THE ACTIVISM AND INCLUSION OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN CARICOM ON TRADE NEGOTIATING MATTERS: A LOOK AT THREE CASES

By
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AUTHOR DECLARATION

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

....................................

Kristina Giselle Hinds
ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to understand why civil society organisations (CSOs) in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) began to mobilise in the 1990s and why government overtures to consulting CSOs on trade matters emerged from around the same time. In addition, this thesis examines the ways in which different types of CSOs have mobilised on trade issues and the ways in which governments have included CSOs in trade consultations. To answer the “why” questions, this thesis posits that both material and ideational factors were important for motivating CSOs to conceive of themselves as needing to mobilise on trade matters in the context of the 1990s. The material and ideational factors of note here are: shifts in the direction of neo-liberal policy orientation, towards a focus on globalisation and towards emphasising good governance. These have impacted on actor interests and perceptions. Despite ideational and material factors impacting on CSO interest perceptions and on government approaches to trade matters, these factors cannot account for variations in the types of CSOs that mobilise and that governments consult on trade matters. This is where institutional factors become important. Institutions can help one to understand how different CSOs have mobilized and how CSOs have been included on trade matters at the region level and across three case studies (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Lucia). In essence the thesis shows that whilst ideational and material factors help one to understand why CSOs have mobilised and have been included, institutional factors help one to understand how they have been included.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACE – Association of Caribbean Economists
ACS – Association of Caribbean States
ACP – African, Caribbean and Pacific
ADA – Association for Development Agencies
BANGO – Barbados Association of Non-Governmental Organisations
BAS – Barbados Agricultural Society
BCCI – Barbados Chamber of Commerce and Industry
BMA – Barbados Manufacturers’ Association
CABA – Caribbean Agri-Business Association
CAFRA- Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action
CAIC – Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce
CARIBCAN - Caribbean-Canada Trade Agreement
CARICOM – Caribbean Community
CARIFTA – Caribbean Free Trade Association
CARIWA – Caribbean Women’s Association
CASME – Caribbean Association of Small and Medium Enterprises
CBI – Caribbean Basin Initiative
CBO- community based organisation
CCA – Caribbean Conservation Association
### List of Abbreviations Cont’d

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<td>Caribbean Conference of Churches</td>
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<td>CCL</td>
<td>Caribbean Congress of Labour</td>
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<td>CDB</td>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Common External Tariff</td>
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<td>CGTN</td>
<td>Caribbean Gender and Trade Network</td>
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<td>CHA</td>
<td>Caribbean Hotel Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIECE</td>
<td>Centro de Investigacion Economica para el Caribe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>Caribbean Labour Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSME</td>
<td>Caribbean Single Market and Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>COHSOD</td>
<td>Council for Human and Social Development</td>
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<td>COTED</td>
<td>The Council for Trade and Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPDC</td>
<td>Caribbean Policy Development Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRG</td>
<td>Caribbean Reference Group on External Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>civil society</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
<td>Coalition of Service Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organisation</td>
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<td>CTO</td>
<td>Caribbean Tourism Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOMA</td>
<td>Downtown Owners and Merchants Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAI</td>
<td>Enterprise of the Americas Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCB</td>
<td>Eastern Caribbean Central Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECLA(C)</td>
<td>Economic Commission on Latin America (and the Caribbean)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIG</td>
<td>economic interest group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATS</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade in Services</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>General System of Preferences</td>
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<td>HD(I)</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCC</td>
<td>Incorporated Caribbean Chambers of Industry and Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import Substitution Industrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITNU</td>
<td>International Trade Negotiations Unit (Trinidad and Tobago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIAT</td>
<td>Leeward Islands Aviation Travel</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALMR</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine Resources (Trinidad and Tobago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>More Developed Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Area</td>
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</table>
NIEO - New International Economic Order
NGO- Non-Governmental Organisation
NJAC – National Joint Action Committee
NJM – New Jewel Movement (Grenada)
Non-EIG – non-economic interest group
NPC – National Planning Commission
NWCT – National Working Committee on Trade
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECS – Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OWTU – Oilfield Workers Trade Union
PAPDA – Haitian Platform for Alternative Development
PNC – People’s National Congress (Guyana)
PNM – People’s National Movement (Jamaica)
PRA - People’s Revolutionary Army (Grenada)
PSOJ – Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica
PSA – Private Sector Agency (Barbados)
PSTT – Private Sector Trade Team (Barbados)
(C)RNM – (Caribbean) Regional Negotiating Machinery
SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme
SLBGA – St. Lucia Banana Growers’ Association
SLP – St. Lucia Labour Party
SLHTA – St. Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association
SLISBA – St. Lucia Industrial and Small Business Association
SP – Social Partnership
STABEX – Stabilisation of Exports (Lomé/EU-ACP context)
SYSMIN - System of Minerals (Lomé/EU-ACP context)
TCC – Technical Coordinating Committee
TTMA- Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers’ Association
TUC – Trade Union Congress
ULF – United Labour Front
UN- United Nations
UNECLA(C) – United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (and the Caribbean)
UNIA – Universal Negro Improvement Association
UNCTAD- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP-United Nations Development Programme
USAID- United States agency for International Development
UWI – University of the West Indies
UWP – United Workers’ Party
WIC – West Indian Commission
WINBAN- Windward Island Banana Grower Association
WINFA – Windward Islands Farmers’ Association
WTO - World Trade Organisation
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is both a regional trading area and a regional political body comprising fifteen countries,¹ most of which are former British colonies. CARICOM countries have long been open to trade and have, consequently, been affected socially, economically and politically by changes in world markets. However, there is little to suggest that civil society organisations (CSOs) in the CARICOM region mobilised in efforts to shape trade agendas before the 1990s. There is also little to suggest that governments attempted to include CSOs of any sort on international trade matters prior to the 1990s.

This thesis attempts to understand relatively recent movements towards activism by CSOs in CARICOM on trade issues up for negotiation between the CARICOM region and the wider world. This thesis also attempts to understand the emergence of government discourses and actions geared towards consulting CSOs on these trade negotiating agendas. Since activism and inclusion of CSOs on trade matters from the 1990s stands in stark contrast to the absence of such prior to the 1990s, this thesis attempts to address the following sets of questions:

1. Why-

   a. have CSOs in CARICOM begun to mobilise or to express interest in mobilising on trade issues?

   b. have governments/CARICOM officials begun to include CSOs or to express interests in including CSOs on trade issues?

¹ CARICOM Members: Antigua and Barbuda; the Bahamas (a member of the Community but not the Common Market); Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; Montserrat; St. Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago.
2. **How -**

   a. *have CSOs of differing sorts mobilised on trade issues?*

   b. *have governments in the region included CSOs on trade issues?*

In order to begin to answer these questions this chapter attempts to do what Stephen R. Covey terms “beginning with the end in mind”, meaning “… to start with a clear understanding of your destination” (1989: 98). Therefore, section 1.1 sets out the reasons behind asking these questions; the arguments to be made in this thesis; and the theoretical approach to be taken. The chapter progresses in section 1.2 to give a brief introduction to CSOs since these are focal groups in the analysis to follow. Section 1.3 presents an outline of the thesis including a discussion of case study choice and research methods.

### 1.1 RATIONALE OF THESIS AND APPROACH TO QUESTIONS

#### THE SOURCE OF THE QUESTIONS

As already stated, CARICOM countries have historically been dependent on trade. The colonial history of the region is relatively well known: most of the countries in the region were inserted into the world trading system during colonisation. These countries were destinations for slaves coming from Africa during the slave trade, they became exporters of agricultural and other primary products to Europe and had to import most other products needed in the colonies. With self-governance and then independence, Caribbean economies continued to be very trade dependent, building on their traditional patterns of exporting one agricultural product and having to import most other goods. Some economies in the region began to move away from one-crop dependence and into newer areas from the 1950s. These countries (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) became known in regional parlance as the “more developed countries” (MDCs) in the region by the 1960s. Conversely, the other less diversified economies in the region were termed the “less developed countries” (LDCs).
Despite efforts at diversification from the 1950s onwards, CARICOM countries continued to be very dependent on trade throughout the 1970s and into the 21st century. For the region’s so-called MDCs total exports and imports combined and taken as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reveal that in the 1970s trade comprised 100% or more of GDP. In the 1980s and 1990s trade continued to account for sizeable proportions of MDCs’ GDP. Figure 1 illustrates this by looking at average trade dependence for these countries.

Figure 1: Average MDCs’ Trade Dependence: 1970-2002

![Average MDCs’ Trade Dependence: 1970-2002](image)

Although data is not available for most of the LDCs before 1977, the data that is available illustrates that at least from the late 1970s these countries were very open to trade too. Average trade dependence for the LDCs during this period illustrates this point (Figure 2).

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2 Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations
Hence, CARICOM countries were highly open to trade well before the 1990s. These countries also negotiated trade agreements with external parties before the 1990s. Most notably, these countries negotiated agreements (the Lomé Accords) with the European Economic Community (EEC) as part of the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group from the 1970s. Why then weren’t CSOs representing important societal groups active on trade issues that would undoubtedly impact on them due to high levels of trade dependency across the region? Also, why didn’t governments consult CSOs that represented important segments of country electorates on important trade matters that would affect the countries in the region?

Perhaps unemployment levels and levels of social well-being were tolerable in the 1970s and 1980s and then changed for the worse in the 1990s. This *material change* could, therefore, account for more visible CSO mobilisation on trade from the 1990s. This argument may seem to hold some merit, since unemployment rates across the region were high in the 1990s. However, the available data for the MDCs and LDCs illustrate

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3 Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations
that high unemployment levels (above 10%) did not suddenly emerge in the 1990s (see tables 1 and 2 below).

Table 1: MDCs’ Unemployment Rates (%) 1980, 1991-2004

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<th></th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Bahamas</th>
<th>Guyana</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Suriname</th>
<th>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</th>
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4 Sources: ILO (2003), Key Indicators of the Labour Market; CDB 2003 Social and Economic Indicators; Barbados Statistical Service (information given to author); CARICOM (2001)

5 Sources: ILO (2003), Key Indicators of the Labour Market; CDB 2003 Social and Economic Indicators; Barbados Statistical Service (information given to author); CARICOM (2001)
This information on unemployment rates across the region is very patchy, owing in large part to deficiencies in data collection across the region. So it does not prove the assertion that high unemployment levels were not new to the 1990s. However, literature that discusses social and economic conditions in the region suggests that chronic unemployment has long plagued the region, as the time series figures available for some countries noted here also tend to imply (e.g. Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada and St. Lucia). According to Bennett (1999):

“In the immediate post-war period the existence of widespread poverty was linked directly to high levels of unemployment” (129)

High unemployment levels have been highlighted as one of the region’s pressing development problems and, as a consequence, development strategies have attempted to deal with this problem from the 1950s. For instance, governments have attempted to combat high levels of unemployment and concomitant social problems via public sector employment and by taking part in a range of economic activities that would generate both wealth and employment (Marshall 1998: 64, 75; Erisman 1992: 4; Mandle 1989: 243-247).

In terms of other indicators that speak to social well being, CARICOM countries have consistently done well in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development tables, particularly amongst developing countries. All CARICOM members (except for Haiti) have been classified as having either “high” or “medium” levels of human development. This information is shown below in Table 3.

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6 Human Development (HD) is an evaluation of GDP, and other economic indicators in conjunction with health, education, poverty and other social indicators. Human development scores are given using an index: the Human Development Index (HDI)
Despite favourable levels of human development, the persistently high levels of exposure to external trade and persistent high unemployment levels (at least from the 1970s) have meant that trade matters have impacted socially and economically on affairs in CARICOM countries well before the 1990s. Certainly, trade began to be universally liberalised from the 1990s with the creation of the WTO to which all CARICOM countries (except the Bahamas) signed up. However, the information provided so far indicates that this liberalisation did not impact markedly on the already high levels of trade openness or unemployment (where data is available) when compared to pre-1990s levels. Hence, the impact of these (material) factors alone cannot help one to understand CSO activism on trade issues from the 1990s or the lack of activism surrounding trade issues up for negotiation by CSOs in the 1970s and 1980s. It follows then that one has to look at other factors. Therefore, this thesis suggests that it is important, to look at factors beyond material ones for understanding CSO motivations for activism in the 1990s and for understanding government motivations for seeking to include CSOs on trade matters.

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ARGUMENTS AND APPROACH TO QUESTION

The *Oxford Paperback Dictionary, Thesaurus and Wordpower Guide* (2001) defines material as “having to do with physical objects rather than the mind or spirit” and materialism as “the belief that material possessions and physical comfort are more important than spiritual values”. These meanings come close to what is meant by material here.

The term “material factors” in this thesis refers to factors that, though they may not be physical, are usually seen as concrete or observable facts. Such factors may be economic, social or political events or occurrences that are seen to have impacts on people’s lives or behaviours. So, an economic recession and its effects on people’s lives (e.g. loss of wealth) can be seen as a material factor. Similarly, the term “materialism”, in social sciences does not refer strictly to valuing physical things. For instance, Marxist thought is seen as materialist in that it conceives of actor behaviour as driven by *economic and social facts* (e.g. the mode of production). To reiterate, materialism and material-based approaches tend to place primacy on social, economic and political occurrences that are seen as “hard” causal facts (Doyle 1997: 322).

The other important aspect of the definition of “material” is its opposite: “the mind or spirit”. This study does not deal with facets of the spirit but of the mind, specifically *ideas, beliefs and perceptions*. Referring to the *Oxford Paperback Dictionary, Thesaurus and Wordpower Guide* (2001) once more, an idea is defined as “a thought or suggestion about a possible course of action ... a belief”. This text then defines a belief as a “feeling that something exists or is true…a firmly held opinion”. Ideas and beliefs describe what people think to be possible or to be true whether or not grounded in fact. In addition a perception is defined as “a way of understanding or regarding something”. So,
perceptions are ideas or beliefs about something and so are theories (“an idea or set of ideas that is intended to explain something”- *Oxford Paperback Dictionary*, 2001).

Without going any further into semantics, it becomes clear that ideas, beliefs, perceptions and theories differ from “material facts”. Therefore, these non-material things are termed “ideational factors” here and are seen as impacting on actor behaviour in addition to material factors. This thesis emphasises ideational factors as important because they help people to make sense of the material world and because they also help people to create material facts. For instance, the idea or belief that a country is best governed as decided in elections in which each citizen holds equal voting rights can be seen as vital in informing the creation of democratic regimes. Subsequently, democratic governmental forms impact on people’s lives in various ways, making theories and the belief in theories important in creating political facts (in this case democratic regimes).

In International Relations there is literature that has discussed the importance of considering ideational factors for understanding actor behaviour in international politics. For instance, Goldstein and Keohane see ideas as “beliefs held by individuals” that can help to explain government policy outcomes (1993: 3), Checkel links political changes to ideas (“broad concepts and basic beliefs”) and sees carriers of ideas as important (e.g. epistemic communities and NGOs) (Checkel 1997: 4-5, 7). More radically, Wendt accounts for actor behaviour in stating: “We want what we want because of how we think about it” (1999: 119). In attempting to understand CSO activism and government openness to consulting CSOs from the 1990s in the CARICOM region, this research follows these scholars by looking at ideational factors as well as material factors as important influences on behaviours. Rather than focusing on trade openness, unemployment rates or human development (material factors) in the context of material changes in the international arena (e.g. trade liberalisation under the WTO) this thesis looks at the links between material factors, changes in the international arena and ideational considerations.
Further, this thesis views international political and economic occurrences as *partly ideationally based rather than being solely material*. For instance, beliefs about how political and economic affairs should be conducted to enhance prosperity that become popular and that are espoused in policy proposals can be made into reality through practices. In this way neo-liberal ideas or theories about economic growth and trade underpinned the creation of the WTO and the liberalising world trading atmosphere. In arguing along this line this thesis follows a mode of thinking similar to that expressed by Peter A. Hall.

Hall asserts that policies can change as a result of a shift in policy paradigms. He applies Thomas Khun’s concept of *paradigms* acting as important factors that frame scientific research. Khun viewed shifts in paradigms as altering the status quo in science (“normal science”). Similarly, Hall sees radical breaks in policy atmospheres, what he calls third order change (i.e. the goals of policy change), as caused by shifts in policy paradigms. Hall uses this model to account for the shift from Keynesian to monetarist policy in the 1970s. This break in policy resulted from a break in policy ideas (i.e. a paradigm shift) (Hall 1993). This thesis draws on this insight by taking the view that ideas shape international policy atmospheres. Therefore, international changes and occurrences are portrayed as, by necessity, both ideational and material in nature. Hence, throughout this thesis occurrences and changes that form the backdrop of CSO and government action on trade matters are termed *ideational-material* changes or occurrences.

Based on these premises this thesis asserts that in order to understand why CSOs and governments have acted in different ways with respect to trade matters over time one must consider:

1. *The ideational-material context of the time (internationally important theories and material occurrences) which impacts on interest perceptions and on actor behaviour.*
This matter of ideational-material factors and their ability to influence actor behaviour will be discussed in Chapter 2. For now though let us look at why and how this thesis addresses questions about the character of CSO mobilisation and government inclusion of CSOs.

In answering the “how” questions, the importance of institutional factors is highlighted. Important institutional factors specific to individual CSOs or that structure CSO-government interaction can help or hinder activism, and can shape patterns and processes of consultation. Ideational and material factors are important in understanding why CSOs want (or do not want) to be included in trade consultations and why they would (or would not) want to create institutions or institutional space for activism. Institutional factors help one to understand how CSOs are included and how they attempt or to be included in consultations on trade affairs.

Institutions have been defined in a number of ways in IR and broader Political Science. The following definitions of institutions are instructive:

- “…rules of conduct in organizations, routines and repertoires of procedure” (March and Olsen 1989: 21, paraphrased in Koelble 1995: 233)

- “…rules and norms that structure the environment of actors and shape how collective outcomes are reached” (Milner 1998: 762).

The first definition focuses on rules and procedures and the second adds norms (conventions of behaviour). The latter definition illustrates that institutions can be conceived as more than structures; they can also be viewed as grounded in conventions of behaviour and conduct. As the latter definition suggests, institutions can shape outcomes so that the ways in which both governmental and socio-economic institutions are organised individually and in relation to other institutions can influence the formation of policy (Garrett and Lange 1995; Milner 1998). It would appear then that it is not enough to look at why CSOs mobilize on trade issues or why governments have begun to consult
CSOs to understand emerging consultation and activism on trade agendas in the CARICOM region. If one wants to look at CSO activism and government consultation of CSOs on trade matters from the 1990s, one should look at the institutional context in which CSOs began to mobilise and at the institutional features internal to CSOs. This institutional focus is important since institutional factors can allow for the inclusion or exclusion of some or all groups (Garrett and Lange, 1995) and can impact on “the degree of power or pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy” (Hall 1986: 19, quoted in Koelble 1995: 236).

Looking at the institutional strengths and weaknesses, rules and norms of differing CSOs can, therefore, help one to understand how these actors have mounted activism on trade. Looking at the same for governments and regional institutions can similarly help us to understand how CSOs have been consulted and included on trade matters. However, institutional considerations can also help one to understand why CSOs have or have not mobilized and why governments have or have not consulted CSOs on trade matters at different periods in time. This chapter previously asserted that ideational and material factors are important in helping one to understand these things, but, even in the context of certain ideational-material contexts institutions can have bearing on group action or inaction. In taking this stance this thesis takes an approach in line with that of some historical institutionalists such as Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longserth (1992) or Peter Hall (1986) who view outcomes as “… the product of interaction among various groups, interests, ideas and institutional structures” (Koelble 1995: 232). The view here also holds commonalities with sociological approaches that see institutions as important in shaping actor behaviour (both how they act and reasons for acting) and looks at the broader socio-economic and cultural contexts in which institutions become important (Koelble 1995: 238). The stance of this thesis, therefore, differs from rational choice institutionalism that sees actors as coming to institutions and acting within them with clear intentions or interests (Koelble 1995: 232; 239-241). Instead, the view here is that, although actors may enter into an institutional context with intentions, institutional contexts can impact on these intentions or interests, as can ideas and the ideational-material context of the time.
These points bring us to the fact that this thesis argues a second point with respect to understanding CSO activism and government consultation of CSOs on trade matters:

\[ \text{ii. The institutional ability of CSOs to mobilise and the institutional context in which CSOs must operate, are important to consider in understanding CSO mobilisation and government/regional consultation of CSOs.} \]

Arguments one (i) and two (ii) combined illustrate an approach that sees material factors, ideational factors and institutional factors as important in understanding why actors behave in certain ways and for understanding how they behave. Ideas held by CSOs and governments in the ideational-material context of the time are important in understanding why they have changed their approaches to international trade agendas. Institutional make-up, capacity and procedures of CSOs and government bodies are important in understanding how CSOs mobilise and how CSOs are able to interact with government/regional officials. Institutional factors can also have bearing on why actors decide to behave in one way or another.

Now that the rationale behind the topic of this thesis and the approaches to be followed have been unearthed, let us look at an important aspect of this thesis that needs to be properly introduced. Specifically, let us look at what is meant by the term “civil society organization” (CSO) and the linked term “civil society” (CS).

\[ \text{1.2 INTRODUCING CS AND CSOS} \]

We can use Plato’s and then Aristotle’s “Politike Koinonia” with the Latin translation “societas civilis” as the early predecessors of the term “civil society”. This term was used to speak of a political society comprising plural forms of association (koinonia) of civilised individuals and groups acting with a single set of goals derived from common
norms and values (ethos) (Cohen and Arato 1992: 84-85; Colás 2002: 27; Ehrenberg 1999: xi). In this view there is no separation of society and Polis. Important facets of this view persist, namely the prerequisite of civility; the centrality of forms of association and; the view that CS has a role to play in governance. However, this early notion is quite different from the meanings of CS that exist today. The evolution of the concept of CS is highlighted in some detail in Appendix A. For now though, let us look at its contemporary use and at how the terms “CS” and “CSO” will be viewed here.

CS AND CSOS IN THIS THESIS

In contemporary thought CS is commonly taken to refer to a realm of public interaction or association that is separate from the state, the economy and (in some conceptions) “political society”. Contemporary discussions are cognisant of overlaps between the spheres designated as state, society, the market/economy and political society but see CS as a public space that is mostly autonomous from the other three spheres – see Figure 3 following - (Edwards 2004: 24-25; Cox 1999: 10; Martinussen 1999: 292; Howell and Pearce 2001: chap. 4; Clark 2003: 93).

Figure 3: Spheres of Social Practice

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8 Political society includes political parties, parliaments, and political organisations (Edwards 2004: 25).
9 Adapted from Martinussen 1999: 292
Although there is not universal agreement on how to define CS or on how to delineate which associations should be viewed as CSOs (these differences in views will be discussed in Chapter 2), this thesis aligns with a view that sees CSOs as any voluntary association that is largely separate from the state, the economy and political society. In taking this approach this thesis includes organisations that represent business, industry and workers interests in addition to those that represent social or “grassroots” concerns. Some approaches exclude the former sort of associations seeing them as forming part of the economy. However, in this thesis these representative associations are viewed as lying somewhere in the space between the economy and civil society. This rather broad definition is in line with Scottish Enlightenment and Marxist approaches to CS (See Appendix A).

Despite the conception of CS and CSOs employed here being broad, the conception of CSOs used here is qualified with the requirement that associations termed CSOs do not aim to become involved in criminal activities. CSOs should be civil. Therefore, organised criminal groups such as gangs and mafias are not CSOs. In defining CSOs in this way, this thesis follows John Keane and Michael Edwards who exclude groups that act as intentionally destructive forces from the world of CS (Keane 2003: 10, 12-13; Edwards 2004: 45). In so doing this thesis adheres to the requirement of “civility” implied in the term civil society\(^\text{10}\) and as portrayed in the following quotations:

- “Civility, from Aristotle to Stephen Carter, assumes that we will disagree, often profoundly, but calls on us to resolve our disagreements peacefully.” (Edwards 2004: 67)

- “Civility is defined as not just ‘good manners’ or ‘polite society’ but as a state of affairs where violence has been minimized as a way of organizing social relations.” (Kaldor 2003:7)

\(^{10}\) The requirement of civility is left out in some approaches such as those that discuss “non-state actors” rather than CS, i.e. their approach differs from that taken here by including criminally oriented groups (Josselin and Wallace 2001: 4)
Political parties are also not seen as CSOs since, even though they may attempt to speak to desires of some within CS and even though they include grass roots members, their aim of taking control of the state excludes them from being seen as part of CS. Political parties, thereby, lie within the sphere of political society with some arms of parties (e.g. youth wings or women’s arms) lying somewhere in the space between political society, CS and the state. Other examples of groups that lie in-between categories are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have been initiated by governments (the overlap between CS and state)\(^\text{11}\) or business/industry representative associations (the overlap between economy, state and CS)\(^\text{12}\).

**CSO SUB-CATEGORIES IN THIS THESIS**

A wide array of organisations exists within CS and for this reason the CSO world will not be treated as a monolith. CSOs are broken into two categories here for the purpose of delineating general differences between different types of CSO. These sub-categories are “economic interest groups” (EIGs) and groups that are not EIGs (non-EIGs). This categorisation is analytical in purpose. It separates CSOs in terms of those that tend to be viewed as driven by *material considerations* (EIGs) and those that tend to be seen as driven by *philosophical or ideational concerns* (non-EIGs). Non-EIGs are groups that can be seen as “cause groups” or which some such as Keck and Sikkink view as motivated by principled beliefs or values. EIGs are groups such as occupational or industry/sector specific associations which tend to be viewed as motivated by self-interests and material concerns (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2, 30; Sell and Parkash 2004: 150). This classification can be expressed as follows in Figure 4:

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\(^{11}\) Sometimes called Government Organised NGOs (GONGOs) or Quasi NGOs (QUANGOs)

\(^{12}\) Sometimes called Business Interest NGOs (BINGOs)
However, classing CSOs as EIGs and non-EIGs is simply an analytical tool for studying groups that tend to be seen as acting out of different motivations. As the later empirical chapters will show, assumptions about some CSOs falling into one category and others into another do not always hold well in reality. So-called non-EIGs are motivated by material concerns (e.g. the well-being of the poor, disenfranchised or women) and EIGs may place important emphasis on principles and values (e.g. right or wrong). Additionally, both EIGs and non-EIGs may mobilise or attempt to mobilise in similar ways.

EIG and non-EIG activism or mobilisation may come in the form of advocacy (calling for a certain course of policy), research in support of advocated policy and outreach/educational work (Sell and Prakash 2004). Forms of activism that are supported by research and attempt to incorporate or support wider segments of society add what Jan Aart Scholte (2004) terms “competence” to CSOs (65-67). This thesis shows that such competence is important in the eyes of governments or officials, who seem inclined to consult with CSOs that are able to contribute “meaningful” policy inputs.
rather than those simply protesting or demonstrating for or against some set of policies or structures (see case study chapters). This thesis will highlight that governments can draw on CSO research and inputs strategically to compensate for their own internal knowledge and institutional capacity gaps. In addition to well-informed and objective oriented activism adding legitimacy to CSOs in official eyes, CSOs themselves can gain from the acquisition of competence. As Scholte puts it:

Superficial civil society activism...frequently neglects to move from purely negative protest to include positive proposal as well. To be sure, opposition and destruction of harmful arrangements is an honourable and valuable endeavour. However, proposition and reconstruction is also required (2004: 66).

Both EIGs and non-EIGs pursue these forms of mobilisation alone or by means of domestic coalitions or extra-territorial networking and cooperation. Moreover, both EIGs and non-EIGs must find the institutional wherewithal to pursue meaningful activism. Thus, despite these CSOs being seen as different in “type”, they pursue similar strategies for activism, face similar obstacles to effective mobilisation and inclusion, and may also act in pursuit of similarly motivated goals. Despite the similarities between EIGs and non-EIGs, let us start with this classification that focuses specifically on the perceived differences between different sorts of CSOs.

1.3 OUTLINE, METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

It should be clear by now that this thesis draws on theories and conceptualizations about material, ideational and institutional factors. Theories about the importance of these factors form the basis for the approach to comprehending why CSO activism and inclusion on trade issues has changed in the CARICOM region. These factors also help one to understand how changes actually look on the ground. Particularly, looking at how CSO mobilisation and activism has changed and has been realised in practice necessitates looking at institutions created by CSOs to advance their perceived interests and by
governments/regional mechanisms that can help or inhibit CSO inclusion. This thesis also values a *historical perspective* in focusing on the *temporal location* of ideational-material occurrences and changes in which CSO and government actions are situated.

Added to theory and history, this thesis uses the empirical findings of three case studies and of CARICOM as a whole to advance its argument and in attempts to answer the previously outlined *“why”* and *“how”* questions. The chapter outline that follows helps to explain how this will be done in this research. The outline is followed by a section on “case studies” that clarifies the choice of country cases within CARICOM.

**CHAPTER OUTLINE**

The theoretical underpinnings of this thesis are introduced and explored in depth in Chapter 2. This chapter discusses contemporary conceptions of the terms civil society (CS) and civil society organisations (CSOs) and connects these to conceptions of *interest groups*. This is done because CSOs are broken into two types of interest groups throughout this work and also because interest group literature holds much in common with that on CSOs. In Chapter 2 the discussions on CSOs and interest groups are also important because they provide rationales for group formation or activism either based on materialist grounds or ideational ones. This ideas-interests or ideational-material division is then explored with reference to International Political Economy (IPE) and International Relations (IR) discussions of state behaviour. Literature that addresses the need to look at institutional factors in understanding how these can help or hinder inclusion is also discussed in Chapter 2.

Chapter 3 proceeds to present a historical look at CS and CSOs in the CARICOM region. This important background chapter discusses the evolution of different sorts of CSOs in the region and looks at their involvement in political matters. In so doing, this chapter presents a historical sketch of CSOs in the region and of the region’s political and socio-economic landscape. This third chapter also looks at the mobilisation and inclusion of CSOs on the creation of regional arrangements, including those on trade. Looking at
CSO involvement in relation to regional trade matters, here forms a launch pad for discussing the activism and consultation of CSOs on trade affairs of extra-regional significance. Chapter 3, therefore, allows for a contextually based assessment of CSO activism and government consultation of CSOs.

Chapter 4 looks at the lack of CSO activism and involvement surrounding trade negotiations in which CARICOM members were involved between the 1970s and the 1980s. CSO inaction and non-consultation are framed in relation to the ideational-material context of the time and ideas and interests held by CSOs and governments in this context. Chapter 4 then looks into the shift in the international ideational-material context and linked shifts in the regional ideational-material context between the 1980s and 1990s. These changes are then connected to the beginning of visible CSO activism on external trade issues and government expressions of interest in consulting CSOs from the mid to late 1990s. So, Chapter 4 looks firstly at CSO mobilisation and inclusion in a time period in which non-reciprocal trade arrangements were the norm and in which interventionist states could appease most sections of society. Secondly, Chapter 4 compares non-activism prior to the 1990s with activism in a time when the international trade climate took a turn for the neo-liberal, in which globalization is said to have emerged and in which emphasis shifted towards good governance. The differences in ideational-material contexts are important to consider in comprehending CSO interest perceptions on economic policy areas (such as trade) and governments’/regional institutions’ willingness to consult with CSOs.

These three grounding chapters (Chapters 2-4) form Part A of this thesis and serve to situate CSO activism and inclusion in the region by looking at the “why” questions that focus on ideational, material and, to a lesser extent, institutional considerations. Part B attempts to examine the “why” questions by looking at ideational and material factors via CARICOM case studies drawn from the Eastern Caribbean. This part of the thesis also pays more attention to institutional considerations in efforts to understand why activism and inclusion became visible from the 1990s and to understand how CSO activism and government overtures to inclusion have been translated into practice. Thereby, Chapters
5, 6, 7 and 8 look at the why questions using case studies. These chapters also introduce the how questions more fully by unearthing the links between institutional considerations and the character of CSO involvement in trade matters in three countries and at the regional level.

The conclusion follows these chapters, pulling together the findings of the cases, linking these to the situating chapters, clarifying the findings and, finally, emphasising the significance of the arguments of the thesis.

THE CASE STUDIES

The three country studies at hand (Barbados, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago) are all located in the Eastern Caribbean. Nonetheless, it is important to note that “Eastern Caribbean” here refers to countries geographically located in the East/South East of the Caribbean and that are members of CARICOM, rather than referring to the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The Eastern Caribbean was chosen as the focal sub-region because it comprises both “More Developed Countries” and “Less Developed Countries” (using the CARICOM classification) and because it comprises countries with different economic make-ups. Looking at the Eastern Caribbean, therefore, allows one to take a snap-shot of the picture in the broader CARICOM region. Choosing countries within the Eastern Caribbean was also important for logistical reasons since it facilitated travel between these countries of geographic proximity.

The three case studies discussed here illustrate some of the diversity within the CARICOM region since they are structured differently economically and socially. Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago tend to be referred to as “more developed countries” (MDCs) whilst St. Lucia represents a “less developed country” (LDCs) and an island

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13 The OECS comprises Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The British Virgin Islands and Anguilla however are not CARICOM members.
state within the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) group. The term “MDC” in the CARICOM context usually refers to the Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, with Suriname being a more recent edition (only joined CARICOM in 1995). If one were to generalise about the MDCs, one could say that they diversified away from dependence on agricultural exports from the 1950s, focussing instead on tourism, export manufacturing (even if mostly for the regional market), and more recently on financial services. In reality though, these countries are quite different. In terms of truly being “more developed” than other countries in the region this does not hold true, especially in the case of Guyana, whether judged in socio-economic or strictly economic terms, but also in the case of Jamaica when one considers the overall socio-economic picture.

Of the so called MDCs, Barbados is the smallest geographically but has the highest level of human development in CARICOM and the highest level of human development of all developing countries in the world according to the UNDP (UNDP 2004). As typical of the MDCs, Barbados is a country for which agricultural production has waned in significance as a foreign exchange earner since the 1970s. Although sugar retains some importance, the service sector has become focal due in large part to a well established tourism industry (also the case in Jamaica and the Bahamas) and also to the provision of financial services. Trinidad and Tobago, on the other hand, has the most significant manufacturing sector in the region. In Trinidad and Tobago (and also in particular Guyana), tourism is less vital than it is in the rest of the region. What is more, in Trinidad and Tobago (also in Guyana and Jamaica to lesser extents), extractive sectors are key, and Trinidad and Tobago gains much foreign exchange from the lucrative oil and petrochemical industry. Looking at two rather different MDCs can allow for an understanding of some of the similarities and differences between MDCs in the region when it comes to considering regional patterns of CSO activism and inclusion.

14 “Development” in the terms MDC and LDC has a lot to do with development based on economic rather than social criteria, for when one looks at social factors some of the MDCs would appear be less developed than or equally developed as some of the LDCs.
15 Tourism is also relatively unimportant in Haiti, the newest and most unstable and impoverished CARICOM state.
St. Lucia on the other hand is one of the “LDCs” in the region. The economy in St. Lucia has remained heavily dependent on the export of bananas to Europe but since the mid-1990s, like most of the other banana dependent LDCs, has been attempting to reposition its economy in the face of declining trade preferences. This process of moving from traditional export products is quite new to St. Lucia and the majority of the Windward Island LDCs in the OECS. Nonetheless, St. Lucia and the other Windward Islands have increasingly made inroads in tourism and other services as a means of coping. As such CS and CSOs within the LDCs could potentially have different concerns and may mobilise differently from those in the MDCs. Moreover, differences between the two MDCs to be discussed could also contribute to different rationales for activism and patterns of activism. In light of the differences between these three cases, we should be able to see whether the temporally located ideational-material factors outlined in Part A of this thesis can plausibly account for CSO mobilisation across countries. Also, these case studies can assist in teasing out whether and how institutional considerations played into motivations of CSO activism and inclusion.

Looking at these three case studies allows one to consider differing countries within a common grouping and to examine a geographical area (the Eastern Caribbean) within the CARICOM grouping. As already stated, reference to the Eastern Caribbean in literature on the region tends to focus on the OECS countries, but looking at non-OECS countries in addition to OECS countries located geographically within the Eastern Caribbean allows for a picture that is likely to be more informative from a wider CARICOM perspective. However, this focus on three differing Eastern Caribbean countries, does not allow for a conclusive examination into why CSO mobilisation/inclusion on trade negotiating agendas in the CARICOM region became more evident in the 1990s.

Looking at an MDC case study like Guyana in which trade openness skyrocketed from the 1990s (note the difference between 1991 and 1992 in Figure 2) could help one

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16 Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines comprise the Windward Islands. All are OECS members. The Leeward Islands are also all OECS members and comprise Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis and the British Virgin Islands.
to examine whether this material factor was more important in understanding CSO activism and inclusion than using cases such as Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago. However, the case of Guyana is inconsistent with the MDCs, in part because of the significance of the underground economy in this country which governments began to bring above ground from the 1990s. Additionally, Guyana is atypical of MDCs and of most countries in the region because of its status as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). In essence, Guyana may be seen as more akin to an LDC when considering both social and economic factors.

The economies of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are to some extent similar, with both having significant manufacturing sectors. However, they are different since Jamaica’s tourism sector is more important than that of Trinidad and Tobago, because of the relative importance of agricultural exports to Jamaica (e.g. coffee and bananas) and also because of the significance of revenue from oil production in Trinidad and Tobago. The economies of the Bahamas and Barbados are similar because of their tourism and other service orientation. Looking at Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados thereby allows one to look at the two rough “types” of MDCs in the region.

The St. Lucian case also may not fully represent the scope of the LDCs or the OECS. Certainly St. Lucia bears much in common with the LDCs in the Windward Islands that have relied on banana production or other forms of agriculture (e.g. spices in Grenada) and can therefore be seen as representative of these countries. However, some of these so-called LDCs, specifically those in the Leeward Islands, are quite different from St. Lucia and would fit better in the MDC characterisation. For instance, the Leeward Island of St. Kitts and Nevis has experienced some of the lowest unemployment levels in the region and is also in the high HD category according to the UNDP’s Human Development report. Antigua and Barbuda is another Leeward Island in the LDC group that falls into the high HD category (UNDP 2004). Like St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda is a service-oriented economy. In these respects these two countries are more similar to Barbados and the Bahamas than the other LDCs (although having substantially smaller populations than Barbados and the Bahamas). As for Haiti, this non-OECS LDC
can be seen as an “outlier” within CARICOM because the scale of its social, economic and political problems are dramatically dissimilar from those of the other CARICOM countries. The following table (Table 4) helps to illustrate some of the similarities and differences between the countries in the region by looking at MDC/LDC status, CARICOM/OECS status, HD rank, other development classifications and the orientation of the economies.

**Table 4: CARICOM Country Classifications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CARICOM LDC/MDC</th>
<th>CARICOM /OECS Status</th>
<th>HD Rank</th>
<th>Other Classification</th>
<th>Dev. Classification</th>
<th>Economy Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>WB Lower Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services/ Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>WB Lower Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>HIPC/ WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services/ Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services/ Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>CARICOM /OECS</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>CARICOM /OECS</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>CARICOM /OECS</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services/ Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>CARICOM /OECS</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>CARICOM /OECS</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services/ Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; Grenadines</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>CARICOM /OECS</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>WB Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>Industry/Services/ Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat(^1)</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>CARICOM /OECS</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>UN LDC/ WB Low Income</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{17}\) In the “Other Dev. Classification” column: WB = World Bank; UN LDC = United Nations Least Developed Country.

\(^{18}\) Montserrat has been largely evacuated following a volcanic eruption.
Looking into CSO activism and government inclusion of CSOs in every country in the region would be the best way to thoroughly understand CSO activism and inclusion on trade issues. Each of the countries is too unique to attempt to make generalisations for the region based on a few, no matter how one combines them. However, looking at all fifteen CARICOM members was not possible for the purpose of this research. This thesis, therefore, attempts to look at countries that could be seen as exemplifying country types rather than simply making choices across the MDC-LDC line or by means of looking at economic indicators. This can allow us to at least make a rough sketch of the regional picture. Clearly, further research is needed to get a more thorough picture of the situation across CARICOM, but, hopefully the observations brought out via this research will be insightful for the region and also for looking at CSOs and trade issues in small developing countries.

The regional level case study supplements the investigation into CSO activism within CARICOM countries by looking at the interaction on trade matters between CSOs and regional officials. This is important in looking at CARICOM countries since they attempt to prepare joint negotiating agendas. The regional case study examines the ways in which domestically situated CSOs have mobilised at the regional level (either alone or working though regional umbrella CSOs) and at the ways in which officials at the regional level have consulted CSOs. Like the other country studies, this case study looks at the why and the how questions.

METHODS

The analysis of CSO activism and inclusion in the case studies is based on qualitative field research, analysing text and theorising. In depth-interviews and analysing discourses in the press and produced by CSOs and governments/regional officials informs many of the claims about why CSOs mobilise and why governments or regional officials consult CSOs. These methods also inform the evaluation of how CSOs mobilise and are incorporated by government/regional officials with respect to shaping trade-negotiating agendas.
Interviewing (and in some cases corresponding with) representatives from different CSOs was useful for interpreting rationales for and patterns of CSO mobilisation. Interviews were also useful as a triangulation tool (in verifying statements made by other interviewees). As such, representatives of CSOs in St. Lucia, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago and of regional umbrella CSOs fitting into both the EIG and non-EIG categories were interviewed. In order to ensure that this analysis was not focussed solely on CSO views, national and regional officials were also interviewed (and corresponded with). Information and insights gathered from representatives of these groups should help in understanding CSO activism and inclusion on external trade matters in the region.

Textual sources were also important sources of information for this research because they helped to map ideational-material trends; ideas about these trends; and group interest perceptions over time. In addition, texts were important for verifying some of the statements or views of interviewees. Interviews and texts were crucial here, as they helped to shed light on the little documented area of CSO involvement in processes of arriving at trade negotiating stances in the CARICOM region.

To be brief, this thesis uses an interpretative methodology, which draws on theories and qualitative methods to craft plausible arguments that can account for movements towards CSO activism and government inclusion of CSOs on trade matters in the CARICOM region.

**SUMMARY**

In a nutshell, this thesis looks at ideational-material trends, interest perceptions and institutional factors and makes use of interpretation in attempts to offer a credible way for understanding CSO activism and inclusion on trade issues in the CARICOM region from the mid- to late 1990s.
The intention is to provide insights into CSO activism and inclusion on trade issues in CARICOM and to contribute to knowledge on the under-studied interplay between CSOs and government/regional mechanisms in the CARICOM region. Despite being CARICOM specific though, the findings of this work may be relevant to other regions or countries.
PART A
CHAPTER 2

CSOS, INTERESTS, IDEAS AND ACTIVISM

This chapter presents important literature about CSOs; interest groups; ideas-based views about actor behaviour; and materialist conceptions of actor behaviour. This chapter presents the approach used to understand why CSO mobilisation in the CARICOM region became visible from the (mid/late) 1990s and why CARICOM government initiatives and discourses aimed at including CSOs in trade consultations emerged from the (mid/late) 1990s. Looking at literature that discusses ideas based and interest-based views about actor behaviour is crucial in this task since this thesis asserts that to understand changes in behaviour one must consider:

i. The ideational-material context of the time (internationally important theories and material occurrences) which impacts on interest perceptions and on actor behaviour.

Hence, CSO mobilisation and government openness to consulting with CSOs need to be considered in light of ideational and material influences important in the international context of the time. This thesis argues that understanding CSO mobilisation and inclusion on trade matters also calls for taking into consideration institutional influences since:

ii. The institutional ability of CSOs to mobilise; and the institutional context in which CSOs must operate, are important to consider in understanding CSO mobilisation and government/regional consultation of CSOs.

To do these things, the chapter begins in section 2.1 by discussing literature about CS and CSOs, and goes on to link this to literature on interest groups. Section 2.1 then
proceeds to look at implicit and explicit reasons behind group activism expressed in both genres of literature. This examination throws up an emphasis, on the one hand, on ideas as motivating group action and, on the other hand, an emphasis on material interests as motivating group action. These two types of factors (interests based and ideas based) are discussed in section 2.2 to expose a rationalist-materialist thread of thought about group action which can be contrasted with views that see actor behaviour as based on ideas. To look at these diverging views more clearly and also to introduce a focus on understanding state and governmental policy behaviour, section 2.3 looks at IR literature that discusses ideas, interests and institutions (or some combination). This literature is important both for looking at CSO activism in the CARICOM area and for looking at CARICOM / government behaviour with respect to consulting CSOs.

In looking at the ideational-material context in which CSO activism and CARICOM/government consultation on trade became visible, Chapter 1 highlighted that this thesis views the following trends as colouring actor behaviour form the mid/late 1990s: neo-liberalisation, globalisation and an emphasis on good governance. These particular facets of the ideational-material context emerged from the 1980s and by the mid/late 1990s came to inform CSO activism and official overtures to CSO consultation. The ideational-material context important in the 1990s is introduced at the end of section 2.3 of this chapter. However, this latter component of the argument “i” will be further expanded on in Chapters 3 and 4.

### 2.1 CS, CSOS AND INTEREST GROUPS

In the previous chapter we defined CS, CSOs and the sub-categories of CSOs (EIGs and non-EIGs) that will be employed in this thesis. However, it is necessary to explore the various discourses about CS/CSOs and those on interest groups to understand the assumptions about ideas and interests as motivators for action implicit in both sets of literature.
CONTEMPORARY CSO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

The CS/CSO discourse can be framed in terms of its long history and in terms of schools of thought. This section highlights the latter (schools of thought) whilst the former (the evolution of the term in historical context) is highlighted in Appendix A of this thesis.

- **THE MAINSTREAM: CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERAL PLURALISTS**

  Conservatives see CS as an associational sphere separate from the state. CSOs are diverse forms of organisation such as micro-enterprises, credit associations, private corporations, bankers’ associations, universities, professional associations, cooperatives, trade unions, popular movements, etc. that are autonomous from and morally superior to the state. CSOs are seen to foster democracy, entrepreneurship and play social roles in this view (Macdonald 1994: 270-271; Edwards 2004: 26). Freedom of choice, self interest, private property, patriarchy and distrust of state bureaucracy are inherent in this conception and the freedom of CS is seen as akin to that of markets. This conception sees the involvement of the (welfare) state in non-political spheres of society as wrong and values CSOs as primarily apolitical forms of association (Macdonald 1994: 271; Cohen and Arato 1992: 43).

  Liberal pluralists\(^{19}\) are somewhat similar in approach and along the conservative-pluralist continuum the view that CSOs are intrinsically valuable is an important one. CSOs are seen as necessary for helping to inculcate a civic spirit and a democratic ethos (Clark 2003: 95). Putnam (1993) calls these values that CSOs generate “social capital”. Although valuing the democratic potential of CS, pluralists (like conservatives) accept inequalities within CS. Their conceptions remain hierarchical because they privilege property rights and competition (in addition to individual freedoms) as the underpinnings of democracy, equality and freedom (Macdonald 1994: 271; Cohen and Arato 1992: 75).

\(^{19}\) Robert Dahl is a noteworthy example of a pluralist political approach
Conservatives value an apolitical CS realm for restoring an ideal and fictive past in which moral values were respected and people could govern themselves (they are backward looking). Pluralists though differ in asserting the importance of citizens’ ability to express views to each other and to the state to reform societies (they are progressive/reformist) (Edwards 2004: 19). For pluralists CSOs can be spheres for political participation outside of formal electoral politics. CSOs are seen as groups in which specific interests can be aggregated and the existence of a plurality of CSOs allows varying interests to compete to assert their political concerns (Macdonald 1994: 271-272; Cohen and Arato 1992: 18; Kaldor 2003: 9). In this vein, for instance, John Clark asserts that in a strong CS, a variety of CSOs vie against each other for attention and support as occurs in a market, but a market driven by interests, ideas and ideologies rather than goods and services (2003: 94). Thus, political decision-making is partly the result of CS and CSOs participating in politics through competition to influence policy choices (Lukes1974: 11-15; Reinalda 2001: 18). This strain of thought holds strong parallels to pluralist discussions of interest groups (to be discussed later in this chapter).

Strands of past CS theorising are present in both pluralist and conservative modes of thought. The stress on the importance of individual freedoms in these schools draws on a host of Enlightenment thought. The links between CS, market considerations and competition runs parallels to CS views of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. Additionally, pluralist thought on CS and CSOs owes much to Tocqueville’s views (see Appendix A).

- **ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES: CRITICAL THEORISTS, POST-MARXISTS/ACTIVISTS**

Critical theorists discuss CS/CSOs structurally by focussing on inequalities inherent in CS and in the state. These conceptions focus on achieving more radical versions of equality, freedom and democratisation than pluralists. Gramsci is an important influence here. His assertion that the state and CS are integrally connected, since state power is maintained via formal organisations of political society (state and/or
political parties) and via the many bourgeois associations of CS such as the church and the media (Macdonald 1994: 272; Colás 2002: 42; Cox 1999: 4-5) is rather poignant. This trend of thought has been applied by those such as Robert Cox who uses Gramscian principles to explain the international economic system in which social relations play an important role both for the maintenance of hegemony and for undermining it via the creation of new counter-hegemonic historic blocs led by a class of enlightened or “organic” individuals and backed by the requisite financial resources (Cox 1983; Cox 1999). Thus, Cox and others (e.g. as Alejandro Colás) bring to the surface not only the status quo functions of CS and CSOs made explicit by Gramsci, but also the revolutionary potential of CS (on an international scale) that is only implicit in Gramsci’s work.20

Post-Marxists21 share the reformist agenda of pluralists in addition to critical theorists’ concerns about exploitation. CS for post-Marxists can facilitate radical democratisation. This club’s outlook emphasises a broad democratising project based on “active citizenship” and opening spaces for more direct citizenship and CSO involvement in political decision-making and governance. Post-Marxists may also see their more radical version of democratisation as needed in international institutions and even within CSOs, in addition to state institutions and domestic governance. Post-Marxists (or Activists in Kaldor’s classification) see the importance of daily struggles, activism or discourse in combating oppression unlike in Marxism where some grand revolution is necessary. Unlike neo-conservatives or liberal pluralists, business organisations are at times downplayed in this view (Macdonald 1994: 273; Kaldor 2003: 8; Howell and Pearce 2001: 54-55).

It is useful to note parallels between the ideas expressed in these strains of thinking on CS and CSOs and those expressed in discussions on interest groups. These parallels will now be addressed.

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20 Stephen Gill and David Law are two other writers that follow this mode of thought in international relations.
21 Jean Cohen, Andrew Arato, Jürgen Habermas and John Keane can be loosely placed in this school of thought
INTEREST GROUPS

In the 1950s there emerged a branch of political science (group theory) that looked at the role of interest groups in domestic politics (Ainsworth 2002: 5; Almond 1958: 271). David Truman was an important writer in opening up the focus on interest groups which he conceived as groups making claims on society on the basis of “shared attitudes” (interests being defined as shared attitudes). In his view, when groups make claims on others via attempting to shape government policy they are seen as political interest groups (1951: 33; Rothman 1960: 17; Macridis 1961: 27; Ainsworth 2002: 12). In more contemporary works within political science interest groups continue to be seen as groups making claims on the state or as “organizations separate from government…which attempt to influence policy” that can provide “the institutionalized linkage between the state and major sectors of society” (Wilson 1990: 1).

Therefore, conceptions of interest groups hold parallels to pluralist and particularly the Tocquevillean conceptions of CSOs. Indeed, much of this work was pluralist in assuming (in Tocquevillean manner) that individual interaction in a plurality of groups could build a democratic ethos. Additionally, inter-group competition in decision-making processes allowed the involvement of people in decision-making (outlined in Conn 1973: 238-239 and Rothman 1960: 21-23).

• COMPARATIVE WORK ON INTEREST GROUPS

The focus on interest groups in political science emerged in attempts to look beneath formal political institutions and the party system in order to understand political systems (Almond 158: 271; Ainsworth 2002: 5). Work on interest groups has tended to be very focussed on American politics because of the pluralist bent in the literature and the specification of the USA as the embodiment of the ideal of pluralist society (see Truman 1951; also outlined in Rothman 1960: 21-23).
Other comparative studies on interest groups have looked at Europe and at the potential of some dominant interest groups to divert pluralism via corporatism and neo-corporatism. Unlike in the American pluralist model, important interest groups (usually labour unions and business associations) are seen as acting in partnership with governments and as holding “insider status” in European systems (outlined in Wilson 1990: 22-23). In some senses though, interest group activity described in corporatist/neo-corporatist literature can be viewed as pluralist but not of the disaggregated and competitive type. Thus, the terms “corporate pluralism” and “competitive pluralism” have been used in addition to terms such as “liberal corporatism”, “democratic corporatism” and “pluralistic corporatism” (Thomas 1993: 9-10).

Added to focussing on interest group systems as being either pluralist or corporatist, some commentators on the topic came to acknowledge the importance of examining formal governmental structures instead of just looking at groups. These works, thereby, took an institutionalist perspective in emphasising the differences between countries with different governmental structures such as, the importance of multiple access points for interest groups to influence policy in the USA in contrast to unitary systems with few choices of venues for interest groups to attempt to influence policies as in Britain (see comparative studies in Richardson 1993).

This thesis draws on some of the assumptions and conclusions of works on interest groups by looking at interest group attempts to impact on governmental processes and at the formal institutional factors that can help or hinder this. This thesis also draws on interest group literature by using the language of interest groups in classifying CSOs as EIGs and non-EIGs.

- **DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CSO AND INTEREST GROUP DISCOURSES**

Despite drawing on group theory, there are important differences between writing on interest groups (or pressure groups) and CSOs. For instance, interest group literature tends to focus on politically active groups (Truman’s political interest groups) and as
such may exclude associations that mobilise at grassroots or community levels or that aim primarily to fulfil individual or community needs (e.g. YWCA and YMCA, community groups). Although this thesis does not examine these groups much either, the use of the language of CS acknowledges that such groups form integral parts of the associational world. In this respect the discourse of CSO differs from that of interest groups.

Another difference is that interest group literature tends to focus on membership organisations or organisations representing narrow constituencies. Truman’s work opened space for a wide range of groups to be considered as interest groups by seeing these as based on shared attitudes (1951: 33; Rothman 1960: 17; Macridis 1961: 27) rather than a strict material (in this case economic based) conception of interests. However, group theory has tended to be focussed on groups acting out of material interests (e.g. labour unions, business associations and agricultural groups) (Macridis 1961: 34; Willetts 2002). Willetts, for instance, notes that the term “interest group” is a biased classification because it focuses on economically powerful groups, assumes these groups act to guard their economic interests and implies that only these groups can impact on politics (Willetts 2002). This tendency to focus on an economic conception of interests and on EIGs likely owes much to attempts at formal theorising on interest groups based on economistic assumptions as perhaps most notably outlined by Mancur Olson (1971).

