitutional separation of the roles of the Church and the state would provoke problems. Yet, as one journalist notes, this statement came one week after the Archbishop's assertion that 'the institution of the church is higher than all other institutions'. See 'He [Christodoulos] revealed again his political identity', *Eleutherotypia*, 26 March 2002, p.54.

³⁸ 'The identity cards again poison Church-State relations', *To Vima*, 27 March 2002, p.6.

³⁹ There was division within the Church over this development as well. One Metropolitan, for example, stated: 'I am completely against [this] development of a role of the Church during the pre-electoral period'. See 'The identity cards again poison Church-State relations', *To Vima*, 27 March 2002, p.6.

statements –and their broad coverage in the daily print media—provoked anxiety within the ruling PASOK party. It also provoked difficulties, however, for the ND party. The party had chosen to put forward Ioannis Tzannetakos—one of the few ND delegates who openly opposed the Church’s stance on the identity cards—as its candidate for the Athens-Piraeus ‘super-prefecture’. This political move triggered, as one newspaper put it, ‘[t]he schism between the Church and Rigillis [ND party headquarters]’⁴⁰. Mr. Tzannetakos had tried on several occasions to ease this rift (and of course to increase his electoral appeal), by seeking the opportunity to meet with the Archbishop⁴¹. According to one source, Church hierarchs debated extensively over whether the Archbishop should meet with Mr. Tzannetakos, and whether the Church should call its faithful to vote against the latter in the forthcoming elections. The hierarchs decided that no such meeting should take place, and no political attack would be made against Tzannetakos⁴². However, the Archbishop did preach in a publicly disseminated sermon that ‘the People should support those who support their faith’⁴³. Furthermore, the Archbishop was also

⁴⁰ V.Chiotis, ‘The schism between Church and Rigillis’, *To Vima*, 22 September 2002, p.A20. According to one report, the Church hierarchy was also critical towards the then Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, Mr. Souflias, once it became known that the latter had proposed Tzannetakos for the candidacy. See M.Antoniadou, ‘The calamitous relations of Mr. Souflias with the Church’, *To Vima*, 17 October 2002.

⁴¹ The latter’s initial refusal troubled New Democracy, as many of its supporters were amongst those who signed the Church’s petition. Whilst one newspaper reported that ‘Mr. Christodoulos does not forgive’ (M.Antoniadou, *To Vima*, 22 September 2002, p.A21), one ND leader expressed his disappointment by declaring ‘is it possible for God to forgive and not the Archbishop, in spite of sincere repentance [on the part of Tzannetakos]?’ (See V.Chiotis, ‘The schism between Church and Rigillis’, *To Vima*, 22 September 2002, p.A20).

⁴² According to one source, the Archbishop did eventually agree to meet with Mr. Tzannetakos, but the date and place of this meeting would likely be kept quiet. See V.Chiotis, ‘The meeting of Tzannetakos with Christodoulos has been set’, *To Vima*, 29 September 2002, p.A.20. According to Chiotis, this fact ‘closed a chapter of tension between ND and the Church which...almost brought definitive rupture in their until now warm relations’. Chiotis also addresses here the subject of how Christodoulos’ agreement to meet with Tzannetakos negatively affected his opponent’s (Mr. Karatzaferis’) chances in the upcoming elections.

⁴³ See M.Antoniadou, ‘Mr. Christodoulos does not forgive’, *To Vima*, 22 September 2002, p.A21.

cited as stating that those who voted for Tzannetakos' opponent in the first round of elections (Mr. Karatzaferis), are 'good Christians'⁴⁴.

Although the Archbishop repeatedly declared that the Church does not involve itself in political issues, politicians at least engaged in serious efforts to ameliorate their relations with the Church in the pre and post-electoral phases. For instance, just before the second round of elections, the ND candidates for Mayor of Athens and Piraeus visited the Archbishop (i.e., the prefectures in which Tzannetakos was running for parliament), seeking the hierarch's blessing for their campaigns⁴⁵. In the end, the ND candidates lost the elections in these prefectures. According to one ND spokesperson, 'It is clear. The elections in [Athens and Piraeus] took place on the basis of the identity card issue', and the Archbishop used the conflict with the ND party in order to manage better its relations with PASOK. Many in the ND party explained this development with reference to the fact that the ruling PASOK government was, at the time, in the process of deciding how to distribute the funds of the latest EU funding package: they claimed that the Church was trying to secure as much as possible of that funding package for itself⁴⁶. The

⁴⁴ It should be noted that Mr. Karatzaferis is the leader of an independent, religion-oriented political party, has especially close ties with the Church, and strongly supported the Church's position on the identity cards. He was one of two opponents to Tzannetakos in the race (the other was the PASOK candidate, Fofi Gennimata). This particular pronouncement by the Archbishop generated a great deal of debate in Greece, as its source was questioned by the Church: Christodoulos denied making the exact statement attributed to him. See T.Tsatsi, 'He "buries" Tzannetakos, blesses the mayors', *Eleutherotypia*, 16 October 2002. A few days later, however, the newspaper *Kathimerini* reported the release of a tape which confirmed that the Archbishop had referred to Karatzaferis' voters as 'good Christians'. See 'Archbishop is caught out by tape', *Kathimerini*, 25 October 2002. Following this declaration by the Archbishop, ND leaders openly expressed their dismay, stating that "they did not expect such interference from the Church, since ND had supported the Church in its conflict with the government over the identity card issue". One New Democracy MP in particular suggested, in no uncertain terms, that the Church should remain outside of politics. See I.Pantelakis, 'Blessings and damnations in the...hell of ND', *Eleutherotypia*, 16 October 2002.

⁴⁵ See S.Yiannaka, 'Rigillis [ND headquarters] supplicant to the Archbishop', *To Vima*, 16 October 2002, p.A3.

⁴⁶ Some ND delegates considered this 'crisis' of relations between ND and the Church as a good opportunity for ND to cease being identified with the Church and with its conservative views, thus making ND a more 'central', rather than conservative party. See 'Lesson from misfortune', *Eleutherotypia*, 3 November 2002, p.10.

decision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, to visit the Archbishop and to present the latter with the government's stance on the Annan Plan for Cyprus, was also seen by many as a pointed effort on the part of the state to improve its relations with the Church⁴⁷. According to one journalist, these developments signalled that 'Christodoulos [was] the winner of the elections': 'although Christodoulos' counteraction on the identity card issue did not succeed in its goal [to change the government's decision], it succeeded in something else -- to cut the government's "appetite" for anti-church measures'⁴⁸. The decision of Prime Minister Simitis to remove Michalis Stathopoulos from the Ministry of Justice was also considered by many as clear evidence of the Church's success⁴⁹.

Through this brief introduction to the identity card issue we see certain recurrent themes⁵⁰. First, the tendency of the Church to play the role of 'protector of national identity'. Second, its tendency to put up a strong fight in relation to the state and, by extension, to become politicised. And third, from the *pre*-history of the 'identity card crisis', the tendency of the state to compromise its stance in the face of Church pressure. One factor which is perhaps unique to the identity card issue is the fact that the state

⁴⁷ See M.Antoniadou, 'Objections to the Annan plan from Mr.Christodoulos in the Synodal meeting', *To Vima*, 20 November 2002, p.A6.

⁴⁸ See N. Papadimitriou, 'Christodoulos the winner of the elections', *Avgi*, 20 October 2002, p.10. It should perhaps be noted that this newspaper is a left-wing paper.

⁴⁹ Stathopoulos was replaced in the government reshuffle which took place in October 2001. See S.Ligeros, 'Simitis' tailor-made cabinet', *Kathimerini*, 25 October 2001. According to Ligeros, the removal of Stathopoulos from this post was 'only to be expected'.

⁵⁰ For an overview of the identity card issue from a discourse analysis perspective, see Y.Stavrakakis, 'Religion and populism: reflections on the "politicised" discourse of the Greek Church', and from a press analysis perspective, L.Molokotos-Liederman, 'Identity crisis: Greece, Orthodoxy, and the European Union'. See also Nikos Alivazatos' discussion of the identity card issue in *The Uncertain Modernisation*, pp.311-320 [in Greek]. Finally, see A.Anastassiadis, 'Religion and politics in Greece: the Greek Church's "conservative modernisation" in the 1990's', for a critique of discourse analysis as applied to the case of the Greek Orthodox Church. Anastassiadis' proposal that 'discourse analysis need not consider discourses either as automatically informative, or performative, but rather as responses to specific social demands' (p.14), is helpful for our understanding of fluctuations in the Church's discourse on the European Union.

chose *not* to compromise with the Church (as, in the end, it did not overturn its May 2000 decision). In order to fully understand the way the identity card issue plays a part in Greek-EU relations, we must examine the particular context in which the identity card issue arose and the factors shaping the relative interests of the Church and of the state over the issue.

The context: church and state interests

One important element of the context in which this issue arose is the presence of Christodoulos in the archbishopric. Many scholars have noted a significant change in the role of the Church in Greek state and society with the advent of Archbishop Christodoulos in 1998. His populist discourse and the increased involvement of the Church in secular issues under his leadership were addressed thoroughly in the press and by a number of academic publications even before the identity card conflict developed. The Church under Christodoulos, especially throughout the identity card issue, may indeed be claiming a 'new role', in terms of its ever-public activity in the social and political domains. Beyond the factor of church leadership, though, the crucial determinants of the context in which the identity card issue arose are particular perceived threats to national identity and to church-state relations—threats which are linked with Greek membership in the European Union. I address these perceived threats below, largely with reference to the Archbishop's discourse on the required role of the Church.

In terms of threats to national identity, the Church perceives a general trend towards denationalisation in the Greek state's increasing identification with the

supranational European Union. The Church thus claims an imperative function of maintaining a national identity which, it argues, is no longer adequately protected by the state. The Church's sensitivities over the preservation of national identity are heightened by the fact that Greek society is increasingly multiethnic (an estimated 10% of the population is comprised of immigrants). Thus, in the light of the EU's demand for enhanced religious freedoms and equality for non-Orthodox citizens, the Church feels a heightened threat to the cultural, linguistic and religious homogeneity of Greece—all elements which are central to conceptions of Greek national identity.

We see in the rhetoric of Archbishop Christodoulos evidence of the Church's concerns that national identity is being compromised through EU membership. One example will suffice to show that, while his language is not anti-European, he portrays the EU as a reason for the critical need to rely on Orthodoxy for the preservation of Greek national identity. In a speech delivered in 1999, he explains the crimes committed by the West against Greek Orthodoxy after the Greek revolution, and the fact that the roots of the European integration project were Roman Catholic, and he declares:

We are in a crisis in the evolution of Hellenism...if we want not only to re-establish our spiritual identity, but to play a role *as Greeks* [emphasis mine] in the EU, we have but one recourse: to re-load ourselves with our historical baggage, which is our Greco-Orthodoxy...⁵¹

And because, as indicated above, the state is thought to have abdicated its role as protector of the nation, the Church demands a continued strong position in relation to the state, so that it will be able to carry out its *public* duty of representing the interests of 'the

⁵¹ 'The Europe of spiritual values and the role of the Greek Orthodox and of Education', address to a crowd of teachers at the National Theatre, 21 January 1999. [in Greek]

People'⁵². Accordingly, efforts to change the balance of church-state relations are especially frowned upon. In a speech delivered soon after his election in 1998, Archbishop Christodoulos referred to those who wish to change the status quo in church-state relations as *graeculi*, which means those who are servile toward everything foreign and are thus undeserving of Greek identity and cause the decay of national identity: such people wish to reduce the Church's role "because they know that the nation owes its survival to the Church"⁵³. Through the Archbishop's rhetoric we can observe how the EU is blamed, albeit *indirectly*, for threatening the close relationship between the Church and the Greek state:

We call this relationship an invaluable heritage... our Church today asks of the politicians to understand the significance of the embers of the ethnos [amongst which he notes religion] and to not destroy them by *mimicking foreign prototypes* ...as a bishop I grieve and pray, as a Greek I ask you to understand personally what is our struggle today, for what reason the Church is obliged to interfere and to ask of the politicians to understand with what navigation we came thus far...to feel our Hellenicity, the blood of our ancestors which beats in our breasts⁵⁴.

The above paragraphs help us to contextualise the Church's interests around the time of the identity card crisis⁵⁵. As for the state's interests, both the state and the media

⁵² As Nikos Demertzis writes, because the Church is, since the establishment of the Autocephaly, a 'legal face of public justice', and because 'public representatives, even those of the Church, do not have rights, but responsibilities', the Church argues that it has a *responsibility* to act in the interests of 'the People'. It was on this basis that the Church explained its collection of signatures for the inclusion of religion on the identity cards. See N.Demertzis, 'Politics and communication: facets of the secularisation of Orthodoxy', p.150. [in Greek]

⁵³ Cited in N.Alivizatos, 'A new role for the Greek Church?', p.23.

⁵⁴ 'Church and People: an unbreakable relationship', speech delivered to the Maritime Club of Piraeus, 19 June 2001. [in Greek; emphasis mine]. It should be noted that this speech was delivered at a time when, for the Church at least, the identity card issue was still 'open'.

⁵⁵ It is debatable whether the Church has a sincere anxiety to preserve Greek national identity or whether this concern simply serves as an effective platform from which to justify its role in Greek society (in other words, a successful utilisation of the *Greek population's* sensitivities). For conflicting views on whether the Church is, in itself, nationalistic, see Y.Stavrakakis, 'Religion and populism: reflections on the "politicised" discourse of the Greek Church', and P.Kitromilides, "'Imagined communities" and the origins of

presented these as directly linked to the European Union; the Church was (initially at least) ambivalent on whether the state's motivation was harmonisation with the EU. All throughout this church-state struggle 'Europe' was presented –in a notably haphazard way– as a key figure in the equation. A few examples will suffice for our present purposes. Early on in the debate Data Protection Authority president Constantine Dafermos was reported as saying 'in Europe they laugh at our identity cards with religion on them'⁵⁶. Meanwhile, following Church research on the extent to which the EU was directly involved in the affair, Metropolitan Kallinikos argued that 'the EU does not oblige Greek legislation on identity cards'. Yet, for his part, Christodoulos made the classic statement that 'Europe may fill our pockets, but it can empty our souls'⁵⁷. The main opposition party also picked up the cue, voiced here by New Democracy MP G.Alogoskoufis: 'the question is to what extent as a country we will maintain certain religious, social and national traditions that we have, or if we will surrender every time, without any resistance, to the powers of the European Union'⁵⁸. Meanwhile, foreign and English-language press reported the issue with headlines such as 'Church bashes Europe',

the National Question in the Balkans'. Furthermore, it should be noted that after the research was conducted for this study, an intense conflict developed between the Patriarchate and the Orthodox Church of Greece. The central matter of dispute was the election of new bishops in Metropolises which are under the Patriarch's jurisdiction, and the Orthodox Church of Greece's refusal to submit the list of candidates to the Patriarch for the latter's approval. According to A.Anastassiades ('Religion and politics in Greece: the Greek Church's "conservative modernisation" in the 1990's'), the Greek Church's relations with the Patriarchate have been a source of anxiety for the Greek hierarchy since the end of the Cold War: 'as long as the majority of orthodox countries remained under socialist rule, the Patriarchate's aura was limited. The center of gravity of [Orthodoxy] was located in Greece' (p.20). Accordingly, perhaps another important dimension of the context in which the identity card issue arose is the heightened vulnerability felt by the Church on an international scale as well, considering the increasing influence of the Patriarchate and the resultant decreased influence of the Church of Greece. The establishment of an office by the Orthodox Church of Greece in Brussels, alongside that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, is considered by many to be an antagonistic (towards the Patriarchate) move on the part of the Orthodox Church of Greece.

⁵⁶ V.Fotopoulou, 'The Civil Code is being "defrocked"', *Eleutherotypia*, 13 May 2000, pp.18/47.

⁵⁷ G.Kalokairinos, "'Tough" Christodoulos; correction from the Patriarchate', *Kathimerini*, 30 May 2000, p.3.

⁵⁸ V.Fotopoulou, 'Stathopoulos: Holy "no" to dialogue six months ago', *Eleutherotypia*, 26 May 2000, p.17.

and ‘Greek Church stirs holy war over ID cards’⁵⁹. The *Observer* in particular noted that ‘the Greek Orthodox Church is calling it a “wild war”, the Greek State a long overdue move to make all Hellenes “more European”’-- thus prompting the reporter’s own question: ‘Does Greece, the EU’s only Orthodox nation, belong to the East or the West?’⁶⁰.

The immediate precursor of the identity card issue and its publicity was the more significant and little noted indication of the EU’s influence over the state’s interests in the matter. Six months prior to the Stathopoulos interview, Foreign Minister George Papandreou had called for the formation of a committee to study issues of religious freedom. Amongst the subjects to be considered was the inclusion of religion on the national identity cards⁶¹. The reason for this action was the Foreign Minister’s wish to address ‘the problems arising from the guilty verdicts against the country for violations of the European Treaty of Human Rights’, and to discuss what legal measures should be taken to address the problem. Thus, the issue of the identity cards was placed within the framework of the *Foreign Ministry*’s efforts to deal with matters that negatively affected Greece’s place in Europe⁶². According to one source, when the Church was invited to participate and share its views on the issues under consideration, it showed ‘no will for dialogue’. The three members who ‘are known to be well-disposed towards the Church’

⁵⁹ ‘Church bashes Europe’, *The Hellenic Star*, Vol.2, No.69, 1-7 June 2000, pp.1-2; and H.Smith, ‘Greek Church stirs holy war over ID cards’, *The Observer*, 28 May 2000, p.26.

⁶⁰ H.Smith, ‘Greek Church stirs holy war over ID cards’.

⁶¹ Other issues to be discussed were proselytism, conscientious objection, and religious education in schools—all of which have led to complaints against the Greek state by citizens of minority faiths.

⁶² See V.Fotopoulou, ‘Stathopoulos: Holy “no” to dialogue six months ago’, *Eleutherotypia*, 26 May 2000, p.17. See also T.Tsatsi, ‘Christodoulos proclaimed an unyielding struggle’, *Eleutherotypia*, 27 May 2000, pp.18/47. Of course, the ECHR is officially linked to the Council of Europe, and not directly to the EU. However, a. the EU does make it clear that the ECHR record of individual countries is especially important to the EU; and b. in Greece, there is little distinction made (even in the press, but especially within Church circles), between the domains of the ECHR, Council of Europe and the EU.

withdrew from the committee, stating that the issues under discussion did not belong in the domain of the Foreign Ministry. They also expressed their disapproval for the Minister's choice of president for the committee: Michalis Stathopoulos. According to constitutional law specialist Nicos Alivizatos (one of the committee members), the Church effectively 'blew up' the committee, with the result that it remains, until today, ineffective⁶³. From this we see that the most recent church-state conflict over the identity cards (prior to that beginning in 2000) arose in the context of a Foreign Ministry initiative to improve Greece's standing within the European Union.

Most significant, however, is the clear link between EU policies and the more recent Greek legislation on the national identity cards. In 1991 the Convention of the Council of Europe drafted an article for the protection of the individual from the automated processing of information of a personal nature⁶⁴. The Convention article was subsequently adopted by the European Parliament, through the directive 95/46/EP⁶⁵. In order to conform to these European legislative developments, in 1997 the Greek government passed law 2472/1997, which sets out 'sensitive personal information' which the state should protect in the name of its citizens, including religious affiliation. According to this law, the use of such information by the state should be 'relative to the aim of its use'⁶⁶. The law also foresaw the establishment of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, the advice of which Prime Minister Simitis followed in introducing the changes to the national identity card.

⁶³ Alivizatos also reveals that Christodoulos had sent a letter to Papandreou that September, prior to the start of the committee's work, asking that Alivizatos be excluded from the committee because he had expressed 'anti-ecclesiastical opinions rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Greek people'. See V.Fotopoulou, 'Stathopoulos: Holy "no" to dialogue six months ago', *Eleutherotypia*, 26 May 2000, p.17.

⁶⁴ This translated into Greek legislation as law 2068/1991. See L.Papadopoulou, 'On the issue of the identity cards', in *The Constitution [To Syntagma]*, Vols.4-5., 2000, p.678.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p.678.

⁶⁶ P.Dimitropoulos, *State and Church: a Difficult Relationship*, p.153.

In spite of such clear EU-related precursors to the 2000 government decision on the identity cards, the extent to which the issue was directly related to the EU was, and remains, an ambiguous matter in Greece. Again, the government claimed that its decision was a matter of harmonisation with European regulations and the protection of personal data. But the Church judged that the government decision had less to do with the EU than with the government's intention to change the balance in church-state relations (more specifically, to limit the role of the Church in both state and society)⁶⁷. Archbishop Christodoulos expressed his view by questioning why Greeks must mimic all that happens in other European countries, when the EU itself did not formally demand the removal of religion from the identity cards. He declared that if religion was, in the end, removed from the identity cards, 'then the people will be disconnected from Orthodoxy...which especially for us Greeks entails a fundamental element of our identity'. Accordingly, he concluded that 'this whole move [by the government] is suspect; it is not simply an issue of observance of certain human rights'⁶⁸. Thus we see a critical divergence in perspectives on the factors motivating the state on the identity card issue. There is also an important lack of consensus on the factors motivating the Church on this matter⁶⁹.

For these reasons, I decided to explore a broad range of perspectives, through interviews conducted with Greek political, religious and academic elites (including major actors in the identity card conflict). This examination is important within the broader

⁶⁷ In the earliest phases of the identity card debate (i.e., Spring/Summer 2000), hierarchs did make comments against the European Union, but these phased out with time and the government increasingly became the focal point of Church complaints.

⁶⁸ 'Christodoulos: Voluntary the inscription of religion', *Ethnos*, 15 May 2000, p.19.

⁶⁹ See especially A.Anastassiadis, 'Religion and politics in Greece: the Greek Church's "conservative modernisation" in the 1990's', for a discussion of various factors motivating the Church in its conflicts with the state beyond that conflict over the identity cards.

context of this study because it reveals, in depth, an ambiguity over the role of religion in Greek-EU relations and the influence of the EU on the place of religion in Greek state and society. I begin by addressing the opinions of those in support of the government decision, including certain major actors in the identity card issue, as well as a number of scholars. These individuals offer their opinions on why and how the government forwarded its decision, and why the Church reacted in the way that it did. These 'secular-minded' opinions give us a sense of these individuals' general perspectives on the Church and the factors which motivate it. I will then consider the perspectives of a number of clerics and theologians on the nature of and reasons behind the government decision, and their explanations of the Church response to the decision. Finally, I conclude with an analysis of the wider implications of the identity card issue, and of the Church's general attitudes to the European Union in light of this particular issue.

The state perspective

Perspectives on why the Simitis government chose to remove reference to religion from the national identity cards vary considerably, even amongst those scholars and practitioners who supported the government decision. Interviewees' explanations of the government decision include reference to EU standards to which Greece must conform; national legislation which was pending implementation, and a general trend towards modernisation, Europeanisation, and secularisation of Greece. Some interviewees also focused on the 'personal' dimension of the issue, in terms of tensions between Michalis

Stathopoulos⁷⁰ and Archbishop Christodoulos, on the one hand, and Prime Minister Simitis and the Archbishop on the other.

According to Stathopoulos, the government decision clearly arose from the government's will to implement Greek legislation which was drawn up in accordance with relevant EU directives⁷¹. He emphasises the need of the Greek state both to conform to EU legislation and norms in human rights provision and, as a matter of rule of law, to implement Greek legislation which had already been voted in by Parliament but had not been put into effect. For Alekos Alavanos (the MEP who raised the issue in the European Parliament), the government decision was based on the more general need for Greece to align itself with the rest of EU member countries. In this sense, the removal of religion from national identity cards was a matter of harmonisation with norms existent in the European Union. Nikiforos Diamandouros (who, at the time of the interview, was the Greek Ombudsman⁷²) considers the decision a realistic and proper action for a modern, democratic government in an age in which Greek society is becoming increasingly diverse. Reform to the identity cards was thus necessary because the cards are state documents which are used by individuals in basic transactions with public administration, and 'declarations of one's inner thoughts and beliefs have no place in such basic transactions'.

According to Ioannis Konidaris (General Secretary of Religious Affairs, in the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs), one can only speculate on the intentions of the state and the extent to which they were shaped by efforts towards Europeanisation, modernisation and secularisation. In his opinion though, 'they had in their minds that this

⁷⁰ The former Minister of Justice, who gave the newspaper interview which set off the entire debate.

⁷¹ Details of this interview and those to follow may be found in the Appendix.

⁷² Today Professor Diamandouros is European Ombudsman.

way, they could kill two birds with one stone': the identity cards are correctly adjusted, and a mark is set as to the direction in which the state is moving in its relations with the Church. The extent to which the decision was directly related to the European Union is an 'ambiguous' matter: 'I don't think the government said that the EU was obliging it to take the decision, but it claimed to be acting in the direction of a modernisation of legislation and harmonisation with that of other European countries'⁷³. Indeed there is a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the matter, perhaps because of how suddenly it became such a public issue. For instance, in Professor Nicos Mouzelis' view, the government decision was not premeditated or ideologically-driven: Simitis did not expect the question to be raised in Parliament at that time and, when faced with the question, simply took the decision which he considered correct. Mouzelis strongly believes that it was not a pre-meditated decision because the change to the identity cards could have been brought about in a more gradual way. After all, he notes, the relevant European legislation is not rigid; Greece could have adapted to it flexibly and gradually. Nor, in his view, was the decision part of a modernisation process. In the long run yes, that would be an effect. But, considering how the decision was taken, Mouzelis believes that it had less to do with modernisation and more to do with lack of preparation on the issue. He rightly notes that, due to his staunchly secular orientation, Simitis has clearly *avoided* involvement in religious affairs.

In fact, many interviewees gave emphasis to the *way* in which the government decision was carried out. For Stathopoulos, only one element of the whole identity card

⁷³ This, he notes, is similar to the long process of implementing legislation on conscientious objection: 'the government was not directly forced by the EU, but it did not want to be exceptional in terms of things that happen in other countries of the EU, in which we are an equal member. We can't ignore the other countries. This does not mean that we are obliged to conform to all of them [the countries]: in many there is no identity card at all'.

issue should have been different: Simitis should not have refused to meet with Christodoulos, as the latter repeatedly requested. According to both him and two other interviewees⁷⁴, Simitis' refusal was probably related to his annoyance with Christodoulos' actions and statements: the latter had not only chosen to take serious measures against the government, but had also voiced derogatory statements against the Prime Minister. Thus, inherent in the way in which the Simitis government handled the issue was an element of stubbornness (an attitude of 'we're going to get our way'), and a message of 'you stick to your domain, and I'll deal with mine'. Another scholar also contends that the government's decision was, in part, related specifically to Simitis' inflexible character. But, this interviewee emphasises, in this particular case Simitis' attitudes were strongly influenced by Christodoulos' own 'very stupid mistakes' and anti-democratic actions⁷⁵.

Interviewees also noted important political dimensions to the issue. For Alavanos, the fact that the government introduced the change immediately *after* elections, without mentioning it beforehand, was especially problematic in that it exposed the government to the Church's criticism that it and the voters were somehow 'tricked'. He contends that the issue could have been managed better by the state, but 'regardless of how the change was introduced, the Church would have reacted negatively'. According to Professor Thanos Lipowatz, one significant problem was the fact that Simitis did not even prepare his own government on the matter: there was so much intra-party division over the issue that, in the end, Simitis faced opposition within the party as well.

⁷⁴ These wished to remain unnamed. Where names are not indicated, this means the interviewee(s) wished to remain anonymous (whether in general or with reference to a particular statement).

⁷⁵ This interviewee wished to remain unnamed.

Secular-minded views of the *Church* in light of the identity card issue reveal a variety of opinion. Responses include reference to the historical place of the Church in Greek society and politics, on the one hand, and factors specific to the Christodoulos-led Church, on the other. We begin here by addressing interviewees' interpretations of the Church's reaction to the identity card changes, followed by their general perspectives on the Church and its motivating factors.

For Konidaris, the Church reaction has to do with the fact that 'it fears a lot of things, and it feels that it must maintain a defensive position'. Thus, in his view, the Church is not anti-European, but it is insecure; it fears that, through increasing homogeneity of EU countries, Orthodoxy will lose its value (as it is currently such a small minority in Europe). But, he emphasises, in the Treaty of Amsterdam it is clear that each country will arrange its own religious affairs. Thus there is no danger of change to legislation if the countries themselves do not want this: 'The EU does not force us to change our relations with the Orthodox Church. If the government decides on such change, this does not mean that the EU forces us'. Thus, as a representative of the government himself, he intimates that it may be in the government's own interests, quite apart from the EU, to introduce changes in church-state relations.

Diamandouros too interprets the Church reaction as a matter of self-defence. According to Diamandouros, the Church, in its current manifestation and led by the current Archbishop, is trying to defend its rights in a very dynamic way. But, he notes,

The perception of this dynamic defence of its rights is the other side of the same coin: I know for a fact that the state is gradually beginning to assert the rights emanating out of both its international obligations and the rule of law under a democratic society. So it's difficult, in fact, to say: it's a kind of chicken-and-egg game.

He notes that Greece is becoming increasingly more diverse, a society of immigrants rather than a society of *emigrants*. In this context, he contends that as Greek democracy deepens, and as the obligation to respect the right to differ becomes increasingly embedded in the Greek legal culture, there will be a growing number of cases that challenge the *traditional* cultural, and in several ways *practical*, application of the pre-eminence of the Orthodox Church. Religious minorities will increasingly assert their rights within the spirit and the letter of the law, and ‘that is where the state has to come in and precisely help promote diversity and, within the rule of law, to defend their rights’. In Diamandouros’ perspective, the Church is groping for ways to understand the reality created by the very sudden change in the composition of Greek society resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the great wave of immigration that became manifest in Greece in the 1990’s. In the context of this change, Greece ceased being the culturally, linguistically, religiously and ethnically highly homogeneous society that it was before, and this created much of turbulence and anxiety and xenophobia. The Church found itself at the helm of those social strata that felt most ambivalent and threatened by the rapid changes to society (part of which was the influx of all these newcomers). Diamandouros thus interprets the Church’s reaction as an attempt to carve a role for itself and preserve its own traditional pre-eminence in Greece within this rapidly changing Greek society.

This theme is echoed by Nicos Mouzelis, who contends that the new Church leadership reacted as it did due to its feeling that the Church was peripheral and did not play any role in social life—‘it was completely ossified’. According to Mouzelis, Christodoulos thought that the way to lead the Church out of such isolation would be to

intervene actively in public life. Thus, apart from various nationalistic causes motivating the Church, the identity card issue was considered an excellent way of mobilising the people, and thereby placing the Church at the centre not only of social life, but of political life. From Mouzelis' perspective, the Church leaders were afraid that, particularly as European integration continued, there would be a threat of the Church becoming gradually disconnected from the state. Accordingly, taking a stand on the identity card issue was a means to counteract these secularising tendencies:

I think it's a combination of the type of leadership *plus* all these subterranean movements going on among the people, which have to do with fears about European integration and so forth, and the peripheralisation that this type of European modernisation brings to a lot of social strata... Thus you have this favourable situation for mobilisation at the base, and a [Church] leadership prepared to profit from this type of dissatisfaction that you have among peripheral social strata.

Mouzelis thus interprets the Church reaction to the identity card decision as a combination of two things: the type of leadership in the Church, and a social base which feels threatened by modernisation.

Alekos Alavanos also emphasises the particular role played by the Church leadership: 'the problems rise with the current form of the Church; the presence of Christodoulos in the archbishopric has a character of "offensive defence" of its status and its influence within the state'. And, through its defensive activities, the Church directly mixes into politics and in a way that is very different from that which prevailed under the previous Archbishop (Seraphim). For Alavanos, two words are key to our understanding of the Church's perspectives on the identity cards -- fear and power:

There is a fear within the Church that it is being expelled, peripheralised—a fear which has a large historical depth, beginning

during Byzantine times and continuing after Ottoman rule. The other key word is power: considering that X.O. [initials for Christian Orthodox, in Greek] is a green light on your identity card which the Jew does not have, nor the Catholic, nor he who chooses not to write his religion, the Church's loss of that green light is considered a weakening of its power.

Many interviewees point to historical factors which shape current Church attitudes and activities. For Nicos Mouzelis, a significant root of the Church's reaction to the identity card change is its historically reactive, defensive attitude towards the West. Referring to a study of the different ways in which eastern and Western Europe evolved sociologically and theologically⁷⁶, he notes that there is an intense emphasis, within the Church, on the negative developments in the West: there are efforts on the part of the Church to maintain its differences from the West and, at the same time, there is a feeling of having been 'left out' of the major developments. According to Mouzelis, there is some theological content to this anti-European feeling in the sense that many in the Church find in the West a rationalistic, logocentric⁷⁷ theology and a type of individualism which is very egoistic and which is somehow linked with the pathologies of modern life (divorce, drugs, suicide, etc). They thus try to maintain their differences with Europe for fear that somehow Europeanisation will undermine what is specific about eastern Christianity. And those who act defensively think that we should turn our backs to the opening of Europe, to somehow close as much as possible the boundaries, in order to maintain our autonomy. However, Mouzelis believes that the most relevant fact is that the Church is afraid of losing its privileges, the dominant position it has over the minorities, etc.

⁷⁶ By Stelios Ramphos, *The Individual's Yearning*. [in Greek]

⁷⁷ In other words, a theology which is based more on reason; *logocentric* in this context may be considered as the opposite of *theocentric* (God-centred).