2.2 MOTIVATIONS FOR CSOS FORMATION AND MOBILISATION

The account of CS, CSOs and interest groups presented so far tells us about the literature and how it will be drawn on in this thesis. However, this discussion has not

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22 To be discussed later in this chapter.
given much information about *the motivations for CSO formation or mobilisation*. We do not know why people form CSOs or when CSOs will mobilise. All the same, there are some implicit and explicit clues that speak to this in the work on CS and interest groups.

**IDEAS OR INTERESTS ATTITUDES AS MOTIVATIONS FOR CSO FORMATION AND ACTIVISM**

- *IDEAS AS MOTIVATIONS*

  Discussions of CSOs emphasise the need for “space” to allow people to associate, form CSOs and to mobilise. The enlightenment image of CS as embodying a space in which people are free and equal and in which people may associate freely highlights this. Similar thinking is evident in pluralist and activist thought on CS. Some pluralist conceptions suggest that healthy CS and the formation of CSOs are facilitated in liberal democracies that provide rights and freedoms for individuals. CSOs are as a result, provided with an enabling environment (Clark 2003: 94-95; Cohen and Arato 1992: 8-9).

  CS and CSOs can also emerge where space needed for them to function has not been sanctioned. CSO activism in the 1980s and 1990s democratisation movements in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa are examples which illustrates that people create what Lipschutz calls “unauthorized political space” (2001: 334) in which CSOs can mobilise. CSOs need space to function (preferably authorised space facilitated in democracies) and are important for democratic purposes (Howell and Pearce 2002: 40). This however, does not explain why/how CSOs are formed or mobilise to serve these purposes.

  In some views of CSO activism, people act collectively for a *commonly shared belief or goal* and these voluntary actions bring important benefits to society. Hegel’s, Tönnies’s and Parsons’ views of CS as an important realm for situating individuals within society through voluntary association, speak to such social benefits (see Cohen and Arato 1992: chaps. 2&3; and Howell and Pearce 2001: 24-25). Liberal stands of
thought, such as those focussing on social capital and others heavily informed by Tocqueville see CSOs as building important “capital” for social stability and democracy (e.g. Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993). Truman’s pluralist view of interest groups is similar in its claims that “shared attitudes” are important for interest groups. Furthermore, a democratic ethos can be built through people’s cross cutting involvement in different groups and because diverse interest groups (existing and potential) can mobilise to have their interests acknowledged (1951: 23-24; Rothman 1960: 16-18). In critical theory and post-Marxist/activist visions, CSOs acting around common beliefs or goals are also seen as potentially bettering society because they have emancipatory potential (Cohen and Arato 1992: 19; Kaldor 2003: 8, 11). These views imply that **CSOs form around and act to further shared beliefs, ethics, or goals.**

- **INTERESTS AS MOTIVATIONS**

An alternate view in some thinking on CSOs is that these act and are formed to represent individual interests. Acting to represent individual (political, social or economic) self-interests that are shared with others may eventually contribute to creating the good life just as in liberal-economic views where individuals participating in commercial activities for their own benefit can lead to enhancing the wealth of a society (see Thomas 1993: 7). This sort of view is particularly evident in some strands of pluralism and other work that uses the language of “interest groups” and starts from a rational individualist ontology.23

In these conceptions groups are seen as competing to represent conflicting interests in politics just as commercial entities compete in markets. **Material interests drive CSOs and these interests motivate collective action.** Collective action is not seen as being shaped by moral, normative or other ideational inclinations (such as Truman’s shared attitudes). Howell and Pearce summarise this view important in liberal-pluralist visions of CS (they state “neo-liberal) by stating:

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23 Olson’s work on collective action is important in this traditions and will be discussed to follow
In the neo-liberal vision of free market economies and liberal democracies, civil society was a plurality of interest groups, symbolizing the freedoms of association and expression as well as the social energies of autonomous, rational individuals. Both market and civil society were arenas of self-regulation. (2001: 65)

From one perspective then CS and CSOs are assumed to be intrinsically beneficent and seen to emerge from people sharing ideas/attitudes. CSOs promote democratic and civic norms, integrate people in societies and are based on commonly shared ideas/beliefs. From an alternative viewpoint CSOs are seen as the collective embodiment of individuals pursuing self-interests. In this latter view CSOs may or may not democratise and CSOs may or may not bring other social benefits to society. This latter view shares facets in common with some political economy interpretations of group activism in general and more specifically with IPE views on CSO activism on economic issues (to be discussed later in this chapter).

A third view is that CS and CSOs are formed to maintain the status quo. Specifically, CSOs function to maintain the dominance of the ruling elite or to hinder resistance to the dominant mode of production. These views expressed in Marxist and Gramscian thought conceive of CSOs as little more than pawns used for domination. However, innovations on Gramscian thought in critical theory and post-Marxist views of CS see the potential of some CSOs resisting the status quo (e.g. Cox 1983; Cox 1999). As a result, some CSOs form in resistance to domination and can be emancipatory.

Some liberal-pluralists and activists see CSOs as existing based on commonly held beliefs. Hence, these views see CSO formation and activism as based on ideational concerns. In contrast, Marxist/Gramscian views of CSOs as representing class interests and pluralist/other conceptions using a rational-individual approach to interests can be seen as materialist. These are materialist because they see interests, whether individual or class, as determined by social, economic or political facts. Material interests drive CSOs

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24 This thought is also expressed in Marxist views of interest groups that focus on the class consciousness of interest groups representing the bourgeoisie that are supported by the state (outlined in Thomas 1993: 8-9)
and CSO activism in materialist stands of thought whilst in other views, ideational and normative factors are conceived as pivotal factors. This ideas-interests division across views on CS and CSOs is therefore important and will be brought out more fully later in this chapter. Let us focus now, however, on explicitly rationalist - materialist account of CSO action.

- **OLSON’S RATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF MOTIVATIONS FOR CSO FORMATION AND MOBILIZATION**

Mancur Olson contradicts the assumptions in early pluralist group theory that groups will automatically be formed or act based on the possession shared interests or attitudes. He argues that if this were true, every interest group would have an organisation and every individual would be a member of one. Since, however, there are obstacles to collective action that hinder group formation and activism all interests do not form groups and all interests do not mobilise (Olson 1982: 17-18).

Individuals and firms in Olson’s conception make *rational cost-benefit calculations based on economic self-interests* when deciding on forming a group or acting on an issue. This is because people are unlikely to waste their resources to gain a good that will benefit both group members and non-members (Olson 1982: Chaps. 2-3; 1983: 14). If compulsion is not used to create interest groups and to mobilise their activities then “selective incentives” (provision of goods/services or penalties) must be put in place to overcome the obstacles to acting collectively (Olson 1971: 51, 60-65; 1982: 21-24).

Olson’s theory applies specifically to what he terms “distributional coalitions”, because these groups organise in their *economic interests* to obtain a portion of some “public good” in the economic realm. For example, for workers it is higher wages and for firms it may be greater market share or more favourable prices. These groups, once they have overcome the hindrances to acting collectively will act in the interests of the group and these are akin to self-interest when discussed with reference to individuals (Olson...
Even though creating benefits for society may be beneficial to the group at hand, group interests stem from concerns that members of the group have joined to represent and do not stem from a need to bring benefits to society. Instrumental goals based on (material) interests are important, societal impact aside. In fact Olson’s work claims that where interest groups have long been able to thrive (e.g. as in older democracies) they may harm public welfare and retard growth rates through the pursuit of group special interests (Olson 1982: 77-78; 1983: 18-24).

- **CONTRADICTIONS TO OLSON’S ACCOUNT OF MOTIVATIONS FOR CSO FORMATION AND MOBILIZATION**

Olson’s explanation of when groups act differed from pluralist explanations that went before it since these assumed that groups form and act around shared interests, without starting from rationalist assumptions about the utility maximising individual. Olson’s conclusions also differ from some contemporary pluralist conceptions about the benefits of CSOs/interest groups. Notably, Olson’s conclusions stand in stark contrast to those drawn by Putnam in his work on CSOs and social capital. Specifically, Putnam concludes that a plurality of voluntary associations can, not only build democratic ethics and social capital, but can enhance economic growth (Putnam 1993) while Olson finds the opposite. Others have explicitly contradicted the focus on rational economic based cost-benefit calculation in helping to explain collective action, for if this applied many groups would not be formed and many collective actions would not be taken. For instance, Terry Moe’s (1980) efforts to relax Olson’s assumption that groups aim to secure public goods and his assumption that rational, perfectly informed, economically self-interested individuals are the basis of group action.

Moe sees a rational actor as: “…an individual, who in choosing from a perceived set of alternatives, arrives at a transitive preference ordering of all alternatives and chooses the best one.” (1980: 14). Making preference choices depends on value systems and people have complex values that should be taken into account. The emphasis on economic considerations in Olson’s theory is a mere simplification. Thus, “Rational
individuals may be grossly ignorant of the objective context, and they *may be motivated by the most altruistic of values.*” (1980: 14-italics added-) For Moe, the choices people make also depend on the information available to them. Different information can lead people to make different rational choices. People must, therefore, base their perceptions of alternatives and their valuations of costs and benefits on individual “definitions of the situation” (1980: 16-17). In this view many different realities are possible and actions are based on “bounded rationality” in which different people define situations differently, thereby making ideational considerations potentially as important as material/economic ones (1980: 18).

**INTERESTS AS MOTIVATIONS FOR EIGS AND IDEAS AS MOTIVATIONS FOR NON-EIGS?**

…studies of small groups and larger voluntary associations have consistently shown that *values other than economic self-interest are often important determinants of individual behaviour.* Thus, while it seems eminently reasonable that economic self-interest plays a major explanatory role in economic interest groups, *there are good reasons for investigating the behavioral implications of other values as well.* (Moe 1980: 113-italics added-).

The above quotation reiterates the point that interests are not the only factors important for motivating EIG mobilisation. The following subsection looks at discussions relating to whether material interests motivate EIGs more than ideational factors and whether ideational factors are more focal for non-EIGs.

- **MATERIAL INTERESTS FOR EIGS AND IDEAS FOR NON-EIGS?**

  Friendship, social interaction, (solidary incentives) and other intangible benefits, such as satisfaction, that people gain from support for a cause/belief (purposive
incentives)\textsuperscript{25} can be important for understanding the formation and functioning of groups (Moe 1980: 117-118). Moe stresses that even in EIGs economic gain need not be the prime motivator for action: workers may mobilise in a union because they value solidarity, justice, equality or class based ideologies; business people may act collectively because they hold social ideologies based on free enterprise and individualism or; farmers because they value the rural landscape and lifestyle (Moe 1980: 116). Moe further highlights that ideas/values can be important “purposive” motivations for activism not because of the instrumentality of one’s participation in realising goals but because participation is itself a benefit (1980: 119). In other words, the interests of a group (either a non-EIG or and EIG) and the motivations for group activism can be defined by looking factors other than material factors (e.g. ideas).\textsuperscript{26}

In the field of IR, Keck and Sikkink highlight the work of activist networks that mobilise on behalf of groups of people (not themselves) or for causes based on “\textit{shared principled ideas and values}” (1998: 30). As in Moe, individual interests and motivations for activism can be defined in terms of a cause or a social value. Group identities and interests can be constructed around causes or values in contrast to the view that associations are likely only to be formed on the basis of economically grounded rational utility maximising calculations. Whereas Olson outlines the importance of rational-material interest based calculations of utility maximising individuals in accounting for group formation/mobilisation, Keck and Sikkink outline that ideas can be important in understanding group activism.

In contrast to these ideas oriented views, material interest based approaches in political science, IR and IPE tend to imply that actors whose material self-interests have been directly affected by some material occurrence (or potential occurrence) will mobilise. Interests are conceived of as things that exist prior to or independently of ideas.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} Similar to Olson’s positive selective incentives but solidary and purposive incentives are not tangible as are physical goods or services.

\textsuperscript{26} Moe also focuses on entrepreneurs as important in the creation of groups, driving their activism and helping to maintain groups (1980: chap. 3)
Interests are based on material facts/realities (economic, political or social) and are seen as the basis of instrumental/rational action.

The following two examples from IPE literature are instructive in illustrating these assumptions:

i. Rogowski discusses the responses of EIG coalitions to trade liberalisation. He argues that in an international climate of trade liberalisation there will be societal conflict between actors representing factors of production that are favoured by liberalisation and those that are not. The make-up of coalitions differs depending on the abundance or scarcity of land, labour and capital and can lead to rural-urban conflict (with capital and labour forming coalitions when they are either the scarce or abundant factors of production) or class conflict when capital and land make up either the abundant or scarce factors of production (Rogowski 1987; 1990). CSOs mobilise along interest based lines and group interests are determined by their location in the economy (scarce/abundant factor of production). Therefore, material changes (in this case trade liberalisation) impact on interests, which are in a sense predetermined by the location of different groups in the economy (scarce/abundant factor of production).

ii. Frieden also looks at trade liberalisation but looks at sector based coalitions that are affected and influence policy instead of looking at factor based coalitions (Frieden 1988). He focuses on sectors because, in the short run, all labour interests will not be affected the same way nor will all of the interests of capital. Labour in highly competitive industries may favour liberalisation because they may see benefits from this whilst labour and capital in less competitive industries would likely oppose liberalisation. Even if in the long run abundant factors will benefit and scarce ones will not, coalitions are more

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27 Although materialist in focus, these two examples are similar to my work in that they focus on group involvement on international trade issues.
likely to form and influence policy on the basis sectoral interests (Frieden 1991: 437-439). Group interests are, therefore, determined by location in the economy (sector) in the context of material changes (trade liberalisation). So, sectoral coalitions mobilise to influence policy in ways that will benefit their material interests.

In both of these examples interests are conceived as material (based on economic facts/determinants) and they are determined from the location of groups of people in the economy and in the context of material changes/occurrences. Neither of these works precludes the activism of non-EIGs on trade (or other economic issues) but the way in which they focus either on sectoral or factorial motivations for CSO mobilisation in response to trade liberalisation imply that only EIGs (groups seen as motivated by economic concerns) will mobilise on trade issues.

The activism of a wide array of CSOs on trade issues from the 1990s though illustrates that this material interest based premise cannot account for all mobilisation. Keck and Sikink’s (1998) work on the other hand suggests that non-EIGs (they discuss networks) mobilise on the basis of principled beliefs and thus are at odds with the assumptions in the works or Frieden and Rogowski (outlined above). Nonetheless, even though both Moe and Keck and Sikkink emphasise the importance of non-material considerations, their views imply that non-material factors tend to be of more importance for non-EIGs than for EIGs. Keck and Sikink highlight that some groups act in pursuit of “instrumental goals” or to fulfil the material interests of the group whilst others are driven by principled ideas and values (1998: 30). Moe also highlights that “economic self-interests” tend to be important in understanding EIG behaviour (1980: 113). Despite seeing the importance of non-material considerations in understanding group formation and activism these writers still adhere to a dichotomy that classes some groups as acting based on material interests (EIGs) and others based on ideas/values (non-EIGs).

This thesis tries to blur this dichotomy by seeing CSOs and CSO activism as driven by people with shared interests and by understanding interests as necessarily
linked to ideas. Here ideas are viewed as helping to inform the way that people conceive of their interests. This goes both for groups that tend to be seen as acting on the basis of “principled beliefs” (non-EIGs) and those usually seen as acting instrumentally out of material interests (EIGs). Even if individuals make cost-benefit calculations and act as rational maximisers and even if some groups can be seen as motivated more by economic self-interests than others, the way they estimate their interests and mobilise can be informed by a variety of ideas and values. It follows then that both EIGs and non-EIGs can be driven by ideational concerns such as norms - defined as shared or “intersubjective beliefs about proper behaviour” - (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002: 14). When CSOs mobilise based on concerns about democracy, governance or the distribution of material wealth, they do so on the basis of ideas and material concerns (the two being interlinked) and they are calling for norms to be upheld or introduced.

Richardson highlights that as people’s material conditions change (wealth, education) and/or when they have access to knowledge (ideas) they may recognise their interests and mobilise:

As people become more educated, articulate and wealthier, and as knowledge and information become more widespread, more people come to recognize their own interests in issues which hitherto they were happy to ignore and leave to others to resolve. (1993: 7)

Richardson cites the environmental movement and the women’s movement as examples of rethinking preferences by some people in Western democracies from the 1970s. In his estimation, the activism in the environmental movement was linked to scientific discovery and, increased information and knowledge about environmental effects of activities/processes (causal ideas). In the case of the women’s movement he sees activism as due to rising consciousness/awareness of women and the recognition of women’s interests in public policies that was previously left to men (1993: 7-8). In other words, women’s groups were formed and mobilised in women’s interests but the articulation of these interests was linked to the acceptance of certain ideas about right about wrong, just and unjust (principled beliefs). Similarly, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink
suggest that although the 1990s transnational anti-violence against women campaign was in women’s self interests “it also involved new ways of thinking about their roles and relationships...” (2002: 12). Along similar lines, this thesis asserts that ideas help to shape the way people conceive of their interests and the way people think about the importance of activism.

Before coming back to this stance however, let us look at some IR/IPE literature on interests and ideas with relation to understanding government behaviour in order to bring the focus on CARICOM / government inclusion of CSOs on trade issues into this evaluation. This focus on government/official behaviour is necessary because in addition to asserting that ideas/interests have driven CSO activism on trade in the 1990s this thesis asserts that CARICOM and its governments began to express willingness to consult CSOs from around the same time based on ideas/interests. The IR literature on ideas based and interest based motivations for actor behaviour is informative on this front and can also be applied to the discussion of motivations for CSO activism.

**2.3 IDEATIONAL AND MATERIAL FACTORS IN UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

Although we previously treated rational-materialist approaches as not interested in ideational factors (in my examples of Frieden’s and Rogowski’s work), in the field of IR there exists material interest based literature that starts from rational assumptions but also attempts to look at ideas. Ideas are brought into these works that look at state behaviour and government policy decision-making in acknowledgement that material interests are not all there is for understanding these phenomena in IR/IPE. Some actions cannot be understood simply through the use of models based on rational (economic) utility maximising assumptions and that see material interests as determinants of action.

However, as Wendt and Woods make clear, when ideas enter into a rationalist-materialist framework they do so as *residual variables* that help to account for variance
or actions that cannot be explained using rationalist explanations alone (Wendt 1999: 78; Woods 1995: 164). Ideas are also brought into rationalist-materialist frameworks to help to explain choices in situations of multiple equilibria (when choices for acting in a variety of different ways are equal) or as tools to help to sustain cooperation/collective action. Ideas are therefore seen as important because they can be used for utility maximisation or for facilitating cooperation (or for various other aims) (Blyth 1997: 241, 243; Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 12-24). In essence then, material interests still remain the important drivers of action.

The following sub-section starts by illustrating this rationalist-materialist consideration of ideas, moves on to look at more nuanced approaches to ideas and interests and then opens out to consider approaches that can be seen as blurring the ideas-interest line more radically.

APPROACHES TO IDEAS

- IDEAS AS TOOLS

Goldstein and Keohane’s work illustrates a rational-materialist approach. They look at how ideas (“beliefs held by individuals”) can help to explain government policy outcomes (1993: 3) and hold that changes in material conditions can allow ideas to have impacts that they did not have previously. They also take the view that ideas tend to be important with changes in material interests (1993: 25). Goldstein and Keohane concede that ideas and interests are linked but wish to separate the two in order to decipher whether state actions can be accounted for via “egoistic interests” or via differences in ideas (1993: 26-27). Goldstein and Keohane categorise ideas as world-views (perceptions about the world, philosophical outlooks), principled beliefs (ideas about right/wrong) and causal beliefs (ideas about cause and effect). These ideas serve as: “road maps” helping people to strategise where information is incomplete; “focal points” that help in making choices in multiple equilibria; or instruments that help to direct outcomes through “institutionalization” and prolonging cooperation (1993: 12-24). These conceptions of
ideas see them as tools to further interests or to achieve outcomes rather than seeing ideas as intrinsically linked to interests.

- **IDEAS AS SHAPING INTERESTS**

More nuanced versions of this materialist approach see ideas as helping to inform preference specification and consider them as more intertwined with interests. The following are examples:

i. McNamara states that ideas (“shared causal beliefs”) are important for understanding policy change (1998: 4). Changes in the international economy in addition to policy failure/crisis open a window for new ideas to be taken up and to influence policies that states adopt or pursue. Here the international economic structure shapes politics but policy choices and policy content are shaped by ideas that help leaders to interpret changes and to define interests (1998: 6-8).

ii. Checkel also sees ideas as important in understanding political change. He links political changes to ideas (“broad concepts and basic beliefs”) and sees carriers of ideas as important (e.g. epistemic communities and NGOs) (Checkel 1997: 4-5, 7). He highlights that ideas can impact on decision-makers by providing a “policy paradigm or road map for interpreting international politics and shaping preferences” (Checkel 1997: 5). Importantly too, he states that ideas find space to be of influence (as road maps) with changes in the international environment that can lead to uncertainty (Checkel 1997: 4, 11). As in Goldstein and Keohane with material changes (causing uncertainty) ideas can become important tools for directing leaders’ policy choices. However, as in McNamara, this view sees ideas as helping to shape preferences too. Checkel’s view adds an institutional element in addition by seeing political institutions as structuring the way in which ideas can impact on decision-makers. He sees weak political
structures as allowing space for ideas to penetrate unlike centralised ones that insulate policy makers from adopting new ideas (Checkel 1997: 6-7, 11)

• **A BRIEF LOOK AT INSTITUTIONS**

Chekel’s work is in the institutionalist tradition in IR, IPE and political science that sees institutions as important in helping to understand political interactions. This institutionalist vein was previously highlighted in this chapter’s discussion of interest groups in which it was shown that the activism and impact of interest groups can be influenced by formal government institutional structures.

Therefore, *institutions can be important because they can facilitate or constrain political action*. In IR, IPE and political science institutionalists too have been divided amongst those who see ideas as important in allowing for formation, stability and changes in institutions and others who see interest calculation and utility maximisation as important in understanding institutional formation and disintegration. In this light, Goldstein and Keohane’s assertion that ideas can be important for institutionalisation of cooperation illustrates how rationalist-materialist strain in institutionalist literature has come to incorporate ideas in accounting for institutional continuity where it may otherwise be rational for individuals to cease cooperation.

Group theory holds other parallels to work in the institutionalist strain. Both group theory and institutionalism tend to look at forms of cooperation/collective action, reasons for cooperation and the outcomes/effects of cooperation. However, institutionalist work in political science and IR tends to looks mainly at governmental/inter-governmental institutions and their impact on policy formation whereas; group theory looks at the internal institutional make-up of groups. Looking at governmental/inter-governmental institutions is important in this thesis for examining the space opened and planned by CARICOM and its constituent governments for consulting CSOs on trade issues. The ideas/interests that motivate governments to create institutional space for CSO
consultation on trade issues are important here. Nonetheless, important too is looking at institutional considerations internal to CSOs.

Specifically, CSOs need to be able to mobilise meaningfully in order to be of impact in their own right and so that their contributions come to be considered by governments or other relevant officials. In addition to interests/perceived interests based on ideational-material factors, institutional factors are important. Specifically the requisite human resources and funding are needed to mobilise with “competence”. Speaking of institutional problems that may face CSOs with respect to efforts to democratise the global economy Scholte states:

Most community associations, NGOs, religious groups and trade unions have operated with small budgets and limited long-term financial security. They have had only a handful of staff specifically dedicated to global economic issues and have often relied heavily on volunteer and low-paid labour. Even some business forums (especially among small entrepreneurs) and think tanks (especially in the South) have led a precarious existence. (2004: 49)

Institutional factors, and in particular the funding and human resources aspects of capacity, are important to consider in understanding CSO mobilisation and consultation on trade matters. The institutional space made available by governments and pertinent bodies for incorporating CSOs is important to consider too. Hence, institutional factors are vital for any understanding of CSO activism and consultation on trade matters, in CARICOM and beyond. For now though let us leave the issue of institutions aside, as this will be explored more fully as the thesis progresses. Instead the following sub-section will look at literature that considers ideas, but in doing so, goes beyond rationalist-materialist and other more nuanced treatments of ideas already highlighted.

• IDEAS AS CONSTITUTIVE

The writings of Blyth (2002, 2003) Woods (1995) and Wendt (1999) are examples of works that are near polar opposites of materialist thought about actor behaviour (or action). Such materialist work was previously highlighted using the IPE examples of
Frieden and Rogowski who see group interests as determined by international economic structures (they look at trade specifically). Similar interest based persuasions can be seen in more general (non-IPE) IR too. For instance, there is work that sees states as acting in their interests as determined by the international structure/system (international structure = material fact), notably Waltz (1979). Work along the realist-liberal continuum (e.g. hegemonic stability theory) that sees international cooperation/institutions as responses to state interests as determined by the international system, is also predominantly materialist in orientation.

Blyth (2002, 2003) Woods (1995) and Wendt (1999) critique the interest-based focus of such thought. They also critique the ideas-interest division and the conception of ideas as tools used to further interests, evident in some efforts to tack on ideas (e.g. Goldstein and Keohane 1993). These authors want ideas to be taken seriously and see them as constitutive of interests. For instance, Wendt states: “We want what we want because of how we think about it” (1999:119) and Blyth expresses that “cognates of interests, such as wants, beliefs and desires” are inherent in interests and, therefore, “… must be considered as part of the concept of interest itself.” (2002: 29). Ideas and interests are seen as inseparable. Such views, thus, go much further than those that see ideas and interests as inherently connected (e.g. McNamara 1998: 8; Checkel 1997: 5).

**IDEATIONAL-MATERIAL CONTEXT**

These discussions of CSOs, interest groups, understanding state action or policy change in IR are connected because they speak about the behaviour of actors. The literature addressed so far has considered ideas, interests or some combination of the two as important for motivating both CSO activism and government policy choices. The discussion has also preliminarily introduced the importance of institutional factors for understanding CSO activism and consultation. However, the discussion has not looked at the contexts in which actor behaviours (CSO activism or government behaviour) are located. In order to understand the timing of CSO activism on trade and government inclusion and overtures to inclusion of CSOs, in this thesis it is important to look at the
the intersection between ideas-interests and changes in international economic conditions in the 1990s. In so doing, this research takes an approach similar to McNamara’s in viewing “economic structure” and “human agency” as important in understanding action.28

On the one hand, this approach implies that material factors form the important context in which CSOs decide to act or governments behave in one way or another. In other words, this approach appears to assume that material facts/occurrences affect material interests and, by extension, precipitate CSO or government action. So, as the works of Frieden or Rogowski highlighted earlier suggest, real or proposed changes in international trade policy thrust actors whose interests are affected to mobilise in support of varying material interests. However, the approach here is not materialist. Just as material interests are not viewed as separable from ideas in motivating action in this thesis, observable international political/economic occurrences or changes are not conceived as material alone in setting the stage for actor behaviour.

International political/economic occurrences are partly ideationally based just as interests are constituted at least in part by ideas. For instance, causal beliefs about how political and economic affairs should be conducted to enhance prosperity that become popular and that are espoused in policy proposals can be made into reality through practices. In this way, neo-liberal market oriented ideas about economic growth and trade underpinned the creation of the WTO and the liberalising world trading atmosphere. In consequence, it is fair to say that ideas are important in constructing material realities. It follows then that changes in material conditions are, at least to some extent, linked to changes in ideas about cause and effect, about the rightness/wrongness of a course of action, or by philosophical views about the world (causal ideas, principled ideas and world views). Hence, throughout this thesis international changes/occurrences are referred to as ideational-material.29 Therefore, CSOs and governments can be seen to

28 McNamara however discusses these with reference to international cooperation.
29 This last point will be brought out more thoroughly in Chapters 3 and 4 to follow, which actually highlight important ideational-material occurrences and trends.
act, not only on the basis of ideas/interests that are internally held or generated, but in the context of specific ideational-material settings.

CONCLUSION

To close this chapter, let us look back at what has been discussed, how this discussion will feed into this thesis and then link these ideas to what will be discussed in the chapter to follow.

This chapter presented a discussion of CSOs and interest groups and in doing so emphasised that this thesis is not in accord with views that see some EIGs as motivated solely by material interests and non-EIGs as motivated solely by ideas. Instead, ideas and interests are viewed as connected and important in understanding the activism of EIGs and non-EIGs. So, in looking at CSO mobilisation in the CARICOM region, the interests of all CSOs are portrayed as intertwined with ideas about the world (world views), right/wrong (principled beliefs) and about cause and effect (causal beliefs).

Without rehashing the argument, similar assertions can be made for understanding government/ CARICOM interests, which form the basis of decisions to act in one way or another. In separating ideas in this way this thesis draws on Goldstein and Keohane’s classification, but, does not disconnect ideas from interests as they do. Within the ideas-interests debate, this work aligns with views that see ideas as of great significance in contextualising actor behaviour and in constructing actor preferences. This view informs the approach taken throughout this thesis in looking at the activism of CSOs in CARICOM on trade from the 1990s and in looking at government inclusion/overtures to inclusion of CSOs from the 1990s.

In short, this research focuses on ideas and interests as interlinked and important in helping to understand the government and CSO actions and this cannot be separated
from the ideational-material context of international occurrences in which actor behaviour is situated.
CHAPTER 3

CSO EVOLUTION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ANGLO-CARIBBEAN FROM THE 19TH CENTURY

The principal CSOs that have been active in CARICOM politics (as early as the 1950s) have been EIGs representing labour and the private sector. However, this thesis asserts that these CSOs did not attempt to participate in shaping trade relations for most of this history, nor did government officials incorporate them systematically on trade issues. Instead, activism by these CSOs and others (notably non-EIGs) consolidated in the 1990s. Governments also began efforts to engage with CSOs on trade affairs from around this time period. This shift toward CSO activism on trade matters occurred in the context of changing ideational-material trends that were important from the 1980s and that opened “space” for the involvement of CSOs in governance by the mid-1990s.

In order to advance these arguments it is important to understand CS participation in governance in the region. Therefore, this chapter looks at the evolution of CSO activism in the region and at the ways in which CSOs have participated in politics in the region over time. This chapter will, in so doing, illustrate that CS writ large became able to participate in political decision-making a century after emancipation, when “space” was opened for political participation and for a variety of CSOs to operate freely. The opening of space for CSO activism is important to consider in understanding CSO activism, both in the Caribbean context and in general. This chapter also shows that for most of the history of the region, the concerns of CSOs were transported into policy spheres through protest or indirectly via a silent bargain between the government, labour and private sector (and their EIGs) rather than through consultation. The move towards CSOs placing an emphasis on engagement with governments through research, advocacy and consultation emerged as novel in the mid/late 1990s. Also novel were government/official proposals for consulting with CSOs in more structured and serious ways than in the past.
Hence, this chapter focuses on: the evolution of the CSO world and CSO activism; reasons for CSO mobilisation on certain issues; and the ways in which CSOs mobilised in certain political or economic arenas between the 19th century and the early 1970s. This allows us to look at the: (a) material, (b) institutional and (c) ideational factors that were important in time-specific ideational-material contexts. One can thereby begin to evaluate the extent to which and the reasons why CSO activism in CARICOM has changed over time, which aids in understanding why CSOs from the 1990s became active in governance and specifically the politics of international trade.

This chapter proceeds in the following manner: section 3.1 discusses the existence and the emergence of politically and socially important CSOs in the region between the 19th century and the end of World War II. Section 3.2 discusses the activism of CSOs on the British West Indies Federation, CARIFTA and CARICOM. This section looks at CSO ideas, interests and at the institutional factors that coloured CSO activism with respect to these regional arrangements. Section 3.2 specifically emphasises the importance of labour activism (between the 1930s and the 1950s) on the formation of the Federation and private sector EIG activism (in the late 1960s and early 1970s) on the formation of CARIFTA and CARICOM. Section 3.3 then proceeds to look at the changes in the variety and character of CSOs in the region from the 1970s up until the end of the 20th century by looking at private sector/industry specific EIGs, radical CSOs, women’s organisations and other NGO type CSOs.

3.1 CSOS AND THEIR ACTIVISM: THE 19TH CENTURY TO MID-20TH CENTURY

Chapter 2 discussed CSOs and stated that space for CSO formation and mobilisation (either authorised or unauthorised) has been viewed as necessary for CSO activism/impact. In this section we look at the space opened for CSOs within the
Anglophone Caribbean. This space was opened when the majority populations in the region gained their freedom with the end of slavery in the 19th century. Space was further expanded following the Moyne Report of 1940\textsuperscript{30} that established a legal basis for political parties, trade unions and cooperatives, opened doors for the free pursuit of entrepreneurial and professional activities, and (as a result) opened space for further development of a middle class (Marshall 1998:57; Crassweller 1972: 239-240).

CSOS TO THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY

Caribbean economies under colonisation were based on plantation production of sugar (and other crops) using slave labour. These production arrangements shaped economic activities and social/class/race relations in the region. There were enslaved “black” majorities, small pockets of free “coloured” people and the well-off “white” elites who usually owned and managed plantations or controlled commerce (Knowles 1959: 6-10; Scarano, 1989: 56).

In addition to economic activities shaping social relations and economic activities in the region, ideas were important. Specifically, racist ideas that were held by colonisers and plantation owners contributed to the exploitation of Africans and persons of African descent as slave labourers in this plantation based economic system. So low was the view of people of African origin that they were seen as little more than property (chattel) to be bought and sold for commercial and household purposes. Additionally, the idea that “New World” territories were little more than resource bases for production geared towards enriching European colonisers within mercantilist systems cannot be forgotten either.

In this colonial ideational-material context commercial and agricultural associations were formed to represent the concerns of the merchant traders and plantation

\textsuperscript{30}The Moyne Commission, prior commissions sent to the region by the Colonial Office, and their contribution to CSO development will be discussed more later on in this section.
owners/managers’ (merchant-planters), who dominated the economic and political landscape in the region up until the mid-20th century, towards relevant colonial officials. Commercial associations were established in the Bahamas (1797), Jamaica (1779), Barbados (1825), and Trinidad and Tobago (1879); agricultural societies were founded in Trinidad and Tobago (1839), Barbados (1845), Jamaica (1895); and a combination of the two was created in St. Lucia in 1884 (the St. Lucia Agricultural and Commercial Society). In contrast, there was little space for associations representing other segments of society within the region; specifically slaves had little space for association and women (even from the planter/merchant elite) tended to be restricted to playing private roles.

By the 19th century though, slavery became untenable. Slave based plantation sugar production declined in profitability, notably, with a shift in British orientation from mercantilist policies and towards liberal ones in the trade realm. Continued slave rebellion and resistance was important too, as also was the activism of CSOs within the UK (specifically the Anti-slavery Society) that called for an end of slavery based on the principled idea that it was an unjust and inhumane system (Scarano, 1989:55, 65). In this context, slavery in the British West Indies was abolished in 1834, with a period of apprenticeship lasting until 1838.

Ex-slaves remained poor and disadvantaged following emancipation particularly since social welfare provisions that were previously provided by plantations evaporated. Plantations were no longer obliged to take the same responsibilities for their work forces as they were obligated to for their slaves. In this setting, welfare-type groups (non-EIGs) grew within ex-slave communities in the form of friendly societies, burial societies, credit associations and women’s groups (Senior 1991: 151; Hunte 2001: 134; Bolland 2001: 190-193). Additionally, church, religious associations and charitable organisations

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31 These tended to be predecessors of modern Chambers of Commerce and Agricultural Societies that today are not so “elitist” in aiming to represent and inform business and agricultural interests throughout society. 32 In the 19th century sugar production in the British West Indies became less profitable when sugar prices fell with competition from other sugar producers. Also, Britain liberalised trade, cutting much of its preferential treatment of colonial produce between 1846-1854. (Sherlock et. al, 1987: 172; Scarano, 1989: 55-56; Knight and Palmer 1989: 8)
became very important in supporting communities. Some charitable organisations were run by wealthy or middle-class white or coloured women for whom voluntary work was one of the few acceptable forms of work available to them and for whom such work was also seen as a status symbol (Reddock 1994: 162-163; Senior 1991: 151).

The end of slavery opened some space for a shift away from political and economic affairs in the region being dominated by the state and the planter-merchant elite and for broader CS association. However, this was at extremely slow pace. So slow was the pace that Brereton (1989) described the years between emancipation and the early 20th century as “quiet times” (86). By the early 20th century, and particularly from the 1930s, the pace of change quickened in part because CSOs and social movements emerged from wider realms of society and mobilised to change the status quo. A labour movement grew and politically oriented CSOs became important by the end of the 19th century. These CSOs were empowered by and built on the work of small clusters of constitutional and workers’ rights advocates that went before them (Brereton 1989: 86; Bolland 2001: 155; Lewis 1977: 18). Such CSO formation and the beginnings of activism must be understood against the ideational-material backdrop of the time.

CSOS FROM THE EARLY TO MID-20TH CENTURY

- **LABOUR ASSOCIATIONS**

Small unions were formed in the region from the early 19th century. In Jamaica there was the Bricklayers and Painters Union (Artisans Union) founded in 1898, there was the Trinidad Workingmen’s Association formed in 1897 and in Guyana the British Guiana Labour Union was formed in 1919 (Bolland 2001: 190-193; Randall 2003: 74-75; Lewis 1977: 18). Strikes were prevalent in many British Caribbean colonies between 1916 and 1924 in: Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Lucia, the Bahamas, Antigua, Grenada, Barbados, British

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33 Although women were active in the labour movement in the 1930s and 1940s they tended to play supportive roles while these organisations were run by males and often centred around male employment as suggested in the presence of “Workingmen’s Associations”.

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Guiana (now Guyana), and British Honduras (now Belize). Nonetheless, very few unions existed since these were illegal. Friendly societies and self-help organisations in existence throughout the 19th century, however, often acted in similar ways to unions by providing benefits, looking after social and welfare concerns and acting as training grounds for workers to develop advocacy and organisational skills (Bolland 2001: 175-177; Randall 2003: 74-75; Lewis 1977: 18; Howe 2001: 123).

By the mid-1930s, working class disturbances spread across the British Caribbean with economic recession that caused decreases in wage and employment levels. In addition workers were vexed by the heavy tax burdens that they bore. Consequently, there were strikes in St. Kitts, British Guiana, St. Vincent and St. Lucia in 1935, in Trinidad, British Guiana, St. Lucia, Jamaica and Barbados in 1937, and further strike action in 1938 by workers in Jamaica and British Guiana (Lewis 1977: 18; Knowles 1959: 44; Brereton 1989: 87).

By the 1940s a labour movement began in earnest in the British West Indies with unions established across the region some years following the creation of a regional umbrella labour association (the British Guiana and the West Indies Labour Congress) in 1926, at the first regional labour conference (Bolland 2001: 506, Arthur 2005: 6).34 Workers acted collectively in efforts to improve working standards and wage levels. The labour movement within the region was also concerned with constitutional matters in light of the inequalities that existed under colonial rule.

Despite having linked the emergence of unions in the region to world economic recession, poverty and inequality under colonialism (material factors) it is important to note that \textit{ideational concerns were pivotal in this movement too}. For instance unions believed that \textit{self-government by means of regional integration} was the best way to pursue independence and equity and therefore pursued an integrationist strategy. This idea was expressed in 1926 at the first regional labour conference in British Guiana, and upheld into the 1950s with the Caribbean Labour Congress’s (CLC) submission of

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34 This umbrella association would become the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) in 1945

Workers also constituted their interests in part based on ideas that they held about the material world which was characterized by colonialism, inequality and poverty. Unions, therefore, mobilized in pursuit of principled beliefs in equality and social justice which were connected to their material interests. Workers’ unions saw bettering working conditions and remuneration, decreasing social inequality, making constitutional advances through self-governance and regional integration as in their interests, but these interests cannot be understood as simply material self-interests. Instead they were entangled with broader ideas about injustice and moral obligation.

• MIDDLE-CLASS CSOs

In the region, there also existed distinctly middle-class political associations aimed at enhancing the representation in legislative councils and improving access to civil service employment for people who had risen up the social ladder no matter their race or colour. These associations were called “Representative Government Associations” and were present throughout the Eastern Caribbean. Additionally, despite their middle-class goals and membership they were able to obtain working class support in demonstrations, petitions and at meetings (Lewis 1977: 41; Bolland 2001: 164).

Middle-class (“brown” or “coloured”) members of society wanted to break through the racial barriers that prohibited their full political and economic participation in society and also limited their abilities for socio-economic advancement in society. In other words, members of Representative Government Associations acted in pursuit of their material interests (socio-economic advancement). Nevertheless, these interests cannot be considered without once more considering principled ideas about the unjust nature of racial and class discrimination. These principled beliefs coloured the character of these CSOs and the way these CSOs perceived and articulated their interests.
• **RACIAL AWARENESS CSOS**

The United Negro’s Improvement Association (UNIA) was founded by Marcus Garvey in Jamaica in 1914. This CSO is the important predecessor of the 1960s/1970s “Black Power” movements in the region and Pan-African associations and movements that continue to exist in the region. It was based on a *Pan-African philosophy*, and spawned branches throughout the Caribbean, in Central America and in New York and operated a publication (*Negro World*) and an ocean liner (the Black Star Line). This CSO aimed at mobilising black entrepreneurs to be the financial engines for a pan-African movement whilst also having a popular base (Bolland 167-171; Desmangles et. al, 2003: 287-288).

UNIA revolved around *ideas about race and ethnic origins* rather than around constitutional or labour issues. Nonetheless, some workers’ rights issues were addressed within UNIA, with members becoming active in the labour and political movements in the 1930s and 1940s when many people chose political action for nation rather than race (Bolland 2001: 172; Knowles 1959: 59-60). Once more, ideas and material concerns were important in understanding UNIA. The interests of UNIA members were linked both to a Pan-African *philosophy* and the *material facts* of political and economic exclusion in the colonial Caribbean.

Following World War I, soldiers from the British West Indian Regiment returned to the Caribbean. These soldiers formed the Caribbean League, whilst deployed in 1917 and this association called for black rights, self-determination and closer West Indian integration (Howe 2001: 120). Their disillusionment at the economic and political circumstances to which they returned intensified their political engagement and contributed to their involvement in protests in Belize, Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad in 1919 and their membership of UNIA and Workingmen’s Associations in the region. *Material conditions* of economic and political marginalisation were expressed in their interests, but so too were *ideas* such as those about justice. These soldiers came to realise
the importance of mobilising in pursuit of principles such as social, economic and political justice during the war and they also came to emphasise the idea of self-determination (Bolland 2001: 196-198; Howe 2001: 126).

In addition to considering ideas and interests in understanding CSO activism and formation we should acknowledge institutional factors that facilitated the formation and activism of CSOs and that helped or hindered CSO abilities to be heard. The abolition of the institution of slavery was important for creating a climate in which free people could mobilise. Colonial Office enquiries aimed at examining the socio-economic conditions within the region were important too. The Colonial Office commissions should be given a bit of coverage here because of their role in opening institutional space for CSOs and CS in general.

In 1938 a Colonial Office investigation (the Moyne Commission) into the conditions in the British Colonies began in light of poor economic conditions and labour uprisings. This Moyne Commission considered the views of a broader spectrum of the populations in the British Caribbean than the traditionally important planter-merchant elite. The Moyne Commission produced an important report that opened space for trade union activity and opened space for economic and political activities by marginalized segments of Anglo-Caribbean societies (Marshall 1998:57; Crassweller 1972: 239-240; Knowles 1959: 49). Before 1938, other Colonial Office Commissions were sent to the region too. A 1932 commission investigated the possibility of allowing the West Indian colonies extended constitutional advances through the creation of a political confederation. Also, in 1921 the Wood Commission investigated the conditions causing unrest in the region following World War I. The resulting Wood Report (1922) recommended constitutional changes for Trinidad, the Windward Islands and Dominica to allow increased political participation in the colonies (Lewis 1977: 41-42; Payne 1989: 6-8; Howard, 1989: 5; Bolland 2001: 143).
The emergence of politically important CSOs must be linked to wider time-specific occurrences too such as: the *First World War* and *Wilsonian ideas* about equality, justice and self-determination espoused in its aftermath. Additionally, according to W. A. Lewis, examples of strike action abroad were important in propelling the British Caribbean labour movement. In particular, strike action in the French, American and British labour movements were important examples for the West Indian region of the potentials of labour mobilisation (Lewis 1977: 19). These occurrences impacted on the *ideas* and *interests* promoted by CSOs in the region, fed into labour activism in the aftermath of 1929/30 recession and *provided the ideational-material context* in which people’s interests in creating organisations to deal with workers’ discontent and political/social inequality were sharpened.

- **EMERGING SELF-GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENT-CSO TIES**

Although by the end of World War II Caribbean societies became more open and formal political institutions become more accessible to a wider range of people, the planter-merchant elite in society remained important because of its control of economic resources. However, the working-classes grew in political significance with the broadening of constitutional rights by the mid-20th century. With the emergence of self-governance, leaders in the region focussed on electoral politics, creating social stability and fostering economic development (Knowles 1959: 183; Marshall 1998: 63).

These leaders focussed heavily on development in their politics and policies and were primarily informed by the *“modernisation and growth”* approach to development35, which constituted the *dominant development policy paradigm* of the time. In particular, the region’s MDCs attempted to develop using Lewis’s modernisation and growth

35 In using the term “modernisation and growth” this thesis follows Martinussen’s categorisation of schools of development in which he combines theories that speak to the necessity of economic growth and those on sociological and political modernisation. These two sets of theoretical approaches are combined into one school of thought by Martiussen because of their similar emphasis on development as a process of modernisation (1999: 50-51, 56, 167-168). The interventionist modernisation and growth approaches to development can be contrasted to the neo-liberal approaches that came to dominate mainstream development thinking by the 1980s.
prescriptions for development that were linked to the Puerto Rican model (Mandle 1989: 243; Marshall 1998: 64-65). The development processes advocated along these lines prescribed government involvement in economic activities and making use of foreign direct investment (FDI) in order to promote industrialisation. So, governments intervened in domestic economic activities via para-statals and governments enticed FDI into the region. Both of these strategies aimed at promoting industrialisation, economic diversification and economic growth (Mandle 1989: 243-244; Marshall 1998: 63-65, 67: Bennett 1999: 129-131).

Governments in the region also attempted to appease important socio-economic groups within society to create social stability and in efforts to win votes at election time. One part of this effort entailed providing relief from unemployment through public sector employment. The other part entailed governments advancing economic diversification and bailing out struggling private producers involved in important economic activities (e.g. those producing flagging agricultural exports) whilst allowing the wealthy planter-merchant classes to focus on other lucrative economic activities such as export trading (Marshall 1998: 64-65; D’Agostino 2003: 123; CDB/Mellon Foundation 1997: 8).

Thereby, political leaders attempted to satisfy the working classes, the middle classes and the wealthy by trying to please everyone but consulting with no one. Some students of Caribbean politics have referred to this state-society bargain, in which governments acted as patrons and interest groups as clients, as “populist-statism” or “state sponsored patron-clientelism” (Marshall 1998: 75; D’Agostino 2003: 123). This governance bargain is also in some respects similar to various definitions corporatism in which the state maintains harmony between labour and private sector interests (Thomas 1993:9).

36 However, governments have not always been successful at this balancing act particularly with persistent high unemployment and poverty in some countries.
37 This differs from neo-corporatism/democratic corporatism which entails tripartite interest group negotiations.
Added to patterns of “populist-statism”, CS/CSO activism and consultation was lacking because self-governance structures that emerged in the region in the 1940s and 1950s mirrored the Westminster parliamentary system. In this system, the executive and legislative branches of government are fused, party discipline is strong, majorities in parliament are exaggerated through the First Past the Post System and there are few access points at which CSOs can intervene to influence policies (Richardson 1993: 89). This has meant that in the CARICOM region governments have been able to operate as unitary entities with few entry points for CSOs. Where CSOs have had access to policy spheres this has been through committees or “task force” mechanisms created on an ad hoc basis (CDB/Mellon Foundation 1997: 21). In other words, the degree of centralisation of political powers and institutions has placed limits on political participation by CS and CSOs in the region.

This point notwithstanding, at the level of regional political and economic arrangements there were instances in which CSOs became involved in trying to shape political arrangements. The following section highlights these instances.

### 3.2 CSO ACTIVISM ON REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FROM FEDERATION TO CARICOM

**THE BRITISH WEST INDIES FEDERATION**

The formation of the British West Indies Federation in 1958 is an example of a process that was (in part) called for by Caribbean workers’ unions and in which they had some input. Labour EIGs supported the creation of a regional confederation from the 1930s. In 1938 Moyne Commission raised the question of confederation but officials in the Colonial Office, planters and merchants and officials in the colonies were not in favour. Planter-class resistance to regional unification strategies had roots as far back as their disapproval of the 1871 Leeward Islands Federation and in persistent failed attempts to unite the Windward Islands (Payne 1989: 5-8; Sherlock et. al. 1987: 260). The lack of
links between the plantations in the West Indies was an important reason for the lack of planter class support, as plantations tended to be in competition with each other and all production geared towards Britain. This lack of linkages was also a result of the British prohibition of trade between the territories (Payne 1990: 25).

On the other hand, support for federal government came from the emerging West Indian middle class, political and labour groups. Delegates from the British Guiana and West Indies Labour Congress were invited to make contributions to the Moyne Commission’s investigations and used the opportunity to submit a draft bill for the creation of a confederation in the region, highlighting the importance of self-government and adult suffrage (Lewis 1977: 42; Arthur 2005: 6; Bolland 2001: 506-507; Payne 1989: 7-8).

Following the Second World War the British Government was in favour of divesting itself of the responsibilities for its Caribbean territories. Creating a political confederation was seen as the only viable self-governance option for these small territories (Crassweller 1972: 666; Sherlock et. al. 1987: 261). Additionally, the Caribbean’s new popularly elected political figures generally believed regional integration was useful, particularly for functional cooperation (Payne 1989: 13-14; Sherlock et. al 1987: 261-262; Marshall 1998: 59). So, discussions on the issue of forming a confederation began at a conference in Montego Bay, Jamaica in 1947 (Lewis 1999: 3; Erisman 1992: 59).

In this context, labour EIG activism on the issue of a regional confederation continued. Notably, the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) submitted a draft bill for a federal constitution in 1947 at the initial meeting on the creation of a confederation (Arthur 2005: 7).

Although it was supposed to be an answer to various CS calls (particularly by the regional labour and political movements) for independence, the Federation brought little

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38 The CLC was the successor to the British Guiana and West Indies Labour Congress
new in the way of governance, since constitutional advances such as universal adult suffrage and ministerial government were granted between 1945 and 1956 in Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, and the Windward and Leeward Islands (Payne 1989: 14-15; Crassweller 1972: 239-240). Moreover, discord between political leadership within the Federation was abundant, specifically in relation to the degree of power to be exercised nationally and federally. For instance, Jamaican leaders opposed strong federal powers, while those in Trinidad, and in most of the other territories to varying degrees, were in favour of a strong federal government (Erisman 1992: 60-61). Little emphasis was placed on trade aspects of integration in the Federal context, which meant that there were no significant changes from the regionally disconnected agriculture export-oriented economies (Lewis 1999: 10; CARICOM 1998). Added to this, economic changes such as increasing industrial production and tourism development in some countries, but not in others, further divided the region’s leaders and thereby contributed to the political complexity of the arrangement.

Economic conditions in some countries improved from the 1950s due to economic diversification that was promoted through development programmes encouraging “industrialisation by invitation” along the lines suggested by W. Arthur Lewis. In particular, Jamaica and Trinidad did very well, with Jamaica’s bauxite and Trinidad’s oil refining industries booming. However, since changes in economic conditions were uneven in the region, some of the more advanced countries (i.e. Jamaica) believed that the Federation was to their detriment. This was compounded by the continued lack of economic interconnectedness in this region that geared production towards North American and British markets and the fact that in attempts to seduce FDI from the USA and the UK the region’s countries competed against each other instead of cooperating (Marshall 1998: 45-60; Payne 1989: 15-16; Sherlock et. al. 1987: 269-270; Bolland 2001: 506-507). So, despite the CLC’s advocacy of regional integration and cooperation political divides dominated Federal politics.

These political and economic differences in the region contributed to the disintegration of the Federation. Jamaica (the Federation’s largest country) decided to

**CARIFTA AND CARICOM**

Following the demise of the Federation, the creation of a Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) was proposed in 1965. It was not until 1967, however, that negotiations for the creation of CARIFTA were resuscitated. In the case of CARIFTA, a regional umbrella private sector EIG, *the Incorporated Caribbean Chambers of Industry and Commerce (ICCC)*, was the important CSO that mobilised in favour of regional economic integration.

The ICCC wanted to reach larger markets, since incentives established in the 1950s to encourage industrial development had, by the 1960s, created industries (in the MDCs) that were quickly outgrowing their local markets. So, the ICCC created a committee that toured the region and met with heads of government to test their views (Payne 1989: 68-69; Axline 1979: 92). In August 1967, when an inter-territory meeting was held in Georgetown Guyana to discuss CARIFTA, government officials, academics (commissioned to undertake feasibility studies) and ICCC representatives discussed and agreed the outline for CARIFTA. This is an instance where there was indeed CSO activism and consultation on trade issues and where this was significant. However, this activism on trade was limited to a regional focus.

Apart from the ICCC, no other CSOs mobilised in efforts to shape this region-wide trade agreement. This may be viewed as consistent with material interest-based views on involvement in trade and economic realms. However, ideas held within the ICCC were important in precipitating this EIG’s mobilisation.
As previously noted, leaders in the region for the most part accepted the *causal beliefs* expressed in the modernisation and growth paradigm. As a result, policies that facilitated the growth of manufacturing sectors in attempts to foster import substitution industrialisation (ISI) were implemented. In Lewis’s version of the modernisation and growth approach, expanding industrial capacity within a protective regional atmosphere and making use of foreign investment were important ingredients for Caribbean industrialisation and development. The belief in the importance of a regional infant industry strategy and the need to attract foreign investment coloured views of governments and private sector entities represented by the ICCC so that a regional trading area became a feasible follow-up to the failed Federation. *Ideas about how to develop economically and about how to pursue profitability shaped interest perceptions* of leaders and some producers in the region (Axline 1979: 70-71; Erisman 1992: 61-62).

Evidence of the importance that regional leaders and the ICCC attached to the modernisation and growth paradigm can be seen in their rejection of proposals from academics invited to the 1967 meeting. These academics advocated the creation of a CARIFTA based on ideas drawn from a paradigm different from the modernisation and growth school.