In Lipowatz' view as well, the Church is struggling to keep its privilege of 'prevailing' in Greece, but he sees no theological content to the Church's reaction on the identity card issue: 'Let's not forget that they have huge estates, and they are afraid of losing these. In the past the state has said you have more than you need, use that estate to pay your own wages. But the Church is not in a position to do that—it is not organised. Also, they have a hand in all the schools. If they lose this, it will be a big problem'. According to Lipowatz, the Church relies on religious nationalism in its battles with the state. Such nationalism is not new to Greece, but it exists in a 'new form', since the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union: 'from that point in time we discovered "our brother" Russians and Serbs...the worst nationalists'. He also believes that the Macedonian issue introduced a new form of nationalism within the Church. Other qualms within the Church against Western Europe and the western faiths, he claims, existed of old, as an element of conservatism 'within an Orthodox Church which did not want to modernise or change anything'⁷⁸. He contends, however, that the differences with Western Christianity are not at the level of dogma, but at the level of history, a history dating back one thousand years. Most relevant to the Church's stance and activities on the identity card issue, though, is the fact that 'the Church wants to have *spiritual power*, but it links this spiritual power with the right to interfere in politics. Pure spiritual power is not enough for the Church; it also wants simultaneous *political power*'.

Professor Paparizos echoes the view that 'It's an issue of power—Christodoulos wants to be able to practice power, and he wants to be an ethnarch'. Clerics in general, he contends, want to maintain their status in Greek society; they want people to stand in

⁷⁸ He emphasises, however, that such conservatism is, of course, not unique to Orthodoxy in Greece; it also exists within Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

their presence; they want to be respected and invited to all public ceremonies, 'and they use the *ethnos* as a card in politics; if they drop the "ethnos" attention, their argument is weakened'. He believes that clerics are especially afraid that Greece will lose its cultural specificity. They basically support a helleno-Christian culture, claims Paparizos;

This has to do both with the role of particular groups who cultivate these fears, and with the fact that religion has always been closely linked to state ideology. So, taking on the state ideology, church leaders developed certain fears that if our state and our politicians change, we [the Church] will lose our place in a space which we manipulate.

The Church perspective

In order to gain insight into the Church's perspective on the identity card issue, the opinions of a number of clerics, theologians, and Church representatives were sought. I present here their general views on the government decision on the identity cards, their opinions on why the government took that decision, and their explanations of why the Church reacted in the way that it did.

Many religion-minded interviewees characterise the government's decision as undemocratic. According to Metropolitan Anthimos of Alexandroupoli, as the majority of the population, Orthodox Greeks are being oppressed with this decision. Or, in the words of Father George Metallinos⁷⁹, the decision creates a 'minority rule' which strips the majority of the Greek public of the right to self-determination and self-designation.

⁷⁹ Professor of Theology at the University of Athens, and well-known in Greece for his many appearances in the mass media and his public voice on social and church-related issues. Also, Fr. Metallinos was one of three individuals who took the matter of the identity cards to the European Court of Human Rights in a case against the Greek State. See ECHR Decision, Sofianopoulos and Others v. Greece, 20 December 2001 (the ECHR decided, without conducting a full trial, in favour of the Greek State).

Constantinos Cholevas (General Editor of the journals published by the Church of Greece) too considers the decision undemocratic, in the sense that the *non-Orthodox* citizens will continue to enjoy privileges by declaring *their* faith to public officials: the Jehovah's Witness has the right to go and declare his faith in order to get out of military service, and Muslims of Thrace have the right to declare their faith in order to get their children into university without having to pass the national exams. Thus, according to Cholevas, the decision disproportionately favours minority groups in Greece. One Metropolitan, however, firmly rebukes clerics for their verbal attacks against the government: 'I think no such governmental decision should be considered anti-democratic, in the context of our always democratic system of government, which is expressed through the majority in the taking of various decisions'⁸⁰.

As for *why* the government chose to remove religion from the identity cards, there is marked ambivalence amongst religion-minded interviewees on this matter. In explaining the reasons behind the decision, the most extreme response was the belief that it was the result of a 'Jewish plot', and that the government was pressured by a Jewish-American lobby (a perspective which prevailed, at least for a time, within the Holy Synod as well)⁸¹. Certain interviewees argue that the government is antithetical to Christianity in general. Most interviewees, however, indicate a desire on the part of the government

⁸⁰ The cleric wished to remain anonymous.

⁸¹ The 'history' of the Jewish-American lobbying efforts on the identity cards was explained in depth to me by Stelios Papatthemelis (who was, at the time, a PASOK MP). He is neither a theologian nor a representative of the Church, but is included in this section because he is considered by many to be a 'political voice' for the Church. Of the other interviewees covered in this section, Papatthemelis gave most emphasis to this particular debate, but certain clerics also referred to it in their explanations of the factors motivating the government. For foreign press coverage of this 'Jewish plot', see 'Web-surfing Church discovers Jewish plot', *Kathimerini*, 16 March 2001 (which refers to the fact that the Church had found, on the website of the Jewish American Committee, a statement declaring that the Jewish-American lobby had met with Greek diplomats visiting the US in 1996 and had asked them to press the government for removal of religion from the national identity cards). For foreign press coverage of this issue, see J.Little, 'Religious row blazes over Greek identity', *BBC News Europe*, 15 March 2001, and M.Henry, 'ID card religion labels spark controversy in Greece', *The Jerusalem Post*, 23 July 2000.

to weaken the role of religion in Greek society or, specifically, the role of the Church (most clerics, it should be noted, use these two concepts interchangeably). According to Metropolitan Anthimos,

There is a rejection, amongst the new enlighteners⁸², of the presence of the Church, which is indeed strong in our lives. But it [the Church presence] is beneficial, and not binding or constraining. What will remain, I say, if we leave all these things—Easter traditions, lighting candles in little churches, feast days—what will remain in our lives to give us a bit of freshness, a hope, and a rejuvenation and a delight?

They want to dull the conscience of the Greek, claims another Metropolitan: ‘no crosses, no icons...a slavery to all things foreign’⁸³. Metropolitan Ignatios emphasises that the identity card ‘does not determine our conscience nor our national course’, but he contends that the government action ‘contains a symbolism: it consists, in practice, of a denial of religiosity as an element of Greek specificity’. For him, the inclusion of religion on the identity cards symbolises history, tradition, and ‘all that gave freedom to our people...Our people had and has its faith as a public element of its life. And this was tried to be harmed, with the pretext of the identity cards’.

There is also, amongst religion-minded interviewees, a great deal of ambivalence over whether the government decision was *aimed* at a full separation of church and state. According to Cholevas, it was an effort to weaken the role of the Church in Greek society, and not a matter of separation of church and state. Yet, at the same time, he claims that ‘Stathopoulos said that after the identity cards we will abolish the religious

⁸² The word used by the Metropolitan is ‘*diafotistes*’; the term it is alternatively used to mean ‘enlightener’, or, sarcastically, ‘propagandist’—someone who seeks to ‘enlighten’ people by propagandising Western values or norms.

⁸³ Interviewee wished to remain anonymous. The interviewee says, furthermore, ‘evidently [the removal of religion from the identity cards] was due to the line followed by all member states before 11 September’, thus laying emphasis on the fact that *after* 11 September, there was discussion within the EU of introducing identity cards which would identify the holder’s religious orientation.

courses. Then we will lower Christ [icons] from the schools. *He said then then then...that the civil wedding would become mandatory, etc.*'. Thus Cholevas sees the identity card change as a 'first step' in a series of measures; and all of the measures to which he refers lie at the heart of church-state relations in Greece. Metropolitan Anthimos emphatically declares that 'the separation of church and state they won't dare to try. For the sake of our peoples, these relations must be maintained, in the form of "distinct roles and mutual support", as we call it. They can't try [to change this] because the people don't want it'. Father George Metallinos rejects the use of the term 'church-state separation': 'what we have today, and what is correct, is a distinction between the roles of church and state (as is constitutionally established); what they [the government] are trying is the detachment of Orthodoxy from every state structure and engagement'. This, he contends, is the program currently being implemented in Greece'. These views reveal an interesting nuance: while, generally speaking, Church representatives do not conceive of the government decision as aimed towards church-state separation, they do feel that the decision, in effect, changes the status quo of church-state relations. In other words, regardless on the government's *intentions*, its decision on the identity cards *resulted* in a change to the status of church-state relations in terms of the place accorded to the Church (and to Orthodoxy) in the Greek state and society. It is thus that the Church sees the identity card issue as a matter to be dealt with by the Church and by the state, rather than, e.g., the EU.

There is a great deal of ambivalence, in particular, over the extent to which the EU is at fault for the changes to the identity card. In fact, there is often an element of contradiction in religion-minded interviewees' perspectives. For instance, Metropolitan

Anthimos contends that ‘there were strong pressures [on the government] from the European lobby’, but the decision was ‘not because of the EU’. Most interviewees refer to the pressures applied by the EU for an enhancement of the rights of religious minorities, and contend that the EU thereby seeks to limit Greece’s right to ‘protect itself’ from proselytism practiced by other faiths (see below for an elaboration on this view). But, on the whole, interviewees place the blame for the identity card change on the Greek government and on certain intellectuals in Greece who are ‘more European than the Europeans’⁸⁴. One notable exception is the perspective of Father George Metallinos. When asked why the government took the decision on the identity cards, his simple response was: ‘the recent decision of the European Court shows how the circuit operates and from where the directions are given...OUR MASTER’S VOICE’⁸⁵. He believes that the decision was aimed at a spiritual division within Greece and, directing a somewhat cryptic accusation against the EU, he declares that ‘this [division] serves the interests of those who want Hellenism to dissolve in two decades’⁸⁶. This is where we are going, unfortunately. But the only thing that never dissolves is Orthodoxy and the Hellenicity which is united with it. We proved this historically many times’. He states his enthusiasm, however, over the fact that at least now Greeks have become aware of ‘who we have against us!’.

No interviewee, however, explained the Church’s reaction to the identity card change by reference to the EU. The Greek state was the clear object of Church statements and activities on the issue. Reiterating his assertion that Stathopoulos

⁸⁴ Clerics’ perceptions of the EU’s role in the identity card issue are addressed more thoroughly in the following section.

⁸⁵ Father Metallinos refers here to the case which he took, together with two other individuals and against the Greek state, to the ECHR (20 December 2001). See footnote 79.

⁸⁶ One may assume he means the two decades of Greek membership in the EU, since 1981.

conceived of the identity card change as a first step in a series of measures, Cholevas declares: 'we reacted against the identity cards *mainly* so other measures wouldn't be taken'. The Church-led demonstrations, he contends, 'gave a response and I think the effort will stop here'. The main argument for the Church's activities on the identity card issue, however, was that the Church was representing the will of the people—protecting Greek citizens from a government acting against their interests. As Cholevas explains, the Church is a spiritual organ which does not depend on the believer's profession of religion on the identity card: the Church founds itself on the confession of the believer in his coming to church, in the fact that all but 2% of the population chooses to have a religious wedding only, and in the respect the believer shows for the Church in the polls⁸⁷. Accordingly, 'the Church is not threatened by the government ...but it is *bothered*, and it involves itself in the problem of its flock'. The pride of the Greek is damaged, he contends, when a handful of judges decide on such a sensitive issue: 'I think the Greek wants Orthodoxy to be an element of his national identity. Beyond this, the Greek has learned that today we have democracy, and each person has the right *not* to be Orthodox'. He does not see any discrimination in Greece on the basis of faith, and declares that he is 'afraid we'll soon reach the point where the Orthodox feels the discrimination'.

In the same vein, Metropolitan Anthimos explains that perhaps the minority in Greece wanted this change to the identity cards ('though it lived here so many years and there are no such problems'); but should not the wish and opinion of the majority be taken into consideration? 'The minority doesn't want [religion on the identity cards], and

⁸⁷ Cholevas is referring here to opinion polls which show the Greek population's respect for the Church as an institution.

the majority, for reasons of confession and witness, as taught by the Bible that we must confess that we are Christian, and because for so many years we had it on our identity cards, says, I want it'; accordingly, he maintains that 'it was a big problem which upset everyone'. But it also upset the clergy in particular whose work, according to Metropolitan Anthimos, is now made more difficult: 'how are we to know, in a wedding or in Holy Communion, if the person is Orthodox?'. He admits this is a technical argument, since priests do not ask people to show their identity cards as proof of faith; 'but the most important is that the soul and the conscience of the Greek citizens for whom it will no longer be written, they have a problem. For some, they don't want to go anywhere without wearing a cross. That's how it is with our identity cards'. This is why the Church reacted so strongly against the government decision and this is why, he contends, the issue is not over for the Church⁸⁸.

However, many religion-minded interviewees opposed the official line taken by the Church and its interference in the realm of politics. The perspective of Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Zakynthos is characteristic of a relatively small but vocal group of clerics who were critical of the Church:

As citizens of a new borderless world we Orthodox Greeks are sometimes afraid of the exchange of ideas, peoples, cultures and dogmas which the EU entails. But no one can harm us, if we keep unaltered inside us the realities of history, faith, and our specificity. And this, without an attitude of nationalism or parochialism. How will we maintain our specificity? Only with the folkloric view of the 'Hellenic' and 'Orthodox' and only with the formal recording of religion, e.g., on our state identity cards? Will we wait for the state to identify what we are? For the state to 'baptize' us?

⁸⁸ When asked what he meant by that statement, he explained that 'the Church's plans could not yet be revealed'.

Or, in the words of another Metropolitan, ‘almost until the eve of this issue, hierarchs, preachers etc., were telling people to be strong Christians and not Christians of the identity cards!’ Accordingly, he declares, ‘the noise [demonstrations, etc] was not worth it; obviously the inclusion of religion on the identity cards proves nothing about the life of a Christian’⁸⁹. According to Christos Yiannaras⁹⁰, the Church’s reaction was ‘very unfortunate’, but, he continues, the state did not ‘leave it much room’ to act otherwise, since Simitis refused to meet with Christodoulos to discuss the matter. However, he emphatically believes that the government decision was, in substance, correct: religion has no place on the state-issued national identity cards.

Professor of theology Savvas Agouridis is also critical of the Church’s position on the identity cards. He maintains that such stances have no theological content and are, rather, remnants of Byzantine ‘political theology’: ‘there are sleeping groups of citizens which, when someone shows up with a programme of awakening, are awakened’. He explains the attitudes of both the Church and its supporters on the identity card issue by reference to the fact that ‘we have not yet matured. And for this reason you see leaders, even the intellectuals, use apocalyptic theology...we haven’t matured psychologically in order to understand the facts of a crisis and to result in some objective conclusions’. Such ‘psychological crisis’ leads Greeks to the past, ‘and that’s why we always go back’. Accordingly, he feels that, in Greece, problems are rarely handled ‘in and of themselves’, and are, instead, burdened by history and fears to do with the ethnos, and ‘our race’.

⁸⁹ He wished to remain anonymous.

⁹⁰ Christos Yiannaras is professor of philosophy at Panteion University, Athens. He cannot be accurately described as representative of, or supportive of, either the ‘Church’ or the ‘state perspective’. His promotion as professor of philosophy was, itself, a much-debated issue in Greece, because his work is mostly devoted to Orthodox theology, history and sociology, and because he is considered a foremost representative of the ‘Neo-Orthodox movement’ (see chapter three).

People mainly fear change and the Church, he contends, simply wants to maintain the status quo (for economic, political, and social reasons). Furthermore, he explains, the politicians compromise in the end and conform to church demands because 'at the end of the day, they are politicians. And the EU played a role in why they *didn't* compromise in the end on the identity cards'. In Agourides' view, the Church's activities were not directed only at the state but also at the EU's influence over Greece: 'we can't stop it, but we can make it difficult. How? By emphasising traditional factors. The others are strong, and we are weak here. We should not submit, we should emphasise our character because we are in danger of being absorbed'. Agouridis sees, in such a mentality, an ignorance of the fact that people will not only remain Orthodox but may become *more* Orthodox if they learn to think of faith outside the bounds of ethnicity and tradition: 'it is therefore not an issue of religion, but of historical psychology, and estimation of reality by the simple person that Europe is a hyper-power, it has the historical political strength, and we are the small ones trying to stand on our feet'.

But as an Orthodox theologian, Agouridis is in the minority with this perspective. Again, the opinions addressed above show that most clerics and theologians approach the identity card issue through the prism of the Greek state's intentions for the place of religion and the Church in the Greek state and society. Meanwhile, the majority of secular-minded interviewees interpret the issue as a matter of modernisation, Europeanisation, and obedience to the principle of the rule of law.

Church, state and the European Union

Against this backdrop of divergent perspectives, I now close with a consideration of the Church's influence on national-EU relations, and the EU's influence on the place of religion in Greek state and society. I begin by examining secular-minded interviewees' perspectives on the implications of this identity card issue. These implications may be divided into three *interrelated* domains: domestic policy, church-state relations, and Greek-EU relations. Here we see that the role of the Church in national-EU relations is intricately linked with the activities of the Church in domestic politics. In terms of domestic politics, a first notable factor is the number of signatures collected by the Church in its petition for a referendum on the issue. The fact that the Archbishop declared the Church's intent to collect more signatures than the number of votes which the ruling party won in the previous national elections is a clear signal of the Church's involvement in politics. The fact that it *succeeded* in this intent, by gathering over 3 million votes, is indicative of the Church's potential *influence* on domestic politics. As Ioannis Konidaris indicates, the political power of this number cannot be overlooked: 'with those numbers, I say the Church has approximately 70,000 votes in its hands, which means this must be taken into consideration in relation to elections. It would not be wise for any politician to go into elections against the Archbishop'. As a member of the Simitis government, he admits that many of the party's MP's were disappointed with Simitis' decision, because they could expect to lose much of their local support. Alekos Alavanos also emphasises that the Church's influence over the

electorate significantly affects many politicians' stances on issues even remotely related to the Church, because of their fear of the consequences in terms of electoral support.

Further evidence of the effect of the Church on domestic politics is the very intense way in which the identity card issue became a main platform of the conservative opposition party, the 'New Democracy' (ND). Its leader, Constantinos Karamanlis, was one of the first to sign the petition for a referendum, thus emphasising the traditional close ties between the party and the Church. The party's manipulation of the issue for electoral purposes was so obvious that the press began ridiculing it as the 'New Theocracy'.

The influence of the Church in domestic politics became even more explicit in the municipal and prefectural elections which took place in October 2002. Though by that point the church-run petition had been completed (with no effect on the government decision), the Archbishop repeatedly declared that the issue was not closed. By reminding politicians of the three million voters who had signed the Church's petition and by publicly calling on all parties to make their positions on the identity card clear prior to elections, the Archbishop took the opportunity of the elections to make one last ditch effort in the Church's campaign. His broadly disseminated statement that the voters of George Karatzaferis are 'good Christians' is thought to have negatively affected the electoral prospects of the latter's opponent in the race (ND candidate I. Tzannetakos, who had taken the government's position against the Church in the identity card dispute). Karatzaferis, who had no basis in a mainstream political party and no strong political platform, *but* had the advantage of church support (not least because he championed its cause in the identity card issue), shocked politicians, journalists, and the Greek public in

general by receiving a substantial percentage of the vote in the ensuing elections⁹¹.

Furthermore, the widely publicised visits to the Archbishop by a number of candidates seeking his blessing, prior to the elections and in the wake of his aforementioned statement (on 'good Christian' voters), could be interpreted as nothing but recognition of the Church's strong influence over domestic politics. Finally, even the fact that Foreign Minister George Papandreou henceforth made a point of personally informing⁹² the Archbishop on significant government policies (such as that on the UN proposal for solution to the Cyprus issue) was considered by many to be a direct effect of 'lessons learned' by the government through the church-state conflict over the identity cards.

In terms of the implications of the identity card issue for church-state relations, many Greek bureaucrats and politicians note with regret that the numerous aspects of church-state relations which urgently require revision were necessarily shelved in the aftermath of this conflict. 'The Church', Konidaris declares, 'is in a state of *self-defence* following the identity card issue. Any slightly religion-related issues addressed by the government are viewed with intense suspicion: they're afraid that we're preparing something against them'. In the short run, according to many, the Church was the winner of this conflict with the state. Minister of Justice Stathopoulos was replaced in the subsequent government reshuffle, and his replacement has notably better relations with the Church hierarchy. Meanwhile, in a widely publicised interview Prime Minister Simitis pointedly declared that the government had no more plans for policies related to the Church—a declaration which received little criticism from the press and the public, due to the widespread perception that 'it was not possible for more to be done' in the

⁹¹ Tzannetakos received 2% of the vote, whilst Karatzaferis received 12% of the vote.

⁹² Or, *consulting*, depending on the perspective taken.

short term (in other words, it was not possible for more religion-related reforms to be pursued)⁹³.

However, in terms of long-term effects on church-state relations, significantly the government did *not* back down on this particular policy, in spite of the extreme opposition it faced from the Church. This fact sets an important precedent for, in all previous intense conflicts between Church and state in the history of modern Greece, significant concessions on particular policies were always made by the state. Finally, as one scholar notes, 'the Church reaction on this issue probably hurt the Church: it will not be able to easily mobilise people again, as the public understood that it was a wasted effort'.

In terms of the impact of the 'identity card crisis' on Greek-EU relations, an oft-cited effect is that it served to 'blacken the image' of Greece within the European Union. As one Greek MEP notes, the whole issue was far too reminiscent of the reactionary tactics of the Church during the crisis over the naming of Macedonia in the 1990's. Much more consequential, though, are the effects related to the above-mentioned domains of domestic politics and church-state relations. First, the identity card issue illustrates a special vulnerability in the Greek political system to the influences of the Church. When, under the threat of electoral losses, we see politicians more attentive to opinions emanating from the archbishopric than from Brussels, we are obliged to recognise the Church as a significant factor in national-EU relations. Of course, the politicians' own responsibility in this must be highlighted: rather than counteract the Church's successful deployment of the national sensitivities of the Greek population by

⁹³ See Greek press coverage of the Thessaloniki Trade Fair (the context in which the interview was given), 8-9 September, 2001.

emphasising the virtues of political and social equality, most politicians either fell silent or fed the intra- and inter-party conflict that arose over the identity card issue.

Second, the identity card issue illustrates a problematic intersection between church-state and Greek-EU relations. Several governmental reforms are pending which are either necessary for conformity with EU standards or have been explicitly demanded by the European Court of Human Rights⁹⁴, but which press on the sensitivities of the Church. For instance, enhanced provision of freedom of conscience by changing the nature of the mandatory religious education courses; guaranteed freedom of religious practice by removing the difficult barriers to the building of mosques or Protestant churches in Greece; simplification of the process through which conscientious objectors (who are mainly Jehovah's Witnesses) may be placed in social rather than military service⁹⁵; and legislation allowing for cremation as an alternative to religious burial⁹⁶. These are but a few examples of reforms which the Church of Greece has staunchly resisted. And, in light of the difficulty the government faced in implementing the identity card reform, we can expect significant delays in the implementation of such related measures.

Within Church circles we find radically different perceptions of the implications of the identity card issue on Greek-EU relations and on church-state relations. I examine these perceptions with reference to current attitudes to the EU and to the state, respectively. The most common phrase used by clerics and representatives of the Church

⁹⁴ Which, of course, falls under the domain of the Council of Europe, but the opinions of which are certainly important to the European Union as a whole.

⁹⁵ Many of the cases against the Greek state in the ECHR are related to conscientious objection. Beyond the challenges heterodox citizens face in gaining the right to alternative service, they sometimes face further problems when assigned to Church-run welfare services.

⁹⁶ See T.Morgan, 'Crematoria plan outrages Greek church', for a report on the Church's resistance to legislation providing for the practice of cremation in Greece. *BBC Europe*, 11 April 2002.

to describe their current attitudes to the EU is '*nai men, alla*' (or, 'yes, but'). Yes to the EU, but no to two things in particular: cultural levelling (i.e., homogenisation across Europe), and threats to Greek national specificity. Cultural pride is strong amongst the Greeks, states Constantinos Cholevas, 'and if Europe makes the mistake of trampling on the pride of Greeks, or acts so as to harm Orthodoxy or our language, we'll have a problem'⁹⁷. As long as there is *respect* on the part of the EU for the specificities of each religious identity and no pressure to conform, then the Church is positive towards the European Union. If at the economic level the UK can say 'no' to the Euro, Metropolitan Anthimos declares, then at the spiritual and cultural level Greece can also resist certain developments.

Such resistance, most religion-minded interviewees explain, should not be considered 'anti-Europeanism'; there is simply *disagreement* with certain opinions and trends, 'and this is democratic'. One cleric, however, does admit to anti-European trends within the Church⁹⁸. He explains this with reference to the fact that the EU is an unknown territory for most elder hierarchs who cannot easily understand and absorb the socio-political changes entailed by membership in the EU. Many such clerics (who are in the majority) were brought up within a climate of conservatism mixed with nationalistic ideals. He claims, furthermore, that the election of Christodoulos to the archbishopric played a catalytic role in the shaping of such a climate within the hierarchy. Negative attitudes to Europe also increased in certain circumstances, such as condemnations of Greece in the ECHR. And, in general, all Greeks felt like second-class citizens of Europe in the 1980's, largely as a result of Greek foreign policy at the time: 'our European

⁹⁷ However, he continues, 'If [the EU] does what it says in its texts, to respect the different traditions, we'll be ok'.

⁹⁸ He wished to remain anonymous.

partners treated us as inhabitants of the 3rd world'. He claims that younger hierarchs, however, 'understand the importance of a politico-economic union, from which the Greek Church has much to gain'⁹⁹.

Yet two particular factors do stand out as problematic even to the most pro-European of religion-minded respondents. First, the EU is considered as overly focused on economic matters and does not attend enough to cultural and spiritual matters. The resistance to any mention of the EU's Christian roots in its Constitutional Treaty is considered indicative of the spirit of materialism which prevails in Europe¹⁰⁰. A second oft-expressed concern is that the European Union is overly liberal. Clerics repeatedly declare that if the EU tries to force such things as the legalisation of gay marriage, to regulate laws on employment on Sundays, to encourage abortion or to change the all-male tradition of Mount Athos, then the Church will resist. Most complaints, however, are aimed at the EU's liberal approach to human rights policies, where these have to do with religious rights and freedoms. Constantinos Cholevas asserts that a compromise on this issue must be found: 'on the one hand, freedom of expression is a European right; on the other, the insecurity of parents and children should be respected and so the Church should work with the state so that where these heresies [religious sects] violate laws and the freedom of opinion of people and stupefy them, these groups will be punished'. Or, as expressed by Fr. Metallinos, '[w]hat does the EU do, when it says that it protects the rights of the minorities. Don't we have rights?'. The resistance, within the EU, to

⁹⁹ This is, I should note, a debatable point, as several elder hierarchs are strongly pro-EU. The respondent goes on to say that 'There is no theological basis for anti-Europeanism. The Christian message is pananthropic. Whoever claims theological reasons for the polemic against the EU simply destroys, adulterates and does injustice to the Christian message'.

¹⁰⁰ As Metropolitan Anthimos puts it, 'you can't form a Constitution of Europe, and not to refer to Christianity. You can't ignore the influence of Christianity in Europe, because wherever you look in European culture, even in the reactions against religion, you find the Christian religion'.

mention of religion in the Preamble to the EU's Constitutional Treaty is also seen as evidence of an EU so biased towards immigrants and minorities that it effectively 'abolishes' European culture ('the root of which is Christianity')¹⁰¹.

Furthermore, many within the Church perceive 'anti-Orthodox trends' within the European Union. Examples of this which are cited include the EU's stance on the naming of Macedonia and the absence of attention to Greece (ancient, Byzantine or modern) in the Museum of Europe and in the EU-funded book by Jean-Baptiste Durocelle on the history of Europe. Another example of 'the undermining' of Orthodoxy is 'the hundreds of Western [Catholic], and especially Protestant groups which practice proselytism' and which are 'guided by foreign decision-making centres'¹⁰².

Yet, in spite of the above, religion-minded interviewees generally emphasise their endorsement of the EU and of Greek participation therein. Many explain, in great detail, all the facts which make Greece European (including the origin of Europe's naming). But most focus on the positive contribution to be made by Orthodoxy to the EU by emphasising that Orthodox culture can enrich European culture. Furthermore, Europe *needs* this contribution, because Christianity is weak within the EU and materialism is rampant; Orthodoxy, these respondents maintain, proposes a healthier 'way of life'. Many also note that in recent years especially, 'we find allies in Europe, rather than enemies'. This statement is repeatedly made with reference to such issues as cloning and euthanasia but, most importantly, the matter of reference to the deity in the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty.

¹⁰¹ It should be noted that the Church has been especially committed to the campaign for including reference to Christianity in the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty, as evinced by its hosting of an international conference to discuss the issue in May 2003.

¹⁰² These specific citations are from Fr. George Metallinos, but other interviewees mentioned these examples as well.

Finally, and most importantly, clerics and church representatives emphasise that ‘the EU doesn’t want to change us’: it is clear in its treaties that the EU ‘must respect the cultural and national identity of the people which it comprises’, and religious matters are to be regulated by the individual states. Accordingly, Cholevas explains, ‘Greece is not afraid of the EU; it is afraid of the decisions taken in Greece *supposedly* because of Europe. If someone says we have to change the Constitution of Greece because the EU asks for it, it will be a *big lie*, because Europe says issues of Church are issues of each country’s Constitution, which each country regulates’. The main concerns of the Church with regard to the EU, Cholevas notes, are clear and were sent in a letter to Giscard d’Estaing: ‘1. The Christian roots of Europe should remain; 2. The national identity of each country should be respected; and 3. Church and religious matters should be arranged by the Constitution of each state—there shouldn’t be a decree from Brussels saying that the Orthodox Church loses its rights. We want the Constitution of each country to decide church issues’. Accordingly, ‘the problem is in *SOME* Greeks, some who are super-modern, who supposedly in order to make us good Europeans, want to change us completely’. And this fact, Cholevas continues, ‘causes harm to Europe. Those who are fanatic supporters of Europe cause it harm, because they say to the simple Greeks that to become Europeans we can’t have the religious courses, to become Europeans we must abolish faith’¹⁰³. In short, the problem is *not* the European Union, but the Greek state.

By contrast, a very small minority of religion-minded interviewees argues, instead, that the problem is the status quo in church-state relations. For instance, Christos Yiannaras emphasises that a separation of church and state is imperative, and ‘should have been the Church’s constant plea’. Savvas Agouridis notes that a presidential decree

¹⁰³ I assume that Cholevas means this with reference to the identity cards.

is a prerequisite for the appointment of a Metropolitan and that each Metropolitan must take his oath in the presence of a prefect: 'I do not consider it honourable towards Jesus Christ that His representatives have to go through the state to do their jobs'. But, as Yiannaras explains, 'in Greece, church-state conjunction is a precondition for social cohesion; here, social cohesion is based mainly on a common tradition, a common faith, a common ethos, and not on a social contract. It is a difficult political problem to change this: with what will the state replace these bases of social cohesion?'

Conclusion

The identity card issue is the most poignant example, in contemporary Greek reality, of the Church's intense efforts to play a role as protector of national identity and to maintain its strong position in relation to the state. At the heart of this issue lies a clear ambiguity about how the EU influences (or, seeks to influence) the place of religion in state and society. It is on the basis of this lack of clarity that the Church fought the state in the way that it did over the identity card issue. The Church's stated interests were primarily to represent the Greek public and to maintain religion as a part of Greek national identity. It was able to wage a strong war (i.e., was able to mobilise people on this basis) on the basis of the historical relationship between Orthodoxy and national identity, and because of its relatively strong position vis-à-vis the state. Again, as pointed out in chapter two, religion wields considerable strength when linked to the national myth; the Greek Orthodox Church was able to mobilise Greeks against unfavourable state policies through its appeals to the national sensitivities of Greeks.

Considering 'religious' attitudes to the EU in light of the identity card issue against the background of those examined in chapter three, we see many parallels as well as differences. Religion-minded interviewees echo certain age-old Greek Orthodox complaints against Europe, but in general they express positive attitudes towards Greek membership in the EU. With their common phrase 'yes, but', they convey certain clear reservations which are mainly to do with religion, culture and national identity. But above all, they register their approval of the fact that the European Union leaves religious matters in the hands of individual states. Accordingly, their attention is overwhelmingly focused on the Church's relations with the Greek state. Any qualms about the EU's over-liberal stances on religious freedoms are to be dealt with—as we see—at the national level. The fact that the Church fought the battle at the national level (in spite of clear and relevant EU legislation in support of the state) indicates that a primary interest of the Church was to preserve the status quo in church-state relations. At the same time, the fact that the EU's official policy on religious matters is based on the subsidiarity principle supported, in effect, the Church's decision to wage its battle directly with the state rather than the EU.

Yet ultimately, the European Union itself influenced both church and state interests in this matter: its policies on religious rights and freedoms require certain measures to be taken by the Greek state, and these measures press on the sensitivities of the Church, the interests of which arise from its historical role as preserver of Greek national identity and its historical place of strength in relation to the state. Thus, the identity card issue reveals a kind of vicious circle: the EU affects the church-state balance and this, in turn, has a clear potential to affect Greece's conformity with EU norms.

CHAPTER FIVE

Islamism and Secularism in Turkey

My second case study, that of Turkey, affords interesting parallels and contrasts with that of Greece. Understanding the role of religion in Turkey-EU relations requires a study of the historical relationship between Islamism and secularism in Turkey. Through this study we will come to understand the much-contended place of religion in Turkish state and society, and the respective interests of 'Islamists' and 'secularists' with regard to this place. Careful attention must be paid to the specificities of Turkish Islamism and secularism, as these are crucial to the ways religion plays a part in Turkey-EU relations.

I thus begin with a consideration of Islam and Islamism in Turkish historical context. This is followed by an overview of the development of Turkish secularism and fluctuations in secularist policies over time. Finally, I present a spectrum of Turkish Islamist perspectives on Europe and the European Union, as recorded in a selection of religious publications. The views expressed in these publications are largely critical of Europe and the EU. This chapter thus serves as a background for the study, in chapter six, of the 'change' to a pro-European stance amongst contemporary Turkish Islamists¹. The following pages will help us to understand the extent to which this 'change' results from the historically complex relationship between Islamism and secularism. We will also come to understand the contending interests of Islamists and secularists and how these affect and are affected by Turkey's potential membership to the EU.