Caribbean scholars of the 1960s-1970s from the University of the West Indies (UWI) who called themselves the “*New World Group*”, recommended regional integration as a possible response to unemployment and economic development problems. They recommended organising the production and the promotion of manufacturing industries on a regional scale to deal with these economic development concerns in order to enhance ISI and to increase levels of inter-island commerce (Bennett: 1999: 129-131; Erisman 1992: 61). Lewis’s view and variations of this, notably the view espoused in the region by economist William Demas, favoured FDI (Axline 1979: 17). However, New World Group scholars viewed FDI as contributing little to the economies in the region. They saw most FDI in the region as draining economies through repatriated profits and charges incurred. They also saw assembly
manufacturing implemented using FDI as using few regional inputs, creating limited new employment and benefiting multinationals disproportionately. These views that broke with the mainstream modernisation and growth development prescriptions of the 1950s were put forth at the 1967 meeting on CARIFTA by Havelock Brewster and Clive Thomas who presented their study: The Dynamics of West Indian Integration (Axline 1979: 19-20; Marshall 1998: 64-65).

So far then, this section has highlighted that the ICCC’s material interests and ideas about development were in line with the mainstream development paradigm and were important for understanding their activism on CARIFTA. Another factor important in understanding their activism and their being consulted was the placement of the private sector in the unofficial populist-statist stability bargain that tended to be followed by governments in the region.

This bargain was similar to a corporatist interest group strategy in which private sector and labour harmony is maintained though catering to concerns of each of these groups in governance. The importance of this stability bargain was reflected in the ICCC’s focus on increasing employment in its proposals for the creation of CARIFTA. This focus on employment concerns could be seen as the instrumental use of ideas about employment as a tool to further the group’s material interests in creating regional arrangements to increase their profits through regional expansion. Yet, even if such ideas were used strategically this illustrates that they were of sufficient salience to merit use and were therefore important. Added to this, conceiving of ideas as little more than tools used for interest advancement implies that it is impossible for CSOs to mobilise and construct their interests on the basis of ideas. However, the discussion of CSO mobilisation and formation in this chapter tries to illustrate that policy ideas (causal beliefs) and principled beliefs can be of real salience for CSOs in combination with interests.

39 Academics writing along these lines included Kari Levitt, Lloyd Best and Clive Thomas (Axline 1979: 19)
Although concerns about employment were expressed by the ICCC and by governments in the region in discussions about CARIFTA, labour EIGs did not appear to mobilise with respect to CARIFTA. Furthermore, unlike the ICCC, labour was not incorporated in the 1967 talks on CARIFTA (despite government-labour-private sector bargain/patron client relationships). Nonetheless, workers’ EIGs remained important in their continual support for and advocacy of regional integration into the 1960s and 1970s. According to Owen Arthur: “…the vision embodied in the post-Federation integration process is one which the political leaders have inherited from our workers’ unions” (Arthur 2005: 7). This philosophical influence, though, is where union impact stopped, as they appear to have been inactive in presenting proposals or voicing their interests with respect to the creation of CARIFTA.

Despite having visions for regional integration along different lines, W. Arthur Lewis’s and New World Group views asserted that regional economic integration could reduce chronic unemployment problems in the Caribbean (Bennett 1999: 129; Axline 1979: 19). So, the material interests of workers in employment matters were at stake in talks surrounding the proposed CARIFTA, yet unions did not mobilise to ensure that the CARIFTA arrangements would properly address labour needs. This paradox can be accounted for by considering that unions either did not perceive trade affairs as priorities around which to organise mobilisation efforts or perceived governments as meeting labour needs in light of the labour-government-private sector governance bargain.

Yet, it was not simply the belief that governments would take care of worker and private sector concerns (as part of the corporatist type stability bargain/populist-statism) that contributed to lack of labour EIG activism with respect to CARIFTA negotiations. If this were the case, why would the ICCC mobilise with respect to CARIFTA? Wouldn’t private sector interests represented by the ICCC be taken care of by governments too if this were the case? The easy answer to these questions would be that it was in the ICCC’s members’ material interests to mobilise, but that it was not in the interests of unions (e.g. the CLC). Nonetheless, as has been highlighted, workers could have been affected
materially by the creation of CARIFTA too. Therefore, one cannot boil activism down to interests alone but should look at other factors such as CSO interest perception and the beliefs and ideas (causal and principled) expressed by CSOs. Moreover, the institutional wherewithal of CSOs to organise effectively around and to prioritise all issues in their material interests should be considered too.

Four years into the life of CARIFTA at the seventh Heads of Government Conference in 1972 the leaders of member states decided to take their cooperative endeavours a step further by creating the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) which was also to include a Common Market (CARICOM 1998; Bennett 1999: 133-135; Lewis 1999: 17-19). Once more the regional umbrella private sector organisation played an important role, whilst labour EIGs did not.

The Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC)\(^40\) helped to broker an important compromise between the LDCs and the MDCs. The CAIC helped to ease political discord over how to create a CARICOM that would not replicate the CARIFTA problems of the MDCs benefiting far more than the LDCs. Although intra-regional trade increased between 1967 and 1974 (from 6.0% to 7.2% of the region’s trade) and all the countries saw gains in intra-regional trade over the period, the distribution was skewed in favour of the MDCs (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago), which accounted for 96.0% of intra-CARIFTA exports and 90.0% of imports in 1974 (Chernick 1978: 29-31). The CAIC helped to broker a compromise through helping to fund the Caribbean Investment Cooperation (CIC) that would transfer equity capital from the MDCs to the LDCs in order to appease the LDCs. This was important since the LDC governments wanted to ensure increased investment to their countries before agreeing on a common external tariff (CET) (Axline 1979: 114, 123, 131). In spite of the private sector members of the CAIC being ambivalent as to the costs and benefits of the CET (according to Axline 1979: 114) they helped to make this important aspect of CARICOM a reality.

\(^{40}\) The CAIC was the successor to the of the ICCC
As in the case of CARIFTA, the regional umbrella private sector EIG mobilised in line with ideas consistent with modernisation and growth theories rather than more radical structuralist views implied in the LDC’s desires for regional industrial planning to ensure investment in their countries. However, as Axline claims, they were not certain as to whether this arrangement would protect private sector interests. Assuming that Axline is correct, the CAIC mobilised based on perceived interests linked to ideas about the benefits of regional economic integration. Mainstream ideas about modernisation, growth and regional integration were therefore important in the specification of the CAIC’s interests.

Also, as in the CARIFTA case, the capacity of the CAIC to broker an agreement for the creation of the CARICOM was important. The CAIC agreed that its members would contribute 40% of the CIC’s funds for investment (Axline 1979: 131). The financial capacity of the CAIC and its members to broker such an arrangement was not shared in common with the regional labour umbrella association (or its members) that once more was inactive on the CARICOM issue.

As was the case with CARIFTA, labour EIGs had material interests that could have been affected by the creation of CARICOM but did not mobilise. Without rehearsing the assertions about labour EIG inaction on CARIFTA too much, once more this inaction can be attributed to beliefs about where priorities lay (interest perception) rather than the possession of material interests alone. This inaction of labour EIGs was also in line with CSO activism throughout the region in the 1970s that focussed on a relatively myopic set of domestic issues (though important issues) whilst not prioritising other important issues such as external trade arrangements, not perceiving these as important, or being institutionally unable to mobilise on these fronts (or some combination of these).
3.3 CSOS IN THE 1970S, 1980S AND ONWARDS

So far this chapter has looked at important CSOs in the region (from welfare-oriented CSOs, to labour and private sector EIGs); at the significance of ideational-material occurrences for understanding CSO formation and activism; and at ideas, interests and institutions also important in comprehending CSO formation and activism. The chapter has shown that labour EIGs and private-sector EIGs emerged as CSOs of particular importance in the state-society bargains used for Caribbean governance in the post-World War II era. The previous section of this chapter also looked at the activism of these two types of EIGs on important regional political and trade arrangements.

This chapter will now proceed to look at the evolution of important CSOs between the 1960s/1970s and the end of the 20th century and will also briefly discuss the activism of these CSOs in general and with respect to trade matters of regional importance.

PRIVATE SECTOR/INDUSTRY SPECIFIC EIGS

The ICCC’s focus on CARIFTA speaks to the growing importance of industrial or manufacturing sectors (particularly in the MDCs) that emerged from governmental focus on diversification and industrialisation based on the (causal) belief that this was the viable path to economic development (Axline 1979: 131). In the 19th century and early 20th century activism in the private sector remained largely centred around the planter-merchant elites in the region and was linked to race-class cleavages. In contrast, with the emergence of internal self-governance by the middle of the 20th century, development strategies that were pursued in the region resulted in other sectors and groups within society growing in importance. Commercial associations such as Chambers of Commerce began to change, becoming more racially diverse, and evolved to become Chambers of Commerce...

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41 The race-class cleavages however have by no means disappeared altogether.
Also, as the manufacturing sub-sector of the private sector became important, manufacturers’ associations began to spring up across the region, particularly in the MDCs. For instance, the Jamaica Manufactures’ Association was founded in 1947, the Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers’ Association was established in 1956 and the Barbados Manufacturers’ Association was formed in 1964. In the 1960s and 1970s these associations began to form throughout the LDCs too.

Some countries focussed diversification efforts away from agriculture and towards tourism. Consequently, tourism-related associations formed throughout the region from the 1950s. In the 1970s and into the early 1980s small business associations emerged as well. The small business association emerged in parallel with government attempts throughout the region to continually open space for economic activity to wider sections of society. Into the 1980s private sector/industry specific CSOs persisted and new ones emerged. Small business associations, manufacturing associations and other industry or sector specific associations continued to emerge into the 1980s (specifically in the LDCs) across the region. In addition, from the 1990s private sector associations emerged to deal with trade issues and their impact on private sector entities (to be highlighted in Chapter 4 and Part B of the thesis).

These EIGs were created and evolved in order to represent specific material interests within the private sector. However, they also emerged alongside government policies purporting to be aimed at increasing social equity (a principled belief). Even though material self-interests are important for understanding the creation of these EIGs, these cannot be de-linked from the ideational context in which they emerged and indeed were encouraged (by governments) to emerge.
LABOUR EIGS

From the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, workers’ unions continued to be important throughout the region, focussing specifically on industrial relations and labour legislation both within individual CARICOM countries but also at the CARICOM level. Unions tended to focus on sector specific and industry specific issues or on day-to-day labour matters rather than focussing most of their energies on broader political matters. This narrowing of focus occurred as political aspirants moved out of unions and into party politics from the 1950s when the franchise expanded (Henry 1999: 94; Nurse 1980: 17).

However, unions have continued to be important in mobilising politically on pressing socio-economic issues in the region (Nurse 1980: 17; George De Peana interview: 07-04-05). Mobilisation on socio-economic issues remained important into the 1980s and 1990s, especially since the relationship between governments/political parties and unions, inherent in the labour-government-private sector bargains that characterised regional governance, started to become strained from the 1980s. This became the case specifically from the 1980s, when policies implemented and policy ideas adopted by governments / political figures in line with international ideational-material trends conflicted with the ideas and interests valued by labour (Henry 1997: 98).

In addition, at the regional level the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL)\(^{42}\) continues to support the integrationist vision espoused by the early 20\(^{th}\) century regional umbrella association both in philosophy and in advocating the necessity of allowing the free-movement of people for work purposes within the CARICOM region under the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) (George De Peana interview: 07-04-05).

\(^{42}\) The CCL is the descendent of the CLC
Therefore, as unions in the region have evolved, they have continued to mobilise based on *philosophies and beliefs* and to represent *worker’s interests*.

**RADICAL CSOS**

The Black Power Movement emerged by the 1970s, building on ideas espoused in Garveyism, ideas advanced by the New World Group and drew on other ideas and occurrences important at the time, for instance in the American civil rights movement or African Black nationalism. The “Black Power” movement mobilised through strikes in attempts to overturn the racially unequal power balance in the region (Ryan et. al. 1995). This movement drew popular support from the working poor and marginalised with interests in improving their conditions (as in the labour movement of the 1930s) and had revolutionary economic and social objectives (Ryan 1995: 41, 46-47). In fact the revolutionary nature of the movement was exposed in Trinidad and Tobago when there was a failed “Black Power Revolution” between February and April of 1970 (Ryan et. al. 1995). 43

Although the “Black Power” movement within CS was politically important and did address issues directly relating to regional integration, and trade relations in general, there is nothing that suggests that members of this movement tried to mobilise or to be consulted by political leaders or state officials on shaping proposed regional trade arrangements. This, however, is unsurprising considering the militant nature of this movement’s proposals and their rejection of the relatively conservative or pragmatic way in which the region was governed and conducted political and economic affairs. To include such groups in consultation on regional affairs could be politically disruptive, especially because of the radical character of their beliefs. Cooperation with such groups could also affect the region’s standing during the Cold War. Added to this, the content of this movement’s aims made consultation difficult as well, since the movement did not

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43 This Revolution is examined in depth in Ryan, Selwyn et. al (1995)
seek reform but drastic structural change. This example points out the pragmatic stance of regional governments that mostly adhered to mainstream policy ideas and did not want to upset the status quo.  

With changes in the international politico-economic atmosphere towards neoliberal economic policy from the 1980s and in the context of the post-Cold War World (that emerged in the 1990s), the activities of such radical racial awareness began to wane in importance. As a result, CSOs of the radical sort that emerged from the Black Power Movement virtually (but not entirely) disappeared and certainly became of limited importance in policy spheres.

The discussion of radical CSOs here hints at the liberal slant of this thesis, therefore a short digression to lay bare this orientation is in order here. In examining CS activism and consultation on trade areas, this thesis takes a view somewhere between Critical Theorists and Post-Marxists. Consultation between various non-state actors and government officials in addition to compromise by all sides are seen here as having the ability to create trade arrangements that are society friendly and equitable. Cooperation and compromise are also seen here as serving important democratic, educational and empowerment functions.

Of course, external factors may contradict these attempts, since states comprising CARICOM must negotiate with those outside of the region. However, so long as the region’s positions begin to consider and include various CS positions in their negotiating agendas, there is some chance of creating more socially acceptable arrangements. The emphasis here therefore, does not leave room for change through all-out-revolution of the Marxian or Gramscian sort, indeed such types of potentially violent aims are contrary to the sort of activities defined in Chapter 1 of this thesis as within the realm of CSOs (i.e. non-violent). Instead, change here is viewed as sustainable principally through

44 Except in the cases of Guyana and Grenada (most explicitly) and also in Jamaica to a lesser extent under Manley in the 1970s.
incremental changes in groups’ abilities to participate in and impact on political processes and (eventually) political outcomes.

With this aside out of the way, the focus on CSO types in the region will continue with a discussion of women’s organisations and a brief peek into the types of CSOs that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.

WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS

The women’s movement spawned several women’s organisations in the region in attempts to raise awareness about the needs and rights of women; the role of women in development; and in efforts to ensure that these issues were recognised by governments. In this respect National Councils of Women and umbrella organisations to represent diverse women’s organisations and to increase awareness on women’s conditions, were formed throughout the West Indies. Also, in 1970 country representatives from these CSOs decided to create a regional umbrella organisation called the Caribbean Women’s Association (CARIWA) (Ellis 2003: 71-73).

This does not mean that women’s organisations were not present prior to the 1970s. Indeed women’s organisations grew in importance from the 1940s with organisations concerned with increasing voting rights for women and participation in party politics (e.g. League of Women Voters-Jamaica-, Women’s Political and Education Organisation- Guyana-) or welfare type organisations concerned with personal and moral improvement, care taking matters or charity work (e.g. Young Women’s Christian Associations -YWCAs- and Mothers Unions). Nonetheless, it was not until the 1970s that new women’s organisations attempted to mobilise so that policy making and policy processes in the Caribbean would be cognisant of women-specific concerns (Ellis 2003: 71-73, Senior 1991: 154).
In this case a materialist conception of activism and interests does not help one to understand CSOs emerging out of the women’s movement and mobilising to mainstream women’s issues in policy spheres. Put differently, material conditions affecting the lives of women did not somehow change in the 1970s. Instead, women participating within these groups became empowered to challenge discrimination and inequality based on the view that such was wrong (principled beliefs) at a time when this ideational trend was growing in the Western world. Women involved in these CSOs came to perceive government policies as perpetuating injustices that disadvantaged them and, based on beliefs about inequality, came to advocate the mainstreaming of women’s issues into policy making as necessary for creating more equitable societies and as vital for economic and social development (i.e. causal beliefs linked to principled beliefs).

Between 1974 and 1976, the governments of Barbados, Antigua, Jamaica and Grenada were encouraged to establish machineries to deal with women’s issues and one such machinery was established within the CARICOM Secretariat in 1981. These machineries were almost universally implemented across CARICOM by the end of the UN’s decade dedicated to women in 1985 (Ellis 2003: 92-93; Senior 1991: 155). The activities of women’s non-EIGs in the region and the ideational-material context in which women’s issues were promoted internationally (via the UN) enabled these CSOs to be consulted by governments through women’s bureaus. Therefore, there was a policy paradigm shift in the international ideational-material context of the 1970s and 1980s that opened space for women’s CSO activism and consultation on policy issues. Despite this change in women’s activism though, between the 1970s and 1990s women’s organisations did not move beyond dealing with domestic/regional economic, social and political concerns. However, this inactivity on trade matters began to change into the 1990s when women’s organisations evolved, forming NGOs and gender-based CSOs.
CSOS EMERGING IN THE 1980S AND 1990S

In addition to the CSOs highlighted thus far, other CSOs and social movements focussing on human rights, indigenous rights, and environmental protection sprang up and became important in the Caribbean, notably from the 1990s (Serbin 1998: 113). Some examples of these at the regional level are the Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC), the Caribbean Human Rights Network, and the Caribbean Association for Integrated Rural Development. These CSOs emerged and mobilised in light of 1990s shifts in ideational-material context and in light of ideas emerging within the region and beyond about NGOs and NGO activism.

A more in-depth focus on these CSOs will be taken up when this thesis moves on to focus on CARICOM and CARICOM CSOs in the 1980s and 1990s (in Chapters 4 and 5). For now though, this is where the introduction to CSOs in the region and the discussion of their evolution stops.

CONCLUSION: FEEDING HISTORY INTO THE CONTEMPORARY

This chapter has attempted to show that from emancipation to the turn of the 21st century various CSOs have emerged and have been important socially and politically. CSOs emerged when ideational-material atmospheres were accommodating or compelling and with CSOs defining their interests based on perceptions, principled ideas and causal ideas. We also see that the activism of CSOs coincided with the opening of space for impacting on policy processes. For instance, the Colonial Office Commissions began to consult workers and political associations at a time when these CSOs were becoming rather active, which opened the potential for these groups to impact on policy outcomes (enhancing labour rights, constitutional rights, and self-governance). In addition, the activism of the regional labour association with respect to the British West Indies Federation, of the ICCC with relation to CARIFTA, and of women’s organisations
with respect to domestic policy were actions that in themselves contributed to widening
the participatory space and enhancing the potential for CSOs to impact on policy
outcomes.

This chapter has preliminarily introduced the fact that CSOs in the Anglophone
Caribbean have been for the most part inactive on trade issues. Looking at activism on
the negotiations surrounding the formation of the British West Indies Federation,
CARIFTA and CARICOM illustrated that, despite some activism on regional political
and trade matters, activism was lacking on external matters. Chapter 4 will look more
closely at the lack of CSO mobilisation on trade matters by contrasting emerging
activism from the mid/late 1990s with that prior to the mid/late 1990s.

In looking at CSOs and their activism, this chapter also highlighted some
important aspects of economic, social and political developments of countries in the
region as a means of presenting important background information. The overview of
CSOs and CSO activism in this chapter, though, has not been exhaustive. It did not
highlight the whole spectrum of CSOs in the region. For instance, this chapter did not
discuss the persistence and evolution of agricultural associations from elitist associations
in the 19th century towards organisations that came to include government para-statals
(with the emergence of heightened government involvement in agricultural activities) or
that became more small farmer or grass-roots oriented (as the fate in agricultural exports
began to suffer from the 1970s). However, some of the exclusions made in presenting this
brief history will be made up for in chapters to follow (especially in the case studies).
CHAPTER 4

DIFFERENCES IN IDEATIONAL-MATERIAL CONTEXT, DIFFERENCES IN CSO MOBILISATION AND INCLUSION

The introductory chapter of this thesis illustrated that the CARICOM region did not become drastically more open to trade in the 1990s than it was in the 1970s (see Figures 1 and 2). Since material changes in the trade sphere cannot account for more visible CSO activism on trade issues and more openness to consulting with CSOs on trade matters what can?

This thesis argues that a focus on good governance; a shift towards neo-liberal economic policy thought and practice; and the emergence of globalisation as process and discourse are important ideational-material trends that emerged by the 1990s to influence changes in activism and inclusion. This current chapter contributes to the above-mentioned argument by looking at the ideational-material trends important from the 1980s and into the 1990s and at those important from the end of the Second World War to the 1970s. CSO activism and consultation on trade arrangements in the 1970s and 1980s was close to non-existent (despite the negotiation of consecutive Lomé Conventions and other trade agreements) partly because the ideational-material context of the time was not conducive to such. So, in understanding differences between CSO and government approaches to trade issues in the 1970s and mid/late 1990s, one must keep in mind the differences in time specific ideational-material contexts.

To bring out these points this chapter begins in section 4.1 by looking at the ideational-material context of the 1970s and at CSO non-activism and non-inclusion on trade issues in CARICOM against this backdrop. Section 4.2 then highlights important ideational-material changes in policy spheres that began to surface from the 1980s and examines the ways in which these impacted on trade arrangements negotiated and implemented during the 1980s and 1990s. Section 4.2 also looks at the ways in which CSOs and governments in the CARICOM region began to change their attitudes and
behaviours with respect to trade matters in the context of these ideational-material changes.

4.1 THE 1970S CSOs AND CARICOM POLITICO-ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The EEC/EU - ACP trade relationship represents the sole negotiating forum on trade in which CARICOM countries have been involved from the 1970s right through to the present, beginning with the Lomé Accords that have been replaced by the Cotonou Agreement/ European Partnership Agreements -EPAs.\textsuperscript{45} In the agenda-setting processes leading up to negotiations of the Lomé agreement in the 1970s, CSO activism was non-existent and neither governments nor the collective CARICOM mechanism consulted with CSOs. This section will look at this CSO non-mobilisation and non-inclusion in the context of the international ideational-material context of the 1970s in which the Lomé negotiations were located.

THE IDEATIONAL-MATERIAL CONTEXT OF THE 1970S

- WELFARISM AND DEVELOPMENTALISM

In the international economic climate of the 1960s and 1970s neo-liberal ideas about the beneficence of a market-led economy or of universal trade liberalisation were not dominant in western thought or policy. On the contrary, welfarist or socialist outlooks based on economic planning and government intervention in economies that aimed to achieve full employment were more important from the 1930s and into the post-World War II period, particularly in the USA and the UK (Backhouse 2002: 290; Martinussen 1999: 50). Also, in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union, control economies and socialist economic planning, though of a different nature than in the USA and Britain, were important forms of economic management (Backhouse 2002: 290). In fact, Robert

\textsuperscript{45} Other trade arrangements were the CBI initiated by the government of the USA and the CARIBCAN agreement with Canada; both began in the 1980s.
Backhouse asserts that welfare economics and socialism were important in mainstream economic thought from the late 19th century and only faced significant challenges from the 1970s (2002: chap. 12). With relation to development thought, Martinussen similarly asserts that into the 1970s “… Latin American and Western researchers expressly rejected central components of the neo-classical legacy…” (1999: 50). Through to the 1970s then, economic interventionism was accepted practice.

Let us focus a bit more closely on this context by commencing with a look at ideas important in American and British thought and policy spheres, particularly because these ideas were subscribed to in the pragmatic English-speaking Caribbean more than communist ideas were.

Welfarism was important in the USA from the 1930s following the Depression beginning with Roosevelt’s New Deal (1933-1937) and then followed by theories put forth by John Maynard Keynes in his 1936 book *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. Following the war the UK implemented Keynesian policies (in the 1940s and the 1950s) and the Kennedy government in the USA made use of similar full employment policies (Backhouse 2002: 229, 290-291). Also in the U.K., state interventionism in the form of nationalisations of industries or companies was sanctioned by the 1945 Labour Party Government that announced plans for nationalisation in coal, steel, electricity gas and transport (Howard 1989: 23). John G. Ruggie summarises the approach of governments to economic affairs from the 1930s in stating:

> Governments everywhere had developed increasingly active forms of intervention in the domestic economy in order to affect the level of prices and employment, and to protect them against external dislocation (1982: 390).

In developing countries similar planning was attempted too but was linked closely to concerns about development. In mainstream development thought that emerged to address post-War reconstruction (in the 1940s) and then to speak to the problems of “underdeveloped countries” (from the 1950s); it was believed that governments should
intervene in economies to kick-start industrial modernisation and balanced economic growth (Backhouse 2002: 302-303; Axline 1979: 10-11; Martinussen 1999: chap. 5). The post-war experiences of interventionism that helped to rebuild Germany and Japan seemed to illustrate this point. Hence, governments were seen as needing to intervene in underdeveloped economies because of the assumed weakness of the entrepreneurial classes in these countries and because these countries were seen as possessing “backward” economies (Howell and Pearce 2002: 14; Martinussen 1999:258-259).

As in Keynesian thought, it was believed that governments should plan and intervene in their domestic economies in order to provide for important economic and social welfare needs in societies. This was necessary since markets did not always operate in advantageous ways (Backhouse 2002: 304, Martinussen 1999: 259). Marshall (2001) highlights that, for the Caribbean region, Keynesian type policies were aimed at maintaining peace between capital and organised labour in the region based on redistribution in exchange for worker cooperation. As a result, welfare benefits were used to create social peace and legitimise the state (279). Keynesian type approaches to economic management thereby facilitated a corporatist style bargain between the state, labour and the private sector which Marshall terms “populist-statism” (2001: 271).

In addition to these mainstream views on development, by the 1950s structuralist ideas purported by Raúl Prebisch of UNECLA saw inequalities between industrialised and developing countries as perpetuating underdevelopment. To change this situation, governments needed to intervene in the economies of underdeveloped countries to develop industries under protective tariff barriers (Backhouse 2002: 303; Erisman 1992: 10; Axline 1979: 10; Brown 2001: 197-199; Martinussen 1999: chap. 6). More radical dependency views took this view further by conceiving developing countries as trapped in a state of underdevelopment as a result of participating in capitalist world system. Countries could only emerge from underdevelopment if their governments took steps: to strengthen domestic economies; to become self-reliant, to focus on exchanges with other

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46 Development economists such as Ragnar Nurkse, Paul Rosenstein Rodan, Walter Rostow and W. Arthur Lewis prescribed these “Big Push”, “Modernisation” and “Growth” theories.
developing countries (South-South Cooperation); and to alter the capitalist system (Erisman 1992: 10-16; 24-26; Axline 1979: 15-16; Brown 2001: 198-200; Martinussen 1999: chap. 6). These alternative views about development involved government economic planning and intervention but also attempted to change international economic relations through advocating a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Samuel 1999: 158-159; Erisman 1992: 46; Serbin 1990: 125; Brown 2001: 201-204). As discussed briefly in Chapter 3, scholarly thinkers who made up the New World Group advanced views of this sort in the CARICOM region.

The combination of mainstream, structuralist and dependency ideas, accepted by different leaders and policy makers in both developing and industrialised countries, contributed to a new chapter being incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT in 1964). This chapter allowed for exceptions to the GATT principle of reciprocity in the conduct of trade between industrialised and developing countries. Also, by the 1970s, preferences could be unilaterally granted to developing countries by industrialised ones under the General System of Preferences (GSP) (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999: 286; Acharya and Daly 2004: 10; Brown 2001: 202). All this meant that redistributive mechanisms, akin to social redistribution at domestic levels, were built into multilateral trade rules.

These exceptions to the liberal trading regime allowed concerns of less developed countries to be factored into trade arrangements and gave developing country governments some leeway to accommodate important societal concerns within their countries. Since the concerns of important social groups were incorporated in trade agreements at this time and since the region’s governments attempted to appease important socio-economic groups, it is plausible that CSOs within the CARICOM region “were happy to ignore and leave to others to resolve” (Richardson 1993: 7) their trade related concerns instead of prioritising or mobilising on trade issues.

Although under the GATT sectoral negotiations reduced tariff levels between industrialised countries between 1945 and the 1970s, many exceptions were written into
this agreement in order to accommodate important concerns expressed by industrialised countries. As a result, John Ruggie has defined the ideas upheld within the GATT as “embedded liberalism”. This label describes a social-democratic framework in which governments had the latitude to facilitate the welfare needs of important domestic groups whilst signing up to a mostly liberalising multilateral trade agreement (Ruggie 1982: 397-398). For industrialised countries too, then, welfarist provisions were incorporated into the GATT.

As a consequence, between World War II and the 1970s, welfarism and developmentalism\textsuperscript{47} formed important facets of the ideational-material context.

- \textit{THE COLD WAR AND GOVERNANCE}

During the 1960s and 1970s, Cold War divides that pitted communist states against non-communist ones, opened space for developing countries to align with one side or another (Marshall 1998: 61). The emphasis in thought on governance in the western world (particularly of the USA and western European countries) was on maintaining non-communist governments (rather than democracy per se) and pursuing non-communist paths to development. The converse was true for the Soviet sphere of influence.

In this context, forms of governance between democracies and right-wing autocracies were condoned, whilst communist ones were shunned. By extension, non-communist interventionist approaches to development were seen as favourable within developing countries under the western sphere of influence, whilst communist-type developmental strategies were viewed as unfavourable. In contrast, communist forms of governance, economic planning and development strategies were recommended for countries aligning with the Soviet pole. Ideational conflict was important in the ideational-material context of the time and because of these divides developing countries

\textsuperscript{47}Developmentalism here refers to state economic interventionism for development as was embodied in the modernisation and growth framework of thought.
became “pawns to be won or lost in the battle between “Pax Americana” and world socialism” (Payne and Sutton 1992: 40). As a result, developing countries could gain trade and aid concessions from one side or another in the divide depending on their ideational bent and English-speaking Caribbean countries were not exceptions. Countries in the region gained financial support, technical advice and trade preferences (notably under the 1980s Caribbean Basin Initiative-CBI-) from the USA to decrease the likelihood of communism taking root (Erisman 2003: 159; Marshall 2001: 277-278).

So, in this ideational-material climate, Caribbean governance and development strategies were acceptable either on one side of the Cold War divide or the other. However, in most of the Anglophone Caribbean governance was usually characterised by supporting welfare concerns, facilitating the private sector, and state economic interventionism in a liberal mode rather than communist one. Material considerations, such as the political, military and financial power of the two major hegemonic blocs, were important in understanding international affairs and impacted on CARICOM actions and approaches to internal policies and external relations. Ideational factors were important too. More to the point, committing ideologically to align with one pole or another, deciding to follow one development path another, and seeking to govern in one way or another, were all decisions made in consideration of ideational standpoints.

Although CARICOM countries tended to be more liberal than communist in their orientations, countries within the region usually decided not to align exclusively with one side or another during the Cold War. Instead, CARICOM countries tended to maintain links with both sides and also to place emphasis on South-South cooperation (Serbin 1990: 127-128). The CARICOM countries as a group in fact stated their commitment to ideological pluralism within the region (Moore 1993: 210). Moreover, some governments in the region were radical in their international political views by criticising Anglo-American imperialism, lauding African independence, and being vocally anti-apartheid. This came in more hard line forms as in Guyana (under Forbes Burnham) and Jamaica (under Michael Manley) and in more subtle ways as in Barbados (under Errol Barrow) (Beckles 2001: 228). These non-aligned and radical outlooks, however, did not mean that
some countries in the region were not closer to one pole or another. Divides within the region over the issue of Grenada’s radical choice of governance model in the early 1980s and over the invasion of the country in 1983 illustrated this clearly (Moore 1993: 213).

What is important to note here is that ideational and material factors in the context of the time matter for understanding approaches to governance, development and trade. No matter where countries stood in the Cold War context, the ideational-material context of the time was one in which state-directed political governance (versus CSO participation) and interventionism for economic governance (versus neo-liberalism) were accepted.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

As previously stated, the Lomé negotiations represented the primary trade-negotiating arena in which CARICOM members were involved. The Lomé arrangements allowed for preferential trade with the industrialised countries of the EEC (now EU) on a non-reciprocal basis. In fact, the ACP countries insisted on non-reciprocity in the Lomé negotiations, stating that this was their right according to the GATT’s allowance for non-reciprocity between developing and developed countries (Babarinde 1994: 20; Kenwood and Lougheed 1999: 286; Acharya and Daly 2004: 10).

Despite these demands, there is no evidence that CSOs were consulted on these trade matters that would affect Caribbean societies and economies; nor is there evidence that CSOs tried to become involved. Instead, government evaluations of countries’ interests were the important factor and this was acceptable in the ideational-material context of time.

The first Lomé Convention was agreed in 1975. This agreement was negotiated in part because of the UK’s proposed entry into the EEC, which prompted the governments of former colonies to try to ensure that trade and economic assistance would continue at
previous levels. These developing countries perceived improving trade and aid arrangements with their former colonisers as vital to their national interests. Moreover, some countries in the EEC (namely France) insisted on maintaining preferential arrangements with ex-colonies and overseas territories (Babarinde 1994: 15-18; Erisman 2003: 168). Also, in analysing the efforts of the ACP countries to negotiate a trade agreement on terms that favoured them, attempts to foster South-South cooperation and an NIEO cannot be forgotten either (Gonzales 1989: 65-66; Payne and Sutton 1992: 46).

The resulting Lomé agreements focussed mainly on promoting trade and investment in the ACP countries and also entailed provisions for the delivery of development assistance.

Under Lomé I (1975-1980) CARICOM countries (along with all other ACP countries) gained trade concessions in important areas such as sugar, rum and bananas in protocols to the Convention. The Lomé included measures aimed at export diversification by encouraging industrial and technical cooperation with European entrepreneurs and using foreign direct investment (FDI). The CARICOM countries also benefited from the export stabilisation scheme (STABEX), which maintained price levels, and they had access to the European Development Fund (EDF) (Babarinde 1994: 21-22; Payne and Sutton 1992: 46-48). Therefore, ACP countries traded with the EEC on a non-reciprocal basis, gained guaranteed market access and guaranteed prices for their exports and were granted investment incentives.

Under the second Lomé agreement (1980-1985) a system called the SYSMIN (similar to the STABEX) was introduced to stabilise the prices of mineral products. Provisions geared towards increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) into the ACP countries, new provisions for special assistance needed by least developed, landlocked and small island states and those to increase expertise in agricultural and rural development programmes were also introduced (Babarinde 1994: 24-26).
Although farmers, workers, business persons and other social groups saw benefits from the provisions of the Lomé, CSOs representing them did not mobilise to make sure that this occurred in arriving at negotiating agendas for the Lomé agreements in the 1970s. Additionally, there is no evidence of government-initiated consultation of CSOs in the region.

**CSO NON ACTIVISM ON LOMÉ NEGOTIATING AGENDAS IN THE 1970S**

Welfare-oriented non-EIGs did not mobilise on the issues negotiated in the Lomé context during the 1970s. These organisations focused on development and welfare related domestic policy issues as well as the delivery of social services. As for women’s organisations that emerged in the 1970s, these mobilised when it came to policy areas relating to equality and to ensure that women’s concerns were represented in all domestic economic and social policy initiatives. For both welfare-oriented and women-specific non-EIGs mobilisation on other areas was absent. How does one account for this non-mobilisation?

There is also little to suggest that consultation between EIGs (business/industry/workers’ specific) and governments/regional officials occurred with respect to the Lomé arrangements. Yet, these EIGs would be impacted by trade arrangements and should have been interested in attempting to make sure these arrangements met their needs. Why then did these EIGs not mobilise in the 1970s either?

However, CSO non-activism was not because CSOs in the region lacked material interests in trade affairs. Negotiated trade arrangements could impact on the profitability of firms, industries and workers operating in traded sectors. Trade arrangements also could impact on the lives of most people in the region because of the high levels of exposure of CARICOM economies and societies to trade. The activism of developmental or welfare-oriented NGOs and women’s associations (later feminist or gender-based organisations) in the 1990s illustrates this and so does that of business/industry and
workers’ EIGs. When in the 1990s members of these CSOs began to view trade agreements as impacting on them and, by extension, came to view themselves as having interests in shaping trade agendas, then activism began.

In the 1990s women’s and developmental non-EIGs focussed and began to mobilise so that their concerns relating to the gendered and the developmental impacts of trade arrangements could be heard. Additionally, EIGs began to assert their concerns about the impact of trade on businesses, industries and workers. This sort of activism could also have occurred in the 1970s. However, in the 1960s and 1970s the idea that CSOs should activate on or prioritise trade issues was lacking within the CSO world.

Material factors also played into this limited activism. Preferential trade arrangements were acceptable in the 1970s and even into the early 1980s as evidenced by preferences granted to regional producers under the CBI with the USA and Caribbean-Canada Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN) (Moore 1993: 207-208). These arrangements allowed for governments to protect important socio-economic groups in their countries (i.e. groups represented by EIGs and non-EIGs) that could potentially be ill impacted by negotiated trade arrangements. In other words, governments could protect important socio-economic groups and as a result CSOs did not see themselves as needing to mobilise on trade issues. So, the ideational-material context in which preferences were acceptable is important in helping to understand a limited CSOs need to mobilise.

However, even if governments were able to accommodate concerns that may have been important to welfare oriented associations, women’s associations, business/industry representative associations and workers unions, these CSOs could have decided to mobilise on trade matters. CSOs of these sorts could have acted to ensure that the concerns they represented were thoroughly understood by governments and that they were accounted for in trade negotiations. Therefore it is plausible that, in addition to the non-reciprocal trade atmosphere of the time limiting CSOs’ material needs to mobilise, the ideational-material context also impacted on CSO perceptions about their interests in mobilising on trade issues.
As for activism by more radical CSOs in the region, to some extent, this existed on trade matters. Structuralist and dependency views about inequality were popularised by the “Black Power” movement and presented to regional leaders by the UWI’s New World Group members from the 1960s. The “Black Power” movement led by UWI students and influenced by the ideas of the New World Group, led strikes in Curacao, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Aruba and Anguilla between 1968 and 1970. As stated in the previous chapter, CSOs rising out of this movement had specific revolutionary economic and social aims. Some of these included positioning “black” people at the centre of the economy through political reorganisation of the countries in the Caribbean on a regional scale; severing the subordinate relationship that Caribbean countries had with past colonisers and the USA; reconstructing the educational systems in the region to be more Afro-centric; and encouraging direct participation in decision-making by people in the region (Ryan 1995: 41, 46-47). These more radical CSOs mobilised in support of ideas about racial inequalities and the perpetuation on underdevelopment at a time when race issues were being firmly dealt with around the world and at a time when structuralist and dependency views were important radical alternatives to mainstream developmental thought. In the end though, none of the CSOs arising out of these radical movements were consulted in the region with respect to the issues up for negotiation in the Lomé processes.

It is important to make a statement here about actors from within the academic community. Although members from the region’s epistemic community were not formally consulted on trade matters, there is evidence to suggest that they have been important in impacting on the thought and actions of governments and inter-governmental organisations within the region. There has been and there continues to be, interchange between the academics and officials within government bureaucracies and regional institutions. For instance, William Demas moved out of academia and into important positions in the domestic public service (Central Bank) and in regional economic policy making mechanisms (CARIFTA, CARICOM, CDB). Similarly from the 1970s into the present Sir Alister McIntyre of Grenada moved in and out of important
positions at UWI campuses in Jamaica and Trinidad, into regional institutions such as CARICOM. Of note too is Norman Girvan who has, from 1970s, moved between the academy and important regional institutions, most recently as the second Secretary General of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS).

A list of this sort could be expanded to include many people from across the region who have moved (and continue to move) between academia and official posts in domestic and regional institutions. They are valued because of their expertise and ability to provide ideas (especially causal ideas) on which government officials can draw. Ideas espoused by these people may have been (and may continue to be) important in shaping approaches to trade negotiations in the region. However, academics will not be examined closely in this thesis because of the focus on activism and consultation of CSOs rather than on individuals from within CS. What is important to take away from this look at scholars is that causal ideas and expertise are seen important to governments.

As we will see in the case studies of Part B of this thesis, the ability to provide expertise tends to provide legitimacy to CSOs that mobilise with respect to trade agendas also. CSOs that are able to present themselves as having expertise to contribute are consulted and have their ideas heeded. Part B of this thesis will also show that linked to the ability of CSOs to present themselves as having expertise and to transmit their ideas to governments, is the possession by these CSOs of the institutional wherewithal to produce well founded research and “informed” policy inputs.

**Institutional capacity levels of CSOs** should also be seen as important because capacity levels have fed into groups’ perceptions of their interests. For instance, EIGs representing small businesspersons or small farmers in the region have tended to focus on day-to-day issues of survival and service provision for members (access to credit, farming technology etc.) rather than on trade issues such as the Lomé (St. Lucia Anonymous interview: 22-07-04; James Paul interview: 09-07-03). More long-term international trade related issues could be left to the governments, even though trade issues up for negotiation were in the material interests of these CSOs. These CSOs did
not perceive trade negotiating issues as issues they should prioritise, in part because they were institutionally unable to prioritise these issues or make them into their interests.

This point can be extended to most EIGs in the region, according to a representative from the Caribbean Export and Development Agency and as reiterated by Malcolm Spence of the RNM. These two interviewees emphasised that EIGs in the region have tended to focus on domestic issues (whether labour organisation or private sector) rather than on shaping international economic arrangements, in part because they lacked the institutional facilities and in part because they viewed governments as representing their concerns (Anonymous interview 29-07-03; Malcolm Spence interview: 10-08-03). Part B of this thesis will further assert that this point about the institutional wherewithal is vital in understanding the activism or non-activism of both EIGs and non-EIGs in the region, just as are ideational and material factors.

We will leave aside this point for now, but it is important to keep in mind that in addition to CSO beliefs about their interests and perceptions about activism in the specific of the ideational-material contexts impacting on their activism (or lack thereof); institutional factors impact on CSO behaviour too. So, limitations faced by various CSOs circumscribed the areas which they could prioritise and around which they could mobilise as did CSO beliefs about mobilisation on various issues.

4.2 THE 1980S INTO THE 1990S: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SEA CHANGE

In the 1980s and 1990s there were three political and economic occurrences important in shaping involvement by CARICOM countries in the world economy and CSO activism and consultation in the region. These changes, that were material facts and that also entailed paradigm shifts, are set out below in Table 5.
Table 5: Changed factors in international setting and type of factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors/Trends</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The end of the Cold War and the attendant emphasis on governance issues;</td>
<td>Material 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-liberal emphasis on economic liberalisation in internal economic affairs and external trade</td>
<td>Ideational 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic, social and cultural changes alluded to by the term globalisation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Each of these impacted on the relationships between governments and societies in CARICOM and on trade arrangements and ideas about trade arrangements held by both governments and CSOs. This section will deal with each of these in turn; the impact of these three factors on CARICOM-EEC/EU and CARICOM-USA trade arrangements; and the impact of these on CSO activism and government consultation of CSOs.

DEMOCRATISATION AND GOVERNANCE

By the end of the 1980s governance issues became important in policy parlance with the emergence of the so-called third wave of democratisation. Democratisation processes spread across Latin America, Asia and Africa, and were also evident with the dissolution of communism in Eastern Europe. Various explanations have been broached in attempts to understand the specific reasons for the change in focus towards democratisation and “good governance”. No matter what explanations are given, all speak of democratisation, good governance and CSO roles in good governance that emerged with the withering of the Cold War by the end of the 1980s (Willetts 2002; Edwards 2004: 15; Kaldor 2003: 1-4-5; chap 3). As communism was meeting its demise, the liberal democratic political model gained resonance and there was a shift in ideational paradigms. Donor governments began placing emphasis on ‘good

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48 Material realities created via policy implementation and action.
49 Ideational in underlying assumptions or in foundations
50 For some of these see the following: Martinussen 1999: 197-198; Eade 2000: 11; Thijn and Bernard 1998: 17; Whaites 2000: 126.
governance” with respect to developing countries as opposed to the Cold War practice of doing business with “corrupt Southern elites in the struggle against communism” (Brown 2001: 210). A by-product of this paradigm shift was an emphasis on the importance of CS and CSOs.

CS and CSOs came to be perceived as important for maintaining or fostering democracy as the following statement emblematic of this strain of thought shows:

...democratic consolidation is difficult to achieve without a strong associational ecosystem, since independent associations provide the channels or mediating structures through which political participation is mobilized and states are held accountable by their citizens... The influence of popular movements in helping to overturn authoritarian rule in Africa, Asia and Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s testifies to the importance of these effects even where associations have been relatively weak. (Edwards 2004: 74-75). 51

In addition, CSOs came to be viewed by donor governments as important for delivering official developmental assistance to developing countries. The following quotation expresses this strain of thought:

The policy community was searching for tools of development practice that did not depend on such a state and that might actively foster the non-state arena...Housed within civil society was a potential agency in the form of NGOs and, later other non-state groups. They were the ones who campaigned for human rights, against corruption and who sought to ensure that governments were accountable to society. (Howell and Pearce 2001: 40-41)

Both ways of thinking emphasised CSOs as important, in the former case, for democratic governance purposes and, in the latter, for decreasing state economic interventionism and increasing transparency in development programming. This movement away from populist-statism and towards non-state or CSO mechanisms became evident in the CARICOM region too. For instance, there emerged an ideational swing towards emphasising the importance of “Social Partners” and CSO involvement

51 Refer to Chapter 1: CS Discourse and Democratisation.
in development, decision-making and governance in regional Head of Governments declarations beginning in 1991 (e.g. in CARICOM 1991a: 2 and CARICOM 1995: 5). \textsuperscript{52}

This shift in ideas was partly driven by prescriptions from industrialised countries (i.e. aid donor countries and organisations) and was also partly driven by CSO activism (e.g. that in the third wave democratisation movements). On the CSO side the CPDC notes the efforts of CSOs to enhance participation in governance in the region:

For more than a quarter of a century non-governmental organizations and more broadly civil society organizations have been at the forefront of efforts to mainstream the participation of ordinary people across the Caribbean in the economic, social and cultural development of the region (CPDC Participation).

Whilst in official policy thought, CSOs have been viewed as having somewhat limited roles in democratisation and good governance, from the perspective of CSOs (particularly non-EIGs) democratisation and good governance have often been conceived of in more radical terms. Notably, various non-EIGs across the globe have attempted to extend and expand the remit of the good governance and democratisation by focussing on democratising global governance. James V. Riker for instance noted in a paper presented at the Montreal International Forum Conference 2005 on “Global Democracy: Civil Society Visions and Strategies”:

...leading civil society organizations and networks have engaged in advocacy for democratizing key global institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and have created new alternate institutions such as the World Social Forum (WSF) and regional forums to enable new democratic forms of citizen empowerment (Riker 2005: 3).

Some examples of CSO efforts to democratise global governance from the 1980s have been highlighted by Dawson and Bhatt, who chart the course of CSO-IMF interactions starting in the early 1980s and increasing investigations into the work of the IMF by various CSOs from 1989 (Dawson and Bhatt 2001: 6-12). The involvement of

\textsuperscript{52} To be looked at in Chapter 5
CSOs in a range of UN conferences during the 1990s also illustrates the efforts of CSOs to democratise global governance (Cammaerts 2004: 4; Cardoso 2003: 2).

Now let us look at another shift in the ideational-material context that emerged from the 1980s.

THE NEO-LIBERAL SHIFT

The debt crisis began in 1982 when Mexico defaulted on its debt and other countries began to find it extremely difficult to repay their debts without recourse to the IMF and World Bank. These international financial institutions (IFIs) recommended scaling back state bureaucracies and reversal of state involvement in the economy (including in the provision of some social services) and prescribed a move towards economic liberalisation both internally and externally. These prescriptions represented a break from state-managed development within the developing world that was accepted up until the late 1970s.

This change was part of the rise of a neo-liberal (sometimes called neo-classical) paradigm shift in economics, which harkened back to nineteenth century laissez-faire views and were used in criticism of Keynesian interventionist welfare state policies. Neoliberalism and related policy prescriptions thereby gained acceptance within the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank from the late 1970s and by the 1980s started to transform mainstream thought and policy practice (Martinussen 1999: 260, Soros 1998: 127).

The neo-liberal shift was based on empirical research that argued the inadequacies of state involvement in various economies evident in research published by economists such as Deepak Lal, Bela Belassa, Jagdish Bhagwati and Ian Little in the early 1980s (Martinussen 1999: 262). However, this shift was also based on ideas. Empirical research showed the inadequacies of state intervention, but this did not mean that the only alternative was non-intervention and recourse to market mechanisms. Indeed more efficient state-led development and management strategies could have been viewed as an
alternative. According to Soros, who terms this ideological standpoint as based on “market fundamentalism”:

State intervention in the economy has always produced some negative results. This has been true not only of central planning but also of the welfare state and of Keynesian demand management. From this banal observation, market fundamentalists jump to a totally illogical conclusion: if state intervention is faulty, free markets must be perfect. Therefore the state must not be allowed to intervene in the economy. (Soros 1998: 127-128)

This shift can therefore be seen as ideational, as a paradigm shift or change in beliefs about cause and effect (causal beliefs). The shift was further supported by the election of governments supportive of the ideas within this paradigm in some of the politically important industrialised countries around the early 1980s, namely: Reagan in the USA, Thatcher in the UK and Kohl in West Germany (Martinussen 1999:262; Soros 1998: 128). Hence, we see the decline of ideas linked to state interventionism with the emergence of a new set of ideas dominating thought in the international context.

A focus on trade liberalisation also came with this shift towards neo-liberalism. The liberalising measures that IFIs prescribed to developing countries included reducing barriers to trade. Trade openness was linked to development, as the following quotation illustrates:

Trade liberalization has been a central part of mainstream policy advice for at least 20 years and one of the most prominent characteristics of recent globalization… There has been a dramatic growth in world trade in the last 50 years as successive rounds of multilateral negotiations have progressively reduced barriers to trade. This has made international trade one of the most important engines of growth in the world economy, underpinning the unprecedented increases in living standards in so many countries since the Second World War. (McCulloch et. al, 2001: 5)

By 1986 the Uruguay Round began efforts to further trade liberalisation (both in goods and in services) and to further liberalisation in other trade related areas (e.g. investment and government procurement). In the run up to creating the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) ministers made overt references to this link and to the necessity of trade liberalisation for economic growth in all countries no matter their size or level of development:

The Agreements reached in the Uruguay Round show that all the participating governments recognize the contribution that liberal trading policies can make to the healthy growth and development of their own economies and of the world economy as a whole. (WTO TNC 1993)

Even though the shift towards trade liberalisation can be seen as a material change in the international economic structure, it is ideational in its underpinnings because of its links to neo-liberal trends in economic policy thought. This ideational shift that underpinned material changes can be seen within CARICOM. For instance Walker tells that at the UWI in the 1980s, dependency economists of the New World Group left the St. Augustine campus and were succeeded by neo-liberal economists (2002: 7).

CONTESTED GLOBALISATION

A “globalisation” discourse emerged around the 1990s in the context of the neo-liberal shift, but the processes of interconnectedness this term describes reach further into history than the 1990s. The 1950s and 1960s saw increasing prosperity in the industrialised world and advances in communications and technology. Such advances facilitated increasing connectedness in trade, investment and finance on the economic side and the ease with which individuals could communicate and travel irrespective or national borders during the 1960s and 1970s. As market-oriented approaches to economic affairs intensified in the 1980s and began to be implemented around the world (including in developing countries and former communist ones) so too did these processes of interconnectedness. Growing interconnectedness, facilitated and complemented by technological advances began to be seen as evidence of “globalisation”, particularly with the end of the Cold War (Spero and Hart 2003: 6-9; Hirst and Thompson 1999: 1-6; Keohane and Nye 2001: Chapter 10).
“Globalisation” though has been used both to describe interconnectedness in economic and social realms and to prescribe the direction in which societies should move. Globalisation is not only a material fact resulting from technological advances, changes in trade and financial flows or increased world travel. For instance, globalisation is not truly global in the economic sense (in terms of trade and financial flows). Near non-existent levels of foreign investment in sub-Saharan Africa suggest this point, as does the fact that although more and more countries participate in cross-border trade and financial transactions these transactions still tend to be dominated by a small cluster of countries (Hirst and Thompson 1999: chapter 2; Gilpin 2000: 171). The unevenness of economic processes described as economic globalisation then may lead one to interpret the term not just as a descriptor but as a prescribed a neo-liberal policy course (Gilpin 2000: 296-297). Caribbean academic, Clive Thomas, expresses this view in stating that globalisation can be seen:

...as process on the one hand, and policies of deregulation and liberalisation of markets, which accompany it. This identity of process and policy is at the heart of many of the fundamental issues of development, democracy and social justice in the global economy today (Thomas 2005: 11 -emphasis added)

Therefore, globalisation does not describe material occurrences alone; it is a set of discourses. Some globalisation discourses see market-oriented policies implicit in the term as progressive and necessary, other discourses frame these policies as problematic but unavoidable and yet others see globalisation as problematic, unnecessary and to be resisted. Varying sorts of CSOs have responded to globalisation according to differing views about processes and policies encompassed by the term. Some CSOs have responded in opposition as evidenced by the protestors from “anti-globalisation” movements and others by trying to shape the course of globalisation with groups calling for greater transparency in global governance, attacking “corporate globalisation” and a range of other issues of “global” salience (Desai and Said 2001: 51; Krut 1997: 3-6; Riker 2005; Scholte 2004a).
The processes of globalisation, specifically advances in information and communications technology and the increasing affordability and ease of world travel, have allowed various social movements and CSOs (both EIGs and non-EIGs) to share ideas, network and mobilise with other CSOs across borders (Hurrell 1995: 55; Kaldor 2003: 94-97; Keck and Sikkink 1998). This interconnectivity and its impact on CSO activism is evident when one considers the growing discourse on “Global Civil Society” in the contemporary context (e.g. Kaldor 2003; Desai and Said 2001: 51). Therefore, in addition to Thomas’s notion of globalisation as processes and policies, Desai and Said’s view of globalisation as “a symbiotic relationship between global capitalism and global civil society” (2001: 51) seems apt. In other words, the term globalisation encompasses policies and processes to which CSOs from around the world have responded and also cross-border networking and solidarity-building activities that CSOs have helped to create.

These interlinked ideational-material changes became visible in the content of trade arrangements in which CARICOM members were involved. The following sub-section explores the discourses and policies linked to good governance, liberalisation and globalisation evident within trade arrangements that CARICOM has negotiated from the 1980s.

**TRADE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE 1980S AND 1990S**

- **LOMÉ III, LOMÉ IV AND THE COTONOU AGREEMENT**

  The Lomé Convention was renewed with Lomé III (1985-1990). The novel aspect of this agreement however, was the inclusion of references to the need to respect human rights and a call to increase social and cultural cooperation between the two groups of countries (Babarinde 1994: 26-28). In other words we see here a shift towards emphasising non-trade issues (one of which is governance) in a trade agreement. However, this does not illustrate an emphasis on CSO involvement in trade agreements
between the EEC and the ACP. However, a CSO focus surfaced in the Lomé IV and more markedly so within the EU-ACP trade talks that succeeded the Lomé framework.

The Lomé IV (negotiated in 1989) addressed non-trade issues such as human rights violations, seeking to preserve the environment and focusing on structural adjustment. It also, in attempts to promote sound management of financial resources, placed conditionality on accessing EDF funding and set aside 15% of EDF funding to encourage states to embrace structural adjustment measures (Babarinde 1994: 30-31).

That this last Lomé began to focus on governance issues and neo-liberal structural adjustment reforms when it did speaks to the new prevalence of views that emphasised liberal governance, in the political arena, and the efficiency of liberalisation in the economic arena (also espoused by the so-called “Washington Consensus”).

The concerns for good governance signalled a newer dimension in the trade and economic relationship between the ACP and EEC that were emblematic of changes in the world linked to calls for better governance from various “Western” CSOs. These changes became further entrenched when Lomé IV was reviewed after five years of its existence to include provisions allowing for greater involvement of NGOs/CBOs in development via “Decentralised Cooperation”. Decentralised Cooperation allowed for participation by non-governmental bodies proposing programmes and activities with the assistance of EU donors who provided funding and assistance in terms of capacity building within the various NGOs/CBOs (Banana Link 1999).

Thus, by the middle of the 1990s governance issues and civil/political liberties became visible in the EU-ACP context of trade and economic arrangements. Attempting to bring CSOs into consultations here may be viewed as strategically aimed at implementing development programmes in cost-efficient ways. Nonetheless, this instrumentality was based on ideas. Donor governments came to believe that some CSOs could be a viable means for implementing development programmes cost effectively and avoiding some of the problems of opacity and mismanagement of development funding.
disbursed to governments. This idea was not significant prior to the 1980s/1990s and only became important when an emphasis on good governance emerged as significant. Therefore, although this causal idea was used for strategic purposes, its use illustrates the prevalence and importance of ideas about CSOs at the time.

Additionally, changes in the trade arrangements between the EU and ACP illustrated the importance of the neo-liberal shift in economic policy thought. An aspect of this market-oriented leaning, inherent in neo-liberal economic thought, was official advocacy of private sector led development rather than state interventionism. As a consequence, Lomé IV advised that the role of the private in development be enhanced via decentralised cooperation too. Like NGOs/CBOs, the private sector was to gain funding, but in the private sector this was to enable businesses and industries to contribute to development by increasing competitiveness, diversification, meeting international standards and the like. In this respect private sector EIGs (business/industry specific/producer associations) became important actors too (Huybrechts, 1998).

Despite its newer neo-liberal slant, the Lomé IV continued to provide non-reciprocal trade access to products from the ACP. However, in the 1990s, non-reciprocal trade relations between the EU and the CARICOM countries came into question due to incompatibilities between the Lomé IV and the WTO. In 1994, Chiquita brands and the Hawaii Banana Association applied to the US government (under Section 301 of the US Trade Act) claiming that the EU import regime for bananas was detrimental to their trade (Barclay 1999: 9; Sutton 1997). In May of 1996 the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel to deal with this case, which the USA won. The EU was thus obligated to liberalise its import regime for bananas to be WTO compatible by 1 January 1999 (WTO 2000: 2, 7-8). This ruling precipitated changes to the EU-ACP trade and economic arrangements that would virtually put an end to non-reciprocal trade relations between the two regions.

In 1998 negotiations between the EU and the ACP on the future of their trade relationships began in light of the termination of Lomé IV in 2000. Consequently the
countries involved signed the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreement in June 2000 (referred to as the Cotonou Agreement) that committed countries to agree regional WTO-compliant Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) by 2008. The Cotonou Agreement emphasised development concerns such as poverty reduction and economic growth, as did previous agreements, and spoke to the importance of good governance and asserted the necessity of including non-state actors (CSOs, private sector actors/firms, etc.) as partners in the consultation processes (European Commission 2004).

Increasing liberalisation can be seen as an attribute of economic globalisation and was important in prompting CSOs to rethink their interests in shaping trade-negotiating priorities. In the face of decreasing preferential access to markets and increasing trade liberalisation, CSOs in the Caribbean, like others in the world, came to mobilise on trade issues whether in support, opposition, or seeking alternatives to the liberalising globalising policy context. Moreover, in the ideational-material context in which good governance became important, these CSOs had some authority to demand consultation by governments in their mobilisation efforts.

In the Cotonou process, for example, the CSO inclusive focus became important. A CSO inclusive approach was advocated in the European Council’s Green Paper of November 1996 that focussed on the need for participation by non-governmental actors through dialogue and access to EDF funding in the post-Lomé IV context (Huybrechts 1998). The need for CSO inclusion was further expressed in a European Parliament report on the post-Lomé IV framework. Here the need to include CS and private sector actors more effectively in decision-making was made explicit with the Parliament stating that it:

Consider that the effective inclusion of organizations of civil society (associations for the defence of human rights, young people, women, the rural population, NGOs, trade unions, economic and social partners, churches, religious and philosophical organizations, etc.), the private sector, universities and teaching and training establishments, decentralized and local communities, must be a prerequisite of Lomé V (Martens 1997).
However, despite this focus on CSOs in governance appearing to come from the EU side of the EU-ACP relationship, it would be difficult to state certainly that this was nothing more than an EU-driven initiative, since a focus on good governance was also present in the broader international ideational-material context (as made clear previously). At the CARICOM level the importance of CSOs in good governance became important in the 1990s too. For instance, a Charter of Civil Society was signed in 1997 and a social partnership between CARICOM and the major regional umbrella labour, private sector and developmental CSOs was established in 1996.

With changing ideational-material trends some CSOs in CARICOM came to conceive of themselves as needing to mobilise on trade issues by the end of the 1990s. Additionally, policy thought as expressed within both the EU and the CARICOM spheres began to focus on CSO inclusion in decision-making and governance. So, the shift towards advocating CSO consultation on trade and economic matters in the EU-ACP setting can be seen as multidirectional.

- **OTHER TRADE ARRANGEMENTS**

In terms of other substantial trade agreements, in the Western Hemisphere there was the introduction of the NAFTA. The NAFTA threatened the CBI trade preferences that “Caribbean Basin” products gained into the USA’s market. In addition, CBI preferences were being eroded in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In response the USA’s president, George Bush (Senior), initiated the Enterprise of the Americas Initiative (EAI) in June 1990 to link trade, investment and debt relief in a coordinated approach to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

The EAI aimed to increase foreign capital inflows into LAC, because it was thought that continued economic growth in LAC was needed in order to bolster nascent political and economic reforms in process in the region. This focus on locking in political and economic reforms was in addition to creating the EAI to compensate for commercial
tensions and distortions to regional trade and investment flows that trade liberalisation between the USA and Mexico could bring (Schott 2001: 10).

After the US Congress ratified the NAFTA in 1993, Vice President Albert Gore (under the Clinton Administration) proposed a hemispheric meeting to discuss political and economic issues including hemispheric free trade. At the first Summit of the Americas held in Miami in 1994, trade became a central issue and plans for the creation of an FTAA were declared (Schott 2001: 11). However, trade was not the only issue. Governments spoke to democracy and sustainable development too. To quote the heading of the Miami Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles, what was established was a “Partnership for Development and Prosperity: Democracy, Free Trade and Sustainable Development in the Americas” (Ministerial Declaration of Miami 1994).

The Miami Declaration illustrated the belief in both the neo-liberal market oriented trend and a focus on democratic governance. This declaration also made reference to including CS and CSOs in so doing:

…we invite the cooperation and participation of the private sector, labor, political parties, academic institutions and other non-governmental actors and organizations in both our national and regional efforts, thus strengthening the partnership between governments and society. (Ministerial Declaration of Miami 1994)

Like arrangements with the EEC/EU, proposed arrangements in the Western Hemisphere signalled a commitment to CSO consultation on trade and economic matters. In the trade arrangements established via the Summit of the Americas Process (the FTAA), input by CSOs was countenanced in 1998 at the fourth FTAA Ministerial Meeting (i.e. the ministerial which signalled the start of negotiations). A Special Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society was established and extended an open invitation to Civil Society from 1 November 1998 until 31 March 1999. This initiative encouraged CSO input via written contributions to the FTAA Secretariat and was converted into a permanent mechanism in 2001.
Prior to 1998 though, some CSOs had access to consultative channels on the FTAA, specifically, private sector EIGs. Business representative organisations gave feedback from as early as the first FTAA Ministerial Summit via a mechanism called the Americas Business Forum (Gill 1999: 3). With the initial invitation to CSOs in 1998, business-related EIGs were encouraged to continue their participation in tandem with that of other types of CSOs. The FTAA ministerial declaration of 1998 specifically spoke to this in stating:

We recognize and welcome the interests and concerns that different sectors of society have expressed in relation to the FTAA. Business and other sectors of production, labor, environmental and academic groups have been particularly active in this matter. We encourage these and other sectors of civil societies to present their views on trade matters in a constructive manner. (Ministerial Declaration of San Jose 1998)

As in the EU-ACP context, proposed trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere emphasised trade liberalisation, economic liberalisation within individual countries through structural adjustment and a focus on governance issues that included space for CSO participation in matters once solely the preserve of governments. Again, the ideational-material context of the 1980s and 1990s must be considered in efforts to comprehend these changes.

4.3 CARICOM AND CSO RESPONSES TO THE TURNING TIDE

Now let us turn to the responses of CARICOM governments and CSOs to these changes in the international political economy during the 1980s and 1990s.

THE IDEATIONAL-MATERIAL CONTEXT AND CARICOM RESPONSES

Neo-liberal structural adjustment measures were introduced into the region from the 1980s. Countries in the region faced serious balance of payments problems, with the debt crisis of the 1980s, with world sugar prices falling, and with the USA taking steps to
protect its domestic sugar producers in response (which was to the detriment of Caribbean exporters) (Heron 2004: 47). In this context, some countries sought help from the IFIs that prescribed neo-liberal adjustment measures to correct balance of payments problems. The following examples illustrate the prevalence of neo-liberal adjustment measures in the region in the 1980s and 1990s:

- Jamaica entered into arrangements with the IMF in almost every year between 1977 and 1990 (Downes 1992);
- Dominica entered into loan agreements with the IMF in 1982 and 1987 (Country Studies US 2003);
- Trinidad and Tobago entered into two arrangements with the IMF in 1989 and 1991 and took a structural adjustment loan from the World Bank in 1991 (Central Bank Trinidad and Tobago 1998: 62);
- Guyana went to the IMF in 1990;
- Barbados sought IMF assistance in 1991; and
- Other countries in the region, particularly in the OECS, took on the task of adjusting independently of the IFIs (Downes 1992).

In this context, heads of governments in the region came to view structural adjustment as important and began to accept neo-liberal economic policy ideas. For instance, in 1984 they jointly stated that:

...[S]tructural adjustment is an integral part of the development process. It essentially involves a conscious and determined shift to a new development path to accelerate development, while adapting to major external or internal shocks to the economic system. (CARICOM 1984b-emphasis added-)

Within CARICOM there, therefore, emerged a shift in thinking about economic development and consequently, CARICOM governments began to move away from heavy involvement in their countries’ economies in efforts to “adjust”. The liberalising trend meant making economic activity more market-oriented rather than state-driven. As part of governments’ strategies to decrease their economic activities, CSOs were at times
brought to the forefront of development initiatives. Governments came to emphasise the importance of “self-help” or “self-reliance” for development and the importance of “NGOs” and private organisations in providing some social services and other important goods and services that were formerly the remit of governments (Robinson 1989: 55; Brown 2000: xi-xiii).

At the regional level, trade liberalisation also became important, most notably in efforts to revitalise regionalism within CARICOM. At the tenth Heads of Government Meeting in Grenada in 1989, a clear focus and a specific commitment to regionalism that was in line with the shift towards increasing trade liberalisation (what has been termed “open regionalism”) was announced (CARICOM 1989). The aim of enhancing regional economic integration was both a goal in itself and a means of adapting and fitting into a more liberal multilateral trade system. The declaration of this meeting also made explicit that including CSOs in this process was important:

We acknowledge the special roles of the private sector, the trade union movement, the regional universities, the religious organisations, women and youth organisations, the various professions, other non-governmental organisations and people of all walks and conditions of life in moving CARICOM forward. (CARICOM 1989)

That this declaration came in 1989, when Cold War divides were fading and just three years after the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations began, is significant. These allusions to CSOs in the Grand Anse Declaration speak to an emerging emphasis on the importance of CSOs within the region and for advancing regionalism. So too did the creation of the West Indian Commission (WIC), proposed at the 1989 Heads of Governments meeting. The WIC was tasked with suggesting ways of advancing the goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas (the treaty establishing CARICOM ) and attempted to “listen to the people” (WIC 1990: 4) in so doing. The recommendations of the WIC led to the creation of the Charter of Civil Society of the Caribbean Community in 1997, thus further enhanced the role of CS and CSOs in regional processes.
With the end of the Cold War and the fall from grace of command economies by the late 1980s, good governance, economic liberalisation and increasing trade, financial flows and technological advances (globalisation) all came to be seen as important in international spheres. Within CARICOM, policy advisers and academics viewed these ideational-material changes in the international sphere as reiterating the need to intensify political and economic integration (deepening integration) in the region. They also saw the need to expand integration (widening integration) in order to include more countries in the Caribbean, as CARICOM was too small a grouping to pull significant international political or economic weight (Bennett 1999: 142). CARICOM thereby enhanced internal liberalisation when, in 1989 member governments agreed to create a single market and a single economy (CARICOM Single Market and Economy-CSME) which would entail the free movement of goods, capital and labour within CARICOM whilst maintaining a higher (GATT/WTO compatible) tariff against extra-regional goods. This was “…an attempt to facilitate economic development of the Member States in an increasingly open and competitive global environment” (CARICOM 1999: 2).

Another attempt to cope with the emerging ideational-material changes of the time was the creation, in 1992, of a CARICOM Working Group to deal with consolidating regional negotiating positions in the context of trade liberalisation arrangements. In 1993 this working group evolved to become the “Prime Ministerial Sub-Committee on External Negotiations”, a committee that was supported by an “Advisory Group” comprised of trade experts. However, with the creation of the WTO, potential changes in the ACP-EU trade relations, and the beginning of the FTAA process, the Prime Ministers of the Sub-Committee and consultants in the Advisory Group believed that a separate negotiating machinery based on Caribbean technical expertise was needed to unify negotiating efforts of the region. As a consequence, the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) was established on 1 April 1997 (CARICOM 2003).

53 These views were stated in the recommendations of the West Indian Commission (WIC).
54 Indeed CARICOM has not been alone in this regard as since the 1980s Latin American and Caribbean countries have developed or reactivated regional integration initiative as a way of responding to threats posed by globalisation (Serbin 1998: 111; Wedderburn 1998: 61).
The RNM was created as a mechanism to deal with trade liberalisation in a globalising atmosphere. CARICOM created the RNM as a regional response to the ideational-material changes of trade liberalisation (and neo-liberal economic management more broadly). The references to the inclusion of “stakeholders”, “transparency” and “consultation” that were expressed in the mandate of the RNM, also illustrate the importance of the ideational-material shift towards emphasising good governance and CSO involvement in policy/decision-making (CARICOM 2002: 41). The RNM was created in the same year as the Charter on Civil Society, so its commitment to CSO consultation must be considered with this in mind. These government expressions of commitment to CSO consultation in general and with respect to trade matters, emerged as a drastic break with past trends. This break must be considered in light of the ideational-material context of time.

So far then, we see that ideational-material trends towards liberalisation, good governance/CS importance and globalisation that grew in importance in the 1980s and 1990s impacted on the actions of the CARICOM grouping. Now let us look at the impact of these ideational-material trends on the actions of CSOs within the region.

EIG ACTIVISM AND INCLUSION ON TRADE FROM THE 1990S

In the 1980s and into the 1990s the emphasis on privatisation and private sector-led development placed the private sector and CSOs representing various sections of the private sector in a good position to address trade and development concerns.

Traditionally important EIGs (e.g. Chambers of Commerce and unions) consolidated, new EIGs were formed (e.g. service coalitions) and other less traditionally active ones (e.g. small farmers’ and small business associations) attempted to become involved in international trade affairs where previously they had not. These private sector EIG actions emerged in response to the changing world ideational-material climate and were also reflections of CSOs’ perceptions of this climate. Ideas formed the background for these politico-economic occurrences and were important because they framed the
ways that EIGs perceived of their interests. In this setting, a range of business/industry-specific EIGs came to prioritise activism on international trade negotiating issues rather than leaving deliberations on trade in the hands of government representatives. In other words, these EIGs became less myopic and broadened the scope of their interests. In efforts to work towards effective activism, based on these reconstituted interests, some EIGs went about altering their institutional arrangements or creating new mechanisms.

Private sector umbrella groups with arms geared specifically towards examining and making representations to government and CARICOM officials began to be established from the late 1990s onwards. For instance:

- The Committee on Trade Policy was created within the Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica (PSOJ);
- The International Trade Negotiations Unit comprising representatives of various private sector organisations in Trinidad and Tobago was officially established in 2002;
- The Private Sector Trade Team (PSTT) in Barbados was established in 2003 as an outgrowth of the Barbados Private Sector Agency (PSA).

Other examples illustrating private sector EIG interests in trade affairs into the early 21st century were the private sector conference of the OECS in 2003 and the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce Conference in 2000. Both addressed trade and development specifically with reference to the WTO, FTAA and CSME (Antigua Star 22-09-03).

Some groups representing small private sector interests, such as small farmers or small businesses, also began to see themselves as needing to become involved in trade issues, at times in association with developmental CSOs. Small farmers’ associations in the Windward Islands joined together to form the Windward Island Farmers Association (WINFA) in 1982. This organisation began activism on the trade front in the 1990s in response to the creation of the Single European Market and liberalisation of the banana
trade. This EIG mobilised fervently to represent member interests when these were threatened yet more by the WTO trade dispute over the entry of ACP bananas into the EU market. WINFA obviously responded to material interests being threatened. However, the occurrences to which WINFA responded cannot be disconnected from ideas. Neo-liberal ideas informed the creation of the WTO and were put into practice, thereby placing preferential arrangements that governed the exchange of bananas between the Windward Islands and the EU under threat. WINFA’s activism occurred in line with the material impact of threats to the banana trade on producer interests.

Hence, WINFA’s activism in calling for “fair trade” can be viewed as strategic and based on self-interests/instrumental goals. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that this material threat to producer interests occurred in a specific ideational-material context; a context in which specific ideas inform policy and action. Furthermore, in rejecting the ideas espoused in neo-liberal trade prescriptions and through WINFA’s commitment to sustaining small farming for broader social and economic development reasons, we can see that the group’s interests were not only material but based on principled beliefs and values. The philosophy of WINFA emphasised the importance of developmental concerns and is illustrated in the association’s partnering with development focussed non-EIGs in their activism (to be discussed further in Chapter 7).

SAPs and the linked emphasis on privatisation, deregulation and increasing competitiveness in the face of trade liberalisation and globalisation also impacted on the relationship between governments and unions. Traditional links were mostly broken as states were less able (though not entirely unable) to grant the traditional pay-offs to workers or continue to provide large amounts of jobs at high wages via public sector employment. Moreover, private sector entities began to restructure in order to enhance competitiveness in the face of “globalisation”, which often meant that there had to be employment cuts. These changes impacted on unions coming to see themselves as needing to place more emphasis on trade matters and were discussed, for instance by representatives of unions, private sector representatives, academics and government officials at a January 1999 ILO Symposium on “Labour Issues in the Context of
Economic Integration and Free Trade – A Caribbean Perspective” (Momm 1999: 235-238).

It would appear then, that ideational-material forces kick-started involvement of CSOs in attempting to steer the direction of trade negotiating agendas pursued by the CARICOM regional group.

**NON-EIG ACTIVISM AND INCLUSION ON TRADE FROM THE 1990s**

The mobilisation of non-EIGs around trade issues and their involvement in consultative processes is more of a break with tradition in the Caribbean than that of EIGs. Brown (2000) speaks of the reinvigoration of traditional non-EIGs and the birth of new “people-oriented” NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s. During this time period, traditional welfare-oriented organisations and newer developmental NGOs were being called on to provide services and assistance within the Caribbean in the face of economic adjustments (xi-xiii). Including these non-EIGs in consultative processes with governments where labour and the private sector were exclusively included in the past began to transform processes of interaction between governments and CSOs.

Accompanying SAPs and the commencement of the Uruguay Round were beliefs within some spheres of CS that the liberal philosophy espoused in SAPs and attempts at codifying trade rules often ran counter to important societal needs. For instance, enhancing social well-being for the poor or marginalised and considering environmental protection as part of any developmental strategy were perceived as underemphasised within mainstream policy practices. Some within CS did not agree with the view that saw mainstream neo-liberal policy prescriptions or framings of globalisation as vital and unavoidable. Therefore, the recommended inclusion of non-EIGs in governmental processes as partners in development on the part of the same IFIs that advocated cuts in public spending on social welfare and also by CSOs opposed to IFI policies is ironic (Brown 2000: xiii). On the part of IFIs a focus on neo-liberal economic beliefs existed in tandem with an emphasis on making use of non-EIGs for implementing development
programmes and providing services. This view in some respects coincided with some CSO and international organisations’ (e.g. the UNDP) beliefs in participation by CSOs in governance or developmental purposes.

Newer CSOs focussing on development and involved in implementing development programmes began to be formed in light of the need to further social welfare concerns and to address the needs of marginalised groups who could be ill-impacted by adjustment initiatives and increased liberalisation in international economic spheres. These newer NGOs grew in importance across the CARICOM region from the 1980s both in the MDCs and the LDCs (Brown 2000: xii; Veron 2000: 8; Dumas-Sanchez 2000: 155-157; Garrity 1996: 53-54). Development NGOs from industrialised countries also expanded their involvement and increasingly became accepted partners in development in developing countries from around the same general time (Mitlin 1998: 81-82). In the CARICOM context, OXFAM has been an important partner of the CPDC, the CGTN and WINFA by the start of the 1990s in assisting them with development and trade related mobilisation.

Also feeding into greater involvement of non-EIGs in CARICOM affairs was the involvement of CSOs in international relations from the late 1980s in efforts to impact on global governance. For instance, and as already noted, CSO-IMF interactions commenced in the early 1980s (Dawson and Bhatt 2001: 6-12), and increased involvement by CSOs in international affairs can be seen in their participation in the UN conferences of the 1990s (Cammaerts 2004: 4).

CARICOM non-EIGs were part of the trend of increasing involvement in international matters. Some CSOs (e.g. the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action) attended various UN conferences in the 1990s. Non-EIGs also gained the support of the region’s leaders and of the CARICOM Secretariat who invited CSOs to assist with creating regional positions for these 1990’s UN conferences. For example, in 1991 the CARICOM Conference of the Heads of Governments acknowledged the importance of NGOs in consultations to prepare for the 1992 UN Conference on

Hence, non-EIGs in the region gained a boost from trends in international CSO activism and were also part of this trend. It is plausible then, that some non-EIGs were empowered by occurrences within the international NGO movement to become active in areas beyond social welfare and development conceived in narrow terms. One could say that this represents the start of CARICOM non-EIGs changing their perceptions. In response these CSOs began to create institutional methods of operating and organising so that their activities would not be limited to local level welfare type activities.

In sum, not only have various types of CSOs (EIGs and non-EIGs) amplified their voices with relation to regional and domestic affairs, non-traditional CSOs have grown in importance within the world of CS and with relation to regional governments and officials. Some examples of these at the regional level will be discussed more in Chapter 5.

Despite government and regional decision-makers consulting with CSOs (EIGs and non-EIGs), decision-making remains in the hands of government mandated officials. However, CSOs of varying ilks have come to perceive themselves as having interests linked to trade politics and thereby see themselves as having interests in shaping approaches to trade affairs. Although CSOs began to become involved in decision-making activities, changes in CSO activism and inclusion across the CARICOM region have not been uniform. Also, although non-EIG action has emerged via various organisations and movements, according to Wedderburn and Serbin, these have had less voice than (private sector) EIGs in CARICOM (Wedderburn 1998: 61; Serbin 1998: 112-113). The rest of this thesis will therefore look at these matters with reference to three countries after examining the regional level of CARICOM.
CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS

The rationale of this chapter was to demonstrate that understanding the ways in which CSOs acted on and conceived of their interests from the 1990s was coloured by ideational-material changes that emerged from the 1980s. The same can be said for understanding some shifts in governmental acceptance of the requirement for CSO consultation. In contrast, the limited activism and inclusion of CSOs in the 1970s should be considered in light of the ideational-material context of that time period. Not only is the ideational-material context important, so too are ideas held about what ideational-material trends mean (or could mean) and ideas about how actors should respond to these trends. The ideational-material context, material impacts that resulted and ideas held about the ideational-material context help us to understand why CSOs became more active and why governments included them more from the 1990s on a range of areas including trade.

Although this chapter asserted that the international ideational-material climate began to change from the 1980s, the mid to late 1990s was the point when changes began to show themselves within the CARICOM context and specifically with relation to CSO activism and participation in shaping international trade and economic arrangements. Nonetheless, CSO activism and the inclusion of CSOs in consultation processes has been and continues to be slow and uneven, despite changes in behaviour and attitudes. This point will be brought out in the case studies to follow in Part B of this thesis.

The importance of institutional factors in understanding how actors responded to trade issues, will also be more fully developed in Part B. Institutional factors help us to understand how ideas and interests constructed in a specific ideational-material context were translated into strategies for mobilisation. Institutional arrangements were developed to facilitate interaction between governments/regional mechanisms and societal groups. These institutional mechanisms were created in the context of the
ideational-material setting of the 1980s and 1990s. Within CSOs there were important institutional changes that came with changing interest perception as well, specifically attempts to fortify CSOs through creating umbrella organisations or through networking for activism.
PART B
CHAPTER 5

TRADE NEGOTIATING AGENDA SETTING AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL: CSO MOBILISATION AND INCLUSION

The previous chapter posited that shifts in the international ideational-material context from the 1980s (liberalisation, globalisation and a focus on good governance) began to impact on CSO activism and on government inclusion of CSOs on trade issues by the 1990s. The emerging focus on CSOs was a break with trends in governance in the region that have tended to be government-dominated. Therefore, CSO inclusion and activism on trade issues are actions situated in a specific historical time in which changes in the international sphere contributed to breaks with the past. These external factors of importance from the 1990s are not all that need be considered though. Interests, the ideas that structure them and institutional factors help one to understand CSO activism on trade issues and government inclusion of varying sorts of CSOs.

In light of these arguments, this chapter looks at CARICOM-level discourses about CSO consultation and at CARICOM-level mechanisms geared towards including CSOs. This chapter also looks at CSO activism which is geared towards region level officials. In looking at CSO activism and consultation, this chapter, additionally, examines the character and differences between EIG and non-EIG activism and inclusion on trade issues at the region level. The chapter is laid out as follows.

Section 5.1 looks at the incorporation of CSOs at the regional level and at the shift in discourse and ideas towards emphasising CSOs. After doing so, Section 5.2 goes on to examine how and why various CSOs mobilise and have mobilised on trade issues at the regional level. This section, thereby, looks at the ideas that constitute interests and the institutions that direct activism as important for both EIGs and non-EIGs.
5.1 WORKING REGIONALLY

CARICOM was created because the small fledgling Caribbean states comprising the group saw the need to cooperate in efforts to integrate and survive in the world economy and in world politics. Institutional constraints were important in deciding to create CARIFTA and then CARICOM, especially considering the size of the individual countries (area wise, population wise, market wise or all three) and resource constraints (human, natural and financial). CARICOM was also crafted at a time when regional arrangements were seen as an option for developing countries wanting to cope with international economic relations (Egoumé 2002: 6; Andriamananjara and Schiff 1998: 3).

Regional trade areas (RTAs) or preferential trade areas (PTAs) were recommended in some strains of structuralist, dependency and modernisation and growth schools of development thought. West Indian scholars also advanced some important approaches to regional trade and economic integration. For instance, W. Arthur Lewis recommended regional economic cooperation for economic growth and in order to modernise the region’s economies. Sir Alister McIntyre and William Demas also advocated economic cooperation and some regional planning, but in a more structuralist vein. Then there were the New World Group academics (e.g. Best, Levitt, Beckford and Girvan) that took up a more radical dependency line in calling for intense region wide planning and government economic intervention as part of any regional economic arrangement (see Bennett 1999: 129-135).

1960s and 1970s views on customs unions and economic advancement in tandem with neo-functionalist thinking about cooperation, based specifically on the European experience, also impacted on CARICOM approaches to regional integration (Brown 2001: 136-138; Axline 1979: 1-2). CARIFTA and CARICOM must, therefore, be viewed as both institutional responses to perceived interests of states and as located within a specific international ideational-material context. Both CARIFTA and CARICOM were initiated in an ideational-material context amenable to such arrangements and in which
states and regional officials were placed as the principal actors in regional and international affairs.

Faced with the trend towards neo-liberalism in economic and development thinking and the emergence of an increasingly complex multilateral trade-negotiating arena in the 1980s and 1990s, these countries saw a need to adapt the regional institution. This time, however, regional arrangements were to be arranged in a more liberal vein which was in line with moves towards “open regionalism” and aimed to promote a liberal trade and economic environment (rather than a protective one) (Egoumé-Bogosso and Mendis 2002: 6). Efforts to create the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) from 1989 were touted as one way of helping the region adapt to the more open economic sphere. Additionally, with relation to trade negotiations, the RNM was established to pool negotiating expertise across the region and, thereby, to overcome some of the institutional hindrances faced in attempts to handle multiple liberalising trade negotiations (see Chapter 4).

In response to liberalising trends CARICOM saw bolstering regional arrangements as the appropriate institutional coping mechanism. The region interpreted changes as requiring a regionally integrated response that built on the region’s legacy of integration. CARICOM leaders and officials conceived deeper economic cooperation (negotiating using united regional positions) and drawing on CSO input as important for dealing with these changes. None of these attempts at coping, though, would by necessity help CARICOM countries. Countries could have, alternately, perceived of themselves as being able to fit into the liberalising world more effectively by negotiating their interests and by liberalising trade individually in multilateral processes (e.g. within the WTO). So, from the 1990s changes in CARICOM must be understood with reference to ideational-material landscape. Moreover, it is important to consider ideas held about the ideational-material context.

Around the same time that CARICOM attempted to foster open regionalism in efforts to cope with ideational-material shifts in a neo-liberal direction and in response to
the linked globalisation, the regional body also moved towards emphasising good governance and CSO partnerships.

**SPEAKING OF SOCIAL PARTNERS, CS AND CSOS AND NGOS**

In looking at the shift in CARICOM emphasis on CSOs, it is useful to look at the emergence of *language pertaining to CSOs* and then *practices for including CSOs* in the workings of CARICOM.


To look more closely let us start with the findings of the West Indian Commission (WIC). From 1989 the WIC attempted to “listen to the people” (WIC 1990) in order to make suggestions on how best to enhance CARICOM. This emphasis on CS was extended in 1991 when the CARICOM Conference of Heads of Governments first made reference to “Social Partners” in the communiqué of an inter-sessional meeting. These social partners comprised the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC) and the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL). By 1996 a non-EIG (the Caribbean Policy Development Centre -CPDC) also came to be included as a CARICOM-level social partner (CARICOM 1991a: 2; CARICOM 1995: 5).

According to CARICOM statements, the social partners were to participate in the run up to negotiating external trade agreements. The following excerpts from the CARICOM Conference of Heads of Governments communiqués issued in 1996 and 1997 show this:

> Heads of Government agreed on the composition of a negotiating team which would include representatives of Member States, Regional...
Institutions (CARICOM and OECS Secretariats and the CDB) and the social partners: business, labour and the appropriate NGO’s. (CARICOM 1996a: 2-emphasis added-)

Heads of Government held discussions with the Social Partners – it was essential to maintain fluid lines of communication and consultation with these partners particularly with regard to their involvement on negotiation processes. (CARICOM 1996b: 4- emphasis added-)

The Heads of Government determined that the Caribbean preparatory process for negotiations on the future arrangements [between the EU and ACP] would involve, in addition to governments, the Associated States and the social partners. (CARICOM 1997: 4- emphasis and bracketed text added-)

Starting in the 1990s a focus on CS using the actual term “civil society” also emerged. Following recommendations made by the WIC, in 1992 government leaders agreed to create a Charter of Civil Society of the Caribbean Community. The Charter was agreed in 1997 (CARICOM 1992: 2; CARICOM 1997: 1). In 2002 a further step was taken in adopting the Lilendaal Statement of Principles, which was slated to operationalise consultations between CSOs and CARICOM. The following excerpt from The Lilendaal Statement of Principles on the Forward Together Conference is worth referring to. In this statement, CSO representatives and the CARICOM Governments:

EMPHASIZE the need for more constructive participation of Civil Society representatives in appropriate decisions making Organs of the Community such as the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP), the Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD), etc; (CARICOM 2002)

The drive for incorporating CSOs in the workings of CARICOM came from CSOs as well as from regional officials. The CSO thrust for greater consultation is noted in the following extract from a CPDC speech delivered at the 2004 Conference of the Heads of Government Meeting:

The CPDC wants to put on record that we are very encouraged by the progressive steps that have brought the NGO stakeholders from crying out to be recognized as “social partners in development” a decade and a half
ago, to the current gradual forging of a partnership with our governments, trade unions and private sector organisations. (CPDC 2004: 2)

Another example of CSOs emphasising and pushing for consultation on regional matters is set out in the following statement made by the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA):

We the members of CAFRA therefore call for:

- Institutionalized entry points for the participation of civil society at the national, regional and international level. In particular recognizing that women are specially disadvantaged in the process, resources must be allocated to facilitate the participation of women and women’s organizations. (CAFRA 2002)

Therefore, CARICOM official discourses spoke to the importance of CSO inclusion in regional affairs and regional CSOs also advocated this. However, this CSO focus within the CARICOM region must be linked to broader external tendencies too. Specifically, the trend towards CSO consultation in efforts to foster “good governance”, as (in part) advised by donor governments and IFIs, must be heeded. The trend across the world towards CSO mobilisation and networking with respect to international agreements and issues such as globalisation, structural adjustment and trade liberalisation (amongst other issues), should be noted also in understanding the context of CSO activism on trade issues and official discourses and actions in acquiescence to this.

THE IDEA OF CSOS IN RELATION TO CONSULTATION ON TRADE

Commitment to CSO consultation has been expressed within the RNM, which focuses solely on trade negotiating issues as opposed to the broader mandate of the Conference of the Heads of Governments. For instance, Malcolm Spence from the RNM is of the opinion that the inclusion of CSOs and the consideration of views from CSOs are important. He further asserted that building institutional capacity within the RNM has helped to accommodate this in the region since:
[Officials in the region] are all so busy trying to keep pace with the negotiations themselves that it is difficult for them to fit in consultations that are critical for them to be effective at the negotiating table. (Malcolm Spence interview: 07-08-03- emphasis and bracketed text added)

Consulting with CSOs is important in his words because:

It does very much affect, not only how we strategise about the negotiations and the technical work that is required to inform those negotiations, but more fundamentally it affects the policy makers who have to sign off on all the positions and strategies that we propose (Malcolm Spence interview: 07-08-03).

This sentiment is further borne out by the statement of the Director General of the RNM (Dr. Richard Bernal) who, speaking of the formation of a Caribbean Non-State Actors Network in November 2004, said that such a network is “key to deepening the process of consultation with civil society stakeholders” (RNM 2004b). These are but examples of the stated commitments to broad-based consultation on trade-negotiating agendas at the regional level. However, this inclusion may be seen as facilitated by governments or regional officials for strategic purposes.55

The FTAA Secretariat has recognised the commitment at the CARICOM level to consultation by considering consultations conducted by the CARICOM Secretariat and the RNM as examples of “Best Practice”. The FTAA Secretariat in particular cited consultations with respect to the CSME, external trade negotiations and the establishment of a Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as worthy of note. In discussing consultations on trade specifically, the FTAA Secretariat highlighted the role of private sector representative associations in trade forums in the COTED context and the involvement of business, labour and other CSOs in the annual Conference of Heads of Governments’ meetings. The FTAA Secretariat also praised the RNM’s Communication and Partnership Strategy (CPS); weekly newsletters; technical working groups; and workshops all of which speak to attempts at CSO inclusion within CARICOM (FTAA 2003).

55 The strategic versus ideationally based focus on CSO consultation will be discussed further on in this chapter.
Nonetheless, there is a bias towards EIG consultation in these processes. Specifically, private sector EIGs were singled out by the FTAA Secretariat as the CSOs consulted on trade negotiating issues in the COTED context, whilst “other social groups” such as those representing labour, youth and women were represented solely in the COHSOD context (FTAA 2003). This point hints that some CSOs are viewed as stakeholders on trade/economic issues more so than others.

Hence, despite expressing the idea that CSOs should be consulted, there remains the view that some CSOs (i.e. EIGs) should be consulted more, or in more depth than others, when it comes to trade topics. The rationale behind this EIG focus is that these are the CSOs seen as “stakeholders” on trade issues. Starting from a material interest based logic and assuming that EIGs will be more likely to mobilise on trade issues than non-EIGs seems to inform this view of stakeholders on trade issues. Although material interest based assumptions (e.g. those of Frieden and Rogowski highlighted in Chapter 2) do not tell us which groups governments are likely to consult, they do imply that some groups are more apt to mobilise on trade issues than others based on material interests being impacted (positively or negatively). Taking these sorts of views as a starting point, officials in the region appear to see EIGs as the prime stakeholders (those likely to mobilise and be directly affected) on trade issues. Added to this is the legacy of opaque consultative patterns embodied in the state, labour and private sector bargain (akin to corporatism) that have tended to characterise regional decision-making processes (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4).

In essence then, even though the importance of CSO consultation on trade negotiating agendas has been expressed by the RNM, this body’s conception of which CSOs are most important is biased in favour of EIGs. The following RNM Press release, which reports on Dr. Richard Bernal’s (Director General of the RNM) keynote address to a conference on commercial law in August 2004, shows the importance of a private sector emphasis (rather than a focus on varying CSO types):
...Ambassador Bernal highlighted that the involvement of the region’s private sector in external trade negotiations gives legitimacy to and ownership of negotiating positions, as regards these stakeholders. “Ultimately, it is firms that trade, not governments,” he said. (RNM 2004c)

The tendency towards viewing EIGs and specifically private sector interests as focal also has to do with institutional considerations. Non-EIGs tend not to have the same resource capacities as (private sector) EIGs. Resource deficits impact on the institutional capacity of non-EIGs (and some smaller EIG groups-to be discussed later in this chapter). By extension, non-EIGs tend to lack the wherewithal to mobilise effectively based on sustained advocacy and research. These CSOs are also less able to contribute well-informed inputs (particularly technical inputs) when they are included in consultative settings, which further hinders them being perceived as legitimate or competent stakeholders. Chapters 2 and 3 hinted at the importance of these institutional factors, the importance of which becomes even more visible in the country case studies of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia to be discussed in the chapters to follow.

So, even if some non-EIGs perceive themselves as having interests affected by trade negotiations or see themselves as having important contributions to make, these non-EIGs are not seen as primary interest groups/stakeholders on trade issues. Moreover, most non-EIGs do not have the institutional means to contribute research or expertise and as a consequence gain only limited consultative space from officials.

This latter point about institutional capacity conferring expertise is important. It illustrates a crucial idea relating to official incorporation of CSOs: CSOs are important for operational or strategic reasons. If CSOs can contribute research or expertise that regional negotiators can use (even when they are not the key stakeholders) they can be included in trade discussions. As with the inputs from the region’s academic community (highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4), CSO inputs are valued for their potential to contribute technical, evidence-based inputs and causal ideas that can be drawn on in formulating

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56 This point about limited non-EIG capacity will be brought out more clearly in the country studies to follow.
regional negotiating positions. One may, therefore, assume that there is not a deep ideationally based commitment by regional officials to CSO inclusion. However, this apparently instrumental or strategic commitment has an ideational basis. Officials within CARICOM and the RNM subscribe to the idea that CSOs have important inputs to add in regional politics (even if these CSOs are mostly private sector EIGs when it comes to trade issues). This type of belief grew to be of influence from the 1990s when the ideational-material trend towards focussing on good governance and emphasising the important roles that CSOs can play in governance and in development began to be endorsed in the region. Even if incorporating CSOs in order to draw on their expertise may not be conceived as exemplifying a commitment to CSO based on “principled beliefs” (i.e. CSO inclusion being seen as right or just) it does illustrate the importance of pertinent ideas of the time. Therefore, ideas about good governance and CSOs in the ideational-context of the 1980s and 1990s have impacted on the ways in which regional officials attempt to advance their goals.

The idea that CSOs are important because of their potential to contribute expertise is a break with the pre-1990s ideas about CSOs. This change in ideas has begun to impact on the ways in which negotiating stances are arrived at in the region. For example, Ambassador Bernal’s plea to “private sector stakeholders” to be actively involved in submitting proposals is relatively new to the regional discourse.

The consultations that the RNM conducts with a range of CSOs across the region and which form part of normalised practices of the institution, also illustrate a break with past trends. Even if for operational reasons versus some deeply felt moral commitment to broadening CSO consultation, and even if skewed towards a private sector EIG focus, the voiced commitment to CSO inclusion has opened avenues for CSO activism and insertion on trade matters and has altered processes of arriving at trade negotiating stances. Opening spaces for CSOs for whatever reason has the potential to further change processes, transform ideas and impact on outcomes.
Moreover, if one takes the words of the RNM seriously, it would appear that room for CSO inclusion and consultation is to some extent being expanded beyond an EIG focus and is indeed based on the institution’s subscription to the principled idea that such inclusion is “right”. A March 2006 Press release from the RNM on the topic of CSO consultations went to lengths to emphasise the various ways in which the RNM has attempted to and continues to attempt to consult with CSOs and to keep them up to date on trade issues. The following excerpt from the press release illustrates this point:

Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) Director General Ambassador Dr. Richard Bernal reaffirmed the RNM’s commitment to interfacing with civil society. “We welcome regular interaction with non-state actors,” he said, emphasising that “the RNM’s outreach activities are geared at engaging a broad cross-section of stakeholders, to the extent that resources allow. We want to hear their concerns and views. We consider the involvement of civil society an integral part of the process.” (RNM 2006- emphasis added-)

The same press release further emphasised the RNM’s commitment to CSO inclusion in stating: “The RNM’s outreach to non-state actors is considered a critically important aspect of its outreach activities as a whole” (RNM 2006). This press statement further stressed that the RNM interfaces with CSOs, including labour/trades unions, private sector actors, and a range of NGOs including environmental NGOs via:

i) Collaboration: Convening joint Seminars/Workshops (in some cases partnering with the CPDC); ii) Briefings: The RNM Director General, Senior Director Mr. Henry Gill and RNM Technical Staff meet regularly with civil society representatives, to exchange views; iii) Dissemination of Information: The RNM regularly updates the NGO community on developments in trade negotiations germane to the Caribbean, sharing with several dozen NGO institutions its newsletter - RNM UPDATE; and, iv) Participating in NGO Forums: RNM staff participate in a variety of NGO-sponsored forums, often as feature speakers. (RNM 2006 -italics in original-)

In order not to overemphasise the significance of a single press release, it should be noted that this press release expresses views about CSO consultation consistent with the RNM’s mandate as laid out in 1997 and in other RNM publications (notably their newsletters: RNM UPDATE). The commitment to CSO consultation and inclusion
expressed in the above mentioned press release is also consistent with the views expressed by Malcolm Spence of the RNM in an interview with the author (Malcolm Spence interview: 07-08-03). These public expressions of commitment along with actions that back them up are in line with the idea that CSOs are vital for promoting good governance.

The deeds and words of the RNM (with respect to CSOs) show that, despite some private sector EIG bias, there is a genuine belief in the importance of broad-based CSO inclusion. Nevertheless, there is also no denying that CSOs are drawn on by the RNM for strategic reasons (they can contribute well-informed inputs) and this enhances their access to RNM officials. Still, the RNM’s information dissemination and other “outreach activities” illustrate the institution’s interest in engaging with and mobilising CSOs.

TO SUM UP FOR REGIONAL MECHANISMS

What we see when looking at the approach of regional officials to consulting CSOs are:

- Efforts being made to overcome the institutional hurdles to effective regional insertion in a globalising world, which includes a neo-liberal oriented trade -negotiating arena. These efforts included increasing the institutional capacity for regional officials to negotiate jointly and, in so doing, to consult with CSOs.

- CARICOM official subscription to the idea that CSOs should be consulted (in line with a CSO oriented shift in thinking about governance). However, emphasis on private sector EIGs and on the strategic use of CSO expertise feature prominently in regional subscription to this idea.

Yet, believing that CSOs can make useful contributions in crafting negotiating positions does not mean that CSOs will mobilise on trade issues. Similarly, creating region wide institutional mechanisms to consult with CSOs will not automatically
translate into CSOs activism on trade issues. We, therefore, need to look at the factors that motivate CSO activism on trade at the region level.

The following section attempts to look at these motivating factors by focussing on EIGs and non-EIGs operating at the regional level.

5.2 UMBRELLA CSO MOBILISATION AND INCLUSION

At the regional level some CSOs (both EIGs and non-EIGs) have attempted to become active on trade by addressing institutional hindrances to effective political mobilisation. In the main, this has meant pooling resources to create institutional strength within CSOs in efforts to shape regional approaches to negotiations. Additionally, at the CARICOM level, officials have opened the door to consulting with the major regional umbrella CSOs. CSOs, therefore, have institutionalised access to government/regional officials specifically via CARICOM Heads of Government meetings, meetings of COTED, and consultations with the RNM.

Particularly notable in the CARICOM context is the activism and inclusion (from the 1990s) of a non-EIG umbrella association called the CPDC. The inclusion of the CPDC is significant since the other major umbrella CSOs (the CCL and the CAIC) are EIGs that have had a history of contact with regional officials, even though they did not have institutionalised contact until 1991 (CARICOM 1991b: 2). A focus on labour and private sector EIGs, of course was consistent with the informal tripartite focus that dominated regional politics as suggested by a look into the region’s history (highlighted in Chapter 3).

Where CSOs have gone beyond the territorial confines that limit capacity, they have gained input in recognition of their ability to make useful contributions. So some

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57 See chapter 2 on the ICCC (later the CAIC) and the CLC (later CCL) on making proposals for the creation of CARIFTA and the British West Indies Federation respectively.
CSOs have pooled capacity at the regional level to create institutions able to focus on trade issues. The creation of such institutions has enabled CSOs to have better chances at participating in processes geared at shaping the trade agenda. Institutional capacity building, by means of regional peak associations, networking and partnering with other CSOs regionally and internationally, has notably allowed a variety of nationally based non-EIGs to build the technical capacity valued by governments and regional officials in order to have access to consultations.

These efforts at activism and related attempts at institution building have been based on the idea that wide arrays of CSOs are stakeholders on trade issues. Specifically, from the mid-to late 1990s CSOs came to express that activism and consultation on trade issues was important for bringing a societal or people-centred approach to trade matters. In other words, from the 1990s, some CSOs (both non-EIGs and EIGs representing marginalised concerns) came to view themselves as having interests in shaping trade-negotiating agendas where they did not see themselves as having these interests before. The ideational-material context of the post-Cold War in which good governance, globalisation and liberalisation have been important trends cannot be understated in attempting to understand this re-conceptualisation of important interests.

However, no matter how CSOs view their interests, EIGs (especially private sector EIGs representing larger businesses) feature more prominently in consultations and in consultative mechanisms than even the most prominent non-EIGs. To examine non-EIG and EIG mobilisation at the region-wide level, we will look here at some regional peak CSOs working in efforts to shape regional trade negotiating agendas.\(^{58}\)

**NON-EIG MOBILISATION AND INCLUSION**

To begin with we will take a look at the most prominent and best recognised regional umbrella non-EIG (the CPDC) and then move on to look at some others of note.

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\(^{58}\) It should be noted though that the CSOs highlighted are but an illustrative cross-section and therefore this is not an exhaustive examination of all active CSOs on such issues.
• **THE CPDC:**

This CSO draws membership from a wide array of CSOs in the Caribbean and gains external funding from various Oxfam (an NGO with international scope) branches. As a result, the CPDC has overcome some of the institutional hurdles that face many non-EIGs in the region.

This organisation has been able to conduct research, document its findings and actively disseminate these to CSOs and bureaucrats in the region and beyond. In addition, the CPDC has received requests for input and information from governments in the region (Anonymous interview: 06-08-03; Munro-Knight interview: 14-07-05; Malcolm Spence interview: 07-08-03; Roosevelt King: 11-08-03; Zakiya Uzoma Waddada interview: 14-04-05). The CPDC has created important expertise that regional and national officials value.

The CPDC, in cooperation with the Caribbean NGO Reference Group on External Relations (CRG) has conducted national consultations throughout the region. These two linked CSOs also facilitated the formation of National Working Committees on Trade (NWCTs) in Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. NWCTs are committees made up of a range of CSOs in different countries that attempt to advance CSO concerns on trade and generally encourage CSO activism on trade issues under negotiation in the WTO, EU-ACP EPAs and the FTAA. NWCTs also link national CSO activism and concerns more aptly to the region level activism of the CPDC (Munro-Knight interview: 14-07-05).

The CPDC’s capacity and networking strength have enabled this CSO to raise its profile. This networking and cooperative work regionally and internationally can be seen through links with and publications for the Commonwealth Foundation; work with the RNM; work with USAID; and collaboration with a number of regionally based CSOs. In consequence, at the CARICOM level the CPDC has gained the recognition that has allowed it to engage with the RNM, COTED and to sit on Prime Ministerial advisory
committees. This is in addition to addressing the annual Conference of Heads of Government meetings and taking part in meetings of COHSOD that focuses on social issues.

Therefore, the institutional factor is important, as the CPDC’s ability to accumulate the needed resources to pay staff, conduct advocacy work and conduct research in order to contribute well-informed inputs at the CARICOM level and beyond shows. Building this institutional capacity and, in particular, focusing on research has been important in allowing this non-EIG the legitimacy that officials view as important for serious consultation. In this regard space has been opened for the CPDC since it has come to be viewed as a useful partner for consultation.

What is more, the idea (espoused by the RNM and within CARICOM) that CSOs have important roles to play in consultations cannot be forgotten. This gives credence to official inclusion of this non-EIG in consultations on trade issues and at the Heads of Government Conference. This point is worth emphasising because including this sort of CSO (a non-EIG) in consultative processes on economic affairs is a break with traditional consultative patterns. Even if the CPDC is included for instrumental reasons by regional officials, this has still opened space for this CSO and its constituent CSOs to advance the ideas that they see as important. Hence, the potential exists for this non-EIG and its member organisations to impact on outcomes where there was very little potential for such prior to the mid/late 1990s.

That the CPDC represents largely non-EIGs with developmental, social, welfare and other non-economic foci (except for some smaller and more marginal EIGs) shows that, although their concerns may seem tangential to trade talks, these actors view issues surrounding trade agreements as relevant to their interests. The involvement of the CPDC in attempting to shape approaches to trade shows that the possession of instrumental economic interests is not the only important factor that motivates actors to become involved in trade issues.
For the CPDC *the idea* that it is important to have input from “sections of the Caribbean populations whose voices are less heard” (CPDC 2003), and that CSOs should participate and mobilise in a wide array of areas is paramount. In this regard the CPDC views CSO activism and mainstreaming CSO participation as important:

Governments are the elected representatives of their countries and as such have a legitimate right to speak on behalf of and make decisions for their populations. However this does not eliminate the right of citizens to speak on their own behalf and to *have a say in decision-making processes* that will affect their lives.

Given this, we believe that leaders must move to ensure that there are institutionalized entry points for civil society participation at the national, regional and global level. The process of trade liberalization is too far reaching and has so many implications for every sector. To exclude civil society is to exclude the very people who will bear the burnt of the impact. (CPDC 2002: 2- emphasis in original)

So far then, it is apparent that the CPDC has attempted to mobilise and activate other CSOs on trade issues on the one hand, and on the other it has attempted to be included by governments and regional officials. This activism and attempted inclusion must be understood in light of ideational and material trends in the direction of good governance, globalisation and liberalisation. Additionally, this non-EIG needed to build the institutional wherewithal to conduct research, gather regional concerns in a structured way and to sustain activism. Hence, institutional factors are important to consider here in addition to ideational and material ones.

• *THE CRG:*

The work of the Caribbean NGO Reference Group on External Relations (CRG), which focuses solely on issues surrounding trade negotiations, is of note too. The CRG is coordinated by the CPDC as a region-wide CSO network comprising the following regional and national umbrella associations: the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA); the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL); the Centro de Investigacion Economica para el Caribe (CIECA); the Association of Caribbean
Economists (ACE); the Association of Development Agencies (ADA); the Haitian Platform for Alternative Development (PAPDA); and the Windward Islands Farmers Association (WINFA). These constituent CSOs in turn comprise over 1,000 national and community-level CSOs (CRG, 2001; Munro-Knight and Sinckler, 2002).

The CRG, therefore, brings together a range of CSOs to make policy proposals from predominantly non-EIG perspectives (although WINFA and CCL are classed as EIGs here[59]). The CRG has conducted and published research papers and put forth advocacy positions on trade liberalisation with relation to the WTO, the FTAA, the previous Lomé IV and the EU-ACP EPAs (Anonymous interview: 06-08-03).

The CRG’s research and advocacy has been issue-specific and specific to each of the negotiating platforms at hand. Such research and advocacy has been directed at the region’s governments and negotiators; at wider CS; and at the institutional mechanism in which negotiations take place in efforts to influence decision-making (i.e. submissions have been made to the FTAA, WTO and ACP-EU apparatuses).