¹ As noted in the Introduction, there are significant nuances to contemporary Islamist pro-Europeanism. I use the word 'change' for simplicity's sake, but the term should be recognised as indicating, for some Islamists, a complete reversal of former attitudes on Europe, for others a moderate modification of perspective, and for others still, part of a more general transformation of perspectives on Islam in contemporary Turkey. The question of whether any 'change' at all has taken place is addressed below.

Islam and Islamism

Critical for our study is awareness of the differences between Islam and Islamism, as well as those *within* each, in the Turkish context. *Islamism* indicates the re-appropriation of a Muslim identity and values as a basis for an alternative social and political agenda to that of the state. *Muslim* is not synonymous with *Islamist*, in the sense that the first expresses a religious identity, the latter, political consciousness.² One might also distinguish between radical, moderate, and ultra-national Islamists, though the boundaries between them often merge³.

Our focus here is primarily on Islamism, rather than Islam, as it is in the realm of Islamism that we find the importance of religious identity in national-EU relations (as evinced in the following chapter). However, in order to properly understand Turkish Islamism and relative attitudes towards EU membership, we must address two specific aspects of the history of Islam in Turkey: first, the uniqueness of Turkish Islam in the early nomads' conversion to the faith; and second, the historical (and contemporary) diversity of Islam in Turkey.

Historical development of Islam in Turkey

The early Turks who came from Central Asia practiced *shamanism*: holy men called shamans led people in worship of elemental forces of nature; they believed that spirits lived among them in the earth and the skies, and that there was one supreme God

² See Nilufer Gole, 'Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites', p.47. See also Daniel Pipes, 'Islam and Islamism. Faith and Ideology', pp.87-93.

³ See Nilufer Narli, 'Turkey's cultural identity and its integration with the European Community: common and divergent dimensions', pp.54-56.

above all gods and natural forces. Their conversion to Islam was facilitated by two factors. First, Turks were largely influenced by communication with the Arab Muslims and the Persians who had converted to Islam. Second, shamanism did focus on one supreme God over others. Also, Turks had already had considerable exposure to monotheism, as many Turks had converted to Christianity through missionaries, some had become Buddhists, and Judaism was the official religion of a large group of Turks called Khazars. Whilst Turks converted to Islam, as a nomadic people with an emphasis on mysticism they were naturally adverse to the strict focus in Islam on rules. Furthermore, those Muslims who converted the Turks to Islam were not themselves orthodox, and were thus fairly open and tolerant of the nomads' own beliefs. Accordingly, the new converts enjoyed considerable freedom in their religious beliefs and maintained many elements of shamanistic practice, as well as their mystical orientation. They did not emphasise questions of theology, and full Islamic law was only gradually applied to them⁴.

Our second important lesson from the history of Islam in Turkey is its diversity: the country's religious landscape is far from homogenous. Sunni Islam came to be considered the 'official' religion of the early Ottoman dynasties⁵. This standard continued throughout Turkish history, and is currently embodied in the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*), the state organ which administers mosques, religious education, and foundations and charities in accordance with Sunni Islam⁶. Today the vast

⁴ Justin McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks: an Introductory History to 1923*, p.6.

⁵ Under the Umayyad and the Abbasid caliphates in particular, Sunni Muslims were considered the 'orthodox' group supported by the Caliph, and they in turn lent their support to the Caliph. See McCarthy, *ibid*, p.9.

⁶ *Diyanet* (thus called from its Turkish title, *Diyanet Isleri Mudurlugu*) was established in 1923, received confirmation of its status after the military intervention of 1960, and appears in the 1982 Turkish Constitution. For further explanation of its structure and activities, see David Shankland, *Islam and Society*

majority of Turks is Sunni Muslim, a minority Shiites. Meanwhile Sufism, dating from the conversion to Islam of Turkic peoples by mystics, persists through *tarikats* (religious orders)⁷. We pay special attention to *tarikats* because of their significant role in Turkish politics and society.

The religious brotherhoods

Both historically and currently, *tarikats* represent an alternative to the 'official' Islam. In Ottoman times, they were often centres of rebellion and assault on the 'centre' of the ulema who, through their proximity to the governing powers, tried to standardise and control all aspects of religious life⁸. In contemporary times, the Sufi religious orders became engaged in a continual struggle to alter the relationship between Islam and the nation-state project by promoting Islam as the central element of national unity in opposition to Kemalist secularism⁹. *Tarikats* were outlawed in 1925 as part of Kemalist secularist measures (see below). The target of the ban was the intense loyalty of their members to *tarikats* leaders: *tarikats* were considered threatening to the authority of the new government and contrary to the individualist, scientific spirit of the modern age. Yet *tarikats* remain a powerful force for organised religion in Turkey¹⁰. Two facts especially explain this phenomenon: firstly, the enforcement of the ban has weakened in accordance with periods of relaxed secularist policy; and second, *tarikats* tend to carry

in Turkey; Adil Ozdemir and Kenneth Frank, *Visible Islam in Modern Turkey*; and Sami Zubaida, 'Turkish Islam and national identity', p.12.

⁷ '*Tarikats*' is an Anglicisation of the Turkish plural of *tarikats*: *tarikatlar*.

⁸ See Yildiz Atasoy, 'Islamic Revivalism and the Nation-State Project: Competing claims for modernity' [accessed online]. The ulema are a community of religious scholars.

⁹ This applies to *tarikats* in general, but particularly to the Naksibendi and the Nurcus. [accessed online]

¹⁰ See A.Ozdemir and K.Frank, *Visible Islam in Modern Turkey*, p.68.

out much of their activity through legally constituted foundations or individuals (*derneks* or, associations, and *vakifs*, trusts, are especially common means through which tarikats organize themselves nationally and internationally). Furthermore, certain groups deny the term 'tarikats' altogether, though they are widely recognised as such¹¹.

Religious groups vary substantially in their organizational principles, traditions, and degree of politicisation. Some reflect traditional forms of sufi mysticism more clearly, and are best known for their particular rituals which become tourist attractions during their festival seasons (the Bektashi for instance, and the Mevlevi with their 'whirling dervishes'¹²). The Alevi, (or, Alawites), are an especially important religious order in Turkey. In their comparatively liberal interpretation of Islam, they are different enough from many Muslims to be considered outside orthodox Islam. This difference has historically placed them in social and political tension against the majority Sunni Muslims. It has also led them to call for a more radical secularism in Turkey, as under the current policy Sunni Muslims are favoured. Alevis are thus politically opposed to the Islamist political parties, which also primarily reflect Sunni Muslim interests. Rather, Alevis have stood out for their tendency towards socialism and communism. Besides their tensions with Sunni Muslims, much debate surrounds the Alevis in terms of their relations with the state: Alevis complain that they are not adequately represented under

¹¹ See D.Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, p.63.

¹² Both the Bektashi and the Mevlevi do, however, have a history of politicisation. The Bektashi order, according to Eric Zürcher's historical study, seems to have supported the revolutionary and secularist Committee of Union and Progress of the Young Turks, as well as the Anatolian resistance movement. Meanwhile, the Mevlevi had contributed forces during the First World War. See E.Zürcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.200.

the current secularist policy, which places organised religion under the direction of the state¹³.

The Naksibendis are one of the largest and most politicised of tarikats. Members of the Naskibendi order had led both the anti-constitutionalist uprising in 1909, and the Kurdish rebellion of 1925. While there have certainly been periods of intense tension between the Kemalist elite and tarikats in general, a close cooperation between the Naksibendis and the state—albeit with preservation of their differences—has persisted throughout Turkish history. For instance, the Naksibendi religious orders have promoted national economic development strategies with reference to Islamic ideology, continually trying to find a balance between economic and political modernisation, on the one hand, and adoption of policies contrary to their religious principles, on the other. Sheik Mehmet Zaid Kotku is an example of a Naksibendi leader who, motivated by a disapproval of western-imposed economic development strategy based on mass consumerism, actively strove for the development of a nationalized industrial sector. As a result, his followers in the State Planning Organisation began to formulate strategies for heavy industrialization in Turkey. With close ties to Necmettin Erbakan¹⁴, Kotku's encouraging of the latter to establish a model Islamic industrial plant led to the founding

¹³ See A.Ozdemir and K.Frank, *Visible Islam in Modern Turkey*, p.71. The efforts of Alevis to communicate with EU officials about their status in Turkey drew a great deal of national media attention and criticism from the secular state. Their cultural, social and religious differences from mainstream Turkey make Alevis a minority group, but the intense sensitivity in Turkey over the question of 'minority status' precludes the state from granting Alevis special treatment. This sensitivity is often discussed with reference to the 'Sevres Syndrome'. The Sevres Treaty of 1920 divided much of what is now Turkey among European powers, and remains high in contemporary Turkish consciousness as a humiliating treaty and a symbol of 'external threats' to Turkish national unity and sovereignty. Thus, the term 'Sevres Syndrome' refers to a prevalent fear in Turkey of any perceived threats to national unity and sovereignty. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1923, reconfigured Turkey's borders and cancelled the Sevres Treaty. See Hakan Yavuz, 'Towards an Islamic liberalism: the Nurcu movement and Fethullah Gulen', for references to Turkish-language analyses of how the state uses the memory of the Sevres Treaty.

¹⁴ A leader in Turkish political Islam, to whom we will pay considerable attention below and in chapter six.

of a national irrigation pump factory¹⁵. A more visible link between the Turkish State and the Naksibendi order, however, lies in the group's public affiliations with former Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and his family. The symbol of his political party (Motherland Party, ANAP) -- the bee -- was taken from the Mormons, whom they held as an example of maintaining faith in a secular world. One of the most frequently cited examples of Ozal's closeness to the Naksibendi brotherhood is his issuance of a decree to re-open the cemetery of the historic Sulemaniye Mosque, so that his mother could be buried next to a renowned Naksibendi leader.

The Nurcu are a large set of tarikats in Turkey today¹⁶. The name comes from their doctrine of *Nur* (Light), but they often refer to themselves as followers, readers, or the disciples of the writings of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi¹⁷. Nursi was a member of the modernist wing of the Naksibendi order in the early 1900's, and founded the Nurcu movement in the 1930's¹⁸. He devoted his teachings to the interpretation of Koranic revelation, aiming to reconcile Islam with modernity by demonstrating that knowledge generated by the natural sciences is present in the Koran. Nursi was highly critical of

¹⁵ The political history of the Naksibendi is drawn from Atasoy's study, 'Islamic revivalism and the nation-state project: competing claims for modernity' [accessed online].

¹⁶ They claim not to be a tarikat, however, and have no initiation process or formal relationship between sheik and follower. These characteristics help them avoid the condemnation of the state on the one hand, and the possible accusations of heresy from orthodox believers on the other. They also help Nurcus remain closer to everyday social life as a sort of midpoint between the traditional tarikat and the broader Islamic community. See D.Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, p.68.

¹⁷ Serif Mardin's *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: the case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi*, is one of the most authoritative accounts of the Nursi's life and principles. See also Jacob Landau, *Politics and Islam: the National Salvation Party in Turkey*, p.8; and A.Ozdemir and K.Frank, *Visible Islam in Modern Turkey*, p.69. Alternative spellings of the name include 'Sait' and 'Sayyid'; Nursi was called 'Bediuzzaman', which means 'Marvel of the Times'. See E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.201.

¹⁸ Nursi was active in the counter-revolution of the Young Turks in 1909, and supported the national resistance movement in 1923, though warning against its secularist tendencies. Nursi was arrested and tried several times for alleged political use of religion (though he was not directly involved in political activity). His writings were banned during the Kemalist period, but were hand-copied by his followers, thus securing the movement's continuation to the present day. See E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.201.

Western civilization, but did not reject the concept of modernity *per se*, as a nation-state and an economic development project. Rather, the Nurcu movement developed into a political protest against the specifically Kemalist modernity project. The aims set out by Nursi for the Muslim believer, according to one interpretation, are as follows: 1) people must lead their lives in such a way as to strengthen faith; 2) when they become sufficiently strong, they must apply the *sharia* (or, Islamic law); and 3) they should aim eventually for the unification of the Islamic world. The second principle is especially crucial, in terms of tensions between Islamists and the secular state: the *gradualness* implied is significant in that 'it permits [Nursi's] supporters to pursue the conventional outlets of Islamic activity, to deny that they are advocating the implementation of the *sharia* now, whilst at the same time hoping that ultimately success will be forthcoming'¹⁹. Much of the contemporary strict secularist trend is based upon reference to this principle. That is, a belief that regardless of the recent pro-western and pro-democracy pronouncements and activities of such groups, their final aims are to render Turkey an Islamic state and to implement the *sharia*. These aims, it is feared, will be realised if and when such groups rise to political power.

Of the dozen or so Nurcu groups, the most widespread is that headed by Fethullah Gulen (or, the Fethullanci). Gulen, like Nursi, is very prolific, and in his works seeks to reconcile modernity with tradition, and science with religion. Unlike the Nurcu movement however, Gulen's community stresses the state-centric Turkish nationalism, the free market, and education. The Fethullah Gulen community involves a complex web of educational institutions and business and media networks, and has founded more than

¹⁹ See D.Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, p.70. The *Sharia* is the body of rules regulating the conduct of the Muslim. The Turks came to spell the word as *Seriat*. See N.Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p.9

300 schools and seven universities in Turkey and abroad. The group owns a scientific monthly, an environment-related magazine, a theological journal, a weekly magazine, a daily newspaper, an English-language religious publication, a television channel and a radio station. The community also controls one of the fastest growing financial institutions in Turkey, and its educational activities are supported by ISHAD, an influential businessmen's group²⁰.

In the 1990's Gulen's influence grew considerably, with his activities in the financial sector yielding contact with political figures to such a degree that one specialist on Islamism in Turkey identifies Gulen as an unofficial part of a government-inspired initiative to expand Turkish influence in the Turkic states (because the government aided Gulen in his establishment of a chain of high schools in those countries)²¹. A close relationship between Gulen and the state also has to do with the latter's open criticism of political Islam in general, and of the Refah and Fazilet political parties in particular²². It may be the relatively positive attitude of certain ranks within the Turkish government towards Gulen which led to what many see as an infiltration by Gulen's followers of segments of the Turkish bureaucracy. Harsh judgments by secular elites that Gulen's activities within the Turkish state and abroad are 'reactionary' and aimed at 'undermining the secular state' culminated in a campaign launched against Gulen by the state-dominated media on 21st June 1999, and eventually to his warrant for arrest in August of 2000²³. The charge against Gulen was for 'inciting his followers to overthrow the secular

²⁰ See H.Yavuz, 'Towards an Islamic liberalism: the Nurcu movement and Fetullah Gulen', pp.595-598.

²¹ D.Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, p.84.

²² 'Welfare' and 'Virtue' parties, respectively. See below for more information on each of these parties.

²³ See H.Yavuz, 'Towards an Islamic liberalism', p.604-605 for criticism from other Nurcu groups as well.

government' (in legal terms, violations of Turkish Penal Code Articles 312 and 313)²⁴.

This move coincided with the NSC-led efforts to purge the bureaucracy of 'reactionaries', and is often treated as a 'continuation of the February 28th process' (see below)²⁵.

Again, the aforementioned tarikats vary in degree of politicisation, as do even sects and individuals *within* each tarikat. Accordingly, some may be viewed as expressions of Islam, and others more explicitly of Islamism. In turning our attention to political Islam in Turkey, however, we narrow our focus specifically to Islamism. According to one interpretation, the succession of four Islamist political parties in Turkey—centred for the most part on the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan—can be considered 'quasi-tarikat': many of the parties' members have displayed the 'tarikats mentality' toward the leader²⁶. However, the Islamist political parties pitched their appeal to citizens at large and not to the religious orders as such; several tarikats have supported political parties that are explicitly secular in their programs²⁷. (These political formations will be discussed thoroughly in the next section and in the following chapter).

²⁴ See Douglas Frantz, 'Turkey assails a revered Islamic moderate'.

²⁵ For more on Gulen, see B.Aras and O.Caha, 'Fethullah Gulen and his liberal "Turkish Islam" movement'.

²⁶ A.Ozdemir and K.Frank, *Visible Islam in Modern Turkey*, p.74.

²⁷ According to Ozdemir and Frank (*ibid*), this is 'likely because they saw their survival in compromising with the ruling powers'. In general, Alevis and Bektashis have tended to back the secular-left parties as better means to support their own existence, and the religious orders closer to Sunni Islam have tended to support the secular-right parties to further their own aims. 'It could also be put the other way around', these scholars argue: 'the secular-left politicians have bargained with, or needed, or used the Bektashi-Alevi groups to gain votes or stay in power, and the secular-right have done the same mainly with the Sunni religious orders' (p.75). Exceptions include the 'Community of Iskender Pasa', the principal branch of the Naksibendi, which constituted Refah's (see below) largest electoral support (see Rusen Cakir, 'Les mouvements islamistes Turcs et l'Europe', p.19); also, both the Naksibendi and the Nurcu formed a large part of the support base of the Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP; see below).

Today, in addition to the political level, a wide range of religious activity exists in the social and economic spheres as well²⁸. The *cemaat* (Islamic communities formed around various sects) provide a strong social base for practicing Muslims. A prominent group of Muslim intellectuals act as influential opinion-leaders for Turkish Muslims, with their publications' adoption of western trends of thought, and their contributions to Islamist journals and newspapers. Meanwhile, religious orders in Turkey run schools, radio and TV stations, they publish newspapers, stage rallies and conferences, and actively recruit among university students. Politicians now openly attend public meetings organized by the *tarikats*, court their leaders and members for support and votes, and appear in their media²⁹. Islamic businesses have thrived, and MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) now acts as a network for many small and medium-sized enterprises³⁰. There are also several Islamist trade unions, professional associations, and chambers of commerce.

Secularism and laicism

Secularism in Turkey has a distinctive and chequered history. As noted in chapter two, secularism may be considered an ideology, or a doctrine denoting a negative attitude to religion. The form of secularism launched by Mustafa Kemal is more precisely called

²⁸ For a thorough analysis of early expansion of Islamist activities, see Jacob Landau, *Politics and Islam: the National Salvation Party in Turkey*, especially pp.7-8. See also M.Heper, 'Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern Perspective'.

²⁹ See A.Ozdemir and K.Frank, *Visible Islam in Modern Turkey*, p.69.

³⁰ MUSIAD is widely considered a Muslim equivalent of TUSIAD, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association. The 'M' in the title is often assumed to mean 'Muslim', but actually stands for 'Independent'. MUSIAD was founded in May 1990, with the aim to create an 'Islamic economic system' as an alternative to the existing 'capitalist system' in Turkey. See Nilufer Narli, 'The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'.

laicism and, as Andrew Davidson notes, ‘a limited, inconsistent, and ambivalent form of laicism’³¹. Attention to the etymology of these terms helps us to understand the distinction between them. The word *secular* is derived from the Latin *saeculum* or *temporal world*, in contra-distinction to *laicism*, from the Greek *laos* or *popular*, demarcating the temporal from the clerical³². Turkish secularism is inspired by the French *laïcité*, but there are critical differences between the French and Turkish versions of secularism³³. In Turkey, the emphasis has been less on the creation of a temporal, worldly society and more on the *popular* or lay, as opposed to clerical, leadership. Religious affairs in Turkey are regulated by, rather than separated from, the state, and the state is not impartial towards all confessional groups (as is claimed to be the case, at least, in France): Sunni Islam remains implicitly the state religion³⁴.

As Niyazi Berkes explains in his highly acclaimed study *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, in non-Christian contexts the tension surrounding secularism is not necessarily between religious and temporal spheres (as in Christendom), but between traditional and progressive forces³⁵. Mustafa Kemal’s vision was one of progress, and he sought to achieve progress through the domination of religious institutions by the state (rather than a disengagement of religious and state institutions). Progress would be

³¹ A. Davidson, ‘Turkey, a “secular” state? The challenge of description’, p.332. The term for laicism in Turkish is *laiklik*. Davidson argues that, because in Turkey *laiklik* did not remove religion from the state, it should be considered ‘a form of laicism, not secularism’ (p.336).

³² N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p.5.

³³ For more on the distinctions between secularism in Turkey and France, see J-P. Burdy and J. Marcou, ‘Laïcité/Laiklik: Introduction’ (the article is an introduction to a *Cemoti* volume entitled ‘Laïcité(s): Actualité et problèmes de la laïcité en France et en Turquie’).

³⁴ See N. Gole, ‘Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites’, pp.48-9. According to Gole, ‘It is only on the issue of taking religion out of the public sphere that French and Turkish secularism are similar’. She also raises the example of debates in both Turkey and France over the ‘headscarf issue’ (the wearing of the headscarf by Muslim women in public places, particularly in schools) as a significant point in common between the two countries in terms of their versions of secularism. For more on the headscarf issue, see E. Ozdalga, *The Veiling Issue, Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern Turkey*.

³⁵ N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, pp.3-4.

achieved through a reform of the religious institutions. However, Kemalist secularist policy (particularly as pursued after his death) comprised *anti-Islamic* features and prescribed the administration of religious institutions by the state³⁶. Thus, the conflict between tradition and the forces of change centred not on a division between the religious and temporal spheres, but on a reaction to *domination* of the former by the latter.

It is important to note the pre-history to the Kemalist secularist reforms. Though our focus begins with those introduced by the Kemalist elite, substantial secularist reforms had been initiated under the Ottoman Empire during the 18th and 19th centuries³⁷. Thus, the aforementioned conflict between tradition and forces of change has roots in the Ottoman period—roots which yielded significant legacies in contemporary Turkish society. The *Tanzimat* period especially (1839-1876) ushered in significant reforms which limited religious traditions. The *sharia* was not abolished completely but was replaced by secular law in all domains save family law; between 1865 and 1888, the legal system was codified along European lines. There also took place, in this period, an overhaul of the educational system in terms of its secularisation and the introduction of explicitly secular schools modelled on the French *lycées*. According to Erik Zürcher, the *tanzimat* reforms can be viewed as a result of both external pressure and ‘internal desire for reform and genuine belief that the empire could only be saved through European-style

³⁶ See Metin Heper, ‘Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective’, p.352. There is a great deal of intellectual debate over the true intentions of Mustafa Kemal’s secularist policies and the extent to which they were actually ‘anti-religious’. This debate is addressed most thoroughly in the work of Andrew Davidson (e.g., *Secularism and revivalism in Turkey*, and ‘Turkey, a “secular” state? The challenge of description’). Davidson basically argues that Mustafa Kemal’s focus was more on reforming Islam rather than controlling or suppressing it; but he concedes that the *implementation* of Kemalist secularist policies in subsequent decades took anti-religious dimensions.

³⁷ The limited scope of this chapter does not allow for a thorough history of secularist reforms under the Ottoman Empire. See Justin McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks: an Introductory History to 1923*, for full accounts of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms of 1789 and of the *Tanzimat* reforms beginning in 1839, in particular.

reform'³⁸. Many of the reforms had to do with the position of the Christian minorities of the Empire and were prompted by pressure applied by European powers for improvements in the position of these communities³⁹. For those supporting traditional (religious) institutions, the secularist reforms were identified with external or foreign pressure and were considered particularly hostile to religion. Thus, we have as legacies of this period the development of a grassroots-level antagonism between secularist and religious tendencies, and a correlation of secularism with foreign (especially western) influence, and threats to religious identity. (The latter can especially be understood as a precursor to anti-western and anti-European sentiment amongst Turkish Islamists.)

These antagonistic tendencies continued with the Kemalist reforms. Although Mustafa Kemal's westernisation project was embraced by the urban elite, Islam remained the dominant rural force. The radical secularism he introduced significantly affected the polity: first, it gave rise to violent reactionary movements particularly during the early years of the Republic; second, it increased the gap between elite and popular cultures⁴⁰. Meanwhile the *inconsistencies* in secularist policy in the decades following Mustafa Kemal's death paved the way for the growth of Islamism.

What follows here is not so much a history of Turkish secularism, *per se*, but of the fluctuating relationship between secularism and Islamism resulting from the aforementioned inconsistencies in secularist policy. We may identify four watershed periods in this relationship: Mustafa Kemal's secularist reforms; the transition to democracy and politicisation of Islam; the post-1980 military coup and the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis'; and the February 28th process. Closely intertwined with these

³⁸ See E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.59.

³⁹ *Ibid*, pp.58-65.

⁴⁰ See N.Gole, 'Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites', p.52.

political developments are other dimensions crucial to the relationship between Islamism and secularism: changes in education policies; transformations related to globalisation, particularly in the field of economics; and migration trends in Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal's secularist reforms

The most definitive secularist measures in Turkish history are those advanced by Mustafa Kemal, revolutionary in their vastness and abruptness. The Sultanate was abolished in 1922, and the Turkish Republic was declared in 1923. Under Mustafa Kemal's direction, the Caliphate was eradicated in 1924. That same year religious courts were closed, and the ministry of *sharia* and of religious foundations was shut down and replaced by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*)⁴¹. *Diyanet* assumed authority over a broad range of religious activity in Turkey, including the strict preparation of the sermon read at the Friday prayer in mosques across Turkey; it grew to be one of the largest and best-financed government departments⁴². In 1928 the constitutional provision which declared 'The religion of the Turkish State is Islam' was deleted. Finally, in 1937, 'secularism' entered the constitution through an amendment declaring the state to be *laik*⁴³.

⁴¹ It should be noted that the creation and continued existence of the *Diyanet*, and the forced imposition of an 'official' Turkish Islam which it represents, are the focus of intense debate over the 'secular' nature of Turkey. Many liberal-minded elites and Islamists argue that *Diyanet*'s existence and activities indicate that there is, in fact, no separation of religion from the state, but only domination of the former by the latter.

⁴² See H.Yavuz, 'Cleansing Islam from the public sphere'. According to Baskin Oran, in 1990 the *Diyanet* budget exceeded that of five combined ministries, and was 1.5 times larger than that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See B.Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?', unpublished paper.

⁴³ See D.Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, p.19, and N.Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p.479.

Religious education was especially targeted by Kemalist reforms. Religious schools (*medresseh*) were closed, and all schools became formally attached to the Ministry of National Education⁴⁴. The Ministry was to oversee compulsory *Lessons in Religion and Morals* in public schools, and was ceded supervision over *Imam-Hatip* schools (religious high schools training mosque prayer leaders and preachers)⁴⁵. There were twenty-nine *Imam-Hatip* schools in 1924; this number was reduced to two in 1932 and the schools were closed in the same year⁴⁶.

Mustafa Kemal's regime also introduced the radical change of *not* using religion to mobilise the masses, as was the tendency during the War of Independence (1919-1923) to legitimise the national struggle carried out against the wishes of the sultan⁴⁷. And, in spite of the active role of some tarikats in the national revolution, all religious brotherhoods were dissolved and banned. As Bernard Lewis notes, the great secularising reforms of that period were directed against the ulema (community of religious scholars), and not the tarikats, 'but it soon became apparent that it was from the [tarikats], not the ulema, that the most dangerous resistance to laicism would come'⁴⁸. For, while the ulema were long accustomed to identifying their interests with those of the state, the tarikats were a much more diffuse force, often reflecting local particularism in opposition to a homogenising state⁴⁹. The Kemalist intent was to replace the force of Islam with

⁴⁴ N.Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p.477.

⁴⁵ There is a great deal of debate surrounding *Imam-Hatip* schools, as their establishment and operation has variously been outlawed, encouraged, and limited.

⁴⁶ See B.Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, p.49 and B.Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p.415.

⁴⁷ Mustafa Kemal sought and received the help of the clerics during the war of independence in an effort to mobilise the masses around the nationalists' goals, but this was a short-term tactical alliance. See B.Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, p.39.

⁴⁸ B.Lewis *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp.409-411.

⁴⁹ The ban on tarikats came in the same year of the Seyh Said Rebellion (a Kurdish revolt, named after its Naksibendi leader).

nationalism, and this required a suppression of even 'folk' Islam. In line with this objective, all religious personnel became part of the civil bureaucracy, religious literature was translated from Arabic into Turkish, and the use of Arabic in public acts such as the call to prayer (*ezan*) was forbidden. Further, public displays of religious observance were discouraged⁵⁰.

Clearly, a crucial element in these reforms was 'westernisation'. According to Binnaz Toprak, the Kemalist attack on Islam was rooted in an antagonism towards religious conservatism which, as defined by the Kemalist elite, equalled anti-westernisation: to secularise thus meant to westernise. Even the concept of nationalism was understood not in a national but in a western context: 'the Turkish nation would exist not as a group of people sharing a common past but as a group of people sharing a common future among the civilised nations of the West'⁵¹. The Kemalist regime thus sought to combat the only competing ideological source for mass mobilisation: Islam. This project entailed not only containment of Islam, but efforts to reform the faith. National progress required rationalisation; accordingly, Islamic teaching was to be rendered compatible with western norms and institutions⁵². Implementation of this idea included such widespread changes as the replacing of the Arabic alphabet by the Latin⁵³. A new Civil Code, based on the Swiss Civil Code, was adopted in place of the *sharia* in 1926⁵⁴. The westernisation project extended even to the Turkish populations' dress: the fez (the traditional Ottoman headgear) was prohibited and replaced by the western-style

⁵⁰ M.Heper, 'Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern Perspective', p.351.

⁵¹ B.Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, p.38.

⁵² S.Ayata, 'Patronage, party and state: the politicisation of Islam in Turkey', p.42.

⁵³ On November 3 1928, Mustafa Kemal passed a law which prohibited the use of the Arabic script in all public affairs after December 1 of the same year. See N.Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p.476, and pp.474-476 for popular reactions against this change.

⁵⁴ See E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.195.

hat or cap⁵⁵. Furthermore, the decree of 1935 established Sunday, instead of Friday, as the official day of rest⁵⁶.

The legacy of Kemalist reforms evolved into an ideology in its own right. As Metin Heper puts it, 'Ataturkism itself became a transcendent goal. Ataturk's message was "bureaucratised"'⁵⁷. Again, Kemalist policy *after* Ataturk carried especially anti-religious features: reforms were aimed specifically to weaken the power of religious functionaries, leaders and communities. Toprak argues that the reforms had little to do with modernisation *per se*: rather, 'they were considered essential...because they gave momentum to the basic aim of the revolution, i.e. to transform Turkish society from an Islamic into a Western setting'⁵⁸. Meanwhile, the promotion of new values, manners, and lifestyles widened the cultural gap between the masses and the newly westernized urban classes.

Writing in 1952, Lewis Thomas observes that 'Ataturk's militant laicism had much less effect upon peasant Islam, upon the aggregate way of life of the large majority of the population which he tried to transform into a modern nation, than is usually supposed or was ever officially admitted'⁵⁹. According to Lewis, the programme of rapid, wholesale, and forced westernisation was, in reality, only secondarily concerned with the 'peasant' mass: 'peasant Islam was thus allowed to continue quietly very much as it always had'⁶⁰. Likewise, Fuat Keyman notes that, whilst Islam was excluded as the

⁵⁵ The prohibition of the wearing of the fez met with marked resistance, as the western-style hat was considered a symbol of Christian Europe. Nearly 7,500 Turks were arrested and 660 executed for resistance to this reform and to the closing of religious shrines and dervish convents. See E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, pp.180-81.

⁵⁶ See E.Zurcher, *ibid*, p.195.

⁵⁷ M. Heper, 'Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern Perspective', p.352.

⁵⁸ B.Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, p.39.

⁵⁹ See L.Thomas, 'Recent developments in Turkish Islam', p.26.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p.26.

'Other' of the national identity in formation, it remained a 'symbolic' system which provided meaning to human existence and thus continued to form the bases of both individual and community identity⁶¹.

The transition to democracy

The transition to democracy and to a multi-party system in 1946, however, ushered in new dimensions in the country's secularisation process. The novel competition of political parties brought religion to the fore, as rival candidates began to tailor their platforms to attract the religious vote: 'Small-town politicians discovered that yielding to and even provoking the religious demands of the masses was most rewarding'⁶². For nearly four decades to follow, a succession of governments introduced extensive changes to the relationship between religion and the state. This trend was visible in policy modifications with regards to Islam. For instance, the *ezan* (call to prayer) in Arabic was reinstated (and adopted overnight in every mosque in Turkey)⁶³. In 1948 *Imam-Hatip* courses started again in ten cities, and by 1951, seven-year *Imam-Hatip* schools were reopened with four years of grammar school and three years secondary school⁶⁴. For the first time in Turkish history, the schools ceased to be categorized as 'vocational schools' so that its graduates could enter all branches of university. This move, according to Baskin Oran, was to prove to be the most important in time, because

⁶¹ See F.Keyman, 'On the relation between global modernity and nationalism: the crisis of hegemony and the rise of (Islamic) identity in Turkey', pp.106-7.

⁶² Baskin Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?', unpublished paper. See also Howard Reed, 'The revival of Islam in secular Turkey'.

⁶³ This change took place in 1950, and continues to the present day. See E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.244.

⁶⁴ By 1960 there were twenty *Imam-Hatip* schools, and seventy by 1970. See B.Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?', unpublished paper.

it marked the beginning of the re-creation of the religious 'counter-elite'. The role played by changes in education policy cannot be overemphasized: many graduates of religious schools later entered politics in the 1980's and 1990's⁶⁵.

In addition to relaxation of secularist policies in appeals to religiously-inclined voters, we have, since the transition to democracy and the multi-party system, the opening of the political sphere to a vast network of Islamic organisations: 'the [ruling parties'] relations with organised religious groups...included symbiotic relations, temporary alliances, and long-term affiliations'⁶⁶. Islamist groups formed covert and overt alliances with the ruling centre-right Democratic Party in particular (1950-60), led by Adnan Menderes. The party made no change to the functions of *Diyanet* (i.e., to the regulation of religious institutions by the state), but it did accept the existence of such religious organisations as the brotherhoods, and effectively legitimised them by receiving the support of the Nurcu movement in elections. Competition between the Democratic Party (DP) and the Kemalist Republican People's Party (RPP) was intense, and in the context of the 1954 elections, Menderes' vulnerability yielded a tightening of government control over the press and universities and increased appeal to religious sentiment. This laid the victorious DP open to the accusation that it had used religion for political purposes and thus jeopardized the secularist principles of the state. Many Turkish intellectuals interpreted the increased prominence of Islam in everyday life as a dangerous resurgence of Islam, and the Kemalist elite perceived a threat to the cultural hegemony which had been established on the basis of secularist principles. Tension between Menderes and the military in particular was heightened when, in 1958, nine

⁶⁵ Tayyip Erdogan, the current leader of AKP, is a prime example.