As in the case of the CPDC, the CRG pools capacity and resources across Caribbean non-EIGs in order to overcome the institutional barriers that tend to limit non-EIG activism on trade matters. Pooling capacity helps to build institutional strength and the ability to produce quality research, which is important because it opens doors to consultative frameworks with regional officials. External funding from the following facilitates the work of the CRG: Oxfam GB, NOVIB (Oxfam Netherlands) and Oxfam Canada (CRG, 2001; CPDC 2002: 4). This assistance (as in the CPDC case) is important in helping this CSO to deal with institutional problems that non-EIGs and more marginal EIGs tend to face in attempting to stay alive.

To the institutional factors, vital for understanding the ability of the CRG to act on trade issues at the regional level, one can add ideational factors. The work of the CRG, like that of the coordinating CSO (the CPDC) is guided by the view that CS has vital roles to play in influencing the drive towards trade liberalisation. The following tenets

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[59] We will come back to this issue again in discussion EIG mobilization.
that the CRG views as fundamental are instructive in illustrating the presence of this idea in discourse:

…[T]he first…affirms the right of every and all citizens to be consulted, informed and make recommendations about processes particularly global ones that will affect their lives. Secondly, we strongly believe that the purpose of the global system must be to put people at the centre of social, economic and political development. (CRG 2001)

It follows then that CS writ large and CSOs of varying sorts need to engage governments, regional negotiators and other officials on trade issues. Once more we see that narrowly conceived material interests do not account for the mobilisation of non-EIGs on trade matters. Certainly material concerns are important, and, undoubtedly, trade affects wide arrays of social groups. However, the perception that a group has interests in trade affairs that need to be acted on (either from a moral/principled or more instrumental perspective) is important also. Similarly, the way in which CSOs organise themselves and operate in efforts to gain the recognition and consultation they seek are important too.

- THE CGTN

Another non-EIG network of note is the Caribbean Gender and Trade Network (CGTN). This network was created in 1999 under the auspices of CAFRA, WINFA, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era - Caribbean (DAWN Caribbean), and Grenada Community Development Agency (GRENCODA) (IGTN, 2005). The CGTN examines the impact of trade agreements and mobilises on trade issues up for negotiation in various arenas. Again we see networking efforts of non-EIGs to overcome the institutional hindrances to action based on the idea that trade affairs are of interest to them. This allows these CSOs to aptly conduct research, educational work and attempt to insert themselves in efforts to shape trade-negotiating positions put forth by the region, as is also the case for the CPDC and CRG:

The Caribbean Gender and Trade Network (CGTN) was set up to strengthen the capacity of Caribbean women's organization for
understanding the impact of the trade liberalization on women's economic and social development. (IGTN, 2005)

For the CGTN, ideational and institutional factors are important in understanding this mobilization, particularly if one considers trade issues to be “gender neutral”, in the words of Robert Guiseppi (Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05) of the Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers’ Association (see Chapter 7).

Since the secretariat for the CGTN is CAFRA, and since the CGTN’s membership includes WINFA (both CAFRA and WINFA members/participants in the CPDC and CRG), this CSO cooperates with the CRG and the CPDC in some of its work. The NWCTs are a notable example of this collaboration (CGTN 2005: 14-15). Collaboration with like-minded CSOs speaks to efforts to share burdens in order to overcome institutional deficits amongst CSOs that operate at the regional level. In consequence, CAFRA and the CGTN have become more active in attempting to shape trade-negotiating stances at the CARICOM level. They have also moved beyond focusing on the region’s governments and officials alone. The CGTN has taken its concerns to the international level in attending all WTO ministerials from Singapore to Cancun as an accredited CSO. It has made submissions to the FTAA and has attended the FTAA CS summits. CAFRA and the CGTN also focus on trade issues within the EU-ACP context and at the regional level with respect to the CSME (CGTN 2005: 16).

Since the CGTN forms part of a broader international network called the International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN), it is linked to a broader movement for gender focussed non-EIG involvement in shaping trade negotiating stances and by extension the broader ideational trend among CSOs (non-EIGs especially). Once more the view that non-EIGs have important roles to play in shaping multilateral trade agendas is evident as is the case in the linked CAFRA and the CPDC. These regional CSOs/networks have this idea in common and this is one factor that facilitates their cooperation in activities aimed at shaping trade-negotiating agendas pursued in the region. In addition, these CSOs are linked in that they gain support from and have links to Oxfam.
This link to Oxfam and the involvement of these groups/networks in international activism speaks to another point of note: that the activism of these CSOs is part of wider non-EIG activism on trade issues that shares the common belief that CSOs have important roles to play in shaping trade arrangements. This brings us back to the importance of international trends that became important particularly from the 1990s. None of these CSOs/networks in CARICOM were active on trade issues prior to the 1990s. They only became so with ideational-material changes, which contributed to shifting the focus of some domestically oriented social or welfare oriented CSOs towards including political activism on economic issues. In fact, it is far from coincidental that these CSOs/networks only emerged from the 1990s (CAFRA in the 1980s). These CSOs were created in the context of: a growing focus on good governance and CSOs; a neoliberal thought and policy paradigm shift; increasing CSO visibility and activism in international affairs; and an array of processes, practices and prescriptions often termed “globalisation”. Therefore, the ideational-material atmosphere that existed in the 1990s facilitated: the emergence of these sorts of peak non-EIGs; non-EIG mobilisation on trade issues; and the appearance of official discourses/practices that illustrated the importance of CSO consultation on trade matters.

The examples of the CPDC, CRG, CAFRA and the CGTN should by now make the point here clear, but to speak about one final non-EIG, one with weaker international links. Let us look at the activities of the Caribbean Conference of Churches (CCC) to support the claims here that CSOs outside of the EIG category view themselves as having roles to play when it comes to shaping the trade negotiating agenda.

- **THE CCC:**

  In initiating discussion at the popular level on the FTAA, holding panel discussions, and establishing a desk for “International Relations and Cultural Affairs”, this organisation attempts to engage with the trade issues under negotiation. The CCC attempts too, to stay abreast of the occurrences pertaining to trade issues in the region; invites personnel from CARICOM and the RNM to its workshops/meetings; and attends
conferences/symposia on trade issues. However, the General Secretary of the CCC, Gerard Granado, stated that the organisation is “…perhaps not as aggressive as it should be on trade” (Gerard Granado interview: 19-04-05). This is understandable, since it appears that the CCC lacks some of the institutional capacity and networking vigour of the CPDC and the other networks/non-EIGs discussed previously (although none of these are wealthy).

This observation aside, the attempts of the CCC to address issues relating to international trade negotiations (as well as with reference negotiations within the region on the CSME) and to raise awareness on trade negotiations are important to consider. This is so because, as an ecumenical CSO, the CCC may especially be viewed as having interests divorced from trade. The CCC’s activities exemplify the belief that CSOs have roles to play in shaping trade negotiations. As is the case with the other non-EIGs and networks of non-EIGs highlighted here (CPDC, CRG, CGTN and CAFRA), this organisation views its role as engaging wider CS in order to help people to understand trade issues. By extension, this awareness raising is thought to encourage wider CS/CSO participation in attempting to shape the regional trade agenda. The idea that CSO engagement with trade issues is important and that the involvement of broader CS is important, has come to inform non-EIG activism and educational work on trade issues since the late 1990s.

It should also be stated that the CCC is a member of the CPDC, illustrating the interlinked nature of non-EIG activism at the regional level and implying that there is at least the shared view amongst these CSOs that non-EIGs should have input into regional trade negotiating agendas and regional trade policies. The same can be said for other regional umbrella non-EIGs that are members of the CPDC. Examples of these are the Caribbean Conservation Association, the Caribbean Human Rights Network, the Caribbean Organisation of Indigenous People, the Caribbean Federation of Youth, and the Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development (see http://www.cpdengo.org). These associations, their members and their causes will not suffer or gain directly as a consequence of the varying tariff levels being considered in most of the issue areas being
negotiated in various trade forums. Yet, they see themselves as having interests to represent and roles to play in shaping trade negotiating agendas.

Possessing some set of narrowly consigned economic/material interests is not the sole factor that leads groups to mobilise. Ideas and institutions are also important for understanding action. The perception that non-EIGs have interests in shaping trade affairs and the concomitant strengthening of non-EIGs through regional cooperation are critical to consider. However, these factors cannot be disconnected from wider temporally located trends in the direction of: (a) neo-liberal policy and ideas (of salience in domestic economic affairs and world trade matters); (b) an emphasis on “good governance” and CSO roles in governance (both domestically and internationally with the growing international CSO activism); and (c) the combined trends termed “globalisation”.

• **TO CLOSE ON NON-EIGS**

Umbrella CSOs/networks at the region level have the ears of the RNM officials and have contact with the CARICOM secretariat. Considering the assertions about official consultation in the region made in section 5.1 of this thesis, it would appear that the inclusion of these CSOs is attributable to their possession of the institutional capacity that allows them to provide knowledge on which regional officials can draw.

In addition to CSO activism and institutional strength building for inclusion and consultation, institutions and attitudes are important to heed as well. On the institutional side, the creation of the RNM geared specifically towards trade negotiations with a CSO inclusive mandate must be considered as important. Although the CARICOM body as a whole has a Charter of Civil Society and has made overtures to CSO inclusion on an array of issues (e.g. in the Lilendaal Principles), its institutional make-up is has been primarily intergovernmental. This governmental focus is a legacy of the time period in which CARICOM was created (the 1970s), whereas the RNM’s composition more relevantly reflects the times in its openness to actors beyond states.
Discursively, amongst officials operating at the regional level there has been a shift towards including CSOs too. The idea that including a wide array of CSO concerns is important is made clear in the tenets of the Lilendaal Principles, the Charter of Civil Society, Conferences of Heads of Governments communiqués (since the 1990s) and in the RNM mandate. This discursive commitment on the side of regional officials may be based on instrumental motives but can only be understood in the post-Cold War context in which ideas emphasising good governance became important. Also, even if one were to assume that the discursive commitments of regional officials are either “just talk” or words aimed at disguising the strategic goals of regional officials, these words have created commitments that CSOs can draw on in order to insert themselves in consultative processes.

All this said, at the domestic level, members of these peak CSOs/networks (that is non-EIGs) tend to have more constricted avenues for consultation or for influencing trade agendas. The idea that CSO inclusion in general is important runs alongside the perception that certain CSOs (EIGs) should be paramount on trade remains important, especially at the domestic levels of the case studies to follow will illustrate.

When it comes down to institutionalised involvement of non-EIGs with regional officials on trade agendas, levels of contact vary widely with the CPDC having the best-institutionalised contact amongst regional peak non-EIGs. This is true when one considers the access of the CPDC to the CARICOM Conference of Heads of Government at the annual meetings, access to Prime Ministerial Committees, access to COTED, and access to/the coordination of programmes/seminars/workshops with the RNM. The CPDC has access that others do not, but since the CPDC is very connected to other region-level non-EIGs/networks this allows the ideas and concerns that these non-EIGs hold in common to be expressed to some degree (Munro-Knight interview: 14-07-05). Moreover, some of these other umbrella non-EIGs are calling for more inclusion; notably CAFRA has been attempting to increase non-EIG involvement through its efforts to gain

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60 That is, so long as the findings of the cases to be discussed in the chapters to follow are viewed as in any way illustrative of the situation in most of CARICOM.
recognition as a formal partner representing a gendered perspective in the CARICOM context (Margaret Gill interview: 30-05-05).

We see then that non-EIGs have attempted to be consulted and have been included in consultations on trade issues at the CARICOM level. These efforts became visible in the mid/late 1990s and have continued into the opening years of the 21st century.

EIG MOBILISATION AND INCLUSION

EIGs have also been active in attempting to shape negotiating stances at the CARICOM level, as one might expect. Here we look at these broken into three categories: Labour EIGs, Private Sector EIGs and Agricultural/Farmer’s EIGs.

- LABOUR EIG ACTIVISM:

Representing workers is the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL) that like the CPDC addresses the annual CARICOM Heads of Government Conference and interacts with officials from the RNM. Although the CCL has a longer history (it was born out of the 1930s Caribbean labour movement) than the CPDC and also has more experience in interacting with CARICOM officials at the Heads of Government Conferences than the CPDC, it does not have representation at COTED meetings. However, the CCL’s General Secretary, George Depeana, opined that the CCL attempts to ensure that labour views are at least known, and will continue to do so throughout the region in hopes that labour concerns will be acted on (George Depeana interview: 07-04-05). So, although it has a longer history as a “partner” in governance than the CPDC, the CCL has more limited contact with the CARICOM as seen in the lack of input at COTED meetings. What accounts for this somewhat limited consultation?

Certainly an interest-based logic would imply that this kind of association would likely mobilise on trade issues. Mobilisation by this sort of EIG could especially be
expected in a region like CARICOM, comprising small open economies with high labour costs, since Caribbean countries face competition from countries with cheaper production costs, one of which is labour costs. In consequence, one would expect that the CCL would have economic interests in trade negotiations. Therefore, solely considering the material threats posed to labour interests by trade negotiations is not a sufficient way in which to think about the CCL’s regional level activism on trade.

One factor to consider in thinking of the CCL is that this CSO may not be institutionally equipped to address trade issues, especially not in the technical or evidence-based manner that is esteemed by regional officials. One distinctly gets this impression on entering the CCL’s office in Barbados, which consists of workspace adequate for not more than the two staff present. The institutional deficits of the CCL are also expressed quite frankly by a representative of the St. Lucian National Workers’ Union (NWU) who asserted that the CCL lacks the financial resources and research prowess to mobilise on trade matters as aptly as it should (Joseph Goddard interview: 16-09-04). Once again, material interests and material factors do not by themselves account for levels of CSO activism on trade issues in the CARICOM region. One important factor is institutional.

Another institutional factor that is important to consider when looking at the CCL is the institutional legacy of this association. The CCL was created as an organisation aimed at addressing the industrial concerns and rights of workers (with a historically based political focus on regional integration). Unlike in the cases of the CRG, the CPDC and the CGTN that were created with built-in mechanisms to deal with trade, or the CAIC that was created with one of its focus points being trade issues, this association was not geared towards dealing with issues such as those up for negotiation in trade spheres. What is more, the institutional set-up of the CCL has not yet been “tweaked” to incorporate trade issues adequately into its work programme. Attempting to address and mobilise on trade issues would therefore require institutional change, a process that may be difficult, particularly in light of the limited institutional capacity of the CCL.
Munro-Knight of the CPDC brings another factor to the fore. She commented, to her chagrin, that labour activism on trade issues in the region appears to be limited because unions in the region view themselves as needing to focus on domestic issues rather than on international issues (Munro-Knight interview: 14-07-05). Munro-Knight’s observation also holds validity when one considers the limited union involvement in shaping trade agendas in the case studies of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia (to be outlined in the chapters to follow). Despite trade affairs having the potential to impact on workers, it seems that in the case of CARICOM, the workers’/labour EIGs conceive of their interests in trade issues in a constricted way. Some authors highlight that a shortcoming of the interest based approach is that interest groups may not act in their interests because they have difficulties identifying these (Woods 1995: 170; Bates and Krueger 1993: 456-457).61 At the regional level, the CCL seems to fit this mould: this EIG did not perceive of activism surrounding trade issues as advancing its interests. The institutional weaknesses of the CCL, further limit the ability of this CSO to mobilise effectively on trade topics.

Despite not fully conceiving international trade issues as one of their main priorities, the CCL’s inclusion as a social partner in the CARICOM setting allows this non-EIG the opportunity to air the concerns of its constituent members with respect to trade negotiations at the annual meetings of the Conference of Heads of Governments. The CCL’s focus however, has mostly been on trade issues internal to CARICOM, notably those relating to the movement of labour under the CSME. Yet, the idea that unions need to mobilise more on trade and to prioritise international trade issues more seems to be growing within the CCL. The CCL’s secretariat has expressed that unions need seriously to consider the potential impacts of trade liberalising agreements on workers (George Depeana interview: 07-04-05). The CCL has also made other efforts to mobilise its member associations on trade issues, for instance, via the Trade in Labour forum held in 2004. The forum:

61 This argument potentially also sheds light on late activism by non-EIGs since we could say that they have long had interests on such issues (making the name “non-EIG” a misnomer) but have been unable to identify such.
…[P]rovided an opportunity for representatives of workers’ organizations throughout the Caribbean to interface with the RNM and to exchange views on measures to ensure that the views of labour are appropriately accounted for, both in respect of general issues in trade negotiations and on matters of specific relevance to labour. (RNM 2004f)

The CCL has also attempted to become active on trade matters through cooperation with other CSOs in the region, notably because of the lack of institutional wherewithal that would allow the CCL to mobilise independently. Specifically, the CCL is a member of the CRG and, in this respect, is active on trade in association with other regional peak CSOs (George Depeana interview: 07-04-05). This shows that, despite the CCL’s limited institutional capacity to deal with trade and in spite of this CSO (its members most notably) not perceiving trade as a top priority, the CCL secretariat has been making some efforts to mobilise its members on trade issues.

- **PRIVATE SECTOR EIG ACTIVISM: CAIC**

The Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC) has a long history of contact with regional organs, indeed the CAIC’s predecessor organisation played an important role in pushing for the creation of CARIFTA, which would later evolve to become CARICOM. Like the CCL, the CAIC has traditionally addressed the annual CARICOM Conference for Heads of Governments. The CAIC sits on working groups on trade as well as meetings with COTED in the CARICOM context.

According to Gisele Mark from the CAIC, this umbrella association conducts research on trade and liaises with private sector interests in the region in efforts to make informed contributions with respect to trade negotiations. The CAIC also works intimately with the RNM and trade ministries in the region (Gisele Mark interview: 15-04-05). This EIG, therefore, conforms to the expectations of a material interest-based logic. It is also worth noting that the CAIC possesses the institutional capacity to conduct research and to engage with regional officials on trade issues. This capacity can be understood in light of this CSO being created in part to address trade matters and also in light of the association being comprised of both the region’s private sector representative
associations and large enterprises that exist in the region. The CAIC has, thereby, been well placed to contribute in consultations on trade. The activism of the CAIC, though, still rests on the group perceiving itself as having to become active on trade issues. Even if based on an instrumental logic, the CAIC came to believe it had to mobilise on trade negotiating issues from the 1990s with changes in the international policy temperature whereas prior to the 1990s, such activism was negligible.

- **PRIVATE SECTOR EIG ACTIVISM: CTO**

In terms of EIGs once more, there is the Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO). This organisation is not strictly a CSO however. Although it attempts to represent its tourism private sector members from across the Caribbean and is not staffed by government officials or civil servants, ministers for tourism comprise more than half of the Board of the CTO (32 out of the 54 board members). This places the CTO out of the CSO category in the strict sense, notwithstanding if viewed as a quasi – NGO (QUANGO), an association that lies in the area between state and society, it can be viewed as an EIG (recall figure 3 on page 24).

The CTO has a short history of involvement in consultations or activism on trade negotiations. In August 2003 Karen Forde-Warner of the CTO noted that it was “only in the last year that we have made a concerted decision to make it [trade] a real priority and put it on the work programme” (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03). Though late in initiating activism, the CTO has been engaging with the RNM and CARICOM on trade issues in efforts to impact on the region’s approach to service negotiations. The RNM, however, played a role in encouraging activism by the CTO. Most notably the RNM commissioned the CTO to conduct a study (completed in 2003) on issues surrounding tourism and trade negotiations. According to Forde-Warner, this study was the first formal CTO attempt to contribute a position to regional officials. Following the submission of this report the CTO took the initiative (in 2003) to seek inclusion at COTED meetings (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03).
One would expect an association such as this one to have been active on trade issues much earlier, considering the implications of the GATS and issues up for negotiations in the GATS context. Also, one would have thought that the trade-related service components in other negotiating realms such as the FTAA would have mobilised the CTO based on material interests. It would appear then, that material interests alone cannot account for mobilisation. Speaking of the CTO’s late activism, Forde-Warner stated that tourism is one of the most liberalised areas in most Caribbean economies. The tourism sectors in the region boast open atmospheres with respect to foreign investment dating from the 1950s. Moreover, very few sub-sectors in the tourism market are protected from external trade competition. Yet Warner emphasised that even though the tourism sector in the region has long been “open”, it remains susceptible to changes in international trade arrangements (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03).

So, why did the CTO only attempt to mobilise on international trade topics from 2003, as opposed to from the mid-1990s with the introduction of the GATS? The CTO’s Forde-Warner answered this question in the following manner:

You have lots of priorities and lots of issues that appear to be very urgent…it is not that we ignored this area, but it was not in the formal work programme. (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03).

A statement of this sort illustrates the significance of group interest perception. Groups do not necessarily respond in what one would consider as their material interests whenever these are impacted on (or are potentially impacted on). Instead, they have to conceive of issues as priority interests before they mobilise on them. Indeed, Forde-Warner indicated that this late acquisition of the idea that mobilising on trade matters was important and ill-affected the CTO’s members since, in not acting earlier the CTO was unable to address issues of particular salience to the Caribbean tourism industry. Some examples of such salient issues are keeping some small sub-sectors protected from external competition and mobilising for the creation of mechanisms or legislations to more easily allow tourism workers to sell their services abroad (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03).
As part of their new activism on trade issues the CTO has been attempting to prioritise tourism matters in the CARICOM trade agenda in order to help Heads of Governments to craft negotiating positions (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12 August 2003). This activism is needed in the CTO’s view because, even as the major industry in the region, tourism has not been a regularised on the CARICOM agenda (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03).

So, what does the CTO tell us about consultation and mobilisation on trade issues? It shows that having material interests that are affected by trade negotiations is not necessarily a sufficient condition to thrust groups into action. The actions of this organisation show that there has to be a perception that certain issues are vital in order to push them up the agenda. As with the CCL, the CTO had to accept the view that trade issues were important enough to necessitate activism, before activism on trade matters could begin. This view was accepted only at the start of the 21st century and was encouraged by the RNM, which attempted to draw on the institutional capabilities within the CTO (specifically the wealth of data and research on the tourism sector and market possessed by the CTO -see CTO website: http://www.onecaribbean.org-). The RNM’s mobilisation of the CTO, and the CTO’s continuing efforts to mobilise on trade, however, must also understood in the ideational-material context that impacted on the region from the mid-to late 1990s.

- PRIVATE SECTOR EIG ACTIVISM: CASME

One final private sector EIG that is worth noting is the Caribbean Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (CASMEs) that was created in September 2004. This EIG is one of the newer umbrella EIGs in the region attempting to pool resources and influence regional economic policy, including on international trade arrangements. Yet,
the member associations only began this endeavour in 2004. How can one account for the lack of a regional body representing these interests and the late mobilisation and advocacy of this group affected by trade negotiations?

Once more we are left with the narrow focus of the member associations, concerned with the most immediate of member concerns despite being undoubtedly affected by market liberalisation. With decreasing tariff levels, small-scale manufacturers and small-scale service providers operating in domestic markets face competition from goods and services that can be produced or supplied more cheaply from external markets. So, the “possession” of interests being affected does not by itself help us to understand inaction by those represented by the CASME. Small business associations in the region had to believe they needed to prioritise international trade issues (rather than just to focus on domestic concerns) in order to organise and in order to propose mobilisation. Speaking of limited small business association activism in 2003 (before CASME was formed), Malcolm Spence of the RNM asserted the importance of institutional factors. He stated that institutional capacity has limited activism by these CSOs, since small businesses are less able to contribute financial and personnel expertise than are associations representing larger businesses (Malcolm Spence interview: 07-08-03). An interviewee from the Caribbean Export and Development Agency brought out a similar point by stating that some private sector associations, particularly the smaller ones, “do not have the capacity in terms of staff who are conversant on trade issues” (Anonymous Interview: 29-08-03).

The RNM has made efforts to consult with and raise awareness of associations representing small and medium-sized enterprises across the region. An RNM Presentation to the Barbados Small Business Association in September 2004 entitled “SME Development in CARICOM: New Approaches, New Solutions” is an example of efforts to mobilise and include small business associations (RNM 2004d). However, the interests represented by small business associations have not been incorporated in consultations on trade negotiating issues at the regional level through activism because of lack of organisation and activism.
Therefore, although the material interests can be important in understanding private sector EIG mobilisation on trade issues, so too are other factors. One is the perception of interests or beliefs about where interests lie and the other is institutional wherewithal. All private sector EIGs have not had the capacity or held to the perceptions that cause them to mobilise in areas that one might expect.

The ideational-material factors highlighted previously (liberalisation, globalisation and good governance) are important to consider too. Before the 1990s EIGs hardly mobilised on trade matters of international importance but with the changes in the ideational-material context, space for mobilisation and consultation emerged. Additionally, efforts by the RNM to mobilise these CSOs from the late 1990s and into the early 21st century illustrate that the atmosphere in which trade agendas are set has changed in the direction of being more consultative. This more consultative emphasis on trade matters must be considered in light of the ideational-material backdrop outlined in the previous chapter.

- **AGRICULTURAL PRIVATE SECTOR/FARMERS’ EIG ACTIVISM: CABA and WINFA**

Agricultural trade issues have long been important in the CARICOM region. To be specific, agricultural trade issues were present in both the Lomé Accords and in the CBI. So, can changing material conditions and their impact on EIG material interests alone account for the mobilisation of agricultural EIGs on trade in the 1990s? Certainly not! Indeed, some consultation and mobilisation by agricultural groups occurred long before the 1990s. For instance, in 1965 there was consultation:

Dealing with the future of the West Indies sugar industry, the Conference recorded its gratitude to the Prime Minister of Barbados for the steps he had taken to hold the recent meeting of representatives of the Governments of Barbados, British Guiana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, *the British West Indies Sugar*
Association, the Caribbean Cane Farmers Association and the Caribbean Congress of Labour on the sale of sugar under the Commonwealth Agreement. The Conference endorsed the resolution passed by that Conference. (CARICOM 1965: 2-emphasis added-)

However, CSO consultations of this sort were anomalous and ad hoc before the 1990s. In addition, CSOs noted here did not continually mobilise for inclusion. Such iterated mobilisation only commenced via EIGs such as WINFA and CABA from the 1990s. The point here is that trade negotiations have always had bearing on agricultural producers, but this only translated into mobilization from the 1990s (Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05). This is because of the ways in which groups perceived their interests and formed institutions to address these perceived interests.

Group perceptions are temporally located, and perceptions of interests are linked to the ideational-material context of the time. Hence, by the late 1990s the trends of liberalisation, globalisation and CSO inclusion for good governance impacted on activism.

In terms of EIGs representing the agricultural sector in the region the activism of the Caribbean Agri-Business Association (CABA), created in 1998, is worthy of note. CABA has mobilised on issues relating to the trade environment and the role of the region’s agricultural sector by looking at various occurrences within the WTO, FTAA and CARICOM settings and the implications for the agricultural sector as a whole and focussing specifically on different industries within the agricultural sector. The association has met with representatives in various industries and countries across the region to address these issues, take concerns to government officials in individual countries and to interface with regional officials (CABA 2002).

An example of this interfacing was the involvement of an RNM official in the CABA Annual General Meeting of 2001 to give an update on the Doha round of WTO negotiations and to receive input from the association (CABA 2001). Another example was a meeting on improving “the capacity of the agribusiness sector to articulate
positions on international trade negotiating issues” held in Jamaica in July 2003 by that country’s Ministry of Agriculture; the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA), the RNM, the Agribusiness Council of Jamaica, and CABA (RNM 2003). CABA also presented a position paper relating to FTAA negotiations at a COTED meeting in 2002 (CABA 2002). These are but examples of mobilising and making input at the regional level, to which others can be added so that:

The efforts of CABA and the commodity groups have not been in vain. CARICOM officials applaud and acknowledge their proactive attitude, involvement and contribution to the development process. (CABA 2002)

This EIG was created in the 1990s following the creation of the WTO, with the start of FTAA talks and with the changing EU-ACP trade context. In other words, this EIG was created in part to deal with trade negotiating concerns and this can be linked to the intensification of liberalisation in the trade sphere that became marked particularly from the mid-1990s. So, when material changes occurred that potentially affected interests we see a response by affected interest groups.

In terms of agricultural EIGs again, the work of WINFA is particularly worthy of note too, since it not only attempts to mobilise on trade issues for small farmers at the CARICOM level, but also at the sub-regional level of the OECS and at the national level of countries within the OECS. A banana desk was created within WINFA in 1992 to deal with marketing and trade issues relating to this important industry at a time in the face of changes to the European banana regime and in the face of threats to the non-reciprocal access to the European market of these fruits produced in the ACP countries (Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05). WINFA further established a Fair Trade Desk in 1997 to address trade issues, specifically in light of potentially losing preferences on banana exports to the EU (ACP-EU Civil Society Information Network, 2003; Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05).

This organisation along with the Barbados Agricultural Society and the Guyana Rice Producers’ Association began to hold a series of talks to create a unified farmers’
stance as it relates to agreements for trade liberalisation (WINFA 2003a). WINFA has continually met with RNM officials, specifically with respect to changes in the banana trade regime and also with respect to other trade issues (RNM 2004b; RNM 2005; Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05). Further, WINFA has become directly involved in engaging with the international trade arena outside of the CARICOM context as evidenced by the attendance of its president at the Cancun Ministerial of the WTO as part of the Via Campesina delegation of the international small farmers’ movement, through its involvement in the ACP-civil society forum and by attending ACP-EU trade meetings (WINFA 2003b; Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05).

Once more, there is a link between activism on trade issues and liberalisation in the trade sphere in response to interests being threatened, as material interest-based assumptions would posit. However, this cannot be separated from the idea that mobilising on trade is important. Material changes in trade rules for bananas were obviously important, but so too were ideas about how these changes should be addressed. Renwick Rose of WINFA for instance emphasised that the idea that WINFA members needed to become more active on trade issues and needed to build institutional mechanisms to do this before becoming active on trade. He further asserted that as “trade liberalisation” increased under the WTO and with “globalisation” WINFA members came to see activism on trade as in farmers’ interests (Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05). A similar point can be made for CABA: in addition to interests being affected, the idea that trade issues needed to be addressed had to be accepted for this association to be formed. This only occurred in the context of ideational-material trends that elevated liberalisation and globalisation as integral to economic progress.

- **TO CLOSE FOR EIGS:**

The EIGs one would expect to mobilise on trade issues have done so, but different EIGs have had differing degrees of contact with regional officials. The EIGs highlighted
here have overcome institutional constraints to action through working regionally, just as have the non-EIGs/networks discussed previously.

Consultation with the CAIC and CCL has been relatively well entrenched when one considers the CARICOM mechanism. However, when it comes to trade, despite both being seen as a “partners” in the CARICOM context, the CCL does not have contact with COTED, whilst the CAIC does. Although other EIGs discussed here (CABA, WINFA, and CTO) do not have contact with the CARICOM mechanisms via the Heads of Government Conference; these EIGs engage regional officials, are consulted by RNM officials and (sporadically) have input in COTED.

Most EIGs became active on trade issues from the 1990s, particularly following the creation of the WTO, with the start of FTAA talks, and with changes to EU-ACP trade relations. We can make the link here to material interests being affected in a changing trade environment and, therefore, we see that material interests being impacted by material changes are relevant in giving these EIGs impetus for action. Nonetheless, the limited action or late action by some of these EIGs in the post-WTO context (i.e. not mobilising until the start of the 21st century), and EIG inaction on pre-1990s trade matters (when their material interests were also at stake) both signal that a material interest based approach is insufficient for understanding activism on trade. Ideational factors, specifically the perception that groups had important interests being affected and that they needed to become involved, should be considered here. Also significant, is the institutional set-up of EIGs since this can assist in creating an environment in which trade issues come to be prioritised. EIG activism on trade, like that of non-EIGs, must also be considered against the backdrop of an enabling ideational-material context in which good governance, liberalisation and globalisation have featured prominently.

Another point that must be brought out is that some EIGs are closely linked with non-EIGs. As a member of the CRG, the CCL networks with non-EIGs attempting to impact on trade negotiating stances in the region. The linking of its activities to those of the non-EIGs in the CRG illustrates that this EIG straddles the EIG/non-EIG boundary. Small
business and agricultural associations do this at times too, as their involvement in
NWCTs in Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia illustrates. WINFA is another EIG to
consider here because, like the CCL, it hops into the non-EIG realm of CSO activism
through its networking and cooperation with regional non-EIGs. Moreover, WINFA may
be viewed as more closely linked with non-EIGs through its links to Oxfam as an
important source of funding and assistance, and because of its focus on social
development and gender issues too.

Associations such as these, though classified as EIGs, not only act out of instrumental
economic interests of the groups they represent, but also because they share in the
principled idea that CSOs with a developmental or social focus have important roles to
play in consultations on trade issues so that social issues can be taken into consideration.
They do not view themselves as having strictly instrumental goals, but also as being
socially focussed. Preconceived instrumental interests do not drive action or link groups
automatically. In addition to interests, ideas are important in understanding networking/
coalition formation for activism, as well as for understanding activism itself.

So what does all this really mean?

CONCLUSIONS FOR THE REGIONAL LEVEL

At the regional level, states combine their capacity within CARICOM and via the
linked RNM. At the level of CARICOM and the RNM there is an emphasis on CSO
consultation in discourse and in practice. The CCL, the CAIC and the CPDC have
regularised contact with the Conference of the Heads of Governments within CARICOM
in their roles as social partners. The CAIC, the CPDC and other CSOs make important

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62 This straddling of the two CSO classifications (and the difficulty of placing the CTO either squarely
inside or outside the CSO zone) is perhaps expected as classifying CSOs is a sometimes difficult task and
further creating categories within the CSO sphere makes for somewhat artificial categorisations such as that
implemented here for the purposes of clarity (see chapter 2).
inputs in the COTED, even though often on a sporadic basis. The RNM collaborates with
the above-mentioned CSOs, other regional umbrella CSOs, domestic chambers of
commerce, domestic sector/industry-specific associations, domestic labour unions and
NWCTs. The RNM staff tours the region, attending meetings and putting on their own
meetings and workshops in order to seek the views of CSOs and disseminate information.
These CARICOM and RNM actions illustrate an emerging regularisation of consultation
between regional officials and a diverse range of CSOs.

This point aside, one must not overemphasise elevated levels of CSO inclusion or
activism at the regional level. Even though some CSOs have pooled capacity in order to
mobilise effectively and to impact on regional processes, only limited sets of CSOs have
been incorporated in the region’s consultative processes on trade issues. Instead, EIGs,
and in particular those representing more prominent commercial interests, tend to
dominate consultative processes on trade. The CAIC’s regular contact with the RNM,
repeated inclusion of in the RNM’s technical working groups, and the regular contact
between the RNM and CAIC member associations (i.e. national Chambers of Commerce)
point to this emphasis.

One might assume that this inclusion stems from the more active mobilisation of
the CAIC on trade issues. Active mobilisation of this association could be seen as
stemming from the fact that the CAIC members possess material interests affected by
trade, especially because it is the CAIC’s members who trade. However, other EIGs that
one might expect to mobilise on the basis of their material interests mobilise less actively
on trade matters at the regional level. The relatively limited activism by the CCL and by
other less prominent EIGs (small business associations, for instance63) are examples of
groups with interests that should propel them to mobilise, but that have not done so to the
same extent as the CAIC. Furthermore, these EIGs have not been incorporated as
integrrally as the CAIC. Threats to material interests are not sufficient in helping one to

63 However, speaking of small businesses in particular Gisele Mark of this institution makes it clear that her
association speaks to the interests of and includes businesses of all sizes, large, medium and small.
understand either regularised CSO mobilisation on trade matters or regularised CSO inclusion in trade consultations by regional officials.

In addition to differences in terms of patterns of EIG mobilisation, it should also be noted that regular EIG activism on trade issues was absent prior to the mid/late 1990s. Despite the existence and evolution of trade agreements that could have impacted on EIG members’ material interests prior to the 1990s (e.g. the Lomé Conventions, the CBI and the CARIBCAN agreement), attempts at dedicated activism by EIGs on these issues did not exist until the 1990s. Hence, having material interests affected by trade cannot, on its own, be seen as the factor that propelled these CSOs towards more concentrated and regularised activism from the 1990s.

This thesis suggests that perceptions about where interests lie are important, since interests do not exist somewhere out there simply to be discovered or acted on. Instead, interests have to be constructed and viewed as interests. From the mid/late 1990s, some EIGs came to view trade matters as priority interests that necessitated mobilisation. Additionally, having or creating the institutional ability to deal with trade issues is important for understanding patterns and levels of activism. Without the institutional wherewithal, activism on trade matters will likely be limited, sporadic and ineffective whether or not a group perceives trade matters as in its interests and worth mobilising on.

Non-EIG activism by the CPDC, the related CRG, and other associations or networks is worth emphasising too. The activism of these CSOs is not based on them responding solely to material self-interests, it is also based on an ideational starting point that values the involvement of CS on issues that impact people’s lives. These ideas inform the way that these non-EIGs conceive of their interests in trade negotiations. However, perceptions of interests alone do not allow for activism. Again, institutional capacity has to be built to allow these actors to mobilise and to be seen as legitimate in consultative processes. These non-EIG umbrella associations and networks have attempted to create or enhance their institutions in order to allow them to make valuable
inputs on trade issues. Just as with EIGs though, this activism is only comprehensible when situated in the ideational-material context of the 1990s.

Trends important in the ideational-material context of the 1990s have also informed the perceptions and approaches of regional officials to CSO consultation. Regional representatives have come to see CSO consultation as important in CARICOM’s efforts to cope with trade liberalisation, with globalisation and as needed in efforts to promote and conform to the norm of good governance. However, regional officials tend towards a focus on EIGs (particularly private sector EIGs) in consultations based on the idea that these EIGs are the most important stakeholders with respect to trade matters. EIGs are seen as the primary stakeholders on trade issues because regional officials seem to start from material interest based assumptions about mobilisation. They, therefore, view CSOs representing traders or workers in the traded sectors as those that should be consulted primarily. Regional officials also tend to include CSOs that have the ability to give targeted and well-researched inputs on trade, since regional officials can draw on the expertise and information generated by these CSOs. Despite strategic and EIG focussed incorporation of CSOs by regional officials and mechanisms, it should also be noted that discourses and actions at the regional level have increasingly come to espouse the view that consultation of a variety of CSO types matters.

All of this implies that factors beyond material or economic interests help one to understand CSO mobilisation and inclusion on trade negotiating agendas in the CARICOM context. Therefore, this chapter has shown that at the CARICOM level, both EIGs and non-EIGs that perceive themselves as having interests in trade matters; that have pooled capabilities; and that have developed the institutional ability to engage with trade issues have mobilised and have come to be included in trade discussions with regional officials. Additionally, patterns of CSO inclusion and activism must be viewed as influenced by the post-Cold War ideational-material context in which trade liberalisation and globalisation were placed high on country agendas and in which CSOs were brought into focus with an emphasis on good governance.
CHAPTER 6

CONSULTATIONS ON TRADE AGENDAS THROUGH SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP? THE CASE OF BARBADOS

As with the broader regional level, material changes alone do not account for tendencies towards CSO mobilisation or towards government openness to consulting CSOs on trade matters in Barbados. Specifically, increased exposure to trade does not help one to understand CSO mobilisation on trade from the 1990s onwards nor does this help us to understand government consultation of CSOs from this time period. The graph in Figure 5 shows that Barbados’s exposure to trade from the 1990s onward was in fact markedly lower than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, increased openness to trade can be disregarded immediately in efforts to understand CSO activism and consultation on trade matters from the 1990s.

So how can we make sense of CSO activism on trade and CSO consultation on trade matters from the 1990s?

Figure 5: Barbados’s Trade Dependency

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64 Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations
This chapter emphasises that an important factor that precipitated a movement towards CSO inclusion in policy consultations in Barbados was the economic crisis that began in 1991. To deal with the social fallout of this economic crisis Barbados institutionalised a tripartite consultative mechanism (the “Social Partnership” -SP-) and this consultative mechanism opened the door for greater CSO involvement in policy processes. Therefore, although trade openness did not drastically increase in Barbados, a material factor (economic crisis) fed into the emergence of consultative space for CSOs on a variety of matters. This point aside, including CSOs and CSO activism should not be seen as driven only by this material factor.

As the previous regional level chapter highlighted, changes in the world ideational-material context, and ideas held by CSOs and government officials about these changes and about how to address these changes must be considered. This chapter will therefore highlight the connections between changes in the ideational-material context, changes in the policy atmosphere in Barbados, and changes in CSO mobilisation. Specifically, the chapter will look at changes in the ways that governments and CSOs came to perceive, and by extension, redefine their interests from the mid/late 1990s.

One must also consider institutional factors in understanding patterns of CSO activism and inclusion or for understanding how CSOs attempted to realise their perceived interests and goals. First of all, the SP institutionalised consultation with EIGs representing labour and the private sector/employers. This institutional arrangement impacted on CSO inclusion in trade consultations. On the CSO side institutional factors must be considered too. Specifically, EIGs (those representing the private sector in particular) have become well coordinated and well versed on trade issues, allowing them to convey their concerns with relation to negotiating issues effectively. As in the regional case, this chapter shows that officials are more apt to include CSOs whose research and expertise they can draw on more readily than they are to incorporate less well-organised groups. This point aside, this chapter highlights that, as with the regional level, non-EIGs
have been trying to become better organised by means of pooling capacity in efforts to address trade issues and be included in consultations.

This chapter presents these arguments in following manner: Section 6.1 examines the ways in which the creation and evolution of the SP opened avenues for CSO consultation. This section also illustrates that the crisis, which precipitated the creation of the SP, contributed to the advancement of neo-liberal policy and policy ideas. Section 6.1 further highlights that the SP has evolved to become an institution used by the Barbados Government to comply with the trend towards good governance that became increasingly important in the 1990s. Section 6.2, follows by looking at the activism and inclusion of CSOs on trade negotiating issues and by linking CSO activism and inclusion to the trends of neo-liberalism, globalisation and good governance on the one hand and to institutional factors on the other hand.

6.1 THE EARLY 1990S-RECESSION AND INSTITUTIONALISED TRIPARTISM

The SP in Barbados was implemented on 24 August 1993 as the “Protocol on Prices and Incomes Policy”. This agreement was signed by the Prime Minister of Barbados (Erskine Sandiford) on behalf of the Barbados Government, (Sir) John Stanley Goddard of the Barbados Private Sector Agency (PSA) on behalf of employers/private sector, and (Sir) Leroy Trotman and Robert “Bobbi” Morris both of the Congress of Trade Unions and Staff Associations (CTUSAB) on behalf of employees/workers (Goddard 2003: 2; Sandiford 2003:1). Hence, a formalised neo-corporatist type arrangement for a consultative governance framework was initiated. This agreement was created on the back of a severe recession that occurred in the country between 1991 and 1993.
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND DOMESTIC REACTIONS

As a result of recessions in the USA, Canada and the UK between 1990 and 1992, economic activity in Barbados slowed, tourist arrivals dropped, industrial production decreased, and unemployment and inflation levels rose between 1989 and 1992. Barbados also saw negative rates of GDP growth, between 1989 and 1991, the fiscal deficit grew, and foreign reserves dwindled. As part of this economic crisis, Barbados also became hard-pressed to service debts with the balance of payments deficit growing to over BDS $100 million by 1991 (Fashoyin, 2001: 1). In reply the Government of Barbados entered into an SAP under the auspices of the IMF (Downes and Nurse 2003; Fashoyin 2001: 1-3).

The agreed structural adjustments did not include currency devaluation (currency value remained BDS $2.00: US $1.00) as a result of the government in the country responding to public disdain for devaluation in negotiations with the IMF (Goddard 2003: 2-3; Sandiford 2003:1, 4). However, other aspects of the austerity arrangements that the IMF proposed (civil servant pay cuts, massive lay-offs comprising nearly a third of the public sector) could not be negotiated away despite being heavily contested within CS (Fashoyin 2001: 2; Blackman 2003: 5). In response to the contested austerity measures implemented and the threat of others that were proposed, an at times confrontational atmosphere between CSOs and the government emerged.

Labour and private sector EIGs in particular opposed the structural adjustment measures. Workers’ unions united to form the Coalition of Trade Unions and Staff Association in September 1991, and this coalition led demonstrations in October and November 1991. Labour unions and private sector/employers’ associations lobbied for the Prime Minister (Minister of Finance) to be ousted via a vote of no confidence.

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65 Unemployment rose from 15.3% in 1989 to 23% in 1992. Inflation rose from 3.1% in 1990 to 6% in both 1991 and 1992 (Fashoyin, 2001: 1)
66 This informal coalition of the Barbados Workers Union (BWU) and the National Union of Public Workers (NUPW) was formalized and renamed the Congress of Trade Unions and Staff Associations of Barbados (CTUSAB) in August 1993 (Fashoyin: 11).
67 This no confidence motion, however, failed to overthrow the country’s leadership.
Discussions between unions and private sector representatives also led to proposals for joint employer-employee protests under the auspices of the National Union of Public Workers (NUPW) and the Barbados Manufacturers’ Association (BMA). Representatives from private sector/employers’ EIGs and labour unions met informally in attempts to come to agreements that would minimise lay-offs and labour militancy in order to “maintain industrial harmony”. Also, church representatives, members of community groups, other CSOs and some unemployed people joined protests in solidarity with union and private sector associations in 1991 (Trotman 2003: 12, 14; Goddard 2003: 3-4; Fashoyin 2001: 2, 11, 20-21, 32).

In other words, labour unions and private sector/employers’ representative organisations rallied public support, by holding meetings to engage CS and by means of public protests, in efforts to dissuade the Barbados Government and IMF representatives against insisting on some of the contentious austerity measures proposed. Speaking of this, Sir Leroy Trotman stated:

In this initiative, we [CTUSAB] met with the Barbados Employers Confederation, the Barbados Chamber of Commerce, the Barbados Manufacturers Association; we met with leaders of the Church; we held ‘town hall’ meetings before they were so glamorously designated and we held public open air meetings. (Trotman 2003: 6)

In this tense atmosphere, the Government of Barbados initiated meetings that included these protesting actors in efforts to cool the heated political climate (Goddard 2003: 4; Sandiford 2003: 3). In the words of Courtney Blackman, the government was “forced” to move towards inclusion of the “social partners”:

The Administration, which had previously merely informed, rather than consulted with, the people, was forced to sit down with the other “Social Partners”, namely the Coalition of Trade Unions and Staff Associations of Barbados (CTUSAB) and the Barbados Private Sector Agency (BPSA), at talks mediated by Church leaders. (2003:5-emphasis added)

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68 These joint protests never materialised as CTUSAB saw private sector – worker cooperation as clouding the agenda of workers.
This government action was a *strategic response* to CSO mobilisation. The government initiated consultative meetings because it wanted to avert further unrest rather than because the government believed that CSO consultation in government policy making was *right or just*. The consultations that ensued involved parties making trade-offs and were codified via the “*Protocol for the Implementation of Prices and Income Policy*”. This Protocol was in essence an agreement between the government, labour unions (represented by CTUSAB) and employers/the private sector representative associations (represented BPSA, created in 1993)⁶⁹ on the terms for restructuring of the economy and on the need to subjugate conflicting group interests to national interests.⁷⁰

Despite SAPs and the government-EIG consultative framework that resulted being responses to an economic crisis in Barbados (a material factor), SAPs, CSO mobilisation and the SP also must be understood with reference to the ideational-material backdrop of the time. By the early 1990s, dealing with balance of payments and other economic problems meant implementing *neo-liberal policies* in the form of SAPs. Implementing SAPs in Barbados was, therefore, a facet of the changing ideational-material atmosphere and impacted on government-society relations.

The policies introduced in Barbados entailed decreasing government involvement in the economy, decreasing public wage bills and focussing on private sector-led development (via export orientation). Specifically, government interventionism and provision of important functions (e.g. public sector employment and tariff protection) as laid out in consecutive development plans between 1960 and 1985 (Howard 1989: 26-30) came into question. Consequently, the populist-statist bargain in the country was threatened and this precipitated disquiet across CSOs in Barbados. *Changes in a neo-

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⁶⁹ The BPSA formalized consultative relations between the various private sector EIGs (Barbados Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Barbados Manufacturers’ Association; Barbados Employers’ Confederation; Barbados Agricultural Society; Barbados Farmers’ Union; Barbados Hotel and Tourism Association; Barbados Small Business Association) that commenced in 1991 (Fashoyin 2001: 12).

⁷⁰ The SP however has not been a substitute for voluntarism in industrial relations. Unions and employers (in the private and public sectors) continue to bargain on work related matters outside of this framework, whilst issues of national concern are the main focus of the SP.
*liberal direction* led to CSOs in Barbados seeing the need to mobilise in attempts to address these changing state-society relations.

The Protocol, which resulted in efforts to calm CSO unrest, entailed CSOs agreeing to compromise on some of their concerns and to collaborate with the government so long as the government was willing to make compromises too. An institutionalised neo-corporatist agreement emerged in which labour and private sector representative associations cooperated with the government to prioritise a jointly agreed notion of national well-being. This meant, for the most part, accepting the neo-liberal policy direction being pursued in Barbados and agreeing to accept changing government-society relations so long as consultation between EIGs and the government occurred. The parties to the Protocol eventually agreed that competitiveness needed to be restored and that productivity in the country needed to be improved via the austerity measures agreed with the IMF. After a range of meetings between the union representatives, employers/private sector organisation representatives and government ministers, an agreement on the necessary initiatives was struck.

The parties agreed that adjustment would be achieved via a stabilisation programme to reduce the fiscal deficit, raise revenue, and slow demand through increased taxation. Raising government revenue was particularly important in light of projected decreased in earnings via imports, as tariffs levels were reduced in conformity to the CARICOM CET and under the advice of the IFIs. So, indirect taxation with a value added tax was introduced. The parties to the Protocol agreed that government expenditure needed to be cut, including an agreement to an 8% cut in public sector wages, and that wages should be frozen in both the public and private sectors until 1995 (extending the 1991-1993 wage freeze established by the IMF). Other measures to keep inflation low and generally improve productivity (e.g. divestment in or privatisation of government owned enterprises and the creation of a National Productivity Council) were agreed as well (Goddard 2003; Sandiford 2003, Fashoyin 2001: 14, 22).
In the end, The Protocol for the Implementation of Prices and Income Policy began a formal neo-corporatist consultative process on economic issues to be implemented by means of quarterly meetings of the signatories. Later (under Protocol II), the creation of a Sub-Committee for discussing issues of concern in Barbados helped to ensure that consultation between the involved parties was regularised. This sort of institutionalised and codified CSO-government consultative forum was novel to Barbados and to the CARICOM region in which consultations with CSOs tended to occur on an ad hoc basis, if occurred.

So far, this summation of the early days of the SP shows that *material interest based approaches to understanding mobilisation hold validity*. Workers’ unions mobilised and consolidated, forming the umbrella organisation CTUSAB, and the private sector organisations (business/industry specific associations) did the same, forming the PSA. *Both groups lobbied when their material interests were threatened*. Workers faced job insecurity and wage cuts, and businesses had to deal with losses in protection (with cuts in import taxes) and labour militancy that hurt their earnings (due to policies advising private sector wage freezes and restructuring to increase efficiency). Action by these EIGs is what one would expect using material interest based conceptions. However, even these supposedly rational-materialist responses to pending changes were *based on ideas about where interests lay* within the policy context of the time.

Labour EIGs could have reacted far more radically than they did in 1991. The labour revolts of 1937 illustrate that radical labour action in order to get the government to heed workers’ demands was possible. Workers did not have to sit down with governments to agree a compromise; nor did they have to cooperate with private sector/employers’ representative associations. However, at a time when *neo-liberal adjustments seemed inevitable* - because of their implementation in the region and the developing world via SAPs and because neo-liberal policy ideas came to be accepted as the best way to cure economic ailments - the course of action pursued by labour EIGs was to seek compromises that would be feasible within this context. Workers’ EIGs did not call for job security at all costs; nor did they threaten to disrupt the economy if they
were not heard (as was the case with the 1937 revolts). Instead, they expressed their interests in a manner that was conditioned by the ideational-material context of the time.

EIGs agreed to reconstitute their interests to fit into those of the country in the face of the ideational-material shift in a neo-liberal direction. Based on the belief that neo-liberal policy changes were inevitable, these EIGs acquiesced to most of the market-oriented policy demands of IMF SAPs on the condition that they could have a role in reforming the policies pursued so that the impacts would not be overly drastic. EIG interests, therefore, evolved in line with changing ideas about the policies necessary for dealing with balance of payments problems. Groups agreed to refashion the way that they conceived of their interests by subjugating these to wider concerns about national welfare versus narrow group self-interests alone. The actions of the PSA and the CTUSAB in agreeing to conceive of their interests differently illustrates that, through interaction, group interests came to be reconstituted based on ideas about how things should be done (causal ideas) and ideas about right/wrong (principled beliefs).

The Barbados Government of the time sought to placate labour and private sector EIG concerns through consultation. This action was instrumental because it served government interests to decrease militancy and to maintain domestic stability. Creating a framework for consultation that was in line with a focus on good governance by IFIs and within development and political policy thought was self-seeking too. However, placing emphasis on consultation cannot be separated from the ideational-material shift towards “good governance”. Additionally, the continuation of the SP beyond the crisis period illustrates that this mechanism has evolved away from an instrument for calming unrest. In Barbados, the parties to the SP have come to believe that this consultative framework is important for advancing national goals and is vital for advancing good governance (this will be highlighted in the following sub-section).

So, although the actions of EIGs and the government were instrumental/self-serving and based on material factors, these actions and expressions of self-interests only had meaning in the context of the time period in which they were situated. Actors held
specific *ideas* about how to act and about the policy atmosphere in which they were located. In other words, the ideational-material context of the time and the ideas held by CSOs and governments about how to respond to ideational-material changes impacted on group interest specification and on group actions.

Nevertheless, EIGs mobilised on economic issues and in broad terms this fits the material interest-based mould. However, the role of churches and other CSOs in protests, and of church representatives (in particular) who acted as intermediaries between conflicting concerns and who helped broker the SP (Fashoyin 2001: 21, 32, 60) is difficult to explain using a material interest based approach. Here one must acknowledge that these actions were based on principled ideas about social responsibility and justice. Church leaders, for instance, perceived themselves as having an interest in facilitating social stability and cohesion. Although this activism would likely not be defined as rational in a rationalist view, it did occur and was based on principled beliefs defining group interests.

**THE EVOLUTION OF THE SP**

The SP has been renewed three times since it was created and continues to focus on maintaining peaceful industrial relations and a *consultative, cooperative* framework for the country’s “*stakeholders*”. The first two Protocols focussed on policies relating to *prices and incomes* that were paramount in the climate of economic stabilisation. Such focal points remain along with emphasis on productivity, increasing competitiveness of local industries and products and maintaining prices in line with incomes (Downes and Nurse 2003; Blackman 2003: 7; Protocol IV, 2001). The SP was, therefore, not a mechanism specifically for dealing with the international trade agenda. Nonetheless, the SP is linked to such at the national level. Specifically, Protocol Four of the Social Partnership: 2001-2004 states that the social partners agree to guarantee, among other things:
2.2 (b) participation in regional, hemispheric and global trade agreements on such terms and conditions as do no violence to the nation’s long term economic and social development; (Protocol IV, 2001:7- emphasis added-)

This Protocol also speaks of the links between productivity, competitiveness, social well-being and trade liberalisation and globalisation in stating:

3.1 The Social Partners are aware that the onset of globalisation and trade liberalisation demands an intensified co-operative effort to accelerate economic growth, increase employment and improve the living standards of all Barbadians. (Protocol IV, 2001: 8 -emphasis added)

These statements hint at the expanding remit of the SP, which began with the third Protocol which very notably institutionalised the SP via a “Social Compact” and, thus, its expansion to include responses to globalisation and trade liberalisation (Protocol III, 1998; Protocol IV 2001; Blackman 2003: 7-8, Downes and Nurse: 2003). 71 Therefore, at least two of the ideational-material trends that this thesis emphasises as important in understanding CSO activism and inclusion from the 1990s emerge as vital for understanding the extension of the SP beyond the crisis period. As such, the consultative device that was developed to deal with a specific economic crisis in Barbados has become an important institution for consultation on important social and economic issues at the national level, including international trade matters.

The SP is collaborative and consensus building in nature as a mechanism for including CSOs in governance. The idea behind the SP is that CSOs (particularly labour and private-sector EIGs) agree not to act in adversarial or confrontational settings with each other or with government, but to reconstitute their interests in order to make cooperation and compromise on important socio-economic policy issues possible in pursuit of “good governance”.

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71 Other newer issues in the SP are public sector reform, poverty alleviation, HIV/AIDS, Human Resource Development and Crime.
The evolution of the SP, and its importance for governance reasons and in the context of trade liberalisation, is reflected too in the 2003 Manifesto of the Barbados Labour Party that won the 2003 national elections (in power from 1994).72 Here the BLP states:

The re-elected BLP Government will:

- Entrench the Social Partnership in the Constitution.
- Extend the scope of its remit so that the Social Partnership becomes a vital instrument for the expansion of participatory democracy, and enhanced standards of civil governance, and resolution of industrial conflict.
- Refine the protocols under which the Partnership functions.
- Broaden the role of the Partnership to involve it fully in the negotiations with the CSME, the FTAA, the WTO, and all other major international economic and trade talks. (BLP 2003: 61)

Of importance here is the commitment to broaden the scope of the SP for governance purposes and to include international trade negotiating issues within the SP. Like the prior statement taken from the 2003 manifesto, the following - once more from the BLP government- reiterates the commitment to consultation and links this commitment to the norm of “good governance” that came to be important by the 1990s:

It is no secret that this Government since coming into office in 1994, has gone beyond the rhetoric to establish systems of accountability and transparency that are so vital to good governance and to a fair and just society.

There is undoubtedly a direct link between a government that consults with the stakeholders of society on important matters before it, and the preservation of a healthy democracy through the expressed confidence of an enlightened and informed public. (Nation Newspaper, 16-04-04-emphasis added-)

In line with intentions for the SP to evolve in a fashion similar to trends in the direction of “good governance”, the SP has grown to encompass CSOs beyond the original EIGs. However, the main CSOs involved remain those representing workers and

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72 This although the SP was created under the prior Democratic Labour Party (DLP) government of Lloyd Erskine Sandiford (1991-1994)
the private sector/employers (Downes and Nurse 2003; Protocol III; Protocol IV). The identical wordings of Protocol IV and Protocol V make this EIG focus clear:

The Social Partners therefore undertake to use such opportunities as may present themselves to effect the deepening and widening of the social partnership including, where appropriate, the formal involvement of accredited non-governmental organisations in its dialogue. (Protocol IV, 2001: 31; Protocol V, 2005: 42-emphasis added-).

Despite the still limited inclusion of CSOs beyond EIGs in the SP, the institution embodies the belief that CSOs have important roles to play in governance. Specifically, the idea that CS and CSOs have integral roles to play in cooperating with government has been significant in maintaining and expanding the remit of the SP for over a decade. Commitment to the SP could be viewed as tactical and self-serving on the part of all parties: all parties can potentially gain important concessions through institutionalised consultation and cooperation. However, if this were little more than a tactic how can one explain the fact that where similar arrangements were created in other countries in the region, these consultative frameworks have not survived? The case study of Trinidad and Tobago to follow, for instance, indicates that where belief in the importance of continual consultation (for good governance purposes) was weak, such a mechanism was unable to survive, group interests notwithstanding.

Even if the SP was originally created for instrumental reasons by private sector/employer groups, labour groups and the government to address various instrumental concerns, the cooperation that ensued was based on specific conceptions of how to deal with problems in collaborative settings. These ideas have grown and have become more entrenched, with the involved CSOs agreeing on the need to reconstitute their interests in consideration of national concerns and the government agreeing to the necessity of consultative arrangements.

73 This term is ambiguous but in Barbados CSOs have legal character as either registered charities (Charities Act) or Non-Profit Companies (Companies Act).
The Government and the Social Partners are bonded not just by a Protocol that is a collection of words, but by *a spirit to do what is in the best interests of the country*. (Arthur 2005: 12-13)

INVolVEMENT OF CSO*S PRIOR TO THE SP

The assertion throughout this thesis that CSOs were not consulted until the 1990s in the CARICOM region should be qualified with respect to Barbados. Fashoyin (2001), for instance, makes it clear that some consultations existed based on tripartism with respect to economic and labour matters from the 1970s, stating:

Consultation at this level was carried out under institutions that were variously referred to as the National Economic Consultative Council or Committee (NECC), which *met on an ad hoc basis* depending on the Government and prevailing economic conditions. Several fora such as this were set up *from time to time*, to address specific issues of national importance. For example, in 1986, the Minister for Labour set up an *ad hoc broad-based committee* to address the unemployment problem at the time. On the other hand, tripartite consultation could be based on the exchange of correspondence or information and need not involve the signing of any memorandum of agreement. (19- emphasis added)

Yet, as the emphasised segments of the above quotation show, consultation was by no means a matter of course. It was with the 1990s crisis and the emergence of the ideational-material trend of “good governance” that systematic and institutionalised inclusion of CSOs (EIGs specifically) by the government began. As already stated, this has continued and has expanded over the years to include more issues and more actors. Moreover, as Blackman (2003) makes clear, previous governments “informed” rather than “consulted” groups within CS prior to the SP (5). The SP changed this so that the sporadic nature of consultation in crisis times has been replaced by a culture of continual cooperation, a process that CSOs mobilised for and government responded to, a process through which actors interests have been reconstituted through interaction and changing ideas.
As for consultations on the trade negotiating agenda pursued by the country, these too were sporadic and ad hoc up until the mid/late 1990s. However, following the creation of the SP, consultations on trade issues were opened in parallel with ideational-material changes in the international sphere favouring liberalisation, emphasising globalisation and seeing the importance of “good governance”. Mobilisation by CSOs in efforts to direct the course that government representatives would take on trade matters was also negligible before the 1990s. In contrast, with the ideational-material changes of the 1990s and as part of a broader international CSO movement towards activism on international trade and economic issues, both EIGs and non-EIGs in Barbados came to perceive of their interests as necessitating a focus on issues up for negotiation in trade arrangements.

Official inclusion of CSOs on trade matters and CSO activism on trade matters will now be discussed in section 6.2.

6.2 THE SP AND CSO CONSULTATION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES

The tripartite mechanism for consultation in Barbados has been streamed into the workings of all government ministries in the country. Hence, the SP has bearing on consultations on international trade arrangements at the ministry level where trade agendas are formulated.

One senior official at the Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade stated that comments and suggestions from the “Social Partners” are “considered” in compiling briefs to guide delegations and to inform the national positions.74 This view was further supported by James Paul, CEO of the Barbados Agricultural Society (BAS) who stated that at annual national consultations the government seeks the opinions and

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74 Senior Official at the Foreign Trade Division, Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. Correspondence, 19-07-04 (referenced as (MFA1) throughout text).
views of stakeholders and as a result has a good feel for the views of agricultural producers on trade arrangements up for negotiation. Moreover, Mr. Paul emphasised that the continual nature of consultations with the Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade has been important for ensuring that the concerns of agricultural producers are understood by officials (James Paul interview: 09-06-03).75 A representative from the Barbados Workers’ Union (BWU) supported this view in stating that as part of CTUSAB, labour unions have been able to make suggestions and have their concerns and views expressed about the direction of Barbados’s trade negotiating agenda in annual national consultations and through continued participation in the SP on all issues of national significance.76

THE INVOLVEMENT OF EIGS

Private sector EIGs are of particular importance in consultation with the ministry responsible for trade issues. Members from private sector EIGs sit on various committees such as the Technical Committee on External Trade Negotiations, the Technical Trade Committee, and The National Committee on External Trade Negotiations. Hence, officials have consulted with private sector EIGs.

Additionally, the concerns and suggestions of private sector EIGs (and individual firms that) have been consolidated with the creation of the Private Sector Trade Team (PSTT) that attempts to mobilise on trade matters. The PSTT conducts research, gathers information on trade talks, disseminates this information to “private sector interests”, and seeks out the views and positions of various realms of the domestic private sector. Views gathered from the private sector are transmitted to the Foreign Trade Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade in the form of proposals or through the PSTT’s participation in Technical Committees (MFA1).

75 This assertion was made as a comparison to the understanding held by the RNM of the interests represented by the BAS, which is James Paul asserts is not as thorough as that held by the government.
76 Anonymous interviewee from the Barbados Workers’ Union; interviewed July 2003, to be referenced throughout text as (BWU-1).
In addition to private sector EIGs being included in consultations via committees, there are working groups on specific issue areas, such as agriculture and intellectual property rights, which are chaired by the government ministries to which the various issue areas pertain. These working groups attempt to evaluate proposals and papers relating to international trade that have been disseminated in different negotiating arenas in order to continually rethink the country’s negotiating positions with the input of ministerial and EIG “stakeholders”. The work of these working groups is fed into the Technical Trade Committee and then passed on to the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Trade, comprising the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Commerce, Consumer Affairs and Business Development and the Minister of Industry and International Business. The Cabinet Sub-Committee on Trade must then either endorse or reject negotiating stances before they are submitted to Cabinet. In addition to these processes, non-trade ministries conduct consultations with their EIG stakeholders before transmitting individual ministerial trade positions and concerns to the division responsible for external trade (MFA1).

Thus, the official commitment to including private sector EIGs in collaborative process on trade exists. This commitment is borne out by Ruall Harris of the Barbados Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) who states:

The BCCI is a member of a number of committees established by the Barbados government, particularly those committees that were established when the government began to negotiate within the WTO setting, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the ACP-EU trade agreement. (Raull Harris interview: 15-06-03)

It is evident that there are systematised processes for consultation between officials and CSOs on trade matters in line with the government’s commitment to the SP. However, consultation remains dominated by CSOs representing private sector interests. Specifically, the PSTT, the BAS, the BCCI, the Barbados Manufacturers’ Association (BMA), and the CTUSAB were named as the prime CSOs/stakeholders consulted in these processes. Across the spectrum of EIGs however, private sector EIGs were the ones
that were most emphasised with respect to consultation on trade issues. Labour EIGs, on the other hand, appear to be emphasised less.

Notably, the private sector CSOs seem to be incorporated in consultative processes from a relatively early stage through their inclusion in Technical Committees, which conduct much of the work pertaining to the formulation of negotiating agendas in various issue areas, and for various negotiating realms. Taking this inclusion of EIGs representing the private sector a further step is the fact that since its creation in 2003, the PSTT has gone as part of the Barbados delegation to international trade negotiations in an advisory capacity. For instance, the PSTT has attended talks on the FTAA, CSME and in the WTO (Lawson Nurse interview: 06-08-04; MFA1).

This better inclusion of private sector EIGs is in part due to institutional factors. Notably, the PSTT has acted to pool capacity across domestic private sector EIGs in order to speak to a variety of issues up for negotiation and to mobilise continually on trade matters. The PSTT represents a wide array of private sector interests and has the staffing capacity to conduct research that allows for formation of specific negotiating proposals and specific information that can be drawn on by government officials in the areas of tourism, manufacturing, agriculture, services and investment (Lawson Nurse interview: 06-08-04). This assertion was made public by an article about the PSTT and trade issues in the press:

The focus of the Private Sector Trade Team, (PSTT) is identifying, researching and documenting the special interests of the Barbados private sector with respect to the on-going international trade negotiations.

These are then communicated to the negotiators through negotiating briefs and discussion. (PSTT, 2003)

With respect to the workers’ union component of the EIG category in consultations on trade issues in Barbados, as previously stated unions are consulted via CTUSAB as part of their involvement in the SP and in national consultations. Additionally, CTUSAB is invited to meetings held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Foreign Trade on trade negotiating proposals being considered by Barbados. At such meetings CTUSAB is able to offer input from the labour perspective and is kept abreast of negotiating positions being put forward by the country. This is the view from the unions as gathered from a union representative (BWU-1) and is confirmed by information gained through correspondence with government representatives:

There are a number of Committees of which the Foreign Trade Division is the host or standing member. On these [committees] there are either representatives from the local trade unions in their individual capacity or their collective capacity under CTUSAB. These Committees make, refine or endorse proposals for Barbados Trade Policy as negotiations by extension impact upon labour. (MFA1)

Although consultation with union representatives exists, this appears to be less of a priority than consultation with EIGs from the private sector. It appears that private sector EIGs, and the PSTT in particular, have been included in earlier phases of consultation than those from labour. The repetition of disdain at labour representatives only being invited to meetings on the FTAA from the eighth such meeting, whilst business representatives were invited from the start, bares some witness to this (BWU-1).

Even though labour EIGs are not as integrated in consultation as are EIGs representing private sector concerns, they have attempted to be heard on trade issues. Labour EIGs have not mobilised in a manner that has been very well coordinated or based on targeted trade research, as has the PSTT. However, they have been included on an ongoing basis in government efforts to consult CSOs even if this has been down the chain in the consultative process.

That labour EIGs have not conducted targeted research and activism on trade as has the PSTT is important to note here. Since the ministry with responsibility for trade values the research and information that they can gain from “stakeholders” (MFA1; MFA2), this can explain the limited emphasis on labour EIGs as opposed to private sector EIGs.
The focus on private sector EIGs can also be connected to the ambiguous term “stakeholder” used in the parlance of government officials. This term is in no way defined but seems to suggest that certain groups should be consulted on certain issues as the pertinent interest groups or stakeholders. This view is based on a material interest based conception that sees some groups as having interests on trade issues and others as being less likely to mobilise. Stakeholders in this conception are not limited to CSOs but can include individual firms (private or parastatal) and industries (MFA1). However, in terms of CSOs, a focus on private sector EIGs appears to dominate the conception of stakeholder on trade issues.

Ruall Harris from the BCCI aptly expressed the view that private sector EIGs are the prime stakeholders on trade in stating:

Governments negotiate trade agreements but governments do not trade, [they] do not do business; it is the private sector that does business. So, whether we are talking about market access, whether we are talking about subsidies and anti-dumping legislation, whether we are talking about even government procurement – where government buys goods and services from the private sector – *all these issues are of the immediate concern of the private sector because it is the private sector that trades.* (Raull Harris interview: 15-06-03)

**THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-EIGS**

When attempting to discover the role of CSOs, representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade indicated that non-EIGs were not very involved. Instead, private sector and labour associations (thus EIGs) were the organisations primarily included in consultations (MFA1, MFA2). This fact was reiterated by Roosevelt King of BANGO who stated that there were no close links between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and BANGO members and that BANGO does not sit on any committees on trade with the Ministry as the local NGO umbrella

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77 Another Senior Officer in the Foreign Trade Division in the Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; interviewed 9 August 2004 (referenced as (MFA2) throughout text).
78 The BAS and the Barbados Small Business Association- two BANGO members falling into the EIG category-have however been consulted.
organisation (Roosevelt King interview: 05-04-05). This speaks partly to the fact that non-EIGs tend not to be viewed as stakeholders when it comes to trade issues, or put differently that they are not perceived to have interests affected, so need not be considered.

Nonetheless, one source from the Foreign Trade Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shed light on the ways that these non-EIGs have been included, with respect to international trade negotiating matters. Non-EIGs, with more awareness of and concerned about the goings on in international trade negotiations have been invited to and have attended “half-day” and “two hour” sessions with trade ministers. Additionally, public consultations, town hall meetings and education for students have been conducted to inform broader CS and to note their concerns (MFA2). This sort of involvement by non-EIGs though is not of the same quality as consultation with other CSOs. EIGs, have been given information, attended meetings to obtain information and so on, just as have non-EIGs, however, this is not the same as being involved in committees (particularly technical committees) and having institutionalised, or at least systematised channels for making suggestions that could potentially influence the national trade negotiating stances.

In other words, non-EIGs have been excluded from more in-depth consultations on formulating agendas for trade negotiations. They are instead informed and educated rather than consulted or invited to participate in consultative frameworks. The approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, as evidenced by the statements of two sources there (MFA1; MFA2), has been to deliver information to non-EIGs about the various ways that they can transmit their views within the multilateral or regional negotiating forums. For instance this ministry sent information and letters to various Barbadian NGOs about the “Open Invitation to Civil Society” within the FTAA, and also about other initiatives such as side meetings in the FTAA context in which labour organisations and NGOs can discuss pertinent issues and submit their views. Consequently, institutionalised consultation with CSOs has been the privilege of EIGs, especially those representing private sector interests.
That the SP was created as a tripartite mechanism based on the more traditionally important CSO interests in Barbados contributes to the marginalisation of non-EIGs. Hence, the primacy of EIGs in consultation on trade (and other economic matters) in formal consultative processes is unsurprising. Yet, materialist assumptions about the groups that constitute stakeholders and traditional patterns of group influence fail to show the full picture here.

First off, private sector EIGs are better equipped with the technical capacity, in the form of knowledgeable staff and facilities, and are funded by contributions from members. This institutional wherewithal has allowed private sector EIGs in Barbados to produce and to commission research. The PSTT for instance has been able to commission research on private sector preparedness for liberalisation of certain economic sectors and on private sector views on trade agreements that the government has been able to draw on. Such research has enhanced the PSTT’s legitimacy and “usefulness” as a consultative partner on trade matters (Lawson Nurse interview: 06-08-04). This factor cannot be forgotten in understanding the better inclusion of private sector EIGs over other CSOs (both EIGs and non-EIGs). This capacity is a resource that is drawn on by officials in government seeking to arrive at the best negotiating positions for the country, particularly considering the capacity constraints of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade in Barbados. Labour unions and non-EIGs in Barbados, in contrast, tend to have less expert inputs to add in the realm of trade, at least from a technical perspective (MFA1; MFA2). Hence, institutional factors play into understanding how private sector EIGs have come to be better included in consultative processes than other CSOs.

Although the activism of EIGs appears to fit with material interest based notions of rational action, these occurrences cannot be separated from ideas. As highlighted previously, EIG interests are framed around ideas and perceptions about where interests lie. Until the 1990s EIGs in Barbados did not attempt to mobilise on trade issues. It was only from the mid/late-1990s with ideational-material changes in the form of neo-liberalisation, globalisation and good governance that private sector EIGs for instance came to prioritise trade issues and it was only in 2003 that they rationalised their
mobilisation efforts on this front in the PSTT. Even though pre-1990s trade agreements impacted on these EIGs’ materially, they did not mobilise until the 1990s; that is until there was a significant shift in the ideational-material context.

Even the SP (a response to neo-liberalisation that evolved to speak of globalisation and governance) was a response to a significant shift in the ideational-material context. Certainly it was a direct response to an economic crisis and social fallout, but the way the crisis was dealt with and the social tensions that resulted are intimately linked to changes in the ideational material context (specifically neo-liberal ones). It was only with the introduction of the SP that EIGs came to be systematically consulted on an array of issues, thus, making their inclusion on trade negotiating issues a matter of course and to some extent a matter of duty.

Even though non-EIGs have not been consulted as intimately as EIGs, some non-EIGs attempt to mobilise on trade issues both domestically and through regional cooperation. Although non-EIGs in Barbados may not be considered to have material self-interests that would propel them into activism on trade talks (by and large their members do not trade) and even though they tend not to be not included in formal consultations on trade; they have at least voiced some public concerns about trade talks in which Barbados is involved. Some non-EIGs have attempted to raise public awareness about trade negotiations through writing articles published in local newspapers, for instance. In so doing these groups have illustrated that they conceive trade issues as forming part of their priorities or interests. Just as with EIGs, this mobilisation is a break with past patterns of activism and ways of conceiving of interests that must be linked to the ideational-material contexts in which action and inaction have been located.

For instance, the Clement Payne Movement, with the assistance of a US based advocacy NGO (Global Trade Watch), initiated the creation of a “National Committee on the Free Trade Area of the Americas”. This committee seeks to include NGOs in discussing issues related to the FTAA, educating broader CS about the FTAA and pressing government “to deal with the FTAA negotiations in a manner that does justice to
the legitimate interests of Barbados.” (Commisiong, 2004). The Clement Payne Movement, as a forerunner event to the proposed creation of this committee, held a public lecture by the director of Global Trade Watch – Lori Wallach- entitled: “The Hidden Agenda Behind The Free Trade Area Of The Americas” and publicised the importance of CS engagement with trade matters in the print media (Commisiong, 2004).

The activities of the Barbados Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (BANGO), established in 1997, further illustrate the attempts of CSOs to consolidate in the 1990s in order to mobilise and become involved in consultation with the government on many issue areas including trade negotiations. BANGO, through its website makes this claim in stating:

Through the efforts of BANGO, nearly every Government Department, Statutory Corporation and Committee of Government relates to CSOs in some way or other, either by partnering with, consulting with or having CSO representation on their Boards and Committees.

BANGO's reputation is such that it is regularly consulted by all three social partners as they seek to engage wide Civil Society participation in their plans and activities. It is a public service for all CSOs in Barbados. (BANGO, 2005)

Roosevelt King of BANGO stated that this CSO participates at the CARICOM level of ministers meetings and becomes involved in RNM consultations and seminars among other activities in order to make contributions on trade matters. He further made it clear that this organisation attempts to keep up to date with the trade negotiations schedule in efforts to actively engage with occurrences relating to the FTAA, WTO, ACP-EU talks and, at the regional level, the CSME. BANGO has held workshops on trade issues to increase the levels of awareness of local CSOs as it related to trade issues too. King also emphasised that BANGO has sent representatives to attend trade related workshops held by governments and private sector EIGs in order to stay abreast of trade issues and in order to ably inform its members and the public of occurrences on the trade front. He further noted that BANGO interacts with private sector associations to make the views of NGOs on trade matters known to these EIGs that are more intimately involved
in shaping the trade agenda in Barbados (Roosevelt King interviews: 11-08-03; 05-04-05).

The above mentioned attempts to make informed contributions on national and regional approaches to trade arrangements commenced from the late 1990s against a backdrop of ideational-material trends in the direction of *neo-liberal reforms* to trade regimes, globalisation and international efforts by CSOs to mobilise on trade matters. BANGO’s mobilisation on trade has also been helped by the fact that BANGO has been allowed in the door of the national consultations of the Social Partners as what Roosevelt King considers to be the “developmental arm of civil society” (Roosevelt King interviews: 11-08-03). The opening of space for CSOs beyond the traditional labour and private sector/employers’ representative associations is therefore important to note and must be linked to attempts by the Government of Barbados to comply with and to advance the ideational-material trend of “good governance” via the SP. However, this has as yet not been translated into non-EIGs being included in consultations on trade matters. The idea that these sorts of CSOs should be included as integrally as EIGs has yet to fully permeate government ministries.

So, non-EIGs have attempted to become better included and to have their voices heard through joint activism, self-education, and awareness raising. Non-EIGs have also found some space for inclusion via the SP and through the limited forums made available to them by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. Yet, as already stated the involvement of non-EIGs in this process should not be overemphasised, especially since both non-EIGs and government officials recognise that these associations have not mobilised very well and have not been well incorporated in consultative processes.

Attempts by the Clement Payne Movement to engage non-EIGs on international trade issues and to build capacity amongst non-EIGs in order to remedy their scant involvement speak to the persistence of limited non-EIG activism. Roosevelt King of BANGO also speaks to the limited non-EIG mobilisation on trade matters in stating: “Development NGOs are not taking trade as seriously as they should” (interview: 11-08-
King’s assertion that NGOs are unable to effectively focus on issues beyond their primary concerns with social and developmental matters and, therefore, tend only to mobilise on trade issues when the implications of trade matters “hit home”, is also poignant here (interview: 05-04-2005).

The sporadic approach to activism in attempts to shape the trade agenda is also borne out by Nalita Gajahdar, immediate past-president of the National Organisation of Women (NOW). For instance, Gajahdar stated that in the year 2000, NOW campaigned as part of the activities of the World March of Women on issues surrounding poverty and trade but highlighted that the organisation has not mobilised on a consistent basis since then (Nalita Gajahdar interview: 26-04-05). Officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade have also emphasised that most non-EIGs are not sufficiently knowledgeable on the trade issues and are not institutionally capable enough to be included in consultative processes. One of these officials elucidated that evidence of limited non-EIG competence is illustrated by the fact that when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade has supplied these groups with information on trade negotiating agendas, these non-EIGs have not attempted to make use of avenues available to them for activism. For instance, non-EIGs have not put forth submissions within the FTAA context even after being informed on the progress of these talks and the issues up for negotiation (MFA2).

As the previous points should make clear, non-EIGs are not conversant on trade issues and are unable to mobilise effectively on trade issues in part due to institutional problems. Non-EIGs are characteristically voluntary organisations with limited paid staff and scant financial resources. Non-EIGs, thus, need to source funding to engage with a wide array of issues, such as those relating to trade arrangements. Both Nalita Gajahdar of NOW and Roosevelt King of BANGO emphasise this point in asserting that financial constraints plague NGOs in Barbados and mean they are staffed mostly by volunteers on

79 This assertion about Barbadian CSOs not taking up the Open Invitation to CS within the FTAA should be tempered however by a recognition that BANGO, representing many NGOS in the country, and other CSOs, form membership of the CPDC, that has indeed made submissions within the FTAA framework, as well as to the WTO, and has been actively involved in dialogue and the submission of research within the ACP-EU setting.
a part-time basis. As a result, these CSOs have been unable to mobilise and interface with government officials on trade as consistently as they would like (Nalita Gajahdar interview: 26-04-05; Roosevelt King interviews: 11-08-03; 05-04-05).

BANGO attempts to help with these institutional capacity problems by pooling capacity and providing what can be compared to “a secretariat for NGOs” so that they can become more involved in various consultative processes (Roosevelt King interview: 05-04-05). The proposed initiative of the Clement Payne Movement, further seeks to enhance the capacity of NGOs - though with reference to the FTAA negotiations-. However, the efforts of these organisations to mobilise consistently are yet to be translated into the sort of effective and sustained activism that would convince government officials to include them more integrally in consultations on trade issues in line with government commitments to widen participatory space for CSOs.

At the regional level, though, the situation is different. As the previous chapter highlighted, at the regional level the CPDC has created sufficient capacity to speak to trade issues and this has led this non-EIG to be viewed by officials as a useful CSO to consult in discussion on trade issues (as discussed further in Chapter 5). BANGO’s membership in the CPDC and its involvement in the policy oriented activities of this regional coordinating non-EIG are notable as means for non-EIGs in Barbados to mobilise and be included in consultations on trade negotiating agendas. This is particularly so as it relates to activism geared towards the regional and multilateral levels since the CPDC makes submissions in the FTAA context, participates at WTO NGO meetings and puts research documents and policy advocacy forth for the ACP-EU negotiations. Regional cooperation between national non-EIGs with limited institutional wherewithal can therefore allow these domestic associations to mobilise and be consulted on trade discussions. However, in Barbados, regional capacity pooling has not translated into domestic non-EIGs being able to activate with enough regularity or competence to be integrally included in government organised consultative forums (Roosevelt King interview: 11-08-03; Nalita Gajahdar interview: 26-04-05; MFA2).
This sub-section has highlighted that non-EIGs face more difficulties in mobilising and in gaining access to officials than EIGs (especially private sector EIGs). The better institutional capacity of EIGs and the fact that EIGs are seen as the focal “stakeholders” on trade amongst CSOs are points that have been highlighted too. However, why would non-EIGs want to mobilise on trade issues or participate in shaping the national or regional trade negotiating agenda?

Here the importance of ideas comes into this analysis. The idea that it is important for CSOs to at least try to become active in shaping such areas is crucial. Nalita Gajahdar’s assertion that a focus on trade began in the late 1990s with NOW widening its advocacy role, combined with the NOW campaign on trade issues during the World March of Women in 2000 illustrates this point. Gajahdar further stated that this activism grew out of the “demonstrations in Seattle”, in response to “globalisation” and in response to “trade liberalisation” (Nalita Gajahdar interview: 26-04-05).

The idea that it is important for non-EIGs to broadened focus in order to look at trade issues in the face of trade liberalisation and globalisation can be seen as part of a broader international or “global” CSO movement towards such. Global and cross-national CSO networks began to gain visibility for focussing on trade issues from the mid to late 1990s and the formation of BANGO in Barbados and the CPDC at the regional level in 1990s can be considered in this light. Further, the involvement of CSOs in the talks and protests surrounding the economic problems of the early 1990s, must be acknowledged as an important factor that brought the importance of mobilisation with respect trade liberalisation to the fore in the CARICOM region.

That non-EIGs in Barbados have found some space for inclusion in official information sharing exercises on trade and other matters can also be linked to the idea that CSO inclusion by governments is important for good governance purposes. As previously mentioned, this idea has led to the tripartite framework of the SP being expanded to open space for more CSOs than the traditional EIGs. Additionally, the Government of Barbados stated in 2005 that it will continue its efforts to expand space
for CSO consultation in governance, according to strategies it put forward in the Draft National Strategic Plan of Barbados 2005-2025 that aimed to:

1.1 Make governance more transparent and accountable in the public sector, civil society and the business community.

1.2 Promote the role of the private sector, trade unions, non-governmental organisations and civic based organisations in transparent and accountable governance.

1.3 Enhance the independent role of the media and ensure greater access to information.

1.4 Facilitate the integration of civil society into all spheres of activity in Barbados, as well as in the country’s interactions at the regional and international level.

1.5 Equip civil society with the tools necessary to contribute in a substantive way to national decision making and the implementation of national initiatives.

1.6 Assist in the development and empowerment of a civil society that is self-reliant and non-partisan. (Government of Barbados 2005: 98-99)

This discourse potentially opens more space for non-EIGs in consultative processes in many areas. Yet, up to the year 2005 non-EIG inclusion with respect to trade policy has been minimal. At the regional level however, the use of umbrella organisations that are able to do research, pool capacity and transmit well researched and succinct inputs, have allowed Barbadian non-EIGs to have some input in regional efforts at shaping trade negotiating agendas.

CONCLUSION: WHAT THIS CASE IMPLIES

The economic crisis that began the early 1990s in Barbados created an atmosphere in which the traditional unwritten social contract was threatened, so that state-societal relations came to be mediated in a formal (though non-binding) contract.
Yet, only from the mid/late 1990s was there some movement towards CSO mobilisation on trade issues and towards greater inclusion of CSOs in decision-making in the country. The SP created the institutional framework that can partly be attributed to this. However, one must understand the international ideational-material context to fully grasp the space opened for CSO consultation. If the institutional setting alone explained regularised CSO consultation, one would expect that CSO inclusion would not exist where an institutionalised framework is non-existent. Yet, when one considers the case study of Trinidad and Tobago to follow, it will become evident that consultation on trade can exist without an overarching domestic framework. Although institutions are important for facilitating CSO activism and consultation, institutional factors alone cannot help one to understand activism and consultation.

To reiterate, one must remember the international trend towards calling for “good governance”, which in part helped to sustain the SP beyond the crisis phase and further encouraged consultation and a discourse of consultation on a wide range of areas (including on trade). Critically too, one must remember that it was only with the creation of the WTO in 1994, proposals for a reciprocal FTAA around the same time, the threat to Lomé preferences in the second half of the 1990s and the picking up of momentum on the creation of the CSME in the late 1990s that these trade negotiating issues grew in salience in CARICOM. The combination of these factors (the trend of good governance, ideas about domestic policy liberalisation, trade liberalisation and globalisation) allow for an understanding of government attempts to involve CSOs in consultations on trade negotiating agendas.

On the CSO side, at the start of the 21st century we see the consolidation of private-sector EIGs with the creation of the PSTT. We also see the emergence of BANGO in the late 1990s, as an effort by non-EIGs to consolidate action, to improve capacity and facilitate more effective participation in governance. The actions of these groups can be considered in the context of the changing international economic climate following the Uruguay Round, in the face of the end of the Lomé, and in light of a variety of trade talks to be simultaneously negotiated and ideas about what these changes meant.
for society. They can also be considered in light of the growing trend toward CSOs calling for inclusion in decision-making in international trade talks at the international level.

Ideas about the “threats” posed by trade and economic liberalisation or about the ways in which the extent to which economic spheres should be liberalised coloured perceptions of interests and are important in understanding CSO mobilisation in Barbados, and the region. Such ideas were internally (domestically and regionally) generated as well as transmitted through international channels. Moreover, government acceptance of the idea that it is important to include actors beyond the state on a consultative basis at a time when such began to be encouraged by various international organisations and donors cannot be forgotten either. This can be viewed as a response to material dictates, or trends, but should also be conceived as subscription to a course of action based on ideational grounds.

The continuation of the SP in Barbados past the crisis years illustrates that both the included CSOs and the Government of Barbados have come to internalise the idea that CSO consultation on areas of importance is vital. The institutionalisation of consultation has allowed for improved transparency, greater participation of EIGs, the expansion of the SP to include a wider range of CSOs, and the ability for these various “partners” to participate in a range of policy areas. Despite these factors, though, levels of activism by and inclusion of different types of CSOs on the trade matters have varied.

EIGs are included more and have mobilised more effectively on trade issues than non-EIGs, as material interest-based assumptions would suggest. EIGs have been the main groups consulted, and little space has been opened for non-EIGs. Non-EIG activism has been more limited than that of EIGs in part because of differences in institutional capacity. However, the ministry responsible for international trade has at least come to see the importance of giving some information to CSOs on trade issues up for negotiation, and non-EIGs have made efforts to increase their potential for inclusion. Space is also being opened for non-EIGs to be included in consultative processes more.
So, the reasons behind CSO activism and consultation, and patterns of activism and consultation in Barbados should be understood by looking at the ideational-material context of the time, ideas about this context, institutional factors and occurrences specific to the country, rather than in terms of material interests alone.

It is now left to tease out how the activism and inclusion of CSOs on trade matters compares for other countries in the region by taking a look at Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia.
CHAPTER 7

TRADE CONSULTATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

The twin island Republic of Trinidad and Tobago stands out somewhat from all other Eastern Caribbean countries within CARICOM. Firstly, its economy is based on exports in petroleum and manufactured goods rather than agriculture and services. Secondly, racial/ethnic and regional rifts have complicated party politics, social and economic relations (Boodhoo and Royer, 2000: 96). These specific national factors may (or may not) impact on CSO activism or inclusion on trade matters; so, this chapter will look at these factors. In addition, as in the previous case study, this chapter will look at the impact of the ideational-material context of the time and of a combination of material, ideational and institutional factors that have coloured patterns of CSO mobilisation and inclusion on trade negotiating issues in Trinidad and Tobago. In other words, this chapter intends to look at CSO activism and inclusion on trade matters from the 1990s to see why and how this occurred.

The following graph illustrates that Trinidad and Tobago faced similar high levels of trade openness in the 1970s as the country did from the 1990s. Therefore, the economy of the country has long been open. This openness implies that CSOs could have mobilised on trade from the 1970s based on the material impacts of trade dependency on various groups within the society.

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80 This however reflects the economy of Trinidad rather than Tobago, the smaller island in this twin island state. Tobago is more akin to most of the Eastern Caribbean both economically and in terms of racial/ethnic composition. These divergences between Trinidad and Tobago are discussed in chapter one in the introduction to the case studies.

81 Such tensions are discussed in chapter one and can be seen in more racially diverse Guyana, Suriname and Belize too, each to varying extents.
In looking at why activism and inclusion have occurred, this chapter asserts that a confluence of international ideational-material factors have shaped CSO perceptions of their interests and impacted on CSO desires to mobilise on trade issues. Government incorporation of CSOs in consultations on negotiating issues has also been impacted on by the ideational-material context of the time. In this regard, this chapter illustrates that despite Trinidad and Tobago’s differences in the social, political and economic landscapes, as in Barbados, the 1990s marked the decade in which CSOs began to become more active and to be considered formal participants in consultative processes with an ideational shift towards *neo-liberalism* (e.g. as embodied in SAPs and the Uruguay Round of the GATT,) with the rise of a *globalisation* discourse, and the ascendance of a focus on *good governance*.

In examining how CSO activism and inclusion has panned out, this chapter focuses on institutional arrangements put in place by CSOs to realise their goals and the impacts of these institutional arrangements on their inclusion by government officials. This chapter also looks at mechanisms that have been officially sanctioned for including CSOs on trade issues and the impact of these mechanisms on patterns of CSO inclusion.

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82 Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations
in trade consultations. To do this, this chapter will examine and compare CSO institutions and government institutions in Trinidad and Tobago with those in Barbados by looking at the EIG and non-EIG activism and inclusion on trade matters.

The first section of this chapter (7.1) looks at the setting in which consultations on trade issues are located and discovers that in contrast to the case of Barbados, inclusion of CSOs on trade cannot be linked to the evolution of institutionalised national consultations. However, as in Barbados, consulting CSOs (specifically EIGs) on trade issues can be linked to broader ideational-material changes, ideas about these changes and ideas about actor interests. The second section of the chapter (7.2) looks at CSO activism on trade issues specifically. This section shows that CSOs have mobilised based on ideas as well as interests in the ideational-material context of the 1990s. Section 7.2 also shows that differences between EIG and non-EIG activism and mobilisation exist and, as in the case of Barbados, these differences are partly due to differences in institutional capacity between different types of CSOs.

7.1 ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND CONSULTATIVE FRAMEWORKS

In Trinidad and Tobago, government interventionism into the economy intensified in the 1970s, facilitated by windfall earnings during oil booms of 1973/74 and 1978/79. This government involvement in the economy also followed “Black Power Movement” and labour union protests (from the late 1960s) that called for government nationalisations in the sugar, petroleum and banking sectors (Harrison 2002: 68-6; Walker 2002: 21-22; Mac Donald 1986: 150, 162-155). Along with intensified government interventionism also came centralised decision-making structures.

Whereas in the 1960s private sector representative associations were consulted on medium term development planning, this ended in the 1970s. Hence, in the 1970s decision-making power became heavily concentrated in the hands of politicians, and a select cadre of technocrats and civil servants. As a consequence, little consultation with
CSOs occurred (Walker 2002: 126). Mac Donald’s discussion of interlocking directorates in which decision-making was concentrated in the hands of a select group of technocrats loyal to the Prime Minister Williams during an unstable time reinforces this point (Mac Donald 1986: 177-79). Therefore, it is clear that by the 1970s, private sector associations, labour unions and other CSOs were excluded from consultations and decision-making arenas.

CSO consultation on national issues in Trinidad and Tobago was also hindered by radicalism on some fronts (efforts to limit protests such as those by the Black Power Movement), divisions within society and by fragmentation and in fighting amongst CSOs. Judith-Ann Walker (2002), for example, illustrates that amongst private sector representative associations in the 1970s there were divisions along racial and sectoral lines. The Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Commerce (Northern) represented the interests of white ex-planters involved in import trading and import substituting business; the Southern Chamber represented largely East Indians and was formed as a splinter from the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber to focus on Southern interests in petroleum; and the TTMA represented mostly the interests of East Indian businessmen in Northern Trinidad (Walker 2002: 121-122). All of these associations represented “big businesses” (Walker 2002: 122; Harrison 2002: 102) and are the associations that began to be consulted on trade negotiating issues with the government from the 1990s. Other associations established in the 1970s (e.g. Hardware Owners Association) were usually East Indian dominated and hostile to white traditional capital. Also, no small business associations existed until 1979 when the Trinidad and Tobago Small Business Association was formed as an outgrowth of the state sponsored Small Business Consultation in 1978. This association though was characterised by fragmentation and dissolved in 1982 (Walker, 2002: 122-123).

Divisions amongst private sector EIGs have also been highlighted by the former Prime Minister Williams. Speaking in 1961 he said:
What we have today is a large segment of the community-union of this or the other, Chamber of Commerce North and South, Manufacturers’ Association, Businessmen’s Association, Agricultural Society of the island or of parts, each pulling this way or that way, each seeking to establish itself and promote its own interests, even at the expense of others, not caring about others, each seeing an individual tree in the whole forest. This gets us nowhere, and the community, subjected to a barrage of propaganda from all sides, itself cannot see the wood from the trees (Quoted in Walker 2002: 121; Ryan 1972: 260)

There was fragmentation along ethnic, class, regional and sectoral lines that undercut consensus building and cooperation in governance. Creating a stability bargain in the country was, therefore, a difficult task. CSOs and social movements that mobilised for economic change from the close of the 1960s, with differing degrees of radicalism, also complicated the sustenance of a social bargain. The National Joint Action Committee (NJAC), the New Beginning Movement, the Oilfield Workers Trade Union (OWTU); the Transport and Industrial Workers Trade Union; the All-Trinidad Sugar Estate and Factory Workers Union; the Tapia House Movement are such examples (Walker 2002: 120, Mac Donald 1986: 150, 163). Their concerns and methods were often in conflict with those of the major private sector representative associations. There were also divisions between some of these CSOs. Notable amongst these divisions were those between unions, such as the divides that existed between the OWTU, whose members tended to be of African descent, and the unions representing sugar industry workers who tended to be of East Indian descent. At times the unions have been able to unite to deal with important socio-economic concerns as in 1965 under the national Trade Union Congress (TUC) and under the United Labour Front (ULF) in 1975, but such partnerships were precarious (Mac Donald 1986: 151, 180)

Divisions and diversity of interests amongst these vocal CSOs and a tendency towards centralised decision-making in government characterised the CSO-government landscape in Trinidad and Tobago during the 1970s. Yet, when economic crisis intensified in the 1980s and the neo-liberal tenets of privatisation in the economy and decentralisation in decision-making began to take hold, consultative processes on

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83 Functioning as the main opposition political party to the PNM then in power.
economic issues surfaced in Trinidad and Tobago. Attempts to create stability via consensus building were initiated at a time when the way the economy functioned was in the process of transformation and when the authoritarian approach to governance was becoming less and less tenable.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FROM THE 1980S ONWARDS

Petroleum prices fell in the 1980s with world prices decreasing by 14% in 1983. As a result Trinidad and Tobago’s earnings plummeted (Walker 2002: 22). In addition, high levels of government expenditure and large consumer import bills ate up Trinidad and Tobago’s gains from oil in the 1970s. Oil production levels in the country also declined and, to make matters worse, there was a recession in the industrialised countries by the start of the 1980s. So, 1982-1987 saw consistent negative growth in the country; government earnings were halved; petroleum revenues fell by 40%; unemployment more than doubled; and no governmental attempts at economic realignment were able to stem economic sclerosis. Consequently, the country sought assistance from the IMF in 1986 with the implementation of a SAP in 1988 (Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Finance, 1988: 1; Boodhoo and Royer, 2000:97; Ramsaran 1993: 144-146).

With structural adjustment this country moved towards a more market oriented approach internally and externally. Most non-agricultural trade restrictions were scrapped, currency controls were removed (circa 1992), and a floating exchange rate regime was adopted (circa 1993) (Boodhoo and Royer, 2000:97-98). Debt relief from the IMF and the SAPs that followed came with some social burdens though. Specifically, discourses indicate that state expenditure on health, education and social services was curbed; state subsidies on electricity, water, transportation increased costs for much of the population; and unemployment and poverty levels were heightened and only began to recover towards the mid-1990s\(^\text{84}\) (Boodhoo and Royer, 2000:109; Kwamina 1988:102).

\(^{84}\) Here the thesis relies on discourses that speak to declines in social spending since there is a gap in government statistics on expenditure during the crisis years. As is the case with other CARICOM countries, accessing time series data can often be problematic.
As state involvement in the provision of social services and in community development was scaled back, developmental and welfare oriented CSOs were brought into the development initiatives in Trinidad and Tobago as evinced in the statement of former Prime Minister A.N.R Robinson:

Traditionally, the area of social development has been largely considered to be the responsibility of the Government. By contrast future policy will be designed to affect *a shift in emphasis and non-governmental organisations* will be accorded an important role in designing and implementing programmes which will serve to enhance individual, family and community well-being… (Robinson 1989: 55-emphasis added-)

“Decentralisation” and “self-help” or “self-reliance” in development were the important starting points here and brought community/village councils and other private voluntary organisations into “cooperative or participatory” relationships with the state in parallel with decreasing reliance on the state (Robinson 1989: 48-50). Kwamina (1988), commenting on the 1988 budget of the Robinson’s NAR government, referred to the promotion of “self-help” as a privatisation strategy of “deregulation via voluntary associations” that put the onus for the provision of social welfare and services on society (102). Whether viewed positively or negatively, leaving social service provision to voluntary associations meant that *developmental or community oriented CSOs* became involved in decision-making processes, at least those in the field of welfare and social development. In the economic sphere though, these non-EIGs tended not to be included in decision-making consultations and were not emphasised as important actors.

The liberalising trend in economic affairs in Trinidad and Tobago translated into private sector led development using an export-oriented development strategy (versus ISI). The government was no longer tasked with managing economic activities as intimately as it had in the past, just as it was no longer slated to take on as involved a role in the provision of welfare services as it had previously. The government was to be a facilitator, or referee in economic affairs that were to be conducted in a neo-liberal vein.

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85 Such welfare oriented CSOs did not register on the scale of those that actively mobilized for social changes in the 1960s and 1970s, but as in most of the region performed important social and economic functions.
Hence, both non-EIGs and EIGs came to be better incorporated in the development processes in Trinidad and Tobago. However, EIGs were more involved in economic aspects of development and non-EIGs were more involved in social areas.

As in Barbados, neo-liberal trends in economic thinking fed into policy ideas and these ideas were implemented, on the recommendation of the IFIs, in efforts to deal with economic crisis. This ideational-material trend brought CSOs (and the members they represented) into policy processes by the 1990s more fully than was the case in the 1970s.

NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE FRAMEWORKS FROM THE 1980s

In remodelling the economic structure and the path to “development” “national consultation” was undertaken by the start of the 1990s (Robinson 1989: 47). The shifting tide internationally towards “good governance” with the emphasis on transparency and inclusion of CS was important in this regard. That the former Prime Minister A. N. R. Robinson spoke to: “…the government’s principle of national consultation and communication with the population on important issues” (Robinson 1988), illustrates this point. Under his administration a National Planning Commission (NPC) that consulted with CSOs and other stakeholders was created to discuss restructuring the economy. This shift towards consulting with CSOs and implementing neo-liberal policies belies a shift in thinking and policy also present within the CARICOM context as evident in the Grande Anse Declaration of 1989 (noted in chapter 4, page 125).

The NPC, established in 1988, was chaired by the Prime Minister (also Minister of Finance) and included government ministers from various ministries; the governor of the central bank; other government representatives (a representative from Tobago and a local government representative); representatives of business and industry EIGs; labour EIGs; and other “Representatives of the Public” (National Planning Commission 1988: 24-26). A “Joint Consultative Council” that included government, labour and employers/the private sector representatives also came to form part of consultative processes for decision making on national matters (Robinson 1989: 47-48). These were
efforts to bring “stakeholders” beyond select politicians, civil servants and technocrats into decision-making at a time when the country was attempting to find its way out of economic problems. As with Barbados, a consultative framework was created in an economic crisis environment. However, the consultative culture between CSOs and the government on issues of domestic salience in Trinidad and Tobago has not been sustained.

The national consultations of the late 1980s neither out-lived the economic crisis nor matured to become regularised as in Barbados. Unlike Barbados, the commitment to subjugating individual group interests to national concerns and cooperating in consultative settings did not emerge. The idea that national consultation and consensus building are important was not accepted in this more differentiated society. Nevertheless, attempts to institutionalise a national consultative mechanism began in Trinidad and Tobago from the late 1990s producing “Compact 2000 and Beyond” in the year 2000. This was basically a tripartite mechanism similar to the SP in Barbados that was promoted by the ILO (an organisation with its long history of tripartism) and based on the Barbados model (Momm 2000). The novelty of this national framework in Trinidad and Tobago was expressed at the signing of this “compact”. For instance, Robert Guiseppi (2000) of the National Trade Union Centre stated:

> Never before has the trade union movement had the possibility of being so closely involved in the key economic affairs of our nation…The Social Compact gives us the potential of being decision-makers and not just the takers of decisions made by someone else. (-Emphasis added-)

This sentiment was reiterated by Gerald E. Pinard (2000) of the Employers’ Consultative Association:

> For the first time in our country’s history we have managed to achieve consensus on a compact between the social partners of Government,

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86 However, such consultation was not altogether novel as the previous discussion of consultations surrounding development planning in the 1960s illustrates.
Labour and Business which covers several areas of common interest to us all in the sphere of economic and social issues. (-Emphasis added-)

This Social Compact though was limited to “the usual suspects”, that is traditionally important EIGs in the CARICOM region. Compact 2000 did not go beyond formalising the previously informal corporatist or populist-statist bargain between the government, labour and the private sector/employers; it did not seek to engage a broad spectrum of CSOs as “social partners”. The model for participation at the national level was based on a thin conception of stakeholders on economic matters. EIGs have been conceived as the main stakeholders on economic issues and, therefore, have been the target groups in consultations rather than viewing other CSOs (non-EIGs) as “social partners” or “stakeholders” with material interests in economic affairs. Therefore, a type of formalised democratic corporatism emerged, linked to a focus on industrial relations and private-sector led development in the neo-liberal vein. One must consider this conception of “stakeholders” on economic issues when thinking about the focus by national officials on EIGs when it comes to trade consultations.

Despite the establishment of a “Social Compact” though, the process seems to have been legless in Trinidad and Tobago. None of the “social partners” in the Trinidad and Tobago interviewed or corresponded with during the course of this research mentioned this mechanism. In contrast, in Barbados all CSO representatives, even CSOs outside of the tripartite framework, mentioned the SP and its concomitant national consultations as an avenue for actual or potential CSO input on domestic and external issues. It appears that in the case of Trinidad and Tobago then, national consultative frameworks are not very important for understanding CSOs consultations on trade issues.

Tony Fraser, commenting on the Social Compact, in a Trinidadian newspaper (the Trinidad Guardian) illustrated his point aptly in stating:

[L]abour and business and the new PNM Government have left the compact in idle storage, the two former perhaps awaiting an initiative from the Government, the latter presumably not wanting to acknowledge that the previous government was able to construct a useful and workable partnership agreement. (Fraser, 18-03-04)
The apparent dormancy of the Social Compact notwithstanding, in 2004 the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, once more made clear its commitment to consultation of CSOs in decision-making in its plans to transform the twin island state into a developed country by the year 2020, in a processes called “Vision 2020”. Vision 2020 attempts to use national consultations in the process of planning in order to create a strategic development plan (Vision 2020 [a]). The Vision 2020 plan attempts to be “participatory, interactive and integrative” using a “multisectoral” and “multidimensional” procedure (Vision 2020 [b])

In elaborating on the processes of “widespread consultation and participation” (Vision 2020 [c]) to be used to achieve this goal the Government stated:

> These phases will continue to have the participation of a wide cross-section of interests and deepen the partnerships between the state, the private sector and civil society. (Vision 2020 [d]-emphasis added-)

This approach is significant as it is inclusive of actors from the public, private and civil “sectors”. People concerned with varied issues (economic, social or cultural) are brought into preparatory meetings and decision-making processes. Within this framework there is a multi-sectoral group comprising prominent persons from various sectors with these CS representatives forming parts of various sub-committees on important areas of national concern including “international relations, regional cooperation and trade”. Each sub-committee comprises “key stakeholders and interest groups at the public, private and community level” and is obligated to “organize and conduct stakeholder consultations to ensure widest possible participation in the process.” (Vision 2020 [a]).

Hence, at the national level, there is once more a framework for the inclusion of CS input in consultative processes, including those relating to trade matters. Moreover, this has advanced a discourse that includes a wide variety of CSOs and has created interactive processes that can potentially alter perceptions about CSO-government consultation in decision-making/policy discussions and groups’ perceptions of their interests. The door has, thereby, been opened for a variety of CSOs to participate in consultative processes on trade (and other areas). However, it is left to be seen whether or
not this mechanism will survive and whether the idea that CSO-government consultations are important will be accepted and will become engrained.

*Neo-liberal policies* implemented in Trinidad and Tobago brought CSOs into development processes and impacted on the creation of national consultative mechanisms (to deal with social fall out brought on by economic crisis). In the years 1988, 2000 and 2004 efforts were made to regularise these in line with a *focus on good governance* that emerged as important by the early 1990s. This point aside, none of these consultative mechanisms have impacted on CSO consultations on trade issues. However, CSO consultation and CSO activism on trade issues have occurred. These instances of activism and consultation have been impacted by the ideational-material trends of neo-liberalisation, globalisation and a focus on good governance, and groups’ perceptions of their interests in light of these trends.

### 7.2 CSO PARTICIPATION ON TRADE ISSUES

Mechanisms for the incorporation of CSOs in consultations on trade negotiating issues in Trinidad and Tobago exist. Firstly, a Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) was established in the 1997 by the government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. The TCC, chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade, invites the participation of *private sector association representatives, trade union representatives, public sector representatives* and *NGO representatives* in its meetings that are held every six weeks (WTO 1999: 17; Guiseppi interview: 19-05-05; Placide interview: 14-04-05; Placide, 2004). Issue specific sub-committees on agriculture, government procurement, market access, investment and services (chaired by the relevant Ministers) also function alongside the TCC. The decisions by such sub-committees must be approved by the TCC before they are transformed into negotiation positions and policy (WTO 1999: 17-18; Placide interview: 14-04-05; Placide 2004).
Secondly, a government appointed Standing Committee on Trade, chaired by the Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturing Association (TTMA), exists too (WTO 1999: 18; Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05; Placide interview: 14-04-05; MTI)\(^7\). This committee meets once monthly, inviting representatives from private sector associations, labour unions and academics from the University of the West Indies (WTO 1999: 18; Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05; Placide interview: 14-04-05).