⁶⁶ S. Ayata, 'Patronage, party and state: the politicisation of Islam in Turkey', p.44.

army officers were arrested for plotting against the government. Furthermore, in April of 1960 Menderes established a committee to investigate the activities of the opposition, including possible links between the RPP and the army. The following month, one week after Menderes announced that the investigation committee would report its findings shortly, the military staged a coup which toppled the Democratic Party government. The majority of its MPs were imprisoned, and Menderes, together with his two close companions, was executed⁶⁷.

A military-led 'National Unity Committee' governed the country for one year before the return to democratic politics⁶⁸. The most significant political formation in this period was the Justice Party which, led by Suleyman Demirel, was in power between 1965 and 1971. The Justice Party, even more so than the Democratic party, established direct and lasting relationships with various Islamic groups, communities and leaders⁶⁹. Since the institution of the multi-party system, Islamists had either formed conservative factions in a centre-right party or had remained underground. But in 1970 Necmettin Erbakan defected from the Justice Party and formed the first openly Islamic political party -- the National Order Party (NOP)⁷⁰. The party was closed in the military coup of May 1971, on the grounds that it violated the principles of laicism. The party's closure was part of a broader military intervention designed especially to combat terrorism and

⁶⁷ See E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, pp. 231-252, for a thorough history of the Democratic Party's rule.

⁶⁸ The NUP was originally led by General Cemal Gursel but effectively run by Colonel Alpaslan Turkes. Turkes later became leader of the National Action Party (MHP), which is currently led by Devlet Bahçeli and forms part of the governing coalition of Turkey.

⁶⁹ See S.Ayata, 'Patronage, party and state: the politicisation of Islam in Turkey', p.44.

⁷⁰ The NOP's support base was comprised of religiously conservative Sunnis in Anatolian cities, small traders and artisans (*esnaf*) of the frustrated periphery and religiously conservative people who were informal members of outlawed religious orders.

rising leftist tendencies in the country (in April martial law had been declared in 11 provinces and all big cities, and was continually renewed for the following two years)⁷¹.

The Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP) was then formed in October 1972. The party fared surprisingly well in the 1973 general elections, not least because of the support it enjoyed from the covert network of the Naksibendi and the Nurcu. The party became a coalition partner in successive governments. This trend of political Islamist growth was interrupted, however, by the rising antagonism between radical right and radical left factions in the late 1970's. Violent clashes verging on civil war provoked the 12 September 1980 'bloodless coup' of the armed forces, led by General Kenan Evren. The leading parties, including the NSP, were banned from political activity⁷². A new constitution was drafted by the military and approved by referendum in 1982.

The growth of Islamic political activity since the introduction of the multi-party system caused uneasiness amongst secularist elites in Turkey. As early as 1952, Lewis Thomas made the following observation:

the lower-class voter—the peasant—has begun to make his voice more heard. He now must be appealed to directly by candidates as never was true before... This is fairly to be called a ticklish matter... [but] it is unfounded to assume that Anatolia's lower classes are moving back toward traditional Islam... Peasant Islam is a vital component in the lives of the backward majority of Turkey's citizens, but it is not therefore a danger to the Turkish Republic⁷³.

Likewise, two years later Howard Reed writes that

[s]ince they assumed power in 1950, [political] leaders have appeared uncertain how to deal with the resurgence of popular Islam, particularly among the peasants, where the decisive voting power lies. Their most consistent policy has been to encourage a straightforward, liberal program

⁷¹ See E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.272.

⁷² N.Narli, 'The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online]

⁷³ L.Thomas, 'Recent developments in Turkish Islam', pp. 26-7, 31.

of religious education. Since mid-1952, there has been a gradual hardening in their attitude toward Islamic manifestations at variance with their interpretation of republican Turkish laws and enlightened public opinion. This trend has been supported by business and army leaders who have expressed concern over the reactionary Muslim undertow⁷⁴.

We have seen in this period (1946-1980), a 'double discourse' transmitted by the Turkish state elites: on the one hand, an effort to sustain a secularist ideology (mainly through the education system), and on the other an effort to win short-term political gains by accommodating Islamic interests⁷⁵. Joseph Szyliowicz interprets this discourse as mainly a matter of utilisation of Islam for the advancement of specific goals, which necessarily entailed making various concessions to the devout voter. These concessions, he contends, did much to promote democratic processes by permitting the integration of peripheral groups into the polity. But, Szyliowicz notes, 'At the same time, they created an environment wherein Islamist ideologues could thrive...'⁷⁶.

The Turkish-Islamic synthesis

It is in the post-1980 coup period that we have our next phase of extreme fluctuation in secularist policy. Central to this fluctuation is the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis', which became a fundamental aspect of military-led state ideology in the 80's. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was first developed in the 1960's by a group of Turkish intellectuals -- 'the Intellectual's Hearth'. The group was established in reaction to the 1968 student movement and as an effort to unite the Turkish right and thus to integrate

⁷⁴ The political leaders to which he refers are those of the Democratic Party, in power at that time. See H.Reed, 'The Revival of Islam in secular Turkey', p.281.

⁷⁵ U.C.Sakallioglu, 'Parameters and strategies of Islam-State interaction in Republican Turkey', p.231.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.231.

the Islamists and the nationalists against, in particular, communism. The Hearth's first success was in developing dialogue between the rightist parties, which led to the 'National Front' governments of the 1970's. The cure for social unrest and political instability, according to this ideology, was the strengthening of the 'national culture', the essence of which was religion. The promotion of the 'national culture' thus required a recreation of the Islamic umma, a community of believers united by the same faith, with the aim of a renewed sense of community to consolidate social unity and thus eliminate the conflict of opposing ideology. The idea involved a return to cultural roots based on unity in a faith providing common moral principles, including respect of state authority. Though the group began as a forum for discussion without political ambitions, members of the Intellectual's Hearth began to hold positions within the government and state bourgeoisie and were thus able to translate their ideals into the official state ideology and, eventually, into legislation and policies of the post-1980 governments⁷⁷.

We see then, under the influence of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, an even more radical reversal of secularist policies. Article 124 of the generals' 1982 Constitution transformed the Turkish Historical Agency and the Turkish Linguistic Society into official agencies to propagate the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Article 24 made religious lessons compulsory throughout high school (for the first time in Turkish history). Mosques were opened in nearly every state institution, as well as in the Grand National Assembly. Meanwhile, General Kenan Evren (who eventually became President), recited several verses of the Koran in his public speeches. Pamphlets containing Koranic verses or sayings of Prophet Mohammad (*hadith*) which

⁷⁷ Information on the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' is drawn mainly from Binnaz Toprak's, 'Religion as state ideology in a secular setting: the Turkish-Islamic synthesis'.

recommended obedience to public authority were dropped from military planes in Kurdish-populated areas; they were also frequently broadcast from radio and television channels. Even more controversially, in their fight against the PKK⁷⁸, military leaders backed the religious fundamentalist Kurdish organisation, Hezbollah⁷⁹.

Islam was considered by the military leaders as a means to integrate society and as a source of morality and ethical behaviour which would protect Turks (and the youth especially) from such trends and communism *and* Khomeinism, as well as the anarchy which prevailed in Turkey in the 1970's⁸⁰. The new emphasis on national religion was also to buttress official Islam against the teachings of the *tarikats*. As Szyliowicz notes, however, the post-1980 period should not be viewed as a radical change to the state's secular orientation: whilst the secularist policies did change significantly, the military leaders remained committed to Kemalist principles: he emphasises that the state simply used Islam for its specific needs during that period. For example, whilst religious education was given greater emphasis, the school courses introduced by the military focused on Mustafa Kemal far more than before and explicitly drew links between his policies and Islamic precepts⁸¹. According to Fuat Keyman, however, this military effort to maintain a prevalence of secularist principles whilst utilising Islam was not, in the end, successful: 'by incorporating Islamic discourse and implicitly taking the *umma* as its model of social organisation, and also by abandoning the radical secularism of the early republic to secure its popular support...the post-1980 military regime weakened the

⁷⁸ Kurdistan Workers' Party.

⁷⁹ See B.Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?', unpublished paper.

⁸⁰ J.Szyliowicz, 'Religion, politics and democracy in Turkey', p.197.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.205. Szyliowicz also suggests that even the courses in the *religious* schools were aimed, during this period, at a socialisation of the students into the principles of secular nationalism. But he concedes that there has not been sufficient research conducted on this subject.

very conditions of existence of Kemalist nationalism and the republican state'⁸². In other words, though the use of Islam was considered by the regime to be a short-term strategy, it led to 'unintended consequences' such as a new prevalence of Islamic organisations within both state and society (i.e., the formation of political Islam and the strengthening of *tarikats* through the latter's support of political Islam).

Indeed, the post-1980 coup period and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis left lingering effects on Turkish politics. The first elections held after the junta were in 1983, when Turgut Ozal and his Motherland Party (ANAP) came to power. ANAP was a perhaps strange, but successful mixture of ideological currents: Ozal's party represented for its members both a serious focus on liberal economic policy (Ozal had been a successful manager in private industry in the 70's) and an open-mindedness towards Islamism (considering his close connections with the Naksibendi order, and the fact that his brother had been a leading member of the Islamist National Salvation Party)⁸³. Both identities served him well in a period during which the fight against communism was a primary national and international concern.

ANAP stands out as the only case in which Islamist elements became a major wing of a mainstream party⁸⁴. Ozal deliberately and almost alone chose each MP candidate from parliament before the 1983 general election, seeking a platform that would include politicians of diverse ideological persuasions. His alliances with religious groups enabled ANAP to establish a virtual monopoly on the religious vote. Thus during this period, the Naksibendis emerged as the single most important lobbying group in

⁸² Fuat Keyman, 'On the relation between global modernity and nationalism: the crisis of hegemony and the rise of (Islamic) identity in Turkey', pp.111-112.

⁸³ E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.297.

⁸⁴ S.Ayata, 'Patronage, party and the state: the politicization of Islam in Turkey', p.44.

politics. Ozal's export-led growth strategy necessitated an aggressive search for foreign customers who, in the 1980's, were found mainly in the Middle East. The Naksibendis, with links to the Gulf States, were expected to play a significant role in promoting Turkish exports to the region and maintaining steady oil supplies. Control over key positions in government and the bureaucracy enabled the well-organised Islamic networks to recruit their own members into civil service jobs, to divert public resources to Islamic activities and business, and to advance Islamic education and the training of new members and cadres. The Islamist faction within the party came to be called the 'Holy Alliance'⁸⁵.

In addition to Ozal's influence on the increased politicisation of Islam, also deserving of attention is his influence on the rise of 'Islamic Capital' in Turkey during and after his reign. 'Islamic Capital' first rose to the fore in 1969 when Professor Necmettin Erbakan, also a staunch Naksibendi, made his entry into politics as the President of the Union of Chambers (the stronghold of small and medium business). Erbakan promoted a nationalistic 'heavy industrial leap forward', and championed small and medium business against the internationalist discourse of Istanbul-based big business. 'Islamic Capital' flourished under Ozal's economic reforms. Banks from Iran and Saudi Arabia were allowed to operate in Turkey, and were endowed with certain privileges vis-à-vis Turkish banks (these foreign banks were later accused of financing Islamist organisations). Also, businessmen from small and medium Anatolian towns began to increase in strength and number and subsequently entered the realm of foreign trade (which, until then, was limited to the large holding companies of Istanbul). These 'Anatolian Tigers', as they came to be called, not only exerted an important pressure on

⁸⁵ S.Ayata, *ibid*, pp. 44-45.

national politics through their organisation (MUSIAD; see above), but also began to finance Islamist organisations and student hostels, on condition that students staying there live a 'true Islamic life'⁸⁶. MUSIAD came to be considered a rival to the secular and politically influential TUSIAD, from which it differed through its principle that economic activity ought to conform to Islamic practice (such as refraining from profiting from interest, which is condemned in Islam)⁸⁷.

As with the role played by changes in education and economic policy, migration trends within Turkey are also closely intertwined with the rise in Islamism during this period. As Islamist supporters moved from provincial towns and villages to urban centres, they were more likely to gain access to formal education and opportunities for upward social mobility. Islamist groups catered to the needs of these migrants by providing food to the poor, scholarships and hostels to university students, a network to young graduates looking for jobs, and credit to shopkeepers, industrialists and merchants. Thus the late 1980's saw the emergence of a new urban middle class and business elite whose identities were strongly defined by their roots in comparatively religious, provincial towns. This new elite actively sought to assert their provincial identity and to preserve their values and traditions⁸⁸.

The effects of such migration trends on the rise of Islamism ought to be seen as interrelated with Ozal's influence through his economic and social policies. Together, these developments also encouraged the advance of the most powerful Islamist political party in Turkish history. The Refah Party was established in 1983 by Ali Turkmen, but

⁸⁶ B.Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?', unpublished paper.

⁸⁷ See N.Narli, 'The Tension between the center and peripheral economy and the rise of a counter business elite in Turkey'. TUSIAD stands for Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association.

⁸⁸ N.Narli, 'The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online]

Erbakan became its leader after Ozal's lifting of the military-instituted ban on former politicians⁸⁹. Refah's main slogan, 'Just Order', proved to be very successful in the ongoing economic, social and political chaos of the 80's and 90's. Defined in Erbakan's green book, *Just Economic Order*, the slogan heralded a Turkey shaped by religious, and especially Islamic, civilisation. According to Baskin Oran, impoverished masses expected in Refah 'a regime that would bring them both economic ease and peace of mind of the "Golden Past" that never was'⁹⁰. The pitch was successful: in the 1987 election, Refah gained 7.2% of the vote; 9.8% in the 1989 local elections; and, in alliance with the ultranationalist party (MHP), drew 16.7% of the votes in the 1991 national elections⁹¹.

The February 28th Process

The rise of Refah to the premiership in the mid-1990's is discussed at length in the following chapter. Here we will address, rather, the *dissolution* of Refah, and the final watershed period in Islamist-secularist relations: the February 28th process of 1997. Tension had mounted between the secularist elite and Erbakan since the beginning of the latter's term in office in 1996, specifically because of his attempts to grant Islam a greater role in public life. Erbakan had proposed to lift the ban on the wearing of headscarves by female civil servants in government offices. He also called for the building of mosques

⁸⁹ Ozal put the decision to a referendum in 1987, which lifted the ban by a narrow margin. See E.Zurcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, p.299.

⁹⁰ See B.Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?', unpublished paper.

⁹¹ N.Narli, 'The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online]

in central Ankara and Istanbul in locations widely viewed as symbols of secularism⁹², and for changing working hours in government offices during the month of Ramadan⁹³. Also, Erbakan's party openly called for a redefinition of secularism in Turkey—interpreted by many as an aim to reverse the policy of secularism altogether⁹⁴.

Refah's undemocratic stance on many issues began to upset secular public opinion. One form of reaction was in a manifest renaissance of Kemalist activity which had been practically dormant until around 1995. A great majority of educated people in large cities started to wear Atatürk badges, stick Kemalist slogans on their cars, organise large public demonstrations, and work in Kemalist associations⁹⁵. Also, 'secular civil society' groups began to wage a war against the rise of political Islam and to enlighten the public about the possible dangers involved in what they described as the 'Iranisation of Turkey'. Secular women, who had established a number of associations and promoted informal networks to defend the advancement of equality among sexes, felt that Islamic fundamentalism placed their interests at risk. Likewise, members of the Alevi sect perceived the Islamist encroachment as a fundamental threat to their communal existence and identity. One highly innovative form of protest was the 'Minute of Darkness for Enlightenment' campaign which lasted for several weeks: during this period, millions of families switched off their home lights every evening as a sign of protest against mounting religious reaction and corruption in government. With the so-called 'Civilian Initiative', the country's trade union, small enterprise and business confederations

⁹² J.Dorsey, 'Turkish military "advice" reigns in Islamist Erbakan government'. [accessed online]

⁹³ K.Osman, 'Turkish army dictates policy over role of Islam in society'. [accessed online]

⁹⁴ See A.Makovsky, 'Fehim Adak: Erbakan seeks cooperation in America', an interview with Fehim Adak (Minister of State in Erbakan's ruling coalition), in which Adak stated that the aim of the Refah Party was to redefine secularism according to European models. [accessed online]

⁹⁵ B.Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?', unpublished paper.

established a platform to adopt a common strategy of opposition against the rising fundamentalist threat⁹⁶. Perhaps more politically consequential, though, was TUSIAD's publication of a very critical report in January 1997--called 'Turkey's Democratisation Perspectives'--which demanded radical liberal reforms, including in particular the closing of the first three years of *Imam Hatip* schools⁹⁷.

But the most powerful response to the rise in Islamism represented in Refah came from the National Security Council (NSC). On February 28, 1997, the NSC introduced a bill comprised of eighteen specific measures designed to curb Islamic 'reactionaryism'. The NSC compelled a reluctant Erbakan to sign the bill, thus granting it force of law. In the '28 February 1997 Declaration', the NSC severely criticised the anti-secular atmosphere and asked the Refah government to take measures to stop the proliferation of Islamist cadres. Following Erbakan's signing of the document, the military gave a series of press briefings in which religious fundamentalism was declared the most dangerous enemy facing Turkey⁹⁸.

The eighteen measures mandated by the NSC may be seen to have cut at the heart of Refah's electoral support. The most important of these included the closing down of many of the country's 688 publicly run religious seminaries and Koranic courses (Refah officials conceded that it recruited many of its cadres and grassroots activists from these seminaries)⁹⁹. The measures demanded that the government ensure all privately run religious courses were placed under the direct control of the Education Ministry. The

⁹⁶ S.Ayata, 'Islam, civil society and the West', draft paper.

⁹⁷ B.Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?', unpublished paper.

⁹⁸ B.Oran, *ibid*.

⁹⁹ Among the 14,000 seminary graduates active in Refah were prominent officials, including former Istanbul Mayor and current leader of the Justice and Development Party, Tayyip Erdogan. See Dorsey, 'Turkish military "advice" reigns in Islamist Erbakan government'. [accessed online]

NSC asserted that, besides the 6,000 private religious courses running under the approval of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, there were thousands of other unlicensed courses being run. According to the NSC, the religious seminaries which were initially created to educate state employees for the operation of mosques had been turned into a political tool in the hands of successive right-wing governments seeking the backing of more conservative and religious rural voters.

The most severe blow to Islamist religious education was in the National Security Council's demand that compulsory primary education be raised from five to eight years. The three-tier education system in effect until that time entailed five years of compulsory primary education followed by a non-compulsory three years of secondary schooling and another three years of high school. At the secondary school level, parents could choose between placing their children in vocational schools, general schools or religious seminaries. An eight-year system effectively denied them that choice, so that children could not attend religious seminaries for their secondary education.

The National Security Council was especially sensitive to what seemed to be a strategic infiltration of government posts by Islamists. Refah ministers had replaced some 400 senior officials in their ministries with party sympathizers. Party officials were reportedly lobbying the foreign ministry to admit more graduates of the religious schools to the diplomatic corps. One Refah parliamentarian even went so far as to advocate that the military academies be opened to *Imam-Hatip* graduates (the military is the only institution which strictly bars these religious schools' graduates). A regularly scheduled rotation of over one thousand judges that autumn, implemented by the Refah-controlled Justice Ministry, was initially structured to move a disproportionate number of Turkey's

leading committed secularist judges out of major cities; only resistance by the Turkish Bar Association forced the Ministry to abandon this plan¹⁰⁰. Furthermore, in 1995 Erbakan's parliamentary delegation sought to delete the constitutional article that proscribes legislation based on Islamic law¹⁰¹. These developments led to the belief that, were Erbakan and his party to form a government without coalition partners, they would surely move aggressively to implement such policies to achieve their vision of Islamic society.

The NSC initiative was justified by its assessment that Islamic fundamentalism was the greatest threat to Turkey. Of course, when similarly the military had declared communism to be the single greatest threat to the Turkish Republic, the military had openly promoted Islam in efforts to combat communist tendencies in the country. What is clear is that by 1997, the rise of a powerful Islamist movement seemed to challenge both concepts for which the military had always cherished responsibility:

The Turkish Nation--unified and sovereign, and Westernisation--Mustafa Kemal's most important legacy. The military's position as the foremost defender of these two concepts had always been the very basis of their superiority in Turkish politics. Furthermore, Islamists were challenging the most fundamental concept of all the militaries of the world: discipline. One army officer accused of and discharged for religious fundamentalism reportedly declared: 'I'll obey my own Imam and not my commander!'¹⁰².

The February 28th process, then, can be seen as a radical break from the 'neorepublican' policies which prevailed in the post-1980 coup period and which allowed space for negotiation, compromise and reconciliation between Islamists and the secular state.

¹⁰⁰ See Alan Makovksy, 'How to deal with Erbakan'. [accessed online]

¹⁰¹ Again, as noted above, Refah's Minister of State at the time argued that the aim was to restructure Turkish secularism along the lines of European models. See A.Makovsky, 'Fehim Adak: Erbakan seeks cooperation in America'. [accessed online]

¹⁰² B.Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?', unpublished paper.

Instead, February 28th represented a return to the republic's radical secularism; it represented, more specifically, 'the need to both stabilize the rule of the original Kemalist project and revive the myth of a homogenous nation and society'¹⁰³. Meanwhile, as one might surmise from the earlier account of civilian initiatives against the rise of Islamism represented in Refah, the February 28th process was greeted with considerable public support at the time.

'Legacies' of the February 28th process

The February 28th process has come to be seen as a 'post-modern coup'¹⁰⁴. The initial 'February 28th Declaration' signalled the beginning of the end of Refah and Erbakan. More significantly, however, it marked the beginning of a long-term effort to quell the political and social strength of Islamism in Turkey. The first main stage of this was the forced closure of Refah Party and the ousting of Erbakan from political activity. Refah was brought to court in May 1997, and in January 1998 the Constitutional Court outlawed the party on the grounds that it violated the principles of secularism and the law of the political parties. Meanwhile, Erbakan was charged under Turkish Penal Code Article 312 (for inciting the public to hatred and separatism), and was banned from politics¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰³ U.Cizre and M.Cinar, 'Kemalism, Islamism, and politics in the light of the February 28th Process', p.312.

¹⁰⁴ In fact, a heated debate broke out in January of 2001 when retired General Erol Ozkasnak (the former General Staff Secretary-General) made a statement—which he later retracted—referring to February 28th as a 'post-modern coup'. See M.Birand, 'February 28 Syndrome'. [accessed online]

¹⁰⁵ See N.Narli, 'The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online]

The February 28th process may be considered to have continued under the government formed after the ensuing elections. The new government was led by Mesut Yilmaz of ANAP, in coalition with two other parties¹⁰⁶. With the strong backing of (and/or pressure from) Kemalist elites and the military, the government embarked on a series of anti-fundamentalist measures. It began to actively investigate the Islamists; inspect student dormitories of Islamic orders; transfer Islamists holding key government posts (such as at the Ministry of National Education) to posts less significant; question the Islamist tendencies of some provincial and district governors; and assert control over religious foundations (the number of which had grown to 8,000 by 1997)¹⁰⁷.

Meanwhile, the Virtue, or Fazilet, Party had been formed by Recai Kutan on the ashes of the Refah Party¹⁰⁸. Fazilet embodied a concerted effort to reform political Islam. First, it promoted itself as pro-democratic, and conspicuously implemented this by declaring support for Turkish membership in the EU. There was no mention of an 'Islamic mission' for the party. Instead, Fazilet leaders focused on the relationship between 'millet' and 'devlet' (nation and state), arguing that the state should be in service of the people rather than far above the people. Fazilet pledged to create a humanitarian state that met the nation's needs without totally dominating it--a more democratic rather than authoritarian state. Second, Fazilet tried to change the chauvinistic image of political Islam by recruiting a number of highly educated, upper-middle class modern

¹⁰⁶ Ecevit's Social Democrat Party (DSP) and the conservative Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) of Mr. Cindoruk.

¹⁰⁷ B.Oran, 'From nation to where in globalising Turkey?' (unpublished paper). However, it is important to note that by 1998, Yilmaz had begun to take a critical stance against the military-provoked fight against 'reactionaryism', stating that only in the case of a clear rebellion of the Islamists should the military be involved in suppressing Islamism. See U.Cizre and M.Cinar, 'Kemalism, Islamism, and politics in the light of the February 28th Process', p.313.

¹⁰⁸ The party was formed by Kutan in December of 1997; with strong behind-the-scenes support of Erbakan, however, the party was considered to be more or less led by Erbakan. See N.Narli, 'The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online]

women. The party also appointed two women to the central decision-making board, neither of whom wore headscarves. Unlike Refah, Fazilet downplayed the headscarf issue altogether, and treated it as a matter of democracy, human rights, and personal liberty rather than as a matter of religion¹⁰⁹.

Whether the party was sincere in its embrace of democracy and of gender equality, or simply trying to preserve its right to existence, is a matter of intense debate (see chapter six). One indication that genuine changes were taking place within political Islam is the split which developed in the party, between the 'traditionalists' led by Kutan, and the 'reformists' whose voice was Abdullah Gul¹¹⁰. In spite of such developments, however, the party was closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001, on the grounds that it was a continuation of the Refah Party¹¹¹.

As in the case of Fazilet's closure, other NSC-led actions designed to limit Islamism came to be treated, in the Turkish press, as further extensions of the February 28th process¹¹². A prime example is the liberal use of Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code to convict people suspected of 'reactionaryism'. The Article prohibits incitement of the public to hatred, enmity or division based on racial, ethnic, religious, sect, regional or class lines. The list of those convicted for religion-related offences includes such prominent political figures as Erkaban and Tayyip Erdogan (the popular mayor of Istanbul, whose conviction under the article ousted him from the position); and influential social and religious leaders, such as the immensely popular journalist, Fehmi

¹⁰⁹ N.Narli, 'The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'. [accessed online]

¹¹⁰ This split evolved into the creation of two separate 'religion-oriented' political parties after Fazilet's closure: the Saadet, or Contentment Party, led by Kutan, and the Justice and Development Party, led by Tayyip Erdogan.

¹¹¹ For a closer look at the Virtue Party and its policies, see B.Yesilada, 'The Virtue Party'.

¹¹² Attention to such issues is important in order to provide a wider picture of what may have led to a change in Islamists' perspectives on Europe.

Koru, and Fethullah Gulen (for plotting to subvert the secular Republic). This article has been a centre of political debate, especially since Erbakan's conviction under it. In Erbakan's case, the offence was in a speech delivered in Bingol on February 28th 1994 (though efforts to prosecute him for violation of Article 312 only began during his term in office, in 1997)¹¹³. After this and many such cases had been referred to the European Court of Human Rights¹¹⁴, there was increasingly open discussion in Turkey of Article 312 as a barrier to Turkish membership in the European Union: both within journalistic and political circles, reform of the Article was being considered necessary for adaptation to the European Convention of Human Rights and for compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria¹¹⁵. Debate over the article's reform became a major sticking point for the leading three-way coalition in 2001-2002, with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) vehemently resisting proposed changes. Amendments to the article were approved in February 2002, following the intense efforts of the coalition-member Motherland Party to include a reformed Article 312 as part of the Democratisation Package presented to the European Union¹¹⁶. However, considerable controversy ensued with regard to the quality of the

¹¹³ See 'Crisis in the government...but why?', *Briefing*, Issue 1300, 10 July 2000, p.3. Erbakan's speech included criticism of the state for replacing the traditional phrase recited by students at the start of classes ('In the name of Allah, the merciful...'), with Mustafa Kemal's words, 'I am Turk, I am right, I am industrious...'. In this fateful speech Erbakan also accused the state of inciting the public to division based on ethnic lines (with reference to the Kurdish issue), and proposed that the only solution to this division was Islam.

¹¹⁴ In February 2003, The European Court of Human Rights produced a unanimous judgment in favour of Turkey in the '*Refah Party and others v. Turkey*' case (application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98). See the court's internet site for further details (<http://www.echr.coe.int>).

¹¹⁵ See *Turkish Daily News*, 24 January 2002 for a number of news and opinion articles on this subject. See also 'Reform package hurdle finally over', *Turkish Daily News*, 8 February 2002, and 'Mini-reform package goes into effect', *Turkish Daily News*, 20 February 2002 [all of the above were accessed online]. 'Copenhagen Criteria' refers to the criteria for EU membership established at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. Beyond certain financial criteria (a functioning market economy), the Copenhagen Criteria include the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

¹¹⁶ The former version of the article stated that 'The person who would openly incites people to hate and hostility by underlining class, racial, religious, sectarian or regional differences will be given a prison sentence in the one to three years range...'; the amended article states that 'The person who publicly incites

amendments: the changes to the article were considered by many to be simply tactical. Regardless of the changes, however, many analysts agree that the problem is not in the law itself, but in its application: similar laws exist in the legal traditions of other European countries. Thus, as is evident through the difficulties in its reform, Article 312 represents deeper problematic aspects of Turkish political culture beyond the problem of poor legal policy.

Another crucial part of the legacy of the February 28th process is the Civil Servant's Decree (or KHK). This controversial decree, advanced by the National Security Council in August of 2000, was designed to purge the Turkish bureaucracy of religious 'reactionaries'. According to one interpretation, 'the decree comes as part of a massive crackdown led by the powerful army since 1997 to eliminate political Islam, which the country's generals deem the major threat to the country's secular order'¹¹⁷. The bill was similar to the purge, two years prior, of more than 160 military personnel for allegedly sympathising with Islamic militants¹¹⁸. The NSC requested the Turkish President's signature on the bill, which would result in the sacking of thousands of civil servants suspected of sympathising with political Islam or Kurdish separatism. The bill became the centre of a heated national debate as the then new President Ahmet Sezer refused -- three times -- the NSC's mandate. To the NSC's great annoyance, Sezer insisted that the rule of law requires a parliamentary vote on such a bill. The government

people to harbor hate or enmity against one another by underlining the social class, racial, religious, factional or regional differences in a way that would create the possibility of disrupting the public order, would be punished with a prison sentence in the one to three years range...'. See M. Birand, 'These cannot be called adaptation laws', in *Turkish Daily News*, 24 January 2002. [accessed online]

¹¹⁷ See 'Coalition leaders meet over controversial decree', *Turkishpress.com*, 22 August 2000.

¹¹⁸ 'Islamist purge in Turkish military', *BBC News Europe*, 16 June 1998. There is no right to appeal for expulsion from the Turkish military. [accessed online]

responded by accusing the president of 'hindering the fight against radical Islam'¹¹⁹, and Turkish media sources suggested that the government might seek to impeach the newly-elected president¹²⁰. Under increased pressure to reveal the reason behind the decree, Prime Minister Ecevit declared that the KHK was 'a legislative effort in accordance with the February 28th decisions'¹²¹. The bill was finally passed in parliament in June 2001¹²².

The challenges facing Tayyip Erdogan in his leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, formed following the closure of Fazilet Party in 2001), may be considered as one further manifestation of the February 28th process. In legal terms, Erdogan's status as a party leader was certainly complex. At the time of the party's formation, Article 76 of the Turkish Constitution stipulated that people convicted of ideological crimes may not run for office, whilst Article 109 stipulated that the prime minister must be a member of the parliament¹²³. In spite of these challenges, the AKP won a clear majority of the votes in the November 2002 national elections. It thus became the first political party, since 1991, to enjoy single party rule¹²⁴. Abdullah Gul was initially sworn in as prime minister; this was meant to be a temporary situation, until Erdogan could be cleared of his criminal charges and allowed to run for office.

¹¹⁹ 'Turkey moves against Islamists', *BBC News Europe*, 23 August 2000. [accessed online]

¹²⁰ 'Turkish president defies government', *BBC News Europe*, 21 August 2000. [accessed online]

¹²¹ According to one Ankara-based news source, 'Quite likely, the possibility that Sezer would reject the KHK never even crossed the government's mind, especially as it had been pounded on over and over again that this KHK was a "continuation of the February 28th process" and therefore an "undeclinable request" from the National Security Council'. See 'Not sorry for Erbakan, but for Turkish law', *Briefing*, Issue 1305, 14 August 2000, p.3.

¹²² See 'Parliament accepts civil servants decree', *Turkish Daily News*, 29 June 2001. [accessed online]

¹²³ Article 109 of the Turkish Constitution stipulates that the prime minister must be a member of the parliament, and Article 76, prior to its amendment in December 2002, stipulated that people convicted of ideological crimes were banned from running for office. See S.Cagaptay, 'The November 2002 elections and Turkey's new political era'. [accessed online]

¹²⁴ See A.Carkoglu, 'Turkey's November 2002 Elections: a new beginning?'. [accessed online]

But Erdogan and the AKP faced significant mistrust on the domestic front and, in particular, from the Kemalist elite. According to Rusen Cakir, there has been a real transformation in Erdogan, 'but the problem is that that is not enough. The question is whether they (the establishment, the army) believe it or want to believe it. I think here there's no chance for him'¹²⁵. Indeed, the tremendous challenges facing Erdogan in his rise to the premiership may be viewed as indications that 'they do not want to believe it'. The AKP's Party Program declares that the party 'considers religion as one of the most important institutions of humanity, and secularism as a pre-requisite of democracy, and an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience...Our Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes'. Furthermore, Erdogan explicitly stated that 'In Turkey, each institution has its own role. The Turkish army is the apple of our eyes. No one is going to interfere between us and our army'¹²⁶. Yet such statements did not suffice as assurance to a skeptical secularist establishment. In this context, the Court of Cassation Chief Prosecutor brought a number of cases against Erdogan, calling for his ban from party leadership and from participation in parliamentary elections; challenging a Diyarbakir State Court ruling clearing Erdogan's criminal record; demanding the AKP's closure; and pursuing corruption charges against Erdogan¹²⁷. Limitations on Erdogan also came from President of the Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer, through his initial refusal to allow constitutional amendments which would pave the way for Erdogan's official leadership of the party. In

¹²⁵ 'PM candidate Erdogan rejects Islamist mantle', *Turkish Daily News*, 14 September 2002. [accessed online]

¹²⁶ 'En Turquie, l'arrivée au pouvoir des islamistes modérés de l'AKP est accueilli dans le calme', *Le Monde*, 6 November 2002, p.4.

¹²⁷ See E.Erduran, 'Erdogan's throne at AKP under dual threat', *Turkish Daily News*, 25 March 2002; 'Erbakan down, Erdogan on the way', *Turkish Daily News*, 19 September 2002; 'This week in perspective', *Turkish Daily News: Turkish Probe*, 15 September 2002; and 'Chief prosecutor demands the closure of AKP', *Turkish Daily News*, 24 October 2002, respectively [all of the above were accessed online].

the end, the Diyarbakir Court's ruling held: Erdogan was cleared of the Article 312 charges, and Constitutional Article 76 was amended by the Turkish parliament (thus allowing Erdogan to become a member of parliament). Following his victory in bi-elections in Siirt in March 2002, Erdogan was sworn in as prime minister.

Our historical overviews of Islamism and secularism in Turkey reveal an intense struggle over the place of religion in Turkish state and society. Mustafa Kemal's secularising reforms aimed at the modernisation and westernisation of Turkish society. The reforms were, as noted above, very sudden and in some cases absolute. Such sudden 'injection' of institutions and values is, as described by Nicos Mouzelis (see chapter two), bound to face difficulties, because of a great disarticulation between the new culture and the live cultural traditions which preceded them. In the words of Joseph Szyliowicz, 'Ataturk had eliminated Islam from public life but the "parallel" Islam [or, unofficial Islam of the religious orders, convents and sects] continued to thrive within society': while the state elites were positivist and secular in orientation, the majority of the population continued to view Islam as a central source of self-identity¹²⁸. This fact became even more evident after the transition to a multi-party political system in Turkey, as politicians began to openly compete for the Islamic vote. We see here what David Martin describes as an 'oscillation' between two versions of the sacred, the one provided by Islam and the other by Kemal Ataturk (see chapter two)¹²⁹. But it was the military coup of 1980 which introduced the most extreme fluctuation in Turkish secularist policies. The fact that these changes were introduced by the *military* in particular,

¹²⁸ J.Szyliowicz, 'Religion, politics and democracy in Turkey', p.194.

¹²⁹ See M.Ahiska, 'Occidentalism: the historical fantasy of the modern', p.366.

traditionally the guardians of Turkish secularism, seems ironic. However, as Szyliowicz argues, whilst at first glance there seems to be a contradiction between ideology and practice, a closer examination suggests that the military's moves reflected a mere continuation of a policy whereby the state 'tried to control Islam and harness it to its own goals'. Thus, the underlying motive for the military's actions was essentially the same as that of previous regimes¹³⁰. What changed was not the Kemalist elite's secular orientation, but certain events and developments within and beyond Turkey (internal division, communism, Khomeinism) which produced, for these elites, a greater need to use Islam as an integrating force. What *can* be considered ironic, however, are the unintended consequences of these policies, in terms of the growth of the kinds of Islamic activities which the Kemalist elites had always sought to suppress.

In other words, Turkish secularism fluctuated in accordance with a variety of short-term and long-term interests of political and military elites¹³¹. Amongst these Nilifer Gole places the establishment of their hegemonic power. Laicism, she argues, is not a neutral term, but rather 'defines and sustains...the political and cultural power of the modernist elites'¹³². The intense emphasis of secular elites on education reforms—limitations on religious education and socialisation into secular ideology—certainly helped to achieve this goal. For their part, the military elites wished to secure their positions as guardians of Kemalist principles. Due in part to the historically symbolic role of Mustafa Kemal's army in paving the way for the establishment of the modern

¹³⁰ J.Szyliowicz, 'Religion, politics and democracy in Turkey', pp.196-7.

¹³¹ Of course, one should distinguish between the various elites: some politicians, e.g., Turgut Ozal, showed a relatively sincere intention to incorporate Islamists into the Turkish state and society in a democratic fashion.

¹³² N.Gole, 'Laïcité, modernisme et Islamisme en Turquie', p.87. Meltem Ahiska makes a similar argument in 'Occidentalism: the historical fantasy of the modern', pp.351-379.

Turkish Republic, the military in Turkey carries symbolic importance as the defender of Mustafa Kemal's values: democracy, secularism, and national unity. The military's suppression of the intense social struggles between left-wing and right-wing factions in the 1970's, and its struggle against communism and the PKK in the 80s, and against political Islam in the 1990's, were widely appreciated. As Nilufer Narli notes, even today there is a high degree of respect in Turkey for the military's presence. Surely this goes a long way to explaining why even after undemocratic moves by the military, perpetrated in the name of secularism, national unity and, in general, Kemalist ideology, there is continued support for the military's watchdog role. The military enjoys a great deal of power through its dominant position in the National Security Council, but also a great deal of autonomy, as it is not officially a part of the Ministry of Defence. Clearly, then, active defence of secularism is one platform upon which the military continues to justify its role in Turkey¹³³. And the Turkish public is continually reminded, often by the military itself, of the persistent threats to the secular state: 'Radical Islam may appear gone one day to re-emerge the next day...it is not possible to say that the danger has vanished'¹³⁴.

Secularisation in Turkey, according to Gole, is considered to be the prerequisite of *westernisation* rather than democratisation and, because secularism is often implemented by authoritarian elites, there is a potential conflict of interest between democracy and secularism¹³⁵. This conflict arises, in the Turkish case, because the Kemalist elites deemed westernisation to require a cultural homogenisation which would solidify the

¹³³ N.Narli, 'Civil-Military relations in Turkey', pp.116-118. See also G.Karabelias, 'The evolution of civil-military relations in post-war Turkey, 1980-95'.

¹³⁴ Former Chief of General Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu, speaking in 2001. Cited by U.Cizre and M.Cinar, 'Kemalism, Islamism, and politics in the light of the February 28th Process', p.312.

¹³⁵ N.Gole, 'Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites', pp.48-49.

nation. The project was thus based on populism rather than on liberalism. According to Fuat Keyman, 'secularism and reformism from above served to construct a national identity compatible with republicanism, nationalism, and etatism, and at the same time to concretize populism and its appeal to organic unity into the identity of the individual subject....Hence, the national identity was meant to be an organic unity of the secular non-class based identity which necessarily involved the subjugation of its Other, i.e. the Muslim identity'¹³⁶. Caglar Ceyer sees Turkish secularism not only as defining a certain place for religion in state and society, but as a *separation* of state and society: 'The militant secularism of the state amounted to a repudiation of what used to be its principal ideological apparatus. The consequence of this repudiation was a separation between state and society, for which Islam continued to be the popular cohesive principle'¹³⁷. And, of course, we can question the extent to which Turkish secularism meets its aims of secularisation at all: according to Andrew Davidson, because laicism entails a close relationship between religion and state, it can be considered as an *obstacle* to secularisation¹³⁸.

The above historical overview also reveals Turkish Islamism as largely shaped by Turkish secularism—a situation, as described by Jose Casanova (see chapter two), in which the state determines the place of religion. This is true of the place of religion in the Turkish state as of its place in society, as a result of intense socialisation of all Turks in secular, Kemalist ideals through the education system. As Metin Heper notes, this socialisation effort was largely successful: his research provides evidence of very little

¹³⁶ Fuat Keyman, 'On the relation between global modernity and nationalism: the crisis of hegemony and the rise of (Islamic) identity in Turkey', pp.104-105.

¹³⁷ C.Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: a Study in Capitalist Development*, p.88.

¹³⁸ A.Davidson, 'Turkey, a "secular" state? The challenge of description', p.344.

support for a Turkish state based on Islam (less than 1% of the population)¹³⁹. The relationship between Turkish Islamism and secularism may be viewed as *contingent*: the Islamist movement clearly developed in a context in which the state dominated society¹⁴⁰. In this context, the Islamists' actions were of course also influential, and involved an element of manipulation of the state's fluctuating secularist policies in order to achieve a place in the political scene. As Tanil Bora points out, beyond their Muslim nationalist discourse (emphasising a Muslim brotherhood with their Arab neighbours), Islamists also employed the discourse of 'official' nationalism, stressing the importance of national unity and national sovereignty¹⁴¹. This fact is particularly clear in their rhetoric on the European Union. It is to the subject of Islamist perspectives on the EU that we turn below, for an in-depth analysis of the roots of the Islamist anti-Europeanism which prevailed in Turkey prior to the period examined in the following chapter.

Islamism and Europe

In the following chapter we discuss the extent to which the current pro-European feeling amongst Turkish Islamists is directly related to such affronts to religion in Turkey. Our intent here is to focus on the substance of Islamist anti-Europeanism as

¹³⁹ Heper's research was conducted in the 1990's. See M.Heper, 'The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics', pp.63-83.

¹⁴⁰ U.C.Sakallioglu, 'Parameters and strategies of Islam-State interaction in Republican Turkey', pp.245.

¹⁴¹ See T.Bora, 'Nationalist discourses in Turkey', p.432. See also Birol Akgun, 'Twins or enemies: comparing nationalism and Islamist traditions in Turkish politics'. Here Akgun explains the sporadic close relationship between political Islamists and the National Action Party. The same theme is explored by Sultan Tepe, in 'A Kemalist-Islamist Movement? The Nationalist Action Party'.

prevailed in the past¹⁴². The time frame for this focus is the 1980's and 90's, at the height of the rise of political Islam in Turkey.

With the exception of certain groups—particularly some Nurcu sects¹⁴³, the Alevis, and radical Islamists¹⁴⁴—Turkish Islamic attitudes towards Europe and Turkish participation in European integration have, in the past, been largely negative. Writing in 1990, Rusen Cakir (journalist and specialist on Turkish Islamism), deems that the only considerable objection to Turkey's participation in the European integration project emanated from the Islamist movements. Cakir emphasizes the diversity in expressions of this movement, stating that their principles of organization, political attitudes and socio-cultural points of view were not only very different from one another, but also sometimes contradictory. In fact, Turkish Islamists were not *exclusively* against the EU, and even those who were, employed different arguments for their stances. An exhaustive study of Turkish Islamist anti-Europeanism in the past is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is useful, however, to draw a picture revealing the aforementioned differences and indicating fluctuations over time. This focus will serve as the background for our assessment of the current pro-Europeanism amongst Turkish Islamists in the following chapter.

¹⁴² We shall, at the outset and in line with prevailing perspective, divide between Turkish Islamists' 'before' and 'after' attitudes to Europe roughly at the time of the 'February 28th process'; the possible arbitrariness of this division will be discussed in the following chapter. This section on 'religious' perspectives is relatively short compared to that for the Greek case study; this discrepancy is due to my lack of knowledge of the Turkish language (as explained in the Introduction), and my reliance on English and French-language texts and an English translation of one Turkish-language text.

¹⁴³ For Nurcus' exceptionalism, see Kazim Gulecguz, 'The European Union, Turkey and Islam in light of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi's views' (a paper presented at a panel entitled 'The European Union and Turkey from the point of view of Democracy, the Law, and Human Rights').

¹⁴⁴ All of which have different reasons for their indifferent or positive attitudes toward Europe. See Rusen Cakir, 'Les Mouvements Islamistes Turcs et l'Europe'.

According to Rusen Cakir, the most extensive and influential criticism of the European Community in the past emanated from the 'Milli Gorus Har' (or, the 'National Perspective Movement'), which took institutional form first in 1969 as the 'Bag Harek' movement ('Movement of Independence'), and then continued in form through successive Islamist political parties¹⁴⁵. Political Islamist anti-Europeanism will be discussed at depth in the following chapter. Our focus here is on views expressed in publications representing certain religious groups (Islamist journals and newspapers).

Nearly all Islamist groups have their own publications, which serve as an influential aspect of their cultural lives. These are a useful source of information regarding their attitudes toward Europe. We shall refer here to a selection of Islamist journals and newspapers from the 1980's and 1990's¹⁴⁶. According to Cakir's study of such journals, the subject of the European Community was treated regularly, at least in one article per issue¹⁴⁷. The journals characteristically offer much information on the evolution of European integration and treat this as an historical inevitability.

When it comes to the question of Turkey's accession to the European Community, however, the subject of antagonism between Islam and Christianity is a point of common reference. The key word in these journals is without a doubt 'common culture'; in Cakir's estimation, none of the Islamists in Turkey perceive themselves as sharing a common culture with the Europeans¹⁴⁸. Cakir presents the opinions expressed in the journal *Islam* as representative of Islamist attitudes toward the EC:

¹⁴⁵ R.Cakir, 'The Westernisation process of the Islamists'. [in Turkish]

¹⁴⁶ These publications are classified as 'Islamist' on the basis of the definition of the term provided above.

¹⁴⁷ Rusen Cakir, 'Les Mouvements Islamistes Turcs et l'Europe'. (The journals, as referenced by Cakir, are cited in footnotes below).

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.16.

The EC is above all a social phenomenon...A phenomenon which crosses frontiers, and which embraces people of one same civilization and of one same culture. It is a continental movement. A movement of unification and of change. It quickens the change of culture. It is an event which realizes fully the fusion of human beings and of culture¹⁴⁹.

Thus other aspects of integration (economic and political) are neglected, and the picture drawn is rather of 'a unity economic in appearance, but Christian in origin'¹⁵⁰. In the journal *Ogut* ('The Opinion'), published by the strongest branch of the Turkish brotherhood 'Kadiriye', the question is posed in the following manner: 'In the club of rich Christian European countries, a poor, Muslim, Asian Turkey?'¹⁵¹. According to *Ogut*, the decision to create the EC 'was taken before the Pact of Rome, during the Catholic Council of Rome, in the presence of Schumann, of de Gasperi and Adenauer'. *Ogut* encourages, instead of Turkish membership in this European unification project, the formation of an Islamic Common Market.

Islam is published by the principal branch of the Naksibendi, the 'community of Iskender Pasa'¹⁵², and has a readership of approximately 100,000. This journal often addresses issues related to the European Community. In August of 1986, it carried the cover title: 'EC: Is it a community of crosses?'. Later that year, the journal's title read 'What is our place during the discussion on the EC?', alongside a picture of the Community's flag, with a cross just in the middle, and next to it a priest addressing the crowd from the height of a throne decorated with a cross¹⁵³. In the same issue, the journal draws attention to the fact that the competition for the design of the EC building

¹⁴⁹ From *Islam*, Issue 36, 1986.

¹⁵⁰ R.Cakir, 'Les Mouvements Islamistes Turcs et l'Europe', p.16.

¹⁵¹ *Ogut*, Issue 13, 1986.

¹⁵² This group comprised the largest electoral support of Refah and is, according to Cakir's estimation, perhaps the most important Islamic group in Turkey.

¹⁵³ *Islam*, Issue 47, 1987.

in Brussels was won by a project symbolizing a cross. The journal also deals extensively with the subject of Christian missionary activity in Turkey. Another issue with the cover title, 'The new objective of the Papacy: Turkey', contains an article entitled 'The adhesion of Turkey to the EU will be decided by the Vatican'¹⁵⁴. One of the main contributors to the journal, Dr. Ersin Gurdogan, summarizes the 'danger' that the EU represents for Turkey: 'The integration of the EC means the refusal of our Muslim identity'¹⁵⁵. In the same issue, another warning comes from Ismet Ozel, the poet converted from Marxism and a widely read Muslim intellectual: 'If Turkey integrates into the EU, one can say she risks quitting her proper life of development. In so doing, she prevents the emergence of an alternative independent Muslim and has sabotaged in this manner the fundamental dynamic of this development [of an independent Muslim]'¹⁵⁶.

Finally, in a section of his study entitled 'Those who do not fear the European Community', Cakir also addresses publications of the Nurcus. The journal *Kopru* (or, 'The Bridge') carries an article entitled 'A Muslim State in Europe' in which the idea that the EC is an 'alliance of crosses' is criticised, and the advantages of membership highlighted. The journal's focus is clearly on religious identity, but with a positive hope of 'a Turkey which finds a place, with its Muslim identity, in the EC, and which can initiate a global dialogue between Europe and the Muslim world'¹⁵⁷. For its part, *Sur* ('The Wall') poses the question 'Why do we fear the EU?'. The journal draws readers' attention to the fact that, based on the example of Turks already living in Europe, 'We

¹⁵⁴ *Islam*, Issue 55, 1988.

¹⁵⁵ *Islam*, Issue 47, 1987.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Kopru*, Issue 100, 1987. Published by the Yeni Asya Nurcu group.

will be able to practice our religion better. There is neither intervention nor repression, but help and facilities'¹⁵⁸.

Sencer Ayata's study of Islamist newspapers reveals anti-Europeanism as a 'subheading' of anti-westernism: 'the West' is presented as a system opposed to Islam (a rival culture and rival religion); a source of foreign domination; and an alien economic system coupled with a controversial form of social organisation¹⁵⁹. Four main characteristics of the West are identified. First, the West is associated with Christianity which, in turn, is considered a contemporary materialistic culture. The historical rivalry and antagonism between Islam and Christianity is a common point of reference of all these papers. Christianity itself, as a religion, is rarely criticized in the Islamic press; the underlying idea here is that every manifestation of religion in social life is beneficial for social well-being. Thus, the principal distinction drawn is less between Christianity and Islam, than between religion, on the one hand, and absence of religion, atheism and secularity, on the other. The Christian experience is considered to be marked by injustice, oppression, misery and ignorance. The secularism of the western world has engendered a spiritually and morally bankrupt way of life. Furthermore, western culture has sparked a major moral collapse of the western world itself, a danger which threatens

¹⁵⁸ *Sur*, Issue 158, 1989.

¹⁵⁹ Sencer Ayata, 'Une approche de la politique étrangère'. The study was published in 1999 but is based on research of such publications in 1997, and focuses on three newspapers in particular: *Akit*, *Yeni Safak*, and *Milli Gazette*. *Yeni Safak* has a readership of 20,000, and is considered a more intellectual journal, devoting much attention to commentaries and information analysis by specialists or authorities on particular subjects, research and documentaries, and translations of foreign press. *Milli Gazette* has a readership of 15,000, and gives priority to the Refah Party (at the time this research was conducted), and to the declarations of its readers. Both *Yeni Safak* and *Milli Gazette* generally align themselves with the Refah Party. *Akit* has a readership of 45,000, and is considered more sensationalist, emotional and ideological, and takes a more radical approach in concentrating on the Middle East and on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

the Islamic world as well through the West's 'colonial' export of modernity and secularism.

Second, colonialism and imperialism are treated as specifically western forms of political, economic and cultural domination. The western imperialist considers non-western people irrational and incapable of governing themselves. The international system is thus profoundly marked by structures of domination, economic exploitation, and cultural exclusion. The poor, the less privileged, the exploited, the subordinated and the excluded are called upon to rise and resist imperialism through the adoption of Islam. Third, the West is identified with capitalism, an economic system characterized by an exploitation without pity, an extreme disparity of revenues, social inequality and the subordination of all human relations to the laws of the market economy.

Finally, the most severe attack directed against the West concerns its social and cultural forms. The individual is the basic element of western society, and is condemned to alienation, rootlessness, and the absence of personal and community identity. The resulting individual is egoistic, greedy, and fundamentally a-social. Western society is essentially hedonistic and in a state of moral crisis, which is evident in its social ills: a growing crime rate, the breakdown of family values, illicit sexual relations, alcohol abuse, drugs and aids. The tendency observed in *Yeni Safak* and *Akit* is to reject a compromise which would result at least in a rejection of the Islamic values and principles. Furthermore, Islam is a system which can compete with and replace the western system, but cannot mix with it. According to Ayata's estimation, based upon the papers' tendency to defend the poor and 'disfavoured' in society especially, the anti-western sentiments expressed stem from acute awareness of social inequalities at the

global and local levels. However, particularly since the beginning of mounting tensions between Refah and the military-dominated National Security Council, certain aspects of western society began to be evaluated positively. Relations between civilians and the military and the concept of a government of consensus became central themes treated in the Islamist papers. The western world is commended for its 'true democracy', marked by the supremacy of civil authorities over the military and that of an elected government over the bureaucracy.

In these newspapers, Europe tends to be treated as a single, homogenous entity, both because of the historical and geographical proximity of its countries, and because of high levels of interaction between them in various domains. In terms of Turkey's relations with Europe, two particularly sensitive issues are frequently addressed. The first concerns the Muslim populations, and especially the Turks, living in Europe: the Islamist papers under consideration tend to criticize European governments for attitudes of intolerance toward Muslim collective identity, the maintenance of a specifically Islamic way of life and the rights of Islamic groups. The European orientation is described as racist, xenophobic, ethnocentric, and exclusive. The papers contain frequent coverage of incidents of ethnic violence and crime directed against the Turks and Muslims, and reports of attacks on persons and private property are emotionally charged. Second, we find in these papers nationalistic, defensive attitudes towards the EU for its continued rejections of Turkey. The tendency of *Yeni Safak* and *Milli Gazete* is to approve certain economic aspects of integration, but to oppose what are considered restrictions on national sovereignty and growing cultural homogenisation. *Akit*, for its part, categorically rejects the idea that Turkey is a part of Europe. The most frequently

penned argument in *Akit* is that the result of Turkey's westernisation, since the beginning of the 19th c., has been erosion of national pride and confidence in its people.

Furthermore, the prevalent opinion communicated in *Akit* is that Turkey has no chance to be integrated into Europe because of the fundamental differences of civilization, based on religion.

Yeni Safak has a relatively sophisticated conception of Turkey's relations with the EU. The journal develops in detail subjects such as the Customs Union's effects on the Turkish economy, the circulation of the workforce, conditions of trade with Europe, and the implications of the Common Agricultural Policy for Turkish agriculture. The differences of revenue between Turkey and Europe, Turkey's demographic upsurge, and the regional economic differences in Turkey are also taken into consideration. Furthermore, European objections to Turkey's past in terms of human rights, government corruption, and the errors of political and economic management are considered serious handicaps to Turkish prospects for EU membership.

The pro-Refah press at the time of the party's rule considered Europe favourably on two counts. First, the commentaries and declarations of European leaders which indicated good will towards Refah were presented with enthusiasm and hope. Meanwhile, European journals were frequently cited in Islamist papers for their arguments against the military intervention and for their appeals for a civil and democratic power in Turkey. Secondly, while tension was mounting between the military and Erbakan, even *Akit* praised European secularism for its guarantees of liberties of conscience and of religion. Somewhat ironically, the paper began to discuss the important role played by religion in European countries.

Conclusion

This brief overview of the relationship between Islamism and secularism in Turkey provides important insights into Islamist anti-Europeanism and possible reasons for current pro-European sentiment amongst Turkish Islamists. Upon the basis of this historical information I argue that Turkish Islamist attitudes towards Europe have little to do with religion *per se*: they are not firm expressions of theological considerations. Rather, the diversity in Islamist opinions on Turkish membership in the European Union, and the fluctuations in these opinions in accordance with changing internal and external political circumstances, point to other factors which influence 'religious' perspectives on Turkish membership in the European Union.

We have identified three main elements of past Islamist anti-Europeanism. First, the stance on Europe has largely been related to anti-western feeling. It is instructive to understand this in relation to the link between Turkish secularist policy and pro-westernisation: suppression of religion in Turkey has, historically, gone hand-in-hand with westernisation policies. Second, Islamist anti-European feeling has been rooted in conservatism which viewed Europe and 'the West' in general as embodiments of *irreligiosity*. Such conservatism is certainly in line with theories of modernity, which point to the dangers perceived by traditional sectors of any society facing sudden exposure to more progressive and modern societies. Third, Turkish Islamist anti-Europeanism in the past was largely a defensive and nationalistic reaction to European rejections of Turkey, especially after the Luxembourg Summit. Such defensive anti-

Europeanism has been an element of both religious and civic nationalism in Turkey, as in other nations during periods of tense relations with the European Union.

Considering these sources of anti-Europeanism, it is not difficult to understand the altered Islamist perspectives on Europe. With increased suppression of religion within Turkey, and as the threat to Turkish religiosity seemed to be greater within Turkey than that imagined in Europe, it is logical that Turkish Islamist attitudes towards Europe would be increasingly favourable. Thus, the fear of encounters with a modern, culturally different and *irreligious or Christian* Europe (depending on the perspective) could be overridden by *local* social concerns stemming from the suppression of Islam in Turkey. An explicit example of this is the altered perspectives expressed in Islamist publications on the issue of Turkish Muslims living in Europe: complaints about the way Turkish Muslims were treated in European host countries were replaced with assessments of the relative freedom religious Turks enjoyed abroad in comparison with the restrictions on religious life in Turkey. Certainly the experience of political Islam has had an effect on Islamist perspectives on Europe. But the fact that suppression of Turkish Islamism goes beyond just the political realm -- as in the prosecution of non-political religious leaders -- suggests that the change to pro-Europeanism may go beyond political opportunism.

Furthermore, the defensive anti-Europeanism which is rooted in perceived rejections from Europe changed considerably between the Luxembourg and the Helsinki Summits. But more importantly, this particular anti-Europeanism has existed and *continues* to exist, both amongst religious and secular-minded Turks, in waves and in reaction to particular messages received from the European Union. Complaints launched against the European Union have resurfaced in Turkish media across the board during

periods of tension between Turkey and the EU (particularly at times when the Copenhagen Criteria seemed to be placing comparatively larger pressures on Turkey than on other applicant countries). Such anti-European sentiment is in no way indicative of rigid ideological perspectives on membership in the European Union.

Indeed, even this brief historical overview reveals that neither secularism in Turkey nor Islamism can be described as unchanging ideologies. Rather, each has fluctuated in accordance with national and external developments, and under the influence of particular leaders. Accordingly, the role of religion in national-EU relations may be most accurately located in the *tension between* secularist and Islamist forces in Turkey and in the pursuit of their contending interests with regard to Turkish membership in the EU. This tension will be studied in the next chapter specifically through the prism of Turkish Islamists' 'change' to pro-Europeanism.

CHAPTER SIX

Political Islamism and pro-Europeanism

In the previous chapter we saw a fairly clear dichotomy between a secular, pro-European Turkish elite and public, and an Islamist, anti-European elite and public. The current situation in Turkey reveals a significantly different and complex picture. Today, Turkish Islamists are among the most vocal pro-European forces in Turkish society. Leaders of political Islamist movements, the largest tarikats and other Islamic communities, the Islamist businessmen's association, etc., now publicly declare their support for Turkish membership in the EU and, in many cases, set this as a primary objective for Turkey.

This situation begs two crucial questions. First, what brought about this change¹? Most date the change to February 28th, 1997, which marks the beginning of the process through which the military-dominated National Security Council gradually forced the closure of Erbakan's Islamist Refah Party, and led to Erbakan's ban from future political activity. The new Islamist pro-Europeanism, then, is widely regarded as a direct effect of what John Esposito has termed 'militant secular fundamentalism'². The second question, related to the first and perhaps more important for our purposes, is, can the Islamist change in perspective on Europe be considered sincere? Many secularist elites in Turkey interpret this modification as part of Islamists' broader efforts to hide their true identity in order to preserve themselves; they argue that Islamists are presenting themselves as pro-European and defenders of democracy in order to protect their right to existence in the

¹ The reader should recall that 'change' is meant to cover a wide spectrum of terms (see chapter five, footnote 1).

political sphere which, once in power, will enable them to fulfil their true aim for an Islamic state³. More muted versions of this mistrust indicate a fear that Islamists will use freedoms provided by the EU to implement religion-based policies which threaten the secular state of Turkey (such as cancelling the ban on the wearing of headscarves in public spaces) or which threaten the unity of the state by inciting the public to religion-based division. It is on the basis of such suspicions that, *at least theoretically*, certain strict secularist policies have been implemented in Turkey⁴.

For instance, speculations about the Islamists' real intentions were the justification for the 'February 28th process', calculated to curb religious 'reactionaryism' and political Islam simultaneously, and for the closure of the Fazilet Party in 2001 by the Turkish Constitutional Court. Further manifestations of this distrust are the ways in which Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code (which covers the crime of 'inciting people to hatred and enmity on the basis of ethnic, religious, regional and sectarian differences') has been liberally applied to imprison individuals considered a threat to the secular state⁵; that the Civil Servant's Decree (KHK) was designed to purge the Turkish bureaucracy of individuals deemed to be religious 'reactionaries'; that the liberal-minded Islamic leader Fethullah Gulen was pursued by Ankara State courts for plotting to subvert the secular Republic; and that the Justice and Development Party was so pursued by state prosecutors prior to and after it was democratically elected in 2002.

² J. Esposito, 'Islam and secularism in the Twenty-first century', p.7.

³ The term 'secularist elites' should be understood here as distinct from 'secular elites', and as indicative of those in the governing ranks in Turkey who especially press secularist reforms in order to curb Islamists' activities. The term does not denote irreligiosity; nor does it merely indicate individuals advocating a separation of religion from politics (such individuals exist also amongst Turkish 'Islamists').

⁴ Later in this chapter I will consider other possible driving forces behind such policies, as well as other explanations for the Islamists' 'change' to pro-Europeanism beyond the February 28th process.

⁵ This article has been a centre of political debate, especially since Erbakan's conviction under it. The article was revised in February 2002. See chapter five for details of the revised version of Article 312.

In response to such developments, currently Islamists (amongst others, some liberal secular-minded elites included) claim that the government attitude and policies towards Islam and Islamism in Turkey are the real barriers to Turkey's westernization and democratisation⁶. Acute complaints are launched against the secularist elites for claiming to be, but not *acting* western and for, in fact, not actually desiring EU membership⁷. A widespread and relatively radical discussion of this began in Turkey in 2001 when (then) Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz identified forces within the government and military as impediments to EU accession⁸. His statement chimed with General Tuncer Kilinc's public assertion that Turkey should seek fresh alternatives to Europe, 'which looks negatively on Turkey's national interests', and retired General Suat Ilhan's remark that EU membership is contrary to Turkish history and the revolution based on Kemalist principles⁹. The nationalist National Action Party (MHP), in particular, was the focal point of criticism as the coalition partner (in the 1999-2002 government) most resistant to crucial reforms: a prime example is the party's staunch stance against amending Article 312, which would free many Islamists from state prosecution¹⁰. Meanwhile, and particularly since the forced closure of the Fazilet Party,

⁶ It should be noted that this chapter is *mainly* based on developments prior to the November 2002 elections, when the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party came to power; the empirical research was conducted in 2000-2001.

⁷ Secularist elites are often considered less than enthusiastic about EU membership for a number of different reasons, ranging from mild to extreme judgments: eg., not wishing to change the status quo; fearing the unveiling of a web of corruption behind them; national pride resisting a limitation of sovereignty, etc. Some of these assessments, as well as others, will be addressed later in the chapter.

⁸ In August 2001, Yilmaz publicly claimed that sensitivities over national security issues were being manipulated with the intent to block EU-related reforms in Turkey. The Turkish media, as well as the Turkish military, interpreted this statement as a direct attack against the military. See 'Motherland Party stands behind Yilmaz in row with the military', *Turkish Daily News*, 9 September 2001 [accessed online].

⁹ See coverage of the debate sparked by Kilinc's statements in 'A General speaks his mind', *The Economist*, 16 March 2002, pp.47-8; and 'Retired Gen. Ilhan: EU membership contradicts Turkish revolution', *Turkish Daily News*, 26 March 2002 [accessed online].

¹⁰ Amendments were finally made to the Article in February of 2002; Fehmi Koru (one of the interviewees for this study, and journalist for *Yeni Safak*), was amongst the first to benefit from these amendments and

criticism of the perceived anti-democratic measures designed to limit Islamism in Turkey has heightened within EU ranks as well¹¹. The result is a cyclical debate in Turkey as to which constitutes the greater barrier between Turkey and the European Union—Islamism or (the Turkish version of) secularism.

As Richard Tapper notes in his *Islam in Modern Turkey*, the question is frequently asked whether Islamic revival poses a political ‘threat’ to the survival of the modern Turkish state; conspicuously missing in scholarship is ‘the age-old Western fear of Islam, now shared by many Turks, and the rarely articulated role of this fear in determining Turkey’s relation to Europe’¹². Our intent here is to lay bare this role in the secularist-Islamist tensions in Turkey. Through this process, we shall see that not only do secularist-Islamist tensions affect Turkey’s relation to Europe, but the prospect of EU membership affects the internal balance between secularist and Islamist tendencies in Turkey. First I will examine the ‘change’ in Islamist perspectives on membership in the EU, focusing initially on political Islam and on the Refah Party in particular. Refah is notable because the process through which it was closed is considered a watershed for Islamist perspectives on Europe, and because continued anti-Islamist policies – increasingly considered as barriers to Turkey’s EU membership – have been identified as a continuation of that February 28th process. Second, based upon interview research, I

be acquitted from charges under Article 312. The MHP also adamantly resisted the ban on capital punishment (an EU requirement), mainly with reference to its will to have PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan executed. According to the MHP’s 1999 Party Programme, ‘the unified Turkish nation [is] the sole social and cultural basis of the country’s existence’. (See N.Canefe and T.Bora, ‘Intellectual roots of anti-European sentiments in Turkish politics: the case of radical Turkish nationalism’.) The execution of Ocalan (representative of the Kurdish threat to Turkish national unity), was thus a top priority for the party.

¹¹ See I.Kemal ‘Turkey must adopt EU-standard democracy’, in *Turkish Daily News*, 10 July 2000. It is crucial to note that closures of political parties are clearly not the only source of complaints from the EU with regards to the political Copenhagen Criteria. Abolition of the death penalty is a primary reform demanded by the EU, as well as provision of education and publication rights in mother languages.