In both of these consultative initiatives relating to negotiating agendas, private sector representative EIGs are the main participants.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF EIGS

The two above-mentioned consultative mechanisms on trade were initiated in 1997 when the country was negotiating a free trade arrangement with the Dominican Republic (DR) that followed trade agreements negotiated with Colombia and Venezuela (Placide interview: 14-04-05). Lawrence Placide, of the International Trade Negotiations Unit (ITNU) in Trinidad and Tobago, stated that this consultative mechanism was seen as important by private sector representative associations because in their opinions the government did not aptly speak to the views or concerns of the country’s private sector (Placide interview: 14-04-05). The view that the government was not fully aware of the concerns of private sector interests was further borne out by Anthony Guiseppi of the TTMA and again by a senior staff member from the Trade Division at the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI; Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05).

In light of this problem, private sector associations mobilised for inclusion in trade talks during the preparatory phases for negotiating the trade agreement with the DR and they began to be better included from this approximate time. Also, during the Uruguay Round of the GATT the Government of Trinidad and Tobago consulted with private sector representative associations by seeking their views on trade related position

\(^7\) Information also gained from a senior staff member at the Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Trade and Industry. Correspondence: 25 April 2005. Will be referred to as (MTI) throughout.
papers and on trade issues in general. However, consultation was sporadic and was not as well coordinated as that which came to exist from the time of negotiations with the DR (Placide interview: 14-04-05).

As in Barbados, mobilisation on trade and institutionalised channels for CSO consultation on issues up for trade negotiations at the ministerial level began in the 1990s, particularly following the Uruguay round. As in Barbados too, EIGs representing private sector concerns emerged as the principle participants. *Unlike in Barbados though, inclusion of EIGs was not an outgrowth of a commitment to consultation of “stakeholders” or “social partners”*. Consultation on international trade issues in Trinidad and Tobago instead emerged from private sector EIGs, as a response to disdain (especially by EIGs representing “big business”) at the way in which bilateral trade agreements and the Uruguay round were negotiated “for them” but without them. Negotiations for bilateral agreements between CARICOM and: Colombia, Venezuela and the DR, were especially important for Trinidad and Tobago, as one of the countries within CARICOM with most to gain and to lose in terms of trade in manufactures. Certainly, amongst the Eastern Caribbean economies, Trinidad and Tobago had the most to gain from these trade agreements as the principal manufacturing power in this area of the Caribbean.

Despite the slightly different rationale for including EIGs in consultation on trade than in Barbados, one must acknowledge the growing tendency towards decentralisation in governance and export orientation based on the private sector that came with SAPs, which opened the door for the private sector to be the prime drivers of economic development. The emphasis within this *neo-liberal influenced conception* placed private-sector EIGs at the centre of consultations on economic affairs following the logic that these actors had direct material interests in trade issues. This is akin to the case of Barbados where the growing importance of neo-liberal ideas brought specific liberalising policies via SAPs. These liberalising policies also intensified following the Uruguay Round. These factors must be considered in understanding the reconstituted interests of EIGs that did not mobilise to attempt to shape trade agendas prior to the 1990s.
So, private sector associations, notably led by those representing major business interests (e.g. Chambers of Commerce and the TTMA), have been the prime CSOs that have mobilised, that have been consulted and that are most deeply integrated in formulation of trade proposals in the TCC and the Standing Committee on Trade. This consultation resulted from their mobilisation on trade issues as a response to their material interests, as a response to interest perceptions in the ideational-material setting of the time and was facilitated by their institutional wherewithal. Let us look a bit at the material basis of private sector EIG activism to begin with.

The TTMA has been the focal point for discussions on trade in general and with respect to trade in goods specifically. This is an outcome one would expect from a material interest based perspective, particularly considering the importance of the manufacturing export sector to the country in economic terms. With its creation in 2002, on the initiative of various private sector interests in the financial services and domestic chambers of commerce, the International Trade Negotiations Unit (ITNU) has also become an important EIG included and active in mobilisation on trade issues but focusing specifically on trade in services. The ITNU was also significant in initiating the creation of the Private Sector Committee on Trade in Services. This EIG’s activism and involvement on trade issues can be understood in light of the perceived need to promote the service sector in the country by private sector interests.

Trade agreements that impacted on the “interests” of these private sector groups represented by the ITNU and the TTMA were negotiated prior to the 1990s though. Yet, it was only from the mid/late 1990s that these EIGs came to conceive of themselves as having to prioritise activism on trade fronts and as needing to create institutions that would allow them to do so aptly. In response to ideational-material shifts that became important in the region by the 1990s, these EIGs came to perceive themselves as having interests in actively mobilising on trade issues. They came to hold somewhat different ideas about where their priority areas for mobilisation lay. Hence, their mobilisation initiatives were not simply automatic responses to changing material circumstances but
were based on changing perceptions of interests against the background of ideational-material shifts. Neither in Trinidad and Tobago nor in Barbados were the interests represented by these EIGs threatened with the loss of preferences or guaranteed markets. Unlike the case of St. Lucia (to be discussed on the chapter to follow), the EIGs that mobilise have done so mostly based on their projected beliefs about the impacts of trade negotiations or because of their perceptions of how liberalisation and globalisation may impact on them. To reiterate, mobilisation by these EIGs can be understood partly by looking at the material impacts that trade arrangements could have on them but also partly by their interest perceptions or ideas about the courses of action deemed to be necessary in light of emerging ideational-material trends.

Looking at the institutional capacity of these EIGs in Trinidad and Tobago also allows one to understand how these EIGs were able to mobilise effectively and to be included in official consultations. The wherewithal of private sector EIGs has allowed them to be aptly informed on the general trade issues and also the issue specific technical issues in order to make well informed inputs. These EIGs have the ability to draw on funding from their private sector members in order to dedicate staffing to the task of undertaking the necessary research on trade issues. Moreover, the ITNU and the TTMA have been awarded grant funding by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to carry out their mobilisation on trade. Specifically, grant funding has been geared towards informing private sector players on occurrences in the trade sphere and towards facilitating their participation in shaping domestic trade negotiating stances. Funding has also been made available by the government of Trinidad and Tobago that allows for representatives of private sector EIGs to take on advisory roles in various trade negotiating settings (Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05; Placide interview: 14-04-05; MTI).

Since these private sector EIGs have been able to build institutional capacity to produce research, officials can draw on them as sources of expertise and knowledge, making them useful consultation “partners”. The ability of these EIGs to undertake research and focus on various areas of trade (that are in the material interests of their members) has allowed their representatives to move beyond consultation to be
incorporated in the field of trade negotiations as advisory members on government delegations that go to various trade negotiations (MTI; Abdullah interview: 05-05; Placide interview: 14-04-05).

So far, the tendency for private sector EIGs to be the CSOs that are intimately involved in shaping trade negotiating approaches has been underlined. However, in Trinidad and Tobago there is little mention of EIGs representing the agricultural side of the private sector when it comes to trade matters. This is unlike in Barbados where there is participation of the Barbados Agricultural Society (BAS) and unlike in the case of St. Lucia (to follow) where these are of great significance.

Although traditionally important, agricultural products (mainly sugar, cocoa and coffee) have diminished to near invisibility as exports the agricultural sector is important from an employment perspective. The agricultural concerns of farmers/producers in Trinidad and Tobago are certainly at issue in trade talks, particularly considering that this is the one economic sector that is most “protected” from open trade (WTO 1999: 68). However, the Standing Committee on Trade does not include agricultural associations in its advisory capacity. Nevertheless, farmers’ associations do have institutionalised contact with the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine Resources (MALMR) via the County Agricultural Consultative Committee. Meetings of this committee comprise representatives from farmer’s associations and are attended by MALMR officials. The committee is able to provide inputs on important policy areas under discussion, one of which happens to be trade (discussed by one of the sub-committees of the TCC). In accounting for agricultural associations’ involvement though, one must consider that in the agricultural sector public enterprises dominate (WTO 1999: 70), implying that the concerns agricultural interests are known to the government to whom such are accountable. So the input of MALMR into consultations on trade issues represents concerns of agricultural producers as these are dominated by state run enterprises.

As for workers’ unions, the situation is different. According to the classification used in this thesis, trade unions fall into the category of EIGs and like private sector
representative associations these began to be concerned with trade matters from the 1990s. Once more, changing ideational-material trends impacted on their interest perceptions so that workers’ EIGs came to prioritise issues up for negotiation in trade spheres. Yet, this group of EIGs seems to play only a limited role in trade consultations particularly when compared to their private sector EIG counterparts.

Although representatives from prominent private sector EIGs indicated that workers’ union representatives rarely attend consultative meetings on trade issues, the view from within trade unions is different. For instance, Vincent Cabrera noted that the trade union movement has been “alienated” from trade talks unlike the situation in Barbados and the Bahamas. He further opined that in Trinidad and Tobago unions tend to be “advised” rather than “consulted” and that trade negotiations have been monopolised by the government and, the private sector representative associations (Vincent Cabrera interview: 14-04-05). The situation painted here is one of exclusion. It is not that unions do not want to be included in talks on trade negotiations or that they do not see trade issues as within their range of interests, but that they are not viewed as the most pertinent stakeholders in this area. Cabrera made this clear by stating that although he has written to the trade Minister about the requirement of continual labour inclusion as specified within the ACP-EU context, his union not been “taken on”, as trade issues are not perceived as within the purview of unions” (Cabrera interview: 14-05-05-emphasis added-).

The opinion of another labour union representative is slightly different but, all the same, illustrates that union concerns are not heard on trade negotiating issues to the extent of opinions from private sector EIGs. Specifically, David Abdullah of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions noted that he was the only representative from labour who has taken part in the Standing Committee on Trade and that there is no labour movement representative who takes part in the TCC (Abdullah interview: 05-05). This limited participation though is due, in his view, to institutional problems faced by unions:
“We don’t have the resources to have people participate. We don’t have the trained people who have knowledge of the detailed negotiating positions…nor have we done the detailed research.” (Abdullah interview: 05-05-emphasis added-)

Vincent Cabrera stated that the Trade Ministry has drawn on the “expertise” of private sector associations and Abdullah speaks of the research capacity of private sector associations and the lack thereof on the part of unions. Both workers’ representatives, thereby, imply that institutional capacity creates expertise, facilitates effective activism and assists in legitimising CSO consultation. Private sector representative associations, especially those representing “big business”, have garnered the institutional capabilities to mobilise well and to be seen as important in government consultations. Since research allows valued insider input in consultative settings, it allows private sector EIGs that have the wherewithal to conduct research or commission research to be more thoroughly incorporated on trade issues than other EIGs (e.g. labour unions, small business associations and agricultural associations). It is not that other CSOs are altogether excluded or that they do not see themselves as having interests in trade matters but that despite these things, they face institutional constraints that make it difficult for them to continually and effectively be involved in consultations on trade issues in meaningful ways. Hence, infrequent union attendance of meetings on trade issues must be linked to capacity problems.

To compound the capacity problem there is no national umbrella association for unions in Trinidad and Tobago, unlike in Barbados where such exists and seeks to unite unions in order to better interact with the government (and employers) with respect to major issues. This lack of coordination and engagement on trade (as well as other issues) is a factor that hinders labour association inclusion and activism on trade negotiating issues.88

We see then the importance of another institutional factor that comes out by comparison between cases. In Barbados where union capacity is pooled this has allowed

88 Yet, in the context of Trinidad and Tobago where fragmentation based on ethnic and regional lines has been significant, this must be kept in mind in understanding this lack of cooperation to some extent.
one umbrella body to be able to participate in consultations. This has facilitated unions’
attendance of meetings on trade and their iterated engagement on trade issues. The same
can be said at the regional level where it appears that both EIGs and non-EIGs that have
pooled capacity via umbrella organisation and regional networks have been able to
mobilise and be included on trade matters. Important to note on the institutional side in
addition, is that in Barbados the SP has included unions and private sector EIGs for over
a decade. This mechanism may, therefore, be seen to contribute to a more ingrained
culture of participation by EIGs on a range of issues than has been the case in Trinidad
and Tobago (discussed in section 7.1).

These points notwithstanding, the general picture is the same for both countries:
private sector EIGs are the major participants in consultative processes based on officials
and some CSOs holding to the idea that private sector EIGs are the prime stakeholders
on trade (they are the traders so they have material interests in trade matters). Additionally, because private sector EIGs (especially dominant private sector EIGs) have
the institutional capacity to produce the valued resource of research, they have further
come to be valued and consulted by officials.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-EIGS

As the previous section implies, CSOs that are not in the EIG category are left out
of the consultative process, as is (for the most part) also the case in Barbados.

According to Hazel Brown from the Network of NGOs of Trinidad and Tobago
for the Advancement of Women89 “there are not many opportunities for NGOs to
participate in decision-making on trade negotiating issues” (Brown interview: 18 April
2005). Brown further notes that although NGOs have been invited to seminars and
workshops, channels of interaction with government officials have not been
regularised; instead, only private sector associations (she states “Chambers of
Commerce”) have been the institutionalised participants (Brown interview: 18-04-05).

89 Note this is a network of NGOs as opposed to an umbrella organization or a unified CSO.
This point was also reiterated by Zakiya Uzoma-Waddada from the Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development (CNIRD) and Nelcia Robinson of CAFRA (both located in Trinidad and Tobago). These persons made it clear that in Trinidad and Tobago non-EIGs are consulted or included differently and less regularly than EIGs. To be specific, non-EIG inclusion by officials has mostly been in seminar form and has been intermittent rather than regularised (Uzoma-Waddada interview: 14-04-05; Robinson correspondence: 09-10-05).

If one considers a material interest based view of stakeholders, that non-EIGs (tending to focus on social welfare and developmental issues vs. being traders) are not included regularly in consultative processes is on the basis that these groups do not have interests in trade. Anthony Guiseppi of the TTMA makes this view startlingly clear when asked whether CSOs such as those representing women’s interests or social concerns were invited to consultative meetings or trade forums. In response, Guiseppi retorted that there was no need to include these groups since trade issues are “gender neutral” (Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05). This comment belies the view that EIGs are the prime CSO stakeholders on trade matters and therefore are the prime groups that should be consulted. This view may be seen, at least to some extent, as informing government approaches to consulting with CSOs. Hence, although non-EIGs have played important roles in service-provision from the 1980s in the areas of social welfare, this has not been translated into non-EIGs being viewed as stakeholders with interests much beyond the remit of social welfare issues.

Yet, at least some non-EIGs want to be involved in these consultative processes, even if they lack the technical expertise. Brown stated that NGOs would like to see more information sharing on issues relating to trade negotiations in order to know what is being negotiated. Additionally, non-EIGs are keen to have input on trade matters, especially regarding employment related effects of trade. The network that Brown represents is also particularly interested in the gendered impacts that issues up for negotiation may have and therefore would like to be better informed of the consultative meetings on trade that exist in the country (Brown interview: 18-04-05). Hence, despite materialist conceptions
of interests, non-EIGs such as those comprising this network appear to see the value of being involved in decision-making processes on trade issues.

Brown, Robinson, and Uzoma-Waddada made it clear that from the 1990s in Trinidad and Tobago, non-EIGs came to see themselves as needing to look at trade issues. This focus emerged based on the idea that the social concerns that they speak to will be impacted on by trade agreements and should be considered in trade consultations (Uzoma-Waddada interview: 14-04-05; Robinson correspondence: 09-10-05). Therefore, some non-EIGs came to perceive of their interests as including trade matters. This occurred in the context of ideational-material trends of importance from the 1990s. However, non-EIG activism on trade matters has been more limited than that of EIGs. How can one account then for the gap between seeing activism as important and actually mobilising?

To start with, it appears that the institutional robustness that would help to enable such activism is lacking. The point here is that resource constraints faced by non-EIGs have made it difficult for these groups to prioritise social welfare issues and concerns in tandem with other linked issues. As a result, non-EIG activism has been infrequent and for the most part ineffective, both of which have limited the consultative avenues made available to them by government officials (Uzoma-Waddada interview: 14-04-05; Anonymous interview: 07-03). Institutional inability to address trade issues continually and as effectively as EIGs are import factors that may deny non-EIGs inclusion in consultative processes and that restrict their potential to have impact on trade agenda through interactive processes. However, when non-EIGs have been facilitated and attempt to correct their capacity deficits, they have begun to conduct research, to do educational work and to discuss trade issues up for negotiation in structured and focussed ways.

A National Working Committee on Trade (NWCT) was established in Trinidad and Tobago under the auspices of the CPDC as a forum that facilitates repeated CSO engagement with trade matters. This structure provides evidence that when non-EIGs
pool capacity, they can become better able to mobilise and assert their interests on trade matters. The NWCT framework has brought together non-EIGs from diverse areas such as youth, women, the disabled as well as some EIGs (Munro-Knight interview: 11-07-05; Anonymous interview: July 2003; Uzoma-Waddada interview: 14-04-05). However, Munro-Knight of the CPDC noted that although private sector EIGs are not the principal participants of the NWCTs, EIGs that speak for small and medium sized enterprises (i.e. less prominent private sector EIGs) have mobilised as part of the NWCT. One example of such a small business representative association is the Downtown Owners and Merchants Association (DOMA) (Munro-Knight interview: 11-07-05).

The CSO participants in the NWCT come together to debate and discuss their concerns on trade issues. Thereafter, the NWCT attempts to transmit the views and concerns expressed in their internal discussions to domestic officials in order to link the regional work of the CPDC and the CRG to local concerns (Munro-Knight correspondence: 14-06-05; Munro-Knight interview:11-07-05; Anonymous interview: 07-03). The cooperative work of these associations via the NWCT has helped non-EIGs to jointly overcome some of the institutional deficits that have constrained their activism.

A lack of material interests is not the obstacle to action here, indeed, even though non-EIGs may not be “traders” or “producers” the socio-economic impacts of trade agreements can impact on the concerns that these CSOs represent. This has long been the case in Trinidad and Tobago and across the region but it was only from the mid/late 1990s that some non-EIGs came to see themselves as having a right to be heard on these issues that affect their lives, and the lives of those whom they represent or work with. Non-EIGs perceived themselves as needing to be consulted and as having interests in shaping trade negotiating agendas in the ideational-material context of the 1990s in which neo-liberal ideas and practices, a globalisation discourse and a focus on good governance characterised the landscape. This intangible factor of perception is important in understanding why non-EIGs have come together in cooperation with the CPDC to form an NWCT. In understanding how they attempt to turn these desires for mobilisation into action though, one needs to look at institutional factors.
The involvement of representatives from EIGs in the NWCT in Trinidad and Tobago, particularly those EIGs from the less dominant private sector associations and unions is worth emphasising once more. These associations are classed as EIGs throughout this thesis. However, these EIGs possess less institutional strength (in terms of human and financial resources) and have less access to government channels of consultation on trade negotiating issues than more prominent private sector EIGs (e.g. the TTMA and Chambers of Commerce). As such, these more constrained EIGs have come together with non-EIGs to discuss trade issues and to pool capacity in efforts to consult with the relevant trade officials.

Here EIGs and non-EIGs have joined together to promote their shared social concerns as well as their material interests. To drive home this point is, the following statement from David Abdullah of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions:

The business associations may have a different interest or philosophical position to labour and the NGO movement in these trade negotiating processes (Abdullah interview: 05-05)

It is clear then some EIGs slide into the non-EIG category by means of acting out of similar principled beliefs or moving beyond their so-called material self-interests. Some EIGs, such as unions and small private sector associations, share with non-EIGs a similar ideational view about why they should mobilise on trade issues. This, of course, is in addition to the more instrumental goals of both the EIG and non-EIG participants in the NWCT in building institutional strength through resource pooling. As stated in Part A of this thesis, the observation illustrates that the EIG/non-EIG classification does not strictly hold in reality, even if it may be useful for simplification or analytical purposes.

So, has this mobilisation and this strategic pooling of resources by these CSOs been translated into consultation?
The answer is that there have been some instances of consultation with these CSOs. For instance, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions and Trinidad and Tobago’s CAFRA branch attended the 2003 Miami ministerial of the FTAA as a component of the country’s trade delegation. This was the first time that these two CSOs were included on trade matters at such a high level, since such inclusion has tended to be the exclusive remit of private sector representative associations. According to Abdullah, this inclusion came on the initiative of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions and CAFRA, but he goes on to note that such inclusion has not continued in any other trade negotiating forum since (Abdullah interview: 05-05). Although CSOs have come to be included in areas in which they were not included prior to the mid/late 1990s, consultation and participation has been rather sporadic when it comes to non-EIGs.

Despite believing that they have important inputs to contribute, non-EIGs (and more marginalised EIGs) have yet to insert themselves in trade consultations with the national government of Trinidad and Tobago in any systematised way. As already stated, institutional constraints have something to do with this and these constraints are what the NWCT has been making efforts to correct. However, the belief that CSOs besides the usual EIGs should be brought into consultative processes at the domestic level does not seem to register fully with all representatives from private sector associations, or with the representatives from government ministries, contacted for the purposes of this research (e.g. a source from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Anthony Guisseppi of the TTMA and Lawrence Placide of the ITNU). The material interest based conceptions about which groups constitute stakeholders on trade appear to dominate their views. Put differently, these persons hold to the idea that dominant EIGs are the legitimate stakeholders on trade matters and this view impacts on the more limited inclusion of non-EIGs in consultations than of EIGs.
CONCLUSION: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

This chapter has highlighted that the ideational-material context of the 1990s and CSO material interests, perceptions and institutional capacity have impacted on CSO mobilisation and consultation in Trinidad and Tobago, even if this has been to a limited extent.

In terms of making a comparison with the Barbados case, a consultative culture did not grow out of the severe economic crisis that occurred in Trinidad and Tobago. The consultative process linked to discussions of trade negotiating issues between government officials and EIGs came in the context, more specifically, of liberalising changes in the world trading atmosphere, especially following the Uruguay Round. Trade liberalisation is important in the case of Barbados too, but in Barbados consultative processes can be linked to the SP framework as well. Moreover, in both cases the neo-liberal shift in ideas about trade and about the importance of the private sector as the main stakeholders on economic issues at the domestic level were important. Hence, the broader neo-liberal trend in ideas and accompanying material changes in the trade realm were important in impacting on private sector EIG constitution of their interests and by extension their activism and inclusion where little such occurred in the area of trade previously. It was only from the mid /late 1990s that EIGs came to conceive of themselves as needing to actively mobilise on trade issues in light of a shift in mainstream ideas about economic management and interactions and linked material occurrences in the international and domestic spheres.

Considering the excerpts of Trinidad and Tobago’s economic history highlighted here illustrates that the inclusion of CSOs in consultative processes of decision-making at the national level is rather complicated due to the divisions that have characterised political, social and economic relations, unlike in Barbados where the social atmosphere is less charged with divisions and the ability to create consensus building mechanisms (e.g. the SP) has been easier. The consultative culture that has been engendered in Barbados through the SP is lacking in the consultative arrangements on trade in Trinidad.
and Tobago. Yet, on issues surrounding trade negotiations CSOs have been included in consultations with government officials from the 1990s and in much the same manner as in Barbados.

The CSOs that dominate the process are EIGs, particularly those from private sector associations representing predominantly well-established businesses. Other EIGs have been included too, such as unions, but not as integrally. This asymmetry in consultation is in part due to constraints that EIGs apart from the better established private sector associations face. So, it appears that the situation is similar to that in Barbados; this in spite of the ethnic, racial, sectoral and regional divisions that have characterised divisions between CSOs in Trinidad and Tobago. It seems then that these factors are in some ways unimportant when it comes to understanding CSOs participation or inclusion in consultations on trade issues.\footnote{Ethnic or racial issues may still have underlying importance within and between EIGs, and also within and between various non-EIGs, but in understanding the involvement of various sorts of CSOs such issues appear less significant at the surface.} Instead factors of salience in Barbados are pertinent to Trinidad and Tobago:

- On the one hand, beliefs held about who should be consulted are important. Trade negotiating issues are seen not just as “gender neutral”, but primarily as an EIG concern by EIGs and government officials.

- On the other hand, the idea that non-EIGs and EIGs besides the usual suspects have interests in trade matters and have roles to play is notable, as it informs their interest construction and their attempts at activism, capacity building and their educational work on trade negotiations. This analysis has tried to illustrate that interests by themselves cannot be taken as the driving force in understanding group activism since groups do not just possess interests they generate them based on their perceptions.

- The institutional capacity of CSOs to mobilise aptly and to be included is also critical for understanding how CSOs have been consulted and patterns of CSO
mobilisation. Notably, the better capacity of the well-coordinated private sector EIGs facilitates their inclusion in consultation, in contrast to the limited means of other EIGs and non-EIGs.

- Another important institutional consideration is the manner in which governments structure channels for consultation so as to facilitate EIG participation rather than that of non-EIGs. This is evident both in Trinidad and Tobago where consultative arrangements on trade are independent of national consultative frameworks and in Barbados where the national consultative framework has been mainstreamed but remains skewed towards EIG consultation.

In addition to these factors the ideational-material trend in the form of a growing emphasis on “good governance” in the wake of the Cold War should be noted. In discussing attempts in Trinidad and Tobago to create mechanisms for national consultation, governance concerns have been highlighted. The ideational-material context in which good governance has become focal therefore may be seen as impacting on general efforts at consultation and even on government approaches to trade matters. However, with respect to trade matters, a commitment to consultation with actors from within CS in line with a focus on good governance appears skewed towards emphasising specific EIGs representing the dominant private sector interests.

So, as in Barbados, there is a bias towards including certain CSOs, whilst excluding or allowing for different methods of inclusion of others when it comes to matters up for external trade negotiation. This skew exists even in spite of the stated commitment to “consultation”, “good governance”, espoused by both the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados governments. This is not to say that there is not a commitment to consultation, but rather that this commitment is rather selective. All the same, the discursive space has been opened to accommodate a variety of CSOs in consultative settings at the domestic level, including non-EIGs, which have begun work together domestically via the NWCTs and regionally (via the CPDC and CAFRA) to create more
space for non-EIGs inclusion on trade topics. These actions by non-EIGs have begun to reduce the EIG bias in consultations, although this bias is still predominant.

Next this thesis moves on to compare the situations in Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados with that in St. Lucia.
CHAPTER 8

CONSULTATIONS ON THE TRADE AGENDA IN AN LDC WITHOUT A NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM: THE ST. LUCIAN EXPERIENCE

The last two chapters started by showing that levels of exposure to trade cannot account for CSO activism on trade, since exposure to trade in the 1970s was either equally high or higher than it was from the 1990s. On the same note, increases in trade exposure cannot account for government openness to consulting CSOs on trade issues either. The following graph shows that the situation in St. Lucia is much the same as those in the previous cases. To be specific, St. Lucia became much less dependent on trade from the 1990s than it was in the late 1970s and late 1980s.

Figure 7: St. Lucia’s Trade Dependence\(^{91}\)

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\(^{91}\) Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations
Therefore, one needs to look at other factors to understand CSO activism on trade and government openness to consulting CSOs from the 1990s. As in the cases of Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados (despite the social, political and economic differences) CSO interest perceptions in the face of ideational-material changes that became important in the 1980s and 1990s are important to consider.

The previous case studies also illustrated that CSO activism and inclusion on trade have been impacted on by institutional considerations. Specifically, in actualising their perceived interests, EIGs have been the CSOs best able to mobilise because of their institutional robustness and have also been the prime CSOs consulted because their institutional wherewithal grants them the capacity to conduct research and mobilise effectively. On the other hand non-EIGs have lacked the institutional ability to move their perceived interests into effective mobilisation. Non-EIGs have also had less success in having governments include them in trade consultations, despite the existence of some inclusion and despite national consultative spaces being opened.

However, this chapter, will show that in St. Lucia EIGs and non-EIGs have faced significant institutional hurdles to mobilising continually and effectively on trade. As a result of these institutional capacity problems, activism by both EIGs and non-EIGs on trade issues has been limited. Also, institutional hindrances have circumscribed the government’s ability to consult with CSOs (both consultation of EIGs and non-EIGs) more markedly than in the cases of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. Even though the ideational-material context of the time has led the St. Lucian government to advocate and initiate CSO consultation on trade matters, the government of St. Lucia has not had the capacity to create regularised consultative settings on trade. The St. Lucian case shows then, that institutional factors help one to understand why some CSOs have been able to mobilise better than others and also why governments have included CSOs in trade consultations in certain ways.

As in the cases of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, ideational factors, specifically ideas about which groups constitute stakeholders on trade topics, have
impacted on how CSOs have mobilised and on how officials have included CSOs in trade consultations. Conceptions about which groups constitute the prime stakeholders on trade have impacted on government inclusion of some CSOs (especially private sector EIGs) over others. Yet, despite these conceptions being important in St. Lucia, it should be reiterated that government-CSO consultation has on the whole been more limited than in the previous two case studies in light of institutional considerations.

In spite of the differences with relation to consultation between this case and the former cases, this chapter will illustrate that institutional factors have impacted on how CSOs have mobilised and how they have been included in consultations with officials on trade issues. Additionally, it will highlight that interest perceptions, framed in the ideational-material context of the time, help one to understand why CSOs mobilised and came to be included.

To bring out these points this chapter proceeds in the following way: Section 8.1 looks at government-CSO consultations in St. Lucia and at some trade related aspects of the economic history of St. Lucia. This section pays special attention to the role of bananas in the economy. Section 8.2 follows by examining CSO activism and inclusion on trade issues and highlighting the differences between this case and the previously discussed cases but, all the same, shows that the ideational-material context is important in understanding activism, as are perceptions of interests and institutional factors.

8.1 ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BANANA AFFAIR

The St. Lucian case differs from the previous two cases with relation to trade in some important respects. As in the previous studies, CSOs could have mobilised on trade in the 1970s and 1980s because of exposure. CSOs however only began to mobilise in the 1990s, but in the case of St. Lucia a very real material threat thrust CSOs into mobilising on trade issues. St. Lucia (along with fellow ACP banana exporting countries) faced
losses in preferential access of their bananas to the European market because of changes to the EU banana regime and also due to a WTO challenge to banana preferences granted to ACP producers. These occurrences led to the country attempting to restructure its economy from the mid-1990s whereas in Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago such restructuring came under SAPs (due to balance of payments problems). In light of these shocks a material interest based conception would lead us to think that CSO mobilisation should been more pronounced than in the other two countries. However, as has been alluded to already, CSO mobilisation in St. Lucia has been limited (though it exists) because of institutional factors.

In fact, although St. Lucia faced some slowing in economic performance between the late 1970s and 1982 from the mid 1980s right into the early-1990s St. Lucia fared relatively well economically due to favourable external market conditions for its banana exports. Notably, St. Lucia saw average GDP growth rates of 7% per annum between 1983 and 1992 (CCA 1991: 64; WTO 2002: 2). With changes to the EU’s banana regime and a challenge from the WTO (both emerging post-1992) GDP growth rates began to peter off in St. Lucia, plunging into the negative range by the start of the new millennium. The following graph illustrates this decline:

Figure 8: St. Lucia’s GDP Growth

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Hence, balance of payments problems did not open the door for the ideational-material shift in a neo-liberal direction does as occurred in the previous two cases. In Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, SAPs brought internal economic liberalisation and external liberalisation (in trade). SAPs also introduced a focus on private sector led development and decentralised service provision (in Trinidad and Tobago rather than in Barbados) that inserted actors from beyond the state apparatus into development and decision-making processes. St. Lucia, however, did not undergo the same move towards internal and external liberalisation, private sector led development or CSO focussed social service provision that some other countries in the region did. Balance of payments problems that afflicted other CARICOM countries and concomitant SAPs were staved off in St. Lucia and in the other OECS countries in part because of the stabilising role of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) that controlled these countries’ shared currency (Eastern Caribbean Dollar). To be specific, the ECCB was pivotal in containing expenditure and external borrowing of its members which helped them to avoid some of the problems faced by other CARICOM states d (Wint 2003: 36, ECLAC 2001: 11).  

Nevertheless, in the 1980s and early 1990s there was cognisance of the importance of structural adjustment (as espoused in the 1984 Nassau Understanding) throughout the region. Additionally, CARICOM members acknowledged the “necessity” of liberalising trade in conformity with international trends (as espoused in the Grand Anse Declaration in 1989) 94. Therefore, even without SAPs, the ideas and policies that formed part of the neo-liberal ideational-material shift of the 1980s (into the 1990s), impacted on St. Lucia. Yet, it was only in the 1990s when these ideas and policies came to impact on St. Lucia more directly via changes to the structure of multilateral trade rules. Hence, when preferential access for the country’s bananas came to be restricted with changes to the EU banana regime (via the Single European Act) and with

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93 However, into the 21st century the ECCB has been less successful in containing expenditure and borrowing. This has meant that some ECCB members now have very high debt to GDP ratios, some teetering on the verge of HIPC status.
94 See chapter 4
preferential access to the EU market being challenged in the WTO the country was propelled towards restructuring the economy\textsuperscript{95}:

Saint Lucia’s main economic policy objective for the period 1994-2000 was structural reform by means of a \textit{progressive liberalization} of international trade, the promotion of tourism and financial activities, and the restructuring of the banana industry. (WTO 2002: 4-emphasis added-)

The neo-liberal trend in ideas and policies (which the government signed up to in the trade sphere via the WTO), therefore, impacted on St. Lucia and the other Windward Island banana exporting economies. It has been estimated, for instance, that average exports of bananas from the Windward Islands decreased by 50\% from an average of 110.2 million Euros between 1989 and 1992 to an average of 55.2 million Euros between 1999 and 2002 (DFID 2004: 42). The declining exports have had significant impacts on farmers with data suggesting that registered banana farmers in the Windward Islands plunged from 24, 100 in 1993 to 7, 300 in 2001. In St. Lucia the number of registered farmers declined from 9, 700 in 1993 to 2, 000 in 2003. In addition, losses in employment between 1993 and 2001 are estimated to be as high as 18\% of the entire working population in the region or approximately 67, 000 job losses (DFID 2004: 43-44).

Since this trade shock attacked St. Lucia’s main export sector directly, neo-liberal policy thought inherent in these arrangements directly impacted on St. Lucia’s economy and on CS. The same, however, cannot be said for Trinidad and Tobago or Barbados. Although Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago reduced their protective tariffs in line with WTO arrangements and in line with the CARICOM CET during the 1990s, neither was reliant on an export sector that came directly under threat, as was the case in St. Lucia.

In response to the neo-liberal ideational-material shift that had specific impacts on the banana industry in St. Lucia, activism on this trade issue grew amongst CSOs, particularly the EIGs from within the agricultural sector. This agricultural EIG activism on trade came via a regional effort directed by the Windward Islands Farmers’

\textsuperscript{95} A similar situation holds for other Windward Island economies
A focus on strengthening the private sector emerged in St. Lucia too. As occurred in Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, with the shift in a neo-liberal direction, the private sector became focal in attempts to propel development. As a consequence, plans were made by the government to include these important actors in consultations on trade matters (MEA; Brian Louisy interview: 17-09-04). Consultation in the trade area between the government and stakeholders, moreover, has been encouraged in the context of the EPAs under negotiation with the EU and more generally too in the context of the contemporary focus on good governance.

CSO activism and government overtures to consultation on trade issues from the 1990s in St. Lucia were novel. Neither prior to nor during the Uruguay Round of the GATT were there consultations with actors outside of the government on issues up for negotiation in the trade realm. Kerde Severin from the St. Lucia Agriculturalists Association makes this point clear in saying: “In the Uruguay Round agricultural stakeholders were not consulted…” (Kerde Severin interview: 16-09-04). This view was reiterated by Brian Louisy of the St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (Brian Louisy interview: 17-09-04) and further by a representative of the St. Lucia Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation (MEA). This official from the Ministry of External Affairs noted that prior to the late 1980s there was no need to include CS representatives with respect to trade negotiating matters and went on to elucidate that only with the creation of the WTO did the government begin to “realise” that actors from outside of the government needed to be involved in consultations on negotiating proposals (MEA).

In spite of this realisation, greater involvement by actors from CS only began with farmers’ representatives mobilising in response to the banana dispute that emerged in the WTO the mid-1990s (MEA). As stated earlier, St. Lucian banana farmers mobilised in

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96 A senior official from the St. Lucia Ministry of External Affairs; interviewed 14-09-04; to be referenced as (MEA) throughout the text.
alliance with other such producers in the region under the aegis of WINFA to lobby within and outside of the CARICOM region for the interests of banana producers. Governments in the Windward Islands responded in support of the activism of WINFA and its constituent members, particularly considering the importance of bananas in these economies. As a result, governments in the Windward Islands in association with private traders created an export enterprise called the Windward Island Banana Development and Exporting Company (WIBDECO). WIBDECO (established in 1994) was an outgrowth of an umbrella banana growers association for the Windward Islands called the Windward Island Banana Growers Association (WIBAN). 97 In its evolution from WINBAN, WIBDECO became a joint government-private sector corporation to market and export bananas in the changing trade atmosphere (Grossman 1998: 69-70; St. Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005).

That farmers’ CSOs were listened to within this context in St. Lucia illustrates again that with trends in a neo-liberal direction intensifying in the 1990s, came consultation between CSOs and governments in the region on trade issues. To understand the role of WINFA (representing banana producers in St. Lucia) and of banana producers in St. Lucia in mobilising to shape trade-negotiating agendas, and indeed to preface an understanding of wider CSO activism on trade issues, it is important to explore the role of the banana industry in the context of St. Lucia’s history.

THE GROWTH OF THE BANANA INDUSTRY

To understand the development of the banana industry in St. Lucia one must look to external and internal factors within the colonial context.

97 WINBAN ceased to be a CSO as member associations became statutory bodies rather than private associations (e.g. the St. Lucia Banana Growers’ Association was converted to a statutory body in 1990 only to be privatized and transformed into a corporation in 1998 - St. Lucia Banana Corporation-). When WINBAN was transformed into WIBDECO in 1994 shares were divided between governments and growers associations/corporations in the Windward Islands, thus removing it further from the CSO category (Ministry of Agriculture 2005).
On the external side, the British administration was concerned about the penetration of an American company called the United Fruit Company that owned an extensive range of banana plantations in Central America by the early 20th century. In efforts to compete with this American company, the British established plantations for the production of bananas in Jamaica and also St. Lucia by 1925 (Grossman 1998: 35; St. Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005). Other attempts to undermine this American dominance in banana production included encouraging British shipping companies to participate in the banana trade with Jamaica and other Caribbean islands (especially in the islands of St. Lucia and Grenada); experimenting with Windward Island banana trade directed at the Canadian market; and the imposition of preferential policies towards bananas imported from the British Empire (Grossman 1998: 35-36).

On the internal side, there were British concerns about economic and social problems that affected St. Lucia. With the declining profitability of sugar production in the islands at the end of the 19th century, plantations of the Windward Islands faced economic and social instability (Thomson 1987: 3; Ferguson 1998). This was particularly notable in St. Lucia where plantation based sugar production was not as well established as in other parts of the region since this method of production was only introduced when the British took over possession of the island in 1814 (Barrow 1992: 11, 15; O’Loughlin 1968: 43). Also, by the 1930s (as in much of the region) dire poverty accompanied by labour unrest came to afflict St. Lucia and the Windwards.

Banana cultivation emerged to fill the void left by plantation production of sugar and helped to deal with unrest linked to poverty in the 1930s. Banana cultivation was compatible with large plantations and also on smallholdings of unfertile and steep land that characterised this country and tended to be occupied by the less well-off in the country. Therefore, banana farming provided opportunities for both the planter class and the descendents of slaves who only had access to small plots of land (Thompson 1987: 3-4). The focus on banana cultivation was also less controversial than British proposals for land reallocation and dealt with problems of seasonal unemployment of plantation workers that was usually associated with a sugar production. In sum, the introduction of
banana cultivation was a viable means of curbing socio-economic unease since the planter classes were allowed to keep their valuable lands and peasant agriculture by the “lower” classes was supported (Thomson 1987: 4-5; Barrow 1992: 25, 30).

The banana trade to Britain was suspended during World War II, but recommenced in 1945 with the British Ministry of Food acting as the sole importer under a managed the market. Since after the war Jamaican producers were no longer able to supply sufficient bananas to the UK, a door was opened for Windward Island bananas, such as those from St. Lucia. This was helped along by the involvement of a Canadian company (Antilles Products) that began shipping bananas from the Windwards to the UK (Grossman 1998: 38-39; St. Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005). In addition, British Empire bananas could enter the UK freely whilst those from Central and South America could only be imported with licences. The reasons for this discrimination were many, ranging from favouring sterling area bananas (as foreign exchange reserves were low following World War II) to assisting colonial economies, facing plummeting sugar prices in the 1950s.98 The Windward banana industry gained another boost in 1952 when a fast-growing British based company, Geest Industries Limited, bought the over-stretched Antilles Products and signed contracts with banana growers’ associations on each of the Windward Islands, guaranteeing these growers a buyer for their fruits (Grossman 1998: 39, 42; Thomson 1987: 28-31; St. Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005).

As a result of these occurrences, by 1957 dependence on sugar decreased dramatically in St. Lucia, and in 1963 the decision was made by the domestic government to abandon sugar production on the island in favour of banana cultivation. Sugar was officially abandoned by 1964, and St. Lucia saw increasing prosperity as “blacks” saw better standards of living based on small-scale banana production for export (Barrow 1993: 22, 30; O’ Loughlin 1968: 45). Indeed, small farming in the banana industry allowed for “blacks” to pay to educate their children, which facilitated the entry of these “banana children” into more affluent jobs in both the private and public sectors in St.

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98 These and other reasons for preferential treatment are notable in helping to understand the development of the banana industry and its importance in St. Lucia and the Windward Islands, but need not be developed at length for the purposes of this study.
Lucia. Bananas and the upward mobility they provided facilitated growing participation of “blacks” in politics, with this group comprising the political elite from the 1950s as well as the commercial elite. Notably, the election of the St. Lucia Labour Party in 1951 ended the political domination of the island by the “white” elite linked to large mercantile or sugar interests. In consequence, only small pockets of “whites” remained on the island following the decline of sugar and those that did tended to move towards commercial activities linked to North American or European business interests (De Albuquerque and McElroy 1999; Barrow 1992: 26-27).

Bananas grew to be of paramount importance because of their export role and also because of their role as a vehicle for social and economic change within St. Lucian society.

BANANAS AND EIGS

EIGs that were formed to support the interests of growers in this important sphere were able to negotiate with the government to improve conditions and also acted with other such associations in the Windward Islands. Banana Growers’ Associations are important to take note of here.

In St. Lucia one such association was formed by the government in the 1930s but in 1948 was privatised to become a CSO. In 1953 the Banana Growers’ Association, which was made up of growers operating on large, medium and small scales (though initially dominated by larger producers), evolved to become the St. Lucia Banana Growers’ Association (SLBGA). This association was based on equality between farmers of varying sizes and acted to politicise rural farmers. The SLBGA so politicised farmers that the United Workers Party (UWP) formed as a breakaway wing of this association and came into political power in 1964. The SLBGA was important in St. Lucia because it negotiated on the behalf of members for infrastructural and other improvements necessary to support this increasingly vital industry from the 1950s (St. Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005; Barrow 1992: 27). Therefore, the SLBGA emerged as a significant
EIG that interfaced with the domestic government. With the growth of the banana industry in the other Windward Islands, growers associations from across the region created the Windward Island Banana Growers’ Association (WINBAN) in 1958 (St. Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005).

Hence, these EIGs were important in mobilising on issues in member interests from the 1950s and would remain important into the 1990s on trade issues. The SLBGA, however ceased to be a CSO when it was once more was converted to a statutory body in 1967 and remained as such until 1998 when it was dissolved becoming a private company owned by all banana growers- renamed the St. Lucia Banana Corporation (SLBC)-(Government of St. Lucia 1999: 11). The involvement of Banana Associations as statutory bodies (as members of WINBAN) and the creation of WIBDECO as a corporation owned by governments and growers’ bodies (some private and some statutory) takes them out of the CSO category. However, other small farmers associations and farmers associations existed within CS in the Windward Islands and by 1982 these came together to form the Windward Island Farmers Association (WINFA) informally and then formally in 1987 (ACP-EU Civil Society Information Network, 2003).

In short, bananas have been an integral part of the economies in the Windward Islands, and more importantly for the purpose of this study, to St. Lucia. When this vital industry came under threat from the mid-1990s with changes to the EU’s banana regime and following the creation of the WTO, banana producers in St. Lucia and in the region saw their ability to export and eek out a living come under threat. As such they mobilised on international trade matters, domestically, regionally and internationally through WINFA, along with other organisations in the Windwards that were not CSOs (e.g. WINBAN and later WIBDECO)99. This mobilisation however was not aimed at shaping trade negotiating agendas; it occurred after the Uruguay Round negotiations, and after the governments of St. Lucia and other banana dependent states in the CARICOM region had agreed to the rules of the WTO.

99 Remember WINBAN was transformed into a strictly corporate entity comprising government and corporate collaboration and as such is not a CSO according to the classification used here.
OTHER EIGS

It is important to emphasise that the story of EIGs in St. Lucia is not all about bananas or agriculture. As noted previously, from the 1960s (as in much of the British Caribbean) St. Lucia attempted economic diversification. Specifically, attempts were made to develop tourism, industrial production (such as light manufacturing) and import substituting agricultural production -i.e. geared towards the domestic market (Caribbean Conservation Association 1991: 64; Barrow 1992: 11). However, the level of economic diversification was slow into the mid-1980s, likely because the economy was buoyed by good fortunes in the banana market, which made concentration on bananas very lucrative.

Even so, attempted diversification brought other EIGs into existence to speak to the needs of these private sector interests. The most significant of these EIGs in St. Lucia is perhaps the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, in existence since 1884 as the St. Lucia Agricultural and Commercial Society and with origins in the planter and commercial elites. Other EIGs include the St. Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association (SLHTA -est. 1968) and the St. Lucia Industrial and Small Business Association (SLISBA -est. 1989). Moreover, the labour movement and unions with roots in the 1930s are important EIGs, although unions lost much of their political clout with the rising importance of self-employment based on small farming in bananas from the 1960s (Barrow 1992: 27; O’ Loughlin 1968: 45).

These are the EIGs, besides those representing banana growers’ interests, which one would expect to become engaged on trade negotiating matters. Yet, what of other CSOs, the non-EIGs that surely have played important parts in development in St. Lucia? What role do these CSOs, representing groups of people who are not traders, play in shaping the approach to trade issues and how does this compare with the role that EIGs of various sorts play? Further, what mechanisms exist for CSO consultation on the trade negotiating agenda? These are the issues to be addressed more fully in Section 8.2.
8.2 CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS ON TRADE AND CSO ACTIVISM

EXISTING CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS

Despite the activism by WINFA and member organisations with respect to the banana dispute in the WTO, neither this occurrence nor the government “realisation” that CSOs needed to be consulted on trade issues has been translated into regularised mechanisms for consultation on trade issues. There is, however, an Inter-Ministerial Committee. This committee includes representatives from various government ministries such as External Affairs, Agriculture and Finance and consults with private sector representative associations on trade matters prior to important trade meetings. Following ministerial approval, proposals from meetings of the Inter-Ministerial Committee, which have become parts of St. Lucia’s trade positions, are fed into the OECS and then the CARICOM forums or bodies (MEA). This relatively limited avenue for consultation is the only one that exists and a formalised framework for national consultations on issues of domestic significance neither exists nor has been mooted.

Nonetheless, there is ministry level contact with stakeholders, such as between the SLHTA and the tourism ministry or between agricultural associations and the agriculture ministry (Andrena Simon interview: 16-09-04; Kerde Severin interview: 16-09-04). Such contact should allow for inputs from various CSOs to feed into decision-making on trade negotiating agendas as well as other issue areas, this though is not necessarily the case.

ENVISIONED MECHANISMS

Following the banana dispute in the WTO, the St. Lucian government made gestures to creating mechanisms for CSO consultation on trade issues prior to national

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100 The problem of limited coordination between ministries on trade issues will be discussed later when speaking of institutional constraints faced by the St. Lucia government.
trade positions being passed onto the OECS level or the CARICOM level. Brian Louisy, of the St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, spoke of the existence of these stated intentions on the side of the government but went on to express that these intimations never became reality. In making this point he articulated that the absence of consultative structures has hindered interaction between CSOs and the government on trade negotiating issues and has weakened the government’s ability to craft well informed positions. This is particularly so since the government’s proposed External Trade Council was not yet functioning, even though the government launched this twice as a vehicle to encourage involvement by CS actors (Brian Louisy interview: 17-09-04).

Speaking of attempts to create formalised mechanisms for consultation, a representative from the Ministry of External Affairs also noted the government’s intention to form the External Trade Council. This council would include CSO participation from private sector representative associations, the labour unions, church and other associations in consultation with government officials. This mechanism has been envisioned to inform decision-makers so they can come up with more “coherent trade policy” and at the same time “engage stakeholders” (MEA). However, as already noted, this framework has not yet become a reality.

Since the crisis in the banana industry ushered in a heightened focus on the service sector as a pivotal earner of foreign exchange and driver of the St. Lucian economy (as well as others in the region), a Coalition of Service Industries (CSI) was established in St. Lucia in March 2005 (RNM 2005).101 This organisation is a government organised NGO, sometimes called a GONGO or a QUANGO (quasi-NGO). This CSI is supposed to allow for a more informed approach to service negotiations in its function of coordinating views domestically, passing these views onto government representatives and then discussing the negotiating stances proposed for St. Lucia.

An interviewee from the Ministry of External Affairs spoke of the importance of organising this coalition, since the involvement of service providers in helping to shape

101 Such are to be implemented across CARICOM as stated prior; the first was created in Barbados in 2002.
negotiating positions has been limited. In this source’s view the limited activism from this sector has been a result of limited institutional capacity within the service sector to deal with trade issues (MEA). Andrena Simon spoke about the lack of capacity of the SLHTA when she opined that although the SLHTA meets with trade and tourism ministers, the Chamber of Commerce takes on most responsibility for discussions on trade issues because the SLHTA is not able to do so effectively (Andrena Simon interview: 16-09-04). The St. Lucian CSI is supposed to correct some of these institutional deficits in order to bring service stakeholders into consultations. However, as stated earlier, this GONGO is as yet not fully operational, as it has only recently been formed. Hence, the inclusion of EIGs from this important realm of the private sector has so far been very limited.

With respect to the intention of governments to include CSOs and the lack of formalised mechanisms for such, a representative (Joseph Goddard) from the National Worker’s Union emphasised that the involvement of unions has been limited even more than that of private sector associations. Goddard states that there “has been talk” about involving unions at the national level about issues such as the CSME and suggestions that unions play an increased role in the context of the EPAs under negotiation with the EU. However, Goddard went on to state that the focus has been on the private sector representative associations since these are viewed as representing the main trade interest groups. Trade unions, on the other hand, have not been accepted to the same extent because they are seen as less linked to trade (Joseph Goddard interview: 16-09-04). Goddard’s view confirms one of the assertions made throughout the case studies in this thesis: that a material interest based conception of which CSOs comprise the important stakeholders has informed official approaches to CSO consultations whether these have been regularised or remain sporadic. This point aside though, unions in the country have expressed interest in and have tried to get involved on their own initiative (Joseph Goddard interview: 16-08-04; MEA).
INCLUSION OF EIGS AND ACTIVISM BY EIGS

So far, this look into frameworks for the formalised inclusion of CSO in decision-making pertaining to trade negotiations has shown that frameworks or mechanisms for facilitating CSO inclusion are lacking in St. Lucia. Yet, where there is consultation between government representatives and CSOs, this has been focussed on primarily on EIGs, specifically private sector representative EIGs. This EIG focus is consistent with the other two case studies and also with a materialist conception of interests (discussed in chapter two) which, though it does not make assumptions about which groups governments will consult, informs government views on which CSOs comprise the focal stakeholders on trade matters. Once more it appears that EIGs are the CSOs that these processes are specifically geared towards. Indeed a representative form the Ministry of External Affairs stated that at the time (September 2004) associations from outside of the private sector were not involved in either formal or informal consultations between government officials and “non-state actors” that do occur, but went on to state that non-EIG consultations “will” occur when the External Trade Council is established (MEA).

It is notable that in St. Lucia, the activism of agricultural associations is more important than it is in the former two case studies (Trinidad and Tobago especially). Of note in particular is the regional umbrella association, WINFA, which mobilised both in St. Lucia and across the Windward Islands. WINFA’s activism and its inclusion by government officials can be attributed to the vital role that the bananas industry has played in the Windward economies (as highlighted previously in this chapter). The economic significance of the banana industry meant that banana growers were supported by governments in the Windward Islands in the face of trade issues that threatened both the interests of banana producers and the economic viability of banana producing countries in the region.

The placement of the SLBGA as a statutory body (that included both government officials and farmers) and the activism on this body, further shows that the government and farmers alike shared concerns over the fate of the banana trade. The same can be said of governments across the Windward Island banana producing countries since similar
arrangements existed in the other three Windward Islands and at the Windward Island sub-region level in the form of WINBAN. Hence, the concerns of EIGs representing banana farmers, such as WINFA and its members, were taken into consideration. Since banana farmers were listened and were of crucial economic significance, this shows that material factors were important in understanding farmer activism and in understanding government openness to consulting with their CSOs (notably WINFA).

However, consulting with CSOs has also been guided by ideas about the importance of this as a facet of good governance that, according to a representative of the Ministry of External Affairs in St. Lucia, has been emphasised in the late Lomé and post-Lomé EU-ACP trade contexts. This representative further stated that consultation with “stakeholders” on trade has become important because “globalisation” and increasing “trade liberalisation” have made such necessary (MEA- italicised words are direct quotations from this interviewee). One cannot state with any certainty that the ideational-material context was more important than were strictly material factors (the economic significance of the banana trade to governments and farmers). Certainly, most favouring materialist conceptions would see the latter as the most significant factor. Whichever was most important though, both were of salience and this is the significant point to heed here. It is important to acknowledge that both ideational and material factors are important for understanding government-CSO interaction on trade.