¹² Richard Tapper, ‘Introduction’ (in ed. R.Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey*), p.1. [Emphasis mine].

will address the debate in Turkey over the questioned sincerity of Islamists' 'change', including secular-minded elite opinions on this, and Islamists' own explanations for their current perspectives on Europe. I will close with a consideration of the 'cyclical debate' in Turkey over whether Turkish secularism or Islamism is the greater barrier to Turkish membership in the EU.

Political Islamist mobilisation

The Refah ('Welfare', or 'Prosperity') Party, was formed in 1983 after the National Security Council's forced closure of two previous religious parties led by Erbakan¹³. The party's rise to the premiership was one of the greatest shocks in Turkish political history, sparking much debate over the possibility of a 'return to religion' in Turkey and an undermining of the secular republic¹⁴. Refah shared a number of characteristics with religious movements in general, as analysed by political scientists¹⁵; we shall address two such characteristics which help explain Refah's appeal and rise to power, followed by two which are offered here as insight into political Islam's radical 'change' in perspective on Turkish membership in the EU¹⁶.

¹³ The National Order Party was founded in 1970 and subsequently closed by the Constitutional Court (May 1971) on the basis that it was acting against secularism; the National Salvation Party was created in its place in 1972. Erbakan was, prudently after NOP's closure, not the founder of NSP or Refah Party (Refah was initially established by Ali Turkmen), but he subsequently became the party's leader. The NSP fared well in 1973, and was an indispensable partner in coalition governments in the 1970's. Its closure came with that of all political parties in existence during the military intervention of 1980.

¹⁴ A wealth of literature within the political science and sociology traditions analyses the extent to which Refah's appeal signaled a 're-Islamisation' of Turkish society (a subject which is beyond the scope of this chapter.) See A.Ugur, 'L'ordalie de la democratie en Turquie, le projet "communautaire Islamique" d'Ali Bulac at la laicite'; see also M.Heper, 'Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective'.

¹⁵ The work of several theorists is included in this text. For an outline of the theoretical framework underlying this section, see Stathis Kalyvas, 'Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation'.

¹⁶ The perspectives of Islamist elites outside of political Islam will be included later in the chapter.

First, religious mobilisation tends to be anti-system. This applies to Refah in so far as it did not share the values of the political order within which it operated¹⁷. Many analysts note Refah's attraction of *protest*, rather than specifically *Islamist*, votes¹⁸. Nilufer Narli describes the protest in terms of centre-periphery tensions (with the centre comprised of military officers, senior bureaucrats, notables, and the industrialists)¹⁹. While rapid urbanisation in the 1950's yielded increasing social mobility of the periphery, rural poverty for the most part simply translated into urban poverty: a *new periphery* developed for the economically disadvantaged, culturally disintegrated, and politically isolated. Thus, as with other religious mobilizations, Refah reflected a 'religious' cleavage in so far as it expressed the efforts of dominated actors (peasants and workers), allied with the middle classes (small and medium-sector businessmen, and some bureaucrats and Muslim intellectuals), to contest the hegemony of the ruling elites in the cultural and political field²⁰.

Second (and related to the first point), religious mobilisation tends to have cross-class appeal. According to Haldun Gulalp, Islamism as represented by the Refah Party was a multi-class political movement which 'used class-related issues to promote a

¹⁷ See Rusen Cakir, 'Les mouvements islamistes Turcs et l'Europe', p.19. See also unpublished paper by Nilufer Narli 'Urbanization, Structural Change, and the rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey'.

¹⁸ See Baskin Oran, 'From Nation to where in globalising Turkey'. See also Metin Heper, 'Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective'.

¹⁹ N.Narli, 'The tension between the center and peripheral economy and the rise of a counter business elite in Turkey'.

²⁰ This too is in line with Kalyvas' assessment of religious mobilisation; see Kalyvas, 'Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation', p.305. See also Nilufer Gole, 'Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: the making of elites and counter-elites'. The term 'Muslim intellectual' is used, in academic texts, interchangeably with 'Islamic intellectual', or 'Islamist intellectual'. The term 'Muslim intellectual', as per Meeker's definition, refers to elite figures who, mainly as columnists and essayists, critique republican political and cultural institutions and call for re-Islamization of the way of life of Turkish believers. See M.Meeker, 'The new Muslim intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey', p.189; see also B.Toprak, 'Islamist intellectuals: revolt against industry and technology'.

project of change in lifestyle and to establish its own version of Islamic society'²¹. As political scientist Stathis Kalyvas notes, 'religious parties solve the collective action problem not through abstract religious ideas but through selective incentives'²². Such incentives tend to be based upon provision of local social services (hospitals, clinics, legal-aid societies), sponsoring of economic projects (banks, credit and investment houses, insurance companies), subsidizing education centres (schools, child-care centers, youth camps), and wide networks of religious publishing and broadcasting. It is through such policies that Refah was able to secure the support and involvement especially of the youth, the economically disadvantaged, and businessmen in the small-to-medium sized sectors. According to Nilufer Narli, 'the Islamist groups have met their diverse economic needs by providing food to the needy, and scholarships and hostel to the university students. They have also offered a network to the young graduates looking for jobs, and have provided credit to the shop keepers, industrialists and the merchants'²³.

These points should help us understand Refah's appeal and rise to power. The party had many strengths which other political parties lacked. These are summarized by one scholar as 'money, purpose, and an alternative vision for Turks which has not yet been tested...perhaps Refah's strongest advantage is the increasing ineffectiveness of Turkey's other political parties'²⁴. Writing at the time of Refah's success, the author of this study states as a generally accepted fact that much, if not most, of the party's support was driven by economic rather than ideological reasons. While economic conditions

²¹ H.Gulalp, 'Globalization and political Islam: the social bases of Turkey's Welfare Party', unpublished paper.

²² S.Kalyvas, 'Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation', p.305.

²³ N.Narli, 'The tension between the center and the peripheral economy and the rise of a counter business elite in Turkey', p.61.

²⁴ M.Goksel, 'Islamic Fundamentalism in Turkey', unpublished paper.

regressed for many Turks, and the secular parties failed to address this, the promise of the *Welfare*, or *Prosperity* party was especially appealing. The party had worked actively to set up an infrastructure throughout the country through which it provided for the needs of some of Turkey's poorest, particularly Anatolian peasants, new arrivals to the cities. Furthermore, Refah gave special emphasis to certain critical issues which had long been neglected by other parties, such as corruption, the problems of the urban poor, and the growing lawlessness and social chaos of large Turkish cities. The municipal administrations controlled by the Islamist mayors since the 1994 local elections were generally well-received, particularly because of their effectiveness in curtailing corruption in the city halls and providing municipal services in deprived neighbourhoods²⁵.

A **third** factor common to religion-based movements, relevant to the party's modified policy on Europe, is that ideology is a poor predictor of their behaviour. Metin Heper draws our attention to two related facts: religion is a multi-functional institution, and Islam has been used by different groups for entirely different purposes²⁶. Likewise, Stathis Kalyvas notes that 'religious movements constitute a social and political phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the religions from which they sprang up':

While they emerge in the context of a broad societal diffusion of religious symbols, they do not just mobilize existing religious identities; they reconstruct them by blending religious, social, economic, and political concerns, by synthesizing traditional and modern appeals, and by mixing utopian millenarist messages with concrete political action. In short, these parties are not just an expression of dormant identities; they redefine these identities. In this sense, they are revolutionary and radical not just within the context of the political regimes within which they operate but also, and this is crucial and often overlooked, [even] within the religious structure

²⁵ Sabri Sayari, 'Turkey's Islamist Challenge'. [accessed online]

²⁶ M.Heper, 'Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective', p.346.

they claim to uphold and represent. Indeed, their practice more often than not diverges in significant ways from their religious matrices²⁷.

Accordingly, both Heper and Kalyvas suggest that, rather than examining political Islam's ideology, we should consider its leadership and 'situational factors' such as the cultural, economic, political, and social variables relevant at a given time²⁸. For instance, in the case of Refah's policies it is crucial to understand Erbakan as a *populist* leader, variously nationalistic and anti-national²⁹. Specifically in terms of Refah's traditional anti-Europeanism, one must also consider the fact that Erbakan played on nationalistic reactions--*across* the political spectrum--to the Luxembourg Summit rejection of Turkey.

Finally, a **fourth** element of religious mobilisation, relevant to Refah's changed policy on Europe, is that success depends on a party's willingness or ability to moderate its stances. According to Kalyvas, religion-based parties often face two major decisions. The first decision is *whether* to modify their religious goals in order to operate within a secular and competitive political environment. Kalyvas deems that religious parties are generally willing to moderate their stances because of a number of *electoral* and *non-electoral* constraints: 'Although the rise of new parties (of any kind) tends to be fueled by "antisystem" positions, the realization that power is within reach creates an incentive to moderate so as to appeal to broader sections of the electorate'³⁰. Second, religious parties must decide *how* to moderate. This challenge often leads to a division within the party between traditionalists and modernists.

²⁷ S.Kalyvas, 'Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation', p.303. The reader should be reminded that our focus is on *Islamism* and not on Islam; as Kalyvas notes, 'Islamism diverges from traditional Islam in that it is thoroughly modern in its leadership and organisation and the articulation of its message' (p.303).

²⁸ See M.Heper, 'Islam, polity and society in Turkey: a Middle Eastern perspective', p.347; Kalyvas makes this argument with reference to religious movements *in general* (through a comparison of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and European Christian Democracy).

²⁹ See Sami Zubaida, 'Trajectories of political Islam: Egypt, Iran and Turkey'.

Political Islamist anti-Europeanism and its constraints

In the Turkish case we see both these principles (moderation in response to electoral and non-electoral constraints, and divisions within the movement) through Refah's tendency to moderation, and in its successor party, Fazilet's, split between *traditionalists* and *modernisers*. The traditionalists were led by Recai Kutan. The modernizers were led by Abdullah Gul (and, informally, by Tayyip Erdogan). Since Fazilet was closed in June 2001, the division between modernists and traditionalists has taken institutional form, with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) formed under the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan and the Saadet ('Happiness' or 'Contentment') Party led by Recai Kutan. In light of the above, it is helpful to consider in greater depth the various constraints faced by political Islamism. Accordingly, I now focus on a series of electoral and non-electoral constraints on Refah which may shed light on its change from an anti-European stance to an openly pro-European platform.

Electoral constraints

Our attention to Refah's appeal explains, relatively clearly, the party's steady growth from 1991 to 1995 (from 10% in the 1991 parliamentary elections, 19% of the vote and control of the government of several large cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, in the 1994 municipal elections, to 21% of the vote in the 1995 parliamentary elections—the largest percentage won by any political party). However, Refah's ascendancy to the *premiership*—albeit with this high percentage of the vote—was intricate and shifty. As

³⁰S. Kalyvas, 'Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation', p.309.

one analyst noted at the time, 'the coalition is the product of the cynical opportunism that currently afflicts Turkish society'³¹.

Refah's path from the December 1995 success to leadership of a coalition owed much to the tensions between Tansu Ciller and Mesut Yilmaz before and after the collapse of the former's coalition government in September 1995. Personal-style accusations flowed between the two quite publicly, with Ciller referring to Yilmaz as 'a political disaster', and Yilmaz labelling Ciller 'the worst Prime Minister the Turks have seen'³². In the ensuing parliamentary elections Refah gained a majority of the votes but not enough to rule on its own, whilst Ciller and Yilmaz' parties fell closely behind Refah in terms of number of votes won. President Suleyman Demirel was expected to invite Erbakan to form a government, but the other parties declared they would not enter a coalition with Erbakan because of his anti-western policies. Ciller in particular decried Erbakan's political movement as a threat to Turkish secularism and to the nation's western orientation³³. A coalition between Ciller and Yilmaz' parties was the obvious solution, the two parties having similar platforms. Within three months (by June 1996), the coalition collapsed due to in-fighting and to corruption charges launched against Ciller by Erbakan. With Yilmaz' refusal of a proposed coalition with Erbakan, on the one hand, and Ciller's potential freedom from the corruption charges (pending a Refah

³¹ 'Turkey: new government, continuing uncertainty', in *CSIS Turkey Update*, August 1996. [accessed online]

³² James A. Jackson, 'Shotgun Marriage', *Time International*, Vol.147, No. 12, 18 March 1996 [accessed online]. According to Jackson, 'they accuse each other of corruption, and each has denounced the other as liar and traitor on at least three nationally televised occasions'.

³³ In fact, on her 1995 trip to Europe to plea for fulfilment of the Customs Union with Turkey, Ciller heavily emphasized the danger facing Turkey if Erbakan's anti-Europeanism were encouraged by a rebuff from Europe. She made strong references to 'the fundamentalists' and their 'deceptive attachment to democracy'. See 'Ciller to Europe', *Turkish Daily News*, 3 November 1995. [accessed online]

'no' vote to the investigation's continuation), on the other, the unlikely political marriage between Ciller and Erbakan resulted³⁴.

An examination of the circumstances which led to Refah's ascendancy reveals a change in Erbakan's anti-European rhetoric even before assuming office. This changed perspective dates from the December 1995 parliamentary elections when the party received the largest majority of votes, but not enough to govern on its own. According to one journalist writing on the day after the 1995 parliamentary elections, 'Mr. Erbakan's extravagant anti-western and anti-Zionist rhetoric proved to be far worse than his bite. Even as the election results were coming in, Bahri Zengin, a close advisor, was modifying a pledge to "tear up" a recently approved customs union with the European Union, saying the party would "renegotiate" the deal'³⁵. Thus, Erbakan changed his tone on knowing he would have to form a coalition with at least one of two leading western-leaning opposition groups (The True Path and Motherland Parties).

Non-electoral constraints

As Stathis Kalyvas notes, because many religious parties operate in semi-authoritarian environments, they face heavy non-electoral constraints. Such constraints often come from ruling elites which control, or are closely intertwined with, military establishments: 'When this is the case victorious religious parties will have to moderate

³⁴Furthermore, the corruption charges against Ciller proved an important bargaining chip for Erbakan, as he was able to use it to negotiate his role as Prime Minister for the start of the term, with Ciller serving as Foreign Minister. See 'RP concession to DYP for coalition', *Turkish Daily News*, 19 June 1996. [accessed online]

³⁵ Andrew Finkel, 'Ciller stays as caretaker amid search for coalition', *The Times*, 26 December 1995. [accessed online]

in order to accede to power, otherwise the military will be likely to subvert their victory (and the process of democratisation)³⁶. In the case of Refah, we clearly see how the non-electoral constraints imposed by the National Security Council limited Erbakan's anti-European policies.

During his campaign for the premiership Erbakan had voiced pointed complaints about Turkey's efforts to join the European Union and, in particular, about the Customs Union. He referred to the agreement negotiated by former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller as a 'Frankenstein' which would make Turks 'servants of the infidel' and pledged to destroy it³⁷. Erbakan had long been identifying the European Community as a Christian Club and proposing an Islamic Union and Islamic Common Market in opposition to the EC. Indeed, as expression of both an anti-Europeanism and an intention to turn Turkey's orientation eastward, Erbakan also proposed an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic NATO, and the introduction of an Islamic currency in Turkey³⁸. Furthermore, Refah pledged to cancel *Operation Provide Comfort*³⁹ and Turkey's military arrangements with Israel. Erbakan's actions drew considerable international attention⁴⁰. While in office he only visited Islamic countries such as Iran, Libya and Nigeria. Erbakan's travels to the Middle East were part of his efforts to establish the D-8, a framework for co-operation

³⁶ S.Kalyvas, 'Unsecular politics and religious mobilisation', p.313.

³⁷ Mehmed Ali Kislali and James Wilde, 'Odd couple in power', in *Time International*, Vol.148, No.4, 22 July 1996. [accessed online]

³⁸ James Dorsey, 'European Rebuffs Strengthen Erbakan's dreams of closer Islamic ties', *The Washington Report*, March 1997. [accessed online]

³⁹ The U.S.-led force stationed in southeastern Turkey to protect the Kurds of northern Iraq against the wrath of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. See James Dorsey, 'Erbakan Striking a balance between Islamic neighbours and Secular Army', *The Washington Report*, October 1996. [accessed online]

⁴⁰ To be sure, the United States, rather than the EU, voiced the greatest concerns about Erbakan's politics: 'while Mr. Erbakan's moves appear so far to have put a dent in US efforts to isolate Iran, they have done little to provoke great concern among Europeans already up in arms about US efforts to restrict their trade not only with Iran, but also with Libya'. 'I'm certainly not being flooded with calls from Brussels', stated Alexander Borges Gomez, a senior EU diplomat in Ankara at the time. See J.Dorsey, 'Erbakan Striking a

between eight Islamic countries. The trip to Libya was especially controversial and an embarrassment for Erbakan as, in his press conference with Khaddafi, the latter criticised Turkey for its attitude towards the Kurds and pressed for recognition of an independent Kurdish state.

In the end, Erbakan's only major dealing with the EU was the rejection of an invitation to dine with EU leaders during their February 1997 Dublin summit⁴¹. His explanation was delivered on clearly nationalist lines which were generally well-received in Turkey: Erbakan refused to attend because the dinner was scheduled after the end of the summit, when some of the leaders would have already departed. This invitation was an insult to Turkey: 'Turkey is a powerful country at the centre of the world. The European countries have to review their policies on world affairs and on Islam. That is why we are warning them'⁴². His decision to reject the EU invitation received the support of Ciller at the time and was reinforced by media opinion.

In terms of all other policies related to the EU and 'the West', however, Erbakan's actions while in office were severely restricted by the coalition and by the active role taken by the military-dominated National Security Council in influencing the government. His pledges to cancel *Operation Provide Comfort* (OPC) and to end all agreements with Israel came to nothing. OPC was extended twice during Erbakan's rule, and three additional military-related agreements were signed with Israel. Nor were there

balance between Islamic neighbours and Secular Army', *The Washington Report*, October 1996. [accessed online]

⁴¹ See Ilnur Cevik 'Victory in the East, setbacks in the West', in *Turkish Daily News* 17 December 1996 [accessed online]: according to Cevik, 'Prime Minister Erbakan once gain was proven right with his decision not to attend a dinner given in his honor by the Dublin Summit leaders'. See also Stephen Kinzer, 'Empty seat at dinner signals Turkey's sensitivity over role', in *New York Times*, 11 December 1996. [accessed online]

⁴² Stephen Kinzer, 'Empty seat at dinner signals Turkey's sensitivity over role', in *New York Times*, 11 December 1996. [accessed online]

any moves to cancel European agreements already in progress⁴³. Parallel to these limitations on Erbakan's foreign policy were, of course, those aimed to curb the domestic force of Islamism through the February 28th process (which, as noted in chapter five, led to Erbakan's ousting from power and ban from future political activity).

Questioned sincerity

In view of these limitations –both electoral and non-electoral constraints—it is difficult to judge Erbakan and Refah's true intentions and the extent of their anti-westernness and anti-Europeanness. Most foreign observers and many of the Turkish elites consulted for this study refer to the February 28th process as the turning point in political Islamists' anti-European attitudes⁴⁴. 'They learned their lesson' is one of the most popular of analyses. More cynical views consider the change to be post-February 28th political opportunism: it was the only way to save themselves, as Erbakan rushed to European judicial processes hoping for a reversal of his party's, and his personal, ban from politics.

Takiye is a word of Arabic origin, variously defined as 'presenting yourself as something you are not', or 'hiding your true identity in order to preserve yourself'⁴⁵. The term was used by many of this study's interviewees to explain Turkish Islamists' European orientation. According to Rusen Cakir (respected journalist and specialist on

⁴³ J.Dorsey, 'Erbakan Striking a balance between Islamic neighbours and Secular Army', *The Washington Report*, Oct 1996. [accessed online]

⁴⁴ This and the following section draw on information from over 100 interviews conducted in Turkey with religious and political leaders, scholars, journalists and businessmen, conducted in June, July and September 2000 and May 2001. This section on 'Questioned sincerity' refers to interviews with secular-minded elites, while the next section focuses on religion-minded elites. See Appendix for further details.

⁴⁵ The Arabic spelling is 'takiyye'.

Islamism in Turkey), instead of trying to understand the real causes of this change over the last 10 years, many observers have tried to simplify the issue by considering the change a matter of *takiye*, 'just as they did each time they faced an issue which did not fit the typical Islamist image in their minds'⁴⁶.

Interview research with the Turkish secular-minded elite reveals an acute division on the question of whether the Islamist change in perspective on Europe may be considered sincere. On the one hand, we have lively discussions about the compatibility of Islam with democracy, the benefits Islamists expect European Union membership would bring in terms of enhanced democracy and freedom in Turkey, and their desire to be a bridge between Europe and the East. Relatively more cynical views consider that a change of perspective has indeed taken place, but only through the experiences of the Refah Party as they have realized that they've no other choice but to follow the path of Turkey's Europeanisation – as pursued by the secular elite. On the other hand, though, there is the sentiment within certain segments of Turkish society, and particularly within the hardline secularist political elites⁴⁷, that no sincere change of Islamists' perspectives has taken place: Islam cannot be compatible with democracy, and Turkish Islamists continue to hope and strive toward the establishment of an Islamist state and a return to the *sharia*. Furthermore, Islamists are identified by such individuals as a threat to the secular state and, thus, to Turkey's western and European orientation. Islamists are also, perhaps more poignantly, regarded as a threat to national unity by encouraging division

⁴⁶ R.Cakir, 'The Westernisation process of the Islamists', pp.50- 51. [in Turkish]. In Cakir's estimation, 'takiye' does not apply in this case; rather, Islamists have undergone a sincere alteration in their attitudes towards Europe, unwillingly but necessarily. He contends that Islamists are 'at the very beginning, the first steps towards westernisation'; they defend some general principles, but they cannot support these in detail – only superficially. Cakir believes that, while the outcome of this process is not certain, there will definitely be no traces of classical Islamism.

⁴⁷ Especially the National Security Council.

within society. Selected interviews are referenced below merely to present the broad spectrum of opinion which arose through the research.

As noted above, in accordance with political science theories about religious mobilisation, it is quite logical that Refah would use the strategy of conforming to the Turkish political system and thus drop its anti-European stance, in order to be able to participate in the political process. It also makes sense that once ousted from its leadership role, Refah would be even more emphatically pro-European in order to protect political Islam's right to future existence through other parties. Such *realpolitik* is what many 'secular-minded' Turkish elites attribute the Islamists' changed perspective to. Opinion varies, however, as to exactly when the change came about. Dr. Nilufer Narli states plainly that Fazilet's embracing of Turkish EU membership was a defence mechanism following the 1997 military intervention in politics. According to Professor Nilufer Gole, Islamists began transforming themselves after they were 'ridiculed for their experiment of going to their Muslim brothers' [with reference to Erbakan's trip to Libya]; 'this is realpolitik: encounter with reality changes your ideological stand'. Ambassador (ret.) Cem Duna argues that the Islamists 'changed overnight': they are pro-European today because they realised that democracy is something good for them as well. Professor Metin Heper, on the other hand, takes a broader perspective of the Islamist movement from its earliest political formations to the present, and ascertains that Islamists changed slowly, becoming more secular with each successive political party: 'they saw their parties could not survive as only religion-oriented, so they began providing goods and services...now the religion-oriented party⁴⁸ is no longer anti-system'. Likewise, Professor Halil Berktaş explains in theoretical terms that the closer

doctrinaire parties come to power, the less they can remain doctrinaire, pure and radical—thus also indicating a gradual change.

According to Professor Soli Ozel, Refah learned, or *received*, a precious lesson in 1997; ‘how much of it they actually learned, or are willing to learn, or are able to apply, we don’t know’. This point raises the question of sincerity, or level of sincerity in any case. Nilufer Gole also notes that, though Islamists are transforming themselves, their current, strong pro-Europeanness is not accompanied by any greater degree of preparation for membership: ‘they haven’t thought about what they need to do’. Her stance regarding Islamists’ future co-operation with Europe is cautious: ‘We will see. That’s experimentation’. Nilufer Narli too tempers a comment on the current, overwhelming pro-EU sentiment amongst Islamists by questioning the extent to which they like the EU, or feel comfortable in it⁴⁹. Cem Duna states emphatically that Islamists’ support of EU membership should in no way be interpreted as an indication of their understanding of Europe as ‘the idea’, or of identifying Turkey within that understanding.

According to Ambassador (ret.) Gunduz Aktan’s strict assessment, ‘Islamists want Europe to soften secularism’. Religious groups are *very* pro-EU because they expect enhanced democracy and freedom there, ‘but they don’t want freedom. They have it in Turkey’. ‘They want more’, he argues, citing Erbakan’s earlier stated wish for a dual-legal system as an example. Professor Sule Kut believes that political Islamists have gone through a metamorphosis and indicates that she is not sure ‘whether they have arrived yet’. Like Aktan, though, she places their motives with regards to EU

⁴⁸ Fazilet Party, at the time of the interview.

⁴⁹ This, according to Narli, will take interviews to know. See section below on Islamist elite opinions.

membership into question: 'they have a false consciousness that the EU or ECHR will be their saviours; they think that their religious freedom will be preserved by the EU, but they have this much freedom in Turkey'. Kut cites the headscarf issue as an example, in that France and Germany have also had struggles similar to those in Turkey over government policies on the wearing of headscarves in public spaces (and in schools and universities in particular). Nilufer Narli also chooses the headscarf issue to demonstrate how the Islamists are 'creating a myth': they want the EU for enhanced freedom of religious expression, and think the headscarf issue will be solved, but they are overlooking, for instance, the French experience with the headscarf issue'. It is important to note, however, that many interviewees cited the split in the political Islamist movement between reformers and traditionalists as evidence of a sincere change on the part of the reformers.

Thus we have a range of perspectives as to why the change came about and whether it is sincere. What is important to note is that the overwhelming majority of secular-minded respondents consider the change a direct effect of the February 28th process, rather than a gradual modification of previous stances on Europe as might come with shedding of Islamic orthodoxy or traditionalism. Likewise, the majority consider the change either merely tactical or simply naïve. Again, the prevalence of these sentiments amongst 'mainstream' Turkish elites is especially significant as it is on the basis of mistrust of Islamists' motivations that the National Security Council has continually pursued strict secularist measures—measures which are increasingly identified as anti-democratic and thus barriers to Turkish membership in the European Union.

Islamist perspectives

We will pay considerably more attention here to Islamists' own explanations for their current pro-Europeanness. I shall address both the opinions of individuals formally part of political Islamist movements, and those of other elite figures who identify religion as a primary aspect of their identities. It is significant to note that several individuals consulted for this study objected to a self-distinction of 'religious' or 'secular', stating that they were both religious *and* in support of secular institutions⁵⁰. It must also be emphasised that these are *elite* opinions; many of these interviewees admitted that it is a struggle to convince their 'masses' of their opinions on Europe⁵¹.

Islamists' accounts of their changed perspective also reveal a broad spectrum of opinion, ranging from survivalist attitudes, expressions of a heightened desire for improved democracy, to assertions that the change to pro-Europeanness has been a gradual process, stemming from issues beyond secularist policies. In explaining reasons for the change in political Islamist perspective on EU membership, Abdullah Gul declares that 'we now realize we will have more freedom there than in our own country'. Gul indicates his personal preference for *bilateral* relations with the EU but, 'because democracy and human rights standards are low in Turkey, and because internal

⁵⁰ Such statements came in response to the question 'would you classify yourself as religious or secular?'; certain respondents explained that a *person* cannot be secular, only institutions. Their perspectives on whether Turkish institutions are actually secular, in terms of separation of 'church' and 'state' are addressed below. It should be noted that these interviewees have not identified themselves as Islamists; I have classified them as such here on the basis of the definition of 'Islamist' provided in chapter five.

⁵¹ An ANAR report reveals that, in terms of grassroots support of Turkish membership in the EU, the AKP ranks second to last, above only the Saadet's grassroots support (69 and 56% respectively). See T.Akyol, 'For the love of Europe!'. See also A.Carkoglu, 'Who wants full membership? Characteristics of Turkish public support for EU membership'. But more important to the present analysis is the interaction between a strongly pro-EU political Islamist structure and the Turkish state structure (i.e., the elite and institutional level). For more on Islam at the grassroots level, see Mehmet Tokay, *Islamic Identity and Development*.

dynamism is not, and will not be, sufficient to bring about the necessary changes, we are obliged to join'. For his part, Tayyip Erdogan admits that he, in line with the Refah Party, was against membership in the EC/EU because of the perceived religious prejudice coming from Europe. 'But now, especially for universal rights, human rights, democracy, freedoms, rule of law, freedom of finance, I no longer think so'. Together these two political Islamist opinions are representative of the new pro-Europeanness within political Islam: a negative, defensive and survivalist attitude with regard to the Turkish internal political situation; a positive embrace of European democracy; and an explicit shelving of previous anti-European feeling which was based on a sense of prejudice coming from Europe⁵².

Islamists outside the realm of politics also offer their considerations of how and why political Islam changed its stance on Europe, ranging from sympathetic to very critical. According to journalist Fehmi Koru, 'February 28th' changed political Islam, but Erbakan's current pro-Europeanism, and that of Islamists in general, is the result of a *process*. First, Erbakan was against the EU because it was a kind of Christian Club, and was afraid that with membership, Muslims would somehow 'lose ground', and Christian missionaries would be all around; 'but without Turkey's membership, Turkey has become as such' [i.e., with Muslims losing ground and infiltrated by Christian missionaries]. Second, according to Koru, Erbakan's previous anti-European stance stemmed from his fear that the Turkish economy would be negatively affected; 'but this is not the case, and I think he realised this'. Other 'religious' perspectives present a

⁵² For academic studies on the potential effects of EU membership on Turkey's human rights provisions, see Bertil Duner and Edward Deverell, 'Country cousin: Turkey, the European Union and human rights', and I.Dagi, 'The politics of promoting human rights: Turkey and western diplomacy', unpublished paper.

relatively harsh assessment of political Islam's change. According to Tayyar Altikulac⁵³, Refah's pro-Europeanism stems clearly from the electoral constraints faced by Erbakan in his efforts to form a governing coalition with Ciller. Refah's change in perspective 'has nothing to do with the February 28th process' but can be understood, rather, as political convenience: 'they dropped their anti-EU stance...in order to open more political space for themselves. These are political manoeuvres'. All parties more or less misuse religion, contends Altikulac, and they see that nobody gained from this; 'the party which misused religion the most got the worst lesson. I think Turkey lived this process and it came to an end'. Likewise, journalist and Muslim intellectual Kazim Gulecguz takes a critical stance on Refah's motivation for change. The most hard-line opposition to EU membership was from Refah voters, he notes, and now even they want to join: 'we believe the Refah party interpreted religion wrongly. They saw democracy as a means, not an end. After February 28th, they learned the true value of democracy. They ended up fighting in European courts after their party's closure. People have understood that we are in a world of globalisation. We can exist in the world with the Islamic culture'. The most critical stance against Refah and its intentions, though, comes from Alevi spokesman Izzetin Dogan: 'they were against Europe, tried to establish an Islamic common market, etc., and *now*, if they seemed to change, their idea is not a sincere change. Because in Europe and in the EU, they will have the opportunity for a much more liberal expression of their ideas and, once they come to power, they will say "it's until here...now we will create our own [Islamic] federation"'.

These opinions are noteworthy especially for two reasons. First, for the varying degrees of explicit self-distancing from political Islam. Second, for the *diversity* of

⁵³ Former director of *Diyamet* and ex-MP for the True Path Party (DYP).

opinion we see here—which discourages generalisations about Turkish Islamists. As Peter Berger notes, we must be sensitive to differences amongst Islamists, often stemming from Sunni and Shiite distinctions, but also within each of these traditions: ‘Where the political circumstances allow it, there is a lively discussion about the relationship of Islam to various modern realities, and there are sharp disagreements between individuals who are equally committed to a revitalised Islam’⁵⁴. This clearly applies to Turkish Islamist stances on political Islam, as well as to their perspectives on Europe, as we shall see below.

In explaining their own reasons for their pro-EU stances, in general we see aspects of both realism and ideology in Islamists’ views. Ali Bayramoglu⁵⁵ reflects a realistic standpoint: ‘there are problems in Turkey, such as limitations of freedom and Article 312. These problems make some, especially intellectuals, think that Turkey will not be able to change these laws. But if we join the EU, we will be able to make these changes more easily. Those who are pro-EU are so first for economic reasons, and second for solving democratic problems’. Journalist Bulent Kaner, displaying a more ideologically-based view, identifies both an awakened need for greater democracy and other factors for changed Islamist perspectives on Europe. He contends that the February 28th process was an important element, influential in terms of teaching the Islamic circles the importance of democracy; ‘before February 28th, Islamic communities had not encountered a real danger to themselves’. But, whilst a very strong factor in the change, Kaner argues that it is a *social process*: ‘we saw the realities of the world. As religious

⁵⁴ Peter Berger, ‘Secularism in retreat’, p.43.

⁵⁵ At the time of the interview, General Director of MUSIAD (Independent Industrialist’s and Businessmen’s Association, considered the Islamist equivalent of the politically influential TUSIAD, Turkish Industrialist’s and Businessmen’s Association).

groups became increasingly active in political, economic, and social circles in Turkey and made real contact with the Turkish system, they had to leave behind the utopia in which they were living'. Speaking specifically on the popular and now global Islamic group to which he belonged, the Gulen Cemaat, Kanes explains that, 'they saw the US, Europe, saw the importance of democracy in those countries and the vision of these people'.

The Fethullah Gulen group was, indeed, one of the first Turkish Islamist groups to openly change from anti-European to pro-European attitudes. This has to do with, as mentioned by Kanes, the relatively greater international exposure of the group. Still, two members of a Fetullah Gulen-based Journalists' and Writers' Association express reasons for their pro-European stances mostly related to secularist-Islamist tensions *within* Turkey. Mustafa Armagan communicates his hopes for broader horizons for Turks: someone who has established himself in Germany has a better position than him because of education and opportunities. Instead, in Turkey he has been subjected to structural violence, constrained and victimized, and thus restricted in his ability to contribute more to humanity. Cemal Ussak, the Association's director, states similar reasons for his wish for Turkish membership in the European Union: 'the EU means for me to live my religion privately and freely. But in Turkey, people do not feel free. I feel more free as a Muslim in Germany, so how can I be anti-EU? What is important is to live as a Muslim, freely'.

The Nurcu group lays even earlier claims to pro-Europeanness⁵⁶. Offering a voice representative of the Nurcu perspective, Kazim Gulecguz cites the ideas of Said-I Nursi, the founder of the Nurcu group: 'Said-I Nursi says there are two Europes. The first, the Christian Europe, leads Europeans to promote human rights and justice. The

second Europe is extreme secularism without any beliefs. We love the first Europe. According to us, there is no problem from a religious perspective. We are open to the world’.

Thus pro-Europeanism is not a purely post-February 28th phenomenon for all religious elites⁵⁷. It is, however, in contrast with the general anti-Europeanism which existed in the past amongst Islamist groups in Turkey. When asked how Islamists reconcile their past anti-Europeanism with their current views, Armagan cautions us to distinguish between facts and ideology. The *fact* is that, considering the Turkish communities living in Germany, Islamists have no problem going to Europe. Ideologically, though, they may have a negative view, because of historical prejudices: relations with Europe were a central component in the construction of Turkish national identity (as is the case with European identity formed in relation to Turkey). ‘There is, then’, he argues, ‘a fundamental conflict between ideology and facts’. Furthermore, such a negative prejudice against Europe reigned in Turkey especially in the 1970’s and 80’s; ‘in the 80’s and 90’s Europe presented itself freely and technologically. Europe has changed, and Turkey has changed’. Armagan considers the reduction in tension against the EU in general, and within political Islam specifically, proof that the ideological approaches are being replaced by factual developments—developments which, he posits, can be explained by secularisation-modernisation theories.

Ali Bulac, a renowned Muslim intellectual, accounts for past Islamist anti-Europeanism in terms of reaction to a religious prejudice coming *from* Europe: ‘before,

⁵⁶ The Fethullanci are a splinter group of the Nurcu. See chapter five.

⁵⁷ The discussion of ‘liberal Islam’ beyond the Turkish case, including the compatibility of Islam with democracy and with European norms is vast, and beyond the scope of this chapter. For a brief introduction, see C.Kurzman, ‘Liberal Islam: Prospects and challenges’.

the Germans—especially the Christian Democrats—were the governing part of the EU, and they see the EU as a Christian Club’. This, Bulac emphasises, provides the main reason for past anti-Europeanism amongst Islamists—perceptions that the EU is exclusive. But because ‘Turkey is very top in suppression of religion’, Islamists have begun to see the EU as a community in which religious freedom is protected (Bulac uses the example of freedom for women to wear the headscarf in European universities). However, the change in perspective also has to do with globalisation and the greater interconnectedness of people in general, and with economics: ‘we want to grow economically with Europe. Muslim business too is suppressed⁵⁸. ‘Muslim business’ is restricted in its investments in Turkey, according to Bulac, which leads Islamists to invest elsewhere. Turkish economic and judicial systems are hard to change, Bulac declares; membership in the EU will help bring about change.

Others explain past anti-European sentiment with reference to the even longer history of antagonism between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe. Ahmet Helvacı, secretary general of MUSIAD, says this past cannot be forgotten easily, neither by Turks, ‘nor by Europeans, considering their history books’. Religion plays an important role in this historical prejudice. Furthermore, he states apologetically, ‘it was not easy for Turkey, especially for those Turks who think of Ottoman times as our glory days, it was not easy for them to accept the superiority of Europeans. They were thinking again, as in the past, Europeans will dominate us’. This is not a nationalistic feeling, he argues; ‘it’s just that at one time we were shaping European history, now we are in the palm of [Europe’s] hand, a pawn in [Europe’s] game. Because the Ottoman Empire’s

⁵⁸ During the interview Bulac brought up the case of the Kombasa Holding Company’s owner who publically vowed to supply the Turkish government with the necessary funds to pay off IMF debts ‘if you

confrontation with Europe was not just economic and political but had cultural and religious dimensions as well'. Still, he concludes by saying that the change in Islamists' perspective was inevitable, for social, economic and cultural reasons. Professor Ahmet Davutoglu also explains past Islamist anti-Europeanism first in terms of the long historical imagination that Europe tried to colonise Turkey, and second as an expressed desire for national sovereignty, for 'a strong Turkey, independent of foreign intervention'. Religion is part of this, he argues, but not the only reason. As insight into current Islamist pro-Europeanism, Davutoglu gives details of such social, economic and cultural reasons as Helvaci may have been referring to: the new perspective, he argues, stems from three facts. First, Turkish Muslims have suffered a great deal under several anti-religious practices, and have grown to see secularism as 'another religion'. Second, Islamists think that in Europe there will be more freedom (also citing the headscarf issue as an example). Third, Muslims today, unlike in the 50's and 60's, are not confined to small, closed communitarian groups. Muslim businessmen are traveling all over the world, and want to have a direct path into Europe. Current Islamists, Davutoglu emphasises, also include intellectuals who want to have enhanced connections with Europe and all over the world, and who seek a more global rather than a local approach.

Three of the main criticisms launched by the secular-minded elite with reference to Islamists' pro-Europeanism are that they are creating a myth (especially with their expectations related to the headscarf); that Islamists are blatantly insincere and have not changed fundamentally to become more open; and that they are naïve (not really knowing, or not having really thought through what membership entails). We have seen,

take away restrictions from us' (in Bulac's words).

thus far, information in support of the first criticism, through interviewees' frequent references to the headscarf issue in their explanations of their pro-European feeling.

With reference to the second major criticism launched by secular-minded elites—that no real change amongst Islamists has taken place—the views offered by two Islamists could *perhaps* be considered to support this claim. Both Fehmi Koru and Nazli Ilicak⁵⁹ explain that a major motivation for Islamist pro-Europeanism is the thought that EU membership will provide Islamists with the chance to 'expand themselves' in Europe. For example, with reference to his statement noted earlier about Christian missionaries proliferating in Turkey, Koru states:

[B]ut this without the benefit of Muslim movement in Europe. Membership means many Muslims will also have the position to affect European minds...Muslims can adapt to new circumstances. We have 2 million Muslims living in Germany, and they are more religious than they would be in Turkey now. Some discovered religion *there*, in Europe. And they live freely. So there is no real obstacle in the minds of Muslims to becoming a member of the EU⁶⁰.

Meanwhile, Nazli Ilicak says that Turkey is already culturally attacked, by European and US films. Thus membership 'will not change things religiously.' On the contrary, she adds, 'it will give us the opportunity to spread'. In fact, she goes further to declare: 'we think that we will dominate. First, we have a strong army. Second, Turks can work for less money, but make more money. There will be no cultural threat, and it will give us the opportunity to spread there'.

With reference to the third criticism—concerning naïveté with regards to EU membership—Islamist elites were asked if they felt membership might threaten Turkish

⁵⁹ Part of the 'reformist' wing of the former Fazilet Party, and one of the two Members of Parliament which was convicted, with the Party, for posing a threat to the secular state.

Islamic values. According to Tayyar Altikulac, there are Turks who feel they will lose their values if Turkey enters the EU, an observation which leads him to identify religion as the primary obstacle to Turkey's membership in the EU. But he proceeds to state his own view that 'this should not be, and is not, an obstacle. Europeans have unnecessary doubts and don't express them openly'⁶¹. And on the Turkish side, there is no foundation to their concern: if you want to lose your values, even now, you can easily do so.' He feels, rather, that Turkey will benefit from entering the EU. Abdullah Gul also holds the view that membership represents no threat to Turkish Islamic identity. The EU, according to Gul, is secular: 'they don't involve in your religion and religious activities. That's good. That's enough.' As for loss of Muslim identity, he posits that 'you cannot prevent something by keeping yourself out. Islam is broad, and is not against science or development. With freedom to educate oneself, you can keep your own identity'. The EU does not want us to change our religion, notes Tayyip Erdogan, 'it is not one of the criteria. We as individuals can be a part of any kind of society with our belief'. Turkish Muslims do not have a problem with integration, but in terms of assimilation, that becomes hard. If Europe wants to go through assimilation, there will be a problem.' But, citing the example of the UK, integrated in the EU but opting out of the monetary union, Erdogan notes 'there's no negative thinking about the UK.' Asked whether he expected 'negative thinking' from the EU towards Turkey for the latter's resistance to assimilation in some respects, Erdogan asserts: 'we haven't yet solved our integration problems; assimilation will come later'.

⁶⁰ Koru, at this point in the interview, was not expressing his own opinion, but elucidating his perception of the bulk of Islamist pro-Europeanism.

⁶¹ Altikulac states, earlier in the interview, that Europeans are afraid to have a Muslim member state in the EU.

These opinions may perhaps be considered naïve, if only in their optimism, or, in Erdogan's case, in the deferment of certain crucial questions to do with assimilation. Other interviewees, however, express well thought-out concerns about ways membership may jeopardize their interests as practicing Muslims. For example, Cemal Ussak feels that EU membership does not present a threat to Islamic identity, but it may negatively affect Turkish family values. Mustafa Armagan believes that there will be some conflict in the sphere of religion if Turkey joins the EU: 'in Europe, religion is well-established in the social sphere; in Turkey, there is a vacuum here. If Turkey enters the EU, it will be difficult to fill this vacuum'. Abdurrahman Dilipak⁶² is much more explicit in his concerns: 'There will be problems. I am concerned about our souls, because the European way of life, sex, drugs, etc. will definitely come here. These problems are contagious, and I'm not sure that they will be controlled if they come to a society like Turkey'. Yet he proceeds to declare that he is not opposed to membership in the EU, stating that Islam is open to the world: 'Islam wants to express itself within other religions...Islam is for peaceful coexistence, pluralism, etc.'. 'But', he admits, 'not all the Muslims today think the same way'.

Also important with reference to the question of Islamists' naïveté are the serious reservations expressed by certain interviewees, as well as openly ambivalent stances, on EU membership. Muslim intellectuals Ali Bulac and Ahmet Davutoglu present their carefully-measured critiques of the EU. For Bulac, there is a critical problem in that 'European democracy is not culturally plural. There is political pluralism, but not cultural'. If cultural pluralism cannot be established in institutional terms, Bulac

⁶² Journalist for far-right newspaper *Akit* and well known in Turkey for his strictly conservative perspectives.

declares, 'we will be administered by Brussels, and I am very afraid of this. With such a big state, what will happen to the little people, to the civilians?' Bulac expresses his clear dislike of trends towards 'the standardisation of everything...which leads people to be like social puppets. We have to keep our freedom to have a critical view against the technocrats and the bureaucrats who define these standards'. Davutoglu is also resistant to such domination by the EU: 'A self-confident Muslim is not afraid of interaction with Europe. But a two-way relationship must be established. Such a relationship cannot exist when Turkey feels a passive follower of a Euro-centric development'. The important thing, argues Davutoglu, is 'our dignity—we can't sacrifice our own values, and culture, in our relations. We would prefer dignity rather than wealth'.

The most extreme expression of reservations comes from Abdurrahman Dilipak. Dilipak declares that he 'cannot say yes or no at the moment' to Turkish membership in the EU: 'It depends on the conditions of accession. The economic, political and cultural freedoms prevalent in European countries is desirable. But it depends on whether these conditions will be put in front of Turkey as well'. Dilipak has considerable doubts as to whether this will be the case: 'Turkey's Islamic identity creates some problems, because Islam is not only a creed, but a whole civilisational philosophy. The problem is to see whether Europe and its institutions can cope with this civilisation and with those institutions. Many of the values and beliefs that have existed in Europe will be shaken totally when they enter into contact with Islam'. This belief leads him to the defensive conclusion that

[T]hat's what stands behind the pressure on Turkey which they [the EU] impose (eg., measures against compulsory religious courses in schools, the problems at universities with headscarves)—these are attempts to create a mosque like a church, an imam like the priest, a Koran like the

Bible, finally, a Muslim like the Christian. So the thing is, whether we will accept this project or not. Carrot or stick?

Thus, while he states that he is not against EU membership for Turkey, neither does he desire membership specifically for the improvement of human rights, democracy, etc, 'because I don't trust that the Europeans will provide that'. Dilipak's mistrust of Europe is extensive, and he outlines two ways in which he believes Europe is less than honest with Turkey. First, he argues that the factories 'they' build in Turkey are those they would not build in their own countries [for reasons of pollution]: 'My fear is that we will be like a bad guy of Europe'. Second, Turkey will not fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria because 'they want it not to fulfil the criteria'⁶³. The reason, which Dilipak finds justified, has to do with Turkey's large population: 'if the visa is abolished, any Anatolian will take the rings off his wife's fingers, sell them, and go to Bonn, Paris, wherever, will find a German or French woman and settle there'. There are certain risks involved for both sides, he argues: the Turkish mafia, for instance, would surpass the Italian one; and the degree of freedom which exists in Europe would not be good for Turkey in things like prostitution. Accordingly, Dilipak concludes that 'at the moment Europe is not ready for us, and we're not ready for Europe'.

The vastly diverse perspectives of Turkish Islamists preclude any simple conclusions about their current pro-European attitudes, including when the change in perspective came about, what its decisive motivating factors were, and—most importantly—the degree of its sincerity. Much room is left for interpretation. For

⁶³ Dilipak refers here to the criteria for EU membership established at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. Beyond certain financial criteria (a functioning market economy), the Copenhagen Criteria include the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

instance, the different degrees of pro-Europeanness may either be interpreted as difficulty for some Islamists in embracing Europe (whether for 'religious' or cultural reasons), or as reflection of honest and healthy critical thinking (as exists within 'secular' perspectives on Europe as well). What is, however, much less ambiguous is the tension between secularists and Islamists over the role of each in national-EU relations. Below I address the views of both secular and religion-minded elites in Turkey on secularist-Islamist tensions in Turkey and how these affect Turkey's place vis-a-vis the European Union.

Which is the greater barrier—Islamism or secularism in Turkey?

Currently there is a great deal of debate and uncertainty in Turkey as to what is more important to the European Union with regards to Turkey's accession: limitation of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, or democracy (which would entail curbing the military's role in politics, and guaranteeing religious freedoms). According to Metin Heper, 'A marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be consummated if the radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and set of values upon the Islamists, and if the latter do not attempt to undermine by word or deed the basic tenets of the secular democratic state in Turkey'⁶⁴. Reflection on the current situation in Turkey, however, reveals that Islamists are not visibly trying to undermine the secular democratic state of Turkey. Thus, a more precise proposition is that the attainment of true democracy in Turkey, and, by extension, of EU membership, is contingent on two things: whether, indeed, the Islamist groups are embracing democracy as sincerely as

⁶⁴ Quoted by John Esposito in 'Islam and secularism in the Twenty-first century', p.7.

they claim to be; and whether the military-led secularist elites are sincere in their motives behind their militant secularist policies.

The views of Ozdem Sanberk⁶⁵ and Professor Sencer Ayata are representative of the perspective that restraint of Islamists has been crucial, thus far, for Turkey's progress towards EU membership. According to Sanberk:

Despite secularism, or perhaps because of secularism, Turkey can join a secular, but of strong religious identity, institution such as the EU⁶⁶. Religion in Turkey, except the political religion, has become an element of stability, and conservatism—it is not destructive. Through the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the secular state has adopted a new approach to conciliation between religion and secularism in a peaceful way. Until Erbakan, who resisted the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. He was forced out of the system because for him, religion was so dominant, or orthodox, that he enhanced religious identity above the other identities. Europe will accept the Muslim religion; it is open to differences. But Erbakan...always rejected such right to difference. Here religion has played a negative role: Erbakan caused major damage in creating a polarity between secularists and Islamists in Turkey. Thus, the paradox is that the military intervention made Helsinki possible. Today, Erbakan enters this synthesis family, to recuperate his political rights. Takiye. Now Islamists are very pro-EU, and the secularists started to say Europe will divide us.

Likewise, Sencer Ayata declares:

If the Welfare [Refah] Party was in power during the time of the Helsinki Summit, I wouldn't give Turkey a chance. It was mainly through the influence of the military, and other factors, which curbed the influence of the Welfare Party. Otherwise I don't think it would have been possible for Turkey to have been included among the 13 candidates. However, now we have a different story: now the military itself is seen as some sort of obstacle to Turkey's integration to the EU. But without this sort of counter-attack by the secularist forces, which include mainly the military,

⁶⁵ President of the politically influential Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV).

⁶⁶ This phrase is, in my view, indicative of a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the role of religion in Turkey-EU relations: the EU is thought to be simultaneously 'secular' and 'of strong religious (i.e., Christian) identity', and Turkey is thought to be compatible with the EU either *in spite of* its secularism (because its secularism distinguishes it from an EU with a 'strong religious identity'), or *because of* its secularism (since the EU, too, is secular). In other words, at least part of the ambiguity stems from somewhat contradictory views of what the EU itself stands for (i.e., whether it is 'secular' or 'of strong religious identity').

I don't think that Turkey would have a chance. So it's a very paradoxical situation: on the one hand, the EU and Europe is extremely critical of the military, its role in Turkish society, in politics, but on the other hand, without the military, with another party in power, Turkey would have no chance.

We find resonance with this opinion even amongst certain Islamists. Izzetin Dogan's viewpoint, as representative of the Alevis, is, to a certain extent, to be expected⁶⁷: 'Europe does not understand the Turkish Army's position well: without its intervention, an occidental type of democracy cannot survive. No other political force, besides the army, would have been able to prevent Erbakan's access, in his efforts to create an Islamic state'. Kazim Gulecguz, as well, shows understanding, albeit reserved, of such secularist measures. 'We do not agree with the secular approach of the government', he declares, 'which sees religion as a threat'. However, the military interventions were *provoked* by what he terms 'mistakes': 'Refah used religion for political purposes, and Gulen tried to capture the state from inside by planting people with the ideology in key positions'. Whilst most Islamist interviewees expressed some criticism of Erbakan and Refah, such sympathetic attitudes towards military interventions against political Islam were rare.

Where most opinion does converge—from interviews with both 'secular-minded' and 'Islamist' interviewees—is in the recognition of what Sandberk and Aktan (amongst others) term an 'ultimate irony' or paradox: that is, the traditionally pro-western and pro-European Turkish governing structure's unwillingness (*not simply inability*) to conform to European standards and implement the Copenhagen Criteria. Turkish nationalism is the reason most commonly cited for this state of affairs—and linked to this, of course, the

strength of the military in Turkish politics. More cynical views consider the government's unwillingness to conform to European demands as part of their efforts to protect their own positions of power. For the civilian leaders, this entails maintaining national sovereignty in its most benign forms, and at its worst, simply trying to preserve the current lack of transparency which masks the corruption underlying the Turkish political structure. For the military leaders, this resistance to conformity with EU requirements is a more visible protection of their positions of strength in Turkish politics, which would be necessarily limited by EU membership. This much is clear through anti-EU statements made (and often retracted) publicly by military officials.

Some of the harshest criticism comes, of course, from Islamists. And through this criticism we see responsibility variously placed on the civil, military, or economic elite. One interviewee declares: 'there are two powers in Turkey—political and military. Politicians make promises to Europe, but at home they have to deal with the military, which doesn't want to allow fulfilment of their promises. This is the problem: not religion, but the battle between these two powers. They just use religion as a scapegoat'⁶⁸. According to Ali Bulac, certain leaders in political circles are against the EU, because they are afraid of losing their 'shares' of power. Bulac also lays blame on the economic giants of Turkey. According to Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey is required to have a liberal economy, 'but in Turkey the big capital does not want the EU; the big capitalists do not support membership because they have become so with the support of the state, and they are afraid of big competition'. Small businesses, however, desire EU membership; and, in the Turkish case, the big capitalists are more secular, and the

⁶⁷ See chapter five, which outlines Alevi-Sunni tensions; Refah was representative of 'mainstream' Sunni Islam in Turkey.

smaller, middle class business is religious, 'so it's very interesting'. Analyzing the programme of TUSIAD specifically, Bulac says tellingly that 'they want the EU *with support of the state*'⁶⁹. For his part, Mustafa Armagan spreads the blame evenly across the secular elite: 'a majority of Turks are pro-EU, but a small group of power-holders try to stop membership because their influence would be damaged. Now they benefit from their opportunities. We cannot generalise about all politicians, bureaucrats, military, but within each, such a *section* exists, and this section does not want transparency'. Armagan cites as an example a privilege which the military stands to protect in thwarting EU membership: in the case of dismissal from the military, there is currently no legal recourse for challenging this decision, 'but the EU wouldn't allow this'.

Closely intertwined with such criticisms are complaints about the insincerity of the secularist elites' concern about 'reactionaryism'. The findings of a recent POLAR Institute Survey, conducted at a time when the military was pinpointing reactionaryism as a primary threat to the Turkish Republic, are quite interesting: reactionaryism was ranked *sixth* of eight top national concerns, after economy, crime, political instability, traffic, and human rights and democracy⁷⁰. It is true that we cannot be certain of Islamists' sincerity either, in their pro-democracy and pro-EU expressions. But it is worthwhile to consider Turkish Islamists' own judgement that the possibility of a democracy in Turkey along the lines of the reforms demanded by the EU depends upon whether the harsh policies driven by the Turkish secularist elite are actually based on a

⁶⁸ The interviewee wished to remain anonymous.

⁶⁹ I assume Bulac means that TUSIAD's loyalty lies with the Turkish state first, even when the latter exhibits tendencies against EU membership.

⁷⁰ POLAR Institute Survey, 'The Report of the Evolution of the First Half Year of 2000', of August 2000.

true concern about reactionaryism and separatism, or are rather motivated by other agendas.

In conclusion, let us return to our starting point -- Richard Tapper's observation of the 'rarely articulated role' of the fear of Islam, now shared by many Turks, in determining Turkey's relations with the EU. Crucially at issue here is what John Esposito explains: 'Secular presuppositions which inform our academic disciplines and outlook on life, our Western secular worldview, have been a major obstacle to our understanding and analysis of Islamic politics and have contributed to a tendency to reduce Islam to fundamentalism and fundamentalism to religious extremism'⁷¹. We clearly see this tendency at play in the Turkish context; and, in light of the diversity we have observed within Islamist opinion, including serious criticisms of political Islam, we should, I contend, take into account the Islamists' strong critique of the secularist elites' use of the 'reactionaryism' argument as the motivation for strict and anti-democratic policies. Fehmi Koru complains that

they [secularist elites] don't have any idea that people with different identities should be recognised as such. Turkey has been seeking modernity for the last 200 years, with modernity including a positivism against anything religious. But modernity has changed, and leaves space for spirituality, and positivism is replaced with morality. So our modernisers were in favour of modernity when modernity was defined by positivism. But when modernity has become different, their attitude was also changed.

Religion, Koru argues, is supposedly not at issue here, but reactionaryism, or fundamentalism:

Until the February 28th process, they made a real distinction between religion and reactionaryism or fundamentalism, and never did anything to give the assumption that religion is equitable with reactionaryism. But *now* it's a mixture of everything. When they talk of reactionaryism

⁷¹ John Esposito, 'Islam and secularism in the Twenty-first century', p.10.

or fundamentalism, some people also take it up as a matter of religion itself...if you are Muslim, you are by definition reactionary and fundamentalist, calling for *sharia* or an Islamic state. If you are a graduate from a religious school, you are a traitor. These things are *very* new...

Through Koru's explanation, we find two especially noteworthy points. First, the view that the February 28th process was a turning point for the *hard line secularists'* attitudes towards Islamism: he notes that the National Security Council has existed since 1961, but was never as powerful as it has been since 1997 (from which point it has become the 'heart of the state system'). According to the Turkish Constitution, the NSC it is a consultative body, 'but now it is a body giving orders to the government, parliament, and judiciary. Why I don't know. But of course, EU membership will mean civilian control of the army, and maybe they're taking precautions so it won't happen'. Second, Koru's statement draws attention to the grey area between the secularist elites' conceptions of reactionaryism and pursuit of their own agendas far beyond any concern about Islamism. Thus, in efforts to explain *why* the NSC has acted as it has since February 28th, Koru offers the following: 'because with more democratic rights, people will have the upper hand in every matter. But in our tradition, hundreds, maybe a thousand people, decide everything. They will lose this, and true democracy will make these people redundant. And they are afraid of this. How to stop this? Going away from the EU...this is the current trend'.

Bulent Kaner also launches complaints against the 'misperceptions of the army and the deep state': 'they use marginal, very fundamentalist Islamic groups to accuse all Islamic communities'. In Islamic circles, he argues, there are no reservations about EU membership. Accordingly, Kaner deduces, 'the problem is not Islam or laicism or

democracy. The problem is that some hegemon in Turkey don't want to share power—political, economic, cultural hegemon protecting their positions'.

Overwhelmingly, the most commonly stated view amongst the Islamist interviewees is that the Turkish version of secularism is in need of revision. The specific *type* of Turkish secularist policy is the target of an increasingly vocal Islamist elite—not, one must note, the concept of a secular Turkish state. 'It is not secularism', is one of the most common assessments one encounters. The mere existence of the national Directorate of Religious Affairs, the *Diyanet*, is often cited as problematic in and of itself. But beyond political formalities, what is clearly most troubling to the Turkish Islamist elite is the governing elites' tendency to treat secularism as a religion itself. This has led the bulk of Islamist elites to emphatically call for European, or Anglo-Saxon, types of secularism. It has also led many to hope that EU membership will bring about a 'true' secularism in Turkey—a true separation of 'church' and state, rather than subordination of the former to the latter. According to Tayyip Erdogan,

our serious problem in Turkey is the difference between perceptions of secularism in Turkey and in Europe. Secularists in Turkey think they *own* secularism. I see two kinds of secularism: that of those in power now, and the European kind of secularism. We accept secularism from a European perspective, Anglo-Saxon, but not the one in Turkey. In Turkey, religion and the state are not differentiated right now, as they say. Religion is under the control of the state, and this gives birth to many problems. If Turkey enters the EU, the solution to this problem will come quicker.

Tayyar Altikulac, a former director of *Diyanet*, voices similar wishes: 'Turkey cannot continue in the path of the EU with the current policy concept of secularism. We must update this current system of secularism. Here, religion is completely under state rule'. Citing more specific problems linking EU membership to Turkish secularism, Altikulac

explains that 'the government's anti-EU politics play a great role in the choosing of officials for the words which will be spoken in religious services. It is impossible for Turkey to enter the EU with the current structure of religious services and the religious education system. The Turkish state claims to be secular, so it should change and act in accordance with the European system'. Islam and democracy, Mustafa Armagan argues, are not incompatible. But 'the way secularism is interpreted and practiced in Turkey, in the extent to which this influences Turkish democracy, affects Turkey's relations with the EU in a negative way'.

Conclusion

These are fitting words with which to close our assessment of the role played by religion in Turkey-EU relations. It is not possible to know, with any degree of certainty, the sincerity behind Turkish Islamists' current pro-Europeanism, nor that behind secularists' strict policies which stand in contradiction to EU democratic standards. There is no simple solution to this cyclical debate. But what emerges through consideration of the debate is that the tension between Turkish Islamists and secularists is, itself, incompatible with European norms and thus poses a significant barrier to Turkey's membership in the EU—only not a barrier testable in a clear manner through the Copenhagen Criteria.

We have seen in this chapter that the Islamists' 'change' to pro-Europeanism, and contemporary relations between 'secularists' and 'Islamists' are very much shaped by the historical relationship between religion and national identity in Turkey, and by the

tensions between religion and state which this relationship bred. As we saw in the previous chapter, since the establishment of the modern Turkish nation in particular, there has been a fundamental conflict in Turkey over the place of religion in state and society. The February 28th process, its 'legacies', and current Islamist pro-Europeanism are all part of a continued struggle over the place of Islam in Turkish state and society. Potential membership in the EU largely shapes the interests of Islamists and secularists in this struggle. And, as we have seen above, the conflict between their interests affects Turkey's place in the EU, because this conflict breeds undemocratic developments (such as political party closures, purges of religious individuals from state institutions, etc.).

The sum of interviews reveals a significant ambiguity reigning in the Turkish political scene: is strict secularism *necessary* for EU membership, or is its anti-democratic manifestation a barrier to EU membership? This ambiguity is perhaps a reflection of that which emanates from the EU itself. On the one hand, the EU promotes an expansion of human rights provisions and, with reference to Turkey, has specifically condemned Turkish undemocratic policies toward religion. In a recent draft report on Turkey's application for EU membership, an EU Parliamentary Committee declared: 'the underlying philosophy of the Turkish state, "Kemalism", implies an exaggerated fear...an important role for the army, and a very rigid attitude to religion, which means that this underlying philosophy is itself a barrier to EU membership'⁷². On the other hand however, it remains remarkably unclear (within but also beyond Turkey) whether the EU

⁷² The Committee's full title is 'European Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. The 'Draft Report on Turkey's application for membership of the EU' was issued on 12 March 2003. Quite notably, after many complaints on the matter within Turkey, references to Kemalism were removed in the final report (issued in May 2003). The final text does, however, refer to the army as an obstacle to Turkish democratization. See 'European parliament committee says army obstacle to democratisation', *Turkish Daily News*, 14 May 2003, and European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (<http://www.abhaber.com/pdf2/oostlanderrapor.pdf>).

actually *wants* a Muslim member-state. Furthermore, the extent to which freedoms sought by many Turkish Muslims (such as the right to wear headscarves in public spaces) are considered fundamental rights within the EU is also quite uncertain (as evinced by the 2004 debates in France over this same issue). Accordingly, the EU itself has an important part to play in solving the cyclical debate over whether Islamism or the Turkish version of secularism is the greater barrier to Turkish membership in the EU.

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, I have sought to explain the complex role played by religion in national-EU relations from a perspective *internal* to the cases of Greece and Turkey. My main argument is that the place of religion in state and society plays a significant role in national-EU relations, because membership (or potential membership) in the EU affects the institutional interests of 'church' and 'state'. It is mainly in the pursuit of these interests that we see an effect on national-EU relations. These interests, in turn, are shaped by the historical relationships between religion and national identity and between 'church' and 'state' in each case. The *complexity* to which I refer above, then, stems from differences in these relationships.

Furthermore, I argue that the role of religion is very *important*, both in theoretical and empirical terms. I have demonstrated the impact of religion in empirical terms through examples of how religion-state relations affect national-EU relations, and how the EU affects religion-state relations in each case. In theoretical terms, we see through these two cases that religious difference from or similarity with a 'core' of religious traditions within the European Union (that is, Western Christianity) tells us very little about the role of religion in national-EU relations. Accordingly, and in contrast with the Huntingtonian perspective, I argue that the historical and contemporary relationships between religion and national identity and between church and state are far more instructive in our understanding the role of religion in national-EU relations. Rather than theological content, our attention is turned here to institutional interests. Thus, on the basis of these two cases I also argue against generalisations about the role of religion: the

relevant institutions, the factors which shape their interests, and the actors involved are all contingent on various historical, social and political factors specific to individual national contexts.

We also draw significant lessons from these two cases with regard to theories of secularisation and theories of nationalism. Scholarship in both these fields has not been very helpful in addressing the cases of Greece and Turkey in a comparative framework. Rather, points which are useful in our understanding of each case had to be drawn together in a selective manner. With regard to theories of secularisation, it is obvious that cross-cultural and comparative approaches have been critical to our understanding of certain fundamental terms. Yet there is very little reference made within the field to the cases of Greece and Turkey and to the two main faiths represented in each country. In general and, paradoxically, most of the information within the field which is relevant to Turkey may be found in those discussions of Orthodoxy in Communist Eastern Europe; whilst, I dare say, some of that relevant to my Greek case comes closer to discussions on Islamic, anti-modern fundamentalism. Thus I believe there is a need for a language within the sociological study of religion which *could* accurately address both faiths in their national contexts¹. With reference to theories of nationalism, the cases of Greece and Turkey examined together represent a challenge to prevalent scholarship and reveal significant gaps due to presuppositions, for example, on 'western' or 'eastern' nationalisms. We have seen, through these two cases, that there are usually major intersections between institutions and activities which are often, in scholarship,

¹ Perhaps particularly since Greece is currently a member, and Turkey relatively close to being a member of the, until now *western* European Union: the fact that the sociology of religion is so centred on Western Christianity is problematic from the perspective of study of the European Union, which is increasingly inclusive of non-western faiths.

compartmentalised into opposing frameworks². In short, this thesis fills gaps in scholarship within both the fields of the sociology of religion and the study of nationalism through an interdisciplinary approach which draws on both these fields.

Religion and national identity

My study of the relationships between religion and national identity in the Greek and Turkish cases addressed certain similarities as well as vast differences between these relationships. In both cases the periods before the establishments of their modern states are characterised by especially close links between ecclesiastical and state power, in the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires respectively. In the Greek case these links were actually enhanced under Ottoman rule, since the Church effectively was the state, for the Orthodox subjects. But it is at the point of establishment of modern states in Greece and Turkey that contemporary relationships between religion and national identity were shaped in each case, and it is at this point that our two cases critically diverge. For, in contemporary terms, a strong link between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity has as its main reference point the experiences and activities of the Church under Ottoman rule and during the Greek national revolution³. Religion thus took on special importance as defender of the nation against the oppressor and, not least, against the religious 'other'. Several historical and sociological studies have indicated that the role of the Church in preserving and defending Greek national identity throughout these periods is overstated

² Here, as noted in chapter two, the work of Anthony Smith is helpful in countering certain such presuppositions (for instance, those to do with the relative harm caused to religious minorities by either ethnic or civic nationalism).

³ Though, as observed in chapter three, the Byzantine era is also crucial to contemporary perceptions of the relationship between religion and national identity.

and, in some cases, simply mythical⁴. Yet such 'images' obtain, and the image of a Church which preserves national identity retains its social force in Greece. Conversely, in the case of Turkey, Islam and its institutions were largely blamed for the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and for its eventual collapse. Accordingly, whilst the Young Turks' revolution entailed use of religion for the purpose of mobilising the masses, the Republic established following the Kemalist revolution programmatically limited the political, social *and* cultural influence of Islam. Thus, the relevant 'images' which obtain in the case of Turkey are those of a nation much-strengthened, compared to the then weak Ottoman Empire, not least due to the usurpation of power by the Young Turks from religious institutions. Turkey's western and European course was henceforth to be sought through the maintenance of a strong, unified, *secular* nation.