Threats to the banana industry were brought via EU reforms to the European banana import regime and then by the WTO dispute (both in the 1990s). Therefore, activism by banana farmers in response bears out materialist conceptions about mobilisation on trade and economic issues. However, this activism should not be separated from the context in which it was located. Banana farmer activism was certainly prompted by material changes in the trade arena and the concomitant effects on farmer earnings or “livelihoods”, in the words of Renwick Rose from WINFA (Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05). However, these changes in themselves were linked to an ideational shift towards neo-liberal policy thought. In this context, CSO activism was: in line with
material dictates but was also preaced by ideas and impacted on by the ideational-material context of the time.

So, ideas and material interests have informed the Government of St. Lucia’s stated “need” to include CSOs and the activism/desire for activism by CSOs on trade issues in the ideational-material context of the time (i.e. the importance liberalisation, globalisation and a focus on governance).

Institutional considerations must be heeded too. Farmers’ associations across the region mobilised jointly via WINFA in the face of this crisis in the banana industry. This cooperation occurred because the constituent associations did not individually have the institutional ability to be able to address their concerns over trade issues in meaningful and well-informed ways (Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05).

The importance of such CSOs and the rationales behind their activism aside, the fact remains that the formalised channels or institutionalised mechanisms allowing for consultations between EIGs of any sort and trade officials are lacking (UNDP January 2000). In this regard, the case of St. Lucia is dissimilar to those of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. There are no systematised mechanisms that regularise government consultation with CSOs, not even of the CSOs that government officials see as important stakeholders on trade matters. Institutionalised consultative channels on trade negotiating matters with business/private sector representative associations do not exist (Brian Louisy interview: 17 -09-04) and the same can be said of consultations between trade officials and labour unions as expressed by Joseph Goddard of the NWU. 102

This partial inclusion of EIGs is both because there are few formal channels for inclusion on the government side, but in part because of the lack of institutional capacity of CSOs (including EIGs) to actively attempt to insert themselves more fully in trade

102 However, the case of the labour movement in St. Lucia must be qualified by the history of unions having relatively weak pull in the island as the emphasis on self-employment grew with the banana industry based on peasant agriculture (previously noted).
matters. Hence, institutional factors are important in understanding the limited involvement of CSOs in this case.

Unlike in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, even the more prominent private sector representative associations lack the staffing and financial resources to allow them to conduct adequate research or to aptly insert themselves in domestic discussions on trade issues up for negotiation in various forums. This is made clear by Kerde Severin from the Agriculturalists’ Association who stated that there is a need to create a free-standing Chamber of Agriculture to build better capacity amongst agricultural producers to conduct research and advocate in a unified way on issues of concern to agricultural producers with reference to trade (Kerde Severin interview: 16-09-04). Additionally a representative from the Ministry of External Affairs speaks to the capacity constraints of private sector actors who “…would love to become involved but have limited resources that limit their ability” (MEA). The president of the SLISBA also highlighted this institutional deficit in an August 1999 newspaper article in which he expressed the need for more funding to establish a secretariat that would enable the association to fulfil its mandate (St. Lucia Online 1999). Institutional problems faced by private sector associations were reiterated by Louisy of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture too- although Louisy champions his institution for attempting to fill this gap - (Brian Louisy interview: 17-09-2004). In this respect, EIGs in St. Lucia are like the non-EIGs in the two prior case studies (and in St. Lucia too) that would like to be included more but cannot effectively advocate due to internal institutional constraints.

Therefore, a material interest-based logic alone does not explain limited activism in this case. Instead, institutional factors take one further in understanding how CSOs have/have not mobilised and have/have not been consulted involvement of CSOs. The lack of mechanisms that facilitate and systematise inclusion speaks to institutional factors that limit participation in St. Lucia and also in other CARICOM countries. This is true even of the EIGs that wield more economic power -as producers of employment and earners of foreign exchange- than non-EIGs.
Malcolm Spence from the RNM sheds light on this institutional capacity problem linking it to population considerations when discussing the differences between CSO involvements across countries in the region. Spence stated that CSOs have been more engaged when it comes to trade “in the larger economies” (such as the cases of Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados) due to the existence of “more critical mass” and “more people who can spend the time and take the energy to pursue the issues with officials”. The difference in terms of CSO participation in shaping the character of trade negotiating agendas between larger, or more advanced economies in CARICOM (as via the Eastern Caribbean cases discussed in this thesis), and smaller or less advanced economies (i.e. this case study), is partly because of institutional factors. Although ideas and the ideational-context may prompt CSOs to want to mobilise more and although material interests being affected has led to mobilisation of EIGs on trade issues; engagement levels have been affected by institutional factors. This has meant that in St. Lucia, where EIGs tend to face similar institutional constraints to action as non-EIGs, there appears to be more cooperation between EIGs and non-EIGs to build capacity and engage with the government on trade issues.

INCLUSION OF NON-EIGS AND COOPERATION WITH EIGS

In St. Lucia an NWCT exists under the auspices of the CPDC. However, unlike the NWCT in Trinidad and Tobago this working committee comprises representatives from an array of private sector associations (e.g. the St. Lucia Vendors Association, the St. Lucia Industrial and Small Business Association and the St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture) in addition to labour unions and an array of non-EIGs (e.g. CSOs representing women, the disabled, churches). Here, CSOs that one would expect to have very different interests and originating from both the EIG and non-EIG categories attempt to work together “…to influence the negotiating positions of policy makers in trade negotiations” (unpublished document CPDC 2004). All of these associations feel the need to work together to pool capacity and engage with the St. Lucian government and the OECS machinery on trade issues.

103 Note that although Barbados is smaller in area than St. Lucia it has a larger population base.
There are both non-EIGs and EIGs that are aware of the fact that there are trade issues under negotiation that will have effects on the economy and society in St. Lucia. Indeed, all CSO representatives interviewed or contacted had at least general policy proposals to offer or concerns they wished to express relating to trade negotiations. Some of the concerns raised related to fair trade, labour standards, gender issues, the need for special and differential treatment and the necessity of food security. Their attempts at activism are informed not only by the possession of material concerns about trade, but also by ideas about trade liberalisation and about CSO mobilisation. The idea that CSOs of all sorts are important stakeholders with vital contributions to make on trade negotiating agendas as required for the purposes of good governance and as needed in light of globalising and liberalising trends is paramount.

This ideational factor is intangible and it is therefore difficult to measure the degree to which it is influential in informing activism on trade or other issues. However, one cannot help but pick up this sentiment in communication with CSO representatives. This is especially evident in their focus on educational work that attempts to engage wider CS on trade issues and is driven by the view that such popular involvement is vital.

Protests were led by CAFRA St. Lucia and the CPDC on 30 September 2005 and included a wide array of CSOs from St. Lucia and across the region. These protests illustrated that ideas and material interests have been important in propelling CSO mobilisation. CSO representatives spoke of the impacts of globalisation and neo-liberal trade policies. They bore placards and spoke to what they saw as problematic about globalisation and trade liberalisation. These groups spoke to the necessity of governments engaging with CSOs and to the importance of CSO activism in efforts to impact on the content of trade agreements (Alfred 2005; Verwer 2005). The words of one protester sum up the point that CSO activism is not only linked to the material interests of those that trade but to wider society:
“It affects not only the farmers, everybody. The small man, the baby that just born, every one of us,” (Alice Francis quoted in Alfred 2005)

St. Lucian non-EIGs that focus on trade were extremely difficult to interview or to correspond with. Their limited numbers in terms of staff and the concentration of work in the hands of a few individuals meant that little direct feedback was gained from these representatives. However, the few conversations that were possible, specifically with staff members at CAFRA St. Lucia, were useful for confirming the assertion that institutional capacity hinders the ability of non-EIGs to mobilise effectively and continually on trade matters. These discussions also revealed, as consistent with the messages at the demonstrations on 30 September 2005, that ideas about trade arrangements and societal inclusion are a critical forces motivating the joint activism of CSOs to address trade agreements. In particular, the sentiments represented in these protests exemplify efforts at bringing a more socially oriented focus into trade talks that have been dominated by a neo-liberal agenda and of efforts to enhance CSO consultation on issues that affect people’s lives.

The lack of institutional capacity to effectively become involved in influencing trade negotiations has meant that activism on trade issues has not been continual despite desires to mobilise on trade and to impact on the agenda of the St. Lucian government. The NWCT in St. Lucia attempts to make up for this deficit.

GOVERNMENT CAPACITY AND CSO INCLUSION

Added to capacity constraints within CSOs are the lack of formalised mechanisms and practices on the side of the Government of St. Lucia. St. Lucia is an important case here because, unlike the more economically diversified economies or the more export oriented CARICOM countries (Jamaica, Barbados, the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago notably), capacity constrains not only CSO involvement on trade issues but also the government from actualising its desires to refashion the ways in which it operates. Such problems pertain to the countries with better ability and where there is more formalised consultation, but the capacity constraints are more marked in some of the LDCs such as
Inadequate staffing in the Ministries of Trade and Industry and Ministries of Legal Affairs is a serious problem. Usually, one senior is responsible for managing and directing as well as attending technical meetings on behalf of the Ministry. Travel fatigue is obvious. The annual budgets of these ministries to support their work programmes are small and inadequate. (Yankey 1996: 4)

This problem was also made clear in the case of St. Lucia via the government’s report in the “Trade Policy Review: St. Lucia”: “The Trade and Legal Division comprises two officers who are charged with the responsibility of undertaking all international trade matters” (WTO 2002: 68). Field visits to St. Lucia confirmed this assertion. Moreover, attempting to interview a second source at the Ministry of External Affairs in St. Lucia was impossible since one individual was largely responsible for trade matters. This situation further reinforces the point that the institutional capacity to broaden consultation on trade in a meaningful way is severely lacking in St. Lucia.

In addition to staffing constraints within the trade ministry in St. Lucia there are also problems of coordination between ministries. For instance report by OECS Trade Policy Project (“Report on Organisation and Functionality Assessment”) stated that there is a: “need for co-ordination at the national level, that is, improved co-ordination among the lead Ministries and between public and private sector agencies” (cited in WTO 2002, 68). This lack of coordination between various government ministries is significant as it can mean that trade negotiating positions that are put forth may be disjointed and disconnected from the needs of the stakeholders that do interact with ministries outside of the external affairs ministry. What is more, if there are not institutionalised mechanisms to coordinate consultation between the government’s ministries, it is difficult to fathom that there would be any with respect to consultation between the ministry that coordinates the trade negotiating agenda and CSOs that desire to be consulted.
This information illustrates just how difficult it is to assess consultative mechanisms on trade in St. Lucia. The same is true for other OECS countries that also lack the institutional wherewithal to deal with the issues up for negotiation in various negotiating theatres. For example in the 2002 WTO Trade Policy Review for St. Vincent and the Grenadines, this government notes that there were only eight staff in the country’s Trade Department and that as such “immediate and comprehensive responses from St. Vincent and the Grenadines in honouring its WTO commitments is severely constrained by inherent financial, technical, institutional and human limitations.” (WTO 2002: 57). Therefore, institutional factors are important, not just on the side of various CSOs that have limited capacity to engage with government, but also on the part of the St. Lucian Government and other similarly strapped governments in the region that are struggling with institutional capacity problems. Indeed institutional problems limit all CARICOM countries and these shared institutional weaknesses underlie the region’s championing of special and differential treatment, other exceptions to trade rules, and advocating for recognition of the problems and hurdles faced by small island developing states (SIDS) within the multilateral trading system.

CONCLUDING FOR ST. LUCIA

The case of St. Lucia is illustrative of the diversity in terms of CSO activism and inclusion in consultation on trade negotiating matters in the CARICOM region. In this case there is no national consultative framework and only limited institutionalised consultation on trade negotiating issues. However, the informal or sporadic consultations that exist seem to focus on EIGs that one would expect to have material interests in trade liberalisation matters. This stated, since the consultation is not formalised, it is difficult to state this with great certainty. With respect to agricultural trade issues though, there is a history of approximately a decade of consultation with CSOs representing banana producers at the domestic level, within the Windward Island context and at the level of the OECS institution, particularly through the work of WINFA. WINFA is notable here because of the pooled capacity that has enabled this CSO to have voice and also because
the banana industry has been a vital organ of the Windward Island economies. This has earned WINFA and its member associations the ability to be heard and consulted by the St. Lucian government on trade issues, particularly in the sphere of agriculture.

Also noteworthy in the case of St. Lucia is that both activism by CSOs and inclusion of CSOs in consultations on trade matters by government bodies are restricted by institutional deficits. The government faces resource constraints that limit the ability to negotiate effectively, far less to take the time and effort to incorporate actors beyond government officials. Additionally, even EIGs in this country are much more resource constrained than in the other two case studies observed. As a result, EIGs and non-EIGs tend to work together, as seen in the St. Lucian NWCT. It is evident that the institutional factor in St. Lucia cannot be underestimated in accounting for patterns of consultation on trade matters up for negotiation.

Similarly, material interest-based factors cannot be underestimated here or in any evaluation of CSO activism and government inclusion of CSOs in consultations surrounding trade issues. Specifically, CSO activism on trade issues in St. Lucia began in noticeable ways in light of material changes to the country’s trading arrangements. CSOs mobilised and governments liaised with pertinent CSOs in efforts to deal with changes in the trade arena. Despite the efficacy of the material and institutional factors though, one should not forget ideational factors. Specifically one must remember the prevalence of the idea that it is important to include CSOs in consultation on trade matters (e.g. held by CSO within the NWCT, and alluded to in the official discourse of the government). One must also consider CSOs’ interest perceptions: they came to see themselves as having a right to mobilise in line with the trend towards good governance and as needing to mobilise on trade because of changes in the direction of liberalisation and globalisation. In other words, the ideational-material context of the time played into CSO perceptions of their interests and into CSO views about the importance of activism on trade matters.

So, although we see a case in which consultations are informal and in which the mechanisms to facilitate such on both the government side and on the side of CSOs are
limited, the ideational-material context of the time and institutional based factors are still important to consider in understanding this.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

This thesis has highlighted that CARICOM countries have long been highly exposed to trade and consequently, changes in trade openness from the mid-1990s cannot (by themselves) account for CSO mobilisation on trade issues from this time. Changes in trade openness also cannot account for CSO consultative spaces being created by governments. Hence, one has to look at other factors and these factors include: ideational-material trends of the time; groups’ ideas and interests in light of these trends; and institutional facilitating factors. Even EIG activism cannot be understood simply by looking at interests. Instead, one should look at how EIGs came to perceive their interests in the context of the time and at the institutional factors that have facilitated their activism and inclusion in consultations.

The country case studies and the CARICOM case have shown that space has been opened for the inclusion of CSOs in consultations on policy issues from the mid/late-1990s. This CSO inclusion became particularly marked by the first few years of the 21st century (the time of writing this thesis). CSOs within the CARICOM region have broken out of the mould of thought that privileges state-centric and technocratic decision-making to see themselves as important “stakeholders” on many issues. This view of CSO activism is in some respects akin to the Gramscian notion of forming counter-hegemonic blocs, but is based on interest perceptions and institutional considerations rather than class interests. Specifically, CSOs need to perceive themselves as having interests or needing to act on a policy area in order for activism to materialise and they also need to create the necessary institutional mechanisms to facilitate this. Important in this regard are ideas that inform views about what groups’ interests are, and these ideas are impacted on by the international ideational-material context of the time.

The case studies have also shown that patterns of CSO mobilisation and inclusion have not been uniform, even though mobilisation and inclusion emerged from the 1990s
where none existed previously. For instance, EIGs and non-EIGs have been included differently and have mobilised to different extents in the region. EIGs (especially private sector EIGs) tend to be the focal groups included on trade matters and the best able to mobilise on trade issues. Material, ideational and institutional influences have impacted on differences between non-EIGs and EIG activism and insertion in trade matters at both the national and regional levels. However, the regional case shows that resource pooling has assisted non-EIGs in dealing with some of the hurdles that have limited their mobilisation and inclusion at domestic levels.

Nonetheless, the status quo has not been reversed because CSOs have mobilised or because domestic/regional officials have begun to better incorporate CSOs in consultative mechanisms on trade. It appears that CSOs representing groups that were traditionally influential (prominent private sector and labour) remain so, a factor that in part is a reflection of the history of the region. One must, therefore, acknowledge that the legacy of the region has also impacted on the way in which CSOs have come to be consulted. Things also remain the same because government and regional officials remain the decision-makers in the final analysis. These officials sit at negotiating tables with other state officials and they do the negotiating. This is consistent with the history of CARICOM and its members and indeed with international politics, which tends to be based on the Westphalian system.

Before considering the implications of these final thoughts it is perhaps good idea to look back at the road that this thesis took to get us here.

THE FOUNDATIONS

This study began by laying a foundation in explaining the terms Civil Society (CS) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), by looking at their historical contexts and by exploring their contemporary meanings. Then CSOs were separated into two quite broad categories that, though somewhat artificial, were employed for the purpose of
clarity in looking at activism and inclusion in consultation and decision-making on economic issues of international scope. Dividing CSOs into EIGs and non-EIGs helped to illustrate the way in which literature on international economic issues views activism of EIGs as stemming from their direct interests being threatened and is, thus, grounded in material interest-based assumptions about collective action. However, with the growth in non-EIG activism on economic issues (such as on trade negotiating issues) it appears that something else must be driving CSO mobilisation as well as the inclusion of non-EIGs by government officials and officials in international organisations. This thesis therefore proceeded to argue that factors besides material ones must help one to account for this mobilisation. These factors are: temporally located changes/factors, ideas, interests and institutions.

Temporal considerations are relevant since a movement towards CSO activism on international trade and economic issues both domestically and particularly internationally became more pronounced from the 1990s with liberalisation in economic affairs, with a shift towards emphasising “good governance” (with the rising proliferation and importance of NGOs), and with globalisation.

Institutional factors can in some respects be linked to material factors that are important in interest-based assumptions: interest groups that are threatened and are able to overcome certain obstacles that hinder action and to create associations or coalitions to act in defence of the group’s direct interests. The creation of institutional frameworks is important. This institutional aspect can help one to understand non-EIG mobilisation on international economic issues as these associations need to gather the funding and human resource capacities to undertake specialised action on a range of issues. Thus, non-EIGs with what some may see as peripheral interests in international trade issues have come to mobilise on these issues. However, when one considers that material interests are created and that ideas are important in creating them, the interests of non-EIGs need not be seen as peripheral.
Some non-EIGs have come to perceive of their interests as directly affected by trade negotiations and necessitating activism. The same assertion, based on ideas constituting interests, can also be applied to EIG activism on trade in the region from the 1990s to the present. Even EIGs have to first perceive themselves as needing to mobilise on trade issues in order to shape institutions, which in turn make this action possible. These perceptions of EIGs may be based on an instrumental logic, but still are at least partially ideational.

Institutional considerations are also important on the side of official channels, be they international organisations, governments or other negotiating structures. The opening of space and channels for consultation or inclusion of CSOs is also important to look at. Mechanisms that have been created or facilitated by officials can allow for CSO consultation and by extension create the possibility for CSO views and concerns to be of impact on official actions.

As already alluded to, in understanding activism and inclusion ideas-based factors are necessary to consider in addition. The impact of the idea that CSOs have roles to play in governance is important to note, both on the CSO and on the government/official side. Although EIGs may be viewed in some camps as the favoured CSOs with roles to play in international economic decision-making, non-EIGs have come to make room for themselves based on the idea that other CSOs have important roles to play in such spheres. Put differently, non-EIGs have framed their interests in trade based on ideas that link a wide array of concerns (development, gender, environment, etc.) to trade agendas. This is particularly the case in light of the various challenges and opportunities faced with liberalisation in the international economic arena and globalisation. The penetration of these ideas can be linked to CSO attempts at creating institutional strength to address trade issues.

Hence, **material, ideational and institutional factors** all need to be considered in attempting to understand CSO mobilisation and consultation, instead of only looking at interest-based assumptions that see interests as pre-existing, pre-defined and triggering
automatic or near automatic reactions. These considerations are not just important for understanding the situation within CARICOM but because they highlight that actions are not determined by material changes alone. Ideas shape material changes; thus the focus throughout this thesis on the relevance of considering temporally located ideational-material contexts.

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

The thesis proceeded to focus on CARICOM, to highlight a history of CSO formation and activism from emancipation. This history illustrated that up until the 1990s, CSO mobilisation on issues of international significance, be they economic or otherwise, was rather limited. Looking at domestic and regional settings, there appears to have been mobilisation of political associations, labour organisations, private sector associations and agricultural associations on various political and economic issues of domestic importance. The activism at the regional and domestic levels though tended to revolve around labour and private sector associations. This notwithstanding, most affairs in this region, even with the independence movements of the 1960s and 1970s, were relatively tightly controlled by bureaucrats and governments in power so that most CSO consultation was sporadic and limited.

The case of trade agreements negotiated from the 1970s aptly shows this point. Trade agreements agreed from the 1970s through to the early 1990s were negotiated without CSO activism on such matters and without government/bureaucratic efforts to consult with CSOs. However, by the late 1990s we see a movement towards emphasising the need to consult with CSOs in the language of CARICOM officials and also in the practices of CARICOM with respect to trade and other issues. In tandem we also see the activism of CSOs, including non-EIGs. These changes in the 1990s can be linked to more than just material factors or material interests being affected. Institutional factors, ideational factors and material interests, all located in the time-specific ideational-
material atmosphere help us to understand activism and movements towards CSO inclusion from the 1990s in CARICOM.

THE CASES

Moving beyond the historical and beyond theorising about the context in which CSO activism and inclusion of CSOs in the CARICOM region developed, the thesis looked at the CARICOM level and three CARICOM country case studies. It explored CSO activism and inclusion on shaping trade negotiating agendas and patterns of CSO inclusion and activism (EIGs and non-EIGs).

In Barbados we saw the introduction of a social partnership that opened space for CSOs in consultations on issues of national salience in a tripartite framework (labour, private sector/employers, government). This occurred in the context of an SAP being created for the country. This consultative framework at the national level was slow to include other CSOs, but is important to consider when looking at consultations on trade because the partnership has been mainstreamed into government ministries. It is not coincidental that this is viewed as an example of “good governance” either. Consulting with social partners on trade though also coincided with the ideational-material trends of trade liberalisation and globalisation. In light of these changes, private sector EIGs have united in the country under the PSTT to create appropriate institutions (from the 1990s) through which they make inputs that government officials value. As for non-EIGs, these are not consulted via official channels but attempt to mobilise and to seek inclusion. The activism of non-EIGs, however, is limited mostly to awareness raising and emphasising discourses that focus on the importance of involving “ordinary” people. Important factors that constrict the mobilisation of non-EIGs at the domestic level are institutional, specifically staffing, funding and other resource constraints.

In Trinidad and Tobago, again consultation on the trade agenda focuses on EIGs. Consultative mechanisms were created without the inclusion of other CSOs in mind, thus
not in any way mobilising non-EIGs. However, these consultations and their EIG focus has not been guided by any sort of social partnership created in the wake of SAPs. The ideational-material trends that led to domestic liberalisation and international trade liberalisation are more important to consider in understanding the activism of EIGs and government consultations with CSOs in the country. These trends were also important to non-EIGs in the country that have attempted to mobilise on trade issues via an NWCT and have also evoked the norm of “good governance” in efforts to be consulted on trade matters. Nevertheless, and as in Barbados, even though non-EIGs view themselves as having interests that need to be addressed in trade consultations, they for the most part lack the institutional capacity to do so and to be included to a degree similar to EIGs.

In St. Lucia, we see a case that differs more than the previous two because capacity is limited all around. There are proposed consultative mechanisms and also government efforts to mobilise CSOs on trade issues. Where there have been consultations, private sector EIGs have been the focus, and the banana industry (particularly via WINFA) has had the ear of government too. Non-EIGs have mobilised on trade in St. Lucia via an NWCT, but in this case the NWCT encompasses and cooperates with private sector groups (e.g. the local Chamber of Commerce). Hence, the NWCT provides a platform for activism for a wide array of CSOs where little such exists otherwise. In addition to both EIGs and non-EIGs lacking the institutional wherewithal to mobilise meaningfully in St. Lucia, avenues for inclusion are limited due to deficits in institutional capacity on the side of the government ministry responsible for trade. Inclusion and activism in this country is therefore more limited than in the Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago. All the same, activism and the leaning towards inclusion became important in the 1990s in St. Lucia with the ideational-material shifts towards liberalisation, globalisation and good governance, just as was the case in the other case studies highlighted.

This investigation into CSO activism and inclusion in discussions of trade negotiating strategies in three countries in the region has shown that understanding this is a complex issue and that there are no easily generalisable rules applicable to the region.
This is perhaps the case when looking at any set of diverse countries, whether or not they have similar historical backgrounds, political and economic ties or regional location.

What the study has shown though, is that the trend towards or emphasis on including CSOs in such processes cannot be separated from occurrences at the international level, specifically the focus on internal economic and external trade liberalisation, linked globalisation and an emphasis on governance issues. These have percolated into the CARICOM context as the three case studies and the regional case indicate. Other examples of a CSO-consultative forum emerging in the region can be seen in the OECS sub-regional setting, and in national consultative mechanisms established in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada and Jamaica, to name but a few examples (Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05; Gleaner 2002a; Gleaner 2002b; BBC Monitoring 2002). These movements towards including CSOs in consultations and towards enhanced CSO activism are time-specific actualisations.

The country cases also showed that in looking at CSOs, EIGs (especially those representing private sector members) are better included and more pointedly active in shaping trade negotiation stances. However, EIG activism did not mean that non-EIGs were not attempting to insert themselves in shaping trade-negotiating agendas since there also exists a desire among other CSOs to become more involved in consultative processes based on the idea that they have important roles to play. Nevertheless, at the domestic level non-EIGs interested in activism on trade issues tend to lack the institutional capacity to do so meaningfully.

The cases examined further showed that where institutionalised or formalised consultative mechanisms exist more inclusion of CSOs (even if these are mostly EIGs) exists. Institutions are thereby important. However the ability to engage CSOs or to implement such consultative frameworks has something to do with institutional capacity within states. Not only is capacity important in understanding the mobilisation of various CSOs around trade issues, it is also important in understanding state responsiveness to CSO concerns.
At the regional level where CSOs unite though, non-EIGs that tend to have little voice at domestic levels have amplified their voices. These regional umbrella non-EIGs and non-EIG networks have helped to encourage mobilisation both at the region level and also within individual countries (for instance via NWCTs). The institutional capacity built by acting together regionally is important in allowing the non-EIGs that see themselves as having interests in trade issues to advance these. These non-EIGs have been included within CARICOM and the RNM, in addition to regional umbrella EIGs. Once more, the 1990s and the concomitant ideational-material trends of the time marked the turning point for CSOs activism and also for CARICOM in its overtures to CSO inclusion.

In addition to ideational factors being important in comprehending attempts at CSO activism on trade issues, ideas are important in understanding government inclusion of some CSOs over others too. Perceptions that partly stem from the interest based assumption about which CSOs would likely have stakes in matters up for trade negotiations (i.e. those that trade), colour patterns of inclusion by government officials. This has meant that non-EIGs are not primarily considered when it comes to consultations on trade issues, even if non-EIGs view themselves as “stakeholders” on trade matters and even where governments have expressed commitments to broad based consultation. It may be fair to say that some non-EIGs will never see themselves as having interests in engaging in issues relating to trade and that the government/official bias towards including EIGs rather than non-EIGs responds to this logic. However, this material-interest based logic is only relevant because it is based on premises that are seen as valid. Non-EIGs should not be excluded or discounted altogether based on these notions, since at least some important non-EIGs view themselves as having interests affected by trade negotiations.

Moreover, with the acceptance of the idea that non-EIGs can contribute to the formulation and the legitimisation of trade stances to make them both more economically or more socially acceptable, officials in the region have come to consider non-EIGs
alongside EIGs in consultations. This non-EIG inclusion may illustrate the instrumental use of the idea of “good governance” since the aim is to utilise information, knowledge and ideas developed and put forth by a wide array of CSOs. Nonetheless, the idea that it is important to include a relatively broad range of CSOs for governance purposes is still an important guiding notion. At the CARICOM level, although one gets the sense there is still a focus more heavily on EIGs, the idea that a variety of CSOs should be consulted seems to have been recognised. This is reflected notably by the RNM with its role of helping to formulate the trade negotiating agenda. Moreover, there seems to be better coordination and activism of non-EIGs (and EIGs of less dominance) at the regional level, which facilitates the incorporation of these CSOs in addition to the more active EIGs that one would expect to mobilise.

SO WHAT?

So what are the implications of the findings presented here in terms of the study of International Relations and International Political Economy?

Since CARICOM countries are relatively powerless on the international scale they are very susceptible to having their desires chipped away at in negotiations. They are neither politically significant in terms of world politics nor economically significant in terms of trade. Therefore, whether CSOs are consulted or whether or not EIGs are included at the expense of non-EIGs, the region’s negotiation proposals will likely be whittled away in the processes of inter-state bargaining. Therefore, in the grand scheme of things, it is likely that undertaking the task of consulting with CSOs when crafting negotiating positions may have very little impact on a negotiated agreement.

This point aside though, listening to CSO inputs in trade negotiating proposals can be important in raising awareness of negotiators, or put differently, in decreasing the disconnect between government/regional officials and the societies they represent. What is more, there is more possibility that socially acceptable positions will be codified in
trade agreements negotiated between CARICOM and other countries if CSO views of all sorts are included in negotiating positions put forth by CARICOM than if such are excluded altogether. The potential to change things exists when processes change and processes have been changing in the CARICOM region, even if slowly and even if unevenly across the region.

As an optimist, I hope that CSO consultation, attempts to consult with CSOs and efforts to institutionalise consultation are genuine at both the domestic and regional levels. On a similar note, I hope, and indeed the CSOs hope, that their research, advocacy and attempts at shaping trade agendas will be heeded at least to some degree. The inclusion of some CSOs (even if dominated by EIGs at present) in trade missions in an advisory capacity speaks to CSOs potentially having some impact in shaping negotiating agendas in the region. In the end though, the degree to which negotiations reflect the consultative processes that occur at the national and regional levels is uncertain and this is no doubt an area worthy of further research. However, continued processes of consultation and opening space for CSOs and CSO activism keep the hope that consultation will impact trade agendas alive.

It is also worth noting here that the connections between domestic, regional and trans-national CSOs/networks (both of EIGs and non-EIGs) mean that CSO activism in the region is not restricted to CARICOM confines. Examples of the connections between CARICOM CSOs and those of transnational reach are not difficult to find. For instance CAFRA and the CGTN are part of the International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN). These two CARICOM CSOs also authorised and supported the “Joint Statement of NGOs and Social Movements” in which “International Civil Society Rejects WTO Doha Outcome and the WTO’s Manipulative Process” (TWN 2002). This thesis also highlighted the links between CSOs such as WINFA and the CPDC with the OXFAM group of NGOs. Another example of CARICOM CSO involvement with CSOs of wider remit is the membership of some Caribbean chambers of commerce (such as the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Commerce) in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) via the ICC Caribbean, which makes policy recommendations on international trade (ICC
These examples of the links between CSOs in CARICOM and those with transnational reach open further potentials for CSO activism in the region. Therefore, even if CSO concerns of are not incorporated in domestic/regional positions CSO involvement in the advocacy of larger associations or networks allows them the potential to be of some impact on trade matters through transnational CSO action.

To close this thesis some final thoughts are worth consideration and emphasis. Activism by CSOs of all sorts and CSO engagement with domestic and regional officials are important actions because they open the potential for CSOs to impact on trade negotiating agendas. Specifically, CSO activism domestically, regionally and internationally and CSO inclusion in consultations with officials are actions that can alter the perceptions held by officials in the region and beyond. Moreover, CSO mobilisation on trade matters can function to raise awareness within the CARICOM societies about trade negotiations that will inevitably impact the region. Surely, this educational and empowering role is of great worth even if there is more inclusion of some CSO inputs than others, even if there is only limited inclusion of CSO positions, and even if negotiators in the end determine what is codified in trade agreements.

The ability for CSO activism and inclusion to alter official views and to educate people are important potentials to ponder in the study of international relations and international political economy. This is particularly the case since the study of international political and economic affairs has tended to favour big issues and high politics, as reflected in the often biased focus on America, Europe or major issues or conflicts. However, at the “lower” levels, communities, societies, countries and regions of all sizes are connected to international affairs which, in my opinion, means that empowering people within CS to understand international occurrences and to choose whether or not to mobilise on international affairs is invaluable.
APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX A - A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TERM CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN THOUGHT

The term CS has a long history in Western thought but has been adopted around the world over time. Although Western conceptions of CS are not universally accepted, these are most influential in the CARICOM region and in the mainstream of international politics. Therefore, this history of CS discourse in European thought is the focus here.

The Emergence of “Civil Society” Language

As stated in Chapter 1, Plato’s and then Aristotle’s “Politike Koinonia” was an early predecessor of “civil society, which delineated a political society or community comprising plural forms of association (koinonia) of civilised (not barbaric) individuals and groups acting in a unified way: a community of societies. Within this sort of society people had a single set of goals derived from common norms and values (ethos) (Cohen and Arato 1992: 84-85; Colás 2002: 27; Ehrenberg 1999: xi). In this conception there was no separation of society and Polis, instead the various forms of societal organisation (mainly communities) are united with government through morals and ethics.

It is thought that the revival of monarchical autonomy and public law in Europe and the corresponding separation of prince and land/people contributed to the evolution of the CS-state divide (Cohen and Arato 1992: 86; Ehrenberg 1999: xii). Absolutism with its separation of princely authority from the many power holders in feudalism further reinforced the trend (Cohen and Arato 1992: 86). Thus, the separation of state and society in Western European history continued from the late Middle Ages through the Renaissance and into the eighteenth century and came to be reflected in a shift away from seeing CS as one with political rule.
Civil Society and Enlightenment Thought

Political Philosophers recognised and contributed to this shift. Hobbes and Locke continued along the more traditional vein by identifying the modern state with civil/political society where society is fused with the state, but diverged in that this fusion did not occur naturally but via a social contract between state and society. Hobbes held that CS authorises the state to exercise power over society to decrease the risk of violence and chaos present in the natural condition (Cohen and Arato 1992: 87; Gauthier 1999: 59; Hampton 1999: 43). Locke viewed the contract as one in which political/civil society is distinguished from the state (“society” and “government”) but the two agree to act “…one political society” (Locke cited in Cohen and Arato 1992: 88).

In France, Montesquieu’s view was based on two social contracts that related to the Roman law distinctions between civil law and political law: laws relating to members of society and those dealing with the relationship between the governors and the governed. CS for Montesquieu was hierarchical (hierarchy based on merit rather than birth), which differs from Locke’s view of CS as comprising equals by virtue of natural law. (Cohen and Arato 1992: 88-89).

These trends of thought show the philosophical shift towards viewing CS as separate from the state and also that, from a sociological vantage point, CS came to be seen as based on rational individual decisions rather than on the natural unity of interests, norms or values between non-barbaric society and state (Colás 2002: 31). Other views also flourished during the eighteenth century that linked CS to universal individual equality and freedom (not simply to contract).

Rousseau for instance held the idea that CS was a social creation, brought about by the institution of private property (Colás 2002: 30, 31). Rousseau’s was a notion of natural law based on universal individuals as rights holders and agents of moral conscience. This equality based view, combined with anti-absolutism in Montesquieu and opposition to privilege in Voltaire and could be seen in societal opposition to the state
grew in French salons, coffeehouses and clubs. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the French revolution were also expressions of this philosophy which, along with various bills of rights in America, set societies based on equality between individuals in opposition to governments and constitutional states with ‘civil societies’ as the only sources of legitimacy (Cohen and Arato 1992: 89,92). In Germany Kant, Fichte and others also thought along similar lines of viewing CS as universal and based on the rule of law (Cohen and Arato 1992: 90-91).

In Britain a slightly different basis for rights and the separation of CS and state emerged. Thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment added a new dimension: “civilised society” which came to mean the material and economic organisation of society separate from the state, rather than CS as strictly a form of political organisation (Cohen and Arato 1992: 90). For writers such as Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith CS was the emergence from “rude” to “polished” society through ownership of property, the division of labour and the exchange of commodities. CS was associated with a capitalist market society; it was a bourgeois thing created out of self-interest (Colás 2002: 37, 38; Ehrenberg 1999: xiii). This introduced the economy into CS (absent in the Aristotelian conception) and allowed for the reduction of CS to economic society (Cohen and Arato 1992: 90) and also for Marxist disregard for CS as a thing of the bourgeoisie.

CS Beyond the 18th Century

Beyond the 18th century were thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, Parsons, Gramsci and Tocqueville who presented discussions on CS. Hegel asserted that CS is the dialectical struggle between ethical life (sittlichkeit) and non-ethical life (antisittlichkeit) that occurs in various forms of association. Associations are necessary because in modern society the family is no longer the primary source of moral life. (Cohen and Arato 1992: 92-113; Colás 2002: 39-41). CS is separate from the state but CS representatives have important roles to play in being governed. Therefore, CS is not sharply separated from the state; the duties of the state and those of CS tend to overlap so that the state conducts some private

Marx stressed the atomistic and dehumanising aspects of CS and that social organisation reflects economic relations, rather than a system of needs as Hegel asserted. Thus, CS tends to be an expression of the dominant bourgeois class in capitalism. Here we see both a critique of Hegel and Marx’s affinity to 18th century Scottish Enlightenment thinkers (Colás 2002: 37). Gramsci innovated on the Marx’s view and also based his conception of CS on the social and political occurrences in Italy and the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. Gramsci saw CS institutions as separate from state and economy yet still linked to the state and the economy by indirectly maintaining the hegemony of the dominant class (i.e. CS was bourgeois). Inherent in his writing though is the possibility for disrupting the existing hegemony by creating counter-hegemonic historic blocks within CS (Cohen and Arato 1992: 144-152; Colás 2002: 42; Cox 1983), which is where Robert Cox picks up Gramsci’s work (Cox 1983).

These views are consistent with earlier thought on CS in that they emphasise separation between CS and the state (enlightenment) and also show that the two are connected in important ways (Plato/Aristotlean view). On the other hand though, there were views that emphasised the importance of maintaining a separation between CS and the state, specifically pluralist views of CS.

Parsons viewed CS as separate from the economy and state and expounded that CS integrates differing social systems through institutionalising values and norms (Cohen and Arato 1992:118-119). Parson’s relates his views to the USA, which he thought was the best illustration of the benefits of integrative effects of CS in conditions of plurality. Tocqueville also used the American example to discuss CS. In his view CSOs place limits on the state, thereby ensuring individual freedoms and limiting state meddling in economic and personal affairs within societies (Cohen and Arato 1992: 38, 117; Ehrenberg 1999: xv). These two linked pluralist conceptions of CS and CSOs continue to hold much sway in contemporary mainstream thinking the subject.
These nineteenth and early twentieth century conceptions have in some respects emerged from those of the eighteenth century. They still place emphasis on the separation of state and society, with some conceptions seeing this separation as less distinct than others. These later views differ slightly from their Enlightenment predecessors in that they tend to place more importance on the role of associations within CS, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
APPENDIX B - A CLOSER LOOK AT TRADE DEPENDENCE ACROSS THE REGION

Chapter 1 illustrated patterns of trade dependence for the MDCs in aggregate. However, in terms of trade dependence, the situation across the MDCs has not been uniform despite relatively heavy trade dependence in all countries. For instance, Suriname’s trade dependency dropped more drastically than any MDC, diving from over 100% in the 1980s to a low of 42.6% in 1993 (but then increased to 77% in 2001). Also, Guyana’s trade dependence leaped substantially above that of all the MDCs from 1987 to 2002. These variations are shown in the following chart:

Figure 9: MDCs’ Trade Dependence: 1970-2002

Chapter 1 also presented composite figures on trade dependence for the region’s LDCs. The following chart maps these in disaggregated form. In looking at this chart we
see that, although levels of trade dependency varied widely amongst the LDCs, in all cases and in all years trade comprised more than 90% of GDP. This illustrates that the LDCs tend to be even more trade dependent than the region’s MDCs.

Figure 10: LDCs’ Trade Dependence: 1977-2002
APPENDIX C - A BRIEF CARICOM HISTORY

The movement towards CARICOM is commonly seen as a descendent of the British West Indies Federation, established in 1958 in light of post-World War II pressure for political independence and British desire to loosen its colonial grip (Lewis 1999: 2). The Federation created a Federal Government drawn from the ten member Caribbean islands. In its four-year life span, the Federation placed little emphasis on economic aspects of integration, as there were no economic changes in the region up until 1962 when the Federation ended (although there were plans for a Customs Union) (CARICOM 1999).

The Federation began to fizzle after Jamaica (the largest country and also a politically influential one in the group) decided, in a referendum on 21 September 1961, to discontinue membership. This action was replicated by Trinidad and Tobago in 1962. These two countries attained their independence in 1962 followed by other West Indian countries but the need for cooperation between the islands was still felt. Trinidad and Tobago proposed that a Caribbean Community should be formed upon its withdrawal from the Federation in 1962 (Lewis 1999: 15-18; CARICOM 1999), hence the view that “…its end [the British West Indies Federation] in many ways must be regarded as the real beginning of what is now the Caribbean Community” (CARICOM 1999).

Between 1962 and 1965 the eight islands of the Eastern Caribbean discussed coming together to create their own federation, but in 1965 Barbados pulled out to pursue its own independence (gained the following year) and further discussions within the Eastern Caribbean were futile (Lewis 1999: 17-18). Additionally, the Premiers of British Guiana (Guyana) and Barbados proposed the creation of a Free Trade Area in the Caribbean in July 1965 (Payne 1989: 65).

104 According to Lewis, Trinidad and Tobago proposed two options: that the eight Eastern Caribbean islands of the Federation take on unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago; and that a Caribbean Economic Community be formed.
In December 1965, at Dickenson Bay in Antigua, the Heads of Government of British Guiana, Barbados and Antigua signed an agreement to set up a Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) (Erisman 1992: 62; CARICOM 1998). However, there was little movement towards actually creating the free trade area, and it took private sector initiative of the Incorporated Caribbean Chambers of Industry and Commerce (ICCC) to give the necessary push.

In August 1967 a meeting was held in Georgetown, Guyana to discuss the FTA issue. At this meeting, government officials, academics (those commissioned to undertake feasibility studies) and leading West Indian businessmen agreed that the outline for CARIFTA was to be based on the Antigua-Barbados-Guyana agreement, with further suggestions being accepted in October of that year at the annual Heads of Government meeting (Erisman 1992: 62-63). CARIFTA materialised on 1 May 1968 when Antigua, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago became members, with Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent joining in July and Jamaica in August (CARICOM 1999). CARIFTA was primarily an economic arrangement and thereby not as politically charged as the Federation that went before it: “The CARIFTA agreement was a standard free trade agreement.” (Bennett 1999: 135).

Four years into the life of CARIFTA, at the seventh Heads of Government Conference in 1972, the leaders of member states decided to take their cooperative endeavours a step further due to dissatisfaction with trade creation for the LDCs within CARIFTA. For instance, MDCs accounted for 96% of intra-CARIFTA exports and 90% of imports in 1974 (Chernick 1978: 29-31). Added to these economic concerns, other political matters were important in coming to the decision to move beyond CARIFTA. Notably, countries saw the need for greater cooperation for broader development purposes and in approaches to international affairs (via foreign policy coordination) and incorporated these in plans to metamorphose CARIFTA (CARICOM 1998; Bennett 1999: 133-135; Lewis 1999: 17-19). Thus, at the 1973 Conference in Georgetown, Guyana, the Georgetown Accord was signed, committing the four MDCs in the group to
establish CARICOM by 1 August 1973 and the other signatories to join by May 1974 (CARICOM 1974: 1-3).  

105 “Progress in Caribbean Integration During 1973,” (Georgetown, Guyana: Caribbean Community Secretariat, 1974), pp. 1-3. This report states that the Georgetown Accord committed Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (the more developed countries in the grouping) to joining the Community on 1 August 1973 while the other less developed countries agreed to join in May 1974.
APPENDIX D - INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF CARICOM

The basic institutional structure of CARICOM was developed in its early days and resembled the intergovernmental structure of CARIFTA.

Initially CARICOM was divided into the Community and the Common Market. The Community was charged with implementing political and functional aspects of coordination while the Common Market dealt with trade issues, namely the CET and Free Trade. The two main centres of authority were the Conference of Heads of Government Conference and the Common Market Council of Ministers. In addition to these a Secretariat established (out of the Commonwealth Caribbean Secretariat of CARIFTA) to coordinate and facilitate CARICOM activities (Erisman: 70-72; Chernick: 11; Axline 78-79).

Since the 1990s the institutional makeup of CARICOM has changed somewhat; there is no longer the somewhat artificial division between the Community and the Common Market. The two main “organs” in CARICOM responsible for making decisions remain the same though:

1. **The Heads of Government Conference** in which each country has one vote and binding resolutions can only be made with unanimity. This body holds ultimate decision-making power and has the mandate for concluding treaties and overseeing relations with non-member states on behalf of CARICOM.

2. **The Council of Ministers** (previously Common Market Council of Ministers) comprises government representatives and meets throughout the year; usually convening prior to the HGC to work out the details of the issues to be considered by their heads of government. Both the HGC and the Council, as governmental representatives, may focus on national rather than regional interests if they wish.
Apart from these main organs there are now four others that did not exist at the time CARICOM was created:

- The Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP)
- The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED)
- The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR)
- The Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD) (CARICOM 2005a)

There are now also three assisting “bodies” dealing with:

- The Committee for Legal Affairs,
- The Budget Committee
- The Committee of Central Bank Governors (CARICOM 2005a)

The CARICOM Secretariat, which is independent of national officials and is not a decision-making organ, remains part of CARICOM. It now includes various specialised committees that deal with social and economic issues of importance.

In addition to these organs, bodies and the Secretariat there are CARICOM institutions such as the University of the West Indies and the Caribbean Development Bank that have been formed over the years, some prior to and some during the life span of CARICOM, with the Caribbean Court of Justice (established in 2005) being the most recent. In 1997 CARICOM leaders created a body floating somewhere between the Secretariat, Community institutions and the Council of Ministers in the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM), which was to develop and execute a negotiating strategy for trade issues in the region.

Nevertheless, the basic intergovernmental plus Secretariat structure adopted from CARIFTA remains but has expanded and evolved, as has CARICOM. The main point to
note though is that the institutional structure of the group continued to reflect the need for
decision making to be located in national governments. Autonomy was not ceded to any
overarching body that would coordinate economic policies within the region or towards
the outside world.
APPENDIX E - DOCUMENTS ON THE ST. LUCIA NWCT

The following 2 pages are copies of documents made available to the author by the CPDC.
St. Lucia
NATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE ON TRADE (NWCT)

Membership List and Mission Statement;
MISSION STATEMENT

The St. Lucia National Working Committee on Trade (NWCT) will work closely with civil society organizations to mobilize and build national level capacity of civil society to influence the negotiating positions of policy makers in trade negotiations.

The NWCT will also work closely with the Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC), to ensure that the collective views of the majority of St. Lucians are taken into consideration for discussions and interventions at the regional and international level.

**MEMBERSHIP (Representatives of Civil Society Organizations/groups)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flavia Cherry</td>
<td>CAFRA St. Lucia (Chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael McCombie</td>
<td>Trade Union Representative (Deputy Chairman) (St. Lucia Seamen Waterfront and General Workers Union, Sans Soucis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Harris</td>
<td>St. Lucia Industrial &amp; Small Business Association (P.R.O.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yhasmine Remy</td>
<td>CAFRA St. Lucia (Administrative Officer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deanne Deterville</td>
<td>National Commission on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliette Simon</td>
<td>St. Lucia Vendors Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawson Antoine</td>
<td>Gospel Hall (church) &amp; Father Michael Francis (Catholic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Flavius</td>
<td>Truth for the Final Generation (church)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Elva</td>
<td>National Council for the Disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alicia Baptiste</td>
<td>St. Lucia National Organization of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teddy Theobalds</td>
<td>Private Sector (Society of Qty. Surveyors &amp; Horticultural Society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy Mayers</td>
<td>President, St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silas Wilson</td>
<td>President, National Youth Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melissa Gilbert</td>
<td>CAFRA Junior League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarina Horscroft</td>
<td>Methodist Women's League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ipa IsaacLancia</td>
<td>Rastafarian Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isidore</td>
<td>Civil Society Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy Ellis</td>
<td>Mirror Newspaper*</td>
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</table>

NATIONAL LEAD COORDINATING ORGANIZATION: CAFRA St. Lucia Chapter
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>VENUE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thur Feb 12</td>
<td>Membership Meeting</td>
<td>6:30pm</td>
<td>ADDITIONS office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur Feb 19</td>
<td>Membership Training Workshop (Refreshments)</td>
<td>3:30-7pm</td>
<td>Bay Gardens Inn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri Feb 20</td>
<td>Networking Meeting &amp; Cocktails</td>
<td>7:00pm</td>
<td>Venue to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur Feb 28</td>
<td>Membership Meeting</td>
<td>5:00pm</td>
<td>ADDITIONS office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat. March 6</td>
<td>National Consultation (TRADE) - RE: Cotonou.</td>
<td>10:15-</td>
<td>Cultural Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed March 17</td>
<td>Lecture - (FTAA &amp; Cotonou Agreements)</td>
<td>6:00pm</td>
<td>Central Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri March 19</td>
<td>Workshop for School Principals</td>
<td>1:30pm</td>
<td>RLREPS Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat. March 27</td>
<td>Town Hall Meeting - Laborie Community Center</td>
<td>7:00pm</td>
<td>Community Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun March 28</td>
<td>Community Discussion about Trade</td>
<td>3:30pm</td>
<td>Choiseui Sec. School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat. April 3</td>
<td>Train the Trainers Workshop for Students</td>
<td>3:00pm</td>
<td>Central Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur Apr 8</td>
<td>Youth Trade Lecture - Anse-La-Raye Town Hall</td>
<td>5:30pm</td>
<td>Anse-La-Raye TH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thur Apr 15</td>
<td>Trade Workshop for Students - SALCC</td>
<td>9:00am</td>
<td>SALCC - Mome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thu Apr 15</td>
<td>Membership Meeting</td>
<td>6:00pm</td>
<td>Central Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 18-23</td>
<td>School Trade Lectures</td>
<td>Flexitime</td>
<td>Five Secondary</td>
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<td>Fri Apr 23</td>
<td>Trade Workshop</td>
<td>9:30-12pm</td>
<td>Bay Gardens hm</td>
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<td>Thu Apr 29</td>
<td>General Meeting</td>
<td>5:30pm</td>
<td>Venja Cor. OfficeG-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur May 6</td>
<td>Membership Training Session and Meeting</td>
<td>6:00pm</td>
<td>Bay Gardens Inn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thur May 20</td>
<td>Consultative Meeting with Government Trade</td>
<td>3:30pm</td>
<td>Ministry of Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon May 24</td>
<td>Workshop for Small Business Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>2-6pm</td>
<td>Auberge Seraphin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat June 5</td>
<td>General Membership Meeting</td>
<td>5:30pm</td>
<td>ADDITIONS office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat Jun 12</td>
<td>Workshop for Persons with Disabilities</td>
<td>10:30-4pm</td>
<td>Venue to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thur June 17</td>
<td>Town Hall Meeting - Gros-Islet Community</td>
<td>6:00pm</td>
<td>Gros-Islet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun June 20</td>
<td>Community Training Session - Multi-Purpose</td>
<td>4:30pm</td>
<td>Babonneau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sat Jul 3</td>
<td>General Meeting - Programme Review</td>
<td>6:00pm</td>
<td>ADDITIONS office</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Lecture for Vendors Association - to be confirmed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Trade Lecture for The Elderly - to be confirmed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Membership Social - To be confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX F - LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

• Barbados

Natalie De Caires
Private Sector Trade Team

Nalita Gajahdar
National Organisation of Women

Non-Attributable
Barbados Workers’ Union

Ruall Harris
Barbados Chamber of Industry and Commerce

Roosevelt King
Barbados Association of Non-Governmental Organisations

Dr. Lawson Nurse,
Private Sector Trade Team

James Paul
Barbados Agricultural Society

Non-Attributable
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade

Non-Attributable
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade

• St. Lucia

Non-Attributable
Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action – St. Lucia

Joseph Goddard
National Workers’ Union

Non-Attributable and off the record
St. Lucia Industrial and Small Business Association
Brian Louisy  
St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture

Michael Severin  
St. Lucia Agriculturalists’ Association

Andrina Simon  
St. Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association

Non-Attributable  
St. Lucia Ministry of External Affairs

- **Trinidad and Tobago**

Anthony Guissepi  
Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers’ Association

Vincent Cabrera  
National Trade Union Centre

Lawrence Placide  
Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Commerce and Industry, International Trade Negotiations Unit

Hazel Brown  
Network of NGOs of Trinidad and Tobago for the Advancement of Women

David Abdulluh  
Federation of Free Trade Unions

Non-Attributable  
Employer’s Consultative Association

Non-Attributable (Correspondence)  
Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Trade and Industry

- **Region Level Officials and CSO Umbrella Organisations**

George De Peana  
Caribbean Congress of Labour

Non-attributable  
Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC)

Shantal Munro-Knight  
Caribbean Policy Development Centre
Karen Ford-Warner  
Caribbean Tourism Organisation

Margaret Gill  
Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA)

Nelcia Robinson  
Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA)

Gerard Grenado  
Caribbean Conference of Churches

Gisele Mark  
Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce

Non-Attributable  
Caribbean Export Development Agency

Renwick Rose  
Windward Islands Farmers’ Association

Malcolm Spence  
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery

Zakiya Uzoma-Waddada  
Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development

Non-Attributable  
UNDP Barbados and the OECS
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--- (1996a). Communiqué Issued At The Seventh Inter-Sessional Meeting Of The Conference Of Heads Of Government Of The Caribbean Community, 29 February-1 March 1996, Georgetown, Guyana. Taken from: 

--- (1996b). Communiqué Issued At The Conclusion Of The Seventeenth Meeting Of The Conference Of Heads Of Government Of The Caribbean Community, 3-6 July 1996, Bridgetown, Barbados. Taken from: 


from:


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(Accessed: 11-07-06)


--- [b]. Vision 2020 - Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Taken from: http://vision2020.info.tt/about/default.asp (Accessed: 07-11-05)

--- [c]. Vision 2020 - Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Taken from: http://vision2020.info.tt/about/strategy.asp (Accessed: 07-11-05)

--- [d]. Vision 2020 - Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Taken from: (http://vision2020.info.tt/planning/interaction.asp (Accessed: 07-11-05)