'Church'-'state' relations

What did all of this mean in institutional terms for religion—i.e., for 'church'-'state' relations? In Greece, the establishment of the Autocephalous Church of Greece was (and continues to be) symbolic of the relationship between religion and nation, in spite of the fact that it entailed subjugation of the Church to the state. For, though it was subordinated to state interests, the Church was effectively strengthened by becoming part of the public sector⁵. In Turkey too religion was subjugated to the state, through the

⁴ As explained in chapter two, the Church generally disapproved of revolutionary ideas and preferred to maintain the status quo of power relations under the Ottoman Empire. It was only after the Greek Revolution had become an irreversible process that individual clerics began supporting it.

⁵ Or in Maniatis' words (cited in chapter three), the state's right to interfere in ecclesiastical matters was legalised, whilst ecclesiastical issues were recognised as public issues.

establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*)⁶. Whilst this may be seen as a tribute to the importance of Islam to the Turkish nation, the *Diyanet*'s establishment clearly reflected an intention to limit and control religion, as was evident in the broad range of anti-religious reforms. Nevertheless, it is clear that in neither case do we have secularism as in full separation of 'church' and 'state'. The critical *difference* between the cases is in the ensuing relationships between 'church' and 'state'.

In the case of Greece, this relationship was one of both tension and intensity. Tension manifested itself in state efforts to curb the power of the Church, efforts which were often met with staunch resistance on the part of the Church and thus resulted in compromise. This, as explained in chapter two, is because religion wields considerable strength when linked to the national myth: the Church of Greece was thus able to mobilise masses against unfavourable state policies on the basis of nationalism. Meanwhile, church-state relations were intense in the sense that each institution often enlisted the support of the other—with nationalism as the common ground between them. Thus, the development of secularisation in Greece took the form of nationalisation of the Church and its use as a buttress for state power; a skewed balance of power between church and state was established (within 'agreed limits of tolerable diversity'), and the Church gained from this arrangement certain privileges which it would, henceforth, actively defend.

⁶ *Diyanet* is the state institution which administers mosques, religious education, and foundations and charities in accordance with the dictates of Sunni Islam. Again, herein lay one of the major asymmetries in these two cases: in the case of Greece I am referring to the establishment of a national church, and in Turkey to the establishment of a state institution. But this inconsistency simply reflects the divergent realities of the two cases, and must be understood within the context of the differences between the experience of *secularisation* in the case of Greece, and the specific version of secularism, laicism, which was implemented in Turkey.

In Turkey too relations between religion and the state are characterised by tension and intensity. The tension manifests itself in Kemalist secularist policies pitted against Islamist efforts to assert themselves in the public sphere. But the operative 'myth' in Turkey, is that of the strength of the Turkish nation due to Kemalism; and 'official' Turkish nationalism henceforth included notions of a strong, sovereign, western-oriented and *secular* state, and it thus excluded religion from its foundations. Thus Islamists have not had an advantageous recourse to nationalism in their contest against the state, as has had the Greek Church. However, Turkish political history is marked by major fluctuations in state secularist parties, with governments variously broadening the freedoms of Turkish Islamists (in the political, social and religious realms), and then limiting them drastically. Accordingly, though in general Turkish secularism rendered Islamism a 'buttress for reaction', this process was neither constant and stable, nor linear. Rather, in spite of the fact that generally secularism entailed repression of Islam, religion was also used at times as a buttress for state power (as in the case of Greece), and in such cases Islamism and nationalism merged. The period of the 'Turkish-Islamist synthesis' is a characteristic example⁷.

Institutional interests

I then examined how the relationships between religion and national identity and 'church' and 'state' led to different institutional interests on the part of the 'church' and 'state'. The pursuit of these institutional interests was examined through the identity card

⁷ A comparable period in Greek political history is that of the military dictatorship of 1967-74, during which there was an especially close link between the Greek Church and the military leaders.

issue, in the case of Greece, and through the February 28th process and its ‘legacies’, in the case of Turkey. As explained in chapter four, the Greek government’s decision to remove reference to religion from the national identity cards was preceded by extensive European legislation on the protection of personal data, as well as a series of convictions in the ECHR against the Greek state⁸. Religious elites, however, conceived of the decision as an effort towards the ‘religious discolouration’ of Greece, and thus as an affront to the relationship between religion and national identity. Additionally, the state’s decision to change the identity cards without consulting the Church, and without compromising on the issue, was perceived as a concerted effort to limit the social and political influence of the Church, and thus as an affront to the relationship between church and state. Accordingly, the Simitis government, rather than the European Union, was the focal point for Church complaints. Church spokespersons emphasised that the European Union did not demand this change, and that according to EU treaties, the EU does not involve itself in national religious matters. Thus the state was increasingly accused by the Church of *using* the European Union as an excuse to limit the power of the Church, the social functions of Orthodoxy and, in general, the presence of religion in Greece. In fact, the Church’s actions indicated that this was a battle to be fought at the national level (between church and state), and thus revealed a clear interest in preserving the status quo in church-state relations. The Archbishop treated the issue as a direct confrontation between himself and the Prime Minister and, in general, the means with which the Church chose to resist the change to the identity cards (public rallies, private

⁸ Again, the immediate and major precursor to the church-state conflict over this issue was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ efforts to form a group of academics and clerics to discuss issues, including that of the identity cards, which were problematic in Greek-EU relations. As noted in chapter two (footnote 84), there were 102 ECHR cases against the Greek state between 1999 and 2003.

meetings with state officials, the drive to collect signatures in petition for a referendum), were all heavily politicised and manifested an anti-state perspective.

In my view, the Church's mobilisation on the identity card issue is best understood within the more general context in which it arose in terms of the decreasing ethnic, and religious, homogeneity of Greek society⁹, and a dwindling alliance between church and state. Viewed from within this prism, the identity card issue was a propitious basis upon which the Church could reassert itself in the public sphere. And ambiguous Church perspectives on the EU in light of the identity card issue seem to confirm this fact. '*Nai men, alla*' ('Yes, but') was the characteristic phrase used with reference to the European Union: yes to the EU, as long as it does not seek the religious discolouration of Greek society, and as long as it does not threaten the Church's relations with the state or the Church's constitutional privileges. Yet, in spite of this ambiguous stance, it is difficult to overlook the clear challenges which EU membership represents for the Church. At a superficial level at least, EU membership signifies a de-nationalisation of the Greek state, in terms of identifying itself more with the supranational EU dimension. Again, given that its role as 'protector' of Greek national identity is a main foundation of the Church's contemporary presence in Greek society, this development would naturally be unsettling to the Church. But at a more practical level, the Church's position in Greek society has been greatly strengthened through its close relation to the state—from subsidies enjoyed by its clergy to state recourse to Church mobilisation on issues of national importance (e.g., the 'Macedonian issue'). The Greek state is under mounting pressure from the EU to provide enhanced religious freedoms and equality for non-

⁹ Its staunch resistance to the building of a mosque in Athens is clearly symptomatic of the Church's preoccupation with preserving, if only superficially, religious homogeneity in Greece.

Orthodox citizens of Greece. Thus, in the light of the state's efforts to conform to EU standards (following many ECHR convictions), the Church perceives a heightened threat to the cultural, linguistic and religious homogeneity of Greece—all elements which are central to conceptions of Greek national identity—and to its traditional close relationship with the state.

In chapter six, I examined the 'February 28th process' in Turkey and what I have identified as its 'legacies'. The February 28th process was, in effect, a military coup directed exclusively against political Islam. Its 'legacies' entailed the closure of Refah's successor party, Fazilet, as well as a series of other measures directed against Islamists. The main justification for such measures, according to the actors behind them and to many secularist elites, is that Islamists are insincere in their embrace of democracy and that they represent a threat to national unity and preservation of the democratic (read secular) Turkish Republic. Meanwhile, Turkish Islamists argue that such limitations on Islamism are, themselves, undemocratic. In their view, the secularist elite structure is simply using Islamism as a scapegoat and as a basis upon which to justify the status quo in power relations (e.g., an active role for the military in Turkish governance, and a continued dominance of secularist elites over Turkish political and economic life). Thus each side accused the other of being the 'greater barrier' to Turkish membership in the European Union, with political Islamists representing 'religion' and the military and secularist elites the 'state'.

Turkish Islamists' attitudes to the EU, examined in the light of the February 28th process, are clearly pro-European. This makes sense because it is Turkish Islamists who stand to gain from the EU's influence on religious reforms that will lead to increased

pluralism. It is crucial to note here that Turkish Muslims who do *not* identify themselves with political Islam do not exhibit the same degree of pro-Europeanism for the same reasons: they prefer a measure of state regulation of religion, so as to prevent the predominance of political Islamists. But they insist on a form of secularism in line with Anglo-Saxon and European norms, rather than the current, strict form of Turkish secularism (laicism).

In the Turkish case it is the *Kemalist elites* who staunchly resist EU-related reforms which would expand freedoms for Islamists, as well as other reforms demanded as part of the EU harmonisation package. For instance, the National Action Party (MHP) openly opposed many reforms demanded by the European Union as part of the ‘harmonisation’ process necessary for EU membership¹⁰. This opposition was directed against abolition of the death penalty, provisions for Kurdish-language education and media, but also reforms to Turkish Penal Code article 312 (which is the basis upon which both Erbakan and Erdogan were forced out of political activity, and upon which many other Islamists were convicted in Turkish courts). Furthermore, spokespersons for the Turkish Armed Forces have voiced pointed complaints against the pressures from the EU for certain reforms which threaten national unity and territorial sovereignty. Religion is simply one domain, but a significantly visible one (considering the fact that even a Prime Minister was ousted from power), in which Kemalist elites assert their attitudes and policies against EU-related reforms. And it is a particularly propitious domain, since, again, secularism (or laicism) is linked so closely to the Turkish ‘national myth’. As guardians of Kemalist ideology, then, this sector of Turkish elites is relatively successful

¹⁰ Particularly in its role as part of the governing coalition immediately preceding the AKP’s current governance.

in mobilising the Turkish public, on the basis of nationalism, against any perceived threats to Kemalist principles.

Thus we see very interesting parallels, as well as contrary tendencies, between the two cases. The curious 'twist' arises when we consider the fact that in Greece, it is the Church which uses nationalism to mobilise people for its cause, and in Turkey it is the Kemalist elite structure; and, furthermore, it is mainly *these* 'institutions' which resist EU-related reforms to do with religious freedoms. Thus we see that the Greek Church and the Kemalist elite structure have in common vested interest in resisting EU reforms to do with religious freedoms. And it is through their pursuit of their interests that they affect, albeit in different ways, their nations' relations with the European Union. It has been central to my argument that these interests have developed in relation to the historical links between religion and national identity, and between 'church' and 'state' in each case.

National-EU relations

What does this all mean for national-EU relations in each case? In the case of Greece, privileges enjoyed by the Orthodox Church of Greece over and against other faiths, limiting religious freedoms for the non-Orthodox, are clearly a problematic point in national-EU relations. To the extent to which the Church succeeds in delaying relevant legislative (and, most important, functional) changes in conformity with EU norms, then it plays a negative role in national-EU relations. As we saw with the identity card issue and subsequent events, the Greek state faced significant difficulty in

introducing one such a reform, and the Church's influence over domestic politics remains considerable: intra- and inter-party conflict resulted from the identity card issue, and in its aftermath the mainline political parties are reluctant to address any further religion-related policies (such as reforms to religious education in public schools). Meanwhile, inasmuch as the EU is indeed the driving force behind reforms introduced by the state (a matter which, again, is surrounded by controversy), then the EU, in turn, affects religion-state relations by provoking church-state conflict.

In the case of Turkey, it is clear that developments such as resistance to reform of Turkish Penal code Article 312, the forced closures of Islamist parties and arbitrary convictions of Turkish Islamists, and the military's role in the latter represent problems in Turkey's relations with the European Union¹¹. Most importantly, there is the fact that the European Union itself has implicated the Kemalist tradition of secularism as a barrier to EU membership. Thus, to the extent to which anti-democratic measures are used to suppress Islamism in Turkey, religion plays a significant—albeit indirect—role in Turkey's relations with the European Union. Meanwhile, the EU, through its insistence on conformity with European norms, affects the internal balance between religion and state in Turkey: the path to EU membership places Turkish Islamism in a position from which it can rightfully claim that Turkish secularism represents a barrier to EU membership. Furthermore, inasmuch as the EU succeeds in encouraging certain reforms relating to religious freedoms, Turkish Islamists enjoy more freedom, and more power, vis-à-vis the Turkish state structure. At the very least it is clear from our examination of the Turkish case that the current state of religion-state relations is, itself, incompatible

¹¹ I should note that the EU did not disapprove of *all* such party closures. Again, the ECHR ruled in favour of the Turkish state in the *Refah Party and others v. Turkey* case.

with European norms and, in fact, a negative factor in Turkey's relations with the European Union.

On the basis of these two cases I argue that, beyond certain delayed, unimplemented, and/or avoided reforms, the *form* of religion-state relations (which allows one institution or another to delay or block certain reforms) is an important factor in each of these cases. Thus, in light of theories which point to emerging European and, perhaps, *EU* norms in religion-state relations, I now examine where Greece and Turkey stand in relation to such norms.

In Greece, the Church's efforts to maintain certain privileges through the state and *vis-à-vis* other faiths is little different to John Francis' description of how Western European established religions have adapted to, and benefited from, certain changes to the regulatory structure, and have struggled to maintain that degree of regulation which most benefits them¹². Beyond the wishes of established churches to accept regulation in exchange for some delimitation of state recognition of newer churches that threaten their membership bases, Francis also explains that established churches may simply act out of a concern to maintain their existing obligations to staffs, buildings, and educational programs: 'the longer established the church, presumably the greater the obligations it has to sustain existing organisations'¹³. This certainly goes a long way towards explaining the Greek Orthodox Church's resistance to EU-incited reforms that threaten its existing privileges—many of which are financial¹⁴. Furthermore, those ambivalent

¹² Of course, 'benefit' is relative, and there can be institutional or 'religious' benefits.

¹³ J.Francis, 'The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships', p.779.

¹⁴ For instance, a weakening of the church-state link in Greece could result in the state's ceasing to remunerate all clerical staff, or to favour the Church as much as it does with large sums of EU funding. I will not assess here the Greek state's motivations in its relations with the Church, but in chapter four I argue that beyond its intention to conform to European standards, also relevant is what Demerath describes

and sporadic vestiges of resistance to the EU within the Orthodox Church of Greece seem little different to Lilian Voye's description of the same phenomenon which existed within European Protestant churches in times past¹⁵, or from anti-European voices heard within conservative Catholic circles in contemporary Poland.

Public religion in Turkey has fewer obvious similarities with European historical and contemporary developments, but certain critical exceptions deserve notice. Its closest historical comparison may be found in Enlightenment France, from which the Turkish version of secularism, *laicism*, takes its name. Also, the experiences of churches under the anti-church model that existed in some of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe is quite similar to those of Islamist groups in Turkey. Many Eastern European churches clearly gained from the severe regulatory climate the advantage of becoming an institutional magnet for those critical of the state. Paradoxically then, churches were strengthened as a force in opposition to the state¹⁶. The same applies to Turkish Islamism, and for political Islam in particular. In both cases of political Islam's rise to power in Turkey (in 1996 and in 2002), the active parties capitalised on votes of protest against the Turkish state. In terms of contemporary similarities with European developments, public religion in Turkey functions much like what John Francis describes as the emerging trend within European churches: increasing involvement in education, charity, and political commentary, rather than the direct encouragement of religious life¹⁷. For instance, the Catholic Church in France is identified more as a producer of

as a desire to weaken the 'cultural wild card' of religion which poses a threat to established policies and policymakers.

¹⁵ L.Voye, 'Secularisation in a context of advanced modernity', pp.280-2. Jean-Paul Willaime has also written extensively on this subject.

¹⁶ See J.Francis, 'The evolving regulatory structure of European Church-state relationships', p.802.

¹⁷ See Francis, *ibid*, pp.775-776.

quality education rather than as a political advocate of a former regime; these schools are popular not as bastions of faith and morals, but as institutions of quality secular education. Similarly in Germany, churches no longer define themselves in support of or in opposition to a particular regime, but are active mainly in the arena of health care and social need¹⁸. Likewise in Turkey, religious groups and political parties have become increasingly active in such domains as education and social welfare. But this development in the case of Turkey comes closer to what Bryan Wilson describes as pillarisation — ‘the response by which some sought to contain the process of secularisation in some European countries’¹⁹. The term applies best to such contexts as Ireland and Belgium, where religious divisions were reflected in the development of distinctly Catholic or Protestant schools, universities, hospitals, etc²⁰. In Turkey, pillarisation primarily reflects a distinction between secular and religious institutions, rather than between different religious groups. These similarities between contemporary Turkey and certain historical and contemporary developments in Europe may also lead us to the conclusion that, as with Greece, Turkey too might be on a path toward convergence with a European norm in religion-state relations.

Perhaps more interesting is the question of whether this ‘European norm’ will spread, as Peter Berger predicts, with the extension of the European Union’s borders²¹. In both Greece and Turkey, institutional interests are the product of long histories of a developed status quo and concerted efforts, through formalism, to maintain this status

¹⁸ Francis, *ibid*, pp.779-780.

¹⁹ B. Wilson, “‘Secularisation’: religion in the modern world’, p.200.

²⁰ See J.Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, p.61, where the author argues that the age of pillarisation in Western Europe has come to an end.

²¹ According to Berger, ‘[i]t is not fanciful to predict that there will be similar developments in Eastern Europe, precisely to the degree that these countries too will be integrated into the new Europe’. P.Berger, ‘Secularism in retreat’, p.44.

quo. These factors will be difficult to change. However, based on my study of Greece and Turkey, I contend that to the extent to which the European Union presses potential and current member states for a convergence in provisions of religious freedoms, it is indeed effecting a convergence with European norms.

We are seeing that this is already the case with Greece, as changes to the status quo in the Church's institutional locale are most often either sought as direct consequence of European Court of Human Rights convictions²², or are openly discussed as governmental efforts to conform with norms within the European Union. In an article entitled, 'The political culture of secularisation', Brian Girvin cites Greece as *the* exception within the EU, for its maintenance of more traditional church-state norms²³. But an examination of contemporary developments in church-state relations in Greece indicates that, in time, this will cease to be the case. As one of my interviewees asserted, in the wake of the identity card issue (ie., the fact that the government did not compromise with the Church, and the issue was gradually forgotten by the wider public), it will be difficult for the Church to mobilise the people again on similar issues²⁴. Further reforms will likely be delayed, in light of the disruption which the Church did bring to the domestic political scene, but carefully measured and consistent efforts on the part of the state should limit the occasions for future intense reactions on the part of the Church. Second, the recent enlargement of the European Union entails a significantly larger Eastern Orthodox presence within the EU. This means two things: the Greek Church will

²² Although the ECHR is a Council of Europe, rather than formally an EU institution, the EU has made it clear that a given country's record in the ECHR is critical to its relations with the EU.

²³ B.Girvin, 'The political culture of secularisation: European trends and comparative perspectives', p.21.

²⁴ However, within days of the formation of the New Democracy government (elected in the March 2004 Greek elections), there was discussion of the Archbishop's plan to request that the new government reconsider the possibility of the voluntary inclusion of religion on the national identity cards. See 'The issue of the identity cards and the stance of the Archbishop', *To Vima*, 10 March 2004, p.A12; and P.Galiatsatos, 'Middle space with right tails', *Ta Nea*, 10 March 2004, p.7.

feel less as a threatened minority, and as it increasingly identifies itself with the interests of other Orthodox populations, in the context of the EU, it will be less likely to play on specifically Greek nationalistic sensitivities. Third, through a process of more active involvement in EU affairs which are of interest to it, the Church has found that it is not alone in many of its concerns. Rather, it has begun to cooperate with churches of other faiths in Europe in joint efforts to promote such causes as including reference to religion in the European Treaty currently being drafted. Finally, the Greek Orthodox Church is not a monolith. This much was clear in the division amongst the hierarchs over the identity card issue, with a number of clerics refraining from participation in the demonstrations and signature collection, and some even publicly criticising the Archbishop's tactics. Recently there has been especially open critique of the Church from within, as well as criticism from without²⁵. Such criticism is likely to influence positively the Church in the long run.

Turkey is a more obvious exception amongst current and potential EU members, for its extremely strict version of laicism. Convergence with European norms in this case is considerably more complex, and more dependent on the European Union's influence. Moderation of Turkish Islamism has not, thus far, succeeded in overcoming secularists' suspicions. The political Islamist party currently in leadership in Turkey does not clash with a liberal-democratic state and has neither directly challenged the secular state nor democratic principles²⁶. Yet perceptions of indirect challenges, such as appointments of 'pro-Islamic' figures to key state posts, have been enough to spark rumours of a military

²⁵ Though subtle and sometimes indirect, from the Ecumenical Patriarch and Archbishop of Albania—both of whom are widely respected in Greece.

²⁶ See M.Heper and S.Toktas, 'Islam, modernity, and democracy in contemporary Turkey: the case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan'. See also A.Insel, 'The AKP and normalizing democracy in Turkey'.

coup²⁷. As long as these suspicions are manifested in undemocratic policies towards religious groups, individuals and political parties, religion-state relations in Turkey will remain incompatible with European norms. A longer life-span of the current religious-oriented government in Turkey (through which the Turkish population at large could better judge its performance as a democratic government which accepts secularisation as institutional differentiation), together with continued pressure from the EU for human rights provisions (of which religious freedoms are a key aspect in Turkey), will most likely render the current form of mobilised public religion in Turkey compatible with EU standards.

Future religion-state relations are likely to be affected by increasingly open discussions on Kemalist ideology and the extent to which its espousal, mainly by the Turkish military, is problematic in terms of Turkey-EU relations²⁸. The internal debate generated by the draft report prepared by the European Parliament Committee on foreign affairs (in which Kemalism was directly implicated as a barrier to EU membership)²⁹, indicates a significant move in this direction. However, it should be noted that a critical complication arises when one tries to ascertain the European Union's true intentions vis-à-vis Turkey as well. For example, to what extent is the EU willing to accommodate an Islamic-oriented regime and a predominantly Muslim country? In Turkey, answers to this question are marked with an evident degree of pessimism. In fact, Islamists' age-old

²⁷ Such rumours were rampant in Turkey in May of 2003 and were, notably, contested by the Chief of Staff General Ozkok himself.

²⁸ As expressed in an article entitled 'Ankara stand-off: how EU reforms have turned into a struggle between the government and the military' (L.Boulton and D.Gardner), Turkey's EU membership will be determined, to a large extent, by whether the AKP is 'in power or only in office; and whether the military is an agent of change or seeks to defend the status quo'.

²⁹ The 'Draft Report on Turkey's application for membership of the EU' was issued on 12 March 2003. As noted in chapter six, the report was revised (following Turks' complaints about the negative critique of Kemalism). See 'European parliament committee says army obstacle to democratisation', and European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (<http://www.abhaber.com/pdf2/oostlanderrapor.pdf>).

complaints that the EU is an 'exclusive Christian Club' are now being voiced within Turkey's secularist circles as well³⁰. There is a marked tendency, even among the pro-western elite, to view with suspicion even the 'constructive criticism' that the EU may have to offer. Accordingly, even the aforementioned European Parliament statements on the nature of Kemalist ideology may, in the end, be discounted as simply another 'excuse' for not admitting Turkey to the European Union.

Part of the solution to this problem will depend on future EU policies towards Turkey -- which must be consistent towards both secularist and Islamist trends, and set a clear and viable path to Turkish membership in the EU. The other, and perhaps more significant, part of the solution to the problem depends on the extent to which secularist and Islamist circles in Turkey will prove capable of discussing their differences in a way that would be compatible with the principle of accommodation that characterizes the EU system. The rise of the Erdogan-led AKP to the premiership in 2002 offers an unprecedented opportunity to judge better Islamists' true intentions, thus removing one of the complexes of secularist-Islamist tensions: though the AKP does continue to face the 'non-electoral' constraint of National Security Council influence, it is at least freed to a great degree of the electoral constraint entailed by coalition formation, since it won a sufficient majority in the national election to form a government on its own.

I close with a few words on the role of religion in the European Union itself. There is, in my view, a fundamental tension between two of the EU's foundational principles with regard to religion: the principle of subsidiarity, and the principle of pluralism. On the one hand, its treaties indicate that, by way of respect to national

³⁰ A notable example is a speech made by the Secretary General of the National Security Council, Tuncer Kilinc: 'the EU is a Christian Club, a neo-colonialist force, and is determined to divide Turkey'. Cited in G.Avci, 'Turkey's slow EU candidacy', p.164.

specificity in terms of cultural and religious traditions of member states, religious matters and 'ecclesiastical' laws are to be regulated by the individual member states. Under the principle of subsidiarity, only in certain circumstances (ie., on matters of fundamental importance to all member states, matters which because of their scale and the importance of their effect, cannot be adequately managed at the national level) may the EU intervene. On the other hand, the EU claims to be religiously and philosophically neutral, but devoted to the principle of pluralism. Accordingly, it aims to influence member states in such a way as to create environments conducive to the flourishing of diversity and pluralism. And the European Union directly influences member states in this direction by proscribing discrimination on such bases as religion. This is especially crucial in the context of increasing religious diversity across Europe (not least due to mass immigration to EU member states, but also to the proliferation of new religious movements). Thus, to the extent to which the European Union seeks to establish a social model which embraces pluralism and provides equal rights for all its citizens, it would appear that a degree of regulation of national religion-related policies is inevitable.

Appendix – Interview research

The research for this study was conducted in 2000-1 in Ankara and Istanbul, and in 2002-3 in Athens. The questions asked centred on the perceived role of religion in relations between Greece and the EU, and between Turkey and the EU respectively¹. The interviews were semi-structured, and generally lasted between 1 and 1½ hours. The fact that the scholarly nature of this inquiry was fully explained enhanced the likelihood that the respondent would express his or her genuine views.

The sample for this study is non-random, as my intent was to compile a sample of potentially knowledgeable and influential leaders. For the Turkish case, I concentrated on the following groups: political, mass media, diplomatic, intellectual, religious, civil service and business elites². For the Greek case, I focused on political, intellectual, bureaucratic and religious elites. This discrepancy is mainly due to my relative familiarity with the Greek case and my knowledge of the Greek language, which allowed me to use Greek-language sources. Because this is an elite survey, the sample does not mirror overall population characteristics such as sex, education, social background, age or region of origin. The sample was not designed to be representative of the mass of Greek or Turkish voters, but of the leadership community in each country.

A general balance was struck between ‘secular-minded’ respondents and ‘religion-oriented’ respondents. Within each group, the sample covers a broad range of ideological perspective, from conservative to liberal. In terms of the ‘religion-oriented’ respondents, in Greece this group includes clerics, hierarchs, theologians, a representative of the ‘neo-Orthodox’ movement, and one bureaucrat (all of the Greek Orthodox faith). In Turkey,

¹ Turkish interviewees were asked to comment solely on the case of Turkey, and Greeks on the case of Greece.

² I use the term ‘elites’ to indicate both formal and informal decision-makers at the society’s national level, interested and/or involved in decisions important for the politics of that society. Elite surveys are valuable for three reasons. First, elites play a crucial role in a state’s political process. Second, although other elite groupings (e.g., business or media) may play a less direct role in politics, they are important in terms of their actions as interest groups lobbying to secure certain goals; as veto groups who must be appeased before a given policy may be implemented; or as shapers of public opinion. Third, and as a less manifest source of policy, the values, beliefs and attitudes of the broad stratum of elites may be indicative of those that go into the making of policy.

this group includes bureaucrats, politicians, Muslim intellectuals, theologians, business figures and journalists. The sample reflects a spectrum of Turkish Islamism, including representatives of Nurcu, Naksibendi, Fetullanci, and Alevi groups.

To identify which leaders I would interview for the Turkish case, I began with a basic list of contact details for a number of Turkish elites, provided to me by ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy). I added to this list names from my readings on the subject of my research, and sought their contact details once in Turkey. My sample further expanded through the suggestions of those interviewees on the original list. The sample thus also reflects the reputational and positional characteristics of the respondents. In the Greek case, I sought interviews with leaders who were especially knowledgeable on, or personally involved in, the identity card issue.

Of course, self-selection was an important element shaping the panel of respondents. I contacted potential interviewees via e-mail or telephone, and depended upon the individuals' willingness or ability (e.g., if they were in town at the time of my research), to meet with me. For the case of some politicians and some 'religious figures', I relied on other contacts to secure my interviews with them. For the Turkish case, no one declined, and few never responded to my letters (only two journalists, who I had tried to contact via their newspapers' e-mail addresses). I had a significantly more difficult time securing interviews in Greece, particularly with clerics: many clerics preferred to submit their responses in written form (as indicated below).

Below is a list of interviewees cited in the Greek and Turkish case studies, respectively. I provide here the institutional affiliation of each respondent (at the time of the interview), and the date of the interview. All of the interviews with Greek elites listed below took place in Athens (I met with one further interviewee, who wished to remain anonymous, in a different Greek city). The location of the interviews with Turkish elites (either in Istanbul or Ankara) is indicated following the date of the interview.

Interviewees in Greece

Savvas Agouridis, Professor of Theology, University of Athens. 27 November 2002

Alekos Alavanos, MP, Synaspismos (Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology),
Member of the European Parliament. 27 January 2003

Metropolitan Anthimos, Metropolitan of Alexandroupoli. 11 January 2003

Constantinos Cholevas, General Editor of publications of the Church of Greece, Holy
Synod, Athens. 9 January 2003

Metropolitan Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Zakynthos. 20 February 2003 (written
communication; date of receipt)

Nikiforos Diamandouros, Greek Ombudsman. 28 January 2003

Metropolitan Ignatios, Metropolitan of Dimitriada. 23 February 2003 (written
communication; date of receipt)

Ioannis Konidaris, General Secretary of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Education and
Religious Affairs (also Professor of Ecclesiastical Law). 14 January 2003

Thanos Lipowatz, Professor of Sociology, Panteion University, Athens. 11 November
2002

Father George Metallinos, Professor of Theology, University of Athens. 7 January 2003
(written communication; date of receipt)

Nicos Mouzelis, Professor of Sociology (ret.), London School of Economics. 12
February 2003

Antonis Paparizos, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Panteion University, Athens. 12
November 2002

Stelios Papathemelis, MP, Panhellenic Socialist Party (now a candidate MP for the New
Democracy Party). 15 January 2003

Michalis Stathopoulos, Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Athens (former
Minister of Justice). 10 December 2002

Christos Yiannaras, Professor of Philosophy, Panteion University, Athens. 23 December
2002

Interviewees in Turkey

Gunduz Aktan, Ret.Ambassador to Greece, former director of TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), and author of Turkey's application to the European Union. 12 September 2000, Ankara

Tayyar Altikulac, Former director of *Diyanet* (Directorate of Religious Affairs) and ex-MP for the True Path Party (DYP). Currently a researcher at the Center for Islamic Studies, Istanbul. 17 May 2001, Istanbul

Mustafa Armagan, Director of Publications Department, Journalists' and Writers' Foundation (a Fethullah Gulen group). 12 May 2001, Istanbul

Sencer Ayata, Professor of Sociology (and Chair of that department), Middle East Technical University, Ankara. 2 July 2000, Ankara

Ali Bayromoglu, Director of MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association). 11 July 2000, Istanbul

Halil Berktaç, Associate Professor of History, Sabanci University, Istanbul. 20 June 2000, Istanbul

Ali Bulac, Muslim intellectual and *Zaman* (a religious-oriented publication) columnist. 18 May 2001, Istanbul

Ahmet Davutoglu, Professor of International Relations, Beykent University, Istanbul. 17 May 2001, Istanbul

Abdurrahman Dilipak, Journalist, *Akit* (a conservative, religious-oriented newspaper). 16 September 2000, Istanbul

Izzetin Dogan, Professor of Law, University of Istanbul, and an Alevi spokesperson. 18 May 2001, Istanbul

Cem Duna, Ret. Ambassador to the EU, Member of the Board of TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), Director of AB Consultancy and Investment Services. 26 June 2000, Istanbul

Tayyip Erdogan, Former Mayor of Istanbul (now Prime Minister and leader of AKP). 11 July 2000, Istanbul

Nilufer Gole, Professor of Sociology, Bogazici University, Istanbul (now Professor of Sociology at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris). 12 July 2000, Istanbul

Abdullah Gul, MP, Fazilet Party (now Foreign Minister of AKP). 6 July 2000, Ankara

Kazim Gulecguz, Journalist, *Yeni Asya* (a Nurcu publication). 15 May 2001, Istanbul

Ahmet Helvaci, General Secretary, MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association). 18 May 2001, Istanbul

Metin Heper, Professor of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara. 3 July 2000, Ankara

Nazli Ilicak, MP, Fazilet Party. 11 July 2000

Bulent Kanes, Journalist, *Turkish Daily News*. 14 September 2000, Ankara

Fehmi Koru, Journalist, *Yeni Safak* (a religious-oriented publication). 14 September 2000, Ankara

Sule Kut, Professor of International Relations and Vice Rector of Bilgi University, Istanbul. 26 June 2000, Istanbul

Nilufer Narli, Associate Professor, International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul. 13 July 2000, Istanbul

Soli Ozel, Professor of International Relations, Bilgi University, Istanbul (also, editor of *Private View*, a TUSIAD journal). 4 September 2000, Istanbul

Ozdem Sanberk, Director of TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation). 14 July 2000, Istanbul

Cemal Ussak, Vice Chairman, Journalists' and Writers' Foundation (a Fethullah Gulen group), and General Secretary, Intercultural Dialogue Platform. 16 May 2001, Istanbul

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